JOURNAL OF THE

800

T69.24 MAY 18

Green

Gutierrez

Hall (OH)

Hall (TX)

Hamilton

Harman

Hastings (FL)

Hefner

Hilliard

Hinchey

Holden

Hoyer

Jackson-Lee

Jefferson

Johnson (SD)

Johnson, E. B.

Johnston

Kanjorski

Kaptur

Kennedy (MA)

Kennedy (RI)

Kennelly

Kildee

Klink

LaFalce

Lantos

LaTourette

Levin

Lewis (GA)

Lincoln

Lipinski

Lofgren

Lowey

Luther

Maloney

Manton

Markey

Martinez

Mascara

Matsui

McCarthy

McDermott

McHale

McKinney

Meehan

Meek

Menendez

Mfume

Miller (CA)

Mineta

Minge

Mink

Moakley

Mollohan

Moran

Murtha

Nadler

Neal

Oberstar

Obey

Olver

Ortiz

Orton

Owens

Pallone

Pastor

Payne (VA)

Pelosi

Peterson (MN)

Pickett

Pomeroy

Poshard

Rahall

Rangel

Reed

Reynolds

Richardson

Rivers

Roemer

Rose

Roybal-Allard

Rush

Sabo

Sanders

Sawyer

Scarborough

Schroeder

Schumer

Scott

Serrano

Sisisky

Skaggs

Skelton

Slaughter

Souder

Spratt

Stark

Stokes

Studds

Stupak

Tanner

Tejeda

Thompson

Thornton

Thurman

Torres

Torricelli

Towns

Traficant

Velazquez

Vento

Volkmer

Ward

Waters

Watt (NC)

Waxman

Williams

Wilson

Wise

Woolsey

Wyden

Wynn

Yates

NOT VOTING—11

Berman

Jacobs

King

Kleczka

McNulty

Payne (NJ)

Peterson (FL)

Quillen

Stenholm

Tucker

Weldon (FL)

So the conference report was agreed

to.

A motion to reconsider the vote

whereby said conference report was

agreed to was, by unanimous consent,

laid on the table.

Ordered, That the Clerk notify the

Senate thereof.

T69.24 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—

NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT

TO NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr.

WALKER, laid before the House a message from the President, which was

read as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

On November 14, 1994, in light of the

dangers of the proliferation of nuclear,

biological, and chemical weapons and

their means of delivery (‘‘weapons of

mass destruction’’), I issued Executive

Order No. 12938 and declared a national

emergency under the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50

U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

As I described in the report transmitting Executive Order No. 12938, the new

Executive order consolidated the functions of and revoked Executive Order

No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, which

declared a national emergency with respect to the proliferation of chemical

and biological weapons, and Executive

Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994,

which declared a national emergency

with respect to nuclear, biological, and

chemical weapons, and their means of

delivery. The new Executive order also

expanded certain existing authorities

in order to strengthen the U.S. ability

to respond to proliferation problems.

The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act and

section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act regarding activities taken

and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the

annual report on the proliferation of

missiles and essential components of

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant

to section 1097 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992

and 1993 (Public Law 102–190), also

known as the ‘‘Nonproliferation Report,’’ and the annual report provided

to the Congress pursuant to section 308

of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination

Act of 1991 (Public Law 102–182).

The three export control regulations

issued under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) are fully

in force and continue to be used to control the export of items with potential

use in chemical or biological weapons

or unmanned delivery systems for

weapons of mass destruction.

In the 6 months since I issued Executive Order No. 12938, the number of

countries that have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has

reached 27 (out of 159 signatory countries). I am urging the Senate to give

its advice and consent to ratification

as soon as possible. The CWC is a critical element of U.S. nonproliferation

policy that will significantly enhance

our security and that of our friends and

allies. I believe that U.S. ratification

will help to encourage the ratification

process in other countries and, ultimately, the CWC’s entry into force.

The United States actively participates in the CWC Preparatory Commission in The Hague, the deliberative

body drafting administrative and implementing procedures for the CWC.

Last month, this body accepted the

U.S. offer of an information management system for the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons that will implement the CWC.

The United States also is playing a

leading role in developing a training

program for international inspectors.

The United States strongly supports

international efforts to strengthen the

1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). In January 1995, the Ad

Hoc Group mandated by the September

1994 BWC Special Conference to draft a

legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the

implementation of the BWC held its

first meeting. The Group agreed on a

program of work and schedule of substantive meetings, the first of which

will occur in July 1995. The United

States is pressing for completion of the

Ad Hoc Group’s work and consideration

of the legally binding instrument by

the next BWC Review Conference in

1996.

The United States maintained its active participation in the 29-member

Australia Group (AG), which now includes the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania. The AG reaffirmed in December the members’

collective belief that full adherence to

the CWC and the BWC provides the

only means to achieve a permanent

global ban on CBW, and that all states

adhering to these Conventions have an

obligation to ensure that their national activities support these goals.

The AG also reiterated its conviction

that harmonized AG export licensing

measures are consistent with, and indeed actively support, the requirement

under Article I of the CWC that States

Parties never assist, in any way, the

manufacture of chemical weapons.

These measures also are consistent

with the undertaking in Article XI of

the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials

and related information for purposes

not prohibited by the Convention, as

they focus solely on preventing assistance to activities banned under the

CWC. Similarly, such efforts also support existing nonproliferation obligations under the BWC.

The United States Government determined that three foreign nationals

(Luciano Moscatelli, Manfred Felber,

and Gerhard Merz) had engaged in

chemical weapons proliferation activities that required the imposition of

sanctions against them, effective on

November 19, 1994. Similar determinations were made against three foreign

companies (Asian Ways Limited,

Mainway International, and Worldco)

effective on February 18, 1995, and imposed sanctions against them. Additional information on these determinations is contained in a classified report

to the Congress, provided pursuant to

the Chemical and Biological Weapons

Control and Warfare Elimination Act

of 1991. The United States Government

continues to monitor closely activities

that may be subject to CBW sanctions

provisions.

The United States continued to control vigilantly U.S. exports that could

make a contribution to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, exercising restraint in considering all such transfers consistent

with the Guidelines of the Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The MTCR Partners shared information not only with each other but with

other possible supplier, consumer, and

transshipment states about proliferation problems and also stressed the importance of implementing effective export control systems.

The United States initiated unilateral efforts and coordinated with

MTCR Partners in multilateral efforts,

aimed at combatting missile proliferation by nonmembers and at encouraging nonmembers to adopt responsible

export behavior and to adhere to the

MTCR Guidelines. On October 4, 1994,

the United States and China signed a

Joint Statement on Missile Nonproliferation in which China reiterated
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

801

1995 T69.28

its 1992 commitment to the MTCR

Guidelines and agreed to ban the export of ground-to-ground MTCR-class

missiles. In 1995, the United States met

bilaterally with Ukraine in January,

and with Russia in April, to discuss

missile nonproliferation and the implementation of the MTCR Guidelines. In

May 1995, the United States will participate with other MTCR Partners in

a regime approach to Ukraine to discuss missile nonproliferation and to

share information about the MTCR.

The United States actively encouraged its MTCR Partners and fellow AG

participants to adopt ‘‘catch-all’’ provisions, similar to that of the United

States and EPCI, for items not subject

to specific export controls. Austria,

Germany, Norway, and the United

Kingdom actually have such provisions

in place. The European Union (EU)

issued a directive in 1994 calling on

member countries to adopt ‘‘catch-all’’

controls. These controls will be implemented July 1, 1995. In line with this

harmonization move, several countries,

including European States that are not

actually members of the EU, have

adopted or are considering putting

similar provisions in place.

The United States has continued to

pursue this Administration’s nuclear

nonproliferation goals. More than 170

nations joined in the indefinite, unconditional extension of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) on May 11,

1995. This historic decision strengthens

the security of all countries, nuclear

weapons states and nonweapons states

alike.

South Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), increasing NSG

membership to 31 countries. The NSG

held a plenary in Helsinki, April 5–7,

1995, which focused on membership

issues and the NSG’s relationship to

the NPT Conference. A separate, dualuse consultation meeting agreed upon

32 changes to the dual-use list.

Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, I report that

there were no expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities

conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order

No. 12938 during the period from November 14, 1994, through May 14, 1995.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 18, 1995.

By unanimous consent, the message

was referred to the Committee on

International Relations and ordered to

be printed (H. Doc. 104–76).

T69.25 ADJOURNMENT OVER

On motion of Mr. ARMEY, by unanimous consent,

Ordered, That when the House adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at 12

o’clock noon on Monday, May 22, 1995.

T69.26 HOUR OF MEETING

On motion of Mr. ARMEY, by unanimous consent,

Ordered, That when the House adjourns on Monday, May 22, 1995, it adjourn to meet at 10:30 a.m. for ‘‘morning hour debates’’ on Tuesday, May 23,

1995.

T69.27 CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS

DISPENSED WITH

On motion of Mr. ARMEY, by unanimous consent,

Ordered, That business in order for

consideration on Wednesday, May 24,

1995, under clause 7, rule XXIV, the

Calendar Wednesday rule, be dispensed

with.

T69.28 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—

NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT

TO IRAN

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr.

WALKER, laid before the House a message from the President, which was

read as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

I hereby report to the Congress on

developments since the last Presidential report on November 18, 1994,

concerning the national emergency

with respect to Iran that was declared

in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, and matters relating to Executive Order No. 12613 of October 29,

1987. This report is submitted pursuant

to section 204(c) of the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50

U.S.C. 1703(c), and section 505(c) of the

International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C.

2349aa–9(c). This report covers events

through April 18, 1995. It discusses only

matters concerning the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order No. 12170 and

matters relating to Executive Order

No. 12613. Matters relating to the

March 15, 1995, Executive Order regarding a ban on investment in the petroleum sector, and the May 6, 1995, Executive Order regarding new trade sanctions, will be covered in separate reports. My last report, dated November

18, 1994, covered events through October 18, 1994.

1. There have been no amendments to

the Iranian Transactions Regulations,

31 CFR Part 560, or to the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part

535, since the last report.

2. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) of the Department of

the Treasury continues to process applications for import licenses under the

Iranian Transactions Regulations.

However, a substantial majority of

such applications are determined to be

ineligible for licensing and, consequently, are denied.

During the reporting period, the U.S.

Customs Service has continued to effect numerous seizures of Iranian-origin merchandise, primarily carpets, for

violation of the import prohibitions of

the Iranian Transactions Regulations.

OFAC and Customs Service investigations of these violations have resulted

in forfeiture actions and the imposition

of civil monetary penalties. Additional

forfeiture and civil penalty actions are

under review.

3. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the ‘‘Tribunal’’), established at

The Hague pursuant to the Algiers Accords, continues to make progress in

arbitrating the claims before it. However, since my last report, the Tribunal

has not rendered any awards although

payments were received by claimants

in late November for awards rendered

during the prior reporting period.

Thus, the total number of awards remains at 557. Of this total, 373 have

been awards in favor of American

claimants. Two hundred twenty-five

(225) of these were awards on agreed

terms, authorizing and approving payment of settlements negotiated by the

parties, and 150 were decisions adjudicated on the merits. The Tribunal

has issued 38 decisions dismissing

claims on the merits and 85 decisions

dismissing claims for jurisdictional

reasons. Of the 59 remaining awards,

three approved the withdrawal of cases

and 56 were in favor of Iranian claimants. As of April 18, 1995, the Federal

Reserve Bank of New York reported

that the value of awards to successful

American claimants for the Security

Account held by the NV Settlement

Bank stood at $2,365,160,410.39.

Iran has not replenished the Security

Account since October 8, 1992, and the

Account has remained continuously

below the balance of $500 million required by the Algiers Accords since November 5, 1992. As of April 10, 1995, the

total amount in the Security Account

was $191,219,759.23, and the total

amount in the Interest Account was

$24,959,218.79.

The United States continues to pursue Case A/28, filed in September 1993,

to require Iran to meet its obligations

under the Algiers Accords to replenish

the Security Account. Iran has yet to

file its Statement of Defense in that

case.

4. The Department of State continues

to present United States Government

claims against Iran, in coordination

with concerned government agencies,

and to respond to claims brought

against the United States by Iran.

On April 18, 1995, the United States

filed the first of two parts of its consolidated submission on the merits in

Case B/61. Case B/61 involves a claim by

Iran for compensation with respect to

primarily military equipment that Iran

alleges it did not receive. The equipment was purchased pursuant to commercial contracts with more than 50

private American companies. Iran alleges that it suffered direct losses and

consequential damages in excess of $2

billion in total because of the U.S. Government’s refusal to allow the export

of the equipment after January 19, 1981,

in alleged contravention of the Algiers

Accords. As directed by the Tribunal,

the United States’ submission addresses Iran’s claims regarding both liability and compensation and damages.

5. The Foreign Claims Settlement

Commission (‘‘FSCS’’) on February 24,

1995, successfully completed its caseby-case review of the more than 3,000

so-called ‘‘small claims’’ against Iran

arising out of the 1979 Islamic revolution. These ‘‘small claims’’ (of $250,000