July 2012 

NASA/CR–2012-217590 

Surveillance and Datalink Communication 

Performance Analysis for Distributed 

Separation Assurance System Architectures

William W. Chung, Dennis J. Linse, Omeed Alaverdi, Carlos Ifarraguerri, Scott C. Seifert, 

Dan Salvano, and Dale Calender 

Science Applications International Corporation, Hampton, Virginia 
NASA STI Program . . . in Profile

Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the 

advancement of aeronautics and space science. The 

NASA scientific and technical information (STI) 

program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain 

this important role. 

The NASA STI program operates under the 

auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. 

It collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and 

disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI 

program provides access to the NASA Aeronautics 

and Space Database and its public interface, the 

NASA Technical Report Server, thus providing one 

of the largest collections of aeronautical and space 

science STI in the world. Results are published in 

both non-NASA channels and by NASA in the 

NASA STI Report Series, which includes the 

following report types: 

 TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 

completed research or a major significant phase 

of research that present the results of NASA 

Programs and include extensive data or 

theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of 

significant scientific and technical data and 

information deemed to be of continuing 

reference value. NASA counterpart of peerreviewed formal professional papers, but 

having less stringent limitations on manuscript 

length and extent of graphic presentations. 

 TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific 

and technical findings that are preliminary or of 

specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports, 

working papers, and bibliographies that contain 

minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive 

analysis. 

 CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 

technical findings by NASA-sponsored 

contractors and grantees. 

 CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. 

Collected papers from scientific and 

technical conferences, symposia, seminars, 

or other meetings sponsored or cosponsored by NASA. 

 SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 

technical, or historical information from 

NASA programs, projects, and missions, 

often concerned with subjects having 

substantial public interest. 

 TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. 

English-language translations of foreign 

scientific and technical material pertinent to 

NASA’s mission. 

Specialized services also include organizing 

and publishing research results, distributing 

specialized research announcements and feeds, 

providing information desk and personal search 

support, and enabling data exchange services. 

For more information about the NASA STI 

program, see the following: 

 Access the NASA STI program home page 

at http://www.sti.nasa.gov

 E-mail your question to help@sti.nasa.gov

 Fax your question to the NASA STI 

Information Desk at 443-757-5803 

 Phone the NASA STI Information Desk at 

443-757-5802 

 Write to: 

 STI Information Desk 

 NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 

 7115 Standard Drive 

 Hanover, MD 21076-1320 
National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Langley Research Center Prepared for Langley Research Center 

Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199 under Contract NNL11AA05C

 

July 2012 

NASA/CR–2012-217590 

Surveillance and Datalink Communication 

Performance Analysis for Distributed 

Separation Assurance System Architectures

William W. Chung, Dennis J. Linse, Omeed Alaverdi, Carlos Ifarraguerri, Scott C. Seifert, 

Dan Salvano, and Dale Calender 

Science Applications International Corporation, Hampton, Virginia 
Available from: 

NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 

7115 Standard Drive 

Hanover, MD 21076-1320 

443-757-5802 

Acknowledgment 

This work was funded by a NASA National Research Announcement under the Concepts 

and Technology Development Project of the NASA Airspace Systems Program under 

Contract NNL11AA05C. The team wishes to thank Sally Johnson, David Wing, and 

Maria Consiglio of NASA Langley Research Center for their technical guidance and 

advice. 

The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in this report is for accurate reporting and does not constitute an 

official endorsement, either expressed or implied, of such products or manufacturers by the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration.
1 

Summary 

This study investigates the effects of two technical enablers: Automatic Dependent Surveillance – 

Broadcast (ADS-B) and digital datalink communication, of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Next 

Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) under two separation assurance (SA) system 

architectures: ground-based SA and airborne SA, on overall separation assurance performance. Datalink 

performance such as successful reception probability in both surveillance and communication messages, 

and surveillance accuracy are examined in various operational conditions. Required SA performance is 

evaluated as a function of subsystem performance, using availability, continuity, and integrity metrics to 

establish overall required separation assurance performance, under normal and off-nominal conditions. 

 
2 

Table of Contents 

1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 9

2 NextGen SA System Architectures .................................................................................................................... 11

2.1 Current SA System Architectures ................................................................................................................. 11

2.2 NextGen Surveillance System Architectures ................................................................................................ 14

2.3 NextGen Communication System Architectures ........................................................................................... 15

2.4 NextGen Separation Assurance Concepts Of Operation ............................................................................... 16

3 Required Separation Assurance Performance .................................................................................................... 18

3.1 Proposed Approach ....................................................................................................................................... 18

3.2 Conflict Detection Zone ................................................................................................................................ 19

3.3 Maneuvering to Achieve Separation Assurance ............................................................................................ 21

4 Modeling of Distributed SA Datalink System Architectures ............................................................................. 23

4.1 Ground-Based SA Datalink System Architecture ......................................................................................... 23

4.2 Airborne SA Datalink System Architecture .................................................................................................. 32

4.3 Summary of Modeling References ................................................................................................................ 35

5 Test Design ........................................................................................................................................................ 37

5.1 Availability, Continutity, and Integrity ......................................................................................................... 37

5.2 Actual Separation Assurance Performance (ASAP) ...................................................................................... 37

5.3 Test Matrix .................................................................................................................................................... 37

6 Test Results and Performance Analysis ............................................................................................................. 40

6.1 Ground-Based Separation Assurance System Architecture ........................................................................... 41

6.2 Airborne Separation Assurance System Architecture ................................................................................... 47

6.3 Comparing Ground-Based and Airborne Results .......................................................................................... 55

7 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................ 57

8 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 58

9 References .......................................................................................................................................................... 59
3 

List of Tables 

Table 2-1. Capabilities Planned for the Data Communication Program ........................................................ 16

Table 4-1. Comparison of FRUIT rate between the verification data and the model .................................... 25

Table 4-2. Surveillance uncertainty and accuracy ......................................................................................... 27

Table 4-3. Summary of surveillance modeling and performance references ................................................. 35

Table 4-4. Summary of communication and maneuver modeling and performance references .................... 36

Table 5-1. Test matrix for the required separation assurance performance study ......................................... 39

 
4 

List of Figures 

Figure 2-1. Current NAS SA system architecture ......................................................................................... 11

Figure 2-2. Current NAS terrestrial network system architecture ................................................................. 12

Figure 2-3. ADS-B ground-based surveillance system architecture .............................................................. 14

Figure 2-4. Subsystems from Aircraft Separation Assurance System ........................................................... 15

Figure 2-5. A representative VDL-2 datalink communication system architecture ....................................... 16

Figure 3-1. A current NAS separation assurance scenario ............................................................................ 18

Figure 3-2. Definition of CDZ according to DO-289 .................................................................................... 20

Figure 3-3. Assured Collision Avoidance Distance (ACAD) ........................................................................ 20

Figure 3-4. A Collision Detection Zone as a function of surveillance and communication performance ..... 21

Figure 3-5. Lateral maneuvering to maintain clear of separation volume ..................................................... 22

Figure 4-1. A representative ground-based surveillance system architecture ................................................ 23

Figure 4-2. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance time from 1090 MHz ADS-B ............. 24

Figure 4-3. A representative terrestrial latency in normal distribution .......................................................... 25

Figure 4-4. Verification of an ADS-B ground receiver model ...................................................................... 26

Figure 4-5. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance performance, tSurveillance ....................... 28

Figure 4-6. Components to determine the required communication performance, tCommunication .................... 28

Figure 4-7. A representative ANSP-review human response model in lognormal distribution ..................... 29

Figure 4-8. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance time from 1090 MHz ADS-B ............. 30

Figure 4-9. Required Separation Assurance Performance, tRSAP ................................................................... 32

Figure 4-10. A representative Airborne-Centric separation assurance system architecture .......................... 32

Figure 4-11. An intent-based Airborne-Centric concept required surveillance time, tSurveillance .................... 34

Figure 4-12. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance time .................................................. 34

Figure 6-1. Determination of the 95th percentile from 10,000 runs of ground-based baseline case, TC0, at 20 NM 

from the ADS-B radio station ........................................................................................................................ 40

Figure 6-2. Actual separation assurance performance due to traffic density ................................................. 42

Figure 6-3. Actual separation assurance performance due to surveillance uncertainty and accuracy ........... 43

Figure 6-4. Effects on ASAP due to communication message size and transmission rate ............................ 44

Figure 6-5. Effects on ASAP due to datalink and voice ................................................................................ 45

Figure 6-6. Effects on ASAP due to CDZ or separation minimum ............................................................... 46

Figure 6-7. Effects on ASAP due to traffic density with a vertical offset maneuver ..................................... 47

Figure 6-8. Traffic density effects on ASAP of the Airborne SA system architecture .................................. 48

Figure 6-9. Accuracy effects on ASAP of an airborne SA system architecture ............................................ 49

Figure 6-10. Number of intent messages effects on ASAP of an airborne .................................................... 50

Figure 6-11. Effects on ASAP due to CDZ ................................................................................................... 51
5 

Figure 6-12. Effects on ASAP due to ownship’s speed ................................................................................. 52

Figure 6-13. Effects on ASAP due to source of intent messages ................................................................... 53

Figure 6-14. Effects on ASAP due to traffic density for a vertical offset maneuver ..................................... 54

Figure 6-15. Comparison of ASAP between ground-based and airborne baseline cases .............................. 55

Figure 6-16. Comparison between the ground-based and airborne concepts under high traffic density ....... 56
6 

Nomenclature 

4D – Four Dimensional 

A/V – Air Vehicle 

ACAD – Assured Collision Avoidance Distance 

ACARS – Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System 

ACCC – Area Control Computer Complex 

ACF – Area Control Facility 

ADS-B – Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 

AGL – Above Ground Level 

AMCCWS – ACF Maintenance Control Center Workstation 

ANSP – Air Navigation Service Provider 

APT - Airport 

ARTCC – Air Route Traffic Control Center 

ASAS – Airborne Separation Assurance System 

ASAP – Actual Separation Assurance Performance 

ATCSCC- Air Traffic Control System Command Center 

ATCT – Air Traffic Control Tower 

ATN – Aeronautical Telecommunications Network 

ATOP – Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedure 

CARTS – Common Automated Radar Terminal System 

CD&R – Conflict Detection and Resolution 

CDTI – Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 

CDZ – Conflict Detection Zone 

CERAP – Combined Center and Radar Approach Control 

ConOps – Concept of Operations 

CPA – Closest Point of Approach 

DLP – Data Link Processor 

DME – Distance Measuring Equipment 

ERAM – En Route Automation Modernization 

FIS-B – Flight Information Services - Broadcast 

FL – Flight Level (in 100 ft increments) 

FMC – Flight Management Computer 

FMS – Flight Management System 

FRUIT – (Unwanted) Friendly Replies Unsynchronized In Time (interference, background) 

Ft - Feet 

GMCC – General National Airspace System Maintenance Control Center 
7 

GMCCWS – General National Airspace System Maintenance Control Center Workstation 

GPS – Global Position System 

HF – High Frequency 

HRM – Human Response Model 

ILS – Instrument Landing System 

L/W – Length and Width Dimension 

MDT – Maintenance Data Terminal 

MFD – Multi-Functional Display 

MPLS – Multi-Protocol Label Switching 

MPS – Maintenance Processor System 

NACV – Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity 

NAS – National Airspace System 

NIC – Navigation Integrity Categories 

NOC – Network Operations Center 

NM – Nautical Mile 

pC_A – Availability of communication subsystems 

pC_C – Continuity of VDL-2 message transmission and receiving 

pC_FC – Successful VDL-2 reception probability due to collision 

pS_I – Integrity of received VDL-2 datalink messages 

pS_A – Availability of ADS-B subsystems 

pS_C – Continuity of ADS-B message transmission and receiving 

pS_FF – Successful ADS-B reception probability due to Free-Space Loss and FRUIT 

pS_I – Integrity of received ADS-B messages 

PSR – Primary Surveillance Radar 

rC – VDL-2 message transmission rate 

RF – Radio Frequency 

RSAP – Required Separation Assurance Performance 

RVSM – Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 

SA – Separation Assurance 

SATCOM – Satellite Communications 

SDP – Service Delivery Point 

SSR – Secondary Surveillance Radar 

STARS – Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 

SWIM – System Wide Information Management 

T95 – The 95th Percentile Value of Collected Data Set 

TBO – Trajectory-Based Operations 
8 

TC – Trajectory Change 

TCAS – Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 

TCP – Trajectory Change Point 

TIS-B - Traffic Information Services - Broadcast 

TRACON – Terminal Radar Approach Control 

UAT – Universal Access Transceiver 

UHF – Ultra High Frequency 

URET – User Request Evaluation Tool 

VDL-2 – VHF Data Link, Mode 2 

VHF – Very High Frequency 

VOR – VHF Omni-directional Range 

VPN – Virtual Private Network 
9 

1 Introduction 

As the U.S. continues the National Airspace System (NAS) transition from a ground-fix surveillance 

system to a performance-based concept of operations to increase the capacity of the NAS and 

improvements in delays and environment, e.g., emissions and noise, the fundamental operational system 

architecture in separation assurance (SA) is also evolving based on two key technology enablers: 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and digital datalink communication. This 

transition as well as the two technology enablers support the Next Generation Air Transportation System 

(NextGen) visions developed by the Joint Program Development Office (JPDO)1

 and Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA).2 

ADS-B, with Global Positioning System (GPS) derived aircraft state information and intent messages, 

will lead to improved surveillance accuracy and track delivery performance for both ground and airborne 

situation awareness. It is expected that the full potential of ADS-B’s surveillance capabilities will support 

visual acquisition, conflict avoidance and collision avoidance, separation assurance and sequencing, 

flight-path deconfliction planning, and simultaneous approaches in the future as specified in RTCA DO242A as well as many surveillance performance requirements based on ADS-B.3

 It is important to 

develop a framework to evaluate these surveillance capabilities in support of concepts of operation 

(ConOps) under different SA system architectures. 

The NextGen plans also anticipate an increased demand for communication between controllers and 

pilots. This is partially due to the predicted increase in traffic, and partially due to the increased 

complexity of routes and instructions. To accommodate this need, data communications will first become 

an alternative to traditional voice communications, and eventually become the predominate form of 

communication.4

 Based on the FAA’s current plan, Very-High-Frequency (VHF) Data Link, Mode 2 

(VDL-2), will be the format for the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) to support the 

Controller-Pilot Datalink Communication (CPDLC) as the ANSP communicates clearances, route 

changes, and advisories to the flight crew to maintain safe separation of NAS traffic. As a key part of this 

ConOps, many datalink communication system performance attributes, such as dependency on range, 

interference, message size, and message rate, will impact communication performance. 

Separation assurance relies on knowing relevant information about ongoing traffic operations, which 

may include traffic state and intent information (provided by the surveillance function), and traffic 

management decisions, i.e., clearances, route changes, and advisories transmitted to the cockpit (provided 

by the communication function). Since these subsystem functions are distributed within the NAS 

infrastructure, effectiveness in getting accurate and timely surveillance information and communication 

messages directly impacts the success of the separation assurance function. Thus, the main objective of 

this study is to investigate the relationship between separation assurance performance and 

surveillance/communication subsystem performance under two SA system architectures, i.e., groundbased SA and airborne SA.5

 Independent variables are ADS-B surveillance and datalink communication 

capabilities and their performance attributes, such as availability, continuity, and integrity. Availability is 

defined as the probability that the ADS-B or datalink transmitter and receiver are available for an 

operation. Continuity is the probability that the system successfully completes an operation, presuming 

that the system is available at the start of that operation. Integrity is the probability that there are no 

undetected errors in a completed data message transaction given that the ADS-B or datalink system is 

supplied with correct source data. Both SA system architectures in this study rely on distributed 

surveillance information and communication message exchange to provide the required separation 

assurance in assuring the safety of the flying public. 

Subsystem performances identified in both SA system architectures, which include surveillance 

systems and communication systems, human response performance, and terrestrial network performance, 
10 

are characterized according to a physics-based modeling approach, past studies, and existing performance 

standards respectively. Additional system parameters, such as range of surveillance and communication, 

track density, and accuracy of the traffic track information are also evaluated. A Monte-Carlo simulation 

is developed to include these subsystem characteristics following the SA system architectures such that 

various operational conditions and parameters can be evaluated to investigate the resulting separation 

assurance performance. 
11 

2 NextGen SA System Architectures 

NextGen is a broad term for the set of goals, programs, systems, decisions, and new technology 

capabilities that will modernize the NAS. This modernization plan is laid out in phases, and culminates in 

a final architecture in 2025. It incorporates many high-level concepts that have been under development, 

all with the goal of increasing safety, capacity, and efficiency. The ultimate goal of NextGen is to 

maintain safe operations of the NAS with increased demand of air transportation services. 

This highlights the requirements of separation assurance, which provides safe separation among 

airborne traffic as well as aircraft ground traffic through the NAS systems. These systems include 

surveillance, communication, and terrestrial network systems; NAS participants, which include ANSP, 

flight crews, and other stakeholders; and integrated processes to separate the traffic at a safe minimum 

distance. Before examining required separation assurance performance according to NextGen’s 

surveillance and communication capabilities, i.e., ADS-B and datalink communication respectively, it is 

important to develop an understanding of the current NAS SA system architectures and SA ConOps based 

on existing surveillance and communication capabilities, since many of the performance attributes will be 

carried over into the NextGen SA system architectures. 

2.1 Current SA System Architectures 

The current NAS Separation Assurance system architecture is based on ground-fixed guidance (e.g. 

VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR), Distance Measuring Equipment (DME), and Instrument Landing 

System (ILS)), surveillance systems (e.g. Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR), Secondary Surveillance 

Radar (SSR), and weather radar), voice communications, and a terrestrial communication system. A 

high-level Operational Concept is shown in Figure 2-1,6

 which divides the NAS into surface, terminal 

(Tower/TRACON), en route, and oceanic service volumes. The focus of this study is in the Terminal and 

En-Route airspace service volumes. Many aspects of the current SA system architectures, e.g., the 

Figure 2-1. Current NAS SA system architecture 
12 

communication network, remain relevant under the NextGen SA system architectures. 

The current NAS terrestrial network system architecture, shown in Figure 2-2, includes 

communication, navigation, surveillance, weather, and landing subsystems.7

 As shown, surveillance 

information to the ANSP stationed in an Area Control Facility (ACF), and voice communication between 

the ANSP and flight crews in the aircraft to maintain the safe separations of all flights operated in the 

NAS are supported via two separate terrestrial networks. Delivery performance of the surveillance and 

communication data to the ANSP is defined in ref. 8. 

Prior to the introduction of data link, all communications between the aircraft (i.e., the flight crew) and 

personnel on the ground was performed using voice communications. This communications used either 

VHF or High Frequency (HF) voice radios, which were further augmented with Satellite Communications 

(SATCOM) in the early 1990s. 

Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) was the first data link service 

introduced into domestic and oceanic airspace. ACARS messages are transmitted over one of three 

ground subnetworks: 

 VHF is the most commonly used and least expensive. Transmission is line of sight so VHF is 

not available over the oceans. 

 SATCOM provides worldwide coverage (except in polar regions) by means of the 

INMARSAT satellite network, and is a fairly expensive service. 

ACF

MPS

MDT

VSCS

DLP

ACCC

MDT

Regional

Office(s)

GMCCWS

GMCC

RMS

Automated Subsystems

COMM Subsystems

RMS

Weather Subsystems

Navigation Subsystems

Surveillance Subsystems

Landing Subsystems

TE

MDT

Sector

Office(s)

Other

ACF(s)

MPS

NICS

AMCCWS

NAS Terrestrial Network 

System Architecture

Figure 2-2. Current NAS terrestrial network system architecture 
13 

 HF is the most recently established sub-network. Its purpose is to provide coverage in the 

polar regions where SATCOM coverage is unreliable. 

Under the current NAS SA ConOps, the ANSP has the sole responsibility of separation assurance. 

Surveillance and communication infrastructures have been developed based on this ConOps as well as 

rules and procedures such that the ANSP can manage separation throughout the airspace. 

2.1.1 Separation Assurance Concept of Operations in Terminal and En Route Airspace 

Terminal Airspace

In the terminal airspace, it is the ANSP’s responsibility to provide aircraft separation and expedite the 

flow of traffic between airports and the en route environment. In order to complete this task, ANSPs are 

provided with automation and communication systems. The automation systems (Common ARTS and 

STARS) deliver a situational display of the airspace with tracks and flight data. The communication 

system gives the controller a constant voice link to the flight crew to issue commands or request 

information. 

The terminal automation system (STARS or CARTS) provides the controller with tactical conflict 

alerts for predicted encounters and imminent conflicts in support of 3 NM horizontal separation and 1000 

ft vertical separation. The primary input for this process is short range radar, such as the ASR-9 and 

ASR-11. The radars have a PSR and SSR system. The secondary radar includes the Air Traffic Control 

Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS).9

 The beacon system interrogates the aircraft every 4-6 seconds and 

provides the positional update to the terminal automation system. The terminal automation displays the 

tracks derived from the radar data. These tracks are correlated with flight plans from the Flight Data 

Input Output (FDIO) system. Each correlated target has a data block that displays basic flight ID 

information, altitude and ground speed. The display systems are called the Terminal Display Workstation 

(TDW) for the STARS and the ARTS Color Display (ACD) for the CARTS. The terminal automation 

system will display visual conflict alerts with 40 seconds warning for predicted conflicts and 30 seconds 

warning for imminent loss of separation.8

 

At present some terminal automation systems have been modified to process ADS-B data, which is 

much more accurate than radar. The use of ADS-B positional data combined with radar and multilateration systems promises a much more accurate separation assurance system for the future. 

The next layer of automation for SA occurs between aircraft equipped with the Traffic Alert and 

Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The TCAS will give pilots a traffic advisory (TA), i.e., when an 

aircraft has entered, or is projected to enter, the protected volume around the own aircraft, or a resolution 

advisory (RA), i.e., when a vertical maneuver should be performed to attain or maintain safe separation 

from a threat. 

En Route Airspace

In the en route airspace, separation assurance remains the ANSP’s responsibility to maintain 5 NM 

horizontal and 1000 ft vertical separation. Traffic surveillance is provided through a network of primary 

and secondary surveillance radars. Separation assurance is performed in a three tiered fashion. The first 

tier is Conflict Probe,10 which is performed with the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) system 

connected to the Host or the equivalent functionality of Conflict Probe in En Route Automation 

Modernization (ERAM) system. Conflict Probe performs with a 20 minute look-ahead horizon on 

intended trajectories developed from flight plans, alerting on aircraft pairs that could potentially have an 

encounter. 
14 

The second tier is tactical conflict alerting performed by the ATC automation system, i.e., Host or En 

Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), over a three minute horizon on radar tracks projected in the 

future on aircraft pairs predicted to have a potential encounter. ADS-B is being added as a new 

surveillance input, which promises greater accuracy for SA algorithms.

The third tier is performed by the TCAS system onboard aircraft that detects a proximity conflict with 

another aircraft. 

2.2 NextGen Surveillance System Architectures 

ADS-B has been identified as the key surveillance system to replace/complement the existing groundfixed surveillance system to support NextGen separation assurance operations. FAA selected ITT in 

August 2007 to build, install, and maintain the ADS-B nationwide network also known as Surveillance 

Broadcast System (SBS).11 A representative ADS-B surveillance system architecture is shown in Figure 

2-3.12 Following the surveillance track’s flow through the network, i.e., from top to bottom in Figure 2-3, 

ADS-B messages in 1090 MHz and UAT from ADS-B equipped aircraft as well as Mode S replies from 

Mode A/C/S equipped aircraft are received by the ADS-B ground radio stations. This surveillance track 

information is then routed through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to control stations, where 

cooperative and non-cooperative tracks are fused, and delivered to the FAA’s Air Traffic Control 

automation Service Delivery Point (SDP) via VPN to support various ground-based air traffic 

management functions, including separation assurance. Under this ConOps, the ANSP with support from 

ground-based automation tools manages separation assurance within a defined airspace. 

In the reverse direction, i.e., from the bottom to the top in Figure 2-3, Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance – Rebroadcast (ADS-R) and Traffic Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B) airborne 

subscribers will receive 1090 MHz (for UAT equipped subscriber) or UAT (for 1090 MHz equipped 

Figure 2-3. ADS-B ground-based surveillance system architecture 
15 

subscriber) track messages and Mode A/C/S track messages from the ADS-B ground radio stations to 

enhance situation awareness of traffic in the vicinity.13 In addition, 1090 MHz or UAT ADS-B IN 

equipped aircraft will also receive ADS-B messages broadcast via the same datalink for position, velocity, 

ID and type, operational status, target state, and trajectory change messages14 from ADS-B Out capable 

aircraft when they are within the reception range. With the track information as well as intent information 

available on the flight deck, an airborne concept5

, in which the flight crew manages separation supported 

by an onboard Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS), as shown in Figure 2-4,12 is also 

supported. 

2.3 NextGen Communication System Architectures 

In the future NextGen architecture, the ATN protocols will replace ACARS as discussed in Section 

2.1. As air traffic increases, ACARS will no longer have the capacity or flexibility to handle the large 

volume of datalink communications. ATN is planned to replace ACARS and will provide services such 

as authentication, security, and a true internet-based architecture. The ATN will be implemented over 

VDL-2 sub network for continental airspace. 

The NextGen plans anticipate an increased demand for communication between controllers and pilots. 

This is partially due to the predicted increase in traffic, and partially due to the increased complexity of 

routes and therefore instructions. To accommodate this need, data communications will first become an 

alternative to traditional voice communications, and eventually become the predominant form of 

communication.4

The Data Communications program will be implemented in three segments, with each segment 

building on the capabilities of the previous segment. Capabilities planned for the segments are shown in 

Table 2-1. 

Data communications will be fully integrated into controller workstations and aircraft cockpits. At 

some point, regulatory requirements may be necessary to encourage avionics adoption. A representative 

datalink communication system architecture is shown in Figure 2-5. 

ADS‐B,

TIS‐B,

ADS‐R

Receive

Systems

Reports

Airborne

Surveillance &

Separation

Assurance (ASSA)

Processing

CDTI

Display

and

Control

Panel

Flight

Crew

Figure 2-4. Subsystems from Aircraft Separation Assurance System 
16 

Table 2-1. Capabilities Planned for the Data Communication Program 

Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 

 Tower and En Route 

environments 

 Departure Clearances and 

Revisions while on ground 

 En Route ATC clearances, 

requests, instructions, 

notifications, voice frequency 

communications transfers, and 

flight crew reports as a 

supplement to voice

 Terminal environment 

 Taxi Instructions 

 4D Trajectory agreements and 

updates 

 Trajectory conformance in En 

Route 

 Delegation of separation 

2.4 NextGen Separation Assurance Concepts Of Operation 

With the expected NextGen technology enablers in surveillance and communication, Net-Centric, 

Performance-Based, Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), and Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) 

are some of the key NextGen concepts1

 that will directly influence the NextGen separation assurance 

capabilities. The main objective is to increase the flow and accuracy of the information to increase the 

NAS capacity, reduce the delay, and maintain the flying public’s safety as demand for air travel grows. 

For this study, two separation assurance concepts with these NextGen concept attributes were 

investigated. The first concept is ground-based automated separation assurance,5

 in which the ANSP has 

the separation assurance responsibility. The traffic surveillance capability will be fully supported by the 

ADS-B ground station and the terrestrial network. Automation tools at ANSP workstations will be 

supported by the System Wide Information Management (SWIM) system with amended flight routes or 

updated flight data.15 The communication system will be supported by the VDL-2 datalink 

communication integrated with the aircraft’s Flight Management Computer (FMC). The ANSP will use 

VDL-2 to provide separation assurance clearances, advisories, and route changes to the flight deck. The 

flight crew will use VDL-2 to communicate with the ANSP for any separation assurance events.17 

Ground Radio

Aircraft Radio

Terrestrial

Network

ANSP

Workstation

Multi‐

Functional

Display (MFD)

Ground Radio

Aircraft Radio

Terrestrial

Network

ANSP

Workstation

Multi‐

Functional

Display (MFD)

Figure 2-5. A representative VDL-2 datalink communication system architecture 
17 

The second concept is the Autonomous Flight Rule (AFR) concept,5 in which the pilot manages the 

separation via the ASAS onboard automation. All cooperative traffic track information will be supported 

by ADS-B IN including the intent information from the airborne ADS-B messages as well ground retransmitted track messages via TIS-B and/or ADS-R.17 The intent information could also come from the 

ground system via System Wide Information Management (SWIM).2

 ASAS will provide the conflict 

detection and resolution functions, and recommended maneuver or route changes are provided to the 

flight crew to maintain separation. Under this concept, no additional communication will be required 

between the flight crew and the ANSP, although the voice communication frequency is available for 

additional coordination, if needed. 

. 
18 

3 Required Separation Assurance Performance 

Separation Assurance requirements play a key role in air traffic control and flow management and 

influence the flight planning as well as the issuance of flight and route clearances. In an ideal NextGen 

Trajectory Based Operation, it is conceivable to generate a gate-to-gate flight clearance with no SA 

conflict. However, due to many different reasons (environmental, aircraft performance, airport 

conditions, etc.) it is very likely that additional flight plan adjustments may be required. Some of these 

changes will be SA related. No attempt is made here to address issues with air traffic management 

(ATM) and system-wide operation of SA. Instead, we will focus on the impact of surveillance and 

communication timing on ground-based and airborne SA operations strictly as related to a pair of aircraft. 

An SA event is defined when a pair of aircraft come closer than a predefined safe distance of each 

other during flight. Consider the ownship flying a predefined flight path as depicted in Figure 3-1. To 

prevent an SA violation, the existence of the potential conflict must be detected, appropriate 

communication between the affected aircraft or between each aircraft and the ANSP must be completed 

and either the ownship or the incoming traffic must perform a lateral offset maneuver with a track 

deviation of Δχ to maintain a safe separation distance at the Closest Point of Approach (CPA). Since all 

engaged aircraft are moving, the above distances can be translated to time. And since SA operations 

require surveillance and communication elements, timing variations from surveillance and 

communication performance, and ground speed of the ownship, Vg, and required deviation angle Δχ can 

affect the overall time and distance required for SA. 

3.1 Proposed Approach 

Separation assurance relies on navigation, surveillance and communication. We are trying to relate 

the SA capabilities to surveillance and communication system parameters. The SA operation hinges on 

two fundamental separation concepts regardless of the ConOps associated with it. These are: 

 Separation Volume is based on a horizontal and a vertical separation distance between a pair of 

aircraft. This is typically depicted as a “hockey puck” or another arbitrary shape around either 



Vg Original 

flight path

Revised 

flight path

CPA

Figure 3-1. A current NAS separation assurance scenario 
19 

aircraft and defines the necessary protected airspace. The size of the Separation Volume is 

primarily based on the aircraft physical and flight characteristics, navigation performance, and 

surveillance capabilities. In addition, uncertainties associated with short term intent are addressed 

by adjusting the size of the separation volume. In this study, we assume a hockey puck shaped 

separation volume with a radius which will be defined as the Conflict Detection Zone (CDZ), and 

a vertical dimension of 1000 ft. above or below. It should be noted that this hockey puck is 

specifically defined for a given pair of aircraft and is placed about either the ownship or the 

engaged traffic. 

 Separation Threshold is the minimum required distance or time needed to detect, verify, and 

maneuver the aircraft in order to maintain clear of the required separation volume. Separation 

threshold is primarily a function of surveillance capability, i.e., time required to identify and 

establish a track with a potential conflict, and communication capabilities, i.e., time to 

communicate with the ANSP for a separation assurance maneuver to maintain safe separation. 

Navigation system capability is also a major contributor, particularly when ADS-B surveillance is 

used. Knowledge of intent can play a significant role in separation threshold for NextGen 

operations. 

The current standard for separation volume is based on legacy VOR navigation accuracies along with 

ATC surveillance radar precision. In the absence of radar coverage, mandatory position reports are used 

to ensure SA. 

The intent of this analysis is to relate the surveillance, communication, and possibly navigation 

subsystem performance parameters to the separation volume and separation threshold distance or time. 

Such information can then be used to define or refine the subsystem performance requirements to achieve 

a desired level of SA performance. However, both separation volume and threshold are strongly 

dependent on the ConOps associated with the air traffic management, air traffic control, and SA 

operations. The focus of the discussion below is on the separation threshold distance or time for SA. 

This way, the calculations are applicable to the current separation standards as well as future operations. 

3.2 Conflict Detection Zone 

To support the study analysis, a conflict detection zone (CDZ) is developed to determine the required 

separation volume or separation distance between the ownship and an intruder to maintain safe 

separation. The CDZ is based on the concepts introduced in DO-28918 that objective separation distance 

can be developed according to the size of the airplane, uncertainty in trajectories and the surveillance 

accuracy being broadcast in ADS-B messages. According to DO-289, CDZ is the sum of the Assured 

Normal Separation Distance (ANSD) and trajectory and position uncertainties as shown in Figure 3-2, 

where Assured Collision Avoidance Distance (ACAD) is shown in Figure 3-3. 
20 

For this study, CDZ is developed based on ACAD, trajectory and position uncertainties, and a buffer 

zone to account for external environment uncertainties, e.g., weather, and an unexpected maneuver from 

either aircraft as shown in Figure 3-4. CDZ is calculated based on ownship’s GPS-based position and 

speed data, and received ADS-B data for a particular traffic of interest. The estimated future position of 

the ownship at a given time of t is shown in Equations 1 and 2 in a local Cartesian coordinate system 

(East and North of a reference point (EO, NO), where the reference point is the current position of the 

ownship). 

 

where ∆p and ∆v are position and velocity uncertainties. The estimated future position error, err(t), can 

be represented by Equations 3 and 4. 

ACAD

ANSD

Conflict Detection Zone (CDZ)

Figure 3-2. Definition of CDZ according to DO-289 

ACAD

A/V L/W box

A/V Size

Figure 3-3. Assured Collision Avoidance Distance (ACAD) 

 

_   (4)

_ (3)

err North t t

err East t t

p v

p v

    

    

   

   (2)

(1)

N t N v t

E t E v t

o p N v

o p E v

      

      
21 

The CDZ is therefore determined as the sum of ACAD, errOwnship(t), errTraffic(t), and a buffer zone as 

shown in Figure 3-4. ACAD is estimated according to Length/Width info in the Aircraft Operational 

Status message or the ADS-B emitter category from the Aircraft Identification and Category message. 

Position uncertainty at the time of determining err(t) of both ownship and traffic of interest is extracted 

from NIC with containment integrity according to ref. 19, and the trajectory uncertainty is estimated 

based on NACV from the Airborne Velocity message. 

Given the above track error equations, the estimated position uncertainty will depend on the time used 

to propagate the current track information. If we assume that no maneuvering is required, a nominal 

limiting case for CDZ can be computed. We call this CDZlimit and it is computed based on a tLimit which 

includes surveillance, CD&R, and communication times, but assumes zero maneuver time. The t in err(t) 

is set to tLimit as shown in Equation 5. 

 tLimit = tSurveillance + tCD&R + tCommunication (5) 

 The term tLimit determines a limiting case for the CDZ, when an SA maneuver would have to be 

initiated before a separation minimum is violated. Surveillance time, tSurveillance, is the required time to 

collect track and intent information for traffic of interest. The time required to process surveillance data 

to determine a conflict and generate a resolution is denoted as tCD&R. The communication time, 

tCommunication, is the required time to communicate a resolution from the ground to the flight deck in a 

ground-based SA system architecture. 

3.3 Maneuvering to Achieve Separation Assurance 

Regardless of the specific SA reason, all flight-path changes can be expressed using a combination of 

one or more of three basic maneuvers to maintain clear of the separation volume, i.e., maintain the 

minimum separation distance of CDZ at CPA: 

Lateral offset: Heading change is used to accommodate lateral separation. A minimum of two heading 

changes separated by some time will usually be required. The first heading change will result in a change 

of course as needed by the SA procedure. Another heading change will be required to return the aircraft 

back towards its initial intended waypoint. In the NextGen TBO operations, this is accomplished by 

CDZlim

Ownship

CPA

Traffic

ACAD

Error and

uncertainty,

err(t)

Additional

buffer (weather,

unexpected

maneuver, etc.

Figure 3-4. A Collision Detection Zone as a function of surveillance and communication 

performance 
22 

introducing an interim trajectory change point (TCP) on the current route. Procedures involving parallel 

tracks will require more than two heading changes. 

Vertical offset: Change in vertical flight path angle is used to facilitate vertical separation. Often the 

SA procedure requires an altitude change to accommodate crossing traffic. An altitude change maneuver 

will require two adjustments to the vertical flight path. The first change will initiate a specified rate of 

climb or descent. The second will capture the target altitude. 

Speed change: Change in airspeed or Mach number is used to accommodate spacing or time of arrival. 

Multiple power adjustments are used to accelerate/decelerate and then maintain the desired airspeed. 

However, during certain high speed or low speed operations, further change of speed in a given direction 

may not be possible due to aircraft limitations. Also, speed changes during continuous descent operations 

will be more problematic and will require more detailed planning. 

Since SA procedures will consist of these simple maneuvers, it is desired to parameterize and assess 

the needed time to perform each of these steps when performing SA. To compute the maneuver time 

component of the RSAP, a conservative approach is to assume the SA maneuver must clear the entire 

hockey puck defined by CDZlimit horizontally or 1000 ft vertically at CPA. The computed maneuver time 

is then added to the surveillance, CD&R, and communication times to arrive at the actual separation 

assurance time (ASAP). By generating ASAP based on various system components’ performance for N 

runs, a minimum RSAP, tRSAP, can be derived from the 95th percentile of the ASAP as shown in Equations 

6 and 7 following the practices from other RTCA performance standard references.3, 13, 14 The time tRSAT

is the minimum required time to prevent a separation assurance violation as defined by CDZ. An 

example of lateral maneuver to remain clear of the separation volume is depicted in Figure 3-5. In this 

example, the hockey puck is centered about the ownship and the ownship turns left to maintain SA 

relative to the traffic. 

 tASAP_i = tSurveillance_i + tCD&R_i + tCommunication_i + tManeuver_i (6) 

 tRSAP = 95th percentile of tASAP_i (i= 1, N) (7) 

CDZlim

Traffic at

tRSAP from CPA

Ownship

Maneuvers

Traffic at

time > tRSAP

Original

relative track

CPA

Relative track after

SA maneuver

Figure 3-5. Lateral maneuvering to maintain clear of separation volume 
23 

4 Modeling of Distributed SA Datalink System Architectures 

To study the required separation assurance performance or RSAP, a Monte Carlo simulation is 

developed according to three key components in the separation assurance concept, i.e., surveillance, 

communication, and flight maneuvers as discussed in Section 3, to determine the actual separation 

assurance performance (ASAP) based on a set of performance parameters and nominal and off-nominal 

conditions, which are discussed in Section 5. The minimum RSAP can then be derived from the 95th

percentile from ASAP data. 

The performance of surveillance, communication, and flight maneuver are modeled according to two 

SA system architectures, i.e., ground-based and airborne concepts.5

 Frame works of the modeling 

approach, which is developed based on datalink performance attributes of availability, continuity, and 

integrity, and datalink system performance parameters, are presented in the following sub-sections such 

that ASAP and associated surveillance performance and communication performance can be studied 

according to physics-based performance, specification-based performance, and performance results from 

past studies. 

4.1 Ground-Based SA Datalink System Architecture 

The ground-based SA system architecture is defined such that so the ANSP has the traffic information, 

including track and intent, automation tools to identify and resolve conflicts, as well as communication 

means to communicate with the flight crew to maintain safe separation according to separation standards 

of all flying aircraft in the designated airspace. The system architecture includes both surveillance and 

communication datalink subsystems. 

4.1.1 Ground-Based SA Concept of Operations 

The ground-based SA ConOps is adopted from the Advanced Airspace Concept.20 A simplified 

system architecture is shown in Figure 4-1. Under this ConOps, the controller workstation has the ADSB track data, a data communication mechanism for transfer of command and trajectory change messages, 

and data communication integrated with the Flight Management System (FMS) on the flight deck to 

allow for loadable trajectory clearances. Conflict detection and resolution automation tools are also 

available at the ANSP workstation. 

ADS‐B

Radio

Station

Surveillance

Terrestrial

Network

Communication

Terrestrial

Network

ANSP

Communication

Radio Station

Figure 4-1. A representative ground-based surveillance system architecture 
24 

4.1.2 Assumptions – Ground-Based 

The following assumptions are made for the Ground-Based SA ConOps. 

 The ANSP has the separation assurance (SA) responsibilities, i.e., SA maneuvers are provided by 

the ANSP 

 All flight plans are available to the ANSP through a network similar to SWIM 

 The ANSP has tools to perform conflict detection and resolution to maintain safe separation, and 

new routes are updated to a shared database 

 All aircraft are ADS-B Out equipped and no Trajectory Change (TC) message is required 

 Datalink communication is the primary SA communication mechanism, i.e., integrated datalink and 

FMS equipage 

 Voice communication will be used in UNABLE and emergency scenarios 

 Latency is the only performance parameter to be considered for the terrestrial networks 

4.1.3 Modeling Components – Ground-Based 

Characteristics of surveillance and datalink communication performance, human response 

performance during the communication exchanges to complete an SA maneuver, and terrestrial latencies 

are based on datalink characteristics and published reports and specifications. Probability based system 

performance metrics and lognormal distribution in representing human response performance are applied 

in the Monte Carlo simulation to quantify the actual separation assurance performance (ASAP), where 

time for the surveillance, communication, and maneuver are measured according to specific test 

conditions. 

4.1.3.1 Surveillance Time, tSurveillance

The traffic track surveillance is modeled using the ADS-B network as shown in Figure 4-2, which is 

Terrestrial Latency

TS_Terrestrial=Latency(μS_T , σS_T) +

tSurveillance_1090

@ DSurveillance

Check & ρTraffic

ABS‐B

Availability,

pS_A

SSR Mode

Setto lower

surveillance

rate,rS,

Check

Free‐Space‐

Loss&

FRUIT, pS_FF

tS=1/rs

tS=tS+1/rs

+

Yes Yes Yes

No No

No

Setto lower

position containment

integrity, NIC, NACV

in SA Maneuver

module

Check

WAAS

Availability

Check

Integrity,

pS_I

Check

Continuity,

pS_C

Yes

Yes

No

No

rS is 1/sec for ADS-B State Vector Report

1/(4.5 sec) for TRACON SSR

1/(12 sec ) for Center SSR

rS_Availability = rS_Continuity= 1 sec

rS_Integrity = HRMANSP_Review

Check

Free‐Space‐

Loss&

FRUIT, pS_FF

Yes

No

Figure 4-2. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance time from 1090 MHz ADS-B 
25 

simplified from Figure 2-3 to objectively quantify the surveillance time, tSurveillance_1090, needed using the 

1090 MHz datalink to establish a track. The model considers availability, continuity, and integrity 

performance as defined in RTCA DO-242A,3

 where availability for the ADS-B transmission and receipt 

are 0.9995 or a combined availability of 0.999 (pS_A), continuity (pS_C) is 0.9998 per flight hour, and 

integrity (pS_I) is 1-10-6 per ADS-B report. Detection of data corruption is performed by a higher level 

application or a human operator. 

The terrestrial latency is modeled according to a normal distribution, Latency(μS_T, σS_T), with a 95th

percentile of 3.0 sec8

 and a maximum of 3.5 sec,7 as shown in Figure 4-3. 

4.1.3.1.1 ADS-B Ground Receiver Model 

ADS-B ground receiver reception performance is modeled using the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter 

(ES) reception model21 with adjustments made to match a set of ADS-B ground receiver data in the range 

between 30 to 90 NM, i.e., the range of interest, as shown in Figure 4.4. The range is the distance from 

the ADS-B equipped aircraft to the ADS-B ground receiver. The model considers the range dependency 

due to transmitter power, receiver minimum trigger level, decoding, and interference, aka the FRUIT rate. 

The ADS-B transmitter power is set for Class A3 at 200 W, and the minimum trigger level is set at -84 

dBm as specified in DO-260B.14 The FRUIT rate of the 1090 MHz ES reception model was adjusted to 

have the levels of Mode A/C and Mode S interference similar to the set of ground receiver data used for 

verification as shown in Table 4-1. 

Table 4-1. Comparison of FRUIT rate between the verification data and the model 

Figure 4-3. A representative terrestrial latency in normal distribution 

Data Provided by  FAA Tech Center 1090 MHz ES Reception Model

Test Case FRUIT Rate/sec Mode A/C Mode S FRUIT Rate/sec Mode A/C Mode S

1 11300 10000 1300 12287 11164 1123

2 17800 16000 1800 17516 15800 1716

3 21200 19000 2200 22108 19930 2128

4 23600 21000 2600 23639 21153 2486
26 

The modeled ADS-B surveillance performance as shown in Figure 4-2 also considers the ADS-B track 

position and velocity message broadcast rate, which is 2 messages/sec.14 Detection of an undetected error 

during a completed transmission is assumed to be made by a higher-level application or a human 

operator. Human operator detection by the ANSP, i.e., reviewing the track and determining if the track is 

incorrect after loading to a display, is used in this study. A lognormal mean of 4 sec, with 99th percentile 

at 6 sec, and a maximum of 12 sec is modeled.8

 

The update rate of the surveillance cycle of 1 sec, rS, as shown in Figure 4-2 is based on the rate of a 

State Vector (SV) report, which is assembled at one second per report.3

 The delay due to incomplete 

transmission is also one second, since the SV report is automatically assembled at this rate, even if there 

is an incomplete transmission, in which case the position and velocity field will be filled with previously 

received data. 

Range (NM)

Reception Probability (%)

FAA Tech Center ADS-B ground receiver data

1090 MHz ES reception model

Range (NM)

Reception Probability (%)

Range (NM)

Reception Probability (%)

FAA Tech Center ADS-B ground receiver data

1090 MHz ES reception model

Figure 4-4. Verification of an ADS-B ground receiver model 
27 

4.1.3.1.2 Off-Nominal Conditions 

The following off-nominal conditions are considered in determining the required surveillance time, 

tSurveillance_1090, as shown in Figure 4-2. 

1. Failure of the ADS-B transmission and receiving systems: When ADS-B systems, e.g., GPS or 

ADS-B receiver malfunctions, the fall-back of the surveillance system is the secondary 

surveillance radar (SSR). Surveillance systems failure is characterized by availability (pS_A). The 

scan rate of SSR is considered in determining the required surveillance time, tSurveillance_1090. The 

accuracy of SSR will affect the CDZ as discussed in Section 3 and is modeled according to Table 

4-2. 

2. When GPS accuracy is changed by applying a correction technology, i.e., WAAS, Selective 

Availability off or on, then CDZ is adjusted according to corresponding NIC and NACV values as 

shown in Table 4-2. 

Table 4-2. Surveillance uncertainty and accuracy 

Additional off-nominal operational procedures, which may have an impact on the surveillance time, 

are also being considered. Figure 4-5 shows two independent dependencies on surveillance time other 

than the 1090 MHz ADS-B track. The first is a scenario requiring additional coordination among ground 

ATC facilities to send the required intent information to the SA automation tools. In this case, a modified 

flight plan or clearance for another flight may have an undetected separation conflict with a particular 

flight. Such information may take several ATC coordination nodes, n, to enter the air traffic management 

automation tools before it is detected that a separation maneuver is required. The parameter n is randomly 

selected according to the following rule: n=0 at 80%, n=1 at 15%, and n=2 at 5%. A probability of p11 is 

given for such occurrences, where p11=2% is selected as the baseline. Latency at the Host Computer and 

ANSP Workstation is estimated at 1 sec each. 

The second off-nominal procedure is a scenario where the ANSP is slow in manually entering the 

intent information due to a lapse. This scenario is given a probability of 1-p1, where p1 is the probability 

that the surveillance data are provided by 1090 MHz ADS-B messages, and the time lapse, ANSPLAPSE, is 

modeled by a normal distribution latency represented by a mean of μL and a standard deviation of σL, 

Latency(μL, σL), at 15 sec and 3 sec, respectively. The parameter setting p1 = 99.9% is selected as the 

baseline. 

4.1.3.2 Communication Time, tCommunication

A VDL-2 based datalink communication model is developed to determine the communication time, 

tCommunication, needed to complete an SA communication transaction between the ANSP and the flight crew. 

A representative flow of communication exchanges between the ground and the flight deck after a 

NIC NACv

RC

Horizontal Velocity

Error (95%)

Vertical Geometric

Velocity Error (95%)

WAAS 10 * <25m 2* <3m/s <15 ft/sec

Selective Aavailability ‐ off 9* <75m 2*

Selective Aavailability ‐  on 7* <0.2NM 1* <10m/s <50 ft/sec

TRACON SSR 6 (RNP‐0.3)** <0.6NM 1**

Center SSR 4 (RNP‐1)** <2NM 1**

*   DO‐242A (ref. 3)

** NAS‐SR‐1000 (ref. 8)
28 

conflict resolution is generated from ground SA automation tools is shown in Figure 4-6. The modeling 

components are described below. 

tSurveillance_1090

tSurveillance_intent

p1 with no ANSP lapse

1-p1 with ANSP lapse

ANSP Lapse

Latency(μL , σL) + tSurveillance

Max(∙) Modified tSurveillance_p1 Flight

Plans or Advisories

ANSP

Workstation

Host

Computer

Terrestrial Latency

TComm_Terrestrial=Latency(μC_T ,

σC_T)

ERAM

+

Random#

0 ‐ n

n is # of ATC 

coordination nodes

p11

Figure 4-5. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance performance, tSurveillance 

HRM(μANSP_Review , σANSP_Review)

1. ANSP receives and 

reviews a resolution

Check if VDL‐2 uplink

successful

2. Time to successfully

uplink the message

HRM(μPilot_Preview , σPilot_Preview)

3. Pilot receives message

& load to FMC

HRM(μPilot_Review , σPilot_Review)

4. Pilot reviews message

@FMC & respond

N×(HRMPilot _Reject + Downlink

+ HRMANSP _Voice+ Uplink)

5. Reject iteration

HRM(μP_Execute , σP_Execute)

6. Pilot executes the advisory

+

tANSP_Review

tUplink

tPilot_Load

tPilot_Review

tNegotiation

tPilot_Executes

tCommunication

Figure 4-6. Components to determine the required communication performance, tCommunication 
29 

1) tANSP_Review: The human response model (HRM) for the ANSP to review the generated conflict 

resolution is represented by a lognormal function with a mean of 4 sec, 99th percentile at 6 sec, and 

a maximum of 12 sec8

 as shown in Figure 4-7. The lognormal function and its appropriateness for 

the HRM are discussed in the next section. 

2) tUplink: The time for successful uplink/downlink using VDL-2 datalink communication is modeled 

based on location and distance to the ground radio station(s), average message rate and length, and 

collision characteristics (distance to other transmitting aircraft) of a p-persistent Carrier Sense 

Multiple Access (CSMA) channel access protocol.22 The basic processing and transmission time 

of a single message is 0.350 sec.23 If the channel is busy (i.e. transmission isn’t immediately 

successful), the protocol specifies the delay before retransmission (using default characteristic 

value) as 1.0 + 2.0×0.6075 + r×0.88 sec where r is a uniform random distribution. 

3) tPilot_Preview: The time for the pilot to preview an uplinked resolution message before loading it to 

the FMC is modeled with a lognormal distribution with a mean of 2.23 sec and a standard 

deviation of 0.35 sec.24 The time for loading the uplinked route or message to the FMC is 

determined to be insignificant. 

4) tPilot_Review: The time for the pilot to review the route or message in the FMC before executing is 

modeled by a lognormal distribution with a mean of 1.89 sec and a standard deviation of 0.44 

sec.24

5) tNegotiation: This term describes the time for the pilot to negotiate with the ANSP if an UNABLE is 

the response to the uplinked resolution. The pilot would downlink the response via datalink, the 

ANSP would use voice to provide a revised resolution, and the pilot would read back the revised 

resolution to confirm. A lognormal distribution to represent a mean of 12.88 sec with a standard 

deviation of 4.95 sec is modeled.25 A 1% probability of this event occurrence is estimated as the 

baseline. 

6) tPilot_Execute: This term describes the time for a pilot to execute a loaded route, once he has reviewed 

and approved it. This is determined to be negligible for this study and is set to 0. 

Figure 4-7. A representative ANSP-review human response model in lognormal distribution 
30 

4.1.3.2.1 HRM – Human Response Model 

The HRM approximates the statistical time distribution that a pilot or controller would take to perform 

a specific task. Based on the results of Sheridan26 and Consiglio24, a lognormal distribution is a good fit 

to the typical probability density for human response time as shown in Equation 8. 

 HRM(μ,σ)=ln N(μ,σ) (8) 

where μ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution, N. The 

distribution is right-skewed and always greater than zero. This is an appropriate distribution if a 

variable can be thought of as the multiplicative product of many independent random variables, 

each of which is positive. Multiple elements of pilot response delay are well fit by log-normal 

distributions in ref. 24 and are used as applicable in this model. An example is shown in Figure 

4-7 for an ANSP reviewing a resolution performance. 

4.1.3.2.2 VDL-2 Reception Model 

The VDL-2 uplink and downlink reception performance is modeled as shown in Figure 4-8, where 

availability, continuity, and integrity are constructed similar to the ADS-B reception model as described 

in Section 4.1.3.1. Voice communication is used when the datalink subsystems are not available. The 

datalink completion time, i.e., the time for a message from a radio frequency (RF) transmitter to a 

receiver, accounting for collision characteristics, is modeled according to the number of ground stations 

and the traffic density.22 A 0.35 second per message transmission rate, rC, is chosen based on 250 msec 

for packet transmission and 100 msec for processing delays at the 95th percentile.23 

tUplink/Downlink (Uplink/Downlink

Communication

Performance)

DCommunication

Message – size and rate

#s of GS & A/V Check

Comm

Transceiver

Availability,

pC_A

Check LOS

Collision, pC_FC

tC=1/rC

tC=tC+1/rC

+

Yes Yes

No No

Check

Integrity,

pC_I

Check

Continuity,

pC_C

Yes

No

No

rC_Collision = rC_Continuity = Random(2.215,3.095) sec

per 3.2.2.4.3.1 DO-224

rC_Integrity = HRMPilot_Review

Voice Comm

Transmit up new

clearanceswith read‐

back

Pilot key‐in on FMC

HRMPilot_FMC_Entry

Pilot review & execute

tUplink/Downlink (Uplink/Downlink

Communication

Performance)

Figure 4-8. A block diagram to determine the required communication time via VDL-2 
31 

4.1.3.3 Maneuver Time, tManeuver

The dynamic performance of the aircraft from maneuver initiation until closest point of approach is 

modeled with a simple, but realistic, model for both the lateral offset and vertical offset maneuvers. 

4.1.3.3.1 Lateral Offset Maneuver 

The lateral offset maneuver time is determined by the time required to initiate, change, and capture a 

new heading plus the time to reach the CPA. As indicated earlier, the CPA for a lateral offset maneuver 

is the tangent point of the relative flight path to the CDZ after the heading change. It is assumed that the 

entire maneuver is conducted at a constant ground speed. The initiation, change, and capture of the new 

heading is approximated as the summation of 

1. 1.5 second initiation of turn 

2. 1 sec turn at bank angle of 15 degrees (rolling into turn) 

3. N sec turn at bank angle of 30 degrees 

4. 1 sec turn at bank angle of 15 degrees (rolling out of turn) 

5. 1.5 second new heading capture 

The rate of change of heading in steps 2 through 4 is calculated from the ground speed. The time 

length of step 3 is adjusted to complete the necessary heading change given the rate of change of heading 

in each step. For this study, the overall heading change is fixed at 15 degrees. After determining the 

distance travelled during the heading change, the time needed to traverse the remaining distance to the 

CPA at the fixed ground speed is determined and added to the previous times to determine the total lateral 

offset maneuver time. 

No specific probabilistic elements are included in the calculation of lateral offset maneuver time. The 

only uncertainty comes from the size of CDZ and therefore the length of time needed to clear the CDZ at 

the CPA. The effects of winds were not modeled. 

4.1.3.3.2 Vertical Offset Maneuver 

The vertical offset maneuver time is determined by the time required to transition the aircraft 1000 ft 

of altitude, the standard vertical separation below FL 290 and above FL 290 for RVSM. The time is 

calculated using a single average rate of climb/descent over the entire altitude with no transition times at 

either end. The rate of climb is selected by engineering estimate from a normal distribution with a mean 

value of 1000 ft/min and a standard deviation of 200 ft/min. An upper bound of 2000 ft/min and a lower 

bound of 500ft/min are enforced as rates of climb/descent outside these values would be rejected by the 

ANSP. 

4.1.3.4 Modeling Summary 

A summary of the ground-based SA modeling is shown in Figure 4-9, with the surveillance 

performance model, the communication performance model, and the SA maneuver model as discussed in 

previous sections. TCD&R is the time for the SA automation to detect the conflict and develop and display 

a resolution. A two second delay is estimated for tCD&R.

13 
32 

4.2 Airborne SA Datalink System Architecture 

The airborne SA system architecture is developed based on the AFR concept,5 where separation 

assurance decisions and actions are developed based on ownship and traffic aircraft track information and 

intent information derived from broadcast ADS-B messages. The AFR concept allows for an alternative 

of receiving intent information from IFR aircraft via datalink from the ground, and both methods of 

receiving intent information were addressed in this study. Within the designated airspace, the flight crew 

will be able to perform self-separation in a system architecture as shown in Figure 4-10. 

Surveillance

Performance

Model

DSurveillance

&

ρTraffic

pS_Availability

pS_Connectivity

pS_Integrity

CD&R

+

Coord

Communication

Performance

Model

DCommunication

Message size (length)

Radio stations and traffic

in range

HRM performance 

pC_Availability

pC_Connectivity

pC_Integrity

SA Maneuver

Dimension,

NIC, and NAC

of ownship 

and intruder,

Buffer ,

VG_Ownship

+ tRSAP

tSurveillance

tCD&R

tCommunication

tManeuver

Figure 4-9. Required Separation Assurance Performance, tRSAP 

AFR Equipped AFR or IFR Equipped

ADS‐B

Radio

Station

Surveillance

Terrestrial

Network

ANSP

ADS-B messages

TIS-B

ADS-R

TIS-B

ADS-R

Communication

Terrestrial

Network

Communication

Ratio Station

Intent

Figure 4-10. A representative Airborne-Centric separation assurance system architecture 
33 

4.2.1 Airborne SA Concept of Operations 

Under AFR, the flight crew and the airplane that is certified for AFR will have the capability to 

perform self-separation in a designated airspace with mixed-equipped traffic, i.e., IFR and/or AFR. An 

onboard Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS)17 provides pilots with information on the 

conflicts, alerts, and resolutions, and provides an interface for pilots to select and load resolution 

maneuvers into the FMS or execute resolutions through tactical flight controls. 

4.2.2 Assumptions – Airborne Concept 

The following modeling assumptions are made for the Airborne SA ConOps. 

 The AFR-equipped airplane performs self-separation without ANSP separation services. 

 AFR flight crews have automation tools certified by the FAA for self-separation. 

 IFR traffic has the right-of-way. 

 Intent messages are essential to AFR operations. 

 A maximum of four-TC messages broadcast will be required. 

 As an alternative, IFR flight plans or intent will be uplinked to AFR via datalink per 

request. 

 No communication with the ANSP is required for SA. 

4.2.3 Modeling Components – Airborne Concept 

The airborne concept relies on 1090 MHz ES messages, which include Airborne Position, Airborne 

Velocity, Aircraft Identification and type, Aircraft Operational Status, Target State, and Trajectory 

Change reports, to receive the traffic track and intent information as defined DO-260B.14 These message 

are then assembled as ADS-B reports to support various applications, such as separation assurance and 

sequencing, conflict avoidance and collision avoidance, and flight path deconfliction planning.3

 For the 

AFR, the intent information, i.e., Target State (TS) messages for short-term intent information and 

Trajectory Change (TC) messages for long-term intent information, is used in automated conflict 

management to support cooperative separation. 

4.2.3.1 Surveillance Time, tSurveillance

Since the Target State and Trajectory Change messages are broadcast at a slower rate than the 

Airborne Position and Velocity messages, successful reception of up to four TC messages is used to 

determine the required surveillance time, tSurveillance_Intent, for the baseline case. To meet the maximum 

ADS-B broadcast rate of 6.2 messages/sec,14 the TC messages are assumed to be broadcast sequentially at 

a rate of 0.8 messages/sec or 0.2 message/sec for four TC messages or 0.4 message/sec for two TC 

messages, which leads to a five-second (4 TC messages) or 2.5-second (2 TC messages) interval to 

broadcast a complete set of TC messages. The value for tSurveillance_Intent is then determined by the time 

needed to receive all four TC messages at the receiver. The time to receive up to four TC messages is 

modeled as shown in Figure 4-11. The 1090 MHz ES reception model for airborne transmission19 is used 

to model the free-space-loss and interference due to FRUIT. The ADS-B transmitter power is set for 

Class A3 at 200 W, and the minimum trigger level is set at -84 dBm as defined in DO-260B.14 The 

surveillance range in the airborne case is the distance between the transmitting aircraft and the receiving 

aircraft. Surveillance system availability, continuity, and integrity are kept the same as in the groundbased system architecture. 
34 

To enable modeling of scenarios where intent data are uplinked to the flight deck from the ground 

versus scenarios where intent data is available via ADS-B ES, a probability of p2 is assumed that intent 

information is provided by airborne ADS-B ES, and under a probability of 1- p2 intent information is 

provided by the ground as shown in Figure 4-12. For the ground-provided intent information scenario, 

the downlink request and uplink intent messages are modeled using VDL-2 reception performance as 

presented in Section 4.1.3.2. A one-second processing time is assumed for ground automation to respond 

to the downlinked intent request. From one to eight intent messages are selected from a uniform 

distribution, which gives an average of close to 4 messages that are equivalent to the airborne ADS-B 

intent messages, and uplinked via VDL-2 to the flight deck. 

1090 MHz Intent

with TC messages

Downlink the Request via

Addressed Datalink

(VDL 2)

Reply from the Ground

(use random # for the #

of messages via VDL 2)

t

Surveillance_Intent_1090

p2 with track data and intent from 1090 MHz ADS-B

tSurveillance

p2

Yes

No

t

Surveillance

Ground

Automation

1090 MHz Intent

with TC messages

Downlink the Request via

Addressed Datalink

(VDL 2)

Reply from the Ground

(use random # for the #

of messages via VDL 2)

t

Surveillance_Intent_1090

p2 with track data and intent from 1090 MHz ADS-B

tSurveillance

p2

Yes

No

t

Surveillance

Ground

Automation

Figure 4-11. An intent-based Airborne-Centric concept required surveillance time, tSurveillance 

Check

ABS‐B

Availability,

pS_A

Check

Free‐Space‐

Loss&

FRUIT, pS_FF

tS_TC_i=1/rs

tS_TC_i=tS_TC_i +1/rS

+

Yes Yes

No No

Check

Integrity,

pS_I

Check

Continuity,

pS_C

Yes

Yes

No

No

Revert to IFR

Dsurveillance &

ρTraffic

tSurveillance_Intent = Max[tS_TC_i, i=1,N]

rS_Availability = rS_Continuity = 0.8/N/sec

rS_Integrity = HRMANSP_Review

N = number of TC messages

Figure 4-12. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance time 

due to Trajectory Change messages, 
35 

4.2.3.2 Maneuver 

The maneuver for the AFR is the same as ground-based offset maneuvers described in Section 4.1.3.3. 

4.3 Summary of Modeling References 

Applicable performance of each subsystem under the ground-based and airborne system architectures 

is summarized in Tables 4-3 and 4-4 for the surveillance model and communication model respectively. 

Table 4-3. Summary of surveillance modeling and performance references 

Surveillance Descriptions Figure Modeling Assumptions References

p S_FF Surveillance reception probability 4‐2 f(D, ρTraffic) Ref. 21

p S_A Availability of surveillance 4‐2 0.9995 Ref. 3

p S_C Continuity of surveillance 4‐2 0.9998 Ref. 3

p S_I Integrity of surveillance 4‐2 10‐6 Ref. 3

p WAAS_Availability Availability of WASS 4‐2 0.99999 Ref. 8

ρTraffic Traffic density 4‐2

TRACON

High ‐ 5.25/NM

Medium ‐ 3.5/NM

Low ‐ 1.6/NM Ref. 14

En Route

0.32/NM Ref. 3

NIC, NACv

Navigation integrity category and

Navigation Accuracy Category ‐  4‐2

TRACON (SSR):

NIC=6NACv=1 Ref. 8

Velocity En Route (SSR):

NIC=4, NACv=1 Ref. 8

WAAS: NIC=10, NACv=2

GPS SA Off: NIC=9, NACV=2

GPS SA ON: NIC=7, NACv=1 Ref. 23

rS_Integrity Surveillance integrity detection interval 4‐2 HRMANSP_Review Ref. 8

tS_Terrestrial Surveillance terrestrial latency 4‐2 3.5 sec Ref. 7

3.0 sec Ref. 8

Modified Flight

Plans 4‐5 Automation

Host Computer Processing time 4‐5 1 sec Estimate

ANSP

Workstation Processing time 4‐5 1 sec Estimate

n # of ATC coordination nodes 4‐5 0: 80% Estimate

4‐5 1: 15%

4‐5 2: 5%

ANSPLapse NASP lapse due to distractions 4‐5

Mean: 15 sec

Std: 3 sec Estimate
36 

Table 4-4. Summary of communication and maneuver modeling and performance references 

Communication

tComm_Terrestrial Communication terrestrial latency 4‐5 5 sec (95 percentile) Ref. 8

HRMANSP_Review HRMfor ANSP review 4‐6 99%: 6 sec Ref. 8

HRMPilot_Preview HRM for pilot preview 4‐6 σ=0.35 sec Ref. 24

HRMPilot_Review HRM for pilot review 4‐6 σ=0.44 sec Ref. 24

HRMANSP_Voice HRM for ANSP voice communication 4‐6

Voice:

μ=12.88 sec,

σ=4.95 sec (1st Short) Ref. 25

HRMPilot_reject HRM for pilot to reject a clearance 4‐6 N(8,2) Estimate

N # of negotiation of a clearance 4‐6

=0 (99%)

=1 (1%) Estimate

rC communication trasmission interval 4‐8 0.35 Ref. 23

p C_FC communication sucessful probability 4‐8 f(D, ρGS & Traffic) Ref. 22

p C_A Availability of communication 4‐8 0.999 Ref. 3

p C_C Continuity of communication 4‐8 0.999 Ref. 4

p C_I Integrity of communication 4‐8 10‐7 Ref. 4

CD&R

tCD&R CD&R processing time 4‐9 2 sec Ref. 13

Maneuver

CDZ (NM) 3‐4 1+uncertainty Baseline

3

Terminal

separation

minimum

5

En route

separation

minimum
37 

5 Test Design 

To investigate the required separation assurance performance under the two selected SA system 

architectures, the focus is on the tradeoff of the key performance parameters associated with the three 

major elements in both ground-based and airborne concepts of operations. These three elements are 

surveillance, communication, and maneuver, where surveillance and communication are based on 

datalink communication under NextGen technology, and maneuver performance depends on both 

surveillance and communication performance and flight dynamics. Test parameters were developed from 

characteristics of the system architectures such that subsystem performance sensitivity and tradeoffs could 

be studied. Each SA system architecture was modeled in MATLAB® based on descriptions discussed in 

Section 4. A Monte Carlo simulation was developed to execute the test matrix presented in Section 5.1.3. 

5.1 Availability, Continutity, and Integrity 

The datalink performance metrics of availability, continuity, and integrity in surveillance and 

communication subsystems were selected according to DO-242A for 1090 MHz surveillance 

performance, which is defined as 0.9995, 0.9998, and 10-6 with respect to the availability, continuity, and 

integrity. Availability for communication defined by DO-224B is 0.999. Continuity and integrity 

performance for the communication system, found in a draft of the FAA’s Final Program Requirements 

for Data Communications, are 0.999 and 10-7, respectively.4

 These values are used as the baseline test 

case. The developed model is capable of studying the impact of these three parameters on the overall 

required separation assurance performance. 

5.2 Actual Separation Assurance Performance (ASAP) 

The tests were developed to calculate the actual separation assurance performance, tASAP, based on a 

range of test conditions. The Monte Carlo simulation ran 10,000 times for each test condition to establish 

a statistical database. Each ASAP consists of four performance components, i.e., i) surveillance time to 

generate CD&R, tSurveillance, ii) processing time for CD&R, tCD&R, iii) communication time to complete an 

SA communication transaction, tCommunication, and iv) maneuver time for a lateral or vertical offset SA 

maneuver, tManeuver. The 95th percentile of the tASAP was then used to determine the required separation 

assurance performance. The required separation assurance performance, tRSRP, is defined in Equation 9. 

Individual required performance elements are also represented by the 95th percentile values as shown in 

Equations 10-12. The value of tCD&R is assumed to be a constant at two seconds for this study. 

 tRSAP = tASAP @95th percentile = (tSurveillance + tCD&R + tCommunication + tManeuver ) @95th percentile (9) 

 tRequired_Surveilance = tSurveillance @95th percentile (10) 

 tRequired_Communication = tCommunication @95th percentile (11) 

 tRequired_Maneuver = tManeuver @95th percentile (12) 

5.3 Test Matrix 

The following test parameters were developed to investigate their effects on ASAP. Based on the two 

SA concepts, i.e., ground-based and airborne, a test matrix was developed to include the following test 

parameters: range, air traffic density, uncertainty and accuracy of the surveillance performance, datalink 

communication performance, datalink vs. voice communication, ground speed of the ownship, and 

separation minimum. 
38 

A medium-density terminal case with a traffic density that is equivalent to the 1999 LA basin14 was 

chosen as the baseline, and both nominal and off-nominal conditions were evaluated. The test matrix is 

shown in Table 5-1. Test Cases 0-29 were developed for the ground-based SA system architecture. Test 

Cases 100-155 were developed for the airborne SA system architecture. The baseline cases, i.e., Test 

Cases 0 and 100 for ground-based and airborne concepts respectively, also have the availability, 

continuity, and integrity as defined in Section 5.1.1. For the airborne concept, the surveillance time to 

acquire 2 intent messages was chosen as the baseline following References 3 and 14 in separation 

assurance applications. 
39 

Table 5-1. Test matrix for the required separation assurance performance study 

Surveillance Communication Maneuver

Test Categories Density Uncertainty

Manual or

Lapse Flight Plan Mod Datalink/Voice Gnd Speed CDZ

GND

Test 

Case

AFRTest 

Case

ADS-B

+ SSR ADS-B Only

Center 

SSR

TRACON

SSR NIC NACV

p1

(No ANSP

Lapse)

p11

(pModified_Plans)

VDL Message

 Size

VDL Mean 

Rate pC_Availability

VGND 

(Knots)

Traffic

Type RBuffer (N

0 100

Med 

Density,

DO-260B 10 2 0.999 0.02 1856 UL/1224DL 62 UL/85 DL 0.999 450 757-Dash8 1 

1 101 2502 102 3503 103 5504 104 757-7575 105 36 106 57 107 9 2

8 108 7 19 - 6 1

10 - 4 111 111 757-74714 - 10% +15 - 10% +16 116

Enroute 

density DO242A

17 117

Low 

Density, 

DO-260B

18 118

Med 

density, 

DO-260B

19 119

High 

density, 

DO-260B

20 -

Enroute 

density 

DO-242A

21 -

Low 

Density, 

DO-260B

22 -

Med 

density, 

DO-260B

23 -

High 

density, 

DO-260B

24 - 0

25 - 0.0526 - 0.127 - 0 (voice)28 - 1 (datalink)29 - 0.98

‐ 151 

‐ 152 

‐ 153 

‐ 154 

‐ 155 

Datalink Performance
40 

6 Test Results and Performance Analysis 

Test results based on 10,000 runs per test case are summarized in this section to show the effects of 

different test parameters on the actual separation assurance performance (ASAP) of each SA concept. 

The ground-based concept results are presented first, followed by the airborne concept results. For this 

study, 95th percentile values of ASAP, surveillance, communication, and maneuver performance are 

chosen to define required separation assurance performance, surveillance performance, communication 

performance, and maneuver performance respectively, and are labeled by T95 in all the figures. A 

ground-based ASAP of the baseline test case, i.e., TC0, at 20 NM away from an ADS-B radio station is 

shown in Figure 6-1 as an example of how the 95th percentile values were determined. 

Figure 6-1. Determination of the 95th percentile from 10,000 runs of ground-based baseline case, 

TC0, at 20 NM from the ADS-B radio station 
41 

6.1 Ground-Based Separation Assurance System Architecture 

Two separation assurance maneuvers were investigated, i.e., lateral offset maneuver and vertical offset 

maneuver. The results are presented in the following sections. 

6.1.1 Lateral Offset Separation Assurance Maneuver 

This section discusses the effects of various parameters for a lateral offset maneuver as described in 

4.1.3.3.1. 

6.1.1.1 Traffic Density Effects 

The effects of the traffic density, which mainly affected 1090 interference (FRUIT rate) are shown in 

Figure 6-2, where four levels of density are presented, i.e., en route, low density, medium density, and 

high density. En route density is developed from DO-242A, and LA-Low, LA-Medium, and LA-High 

densities were developed based on traffic density from the Los Angeles Basin ADS-B Measurement 

Trials identified in DO-260B.14 Figure 6-2(a) shows the effects of traffic density and range on tASAP, 

which includes tSurveillance,, tCommunication,,and tManeuver, Figure 6-2(b), (c), and (d) respectively. All 

performances shown are at the respective 95th percentiles of the results where “T95” is labeled. 

From Figure 6-2(b), surveillance performance shows strong dependency on traffic density and range 

from the ADS-B ground radio station. The values of tSurveillance are all under 30 sec, which meets ref. 8 in 

both terminal and en route airspace to detect a separation standard violation. The baseline test case (lines 

in dark blue) used traffic density the same as LA-Med traffic density (lines in dark blue) but with ADS-B 

availability at 0.9995, while the other four test cases, i.e., TC16-TC19, were with 100% ADS-B 

availability. 

With the exception of the LA-High traffic density condition (TC19, lines in magenta), values of the 

95th percentile of surveillance time, tSurveillance, as shown in Figure 6-2(b), are consistent with ref. 3, i.e., 

meeting the required State Vector report update interval within 12 sec (95th percentile) in acquisition 

range between 20 and 90 NM for the terminal and en route airspace domains. However, for the LA-High 

traffic density condition, tSurveillance is greater than this performance specification. 

The communication performance, tCommunication in Figure 6-2(c), does not show a significant effect due 

to traffic density. The maneuver performance, tManeuver in Figure 6-2(d), shows a strong effect due to 

traffic density. The CDZ for a lateral offset maneuver, which shows a clear dependency on the 

surveillance performance, is shown in Figure 6-2(e). 
42 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tCommunication (d) tManeuver

(e) CDZ

Figure 6-2. Actual separation assurance performance due to traffic density 
43 

6.1.1.2 Surveillance Uncertainty and Accuracy Effects 

Five surveillance uncertainty and accuracy conditions were investigated as shown in Table 4-2, with 

the same traffic density. They are WAAS, Selective Availability Off, Selective Availability On, 

TRACON SSR, and Center SSR. Figure 6-3 shows the effects on the tASAP due to the surveillance 

uncertainty and accuracy. Figure 6-3(d) and (e) show that tASAP reflects strong effects of the surveillance 

uncertainty and accuracy on tManeuver and CDZ. Results also show that the 95th percentile of tASAP of all 

(e) CDZ

(a) tASAP

(c) tCommunication (d) tManeuver

(b) tSurveillance

Figure 6-3. Actual separation assurance performance due to surveillance uncertainty and accuracy 
44 

ADS-B based surveillance, i.e., WAAS, Selective Availability Off, and Selective Availability On 

conditions, are all under the two-minute alert suggested in DO-242A for separation assurance 

applications. The 95th percentile of tASAP for TRACON SSR and Center SSR shows an alert greater than 

two minutes will be required. Both required surveillance time, tSurveillance in Figure 6-3(b) for ADS-B 

based surveillance, and required communication time, tCommunication in Figure 6-3(c), show independence to 

surveillance uncertainty and accuracy as expected. 

CDZ as shown in Figure 6-3(e), seems to suggest that the separation minimum in the terminal 

airspace, i.e., within 60 NM of the airport, could be reduced from the current 3 NM minimum separation 

standard when GPS surveillance is available via WAAS, Selective Availability Off, and Selective 

Availability On. With TRACON SSR, the 95th percentile of CDZ is at 2.78 NM at 40 NM, which is close 

to the current horizontal separation minimum in the terminal airspace of 3 NM. With Center SSR, the 

95th percentile of CDZ is at 5.6 NM at 90 NM, which is greater than the current 5 NM minimum 

horizontal separation minimum in en route airspace. 

6.1.1.3 Datalink Communication Media, Datalink vs. Voice 

The impacts of message size and transmission rate on VDL-2 based datalink performance were 

investigated. Results are shown in Figure 6-4, which shows a minimal effect within the range of interest, 

(a) tASAP (b) tCommunication

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-4. Effects on ASAP due to communication message size and transmission rate 
45 

i.e., between 20-90 NM. However comparing datalink only as the communication media vs. voice only, 

as shown in Figure 6-5, shows drastic differences with datalink, which provided improved ASAP 

performance relative to voice communication. From Figure 6-5(a), both datalink and voice show a twominute alert will be on the conservative side. All performance shows relatively low sensitivity due to 

range, which is expected since the VDL-2 model does not include the signal degradation due to distance. 

6.1.1.4 CDZ Effects 

The effects due to buffer size or separation minimum is determined by comparing the 95th percentile of 

tASAP between the baseline case with cases where CDZs are set to 3 NM and 5 NM, as shown in Figure 6-

6(e), which are equivalent to current minimum horizontal separation distance in the terminal and en route 

airspace, respectively. The baseline case has a 1 NM buffer plus uncertainty of the position and velocity 

accuracy according to NIC and NACV. Based on 95th percentile of tASAP, both 3 NM and 5 NM CDZ will 

require an alert time greater than two minutes. 

(a) tASAP (b) tCommunication

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-5. Effects on ASAP due to datalink and voice 
46 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tCommunication (d) tManeuver

(e) CDZ

Figure 6-6. Effects on ASAP due to CDZ or separation minimum 
47 

6.1.2 Vertical Offset Separation Assurance Manevuer 

Effects due to traffic density using a vertical offset maneuver are shown in Figure 6-6. Surveillance 

and communication performance, i.e., tSurveillance and tCommunication in Figures 6-7(b) and (c), are very similar 

to the lateral offset cases as expected. Time to perform a vertical offset maneuver, tManeuver in Figure 6-

7(b), takes almost twice that for a lateral offset maneuver (approximately 44 sec, Figure 6-2(d)). The 

values of 95th percentile of tASAP as shown in Figure 6-7(a) for the medium and high terminal traffic 

density, i.e., LA-Med and LA-High, exceed two minutes. 

6.2 Airborne Separation Assurance System Architecture 

Airborne SA results are presented in this section. Two SA maneuvers were investigated, i.e., lateral 

offset maneuver and vertical offset maneuver. 

(a) tASAP (b) tCommunication

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-7. Effects on ASAP due to traffic density with a vertical offset maneuver 
48 

6.2.1 Lateral Offset Maneuver 

This section shows the effects of various parameters for a lateral offset maneuver. 

6.2.1.1 Traffic Density Effects 

Results for traffic density effects on the airborne SA system architecture actual separation assurance 

performance (ASAP) are shown in Figure 6-8, for four intent messages. Since the flight deck performs 

self-separation, no ground-to-flight deck communication is required when all intent information is 

obtained from the ADS-B Trajectory Change messages and/or Target State message. The value for 

tSurveillance includes a 1% probability that intent information for IFR aircraft is obtained from the ground via 

VDL-2 as shown in Figure 4-9. All tASAP values are under two minutes using the assumption that two TC 

intent messages are required for the airborne concept. Figure 6-8(a) also shows that in less congested 

airspace, e.g., en route in green, where airborne concept is most applicable, a 60 sec alert time is 

adequate. The baseline case (TC100) is overlapping with the TC118, which both have the same traffic 

density, i.e., LA-Med, as expected with the only difference in ADS-B’s availability at 99.9% vs. 100% 

respectively. 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-8. Traffic density effects on ASAP of the Airborne SA system architecture 
49 

6.2.1.2 Surveillance Accuracy Effects 

Three surveillance accuracy conditions were tested, which are WAAS, Selective Availability Off, and 

Selective Availability ON. WAAS represents the surveillance accuracy in the NAS, while Selective 

Availability Off represents oceanic airspace where WAAS is not available. Effects due to surveillance 

accuracy are shown in Figure 6-9, which shows that Selective Availability On has the largest CDZ 

relative to WAAS and Selective Availability Off to ensure separation assurance. In these test cases, the 

time for surveillance, tSurveillance, for all three cases is the same since the surveillance time is independent of 

the accuracy. The CDZs, as shown in Figure 6-9(d), show the dependency due to the uncertainty and 

accuracy in the surveillance data. Values of all the 95th percentile of tASAP are all under two minutes at the 

given surveillance accuracy levels. 

. 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-9. Accuracy effects on ASAP of an airborne SA system architecture 
50 

6.2.1.3 Number of Intent Messages Effects 

Effects due to number of intent messages from the airborne transmitted ADS-B messages are shown in 

Figure 6-10, which shows tASAP’

s dependency with respect to the range and number of intent messages. 

With two intent messages, i.e., the baseline case (lines in blue), where intent messages are broadcast 

sequentially at 0.8 message/sec under the terminal medium density or LA-Med, the required separation 

assurance time, i.e., the 95th percentile values of tASAP in Figure 6-10(a), is significantly less than two 

minutes, and the CDZ in Figure 6-9(d) is significantly less than the current 3 NM separation minimum. 

With four intent messages (TC153) as shown in Figure 6-10(a) (lines in sky blue), values of the 95th

percentile of tASAP is also under the two-minute alert. 

 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-10. Number of intent messages effects on ASAP of an airborne 

SA system architecture 
51 

6.2.1.4 CDZ Effects 

The effects due to three different CDZs are shown in Figure 6-11, where the baseline case, which 

includes a 1 NM buffer plus surveillance uncertainty and accuracy, is compared with 3 NM and 5 NM. 

tManevuer is the most dominant factor in maintaining separation assurance performance for a B757 size of 

airplane to make a 3 or 5 NM lateral offset maneuver. An alert time of more than two minutes is required 

for all 5 NM CDZs at any range. An alert time of more than two minutes is required for surveillance 

range greater than 40 NM for the 3 NM CDZ case. 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-11. Effects on ASAP due to CDZ 
52 

6.2.1.5 Ownship Speed Effects 

Since ASAP performance is measured in time, ownship ground speed was expected to have an effect 

on tASAP. Figures 6-12(b) and (d) show surveillance performance, tSurveillance, and CDZ respectively are 

independent of ownship speed as expected. But the time to maneuver for a lateral offset, tManeuver, is 

dependent on ownship ground speed. In all cases, the 95th percentile of tASAP is under two minutes. 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-12. Effects on ASAP due to ownship’s speed 
53 

6.2.1.6 Ground Intent Effects 

Obtaining timely intent information is essential to the airborne separation assurance operational 

concept. Figure 6-13 shows the effects due to the source of the intent messages. In the baseline case, 

TC100, 99% of intent messages are from 2 ADS-B Trajectory Change (TC) messages with 1% from the 

ground, Test Case 154 (TC154) considers 50% of the intent messages coming from airborne ADS-B 

messages and 50% from the ground, and Test Case 155 (TC155) considers 100% of the intent messages 

coming from the ground. For both ground-provided intent cases (TC154 and TC155), number of intent 

message was uniformly distributed between 1 to 8 messages, which would be equivalent to an average of 

4 messages to be comparable with the highest ADS-B TC messages, i.e., four, in TC153. The results 

show that surveillance time from TC155, i.e., 100% of intent from the ground, takes less time than the 

baseline case with two TC intent messages and the 50/50 split between the airborne and ground intent 

case (TC154), as shown in Figure 6-13(b). This suggests that obtaining intent from the ground is faster 

than from airborne ADS-B intent with two TC messages. Further investigations are needed to assess the 

effects of the additional VDL-2 communication, which is used to support the ground-intent uplink in this 

study. 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ

Figure 6-13. Effects on ASAP due to source of intent messages 
54 

6.2.2 Vertical Offset Maneuver 

For a 1000 ft vertical offset maneuver, ASAP responses according to traffic density for the airborne 

separation assurance ConOps are shown in Figure 6-14. The values of tSurveillance as shown in Figure 6-

14(b) are very similar to the lateral offset maneuver case which is expected. Time to maneuver, tManeuver

as shown in Figure 6-14(c), however, is significantly larger than the lateral offset maneuver as shown in 

Figure 6-8(c). As shown in Figure 6-14(a), the required separation assurance performance, or values of 

the 95th percentile of tASAP, are greater than two minutes for the high traffic density case (TC119), i.e., 

LA-High for surveillance range greater than 64 NM. 

(a) tASAP

(b) tSurveillance (c) tManeuver

Figure 6-14. Effects on ASAP due to traffic density for a vertical offset maneuver 
55 

6.3 Comparing Ground-Based and Airborne Results 

Figure 6-15 shows the comparison between the ground-based and airborne separation assurance 

concept baseline cases, i.e., TC0 vs. TC100, for a lateral offset SA maneuver. Since no communication is 

required for the airborne concept, values of 95th percentile of tASAP are smaller for the airborne concept 

(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance

(c) tCommunication (d) tManeuver

(e) CDZ

Figure 6-15. Comparison of ASAP between ground-based and airborne baseline cases 
56 

than the ground-based, as indicated in Figure 6.15(a). It is noted that tSurveillance in Figure 6-15(b) for the 

ground-based case (TC0), is less than the airborne case (TC100). This is due to in the ground-based case 

the surveillance time is determined by the reception of a single ADS-B position message at a broadcast 

rate of 2 messages/sec, while in the airborne case the surveillance time is determined by the reception of 

both of two TC messages broadcast at 0.4 messages/sec. Both cases, however, show they are within the 

two-minute alert as indicated in ref. 3. From the CDZ shown in Figure 6-15(e), both ground-based and 

airborne concepts support a significantly lower separation minimum than the existing standard of 3 NM in 

the terminal airspace under a separation assurance system architecture based on ADS-B surveillance and 

datalink communication. 

Since ADS-B reception performance is highly affected by traffic density, a comparison of the groundbased case and airborne case at the highest traffic density, i.e., LA-High, is made for TC19 and TC119. 

Figures 6-16(a) shows that due to higher surveillance time to receive both of two TC messages at a lower 

broadcast rate under high traffic density or higher interference, the value of the 95th percentile of tASAP for 

the airborne case (TC119), where no communication time is needed, is higher than the ground-based case 

(TC9) beyond the 67 NM range. Both SA concepts still meet the two-minute alert time. 

Figure 6-16. Comparison between the ground-based and airborne concepts under high traffic 

density 
57 

7 Conclusions 

A statistical-based simulation model was developed to investigate required separation assurance 

performance based on the NextGen technology enablers in surveillance and communication, which are 

ADS-B and VDL-2 respectively. The simulation framework was constructed following two 

representative separation assurance system architectures, i.e., ground-based and airborne-centric concepts, 

with three major elements: surveillance, communication, and flight maneuver. The objective was to 

develop objective measurements to determine the required separation assurance performance according to 

specified operational performance metrics, e.g., availability, continuity, and integrity in surveillance and 

communication subsystems. Additional parameters were also included in the model, such as range, air 

traffic density, uncertainty and accuracy of surveillance, datalink rate and message length. Off-nominal 

operational conditions, including falling back to voice for communication and Secondary Surveillance 

Radar as a backup for surveillance when ADS-B was not available, were also included in the 

investigation. Human performance responses were modeled based on results from applicable studies, and 

terrestrial network latencies were adapted from existing specifications. 

The following conclusions are developed from the test results. 

1) The results support a two-minute alert time as suggested in ref. 3 for an ADS-B based surveillance 

system architecture and 1 NM buffer zone. The alert time can be reduced to one minute in less 

congested airspace such as en route airspace. 

2) The Collision Detection Zone (CDZ) developed based on surveillance uncertainty and accuracy, 

which is equivalent to the separation minimum, shows a horizontal separation minimum of less 

than 2 NM for a GPS-based surveillance system. Under the TRACON SSR case, CDZ is 

consistent with the current horizontal separation minimum at 3 NM. However, for the Center SSR 

case, CDZ developed under the methodology in this study is greater than the current horizontal 

separation minimum of 5 NM. 

3) Under the ground-based separation assurance system architecture, required communication time or 

tCommunication for datalink is significantly less than the voice communication. 

4) Under the airborne concept with up to four intent messages, tASAP shows the two-minute alert time 

is very conservative with the given 1 NM buffer zone. 

5) Under the airborne concept, the ground-provided intent via VDL-2 takes less time than the four 

Trajectory Change messages from the airborne ADS-B link. 

6) The airborne concept shows less tASAP than the ground-based separation assurance system 

architecture as expected since communication on the resolution maneuver is not required under 

that concept. 

7) The vertical offset maneuver in both ground-based and airborne concept of operations shows 

significant maneuver time increase over the lateral offset maneuver. 
58 

8 Recommendations 

The following recommendations are made to improve the methodology and models developed under 

this effort. 

1. The 1 NM buffer is an arbitrary estimate to account for unexpected events developing during the 

flight maneuver such as weather or sudden change of the intruder trajectory. This buffer needs to 

be investigated with human-in-the-loop simulation under different encounter geometries to 

determine the proper value to be used. 

2. The methodology to account for surveillance uncertainty and accuracy needs to be verified to 

ensure compliance with the existing horizontal separation minimum supported by Center SSR. 

3. When intent surveillance information is used in the airborne separation assurance concept under 

high traffic density, resulted surveillance performance exceeds recommended State Vector report 

update interval. Further investigations are recommended to determine if new performance 

requirements are needed for ADS-B applications that require intent information in addition to the 

State Vector reports. 

4. The VDL-2 model does not account for signal degradation due to distance as the ADS-B reception 

model does. Inclusion of this RF transmission property, i.e., free-space loss, is desired. 

5. A literature search should be conducted to document human performance response according to 

datalink applications under the NextGen environment and to enhance the fidelity of human 

performance response used in the simulation developed in this study. 

6. Several subsystems’ performances were represented by engineering estimates, e.g., human 

operator lapse due to distraction, ANSPLapse, and processing time at Host and ANSP Workstation. 

Future studies will be needed to enhance the fidelity of these modeling elements. 

7. A human-in-the-loop simulation should be conducted with various encounter geometries to test 

and verify separation assurance performance for surveillance, communication, and flight 

maneuver, and the results should be applied to refine the model to support future separation 

assurance requirement estimates. 
59 

9 References 

1. JPDO: “Concept of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,” Joint 

Planning and Development Office, Version 3.2, 30 September 2010. 

2. FAA: “FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan,” Federal Aviation Administration, March 2011. 

3. RTCA: “Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B),” RTCA DO-242A, June 25, 2002. 

4. FAA: “Final Program Requirements for Data Communications,” DRAFT, 6 June 2009. 

5. Wing, David, et al.: “Comparison of Ground-Based and Airborne Function Allocation Concepts 

for NextGen Using Human-In-The-Loop Simulations,” 10th AIAA Aviation Technology, 

Integration, and Operations (ATIO), 13-15 September 2010, Fort Worth, Texas. 

6. FAA: “National Airspace System Enterprise Architecture,” National Airspace System Near-Term 

(2010) As-Is Enterprise-Level Architecture,” Air Traffic Organization, FAA, Version 1.0 January 

29, 2010. 

7. FAA: “NAS System Specification, Functional and Performance Requirement for the National 

Airspace System, General, Volume 1,” FAA, Department of Transportation, NAS-SS-1000, 15 

April 1995. 

8. FAA: “National Airspace System Requirements Specifications,” Department of Transportation, 

NAS-SR-1000, Revision B, June 2008. 

9. FAA: “Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) Characteristics,” FAA Order 

1010.51A, 8 March 1971. 

10. Santiago, C; and Crowell, A.: “A Visualization Tool for Analysis of Air Traffic Management 

Scenarios and Automation,” AIAA 2010 Modeling and Simulation Technologies Conference, 

AIAA-2010-7613, August 2010, Toronto, Canada. 

11. FAA: “Fact Sheet – Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B),” May 27, 2010. 

12. RTCA: “Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for Aircraft Surveillance 

Applications,” Draft Version 3.0, RTCA SC-186, WG-6-WP27-04, 2011. 

13. RTCA: “Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Aircraft Surveillance 

Applications System (ASAS),” RTCA DO-317, April 14, 2009. 

14. RTCA: “Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services – 

Broadcast (TIS-B),” RTCA DO-260B, December 2, 2009. 

15. FAA: “FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan,” Department of Transportation, March 2011. 

16. RTCA: “Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for Aircraft Surveillance 

Applications (ASA),” RTCA DO-289, December 2003. 
60 

17. Mercer, J.; Prevot, T.; Brasil, C.; Mainini, M.; Kupfer, M.; and Smith, N.: “An Integrated 

Tool Suite for En Route Radar Controllers in NextGen,” 27th International Congress of 

the Aeronautical Sciences, 2010. 

18. SC-186: “Proposed Revisions to ADS-B MASPS: Integrity and Accuracy Monitoring, RTCA 

Special Committee (SC) 186 WG-6 NIC/NAC Draft 3.0, July 2001. 

19. Wing, D, et al.: “Comparison of Ground-Based and Airborne Function Allocation Concepts for 

NextGen Using Human-In-The-Loop Simulations,” AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and 

Operations Conference, September 2010, Ft. Worth, Texas. 

20. Erzberger, H.: “Transforming the NAS: The Next Generation Air Traffic Control System,” 

NASA TP-2004-212828, October 2004. 

21. Chung, W., and Staab, R.: “A 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance – 

Broadcast (ADS-B) Reception Model for Air-Traffic-Management Simulations,” AIAA AIAA2006-6614, Keystone, Colorado, August 2006. 

22. Bretmersky, S., and Apaza, R.: “Esitmation of VDL Mode 2 with Hidden Transmitters,” 2009 

IEEE Aerospace Conference, 978-1-4244-2622-5, Big Sky, Montana, March 2009. 

23. RTCA: “Signal-In-Space Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for 

Advanced VHF Digital Data Communications include Compatibility with Digital Voice 

Techniques,” RTCA DO-224B, 2005. 

24. Consiglio, M., et al.: “Human In The Loop Simulation Measures of Pilot Response Delay in a 

Self-Separation Concept of Operations,” 27th International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences, 

ICAS 2010, Nice, France, September 2010. 

25. Lazito, S., et al.: “The Impact of Voice, Data Link, and Mixed Air Traffic Control Environments 

on Flight Deck Procedures,” 2003 ATM 5th Seminar, Budapest, Hungary. 

26. Sheridan, T., et al.: “Human Transient Into-the-Loop Simulation for NGATS,” AIAA Modeling 

and Simulation Technologies Conference and Exhibit, AIAA 2006-6114, Keystone, Colorado, 

August 2006. 

27. FAA: “Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance Requirements 

to Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service; Final Rule,” Part III, 14 CFR Part 91, Department 

of Transportation, 28 May, 2010. 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

2. REPORT TYPE 

Contractor Report

 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Surveillance and Datalink Communication Performance Analysis for 

Distributed Separation Assurance System Architectures

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

NNL11AA05C

 6. AUTHOR(S)

Chung, William W.; Linse, Dennis J.; Alaverdi, Omeed; Ifarraguerri, 

Carlos; Seifert, Scott C.; Salvano, Daniel; Calender, Dale

 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

NASA Langley Research Center 

Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199 

 

 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546-0001

 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

 REPORT NUMBER

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

NASA

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Langley Technical Monitor: Sally C. Johnson

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Unclassified - Unlimited

Subject Category 03

Availability: NASA CASI (443) 757-5802

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

STI Help Desk (email: help@sti.nasa.gov)

14. ABSTRACT

This study investigates the effects of two technical enablers: Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and 

digital datalink communication, of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Next Generation Air Transportation System 

(NextGen) under two separation assurance (SA) system architectures: ground-based SA and airborne SA, on overall separation 

assurance performance. Datalink performance such as successful reception probability in both surveillance and communication 

messages, and surveillance accuracy are examined in various operational conditions. Required SA performance is evaluated as 

a function of subsystem performance, using availability, continuity, and integrity metrics to establish overall required 

separation assurance performance, under normal and off-nominal conditions. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Air traffic; Communication; Separation assurance; Surveillance

18. NUMBER

 OF 

 PAGES

65

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

(443) 757-5802

a. REPORT

U

c. THIS PAGE

U

b. ABSTRACT

U

17. LIMITATION OF 

 ABSTRACT

UU

Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

411931.02.51.07.01 

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT

 NUMBER(S)

NASA/CR-2012-217590

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 

gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 

collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 

Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person 

shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

01- 07 - 2012