NEWS FROM THE FRONT 

 DATE September 2017

Refocusing Counterinsurgency (COIN) Centric 

Fire Support 

 

Authors: 

LTC Michael D. Vick 

Dr. William (Bill) Rierson, Ed.D. 

Public release. This product contains unclassified/unrestricted information releasable to 

the public. 
Refocusing Counterinsurgency (COIN)-Centric Fire Support 

“Only the dead have seen the end of war.” 

 -George Santayana

With the ever-changing world dynamic, the US military and its 

unified action partners must continue to refocus on large-scale 

combat operations against a regional peer threat after over 

fourteen years of COIN. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs made 

this point clear and additionally identified potential 

adversaries to include Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.i

Additionally, the United States and its unified action partners 

must continue with the challenge of global terrorism and not 

forget the lessons of COIN warfare. However, over fourteen years 

of protracted COIN warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan and a 

reduction in the force over the last eight years has atrophied 

the military in terms of training, equipping and readiness for a 

large-scale combat operation. 

Potential large-scale conventional adversaries to the United 

States and its allies have adapted, modernized and advanced 

their capabilities since the Cold War. Additionally, these 

adversaries manifest themselves in the form of a continued 

expansion of their militaries. For example in a comparison to 

the United States military, China boasts 2,335,000 active 

military personnel while the US 1,400,000; China has a tank 

strength of 9,150 while the US has 8,848; China has 6,246 towed 

artillery systems while the US has 1,299; China has 1,710 Self 

Propelled Artillery systems while the US has 1,934; China has 

1,770 Multiple Launch Rocket systems while the US has 1,331; 

granted the US outmatches China with overall aircraft with China 

at 2,942 while the US has 13,444.ii Although the aircraft gap is 

to our advantage, the downsizing of the military over the last 

eight years has resulted in a shortage of pilots. You would find 

a similar gap if compared to Russia and North Korea. 

The United States and its allies must close the fire support 

gap to achieve a position of maneuver advantage if faced with a 

large-scale combat operation against a conventional peer threat. 

The gap must not only be closed in terms of organizing, 

equipping and manning. Commanders and their staffs must close 
this gap by refocusing the COIN-centric fire support mindset and 

begin to synthesize the targeting effort through the lens of a 

combined arms formation. To accomplish this, Commanders must 

fully integrate the division artillery (DIVARTY) into the 

division as the force field artillery headquarters; implement 

the D3A targeting methodology as a synchronizing function; 

reshape overly restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE); and fully 

integrate the Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC) into 

the division Current Operations Integrating Cell (COIC). 

Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Integration 

Army Forces Command’s (FORSCOM) decision to implement 

DIVARTY’s into divisions without organic field artillery 

battalions and a Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) proves 

problematic in the ability to fully integrate the DIVARTY. The 

FORSCOM implementation order included the attachment of the BCT 

field-artillery battalions to the DIVARTY while the battalions 

remain organic to the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) no later than 

January 2016.iii Many division commanders are empowering DIVARTY 

commanders to standardize training and further certify the 

direct support battalions. However, an attachment relationship 

rather than an organic relationship limits the DIVARTY 

commander’s ability to accomplish this task. For example, each 

of the BCTs have different training and deployment schedules 

that proves problematic in synchronizing and standardizing the 

training across all three brigades. This situation challenges 

the DIVARTY commander in achieving massed fires across the 

division. Historically, artillery battalions had a habitual 

working relationship with maneuver brigade but were not organic 

to maneuver brigades. 

In pre-Iraq/Afghanistan large-scale combat operations this 

habitual relationship mostly worked well as shaped around the 

roles of direct support, general support, reinforcing, and 

general support reinforcing making indirect fire a significant 

combat multiplier. It was not until modularity and the formation 

of modular brigades did we decide to make direct support 

battalions organic to BCTs (much of which was promulgated 

through the book Breaking the Phalanx by Douglas A. Macgregor) 

to make the BCT look like the Armored Cavalry Regiment. This 

allowed the BCT commander to own the artillery battalion and 

therefore train them. While this worked well for brigade level 

operations, it proves problematic for division level operations 

concerning massing of fires to shape the division deep fight. 
This further manifested into the integration of the Security 

Forces Advisory Teams (SFATs) and contributed to successful COIN 

operations, and we should not forget the lessons learned from 

those COIN experiences. However, now it is time to get back to 

the basics and prepare to fight a peer conventional threat at 

the division level. And to accomplish the fires aspects of this 

kind of fight, the DIVARTY commander needs the proper authority 

and organization to fully implement these basic and collective 

skills so not to have a continued atrophy, lack of training 

consistency and standardization across the division artillery 

formation. 

The ability to standardize artillery battalion training across 

the division remains the DIVARTY commander’s responsibility; 

however, the commander is limited in achieving this endeavor. 

The 2014 FORSCOM DIVARTY implementation order gives the DIVARTY 

commander authorities to plan, execute and assess all field 

artillery (FA) individual and collective training to include 

training guidance and approval of unit training plans and 

programs. Additionally, this includes Mission Essential Task 

List (METL) guidance to ensure FA Battalion METL supports the 

Brigade Combat Team’s METL, and unit and section training and 

certifications.iv However, the current command authority and the 

attached relationship limits the DIVARTY commander’s ability to 

achieve these ends. For example, while one BCT artillery 

battalion might have codified and standardized training 

procedures that work well, the other two could likely be 

struggling. 

Allowing the DIVARTY commander to standardize training across 

the division requires division level standard operating 

procedures in the form of a Red Book or similar document; and 

can best be accomplished through an organic relationship. An 

attached relationship could work if the DIVARTY commander can 

have authority over the BCT artillery battalions through section 

level certification. Using the Red Book standards and the 

artillery table training methodology, once trained and certified 

through individual and section level, the artillery battalions 

should be attached back to the BCTs for collective training and 

certification leading up to a Warfighter, CTC rotation, or 

deployment. It is at the collective level of training (above 

battery) that we struggle to achieve massing and focused fires. 

The discussion point becomes one of: Can we best achieve this 

with battalions organic to the DIVARTY or organic to the BCTs? 
The primary responsibility of the DIVARTY commander as the 

Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) is to coordinate, integrate, 

synchronize and employ fires for the division commander. 

Moreover, the DIVARTY must be able to mass fires, employ radars, 

plan and oversee resupply rates and execute division-level 

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The DIVARTY provides 

mission command for training management and certification for 

the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) field artillery battalions and 

fire support cells. Finally, the DIVARTY oversees the training 

and certification of the division fire-support cell to achieve 

coordination, integration and synchronization of fires.v These 

responsibilities are a tall order under the current organization 

and command relationship. 

These responsibilities require the full integration of the 

DIVARTY into the division unlike assigning a field artillery 

brigade as a Force Field Artillery Headquarters; and to achieve 

full integration, the DIVARTY commander must possess organic 

cannon and/or rocket battalions. Changing support relationships 

such as attaching the BCT artillery battalions or receiving 

corps artillery battalions for support significantly limits the 

DIVARTY commander’s ability to achieve all of the aforementioned 

responsibilities. The DIVARTY must be fully integrated into 

division level operations and held accountable as the Force 

Field Artillery Headquarters for synchronized, timely, and 

focused fires across the division to include counterfires and 

achieving mass on enemy high payoff targets. 

Highly trained DIVARTYs with organic artillery battalions 

remains critical to achieving timely indirect fires coordinated 

to achieve mass and synchronized with the other warfighting 

functions against a peer threat. A compromise could be to leave 

the FA battalions organic to the BCTs and assign additional 

rocket battalions organic to the DIVARTY. With this situation, 

the DIVARTY can focus on the division deep fight leaving the BCT 

artillery battalions to focus on the close fight. Based on 

observations of Warfighters, consistently fires are not timely, 

artillery units are out of position to support the fight, or 

they move too aggressively forward of maneuver and find 

themselves in a direct fire fight. 

Artillery training with all warfighting functions leading up 

to a Warfighter and with organic field artillery battalions 

remains omnipotent. Army units achieved this in the past through 

the artillery table training methodology integrated with the 
maneuver training tables. Moreover, Fires elements from sensorto-shooter must conduct routine digital sustainment training to 

reduce fire mission processing times at each level. Finally, 

staffs must conduct a fires rehearsal, digital fires rehearsal, 

and a combined arms rehearsal with all warfighting functions and 

supporting element involvement. Sustainment proves to be 

challenge for DIVARTY as well. 

The Army’s decision to field DIVARTYs without an organic 

sustainment battalion further challenges the DIVARTY to achieve 

sustained indirect fires in support of the deep fight. In a 

combined arms operation against a regional peer threat, any 

organization where Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) or High 

Mobility Artillery Rocket System battalions (HIMARS) are task 

organized to the DIVARTY, the DIVARTY will be challenged with 

sustaining these additional battalions (mostly concerning Class 

V) without a sustainment battalion. The ADP 3-09.90 indicates 

that division artillery can be task organized with up to five 

cannon or rocket battalions. Unlike a field artillery brigade, 

the division artillery does not have an organic sustainment 

battalion. This requires a close relationship between the 

division artillery and the sustainment brigade supporting 

division operations. 

With the current organization, the DIVARTY is lacking the 

sustainment battalion staff built around the DIVARTY, 

specifically the Support Operations Officer (SPO) in planning 

and coordinating the delivery of supplies. Without this staff 

support, the S4 is significantly challenged with sustainment 

operations. Currently commanders task organize the forward 

support companies alongside their habitually supported battalion 

when placed under the division artillery. This situation extends 

the Lines of Communication (LOCs) creating additional resupply 

challenges to incorporate the eight principles of sustainment 

into division artillery operations.vi Because of this situation, 

the DIVARTY sustainment leaders (mostly the Executive Officer 

and the S4) must develop a close supporting relationship with 

the division G-4 and supporting sustainment brigade to enable a 

sustained level of resupply in a an extended operation against a 

regional peer threat. With the DIVARTY fully integrated and 

trained, the next challenge becomes training the division staffs 

in using mostly deliberate targeting rather than COIN-centric 

dynamic targeting to avoid playing whack-a-mole, but rather 

shaping the deep fight before it becomes the close fight. 
D3A Methodology as a Synchronizing Function 

 Differently than COIN, combined arms operations against a 

peer threat rely heavily on proactive fire support which 

requires synchronized and massing of fires in support of 

maneuver using a deliberate targeting process as well as a 

dynamic targeting process. In the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

the Army largely used COIN-Centric targeting processes to 

include such methodologies as the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, 

Analyze, Disseminate (F3EAD), and the Find, Fix, Track, Target, 

Engage, Assess (F2T2EA). While these processes work well for 

COIN operations and dynamic targeting, they do not work well 

when used alone in a large-scale combined arms operation against 

a peer enemy. The US Army’s deliberate targeting process 

includes the Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A) 

methodology.vii However, many of skills required for the D3A 

targeting methodology have atrophied over the past fourteen 

years. 

At the US Army division, corps, and brigade level, staffs 

struggle with deliberate targeting in support of a combined arms 

operations on a linear, contiguous battlefield against a peer 

threat. Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) trends since 

2014 clearly reveal this problem; “Division fire support cells 

are not effectively planning, coordinating, and synchronizing 

fires within the deep-close-security operational framework.”viii

Divisions remain obsessed with the close fight and frequently 

neglect the deep fight, focusing on dynamic targets of 

opportunity, losing sight of critical deliberate high payoff 

targets deep in enemy territory that will shape the future 

fight. MCTP trends confirm this problem, “Targeting working 

groups often focus only on decisive operations and neglect 

shaping operations.”ix Keep in mind that these trends were in 

2014, and the divisions and Corps continue to struggle with 

these same problems through 2017. Divisions continue to play 

Whack-a-mole with a COIN-centric targeting mindset. 

 Division staffs revert to a COIN-centric targeting mindset 

of reactionary targeting rather than proactive deliberate 

targeting. For example, a division staff will use a Gray Eagle 

with a hellfire rather than following the Attack Guidance Matrix 

(AGM) and the Target Selection Standards (TSS) which clearly 

shows rockets or artillery as the first priority delivery asset. 

There is a purpose for these products in that they provide the 

weaponeered ammunition requirement to achieve the desired 
effect. Moreover, divisions will use inappropriate delivery 

assets such as fixed wing attack aviation on an enemy mortar 

section. This reactionary approach to targeting prevents timely, 

effective and proactive fires that shape the deep fight. The 

Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A) targeting methodology 

provides the framework for achieving planned targeting resulting 

in proactive focused fires that are massed on enemy high payoff 

targets. D3A starts in the decide phase with the Intelligence 

Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in considering enemy High 

Value Targets (HVTs). To allow focus, let us consider one 

potential HVT to include enemy Integrated Air Defense Systems 

(IADS). 

Decide Phase, considering Near-peer Integrated Air Defense 

Systems (IADS) 

The Decide phase of the D3A becomes important in correctly 

identifying High Payoff targets whose destruction supports the 

accomplishment of the friendly force mission. COIN operations 

have not seen extensive usage of IADS by insurgent forces, and 

insurgents have sporadically used man-portable air defense 

(MANPADS) systems against coalition aircraft; however, peer 

opponents with air defense capabilities are on par with US 

forces and pose challenges to coalition forces in gaining air 

superiority or supremacy during initial operational phases. 

Engaging peer threat IADS capabilities with firing 

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) targeting becomes a 

challenge in achieving air superiority and must first be 

identified during the Intelligence Preparation of the 

Battlefield (IPB) process. Target value analysis yields these 

threats as high value targets (HVTs) based on the enemy courses 

of action (COAs). If HVTs affect or jeopardize the success of 

friendly courses of action, they become high payoff targets 

(HPTs). S2/G2 targeting, the Field Artillery Intelligence 

Officer (FAIO), and the S2/G2 intelligence collection manager 

identify named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of 

interest (TAIs) and assign intelligence disciplines.x The guiding 

documents that manifest from the Decide phase include the Target 

Selection Standards (TSS), the Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM), and 

the High Payoff Target List (HPTL). Using only COIN-centric 

targeting methodologies and not the planned D3A methodology will 

prevent focused and massed fires on IADS. The subsequent 

challenge becomes one of locating these threats through the 

detection phase of the D3A. 
Detect Phase of the D3A 

It is in Detect phase that division staffs frequently 

become overly focused on the close fight and lack visualization 

of high payoff targets in the deep area. The G2 Collection 

Manager, in collaboration with the entire staff and considering 

the commander’s targeting guidance, shapes information 

collection strategies necessary to detect and track high payoff 

targets through the Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) plan.xi MCTP trends since 2014 clearly 

support this assertion; in 2014, “Units provide inconsistent 

intelligence inputs that lack important details needed in the 

TWG (Targeting Working Group) to synchronize future fires;” in 

2015, the trend continued with intelligence analysis related to 

“accuracy, and timeliness;” in 2016, the divisions continued with 

problematic shaping of the deep fight.xii The trends clearly 

demonstrate division staff’s limited understanding of the D3A 

methodology in the Detect phase which manifests itself into 

ineffective fires in the Delivery phase. 

Deliver Phase of the D3A 

In the Deliver phase, divisions frequently begin engaging 

dynamic targets in the close fight and lose sight of the deep 

fight. Many of these targets are not on the HPTL. This habit 

stems from a COIN-centric targeting mindset. Staffs lack 

targeting discipline in recognizing high payoff targets over 

targets with less value. The Deliver phase of the D3A includes 

the division’s opportunity to execute the targeting plan in 

accordance with the governing documents to include the AGM, TSS, 

and the HPTL.xiii If the Decide phase went well, the ISR assets 

will have accurately identified many of the HPTs during the 

Detect phase. Now, the division would likely be able to achieve 

the desired effect on these HPTs. MCTP observations identify 

inadequate fire support rehearsals followed by inadequate fire 

support planning as mentioned above. These inadequacies manifest 

into a staff’s inability to maintain targeting tactical patience 

resulting in desynchronized, untimely, fragmented, unfocused, 

and ineffective fires. As a result, assessing the effects of 

these fires proves a significant challenge. 

Assess Phase of the D3A 

Divisions struggle with assessing damage to targets largely 

because they do not understand how to assess the damage, and 

they do not allocate assets to assess damage. Combat assessment 

includes Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness 

assessment, and reengagement recommendations. Assessments inform 

the commander in the targeting decision board to allow reattack 

decisions. BDA does not always have to include personal 
observation of the damage to the engaged target to determine 

number of casualties or equipment destroyed. BDA takes other 

forms such as whether the targets continue to move, the 

cessation of fires from an area, or using a munitions 

effectiveness assessment.xiv Targeting Working Groups (TWGs) 

frequently do not include briefings on assessments of engaged 

targets, measures of performance (MOP) or measures of 

effectiveness (MOE) of lethal or non-lethal engagements for 

executed targets. MOPs are discussed, but no review of a combat 

assessment to determine if the desired effect had been attained 

or if a reattack was necessary or recommended for a specific 

target or weapons system. Another limiting factor includes 

overly restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE). 

 

Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) 

COIN-centric ROE result in overly restrictive measures that 

effect the timeliness of fires. Development of the ROE is rooted 

in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) developed after the 1949 

Geneva Conventions. The LOAC is a complex body of law created by 

Western countries that is governed by the principles of 

necessity, proportionality, and distinction.xv Divisions impose 

additional restriction on themselves when they shape the ROE for 

using military force. Rightfully so, the ROE became more 

stringent concerning lethal target engagement during COIN 

operations in the Global War on Terror. The Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff required that for Department of Defense, 

Services, Combatant Commands and their subordinate forces 

headquarters, combat support agencies and coalition partners all 

have target coordinate mensuration certification and 

accreditation programs for deliberate and dynamic targeting.xvi 

Divisions are now challenged with determining which targets 

must be handled sensitively due to potential political 

repercussions and major adverse consequences. These recent 

constraints to include high levels of target engagement 

authority (TEA) approval contribute to untimely and ineffective 

targeting. No doubt, these restrictions coupled with precision 

guided munitions (PGMs) rather than conventional munitions are 

necessary for targets with extensive collateral damage concerns. 

However, we must ask ourselves this question: Have we placed 

overly restrictive targeting measures as a result of COINcentric targeting that will cripple us in a large-scale combat 

operation against a regional peer threat? 
As we see a shift away from COIN towards potential conflict 

with a peer opponent, adherence to the LOAC is still essential. 

To allow a level playing field, the ROE must be less restrictive 

and clear and concise for deliberate and dynamic targeting and 

counterfire in offensive and defensive operations during phases 

0 (Shape), I (Deter), II (Seize the Initiative), and III 

(Dominate). The ROE must be simple rather than convoluted and 

left to interpretation. It cannot place unnecessary restrictions 

upon the use of military force that may potentially impede the 

success of friendly operations. The commander establishes 

restrictions within the targeting guidance, and the SJA ensures 

that these restrictions are articulated within the ROE. The ROE 

will and should become more stringent based on the operational 

environment as we have seen during COIN operations for phases IV 

(Stability) and V (Enable Civil Authority). 

Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC)/Current Operations 

Integrating Cell (COIC)/Fires Cell integration and shared 

understanding 

Integrating the Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC) 

into the division Current Operations Integrating Cell (COIC) and 

the Fires Cell proves critical to coordinating and synchronizing 

fires in support of the maneuver commander’s objectives and 

intent and improved shared understanding. As a result of lessons 

learned in multiple warfighter exercises and named operations, 

the JAGIC allows the division commander to integrate and 

coordinate fires to synchronize Joint and Army fires.xvii Based on 

MCTP Warfighter observations, divisions are challenged with 

integrating the JAGIC into the COIC and the Fires Cell. 

The COIN-centric mindset results in the division COIC 

focused on such things as the Battle Update Brief (BUB) and 

dynamic targets rather than the execution of the deliberate 

targeting plan. MCTP trainers frequently observe the BUB 

becoming the priority over the execution of a time-sensitive 

High Payoff Target (HPT) that the JAGIC is attempting to engage. 

Moreover, many staffs do not have battle drills in place to 

ensure the Common Operational Picture (COP) remains updated 

across systems in the JAGIC, COIC, and the DIVARTY. Ineffective 

system integration results in fire support coordination measures 

not always updated to include critical measures such as the 

Coordinated Fire Line (CFL), the Fire Support Coordination Line 

(FSCL), and friendly troop locations. 
Integrating the DIVARTY, JAGIC, and COIC proves critical to 

managing airspace to synchronize Close Air Support (CAS), Air 

Interdiction (AI), and surface-to-surface fires. The JAGIC 

provides a joint team to control division airspace for 

integrated and more efficient synchronization of fires.xviii

Training to achieve full integration of the COIC, JAGIC and the 

Fires Cell must start months before a Warfighter, CTC rotation 

or deployment. The COIC, JAGIC, and Fires Cell must train 

together. Much of this training to allow integration would 

include digital sustainment training and divisions many times do 

not support JAGIC training. Furthermore, the lessons learned in 

this training must be captured and codified in the form of 

doctrine, standard operational procedures (SOPs) and battle 

drills. 

The JAGIC positions the Air Support Operations Center 

(ASOC) within the division instead of maintaining it at corps 

level. This allows the divisions to better shape their own deep 

area with more responsive fires. Now the divisions must 

understand how to best integrate the JAGIC to allow for

division-level rapid execution and clearance of fires and 

airspace deconfliction. The integration of the JAGIC into 1st 

Armored Division’s Division-Main (D-Main) CP provided improved 

airspace deconfliction and coordination. The division improved 

in their ability to dynamically retask previously distributed 

joint air assets in real time to support the division 

commander’s priorities. The division was challenged with 

integrating the JAGIC with the division fires cell, air and 

missile defense (AMD) and G3/Aviation sections. Moreover, the 

division staff did not fully understand the roles, 

responsibilities and functions of each JAGIC member.xix

Summary 

All of the problems with fire support as mentioned above 

exist under the umbrella of a COIN-centric mindset. With 

targeting, the division command and staff must understand and 

implement the D3A methodology as a synchronizing function In 

order to change that mindset. Commanders and their staffs must 

deconstruct the habits associated with COIN-centric targeting 

through phases 0 (Shape), I (Deter), II (Seize the Initiative), 

and III (Dominate). However, they should not forget those 

lessons in phases IV (Stability) and V (Enable Civil Authority). 

Moreover, commanders and their staffs must fully integrate the 

division artillery (DIVARTY) into the division as the force 
field artillery headquarters with preferably organic Multiple 

Launch Rocket Battalions. If not, then empower the Corps by 

assigning a JAGIC at the Corps level. These long-range shooters 

will allow the division or the Corps to better shape the deep 

area and achieve massed and focused fires. The additionally 

organizational adjustments to allow the DIVARTY to standardize 

training for the BCT field artillery battalions across the 

division will result in improved fire support in the close fight 

and brigade deep fight. Finally, fully integrating the DIVARTY, 

JAGIC, and the COIC proves critical to a shared understanding of 

the battlefield situation across the warfighting functions. This 

will in turn improve deliberate and dynamic targeting in support 

of maneuver operations to allow focused fires, and massing of 

fires. 

 
1. Mehta, Aaron. 2015. "Pentagon Releases National Military 

Strategy." DefenseNews 1. 

2. ATP 3-60, Targeting, May 2015 

3. FORSCOM DIVARTY implementation order, FORSCOM headquarters, 

Fort Bragg, NC, April 9, 2014. 

4. Whitepaper, “Field Artillery Brigade/DIVARTY” (staffing 

version), U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK, 

2014. 

5. Ibid, Whitepaper 

6. ADRP 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2012 

7. Ibid, ATP 3-60. 

8. Bohnemann, Edward T., 2014. MCTP Trends in a Decisive 

Action Warfighter Exercise, 25. 

9. Ibid, 2014, 2015, 2016. MCTP Trends. 

10. Ibid, ATP 3-60. 

11. Ibid, ATP 3-60. 

12. Ibid, Bohnemann, Edward T. 

13. Ibid, ATP 3-60. 

14. Ibid, ATP 3-60. 

15. Rod Powers, 2016. “Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), The Rules 

of War.” https://www.thebalance.com/law-of-armed-conflictloac-3332966

16. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 

3505.01C), 28 October 2016. “Target Coordination 

Mensuration Certification and Program Accreditation.” 

17. United States Army Combined Army Center webpage. 

http://usacac.army.mil/node/1510

18. Ibid, United States Army Combined Arms Center webpage. 

19. BG Joseph P. Harrington & Dr. William M. Rierson, 2014. 

eArmor, “1st Armored Division Leads Army in Re-examining 

Mission Command ‘Initiatives’.” 

http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/201

4/OCT_DEC/Harrington.html 

20. Global Fires Power (GFP) Strength in Numbers 

http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparisondetail.asp?form=form&country1=United-States-ofAmerica&country2=China&Submit=Compare+Countries