COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued by Teleconference 

RUTH BETTIE CALLOWAY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0805-96-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 APRIL 22, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY 

J. Michael Gamble, Judge 

 Thomas S. Leebrick (Mosby & Leebrick, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Ruth Bettie Calloway (appellant) appeals her conviction of 

driving under the influence of alcohol, a second offense, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-266. She contends that the trial court 

erroneously denied her motion to suppress. She argues that the 

trial court erred when it concluded that the investigating 

officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop her 

vehicle and to subsequently investigate her for driving under the 

influence of alcohol. She also argues that the trial court erred 

when it concluded that the investigating officer had probable 

cause to arrest her for driving under the influence of alcohol. 

Finally, she contends that because the evidence of her breath 

test should have been suppressed, the remaining evidence was 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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insufficient to support her conviction. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 At 2:49 a.m. on July 8, 1995, Deputy Tetterton was informed 

by a dispatcher of a disturbance at the "last brick house" on 

Randolph Lane. Two minutes later he arrived at Randolph Lane and 

saw a car driven by appellant. Deputy Tetterton proceeded to 

stop appellant's car and arrest her for driving under the 

influence of alcohol. Appellant later took a breath test that 

indicated that her breath alcohol content exceeded the legal 

limit. 

 Appellant was arrested and charged with second offense 

driving under the influence of alcohol. Appellant moved to 

suppress the results of her breath test on Fourth Amendment 

grounds, and the trial court overruled her motion. At the 

conclusion of the evidence, appellant renewed her Fourth 

Amendment arguments in a motion to strike the Commonwealth's 

evidence. The trial court overruled this motion and convicted 

appellant of second offense driving under the influence of 

alcohol. 

 II. 

THE INITIAL STOP OF APPELLANT'S CAR 

 Appellant contends that Deputy Tetterton's initial stop of 

her car was unlawful because he lacked a reasonable, articulable 
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suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity. We 

disagree. 

 Upon appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. See Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 

Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991); Reynolds v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 436, 388 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1990). 

Determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause require 

de novo review on appeal. Ornelas v. United States, U.S. 

___, , 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 

However, a trial court's "findings of historical fact" should be 

reviewed only for "clear error." Id. 

 "In order to justify an investigatory stop of a vehicle, the 

officer must have some reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 

vehicle or its occupants are involved in, or have recently been 

involved in, some form of criminal activity." Logan v. 

Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 441, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) 

(citing Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 143-44, 384 

S.E.2d 125, 127 (1989)). "In determining whether an 'articulable 

and reasonable suspicion' justifying an investigatory stop of a 

vehicle exists, courts must consider 'the totality of the 

circumstances -- the whole picture.'" Murphy, 9 Va. App. at 144, 

384 S.E.2d at 128 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 

8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). 
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 We hold that Deputy Tetterton had a reasonable articulable 

suspicion that appellant was involved in criminal activity when 

he initially stopped her car. The record established that Deputy 

Tetterton received a report from a police dispatcher that an 

African-American woman was "yelling, screaming, and knocking" on 

the front door of a residence on Randolph Lane in a manner that 

was unwelcome and upsetting to one of the occupants of the house. 

 The dispatcher also told him that the person causing the 

disturbance drove a "small" car that was parked in the driveway 

to the house, which was the last brick house on the street. 

Approximately two minutes later, Deputy Tetterton arrived at 

Randolph Lane and saw a Ford Tempo backing out from one of the 

last two driveways on the street. When the car approached Deputy 

Tetterton, he saw that it was driven by an African-American 

female. Based on these observations, he decided to stop the 

vehicle and investigate. 

 The factual scenario reported by the dispatcher provided an 

objective basis for the deputy to suspect that the person who 

caused the disturbance at the house on Randolph Lane was involved 

in some form of criminal activity. Although Deputy Tetterton did 

not know the exact nature of the "problem" at the residence, the 

fact that the person at the front door was causing a disturbance 

at an unusually early hour and that this disturbance provoked an 

occupant of the house to call the police provided an objective 

basis for the deputy to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. 
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 In addition, considering the dearth of activity on this small, 

residential street in the predawn hours of the morning, and 

Deputy Tetterton's quick arrival at the scene, it was reasonable 

for him to conclude that appellant was the person who caused the 

disturbance at the house on Randolph Lane. The deputy saw 

appellant's car backing out from one of the last driveways on the 

street two minutes after learning of the disturbance, and 

appellant matched the police dispatcher's description of the 

person who purportedly caused the disturbance.1

 III. 

 INVESTIGATION OF APPELLANT FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 

 We hold that Deputy Tetterton had a reasonable articulable 

suspicion that appellant was driving under the influence of 

alcohol that justified his further detention of her to perform 

field sobriety tests. The record establishes that after Deputy 

Tetterton stopped appellant's car, he approached the driver's 

side window to ask appellant a few questions. When he arrived at 

the driver's side window, Deputy Tetterton detected the odor of 

alcohol on appellant's person. After asking appellant if she had 

 1We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Deputy 

Tetterton's stop was justified under the "community caretaker" 

exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of warrantless 

searches and seizures. The record does not establish that Deputy 

Tetterton had a reasonable articulable suspicion that appellant 

was either in distress or in need of assistance at the time he 

stopped her car. See Commonwealth v. Waters, 20 Va. App. 285, 

288-89, 456 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1995). However, "[a]n appellate 

court may affirm the judgment of a trial court when it has 

reached the right result for the wrong reason." Driscoll v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 449, 452, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992). 
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been drinking, appellant admitted that she had consumed three 

beers. As discussed previously, Deputy Tetterton reasonably 

suspected that appellant had engaged in the unusual behavior of 

"yelling, screaming, and knocking" on the door of a nearby 

residence in the predawn hours of the morning. The deputy then 

asked appellant to step out of the car to perform field sobriety 

tests. Based on these circumstances, Deputy Tetterton had a 

reasonable articulable suspicion that appellant was operating her 

vehicle while intoxicated. 

 IV. 

PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST APPELLANT 

 We hold that Deputy Tetterton had probable cause to arrest 

appellant for driving under the influence of alcohol. 

"'[P]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within 

the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably 

trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person 

of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is 

being committed.'" Jones v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 229, 231, 

443 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1994) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 

Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 

906, 102 S. Ct. 1753, 72 L.Ed.2d 163 (1982)). After Deputy 

Tetterton stopped the car driven by appellant on Randolph Lane, 

he noticed the odor of alcohol on appellant's person, the 

"glassy, bloodshot" appearance of her eyes, her slow and slurred 

speech, and her "unsteady and wobbly" performance of the field 
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sobriety tests. Based on these facts, it was reasonable for the 

deputy to believe that appellant had been driving her car while 

under the influence of alcohol. 

 Because the trial court correctly overruled appellant's 

motion to suppress her breath test, the evidence at trial was 

sufficient to support her conviction. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction of 

driving under the influence of alcohol, a second offense, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-266. 

Affirmed.