United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

Comptroller General

of the United States

 

Decision

Matter of: Science Applications International Corporation

File: B-407105; B-407105.2

Date: November 1, 2012

Gregory H. Petkoff, Esq., D. Joe Smith, Esq., Matthew L. Haws, Esq., Carla J. 

Weiss, Esq., Edwin O. Childs, Esq., and Leslie Harrelson, Esq., WilmerHale LLP, 

for the protester.

Carl J. Peckinpaugh, Esq., and Shaun C. Kennedy, Esq., for Computer Sciences 

Corporation, an intervenor.

Maj. Brent A. Cotton and Max D. Houtz, Esq., Defense Intelligence Agency, for the 

agency.

Tania Calhoun, Esq., and Edward Goldstein, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, 

GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Protest that agency improperly evaluated awardee’s technical proposal is 

sustained where the record shows that the agency did not reasonably consider the 

awardee’s proposed technical approach, which included using “large numbers” of 

uncleared personnel to perform the solicitation’s requirements.

2. Protest that agency failed to perform a reasonable price realism evaluation is 

sustained where the solicitation provided for evaluating offerors’ prices for realism, 

the awardee’s price proposal indicated that its low price was due to a particular 

technical approach, and the agency did not reasonably consider this technical 

approach in conducting its price realism assessment.

DECISION

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), of Chantilly, Virginia, 

protests the decision by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to award a task 

order to Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), of Falls Church, Virginia, under 

task order request (TOR) No. HHM402-12-R-0087, for intelligence analysis support 

of the ORION Analytical Capability (ORION O2

) program. SAIC primarily argues 

that DIA improperly evaluated technical and price proposals and made an improper 

source selection decision.

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The decision issued on the date below was subject to 

a GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has 

been approved for public release.
Page 2 B-407105, B-407105.2 

We sustain the protest in part and deny it in part. 

BACKGROUND

The ORION project establishes a high density computing capability and analytical 

tool for DIA analysts. The project is an integration effort to deploy a cloud-enabled 

data layer for the Department of Defense Intelligence Information Systems 

(DODIIS) that improves the handling of data for classified users.1 SAIC was 

awarded a non-competitive task order under DIA’s Solution of Information 

Technology Enterprise (SITE) multiple-award indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity

contract to develop the project. Approval was granted for this follow-on contract to 

achieve operational status. Contracting Officer’s (CO) Statement at 1-2. 

The TOR, issued May 15, 2012 under the SITE contract, contemplated award of a 

fixed-price, level-of-effort task order to be performed over a 1-year base period and 

up to two 1-year option periods. TOR Statement of Objectives (SOO) at 7. The 

overall requirement is to secure the personnel and materiel needed to ensure that 

the ORION O2 program is successfully and seamlessly integrated onto the ORION 

Data Layer. Id. at 2. The TOR set forth three objectives: systems maintenance, 

system enhancements, and other direct costs (ODCs). The agency estimated the 

price range of the acquisition as between $145 and $155 million based on its 

available budget. Amend. No. 1, at 5; CO Statement at 3.

Award was to be made to the firm whose offer was found to be the best overall 

value, considering two evaluation factors, technical/management and price. TOR 

Instructions, at ¶ 3. The technical/management factor was significantly more 

important than price; the importance of price in the award decision was to increase 

as the relative differences in technical/management ratings of offers decreased. Id. 

Technical/management proposals were to be rated outstanding, good, acceptable, 

and so on. The rating was to be based on DIA’s determination of the degree to 

which the proposal satisfied the requirements of seven equally important subfactors: 

(1) teamwork; (2) technical capability; (3) innovation and vision; (4) program 

management; (5) architecture maintenance; (6) comprehensive presence; and 

(7) past performance. After evaluating proposals, DIA was to notify offerors of their 

weaknesses and/or deficiencies, hold oral presentations, and evaluate the 

presentations against the same criteria as the written proposals. Id.

For each period of performance, the TOR’s price schedule included a contract line 

item number (CLIN) for the total level-of-effort and a CLIN for ODCs for which a 

plug figure of $3 million was supplied. TOR at 3-4. Proposed prices were to be 

determined by multiplying the unit quantities by the proposed unit prices for each 

 

1 Orion Program Brochure at 1, available at http://www.orionprogram.com. 
Page 3 B-407105, B-407105.2 

CLIN, and by totaling the amount for each period of performance. TOR Instructions 

at ¶ 7. Offerors were also required to provide narrative price proposals and to 

submit labor rate and ODC information on a pricing template. Id. 

With respect to the evaluation of price proposals, the TOR stated:

The Government will evaluate the price quotation to determine price 

reasonableness of the proposed total evaluated price. . . . Each 

proposal will be evaluated to determine whether the government 

considers the proposed price to be compatible with the scope of effort, 

[is] not unbalanced, and [is] neither excessive nor insufficient for the 

effort to be accomplished. Prices are unbalanced if they are 

significantly overstated or understated in relation to the actual cost of 

the work. This may be grounds for eliminating a proposal from 

competition on the basis that the offeror does not understand the 

requirement. The government will evaluate price reasonableness in 

relation to the IGCE or any other information used as a basis of 

comparison. 

Id. at ¶ 4.

Regarding any trade-off analysis performed to determine the best value to the 

government, the TOR stated that the critical factor in making such a tradeoff was 

not the spread between technical ratings but, rather, the significance of that 

difference; that is, what the difference might mean in terms of performance and 

what it would cost the government to take advantage of it. Id. at ¶ 3.

DIA received proposals from [DELETED] firms, including those submitted by SAIC 

and CSC. A source selection evaluation board (SSEB) evaluated 

technical/management proposals, and price proposals were evaluated by the CO, a 

contracts specialist, and a price panel.2

 All offerors were retained in the competitive 

range and sent discussion items for their written responses. DIA held oral 

presentations with each firm, and received final proposal revisions. The SSEB 

conducted a final consensus evaluation based on these inputs. The final evaluation 

results were as follows:

 

2 DIA states that the initial CO departed in June, after concluding the price analysis, 

at which point the source selection authority (SSA) assumed the CO’s duties. DIA 

Legal Memorandum, at 2. The statements submitted in response to this protest, 

however, are signed by the SSA acting as the CO. Consequently, the record, in 

some instances, is not entirely clear as to which CO the CO’s Statements refer.
Page 4 B-407105, B-407105.2 

SAIC CSC

Technical/Management GOOD GOOD

Teamwork 1 Significant Strength 1 Significant Strength

Technical Capability 2 Significant Strengths 1 Significant Strength

Innovation and Vision 2 Significant Strengths 2 Significant Strengths

Program Management 1 Strength 1 Strength

Architecture Maintenance 1 Strength 1 Strength

Comprehensive Presence 1 Strength 1 Strength

Past Performance 1 Strength 1 Strength

Price $134,269,366 $110,692,127

AR, Exhs. 10.2 and 10.3, Final SSEB Consensus Reports for CSC and SAIC, 

respectively; Exh. 11.1, Price Panel Report.

The SSEB’s final report summarized its qualitative findings for each proposal. For 

CSC, the SSEB began by noting that the firm’s “minimal resources” for data 

engineers could pose a risk that might need to be addressed if CSC were awarded 

the task order. The SSEB stated that CSC should be prepared to provide up to 

[DELETED] additional data engineers in order to successfully complete the task to 

standard and maintain schedule. AR, Exh. 10.1, Final SSEB Report, at 1. The 

price panel report described the agency’s price analysis.

The CO (the SSA) and the contracts specialist prepared an award recommendation 

memorandum based on these reports. The memorandum summarized the SSEB’s 

findings, including its identification of a potential risk in CSC’s technical proposal 

stemming from CSC having proposed a relatively low number of data engineers. 

AR, Exh. 12.1, Award Recommendation Memorandum at 7. Regarding price, the 

memorandum indicated that, if award were made to CSC and additional data 

engineers were needed, the cost impact to the government would be minimal 

because the increased level of effort would only be needed for the first year. Id. at 

12. The memorandum found the proposals technically equal. In light of CSC’s 

lower price, the memorandum recommended award to CSC. Id. at 15-16.

The SSA’s award decision acknowledged the reports prepared by the SSEB and 

the price panel, as well as the award recommendation memorandum, and 

concluded that CSC offered the best value to the government. AR, Exh. 12.2, SSA 

Award Determination Memorandum, at 3. SAIC filed this protest after receiving a 

debriefing. SAIC primarily argues that DIA improperly evaluated 

technical/management proposals; failed to conduct a price realism analysis of 

CSC’s proposal; and failed to conduct a reasonable source selection decision. 

SAIC also argues that the solicitation failed to accurately reflect the scope of the 
Page 5 B-407105, B-407105.2 

agency’s requirements. For the reasons discussed below, we sustain the protest in 

part and deny it in part.

3

 

DISCUSSION

Technical/Management Evaluation

SAIC argues that CSC should have been assessed a weakness based on the fact 

that it proposed to perform the requirements using large numbers of uncleared 

personnel--personnel without security clearances. The protester also argues that 

DIA failed to reasonably consider the risks associated with the fact that CSC 

proposed “minimal resources” for data engineers. SAIC contends that, if DIA had 

properly evaluated these areas, CSC’s proposal would have been rated no higher 

than “acceptable.” SAIC also argues that DIA improperly evaluated its proposal 

because its strengths should have been significant strengths and, as a result, its

proposal should have been rated “outstanding” under the technical/management 

factor.

The evaluation of an offeror’s proposal is a matter within the agency’s discretion. 

VT Griffin Servs., Inc., B-299869.2, Nov. 10, 2008, 2008 CPD ¶ 219 at 4; IPlus, Inc., 

B-298020, B-298020.2, June 5, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 90 at 7, 13. In reviewing a 

protest of an agency’s evaluation of proposals, our Office will examine the record to 

determine whether the agency’s judgment was reasonable and consistent with the 

stated evaluation criteria and applicable procurement statutes and regulations. 

Shumaker Trucking & Excavating Contractors, Inc., B-290732, Sept. 25, 2002, 2002 

CPD ¶ 169 at 3. While we will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency, 

we will sustain a protest where the agency’s conclusions are inconsistent with the 

solicitation’s evaluation criteria, undocumented, or not reasonably based. DRS 

ICAS, LLC, B-401852.4, B-401852.5, Sept. 8, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 261 at 4-5. For 

the reasons discussed below, we find that DIA unreasonably evaluated CSC’s 

proposal, but have no basis to question its evaluation of SAIC’s proposal. 

SAIC argues that DIA improperly failed to consider CSC’s proposal of “large 

numbers” of uncleared personnel as a risk or weakness because it indicates that 

the firm does not understand the ORION program. SAIC acknowledges that the 

TOR did not prohibit offerors from proposing a mix of cleared and uncleared 

 

3 Because we sustain SAIC’s challenge of the agency’s evaluation, and recommend 

that DIA make a new source selection decision based on the results of a new 

evaluation, we need not address SAIC’s arguments concerning the source selection 

decision. Additionally, although our decision does not address all of SAIC’s 

arguments, we have fully considered each of them and conclude that the remaining 

arguments do not provide a basis to sustain the protest. 
Page 6 B-407105, B-407105.2 

personnel. However, SAIC asserts that where, as here, the awardee will need

access to a significant level of [DELETED] systems, materials, and information, it 

was incumbent upon the agency to consider CSC’s extensive use of uncleared 

personnel to perform the work.

SAIC explains that the ORION program is deployed on a [DELETED] network and is 

intended for use by cleared personnel. The [DELETED] systems at issue here all 

reside at [DELETED] government facilities and the awardee will be required to 

perform work on such systems at such sites routinely. SAIC states that, while 

uncleared personnel could participate in early development activities, only fully 

cleared staff would be permitted to participate in integration, test, and deployment 

activities on a [DELETED] system. DIA does not contest SAIC’s characterization of 

the program’s [DELETED] nature. DIA’s only response, which appears to agree 

with SAIC, is that part of the task order can be conducted outside of a [DELETED] 

facility prior to introduction of the systems into the [DELETED] networks. Id. The 

record, as discussed below, shows that DIA believed CSC’s use of “large numbers” 

of uncleared personnel was an issue it needed to consider, but it also shows that 

DIA failed to meaningfully consider the matter. 

In its price proposal, CSC indicated that it intended to use “large numbers” of 

uncleared personnel in performance of the contract. Specifically, its price proposal 

read as follows: 

By using a large numbers of [uncleared] individuals in our proposed 

solution, CSC is able to propose skilled individuals without having to 

include the salary premiums normally associated with cleared

personnel in our proposed price. [DELETED] 

CSC truly believes that using highly qualified [uncleared] personnel 

has enabled us to propose the lowest executable price without 

introducing additional risk to the ORION Analytics effort.

AR, Exh. 7.2, CSC Initial Price Proposal at 1-2.

CSC’s price proposal does not specify how many or which of its proposed 

personnel were to be uncleared, and is otherwise silent on the matter. 

In its report on the price evaluation, the price panel included the following statement

indicating that the SSEB found acceptable CSC’s use of uncleared personnel: 

CSC’s proposed solution is to utilize a large number of [uncleared] 

individuals, while ensuring that critical personnel have [DELETED] 

clearances. The use of [uncleared] personnel was briefed as 

acceptable by the requiring activity and the SSEB was fully aware that 

CSC’s proposal utilized [uncleared] personnel.
Page 7 B-407105, B-407105.2 

AR, Exh. 11.1, Price Panel Report, at 3.

There is no contemporaneous record of the SSEB’s consideration of this issue, 

however, and, even if the SSEB were “fully aware” of CSC’s approach, as the price 

panel report suggests, there is no evidence of the SSEB’s views on the matter.

In responding to the protest, the agency asserts that the SSEB confirmed that 

CSC’s mix of cleared and uncleared workers was “appropriate,” citing a statement 

made by the CO in response to the protest. Specifically, the CO explained that 

upon realizing that CSC’s price was significantly below the government cost 

estimate, the CO: 

[r]eviewed the amount and type of labor CSC had stated would be 

conducted by personnel without [DELETED] clearances (which was 

allowed). The labor for these individuals is often significantly lower 

than personnel with [DELETED] clearances. The CO then provided 

the SSEB with those sections of the CSC proposal where uncleared 

personnel were used in order to assure the SSEB considered this mix 

a viable solution. The SSEB noted that the level of CSC’s use of 

uncleared personnel was acceptable.

CO’s Statement at 6.

As discussed below, we find that the CO’s Statement does not reasonably comport 

with the underlying record.

4

First, as noted by SAIC in its comments, the CO could not have reviewed the 

“amount and type of labor CSC had stated would be conducted by noncleared 

personnel,” because no such information exists in CSC’s proposal. Second, the CO 

could not have provided the SSEB with any sections of CSC’s proposal “where 

uncleared personnel were used” because, aside from the price proposal, which only 

generally indicates CSC’s utilization of “large numbers” of uncleared individuals, 

there are no such sections.

 

5

 

4 DIA also asserts that, even if CSC’s proposal were rated lower, the SSA could 

have come to the same award decision. See Agency Legal Memorandum at 13-

14. We do not give this post-hoc argument raised in response to the protest any 

weight. See Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 

1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 91 at 15.

 Third, there is no contemporaneous evidence that the 

5 The CO does not indicate that the SSEB actually reviewed CSC’s price proposal. 

Rather, in response to SAIC’s document request, DIA stated that the CO gave the 

SSEB a document with quotes from CSC’s proposal and asked the SSEB to review 

the cleared/uncleared personnel mix proposed by CSC, but did not save the 

(continued...)
Page 8 B-407105, B-407105.2 

SSEB “noted that the level of CSC’s use of uncleared personnel was acceptable,” 

and, more important, the record does not show how the SSEB could have identified 

CSC’s level of use of uncleared personnel or its mix of cleared/uncleared personnel 

based on the general statements in CSC’s price proposal. Despite two 

opportunities to respond to the protester’s allegations, DIA has not provided any 

statement from any SSEB member concerning what the SSEB knew or concluded 

concerning CSC’s use of “large numbers” of uncleared personnel.

Rather, in response to SAIC’s comments, the CO provided a supplemental 

statement in which he concedes that CSC’s proposal did not “specifically dictate the 

number of personnel or specific labor categories that will be cleared versus 

uncleared.” Supp. CO Statement at 3. The CO explains that he identified passages 

in CSC’s proposal as areas where “the use of uncleared personnel or [DELETED] 

became apparent,” which “indicated” to him “a use of uncleared resources,” and that 

he provided these passages to the SSEB. Id. 

CSC’s technical/management proposal, however, does not contain any passages 

that “indicate” CSC’s use of uncleared personnel. Indeed, the CO also concedes 

that, “standing alone, these sections do not convey the use or extent of use of 

uncleared personnel.” Id. Thus, even if the CO had given sections of CSC’s price 

proposal to the SSEB, and even if the SSEB had found CSC’s use of uncleared 

personnel acceptable in principle (an assertion for which there is no 

contemporaneous evidence), DIA has not shown it was even possible for the SSEB 

to ascertain the extent to which CSC proposed to use uncleared personnel. As a 

consequence, DIA’s claim that it had “adequate information by which to identify risk, 

assess risk, and conclude that there was no risk to successful performance” based 

on CSC’s proposal of “large numbers” of uncleared personnel is unsupported. 

Accordingly, we conclude that DIA did not reasonably consider CSC’s proposed use 

of “large numbers” of uncleared personnel to perform the solicitation requirements 

in evaluating CSC’s proposal, and sustain the protest on this basis. Id.

SAIC also argues that DIA improperly failed to evaluate CSC’s proposal of “minimal 

resources” for data engineers as a weakness. SAIC asserts that CSC’s failure to 

propose adequate data engineers, particularly when combined with the fact it 

proposed large numbers of uncleared personnel who would be unable to provide 

services capable of meeting all of the requirements under the TOR, represents a 

significant risk that amounted to a weakness.

The record, however, reflects that the SSEB identified this issue as a potential risk. 

SAIC’s focus on whether the issue is considered a risk or a weakness is immaterial; 

 

(...continued)

document. Comments at 32 n.17. The CO’s supplemental statement, described 

below, appears to reconstruct the information that he allegedly provided the SSEB. 
Page 9 B-407105, B-407105.2 

the essence of the evaluation is reflected in the evaluation record itself--the actual 

evaluation findings--and not the adjectival descriptions of those findings. See

Chapman Law Firm, LPA, B-293105.6 et al., Nov. 15, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 233 at 5. 

What’s more, the SSA did characterize this issue as a “weakness,” and considered 

that any associated increase in price would have only a minimal impact on CSC’s 

position as the lowest-priced offeror.6

 The SSA found that the savings to the 

government outweighed the risk. AR, Exh. 12.2, SSA Award Decision 

Memorandum, at 2. We have no basis to question the reasonableness of the 

agency’s consideration of this issue. 

Turning to the evaluation of its own proposal, SAIC argues that each of its strengths

under the technical/management factor should have been evaluated as significant 

strengths and that its proposal should have been rated “outstanding.” 

As a general matter, adjectival descriptions and ratings serve only as a guide to, 

and not a substitute for, intelligent decision-making. See Chapman Law Firm, LPA, 

B-293105.6 et al., supra. The essence of the evaluation is reflected in the 

evaluation record itself--the actual evaluation findings--and not the adjectival 

descriptions. We have considered SAIC’s arguments as to each of the areas it 

challenges and find them without merit. We address one example here. 

The SSEB evaluated SAIC’s proposal as having a strength under the program 

management subfactor because its ability was “greater than the minimum required” 

to transition from the existing contract and accomplish the task. AR, Exh. 10.3, 

Final SSEB Consensus Report for SAIC, at 5-6. The SSEB stated that SAlC’s 

sound program management and ability to recruit cleared personnel would enable 

the program to succeed, and that its proposal showed SAIC’s “proven management 

approach and agile development methods that are currently in use” show its ability 

to successfully deliver projects on time and budget. Id. at 6. SAIC argues that the 

SSEB’s comment that its proven management approach and development methods 

show its ability to “successfully deliver” projects on time and budget show that it

merited a significant strength. As DIA points out, this language in no way 

demonstrates that SAIC’s proposal did any more than exceed the minimum 

requirement and represent added value, the definition of a strength here. We have 

no basis to conclude that the agency acted unreasonably in assigning SAIC a 

strength, as opposed to a significant strength, for this aspect of its proposal.

 

6 DIA did not document its finding that this matter would have a “minimal impact” on 

CSC’s price. Using the fixed labor rates in its price proposal, CSC calculates that 

the addition of [DELETED] more data engineers for the first year of the contract 

would add just over $[DELETED] million to the firm’s total price. CSC Comments at 

5 n.5.
Page 10 B-407105, B-407105.2 

Price Evaluation

SAIC argues that DIA improperly failed to conduct the price realism analysis 

required by the solicitation and that, if it had conducted such an analysis, it would 

have found significant risks in CSC’s proposal. DIA counters that the solicitation did 

not require a price realism analysis, but only a price reasonableness analysis.

As a general matter, when awarding a fixed-price contract, an agency is only 

required to determine whether offered prices are fair and reasonable. Federal 

Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 15.402(a). An agency’s concern in making a price 

reasonableness determination focuses primarily on whether the offered prices are 

too high, as opposed to too low, because it is the contractor and not the government 

that bears the risk that an offeror’s low price will not be adequate to meet the costs 

of performance. Sterling Servs., Inc., B-291625, B-291626, Jan. 14, 2003, 2003 

CPD ¶ 26 at 3.

Price realism need not necessarily be considered in evaluating proposals for the 

award of a fixed-price contract, because these contracts place the risk of loss upon 

the contractor rather than the government. However, an agency may include in a 

solicitation a provision which provides for a price realism evaluation for the purpose 

of assessing whether an offeror’s low price reflects on its understanding of the 

contract requirements. General Dynamics One Source, LLC; Unisys Corp., 

B-400340.5, B-400340.6, Jan. 20, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 45 at 9. Where a solicitation 

provides for a price realism evaluation, the depth of an agency’s evaluation in this 

regard is a matter within the sound exercise of the agency’s discretion. Citywide 

Managing Servs. of Port Washington, Inc., B-281287.12, B-281287.13, Nov. 15, 

2000, 2001 CPD ¶ 6 at 4-5. In reviewing protests challenging price realism 

evaluations, our focus is on whether the agency acted reasonably and in a manner 

consistent with the solicitation’s requirements. General Dynamics One Source, 

LLC; Unisys Corp., supra. 

Although the TOR did not state that prices would be evaluated for realism per se, it 

effectively provided for such an evaluation where it established that DIA would 

evaluate price proposals to determine whether proposed prices were “compatible 

with the scope of effort, are not unbalanced, and are neither excessive nor 

insufficient for the effort to be accomplished,” and that “[t]his may be grounds for 

eliminating a proposal from competition on the basis that the offeror does not 

understand the requirement.” TOR Instructions at ¶ 4. Analyzing whether an 

offeror’s fixed price is so low that it reflects a lack of understanding of solicitation 

requirements is the crux of a price realism evaluation, and by informing offerors that 

their proposals would be evaluated in this regard, the TOR established that the 

agency would, in essence, assess offerors’ prices for realism. Flight Safety Servs. 

Corp., B-403831, B-403831.2, Dec. 9, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 294 at 5. 
Page 11 B-407105, B-407105.2 

Having concluded that the TOR contemplated a price realism evaluation, the 

question becomes whether DIA properly evaluated CSC’s price in light of this 

provision. The record reflects that DIA took steps in this regard but that those steps 

fell short.

Notwithstanding DIA’s argument that it was not required to evaluate CSC’s price for 

realism, the CO appears to have been concerned that CSC’s total proposed price 

was low when compared to the government estimate of approximately $163.5 

million. The CO states that he took three steps to address this issue. 

First, the CO states that he directed the SSEB to conduct an additional analysis of 

the number of hours and labor categories in each proposal, and to determine if they 

were sufficient to meet the RFP’s requirements. CO Statement at 6; CO 

Supplemental Statement at 2. As a consequence of this review, the SSA 

considered the SSEB’s risk finding associated with CSC having proposed “minimal 

resources” for data engineers, and quantified this risk in terms of the potential price 

impact associated with increasing the level of effort for CSC’s data engineers. 

Second, the CO states that he reviewed the labor categories and rates submitted by 

both firms. CO Statement at 6; CO Supplemental Statement at 2. The CO’s 

statement is supported by the price panel report. AR, Exh. 11.1, Price Panel 

Report, at 3. Nearly all of CSC’s proposed labor categories were categories under 

the SITE contract. CSC’s rates were compared to the ceiling values established by 

that contract and found to be equal to or below the negotiated ceiling values. Id. 

SAIC has given us no basis to question this aspect of the agency’s evaluation.

Third, again, the CO states that the CO and/or the SSA acting as the CO: 

[r]eviewed the amount and type of labor CSC had stated would be 

conducted by personnel without [DELETED] clearances (which was 

allowed). The labor for these individuals is often significantly lower 

than personnel with [DELETED] clearances. The CO then provided 

the SSEB with those sections of the CSC proposal where uncleared 

personnel were used in order to assure that the SSEB considered this 

mix a viable solution. The SSEB noted that the level of CSC’s use of 

uncleared personnel was acceptable.

CO Statement at 6; CO Supp. Statement at 2.

We have already found that the record does not support this account. DIA clearly 

recognized that CSC’s proposal of “large numbers” of uncleared personnel was an 

issue it needed to consider because, among other things, it may have been the 

principal reason for CSC’s much lower price. However, DIA has not shown that it 

even had the information to consider whether CSC’s low price based on this 

approach reflected on its understanding of the TOR’s requirements. Therefore, 
Page 12 B-407105, B-407105.2 

under the circumstances, we conclude that DIA’s failure to adequately consider this 

matter rendered its price realism evaluation of CSC’s proposal unreasonable. 

Alleged Solicitation Defects

SAIC argues that the competition was fundamentally flawed because the TOR did 

not accurately reflect the scope of agency’s actual requirements, which only 

became apparent when DIA issued the task order at a price significantly below the 

estimated price range established by the agency. In this regard, SAIC contends 

that, during the run-up to this procurement, DIA stated that its budget for the 

program was $50 million per year, or between $95 and $105 million for a base and 

one option year. Since the TOR included two option years, SAIC asked, “Given that 

the period of performance is now 3 years, is the estimated price range now $145 M 

– $155 M?” The agency’s response was, “Your assumption is correct.” Amend. No. 

1, at 5. SAIC states that it relied on this estimated price range to represent the 

required level of effort because the TOR did not clearly define the scope of work. 

SAIC asserts that issuance of the task order at a price well below the estimated 

price range must have meant that the requirements changed. We do not agree.

The estimated price range was just that, an estimated price range that reflected 

DIA’s budget for the program. Offerors were not required to propose pricing within 

this range, and neither SAIC nor CSC did so. The record shows that CSC’s 

proposed level of effort was within [DELETED], and that the major driver of its lower 

price was its lower labor rates. There is no evidence that DIA’s requirements 

changed.

In a related matter, SAIC argues that it understood the above exchange regarding 

the agency’s estimated price to define the scope of work inclusive of a plug figure of 

$3 million per year for other direct costs (ODCs). SAIC states that, with this 

understanding, it proposed a price for labor and ODCs in the base year of 

$[DELETED], just shy of DIA’s estimated budget of $50 million.7

 

The CO states that he advised all offerors that the entire amount of the committed 

funds for the base year of the program, estimated at between $45 and $50 million, 

would be placed on the awardee’s contract. CO Statement at 3. The CO then 

 

7 According to SAIC, the fact that CSC’s task order included ODCs in an amount 

more than six times the amount of the ODC plug number means DIA’s ODC 

requirements changed. SAIC alleges, with no support, that DIA decided it needed a 

reduced level of effort and more ODCs but did not advise offerors of this change. 

However, as DIA explains, the fact that CSC proposed a solution with a lower price 

permitted it to place more of its available budget on ODCs to meet its requirements 

for materials. SAIC has not persuaded us that those requirements have changed. 
Page 13 B-407105, B-407105.2 

stated that all offerors were aware that any additional committed funds would be 

placed not on the labor CLIN of any contract, but on the ODC CLIN. Id.

SAIC claims the CO’s intention to place additional committed funds on the ODC 

CLIN created a latent ambiguity in the TOR because SAIC believed the $50 million 

estimated price defined the level of effort. SAIC states that had it known it could 

use a lower level of effort, it “could have submitted a highly competitive proposal.” 

Protest at 17. Again, however, the estimated price range was not a price target as 

SAIC’s argument would suggest. SAIC’s alleged interpretation of the estimated 

price range, and its decision to price its proposal to “back out” of that range, is 

therefore unreasonable. 

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that DIA reevaluate proposals in a manner that is consistent with 

the solicitation’s evaluation criteria, and properly document its evaluation. Upon 

completion of the reevaluation, DIA should perform and document a new 

price/technical tradeoff analysis. If CSC’s proposal is not found to reflect the best 

value to the government, DIA should terminate for the convenience of the 

government CSC’s contract and award to the offeror whose proposal is determined 

to be the best value to the government. We also recommend that SAIC be 

reimbursed its costs of filing and pursuing the protest. Bid Protest Regulations, 4

C.F.R. § 21.8(d)(1) (2012). The protester’s certified claims for such costs, detailing 

the time expended and costs incurred, must be submitted directly to the agency 

within 60 days after receipt of this decision. 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(f)(1).

The protest is sustained in part and denied in part. 

Lynn H. Gibson

General Counsel