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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

HOW NATION-STATES CRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 

DOCUMENTS

Alan G. Stolberg

October 2012

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them 

to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013. 

*****

The crafting of this monograph would never have been possible without the incredible support of so many. For this, and 

so much more, I will always be grateful. There are some that I 

absolutely must make mention of: to Professor Douglas Lovelace 

and Dr. Anthony Echevarria of the Strategic Studies Institute 

of the U.S. Army War College, thank you so much for the great 

financial and moral support; to the U.S. Army War College for 

the willingness to provide me the time for a 6-month sabbatical 

to conduct the research that was so key to the analysis; to the 

many men and women in each of the five countries that worked 

on their nation’s national security strategy documents and their 

readiness to share their experiences, both good and bad, with me. 

Within each country, there were always one or two that stepped 

forward in a special way to hold my hand and open the key doors 

that I needed to pass through: Dr. David Connery for Australia, 

General of Division Gerson Menandro in Brazil, Helmoed Heitman for South Africa, Sir David Omand in the United Kingdom, 

and in the United States, former National Security Advisor Steve 

Hadley provided time that he did not have in numerous ways to 

help shape this document’s outcome. There were others behind 

the scenes who helped make this all happen, to include Mr. Kia 

Ghorashi who always ensured that I had a vehicle to communicate with former NSA Hadley, Ms. Saline Guimaraes Currin who 

served as my superb Portuguese translator at an absolutely critical period, and to Ms. Tara Colyer, who made sure that I could 

travel wherever and whenever I needed. To all of these, as well 

as those space will not permit me to mention, thank you. 

There will never be a way that I could truly thank my family enough for both supporting and putting up with this journey 

during this past year. For my love, Dianne, thank you as always 

for the support that you gave me.
iii

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ISBN 1-58487-550-X

v

FOREWORD

In some manner, shape, or form, every nation state 

in the international system has a national security 

strategy or strategies. These strategies are intended to 

guide the state as it makes its way through the labyrinth of challenges that every nation state faces in the 

21st century. The strategy could represent the nation’s 

overall grand strategy or it could be a national security-related strategy for one particular issue, like force 

structure development for the armed forces. Strategy 

making is an art; not a science. Sometimes these strategies work and sometimes they do not. Some are effective and efficient as desired and others are less so. 

The focus for this assessment is how a nation state can 

craft the most effective and efficient national securitytype strategy possible. 

To address these key questions, the national security strategy development processes in this monograph were examined and contrasted in five different 

nation-states to determine the methodologies they 

employed. For each case study, members of the government who actually worked on the development of 

the national strategy document in question were interviewed. These individuals—civil servants, career 

military officers, and senior political appointees—all 

had a story to tell about the separate approaches to 

strategy formulation. 

In the analysis of the strategy development processes utilized by Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the 

United Kingdom (UK), and the United States, it became apparent that there were both similarities and 

differences in the manner that each nation conducted 

its strategy formulation. But most important, each 

one of national strategy development processes was 
vi

found to contain elements that could have real value 

for those countries not employing those particular approaches. Australia and the UK were superb in ensuring true whole of government coordination, as well 

as concurrent application of the government’s budget 

process and the formal administration of a risk assessment for the given strategy. Australia and South 

Africa did a superb job in bringing civil society into 

their document formulation processes. Brazil was exceptional in the creation of detailed ways and means 

critical for strategy implementation. Finally, the U.S. 

approach included addressing all elements of national 

power, as well as the identification of potential strategy modifiers if the national strategy was found not to 

be working in certain areas.

Given the complexities of the 21st century in the 

national security arena, the Strategic Studies Institute 

believes that assessments like the one you are about to 

read will be crucial to both practitioners and academics alike to gain greater understanding for the most 

effective and efficient approaches to national strategy 

making in the 21st century.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ALAN G. STOLBERG is Associate Professor of National Security Studies, faculty member of the National Security Policy Program, and former holder of the 

Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. 

Army War College. A retired Army colonel, he served 

in a variety of intelligence and policy and strategy positions as a European and Eurasian Foreign Area Officer, to include Soviet/East European Political Military Planner for the Joint Staff J5 during the time of 

the fall of the Berlin Wall, American Liaison Officer 

to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 

during the siege of Sarajevo in 1995, and Chief of the 

Europe/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Division in United States European Command 

(USEUCOM) J5 during the Kosovo conflict and the 

first year of the Global War on Terror. His current 

research focuses on policy and strategy making, European and Eurasian security, security cooperation, 

and the U.S. Government interagency. He holds an 

M.A. in international relations from the University of 

Southern California, an M.A. in national security and 

strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and 

a Ph.D. in political science from Temple University.

ix

SUMMARY

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a 

spectrum of comprehensive national security strategy-related documents that have been created, in part, 

to institutionalize the existence of national-level direction for a variety of national security issues and to do 

this at the unclassified level for the public audience of 

those democratic nations, as well as in some cases, for 

external audiences. The intent of this monograph is to 

explore the actual processes that nation states employ 

to craft their national security strategy-related documents. The focus is specifically oriented on how to 

perform such analysis for the development of national 

security strategies (NSS). 

For each of the case studies in question, this monograph will address the oversight, strategic context, national interests and domestic political considerations, 

facts, and assumptions used to frame strategy development, objectives and measures of effectiveness, 

ways and means, risk assessment, the identification 

of a formal feedback mechanism, and who within the 

government had the final approval authority for the 

document. Five countries and their national strategy 

documents were selected for assessment: Australia, 

Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK), and 

the United States. For each case, at least one national 

strategy document was evaluated per country and 

more than one department or ministry from the government’s executive branch participated in each nation’s document drafting process. 

The Australian approach to national strategy 

formulation as demonstrated by the developmental processes utilized for the 2008 National Security 

Statement and the 2009 White Paper (WP) indicates a 
x

clear focus on crafting whole of government coordinated documents. Participating actors would be found 

to be negligent if they did not coordinate. The formulation process emphasizes inclusion of the managers 

who control the fiscal means at every step of decisionmaking for these efforts. In addition, the risk analysis 

concept is becoming fully institutionalized. Finally, a 

wide spectrum of Australian civil society was formally 

solicited for its thinking on the major issues confronting the 2008 WP drafters. 

The Brazilian 2008 National Strategy of Defense

(NSD) represents the first national strategy of its 

kind in Latin America. In combination with the 2005 

National Defense Policy and the forthcoming WP, Brazil 

is developing a systematic approach to the crafting of 

national strategy. Of particular note is the Implementation Measures component of the NSD and the associated degree of fidelity with the strategy’s ways and 

means. With the publication of the strategy, this approach provides the ministries and agencies responsible for strategy implementation with the planning 

information necessary to begin detailed execution.

Both the South African White Paper and Defence 

Review assisted the nation in moving beyond the 

apartheid era. The documents provided a nationallevel strategy for the defense establishment on its role 

in the society writ large, as well as the approach in 

the form of ways and means to execute that strategy 

with the nation’s armed forces in the near to midterm. 

These documents were guided in detail by the state’s 

legislative body and uniquely supported by the significant inclusion of civil society throughout the course 

of their development processes. 

The evolution of the UK national strategy development process since 2007 has been significant, especially 
xi

with the inclusion and alignment of the means (fiscal 

resources in the budgeting process) and the utilization of the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) 

in analysis of risks and related national interests. This 

is especially true in the linkage between the NSS and 

the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), along 

with the connectivity between the ends, ways, and 

means contained in the two documents. While an excellent tool, one potential drawback of the formalized 

risk analysis process contained in the NSRA is that 

the strategy’s ultimate objectives may be framed more 

than they should be in terms of risks and challenges, 

rather than opportunities. Thus, the focus could be on 

problem solving as opposed to “goal seeking,” having 

the ultimate effect of inhibiting strategic thinking. 

The U.S. NSS is the only complete whole of government national security document that the U.S. Government publishes. The NSS is best developed through 

coordination and collaboration with all government 

departments and agencies that have responsibility for 

both foreign and domestic national security concerns. 

This analysis reviews the development of three different NSSs: 2002, 2006, and 2010. These three were selected because they required the consideration of the 

many complex issues of the post-September 11, 2001 

(9/11) world and because they were developed at the 

direction of two different Presidents representing two 

different political parties, and with the detailed support of three different national security advisors and 

associated National Security Council (NSC) staffs.

1

HOW NATION-STATES CRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 

DOCUMENTS

The word “strategy” is used in a variety of contexts. 

There are business strategies, coaching strategies, financial strategies, and research strategies. . . . An organization develops a strategy based upon its mission 

or goal, its vision of the future, an understanding of 

the organization’s place in the future, and an assessment of the alternatives available to it, given scarce 

resources. . . . Development of a coherent strategy is 

absolutely essential to national security in times of 

both war and peace.1

—Mackubin Thomas Owens

The basic principles of strategy are so simple that a 

child may understand them. But to determine their 

proper application to a given situation requires the 

hardest kind of work.2

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

INTRODUCTION

The need for security and the institutionalization 

of that security in national strategy and its associated documents is becoming a significant concern 

for nations in the 21st century international system. 

This need requires the development of national-level 

strategies that are designed with objectives that, if attained, can ensure the conditions necessary for security for a given actor in the international system can 

be met. Nations have always had a variety of strategies that were intended for use at the strategic or na-
2

tional level of government. That does not mean that 

they were either “good” or “bad” strategies or that 

they were in place at the right time for the right event. 

But they did frequently exist in one form or another. 

Most of these strategies existed in formal documents 

that were classified and not open to public scrutiny. 

More often than not, strategies that were focused on 

national security related issues like the overall foreign and domestic security strategies for the nation, 

as well as more specialized strategies like those designed to guide the nation’s military strategy, the development of the structure, roles, and missions for its 

armed forces, or perhaps a specific strategy designed 

for counterterrorism, were not set down in one definitive document. Rather, components of these types of 

national strategies that were in place for nations that 

functioned as democracies were either classified or, if 

unclassified, typically found in senior leader speeches, 

testimony before legislative branches of government, 

or in interviews or press conferences provided to the 

media. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of 

a spectrum of comprehensive national security strategy related documents that have been created, in part, 

to institutionalize the existence of national-level direction for a variety of national security issues and to do 

this at the unclassified level for the public audience of 

those democratic nations, as well as in some cases for 

external audiences.

There are several purposes for placing these national security strategies within the public domain: 

1. They serve as a broad construct for government 

departments or ministries (as well as legislative and 

judicial bodies), to ensure that they understand the 

intent (approach or direction) that the elected senior 

leadership desires in selected national security areas.3
3

In essence, a national security-related strategy can be 

“a unifying document for the executive branch (of 

a democratic government) . . . designed to create an 

internal consensus on foreign, defense, diplomatic 

. . . economic, (and homeland security) strategy.”4

2. These strategies can function to inform the legislative body within a democracy (e.g., Parliament, Congress) on the resource requirements for the strategy in 

question, and “thus facilitate the (fiscal) authorization 

and appropriation processes.”5

3. The documents have the ability to be a strategic 

communications tool for both domestic and foreign 

audiences. These audiences include the domestic constituents of a democratic state—those that are considered key to the election of a party in power such as 

lobbying groups or unions. It could also be directed at 

other actors in the international system, such as other 

nation-states or entities that are potential threats that 

are considered to be significant to the state developing the document. All of these audiences may change 

over time, depending on the issues faced by the crafting state during the course of the writing.6

The intent of this monograph is to explore the actual processes that nation-states employ to craft their national security strategy related documents. It is what 

Alexander George, the famed Stanford academic, calls 

process theory, the analysis of how to structure and 

manage the policymaking process.7 For the policymaking (or strategy making) process to have its greatest chance for success, George found that it should be 

able to: 1) Ensure sufficient information is available 

and analyzed adequately; 2) Facilitate the identification of the policymaking actor’s major values and 

interests, and ensure that the objectives are guided 
4

by those values and interests; 3) Assure that a wide 

range of options, along with their inherent risks, are 

considered prior to determining the ultimate course of 

action; 4) Provide careful consideration of each course 

of action option; and 5) Be willing to accept that the 

policy (strategy) is not succeeding and learn from that 

experience.8 In the case of this research, the focus is 

specifically oriented on how to perform such analysis 

for the development of national security strategies. 

For each case study in question, this monograph 

will include addressing the oversight (how and why 

it was determined to create the document), strategic 

context (identification of strategy stakeholders, legal 

issues, determination of prior/current policies and 

strategies), national interests and domestic political 

considerations (how were national interests determined and what were the domestic political considerations for the assessed document), facts and assumptions used to frame strategy development (what 

guidance was provided by the national leadership, 

and determination of any constraints or restraints, 

such as resource considerations like money or time 

for the strategy, what threats and opportunities were 

established for the strategy), objectives and measures 

of effectiveness (how were the objectives identified 

and measures of effectiveness for the strategy developed), ways (courses of action) and means (how were 

the resources required to conduct the courses of action 

established for the strategy), risk assessment (how 

was risk assessed, such as political and monetary cost, 

second and third order effects, along with the identification of potential spoilers to the strategy such as unanticipated actions that an opponent might take or the 

occurrence of natural events like poor weather, and 

modifications to the strategy that could be employed 
5

to address these spoilers), the identification of a formal feedback mechanism (created to formally review 

progress of the strategy’s implementation on a regular 

basis; intended to determine when and if adjustments 

had to take place), and whom within the government 

had the final approval authority for the document.

The content of the questions described above were 

addressed to support the analysis of each of the identified case studies and originated with the U.S. Army 

War College’s National Security Policy Program’s 

(NSPP) Policy Formulation Model. Those questions 

contained in the Model had been developed, expanded, and updated on an annual basis between 2004-11 

by the students and faculty in each succeeding NSPP 

class. The Model, with applicability for both policy 

and strategy formulation, identifies a series of variables or directive steps to be addressed in the national 

security policy or strategy formulation process. In effect, it was designed to serve as a detailed checklist 

that could be employed for the crafting of any type 

of national security-related policy or strategy.9 These 

questions are intended to represent a comprehensive 

listing of all questions that those charged with formulating policy and strategy would have to consider in 

their analysis. Sequencing of the questions, the order 

that they are engaged, is secondary to the concept 

that they must be asked. Most important is that all the 

questions were taken into account by the end of the 

formulation process. Given the assumption that these 

are the right questions to consider, then risk would be 

taken by the actor doing the crafting in every instance 

that the substance of the questions were either partially or fully not part of the strategy’s analytic process. 

The risk could be manifested within the strategy by 

issues such as less support within the government’s 
6

executive body and/or legislative body if the document is not fully coordinated. In turn, this could mean 

that the resources may not be available to ensure that 

the strategy can be fully implemented.

The monograph then aligned the questions to individual case studies of nation-states conducting their 

national strategy document formulation processes. 

These case studies were selected based upon a determination of two primary factors: 1) The nation-states 

in question had developed national security strategy 

documents that involved participation in the drafting 

process from more than one department or agency 

from the executive branch of government; and, 2) 

Individual participants who were involved in the 

actual drafting process would be willing to respond 

to the questions delineated above, either in person 

or by written response. In addition, subject to travel 

resource availability, an effort was made to have as 

many different regions of the world as possible represented in the review. Ultimately five countries and 

their national strategy documents were selected for 

assessment: Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United 

Kingdom (UK), and the United States. For each case, 

at least one national strategy document was evaluated 

per country, and more than one department or ministry from the government’s executive branch participated in each nation’s document drafting process. 

Once the data were gathered, the author of the 

monograph compared and contrasted the various processes employed by each nation in its strategy document development. This included the identification 

of the separate components of the strategy formulation process utilized for each one of the assessed national strategy documents. Using the questions as the 

common analytic tool, the cases were then evaluated 
7

in contrast to each other. The comparative analysis 

demonstrated both the positive and negative impact 

of how the formulation process questions were addressed in each case; or in some cases, not addressed 

at all. 

The last portion of the monograph evaluates the 

lessons learned from all five cases and identifies specific lessons that could be applicable to strategy document formulation for any future actor engaged in the 

process. These ranged from how to ensure maximum 

agreement on the strategy among all relevant national security actors within the whole-of-government 

framework, the most advantageous way to engage 

civil society in the national strategy formulation process, and how best to identify national interests and 

development of a sound risk assessment process, to 

crafting valuable detail on the strategy’s ways and 

means that could best be utilized by planners, direct 

linkage of the national security strategy to a strategic 

defense review type document, similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in the United States, and 

the identification of potential spoilers to the strategy 

and modifications that could be employed to adjust 

the strategy accordingly. In the end, the key question 

addressed was: was the strategy development process 

as effective and efficient as it could have been? If the 

crafting process was assessed to be flawed, it is likely 

that the resulting strategy was also flawed in some 

manner.10 The ultimate intent of this monograph is 

to attempt to determine lessons from these case studies that will contribute to minimizing future national 

security strategy developmental flaws for any nation 

undertaking the development of these documents. 
8

WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY AND ITS 

RELATED STRATEGY DOCUMENTS? 

The concept of national security is directly related 

to the notions of both security and nation or state, and 

their relationship to each other. But writing in 1952, 

Arnold Wolfers made it clear that the idea of national 

security “may not mean the same thing to different 

people.”11 In 2008, Ann Fitz-Gerald affirmed the same 

view on differing definitions of national security in the 

contemporary period when she stated that “national 

security differs from country to country, and indeed 

from institution to institution.”12 The reasons for these 

varied interpretations are diverse. The two principal 

explanations for the national differences lie with different perspectives on national interest. These different perspectives are largely inherent in the respective 

strategic culture of each nation-state. 

Security as a separate idea also has broad interpretation. The term itself points to a degree of protection 

of acquired values, to include the absence of threats 

to those values and the absence of fear that those values will be attacked. It is a value for which “a nation 

can have more or less” and “aspire to have in greater 

or lesser measure.”13 Walter Lippmann described the 

measure for the attainment of security as: “A nation 

is secure to the extent that it does not have to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is 

able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in 

such a war.”14 That may have made sense at the time 

of Lippmann’s writing in 1943, but for purposes of 

this analysis, the concept of security will be measured 

beyond the issue of war and the military instrument 

of power. Over time, the idea of security within the 

international system has broadened to reflect varying 
9

degrees of the union of national military and defense 

related security with that of domestic/homeland security, as well as to ensure the inclusion of the state, 

civil society, and the individual. In the 21st century, 

the overall security concept is being looked at to encompass a “country’s society as a whole” and to include addressing transnational threats ranging widely 

from energy security, the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD), and catastrophic natural 

disasters to population growth, pandemic disease, climate change, and global poverty. 15

 David Baldwin identified seven specific questions 

for the analysis of the security concept: Security for 

whom? Security for which values? How much security? From what threats? By what means? At what cost? 

In what time period? In response to these questions, 

security for a given nation could be characterized with 

respect to how the nation’s values are to be secured, 

the specific values being addressed, the degree of the 

security to be attained, the kinds of threats that the security must direct itself to, the means for coping with 

such threats, the costs for doing so, and the relevant 

time period.16 The characteristics provided by the national answers to these questions will help determine 

the real extent of a country’s perspective on what security will consist of for the nation in question. These 

characteristics are likely to be significantly influenced 

by how the state actors choose to define the concepts 

of national interest and strategic culture on behalf of 

the nation; in turn, this will lead to a determination of 

how the state defines national security for itself. 

A national interest is “that which is deemed by a 

particular state (actor) to be a . . . desirable goal.” The 

attainment of this goal is something that the identifying actor believes will have a positive impact on itself. 
10

Realization of the interest could enhance the political, economic, security, environmental, and/or moral 

well-being of a populace and the state (actor) or national enterprise to which that populace belongs. This 

holds true within the territory of the actor, as well as 

in any external relations that the actor may undertake 

outside of the administrative control of that actor. Interests are essential to establishing the objectives or 

ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy. 

They help answer questions concerning why a policy 

is important. National interests also help to determine 

the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy 

or strategy. 

The concept of interest is not new to the 21st century international system. It has always been a fundamental consideration of every actor in the system. 

They are what the actor values. These interests could 

be designed purely for the sake of advancing the 

power of an actor with the object of attaining greater 

security for that actor, or they might be guided by values and ethics with the intent of doing some type of 

good for parts of the international system, or the overall system in general. This might include collaboration 

and coordination with other actors in the international 

system.It could also require the interest-crafting actor 

to subordinate certain interests that only benefit it for 

the sake of other interests that are of greater value to 

additional actors in the system. In addition, interests 

are typically categorized and determined by intensity 

or prioritization. Terms like survival, vital, critical, 

major, serious, secondary, extremely important, important, less important, humanitarian, and peripheral 

have been used to categorize interests in academic 

writings and official government documents. Some 
11

categorize how significant the interest is in terms of 

chronological relationship to the actor that determines 

the interest (near-term versus longer-term impact), 

while others relate categories to the intensity of the 

substantive influence that the interest is determined to 

have on the actor.17 All of these questions are directly 

influenced by the strategic culture of the nation actor 

in question.

Thomas Mahnken explains that strategic culture 

“is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes 

of behavior, derived from common experiences and 

accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape 

collective identity and relationships to other groups, 

and which determine appropriate ends and means for 

achieving security objectives.”18 The concepts of the 

national interest and national security are framed by 

the strategic culture associated with each of the five 

national case studies being assessed in this monograph. Each of the national strategic cultures refers 

to modes of thought and action with respect to force, 

derived from perception of the national historical 

experience, aspiration for self-characterization . . . and 

from all of the many distinctively (national) experiences (of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, 

and ‘way of life’) that characterize a citizen from that 

nation.19

“Geography and resources, history and experience, 

and society and political structure” represent a nation’s strategic culture. Examples include the UK, 

which as an island nation has traditionally favored 

sea power and indirect strategies and avoided the 

maintenance of large land forces,20 while “Australia’s 

minimal geopolitical status, its continental rather than 

maritime identity, and its formative military experiences have shaped its way of war.”21
12

The combination of national interests with strategic culture, and a country’s understanding of what its 

security concerns should be, leads to the identification 

of what the idea of national security will mean for an 

individual nation-state member of the international 

system. Some countries view their national security 

on a global basis, others regionally, and a third group 

focuses on their immediate borders and internal domestic security issues. Once determined, the next step 

is the association of the terms “national” and “security” with the concept of strategy. 

Strategy, different from policy, which answers 

the question of what to do about something or why 

something is to be done, is the response to the question of how to implement or execute the policy—it is 

“how something is done.”22 It’s “a plan for deploying 

capabilities to achieve policy objectives.”23 The U.S. 

Department of Defense defines strategy as “a prudent 

idea or set of ideas for employing (all) the instruments 

of national power in a synchronized and integrated 

fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”24 These ideas provide a structure for 

a direction in the role of a guiding path through the 

maze of international (and domestic) events, which 

are, in turn, linked to ultimate objectives.25 Most importantly, strategy is a calculated or deliberate relationship between ends and means, intentions and capabilities, and power and purpose.26 It reconciles what 

the actor crafting the strategy wants (objectives) with 

the resources available (capabilities) to meet the wants 

(attain the objectives).27 For nation-states, a national 

strategy contributes to the country’s effort to “best 

cause security for itself.”28

These strategies specifically designed to “cause security” come under the heading of national security 

strategy. A nation’s national security strategy “rep-
13

resents a nation’s plan for the coordinated use of all 

the instruments of state power—nonmilitary as well 

as military—to pursue objectives that defend and 

advance the national interest.”29 The term “national 

security strategy” describes a “planned, systematic, 

and rational process . . . shaped by strong leaders, organizational cultures, and governmental structures.”30

This process is intended to result in a country’s written “public, authoritative declaration about the manner in which it intends to achieve its security objectives within” both the international system and its 

own domestic security environment. These are official 

strategies that are written and published by governments.31 In fact, there are a number of different types 

of formal strategy documents that address national 

security issues within the international system, each 

with its own descriptive name. The most well known 

examples are labeled: national security strategy, white 

paper, strategic defense review, and national defense 

strategy. Of these, the most comprehensive one is typically described as the given nation’s “national security 

strategy.”

A nation’s national security strategy can serve 

a variety of purposes. Citing a number of different 

sources, Sharon Caudle indicated that a successful national security strategy could provide the ability to: 

communicate a detailed strategic vision of the current 

and future security environment; communicate the 

nation’s values; present a comprehensive analysis of 

the range of threats to the homeland; consolidate the 

government’s various national security related policies and strategies; present prioritized and measureable goals and objectives with timelines; identify the 

international and domestic factors such as comparative capabilities, issues, and trends that will impact the 
14

attainment of security goals and objectives; develop a 

whole-of-government approach to national security 

policy and strategy making that encompasses all relevant departments and agencies; identify the courses of 

action and resources (ways and means) to be utilized 

to attain national objectives and provide guidance to 

governmental departments and agencies for budgeting, planning, and organizing their responsibilities for 

implementation of the national strategy; and serve as 

a link between the strategy’s objectives and courses 

of action designed to attain the objectives as a tool for 

requesting resources.32

The ultimate value for a publically declared national security strategy is best determined by the true 

intent of the originators. The key question that frames 

the purpose for the drafters is whether the strategy is 

primarily intended to be a realistic strategy that has 

the ability to attain its ends with the available resources or, rather, is more of a strategic communications 

tool that will declare the nation’s national security 

focus for external international consumption as well 

as justification for domestic governmental resourcing 

requirements. The first formal American national security strategy (National Security Strategy of the United 

States), drafted in 1987, was characterized as a useful 

document that “brings together familiar statements 

of American foreign and defense policies . . . it also 

sets out . . . American interests and objectives . . . and 

lists some of the threats to those interests.” But that 

NSS was also described by the same commentator as 

not having “set forth the priorities and choices which 

are the essence of the strategy.” Such strategic fidelity could only be provided in a classified document.33

The result is that some national security documents 

may be more useable for the whole-of-government 
15

national security community, depending upon the actual intent for the creation of the document.

One of the key features of national security strategies that provides value to subordinate policy and 

strategy makers is the inclusion in the document of 

that nation’s grand strategy, sometimes termed strategic vision. Grand strategy “is a conceptual framing that 

describes how the world is, envisions how it ought to 

be, and specifies a set of policies that can achieve that 

ordering.”34 A grand strategy represents the “grand 

design” and presents “the overall mosaic into which 

the pieces of specific policy (and strategy) fit.”35 It is 

the “unifying concept” that guides or directs all other 

national security related policies.36 National policy 

can only be established after over arching national 

security aims and objectives have been identified. It 

is the grand strategy that determines those aims and 

objectives. Grand strategy becomes a function of the 

“national intent” within the strategic environment.37

In hierarchical terms, grand strategy represents the 

highest level or type of strategy.38 In the end, national 

security strategy and other types of national-level 

security-related strategies will serve to implement a 

grand strategy.39

Additional types of national security-related strategy documents include what is termed a white paper. 

A white paper is the title given to an “official government report in any of a number of countries (primarily 

in the UK-led Commonwealth of Nations), including 

Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, 

which sets out the government’s policy on a matter 

(typically for a single functional vice regional policy 

issue such as defense or counterterrorism).”40 Like 

documents also include strategic defense reviews 

(known in the United States as the QDR), which are 

efforts to link national interests and courses of action 
16

(ways) to support those interests with the military 

resources required (forces, personnel, infrastructure, 

and material) to ensure that the nation possesses the 

military capability to ensure its security. It allows the 

government to identify the strategic security environment that it will have to plan against. “The Review 

looks at the type of force desired in the future and 

helps to plan adequate resources to achieve it.”41 Other titles for these documents include national defense, 

military, and counterterror strategies.

All of these national security documents in their 

different shapes and sizes can be grouped into a hierarchy of sorts. There is a relationship amongst the 

documents at each level of the national strategy formulation process: “the logic at each level is supposed 

to govern the one below and serve the one above.”42 In 

this case, the national security strategy with the inclusion of a nation’s grand strategy would serve as the 

strategic standard for all subordinate national strategy 

documents. “The other documents are, or should be, 

logically related to if not derived from it.” The national 

interests defined in the NSS would help to orchestrate 

supporting functional security strategies. Australian 

and UK strategic defense reviews and white papers 

are in support of national security strategies, and the 

U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the U.S. 

National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the NSS.43

 The single most important question to be addressed 

is whether there is a “best” way to develop these documents. An associated question is the determination of 

the amount of risk that the nation could be taking by 

not employing certain approaches to national strategy 

document development. For example, some argue that 

the crafting of a national strategy is normally a “multidisciplinary and multiagency exercise.” If the strategy 
17

development process does not involve the participation of all the required government actors, then the 

strategy itself is likely to be flawed. Following this 

line of thinking, no single government department or 

agency would be capable of mastering the contemporary security environment to the degree necessary to 

craft national security strategy documents without the 

active participation of other like government actors.44

Understanding the risk of crafting these documents in 

one way or another may help determine the overall 

ability of the final strategy to attain its objectives. As 

examples, there is risk in utilizing a whole-of-government approach where every department and agency 

has a say in the strategy’s development; the strategy 

could be “watered down” with every agency’s concern being listed and no specific identified focus. In 

the opposite vein, there is also risk associated in only 

having a very small group of individuals work on the 

documents, with only minimal whole-of-government 

coordination taking place; because such an approach 

lacks the assurance by the other governmental actors 

that all the predetermined ways and means will be 

available to attain the strategy’s objectives. In the end, 

it is likely that the individuals who actually conducted 

the national strategy drafting, in conjunction with the 

government departments and agencies that they represented in the process, will be able to resolve whether 

the strategy in question will prove its worth. The following pages will help assess whether the effort was 

worth it. 
18

CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIA

The Australian government has never published a 

whole-of-government-like national security strategy, 

but there are a number of national strategy documents that delineate the country’s national strategy. 

For this evaluation, they are the 2008 National Security 

Statement (NSS) and the 2009 Defence White Paper: Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030

(WP).45 While the focus of the analysis will be on the 

process utilized to develop the 2009 WP because it 

provided the most significant whole-of-government 

detailed strategic approach for an entire strategy development process and because “defence consumes 

around 90% of all government funding for national 

security,”46 the NSS document will also be addressed, 

in part, because it was the first of its kind. The 2009 

WP is considered the principal strategic document for 

the nation because it provides an overall framework 

that other national strategy documents can draw from 

for their own foci.47 These defense white papers, essentially a combination of the NDS and the QDR, establish “the Government’s long-term strategic direction and commitments for defense as well as future 

capability requirements.”48 Following a tradition of 

“strategic basis” papers since 1953,49 the 2009 WP was 

the fifth defense white paper to be published, with the 

first taking place in 1976, and the last one occurring 

in 2000, with updates in 2003 and 2005.50 The shift to 

a broader whole-of-government perspective began after the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the 

expanded emphasis on the threats of terrorism, failed 

states, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.51 In addition to the actual WP itself, the 

developmental process “included the commissioning 
19

of eight internal companion reviews, an intelligence 

capability review . . . a defence procurement review, 

together with a separate comprehensive audit of the 

Defence budget.”52 The process involved the Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the National Security Committee of Cabinet, the Secretaries 

Committee on National Security, as well as the primary drafting elements in the Department of Defence 

(DoD).

The NSS, a first of its kind part of the Australian 

national security formulation process, is not a strategy 

but is rather designed to provide “a strategic framework to drive policy development in the various departments . . . with responsibilities for . . . national 

security.” It was presented to Parliament in December 2008 in the form of a speech, rather than a written 

document, by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and was intended to give the “context for the Defence White Paper, which will detail the way forward for . . . defence

over the next 20 years.” It also was designed to “inform a regular Foreign Policy Statement to the Parliament . . . shape the Counter-Terrorism White Paper 

. . . guide the development of the Government’s first 

National Energy Security Assessment . . . (and) incorporates the recommendation of the Homeland and 

Border Security Review.” In essence, the NSS would 

serve to connect the diverse elements of the Australian national security community into a coherent and 

coordinated “whole.” The NSS also delineated the nation’s enduring national interests and ends, providing 

specific direction for all national security related strategy documents, one of which was the 2009 WP.53

During the 2007 election, the Labor Party argued 

that with the dynamic changes that had taken place 

in the global security environment and the fact that 
20

no WP had been published since 2000, a new one was 

essential for a new Labor government in office. Examples cited that described those changes included: 

the events of 9/11 and the terror bombings in Bali, 

London, Madrid, and Jakarta; wars in Afghanistan 

and Iraq; the emerging risk of WMD transference to 

threatening nonstate actors and Iran; and huge shifts 

in the global distribution of power.54 Another part of 

the Labor Party’s justification for the new WP was 

also directed at their view of a need for greater discipline in the force development equipment acquisition process for the armed forces.55 Shortly after the 

November 2007 election, newly elected Prime Minister Rudd directed the production for a new WP. 

There is no legislative requirement for the crafting of 

national security strategy related documents in Australia. Thus, the publication of the WP can be viewed 

as the most politically effective way for a “new government to demonstrate its commitment” to address 

emerging national security problems for Australia.56

A Labor Party Policy Document released just prior to 

the 2007 election indicated that a “new defence white 

paper will ensure that Australia’s defence capability 

requirements are achievable and shaped by our longterm strategic priorities, rather than short-term political objectives.” A rigorous analysis of the connections 

between strategic objectives, force planning, and capability priorities was promised, to include ending a 

long time disconnect between strategic guidance and 

force structure planning.57

After the 2007 election and owing to the changing 

and uncertain strategic outlook for Australia and the 

world, one of the earlier national security commitments made by the Rudd Government was to produce 

a WP every 5 years. In the year before a new WP is 
21

developed, the government committed itself to produce “a strategic risk assessment, a comprehensive 

force structure review, and an independent audit of 

the Defence establishment to confirm the affordability of capability plans and make adjustments, should 

circumstances dictate.”58 In essence, the Labor Government intends to institutionalize an overall review 

of Australia’s national defense strategy on a regular 

basis. 

The Australian cabinet-based system of government has a singular advantage for the coordination 

of strategy formulation. It is usually able to resolve 

interagency disagreement at the Deputy Secretary 

level because all officials in an Australian ministry below the level of the senior official in the ministry (the 

Minister) are civil servants. There are no other political appointments below the level of that single most 

senior individual. At the same time, those in the decisionmaking system must be sensitive to the current 

political climate in order to be able to operate within 

the senior level of the government’s political framework. The Prime Minister’s expectation is that coordination both within and external to departments is the 

norm. While not working seamlessly, coordination 

and collaboration have been institutionalized within 

the Australian national-security related interagency 

for at least 30 years. It is a relatively small community 

and most civil servants know each other “quite well.” 

If the civil servant does not coordinate, that individual 

will not be in compliance with government policy and 

will not be promoted. Success for a civil servant will 

not be achieved in Canberra by conducting “one upmanship” against another department.59

The writing itself was led and conducted by the 

DoD. The NSC staff concept is not a strong one in 
22

Australia and this motivates the Prime Minister to look 

to the department responsible for creating the strategy 

to synchronize the whole-of-government effort. Mr. 

Michael Pezullo, Deputy Secretary of Defence (counterpart for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

in the U.S. system) was the leader and lead author for 

the DoD team that actually drafted the document. He 

was assisted by two senior officials, Major General 

John Cantwell and Ms. Maria Fernandez, individually 

responsible for force structure, information technology, and human resource issues, and the eight internal companion reviews of defense organization. Approximately 100 career military officers and Defence 

civil servants participated in the WP drafting effort, 

“of which 30 were in the dedicated core drafting team 

and the remainder spread across various Defence 

agencies doing specific work on force structure issues 

or the companion reviews.” The Minister of Defence 

appointed his own three-person advisory panel of senior defense experts to act as his own sounding board. 

During the drafting process, the panel met approximately every 6 weeks to advise the minister.

The National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) 

also met regularly at the ministerial level (equivalent 

to the U.S. National Security Council [NSC]) in 2008 to 

address the development of the WP, including a long 

discussion early in the process on Australia’s strategic outlook. The NSC is the senior level Australian 

“decisionmaking and coordinating body for national 

security matters and consists of “the Prime Minister, 

Deputy Prime Minister, the Treasurer, the Ministers 

for Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the AttorneyGeneral.”60 In addition to the formal NSC meetings, 

individual ministers met over the course of the year 

to discuss specific elements of the WP. Prime Minister 
23

Rudd, his fellow NSC minister members, and the finance minister, Mr. Lindsay Tanner, were extensively 

involved with the WP’s development throughout the 

crafting process. The entire process began in December 2007 and lasted for 20 months until May 2009.61

Given the involvement of the senior Labor Party officials at the helm of the government and civil servant 

leadership participating on the drafting team, the 2009 

WP was a combined product of both top down and 

bottom up approaches to the substance of the document.62

The members of the drafting team actually proposed the specific organizational structure for the WP 

document. There has been a general core conceptual 

structure for all prior WPs. This included addressing 

the environment, relationships with other nations, 

risks, trends, strategic interests, resulting tasks and 

roles for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and capabilities required by the ADF. A primary difference 

between the five WPs is the emphasis placed on these 

specific subject areas.63 As an example, the threat of 

terrorism to the Australian homeland received more 

emphasis in the 2009 WP than in the four previous 

ones. This was as a result of events like the 9/11 attacks and the bombing of tourist resorts on the island 

of Bali in 2002 and 2005.

 The creation of a dedicated team from DoD to develop the document allowed for a synergy to be developed in the coordination process for the WP. The team 

was able to obtain whatever support was required 

from DoD because of the senior rank of Michael Pezullo; the Prime Minister expected him to operate 

as a national level leader. He held weekly meetings 

with the Defence Minister and received decisions on 

a monthly basis from him. Pezullo also met regularly 
24

with the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG), 

a U.S. Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) equivalent group consisting of senior level civil servants 

from a variety of national security-related ministries 

like Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and 

the Attorney General. The SPCG then provided analysis and recommendations for WP issues to the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS), a U.S. 

Deputies-level equivalent body at the second tier of 

government that is “the peak inter-departmental body 

to advise [the] government on policy and expanded 

operational matters.” It is chaired by the Secretary of 

the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, has 

strong National Security Advisor involvement and, 

thus, has a great deal of influence.64 The SCNS had the 

primary responsibility to ensure two-way feedback 

for the whole-of-government coordination process between the drafting group and the senior government 

decisionmaking bodies during the entire course of the 

development of the WP.65

In addition, Pezzullo and his team had access to 

the highest levels of the Australian Government to 

receive guidance for the document. He could speak 

directly to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) if necessary because Pezullo reported directly to both the 

DoD Secretary and to the CDF. The Service Chiefs 

and the Vice CDF were Pezullo’s peers, and he could 

deal directly with them. Finally, the Department of 

Finance (equivalent of the U.S. Office of Management 

and Budget) was brought in to work with the drafting 

team from the very beginning of the process.66

Different from the WP, the NSS was primarily 

drafted by one individual, Ms. Sarah Guise from the 

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, under the guidance of Angus Campbell, First Assistant 
25

Secretary, Office of National Security, and Duncan 

Lewis, Deputy Secretary. The Statement was also 

coordinated though the SPCG to ensure maximum 

whole-of-government coordination; approximately 

12 different departments and agencies were involved 

in the process, to include the budgeting community 

(Department of Treasury). NSS stakeholders included 

both foreign and defense as well as homeland, border 

security, and domestic economic actors, along with 

the general public, which was more an audience than 

a stakeholder because it was not consulted on the development of the NSS.67

The major stakeholders for the WP document were 

the armed forces (both as an entity and any capabilities the forces acquire), the separate military services, 

DFAT, and the Departments of Finance and Treasury (overall money affordability) for the budgetary 

process.68 In particular, the two budget-associated 

departments were very rigorous in their efforts to ensure that the military operated within its fiscal means. 

Owing to the fact that the global financial crisis took 

place in the middle of the WP drafting process, there 

was an increasing need to ensure fiscal responsibility 

for the WP. As a result, the WP directed the Strategic 

Reform Program for Defence to save $20 billion from 

the administrative/support components of DoD over 

the next 10 years, which could be reinvested into new 

capabilities.69 Regardless of whether a Coalition or 

Labor government is in power, there has traditionally 

not been any opposition to defense issues from Parliament. In reality, the Australian Parliament is not a 

major stakeholder in the development of a DoD WP; 

the government is elected to govern and there has 

typically been a bipartisan approach to defense. In 

the Australian political environment at the time, there 
26

was strong political pressure, and an expected electoral price to be paid if the government were unable 

to fund WP execution. In the end, there was no major 

parliamentary involvement in the development of the 

2009 WP.70

Seeking recommendations, the NSS drafting effort 

consulted up to as many as 12 different think tanks 

and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), like the 

Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The drafters also 

examined the national security strategy efforts of other nations, to include the United States, UK, Canada, 

Singapore, and the Netherlands, to determine lessons 

learned.71

It was determined to formally bring civil society 

into the WP decisionmaking process at an early stage. 

This was done to determine how much the Australian 

people would be willing to spend on defense in the 

form of fiscal resources because civil society is considered to be a key part of the Australian audience for the 

WP.72 The Government sought the thinking of the population though the White Paper Community Consultation Program. It was “an extensive effort to engage 

Australians from all walks of life, as well as defence 

specialists, academics, business and industry representatives from State and Territory governments.” To 

make this work, the WP Consultation Program panel 

headed by Mr. Stephen Loosley, former Senator and 

Parliamentary Chairman of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, widely 

disseminated a 52-page paper that identified key 

questions for civil society groups and individuals to 

address. The three key questions were: “1.What role 

should our armed forces play? 2. What kinds of armed 

forces should we develop? and 3. Can we afford such 

forces?” People were invited to contribute by attend-
27

ing meetings that would be announced in their area 

and/or submitting written input; 30 public meetings 

and 35 private meetings were held in every state and 

territory over the course of a 10-week period. Over 

600 people attended the public meetings. The WP 

Consultation Program panel also received 450 written 

submissions. The Report’s Findings were released in 

April 2009, in time to be utilized in the drafting of the 

WP.73 It provided input from all sides of the spectrum 

of society that reflected a broad range of the Australian people, both pro and con in terms of the strategy 

and its fiscal resourcing component.74

The foreign audience was also considered very 

important for the WP document because Australia 

wanted to convey complete transparency to its regional neighbors. The intended outcome would be 

that, with the strategy and force development results 

of the process, the other regional powers would not 

view Australia as a threat.75

Threat analysis was coordinated by the working 

group director. He could request specific assessments 

from separate intelligence community agencies, as 

well as industry, as relevant.76

Australian strategic culture has been fairly consistent since the first WPs and strategic assessments were 

crafted in the mid 1970s. There is continuity between 

the five identified national interests in the 2000 WP and 

the four interests in the 2009 document. Security of the 

homeland remained the principal national interest in 

all WPs. The primary national interest changes for the 

2009 WP relate to a desire to develop and maintain 

an expeditionary posture for the armed forces as well 

as a continental posture for the Australian continent.77

At the same time, the NSS indicated “that Australia’s 

national security interests are more complex and less 
28

predictable than in the past . . . international and domestic security issues intertwine.”78 When determining Australian national interests, both what they were 

and their levels of importance in relation to each other, 

those doing the evaluation found that the importance 

of any national interest for the WP increased in direct 

proportion to geography, based upon potential identified missions for the nation’s armed forces. There has 

always been tension for Australia between geography 

and alliance engagement and between regional priorities and global interests.79 In describing the detailed 

analysis of the approach from an Australian perspective to determine how to define the nation’s national 

interests, three key national security variables were 

identified that should be included in the determination: geography related to the location of potential 

threats and opportunities for Australian security, 

risk involving the significance of what instruments 

of national power would be employed to address or 

not address those same threats and opportunities, 

and policy concerning how and in what quantity the 

country chooses to contribute to the international system: having Australia doing its share in the lead or 

as a contributor within the international community, 

in peace or conflict. This last national security interest related to how Australia viewed itself as a “good 

citizen” of the world community in relation to its role 

in the world and its willingness to support “purposes 

beyond ourselves.”80 Australian strategic culture dictates that unless countries in the developed world, like 

Australia, address what they term “disfunctionality” 

in the international system, then “bad” things like the 

spread of terrorism will take place.81

In descending order of interest, the closer geographically to a potential area of a required military 
29

operation, the greater the importance of the interest to 

the nation. Thus, the closer the threat challenge or the 

opportunity, the greater the importance of the interest. In the Australian case by level of national interest, 

there was assessed to be more importance for a national interest associated with the defense of the Australian continent than the need to ensure local regional 

stability in the South Pacific, followed by stability in 

the Western Pacific and Eastern Indian Ocean area (relations with China could fall into this category). The 

last and least important national interest considered 

for security, was what was termed “broader area operations;” where the entire spectrum of force might be 

applied on a global basis somewhere in the world in 

support of a multinational operation.82 For the ends of 

the strategy, it was agreed to develop a strategically 

effective course that that could meet the WP’s minimum established needs.83

The WP’s detailed ways and operational means 

were formulated at a classified level and placed in a 

separate classified document.84 Much of the ways and 

means analysis was done through addressing the individual scenarios in a wargaming process designed 

to evaluate their capacity for actual execution. The intent was to test the military’s capability to perform in 

each scenario.85

At the beginning of the strategy development 

process, the WP was considered to be resource unconstrained. However, the coming of the 2008 global 

financial crisis changed that approach, and a decision 

was made to concurrently address fiscal resource 

means.86 For the means of the WP, the 2009 document 

was crafted for long-term implementation, to include 

a funding planning horizon out to 2030, 21 years into 

the future; far longer than its four WP predecessors. 
30

In principle, the government pledged funding for the 

execution for the ways contained in the WP, extending for the entire 21-year period. No prior Australian 

Government had prepared detailed financial defense 

plans beyond a 10-year horizon.87 “The government 

has committed to sustainable funding arrangements 

for the defence budget for future years to provide 

certainty for planning . . . to meet the growing cost 

of military equipment.”88 The assumption is that the 

fiscal resources will be in place for WP implementation; the document was written in consonance with 

the resource planning effort. Development of the NSS 

was also resource constrained, “consistent with the 

government’s fiscal strategy and . . . budget rules.”89

The NSS did include addressing threats to the nation, but there was no identification of the threats or 

risks of the threats in terms of prioritization (most or 

least important). One informal analysis was made 

of the number of citations in the NSS that addressed 

challenges or threats. It indicated that terrorism and 

violent extremism were cited 27 times as the most 

discussed threat or risk, and drugs, arms, and trafficking were only addressed once in the document. 

In between the two risk subject areas were 18 other 

related issues, with 9 citations for the highest to 1 for 

the lowest that could be defined as threat risks to Australia.90 Clearly, the evaluation of risk and its associated threats in the NSS indicated that this part of the 

assessment remained immature.

 A highly classified risk assessment was conducted 

for the WP. This was the first one conducted for any 

WP. For the first time with the 2009 document, the Australian government utilized a coherent and coordinated whole-of-government approach to risk evaluation 

for a WP.91 Risk analysis for the strategy was found to 
31

still be an art and not a science.92 The Australian Government developed a Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA) 

methodology that assesses potential risks, probability, 

seriousness, and consequence. It is designed to assess 

for priorities and differentiate between force structure 

options. There were four components to the risk management framework: 1) Risk Context (strategic outlook, policy goals and objectives, and an assessment 

of the Government’s tolerance for risk against the risk 

being evaluated; 2) Risk Assessment (risk identification, analysis—the likelihood and consequences of the 

risk, and evaluation); 3) Risk Treatment (identify measures to reduce risk and the consequences of the risk 

by lessening the likelihood of an event occurring); and 

4) Risk Review (addressing residual risk and regularly 

monitoring and reviewing risk).93

The Australian DoD conducted a formal series of 

workshops during July 7-18, 2008, that performed a 

risk analysis focusing on the likelihood (from almost 

certain to occur once a year or more frequently to very 

rare/almost incredible to occur only once in 1,000 or 

10,000 years) and consequences of risk (ranging from 

a high of catastrophic to a low of minor) in support 

of the 2009 WP. Likelihood was based on intelligence 

assessments. The consequence assessment was based 

on policy, intelligence, and consequence management 

input for the “development, maintenance, and management of critical national systems, infrastructure, 

or capability.” Most critical was the impact of the risk 

events being evaluated. Based on the outcome of the 

workshops, modifiers or “risk treatment” for the WP 

were developed in the August-September 2008 period. 

They were assessed in terms of implications for force 

structure, force posture, and international defense 

relationships.94
32

The risk assessment evaluated a range of both 

potential external conventional conflicts, regardless 

of likelihood, such as between the United States and 

China, and domestic issues like disaster relief. Risk 

profiles were created by type of risk and the associated force and its operational posture. Part of the risk 

analysis involved a review of potential spoilers to the 

WP strategy. The working group performed the potential spoiler assessment by reviewing possible scenarios such as the impact of Pakistan devolving into 

a failed state, if the monarchy fell in Saudi Arabia, as 

well as if there were a lack of fiscal resources or if for 

some reason the political will of the Australian people 

had been diminished or changed. Based upon those 

spoiler scenarios that were reviewed, a series of war 

games was held to review the scenarios and determine what types of modifying ways and means could 

be employed to influence the spoilers in relation to the 

originally proposed WP strategy. These contingent 

spoilers and modifiers were then set down in the classified risk assessment for the WP.95

At the conclusion of the strategy formulation 

process and after the government had completed 

formal coordination and approved the final document, implementation for both the NSS and the WP 

were reviewed on a quarterly basis each year by the 

Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. 

This was accomplished by their analysis of a spreadsheet submission made by the DoD of its evaluation 

of progress being made towards WP supporting objectives or “targets” contained in each of the document’s chapters; it included the identification of lead 

and supporting agencies and proposed timelines for 

strategy implementation. The cabinet implementation 

unit of the Department of the Prime Minister and the 
33

Cabinet did quarterly reviews to track implementation of key government commitments, to include that 

of the 2009 WP. The review process for the NSS was 

a bit different—instead, some of the major elements 

were split out and reported on individually, including by the Department of the Prime Minister and the 

Cabinet. The quarterly review process of government 

approved national-level policies and strategies had a 

long time tradition within the Australian government. 

Each department has been required to submit its assessment of the progress or lack thereof being made 

of the policies and strategies that it was responsible 

for, especially in light of how it was doing to meet the 

electoral commitments made by newly elected governments.96

In addition to the quarterly review process that 

the Australian government has developed to continuously review the 2009 WP, the DoD also published a 

document in 2010 that lays out the Australian Government’s approach to the major components of strategy 

formulation as it relates to individual government 

strategies, to specifically include the NSS and the WP. 

Titled The Strategy Framework 2010, it is intended for 

three audiences: senior DoD decisionmakers, DoD 

staff that use or prepare the documents that this publication addresses, and any other interested parties 

in the overall government that want to understand 

the DoD approach and how it aligns itself within the 

government for strategic guidance. Replacing the 

last Strategy Framework edition published in 2006, 

the 2010 edition lays out the process that the government uses “to synchronize the formulation of strategic 

guidance, strategic planning for operations, international engagement, preparedness management, and 

capability development. It aims to guide planners to 
34

create strategic-level documents that are congruent, 

coherent, and comprehensive.”97

The Australian approach to national strategy formulation as demonstrated by the developmental processes utilized for the 2008 NSS and the 2009 WP indicates a clear focus on crafting whole-of-government 

coordinated documents. Participating actors would be 

found to be negligent if they did not coordinate. The 

government utilizes a well institutionalized approach 

that ensures consistent participation on the part of all 

interested departments and agencies of the Australian 

national security community. The formulation process 

also emphasizes inclusion of the managers who control the fiscal means at every step of decisionmaking 

for these efforts. In addition, the risk analysis concept 

is becoming fully institutionalized.98 Finally, a wide 

spectrum of Australian civil society was formally solicited for its thinking on the major issues confronting the 2008 WP drafters. In the end, the Australian 

government has crafted a very sophisticated approach 

to the development of national security strategy 

documents. 

CASE STUDY: BRAZIL

Although the armed forces have wanted it since 

the end of World War II, the 2008 National Strategy of 

Defense (NSD) is the first ever national level national 

security-related strategy published by the Brazilian 

government.99 This document was intended to serve 

as the implementing strategy for the National Defense 

Policy published in June 2005. The decision to craft the 

national defense strategy was catalyzed by two primary factors: the perception that Brazil was having an 

increasing influence on the world stage, and the gov-
35

ernment’s belief that that a gap existed in the part of 

Brazilian legislation that governed the direction of the 

armed forces. 100 There was also a desire to engage Brazilian society through the NSD to obtain their support 

for the armed forces and, thus, ensure that they were 

a part of any defense strategy-related decisions to be 

made within the democratic process. This promotion 

of the relationship between the society and the armed 

forces is intended, in part, to ensure that the composition of the armed forces reflects the makeup of the current Brazilian society, thus making it a reflection of the 

Brazilian nation as a whole thru mandatory military 

service.101

The actual decision to create a national strategy of 

defense was codified in a National Decree by President Lula da Silva on September 6, 2007, which established a Ministerial Committee to “design the National Strategy of Defense” for the next 10-15 years. 

The Ministerial Committee was chaired by Minister of 

Defense (MOD) Nelson Jobim and coordinated with 

Minister-in-Chief of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (the planning ministry for the entire government) 

Mangabeira Unger. These two ministers, in conjunction with President Lula da Silva determined the primary contents of the document. The Ministers of the 

Planning, Budget, and Management Ministry, Finance 

Ministry, and Science and Technology Ministry were 

also involved, as were the commanders of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force. While the NSD was intended to 

be inclusive by the government, there was a perception that other Ministries were not so involved in the 

document’s contents.102

 For the Ministerial Committee, while the MOD 

had overall responsibility for the document’s development, Minister Unger and the Strategic Affairs 
36

Ministry were initially responsible for directing the 

document’s drafting effort and ensuring coordination 

with all other involved government actors. The Ministerial Committee received little or no guidance for 

the document at the beginning from any senior leaders. No constraints were imposed on what the finished 

product should look like.103 The Ministry’s Defense 

Advisory Division, consisting of two active officers 

from each of the three services, along with one retired 

Army colonel and a civilian professor, conducted the 

actual writing of the NSD’s first draft. Work began in 

the September/October 2007 timeframe and continued until the NSD was approved in December 2008.104

The Ministerial Committee had many meetings 

with the three services and traveled around the country to visit numerous military bases to meet with each 

of the seven 4-star general regional commanders of 

the Brazilian Army, as well as to naval units, defense 

education facilities, and research and development 

centers.105 In addition, roughly 10-20 academics were 

consulted on the document. While all were heard, the 

three services contributed the greatest amount of input, by far, for the document.106 The Ministerial Committee also consulted with experts from outside the 

government, to include “various public and private 

agencies, as well as knowledgeable citizens in the area 

of defense.” This included think tanks, retired military 

officers, and former ministers of the services.107 There 

was discussion about the potential to bring in the general society’s public audience, but it was decided that 

it would unreasonably lengthen the drafting process 

and, thus, there was no conscious attempt to engage 

with that component of civil society as an entity for 

input for the document. Towards the later part of the 

document’s development, the Ministerial Committee 
37

also consulted with the Defense Front in Parliament 

(an informal grouping of parliamentary committees 

that had an interest in national security), particularly 

the Permanent Commission on Defense and Foreign 

Affairs.108 In the end, if there was disagreement within 

the Working Group, the group ultimately reached a 

consensus in dialogue with the MOD and the nation’s 

senior leadership.109 President Lula da Silva presented 

the NSD recommendations for approval to the National Security Council (NSC).110

Later in the process, a Working Group was established that consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces. This Working 

Group consisted of about eight general officers and 30 

officers at the rank of colonel or navy captain. While 

the other three ministries were not represented on the 

Working Group, they were able to review and comment on the NSD drafts. The Working Group began its 

work in the April/May 2008 timeframe after receiving 

the Ministerial Committee’s first draft, and completed 

its draft in June 2008. This second draft was then transmitted back to the Ministerial Committee.111 Minister 

Unger had a continuous dialogue with the services, 

which resulted in numerous adjustments to the various drafts of the document. Some of the changes resulted in change to verbiage, but not necessarily to the 

ideas that Minister Unger wanted to convey; they remained in the Strategy. This included continuation of 

the draft as a demonstration that all classes of society 

would be committed to the security of the nation. Both 

the Defense and Strategic Affairs Ministers personally worked on the final document. When there was 

disagreement that would not permit compromise, the 

MOD position prevailed. Once complete, a last draft 

was transmitted to the chiefs of the Armed Forces for 
38

formal approval; they were given 24 hours for any 

last comments since they had been involved through 

their staffs in the entire drafting process from the very 

beginning. The draft then went to the President who 

convened the National Defense Council (NDC) with 

senior representatives from all involved ministries in 

attendance. This represented the first meeting of the 

NDC ever conducted. The NDC issued a decree supporting the document and forwarded it to the Parliament, also known as the National Congress, for final 

approval. It was actually the 35th draft of the document that was published.112

The NSD is oriented on the development of medium- to long-term actions along three key axes: 

“reorganization of the armed forces, restructuring of 

the Brazilian defense industry, and management of 

personnel in the armed forces.” There are three additionally associated defense sectors that are addressed: 

cyber, space, and nuclear.113 All had to be addressed 

within the context of the 2005 National Defense Policy. 

The NSD also had to ensure that there were no contradictions with, and must be in support of, the 2004-

2007 Brazil for All Plan.

114 Approved by the Brazilian 

Congress in August 2003, it established overarching 

development objectives for the nation to include social inclusion and reduction of social inequalities, 

environmentally-sustainable economic growth generating employment and income and reducing regional 

inequalities, and promotion and expansion of citizen 

empowerment and strengthening of democracy.115 In 

addition to other Brazilian strategic documents, as 

part of their preparation, the drafters also reviewed 

the national strategy documents of other countries, 

to include U.S., French, and German national strategies.116Historically, the national interests were orient-
39

ed on the former antagonisms in the south. But it was 

recognized that in the 21st century, there are other issues of greater import to the Brazilian people.117 The 

national interests that were identified for the NSD 

came directly from the Objectives of National Defense 

as addressed in the National Defense Policy of 2005. The 

origin of the 2005 document’s interests came from the 

1988 Federal Constitution and its subsequent amendments.118 These interests represented a combination of 

internal components for Brazilian society like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and “preservation of the 

cohesion and national unit” of the Brazilian populace, 

as well as external interests of regional stability, the 

contribution for the maintenance of peace and the international system, and a broader insertion of Brazil 

into international decisionmaking processes.119 The 

principle of noninterference with other countries was 

also to be codified as a guiding interest.120 None of 

these were specifically listed as national interests in 

the NSD, but all those directly involved in the drafting process that were interviewed for this monograph 

confirmed that the national defense objectives from the 

2005 document represented the national interests that 

guided the 2008 NSD. The intent behind the utilization of those interests was to affirm “the commitment 

of every Brazilian citizen, both civilian and military, 

to the . . . virtues of sovereignty, heritage, and territorial and national unit integrity, within a wide framework of democratic fullness and of total respect to our 

neighbors.” None of the interests were prioritized; all 

were considered to have had “the same degree of importance for defense.”121

 For assumptions and facts that were employed by 

the NSD drafting group, formulation of the NSD was 

not constrained by any limitation on fiscal resources. 
40

It was intended to be a resource unconstrained strategy. It was felt that the society would be convinced 

to provide the fiscal resources necessary to implement 

the NSD after publication.122 The identifiable threats 

were developed under the direction of Minister Unger 

and ranged from the lack of societal participation in 

matters of national defense and budget insufficiency 

to the obsolescence of military equipment and the restrictions on technology transfer placed on Brazil by 

more advanced countries.123

The ends or objectives for the NSD were derived 

directly from the national interests (Objectives of National Defense) that were contained in the 2005 national policy document.124 In essence, the national interests 

became the ends for the strategy. It was very important for the drafters to take into account the flexibility 

and adaptability of Brazilian culture, and a sense of 

people doing the best for the country, when determining the interests that would establish the objectives for 

the NSD.125 For the NSD, the real origin of these ends 

began with the 1988 Federal Constitution, which in turn 

directly influenced the Objectives of National Defense 

contained in the 2005 National Defense Policy. In addition, other less formal guidance to the drafting group 

was found in senior level speeches on foreign and defense policy. It was a combination of the data found in 

the both the formal documents and less formal guidance associated with the speeches that led to the final 

acceptance of the Objectives of National Defense and 

the Guidelines chapters in the National Defense Policy

document as representing the strategic ends for the 

NSD. The Guidelines chapter contains 26 national security related focused objectives that could be considered supporting objectives for the ends found in the 

Objectives of National Defense chapter. There were 
41

no measures of effectiveness developed for any of the 

strategy’s objectives. In part, this could be because 

so many of the objectives—like maintenance of the 

nation’s sovereignty and heritage and sustaining its 

territorial integrity—are long-term permanent goals 

with no real end in sight.126

The armed forces do utilize measures of effectiveness for the implementation component of the NSD. 

These were derived by utilizing the Balanced Scorecard Performance Measurement System developed 

by Drs. Robert Kaplan and David Norton for the Balanced Scorecard Institute headquartered in the United 

States (Cary, North Carolina). “Leading and lagging 

measures are identified, expected targets and thresholds are established, and baseline and benchmarking 

data is developed.”127 This performance measurement 

system was obtained from the American Armed Forces by Brazilian officers during travel to Washington, 

DC, in 2005. In the case of this strategy, the focus is on 

the objectives established for the individual services. 

One example was the establishment of an office on the 

Army Staff (Strategic Follow Up Section in the Policy 

and Strategy Directorate) to orchestrate the measures 

of effectiveness for Army supporting objectives connected to the designated ways and means in the Implementation Measures portion of the NSD. This office conducts an assessment of the difference between 

what the Strategy designates as objectives and what 

can be resourced to attain the objectives.128

The strategy’s ways and means were developed for 

inclusion into the Implementation Measures section of 

the NSD. Some of the detailed ways and means came 

from service military planning documents, some of 

which were classified. The section included detailed 

delineation of guidance for the actors (departments 
42

and agencies) that will be required to implement the 

strategy, such as direction to the three services of the 

armed forces that they must develop three sets of plans 

for detailed force structure development, with established goals for the short term (up to 2014), mid-term 

(from 2015-22), and the long-term (from 2023-30).129

Additional sections of the Implementation Measures 

section originated with other ministries, like the Scientific and Technology and Defense Industry sections 

from the Ministries of Science and Technology, Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade; all in addition 

to the MOD and the services. Another such example 

would be the Ministry of Interior for developmental 

issues. These ministries were brought into the NSD 

Implementation Measures development process on 

an as needed basis for their expertise as the executing 

ministry for a particular course of action (way), and 

not for every issue.130

The detailed ways and means in the Implementation Measures section provided a real degree of fidelity for the ministries charged with implementing the 

NSD. The content of this section was developed by 

Minister Mangabeira and the Strategic Affairs Ministry. It was based upon a determination of both vulnerabilities and opportunities that could be employed 

to address those vulnerabilities. This was exemplified 

when the MOD insisted on maintaining the comment 

describing the “obsolescence of most of the equipment 

of the Armed Forces.” The MOD Working Group proposed eliminating the comment drafted by the Ministerial Committee. Minister Jobim overruled the comment’s elimination because he believed that he could 

employ it in the final document to justify increases 

to the defense portion of the national budget.131 Each 

executing ministry was identified by the issue it was 
43

responsible for, along with the provision of suspense 

dates indicating when implementation planning documents in direct support of the NSD were required 

to be complete.132 This section actually provided the 

planners located in the associated ministries with the 

information necessary to begin the execution of the 

tasks established by the NSD. The details made the 

Implementation Measures section absolutely critical 

to the success of the Strategy and, in turn, represented 

a major contribution to national strategy development 

for the nation. 

Some select risk assessment did take place in the 

development of the NSD. This was the case with the 

proposal to commit 2.5 percent of the gross national 

product (GNP) to future defense spending. Such an 

increased fiscal commitment would greatly speed the 

modernization of the armed forces. However, it was 

assessed that the risk to other parts of the economy 

was simply too great to permit such a redirected outlay of fiscal resources. In the end, the proposal did not 

go forward to the nation’s senior leadership for consideration because of the risk assessment.133

After the MOD and the Minister of the Secretary 

of Strategic Affairs came to agreement on the NSD, 

they forwarded the document to the President for his 

approval. The President then met with the members 

of the National Defense Council to obtain their views, 

which resulted in agreement and formal presidential 

approval on December 18, 2008.134

While there was no formal feedback mechanism 

that described the status of the NSD when in an execution status, the drafting committee did develop the 

Final Provisions annex to the NSD, which determined 

additional planning documents to be developed based 

upon the evolving implementation of the strategy. 
44

These were to be complementary to the strategy itself 

and could require adjustment as the separate plans 

were executed.135 As an example, in 2009, the MOD 

directed the Army Staff to create an NSD implementation strategy for the Army.136 It was then codified in 

the Complementary Defence Act No. 136, signed in 

August 2010, that the NSD must be updated by the 

MOD and submitted to the Parliament every 4 years. 

In addition, the legislation further stated that a new 

White Paper document, to be published in 2012 and 

intended to complement the NSD, would elaborate in 

detail on how the NSD would be implemented. Each 

new presidential regime will be required to publish 

this document in the second year of its administration.137

The Brazilian 2008 NSD represents the first national strategy of its kind in Latin America. In combination 

with the 2005 National Defense Policy and the forthcoming White Paper, Brazil is developing a systematic approach to the crafting of national strategy. Of particular note is the Implementation Measures component 

of the NSD and the associated degree of fidelity with 

the strategy’s ways and means. With the publication 

of the strategy, this approach provides the ministries 

and agencies responsible for strategy implementation 

with the planning information necessary to begin detailed execution. 

CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA

The South African national strategy development 

process was unique with respect to the other four case 

studies because it primarily originated with the ending of the apartheid regime and the first truly democratic election in the history of the Republic. Conflict 
45

between the former regime and the African National 

Congress (ANC)-led opposition was decades old by 

the time that the first truly all inclusive elections were 

held in April 1994. In effect, the new national strategy 

and its associated drafting process was a product of 

revolution. It was a new South Africa and with that 

came the recognition that all issues associated with 

defense and the South African armed forces would 

have to change.138

 The Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee of 

Parliament on Defence (JSCPD) requested a new 

budget for the armed forces shortly after the new 

government was installed in mid 1994. In reviewing 

the budget submission by the South African National 

Defence Force (SANDF), which still had a senior leadership from the apartheid era, Parliament found the 

submission oriented on a pre-1994 defense posture 

and policy; it was a repetition of the past, focusing on 

defense strategy and force structure and not addressing issues like civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, the racial and gender make 

up of the force, language, and religious policy.139 The 

JSCPD then informed the Minister of Defence that it 

would not approve a new budget until a comprehensive defense policy review was conducted; this led to 

the processes that resulted in the 1996 White Paper on 

National Defence for the Republic of South Africa (White 

Paper) and the follow on 1998 South Africa Defence 

Review (Defence Review), designed to implement the 

White Paper’s recommendations for the SANDF.140

While there had never been a comprehensive national 

security strategy developed for South Africa that employed the strategic model used by the UK, there was 

a history of white paper strategic documents going 

back to the 1970s.141 The 1996 White Paper contains 

the government’s grand strategy and defense policies. 
46

It “is concerned with countering military threats; with 

the orientation, preparation, maintenance, and employment of armed forces; and with the procurement 

of weaponry and military equipment.”142 In support 

of the policy framework (“political guidance”) and 

strategic direction established by the White Paper, the 

Defence Review elaborated on the “policy framework 

through comprehensive long-range planning on such 

matters as posture, doctrine, force design (there were 

4-5 options addressed), force levels, logistic support, 

armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.”143

While the armed forces were focused on the definitions for its roles and missions, along with its force 

structure and size for the new government, Parliament and the Minister of Defence (MOD) were far 

more concerned with issues relating to governance 

and management, with an orientation on civilian 

oversight over the armed forces. This would include 

the specific oversight that Parliament would be able 

to maintain, accountability on the part of the armed 

forces, transparency in all that they were responsible 

for, and the creation of a new civilian Defence Secretariat (similar to a civilian staffed component of the 

U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense144). As a result 

of this orientation, both the White Paper and the Defence Review became products, in part, of these varied 

demands as opposed to the result of a single requirement to craft a national defense strategy and develop 

the force structure to execute it. Under the direction 

of Committee chairs, initially Mr. Tony Yengeni, followed by Ms. Thandi Modise, the Parliament’s JSCPD 

served in the role of the governing actor that would 

ensure that all government demands were met by the 
47

documents. The JSCPD was created with an oversight 

function over the armed forces because there was a 

high level of mistrust by the new government from 

the apartheid era for the SANDF in the immediate pre1994 period. The Committee was given the responsibility “to investigate and make recommendations regarding budget, functioning organizations, armament 

policy, and state of preparedness of the SADF; and 

to perform other functions relating to parliamentary 

supervision of the armed forces as may be prescribed 

by law.”145 After receiving what it considered to be 

an inadequate proposed equipment acquisition strategy for the armed forces from the MOD, the JSCPD 

also mandated a comprehensive review of national 

defense requirements, resulting in the creation of the 

new Defence Review.146

During the course of the formulation process and 

after the MOD publically published a first draft of the 

White Paper in June 1995 with an invitation to all South 

African citizens to comment on it, the JSCPD received 

over 90 written submissions and held three “consultative conferences” on the contents of the White Paper 

before approving it.147 The Defence Review included 

even more civil society participation than the White 

Paper, and to ensure that all interested stakeholders in 

the society were allowed input, three “national consultative conferences” were held between February 1996 

and May 1997, and two rounds of regional workshops 

were held in nine different provinces throughout the 

country in both July 1996 and May 1997. The conferences and workshops were open to the public, with 

attendance “by national and provincial parliamentarians, members of political parties and government 

departments, and a broad cross section of the defense 

establishment and civil society”148 (business, labor, 
48

clergy like the Catholic Bishops Conference, NGOs 

such as Green Peace, and local community leadership149). The Defence Secretariat went to great lengths 

to ensure that the public participated, including flying large numbers of civil society representatives (e.g., 

NGO directors and clergy and local community leaders) in aircraft to ensure that they could attend conferences and workshops.150 It was the inclusion of civil 

society with the multiple workshops and conferences 

over the course of drafting both documents that substantially lengthened the drafting process. But once 

the JSCPD approved the documents, passage through 

Parliament and Cabinet was fairly easy.151

At the beginning of the drafting and coordinating 

process in the 1994-95 time frame, there was no real 

integrated interagency-type system of governance in 

the country. This did not come about until 1999. There 

also was no NSC-type entity in place until 2000.152

Thus, for the actual drafting that took place during 

this period, the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence had overall responsibility for the development 

of both documents and “[both were] the manager[s] 

of the processes leading to [their] formulation.” For 

the Defence Review, a main Defence Review Working 

Group appointed by the Minister of Defense and coordinated by the civil servants in the Secretariat for Defence, with sub-working groups or sub-committees, 

was established and included MOD personnel (serving members of the armed forces), members (civilian) 

of the new Defence Secretariat, SANDF personnel (a 

colonel or Navy captain was provided to the main 

Working Group by each of the uniformed services153), 

Members of Parliament and, most interestingly, individual members of civil society organizations (CSOs), 

to include the academic community and NGOs. The 
49

Working Group specialist sub-committees on “defence 

posture, functions and force design, human resource 

issues, Part Time Component (reserve force), the 

arms industry, legal issues, and land and the environment.”154 In some key areas of the documents, the primary work was conducted within “security clusters” 

with personnel from the MOD, Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, the intelligence community, and the police. 

Although up to 40-50 people may have attended the 

meetings as members of individual working groups, 

only about eight of these individuals performed the 

actual written drafting of the separate chapters in each 

document.155

There was a hierarchy of outside involvement. In 

what the MOD called “stakeholder consultation,” the 

Defence Secretariat differentiated between “stakeholders” and “interest groups.” Stakeholders had an 

“immediate material interest in the process and its 

outcomes, (government departments, trade unions, 

the military defence industry, parliament)” while interest groups had an interest but not a material stake 

in the outcome (academics, NGOs, think tanks, and 

other CSOs). This permitted the Working Group to 

focus on attaining consensus with stakeholders, but 

not necessarily with interest groups, although their 

views were taken into account.156 While the MOD was 

technically “in charge” as the responsible department 

for developing the two strategies, the JSCPD and Parliament as a whole were definitely not going to be 

“rubber stamps” as they constantly questioned and 

reviewed the documents, and were responsible for approving the policy substance of the documents along 

with the budget required to execute them. In fact, the 

JSCPD was very active throughout the White Paper 

development process and “insisted on ratifying the 
50

drafts line by line.” With Parliament’s final approval 

with multi-party support, after the Cabinet had ratified the document, the MOD described the White Paper as representing a national consensus on defense 

policy.157

A synthesis among all the participants in the drafting process took place over the course of 17 separate drafts of the White Paper. Issues that could not 

be agreed to between the more traditional SANDF 

uniformed personnel, all of whom had served in the 

armed forces before 1994, and the civilians in the new 

DoD, many of whom had served with or for the ANC 

in support of majority black rule, were referred to the 

JSCPD.158

Both approaches were designed to guide the future direction of the nation’s armed forces. But they 

were also intended to inform neighboring countries 

and regional organizations like the African Union 

(AU) and the South Africa Development Community 

(SADC), as well as the greater international community like the United Nations (UN), on South Africa’s 

national security orientation. A key component was to 

be the assurance that South Africa would not intimidate its neighbors. In addition, the documents communicated the changes in the missions of the nation’s 

armed forces since the end of apartheid to civil society 

as a whole. This included target audiences throughout 

the breadth of South African society: the electorate, 

the media, and separate civil society organizations.159

CSOs consisted of civil institutions like think tanks or 

academic bodies that address issues such as human 

rights, democracy, and governance; civil society engagement; small arms and light weapons; peacekeeping and conflict resolution; anti-corruption; and terrorism and organized crime.160 The inclusion of South 
51

African civil society stemmed from an acknowledged 

lack of expertise within the government in certain related areas, “as well as the perceived need to legitimize 

the security architecture that (had been previously) 

associated with repression and apartheid.”161 This was 

in the tradition of the “Bush Conference,” which was 

a gathering of the elders of a tribe. The elders have 

the responsibility to listen to all members of the tribal 

family and then bring the information to the attention 

of the tribal chief. The tribal chief will then make a 

decision. This was the role of the JCSPD and resulted 

in the very strong tradition of ensuring that the voice 

of the people is heard.162

The involvement of civil society was an especially 

important component of the audience for national security at this time in the nation’s history because the 

concept of national security was changed by the end of 

apartheid. In essence, (defense) policy was no longer 

considered to only be the prerogative of the President 

and MOD. In the post-apartheid South Africa, it had 

also become the business of Parliament and the relevant CSOs.163 Their involvement significantly influenced the White Paper strategy to be structured for a 

“primarily defensive orientation and posture . . . (that 

was) reactive or strategically defensive.” This was a 

significant change from the “proactive and strategically offensive strategy of the apartheid era.”164 Civil 

society’s expanded participation in the development 

processes also compelled the White Paper to emphasize “the importance of ensuring robust and stable 

civil-military relations in a democracy,”165 another 

very important change from what had taken place 

during apartheid. 

Identification of the national interests for the White 

Paper was directly linked to the Preamble of the new 
52

South African Constitution that was approved in 1996.166

Domestically, the emphasis for the interests was on 

the nation’s reconstruction and development program, while externally regional security became the 

key interest. Taking direction from the Constitution, 

domestically, the consolidation of the nation’s new 

democratic political system, achievement of social justice, economic development, and a safe environment 

to live in were the national interests with the highest 

priorities. Externally, the highest interests were the 

defense of the country and regional security.167 A key 

external interest was confidence building with neighboring states to demonstrate that South Africa had neither the intent nor desire to intimidate them, and that 

no preemptive operation against any of them would 

ever take place.168 Most importantly, security would 

no longer be viewed as primarily a military concept. 

“The security of people and the non-military dimensions of security, (known as human security), have 

gained prominence.”169 It would now have “political, 

social, economic, and environmental dimensions.” 

The concepts of “democracy, social justice, economic 

development and environmental protection” were to 

be considered more important for enduring security 

than “large arsenals and standing armies.”170

The result of the analysis of national interests is that 

a new security hierarchy had been developed for the 

post-apartheid South African nation. In effect, defense 

had become a subset of socio-economic development 

policy. The nation’s Reconstruction and Development 

Programme (RDP) became the highest component of 

national policy, with defense policy taking a subordinate role. This approach had the added effect of iden-
53

tifying the need to reallocate fiscal resources for the 

RDP and curtailing military spending.171

Because of the higher prioritization of the domestic 

interests, it was clear from the beginning of the drafting process that defense expenditures would have 

to be reduced, necessitating a strategy that would be 

resource constrained. The guidance received for the 

drafting team from both Deputy Minister of Defence 

Ronnie Kasrils and the JSCPD was that the White Paper 

approach must be “needs driven but cost constrained” 

for the guidance that would shape the SANDF’s future force design and structure.172

Rather than a traditional orientation on threats to 

the state, the Defence Review strategy was based upon 

a risk analysis. “The strategy was driven by defining 

defence contingencies and their associated risks, and 

(then) prioritizing (the strategy’s mission capability 

requirements for the armed forces)” in relation to the 

greater risks. The four principal resultant ends for the 

capabilities of the armed forces were developed by the 

risk analysis: self defense, regional security and peace 

support operations, international obligations, and internal support to civil authorities. These became the 

primary missions for the post-apartheid SANDF. Over 

the course of the strategy crafting process, there were 

93 different contingencies developed, with their concepts of operation (the strategy’s “ways”) for addressing the four primary missions. “These were evaluated 

for effectiveness through war gaming techniques.” 

Various force structure elements (means) were applied and assessed for each mission via the gaming. 

The intensive gaming approach permitted the drafters 

to optimize the Defence Review’s “ways and means 

to ensure the greatest possible risk reduction within 

various budgetary envelopes.” This approach allowed 

final recommendations to be “made with full knowl-
54

edge of the risk that they entailed, as well as their cost 

(budgetary) operations.”173

Some believe that while many concepts of operation and force design options were reviewed and war 

gamed, the final strategy was based entirely on an assessment of the likely budget, which was then divided 

up to give each service enough money “to prevent 

squeals of outrage.” Thus the budget drove the national strategy rather than the strategy mandating the 

budget. Likely defense missions over the near- to midterm were not taken into account. As a result, there is 

a belief in some circles that the final force design was 

not adequate to meet all identified contingencies, such 

as peacekeeping operations.174

The analysis conducted in support of the Defence 

Review did identify some potential strategy spoilers. 

In particular, the determination of the importance of 

the national interests combined with budgetary restrictions could place further constraints on defense 

expenditures for the “short to medium-term” period 

of the Defence Review’s existence. As a modification, 

the DoD Offices of the Secretary of Defence, the Chief 

of the SANDF, the chiefs of the Services and their 

staffs are instructed to make required “short-term adaptations to ensure the maintenance of the required 

capabilities and expertise within the financial allocation to defence.”175

A key weakness of the strategy was the lack of 

much of the implementation process. 

The Treasury simply declined to provide the necessary funding, and the Defence Force simply ignored 

much of the DR—for instance closing down the Parachute Brigade and its only division-level headquarters 

(HQ) within a year or so of those being set down as 
55

part of the force design to be maintained, and doing so 

with no reference at all to Parliament.176

Both the White Paper and Defence Review assisted 

the nation in moving beyond the apartheid era. These 

strategic documents allowed South Africa to enter the 

20th century with a very different approach to the concept of national security than it had lived with in the 

recent past. The documents provided a national-level 

strategy for the defense establishment on its role in the 

society writ large, as well as the approach in the form 

of ways and means to execute that strategy with the 

nation’s armed forces in the near- to mid-term. These 

documents were guided in detail by the state’s legislative body and uniquely supported by the significant 

inclusion of civil society throughout the course of 

their development processes. Both of these contributions to national strategic development have made the 

South African strategy document process unique and 

worthy of additional analysis because of their applicability to other states and their associated approach to 

strategy formulation. 

CASE STUDY: UNITED KINGDOM

The first National Security Strategy of the United 

Kingdom was published in March 2008. This publication was initially “stimulated by the U.S. example of 

national security strategy development (and a wish on 

the part of some British commentators to see a distinctive UK voice in security strategy)”177 and catalyzed by 

discussions begun in 2006 by the UK think tank known 

as DEMOS. All sides of the UK political spectrum supported this effort. The Conservative Party’s National 

and International Security Policy Group also devel-
56

oped a “national security approach” in the 2005-07 

period, key elements of which were the creation of an 

NSS.178 During this time, there was also some thought 

being given within the government about the need for 

an NSS.179 Speaking at the annual DEMOS security lecture in December 2006, Sir David Omand, former UK 

Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet 

Office, described the long-term and uncertain nature 

of the 21st century threats, such as border security 

for the sea, air, and space, as well as environmental 

security issues that the UK would have to confront. 

These types of challenges had eliminated the division between internal and external national securityrelated issues and would now have to be addressed in 

a singular manner. The various governmental actors 

responsible for these national security issues in the 

UK would only be able to work together in a mutually 

supporting manner if they were “guided by (an) understanding of the ‘Grand Strategy’ being followed.” 

This grand strategy would contain the strategic “aim” 

and “direction” for the nation, thus permitting the varied state actors to be led towards common objectives 

in the foreign and domestic spheres of national security. The grand strategy in question would require the 

development of a national security strategy. It would 

be the development of such a national strategy that 

would provide the government with the ability to anticipate rather than simply react to national security 

challenges and opportunities.180

This speech was followed by the publication of a 

DEMOS report in February 2007 that elaborated on 

the need for a whole-of-government approach to an 

NSS. Such a strategy would:

• articulate a vision of the current and future 

security environment;
57

• communicate Britain’s values in the 21st 

century;

• develop a framework for collaboration across 

government on national security policy and 

identify policy areas where departments and 

agencies can be more efficient and effective in 

working together;

• prioritize national security policies and initiatives and the allocation of resources; and,

• bring together the plethora of departmental 

white papers on national and international security.181

An additional influence was the work of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a think tank 

that created an independent Commission on National 

Security in the 21st Century. The Commission, chaired 

by Lord George I. M. Robertson, a former Secretary 

General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and UK Defense Secretary, authored its initial 

report in October 2007, highlighting significant changes in the security landscape that the authors felt had 

not been properly addressed by the government. They 

included a power shift from Europe to Asia and the 

Pacific, failed and failing states, climate change and 

resource scarcity, and the rise of complex networked 

societies.182

Articulation of strategic vision would be designed 

for both government actors and the public at large. 

There were already several government national security strategy-like documents in existence, such as 

MOD Strategic Defense Reviews, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) international priorities, the 

CONTEST counterterrorism strategy, and numerous 

Home Office related publications. In fact, these minis-
58

tries were believed to often have policies and missions 

that were not integrated or, at least, not necessarily 

mutually supporting, with the MOD focused on external defense, the FCO on external diplomacy, and the 

Home Office (HO) oriented internally. The result was 

frequently poor coordination and an inability to attain 

policy objectives. The development of an NSS would 

create the conditions for the promotion of greater synergy between national security related departments 

and agencies, allowing for improved resource allocation and risk analysis. An NSS would also serve to create public confidence in the government’s approach 

to national security so that the crafting process would 

be better understood and transparent. Finally, an NSS 

would influence the way national security resource allocation is managed, ensuring that that allocation was 

aligned with risk prioritization.183

In part because the MOD strongly supported the 

need for an NSS owing to the belief that no one in the 

government was viewing security from the perspective of an overall whole-of-government approach, 

partly because of the acceptance of the DEMOS speech 

and report findings, and partly because the new administration of Labor Party Prime Minister Gordon 

Brown wanted to signal that he was different from his 

predecessor, Tony Blair, in reintroducing more formality into government processes, the newly installed 

Labor government announced in June 2007 that an 

NSS would be developed.184

What was to become the UK’s first of three wholeof-government NSSs was crafted between June 2007 

and February 2008. The second (essentially an update), was published in June 2009, and the third NSS, 

in conjunction with an updated Strategic Defence and 

Security Review (SDSR), was published after the elec-
59

tion by the incoming Conservative government in October 2010.185 The National Security Secretariat (akin 

to the U.S. National Security Staff or what was previously known as the NSC Staff) component of the Cabinet Office under the auspices of the Secretary of the 

Cabinet had the responsibility for leading the wholeof-government effort to draft these documents. The 

National Security Secretariat was created, in part, in 

line with recommendations made in another DEMOS 

think tank report, this one first published in 2007.186

Because the 2008 document and ensuing process were 

completely new, the Cabinet Office-led team had to 

determine what the contents of the NSS would be. All 

personnel who worked on the drafting of the documents were either career civil servants or serving military officers. An intergovernmental or interagency 

whole-of-government committee with senior representatives from all relevant departments was formed. 

The committee included personnel from the Cabinet 

Office National Security Secretariat as the lead agent, 

the MOD, FCO, HO, Department for International Development (DFID) (the department responsible for orchestrating the government’s foreign assistance similar to the U.S. Agency for International Development 

[USAID]), and the intelligence agencies.187

Officials strongly wanted the 2008 document to 

benefit from cross government coordination. This 

would be the case with the participation of senior personnel from the major department ministries involved 

as well as the two major political parties.188 At the same 

time, the Prime Minister’s office via Mr. Matt Cavanagh, Special Advisor for Security to Prime Minister 

(PM) Gordon Brown, became directly engaged with 

the drafting process. The result was that there were 

two separate and different approaches to the NSS. 
60

One was embedded in the Cabinet Office with government career civil service bureaucrats and military officers, and the other with the Prime Minister’s special 

(personal) advisors in 10 Downing Street approaching 

the topic from a political perspective.189 Two separate 

drafts emerged; each originating from one of the two 

groups. It became the responsibility of the Cabinet Office, under the direction of Mr. William Nye and the 

National Security Secretariat to merge the two. Within 

that process, the MOD and FCO crafted their own 

chapters in the 2008 NSS, with the FCO component 

addressing foreign policy issues.190 The departments 

were concerned that the creation of the NSS could lead 

to some type of national security related policy prioritization and, as a result, were focused on protecting 

their existing operational and financial commitments 

by ensuring that the NSS gave a high priority, or at 

least mentioned, any activity that they were responsible for.191 During the course of the development of the 

2008 NSS, a political commitment was made by the 

Labor Party in power, and supported by the Conservative Party opposition to create an NSS update. The 

Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat would be 

responsible for ensuring the updates were conducted, 

as well as monitoring their implementation. This was 

the origin of the 2009 and 2010 NSS documents.192

The 2009 NSS was essentially a reworking of the 

2008 document and was designed to demonstrate what 

had changed since the publication of the first NSS.193

This was conducted by the same Labor Party government that had drafted the first document. A significant 

difference between the first two NSSs was that while 

the respective ministries drafted their related sections 

for the 2008 NSS, the 2009 NSS was written in its entirety by the Cabinet Office National Security Secretar-
61

iat and coordinated closely with the ministries. Neither one of the first two strategies was designed to be 

overly constrained by resources. These were intended 

to be national strategies that were “resource blind.”194

In comparison with what was to become the 2010 NSS, 

the 2008 and 2009 documents did not “force prioritization” of components of the strategy for policy emphasis, such as “the creation of a special relationship with 

India or protecting the homeland” and there was no 

clear link to resource allocation for the budget.195

Those crafting the 2010 NSS in the Cabinet Office 

National Security Secretariat on behalf of the new Coalition (Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties) 

government were able to take advantage of the drafting experiences associated with the first two strategies. 

The Conservative Party Board actually approved the 

NSS concept prior to their election that year.196 This 

NSS would be different for two primary reasons: the 

NSS was written concurrently and intended to link directly with the first SDSR developed by the UK since 

1998,197 and because the drafters employed a sophisticated risk analysis methodology for both the national 

security strategy and the SDSR.198 This NSS, published 

on October 18, 2010, was specifically designed to 

establish the end state objectives for the SDSR, published on October 19, 2010, which identified the ways 

and means of achieving these ends.199 The NSS could 

be considered an aspiration document (aspiring for 

objectives).200 It would set “the context for the SDSR 

through which all instruments of national power are 

brought together.”201 Both overarching documents 

were intended to be supported by several supporting 

strategies like the CONTEST counterterrorism, cyber, 

and counterproliferation strategies. The ministries 

charged with drafting the supporting strategies col-
62

laborated during the crafting process202 so that they 

would be mutually supporting. 

The 2010 drafting process expanded the wholeof-government collaboration process, especially with 

the participation from the outset of the ministries and 

agencies representing the resource ways for the SDSR. 

It included all of the new NSC government member 

departments (FCO, Home Office, MOD, Department 

of Energy and Climate Change [DECC]), and the Cabinet Office, in addition to the critical addition of the 

Treasury (Her Majesty’s Treasury [HMT]), as well as 

the DFID,203 and Departments of Transport and Communities (regional and local government).204 The Coalition Government also had the benefit of the final 

IPPR Commission on National Security in the 21st 

Century report which strongly recommended that 

the “barriers between departmental” stovepipes be 

broken down with the assistance of a strengthened 

“strategic center of government.”205 Among the responsibilities for the new National Security Secretariat 

created to support the NSC and new National Security Advisor position, was the requirement to ensure 

that the departments develop well prepared papers 

that present options for “collective decision and effective implementation.”206 This new formal mechanism 

would be responsible for bringing “together all the 

Departments of Government in the pursuit of national 

objectives . . . (to) align national objectives . . . for strategic decisions about foreign affairs, security, defence, 

and development.”207 Ten personnel from the national 

security related departments were seconded to the 

National Security Secretariat to ensure the ability for 

real cross government coordination during the course 

of the actual drafting process for both the NSS and the 

SDSR.208
63

The 2010 process “did deliver on integration (collaboration may be a more appropriate term at this 

point because while the process did get different departments and agencies into the same room with each 

other, these same departments and agencies were 

providing their own separate submissions to the National Security Secretariat)209 and outcome because the 

process enabled conversations to be had, decisions to 

be made, and realities to be recognized.”210 As the two 

documents were developed in parallel, there was a 

consistency with the identification of the ends, ways, 

and means.211 The participating ministries all were able 

to review the various iterations of each as they were 

being crafted.212 The ongoing review process came 

about through a disciplined series of weekly meetings chaired by the National Security Advisor and 

with all of the NSC ministerial Permanent Secretaries (U.S. Undersecretary-equivalent) in attendance.213

These meetings were always conducted a week in 

advance of ministerial level meetings chaired by the 

Prime Minister on the same topics.214 Of note, there 

were only a handful of cabinet level meetings that addressed the 2008 and 2009 documents. External to all 

government actors involved in the drafting process, 

the government also consulted with think tanks and 

private experts on a variety of issues, such as the dialogue created by the Office of Cyber Security “with a 

number of nongovernment experts from across industry, universities, and (other) professional institutions 

to help with the development of (the cyber component 

of the strategies).”215

In fact, it appears that the SDSR rather than the NSS 

was the primary focus of the 2010 national strategymaking cycle; thus emphasizing the ways and means 

for this iteration of national strategy development. 
64

The draft versions of both documents were developed 

in the June-September 2010 time frame by the National Security Secretariat and featured constant NSC discussion among relevant cabinet ministers on interests 

and risk.216 The government wanted flexibility on how 

it chose to define interests in terms of “hard vs. soft” 

interests—the constant struggle for a state between the 

national interests and the values of the state. In the UK 

case, human security problems were discussed to determine where they fit in the prioritization for national 

interests.217 There was a greater effort with this NSS 

to include UK218 long-term national interests in consonance with the shorter near-term threats that had 

evolved since the events of 9/11; thus, energy security 

issues were identified in the same national interest 

context as were terror and Afghanistan. To further the 

discussion, in addition to the National Security Secretariat, the FCO and HCO also drafted papers proposing their view of national interests. With the employment of the new National Security Risk Assessment 

(NSRA) methodology, prioritized risks actually were 

used to identify and prioritize national interests—this 

was case for both external and internally focused national interests.219

The ways and means appeared to be the primary 

focus of the 2010 strategy developmental process.220

With specific reference to the resource means, both 

the 2008 and 2009 NSSs were considered to be unconstrained by resources. But in 2010, in light of the impact of the global financial crisis,221 the Coalition Government made a conscious decision to align both the 

NSS and the SDSR with the fiscal resources available 

for strategy implementation. Based on the information 

contained in the 2010 document, the related ministries 

were directed to develop their own detailed budget-
65

ing decisions to support the national strategy. Counterterrorism was prioritized and received lesser cuts 

than any other programs addressed in the 2010 NSS. 

222 The only area that received an increase in budget 

was cyber security.223 Future acquisition commitments 

were reduced in line with the available resources and 

the aims contained in the NSS.224 In addition, the government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) 

was conducted in 2010 and released the same month 

that the NSS and SDSR were released. This document, 

developed by HMT and signed by the department 

head, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was intended 

to be in direct alignment with the SDSR. To that end, 

it fully funded the UK’s mission in Afghanistan and 

supported specific national security areas such as cyber defense.225

A key addition to the two 2010 documents was 

the application of the NSRA. The National Security 

Secretariat, building on an original domestic-focused 

National Risk Assessment,226 formally employed the 

NSRA in conjunction with “subject matter experts, analysts, and intelligence specialists”227 across the government through a series of workshops228 to “compare(s), 

assess(es) and prioritize(s) all major disruptive risks to 

the UK’s national interest which are of sufficient scale 

or impact . . . to require action from (the) government 

and/or have an ideological, international, or political 

dimension.”229 Risk assessment is not new to UK strategy formulation. It actually began with the analysis 

of risk likelihood, vulnerability, and the impact of the 

risk as described in the 2002 counterterror strategy, 

as well as the domestic-oriented 2004 National Risk 

Assessment, which “drew on the “Defence Planning 

Assumptions” methodology developed in the 1990s.” 
66

The strategy was then focused on how to reduce the 

likelihood of the risk becoming actualized.230

This 2010 assessment was conducted to address 

risks over the next 5- and 20-year time periods. All 

evaluated risks were viewed as potential threats or 

challenges to the state and were identified in eight 

broad categories: 1) terrorism, 2) state threats, 3) risk 

of instability, 4) risk of disruption to flows of people 

and supplies that were essential to the economy, 5) 

risk to disruption of the flow of capital or information, 

6) risk to the international system, 7) transnational organized crime, and 8) natural hazards. The likelihood 

and impact of each risk was considered, as was the 

economic cost, and impact on infrastructure and society, along with the impact of those risks on their ability to increase the likelihood of one or more other risks 

taking place. The NSRA was considered so valuable to 

the process that it was decided to formally update it 

every 2 years.231

Potentially the most significant component of the 

NSRA methodology was the assessment for the likelihood of these threats or challenges to emerge over the 

two given time periods. While clearly subjective, the 

evaluation was made based on four criteria: intent, capability, vulnerability, and historical evidence. These 

variables were coupled with the will of actors to carry 

out malicious or violent activity, the capacity of these 

same actors to conduct these activities, the vulnerability of intended targets in the UK and UK interests 

in the world, and any related historical data. The assessment then compared the outcomes by impact and 

likelihood to each other, and developed a scoring system ranging from highly plausible to highly implausible concerning the likelihood of a given threat being 
67

carried out over the course of the next 5- or 20-year 

periods.232

It was a subjective process that had limitations, 

and the National Security Secretariat determined that 

it had to give the Prime Minister, senior Ministers, and 

other senior officials the opportunity to consider the 

relative positioning of the risks; to ensure that they 

were placed in a logical manner from their perspectives. The Secretariat found that it was not possible to 

prioritize geographically, primarily because most of 

the risks crossed or straddled geographic boundaries. 

It proved difficult to differentiate between current activity and the likelihood for risks to mature over time. 

It was also difficult to weigh one-time events like a 

single terrorist attack against risks that manifest themselves over time or in several forms, such as the smuggling of drugs into the country.233

The employment of the NSRA and its ensuing findings permitted a structured discussion to take place 

among UK officials on the risk impact of both domestic and international threats and challenges, leading 

not only to a determination of risk but to identification 

and prioritization of the related interests. Most importantly, the methodology presented a means for prioritizing risks that “represent the most pressing security 

concerns in order to identify the actions and resources 

needed to deliver . . . responses to those risks” in order 

to mitigate their impact. The risks were prioritized in 

three tiers: Tier One: those of highest priority in terms 

of likelihood and impact (e.g., international terrorism 

affecting the UK); Tier Two: next highest priority in 

terms of likelihood and impact (e.g., attack on the UK 

by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, 

radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN); Tier Three: 

third highest priority in terms of likelihood and im-
68

pact (e.g., large scale conventional military attack on 

the UK).234

All risks, regardless of tier ranking, were to be considered important and require government action “to 

prevent or mitigate the risk.” In some cases, action is 

taken to prevent a lower tier risk from rising to a higher tier, such as assistance to an area of potential instability before it becomes more unstable. In the end, 

the prioritization of risks is conducted in order for a 

strategy to prioritize capabilities needed to prevent or 

mitigate those risks. The higher the risk, the greater 

the effort needed for prevention or mitigation.235 This 

effort tied to the risk evaluation is contained in the 

National Security Tasks (NST) and Planning Guidelines found in the SDSR. The eight tasks and the more 

detailed planning guidelines are intended to serve as 

the ways needed to attain the objectives identified in 

the NSS. They are designed to “drive detailed decisions by departments over the next five years on how 

to prioritize resource allocation and capability development.”236

For the future, it was determined that the NSRA 

would be updated every other year and the SDSR 

would be developed every 5 years, with the next ones 

scheduled for 2012 and 2015, respectively.237 The SDSR 

is being reviewed every month or two for effectiveness.238 The relationship between the two documents 

is a key advantage to the 2010 UK national strategy 

development process, as the ends of the NSS are supported by the ways and means contained in the SDSR. 

The fidelity of the ways, as identified in the SDSR 

NST and Planning Guidelines, along with the Defense 

Planning Assumptions (DPA), in their description 

of the type, number, and intensity of military operations that the MOD has to be prepared to execute will 
69

provide a planner in the MOD the necessary detailed 

guidance to plan for like missions.239

The evolution of the national strategy development 

process since 2007 has been significant, especially 

with the inclusion and alignment of the means (fiscal 

resources in the budgeting process) and the utilization 

of the NSRA in analysis of risks and related national 

interests. This is especially true in the linkage between 

the NSS and the SDSR, along with the connectivity 

between the ends, ways, and means contained in the 

two documents. While an excellent tool, one potential drawback of the formalized risk analysis process 

contained in the NSRA is that the strategy’s ultimate 

objectives may be framed more than they should be in 

terms of risks and challenges, rather than opportunities. Thus, the focus could be on problem solving as 

opposed to “goal seeking,” having the ultimate effect 

of inhibiting strategic thinking.240

The system used to orchestrate the strategy development process has also evolved with the creation of 

the NSC and the National Security Secretariat. At the 

same time, the desire for a true whole-of-government 

product is impacted by the cultures of the departments involved in the process as they influence strategy making. “Actors (sometimes) create cultures that 

get in the way of a more coherent approach.” In the 

end, virtually all participants continue to believe that 

politics and institutional culture matter more than the 

strategy development process. The good news is that 

the participants also tend to believe that, where necessary, the process can be utilized to change (at least 

part of) the political culture.241 The evidence is clear 

for the UK that this type of change can occur, as demonstrated by the creation of new institutions under direction to make the final product one that is based on 
70

a true whole-of-government approach, as was the case 

with both the 2010 NSS and 2010 SDSR. 

CASE STUDY: UNITED STATES

The requirement for the United States to craft a 

national security strategy (NSS) document was first 

codified in the National Security Act of 1947, and 

amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The 1986 amendment requires the President to submit the document 

on an annual basis to Congress to provide a comprehensive report on U.S. national security strategy. 

Both pieces of legislation mandate that the strategy 

include a “comprehensive description and discussion of worldwide interests, goals, and objectives . . .

that are vital to the national security of the United 

States.” It would also address foreign policy, worldwide military commitments, U.S. national defense capabilities, short- and long-term uses of the elements 

of national power, and the requirement to have the 

strategy transmitted to Congress in both a classified 

and unclassified form.242 A number of national strategies were developed over time prior to the GoldwaterNichols legislation, to include what many believe was 

the most significant grand strategy of the era, NSC68, the key containment strategy against Soviet and 

Chinese communism. All were crafted during the preGoldwater-Nichols Act period at the classified level.243

There have been 15 NSSs published by five different administrations since the implementation of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act: 244

• Reagan (2nd Administration): 2 (1987/1988)

• Bush 41: 3 (1990/1991/1993)

• Clinton: 7 (1994/1995/1996/1997/1998/1999/

2000)
71

• Bush 43: 2 (2002/2006)

• Obama: 1 (2010)

Clearly there are some gaps during the 25-year period (between 1987-2012) for NSS publication, given 

the understanding that the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

stipulates that the NSS is to be provided to Congress 

on an annual basis and that it is to be published during the first 150 days of any new administration. Some 

observers believe that an annual requirement for an 

NSS could be too frequent because a nation’s approach to national security is unlikely to completely 

change every year.245 In addition, the requirement for 

a new administration to develop an NSS within its 

first 150 days, while many important political appointee national security related policy positions are still 

being made and some are undergoing congressional 

confirmation, is simply very difficult to execute. None 

of the previous four administrations have been able to 

meet that standard. 

The NSS is intended to represent the highest level 

national strategy document in the United States. It 

establishes the strategic vision or grand strategic direction for the administration in power, provides the 

“objectives,” and includes all the elements of national 

power. It also serves as the “umbrella” strategy for 

guiding a number of other national security related 

strategy documents, like the Department of Defense’s 

National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy, the QDR, and the national security-related strategies developed by other departments and agencies in 

the U.S. Government.246

The U.S. NSS is designed to have a number of different purposes. The primary one is to convey it to the 

various departments and agencies of the executive 

branch, to “provide guidance on foreign and defense 
72

policies.”247 A second is to provide the President’s national security-related strategic guidance or vision to 

Congress to substantiate the need for fiscal resources. 

The third is to communicate the same vision to a number of other audiences, both foreign and domestic so 

that they understand the administration’s intentions 

in the national security arena. The fourth is to address 

specific domestic audiences, frequently political supporters of the administration, that want to see their 

national security concerns prominently highlighted. 248

Finally, the NSS assists in the establishment of a President’s national security agenda in the public domain. 

As a strategic communications tool, the publication 

of the NSS allows the administration an opportunity 

to “publicly explain and sell its policies.”249 Much of 

the information contained in the NSS was extracted 

from the administration’s policy—often articulated in 

key presidential speeches—essentially codifying what 

was already stated.250

The NSS is to be considered a “public strategy document; one that can create a list of national interests 

and “desirable goals,” but will not contain the detailed 

ways and means needed for an executable strategy. 

To a great degree, this is because it must be an unclassified document to serve as the strategic communications tool described above. The ways and means 

specificity is traditionally contained in the classified, 

and occasionally unclassified, directives (titled National Security Policy Directives [NSPD] in the Bush 

43 administration and Presidential Policy Directives 

[PPD] by the Obama administration) issued by an 

administration on key national security issues requiring policy and strategy direction. 251 Examples would 

be NSPD-9 (Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United 

States) and PPD-6 (U.S. Global Development Policy).252
73

The NSS is the only complete whole-of-government national security document that the U.S. Government publishes. All other national security related 

strategies, like the NDS or the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security (NSHS), are broad in scope, and 

do cut across various levels and sectors of government, but are still narrower than the NSS in terms of 

their focus on the needs of the national security problem that the specific strategy is charged with providing guidance for. Coordination for the NDS primarily 

rests with the defense community, while coordination 

for the NSHS is with the domestic security-focused 

federal, state, and local governments. The NSS provides guidance that addresses all these areas and, 

as such, is best developed through coordination and 

collaboration with all government departments and 

agencies that have responsibility for both foreign and 

domestic national security concerns.253 This analysis 

will review the development of three different NSSs 

(2002, 2006, and 2010), selected because they required 

the consideration of the many complex issues of the 

post-9/11 world and because they were developed at 

the direction of two different Presidents representing 

two different political parties, and with the detailed 

support of three different national security advisors 

and associated NSC staffs. 

2002 National Security Strategy.

Based upon the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, creation of the 2002 NSS was understood and accepted 

as a statutory requirement by the administration of 

George W. Bush (Bush 43). In particular, the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed hard 

for the NSS to be developed early in the first Bush 43 
74

administration so as to serve as guidance for the yet 

to be developed NDS and National Military Strategy 

(NMS). It was decided early that the 2002 NSS would 

be a top down-directed document from the White 

House, similar to the way that the Cold War containment strategy (NSC-68) was drafted in early 1950; by 

only a small handful of people at the direction of the 

government’s most senior leadership. This would ensure that the strategy would be framed with a strategic perspective.254 This approach to the crafting also 

meant that very few would be involved, both in the 

writing and in the associated interagency coordination. Presidential National Security Advisor (NSA) 

Condoleeza Rice in direct consultation with Bush 43 

made a determination to keep it very close hold. In 

fact, in the copies that were distributed for coordination, a note was on the front indicating that it was for 

the cabinet member’s eyes only.255

The NSC staff, under the direction of NSA Rice, solicited views from a variety of sources on what should 

be included in the document. Of its own volition, the 

State Department’s Office of Policy Planning headed 

by Richard Haass crafted a comprehensive global 

strategy in the summer of 2001 that read, in the eyes 

of some readers, more like a report card than a national strategy, and was not written in the President’s 

personal voice. The NSS was an official document and 

required presidential signature prior to forwarding 

to Congress. As a result, in the fall/winter of 2001-02, 

NSA Rice requested Dr. Philip Zelikow, a highly respected academic from the faculty of the University 

of Virginia, to develop the real first draft of the 2002 

NSS.256

The issues to be addressed in the draft were discussed during a lunch meeting sometime during that 
75

same period between Dr. Zelikow, NSA Rice, Michael 

Gerson, the President’s Chief Speechwriter, and Counselor to the President at that time, Karen Hughes. Dr. 

Zelikow was also guided in his writing by several 

speeches made by President Bush. Over the course of 

the period that he worked on his draft, winter 2001-02 

thru summer 2002, Zelikow met periodically for additional guidance with NSA Rice and the NSC Staff 

Executive Secretary (NSC EXSEC), Stephen Biegun, as 

well as with others like Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Trade 

Representative, and Elliott Abrams, Special Assistant 

to the President and Senior Director on the National 

Security Council for Near East and North African Affairs, for additional comments on various issues. Zelikow crafted several drafts of the NSS. After she had 

reviewed the initial draft NSS, NSA Rice had NSC EXSEC Biegun and Ms. Anna Perez rephrase some parts 

of the document into a more colloquial form. In the 

end, Zelikow had a significant foundational role in the 

development of the initial draft of the 2002 NSS.257

After Zelikow received and inserted inputs from 

the senior directors on the NSC staff, NSA Rice provided the final Zelikow draft to President Bush in 

the summer of 2002. The President took it with him 

to read in detail during a weekend that he spent at 

the presidential retreat at Camp David, MD. After his 

return from the Camp David weekend, he informed 

NSA Rice that the document needed to be rewritten 

in his own speaking voice. “I thought this document 

was supposed to be my strategy . . . . It doesn’t sound 

like me.” NSA Rice then took the Zelikow draft and 

personally reworked it during July-September 2002. 

She reworded and shortened it. NSA Rice also consulted with every senior director on the NSC staff 

during this period on the issues that directly related 

to them.258 It was during this time that NSA Rice final-
76

ized what became very politically sensitive comments 

on the need for the United States to have the option to 

actively preempt terrorists who had gained an ability 

to strike American interests or the American homeland with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The 

material on the preemption of terrorists had originally 

been developed by Zelikow in one of his early drafts. 

NSA Rice deleted some of that material and moved it 

to the document’s WMD section. NSA Rice requested 

NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger to review that section in detail and modified it based upon Bellinger’s 

advice.259 When complete, the document was a significant revision and modification of the Zelikow draft 

that represented the personal views of NSA Rice and 

the President.260

The primary audiences for the 2002 NSS were the 

U.S. Government national security interagency community (e.g., State, Defense, and the intelligence community), as well as the American people, the media, 

and both external allies and enemies. There was a belief among senior participants in the drafting process 

that Congress, as the nation’s legislative body, had a 

larger role to play as part of the audience, and was not 

engaged to the degree that it should have been by the 

NSC staff. Using the Scowcroft Model on how the NSC 

staff should operate, the NSC staff serves the President, not Congress. The departments in the Executive 

Branch were the components of the federal government meant to work with Congress. As a result, there 

was virtually no outreach to Congress in advance of 

the document’s release at the end of September 2002. 

Some in Congress felt strongly that they and the institution they represented had been slighted.261 To that 

end, Senator Robert Byrd, a Democrat from West Virginia, stated that: 
77

the only reference to the Constitution . . . that is made 

in this document titled ‘The National Security Strategy’ 

. . . (is) that: ‘The constitution has served us well . . . .

That is the alpha and the omega of the reference to the 

Constitution. . . . And note, too, that the word ‘constitution’ as mentioned in the President’s document is in 

lower case. . . . This administration doesn’t believe that 

it merits a capital C even.”262

From the hindsight perspective of some of the 2002 

NSS drafters, not engaging with Congress with its important role was an oversight.263

The 2002 NSS chapters were structured in order 

of importance. This ranged from championing aspirations of human dignity and strengthening alliances 

to defeating global terrorism and preventing attacks 

against the United States and its friends at the highest end, down to transformation of America’s national 

security institutions at the lower end.264 Clearly, the 

leading placement of human dignity aspirations demonstrated an emphasis on the importance of valuedriven national interests for the strategy. During the 

development of the document, it became clear that 

in the post-9/11 era the spread of democracy had become embedded as a national interest in the battle of 

ideals to defeat terrorism.265 NSA Rice believed it to be 

key that the 2002 NSS, the first NSS of the post-9/11 

world, should delineate the advancement of democracy and democratic institutions as vital U.S. national 

interests. This thinking originated with the influence 

of academic specialists on the Middle East like Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, the 2002 Arab Human 

Development Report, and “multiple conversations” 

with President Bush. It would be these national interests from which the long-term objectives (end state 

aims) for the 2002 NSS would be derived. 266
78

The development of the national interests was not 

a separate distinct process for the 2002 NSS. Zelikow 

took the lessons of 9/11 about what to do in the world. 

He understood that national interests would endure 

after what had become the post-9/11 world. As noted 

above, Zelikow also used a number of presidential 

speeches to guide his national interest formulation. 

In addition to the June 2002 West Point, NY, address, 

he also examined the speeches at the Reagan Library 

and the Citadel.267 He added the significance of terror 

to the national interests in the discussion but did not 

eliminate any other interests that had been delineated 

in past strategic documents.268

Domestic political considerations were “minimal” 

and not a major factor for the 2002 NSS drafters. This 

was to be an articulation of the Bush 43 administration 

policy regarding the formulation of national security 

strategy that domestic politics did not have a role in 

this development. The internal U.S. national debate 

over whether to attack Iraq was taking place during 

the final stages of the document’s drafting and coordination process in late summer 2002. NSA Rice wanted 

the NSS to stand alone to represent the nation’s security strategy to the world writ large and not just for 

Iraq. She did not want the Iraq debate to be addressed 

in the document and, as such, “the case for Iraq was 

not made by the strategy.”269

“Events and creative thinking” really determined 

both the challenges (to include threats) and opportunities (ends) for the strategy. From President Bush’s 

perspective, “inside every challenge is an opportunity 

for the country.”270 Measures of effectiveness were not 

created for the ends at the time of the drafting process. But in some aspects, they did come later for the 

democratization and development objectives with the 
79

implementation of the Millennium Challenge Account 

(MCA) program. The MCA began implementation in 

2004, and subsequently the State Department utilized 

those effectiveness measures developed for the MCA 

program to assess progress towards the democratization and development objectives described in the 2002 

NSS. 271

 There were no operational objectives contained in 

the NSS.272 The 2002 NSS was drafted with the intent 

that the departments and agencies in the federal government that it was providing strategic guidance for 

would create implementation plans that delineated 

the strategy’s ways and means in detail. One such 

example was the State Department’s Broader Middle 

East and North Africa Initiative created in 2004 to advance democracy and economic development in the 

region.273

The 2002 NSS was written to be resource unconstrained. The Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) was never brought into the formulation process. A key unspoken assumption was that, in part, 

the finished document was to be provided to the relevant government departments and agencies for them 

to utilize as strategic justification for their budgets.274

The concept of risk as a separate entity was only 

addressed in specific components of the 2002 NSS. 

The world as an entity, and the associated international system, with its inherent risks was understood by 

the crafters. For this type of a strategy, some believed 

that risk cannot be assessed devoid of a separate specific case; it had to have detailed context.275 A place 

that risk was directly evaluated concerned the issue 

of the preemption of terrorists with a WMD capacity. 

Risk associated questions that were assessed included: would the United States appear too aggressive to 
80

the world community if it delineated a preemptive 

approach in the document, and should all potential 

diplomatic options be exhausted before preemptive 

measures requiring the military element of power be 

used? Reflecting this risk analysis, the statement “We 

will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions”276 was inserted into the text 

of the document in the section that described the preemptive policy against WMD-equipped terrorists. The 

section addressing preemption of WMD-equipped 

terrorists was intentionally written in a very deliberate manner, with caveats as deemed appropriate; the 

intent was to clarify the strategy’s intent in detail.277

Neither strategy spoilers nor modifiers were considered during the drafting, in part because the NSS 

was designed as a strategy that would unfold over 

a long-term period. The result was that the drafters 

wanted to give the strategy the time that it needed to 

work to minimize the potential of premature adjustment of the strategy.278 It was also a conscious decision 

to not identify potential spoilers and modifying ways 

and means to the strategy because of the possibility 

such an effort would distract executing departments 

and agencies from the primary direction of the NSS.279

Once NSA Rice’s final draft was complete, the President read it in detail, only providing minor changes. 

After the President provided his comments on NSA 

Rice’s draft, Deputy NSA Steve Hadley forwarded the 

document to the senior leadership at State, Defense, 

and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); requiring 

a very truncated review and transmission back to the 

NSC staff. The departments were intentionally not informed that the President had already approved the 

draft, so that they could feel completely unconstrained 

to provide feedback comments. State provided a num-
81

ber of comments, with some being accepted and others 

not. CIA also returned a number of comments related 

to their view of the world, but they were narrower in 

scope than the State comments. The Department of 

Defense (DoD) comments were primarily critical of 

the fact that the NSS was being drafted at all, rather 

than any of the substantive concepts. EXSEC Biegun 

met with Defense Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) Doug Feith to address defense concerns 

about the draft NSS. In a congenial meeting, with the 

focus on the substance of the document, USDP Feith 

was comfortable with the majority of the NSS and 

only provided some relatively small substantive suggestions that were accepted. There was no significant 

disagreement from any of the government institutions 

on either the policy proposals or the premise that the 

draft was a useful U.S. strategy.280

Once final and signed by the President, there was 

no formal feedback mechanism in place to evaluate the 

progress of the strategy once execution had begun.281

2006 National Security Strategy.

After President Bush had been reelected for his 

second term in November 2004, NSA Rice was named 

the new Secretary of State, and Deputy NSA Stephen 

Hadley (NSA Hadley) was appointed the new NSA 

to the President. After the November 2004 election, 

NSA Hadley, in consultation with Bush 43, made a 

determination in early 2005 that it was time for a new 

NSS. It made sense to craft one every 4 years. While 

the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation mandates that 

a national security strategy be transmitted to Congress on an annual basis, Congress never articulated 

concern that the most recent Bush 43 NSS had been 
82

published in 2002. The nations’ national security situation had changed since September 2002. Some of 

the 2002 objectives had been attained, like the fall of 

Saddam Hussein and movement on the President’s 

Freedom Agenda (support to enable democracies and 

work with democracies as natural allies) via the color 

revolutions in Lebanon, Ukraine, and Georgia, while 

others had not, such as fulfillment of all goals towards 

Iraq. It would be important to improve on the specific 

articulation of parts of the 2002 NSS that had been 

perceived as misunderstood, such as the preemption 

policy targeting terrorists with a WMD capability, as 

well as to address some of the adverse changes that 

had taken place since it was published.282 One most 

significant example was that the President felt it was 

very important “to take the edge off of the preemption 

statements (from the 2002 NSS) for the 2006 NSS without changing the substance of the policy.”283

Like the 2002 document, the 2006 NSS was designed 

to be a top down-driven strategy, with detailed direction for the strategy’s structure and content to come 

from the NSA and President. The President was the 

principal stakeholder for the strategy, and everyone 

else (both government and nongovernment actors) 

was the audience. NSA Hadley wanted the NSS to 

be an update rather than a fundamental new strategy 

and indicated that the 2006 document should serve 

as a continuity document from the 2002 NSS, to include the same chapter headings, plus one additional 

one that addressed globalization. It would represent 

a similar worldview for the President, with similar 

threats and similar opportunities, and would also contain the lessons gained from the first Bush 43 administration in the national security realm. There would be 

a recapitulation of the 2002 NSS and a summary of the 
83

Bush 43 administration’s first 4 years in the national 

security arena. The new document would also include 

greater detail on how to implement specific policies 

and conclude with the nation’s strategic direction for 

the future, especially for the war on terror.284

One of the first initiatives that NSA Hadley took 

was to create a new office on the NSC staff, the Office of Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform. 

Responsible for regional and functional strategic reviews, contingency planning, and other strategic planning duties, this would be the office that would draft 

the 2006 NSS. Drs. Peter Feaver and William Inboden 

were recruited from highly respected academic, State 

Department, and think tank backgrounds to staff this 

office and draft the new NSS. Dr. Feaver had also 

served in the first Clinton administration NSC staff 

where he served as the director-level coordinator for 

the 1994 NSS. 285

In terms of the mechanics of the document’s crafting, NSA Hadley gave very specific guidance that the 

NSS drafts were not to be shared with anyone else 

beyond himself, and all writing was to be conducted 

on a shared computer hard drive. There would be no 

general distribution for interagency coordination. This 

was done to ensure complete freedom for a deliberative drafting process without risk of leaks. There were 

three primary reasons for such a top down, close hold 

approach to guide the process: 1) to ensure adequate 

operational security to prevent premature leaks; 2) to 

achieve desired strategic coherence so that the parts 

would all fit together, not appearing to be forced together by committee; and 3) to achieve the desire to 

speak in one presidential voice. As the President’s 

message to the world, it had to be in his speaking 

voice. The President actually crossed out and added 
84

individual words. The document was to be short like 

the 2002 NSS, both to help ensure that it would be “an 

exercise in intellectual discipline” and so that people 

would read it. The two drafters split the 10 chapters 

between themselves for the actual writing, based 

upon substantive expertise and personal preference. 

It was a very collaborative process, and they would 

repeatedly edit each other’s drafts prior to transmittal 

to NSA Hadley.286

At the beginning of the drafting process in the 

summer of 2005, Dr. Feaver solicited advice on the 

substance of the new NSS from a number of respected 

strategists in and out of government (e.g., Dr. Steven 

Krasner, Director, Policy Planning, State Department; 

Dr. John Lewis Gaddis, Professor at Yale University, 

and Dr. Eliot Cohen, Professor at the Johns Hopkins 

School for Advanced International Studies, among 

many others). In early fall 2005, the drafters briefed a 

limited Principals Committee meeting (with only the 

key NSC national security oriented cabinet secretaries 

and the CIA director present) to gain their approval 

for the organization of the 2006 NSS and for strategic 

guidance on particularly salient sections. Both drafters also met with the NSC Staff senior directors on an 

individual basis to obtain their input for the sections 

of the NSS that concerned them. NSA Hadley and 

Deputy NSA J. D. Crouch, along with Mike Gerson, 

the President’s chief speechwriter, would edit the 

drafts on a line by line basis.287

The actual writing took place during OctoberDecember 2005. One of Dr. Feaver’s objectives was 

to refine some of the language contained in the 2002 

NSS that had been critiqued in public fora; in some 

cases because he felt that it was misunderstood. One 

example was the use of support for democratization 
85

as a tool against terrorism. Dr. Feaver also developed 

a group of what he termed “trusted agents for each 

cabinet secretary” that were resident in counterpart 

components of the government’s national security 

related interagency. These were Steve Krasner, Director of Policy Planning, and Philip Zelikow, Counselor 

to the Secretary, both from the State Department; 

Eric Edelman, the USDP from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Thomas Fingar from the National 

Intelligence Council; John Hannah, the NSA to the 

Vice President; Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of 

the Treasury; and Lieutenant General Gene Renuart, 

Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), the Joint 

Staff. He would dialogue separately with these individuals to gain their views on a variety of issues, 

to include the format of the document. Examples of 

valued input included development policy and issues 

concerning Iraq from the State Department’s Krasner 

and Zelikow. In addition, Dr. Feaver maintained a 

close relationship with Barry Pavel, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, to ensure that 

the 2006 NSS would be synchronized with the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-produced NDS and 

QDR, which were both undergoing development during this same period.288 Another key process innovation that the drafters employed was the use of a “Red 

Team” to develop a critique of the 2002 NSS on a line 

by line basis. They contacted Dr. Joseph Collins on the 

faculty of the National War College, a former Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense, to put together a team 

of highly qualified former practitioner academics that 

would evaluate the document in detail and provide 

their critique to the NSC staff drafters. Taking place 

roughly between July and November 2005, the value 

added was to ensure that the drafters had addressed 
86

all potential critiques of the substance contained in the 

2002 NSS at the beginning of their drafting process.289

In early December 2005, NSA Hadley and both 

drafters had an extended meeting with the President 

to receive his comments on the first complete draft. 

He felt the substance was good and liked the structure, but wanted the language to be more in his voice 

so that “the average Joe in Lubbock, TX, could understand it.” More importantly, President Bush wanted 

to make it clear that this was the American people’s 

national strategy and he wanted them to be able to 

take ownership for it. There would be no compromise 

in the substance. His emphasis in the meeting with 

the drafters was on democracy and human dignity as 

“an antidote to the jihadists.” He also did not want 

to minimize the importance of “American Exceptionalism” in the strategy. America still needs to be the 

world leader and other countries want it to be. “Even 

if countries gripe about it, they still want America to 

lead.”290

For the development of the national interests, there 

were two identified general priorities: the war on terror, to include the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and relations with the other major powers 

(e.g., Russia, China, India, Japan, Europe, etc.). The 

drafters were “not working with a blank sheet” but 

rather were “standing in the shoes” of the prioritization established in the 2002 NSS. The analytical task for 

the 2006 document lay in identifying where the 2002 

strategy was working and where it was not, as well as 

clarifying where the 2002 strategy was misunderstood 

and where new realities necessitated new approaches. 

The second Bush 43 inaugural address, given in January 2005, was also considered an important source 

for how the President’s approach to America’s role in 
87

the world had evolved since 2002. The concepts of the 

advancement of democracy and human dignity were 

considered among the most important interests and, 

in turn, among the most important chapters in the 

strategy.291

The most important new development since the 

2002 NSS was the unfolding of the war in Iraq. It commanded the lion’s share of strategic resources and attention, and its future trajectory would impinge on all 

the other strategic aims of the NSS. At the same time, 

Iraq was not the only strategic priority, and the United 

States could not afford to suspend all other pursuits 

until the fate of Iraq—whether the United States left 

in victory or defeat—was settled. The challenge for 

the drafters of the 2006 NSS was to capture both sides 

of this coin: Iraq’s relative importance and the importance of the rest of the national security agenda. Timing was deemed to be key. If things were going well in 

Iraq, the priority could shift downwards; the reverse 

would be true if things were not going well: it would 

push the priority higher. The lesson for the drafters of 

the 2006 NSS was that, for the most part, the nation’s 

national interests are enduring and do not change; the 

exception is when there is one dominant event ongoing during the drafting, like a war; and for that, the 

impact is on prioritization of the issue (the impact of 

how resources are allocated) and its timing.292

Both the President and NSA Hadley made it clear 

that domestic politics should not impact the substance 

of the drafting of the NSS. In particular, President 

Bush made it known that the NSS should not be limited to accommodate anti-Iraq policy isolationism, 

economic trade protectionism, and anti-immigration 

desires, but rather be drafted to rebut those influences 

in the court of public opinion.293
88

The drafters determined that the ways of countering the asymmetric approach of the jihadists was 

the integrated employment of all the elements of national power. Kinetic action was needed to destroy 

and degrade the terrorist network while the spread of 

democratization, the advancement of human dignity, 

and the expansion of prosperity through economic 

development were needed to win the war of ideas. In 

addition, another way to support those aims was the 

maintenance of constructive relations with the other 

powers, like China, Japan, India, and Pakistan, as well 

as Europe.294

Actual resourcing, the means required for implementing the NSS, were not identified in the document. 

It was to be an unconstrained strategy. The resource 

intent was that the publication of the NSS “would 

guide the strategic planning in the government’s departments and agencies for budget justification.” An 

associated development for this NSS was the crafting 

of what became known as the “Silver Bullet List.” This 

document was developed by the NSC after the strategy’s publication with input from the same NSC staff 

office that drafted the NSS; it identified about 10 specific national security related programs that mandated 

NSA Hadley’s direct personal coordination with the 

White House OMB. These 10 or so programs, many of 

which were addressed either directly or indirectly in 

the 2006 NSS (e.g., the desire for a civilian reserve corps 

of development specialists in the State Department 

Office of the Special Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization) became national security priorities 

for resourcing. The Silver Bullet list did not consist of 

the highest dollar items or even the top overall budget 

priorities in the national security arena. Rather, the 

list consisted of those priority items that the regular 
89

OMB budget development system might inadvertently downgrade were it not for top level NSC staff 

intervention.295

While a specific risk assessment was never conducted, the intelligence community was tasked to 

determine what could go wrong with specific policies 

and strategies addressed in the NSS. Some policy and 

strategy spoilers and modifiers were identified (“tried 

to anticipate things that could go wrong”) such as what 

would happen if a major country collapsed through 

internal strife or what would be the connection between democratization and counter terror issues. It 

was clear that, in addition to elections, democratization was also about the peaceful resolution of disputes 

and religious tolerance. The drafters also addressed 

the issue of preemption of terrorists with WMD; there 

could be the risk of negative consequences if not carried out in consultation with allies. One very important comment about the concept of risk that emerged 

from this discussion was “there are never enough resources to eliminate risk, only to reduce it.”296 There 

were actually about 65 drafts of the 2006 NSS before 

approval of the final one. NSA Hadley and Deputy 

NSA Crouch spent a great deal of time reviewing the 

key drafts, which numbered somewhere less than 10. 

Secrecy remained fundamental. Once he felt that the 

President was comfortable with the document’s direction, NSA Hadley authorized the two drafters to 

share the contents with the NSC Staff senior directors 

for their specific areas of focus. It was still maintained 

in an extremely close hold format. There was no electronic transmission and the senior directors would 

have to come to the White House Situation Room to 

read their relevant sections and provide comments; no 

one else on their staffs was permitted to view the draft. 
90

NSA Hadley also convened senior NSC staff meetings 

devoted to critiquing draft sections of the NSS. The 

President then reviewed the near final draft one last 

time before providing it to the rest of the interagency 

for final coordination. Bush 43 had to make some final 

decisions at this point on language impacting delicate 

issues like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which he 

did. A paper copy of the NSS draft was sent by courier 

to each of the NSC principals (Department Secretaries 

and Agency Heads) 2-3 weeks before the document’s 

release in March 2006. Only that senior individual and 

one other designated person in the same organization would be allowed to review the draft. They had 

to provide their comments in paper form within 72 

hours; again, no electronic transmission. Finally, 5-6 

days before the formal release, the 2006 NSS draft was 

transmitted electronically for the first time for final 

review by every NSC department and agency. The respective senior leadership could share the draft with 

whomever they chose to. They had up to 48 hours to 

return their comments to the NSC staff. At this point, 

very few changes were proposed; but some were still 

significant: the State Department wanted a change on 

China and tougher language for Iran. The document 

was finally sent to the printer in time for the March 

2006 release.297

For the actual roll out of the strategy to the media, the American people, and the world by the same 

President who had published the nation’s last national 

security strategy, a crucial question for determination 

was: should the 2006 NSS be depicted as a new strategy? The answer was no, it was not a new strategy; 

rather, it was a “refined” one.298

While there was no immediate feedback mechanism to determine levels of success and failure created 
91

specifically for the 2006 NSS, during his tenure, NSA 

Hadley created a separate management tool, dubbed 

“Record 2008,” intended to track progress toward specific goals and objectives in the national security arena 

for the second Bush 43 administration. These desired 

accomplishments were tied to the objectives for the 

2006 NSS (e.g., what was the progress for democratization in Iraq?). There were also tasks associated with 

each of the identified objectives. Record 2008 was conceived as a management tool to enable NSA Hadley 

and his senior staff to monitor progress, or the lack 

thereof, for policies in their areas of responsibility. 

This analysis took the form of a “stoplight chart,” with 

color coding for each policy. If the color was green, 

then the execution of the policy was believed to be on 

track to attain the established end state aims for it. If 

the color was orange, it was deemed not on track but 

not requiring a fundamental reconsideration of the 

policy and strategy; with a bit more effort, attention, 

or resources, the policy could get back on track. If the 

color was red, it would mean that not only was the 

policy not on track to achieve the desired objectives 

but also that the policy would require a fundamental 

revision to attain the aims that had been set. If a policy 

area received a critical mass of red lights, it was ripe 

for a thorough interagency review to examine the entire policy and determine changes that would have to 

be made, as happened with Iraq policy towards the 

end of 2006. The analysis for the chart was supposed 

to be conducted on a quarterly basis by the responsible 

NSC staff directors and provided to NSA Hadley.299
92

2010 National Security Strategy.

This NSS drew on the Obama administration National Security Priorities Review (NSPR). The NSPR 

was initiated to create a broad assessment of national 

security issues that the new administration would 

face, to focus the senior Obama administration national security leadership team around one coherent set 

of national security priorities early in the President’s 

new term, and to provide a broad framework at the 

global strategic level for the administration’s national 

security approach. The NSPR came about, in part, because of concern in January 2009 that the Defense-led 

QDR, along with strategic reviews being developed 

by other departments, could be conducted in an autonomous manner from the remainder of the other 

traditional national security documents that are typically drafted (remembering that Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates would remain in his position after the 

Bush 43 administration departed office, and already 

had his staff working on the QDR), and with no direction yet from the new Obama White House. This new 

review would be a classified document orchestrated 

by the Defense Strategy Directorate from the National 

Security Staff—the new title for what had previously 

been known as the NSC Staff. Planners from all the 

departments and agencies with a national-security 

role were identified to provide the views of their organizations for the review. The NSPR addressed major threats, challenges, and opportunities and tiered 

them in priority order from the perspective of the 

President—it was to ultimately represent his national 

security priorities. The document was designed to describe the environment and framework that would be 

used to advance the national security agenda for the 
93

new Obama administration leadership team, which 

approved the final document at a Principals Committee meeting in the March-April 2009 timeframe.300

Having the information from the NSPR, and understanding the congressional requirement for the 

administration to produce an NSS, General (Retired) 

James Jones, the first NSA for President Obama, directed the National Security Staff Office of Strategic 

Planning to work with the President’s chief speechwriter and Deputy NSA Ben Rhodes to develop the administration’s NSS. Rhodes was critical in the Obama 

administration process because of the personal relationship that he had with the President and the ability 

that he would have to capture his thinking on national 

security issues, as well as the President’s voice in the 

actual writing style. He also had an excellent appreciation of the domestic political aspects that could influence the NSS. In the end, he was the only drafter 

who consistently worked directly with the President 

on the document.301

The intent of the NSS would be to articulate the 

President’s key concepts in the national security arena. The document was designed to describe broad 

concepts. It would provide a general construct and associated ways for a vision of how the Obama administration would approach international and domestic 

security.302

The initial drafters in the Strategic Planning office 

(Colonel Ron Tuggle, Mr. Tom Greenwood, and Ms. 

Kate Phillips Charlet), under the supervision of Ambassador Mary Yates, Special Assistant to the President and Special Advisor of Strategic Planning, spoke 

with the drafters of the 2006 NSS, Drs. Peter Feaver 

and William Inboden, both of whom were very helpful in their description of the process and the pitfalls 
94

that they encountered during the course of the drafting effort. The Obama administration drafters initially reviewed the 2002 and 2006 NSSs in detail to 

determine where the differences should be for their 

document.303 They used the NSPR, as well as a number of President Obama’s speeches, like the one made 

in Cairo, Egypt, and the Oslo Peace Prize acceptance 

speech, along with national strategy documents that 

had come before, such as previous NSSs and QDRs, 

to provide the President’s thinking and voice for the 

writing.304 President Obama formally met with his 

NSA, NSS Deputies, and Ambassador Yates twice to 

review progress and drafts and to provide direct guidance for the drafters, ensuring that they were “on the 

right path.” The President directed the drafters to emphasize prosperity, both at home and abroad, and the 

concept that while the United States will continue to 

play a major leadership role, it would be important to 

identify ways to have other countries also play leadership roles within the international system. President 

Obama felt strongly that domestic homeland security 

and external national security policy and strategy must 

all be viewed as part of the nation’s national security 

effort; with the result that homeland security would 

be included as an equal part of the Obama NSS.305 The 

drafters worked on the document for 6-8 months (from 

the later part of 2009 to May 2010) and coordinated 

very closely with the other National Security Staff directorates to frame their respective issues (e.g., cyber 

security, counterterrorism, intelligence, defense, and 

global development).306

After the initial draft of the 2010 NSS was complete, it was transmitted for comment to the counterpart offices in the other national security related 

departments and agencies by the Strategic Planning 
95

Office (e.g., State, OSD, Joint Staff, DHS, Office of 

the Director for National Intelligence, Treasury, and 

Justice). They were given a few days to respond with 

comments in preparation for a Deputies Committee 

meeting review of the NSS draft. The same thing occurred in advance of a Principals Committee meeting. 

Roughly 70 percent of the feedback was incorporated 

in the document. NSA Jones felt it very important to 

receive and consider the input from the other departments and agencies.307

Ambassador Yates consulted frequently throughout the document development process with counterparts in other government agencies: State, OSD, and 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In part, 

these consultations took place to ensure that national 

security-related strategy documents being developed 

by these departments during this same time period, 

like the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), 

were informed and synchronized by the soon to be 

published NSS. In addition to the solicitation of formal input from various government actors, NSA 

Jones also solicited the comments of outside senior 

readers including two that had retired from government service: Colin Powell, former Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Secretary of State, and 

Thomas Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for 

Political Affairs. One of the drafts was transmitted to 

them, and they both provided valuable input to the 

drafting process.308

For this NSS, a stakeholder was described as an actor who had something to either gain or lose in relation to the document. In this case, the President was 

the key stakeholder. The audiences consisted of the 

domestic constituents (not all of them—only the more 

influential ones like Congress and labor unions) and 
96

certain influential countries in the external political 

realm.309

Lower level national security documents that addressed national interests were reviewed during the 

development of the national interests for the 2010 

NSS. Previous NSSs were also reviewed but did not 

influence the drafter’s recommendations concerning 

which national interests to select and what priority 

order to place them in. Four enduring interests were 

decided upon, with the economy given a high priority 

role based on Obama administration belief that “more 

influence comes from economic leadership than from 

military might.” Security of the homeland would always be the highest priority.310

Domestic political considerations did play a role 

in the development of this document. There was a 

conscious decision made by NSA Jones to address 

“homeland security related concerns,” which meant 

that in addition to the global economy, issues like 

the domestic economy, human capital, education and 

support for U.S. businesses would be addressed and 

supported as part of the core foundation for American 

national security.311 The end state aims were derived 

from the national interests. There were supporting objectives aligned with each interest. But, in effect, these 

were objectives that were really designed to be aspirations as opposed to objectives that could be fully attained. This approach permitted real flexibility for the 

NSS. There were no real measures of effectiveness for 

the strategy because of the determination to write it as 

a less specified document.312

The ways to aspire towards the national interest 

derived end states were delineated in Chapter III (Advancing Our Interests) of the document, with a number of them identified under the headings of Security, 
97

Prosperity, Values, and International Order.313 Despite 

the NSS being a document of the highest policy and 

strategy, the administration did consult with OMB to 

explore methods of applying fiscal constraints to the 

NSS; this was found to prove difficult when dealing at 

the strategic broad concept level. Risks were assessed 

and discussed as interests were prioritized.314

The Office of the Director for National Intelligence 

was tasked to provide analysis of events that could 

take place that would serve to spoil components of 

the strategy. They helped to identify potential spoilers 

(e.g., what would happen if elements in South America 

responded negatively to the NSS?).315 The document 

was also reviewed two to three times by the intelligence community to determine what might have unintended consequences with U.S. allies and others. It 

was very important to the Obama administration that 

the NSS was a clear articulation of the policies and 

priorities but not inadvertently offend other countries, 

and the intelligence community had the responsibility 

to craft that analysis for the drafters.316

Once NSA Jones approved the final draft of the 

NSS, it was then approved at a Deputies Committee 

meeting, a limited (only national security related departments and agencies represented) Principals Committee meeting, and then approved and signed by the 

President. President Obama was very involved in the 

content of the NSS and personally drafted the 3-page 

introductory cover letter.317

A COMPARISON

The governments in each of the five case studies set 

out to accomplish a similar purpose—to develop national security strategy-type documents that will pro-
98

vide strategic direction for the nation in the national 

security arena for an established period of time. Their 

approaches differ to varying degrees. What is clear at 

the beginning is that there are pluses and minuses to 

each approach, in part, because each strategy is developed in somewhat different conditions and, at times, 

for a number of purposes. This section will provide a 

comparison and contrast the approaches. 

Oversight.

Until the last several years, it was only the United 

States that had developed whole-of-government national security strategy-type documents on a regular 

basis. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates that 

requirement for the crafting of a national security strategy report for Congress on an annual basis and within 

the first 150 days of a new presidential administration 

taking office.318 In a formalized manner, the creation 

of such documents on a multiagency-level goes all the 

way back to the National Security Act of 1947 legislation.319 The NSS would establish the strategic vision 

or grand strategic direction for the administration in 

power. It is intended to be a stand-alone document 

that will help guide the national security-related documents of other U.S. Government departments and 

agencies. There have been 15 U.S. NSSs published to 

date since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In addition to the U.S. legislation mandating the 

crafting of national strategy on a regular basis, Brazil 

codified a requirement in August 2010 to update the 

NSD every 4 years, as well as requiring the publication 

of a new White Paper document designed to implement the NSD. Each new presidential regime would 
99

be required to publish an NSD in the second year of 

its administration. Australia, South Africa, and the 

UK are all directed to develop their national security 

strategy-type documents based upon the discretion 

of the government in power. There is no legislation 

in place for these countries requiring the creation of a 

national security strategy-like document. It will be a 

political decision to craft one.

Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK have all 

published national security strategy-type documents 

that involved government actors outside of the respective defense ministries. But it is only the UK that 

has published a true whole-of-government NSS to 

date. The Labor Party, followed by the Conservative/

Liberal Democrat Party Coalition, all supported the 

necessity to develop both an NSS and, in the case of 

the Coalition government, an SDSR that was directly 

related to the NSS (published in 2010); both following 

the 2008 and 2009 WPs. The NSS provided the ends 

and the SDSR provided the detailed ways and means 

for the nation’s national security establishment. The 

Australian Labor Party administration directed the 

publication of the 2008 National Security Statement and 

the 2009 WP. While neither of these documents meets 

the definition of a true NSS, they are able to provide 

the necessary direction to the nation’s armed forces. 

South Africa did something similar with the South 

African 1996 White Paper and 1998 Defence Review; 

both directed by the first post-apartheid government 

and requiring two related documents to depict the 

ends in one and the ways and means in the other. One 

major exception between the Australian and South 

African documents was that the Australian strategies 

were whole-of-government crafted, while the South 

African ones were developed primarily by the MOD 
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in conjunction with the separate armed services, as 

well as civil society. Finally, Brazil published its first 

whole-of-government document in 2008; similar to the 

Australian, South African, and UK defense reviews, 

but with a primary emphasis on organization and development of the armed forces.

In addressing the organization of the armed forces, 

Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK had developed working groups specifically created to work on 

the actual crafting of the respective documents. For 

the most part, these individuals had virtually no other 

duties during their time on these groups other than 

to work on the document. The drafting effort for each 

country was a bit different. 

For Australia, the 2009 WP crafting effort was led 

and conducted by the DoD, while the NSS was crafted 

by the members of the Office of the Prime Minister and 

the Cabinet. In the case of Brazil, both the MOD and 

the Strategic Affairs Ministry committed personnel to 

working groups that prepared the 2008 NSD; with the 

MOD having overall responsibility. The 1996 South 

African White Paper was drafted by a MOD working 

group with the Deputy MOD personally involved in 

the process. The 1998 Defence Review was organized 

differently, with participation from a larger number 

of actors, both state and nonstate. In addition to the 

MOD lead and other MOD personnel, sub working 

groups were established that included personnel from 

the SANDF services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 

intelligence community, police, members of Parliament, and some individual members from civil society (from academia and NGOs). 

In the case of the UK, the 2008 NSS was developed 

by a whole-of-government working group committee 

that was led and managed by the Cabinet Office Na-
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tional Security Secretariat with representation from 

the MOD, FCO, HO, DFID, and intelligence agencies. 

The MOD and FCO actually crafted their own chapters. This committee also had to consolidate significant 

input that was received in the way of a draft document written by some of the Prime Minister’s personal 

advisors. The National Security Secretariat-led team 

had to consolidate the two drafts. The same drafting 

process was utilized for the 2009 and 2010 UK NSSs. 

In 2010, the UK also produced its SDSR for the first 

time in 11 years. Written concurrently with the NSS 

and released 1 day apart, the SDSR drafting group expanded beyond that of the NSS to include the DECC, 

Departments of Transport and Communities, and the 

HMT, critical to ensure that the fiscal resource ways 

for the document would be addressed.

The U.S. NSSs were developed in a somewhat different manner. This was the only case where there was 

no identified specifically committed working group 

that involved more than one department or agency. 

The document was always written in utmost secrecy, 

with only a handful of senior personnel involved. All 

three NSSs were written by select personnel on the 

NSC/NSS staff. Typically, no more than a handful 

of individuals actually worked on each of the three 

NSSs that were addressed. They were either assigned 

to a special strategic planning directorate on the Staff 

or, as in the case of the 2002 NSS, were individually 

requested to work on the draft as an outside expert 

and have the final draft written by the NSA herself. In 

all three cases, the drafting of the NSS was always an 

additional task to the other daily duties that all of the 

involved personnel participated in. The only addition 

was when the 2006 NSS drafting team reached out to a 

“Red Team” of academics to review the previous 2002 
102

NSS to suggest where improvements could be made 

for the new document. 

There were three different approaches to document coordination and the determination of which 

actors would be involved in the process. Australia, 

Brazil, and the UK have a policy to maximize wholeof-government coordination from the very beginning 

of the drafting process—including all related ministries/departments and agencies, and doing it often 

in a formal process during the entire period of the 

document’s development. The emphasis is clearly on 

inclusion vice exclusion for any of the national-level 

national security-oriented institutional actors. The 

South African approach only involved the MOD and 

the services, but was influenced to a certain degree by 

the civil society. The U.S. process involved all respective departments and agencies that had NSC membership, but with the exception that those not on the 

actual NSC/NSS staff were typically given much less 

time to review and comment. 

Strategic Context.

The stakeholders and audiences were essentially 

the same in all five cases with some select exceptions 

and with different degrees of importance placed on 

certain audiences. All primary stakeholders were in 

the executive branch, with the chief executive (president or prime minister and his office, along with the 

department or ministry of defense, to include the 

services of the armed forces). The one exception was 

the United States—Defense and the services were not 

considered stakeholders. Additional executive branch 

national security related ministerial stakeholders included the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
103

(DFAT) for Australia and the Brazilian Strategic Affairs ministry. In the case of South Africa, given its very 

powerful role in the near aftermath of apartheid, the 

Parliament had to approve both the White Paper and 

the Defence Review, thus placing itself in the position 

of a stakeholder. It could also be argued that with the 

close inclusion of the ministries or offices responsible 

for fiscal resources in the cases of Australia and the 

UK, that these actors also became stakeholders in the 

national strategy development process. In addition, to 

varied degrees, the fidelity for the ways and means 

provided in the 2008 Brazilian NSD necessitated the 

inclusion of all government implementing actors of 

the strategy as stakeholders early in the process. These 

included the Ministries of Planning, Budget, and Management; Finance; Science and Technology; Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade; and, the Interior. 

Finally, for the Australian and UK cases, the political 

parties in power at the time of document development 

could also be considered stakeholders because of their 

role in directing the strategies to be crafted while they 

were still out of power and vying for elected office.

The audiences for the documents and crafting 

authorities were also essentially the same with the 

exception of the civil society. These primary audiences consisted of the other relevant departments and 

agencies in the executive branch of the government, 

the legislative branch (parliament and congress), the 

media, and other countries. Civil society was a unique 

and intentional audience on the part of the Australian 

and South African governments. In both cases, there 

was a conscious decision to reach out to civil society 

(academia, think tanks, business, industry and, in the 

case of South Africa, even clergy and NGOs like Green 

Peace, and leadership at the local community level. 
104

Both countries held parliamentary hearings and formal public meetings to ensure that these voices were 

heard on their views about national security for the 

respective nation. Brazil consulted with think tanks, 

retired military officers, and former ministers of the 

services. Also, U.S. drafting teams held informal consultations with certain think tank and academic personnel, as well as a number of well known former 

government leaders. 

There were no identified domestic or international 

legal issues for any of the national strategy making 

cases, with the exception that it was intended that 

no known laws be circumvented or ignored. Also, in 

each case, all prior related policies and strategies were 

reviewed; especially when similar formal documents 

had been produced in the past, such as the Australian 

or UK white papers or SDSRs, or the U.S. NSS. 

National Interests and Domestic Political 

Considerations.

For Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, 

national interests were typically identified from prior 

national strategy documents, the nation’s constitution, 

or presidential speeches, as in the case of the United 

States, and were associated with themes of key importance to each country. The Brazilian interests were 

derived from the National Defense Policy of 2005 and 

were related to issues like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regional stability. South African national 

interests were directly linked to the 1996 Constitution 

and focused on the nation’s new democratic system, 

the achievement of social justice, economic development, as well as assuring neighboring countries that 

South Africa had neither the intent nor the desire to 
105

intimidate them. U.S. interests were normally found 

in prior speeches that the serving President had made, 

or originated with key events like the aftermath of the 

9/11 attack, the war on terror, and the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The Australian approach to identifying national 

interests also employed previous white papers as a 

start point, especially the 2000 White Paper for the 

interests in the 2009 document. At the same time, 

because the government was willing to accept additional international or external obligations and the fact 

that domestic security interests had grown because of 

the events of 9/11 and the Bali bombings, there was 

a more in-depth examination of what the 2009 interests should be. The crafters of the 2009 White Paper 

determined that geography would be a key variable 

for their national interest decisions; with the premise 

that the closer a threat was to Australian territory, the 

greater the importance of that interest.

For the UK, the national interests in the 2010 NSS 

were, in part, a product of a debate between “hard” 

and “soft” interests, so that issues like energy security 

interests could be developed in the same context as interests related to terror or the conflict in Afghanistan. 

In addition, the UK NSRA methodology was also employed to prioritize risks that could then be identified 

as interests and would be prioritized in accordance 

with the same risk assessment approach. 

The only real domestic political considerations 

were those involving the commitments made by the 

political parties with administrations in power in Australia and the UK. These parties had made electoral 

commitments to produce the White Paper in Australia 

and the NSS and SDSR in the UK. Therefore, having 

made campaign promises, it was incumbent on the 
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newly elected administrations to develop the documents in a timely manner.

Facts, Assumptions, and Other Factors Framing 

Strategy Development.

Each of the drafting teams/individuals received 

guidance and direction from the senior elected officials in the administrations, either a president or 

prime minister. In the case of South Africa, the teams 

also received some guidance from parliament. The 

guidance came in both the substance as well as, in the 

case of the United States, in the desire that the document be drafted using the President’s personal voice 

for a writing style. 

The Brazilian NSD, the first two UK NSSs, and 

the U.S. NSSs were intentionally drafted to be unconstrained by resources. The belief was that if the strategy was sound, the resources would follow. This was 

not the case for Australia, South Africa, or the 2010 UK 

documents. In the Australian case, the Departments 

of Finance and Treasury were brought in at the beginning of the development for the 2009 White Paper to 

ensure that fiscal considerations were addressed at every step of the formulation process. The South African 

White Paper and Defence Review were based upon 

an assessment of the likely budget, with the budget 

driving the strategy rather than the strategy mandating the budget. For the 2010 UK NSS and SDSR, Her 

Majesty’s Treasury was brought in at the beginning of 

the drafting process to advise on fiscal resource issues; 

the documents were also intended to be in line with 

the government’s Comprehensive Spending Review 

(CSR), which was released the same month that the 

2010 NSS and SDSR were released.
107

The threat challenges for the strategy documents 

were evaluated by the respective Australian, South 

African, UK, and U.S intelligence communities. All 

identified threats were also assessed in the formal 

or semi-formal risk assessment processes that all but 

the United States utilized. For Brazil, rather than the 

intelligence community, the Ministry for Strategic 

Planning developed the threats, ranging from lack of 

societal participation in matters of national defense 

and budget insufficiency to the obsolescence of military equipment and restrictions of technology transfer 

placed on Brazil by more advanced countries. 

Identification of the Strategy’s Objectives

and Measures of Effectiveness.

In some manner, all five countries derived a strategy’s objectives from their national interests. As an 

example, the Brazilian ends were contained in their 

2005 national policy document and directly linked 

to the 1988 Federal Constitution. But in effect, most 

objectives were aspirations as opposed to objectives 

that could be fully attained, thus permitting various 

degrees of flexibility for portions of the strategies. 

The only country that developed a formal approach 

utilizing measures of effectiveness for a national strategy was Brazil. This was accomplished with the employment of a system developed in the United States 

(Balanced Scorecard Performance Measurement System) and applied to the supporting objectives contained in the Brazilian NSD, in coordination with the 

ways and means found in the NSD’s Implementation 

Measures section. 
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Ways (Courses of Action) and Means.

As written, only the Brazilian NSD contained detailed ways and means. The ways and means in the 

four other state strategies were either developed at the 

classified level and not published in the public documents (Australia and South Africa), or were developed in a fairly generic manner (UK and the United 

States), with the intent that the relevant departments 

and agencies responsible for executing the national 

strategy would draft the detailed ways and means. 

There was one exception for the United States: after 

the publication of the 2006 NSS, the U.S. NSC Staff did 

develop a management tool, the “Silver Bullet List,” to 

highlight certain national security-related programs 

that may have been associated with ways required to 

implement portions of the strategy in order to coordinate their funding with the White House OMB. Most 

significantly, for the Brazil NSD, the detailed ways 

and means in the Implementation Measures section 

were provided with such a degree of fidelity that the 

implementing ministries could begin their planning 

processes for execution without further guidance. 

Risk Assessment.

Australia and the UK had formal risk assessment 

processes in place for their national strategy development. Brazil, South Africa, and the United States did 

address some risk on a much more ad hoc basis, to include potential strategy spoilers and modifiers. Brazil 

did consider the risk of the impact of providing more 

funding to defense at the expense of other parts of the 

national economy. South Africa examined the impact 
109

of budget restrictions on the ability to attain national 

interest objectives during the development of the 1998 

Defence Review. The U.S. drafters for the 2006 NSS 

tasked the intelligence community to determine what 

could go wrong with some specific policies and strategies contained in the document, with a number of 

important spoilers being identified (e.g., Hamas being 

elected to office). One important analytical point in 

terms of modifiers that emerged from the U.S. evaluation was that “there are never enough resources to 

eliminate risk, only to reduce it.”

Both the Australian and UK risk assessment processes were formalized. Australia conducted a highly 

classified assessment for the 2009 WP. Known as the 

Strategic Risk Assessment, it addressed risk context, 

assessment, treatment, and review over the course of 

time. Based on the outcome of workshops that conducted the analysis of a number of issues, to include 

potential scenarios, both domestic and international, 

the document drafters developed modifiers, or “risk 

treatment” approaches for the WP that were inserted 

in the Australian strategy. The UK developed the 

NSRA methodology for the 2010 NSS and SDSR. The 

NSRA was implemented through a series of workshops, that also included a number of government 

“subject matter experts,” analysts, and intelligence 

personnel, to compare, assess, and prioritize all major 

risks over the next 5 to 20 years that could potentially 

disrupt components of the national strategy. The likelihood and impact were considered for each risk issue. 

This process was considered so valuable to the drafting process that it was decided to formally update it 

every 2 years.
110

Approval Authority.

The strategies for all five countries required executive branch approval, either by the president or 

prime minister. These final decisions by the senior 

executives were made after consultation with executive branch ministers/secretaries at the conclusion of 

review processes that had taken place. For Brazil, this 

required a meeting of the National Defense Council, 

and a Principal’s Committee meeting for the United 

States. The Australian and UK leaderships approved 

their documents after extensive whole-of-government 

drafting efforts that had taken place over a number of 

months. In the South African case, in addition to the 

President and Minister of Defence, it was important 

to obtain the approval of the parliament for the 1996 

White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review.

Feedback Mechanism.

Brazil, South Africa, the UK, and for the most part 

the United States, have no formal feedback mechanism 

in existence that would tell the government when 

components of the strategy were successful and when 

they were not. As it has done with other policy and 

strategy documents, the Australian Department of the 

Prime Minister and Cabinet reviews the progress of 

the 2009 White Paper quarterly, based upon submission of information from the DoD. These reviews are a 

long time tradition in the Australian government and 

are considered important in light of the need to demonstrate the ability to meet electoral commitments 

made by a new government. In the case of the United 

States, while there has not been a feedback mecha-
111

nism specifically designed for an NSS, the NSC staff 

administration of NSA Hadley developed a feedback 

mechanism for policies approved by the NSPD-1 process of deputies and principals committee meetings. 

“Record 2008” was employed to monitor the evolution of a number of key policies on a quarterly basis. It 

was designed to assess the policies for success, if they 

required a bit more effort, attention, or resources, or if 

they would need a fundamental revision to attain the 

aims that had been set. 

IS THERE A BEST WAY?

The analysis of the five case studies demonstrates 

that there is no one proven way for crafting national 

security strategy documents. But there are valuable 

lessons that can be derived from these cases and, when 

combined, these could serve as a viable start point for 

a future drafting effort. This section will attempt to 

provide that start point for future national strategy 

document development.

Requirement.

There are three primary reasons why the development of a national security strategy type document 

can assist a country in its navigation of national security issues: 

1. Resourcing—to better align national security 

priorities and funding; 

2. Coordination—to reduce duplication of effort 

between government departments and agencies, as 

well as between different tiers of the government; and 

3. Communication—to provide better clarity for 

both the government and private sector.320
112

As described, these represent benefits to both 

stakeholders and audiences to ensure the security of 

the respective state. The complexities of the 21st century feature challenges and associated opportunities 

that are in a continuous condition of change or modification. The result is the need to institutionalize the 

requirement to develop a national security strategytype document on a regular basis, to be done in tandem with other key national strategy documents, like 

the NDS and QDR for the United States, SDSR for the 

UK, the Defence Review for South Africa, and the new 

White Paper for Brazil. This formalization of the requirement will ensure that national security strategy 

is being consistently reviewed for modification and 

adjustment.

The U.S. 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates 

a requirement for the crafting of a national security 

strategy report for Congress on an annual basis and 

within the first 150 days of a new presidential administration taking office.321 As written, both requirements 

are infeasible. At the national level of government, it 

is rare for a nation to have to change its national strategy on an annual basis; such a change would likely 

only occur in time of the need for a response to a major event (e.g., 9/11, changes in an ongoing war). The 

two Bush 43 administrations crafted one NSS during 

every 4 years, and as of this writing, there has only 

been one Obama administration NSS. Of the 15 U.S. 

NSSs to date, six of them were written by new administrations (Bush 41, Clinton twice, Bush 43 twice, and 

Obama) and none of these were published within the 

established 150-day period; publication usually taking place during the second year of a new administration. The absence of additional NSSs and the fact that 
113

none were published during the first 150 days of an 

administration have never been missed. An equally 

important consideration for a new administration is 

that it needs time to put in place all of its political appointee senior leaders in positions that have a national 

security agenda; and provide them with a “learning 

period,” the time necessary to understand the issues 

they have been appointed to work, which is likely to 

take months. Typically many of the appointees may 

not even have been approved by Congress at the 150-

day mark.322

Recommendation. It is more appropriate to institutionalize something similar to the 2010 Brazilian legislation requiring production of an NSS-type document 

(NSD for Brazil) every 4 years and the requirement 

for a new presidential administration to produce one 

in the second year of its administration. This must be 

flexible to be able to accommodate the need for a new 

strategy to be created in a situation where a major 

event took place during the life of the administration. 

The legislation should stipulate that the development 

of the NSS should be coordinated with the production of other key national security strategy-type documents and stipulate them by name and how often they 

are to be written. 

Organization.

Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK had 

developed dedicated working groups to conduct the 

actual writing of the documents. The participants normally had no other responsibilities during the time 

that they served on the working groups, allowing them 

total focus on the very complex task at hand. In part, 

the issue is that the regular positions that the drafters 
114

typically occupy are so busy that those activities will 

likely take away from the difficult work required for 

the national strategy document. The composition of 

three of four of the working groups encompassed all 

ministries/departments involved in national security; 

the South African one only involved the MOD and the 

services.

With the exception of South Africa, all drafting efforts were either led by an organization similar to the 

U.S. National Security Staff, or as in the case of Brazil, 

by two ministries working together. For the document in question to be a true whole-of-government 

product, it warrants leadership for its development from the center of executive branch power, as 

opposed to a single (South Africa) or two (Brazil) 

ministries. The United States also established an Office of Strategic Planning during the second Bush 43 

administration on the NSC staff. This office had the 

responsibility to craft the NSS, conduct regional and 

functional strategic reviews, and perform contingency 

planning.323 It was a unique office for the NSC staff because its emphasis was on longer term strategic planning responsibilities. An additional component of the 

U.S. organization for the 2006 NSS was the creation of 

the “Red Team” from the National Defense University. This group was able to provide in depth analysis 

of the previous NSS (2002) and its applicability or lack 

thereof to the conditions faced by the drafters in 2005-

2006; an asset in determining where the NSS that was 

being drafted should differ from the previous one.

 Finally, Australia published a document that 

specifically delineated their government’s strategic 

planning process in detail, especially their model for 

the development of a national strategy. It includes 

addressing government direction, strategic guid-
115

ance, strategic planning for operations, international 

engagement, preparedness, capability, and budget 

planning.324

Recommendation: Dedicated working groups 

should be created and led by the national security 

staff of the nations’ senior executive (e.g., Office of the 

Prime Minister and Cabinet for Australia; National 

Security Secretariat for the UK; and the NSC for the 

United States). 

The actual national security staff participation 

should come from a permanent directorate/office on 

these staffs that are designed to focus on long-term 

strategic planning. Responsibility for the actual drafting of the national strategy document should be given 

to this strategic planning office to ensure it has a coherent top-down focus directly from the chief executive. This allows for direct access to the office of the 

chief executive for guidance and direction. It would 

provide the detailed direction for the wider working 

group and collate the writing effort. The national security staff office will have to be staffed with a sufficient number of personnel to allow members the opportunity to solely work on projects and have no other 

responsibilities for extended periods of time. Associated working groups would assess and coordinate review of the strategy document. Ideally the members 

of the wider working group should also have no other 

responsibilities during the time of the drafting effort 

and have direct access to the senior leadership of all 

departments and agencies in the government that have 

a stake in the document. As in the Australian and UK 

cases, consideration should be given to having representation from the departments and agencies with a 

major stake in the document on the full time drafting 

team (e.g., DoD/MOD, MFA/State Dept, Joint Staff/

General Staff). 
116

Recommend the creation of a “red team” to review 

the previous document and challenge its assertions 

for continued applicability and inclusion in the new 

one being drafted.

Also recommend publication of a document that 

delineates the strategic planning process for the government in sufficient detail that any mid-senior level participant in the whole-of-government process 

would understand the national strategy formulation 

process approach to be taken.

Coordination.

The whole-of-government coordination that was 

conducted in Australia, Brazil, and the UK appeared 

to facilitate the inclusion of the departments/ministries and agencies representing all the elements of 

national power in the respective governments. The 

United States orchestrates this process in a very close 

hold manner with direction coming from the top (directly from the chief executive) down to the few on 

the NSS staff drafting the document. There is potential 

disadvantage that mid levels of the interagency that 

are knowledgeable in implementation requirements 

will not be able to provide input. There is also risk 

that stakeholders in other departments/ministries 

and agencies that had minimal opportunity to coordinate will not be comfortable enough with the strategy to ensure buy-in from their organization after the 

drafting process is complete.325 At the same time, there 

is also risk that the inclusion of so many actors will 

lead to a document of compromise that addresses every conceivable issue, with none of them being given 

priority. The result would be a document reflecting 

bureaucratic consensus with no real focus. 
117

This emphasis on inclusion rather than exclusion 

of actors that would have responsibility for executing 

the national strategy would likely lead to greater acceptance of the strategy’s objectives even before the 

required planning for implementation took place. It 

would also have the added advantage of ensuring that 

concerns from the related departments/ministries 

with strategy proposals could be evaluated prior to 

the document being forwarded for senior leader review. Finally, when distributed for highest-level approval, adequate time should be provided for the departments/ministries and agencies to ensure proper 

internal review.

Recommendation: A regularized coordination process be established for the national strategy formulation process that ensures all departments/ministries 

and agencies that have a stake in the document are 

permitted time to properly address document issues 

of relevance to those actors, to include the entire document when necessary. They should be given adequate 

time for review and comment as required. But in the 

end, the senior executive leadership must make the 

final decisions for the strategy document. To be a true 

successful national strategy, it must be one that ensures prioritization of national objectives and focuses 

on the key issues vice every issue facing the nation 

during that period in time. This means that, for focus, 

the process must be driven from the top and the document cannot be founded on consensus because it is the 

chief executive’s vision that is at stake.

Stakeholders.

As noted earlier, the stakeholders are key because 

the document is written to attain objectives that they 

are accountable for to their public and their political 
118

party. In addition to the chief executive of the state 

and to a somewhat lesser degree, the departments/

ministries and agencies that have national security 

responsibility and are charged with implementing 

the national strategy must also be considered to be 

stakeholders. This inclusion becomes important for 

the complete acceptance and support for the document from within the whole-of-government devoted 

to national security issues; especially because these 

other stakeholders will have to work to attain fiscal 

resources for their execution responsibilities.

Recommendation: Government departments/ministries and agencies with national security authorities 

should be formally identified as stakeholders in the 

national security strategy formulation process. It must 

be understood that for purposes of a national security 

strategy type document, the chief executive is the primary stakeholder and the NSS needs to reflect his/her 

views and style of expression.

Audience.

The importance of the domestic audience is significant for obtaining support for the resources necessary to implement the national strategy. Key audiences would be the Congress or Parliament, as well as 

the media, and other countries. It becomes especially 

important for legislation that requires the drafting of 

the national security strategy specifically for legislative body review. The involvement of civil society 

(academia, think tanks, business, industry and, in the 

case of South Africa, even clergy and NGOs like Green 

Peace, and leadership at the local community level) is 

becoming more important in a time of fiscal austerity. Both Australia and Brazil have been successful in 
119

including civil society and receiving their thinking on 

national security issues through parliamentary hearings and formal public meetings. 

Recommendation: To the degree possible, in addition to the legislative body of government and the 

media, consider civil society to be an important audience and hold congressional/parliamentary hearings 

that solicit their input. During the time of the drafting coordination process, strongly suggest that select 

committees be briefed on the substantive content discussion of the strategy in order to obtain their input. 

Immediately upon document release, would recommend specific presentations be provided to the entire legislative body either as a whole, or by relevant 

committee (e.g., at a minimum in the United States, 

it would be for congressional committees on foreign 

relations, armed services, homeland security, intelligence, and appropriations).

National Interests and Domestic Political 

Considerations.

Four of the five cases used prior national strategy 

documents, the nation’s constitution, or presidential 

speeches to help identify national interests. The UK 

also employed its NSRA methodology to help determine and prioritize interests. For a democracy, most 

important is to ensure that both the executive and legislative branches of government believe the national 

interests that are identified are the right ones for the 

nation at that point in time, and in priority order. The 

national security environment of the 21st century 

mandates that a national strategy encompass both domestic and external national interests. 
120

To the national security document drafters, the issue of domestic political considerations can be a twoedged sword. It can influence the strategy in such a 

way that emphasizes some issues at the expense of 

others, potentially forcing a political subjectivelybased prioritization for the strategy’s objectives. On 

the other hand, an understanding of the political factors that permit the drafters to know what the American people will and will not support can ultimately 

impact the development of the NSS and what it says. 

These factors cannot simply be ignored in a democracy and in the end, domestic political considerations 

can impose constraints which may be unavoidable. 

Recommendation: Continue to employ prior national 

strategy documents, the nation’s constitution, or presidential/prime minster’ speeches to help identify and 

prioritize national interests. The ability to link interest 

development to risk evaluation can have the added 

benefit of providing greater detail to the description 

of the national interest. Balance the necessity of taking 

domestic political considerations into account with 

the requirement to ensure, to the greatest degree possible, that the strategy’s end state aims and prioritization are unimpeded by political constraints.

Constrained or Unconstrained?

There are two major components of constraints 

that can impact the national strategy development 

process: domestic politics and resources (means). The 

issue of domestic politics was addressed in the paragraph above. Constraints of resource means in the 

national security arena typically relate to money, personnel, equipment, or technology. Australia and the 

UK found it to their advantage to form national strat-
121

egy documents that were based on the fiscal resources 

that their related treasury departments and ministries 

could make available. Other nontreasury related departments/ministries were already participating in 

the formulation process and could address potential 

personnel, equipment, and technology constraints. It 

could be argued that details for a strategy are more 

important in a time of resource (fiscal) austerity, thus 

creating an argument for potential fiscal issues to be 

understood early on in the strategy development process.

Recommendation: While the ideal is a strategy that 

can be developed in completely unconstrained conditions, it is especially important during a time of austerity to understand potential limitations all throughout 

the strategy drafting process. The departments/ministries/agencies that control or manage the fiscal resources should be invited to participate in the national 

security strategy drafting process from the start. They 

would be there to advise, not enforce limitations. The 

national strategy document drafting process should 

always begin with an unconstrained approach; the resource tradeoffs would then follow. 

Identification of the Strategy’s Objectives 

and Measures of Effectiveness.

There is no real difference between how the five 

nations developed their strategy’s objectives; they 

were related to the national interests. Most objectives 

were aspirational in nature, thus allowing for flexibility on the part of the strategy. 

Brazil was the only country that utilized a formal 

approach utilizing measures of effectiveness for a national strategy. The Balanced Scorecard Performance 
122

Measurement System was applied to supporting objectives contained in the Brazilian NSD in coordination with the ways and means found in the NSD’s Implementation Measures section. Such an approach can 

assist a strategy maker to determine when the strategy is succeeding and when it is not. This is especially 

valid for a program designed to monitor the strategy’s 

progress after the strategy has gone into effect.

Recommendation: Continue to establish objectives 

for the strategy that are directly related to identified 

national interests. Formalize a program to develop 

measures of effectiveness for the strategy as it is being 

implemented; to serve as an analytic tool to determine 

how successful components of the strategy have been 

towards the outcome of attainment of the strategy’s 

objectives and when those components require adjustment. The measures of effectiveness should be used to 

evaluate the ability of the ways (courses of action) to 

approach attainment of the strategy’s objectives. All 

of the above could be contained in a separate annex to 

the strategy that focuses on measures of effectiveness. 

Ways (Courses of Action) and Means.

Only the Brazilian NSD contained detailed ways 

and means. Their presence in the Implementation 

Measures portion of the Brazilian NSD, with a real degree of fidelity, provided sufficient detail to the planners in the ministries responsible for implementing 

the NSD to begin planning how their respective ministries would execute the strategy. None of the other 

national security related strategies could do that. In 

particular, this has been a problem with NSSs in the 

United States. “The 1998, 2000, (2002), and 2006 national security strategies . . . list goals without going 
123

into much detail as to how they might be achieved in a 

practical sense.”326 The advantage to greater fidelity in 

the ways and means is that the rest of the government 

that has a stake in the strategy can immediately begin 

working on implementation planning, to include requests for fiscal resources.

Recommendation: Provide as much detail as possible in the strategy’s ways and means. This should 

be designed to specify the guidance necessary for the 

implementing government departments/ministries 

and agencies to use to begin detailed planning for 

execution. The departments/ministries and agencies 

with responsibility to execute individual ways should 

be identified and directed to be responsible for their 

component of that part of the strategy. 

Risk Assessment.

The Australian and UK risk assessment processes 

for national strategy development have become formalized in the last several years. As such, both countries have models that can be used to assess strategic 

risk context, assessment, treatment, and review over 

the course of time. Coupled with workshops that utilize the models on specific scenarios related to the 

strategy being developed, the document drafters are 

able to identify potential strategy spoilers as well as 

modifiers to address the spoilers.

Recommendation: Include and formalize risk assessment analysis for all national security-type strategies. 

Review the risk assessment models being utilized by 

Australia and the UK for potential utilization for other 

national strategies. Mandate that a risk assessment 

annex that would include identification of potential 

spoilers and associated modifiers be developed for 
124

the strategy. In the United States, something similar 

is already being done at the classified level by the 

Joint Staff on an annual basis for the National Military 

Strategy. 

Approval Authority.

The strategies for all five countries require final 

executive branch approval, either by the president or 

prime minister. This is logical since the chief executive is ultimately responsible for the nation’s national 

security. 

Recommendation: Retain the chief executive as the 

final approving authority for the national security 

strategy.

Feedback Mechanism.

Only Australia has created a formal system to regularly review (quarterly) the national strategy documents for success, failure, and potential modification. 

This process is based upon submission of information 

from the Australian DoD. Also, the United States developed a feedback mechanism for policies approved 

by senior level meetings. Although not specifically 

developed to support the NSS crafting effort, “Record 2008” was employed to monitor the evolution of 

a number of key policies on a quarterly basis; if they 

required a bit more effort, attention, or resources, or if 

they would need a fundamental revision to attain the 

aims that had been set. The complexities of the 21st 

century require some sort of a formal monitoring effort to determine when a national strategy is succeeding and when it is not. 
125

Recommendation: Any nation crafting a national security strategy-type document should have a formal 

process to continuously review that strategy for success, failure, and potential modification. It will require 

formal guidance from the office of the nation’s chief 

executive that directs the other department/ministry 

and agency stakeholders in the strategy to provide 

detailed information describing the progress of the 

strategy on a regular basis. The review process should 

be led by the actor in the executive branch that had responsibility for the document’s development. A public document should be produced every 2 years, or 2 

years after the publication of the last national strategy, 

that provides a review of the progress of the strategy, 

as appropriate in terms of success, failure, and modification.

ENDNOTES 

1. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Strategy and the Strategic Way 

of Thinking,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 60, No. 4, Autumn 

2007, p. 111.

2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, New York: Doubleday, 1948, p. 36, as quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, Regaining Strategic Competence: Strategy for the Long 

Haul, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009, p. 33.

3. Ronald Tuggle, (former Director of Strategic Planning, National Security Staff, The White House), in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011. 

4. Thomas P. Reilly, “The National Security Strategy of the 

United States: Development of Grand Strategy,” U.S. Army War 

College Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA, May 3, 2004, p. 14.
126

5. Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, March 15, 1995, p. 2. 

6. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011.

7. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice 

in Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 

Press, 1993, p. 20.

8. Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign 

Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, Boulder, CO: 

Westview Press, 1980, p. 10.

9. Alan G. Stolberg, “Making National Security Policy in the 

21st Century,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security 

Policy and Strategy, 4th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2010, p. 30.

10. Richard B. Doyle, “The U.S. National Security Strategy: 

Policy, Process, Problems,” Public Administration Review, No. 67, 

Vol. 4, July/August 2007, p. 628.

11. Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous 

Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly, December 1952, Vol. 67, 

No. 4, p. 481.

12. Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, “A UK National Security Strategy: 

Institutional and Cultural Challenges,” Defence Studies, March 

2008, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 5, as referenced in Sharon L. Caudle, “National Security Strategies: Security from What, for Whom, and by 

What Means,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2009, p. 8.

13. Wolfers, pp. 484-485; and David A. Baldwin, 

“The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, 

1997, p. 13. 

14. Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, 

Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1943, p. 51, as quoted in Wolfers, p. 484.
127

15. Caudle, p. 1-3. 

16. Baldwin, p. 12-17.

17. This paragraph and the one above are excerpted from 

Alan G. Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide 

to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and 

Strategy, 4th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, July 2010, pp. 2-3. 

18. Thomas G. Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,” 

Science Applications International Corporation Report, Contract 

No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, revised 

November 13, 2006, McLean, VA, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), p. 4.

19. Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American 

Example,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, Fall 1981, p. 22, as 

quoted in Mahnken, p. 4. 

20. Mahnken, p. 3. 

21. Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s 

Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901-2005, Canberra, Australia: 

Land Warfare Studies Center, 2005, as quoted in Mahnken, p. 3.

22. Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American 

Statecraft, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 3. 

23. Richard K. Betts, “U.S. National Security Strategy: Lenses and Landmarks,” paper presented for the launch conference of the Princeton Project “Toward a New National Security 

Strategy,” November 2004, p. 7.

24. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary 

of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, November 15, 2011.

25. Gregory D. Foster, “Missing and Wanted: A U.S. Grand 

Strategy,” Strategic Review, Vol. 13, Fall 1985, p. 14, as referenced 

in Deibel, p. 18. 
128

26. John Lewis Gaddis, “Containment and the Logic of Strategy,” The National Interest, No. 10, Winter 1987-88, p. 29, as referenced in Deibel, p. 19; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 

New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. viii, as referenced in 

Deibel, p. 4. 

27. Charles M. Fergusson, Jr., “Statecraft and Military Force,” 

Military Review, No. 46, February 1966, p. 70, as referenced in 

Deibel, p. 19.

28. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, 

Germany, and Britain Between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 1984, p. 13, as quoted in Deibel, p. 417.

29. Doyle, p. 624. 

30. The George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, “Module 9—National Security Strategy: Processes 

and Structures,” 2003, available from www.marshallcenter.org/

site-graphic/lang-en/page-coll-ep-1/xdocs/coll/ep-syllabus-03-05/

module-09.htm, and quoted by John K. Bartolotto, “The Origin of 

the Developmental Process of the National Security Strategy,” 

U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA, 

May 3, 2004, p. 6.

31. Doyle, p. 624.

32. Caudle, p. 10-11.

33. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Hearings Before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee on National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 3, 1987, p. 1054.

34. Stephen D. Krasner, “An Orienting Principle for Foreign 

Policy,” Policy Review, No. 163, October 1, 2010, p. 1, available 

from www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/49786.

35. Foster, p. 14, as quoted in Deibel, p. 12.

36. Helmut Schmidt, A Grand Strategy for the West, New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 5-6, as referenced in 

Deibel, p. 417. 
129

37. Professor Julian Lindley-French, “”Who Does National 

Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence Submitted to the House of Commons, September 

2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/

cmselect/cmpubadm/435/435we13.htm.

38. Edwin Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943, p. viii, as referenced in Deibel, p. 416.

39. Clark A. Murdock, Improving the Practice of National 

Security Strategy: A New Approach for the Post-Cold War World, 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

2004, p. 14.

40. Collins English Dictionary—Complete and Unabridged, New 

York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003. 

41. Jennifer Taylor and Emily Boggs, “Strategic Defense 

Reviews: Procedures, Frameworks, and Tools to Enhance Future Defense Institution Building Projects,” A Report of the CSIS 

New Defense Approaches Project, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, September 2011, p. 3. 

42. Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International 

Security, No. 25, Fall 2000, p. 6, as quoted in Deibel, p. 9.

43. See Doyle, p. 625; Deibel, p. 9; and Murdock, p. 9. 

44. Carnes Lord, “Strategy and Organization at the National 

Level,” Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process, Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 1991, p. 143; Doyle, p. 628; 

and Caudle, p. 6.

45. Kevin Rudd, “The First National Security Statement to 

the Australian Parliament,” public address given, December 4, 

2008, available from www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/docs/2008-

National-Security-Statement.pdf; and Joel Fitzgibbon, Defence White 

Paper 2009: Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 

2030, Canberra, Australia: Defence Publishing Service, 2009. 
130

46. Carl Ungerer, “The Case for an Australian National Security Strategy,” Policy Analysis, Strategic Policy Institute, July 28, 

2011, p. 8.

47. Michael L’Estrange (former Secretary of the Department 

of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and current Director, National Security College, Australian National University), in discussion with 

the author, September 29, 2011. 

48. John Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, Canberra, 

Australia: Defence Publishing Service, 2010, p. 20. 

49. David Connery (Deputy Director, National Security College, Australian National University) email to the author, May 12, 

2012. 

50. Michael Pezullo (former Head of the 2009 White Paper 

drafting team and current Chief Operating Officer for the Customs and Border Protection Service), in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011. 

51. Stewart Woodman (Professor, Australian Defence Force 

Academy), email to the author, May 21, 2012. 

52. Patrick Walters, “The Making of the 2009 Defence White 

Paper,” Security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 2009, p. 1.

53. Rudd, “The First National Security Statement to the 

Australian Parliament.” 

54. Joel Fitzgibbon, “Speech to the National Press Club of 

Australia: Labor’s Defence Reform Project—Meeting Strategic 

Challenges in the 21st Century,” July 30, 2008, available from 

www.defence.gov.au/minister/FitzgibbonSpeechtpl.

cfm?CurrentId=8020, as cited in John Angevine, “Self-Reliance 

Defence of Australia: Creating a Dependent Australian Defence 

Force?” unpublished paper, March 8, 2011, p. 4.

55. Greg Raymond (Director, Strategic Policy Guidance, Department of Defence) and Bryden Spurling (Deputy Director, 

Strategic Policy Guidance, Department of Defence), in discussion 

with the author, September 27, 2011. 
131

56. Ibid. 

57. Kevin Rudd et al., Labor’s Plan for Defence: Election 2007 

Policy Document, Canberra, Australia: T. Gartrell, November 2007, 

p.2, as referenced in Walters, p. 2-3.

58. Walters, p. 6.

59. Pezullo, in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011; 

and L’Estrange, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.

60. Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, p. 10; and Australian Government, “The Australian Intelligence Community: 

Agencies, Functions, Accountability, and Oversight,” 2006, p. 13.

61. Pezullo, as referenced in Patrick Walters, “The Making of 

the 2009 Defence White Paper,” Security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 2 

Winter 2009, pp. 9-10; and Pezullo, in discussion with the author, 

September 28, 2011. 

62. Raymond and Spurling, in discussion with the author, 

September 27, 2011. 

63. Ibid.

64. Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, pp. 10-11, and 

Rudd, “The First National Security Statement to the Australian 

Parliament.” 

65. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, 

September 27, 2011. 

66. Pezullo, in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011; 

and Marc Ablong (former Chief of Staff for the 2009 White Paper 

drafting team and current Assistant Secretary for Strategic Issues 

Management, Ministerial Support and Public Affairs Division, 

Department of Defence), in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011. 

67. Sarah Guise (primary drafter of the 2008 National Security 

Statement and current Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism and 
132

Border Security, Homeland and Border Security Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in discussion with the 

author, September 29, 2011. 

68. Graham Eveille (Assistant Secretary, Defence Policy and 

Operations Branch, Defence Intelligence and Research Coordination Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in 

discussion with the author, September 28, 2011. 

69. Raymond and Spurling, in discussion with the author, 

September 27, 2011; and Ablong, email to the author, May 22, 

2012. 

70. Ablong, email to the author, May 22, 2012. 

71. Guise, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.

72. Ibid.

73. Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, p. 18; Department 

of Defence, Key Questions for Defence in the 21st Century: A Defence 

Policy Discussion Paper, Canberra, Australia: Defence Publishing 

Service, 2008; and Department of Defence, Looking Over the Horizon: Australians Consider Defence, Canberra, Australia: Defence 

Publishing Service, December 2008.

74. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, 

September 27, 2011. 

75. Ibid. 

76. Stephen McFarlane (Assistant Secretary, Intelligence Policy Branch, Defence Intelligence and Research Coordination Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011 and in email received 

May 8, 2012. 

77. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, 

September 27, 2011. 

78. Carl Ungerer and Anthony Bergin, “The Devil in the Detail: Australia’s First National Security Statement,” Policy Analysis, 
133

Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 

10, 2008, p. 2. 

79. L’Estrange, in discussion with the author, September 

29, 2011. 

80. Pezullo, in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011. 

81. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, 

September 27, 2011. 

82. Ibid. 

83. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

84. Ibid.

85. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, 

September 27, 2011. 

86. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

87. Walters, pp. 7, 10.

88. Joel Fitzgibbon, Defence White Paper 2009, p. 138, as quoted 

in Walters, p. 8.

89. Guise, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011. 

90. Ungerer and Bergin, “The Devil in the Detail: Australia’s 

First National Security Statement,” p. 3. 

91. L’Estrange, in discussion with the author, September 

29, 2011. 

92. Raymond and Spurling, in discussion with the author, 

September 27, 2011. 

93. Department of Defence, “Strategic Risk Assessment for the 

(Australian) Force Structure Review and Related Defence White 

Paper Processes,” unpublished paper, 2008, p. 1-2.
134

94. Ibid. 

95. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

96. Ibid.; and Guise, in discussion with the author, September 

29, 2011, and in an May 8, 2012 email.

97. Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, p. i.

98. Connery, email to the author, May 12, 2012. 

99. Colonel Cunha Mattos (Analyst, Army Design Project, 

Policy and Strategy Directorate, Army Staff), in discussion with 

the author, August 8, 2011. 

100. Colonel (Retired) Marcos Antonio (former Coordinator 

for the MOD Working Group on the NSD and current Manager, 

Strategic Defense Section, Joint Staff of the Armed Forces) and 

Captain Rafael Santos (former Strategy and Policy Advisor, Secretariat of Policy, Strategy, and International Affairs, MOD, for the 

NSD, and current Advisor, Policy and Strategic Planning Division, Navy Staff), in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011. 

101. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, National Strategy of Defense, 

Brazilia, Brazil: December 17, 2008, p. 5.

102. Colonel Edson Diehl Ripoli (seconded to the Ministry of 

Strategic Affairs Working Group that wrote the first draft of the 

NSD and currently on the personal staff of the Army Commander), in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011; and “Brazil’s 

Pursuit of a Nuclear Submarine Raises Proliferation Concerns,” 

WMD Insights, March 5, 2008.

103. General Brigade (2 star) Luiz Linhares (seconded to the 

Ministry of Strategic Affairs Working Group that wrote the first 

draft of the NSD and currently the Deputy Chief of Personnel, 

Army Staff), in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.

104. Ibid.

105. Linhares; and Captain (Retired) Ruiz Campos 

(seconded to the Ministry of Strategic Affairs Working Group that 
135

wrote the first draft of the NSD), in discussion with the author, 

August 8, 2011.

106. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011. 

107. Lula da Silva, p. 5.

108. Linhares; and Campos, in discussion with the author, 

August 8, 2011. 

109. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011. 

110. Linhares, in an email to the author, May 1, 2012. 

111. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011. 

112. Linhares; and Campos, in discussion with the author, 

August 8, 2011; and Antonio, in discussion with the author, 

August 9, 2011. 

113. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011. 

114. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011. 

115. Plano Brasil de Todos, August 2003, as quoted in European 

Commission, Brazil Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013, 14.05.2007 

(E/2007/889), p. 6, available from eeas.europa.eu/brazil/csp/07_13_

en.pdf.

116. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011. 

117. Ibid. 

118. “Titulo I—Dos Principios Fundamentais da Constituicao 

Federal,” Federal Constitution of Brazil, 2003, available from www.

planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constitui%C3%A7ao.htm.

119. Ibid.; Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 

2011; and Lula da Silva, p. 14.

120. Mattos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011. 
136

121. Antonio and Santos, in discussion with the author, 

August 9, 2011. 

122. Linhares, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.

123. Ibid.

124. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011

125. Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011. 

126. Ibid.; and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, National Defense 

Policy, June 30, 2008, p. 14, 19-21. 

127. Mattos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011, 

as described in Balanced Scorecard Institute, “Performance 

Measurement,” available from www.balancedscorecard.org/BSC

Resources/PerformanceMeasurement/tabid/59/Default.aspx.

128. Colonel Pinheiro Evandro (Chief, Strategic Follow-On 

Section, Policy and Strategy Directorate, Army Staff), in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011. 

129. Lula da Silva, pp. 49-50.

130. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011. 

131. Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011; 

and Lula da Silva, p. 42.

132. Lula da Silva, pp. 42-70.

133. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.; and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, National Strategy of 

Defense, December 17, 2008, p. 66-70.

136. Mattos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.
137

137. Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011; 

Brazilian Complementary Act no. 136 of August 25, 2010, Diário 

Oficial da União (Brasilia), August 26, 2010, as described in Sam 

Perlo-Freeman, et al., “Military Expenditure,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2011, Stockholm, Sweden: 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, p. 173, available from www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/files/SIPRIYB1104-04A-04B.

pdf; and General of Division Julio (Chief Advisor for MOD Strategic Planning), in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

138. Major General (Ret.) Len le Roux (former Director of 

Strategy for the Chief of Defense Forces), email to the author, June 

24, 2011. 

139. Len le Roux, “The South African National Defence Force 

and its Involvement in the Defence Review Process,” Ourselves 

to Know: Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in 

Southern Africa, Rocky Williams et al., eds., Pretoria, South Africa: 

Institute for Security Studies, 2003, p. 156. 

140. Ibid. 

141. Dr. Deon Fourie, (retired Professor of Strategic Studies 

at the University of South Africa, Brigadier General (Ret.) South 

African Army Reserve, and one of the advisors for both the White 

Paper and Defence Review), in discussion with the author, June 

30, 2011. 

142. “Chapter 1: Introduction,” White Paper on National 

Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 8, 1996, available from

www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencwp.htm.

143. “Chapter 1: Introduction Aim and Focus,” South African 

Defence Review, 1998, available from www.dod.mil.za/documents/

defencereview/defence%20review1998.pdf; and Mr. Helmoed Heitman (South African defense consultant that advised on the both 

the White Paper and Defence Review), in discussion with the author, June 30, 2011. 

144. RADM R.W. Higgs (current Chief of the South African 

Naval Staff and the Navy representative for the 1998 Defence Review), in discussion with the author, June 29, 2011. 
138

145. Gavin Cawthra, “From Total Strategy to Human Security: The Making of South Africa’s Defence Policy,” Copenhagen, 

Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1999, available 

from www.ciaonet.org/wps/cag02/, as quoted in James Ngculu, “The 

Role of the Parliamentary Defence Committees in Ensuring Effective Oversight: The South African Experience,” Ourselves to Know: 

Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa, Rocky Williams, et al., eds., Pretoria, South Africa: Institute 

for Security Studies, 2003, p. 180; and Len le Roux, email to the 

author, April 16, 2012. 

146. Ngculu, “The Role of the Parliamentary Defence Committees in Ensuring Effective Oversight,” p. 181.

147. “Chapter 1: Introduction,” White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa; and Brigadier General (Ret.) 

John Wesley, South African Air Force, Air Force member on the 

White Paper drafting committee, in discussion with the author, 

June 30, 2011.

148. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011. 

149. “Chapter 1: Introduction Aim and Focus”; “Chapter 15: 

Conclusion,” South African Defence Review, 1998, available from 

www.dod.mil.za/documents/defencereview/defence%20review1998.pdf;

and Mr. Helmoed Heitman (South African defense consultant 

that advised on the both the White Paper and Defence Review), in 

discussion with the author, June 30, 2011. 

150. Cawthra.

151. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011. 

152. Susanna Bearne et al., “National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform,” Santa Monica, CA: 

Rand Corporation Europe Technical Report, 2005, p. 11. 

153. Higgs, in discussion with the author, June 29, 2011.

154. “Chapter 1: Introduction Aim and Focus,” South African 

Defence Review.
139

155. Le Roux, emails to the author, June 24, 2011 and April 16, 

2012; Heitman, in discussion with the author, June 30, 2011; and 

Wesley, in discussion with the author, June 30, 2011. 

156. Cawthra.

157. Ibid.

158. Kai Michael Kenkel, “Civil Society Participation in Defence Policy Formulation: Academic Experts and South Africa’s 

Post-Apartheid Defence White Paper,” Journal of Security Sector 

Management, Vol. 4, No.1, January 2006, p. 9. 

159. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011; Heitman, in 

discussion with the author, June 30, 2011

160. Fatoumatta M’boge and Sam Gbaydee Doe, “African 

Commitments to Civil Society Engagement: A Review of 8 NEPAD Countries,” African Human Security Initiative Paper 6, 

August 2004, p. 1, available from www.iss.co.za/pubs/Other/ahsi/

Mboge_Doe/Contents.html.

161. Bearne et al., p. 13.

162. Wesley, in discussion with the author, June 30, 2011. 

163. Deon Fourie, “From Executive War to Defence by Constitution: South African Defence Policy Making from 1914-2002,” 

unpublished paper delivered at a conference in Santiago, Chile, 

1999, p. 12.

164. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011. 

165. Rocky Williams, “Defence in a Democracy: The South 

African Defence Review and the Redefintion of the Parameters 

of the National Defence Debate,” Ourselves to Know: Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa, Rocky 

Williams et al., eds., Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security 

Studies, 2003, p. 206. 

166. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, available from www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/.
140

167. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011. 

168. Higgs, in discussion with the author, June 29, 2011. 

169. “Chapter 4: The Strategic Environment,” White Paper on 

National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 8, 1996, available from www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencwp.htm, as quoted in Francois Very, “From Theory to Culture: Emergent South 

African Strategic Culture,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 

Vol. 9, Issue 3, Spring 2006, p. 18-19. 

170. Laurie Nathan, “Beyond Arms and Armed Forces: A 

New Approach to Security,” South African Defence Review, No. 4, 

1992, pp. 12, as quoted in Kai Michael Kenkel, “Civil Society Participation in Defence Policy Formulation: Academic Experts and 

South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Defence White Paper,” Journal of 

Security Sector Management, Vol. 4, No.1, January 2006, p. 11. 

171. Cawthra, “From Total Strategy to Human Security.”

172. Ibid.

173. Le Roux, emails to the author, June 24, 2011 and April 

16, 2012. 

174. Heitman, email to the author, April 22, 2011.

175. “Chapter 15: Conclusion,” South African Defence 

Review, 1998. 

176. Heitman, email to the author, April 22, 2011.

177. Sir David Omand (former Permanent Secretary and Security and Intelligence Coordinator, the UK Cabinet Office), email 

to the author, March 26, 2012. 

178. Mark Phillips, (Advisor to the Conservative Shadow 

Government), email to the author, April 18, 2012.

179. A United Kingdom (UK) official involved in the development of the national security strategy (NSS), in discussion with 

the author, June 28, 2011.
141

180. Sir David Omand, “In the National Interest: Organizing 

Government for National Security,” The DEMOS Annual Security Lecture, December 2006, available from www.demos.co.uk/files/

Organising_government_for_national_security.pdf?1240939425.

181. Charlie Edwards, “The Case for a National Security 

Strategy,” DEMOS Report, February 2007, p. 3, available from

www.demos.co.uk/files/Demos_report_the_case_for_a_national_

security_strategy.pdf?1240939425.

182. Paddy Ashdown and George Robertson, “Independent 

Commission on National Security,” London, UK: Institute for 

Public Policy Research, October 25, 2007, available from www.

ippr.org/articles/56/956/independent-commission-on-national-security.

183. Ibid., pp. 13-15.

184. Omand and another official involved in the development 

of the NSS, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.

185. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “The National Strategy 

of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World,” 

March 2008; Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009: Security for the 

Next Generation,” June 2009; Prime Minister David Cameron and 

Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, “A Strong Britain in an Age of 

Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,” October 2010; and 

Prime Minister David Cameron and Deputy Prime Minister Nick 

Clegg, “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic 

Defense and Security Review,” October 2010.

186. Charlie Edwards, “National Security for the Twenty-First 

Century,” DEMOS Report, 2007, p. 15, available from www.demos.

co.uk/publications/nationalsecurityforthetwentyfirstcentury.

187. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in 

discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.

188. Mr. Struan McDonald (Acting Head, Strategy Unit, UK 

MOD), in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

189. Omand, email to the author, March 26, 2012.
142

190. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in 

discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.

191. Ibid. 

192. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the 

author, June 28, 2011.

193. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011; 

and a senior government official, in discussion with the author, 

June 28, 2011.

194. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the 

author, June 28, 2011.

195. Institute for Government and the Libra Advisory Group, 

“Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence Submitted to the House of Commons, August 2010, available from www.publications.parliament.

uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubadm/435/435we07.htm.

196. Phillips, in discussion with the author, June 14, 2011.

197. Samuel Selvadurai (Strategy Officer, Foreign Commonwealth Office [FCO] Policy Unit), in discussion with the author, 

June 27, 2011.

198. UK Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat, “UK 

National Security Strategy: National Risk Assessment—Methodology,” unpublished paper, 2010.

199. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011; 

and Cameron and Clegg, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: 

The Strategic Defence and Security Review, p. 9. 

200. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in 

discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.

201. Cabinet Office, “Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence 
143

Submitted to the House of Commons, September 2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/

cmpubadm/435/435we04.htm.

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid; and McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 

27, 2011.

204. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the 

author, June 28, 2011.

205. IPPR, “Shared Responsibilities: A National Security 

Strategy for the UK,” The Final Report of the IPPR Commission 

on National Security in the 21st Century, June 2009, available 

from www.ippr.org.

206 . Right Honorable Oliver Letwin, MP, “Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” 

Written Evidence Submitted to the House of Commons, August 

2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/

cmselect/cmpubadm/435/435we03.htm.

207. Dr. Robin Niblett, ”Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence 

Submitted to the House of Commons, October 18, 2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/

cmpubadm/435/435we09.htm.

208. Letwin.

209. Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012.

210. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in 

discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.

211. Selvadurai, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

212. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

213. Cabinet Office, ”Who Does National Strategy—Public 

Administration Committee Contents.” 
144

214. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

215. Cabinet Office, ”Who Does National Strategy.” 

216. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011; 

Selvadurai, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011; and a 

senior government official, in discussion with the author, June 

28, 2011. 

217. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

218. Ibid.

219. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the 

author, June 28, 2011.

220. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

221. Omand, email to the author, March 26, 2012.

222. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the 

author, June 28, 2011.

223. Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012.

224. Andrew Simpson, “Defence Acquistion,” Evaluating 

the 2010 Strategy Review, London, UK: Chatham House, October 

2010, p. 13. 

225. Chancellor of the Exchequer, “Spending Review 2010,” 

October 2010, p. 9, available from cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_

completereport.pdf; and an official involved in the development of 

the NSS, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.

226. Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012. 

227. Cameron and Clegg, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 25. 

228. Selvadurai, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.
145

229. National Security Secretariat, “UK National Security 

Strategy: National Security Risk Assessment—Methodology,” 

unpublished paper, undated, p. 1.

230. Omand, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2011; and 

Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012.

231. National Security Secretariat, “UK National Security 

Strategy: National Security Risk Assessment—Methodology,” 

pp. 2, 10.

232. Ibid, pp. 6-7. 

233. National Security Secretariat, “UK National Security 

Strategy: National Security Risk Assessment—Methodology,” 

pp. 9-10. 

234 . Cameron and Clegg, A Strong Britain in an Age of 

Uncertainty, p. 25-27.

235. Ibid, p. 28.

236. Cameron and Clegg, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, pp. 10-12. 

237. Phillips, in discussion with the author, June 14, 2011.

238. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

239. Paul Cornish, “Indecision by Design,” Evaluating the 2010 

Strategy Review, London, UK: Chatham House, October 2010, p. 3. 

240. Nick Birks, “Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence 

Submitted to the House of Commons, September 2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/

cmpubadm/435/435we08.htm.

241. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in 

discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.

242. National Security Act of 1947, “National Security Strategy Report,” Public Law 80-235, Section 108, July 26, 1947; and 
146

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,

“Annual National Security Strategy Report,” Public Law 99-433, 

Section 104, October 1, 1986.

243. Catherine Dale, “National Security Strategy: Legislative 

Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress,” 

Congressional Research Service RL 34505, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 15, 2008, p. 2. 

244. Ibid., p. 3.

245. Dale, “National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, 

Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress,” p. 13.

246. Ibid, p. 14-15. 

247. Colonel Ronald Tuggle (Director for Strategic Planning, 

NSS Staff, from 2009-2011 and current Chief of Staff for Arlington 

Cemetery), email to the author, May 31, 2012.

248. Don M. Snider, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 15, 1995, pp. 5-6. 

249. Dale, “National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, 

Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress,” p. 17.

250. Tuggle, email to the author, May 31, 2012; and Ambassador Mary C. Yates (Special Assistant to the President and Special 

Advisor of Strategic Planning, National Security Staff), email to 

the author, June 4, 2012.

251. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, “Strategy 

for the Long Haul: Regaining Strategic Confidence,” Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009, p. 12.

252. Federation of American Scientists, “Presidential Directives and Executive Orders,” available from www.fas.org/irp/

offdocs/direct.htm.

253. “Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,” GAO-04-
147

408T, Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, February 3, 

2004, p. 6; and Tuggle, email to the author, May 31, 2012.

254. Stephen J. Hadley (former Deputy National Security Advisor to the President in the first Bush 43 administration and the 

National Security Advisor to the President in the second Bush 43 

administration), in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011; 

and Condoleezza Rice (National Security Advisor to the President 

during the First Administration of Bush 43), in discussion with 

the author, April 30, 2012. NSC-68 was drafted by a small group 

of personnel from the Departments of State and Defense, and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff under the leadership of Paul Nitze from the 

State Department Policy Planning Staff, and all at the direction of 

the Secretaries of State and Defense. See Steven L. Rearden, “Paul 

H. Nitze and NSC 68: ‘Militarizing’ the Cold War,” in The Policy 

Makers: Shaping American Foreign Policy from 1947 to the Present, 

Anna Kasten Nelson, ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 

Publishers, 2009, pp. 5-28. 

255. Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November 

11, 2011. 

256. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.

257. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011; 

Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012; Zelikow, in 

discussion with the author, November 11, 2011; and Hadley, in 

discussion with the author, December 20, 2011. 

258. Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20, 

2011 and as quoted in Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: 

A Memoir of My Years in Washington, New York: Crown Publishers, 2011, p. 153. 

259. Ibid.; and Zelikow, in discussion with the author, 

November 11, 2011. 

260. Rice, email to the author, May 30, 2012; and Hadley, 

email to the author, May 30, 2012.

261. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.
148

262. “Senator Robert Byrd stands up for our Constitution,” 

Portland Independent Media Center, October 14, 2002, available 

from portland.indymedia.org/en/2002/10/105485.shtml.

263. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.

264. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, available from georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/

nss/2002/.

265. Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 

20, 2011.

266. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012. 

267. “Governor Bush Discusses Foreign Policy in Speech 

at Ronald Reagan Library,” November 19, 1999, available from

www.fas.org/news/usa/1999/11/pr111999_nn.htm; “Bush’s Speech at 

the Citadel,” New York Times.com, December 11, 2001; and Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, 

Vol. 79, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 45-62, as cited by Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011. 

268. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.

269. Ibid.

270. As quoted by Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011.

271. Esther Pan identifies 16 measures of effectiveness for 

progress towards democratization and development. See Pan, 

“Millenium Challenge Account,” Council on Foreign Affairs Backgrounder, May 28, 2004, available from www.cfr.org/pakistan/

foreign-aid-millennium-challenge-account/p7748, as cited by Condoleezza Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012.

272. Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November 

11, 2011. 

273. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012; and 

Department of State, “Broader Middle East and North Africa 
149

Initiative (BMENA),” December 2004, available from 

bmena.state.gov/.

274. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.

275. Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November 

11, 2011. 

276. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, September 

2002, p. 16, available from georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/

nss/2002/.

277. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.

278. Ibid.

279. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012.

280. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.

281. Ibid.

282. Peter Feaver (Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and 

Institutional Reform, NSC Staff, from 2005-07, and current Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC), in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and 

Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.

283. Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012, 

and in email to the author, May 30, 2012.

284. William C. Inboden (Senior Director for Strategic Planning, NSC Staff, during the 2d Bush 43 Administration, and current Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 

Austin, Texas), in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011; 

Peter Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; 

and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.

285. Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.

286. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 

6, 2011. 
150

287. Ibid.; and Hadley, in discussion with the author, 

February 16, 2012.

288. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011.

289. Ibid.; and Dr. Joseph J. Collins (lead for the National War 

College “Red Team” in summer-fall 2005, and current Professor 

of National Security Strategy, National War College, Washington, 

DC), in discussion with the author, November 28, 2011. 

290. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 

6, 2011.

291. Ibid.

292. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and Hadley, in discussion with the author, 

February 16, 2012.

293. Ibid.

294. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 

6, 2011.

295. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; 

and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.

296. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6, 

2011; Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; 

and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.

297. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6, 

2011; and Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 

2011.

298. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011.

299. Ibid.

300. Barry Pavel (Senior Director for Defense Strategy from 

2008-2010, NSS Staff, and current director of the International 
151

Security Program and director-designate of the Brent Scowcroft 

Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council of the 

United States), in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011, 

and email to the author, June 9, 2012; and Tuggle, in discussion 

with the author, September 14, 2011.

301. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 

2011; and Thomas Greenwood (Director for Strategic Planning, 

NSS Staff, from 2009-2011, and current Director for Pakistan, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for South and Central 

Asia, OSD), in discussion with the author, May 2, 2012.

302. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 

14, 2011. 

303. Ambassador Mary C. Yates (Special Assistant to the President and Special Advisor of Strategic Planning, National Security 

Staff during crafting of the 2010 NSS), in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012.

304. Ibid.; Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 

14, 2011, NYTimes.com, “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009, available from www.nytimes.com/2009/

06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all; and The White 

House, “Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel 

Peace Prize,” Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2009, available from 

www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptancenobel-peace-prize.

305. Yates, in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012. 

306. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 

14, 2011.

307. Ibid.

308. Yates, in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012.

309. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 

14, 2011.
152

310. Ibid.; and The White House, National Security Strategy, 

May 2010, p. 7. 

311. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 

2011; and Pavel, in discussion with the author, June 7, 2012.

312. Ibid.

313. The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, 

pp. 17-50. 

314. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 

2011, and email to the author, May 31, 2012; and Yates, email to 

the author, June 4, 2012.

315. Ibid. 

316. Yates, in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012, and 

email to the author, June 4, 2012. 

317. The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010.

318. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 

of 1986, “Annual National Security Strategy Report,” Public Law 

99-433, Section 104, October 1, 1986.

319. National Security Act of 1947, “National Security Strategy 

Report,” Public Law 80-235, Section 108, July 26, 1947.

320. Ungerer, “The Case for an Australian National Security 

Strategy,” p. 7.

321. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986.

322. Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 

20, 2011.

323. Duke Sanford School of Public Policy, “Peter D. Feaver,” 

available from fds.duke.edu/db/Sanford/pfeaver.
153

324. John Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, Canberra, 

Australia: Defence Publishing Service, 2010.

325. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 

6, 2011.

326. Krepinevich and Watts, Regaining Strategic Competence: 

Strategy for the Long Haul, p. 12.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

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