THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent-Petitioner,

v.

Stephon Robinson, P etitioner-Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000990

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT O F APPEALS

Appeal from Barnwell County Doyet A. Early III, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27883 Heard January 10, 2019 – Filed May 8, 2019

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

Appellate Defender Victor R. Seeger, of Columbia, for Petitioner-Respondent.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Deputy Attorney

General Donald J. Zelenka and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin, all of Columbia; and Solicitor James Strom Thurmond Jr., of Aiken, all for Respondent-Petitioner.JUSTICE JAMES: Stephon Robinson was convicted o f first-degree burglary and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime . Robinson appealed, and the court of appeals remanded the matter to the t rial court to conduct an on-the-record balancing test regarding the admissibility of certain prior convictions the State used to impeach Robinson's credibility pu rsuant to Rule 609(a)(1) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. State v. Robinson , Op. No. 2014

- UP-068 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 19, 2014). After the remand h earing, the trial court ruled Robinson's prior convictions were properly admitted; cons equently, the burglary and weapon convic tions remained in place.

Robinson appealed again, and the court of appeals issued an un published opinion holding that although the trial court erred in applying two of the five factors

we set forth in State v. Colf

, 1 any error in the admission of Robinson's prior convictions for impeachment was harmless. State v. Robinson , Op. No. 2017-UP

065 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 1 , 2017). We granted cross-petit ions for writs of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. We affirm the court of appeals as modified. The court of appeals reached the correct result by a ffirming Robinson's convictions; however, as we will discuss below, the court of ap peals' analysis of the admissibility of the prior convictions was erroneous.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At around 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, February 20, 2011, Eddie Willia ms was relaxing in his home when he heard a car pull into his driveway . Williams testified

he heard a knock at the front door, looked through a window, an d saw Robinson and the white car Robinson had driven to his house on prior occasio ns. Williams ignored the knock at the door because he figured Robinson had come to the house to play video games with his nephew, who was not home. Williams testif ied Robinson got

back into the car and left. Williams made his lunch and retire d to his bedroom to

watch a NASCAR race.

Williams testified that about ten minutes later, he again heard a car pull into his driveway and then heard his front door being kicked in. He grabbed a handgun

from his nightstand and went to investigate. Williams testifie d he started down the hallway and confronted Robinson face-to-face. Williams testifi ed he also saw

1 337 S.C. 622, 627, 525 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2000) (adopting the fi ve-factor test used by federal courts to assist in determining whether the probativ e value of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudi cial effect for purposes of imp eachment under Rule 609, SCRE).Robinson's brother (Reginald Feld er) and another individual he did not recognize

inside his home. Williams fired his handgun, and the intruders ran away. Williams

testified Robinson also had a handgun and fired it in his direc tion while fleeing the

home. Williams testified he then retrieved a shotgun and fired it into the air outside the house as the three individuals escaped in a white car. Wil liams called law enforcement around 2:20 p.m. and told police the intruders were driving a white four-door vehicle he thought to b e a Pontiac. In two separate photo lineups,

Williams identified Robinson and Robinson's brother as two of t he three intruders.

The third intruder was never identified.

On cross-examination, Robinson attacked Williams' credibility, establishing that Williams initially failed to t ell law enforcement he had f ired his handgun.

Williams admitted that on the day of the incident, he falsely i nformed law

enforcement that the bullet holes in his home were not from the burglary but had been there since he purchased the home. Williams testified he was not truthful with

law enforcement because he th ought his handgun had to be regist ered in order for it to be legal. The gun had been reported stolen in Beaufort Coun ty, but Williams

testified he was unaware of th is when he purchased the gun.

Shelly Leanna Gunnels testified she had been in an "on and off" relationship

with Robinson for the last six or seven years. She testified s he allowed Robinson to

use her white Pontiac sedan "whene ver he wanted to use it." Gu nnels testified

Robinson borrowed her car on Febr uary 19 and returned it on February 20 (the day of the incident) "around that afternoon."

At the close of the State's case-in-chief, the trial court inf ormed Robinson of

his right to testify in his defense and warned him the State mi ght be permitted to impeach his credibility with his prior criminal convictions. When Robinson stated he wanted to testify, the State r equested to impeach him pursua nt to Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE, using 2009 convictions for second-degree burglary and att empted strong arm robbery and two 2007 Georgia convictions for breaking into an a utomobile. As we will discuss, Rule 609(a)(1) provides that prior convictions pu nishable by imprisonment for more than one year "shall be admitted" to impe ach the credibility

of a defendant who testifies, "if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused." This test places the burden on the State to convince the trial court the evidence should be

admitted.

Robinson objected, arguing "the prejudicial value outweighs th e probative value." Without conducting the re quisite on-the-record analysi s of the Colf factors,the trial court ruled the strong arm robbery conviction and the two breaking and entering into an automobile convictions were admissible. The t rial court ruled the second-degree burglary conviction was also admissible but ruled it had to be referred to generically as a "prior felony conviction carrying more than one year in prison." The use of the burglary convicti on for impeachment is not an is sue in this appeal.

Robinson testified and denied any involvement in the incident but admitted to knowing Williams and previously going to Williams' house a "goo d bit of times" to "get things from [him]." Robinson later clarified he knew Will iams because

Williams sold him marijuana. Robinson testified he was at his own house with his

brother and cousin at the time of the incident. Robinson testi fied he borrowed

Gunnels' vehicle the night before the burglary so he, his broth er, and his cousin could

go to a club that night. Robinson testified he took the car ba ck to Gunnels around noon or 1:00 p.m. the next day, wh ich would have been prior to the burglary.

On cross-examination, the State questioned Robinson about his prior

convictions as follows:

Q: Are you the same Stephon Robinson that was convicted of strong

arm robbery in 2009? 2

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you're the same Stephon Robinson that had another felony

conviction in 2009 that carried m ore than a year, aren't you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you're the same Stephon Robinson that in 2007 had two convictions for breaking and ente ring automobiles with the inte nt to commit a felony or theft?

A: Yes, sir.

2 As noted above, the State origin ally informed the trial court this was an attempted strong arm robbery conviction but then told the jury it was a strong arm robbery conviction. There was no objection to this distinction by Robi nson, and there is no sentencing sheet in the record to allow us to discern which off ense is correct. This discrepancy does not affect our a nalysis. For consistency, we will refer to this prior conviction as a strong arm robbery conviction.Q: But you want this jury to belie ve that you don't know anything about

this?

A: Yes, sir, because for one, I plead guilty to all of my charges and take my responsibility because I know I was guilty of those cha rges. And two, that was back in my past when I did stupid things to g et a little money to do things because I didn't have. But my parent s recently passed away and we got insurance money and all kind of money ba ck off that, and I have no reason to kick in this man's door. Not hing.

Q: Let me ask you this, in 2007, was your brother with you wheneve r you broke into the cars?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did he plead guilty to his charges?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And in 2009, with the strong arm robbery, was your brother with you then?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who else was with you?

A: No one.

Q: You and your brother?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that other felony charge from 2009, was your brother with y ou then?

A: No, sir.

Q: He wasn't?

A: No, sir. You talking about the burglary, right?

Q: The charge that you pled guilty to in 2009, the felony charge t hat carried more than a year.A: Yes, sir, yes, sir.

Q: Was your brother with you on that?

A: No, sir.

Q: Okay. So in three out of the four times when you committed a crime, your brother was with you?

A: Yes, sir.

Arthur Wallace, Robinson's cousin, testified he, Robinson, and Reginald Felder went to the club together the night before the incident in Gunnels' vehicle and

that Robinson returned Gunnels' vehicle to her around noon or 1:00 p.m., which would have been before the burgl ary. Wallace denied their invo lvement in the burglary and testified that he, Robinson, and Felder all hung o ut together at Robinson's house that day. The S tate impeached Wallace's credi bility with a 2008 second-degree burglary convicti on. Robinson does not challenge Wallace's impeachment in this appeal.

Reginald Felder (Robinson's brother) similarly recounted the t hree going to the club the previous night and hanging out together at Robinso n's house on the day

of the incident. Felder testified Robinson returned Gunnels' vehicle around 1:00

p.m. the day of the burglary. The State impeached Felder's cre dibility with the same 2007 Georgia convictions for breaking into an automobile and th e same 2009 conviction for strong arm robbery that were used to impeach Rob inson. Robinson does not challenge Felder's im peachment in this appeal.

During Robinson's closing argument, Robinson attacked Williams' credibility. During the State's closing argum ent, the State acknowledged the importance of credibility in the case and commented on the credibility of eac h of the witnesses. The trial court gave the following limiting instruction on Robi nson's prior convictions in its charge to the jury:

You also heard in this case evidence that the defendant had been, in the past, convicted of crimes other than the one for which he is now on trial. This evidence may be considered by you if you conclude it's true only in deciding

whether the defendant's testimony is believable or credible and for no other purpose. You must not consider thedefendant's prior record as any evidence of the defendant's guilt of the charge we are trying here today.

Robinson appealed his convictions. The court of appeals found the trial court erred by failing to conduct a meaningful on-the-record balancing test when deciding

whether to admit Robinson's prior convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court for the sole purpose of conducting the balancing test. 3 State v. Robinson , Op. No. 2014-UP-068 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 19, 2014). On remand , the trial court conducted a hearing and heard arguments as to whether Robinson' s prior convictions were admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) and State v. Colf . After the hearing, the trial court issued an order addressing each of the Colf factors and concluded "the probative value of the introduction of [Robinson's] prior recor d outweighed any prejudice to him under Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE." The trial court denied Robinson's

motion for a new trial.

Robinson again appealed. The court of appeals addressed only two of the five Colf factors, held the trial court erred in its application of thos e two factors, but

affirmed Robinson's convictions b ecause "any error in the admis sion of Robinson's prior convictions was harmless." State v. Robinson , Op. No. 2017-UP-065 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 1, 2017). The court of appeals did not address the remaining three Colf factors and thus did not determi ne whether the prior convictions were properly admitted after an analysis of all five Colf factors. We granted both Robinson's and the State's petitions for writs of certiorari.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only. State v.

Baccus , 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "The admission of evidence concerning past convictions for impeachment purposes remains wi thin the trial [court's] discretion, provided the [trial court] conducts the a nalysis mandated by the

evidence rules and case law." State v. Dunlap , 346 S.C. 312, 324, 550 S.E.2d 889, 896 (Ct. App. 2001). "An abuse o f discretion occurs when the c onclusions of the

trial court either lack eviden tiary support or are controlled by an error of law." State

v. Douglas , 369 S.C. 424, 429-30, 632 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2006).

3 See State v. Scriven , 339 S.C. 333, 344, 529 S.E. 2d 71, 76 (Ct. App. 2000) (providing a trial court must conduct "a meaningful analysis to balance the impeachment value of [a defenda nt's] prior convictions, if any, against the prejudicial impact, as clearly re quired under Rule 609(a)(1)").III. DISCUSSION

Both Robinson's and the State's arguments revolve around their perception of

a correct application of the Colf factors in determining whether Robinson's prior convictions were ultimately admissible at trial pursuant to Rul e 609(a)(1), SCRE. Robinson argues the court of appeals correctly applied the two factors it discussed but erred by not addressing the remaining factors and not rulin g on the ultimate admissibility of his prior convictions. Robinson also argues t he error in admitting the prior convictions was not harmless beyond a reasonable doub t. The State argues the court of appeals erred in its application of the two factors it did discuss.

In discussing the issues pertin ent to this appeal, we will atte mpt to clarify the approach that must be undertaken by a trial court when determining whether to admit or exclude evidence of prior convi ctions of a witness for impea chment purposes.

A. Rule 609, SCRE

Rule 609 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence governs the ad missibility

of a witness's prior convictions for purposes of impeachment. Rule 609 prescribes varying standards for admissib ility of evidence of prior convic tions. In pertinent part, Rule 609 provides:

(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,

(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has

been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the proba tive value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused;

and

(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a

crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

. . . .(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule

is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the

proponent gives to the advers e party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of

such evidence.

Rule 609(a) invokes three impeachment scenarios. First, under Rule 609(a)(1), evidence that a witness other than an accused has be en convicted of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one yea r (in the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred) is admissible, subj ect to Rule 403, SCRE. Under Rule 403, evidence of such a conviction "may be ex cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of un fair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consider ations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. " The Rule 403 test places the burden upon the opponent of the evidence to establis h inadmissibility pursuant to Rule 403. Second, under Rule 609(a)(1), when the a ccused chooses to testify during his trial, if the State seeks to introduce impea chment evidence that the accused has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonmen t for more than one year, the evidence is admissible if the State establishes t he probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect upon th e accused. Third, under Rule 609(a)(2), if a witness, even an accused, has been c onvicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, evidence of such a con viction shall be admitted regardless of the maxim um punishment and regardless of the probative value or prejudicial effect of the evidence. See State v. Bryant , 369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 S.E.2d 152, 155 (2006).

Rule 609(b) invokes one impeachmen t scenario. Evidence of a co nviction of any kind is not admissible if more than ten years has elapsed f rom the date of

conviction or the release of the witness from confinement for t hat conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the proponent of the eviden ce establishes that the probative value of the conviction, supported by specific facts and circumstances,substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Rule 609(b) in cludes notice requirements and establishes a presumption against the admissib ility of these "remote" convictions, and the State bears the burden of substan tially overcoming the presumption.

Rule 609(a)(2) requires no balanc ing test for admissibility of a prior conviction for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. However, Rule 609(a)(1) and Rule 609(b) require the trial court to balance—in three varying degrees—the probative value of evidence of a prior conviction a nd the degree of prejudice to the opponent of the evidence (as noted, the Rule 4 03 test also requires the trial court to consider confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, etc.). Even though these three Rule 609 admissibility tests differ from one another, we have, through State v. Colf , provided a uniform set of factors for the trial court to cons ider when applying each test.

In State v. Colf , we considered the admissibility of a criminal defendant's convictions under Rule 609(b), as the defendant's trial took pl ace more than ten years

from the defendant's release from confinement for the prior con victions. 337 S.C. 622, 625-26, 525 S.E.2d 246, 247-48 (2000). In Colf , we adopted the five-factor analysis employed by federal courts when weighing the probative value of prior convictions against the prejudicial effect to the accused. Id. at 627, 525 S.E.2d at

248. These factors include:

1) The impeachment value of the prior crime.

2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness's subse quent history.

3) The similarity between the pas t crime and the charged crime

.

4) The importance of the defendant's testimony.

5) The centrality of the credibility issue.

Id. "These factors are not exclusive; trial courts should exercise their discretion in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Id. Although Colf focused on the admission of prior convictions more than ten yea rs old under Rule 609(b), our courts have also consistently applied these factors for purposes of a Rule 609(a)(1) analysis. See, e.g.

, Bryant , 369 S.C. at 517 n.1, 6 33 S.E.2d at 155 n.1.To summarize, Rule 609(a)(2) contemplates one impeachment scen ario, that being for convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false s tatement, with automatic admissibility regardless of who the witness is and regardless of punishment or resulting prejudice. Rule 609(a)(1) and Rule 609 (b) contemplate three impeachment scenarios with three different admissibility standards: (1) under Rule 609(a)(1), if the witness is someone other than the accuse d and has a prior

conviction of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for m ore than one year,

the trial court must balance the Colf factors and determine whether, under Rule 403, the probative value of the convi ction is substantially outweigh ed by the danger of unfair prejudice and/or other rel evant considerations set forth in Rule 403. The burden of establishing inadmissibility of the conviction is upo n the opponent of the evidence; (2) under Rule 609(a)(1), if the witness is the accus ed and has a prior

conviction of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for m ore than one year,

the trial court must balance the Colf factors and determine whether the probative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused. The burden of establishing admissibility is upon the State, the proponent of the evidence; (3) under Rule 609(b), if the convicti on is a "remote" conviction ( even a conviction of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609( a)(2)), the trial court

must balance the Colf factors and determine whether the probative value of the conviction, supported by specific facts and circumstances, subs tantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Rule 609(b) establishes a presumption against the admissibility

of a remote conviction and places the burden of establishing ad missibility of the conviction upon the proponent of the evidence.

While the same Colf factors are to be considered in determining admissibility under all three of the 609(a)(1) and 609(b) impeachment scenari os, the practitioner

and the trial bench should be mi ndful of the different admissib ility standards in the three scenarios. We also note that these rules apply in civil cases, except of course the portion of Rule 609(a)(1) prescribing the standard to be ap plied when the witness

is the accused in a criminal case. This Court and the court of appeals have

encountered various circumstances under which a Rule 609/ Colf analysis was required. In the instant case, we have the opportunity to clar ify some of the issues faced by both trial courts and appellate courts when Rule 609(a )(1) is in play.

In Bryant , the defendant was on trial for murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon; he testified at trial and was impeached with two prior

firearms convictions. 369 S.C. at 514-15, 633 S.E.2d at 154-55 . When considering whether those convictions were automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) as crimes of dishonesty or false statement, we stated: "Violations of narcotics laws are generally not probative of trut hfulness. Furthermore, a convic tion for robbery,burglary, theft, and drug possess ion, beyond the basic crime it self, is not probative of truthfulness. Likewise, firearms violations also are not ge nerally probative of

truthfulness." Id. at 517, 633 S.E.2d at 155-56 (int ernal citations omitted). Fin ding the defendant's prior firearm convictions did not involve disho nesty or false statement, we explained the probative value of the convictions should have been weighed against their prejudicial effect prior to their admissi on under Rule 609(a)(1). Id. at 517, 633 S.E.2d at 156. We ultim ately held it was error for the trial

court to admit the defendant's prior firearm convictions. Id. at 518, 633 S.E.2d at

156. We reasoned the defendant's prior firearms convictions " had nothing to do with [the defendant's] credibility a nd, their admission was more prejudicial than probative, especially in light of the offenses for which he was on trial." 4 Id.

In State v. Broadnax , the defendant was on trial for armed robbery and kidnapping; he testified at trial and was impeached with his pr ior armed robbery convictions. 414 S.C. 468, 471-72, 779 S.E.2d 789, 790-91 (201 5). The trial court

admitted the defendant's armed robbery convictions pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2) and the court of appeals' prior decision in State v. Al-Amin , 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2003). Broadnax , 414 S.C. at 471, 779 S.E.2d at 790. Overruling Al-Amin and reaffirming the rule articulated in Bryant , we held armed robbe ry is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement and, therefore, the defendant's prior convictions

were not admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). Broadnax , 414 S.C. at 476, 779 S.E.2d at 793. We explained that "for impeachment purposes, crimes of 'dishonesty or false

statement' are crimes in the nature of crimen falsi 'that bear upon a witness's propensity to testify truthfully.'" Id. (quoting Adams v. State , 644 S.E.2d 426, 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)). We emphasized our holding did "not precl ude the admission of prior convictions for armed r obbery; rather, it merely enabl es a trial judge to conduct a balancing test pursuan t to Rule 609(a)(1) when the St ate seeks prior convictions for armed robbery t o impeach a criminal defendant's testimony." Id. at 478, 779 S.E.2d at 794.

B. Application of the Colf Factors and Rule 609(a)(1) in this Case

4 Perhaps a clearer statement in Bryant would have been that the prior firearms

convictions "had little" to do with the defendant's credibility, as we did not intend to hold prior firearms convictions a re per se inadmissible under R ule 609(a)(1) and Rule 609(b). We can envision circumstances in which such prior convictions may well be admissible, provided th e trial court conducts the requi site balancing test and rules accordingly.Robinson's prior convictions inc lude a 2009 conviction for seco nd-degree burglary, a 2009 conviction for strong arm robbery, and two 2007 Georgia convictions for breaking and en tering into an automobile with t he intent to commit a felony or theft. As previously noted, the 2009 second-degree burglary conviction

was "sanitized" when the trial court allowed the State to elici t testimony that Robinson had a prior felony convi ction carrying more than one y ear in prison. The

introduction of this conviction is not an issue in this appeal.

The parties obviously disagree as to the admissibility of the s trong arm robbery conviction and the two br eaking and entering into an au tomobile convictions. Robinson's strong arm robbery conviction and his two breaking into an automobile convictions are not automatically admissible as crim es of dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a )(2); therefore, the trial cour t was required to conduct an analysis under Rule 609(a)(1) and State v. Colf to determine whether the probative value of admitting these prior convictions outweighed the prejudicial effect to Robinson. As we noted above, on remand, the trial co urt considered all five Colf factors and determined the convi ctions were admissible under R ule 609(a)(1); however, the court of appeals revi ewed only two of the five factors.

1. The impeachment value o f the prior crime.

"The starting point in the analysis is the degree to which the prior convictions have probative value, meaning th e tendency to prove the issue a t hand—the witness's propensity for truthfulness, or credibility." State v. Black , 400 S.C. 10, 21, 732 S.E.2d 880, 886 (2012). "The tendency to impact credibility . . . determines the impeachment value of the prior conviction. Impeachment value r efers to how strongly the nature of the conviction bears on the veracity, or credibility, of the

witness." Id. at 21-22, 732 S.E.2d at 887. The purpose of the impeachment is not
to show the witness is a bad person but rather to show backgrou nd facts which impact the witness's credibility. Id. at 22, 732 S.E.2d at 887.

The trial court provided the following analysis regarding the i mpeachment value of Robinson's prior crimes:

This Court finds the admission of the four prior convictions has value for impeachment purposes and that the prejudicial effect of the admission of the prior convictions, if any, is not outweighed by their admission. While no specific details of the prior convictions were provided to this Court or the jury in this case, the mere factthat the Defendant had twice been convicted of serious

crimes within a few years of the alleged offense would tend to impact the Defendant's credibility. Simply put,convictions for breaking into motor vehicles and strongarm robbery don't imply that the accused was an armed burglar, as was alleged in this case, but they do imply that the accused is not someone to be trusted - that he might

not be credible.

Citing Black , 400 S.C. at 21-22, 732 S.E.2d at 887, and Bryant , 369 S.C. at 517, 633 S.E.2d at 155, the court of appeals concluded the trial court e rred in finding Robinson's prior convictions had impeachment value, reasoning S outh Carolina courts have found prior convictions for robbery, burglary, and theft are not probative

of truthfulness. This was error.

In Black , the defendant's only corrobora ting witness was impeached usin g two manslaughter convictions that were more than ten years old. 400 S.C. at 15, 732 S.E.2d at 883. Because of the remoteness of the prior convicti ons, under Rule 609(b), the convictions were only admissible if the probative v alue "substantially" outweighed the prejudicial effect. Id. at 18, 732 S.E.2d at 885. This is a more strenuous admissibility test than the one called for under Rule 609(a)(1). When employing a Colf analysis and addressing the impea chment value factor, we stated

, "A rule of thumb is that convic tions that rest on dishonest con duct relate to credibility, whereas crimes of violence, which may result from a myriad of causes, generally do not." Id. at 22, 732 S.E.2d at 887. We noted that although the prior convictions arguably raised concerns regarding the witness's ge neral character, it is more narrowly the witness's propensity for telling the truth th at is properly placed at

issue under Rule 609. Id. at 23, 732 S.E.2d at 887. We held, "The manslaughter convictions, while crimes of violence, are not particularly pro bative of the specific trait of truthfulness; consequently, their impeachment value is limited. . . . In this case, the trial court did not relate any specific facts or circ umstances, other than the mere existence of the convictions, that made them particularly probative of [the witness's] credibility." Id. at 23-24, 732 S.E.2d at 887-88.

As mentioned above, in Bryant , when we discussed the possibility of a prior

conviction's automatic admissib ility under Rule 609(a)(2), we s tated, "[A] conviction for robbery, burglary, theft, and drug possession, b eyond the basic crime itself, is not probative of truthfulness." 369 S.C. at 517, 633 S.E.2d at 155. Here, the court of appeals applied our statement out of context in fi nding Robinson's prior convictions were not probative of credibility for purposes of a Rule 609(a)(1)analysis. Although prior convic tions for robbery, burglary, th eft, and drug possession are not crimes of dishonesty or false statement, whi ch would result in automatic admissibility under Rule 609(a)(2), such convictions may still have impeachment value under Rule 609( a)(1). If the court of appeal s' conclusion regarding this factor is carried to its logical extreme, no con victions would ever have impeachment value under Rule 609 unless they were crimes of dis honesty or false statement admitted under Rule 609(a)(2). Rule 609(a)(2) would inevitably swallow Rule 609(a)(1).

Even though Robinson's convicti ons for strong arm robbery and breaking and entering automobiles are not crimes involving dishonesty or fal se statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2), that does not rule out the exist ence of impeachment value in each one of these prior offenses. The trial court obs erved, "Simply put, convictions for breaking into motor vehicles and strong-arm rob bery don't imply that

the accused was an armed burglar, as was alleged in this case, but they do imply that the accused is not someone to be trusted - that he might not be credible." It was within the trial court's discre tion to conclude that because Ro binson has prior convictions for such offenses, he legitimately might not be con sidered credible. See

Black , 400 S.C. at 21-22, 732 S.E.2d at 887 ("Impeachment value refe rs to how strongly the nature of the conviction bears on the veracity, or credibility, of the witness."). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in fi nding Robinson's prior convictions had impeach ment value.

2. The point in time of the conviction and the witness's subsequen t history.

Robinson's prior convictions were in 2007 and 2009. He was tri ed for the burglary of Williams' residence in 2011. The trial court found Robinson's prior convictions revealed a continuing pattern of criminal behavior that could legitimately impact his credibility in the eyes of the jury. T he court of appeals did

not address this factor.

Robinson acknowledges the temporal proximity of his prior convi ctions to his current charges. However, Robinson contends the trial court erred by mentioning in

its remand order what the senten ces were for his convictions, a rguing that while there was temporal proximity, "the jury did not and should not have known what the

sentences were for each of Robinson's prior convictions." This argument has no merit, as the jury heard no evidence of the length of the sente nces for the prior convictions. The trial court simply addressed the "subsequent history" portion of

this Colf factor by comparing Robinson's prior releases from confinement to thetiming of the instant crime. An analysis of the sentences illu strates closeness in time between the prior offenses and the offense for which Robinson w as on trial, revealing a pattern of behavior that legitimately evoked questi ons of Robinson's credibility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in w eighing this factor as it

did.

3. The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime.

"[E]vidence of similar offenses i nevitably suggests to the jury the defendant's propensity to commit the crime with which he is charged. This risk is not eliminated by limiting instructions." Colf , 337 S.C. at 628, 525 S.E.2d at 249. "[W]hen the prior offense is similar to the offense for which the defendant is on trial, the danger of unfair prejudice to the defen dant from impeachment by that p rior offense weighs against its admission." Bryant , 369 S.C. at 517-18, 633 S.E.2d at 156.

Robinson dwells heavily on this point and claims the trial cour t erred in its application of this factor. The trial court found there was ve ry little similarity between the past crimes and the charged crimes. The trial court reasoned:

[T]he State was prohibited from mentioning the Defendant's 2009 burglary co nviction during the trial. Instead, the State was required to simply refer to the conviction as "a felony conviction that carries more than a year." There is nothing about that characterization of the prior conviction to make it similar to the offense that the Defendant faced. As to the strong-arm robbery and breaking into motor vehicles charges, there is no indication that any of those charges involved the use of a deadly weapon (a crucial element of the burglary charge), or that they involved entering someone's home (also an element of the burglary charge). Despite defense counsel's claim, there is no similarity between the prior convictions

and the offenses for which the Defendant was on trial in

this case.

The court of appeals did not address this factor.

First-degree burglary is defined , as applied to this case, as e ntering "a dwelling

without consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelli ng" and "when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight , he or another participant in the crime . . . is armed with a deadly weapon." S.C. Code Ann. § 16

-11-311(A)(1)(a) (2015). "Strong armed robbery is defined as th e felonious or unlawful taking of money, goods, or other personal property of any value from the person of another or in his presence by violence or by putting such person in fear."

State v. Rosemond , 356 S.C. 426, 430, 589 S.E.2d 757, 758 (2003). The Georgia breaking and entering into an automobile convictions are violat ions of section 16-8

- 18 of the Georgia Code (2018), whi ch provides: "If any person s hall enter any

automobile or other motor vehicle with the intent to commit a t heft or a felony, he shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or , in the discretion of the trial judge, as for a misdemeanor."

Robinson argues the similarity o f his prior convictions to the instant burglary charge weighs against admissibility. He contends the common th read between the burglary charge and the prior convictions is the taking of the property of another. Robinson asserts the jury became aware of his prior stealing ha bits and his pattern of escalating conduct.

Robinson also points to another similarity between his prior co nvictions and the charged offense that he contends requires exclusion of the prior convictions— his brother being with him during his commission of the prior c rimes and the charged crime. The State cross-examined Robinson on this point, but Ro binson did not object to that line of questioning; therefore, this narrow argument is not preserved

for our review. See State v. Dunbar , 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) (providing an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must

have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for appeal).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in analyzing the s imilarity factor as it did. Robbery and breaking and entering into automobiles inv olve different conduct than burglary and posse ssion of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and neither the robbery nor the breaking into au tomobiles involved being armed with a deadly weapon or entering a dwelling. The f act that breaking and entering automobiles and fi rst-degree burglary both involve entering into

someone's property without consent was not, in the trial court' s judgment, a determinative factor. Neither was the fact that robbery and bu rglary are overly similar just because, according to Robinson, most burglaries ar e undertaken with an eye towards stealing something. In this case, the trial court' s limiting instruction sufficiently addressed Robinson's fear that the evidence would be inappropriately used as propensity evidence. The trial court acted within its discretion in weighing

this factor as it did.4. The importance of the defendant's testimony.

Robinson's defense at trial was an alibi defense. When analyzi ng the importance of Robinson's testimony, the trial court reasoned:

Given the fact that the Defendant's testimony was entirely cumulative to the testimony of the other two defense witnesses, it was not necessary for the Defendant to take the stand in his defense. In fact, the only thing the

Defendant testified to that hi s other witnesses did not

confirm was that he [Robinson] had bought marijuana

from Mr. Williams at the home prior to the date of the burglary.

The court of appeals did not address this factor.

Robinson argues the trial court's evaluation of the importance of his testimony ignored the constitutional significance of his right to testify in his own defense and

the State's efforts to undermine his alibi defense. He contend s there is often a no more powerful witness for the defense than the defendant himself. Robinson argues, "To characterize [his] testimony as cumulative because he prese nted other alibi witnesses is far too simplistic." Robinson contends the "most compelling portion" of his testimony was his explanation that he had taken responsi bility for his past crimes, as well as noting his lack of motive to steal. He maintains the importance of his testimony increased the potential prejudice of admitting hi s prior convictions and should have weighed against their admission.

The trial court acted within its discretion in analyzing this factor. Robinson's direct examination was brief; his testimony largely echoed the testimony of his brother and cousin, who were both able to communicate the alibi upon which

Robinson's defense relied. T hough Robinson communicated a coup le of additional points, his testimony was largely cumulative to that of other w itnesses. See Brooke

v. United States , 385 F.2d 279, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (finding there was no abus e of discretion in ruling a defendant's prior convictions could be u sed for impeachment in the event he testified because defendant would have given a version that was substantially the same as the ve rsion given by another defense witness).

Additionally, Robinson's testim ony was not necessary to explai n his mindset

at the time of the alleged crime. Cf. United States v. Smith , 181 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding the importance of a defendant's t estimony was enhanced when the State was required to prove his intent to def raud, thus, this factorcut against the admission of the defendant's prior convictions). With or without Robinson's testimony, the jury had to resolve the issue of Will iams' credibility, since his testimony was the only direct evidence of Robinson's guilt.

Robinson also contends the trial court ignored his argument th at it was important for him to testify so he could explain to the jury th at his prior convictions were guilty pleas, which showed he admits responsibility for th e crimes he commits, and that his refusal to plead to the instant charges would tend to establish he was not guilty of the instant charges. This argument is quite illogica l. Following Robinson's rationale to its logical extreme, he should want the prior convictions to be introduced so he could explain to the jury that he accepts responsibility when he is guilty but denies responsibility when he is not guilty.

Robinson also cites authority discussing the constitutional rig ht of an accused to testify in his defense regardi ng criminal matters. A defend ant's right to testify is

indeed fundamental. See, e.g.

, State v. Rivera , 402 S.C. 225, 241, 741 S.E.2d 694, 702 (2013) (declaring a criminal defendant's right to testify i s a well-established right in South Carolina). However, this right does not preclude the State from impeaching

a defendant's credibility with prior convictions. If the defen dant's right to testify were to trump all other considerations relevant to Colf and Rule 609, then a defendant could never be impeach ed with prior convictions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this factor as it did.

5. The centrality of the credibility issue.

Acknowledging the lack of physical evidence in this case, the t rial court found the credibility of Williams, Robinson, and Robinson's other wit nesses "was central to the case." The trial court explained this factor weighed in favor of admitting Robinson's prior convictions. However, the court of appeals di sagreed, explaining

it was error for the trial court to find this factor weighed in favor of admitting the prior convictions "because our courts are hesitant to admit evi dence of prior convictions when credibility is central to the case." The cour t of appeals relied on

Green v. State , 338 S.C. 428, 433-34, 527 S.E.2d 98, 101 (2000), for this pro position.

In Green , we affirmed the post-conviction relief (PCR) court's finding that

defense counsel was ineffective fo r failing to argue the probat ive value of the defendant's prior convictions for possession of crack cocaine w as outweighed by their prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), when the d efendant was on trial for distributing crack cocaine within proximity of a school. 3 38 S.C. at 432, 527 S.E.2d at 100. We noted the novelty of the issue: "whether the probative value of aprior conviction, similar to the crime charged, not involving d ishonesty or false statement, outweighs its prejudicial effect, where credibility is critical." Id. at 432

- 33, 527 S.E.2d at 100. After listing the Colf factors and noting the trial court should have considered them, we reasoned:

In the instant case, evidenc e in the record supports the PCR court's ruling that [the defendant] was prejudiced by

defense counsel's failure to argue the prejudicial effect of the convictions outweighed th eir probative value. [The defendant] was impeached with evidence of two convictions for possession of cocaine that were four and five years old. His credibility was critical, as the jury had

to choose between his version of events and that of the SLED agents.

Id. at 433-34, 527 S.E.2d at 101.

The court of appeals' a nalysis and reliance on Green is flawed. In Green , we were primarily concerned with the similarity of the prior convi ctions to the current charges. Further, we did not make a ruling as to which directi on the credibility factor would turn, only recognizing "credibility was critical." This analysis did not

constitute a broad conclusion that our courts are hesitant to a dmit evidence of prior convictions when credibility is central to a case.

Robinson also argues the following statement in Bryant supports the court of appeals' proposition: "[T]he State should not be allowed to att ack the defendant's credibility with inadmissible prior convictions; especially whe re the [defendant's] credibility was essential to his defense." 369 S.C. at 518-19, 633 S.E.2d at 156. Importantly, Robinson overlooks our use of the word "inadmissib le" in this passage.

We made this statement in Bryant during a harmless error an alysis. It goes without saying that an "inadmissible" c onviction should ne ver be admitt ed into evidence.

Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, when credibility is central to a case, the introduction of prior convictions for impeachment pur poses becomes even more legitimate. Rule 609 is entitled "Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime." Attacking the accused's credibility forms the entire b asis for a party seeking introduction of prior conviction evidence under Rule 609. If t he jury must choose

between the defendant's credibility and that of another witness , there would be a high probative value in admitting evidence of prior convictions to i mpeach the defendant's credibility. On th e other hand, if credibility is not central to the case,then the prior convictions would have less probative value, and the risk of a jury improperly using the prior convictions in an inappropriate mann er, despite a limiting instruction, could be higher.

Other jurisdictions favor admissibility when witness credibilit y is central to a jury's deliberation. See, e.g.

, United States v. Jackson , 696 F.2d 578, 589 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding the probative value of a prior conviction was fu rther enhanced by the

critical role a defendant's credi bility would have played if he had chosen to testify);

United States v. Caldwell , 760 F.3d 267, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2014) (providing that when credibility is important, this factor weighs in favor of admiss ibility); United States

v. Smith , 181 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("[C]redibility wil l be critical.

This factor tilts significantly in favor of admitting the prior convictions."); State v.

Swanson , 707 N.W.2d 645, 655-56 (Minn. 2006) ("Because credibility was a central issue here, the fourth and fifth [] factors weigh in favor of a dmission of the prior convictions."); Jordan v. State , 592 So. 2d 522, 524 (Miss. 1991) ("The importance

of the defendant's credibility w eighs in favor of admissibility of the prior convictions."); State v. Bohe , 447 N.W.2d 277, 281 (N.D. 1989) ("[I]n light of the nature of [the defendant's] prio r felonies and of the fact that the credibility of the

witnesses was the main issue in t he case, the probative impeach ment value of [the defendant's] prior felony convictions appears to outweigh the p rejudicial effect of their admission into evidence.").

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this f actor as it did.

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the Colf factors as it did and in concluding Robinson's prior convictions were admissi ble under Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE. In any given case involving the same indicted charges, two different trial courts could examine the same prior conviction(s), evaluate the same

five Colf factors, and perhaps reach oppo site conclusions as to the admis sibility of the prior convictions. In such an instance, it is conceivable that under our standard of review, both trial courts would be affirmed. This is the na ture of our standard of review in Rule 609(a)(1) cases when a trial court weighs the probative value of a prior conviction against its prejudicial effect.

We affirm the court of appeals' decision to uphold Robinson's c onvictions for first-degree burglary and possession of a weapon during the com mission of a violent crime. However, we modify the court of appeals' opinion by hol ding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Robinson's prior conv ictions under Rule609(a)(1), SCRE. In light of our holding, we need not examine Robinson's harmless

error argument. See State v. Allen , 370 S.C. 88, 102, 634 S.E.2d 653, 660 (2006) (declining to address remaining issues when the disposition of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW, JJ., and Acting Justice Thomas E. Huff

concur.