2

3 4 

### 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 1 of 85

MARSHA JONES MOUTRIE (SBN 69711) City Attorney JOSEPH LAWRENCE (SBN 99039) Assistant City Attorney LANCE S. GAMS (SBN 125487) MARTIN T. TACHIKI (SBN 83044) Deputy City Attorneys 1685 Main Street, Third Floor Santa Monica, California 90401-3295 Telephone: (310) 458-8336 Facsimile: (310) 395-6727 marty.tachiki@smgov .net Attorneys for Defendant, CITY OF SANTA MONICA 

### EXHIBIT 

# j

# --8-=L

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and MARYE. PETERS, United States Secretary ofTransportation,

Plaintiffs,

v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA,

Defendants. CASE NO.: CV08-02695 CW(Ex)

DATE: TIME: COURTROOM: May 15,2008

8:30AM 10



### DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTAMONICA'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ANDAUTHORITIES INSUPPORT THEREOF; SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN; ANDEXHIBITS

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION2 Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page2of85


### TABLE OFCONTENTS Page 3 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARy........................................................................ 1 4 ARGlJMENT....... 3 5 1. 6 

### 7 8 9 10 11 

### 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 II 

### 20 21 

### 22 23 24 25 26 27 

### 28 THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ISSUE A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

BECAUSE THE INTERIM CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IS UNLAWFUL ON ITS FACE AND THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE IT 3

A. The Cease and Desist Order is Unlawful Under Federal Statutes

. B. The Law Does Not Preclude This Court From Assessing the Validity ofthe Interim Cease and Desist Order Itis Asked To Enforce

. 

## c. Interpreting The Law To Preclude This Court From Ascertaining The Legality Ofthe Interim Order Would Frustrate The Congressional Requirement That Due Process May Only Be Circumscribed To Protect Safety

. 

### D. The Notion That This Court May Not Assess The Interim Order's Validity Should Also Be Carefully Reassessed Because the Order's Deficiencies May Implicate This Court's Jurisdiction

. AN INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE THE FAA IS UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF IlIIS CASE

. A The Ordinance Validly Expresses The City'S Proprietary Rights

. B. The FAA's Claims That The Ordinance Violates Federal Law Are Arbitrary and Capricious

. I. Contrary to the FAA's Unsubstantiated Assertions, the Ordinance Does Not Unreasonably Discriminate Between Categories OfAircraft

. 2. Nor Does The Ordinance Grant Any Exclusive Right..

. OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 4

6

9

10

11


### 12

13

13 142

3 4 

### 5 6 7 8 9 10 I I 12 13 14 15 Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 3 of 85


### TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. The Ordinance IsFully Consistent With Both the Documents Which Transferred the Airport Back to Its Long-time Owner, the City Atthe End ofWorld War II And With the 1984 Settlement Agreement Which Resolved the Rights And Responsibilities Ofthe City and FAA With Respect to The Airport Through the Year 2015

. 

### Page

16 CONCLlJSION 22 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 

### 27 28 

## c. The Court Should Also Conclude That The City Is Likely

To Succeed On The Merits Because The Tenth Amendment Protects the City Against the FAA's Demand That The City Accept C&D Aircraft AtIts Airport, Even Though Doing So Violates The FAA's Own Safety Standards

. III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD ALSO BE DENIED BECAUSE THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS TIPS MARKEDLY INTHE CITY'S FAVOR AND DENIAL WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST BY FAVORING PUBLIC SAFETY OVER INDIVIDUAL CONVENIENCE

.

]] 15

16

19

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTAMONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION2



### 3 4 5 6 7 8

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page4of85

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page 

### Cases Ai6f4r2~t~~6: 

# fi3'(~}fci:~t9~

1{~~~~~:'.~~~~~:~~: 4 Air One HelicoptfftS, Inc. 

### v. FAA, 86 F.3d 880 (9t Cir. 1996) 8 Alr Transport Ass 'n'ofAmerica v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975) 13 Clark v. Busey, 9 959 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1992) .4 10 Federal Land Bank ofJackson inReceivership 

### v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank,

727 F. Supp. 1055, 1058-1059 (S.D.Miss. 1989) 8 11 Federal Maritime Comm 'nv. South Carolina Ports Auth; 12 535 lJ.S. 743, 762 (2002) 7 13 Gordon vHavasf! Palms, 93 Cal.AppAt 244,249 (200 1) 19 14 15 16 17 GTE Sf?uth, Inc. v. MOfhris~n, 99 f·.3d 733, 744 (4 CIL 1999) 8 Millard Refrigerated Services, Inc., v. FAA, 98 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 13 Nader v. FAA, 18 440 F.ld 292 «(~ADC 1971) 6 19 National Business Aviation Ass 'n. 

### v. City ofNaples Airport Authority, 162 F. Supp.2d 1343 (M.D.Fla. 2001) 13 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Nai1f~·~3~e~if(C~e:..fN:y.o~·1998)~~.~:. 

# ~~~.~!~~~.~~~~: 13 New York v. United States, 505lJ.S. 144, 157 (1992) 17 Printz v. United States, 521 lJ.S. 898, 935(1997) 17 Slati~~I~;:31~t4 

# {7~;6).~::.~.~~~~~~· 13 United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 27 379 lJ.S. 383 (1965) 22 28 jjj ,

### 2

3 

### 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 

### I1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 

### 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 5of 85

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Western Air Lines, Inc. v. PortAuthority ofNew York, 658 F.Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 13 Yakus v. United States, 321 tJ.S. 414 (1944) 7

Statutes 28 tJSC ~ 1331 8 28 tJSC ~ 1345 ." 8 49 U.S.C. §40103(e) 15 49 tJ.S.C. §40113(a) 4 49 U.S.C. §40133 ; 4 49 tJ.S.C. §4'1713 12 49 U.S.C. §46101(a)(4) 4, II 49 U.S.C. 

### §46105(c) 4,5 49 tJ.S.C. §46106 11 49 U.S.C. §46107 11 49 U.S.C. §46110(a) :7 49 tJ.S.C. §46110(b) : 7 49 U.S.C. §46110(c) 6 49 U.S.C. §47107(a)(I) 14 49 U.S.C. §47107(a)(4) 15 49 U.S.C. §47111(f) 11 49lJ.S.C. §47121 4 California Government Code § 830(a) 19 California Government Code § 830.6 19 California Government Code § 835 19

IV OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 6of85

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

### 2 Page 

### 3 Regulations 4 14C.F.R.§16.1 5 

### 5 14 C.F.R. § 16.I09(a) 

### 5 6 14C.F.R. § 16.11 4 7 14 C.F.R. § 16.229(a) 9 

### 8 14 C.F.R. § 16.3 6 

### 9 14 C.F.l{ § 16.31(d) 

### 5 10 Constitutional Provisions II California Constitution, Article XI, § 5(a) 14 12 California Constitution, Article XI, § 7 14 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 

### 27 28 v

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

### 25 References to Exhibits Ithrough 21 aretothose exhibits attached toDefendant City

ofSantaMonica's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application foraTemporary Restraining Orderfiledon April 25, 2008. References to Exhibits 22 through 34 are attached hereto and submitted with this Opposition toPlaintiffs Application foraPreliminary Injunction. Case2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 7of85



### INTRODUCTION ANDSUMMARY 2 The City opposes the issuance ofapreliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of 3 its ordinance (vthe Ordinance")(Exhibit 15)I,duly enacted toprotect the public and the City 4 by implementing federal safety standards which define the Santa Monica Airport facilities as 5 inadequate forthe C&D category aircraft that are using the Airport in growing numbers. The 6 Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") unlawfully issued aso-called "interim cease and 7 desist order" ("Interim Order") to block enforcement ofthe Ordinance and filed this action to 8 effectuate its Interim Order. But, the Interim Order isfacially invalid. Itwas issued in asix 9 year old administrative proceeding under 14C.F.R., Part 16("Part 16") that, by the FAA's 10 own admission, remains atits earliest, pre-hearing phase. The federal government's action II is an unprecedented and unlawful procedural maneuver. The statutory scheme adopted by 12 Congress simply does not allow such an order absent ahearing or aclear safety emergency. 13 There has been no administrative hearing; and, itisthe City, not the FAA, which has acted to 14 protect safety. Thus, under these circumstances, the FAA has no authority to issue, and this 15 Court has nojurisdiction to confirm, apremature order prohibiting enforcement ofthe 16 Ordinance. 17 The legality ofthe Interim Order is squarely before this Court, and that order is 18 entitled to no deference. Rather, ifthe federal government believes that its unauthorized 19 Interim Order (rather than the City's duly adopted safety ordinance), should be enforced, 20 then the federal government must meet the normal standards for extraordinary relief. 21 However, itcannot; neither the law nor the facts support the preliminary injunction request 22 The FAA claims that the Ordinance must give way merely because itwould 23 inconvenience acomparatively small number ofpersons who fly on C&D aircraft. However, 24



### 26 27 28Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 8of85

those flyers have, within their own power, the choice and ability to simply fly in and out of 2 Santa Monica Airport on compliant aircraft oruse another local airport. Unlike the flyers, 3 the City and itsresidents have noready alternatives. Residents live in family homes within 4 300 feet of: and below, the runway ends. (Trimborn I,

## '12;Trimborn II, ~3 and Exhibit 1)2 5 No runway safety areas protect them against an overrun. They cannot simply trade for a 6 safer home as flyers may trade aircraft. And, the City isresponsible forthe safety ofits 7 Airport. The City cannot simply hand its legal responsibility offto the federal government 8 even though that government will not letthe City conform the Airport to federal safety 9 standards. 10 Nonetheless, the FAA proclaims that the City must cease and desist from enforcing its II safety Ordinance, that this Court must enforce the FAA's Interim Order, and that the City 12 may not challenge the legality ofthat Interim Order inthis Court. Such isnotthe law. 13 Having voluntarily invoked thejurisdiction ofthis Court, the federal government cannot then 14 proclaim that the Court must do itsbidding despite the circumstances and the law. Congress 15 certainly did not cede authority to the FAA to turn afederal court into'itsrubber stamp, and 16 most certainly not do so inthe this factual and legal context 17 To the contrary, Congress requires the FAA toprotect safety first. This 18 Congressional directive reflects one inescapable reality: accidents happen. Equipment fails' 19 and people make mistakes. Accidents happen to novices and to professionals alike. (See 20 Trimborn II, ~~7and 8). One need not look beyond the daily newspaper orweekly magazine 21 to be reminded that experienced professionals operating all types ofcraft, including 22 automobiles, ships and airplanes have accidents. Even professional licensure and years of 23 24 25 26 27 

### 28 2 The Declaration of Robert Trimbom In Support of the City of Santa Monica's Opposition totheApplication foraTemporary Restraining Orderwas filedonApril 25, 2008 andis hereinafterreferredtoas "Trimborn I". TheDeclarationofRobertTrimbom inSupportoftheCity'S SantaMonica's Opposition totheApplication foraPreliminary Injunction isattachedhereto andis hereinafter referred toas "Trimborn II". TheDeclarationofJames Hallwas filedonApril 25, 2008 inOpposition totheApplication foraTemporary Restraining Orderandishereinafter referredtoas "Hall". 2

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

. Page 9of85

unblemished experience do notavert the danger. Thus, the FAA has adopted safety 2 standards to safeguard the public against the inevitability oferror and failure

.. 3 As aprudent and responsible government and airport owner, the City of Santa Monica 4 has acted to implement those standards. The City studied the safety options, conducted 5 numerous public hearings, engaged inyears ofnegotiations with the FAA, evaluated 6 alternative proposals, and ultimately reached the legislative conclusion that Airport safety 7 was best enhanced by conforming runway usage to the category A and B aircraft that the 8 FAA has approved the Airport to service because they are able to safely operate atthe 9 Airport. The Ordinance ismeasured and targeted. Itoffers the least intrusive infringement, 10 on Airport usage while protecting residents ofthe City, neighboring communities, businesses II and visitors. Yet, the FAA claims that none ofthis matters. Again, such isnotthe law. The 12 potential benefit ofenforcing the Ordinance greatly outweighs any alleged harm ofitstaking 13 affect, Like the law, the balance ofhardships tips precipitously inthe City'S favor. And, 14 considerations ofpublic safety and welfare dictate that, while this legal dispute remains 15 pending, public safety should beprotected through enforcement ofthe ordinance. 16 17 18 19 I. ARGUMENT

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ISSUE A PRELIMINARY 20 INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE INTERIM CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IS 21 UNLAWFUL ON ITS FACE AND THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO 22 ENFORCE IT. 23 24 Inresponse to the federal government's application for aTemporary Restraining 25 Order. the City has already argued that the FAA had no authority to issue the cease and 26 desist order, and that this Court hasjurisdiction to assess the Interim Order's validity. And, 27 the Court has preliminarily concluded that itmay not assess the Interim Order's validity and 

### 2812

13

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

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must effectuate it. The Court's preliminary conclusion that the FAA's order must be 2 enforced through injunctive relief warrants careful reconsideration because the illegality of 3 the Interim Order does not simply impact its enforceability, italso raisesjurisdictional 4 questions. 5 To the extent that there isjurisdiction toreview afinal order ofthe FAA,that 6 jurisdiction lies exclusively within the United States Courts ofAppeals. See Clark v.Busey, 7 959 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1992). However, asthe courts ofappeals have not acted, nor 8 even been asked to act, this Court too lacksjurisdiction to enforce the FAA purported 9 "order". There is noproper orvalid order to enforce. See e:g.,Air California v. 

# us. 10 Department ofTransportation, 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1981). There exists no subject I I matter jurisdiction forthis court toproceed.



### A. The Cease and DesistOrder isUnlawful Under Federal Statutes. 14 The Court has preliminarily concluded that 49 U.S.C. §§40113(a), 46105(c) and 14 15 C.F.R. § 16.1I authorizes the FAA's issuance ofthe Interim Order. This issue warrants 16 more attention. While those statutes and regulation mention orders, their language and the 17 statutory scheme reveal that they do not authorize the action taken by the FAA inthis case. 18 The FAA's own regulation, 14C.F.R. § 16.11 authorizes the FAA to issue orders on 19 Part 16proceedings, but only pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§40133 and 47121. Neither ofthose 20 statutes expressly authorizes the extraordinary relief ofacease and desist order in aPart 16 2I proceeding. 22 Nor should they be construed to authorize such extraordinary agency action. Section 23 4712 I deals with record keeping and audits, not airport operations. Section 40I13(a) refers 24 to the issuance oforders ingeneral. But, amore specific federal statute governs the cease 25 and desist order inthis case: 49 U.S.c. §4610l(a)(4). Itprovides: "After notice and an 26 opportunity for hearing, the Secretary shall issue anotice to compel compliance with this 27 part [49 U.S.c. Part A]] ifthe Secretary

... finds inan investigation under this subsection 28 4Case2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 11 of85

that aperson isviolating this part." (Emphasis added.). Thus, the most specific and 2 therefore applicable federal statute requires ahearing before the issuance ofacompliance 3 order. And, the parties do not dispute that no such administrative hearing has occurred in 4 this case. 5 The federal statutory requirement ofahearing before issuance ofacompliance order 6 isreflected inthe FAA's own regulations. 14C.F.R. 

### § 16.109(a) provides that "the agency 7 will provide the opportunity forahearing if, inthe Director's Determination, the agency 8 proposes to issue

... acease and desist order

... orany other compliance order issued by the 9 Administrator to carry outthe provisions ofthe acts, and required to be issued after notice 10 and opportunity for ahearing." Thus, in advance ofahearing, the Director may only I1 "propose" issuance ofacompliance order. The order itself may only be issued after a 12 hearing. 13 Indeed, the statutory scheme enacted by Congress authorizes the FAA Director to act 14 before ahearing inonly one situation, asafety emergency. 49 U.S.C. 

### §46105(c) states that: 15 "When the Administrator isofthe opinion that an emergency exists related to safety inair 16 commerce and requires immediate action, the Administrator

... may ... issue orders without 17 regard to this subpart

.... " Thus, Congress simply has not allowed the FAA to issue acease 18 and desist order without first conducting ahearing, except inthe case ofsafety emergencies. 19 That section does not authorize interim orders inPart 16proceedings, which relate to 20 such issues as whether federal grantees are operating their airports incompliance with 21 statutory mandates prohibiting unreasonable discrimination and exclusive rights. 

### See 14 22 C.F.R. ~ 16.1 [listing Congressional statutes authorizing Part 16actions, but not listed 23 among the provisions in 14C.F.R. 

### § 16.1 is49 U.S.C. 

### §46105(c).] 24 Here, placing the cart far ahead ofthe horse, the Director has purported to issue an 25 "interim cease and desist order" prior to the issuing adetermination. (Interim Order at 1,2). 26 Part 16.however, does not authorize the Director to issue abinding cease and desist order. 27 Under Part 16, § 16.31(d) only authorizes the Director, atthe time he renders his 

### 28 5

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 12of85

determination, topropose the issuance ofa Cease and Desist order. Thus, under the FAA's 2 own regulations, even ifthe Director had issued his initial determination

-- which he has not 3

--he could not have issued abinding cease and desist order. The regulations provide that the 4 Director's Determination isthe "initial determination made bythe Director following an 5 investigation, [and] isanon-final agency decision"). 14C.F.R. § 16.3. Moreover, under Part 6 16,the Director's Determination, ifand when issued, will function as aproposed set of 7 findings and remedial actions. Ifthe Director's Determination is adverse to the City, the 8 next step will be ahearing before ahearing officer and then an appeal to the Associate 9 Administrator for Airports, who may make aFinal Decision. (14 C.F.R., Part 16, Subparts D 10 and G). 11 Thus, under the federal regulations itisundisputable that, after six years, the 12 underlying agency process is still inits earliest phases ofthe Part 16proceedings; and 13 because the Director has not yet issued an initial Determination, has not issued aproposed 14 Cease and Desist Order, and has not afforded the City ahearing, the FAA has no authority 15 under itsown regulations to issue abinding Cease and Desist Order and has not presented 16 this Court with avalid order that can be enforced. 17 Thus, the federal laws that define and limit the FAA's authority do not allow itto ; 18 issue an interim cease and desist order inaPart 16proceeding. The agency's emergency 19 powers are limited to averting immediate safety risks. See, Nader v. FAA, 440 F.2d 292, 293 20 (CADC 197/) [ill effects ofsmoking did notjustify FAA's exercise ofemergency power to 21 ban smoking on commercial aircraft since the FAA only has that power in aclear safety 22 emergency]. 23 24 25 the Interim Cease and Desist Order It IsAsked To Enforce.



### B. The Law Does Not Preclude This Court From Assessing the Validity of

26 The Court's initial decision that itlacks thejurisdiction to consider the legality ofthe 27 cease and desist order rests on49 U.S.c. §46110(c). However, that statute only vests 28Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 13of85

exclusive jurisdiction inthe courts ofappeal after (1) an aggrieved party exercises its option 2 to seek review ofan FAA order [§4611O(a)],and (2) the clerk ofthe court transmits the 3 petition forreview to the Secretary [§46110(b)]. Neither ofthese events has occurred inthis 4 case. Accordingly, atthis time, no court ofappeals has taken anyjurisdiction over any part 5 ofthe FAA's order; and this Court's jurisdiction and ability to act are called into doubt. 6 Indeed, plaintiff herself puts the validity ofthe Interim Order atissue by assertions that "the 7 City isplacing itself squarely inviolation ofavalid and effective order ofthe FAA" 8 (Plaintiff's Memorandum at 8;see also, id. at 10). 9 Nor isplaintiffs' position supported bythe cases she has cited. In Yakus v. United 10 States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), the Supreme Court found that provisions ofastatute conferring lion an Emergency Court ofAppeals '''exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity ofany 12 regulation ororder', coupled with the provision that 'no court, Federal, State, orTerritorial, 13 shall havejurisdiction orpower to consider the validity ofany such regulation are broad 14 enough interms to deprive the district court ofpower to consider the validity ofthe 15 Administrator's regulation ororder as adefense to acriminal prosecution forits violation." 16 Id. at429. As discussed above, the statutory scheme governing appellate courtjurisdiction 17 to review FAA orders does not make exclusive jurisdiction automatic; rather, exclusive 18 jurisdiction istriggered only when apetition forreview has been filed and the Court sends 19 the petition to the Secretary [49 U.S.C. §46110(a)-(c)], none ofwhich has occurred here. 20 Moreover, none ofthe statutes the FAA relies on contain aprovision removing this Court's 21 power to consider the validity ofthe regulation ororder before issuing injunctive relief. 22 Likewise inFederal Maritime Comm 'nv. South Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 23 762 (2002), the enforcement statute expressly limited the district court's authority to review 24 "whether the relevant order 'was properly made and duly issued.''' Id. [quoting 46 25 U.S.C.App. § 1713(c)]. Again, there isno corresponding statutory limitation on the Court's 26 authority in statutes cited by the Secretary inthis case. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not 27 hold that the sanctioned party could never contest the merits ofthe agency's action, but only 28 7

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 14 of 85

that its failure to do so before the agency would compromise its ability to do so later. Id. 2 Here, the FAA has voluntarily invoked this Court's limitedjurisdiction by claiming 3 that certain laws compel this Court to enforce the FAA's "valid and effective" action. But 4 those laws do no such thing particularly inasituation where the FAA's "valid and effective" 5 action soplainly hasjumped the gun. The Court's already limitedjurisdiction is squarely 6 therefore indoubt. And since the FAA asserts that ithas notyet made any decision, itis 7 difficult to see what otherjurisdiction exists.' 8 By issuing the Interim Order, and then immediately seeking aTRO, the FAA has 9 facially violated the very laws itsays applies. The FAA, incontravention ofapplicable law, 10 has deprived Santa Monica ofthe ability to contest the Interim Order before the agency prior I I to any proceeding inthis or any other Court. 4 The governing statutes and regulations 12 preclude such high-handed action. The law the FAA invokes bars itfrom dragging the City 13 before this Court. No legal principle prevents Santa Monica from defending itself by 14 challenging the legality ofFAA's order and this Court's jurisdiction. Nor should this Court 15 allow such unfairness by the FAA. Cj Air One Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 86FJd 880, 881 16 (9th Cir. 1996)1Ninth Circuit grants review despite FAA's claim that the court lacked 17 jurisdiction to review anFAA opinion to end "bureaucratic gridlock" and thereby ensure 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 J In addition to these specific statutes, the federal government has also cited two general jurisdictional statutes inits complaint: 28USC § 1331,which confers broadjurisdiction overcases presenting federal questions under the Constitution, laws and treaties ofthe United States; and 28 USC § 1345,whichauthorizesthefederalgovernmenttosueinfederalcourt. Despitethesestatutes' breadth, issues oftheir application can be subtle. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank ofJackson in Receivership v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank 727 F. Supp. 1055, 1058-1059 (S.D.Miss. 1989) 

### lnotingthedifficulty ofdetermining theexistenceoffederalquestionjurisdiction inacaseinvolving federalagencies andexplaining thattherequirementof "arising under" istechnical onethatmustbe assessedbythecourts].



### 28 4Theothercasescitedb~theGovernmentaresimilarlyinapposite. GTE South, Inc. 

### v. Morrison, 199F.3d733,744(41 Cir. 1999)(differentstatutoryschemeinwhichappealschallenging validityofruleswerealreadypending); United States v. Ruzicka, 329U.S. 287,290-92 (1946) (statuteexpresslybarredsanctionedpartyfromcontestingvalidityoforderinenforcement proceeding, whilealsoproviding aseparateadministrativeprocessforsuchclaims).

______________ 8 OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATlON FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION8

9 

## c. Interpreting The Law To Preclude This Court From Ascertaining The Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 15of85

fairnessl.5 2 In short, itis one thing forCongress toprovide that aparty aggrieved by an 

### 3 administrative decision may only seekjudicial review ofthat decision inafederal appellate 4 court. 

### It isquite another thing forthis Court to conclude that acity aggrieved by an 5 unlawfully issued Interim Order isnot entitled to contest the invocation ofthis Court's 6 limitedjurisdiction or otherwise defend itself and its ability toprotect safety ifdragged into 7 the United States District Court bythe FAA.

10 Legality Ofthe Interim Order Would Frustrate The Congressional I I Requirement That Due Process May Only Be Circumscribed To Protect 12 Safety. 13 As explained in subsection A above, the federal statutory scheme requires ahearing in 14 advance ofan FAA cease and desist order; the only exception being when asafety 15 emergency exists. Here, the FAA is attempting tojump this requirement, but the Court 16 should not allow aregulatory agency to disregard requirements ensuring fairness. Congress 17 has struck abalance between fairness to the regulated entity and public safety. When safety 18 is at imminent risk, Congress has established that the process guarantee must yield to that 19 necessity. Otherwise, those guarantees must behonored. The balance Congress struck must 20 be respected. 21 Moreover, ifcountenanced bythis Court, theprocedural maneuver which the FAA 22 has undertaken to defer its duties will also violate federal requirements offairness in another 23 important way. Inthe hearing which the FAA has so far avoided, the burden ofproof will 24 be on the FAA. 14C.F.R. § 16.229(a) isunambiguous onthis point. 

### Itprovides "The 25 26 27 :;Of course, given the repeated pronouncements by fAA officials that the City's actions are illegal, any proceeding before the FAA likely is futile as the FAA has already predetermined the 28 outcome, further eroding notions ofdue process. 9

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION7

8 

### D. The Notion That This Court May Not Assess The Interim Order's Validity Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 16 of85

burden ofproof ofnoncompliance with anAct orany regulation, order, agreement or 2 document ofconveyance issued under the authority ofanAct is on the agency." By the

_ 3 unlawful expedient of leapfrogging over the hearing requirement, the FAA has avoided its 4 burden ofproof

- aburden imposed by its own regulation and which itlikely cannot meet on 5 the facts ofthis case. Federal law should not be interpreted to allow the FAA to avoid its 6 burden ofproof.

9 Should Also Be Carefully Reassessed Because the Order's Deficiencies 10 May Implicate This Court's Jurisdiction. I I The unprecedented process followed by the federal government inthis case raises 12 serious issues ofjurisdiction inother ways as well. The three federal statutes, which are 13 cited inthe complaint forpurposes ofdemonstrating jurisdiction, require an administrative 14 hearing before the Secretary isauthorized to file suit. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 46106, 46107 and IS 471 II (f). Section 46106 empowers the Secretary to file suit to "enforce this part ora 16 requirement orregulation prescribed, oran order orany term ofacertificate orpermit issued, 17 under this part." Thus, to invokejurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 

### §46106, the Secretary must, 18 inthis case, establish that issuance ofthe Interim Cease and Desist Order was consistent with 19 the federal statutes. That requirement cannot be met inthis case. As explained in subsection 20 A. above, the federal statutory scheme limits the FAA's authority to issue orders to those 21 situations inwhich ithas first given notice and conducted ahearing. See 49 U.S.C. § 22 46101 (a)(4)["After notice and an opportunity forahearing

...the Secretary of 23 Transportation, Under Secretary, orAdministrator shall issue an order to compel compliance 24 with this part if [he or she] finds inan investigation under this sub that aperson isviolating 25 this part:'] Likewise, 49 U.S.C. §46107 makes the existence ofan order aprerequisite to 26 suit,6 Similarly, 49 U.S.C. 

### §47111(f) allows this Court to effectuate enforcement ofgrant 27 28 (, Moreover, both specific provisions ofthe United States Code expressly state that court 10 OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OFSANT AMONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 17of85

conditions, but ittoo requires an administrative hearing before the Secretary may initiate 2 judicial proceedings. See 49 U.S.c. §47111(e). 3 Moreover, these statutes do not excuse the federal government from meeting other 4 prerequisites to filing suit such as an actual case orcontroversy, standing and ripeness. Here, 

### 5 itisnot clear, for instance, that the matter isripe because the FAA has not conducted the 6 hearing required by federal law as aprerequisite toproposing and issuing acease and desist 7 order and as aprerequisite to invoking thejurisdiction and the enforcement powers ofthis 8 Court. 9 Thus, for all the reasons explained inthis section, the Court should reconsider its 10 initial decision that itcannot assess the legality ofthe Interim Order. The Court's limited II jurisdiction has not been properly invoked. 12 13 II. AN INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE THE FAA IS UNLIKELY 14 TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THIS CASE. 15 ., 16 Commencing with its administrative complaint against the City under Part 16in 17 October 2002 and followed by its administrative order to show cause and its cease and desist 18 order inthe Part 16proceeding and most recently inplaintiffs' complaint filed herein, the 19 FAA has asserted anumber ofclaims, which the City has steadfastly refuted with both 20 argument and evidence for almost six years. Even acursory review ofthose claims and the 21 City's evidence shows that the FAA's actions inthis dispute have been arbitrary and 22 capricious and that the Interim Order should therefore not be effectuated by this Court. 23 Instead, the Court should recognize andprotect the rights ofthe City as an airport proprietor 24 tokeep its Airport safe and thereby protect the public against aircraft accidents and the City 25 26 27 proceedings may be initiated "with respectto safetyduties andpowers designated tobecarried out bytheAdministrator". Inthiscasethereisnolawfulorder, andtheAdministrator orhis designee is 28 notactingtodischarge safetyduties. OnlytheCityisactingtopromote safety. I I OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 18of85

against liability forthose accidents. Neither the law nor the balance ofhardships favor the 2 FAA. 3 4 

### A. The Ordinance Validly Expresses The City's Proprietary Rights. 5 Congress has affirmed thejudicial recognition ofthe "proprietor's exception" to 6 federal preemption ofaviation regulation. 49 U.S.C. 

### §41713. See also. National Helicopter 7 Corp. ofAmerica v. City ofNew York, 13'7F.3d 81, 89 (2nd Cir. 1998) Itallows the City to 8 make its Airport safe and protects the City from the unfairness which will result ifthe FAA 9 is allowed toprevent the City from making the Airport safe by federal standards. The 10 exception thereby ensures that airport proprietors will not beplaced inthe extremely unfair 11 position ofbearing liability for circumstances beyond their control. 12 The exception gives airport proprietors the right to take reasonable actions toprotect 13 themselves against liability which would otherwise arise forunsafe conditions existing at 14 airports. See Air Transport Ass 'nofAmerica v, 

### Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58,63-64 (N.D. Cal. 15 1975)[explaining that an airport proprietor isresponsible forthe consequences attendant 16 upon its operation ofapublic airport]; Slapin

### v. LosAngeles Internat 'IAirport, 65 17 Cal.App.3d 484,488 (1976)[ explaining that, notwithstanding statutory immunities, 18 California cities may be liable for dangerous conditions attheir airport]. 19 Thus, pursuant tothe proprietor's exception, an airport proprietor may limit airport 20 operations to avoid liability forunsafe conditions. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port 21 Authority ofNew York, 658 F.Supp. 952, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)[discussing the exception]. 22 The proprietor's exception isreflected infederal grant assurance conditions and regulations 23 which allow airport owner/grantees to ensure safety. (Exhibit 10). Itallows an airport 24 proprietor and operator to, for example, impose acurfew toprotect against nuisance claims 25 for unreasonable noise. National Helicopter Corp, ofAmerica v. City ofNew York, 137F.3d 26 81, 89-90 (2nd Cir. 1998). Likewise acity owning an airport may ban particular classes ofjet 27 aircraft 

### to avoid liability forjet noise. National Business Aviation Ass 'n.

### v. City ofNaples 28 12

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

. PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION17

18 19

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 19 of 85

Airport Authority, 162F. Supp.2d 1343, 1352-54 (M.D.Fla. 2001). The FAA has contended 2 inthis dispute that the proprietor's exception islimited to taking steps to avert unreasonable 3 noise. That is simply incorrect. Congress has not limited theproprietor's exception to noise 4 restrictions, and the FAA itself recognizes that the exception gives airport proprietor's the 5 right to establish weight limits which exclude larger aircraft. See, Millard Refrigerated 6 Services, Inc. v. Omaha Airport Authority, FAA 13-93-19 (August 4, 1995), remanded on 7 other grounds byMillard Refrigerated Services, Inc., v. FAA, 98 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 8 (upholding weight based ban). Moreover, itsimply makes no sense to interpret the 9 Congressional mandate oftheproprietor's exception asbeing limited to noise restrictions. If 10 Congress meant only this, itcertainly could have stated so easily enough. 11 Like federal law, state law empowers Santa Monica toprotect airport safety. The 12 California Constitution gives all California cities broad police powers toprotect the public, 13 safety, health and welfare through local legislation. California Constitution, Article XI, 

### §7. 14 Those powers are even broader forcharter cities like Santa Monica, which are granted 15 additional "home rule" powers by Article XI, 

### §5(a). 16 

## B. The FAA's Claims That The Ordinance Violates Federal Law Are

Arbitrary and Capricious. I. Contrary to the FAA's Unsubstantiated Assertions, the 20 Ordinance Does Not Unreasonably Discriminate Between 21 Categories OfAircraft. 22 Federal law requires airport operators, which have received federal grants, to make 23 their airports "available forpublic use onreasonable conditions and without unjust 24 discrimination." 49 U.S.C. §47107(a)(I). This requirement isechoed inGrant Assurance 25 22(a). (Exhibit 10) The FAA's Notice ofInvestigation against the City and its cease and 26 desist order, both pursuant to Part 16,arebased, inpart, on the contention that the City has 27 unjustly discriminated by banning Category C&D aircraft. As the record shows, this 28 1312

13

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

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contention is spurious and should berejected out ofhand. The Aircraft Conformance 2 Program merely implements federal safety standards. The ban ofCategory C&D aircraft 3 reflects the fact that the Airport's runway lacks runway safety areas forthose faster aircraft. 4 There are no margins for error because the runway ends arejust feet from major streets and 5 homes. 6 Even the FAA itself recognizes that safety may require imposing conditions on 7 Airport usage. Grant Assurance 22(h) states that the City "may establish such fair, equal and 8 not unjustly discriminatory conditions to be metby all users ofthe airport as may be 9 necessary forthe safe and efficient operation ofthe airport." (Exhibit 10) The City has 10 prohibited fasterjets because, under the FAA's own standards, their use ofthe Airport isnot II safe given the lack ofrunway safety areas, topography, and proximity ofhomes.

2. Nor Does The Ordinance Grant Any Exclusive Right. 14 Federal law also prohibits the City from giving any person an exclusive right forthe 15 use ofairport facilities. 49 U.S.C. §§40103(e) and 47 107(a)(4). However, as is obvious on 16 the face ofthe Ordinance, itdoes not exclude anyperson from the use ofairport facilities. 17 Any person who had access prior to implementation ofthe Ordinance can have access after 18 the Ordinance isenforced, as long asthey operate acompliant aircraft. Category C&D 19 operators are not an immutable class. Many C&D aircraft operations at SMO were 20 conducted by operators that utilize multiple aircraft, both compliant and non-compliant. 21 (Trimborn II,~12.) Moreover, the distinction between Category C&D aircraft and Category 22 A&B aircraft isreasonable and rationale because the Airport is approved by the FAA for 23 category Aand B aircraft, but lacks the Runway Safety Areas specified byFAA's own 24 published guidance for'Category C&D aircraft. 25 26 27 28 142

3 4 5 6

15

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO I)LAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page21 of85

3. The Ordinance IsFully Consistent With Both the Documents Which Transferred the Airport Back to Its Long-time Owner, the City Atthe End ofWorld War IIAnd With the 1984 Settlement Agreement Which Resolved the Rights And Responsibilities Of the City and FAA With Respect to The Airport Through the Year 2015. 7 The FAA contends that the Instrument ofTransfer which transferred the Airport back 8 to the City atthe end ofWorld War IIsomehow circumscribes the City's right, asproprietor, 9 to operate the Airport safely. This is, likewise, simply and obviously wrong. Although the 10 City leased the Airport to the federal government during the War, itretained its fee interest II inthe airport land. The conveyances made by the City tothe federal government were 12 merely leases. They expired, by their own terms 12months after President Truman 13 terminated the national state ofemergency by Proclamation 2487 in 1952. (Exhibits 2 14 through 7). Thus, the federal government merely acquired possessory rights, temporarily 15 and by leasehold, during the World War II, and the City'S recovered itspossessory rights 16 after the War ended. As amere tenant, the federal government can not dictate terms upon 17 the landlord (the City) once itsrights as atenant were extinguished. And, even ifthe federal 18 government could have imposed restrictions by this transfer, those restrictions would only 19 have mandated compliance with the federal prohibitions against unjust discrimination and 20 exclusive rights; they would not have added other substantive obligations. 21 Likewise, the Ordinance comports with the 1984Settlement Agreement. (Exhibit 8) 22 Itrequires the City to keep the Airport open until 2015 to avariety ofaircraft. However, that 23 requirement is circumscribed bythe explicit language ofthe Agreement which states: "The 24 airport will be capable ofaccommodating most kinds ofgeneral aviation aircraft, generally 25 consistent with Group IIDesign Standards set forth inFAA advisory Circular 150/300-4B 26 dated February 24, 1983." (Emphasis added.)(Exhibits 8) That circular, which provided 27 technical guidance forthe design ofsafe and efficient airports, provided: "[t]he standards, 

### 28Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page22 of85

recommendations, and guidance material inthis Advisory Circular CAC)define an airport 2 suitable forthe less demanding Aircraft Approach Category A and B airplanes, i.e., airplanes 3 with approach speeds ofless than 121 knots." (Emphasis added.)(Exhibit 9) Thus, by its 4 plain language and the reference to an advisory circular from the FAA, the 1984 Agreement 5 only obligates Santa Monica tokeep its Airport accessible to slower aircraft. That iswhat 6 the City bargained for inthe 1984 Agreement, and that is what the FAA agreed to when it 7 executed the agreement. Additionally, the Runway Data Table on the Airport Layout Plan 8 forthe Airport approved by the FAA inAugust 1991 specifies anAirport Reference Code of 9 B-I1 indicating the FAA's recognition that the Airport was designed for category A and B 10 aircraft. (Exhibit II.) This is further evidence that the 1984 Agreement only obligates the 11 City to keep the Airport accessible to amix ofsmaller aircraft. And, the City has fulfilled its 12 obligations under the 1984Agreement. In2007, the Airport accommodated about 127,000 13 operations, but only about 9,000 operations involved aircraft larger than the B-II category 14 specified inthe Agreement. (See Trimborn II~ 11.) 15 The FAA has also asserted inits administrative complaint and its Order to Show 16 Cause that the Ordinance violates both the Instrument ofTransfer assigning the lease ofthe 17 Airport back to the City atthe end ofWorld War IIand the 1984 Settlement Agreement 18 between the FAA and the City. Again, the evidence belies these claims. 19 20 

# c. The Court Should AlsoConclude That The City IsLikely To Succeed On 21 

### The Merits Because The Tenth Amendment Protects the City Against The 22 

### FAA's Demand That The CityAccept C&D Aircraft AtIts Airport, Even 23 

### Though Doing SoViolates The FAA's Own Safety Standards. 24 The Tenth Amendment ensures the viability ofour system ofdual sovereignty by 25 confirming "that thepower ofthe Federal Government is subject to limits that may, ina 26 given instances, reserve power to the States." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 27 (1992). While Congress has the authority to encourage states toregulate according to 28 16

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page23 of85

federal preferences, "the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to 2 compel the States to do so." New Yorkv. United States, Id. at 149. See Printz v. United 3 States, 52 IU.S. 898, 935(1 997)["The Federal Government may neither issue directives 4 requiring the State to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers

... to 5 administer orenforce afederal regulatory program."] "While Congress has substantial 6 powers to govern the Nation directly, including inareas ofintimate concern to the States, the 7 Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability torequire the 8 States to govern according to Congress' instructions." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 9 at 162. The law is abundantly clear: federal coercion isproscribed. 10 Thus, the central question ofthis case - whether the federal government may require 11 Santa Monica to allow C&D aircraft at itsAirport, notwithstanding the obvious dangers they 12 pose under federal safety standards

- is aquestion ofconstitutional dimension. Particular 13 care must be taken to fully assess the City's rights and duties to ensure protection ofits 14 Tenth Amendment rights. 15 Here, by asix-year long course ofconduct, beginning prior to its administrative 16 complaint against the City and extending through the issuance ofthe Interim Cease and 17 Desist Order, the FAA has attempted tocompel the City to accommodate aircraft for which 18 the Airport was not designed. However, the evidence shows that isunsafe. Mr. James Hall, 19 apast Chairman ofthe National Transportation Safety Board, stated inhis declaration that 20 "in the absence ofmeeting the federal standards forRSAs [Runway Safety Areas] at Santa 21 Monica Airport, Category C&D aircraft should not bepermitted to operate due to the serious 22 risk ofinjuries and deaths to occupants ofthe aircraft and members ofthe community 23 resulting from aircraft operating onthe margins ofsafety with no provision forthepossibility 24 ofmechanical failure orpilot error." (Hall, ~ 16) 25 Significantly, the City's grant assurances with the federal government preserve its 26 proprietary rights, as airport operator. Grant Assurance 22(i) provides that "[t]he sponsor 27 

### ISanta Monica] may prohibit or limit any given type, kind ofclass ofaeronautical use ofthe 28 17

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 24of85

airport ifsuch action isnecessary forthe safe operation ofthe airport ornecessary to serve 2 the civil aviation needs ofthe public." Grant Assurance 22(i). (Exhibit 10) Moreover, the 3 1984 Settlement Agreement provides that the City is only required to accommodate Category 4 A&B aircraft, through its reference to anAdvisory Circular setting forth design standards for 5 airports that only accommodate A&B aircraft. (Exhibits 8 and 9) Now, the FAA, ata 6 preliminary stage ofan administrative proceeding, before an initial determination, before a 7 hearing and before afinal agency determination, attempts to ignore the City's rights and strip 8 the City ofits authority and property by forcing the City touse itsresources to accommodate 9 faster Category C&D, even though the runway has no Runway Safety Areas to create 10 margins lor error or mechanical failure and the runway ends are less than 300 feet from I I family homes. 12 This coercion isboth unlawful under the Tenth Amendment and patently 13 unreasonable. The FAA, itself, has determined that runway safety areas are necessary and 14 appropriate for C&D aircraft. The City, asproprietor and responsible party, has determined IS that itwould be infeasible toprovide such RSAs while maintaining the current usable 16 runway length, because the topography (steep drops offs ateach end ofthe runway) and the 17 immediate proximity oflong-standing residential neighborhoods make installation of 1,000 18 foot flat RSAs impracticable. The FAA has rejected City proposals toprotect safety through 19 adequate RSAs and EMAS. Thus, the only way forthe City to provide the margin ofsafety 20 intended by the FAA design standards istoban operations by C&D aircraft. 21 Ifsuccessful, the FAA's attempt, by its Interim Cease and Desist Order, toprevent 22 enforcement ofthe City's Ordinance and force the City to accommodate Category C&D 23 aircraft would commandeer the resources ofthe City to implement the FAA's regulatory 24 approach ofrequiring an airport proprietor to accept operations ofaircraft far faster than 25 those forwhich the proprietor designed, built and agreed to operate its airport. Inthe event 26 ofan overrun, the FAA's demand, ifsuccessful, would not only force the City to expend 27 emergency resources but also, more importantly, shoulder the liability risks associated with 28 ]8

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 25 of 85

allowing operations ofaircraft without safety measures specified by the FAA's own 2 standards. See, e.g. Gordon vHavasu Palms, 93 Cal.App.4th 244, 249 (2001). 3 Moreover, other than implementing asafety plan that reflects the FAA's standards, 4 there isno mechanism under state law by which the City can shield itself from liability. The 5 California Government Code confers immunities from liability for dangerous conditions on 6 public property but they are limited in scope and would only apply to the Airport ifits 7 runway safety measures were designed inconformity with federal runway standards. See 8 California Government Code §§ 830(a), 830.6, and 835[establishing that cities are 9 responsible and liable for dangerous conditions onpublic property but may obtain statutory 10 immunity by designing and implementing safety protections]. Additionally, the FAA will 11 not assume the risks associated with accommodating faster aircraft atthe Airport. 12 Thus, the Secretary's position isthat pursuant to the FAA's Interim Cease and Desist 13 Order the City has no choice but to accept and shoulder the risks attendant upon 14 accommodating faster aircraft without the safety measures the FAA has designated as 15 appropriate forthose aircraft. The Tenth Amendment precludes the FAA from forcing this 16 obligation upon the City. 17 18 

### III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD ALSO BEDENIED BECAUSE THE 19 

### BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS TIPS MARKEDLY INTHE CITY'S FAVOR 20 ANDDENIAL WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST BYFAVORING 21 PUBLIC SAFETY OVER INDIVIDUAL CONVENIENCE. 22 23 The Declarations ofRobert Trimborn and James Hall attest to and explain the safety 24 risks atthe Santa Monica Airport. In short, there are no runway safety areas. The residents 25 living within 300 feetofthe runway ends are thus atrisk inthe event ofan overrun resulting 26 from pilot error orequipment failure. And, the risk isheightened by increased usage ofthe 27 Airport by C&D aircraft, which travel faster and therefore require longer runway safety 28 19

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

### 28 Case2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page26 of85

areas. The risk is also increased by theAirport's location on aplateau above the surrounding 2 residential neighborhoods. Thus, landing atthe Airport has been likened to landing onthe 3 deck ofan aircraft carrier inthat there isno margin for error. But, the risks are different. 4 The Airport has no tail hook to stop planes. And, inthe event an overrun, afaster aircraft 5 will not plummet into the open sea. Itwill crash into adense residential neighborhood, 6 populated by families who depend upon the City forprotection against overruns. 7 And itisundeniable that overruns occur. There have been two at Santa Monica 8 during the pendency ofthis dispute, one fatal. There was also an overrun at Santa Barbara 9 Airport last year, involving aplane which had landed at Santa Monica 13times inthe 7 10 months before the Santa Barbara accident. (Trimborn II, ~8F.) 11 Atthe hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order, the Court considered and 12 appeared to accept plaintiffs assertion that faster C&D category aircraft do notpose a 13 significant risk at Santa Monica Airport because C&D operations are safer than the 14 operations ofslower aircraft. This assumption should receive additional consideration. All 15 humans make mistakes, aridall equipment fails. While itistrue that the overruns to date at 16 Santa Monica have involved Category B aircraft and while itistrue that pilots ofC&D 17 aircraft may have more training orexperience, those two facts do not warrant dismissal of 18 the City's safety concerns. The vast majority ofoperations atthe Airport involve Category 19 A&B aircraft. Because those aircraft account for over 90%ofthe operations, itisnot 20 surprising that they would be most likely to experience overruns. That likelihood does not 21 make the Airport safe forC&D operations. Though the likelihood ofan overrun by aC orD 22 category aircraft may be smaller, the lower probability ofaCorD aircraft overrun is 23 irrelevant to an airport like Santa Monica Airport which cannot afford even asingle overrun 24 ateither end ofitsrunway. (Trimborn II, ~6). The Category B aircraft, which overran the 25 runway atthe start ofthis dispute, stopped atthe edge ofthe airport property and burned up, 26 killing the passenger and pilot. A Category C orD aircraft traveling much faster and 27 weighing len times more would likely have crashed and burned inthe residentialCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page27of85

neighborhood across the street. And, asthe evidence shows, C&D aircraft do overrun 2 runways. The fatal overrun atTeterboro in2005 involved Category C aircraft which had 3 previously landed at Santa Monica Airport. (Trimborn II,~8C). This undeniable risk is 4 why the FAA's runway safety requirements apply to all airports, notjust those that have 5 experienced overruns and certainly notjust those which only accommodate Category A&B 6 aircraft. The risk is common to all aircraft but the federal safety requirements are more 7 demanding for category C&D aircraft because faster aircraft require greater safety margins. 8 Against this risk

- arisk ofboth injury and death toAirport users and neighbors and a 9 risk to the City of liability that the FAA will not letitavert
- the Court must weigh the 10 convenience ofAirport users who wish totravel inC&D aircraft against the risk ofinjury II and death to nearby residents who homes arejust offthe ends ofthe runway. There are 12 about 25 operations per day involving C&D aircraft. The passengers on those planes have 13 other choices. They may use other aircraft. (Trimborn I, ~~ 13and Trimborn II, ~~ 11to 14.) 14 The evidence shows that fractional operators make iteasy fortheir clients to change aircraft. 15 They may use other airports inthe area. 16 Inruling on this application, the public interest should be dispositive. See United 17 States v.First Nat 'lBank, 379 U.S. 383 (1965). This means that public safety must I8 outweigh the federal governments concerns about the convenience ofarelatively small 19 number ofAirport users. Tothe residents living below the runway ends, this is amatter of 20 safety. not mere inconvenience. Runway overruns happen, and an overrun by aC orD 2I aircraft at Santa Monica would threaten their lives. (See Exhibit 12) And, the City would 22 bear legal responsibility forthat catastrophe. This court should protect the public interest by 23 allowing the City to enforce its Ordinance. 

### 24 25 

### 26 27 28 21

OPPOSITION BYDEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION6

7 DATED: May 6, 2008 8 9 10 

### 1I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 

### 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 

### 2 CONCLUSION Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page28 of85

3 For the forgoing reasons, the City ofSanta Monica respectfully requests that this court 4 decline to issue apreliminary injunction and allow the Ordinance to go into effect toprotect 5 safety during the pendency ofthis dispute.

OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

MARTIN T. TACHIKI Deputy City Attorney Attorneys forDefendant CITY OF SANTA MONICA



### 22 OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 29 of 85

DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN IN SUPPORT OF 2 THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA'S OPPOSITION TO THE 3 APPLICATION FOR APRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 4 5 I, Robert Trimborn, declare that the following istrue and correct based upon my 6 personal knowledge and that, ifcalled upon to testify as awitness in any legal proceeding, I 7 could and would competently testify as set forth inthis declaration. 8 9 I
. Iam the Acting Airport Director ofthe Santa Monica Municipal Airport 10 ("Airport"), and Ihave served asAirport Manager orActing Airport Director continuously 11 since August of 1996. As Istated inmy prior declaration in opposition to the issuance ofthe 12 Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"), Ihave been involved inall aspects ofthe Airport's 13 management during the past twelve years, and Iam familiar with all aspects ofits history 14 and operation. 15 2. As part ofmy management duties inoperating the Airport, Iparticipate in 16 several national and regional aviation organizations such as the Southwest Chapter ofthe 17 American Association ofAirport Executives, the American Association ofAirport 18 Executives, and the Aviation Technical Advisory Committee ofthe Southern California 19 Association ofGovernments. These organizations provide updated information regarding 20 operational issues for airports like Santa Monica Municipal Airport. Ialso monitor the 21 aircraft that use the Airport to ensure that aircraft can safely operate within the physical 22 constraints ofthe Airport. Monitoring events atother airports is an important aspect ofmy 23 management duties since aircraft operating atother airports often become users ofSanta 24 Monica's Airport. 25 3. Inmy prior declaration, Inoted that the Airport sits on aplateau 40 feet above 26 the surrounding residential neighborhoods. As the photographs attached asExhibit Ito the 27 City's Opposition to the Application for aTRO show, homes inthose neighborhoods are less 

### 28 23 DECLARA TION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN2



### 3 4 5 6 

### 7 8 9 10 

### I1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 

### 26 27 28 Case2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 30of85

than 300 feet from both ends oftherunway. Since the Airport has no runway safety areas ("RSAs") to safeguard residential neighbors oraircraft operators using Santa Monica Airport, Ihave become particularly concerned about the probability ofan aircraft overrun into the nearby residential neighborhoods and Ihave monitored the incidents ofaircraft
overruns atother airports to determine ifthere were precautionary measures that the City could institute toprevent acatastrophic loss oflife and property from an accident in Santa Monica. My concern was reinforced when James Hall, aformer Chairperson ofthe National Transportation Safety Board concurred with my belief that the continued operation of category C and 0aircraft without adequate runway safety areas should not bepermitted. See Declaration ofJames Hall submitted with the City's Opposition to the Application for a TRO. 4. Aircraft overruns at Santa Monica Airport and other airports across the country
are stark reminders that aircraft accidents can occur due topilot error ormechanical problems with the aircraft. The dramatic growth incategory C and 

### 0aircraft operations at Santa Monica Airport is afurther reminder that the probability ofpilot error ormechanical problems with these aircraft are increasing. Incidents involving pilot error and aircraft mechanical problems are nottheoretical problems, but actual events that have occurred at Santa Monica and atother airports nationwide. 5. At Santa Monica Airport, the most deadly accident occurred on November 13, 2001 when atwin engine Cessna 340A continued offthe end ofRunway 21, vaulted an embankment and came torest on an airport service road during an aborted takeoff due to pilot error. The details are set forth inparagraph 8B below. More recently onJanuary 13, 2008. asingle engine four seatJabiru aircraft went offthe end ofRunway 21, rolled down the west slope ofthe Airport and came torest on the service road. Itwas reported that the pilot experienced mechanical failure on landing. The details are set forth inparagraph 8G below. 6. While the FAA has focused onthe lower probability ofan aircraft inthe

24 DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORNCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 31 of 85

categories with faster approach speeds overrunning the Airport's runway, my review ofthe 2 incidents that have occurred atthe Santa Monica Airport have ledme tobe concerned about 3 the tremendous difference inthe impact ifacategory Cand 0 aircraft, as opposed to a 4 category Aor B aircraft, were tooverrun the ends ofthe runway into the residential 5 neighborhoods. Although the two aircraft accidents atthe Airport were category A aircraft, 6 the slower speeds atwhich they operated resulted inthe aircraft remaining within the Airport 7 boundaries. With the total absence ofRSAs atthe Santa Monica Airport, the category C and 8 D aircraft incidents described below atother airports demonstrate that similar category C and 9 D aircraft overruns in Santa Monica would go beyond the Airport's boundaries into the 10 residential areasjust offthe ends oftherunway. Without RSAs that meet FAA standards for II the aircraft fleet mix that uses the Airport orother runway safety measures to mitigate the 12 impact ofpilot error or aircraft mechanical failure, the lower probabilities ofacategory C 13 and D aircraft overrun isnot particularly relevant for an airport that cannot afford even a 14 single category CorD aircraft overrun. See Exhibit 12the City'S Opposition to the 15 Application for aTRO. 16 7. There have also been dramatic jet aircraft runway overruns atthe airports in 17 Santa Barbara, Teterboro, New Jersey and Palomar airport inCarlsbad, California

- some of 18 which resulted in loss oflife and substantial property damage and all ofwhich were by the 19 same type ofaircraft that use Santa Monica Airport. As the previously submitted Exhibit 12 20 illustrates, had the overruns atTeterboro and Santa Barbara occurred atthe Santa Monica 21 Airport, the aircraft would have traveled agood distance into the residential neighborhoods 22 adjacent to the Airport. As the specifics ofthese accidents indicate, pilot error or mechanical 23 problems do occur regardless ofthe aircraft type orthe caliber ofthe pilot operating the 24 aircraft. 25 8. Although acategory C or0 aircraft has notyet overrun the ends ofthe runway 26 at Santa Monica, my review ofthe National Transportation Safety Board's ("NTSB") reports 27 have revealed that several ofthe overrun accidents atother airports involved the same 28 25 DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORNCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 32of85

aircraft models that use the Santa Monica Airport. Based onNTSB reports, overruns caused 2 by pilot error and mechanical problems occur atboth air carrier and general aviation airports 3 and with both commercial and private pilots. Some ofthe accidents that have occurred 4 recently are: 5 A. Little Rock, Arkansas

- AMcDonnell Douglas MD-82 aircraft operated 6 by American Airlines overran the end ofthe runway onJune 1, 1999 while landing during 7 severe thunderstorms. The NTSB concluded that errors made by the flight crew contributed 8 to the overrun. See Exhibit 22. asummary copy ofNTSB report DCA99AM060. 9 B. Santa Monica, California

- On November 13,2001, aCessna 340A 10 overran the end ofthe runway during an aborted take-off resulting inthe death oftwo II people. The NTSB concluded that the pilot failed to remove the control gust lock prior to 12 take-off and further failed to abort the take-off with sufficient runway remaining to stop the 13 aircraft on the runway. See Exhibit 23, asummary copy ofNTSB report LAX02FA028. 14 C. Teterboro, New Jersey

- OnFebruary 2, 2005, aChallenger CL-600- 15 IAII overran the end ofthe runway on departure. The aircraft went through an airport 16 perimeter fence, across asix-lane highway where itstruck amotor vehicle and passed 17 through aparking lotbefore impacting abuilding. The NTSB concluded that the pilot failed 18 to ensure that the aircraft was loaded within proper weight and balance limits, but still 19 attempted to take-off from the airport. See Exhibit 24, asummary copy ofNTSB report 20 DCA05MA031. The actual aircraft involved inthis accident had operated previously atthe 21 Santa Monica Airport on June 23, 2004. 22 D. Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois

- On December 8,2005, aBoeing 23 737-300 overran the end ofthe runway upon landing atMidway Airport. The aircraft went 24 through both ablast fence and airport perimeter fence before entering an adjacent roadway 25 where ithit amotor vehicle and killed achild inthe motor vehicle. The NTSB cited several 26 factors related to the pilot's judgment and the absence ofarunway safety area orother 27 aircraft arresting system to capture an aircraft overrunning the end ofthe runway. See 28 26 DECLARA nON OF ROBERT TRIMBORN

### 2

Although the Santa Monica Airport has not had an overrun from acategory C

Case2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 33of85

Exhibit 25, asummary copy ofNTSB report DCA06MA009.



## E. McClellan-Palomar Airport, Carlsbad, California

- On January 24, 3 2006, aCessna 560 Citation overran the end ofthe runway on landing atthe airport. The 4 NTSB found that thepilot's failure to attain aproper touchdown point during the landing and 5 approach speed contributed tothe accident. 

### Fourpeople died inthe accident. See Exhibit 6 26, asummary copy ofNTSB report SEA06MA047. 7 F. Santa Barbara, California

- On June lO, 2007, aFalcon 900 overran the 8 end ofthe runway on departure from the airport. The airline transport rated captain ofthe 9 aircraft reported that the aircraft accelerated normally, but the aircraft did not respond ashe 10 had expected. Although the captain decided to abort the take-off, he did not have sufficient II remaining runway and the aircraft overran the end ofthe runway. Fifteen people were 12 injured inthe accident. See Exhibit 27, asummary copy ofNTSB report SEA07LAI52. 13 The actual aircraft involved inthis accident has operated atthe Santa Monica Airport thirteen 14 times between November 15,2006 and May 5, 2007. 15 G. Santa Monica, California

- Several months ago onJanuary 13,2008, a 16 DeSousa Jabiru J400 aircraft overran the end ofthe runway while landing atthe Santa 17 Monica Airport. The pilot reported landing approximately halfway down the runway, 18 applying full brakes, but experienced brake failure three quarters ofthe way down the 19 runway. Three people were injured when the aircraft skidded down a35 foot embankment. 20 See Exhibit 28, asummary copy ofNTSB report SEA08LA060.

9. 21 22 or

### D aircraft, many ofthe aircraft noted above also operate atthe Santa Monica Airport. As 

### I 23 stated above, the Challenger CL-600-lA aircraft that overran the end ofthe runway at airport 24 inTeterboro, New Jersey on February 2,2005 had previously been to the Santa Monica 25 Airport on June 23, 2004 and the Falcon 900 aircraft involved inthe Santa Barbara incident 26 on June IO, 2007 operated atthe Santa Monica Airport thirteen times between November 15, 27 2006 and May 

### 5, 2007. Pilots ofvarying degrees ofexperience and aircraft ofall types have 28 27 DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORNCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 35 of 85

operations forthe one year period ending inJune 2000. By calendar year 2007, the number 2 ofcategory C and D aircraft have grown to over 9000 operations, an increase of32%. 3 12. On average 174aircraft use the Airport on adaily basis and ofthat number, 4 only about 12to 13aircraft are either category C orD. Ofthe people who use the category 5 C and D aircraft. many ofthem are users ofcharter or fractional share operations that permit 6 the user to shift to other aircraft. Those charter and fractional share users are able to shift to 7 aircraft with slower approach speeds that are compatible with the Airport's Airport 8 Reference Code ("ARC") designation ofB-1I. See Exhibits 16, 17and 18,which were 9 attached to the City's Opposition tothe Application for aTRO and are copies ofrelevant 10 information from the internet pages ofthree fractional share companies regarding the right to II trade to acompliant aircraft. Inthe month ofApril 2008, there were 641 total category C 12 and D aircraft operations and 303 ofthose operations, or about 47.3%, were by fractional 13 share companies. As I stated inmy earlier declaration, the City's Ordinance will not stop 14 any person from using the Airport. 15 13. Although the FAA has argued that the City's Ordinance would interfere with 16 the safe and efficient use ofair space inthe Los Angeles area by creating congestion and 17 delay forairtraffic, itprovided no facts to substantiate that claim. First, as stated above, the 18 individuals who use the 12to 13aircraft that could be affected bythe Ordinance could 19 switch to aircraft that are compliant tothe Airport's current ARC ofB-II. Second, airports in 20 the region have operated atmuch higher levels inthepast and the number ofaircraft that 21 could potentially be diverted from Santa Monica Airport by enforcement ofthe Ordinance 22 could bereadily accommodated by airports inthe Los Angeles area. For example, in2007, 23 Los Angeles International Airport ("LAX") averaged about 933 aircraft per day and Van 24 Nuys Airport averaged about 513 aircraft per day. True and correct copies ofthe statistics 25 for LAX and Van Nuys airports from the Los Angeles World Airport's internet site are 26 attached hereto as Exhibits 30 and 31. Third, the Hawthorne Airport requested the assistance 27 ofthe City ofSanta Monica indiverting category Cand 0aircraft to its airport since itis 28 29 DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN18

DECLARA nON OF ROBERT TRIMBORN

Case2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page 36of85

operating below its operational capacity. InJanuary 2008, Ihad aconversation with the 2 operator ofthe Hawthorne Airport and he indicated their desire to increase the number of 3 category C and 0 operations atthe Hawthorne Airport. 4 14. Some current users ofCategory Cand 0aircraft will undoubtedly convert to 5 compliant aircraft, but even ifnone did, the 12to 13aircraft that could be affected bythe 6 City's Ordinance would not have asignificant effect onthe traffic atthese two airports or air 7 traffic inthe Los Angeles area. As the attached table from the internet site for Van Nuys 8 Airport shows, as recently as 1999, total operations were 598,564 which is over 200,000 9 more operations then the 2007 total operations level of394,915. A true and correct copy of 10 the operations figures shown the Van Nuys Airport internet site is attached hereto as Exhibit I I 32. Similarly, in 1999, Los Angeles International Airport ("LAX") had total operations of 12 779. I50. which isalmost over 100,000 more then the 2007 total operations level of680,954. 13 True and correct copies ofthe internet pages forthe operations levels atLos Angeles 14 International Airport are attached hereto as Exhibits 33 and 34. In addition, other airports in 15 the area include the facilities atHawthorne, Torrance, Long Beach, Burbank and EIMonte. 16 Itisentirely baseless forthe FAA to contend that 9000 operations per year or

### 25 operations 17 per day would cause congestion and delay for airtraffic inthe Los Angeles area.

19 Ideclare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is true and correct and is 20 executed this 5th day ofMay 2008 under the laws ofthe United States ofAmerica and the 21 State ofCalifornia inthe City ofSanta Monica, California. 22 23 24 25 

### 26 27 28 30Case2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 37of85



# EXHIBIT 22DCA99MA060

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 1of 1 Page 38 of 85

NTSB Identification: DCA99MA060. The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (OMS). Please contact RecQrds Mana~menLDivision Scheduled 14CFR Part 121: Air Carrier AMERICAN AIRLINES INC Accident occurred Tuesday, June 01, 1999 in LITTLE ROCK, AR

Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/28/2002 Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registration: N215AA Injuries: II Fatal, 45 Serious, 65 Minor, 24 Uninjured. The full report (NTSB/AAR-01-02) is available on the NTSB Web site. See http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictnlpublictn.htm for details. On June 1, 1999, at 2350:44 central daylight time, 1American Airlines flight 1420, aMcDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), N215AA, crashed after itoverran the end ofrunway 4R during landing at Little Rock National Airport in Little Rock, Arkansas. Flight 1420 departed from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Texas, about 2240 with 2 flight crewmembers, 4 flight attendants, and 139 passengers aboard and touched down in Little Rock at2350:20. After' departing the end ofthe runway, the airplane struck several tubes extending outward from the left edge ofthe instrument landing system (ILS) localizer array, located 411 feet beyond the end ofthe runway; passed through a chain link security fence and over arock embankment to aflood plain, located approximately 15 feet below the runway elevation; and collided"with the structure supporting the runway 22L approach lighting system. The captain and 10passengers were killed; the first officer, the flight attendants, and 105passengers received serious or minor injuries; and 24 passengers were not injured.2 The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and apostcrash fire. Flight 1420 was operating under the provisions of 14Code ofFederal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) ofthis accident as follows: The flight crew's failure to discontinue the approach when severe thunderstorms and their associated hazards to flight operations had moved into the airport area and the crew's failure to ensure that the spoilers had extended after touchdown. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's (1) impaired performance resulting from fatigue and the situational stress associated with the intent to land under the circumstances, (2) continuation ofthe approach to alanding when the company's maximum crosswind component was exceeded, and (3) use ofreverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio after landing.

Index for JuI11999 

### I II1d~)LQCmQnt~



# 031
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# EXHIBIT 23LA~~~:-g7a8-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Pllge 1of 1 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 4(Jof 85

NTSB Identification: LAX02FA028. The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division 14CFR Part 91:General Aviation Accident occurred Tuesday, November 13, 2001 in Santa Monica, CA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/23/2003 Aircraft: Cessna 340A, registration: N2RR

Injuries: 2Fatal. During an aborted nighttime takeoff, the airplane continued offthe end ofthe 4,987-foot-10ng runway, vaulted an embankment, and impacted aguardrail on an airport service road 30 feet below. According to the manufacturer's pilot operating handbook, the takeoff distance required for the ambient conditions was 1,620 feet and the accelerate-stop distance was 2,945 feet. Several witnesses reported observing the airplane traveling along the runway atanunusually high speed, with normal engine sound, and without becoming airborne; followed by an abrupt reduction in engine power and the sound ofscreeching tires. Skid marks were present on the last 1,000 feet ofthe runway. Inthe wreckage, the gust lock/control lock was found engaged inthe pilot's control column. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) ofthis accident as follows: The pilot's failure to remove the control gust lock prior to takeoff and his failure to abort the takeoff with sufficient runway remaining to stop the airplane on the runway. Full narrative 

### aveilsble Index for Nov200l 

## IIndexof months



# 032
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# EXHIBIT 24DCA05MAOJJ

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

NTSB Identification: DCA05MA031. The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records ~anagemenlI)ivision Nonscheduled 14CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter Accident occurred Wednesday, February 02, 2005 inTeterboro, NJ

Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/1/2007 Aircraft: Bombardier CL-600-1 A11,registration: N370V Injuries: 4 Serious, 2Minor, 7Uninjured. The Safety Board's full report is available athttp://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number isNTSB/AAR-06/04. On February 2,2005, about 0718 eastern standard time, aBombardier Challenger CL-600-1All, N370V, ran off the departure end ofrunway 6 atTeterboro.Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey, at aground speed ofabout 110knots; through an airport perimeter fence; across a sixlane highway (where it struck avehicle); and into aparking lotbefore impacting abuilding. The two pilots were seriously injured, aswere two occupants inthe vehicle. The cabin aide, eight passengers, and one person in the building received minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postimpact fire. The accident flight was an on-demand passenger charter flight from TEB to Chicago Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois. The flight was subject to the provisions of 14 Code ofFederal Regulations (CFR) Part 135and operated by Platinum Jet Management, LLC (PJM), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, under the auspices of acharter management agreement with Darby Aviation (Darby), Muscle Shoals, Alabama. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) ofthis accident as follows: the pilots' failure to ensure the airplane was loaded within weight and balance limits and their attempt to takeoff with the center ofgravity well forward ofthe forward takeoff limit, which prevented the airplane from rotating atthe intended rotation speed. Contributing to the accident were: 1)PJM's conduct ofcharter flights (using PJM pilots and airplanes) without proper Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification and its failure to
. ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14CFR Part 135 requirements; 2) Darby Aviation's failure to maintain operational control over 14CFR Part 135 flights being conducted under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the development of systemic patterns offlight crew performance deficiencies like those observed in this accident; 3) the failure ofthe Birmingham, Alabama, FAA Flight Standards District Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight ofoperations conducted under Darby's Part 135 certificate; and 4) the FAA's tacit approval ofarrangements such as that between Darby and PJM.

Index for Feb2005 

## IIndex ofmonths



## .••. 033 http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsblbrief.asp?ev _id=20050208XOO 153&key= 1 5/2/2008Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 43 of 85



# EXHIBIT 25DCA06MA009

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page I of I Page 44 of 85

NTSB Identification: DCA06MA009. The docket is stored inthe Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records M~magement Division

. Scheduled 14CFR Part 121: Air Carrier SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO Accident occurred Thursday, December 08, 2005 in Chicago, IL

Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/29/2007 Aircraft: Boeing 737-700, registration: N471WN Injuries: 1Fatal, 1 Serious, 21 Minor, 85 Uninjured. The Safety Board's full report is available athttp://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm. The Aircraft Accident Brief number isNTSB/AAR-07/06. On December 8, 2005, abouU914 central standard time, Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 1248, aBoeing 737-7H4, N471 WN, ran off the departure end ofrunway 31 center (31C) after landing at Chicago Midway Airport (MOW), Chicago, Illinois. The airplane rolled through ablast fence, and airport perimeter fence, and onto an adjacent roadway, where it struck an automobile before coming to a stop. A child in the automobile was killed, one automobile occupant received serious injuries, and three other automobile occupants received minor injuries. Eighteen ofthe 103 airplane occupants (88 passengers, 3 flight attendants, and 2pilots) received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplarie was being operated under the provisions of 14Code ofFederal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI), Baltimore, Maryland; about 1758 eastern standard time. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed atthe time ofthe accident flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) ofthis accident as follows: The pilots' failure to use available reverse thrust in atimely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted in arunway overrun. This failure occurred because the pilots' first experience and lack offamiliarity with the airplane's autobrake system distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the challenging landing. Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airline's 1)failure to provide its pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies and procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations; 2) programming and design ofits onboard performance computer, which did not present inherent assumptions inthe program critical to pilot decision making; 3) plan to implement new autobrake procedures without afamiliarization period; and 4) failure to include amargin of safety in the arrival assessment to account for operational uncertainties. Also contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to divert to another airport given reports that included poor braking action and atailwind component greater than 5knots. Contributing to the severity ofthe accident was the absence ofan engineering materials arresting system. which was needed because ofthe limited runway safety area beyond the departure end of runway 3JC. Full nl!!Ta,ti yeaYf1.ila,bl

e Index for Dec2Q05 

### lIndex.of months



## .~... 03!r http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsblbrief.asp?ev _id=20051213XO 1964&key= I 5/2/2008Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 45 of 85



# EXHIBIT 26SEA@~2l:t8-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed05/06/2008 Page

## ~~f1gg2

NTSB Identification: SEA06MA047. The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (OMS). Please contact Records Management Division 14CFR Part 91: General Aviation Accident occurred Tuesday, January 24, 2006 in Carlsbad, CA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/20/2007 Aircraft: Cessna 560, registration: N86CE

Injuries: 4Fatal. Air traffic control cleared the flightcrew for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 24, which was 4,897 feet long. The flightcrew then reported that they had the runway in sight, cancelled their instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance, and executed avisual flight rules (VFR) approach in VFR conditions to the airport. The reported winds favored alanding toward the east, onto the opposite runway (runway 6). During the approach, after aquery from the first officer, the captain indicated tothe first officer that he was going to "

...land to the east," consistent with the reported winds. However, the final approach and subsequent landing were made to runway 24; which produced asix-knot tailwind. During the approach sequence the captain maintained an airspeed that was approximately 30knots higher than the correct airspeed for the aircraft's weight, resulting inthe aircraft touching down about 1,500 feet further down the runway than normal, and much faster than normal. The captain then delayed the initiation of a go-around until the first officer asked ifthey were going around. Although the aircraft lifted off the runway surface prior to departing the paved overrun during the delayed go-around it impacted alocalizer antenna platform, whose highest non-frangible structure was located approximately 304 feet past the end ofthe runway, and approximately two feet lower than the terrain atthe departure end ofthe runway. The aircraft continued airborne as itflew over downsloping terrain for about 400 more feet before colliding with the terrain and acommercial storage building that was located at an elevation approximately 80 feet lower than the terrain at the end ofthe runway. The localizer antenna platform was located outside ofthe designated runway safety area, and met all applicable FAA siting requirements. The captain had type 2 diabetes, for which he took oral medication and monitored blood sugar levels. He did not reveal his history ofdiabetes to the FAA. The captain's post-accident toxicology testing was consistent with an elevated average blood sugar level over the previous several months; however, no medical records ofthe captain's treatment were available, and the investigation could not determine ifthe captain's diabetes or treatment were potentially factors in the accident. The captain ofthe accident flight was the sole owner of acorporation that was asked by the two owners ofthe accident airplane to manage the airplane forthem under aPart 91 business flight operation. The two owners were not pilots and had no professional aviation experience, but they desired to be flown to major domestic airports so that they could transfer and travel internationally via commercial airlines. One ofthe two owners stated that the purpose ofthe accident flight was to fly abusinessman to ameeting, and to also transport one ofthe owner's wives to visit family at the same destination. According to one ofthe owners, the businessman was interested inbeing athird owner in the accident airplane, so the owner permitted the businessman to fly. The owner also stated that the accident pilot told him that the passenger would pay for expenses directly related to the operation ofthe airplane for the flight (permitted under FAA Part 91 rules), and an "hourly fee" (prohibited under FAA Part 91 rules); however, no documentation was found to corroborate this statement forthe accident flight orprevious flights.


## .." 035 http://www .ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev _id=20060202X00149&key= 1 5/2/2008SEAD6MA047

-Case-2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) ofthis accident as follows: The captain's delayed decision to execute abalked landing (go-around) during the landing roll. Factors contributing to the accident include the captain's improper decision to land with a tailwind, his excessive airspeed on final approach, and his failure to attain aproper touchdown point during landing. Full narrative available



## ..• 036
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# EXHIBIT 27SEA07LA152

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 1of2 Page 49 of 85

NTSB Identification: SEA07LA152 14CFR Part 91:General Aviation Accident occurred Sunday, June 10,2007 in Santa Barbara, CA Aircraft: Dassault-Breguet Mystere Falcon 900, registration: N914DD Injuries: 15Uninjured. This ispreliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors inthis

report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. On June 10,2007, approximately 1412 Pacific daylight time, N914DD, registered as aDassaultBreguet Mystere Falcon 900, was substantially damaged when itoverran the departure end of Runway 25 on take-off roll atthe Santa Barbara Municipal Airport, Santa Barbara, California. The airplane was registered to Kerry Acquisitions LLC, ofConcord, Massachusetts, and operated by Trishan Air, of Santa Barbara. The airline transport rated captain, airline transport rated pilot acting as first officer/co-pilot (Fa), and 13passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed forthe 14CFR Part 91 business flight, and an instrument flight plan was filed. The flight was originating atthe time ofthe accident. ' In atelephone interview with the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC), the captain, who was acting as the pilot-in-command, reported that during the take-offroll the airplane accelerated normally. The captain stated that as the airplane accelerated the co-pilot, verbalized "VI" and shortly thereafter "rotate." The captain further stated that immediately after "rotate" was verbalized he applied back pressure on the control column, "

...but the nose wouldn't come up. Icontinued to pull back on the yoke until itwas all the way back inmy chest, but there was still no response. The nose wouldn't come off the ground." The captain reported that he then rejected the takeoff but was unable to stop the airplane on the remaining available runway, which resulted in the aircraft overrunning the end ofRunway 25, coming torest slightly offthe extended centerline about 300 feet from the departure end. Company maintenance personnel, who examined the airplane shortly after the occurrerice, reported that the airplane had sustained substantial damage to the forward section ofthe pressure vessel, just aft ofwhere the nose landing gear is attached; the nose landing gear had separated during the overrun. At the request ofthe lIC, Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) inspectors from the Van Nuys Flight Standards District Office, Van Nuys, California, will provide oversight supervision during an examination ofthe airplane by representatives from Dassault-Breguet, in an effort to identify the origin ofthe anomaly.



## .••., 037 http://www .ntsb.gov/ntsblbriefasp?ev jd=20070616X00749&key=I 5/2/2008SEAD7LA15')

-Case 2:rr8-cv-02695-GW-E

Index for J\ln2007 I Indexofmonths Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

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# EXHIBIT 28SEA08LA060

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Page 1 of 1 Page 52 of 85 Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

NTSB Identification: SEA08LA060 14CFR Part 91: General Aviation Accident occurred Sunday, January 13,2008 in Santa Monica, CA Aircraft: DeSousa Jabiru J400, registration: N522RJ

Injuries: 3 Uninjured. This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this

report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. On January 13, 2008, at 1720 Pacific standard time, an experimental DeSousa Jabiru J400 airplane, N522RJ, overran runway 21 during landing atthe Santa Monica Airport, Santa Monica, California. The airplane sustained substantial damage and the pilot, the owner and operator ofthe airplane, and the two passengers, were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight conducted under the provisions of 14CFR Part 91. The airplane departed Catalina Island, California, approximately 35 minutes prior to the accident. Santa Monica was the pilot's intended destination and no flight plan was filed. During atelephone .conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-incharge, the pilot reported the airplane touched down approximately halfway down the runway. He reported that he applied full brakes, however, approximately three quarters the way down the runway, the brakes failed and the airplane overran the runway. After exiting the runway, the airplane collided with aconcrete ditch and skidded down a35-foot embankment.

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# 03qCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 53of85



# EXHIBIT 29Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

U.S. Department ofTransportation Federal Aviation Administration Filed 05/06/2008 Page 54 of 85



# Advisory Circular

Subject: Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns AC No: 150/5220-22A Change:

I. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (Ae) contains standards for the planning, design, installation, and maintenance of Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) in runway safety areas (RSA). Engineered Materials means high energy absorbing materials of selected strength,. which will reliably and predictably crush under the weight ofan aircraft. 2. CANCELLA TlON. This AC cancels AC 150/5220-22, Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS)for Aircraft Overruns, dated August 28, 1998. 3. BACKGROUND. Aircraft can and do overrun the ends of runways, sometimes with devastating results. An overrun occurs when an aircraft passes beyond the end of a runway during an aborted takeoff or while landing. Data on aircraft overruns over a 12-

.year period (1975 to 1987) indicate that approximately 90% of all overruns occur at exit speeds of 70 knots or less (Reference 7, Appendix 4) and most come to rest between the extended runway edges within 1000 feet of the runway end (Reference 6, Appendix 4). To minimize the hazards of overruns, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) incorporated the concept of a safety area beyond the runway end into airport design standards. To meet the standards, the safety area must be capable, under normal (dry) conditions, of supporting the occasional passage of aircraft that overrun the runway without causing structural damage to the aircraft or injury to its occupants. The safety area also provides greater accessibility for emergency equipment after an overrun incident. There are many runways, particularly those constructed prior to the adoption of the safety area standards, where natural obstacles, local development, andlor environmental constraints, make the construction of a standard safety area impracticable. There have been accidents at some of these airports where the ability to stop an overrunning aircraft within Date: 9/30/2005 Initiated by: AAS-I 00

the runway safety area would have prevented major damage to aircraft and/or injuries to passengers. Recognizing the difficulties associated with achieving a standard safety area at all airports, the FAA undertook research programs on the use. of various materials for arresting systems. These research programs, as well as, evaluation of actual aircraft overruns into an EMAS have demonstrated its effectiveness in arresting aircraft overruns. 4. APPLICATION. Runway safety area standards cannot be modified orwaived. The standards remain in effect regardless of the presence of natural or manmade objects or surface conditions that might create a hazard to aircraft that overrun the end of a runway. A continuous evaluation of all practicable alternatives for improving each sub-standard RSA is required. FAA Order 5200.8, Runway Safety Area Program, explains the evaluation process. FAA Order 5200.9, Financial Feasibility and Equivalency ofRunway Safety Area Improvements and Engineered Material Arresting Systems, is used in connection with FAA Order 5200.8 to determinet he best practicable and financially feasible alternative for an RSA improvement. The FAA does not require an airport sponsor to reduce. the length of a runway or declare its length to be less than the actual pavement length to meet runway safety area standards if there is an operational impact to the airport. An example ofan operational impact would be an airport's inability to accommodate its current or planned aircraft fleet. Under these circumstances, installing an EMAS is another way ofenhancing safety. A standard EMAS provides a level of safety that is generally equivalent to a full RSA built to the dimensional standards in AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design. It also provides an acceptable level of safety for undershoots.

••••• i 

# O~GCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E

AC 150/5220-22A The FAA recommends the guidelines and standards in this AC for the design of EMAS. Ingeneral, this AC is not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation. It is issued for guidance purposes and to outline amethod of compliance. However, use of these guidelines is mandatory for an airport sponsor installing an EMAS funded under Federal grant assistance programs or on an airport certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 139, Certification ofAirports. Mandatory terms such as "shall" or "must" used herein apply only to those who seek to demonstrate compliance by use ofthe specific method described by this AC. If an airport sponsor elects to follow an alternate method, the alternate method must have been determined by the FAA to be an acceptable means of complying with this AC, the runway safety area standards inAC 150/5300-/3, and 14CFR Part 139. 5. RELATED READrNG MATERIAL. Appendix 4, Related Reading Material, contains a list of documents with supplemental material relating to EMAS. These documents contain information on materials evaluated, as well as design, construction, and testing procedures utilized. Testing and data generated under these FAA studies may be used as input to an EMAS design without additional justification. 6. PLANNING CHARTS. The figures included in Appendix 2, Planning Charts, are for planning purposes only. They are intended as apreliminary screening tool and are not sufficient for final design. Final design must be customized for each installation. The figures illustrate estimated EMAS stopping distance capabilities for various aircraft types. The design used in each chart is optimized specifically for the aircraft noted on the chart. Charts are based on standard design conditions, i.e. 75-foot set-back, no reverse thrust, and poor braking (0.25 braking friction coefficient).

a. Example 1. Assume a runway with a DC-9 (or similar) as the design aircraft. Figure A2-1 shows that an EMAS 400 feet in length (including a 75-foot set-back) is capable of stopping a DC-9 within the confines of the system at runway exit speeds of up to 75 knots. b. Example 2. Assume the same runway, but assume the design aircraft is a DC-1O (or similar). Figure A2-2 shows an EMAS of the same length, but designed for larger aircraft, can stop the DC-I 0 within the confines of the system at runway exit speeds of up to 62 knots. 7. PRELIMINARY PLANNING. Follow the guidance in FAA Orders 5200.8 and 5200.9 to Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 55 of 85

9/30/2005 determine practicable, financially feasible alternatives for RSA improvements. Additional cost and performance information forEMAS options to consider in the analysis can be obtained from the EMAS manufacturer. 8. SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. For purposes ofdesign, the EMAS can be considered fixed by its function and frangible since it is designed to fail at a specified impact load. An aircraft arresting system such as EMAS is exempt from the requirements of 14 CFR Part 77, Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace. When EMAS is the selected option to upgrade a runway safety area, it is considered to meet the safety area requirements of 14 CFR Part /39. The following system design requirements must prevail for all EMAS installations:

a. Concept. An EMAS is designed to stop an overrunning aircraft by exerting predictable deceleration forces on its landing gear as the EMAS material crushes. It must be designed to minimize the potential for structural damage to aircraft, since such damage could result in injuries to passengersandlor affect the predictability of deceleration forces. An EMAS should be design for a20-year service life. b. Location. An EMAS is located beyond the end of the runway and centered on the extended runway centerline. It will usually begin at some setback distance from the end of the runway to avoid damage due tojet blast and undershoots (Figure A1-2, Appendix 1). This distance will vary depending on the available area and the EMASmaterials. Where the area available is longer than required for installation of a standard EMAS designed to stop the design aircraft at an exit speed of 70 knots, the EMAS should be placed as far from the runway end as practicable. Such placement decreases the possibility of damage to the system from short overruns or undershoots and results in a more economical system by considering the deceleration capabilities of the existing runway safety area. The resulting runway safety area must provide adequate protection for aircraft that touch down prior to the runway threshold (undershoot). Adequate protection is provided by either: (I) providing at least 600 feet (or the length of the standard runway safety area, whichever is less) between the runway threshold and the far end ofthe EMAS bed ifthe approach end ofthe runway has vertical guidance or (2) providing the full length standard runway safety area when no vertical guidance is provided. An EMAS is not intended to meet the definition of a stopway as provided in AC 150/5300-13. The runwayCase 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

9/30/2005 safety area and runway object free area lengths begin at a runway end when a stopway isnot provided. When a stopway is provided, these lengths begin atthe stopway end (AC 150/5300-13). The airport sponsor, EMAS manufacturer, and the appropriate FAA Regional Airports Division! Airport District Office (ADO) should consult regarding the EMAS location to determine the appropriate location beyond the end of the runway for the EMAS installation for aspecific runway.

c. Design Method. An EMAS design must be supported by avalidated design method that can predict the performance ofthe system. The design (or critical) aircraft is defined as that aircraft using the associated runway that imposes the greatest demand upon the EMAS. This is usually, but not always, the heaviest/largest aircraft that regularly uses the runway. EMAS performance is dependent not only on aircraft weight, but landing gear configuration and tire pressure. In general, use the maximum take-off weight (MTOW) for the design aircraft. However, there may be instances where less than the MTOW will require a longer EMAS. All configurations should be considered in optimizing the EMAS design. To the extent practicable, however, the EMAS design should consider both the aircraft. that imposes the greatest demand upon the EMAS and the range of aircraft expected to operate on the runway. In some instances, this composite design aircraft may be preferable to optimizing the EMAS for. a single design aircraft. Other factors unique to a particular airport, such as available RSA and air cargo operations, should also be considered in the final design. The airport sponsor, EMAS manufacturer, and the appropriate FAA Regional Airports Division!ADO should consult regarding the selection of the design aircraft that will optimize the EMAS for a specific airport. The design method must be derived from field or laboratory tests. Testing may be based either on passage of an actual aircraft or an equivalent single wheel load through a test bed. The design must consider multiple aircraft parameters, including but not limited to allowable aircraft gear loads, gear configuration, tire contact pressure, aircraft center of gravity, and aircraft speed. The model must calculate imposed aircraft gear loads, g-forces on aircraft occupants, deceleration rates, and stopping distances within the arresting system. Any rebound of the crushed material that may lessen its effectiveness must also beconsidered. d. Operation. The EMAS must be a passive system. Filed 05/06/2008 Page 56 of 85

AC 150/5220-22A

e. Width. The minimum width ofthe EMAS must be the width of the runway (plus any sloped area as necessary--see 8 (h) below). f. Base. The EMAS must be constructed on a paved surface capable of supporting the occasional passage ofthe critical design aircraft using the runway and fully loaded Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) vehicles without deformation of the base surface or structural damage to the aircraft or vehicles. It must be designed to perform satisfactorily under all local weather, temperature, and soil conditions. Itmust provide sufficient support to facilitate removal of the aircraft from the EMAS. Full strength runway pavement is not required. Pavement suitable for shoulders and blast pads is suitable as an EMAS base. AC 150/5300-13 provides recommendations on pavement for shoulders and blast pads. State highway specifications may also be used. g. Entrance Speed. To the maximum extent possible, the EMAS must be designed to decelerate the design aircraft expected to use the runway at exit speeds of 70 knots (approach category C and D aircraft) without imposing loads that exceed the aircraft's design limits, causing major structural damage to the aircraft or imposing excessive forces on its occupants. Contact the FAA's Airport Engineering Division (AAS-IOO) at 202-267-7669 for guidance when other than approach category C and D aircraft is proposed for the EMAS design. Standard design

. conditions are no reverse thrust and poor braking (0.25 braking friction coefficient). Generally, when there is insufficient RSA available for a standard EMAS, the EMAS must be designed to achieve the maximum deceleration of the design aircraft within the available runway safety area. However, a 40-knot minimum exit speed should be used for the design of a non-standard EMAS. For design purposes, assume the aircraft has all of its landing gear inf ull contact with the runway and is traveling within the confines ofthe runway and parallel to the runway centerline upon overrunning the runway end. The airport sponsor, EMAS manufacturer, and the appropriate FAA Regional Airports Division! ADO should consult regarding the selection of the appropriate design entrance speed for the EMAS installation. Note that current EMAS models are not as accurate for aircraft with a maximum take-off weight less than 25,000 pounds.

3



## ...• 042Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E

AC 150/5220-22A h. Aircraft Evacuation. The EMAS must be designed to enable safe ingress and egress as well as movement of ARFF equipment (not necessarily without damage to the EMAS) operating during an emergency. Ifthe EMAS is to be built above existing grade, sloped areas sufficient to allow the entrance ofARFF vehicles from the front and sides must be provided. Provision for access from the back ofthe EMAS maybe provided if desirable. Maximum slopes must be based on the EMAS material and performance characteristics of the airport's ARFF equipment. i, Maintenance Access. The EMAS must be capable of supporting regular pedestrian traffic for the purposes of maintenance of the arresting material and co-located navigation aids without damage to the surface ofthe EMAS bed. An EMAS is not intended to support vehicular traffic for maintenance purposes. j. Undershoots. The EMAS must not cause control problems for aircraft undershoots which touch down in the EMAS bed. Fulfillment of this requirement may be based exclusively on flight simulator tests. The tests will establish the minimum material strength and density that does not cause aircraft control problems during an undershoot. Materials whose density and strength exceeds these minimums will be deemed acceptable. k, Navigation Aids. The EMAS must be constructed to accommodate approach lighting structures and other approved facilities within its boundaries. It must not cause visual or electronic interference with any air navigation aids. All navigation aids within the EMAS must be frangible as required by 14CFR Part 139. To meet the intent ofthis regulation, approach light standards must be designed to fail at two points. The first point offrangibility must be three inches or less above the top ofthe EMAS bed. The second point of frangibility must be three inches or less above the expected residual depth of the EMAS bed after passage ofthe design aircraft. As apart ofthe EMAS design, the EMAS manufacturer must provide the expected residual depth to allow the determination ofthis second frangibility point. I. Drainage. The EMAS must be designed to prevent water from accumulating on the surface of the EMAS bed, the runway or the runway safety area. The removal and disposal of water, which may hinder any activity necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the airport, must be inaccordance with AC )50/5320-5, Airport Drainage. The EMAS design must consider ice accumulation and/or snow removal lirnitations/requirementsd ictated by the project locale. Requirements/limitations must be

4 Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 57 of 85

9/30/2005 addressed in the approved inspection and maintenance program discussed inparagraph 14and Appendix 3.

m. Jet Blast. The EMAS must be designed and constructed so that itwill not be damaged by expected jet blast.

n. Repair. The EMAS must be designed for repair to a usable condition within 45 days of an overrun by the design aircraft at the design entrance speed. Note that this is adesign requirement only. An EIytAS bed damaged due to an incident (overrun/undershoot, etc.) must be repaired in a timely manner. The undamaged areas ofthe EMAS bed must be protected from further damage until the bed is repaired. 9. MATERIAL QUALlF:ICA TION. The material comprising the EMAS must have the following requirements and characteristics:

a. Material Strength and Deformation Requirements. Materials must meet a force vs. deformation profile within limits having been shown to assure uniform crushing characteristics, and therefore, predictable response to an aircraft entering the arresting system. b. Material Characteristics. The materials comprising the EMAS must:

(1) Be water-resistant to the extent that the presence ofwater does not affect system performance.

(2) Not attract vermin, birds, wildlife or other creatures.(3) Be non-sparking.

(4) Be non-flammable. (5) Not promote combustion. (6) Not emit toxic or malodorous fumes in a tire environment after installation.

(7) Not support unintended plant growth with proper application ofherbicides.

(8) Exhibit constant strength and density characteristics during all climatic conditions within a temperature range appropriate for the locale.

(9) Be resistant to deterioration due to: (a) Salt.



## ..•.. 043Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

9/30/2005 (b) Approved aircraft and runway deicing fluids.(c) Aircraft fuels, hydraulic fluids, and lubricating oils.

(d) UV resistant. (e) Water. (I) Freeze/thaw. (g) Blowing sand and snow. (h) Paint. 10. Material Conformance Requirements. An EMAS manufacturer must establish amaterial sampling and testing program to verify that all materials are in conformance' with the initial approved material force versus deformation profile established under paragraph 9.a. Materials failing to meet these requirements must not be used. The initial sampling and testing program must be submitted to and approved by the FAA, Office of Airport Safety and Standards for each design method found by the FAA to be an acceptable means of complying with this AC. Once approved, the program may be used for subsequent projects. II. DESIGN PROPOSAL SUBMITTAL. The EMAS design must be prepared by the design engineer and the EMAS manufacturer for the airport sponsor. The airport sponsor must submit the EMAS design through the responsible FAA Airports Region/District Office, to the FAA, Office of Airport Safety and Standards, for review and approval. The EMAS design' must be certified as meeting all the requirements ofthis AC and the submittal must include all design assumptions and data utilized in its development as well as proposed construction procedures and techniques. The EMAS design must be submitted at least 45 days prior to the bid opening date for the project. 12. QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROGRAM. A construction quality assurance program must be implemented to ensure that installation/construction is in accordance with the approved EMAS design. The construction contractor and EMAS manufacturer prepare the construction QA program for the airport sponsor. The airport sponsor must submit the construction QA program to the responsible FAA Airports RegionlDistrict Office for approval 14 days prior to the project notice toproceed. Filed 05/0612008 Page 58 of 85

AC 150/5220·22A 13. MARKING. An EMAS must be marked with yellow chevrons as an area unusable for landing, takeoff, and taxiing inaccordance with AC 150/5340-1, Standards for Airport Markings. Paint application should be in accordance with the EMAS manufacturers' recommendations for the EMAS system. 14. INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE. The EMAS manufacturer must prepare an inspection and maintenance program for the airport sponsor for each EMAS installation. The airport sponsor must submit the program to the responsible. FAA Airports RegionlDistrict Office for approval prior to final project acceptance. The airport sponsor must implement the approved inspection and maintenance program. The program must include any necessary procedures for inspection, preventive maintenance and unscheduled repairs, particularly to weatherproofing layers. Procedures must be sufficiently detailed to allow maintenance/repair of the EMAS bed with the airport sponsor's staff. The program must include appropriate records to verify that all required inspections and maintenance have been performed by the airport sponsor and/or EMAS manufacturer

.. These records must be made available to the FAA upon request. Appendix 3, Inspection and Maintenance Program, outlines the basic requirements ofan EMAS inspection and maintenance program. Airport personnel must be notified that the EMAS is designed to fail under load and that precautions should be taken when activities require personnel to be on, or vehicles and personnel to be near, the EMAS. 15. AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING (ARFF).

a. Access. As required by paragraph 8 (h), an EMAS is designed to allow movement oftypical ARFF equipment operating during an emergency. However, as the sides of the system are typically steeply sloped, and the system will be severely rutted after an aircraft arrestment, ARFF vehicles so equipped should be shifted into all-wheel-drive prior to entering and maneuvering upon an EMAS.

. b. Tactics. Any fire present after the arrestment of an aircraft will be three-dimensional due to the rutting and breakup of the EMAS material. A dualagent attack and/or other tactics appropriate to this type offire should be employed. 16. NOTIFICATION. Upon installation of an EMAS, its length, width, and location must be included as a remark in the AirportlFacility Directory (AFD). To assure timely publication, the airport sponsor must

5Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Page 59 of 85

AC 150/5220-22A forward the required information to the FAA Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) as soon as possible, but not later than the "cut-off' dates listed in the AFD, for publication on the desired effective date. (The AIS address and cut-off dates are listed on the inside front cover of the AFD.) The airport sponsor must also notify the appropriate FAA Regional Airports Division! ADO. The following isan example ofatypical entry:

DAVlD L. BENNETT Director ofAirport Safety and Standards Filed 05/06/2008

913012005

• "Engineered Materials Arresting System, 400'L x l50'W, located at departure end of runway 16." When an EMAS is damaged due to an overrun or determined to be less than fully serviceable, aNotice to Airmen (NOTAM) must be issued to alert airport users ofthe reduced performance ofthe EMAS.

## o N t.. ,'.:.:.:::'..'.:.:,':'RSA '.' " .:::::::.:.:.: 

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HOTES: 

## .& 600 FEET MINIMUM REOUCTION APPUE.S ONLY TO RUNWAY ENDS WITH VERTICAL GUIOAHCE FOR APPROACHeS. 

## .&. THE WIDTH Of' THE EMAS BED IS THEWIDTH OF THE RUNWAY PLUS ANY SLOPED AREA ALONG THE SIDES REQUIRED FOR SAFE IHGRESSIEGRESS AND MOVEMalT OF ARFF EQUlf'MENT OPERATING DURING AN EMERGENCY. 

## & THE EMAS BED IS DESIGNED TO STOP THE OESlGH AIRCRAFT THAT EXITS THE ENOOF THE RUNWAY TRAVEUNG ATro KNOTS.

FIGURE AI-I. STANDARD EMAS INSTALLATION PROVIDES A LEVEL OF SAFETY THAT ISGENERALLY EQUIVALENT TO A STANDARD RUNWAY SAFETY AREA (RSA). VI >-!'2 -e VI -eN to N ::s 0 c. ' _. N X N ->- 

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AC 150/5220-22A Appendix I

A 1-2 

# .------ 9/30/2005'



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## • • PlAr'JNiNG DURPOSES ONLY 'lOT TOHEUSEr) FO~ DtS'GN

. SEE PARAGRAPH Ii OC-S GW

## = 114,000 Ibs NO REVERSE THRUST & POOR BRAKING 90

80 

## i -I

c:

~ 70 

# !

... ~80 > c 

## I :lI II:: S j50

~ c ::IE

40

30100 400 600 £MAS LENGTH IfHtJ Noles 1 AtrestOl' Includes a ;5 n plJII'ed Iea(j..inriQld ramp A 35f1sethaCkcan be used to ImproveperfoflTlance (Ofshort safety areas 2 Poor I:)(ak~ simulated U$lng0.25 brakirg friCtloo coefficMtrt FIGURE A2-1. VI >!;2
"0 VI "ON to N ::l 0 0.' _. N ;>< N N> 

## o

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~ I m 

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# -- o 0) 

# -- N o o CO \J Q) (Q CD 0) N o ....•.• CO CJlPLANNING PURFDSES ONLY ~KJf '0 BEuSED FOR DESIGN· SEE P".R.o.CR;,PH 6
OC·10 GW=455,000 Ibs. NO REVERSE THRUST & POOR BRAKING

90

80

30- 100 300 400 500 ElMS LENGTH (fMt) 700 800 200

Notes'

, Arrestor Includes a i5 npaved lead·in rtgtdramp. A 35 ftsetback can be used 10Improve perloonance for $hOltsafely areas 2 Poor braking simul/lled USlflg 0 25 !:raking fnctlon coefficient.FIGURE A2-2.
i:& i 

## o a> C/l CD N o CO I o < I o N (j) CO 01 I G)

~ I 

### m o o o c 3 CD :::J ....•. ......>. 01

11 CD 0.. o 01 

# -- o (j) N o o CO '"'0 a> CO CD (j) c.v o 

# - CO 01PLANNiNG PURPOSES ONLY NOT ro BE USED FOR DESIGN SEE PARAGRAPH 5
B·137-400 GW = 150,000 Ibs. NO REVERSE THRUST & POOR BRAKING

90,

80

30100 200 300 400 GOO EMAS LENGTH (feet) eoo 700 800

~ .It i Notes: 1 Atreetor ird\lde$ a75 IIP'Ved lead-in rigid ramp A 35ftselbecl< can b! used to improveperformance for short Sllfety areas 2. Poor braking siroolatedusi~ 0.25 braking friction coelft<:lert

> N I W FIGURE A2-3. VI >!;2 '0 VI 'ON n tv ::J 0 0.'

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B-757 GW" 265,000lbs. NO REVERSE THRUST & POOR BRAKING

90

30100 200 300 400 eoo 700 800

Noles.

, Arrestor inclvdes a 75 II paved lead-in rigid ramp A 35 ft setback can be used to improve petfClfmance forshort safety areas 2 Poorbtak!og$il1')Ulated ~ 025btakingfnctioneoeff~nl

FIGURE Al-4. I IJ. !



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- S:E.£ P~,RAGR.APH6 B-747 GW =875,000 Ibs. NO REVERSE THRUST & POOR BRAKING

90-

ao·

40

30 tOO 200 300 400 500 £MAS LENGTH (fHt) 100 aoo



## , 

# • c Notes 1 Alr~Ol ircludel a 75ttpaved Jeoad·mrigid ramp A 35 nsetbl!cl< can be U$ed to II11provepertQrlT\lll'lCe(0/ $IlOl1li1ilfelyare.,s 2. Poor braking sll'T1IJlaled using 025 braking frictIOncoeftklient

> N I VI FIGURE Al-S. VI >~ ...,VI "ON n N :s 0 0.' _. N >: N N> 

## o

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## --- o en



## --- N o o CO "U Q) (0 CD en en o 

# - CO oiPLANNING PURV'OSES O'lLy 'lOT TO IlE USIW FOR DESIGN· SEE PA.RAGRAPH 6 CRJ-200 GW

## = 63.000 Ibs. NO REVERSE THRUST & POOR BRAKING

90

aD .

40

)0100 200 300 400 500 EMAS LENGTH Ife«) 700

Noles. 1. Alrestot InClUdeSII 75tlllElved lead·ill riQildramp A 35 11setbllCk can be used to 1lT1J)rOve peI1orma~e for Short safety areas 2 Poor b'al(ing simulated UIIirg 0.25 bral<ing rrictiorl coeffk;ienl.

i II. FIGURE A2-6.



### o c.n co ;1>;1> 

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# -- a 0> 

### i\:5 a a coG-IU GW=69.700 Ibs. NO REVERSE THRUST & POOR BRAKING

90

80

30" 100 200 300 400 100 EMAS LENO'm (fHt)

1 

## •• r>t.ANNI~.JGPURPOSES ONLY NOr rc BE :';SrD J:'OR OESfGN

. SEt: ~ARAGRAPH IJ

800 700 800

Notes:

, Arr"lor indUdes a 75 II peved ~<1-in rigidrllmp A 35 rt 5etback can be used to imPfQlle pimorlllllnce for$hartsafety are-n 2. Poor braklng $Imulale<l Us.ing0.2.5 bralong fl'!Cooncoeff1clel'(
FIGUREAl-7. 

## o Q) C/l CD N o CO I o < I o N (j) <D 01 I G)

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### N o ·0 CO "'U Q) CO CD (j) CO o ...., CO 01Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

AC 150/5220-22A Appendix 2

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9/30/2005



## " 055Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 70 of 85

9/3012005 AC 150/5220-22A Appendix 3 APPENDIX 3. INSPECTION AND MAINTENACE PROGRAM.

An inspection and maintenance program,p repared bythe EMAS manufacturer, will be submitted to and approved bythe fAA Regional/Airports District Office. The Airport sponsor must implement the approved inspection and maintenance program. As aminimum, abasic EMAS inspection and maintenance program must address the following areas:

1. General information onthe EMAS bed including

• Adescription ofthe EMAS bed

• Material description

• Contact information forthe EMAS manufacturer 2. Inspection requirements including:

• Type and frequency ofrequired inspections

• Training ofpersonnel

• Instructions on how to conduct each inspection

• List oftypical problems and possible solutions

• Required documentation for inspections

• Inspection forms 3. Maintenance and repair procedures including:

• List ofapproved materials and tools Description ofrepair procedures for typical damage to an EMAs bed such as repairing depressions/holes, abrasion damage, replacing adamaged block, repairing coatings, caulking/joint repair, etc. 4. Any unique requirements due to location such as snow removal requirements and methods. Identify compatible deicing agents. Specify snow removal equipment that iscompatible with the EMAS bed and recommended clearing procedures and/or limitations. 5. Warranty information

A3-1 

## 056Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

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A3-2 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 71 of85

9130/2005



### " 

## 057Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 72 of 85

9/30/2005 AC 15015220-22A Appendix 4 APPENDIX 4. RELATED READING MATERIAL.

This appendix contains a listing of documents with supplemental material relating to the subject of EMAS. These documents contain certain information on materials evaluated as well as design, construction, and testing procedures utilized to date. These publications may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA 22151.

1. DOT/FAA/PM-87/27, Soft Ground Arresting Systems, Final Report, Sept. I986-Aug. 1987, published Aug. 1987 by R.F. Cook, Universal Energy Systems, Inc., Dayton, OH. 2. 2. DOT/FAA/CT-93/4, Soft Ground Arresting Systems for Commercial Aircraft. Interim Report. Feb. 1993 by Robert Cook. 3. DOTIFAA/CT -93/80, Soft Ground Arresting Systemsfor Airports, Final Report, Dec. 1993 by Jim White, Satish K. Agrawal. and Robert Cook. 4. DOT,'FAAI AOV 90-1, Location ofCommercial Aircraft Accidents/Incidents Relative toRunways, July 1990. 5. UDR-TR-88-07, Evaluation of a Foam Arrestor Bedfor Aircraft Safety Overrun Areas, 1988 by Cook, R.F., University of Dayton Research Institute, Dayton, OH.

M-I 

## 05&Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

AC 150/5220-22A Appendix 4

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# EXHIBIT 30Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 75 of 85 

### Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) Traffic Comparison (TeOM) Los Angeles International Airport
December 2007 Calendar YTDDecember

..--
.__......._----_.~-_ .. 2007 2006 %Change 2007 2006 % Change Passenger Traffic Totals Dorrestic 3.633,704 3.687,799 -1.47% 44,732,810 44.129.926 1.37% International 1,456.168 1,384,533 5.17% 17,163,265 16,910,748 1.49% ._--------_ ..-. _._------- Total 5,089,872 5,072,332 0.35% 61,896,075 61,040,674 1.40% Domestic Passengers Scheduled Carriers 3,290,869 3,360,849 -2.08% 40,875,515 40,256,824 1.5% Corrrruter Carriers 339,270 323,534 4.86% 3,830,943 3,840,656 -0.3% O1arter Carriers 3,565 3,416 4.36% 26,352 32,446 -18.8% Totals 3.633,704 3,687,799
.-1.47% 44,732.810 44,129.926 1.37% International Passengers TomBradley inti 756,929 708,831 6.79% 9,193,010 9,028,075 1.83% Terrrinal2 320.378 326.835 -1.98% 3,851.891 3,860,728 -0.23% Terrrinal4 119,498 107,203 11.47% 1,324,111 1,308,144 1.22% Terrrinal7 89.729 72.661 23.49% 838,790 896,238 -6.41% Terrrinal5 75,971 74.107 2.52% 829,393 708,286 17.10% AllOther Terrrinals 93,663 94,896 -1.30% 1,126,070 1,109,277 1.51%

._.--_.~

.•._._-_._--------- ------_.


## __.- Totals 1,456,168 1,384,533 5.17% 17,163,265 16,910,748 1.49% US Customs Arrivals TomBradley ~tl 401,864 385,683 4.20% 5,246,231 5,081,738 3.24% Terrrinal2 115,145 124,300 -7.37% 1,416,674 1,498,516 -5.46% Terrrinal4 86,998 69,051 25.99% 844,712 817,436 3.34% Termnal7 47.383 41,093 15.31% 462,558 493,901 -6.35% Terrrinal5 41,684 28,956 43.96% 459,411 355,915 29.08% -.-.------_

.._---.-- ------_._--_._----_
.._-------"-----.-- Totals 693.07_4 649.083 6.78% 8,429,586 8,247,506 2.21% Air Cargo (Tons) Mail 7,181 6,983 2.82% 76,093 78,871 -3.52% Freight 160.826 171,853 -6.42% 2,001,434 2,024,089 -1.12% --_._._-_ ..•.------.-------------------

_ ..--------- - -_._------~._---
--- Total 168,007 178,837 -6.06% 2,077.527 2,102,960 -1.21% FAAAircraft Movement AirCarrier 38,773 39,565 -2.00% 467,193 463,341 0.83% AirTaxi 17,959 15.045 19.37% 193,930 174,745 10.98% General Aviation 1,645 1,339 22.85% 17,217 16,142 6.66% Mlttary 160 149 7.38% 2,614 2,614 0.00%

'0' •

________ ..__ - .._----_.

__ .---_
.._--_._-- Total 58,537 56,098 4.35% 680,954 656,842 3.67%



## 060Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008· Page 76of85



# EXHIBIT 31Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E

Passenger Traffic Totals Dorrestic International Total Domestic Passengers Scheduled Carriers ColTTT1JterCarriers Charter Carriers Totals International Passengers All Other Terrrinals Totals US Customs Arrivals Totals Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 77 of 85 

## LosAngeles World Airports (LAWA) Traffic Comparison (TeOM) Van Nuys Airport

December 2007 ------_. 2007 2006 "Change'
0 100.00% 0 0 0.00%

.._'-_._~._------ 0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00% 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0.00%

... _--_._-~-----_._-+.-----_._._._.~--.---_.- 0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00% 0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

Air Cargo (Tons) Mail 0 0 0.00% Freight 0 0 200.00%

.._-~----_._--- Total 0 0 200.00% FAA Aircraft Movement Air Carrier 0 0 0.00% Air Taxi 1.157 1.273 -9.11% General Aviation 27.052 27,415 -1.32% Mlilary 12 24 -50.00%

.....__ ._.- .._..-.__ ..•.._.-- Total 28,221 28,712 -1.71% Calendar YTD December 2007 2006 "Change
99 0.00% 0 0 0.00% 0 99 -100.00%

0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 99 -100.0% 0 99 -100.00%

0 0 0.00% 0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

o 8 o

8 0.00%

3.60% 8 8 3.60%

o 0 0.00% 15,931 16,157 -1.40% 358,255 378,026 -5.23% 278 732 -62.02%

...-------_
.._--

_ ..._-------- ---- 374,464 394,915 -5.18%

.1-:1 

## 061Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 78of85



# EXHIBIT 32WWW.LA WA.ORGIV!\Y

- Van Nuys Base Aircraft

VNY

news & airport facts :-Statistics> BasedAircraft> Total Operation History maps

information VAN NUYS AIRPORT TOTAL OPERATIONS HISTORY quick department links projects Listed below is an account of the total flight operations conducted at the Van Nuys Airport.

YEARS TOTAL OPERATIONS YEARS TOTAL OPERATIONS 1949 70,275* 1979 600,953 1950 110,214 1980 540,560 1951 125,839 1981 558,918 1952 123,867 1982 507,758 1953 "133,222 1983 494,273 1954 131,303 1984 575,271 1955 144,661 1985 492,382 1956 194,821 1986 477,689 1957 218,401 1987 476,627 1958 191,671 1988 468,779


## , 1959 215,720 1989 507,003 

# •
~ 1960 228,132 1990 528,110 1961 281,336 1991 509,620 

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1962 320,993 1992 520,468 

## o Q) 1963 341,684 1993 514,320 (Jl CD 386,063 1994 486,584 I'V 1964 0 co 1965 439,563 1995 526,177 I o < 1966 534,331 1996 526,433 I 0 I'V 1967 496,564 1997 537,470 en co (J1 1968 567,973 1998 560,662 I G) 1969 526,230 1999 598,564 ~ I 

### m 1970 575,784 2000 483,365 1971 562,030 2001 456,778 0 0 1972 574,415 2002 498,477 o c 2003 460,734 3 1973 581,341 CD :::l 454,753 

# - 1974 586,680 2004 --" (J1 1975 588,680 2005 415,961 1976 618,694 2006 400,398 11 1977 592,863 2007 394,915 CD Q. 1978 601,230 2008 0 (J1 

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http://www.lawa.orglvny/HistoryBasedAircraft.cfrn 5/3/2008Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 1Q Filed 05/06/2008 Page 81 of85



# EXHIBIT 33WWW.LAWA.ORG/LAX- 10Year Summary

f4Qs :- Statistic> Ten YearSummary> FAAAircraft Movements

Air Carrier Air Taxi Military General Total Aviation 1993 408,043 212,592 14,784 47,027 682,446 1994 418,166 214,473 14,213 43,036 689,888 1995 472,134 230,997 3,178 26,330 732,639 1996 502,056 233,832 3,262 24,716 763,866 1997 524,035 227,479 3,572 26,406 781,492 1998 525,089 219,123 3,326 26,031 773,569 1999 542,082 215,886 2,646 18,536 779,150 2000 565,805 198,306 2,304 17,018 783,433 2001 524,014 193,892 2,052 16,156 738,433 2002 449,712 177,123 2,115 16,474 645,424 2003 433,370 171,199 2,561 15,248 622,378

-:back inside the airport quick department links projects rules & regs TEN YEAR SUMMARY OF FAA AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS

contact us I comments I sitemap

http://www.lawa.orgilaxitenYrSummary.cfm?process=2d Page Iof2

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# EXHIBIT 34Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 85 of 85 

## LosAngeles WorldAirports (LAWA) Traffic Comparison (TeOM) LosAngeles InternationalAirport

December 2007 Calendar YTD December 2007 2006 %Change 2007 2006 % Change Passenger Traffic Totals Domestic 3,633,704 3,687,799 -1.47% 44.732.810 44.129,926 1.37% International 1,456,168 1,384,533 5.17% 17,163,265 16,910,748 1.49% Total 5,089,872 5,072,332 0.35% 61,896,075 61.040,674 1.40% Domestic Passengers Scheduled Carriers 3.290,869 3,360,849 -2.08% 40,875,515 40,256.824 1.5% Cormuter Carriers 339,270 323,534 4.86% 3,830.943 3.840,656 -0.3% Charter Carriers 3.565 3,416 4.36% 26,352 32,446 -18.8%

-._-------- Totals 3.633,704 3,687.799 -1.47% 44.732,810 44,129,926 1.37% International Passengers Tom Bradley Inti 756,929 708,831 6.79% 9,193,010 9,028,075 1.83% Temlnal2 320,378 326,835 -1.98% 3,851,891 3,860.728 -0.23% Terminal 4 119,498 107,203 11.47% 1,324,111 1.308.144 1.22% Terminal 7 89,729 72,661 23.49% 838,790 896,238 -6.41% Terminal 5 75.971 74,107 2.52% 829,393 708,286 17.10% All Other Terminals 93,663 94,896 -1.30% 1,126,070 1,109,277 1.51% Totals 1,456,168 1,384,533 5.17% 17.163,265 16,910,748 1.49% US Customs Arrivals Tom Bradley Inti 401,864 385,683 4.20% 5,246,231 5,081,738 3.24% Terminal 2 115,145 124.300 -7,37% 1,416,674 1,498.516 -5.46% Terminat 4 86,998 69,051 25.99% 844,712 817,436 3.34% Terminal 7 47,383 41.093 15,31% 462,558 493,901 -6.35% Terminal 5 41,684 28,956 43.96% 459,411 355.915 29.08% Totals 693.074 649,083 6,78% 8,429,586 8,247,506 2.21% Air Cargo (Tons) Mail 7,181 6,983 2.82% 76,093 78,871 -3.52% Freight 160,826 171,853 -6.42% 2.001,434 2,024,089 -1.12% Total 168,007 178,837 -6.06% 2,077,527 2,102,960 -1.21% FAA Aircraft Movement Air Carrier 38,773 39,565 -2.00% 467.193 463,341 0.83% Air Taxi 17,959 15,045 19.37% 193,930 174,745 10.98% General Aviation 1,645 1,339 22.85% 17,217 16,142 6.66% tv'ilitary 160 149 7.38% 2.614 2,614 0.00% ---_. ---'--'-~--~ Totat 58.537 56,098 4.35% 680,954 656,842 3.67%



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