FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2023-0422

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STEPHANIE ANNE HOSKINS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

Brantley S. Clark, Jr., Judge.

September 11, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Stephanie Anne Hoskins, appeals her judgment 

and sentences for various drug offenses. She raises four 

arguments on appeal, only one of which merits discussion and 

reversal. We agree with Appellant that the trial court erred in 

failing to conduct an inquiry under Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 

(Fla. 4th DCA 1973), in response to her repeated requests to 

discharge her counsel. Not only did Appellant clearly and 

unequivocally indicate in her written statements to the trial court

that she wished to discharge her counsel and that the alleged 

ineffectiveness arose from the current representation, but she also 

claimed that counsel was incompetent and stated her reasons for 

that belief. See Blanding v. State, 939 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2006) (holding that a Nelson hearing is required (1) when the 
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defendant makes a clear and unequivocal statement that he 

wishes to discharge appointed counsel; (2) the reason for the 

requested discharge is a claim of incompetence; and (3) the alleged 

ineffectiveness arises from the current representation by counsel, 

not past indiscretions, and explaining that the failure to conduct a 

preliminary inquiry into a defendant’s reason for seeking to 

discharge court-appointed counsel is a structural defect in the trial 

that requires reversal as per se error). 

The fact that Appellant’s third pro se motion for appointment 

of substitute counsel did not contain a completed certificate of 

service is not dispositive of this issue given that Appellant’s 

written statements to the trial court satisfied the Blanding

elements. See Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1209 (Fla. 2014) 

(analyzing the appellant’s letter to the trial court in determining 

whether a Nelson hearing was required); Rutledge v. State, 1 So. 

3d 1122, 1125–26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (analyzing the appellant’s 

letters in assessing whether the trial court erred in failing to 

schedule a second Nelson inquiry); see also Hyacinthe v. State, 326 

So. 3d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (reversing and remanding for 

the trial court to conduct a Nelson hearing where, in his three 

letters to the trial court, the appellant claimed that defense 

counsel had not provided him evidence relating to his case, had 

failed to retain a forensic expert to conduct a review of his 

computer, and had failed to inform him of details regarding plea 

discussions with the State); Boaz v. State, 135 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2014) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to 

conduct a Nelson inquiry where the appellant alleged in a letter to 

the court that his trial counsel forced him to enter a plea, promised 

him that the court would sentence him to probation, and failed to 

file other requested motions).

Moreover, we reject the State’s argument that Appellant 

abandoned this issue by not expressing her dissatisfaction with 

counsel at trial. See Jackson v. State, 914 So. 2d 30, 32–33 (Fla. 

2d DCA 2005) (rejecting the State’s argument that the appellant 

waived the Nelson issue by not moving to discharge defense 

counsel again before the start of trial where the appellant filed a 

motion seeking a hearing, he took steps to bring the motion to the 

trial court’s attention, and the trial court ruled on the motion and 

explaining that “[o]nce the trial court ruled on Jackson’s motion, 
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he was not required to repeatedly bring the issue to the trial court’s 

attention in hopes of receiving a different ruling”). 

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse Appellant’s judgment 

and sentences and remand for a new trial. See Maderson v. State, 

29 So. 3d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that the trial 

court’s Nelson inquiry was insufficient and reversing and 

remanding for a new trial); Ewing v. State, 996 So. 2d 871, 872 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Because the trial court did not conduct a 

Nelson hearing after Appellant made specific complaints regarding 

counsel’s performance, we reverse and remand for a new trial”).

REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial. 

LEWIS, M.K. THOMAS, and NORDBY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Ross S. Haine, II, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.