## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 22

- 1629

___________________________
United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.
Dominique D. Tipler

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri

____________
Submitted: January 13, 2023 Filed: May 3, 2023 [Unpublished]

____________ Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Dominique D. Tipler pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)

. The district

court 1 calculated an advisory sentencing range of 77 to 96 months of imprisonment

1 The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.-2- under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) and then imposed a sentence of 96 months

. The Guidelines calculation was higher than
it otherwise would have been because the district court concluded Tipler had two prior felony convictions that were “either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 ; see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1

. 2(a)(1) (defining a
“crime of violence” as including “any offense under .

. . state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”)

.

Tipler’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court wrongly determined his past conviction under Missouri law for exhi biting a lethal weapon was a “crime
of violence .” See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.03 0 .1(4) (prohibiting “knowing ly

. . . [e]xhibit [ ing ]
, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner”). T ipler acknowledges we have
held convictions under this Missouri statute qualify as a crime of violence under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s force clause

. See
, e.g. , United States v. Hudson

, 851 F.3d 807, 80 9– 10 (8 th Cir. 20 17). Nonetheless, Tipler argues the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Borden v. United States , 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), change d the legal landscape , effectively nullifying precedent such as Hudson

. Because of
Borden , Tipler contends, a criminal statute must include force (or threatened force)

“ targeted against the person of another intentionally designed to cause them harm” in order to fit within § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s force clause

. Because the Missouri statute at issue lacks such an intent

- to

- harm (or threaten harm) requirement , Tipler argues it does not qualify as a crime of violence.

Tipler’s reading of Borden conflicts with our more narrow interpretation of its holding . We have read Borden as holding “only that the force clause categorically
exclud es offenses that can be committed recklessly .” United States v. Larry , 51
F.4 th 290, 292 (8 th Cir. 2022)

. Under this view

, we held in Larry th at a conviction
under this Missouri statute still qualifies as a crime of violence because it requires
the prohibited exhibition of the lethal weapon “be committed with knowledge

. ” Id

. We are bound by this holding. See Mader v. United States , 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8 th-3- Cir. 201 1 ) (en banc) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel” ( quoting Owsley v. Luebbers , 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8 th
Cir. 20 02)). Thus, the district court was correct to c onclude Tipler’s prior conviction

was a crime of violence

.

W e accordingly affirm the district court’s judgment.

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