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NEWS FROM THE FRONT

January 2019

Critical Enablers to Conducting Effective Advise, 

Assist, Accompany and Enable (A3E) Missions

Insights from 1-98th CAV training of the Iraqi 9

th Armored Division

MAJ Elliot Miles

Military Analyst (forward)

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Approved for Public Release

Distribution Unlimited
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News from the Front:

1-98th Cavalry Trains Iraq’s Only Armored Division

18th Airborne Corps

Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve

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Forward

The enemy of my enemy is my friend is an ancient proverb which suggests that two 

parties can or should work together against a common enemy. The challenge becomes 

understanding the most effective method of integrating and affecting change with 

someone that was once an enemy. 

The 1

st Squadron, 98th Cavalry Regiment, 155th Armored Brigade Combat Team, 

Mississippi National Guard embedded with Iraq’s vaunted 9th Armored Division from 

2018 to 2019. This division has a history from the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and more 

recently from the Battle of Mosul. One can surmise the generals in Iraq’s army today 

were mid-grade when the U.S. invaded in 2003 and junior officers during Operation 

Desert Storm.

This News from the Front (NFTF) is an overview of some of the lessons learned from a 

U.S. Army Advise, Assist, Accompany and Enable (A3E) mission. 

The lessons from the 1-98th CAV are: 

 Take your time to grow a relationship

 Apply cultural awareness training

 Personality is critical for A3E

 Build trust

 Balance risk to force with risk to mission while building trust

 Get to know your interpreters

 Realize that frustrations the Iraqis have may be more directed at the process and 

not the A3E team

 A3E missions inherently have interoperability difficulties

 Be prepared to manage expectations, to include your own

Front Cover: 1

st Squadron, 98th Cavalry Regiment commander, LTC Glenn Adams,

talks with Iraqi generals about an upcoming Iraqi Army and Air Force training 

exercise at Camp Taji, Iraq, Dec. 20, 2018. (US Army National Guard photo 

illustration by Spc. Jovi Prevot)
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In June 2018, elements of the 1-98 CAV, 155 ABCT deployed to Camp Taji, Iraq to 

conduct an Advise, Assist, Accompany, and Enable (A3E) mission with the 9th Armored 

Division. Supporting Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was not a mission the unit 

initially expected. In fact, the squadron spent months of training, to include a rotation 

through the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California to fill a theater security 

cooperation requirement in Kuwait.

U.S. Army units have been filling this security cooperation mission in Kuwait since

Operation Desert Storm ended in 1991. Until 2018, the armored brigade has always 

been an active duty unit, but now a National Guard unit from Amory, Mississippi is 

building partner capacity (BPC) for Iraq by embedding with the 9th Armored Division to 

help them build and sustain combat-readiness.

Squadron Commander LTC Glenn Adams directly liaises with the 9

th Armored Division

Commanding General Major General Walid. The soldiers from “Gunslinger” squadron, 

the A3E team works side-by-side with their Iraqi counterparts. 

Gunslinger’s A3E mission for 

OIR takes on a new level of 

criticality. The U.S. Army spent 

years training the Iraqi Army and 

when it left in 2011, the United 

States, Iraq, and the 

international community had 

every reason to believe Iraq’s 

army could defend itself. That 

was until 2014 when ISIS 

crossed the border and seized 

Fallujah and Ramadi. Then a 

bad situation turned for the 

worse and the world watched in 

complete shock when ISIS 

fighters stormed into Mosul and seized control.

Training is something the U.S. Army does all the time and certainly there are 

challenges. However, training a foreign army is incredibly challenging. Performing this 

mission in Iraq adds an element of possible grave danger as the mission requires

advisors to “accompany” if the division headquarters has to execute expeditionary 

mission command. Other challenges include: cultural awareness, interpreters, trust, 

governance, and interoperability.

Shortly after the war in Afghanistan and Iraq began, the U.S. Army realized the need for 

its Soldiers to learn the culture about the country in which they would deploy. United 

States Army Forces Command directed cultural awareness training during preA distinguished visitor party comprised of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers and airmen 

participates in a tour of aviation assets and capabilities brief at Camp Taji, 

Iraq, Dec. 20, 2018. (US Army National Guard photo by Spc. Jovi Prevot)
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deployment work-ups so soldiers could establish rapport faster and prevent damaging 

the relationship from words or actions that may be offensive in the Middle Eastern 

culture. Everyone, regardless of mission, had to complete about an hour or two of 

instruction on Islam, language, and the ethnic or social norms of their target country. 

For the Gunslingers, their new mission requires trust to be more effective with the Iraqis. 

All the things soldiers were taught in cultural awareness classes for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) had to be relearned and become habits fast! The squadron did not 

expect to perform this mission, but when it became a reality, the team acknowledged 

the task and put their best foot forward.

Part of the trust factor is having the right rank to liaise with a two-star general officer and 

his Sergeant Major. Previous A3E or BPC campaigns throughout U.S. Army history 

have always made a deliberate pairing between a U.S. Army officer of the appropriate 

rank and the advisee of the host military. In the case of 9th Armored Division, a MAJ

could have done the job, but it is optimal to have a LTC. 

Additionally, the officer-in-charge of an A3E mission typically leads a team that is 

comprised of all the warfighting functions. Therefore, it makes sense to have a LTC in 

charge of a team with a battalion-like structure. The Iraqis are based on a culture that 

emphasizes social hierarchy and may find it insulting to have a MAJ as the direct 

counter-part to a division commander. This could subsequently impact the U.S. Army’s 

credibility with the supported unit.

Things that are unfamiliar to American culture have to be overcome. Last summer, LTC

Adams and SGM Moyer spent a significant amount of time getting to know the division 

commander and his staff. This required conversation and drinking chai, but even 

conversation has its social rules in Iraq. Talking about one’s family is a topic that must 

be avoided initially. Conversely, if the Iraqis start bringing it up, then it is a good sign 

that the relationship has evolved to a more comfortable level. 

One of those conversational topics that would seem inevitable is the U.S. and Iraq 

fighting each other in the past. Often there are casual conversations on Desert Storm, 

but the 9th Armored Division’s role during the 2003 United States’ invasion never come 

up, said LTC Adams. Despite the outcome and the potential sore spot with the Iraqis, 

these discussions, as well as the division’s role in the 9-month long battle for Mosul, can 

serve as learning vignettes on combined arms warfare.

The squadron conducts classes and works daily with the Iraqis. Emotions are a natural 

part of the work environment, but in Iraqi culture, losing one’s cool causes one to lose 

face. While anger is a natural human reaction, losing control and displaying outrage 

affects credibility. Credibility and trust impact the mission with the Iraqis.
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Fortunately, there is help when it comes to cultural awareness, but this help also comes 

with a cost. Gunslinger had two contract interpreters, of Iraqi-ethnicity, but American

citizens. Despite this, there are still challenges when it comes to Category IIi

Interpreters. The military culture has its own style of language and interpreters who, 

regardless of category and 

fluency, may not always know the 

nuances of military lexicon despite 

being American or Iraqi and 

employed by the Army. The 

squadron did not hire their 

interpreters, but had to use them 

and integrate with them just as 

much as they integrate with the 9th

Armored Division. 

Another tier of challenge exists. There are linguists and there are translators, according 

to SGM Moyer. “An interpreter translates word for word, and there is a lot of variation 

between English and Arabic while linguists have to learn us, so they can easily translate 

our feelings,” he added. Linguists must use the appropriate words in the target language 

to accurately convey urgent or critical things. When using interpreters for an A3E 

mission, one must have a solid relationship with them as much as with the supported 

staff. 

Unfortunately, the U.S. Army is all too familiar with green-on-blue attacks or the insider 

threat that wreaked havoc on A3E and key leader engagements in Afghanistan. As 

squadron commander, LTC Adams, must balance the risk to mission and risk to force 

with trust as the fulcrum. During the violent days of OIF, American soldiers did not 

always wear their body armor or helmet during meetings with Iraqis, but these were 

meetings in which American soldiers controlled the environment and the Iraqis were 

usually unarmed civilians. Now, Adams and his team go to the Iraqi side of Camp Taji 

where they control the environment. 

“It is key to not let knowledge get lost in translation. 

Linguists are everything, and they will make you or 

break you.”

-- SGM John Moyer --

The Defense Language Institute continues to provide foreign language study 

materials such as:

 Rapport – 6-8 hours of culture and language

 Headstart2 – 80-100 hours of culture and language

 Language Survival Kits – Text, Audio, and Up to 3,000 mission-related phrases

https://dliflc.edu/#homepage-tab|1
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Meetings and their security take on 

the same level of planning as 

missions did when the U.S. was 

routinely patrolling the streets of 

Baghdad. Basic troop leading 

procedures remain the same and 

are in effect. The team always has 

situational awareness and 360-

degree security when they are with 

the Iraqis. While the risk to force 

cannot be eliminated, the optics of 

the A3E team in body armor risks 

insulting the Iraqis. Subsequently, 

this impacts trust.

The Iraqis have to know that they 

can trust the U.S. Army and that 

LTC Adams, and his team are 

genuinely trying to help build 

partner capacity among the 9

th

Armored Division and its brigades. 

The Gunslinger team identified a need for Combat Life-Saver training in the division. 

Furthermore, leveraging the unique talents that a National Guard unit brings with civilian 

and military expertise enabled the 1-98th to use one of their organic soldiers who just 

happens to be an X-Ray technician in his civilian job. Normally, one does not see an XRay technician in a combat-arms unit. Fortunately, LTC Adams was able to apply a 

creative and field-expedient solution to train the Iraqis on a piece of equipment they 

had, but did not know how to use.

Similarly, SGM Moyer recounted a 

time when by pure coincidence 

they found a Forward Repair 

System (FRS) in a connex that 

was still in the box. Since the

Iraqis like the M1 Abrams Tank 

and the U.S. divested the FRS to 

them to actually be used, the team 

broke it out and trained 9th

Armored on the system. It was too 

easy to let things like the FRS and 

X-Ray machine go untouched, but 

by staying true to the mission and 

underscoring trust, the 

relationship can continue to grow. 

“This opened the door to endless 

possibilities. It’s a matter of trust 

A U.S. Army soldier teaches an Iraqi marksmanship course at Camp Taji, 

Iraq, Dec. 19, 2018. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Spc. Jovi Prevot)

A U.S. Army soldier teaches preventative maintenance to the 9th Armored 

Division at Camp Taji, Iraq, Oct. 10, 2018. (US Army photo by Spc. Madelyn 

Sanchez)
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and freedom of maneuver with the 9th Armored Division,” said SGM Moyer. And this 

relationship will also benefit the next A3E team that comes here to continue the 

progress and 1-98 Cavalry Squadron’s hard work.

Just like the American Army has its way of doing things, so too does the Iraqi military. 

Unfortunately, the Iraqi Security Forces and Ministry of Defense tend to have a different 

dynamic on management or governance than U.S. Army soldiers might expect from 

their senior leadership. This tends to put another challenge on LTC Adams and the A3E 

mission.

The 9th Armored Division moved to Camp Taji after the battle for Mosul ended in 2017,

said LTC Adams. “They were told to figure out their own billeting and work spaces. 

[Now] we are trying to modernize [and] are waiting on twenty laptops,” he said. The Iraqi 

army has a supply system, but the 

leadership, implementation, and 

efficacy of it varies among the 

brigades. In some cases, parts are in 

the warehouse, but they are not getting 

to the units. While helping the Iraqis 

facilitates building trust and acquiring

spare parts is one aspect to reinforce 

relationships however, SGM Moyer 

stresses “Do not promise anything!”

No one, especially those on an A3E mission, will tell a host nation that the American

way is the best way. However, there are some common characteristics among the most 

capable of those in the profession of arms. The difficulties LTC Adams and SGM Moyer 

have when the Iraqis ask for more than can be provided could be attributed to a nation’s 

defense institution that is lacking in ability, capacity, or willingness. A host nation does 

not necessarily have to mimic what the U.S. does, but to underscore the institutional 

weakness, a coalition adviser with another Iraqi division said the Iraqis want parts more 

than the training itself.

This dynamic impacts training and planning for the 9th Armored Division, which hinders 

the A3E effort. The division does not always have enough tank ammunition to shoot for 

training. There are training and service rounds, so if the Ministry of Defense cannot 

provide a sustained supply of training rounds, then less training occurs because the 9th

Armored Division wants to save the service rounds for combat. They also do not have 

money to operate all the base life-support functions. The other impact is that the 

concept of a long-range plan does not exist. “We asked them if they had an established 

deployment cycle, so we could help them on short, near, and far planning” LTC Adams 

said. “Their long term horizon is maybe two months.”

“It became a situation of ‘insert Americans here’ 

[and] a means to provide consumable supplies, 

garrison life support, parts that they should get 

through their own supply system and their own 

budget.” 

-- LTC Glenn Adams --
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With an already uphill logistical 

atmosphere in the Ministry of Defense, 

there exists an immature supply chain that 

is supposed to provide Russian model T90 Tanks, BMP-3 Infantry Fighting 

Vehicles, operator training, maintenance 

training, and spare parts for both

platforms. According to a Polish liaison 

officer to the 9th Armored for Russian or 

Eastern-Bloc equipment, the 9th Armored

has been waiting on parts since July 2017. 

However, the 9th Armored also sent some 

of their soldiers to Poland to learn how to 

conduct maintenance on the Russian 

equipment. So now, the 9th Armored is in a 

position of needing two separate supply 

chains and technicians that are trained and 

proficient on two different platforms. 

As the commander with only a small percentage of his squadron with him in Iraq, LTC

Adams must manage his time extraordinarily well to lead the A3E team and his soldiers 

in Kuwait and Syria. The squadron executive officer and CSM remained in Kuwait, but 

LTC Adams retains all the authorities of the commander. LTC Adams, SGM Moyer, and 

the operations SGM, dedicate about half their day to squadron requirements and the 

other half to the 9th Armored Division. They work seven days a week to lead a squadron 

of 600 that is spread out among three different countries. 

The Gunslinger team mobilized 

from Mississippi in early 2018 and 

trained for a mission they did not 

expect. They conducted fullspectrum operations training at the 

National Training Center, exercised

the Army Prepositioned Stock 

issuance process in Kuwait, and 

then began a difficult mission in 

Iraq. Even though the 9th Armored 

Division had a great relationship 

with their previous A3E team, LTC

Adams and SGM Moyer continue to 

develop that relationship and build 

trust with the Iraqis. Success means 

staying engaged daily, putting 100 

percent effort into the job, managing expectation of the Iraqis, and planting the seeds for 

the day the Iraqis take over their own training.

i CAT II vs. CAT III

 

A3E missions have always been a doubleedged sword. LTG Joseph Stilwell and the 

War Department believed U.S. support to 

the Nationalist Chinese during World War 

II should only be insofar as they can help 

themselves. Prior to 1950, the U.S. policy 

for the Republic of South Korean (ROK) 

army was to train and equip them within the 

country’s economic capacity.

The Nationalists succumbed to the 

Communists in 1949, and the ROK army 

could not stop the North Korean invasion in 

June 1950.

U.S. Army Soldiers from 1-98th Cavalry pose for a photo with soldiers 

from the 34th Brigade, 9th Armored Division after an equipment 

maintenance course graduation ceremony at Camp Taji, Iraq, Nov. 03, 

2018. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Madelyn Sanchez)
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CAT II linguists must have native proficiency in the target language International Listening Ready Test (ILRT level 4 

to 5) and an advanced working proficiency in English (ILRT level 2+). Target languages consist of Pashtu, Dari, Urdu, 

Russian and Uzbek.

CAT II linguists shall be U.S. citizens who have been screened by U.S. Army Counterintelligence personnel assigned 

by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. CAT II linguists will be granted access to SECRET by the U.S. 

Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility or other designated U.S. Government Personnel Security 

authority for the specific purpose of providing support to the operations. The MI Battalion will screen linguists 

once they arrive in theater.

CATIII

Native proficiency in the target language is preferred, but not required. CAT III linguists should meet at a minimum 

the criteria of ILRT level 3. CAT III linguists must be able to understand the essentials of all speech in a standard 

dialect and have broad enough vocabulary that he/she rarely has to ask for paraphrasing or explanation. CAT III 

linguists must be able to follow accurately the essentials of conversations between educated native speakers, 

reasonably make and answer telephone calls, understand radio broadcasts, news stories similar to wire service 

reports, oral reports, some oral technical reports and public addresses on non-technical subjects. CAT III linguists 

shall be fluent in English. 

CAT III linguists shall be U.S. citizens who either possess a TOP SECRET Security Clearance with access to Sensitive 

Compartmented Information (TS/SCI), or who, after prescribed counterintelligence screening, have been granted, 

at a minimum, an interim TS/SCI clearance by the U.S. Government.