1 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS 

CAUSE NO. PD-1510-15 

__________________________ 

EX PARTE ANDRE DEROSIER 

_______________________ 

FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT FT. WORTH 

IN CAUSE NUMBER 02-15-00100-CR

AND 

FROM THE 367TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

DENTON, TEXAS 

IN CAUSE NUMBER F-2002-0330-E 

__________________________________ 

APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO THE 

STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 

_________________________________ 

FRED MARSH 

EDWARD NOLTER 

Marsh & PAINE, P.C. 

101 S. Woodrow 

Denton, TX 76205 

Tel: (940) 536-377 

Fax: (940) 382-4288 

FDM@MARSHPAINELAW.COM 

EJN@MARSHPAINELAW.COM 

PD-1510-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 12/7/2015 12:00:00 AM

Accepted 12/7/2015 2:40:22 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
2 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 PAGE 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 3

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 5

ARGUMENT 6

PRAYER 18

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE & SERVICE 19
3 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASE PAGE

Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) 16

DeDonato v. State, 819 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) 14

Ex parte Armstrong, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 362, 8 S.W.2d 674 (1928) 7

Ex parte Derosier, No. 02-15-00100-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11155 

(Tex. App.—Ft. Worth Oct. 29, 2015, pet. filed))

passim

Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) 11

Ex Parte Sledge, 391 S.W.3d 104 (2013) 14

Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) 9

Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969 

(1915)

7

Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) passim

Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 538 (Tex. Crim.App.2007) 17

Marin v. State, 851 SW2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) 12

McKinney v. State, 207 SW3d 366 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) 17

Murray v. State, 302 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) 10

Rhodes v. State, 240 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) passim

State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) 8

Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) 15
4 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 181 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) 15

United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625 (2002) 8

CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES PAGE

Tex. Const. Art. 1§ 10 16

Tex. Const. Art. 5 § 8

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 4.05 17

Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 21.26 7

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07 16
5 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS 

CAUSE NO. PD-1510-15 

__________________________ 

EX PARTE ANDRE DEROSIER 

_______________________ 

FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT FT. WORTH 

IN CAUSE NUMBER 02-15-00100-CR

AND 

FROM THE 367TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

DENTON, TEXAS 

IN CAUSE NUMBER F-2002-0330-E 

__________________________________ 

APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO THE 

STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

_________________________________ 

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: 

Comes now Appellant, by and through his attorney of record Mr. Fred Marsh, 

and respectfully urges this Court to deny the State’s petition for discretionary review of 

the above named cause. 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument is not necessary because this Court’s precedent regarding subjectmatter jurisdiction is firmly established and will not aid the Court in its decision to deny 

the State’s petition.
6 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

ARGUMENT 

The State has presented one issue for this Court’s review. The very wording of 

the issue shows that State lacks a fundamental understanding of subject-matter 

jurisdiction and its importance to any court’s authority to act lawfully. The Second 

Court of Appeals correctly interpreted this Court’s precedent based upon the facts of 

the case and the State’s petition should be refused. 

The State’s question is: 

“If a defendant agrees to plead to a lesser offense, that is not actually a 

lesser included offense, of an indicted offense over which the trial court 

has proper subject-matter jurisdiction, can a defendant later attack that 

bargained-for judgment based on a subject-matter jurisdiction claim?”

(PDR 2) 

The Texas Constitution, statutes, and this Court’s precedent affirmatively decide 

this issue against the State. However, before Appellant begins his legal analysis on this 

issue, this Court should be cognizant of two (2) important facts. First, the State 

admitted during its opening argument to the trial court that “[a]s far as subject-matter 

jurisdiction, this Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because a terroristic 

threat is not a lesser included, but Appellant is estopped from making those claims 

now.” (2 RR 12). Second, the trial court found it did not have subject-matter 

jurisdiction but denied Appellant’s writ because it found Appellant’s sentence was an 

illegally lenient sentence and Appellant was estopped from challenging it. (CR 91-94). 
7 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

The Court of Appeals noted this distinction in its opinion, “* * * The State, the trial 

court, and Derosier all agree that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.” Ex 

parte Derosier, No. 02-15-00100-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS, at 11155 *4 (Tex. 

App.—Ft. Worth Oct. 29, 2015, pet. filed)]). 

The law is not as muddied as the State asserts. (PDR 9) In fact, the Court of 

Appeals “blind reliance on subject-matter jurisdiction” was correct as to the law and as 

the facts of this case point out. (PDR 11). “* * * Jurisdiction may be concisely stated to 

be the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in a given case. Unless the 

power or authority of a court to perform a contemplated act can be found in the 

Constitution or laws enacted thereunder, it is without jurisdiction and it acts without 

validity.” Ex parte Armstrong, 110 Tex.Crim. 362, 8 S.W.2d 674, 676 (App.1928). 

Furthermore, due process requires that a criminal action in a state court must be before 

a court of competent jurisdiction. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915). 

Article 5 § 8 of the Texas Constitution confers power on Texas District Courts. 

Article 4.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure gives District Courts their 

jurisdiction. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 4.05 states: 

“District courts and criminal district courts shall have original jurisdiction in 

criminal cases of the grade of felony, of all misdemeanors involving official 
8 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

misconduct, and of misdemeanor cases transferred to the district court under Article 

4.17 of this code.”

Most importantly, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement 

of the parties. Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); State v. 

Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), overruled on other grounds by 

State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Ex Parte Sledge, 391 

S.W.3d 104, 108 fn. 23 (2013)(citation to Garcia); see also United States v. Cotton, 

535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002)("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves the court's 

power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.") The Court of Appeals 

embraced this when it affirmatively held that “[i]t is axiomatic that subject-matter 

jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement of the parties; jurisdiction must be vested 

in a court by constitution or statute.” Derosier at *5 (citations omitted). 

The State is challenging the Court of Appeals correct holding because it “did not 

consider that the trial court had jurisdiction of Appellant’s originally-charged case, and 

the lesser offense was agreed to by the parties after jurisdiction had already been 

established.” (PDR 4). The State provides no supporting law or authority for this 

assertion. Furthermore, this is incorrect. 
9 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

The entire crux of the State’s argument is that Appellant cannot challenge his 

conviction because he received an illegal sentence (Rhodes v. State1

) or because 

Appellant did not object to the entry of judgment as the defendant did in Murray v. 

State2

 and estopped from challenging his conviction. The problem with the State’s 

argument is that this Court has consistently held that challenges to the subject-matter 

jurisdiction are immune to any of the various forms of estoppel. Ex parte Williams, 65 

S.W.3d 656, 659-60 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (Keller, P.J. concurring)(“Subject matter 

jurisdiction is immune to estoppel considerations, * * *)) 

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that there was no question in Rhodes that 

the trial court had subject-jurisdiction over the offenses. The issue in Rhodes was that 

it was an illegal sentence. In Rhodes, all of the offenses were for crimes that the trial 

court had subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case, Appellant did not receive or suffer 

from an illegal sentence. Appellant suffers from an illegal conviction because the trial 

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. There is a difference. An illegal sentence 

presupposes that the conviction was lawful. In this case, the State knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently dismissed the felony counts for which the trial court had 

jurisdiction. (CR 34; WHC-Ex. 4). Likewise, the State knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently amended the indictment to allege a misdemeanor for which the trial court 

1 240 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 
10 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

did not have jurisdiction. (CR 31; WHC-Ex. 3). The State’s attorney is responsible for 

the pleadings in a criminal action, not the defendant. 

The other crux of the State’s argument is based in part on this Court’s decision in 

Murray v. State. Murray was a unanimous decision authored by Presiding Judge 

Keller. In Murray, the defendant had agreed to plead to a misdemeanor for which the 

trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. After the trial court took the case under 

advisement, the defendant retained new counsel who filed a motion to revoke the 

defendant’s plea of guilt. Id. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, convicted him 

of the misdemeanor offense, and the defendant appealed his conviction. Id. The primary 

issue in this case was not whether the State was estopped from asserting a subjectmatter jurisdictional claim but if the defendant could withdraw his guilty plea, with 

reason, prior to the trial court rendering a judgment. Id at 883. 

The State’s entire theory regarding this is based upon this Court’s statement in 

Murray addressing estoppel which states: 

“The State advances a number of theories of estoppel that it believes 

prevents appellant from challenging the judgement in this case: invited 

error, estoppel by judgment, estoppel by contract, promissory estoppel, 

and quasi-estoppel. We assume, without deciding, that the State is not 

barred by a subject matter jurisdiction claim.” Id. at 882. 

2 302 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) 
11 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

However, this assumption appears to have been resolved in Murray itself and 

this Court’s recent unanimous decision in Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d 786, 788-89 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

Prior to this statement in Murray, this unanimous Court addressed the State’s 

argument regarding the issue that public policy favors and encourages plea bargaining 

in criminal cases with Presiding Judge Keller holding: 

“Even if the policy of encouraging plea bargaining were considered, the 

State has the ability to achieve the practical result reached in cases like 

this without running afoul of the statutory scheme. The State could 

obtain an indictment, or a waiver of indictment from the defendant, 

for a felony offense that does include the misdemeanor offense the 

parties wish to be the subject of a plea-bargained judgment. Or 

perhaps the felony prosecutor could obtain the cooperation of a county 

attorney or other prosecutor in misdemeanor cases to plead the defendant 

to the misdemeanor in question in a court that has misdemeanor 

jurisdiction. In either event, the plea could be made in exchange for 

dismissal of the charged offense with prejudice. These alternate methods 

of handling the plea would avoid the potential double jeopardy problems 

associated with convicting someone of an offense that is not in fact a 

lesser-included offense of the offense charged.” Id. at 881 (internal 

citations omitted, emphasis added). 

It appears that this Court answered its own question regarding estoppel and 

provided the solution for issues, such as those presented in this case, when the State 

and the defendant agree to plead to a misdemeanor in district court. 

Furthermore, this Court’s solution begs the question, if this Court would not 

carve out a subject-matter jurisdiction exception for public policy then how could this 
12 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

Court create an estoppel exception when subject-matter jurisdiction is an “absolute 

systemic requirement[-] * * * and [is] not forfeitable?” Marin v. State, 851 SW2d 275 

(Tex.Crim.App.1993.) Subject-matter jurisdiction is “independent of the litigant’s 

wishes. Implementation of these requirements is not optional and cannot, therefore, be 

waived or forfeited by the parties.” Marin at 279.

Furthermore, Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 21.26 statutorily provides the solution as

articulated in Murray. It states:

“Upon the filing of an indictment in the district court which charges an 

offense over which such court has no jurisdiction, the judge of such 

court shall make an order transferring the same to such inferior 

court as may have jurisdiction, stating in such order the cause 

transferred and to what court transferred.” (emphasis added).

The plain wording of the statute creates a requirement for the trial court and not 

of Appellant. This is a statutory requirement of the trial court to act as the gatekeeper to 

ensure that a misdemeanor is before a court of competent jurisdiction. When the State 

amended the indictment to include a misdemeanor and then dismissed all of the felony 

counts, the trial court was required to sua sponte transfer the case “to such inferior 

court as may have jurisdiction.” Id. The trial court did not do this. 

In Moss this unanimous Court explained the importance of jurisdiction as 

follows:
13 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

“We have held that a lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction 

deprives a court of any authority to render a judgment. See Garcia, 

596 S.W.2d at 527 (quoting Ex parte Armstrong, 110 Tex. Crim. 362, 

366, 8 S.W.2d 674, 675-76 (1928) (stating that "[u]nless the power or 

authority of a court to perform a contemplated act can be found in the 

Constitution or laws enacted thereunder, it is without jurisdiction and its 

acts without validity.")). We have further explained that when a court acts 

without jurisdiction, such as by entering a judgment without the necessary 

authority to do so, the purported action taken by the court is void. See Nix 

v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (identifying a lack 

of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction as reasons a judgment would be 

void). * * * In contrast, if a defendant confesses and is convicted at 

trial because he is guilty of the crime committed, but the court lacked 

subject-matter or personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the 

judgment of conviction is void. See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 (citing 

Garcia, 596 S.W.2d at 527).” Moss, at 788-789. (Emphasis added).

This is exactly the case before this Court. It does not matter if Appellant 

accepted the plea bargain advanced by the State, that it was beneficial to him, or that he 

waited twelve (12) years to file his writ challenging the jurisdiction of the convicting 

court. 

This is not a case where Appellant took his case to trial and requested a jury 

instruction for a lesser-included offense. The facts of this case show that it was the 

State who amended the indictment to include an offense that was a misdemeanor for 

which the trial court lacked jurisdiction. (CR 31; WHC-Ex. 3). The State then filed a 

motion to dismiss the felony counts originally alleged and proceeded with the 

misdemeanor offense, which the trial court granted. (CR 34; WHC-Ex. 4); (CR 36; 
14 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

WHC-Ex. 5). When the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss on the felony 

counts, it lost jurisdiction over Appellant because the amended indictment failed to 

charge a felony for which terroristic threat is a lesser-included offense. 

The State is correct in that there are two (2) cases where estoppel bared subjectmatter jurisdiction claims. (PDR 9). The State cites Ex parte Sledge, 391 S.W.3d 104, 

108 (Tex.Crim. App.2013) and DeDonato v. State, 819 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 

(Tex.Crim.App.1991). Id. These cases are easily distinguishable and are not applicable 

to the case at bar. This Court denied habeas relief in Sledge because the defendant 

raised his jurisdictional claim in a second writ and not his first. Sledge at 111. This was 

Appellant’s first writ of habeas corpus. 

DeDonato is inapplicable and does not stand for the proposition the State 

asserts. The State relies on Justice Maloney’s concurrence in that case regarding 

estoppel being applied to subject-matter jurisdiction. (PDR 9). Justice Maloney agreed 

with the decision but not with the majorities reasoning. DeDonato at 167. In particular, 

Maloney disagreed with the decision because it failed to account for the various other 

provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure that define the jurisdictional limits of the 

various courts. In any event, this Court held that jurisdiction was established because at 

the time the law allowed for the offense to be prosecuted as a Class B or Class C 
15 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

misdemeanor. Id at 166. Therefore, the trial court did have subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Dedonato relied on Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 267 fn. 7 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). 

Since Dedonato this Court has has addressed Justice Maloney’s concerns by 

addressing Studer in several cases. As it applies to determining subject-matter 

jurisdiction, this Court stated in Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 181 

(Tex.Crim.App.2007): 

“Implicit within both Studer and Cook is that ‘the offense’ charged must 

be one for which the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Although 

the ‘indictment’ provision of the constitution explicitly speaks only of the 

two requirements of ‘a person’ and ‘an offense,’ the constitution also sets 

out the subject-matter jurisdiction of Texas courts. An indictment must 

also satisfy the constitutional requirement of subject-matter 

jurisdiction over ‘an offense.’” (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

The indictment “must be capable of being construed as intending to charge a 

felony (or a misdemeanor for which the district court has jurisdiction).” Teal at 181. As 

it pertains to the case at bar, the State failed to amend the indictment charging a felony 

or misdemeanor for which the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The amended 

indictment added Count Seven (7) which reads: 

“On or about April 27th, 2001, the [Appellant] did then and there 

threaten [the alleged victim] with an offense involving violence and 

[Appellant] did that with the intent to place [the alleged victim] in fear of 

imminent serious bodily injury, in Denton County, Texas, against the 

peace and dignity of the state.” (CR 31; WHC-Ex. 3). 
16 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

The State tracked the language of the misdemeanor offense of Terroristic Threat. 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07 (a)(2)(West 1994)(CR. 52, WHC-Ex. 11). The 

statute at the time of Appellant’s trial and alleged plea read:

“(a) A person commits an offense if he threatens to commit any offense 

involving violence to any person or property with intent to: 

(2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury;”

However, this is not an offense for which the district court had subject matter 

jurisdiction. The offense alleged was a Class B misdemeanor (instead of a Class A 

misdemeanor, which the judgment reflects). The statute regulating punishment for the 

offense of Terroristic Threat at the time read: 

“An offense under Subdivision (1) or (2) of Subsection (a) is a Class B 

misdemeanor. An offense under Subdivision (3) of Subsection (a) is a 

Class A misdemeanor. An offense under Subdivision (4) of Subsection 

(a) is a felony of the third degree.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07

(b)(West 1994)(CR 52; WHC-Ex. 11).

Article 1 § 10 of the Texas Constitution requires that unless waived by the 

defendant, the State must obtain a grand jury indictment in a felony case. Without an 

indictment or valid waiver a District Court does not have jurisdiction over that case. 

Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471, 475-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (collecting cases and 

stating, "Jurisdiction vests only upon the filing of a valid indictment in the appropriate 

court."). For an indictment to be constitutionally valid and vest a District Court with 
17 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

subject-matter jurisdiction it must meet the test enunciated in Teal v. State, 230 

S.W.3d 172, 179-181 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)(citing Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). 

On its face the amended indictment failed to allege an offense for which the 

District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction because the charged misdemeanor did not 

allege a “misdemeanor[] involving official misconduct” nor was it a misdemeanor case 

that was transferred to this Court under Article 4.17 of the Penal code. See Tex.Code 

Crim. Proc. art. 4.05. “[T]he indictment, * * *, must be capable of being construed as 

intending to charge a felony” (or a misdemeanor for which the district court has 

jurisdiction). Teal at 181. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that the 

amended indictment was intended to charge a felony. Ergo, the trial court lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction to accept Appellant’s plea. 

The State’s assertion that this Court should write on the issue because these 

specific facts have not been decided by this Court is unnecessary. (PDR 9). The State 

primarily relies on Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 537-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 

(Keller, P.J., dissenting) (discussing the doctrine of "beneficial acquiescence") and 

McKinney v. State, 207 S.W.3d 366, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)(Keller, P.J. 

concurring). However, both of these cases are inapplicable because they deal with a 
18 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

defendant requesting a lesser-included offense during trial and do not address the trial 

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Finally, the State’s argument that it has been prejudiced is completely without 

merit. (PDR 13). As previously argued, it was the State who amended the indictment 

and requested that the felony counts be dismissed. Had the State wanted to address 

this issue it should have done so at trial and not after Appellant filed his writ of habeas 

corpus. 

The reason it is unnecessary to write on this issue is because this Court has 

consistently held that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement of 

the parties. Supra. Without jurisdiction, a court as no authority to act, including 

accepting a plea bargain for which it lacks jurisdiction. Supra. The State’s petition 

should be denied. 

PRAYER

The Second Court of Appeals correctly decided the issue based upon this 

Court’s precedent and the facts. This Court should deny the State’s petition for 

discretionary review because the law and this Court’s precedent are well established in 

this area. 
19 – Appellant’s Response to State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

Respectfully Submitted, 

/s/Fred Marsh 

FRED MARSH SBOT# 13016000 

EDWARD NOLTER SBOT#24081073 

Marsh& Paine, P.C. 

101 S. Woodrow 

Denton, TX 76205 

Tel: (940) 382-4200 

Fax: (940) 382-4288 

FDM@MARSHPAINELAW.COM 

EJN@MARSHPAINELAW.COM

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Appellant certifies that the this reply brief in the instant cause contained a word count 

of 3,652, said count being generated by the computer program Microsoft Word that was used 

to prepare the document. 

Signed this, the 5th day of December, 2015. 

/s/Fred Marsh 

FRED MARSH 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Brief has been forwarded to the District Attorney 

of Denton County, Texas on this the 5th day of December, 2015. 

/s/Fred Marsh 

FRED MARSH