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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

SHERRI ADELKOFF,

 Appellee

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STEVEN ADELKOFF,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 711 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree April 25, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Family Court at No(s): FD 13-008242-016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED: April 21, 2017

I respectfully dissent. 

As this Court has explained,

[a] trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an 

award of equitable distribution. Our standard of review when 

assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable 

distribution of marital property is “whether the trial court abused 

its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow 

proper legal procedure.” We do not lightly find an abuse of 

discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing 

evidence. This Court will not find an “abuse of discretion” unless 

the law has been “overridden or misapplied or the judgment 

exercised” was “manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in 

the certified record.” In determining the propriety of an equitable 

distribution award, courts must consider the distribution scheme 

as a whole. “[W]e measure the circumstances of the case 

against the objective of effectuating economic justice between 

the parties and achieving a just determination of their property 

rights
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Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

Here, the trial court found credible the testimony of Wife’s expert, Mr. 

Brabender, who concluded that Husband’s interest in IEP could not be valued 

at the time of the equitable distribution hearing. Trial Court Opinion, 

7/7/2016, at 11. Based on this testimony, the court determined that IEP 

was a going concern and crafted an order requiring Husband to hold the IEP 

interest in a constructive trust for the benefit of both parties. It was well 

within the court’s discretion to defer distribution of Husband’s IEP interest 

until such interest can be valued. Based on our standard of review, I believe 

we must affirm. 

Additionally, I note that, while deferred disposition schemes are not 

favored generally, in situations such as the one presented here, such 

arrangements serve economic justice in the long run. I am unconvinced that 

the Majority’s remand for a hearing at this juncture will result in a final 

distribution order because there is no guarantee that the IEP interest can be 

valued at this time. If Mr. Brabender testifies that the interest cannot be 

valued, and the learned trial judge agrees and Husband again appeals, do 

we have a second do-over? Experts are costly and attorneys are equally 

expensive. The parties have had their bite at the apple. Remands could go 

ad infinitum. 
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Accordingly, because I find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in crafting its equitable distribution order, I would affirm.