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PREVENTING AN ECONOMIC SHOCK WAVE: 

SECURING THE PORT OF HOUSTON FROM 

A TERRORIST ATTACK 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

AUGUST 24, 2011 

Serial No. 112–41 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management ........................................................................ 6 

The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

WITNESSES

Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Maritime and Coast Guard Issues, Homeland Security and Justice Team, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Captain James H. Whitehead III, Sector Commander, Sector Houston-Galveston, U.S. Coast Guard: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

Sheriff Adrian Garcia, Harris County, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 31 

Mr. James T. Edmonds, Chairman, Port of Houston Authority: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36 

Captain William J. Diehl (United States Coast Guard, Ret.), President, Greater Houston Port Bureau, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 39 

(1) 

PREVENTING AN ECONOMIC SHOCK WAVE: 

SECURING THE PORT OF HOUSTON FROM A 

TERRORIST ATTACK 

Wednesday, August 24, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Houston, TX. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., at Port 

of Houston Authority, 111 East Loop North, Houston, Texas, Hon. 

Michael T. McCaul [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul and Keating. 

Also Present: Representatives Jackson Lee and Green. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The committee will come to order. Let me first 

thank the Houston Port Authority and all the people here who 

have made this happen. I want to thank the witnesses for being 

here today, and I also want to thank the Ranking Member for a 

yeoman’s effort coming all the way down from beautiful Cape Cod 

and Nantucket, Massachusetts, where the weather is about 80 degrees and beautiful to 110 degrees Houston, and so thank you very 

much for being here today. 

I want to thank my colleague Gene Green for being here as well 

and I know he will have a statement as well. 

With that, this is an official Congressional hearing. It is not a 

town hall meeting. We have to abide by the House rules, the House 

of Representatives, and I just want to, again, thank everybody 

again for being here today. I now recognize myself for an opening 

statement. 

Osama bin Laden’s ‘‘war of a thousand cuts’’ on the U.S. economy 

has always been a key facet of his strategy. His personal files 

found in his lair at Abbottabad, Pakistan, revealed a brazen idea 

to blow up oil tankers. By doing so, he hoped to damage not only 

the United States, but the world’s economy. The picture of an oil 

tanker ablaze, like this one off the coast of Yemen, would indeed 

add fuel to our financial crisis. 

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have a history of attacking ships. In 

January 2000, there was an attack on the USS Sullivan. In October of 2000, a small boat with explosives blew a hole in the side 

of the USS Cole, killing 17 of our sailors. In October 2002, a 

French oil tanker was set ablaze, killing and injuring several crew 

members in the Straits of Hormuz. In 2005, there was an attack 
2 

against the USS Ashland. In July of 2010, there was a terrorist attack on a Japanese oil tanker. 

The Government Accountability Office, or GAO, in its report on 

terrorist attacks targeting energy tankers states the supply chain 

faces three types of threats: Suicide attacks with explosive-laden 

boats similar to the one used against the USS Cole in the Gulf of 

Aden; standoff attacks with weapons launched from a distance, 

such as rocket-propelled grenades and; third, an armed assault 

used by pirates off the coast of Africa. 

Not only would a successful attack result in the loss of life and 

have a detrimental effect on the economy, it would also be a psychological blow and would have environmental consequences. 

The Port of Houston is the energy capital of the United States, 

and it is a target-rich environment. The port stretches from Galveston Bay, past Texas City, across the Gulf Intercoastal Waterway, past Bayport and the San Jacinto Monument, and deep into 

the City of Houston. The port includes a ship channel, a 52-mile 

highway for shipping. It has a wide range of businesses and is not 

just one of the physically largest ports in America, but also a leader in the movement of cargo. 

Houston brings in more imports than any other U.S. harbor. 

Houston has the second-highest level of exports and the secondhighest level of maritime tonnage. More than 7,800 vessels arrive 

and 150,000 large movements are registered annually. 

Most importantly, roughly 25 percent of the oil imports for America flow through the Port of Houston. Each day, 25 to 30 oil and 

chemical tankers move along the Houston Ship Channel, and 31 

percent of America’s crude oil refining capacity takes place right 

here in this harbor. If catastrophe struck the port, there is little 

spare capacity to import and refine crude oil elsewhere in the country. In short, an attack on the Houston port could cripple this. 

A 2007 study by the Houston Port Authority estimated that the 

port directly leads to $285 billion in National economic activity, 1.5 

million jobs, and $16.2 million in Nation-wide tax revenues. The 

U.S. Coast Guard estimates that if the Houston Ship Channel were 

closed, it would have a direct negative impact on the economy of 

approximately $406 million per day. 

Americans are now paying nearly $4 for a gallon of gas. Even an 

attack causing little damage could raise prices at the pump by a 

dollar or more. The Port of Houston is integral to America’s economy. We must ensure there are no gaps in our security at this port 

and ensure that terrorists do not wound our economy or harm our 

citizens by successfully carrying out an attack in Houston. 

The U.S. Coast Guard, Texas State and county officials, and industry stakeholders associated with the Port of Houston, have done 

a great deal to protect this port and its shipping from a terrorist 

attack. The U.S. Coast Guard, who is present here today, and local 

police, as the Sheriff is here today, have access to a real-time satellite tracking system that pinpoints the exact size and location of 

every ship in and around Houston. The Coast Guard has heavily 

armed vessels patrolling the channel along with the Harris County 

Sheriff boats. Equally important, Texas established the Houston 

Ship Channel Security District, a unique industry-Government 
3 

partnership, to assist protecting the facilities surrounding the ship 

channel. 

The GAO has made several recommendations to mitigate terrorist attacks at ports. It recommends that all participants should 

plan for meeting the growing security workload as liquefied natural 

gas shipments increase; that ports should plan for dealing with the 

economic consequences of an attack; that terrorism and oil spill response plans at the National and local level should be integrated; 

and that performance metrics should be developed for an emergency response. All agencies agree with these recommendations. 

I do want to point out another issue, and that is that once the 

Panama Canal, which I recently visited, its project is complete in 

2004 to deepen the Canal, they will be able to accommodate vessels 

with drafts up to 50 feet. Unfortunately, the Houston Ship Channel 

cannot accommodate such large ships because it only is dredged to 

45 feet. Larger ships will not be able to enter the Houston Ship 

Channel. Additionally, it is notable that if a ship were sunk in the 

middle of the Channel, it would effectively cut off commercial traffic in the port until the ship could be refloated and moved. The cost 

of a shutdown would damage this economy extremely. 

So, today, we examine whether the GAO recommendations have 

been instituted, what needs to be done to enlarge the Houston Ship 

Channel, and whether we need to do more to prevent—what we 

need to do more to prevent al-Qaeda and its affiliates from, again, 

wounding our economy as they did on September 11. 

Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here and especially my great thanks to the Ranking Member for making a long 

journey from a very nice place in America down to beautiful Houston, Texas, and with that, I recognize him. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

AUGUST 24, 2011 

Osama bin Laden’s ‘‘war of a thousand cuts’’ on the U.S. economy has always been 

a key facet of his strategy. His personal files, found in his lair at Abbottabad, Pakistan, revealed a brazen idea to blow up oil tankers. By doing so he hoped to damage, 

not only the United States, but the world’s economy. The picture of an oil tanker 

ablaze would indeed add fuel to our financial crisis. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have 

a history of attacking ships: • In January 2000 there was an attack on the USS Sullivan; • In October 2000, a small boat with explosives blew a hole in the side of the USS 

Cole, killing 17 of our sailors; • In October 2002 a French oil tanker was set ablaze, killing and injuring several 

crewmembers; • In 2005 there was an attack against the USS Ashland and Kearsarge; and • In July 2010 there was a terrorist attack on a Japanese oil tanker. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its report on terrorist attacks targeting energy tankers states the supply chain faces three types of threats: • Suicide attacks with explosive-laden boats, similar to the one used against the 

USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden; • Standoff attacks with weapons launched from a distance, such as rocket-propelled grenades; and 

• An armed assault, as used by pirates off the coast of Africa. 

Not only would a successful attack result in loss of lives and have a detrimental 

effect on the economy, it would also be a psychological blow and may have environmental consequences. 

The Port of Houston is the energy capitol of the United States, and a target-rich 

environment. The port stretches from Galveston Bay, past Texas City, across the 

Gulf Intercoastal Waterway, past Bayport and the San Jacinto Monument, and deep 
4 

into the City of Houston. The port includes the Houston Ship Channel; a 52-mile 

highway for shipping. 

It has a wide range of businesses and is not just one of the physically largest 

ports in America, but also a leader in the movement of cargo. 

• Houston brings in more imports than any other U.S. harbor (88.2 million tons 

valued at $60.1 billion in 2010). 

• Houston has the second-highest level of exports (73.2 million tons valued at 

$70.8 billion in 2010), and the second-highest level of total maritime tonnage 

(220 million tons in 2010) in the United States. 

• More than 7,800 vessels arrive and 150,000 barge movements are registered annually. 

• Most importantly roughly 25% of the oil imports for America flow through the 

Port of Houston. Each day 25–30 oil and chemical tankers move along the 

Houston ship channel. And 31% of America’s crude oil refining capacity is in 

this harbor. If catastrophe struck the port, there is little spare capacity to import and refine crude oil elsewhere in the country. 

A 2007 study by the Houston Port Authority estimated that the port directly leads 

to $285 billion in National economic activity, 1.5 million jobs and $16.2 million in 

Nation-wide tax revenues. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that if the Houston Ship 

Channel was closed, it would have a direct negative impact on the economy of approximately $406 million per day. 

Americans are now paying nearly $4.00 for a gallon of gas. Even an attack causing little damage could raise prices at the pump by a dollar or more. The Port of 

Houston is integral to America’s economy. We must ensure there are no gaps in our 

security at this port, and ensure that terrorists do not wound our economy or harm 

our citizens by successfully carrying out an attack in Houston. 

The U.S. Coast Guard, Texas State and County officials, and industry stakeholders associated with the Port of Houston have done a great deal to protect the 

port and its shipping from a terrorist attack. The U.S. Coast Guard and local police 

have access to a real-time satellite tracking system that pinpoints the exact size and 

location of every ship in and around Houston. The Coast Guard has heavily armed 

vessels patrolling the channel, and along with Harris County Sheriff boats, stand 

ready to respond. Equally important, Texas established the Houston Ship Channel 

Security District, a unique industry-government partnership to assist protecting the 

facilities surrounding the ship channel. 

The GAO has made several recommendations to mitigate terrorist attacks at 

ports. It recommends: 

• All participants should plan for meeting the growing security workload as liquefied natural gas shipments increase; 

• Ports should plan for dealing with the economic consequences of an attack; 

• Terrorism and oil spill response plans at the National and local level should be 

integrated; and 

• Performance metrics should be developed for an emergency response. 

All agencies generally agreed with the GAO recommendations. 

I would be remiss if we did not consider one other major point. Once the Panama 

Canal’s deepening project is complete in 2014, the Canal will be able to accommodate vessels with drafts up to 50 feet. Houston cannot accommodate such large ships 

because it is only dredged to 45 feet. Larger ships will not be able to enter the Houston Channel. Additionally, it is notable that if a ship were sunk in the middle of 

the channel, it would effectively cut off commercial traffic in the port until the ship 

could be refloated and moved. The cost of a shutdown would damage the U.S. economy. 

• Today we examine whether the GAO recommendations have been instituted, 

what needs to be done to enlarge the Houston Ship Channel and whether we 

need to do more to prevent al-Qaeda and its affiliates from again wounding our 

economy as they did on 9/11. 

I thank the witnesses for being here and I especially want to thank the Ranking 

Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for 

being with us today and recognize him for 5 minutes for the purpose of making an 

opening statement. 
5 
6 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

having what I think is an extremely important hearing. 

Where my house is, I can view the Cape Cod Canal because it 

is right there on the water, and so I see the Cape Cod Canal, and 

I will tell you, having the view of this canal just dwarfs that so 

much, and this is an extraordinary site and very important in 

terms of our economic input. So I would like to thank you for having the hearing. 

I would like to also acknowledge my colleagues that are here, 

Representative Gene Green. It is great to allow, you know, an outsider to come into your area like that. I appreciate it. 

We will be joined at some point by Representative Sheila Jackson 

Lee, who is also on the committee. 

I will tell you, both Chairman McCaul and I realize that you cannot conduct proper oversight in a vacuum, which means that you 

must go into the field and see first-hand the security measures 

mandated by Congress and do our best to make sure that things 

are running smoothly and determine what else may have to be 

done to provide help, and we are here in Houston just to do that. 

It gives me a great pleasure to be here in Texas, and I look forward to hosting Chairman McCaul in Boston when we conduct a 

field hearing there to examine the aviation security procedures at 

Logan Airport which is also a port as well. 

Today, however, we are going to examine the Port of Houston 

which links the city of Houston with over 1,053 ports in 203 countries and is, therefore, an excellent location to determine exactly 

what the best practices are in maritime security. 

The Port of Houston, as the Chairman mentioned, is one of the 

largest ports in the world, and it is home to the world’s largest concentration, as Representative Green knows, of petroleum facilities 

and $15 billion in petrochemical complex, which is ranked second 

in the entire world. 

Although much attention is given to aviation security since 9/11, 

and rightly so, we cannot ignore the very real potential of threats 
7 

that exist in the maritime sector and the steps that must be taken 

to protect our ports and waterways from the threat of terrorist activity. 

In my district, it sits right on the water and includes parts of the 

South Shore and, as the Chairman mentioned, Cape Cod and the 

islands, but my district is also near the Port of Boston, which is 

the oldest running port in the Western hemisphere. So I am no 

stranger to the maritime environment, and I look forward to examining the similarities and differences between security measures 

here in Houston and those in the Port of Boston which supplies 90 

percent of the Massachusetts heating and fossil fuels. 

Both the Port of Houston and Boston house tankers carrying liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, and oil. If a terrorist 

attack occurred at a port like that and resulted in the explosion of 

any of these volatile materials, the result would truly be catastrophic. 

Unfortunately, terrorists overseas have demonstrated that, indeed, they have the ability to carry out these type of attacks, and 

the fact that they haven’t occurred here in our country should 

mean nothing to us. We should be vigilant and ready. 

We could have said the same thing about aviation security before 

9/11 and Logan Airport, where that terrible day initiated, which we 

will be looking at the anniversary quite soon of 10 years. 

The Chairman mentioned the very real possibility in terms of the 

suicide boat attacks of the tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen 

that killed one person, injured 17, and spilled 90,000 barrels of oil. 

In 2010, the Coast Guard approved shipments of liquefied natural 

gas from Yemen to our home area within 50 feet of residential 

neighborhoods, despite concerns that the cargo was coming from a 

country that has been identified as a terrorist safe haven and has 

previously experienced terrorist attack of their own. 

The economic impact of the Limburg attack included a shortterm collapse in international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and, ultimately, cost Yemen $3.8 million a month. If that type of attack 

ever occurred here and caused a massive oil spill, even larger than 

the one that occurred in Yemen, we may, once again, experience 

the type of economic damage that occurred in the aftermath of 

Deepwater Horizon and its oil spill. 

According to Dun and Bradstreet, Deepwater Horizon’s oil spill 

negatively impacted 7.3 million active businesses in 5 Gulf States, 

85 percent of which were small businesses with less than 10 employees. So this just isn’t a big corporation or big business concern, 

economically it affects even our small businesspeople. It also affected 34 million jobs, $5.2 trillion in sales, and as we all remember 

what happened, the price of oil went up. 

So even though I am here sharing a concern about maritime security, each and every American should be concerned about the security of this Houston port. Any major stoppage in that, any interruption will affect them drastically in all their economic endeavors 

and cripple our country. 

Given the upcoming anniversary of September 11 and its attacks, 

coupled with our current economic climate, we need to make sure 

that any additional damage to the job market is protected, and the 

cost in terms of jobs of such an attack would be incredible. 
8 

So I look forward to the hearing. I look forward to hearing from 

our witnesses, and I thank the Chairman, again, in bringing to the 

attention at this important time this National security necessity. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member. 

The Chairman asks unanimous consent that the gentleman, Mr. 

Green, be allowed to participate in this hearing and provide an 

opening statement, and without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. 

First, I want to welcome you to the Port of Houston, both Chairman McCaul and also my colleague from Massachusetts, and I actually had the opportunity a few years ago to watch that LNG 

tanker go through the Boston Harbor to the facility there and the 

security protections that are provided for it. 

But I represent most of the Port of Houston. I also share the Port 

of Houston with Congressman Ted Poe and Pete Olson to the east, 

but where you are standing or sitting today is in our district. As 

you know, it is the No. 1 foreign tonnage port in the country. It 

is the lifeblood of the economy in southeast Texas, but I think in 

the whole country, because of what we produce in refined products 

and other products in our community. 

Best example I know is that when we first started using the 

transport worker identification card, the TWIC card, it was estimated we would have 50- or 60,000 people who work on the port 

who would need those cards. The last time I checked—and our port 

chair may tell us—we had over 250,000 of those cards issued at the 

Port of Houston. So 250,000 people, a quarter of a million people, 

come to the port to work and have to use that TWIC card to get 

on the site unless they are escorted. 

So it is such an economic generator. We have five refineries and 

more chemical plants than I can count. Without the port, they 

wouldn’t be here. In fact, we are working on an historic designation, if we can ever get it through the House. Buffalo Bayou, which 

is the Port of Houston’s historical name, to be a National heritage 

area, not just based on the San Jacinto battleground and some of 

the historic things we have, but how did the biggest petrochemical 

complex in the country, second-largest in the world, develop here 

on the port, and how did this port 50 miles inland become developed? So we are working on that with the support of the Port of 

Houston and all of our local communities. 

But I want to welcome you. There has been some great successes 

here, and I know we will hear about them from our panel today. 

I welcome our panel, particularly our sheriff, who is a constituent 

and also a long-time friend, and our port is safer today than it was 

after 9/11 but we can still do improvements. I think if you compare 

our port security to every other port that I know of in the country, 

we have done so much more because, again, of the volatility of the 

products we produce. 

But again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being here and thank 

you, Bill. 

[The statement of Hon. Green follows:] 
9 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HONORABLE GENE GREEN

AUGUST 24, 2011 

Thank you Chairman McCaul for holding this important hearing and inviting me 

to participate. Ensuring the security of our Nation’s ports is a top priority in Congress and we have all worked together to secure these key assets that are critical 

to our economy. Here in Houston and East Harris County, we rely on the safety 

and security of our port and the facility operators directly surrounding the port live 

this every single day. 

The Port of Houston is the largest foreign tonnage port and the largest petrochemical port in the country. In fact, it moves the second-largest amount of cargo 

in the country, as 8.5% of our Nation’s cargo moves through the Port of Houston. 

The commerce that occurs at our port is critical to our Nation’s energy and chemical 

sectors and to our country’s ability to trade and move goods throughout our country. 

It is a port of National significance. We must ensure the security and safety of the 

people who work at and near the port, the community surrounding the port and the 

facilities here. 

Whether the threat is from nature or it is manmade, preparedness is the key to 

maintaining our security and safety. The Federal Government has partnered with 

the Port of Houston Authority, facilities at the port and along the ship channel, as 

well as State and local government agencies. This partnership, the Houston Ship 

Channel Security District, is critical to maintaining a high level of security. 

Forming the Houston Ship Channel Security District was a major accomplishment 

that increases the area’s emergency preparedness and disaster response capabilities. 

This important partnership takes advantage of the long tradition of cooperation 

among companies and governmental entities working in the ship channel area. 

Since fiscal year 2002, the port has received nearly $19 million from the Federal 

Port Security Grant Program, which is part of over $30 million in Federal homeland 

security funds that are providing the latest in technology, detection, and oversight 

for security purposes. These funds are crucial to keeping our country safe and protecting the communities and workers at our Nation’s ports. 

I look forward to working with my friend Chairman McCaul and our colleagues 

to identify the needs of the Port of Houston and ports across the country and to address them as we move forward to strengthen our country and our economy. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me thank you for being here as well and participating in this important hearing. 

[The statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Thank you Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Keating for convening this 

very important field hearing to examine the programs, policies, procedures, and implementation of maritime security efforts at the Port of Houston with an emphasis 

on protecting the port and the supply chain from a terrorist attack. I would like to 

welcome our witnesses today: Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell, Director of Maritime and 

Coast Guard Issues, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office; Captain James Whitehead, Sector Commander, Sector Houston-Galveston, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; my friend, Sheriff Adrian Garcia, Harris County Sheriffs Office, Texas; Mr. James T. Edmonds, 

Chairman, The Port of Houston Authority; and Captain William Diehl (USCG Ret.), 

President, Greater Houston Port Bureau, Inc. Thank you for participating in this 

very important field hearing. 

The Port of Houston is home of the second-largest petrochemical complex. 

The country’s largest refinery is located on the Houston Ship Channel, where refined energy products are transported by way of an infrastructure made up of pipelines, rails, and our roadways. 

The infrastructure utilized through these transportation resources includes the 

Colonial Pipeline system, which is the largest petroleum product pipeline system in 

the Nation and is vital to the demands of energy throughout the Southern part of 

our Nation and the East Coast. The Nation’s economy and security are heavily dependent on oil, natural gas, and other energy commodities. Bolstering port security 

in Houston and throughout the country is of paramount concern. The Port of Houston is a 25-mile-long complex of public and private facilities located just a few hours’ 

sailing time from the Gulf of Mexico. The port is ranked first in the United States 

in foreign waterborne commerce, second in total tonnage, and sixth in the world. 
10 

More than 220 million tons of cargo moved through the Port of Houston in 2009. 

More than 7,700 vessel calls were recorded at the Port of Houston during the year 

2009. 

Economic studies reveal that ship channel-related businesses support more than 

287,000 direct and indirect jobs throughout Texas while generating nearly $11 billion in economic impact. Additionally, more than $649 million in State and local tax 

revenues are generated by business activities related to the port. Approximately 

87,000 jobs are connected with the Port of Houston itself, and over 80% of those 

people live in the Houston Metropolitan area. 

Centrally located on the Gulf Coast, Houston is a strategic gateway for cargo originating in or destined for the U.S. West and Midwest. Houston lies within close 

reach of one of the Nation’s largest concentrations of consumers. More than 17 million people live within 300 miles of the city, and approximately 60 million live within 700 miles. 

Safe and secure seaports are an essential element in building efficient and technologically advanced supply chains that move cargo quickly to distribution centers, 

stores, and factories around the world. 

Although we have made progress since the 9/11 attacks in enhancing the security 

of the Nation’s ports, we cannot afford to be complacent. 

The danger is very real that we may be escorting a weapon of mass destruction 

to its target. For every mile along the Houston Ship Channel that dangerous cargo 

passes, an additional 2,000 people are at risk. Clearly, once the cargo reaches the 

city, the risk is at its greatest. 

I will continue to support strong efforts that make the movement of cargo through 

the global supply chain as secure as possible, and I am committed to doing everything feasible to ensure the security of the Nation’s ports. 

I am interested to hear from our witnesses on all aspects of securing the offshore 

energy infrastructure, including security inspections in place and other measures to 

better secure Outer Continental Shelf facilities and deepwater ports. How the 

United States Coast Guard assesses the offshore infrastructure as we look to our 

ports is critical. 

The findings from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 

Spill incident illustrated how examining the role that the industry and Government 

sectors played in assessing vulnerabilities and the impact the incident had on the 

economic, social, and environmental systems. The quality of information shared 

from this unfortunate event could improve the quality of information that informs 

Congress on the most appropriate programs and budget decisions to best ensure security for our ports and how to utilize scarce resources in a constrained fiscal environment. 

From reviewing your testimonies, please know that I share your concerns about 

achieving a balance between securing our ports and maintaining our viable business 

options. As such, I would like to assure all of you that in my capacity as Ranking 

Member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security, it has 

been my priority to see a vibrant and secure America, where people and trade are 

safe and secure to move throughout this great Nation. 

I am aware of the increased demands of security and the allocation of Federal 

funds, as a result, I am committed to doing everything in my power to ensure that 

transportation and port security grants are allocated in a timely and targeted manner. 

Today’s hearing is most important at the Port of Houston for Houston is home 

to hundreds of energy companies and many of these companies are involved in exploring for and producing oil and natural gas in the Gulf of Mexico and transporting 

it from sea to shore. Furthermore, energy tankers sail through Houston Ship Channel, and major facilities for refining oil are located along or the Ship Channel. 

As a Member of Homeland Security, I am glad that Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Keating have called this issue to the forefront. I would like to welcome 

everyone to the 18th Congressional District of Houston, Texas, and thank you for 

your strong initiative in making our seas and ports more secure. 

Mr. MCCAUL. With that, I will introduce the witnesses. We have, 

first, Mr. Steve Caldwell, director in GAO’s Homeland Security and 

Justice Team. His recent GAO reports and testimony have covered 

issues related to protecting critical infrastructure, particularly in 

the ports, including the implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act, or SAFE Port Act. 
11 

He has an extensive international experience having spent almost a third of his career overseas visiting 27 countries as part of 

his work on homeland security and other issues. Thank you for 

being here. 

Next, we have Captain James Whitehead, who currently serves 

as commander of the U.S. Coast Guard Sector Houston-Galveston, 

after serving for 2 years as deputy commander. He serves as the 

Officer in Charge of Marine Inspections, or OCMI, Captain of the 

Port, Federal Maritime Security Coordinator, Search and Rescue 

Mission Coordinator, and Federal On-Scene Coordinator for an 

area spanning from Matagorda Bay, Texas, to Lake Charles, Louisiana. Captain Whitehead is a graduate of the Coast Guard Officer 

Candidate School and the U.S. Naval War College. Captain, thank 

you for being here today. 

Next, we have your constituent and my friend as well, Sheriff 

Adrian Garcia who heads the largest sheriff’s office in Texas and 

the third-largest in the United States. Sheriff Garcia is a native 

Houstonian. He became an officer with the Houston Police Department in 1980. In 1999, Mayor Lee Brown promoted him to director 

of the mayor’s Anti-Gang Office, where he served until 2003. Sheriff Garcia was elected to the Houston City Council in 2003, and he 

chaired the council’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Committee before being elected to sheriff. Sheriff, thank you so much 

for being here today. 

Next, another friend, Mr. Jim Edmonds, was appointed chairman 

of the Board of Commissioners of the Port of Houston Authority in 

June 2000. He was first appointed to the Port Commission in October 1996, representing Harris County, and under Chairman Edmonds’ leadership, the Port of Houston Authority has been able to 

expand its business opportunities. In addition to his responsibilities 

with the Port of Houston, Chairman Edmonds serves as a member 

of the Board of Pilots Commissioners and on the board of Memorial 

Hermann Healthcare System, the I–69 TxDOT Advisory Committee, and the Gulf Coast Rail District. Thank you, Jim, for being 

here today as well. 

Finally, we have Captain Bill Diehl, the U.S. Coast Guard. He 

is president of the Greater Houston Port Bureau, a maritime trade 

organization of 125 companies. Captain Diehl became president of 

the Port Bureau after retiring from the Coast Guard in 2009 where 

he served in a variety of challenging jobs, including being the senior U.S. diplomat at the Panama Canal. Captain Diehl is a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy. Mr. Diehl, thank you also for 

being here as well. 

With that, we will begin our opening statements and the Chairman now recognizes Mr. Caldwell for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, MARITIME AND COAST GUARD ISSUES, HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CALDWELL. Thank you very much, Chairman McCaul and 

Mr. Keating and Mr. Green. I also want to thank the other witnesses for what they do every day to protect this port and the other 

ports in our country. 
12 

While my written statement today doesn’t focus that much on 

tankers, I do want to point out the report we did in 2007, which 

was a comprehensive report with a lot of detail on the threats to 

tankers, the tankers that arrive every day to supply our refineries 

and to power our economy. Mr. McCaul and Mr. Keating have already talked a little bit about the different kinds of attacks that 

can occur on a tanker and the consequences of those attacks. So I 

will skip on to some of the other things here. 

One of the areas that we have been particularly concerned about 

is the attacks on tankers at maritime choke points, and these could 

be international straits, major transit canals, or channels within a 

port such as the Houston Ship Channel we have here, and our concerns do appear validated by the recent revelations about alQaeda’s intentions, as well as the attack on the MV Star in the 

Straits of Hormuz. 

While our previous report on tankers only touched briefly on the 

issue of piracy, that has actually become a bigger threat than terrorist threats to tankers. Specifically, there were 48 attacks on 

tankers in 2006, 149 in 2010, and it is trending even higher in 

2011. Those are pirate attacks, and then from the pirate perspective, they have a very successful business model with ransoms for 

tankers going from about $3 million in 2009 up to $12 million in 

2011. 

To date, these terrorist attacks and these pirate attacks have occurred far from Houston, thankfully, where United States has limited control over the security situation. But now, I will turn my attention to U.S. ports and the waters where there is a lot we can 

do to prevent and respond to these type of attacks. 

Our previous report, as has been mentioned, had five recommendations specific to planning for, and responding to, a terrorist attack on a tanker within a U.S. port. Two of our recommendations do remain unaddressed. One related to the integration of operational plans, and the other related to performance 

measures. 

Moving beyond Houston and touching on some of the areas that 

Mr. Keating talked about, let’s go offshore. There are over 4,000 

offshore platforms and related infrastructure within the Gulf of 

Mexico, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill showed just what the 

consequences of an explosion on such a platform can be. I suspect 

that those that wish us harm could not help but notice the difficulties the Nation faced in capping an oil spill deep on the seabed. We 

all remember the media count day after day for the 84 days it took 

to cap that well and for the 4 million barrels of oil that were spilled 

into the Gulf. 

Now, we can imagine another explosion or even multiple explosions done on purpose. In addition to the response to protect the 

environment that we already saw, we would have to add to the 

complexity of that by putting on a law enforcement and a security 

response as well. 

Now, with this testimony, another thing that we are doing, based 

on work we are doing for the subcommittee, is reporting on Coast 

Guard security assessments of such offshore infrastructure. We 

found that the Coast Guard was not addressing about one-quarter 

of the assessments it should have been doing. We also found that 
13 

the Coast Guard was—I am sorry—the Coast Guard was not doing 

these assessments. Based on that, we are making recommendations 

to the Coast Guard which they have accepted which will improve 

their internal controls so that they can identify all of those facilities that do require such assessments. 

One of the Coast Guard’s other big challenges in doing these 

kinds of offshore assessments harkens back to the Deepwater Horizon in that such facilities are actually vessels called MODU’s, mobile offshore drilling units, do not fall under the Coast Guard’s current regulations for security; thus, the Coast Guard is not conducting the same kinds of security assessments on MODU’s that it 

is in doing in terms of an oil platform or production facility. 

In closing, we will continue with our other work for the committee, continuing to look at Coast Guard work at offshore facilities, both oil production platforms and deepwater ports such as 

LOOP and some others that are in Massachusetts Bay. 

I will be happy to respond to any questions. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Caldwell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL

AUGUST 24, 2011 

GAO Highlights 

Highlights of GAO–11–883T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management; Committee on Homeland Security; House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The Nation’s economy and security are heavily dependent on oil, natural gas, and 

other energy commodities. Al-Qaeda and other groups with malevolent intent have 

targeted energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure because of their importance to the Nation’s economy and National security. The U.S. Coast Guard—a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is the lead Federal agency 

for maritime security, including the security of energy tankers and offshore energy 

infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also has responsibilities 

for preventing and responding to terrorist incidents. This testimony discusses the 

extent to which: (1) The Coast Guard and the FBI have taken actions to address 

GAO’s prior recommendations to prevent and respond to a terrorist incident involving energy tankers, and (2) the Coast Guard has taken actions to assess the security 

risks to offshore energy infrastructure and related challenges. This testimony is 

based on products issued from December 2007 through March 2011 and recently 

completed work on the Coast Guard’s actions to assess security risks. GAO reviewed 

documents from the Coast Guard’s risk model and relevant laws, regulations, policies, and procedures; and interviewed Coast Guard officials. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is recommending that the Coast Guard revise policies and procedures to ensure its analysts receive the annual updated list of regulated offshore energy facilities to ensure risk assessments are conducted on those facilities. The Coast Guard 

concurred with this recommendation. 

MARITIME SECURITY.—PROGRESS MADE, BUT FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO SECURE

THE MARITIME ENERGY SUPPLY

What GAO Found 

The Coast Guard and the FBI have made progress implementing prior recommendations GAO made to enhance energy tanker security. In 2007, GAO made 

five recommendations to address challenges in ensuring the effectiveness of Federal 

agencies’ actions to protect energy tankers and implement response plans. The 

Coast Guard and the FBI have implemented two recommendations, specifically: (1) 

The Coast Guard, in coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, developed protocols for facilitating the recovery and resumption of trade following a disruption to the maritime transportation system, and (2) the Coast Guard and the 
14 

FBI participated in local port exercises that executed multiple response plans simultaneously. The Coast Guard has made progress on a third recommendation through 

work on a National strategy for the security of certain dangerous cargoes. It also 

plans to develop a resource allocation plan, starting in April 2012, which may help 

address the need to balance security responsibilities. However, the Coast Guard and 

the FBI have not yet taken action on a fourth recommendation to develop an operational plan to integrate the National spill and terrorism response plans. According 

to DHS, it plans to revise the National Response Framework, but no decision has 

been made regarding whether the separate response plans will be integrated. Also, 

DHS has not yet taken action on the final recommendation to develop explicit performance measures for emergency response capabilities and use them in risk-based 

analyses to set priorities for acquiring needed response resources. According to DHS, 

it is revising its emergency response grant programs, but does not have specific 

plans to develop performance measures as part of this effort. 

The Coast Guard has taken actions to assess the security risks to offshore energy 

infrastructure, which includes Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities (facilities 

that are involved in producing oil or natural gas) and deepwater ports (facilities 

used to transfer oil and natural gas from tankers to shore), but improvements are 

needed. The Coast Guard has used its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model 

(MSRAM) to examine the security risks to OCS facilities and deepwater ports. To 

do so, the Coast Guard has coordinated with the intelligence community and stakeholders, such as the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement. However, the Coast Guard faces complex and 

technical challenges in assessing risks. For example, the Coast Guard does not have 

data on the ability of an OCS facility to withstand an attack. The Coast Guard generally recognizes these challenges and has actions underway to study or address 

them. Further, GAO determined that as of May 2011, the Coast Guard had not assessed security risks for 12 of the 50 security-regulated OCS facilities that are to 

be subjected to such assessments. Coast Guard officials later determined that they 

needed to add these OCS facilities to MSRAM for assessment and have completed 

the required assessments. However, while the list of security-regulated facilities 

may change each year based on factors such as production volume, the Coast 

Guard’s current policies and procedures do not call for Coast Guard officials to provide an annual updated list of regulated OCS facilities to MSRAM analysts. Given 

the continuing threat to such offshore facilities, revising its procedures could help 

ensure that the Coast Guard carries out its risk assessment requirements for security-regulated OCS facilities. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss Federal efforts to ensure the security of 

energy tankers and the offshore energy infrastructure that produces, transports, or 

receives oil and natural gas. The Nation’s economy and security are heavily dependent on oil, natural gas, and other energy commodities. Further, it is fitting that today’s hearing is in Houston because the city and the surrounding area play a central role in the maritime energy sector. Houston is home to hundreds of energy companies and many of these companies are involved in exploring for and producing oil 

and natural gas in the Gulf of Mexico and transporting it from sea to shore. In addition, energy tankers sail through the Houston Ship Channel, and major facilities for 

refining oil are located along or near the channel. 

Al-Qaeda and other groups with malevolent intent continue to target energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure because of their importance to the Nation’s 

economy and National security. In May 2011, the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) issued a press statement that intelligence information showed that throughout 2010 there was continuing interest by members of al-Qaeda in targeting oil 

tankers and commercial oil infrastructure at sea. While a terrorist attack on energy 

tankers or offshore energy infrastructure has not occurred in the United States, 

other countries have experienced such attacks. 

Additionally, while it was not the result of an attack, the Deepwater Horizon explosion in April 2010 showed that the consequences of an incident on offshore energy infrastructure could be significant. The explosion resulted in 11 deaths, serious 

injuries, and the largest oil spill in the history of the United States. The response 

to the incident encountered numerous challenges, and by the time the well was 

sealed nearly 3 months later, over 4 million barrels of oil had spilled into the Gulf. 

The spill created significant environmental damage and had an adverse impact on 

workers and businesses, with an estimated cost to compensate for these damages 

totaling billions of dollars. 

The U.S. Coast Guard—a component of DHS—is the lead Federal agency for maritime security, including security of energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure. The FBI—an agency in the Department of Justice (DOJ)—shares responsibility 
15 

1GAO, Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers, GAO–08–141 (Washington, DC: 

Dec. 10, 2007). 2GAO–08–141. 

3GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration Among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa, GAO–10–856 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2010); and Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan 

Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa, GAO–11–449T (Washington, DC: Mar. 

15, 2011). 4 In looking at the Coast Guard’s assessments of risks, we focused on security risks—risks 

emanating from terrorists or others that would purposely attack or sabotage offshore energy infrastructure. We did not focus on accidental risks to such infrastructure. However, we have ongoing work to assess industry plans for developing new methods or technologies to control and 

contain blowouts occurring in subsea environments. We are conducting this work at the request 

of the Ranking Member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. We expect to issue 

this related report in the winter of 2012. We are also conducting broader work examining the 

Coast Guard’s use of MSRAM for the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation; the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs; and the Chairwoman of the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. We expect to issue this report later in 2011. 5The DHS Quadrennial Review outlines a strategic framework for stakeholders, including 

Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector entities, in responding to security threats. For more information about the DHS Quadrennial Review, see 

GAO, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed, GAO–11–153R (Washington, DC: Dec. 16, 2010). 6The National Infrastructure Protection Plan represents a strategy for protecting critical infrastructure and key resources, and it offers a framework for assessing risk. For more information about the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, see GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk 

Management and Resilience, GAO–10–296 (Washington, DC: Mar. 5, 2010). 7 National Research Council: Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to 

Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: 2010). 8GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, GAO–06–91 (Washington, DC: Dec. 15, 

Continued 

with the Coast Guard for preventing and responding to terrorist incidents in the 

maritime environment, including incidents involving energy tankers. In December 

2007, we issued a report that examined Coast Guard and FBI efforts to prevent and 

respond to an incident involving energy tankers and we made several recommendations to the Coast Guard and the FBI to improve efforts in these areas.1

My testimony today will address two main objectives: 

• the extent to which the Coast Guard and the FBI have taken actions to address 

our prior recommendations to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving energy tankers; and, 

• the extent to which the Coast Guard has taken actions to assess the security 

risks to offshore energy infrastructure and the challenges, if any, in conducting 

such assessments. 

My statement is based on our past work on energy tankers issued in December 

2007 and recently completed work on actions the Coast Guard has taken to assess 

security risks in the maritime environment.2 To obtain information on the first objective, we reviewed our prior reports on energy tankers, and asked the Coast Guard 

and the FBI to provide us an update, along with supporting documentation, on any 

actions that they have taken to address our recommendations from the December 

2007 report. To provide additional information on threats to energy tankers, we also 

reviewed our recent work on piracy.3 More detailed information on the scope and 

methodology used for our past reviews appears in those reports. 

To address the second objective, we interviewed officials in Coast Guard headquarters and field offices in New Orleans, Louisiana and Boston, Massachusetts because these officials were knowledgeable about how the Coast Guard uses the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM)—a tool that the Coast Guard uses to 

assess the security risks to vessels and offshore energy infrastructure.4 Moreover, 

the New Orleans and Boston field offices are the only offices presently conducting 

assessments of offshore energy infrastructure. We also reviewed Coast Guard documents on MSRAM, such as Coast Guard guidance to its field units and the MSRAM 

training manual. In addition, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations, policies 

and procedures, and other documents related to security risk assessments. For example, we reviewed the DHS Quadrennial Review,5 the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,6 and a National Research Council report on risk assessments at DHS.7

We also reviewed our prior report on risk assessment efforts carried out by the 

Coast Guard.8 In addition, we compared the Coast Guard’s policies and procedures 
16 

2005) and Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security, GAO– 

10–940T (Washington, DC: July 21, 2010). 9GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD–00–21.3.1 

(Washington, DC: November 1999). 10We will continue our broader work looking at the security of offshore energy infrastructure, 

including Coast Guard security inspections and other challenges. 11This figure is based on the most recently available data for a full year from the U.S. Energy 

Information Administration. 12The OCS is a designation for all submerged lands of which the subsoil and seabed are outside the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. State, but within U.S. jurisdiction and control. 13 Based on an estimate from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 

and Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 

(Washington, DC: January 2011). 

regarding security actions with criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.9 Further, we interviewed representatives from two companies that 

together operate 18 of the 50 Outer Continental Shelf facilities, a type of offshore 

energy infrastructure, regulated for security in 2011. While the information obtained from these interviews is not generalizable to the offshore energy industry as 

a whole, it provided insights into owners’ and operators’ concerns regarding security 

and actions they have taken to address such concerns. This testimony concludes our 

work on Coast Guard efforts to assess security risks for offshore energy infrastructure.10

We conducted this performance audit from October 2010 through August 2011 in 

accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

BACKGROUND

The Nation’s economy and security are heavily dependent on oil, natural gas, and 

other energy commodities. Nearly half of the Nation’s oil is transported from overseas by tankers. For example, about 49 percent of the Nation’s crude oil supply— 

one of the main sources of gasoline, jet fuel, heating oil, and many other petroleum 

products—was transported by tanker into the United States in 2009.11 The remaining oil and natural gas used in the United States comes from Canada by pipeline 

or is produced from domestic sources in areas such as offshore facilities in the Gulf 

of Mexico. With regard to these domestic sources, the area of Federal jurisdiction— 

called the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)12—contains an estimated 85 million barrels of oil, more than all onshore resources and those in shallower State waters combined.13 In addition, the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP), a deepwater port, is 

responsible for transporting about 10 percent of imported oil into the United States. 

Federal Agency Roles 

As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard seeks to mitigate many kinds of security challenges in the maritime environment. Doing so is 

a key part of its overall security mission and a starting point for identifying security 

gaps and taking actions to address them. Carrying out these responsibilities is a difficult and challenging task because energy tankers often depart from foreign ports 

and are registered in countries other than the United States, which means the 

United States has limited authority to oversee the security of such vessels until they 

enter U.S. waters. Offshore energy infrastructure also presents its own set of security challenges because some of this infrastructure is located many miles from shore. 

The FBI shares responsibility with the Coast Guard for preventing and responding 

to terrorist incidents in the maritime environment, including incidents involving energy tankers. 

Risks to Energy Tankers 

Energy tankers face risks from various types of attack. We identified three primary types of attack methods against energy tankers in our 2007 report, including 

suicide attacks, armed assaults by terrorists or armed bands, and launching a 

‘‘standoff’’ missile attack using a rocket or some other weapon fired from a distance. 

In recent years, we have issued reports that discussed risks energy tankers face 

from terrorist attacks and attacks from other criminals, such as pirates. Terrorists 

have attempted—and in some cases carried out—attacks on energy tankers since 

September 11, 2001. To date, these attacks have included attempts to damage tankers or their related infrastructure at overseas ports. For example, in 2002, terrorists 

conducted a suicide boat attack against the French supertanker Limburg off the 
17 

14The motivation behind an attack may distinguish piracy from terrorism. For example, the 

motivation for piracy is often monetary, whereas terrorism is politically motivated. 15The International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau operates a Piracy 

Reporting Center that collects data on pirate attacks worldwide. 16For more information on U.S. Government efforts to combat piracy, see GAO–10–856, which 

discusses the Coast Guard’s and other agencies’ progress in implementing efforts to prevent piracy attacks. This report contains recommendations to improve U.S. Government efforts to combat piracy. 

coast of Yemen, and in 2010, an incident involving another supertanker, the M/V 

M. Star, in the Strait of Hormuz is suspected to have been a terrorist attack. Our 

work on energy tankers identified three main places in which tankers may be at 

risk of an attack: (1) At foreign ports; (2) in transit, especially at narrow channels, 

or chokepoints; and (3) at U.S. ports. For example, foreign ports, where commodities 

are loaded onto tankers, may vary in their levels of security, and the Coast Guard 

is limited in the degree to which it can bring about improvements abroad when security is substandard, in part because its activities are limited by conditions set by 

host nations. In addition, while tankers are in transit, they face risks because they 

travel on direct routes that are known in advance and, for part of their journey, 

they may have to travel through waters that do not allow them to maneuver away 

from possible attacks. According to the Energy Information Administration, 

chokepoints along a route make tankers susceptible to attacks. Further, tankers remain at risk upon arrival in the United States because of the inherent risks to port 

facilities. For example, port facilities are generally accessible by land and sea and 

are sprawling installations often close to population centers. 

Beyond the relatively rare threat of terrorist attacks against tankers, the threat 

of piracy has become relatively common.14 In particular, piracy threatens tankers 

transiting one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes near key energy corridors and 

the route through the Suez Canal. The vast areas at risk for piracy off the Horn 

of Africa, combined with the small number of military ships available for patrolling 

them, make protecting energy tankers difficult. According to the International Maritime Bureau, 30 percent (490 of 1,650) of vessels reporting pirate attacks worldwide 

from 2006 through 2010 were identified as tankers.15 See table 1 for a summary 

of tankers attacked by pirates during 2006 through 2010. 

TABLE 1.—NUMBER OF TANKERS ATTACKED BY PIRATES, 2006–2010 

Type of Commodity Transported 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

Bitumen* .......................... 0 1 0 2 2 

Chemical/Product** ......... 35 52 55 69 96 

Crude Oil ......................... 9 25 30 41 43 

Liquefied Natural Gas .... 0 1 0 1 1 

Liquefied Petroleum Gas 4 5 6 5 7 

Totals ..................... 48 84 91 118 149 

Source: International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual 

Report (United Kingdom, 2010). 

* Bitumen is a heavy black viscous oil often used in paving materials and sealants. 

** This category includes tankers that transport chemicals or oil products other than crude 

oil. 

As shown in the table, pirate attacks against tankers have tripled in the last 5 

years, and the incidence of piracy against tankers continues to rise. From January 

through June 2011, 100 tankers were attacked, an increase of 37 percent compared 

to tankers attacked from January through June 2010. Figure 1 shows one of the 

recent suspected pirate attacks. In addition, tankers are fetching increasing ransom 

demands from Somali pirates. Media reports indicate a steady increase in ransoms 

for tankers, from $3 million in January 2009 for the Saudi tanker Sirius Star, to 

$9.5 million in November 2010 for the South Korean tanker Samho Dream, to $12 

million in June 2011 for the Kuwaiti tanker MV Zirku. The U.S. Maritime Administration and the Coast Guard have issued guidance for commercial vessels to stay 

200 miles away from the Somali coast. However, pirates have adapted and increased 

their capability to attack and hijack vessels to more than 1,000 miles from Somalia 

using mother ships, from which they launch smaller boats to conduct the attacks.16

To address the growing concern over piracy, the Coast Guard has issued a directive 

with guidelines for U.S. vessels operating in high-risk waters. This directive pro-
18 

17See 33 C.F.R. § 106.105. 18Facilities meeting any of the threshold criteria are often referred to as Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA)-regulated facilities. The production or personnel thresholds for 

determining whether an OCS facility will be subject to security requirements in accordance with 

33 C.F.R. part 106 are: (1) Producing greater than 100,000 barrels of oil a day, (2) producing 

more than 200 million cubic feet of natural gas per day, or (3) hosting more than 150 persons 

for 12 hours or more in each 24-hour period continuously for 30 days or more. According to 33 

C.F.R. § 140.10, production means those activities which take place after the successful completion of any means for the removal of minerals, including, but not limited to, such removal, field 

vides vessel owners and operators with direction for responding to emerging security 

risks. 

Risks to Offshore Energy Infrastructure 

Offshore energy infrastructure also faces risks from various types of attacks. For 

example, in 2004, a terrorist attacked an offshore oil terminal in Iraq using speedboats packed with explosives, killing two U.S. Navy sailors and a U.S. Coast 

Guardsman. Potential attack methods against offshore energy infrastructure identified by the Coast Guard or owners and operators include crashing an aircraft into 

it; using a submarine vessel, diver, or other means of attacking it underwater; ramming it with a vessel; and sabotage by an employee. Offshore energy infrastructure 

may face security risks because this infrastructure is located in open waters and 

generally many miles away from Coast Guard assets and personnel. 

In addition to our work on energy tankers, we have recently completed work involving Coast Guard efforts to assess security risks and ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure. Specifically, our work focused on two main types of offshore energy infrastructure that the Coast Guard oversees for security. The first 

type are facilities that operate on the OCS and are generally described as facilities 

temporarily or permanently attached to the subsoil or seabed of the OCS that engage in exploration, development, or production of oil, natural gas, or mineral resources.17 As of September 2010, there were about 3,900 such facilities, and if a facility of this type meets or exceeds any one of three thresholds for production or personnel, it is subject to 33 C.F.R. part 106 security requirements.18 In this testimony, 
19 

operations, transfer of minerals to shore, operation monitoring, maintenance, and workover. According to the Coast Guard, the statement; ‘‘transfer of minerals to shore’’ encompasses fixed 

facilities that operate as ‘‘Transmission Facilities.’’ Production quantities shall be calculated as 

the sum of all sources of production from wells on the primary and any attending platform(s), 

including the throughput of other pipelines transferring product across the same platform(s). 19See 33 C.F.R. § 148.5. Although deepwater ports are generally not regulated for security in 

accordance with MTSA, owners and operators generally carry out similar measures to those carried out for OCS facilities by, among other things, developing security plans comparable to those 

implemented by OCS facilities pursuant to part 106. See 33 C.F.R. § 150.15(x). 20 According to the Coast Guard, one of the Gulf of Mexico deepwater ports is expected to be 

decommissioned in the near future. 21GAO–08–141. 

we focus on the 50 facilities that, in 2011, are regulated for security because they 

meet or exceed the threshold criteria. We refer to these security-regulated facilities 

as OCS facilities. The second type of offshore energy infrastructure are deepwater 

ports, which are fixed or floating manmade structures used or intended for use as 

a port or terminal for the transportation, storage, or handling of oil or natural gas 

to any State and includes the transportation of oil or natural gas from the United 

States’ OCS.19 There are currently four licensed deepwater ports—two in the Gulf 

of Mexico and two in Massachusetts Bay.20 Unlike OCS facilities, which are involved in the production of oil or natural gas, deepwater ports enable tankers to offload oil or liquefied natural gas for transport to land by underwater pipelines. 

PROGRESS MADE ADDRESSING OUR RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS

COULD HELP IMPROVE TANKER SECURITY

In 2007, we assessed Coast Guard and FBI efforts to ensure the security of energy 

tankers and respond to terrorist incidents involving energy tankers.21 We found that 

actions were being taken, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and 

port facilities at which tankers would be present. For example, the Coast Guard visits foreign exporting ports to assess the effectiveness of the anti-terrorism measures 

in place. Additionally, port stakeholders in the United States have taken steps to 

address vulnerabilities at domestic ports. For example, the Houston Ship Channel 

Security District is a public-private partnership that was established to increase 

preparedness and response capabilities with the goal of improving security and safety for facilities, employees, and communities surrounding the Houston Ship Channel. The security district has installed technology, such as night vision and motionactivated detection equipment, and conducts patrols on land and in the water. However, we also reported on challenges that remained in: (1) Making Federal agencies’ 

protective actions more effective, and (2) implementing plans for a response to an 

attack, if a terrorist attack were to succeed despite the protective measures in place. 

We made five recommendations in our 2007 report, three of which were directed 

to the Secretary of Homeland Security and two of which were directed jointly to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General. The departments concurred or partially concurred with all of the recommendations. The Coast Guard and 

the FBI have made progress in implementing these recommendations—two have 

been implemented, and the Coast Guard is in the process of implementing a third— 

but actions have not yet been taken to address the remaining two recommendations. 

See table 2 for a summary of our findings, recommendations, and the current status 

of agency efforts to implement our recommendations. 
20 

TABLE 2.—STATUS OF GAO RECOMMENDATIONS ON TANKER SECURITY 

FROM GAO–08–141 

Findings Recommendation and Status 

Resource allocation.—Based on 

Coast Guard records, we 

found that Coast Guard field 

units in several energy-related ports had been unable 

to accomplish many of the 

port security responsibilities 

called for in Coast Guard 

guidance. According to the 

data we obtained and our 

discussions with field unit 

officials, we determined that 

resource shortfalls were the 

primary reasons for not 

meeting these responsibilities. Furthermore, the 

Coast Guard had not yet developed a plan for addressing new liquefied natural 

gas (LNG) security resource 

demands.

Recommendation.—We recommended that the 

Coast Guard develop a National resource allocation plan that would balance the need to meet 

new LNG security responsibilities with existing 

security responsibilities and other Coast Guard 

missions. 

Status.—In progress. The Coast Guard has begun 

work on a National strategy for reducing the 

maritime security risks present in the bulk 

transportation and transfer of certain dangerous 

cargoes, including LNG. Coast Guard officials 

expect to finalize the strategy in April 2012 at 

which point they expect to develop a resource allocation plan to implement the strategy. In the 

interim, the Coast Guard has published guidance to clarify the timing and scope of the process that is necessary to ensure full consideration 

is given to safety and security of the port, the facility, and the vessels transporting LNG. 

Guidance for helping to mitigate economic consequences.—We reported 

that the economic consequences of a terrorist attack on a tanker could be 

significant, particularly if 

one or more ports are closed. 

We identified some ports 

that, on their own initiative, 

were incorporating economic 

recovery considerations into 

their port-level plans, but at 

the time of our review in 

2007, there was no National-level guidance for use 

by local ports.

Recommendation.—We recommended that the 

Coast Guard develop guidance that ports could 

use to plan for helping to mitigate economic consequences, particularly in the case of port closures. 

Status.—Implemented. The Coast Guard and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have developed Joint Protocols for the Expeditious Recovery of Trade. These protocols establish a communications process and describe how the Coast 

Guard and CBP will coordinate with other Federal agencies and the maritime industry to facilitate recovery and resumption of trade following 

an event that causes a major disruption to the 

maritime transportation system. 

Integration of spill and terrorism response at the National level.—We found that 

while National- and portlevel plans exist to address 

spill response or terrorism 

response, Federal agencies 

and ports could face challenges in using them effectively. We reported that the 

separate spill and terrorism 

response plans should be integrated for responding to 

an attack on an energy commodities tanker.

Recommendation.—We recommended that the 

Coast Guard and the FBI coordinate at the National level to help ensure that a detailed operational plan be developed that integrates the different spill and terrorism sections of the National Response Plan. 

Status.—Not implemented. The different spill and 

terrorism response sections of the National Response Plan remain separate annexes in the renamed National Response Framework. According to the Coast Guard, the National Response 

Framework is currently under revision, but no 

decision has been made regarding the spill and 

terrorism response annexes. Pending that decision, the FBI has not taken any action to implement this recommendation. 
21 

TABLE 2.—STATUS OF GAO RECOMMENDATIONS ON TANKER SECURITY 

FROM GAO–08–141—Continued 

Findings Recommendation and Status 

Integration of spill and terrorism response at the local 

level.—In addition to the 

need for operational plans 

as noted above, we reported 

that agencies should conduct 

joint exercises that simulate 

an attack and the agencies’ 

responses. Without such exercises, it would be questionable whether joint Coast 

Guard and FBI activities 

would proceed as planned.

Recommendation.—We recommended that the 

Coast Guard and FBI coordinate at the local 

level to help ensure that spill and terrorism response activities are integrated for the best possible response by maximizing the integration of 

spill and terrorism response planning and exercises at ports that receive energy commodities 

where attacks on tankers pose a significant 

threat. 

Status.—Implemented. In April 2008, the Coast 

Guard updated guidance which states that the 

ability to simultaneously execute multiple plans, 

including Federal, State, and local response and 

recovery plans, should be part of an overall exercise and preparedness program. In accordance 

with this guidance, the Coast Guard, along with 

the FBI and other stakeholders, has conducted 

exercises that address an integrated spill and 

terrorism response. 

Performance measures for 

emergency response.—We 

found that some ports had 

reported difficulty in securing response resources to 

carry out planned actions 

and decisions about the need 

for more response capabilities were hindered by a lack 

of performance measures 

tying resource needs to effectiveness in response.

Recommendation.—We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with Federal, 

State, and local stakeholders to develop explicit 

performance measures for emergency response 

capabilities and use them in risk-based analyses 

to set priorities for acquiring needed response 

resources. 

Status.—Not implemented.—DHS has not yet developed explicit performance measures for emergency response capabilities. According to DHS, it 

is revising its grant programs, but performance 

measures have not yet been developed as part of 

this effort. 

Source: GAO. 

Regarding our recommendation that the Coast Guard and the FBI coordinate to 

help ensure that a detailed operational plan be developed that integrates the different spill and terrorism sections of the National Response Framework, DHS is in 

the process of revising this document and did not have further information regarding whether or how the spill and terrorism response annexes may be revised. Further, the FBI has not taken independent action to implement this recommendation, 

in part because it did not concur with the need to develop a separate operational 

plan. In the event of a successful attack on an energy tanker, ports would need to 

provide an effective, integrated response to: (1) Protect public safety and the environment, (2) conduct an investigation, and (3) restore shipping operations in a timely manner. Consequently, clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities 

for all essential stakeholders are needed to ensure an effective response, and operational plans for the response should be explicitly linked. Regarding our recommendation that DHS develop performance measures for emergency response capabilities, DHS has begun to revise its grant programs, but it is too early in that 

process to determine whether and how performance measures will be incorporated 

into those revisions. Performance measures would allow DHS to set priorities for 

funding on the basis of reducing overall risk, thereby helping ports obtain resources 

necessary to respond. We continue to believe that the recommendations not yet addressed have merit and should be fully implemented. 

COAST GUARD HAD NOT ASSESSED RISKS TO ALL OCS FACILITIES

In accordance with Federal statutes and Presidential directives, the Coast Guard 

assesses security risks as part of its responsibilities for ensuring the security of OCS 

facilities and deepwater ports. In doing so, the Coast Guard, among other things, 

uses a tool called the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM). Coast 

Guard units throughout the country use this tool to assess security risks to about 

28,000 key infrastructure in and around the Nation’s ports and waterways. For ex-
22 

22The Homeland Security Act of 2002, enacted the same day as MTSA (November 25, 2002), 

established DHS and gave the Department wide-ranging responsibilities for, among other 

things, leading and coordinating the overall National critical infrastructure protection effort. 

Title II of the Homeland Security Act, as amended, primarily addresses the Department’s responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection. According to DHS, there are thousands of facilities in the United States that if degraded or destroyed by a manmade or natural disaster 

could cause some combination of significant casualties, major economic losses, or widespread and 

long-term disruptions to National well-being and governance capacity. 23DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency (Washington, DC: January 2009). This plan represents a strategy for protecting critical 

infrastructure and key resources and it offers a framework for assessing risk. DHS issued the 

original plan in June 2006. 24 Network effects involve the ripple effect of an incident or simultaneous incidents on key sectors of the economy. For example, production facilities, pipelines, transfer stations, and refineries are part of the oil and natural gas network in and around the Gulf of New Mexico. Assessing network effects could involve determining whether a terrorist attack on a few key assets 

would have a disproportionate effect on the performance of this network. Such an assessment 

could examine the degree to which such an incident could disrupt the flow of oil or natural gas 

to industries that use these types of energy as inputs to their production functions. 25DHS defines threat as a natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that 

has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or 

property. For the purpose of calculating risk, the threat of an intentional hazard is generally 

estimated as the likelihood of an attack being attempted by an adversary; for other hazards, 

threat is generally estimated as the likelihood that a hazard will manifest itself. In the case 

of terrorist attacks, the threat likelihood is estimated based on the intent and capability of the 

adversary. DHS defines vulnerability as a physical feature or operational attribute that renders 

an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard. In calculating the risk of an intentional hazard, a measure of vulnerability is the likelihood that an attack is successful, given 

that it is attempted. DHS defines consequence as the effect of an event, incident, or occurrence; 

reflects the level, duration, and nature of the loss resulting from the incident. For the purposes 

of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, consequences are divided into four main categories: Public health and safety (i.e., loss of life and illness); economic (direct and indirect); psychological; and governance/mission impacts. 26MSRAM assesses consequences of six factors: (1) Deaths and injuries, (2) primary economic 

impact, (3) environmental impact, (4) National security impacts, (5) symbolic impacts, and (6) 

secondary economic impacts. 

ample, MSRAM examines security risks to National monuments, bridges, and oil 

and gas terminals. 

The Coast Guard’s efforts to assess security risks to OCS facilities and deepwater 

ports are part of a broader effort by DHS to protect critical infrastructure and key 

resources.22 To further guide this effort, in 2009 DHS issued an updated version of 

the 2006 National Infrastructure Protection Plan which describes the Department’s 

strategic approach to infrastructure protection.23 The plan placed an increased emphasis on risk management and it centered attention on going beyond assessments 

of individual assets by extending the scope of risk assessments to systems or networks.24 For example, while the 2006 plan focused on assessing the vulnerability 

of facilities, the 2009 plan discussed efforts to conduct systemwide vulnerability assessments. 

Progress Made Assessing Offshore Security Risks 

The Coast Guard has taken a number of actions in assessing security risks to 

OCS facilities and deepwater ports. The Coast Guard has used MSRAM to, among 

other things, examine security risks to OCS facilities and deepwater ports by assessing three main factors—threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.25 First, Coast 

Guard analysts use MSRAM to assess security risks against such energy infrastructure by examining potential scenarios terrorists may use to attack OCS facilities or 

deepwater ports. For example, MSRAM assesses attack scenarios, such as an attack 

by a hijacked vessel, a small boat attack, sabotage, or an attack by a swimmer or 

diver. Second, the analysts use MSRAM to evaluate vulnerabilities of OCS facilities 

and deepwater ports by examining the probability of a successful attack by assessing factors such as the ability of key stakeholders, including the owner, operator, 

or law enforcement, to interdict an attack and the ability of a target to withstand 

an attack. Third, the analysts use MSRAM to evaluate potential consequences of an 

attack, such as deaths or injuries and economic and environmental impacts.26

MSRAM’s output produces a risk index number for each maritime target—such as 

an OCS facility or deepwater port—that allows Coast Guard officials at the local, 

regional, and National levels to compare and rank critical infrastructure for the purpose of informing security decisions. According to Coast Guard officials, based on 

MSRAM’s output, which is a relative risk ranking, OCS facilities are not considered 

to be high-risk targets. 
23 

27 According to the Coast Guard, secondary economic impacts are a factor representing a description of follow-on economic effects of a successful attack. 

To inform analysts’ inputs into MSRAM, the Coast Guard has coordinated efforts 

with the intelligence community and key stakeholders. For example, the Coast 

Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center inputs threat assessment data into 

MSRAM. Coast Guard analysts also use information from other stakeholders, such 

as reports produced by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), which contain oil and gas 

production data, to inform their evaluations of vulnerabilities and consequences. 

Based on the assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, MSRAM 

produces a risk index number for each OCS facility and deepwater port. The Coast 

Guard has also taken actions to supplement MSRAM by, among other things: (1) 

Including new data fields on the frequency with which tankers visit a port and (2) 

adding additional threat scenarios, such as a threat involving a cyber attack, to its 

data set. 

While MSRAM has been applied to deepwater ports, Coast Guard officials have 

also used an independent risk assessment to assess security risks as part of the application process for recently constructed deepwater ports. For example, in December 2006, as part of the application process for a proposed deepwater port in the 

Massachusetts Bay, the Coast Guard, the owner and operator, and other stakeholders collectively identified and assessed threat scenarios as well as the potential 

consequences and vulnerabilities of each scenario. Based on this assessment, stakeholders identified and agreed to carry out security measures to mitigate the risks, 

such as installing camera systems and increasing radar coverage. 

Challenges in Data and Scope Hinder Risk Assessments 

The Coast Guard faces complex and technical challenges in assessing security 

risks. The Coast Guard recognizes these challenges and generally has actions underway to study or address them. Coast Guard officials noted that some of these challenges are not unique to the Coast Guard’s risk assessment model and that these 

challenges are faced by others in the homeland security community involved in conducting risk assessments. Specific challenges are detailed below. 

Challenges in Data 

• Vulnerability-related data.—The Coast Guard does not have data on the ability 

of an OCS facility to withstand an attack, which is defined in MSRAM as target 

hardness. The Coast Guard recognizes that target hardness is an important 

consideration in assessing the vulnerability of OCS facilities. However, MSRAM 

analysts described challenges in assessing target hardness because empirical 

data are not available or research has not been conducted to do so. For example, 

research on whether a hijacked boat or an underwater attack could sink an offshore oil or natural gas platform would give the Coast Guard and owners and 

operators a clearer sense of whether this attack scenario could result in major 

consequences. Coast Guard officials and corporate security officers with whom 

we spoke indicated that such research would advance knowledge about the 

vulnerabilities of OCS facilities and deepwater ports. Gaining a better understanding of target hardness of these and other threat scenarios could improve 

the quality of the output from MSRAM. According to Coast Guard’s MSRAM 

Program Manager, the Coast Guard may recommend conducting more research 

on the vulnerability to and consequences of attack scenarios as a result of a 

study it is currently conducting on OCS facilities in the Gulf of Mexico. The 

Coast Guard initiated this study in the fall of 2010 after the Deepwater Horizon 

incident. The study initially reviewed the ‘‘lessons learned’’ from Deepwater Horizon and how those lessons could be used to improve MSRAM. During the 

course of our review, Coast Guard officials stated that the scope of the study 

has been expanded to include OCS facilities and that the Coast Guard expects 

to issue its report in the fall of 2011. 

• Consequences-related data.—The input for secondary economic impacts 27 can 

have a substantial effect on how MSRAM’s output ranks a facility relative to 

other potential targets. Undervaluing secondary economic impacts could result 

in a lower relative risk ranking that underestimates the security risk to a facility, or inversely, overvaluing secondary economic impacts could result in overestimating the security risk to a facility. However, the Coast Guard has limited 

data for assessing secondary economic impacts from an attack on OCS facilities 

or deepwater ports. Coast Guard analysts stated that gathering these data is 

a challenge because there are few models or guidance available for doing so. 

During the course of our review, the Coast Guard started using a tool, called 
24 

28 IMPLAN stands for IMpact Analysis for PLANning. It is a tool that assesses economic relationships between primary economic impacts and secondary economic impacts. 29GAO/AIMD–00–21.3.1. 30MODUs engage in drilling rather than production. 

‘‘IMPLAN,’’ that helps inform judgments of secondary economic impacts by 

showing what the impact could be for different terrorist scenarios.28 The tool, 

however, has limits in that it should not be used where the consequences of a 

terrorist attack are mainly interruption to land or water transportation. Enhancing DHS’s and the Coast Guard’s ability to assess secondary economic impacts could improve a MSRAM analyst’s accuracy in assessing the relative risk 

of a particular target. Coast Guard officials added that they are working with 

DHS’s Office of Risk Management and Analysis in studying ways to improve 

how it assesses secondary economic impacts. 

Challenges in Scope 

• Challenges in assessing security risks to OCS facilities.—We determined that 

the Coast Guard did not conduct MSRAM assessments for all 50 of the OCS 

facilities that are subject to Federal security requirements in 2011. Coast Guard 

guidance calls for MSRAM analysts to identify and assess all significant targets 

that fall within a unit’s area of responsibility, which includes all security-regulated OCS facilities. Specifically, as of May 2011, we found that MSRAM did 

not include 12 of the 50 OCS facilities operating at that time. Coast Guard officials generally agreed with our finding and they have since incorporated these 

12 facilities into MSRAM and completed the required risk assessments. While 

the Coast Guard plans to update its policies and procedures for inspecting and 

ensuring the security of OCS facilities in the future, the current set of policies 

and procedures do not call for an updated list of OCS facilities to be provided 

to MSRAM analysts to assess the security risks to such facilities annually. 

Coast Guard officials acknowledged that their policies and procedures did not 

include this requirement. Revising policies and procedures to include such a requirement is important in that the number of OCS facilities could change each 

year. For example, some facilities may drop below the production or personnel 

thresholds described earlier in this statement, thereby falling outside the scope 

of 33 C.F.R. part 106, or other facilities could meet or exceed such thresholds, 

thereby rendering them subject to part 106. Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government state that policies and procedures enforce management 

directives and help ensure that actions are taken to address risks.29 In addition, 

internal control standards state that such control activities are an integral part 

of an entity’s planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of Government resources and for achieving effective results. Developing 

such procedures could help ensure that the Coast Guard carries out its risk assessment requirements for such security-regulated OCS facilities. 

• Challenges in assessing security risks to offshore energy infrastructure that is not 

subject to security requirements.—With respect to OCS facilities, analysts only 

use MSRAM to assess security risks associated with those OCS facilities that 

are regulated for security under 33 C.F.R. part 106. For example, the Deepwater 

Horizon did not meet the threshold criteria subjecting it to regulation under 

part 106, and therefore, MSRAM was not used to assess its security risks (see 

figure 2 for a photo of the Deepwater Horizon explosion). According to Coast 

Guard officials, mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs), such as the Deepwater 

Horizon, do not generally pose a risk of a terrorist attack since there is little 

chance of an oil spill when these units are drilling and have not struck oil.30

However, the officials noted that there is a brief period of time when a drilling 

unit strikes a well, but the well has yet to be sealed prior to connecting it to 

a production facility. The Deepwater Horizon was in this stage when it resulted 

in such a large oil spill. During that period of time, MODUs could be at risk 

of a terrorist attack that could have significant consequences despite a facility 

not meeting the production or personnel thresholds. For example, such risks 

could involve the reliability of blowout preventer valves—specialized valves that 

prevent a well from spewing oil in the case of a blowout. Gaining a fuller understanding of the security risks associated with MODUs, such as the Deepwater 

Horizon, could improve the quality of program decisions made by Coast Guard 

managers on whether actions may be needed to ensure the security of this type 

of facility. According to Coast Guard officials, they are studying the ‘‘lessons 

learned’’ from the Deepwater Horizon incident and part of the study involves examining whether analysts should use MSRAM to assess MODUs in the future. 
25 

31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A 

Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: February 2010). 32 National Research Council: Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to 

Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: 2010). 33See Gerald G. Brown, W. Matthew Carlyle, Javier Salmero ́n, and Kevin Wood, Operations 

Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School: Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack and Planning Defenses (Monterrey, California: 2005). According to DHS, resiliency is the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a 

change in conditions. 34 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deep 

Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling (Washington, DC: January 

2011). 

• Challenges in assessing systemic or network risks.—MSRAM does not assess 

systemic or network risks because, according to Coast Guard officials, these 

types of assessments are beyond the intended use of MSRAM. The 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2010 DHS Quadrennial Review,31 and a 

National Research Council evaluation of DHS risk assessment efforts 32 have 

determined that gaining a better understanding of network risks would help to 

understand multiplying consequences of a terrorist attack or simultaneous attacks on key facilities. Understanding ‘‘network’’ risks involves gaining a greater understanding of how a network is vulnerable to a diverse range of threats. 

Examining how such vulnerabilities create strategic opportunities for intelligent 

adversaries with malevolent intent is central to this understanding. For example, knowing what damage a malicious adversary could achieve by exploiting 

weaknesses in an oil-distribution network offers opportunities for improving the 

resiliency of the network within a given budget.33

How the Coast Guard assesses offshore infrastructure within the broader set of 

networks is important. The findings of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill incident illustrate how examining networks or systems from 

a safety or engineering perspective can bring greater knowledge of how single facilities intersect with broader systems.34 The report noted that ‘‘complex systems almost always fail in complex ways’’ and cautioned that attempting to identify a sin-
26 

35We are conducting this work for the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation; the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; the House Committee on Energy and Commerce; the Chairman 

of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; the Ranking Member of the 

House Committee on Homeland Security; and the Ranking Member of the House Committee on 

Natural Resources; and the Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management. 

gle cause for the Deepwater Horizon incident would provide a dangerously incomplete picture of what happened. As a result, the report examined the Deepwater Horizon incident with an expansive view toward the role that industry and Government sectors played in assessing vulnerabilities and the impact the incident had on 

economic, social, and environmental systems. Enhancing knowledge about the 

vulnerabilities of networks or systems with which OCS facilities and deepwater 

ports intersect could improve the quality of information that informs program and 

budget decisions on how to best ensure security and use scarce resources in a constrained fiscal environment. Doing so would also be consistent with DHS’s Quadrennial Review and other DHS guidance and would provide information to decision 

makers that could minimize the likelihood of being unprepared for a potential attack. Coast Guard officials agreed that assessing ‘‘network effects’’ is a challenge 

and they are examining ways to meet this challenge. However, the Coast Guard’s 

work is this area is in its infancy and there is uncertainty regarding the way in 

which the Coast Guard will move forward in measuring ‘‘network effects.’’ 

CONCLUSIONS

The threat of terrorism against energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure 

highlights the importance of the Coast Guard having policies and procedures in 

place to better ensure the security of energy tankers, OCS facilities, and deepwater 

ports. The Coast Guard has taken steps to implement prior GAO recommendations 

to enhance energy tanker security, and it continues to work towards implementing 

the three outstanding recommendations. Improvements in security could help to 

prevent a terrorist attack against this infrastructure, which could have significant 

consequences, such as those resulting from the Deepwater Horizon incident. While 

the Coast Guard does not consider OCS facilities that it has assessed in MSRAM 

to be high-risk, it is important to assess all OCS facilities as required by Coast 

Guard guidance. Since May 2011, when we determined that some OCS facilities 

were not assessed, the Coast Guard has completed its assessments for the previously omitted facilities. However, given that the list of security-regulated facilities 

may change each year based on factors such as production volume, it is important 

to ensure that any facilities added to the list in the future will be assessed for security risks in MSRAM. By revising policies and procedures to help ensure that an 

updated list of OCS facilities is provided to MSRAM analysts on an annual basis, 

the Coast Guard would be better positioned to ensure that all risk assessments for 

facilities requiring such assessments be conducted in a manner consistent with the 

law and Presidential directive. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION

To strengthen the Coast Guard’s efforts to assess security risks and ensure the 

security of OCS facilities, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard 

revise policies and procedures to ensure that MSRAM analysts receive the annual 

updated list of security-regulated OCS facilities to ensure that risk assessments 

have been conducted on all such OCS facilities. 

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

We provided a draft of this testimony to DHS and DOJ for comment. The Coast 

Guard concurred with our recommendation to revise policies and procedures to ensure that MSRAM analysts receive the annual updated list of security-regulated 

OCS facilities. DHS and DOJ provided oral and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, 

this concludes my prepared statement. This testimony concludes our work on Coast 

Guard efforts to assess security risks for offshore energy infrastructure. However, 

we will continue our broader work looking at the security of offshore energy infrastructure, including Coast Guard security inspections and other challenges. Our 

evaluation will focus on Coast Guard security inspections and other measures to 

better secure OCS facilities and deepwater ports.35 We will continue to work with 
27 

the Coast Guard to develop solutions to ensure that inspections of OCS facilities are 

completed as required. 

I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell. 

The Chairman now recognizes Captain Whitehead for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JAMES H. WHITEHEAD III, SECTOR 

COMMANDER, SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON, U.S. COAST 

GUARD 

Captain WHITEHEAD. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Green, Congressman Keating. Thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you and discuss port security in the Houston-Galveston area. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned many of the titles so I will skip 

all those that I hold. But I would like you to know that the Sector 

focuses on three fundamental roles, and it is maritime safety, security, and stewardship. As the Commandant, Admiral Robert Papp, 

has stated, ‘‘We protect those on the sea; we protect America from 

threats delivered by sea; and we protect the sea itself.’’ 

These primary roles are accomplished in cooperation with our 

maritime partners through three committees in this area: HoustonGalveston Navigation Safety Advisory Committee, Area Maritime 

Security Committee, and the Central Texas Coastal Area Committee. These committees represent robust, active collaborations of 

a wide range of Federal, State, local stakeholders from law enforcement, industry, port authorities, shippers, agents, and educational 

institutions, and others. Members from all three meet, train, exercise together regularly to develop and refine plans, address issues 

of concern, disseminate information, and share ideas and best practices in pursuit of continuous improvement in all three fundamental roles. The largest of the three is the Area Maritime Security Committee chartered in 2004, now comprising over 400 members at-large. 

In Houston, we routinely conduct integrated operations with our 

city, county, State, and Federal law enforcement partners. The 

joint agency, Houston Area Maritime Operations Center, is a prime 

example of the type of coordination directed in the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan recently signed by the U.S. Coast Guard, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement. These operations typically involve the Harris County’s Sheriff Office and local police department marine divisions as well as CBP, ICE, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and other partners. 

We also rely heavily on our port partners to be our ‘‘eyes on the 

water.’’ With an average of 350 tow and 700 deep draft ship movements daily in the Houston Ship Channel in over 100 waterfront 

facilities with a vigilant security presence, we have a valuable resource of maritime industry stakeholders who are best positioned 

to recognize when things are out of the ordinary and who diligently 

report on breaches of security and suspicious activity. 

We also receive reports on fraudulent use of the Transportation 

Worker Identification Card and work closely with our local law en-
28 

forcement and legal agencies, such as the Harris County District 

Attorney, to ensure these cases are prosecuted. 

The Ship Channel Security District, as has been mentioned, represents a unique private-public partnership formed to improve security and safety for facilities, employees, and communities surrounding the Houston Ship Channel. The Coast Guard played an 

important role in the formation of the district and continues to 

work closely with them to ensure alignment of our priorities and 

unity of effort. As Sector commander, I am a member of the Security District Advisory Council and regularly sit on that. 

The Sector also makes excellent use of our robust vessel traffic 

service. The VTS’ primary role is facilitating the safe transit of vessels in the waterways and ports along the Houston Ship Channel. 

The VTS’ cameras, automatic identification system feeds, remote 

radar observation capability, and radio communications also provide an additional layer of security. In addition to the VTS resources in the Houston Ship Channel Sector, Houston-Galveston 

has access to feeds from three AIS receivers mounted on offshore 

oil platforms which provide heightened awareness of activities in 

the maritime domain. 

Mr. Chairman, threats and vulnerabilities will always exist, but 

through the active involvement of hundreds of partners who are directly involved with or impacted by the maritime industry in the 

Houston-Galveston area, this Sector is committed to deterring incidents before they happen, well-prepared to respond to them should 

they occur, and has a resiliency to rebound quickly in the aftermath. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am 

happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Captain. 

[The statement of Captain Whitehead follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JAMES H. WHITEHEAD III 

AUGUST 24, 2011 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished guests, I want to thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss port security in the HoustonGalveston area. 

As the Sector Commander and Captain of the Port in Houston-Galveston, I serve 

as the region’s Federal Maritime Security Coordinator, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, and the Officer-in-Charge Marine Inspection. The Sector focuses on two 

major operational processes—PREVENTION and RESPONSE—in support of three 

fundamental roles: Maritime Safety; Maritime Security; and Maritime Stewardship. 

As the Commandant, ADM Robert Papp, has stated, ‘‘We protect those on the sea; 

we protect America from threats delivered by sea; and we protect the sea itself.’’ 

We accomplish these fundamental roles by cooperating with our maritime partners through three committees: The Houston-Galveston Navigation Safety Advisory 

Committee; the Area Maritime Security Committee; and the Central Texas Coastal 

Area Committee. 

These committees represent robust, active collaboration between a wide range of 

Federal, State, and local stakeholders from law enforcement, industry, port authorities, shippers, agents, and educational institutions, among others. Members from all 

three committees meet, train, and exercise together regularly to develop and refine 

plans, address issues of concern, disseminate information, and share ideas and best 

practices. The largest of the three committees is the Area Maritime Security Committee which was chartered in 2004 and now includes over 400 members-at-large. 

The committee has active working groups in the areas of facility security, intelligence, law enforcement, grants, public affairs/outreach, and joint training and ex-
29 

ercises. The work is continuous, and progress in the various areas is reported to the 

membership during quarterly meetings. 

In Houston, we routinely conduct integrated operations with our city, county, 

State, and Federal Law Enforcement partners. The joint agency Houston Area Maritime Operations Center is a prime example of the type of coordination directed in 

the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan recently signed by the U.S. Coast 

Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These operations typically involve the Harris County Sheriff’s Office and local city Police Department marine divisions as well as CBP, ICE, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and other Federal partners. 

This concept will continue to grow and expand across the entire Sector in the coming months, as our implementation plan takes effect. Efforts are also underway with 

our neighboring Sectors to align and streamline our operations across all jurisdictional boundaries. 

We also rely heavily on our port partners to be the ‘‘eyes on the water.’’ With an 

average of 350 daily tow movements in the Houston Ship Channel and more than 

100 waterfront facilities with a vigilant security presence, marine industry stakeholders are well-positioned to recognize when things are out of the ordinary and 

serve as a valuable resource by diligently reporting breaches of security and suspicious activity. We also receive reports on fraudulent use of the Transportation 

Worker Identification Card, and work closely with our local enforcement and legal 

agencies such as the Harris County District Attorney to ensure these cases are prosecuted. 

In terms of maritime traffic and cargo, the Port of Houston ranks first in the 

United States for number of ship arrivals and second in total cargo tonnage. Houston handles over 50 percent of all containerized cargo arriving at Gulf of Mexico 

ports. Additionally, more than 50 percent of the gasoline used in the United States 

is refined in this area. With more than 100 petrochemical waterfront facilities, 

Houston is the second-largest such complex in the world. Major corporations such 

as Exxon-Mobil, Shell, Saudi ARAMCO, Stolt Nielson, Odfjell USA Inc., Sea River 

and Kirby Marine have National or international headquarters in Houston. 

In recognition of the significance of Houston’s shipping activity, the State of Texas 

formally established the Houston Ship Channel Security District (HSCSD) in 2010. 

The HSCSD represents a unique public-private partnership formed to improve security and safety for facilities, employees, and communities surrounding the Houston 

Ship Channel. The Coast Guard played an instrumental role in the formation of the 

HSCSD, and continues to work closely with the HSCSD to ensure alignment of priorities and unity of effort. As Sector Commander, I am a member of the HSCSD 

Advisory Council and Sector Port Security specialists attend HSCSD board meetings. The district provides oversight of comprehensive and cost-effective security solutions, leveraging more than $30 million in Federal Port Security grants along with 

$4 million in annual member assessments to install technology and security infrastructure and provide funds for specific security projects, maintenance, and operational services. 

The Port of Houston accommodates a large number of tankers carrying crude oil, 

refined products and chemical cargoes. With approximately 9,600 deep draft ship arrivals each year, the Coast Guard maintains a very extensive Port State Control 

program in the Houston-Galveston area. The Port State Control program ensures 

the safe carriage of hazardous materials in bulk. Because over 90 percent of cargo 

bound for the United States is carried by foreign-flagged ships, this National program prevents operation of substandard foreign ships in U.S. waters. 

The Sector also makes excellent use of its robust Vessel Traffic Service (VTS). The 

VTS’s primary role is facilitating safe vessel transits in the waterways and ports 

along the Houston Ship Channel. The VTS cameras, Automatic Identification System (AIS) feeds, remote radar observation capability, and radio communications, 

also provide an additional layer of security. In addition to the VTS resources in the 

Houston Ship Channel, Sector Houston-Galveston has access to feeds from three 

AIS receivers mounted on off-shore oil platforms, which provide heightened awareness of activities in the maritime domain. 

Mr. Chairman, threats and vulnerabilities will always exist. But through the active involvement of hundreds of partners who are directly involved with or impacted 

by the maritime industry in the Houston-Galveston area of responsibility, this Sector is committed to deterring incidents before they happen and is well-prepared to 

respond to them should they occur. 

In 1787, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist Paper Number 12 laid the foundation 

for the modern Coast Guard when he noted that ‘‘[a] few armed vessels, judiciously 

stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense, be made useful 
30 

sentinels of our laws.’’ We’re proud of that legacy and our role in continued national 

strategy to keep our homeland secure. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The Chairman now recognizes Sheriff Garcia for 

his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF SHERIFF ADRIAN GARCIA, HARRIS COUNTY, 

TEXAS 

Sheriff GARCIA. Thank you, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, and thank you, my friend Congressman McCaul. Thank 

you all for bringing much-needed attention to our good work here 

at the Port of Houston and the Houston Ship Channel. I would like 

to think that we are demonstrating to Washington how we can 

work in a bipartisan, nonpartisan way to make sure that all stays 

well and healthy for our communities. 

You have heard from others today already about how this port 

and this ship channel is growing and how it is serving this incredible community and how it is one of America’s most important lifelines to the world. You have at your fingertips all the facts and figures about the essential raw materials and products that move 

along the Houston Ship Channel, enabling us to live our everyday 

lives in the modern world. 

As you have mentioned, Congressman McCaul, we have learned 

about Osama bin Laden, how he had some of the same information 

showing how important the ship channel is and the Port of Houston is. No doubt would-be terrorists in the United States and foreign countries know this, too. Next time they scheme to kill Americans and disrupt the energy supply of Planet Earth, they may 

think about targeting the very ground that we are on today. 

I am here as the person in charge of local law enforcement that 

has been chosen to coordinate the protection of the ship channel 

and all of its crucial assets. There is no mission more important to 

me than preventing a terrorist attack on Harris County. I assure 

you that our partners and I, Coast Guard, CBP, and others, are actively working to pursue this mission every day. We patrol the waterway in boats and in air with our fixed-wing aircraft, and I have 

been working to add an airborne drone to our surveillance arsenal 

so we can exploit the latest advances in such technologies. 

We keep our electronic eyes trained on the ship channel 24/7 

with camera sensors, radar, and other technology. Data from these 

high technology devices is fed into a monitoring center that we operate on the other side of town 24/7. We help the Coast Guard escort high-value asset vessels. We join the Coast Guard and CBP in 

boarding ships and scanning ship hulls, and although several operations are highly sensitive, I can tell you that our patrols on land 

and water have responded to calls for service such as suspicious 

persons in vehicles, security zone breaches by personal water craft, 

sunken boats, downed power lines, industrial accidents, security 

card violations at plant gates, and others. 

In addition, we have helped industry sites evaluate their own security efforts and equipment to point out any vulnerabilities because prevention is job No. 1. We also have to prepare for disaster, 

man-made or not. We work hand-in-hand with Federal, State, and 

local authorities not only to share intelligence, but also to conduct 
31 

emergency response exercises. I would like to recognize Major Michael Wong and Captain Cordova, Deputy Hidorga as some of the 

key folks in these efforts that handle these matters on a day-to-day 

basis. 

We are also in touch with pipeline companies, railroads, and 

emergency planners. 

In a very different kind of pioneering outreach, I have established what we call the Incidence Response Forum. We use it to engage the widespread Middle Eastern and South Asian communities 

in the Houston area. This is a two-way communication pathway for 

law enforcement to share information with key civic and religious 

leaders. The spirit in which we started this program several 

months ago was expressed very well in a Homeland Security memo 

issued by the Federal Government within the last 3 weeks. It is titled, ‘‘Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism 

In The U.S.’’ Here is a brief excerpt that refers to the attempts by 

terrorist groups to recruit American residents: ‘‘Countering 

radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by engaging 

and empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build 

resilience against violent extremism. Law enforcement plays an essential role in keeping us safe, but so too does engagement and 

partnership with communities.’’ 

But our Incident Response Forum has other uses. By sharing information with these constituents, we help protect them against 

misguided attacks that may stem from terrorist acts anywhere in 

the world. These leaders can also report hate crimes, help calm 

tensions that may arise in ethnic communities and provide feedback about the effectiveness of law enforcement by the Harris 

County Sheriff’s Office. We are conducting crisis response exercises 

with this group. 

Overall, in Harris County, there is no deficit of will, dedication, 

cooperation, coordination, or maximization of resources when it 

comes to protecting the Houston Ship Channel, but we do need additional funding, as I have stated in my previous testimony in 

Washington, to hire the necessary personnel to fulfill all the responsibilities that we want. We would also like to encourage funding for the type of community engagements as I just mentioned regarding the Incident Response Forum. 

I just will close by saying this: Congressman, you mentioned that 

international polls indicate that folks in other parts of the world 

may not see America as strong. The Harris County Sheriff’s Office 

is ready to work alongside our partners and you to prove to domestic and international terrorists that they are mistaken about America’s strength and determination. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Sheriff Garcia follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADRIAN GARCIA

AUGUST 24, 2011 

Thank you, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, and thank you to my 

friend, the gentleman from Texas, Congressman McCaul, for inviting me to provide 

testimony about Harris County. I’m glad you represent part of our county. I’m glad 

you and I have been able to work together on several pressing issues involving the 

well-being and safety of our constituents. I’d like to think we’re showing Washington 

how to work in harmony on a bi-partisan and non-partisan basis. 
32 

You have heard from others today about how this growing, bustling, sprawling 

community is one of America’s most important lifelines to the world. You have at 

your fingertips all the facts and figures about the essential raw materials and products that move along the Houston Ship Channel, enabling us to live our everyday 

lives in a modern world. 

We have learned that Osama bin Laden had some of the same information showing how important this lifeline is. No doubt, would-be terrorists in the United States 

and foreign countries know this, too. Next time they scheme to kill Americans and 

disrupt the energy supply of planet Earth, they may think about targeting the 

ground we are on today. Obviously, oil tankers, refineries, and petrochemical plants 

are potential targets because they have huge physical profiles, and most of them 

contain highly flammable substances. 

I’m here as the person in charge of the law enforcement agency that has been chosen to coordinate the protection of the Ship Channel and all of its crucial assets. 

This may surprise some of our local audience, because the Sheriff’s Office is known 

more for running the Nation’s third-largest jail and patrolling an unincorporated 

area with the same number of residents as the city of Philadelphia. But there is 

no mission more important to me than preventing a terrorist attack on Harris County. 

I assure you, we actively pursue this mission every day. We patrol the waterway 

in boats. Sometimes we patrol from the air with our fixed-wing craft, and I have 

been looking into adding an airborne drone to our surveillance arsenal so we can 

exploit the latest advances in such technology. We keep our electronic eyes trained 

on the Ship Channel area 24/7 with cameras, sensors, radar, and other technology. 

Data from these high-technology devices is fed into a monitoring center that we operate on the other side of town, safe from any damage that would be caused in this 

zone. 

We help the Coast Guard escort ‘‘High Value Asset’’ vessels. We join the Coast 

Guard and Customs in boarding ships and scanning ship hulls. We’ve even acquired 

technology from at least one other security-minded nation to help keep our eyes on 

the situation underwater. 

Although much of our operations are highly sensitive, I can tell you that our patrols on land and on the water have responded to calls for service such as these: 

• Suspicious persons and vehicles 

• Security zone breaches by personal watercraft 

• Sunken boats and downed power lines 

• Industrial accidents 

• Security card violations at plant gates. 

Fortunately, none of these incidents stemmed from a plot to bring us massive 

harm. 

In addition, we have helped industrial sites evaluate their own security efforts 

and equipment to point out any vulnerabilities. Prevention is Job One, after all. 

But we also have to prepare for a disaster, man-made or not. We work hand-inhand with Federal, State, and local authorities not only to share intelligence, but 

also to conduct emergency response exercises. We’re in touch with pipeline companies, railroads, and emergency planners. 

In a very different kind of pioneering outreach, I have established what we call 

the Incidence Response Forum. We use it to engage the widespread Middle Eastern 

and South Asian communities in the Houston area. This is a two-way communications pathway for law enforcement to share information with key civic and religious 

leaders. 

The spirit in which we started this program several months ago was expressed 

very well in a homeland security memo issued by the Federal Government within 

the last 3 weeks. It’s titled ‘‘Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.’’ Here is a brief excerpt that refers to attempts by terrorist groups to recruit American residents: 

‘‘Countering radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by engaging and 

empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience against violent extremism. Law enforcement plays an essential role in keeping us safe, but so 

too does engagement and partnership with communities.’’ 

But our Incidence Response Forum has other uses. By sharing information with 

these constituents, we help protect them against misguided attacks that may stem 

from terrorist acts anywhere in the world. These leaders can also help report hate 

crimes, help calm tensions that may arise in ethnic communities, and provide feedback about the effectiveness of law enforcement by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office. We are conducting crisis response exercises with this group. 
33 

Overall: In Harris County, there is no deficit of will, dedication, cooperation, coordination, and maximization of resources when it comes to protecting the Houston 

Ship Channel. But we do need additional funding so we can stay ahead of domestic 

and international terrorism threats. 

A few weeks ago in Washington, I testified to one of your sister subcommittees 

about the bottom line in Harris County: We are not yet able to deploy personnel 

to the extent that this type of responsibility demands. 

We received $30 million in Homeland Security grants from the Federal Government for new security hardware. But the grants do not allow for investment into 

the most critical of resources; and that is the full-time deputies and the necessary 

training they need to be effective in policing a unique environment like the Ship 

Channel. We’d also like to see Federal funding for the kind of community engagement programs I described moments ago. We appreciate the Federal Government’s 

direction on this; we’d also appreciate more resources that address the Federal Government’s root mission of protecting the homeland. 

Another financial challenge is local. The Ship Channel Security District collects 

assessment fees from its 100 or so private industry members and pays the money 

to county government in return for security services and enhancements. But the National economy has harmed property values in the Houston area, and these values 

are the foundation of the tax base the county uses to fund all of its operations, including my agency. The county cut its overall spending by forcing a hiring freeze. 

I have lost several hundred employees as a result since October 2009, with more 

than 125 just from our Patrol Bureau. All of my crime-fighting programs are 

strained; I have had to pay an exorbitant amount of overtime just to staff my jail 

at required State standards. 

And yet, we have not been awarded any COPS grants from the Justice Department, apparently because law enforcement agencies that have had to lay off employees got first priority. I hope Congress and the administration will recognize that a 

forced hiring freeze—not even replacing attrition—is in fact a layoff—especially 

when it prevents us from deploying more crime-fighters to the National security 

asset known as the Houston Ship Channel. We’d welcome any kind of assistance 

from Washington, whether it comes from COPS grants or elsewhere. 

If you will invest in us, one of the things we can give you in return is a National 

model for cooperation among Government agencies and the business community. 

Eight cities border the Ship Channel Security District. Other partners in the security district include the Texas Department of Transportation, the Metropolitan 

Transit Authority, the county’s Office of Emergency Management and its other 

agencies, and the University of Houston. The security district has an 11-member 

board, eight of whose members come from private industry. 

The Coast Guard, Merchant Marine, and Customs and Border Patrol play major 

roles here. We also fall under the Area Maritime Security Council, which takes a 

regional approach to maritime and border security in Houston and nearby Galveston, Freeport, and Texas City, Texas. Of course our port authority is another 

major partner. In your National research, you will probably find it difficult to find 

another locale where the job of combining private industry interests with the operations of efficient Government has been carried out so successfully. 

We all want to meet the highest expectations of our community, of the Nation, 

and of the world. And we need your help. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Sheriff, and let me—appreciate the 

good work that you do and we certainly support our local sheriff 

as well. 

So, with that, Mr. Edmonds, you are recognized for testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES T. EDMONDS, CHAIRMAN, PORT OF 

HOUSTON AUTHORITY 

Mr. EDMONDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members. I appreciate very much the opportunity to speak to you today about how 

security and emergency preparedness is handled at the Port of 

Houston. 

I believe that we have a good story to tell. As you know and as 

has been pointed out, the Port of Houston is one of the busiest 

ports in the country. As has been pointed out, it is the second-largest petrochemical complex in the world. There are more than 150 
34 

distinct maritime entities along the upper Houston Ship Channel, 

which includes, of course, the Port Authority, and each of us has 

a different business model, and we all have different security risks. 

But I am proud to say that when it comes to security and emergency preparedness, the industrial community at the Port of Houston has a strong tradition of effective collaboration and communication, but before I talk about security, and at the risk of being redundant, let me provide you with a brief overview of the port. Specifically, how the port is organized and its various pieces will help 

you understand how security is handled here. 

There is a saying in the port business if you have seen one port 

you have seen one port. In fact, they are all different, one way or 

another. The Port of Houston is a 25-mile complex comprised of 150 

private companies as well as the public facilities that the Port Authority operates. The Port Authority is the public entity, and we 

operate eight terminals. As I mentioned to Congressman Keating, 

we operate some of those for ourselves. We have others that know 

better than we do, operate those kind of facilities. 

While the Port Authority does have the overall responsibility as 

the local partner with the Federal Government in maintaining the 

Houston Ship Channel, in practical terms, we really are just one 

of many players that make up the greater Port of Houston. 

As you know, the Federal Government has the primary responsibility at the port regarding security and emergency response. We 

have obviously a number of Federal partners, but it is primarily 

the U.S. Coast Guard that will provide direction and coordination 

in any kind of all-hazard event. The Coast Guard’s mission, as you 

have heard, is also to protect the waterway and to regulate the security of vessels into maritime facilities. 

While the Federal Government provides the overall guidance and 

authority on large incidents, each of us along the Houston Ship 

Channel has developed emergency response plans that conform to 

standards in Federal law. I can speak, of course, to the Authority’s 

eight terminals. Our plan is on-going, coordinated by the Port Security Emergency Operations Department to respond to any security or emergency situation. On a regular basis, the Port Authority 

works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, Harris County Sheriff, 

and Houston Police Department, other Federal and local agencies, 

as well as a broad spectrum of external industry stakeholders to 

provide a coordinated response to any kind of a security situation 

that may arise. 

The Port Authority has an internal committee that meets regularly to review and revise our emergency operations plans which 

includes the National Incident Management System procedures. 

We are also the first port in the United States to be certified as 

obtaining the International Organization of Standardization, the 

ISO, 28000.2007 security standard, and I am pleased to say that 

we were just recertified in March of this year for another 3 years. 

Our port security and emergency operations team is led by Captain Marcus Woodring, right behind me. Captain Woodring joined 

the port team in July after retiring from 28 years of service with 

the U.S. Coast Guard, the last 5 years here in Houston as both the 

captain of the port and as deputy commander. He is the certified 

emergency manager and oversees our port police and our marine 
35 

departments, encompassing approximately 150 professional responders. We are very pleased that he has joined us, and I think 

that he will bring a serious upgrade to our operations and we are 

excited about that. 

As you can see, there are many players involved in security at 

the port. As I mentioned, there is 150 private industries, as well 

as all of our partners at the Federal and State and local levels. It 

is, indeed, a complex mix, and the stakes are high, but altogether 

the port is, as has been pointed out by you, a significant economic 

engine. 

I will give you another statistic. According to a recent economic 

impact study, marine cargo activity at the public and private terminals at the Port of Houston along the Houston Ship Channel generates $118 billion of local economic activity in Texas. This activity 

produces $3.7 billion in tax revenue and is responsible for more 

than 785,000 direct and indirect jobs. 

To give you some magnitude of the activity in 2010, there were 

7,800 vessel calls at the Port of Houston, and as the Chairman 

mentioned, there is over 150,000 barge movements annually. So 

this activity makes the overall port the largest in the Nation in foreign water-borne tonnage and second in total tonnage. 

The port is critical to our Nation’s energy security. As I mentioned earlier and as has been mentioned, the port is home to the 

largest petrochemical complex in the United States and second in 

the world. The Port of Houston is ranked as the largest importer 

and exporter of petroleum and petroleum products in the United 

States. The country’s largest refinery with a refining capacity of 

567,000 barrels of oil a day is located on the channel. 

From Houston, refined energy products are delivered over the infrastructure that transports them to every market east of the 

Rocky Mountains through a network of roads, rails, and pipelines 

that originate along the Houston Ship Channel, and this includes 

the 5,519-mile long colonial pipe system, which is the largest petroleum product pipeline system in the Nation and is vital to the energy for the south and the east coast of the United States. 

Despite the inherent challenges of this many people and interests, the Port of Houston has demonstrated that we effectively collaborate on security issues. Our assets have been recognized in 

that we have been called a model for the Nation. A quote from the 

2009 report by the U.S. Coast Guard on port Interagency information sharing states that: ‘‘Port partnerships are predictably strongest, most collegial and most proactive where major calamities have 

necessitated life-and-death relationships of trust. This was most 

evident in the partner interviews in Sectors New York and Houston.’’ 

One of our significant efforts that helped us earn this accolade 

is an initiative that was passed by the Texas legislature. As has 

been mentioned, the State of Texas provided great leadership and 

foresight in the creation and usage of the Houston Ship Channel 

Security District. Captain Diehl will speak more to that in his testimony, but I want to take just a minute to highlight the importance of this recently-appointed entity. 

The security district was created to complement the Federal port 

security programs. The Federal dollars given to ports for security 
36 

allow for great improvements through purchasing equipment or 

supporting training exercises, but they did not include money for 

operation and maintenance. In our case, that is about $4 million 

annually. So Harris County, the Port Authority, and Houston Ship 

Channel industries worked together with the legislature to create 

the management district around the port, and the district assesses 

the industries within a certain boundary, and these funds then are 

used for the O&M of the district. 

I would say to you that I am very pleased to be a small part of 

that. I think former Secretary Chertoff saw that as a model for this 

country, in fact, during the legislative process wrote letters of support for us, but he saw immediately the viability of this concept. 

I believe that I am correct in saying that I think other ports have 

looked at that model for their own security needs, and so we are 

very pleased that it is here, and I am very pleased that Captain 

Diehl and his organization basically administer that entity. 

So I, like the other gentlemen, am pleased to answer any questions that you may have when that is appropriate. 

[The statement of Mr. Edmonds follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES T. EDMONDS

AUGUST 24, 2011 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your panel to talk about how security and emergency preparedness is 

handled at the Port of Houston. I believe that we have a good story to tell. As you 

may know, the Port of Houston is one of the busiest ports in the country and is 

home to the second-largest petrochemical complex in the world. There are more than 

150 distinct maritime entities along the upper Houston Ship Channel, including the 

port authority, and each of us has different business models and security risks. But 

I am proud to say that when it comes to security and emergency preparedness, the 

industrial community at the Port of Houston has a strong tradition of effective collaboration and communication. I hope that my participation, along with my colleagues here on this panel, that you will have a better understanding of our challenges and successes. 

Before talking about security, it is important to provide you with an overview of 

the Port of Houston. Specifically, how the port is organized and its various pieces 

will provide the fundamental understanding of how security is handled. There is a 

saying that if you have seen one port, you have seen one port. The Port of Houston 

is a 25-mile-long complex comprised of these 150-plus private companies, as well as 

the public facilities operated by the Port of Houston Authority. 

The port authority, which I represent, is the public entity along the ship channel 

and it owns or operates eight terminals. While the port authority does have the 

overall responsibility as the local partner with the Federal Government in maintaining the Houston Ship Channel, in practical terms, we are one of many players that 

make up the greater Port of Houston. 

As you may know, the Federal Government has the primary authority at the port 

regarding security and emergency response. We have several Federal partners, but 

it is primarily the U.S. Coast Guard that would provide direction and coordination 

in any all-hazard event. The Coast Guard’s mission is also to protect the waterway 

and regulate the security of vessels and maritime facilities. 

While the Federal Government provides the overall guidance and authority on 

large incidents, each of us along the Houston Ship Channel has developed emergency response plans that conform to standards in Federal law. I can speak, of 

course, to the port authority’s plan for our eight terminals. Our plan is an on-going, 

coordinated effort by the Port Security and Emergency Operations Department to 

respond to any security or emergency situation. On a regular basis, the port authority works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, Harris County Sheriff’s Office, Houston 

Police Department, Federal and local agencies as well as a broad spectrum of external industry stakeholders to provide a coordinated response to security situations. 

The port authority has an internal committee that meets regularly to review and 

revise our Emergency Operations plan, which includes National Incident Manage-
37 

ment System (NIMS) procedures. We also are the first port in the United States to 

be certified as obtaining the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) 

28000:2007 security standard, and were just recertified in March, 2011, for another 

3 years. 

Our Port Security and Emergency Operations Team is led by Captain Marcus 

Woodring, who joined the Port Authority team in July after retiring from 28 years 

of service in the U.S. Coast Guard, the last 5 years here in Houston as both the 

Captain of the Port and Deputy Commander. He is a Certified Emergency Manager 

and oversees our Port Police and Marine Departments, encompassing approximately 

150 professional responders. He is here with me today, and has the responsibility 

of directing and monitoring the port authority’s security and emergency program 

while meeting Federal, State, U.S. Coast Guard, and other regulatory requirements. 

As you can see, there are many players involved in security at the Port of Houston. There is the port authority, 150 private industries, as well as partners or authorities at the Federal, State, and local levels. It is a complex mix. And the stakes 

are high. Altogether, the Port of Houston is a significant economic engine. According 

to a third-party economic impact study, marine cargo activity at the public and private terminals of the Port of Houston and along the Houston Ship Channel generates nearly $118 billion in economic activity in the State of Texas. This activity 

produces $3.7 billion in tax revenue and is responsible for more than 785,000 direct 

and indirect jobs. In 2010, there were 7,800 vessel calls at the Port of Houston and 

over 150,000 barge movements. This activity makes our overall port the largest in 

the Nation in foreign waterborne tonnage and second in total tonnage. 

This port is also critical to our Nation’s energy security. As I mentioned earlier, 

the port is also home to the largest petrochemical complex in the United States. The 

Port of Houston is ranked as largest importer and exporter of petroleum and petroleum products in the United States. The country’s largest refinery, with a refining 

capacity of 567,000 barrels a day, is located on the channel. From Houston, refined 

energy products are delivered over the infrastructure that transports them to every 

market east of the Rocky Mountains through the networks of roads, rails, and pipelines originating in Houston. This includes the 5,519-mile Colonial Pipeline system, 

which is the largest petroleum product pipeline system in the Nation and is a vital 

energy artery for the South and East Coast. 

But, despite the inherent challenges of this many people and interests, the Port 

of Houston has demonstrated that we effectively collaborate on security issues. Our 

successes have been recognized in that we have been called a model for the Nation. 

A quote from a 2009 report by the U.S. Coast Guard on Port Interagency Information Sharing states: 

‘‘Port partnerships are predictably strongest, most collegial and most proactive 

where major calamities have necessitated life-and-death relationships of trust. This 

was most evident in the partner interviews in Sectors New York and Houston . . .’’. 

One of the significant efforts that helped us earn this accolade is an initiative that 

was passed by the Texas Legislature. The State of Texas provided great leadership 

and foresight in the creation of the Houston Ship Channel Security District. Captain 

Bill Diehl, who is also a part of your panel will speak more about the district and 

its role in more detail, but I want to spend a few moments and highlight the importance of this recently formed entity. The security district was created to complement 

the Federal port security programs. The Federal dollars given to ports for security 

allowed for great improvements through purchasing equipment or supporting training exercises, but it did not include money for operation and maintenance, personnel, or any matching requirement. Harris County, the port authority, and private 

industry worked together with the legislature to create a management district 

around the port. The district assesses the industries within its boundaries and these 

funds will be used in concert with the Federal funds to implement regional and 

port-wide security solutions. 

Thank you for the opportunity to host your committee hearing here today. I’m 

happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Edmonds. I agree with you, the security district is a model for the Nation, and I applaud everybody 

who has participated in it. 

With that, I recognize Captain Diehl for his testimony. 
38 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM J. DIEHL (UNITED STATES 

COAST GUARD, RET.), PRESIDENT, GREATER HOUSTON 

PORT BUREAU, INC. 

Captain DIEHL. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of 

the committee. Thank you. 

I appreciate the opportunity you have provided me today to discuss port security from an industry perspective. I represent businesses that depend on the ship channel, and we have a very vested 

interest in keeping it safe, secure, efficient, and operational. Currently, the lack of dredging funding is a big issue for us, as discussed in my submitted testimony, but in the interest of time I will 

focus my verbal comments on the Houston Ship Channel Security 

District. 

After 9/11, a group of industry leaders from East Harris County 

Manufacturers Association sat down with law enforcement officers 

from Harris County, the city, Coast Guard, the Port of Houston Authority, and others to discuss ways to help. Because of the inherent 

nature of security, that is, you need weapons and jurisdiction, industry-backed several large security initiatives sponsored by Harris 

County. With industry, State, and local authority support, legislation was passed forming the Ship Channel Security District, which 

gave the district authority to assess its members. 

The security district concept of industry assessing themselves 

and then decide how to allocate the funding works because it is run 

by industry. Of the 11 members of the Houston Ship Channel Security District board of directors, eight are industry representatives 

who work as senior plant managers. If Government were to assess 

significant security tariffs on industry and then allocate the funding without industry prioritization, I doubt that it would be as well 

supported as it is. When a board member is obligated to interact 

with their fellow plant managers and justify their decisions, you 

get better industry participation and support on security initiatives. 

As a result of this work, we now have a unique public-private 

partnership that improves security for facilities, employees, and 

communities by providing increased preparedness and response capabilities. The district’s infrastructure improvements include wireless and fiber optic wire communication systems with integrated 

analytical and intelligence video software, surveillance and detection cameras, night vision, motion detection technology, and additional technology components such as radar, sonar, and sensor 

packages. We have already added 112 cameras, 69 handheld radiation detectors, two marine side-scan sonar units, four patrol boats, 

seven patrol trucks, five radar sites, and an underwater remotelyoperated vehicle to our regional security picture. 

I do have one suggestion that will help us in utilizing grant 

fundings more efficiently. We need the grant process to be either 

faster or more flexible. Because of the lag between grant approval 

and receipt of funds, we have a situation where agencies that several years ago needed boats and cameras now have different infrastructures or are unable to staff, due to budget cuts, previous 

rounds’ equipment. 

Business allocates large sums of money for long-term projects, 

but as they move forward towards completion they don’t put them 
39 

on auto pilot. They are continually modifying and completely 

changing them to give them the best return for investment. That 

is sort of the industry model, but we lose that with these Federal 

grants because of the slow, rigid grant funding process. 

In summary, the security district is a learn-as-you-go process, no 

different than what all of us experience as we grow in this 9/11 security world. We know that working together we move more ships 

in this port than any other port in the United States. Moreover, we 

know the main reason this industry-led security district works is 

because, at the end of the day, we are all focused on keeping the 

ship channel open. Our security district decisions must complement 

our effective, productive businesses and keep traffic moving. Industry wants to be involved and wants to be part of this solution. We 

understand security’s expensive. We think that by bonding together, by using this model, we get better security at less cost. 

I want to close by emphasizing industry is not looking to supplant the responsibility of DHS, but rather, to work with them to 

gain the maximum security practical for our part. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to appear before you 

today, and I look forward to any questions that you or the committee Members may have. 

[The statement of Captain Diehl follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. DIEHL

AUGUST 24, 2011 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity you 

have provided me today to discuss port security in Houston from an industry perspective. 

As President of the Greater Houston Port Bureau I work with our 130 member 

companies to facilitate commerce in the maritime community. These companies include the ports, terminals, longshoremen, line handlers, agents, and others. The 

Port Bureau also provides administrative services to the Houston Customhouse Brokers and Freight Forwarders Association (roughly 100 companies), and to the Houston Ship Channel Security District (124 companies). This means we work a lot with 

the companies who depend on the Houston Ship Channel. 

Chairman Edmonds discussed the significance of the port and I agree it has huge 

value to our Nation and economy. I may be biased, but I see maritime transportation as the most important mode of transportation to our country. Think about 

it, roughly one-third of our GDP is tied to global trade and 95% of that tonnage 

moves through our Nation’s ports, so keeping commerce flowing is critical to us as 

a Nation. President Obama set a goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2015. The only 

way we are going to get there is through our ports. To keep our ports vibrant we 

need trade agreements, reliable intermodal transportation (i.e., roads, rail, & barge 

infrastructure) and dredging. Of these three, dredging is the most pressing. We are 

choking our global competitiveness by not maintaining our ship channels. Currently 

8 of our 10 largest ports are not at their authorized width or depths. We can talk 

today about securing our ports, but if we cannot get ships in or out, then that conversation will not mean much. Needless to say, at the Port Bureau, we are dedicated advocates for the immediate passage of the Realize America’s Maritime Promise (RAMP) Act (H.R. 104) and the corresponding Senate bill S. 412. 

As I transition to my security comments I want to be very clear from the start 

that industry is not looking to supplant the responsibility of DHS, but rather to 

work with them to gain the maximum security practical for our port. Houston is 

the busiest port in the Nation and the centers of the petrochemical and break bulk 

industries for the United States. Our speed and efficiency are what make us successful. What we like as industry is a stable, predictable business environment. This 

can sometimes be a challenge along a ship channel: Ship collisions, allisions, and 

groundings, hurricanes, oil spills and now security incidents can threaten our ability 

to conduct business. Like any liability to a business, one puts plans and procedures 

into place to reduce the risk and to mitigate the effects when these incidents do 

occur. 
40 

When I was with the Coast Guard we talked about Safety, Security, and Environmental Stewardship; I can tell you that industry gets it, for without an operating 

ship channel we go out of business. For safety and environmental response, most 

companies found co-ops as an effective way to pool resources, and utilize more expertise at less cost than going it on their own. When 9/11 happened they looked to 

this successful co-op approach. However in this case, forming co-ops turned out to 

be a bit more challenging because of the inherent law enforcement framework of security. Private security guards have no jurisdiction on the channel. Put simply: 

When an event occurs, you need someone on scene with a weapon and the authority 

(badge) to take action and resolve the situation. 

To address this post-9/11 security liability a group of industry leaders from the 

East Harris County Manufacturers Association sat down with the law enforcement 

officers from Harris County, the City, Coast Guard, the Port of Houston Authority 

and others to discuss ways to help. Under the Area Maritime Security Committee 

they furthered communications and prioritization of the port security grant process 

to maximize the benefits to the entire community. This successful interaction grew 

and besides elevating their own facility security, these leaders, with the guidance 

of Pat Bellamy from the University of Houston, pushed the idea of using technology 

to coordinate a regional security approach to protecting the ship channel. Because 

a Governmental agency could best deliver security across many facilities, Harris 

County stepped forward to be the sponsor for the project. When large matching 

funds were required industry backed the plan by championing the formation of the 

Houston Ship Channel Security District. With industry, State, and local authority 

support, legislation was passed, so that the District could assess its members. 

The Security District concept of industry assessing themselves and then deciding 

how to allocate the funding works because it is run by industry. Of the eleven members of the Houston Ship Channel Security District Board of Directors, eight are industry representatives who work as senior plant managers. The other three Board 

members represent local municipalities, Harris County and the Port of Houston Authority, comprising a governing body in which everyone is vested in stimulating 

cargo movement and protecting commerce. If Government were to assess a significant security tariff on industry and then allocate that funding without industry 

prioritization, I doubt that it would be as well supported as it is. When board members are obligated to interact with their fellow plant managers and justify their decisions you get better industry participation and support of the security initiatives. 

As a result of this work, we now have a unique public-private partnership that 

improves security for facilities, employees, and communities by providing increased 

preparedness and response capability. The first year’s assessment raised over $4.5 

million dollars in support of the Harris County Security Project which has had an 

immediate impact on local law enforcement. The District’s infrastructure improvements include wireless and fiber-optic wired communication systems with integrated 

analytics and intelligent video software, surveillance and detection cameras, night 

vision, motion detection technology and additional detection components such as 

radar, sonar, and security sensors. With specially trained law enforcement personnel 

using marked cars, patrol boats, and enhanced communications systems, the district 

not only works to deter terrorism, but is able to impact theft and aid with other 

safety and security issues. We have added 112 cameras, 69 handheld radiation detectors, 2 marine side-scan sonar units, 4 patrol boats, 7 patrol trucks, 5 radar sites, 

and an underwater remote operated vehicle to our regional security picture. We 

have another patrol boat, 14 land vehicles, and communications infrastructure 

under construction. 

We’ve seen two dividends emerge from the Security District: Resiliency and coordination. Bolstering resiliency, this equipment will help mitigate disruption of 

business during events such as hurricanes, evacuations, or plant upsets, and help 

district members recover and restore normal operations quicker. For coordination, 

we know that during a security incident, everyone in the area will be called upon 

to contribute. What we’re doing now is ramping up so that during an incident, our 

response is brought to bear seamlessly and coherently. 

I do have one suggestion that would help us utilize grant funding more efficiently. 

We need the grant process to either be faster or more flexible. Right now, the grant 

process only generates money several years after it has been awarded. This time 

delay is aggravated by the substantial constraints on the way funds are spent. Because of the lag between grant approval and receipt of funds, we have a situation 

where agencies that, several years ago may have needed boats and cameras, now 

have different infrastructure or are unable to staff (due to budget cuts) previous 

rounds’ equipment. If we have the ability to address our needs when we receive the 

grants instead of after years of wading through a bureaucratic process, we can use 

the money more efficiently by addressing current concerns. Businesses allocate large 
41 

sums of money for long-term projects, but as they move towards the completion they 

don’t put them on autopilot. They are continually modifying or completely changing 

them to give them the best return for the investment. Currently, we lose that with 

this slow and rigid grant funding process. 

I will close by saying that we see the Security District as a learn-as-you-go process, no different than what all of us are experiencing as we grow into this post9/11 security world. We know that by working together we move more ships in this 

port than any other port in the United States. Moreover, we know the main reason 

that this industry-led Security District works is because at the end of the day, we’re 

all focused on keeping the ship channel open. Our Security District decisions must 

complement our effective, productive businesses and keep traffic moving. Industry 

wants to be involved and wants to be a part of the solution. We understand security 

is expensive. We think that by bonding together—by using this model—we are getting better security with less cost. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to appear before you today, and I look 

forward to any questions that you or the committee Members may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Captain. 

The Chairman now recognizes himself for questions. 

As I stated, the recent killing of Osama bin Laden revealed a lot 

of things in a treasure trove of documents, one relating to a spectacular, potential attack on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11; the 

other, targeting oil tankers at ports such as the Houston Port Ship 

Channel. That obviously got my attention as one of the main reasons I am having this hearing today. 

When you look at the past, they have done it before. I mean, this 

is a picture of the oil tanker attacked and targeted by al-Qaeda off 

the coast of Yemen. So it is nothing new these tactics. This is the 

kind of scenario we want to prevent, and that is the purpose of the 

hearing today. 

The GAO I think did a very good study and analysis of security 

concerns and what needs to be done to make sure that something 

like this never happens at this port in Texas. However, there was 

a picture taken of the Houston Ship Channel with a very small vessel going into the port, into the ship channel, which did raise some 

concern. 

So my first question is to Mr. Caldwell: How often does this type 

of scenario occur where a small vessel, kind of like what attacked 

the USS Cole, has come into the ship channel undetected? 

Mr. CALDWELL. It is a hard question. I don’t want to exaggerate 

an antidote because, when I took that picture, I had been to the 

ship channel area several times down here in my maritime security 

work, but I am not always on the channel that often, but I am on 

the channel and took that picture. So I think some of the things 

that have been talked about like cameras and patrols may help reduce that, but it is my understanding this is a prohibited zone. So 

I was quite concerned actually to see that boat when I took that 

picture. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Is this a frequent occurrence or just a rare occurrence? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Well, I have been to—it has happened twice—of 

the two times, I have been on the channel, it has happened that 

one time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is something obviously—and let me just first 

say, though, that the Coast Guard, Harris County Sheriff’s Office, 

Port Authority have done a fantastic job I think securing this. We 

can never emphasize hardening our security more, and I think that 

is one point of this hearing. 
42 

My next question is to Mr. Edmonds and Captain Diehl. This is 

basically an illustration of the energy supply for the Nation, and 

when you look at this map, it really brings out the fact that the 

majority of the energy for the Nation comes right out of here. I 

know the ExxonMobil refinery refines about 31 percent of the Nation’s energy. If that was taken out by a small vessel like this one, 

you can imagine the long-term consequences, economic. It could 

cripple this Nation from an energy standpoint and an economic 

standpoint. 

Can both of you speak to that issue in terms of how important 

this port really is? 

Mr. EDMONDS. Well, the numbers that I use in my speeches—and 

these gentlemen can help me if I am wrong—but something in the 

neighborhood of 49 percent of the refined products used in this 

country every day come from the Houston Ship Channel industries 

and an eighth of the gasoline consumed every day. So it would be 

devastating to the economy of the country. 

The tragedy is you don’t even have to blow up an Exxon. You can 

just shut off access to the waterway and you shut down all that refining capability. There is something leaving this port 24 hours a 

day through a pipeline or railcar or truck. So there is all kinds of 

arteries of movement, and you damage any one of those and that 

has a devastating economic impact. 

The one thing I would say, Captain Diehl mentioned the East 

Harris County Manufacturers Association. That is organization of 

the ship channel—the big producers along the Houston Ship Channel. They are very effective people. They have their own security 

systems and plans, and I think that I can sit here with a degree 

of confidence and say to you that an Exxon or Shell or those people, 

they are sophisticated. They know what they are doing. They are 

very well-protected in their own right. What we try to do is overlay 

that protection to help them, support whatever systems that they 

have in place to make sure that the entire channel is safe. I go to 

sleep pretty much every night not worrying about that. 

But I have to say to you that it could sure happen, and it could 

quickly and easily. But, that said, I think we are vigilant and I 

think that the ship channel on the whole cooperates very well. 

Nine-eleven brought us all together, and since then we have had 

a lot of port-wide security systems and committees and approaches 

and sharing of information and cooperation that has made this, for 

what it is and for the 25 miles of it, about as safe and secure as 

I think we can make it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Captain Diehl. 

Captain DIEHL. Yes. Thank you. 

I won’t repeat the numbers that the Chairman put in his statement, but I would just summarize it this way for you. 

One-third of our economy is associated with global trade, and 

that trade comes and goes through our ports. Ninety-five percent, 

99 percent of it by tonnage probably comes in and out of our ports 

by ships. So it is not only the Port of Houston, but it is all our 

major ports are key to our economy. You shut it down; we are going 

to start heading towards a recession. 
43 

What makes us unique as Houston is these refineries. You can 

shut down a container port and move up the coast to the next container port to deliver those boxes. You can’t package up the refinery and move it. You can’t take those pipelines and pull them out 

of the ground and shift them over to New Orleans. That is what 

is unique. 

But I will tell you, though, when we look at it from the industry 

point of view, we look at security as a liability, the same as we look 

at safety and environmental response. Those are all liabilities. We 

want to keep it safe, secure, environmentally sound, and we want 

to make money. That is the liabilities we look at. So any one of 

these is sort of key for us, and I think what you see out of it, we 

form these groups, these partnerships to address those. 

We have great safety partnerships. We now have—with the security district, we have a very solid security partnership. We have environmental co-ops and things like that to ensure that we can respond. It has proven to work in a big natural disaster such as 

when Hurricane Ike came through here that everyone was able to 

get this thing back up and running in short order. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yeah, let me just take a moment to commend you 

and Mr. Edmonds and Sheriff Garcia for your great work on the 

security district and Captain Whitehead with the Coast Guard. I 

think that it really is a model for the Nation, and it was so successful that it moved us up in terms of the port security grants from 

No. 3 to No. 2 in the Nation, which I think was fantastic. 

One area of funding I am concerned with—and I think, Captain 

Diehl, you talked about it—is with respect to dredging. The Port 

of Houston contributes, as you know, about $120 million into this 

trust fund for maintenance, and yet we only get back about $20 

million or $22 million. The administration sent back about $20 million. The Army Corps of Engineers is recommending somewhere between $40- to $80 million for dredging purposes. With the canal the 

way it is at 50 feet, we won’t be able to accept some of those ships 

coming from the canal into the Houston Ship Channel if we don’t 

have the funding to dredge. Can you speak to that issue? 

Mr. EDMONDS. You are right, and the channel maintenance is 

one of the biggest priorities we have. 

From the sea buoy to shale is about 45 feet. We have received 

three 8,100 TEU ships so far. I did not believe—none of us believed 

that we would receive a ship that large this soon. We thought we 

would wait until 2014. 

The first priority that we have is to dredge the channel from the main channel into Bayport. It is about $150 million. To be candid 

with you, for us to go through the normal Federal Government 

process, it would be 10 to 12 years before we could even get started, and we would lose our customer base if we do that. So we are 

going to fund the $150 million ourselves to make sure that that 

happens so we don’t lose any of that business opportunity. 

But I think at the end of the day about an 8,500 TEU ship will 

be the large ship that will call on Houston. That is a lot of cargo 

movement, and you get six or seven of those in here every day or 

2 days, it is a lot of product that will come. 

But the biggest on-going, No. 1 priority in my mind, other than 

the construction of Bayport and those things to have the appro-
44 

priate dock and moorage capability—is that channel maintenance, 

and we are losing every year a significant amount of the depth that 

we were granted in the last widening and deepening project. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I hope that, Mr. Green, you and I and the Ranking 

Member would like to do this as well, to work on this effort to get 

more of the funding back. 

Mr. EDMONDS. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I am not sure about the Ranking Member. I know 

Mr. Green and I have co-sponsored the RAMP Act, which essentially says that 100 percent of the money sent to the trust fund 

come back for harbor maintenance, and I think that is—— 

Mr. EDMONDS. We don’t even need the whole 120. If we could 

just get 80 or 40 or 50 of it, that would be fine—take care of our 

own needs. 

Mr. MCCAUL. We will work on that one. 

Mr. EDMONDS. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Finally, I know I have taken more than my time, 

but I want to ask Mr. Caldwell and the Sheriff, in terms of your 

recommendations on what needs to be done to ensure that the type 

of tanker explosion I showed earlier does not occur in the Houston 

Ship Channel, what more can we do in terms of security at the 

port? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Well, one of the things that we have noted is, you 

know, one of our recommendations is that they do more local exercises and integrate both the law enforcement and the spill response. Coast Guard did provide us some information on those exercises. There was one that met our criteria in Port Arthur, but we 

had not seen one for Houston. So that would be one that I would 

want Houston to do, given it is important, as we talked about 

today. We have closed that recommendation because the Coast 

Guard is doing those exercises. It is just I would like to see one 

in Houston. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Captain Whitehead, do you have any recommendations? 

Captain WHITEHEAD. I can say we have done exercises where we 

have combined it in Houston. So I am not sure how the information 

flowed, but it is important. Many of the terrorist exercises will 

have an aspect of oil spill along with it, so we combine those together, realizing that, you know, the likelihood of those occurring 

together would be high. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sheriff. 

Sheriff GARCIA. Congressman, I think that, as we have been talking, unfortunately, when it comes to effective security of such a 

critical asset like the Port of Houston, the ship channel, funding 

and funding to accomplish a variety of these initiatives always 

seems to be the common thread. We are using technology. We are 

very grateful for all the work that the security district has accomplished for us and the various technologies that we have, but with 

that comes the cost of operations and maintenance. All the technology is great if you can have a body to turn it on and to monitor. 

So personnel and ability to fund those boots on the ground in a 

tight economy, like what we are currently in, is important to look 

at. 
45 

So a recommendation that I would bring forth is that—I know 

that there is debate about the COPS—the state of the COPS program from the Department of Justice, but I would urge this body 

to look at a COPS program for ports. I think that is an area that 

seriously needs to be considered so that you can accomplish support 

to local communities, involving Federal and National security assets like the port, but that you help local law enforcement meet 

those goals and work effectively alongside our partners. 

So I would urge a COPS program for ports, as well as, you know, 

in a significant area like Harris County and maybe a few other 

places in the country. UASI plays a very critical role, but then we 

still have the challenges of drug cartels and transnational gangs 

and organized crime and all those challenges. So I would also urge 

that maybe a UASI for ports be considered in addition to that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think that is an excellent recommendation. I have 

consistently supported the COPS program. You and I have discussed it personally, and I sent letters to the Department of Justice 

to get that funding for your office and for Harris County, and I 

want to thank you for your testimony. 

With that, I recognize the Ranking Member. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a quick question because of the concerns I have regionally 

as well. So, Mr. Edmonds, specifically on LNG and LNG tankers 

themselves, can you just comment on some of your experience, 

what you learned, what you are doing, you think is the most vital, 

you know, type of approach to LNG and LNG tanker security? 

Mr. EDMONDS. I am not prepared to answer that question, sir, 

because the Port Authority is the public side of this. The private 

side operates itself, and we have no authority or control over it. 

Having said that, though, Captain Whitehead can respond as the 

captain of the port. 

Captain WHITEHEAD. Yes, Congressman. In fact, 2 days from now 

we have a Yemeni—you mentioned earlier a Yemeni LNG tanker. 

We have one coming into the Port Arthur area. Although we don’t 

have any LNG tankers come into this area, the Houston Ship 

Channel, but we do have them come into both Freeport, Lake 

Charles, and Port Arthur. With those, we do take additional measures. We utilize our MSSTs. Our maritime security safety teams 

assist us in securing the—as well as we work with our port partners when they come in as well to secure the port, make sure that 

we board the vessel before it even comes in, do security sweep, escort the vessel in. So we take additional security measures with 

LNG tankers that come into port. 

Mr. KEATING. That really prompts another question I had, Captain. There has been an estimate of as many as 15 countries that 

aren’t maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures in their port 

facilities. So it is not just a question of keeping our own port safe. 

These are coming in from other countries, and the Coast Guard has 

the authority to deny them access, if necessary, from doing this, 

which is a very strong potential tool to get those countries to cooperate. What can we do more from your vantage point? Because 

you can enforce it. You have that ability. What can we do more to 

make those countries do a better job on the front end of this with 
46 

the anti-terrorism kind of securities that should be in place before 

they ever leave their port? 

Captain WHITEHEAD. I would have to take that one for the 

record. It is better answered from our Coast Guard headquarter’s 

perspective. 

What we can do, in general as a Coast Guard, I can tell you we 

have—in my time here, we have denied entry to a few vessels 

based on the countries they were coming from inadequate security 

measures, as well as delayed the ships from coming in until—because if they don’t have adequate security measures, we board the 

ships, hold them offshore, board the ships, and do those additional 

security sweeps. 

Mr. KEATING. I think that—just from our own vantage point, I 

think that is a tremendous tool we should use to make sure those 

countries are doing their part on their end to make our job easier 

and make everyone safer. 

So thank you. I am interested in maybe taking that up with 

headquarters in that regard. 

Sheriff, you mentioned the woeful state of financing—I think if 

I am paraphrasing for you. You know, some of this is penny-wise 

and pound-foolish. Because if you look at the economic impact that 

we have here and one of the largest, right here, in the country and 

having, you know, the inadequate funding resources to do this is 

something that really doesn’t seem to be very wise on my part. Because the impact of even at choke points, even sinking vessels, 

even using the vessels as a missile, even doing damage to bridge 

and infrastructure, what that could do to just shut everything 

down is a great concern. 

So what would you do and where do you see that translating into 

your not being able to do your job as well as possible and what 

other things would you do if you had more resources? 

Sheriff GARCIA. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I will 

tell you that there is probably no other responsibility that I have 

that keeps me up at night and as a part of my daily conversation 

and part of what I regularly challenge my major, who is over our 

homeland security emergency preparedness responsibilities, and it 

is frustrating for us not to have the personnel to be able to be on 

point at all places and present and visible so that we can provide 

all the deterrence necessary. 

So, first of all, I would say that if we had additional resources 

it would be to make sure that we have the personnel available to 

provide all the levels of monitoring, patrol—both on land and water 

and in air—and resources to provide dedicated air support for the 

port, dedicated air surveillance for the port, and then also investment in other forms of technology that would help us create a 

greater zone of protection around the port and in the respective 

community. 

I had the opportunity to visit Haifa—the Port of Haifa as an example. You don’t go near that place or move around that place 

without somebody knowing about it. Doesn’t matter whether you 

are coming off a neighborhood street or major thoroughfare or the 

entry into the port area, people know about it, and that is the way 

this area should be, and it should be secured. So finding other 

forms of technology to accomplish that level of security is critical. 
47 

Then, you know, higher levels of training with private industry, 

higher levels of coordination and information sharing would be 

areas where I would invest as well. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

I think that segues to another question that I had, Captain Diehl 

and maybe all of you can take a shot at this, but it is the idea that 

you have got so many resources here and you seem to be ahead of 

the curve in terms of sharing those resources and dealing with it. 

But are the sophisticated technological equipment, the monitoring, 

the videotapes in the private sector, are they at the disposal and 

shared all the time with local law enforcement, with the Coast 

Guard? 

Captain DIEHL. The idea—the concept of the Ship Channel Security District, as we say, is to create this ring of steel where there 

will be nodes to the Coast Guard, to the Port Authority, to the 

Sheriff, to the city, to all the municipalities’ law enforcement, Pasadena, Deer Park, and all those people would have access to this information. That is the vision that we have for growing into it. 

Right now, we are in the—as we come on-line, we are turning it 

on for different places and letting them look at it. 

I just want to sort of go back to what the sheriff said about it, 

though. We do have some good technology that makes us more efficient. Without the manning, though, it becomes a concern for us. 

As industry people, you know, we can’t just hire security guards 

and send them down. You have to have jurisdiction. You have got 

to have the ability to use weapons in this thing. So we really want 

to back—and that is why the partnership works for the security 

district is we look to local law enforcement, the Coast Guard, Sheriff, and the city and others that have badges to operate and know 

what they are doing on the thing. 

The bottom line, though, comes—and this is what concerns us a 

little bit as we go forward—knowing that the deficit, things coming 

off the Hill and things like that is people say, okay, when are we 

going to be done with the Ship Channel Security District. It would 

be the same as going to your local police department and saying, 

hey, by the end of the year we want crime solved, because next 

year it is not going to be in the budget. That is sort of what my 

members tell me. Hey, security is not going away. It is a liability 

for us that we have got to address, and we know we are in it for 

the long term, and the long term means that we have got to have 

bodies, bullets, boats and all that—buildings and things like that 

to take us to the next level. 

Mr. KEATING. So we have the technology. We don’t have the 

manpower to monitor it? 

Captain DIEHL. We have technology that we are implementing. 

We are not quite where we want to be on it. As I said, we put this 

thing together. We look at it and go, that works, that doesn’t work. 

As we grow into it, it is sort of like the best practices you see that 

normally go into the area of maritime security. We are actually 

heavily involved in looking at and saying that doesn’t work for the 

Sheriff to get that information to respond appropriately. 

So they give us that feedback, and then we are adjusting. So we 

are learning as we go. We are not perfect, but we are further along 

than what we were many years ago. 
48 

Mr. KEATING. So you have the feed that can go directly to the 

Sheriff’s office—— 

Captain DIEHL. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. That is a great partnership you have got going 

there. 

Certainly I think your point is well made. I mean, when you look 

at—we do have needs as a country, and we are in a deficit situation. However, two of our biggest issues besides—putting today’s 

hearing aside in terms of our own security—are jobs and our economy, and if we are investing in that area, it makes sense to me 

that that is an area where we are going to get multiple effect back. 

I just had one other question to Mr. Caldwell, and then I will 

yield my time back. 

Again, in terms of integration, we have got a sense with the captain in terms of what is done, but I think the two things that— 

you know, your initiative the GAO recommended for the FBI working with the Coast Guard for spills and for terrorist threats, working together, how is that integration going with the FBI and—what 

is the state of that? 

Mr. CALDWELL. I mean, unfortunately, it has been somewhat of 

a moving target. I mean, when we made that recommendation, 

DHS was basically reorganizing what had been called the Federal 

response plan into the National response framework, and you need 

kind of that big picture in place to figure out where your detailed 

operational plans would be. Now, they are under another revision 

to that. So, unfortunately, some of that big-picture stuff has to be 

taken care of. 

But certainly from a Coast Guard perspective they have been 

pretty active in exercises; FBI less so. 

Mr. KEATING. Sheriff, how is your interaction with the FBI? 

Sheriff GARCIA. Excellent. We have a great working relationship 

with the Bureau; and every time we have had a change in SACs, 

we have a discussion soon thereafter introducing one another. I 

have called on them on a number of occasions for a variety of 

things, including public corruption, and so we have an outstanding 

working relationship with them. 

I did want to go back to one other area of investment on your 

question, Congressman, if I may, and that is as you see this law 

enforcement and private and public industry relationship, an important investment, if I had the resources, would be in public engagement. Having the relationship with the community, with the 

great diverse community that we have in this area is critical. You 

know, if folks don’t have the confidence and trust to come forward 

with anything they may be aware about, then, you know, our technology isn’t going to light up. Because, ultimately, some tip, some 

information starts with a human being, and we have got to make 

sure that local law enforcement and our Federal partners have that 

relationship and the ability to build and strengthen those relationships. 

So going back to the Incident Response Forum, that is a critical 

area that we have to also look at. It is not technology, but it is an 

important investment to make in terms of building active and 

human relationships. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Sheriff. I yield my time. 
49 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Bill. 

Now, the Chairman recognizes Mr. Green for his questions. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you for the courtesy of not being on the committee 

in allowing me to both make a statement and ask questions. 

First of all, I don’t want to take anything away. Obviously, we 

need dredging money. Because that 250,000 folks that have those 

transport worker cards would probably not be here unless we keep 

that dredging going and, of course, for the growth; and I know a 

lot of other ports are having the same problem. So that is an issue. 

Sheriff and Captain, I was out on a Coast Guard helicopter right 

after 9/11 when we had joint boardings of Coast Guard personnel 

and Navy personnel. Obviously, the Navy for the defense and Coast 

Guard because of the law enforcement capability. I don’t think we 

do that anymore, but it is still available if needed simply because 

we have a better intelligence network and if there is a ship coming 

in from an unusual location that we don’t feel comfortable with 

that is still available, whether it is in the Port of Houston or elsewhere I know. 

But I also know that since 9/11 and having our Sheriff with us 

today, I am fortunate to represent a lot of cities along the Houston 

Ship Channel; and they all have law enforcement. At one time, 

there wasn’t any coordinated effort. But the Sheriff is a designated 

State law enforcement—and the city of Houston, the city of Deer 

Park, Pasadena, you name it, all the way out to Baytown and La 

Porte. 

So that is the benefit we have. We have one Sheriff. I have to 

admit, we did have some problems between Federal and State after 

9/11, the coordination effort there, but that was dealt with. Because, like the Sheriff said, our deputy ISAC, about 2 years into 

9/11, the FBI told me they had been on every plant along the channel to give them an assessment of their vulnerability. 

The Houston area and the port and the businesses in the area 

that form the port security district by State law that was supposed 

to come up with some of the maintenance money—and this is industry who is going to tax themselves based on, you know, the 

grants that the port gets and the area gets for security apparatus. 

So that is important. 

I am real familiar with LNG, though. We don’t have an LNG facility in the Port of Houston. That is why we don’t get the LNG 

tankers. We have a great pipeline network that comes in. I am familiar with the one that comes into Boston Harbor, and I don’t 

know if Captain Whitehead, Captain Diehl, the agreement on that 

from Yemen—and I don’t know if this is true for every cargo from 

Yemen—but I know going into Boston Harbor they actually go to 

the Island of Malta and are inspected. Are either of you familiar 

with that? That was a Coast Guard arrangement? 

Captain WHITEHEAD. I am somewhat familiar with it. I know 

they have it for the tankers going into Boston. I don’t want to 

speak for Boston, but I know they did do some pre-boardings of it 

in the Malta area. 

Mr. GREEN. I know the company. There is a Houston company 

that actually has that contract, and that has been the agreement. 

They would check that Yemen cargo, although previously that were 
50 

actually coming in from Algeria, and I understand now they are 

probably going to come in from—because of the problems in Yemen, 

they will come in from Trinidad for the LNG for the Boston area. 

So there are ways we can deal with that and still have imported 

LNG or, in our case, we are looking at exporting LNG, which can 

be the same volatile product if it is on a ship. That is important. 

Let me ask the Sheriff, though, briefly, the Homeland Security 

appropriations bill passed by the House would cut numerous 

Homeland Security grant programs to State and local entities. The 

bill would cut local and State grant programs about 55 percent 

when compared to fiscal year 2011 enacted and 67 percent compared to the President’s request. Your local law enforcement depends on these grant dollars to help fund the maritime security 

missions and prepare needed maritime assets our ports depend on. 

Can you talk about if you don’t have those up-front grants, at least 

can have the apparatus? 

Also I wonder if you could share about the port security district 

and what it has been doing and on the technology side to make literally a wireless and fiber optic communications between not only 

law enforcement agencies, the plant, the port plants, and the port 

to make sure we have that capability. 

But also mainly we talk about money, and if you don’t have that 

up-front money, it doesn’t do any good to worry about maintaining 

it, because we just don’t have the infrastructure. 

Sheriff GARCIA. Well, Congressman, thank you for your very 

pointed question. The fact is, without the support of the Federal 

Government in regards to the local mission that we have as it relates to a National security interest, we can’t get it done; and so 

it is imperative that your colleagues hear the value of that support 

and what it means to the local community and local agencies like 

myself, and so we have to maintain that funding. 

A 50 percent cut in what we are currently getting, which isn’t 

enough, equals to dire circumstances and tremendously reduced capacity and ability to respond effectively to National and international threats to our local communities. So that is scary, and so 

it is imperative that that be heard. 

Second, as Captain Diehl has said, thanks to a variety of resources and collaborations and to the security district, we have a 

true ring of steel. It is so—we are light years in front of many people. We are a model for other communities in terms of how tying 

in technology systems has been effective and has gotten us to the 

point that we are at. 

But it all goes back to it is great technology. We are truly a 

model. We are contemporary. We are very futuristic in many 

senses. But at the end of the day, we need, you know, blood, sweat, 

and tears to be able to monitor those systems. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all my questions, 

but, again, I appreciate the courtesies of both of you having the 

hearing here but also allowing me to weigh on the committee. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Absolutely. It is great to see you over the August 

recess as well. 

With that, the Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from 

Houston, who arrived just in the nick of time before adjournment, 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. 
51 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much. To 

my colleagues, it is a pleasure to be with Congressman Gene 

Green. We work very hard and together on great assets of this 

whole community and one that is in his Congressional district that 

he shares but has really been a focused leader on the issues necessary in support of the port. 

Congressman Keating, please feel welcomed. We knew that you 

had enough cool breezes in Massachusetts, and we wanted to make 

sure that you could appreciate the diversity of this great land by 

coming here to Houston, Texas. We welcome you to our multiple 

Congressional districts, and we hope that you have benefited from 

coming to this great asset. 

To all of you, and certainly to be at the port is one of my chief, 

if I might say, joys. Because as I have traveled and represented 

this area and traveled internationally and been on the Homeland 

Security Committee, it takes all of the witnesses collectively in 

their respective responsibilities to really ensure that this economic 

engine is protected and that it continues to achieve as it has done. 

Chairman McCaul, thank you as well. You recognized a very, 

very important topic, and if I might just say a few opening words 

that may have already been said, but I think it is important to just 

note that this port has really been the basis for some 287,000 direct and indirect jobs, generating $11 billion in economic impact 

and more than $649 million in State and local tax revenues and 

approximately 17,000 jobs that are connected with the Port of 

Houston. 

I was the convener and leader of a conference on international 

investments, which is why I was delayed with a number of out-oftown guests, and I thank you for your indulgence. But it also allowed me to receive one or two more briefings on the occurrence 

yesterday in the eastern region that impacted cities coming from 

Canada into New York and into Washington, DC, and beyond, 

starting in Mineral, Virginia. I think it is important, as I ask a series of questions, to focus on the importance of preparedness. 

We saw a 5.9 on the Richter scale earthquake. People in New 

York thought it was a terrorist attack. People in Washington, DC, 

as I was keeping up with staff and getting reports, were not aware 

of what it might be, and in that city were probably millions or at 

least hundreds of thousands of tourists, along with our remaining 

staff, certainly some Members of Congress and others, and, frankly, 

it was the seat of Government and then many, many other places. 

I think this hearing, although it is focusing on the port, it really 

has to raise the question of preparedness. I don’t mind adding to 

the record, Chairman McCaul, because we might likely have a 

hearing on this issue when we return, is the level of preparedness, 

and it is clear that we are not prepared, that information did not 

segue into the population as it should have. The evacuation might 

have been incorrect. I need to be corrected, but I am told that 

earthquakes require one to go into places, as opposed to go out of 

places, and everybody was evacuated out of the building, and there 

may be some question. 

But I think this hearing points to being prepared in order to confront the aftermath of not being prepared, and I am grateful that 

it was a 5.9 earthquake that did not see, to our knowledge—reports 
52 

may still be coming in—a loss of lives, and of course, we not have 

yet assessed the damage. 

But just imagine that kind of impact, without the preparedness 

that is necessary, which really includes resources. I want us to get 

to the point where we feel comfortable with preparedness for a natural disaster and a man-made disaster, which is what we are 

speaking of today. 

So I am going to first pose questions to Mr. Caldwell of the GAO 

because I think integration of our law enforcement and preparedness agencies—I know that you did a report in 2007 trying to encourage the transfer of information, the integration of information 

between our local and State, but I assume our other law enforcement agencies—and we now have a multiple number of agencies 

dealing with terrorism after 9/11. Could you respond more in depth 

to that question and tell us exactly in 2011 where we are in making progress on that integration? 

Mr. CALDWELL. We had five recommendations in our earlier report, and three of those have been either closed or they are in 

progress of being closed. Two that were not closed, one had to do 

with exactly the issue you are talking about, the integration of 

operational plans. So that one is still being done; and, at this point, 

we don’t have a commitment from DHS or FEMA about how low— 

to what operational level of planning they are going to take that 

integration. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Why don’t you pause for a moment and just 

tell us what that would be like? Maybe you want to give an example of an incident or what does that mean when you have the integration of operational plans? 

Mr. CALDWELL. So, in our report that we did, we found that there 

was separate operational response plans for an oil spill or an environmental response and separate plans for a law enforcement response and terrorist attack on a tanker. You would have to integrate those two at the same time. The report has detailed comparison of the plans and how they have to be integrated, and so we 

were asking for exercises, which have been done, as well as integration of those operational plans so everyone knows their role 

when something actually happens. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you believe that, if we reached that goal, 

this very question that we are asking about, potential economic impact, if a port like the Port of Houston was actually subjected to 

a terrorist attack, we would be better prepared and better able to 

address it? So it really has to do with saving lives and dollars? 

Mr. CALDWELL. It has to do with making sure everybody knows 

what they want to do to maximize protection of lives and the economy, things like that. 

Also leads to the other recommendation which is still open which 

was on performance measures. We have talked a lot about money 

and resources that are needed, but we still don’t really have a clear 

path of measuring either DHS or FEMA in terms of some of these 

response assets, which ones work, which ones are going to actually 

help us be more prepared. So that is still a very open question. It 

is a very difficult thing to do. How do you measure preparedness 

of a lot of systems? It is not just of an individual program. It is 

how these things fit together. 
53 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think that is key. Because I guess I would 

interpret it as one hand knowing what the other hand is doing, either to jump immediately into action or to use all the necessary 

principles that needed to be involved if there was a terrorist act. 

The question I raise for the earthquake was whether or not we had 

everyone involved that needed to be involved as we looked at this 

up and down the East Coast. 

Mr. Edmonds, there is another captain at the table, but you are 

the administrative captain of this very large area. First, I would 

like you to give me, if you have the acreage of what you supervise 

in the Houston port for people to get the magnitude of how large 

it is. Again, focus on the responsible use of resources, the moneys 

that you could use and have used. We have been very glad to provide you with a number of funding. I have been very glad to be a 

supporter of that for the port for terrorist prevention, if you will. 

I don’t think that is something that necessarily can be, but tell me 

how additional resources would be helpful in managing this very 

huge entity that you have supervision over. 

Mr. EDMONDS. First, I don’t know the acreage size. Does anyone 

know the acreage size? We will get that for you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Just the magnitude, if somebody knows how 

many city blocks. 

Mr. EDMONDS. It is pretty good size. By Texas standards, it is 

pretty good size, but we will get that for you in a minute. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is big. 

Mr. EDMONDS. It is big. 

But let me go back to something that I think speaks to the baseline of your question. 

Because of our geography and because of weather patterns, as 

you well know, we are hurricane prone. So for many, many years 

we have had a very sophisticated hurricane plan. After 9/11, that 

was our baseline to begin to build off of to try to apply security 

issues to that plan because they are very much interrelated. 

I will say to you that in the most recent situation with Ike, I 

think the hurricane plan worked very, very well. Not to get into the 

detail of it, but it is a port-wide committee chaired by captain of 

the port or NOAA, one of those two agencies. All the stakeholders 

in the port are involved in it. There is a schedule that, as a storm 

begins to come, we begin to get ships out of the channel, begin to 

batten down everything until basically everything is secured, including container of wharf grains. Everything is secured and everything is gone or tied down, and it worked very well for us in Ike. 

But, after 9/11, we took that baseline and said, okay, we will try 

to now apply that to different security issues. We have been the recipient I think of some $45 million roughly of security grants since 

9/11, thanks very much to you, Congressman and all of you, but 

we have used those for gate and fence and different kind of hardware security improvements to make sure that we can secure our 

properties. 

The security district, the quick history on that was a former 

county judge was approached by a bunch of ship channel industries 

to apply for a grant for a port-wide security communications capability. They didn’t feel like they qualified under the grant program. 

So the county judge applied for that and got $26 million from the 
54 

original grant. The problem was the $4 million of O&M money. So 

that is how we came together to supply that. 

So we have been an active participant. We have been fairly successful, but we have used those moneys for programs and for integration of programs to make sure that we all communicate with 

each other, that we try to act as one family looking after each other 

to make sure that everyone is secure and as safe as we can be. 

One of the concerns that I have about the security district is— 

if I am correct in this, Captain Diehl, help me—I don’t believe 

there is replacement dollars. One of the beauties of this country is 

technology is evolving every day. That is going to become stale 

technology in short order. So we are going to have to start all over 

in the grant process to get another grant to upgrade the technology. So that is something that you all might think about as you 

deliberate the funding programs. 

Well, she asked me the acreage—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is big. 

Mr. EDMONDS. Eleven thousand five hundred acres of developed 

and undeveloped property. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is big. Thank you. 

Mr. EDMONDS. That is just the authority. There is 25 miles, as 

you know—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Coast line. 

Mr. EDMONDS. As the crow flies. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I just have some follow-up. I 

am trying to read that clock, but with distance and your generosity—I can feel your generosity as I am sitting here. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I didn’t know you could feel that. 

Mr. EDMONDS. It has been there for a long time, as you know. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want to focus on Sheriff Garcia. I happen to 

believe that personnel are key to terrorist prevention or terrorist 

acts prevention, in addition to technology with Mr. Edmonds. So I 

guess I am a fan of people working with technology and keeping 

up with the latest technology. 

There is a possibility—and I don’t think I am giving anyone any 

ideas—that the huge cargo ships represent enormous targets, either by bypassing the scrutiny when the ships were loaded with 

some sort of uranium—some nuclear capacity that is triggered once 

entering this port. The port, interestingly enough, is located in a 

populated area. We should be very clear. We thank the port for its 

hugeness, but it is—and it has been a good neighbor, but it is in 

an area of residential communities. 

I want you to be pointed in your response about the difficulty of 

shortchanging trained personnel where you are a partner with Federal funding. Because my belief is that even in this time of debt 

reduction, we should be prioritizing what we have to spend money 

for, and I think homeland security is important. I am going to ask 

my last two questions of Captain Whitehead and retired Captain 

Diehl as just to say: What would be the most important element 

that you would want this hearing to know in terms of the prevention or the need for increased security at this port that we take 

away and back to Washington? 

But, Sheriff Garcia, if you can focus on the elements of preventing a cargo ship coming in or a seaman determined to perform 
55 

a terroristic act who has managed to get through and be a seaman 

on one of the many cargo ships that are coming in from international waters. 

Sheriff GARCIA. Congresswoman, thank you for your question 

and your leadership on this issue, because it is imperative that I 

do get the message out that I need flesh and blood to carry out my 

mission. Going back to the old adage that cops on patrol do prevent 

crime, well, the deputies on patrol on water and land, around the 

port, can prevent acts of terrorism or criminal operations that can 

lead to terrorism. 

So it is imperative, and as I have said it before at a Congressional testimony that you and I were at, you know, I am a fan of 

the COPS program. I am a fan of, you know, that we are participating in a joint Federal operation here in patrolling of the Port 

of Houston and the Houston Ship Channel. So, thus, I do believe 

that justifies the need for the Federal Government to support a 

local law enforcement agency like myself. 

But also let me be very pointed. When the Sheriff’s office got into 

this relationship with the ship channel and the Port of Houston in 

regards to being the lead agency, we made commitments. We made 

commitments, and at this point because of current economic situations, we are not living up to those commitments. I want to live up 

to those commitments. I want to exceed those expectations. 

I want to be a good partner to my partners with the Coast Guard 

and the CBP and other agencies, but I want to make sure that we 

don’t look back to days like today where we are making it clear 

that we do need support to provide all of the presence of patrol, 

water, land, monitoring of technologies, community relationship 

building, all those issues that would work to keep us safe but 

weren’t able to do it because we didn’t have the salary dollars to 

do that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So cutting funds would have a negative impact? 

Sheriff GARCIA. It would have a catastrophic impact. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. On this port and its surrounding area? 

Sheriff GARCIA. Yes, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Captain Whitehead, something vital we need 

to focus on. 

Captain WHITEHEAD. I would say—I mentioned it earlier—the 

partnerships are key and that is done through people. Technology 

certainly enhances that and facilitates that, but the people are key, 

as you mentioned, Congresswoman, to exercise, train together, 

work together continuously. So those people and interacting together and having the ability to, you know, day in and day out 

work together I think are key to preventing terrorist attacks here. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Captain. 

Captain. 

Captain DIEHL. Good morning. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Good morning. 

Captain DIEHL. If you measured how many law enforcement people are on the ship channel—let’s say, the number is 1,000, if you 

are going across DHS and you are going across the local authorities 

and things like that. What you have the ability to do is gather in 

what Congressman Green talked about, 250,000 people with TWIC 
56 

cards, and that is the industry that works here, and that speaks 

back to what you heard earlier is the partnerships are key. As industry here, we realize if this thing isn’t safe, secure, and environmentally working, we don’t make a profit as industry. We want to 

keep cargo moving. 

Speaking for the Ship Channel Security District, the concerns 

that we have is we have stepped up and said, you know what, we 

are going to help, we are going to supplement, we are going to tell 

you what works without hindering our movement of efficiency of 

cargo. It is a great dovetail between industry and those that are 

protecting us, and that works. 

What the fear is in preparing for this testimony was, okay, with 

the budget cuts, they are going to start giving us less. They are 

going to say, oh, you are a good model down there; you guys can 

shoulder a little bit more of it. That wasn’t really the plan. The 

plan was to work together more to support them to come to the 

table and help them. 

So if we are going to be penalized with less port security grants 

because we are actually assessing ourselves, we are going to lose 

a lot of support among the ship channel security industries that 

are saying, so we rogered up for, you know, in some cases, to pay 

$250,000 a year in assessments to support the security so that 

DHS can pull back? That is not going to go over very well with the 

people I represent. 

Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In conclusion, let me just say that is a very, 

very important point here, you establish yourself as a model really 

for other ports to emulate, and in order to keep up at that level 

of perfection, you need the resources that might be missing because 

someone highlights and says, boy, they are doing great; let’s let 

them to do great with less. 

I just want to put on the record I am constantly looking at ways 

to improve the TWIC card process, and I know the Coast Guard is 

working very hard. Captain, I am well aware of it. But one of the 

things the TWIC card is supposed to do is provide protection, but 

it also sometimes denies opportunity for work for people who are 

in no way a terrorist threat. I would like to see the TWIC card 

process streamlined, move faster, and for the many men and some 

women who have asked about why their process is 6 months, 1 

year, sometimes we know that there is some concerns that we have 

to engage. We need resources for that to make sure the TWIC 

card—— 

My last final point is cargo inspection for the inbound cargo carriers is crucial. We must keep the international connection where 

cargo is being inspected at a high level so that we can protect 

America as those ships are coming in, and I am still not comfortable at where we are on all of the inspections of major cargo 

coming into the United States, and certainly the Houston port is 

one of those recipients. 

So I think this is an important hearing, but I would offer to say 

that I am looking at legislation around this issue, and I would say 

to the Chairman that this is an important bipartisan effort, and I 

look forward to working with this committee as we go forward. 
57 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the gentlelady for recognizing my generosity and being bipartisan. I think that we do have a debt crisis, 

but we also have an obligation under the Constitution to provide 

for a common defense as well. This committee will be having an authorization bill I believe coming up in the fall. That will give us an 

opportunity I think to address some of these funding issues. 

Sheriff, you and I have spoken about the COPS grant program 

that I fully support, and I would hope the whole Harris County delegation would join me in my letter supporting your efforts for that. 

The security district, the success of that is you moved from No. 

3 to No. 2 on the port security grant program. I think that is certainly good news for Harris County. 

Then, finally, I think as my colleague Mr. Green pointed out, on 

the dredging issue—and I hope the gentlelady from Houston will 

join me on this one as well—when we send $120 million to Washington and only get $20 million back—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Absolutely. 

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. That is one of the largest ports in the 

world with one of the biggest risks in the world. 

When you have got the Panama Canal having 50 feet and we 

only have 40 to 45 feet, that is going to be a serious problem in 

terms of trade and the ships coming down the channel. So I would 

hope that we have an opportunity I think to work together on that 

effort as well in a bipartisan effort in the Harris County delegation. 

So, with that, I just want to thank all the witnesses. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Will the gentleman yield for a moment? 

I just want to answer ‘‘yes’’ on the record to join you on the 

dredging issue and on the COPS grant, and I ask for bipartisan 

support as we come up on the appropriations for 2012 and the zeroing out—— 

There are those of us, bipartisan, by the way, Chairman McCaul 

will be submitting an amendment to restore the COPS funds for 

the upcoming fiscal year. I think if we can secure the bipartisan 

support that we have secured before, everyone will understand that 

the re-funding of the COPS grant is what you call a maximizing 

of your investment with the trained law enforcement officers that 

will benefit from it. So I would like to call upon your support for 

the restoring of those funds for 2012. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes, I would also like to point out, let’s not offset 

it with NASA. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Not at all. 

Mr. MCCAUL. We have to find an offset, and we are not going to 

hurt NASA. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Not at all. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I know the gentlelady agrees with that as well. 

The Chairman recognizes for a final statement the Ranking 

Member. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thanks for having 

this hearing. I learned a lot. 

We are just days away from the 10th anniversary of 9/11. This 

testimony today indicated that we are light years—we have moved 

light years in our understanding and anticipating and preparing 

for all kinds of terrorist threats. 
58 

What this hearing also underscores, too, is that, you know, even 

with the ring of steel, even with the model programs, the role of 

security is a Government role; and so as we come away from this 

hearing, we understand our obligation, particularly being Members 

of the Homeland Security Committee, to do this, to protect our citizens, to make sure our commerce is clear and protect our economy 

and our jobs. 

We have an enormous obligation right here in this area, and I 

have learned a lot from being here, and I want to thank everyone 

for giving me that opportunity. 

Mr. MCCAUL. We certainly appreciate you coming all the way 

down from the beautiful bay area of Cape Cod and Nantucket to 

beautiful Houston and the port. 

With that, let me thank the witnesses and everybody for being 

here today. I know we have some Coast Guard vessels out standing, that we are going to take a little ride to the ship channel. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 10 

days; and so, with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ