NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2024 IL App (3d) 220168-U

Order filed April 3, 2024

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2024 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

THOMAS A. REBMANN JR., ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

Kankakee County, Illinois

Appeal No. 3-22-0168 

Circuit No. 19-CF-693 

Honorable 

William S. Dickenson, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment.

Presiding Justice McDade specially concurred.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance at trial. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Thomas A. Rebmann Jr., appeals from his convictions for aggravated 

discharge of a firearm, arguing that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance where he 

abandoned a potentially meritorious claim of self-defense and failed to object to a key witness’s 

prior statements. We affirm. 
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On October 4, 2019, the State indicted defendant on two counts of aggravated discharge 

of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2018)) stemming from a September 16, 2019, 

shooting near a school bus preparing to unload children. When defense counsel entered the case 

on February 22, 2021, all previously tendered discovery was given to him, including the 

disclosure of a potential witness, Tolina Shannon, along with a transcript of her testimony in a 

separate but related matter. Defendant filed a statement disclosing a claim of self-defense.

¶ 5 The case proceeded to a jury trial on January 24, 2022. Relevant to this appeal, Cameron 

Curtis testified that he worked for the United States Postal Service. On the afternoon of 

September 16, 2019, he was delivering mail on the 400 block of South Lincoln Avenue in 

Kankakee. At that time, he observed “a silver Grand Prix, Grand Am style car” speeding 

northbound down the street. Curtis observed a school bus driving southbound toward two 

daycares. He indicated that the car was unable to pass due to the narrow roadway and stopped 15 

to 20 feet in front of the school bus. 

¶ 6 After the car and bus were stopped, a 5-foot-10 inch to 5-foot-11 inch tall Caucasian male 

with blond hair that was buzzed on the side and short on the top exited the driver’s side and 

walked around the front of the car. Curtis heard the man yelling, “I told you mother fuckers to 

get out of the way.” Curtis observed the man pull out a handgun and fire “what [he] thought was 

four rounds.” The man was approximately 50 to 60 feet away from the bus when he began firing. 

He fired in a southeastern direction, away from both the school bus and Curtis. Curtis testified 

that the man appeared to be shooting in the direction of a residence which he knew to be 

occupied by the Carmona family. The man “didn’t appear to be” shooting at any person. Curtis 

indicated that he was aware that the Carmona family was affiliated with the Latin Kings gang. 
3 

¶ 7 When the shooting began, Curtis had already passed the Carmona residence and was 

standing several houses north of that location. Curtis explained that he had not observed anyone 

outside the Carmona residence when he had walked past it. Curtis reiterated that the man had 

“definitely not” shot at the school bus. Curtis testified that children had been preparing to exit the 

bus when the shooting began, and he heard a daycare employee yell for the bus driver to exit the 

area. Curtis indicated that the children returned to the school bus which then drove south. Once 

the school bus passed the street, the man returned to his car and drove northbound. 

¶ 8 Latonya Hill testified that she had been employed as a school bus driver for 

approximately 20 years. In September 2019, Hill drove morning and afternoon routes. When 

asked whether her afternoon route included South Lincoln Avenue in September 2019, Hill 

replied that she could not remember that date. She could recall recent events but did not 

remember anything regarding September 2019.

¶ 9 Hill did not recall writing on an incident report after her afternoon shift on September 16, 

2019, that she had been dropping children off in the 400 block of South Lincoln Avenue. Neither 

did she recall giving a recorded interview to Kankakee Detective Kris Lombardi on September 

17, 2019. Hill testified that she did not remember: (1) which street she turned from, (2) what she 

noticed as she attempted to drop off the children on South Lincoln Avenue, (3) that the bus was 

in the middle of the roadway dropping off children and a gray silver car approached her, (4) that 

the driver of the silver car was in a hurry but was blocked in by the school bus and could not 

have gotten around it, (5) that she noticed the driver was fidgety and agitated, (6) the closeness 

of the silver car to the school bus, (7) writing in her September 16 written statement that she 

observed seven males come from the side of a residence, (8) describing that residence, (9) that 

the men came from the left/east side of the street or what the driver of the silver car did when 
4 

they appeared, (10) yelling “no, no, no” at the driver of the car or that he responded with “move 

the fucking bus move the fucking bus,” (11) that she observed the driver holding a gun or that he 

again told her to move the bus, (12) hearing a gunshot from the group of men near the residence 

after the driver told her to move the bus a second time, (13) the driver of the silver car shooting 

back at the group of men, (14) that the driver and the group were firing back and forth, 

(15) anything about how she drove out of the area, (16) describing the driver as a Caucasian male 

wearing shorts and a white tank top, (17) explaining that she kept her attention on the driver 

because he appeared “too fidgety,” or (18) telling Lombardi all of these facts. She denied telling 

Lombardi that “about seven guys came from the side of the building and by that time the driver 

of the car that’s by the bus *** gets out.” On cross-examination, Hill testified that she did not 

remember police responding to the area. She also stated that during her employment as a bus 

driver, including the day of the incident, she had never found a bullet hole in her school bus. 

¶ 10 The next day, defense counsel moved to strike Hill’s testimony because she was not a 

competent witness. The State argued that she was a recanting witness. The court denied the 

motion to strike and found that Hill could be impeached with her prior inconsistent statements. 

¶ 11 Officer Jack Klasey of the Kankakee Police Department testified that at approximately 

3:30 p.m. on September 16, 2019, he responded to reports of a shooting in the 400 block of 

South Lincoln Avenue. He met with Hill and checked the occupants of the bus for injuries. 

Klasey spoke with Ruben and Martin Carmona outside of their residence and was directed to an 

area of the street north of the residence where he located six spent .45-caliber shell casings. 

Klasey was informed by anonymous witnesses that the car involved in the shooting was a silver 

sedan. Through the investigation, defendant became a person of interest. Klasey became aware 

that defendant’s girlfriend, Veronica Ayala, owned a silver Grand Prix. On cross-examination, 
5 

Klasey testified that he was unsure whether Ruben was currently being prosecuted for the same 

event in another courtroom but indicated that could be the case. 

¶ 12 The State played a previously admitted video recording from the school bus for the jury. 

The video depicted Hill driving the school bus. Two adults and several children were on the bus. 

The bus stopped, and a light-colored vehicle can be seen stopping abruptly. Hill shouted “No” 

several times and drove forward. A Caucasian male can be seen emerging from his car. Hill 

drove forward a short distance, stopped, and ducked down. Six gunshots can be heard. Hill drove 

forward again and contacted dispatch. She again yelled “No” toward the driver’s side of the 

school bus. Hill informed dispatch that she had been involved in a crossfire. 

¶ 13 Lombardi testified that he investigated the September 16, 2019, shooting on South 

Lincoln Avenue. He photographed the six shell casings that had been discovered on the street. 

Lombardi interviewed Hill on September 17, 2019. The interview was video recorded, which 

was admitted and published to the jury. The video depicted Hill telling Lombardi everything that 

she could not remember telling him when she had testified the day before. On cross-examination, 

Lombardi testified that he concluded that defendant was the man who could be seen exiting the 

silver car and raising his arm when shots were heard on the video. Lombardi also opined that the 

six bullet casings near that area belonged to defendant. He explained that bullet casings only 

travel approximately 10 to 20 feet. Any casings from shots fired by individuals near the 

residence could not have travelled 700 feet to the street.

¶ 14 Sergeant Timothy Klopp of the Kankakee Police Department testified that he provided 

Hill with a photographic array on September 20, 2019. The identification was video recorded and

was played for the jury. In the video, Hill was shown six photographs. She took approximately 

21⁄2 minutes to study the photographs. She informed Klopp that she recognized numerous 
6 

features in one photograph but was not completely sure. Hill explained that “the hair, the beard, 

nose, eyes and neck [made her] believe that that was the driver but [she thought] he [was] thinner 

now.” Hill identified the photograph of defendant as the man who fired the gun near the school 

bus on September 16, 2019. 

¶ 15 Hill was recalled as a witness during defendant’s case-in-chief. Defense counsel showed 

her a previously admitted written incident report from the Illinois Central School Bus company. 

The account recorded in the report was consistent with the oral account of events that she gave to 

Lombardi. Hill indicated that she began yelling “no” as she “looked ahead and seen around seven 

males come from the side of the house.” The driver yelled for her to move the bus. Gunshots 

were fired. As she drove away slowly, she explained that “the Kings (as known as) from the 

house were still firing the guns.” Hill acknowledged that the signature on the report appeared to 

be hers; however, she did not remember writing it. She denied that the report was in her 

handwriting, then admitted that it could be her handwriting, but she had no recollection of 

writing it. 

¶ 16 Hill testified that she had no recollection of being shown an initial photographic array by 

Lombardi on September 17, 2019. Defense counsel showed her a copy of a lineup questionnaire 

from that day. Hill denied that the witness signature was hers and testified that she did not recall 

viewing any of those photographs previously. The array contained defendant’s juvenile 

photograph. Hill did not identify defendant in the September 17 lineup. 

¶ 17 Hill was shown the previously admitted bus video recording from September 16, 2019. 

She acknowledged that she appeared on the video but could not recall the incident. Hill was 

shown the videos of the September 20, 2019, photographic identification with Klopp and her 

September 17, 2019, interview with Lombardi. She again acknowledged that she appeared on the 
7 

video but did not recall participating in those events. Hill indicated that she did not recognize

defendant from the day of the shooting, stating: “I never seen that face around town.”

¶ 18 Lombardi was recalled as a witness. He testified that he administered the initial

photographic lineup to Hill on September 17, 2019. She did not identify defendant’s photograph 

on that date. When asked by defense counsel why Hill was called back for another photographic 

lineup several days later, Lombardi explained that the photograph of defendant in the September 

17 lineup was from 2011 when defendant was a juvenile. The photograph included in the 

September 20 lineup depicted defendant as an adult. 

¶ 19 Ayala testified that she was defendant’s fiancée. At the time of the shooting, she and 

defendant lived together with their two children in the neighboring town of Chebanse, 

approximately 10 to 15 minutes from South Lincoln Avenue. She was working in Grant Park on 

the afternoon of September 16, while defendant was at home. Ayala testified that defendant did 

not have a driver’s license. She admitted that she had owned a 2013 Grand Prix but testified that 

defendant did not drive that car.

¶ 20 During the jury instruction conference, defense counsel did not ask for the prepared 

instruction for self-defense to be given. The instruction was subsequently withdrawn. In closing, 

defense counsel argued that the State had not met its burden in proving that defendant had been 

the shooter, highlighting the lack of identification of defendant by the witnesses. Counsel 

highlighted Hill’s failure to identify defendant in the initial photographic lineup and her 

hesitancy and uncertainty in identifying defendant in the second photographic lineup four days 

later. Further, defense counsel argued that no DNA or fingerprints from the shell casings had 

been presented, no registration number from the involved vehicle had been obtained, and the 
8 

admitted video recordings did not show defendant as the shooter that day. The jury found 

defendant guilty on both counts. 

¶ 21 Defense counsel filed a motion for new trial, arguing in relevant part that the State had 

committed a discovery violation by failing to tender discovery related to the prosecution of 

Ruben Carmona for the same September 16, 2019, shooting. At a hearing, counsel argued:

“They failed to provide us with the 412 and they’re—yeah, and they’re 

across the hall prosecuting Ruben Carmona, and I don’t know who else in a case 

known as 2020-CF-813. I mean I have no idea how they think they can do that. I 

mean I really I don’t. They—you know, that’s a very material fact. They owed us 

a 412. 

You know, if you look at my 413—if you look at my 413, I said we might 

use self defense as an affirmative defense, but we don’t even have the information 

to do that thanks to the State.”

In response, the State explained that the only difference between the discovery in Ruben’s case 

and the instant case was a transcript of testimony provided by Shannon in a separate but related 

nuisance hearing. In that testimony, Shannon indicated that she had observed Ruben shooting in 

the direction of the school bus. The State tendered this transcript along with Shannon’s address 

and the identity of the court reporter who recorded the testimony on February 22, 2021, when 

defense counsel entered the case. Counsel acknowledged that he had received the transcript in 

question and “the transcript didn’t hurt [them] in any way.”

¶ 22 The court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. At a sentencing hearing, the counts 

merged, and defendant was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals.

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS 
9 

¶ 24 On appeal, defendant argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel 

where trial counsel abandoned a meritorious claim of self-defense and failed to object to the 

introduction of Hill’s prior statements. 

¶ 25 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 26 “Every defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under 

the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Illinois.” People v. 

Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. People v. 

Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30. In order to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that 

there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

¶ 27 To establish deficiency, “a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the 

challenged action or inaction *** was the product of sound trial strategy and not of

incompetence.” People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317 (2010). Actions that are considered 

matters of trial strategy are afforded great deference by the court and “are generally immune 

from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432 (1999) 

“[A] reviewing court will *** mak[e] every effort to evaluate counsel’s performance from his 

perspective at the time, rather than through the lens of hindsight.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 

312, 344 (2007). 

¶ 28 1. Failure to Pursue a Claim of Self-defense 
10 

¶ 29 Defendant first contends that Hill’s statements, admitted as substantive evidence, 

provided strong evidence supporting his claim of self-defense which counsel unreasonably 

abandoned in favor of a theory that the State failed to prove defendant was the shooter in the face 

of strong identification evidence. Additionally, defendant asserts that, had the jury considered 

self-defense, a reasonable possibility exists that they may have acquitted defendant. 

¶ 30 To raise a claim of self-defense, the record must contain some evidence, however slight, 

which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support the claim. People v. French, 2020 IL App 

(3d) 170220, ¶ 20. 

“The elements of self-defense are: (1) that unlawful force was threatened against a 

person; (2) that the person threatened was not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of 

harm was imminent; (4) that the use of force was necessary; (5) that the person 

threatened actually and subjectively believed a danger existed that required the 

use of the force applied; and (6) the beliefs of the person threatened were 

objectively reasonable.” People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225 (2004). 

“Self-defense is an affirmative defense, meaning that unless the State’s evidence raises the issue 

involving the alleged defense, the defendant bears the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to 

raise the issue.” People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 157 (1990). If the State negates any of the

enumerated elements, a defendant’s claim of self-defense fails. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225. 

¶ 31 “Generally, counsel’s decision to argue one theory of defense to the exclusion of another 

is considered trial strategy.” People v. Gill, 264 Ill. App. 3d 451, 462 (1992). Here, defense

counsel disclosed an intention to raise a claim of self-defense. At trial, counsel presented no 

argument or evidence to further that claim, opting instead to put forth the theory that the State 

had failed to prove defendant was the shooter. He specifically informed the court that he was not 
11 

asking the jury to be given the self-defense instruction that had been prepared by the State.

Instead, counsel chose to attack the State’s identification evidence. He relied heavily on the 

failure of the witnesses to identify defendant as the shooter outside of the second photographic 

lineup presented to Hill. Defense counsel argued that the length of time spent studying the 

photographs and Hill’s lack of certainty rendered the only presented identification evidence 

insufficient, beyond a reasonable doubt, to prove defendant was the shooter. He further 

highlighted the lack of physical evidence, matching vehicle evidence, and video evidence to 

prove defendant was the shooter. 

¶ 32 Assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s claim of self-defense is viable, it remains

reasonable trial strategy to avoid raising the claim as admitting to shooting in self-defense would 

be incompatible with counsel’s theory that the State failed to prove defendant was the shooter. 

See People v. White, 2011 IL App (1st) 092852, ¶ 70. The fact that counsel’s strategic decision 

to argue that the State failed to prove its case was ultimately unsuccessful does not render that 

decision unreasonable or his representation deficient. Id. Consequently, defendant’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a claim of self-defense fails. 

¶ 33 In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s argument that the record shows that 

defense counsel did not make a strategic decision to abandon his claim of self-defense but did so 

due to his mistaken belief that he did not possess all the discovery. Defense counsel does briefly 

indicate that he may have presented a self-defense claim but he did not possess all the 

information; however, the record clearly demonstrates that counsel reviewed all the tendered 

discovery, including the transcript of Shannon’s testimony, and then disclosed his potential claim 

of self-defense. The record also reflects that counsel was not aware that Hill would testify 

inconsistently with her recorded statements. It is reasonable to presume that counsel opted to 
12 

change theories after observing the newly discovered weakness in the State’s case. Accordingly, 

that single statement from defense counsel during argument on his posttrial motion is insufficient 

to overcome the presumption of sound trial strategy. 

¶ 34 2. Unavailability of the Witness

¶ 35 Defendant argues that Hill’s video recorded statements to police, as well as her written 

statements to the bus company, were testimonial in nature and required Hill be subject to crossexamination to be admissible. Defendant contends that due to Hill’s complete memory loss

regarding the incident, she was not sufficiently available for cross-examination to satisfy the 

confrontation clause. Therefore, defendant states that defense counsel should have objected to 

the admission of Hill’s prior statements.

¶ 36 Relevant to this appeal, section 115-10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 

allows prior statements of a witness to be admitted as substantive evidence if (1) the statement is 

inconsistent with their trial testimony, (2) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning 

the statement, (3) the statement narrates an event of which the witness has personal knowledge, 

and (4) the witness either acknowledges under oath that he or she made the statement or it is 

established that the statement was accurately recorded by videotape recording or similar device. 

725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2018). Additionally, for the statements to be admissible, they must 

also satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause. People v. Dabney, 2017 IL App (3d) 

140915, ¶ 18. 

¶ 37 The confrontation clause requires that criminal defendants have the right to confront the 

witnesses against them. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. The confrontation 

clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is 

effective in whatever way and to whatever extent defense counsel desires. People v. Leonard, 
13 

391 Ill. App. 3d 926, 934 (2009). “[A] gap in the witness’ recollection concerning the content of 

a prior statement does not necessarily preclude an opportunity for effective cross-examination.” 

People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 88 (1989). “The confrontation clause is not violated when a 

witness appears, answers questions, and is cross-examined but is unable to remember previous 

events.” People v. Martin, 408 Ill. App. 3d 891, 896 (2011). 

¶ 38 Here, Hill appeared on multiple days to testify at trial. During the State’s case-in-chief, 

Hill answered preliminary questions regarding her age and employment. When the questioning 

turned toward the events of September 16, 2019, Hill largely responded that she did not know or 

could not recall. At one point, she denied making a certain statement to Lombardi regarding 

seven individuals near the house. During cross-examination, she testified that she had never, at 

any point in her employment, found a bullet hole in her bus. The next day, defense counsel 

recalled Hill to testify in defendant’s case-in-chief. When asked about her written statement to 

the bus company, Hill acknowledged her signature on the statement even though she had no 

recollection of writing it. She also acknowledged providing video recorded statements to the 

police even though she did not recall making the statements. Further, defense counsel was able to 

obtain a complete denial of Hill’s identification of defendant as the shooter on September 16, 

2019. When asked if she recognized defendant from that event, Hill unequivocally said she had 

“never seen that face” before. 

¶ 39 Defendant argues that Hill answering a few preliminary questions and then failing to 

answer even the most rudimentary questions about the incident and her statements rendered her 

unavailable for cross-examination. In support of this contention, defendant relies on In re 

Brandon P., 2014 IL 116653, ¶¶ 46-47, and In re Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d 776, 778 (2004). 

We find these cases to be inapposite. Both cases involved a victim who, after answering a few 
14 

preliminary questions, refused to continue testifying or answer any further questions. Here, Hill 

answered every question asked from both the State and defense counsel over multiple days. 

While a significant portion of her testimony was that she did not know or could not remember 

the answers, defense counsel was able to elicit substantive information from her. We find Hill’s 

appearance at trial and her willingness to answer any question asked of her provided defense 

counsel with an effective opportunity to cross-examine her. See Leonard, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 

935-36 (“That [defendant] was not able to cross-examine [the witness] to the extent he would 

have liked does not rise to a violation of his right to confront [the witness]. [The witness]’s

supposed gaps in memory, while making cross-examination of him challenging, did not preclude 

the opportunity for cross-examination.”). Thus, any objection counsel may have made to the 

admission of Hill’s statements on these grounds would not have been successful and defendant’s 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue fails.

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed. 

¶ 42 Affirmed. 

¶ 43 PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring:

¶ 44 I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s judgment, only because 

the case law appears to require it. I write separately to note the disingenuousness of precedents 

that facilitate a finding that defendant had an opportunity to effectively cross-examine Hill, despite 

the fact that her substantive testimony was that she did not know or could not remember any of the 

facts of the relevant incident. This is especially true where, as here, evidence which reasonably 

appears to lean toward being exculpatory cannot be explored or developed by the examination of 

an eyewitness.
15 

¶ 45 I am aware that, as the majority points out, relevant case law provides that a witness’s lack 

of recollection does not necessarily preclude an opportunity for effective cross-examination, (see 

Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 88), and that a witness is subject to cross-examination “when he is placed on 

the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions.” United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 

561 (1988). However, I disagree with this case law to the extent it finds it is possible for a defendant 

to effectively cross-examine a witness whose testimony consists almost exclusively of reiterating 

that she has no recollection of any of the events relevant to the charged offense. It does, however, 

so conclude, and so I concur.