United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

Comptroller General

of the United States

 

Decision 

Matter of: DynCorp International LLC 

File: B-402349 

Date: March 15, 2010 

Richard J. Vacura, Esq., Keric B. Chin, Esq., Robert A. Salerno, Esq., K. Alyse 

Latuour, Esq., and Marc A. Hearron, Esq., Morrison & Foerster LLP, for the protester. 

Capt. John J. Pritchard, Department of the Army, for the agency. 

Sharon L. Larkin, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the General 

Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision. 

DIGEST 

Protest that task order requests for proposals (TORP) are outside the scope of 

multiple-award indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contracts is sustained, 

where the ID/IQ contracts were limited to providing counter-narcoterrorism support 

services worldwide, and the TORPs sought mentoring, training, facilities, and 

logistics support services for the Ministry of the Interior and Afghan National Police 

in general law enforcement and counter-insurgency activities, which were not 

reasonably contemplated under the ID/IQ contracts. 

DECISION 

DynCorp International LLC, of Falls Church, Virginia, protests the issuance of task 

order requests for proposals (TORP) 150 for mentoring and training the Ministry of 

the Interior and Afghan National Police and TORP 166 for facility maintenance and 

logistics support for the Afghan National Police Development Program, by the 

Department of the Army under multiple-award indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity 

(ID/IQ) contracts to provide program and operations support for the Department of 

Defense Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office. DynCorp contends 

that the TORPs are outside the scope of the ID/IQ contracts. 

We sustain the protest. 

BACKGROUND 

On August 24, 2007, five ID/IQ contracts were awarded on the basis of full and open 

competition to Blackwater Lodge & Training Center, Inc. (now U.S. Training Center); 
Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems, Inc.; Northrop Grumman/TASC, Inc.; Raytheon 

Technical Services Company; and ARINC Engineering Services, LLC. These 

contracts were awarded pursuant to request for proposals No. W9113M-06-R-0014, 

issued by the United States Army Space & Missile Defense Command/Army Forces 

Strategic Command for program and operations support for the Department of 

Defense Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office.1

 The mission of the 

Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office is to provide technology to the 

Department of Defense, other federal agencies, partner nations, and state and local 

authorities engaged in counter-drug and counter-narcoterrorism operations. AR, 

Tab 4e, ID/IQ Contract Performance Work Statement, at 5; see also AR, Tab 3a, ID/IQ 

Contract Acquisition Strategy, app. A, at A-1 (Counter Narcoterrorism Technology 

Program Office’s statutory authority is “to provide support for counter-drug activities 

of any other department or agency of the Federal Government or of any State, local 

or foreign law enforcement agency”). 

The scope of work for the ID/IQ contracts was limited to providing the “necessary 

goods and services required by the [Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program 

Office] to support the counter-narcoterrorism mission” of the above listed agencies, 

nations, and authorities in three “program performance areas”: technology 

development and application; training, operations, and logistics support; and 

program and executive support. AR, Tab 4e, ID/IQ Contract Performance Work 

Statement, at 6, 13. The performance work statement stated: 

These support services will support the technology development and 

application of new counterdrug technologies. Support for training, 

operations, and logistic[s] for military and civilian missions (including 

conveyances, weapons, security services, etc.), and professional and 

executive support for information operations and information 

technology (IT) deployment will also be provided under this 

acquisition. 

Id. at 5. The performance work statement indicated that although these services 

would be provided worldwide, the current “primary countries of interest” were 

Colombia and Afghanistan. Id. at 6. The performance work statement also 

specifically noted, as examples, that the goods and services provided would outfit 

and support counter-narcoterrorism units such as the Counter Narcotics Police in 

Afghanistan and the Counter Narcotics Brigade in Columbia. Id. at 6. 

With regard to training and security services specifically, the performance work 

statement stated that the services would be “in support of counter-narcoterrorism 

missions and objectives.” Id. at 18, 19. The performance work statement also 

 

1

 The contracts were for a base year and four 1-year options, and had a collective 

ceiling price of $15 billion. Agency Report (AR) at 14. 

Page 2 B-402349 
identified representative examples of the training and security services 

contemplated, including security force training for border police in Afghanistan, 

training of counter-narcoterrorism forces in Afghanistan, and protective services for 

counter-narcoterrorism activities in Afghanistan. Id. 

In addition, the solicitation for these ID/IQ contracts included three sample task 

orders, each of which included a sample performance work statement to illustrate 

representative TORPs. The sample task orders were to: (1) develop high resolution 

short-wave infrared cameras for surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft; 

(2) provide intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance support in the Trans-Sahara 

region of Africa; and (3) train Afghan Border Police to perform functions necessary 

to deny the flow of illegal persons, drugs, and weapons across borders. AR, Tabs 4be, Sample Task Orders. 

The first of the two task order requests at issue here, TORP 150, seeks mentoring and 

training services for the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and Afghan National Police.2

 

AR, Tab 5c, TORP 150 Performance Work Statement, at 1. The Ministry of the 

Interior is responsible for nationwide law enforcement in Afghanistan and controls 

the Afghan National Police.3

 The Afghan National Police consists of a variety of 

organizations, most of which are involved in general law enforcement, safety and 

security, and counter-insurgency activities.4 Only two of these organizations--the 

 

2

 TORP 150 includes a base and two option years; the total government estimate for 

this work is $905,264,000. AR, Tab 5a, TORP Acquisition Strategy, at 9. 

3

 AR, encl. 3, Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office Memorandum 

(Dec. 4, 2009), at 1; Protest, exh. 8, Department of State and Department of Defense 

Inspectors General Report (Nov. 2006), at 11. 

4

 The Afghan National Police consists of the following organizations: Afghan 

Uniformed Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, and 

several “specialized elements” such as Counter-Narcotics, Counterterrorism, Fire 

Fighting, Major Crimes Task Force, and the Special Police Operations Unit. AR, 

Tab 5c, TORP 150 Performance Work Statement, at 1; AR, encl. 3, Counter 

Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office Memorandum (Dec. 4, 2009), at 1-2; 

Protest, exh. 6, Afghan National Police Fact Sheet, at 1. The Uniformed Police, 

which is the largest organization within the Afghan National Police, is responsible 

for general law enforcement, public safety, and internal security throughout 

Afghanistan. The National Civil Order Police is responsible for addressing civil 

disturbances in large urban areas. The remaining organizations are smaller and have 

specialized missions, primarily focused on a variety of criminal and counterinsurgency activities. Protest, exh. 6, Afghan National Police Fact Sheet, at 1; 

Comments at 24-25. 

Page 3 B-402349 
Afghan Border Police and Counter-Narcotics element--have a mission directly 

involving counter-drug operations. Protest, exh. 6, Afghan National Police Fact 

Sheet, at 1; Comments at 24-25. Specifically, the Afghan Border Police are 

responsible for patrolling Afghanistan’s borders, conducting counter-smuggling 

operations, and managing immigration; the Counter-Narcotics element is responsible 

for eliminating the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Protest, exh. 6, Afghan 

National Police Fact Sheet, at 1; Comments at 25. Thus, the Ministry of the Interior 

and Afghan National Police are involved in counter-drug and counter-narcoterrorism 

activities, but these activities are not their primary functions. 

The stated “objective” of TORP 150 is to “support the Afghanistan [Ministry of the 

Interior] and the [Afghan National Police] to increase their overall capabilities to 

provide a trained and professional police presence, enhance public security, and 

support the rule of law in Afghanistan.” AR, Tab 5c, TORP 150 Performance Work 

Statement, at 1. In furtherance of this objective, the TORP requests 100 mentors to 

“provide for the administration and execution of the functions of the [Ministry of the 

Interior],” with approximately 30 of these mentors designated as key personnel. Id.

at 2-4. One of the designated key personnel mentors is to provide training and 

support for the “Director [of] Afghan Border Police.” Id. at 6. As noted above, the 

Afghan Border Police are involved in counter-narcoterrorism operations. 

The remaining mentors identified in the TORP support Ministry of Interior 

operations or law enforcement activities generally. For example, the TORP seeks 

mentors to develop policies and strategies for the Afghan fire department, the 

Ministry of Interior’s interaction with Parliament, and strategic communications. Id.

at 5, 19. Several other mentors are requested to assist individuals who perform a 

variety of financial management services for the Ministry of the Interior. Id. at 21-22. 

Mentors are requested to assist with such things as personnel policy management, 

facilities management, medical and nursing, computer network and call center 

operations, and procurement. Id. at 9, 15, 20, 23-26. Mentors are also sought to 

support some general intelligence and law enforcement activities, including 

developing policies and strategies for counterterrorism operations, criminal 

investigations, intelligence, military, and police operations. Id. at 7-8, 10-18. 

Notably, none of the descriptions of the mentoring and training tasks included in 

TORP 150 (including for the Afghan Border Police) describe or mention 

responsibilities directly related to counter-narcoterrorism. Notwithstanding the 

wide range of mentoring and tasks described above, TORP 150 generally states, 

“[t]his task effort will support the Warfighter in globally combating Narcoterrorism.” 

Id. at 1. 

Page 4 B-402349 
The second of the two task order requests at issue here, TORP 166, seeks facility 

maintenance and logistics support for TORP 150.5 Specifically, TORP 166 requires 

facility maintenance and logistics support services for the “Afghan National Police 

Development Program” in Camp Gibson, Afghanistan, and facility maintenance and 

logistics support for 14 other named camps.6

 AR, Tab 5e, TORP 166 Performance 

Work Statement, at 1-156. The services sought under the TORP for Camp Gibson 

include such things as dining facility support, security services, water and electrical 

system support, medical support, vehicle fleet maintenance, and custodial services. 

Id. at 3-11. The TORP requires similar services for the other named camps. The 

TORP generally states that these services “directly support the [United States] and 

NATO missions to train the [Afghan National Police] to stabilize the country with 

emphasis on the reduction of illicit drug production and Narco-industry in 

Afghanistan.”7

 Id. at 1. However, as discussed above, the Afghan National Police 

includes many divisions, only two of which appear to perform counter-drug 

operations, and this TORP does not otherwise state responsibilities directly related 

to counter-narcoterrorism. 

DISCUSSION 

DynCorp, which does not hold an ID/IQ contract with the Counter Narcoterrorism 

Technology Program Office, protests that TORPs 150 and 166 are outside the scope 

of the underlying ID/IQ contracts because the requested services are unrelated to 

counter-narcoterrorism.8

 The Army asserts that the ID/IQ contracts are written 

broadly so as to include the services requested here. 

 

5

 TORP 166 includes a base and two option years; the total government estimate for 

this work is $702,360,000. AR, Tab 5a, TORP Acquisition Strategy, at 9. 

6

 The “primary mission” of Camp Gibson is to “provide life support for mentors” at 

the Ministry of the Interior and other police training commands, but Camp Gibson 

also “provide[s] support to the management and logistics of the [Afghan National 

Police] program as a whole.” Id. at 2. 

7

 TORP 166 also contains a general statement similar to the statement in TORP 150 

(quoted above): “This task effort will support the War Fighter in the combating of 

Narcoterrorism worldwide.” AR, Tab 5e, TORP 166 Performance Work Statement, 

at 1. 

8

 DynCorp previously provided training for the Ministry of the Interior and Afghan 

National Police under a task order with the Department of State that expired on 

January 31, 2010 (but was extended to March 31, 2010 to allow for transition). In the 

past, the Department of State maintained responsibility for training the Ministry and 

most of the organizations within the Afghan National Police, while the Counter 

Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office maintained responsibility for training 

for the Afghan Border Police, which, as noted above, is engaged in counter-

(continued...) 

Page 5 B-402349 
Under the Federal Acquisition and Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), as modified by 

the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2008, our Office is authorized 

to hear protests of task orders that are issued under multiple-award contracts (or 

protests of the solicitations for those task orders) where the task order is valued in 

excess of $10 million, or where the protester asserts that the task order increases the 

scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued. 

10 U.S.C. § 2304c(d) (2006); 10 U.S.C.A § 2304c(e)(B) (2009); Innovative Techs. 

Corp., B-401689 et al., Nov. 9, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 235 at 6. Task orders that are 

outside the scope of the underlying multiple-award contract are subject to the 

statutory requirement for full and open competition set forth in the Competition in 

Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), absent a valid determination that the work is 

appropriate for procurement on a sole-source basis or with limited competition. 

41 U.S.C. § 253(A)(1)(A) (2006); Anteon Corp., B-293523, B-293523.2, Mar. 29, 2004, 

2004 CPD ¶ 51 at 4; Erwin and Assocs., Inc., B-278850, Mar. 23, 1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 89 

at 7. 

The analysis of whether a task order is outside the scope of a multiple-award 

contract is the same as the analysis of whether a contract modification is outside the 

scope of a single-award contract. Anteon Corp., supra, at 4-5. In addition, the law in 

this area is well-settled. In determining whether a task order is beyond the scope of 

the contract, GAO and the courts look to whether there is a material difference 

between the task order and that contract. Id. at 5; MCI Telecomms. Corp., 

B-276659.2, Sept. 28, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 90 at 7; see also AT&T Commc’ns, Inc. v. 

Wiltel, Inc., 1 F.3d 1201, 1204 (1993); CCL, Inc., 39 Fed. Cl. 180, 191-92 (1997). 

Evidence of such a material difference is found by reviewing the circumstances 

attending the procurement that was conducted; examining any changes in the type of 

work, performance period, and costs between the contract as awarded and as 

modified by the task order; and considering whether the original contract solicitation 

adequately advised offerors of the potential for the type of task order issued. Anteon 

Corp., supra, at 5; Data Transformation Corp., B-274629, Dec. 19, 1996, 97-1 CPD ¶ 10 

at 6. The overall inquiry is whether the task order is of a nature that potential 

 

(...continued) 

narcoterrorism operations. Pursuant to an interagency decision, the Department 

of State and Department of Defense’s Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan decided that the responsibility for training the Afghan National Police 

(including the Afghan Border Police) should be performed by the Department of 

Defense. The Department of Defense decided to procure the training for the 

Ministry of the Interior and the Afghan National Police through the Counter 

Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office ID/IQ contracts. AR at 14-15. The Army 

concedes that many of the services that are the subject of this protest were provided 

in the past by DynCorp under its task order with the Department of State. Id. at 21. 

Page 6 B-402349 
offerors would reasonably have anticipated. Anteon Corp., B-293523, B-293523.2, 

Mar. 29, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 51 at 5. 

DynCorp argues that the services requested by the TORPs at issue here are outside 

the scope of the underlying ID/IQ contracts, because the requested services are 

broader than and only indirectly related to the underlying contracts’ counternarcoterrorism efforts. In DynCorp’s view, these TORPs involve support services for 

counter-insurgency and other efforts unrelated to counter-narcoterrorism, and 

include support for organizations within the Ministry of the Interior and Afghan 

National Police that are not directly involved in counter-narcoterrorism operations. 

Protest at 20-26; Comments at 21-34. 

The Army admits that the Ministry of the Interior and Afghan National Police are 

primarily involved in counter-insurgency activities. AR at 40. However, according to 

the Army, there is a “nexus” between these counter-insurgency activities and 

counter-narcoterrorism “because in Afghanistan the insurgency is funded by drug 

trafficking” and therefore “any organization or ministry conducting counter[-] 

insurgency operations in Afghanistan necessarily is involved in countering illegal 

drug trafficking.” AR at 23, 34-38; Contracting Officer’s Statement at 49-53 

(explaining how drug trades support insurgency). Because of this funding “nexus,” 

the Army contends that there is no difference between counter-insurgency and 

counter-narcoterrorism--“the two are the same.” AR at 43. The Army also argues 

that the language of the underlying ID/IQ contracts (and sample tasks included 

within them) is broad enough to include training for all police and Ministry of the 

Interior activities and is not limited to counter-narcoterrorism. AR at 31-34, 43-49. 

Based on our review of the record, we find that the underlying ID/IQ contracts do 

not contemplate providing the services requested by the TORPs here. As noted 

above, the underlying ID/IQ contracts advised that future task orders would be 

related to the counter-narcoterrorism mission of the Counter Narcoterrorism 

Technology Program Office.9

 AR, Tab 4e, ID/IQ Contract Performance Work 

Statement, at 6, 18-19. Although the ID/IQ contracts were broadly written and 

included some training and logistics support, these contracts made clear that the 

activities had to be related to counter-narcoterrorism operations. 

Here, with regard to TORP 150, only a small portion of requested training services 

arguably relate to counter-narcoterrorism or support the counter-narcoterrorism 

mission of the Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office. See Contracting 

 

9

 To the extent that the contracting officer asserts that the Counter Narcoterrorism 

Technology Program Office’s mission is broader than counter-narcoterrorism 

activities, Contracting Officer’s Statement at 29-31, the ID/IQ contracts did not 

announce that mission objectives other than counter-narcoterrorism-related 

activities would be supported by task orders issued under the ID/IQ contracts. 

Page 7 B-402349 
Officer’s Statement at 54. The vast majority of the TORPs’ requested services involve 

training the Ministry of the Interior and Afghan National Police in activities that 

support their missions of providing general law enforcement and fighting the 

insurgency. These activities and missions are not mentioned anywhere in the ID/IQ 

contracts. The fact that there may be some small overlap in the services requested 

by the TORPs with those required under the ID/IQ contracts does not permit an 

agency to purchase other services under the ID/IQ contracts that were not 

reasonably contemplated when the ID/IQ contracts were issued. Anteon Corp., 

supra, at 5. 

In addition, we find the disconnect between the underlying ID/IQ contracts and 

TORP 166 particularly striking. Although, as mentioned above, the ID/IQ contracts 

contemplated certain training and logistics support for counter-narcoterrorism 

activities, the performance work statement for TORP 0166 essentially identifies a 

logistics contract unrelated to these activities for the operation of 15 specific camps 

located throughout Afghanistan. For example, to support the operation of these 

camps, the task order anticipates providing dining facilities; maintaining water 

systems; providing heating, ventilation, and air conditioning services; maintaining 

the electrical system, a fleet of vehicles, and communications systems; and providing 

medical services, a laundry, and morale, welfare and recreation activities. AR, 

Tab 5e, TORP 166 Performance Work Statement, at 3-11. 

Although the agency argues that the services sought by the TORPs are within the 

scope of the underlying ID/IQ contracts because the insurgency in Afghanistan is 

funded, at least in part, by money from drug trafficking, AR 34-38, our analysis is 

necessarily focused on the contract vehicles at issue here--i.e., the underlying ID/IQ 

contracts and the two TORPs for task orders the agency seeks to place against them. 

As noted above, the ID/IQ contracts do not include counter-insurgency activities and 

did not advise offerors that mentoring, training, facilities, and logistics support for 

counter-insurgency, general law enforcement, or the administration of the Ministry 

of the Interior or the Afghan National Police unrelated to counter-narcoterrorism 

operations could be provided. Instead, as discussed above, the ID/IQ contracts 

limited the training and support to activities that supported counter-narcoterrorism 

operations. 

We also reject the agency’s arguments that the sample task orders placed potential 

offerors on notice that police training broader than counter-narcoterrorism training 

could be provided under the ID/IQ contracts. See AR at 44. Our review of the three 

sample task orders shows a clear nexus between the activities or technology 

requested and counter-narcoterrorism operations. While “Sample Task 3” provides 

for training and facilities support for the Afghan Border Police, this police 

organization (in contrast to rest of the Afghan National Police, with the exception of 

the Counter Narcotics element) is directly involved in counter-narcoterrorism 

activities. In addition, the sample task made clear that the training was to teach the 

border police how to “perform the functions necessary to deny the flow of illegal 

persons, drugs, and weapons across borders.” AR, Tab 4d, Sample Task 3 

Page 8 B-402349 
Performance Work Statement, at 1. Here, however, the vast majority of services 

requested under the TORPs support counter-insurgency and other operations that do 

not involve counter-narcoterrorism-related operations. 

Finally, we find unpersuasive the agency’s reliance on general statements in the 

TORPs and ID/IQ contracts to show that the TORPs are within the scope of the ID/IQ 

contracts. For example, we note that the “mission objective” for each of the TORPs 

generally states that the services sought “support the Warfighter in globally 

combating Narcoterrorism.” AR, Tabs 5c and 5e, TORP 150 and 166 Performance 

Work Statements, at 1. We also acknowledge the presence of general statements in 

the ID/IQ contracts that indicate that the Counter Narcoterrorism Technology 

Program Office will acquire goods and services “that cross traditional Department of 

Defense acquisition and contracting scopes,” cover a “full spectrum of support,” and 

include “[s]upport for training, operations, and logistic[s] for military and civilian 

missions.” AR, Tab 4e, ID/IQ Contract Performance Work Statement, at 5. However, 

these statements must be read in the context of the solicitations as a whole. As 

noted above, the underlying ID/IQ contracts make clear that the services involved 

were to be provided in connection with counter-narcoterrorism operations, while the 

TORPs sought services that were much broader than counter-narcoterrorism and, 

therefore, are outside the scope of the ID/IQ contracts. A contracting agency cannot 

extract isolated “catch all” words and phrases from a contract, or stretch the 

flexibility of that contract, in order to justify issuing a task order whose nature 

would not reasonably have been anticipated by potential offerors; to countenance 

such a justification would eviscerate the requirements of CICA.10 Ervin and Assocs., 

Inc., supra, at 9. 

In sum, we find that the TORPs for training and associated facilities and logistics 

support for the Ministry of the Interior and Afghan National Police are outside the 

scope of the ID/IQ contracts to support worldwide counter-narcoterrorism 

operations. We sustain the protest on this basis. 

RECOMMENDATION 

We sustain the protest and recommend that the Army cancel the TORPs and either 

conduct a full and open competition for these services, or prepare the appropriate 

justification required by CICA to limit the competition. We also recommend that the 

agency reimburse the protester the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing its 

 

10 Furthermore, we note that the ID/IQ contracts do not include most of the labor 

categories required to perform the work sought by the TORPs. Although the agency 

asserts that the labor categories identified in the ID/IQ contracts were not 

all-inclusive or intended to limit the tasks that could be expected, the fact that so 

many of the necessary labor categories are not included in the ID/IQ contracts also 

indicates that the TORP services are outside the scope of the contracts. 

Page 9 B-402349 
Page 10 B-402349 

protest, including attorneys fees. 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(d)(1). The protester must submit 

its certified claim for costs, detailing the time expended and the costs incurred, 

directly to the agency within 60 days after receipt of this decision. 4 C.F.R. 

§ 21.8(f)(1). 

The protest is sustained. 

Lynn H. Gibson 

Acting General Counsel