111th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

1st Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY: LIFE IN A 

RUSSIAN NEWSROOM

NOVEMBER 3, 2009

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington: 2012


big-LOGO.EPS
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515

202–225–1901

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov

Legislative Branch Commissioners

HOUSE 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA,

Co-Chairman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, MASSACHUSETTS

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER,

NEW YORK

MIKE MCINTYRE, NORTH CAROLINA

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, NORTH CAROLINA

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

JOSEPH R. PITTS, PENNSYLVANIA

DARRELL E. ISSA, CALIFORNIA

SENATE 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, MARYLAND,

Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND

TOM UDALL, NEW MEXICO

JEANNE SHAHEEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE

SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA

RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA

ROBERT F. WICKER, MISSISSIPPI

Executive Branch Commissioners

MICHAEL H. POSNER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MICHAEL C. CAMUN ̃ EZ, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States’ permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and 

meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian 

concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

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VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY: LIFE IN A RUSSIAN NEWSROOM

NOVEMBER 3, 2009

PARTICIPANTS 

Page 

Ron McNamara, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ............ 1

Kyle Parker, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .................. 2

Dmitry Muratov, Editor, Novaya Gazeta ...................................................................................... 3

Maxim Trudolyubov, Op-Ed Editor, Vedomosti ........................................................................... 4

Grigory Shvedov, Chief Editor, Caucasian Knot .......................................................................... 5

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VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY: LIFE IN A RUSSIAN NEWSROOM 

NOVEMBER 3, 2009

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington, DC

The briefing was held at 11 a.m. in room 1539, Longworth House Office Building, 

Washington, DC, Kyle Parker, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe, moderating. 

Panalists present: Ron McNamara, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe; Kyle Parker, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Dmitry Muratov, Editor, Novaya Gazeta; Maxim Trudolyubov, Op-Ed 

Editor, Vedomosti; and Grigory Shvedov, Chief Editor, Caucasian Knot. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. OK. The first [audio break] put the mic on [audio break] works. 

Test. OK. [Audio break.] Yes. Good morning. My name is Ron McNamara. On behalf of 

our Chairman, Senator Cardin, and our Co-Chairman, Congressman Alcee Hastings, I 

welcome you to today’s briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

regarding developments in the state of media in the Russian Federation. 

I’m joined by my colleague Kyle Parker, who’s serving as our analyst for developments in the Russian Federation. I’ll share a few brief opening remarks and then certainly recognize any members of the Commission or Members of Congress who might 

appear this morning, and then Kyle will do an introduction of our special guests today. 

As with all Commission briefings, there will be a full transcription of today’s proceedings posted on the Commission’s Web site, which is www.csce.gov. In addition, should 

time permit, we will entertain questions from the audience. We ask that you do keep your 

question succinct, provide your name for the transcription purposes, and any affiliation 

that you might have. So we’ll see if time permits. 

Ask Prime Minister Putin about the state of media in the Russian Federation, and 

he is likely to launch into a barrage of statistics that would make an apparatchik from 

the Soviet Planning Agency proud. But the numbers—this numbers game is merely a 

diversionary tactic aimed at overwhelming the bothersome questioner and masking the 

truth about the gradual yet steady erosion of independent journalism in Russia since his 

assumption of power a decade ago. 

This is not to suggest that there were not challenges during the tumultuous 1990s, 

a period which witnessed upheaval, as well as conflict that raged for much of the decade 

in the North Caucasus. Putin’s pursuit of what he and his Kremlin colleagues termed 

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‘‘managed democracy’’ has taken its toll on Russia’s democratic development and key elements of civil society, especially human-rights defenders and independent journalists. 

On one of its growing lists of victims, Anna Politkovskaya, once quipped, ‘‘my job is 

simple: to look around and write what I see.’’ Like her, scores of her colleagues, including 

Paul Klebnikov, have paid for their journalist pursuits with their lives. The harsh reality 

is that those who venture into sensitive subjects such as human-rights abuses or corruption run the risk of sharing that fate. 

Investigations are opened, rarely leading to arrest and even rarer, to prosecutions. 

At least a handful of Russian journalists have been killed in the past year alone, among 

them journalist and human-rights activist Natalia Estemirova. Meanwhile, Russia’s 

information space for independent media outlets—newspapers, radio and television—continues to shrink, with Russians increasingly migrating to blogs and other technologies to 

fill the void. 

We are fortunate to welcome to the Helsinki Commission today several of Russia’s 

remaining independent journalists, committed to pursuit of their professional activities in 

an often hostile and potentially dangerous environment. Before turning to my colleague, 

Kyle Parker, I did want to make a special note of appreciation to Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty for their assistance with the witnesses in today’s program. 

Just going back a little bit in my own involvement in the Helsinki process, when I 

was detailed to Vienna in the late 1980s, it was a rather strange dynamic. One of the 

issues I was dealing with was a free flow of information. Most of the western broadcasts, 

including RFE/RL’s broadcast, were jammed at the time, and there was an erstwhile RFE/

RL correspondent, Roland Eggleston, who dutifully covered the proceedings. 

But my Soviet colleagues refused to even sit down and to speak with him, so after 

each of our negotiating sessions I’d go over and speak to them, to the RFE/RL correspondent, when the Soviet colleagues would walk by. And I’d occasionally say, well, 

wouldn’t you like to give your own take on today’s discussions, or what have you? And 

they utterly refused and swore that there would never be a secession of jamming of foreign broadcasts. 

Well, we thankfully have moved significantly past that step, or phase, in development. However, there are troublesome aspects of the media environment today, and we 

look forward to the presentations of our expert panelists. So I’ll turn to Kyle Parker now 

for any additional comments and the introduction of our expert [audio break]. 

Mr. PARKER. Thank you, Ron. I would also add that the proceedings are being televised on the House TV system and will later be posted on YouTube for anyone who wants 

to review them or someone who might not be able to be here. We will start off with 

Dmitry Muratov, and the bios should be outside and also on our Web site, but just a few 

words. Mr. Muratov is the Editor-in-Chief of Novaya Gazeta, which is an independent 

Russian newspaper widely acclaimed for its critical and investigative reporting. Mr. 

Muratov helped found the newspaper in 1993 before taking its helm in 1995. 

In the mid-1980s, he was an Editor for Komsomolskaya Pravda. Mr. Muratov and his 

colleagues at Novaya Gazeta have been awarded numerous journalistic and human-rights 

prizes. In 2007 he was recognized by the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists for his ‘‘courageous fight for press freedom’’. Since 2000, Novaya Gazeta journalists 

Igor Domnikov, Yuri Shchekhochikhin, Anna Politkovskaya, and Anastasiya Baburova 

were killed in response to their work. 

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It’s certainly a great privilege and an honor to have you here today. I might note that 

Yuri Shchekhochikhin was well-known here in Congress and had taken part in a number 

of exchanges to the Open World Program in 1999 and, I think, 2000, and had a lot of 

friends among our commissioners and throughout the halls of Congress here. So we certainly are very happy to have you here and would welcome any remarks you have for us 

today, Mr. Muratov. 

Mr. MURATOV [through interpreter]. Right, thank you, well then, maybe let me say 

a few words about my perished friends and colleagues, and then I will say a few words 

about how we see the current situation in Russia from the vantage point of our newspaper. Yuri Shchekhochikhin was a member of the Russian Parliament, the state Duma, 

and was head of the Duma Committee on Combating Corruption. He was my best friend. 

He died in 7 days and he had no skin on him left. His hair was gone; in 1 week he aged 

30 or 40 years. 

The criminal investigation into Yuri’s death was launched only 6 years after the fact, 

after personal interference by President Dmitry Medvedev. Yuri was investigating a major 

smuggling affair that was involved in contraband and smuggling of weapons and furniture, and people who were able to stop this investigation are now in high places. They 

are senators and members of the Parliament, and their names are Bierkov and 

Kolesnikov. 

And in part, this investigation revealed a theft or loss of over 50 charges of highly 

toxic substances from the stockpiles of the KGB. This is what I learned from an investigator who was assigned to this case and who was hastily retired. And the medical charts 

and the medical records and history of Yuri Shchekhochikhin somehow also got misplaced 

or lost, and can you imagine this is a medical chart of a member of a national parliament 

who was diagnosed with a very rare disease, layoa disease, and somehow they can’t find 

these medical records? 

The body was exhumed and analyzed, and unfortunately, the results were inconclusive after all this time in labs, and again, this only became possible due to personal 

involvement and interference by the Russian president. The investigation of another 

crime, the murder of our beloved colleague Anna Politkovskaya, is slowly dragging. Somebody—and of course, nobody knows who that somebody is—issued a travel document, a 

passport, to the person who was suspected in the killing of Anna Politkovskaya, and he 

was able to leave the country after this person’s name was placed on most-wanted lists 

both in the country and by the INTERPOL. 

I sincerely hope that the current political leadership will have enough willpower and 

courage to pursue with the investigation to get some results, unlike the previous administration. And I would like to ask you a huge favor. In every meeting, in any encounter 

with representatives of Russian political establishment and government, please, bring up 

this meeting. Please ask these uncomfortable questions. Please try not to be too polite. 

You don’t have to be friends with murderers in order to be successful in trading oil and 

gas. Thank you. 

Mr. PARKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Muratov. We will certainly carry your 

suggestion back to our bosses, to our Commissioners in their meetings with senior officials 

of the Russian Government. And now, we will turn to Maxim Trudolyubov, who is commentary editor for Vedomosti, an independent business daily published jointly by the Wall 

street Journal and the Financial Times. He also co-hosts a weekly talk show on Russia’s 

Ekho Moskvy radio. Trudolyubov was awarded the 2007 Paul Klebnikov Integrity in JourVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:51 Sep 19, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 3194 Sfmt 3194 U:\WORK\110309.TXT KATIE
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nalism Fellowship and is currently at Yale University, where he was selected to participate in the 2009 Yale World Fellows program. Mr. Trudolyubov is on the Russian panel 

of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council. Mr. Trudolyubov, your remarks. 

Mr. TRUDOLYUBOV. A few words about the newspaper. It’s a national business daily, 

just like the Wall Street Journal here or the Financial Times. So we’re catering to a business audience and top politicians and younger people who are involved in pursuing 

careers in business. But we have an opinion page which is one of the very few in Russia. 

This whole concept of an editorial and opinion page is relatively new in Russia. We had 

to actually, in a way, present it, because Russia’s tradition of journalism doesn’t really 

divide between fact and opinion, and we had to, with time and effort, to explain and to 

show to our audience, even the educated and enfranchised audience that we have, that 

it’s an important concept of distinguishing between news and commentary on that—on 

fact. 

And I guess we’ve been relatively successful, although the whole concept is not really 

developing very well, simply because most media are under heavy control in all kinds of 

ways. But I think that an encouraging sign is that opinion and discussion is—has become 

really important, much more important than it used to be. We—our opinion page has got 

more visibility for the past year or two, which probably means that people start to think 

more and start to get—are getting more serious about crucial issues, because we are about 

crucial issues of policy, economic policy, freedom or speech, human rights. That’s what we 

cover. 

I strongly agree with Dmitry Muratov, and I just want to put my own voice behind 

this as well, because there’s not much that foreign, external forces may do for Russia’s 

situation. The freedom of speech is our internal—most of the things we’re dealing with 

are internal things. We have to deal with them ourselves. But when we are talking about 

people who’ve been killed on their duty, being journalists, investigators, it’s important 

that Russian authorities do not forget that people—that there are other people abroad 

who care about it, and they don’t forget that there is a system of coordinates, a system—

a moral compass, as it were, in the world, that good and evil are still considered good 

and evil. And that, I think, is very important for us who work in Russia and for people 

who are in journalistic profession in Russia to feel that this moral compass does exist. 

And we still have—we still live in the world where good is good and evil is evil. 

And one last thing is, that something that we noticed, the attitude is changing in—

obviously, the current administration in the U.S. is doing a lot new things, and many of 

the policies of the past administration are, of course, rejected. But when we see things 

like an editor of an American magazine advising—it’s probably—somebody heard there 

was a story, a magazine published in the United States by Conde ́ Nast, they had a—they 

carried the story on Vladimir Putin, and their internal law department, legal department, 

advised them not to carry that story in Russia. That’s GQ, that’s a magazine published 

by Conde ́ Nast. 

And so they asked, and they basically asked their Russian edition not to run that 

story on Putin in Russia, which is a case of an American company caring about their business in Russian and at the same time forsaking values of freedom of speech, which is one 

little example. It happens a lot with China, as you all know, because business is business. 

But this is something that’s troublesome and worrying for us who work in Russia, who 

deal with—who have to deal with a very hostile environment where people don’t—many 

people don’t understand what freedom of speech is for, simply because they are not 

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allowed to try and test the effect of media on—of media as a check on government. That’s 

the important cause that we are pursuing, and we need some support, sort of some moral 

support from the outside world. Thank you. 

Mr. PARKER. Thank you, Mr. Trudolyubov. And finally here we’ll turn to Grigory 

Shvedov, who’s Director of Caucasian Knot, www.kavkaz.memor.ru—yes? 

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE. Caucasian [inaudible] that will be easier, I think. That’s an old 

[inaudible] unfortunately. 

Mr. PARKER. Oh, that’s the whole URL, OK—an independent media service providing 

news and information on the Northern and Southern Caucasus. Mr. Shvedov is also 

Director of the Memo.Ru Information Agency, which focuses on new strategies of mobilizing public opinion and has directed numerous projects on social-marketing techniques. 

Since 1999 he’s held several posts with human-rights organizations, with Memorial, and 

is currently serving as a board member of the International Memorial and a representative in Memorial’s Moscow office. In 2002 through 2006 he supervised the organization’s 

regional network of 70 branches in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. 

He is also a previous witness at a hearing on Ingushetia we did a couple years ago. 

Mr. Shvedov is really probably the best there is inside or outside a government on 

current, reliable information on the turbulent North Caucasus, someone who is able to 

travel throughout these regions, which certainly is fairly complicated logistically and 

takes no small amount of courage these days, with the violence that takes place there. 

Someone who’s given—I think he had a recent 5-hour sit-down with the President of 

Dagestan, so a person with great access, and during the question-and-answer period, 

please, our topic is free media, but we have a world-renowned expert on the Caucasus, 

which is of great interest to this Commission. Please feel free to pose him some questions 

on that topic. Mr. Shvedov. 

Mr. SHVEDOV. Thank you very much. That was presented too complimentary. Thank 

you. While I will try to address the two main points now, I would like to share what’s 

going on in the Caucasus, most of all in the Northern Caucasus, and then I would come 

up with some specific ideas of what might be done on, first of all, on what’s going on right 

now. 

Unfortunately, we do see that from the time that we’ve been talking here in the 

hearings in June 2008, the situation in the Northern Caucasus became no less a challenge. It’s still the region which is very important to recognize not just a part of Russian 

Federation. It is a part of Russian Federation, but as a reason where human-rights violations are mass and cruel. It is a part of the world which really requests attention from 

the people in this room, in many auditoriums, because unfortunately, this region is a 

region where the rights of freedom to religion, the rights of the freedom of be free from 

torture, the rights—even such rights as a freedom to leave are violated. 

Our colleagues and friends have been killed. That was mentioned already Natalia 

Estemirova, the person who worked a lot in Memorial and provided enormous materials 

to Human Rights Watch for their reports. After that, two other activists of NGO have 

been killed in Chechnya. Just recently this month, a colleague of ours in Ingushetia, 

Maksharip Aushev, was killed, and we do see that this wave of killings is not something 

new happening in the region. We do see that—at least we in civil society in Russia—my 

colleagues publicly said that we share responsibility for their killings, because before 

those people in the NGOs had been killed, it was an enormous number of killings among 

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just regular people who have been announced to be a terrorist, who have been announced 

to be a rebel. 

In some cases, definitely they do unfortunately have terrorism rebels in the region, 

and in some cases terrorists and rebels have been killed, but even by the Russian laws, 

it’s not allowed to kill a person, even if he is seen as a terrorist or rebel. It should be 

the decision of the court, the person should be taken to prison. In many cases, before the 

killings increased that much this summer, we had seen dozens and dozens of people kidnapped and killed, and our responsibility, I believe in that, in being not much heard, not 

much understood how important it is, has now led to a situation that not even unknown, 

innocent people are tortured and killed, but also very well-known human-rights defenders, 

journalists, are targeted. 

And by saying this, I also want to put some sort of responsibility to our colleagues 

abroad. I was sharing this with our European colleagues. Right now, Sweden is chairing 

and talking to the officials in the European community on their level of responsibility. I 

believe we share responsibility for those people in the region who are brave enough to 

do their daily work, and I strongly believe that it is complicated not to see that they very 

much depend on how you react. If it is any public interest in your country, in Europe, 

toward what they do, because in our country, unfortunately, we have, as it was described 

by Dmitry, our approach toward journalists as it was described by Maxim, we do have 

a very specific approach toward those people. 

It would be unfair to describe the situation in the Northern Caucasus just from a 

point of view over human-rights violations, which are essential and very important. 

Unfortunately, from the spring 2009, we have an increase in terrorism. There are terrorist 

units which have not been active for a long period of time which now are. More than 14 

suicide bomber’s attacks have been implemented in different parts of the northern 

Caucasus, and we need to admit that these types of activities are growing. 

We need to admit that it is not the same situation in Chechnya and in other parts 

of Russia, although it is publicly announced as an equal by the local leaders. We need 

to admit that the real terrorism, not just a threat but reality, exists. Civilians are targeted, not only officials. We need to admit that from the statistics we have and also from 

statistics which are provided by the initiatives of the CSIS here in Washington, it’s quite 

clear that the number of attacks, the number of operations is only increasing from both 

sides, from the sides of rebels and terrorists and from the side of law-enforcement agencies. 

This all is showing another picture for us, the picture which is quite clear. There is 

a fight going on within the society. More and more people are involved in that. I could 

be finishing this main part of the picture of the region, it would be unfair to say that 

we don’t see any difference from what is going on right now toward what was going on 

during so many years. 

I do believe that there are new leaders and new policies implemented in the Northern 

Caucasus. There are leaders who are trying to fight against corruption, as the president 

of Ingushetia, and that’s the main reason he was attacked and almost killed. There are 

people who are trying to buildup the trust, develop a dialect in the region, as the leaders 

of Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan. There are such new approaches on the ground. 

The thing is, they are unfortunately not that successful so far. Although there are 

new type of officials who are trying to think in a different way, it would be optimism to 

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say a Medvedev-type of way. And let me share this optimism. Still, these new policies are 

not dominating in the region, and let me share very shortly these five main recommendations which actually have been published in an op-ed of Washington Post before the 

meeting of Medvedev and Obama, and I know our colleagues shared this recommendation 

with Mr. Obama. 

I strongly agree that perezagruzka, which was announced within the relationships 

between Russia and the United States, United States and Russia, should really include 

the civil-society sector. It is not just the governmental officials who are in relationships. 

It’s not OK that the governmental talks and relationships are monopolizing relationships 

between our country. 

I strongly believe that this perezagruzka should include much more look of grassroots 

initiatives, and we have very interesting results of the Obama-Medvedev civil forum, 

which was happening in July this year in Moscow. And unfortunately, Mr. Medvedev was 

not able to join it, but I strongly believe that if American NGOs as well as Russian ones 

would be interested in the real cooperation, new type of cooperation, not training from 

one side to another side, but a real partnership, that would be strongly developing our 

societies. 

The second is to really focus on the region which faces crises. You know all what was 

going on August—in the August between Russia and Georgia. We know all that there are 

mistakes which have been clearly done by the Russian officials, by the Georgian officials, 

but I want to address the issue of the frozen conflict regions. For many years, these situations have been seen as a frozen conflict. The international community almost gave up 

on it, and then finally, we got what we got that August. If there could be a more active 

role and if there was a more active role now in the Northern Caucasus, in the South 

Caucasus, more active role might prevent the serious crisis which we saw in the August. 

The third is to recognize the importance of media and a new type of participatory 

media. I strongly believe that old-fashioned strategies based on 20th-century approach 

[inaudible] that support the existing media, are not going to work. I strongly believe that 

in the countries like Iran, countries like Russia, even in China, the participatory media 

might really involve the society in discussing and dealing with problems. 

And the fourth recommendation comes through forming new strategies which would 

be facing these new types of developments of the 21st century. And we see the essential 

role of the Internet, and we see the essential role of a public engagement which might 

be so differently developing the situation in the region. Right now, I’m not talking about 

the political developments, I’m talking about social and public developments which we 

saw are coming up from people nowadays, in many cases, including the campaign we saw 

organized during elections in the United States. 

And the last one would be to focus on these approaches targeting people instead of 

targeting the decisionmakers, instead of targeting those who are really in charge of so 

many issues, in charge of so many issues. We have a chance always to work with people 

through social-marketing activities, through any other public initiatives, through different 

participatory media-Internet additions, through those additions which are really popular 

and read by the Russianers by certain target groups of Russianers. I strongly believe that 

idea of working with the values of a people. 

This word, value, was recently mentioned in the visit of Hillary Clinton to Moscow. 

Working with values of people is so essential. We are losing the battle for the public conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:51 Sep 19, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 3194 Sfmt 3194 U:\WORK\110309.TXT KATIE
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sciousness, at least in Russia. I strongly believe it is possible through op-eds, through 

independent coverage of the newspapers, through the Internet, through public-awareness 

campaigns to work with the people on the ground, not only with intelligentsia, not only 

with opinion-makers. There are those people who right now, unfortunately, are not so 

much pro-liberal or pro-democratic. 

I strongly believe that these points are important ones to the direction of a new 

approach, new strategy that we are lacking. I strongly believe in Russia, in many of the 

poor Soviet countries, I strongly believe, and in South Caucasus as well. And these new 

approaches, this is a challenge. Would we see any change, or are the changes just supposed to happen here in the United States? I strongly believe we need change as well over 

foreign policies of our colleagues here. Thank you. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Great, thank you very much, and we certainly appreciate the variety 

of issues and concerns that the panelists have raised. I did have one or two sort of general 

questions. There were mentions of President Medvedev, and I wonder if the panelists 

could point to any substantive changes in approach to the media under President 

Medvedev, compared with his predecessor, current Prime Minister Putin. 

And just picking up on this last point regarding new technologies and media and so 

forth, I wonder if you could also talk about the challenges that—sort of the typical Russian citizen who’s interested in expressing his or her opinion in utilizing these, and then 

also the adeptness of the authorities in utilizing these new technologies as well. I guess 

one of the thoughts that comes to mind is, we might see somebody with an iPod or some 

outward manifestation of a buy-in into some of these technologies, but I would suggest 

that those types of technologies can also be utilized to reinforce certain messages that 

some of the Russian leadership through organizations such as Nashi, which I see is pursuing lawsuits against foreign journalists in addition to domestic lawsuits that have been 

brought by a number of individuals. 

So mainly, the differences in approach between President Medvedev and his predecessor and now Prime Minister and these new technologies. The Commission did—Kyle 

organized a briefing about a week ago or so on the use of these new technologies, so if 

you could address that question in the context of the Russian Federation, that would be 

great. Thank you. 

Mr. MURATOV [through interpreter]. Well, I knew, I anticipated this question about 

Putin and Medvedev. Is it true that they are really different? And I sort of knew that 

we were going to go back to this old cliche from Hollywood movies about a good cop and 

a bad cop. I would say that one of them is a cop; the other one is not. [Laughter.] 

Mr. MCNAMARA. The other one is a lawyer. 

Mr. MURATOV [through interpreter]. And there’s been a visible change in public 

opinion recently, primarily reflected in the condemnation of Stalin and also in the personal statements made by President Medvedev that were addressed to the more advanced 

members of the society, to the small minority. That’s actually the big difference between 

them; whereas Medvedev has the courage and musters some courage to address the 

minority, traditionally, Prime Minister Putin appealed to the vast majority of Russians. 

But of course, the minority that President Medvedev is appealing to is defenseless. 

And regardless of the fact that none of the representatives of this minority were represented, registered or even victorious at the recent elections of October the 11th. But 

9

when we uncover facts of falsification of votes at the election, it is a good testament to 

the fear experienced by the majority. This is Ms. Merkel calling, I suppose. [Laughter.] 

Now, I’d like to say a few words about the new technologies. We were just sitting 

here and a few minutes ago, you could hear the sound of police sirens. I suppose that 

the German chancellor was passing by this building. You heard them, right? And just 

recently, we uncovered—in fact, there were actually hearings on the allegations that 

someone named Yusufov, a very well-known corrupt official, in Russia who unlawfully 

gained about 300 million euros, and he was trying to use this money to purchase old 

unused shipyards in Ms. Merkel’s homeland. 

And he’s a very typical Russian corrupt individual. He has got a vast collection of 

cell phones, about 4,000 of them. They are very expensive and very exclusive cell phones, 

and when he has a birthday party, Sir Elton John performs for 3 million, if I’m not mistaken—dollars. I investigated the activities of this gentleman jointly with Der Spiegel 

magazine, because leaders of Russia and Germany were compelled to discuss this issue 

of these murky dealings. And this is my message to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Parker: I 

think that within this framework of a Commission on Cooperation and Security in Europe, 

we have to establish a panel, a standing committee on fighting corruption in Europe. 

I suppose jointly, with our non-government organizations, other players such as 

Transparency International this Committee or Commission has to buildupon the best 

work of independent journalists in the United States and in Europe. There’s got to be a 

white paper or white book on corruption, because I believe that corruption is just one of 

the varieties of a party. This is stealing the future. And I love this saying that I like to 

quote. It was published in my newspaper. The elites in Russia want to rule like Stalin 

and to enjoy Abramovich’s lifestyle. But in order to prevent them from ruling like Stalin, 

we have to pursue them and persecute them so they wouldn’t enjoy the lifestyle of 

Abramovich. Thank you. 

Mr. TRUDOLYUBOV. Yes, I think we don’t have much time, but yes, it’s a very good 

way of putting it. I totally agree that corruption is—actually is one single, huge, problem 

that prevents Russia from developing as an economy and as a society. And I totally subscribe to an idea of an international cooperation in pursuing stories of Russian corrupt 

officials and well-connected businessmen who are trying to legalize their gain abroad in 

countries like the United States and in Western European countries. And I think that’s 

also—I wanted just to touch an idea of Russia having a minority of people who understand the country’s situation and who would be able to contribute to country’s development if they had a chance. 

Many of these people are my audience of my newspaper. We have a fruitful exchange 

of ideas all the time, and I feel their response and I see that that we have a lot of people, 

not just in universities of non-government organizations, but in government, people who 

work for all kinds of ministries, and Presidential administrations who actually understand 

very well the limitations of the current system of government. They just need coordination. They just need this feeling that change can be brought about. 

Russia currently is a society which doesn’t believe that change is possible. It’s a 

moral problem, in a way. It’s a social and moral failure to believe that a joint effort, collective action may be useful, may work. So we very much need, probably little, tiny successes 

on things like civil society achieving its success, press publishing something and achieving 

a result, however limited and local. That’s what we are working on and we need the moral 

support that foreigners can provide. Thank you. 

10

Mr. SHVEDOV. Well, while I am trying to briefly answer the questions you addressed, 

I believe the differences you’ve been pointing out within the new media approaches, I 

think, there are maybe not so many examples. We don’t see substantial change toward 

media in Russia. We don’t see how independent TV stations, radio stations are flourishing 

in Russia. We don’t see it. But we do see Mr. Medvedev talking to Novaya Gazeta, which 

is important, which is not only about material but also a very important message. 

We do see Mr. Medvedev publishing an article and opening a discussion about this 

article on ‘‘Gazeta.ru, Internet edition.’’ We do see other steps which do exist. They maybe 

are not about change of a strategy, but on the tactical level, we do see the differences. 

On the second issue you raised, the new technologies and if they might be utilized by 

what we call the dark part of a civil society, or it might also be not presented as a civil 

society at all, and that’s the issue of debate in academia. 

Yes, for sure, it exists. I need to admit, it’s much more effectively used by neo-fascists 

than by liberals. The 2.0 platforms, sure it is so. That’s why it is essential to put attention. That’s why it is essential to look toward these new approaches because those who 

want distribute hatred, those who want to distribute any kind of radical ideas, those who 

are terrorists, by the way, are very effective. 

Check out the YouTube. It’s not about some forgotten Russian Web sites. How much 

you have on YouTube with terrorist statements. How effective are terrorists’ leaders? 

They are using it a lot. That’s why it’s challenging for us. For sure they are effective. 

What about our ideas? What about our messages? First of all, do we have messages? I 

think we have a lack of messages, truly speaking, in Russia, toward the society. 

What actually we want to say? We can criticize officials. Yes, for sure, they are doing 

a lot of mistakes, but what’s the role of society? What do we have to say? This part of 

society, which, as was described maybe minority, what do we have to say? Not too much 

of a message as I personally see. Not too many good and effective leaders I see in YouTube 

and other Web sites and the social networks. That’s why it is a challenge. And you are 

right. But being right, you are giving another point for me, for us to focus on these new 

approaches, for us to really think how to work within society. They are the people. Thank 

you. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. We’ll now entertain any questions that you 

may have from the audience. There is a microphone set up in the room here. We do ask 

that you keep your question fairly to the point, and if you could start out with your name 

and any affiliation that you have. Thank you. 

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE. Please press the button. 

[Off mic.] 

QUESTIONER. Can you hear me now? OK. My name is Alex Van Oss. I teach at the 

Foreign Service Institute, the Caucasus area studies, and I was actually interviewed in 

June by Caucasus Knot when I was in Moscow. They got me by surprise. I have a bookshelf about twice as long as this desk, books about Chechnya, and they’re all grim 

reading. There’s only so much I can read. And therefore, I’m fascinated by Mr. Shvedov’s 

suggestion that there need to be new kinds of NGO projects that are perhaps different 

from this old style of journalism, which is very important to documents what happens. 

What kinds, specifically, of new projects might there be? 

Mr. SHVEDOV. Thank you very much for addressing this. I strongly believe that we 

live in an old frame in Russia specifically, but I think in many of our post-Soviet counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:51 Sep 19, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 3194 Sfmt 3194 U:\WORK\110309.TXT KATIE
11

tries, as well. But further than the human rights groups are trying to send as many messages, as many materials as they produce toward our Western colleagues, here in Washington, in Strasbourg, in Brussels and many other European and other capitals. Within 

this framework, it was expected that politicians here in the West would influence Russian 

politicians, and they would make our life better. 

It’s not working at all. It’s not working not only in 21st century, it was not working 

already in the end of 20th century. I strongly believe in new strategies which are focused 

on the Russianers are essential, which are focused on dealing with the people who live 

in their particular region are important. So that might be the social marketing strategies. 

That might be any kind of strategic communication strategies. We do have experience of 

this kind of projects, and we have data which shows they are effective; they are making 

difference, they are changing things. 

And for sure, that’s not about political change. Personally, I don’t believe in any 

Orange Revolution in Russia. I don’t think that’s a good scenario for the country. I don’t 

think the political issues are the most important ones for the country right now. I think 

the most important ones are these issues when we are working with social apathy. Then 

they are targeting people in order not only to criticize officials, but to act. Then they can 

act, then they can change things on the ground. And there are hundreds of cases like that. 

Be active, don’t slip. Just rise up and be active, because in many cases, it’s just a 

lack of information. In many cases, in the Caucasus as well, by engaging in solving the 

problem, by talking to officials, you can really do the change. [Audio interference.] Am I 

saying something bad? [Laughter.] 

Sorry. So I strongly believe that yes, we have very different points of view in many 

cases. But the apathy is a major threat, and a lot of different specific stories, and even 

the stories which are very unfortunate, with the people kidnapped and tortured, might 

be addressed. Then the society reacts properly. That’s the only kind of protests which are 

needed. It’s not only the meetings and the demonstrations that are needed. 

I strongly believe that—for example, in the Caucasus, we do lack very much that 

public discussion, debate. There are so many discussions and so many debates coming 

back to the question you raised on the hatred-based Web sites and discussions how bad 

are Ossetians in Ingushetia, how bad are Ingushetians in Ossetia. And so many of the 

discussions are not taking place, if we are talking about the future. What really can 

people do in order to change things in their region? So these specific scenarios, these specific projects, I think, might come up from the people on the ground, and we do have such 

people. So we do need just a little more of work here. 

In the peoples’ conscious area. In the area of specific projects which might make a 

difference, even if it is a little difference. Thank you. 

[Audio interference.] 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Perhaps we will hold off until the bells. 

[Audio interference.] 

Mr. MCNAMARA. I think you’re good to go. 

QUESTIONER. All right. Good afternoon. My name is Karen Fisher. I’m from APCO 

Worldwide here in DC. I’m wondering, given that the state owns or controls all of the 

media outlets in Russia, when you have a situation with a highly publicized case, such 

as that of Yukos Oil CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, to what extent does the press become 

12

part of the Kremlin’s strategy to fulfill its political agenda on top of the manipulations 

of the legal and judicial system against those like Khodorkovsky? 

INTERPRETER. Could you repeat the question, please? I’m sorry. 

QUESTIONER. Oh, I’m sorry. Given that the state owns or controls most of the media 

outlets in Russia, when you have a situation with a high publicized case, such as that 

of Yukos Oil CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, to what extent does the press become part of 

the Kremlin’s strategy to fulfill its political agenda on top of the manipulations of the 

legal and judicial system? So utilizing the press and media as part of their means to——

Mr. MCNAMARA. Perhaps we’ll take another question. 

QUESTIONER. OK, no problem. Thank you. 

INTERPRETER. [In Russian.] 

QUESTIONER. Good afternoon. My name is Valery Zutsev. I’m freelance writer covering the Caucasus region. I have a question for Dmitry Muratov and Grigory Shvedov. 

The one for Mr. Muratov—you’ve mentioned that Medvedev and Putin are not exactly the 

same, there are a lot of differences. You’ve mentioned Medvedev’s recent statements. But 

what about actions? Don’t you think that it is possible that these statements are just 

signs that do not lead to any action, any real practical thing? What do you think about 

this? 

And a couple of questions for Grigory Shvedov. There has been a speculation that the 

killings in the Caucasus will stop after the fight in the Kremlin will stop. What do you 

think about this speculation? Do you think it is true or not? I am particularly referring 

to, for instance, the opinion that President Yevkurov was appointed by President 

Medvedev—sorry about two Presidents—in spite of Putin’s skepticism, to say about this. 

And another question is about rise of violence in North Caucasus following the war 

in Georgia in August 2008. Do you think there is a connection between the war in August 

last year and the rise of violence in North Caucasus? Thank you. 

Mr. MURATOV [through interpreter]. I will be able to answer these questions only in 

part, not in full. Sorry. In a very short time I will have a personal interview with Mikhail 

Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev. The court gave permission for such an interview. And 

right now, preliminary through the defense attorneys who are discussing possible 

approaches to that interview. In these negotiations, Khodorkovsky is referencing his own 

article that was published in Maxim’s paper where he is saying, well, we shouldn’t really 

wade or interpret the situation. We need to see this majority that is willing to modernize. 

He calls it a modernizing majority of innovating majority. These are, by few million 

people—3 or more million people who would be able to embark on this huge task to modernize and reform the society in Russia. 

And this article, I think quite justly, resonated with a lot of readers. I think that 

eventually the Russian society should take full ownership of its future. It should take 

charge in the forming and shaping the agenda and the plans. And it might seem bizarre, 

but looks like Khodorkovsky and Medvedev were reading from the same page. It’s a very 

interesting story. 

Mr. SHVEDOV. Thank you for questions. On first run, if media is part of Kremlin 

agenda, I’m just not able, actually, to answer. I don’t know where Kremlin agenda, but 

I strongly believe that there is need in the information, for example, from the Caucasus. 

So there is need to know what’s going on. Then you have so many channels which are 

13

transmitting the pictures which are not showing the essence of what is going on. You 

really don’t know what’s going on in the region. 

So I think in many cases, those independent pages and papers which exist are 

showing that there is an understanding that there is a need for facts, which would be 

provided not by PR companies, which are collecting, monitoring, sending and actually, in 

many cases, not what is really going on, but a real mirror. 

On the questions of Valery Zutsev, definitely Yevkurev, President of Ingushetia, I 

think very much implements the different task from what was done prior to his job in 

this region. Definitely he implements different policies, not Putin’s that much. But at least 

we see these in his actions. But if the killings would stop by the decision of the Kremlin, 

that is really a very open question. I strongly believe that there is a role which is essential 

of Kremlin in what is going on in the Northern Caucasus. But it’s already too late to 

expect any other bureaucrats to make a decision, sign a piece of paper in any other tables, 

and then overnight everything would change. 

You probably remember, just recently there have been talks between Kadirov and 

Zakayev. And Zakayev filed a statement that from now on, no more violence in Chechnya. 

Guess what? Nothing changed. Zakayev is certainly not much more influential than Russian officials in the Kremlin, but unfortunately, my feeling, and the information I’m gathering in the meetings which are off the record—just last Monday I was in Dagestan, and 

many of the remote places of this huge republic—were giving me a feeling that there are 

so many people who are ready to fight, who are ready to organize terrorist attacks, who 

believe in things which is not so easy to understand, but strongly believe in these things. 

And none of the decisionmakers would influence that. But that’s already the good 

thing, that there is a recognition, in a couple regions of the Northern Caucasus, excluding 

Chechnya, that there is need to talk, maybe not to those people who commit terror 

attacks, but to huge number of their supporters. So the second—and you also mentioned 

on Yevkurov, that he was—I would really say that I strongly think that he was attacked 

not because of the developing terrorism in the region. He was attacked because of his fight 

with corruption, which shows on what Maxim described here earlier, to what extent it is 

a real problem, that the president of a regional republic might be attacked just due to 

such a reason. 

And the second issue of the rise of the violence, which is linked to the crisis which 

we had in August—we had the war. Yes, I think then we have in the region, like the 

Caucasus, military strategy implemented that certainly leads to the further crisis and further violence. I won’t answer to make a point or that further developments in the 

Northern Caucasus, or the whole approach of separatism. For many years separatism was 

not any more an issue. Chechnya was leaving, and leading from this discussion because 

of lack of leadership and lack of real examples, and many other reasons of responsibility 

of a separate state. 

But recognizing South Ossetia, recognizing the Abkhazian people—not a region, but 

people—as those who have the right to an independent state, the Russian state gave a 

huge credit to literally dozens of those people in the small nations which are, as South 

Ossetia of 30 or 40,000s of people, to talk about possible independence from Russia or 

independence from the region they live in. And that’s really very much developing the 

whole idea of a violence, and that’s very much the solution which leads to the dead end, 

unfortunately. 

14

So I think you, Valery, also wrote one of the articles about Ossetians, as well, in the 

Northern Ossetia, to what extent this is an issue even for North Ossetia to talk about 

the Ossetian state. So very much I believe today the South Caucasus and the Northern 

Caucasus are linked to each other, and the whole approach, including the approach I see 

here, United States and in Europe, in dealing separately—these are one country, these 

are another country—approach we know from ancient Rome. 

This approach is not going to be successful, because unfortunately today, the terrorists, the rebels, those who promote hatred, they are very much in context, they are very 

much communicating with each other. Those who promote different scenarios to actually 

develop a community which called now Imarat Kavkaz—they certainly, in context, and 

they certainly work together and they are popular among the population in those regions. 

So by forgetting that this whole region needs some different messages, and different 

policies and different steps than the military tanks, and the soldiers marching, we are 

going to the direction which is not going to be peaceful. Thank you. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. If you could identify your——

QUESTIONER. Yes, my name is Jaroslaw Martyniuk, and I work for Intermedia 

Research Institute, and my question to the panel is twofold: First of all, Intermedia’s and 

other surveys have shown that the majority of Russian are quite happy with the media 

that they have. In fact, about two-thirds to 70 percent say they are content with what 

they have. How does one explain this attitude? 

The second part of my question concerns also some survey results. Surveys show 

there is a very high level of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Russia. For example, only onethird of Russians have a favorable attitude of Ukrainians, while in Ukraine the opposite 

is true: 90 percent have a favorable attitude toward Russians. And as you aware, President Medvedev wrote a letter to Yushchenko accusing him anti-Russian policies, which 

include the desire to join NATO, discussion of the 1933 famine-genocide, et cetera. This 

undoubtedly has fueled, contributed to the anti-Ukrainian attitudes. So my question is 

this: to what extent does this represent genuine attitudes of Russians? Or is this largely 

or mostly a product of Russian media? Thank you. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. If we could have another questioner, given our limited time—yes, 

please. 

QUESTIONER. Nadia McConnell, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation. I apologize if this was covered in the hearing, but I was attending a meeting on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We 

and several other organizations operating here, like the Moldova Foundation, the Baltic 

and Georgians, believe that we need to address some of these issues on a regional basis. 

And by region, we mean the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Sea region. And to that end, we’re 

also interested in creating a network of information and media sources in this region. My 

question is, do you have cooperations with media organizations in this region, and if so, 

to what extent, or what would you like it to be in the future? 

Mr. MCNAMARA. I think we have time for one additional question, which will be the 

final question, and then we can have about seven or so minutes for our panelists to 

respond. If there are any other questions? 

QUESTIONER. Thanks. My name is Alex Maffest. I’m an intern for Senator Cardin. 

This is not really a question about conventional media, but it’s a question about, do Russians have access to social networking sites such as Twitter or Facebook? That these were 

15

quite influential in the Iranian elections—they give access to the public for a source of 

identity. 

Mr. MURATOV [through interpreter]. I will answer only one of the questions that were 

posed. That was Mr. Martyniuk’s question about the sentiment toward Ukraine. I wasn’t 

aware of this survey. If they ran this survey, I suppose they polled the owners of the TV 

channels. And I can confidently state that the majority of Russians don’t watch official 

Russian TV channels. If they do watch them, they do it just for one simple reason: They 

want to understand what the officials want them to think. What I know for sure is, it 

was actually proven by one of our reporters that during the commercials breaks, you get 

a better idea of the Moscow sewage system for wastewater. That way our TV industry 

saves our water sewage sector. And therefore I’m very thankful to our TV for that. 

Mr. TRUDOLYUBOV. As for the Russians being content with the kind of media they 

have, well, the question is—I think—well, yes, our audience is limited. Even Novaya 

Gazeta, which is a much larger publication than us, we are about—let’s say 100,000, 

150,000. That’s our readership. But we are, again, a business newspaper and our op-ed 

page is widely read, but read mostly by people who are among the minority that’s been 

mentioned here already, people who are already enfranchised, people who understand 

what’s going on. So we are not converting them, in a way. 

I think that there is a certain problem of people who don’t know that they don’t 

know. That’s the problem. They may become a lot more active if they would become aware 

of the scale of corruption, the scale of mismanagement and inefficiency that is represented 

by the current government. And it’s our challenge. It’s the challenge that we are facing. 

The publications that are free and that are quality newspapers—they are, of course, limited in scope. 

But whenever possible—and new media is a great help in that sense—whenever possible, our message is being carried further down the line for people who don’t read quality 

newspapers, who don’t live in Moscow, who are not involved with businesses. But in the 

end, the message gets through, and I think that new media will be a great help more 

and more in distributing. 

And also about the social networks—yes, social networking is a growing area. Lots 

of people are more and more connected, and that’s where—again, quality press has a role 

to play, because as anywhere in the world, networking is developing but quality journalism is not. Quality journalism is suffering because of the market situation, because of 

the business model that’s failing, because of the advertising-based model for financing. 

Quality journalism is in crisis everywhere in the world, and it will be in crisis in Russia 

very soon. We are lagging behind in that sense, but we will reach that stage where we 

will have to face this. 

So networking is developing, but the message that they are carrying is the message 

that we are responsible for. So we just have to continue doing what we are doing, and 

I think that’s a tipping point with—somewhere would be reached, when people just wake 

up to the scale of corruption and inefficiency that is prevailing currently in Russia. 

Mr. SHVEDOV. Well, I can’t address the Ukrainian question, but on the first comment, 

I would say that from the data I know, the level of mistrust, the level of belief to the 

Russian press—that was surveys which have been done by Levada Analytic Center, in 

cooperation with Sarah Mendelson—are showing that Russian media is not something 

which satisfied Russianers. It’s also very much a debate to what do we call the media. 

16

You know, in the United States, a lot about infotainment. I mean, in the United States 

it’s as well an issue. In many other countries. 

If we are talking about the Russian TV stations, if we are talking about broader 

access of the Russianers to the media, I think we are facing the mistrust, misbelief, the 

Internet, certainly and the high quality few newspapers is a different case. Maybe a 

couple a magazines. So overall I don’t think the Russian population is happy, although 

that’s quite clear that infotainment is very popular. And with this the population is much 

more happy than we think. 

On the issue you raised about networking and the cooperation with local sources, certainly, that’s something in our work we do very much use and I think that that’s something which is very much needed. The question is, to what extent this is a long-term 

approach, to what extent it is developing and supporting those who exist there, and independent from any groups of interest, because in the Caucasus, including Karabakh and 

many other South Caucasian regions, we do have very strange terms, what is independent 

media. 

If media—specifically newspapers or websites—is dependent on opposition, is 

dependent on some political figures which are in opposition right now, oh, that’s independent. I would call independent media those which are professional, those which are 

not linked to any other political or business frames, and those, I think, are very much 

lacking the cooperation, and cooperation, in general, is very much needed. But what kind 

of cooperation? I strongly believe in support and development of media. Not only support, 

but also professional development, which is addressing the standards which were just 

right now eliminated. 

And the last one, yes, certainly, we have access to the social networks. The question 

is, to what extent it makes a difference, to what extent it is used as a social engagement 

tool, or it is used just for spending time, just for communication without any meanings, 

without any leverage for the society. I strongly think that in Russia, it is not used enough 

to influence. 

I was just in another meeting, giving an example of some articles we published, 

which came fully from a social network, exchanges and debates which are going on, and 

then people stopped to sit in this computer-friendly communication but just got off to the 

streets to say what they wanted to say in Lidi Kavkaz. We have many examples of this 

kind of things happening, then the social networks are playing the essential role. I think 

much more should be done by the civil society in Russia and in many other countries in 

the Southern Caucasus, because that’s a challenge to us. Not too many things are done 

by the civil society to lead in these social networks. That’s why other people are leading 

there. Thank you. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. This concludes this briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We definitely appreciate the presence of the 

experts today, and certainly wish you all the best as you return to the Russian Federation. As I have indicated, a full transcription and other materials related to today’s 

hearing will be posted on our Commission’s Web site: www.csce.gov tomorrow within 24 

hours. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the briefing ended.] 

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