*

The Honorable Bernice Bouie Donald, Circuit Judge, did not participate in deciding the case.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 12a0063p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

BRANDON CHAPMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 1005;

GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 10-3616

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 09-00074—Dan A. Polster, District Judge.

Argued: March 2, 2011

Decided and Filed: March 1, 2012 

Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Circuit Judge; MARTIN, BOGGS, MOORE, COLE,

CLAY, GIBBONS, ROGERS, SUTTON, COOK, McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN,

KETHLEDGE, WHITE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: David W. Neel, DAVID W. NEEL, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant.

Joan Torzewski, HARRIS RENY TORZEWSKI, L.P.A., Toledo, Ohio, Angela M.

Tsevis, LATHROP & GAGE, Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:

David W. Neel, DAVID W. NEEL, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Joan

Torzewski, HARRIS RENY TORZEWSKI, L.P.A., Toledo, Ohio, Angela M. Tsevis,

David C. Vogel, LATHROP & GAGE, Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellees. 

1
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Brandon Chapman brought an action

against his employer, General Motors (GM), alleging breach of the collective bargaining

agreement, and against his union, the United Auto Workers Local 1005 (UAW), alleging

breach of the duty of fair representation, a combination referred to as a hybrid § 301/fair

representation case. He alleged the UAW failed to pursue his oral complaint against GM

through the contractual grievance procedure. Chapman did not challenge the alleged

union error through the appeals procedure mandated by the UAW Constitution. Instead,

he filed this suit.

The district court held that Chapman was barred from suit because he failed to

exhaust his internal union remedies and granted summary judgment to GM and the

UAW. Chapman appeals, arguing that our decision in Williams v. Molpus, 171 F.3d

360, 369 (6th Cir. 1999), requires that his case be remanded for a trial on his fair

representation claim to determine whether the exhaustion bar to suit is excused.

This case was accepted for initial en banc review to determine whether we erred

in Molpus when we held the general requirement that a plaintiff must exhaust internal

union remedies or be barred from suit is excused if the union breaches its duty of fair

representation. Our reasoning on this issue in Molpus resulted from a misunderstanding

of Supreme Court precedent and the national labor policy upon which it relies. For the

reasons articulated below, we overrule Molpus in part and, to the extent noted, its

progeny, Burkholder v. Int’l Union, 299 F. App’x 531 (6th Cir. 2008). We AFFIRM

the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of GM and the UAW.
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 3

I. BACKGROUND

Chapman was hired as a temporary hourly employee at GM on June 5, 2006, was

released from employment during the regular two-week summer plant shutdown and

rehired in July 2006. In June of 2007, Chapman wanted to take an additional week off

after the annual shutdown to tour with his band. Chapman asked his stepfather, Bill

Newman, who was a Union Committeeman for UAW Local 1005, if he could take off

the additional week. Chapman did not speak with his assigned union representative or

any member of GM management.

Newman spoke with Tom Danzey, a GM labor relations representative, about

Chapman’s situation. Danzey told Newman temporary employees were not entitled to

leaves of absence; but, because Chapman had a clean record, he would not be barred

from consideration for future temporary positions. Newman then told Chapman he was

“good to go on vacation.” Chapman never spoke with any management personnel at GM

regarding the request for time off nor did he request or receive any paperwork showing

that the time off had been approved.

After his absence, Chapman did not contact GM management about returning to

work nor did he attempt to return to the plant. Instead, he spoke with Newman who

contacted Danzey. Danzey said there were no openings for temporary employees.

Chapman again talked to Newman, who said he would “take care of it” though Chapman

stated he did not know what Newman meant by that. Chapman understood he could file

a grievance but never filed one and never spoke to anyone in GM management, his own

union representative, or anyone from the union except his stepfather. Newman discussed

Chapman’s situation with the new UAW Shop Chairman, Danny Smith, who told

Newman not to write a grievance for Chapman. Chapman took no further action for a

year.

On June 16, 2008, Chapman was re-hired as a temporary employee at GM. He

alleges that around this time he learned that UAW representatives had not filed a

grievance on his behalf and approached Ken Jelen, the UAW Shop Chairman who had

replaced Smith, to explain his situation. On October 30, 2008, Jelen sent Chapman a
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 4

letter explaining Chapman had no case to pursue. Chapman alleges Jelen told him that

Smith had “messed it up” and Chapman’s predicament should have never happened.

Chapman did not pursue an appeal of Jelen’s decision through the internal grievance

procedures as required by the UAW Constitution.

Instead, Chapman brought suit. His hybrid § 301/fair representation action

alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement against GM and breach of the duty

of fair representation against the UAW. See 29 U.S.C. § 185. The district court granted

the motions for summary judgment of GM and the UAW and dismissed the case. See

Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, No. 1:09-CV-74, 2010 WL 1417008 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 6,

2010). To litigate the merits of his § 301 claim against the employer, the district court

reasoned, Chapman must first prevail on his fair representation claim against the UAW.

Id. at *2. The court held that Chapman’s fair representation claim failed because

Chapman did not exhaust his internal union remedies as required by the UAW

Constitution. Id. at *3.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo and considers the facts

and any inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. White v. Detroit Edison Co., 472 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2006). Summary

judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When

the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of his

case on which he bears the burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS

The case before us and the aspect of Molpus we reconsider hinge on

understanding the difference between two sets of remedies: contractual remedies arising

from a collective bargaining agreement and internal union constitutional remedies. Here,
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 5

1

See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1960)

(federal courts are not to “review the merits of an arbitration award,” but only determine whether the award

“draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior &

Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581–83 (1960) (holding that grievance machinery “is at the very heart

of the system of industrial self-government” and the courts should not deny an order to arbitrate “unless

it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that

covers the asserted dispute”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)

(holding that because the parties bargained for the “arbitrator’s judgment,” the underlying “question of

contract interpretation” is for the arbitrator, and the courts have “no business weighing the merits of the

grievance”).

the contractual remedy is the grievance procedure established in the contract between

the UAW and GM, a procedure created to settle disputes between an employee and GM.

The internal union remedy is the appeal procedure established in the UAW Constitution,

a procedure created to settle disputes between the UAW and the employees it represents

in the workplace. A hybrid § 301/fair representation case encompasses both sets of

remedies, each of which has its own distinct exhaustion doctrine. In Molpus, we applied

the wrong exhaustion doctrine. An overlap in terms and doctrines led to our confusion;

an overview of labor policy and case precedent will clear it up.

A. Historical Underpinnings of Exhaustion

Congressional policy is the touchstone guiding development of the labor-law

case precedent that applies to this case. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management

Relations Act (LMRA) provides, “[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the

parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising

over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.”

29 U.S.C. § 173(d). The seminal Supreme Court instruction on this national policy is

found in the Steelworkers Trilogy,1

 three labor law opinions issued in 1960 that explain

why the judiciary shall defer to the method of dispute resolution selected by the parties.

Congress and the courts determined that allowing the parties to implement their own

system of industrial self-government would help achieve industry stabilization and

industrial peace. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578–79. They also recognized that rapid

and industry-specific resolution of all disputes between the parties would relieve the

judiciary from the adjudication of disputes that otherwise could overwhelm the court

system.
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 6

The two doctrines of exhaustion in question here developed in response to these

historical purposes. The extent of judicial deference was first made clear in the

application of exhaustion requirements to contractual grievance procedures. In Republic

Steel Corp. v. Maddox, the Supreme Court held that, before bringing suit, employees are

required to “exhaust” contractual grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the

collective bargaining agreement. 379 U.S. 650, 652–53 (1965). As will prove important

to this case, the Court referred to both codified national labor policy and the practical

need to solve a problem at its source when holding: “employees . . . must attempt use

of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of

redress[;]” and “there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the union the

opportunity to act on his behalf.” See id. at 652–53 (emphasis added). Failure to

exhaust contractual remedies thus became a bar to litigation.

The workplace realities that prompted judicial deference to contract remedies

also set limits on that deference. The Supreme Court recognized that a litigation bar for

failure to exhaust contract remedies can work an unacceptable injustice when the union

acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its

duty of fair representation to the employee. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967);

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). When the union breaches

this duty in representing the employee against the employer, the failure to exhaust

contractual grievance remedies may be the result of the union’s actions, not the

employee’s. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185–86. Thus, where the employee can prove that

the union breached its duty in handling his grievance, his case may proceed despite his

failure to exhaust the contract remedies and notwithstanding the bar of finality normally

accorded the grievance or arbitration proceeding with the employer. See id. at 185–87;

Hines, 424 U.S. at 566–67.

Out of these cases grew the present litigation form, combining claims against the

employer and the union into one hybrid case. The suit against the employer alleges a

breach of the collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the LMRA. The suit

against the union alleges breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, implied under
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 7

the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158; DelCostello v. Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983). The two claims, however, are inextricably

interdependent: “To prevail against either the company or the Union, [the employee]

must not only show that [his] discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry

the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union.” Hines, 424 U.S. at 570–71;

see also DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164–65. The employee must prove both claims to

recover from either defendant. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165; White, 472 F.3d at 425;

Driver v. USPS, Inc., 328 F.3d 863, 868 (6th Cir. 2003). Vaca and Hines clarified the

hybrid form of § 301/fair representation cases and established the rules governing

exhaustion of contractual remedies arising from a collective bargaining agreement.

In addition to contractual remedies and the exhaustion doctrine pertaining to

them, § 301/fair representation cases also concern internal union remedies and an

exhaustion doctrine applicable to them. This overlap of the language of remedies and

exhaustion led to our confusion in Molpus. The case of Clayton v. International Union,

451 U.S. 679 (1981), can set us right again. There the Supreme Court explained the

distinction between the sets of remedies:

In contrast to contractual grievance and arbitration procedures, which

are negotiated by the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement and are

generally designed to provide an exclusive method for resolving disputes

arising under that agreement, internal union appeals procedures are

created by the union constitution and are designed to settle disputes

between an employee and his union that arise under that constitution.

Id. at 695–96 (emphasis added). The Court also addressed an employee’s duty to

exhaust internal union remedies and explained when an employee is exempt from that

duty. 

B. Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies: Clayton

In Clayton, the Supreme Court set forth guidance for determining when failure

to exhaust internal union remedies will bar § 301/fair representation litigation. It

focused on one strain of national labor policy articulated in Republic Steel, the

encouragement of “private rather than judicial resolution of disputes arising over the
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 8

interpretation and application of collective-bargaining agreements.” Clayton, 451 U.S.

at 687 (citing Hines, 424 U.S. at 567, 570–71). The Court noted two avenues for

satisfying that policy: “Where internal union appeals procedures can result in either

complete relief to an aggrieved employee or reactivation of his grievance, exhaustion

[of internal union remedies] would advance the national labor policy of encouraging

private resolution of contractual labor disputes.” Id. at 692 (emphasis added).

Additionally, an important practical purpose is achieved by requiring exhaustion in

either circumstance; it allows the union the opportunity “to rectify the very wrong of

which the employee complains[.]” Id. at 692 n.21.

The Supreme Court recognized “courts have discretion to decide whether to

require exhaustion of internal union procedures[,]” but the Court articulated three factors

relevant to a court’s exercise of discretion: (1) “whether union officials are so hostile

to the employee that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim”; (2)

“whether the internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate

the employee’s grievance or to award him the full relief he seeks”; and (3) “whether

exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasonably delay the employee’s opportunity

to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim.” Id. at 689. If a court finds any

of these factors to exist, “the court may properly excuse the employee’s failure to

exhaust.” Id.

C. Circuit Precedent and Molpus

Our circuit has followed the Clayton model, reviewing the affirmative defense

of failure to exhaust internal union remedies as the first step in § 301/fair representation

litigation. We required plaintiffs to show that internal union remedies were exhausted,

or were futile, before allowing them to litigate a claim alleging a union’s breach of the

duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Monroe v. Int’l Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 25–26

(6th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for failure to

exhaust union appeals procedures under Clayton without examining whether union

breached duty of fair representation); Wagner v. Gen. Dynamics, 905 F.2d 126, 127–29

(6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding plaintiff’s failure to exhaust internal union
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 9

remedies could not be excused); Rogers v. Bd. of Educ. of Buena Vista Schs., 2 F.3d 163,

166–67 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal, under Clayton, of claim based on

Michigan’s Public Employees Relations Act for failure to exhaust internal union

remedies).

The exhaustion of remedies discussion in Molpus, 171 F.3d at 369, carried into

Burkholder, 299 F. App’x at 535–37, stands as an anomaly in our jurisprudence. On

appeal to this Court in Molpus, the UAW reiterated its argument that plaintiff’s

§ 301/fair representation cause of action was barred by his failure to exhaust internal

union remedies. This Court disagreed, noting, “[t]he general requirement that a grievant

must exhaust his or her internal union remedies . . . is excused if the union breaches its

duty of fair representation.” Molpus, 171 F.3d at 369 (emphasis added). The opinion

quoted Hines as authority, stating “‘[t]he union’s breach of duty relieves the employee

of an express or implied requirement that disputes be settled [through] contractual

grievance procedures[.]’” Id. (quoting Hines, 424 U.S. at 567) (emphasis added).

Molpus mistakenly applied the exhaustion doctrine applicable to contractual grievance

procedures discussed in Hines to a case that turned on failure to exhaust internal union

remedies. Because Chapman relies on the Molpus analysis in this appeal, we accepted

the case en banc to address the confusion in Molpus and Burkholder. Though the

conflation of exhaustion doctrines continued in Burkholder, the concurrence in that case

challenged the lead opinion’s analysis of Molpus and suggested a need to correct

Molpus:

[I]ts broad language unconditionally waives the exhaustion requirement

for any plaintiff who alleges a breach of duty of fair representation in his

or her complaint. This consequence is contrary to the general policy of

having labor disputes first submitted to internal union grievance

procedures . . . and the UAW appropriately criticizes the Molpus

language for that reason.

. . . Molpus should . . . be closely scrutinized if the issue comes before a

future en banc panel of this court.

Burkholder, 299 F. App’x at 538 (Gilman, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 10

The overly broad language regarding exhaustion of internal union remedies in

our Molpus decision resulted from our reliance on Hines, a contractual remedies case.

We confused constitutional union remedies with contractual grievance procedure

remedies arising from a collective bargaining agreement. See Willetts v. Ford Motor

Co., 583 F.2d 852, 856 (6th Cir. 1978) (“Exhaustion of internal union remedies and

resort to exclusive contractual remedies are separate prerequisites to an employee suit.”).

This led to application of the exhaustion doctrine for contractual remedies instead of the

exhaustion doctrine applicable to internal union appeals procedures as explained by the

Supreme Court in Clayton. Cf. Winston v. Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers,

Local Union No. 89, 93 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing distinction between

contractual remedies and internal union remedies, but holding Clayton inapplicable

because contractual remedies, not internal union remedies, were at issue in that case).

The Burkholder concurrence recognized that the use in Molpus of the contractual

exhaustion doctrine for an internal union remedies case undercut the rationale of prior

labor-law precedent. Hines had reasoned that it is appropriate to excuse an employee

from exhaustion of the contractual grievance procedure where failure to exhaust is due

to the union’s error or wrongdoing and, thus, is beyond the employee’s control. Clayton

recognized that where the employee chooses not to undertake exhaustion of internal

union remedies, and thereby denies the union an opportunity to correct the very error of

which he complains, the rationale of Hines is simply inapplicable.

Continuation of the Molpus analysis would also ignore practical considerations,

recognized since the Steelworkers Trilogy, that undergird national labor policy.

Exercising internal union remedies requires dialogue among those involved in the

process and can repair a claimed wrong or explain why no wrong occurred, all short of

litigation. Allowing employees to sidestep this system substitutes litigation for the

method chosen by the employer and union for orderly resolution of employee

grievances. It denies the system an opportunity to work and, because the suit is a hybrid

§ 301/fair representation case, carries both employer and union into the courthouse.

Plaintiffs are encouraged to file complaints alleging a breach of the duty of fair
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 11

representation because that allegation results in a trial on the merits under Molpus. That

defeats the purpose of exhaustion and wastes judicial resources.

These are the problems Congress sought to avoid by enacting a policy declaring

private resolution by the parties as the preferred method for settling workplace disputes.

Therefore, in light of both judicial precedent and Congressional policy, we overrule

those portions of Molpus and Burkholder analyzing the exhaustion of internal union

remedies, Molpus, 171 F.3d at 369; Burkholder, 299 F. App’x at 535–37, thus aligning

our precedent with the analysis articulated in Clayton. The remaining aspects of Molpus

and Burkholder remain good law.

D. Application of Clayton to This Case

It is undisputed that Chapman failed to undertake his obligation to exhaust the

internal union remedies mandated by the UAW Constitution. He did not avail himself

of an appeal at any level of the multi-level appeal process provided in Article 33 of the

UAW Constitution. To determine whether his failure to exhaust internal union remedies

should be excused, we begin with review of the three relevant Clayton factors. We

inquire: whether union officials were so hostile that Chapman could not hope to obtain

a fair hearing on his claim; whether the internal union appeals procedures would be

inadequate either to reactivate his grievance or to award him the full relief he seeks; or,

whether exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasonably delay his opportunity to

obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689. If

Chapman does not establish any of these factors, then his failure to exhaust his internal

union remedies bars him from bringing suit against the UAW and also bars his suit

against GM. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164–65; Garrison v. Cassens Transp. Co.,

334 F.3d 528, 538 (6th Cir. 2003).

Chapman introduced no evidence that union officials were hostile or that the

internal union appeal procedures would unreasonably delay a judicial hearing on his

claim. Accordingly, our review turns to the second factor, whether the internal union

remedies are adequate, i.e. whether they could have reactivated his grievance or

awarded him full relief.
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 12

The record reveals that the internal union appeal procedures are adequate. Upon

being told by Ken Jelen, the UAW Shop Chairman, that he had no case to pursue,

Chapman could and should have initiated the appeal procedures under Article 33 of the

UAW Constitution. Section 1 therein authorizes an appeal of “any action, decision, or

penalty” or a “failure or refusal to act” by a Local Union or its officers. Section 2

specifically references the progressive steps for “any challenge to the handling or

disposition of a grievance[.]” Chapman’s claim that a Union official told him he had no

valid grievance and refused to proceed with any processing is a classic example of a

“refusal to act” or improper “handling or disposition of a grievance” that should be

challenged through the internal union appeals procedures. See Ryan v. Gen. Motors

Corp., 929 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir. 1989) (“It is well-settled that the opinion of a union

representative cannot be construed as a waiver of the UAW’s constitutional appeal

requirements.”).

Chapman could have initiated his internal union appeal orally or in writing to the

Local membership and continued to appeal beyond the Local to the International

Executive Board and then to the Convention Appeals Committee or the independent

Public Review Board (PRB). The PRB has the authority to require the Union to pay

money damages, back pay, or both and to require the Union to reinstate and process a

grievance.

Chapman could have challenged the union’s failure to pursue his contractual

grievance whether that grievance had been initiated orally or in writing. Oral grievances

are a recognized part of the contractual grievance procedure in the collective bargaining

agreement: Step One begins with oral presentation of the grievance and concludes with

reducing the grievance to writing. Pursuant to a Letter Agreement between GM and the

UAW, had Chapman undertaken the internal union procedures and successfully appealed

the Union’s failure to pursue the grievance, GM could have reinstated Chapman’s

grievance at the step in the contractual procedure at which the erroneous disposition of

the grievance occurred. Therefore, the internal union appeal procedures were adequate
No. 10-3616 Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, et al. Page 13

to reactivate Chapman’s grievance and he cannot satisfy the second Clayton factor to

excuse his failure to exhaust.

Chapman has not established any of the three Clayton factors upon which the

Court may properly excuse his failure to exhaust his internal union remedies. Therefore,

his fair representation claim against the UAW is barred. Because, in this hybrid case,

Chapman’s fair representation claim is “inextricably interdependent” with his § 301

claim, see DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164–65, he must prevail on his fair representation

claim against the Union before he may litigate the merits of his § 301 claim against GM.

UPS, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 67 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus,

Chapman’s hybrid § 301/fair representation suit is barred for failure to exhaust internal

union remedies.

IV. CONCLUSION

Discrete portions of our decisions in Molpus and Burkholder are inconsistent

with Supreme Court precedent and contrary to national labor policy. Therefore, we

overrule those portions of Molpus and Burkholder, as fully explained in this opinion.

Because Chapman failed to establish a legally justifiable basis under Clayton for his

failure to exhaust his internal union remedies, his failure is not excused and the

exhaustion bar applies. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary

judgment and dismissal of Chapman’s suit against GM and the UAW.