Operational Design

Distilling Clarity from Complexity 

for Decisive Action

Jeffrey M. Reilly, PhD

Department of Joint Warfare Studies 

Air Command and Staff College 

Air University Press 

Air Force Research Institute 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2012
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Reilly, Jeffrey M.

Operational design : distilling clarity from complexity for decisive action / Jeffrey 

M. Reilly.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-58566-221-0 (alk. paper)

1. Operational art (Military science) 2. Military planning. 3. Military art and 

science—Decision making. I. Title. 

U162.R36 2012

355.401—dc23

 2012025006

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or views of the 

Air Command and Staff College, the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air University Press 

Air Force Research Institute 

155 North Twining Street 

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6026 

http://aupress.au.af.mil

AFRI

Air Force Research Institute
iii

Contents

List of Illustrations iv

About the Author ix

Preface xi

1 The Process of Operational Design 1

2 Developing an Operational Approach 21

3 Methodology for Understanding and 

Employing Operational Design 31

4 Establishing the Link between Operational 

Design and Decision Analysis 59

5 Operational Design and Counterinsurgency 83

Abbreviations 119

Bibliography 123

Index 131
iv

CONTENTS

Illustrations

Figures

1 Peninsula Campaign, 1862 3

2 Understanding the operational environment 6

3 Mapping actor relationships and systemic links 12

4 Frame-of-reference theory 15

5 Perception of Iranian decision making 16

6 Complexity of Iranian decision making 17

7 Different perceptual patterns 18

8 Macro and micro perceptual patterns 18

9 Egyptian courses of action at the Battle of 

Megiddo in 1479 BC 22

10 Elements of operational design 24

11 Separation of operational design and art in the 

joint operation planning process (JOPP) 26

12 Separation of the 13 elements of operational 

design into distinct operational design and art 

elements and their relationship to the JOPP 27

13 Relationship between operational art and 

design 28

14 Operational design’s cognitive map 32

15 The cognitive map and the four national 

instruments of power 33

16 Relationships among end state, objectives, 

effects, and tasks 38

17 Battle of the Bach Dang River 39

18 Characteristics of a center of gravity 41
v

CONTENTS

19 Systems perspective of operational 

environment 43

20 Critical-factor analysis model 43

21 Relationship between the Iraqi COG at the 

operational level of war and the Kari system 

decisive point during Operation Desert Storm 45

22 Critical-factor analysis of Iraqi command and 

control and the Kari system 46

23 Relationship between the coalition’s COG at 

the strategic level of war and the decisive point 

of Israel during Operation Desert Storm 47

24 Southwest Pacific in World War II: physical 

line of operation 48

25 Operation Overlord: decisive points along 

logical lines of operation 49

26 Transformation of COGs as an operation’s 

objectives change 50

27 Transformation of the relationships among 

the levels of war 51

28 The multifarious nature of arranging 

operations 52

29 Integration of commander-driven 

operational design with the joint operation 

planning process 60

30 Cognitive map outlining an initial strategy 61

31 Notional arrangement of modules into force 

packages 64

32 War gaming by phase 65

33 War gaming by decisive points 66

34 War-gaming sections 67
vi

35 North Vietnamese alteration of strategy, 

1965–72 68

36 Action-reaction-counteraction war-gaming 

sequence 70

37 Notional war-gaming time line for one move 71

38 The DST composed of map graphic and 

synchronization matrix 72

39 DST analysis to commit operational reserve 74

40 Decision support matrix with decision criteria 

for a warning order and execute order 75

41 CCIRs’ direct correlation to decision criteria 

established in the DSM 77

42 CJTF refined cognitive map 78

43 The Vicksburg Campaign 79

44 The classic clash of wills 84

45 The MACV’s systems analysis 85

46 COIN effectiveness: understanding the system 

and demonstrating an enduring commitment 87

47 Map of the operational environment 90

48 Hypothetical Kajaki Dam operational 

environment map 91

49 Traditional operational design and the 

relationships among levels of war 92

50 COIN design and the relationships among 

levels of war 94

51 RIP/TOA has significant impact on objectives 

and operational continuity 96

52 Synchronizing operational design relationships 

among levels of war 98

CONTENTS
vii

53 ISAF’s regional commands 101

54 Key terrain districts in Afghanistan 101

55 Tactical-level COIN design 102

56 Traditional COIN defense patterns 104

57 RF/PF responsibility for rural hamlet security 108

58 Notional COIN DST 112

59 Measuring the governance confidence gap 115

Tables

1 Relationships among national strategic 

end state, military end state, and termination 

criteria 37

2 Identifying centers of gravity 41

3 Annual security-force fatality totals 105

4 Status of the SOI as of September 2009 107

CONTENTS

ix

Dr. Reilly is a retired Army officer with 26 years of active-duty 

service. He began his service as a draftee and served 28 consecutive 

months in Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. His theater-level 

planning and operations experience includes serving as a theaterlevel combined and joint operations officer, Plans division chief, and 

member of the “two major theater war” plans team. He is an adjunct 

faculty member for the NATO School’s Operational Planning Course, 

a frequent speaker at the USAF Weapons Instructor Course, and a 

member of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s Military Education Coordination Council Working Group. Dr. Reilly has also given 

a number of presentations at international defense colleges, including 

the Ethiopian Defense Staff College in Addis Ababa and the Polish 

National Defense University in Warsaw. Additionally, he conducted 

research on design in Afghanistan during 2010 and 2011. He currently serves as director of joint education at the Air Command and 

Staff College.

About the 

Author

xi

Preface

Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained 

by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military 

history, will form a true school of instruction for generals. 

If these means do not produce great men, they will at least 

produce generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the 

natural masters of the art of war.

—Antoine Henri de Jomini 

The Art of War

The exploration of operational design is a transformative venture. 

It represents a tremendous leap in intellectual theory that will have 

far-reaching implications on the future of planning. In spite of its obvious importance, however, design remains shrouded in the inherent 

complexities that cloak the operational level of war and the concepts 

involved in campaign planning. Perhaps even more significant is the 

fact that we have collectively failed to empower the intrinsic relationship between design and decision analysis. The value of design is not 

just providing a mechanism to construct a campaign plan. Its true 

value rests in its fundamental capability to facilitate decision making. 

If approached deliberately, design provides a foundational basis for 

formulating preplanned decision points and creating the structure 

for linking decision analysis to emergent opportunities. Linking operational design with decision analysis substantially reduces the risk 

associated with an operation and increases the probability of a plan 

surviving first contact.

This analysis takes a didactic approach. It attempts to demystify 

the aura surrounding operational design by presenting a theoretical 

framework for comprehending its fundamental precepts. The goals 

of this analysis are threefold: provide a methodological example for 

understanding and applying design, show how design enhances decision making and risk analysis, and investigate the major differences 

between design in major combat operations and design in counterinsurgency (COIN). 

The contents of this study should not be construed as either prescriptive or mechanistic. Warfare is a multifaceted entity conducted 

in evolving operational environments and against complex, adaptive 

adversaries. Design is not a sequential methodology or a simplistic 
xii

PREFACE

checklist. It is a foundational part of operational art that provides the 

crucial element of structure. This heuristic examination of design 

simply searches for a way to explain design’s intricate structural relationships and highlight the intrinsic potential for deliberately crafting decision analysis. When commanders and staffs approach operational design from this perspective, we move one step closer to the 

natural masters of the art of war.

Illustrations were created by the author unless otherwise noted.
Chapter 1

The Process of Operational Design

Operational design’s principal purpose is to distill clarity from complexity for decisive action. This factor is frequently overlooked in the intellectual discourse that surrounds the exploration of design. The reasons 

for this include a tendency to focus on the complexity of operational 

environments and a reticence to link the process of design to a structure 

focused on decision making. Operations invariably occur in multifaceted environments. No commander ever has perfect information, all 

of the resources he or she desires, or enough time. The process of operational design, however, is not about discovering complexity. Design is 

about creating operational vision from complexity and offsetting the 

uncertainty embedded in operations with effective decisions. 

Although there are no precise formulas for developing design,1

 attaining effectiveness requires a structural basis that joint force commanders (JFC) and their staffs can understand and apply. Many contemporary theorists, however, refuse to accept structure as a key 

component of design. They feel structure leads to prescription and 

diminishes the intellectual exploration of each operation’s unique 

mission requirements and environmental characteristics. This perception has a degree of validity, but it is also myopic. As long as JFCs 

and their staffs recognize the iterative nature of planning, differences 

in mission requirements, and distinctive environmental anomalies, 

structure is an invaluable organizational tool. 

Structure simply provides the basic parameters for focusing critical 

thinking and guiding design’s intellectual discourse toward key planning goals.2

 When adequate structure is absent, intellectual discussions founder and critical thinking disintegrates. This impairs the 

ability to judiciously assess the environment, identify the problem requiring resolution, and develop an operational approach that supports commander-level decision making. 

Decision making is centrifugal to design’s structure because it determines who has the initiative and ultimately who wins. Operational 

environments are constantly in a state of change, and when staffs assist commanders in understanding decision criteria and risk mitigation, the commanders are much more likely to act decisively. However, when the design process lacks the structure to focus on decisions, 
2 │ the process of operational design

commanders can fall prey to excessive analysis and potentially catastrophic forms of indecision. A classic illustration of this is Gen 

George B. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign during the American 

Civil War.

At 2:00 a.m. on 22 July 1861, less than a day after the Union’s humiliating defeat at Manassas, Virginia, a telegram directed General 

McClellan to take command of the Army of the Potomac.3

 McClellan 

was far from an average officer. He had studied under Prof. Dennis 

Hart Mahan at the US Military Academy, was versed in Jomini, and 

in 1846 graduated second in a class of 59 cadets. He also participated 

in Gen Winfield Scott’s amphibious landings at Vera Cruz during the 

Mexican War, and in 1855 he was one of three American officers sent 

to Europe to study the Crimean War. McClellan left the Army in 1857 

and by 1860 was the president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. 

When the Civil War began, he was credited with crushing organized 

southern resistance in northwest Virginia through the engagements 

at Rich Mountain and Corick’s Ford. In terms of organizational and 

administrative skills, combat experience, and intellect, McClellan 

personified the exact type of leader needed to regalvanize and lead a 

dispirited force. 

Between July and October 1861, McClellan meticulously organized and trained a fighting force of 120,000 men. McClellan, however, was reluctant to use this force and act decisively. He believed 

that the Confederate forces confronting him outside Washington 

were numerically superior to the army he had forged. To assess the 

Confederate strength, McClellan authorized Allan Pinkerton to conduct reconnaissance missions and espionage behind Confederate 

lines. Pinkerton estimated that the Confederate forces consisted of 

115,000 men and over 300 pieces of artillery. In fact, the Confederate 

forces led by Gen Joseph E. Johnston numbered fewer than 45,000 at 

their peak—less than 40 percent of what McClellan believed was opposing him. By January 1862 President Lincoln was totally dismayed 

with McClellan’s lack of initiative, exclaiming, “If General McClellan 

does not want to use the Army for some days, I would like to borrow 

it provided I could see how it could be made to do something.”4

 President Lincoln and many of the other Union leaders pressed McClellan 

to mount an overland campaign to seize the Confederate capital of 

Richmond. McClellan resisted, however, because in his estimation an 

overland campaign would entail attacking over 100 miles through 

hostile terrain, crossing multiple rivers, and maintaining a tenuous 
the process of operational design │ 3

supply line. To McClellan’s credit he developed one of the American 

Civil War’s most imaginative and ambitious campaign plans. The 

plan focused on leveraging the Union’s naval superiority and achieving an asymmetric advantage over the Confederate forces. Originally 

known as the Urbana Plan, it called for bypassing the Confederate 

forces entrenched around Manassas and Centerville and conducting 

an amphibious assault to seize Richmond. President Lincoln had several major reservations about the risk involved in the plan, and he 

subjected it to several military councils. However, when McClellan 

persisted in advocating his plan, President Lincoln eventually gave it 

tacit approval. 

On 7 March 1862, however, Gen Joseph E. Johnston, forewarned of 

McClellan’s plan, repositioned the Confederate forces around Manassas 

to positions south of the Rappahannock River. When the Confederates 

vacated their defensive positions, reporters went forward and discovered Quaker guns (wooden logs set up to replicate cannons) and defenses that were far from impregnable. Undeterred, McClellan revised 

his plan and sought approval to land Union forces farther south in the 

vicinity of Fort Monroe. On 17 March 1862, a Union naval force of 400 

ships began transporting 121,500 men, 44 artillery batteries, and over 

15,000 horses to the Virginia peninsula (fig. 1).5

Figure 1. Peninsula Campaign, 1862. (Courtesy of Florentine Films)
4 │ the process of operational design

By early April, McClellan had amassed approximately 55,000 soldiers in front of the Confederate defenses at Yorktown. But again 

McClellan was reticent to act. His plan had been disrupted by not 

receiving command of the 12,000-man force at Fort Monroe and the 

loss of McDowell’s Corps, which was redirected to protect Washington, DC. 

In the meantime, the Confederate forces under Gen John B. 

Magruder employed a series of deception operations that convinced 

McClellan the Confederates had a much larger force. In actuality, 

Magruder had a force of fewer than 13,000 men stretched along a 

12-mile line, and his superior General Johnston considered the defenses untenable. On 3 May 1862, before McClellan could attack, 

Johnston began withdrawing the Confederate forces and ordered 

James Longstreet to conduct a delaying action near Williamsburg. 

On 15 May at Drewry’s Bluff, Confederate forces defeated an attempt 

by McClellan to conduct a simultaneous attack using Union naval 

forces along the James River. This tactical setback created a major 

psychological disruption for McClellan. 

As McClellan’s lead forces came within six miles of Richmond, the 

Chickahominy River overflowed its banks and split the Union forces 

before they could attack. The Confederates seized this opportunity 

and attacked McClellan at Seven Pines on 31 May. The battle resulted 

in 790 Union soldiers killed, 3,594 wounded, and approximately 647 

captured. Confederate losses included 980 killed, 4,749 wounded, 

and 405 missing.6

 The most significant casualty was Gen Joseph E. 

Johnston. When General Johnston was wounded, Robert E. Lee took 

command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Although McClellan 

subsequently had numerous opportunities to seize the initiative, he 

persisted in waiting for reinforcements and optimal weather conditions. 

McClellan’s campaign culminated in the Seven Days’ Battles from 

25 June to 1 July 1862. The Union and Confederate forces fought six 

major engagements during this time, and the only Union defeat was 

at Gaine’s Mill. At the battle of Malvern Hill on 1 July 1862, the final 

battle of the campaign, Lee’s forces conducted a series of disjointed 

frontal assaults on Union defensive positions and lost heavily. Confederate losses exceeded 5,300 casualties. In spite of this, McClellan 

refused to counterattack and instead withdrew to Harrison’s Landing 

on the James River. The campaign losses for both sides were appalling. The Confederates suffered 20,614 casualties, and the Union 

forces 15,849. On 3 August 1862 McClellan’s forces began withdraw-
the process of operational design │ 5

ing from the peninsula, thus ending a campaign that could have substantially altered Southern resistance. The effects of McClellan’s campaign, however, were not isolated to the Virginia peninsula. When 

General Lee understood that McClellan’s forces were withdrawing, he 

committed his forces to destroy the Union forces under General Pope 

at the Second Battle of Manassas on 29 and 30 August 1862. 

In retrospect, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign was a viable plan. 

McClellan created a sophisticated plan that used an indirect approach, exploited the Union’s naval superiority, and focused on a key 

decisive point, the Confederate capital of Richmond. McClellan demonstrated exceptional innovation in logistics and naval gunfire support and even attempted to use two observer balloons to provide 

intelligence on enemy movements. His primary faults, however, revolved around over-analyzing his adversary’s capabilities, failing to 

take decisive action, and not conducting a realistic risk assessment. 

Collectively these omissions made McClellan extremely vulnerable 

to not one but a series of Confederate deception operations. Although 

Alan Pinkerton’s inflated intelligence summaries are partially to 

blame for this, the Confederates had exhibited a clear pattern of using 

deception to mask their limited military capacity. They used deception throughout 1861 and 1862 in their defenses immediately outside 

Washington, DC, at Manassas, at Centerville, and again during the 

Peninsula Campaign at Yorktown. The crucial liability in McClellan’s 

campaign design was in McClellan’s own inflexibility and indecisiveness. The outcome of his plan might have been dramatically different 

if he had incorporated better decision making and risk analysis tools 

in his design. 

Understanding the Operational Environment

The process of operational design is an analytical fusion of strategic direction, the operational environment, and the problem requiring resolution. The result of design is the development of an operational approach that engenders flexibility through incisive decision 

making and balanced risk analysis. Understanding the environment 

is the initial step and foundational basis for the entire design process. 

The environment is a multifarious, interactive, and constantly evolving series of systems. It encompasses not only the immediate area of 

operations, but also all areas, actors, and factors that either influence 
6 │ the process of operational design

or have the potential to influence the area of operations. The concept 

of understanding the environment is not new, but the methodology 

has been modified to support a more holistic critical analysis of the 

environment’s systemic interconnectivity. Understanding the environment also yields a structural origin for envisioning key aspects of design such as end-state conditions, objectives, centers of gravity (COG), 

decisive points, lines of operation, and adversary perspectives. 

The construct of framing the environment consists of two interrelated subsystems that foster a shared understanding of the environment’s interconnectivity and a mechanism for identifying the problem 

requiring resolution (fig. 2). The two subsystems are the observed 

system and the desired system.7

 The observed system is an analytical 

depiction of the environment as it currently exists. It consists of regularly interacting, interdependent, and independent elements that affect the joint operations area and ultimately the mission. Planners 

begin framing the environment by examining key factors such as 

principal actors and their interrelationships; cultural relationships; 

historical context; physical geography; instruments of power; elements of power; and political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) elements. 

Launch

Site

P

M

E

S

I

I

Cultural

Environment

Historical

Context

Instruments of 

Power

- Diplomacy 

- Information

- Military 

- Economics

Elements of Power

- Geography

- Population

Environmental

Frame

1910

Japanese Rule

1945

Independence

1950

Korean War

1953

Armistice

1990

Soviet Collapse

1993–94

Nuclear Crisis

1994

Kim Jong Il

1998

Taepodong Test

2005

Nuclear Weapons 

Declaration

2010

Yeonpyeong Island

Observed System

Adversary’s

Desired Political 

End State

Time

Desired 

Political End 

State

Tension

Desired System

Barriers

1955

Juche

1968

Blue

House

Other Actors

(Friendly/Adversary)

Figure 2. Understanding the operational environment
the process of operational design │ 7

The Observed System

There is no exact alchemic prescription for visualizing the observed system because the observed system is a construct of what one 

has the capability to see and understand. The term “observed system” 

does not necessarily convey that what one is observing is the system 

as it actually exists. Not all variables are readily visible or have evolved 

sufficiently to be systemically linked. Some operational environments 

evolve over time and may not be self-evident. An illustration of this is 

Operation Iraqi Freedom during the period 2003–2006. Iraq was engulfed in almost uncontrollable sectarian violence, complex interactions among tribes, clans, and other groups, and international interference by Iran. Not until late 2005 and early 2006 could crucial 

patterns of activity be identified to create the foundation for the allied 

surge’s success. 

Another critical realization is that not all observed systems are 

openly accessible and access to an environment’s systemic information is not always equal. As a result, the accuracy of a depiction of an 

observed system is dependent upon two essential variables: access to 

information and the ability to critically analyze that information. An 

example of this is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 

Most nations have very limited access to North Korea, and this directly affects what can be observed and mapped within the DPRK’s 

environmental context. Concepts such as the DPRK’s juche are superficially understood by the West but have a tremendous impact on 

North Korea’s national “will to act.” First proclaimed by Kim Il-sung 

in 1955, juche has evolved as part socio-political and part religious 

philosophy that justifies major policy decisions.8 Juche serves as an 

unknown determinant in what the West perceives as irrational acts of 

provocation, such as the sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan in 

March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in January 2011. 

The ability to critically analyze information within the observed 

system is equally as important as access to information. When planners develop the observed system, they must be able to analyze available information in depth and comprehend what the information 

implies for operations. For example, the current illiteracy rate in Afghanistan is approximately 72 percent. Although this seems like an 

innocuous bit of information for an underdeveloped nation, it has a 

major effect on operations and mission success. Illiteracy affects operations in Afghanistan in several important ways. First, illiteracy is 
8 │ the process of operational design

the single biggest obstacle undermining the building of effective Afghan security forces. Only 14 percent of the individuals entering the 

Afghan armed forces are literate.9

 Security forces cannot be effective 

unless they can read and write orders and understand basic manuals 

associated with tactics, administration, equipment, and maintenance. 

Literacy is an important enabler to professionalize security forces, reduce corruption, enhance stewardship, and increase recruiting.10 The 

magnitude of Afghan illiteracy presents an incredible challenge for 

the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, and it dramatically slows 

the ability to field Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police 

forces. The NATO Training Mission has made literacy a priority, but 

as of May 2011, only 50 percent of the armed forces were projected to 

be literate at the first-grade level by January 2012.11

The second way illiteracy affects operations in Afghanistan is in 

information operations (IO). If the majority of the population cannot 

read or write, the mechanism used to communicate IO has to be 

modified to accommodate that factor. Traditional IO methodologies 

do not work among illiterate populations. In October 2010 the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) conducted a 

survey of 1,500 men in northern and southern Afghanistan. Sixtyeight percent of the respondents in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces had seen photos of the planes striking the Twin Towers on 9/11. 

However, 92 percent of those respondents could not relate the photos 

to the events of 9/11 or identify the role those events played in international intervention.12 Additionally, it is important to stress that our 

adversaries understand how to leverage illiteracy to support their IO. 

The traditional agent of change in Afghanistan is the mullah. However, many mullahs are either illiterate or functionally illiterate. The 

Taliban exploit this by providing interpretations of written documents such as the Koran to justify acts of violence. 

However, perhaps the most significant implication illiteracy has 

for operations is on the future of a nation. In today’s international 

environment, no nation can compete effectively or be self-sufficient 

without an educated workforce. Illiteracy also implies that decades of 

investment will be required to create that workforce, which should be 

accounted for in the development of end-state conditions.

The intent of highlighting illiteracy is not to dramatize the effects 

of illiteracy but to underline the need to critically analyze all variables 

identified in the observed environment. Access to information is important. However, understanding what the information means is a 
the process of operational design │ 9

vital element in projecting the accuracy of what planners observe. In 

many instances military planners will simply not have the skill required to interpret key variables. Accurately depicting the observed 

system requires an expansive diversity of expertise. It is virtually impossible for military planners to be experts in areas such as international economics, foreign relations, forensics, and ethnography. 

Consequently, it is essential to integrate other government agencies, 

nongovernmental organizations, and specialists as early as possible 

into the design process. It is crucial to meticulously describe the observed system as precisely as possible if planners are going to leverage 

a genuine understanding of the desired system’s potential.

The Desired System

The environment’s desired system analyzes the perceived tension 

between the strategic political direction provided by national or multinational authorities and the adversary’s desired political end state. 

This analysis examines not only the tensions between friendly and 

adversary political end-state conditions but also time, other actors 

capable of influencing the end state, and barriers to the operation. 

A common misperception in the dissection of friendly and adversary desired political end states involves the intricate nature of 

what an actor wants to do and what an actor is willing to do. A 

subtle but significant difference between these two contrasts affects 

the derivation of key planning assumptions, branches, and sequels. 

An illustration of this is China’s theory of unrestricted warfare. In 

February 1999 senior Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang 

Xiangsui published Unrestricted Warfare in response to perceptions 

about US global power projection. Unrestricted Warfare advocates 

going beyond traditional boundaries when necessary to achieve national political objectives. Qiao and Wang describe unrestricted 

warfare as the use of “supra combinations” that transcend the confines of the military sphere: 

These things make it clear that warfare is no longer an activity confined only 

to the military sphere, and that the course of any war could be changed, or its 

outcome decided, by political factors, economic factors, diplomatic factors, 

cultural factors, technological factors, or other nonmilitary factors. Faced 

with the far-reaching influence of military and non-military conflicts in every 

corner of the world, only if we break through the various kinds of boundaries 

in the models of our line of thought, take the various domains which are so 
10 │ the process of operational design

completely affected by warfare and turn them into playing cards deftly shuffled in our skilled hands, and thus use beyond-limits strategy and tactics to 

combine all the resources of war, can there be the possibility that we will be 

confident of victory.13

This text signals a willingness to use cyber warfare, information 

operations, and terrorism to attack both military and nonmilitary 

targets. These targets would include financial institutions, power 

grids, water supplies, and other key infrastructure components. In 

Qiao’s words, “The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are 

no rules, with nothing forbidden.”14

As planners deliberate aspects of what an adversary wants to do 

and is willing to do, they must be cognizant of time. The temporal 

dimension has an effect far beyond being a limited resource. Planning in a time-compressed environment is extraordinarily difficult, 

but time is also crucial in determining how long it will take to achieve 

the desired political end state and how long the effects must last. 

When national or multinational authorities promulgate strategic direction, they must have an acute awareness of the “will” to achieve the 

end state and the conditions necessary to maintain that “will.” Military operations are expensive in terms of lives and financial burden, 

and there is a direct correlation between the level of ambition and 

cost. As the cost of a military operation goes up, the level of ambition 

and “will” goes down. This is a common phenomenon associated 

with most wars, and it is evident in the support for operations in Afghanistan. In 2011 the Congressional Research Service estimated the 

cost of Operation Enduring Freedom at approximately $2 billion per 

week.15 This financial burden, combined with almost 3,000 International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members killed in action, has 

caused a marked decrease in US and coalition support for the war. A 

CNN survey conducted in the United States between 17 and 19 December 2010 revealed that 63 percent of those surveyed opposed the 

war. This is not meant to judge operations in Afghanistan but simply 

to emphasize the fact that planners must understand the impact of 

time on national and coalition support for military operations. 

Another aspect of time planners must consider is the relationship 

between the desired political end state and how long the conditions 

established by military operations will last. A phrase often used to 

describe political end state conditions is “long-term regional stability.” 

The problem is that long-term is never adequately defined. Does longterm mean 10 years, 20 years, or longer? The answer has a major im-
the process of operational design │ 11

pact on the effectiveness of military operations and the development 

of termination criteria. On 27 July 1953 an armistice terminated major hostilities on the Korean peninsula. The armistice created a 

160-mile-long and 2.5-mile-wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) between 

the Republic of Korea and the DPRK. When the armistice was signed, 

North Korea was not able to bring significant effects on the Republic 

of Korea. However, by the early 1990s advances in artillery systems, 

surface-to-surface missiles, and the DPRK’s nuclear program drastically altered regional stability. It is crucial to grasp the fact that longterm regional stability does not necessarily constitute an indefinite 

state of being. 

Just as time affects the desired system, other actors have a dynamic 

capability to influence the political end state. As planners develop the 

construct for the desired system, they should assess the possible effects—both positive and negative—of all actors on desired end-state 

conditions. Some actors will be allies, some overt adversaries, some 

neutral, and some neutral with the potential to intervene. It is absolutely imperative to map actor relationships, understand their systemic links, and develop actions that will set the conditions for 

achieving the political end state. Mapping actor relationships assists 

planners with identifying strategic and operational assumptions and 

guides the development of associated branches and sequels. Additionally, it provides the strategic-level vision for whole-of-government, 

intercombatant command, and multinational coordination. 

Any investigation of systemic actor relationships (fig. 3) must also 

include an examination of how the actors make decisions. Decisionmaking theory is supported by many studies that include the rational 

actor, cognitive, cybernetic, and polyheuristic models. However, actors draw from a diverse set of frames of reference to make decisions, 

and there is no universal decision-making pattern. The key is recognizing the differences in the patterns and their impact on operations. 

Of course, an ally’s decision making can have just as dramatic an effect on an operation as an adversary’s.

In March 2002, the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom hinged 

on the creation of a northern front that would attack Iraq through Turkey. By early 2003, however, US equipment was sitting on ships circling 

in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, waiting for the outcome of negotiations with the Turkish government.16 On 1 March 2003 the Turkish 

Parliament decided in a 264–251 vote to veto the deployment of an 

estimated 62,000 US personnel onto Turkish soil to attack Iraq.17 This 
12 │ the process of operational design

demand probably did not seem unreasonable to most US military personnel because the United States was offering $30 billion in grants and 

loan guarantees and putting pressure on Europe to accept Turkey into 

the European Union. But without intimate knowledge of Turkey, its 

domestic politics, and its strategic concerns, this proposal was extraordinarily unrealistic. The outcome was not only a denial of using Turkey as a northern front, but also severely strained US-Turkish relations.

The last segment of analyzing the desired system is identifying 

barriers to the desired political end state. Determining barriers facilitates analysis of a critical aspect of planning that is often missing: 

expectation management. When a plan is formulated or undergoes a 

major revision, political leaders must understand the full scope of the 

plan’s capabilities and its limitations. This fosters a more realistic examination of planning assumptions and promotes better decision 

making and risk analysis. Barriers exist in many forms, including 

time, force levels, interagency disputes, intergovernmental organizations, and numerous other key factors. As planners identify barriers, 

they must conduct a thorough assessment of the barriers’ impacts on 

the desired political end-state conditions and raise critical issues to 

the political authorities for decisions. A realistic appraisal of barriers 

assists JFCs and their staff with conveying an accurate depiction of 

what can and cannot be accomplished, and it frames expectation 

UN

Stability

HA

Use

DIE

IOPs

Use

DIE

IOPs

May Allow

SPOD/APOD

Use

Aquila

Regional

Hegemony

Must Be Restrained from

Direct Intervention

Alliance

Stability

Energy

Perseus

Stability

COIN

MA

HA

Auriga

Survival

Saggita

Long

Term

Build

Build

Batari

Population

Corvus

Use DIE

IOPs

Deter

Defeat

BLA

Autonomous

State

MO M3

Isolation

Cetus

Dacro

Key Systemic

Links

Vulpecula

Regional

Hegemony

Delphi

Short

Term

Alliance

Adversaries

Neutral

Possible Intervention

Population

Alliance Actions

Block Relationship

Break Relationship

Figure 3. Mapping actor relationships and systemic links
the process of operational design │ 13

management for political leaders. It also provides JFCs with a basis to 

make effective recommendations when political leaders direct a 

change in operational-level resources.

In August 2009, GEN Stanley McChrystal dramatically revised 

Operation Enduring Freedom’s strategy. He transformed the operational focus to population-centric operations, revitalized theater 

command and control, created an ISAF operational headquarters, 

and pushed for an accelerated growth of Afghan security forces. The 

new strategy, however, was confronted by a number of operational 

limitations. The environment was almost totally devoid of critical logistics infrastructure, and the adversary was increasingly emboldened, aggressive, and adaptive. As a result, General McChrystal requested 40,000 additional personnel to execute the strategy. But when 

President Obama reviewed General McChrystal’s strategy, he cut the 

requested forces by 10,000 personnel. This change altered the focus of 

the strategy; however, it maintained essentially the same objectives 

and political expectations. Political leaders expected the revised 

strategy to have the same striking success as the 2007 surge in Iraq. 

By July 2010 political leaders were requesting metrics to assess the 

strategy’s effectiveness, in spite of the fact that the strategy’s forces 

had not even fully closed in the theater. The result was a political 

miscue that emboldened insurgent efforts. The president announced 

his intent to initiate a withdrawal of forces in 2011 without meeting 

the operational conditions necessary for a withdrawal. This message 

was later corrected, but to the Taliban, Haqqani network, and other 

insurgent groups, it was an informational windfall. The point is that 

barriers and expectations must be reassessed during any reframing of 

the environment or revision of the strategy and not just during the 

development of the strategy. 

The process of examining barriers during the analysis of the desired system is directly linked to correctly identifying the problem 

requiring resolution. As obvious as it seems, operational limitations 

significantly affect the ability to solve the problem identified by political leaders. Excessive operational limitations may not only prevent 

mission success but also precipitate a new set of problems that political 

leaders are unprepared to deal with or accept. Consequently, correctly identifying the core problem that actually requires resolution is 

a centrifugal component of the design process.
14 │ the process of operational design

Identifying the Problem Requiring Resolution

One of the most important parts of the analysis of the observed 

and desired systems is the identification of the specific problem requiring resolution. Identifying the problem and understanding its 

surrounding context are vital to determining how to solve the problem. This step assists planners with recognizing what is possible and 

what is not possible. Additionally, it mitigates the possibility of solving the wrong problem. 

Identifying the problem requires a comprehensive exploration of 

the contextual and environmental factors causing the tension between the desired political end states of friendly parties and those of 

adversaries. Isolating the underlying causes of tension empowers a 

much more precise methodology of what needs to be acted upon to 

achieve the desired political end state. To do this effectively planners 

must understand the potential to change the environmental conditions, the operational limitations, and the full implications of changing the environmental system. Grasping the environment’s potential 

is important because the action taken may not only solve the problem 

but also prevent future problems. Identifying operational limitations 

is crucial to determining such factors as prohibited and required military actions, rules of engagement, diplomatic support agreements, 

and host nation requirements. Changing any contextual feature of 

the environment has second- and third-order effects on the environmental system. Planners need to project the potential implications of 

desired changes and screen those changes for possible threats to US 

national, coalition national, and regional national interests. 

When analysis of the problem is completed, the result should be a 

clear, concise problem statement identifying the problem being solved 

and how it will be resolved. Of course the entire design process is iterative, and the problem statement may require several revisions to 

reach maturity. An example of an initial problem statement might be:

Country X’s overt military actions in the Caspian region threaten access to 

vital energy resources and international economic stability. The coalition 

seeks freedom of access to key energy resources and the establishment of the 

conditions necessary for long-term regional stability. Country X must be deterred from further aggression or risk coalition military intervention. Coalition forces will defend the territorial integrity of Country Y and ensure international access to energy resources.
the process of operational design │ 15

Frame-of-Reference Theory

Before JFCs and their staff begin the development of an operational approach, they must validate their frame of reference for both 

the operational environment and problem identified. Frames of reference are double-edged swords. All individuals naturally use schemata to frame contextual elements and problems (fig. 4).18 Consequently, in complex environments there is an innate tendency to 

focus on systemic similarities of previously learned schemata rather 

than identifying and investigating systemic anomalies. Isolating and 

examining the operational environment’s systemic anomalies is an 

intrinsic element of forming schemata. The challenge is to ensure that 

the schemata used in the design process are correct. 

Dialectical Tension

Schemata

Observation

Original

Frame of Reference

New Schemata

New Observation

Original

Frame of Reference

Figure 4. Frame-of-reference theory

One of the most common mistakes planners make is “mirror imaging,” especially in unfamiliar cultural contexts. When the mind 

confronts new surroundings, it imposes schemata on the incoming 

sensory data. Noted developmental psychologist Jean Piaget theorized 

that the mind either assimilates new sensory data into existing schemata or modifies the schemata to incorporate the new data.19 Both of 

these constructs have a certain basis of validity, but identifying the 

best way to combine data and schemata is situation-dependent. The 

key is to understand the dialectical tension between these two constructs and how they empower critical thinking skills. 
16 │ the process of operational design

An illustration of mirror imaging is an American attempting to 

comprehend Iran’s national-level decision making (fig. 5). To most 

Americans, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the president of Iran and as 

such is Iran’s principal decision maker. The American democratic 

ideal influences this perspective because we view officials elected by 

the electorate as the key components of the national decision-making 

system. As a result, we might perceive Iran’s president, Parliament, 

and Assembly of Experts as the integral elements of all systemic political decision making. The danger of this point of view is it relegates 

key Iranian appointed officials such as the supreme leader, Guardian 

Council, Expediency Council, and Cabinet to mere influencers.

Parliament

President Cabinet

Assembly of Experts Supreme Leader Expediency Council

Head of Judiciary

Armed Forces

Guardian Council

Screens Candidates

Elected by Electorate Appointed by

Elected Institutions Unelected/Appointed

Figure 5. Perception of Iranian decision making

Iran’s political decision-making system possesses a far more intricate 

nature. Figure 6 provides a cursory depiction of just how complicated 

Iranian decision making is in reality. Iran is a theocratic democracy, and 

the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, exerts a central role in all 

decision making. As the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei (not the 

president) is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and he alone has 

the power to declare war, neutrality, or peace. Additionally, the supreme 

leader appoints and can dismiss the supreme commander of the Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps, the leaders of the judiciary, and even the 

state media networks. He also has the authority to appoint six of the 

Council of Guardians’ 12 members. This council is a dominant force in 

the oversight of Iranian parliamentary activities and determines which 

candidates are qualified to run for public office. The supreme leader’s 

power base is amplified in two other significant ways. He controls the 

Expediency Council, which mediates disputes between Parliament and 

the Council of Guardians, and he has approximately 2,000 clerical field 

operatives positioned throughout the government.20
the process of operational design │ 17

When properly understood, these details provide a much different 

perspective on Iranian planning, decision, and execution cycles. 

When planners use frames of reference, they must ensure the frames 

are accurate visualizations or at least acknowledge key information 

voids and adjust their schemata. Thus it is important to leverage interagency analysis and seek assistance from specialists. 

Understanding Gestalt Theory

Another critical aspect of understanding frames of reference is 

Gestalt theory. Christian von Ehrenfels and other German psychologists such as Max Wertheimer used Gestalt theory to explain perceptual patterns of wholeness and totality. This concept attempts to describe how people organize visual elements as a whole and stresses 

that what they actually see may not be the sum of the parts. In essence, Gestalt theory questions the derivation of patterns of wholeness and advocates a deeper critical analysis of perceptions. In Max 

Wertheimer’s words, “Here too we find science intent upon a systematic collection of data, yet often excluding through that very activity 

precisely that which is most vivid and real in the living phenomena it 

studies. Somehow the thing that matters has eluded us.”21

Figure 6. Complexity of Iranian decision making

Supreme Leader Commander in chief of armed forces

Heads intelligence and security

Appoints and dismisses judiciary

Assembly of Experts

Elects Supreme Leader

President

Nominal head of Supreme National 

Security Council

Determines economic policies

Expediency Council

Mediates disputes between

Parliament and 

Council of Guardians

Council of 

Guardians

Examines all laws passed by 

Parliament

Judiciary

Appointed

Armed Forces

Regular Army

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Supreme Leader Commander in chief of armed forces

Heads intelligence and security

Appoints and dismisses judiciary

Assembly of Experts

Elects Supreme Leader

President

Nominal head of Supreme National 

Security Council

Determines economic policies

Expediency Council

Mediates disputes between

Parliament and 

Parliament Council of Guardians

Unicameral

8 Vice Presidents 22 Ministers Council of 

Guardians

Examines all laws passed by 

Parliament

Judiciary

Appointed

Armed Forces

Regular Army

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Electorate Elects

Determines who can 

run for Assembly of 

Experts

Elected by Electorate

Iranian Decision Making
18 │ the process of operational design

The significance of Gestalt theory is that as we develop the framework for the operational environment’s observed and desired systems, 

we must be cognizant of different ways to visualize systemic characteristics. Figures 7 and 8 show examples of this. In figure 7, one individual may see a vase, and another may see two heads facing each 

other. In figure 8, a person with a macro perspective sees the letters L and 

H. However, a person with a micro perspective may see a collection of 

small Hs forming the letter L and small Ls forming the letter H. One 

of these patterns represents reality, and the other is an aberration. 

H 

H 

H 

H

H 

H 

H H H H H H H

H 

H 

H 

H

H 

H 

H H H H H H H

L L

L L

L L

L L L L L L L L

L L

L L

L L

L L

Figure 7. Different perceptual patterns

Figure 8. Macro and micro perceptual patterns
the process of operational design │ 19

Gestalt analysis emphasizes the criticality of viewing the environment from multiple perspectives to form a metacognitive understanding of the environment’s complexity and interconnectivity. JFCs 

and their staffs must understand this because it has a tremendous effect on the development of the operational approach. If the perceived 

observed and desired systems are inaccurate, the discrepancies will 

have a cascading impact on the operational approach’s end-state conditions, objectives, centers of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, phasing, and assumptions. 

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. de Czege, “Systemic Operational Design,” 2.

2. This monograph defines critical thinking as a judicious evaluation of commonly accepted beliefs and assumptions.

3. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 348.

4. Stackpole, From Cedar Mountain to Antietam, 1.

5. Sears, George B. McClellan, 167–69. 

6. Johnson and Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, The Struggle 

Intensifies, 219.

7. Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine Pamphlet 10, Design in Military Operations, 8.

8. Ch'oe, Lee, and de Bary, eds., Sources of Korean Tradition II, 419.

9. US Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security, 24.

10. US Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability 

in Afghanistan, April 2011, 20.

11. Mora, “Half of Afghan Military Forces Won’t Achieve 1st Grade Literacy 

Level by 2012.”

12. International Council on Security and Development, Afghanistan Transition, 

26–28.

13. Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 191.

14. Ibid., 2.

15. See Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror 

Operations since 9/11, 28–31.

16. Kapsis, “The Failure of U.S.-Turkish Pre-War Negotiations.”

17. See Mintz, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions?,” 8.

18. See Bartlett, Remembering.

19. See Piaget and Inhelder, Memory and Intelligence.

20. Maleki, “Decision Making in Iran’s Foreign Policy.” See also Afrasiabi and 

Maleki, “Iran’s Foreign Policy after 11 September.”

21. Wertheimer, “Gestalt Theory.”

Chapter 2

Developing an Operational Approach

The operational approach is the “commander’s description of the 

broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end 

state.”1

 When JFCs and their staffs initiate the development of an operational approach, they must recognize the fundamental differences 

between the functions of operational design and the functions of operational art. The function of operational design is important because 

it determines how design relates to operational art and integrates into 

the joint operations planning process. Design is part of operational 

art, but the elements of design operate as discrete entities during the 

development of an operational approach. Effective planning and 

problem-framing relies on an unbiased approach to mission analysis. 

When operational art dominates the elements of design too early in the 

planning process, it unduly influences the process with predisposed 

courses of action (COA). This stifles critical thinking and prevents 

the development of innovative solutions to problems. 

The operational approach to design is not new. It is as old as warfare itself. When man first used a stick to sketch an operational concept in the dirt, he developed the ability to cognitively link objectives with maneuver. In 1479 BC one of Egypt’s greatest pharaohs, 

Thutmose III, used operational design to subdue a rebellion of 

Canaanite kings and princes at Megiddo.2

 Generally regarded as the 

first recorded battle in history, Megiddo provides crucial insights into 

the development of operational design and the integration of operational art. Based on what we know about Thutmose’s campaign, his 

operational design reflected a remarkably sophisticated analysis of 

end-state conditions, objectives, effects, center of gravity, assumptions, and phases.3

The battle at Megiddo originated in a Canaanite quest to topple 

Egyptian regional domination. Encouraged by Egyptian domestic 

difficulties, the king of Kadesh formed a coalition of states to contest 

Egypt’s hegemony. The coalition selected the key terrain in and 

around the walled fortress of Megiddo to defend its interests. This 

terrain included the vital lines of communication running from 

Egypt to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. When the Egyptians discovered this threat to their national interests, their army conducted a 
22 │ developing an operational approach

phased march of approximately 230 miles to the Yehem crossroads. 

At Yehem, Thutmose III held a war council to assess intelligence 

gathered on the Canaanite dispositions and to determine the best 

course of action. Thutmose had three possible axes of advance to attack the Canaanite coalition (fig. 9). The first was to the north toward 

Yokneam. This axis was defended by coalition infantry. The second 

was in the center leading directly into Megiddo. It was lightly defended with nearby chariots, but the terrain was restrictive and not 

favorable for deploying forces if attacked during the march. The third 

was to the south, and like the north axis, it was defended by infantry.

Megiddo 

Egyptian 

Council 

at Yehem 

Yokneam 

Taanakh 

Infantry 

Infantry 

Chariots 

Egyptian 

Axis of 

Advance 

Aruna 

Figure 9. Egyptian courses of action at the Battle of Megiddo in 1479 BC. 

(Based on Yohanan Aharoni, Carta’s Atlas of the Bible [Jerusalem: Carta, 

1964]: 32.)
developing an operational approach │ 23

During the mission analysis, Thutmose’s generals were predisposed to eliminate any COA associated with the center axis of advance. They begged Thutmose not to select the center route because 

of the restrictive terrain. Egyptian records reflect this opposition: 

“Let our victorious lord proceed according to the design of his heart 

therein, but do not cause us to march upon this impassable road.”4

Thutmose, however, overruled his generals’ objections. Based on 

intelligence reports, he had an accurate assessment of where the Canaanites had deployed their forces. He determined that attacking 

along the center axis would surprise his adversaries and allow him to 

crush the decisive point of Megiddo. Leading the Egyptians himself, 

Thutmose attacked along the center axis, catching the Canaanite coalition by surprise. This allowed Thutmose to deploy his forces in 

front of Megiddo before the Canaanite forces could redeploy and engage the Egyptians. When the two forces finally met, the Egyptians 

routed the Canaanites so fast that their retreating forces had to be 

hauled up the walls of Megiddo because the gates to the city were 

locked shut. The Egyptian attack, however, bogged down when the 

Egyptian forces stopped to pillage the coalition’s encampment. This 

critical delay afforded the Canaanite forces the opportunity to escape into the fortress of Megiddo, robbing the Egyptians of a quick, 

decisive victory. The Egyptians laid siege to the city for five months, 

and eventually Megiddo surrendered. In spite of the lengthy siege, 

Thutmose achieved his desired strategic end-state conditions. His 

reign was never challenged by another rebellion, and the defeat of the 

coalition’s forces forced other towns in the Syrian zone of influence to 

submit to Egyptian hegemony.5

Since Megiddo, the basic intellectual framework that military 

planners have used throughout history has changed very little. The 

contemporary explanation of operational design, however, remains 

unclear. Current joint doctrine establishes a clear purpose for operational design, but the analytical process underpinning joint planning 

remains vague.6

There are two principal reasons for this. First, although operational design is primarily an intellectual exercise based on experience 

and judgment, it has a defined structural component. Second, joint 

doctrine does not distinguish operational design and operational art 

as two distinct entities. In 1995 the keystone document Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, introduced the 14 facets 

of operational art. In subsequent iterations of joint doctrine, these 
24 │ developing an operational approach

facets evolved into the 13 elements of operational design.7 As a result, 

operational design and art have become blended with little explanation of their inherent distinctions. The current JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, define operational design 

and operational art as follows:

[Operational design is] the conception and construction of the intellectual 

framework that underpins joint OPLANs and their subsequent execution. . . .

Operational design extends operational art’s vision with a creative process that 

helps commanders and planners answer the ends–ways–means–risk questions.8

 (emphasis in original)

[Operational art is] the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations and organize and employ military 

forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.9

The thought process helps commanders . . . visualize how best to effectively 

employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission.10

These definitions present operational design and art as two separate but related functions. However, current doctrine does not delineate 

which of these elements relate to design and which relate to art. Using 

the above definitions, operational design elements should assist commanders and their staffs in creating a planning framework, and operational art elements should support the development of strategy 

during the COA-development step of the joint operation planning 

process (JOPP). Figure 10, based on JP 5-0, comes very close to illustrating this separation.

Termination 

Military end state 

Objectives 

Effects 

Center of gravity 

Decisive points 

Lines of operation and lines of effort 

Direct and indirect approach 

Anticipation 

Operational reach 

Culmination 

Arranging operations 

Forces and functions 

Elements of Operational Design 

Figure 10. Elements of operational design. (Based on JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-18.)
developing an operational approach │ 25

Why is it so important to separate these two concepts? The principal 

reason is to have a focused organizational structure that unambiguously articulates the preliminary vision for the operational approach. 

Dividing operational design and art into two separate entities provides commanders and their staffs with an impartial organizational 

structure for problem framing during the initiation and missionanalysis steps of the JOPP. Prematurely introducing complex operational art concepts such as anticipation, forces and functions, and 

operational reach into the mission-analysis step detracts from problem framing by developing a solution before the full nature of the 

problem has been determined. The significance of this organizational 

shift to separate operational design and art is that it reduces the tendency to interject preconceived solutions and strategies into the 

JOPP’s mission-analysis step. This approach maximizes the potential 

for developing unbiased COAs. Once operational design creates the 

framework for informed vision, planners can use strategy to integrate 

operational art into the JOPP’s COA-development, analysis, and 

comparison steps.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines strategy as a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational 

objectives. Strategy provides a crucial mechanism for integrating operational design and art by outlining the planning guidance for COA 

development. Figure 11 shows a methodology for integrating operational design and art into the JOPP. This methodology uses operational design to begin structuring the operational approach in an unbiased environment during the JOPP’s initiation and mission-analysis 

steps. Once the initial operational approach is framed, the JFC can 

introduce strategy to integrate operational art into the structure established by the elements of operational design. The challenge presented in our current joint doctrine is determining which elements of 

operational design support problem framing and which support 

strategy development.

An analysis of the 13 elements of operational design and the requirements for developing an operational approach reveal eight 

inter related elements that provide a basic cognitive framework for 

problem framing. These elements are end state, objectives, effects, 

centers of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, arrangement of 

operations, and assumptions. Seven of these eight elements are listed 
26 │ developing an operational approach

in joint publications as doctrinal elements of operational design. The 

only element not so listed is assumptions. Assumptions are included 

here as an element of operational design since they provide the core 

framework for all plans and are arguably the primary reason for most 

plans’ failures. Assumptions help frame what a plan is going to do and 

what it is not going to do. They articulate major decision points and 

catastrophic risk and identify the branches and sequels required to 

mitigate risk.

In contrast to the design elements, the operational art elements 

focus on the development of strategy. They integrate with operational 

design during the JOPP’s COA-development step to communicate 

the organization and employment of forces. These elements assist 

JFCs in formulating an initial strategy and providing guidance to the 

staff for COA development during the JOPP. 

This deliberate bifurcation of operational design and art simplifies 

their integration into the JOPP by delineating key responsibilities 

along the lines of problem framing and military strategy development (fig. 12). This action does not relegate operational art to a subordinate position below operational design. In actuality, operational 

design is subordinate to operational art (fig. 13). When national or 

multinational leaders provide strategic direction, JFCs and planners 

Receive Strategic Direction

Approval

Conduct JIPOE

Develop Mission Statement

Present Mission Analysis Brief

Issue Planning Guidance

Develop COA Options

Identify Decision Points

Determine Governing Factors

Compare COAs to Governing Factors

Present COA Decision Brief

Issue Plan/Order

Operational Art

Integration of 

Operational Design

and

Operational Art

Operational Design

Operational Art

and Design Continue 

through Planning and 

Execution

Initiation

COA Development

COA Analysis / War Gaming

COA Comparison

COA Approval 

Plan/Order

Mission Analysis

Figure 11. Separation of operational design and art in the JOPP
developing an operational approach │ 27

use operational art to build the design structure. This structure then 

provides the analytical basis for understanding the environment, 

identifying the problem, and developing an operational approach. 

Design assists JFCs with creating a cognitive map to visualize the theater strategy and provide the guidance necessary for COA development. JFCs and planners use operational art to develop COAs based 

on the vision embodied in the commander’s design. As planners analyze and war-game COAs, they can identify key preplanned decisions 

that leaders must make. These activities also present a focal point to 

formulate emergent opportunities that exploit projected environmental conditions or enemy actions. This deliberate integration of 

operational art and design forms a critical foundation for examining 

risk, comparing COAs, and selecting a COA. When a COA is finally 

selected, the JFC uses operational art and design to refine the cognitive map and solidify the operational vision that synchronizes tactical 

actions to accomplish operational objectives.

Recently several eloquent articles have described the complex origins and interactions among strategy, operational art, and design. 

However, these intellectual endeavors have little utility unless comFigure 12. Separation of the 13 elements of operational design into 

distinct operational design and art elements and their relationship to 

the JOPP

Problem Framing Strategy Development

COA

Approval

Joint Operation Planning Process

Initiation 

Mission Analysis

Plan/Order

COA

Development

Analysis

Comparison

Operational Design

End State

Objectives

Eects

Centers of Gravity

Decisive Points

Lines of Operation/Eort

Arrangement of Operations 

Assumptions

Operational Art

Direct vs. Indirect

Operational Reach

Anticipation

Culmination

Forces and Functions

Strategy

Concept

of

Operation
Operational 

Art 

Operational 

Design 

- Understand the Environment - Dene the Problem - Develop Operational Approach 

— Create Initial Cognitive Map

Develop COAs 

Identify Preplanned 

Decisions 

Formulate Emergent 

Opportunities 

Rene Cognitive Map

Rene Operational 

Vision 

Frame the 

Problem 

National/Multinational 

Strategy 

Direct Tactical Execution 

Reframe the 

Problem 

around Key 

Decisions 

Receive 

Strategic 

Direction 

Operational Art 

Synchronizes Tactical 

Actions to Accomplish 

Operational Objectives 

Operational Design Assists 

Operational Art in Linking a 

Series of Major Operations 

to Accomplish Strategic 

Objectives by Providing a 

Cognitive Vision 

Establish Vision for 

Theater Strategy 

Build Decision 

Support 

Template 

Develop Decision 

Support Matrix 

Figure 13. Relationship between operational art and design
developing an operational approach │ 29

manders and their staffs have a design methodology they can both 

understand and use. As this analysis continues, it describes a methodology that can be used to comprehend design and employ it to 

provide clarity in visualizing the operational approach.

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-5.

2. For a description of Megiddo, see Fuller, A Military History of the Western 

World, vol. 1, 4–7.

3. Gabriel and Boose, Great Battles of Antiquity, 53.

4. Nelson, “Battle of Megiddo,” 22. See also Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts 

Relating to the Old Testament, 234.

5. Gabriel and Boose, Great Battles of Antiquity, 59.

6. Dickson, “Operational Design,” 23.

7. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, III-10.

8. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, II-4.

9. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, GL-13. 

10. Ibid., I-5.

Chapter 3

Methodology for Understanding 

and Employing Operational Design

A number of methodologies of varying complexity and focus explain how to construct an operational design for a campaign plan. 

Examples include the effects-based approach to operations, systemic 

operational design, and numerous fusion models. The methodology 

described in this analysis rests on the eight interrelated design elements discussed in chapter 2. It is presented in a sequential format 

based on conventional operations to provide foundational knowledge for understanding operational design’s basic framework. However, it should be emphasized that this methodology is not prescriptive. 

Operational design is an iterative process and not necessarily a sequential 

methodology. Additionally, different types of operations have distinctive effects on how JFCs and their staffs develop supporting operational designs to frame problems and enhance decision making.

One of operational design’s key products is a cognitive map. This 

map assists JFCs and their staffs with envisioning an entire operation. 

It also allows them to assess the congruency of critical links among 

the national strategic end state, military objectives, effects, centers of 

gravity, decisive points, and lines of operation.

The cognitive map evolves through several iterations as the JOPP 

progresses. During the JOPP’s initiation and mission-analysis steps, 

the JFC develops a basic map that outlines the initial campaign strategy 

and provides guidance to the staff on course-of-action development. 

As the vision for a campaign unfolds during the JOPP’s course-ofaction analysis, comparison, and selection steps, a more detailed map 

should emerge that depicts phases and even stages within phases. 

There is no specified format for the cognitive map. The format should 

support the commander’s ability to visualize the entirety of the campaign or operation. It should also assist the JFC in identifying critical 

decision points and serve as a tool to communicate his vision to civilian leaders, allies, and component commanders. Additionally, the 

format should aid the staff in checking the links among the elements 

of operational design and ensure the best possible alignment and arrangement of operations for accomplishing the national strategic end 
32 │ methodology for employing design

state. Figure 14 gives an example of a simplified cognitive map and 

the alignment of key elements of design.

End 

State

Eects

Centers of Gravity

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

Assessment of 

National 

Strategic End 

State 

Determination of 

Military End State and 

Termination Criteria

Assumptions:

Time

Politics

Forces

Enemy

Line of Operation/Eort 

Phase I Phase II Phase III 

Decisive Points 

Line of Operation/Eort 

Decisive Points 

Line of Operation/Eort 

Decisive Points 

Objectives

Figure 14. Operational design’s cognitive map

Because there is no standardized interagency planning process, 

the cognitive map also provides a valuable communication mechanism 

for interagency coordination. Arraying the elements of operational 

design in a cognitive framework conveys key military operational 

concepts in a format that diverse agencies can grasp relatively quickly. 

It also presents a methodology for integrating the four national instruments of power linking the strategic and operational levels of operations, as well highlighting interagency decision points (fig. 15).

Understanding End State, 

Objectives, Effects, and Tasks

The point of origin for developing an operational approach is an 

analysis of strategic guidance and a comprehension of the national 

strategic end state. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines end state as “the 

set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.”1

 The gravity of employing the military instrument of 

power, however, mandates a clear understanding of strategic purpose 

bounded by a national strategic end state and a military end state. The 

president and the secretary of defense provide strategic guidance es-
methodology for employing design │ 33

tablishing a set of national strategic objectives that should culminate 

in the accomplishment of the national strategic end state. The national strategic end state describes the president’s political, informational, economic, and military vision for the region or theater when 

operations conclude.2

 These broadly expressed conditions provide 

the basis for determining the military end state and the termination 

criteria necessary for concluding military activities.

However, the derivation of strategic guidance is extraordinarily 

complex and dynamic. Guidance originates from numerous sources, 

the most common of which are strategic-level policy statements. 

These statements include the National Security Strategy, National 

Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and national 

security presidential directives. For example, the 2008 National Defense Strategy outlines five objectives:

•   Defend the Homeland

•   Win the Long War

•   Promote Security

•   Deter Conflict

•   Win our Nation’s Wars3

Strategic guidance can also be derived indirectly from interagency 

and even international directives, such as United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions. Additionally, strategic direction can evolve 

Diplomatic

Economic

Information

Military

Strategic

End State

Strat 

CoG

Op

CoG

Conditions for Success

Strategic 

End State

Strat 

CoG

Op 

CoG

Obj

Obj

Obj

Obj

Conditions for Success

Figure 15. The cognitive map and the four national instruments of power
34 │ methodology for employing design

out of executive-level addresses to the nation. One example of the latter 

is the development of the national strategic objectives forming the 

original end-state conditions for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

On Tuesday, 11 September 2001, the history of our nation changed. 

Between the hours of 8:45 and 10:00 a.m., terrorists hijacked four 

commercial airplanes and crashed two into the World Trade Center,

one into the Pentagon, and one into a field in rural Pennsylvania. 

Pres. George W. Bush articulated the end-state conditions for the ensuing OEF in a joint session of Congress on 20 September. Those conditions were broadly described as the destruction of terrorist training 

camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of al-Qaeda 

leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.4

 By 

the time the first strikes of OEF occurred on 7 October, the end-state 

conditions had expanded. On that date, Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld amplified the president’s guidance at a Department of Defense news conference.5

 He stated that the operation’s objectives were 

to convince Taliban leaders that the harboring of terrorists is unacceptable, acquire intelligence on al-Qaeda and Taliban resources, develop 

relations with groups opposed to the Taliban, prevent the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists, and destroy the Taliban military, allowing opposition forces to succeed in their struggle. Also, 

military force would help facilitate the delivering of humanitarian 

supplies to the Afghan people. The initial phase of OEF demonstrates 

the acute situational awareness JFCs and their staffs must have to 

plan effectively. Planners must understand that end-state conditions 

are dynamic and often emanate from nontraditional sources.

Another illustration of the complexity involved in assessing and 

understanding the national strategic end state is the development of 

objectives for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Initially, 

when Pres. George H. W. Bush addressed Congress on 5 August 1990, 

three days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the US national policy objectives in the Persian Gulf were to:

•   Bring about the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait

•   Restore Kuwait’s legitimate government

•   Ensure the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations

•   Ensure the safety of American citizens abroad
methodology for employing design │ 35

By 15 January 1991, on the eve of initiating air operations, these 

objectives had changed dramatically because of Iraq’s refusal to withdraw from Kuwait and the UN’s approval to use force. The national 

strategic end-state conditions evolved into:

•   Destroy  Iraqi  capability to produce  and  employ weapons of

mass destruction

•   Destroy Iraqi offensive military capability

•   Cause the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait

•   Restore the legitimate government of Kuwait6

During the iterative planning process, military planners have an 

obligation to seek clarification on unclear or ambiguous national 

strategic objectives that form the basis for the desired end state. Planners must assess the plausibility of attaining strategic, operational, 

and tactical objectives and understand exactly what they mean. For 

instance, if an objective says “reduce weapons of mass destruction,” 

does this mean reduce weapons of mass destruction by a percentage, 

or destroy their employment and production capabilities? Another 

example is “halt enemy forces.” Does this mean simply stop the enemy 

forces, or is the expectation to bring the enemy to a culmination 

point where he can no longer mount offensive operations or attain his 

objectives? The repercussions of misunderstanding the desired strategic end state are dramatically significant because of its link to the 

military end state and other corresponding objectives.

The military end state is military specific. It describes the national 

strategic end-state conditions that the military instrument of power 

will direct its efforts to achieve. The military end state is a set of required conditions that define the achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point at which the president no longer 

requires the military instrument of national power as the primary 

means to achieve remaining national objectives.7

 The military end 

state reflects the conditions established by the national strategic end

state; however, it is more specific and normally incorporates supporting conditions, such as a UN Security Council resolution, associated 

with the other national instruments of power.

Although the termination of military operations is a political decision, effective planning cannot occur without a precise vision of the 

military end state and its associated termination criteria. Termination criteria are “the specified standards approved by the President 
36 │ methodology for employing design

and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded.”8

 Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is essential to 

achieving the national strategic end state. The conditions, derived 

from the military end state and national strategic end state, contribute to developing termination criteria that must be met before concluding military operations. Termination criteria require planners to 

consider a wide variety of operational issues and anticipate the nature 

of post-conflict operations.9

 Termination criteria are dynamic. They 

evolve throughout the JOPP and are usually not evident until after 

the JOPP’s course of action analysis and war-gaming step. Therefore, 

it is probably more efficient to use the military end-state conditions 

as the initial termination criteria until the COA analysis is complete. 

Planners should also realize that termination criteria can change 

significantly during the execution of an operation because national or 

multinational leaders may opt to modify directed strategic end-state 

conditions to pursue less aggressive goals or take advantage of environmental opportunities. As a result, termination criteria are essentially in draft form until the strategic leadership directs the cessation 

of military hostilities. Once cessation is directed, planners need to 

review the termination criteria and refine them to meet leader expectations and environmental conditions. Table 1 shows an example of 

the relationships among a national strategic end state, a corresponding military end state, and termination criteria.

The analysis of the national strategic end state, military end state, 

and termination criteria, in conjunction with an assessment of the 

operational environment, provides the basis for determining objectives. Objectives are “clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal[s] 

toward which every operation is directed.”10 They describe the political, 

economic, informational, and military goals necessary to accomplish 

the desired end state. Examples of military objectives are:

•   Deter Vulpecula’s forces from armed intervention into the country of Auriga

•   Enable humanitarian assistance in Auriga

•   If deterrence fails, defend Auriga from Vulpeculan intervention

JFCs and their staffs support and clarify objectives by developing 

measurable, desired strategic and operational effects and assessment 

indicators. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system 
methodology for employing design │ 37

that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. Effects 

are conditions derived from objectives and exist in two forms, desired and undesired. Desired effects describe the conditions necessary within the operational environment for achieving an objective. 

Undesired effects  reflect the conditions to be avoided because they

would inhibit the accomplishment of an objective. This analysis increases operational- and tactical-level understanding of the operation’s purpose and the commander’s intent. Additionally, this alignment provides the basis for operational-level assessment. If the effects 

correctly describe the achievement of the objective, JFCs have a 

mechanism for assessing the effectiveness of their operations. The 

conditions signified in the effects aid in determining tasks for components, subordinate-level units, and low-density/high-demand assets. Tasks are implied actions describing the accomplishment of desired effects or the avoidance of undesired effects. Figure 16 highlights 

this intrinsic interrelationship and the inherent links among end 

state, objectives, effects, and tasks. This is not the sole means for eiTable 1. Relationships among national strategic end state, military 

end state, and termination criteria

National Strategic 

End State

Military 

End State

Termination 

Criteria

International peace 

and security in the 

Zoran Sea region 

restored with full 

implementation of all 

UN Security Council 

resolutions (UNSCR) 

and the sovereignty 

and territorial integrity 

of Auriga preserved

•   Peace and security of 

Auriga restored

•   UNSCR 1783 implemented, restoring a 

secure environment 

for the provision of 

humanitarian assistance

•   Regional peace and 

security no longer 

threatened by armed 

conflict

•   WMD threat eliminated

•   Preconflict sovereignty and borders 

of Auriga intact 

•   The flow of humanitarian aid into 

and evacuation out 

of Auriga uninterrupted by armed 

attacks

•  Vulpecula no longer able to mount 

offensive operations

•  Vulpecula’s 

weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) 

employment, 

production, and 

storage capabilities 

eliminated
38 │ methodology for employing design

ther qualitatively or empirically measuring operational progress, but 

it represents a crucial assessment foundation for JFCs. 

The concept of linking end state, objectives, effects, and tasks is far 

from a novel approach. History is full of examples. One of the most 

sophisticated illustrations occurred during the Mongol conquest of 

Vietnam  in  1287–88.  During the  thirteenth  century, the  Mongol

sphere of influence extended from China to Eastern Europe, and very 

few nations were capable of withstanding the Mongols’ power. In 

1287 they invaded Vietnam to expand their regional influence. When 

the Vietnamese were confronted by the Mongol onslaught, their national strategic end-state conditions were simple: regime survival and 

withdrawal of the Mongol forces. To achieve these end-state conditions, the Vietnamese, led by Tran Hung Dao, adopted a deliberate 

strategy of strategic withdrawal. The objectives were to extend the 

Mongol lines of communication beyond their capability to sustain 

their force and to lure the Mongols into terrain where they could not 

use their dominant force, their cavalry. The desired effect was the 

withdrawal of the invading Mongol forces. Another closely related 

Vietnamese objective was denial of Mongol freedom of movement on

the land surface. The Vietnamese accomplished this by tasking their 

forces to destroy prominent bridges and interdicting key road networks. The cumulative effect created by this combination of objecLevel Guidance

National strategic

Theater strategic

Operational

Tactical

Strategic end state

Objectives

Objectives

Objectives

Military end state

Military end state

Objectives

Eects

Eects

Tasks

Tasks

Tasks

Mission

End state describes the set of

conditions to meet conict

termination criteria.

Objectives prescribe friendly

goals.

Eects describe the conditions

related to the objectives.

• Desired eects describe

 conditions needed to

 achieve objectives.

• Undesired eects describe

 conditions that will impede

 achievement of objectives.

Tasks describe friendly actions to

create desired eects or preclude

undesired eects.

Mission describes the

organization’s essential task or

task(s) and purpose.

Figure 16. Relationships among end state, objectives, effects, and tasks
methodology for employing design │ 39

tives, effects, and tasks was to force the Mongols to withdraw along 

the river system. Using Ngo Quyen’s victory over the Chinese in 938 

as an example, Tran Hung Dao calculated that these actions would 

cause the Mongols to withdraw their forces via the Bach Dang River 

system (fig. 17).11

Figure 17. Battle of the Bach Dang River

Haiphong 

Battle Site 

Bach Dang River 

Mongol Conquest of Vietnam 

9 April 1288 

Vietnamese 

Ships 

Spikes 

Mongol Ships 

After studying tidal projections, Tran directed that sharpened 

poles be cut, tipped with iron, and embedded in the river just to the 

north of modern-day Haiphong. On 9 April 1288, a small flotilla of

Vietnamese shallow-draft  boats  engaged the  Mongol  fleet  at  high 

tide. When the Mongol fleet deployed for decisive action, the Vietnamese feigned retreat upriver and drew the Mongols after them in 

hot pursuit. As the tide fell, thousands of Vietnamese boats attacked

the Mongol fleet at a prearranged point. When the Mongol fleet attempted to retreat to the sea, it was hopelessly caught in Tran’s barrier 

system of iron-tipped poles, losing an estimated 400 ships and 6,000 

men.12 The Vietnamese ability to link effects to objectives and desired

end-state conditions had a significant impact on their successful resistance to Mongol domination.
40 │ methodology for employing design

Aligning the End State, Objectives, and 

Effects with Centers of Gravity

An operation’s end state, objectives, and effects have limited viability 

until they are aligned with a detailed systems analysis of the enemy 

and friendly centers of gravity. Joint doctrine defines center of gravity

(COG) as “the source of power that provides moral or physical 

strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”13 COGs are often described using the Clausewitzian notion “hub of all power.” From this 

perspective, if you destroy the COG, you cause the entire system to 

collapse. However, this is rarely the case because COGs are almost 

always protected and our adversaries are complex adaptive systems. 

What our doctrine does not clearly state isthe purpose of a COG. The

principal purpose of a COG is focus. Identifying COGs at the three 

levels of war establishes a clear delineation of priorities and responsibilities. It also produces a congruency mechanism that links actions 

at all three levels of war. The COG focus at the strategic level of war 

should create a directional foundation for the operational level of 

war, which should do the same for the tactical level of war. Assessing 

the dynamic characteristics of a COG bonds the desired end state, 

objectives, and effects with the strategy designed to defeat, destroy, 

neutralize, or protect a COG. However, the characteristics of a COG 

are far from simple. Figure 18 indicates why COG identification is 

often an elusive challenge.

Identifying a COG

Identifying a COG requires three important analytical and iterative steps. The first step is identifying the existing COGs at each level 

of war. The second step is a critical-factor analysis of each of those 

COGs to identify the decisive points and lines of operation leading 

into the COG. The final step is an analysis of how operations may 

shape and transform the COGs.

Determining a COG is a key step omitted from doctrine, and it 

requires a disciplined methodology. Contemporary doctrine focuses 

on critical-factor analysis without elaborating on how a COG itself is 

identified. The danger of this approach is aligning the end state, objectives, and effects against the wrong COG. At a minimum, JFCs and 

their staffs should consider enemy and friendly actors, their interests 
methodology for employing design │ 41

and intent, key systems supporting those actors in the operational 

environment, and their strengths, weaknesses, and potential courses of 

action. This establishes a deliberate foundation for subsequent criticalfactor analysis and reduces the potential for focusing on preconceived 

notions. Table 2 illustrates one method of arranging data and analyzing key systems to identify potential COGs of different actors. This 

type of analysis can also facilitate the assessment of political assumptions concerning a nation’s support for, neutrality to, or hostility to an 

Center of 

Gravity 

(COG)

Exists at each 

Contains many level of war

intangible elements 

at strategic level

Linked to objective(s)

Mostly physical at 

operational and 

tactical levels

Can endanger one's 

own COGs

Often depends 

on factors of time 

and space

Dependent upon 

adversarial 

relationship

Is a source of leverage

May be where the 

enemy's force is most 

densely concentrated

Can shift over 

time or between 

phases

Allows or 

enhances 

freedom of action

May be 

transitory in 

nature

Figure 18. Characteristics of a center of gravity. (Reprinted from JP

5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-23.)

Table 2. Identifying centers of gravity

Actor Objective

Systems 

Analysis Strengths

WeaknessesCourses of 

Action

Political

Military

Economic

Social

Infrastructure

Information
42 │ methodology for employing design

operation. However, it is imperative to link all COG assessments with 

friendly objectives and desired end-state conditions. As objectives 

and end-state conditions change, there is a high probability that the 

adversary’s COGs will change. Additionally, there is a possibility the 

friendly COG may change.

It is also important to emphasize that identifying COGs requires a 

fundamental understanding of the three levels of war. Each level has 

specific functions, which should be examined to determine the desired effects at that level. The strategic level of war establishes national 

or multinational strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level include establishing national and multinational 

military objectives, sequencing initiatives, defining limits and assessing risks for the use of military and other instruments of national 

power, and providing military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.14 The operational level links the employment of tactical forces to achieving the strategic end state. At the operational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations 

to establish conditions that define the end state.15 The tactical level 

involves the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.16 Comprehending the functions of each level of 

war helps JFCs and their staffs identify the correct COGs and provide 

the right focus.

Conducting Critical-Factor Analysis

As figure 19 indicates, a COG is almost never a single node. COGs 

usually consist of multiple nodes with interconnecting relationships 

to the operational environment’s systemic architecture.

The critical-factor analysis model (fig. 20) developed by Joe Strange 

and amplified in Jack Kem’s Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade

provides an analytical tool for assessing a COG’s key nodes.17 This 

model examines three factors related to a COG: critical capabilities, 

critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.

Critical capabilities are crucial enablers for a COG to function and 

are essential to accomplishing an adversary’s objectives. Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a 

critical capability to become fully operational. Critical vulnerabilities 

are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are de-
Social

Information

Infrastructure

Military

Economic

Political

Node

Link

Operational

Center of

Gravity (COG)

Strategic COG

IDENTIFYING CENTERS OF GRAVITY 

Figure 19. Systems perspective of operational environment. (JP 5-0,

Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, IV-11.)

Center of Gravity Critical Capability

Critical Vulnerability Critical Requirement

Means that are considered crucial 

enablers for the adversary’s COG to 

function and essential to the 

accomplishment of the adversary’s 

assumed objective(s)

Those essential conditions, 

resources, and means for a critical 

capability to be fully operational

Aspects or components of the 

adversary’s critical requirements 

which are decient or vulnerable to

direct or indirect attack that will 

create decisive or signicant eects 

disproportionate to the military 

resources applied

Source of power that provides 

freedom of action, physical strength, 

and will to ght

End State / Objective:

Figure 20. Critical-factor analysis model
44 │ methodology for employing design

ficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack achieving decisive or 

significant results. Examining these critical factors identifies the decisive points that reveal the keys to attacking and preserving COGs.

Centers of gravity are often confused with decisive points, but 

these two entities have distinct differences. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when 

acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an 

adversary or contribute materially to success. Decisive points offer a 

mechanism for affecting a protected COG. COGs and decisive points 

should always be considered in relation to one another and never in 

isolation. Decisive points are also used to develop lines of operation 

that provide a vision for how to organize and employ US and coalition military efforts. Additionally, an analysis of COGs enables JFCs 

to identify the physical or geographic points, major events, functions, 

and systems that will ensure unified action during the campaign.

Decisive points belong to one of four basic categories: physical, key 

events, functional, and systemic. Examples of physical decisive points 

are major cities, rivers, straits, islands, command posts, and airspace. 

Key events include initial lodgment of friendly forces, culmination of 

the enemy’s strategic reserves, establishment of bridgeheads, and 

elections. Functional and systemic decisive points are closely related 

to key events because they are either intangible or multifaceted, but 

they are different because of their purpose. Functional decisive points 

correspond to specific tasks or functions. Illustrations include establishing early warning; gaining air superiority; conducting reception, 

staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); and protecting 

the force. Systemic decisive points affect a node or combination of 

nodes within a system. Examples include a power-generation plant 

controlling an electrical grid, a fiber-optic link enabling telecommunications, and computer servers facilitating critical aspects of financial 

transactions. Analyzing decisive points assists JFCs and their staffs in 

determining and prioritizing the best methodology for affecting an 

adversary’s COGs and seizing the initiative.

Operation Desert Storm is a classic case in point illustrating the 

connectivity between COGs and decisive points. During the construct 

of the operational design for Operation Desert Storm, the coalition 

identified the Iraqi command and control system as the operational 

COG. One of the decisive points protecting this COG was the Iraqi 

Kari system, an integrated air-defense command and control (C2) 

system that provided tracking and targeting information for Iraqi 
methodology for employing design │ 45

fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (fig. 21). The Kari system 

included French and Italian long-range and short-range radars capable 

of detecting aircraft flying as low as 50 feet. Additionally, the system 

was augmented with a Japanese RM-835 ground-based system capable 

of tracking electronic emissions and Chinese Nanjing low-frequency 

radars.18 This collective arrangement of equipment gave the Iraqis a 

dynamic early warning system capable of identifying the launch of air 

operations against their strategic and operational COGs.

Figure 21. Relationship between the Iraqi COG at the operational 

level of war and the Kari system decisive point during Operation 

Desert Storm Decisive Point 

Decisive Point 

Decisive Point 

Protected COG 

IRAQI C2 

KARI System Kari System 

Although no doctrinal critical-factor analysis was conducted during the planning for Operation Desert Storm, analysis of the Kari 

system revealed several key vulnerabilities. The system, controlled by 

four sector operation centers, consisted of a number of diverse radar 

systems with limited repair parts. Additionally, the system’s 500 radars were located at approximately 100 geographically dispersed sites 

with fragile communications links and limited power.

A contemporary critical-factor analysis of the Kari system (fig. 22) 

shows the relationships of the Iraqi command and control COG to its 

critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. 

It also indicates how analysts assessed critical vulnerabilities to determine where to attack. On 16 January 1991, the coalition selected and 

destroyed two radar clusters separated by 60 miles of open desert, 

opening the way for coalition aircraft to attack other decisive points 

related to Iraqi command and control.
46 │ methodology for employing design

It is important to emphasize that operational design requires planners to identify both friendly and enemy COGs and friendly and enemy 

decisive points. Any design that does not assess friendly COGs and 

decisive  points  creates  a  serious flaw  in  the  operation.  Analyzing 

friendly COGs and decisive points identifies what the friendly forces 

must protect and allows the friendly forces to prioritize defensive operations and the use of scarce resources.

Desert Storm offers another illustration of linking decisive points 

to centers of gravity. During Desert Storm, Iraq identified the coalition’s strategic COGs as the coalition itself. In an effort to destroy the 

coalition, the Iraqi military fired Scud missiles into the state of Israel 

hoping to bring Israel into the conflict and disintegrate critical Arab 

support for the coalition. As a result of Iraq’s strategy, coalition forces 

had to position Patriot air defense systems in Israel and modify air 

operations to protect Israel (fig. 23).

As JFCs and their staffs evaluate decisive points, they determine 

the most important ones and designate them as decisive points for 

Figure 22. Critical-factor analysis of Iraqi command and control and 

the Kari system

Center of

Gravity

Critical

Capabilities 

Critical

Requirements

Critical 

Vulnerabilities

Iraqi C2 

Power

Supply

Critical Factor Analysis

Diversity

of Radar

Types

Geographic

Dispersion

of KARI System

Supply of 

Equipment

Parts

Fragile

Communication

Links

Integrated

Communications System

Integrated Air

Defense System

Protection

Communication Links

Early Warning

Systems

Communicate Orders

Control Forces

Provide Early

Warning 

Enable

Intelligence 
methodology for employing design │ 47

the campaign. These designated decisive points become the basis for 

developing lines of operation (LOO), visualizations of a campaign’s

concept of operations that link tactical and operational objectives to 

the end state.19 LOOs define the orientation of the force in time and

space or purpose in relation to an adversary or objective. LOOs also

assist JFCs in synchronizing military activities directed at a series of 

strategic and operational objectives to attain the military end state.

An operation’s LOO can be described as physical, logical, or both. 

JP 5-0 defines a physical LOO as “a physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or 

that connects actions on nodes and decisive points related in time 

and space to an objective(s).”20 An example of a physical LOO is General MacArthur’s island-hopping campaign in the Southwest Pacific 

during World War II. MacArthur maneuvered his forces along a geographic line of operation from Australia to New Guinea and then to 

the Philippines (fig. 24).

A logical LOO is “a logical line that connects actions on nodes and 

decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s).”21 A 

logical LOO focuses on  depicting an arrangement of tasks,  effects, 

and objectives. The Allied liberation of Western Europe provides an

excellent illustration of a logical LOO. On 12 February 1944, the Allied

combined chiefs of staff gave General Eisenhower a one-page directive ordering  the reconquest  of Western Europe.  Using  the Allied 

Figure 23. Relationship between the coalition’s COG at the strategic 

level of war and the decisive point of Israel during Operation Desert 

Storm

Decisive Point 

Israel 

Protected COG 

Desert Storm Coalition 
48 │ methodology for employing design

combined chiefs of staff ’s guidance, General Eisenhower and his staff 

developed seven key decisive points aligned along a logical LOO for 

the campaign (fig. 25). Those decisive points were (1) establish a 

lodgment on the coast of Normandy, (2) conduct a breakout and 

build up a logistics base, (3) pursue the enemy on a broad front with 

three Army groups, (4) secure ports in Belgium and Brittany, (5) build 

up logistics in the vicinity of the Rhine, (6) complete the destruction 

of the enemy forces west of the Rhine, and (7) launch the final attack 

as a double envelopment.22 What is important to note is that this

plan’s execution did not deviate significantly from its original intent.

The visualization of a concept of operations normally has multiple 

interconnected LOOs reflecting the simultaneous accomplishment of

key tasks and objectives. The interconnectivity between lines of operation can also be used to show key decision points that connect the 

concept of operation with branches and sequels.

Figure 24. Southwest Pacific in World War II: physical line of operation. 

(Reprinted from Charles R. Anderson, Papua Campaign Brochure, US 

Army Center of Military History, n.d.)
methodology for employing design │ 49

How Operations Shape and Transform COGs

Planners must remain cognizant of the fact that COGs are dynamic. They can change based on the success or failure of military 

operations, changes in national policy, modifications to objectives, 

and enemy actions. As an example, a JFC designates an adversary’s 

operational reserve as the COG at the operational level of war. His 

intent is to focus coalition forces on bringing the enemy to the culmination point, depriving him of attaining his military objectives. However, once coalition forces destroy the exploitation force, what is the 

new COG at the operational level of war? The reason for raising this 

issue is planners must think ahead to ensure that the relationships 

among LOOs, decisive points, COGs, objectives, effects, and the end

state are properly aligned. Additionally, the identification of COG 

transformations assists commanders in setting the preparatory conditions necessary for executing the next phase of the operation. This 

does not mean that planners should approach COGs from a purely 

linear perspective. As figure 26 implies, the focus directed at COGs 

can overlap phases of an operation with components being directed 

to conduct asymmetric attack and establish the conditions required 

Figure 25. Operation Overlord: decisive points along logical lines of 

operation

Operation Overlord

1. Land on Normandy coast 

4. Secure ports in Belgium and Brittany

6. Complete destruction of enemy forces west of Rhine

2. Build up resources 

3. Pursue broad front with two Army groups 

5. Build log base in vicinity of Rhine 

7. Launch nal attack as double envelopment
50 │ methodology for employing design

for future phases. In general, COGs at the strategic level of war will 

rarely change as an operation progresses. At the operational level of 

war, COGs may change slightly, and at the tactical level they will most 

probably change.

It is also important to understand that the relationships among the 

levels of war change based on national strategic objectives and the 

complexities of the operational environment. If attainment of national strategic objectives requires conventional military operations, 

then the relationships among the three levels of war will more than 

likely be arranged in a hierarchical fashion. However, if military 

forces are employed in irregular warfare operations, the relationships 

among the levels of war are much more dynamic. In irregular warfare, seemingly insignificant actions at the tactical level of war can 

have immediate repercussions on the operational and strategic levels 

of war. Figure 27 shows the contrast in how different types of operations shape and transform the relationships among the levels of war.

The Arrangement of Operations

The arrangement of operations to accomplish military objectives 

and national strategic end-state conditions is one of the most imporFigure 26. Transformation of COGs as an operation’s objectives change 

COGs Are Dynamic

Levels of War 

Strategic 

Operational 

Tactical 

PH II 

Seize Initiative 

PH III 

Dominate 

PH IV 

Provide Stability 

C4ISR 

Front Line 

Forces 

Operational 

Reserve 

Second 

Echelon 

Forces 

Homeland 

Defense 

Forces 

Leadership 
methodology for employing design │ 51

tant decisions a JFC will make. This decision involves a detailed consideration of how LOOs align with friendly and enemy COGs and the 

vertical and horizontal relationship of decisive points between LOOs.

Figure 28 depicts the multifarious nature of these relationships and 

the challenges in determining how best to arrange operations.

Commanders assess a host of essential factors when determining 

how to arrange and link related military operations. These factors include the geography of the joint operation area, available strategic lift, 

changes in command structure, force protection, logistics, adversary 

reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion.23 The doctrinal tool 

for arranging the sequential and simultaneous nature of operations is 

phasing. JP 5-0 defines phases as “definitive stage[s] of an operation 

or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a 

common purpose.”24

Phasing helps JFCs and their subordinates to visualize how an entire 

operation will unfold and to determine force, resource, and time requirements. The principal benefit of a phase is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives by planning manageable subordinate 

operations to gain progressive advantages. Phases can be sequential or 

Figure 27. Transformation of the relationships among the levels of war 

Strategic

Level 

of War

Operational

Level 

of War

Tactical

Level 

of War

Strategic

Level 

of War

Operational

Level 

of War

Tactical

Level 

of War

of War

Operational

Level 

Tactical

Level 
52 │ methodology for employing design

simultaneous, and they can overlap. A transition from one phase to 

another, say from defensive to offensive operations, signals a change in 

emphasis. During planning, commanders establish conditions that 

should be met before transitioning to or initiating a new phase. 

Joint doctrine provides extensive information on phases, but it 

does not state how phases are structured. Phases consist of six key 

entities: objectives, effects, start and end times, major tasks, priority 

of effort, and the desired phase transition or initiation criteria.

BP

Loss Port

Capability

LOCAL AIR

SUPERIORITY

ACHIEVED

NAVAL

SUPERIORITY

ACHIEVED

EARLY

SA

LOCS

SECURED

IN JOA

VP DETERRED

FROM EARLY

INTERVENTION

CJTF FOC

IN AUR+SAG ARF FOC

BP

VP

Intervention

DETERRENCE

COGS END

STATE

VP MIL

FORCES

COUNTERINSURGENCY

SECURE

KEY

FACILITIES

INTEGRATION

WITH LOCAL

AUTH/IO/NGO

HUMANITARIAN

ASSISTANCE

ENABLED

PROVIDE

BASIC

SERVICES

TRAIN

AUR

FORCES

DENY BLA

FROM

OUTSIDE

DJERA MT

BLA ISOLATED

FROM VP

SUPPORT

BATARI

SUPPORT TO

BLA SPLIT

SP

BLA Joins Gov’t

BLA MIL

ORGANIZATION

AU

SECURITY

FORCES

NEO

ENABLED

AU

STABILIZED

ACHIEVE INFO

DOMINANCE

ACCESS TO

CAPELLA IA

SECURED UNIMPEDED

ACCESS TO

ENERGY

BP

Collapse of

AUR Gov’t

HUMAN

ASSISTANCE

SECURITY

AND

STABILITY

BLA

NEUTRALIZED

VP

DETERRED

AUR / PER

STABILITY

FREE ACCESS

TO REGION/

RESOURCES

CONDITIONS

FOR TOA

TO UN FORCES

HA

UNIMPEDED

Key to abbreviations

ARF Alliance Reaction Force JOA joint operations area

AU Aurigan LOCs lines of communications

AUR country of Auriga MIL military

AUTH authority MT mountain

BLA Batari Liberation Army NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

BP branch plan NGO nongovernmental organization

CJTF combined joint task force PER country of Perseus

COGs centers of gravity SA situational awareness

FOC full operational capability SAG country of Sagitta

HA humanitarian assistance SP sequal plan

IA international airport TOA transfer of authority

INFO information UN United Nations

IO information operations VP country of Vulpecula

Figure 28. The multifarious nature of arranging operations
methodology for employing design │ 53

A template of this phase structure is as follows:

Phase I – Deter

Objectives: Deter aggression and prepare for hostilities.

Effects: Adversary’s leadership recognizes the coalition’s resolve 

and understands the risk of using military force; theaterwide force 

protection established in the event of attack.

Commences: Commences upon receipt of unambiguous warning.

Ends: Ends when hostilities are initiated.

Tasks: Monitor and confirm intelligence indicators; institute operational security directives; implement force protection measures; 

coordinate flexible deterrent options; flow force enhancements; employ counter special operations forces (SOF) operations; prepare reception, staging, onward movement, and integration assets; update 

pre–air tasking order.

Priority of Effort: First to air component command, followed in 

order by special operations component command, naval component 

command, and land component command.

Phase Transition or Initiation Criteria: Force protection established; 

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 

protected; aerial and sea ports of debarkation prepared to receive 

follow-on forces; sea lines of communication secured; command prepared for hostilities.

Upon completion of each phase, planners must meticulously ensure 

that their operational design integrates all four of the national instruments of power. If planners focus solely on the military instrument of 

power, they lose control of the operational design by not leveraging 

the other three instruments of power. All diplomatic, informational, 

military, and economic courses of action should be forged into a single 

unified course of action. Additionally, the operational design should 

carefully examine potential first-, second-, and third-order effects of 

all military and nonmilitary actions.

For instance, if the strategic objective is to deter aggression, the 

operational design should incorporate other aspects such as an operational assessment of possible UN resolutions, the role of the media, the freezing of assets, and the imposition of economic sanctions. 

Failing to synchronize or deconflict nonmilitary initiatives can have

severe and unintended consequences. As an illustration, if the Department of State were to implement a unilateral or uncoordinated 
54 │ methodology for employing design

plan to impose sanctions on a country such as North Korea, it could 

well provoke hostilities. This could produce cataclysmic results, especially if the theater headquarters were not prepared to respond.

Assumptions: The Forgotten 

Element in Operational Design

Joint doctrine defines an assumption as “a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to 

complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the 

course of action.”25 This complex definition, however, obscures the 

critical role that assumptions play in operational design. As a result, 

planners often see the primary role of assumptions as simply a tool to 

continue planning and not as a key framework element in operational 

design. Assumptions endow operational design with the ability to identify the greatest risk to an operation. This crucial ability assists JFCs 

and their staffs with determining branches and sequels, pinpointing 

decision points, and developing the initial commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).

Failure to properly assess assumptions can have catastrophic and 

historic consequences, as it did at the battle of the Teutoburger Wald 

in 9 AD.26 This obscure battle changed Rome’s vision of hegemony 

and quite possibly history. It began as a campaign to subdue rebellious 

Germanic tribesmen, and it ended in the halting of Roman expansion 

beyond the Rhine River. At the time of this battle, the Romans were 

the masters of operational design. They had superior organization, 

training, and advanced technology and were confronting an adversary they had previously slaughtered like cattle. However, they failed 

to identify two critical assumptions. The first assumption was that the 

Germanic tribesmen serving in the Roman army would remain loyal 

allies. The second was that the Roman legions would be able to deploy their forces and not have to fight on the march in the forests.

In the battle, an alliance of Germanic tribes under the military 

leadership of Arminius defeated the XVII, XVIII, and XIX Roman

legions under Quinctilius Varus. According to the Roman historian

Gaius Cornelius Tacitus, the Roman legions, composed of more than 

20,000 men, were ambushed in the forests of the Teutoburger Wald 
methodology for employing design │ 55

and annihilated by Arminius’s warriors. Those who survived were 

crucified, buried alive, or sacrificed to the Germanic gods. The battle 

is significant because it marked the end of Rome’s expansion into the 

Germanic frontier.27 Additionally, this defeat shows that Roman overconfidence trivialized its assessment of assumptions.

In many ways the assumptions derived during operational design 

define the overall quality of an operation plan (OPLAN). If planners 

approach an OPLAN’s assumptions as just another mechanical step 

in the JOPP, the probability of a plan surviving first contact decreases 

substantially. Assumptions  are not merely  a list in the OPLAN for 

enhancing the plausibility of the operational design. They require constant vigilance, and they should neither be forgotten nor discarded 

because they identify the greatest risk to the successful execution of 

the OPLAN. Consequently, in case an assumption proves not to be

true, a corresponding branch or sequel should be developed in advance 

to prevent disaster and ensure success of the campaign. This emphasis 

on assumptions in turn creates a foundation for establishing CCIRs 

that assist the JFC in making effective decisions during execution. It 

does this by focusing CCIRs toward the most critical decisions a JFC 

must make. Of course if an assumption is invalidated, any decisions 

based on that assumption should be immediately reexamined.28

Another indicator of the quality of an OPLAN’s operational design 

is the correlation of assumptions to the levels of war. As planners develop assumptions, they should align those assumptions with the appropriate level of war capable of planning and executing the branch or 

sequel. For example, consider an assumption concerning the availability 

of strategic lift for the initial phases of a campaign. An operationallevel headquarters has almost no ability to influence the development

of a branch or sequel involving strategic lift because it does not control the assets. These assets are controlled at the strategic level of war, 

and any assumptions concerning them should be incorporated into 

the strategic guidance and planning. This aligns responsibility for 

planning any associated branches or sequels for strategic lift with the 

level of war most capable of executing the branch or sequel. It also 

keeps the operational level of war from planning a branch or sequel it 

cannot execute. This, however, does not mean that the operationallevel headquarters can ignore assumptions made at the strategic level. 

JFCs and their staffs must still plan appropriate responses, but their 

responses to strategic-level assumptions are tailored to planning areas 

they can affect.
56 │ methodology for employing design

Assumptions have three basic characteristics. They should be logical, 

realistic, and essential for the planning to continue.29 There are no 

“cookie cutters” for determining assumptions. But there are some 

common categories of assumptions to consider in operational design. 

These categories are time, politics, forces, and the enemy.30

At the operational level of war, time is arguably the most important 

assumption, especially for power-projection nations. Time drives the 

ability to prepare, deploy, and generate forces. It also influences the effectiveness of execution, cost, and everything related to an operation. If 

an operation assumes C = D based on an unambiguous warning, then 

deployment and the operation begin simultaneously. (C-day is the unnamed day on which deployment for an operation begins or is to begin. 

D-day is the unnamed day on which a particular operation begins or is 

to begin.) If C = D - 5, then deployment begins five days prior to the 

beginning of the operation. If either of these assumptions proves to be 

false, then a branch or sequel must be available for execution.

Political assumptions encompass a wide range of issues such as access to host nation support, basing rights, overflight routes, and nation neutrality. As with all assumptions, political assumptions are 

inherently complex and must be constantly assessed for changes 

through focused CCIRs. An example is the assumption that China 

would not commit military forces to combat during the Korean War.

On 7 October 1950, the UN General Assembly approved a Britishsponsored resolution authorizing UN Command (UNC) forces to 

occupy all of North Korea. This resolution was based on the belief 

that China would not commit combat forces to support the North 

Koreans. At the time, Chinese communist forces (CCF) were still 

battling 400,000 Nationalist Chinese forces for control of China. The 

Chinese economy was in shambles, and the CCF were underequipped 

and undertrained. In spite of these challenges, on 19 October 1950 

China introduced an initial Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) 

estimated at 260,000 men. The CPVF fought throughout the duration

of the Korean War and suffered over 539,000 casualties.31 It is interesting to note that China may have decided as early as August 1950 to

intervene in Korea, but there was little if any attempt to collect and 

evaluate CCIRs against this assumption.32

Assumptions about enemy forces are critical also, and it is vitally 

important to never “assume away” an enemy capability. Examples of 

enemy assumptions include where the enemy’s main effort will be, 

when the enemy’s activities will culminate, and whether the enemy 
methodology for employing design │ 57

will use weapons of mass destruction. Historically, many plans have 

failed because they underestimated an enemy’s capability and did not 

have a requisite branch or sequel prepared to counter that capability. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) gives us an excellent example. During the planning for OIF a central assumption was that regular Iraqi 

army units would “capitulate and provide internal security.”33 This assumption was a key element in the decision to limit the amount of 

combat power deployed to Iraq, and it had a significant impact on the 

effectiveness of stability operations when this proved to be false.

Forces are another category of assumptions vital to power-projection 

nations because they have significant and complex interrelationships 

with all categories of assumptions. If a power-projection nation misjudges an assumption about forces, dire consequences can follow. 

Most assumptions in this category revolve around the availability of 

forces for employment. These include not only US forces, but also 

such assets as prepositioned war stocks, maritime prepositioned sets 

afloat, and coalition forces.

It is also important to understand that assumptions can have cascading effects on decisions made about forces. OIF is again an excellent illustration. The decision that OIF’s force structure was sufficient 

to accomplish the strategic end state proved to be severely flawed for 

several interconnected reasons. First, this decision was directly linked 

to three critical planning assumptions:

1) The Iraqi regular army would “capitulate and provide internal 

security.”

2) Iraqi resistance was unlikely.

3) Postwar Iraq would not be a US military responsibility.

Second, on 23 May 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved 

the Iraqi Army, which the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) 

commander had assumed would provide internal security. Third, a 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis observed that the 

OIF OPLAN did not document risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were proven wrong. According to a 2006 report by the 

Joint Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not examine 

the consequences of assumptions, which contributed to the inability 

of coalition forces to prevent the breakdown of civil order in Iraq.34

OIF highlights the direct correlation among assumptions, operational design’s planning framework, and decision analysis. Proper 
58 │ methodology for employing design

development of assumptions allows JFCs and their staffs to frame risk 

and determine risk levels. Assumptions also identify major decision 

points for JFCs. Planners must make every effort possible to validate 

or invalidate assumptions prior to reaching critical decision points.

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary, 126.

2.  US Army War College, Campaign Planning Primer AY 07, 10.

3. US Department of Defense, 2008 National Defense Strategy, 6.

4. Bush, President’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.

5. US Department of Defense press briefing, Rumsfeld and Myers.

6. National Security Directive 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression, 2.

7. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-19.

8. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 367.

9.  JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, III-9.

10. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 265.

11. Grant, ed., 1001 Battles That Changed the Course of World History, 181–86.

12. Chapius, A History of Vietnam from Hong Bang to Tu Duc, 84.

13. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, GL-6.

14. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, GL-22.

15.  Ibid., GL-19.

16. Kem, Campaign Planning.

17. Ibid. and Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities.

18. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 105.

19.  US Army War College, Campaign Planning Handbook, 93.

20. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, IV-20.

21. Ibid. 

22.  D’Amura, “Campaigns,” 42–51. See also Pogue, Supreme Command, which 

provides a description of General Eisenhower’s wartime command, focusing on the 

general, his staff, and his superiors in London and Washington and contrasting Allied and enemy command organizations.

23. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-35.

24.  Ibid., IV-33.

25. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 30.

26. Fuller, Military History of the Western World, 239.

27.  Wells, The Battle That Stopped Rome.

28.  US Army War College, Campaign Planning Handbook, 38.

29.  JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, IV-8.

30.  US Army War College, Campaign Planning Primer, 17.

31.  Li, Millett, and Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember, 6.

32. Jian, “Sino-Soviet Alliance,” 26.

33. US Army, On Point.

34. US Joint Forces Command, Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004.
Chapter 4

Establishing the Link between Operational 

Design and Decision Analysis

In recent years numerous publications have expanded the exploration of operational design beyond our current joint doctrine. Their 

focus has been how to integrate operational design into the JOPP and 

what role commanders play in the process. As a result, operational 

design is evolving as a leader-driven process oriented on problem 

framing. The intellectual process of problem framing is extremely 

valuable for developing a solution; however, deriving a correct solution does not necessarily guarantee success. To have success, the 

commander must apply decision analysis to implement the solution. 

The difference between problem framing and decision analysis is that 

decision analysis produces decision criteria to aid a commander in 

making the best decision.

The structure that operational design provides shapes decision 

analysis directly and indirectly throughout the JOPP. However, there 

are three critical junctures in the JOPP where operational design has 

the potential to significantly influence the effectiveness of decision 

analysis. The first juncture is in the JFC’s overarching vision for the 

theater or operational strategy. The second is during course analysis 

and war gaming, and the third is just after the selection of the accepted course of action. Figure 29 illustrates these junctures and the 

commander/staff operational design interaction during the JOPP.

As an example of design’s link to decision analysis, if the forward 

edge of the battle area (FEBA) is penetrated by a major force, the correct decision may be to commit the operational reserve. But if the 

reserve is committed too soon or too late—or along the wrong axis—

it may result in a catastrophic failure.

The cognitive map’s holistic view, combined with its capacity to 

identify decision points, is one of the principal reasons why operational design should be a commander-driven process that integrates 

into the JOPP. In contrast, the JOPP is primarily a staff-driven process that takes its direction from the JFC’s vision embedded in the 

command’s operational design. Operational design should begin at 

the initiation of the JOPP and continue through to the completion of 

the plan or the execution of the order. The primary reason for this is 
60 │ establishing the link

that operational design should set the foundation for the analysis of 

preplanned and emergent-opportunity decisions.

Overarching Vision for Strategy

As the JFC completes the initiation and mission-analysis steps of 

the JOPP, one of the products he should develop is a preliminary vision of the theater or operational strategy. Strategy has been characterized by terms such as annihilation, attrition, deterrence, decapitation, disaggregation, and diffusion. JP 1-02 defines theater strategy as 

“concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the 

synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and 

other instruments of national power.”1

 The vision the JFC constructs 

functions as a guideline for COA development. It should be as generic as possible so that it does not prejudice courses of action, but it 

Joint Operations Planning Process

(Sta Driven)

Initiation

Mission Analysis

COA Development

COA Analysis 

and War Gaming

COA Comparison

COA Approval

Plan or Order Development

Operational Design 

(Commander Driven)

Receive Guidance

Assess End State

Determine Objectives and Eects 

Conduct COG Factor Analysis

Dene Initial Assumptions

Initial Guidance to Sta

and Components

Provide Planning Guidance 

to Sta and Components

Determine Decisive Points

Draft Lines of Operation/Eort

Rene Assumptions

Present Initial Cognitive Map 

Provide Overarching Strategy

Develop Decision Support Template (DST)

and Synchronization Matrix

Provide DST and Synchronization Matrix to Components and Interagency

Rene Cognitive Map 

Finalize Assumptions

and Prepare CCIR

Conduct COA Decision Support Analysis

Identify Branches and Sequels

Prepare Risk Assessment

Operational Design Completed 

Commander/Sta

Interaction

Receive Input from Components and Interagency

Receive Input from Components and Interagency

Develop Decision Support

Matrix

Provide DST and Synchronization Matrix to Components and Interagency

2

3

Draft Lines of Operation/Eort

Present Initial Cognitive Map 

Provide Overarching Strategy

1

Figure 29. Integration of commander-driven operational design with 

the joint operation planning process
establishing the link │ 61

should also have enough structure to ensure that the staff understands what the commander wants. One methodology embedded in 

operational design for achieving this is the cognitive map described 

in the previous chapter.

A cognitive map reflects the intrinsic relationships among LOOs, 

decisive points, centers of gravity, objectives, effects, and the endstate conditions. This visualization assists JFCs with determining the 

arrangement of multiple LOOs and assessing the risks associated 

with assumptions. But most importantly, the cognitive map identifies 

initial decision points critical to the success of the operation. Note that 

decision points are different from decisive points. A decision point is 

a position in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates 

making a key decision concerning a specific course of action.

Figure 30 depicts a JFC’s initial cognitive map developed prior to 

providing COA guidance. The map indicates decisive points, LOOs, 

enemy COGs, objectives, and end-state conditions. The map also denotes two key decision points that will shape the strategy. The first 

decision point on the deter LOO identifies the crucial point where 

deterrence fails. This decision point will mandate a military recomFigure 30. Cognitive map outlining an initial strategy

Lines of Operations with 

Decisive Points and Decision 

Points

Centers of 

Gravity

Deter

Deterrence Fails

Combat Operations

Sequel

Security and Stability

Sequel

Assumptions:

Time

Politics

Forces

Enemy

Strategic 

Level

Leadership

Operational 

Level

Exploitation 

Forces

Tactical 

Level

Insurgent 

Forces

Secure

APODs

SPODs

FDOs NEO Force 

Protection

Initiate

Pre ATO

Def.

Ops

O.

Ops

Enemy

Forces

Collapse

Decision

Point

Decision

Point

HA Eco.

Reconstruction

UN

Hando

Termination
62 │ establishing the link

mendation and a political decision to use force. The staff should take 

this guidance and incorporate it into courses of action being developed. The second decision point on the combat operations LOO 

identifies a decision to recommend termination of combat operations. In this case, planners assess that the enemy has limited strategic 

objectives and will sue for peace prior to friendly forces achieving all 

military termination criteria. This preplanned decision point allows 

the JFC to formulate recommended decision criteria for political 

leaders and determine how it affects the theater strategy and the attainment of national or multinational strategic objectives. The main 

point of this example is that developing a sound operational design 

enhances the JFC’s ability to envision the best strategy for the operation or campaign. This strategy, linking the application of military 

force to the attainment of national or multinational strategic objectives, forms the basis for COA development.

When JFCs incorporate their strategic vision into COA development, the staff ’s productivity increases significantly. This also prevents the myopic exploration of divergent (e.g., preemptive and nonpreemptive) courses of action. Directing the development of a 

nonpreemptive course of action is largely an unproductive activity 

because of the exceptional risk to the military force involved. No one 

should expect a US or multinational military force to stand idly by 

while an adversary strikes a blow. The more astute guidance is to develop courses of action with branches and sequels that give political 

leaders the flexibility to use military force if deterrence fails. This type 

of guidance also forms a much better foundation for identifying governing factors to select the best course of action.

In operational design it is imperative to understand that a large 

number of factors shape theater strategy, but one of the most critical 

influences on strategy is power projection. The Mongol conquest of 

Transoxiana, modern day Uzbekistan, provides a relevant example 

for today. In 1218 a Mongol caravan with emissaries was transecting 

the territory of Transoxiana ruled by Shah Ala al-Din Muhammad II. 

One of the Shah’s governors, Inalchuq, interdicted the caravan in the 

vicinity of Otrar and slaughtered its 450–500 occupants. This event 

occurred as the Mongols were heavily engaged in the conquest of north 

China. As a result, instead of applying military force Genghis Khan 

sent three emissaries to the Shah: two Mongols and a Muslim. The 

Shah shaved the two Mongols, beheaded the Muslim, and sent his 

head back to Genghis Khan with the two Mongol ambassadors. Out-
establishing the link │ 63

raged at this provocation, Genghis assembled 90,000 men and marched 

to Transoxiana.2

 The initial engagement occurred along the Syr Darya 

River in the Fergana Valley. The Shah’s forces, with an estimated 400,000 

men, defeated the Mongol attack. However, Genghis used this setback to fix and envelop the Shah’s forces. The Mongols marched north 

and attacked the city of Otrar, capturing the governor, Inalchuq, who 

had attacked the Mongol caravan. The Mongols put Inalchuq to death 

by pouring molten silver into his eyes and ears and continued their 

attacks.3

 Stunned by the Mongol advances, the Shah’s forces were paralyzed. The Mongols then attacked the strategic cities of Bukhara and 

Samarkand, causing the Shah’s forces to completely collapse.

At first glance the salient lesson appears to be that a strategy of 

asymmetric attack caused catastrophic psychological paralysis. But the 

real lesson in the Mongol strategy is power projection. The Mongols 

were able to project a light, lethal force over 2,000 miles across the Tien 

Shan Mountains without the aid of a modern transportation system.

Today this lesson is just as important as it was in 1219–20. You can 

have an adaptive and sophisticated strategy, but before you can bring 

force to bear you must be able to get to the fight. This basic requirement 

places some significant limitations on strategy. As JFCs develop their 

strategy, they must judiciously assess the combat power needed to 

achieve the strategic political objectives and their ability to project that 

power. Assuming that there will be time to build a complete force is 

high risk. The international community has learned through Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Iraqi Freedom that 

if an opponent is afforded the freedom to build combat power, the consequences are grave. Strategic lift will limit the initial agility of strategy 

in most current operational environments. Therefore, JFCs are initially 

left with a baseline choice of a denial or halt strategy. A halt strategy 

focuses on simply stopping the enemy. In contrast, a denial strategy 

concentrates on bringing the adversary to culmination, preventing him 

from accomplishing his military and political objectives. Both of these 

approaches have a tremendous impact on COA development. Commanders cannot develop a cogent concept of operations or a scheme of 

maneuver without knowing how their force builds.

Based upon the JFC’s strategy, power projection should build on 

four rudimentary and integrated force modules: command, control, 

communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); combat power; force protection; and sustainment. 

Each of these modules can be combined into joint and multinational 
64 │ establishing the link

force packages designed to accomplish specific objectives. The intent 

here is not to conduct a transportation feasibility analysis before developing and analyzing courses of action. Rather, the main point is for the 

JFC to have strategy guidance that incorporates a force flow vision. Figure 31 provides a conceptual overview of modularly arranging forces 

into force packages to accomplish specific deployment objectives. In 

this case, based on the operational environment, the JFC gives C4ISR 

the initial priority of force flow to build situational awareness. As the 

force flow progresses, the priority shifts to force generation, then interdiction, and finally to combat forces for maneuver. The force flow then 

continues in the form of additional packages until all of the JFC’s forces 

have closed in theater. Arranging forces in modules and packages provides enhanced operational flexibility to the JFC.

Additionally, understanding force-generation priorities empowers 

a JFC’s ability to maximize the effectiveness of a deterrence phase 

and, if required, have the force necessary to accomplish the national 

strategic objectives. The basic principles of the construct “strategic 

preclusion” are valid. JFCs should develop a strategy that employs 

joint maneuver and interdiction forces capable of moving with such 

speed and with such overmatching lethality that a potential enemy 

cannot “set” his forces and operate at an advantage.4

Force Generation 

Package 

FDO/Situational Awareness 

Package 

C4IISR 

Combat 

Power 

Force 

Protection 

Sustainment 

Interdiction 

Package 

C4IISR 

Combat 

Power 

Force 

Protection 

Sustainment 

Maneuver 

Package 

C4IISR 

Combat 

Power 

Force 

Protection 

Sustainment 

C4IISR 

Combat 

Power 

Force 

Protection 

Sustainment 

C-Day 7 14 

14 21 C+28 

Power Projection and 

Theory of Strategic Preclusion 

Figure 31. Notional arrangement of modules into force packages
establishing the link │ 65

Course of Action Analysis and War Gaming

The second juncture at which operational design’s framework influences decision analysis is during the COA analysis and war-gaming 

step. Most of the war gaming conducted today is automated; however, 

manual war gaming provides JFCs the opportunity to evaluate 

courses of action against a complex, adaptive adversary. Manual war 

gaming is one of the most difficult activities in the JOPP. It requires a 

well-defined structure, discipline, extensive preparations, and rehearsals. In spite of these costs, war gaming provides an operational 

fidelity that is invaluable to the JFC. It sets the foundation for the 

development of the decision support template (DST) and the decision support matrix (DSM).

The structure of a war game is composed of the war-gaming technique, the war-gaming staff, and the physical layout of the war-gaming 

space. The selection of the war-gaming technique depends on the 

amount of time available to war-game and the JFC’s focus. The two 

most commonly used techniques are war gaming by phase and by 

decisive points. The JFC and his staff can use one or a combination of 

the techniques. War gaming by phase is the most comprehensive approach and usually requires the most time (fig. 32). This technique 

assists the JFC with assessing specific phases or an entire operation.

War gaming by decisive points provides the JFC and his staff the 

ability to focus on a geographic area, key event, function, or critical 

factor during a specific period of time (fig. 33). Examples of such 

Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5

OPFOR

COA

COA

Figure 32. War gaming by phase. (Reprinted from Führungsakademie 

der Bundeswehr, Wargaming: Guide to Preparation and Execution

[Hamburg, Germany: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 2006], 8.)
66 │ establishing the link

decisive points include a constrained sea line of communication, 

lodgment operations, and key command and control transitions.

The staff organization supporting war gaming normally consists of 

four to five major sections: the executive section, support section, 

blue cell, white cell, and red cell (fig. 34). The executive section directs 

and controls the war game. The section’s war-gaming director has 

overall responsibility for executing the JFC’s guidance during the war 

game. The coordinator facilitates preparation and setup of the war 

game, and the referee adjudicates blue- and red-cell moves. The support section consists of the component liaison officers (LNO) and 

operational analysts, who provide detailed analysis of component 

contributions and joint functions. The blue cell consists of joint planning group (JPG) members responsible for developing, executing, 

and assessing the effectiveness of the friendly course of action being 

war-gamed. The white cell is optional. Its primary role is playing nonbelligerent actors who may have a significant effect on a course of 

action. A good example of this is China’s potential effect on courses 

of action involving the Korean peninsula. Each of these elements has 

crucial responsibilities in war gaming, but perhaps the most important cell impacting decision analysis is the red cell.

As a JPG forms, one of the JPG director’s first tasks is establishing 

a dedicated red cell to analyze enemy courses of action. The red cell 

should do much more than simply plan red moves. It should prepare 

Figure 33. War gaming by decisive points. (Reprinted from Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Wargaming Guide to Preparation and 

Execution [Hamburg, Germany: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 

2006], 8.)

OPFOR

COA

COA

Base

of

Ops

DP

DP

DP DP

DP

COG DP

OPFOR

DP

Cycle 1 Cycle 2
establishing the link │ 67

a red operational design focused at a minimum on the enemy’s most 

likely and most dangerous courses of action. The operational design 

should identify enemy assumptions, branches, sequels, and associated decision points. Additionally, the red cell should analyze how 

red leaders collect intelligence, make decisions, and conduct their 

planning, decision, and execution cycle.

Understanding adversarial decision making is an absolutely essential 

planning element for JFCs because it links the application of military 

force to the attainment of national strategic end-state conditions. In 

simple terms, when friendly forces face an adversary, they are trying 

either to deter that adversary from action or compel him to take an 

action. The cumulative effects of inappropriately applied military 

force may move friendly forces further away from attaining the national strategic end-state rather than closer. To set the foundations for 

this analysis, the red cell should analyze the enemy’s decision making 

model. The tendency for most westerners is to approach decision 

making from a rational model based on cost-benefit association. 

How state and nonstate actors make decisions, however, is far more 

complex than this, especially when one considers the effects of culRed Cell

Spokesman

Scribe

JOPG

Blue Cell

Spokesman

Scribe

JOPG

White Cell

Spokesman

Scribe

Other

Executive

Director of War Gaming

Coordinator

Referee

Scribe

Support

LNOs

OA-Experts

Chain of Command

Support

Figure 34. War-gaming sections. (Reprinted from Führungsakademie 

der Bundeswehr, Wargaming Guide to Preparation and Execution

[Hamburg, Germany: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 2006], 8.)
68 │ establishing the link

tural, ideological, and religious dimensions. When the red cell has 

the ability to replicate the adversary’s decision-making model, it substantially enhances the effectiveness of war gaming and builds a key 

perspective for the JFC to make friendly force decisions. Comprehending the enemy’s decision analysis model will also yield indications of whether or not the enemy is altering his strategy.

During the Vietnam War the North Vietnamese skillfully alternated the emphasis of their strategy between conventional and unconventional operations (fig. 35). In 1965 the North Vietnamese 

Army (NVA) and National Liberation Front (NLF) attempted to use 

battalion-sized conventional attacks to achieve their objectives. As 

the Americans applied conventional forces to counter this maneuver, 

the NVA shifted to irregular warfare. Unable to accomplish its strategic objectives through irregular means, the NVA launched the Tet 

offensive of 1968. When this failed, it reverted back to irregular warfare. In 1972, as the Americans attempted to withdraw their forces 

under the policy of Vietnamization, the North Vietnamese launched 

the Nguyen Hue (Chiến dịch Xuân hè) or Eastertide offensive. This 

offensive cost the NVA over 125,000 lives; however, it set them in a # NVA Bn or Larger Attacks 

Years

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

120

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

Conventional

Warfare

Irregular

Warfare

Exploit

with

Conventional

Assets

Exploit

with

Unconventional

Assets

110

Predicting Eects

The Vietnam Paradigm

Figure 35. North Vietnamese alteration of strategy, 1965–72
establishing the link │ 69

strategic position to overrun the South Vietnamese government in 

1975.5

 The focal point of this historical anecdote is not the alternation 

of strategy, but the use of the red cell to predict alternations.

All sections involved in war gaming must understand the sequence 

for the war game and approach it in a disciplined manner. Discipline 

emanates from two sources of the war-game structure. The first is the 

designation of the spokesmen for the red, blue, and white cells. Each 

cell should ideally have only one spokesman, who must be able to 

fully articulate the team’s actions. This minimizes potentially distracting discussions that fail to contribute to the war-game process. 

The second source is time, and it serves as the principal means for 

instilling discipline in the war-game process. This element of structure keeps the war game from disintegrating into a series of peripheral 

discussions about a course of action. When the JPG decides to conduct a war game, it requires a tremendous investment in time and 

resources. If the JPG director allows the structure to disintegrate, the 

return on investment is significantly diminished. The intent of war 

gaming is threefold: to assist the JFC in selecting the best course of 

action, identify COA modifications, and conduct decision analysis. 

The war-gaming sequence, combined with strict time limitations, 

provides the vital element of discipline. A notional sequence for one 

war-game move is depicted in figure 36. The war-gaming sequence 

used most often is a basic action-reaction-counteraction move culminated by a cognition phase.

Prior to the first move, the war-gaming coordinator explains to all 

sides how the war game will be executed. Then the war-gaming director sets the context of the operational environment by reviewing the 

strategic setting, salient characteristics of the area of responsibility 

(AOR), the belligerents, and key events leading up to the start of the 

war game. With this foundation established, the blue and red cells 

preview the courses of action to be war-gamed, their order of battle, 

and the disposition of their forces. Based on this information, the 

war-gaming director decides which side has the initiative.

When the war-gaming cells begin the action step of the war game, 

the team with the initiative provides an overview of its activities during the designated operational time frame. The opposing team is then 

allowed to ask any questions for clarification, and the referee adjudicates any controversial activities identified during the sequence. 

When this concludes, the scribes from the executive section and red, 

blue, and white cells record the results.
70 │ establishing the link

In the reaction step, the side without the initiative identifies the 

opposing side’s actions it observed and summarizes its reactions. 

When it finishes, the opposing team asks questions for clarification, 

and the referee adjudicates any controversial activities. The scribes 

record the results and insights from this step. Figure 37 shows this 

sequence in a time line.

The side with the initiative then begins the counteraction step by 

describing what it observed during the reaction step and giving an 

overview of its counteractions. When this concludes, the side without 

the initiative asks questions for clarification, and the referee provides 

adjudication, if necessary. The scribes then record the results and insights from this step.

The most important step in a war-game move is the cognition 

phase. During this step the component LNOs, subject matter experts, 

and operational analysts are polled for their insights on the war-game 

move. The scribes review their conclusions for the plenary war-game 

group. The focal points for this analysis are decision points, decision 

Initial Situation

Action Reaction Counteraction

Cognition Phase

War-game overview

Review of strategic setting

Red/blue overview of COAs

Red/blue current order of battle described

Decision on red or blue initiative

Team with initiative 

describes initial actions

Opposing team asks 

questions for clarication

Umpire adjudicates

Scribes record results 

Opposing team identies 

actions observed

Opposing team describes 

reactions

Team with initial initiative 

asks questions for clarication

Umpire adjudicates

Scribes record results 

Team with initial initiative 

identies actions observed

Team with initial initiative 

describes counteractions

Team with initial initiative asks 

questions for clarication

Umpire adjudicates

Scribes record results 

Figure 36. Action-reaction-counteraction war-gaming sequence
establishing the link │ 71

criteria, CCIRs, risk, and recommended modifications to the course 

of action. The war-gaming director then determines the conclusions 

from the move and directs that the appropriate changes be recorded 

in the COA decision support template.

A DST is a graphic record of the war game consisting of the concept of operations graphics and the synchronization matrix. It “depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces 

and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information 

required to execute a specific friendly course of action.”6

 The DST 

also identifies named areas of interest (NAI) and target areas of interest (TAI). NAIs are the geographical areas where “information that 

will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. 

Named areas of interest are usually selected to capture indications of 

adversary courses of action, but also may be related to conditions of 

the operational environment.”7

 TAIs are “the geographical area[s] 

where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly 

forces. Not all target areas of interest will form part of the friendly 

course of action; only target areas of interest associated with high 

Initial Situation

Action Reaction Counteraction

Cognition Phase

War-game overview

Review of strategic setting

Red/blue overview of COAs

Red/blue current order of battle described

Decision on red or blue initiative

Team with initiative 

describes initial actions

Opposing team asks 

questions for clarication

Umpire adjudicates

Scribes record results 

Opposing team identies 

actions observed

Opposing team describes 

reactions

Team with initial initiative 

asks questions for clarication

Umpire adjudicates

Scribes record results 

Team with initial initiative 

identies actions observed

Team with initial initiative 

describes counteractions

Team with initial initiative 

asks questions for clarication

Umpire adjudicates

Scribes record results 

(1 min.) (1 min.)

(1 min.)

(1 min.)

Teams’ conclusions (1 min.)

Components’ personnel insights (5 min.)

Team scribes’ review (1 min.)

Director’s conclusions (1 min.) 

(10 min.)

(5 min.)

(3 min.)

(3 min.)

(1 min.)

(3 min.) (3 min.)

(3 min.)

(1 min.) (1 min.)

(1 min.) (1 min.)

Figure 37. Notional war-gaming time line for one move
72 │ establishing the link

priority targets are of interest to the staff. These are identified during 

staff planning and war gaming. Target areas of interest differ from 

engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all 

available weapons; target areas of interest might be engaged by a single 

weapon.”8

 Figure 38 shows a decision support template combining 

decision graphics with a synchronization matrix.

DP 1 

Decision Support Template

Synchronization Matrix

Phase Deterrence Seize Initiative Dominate 

OPFOR

LCC 

MCC 

ACC 

SOCC 

POTF 

JIACG 

C2 

Intel 

Sustainment 

Info Ops 

Civil Aairs 

Components

Joint 

Functional 

Areas

Decision Pts 

Branch

Sequel

CCIR 

Risks 

Assessment 

Activity/Time D-20 D-10 D-Day D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 D+5 D+10 

MILDEC 

Figure 38. The DST composed of map graphic and synchronization 

matrix
establishing the link │ 73

Decision Support Matrix

The third juncture in the JOPP where operational design has the 

potential to enhance decision analysis is after the JFC approves the 

course of action. Once the JFC approves a course of action, it forms 

the basis for the plan’s strategic concept, providing an opportunity to 

develop a decision support matrix and finalize assumptions. The collective analysis derived from the DST’s record of enemy actions, 

friendly actions, NAIs, and TAIs establishes a crucial foundation for 

determining key decision points. JP 1-02 defines a decision point as 

“a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates 

making a key decision concerning a specific course of action.”9

 However, identification of decision points is only half a DST’s value. The 

other half is formulating the decision criteria for the JFC’s preplanned 

decisions and emergent opportunities. This information is captured 

in a decision support matrix that records each key preplanned decision and decision criteria that evolve from the DST analysis and refinement of assumptions.

The following heuristic example links the war-gaming analysis 

captured in the DST (fig. 39) with the creation of a DSM. One of the 

most crucial decisions a JFC may have to make is the commitment of 

Key to abbreviations in figures 38–42

AA avenue of approach

ACC air component commander

ATO air tasking order

AUR country of Auriga

Bde brigade

BLA Batari Liberation Army

C2 command and control

C4ISR command; control; communications; computers; and 

intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CHOP change of operational control

CJTF combined joint task force

COG center of gravity

COIN counterinsurgency

DP decision point

FEBA forward edge of the battle area

FOM freedom of movement

HA humanitarian assistance

Info information

Intel intelligence

IO information operations

JFLCC joint force land component 

commander

JIACG joint interagency coordination 

group

LCC land component commander

MCC maritime component commander

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade

MILDEC military deception

NAI named area of interest

OEF operational exploitation force

Op. res. operational reserve

OPFOR opposing force

Ops operations

PER country of Perseus

POTF psychological operations task 

force

Pts points

SOCC special operations component 

commander

SOF special operations forces

TAI target area of interest

TBM theater ballistic missile

Vul Vulpeculan

WARNORD warning order

WMD weapons of mass destruction
XX 

FEBA A 

FEBA A 

FEBA B TAI 1 

NAI 2 

NAI 1 

X 

X 

NAI 3 

TAI 3 

XX 

DP 2 

X

Decision Support Template 

Phase II Seize Initiative

Commences: G-Day (the day on which an order is 

or is due to be given to deploy a unit)

Ends:

- G+20 or culmination of enemy forces

Objectives:

- Deny enemy attainment of objectives

- Set conditions for offensive operations

- Stabilize Aurigan government

Effects:

- Force enemy to culminate forward of FEBA A

- Interdict enemy exploitation forces

- Delegitimize BLA insurgency

Tasks:

- Defend FEBA A

- Establish local air superiority

- Conduct special reconnaissance

- Establish local sea superiority

- Secure Capella International Airport (CIAP)

- Generate force for dominate phase

Priority of Effort:

LCC, ACC, MCC, SOCC

Phase Transition Criteria:

Enemy forces culminated forward of FEBA A; conditions 

set for offensive operations

Time G+1

ENEMY

Vul

BLA

Multidivision atk along coastal AAs in Perseus and Auriga; Sptd 

by insurgents

Threatening Bde size penetration FEBA A; OEF moving toward coastal AA NAI 1

- Insurgents blocking LLOCs vic. Aurigan capital of Capella

CJTF Main body in Sagitta. Coalition Response Force (CRF) BCT+ in Perseus. Priority of effort: 

Denial ops vic Perseus coastal AA

LCC Perseus’s forces at < 70%; tactical reserve committed

ACC Local air superiority vic Perseus coastal AA

Defensive counterair-APODS, Perseus SPODs

Counterland (CAS/AI) – priority of effort Perseus Coastal AA

Strategic attack of Vulpeculan WMD employment sites

MCC Move SAG (MD) to vic Perseus Nth Coast SPODs; establish local sea superiority vicinity 

Perseus coast; conduct countermine ops; prepare to CHOP MEB to LCC

Intel Priority of ISR to NAI 1 and TAI 1

IO Highlight Vulpeculan aggression; humanitarian crisis; impact on world energy resources

PSYOPS Conduct leaflet drops in BLA areas announcing CJTF commitment to Aurigan govt.

C2 Forward CP in Sagitta; TAC vicinity port of Vermillion

Force Protection Priority of effort: APODs; SPODs; TAAs; LOCs

Decision Points Decision point 2: CHOP MEB to LCC as operational reserve; commit operational reserve for 

employment vicinity TAI 1.

Branches Move CJTF main body through Sagitta and attack Vulpecula to force withdrawal of forces 

from Perseus

CCIR Priority: Decision criteria for decision point 2 (commitment of operational reserve)

Risk High Risk – Mitigate risk through deployment of air and naval power

Figure 39. DST analysis to commit operational reserve
establishing the link │ 75

the operational reserve. This is such a critical decision because when 

the operational reserve is committed, the joint force risks culmination. If the reserve is committed too soon or too late, or along the 

wrong axis, the force may experience catastrophic failure. In the DST 

shown in figure 39, the JFC faces a multidirectional attack without 

the ability to employ a fully operational combined joint task force 

(CJTF). He risks losing his seaports of embarkation (SPOE), and a 

major enemy force is penetrating the forward edge of the battle area 

(FEBA). Does he commit the reserve or not? By framing the problem, 

the JFC knows intuitively to commit the reserve. However, even 

though this is a correct decision, how the decision is executed determines the decision’s outcome. Framing the problem and determining 

the correct solution do not necessarily guarantee success. In this case, 

the war game has identified the early commitment of the operational 

reserve as a critical decision the JFC must make. The JFC and the staff 

examine this decision point and the information recorded on the 

DST from the war game and develop decision criteria that will be 

recorded in the DSM.

Figure 40 provides an example of a DSM format identifying the 

decision point, TAI, NAI, event, decision required, decision criteria, 

assets available for employment, and CJTF actions related to this example. This format deliberately separates decision criteria and CJTF 

actions into the information required for a warning order and the 

information required for an execute order. This builds flexibility for 

Decision Support Matrix MCO

Decision Req Decision Criteria Assets CJTF Actions

Vul forces 

engage FEBA A 

in strength 

along coastal 

AA and 

operational 

exploitation 

forces (OEF) 

moving toward 

coastal AA

Vul forces threaten Bde-size 

penetration of FEBA A

Vul OEF preparing to move 

316th Armor Bde vicinity NAI 1 

Perseus’s forces at < 80% 

strength

Authorize preparation actions to 

CHOP MEB

Issue warning order

Revise CJTF guidance letter 

Submit ATO input

CHOP MEB

Issue execution order to CJTF 

and coalition forces

Redesignate operational reserve 

LCC

ACC

MCC

SOF

Perseus and 

Auriga forces

Deploy MEB ashore

Authorize JFLCC to 

commit MEB to block 

penetration of FEBA 

A along coastal AA

FEBA A

Vul Bde at > 70% strength has 

penetrated FEBA A

Air and res are insucient 

alone to stop penetration

Perseus’s forces < 70% 

strength

Perseus’s reserve already 

committed

Notes: Assume maximum enemy movement rate (mounted) in contact to be .5 km/hr 

Estimate Vul movement time between FEBA A and FEBA B to be 24 hrs 

Estimate minimum preparation time for MEB to block Vul penetration of FEBA A to be 24 hrs 

Authorize JFLCC to 

issue warning order 

to operational 

reserve (MEB) to 

block penetration of 

FEBA A along 

coastal AA

CHOP MEB to JFLCC

Perseus’s forces

unable to block 

penetration of Vul 

forces

FEBA A penetrated 

by Vul 1st 

Echelon Bde

# 1 # 1

LCC

ACC

MCC

SOF

Perseus and 

Auriga forces

WARNORD

Perseus’s forces

unable to block 

penetration of Vul Execute Order

DP TAI NAI Event

1

Figure 40. Decision support matrix with decision criteria for a warning order and execute order
76 │ establishing the link

the JFC and his components by allowing them to initiate preparations 

without committing forces prematurely.

It is impossible to forecast every decision a JFC must make; however, key preplanned decisions can be identified. Preplanned decisions 

are those the JFC and the staff know they must make. They include, 

but are not limited to, major branches and sequels discovered during 

the JOPP’s COA analysis and war-gaming step, planning assumptions, priorities of effort, phase transitions, and time-sensitive targets.

We have already emphasized that each planning assumption requires a branch or sequel, but also each branch and sequel require a 

separate DST and DSM. If the planning assumptions are correctly 

identified and an assumption proves not to be true, the success of the 

entire operation or campaign is at risk.

The decision criteria embedded in the DSM provide a JFC an analytical tool for measuring risk and synchronizing the actions of friendly 

forces. They also assist a JFC in visualizing the timing of operations. 

If the DSM’s decision is properly constructed, the JFC will have a 

much better gauge of when to issue a warning order and when to issue an execute order. The collection of DSMs formed from the decision analysis becomes a playbook of decisions that allows the JFC to 

review and study key decisions well before execution. Although JFCs 

will always have to rely on coup d’oeil, decision analysis aided by a 

DSM reduces the risks of ineffective or poorly thought-out plans and 

decision points.

The DSM also provides a structure for enhancing the effectiveness 

of CCIRs. JP 3-0 defines a CCIR as an information requirement identified by the commander as critical to facilitating timely decision 

making. A CCIR’s two key elements are priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and friendly-force information requirements (FFIR). PIRs 

establish intelligence-support priorities that the commander and staff 

need to understand about an adversary or the operational environment. FFIRs identify information the commander and staff needs to 

understand concerning the status of the friendly force and supporting capabilities. The information derived from a DSM’s decision criteria corresponds directly to the PIRs and FFIRs that the JFC needs to 

make a decision. Using the DSM decision criteria established in figure 40, figure 41 presents an example of how the DSM focuses CCIRs. 

The decision required is to commit the operational reserve to stop an 

enemy penetration of FEBA A along the coastal avenue of approach. 

The PIR and FFIR for this decision are taken directly from the DSM’s 
establishing the link │ 77

decision criteria and aligned with a time-sensitivity estimate indicating the latest time the information is of value. This focuses the collection and analysis of CCIRs against specific priority JFC decisions.

Throughout the JOPP the cognitive map is constantly refined to capture the JFC’s operational vision. This map provides the JFC the ability 

to communicate his vision to political leaders, allies, combatant commanders, interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, 

nongovernmental organizations, and subordinate components. This 

communication mechanism links all three levels of war and serves as a 

blueprint for the operation or campaign. Figure 42 illustrates a refined 

cognitive map. The cognitive map and the analysis in the DST and 

DSM are essential elements for making effective decisions. 

We must emphasize that not all decisions can be relegated to a 

nice, neat, preplanned format. Adversaries are complex, adaptive 

systems, and they are always capable of doing the unexpected. However, JFCs can shape emergent opportunities through both proactive and reactive operational maneuvers. The challenge is establishing a decision analysis framework that supports taking advantage 

of emergent opportunities.

Figure 41. CCIRs’ direct correlation to decision criteria established in 

the DSM

EXECUTIVE ORDER:

Deploy MEB ashore

Authorize JFLCC to commit

MEB to block penetration of

FEBA A along coastal AA

Decision Point Decision Required

WARNING ORDER:

Vul Bde at greater

than 70% strength

has penetrated

FEBA A

Air and res are

insucient alone to

stop penetration

Perseus’s forces less

than 70% strength

Perseus’s reserve

already committed

CCIR

PIR FFIR

Remarks

Commit operational

reserve to stop penetration

of FEBA A along coastal

avenue of approach

Vul forces threaten

Bde size penetration

of FEBA A

Perseus’s forces at

less than 80%

strength

Latest time

information of

value: D+4

Vul OEF preparing

to move 316th Armor

Bde vicinity NAI 1

Authorize JFLCC to issue

warning order to op. res.

(MEB) to block penetration

of FEBA A along coastal AA

CHOP MEB to JFLCC

1
78 │ establishing the link

Shaping Emergent Opportunities

One of military history’s most masterful illustrations of shaping 

emergent opportunities is Gen Ulysses S. Grant’s decision analysis 

during the Civil War’s Vicksburg campaign. Located 250 feet above 

the Mississippi River, the Confederate city of Vicksburg dominated 

transportation and supply along the river. It was a strategic choke point 

vital to the interests of both the North and the South and a crucial 

objective for the Union forces.

In the fall of 1862, Grant mounted an initial campaign to seize 

Vicksburg but failed after his logistics trains were destroyed at Holly 

Springs on 20 December, by Confederate general Earl Van Dorn. In 

spite of this setback, however, Grant immediately began analysis of 

three courses of action to seize Vicksburg. The first was to dredge a 

new channel in the Mississippi River allowing Union forces to bypass 

the artillery dominating approaches to Vicksburg. The second involved bypassing Vicksburg by opening an axis of advance through 

the bayous between Providence and the Red River in Louisiana. The 

third concentrated on finding an overland route on the west side of 

the Mississippi.10 Although there was no formal doctrine at this time, 

Figure 42. CJTF refined cognitive map

CJTF Lines of Operation

Lines of 

Operation

Enable HA

COIN

Preclusion

Security

OBJECTIVES

DECISIVE POINTS

6

13

14

3 4

Decision Points

1. Initiate sequel 1 – deterrence fails

2. Commit op reserve to FEBA A

3. Aurigan government collapses

4. Vul terminates hostilities

5. BLA collapses

1. IO dominance achieved

2. Lodgment secured 

3. Capella Int. Airport secured

4. Allied noncombatants secured

5. HA ops enabled

Sequel

A. FEBA A defended

B. Air superiority established

C. Vul OEF culminated

D. TBM/WMD threat neutralized

E. Vul oensive forces destroyed

6. Vul isolated

7. Govt. locations secured

8. Strategic infrastructures secured

9. Vul ceases BLA support

10. Kandar Valley secured

11. Insurgency contained

End state: A peaceful, stable, and secure region with the 

sovereignty of each state secure within internationally recognized 

borders, not threatened by external aggression, with respect for the 

human rights of each individual and with freedom of access to the 

international community.

7

10

Operational 

COG

11

Operational Strategic

E

N

D

S

T

A

T

E

Ensure FoM for HA

Ensure safety of 

alliance nationals in 

AUR

Ensure 

uninterrupted 

access to region and 

its energy sources

Restore security and 

stability in AUR and 

PER

Prevent escalation 

and widening of 

conict

Enable evacuation 

and HA ops

Contribute to 

restoration

of regional peace and 

security

Counter BLA 

insurgency

Demonstrate alliance 

resolve to deter Vul 1 2

Phase I 

Deter

Phase II 

Seize Initiative

Phase III

Stabilize

A B C D E

1

Phase IV

Enable

Vul :

C4ISR

BLA

Aurigan 

Security 

Forces

4

9

5

2

8 3

5

12. Energy resources secured

13. BLA begins negotiation

14. Aurigan security forces capable

12

Main Plan
establishing the link │ 79

Grant’s decision analysis demonstrated a mastery of operational design’s principal concepts. He combined the constructs of center of 

gravity, lines of operation, and decisive points with deception to 

shape emergent opportunities.

At the beginning of Grant’s second campaign to seize Vicksburg, 

the Union and Confederate forces were almost evenly matched. Both 

sides had approximately 50,000 men. Realizing this, Grant developed 

and executed a deception plan consisting of several diversions to confuse, fix, and realign Confederate force ratios. Grant ordered Maj Gen 

Frederick Steele to attack north of Vicksburg and destroy Confederate supplies and livestock. This attack, in conjunction with movements 

of Sherman’s forces and Col Benjamin Grierson’s famed cavalry raid, 

diverted Confederate attention north and concealed Grant’s movements on the west side of the Mississippi. But Grant’s boldest decision 

was to cut his own supply lines.

On 30 April 1863, Grant crossed the Mississippi River below 

Vicksburg at Bruinsburg (fig. 43) and was faced with two choices: halt 

and build up logistics or cut his supply lines and continue the attack. 

Grant seized the opportunity to continue the attack. His decision 

Figure 43. The Vicksburg Campaign. (Reprinted from Vicksburg National Military Park, map of the Vicksburg Campaign, http://www.nps 

.gov/vick/planyourvisit/park-maps-and-brochure.htm.)
80 │ establishing the link

analysis assumed that if he waited for supplies, his adversaries, Confederate lieutenant generals John C. Pemberton and Joseph Johnston, 

would be able to unite forces and reinforce Vicksburg with fresh 

troops.11 Grant’s methodical decision analysis process enabled him to 

envision how the campaign should unfold and established the conditions necessary to keep his adversaries off balance. His forces swept 

Confederate forces aside at Port Gibson on 1 May and continued on 

to Raymond where he again defeated the Confederates. At Raymond, 

Grant was confronted with Confederate forces to his west at Vicksburg and to his east at Jackson. At this critical point, he made the 

decision to halt his assault on Vicksburg and attack the city of Jackson 

to prevent the Confederate forces under Johnston from linking up 

with Pemberton’s forces at Vicksburg. After defeating this threat to 

his east flank, Grant moved westward to seize Vicksburg. His forces 

defeated the Confederates at Champion Hill and again at the Big 

Black River Bridge, and by 17 May were ready to begin the assault on 

Vicksburg. Grant’s initial assaults on Vicksburg on 17 and 22 May 

failed, and he was forced to conduct siege operations. The cumulative 

effect of the siege operations, however, took its toll on the Confederate forces, and on 4 July 1863, Vicksburg surrendered.

In spite of the delay caused by the siege, Grant achieved a tremendous victory at Vicksburg. For the South, the fall of Vicksburg was a 

monumental strategic and psychological loss. A large part of Grant’s 

success was due to his decision analysis and his ability to formulate 

decision criteria. Grant used his preplanned decision analysis to develop viable responses to emergent opportunities.

Shaping emergent opportunities draws from the cognitive vision 

ingrained in operational design’s decision analysis. The DST derived from the analysis and war gaming of COAs provides a critical 

framework for examining the effects of friendly and enemy actions 

on the campaign. Every action of a friendly or enemy force will 

most likely precipitate some form of reaction or counteraction. Anticipating these actions and counteractions is vital. JFCs and their 

staffs must be able to envision key decisions and establish clearly 

defined decision criteria. The creation of specific decision criteria 

not only provides a metric for commanders to assess decisions, but 

also focuses the collection efforts of the CCIR. This minimizes the 

passing of irrelevant information through the collection system and 

speeds up analysis. It is important to emphasize that no one can 

predict with 100 percent accuracy what an adversary will do. Ad-
establishing the link │ 81

versaries are complex, adaptive, thinking systems. However, as JFCs 

and their staffs construct their campaign, a deliberate and disciplined analysis of potential decisions will provide an effective approach to exploiting emergent opportunities.

Notes

1. JP 1-02, Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary, 370. 

2. de Hartog, Genghis Khan, 86–98.

3. Greene, 33 Strategies of War, 181.

4. US Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 14–15.

5. Thayer, War without Fronts.

6. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 98.

7. Ibid., 249.

8. Ibid., 361.

9. Ibid., 99.

10. Catton, Grant Moves South, 323; and Bearss, Vicksburg Campaign, 427.

11. Badeau, Military History, 162–63.

Chapter 5

Operational Design and 

Counterinsurgency

One of the common oversights embedded in doctrinal practices is 

applying foundational principles to all operational environments 

without assessing their relevance or impact. This is certainly the case 

in applying operational design to major conventional operations and 

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. There are significant differences between these two types of operations. For both, as Clausewitz 

stated long ago, “the political object is the goal, war is the means of 

reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from 

their purposes.”1

 However, destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in 

a COIN environment does not necessarily guarantee the attainment 

of the political objective.2 This factor has a significant impact on a 

planner’s approach to operational design. The planner must recognize the intricate nature of an insurgency’s root causes and craft a 

design framework that supports the analysis of those complexities. 

Some traditional aspects of operational design, such as center of 

gravity and arrangement of operations by phase, may not relate or 

function in the same manner as they do in major conventional operations because of the COIN’s complexity.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, defines insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or 

movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”3

 In contrast, COIN is the “comprehensive civilian and military 

efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.”4

The distinction between major conventional operations and COIN operations is not just the fight for governance. There is also a dramatic difference in the temporal dimension that affects operational design.

Most analysts acknowledge that a commitment to conduct COIN 

operations is often a commitment to decades of support. The root 

causes of insurgencies usually evolve over lengthy periods of time, 

and they are not going to be eradicated in a few months or even years. 

A recent RAND study of COIN campaigns since 1945 found that the 

successful ones lasted an average of 14 years and the unsuccessful 

ones an average of 11 years.5 However, we must also understand that 

COIN is a race against time. The counterinsurgent must produce a 
84 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

balanced mixture of short-term and long-term results to solidify the 

support of the people. As David Galula states, “The counterinsurgent 

needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win.”6

 As figure 44 indicates, over time the counterinsurgent’s will to succeed and 

his level of ambition decline markedly. As time elapses and the cost 

goes up in lives and dollars, support for a COIN diminishes. This is 

especially true for democratic nations waging COIN operations. In 

any 10-year period, democratic nations undergo a series of business 

and election cycles that directly affect the level of COIN ambition and 

the will to win. Time will most often favor the insurgent. Consequently, a COIN design should shape the natural trajectory working 

against the will to win by showing immediate improvements in selected key areas. This requires a sophisticated design that fuses an 

understanding of the system with the ability to promote a sense of 

enduring commitment to the host nation. Maximum campaign effectiveness is achieved only when these two entities are integrated.

Governing Authority 

Years 

COIN 

Will 

to 

Succeed 

and 

Level of 

Ambition 

5 10 15 

Security 

Governance 

Shadow 

Governance 

Sanctuary 

Economic 

Development 

Governance 

Power 

Consolidation 

Cost 

Lives/$ 

Will 

COIN design should 

shape a vision that 

stabilizes the natural 

trajectory of 

insurgencies to foster 

the will to win. 

Services 

Destabilization 

Figure 44. The classic clash of wills
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 85

The initial focal point to increase campaign effectiveness is to 

under stand the system. Systems analysis is far from a new concept in 

the COIN environment. The United States used systems analysis extensively in the COIN effort during the Vietnam War. The Military 

Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) defined a system as “a complex of interdependencies between parts, components and processes 

that involve discernible regularities of relationship.” This definition 

also refers to a system as the interdependency between the complex 

and its surrounding environment.7

 Figure 45 provides a macro view 

of the systems analysis developed by the MACV.

This analysis was augmented with numerous research studies such 

as Douglas Pike’s War, Peace, and the Viet Cong that provided a strategic perspective on the Vietnamese communist strategy of dau tranh 

(struggle). This strategy focused on the unremitting use of military 

and nonmilitary force over long periods of time in pursuit of an obFigure 45. The MACV’s systems analysis. (Reprinted from Combined 

Intelligence Center Vietnam, The Enemy System: Subregion 1, Research 

and Analysis Study ST 70-01, 24 August 1970, figure 1.)

Enemy 

Use of 

Cambodia 

Enemy 

Use of 

Laos 

Enemy Base Areas, 

Caches, Camps 

Provinces

Enemy Military Activity

Villages, Precincts, Hamlets

Local VC Areas 

Districts

VC Infrastructure and 

Other Support 

Support 

from 

China 

Support 

from 

USSR 

Other 

Communist 

Support Neutral and 

Free World 

Support 

National Borders and Boundaries 

Air Space 

Territorial Waters

DMZ 

USSR 

North 

Vietnam 

War-Making 

and Support 

Capabilities 
86 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

jective and possessed a dual character: the armed struggle and the 

political struggle. Pike referred to the individual fighting the political 

struggle as

the man in the black pajama of the Vietnamese peasant. His mission is to steal 

the people away from the government. His concern is almost exclusively control of the people, as distinguished from the big-unit war, where the concern 

is “control” of the enemy’s army. He seeks to achieve this through programs 

designed to control the people, programs augmented and made possible by as 

much (and as little) military effort as is required.8

The intent of the MACV’s analysis was to develop a conscious targeting effort against the total enemy system by acting on subsystem 

components. The enemy system was seen as complexes consisting of 

one or more base areas, travel routes, commo-liaison stations, and 

other elements that allowed it to functionally regenerate itself despite 

the loss of single elements. The systems model developed by the 

MACV encompassed the enemy subsystem, the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), the military subsystem, the rear services subsystem, 

and an assessment of the system’s strengths and weaknesses.9

Although the US failed in Vietnam, the MACV’s systems analysis 

was an effective COIN tool. Between 1967 and 1972, the percentage 

of government-secured population rose from 42 to 80.10 During that 

same time frame the Viet Cong’s force strength declined by 50 percent, and by 1972 only 20 percent of the communist forces in South 

Vietnam were Viet Cong. The rest were North Vietnamese regulars or 

North Vietnamese in traditional Viet Cong units.11 We should remember that South Vietnam’s final capitulation was the result of a 

North Vietnamese conventional invasion backed by 165,000 soldiers, 

massive amounts of artillery, and over 600 tanks.

In spite of the US failure in Vietnam, systems analysis provides a 

crucial tool for today’s COIN operations. Examining an insurgency 

begins with understanding “the system” (fig. 46). This requires defining what the system is and linking that system to campaign effectiveness. The framework for systems analysis is not just a political, 

military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) 

systems correlation. The systems analysis should reflect a comprehensive examination of the desired end state, related objectives, historical context, relevant actors, and effects of culture. Additionally, 

the framework should analyze potential barriers to COIN operations such as security, corruption, illiteracy, financial system, ethnic 

divisions, religious diversity, and enemy sanctuary. Identifying bar-
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 87

riers allows planners to scope the true context of the problem, analyze priorities, and determine a realistic balance of short- and longterm desired results.

Once COIN planners frame the system, the focus becomes how to 

engender a sense of enduring commitment to the host nation. COIN 

forces must earn the trust and confidence of the host nation. One 

method for accomplishing this is through cultural integration. The 

process of cultural integration provides a mechanism for guiding 

COIN forces in working within the host nation’s culture. Planners 

assess the critical junctures where culture will have a dominant effect 

in galvanizing popular support for COIN efforts. Planners should use 

the historical, social, and anthropological information derived from 

the systems analysis along with human terrain mapping to develop a 

cultural integration process that links directly to policy actions.

There are three primary reasons why cultural integration is important. First, the insurgent uses the host nation’s culture to communicate with the population and gain support. This use of culture 

empowers the clandestine infrastructure to project shadow goverFigure 46. COIN effectiveness: understanding the system and demonstrating an enduring commitment

COIN Design

COIN 

Campaign 

Eectiveness 

Demonstrate Enduring 

Commitment 

Knowledge Actions 

Cultural 

Integration 

Build Trust, 

Condence, 

Relationships 

P 

M 

E 

S 

I 

I 

Desired 

Political End 

State 

Cultural 

Environment 

Corruption 

Illiteracy 

Ethnic 

Divisions 

Religious 

Diversity 

Understand the System

Barriers 

Governance 

Capacity 

Security 

Capacity 

Actors S 

(Friendly/Adversary) 

Financial 

 System 

Insurgent 

Historical Sanctuary 

Context 
88 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

nance. Second, when COIN forces operate outside of a culture, they 

alienate the population and render policy objectives ineffective. 

COIN forces must develop and disseminate narratives, symbols, 

and messages that resonate with the population’s preexisting cultural system.12 Third, governing authority is the focus for all COIN 

operations. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength 

only when his power is embedded in the host nation’s political organization and it is firmly supported by the population.13

The challenge for COIN commanders and their staffs is how to 

digest the voluminous information emanating from the systems 

analysis and correlate that information to policies that provide the 

population with security, services, and governance. One method is 

recording the salient systems analysis information on an operational environment map. Using Afghanistan as an example, figure 

47 depicts a generalization of historical, social, cultural, and security issues confronting the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF). The concept of operational environment mapping is neither 

a new nor a revolutionary idea. It simply provides a way to create a 

holistic vision for the commander by connecting systemic parts to 

the operational environment.

Although mapping the operational environment appears simplistic, it requires significant critical insight to distinguish the 

links between systemic parts. The Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, is an excellent heuristic example. This dam 

provides one of the most crucial services in Afghanistan—electricity. A 2006 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation found 

that 25 percent of Afghanistan’s population listed the lack of electricity as their greatest problem. The only problem rated higher 

was unemployment. Progress in providing electricity has been 

systematically stalled. In 2001 approximately 6 percent of the population had access to electricity. By 2010 only 497,000 of the approximately 4.8 million households in Afghanistan had access to 

the national power grid.14 This is well below the developmental 

goal of providing power to 65 percent of urban and 25 percent of 

rural households.

Figure 48 presents a hypothetical map of the Kajaki Dam’s operational environment. The map highlights key PMESII factors and the 

tremendous problems associated with security. But the map fails to 

show the seams between the interagency vision, the host-nation government’s requirement for immediate progress, and the military’s 
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 89

ability to provide security. The United States Agency for International 

Development’s (USAID) vision for the dam is a long-term objective 

to provide cheap electricity to areas of Kandahar, Kajaki, Sangin, 

Musa Qala, and Lashkar Gah. The Afghan government, however, is 

under intense pressure to supply electricity to its constituents now, 

and the failure to provide this service undermines the government’s 

authority to govern.

The holdup is the military’s ability to create a secure environment, not only in the area around Kajaki, but also in the surrounding districts where the hydroelectric plant’s power cables traverse. 

Since 2006 numerous military operations have supported the Kajaki Dam development. Progress, however, was hindered because a 

third turbine required to generate additional power could not be 

moved along the route to the dam. In 2008 over 2,000 British soldiers escorted the third turbine generator to the dam site. Despite 

this, the turbine was still not operational in 2010 because the cement and other materials required to emplace the turbine could not 

be transported along the route to Kajaki. The other potential answer 

to this problem is to supply the population in these areas with generator banks. This form of energy is more expensive, but it is easier 

to construct, requires less security, and is more responsive to the 

people’s needs.

Ironically, the beneficiary of the Kajaki Dam dilemma is the Taliban. 

The failure to make the dam operational highlights the Government 

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIROA) inability to provide 

the basic essentials of security and services to its people. Additionally, 

the Taliban’s control of the surrounding districts indirectly presents it 

with a dual source of income to fund its operations. It diverts energy 

from the Kajaki hydroelectric plant to irrigate poppy fields for opium 

production and charges the local citizenry for the electricity that does 

come from the plant. The Helmand provincial government estimates 

it loses $4 million a year in electricity revenue to the Taliban.15

The Kajaki Dam illustrates the need to connect systemic parts, especially between the different levels of war. Creating a map of the 

operational environment empowers cognitive vision, but it does not 

present a means to analyze interconnecting systemic parts. One solution to this is combining the map of the operational environment 

with traditional aspects of operational design.
Op Design: Systems Analysis 

1893 

Durand Line India 

Partition 

1947 

Najibullah 

Collapse 

1992 1979 

Soviet 

Invasion 

Soviet 

Withdrawal 

1989 

King Amanullah 

1919 

Golden Age 

Starts 

1949 

Indo-Pak 

Wars 

1965 -1971 

 Elements of Insurgent Inuence • Shadow governance 

• Population intimidated and/or coerced 

• Insurgents have freedom of movement 

• Friendly freedom of movement limited 

• Infrastructure development disrupted 

• Economic capacity truncated 

Economic

Kabul Conf 

Hydro-Electric 

Torkham Gate 

Mining 

National Identity Forming 30 + Years of War 

Military

ANSF 

Local Security 

Police 

CIVCAS 

Pak Sanctuary 

Pak ISI 

Inuence of Pakistan

HQN 

TB 

TB 

TB 

TB 

TTP 

HIK 

TB 

HIG 

HIG 

HIG 

ISAF Strategy 

Change 

2009 

US 

 Intervention 

2001 

ISAF 

2002 

OIF 

2003 

Pakistan 

Elections 

2008 

Lisbon Conf. 

2010 

Information

CIVCAS 

ISAF Strategy 

Elections 

Lisbon Conf. 

King Abdur Rahman 

Golden Age 

Ends 

1973 

TB 

Cultural 

Qawm Deobandi Islam Pashtunwali Jirga Human Terrain (Durrani, Ghilzay...) Hoqooq Baksheesh 

Pakistan 

 ISAF Focus 

• National through local governance improved • Security in key population centers 

• Security connected between regions • Friendly freedom of movement assured • Major infrastructure projects ongoing 

• Economic corridor sustainable 

Threat Objective 

HQN – Haqqani Network (Zadran Tribe) 

Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan and the reestablishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 

TB – Taliban Restore Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan TTP – Tehrik-e 

Taliban PAK 

Establish fundamentalist Islamic government in Pakistan 

HIG – Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin 

Establish Sunni Islamist state under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 

HIK – Hezb-e IslamiKhalis 

Regain historical control of Nangahar 

TNSM – Tehrik Nefaz-E Shariat Mohammdi 

Implement Sharia Law in PAK 

HQN 

TB 

HQN 

TB 

TNSM 

Barriers • TB/HQN Sanctuary in Pakistan 

• Cultural Understanding of Afghanistan 

• Security Capacity • CIVCAS 

• Corruption 

• Narco-Tracking 

• Illiteracy • Financial System 

Infrastructure

Water 

Electricity 

Roads 

Health Care 

Education 

Political

Rule of Law 

Elections 

Illiteracy 

Corruption 

Opium Production 

Reintegration 

Challenges

Issues

 Strategic Minerals 

 Key Trade Routes 

TTP 

Social

Loya Jirga 

Islam 

Sharia Law 

Tribes/Clans 

Pashtunwali 

Dari-Pashto 

Figure 47. Map of the operational environment
Figure 48. Hypothetical Kajaki Dam operational environment map

Regional Taliban HQ

Traditional Taliban Stronghold

Kajaki Dam

Vital to development plans

Electrifying southern AfghanistanIncreasing cultivation

Dam under renovationTaliban controls surrounding areas

Helmand Province

23,058 square milesMountainous to northDesert plain in southHelmand River runs throughout

Source of water and electricity

Economy

Poppy cultivationBarley, cotton, wheatApricots, grapes, melonsAnimal husbandry

Ring road = main arteryCapital: Lashkar GahPopulation: up to 1.4 million94% ruralEthnic composition

Mainly Pushtun

Barakzai: 32%Noorzai: 16%

Alokzai: 9%

Eshaqzai: 5%

Some Baluch in south

Literacy rate: 4%

Hasanzai

Alizai

Jalozai

Alizai Tribe

Part of Durrani ConfederationLeader: Sher Mohamed Akhundzada

Opposed by some

Located in:

BaghranMusa QalaNaw ZadKajaki Districts

Dominated Helmand until 1994Returned to power in 2001Reprisals taken against Eshaqzai

Helmand Province Kajaki Dam

Insurgent Inuence and Capability

Not AssessedINS Limited CapabilityINS Demonstrated CapabilityINS Eective Capability
92 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

Relationship between the Traditional 

Aspects of Operational Design and 

Irregular Warfare’s COIN Operations

Assessing any type of operation begins with an understanding of 

the levels of war or operations. Many planners talk past each other 

because of confusion over what level of war they are discussing, and 

nowhere is it more confusing than in COIN operations. No two insurgencies are the same. They differ in their root causes, operational 

environments, and insurgent forces. Additionally, insurgent actions 

at the tactical level draw immediate attention from all levels of war, 

and this phenomenon blurs responsibilities, interagency integration, 

and command relationships. Figure 49 presents a traditional view of 

the levels of war and corresponding operational designs. COIN operations have an inherent complexity, and insurgencies cannot usually 

be resolved through quick, decisive military action. As a result, there 

are different types of interactions among the levels of war. These interFigure 49. Traditional operational design and the relationships among 

levels of war

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

Military 

Strategic 

End State

Diplomatic 

Economic 

Information 

Phase Phase 

Obj

Obj

Obj 

Obj

Military End State

Termination Criteria

Strategic 

COG

Security 

Services 

Governance

Economic 

Development 

Obj

Obj

Obj 

Obj

 

Operational 

COG

Security 

Services 

Governance 

Economic 

Development 

Military End State

Termination Criteria

Strategic

COG

Phase Phase 

Phase Phase 

Strategic 

End State

Operational 

COG

Tactical

COG
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 93

actions require much more detailed coordination than the traditional 

model and change the way we visualize operational design elements.

In COIN operations, the interrelationships among the levels of 

war move away from a hierarchical structure to a much more integrated and complex arrangement similar to figure 50. The reason for 

this shift is the pervasive complexity embedded in a COIN’s operational environment and the scope of the interagency interactions 

necessary for success. In this model, the tactical level of war rests on 

top of the operational and strategic levels because tactical actions are 

what everyone sees first, and those actions can have immediate effects on both of the other levels. For example, on 30 September 2010 

two NATO helicopters crossed into Pakistan’s Kurram tribal region 

and fired on a Mandata Kandaho border patrol post, killing three 

Pakistani soldiers. Within hours, Pakistani authorities ordered a halt 

to all trucks and oil tankers ferrying supplies to the ISAF’s forces 

through Afghanistan’s Torkham Gate checkpoint.16 This tactical confrontation resulted in a 10-day blockade of the Torkham Gate area 

and the destruction of an estimated 150 trucks by Pakistani and Taliban 

attackers.17 This situation was serious enough to require international 

mediation at the strategic level to reach resolution.

The integrated arrangement shown in figure 50 also supports the most 

common view of the center of gravity in COIN environments. In major 

conventional operations, identifying COGs at each level of war provides 

a mechanism for focusing military forces during the campaign’s phases. 

In COIN operations, the complexity of coordinating military, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations may 

necessitate the identification of a single COG to achieve a focus of efforts. 

Military planners naturally tend to concentrate their COG analysis on 

the enemy’s forces. The problem for planners in many COIN contexts is 

that there may not be a single entity that constitutes a homogenous insurgency. In Iraq, military forces have been confronted by Sunni, Shia, and 

al-Qaeda operatives and numerous criminal networks. The same is true 

for Afghanistan, where insurgents come from multiple groups, including 

the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-e-Islami 

Khalis (HIK), Hizb-l Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and the Tehrik-i-Taliban 

(TTP). Each of these groups has different objectives. Although it appears 

counterintuitive, identifying a single COG to support COIN operations 

may actually provide better focus.

One of the most often cited COGs in COIN operations is the host 

nation’s population. This concept directs the focus of COIN opera-
Figure 50. COIN design and the relationships among levels of war

Strategic 

Tactical 

RIP

TOA 

RIP

TOA 

LOELOELOELOE

Military 

Strategic 

End State

Diplomatic 

Economic 

Information 

Phase Phase 

Operational 

Stage Stage 

Strategic 

COG

Security 

Services 

Governance 

Economic 

Development 

RIP 

TOA 

Governing 

Authority 

Strategic

COG

Obj

ObjObjObj

Operational 

COG

Military End State

Termination Criteria

KTD

KTDKTDKTD

Provinces
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 95

tions at security, services, governance, and economic development 

for the people. What this concept misses, however, is the fact that 

COIN forces can focus almost exclusively on the population and fail 

to subdue the insurrection. COIN forces can provide security, services, and even economic development for the population and not 

succeed because the people have too little confidence in the host nation’s governing authority. Any gains in security, services, and economic development are ephemeral unless they inspire confidence in 

the governing authority. Additionally, as figure 50 depicts, governing 

authority must be ensured simultaneously at all three levels of war to 

produce success. The strategic level of war has the responsibility for 

transforming or developing a form of government that is legitimate 

in the eyes of the people and coordinating the international support 

for that government. The operational level coordinates security, stability, and economic development operations throughout the nation 

to highlight the host nation’s ability to govern effectively. Last, but no 

less important, the tactical level has the burden of execution. The face 

at the forefront for all three levels of war should be the host nation.

Focusing on governing authority also functions similarly to a Janus 

strategy. On one side, COIN forces support and facilitate the host nation’s governance. But on the other side, COIN operations should 

also concentrate on neutralizing the insurgent’s governing authority. 

Using this perspective, the strategic level focuses on denying international support and sanctuary to the insurgents. The operational 

level coordinates and directs military operations aimed at neutralizing the insurgent’s clandestine infrastructure and denying the ability 

to establish shadow governance. The tactical level once again has responsibility for executing the operations.

The COG is not the only area in which operational design is applied differently for COIN operations than for major conventional 

operations. Because of the temporal dimension of war, the arranging 

of operations is another area in which there are critical differences. 

Although major conventional operations can last years, COIN operations may last decades. As a result, arranging operations into phases 

may not be effective. If a COIN campaign’s stability-operations phase 

lasts years, how does the operational level of war coordinate and direct operations against an adaptive adversary with friendly forces and 

headquarters rotating in and out of a theater? In that type of environment, the use of phases makes it almost impossible to maintain con-
96 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

tinuity of effort, develop assessments, and simultaneously adjust to 

an ever-changing operational context.

The answer is to break phases into stages and follow the relief in 

place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) process (fig. 51). Stages allow 

phases to be broken into smaller, more manageable portions of time 

to direct and adjust operations. One of the greatest obstacles to the 

ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is the lack of continuity 

between units rotating in and out of theater. Whether it is an Army 

brigade combat team (BCT) replacing a Marine regimental combat 

team (RCT) in al-Anbar, Iraq, or an Army BCT replacing another 

Army BCT in Afghanistan’s Regional Command (RC) East, the 

operational-level headquarters must subdivide phases to ensure 

transitional continuity. Units have been rotating in and out of Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002, and as the commanders have changed, 

the vision for success has also changed.

In 2008 a BCT from the 101st Air Assault Division rotated into Afghanistan and began work on the Khost-Gardez road system. The objective was similar to the Kunar model explained in David Kilcullen’s 

Accidental Guerrilla.

18 The purpose of the road was not simply to develop infrastructure. The road was a means to project combat power 

for security, stimulate economic growth by creating access to markets, 

and simultaneously demonstrate governing authority. In 2009 the 

BCT’s RIP/TOA occurred; the next BCT rotated in and focused on difFigure 51. RIP/TOA has significant impact on objectives and operational continuity

RIP/TOA Eect

Obj 

Obj 

Obj 

Obj

Military End State 

Termination Criteria 

Strategic 

COG

Security 

Services 

Governance 

Economic 

Development 

Stage RIP 

TOA 

Stage 

Operational 

COG
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 97

ferent priorities. Work on the road system came to a virtual standstill. 

When the BCT from the 101st Air Assault Division rotated back to 

Afghanistan in 2010 and found that their progress on the road had 

stopped, they immediately refocused on the road. The purpose of this 

anecdote is not to judge the commanders from either of the BCTs, but 

to highlight the challenges of maintaining continuity during a lengthy 

phase. Unfortunately, this example is far from unique, and a breakdown in continuity occurs not only between military units but also 

between agencies and multinational organizations. The danger is that 

this inconsistency degrades the host nation’s confidence in the United 

States’ ability to foster an enduring international commitment.

Establishing continuity and consistency in a COIN operation depends on three salient factors: a standardized structure for operational design at all three levels of war, an in-depth appreciation for 

local security, and the ability to understand and conduct assessment. 

The notion of developing a standardized structure for operational design faces significant opposition because many fear it will lead to prescription and a checklist mentality. There is a marked difference, 

however, between dictating how a commander develops a design and 

standardizing how the design is recorded and used for synchronization across the levels of war. It is unhealthy to put constraints on how 

a commander develops a design. A commander must have flexibility 

in formulating a design so that it supports his or her vision for execution. But not establishing a framework for operational design is similar 

to conducting the JOPP and not recording the end product in accordance with the five-paragraph format for plans and orders. Furthermore, an operational design must be understood not only by US and 

multinational military forces, but also by the interagency and multinational organizations participating in the COIN. It should facilitate 

synchronization and leverage the national instruments of power at all 

three levels of war. This cannot be achieved without a common 

framework that serves as an integrating mechanism.

COIN design at the strategic and operational levels is closely related to the design developed for major conventional operations. The 

core of the design is based on the relationships among the end state, 

objectives, effects, and COG(s) and the identification of decisive 

points and lines of operation.

Figure 52 depicts a notional structure attempting to align actions 

at the strategic and operational levels of war based on a common 

framework. This cognitive map is a starting point to ensure both levels 
Figure 52. Synchronizing operational design relationships among levels of war

COIN Strategic Decision Analysis

End State

Disrupt, Dismantle, 

Defeat AQIA

Strategic 

COG

GIROA 

Legitimacy

to Govern

Objectives

Deny al-Qaeda safe haven- Pakistan govt. supports safe- haven denial

- al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (AQIA) isolated and marginalized- ISI support to Taliban eliminatedReverse Taliban momentum- GIROA rule of law established- Taliban isolated- Queta Shura marginalizedDeny TB overthrow of GIROA- GIROA governancecondence gap minimized- Government corruption reduced to normStrengthen capacity of ANSF and GIROA- ANSF at sucient levels to defend against Taliban- ANSF capable of providing local securityANSF/GIROA lead responsibility for future

- Capable, functioning GIROA- Condence gap minimized- Rule of law established

Diplomatic

Loya 

Jirga

Peace 

Conf.

Kabul 

Conf.

Lisbon 

Conf.

Economic

Information

Military

CIVCAS Corruption Opium Production Afghan ANSF Capacity

Progress

Limited

Progress

ANSF

Capacity

Pakistan

EconomicCorridors

Afghan

Financial

System

Electric

Grid

Mining 1390

Budget

Economic 

Corridors

Secure

Population

Secure Surge

Initiate

Withdrawal

Limit

Withdrawal

Water

System

Governance Reintegration
COIN Operational Decision Analysis

PresidentialElection

District

Elections

SelfReliance

Afghan Governance

Rule of

Law

AntiCorruption

Operational 

COG

ANSF

Security 

Capacity

Surge RC South Pop. Centers

Secured

Security

ANA Local Security

RC East

ANP Economic Corridors KTDs Functioning

ElectionGrid Short Term

Services

Water

System

Long Term

Health

Care

Education Transportation

Economic

Corridors

Economic

Sustainment

Economic Development

Employment Alternative

Opium Prod.

KTDs

HWY #7

HWY #1

Objectives

Deny insurgent sanctuary- HQN ineective- Limited AQIA support to QTBNeutralize QTB - GIROA governance expanded- GIROA services eective- ROL functioning- Corrupt leaders removed- Queta Shura delegitimizedProtect GIROA- High-prole terror attacks reduced- 80% KTDs secured- HWYs 1, 3, 5, and 7 securedBuild host-nation security capacity - ANSF at sucient levels to defendagainst Taliban- ANSF capable of providing local securityANSF/GIROA lead responsibility for future- ANSF leads security ops

Figure 52. Synchronizing operational design relationships among levels of war (continued)
100 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

of war are working in conjunction with one another and not working 

at cross purposes. It identifies key decision points, relationships 

among lines of operation, points at which the two levels of war are 

not synchronized, and the potential impact of improperly aligned 

stages and RIP/TOAs.

At the tactical level of war, complexity has an enormous impact on 

the development of the cognitive map. Tactical commanders face a 

great diversity of challenges, such as different insurgent groups operating in their area of operations, ethnic and tribal enclaves, and vast differences in area resources and host-nation political leaders’ capabilities. 

To meet the challenges emerging out of the US COIN experiences in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the organizational structure of the combined 

joint operations area (CJOA) is evolving. This is clearly seen in Afghanistan, where the CJOA structure is based on regional commands (RC), 

key terrain districts (KTD), and area-of-interest districts. This type of 

CJOA organization is not a new concept. It has been used in varying 

degrees since ancient times. This organizational approach, however, 

provides a fresh perspective on battlespace ownership and focusing operations. In this concept, the operational-level headquarters oversees a 

series of regional commands. The regional commands coordinate all 

regional civil-military activities conducted by the military elements in 

a number of different provinces. An illustration of this is seen in the 

ISAF’s regional command organization of Afghanistan (fig. 53).

To maximize the effectiveness of COIN operations, each of these 

regional commands has undergone a district-level key terrain assessment to identify key terrain districts and area-of-interest districts. 

KTDs contain concentrated populations, major centers of economic 

productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes. Area-ofinterest districts exert influence on KTDs and facilitate information 

collection and operational resource support.19 Additionally, the ISAF 

has linked the KTD system to economic corridors that support the 

vision for economic development. Figure 54 illustrates Afghanistan’s 

KTDs, area-of-interest districts, the Ring Road, and the border crossing points that generate the majority of Afghanistan’s revenue.

The ISAF and its operational-level headquarters, the ISAF Joint 

Command, have a specific set of selection criteria for designating 

KTDs and area-of-interest districts. However, planners should understand that the physical location of KTDs may also be an important 

consideration for selection. In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 

Practice, David Galula describes the optimum geographic environments 
Figure 53. ISAF’s regional commands

Figure 54. Key terrain districts in Afghanistan

RC (West) 

RC (North) 

RC (East) 

RC (South) 

RC (Southwest) 

#3 – Hairatan 

#5 – Zaranj #2 – Wesh (Chaman) 

#8 – Ghulum Khan 

#1 – Tor Kham 

#6 – Shayr Khan Bandar 

#7 – Torah Ghundey 

#4 – Islam Qal’eh 

Key Terrain District (81)

Area of Interest District (41)

Border Crossing Point
102 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

and physical shapes for both insurgencies and COINs. He states that 

the most favorable shape for an insurgency is a land-locked blunt star 

and for COIN operations an island shaped like a pointed star.20 Although Galula does not elaborate on the rationale for these shapes, 

the primary consideration is undoubtedly security of the population. 

What is significant about Galula’s main point is that KTDs should be 

positioned where they collectively provide maximum security for the 

population. A commander may not have the luxury of conducting 

COIN operations on an island shaped like a pointed star, but he or 

she may be able to artificially create those conditions.

Doctrinal changes are also affecting the articulation of tacticallevel cognitive maps. Recently JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (revision final coordination), introduced the term lines of effort (LOE) to 

the joint lexicon. LOEs establish operational and strategic conditions 

by linking multiple tasks and missions.21 If we combine the impact of 

RIP/TOAs on operational continuity, KTDs, economic corridors, and 

LOEs with the overarching focus on governing authority, the cognitive map at the high tactical level may resemble figure 55. In this 

model, the operational-level headquarters issues guidance to RCs on 

objectives using stages and RIP/TOAs to delineate overlapping responsibilities between units. The stage defines what the common objectives/

tasks are and the RIP/TOA describes the specific KTD conditions units 

must achieve to meet their responsibilities towards those objectives/

tasks. The tactical units assuming responsibility for the RC then use 

Regional 

Command 

RIP 

TOA 

RIP 

TOA 

LOE

LOE

LOE

LOE

LOE

Stage Stage 

ProvincialLevel

Governing 

Authority

KTD(s)

KTD(s)

KTD(s)

RIP 

KTD(s)

Figure 55. Tactical-level COIN design
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 103

that guidance to develop LOEs aimed at the directed KTD tasks. The 

cumulative impact of the LOEs and KTD tasks should be directed at 

enhancing the provincial-level governing authority.

Some examples of tactical-level LOEs are:

•   Expanding governance of KTDs along Highway 7.

•   Securing freedom of movement  along Highway  1 to facilitate

economic opportunity for KTDs A, B, and C. 

•   Securing  the  economic  corridor  from Gardez-Khost  (GK)  to

Highway 1 to increase stability for KTDs D, E, F, and G.

•   Building local security force capacity in KTDs H, I, and J.

The overall objectives of providing a common structural framework for operational design are continuity and unity of effort. Units 

and agencies responsible for executing COIN operations need as 

much clarity as possible. This can happen only with an understanding of everyone’s roles and a vision for integration. Additionally, a 

common framework affords the ability to visualize risk and leverage 

interdependencies between agencies to mitigate that risk.

Centrifugal Force of Local 

Security in COIN Operations

The chances of two insurgencies being the same are nil, but local 

security is a decisive point that deserves planners’ explicit attention. 

Security is the first principle of warfare, and nowhere is it more important than in COIN operations. Almost every aspect of COIN depends either directly or indirectly around local security. As a result, 

local security is a crucial decisive point along the security line of operations. In spite of this fact, local security remains an area plagued 

by mistakes. When COIN forces build host-nation security capacity, 

there is a consistent tendency to concentrate almost solely on conventional forces. Local security in actuality requires a deliberate layering of forces. Conventional forces are good at conducting strike 

operations in insurgent-controlled areas and assisting in the establishment of security in contested areas. But conventional forces are 

not optimal for static security or law and order.

The traditional defense pattern for successful COIN operations (fig. 

56) uses conventional forces to establish a security belt that enables 
104 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

local security to take place. This is done in concert with special operations forces that prepare insurgent-contested areas for the introduction 

of local security forces. After this foundation is established, local security forces assume security responsibility for consolidation operations 

and the introduction of police forces. Local security forces tie into police operations and bring the population under government control. 

This widespread dispersion of forces provides better protection for the 

people and frees conventional forces to strike insurgent refuges.

The classic mistake is handing off responsibility for local security 

to police forces before the necessary conditions have been established 

for their success. Handing off local security to an unprepared police 

force is a critical and unforgiving vulnerability. A key illustration of 

this is the Brookings Institution’s data on Afghan security force casualties, 2007–09 (table 3).22 In addition to those casualties, Afghanistan’s 

Ministry of the Interior reported 595 police officers killed and 1,345 

wounded during the first six months of 2010. There are numerous 

reasons for the disparity of casualties between the Afghan National 

Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Two of the primary causes are training and equipment. The ANP are neither trained 

nor equipped to face the security environment they are being thrust 

into. The ISAF has made Herculean strides to correct these deficiencies, but there is still a missing dimension in Afghanistan’s security—

the intermediate layer of local security forces.

Figure 56. Traditional COIN defense patterns

Base

Camp

Remote Area OperationInsurgent Controlled Area

Contested

Area

Strike Operation

by Conventional 

Forces

SOF

OGA

Operation

Friendly

Controlled 

Area

Consolidation

Operation

Regional

District

Forces

Local

Village

Security
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 105

Known by names such as territorial defense and civil defense, local 

security has a significant effect on all three levels of war. At the tactical level, once conventional forces have established an initial security 

belt, local security enables stabilization to take place. It does this by 

insulating the population from insurgent demands for food, money, 

medicine, and other resources and by reducing the fear of insurgent 

reprisals for passing intelligence information to COIN forces. This 

not only increases insurgent vulnerabilities, but also generates confidence in the reconstitution of governing authority.

At the operational level of war, local security provides the foundation for expanding infrastructure and lines of communication. There 

is an unmistakable relationship among infrastructure, lines of communication, and a government’s ability to project power. The significance of this relationship is seen in the priority and frequency of insurgent attacks on infrastructure and lines of communication. 

Underdeveloped lines of communication favor insurgencies, and the 

sabotage of critical infrastructure constitutes a fundamental element 

in most insurgent strategies. In most cases, insurgents do not have 

the military capability to overtly gain power. They accomplish this 

indirectly by destroying the government’s economic base. This accentuates economic crises, creates unemployment, inflates the cost of living, and perpetuates a fertile base for recruitment.

During the insurgency in El Salvador (1979–92), one of the 

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front’s (FMLN) key objectives 

was preventing productive economic activity. A captured insurgent 

document outlined the following areas for systematic destruction: 

fuel pipelines, electricity grids, railroads, telephonic communications, and agricultural export crops.23 The FMLN’s targeting of infrastructure had another deliberate and insidious effect. It generated 

capital flight and inhibited international investment. From 1979 to 

1980, over $2 billion fled El Salvador for Miami.24

The ability to limit and prevent the types of insurgent depredations 

described above rests with the realization of the intrinsic impact that 

local security forces have on the operational environment. Investing 

Table 3. Annual security-force fatality totals

2007 2008 2009

Afghan National Army 209 226 282

Afghan National Police 803 886 646
106 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

in local security is one of the wisest investments COIN forces can 

make. However, local security’s contributions are not confined to the 

dimension of physical security at the tactical and operational levels of 

war. Local security can also serve as a strategic COIN function. If 

implemented properly, local security is a catalyst for inducing the 

populace to support the host-nation governing authority. Individuals 

who commit themselves to local security, especially at the village 

level, demonstrate a clear rejection of the insurgent movement.25 This 

commitment decisively strips away support for the insurgency and 

imperils the insurgent’s strategic center of gravity, the ability to exert 

governing authority.

Models for Implementing Local Security

There are numerous models for establishing intermediate local security forces. However, the two basic ones are arming local tribesmen, similar to the Sons of Iraq (SOI), and the Vietnam-era regional/

popular forces model. Both have advantages and disadvantages, and 

both function best in specific operational contexts. The SOI are Iraqi 

civilians who have voluntarily allied with US forces to provide security 

against insurgents and militias at the local level.26 The movement began slowly during 2005 in al-Anbar Province. Known as the al-Anbar 

Awakening Council, groups of Sunnis, some of them former militants, banded with US military forces against al-Qaeda. The US forces 

gradually turned local security responsibility over to these groups, 

paying members $10 per day. By late 2007 the SOI included both 

Sunnis and Shiites, and groups were active in eight of Iraq’s provinces, with a membership numbering over 73,000.27 The SOI had over 

100,000 by 2008. Table 4 shows the status of the SOI in 2009. 

The impact of the SOI combined with the military surge is readily 

evident. Civilian casualties dropped from a high of 34,500 in 2006 to 

3,000 in 2009, and US military fatalities dropped from 905 to 149 during the same time frame.28 The challenge with the SOI model is its ad 

hoc nature. It worked in a specific environmental context; however, its 

long-term effect remains unknown. The Iraqi central government is 

reticent to integrate these groups into the national-security force structure and is gradually phasing them out of their security role.

Tens of thousands of SOI members are still without full employment, despite the Iraqi government’s pledge to provide police posi-
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 107

tions and vocational training. In March 2010 only 40 percent of SOIs 

were fully transitioned into full-time jobs.29 Distrust between the 

SOIs and the Iraqi central government has been building consistently 

with SOI complaints of late paychecks, failure to pay salaries, and arrests of its members.30 Many fear that these conditions are generating 

an incensed Sunni population that is potentially dangerous to the future stability of Iraq. Evidence is seen in numerous allegations of SOI 

members defecting back to al-Qaeda. Arming tribes can be an expedient approach to fostering local security; however, it can be high risk 

and in the long run work against stability. The key is ensuring that the 

host nation keeps its pledges.

The Vietnam-era regional/popular forces model is a much more 

deliberate and integrated method of fostering local security. The regional forces (RF) were company-sized elements that operated in a 

district or province. The popular forces (PF) operated as platoonsized forces and were usually assigned to a specific village or static 

security task such as guarding key infrastructure, roadways, and waterways. Both of these forces worked in conjunction with the national 

police. Although they remained predominantly in their home provinces and villages, the RFs’ and PFs’ principal loyalty was to the central government.

The basic concept of using these forces predates the American involvement in Vietnam, but it was not until after 1965 that their greatest expansion occurred. In 1965 the total force structure for RFs, PFs, 

and national police was 320,000. By 1972 these forces numbered 

664,000.31 Their work was exceptionally dangerous, and they suffered 

horrendous casualties. However, they were also very effective. Evidence to support their effectiveness is seen in figure 57 showing the 

forces and their corresponding responsibility for the security of the 

Table 4. Status of the SOI as of September 2009

Location of SOI Group(s) Date of Transfer Number of SOIs

Baghdad and immediate vicinity 1 October 2008 ~51,000

Diyala/Qadisiyah Provinces 1 January 2009 ~11,000

Anbar/Babil/Wasit Provinces 1 February 2009 ~12,000

Ninewa/Tamim/Salahuddin Provinces 1 April 2009 ~20,000

Reprinted from Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq (Washington, DC: Brookings, 31 October 2010), 9.
108 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

population. At first glance it appears that the RF/PF effectiveness diminishes between 1969 and 1972, but closer analysis shows the opposite effect on local security. As the RFs’ and PFs’ responsibility for 

security declined, they were being replaced by greater numbers of 

national police, indicating a more secure environment. In COIN operations, security forces transferring their responsibility for securing 

the population to police forces is a major sign of a return to normalcy. 

Between 1969 and 1972, the national police’s responsibility for the 

security of the population increased more than three times from 5 to 

17 percent. This relationship also correlates with the South Vietnamese 

government’s expansion of security.

Another indicator of the RFs’ and PFs’ viability is their impact on 

the Viet Cong Infrastructure, the clandestine organization that commanded the majority of communist operations, established shadow 

governance, and conducted most of the terrorism against the population. Together the RFs and PFs accounted for a larger share of VCI 

Figure 57. RF/PF responsibility for rural hamlet security. (Based on 

data from Hamlet Evaluation System Computer Tapes, 1969–72, in 

Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller), 14 February 1973.)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1969 1970 1971 1972

Responsibility for Rural 

Hamlet Security

PF

RF

National Police

Percent of 

South Vietnamese

Population
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 109

killed or captured than any other force. In 1970 they were responsible 

for 50 percent of the VCI killed or captured and in 1971 approximately 39 percent. As Thomas Thayer points out in War without 

Fronts, the RFs and PFs were the most cost-effective forces of the 

Vietnam War. They secured more territory than any other force, increased friendly-force ratios, and inflicted between 23 and 33 percent 

of the total communist combat deaths. They accomplished this while 

receiving only 4 percent of the total war budget.32

Effectiveness in the RF/PF model does not originate from simply 

emplacing another layer of security at the local level. Planners need 

to understand efficiency and how to generate the local security forces’ 

commitment to the host nation’s governing authority. An option that 

is often ignored is establishing a mechanism for recycling conventionalforce manpower. Under this concept conventional force members 

that have completed their term of service are either placed into or 

recruited for local security. Many nations operate with militaries 

founded on a system of conscription that obligates individuals to a 

certain number of years of service. Once they complete their term of 

service, these individuals return to their homes without further obligation. The cost of not leveraging this efficiency is significant. Between mid 1981 and January 1983—during El Salvador’s Civil War—

over 7,000 Salvadoran soldiers were trained at Fort Benning, Georgia. 

By June 1983 only half of these soldiers were still on active duty, and 

of the ones trained in 1981, only 15 percent remained.33 The failure to 

harness this manpower for local security was amplified by the cost of 

the soldiers’ training. The cost of training El Salvador’s Bellosso battalion, 500–600 men, was $8 million.34

Galvanizing the population to support local security is an exceptionally difficult task. Local security patrols represent a direct challenge to insurgents for control of the population, making them high 

visibility targets. The simplest and perhaps most effective method of 

gaining popular support is by expanding the populace’s material reliance on the government. In many situations this can be done at a 

negligible cost. Areas worthy of investment include:

•   medical care for wounded personnel,

•   immunizations, aspirins, and other common drugs,

•  agricultural information on crops, agronomy, and animal husbandry,

•   education for children and adult literacy programs,
110 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

•   well digging, and

•   loans for fertilizer and water pumps.

The RF/PF model possesses a number of distinct advantages; however, it also has a number of disadvantages. The creation of RF/PF 

local security forces is a slow and resource-intensive process. It requires 

additional manpower, trainers, and equipment. Its principal strength 

is that it can be shaped to demonstrate loyalty to the central government, but that loyalty must not be allowed to devolve into assassination squads. During El Salvador’s civil war, the civil defense force, 

Organización Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN), created many of 

the conditions that ignited the war and prolonged it. During 1980 

alone, ORDEN was suspected of committing 861 political murders.35

Structuring the host-nation security capacity is one of the most 

significant decisive points in a COIN operation. Whatever model 

planners use, they must understand the gravity of local security and 

match it to the operational context. Matching the wrong model to the 

wrong context can have catastrophic consequences.

Making Decisions and Supporting Decision 

Analysis in the COIN Environment

Decision making and decision analysis are different in COIN environments than in major conventional operations in several important ways. The first is temporal. During major conventional operations, most command-level decisions evolve in a time-compressed 

planning-decision-execution (PDE) cycle. Moving large forces and 

changing component orders such as the air tasking order often require decisions to be adequately executed within a 72- to 96-hour 

period. In a COIN environment, most decisions emanate out of an 

extended PDE cycle. The principal reason for this is that very few 

military actions in a COIN mandate immediate responses. Most decisions in COIN operations are long-term projections involving the 

implementation of governance policies, the oversight of economic 

development projects, and the improvement of basic services. There are 

exceptions, however, including the commitment of a quick-reaction 

force, the kinetic engagement of a high-value target, and the daily 

battle for dominance in information operations.
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 111

Decision making in COIN operations also differs in the coordination, approval authority, and time required to obtain approval. In a 

COIN, effectiveness stems from the comprehensive involvement of 

the host nation, allies, intergovernmental organizations, other US 

government agencies, and, in some cases, key nongovernmental organizations. Many decisions are made by consensus, and approval 

authority can necessitate the involvement of national and multinational leaders. 

Another difference is that targeting decisions may be more complex in a COIN environment than in conventional operations. An illustration of this is the kinetic engagement of a high-value insurgent 

target. In today’s environment, the process is not as simple as identifying, nominating, locating, and engaging the target. Attacking a target entails compiling evidence against the target, reviewing the legality 

of engaging the target, and conducting a thorough collateral damage 

estimate. Additionally, the decision maker should analyze what removal of that target means to the insurgent system. Timing is everything, and in some cases removal of a high-value target can actually 

work against COIN efforts—for example, if the high-value target is 

making overtures toward reintegration. Of course, targeting is not confined to kinetics. Another kind of targeting is the removal of corrupt 

officials. As for kinetic targeting, the decision maker must gather legal 

evidence and analyze the effect of removing an official on the host 

nation’s political system. Counterinsurgents must also determine 

whether to bring that official to trial, relieve him or her of duties, or 

marginalize his or her influence by empowering other officials.

COIN Decision-Support Tools

The diversity of decisions that confront COIN commanders demands 

the development and use of a variety of skillfully crafted decisionsupport tools. One of the most critical is the decision-support template, just as it is in major conventional operations. A COIN DST is 

very similar to the ones used in major conventional operations. It 

consists of an operational diagram depicting the major operations 

and objectives of the CJOA and a comprehensive synchronization 

matrix (fig. 58). In a COIN environment, synchronization may require the identification of such details as Gregorian and Persian years, 
Figure 58. Notional COIN DST

Create 

Economic 

Corridor 

Stimulate 

Commerce 

RC South

Gregorian Year

Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 

Persian Year

Season 

Key 

Events

Key Dates

2010 2011

1388 1389 1390

1389 Budget Parliamentary 

Elections

1390 Budget

Nauroz

Al-Hajj Ramadan (11 AUG – 9 SEP)

Al-Hajj Nauroz

Kabul Conf. LISBON Conf. Reintegration

Haqanni

HIG

HIK

TTP

ANSF

IJC

RC South

RC Southwest

RC East

RC Center

RC North

RC West

Rip/TOA

Victory of Muslim

Ashura Nation (28 APR) Independence Day (19 AUG) Ashura Victory of Muslim

Nation (28 APR)

OMID I OMID II

Mastarak

GG Road

RC Southwest RC East

Revenue Growth Torkham Gate

KTDs 1-5

Hydro Power

KTD Economic Corridor

Quetta 

Shura Reconciliation

Meeting

ANP: 109K by Oct ‘10 ANA: 171.6K by Oct ‘11

Security Kabul Conf.

KG Road

Winter Spring Summer Fall Winter Spring Summer Fall 
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 113

seasons, budgets, key cultural dates, major insurgent and friendlyforces activities, and the roles of other governmental agencies.

The DST assists commanders and staffs with identifying key interactive links and critical junctures for assessment. This is vitally important because the lengthy nature of COIN operations makes it exceptionally difficult to pinpoint key decision points and adapt 

operations to an ever-changing operational environment and adaptive adversaries.

Although we can war-game certain aspects of COIN operations, 

real analysis must be focused on the collection and examination of 

longitudinal data. This data should focus primarily on the insurgent’s 

effectiveness in exerting governing authority and the population’s attitude toward the host nation’s governing authority. Longitudinal 

data is an intrinsic ingredient in developing incisive assessment criteria. If it is accurate, longitudinal data provides the ability to assess the 

COIN strategy and even more significantly to show the subtle types 

of progress that lead to success. This is absolutely crucial for gaining 

and maintaining domestic and international support for the COIN. 

Intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

and individual nations are reluctant to make monetary donations or 

provide assistance if progress cannot be articulated. Longitudinal assessment tools in a COIN are difficult to set up because they must 

measure effects over multiple periods of time in a continuously 

changing operational environment. However, if constructed properly 

longitudinal assessment is invaluable.

During the Vietnam War the United States experimented with a 

number of methodologies to determine Vietnamese popular attitudes. 

However, it was not until January 1967 that the United States began 

in earnest to institutionalize assessment. This was almost four years 

after the 2 January 1963 Battle of Ap Bac, which signaled the United 

States’ ever-growing involvement in Vietnam. In 1967 the Defense 

Department instituted the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to measure pacification. The intent of the HES was to construct a device to 

measure the status of the US-led Revolutionary Development Program in over 12,000 Vietnamese hamlets. In October 1969 the US 

Pacification Studies Group developed the Pacification Attitudinal 

Analysis System (PAAS) to depict rural South Vietnamese attitudes 

toward political and economic development and security. This was 

followed up in March 1971 with efforts to capture urban Vietnamese 

perspectives. Both the HES and PAAS had developmental problems 
114 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

that are commonly associated with an evolving assessment system. 

They struggled with what information to collect and how best to collect it. Additionally, as the HES and PAAS changed their methodologies, what they were measuring changed, which artificially limited 

the validity of their data. For example, in 1971 the HES changed its 

scoring system to give greater weight to political factors affecting security.36 This in turn had an impact on what constituted insurgent 

forces and how security was measured.

In spite of their limitations, the HES and PAAS experience offer 

numerous lessons. One of the key lessons is to have an assessment 

plan when COIN operations begin. When the United States experimented with the HES and PAAS in Vietnam, data collection and automated multivariate regression analysis were in their infancy. Additionally, computer automation was virtually in the “stone age.” This 

factor severely inhibited US assessment efforts and created a delay in 

developing a comprehensive analysis system. Being unable to holistically assess the insurgency during the early days of US involvement 

fostered an overreliance on kinetic options that may have worked 

against the COIN efforts. It also wedded assessment to a dependence 

on friendly and enemy casualty data to measure success.37 Another 

lesson from the HES and PASS era is to develop an understanding of 

how strategic end-state conditions, objectives, effects, and COGs 

form the core of longitudinal assessments. If the COG is governing 

authority, the objectives and effects should assess the progress of the 

host nation’s governing authority and the effectiveness of COIN actions taken to neutralize the insurgent’s governing authority. When 

the HES and PAAS came into being, there was no real longitudinal 

assessment plan. As a result, when these systems began measuring 

different variables and defining insurgents differently, the data could 

not accurately reflect the potential causality of long-term effects.

Perhaps one of the greatest lessons derived from the HES and 

PAAS experience is that two factors—development and security—accounted for 95 percent of the common variance in the HES data. The 

development factor indicated 50 to 60 percent of the common variance, and security represented 40 to 50 percent. Analysis of the HES 

security data also revealed strong correlations between hamlet security and the Viet Cong’s ability to tax and recruit.38

Today COIN forces have access to a sophisticated array of assessment tools, postmodern technology, and the lessons of the past. However, assessment in COIN operations is still lagging. The most promi-
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 115

nent problems encountered in Afghanistan are attitudinal, cultural, 

and human, and commanders show a surprising passivity to collecting information that is not enemy driven.39 Overlooked in contemporary COIN operations is the potential validity of the HES’s common 

variance correlations concerning development and security. Numerous International Security Assistance Force organizations are collecting data on both of these factors; however, the data is not providing 

commanders or political leaders the assessment mechanisms they require to make critical decisions. Host-nation attitudinal data provides 

invaluable insight into the population’s perception of progress and its 

support for the governing authority. This data may also yield a tilt line 

indicating the minimum support from the population necessary for 

success. The concept of the tilt line is to provide the commander a 

decision tool for modifying or changing the COIN strategy. Figure 

59, derived from unscientific ABC News/BBC/ARD poll data on Afghans’ positive perceptions of local conditions, presents a theoretical 

illustration of this concept. The data, similar to the HES, orients on 

longitudinal analysis of living conditions and security, where most of 

the common variance for assessing COIN operations traditionally 

exists. The dotted line is a trend line indicating where the population’s 

support for the Afghan governing authority should be maintained to 

meet the minimum conditions necessary for success.

Figure 59. Measuring the governance confidence gap

Positive

Perceptions

of Local 

Conditions

Time

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

2005 2006 2007 2008

Security

Living Conditions Minimum Support

for Success

Governance

Condence

Gap
116 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

When perceptions of living conditions and security go above or 

dip below this line, the perceptions produce a benchmark to measure 

confidence in the Afghan governing authority. In figure 59, there is a 

clear indication of a precipitous decline in confidence in the governing authority beginning in 2006. As the confidence gap grows, 

mounting evidence suggests that the strategy may need to be modified to ensure success. If this data were more scientific and had been 

analyzed against other environmental factors, it might have shown a 

clear decision point for the commander.

The intent of this example is not to state that living conditions and 

security are the sole determining factors in a COIN. Data analysis 

requires a 360-degree examination of the operational environment to 

ensure that something as simplistic as a drought or flood has not corrupted the data and implied findings. What this example is trying to 

show is that commanders need better decision-making tools to support the demands of multifaceted COIN operations.

Conclusion

Design is on the verge of a doctrinal breakthrough that will have a 

far-reaching impact on how JFCs and their staffs develop campaigns. 

Forging design’s future, however, requires a methodology that can be 

explained, understood, and applied. This methodology must also incorporate the foresight to visualize the salient differences between the 

design used for major conventional operations and the design employed in irregular warfare. These radically different operational contexts require distinctive methodological approaches that distill clarity 

for commanders and staffs. Regardless of the operational context, 

however, operational design’s effectiveness revolves around linking 

design to decision making and risk analysis. In the future, planning, 

decision, and execution cycles will be significantly compressed. JFCs 

and their staffs will face complex networks of nation-state and nonnation-state adversaries, a proliferation of critical technology, crippling cyber attacks, and denial of the electromagnetic spectrum. 

Overcoming these challenges mandates a vision that will expedite effective decision making and institutionalize approaches to accurately 

assessing risk. When this occurs, well-developed plans will survive 

first contact.
operational design and counterinsurgency │ 117

Notes

1. Clausewitz, On War, 87.

2. Metz, “Counterinsurgent Campaign Planning,” 61.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, GL-6.

4. Ibid., GL-5.

5. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 10.

6. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 55.

7. Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, The Enemy System, 2–3.

8. Pike, Viet-Cong Strategy of Terror, 17–18.

9. Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, The Enemy System, 2–3.

10. US Department of Defense, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Table 3, 14 

February 1973.

11. Thayer, War without Fronts, 32.

12. McFate and Jackson, “Object beyond War,” 13.

13. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 54–56.

14. Blackledge, Lardner, and Riechmann, “After Years of Rebuilding, Most Afghans Lack Power.”

15. Trofimov, “U.S. Rebuilds Power Plant.”

16. Cloud, Rodriguez, and King, “Pakistan Closes Border Crossing.”

17. Rising, “Pakistan to Reopen Border Crossing Used by NATO.”

18. Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 70–109.

19. US Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability

in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, 34.

20. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 25.

21. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, revision final coordination.

22. Livingston, Messera, and O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index, 13.

23. Gibb, “Where Will All the Soldiers Go?,” 47–48.

24. Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador at War, 357.

25. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars, 40.

26. Rubin and Farrell, “Awakening Councils by Region.”

27. O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 3–12.

28. Ibid., 3.

29. DePetris, “Remember the Sons of Iraq?”

30. Harari, “Uncertain Future for the Sons of Iraq,” 3.

31. Thayer, War without Fronts, 157.

32. US Department of Defense, Southeast Asia Analysis Report, 32–34.

33. Oriofsky, “Operation Well Being Begins,” 448.

34. Craves, “Foreign Assistance Resource Problems,” 26.

35. Americas Watch Committee and Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, Free Fire, 4.

36. Thayer, War without Fronts, 145–51.

37. Bjelajac, “Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency,” 1.

38. Sweetland, Item Analysis of the HES (Hamlet Evaluation System), 3.

39. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, 4.

Abbreviations

AA avenue of approach

ACC air component commander

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

AOR area of responsibility

APOD aerial port of debarkation

ARF Alliance Reaction Force

ATO air tasking order

AU Aurigan

AUR country of Auriga

AUTH authority

BCT brigade combat team

Bde brigade

BLA Batari Liberation Army

Bn battalion

BP branch plan

C2 command and control

C4I command, control, communications, computers, 

and intelligence

C4ISR command; control; communications; computers; 

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CCF Chinese communist forces

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CHOP change of operational control

CIVCAS civilian casualty

CJOA combined joint operations area

CJTF combined joint task force

CMH Center of Military History

COA course of action

COG center of gravity

COIN counterinsurgency

CPVF Chinese People’s Volunteer Force

Def. defensive

DMZ demilitarized zone

DP decision point
120 │ abbreviations

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

DSM decision support matrix

DST decision support template

FDO flexible deterrent option

FEBA forward edge of the battle area

FFIR friendly-force information requirement

FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front

FOC full operational capability

FOM freedom of movement

GAO Government Accountability Office

GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

HA humanitarian assistance

HES Hamlet Evaluation System

HIG Hizb-l Islami Gulbuddin

HIK Hezb-e-Islami Khalis

HQN Haqqani network

IA international airport

ICOS International Council on Security and 

Development 

IJC International Security Assistance Force Joint 

Command

INS insurgent

IO information operations

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JIACG joint interagency coordination group

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment

JOA joint operations area

JOPP joint operation planning process

JP Joint Publication

JPG joint planning group

JPME joint professional military education

KTD key terrain district
abbreviations │ 121

LCC land component commander

LNO liaison officer

LOC line of communications

LOE line of effort

LOO line of operation

MA military action

MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MCC maritime component commander

MCO major combat operation

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade

MILDEC military deception

NAI named area of interest

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NGO nongovernmental organization

NLF National Liberation Front

NVA North Vietnamese Army

OA objective area

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom, operational 

exploitation force

Off. offensive

OGA other government agency

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPFOR opposing force

OPLAN operation plan

Ops operations

PAAS Pacification Attitudinal Analysis System

PDE planning-decision-execution

PER country of Perseus

PF popular forces

PIR priority intelligence requirement

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, 

and infrastructure

POTF psychological operations task force

QTB Quetta Shura Taliban

RC regional command

RCT regimental combat team

RF regional forces
122 │ abbreviations

RIP/TOA relief in place / transfer of authority

ROL rule of law

RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

SA situational awareness

SAG country of Sagitta

SOCC special operations component commander

SOF special operations forces

SOI Sons of Iraq

SP sequal plan

SPOD seaport of debarkation

SPOE seaport of embarkation 

TAA tactical assembly area

TAI target area of interest

TBM theater ballistic missile

TOA transfer of authority

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban

UN United Nations

UNC UN Command

UNSCR UN Security Council resolution

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USCENTCOM US Central Command

VC Viet Cong

VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure

VP country of Vulpecula

Vul Vulpeculan

WARNORD warning order

WMD weapons of mass destruction
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9/11 (11 September 2001), 8, 34

actor, 5–6, 9, 11–12, 40–41, 66–67, 86

Afghan National Army (ANA), 8, 104–5

Afghan National Police (ANP), 8, 104–5

Afghanistan, 7–8, 10, 13, 34, 88–89, 93, 

96–97, 100–101, 104–5, 115–16

al-Anbar Awakening Council, 106

al-Qaeda, 34, 93, 106–7

area of interest, 71–73, 100

area of operations, 5–6, 100

Army of Northern Virginia, 4

Army of the Potomac, 2

Asia Foundation, 88

assumptions (in operational design), 9, 

11–12, 19, 21, 25–26, 41, 54–58, 61, 

67, 73, 76

Bach Dang River, 39

barriers, 9, 12–13, 39, 86

Battle of Ap Bac, 113

Brookings Institution, 104

Bush, Pres. George H. W., 34

Bush, Pres. George W., 34

C4ISR. See command; control; communications; computers; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

Canaanite forces, 21–23

center of gravity (COG), 6, 19, 21, 25, 

31, 40–42, 44–47, 49–52, 61, 73, 79, 

83, 93, 95, 97, 106, 114

Cheonan, 7

China, 9, 38–39, 45, 56, 62, 66

Civil War (US), 2–3, 78, 109–10

Clausewitz, Carl von, 40, 83

cognitive map, 27, 31–33, 59, 61, 77–78, 

97, 100, 102

COIN. See counterinsurgency

combat power, 57, 63, 96

combined joint task force (CJTF), 52, 

73–75, 78

command; control; communications; 

computers; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(C4ISR), 63–64, 73

commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR), 54–56, 71, 73–74, 

76–77, 80

Confederate forces (US Civil War), 

2–5, 78–80

confidence gap, 115–16

counterinsurgency (COIN), 73, 83–88, 

92–95, 97, 100, 102–6, 108, 110–16

course of action (COA), 21–27, 36, 41, 

53–54, 59, 60–67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 78

critical capability, 42, 45

critical requirement, 42, 43, 45, 54

critical vulnerability, 42–43, 45

critical-factor analysis, 40–46, 65

culture, 6, 9, 15, 86–88, 113, 115

decision analysis, 57, 59, 65–66, 68–70, 

73, 76–80, 110

decision criteria, 1, 59, 62, 73–77, 80

decision making, 1, 5, 11–12, 16–17, 

31, 67–68, 76, 110–11, 116

decision point, 26, 31–32, 48, 54, 58–59, 

61–62, 67, 70–71, 73–75, 76, 100, 

113, 116. See also decisive point

decision support matrix (DSM), 65, 

72–73, 75–77

decision support template (DST), 65, 

71–77, 80, 111–13

decisive point, 5–6, 19, 23, 25, 31, 40, 

44–49, 51, 61, 65–66, 79, 97, 103, 

110. See also decision point

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 

7. See also North Korea

Desert Shield. See Operation Desert 

Shield

Desert Storm. See Operation Desert 

Storm

desired system, 6, 9, 11–14, 18–19

Eastertide offensive, 68

Index
132 │ index

effects (as an element of operational design), 5, 8, 10–11, 14, 21, 25, 31–32, 

36–40, 42, 47, 49, 52–53, 57, 61, 67, 

74, 80, 86, 93, 97, 113–14

Egypt, 21–23

El Salvador, 105, 109–10

elements of operational design, 21, 

24–27, 31–32, 93

elements of power, 6

end state, 25, 40, 49, 86, 97; end-state 

conditions, 6, 8, 19, 21, 23, 34, 36, 

39, 42, 50, 61, 114; military end 

state, 21, 24, 32–33, 35–38, 47; political end state, 9–12, 14; strategic 

end state, 31–38, 42, 50, 57, 67

execute order, 75–76

Farabundo Martí National Liberation 

Front, 105

force protection, 51, 53, 63, 74

frame-of-reference theory, 15

Galula, David, 84, 100, 102

Genghis Khan, 62

Gestalt theory, 17–18

Grant, Ulysses S., 78–80

Guidance for the Employment of the 

Force, 33

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), 108, 

113–15

Haqqani network, 13, 93

Helmand Province, 8, 88–89

Hezb-e-Islami Khalis, 93

illiteracy, 7–8, 86. See also literacy

information operations (IO), 8, 10, 52, 

73–74, 110

instrument of power, 6, 32–33, 35, 53, 97

insurgency, 74, 83, 86, 92–93, 102–3, 

105–6, 114

insurgent, 13, 84, 87, 92, 95, 100, 104–6, 

111, 113–14

International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), 10, 13, 88, 93, 100–101, 

104, 115

Iran, 7, 16–17

Iraq, 7, 11, 13, 34–35, 44–46, 57, 63, 93, 

96, 100, 106–7

irregular warfare, 50, 68, 92, 116

Israel, 46–47

Janus strategy, 95

Johnston, Gen Joseph, 2–4, 80

joint doctrine, 23, 25, 40, 52, 54, 59

joint operation, 24, 36, 41, 43, 51, 60, 102

joint operation planning process 

(JOPP), 24–27, 31, 36, 55, 59–60, 

65, 73, 76–77, 97

Joint Publication 3-0, 23–24, 76

Joint Publication 3-24, 83

Joint Publication 5-0, 24, 41, 43, 47, 51, 

102

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 33

juche, 7

Kajaki Dam, 88–89, 91

Kandahar Province, 8, 89

Kari system, 44–46

Kem, Jack, 42

key terrain district (KTD), 100–103

Kilcullen, David, 96

Kim Il-sung, 7

Kuwait, 34–35

Lee, Gen Robert E., 4–5

levels of war, 40, 42, 45, 47, 49–51, 55–56, 

77, 89, 92–95, 97–100, 105–6

Lincoln, Pres. Abraham, 2–3

lines of effort (LOE), 102–3

lines of operation (LOO), 6, 19, 25, 31, 

40, 44, 47–49, 51, 61–62, 79, 97, 100

literacy, 8, 109. See also illiteracy

MacArthur, Gen Douglas, 47

Magruder, Gen John B., 4

Malvern Hill, 4

McChrystal, Gen Stanley, 13

McClellan, Gen George B., 2–5

Megiddo, Battle of, 21–23

Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), 85–86

mirror imaging, 15–16

Mongol Empire, 38–39, 62–63

named area of interest (NAI), 71, 73–75

National Defense Strategy, 33
index │ 133

National Liberation Front, 68, 105. See 

also North Vietnamese Army and 

Viet Cong

National Military Strategy, 33

National Security Strategy, 33

NATO, 8, 93

North Korea, 7, 11, 54, 56. See also

Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea

North Vietnamese Army, 68, 86. See 

also National Liberation Front and 

Viet Cong

Obama, Pres. Barack 13

objectives, 6, 9, 13, 19, 21, 25, 27, 31–42, 

47–53, 60–64, 68, 74, 78, 83, 86, 

88–89, 93, 96–97, 102–3, 105, 111, 114

observed system, 6–7, 9

Operation Desert Shield, 34, 63

Operation Desert Storm, 34, 44–47, 63

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 

10, 13, 34, 73–74

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 7, 11, 57

Operation Overlord, 49

operation plan (OPLAN), 24, 55, 57

operational art, 21, 23–28

operational environment, 5–6, 15, 18, 

36–37, 41–43, 50, 64, 69, 71, 76, 

88–91, 93, 105, 113, 116

operational planning, 24

Organización Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN), 110

Pacification Attitudinal Analysis System (PAAS), 113–14

Pakistan, 93

Peninsula Campaign (US Civil War), 

2–3, 5

Persian Gulf, 34

phases: of an operation, 21, 31, 34, 

49–53, 55, 64–65, 74, 76, 83, 93, 

95–97; of a war game, 65, 69–70

Pike, Douglas, 85–86

planning-decision-execution cycle, 110

PMESII, 6, 86, 88

Qiao, Liang, 9–10

Quetta Shura Taliban, 93

Republic of Korea, 7, 11

Revolutionary Development Program, 

113

Richmond, VA (in US Civil War), 2–5

RIP/TOA, 96, 100, 102

risk analysis, 5, 12, 116

Rumsfeld, Donald, 34

Saudi Arabia, 34

Second Battle of Manassas (US Civil 

War), 5

September 11, 2001. See 9/11

Seven Days’ Battles (US Civil War), 4

Shah Ala al-Din Muhammad II, 62–63

Shiites, 93, 106

South Korea. See Republic of Korea

South Vietnam, 69, 86, 108, 113. See 

also Vietnam

Southwest Pacific, 47–48

Strange, Joe, 42

structure (in operational design), 1, 25, 

27, 59, 65, 69, 76, 97, 100

Sunnis, 93, 107

sustainment, 63

synchronization matrix, 71–72, 111

systems analysis, 40–41, 85–88

Taliban, 8, 13, 34, 89, 93

target area of interest (TAI), 71–75

tasks (and operational design), 32, 37–39, 

44, 47–48, 52–53, 73–74, 102–3

termination criteria, 11, 33, 35–37, 62

Tet offensive, 68

Teutoburger, 54

Thayer, Thomas, 109

Thutmose III, 21–23

time (as a factor in operational design), 

9–12, 51, 56, 65, 69, 84, 96 

Torkham Gate, 93

Transoxiana, 62–63

Turkey, 11–12

Union forces (US Civil War), 2–5, 78–79

United Nations (UN), 52–53, 56

United Nations Security Council, 8, 33, 

35, 37

United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID), 89

unrestricted warfare, 9–10
134 │ index

Urbana Plan, 3

US Pacification Studies Group, 113

Vicksburg, MS (in US Civil War), 78–80

Viet Cong, 85–86, 108, 114. See also

National Liberation Front and 

North Vietnamese Army

Vietnam, 38–39, 86, 106–7, 114. See 

also North Vietnamese Army and 

South Vietnam

Wang, Xiangsui, 9

war game, 36, 59, 65–73, 75–76, 80

warning order, 73, 75–76

Wertheimer, Max, 17

World War II, 47–48

Yeonpyeong Island, 7
Operational Design

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