IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Teena M. Parrillo, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 268 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: July 14, 2017

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge1

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE COLINS FILED: September 12, 2017

Teena M. Parrillo (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review of the order 

of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), holding that she is 

ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits under Section 402(b) of the 

Unemployment Compensation Law2(Law) because she voluntarily quit her job 

without a necessitous and compelling reason. We affirm.

 

1 This decision was reached before Judge Hearthway’s service with the Court ended on 

September 1, 2017.

2 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, § 402(b), as amended, 43 P.S. §

802(b). Section 402(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n employe shall be ineligible for 

compensation for any week ... [i]n which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work 

without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature ....” 43 P.S. § 802(b).
2

Claimant was employed by the Law Office of Mark Zlock, PC

(Employer) in a full-time position as Legal Secretary and Office Manager, from 

August 3, 2012 until June 17, 2015. (Record Item (R. Item) 10, Referee’s Decision, 

Finding of Fact (F.F.) ¶1.) The additional facts found by the Referee and adopted 

by the Board concerning Claimant’s separation from that employment are as

follows: 

2. At the time of separation, [C]laimant was working remotely 

for [E]mployer from her residence in Florida.

3. On June 17, 2015, [E]mployer became concerned about 

apparent irregularities in his communication system including 

computer, electronic mail and telephones.

4. [E]mployer consulted a technician who advised him to 

remove everyone from the system until the problem could be 

identified and addressed.

5. During the course of this employment, [E]mployer 

communicated with [C]laimant by sending texts to her 

personal cellular telephone, although [E]mployer had 

provided [C]laimant with a business telephone.

6. On June 17, 2015, [E]mployer texted [Claimant] on her 

personal telephone and asked for passwords of various 

systems. 

7. On the same date [E]mployer advised [C]laimant to refrain 

from accessing any of [E]mployer’s equipment.

8. [E]mployer did not state to [C]laimant that she was fired or 

use any other language indicating termination of employment. 

9. [C]laimant texted [E]mployer on June 17, 2015 and asked if 

he had intended to send her the instruction to stay off the 

systems.

10. [E]mployer did not immediately respond to [C]laimant’s 

questions.
3

11. Over the next two days, [E]mployer continued to send 

texts to [C]laimant on her personal telephone requesting 

information regarding work issues.

12. [C]laimant advised [E]mployer by a text message sent on 

June 21, 2015, that she interpreted his June 17, 2015 email 

message to stay off the communication systems as a firing.

13. [C]laimant voluntarily left this employment.

(R. Item 10, Referee’s Decision, F.F. ¶¶2-13; R. Item 13, Board’s Order.) 

Claimant applied for unemployment compensation benefits on July 3, 

2015, stating that she had been discharged from her employment. (R. Item 2, 

Internet Initial Claims Form.) She stated further that, with the permission of 

Employer, she had had complete control of Employer’s business, gaining access to 

the computer remotely, and that she had changed the computer password and 

neglected to inform Employer quickly enough and he “flipped out basically.” (Id.) 

Claimant stated that she sent Employer the password but that he responded with a 

text indicating that she was not to access the computer system, and he then failed 

to respond to her texts inquiring why she was being denied permission to access 

the computer. (Id.)

 Employer disputed Claimant’s account, stating that it was the belief 

that his computer was being accessed by someone outside the business that 

prompted him to text Claimant on June 17, 2015 with instructions not to access the 

computer; he indicated that he did not hear from Claimant again after that evening 

until June 21, 2015, when Claimant emailed him that she interpreted his 

instructions to mean that she had been fired. (R. Item 4, Records of Oral 

Interviews.) Claimant’s June 21, 2015 email to Employer reads, in part,

As per your instructions in two text messages to me on 

June 17, 2015 at 9:10 p.m. that I am NOT allowed to 

access any of your personal and business related accounts 
4

including but not limited to the business computer, 

emails, bank, phone, medical, etc...., I immediately 

ceased all work on your business, boxed up your items 

and turned off the cell phone that was connected to the 

office number of 215-579-2215. Since my accessing 

these items including the computer and the phone is my 

daily job, I took this as being fired since you failed to 

provide any other explanation of your decision. 

(Claimant’s Exhibit C-1.) 

On July 27, 2015, the Department of Labor and Industry’s Office of 

Unemployment Compensation Benefits issued a determination that Claimant was 

not ineligible for benefits; the Department considered Claimant’s eligibility under 

both Section 402(b) and Section 402(e)3of the Law, and concluded that Claimant 

did not quit her employment but rather that Employer initiated the separation, and 

Employer failed to prove that he had done so as a result of Claimant’s willful 

misconduct. (R. Item 5, Notice of Determination.) Employer appealed, and the 

Referee conducted a hearing on October 27, 2015, at which both Claimant and 

Employer appeared and testified by telephone, and Employer presented the 

testimony by telephone of a witness, Judy Sherman. (R. Item 9, Referee’s Hearing 

Transcript (H.T.) at 1-34.) 

On October 30, 2015, the Referee issued a decision reversing the 

determination of the Office of Unemployment Compensation Benefits. The 

Referee determined that the hearing testimony established that Claimant 

voluntarily left her employment; ruling under Section 402(b) of the Law, the 

 

3 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, § 402(e), as amended, 43 P.S. § 

802(e). Section 402(e) provides that an employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any 

week “[i]n which his unemployment is due to his discharge or temporary suspension from work 

for willful misconduct connected with his work . . . .” 43 P.S. § 802(e).
5

Referee found Claimant ineligible for benefits because she had voluntarily left her

employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. The Referee 

stated:

In this case, [C]laimant testified that [E]mployer fired her 

by instructing her not to access any of the [E]mployer’s 

computer system on June 17, 2015. The [R]eferee does 

not find [C]laimant’s testimony credible and resolves all 

conflicts in favor of [E]mployer. [E]mployer testified 

that he instructed [C]laimant not to access his 

communication systems and continued to ask her 

questions about work on June 18 and June 19, 2015, 

indicating to her that he had not fired her. [R]eferee 

finds [E]mployer’s testimony credible.

(R. Item 10, Referee’s Decision, Reasoning.) 

 Claimant appealed the Referee’s decision to the Board. On December 

22, 2015, the Board issued an order adopting and incorporating the Referee’s 

findings and conclusions and affirming her decision. (R. Item 13, Board Order.) 

Claimant then filed the instant petition for review appealing the Board’s order to 

this Court.4 

Before this Court, Claimant contends that she was “constructively 

discharged for unknown reasons;” she asserts that Employer has provided 

inconsistent accounts of the events that transpired on the date she left her 

employment and that the documentary evidence he produced just days prior to the 

hearing both prejudiced her and confused her, rendering her not credible in the 

 

4 Our review of the Board’s order is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether 

constitutional rights were violated. Mathis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 64 

A.3d 293, 297 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). 
6

eyes of the Referee. (Claimant’s Brief at 12, 14-16.) Claimant objects specifically 

to the inclusion in the record of text messages between Employer and his 

girlfriend, Ms. Sherman, which she deems not authentic. 

The question of whether a claimant has voluntarily quit her 

employment or whether she was discharged is a question of law for this Court to 

determine, based on the totality of the record. Bell v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 921 A.2d 23, 26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). A claimant 

voluntarily terminates her employment if she leaves, resigns, or quits employment 

“without action by the employer.” Fishel v. Unemployment Compensation Board 

of Review, 674 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (en banc). “To be interpreted as 

a discharge, an employer’s language must possess the immediacy and finality of 

firing.” Id. Here, Claimant acknowledged that the text message she received from 

Employer on June 17, 2015 instructing her not to access any business accounts said 

nothing about her being fired or instructing her not to return to work the next day. 

(R. Item 9, H.T. at 19.) Claimant testified that when she received the 

aforementioned text, she responded with a return text to Employer asking him 

whether he understood that he had texted that message to her, and asking him what 

was happening, but Employer did not immediately respond. (Id.) Claimant 

testified that after she received the text, she:

[S]hut everything down...So to suddenly receive that and 

be told that you are now not allowed to access anything, 

including the phone which would have nothing to do 

again with the computer issue, I can’t do my job. My job 

is done. If I can’t do that stuff, I can’t do my job. 

(Id., H.T. at 20.) Claimant did not introduce any text messages or other 

documentary evidence that she asked Employer whether she was discharged. 
7

Other than her interpretation of Employer’s text message to mean that she had been 

fired, Claimant offered no evidence to support her assertion that her employment 

had been terminated. 

We find no merit in Claimant’s argument that she was disadvantaged 

by the continuances granted Employer, and the additional time period he was 

therefore allowed during which he could submit evidence. The record includes the 

original notice of hearing scheduled for September 3, 2015, together with 

subsequent hearing notices issued for hearings on September 15, 2015 and October 

13, 2015, all of which were continued. Claimant asserts that Employer should not 

have been permitted to submit evidence after the initial deadline established prior 

to the initially scheduled hearing. Five days prior to the hearing, Employer 

submitted a series of text messages, most between Claimant and Employer, and 

several between Employer and Ms. Sherman, Employer’s witness. We find there 

was no prejudice to Claimant from the introduction of these texts. The texts 

between Employer and Ms. Sherman serve only to corroborate Employer’s 

testimony that he was unaware of why Claimant was not responding to his 

messages on July 18, 2015 and July 20, 2015. At the hearing, Claimant 

acknowledged having received text messages from Employer on her personal 

phone on June 18, 2015 and again on June 20, 2015, regarding work-related issues; 

she stated, however, that there was no point in responding to these messages given 

the fact that she was not permitted to do anything. (R. Item 9, H.T. at 22- 23.) 

Claimant was thus not prejudiced by the fact that Employer offered portions of 

these texts as evidence at the hearing. The remainder of the text messages between 

Claimant and Employer documented work conversations that occurred prior to the 

incident on June 17, 2015, and were not at all relevant to the matters considered by 
8

Referee, nor were there findings made with regard to any information contained in 

these texts. Each of the hearing notices advising the parties of the rescheduled 

hearing dates included the instruction that documents to be entered into the record 

at the hearing must be submitted to the Referee Office at least five days before the 

hearing, so Employer was permitted to offer this evidence, and did so five days 

prior to the hearing. 

 Claimant also asserts that Employer told inconsistent stories 

throughout the proceedings, and should not therefore have been found credible. 

First, it is axiomatic that the Board is the ultimate finder of fact and final arbiter of 

credibility, and we are bound by its credibility determination. Peak v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 501 A.2d 1383, 1388 (Pa. 1985). 

Second, the record reveals that Employer gave a consistent account of events that 

transpired, beginning with his response to the Erie Unemployment Compensation 

Service Center and ending with his testimony before the Referee. Accordingly, we 

find this assertion to be without merit. 

Here, the Board found that Claimant voluntarily left her employment, 

and under Section 402(b) of the Law, a person shall be ineligible for 

unemployment compensation benefits when the unemployment is due to 

voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. 

43 P.S. § 802(b). It was therefore Claimant’s burden to demonstrate a necessary 

and compelling reason for leaving her employment, Mathis v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 64 A.3d 293, 299 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); Green Tree 

School v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 982 A.2d 573, 577 (Pa. 
9

Cmwlth. 2009); Fitzgerald v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 714 

A.2d 1126, 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), and she failed to do so.5 

 The Referee found that Claimant’s testimony was not credible, and 

resolved all conflicts in favor of Employer. Employer testified that he did not fire 

Claimant on June 17, 2015, but rather instructed her not to access his 

communications systems and continued to ask her work-related questions on the 

following days, indicating to her that he had not fired her. The Board affirmed the 

decision of the Referee, and we are bound by its credibility determination.

Accordingly, the Board’s Order is affirmed.

____________________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

 

5 Claimant was required to show circumstances that produced real and substantial pressure to 

terminate employment and would compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner, and that 

she acted with ordinary common sense in quitting her job and made a reasonable effort to 

preserve her employment. Mathis, 64 A.3d at 299-300; Craighead-Jenkins v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 796 A.2d 1031, 1033 & n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); Fitzgerald, 

714 A.2d at 1129.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Teena M. Parrillo, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 268 C.D. 2016

: 

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 12th day of September, 2017, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is 

hereby AFFIRMED.

____________________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge