J-A22036-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.R., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: H.R., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 229 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0003030-2017, 

FID: 51-FN-376411-2009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2018

Appellant H.R. (“Mother”) files this appeal from the Order dated and 

entered on December 1, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County Family Court adjudicating dependent her two sons, Q.R., born in 

December 2002, and L.R., born in October 2011 (collectively, the “Children”).

1

Specifically, Mother appeals the finding of abuse as to Q.R. related to two 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

In its Opinion filed on May 31, 2018, the trial court erroneously indicates 

that the instant appeal arises from its December 1, 2017, and December 29, 

2017, Orders involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights. See Trial 

Court Opinion, filed 5/31/18, at 1. 
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indicated reports from August 26, 2017.

2

 After review, we affirm the trial 

court’s order.

The family came to the attention of the Department of Human Services 

(DHS) on August 26, 2017, following reports of Mother’s alleged physical 

abuse of Q.R. N.T. at 9. DHS alleged that Mother had filmed Q.R. 

masturbating with the intent to publish such video on the Internet. Id. at 10-

11. As testified by DHS Intake Worker, Yavonna Shields, there were additional

allegations of prior sexual abuse, untreated mental health issues, and harm 

to family pets related to Q.R.3 Id. at 11-13. 

Notably, Q.R. had been hospitalized for mental health evaluations on 

three occasions since March of 2017 and was at Fairmount Behavioral Health 

at the time of the hearing.4 Id. at 14, 25. Subsequent reports were received 

which included allegations relating to the mental health of Mother; lack of 

____________________________________________

2 While the court expressed approval of DHS’ oral request for the indicated 

Child Protective Services (“CPS”) abuse reports of August 26, 2017, to be 

founded, Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 12/1/17, at 44-47, we observe that 

there was not a written order reflecting a finding of abuse pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6303.

3 Ms. Shields testified to allegations of Mother “hitting and punching” Q.R. 

N.T. at 9-10. Ms. Shields further stated that, while Mother denied physical 

harm or discipline to Q.R., Mother confirmed filming Q.R. “dancing nude, but 

that she did not distribute it.” N.T. at 17-18. Ms. Shields also noted that 

Mother admitted Q.R. had killed his brother’s turtle. Id. at 18.

4 Q.R. reportedly did not wish return to Mother’s care. Dependency Petition, 

11/14/17, at ¶¶5 b, c, i.
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medical care as to Q.R. and L.R. for an extended period of time; physical 

discipline of Q.R.;5lack of treatment for Q.R. for past injuries and sexual 

abuse; Q.R.’s desire to harm animals; Mother’s lack of compliance with the 

safety plan and refusal to accept in-home services and supports; absence of 

a bond between Mother and Q.R.; and the unkempt nature of the home.6 

Dependency Petition, 11/14/17, at ¶¶5 j, k.

DHS filed dependency petitions as to Q.R. and L.R. on November 14, 

2017. An adjudicatory hearing pertaining to these petitions was held on 

December 1, 2017. Mother was present and represented by Elizabeth Larin, 

Esquire. Children, almost fifteen years old and six years old at the time, 

although not present, were represented by a Child Advocate, Brian Johnson, 

Esquire.7 DHS presented the testimony of DHS Intake worker, Yavonna 

____________________________________________

5 Ms. Shields observed scars on Q.R.’s right shoulder, left thigh, and right 

thigh, which Q.R. attributed to Mother’s branding him with a fork as a result 

of his playing with fire. Mother also hit him with a metal broom and burned

him with a curling iron. N.T. at 18-19. 

6 On October 3, 2017, DHS observed “that [Q.R.]’s bedroom lacks a bed, and 

is strewn with clothes and trash; that [Mother] and [L.R.]’s bedroom was 

unkempt and contained a full-size bed on a broken metal frame and a deflated 

air mattress; that the home was unkempt and strewn with trash and dirty 

laundry on the floors; and that there were also several bags of trash and dirty 

diapers in the home.” Id. at ¶5 l.

7 Notably, Attorney Johnson’s office, the Defender’s Association Child 

Advocacy Unit, was appointed by the trial court on November 15, 2017, as 

counsel and guardian ad litem to represent the Children. Such appointment 

was to represent the Children’s interests in connection with proceedings 

related to abuse, dependency, termination of parental rights, adoption and/or 

custody. Order Appointing Counsel, 11/15/17. 
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Shields, for purposes of the adjudication. Prior to the completion of Ms. 

Shields’ testimony, Mother agreed to an adjudication of dependency and 

commitment.8, 9 N.T. at 20. The parties stipulated that had Ms. Shields 

continued to testify she would have testified to the facts set forth in the 

dependency petitions. There was not a stipulation, however, as to the veracity 

of such facts. Id. at 21. Thereafter, the trial court additionally approved DHS’ 

____________________________________________

While this appeal was pending, this Court extended the requirements of In re 

Adoption of L.B.M., 639 Pa. 428, 432, 161 A.3d 172, 174 (2017), and its 

progeny to dependency actions generally. See L.B.M., supra (the issue 

decided was whether 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a), which mandates the 

appointment of counsel for children involved in contested involuntary 

termination of parental rights proceedings, is satisfied by the appointment of 

a GAL provided that the GAL is an attorney.); see also In re T.S., ___ Pa. 

____, 192 A.3d 1080 (2018) (holding that the trial court did not err in allowing 

the children’s GAL to act as their sole representative during the termination 

proceeding because, at two and three years old, they were incapable of 

expressing their preferred outcome.); In re J’K.M., 191 A.3d 907 (Pa.Super. 

2018) (reversing order denying appointment of a separate counsel for 

dependency proceedings where there was a conflict between the child’s best 

interests and legal interests). Instantly, upon our review, we discern no 

conflict between Q.R.’s preference and his best interests. However, the 

preference of L.R. who was six years old at the time of the proceeding in 

question is unknown, and the certified record does not suggest his preference. 

If the trial court determines there is a conflict between his preference and his 

best interests, L.R. must have separate legal counsel to advocate for those 

disparate interests in future proceedings.

8 Attorney Johnson supported the adjudication and commitment of the 

Children. Specifically, in response to inquiry from the trial court, he replied, 

“I am in agreement with the stipulations as to [the Children’s] full commits. 

And the recommendations for the children then for mom. . . .” N.T. at 49.

9 Mother does not challenge the adjudication of dependency on appeal.
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oral request for two indicated CPS abuse reports as to Q.R. from August 26, 

2017, to be founded.10 Id. at 44-47. The certified record, however, does not 

contain a written order reflecting a finding of abuse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6303. Such a finding is not reflected in the court’s December 1, 2017, order 

memorializing adjudication and disposition. Order of Adjudication and 

Disposition – Child Dependent, 12/1/17. Of relevance, the following exchange 

occurred on the record: 

MS. HARRISON: Your Honor, had previously inquired 

about the status of the report. So I don’t know if the [c]ourt wants 

that on the record before mom leaves.

THE COURT: Yes. What’s the status of the reports of DHS 

investigation for August 26th.

MS. HARRISON: Before she leaves.

THE COURT: Counsel’s here.

MS. HARRISON: Okay.

THE COURT: She needs to start making her phone call.

MS. HARRISON: Your Honor, the CPS Report from 8/26/17 

in regard to the hitting, that report is indicated. The additional 

CPS Report with respect to the other issues discussed with the 

[c]ourt will also be indicated.

In addition, there were a number of reports that came in. 

There is a valid GPS from 10/2/2017, which is referenced in the 

____________________________________________

10 The court additionally found that Mother’s adult daughter, N.R., and N.R.’s 

infant daughter, N.M., also resided in Mother’s household and then held 

Mother in custody until N.R. surrendered N.M. to DHS. Id. at 28-44. Mother 

appeals this issue separately at Superior Court Nos. 230 & 232 EDA 2018. 

N.R. and N.M. were not a subject of the instant dependency proceedings and 

appeal.
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petition. And there is still pending CPS Report from 11/22 and 

that matter will still be pending, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So as it stands right now within the last say, 

like, four months I have two indicated reports.

MS. HARRISON: Two indicated and --

MS. SHIELDS: Three indicated, two from 8/26, one from 

10/2 and a valid GPS from 10/3. And there’s a pending CPS.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MS. HARRISON: And we would ask for the indicated 

reports to be founded based on the stipulation and the testimony 

if the [c]ourt would grant.

MS. LARIN: What are you asking?

MS. HARRISON: That the findings --

THE COURT: That the indicated reports --

MS. LARIN: Your Honor, I don’t even have the --

THE COURT: -- be marked founded based on the 

stipulation.

Ms. Larin, I’ll hear from you.

MS. LARIN: I mean, my only objection is that I haven’t 

actually seen those reports. But if it’s based on the stipulation of 

what’s in the petition and if you’re saying what’s in the petition is 

what you’re asking to be founded.

MS. HARRISON: Yes. Yes, correct.

MS. LARIN: That would --

I did not stipulate to the veracity of those, Your Honor.

MS. HARRISON: The [c]ourt can make a credibility 

determination of the testimony, which was on the two CPS Reports 

that was presented at the very least.

THE COURT: Well, actually, when we were on the record 

before counsel indicated that they would stipulate to the 

adjudication, Ms. Shields had already testified to the August 26, 

2017, CPS Report.
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MS. LARIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I think that that dealt with the physical 

abuse or the alleged physical abuse of [Q.R.] by [Mother].

MS. HARRISON: And the videotaping.

THE COURT: And the videotaping.

MS. HARRISON: Which is the same day. It’s a separate 

report.

THE COURT: And it’s a separate report. So those are the 

two reports that did come in. And so, based on that I believe that 

I can make the finding.

MS. HARRISON: Thank you.

THE COURT: In terms of the October 2nd report, and I think 

the October 2nd report had to do with – I don’t know that I got full 

testimony on the October 2nd report.

MS. HARRISON: I’m fine with the two founded reports, 

Your Honor. That’s sufficient.

THE COURT: Okay. That’s fine. So that’s what I feel 

comfortable with doing.

. . . 

N.T. at 44-47.

On December 29, 2017, Mother, through counsel, filed a timely notice 

of appeal as well as a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Rule 

1925(a) Opinion on May 31, 2018.11

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for this Court’s review:

____________________________________________

11 The trial court filed a single opinion addressing the instant appeal involving 

the court’s finding of abuse and Mother’s separate challenge to her 

incarceration.
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1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion by finding child abuse after [Mother] had already been 

involuntarily removed from the [c]ourtroom, so that she was 

unable to present any evidence in her own defense, in violation of 

her rights to due process? 

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion by finding child abuse when [Mother] had not been 

provided notice that the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services intended to pursue a finding of child abuse against her, 

and where the Philadelphia Department of Human Services did not 

indicate that they were requesting a finding of child abuse at the 

outset of the Adjudicatory hearing? 

3. To the extent the trial court based a finding of child abuse on 

counsel’s stipulation at the Adjudicatory hearing, did the trial court 

commit an error of law, abuse of discretion, and violate [Mother]’s 

right to due process? 

4. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion when it based its finding of child abuse on 

uncorroborated hearsay statements, in violation of 23 Pa.C.S.[A.]

§6381(b), the Juvenile Act, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, 

and [Mother]’s right to due process? 

5. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion by finding child abuse where the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the child was abused, as defined by 23 

Pa.C.S.[A.] §6303? 

Mother’s Brief at 7-8.

Our standard of review for dependency cases is as follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we 

review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010) (citations omitted); 

see also In the Interest of L.Z., 631 Pa. 343, 111 A.3d 1164 (2015). “The 
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trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is 

likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the 

evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citations

omitted).

[T]o adjudicate a child dependent, a trial court must determine, 

by clear and convincing evidence, that the child:

is without proper parental care or control, 

subsistence, education as required by law, or other 

care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or 

emotional health, or morals. A determination that 

there is a lack of proper parental care or control may 

be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, 

guardian or other custodian that places the health, 

safety or welfare of the child at risk.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1). “Clear and convincing” evidence has 

been defined as testimony that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in

issue.” In re C.R.S., 696 A.2d 840, 843 (Pa.Super. 1997) 

(citation omitted).

In accordance with the overarching purpose of the Juvenile Act 

“[t]o preserve the unity of the family wherever possible,” see 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1), “a child will only be declared dependent 

when he is presently without proper parental care and when such 

care is not immediately available.” In re R.T., [ ] 592 A.2d 55, 

57 (Pa.Super. 1991) (citation omitted). This Court has defined 

“proper parental care” as “that care which (1) is geared to the 

particularized needs of the child and (2) at a minimum, is likely to 

prevent serious injury to the child.” In re C.R.S., supra at 845 

(citation omitted).

In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa.Super. 2013).
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Under the current version of the CPSL, effective June 12, 2018,

12 child 

abuse is now defined as follows:

(b.1) Child abuse.--The term “child abuse” shall mean 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly doing any of the following:

(1) Causing bodily injury to a child through any recent 

act or failure to act.

(2) Fabricating, feigning or intentionally exaggerating 

or inducing a medical symptom or disease which 

results in a potentially harmful medical evaluation 

or treatment to the child through any recent act. 

(3) Causing or substantially contributing to serious 

mental injury to a child through any act or failure to 

act or a series of such acts or failures to act. 

(4) Causing sexual abuse or exploitation of a child 

through any act or failure to act.

(5) Creating a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury to 

a child through any recent act or failure to act. 

(6) Creating a likelihood of sexual abuse or 

exploitation of a child through any recent act or 

failure to act. 

(7) Causing serious physical neglect of a child.

(8) Engaging in any of the following recent acts:

(i) Kicking, biting, throwing, burning, stabbing or 

cutting a child in a manner that endangers the child. 

____________________________________________

12 The definition of child abuse remained the same as the prior version of the 

CPSL, effective October 28, 2016, to February 20, 2018, in effect on August 

26, 2017. Further, only Subsections (b.1)(8)(vii)(D) and (b.1)(10), which are 

not relevant instantly, were not included in the version of the CPSL, effective 

July 1, 2015, to October 27, 2016, in effect prior to that.
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(ii) Unreasonably restraining or confining a child, 

based on consideration of the method, location or the 

duration of the restraint or confinement. 

(iii) Forcefully shaking a child under one year of age.

(iv) Forcefully slapping or otherwise striking a child 

under one year of age.

(v) Interfering with the breathing of a child.

(vi) Causing a child to be present at a location while a 

violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 7508.2 (relating to 

operation of methamphetamine laboratory) is 

occurring, provided that the violation is being 

investigated by law enforcement. 

(vii) Leaving a child unsupervised with an individual, 

other than the child’s parent, who the actor knows or 

reasonably should have known: 

(A) Is required to register as a Tier II or Tier 

III sexual offender under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.]

Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to registration of 

sexual offenders),11 where the victim of the 

sexual offense was under 18 years of age 

when the crime was committed.

(B) Has been determined to be a sexually 

violent predator under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9799.24 (relating to assessments) or any 

of its predecessors.

(C) Has been determined to be a sexually 

violent delinquent child as defined in 42 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9799.12 (relating to 

definitions).

(D) Has been determined to be a sexually 

violent predator under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9799.58 (relating to assessments) or has 

to register for life under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9799.55(b) (relating to registration).
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(9) Causing the death of the child through any act or failure 

to act.

(10) Engaging a child in a severe form of trafficking in persons 

or sex trafficking, as those terms are defined under 

section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 

2000 (114 Stat. 1466, 22 U.S.C. § 7102).

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(b.1) (footnote omitted). 

Bodily injury is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or 

substantial pain.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(a). Serious mental injury is defined 

as “[a] psychological condition, as diagnosed by a physician or licensed 

psychologist, including the refusal of appropriate treatment, that: (1) renders 

a child chronically and severely anxious, agitated, depressed, socially 

withdrawn, psychotic or in reasonable fear that the child’s life or safety is 

threatened; or (2) seriously interferes with a child’s ability to accomplish ageappropriate developmental and social tasks.” Id. Further, serious physical 

neglect is defined as follows:

Any of the following when committed by a perpetrator that 

endangers a child’s life or health, threatens a child’s well-being, 

causes bodily injury or impairs a child’s health, development or 

functioning: 

(1) A repeated, prolonged or egregious failure to 

supervise a child in a manner that is appropriate 

considering the child’s developmental age and 

abilities. 

(2) The failure to provide a child with adequate 

essentials of life, including food, shelter or medical 

care. 
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Id. Lastly, sexual abuse or exploitation is defined, in part, as “(1) [t]he 

employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child 

to engage in or assist another individual to engage in sexually explicit conduct, 

which includes, but is not limited to, the following: . . . (iv) [a]ctual or 

simulated sexual activity for the purpose of producing visual depiction, 

including photographing, videotaping, computer depicting or filming. . . .” Id.

In In the Interest of J.R.W., 631 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Pa.Super. 1993), 

we explained that, pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation, the Juvenile Act’s 

definition of dependent child subsumed the definition of child abuse outlined 

in the CPSL. Thus, we stated the two laws “must be applied together in the 

resolution of child abuse complaints.” Id. at 1023. We reasoned:

The Legislature intended a detailed and specific definition of abuse 

to leave no doubt as to the capacity of the trial court, which in this 

case can only be the Juvenile Court, to make a finding and 

determination that a child has been abused. In its capacity as a 

trial judge, the Juvenile Court judge will look and must look to the 

above definition of child abuse in a case referred by the child 

protective service agency to the Court under petition for review of 

dependency when child abuse has been alleged.

Id. 

In addition to establishing the pertinent definition of child abuse, the 

court in In the Interest of J.R.W. also stressed that the juvenile court’s 

determination of whether child abuse occurred must be supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. Id. 

[T]he clear and convincing evidence necessary to find 

dependency, has been imposed by the Legislature as the standard 

which the Juvenile Court must apply in deciding abuse cases. . . . 
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There is no conflict, constitutional or otherwise, with the clear and 

convincing evidence standard imposed by the Act to establish child 

abuse. 

Id.; see also In re L.Z., __ Pa. __, 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (2015).

Moreover, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381 provides, in part: 

(d) Prima facie evidence of abuse.--Evidence that a child has 

suffered child abuse of such a nature as would ordinarily not be 

sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the 

parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child shall 

be prima facie evidence of child abuse by the parent or other 

person responsible for the welfare of the child.

As to the August 26, 2017, reports of abuse, the trial court stated:

In the present case, the social worker testified based on her 

investigation following a Child Protective Services report, Q.R. 

showed her scars on his body he attributed to the physical abuse 

of his Mother. Furthermore, the social worker testified Mother 

confirmed she videotaped Q.R. engaged in sexual acts on her 

telephone. Furthermore, Mother admitted she was aware [of] 

Q.R. harming family pets. The social worker testified Mother 

stated allegations of her hitting Q.R. were false. 

Counsel for the Department of Human Services requested the 

indicated Child Protected Services report of August 26, 2017 

alleging physical abuse of Q.R. and videotaping of Q.R. be marked, 

“founded.” Counsel for Mother stipulated to the petition of the 

Department of Human Services and adjudication of Q.R. and L.R. 

The [c]ourt’s ruling and determinations were based on the 

testimony of the social worker.

The [c]ourt reasoned concern of the allegations of physical and 

sexual abuse perpetrated on Q.R. by Mother. The [c]ourt marked 

the indicated Child Protective Services report of August 26, 2017 

as founded based on the testimony and the stipulations.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/31/18, at 4-5 (citations to N.T. omitted). Mother argues

that the trial court entered a finding of abuse without notice and in violation 
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of due process, and on the basis improperly admitted evidence. Mother’s Brief 

at 19-59.

In the case sub judice, when adjudicating Q.R. dependent the trial court 

did not make a finding of abuse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303. Although 

such is arguably apparent from the court’s on-the-record findings, N.T. at 44-

47, the trial court did not include such a finding in its written adjudication, or 

otherwise.

13 Order of Adjudication and Disposition – Child Dependent, 

12/1/17. Hence, an appeal of this issue is not viable. See Pa.R.A.P. 341 (an 

appeal may be taken from an order entered as a final order). 

Further, to the extent Mother argues before this Court that her right to

due process was violated due to lack of notice or the fact that the issue was 

addressed after she was removed from the courtroom, Mother failed to raise 

this claim first with the trial court and, instead, presents it for the first time 

on appeal. Additionally, counsel did not timely challenge that a finding of 

abuse was addressed after Mother had been removed from the courtroom and, 

therefore, outside the presence of Mother. Counsel, who was present and 

remained in the courtroom after Mother was removed therefrom, placed an 

____________________________________________

13 While it is not indicated on the cover sheet of the petition that the petition 

alleges child abuse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303, it certainly is arguable 

from the allegations set forth therein pertaining to the purported physical 

abuse and discipline of Q.R., the filming of Q.R., the failure to comply with the 

recommended mental health treatment, and the failure to provide appropriate 

medical care. Dependency Petition, 11/14/17, at ¶¶5b, c, j, k. 
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objection on the record related to the CPS reports of August 26, 2017, 

involving the alleged abuse of Q.R. by Mother and indicated she had not seen 

the reports. N.T. at 46; however, counsel did not raise a lack of notice or 

failure to raise the issue of abuse in the petition. Thus, Mother has waived 

these claims on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for waiver of issues 

not first raised in lower court); Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 515-16 

(Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 609, 674 A.2d 1073 (1996) (stating:

“[I]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a 

timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings 

before the trial court. Failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental 

error, such as an erroneous jury instruction, will result in waiver of that issue. 

On appeal, the Superior Court will not consider a claim which was not called 

to the trial court’s attention at a time when any error committed could have 

been corrected.”) (citations omitted). 

For the foregoing reasons, Mother’s claims fail, and the trial court’s 

Order adjudicating Children dependent is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

P.J.E. Bender joins the memorandum.

Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/18