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[House Report 106-130]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

106th Congress                                            Rept. 106-130
  1st Session           HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES              Part 1   

=======================================================================

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

                                _______
                                

                  May 7, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______

    Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 1555]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The bill as reported.............................................     2
Purpose..........................................................     7
Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee 
  intent.........................................................     7
Scope of committee review........................................     7
Committee findings and recommendations...........................     8
Areas of Special Interest........................................    11
    The Threat from the People's Republic of China...............    11
    National Security Agency.....................................    12
    National Imagery and Mapping Agency..........................    13
    Oversight Issues.............................................    13
Joint Military Intelligence Program..............................    14
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities.....................    19
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported..............    25
    Title I--Intelligence Activities.............................    25
        Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations.............    25
        Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations.......    25
        Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments...............    25
        Section 104--Community Management Account................    25
        Section 105--Authorization of Emergency Supplemental 
          Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999....................    26
    Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
      Disability System..........................................    26
        Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations.............    26
    Title III--General Provisions................................    26
        Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and 
          Benefits Authorized by Law.............................    26
        Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence 
          Activities.............................................    26
        Section 303--Sense of Congress on Intelligence Community 
          Contracting............................................    27
    Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency........................    27
        Section 401--Two-year Extension of CIA Central Services 
          Program................................................    27
    Title V--Department of Defense...............................    27
        Section 501--Protection of Operational Files of the 
          National Imagery and Mapping Agency....................    27
Committee position...............................................    27
Findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government 
  Reform and Oversight...........................................    28
Oversight findings and recommendations...........................    28
Fiscal year cost projections.....................................    28
Congressional Budget Office estimates............................    28
Committee cost estimates.........................................    31
Specific Constitutional authority for Congressional enactment of 
  this legislation...............................................    31
Changes to existing law..........................................    31
Additional views.................................................    35

    The amendment is as follows:
    Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu 
thereof the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for 
fiscal year 1999.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Two-year extension of CIA central services program.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Protection of operational files of the National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the following elements of the United States Government:
          (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (2) The Department of Defense.
          (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (4) The National Security Agency.
          (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (6) The Department of State.
          (7) The Department of the Treasury.
          (8) The Department of Energy.
          (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized 
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2000, for the conduct of the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed 
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1555 of the One 
Hundred Sixth Congress.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on 
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the 
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the 
Executive Branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

  (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central 
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess 
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2000 under section 102 when 
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, 
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian 
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
  (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central 
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority 
granted by this section.

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2000 the sum of 
$193,572,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the 
Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available 
until September 30, 2001.
  (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community 
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are 
authorized 348 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2000. Personnel 
serving in such elements maybe permanent employees of the Community 
Management Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
United States Government.
  (c) Classified Authorizations.--
          (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts 
        authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
        Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be 
        appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal 
        year 2000 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
        102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until 
        September 30, 2001.
          (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel 
        authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community 
        Management Account as of September 30, 2000, there are hereby 
        authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of 
        that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of 
        Authorizations.
  (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2000, any 
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed 
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Community Management Account 
from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed 
on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or 
member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less 
than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by 
the Director of Central Intelligence.
  (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the 
        authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 
        shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. 
        Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
        test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
        September 30, 2001, and funds provided for procurement purposes 
        shall remain available until September 30, 2002.
          (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
        shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States 
        funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under 
        paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so 
        transferred for the activities of the National Drug 
        Intelligence Center.
          (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
        Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
        provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
          (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
        the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
        operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

SEC. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
                    FISCAL YEAR 1999.

  (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
year 1999 under section 101 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272) for the conduct of the 
intelligence activities of elements of the United States Government 
listed in such section are hereby increased, with respect to any such 
authorized amount, by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to 
such authorization were increased by an emergency supplemental 
appropriation in a supplemental appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999 
that is enacted after May 1, 1999, for such amounts as are designated 
by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)).
  (b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation or expenditure of 
those amounts deemed to have been specifically authorized by Congress 
in the Act referred to in subsection (a) is hereby ratified and 
confirmed.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2000 the sum of 
$209,100,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed 
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity 
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of 
the United States.

SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.

  It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence 
should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, 
whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United 
States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to 
the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, 
should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the 
procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the 
United States.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF CIA CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.

  Section 21(h)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403u(h)(1)) is amended by striking out ``March 31, 2000.'' and 
inserting ``March 31, 2002.''.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 501. PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND 
                    MAPPING AGENCY.

  (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 22 of title 10, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

``Sec. 446. Protection of operational files

  ``(a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, Review, 
Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The Director of the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency, with the coordination of the Director of Central 
Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency from the provisions of section 552 of title 5 (Freedom 
of Information Act), which require publication, disclosure, search, or 
review in connection therewith.
  ``(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of this 
section, the term `operational files' means files of the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as 
`NIMA') concerning the activities of NIMA that before the establishment 
of NIMA were performed by the National Photographic Interpretation 
Center of the Central Intelligence Agency (NPIC), that document the 
means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected 
through scientific and technical systems.
  ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated 
intelligence are not operational files.
  ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall 
continue to be subject to search and review for information 
concerning--
          ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for 
        permanent residence who have requested information on 
        themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 of title 
        5, or section 552a of title 5 (Privacy Act of 1974);
          ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not 
        exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of 
        title 5; or
          ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by the 
        any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, 
        Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of 
        an intelligence activity:
                  ``(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives.
                  ``(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate.
                  ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
                  ``(iv) The Department of Justice.
                  ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NIMA.
                  ``(vi) The Office of the Director of NIMA.
  ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which 
contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational 
files shall be subject to search and review.
  ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in 
files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the 
exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from 
search, review publication, or disclosure.
  ``(C) Records from exempted operational files which have been 
disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under 
paragraph (1) and which have been returned to exempted operational 
files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review.
  ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by 
a provision of law which is enacted after the date of enactment of this 
section, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies its 
provisions.
  ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person 
who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, alleges 
that NIMA has withheld records improperly because of failure to comply 
with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available 
under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5.
  ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided 
for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
          ``(i) In any case in which information specifically 
        authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to 
        be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign 
        relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NIMA, 
        such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the 
        court.
          ``(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, 
        determine the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions 
        of the parties.
          ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are 
        improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in 
        exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such 
        allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal 
        knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
          ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records 
        were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of 
        operational files, NIMA shall meet its burden under section 
        552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, by demonstrating to the court by sworn 
        written submission that exempted operational files likely to 
        contain responsible records currently perform the functions set 
        forth in paragraph (2).
          ``(II) The court may not order NIMA to review the content of 
        any exempted operational file or files in order to make the 
        demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the 
        complainant disputes NIMA's showing with a sworn written 
        submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible 
        evidence.
          ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the 
        parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 
        36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that 
        requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 
        36.
          ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NIMA has 
        improperly withheld requested records because of failure to 
        comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall 
        order NIMA to search and review the appropriate exempted 
        operational file or files for the requested records and make 
        such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with 
        the provisions of section 552 of title 5, and such order shall 
        be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this 
        subsection.
          ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint 
        pursuant to this paragraph NIMA agrees to search the 
        appropriate exempted operational file or files for the 
        requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon 
        such complaint.
          ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the 
        court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated 
        with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission 
        to the court.
  ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less 
than once every ten years, the Director of the National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence shall review 
the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether 
such exemptions may be removed from the category of exempted files or 
any portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve 
any determination to remove such exemptions.
  ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include 
consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the 
subject matter of the particular category of files or portions thereof 
and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the 
information contained therein.
  ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NIMA has improperly withheld 
records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek 
judicial review in the district court of the United States of the 
district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of 
Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to 
determining the following:
          ``(A) Whether NIMA has conducted the review required by 
        paragraph (1) before the expiration of the ten-year period 
        beginning on the date of the enactment of this section or 
        before the expiration of the ten-year period beginning on the 
        date of the most recent review.
          ``(B) Whether NIMA, in fact, considered the criteria set 
        forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
subchapter I of chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
by adding at the end the following new item:

``446. Protection of operational files.''.

                                Purpose

    The bill would:
          (1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for 
        (a) the intelligence and intelligence-related 
        activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community 
        Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence 
        Agency Retirement and Disability System;
          (2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 
        2000 for the intelligence and intelligence-related 
        activities of the U.S. Government and permit the 
        Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel 
        ceilings in Fiscal Year 2000 for any intelligence 
        element up to two percent above the authorized levels, 
        with the approval of the Director of the Office of 
        Management and Budget;
          (3) Authorize $27 million for the National Drug 
        Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
          (4) Authorize increased appropriations included in 
        the currently pending ``Kosovo'' emergency supplemental 
        appropriations bill for the conduct of intelligence and 
        intelligence-related activities by the United States 
        Government by the amount therein appropriated as 
        emergency supplemental appropriations;
          (5) Authorize the continuation of the CIA Central 
        Services Program through March 31, 2002; and
          (6) Authorize the protection of the operational files 
        of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

  Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent

    The classified annex to this public report includes the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated 
language. The committee views the classified Annex as an 
integral part of this legislation. The classified Annex 
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered 
by the committee, which underlies the funding authorization 
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The committee intends 
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified 
Annex to this report be conducted in accord with the guidance 
and limitations set forth as associate language therein. The 
classified Schedule is incorporated directly into this 
legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill. The 
classified Annex is available for review by all Members of the 
House of Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause 
13 of Rule XXIV of the House.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under 
the jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign 
Intelligence Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and 
Related Activities (TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence 
Program (JMIP) of the Department of Defense.
    The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign 
intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by: 
(1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence 
Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Departments 
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the Department of State; 
(6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the Department of 
Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the 
National Reconnaissance Office; and (10) the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency.
    The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of 
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a 
functional part of the basic military force structure and 
provide direct information support to military operations. 
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence 
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program 
that respond to the needs of military commanders for 
operational support information, as well as to national 
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Armed 
Services Committee in the House of Representatives has joint 
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs 
comprising TIARA.
    The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated 
program management of defense intelligence elements that 
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included 
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency 
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence 
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery 
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support, 
aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included 
in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the 
Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense 
General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself 
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program 
(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP), 
(c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program 
(DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program 
(DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program 
(DSRP). As with TIARA programs, the Armed Services Committee in 
the House of Representatives has joint oversight and 
authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising the JMIP.

                 Committee Findings and Recommendations

    The committee completed its review of the President's 
fiscal year 2000 budget, carrying out its annual responsibility 
to prepare an authorization based on close examination of 
intelligence programs and proposed expenditures. The review 
reflected the committee's continuing belief that intelligence 
activities must be examined by function, as well as by program. 
Thus, the committee's review was again structured across 
program lines and intelligence disciplines and themes. The 
committee held nine full committee budget-related hearings. 
Issues addressed included: acquisition of overhead collection 
systems, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence 
(IMINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Analysis and Production, 
and Covert Action. A separate hearing was also held that dealt 
with support to military operations. Two hearings were held 
addressing the DCI's overall budget submission and the state of 
health of the Intelligence Community. The Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI) , and the Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM) testified in 
order to personally explain their views and plans for the 
future of intelligence and the Intelligence Community. The 
committee also had six ``capabilities'' demonstrations and 
briefings that presented to the committee a variety of 
operational capabilities associated with all aspects of 
intelligence collection and analysis. There were, in addition, 
numerous individual briefings of Members and over 100 staff 
briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget 
requests.
    The committee continued to place heavy emphasis on 
understanding and addressing the future needs of the 
Intelligence Community, and the several distinct roles that it 
plays in national security. For the past four years, the 
committee has discussed the fact that our national security is 
affected by a set of international issues more diverse than 
those emphasized during the Cold War. Heretofore, some of these 
issues have not been identified so readily with our global 
interests. Throughout our review, there has been a constant 
theme: the threats we face demand that the Intelligence 
Community be vigilant on both the strategic and tactical levels 
and the Intelligence Community must maintain a world-wide view, 
with a highly flexible set of resources.
    The fact remains, however, that our intelligence 
capabilities have dwindled since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, and we have failed to build new capabilities that will 
become increasingly critical. This is especially true in the 
areas of espionage, covert action, and in our toughest SIGINT 
activities. We, as a nation, cannot continue this course. 
Therefore, since the beginning of the 104th Congress, the 
committee has focused on increasing investments for 
intelligence. The committee has highlighted not only areas of 
greatest immediate priority, but also stressed the need for 
enhancing global coverage areas to rebuild important 
indications and warning capabilities for policy makers and 
military commanders. Given the rapidly changing nature of 
intelligence targets, the growing demands made of the 
Intelligence Community and recent, real-world tests of our 
intelligence capabilities, we believe that significant 
additional investments will be necessary. Specifically, this 
year, we have focused investments in the following areas:
         Correcting the imbalances between collection--on the 
        one hand--and tasking, processing, exploitation and 
        dissemination (TPED), and analysis--on the other;
         Recapitalizing SIGINT, also emphasizing the need to 
        finalize a strategic plan for SIGINT and taking steps 
        to implement changes in process and management;
         Innovating paradigms for imagery, to include 
        commercial resources;
         Building a stronger and more extensive clandestine 
        HUMINT capability; and
         Putting new tools in the covert action ``toolbox.''
    The Intelligence Community truly represents our nation's 
first line of defense. The world that we face today, and that 
we will be facing in the next 10-15 years, poses different 
threats to national security from those prevalent in preceding 
decades. Although it is true that we are at less risk of a 
massive nuclear confrontation, other aspects of our security 
are at greater risk. For instance, there is a growing 
possibility that a rogue nation or group will acquire the 
ability to attack U.S. interests, or the United States itself, 
with a nuclear, biological, or chemical device, or some other 
weapon of mass destruction. These possibilities place 
increasing and complex demands on the Intelligence Community, 
and require flexible and robust intelligence capabilities. The 
increasing assaults on our national security posed by terrorism 
(international and domestic), narcotics trafficking, 
international organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and conventional weapons, illicit arms sales and 
foreign intelligence activities must be countered decisively. 
To do so requires a solid foundation of intelligence collection 
and analysis, and, sometimes, under proper Presidential 
direction, actions by the Intelligence Community itself.
    In all cases, the Intelligence Community's consumers expect 
the Community to retain its traditional role of providing 
strategic intelligence. Whenever possible, the Intelligence 
Community is expected to provide insightful warning of 
impending crises, whether diplomatic, commercial, political, or 
military. Such early indicators increase the likelihood that a 
crisis will be resolved with words instead of weapons.
    For the military, however, the revolutionary nature of 
modern warfare, the altered global threat, and the increasing 
demands of contingency operations (i.e., peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, and humanitarian relief) prove the need for 
balance between strategic and tactical intelligence support, 
always remembering that intelligence is a low cost force 
protector and force multiplier. Similarly, the law enforcement 
community has come to expect the Intelligence Community to 
focus heavily on providing actionable tactical intelligence, as 
well as direct support to joint and multilateral operations. 
Ensuring that this balance exists is critical. Therefore, while 
ensuring that the military has the best possible intelligence, 
proper attention also must be given to maintaining the 
capabilities for strategic intelligence that are critical for 
policy planning, crisis control, and mission success.
    Intelligence, tactical and strategic, is needed to address 
the salient threats of the day. The United States continues to 
face a dilemma in its dealings with leaders like Saddam 
Hussein, who possess various weapons of mass destruction and 
have demonstrated a will to use them. Saddam Hussein has 
consistently threatened the stability of a strategically 
important region. The United States must have the intelligence 
that would not only support a policy decision and its 
implementation, but would also provide the information 
necessary to develop options. The fact is that we do not have 
the intelligence we need and Saddam Hussein and others like him 
will continue to challenge our foreign policy objectives and 
threaten our national security. Perhaps more frightening still 
are the individuals and transnational groups who may also 
acquire similar capabilities. The only certainty is that, as 
these individuals' and groups' resources increase, their 
capabilities will grow more fearsome, and their tactics will 
become harder to detect. But, we cannot look at these threats 
alone.
    The most demanding circumstances in which the Intelligence 
Community must operate are those in which U.S. military forces 
and official personnel are deployed in potentially hostile 
situations, such as currently in the former Yugoslavia. The 
role of intelligence in operations conducted in Kosovo and the 
Balkans, generally, is extensive. It ranges from building 
target ``folders'' to assessing damage; enhancing force 
protection to predicting and assessing the impact of the mass 
migration of refugees; understanding the plans and attentions 
of key leaders, to provide the President with options between 
sending a demarche, and launching a cruise missile. And, all 
the while, the President, his cabinet and military commanders 
expect that the Community will be the bellwether for 
identifying the next areas of crisis or concern around the 
globe. Moreover, the Intelligence Community may not, for a 
moment, ignore the more traditional geo-political and military 
threats such as in North Korea and China and in a Russia that 
may yet collapse.
    As a result of these demands, the Committee has evaluated 
the budget submission on a program-by-program basis, assessing 
each program in terms of its capabilities and how it fits into 
the overall capabilities of the Intelligence Community, now and 
into the future. At this time, as a consequence of the demands 
and challenges faced by the Intelligence Community, we 
recommend an authorization that is approximately one percent 
above the President's request.

                       Areas of Special Interest

The Threat From the People's Republic of China

    The committee is very concerned about the alarming 
allegations of espionage and illegal technology acquisition 
directed by the People's Republic of China. It also has serious 
concerns about corresponding weaknesses in U.S. 
counterintelligence and security programs, and about 
insufficient Intelligence Community counterintelligence 
capabilities. As a result, the committee has taken a series of 
aggressive steps in the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000 that are designed to counter the growing 
Chinese intelligence threat to U.S. national security 
interests. These measures include specifically targeted funding 
increases and directed oversight of key Intelligence Community 
functions.
    In the area of intelligence analysis, the committee has 
emphasized the need for more competitive analysis. As part of 
this effort, the committee has authorized additional funds 
specifically to subject the China-Taiwan Issues Group in the 
Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence to 
rigorous external competitive analysis to ensure that this key 
analytical component is held to the highest analytic standards 
possible. The committee has directed the Deputy Director for 
Intelligence to expose CIA's China analysts to ``contrary 
thinking'' to challenge their suppositions and analytical 
methodologies more aggressively, and to forestall any 
possibility of ``group think.'' Furthermore, to facilitate the 
determination of future resource and oversight requirements, 
the committee has asked the Deputy Director for Intelligence 
for bi-annual progress reports on the application of 
alternative contrary-type analysis to the China-Taiwan Issues 
Group.
    For some time, the committee has been troubled by the level 
of resources that the Department of Energy (DoE) dedicates to 
analysis of technical subject matter relating to foreign 
nuclear weapons programs and capabilities. The Chinese and 
Russian nuclear weapons programs are of utmost interest to U.S. 
policymakers responsible for nonproliferation and other 
important national security programs, yet analysis of these 
programs at DoE has not kept pace with demand. The committee 
believes that comprehensive intelligence analysis of foreign 
nuclear programs should be considered an integral part of an 
effective counterintelligence program at DoE, and has 
authorized a substantial funding increase for this purpose that 
focuses on the Chinese and Russian nuclear programs, and on 
proliferation analysis. The committee also sustained requests 
for a substantial increase in funding for DoE's Office of 
Counterintelligence, and approved a subsequent adjusted request 
to increase funding for a new counterintelligence cyber 
information security program at DoE.
    Other relevant committee initiatives address 
counterintelligence shortcomings at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense (DoD), and 
provide increased funds for related offensive intelligence 
collection by CIA that will enhance U.S. counterintelligence 
capabilities. The committee, for example, has provided a 
substantial increase in funds to enhance counterintelligence 
and investigative agent training at the FBI, which is becoming 
increasingly overwhelmed by the broad-based and unorthodox 
intelligence collection methods employed by the Chinese. The 
committee has sustained a very large increase in funding 
proposed by the President to enhance DoD security by improving 
acquisition protection, information systems protection, and 
overall counterintelligence capabilities. The committee has 
also provided a substantial funding increase for CIA operations 
directed against hostile foreign intelligence services, and has 
authorized additional funds to enhance CIA's understanding of 
foreign Denial and Deception (D&D) techniques. And in the area 
of linguistic support to collection and analysis, the committee 
has added substantial funding for language training so as to 
ameliorate linguistic weaknesses across the Intelligence 
Community.

National Security Agency

    The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has stated to 
the committee that recapitalization of SIGINT capabilities is 
one of the top priorities for the Intelligence Community. The 
recently retired, former Director of NSA suggested that a 
significant amount of investment will be required in order to 
revitalize the overall SIGINT system. The committee believes 
that the DCI and the former Director of NSA are correct in 
terms of priority and funding requirements. The committee 
notes, however, that money and priority alone will not revive 
NSA, nor the overall SIGINT system. In the last two Congresses, 
the committee has been direct in its identification of process 
and management problems that require attention. The committee 
believes that NSA management has not yet stepped up to the 
line. There have been some efforts at reform, but there are 
still several areas where change is not only needed but is 
critical for NSA's future.
    The committee believes that NSA is in serious trouble. The 
committee has devoted considerable attention to this issue in 
the classified annex to this report. The committee believes 
that NSA has very talented people dedicated to an exciting 
mission, whose creativity can be unleashed and properly 
directed, in concert with private industry, to build a bright 
future. The committee looks forward to the opportunities for 
change that present themselves with the introduction of a new 
Director of NSA. The committee salutes the efforts by the 
former Director, who we credit for starting some of the changes 
that we have seen. But, there is much more to do. The committee 
hopes that the new Director will find the specific points and 
observations in the classified annex to this report of value as 
he seeks to effect needed changes.

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

    In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, 
the committee approved the Administration's proposal to proceed 
with the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), within some 
specified boundaries and on the condition that the 
Administration take vigorous steps to provide for the essential 
tasking, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) functions 
necessary to respond to the huge increase in imagery collection 
capabilities promised in FIA. Despite the committee's emphasis 
on the TPED issues, the committee believes that the 
Administration has not adequately responded. Specifically, the 
committee has not seen a serious commitment to fund TPED 
solutions--costs the committee believes will be in the billions 
of dollars. The committee credits the Director of NIMA for his 
continued efforts at arriving at a TPED modernization plan. The 
committee hopes that this plan will emerge in the very near 
future, so that there can be a better understanding of the 
shortfalls and the difficulties ahead.
    The committee feels it is necessary in this authorization 
report to reemphasize its position on TPED and its contingent 
support for FIA for two basic reasons. First, at its hearing on 
support to military operations, representatives from three 
Commanders-in-Chief told the committee that, although they 
generally supported new collection systems, they had concerns 
that the massive amounts of data collected would be relatively 
useless without the necessary analytic mechanisms and manpower. 
The second reason is that the committee believes TPED 
shortfalls may well come before FIA. In fact, TPED shortfalls 
related to deployment of the Enhanced Imagery System (EIS), 
planned for deployment much sooner than FIA, threaten to 
overwhelm existing analytical resources almost immediately.
    The committee believes that TPED shortfalls cannot best be 
solved solely by hiring hundreds of additional imagery 
analysts, although there will probably be a need to hire and 
train many more than are currently projected. A commitment to 
development and deployment of analytical tools and 
infrastructure as well as, research into other areas or 
capabilities that might cue an imagery analyst, are other areas 
where solutions beyond mere personnel increases are in order.

Oversight Issues

    The committee, in its oversight of the National Security 
Agency, verbally requested access to documents in the files of 
the Office of the General Counsel. While some material has been 
provided to the committee, the General Counsel of the National 
Security Agency has argued that there may be other documents to 
which the government attorney-client privilege applies. The 
committee finds this claim of privilege peculiar and urges the 
Office of the General Counsel to review both the law of 
attorney-client privilege as it applies to congressional 
inquiries and the history of congressional oversight of U.S. 
intelligence agencies. The committee would be extremely 
displeased to conclude that a general counsel of an 
intelligence agency was interfering with the legitimate and 
constitutional rights of the committee to oversee the 
intelligence activities of an executive branch agency through 
an erroneous assertion of privilege. Under such circumstances, 
the committee would fully exercise the many prerogatives at its 
disposal to remedy the situation.

                  Joint Military Intelligence Program

Ground-Based Common Sensor/Prophet: Fence $12.8 million

    The budget request contained $12.8 million in PE 35885G for 
the ground based common sensor (GBCS)/Prophet tactical signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) system.
    The committee notes that the Army terminated the GBCS 
program in November 1999 for lack of performance, and that the 
service wants to move to the new, less complicated Prophet 
program. The committee is concerned that the GBCS effort, begun 
over seven years ago, was unsuccessful because of a lack of 
achievable requirements and an overly sophisticated technical 
approach.
    The committee has received limited formal explanation of 
the evolving Prophet concept. However, the Army's approach to 
Prophet is more simplistic than GBCS, but appears to be 
inadequate to properly collect and process modern battlefield 
SIGINT necessary to provide useful tactical intelligence. 
Furthermore, the committee questions the need for a ground-
based tactical SIGINT collection capability to supplement the 
Army's airborne efforts.
    The committee directs that no authorized or appropriated 
funds be obligated or expended until the Secretary of the Army 
provides the congressional defense and intelligence committees 
a detailed concept of operations for Prophet together with a 
detailed program definition and technical approach for this 
ground-based, tactical SIGINT collection system.
    The committee recommends the budget request.

Aerial Common Sensor: -$2.7 million

    The budget request included $14.7 million in PE 35885G for 
the Army's aerial common sensor (ACS).
    The committee notes that it has received insufficient 
information on the specific plan, concept of operation, and 
programmatics for the ACS. Further, the Army has not yet 
decided on the aircraft it will use for ACS. This will directly 
affect the costs of procurement, sensors and their integration, 
and operations and maintenance. Until such basic decisions are 
made, the committee cannot determine the overall worth of the 
program, and therefore, cannot provide a blanket authorization.
    Therefore, the committee authorizes $12.0 million in this 
PE, a decrease of $2.7 million for ACS. However, no funds 
authorized or appropriated for ACS are to be obligated or 
expended, until 30 days after the congressional defense and 
intelligence committees have been provided a report that 
includes the following:
    (1) The specific aircraft selected for the ACS.
    (2) The specific ACS concept of operations and program 
plan. The program plan must include the projected funding over 
the five-year defense plan, and expected total cost.
    (3) Identification of the generic sensor suites and 
development/acquisition plan to provide these sensors.
    (4) Certification from the Director, National Security 
Agency, that ACS conforms to the requirements of the 2010 
Unified Cryptologic Architecture.

National Technology Alliance: +$5.0 million

    The budget request contained $88.4 million in PE 35102BQ 
for the Defense Imagery Analysis Program, and included for $8.1 
million for National Imagery Mapping Agency (NIMA) technology 
investment.
    The committee is aware that the NIMA National Technology 
Alliance (NTA) program continues to demonstrate its worth 
within the Intelligence Community while it has expanded to 
address the needs of the Department of Defense. NTA innovation 
in a variety of technologies, with applications that cross 
department, service and agency boundaries, is reducing costs, 
increasing performance, and saving precious funds.
    The committee continues to support the NTA's efforts to 
provide solutions based on advances in technology for both the 
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. The 
committee recommends $93.4 million in PE 35102BQ, an increase 
of $5.0 million for the NTA.

Joint Airborne SIGINT Program: -$1.6 million

    The budget request contained $81.6 million in PE 35206F for 
joint signals intelligence (SIGINT) avionics family (JSAF).
    The committee notes that JSAF funding provides resources 
for developing the two components of the future airborne SIGINT 
collection system as well as the program office operations and 
engineering costs. The committee also notes that the current 
program office has approximately 70 personnel including both 
government and contracted advisory and assistance services 
employees, which the committee finds to be significantly more 
dedicated manpower than other similar programs.
    The committee recommends $80.0 million in PE 35206F for the 
JSAF program, a reduction of $1.6 million. This reduction is to 
be applied solely to reducing the JSAF program office 
management staff. No reduction is to be applied to system 
developments.

Tactical Control System: +$3.0 million/earmark $4.5 million

    The budget request contained $69.7 million in PE 35204N for 
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and included $24.6 
million for the tactical control system (TCS). No funding was 
provided for the operation of the UAV systems integration 
laboratory (SIL) or to continue its development of the multiple 
UAV simulation environment (MUSE).
    The committee continues to be supportive of the TCS and 
notes that TCS software is the key to interoperability for 
future medium altitude and tactical UAVs and their payloads. 
Further, the committee is supportive of the TCS objective to 
interface with high altitude UAVs.
    The committee notes that the Naval Surface Warfare Center 
program office continues to develop most of the TCS software 
and expend most of the TCS developmental funding in-house. The 
committee believes that the TCS program could be more 
efficiently managed if the TCS developments, including software 
engineering and maintenance, were to be outsourced in whole to 
the prime system integration contractor. Further, the committee 
believes such outsourcing would allow for a smaller and more 
efficient government program office. The committee believes 
that holding a prime contractor responsible for total system 
performance has demonstrated success with many other programs.
    Finally, the committee notes that the U.S. Atlantic Command 
(USACOM) has been without a TCS capability for its UAV testing, 
and that an additional $3 million is required to provide such a 
capability.
    Therefore, the committee recommends $72.7 million in PE 
35204N, an increase of $3 million for procuring a TCS ground 
station for USACOM. Further, the committee directs a 
reallocation of $4.5 million within this PE specifically to 
realize the program office efficiencies discussed above and to 
move software development and maintenance responsibility to the 
prime contractor. This funding is to be reapplied within the 
TCS program to fund the SIL MUSE efforts.

Multi-Function Self-Aligned Gate Technology: +$6.0 million

    The budget request included $69.7 million in PE 35204N for 
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and $9.4 million in 
35207F for manned reconnaissance systems. No funding was 
provided in either program element for the multi-function self-
aligned gate (MSAG) active aperture antenna (AAA) technology.
    Congress has supported this AAA technology for several 
years, and the committee is pleased with the successful MSAG 
antenna demonstration completed in August 1998. During this 
unprecedented demonstration, the MSAG provided wide-band, 
duplex, communications links simultaneously to a ground 
vehicle, an aircraft, and a satellite surrogate.
    The committee believes that a single, electronically 
steered antenna array that can provide multiple wide-band 
communications links would be a cost-effective solution to 
numerous Department of Defense communications requirements. 
However, the committee is disturbed to note that the Department 
has failed to provide even minimal funding for this technology.
    The committee understands that the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and 
Intelligence) is considering initiation of an advanced concept 
technology demonstration of the MSAG technology and that the 
Air Force is supportive of testing this antenna technology on 
reconnaissance aircraft.
    Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $3.0 
million in PE 35204N for operational evaluation of the MSAG AAA 
on the tactical control station and the Predator UAV. The 
committee also recommends an increase of $3.0 million in PE 
35207F for evaluation of the MSAG AAA onboard the RC-135 Rivet 
Joint aircraft.

Common Imagery Processor

    The budget request included $4.9 million in PE 35208F for 
the common imagery processor (CIP).
    The committee understands that the CIP has been 
manufactured with a known design input/output limitation that 
precludes it from processing real-time imagery from current and 
future high-data rate digital cameras. The committee does not 
understand why the Department of Defense pursued a common 
government solution to digital imagery processing without 
ensuring a capability to process the high data rates from 
current and future digital cameras. Further, the committee is 
aware that the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) has integrated 
commercial imagery processing technologies into a system that 
can process these high data-rates in real-time. These 
commercial solutions are not only less expensive, but provide 
an upgrade path for future requirements.
    The committee notes the partnering relationships now being 
fostered between the government contractor and the NRL to 
provide a CIP that is more commercially-based and capable of 
processing modern digital imagery. The committee strongly 
supports this relationship, and it expects the Air Force and 
Navy to work more closely together to ensure that modern 
digital camera systems can be fully exploited in real-time by 
the CIP.
    The committee supports the budget request.

Global Hawk High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: +$25.0 
        million

    The budget request contained $70.8 million in PE 35205F for 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), including funding for 
Global Hawk and DarkStar air vehicles.
    Since the budget request was developed, the Air Force has 
terminated the DarkStar aircraft, leaving Global Hawk as the 
only endurance UAV program. While some residual funding may 
result, termination costs for DarkStar are yet to be 
determined. However, thecommittee understands the Air Force 
plans to use any residual funds for Global Hawk testing and evaluation.
    Recently, a Global Hawk test air vehicle crashed, 
destroying with it the only integrated reconnaissance sensor 
package. The committee notes the importance of resuming the 
user evaluation and testing of Global Hawk, and of sustaining 
the industrial base until completion of the user evaluation.
    The committee recommends $95.8 million in PE 35205F, an 
increase of $25.0 million for Global Hawk.

Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: +$20.0 million

    The budget request contained $38.0 million for three 
Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and one ground control 
station (GCS).
    The Predator continues to be the Department of Defense's 
only operational UAV. The committee notes that the Predator has 
been flying support missions in Bosnia, and now Kosovo, for 
over three and one-half years, logging more than 11,000 total 
flight hours. Because of its importance to theater commanders' 
intelligence needs, a solid Predator production base must be 
continued, attrition reserve air vehicles must be maintained 
and improvements must be made to fully exploit the system's 
potential. For example, the committee believes the laser 
designator upgrades now being integrated into some aircraft for 
immediate contingency needs should be integrated fleet-wide.
    Although Predator operations are expected to be expanded to 
other theaters and operational areas, the committee understands 
Predator is currently not deployable worldwide because of some 
host-nation communications frequency restrictions. 
Consequently, the committee believes the Air Force needs to add 
the tactical common data link (TCDL) to the air vehicles and 
the GCS to overcome this operational limitation.
    Finally, the committee notes that when using the satellite 
communications link with the aircraft, the GCS can only control 
a single air vehicle. This situation precludes dual aircraft 
control for on-station relief. The committee believes that a 
dual-channel, beyond-line-of-sight satellite communications 
capability needs to be retrofitted into existing aircraft.
    Therefore, the committee recommends $58.0 million, an 
increase of $20.0 million, to procure two additional attrition 
reserve UAVs, production versions/kits of the laser designator, 
the TCDL and the dual-channel satellite communications suite.

Electro-Optical Framing Technologies: +$5.0 million

    The budget request contained $5.0 million in PE 35206N for 
airborne reconnaissance systems, including $2.0 million for 
electro-optic (EO) framing technologies.
    The committee continues to support development of the 
revolutionary digital EO framing technologies with on-chip 
forward motion compensation (FMC). The committee notes the Navy 
F-14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Podded System--Completely 
Digital (TARPS CD) demonstration system using this technology 
has recently been successfully employed at sea. Based on this 
success, the committee believes there is a need for additional 
TARPS CD risk-reduction pods and that the Navy should expand 
this effort. Further, the committee believes that the EO 
framing with on-chip FMC should be fully developed and improved 
to satisfy current and future applications on aircraft such as 
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles and other tactical fighter 
aircraft.
    Therefore the committee recommends $10.0 million in 
PE35206N, an addition of $5 million, for continued development 
of EO framing with on-chip FMC technologies. These efforts 
shall include development of the high quantum efficiency 
infrared framing chip, precision strike improvements, and step-
framing technologies.

Joint Reserve Intelligence Program: +$250,000

    The budget request contained $10.1 million for operation of 
the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP).
    The committee notes the superb intelligence analysis and 
production support the JRIP has continued to provide the active 
forces. The committee is acutely aware of the JRIP support to 
producing imagery exploitation keys, the cataloging of specific 
equipment and facilities for rapid identification for 
targeting. This imagery key production has significant positive 
impact for ongoing crisis support. However, the JRIP is not 
properly funded for the numbers of man-days necessary to 
continue this effort.
    The committee recommends $10.3 million, an increase of 
$250,000 for this purpose.

              Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

All Source Analysis System (ASAS): -$4.7 million

    The budget request contained $43.7 million, an increase of 
$14.9 million from the fiscal year 1999 appropriated amount, in 
PE 64321A for ASAS.
    The committee recognizes the importance of the ASAS 
capability, but it is troubled by the development costs of this 
intelligence support system, particularly when compared to the 
modest costs for the other services' intelligence systems. 
Therefore, the committee recommends $39.0 million in PE64321A, 
a decrease of $4.7 million.

Semi-Automated Imagery Processor: +$2.5 million

    The budget request contained no funding in PE 63766A for 
tactical electronic surveillance systems.
    The committee notes that the semi-automated imagery 
processor (SAIP) is an advanced concept technology 
demonstration (ACTD) designed to provide automatic target 
cueing to support imagery analysts. Further, the tool provides 
a limited capability for automated target recognition. While 
the SAIP is not perfected, the committee notes the development 
effort and results to date. The committee remains concerned 
that current and future imagery collection systems are 
overwhelming the limited number of imagery analysts available 
to put ``eyes on target.'' Automated capabilities to reduce 
imagery analyst workloads are critically needed. The committee 
believes that the SAIP represents the best effort to date to 
provide such radar imagery automation. However, the Department 
has, again, failed to provide sufficient funding for the 
transition of a needed ACTD capability to an operational 
application.
    The committee recommends $35.7 million in PE63766A, an 
increase of $2.5 million for the transition of the SAIP effort 
from an ACTD to an operational capability. The committee notes 
that the SAIP is not a total solution and expects the Army to 
continue efforts to refine and improve the SAIP.

Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System: Fence $60.0 million

    The budget request contained $60.0 million for the Advanced 
Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS).
    The committee is fully aware of this program's troubled 
history and technical problems. The committee is not pleased 
that the operational evaluation, originally scheduled for 
fiscal year 1998, has been delayed once again, pushing the 
production decision into fiscal year 2000. In light of its poor 
performance and reliability track record, the committee cannot 
support continued funding until a thorough independent test and 
evaluation of the system has been completed.
    The committee recommends the amount requested, but directs 
that none of these funds may be obligated or expended until 30 
days after the Department of Defense has provided a report to 
the congressional defense and intelligence committees on the 
completion of a successful formal operational evaluation of the 
ATARS. Further, the committee believes that no amounts 
authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 1999 for production 
system procurement should be used to procure additional low 
rate initial production (LRIP-3) systems before completion of 
the operational evaluation.

Hyper-Spectral Analysis: +$8.0 million

    The budget request contained $12.1 million in PE 65867N and 
$10.1 million in PE 27247F for Navy Force and Air Force 
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP).
    The committee has learned of a revolutionary new spectral 
exploitation technology that has been tested on a limited scale 
onboard Navy intelligence collection aircraft. This technology 
provides real-time, automated, hyperspectral, wide-area search 
functionality. By searching for spectral anomalies, it provides 
users with automated target nominations without a priori 
information. This could dramatically cut imagery analyst 
workloads, while greatly improving real-time targeting and 
threat warning. The committee believes such a capability is 
needed to exploit the vast amount of imagery data that the 
intelligence community is able to provide.
    Therefore, the committee recommends $16.1 million in PE 
65867N and $14.1 million in PE 27247F, an increase in each of 
$4.0 million respectively for the services to procure and test 
multi-spectral sensors and exploitation tools. The goal is to 
eventually transition this as an operational technology to the 
services for advancing imagery cueing and analysis.

Beartrap Nonlinear Dynamics And Environmental Characterization: +$6.0 
        million

    The budget request contained $17.8 million in PE 63254N for 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) system developments, including 
$5.3 million for Project Beartrap.
    The committee notes that that the budget request for 
Beartrap supports hardware and software developments for 
advanced capability acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, as well 
as data collection and analysis for threat assessment and 
environmental characterization. The committee understands that 
basic research in nonlinear dynamic stochastic resonance 
(NDSR), supported by the Office of Naval Research, has advanced 
to the point that it offers explanations for many observed 
physical phenomena and it offers the potential to develop 
significantly improved acoustic and non-acoustic AWS sensor 
systems. The committee believes that NDSR technology offers a 
significant opportunity to enhance the capabilities of Beartrap 
at a time when evolving ASW requirements indicate the critical 
need to integrate these latest relevant technologies. Specific 
areas include characterization of the ocean nonlinear dynamics 
environment, application of NDSR technology in advanced 
Beartrap sensors and validation of NDSR ASW performance.
    The committee also notes that the Navy requires extensive 
environmental data to achieve effective performance from the 
extended echo ranging (EER) devices used in shallow littoral 
waters. These active acoustic devices are key to naval airborne ASW 
performance. The Beartrap program is well suited to collect this 
environmental data.
    The committee recommends $23.8 million in PE 63254N for ASW 
systems development, an increase of $6 million for Project 
Beartrap for the purposes outlined above.

Ocean Surveillance Information System: +$4.0 million

    The budget request contained $41.6 million in PE 64231N, 
including $2.1 million for the ocean surveillance information 
system (OSIS).
    The committee understands the need for improving analytic 
software search tools, particularly as the information 
populating intelligence databases continues to increase 
exponentially. The committee notes that the intuitive database 
search tool known as the contiguous connection model (CCM) 
being incorporated into the Army's all source analysis system 
(ASAS) provides a significant advance in providing such 
automated search functionality, for both formatted and 
unformatted data. The committee believes the CCM would 
significantly improve Navy intelligence analyst effectiveness, 
and that it should be incorporated into the OSIS evolutionary 
development.
    The committee recommends $45.6 million in this program 
element, an increase of $4.0 million for this purpose.

Distributed Surveillance System: +$19.0 million

    The budget request contained $14.9 million in PE 64784N for 
continued development of the distributed surveillance system.
    The Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) program 
includes both fixed and relocatable acoustic sensor systems to 
detect and track diesel and nuclear powered submarines. The 
Fixed Distributed System (FDS) is a series of permanently 
installed acoustic arrays and the Advanced Deployable System 
(ADS), currently under development, will comprise sensors that 
can be rapidly deployed in littoral environments.
    The committee understands that the incorporation of fiber 
optic sensor technologies in acoustic arrays can greatly reduce 
maintenance requirements for these systems. Littoral anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) operations pose complex challenges in 
the evaluation and analysis of acoustic sensor data due to the 
high volume of traffic and diverse environmental conditions. 
The committee is concerned that the ADS program does not 
adequately address the issues of automation of detection and 
tracking functions and connectivity to the Global Command and 
Control System (GCCS) and web-based network centric warfare 
systems.
    Accordingly, the committee recommends $33.9 million, an 
increase of $19.0 million for the distributed surveillance 
system; $8.0 million for the continued application of remote-
powered fiber optic sensor technologies for FDS acoustic 
arrays, and $11.0 million for the development of improved 
detection and tracking algorithms to

provide increased automation for the ADS and an interface with 
the GCCS and other network centric warfare systems.

Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System: +$5.0 million

    The budget request contained $5.0 million for procurement 
of the Marine Corps' mobile electronic warfare support system 
(MEWSS).
    The committee notes that the Army and the Marine Corps were 
working together to field a modern ground signals intelligence 
collection capability. The committee notes that the Army 
recently terminated its portion of this program, the ground 
based common sensor (GBCS). This has had a direct impact on the 
Marine Corps' MEWSS, increasing costs and affecting the 
fielding schedule. The committee understands that the Army has 
decided to mitigate this additional cost by providing GBCS 
residual equipment to the Marine Corps. However, this equipment 
will have to be retrofitted into the MEWSS vehicle and 
modifications to the equipment will have to be made. This will 
come at additional cost, which the Marine Corps could not have 
anticipated.
    The committee recommends $10.0 million, an addition of $5.0 
million for the Marine Corps to accept and modify the GBCS 
sensors systems into the MEWSS.

Space-Based Infrared System-High

    The budget request contained $328.7 million in PE 64441F 
for the space-based infrared system-high (SBIRS High).
    The committee notes that the budget request for SBIRS High 
reflects a reduction of $235.5 million when compared to the 
projections in the fiscal year 1999 budget request. The Air 
Force also delayed the first launch of SBIRS High from fiscal 
year 2002 to fiscal year 2004. The Air Force justified this 
delay partly because deployment of a National Missile Defense 
(NMD) program, that SBIRS High will support, was delayed from 
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005, and partly because the 
Defense Satellite Program (DSP) satellites, that SBIRS High 
will replace, are lasting longer than expected.
    The delay will increase SBIRS High program costs by $500 
million to $1 billion in the outyears. Further, although the 
NMD date now proposed by the Administration is two years later 
than it proposed last year, the committee understands that the 
deployment date could be accelerated if the NMD test program 
proceeds well. SBIRS High will also support theater missile 
defenses, particularly in meeting the growing threat posed by 
longer range missiles, against which the United States has only 
very limited defensive capabilities. Finally, with first launch 
in fiscal year 2004, the full constellation of SBIRS High would 
not be available to support a 2005 NMD deployment. The 
committee strongly supports the SBIRS High mission and 
concludes that the restructuring and delay of this program are 
unjustified.
    The committee also strongly objects to the manner in which 
the Air Force implemented a work slowdown in anticipation of 
approval of its proposed fiscal year 2000 program reduction.The 
committee was not informed of this decision until after the contractor 
had been ordered to restructure the program spending rates to 
accommodate the proposed schedule change. This procedure precluded any 
realistic opportunity for congressional review of the Air Force 
decision and preempted congressional oversight prerogatives. The 
committee recognizes that restoring SBIRS High to a first launch date 
of fiscal year 2002 is now impossible, and to restore the date to 
fiscal year 2003 would require approximately $400 million in additional 
funding in fiscal year 2000.
    The committee believes that, because of the delay in the 
program and the substantial cost growth that results, the 
Department will have the opportunity to examine competitive 
alternatives that may be available to achieve comparable or 
superior capabilities at comparable or lower costs. Therefore, 
of the funds authorized for SBIRS High, the committee directs 
that $10.0 million may be used only for airborne and space 
experiments of a sensor technology described in the classified 
annex.
    To sustain the SBIRS High program in the most effective 
manner and assure that it is accorded a high priority in the 
future, the committee recommends $168.7 million for a new SBIRS 
High program element in the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization, 64XXXC, and $160.0 million for PE 64441F. The 
committee believes that an alternate management and funding 
structure, in which BMDO provides management oversight, the Air 
Force serves as executive agent, and both share funding 
responsibility, would provide the most thorough assessments of 
SBIRS High importance in the future.

Space Based Infrared System-Low

    The budget request contained $151.4 million in PE 63441F 
and $77.7 million in 64442F for the space based infrared 
system-low (SBIRS Low).
    The committee notes that the Air Force substantially 
restructured the SBIRS Low program, terminating two planned 
demonstration projects and delaying the first launch of SBIRS 
Low from 2004 to 2006. The Air Force argues that the 
cancellations were justified because much had been learned from 
the effort to develop the demonstrators, that proof of 
principle had already been established in earlier experiments, 
and that schedule delays and cost growth in the demonstration 
projects had increased program risk and cost.
    The committee believes that deployment of SBIRS Low is 
critical to meeting the growing long-range ballistic missile 
threats, and that the delay is very damaging to the U.S. effort 
to field capable systems in response to these threats in a 
timely manner. The committee is also informed that the Navy 
Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense system will rely on SBIRS 
Low for discrimination and external cueing. The SBIRS Low delay 
could seriously degrade the capabilities of the currently 
planned interim NTW system known as Block I and could slow 
progress toward the NTW objective system.
    The committee strongly objects to the manner in which the 
Air Force carried out the SBIRS Low program restructuring. The 
Air Force informed the congressional defense committees the day 
prior to notifying the contractors of the cancellations of the 
demonstration projects, effectively precluding review of an 
important decision in a program of high congressional interest. 
Further, the committee believes that the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization (BMDO) was not adequately consulted 
concerning the decision.
    To ensure that SBIRS Low is accorded the high priority the 
committee believes is warranted by wider military requirements 
and to ensure that other service and DOD equities in the 
program are protected, the committee recommends $110.0 million 
in a new BMDO program element, 63XXXC, $41.8 million in PE 
63441F, and $77.7 million in PE 64442F for SBIRS Low. The 
committee believes that an arrangement, in which BMDO provides 
management oversight, the Air Force serves as executive agent, 
and both share funding responsibility, provides the best chance 
of success in the future.

Air Force/National Reconnaissance Office Partnership: -$2.9 million

    The budget request contained $2.9 million in PE 63856F for 
the Air Force/National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) partnership 
program.
    The Air Force/NRO partnership program funds studies and 
analyses of opportunities to better integrate the activities of 
the two organizations. The committee believes that the 
leadership structure of the two organizations is appropriate to 
foster such integration, and that each organization should be 
highly motivated to leverage the investments of the other as a 
means of conserving scarce resources. The committee believes 
that the activities funded in this program should be part of 
the regular order of business for both the NRO and the Air 
Force. The committee recommends no funding in PE 63856.

Special Operations Forces Reconnaissance: +$2.1 million

    The budget request contained $1.4 in PE 116405BB for 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) intelligence research and 
development. No funds were requested for the special operations 
tactical video system (SOTVS) digital, underwater camera.
    The committee notes that a commercial camera system for the 
joint SOTVS digital, still camera requirement is not available 
and that the commercial market gives no sign of providing an 
off-the-shelf solution.
    Further, a digital imagery capability would provide near-
real-time information support to special operations forces 
(SOF) and would not require a wet-film processing requirement 
as do the current film-based cameras. The committee believes 
this is a capability that needs to be provided to the SOF as 
quickly as possible. The committee believes a government-funded 
digital camera is the only potential near-term solution to this 
reconnaissance requirement. The committee understands that $4.1 
million is required to complete development of a camera that 
meets all joint requirements.
    The committee recommends $3.5 million in PE116405BB, an 
increase of $2.1 million for the SOTVS digital underwater 
camera. The committee recommends the Commander in Chief, SOCOM, 
seek reprogramming authority to fund the remainder of the joint 
requirement.

                           Section by Section

                    Title I: Intelligence activities

Section 101--authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists those elements of the United States 
Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 
2000.

Section 102--classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 incorporates by reference the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations. That schedule sets forth the 
specific amounts authorized to be appropriated for specific 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities and personnel 
ceilings for fiscal year 2000 for those United States 
government elements listed in section 101. The details of the 
Schedule are explained in the classified annex to this report. 
The Schedule of Authorizations correlates to the President's 
classified budget submission to Congress.

Section 103--personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central 
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (``OMB''), in fiscal year 2000, to 
exceed the personnel ceilings applicable to the components of 
the intelligence community under section 102 by an amount not 
to exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings otherwise 
applicable under section 102. The Director may exercise this 
authority only when necessary to the performance of important 
intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be 
reported to the two intelligence committees of the Congress.
    The committee emphasizes that the authority conferred by 
section 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of 
personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the 
section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with 
flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for 
contingencies, and for overages caused by an imbalance between 
hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The 
committee does not expect the Director of Central Intelligence 
to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed 
levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations, except for the 
satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs that are 
consistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in 
this legislation. In no case is this authority to be used to 
provide for positions otherwise denied by Congress.

Section 104--community management account

    Section 104 details the amount and composition of the 
Community Management Account (``CMA'') of the Director of 
Central Intelligence.
    Subsection (a) of section 104 authorizes appropriations in 
the amount of $193,572,000 for fiscal year 2000 for the 
staffing and administration of various components under the 
CMA. Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for the 
Advanced Research and Development Committee to remain available 
for two years.
    Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 348 full-time 
personnel for elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2000 and 
provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the 
CMA element or detailed from other elements of the United 
States Government.
    Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion 
of the CMA.
    Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a 
reimbursable basis, with certain exceptions.
    Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount 
authorized for the CMA under subsection (a) to be made 
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (``NDIC'') 
in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e) requires the 
Director of Central Intelligence to transfer the $27,000,000 to 
the Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under 
the authority of the Attorney General, and subject to section 
103(d)(1) of the National Security Act.

Section 105--authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for 
        fiscal year 1999

    Section 105 specifically authorizes any intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for which emergency 
supplemental appropriations are expected to be included in the 
``Kosovo'' supplemental appropriations bill under consideration 
by the Appropriations Committee in the House at the time of the 
Intelligence Committee's consideration of the fiscal year 2000 
intelligence authorization act. This provision is intended to 
meet the requirements of section 504 of the National Security 
Act of 1947, as amended, which mandates specific authorization 
for the conduct of all intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities by the United States Government. This provision 
should not be read to authorize any subsequent emergency 
supplemental appropriations bills for Fiscal Year 1999 that may 
include funds for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities. Such subsequent bills will require individual 
authorization to satisfy the requirements of section 504.

 Title II: Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system

Section 201--authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$209,100,000 for fiscal year 2000 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

                     Title III: General provisions

Section 301--increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by this 
Act for salary, pay, retirement and other benefits for federal 
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental 
amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation 
or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302--restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations within the Act does not constitute authority for 
the conduct of any intelligence activity that is precluded by 
the Constitution or other laws of the United States.

Section 303--Sense of Congress regarding intelligence community 
        contracting

    Section 303 expresses the sense of Congress that the DCI 
should continue to direct elements of the intelligence 
community to award contracts in a manner that would maximize 
the procurement of products produced in the United States, when 
such action is compatible with the national security interests 
of the United States, consistent with operational and security 
concerns, and fiscally sound.

                 Title IV: Central Intelligence Agency

Section 401--two-year extension of CIA central services program

    Section 401 extends the Central Intelligence Agency's 
authority to carry out the Central Services Program first 
authorized as part of the fiscal year 1998 authorization Act. 
P.L. 105-107. This provision extends the termination date of 
the Central Services Program to March 31, 2002.

         Title V: Department of Defense intelligence activities

Section 501--protection of operational files of the National Imagery 
        and Mapping Agency

    Section 501 provides for the protection of the operational 
files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to the 
same extent those files were protected under the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 431 prior to 
NIMA's creation. Furthermore, this provision grants an 
exemption under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from 
searching, reviewing, publishing, or disclosing its operational 
files. This new provision includes those NIMA files, including 
imagery and imagery intelligence, previously maintained by the 
National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency. This statutory language was 
inadvertently omitted when the statutes creating NIMA were 
enacted.

                           Committee Position

    On April 28, 1999, in open session, a quorum being present, 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded 
vote of 14 ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 1555, as 
amended by an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered 
by Chairman Goss. By that vote, the committee ordered the bill, 
as amended, reported favorably to the House. On that vote, the 
Members present recorded their votes as follows:
    Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. Lewis--aye; Mr. McCollum--
aye; Mr. Castle--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Bass--aye; Mr. 
Gibbons--aye; Mr. LaHood--aye; Ms. Wilson--aye; Mr. Dixon--aye; 
Ms. Pelosi--aye; Mr. Bishop--aye; Mr. Sisisky--aye; Mr. 
Roemer--aye.

   Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform

    With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the House of 
Representatives, the committee has not received a report from 
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight pertaining to 
the subject of this bill.

                           Oversight Findings

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee held nine full-
committee hearings, as well as six full-committee briefings, on 
the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 1555. Testimony 
was taken from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Acting 
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence, the Deputy Directors for Operations and 
Intelligence, numerous program managers, and various other 
knowledgeable witnesses on the activities and plans of the 
intelligence community covered by the provisions and 
authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The bill, 
as reported by the committee, reflects conclusions reached by 
the committee in light of this oversight activity.

                      Fiscal Year Cost Projections

    The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to 
ascertain the outlays that will occur in fiscal year 2000 and 
the five years following if the amounts authorized are 
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified 
annex and are in accordance with those of the executive branch.

                 Congressional Budget Office Estimates

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) and (3) of rule XIII of 
the Rules of the House of Representatives, and pursuant to 
sections 308 and 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
the committee submits the following estimate prepared by the 
Congressional Budget Office:

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                       Washington, DC, May 4, 1999.
Mr. Dan L. Crippen,
Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Crippen: In compliance with the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost estimate of 
H.R. 1555, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 
2000,'' pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974. I have attached a copy of the bill as 
approved by the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence on April 28, 1999.
    As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in 
the very near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited 
response to this request by the CBO's staff. Should you have 
any questions related to this request, please contact Patrick 
B. Murray, the Committee's Chief Counsel. Thank you in advance 
for your assistance with this request.
            Sincerely,
                                          Porter J. Goss, Chairman.
                                ------                                

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                       Washington, DC, May 5, 1999.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1555, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn Sauter.
            Sincerely,
                                          Barry B. Anderson
                                    (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
    Enclosure.

H.R. 1555--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000

    Summary: H.R. 1555 would authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2000 for intelligence activities of the United 
States government, the Community Management Account, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System 
(CIARDS). The bill would also authorize such sums as may be 
necessary to fund an emergency supplemental appropriation for 
fiscal year 1999.
    This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of 
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting 
H.R. 1555 would result in additional spending of $194 million 
over the 2000-2004 period, assuming appropriation of the 
authorized amounts. CBO has no basis for determining the cost 
of an emergency supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 
1999. The unclassified portion of the bill would not affect 
direct spending or receipts; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures 
would apply.
    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from 
application of that act legislative provisions that are 
necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that 
the unclassified provisions of this bill either fit within that 
exclusion of do not contain intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined by UMRA.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 1555 is 
shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary 
information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because 
parts are classified at a level above clearances held by CBO 
employees. For the purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that 
H.R. 1555 will be enacted by October 1, 1999, and that the 
authorized amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2000.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  By fiscal years, in millions of dollars--
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
                                                              1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Spending Under Current Law for Intelligence Community
 Management:
    Budget Authority......................................      102        0        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays.....................................      104       39        9        2        0        0
Proposed Changes:
    Authorization Level...................................        0      194        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays.....................................        0      120       58       12        4        0
Spendign Under H.R. 1555 for Intelligence Community
 Management:
    Authorization Level \1\...............................      102      194        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays.....................................      104      159       67       14        4       0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1999 level is the amount appropriated for that year.

    Outlays are estimated according to historical spending 
patterns. The costs of this legislation fall within budget 
function 050 (national defense).
    The bill would authorize appropriations of $194 million for 
the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds the 
coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management of 
the intelligence agencies. In addition, the bill would 
authorize $209 million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs 
attributable to military service and various unfunded 
liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and 
the authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed 
in the CBO baseline.
    Section 501 of the bill would allow the Director of the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), in coordination 
with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to 
exempt certain documents from provisions of the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). The bill would allow exemptions for 
files concerning the activities of NIMA that, prior to its 
creation in 1996, were performed by the National Photographic 
Interpretation Center (NPIC) within the CIA and that document 
the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
is collected through scientific and technical systems. H.R. 
1555 would also require a decennial review under rules and 
procedures similar to those governing operational files of the 
CIA.
    CBO believes that section could result in discretionary 
savings from reduced administrative and legal costs that NIMA 
might otherwise incur to respond to FOIA requests. These 
potential savings could be partially offset by any future legal 
costs arising from the limited judicial review that H.R. 1555 
would permit. (Judicial review would allow legal challenges of 
NIMA's decisions to exempt certain files.) H.R. 1555 would also 
require NIMA to review the exempt status of operational files 
every 10 years, but CBO believes that the resulting cost would 
be small, considering the classification reviews that occur 
under current law. CBO cannot estimate the budgetary impact of 
section 501 because we have no information about the number of 
files that this section would affect or the unit cost for NIMA 
to review them.
    Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from application of the act 
legislative provisions that are necessary for the national 
security. CBO has determined that the unclassified provisions 
of this bill either fit within the exclusion or do not contain 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined by 
UMRA.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Dawn Sauter. Impact on 
State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Teri Gullo. Impact on the 
Private Sector: Eric Labs.
    Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                        Committee Cost Estimates

    The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional 
Budget Office.

 Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of This 
                              Legislation

    The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
United States government are carried out to support the 
national security interests of the United States, to support 
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to 
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of 
the United States. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of 
the United States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress 
shall have power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the 
common defence and general welfare of the United States; * * * 
``; ``to raise and support Armies, * * * ``; ``to provide and 
maintain a Navy; * * * `` and ``to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution * * * all 
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.'' 
Therefore, pursuant to such authority, Congress is empowered to 
enact this legislation.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

       SECTION 21 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949

                        central services program

  Sec. 21. (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (h) Termination.--(1) The authority of the Director to carry 
out the program under this section shall terminate on March 31, 
[2000] 2002.
                              ----------                              

               CHAPTER 22 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

CHAPTER 22--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  SUBCHAPTER I--MISSIONS AND AUTHORITY

Sec.
441.  Establishment.
     * * * * * * *
446.  Protection of operational files.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 446. Protection of operational files

  (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, 
Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The Director of the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, with the coordination of 
the Director of Central Intelligence, may exempt operational 
files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency from the 
provisions of section 552 of title 5 (Freedom of Information 
Act), which require publication, disclosure, search, or review 
in connection therewith.
  (2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of this 
section, the term ``operational files'' means files of the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (hereinafter in this 
section referred to as `NIMA') concerning the activities of 
NIMA that before the establishment of NIMA were performed by 
the National Photographic Interpretation Center of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (NPIC), that document the means by which 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected 
through scientific and technical systems.
  (B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated 
intelligence are not operational files.
  (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files 
shall continue to be subject to search and review for 
information concerning--
          (A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully 
        admitted for permanent residence who have requested 
        information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of 
        section 552 of title 5, or section 552a of title 5 
        (Privacy Act of 1974);
          (B) any special activity the existence of which is 
        not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of 
        section 552 of title 5; or
          (C) the specific subject matter of an investigation 
        by any of the following for any impropriety, or 
        violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential 
        directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity:
                  (i) The Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
                  (ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of 
                the Senate.
                  (iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
                  (iv) The Department of Justice.
                  (v) The Office of General Counsel of NIMA.
                  (vi) The Office of the Director of NIMA.
  (4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which 
contain information derived or disseminated from exempted 
operational files shall be subject to search and review.
  (B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational 
files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall 
not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating 
operational files from search, review publication, or 
disclosure.
  (C) Records from exempted operational files which have been 
disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted 
under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to exempted 
operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search 
and review.
  (5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded 
except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date of 
enactment of this section, and which specifically cites and 
repeals or modifies its provisions.
  (6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any 
person who has requested agency records under section 552 of 
title 5, alleges that NIMA has withheld records improperly 
because of failure to comply with any provision of this 
section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set 
forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5.
  (B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner 
provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
          (i) In any case in which information specifically 
        authorized under criteria established by an Executive 
        Order to be kept secret in the interests of national 
        defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced 
        for, the court by NIMA, such information shall be 
        examined ex parte, in camera by the court.
          (ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent 
        practicable, determine the issues of fact based on 
        sworn written submissions of the parties.
          (iii) When a complainant alleges that requested 
        records are improperly withheld because of improper 
        placement solely in exempted operational files, the 
        complainant shall support suchallegation with a sworn 
written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise 
admissible evidence.
          (iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested 
        records were improperly withheld because of improper 
        exemption of operational files, NIMA shall meet its 
        burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, by 
        demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission 
        that exempted operational files likely to contain 
        responsible records currently perform the functions set 
        forth in paragraph (2).
          (II) The court may not order NIMA to review the 
        content of any exempted operational file or files in 
        order to make the demonstration required under 
        subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NIMA's 
        showing with a sworn written submission based on 
        personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
          (v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the 
        parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 
        through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
        except that requests for admissions may be made 
        pursuant to rules 26 and 36.
          (vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that 
        NIMA has improperly withheld requested records because 
        of failure to comply with any provision of this 
        subsection, the court shall order NIMA to search and 
        review the appropriate exempted operational file or 
        files for the requested records and make such records, 
        or portions thereof, available in accordance with the 
        provisions of section 552 of title 5, and such order 
        shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply 
        with this subsection.
          (vii) If at any time following the filing of a 
        complaint pursuant to this paragraph NIMA agrees to 
        search the appropriate exempted operational file or 
        files for the requested records, the court shall 
        dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.
          (viii) Any information filed with, or produced for 
        the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be 
        coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence 
        prior to submission to the court.
  (b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not 
less than once every ten years, the Director of the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Director of Central 
Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under 
subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be 
removed from the category of exempted files or any portion 
thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve any 
determination to remove such exemptions.
  (2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include 
consideration of the historical value or other public interest 
in the subject matter of the particular category of files or 
portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a 
significant part of the information contained therein.
  (3) A complainant that alleges that NIMA has improperly 
withheld records because of failure to comply with this 
subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of 
the United States of the district in which any of the parties 
reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, 
the court's review shall be limited to determining the 
following:
          (A) Whether NIMA has conducted the review required by 
        paragraph (1) before the expiration of the ten-year 
        period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 
        section or before the expiration of the ten-year period 
        beginning on the date of the most recent review.
          (B) Whether NIMA, in fact, considered the criteria 
        set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required 
        review.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

              ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN PORTER J. GOSS

    Recently, and perhaps for the first time in the committee's 
history, an Intelligence Community element of the United States 
Government asserted a claim of attorney-client privilege as a 
basis for withholding documents from the committee's review. 
Similarly, various agencies within the Intelligence Community 
have asserted, with disturbing frequency, a ``deliberative 
process'' or ``pre-decisional'' argument as a basis for 
attempting to keep requested documents from the committee's 
scrutiny. These claims are unpersuasive and dubious.
    As part of its regular oversight responsibilities and 
preparatory to the committee's legislative action on this bill, 
the committee was questioning the National Security Agency's 
(NSA) application of current operational guidelines in light of 
the enormous technological advances that have been made in the 
past several years. The committee was seeking to ensure that 
the NSA was carrying out its signals intelligence mission in 
consonance with the law, relevant executive orders, guidelines, 
and policy directives. At bottom, the committee sought to 
assure itself that the NSA General Counsel's Office was 
interpreting NSA's legal authorities correctly and that NSA was 
not being arbitrary and capricious in its execution of its 
mission.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ In the 1970s it was learned that the NSA, as well as other 
elements of the United States intelligence community, engaged in 
serious abuses of the privacy interests of U.S. persons. The 
congressional hearings on these and other matters led directly to the 
establishment of the Senate Select committee on Intelligence; see S. 
Res. 400, 94th Congress; and the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence (HPSCI); see H. Res. 658, 95th Congress. Additionally, as 
a result of those inquiries, executive orders were issued and 
guidelines and policy statements were promulgated defining the mission 
of the NSA and its legal obligations and responsibilities pursuant to 
the Constitution and other laws of the United States. See Legislative 
Oversight of Intelligence Activities: The U.S. Experience, Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-6 (Comm. 
Print)(October 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If the NSA General Counsel provided too narrow an 
interpretation of the agency's authorities, it could hamper the 
collection of significant national security and intelligence 
information. If, on the other hand, in its effort to provide 
timely intelligence to the nation's policy makers, the NSA 
General Counsel construed the Agency's authorities too 
permissively, then the privacy interests of the citizens of the 
United States could be at risk. To that end, the committee 
asked the NSA General Counsel to provide the committee with 
legal memoranda, opinions rendered, and other documents in the 
General Counsel's Office that established that the advice it 
was providing to the NSA's technicians, operators, and 
management was effective in helping the NSA achieve its mission 
goals and objectives.
    The committee's oral request for some of these documents 
was met by the NSA General Counsel's claim of a ``government 
attorney-client privilege.'' The claim was made on behalf of 
the Director of the NSA, and the NSA, corporately. Shortly 
thereafter, the committee was again advised by a representative 
of the NSA--at a budget hearing concerning the NSA's fiscal 
year 2000 budget request--that the agency was working on the 
document request, but that some documents would not be made 
available because of the operation of the attorney-client 
privilege.
    During additional conversations with employees of the NSA 
General Counsel's Office, the Committee reminded the NSA 
lawyers of the agency's statutory obligations under section 502 
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. That statute 
provides, in pertinent part, that the heads of all Intelligence 
Community elements are obligated to furnish ``any information 
or material concerning intelligence activities * * * which is 
requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to 
carry out its authorization responsibilities.'' 50 USC 
Sec. 413a(2). These admonitions to the NSA about its 
responsibilities under the law were met by the argument that 
``common law privileges,'' i.e., the attorney-client privilege, 
survive even mandatory and unambiguous statutory language in 
the absence of express language to the contrary.
    The NSA General Counsel's Office contended, therefore, that 
its legal opinions, decisional memoranda, and policy guidance, 
all of which govern the operations and mechanisms of that 
federal agency, are free from scrutiny by Congress. This would 
result in the envelopment of the executive in a cloak of 
secrecy that would insulate the executive branch from effective 
oversight. It would also undermine the intent of the 94th and 
95th Congresses to establish stringent congressional oversight 
of the Intelligence Community. This outcome would seriously 
hobble the legislative oversight process contemplated by the 
Constitution.
    Congress has broad constitutional investigative powers. The 
Constitution provides that ``Each House may determine the Rules 
of its Proceedings.'' U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 5, cl.2. Each 
chamber delegates the authority to rule on objections to the 
production of documents, such as claims of attorney-client 
privilege, to its various committees. The rules of judicial 
procedure are not applicable to congressional inquiries. United 
States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 679-80 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There is 
no law that forbids a congressional committee from exercising 
its discretion to reject claims of attorney-client privilege. 
Long standing precedents grant legislative bodies prerogatives 
and a level of discretion on such matters not commonly found in 
adjudicatory bodies.
    At common law, for instance, English courts were bound by 
an assertion of attorney-client privilege; Parliament was not. 
See Proceedings Against Ralph Bernstein and Joseph Bernstein 
(``Contempt Report''), H.R. Rep. No. 462, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
at 12-13 (1986)(contempt proceedings against Ferdinand Marcos' 
lawyers for refusal to disclose to House subcommittee any legal 
communications had with their client). American commentators 
have long accepted the English common law custom as the 
practice established and followed in the Congress and other 
legislative bodies of the United States. See L. Cushing, 
Elements of the Law and Practice of the United States of 
America, 390 (1856 ed., reprinted 1971)(''A witness cannot 
excuse himself from answering * * * because the matter was a 
privileged communication to him, as where an attorney is called 
upon to disclose the secrets of his client * * *'').
    In fact, Congress has, from time to time, set aside 
assertions by private lawyers and private witnesses that their 
legal communications should be shielded from disclosure in a 
Congressional hearing based on the attorney-client privilege. 
See Contempt Report at 13; Attorney-Client Privilege: Memoranda 
Opinions of American Law Division, Library of Congress: 
Hearings before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the 
House Comm. onEnergy and Commerce (``Attorney-Client Privilege 
Memorandum Opinions''), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Committee Print)(1983); 
Health Care Fraud/Medicare Secondary Payer Program: Hearing Before the 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. On 
Governmental Affairs (``Health Care Fraud Hearings''), 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess., at 1-11 (1990), aff'd sub nom., In the Matter of Provident Life 
and Accident Insurance Co., CIV-1-90-219 (E.D. Tenn. June 13, 1990); 
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Right of Congressional Access to 
Documents for Oversight Purposes in the Case of the Supervision of the 
Telephone Loan Program by the U.S. Department of Agriculture: Subcomm. 
on Conservation, Credit, and Rural Development of the House Committee 
on Agriculture (``Congressional Access Report''), 102d Cong., 1st 
Sess., (Committee Print)(1991).
    Furthermore, there is no clear principle in our 
jurisprudence that a ``government attorney-client privilege'' 
has as broad a scope as its non-governmental counterpart. In 
fact, the opinion rendered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
8th Circuit established the converse principle. See In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of the 
Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997). See also In re 
Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). Moreover, memoranda and other documents that form 
the basis of working law within an agency must be made 
available to Congress when requested. See Afshar v. Department 
of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1139, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Schlefer 
v. United States, 702 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Briston v. 
Department of State, 636 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Commission; 598 F.2d 18, 24 
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Jordan v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 
753, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).
    The documents for which the claim was asserted are 
presumably key interpretive memoranda and opinions utilized by 
agency officers to carry out their governmental duties in 
conformity with the law. The committee's constitutional and 
statutory authority to conduct oversight of the Intelligence 
Community provides a compelling rationale for the rejection of 
any claim that the government attorney-client privilege 
protects any documents within the possession of an intelligence 
community entity from disclosure to this committee. See U.S. 
Const., art I, Sec. 5, cl. 2; 50 U.S.C. Sec. 413a(2). The fact 
that the privilege was asserted by government lawyers, on 
behalf of other government officials, vitiates the availability 
of the asserted privilege.
    The efforts of NSA, described above, and any other similar 
effort by Intelligence Community elements, to shield its own 
interpretations of their agency's legal obligations and 
decisional memoranda from congressional review must be 
rejected. Former Attorney General Cushing once aptly described 
the realities of our system of governance. He stated:

          [T]he relation of the departments to Congress is one 
        of the great elements of responsibility and legality in 
        their own action. They are created by law; most of 
        their duties are prescribed by law; Congress may at all 
        times call on them for information or explanations in 
        matters of official duty; and it may, if it sees fit, 
        interpose by legislation concerning them, when required 
        by the interests of the Government.--``Office and 
        Duties of Attorney General,'' 6 Opinion of the Attorney 
        General 326, 334 (1854)(emphasis added).

    This is a concise statement of our governmental scheme. The 
executive interprets and carries out the laws enacted by 
Congress. Therefore, to the extent that an agency's documents 
serve as interpretive guidance, or as research tools for agency 
personnel, such documents constitute a body of working law 
within that agency. See Taxation With Representation v. 
Internal Revenue Service, 646 F.2d 666, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
As such, they cannot be withheld from the committee. See 
Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1139, 1141; Schlefer, 702 F.2d 277; 
Briston, 636 F.2d at 605; Bristol-Myers Co., 598 F.2d at 24; 
Jordan, 591 F.2d at 774. The committee ought, then, have access 
to these legal interpretations to ensure proper execution of 
the laws by the agencies within their legislative jurisdiction.
    Additionally, hornbook law makes it plain that attorney-
client privilege cannot work to preclude examination of legal 
opinions or files within a corporate entity by its overseers. 
In the context of private corporations, the board of directors 
is entitled to review all legal notes, files, opinions, and 
memoranda produced as a result of legal discussions between the 
chief executive officers and the corporation's lawyers. In our 
system of government, by analogy, the legislative branch can be 
viewed as a board of directors with oversight authority of the 
executive, which is responsible for its actions to the board. 
Despite the separation of executive and legislative powers 
under the Constitution, the two political branches are without 
doubt integral parts of the same corporate entity: the federal 
government of the United States of America. See The Attorney 
General's Refusal To Provide Congressional Access to 
``Privileged'' Inslaw Documents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary 
(``Inslaw Hearings''), 101st Cong. 2d Sess., at 103-04 
(1990)(citing written testimony of General Counsel to the Clerk 
of the House).
    The lawyers within the Office of the NSA General Counsel, 
indeed, the General Counsel himself, are paid their wages and 
expenses from the public fisc. These funds are collected from 
the people of the United States and authorized and appropriated 
by the Congress for the conduct of government business in the 
public interest. It is elementary, therefore, that legal advice 
and counsel provided by federal government attorneys to federal 
government officers are subject to oversight and scrutiny by 
the Congress. See Contempt Report, supra; Attorney-Client 
Privilege: Memorandum Opinion, supra; Health Care Fraud 
Hearings, supra; Inslaw Hearings, supra; Congressional Access 
Report, supra. 
    Underlying this legal foundation is sound public policy, 
especially in the context of Intelligence Community oversight. 
Congress clearly has manifested its intent to provide for open 
government. When concerning itself with matters of national 
security and the protection of sources and methods, however, 
Congress has acknowledged a need for secrecy and the protection 
of sensitive information from public disclosure in order to 
keep the information from our nation's enemies. Accordingly, 
the intelligence committees have been given a statutory 
obligation and a fiduciary duty to conduct oversight of the 
United States Government elements that must necessarily and 
understandably carry out their official duties in secret. This 
acknowledgment compels the committee to exercise its discretion 
and reject completely the notion that agovernment attorney-
client privilege can allow an Intelligence Community element to 
withhold information requested by the committee.
    Similarly, any effort by Intelligence Community elements to 
advance a so-called ``pre-decisional'' or ``deliberative 
process'' privilege as a basis for withholding requested 
information from congressional oversight ought to be rejected. 
Any assertion that a document will not be provided to the 
committee because it may be an ``internal'' agency document, or 
otherwise ``uncoordinated'' is unacceptable. When an agency 
offers these explanations for its refusal to produce documents 
requested by Congress, it is improperly putting Congress in the 
category of a ``citizen requester'' under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) and trying to extend Exemption 5 of that 
Act to Congress. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552.
    Exemption 5 of FOIA permits withholding of information from 
requesters on the basis that the documents do not indicate a 
final disposition. Exemption 5 allows withholding from 
requesters if documents are preliminarily and deliberative in 
nature. It also permits withholding from requests under the Act 
if such documents would disclose privileged communications, 
such as between an attorney and his client. In the FOIA, 
itself, however, Congress specifically provided that Exemption 
5 ``is not authority to withhold information from Congress.'' 5 
U.S.C. Sec. 552(d). The case of Murphy v. Department of the 
Army, 612 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), is illustrative of this 
point.
    In Murphy, the court permitted the government department to 
withhold a memorandum produced by the department's General 
Counsel's Office from a citizen FOIA requester as pre-
decisional and also likely covered by the attorney-client 
privilege. Despite the fact that the memorandum at issue in the 
Murphy case was exempt under the FOIA, the document was made 
available to Congressman Carl D. Perkins. The plaintiff cited 
the disclosure of the document to the Congressman as proof that 
the exemption should not apply in his case. The court rejected 
this argument, however, noting that the FOIA exemptions 
provided no basis for withholding information from Congress 
because of:

          * * * the obvious purpose of the Congress to carve 
        out for itself a special right of access to privileged 
        information not shared by others * * *. Congress, 
        whether as a body, through committees, or otherwise, 
        must have the widest possible access to executive 
        branch information, if it is to perform its manifold 
        responsibilities effectively. If one consequence of the 
        facilitation of such access is that some information 
        will be disclosed to congressional authorities but not 
        to private persons, that is but an incidental 
        consequence of the need for informed and effective 
        lawmakers.--Id. at 1155-56, 1158.

    Congressional authority to investigate is concomitant with 
its authority to legislate. It is necessary, then, to have 
unfettered access to executive branch information in order to 
be able to make sound legislative judgments. It is exactly the 
``uncoordinated,'' ``deliberative,'' ``internal,'' and ``pre-
decisional'' documents of an agency that Congress needs in most 
cases. These documents can provide unique insights into the 
full spectrum of thought on any given issue pending before an 
agency and Congress. Without access to such documents, Congress 
would be left only with the ``spin'' the executive branch 
agency opted to provide to the legislative branch. This result, 
without question, would only serve to undermine the legitimate 
authority of Congress to conduct independent oversight. 
Therefore, I would expect the committee to reject all efforts 
to extend the FOIA Exemption 5 to congressional requests for 
information.

                                                    Porter J. Goss.

                                
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