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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

THE PROSPECTS FOR

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN TUNISIA:

A YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION

Querine Hanlon

September 2012

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not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the United States Institute of Peace, the 

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-538-0
iii

FOREWORD

The Arab Spring began in Tunisia. The tragic selfimmolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in December 

2010 struck a chord of discontent and frustration that 

ultimately propelled Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to step down barely a month later. The 

reverberations of this unprecedented series of events 

were felt throughout the region, and protestors took 

to the streets in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria, 

and Yemen. A year later, Tunisia’s remarkable transition continues to influence the region. 

Tunisia has achieved in 1 year what none of the 

other Arab Spring states have been able to accomplish. 

Some have suggested that Tunisia’s transition might 

even be a model for the Arab Spring countries. The 

Tunisian military’s refusal to fire on the demonstrators and its decision to eschew an overtly political role 

in the transition have left the task of creating a new 

political order in Tunisia to the civilian bureaucracy, 

nascent political parties, and civil society groups. In 

national elections widely heralded to be free and fair, 

Tunisians elected a caretaker government and a National Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a 

new constitution for Tunisia in 2012. 

In this monograph, Dr. Querine Hanlon of the 

National Defense University and the United States 

Institute of Peace finds that Tunisia is well poised to 

undertake serious security sector reform (SSR). SSR 

is a comprehensive tool for fixing the dysfunctional 

security sectors in fragile states emerging from conflict, developing capacities to meet the human security needs of their populations, or transitioning from 

authoritarian rule. In many fragile states, the security 

institutions are themselves a major source of insecurity. Dr. Hanlon argues that transforming the security 
iv

sector into one that is democratically accountable and 

functions in accordance with the rule of law is an important step toward averting the recurrence of insecurity and conflict and preventing newly democratic or 

transitioning regimes from reverting to authoritarian 

rule. 

Although the prospects for SSR in Tunisia are perhaps better than in any other Middle East and North 

Africa (MENA) state following the Arab Spring, substantial challenges remain. Dr. Hanlon argues that the 

raison d’être of Ben Ali’s security institutions was to 

protect the regime, not the population. The abuses of 

Tunisia’s internal security institutions and the impunity with which they acted against ordinary citizens 

served as a catalyst for the protests that ended Ben 

Ali’s rule. Reforming or otherwise dismantling this 

large and complex sector will be no easy task. The 

transition to democratic rule will require a fundamental reorientation of the mandate and institutional culture of the labyrinth of security institutions that constitute the Tunisian security sector. SSR will be critical 

for building trust in the government and its security 

institutions and central to the construct of a national 

narrative that undergirds a new social contract between the people of Tunisia and its government. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on the 

role of SSR in transforming the security sectors in the 

transitioning Arab Spring countries in accordance 

with democratic principles and the rule of law.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

QUERINE HANLON is the National Defense University Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of 

Peace (USIP). Dr. Hanlon is currently on sabbatical 

from her appointment as Dean of Academic Affairs at 

the College of International Security Affairs, National 

Defense University (NDU). At USIP, Dr. Hanlon, with 

Dr. Richard Shultz of The Fletcher School, is conducting a major research project entitled, “Designing Security Sector Reform for the 21st Century.” Dr. Hanlon 

is also working on security sector reform in North 

Africa and recently traveled to the region on a USIP 

engagement trip. At the National Defense University, 

Dr. Hanlon was instrumental in designing the College’s post-September 9, 2011-focused security studies curriculum. During her tenure, she transformed 

the institution from a small University component to 

NDU’s newest degree-granting college, and negotiated, funded, and implemented NDU’s first satellite 

campus at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School in Fort Bragg, NC. Dr. Hanlon also expanded the College’s International Counterterrorism 

Fellowship Program, a partnership capacity-building 

program into NDU’s largest international graduate 

program with over 400 graduates from 85 partner 

nations. Dr. Hanlon is Associate Professor at the College of International Security Affairs. Previously, Dr. 

Hanlon was also a nonresident Fellow at the National 

Strategy Information Center, participating in two key 

projects on “Adapting America’s Security Paradigm 

to a New Era: Conflict, Coalitions, and Capabilities in 

the Contemporary Security Environment” (2008-10) 

and “Teaching About Armed Groups and Irregular 

Warfare” (2006-08). 
vi

Dr. Hanlon’s recent publications include “Security 

Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year After the Jasmine 

Revolution,” USIP Special Report No. 304 (March 

2012); Adapting America’s Security Paradigm and Security Agenda (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 2011), with Roy Godson, Richard 

Shultz, and Samantha Ravich; “The Sources of Instability in the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2011), with Richard Shultz, 

Roy Godson, and Samantha Ravich; The Three Images 

of Ethnic War (Praeger Security International, 2009); 

Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare: Adapting Professional Military Education (Washington, DC: National 

Strategy Information Center, 2009) with Roy Godson 

and Richard H. Shultz, Jr.; and “Globalization and the 

Transformation of Armed Groups,” in Armed Groups: 

Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, Jeffrey Norwitz, ed. (Naval War College 

Press, 2008). Dr. Hanlon is a graduate of the Edmund 

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and holds an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. from The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University.
vii

SUMMARY

In the year since the revolution, Tunisia has 

achieved what no other Arab Spring country has managed: peaceful transition to democratic rule through 

national elections widely viewed to be free and fair. 

The legacy of the previous regime, however, remains: 

a complete lack of transparency, no real parliamentary or government oversight, and largely unchanged 

rules of engagement and training. Tunisia’s internal 

security services are feared by the population and 

are themselves fearful of fulfilling their basic policing 

tasks. The Tunisian Armed Forces clearly ascribe to 

the concept of civilian oversight of the military. Although they are currently fulfilling a number of internal security tasks, they have publicly stated their 

intention to return to the barracks when the police can 

resume responsibility for internal security. Security 

sector reform (SSR) will be critical for building trust in 

the new government and its security institutions. The 

raison d’être of Ben Ali’s security institutions was to 

protect the regime, not the population. SSR is essential 

for reorienting the mandate and institutional culture 

of Tunisia’s labyrinth of security institutions. Serious 

reform of the security sector is essential if Tunisia’s 

transition to democratic rule is to succeed in the long 

term.

1

THE PROSPECTS FOR

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN TUNISIA:

A YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

Mohammed Bouazizi’s altercation with a policewoman in the dusty town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, on 

December 17, 2010, was ordinary in its arbitrariness, 

but extraordinary for what it sparked. After spitting in 

and slapping his face, a local policewoman confiscated Bouazizi's vegetable cart—and all its goods bought 

on credit—and in so doing threatened his livelihood 

and the sole means of support for his entire family. 

Bouazizi tried to appeal to the local municipal officials, but they refused to see him. With little education 

and no prospect of another job, the 26-year-old man 

set himself on fire in front of the municipal headquarters building.1

 He succumbed to his wounds in the 

hospital on January 4, 2011, 10 days before Tunisian 

President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was forced to step 

down. 

Bouazizi’s tragic protest struck a chord of discontent and frustration that sparked public demonstrations throughout Tunisia. The initial demonstrations 

took place on the day of Bouazizi’s self-immolation in 

Sidi Bouzid and by late December had spread to the 

nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala. On January 12, 

demonstrations began in the capital of Tunis. What 

had begun as an outpouring of frustration and protest over poor economic conditions, and particularly 

high youth unemployment, rapidly escalated into an 

unprecedented challenge to Ben Ali’s 23-year rule. 

The internal security services—the police and the 

National Guard—responded in force. While some 
2

protests were largely peaceful, others turned violent. 

Police opened fire on crowds and arrested protestors, 

journalists and opposition party members, lawyers, 

and rights advocates. But the police response failed 

to quell the protests. On January 13, Ben Ali made a 

last-ditch attempt to save his rule. On national television, he pledged to step down when his term ended in 

2014, offered new parliamentary elections, and vowed 

to end state censorship. But with the carrot came the 

stick. He deployed the military to buttress the internal 

security forces and, on January 14, declared a state of 

emergency that prohibited gatherings of more than 

three people and authorized the use of force against 

any individuals who ignored the ban. 

Then General Rachid Ammar, Chief of Staff of 

the Army, struck a mortal blow. He said “No.” The 

military’s refusal to fire on the demonstrators left Ben 

Ali with no means to quash the demonstrators forcibly, and he fled to Saudi Arabia that same day.2

 In 

the immediate aftermath of his departure, there were 

numerous reports of violence between the security 

services and rogue elements. Elsewhere the police 

fled, and the Army was deployed to maintain order 

on the streets—assuming the internal security tasks of 

securing the population, manning checkpoints, and 

protecting strategic sites and public buildings.3

 Unlike the case of Egypt, however, the Tunisian military 

chose to stay at the critical margins. In a rare public 

address on January 24, General Ammar promised to 

uphold Tunisia’s revolution and to guarantee stability 

until elections were held.4 The military’s critical decision to eschew an overtly political role in the transition left the task of creating a new political order to 

the civilian bureaucracy, nascent political parties, and 

civil society groups.
3

Tunisia’s new government faces major challenges 

to dismantle Ben Ali’s security regime and to ensure 

the transition to democratic rule with civilian oversight over the instruments of force. The abuses of 

Tunisia’s internal security institutions and the impunity with which they acted against ordinary citizens 

served as a catalyst for the protests that ended Ben 

Ali’s rule. Reforming or otherwise dismantling this 

large and complex sector will be no easy task. But it 

is an essential component of constructing a new social 

contract in Tunisia.

WHY SECURITY SECTOR REFORM?

Security sector reform (SSR) is a comprehensive 

tool for fixing the dysfunctional security sectors in 

fragile states that are emerging from conflict, developing capacities to meet the human security needs of 

their populations, or transitioning from authoritarian 

rule.5 SSR is also an important tool for the prevention of conflict. In many fragile states, the security 

institutions are themselves a major source of insecurity. Transforming the security sector into one that is 

democratically accountable and functions in accordance with the rule of law is an important step toward 

averting the recurrence of insecurity and conflict and 

preventing newly democratic or transitioning regimes 

from reverting to authoritarian rule. 

The SSR agenda is an ambitious one. SSR aims to 

address a range of security-related challenges. These 

include: 1) the lack of statutory security providers due 

to inadequate institutions, poor training, or corruption; 2) the presence of armed nonstate actors, gangs, 

and other nonstatutory security providers; 3) the absence of legitimate and effective formal or informal 
4

justice institutions; and 4) the lack of effective, transparent governance of the security sector. Yet, how 

these challenges present themselves in a particular 

fragile state will vary according to legacies of conflict; 

tribal, ethnic, or religious patterns; systems of government; colonial legacies; the level of economic development; environmental conditions; the vibrancy of civil 

society; and transnational influences, to name but a 

few. In other words, there is no formula for SSR that 

will be applicable to all states. 

Tunisia is well positioned to undertake SSR. With 

a small territory and relatively homogeneous population, Tunisia features a large and educated middle 

class, a liberalized economy, a youth bulge that is 

diminishing, and a history of encouraging socioeconomic freedoms, particularly for women.6

 For example, Tunisian election law mandates that party lists 

be comprised equally of both male and female candidates. Twenty-seven percent of the members of the 

National Constituent Assembly are women. Women 

serve in the military and constitute more than 50 percent of university students. Additionally, despite the 

significant constraints on speech and protest, Tunisia 

under Ben Ali featured both legal and illegal opposition parties, and a range of civil society groups that 

engaged in muted opposition to the government. 

Tunisia has a vibrant legal community, a bar association, a lawyers union, and civil society groups, 

many of which were active even under Ben Ali. Civil 

society activists under Ben Ali were able to monitor 

the government’s activities through the publication 

of laws and amendments, as well as appointments. 

Tunisia also has a well-developed legal code that, in 

principle, proscribes the functions of the government. 

There are 1,700 laws and amendments that govern the 
5

security sector alone (there is no legislation governing 

the intelligence sector). Although the extent to which 

these laws are still in effect is as yet unclear, they do 

provide a foundation on which to reform the security 

sector and its oversight mechanisms. 

Tunisia also has significant security capacity. Although the country is small in size relative to other 

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states, its 

armed forces have ably filled the vacuum created by 

the collapse of Ben Ali’s security apparatus and the 

defections of police throughout the country. While 

providing internal security, the armed forces have 

also secured the maritime and land borders, countered 

cross-border incursions from Libyan armed groups, 

and established five refugee camps for 1.6 million 

refugees, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, fleeing the 

violence in Libya.7

 The armed forces clearly ascribe to 

the concept of civilian oversight of the military, and although they are currently fulfilling a number of internal security tasks, they have publicly, and repeatedly, 

stated their intention to return to the barracks when 

the police can again fulfill their security functions. 

One of the most striking features in Tunisian society, even a year after the revolution, is the veritable 

explosion of public discourse and debate. As one 

senior military officer noted, Tunisians “never used 

to talk about politics. Now we talk about politics all 

the time. We have so much freedom now. We almost 

don’t know what to do with it.”8 Every evening, Tunisia’s three television stations devote their evening 

programming to debates on every subject imaginable. 

Recently, for example, a long debate between the President of the Tunisian League for Human Rights and a 

salafist student addressed the right to wear the niqab

(the Muslim face veil for women) at school. “Tunisia 

has become a debating society,” Radwan Masmoudi, 
6

Director of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, observed.9

Another metric of change is the number of political parties. Under Ben Ali there were five official political parties. During the October 2011 election, there 

were 111. A civil society activist told us that “all Tunisians are learning what democracy is and how it really works. We don’t really have political parties, and 

the parties we have don’t really know yet how to act 

like parties or what role they should play in the opposition.”10 Yet, these parties competed for seats in the 

National Constituent Assembly in Tunisia’s first postrevolutionary elections, which were widely heralded 

to be free and fair.

Civil society has also burgeoned. Some 2,000 new 

civil society groups have emerged in Tunisia since the 

revolution. Although many of these groups are still 

virtual, they are pushing for a voice in the Tunisian 

transition—demanding transparency, and fueling 

the Tunisian “debating society,” particularly among 

Tunisian youth. According to Omar Mestiri, director 

of Radio Kalima, “post-revolutionary media is now 

delivering journalist materials more representative 

of Tunisian society. Now, there is more space for different opinions and dialogue.”11 In the year since the 

fall of Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisia gained four new cable 

channels, 12 radio stations, and 18 newspapers.12

Although the prospects for SSR in Tunisia are perhaps better than in any other MENA state following 

the Arab Spring, substantial challenges remain.13 The 

raison d’être of Ben Ali’s security institutions was to 

protect the regime, not the population. The transition 

to democratic rule will require a fundamental reorientation of the mandate and institutional culture of the 

labyrinth of security institutions that constitute the 
7

Tunisian security sector. SSR will be critical for building trust in the government and its security institutions and central to the construct of a national narrative that undergirds a new social contract between the 

people of Tunisia and its government.

MAPPING TUNISIA’S SECURITY SECTOR

What are the prospects for SSR in Tunisia? What 

progress has been made in the year since the fall of 

the Ben Ali regime? What gaps remain, and how best 

can these gaps be addressed? To answer these questions, we will map the security sector in Tunisia, assess the status of reform efforts currently underway, 

if any, and identify gaps. Four categories of actors, 

institutions, and functions comprise Tunisia’s security sector: (1) statutory security providers; (2) governance and democratic oversight; (3) justice and the 

rule of law; and (4) civil society. We will conclude by 

proposing additional steps that the Tunisian government and the international community can undertake 

to address those gaps, realize Tunisia’s security sector 

transformation, and support the country’s transition 

to democratic rule. 

Statutory Security Providers.

Statutory security providers typically include all 

state institutions with a formal mandate to ensure the 

safety of the state and its citizens, such as the armed 

forces, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, and 

border and customs guards. In Tunisia, the statutory 

security providers are part of the Ministry of National 

Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior and Local 

Development (MOI). There are also forces assigned to 
8

the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The intelligence capabilities are assigned to the Ministries of Defense, Interior, 

and Foreign Affairs.

The Armed Forces. The Tunisian Armed Forces 

(Forces Armees Tunisiens) are small, well disciplined, 

and widely respected for their refusal to follow orders 

to use lethal force against their countrymen. Their inaction makes them stand out compared to the armed 

forces of other MENA nations. They are unique in the 

region for other reasons as well. The Tunisian military, 

unlike the armed forces of other MENA countries, is 

completely subordinate to the government and controlled by it. Consequently, the Tunisian armed forces 

never played a political role, nor did they legitimize 

the former regime.14 Additionally, Tunisia’s armed 

forces are not economically invested in the old regime. 

Unlike the Egyptian military, Tunisia’s armed forces 

did not receive any special compensation or material 

advantages for their service to the state.15

In discussions with senior members of the armed 

forces, they openly admit that in Ben Ali’s hierarchy 

of security institutions, they were at the bottom. “We 

were always last,” noted one senior officer. “The regime did not like us,” another noted. Indeed, in my 

conversations with military officers, it became clear 

that the military’s distance from the regime was deliberately created by President Bourguiba, Tunisia’s 

founding president, who feared a possible coup and 

sought to institutionalize the military’s distance from 

the center of power.16 Ben Ali, who was himself a former Interior Minister, continued this policy, while 

buttressing the capabilities and size of the MOI security forces. 

Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali kept the armed forces 

deliberately out of the center of power. Conscript-
9

filled military ranks were deployed to less-populated 

regions of the country to do public works projects. 

Deployments were chiefly for peacekeeping missions 

in Africa, which kept the armed forces engaged elsewhere. A generation of officers was educated in the 

war colleges and command and staff colleges in the 

United States through International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Counterterrorism 

Fellowship Program (CTFP). The military was kept 

small, numbering between 40,000 and 43,000 forces. 

The Tunisian Armed Forces include the Army, 

Navy, and the Air Force. The Army numbers only 

27,000 soldiers, and the Navy has no deep-water 

ships. The Air Force has less than 20 working helicopters and only 20 combat capable aircraft.17 Yet, the 

Army’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions gave it the essential experience to 

fill the void left by the security forces as Ben Ali’s government collapsed. The armed forces quickly moved 

to protect key infrastructure, restore law and order, 

and maintain security and stability. A year after the 

revolution, 18,000 soldiers continue to guard some 700 

buildings and vital installations. In addition to assuming traditional internal security functions, the armed 

forces also face serious challenges along Tunisia’s 

land and maritime borders. Some 1.6 million refugees 

from Libya’s civil war, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, crossed into Tunisia, and some 30,000 Tunisians 

fled to Lampedusa, an island off the coast of Italy.18

The stark contrast between the impunity of the internal security services and the measured restraint of 

the armed forces is reflected in how the two organizations are publicly viewed. Whereas the security forces 

are reviled and hated, the armed forces are viewed as 

belonging to the people. “The Army is one of us!” has 

been a rallying cry at demonstrations.
10

Compared to those of other MENA nations, the Tunisian Armed Forces were also funded at much lower 

levels in both absolute and relative terms as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). For example, in 

2009, Tunisian military expenditures were 1.2 percent 

of GDP, whereas Libya and Egypt’s military spending 

was 2.8 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively.19 Ministry officials noted that both Bourguiba and Ben Ali 

had kept the military’s capabilities small, but “sufficient for our mission.” 

A year after the revolution, this assessment remains 

unchanged. Ministry officials rank the priorities of the 

Tunisian government to be economic, with national 

security—particularly the control of borders—as subordinate. When asked whether the Tunisian military 

has sufficient equipment to accomplish its expanded 

mission since the revolution, the response was a surprising affirmative. “We have the manpower we need. 

We managed to go through the revolution and do all 

that we do with what we have. . . . We do not need 

expensive weapons or aircraft—perhaps only helicopters.”20

In a formal ministry briefing, senior military officers noted that “the reform of the defense and the 

security sector requires a political system based on 

good governance.” In addition to a commitment to 

transparency, officials noted that the Army must be 

open to different political and social actors, and that 

its budgets must be available for public scrutiny. “The 

term ‘classified’ or ‘top secret’ must not constitute, under any condition, an obstacle to the transparency of 

the defense budget.” They also embraced the concept 

of democratic oversight, noting that it is “imperative” 

that there be parliamentary oversight of reforms of the 

Ministry and of the progress of those reforms.21
11

In minimizing and sidelining the military, Ben Ali 

created a professional, apolitical institution that was 

little known—and little feared. Before General Ammar emerged a national hero, he was an unknown. 

Yet, his actions propelled the Tunisian Armed Forces 

to a position of preeminence—the institution that protected the Tunisian state and the Tunisian people, not 

the corrupt regime. Having expressed a preference for 

the barracks over politics, the armed forces emerged 

as one of the only respected institutions of the previous regime.

The unique attributes of the Tunisian Armed 

Forces—its credibility, commitment to assuming its 

traditional functions, and its skill and willingness to 

assume an internal peacekeeping mission—suggest 

that the scope for reform of the military is very small. 

There will be challenges adjusting to a democratic system of governance and parliamentary oversight. Yet, 

the need for oversight is recognized and welcomed by 

the senior officers we spoke to as being essential to 

democratic governance. Another task will be a strategic one—military officers are keen to engage in the 

drafting of national strategies now that the exercise 

is no longer top down by fiat. Indeed, senior military 

officers seek to expand their role as subject matter experts and to support civilian decisionmakers in the 

ministry, as their counterparts do in most democratic 

nations. The armed forces appear well poised to tackle 

these tasks.

One senior military officer observed that the reform of any one ministry is closely tied to the reform 

of other ministries, and that the reform of the Ministry 

of Interior will be critical for determining how quickly 

the armed forces can cease conducting internal security functions. But until the legitimacy and capacity of 
12

the MOI is addressed and improved, the armed forces 

will likely continue to provide an internal security 

function, although increasingly in a supporting role. 

The Internal Security Forces. As much as the armed 

forces are admired as the heroes of the revolution, the 

police are widely reviled for keeping Ben Ali and his 

family in power, for imprisioning and torturing Tunisians who ran afoul of that regime, and for shooting 

civilians during the protests. During a recent visit, I 

was told that the unpopularity of particular ministries can be measured by the amount of barbed wire 

around their buildings. A year after the fall of Ben Ali, 

the MOI was still surrounded by concertina wire a few 

layers deep—more to protect those inside than to barricade the ministry. Army tanks also stood guard. The 

impression was of a ministry under siege.

The internal security forces controlled by the MOI 

include the police, the National Guard, the Judicial Police (which operates in the Ministry of Justice and the 

courts, but is controlled by the Ministry of Interior), 

the Intervention Forces (Special Weapons and Tactics 

[SWAT] forces), and the Presidential Guard Forces. 

The internal security forces are almost byzantine in 

their complexity, and the organizational chart of the 

MOI remains classified, which complicates the task of 

mapping the internal security structures controlled by 

the MOI, as well as the oversight mechanisms within 

the Ministry. 

It is also difficult to establish the size of the security 

forces. There are no officially published statistics, and 

the ministry website offers no details—it is the only 

ministry on the Tunisian government website with an 

empty tab. Media reports have estimated the security 

forces to number from 150,000 to 200,000, although 

subsequent ministry announcements acknowledged 

that those numbers were deliberately inflated. Actual 
13

internal security forces are estimated to number between 40,000 and 80,000, approximately half of which 

are part-time augmentation forces or paid informants. 

The higher figure accords with the ministry payroll.22

According to Mohammad Lazhar Akremi, the Minister Delegate to the Minister of Interior in Charge of 

Reforms under the previous transitional government, 

internal security forces (police, National Guard, and 

civil defense forces) numbered 49,000 before the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. The police subsequently 

recruited an additional 12,000 forces, bringing the total to 61,000.23 New recruits were needed to inject new 

untainted officers into the force, to manage the rise in 

crime, weapons, and drug trafficking, and to replace 

the forces that had disappeared after the fall of the regime. However, the training program for these new 

recruits has not been reformed. 

The police include both the regular police and the 

political police, which were reportedly disbanded during the transitional government of Beji Caid Essebsi in 

March 2011. The political police were fully integrated 

with the regular police, but operated under a parallel 

hierarchy. The political police maintain the secret files; 

two copies of each are currently kept at the Ministry of 

Interior, where ministry officials claim they are safe. 

However, individuals who have left the police or the 

MOI have reported that files have been burned. Tunisian law currently prohibits publication of these files 

for 50 years. Although not as extensive as the files of 

some other totalitarian regimes, they contain a great 

deal of potentially damaging and possibly false information. Who actually controls the files is unclear.24 The 

release on January 18, 2012, of a video on YouTube 

and Facebook depicting the newly appointed Minister of Interior, Ali Laarayedh, reportedly engaged in 
14

a sexual act in a prison cell suggests that it is not the 

Minister of Interior who controls the files.25

Whereas the police operate mostly in urban areas, 

the National Guard operates in the coastal and rural areas where the revolution began. Described as a 

paramilitary organization or a gendarmerie, the National Guard numbers approximately 12,000. National 

Guard forces man checkpoints, and there is a small 

fleet of patrol boats for customs and border protection 

operations. The Guard reportedly also has a counterterrorism capability consisting of the National Guard 

Commando Group, the National Guard Special Unit, 

and the Tunisian Anti-Terrorism Brigade.26

The Judicial Police are part of the Ministry of Interior but work within the Judiciary. They are the 

investigative arm of the internal security forces with 

responsibility for collecting evidence, conducting investigations, and writing the formal reports of the investigations for cases before the courts. The Judicial 

Police do not have the tools to do professional investigations. According to Judiciary lawyers, the Judicial 

Police do not have the capacity for fingerprinting, 

DNA testing, or other means of collecting evidence. 

Their investigations rely solely on confession. The 

confession becomes the basis for the investigation 

report, which is the sole means by which evidence is 

submitted in the court before the judge. Under the Ben 

Ali regime, the Judicial Police used violence and torture during their interrogations, both to extract confessions and to force the accused to sign the confessions. There is no provision for the presence of legal 

counsel from the moment of arrest to the conclusion 

of the investigation.27

The Presidential Guard Forces (PGF) are also part 

of the Ministry of Interior. There are no reliable estimates or officially published records to determine the 
15

size of the PGF. Their principle duty was to protect 

the President and his family. During the demonstrations in January 2011, the Presidential Guard reportedly fired on demonstrators and battled the Tunisian 

armed forces.28 The testimony of Ali Seriati, the former 

Presidential Security Chief, during the trial for his role 

in the deaths of protesters, revealed that the PGF had 

not only snipers but also water cannons and other 

crowd-suppression capabilities.29 This suggests that 

the PFG’s mandate under Ben Ali was quite broad.

A strong current in Tunisian society seeks justice, 

if not revenge. Many police fled as the government 

collapsed, and others have remained in their homes 

or elsewhere with family, fearing that there will be 

retribution for their roles both before and during the 

revolution. Some 250-300 police stations were burned, 

and in several towns in the interior of Tunisia, the attacks took a more personal turn with the burning of 

policemen’s homes. 

The police are fearful that they will be targeted 

for revenge or prosecuted for their roles in Ben Ali’s 

security apparatus. This fear has limited their ability 

to perform normal police functions. The sudden reversal from a position of power and respect to one of 

weakness and derision has generated frustration, fear, 

and anger. Police syndicates have organized strikes 

to draw attention to their plight and to call for improved working conditions and government protection while on duty.30 These strikes have sparked large 

counterdemonstrations with protestors shouting, “Go 

Back to Work,” and carrying placards with slogans 

like “People Want to Purge the Ministry of Interior.”31

Adel Jebali, a member of the National Union for Security Forces, one of the police syndicates, noted that 

“people perceive us to be criminals.”32
16

Tunisia has a great deal of police capacity. Senior 

officers are often highly educated, and many have 

attended police training academies in Europe. Educational standards are also quite high for entrance 

into the police force. Police currently are educated 

alongside military officers at the military academy, 

although there is a proposal to create a separate police 

academy. There is also a solid police infrastructure 

(e.g., police stations, communications equipment, vehicles, and uniforms). Training is standardized, and 

even Rules of Engagement have been established. The 

problem is that all of these remain largely unchanged 

from the Ben Ali regime. Under Ben Ali, the police 

were responsible for serious human rights violations, 

including illegal and arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial executions. According to a National Guard 

officer, “The competence was there, but the climate 

was terrible.”33

The current Minister of Interior, Ali Laarayedh, 

was himself tortured during the 16 years he was jailed 

by the Ben Ali regime. He is an interesting choice for 

the Interior Ministry—one that the previously banned 

Ennahda Party was at first hesitant to fill. After Ennahda won a plurality in the national elections and 

began selecting cabinet members, some of the party 

leadership were concerned that the appointment of an 

interior minister from Ennahda would generate the 

perception that the party was intent on revenge. The 

party leadership was wary of a potential misstep that 

could fuel further fear, particularly within the ministry and among its personnel. But in the run-up to the 

October elections, two senior members of Ennahda, 

both of whom had been imprisoned and tortured under Ben Ali, were invited to a meeting with interior 

ministry officials and the leaders of the two police 
17

syndicates. The meeting had been arranged by the 

syndicates, and the request was made that Ennahda 

fill the position of the new Minister of Interior after 

the elections. 

This first meeting was followed by others, and the 

two senior leaders began to engage regularly with the 

syndicates. In a conversation over Ennahda’s intentions, the two Ennahda leaders reassured the attendees, telling them that despite being among the worst 

tortured members of the Ennahda party, “We do not 

hold it against you. We need reform,” they told their 

audience. “We need to turn the page and look to the 

future.” One of the Ennahda leaders recognized the 

man who had tortured him in the audience. This man 

asked his former victim, “Do you hate us?” The Ennahda leader said, “No. You were a screw within the 

engine. If it wasn’t you, it would have been someone 

else.” 

In relating this story, the Ennahda leader emphasized that the party would “never allow anyone 

to pursue revenge.” Moved to tears, he added, “I do 

not want compensation for my suffering. . . . The only 

thing that will save me is to see my country the way I 

want. It would be a gross mistake if we fail to deliver 

an inclusive system for everyone.”34

There are positive indications that reform of the 

interior ministry has been a priority for Tunisia’s transitional governments. In May 2011, the MOI reached 

out to the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of 

the Armed Forces (DCAF) to undertake a preliminary 

study of the Ministry’s communication with the public. The Communication Review, released in September 2011, offers a series of recommendations intended 

to “restore confidence between citizens and security 

forces.”35 In November, 2011, Le Labo’ Démocratique, a 
18

civil society group, together with DCAF, organized an 

international conferences on the archives of the secret 

police to help the MOI explore how best to manage the 

archives and how to establish parliamentary control 

over MOI intelligence capabilities.36

The most comprehensive plan for reform of Tunisia’s security sector is the Ministry of Interior white 

paper, entitled “Security and Development: A White 

Paper for Democratic Security in Tunisia.”37 The report was released by Tunisia’s interim President, 

Foued Mebazaa, and Akremi. Akremi was nominated 

to the ministry in July 2011 to lead the reform effort 

and was charged by the Minister of the Interior, Habib 

El Essid, to draft a white paper with proposals for reform that would be specifically targeted to the needs 

of Tunisia. Akremi called upon experts throughout 

the ministry and from France, Spain, and Switzerland 

to participate in drafting the proposal, and the draft 

white paper was submitted for review to a seminar in 

September 2011.38 The final document contains their 

critiques.39

 According to the white paper, the proposed reform 

of the Tunisian security sector “can be summarized as 

moving from a police order to a police service that can 

respond urgently to the new challenges of crime.” To 

achieve this objective, “all the levers of modernization 

should be mobilized at the same time: reconciliation 

of the National Police and the National Guard, redistribution of responsibilities between municipalities 

and the state security services, and implementation of 

local security, modernization of human resource management, optimization and sharing of material, and 

finally, citizen control.”40

The report recognizes and addresses many of the 

key issues for reform of the MOI. The opacity of the 
19

ministry with regard to its labyrinth security structures and actors is addressed through a reorganization of the security services into three bodies—the 

National Guard, the National Police, and Civil Protection—and the merger of civilian and uniformed National Police.41 Recruitment and training are treated 

extensively in a separate chapter, which recommends 

the creation of a Tunisian police academy, new salary 

hierarchies and career management mechanisms, and 

an overall emphasis on professionalism and ethics 

in recruitment, training, and advancement. Another 

chapter is devoted to the public image of the security 

services. 

The report notes that no communication plan alone 

can change a “bad image.” The MOI’s image will only 

transform “when the professional practices of all its 

agents are transformed.”42 Mechanisms to accomplish 

this transformation include not only new uniforms 

and open reception areas in police stations and guard 

bureaus, but also new codes of conduct and greater 

police transparency.43 Notable are the calls for reforms 

of policy custody practices, police intelligence, and 

techniques for video surveillance and electronic monitoring, and the banning of imprisonment for religious 

or political ideas. 

Currently, the white paper constitutes the only 

sector-wide roadmap for reforming Tunisia’s security 

sector. It clearly acknowledges and addresses the critical challenges in transforming the institution and culture of the MOI. Although the report was prepared by 

the previous transitional government as an MOI input 

for the work of the Constituent Assembly, it appears 

unlikely that the new government will adopt its assessment and recommendations. When asked about 

the utility of the white paper as a roadmap for reform, 
20

members of the Ennahda political bureau acknowledged that although the report contains useful suggestions, it is a product of the “old regime.” Ennahda 

seeks to draw upon the expertise of a wide and inclusive group of experts, including not only Italian and 

French, but also British, American, Swiss, and South 

African, to develop a new SSR plan. Ennahda emphasized the importance of the inclusion of Tunisian experts because the model developed must ultimately 

meet “their aspirations.”44

Intelligence Agencies. The Intelligence Agency is 

part of the Ministry of Interior, although there are 

also intelligence functions in the Ministry of Defense 

and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information on 

the intelligence community is not widely available. 

The white paper, however, devotes a final chapter 

to intelligence reform. The report cautions that failure to reform the intelligence function will leave “a 

small minority of decision makers” with a monopoly 

of “the power of knowledge.”45 To guard against this 

situation, the paper recommends creating a National 

Intelligence Agency with clearly defined objectives 

and a legal framework under which to operate. The 

proposed agency would also be subject to strict controls at two levels—ministry control and parliamentary control.46 Personnel would include both military 

and civilians. Domestic intelligence collection would 

be prohibited.47 The Intelligence Agency would be removed from the MOI and report directly to the president of the republic.48

The Intelligence Agency would also have a coordinating function. The white paper proposes that 

the agency coordinate collection and analysis for a 

National Intelligence Council. This council would be 

chaired by a head of state or head of government as 
21

determined by the future constitution and would include two members of the National Assembly.49 The 

white paper also recommends creating a parliamentary committee in the National Assembly that would 

include a few members with special clearances who 

would exercise oversight of the agency’s activities 

and its budget. Two parliamentary committee members would also serve on the National Intelligence 

Council.50

There are currently no laws governing the intelligence sector.51 A sound legal framework is a precondition for effective, efficient, and accountable security 

governance, particularly over the intelligence sector. 

Tunisia will need a legal framework that defines the 

roles and missions, the intelligence institutions and 

functions, and the prerogatives and limits of the intelligence organizations and their members.52 Equally 

important will be undertaking reforms with enough 

transparency to build public trust and confidence in a 

function intimately tied to the abuses of the previous 

regime.

Governance and Democratic Oversight.

The second key piece of Tunisia’s security sector 

is governance and democratic oversight. These are 

found in the executive functions of Tunisia’s transition governments, the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the three national commissions, and the National 

Constituent Assembly—the democratically elected 

parliamentary body with a mandate to draft a new 

constitution for the Republic of Tunisia.

The First Transition Government, January 17-February 

27, 2011. The first transition government was created 

in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure. On 
22

January 17, 2011, Prime Minister Mohammad Ghannouchi named a new interim unity government. The 

19 ministers included six members of Ben Ali’s cabinet—including the three critical Defense, Interior and 

Foreign Affairs Ministries—three opposition leaders, 

and 10 independents. The interim government sought 

to begin crafting a new narrative contrasting it with 

its predecessors. In addition to including opposition 

members in the government, promises were made to 

free political prisoners and to include international 

monitors at the upcoming elections; furthermore, political groups, including Islamist parties, were granted 

amnesty. The transition government also created three 

national commissions, which began work on January 

19, 2011. (These will be discussed in further detail below). However, the participation of Ben Ali loyalists 

sparked a new round of violent protests. Five ministers defected from the interim government soon after 

it was formed, and Ghannouchi replaced the Ministers of Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs. Finally, 

as protests continued to mount, Ghannouchi himself 

resigned on February 27, 2011, and Beji Caid Essebsi, a 

former foreign minister under Bourguiba, became the 

new Prime Minister.53

The Second Transition Government, February 27-

December 24, 2011. The second transition government 

under Beji Caid Essebsi sought to address protestors’ 

demands, particularly the charge that the dismantling 

of Ben Ali’s security establishment was not moving 

apace. He appointed a new cabinet largely comprised 

of technocrats who had not served under Ben Ali’s 

government. The new government announced the 

dissolution of Ben Ali’s political police and his ruling 

party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique

(RCD), in March 2011.54 Despite progress, antigov-
23

ernment protests and violent street battles in Tunis 

reflected a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the pace 

of change and fear that the new government would 

revert to autocratic rule. 

Yet, in the midst of ongoing protests, the second 

interim government made two critical decisions: first, 

to place constitutional reform ahead of elections; and 

second, to delay the elections for a National Constituent Assembly from July to October 2011. The first decision ensured that the old constitution, which privileged the RCD and thus made free and fair elections 

virtually impossible, would not return the old ruling 

party or Ben Ali’s political establishment to power. 

The second delayed the transitional period, so that reformist and opposition parties would be afforded the 

opportunity to compete and to shape the drafting of a 

new constitution for Tunisia.55

More than 90 percent of registered Tunisian citizens participated in what was Tunisia’s first truly 

competitive election since it declared independence 

from France in 1956.56 The previously banned Islamist 

Ennahda Party won a plurality of 89 of the 217 seats in 

the National Constituent Assembly.57

The Caretaker Government, December 23, 2011-present. The Ennahda Party combined with the secular 

Congress for the Republic Party and the left Ettakatol 

Party to form a caretaker government to run the country during the year-long period in which the Assembly 

is charged with drafting a new constitution.58 Hamadi 

Jebali, Ennahda’s secretary general, is the new Prime 

Minister, and Moncef Marzouki, head of the Congress 

for the Republic, holds the largely ceremonial post of 

Tunisian President. At its first meeting, the Assembly 

confirmed the selection of Mustafa Ben Jaafar, leader 

of the Ettakatol party, as speaker of the new assembly. 
24

The new Prime Minister, Hamadi Jebali, proposed a 

cabinet, which was approved on December 23, 2011. 

Only the Minister of Defense, Abdelkarim Zbidi, remained unchanged from the previous cabinet.

The Constituent Assembly approved Tunisia’s new 

government but did not stipulate when the government’s mandate would end. Given the 1-year mandate 

for the drafting of the constitution, the assumption 

was that elections would shortly follow completion 

of the constitution in late 2012 or early 2013. But in 

February 2012, Prime Minister Jebali announced that 

elections would not be held until August 2013.59 One 

month later, Jebali announced that elections would be 

held no later than June 2013, and preferably on April 

9, Tunisia Martyr’s Day.60 The delays may simply reflect the government’s recognition that drafting a new 

constitution in only a year is not feasible (in South 

Africa, the new constitution was drafted in 2 years). 

However, civil society groups and opposition parties 

have expressed concern over the government’s open 

mandate. Former Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi 

has called for the National Constituent Assembly to 

respect the mandate to draft the constitution and prepare for elections within a period not exceeding October 23, 2012.

The Ministry of Defense. Civilian oversight and governance of the Tunisian Armed Forces are assigned to 

the Tunisian MOD, led by a civilian Minister of Defense. The MOD is an almost entirely civilian organization. It has primary responsibility for the implementation of policy decisions regarding the uniformed 

services. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is the 

principle advisor to the Minister. The Chiefs of Staff 

of each of the three services—Army, Air Force, and 

Navy—command each of their respective services but 

do not serve on a unified general staff. Coordination 
25

among the services is the responsibility of the Chief of 

Staff of the Armed Forces.

The Ministry of Defense is comprised of the Ministerial Cabinet, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, 

and the National Defense Institute, the senior military 

defense university. The MOD oversees seven directorates for military justice, general conscription and 

mobilization, central administration, personnel and 

training, information and culture, military health, and 

the “National Military Mutuality,” as well as the High 

Committee of the Armed Forces, “specialized instruments,” technical departments, and military schools.61

The Minister of Defense’s specific authorities are 

defined by a 1975 Presidential Decree, which specifies 

that the Minister of Defense serves the President of 

the Republic, who is the Supreme Commander of the 

Armed Forces. The Minister of Defense has the task of 

ensuring the security and integrity of national territory and the protection of people’s lives.

As in the case of the armed forces, the scope of 

reform of the MOD is quite small. The Ministry will 

need to adjust to a democratic system of governance 

that will likely involve regular review and oversight 

by parliamentary committees of the MOD and its 

budget. This will require institutionalizing a culture 

of oversight and adjusting processes and procedures 

to accommodate external review. Yet, the need for 

oversight is recognized and welcomed by the Ministry, suggesting that the MOD will not resist these 

changes. Another likely reform will involve the inclusion of both civilians and military officers in the 

drafting of national strategies and strategic planning, 

a role that military officers did not fulfill in the Ben 

Ali regime. Senior military officers are keen to fill the 

role of subject matter experts and to support civilian 
26

decisionmakers, as their counterparts do in most democratic nations. 

The Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior is 

the proverbial black box of Tunisia’s security sector. 

Successful SSR in Tunisia will ultimately hinge on the 

establishment of real, democratically elected, civilian 

oversight of the MOI. Tunisian human rights activists 

characterize the current relationship between Minister 

of Interior Laarayedh and his Ministry as “a war.”62

The standoff between the Minister of Interior and 

the director of one of the ministry’s subordinate security forces in January 2012 dramatically underscores 

this point. Laarayedh sought to remove Monsef Al 

Ajimi, the Director of the Intervention Forces, from 

his post. Ajimi had been formally accused of firing on 

crowds in Thala during the revolution. But Ajimi had 

the loyalty of some 12,000 police from the Bouchoucha Barracks, who physically blocked access to the accused director and then organized a strike in protest 

of his attempted removal. Across Tunis, key installations were left with no Tunisian security presence, 

including the embassies. One of the police unions intervened, persuading the strikers that their interests 

were not being served by supporting a senior member 

of the Ben Ali security apparatus—a man who had 

fired on the people. The courts have not yet ruled on 

the case, and although the strikes ceased, the Minister 

of Interior was forced to move the accused director to 

a consultant position elsewhere in the ministry. 

Both the video release and the thwarted attempt 

to fire the Director of the Intervention Forces suggest 

that Laarayedh’s authority over the ministry—and 

thus, the authority of the civilian transition government approved by the nationally elected Constituent Assembly—is quite limited. It also suggests that 
27

ministry officials are likely to resist efforts to reform 

the Ministry, and, as the incident of the Intervention 

Forces suggests, that they have the capacity and the 

resources to do so. According to a legal activist engaged in promoting security sector reform, “Senior 

officers in the MOI do not have the intention to do reform. Those senior officers are not collaborating with 

the new government. They are resisting any reform 

and are seeking to protect their interests, their positions, and themselves.”63

Three National Commissions. The three commissions 

created within days of Ben Ali’s overthrow constitute 

another important element through which civilian 

authority over Tunisia’s transition to democratic rule 

is exercised. The three commissions are the National 

Commission to Investigate Violence During the Riots, 

headed by Tawfik Bouderbala; the National Commission to Investigate Corruption, headed by Abdelfattah 

Amor; and the High Commission for the Fulfillment 

of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition, headed by Iyadh Ben Achour.

The most important of these three commissions is 

the High Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition, headed by Ben Achour. Also known as the Ben 

Achour Commission, it includes 154 technical experts, 

legal advisors, and members of Tunisia’s political 

parties and civil society. According to Albert Stepan, 

“This Commission is one of the most successful and 

consensual organizations in the history of crafting a 

democratic transition.”64

The Ben Achour Commission began work on January 19, only days after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. On 

April 11, 2011, members of the Commission approved 

a number of documents that defined the post-Ben Ali 
28

transition to democratic rule, each of which was subsequently implemented. First was the decision to create 

a Constituent Assembly to produce a new constitution 

and to hold Tunisia’s first elections for seats in this 

assembly. Second, the Commission agreed that the 

Constituent Assembly would appoint a government 

and that this government would be responsible to the 

Constituent Assembly. Third, the Commission adopted a proportional representation electoral system 

and required that party lists contain alternating male 

and female candidates. Fourth, the commission invited international observers to monitor the elections 

and created an independent electoral commission by 

moving the Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les 

Élections (ISIE) out of the Ministry of Interior. Finally, 

the Commission agreed to dissolve the RCD and ban 

some of its leaders from participation in the elections 

for the Constituent Assembly. Other party members, 

however, were permitted to form new parties and to 

participate in the election.65

The commission appointed two other national 

commissions to respond to civil society demands for 

transparency and justice. The National Commission 

to Investigate Violence During the Riots was headed 

by Tawfik Bouderbala, the former president of the Tunisian Human Rights League. The Commission was 

quickly overwhelmed with claims, even though the 

Commission is limited only to the 2-to-3-month time 

frame of the demonstrations immediately before and 

during the revolution. The second commission, the 

National Commission to Investigate Corruption, was 

headed by Abdel Fattah, a Special Rapporteur for the 

former UN Human Rights Committee and a political 

science professor.66 All three commissions are currently at a standstill. The chair of the corruption committee 
29

died from an apparent heart attack, and the other two 

commissions are awaiting guidance from the Constituent Assembly and the transitional government. The 

National Commission to Investigate Violence During 

the Riots will reportedly release its findings in latespring 2012.67

The National Constituent Assembly. During the 

transitional period, the 217-seat National Constituent Assembly is Tunisia’s legislative body. It has a 

clear mandate to draft a new constitution for Tunisia 

during 2012. What is less clear is the interim government’s mandate for reform. Although the Constituent 

Assembly approved the caretaker government headed 

by Prime Minister Hemadi Jebali, this does not necessarily confer a mandate to reform the government or 

the security sector before the Constituent Assembly 

has drafted a new constitution and before elections for 

a new government are held at a yet-to-be-determined 

date in 2013.

The Constituent Assembly has made some progress. Its members adopted a “mini-constitution” in December 2011 that defines government and parliamentary authority until the new constitution is complete. 

In mid-January, members also approved internal bylaws to govern the constitution-drafting process.68 Article 111 creates a commission to draft the constitution, 

and, on January 18, 2012, Ben Jaafar was appointed 

head of this commission. It coordinates the work of six 

other committees that will focus on: 1) introduction, 

basic principles, and constitutional review; 2) rights 

and freedoms; 3) legislative and executive powers, 

and relations between powers; 4) civil, administrative, 

financial and constitutional justice; 5) constitutional 

bodies, including all committees, focused on media 

pluralism, financial regulation, separation of politics 
30

and religion, and law enforcement and security; and 

6) local, regional and municipal issues.69 Particularly 

encouraging was the adoption of transparency rules 

during the constitution-drafting process. According to 

Article 62, “Public information is the rule, secrecy is 

the exception. It is up for the members of the committee to decide [when exceptions will be made].”70

Justice and the Rule of Law.

The third component of the Tunisian security sector consists of the justice functions as they relate to 

the security sector and the rule of law. This includes 

the Ministry of Justice and its prison regimes, the judiciary, and prosecution services. 

The Ministry of Justice overseas the application 

of Tunisian law, including the offices of the regional and national judiciary and the administration of 

prisons and rehabilitation centers.71 According to a 

1974 Presidential Decree, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for developing and implementing judicial 

policy; drafting legislation and commenting on draft 

legislation submitted by other ministries; drafting 

international conventions; organizing and inspecting 

judicial public services; and considering applications 

for pardon, parole, rehabilitation, and revision.72 Subsequently, with the inclusion of ministry oversight of 

the prison system and human rights, the ministry’s 

functions also included the execution of sentences and 

the promotion of human rights.73

The General Directorate of Prisons and Rehabilitation (GDSR), which oversees the Tunisian prison 

system, is one of the subordinate organizations of the 

Ministry of Justice.74 Interestingly, it is currently being 

run by an Army Senior Colonel (one-star equivalent).75
31

There are 35 confinement facilities under the GDSR, 

including one prison housing strictly women and seven juvenile detention and rehabilitation centers.76 In 

February 2011, a general amnesty law authorized the 

release of 500 political prisoners.

The Tunisian Judiciary has three levels of regular courts—Cantonal, First Instance, and Appeals. At 

the apex is the Court of Cassation. At each level, the 

courts have sections for civil, commercial, criminal, 

social, and personal status cases (there are no specialized Sharia courts). The High Court, according to Article 68, meets for cases of high treason committed by 

a member of the government.77

According to Article 65 of the Tunisian Constitution, “The judiciary is independent; the magistrates in 

the exercise of their functions are not subjected to any 

authority other than the law.”78 In practice, however, 

the executive has almost exclusive control over the 

judiciary. The Tunisian president chairs the Superior 

Council of Magistrates (Le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature), which recommends judges (magistrates); the 

Tunisian president also appoints judges. The Minister 

of Justice also serves on the Superior Council, and the 

Ministry administers the judiciary and its budget and 

determines the number of judges needed and their 

assignments. Reportedly under Ben Ali, the Ministry 

even determined case assignments and intervened 

to ensure favorable rulings for members of the Ben 

Ali establishment.79 The Minister of Justice can also 

transfer judges and prosecutors without their consent 

for punitive reasons or to intimidate. A recent European Union Justice Peer Review Report on Tunisia, 

published in December 2011, recommends “immediate steps” to restore public confidence in the justice 

system and the establishment of an independent and 

effective justice system founded on the principles of 
32

judicial independence and the impartiality and irrevocability of judges and prosecutors.80

The prosecution system in Tunisia is largely judicial, and prosecutors are comparable to judges. Trials are by judge, not jury. Prosecutors are part of the 

Ministry of Justice, although the Judicial Police, who 

conduct investigations and prepare the report for 

prosecution, are part of the Ministry of Interior. The 

Youth Lawyers Association and the Lawyers Union 

have proposed reforms of both the prosecutorial system and the role of the Judicial Police. One recommendation is to allow legal counsel to be present during 

interrogations conducted by the Judicial Police. In 

January 2012, association representatives met with the 

minister of justice, who reportedly told them that it 

was not possible to move away from an interrogationbased system. Reforming the prosecutorial system and 

the Judicial Police, as these groups proposed, would 

require training the police to conduct real investigations, transferring the Judicial Police to the MOJ and 

training lawyers to advocate for their clients during 

interrogation. The representatives concluded that the 

enormous institutional obstacles and time constraints 

limit the will to undertake serious political reform.81

The Lawyers Union and the Youth Lawyers Association are able to submit their proposed reforms to the 

Constituent Assembly, particularly on issues relating 

to judiciary reform and human rights laws. However, 

they noted that the Assembly has not yet begun work 

on these issues, since its focus has been on creating the 

bylaws to govern the work of the Assembly.82

No equivalent white paper addresses the MOJ, but 

some efforts are under way to assess prospects for the 

reform of key subsectors. The number of active nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and international 
33

organizations (IO) efforts focused on justice sector reform suggests that the lack of a roadmap has not limited efforts. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice appears to be 

less of a black box than the MOI, although civil society 

groups such as the Tunisian Human Rights League 

question whether any of these efforts have produced 

meaningful reform.83

One of the first groups to engage with the Ministry of Justice was the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Discussions eventually produced an agreement in October 

2011. The scope of the DCAF effort with regard to 

MOJ reforms includes institutional and legal reform 

of the penitentiary and re-education system as well as 

strengthening the capacity of the penitentiary and its 

personnel.84 In late January, DCAF met with the Minister of Justice, Noureddine Bhiri, to discuss the implementation of the memorandum of understanding 

between the ministry and DCAF for prison reform.85

The UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN 

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

(OHCHR) are reportedly also engaged in training programs to support prison reform. The United States has 

also sought to engage on the issue of prison reform, 

but has not yet signed an agreement with the Tunisian 

government.

DCAF has also worked with the Ministry of Interior to collect and catalogue laws and amendments 

relating to the security sector. These texts have been 

uploaded to an electronic database, accessible in both 

Arabic and French, which was released to the MOI on 

January 26, 2012. The index includes legislation relating to the traditional security providers (the military 

and the police), the justice sector (the courts and prisons), as well as management and oversight of the se-
34

curity sector (government, ministries, parliament, and 

the courts). Legislation governing the work of political parties, the media, and NGOs was also included.86

This single, easily accessible, and searchable resource 

for all laws and amendments pertaining to the security sector greatly enhances the transparency of the 

legal framework governing the security sector. 

Another reform initiative that has garnered international engagement is the training of prosecutors. 

The UNDP-Tunisia has begun to develop a training 

program, and the American Bar Association (ABA) 

Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI) has also sought to offer 

training for young attorneys that focuses specifically 

on how to understand their role in a democratic society. Key issues include how to protect the rights of the 

accused and the political rights of the public. 

The challenge of how best to resolve the issue of 

transitional justice is particularly pressing in Tunisia 

as public frustration with the apparent lack of progress has grown. While there is a strong impulse for 

revenge against those who were responsible for the 

human rights abuses of the Ben Ali regime, there is 

also widespread recognition that the numbers of individuals who were “tainted” by the Ben Ali regime are 

so large that the process of bringing them all to justice 

will likely stretch beyond the current 12-to-18-month 

transition process. Many acknowledge that amnesty 

is not politically possible, given the charged nature of 

the issue today, but people from across the political 

spectrum also agree that some form of amnesty will 

be necessary to prevent the construction of a post-Ben 

Ali Tunisia from being derailed. According to activists 

at the Tunisian Human Rights League, “Tunisia can’t 

have progress without some reconciliation with the 

old regime, but the people won’t support it.”87
35

Ennahda clearly recognizes the importance of judicial accountability for the crimes of the Ben Ali regime and created a new position in Jebali’s cabinet. 

The new Minster for Transitional Justice and Human 

Rights is Samir Dilou, a lawyer and member of the Executive Bureau of the Ennahda Party. Dilou is also an 

Ennahda deputy in the Constituent Assembly and the 

spokesperson for the Jebali government. Implementation of transitional justice is a key issue in the transitional government’s agenda. Given the depth of the 

former regime’s corruption and its influence within 

the judicial system, it remains a question whether justice can be achieved without first implementing extensive internal judicial reform.

A key issue is the corruption of the judicial system. Corruption was rampant, particularly in the last 

five years of Ben Ali’s regime. As one activist noted, 

“He fell so quickly because not a single family was untouched by the corruption.” The corruption extended 

across the government, not just in the Ministries of 

Justice and Interior, but also in the Ministries of Agriculture, Government Property, Commerce, and Industry, to name a few. “At the end,” the activist added, 

“everyone was fed up with the corruption, even in the 

government. This is why the revolution took only 2 

days in Tunis. He [Ben Ali] fled because no one came 

to his defense.”88 It will be essential to remove the coterie of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers who were loyal 

to the Ben Ali regime. Practices such as the fixing of 

sentences before trial will need to be reformed. 

Another critical issue for the reform of the justice 

sector will be assessing whether the body of laws and 

institutional guidelines sufficiently protect the rights 

of all citizens and adequately constrain the authority 

of government entities in accordance with the rule of 
36

law. Equally critical will be reforming the institutional 

and operational culture of the ministry, the judiciary, 

the prosecutorial services, and the prison system to 

adhere to these laws and guidelines; training existing 

personnel how to operate according to these guidelines; and recruiting and training new personnel to 

fill the mission of the justice sector in accordance with 

democratic governance and the rule of law.

However, within the Judiciary, and in stark contrast to the Ministry of Interior, there are some indicators that reform has begun. Judges and prosecutors 

who were known to be corrupt are beginning to be 

discharged. This is a promising beginning. A draft law 

removing the President of Tunisia and the Minister of 

Justice from the Superior Council is also being considered.89 According to Moussa Abdelsattar, the Director of the Tunisian League of Human Rights, there 

are five issues that need to be addressed for there to 

be justice in Tunisia. First, the regime needs to prosecute former regime officials who engaged in human 

rights violations during the revolution. Second, there 

needs to be reconciliation between these perpetrators 

and their victims. Third, the government must establish standards for the adequate compensation of the 

victims of the former regime. Fourth, it is necessary 

to implement reform of the security apparatus, the judicial system, and the media. And, finally, there must 

be assurances that the martyrs of the revolution will 

be honored appropriately. According to Abdelsattar, 

progress is being made only on the first element.90

Ennahda’s leadership has urged patience to allow 

the judicial system to work and to allow reform of 

the judicial system to begin to take effect. According 

to Dilou, it is imperative that the government begin 

implementing justice while at the same time purging 
37

the judiciary of corrupt elements from the former regime.91 Because the reform process will take time, “it 

is imperative that we carry on both the reform process 

and the transitional justice process simultaneously.” 

Ennahda cannot ignore real demands for justice 

from the former regime’s many victims, who mobilized to overthrow the regime and who expect the new 

government to hold the perpetrators accountable. Yet, 

Ennahda does not want to generate the perception 

that the new government is after revenge. Nor does 

it want to further undermine the ability of the police 

to resume legitimate security functions, which will 

in turn enable the military to return to the barracks. 

Balancing these issues will require a transparent, inclusive, and incremental process to achieve legitimate 

justice without making the passive supporters of the 

Ben Ali regime into a new class of victims and sacrificing Tunisia’s present stability. 

Civil Society.

The final piece of the Tunisian security sector map 

is civil society, a broad category that includes the media, NGOs, trade unions, and human rights advocacy 

institutions that promote democratic oversight and 

transparency of the security sector for ordinary citizens. 

Civil society is a bright point in the Tunisian security sector. Since the revolution, the number of civil 

society groups has exploded. Civil society groups are 

engaged in issues with relevance across the security 

sector spectrum, and their efforts, together with public pressure, have been critical in pushing Tunisia’s 

transitional regimes to move forward with reforms. A 

few examples are worth noting.
38

While the media have focused on the important 

part that social networks played in the Tunisian 

revolution, there are civilian institutions that existed 

in Tunisia well before the revolution. One of these 

institutions is the General Tunisian Workers Union 

(UGTT). Its membership numbers in the hundreds 

of thousands.92 The UGTT organized several strikes 

during the decades of Ben Ali’s rule.93 Institutions like 

the UGTT that survived the Ben Ali regime with their 

legitimacy intact will be important actors during the 

transition period and, unlike many of the new civil 

society groups, are well organized and well known to 

Tunisia’s citizens.

Tunisians have created new civil society groups to 

push for transparency and accountability during the 

transition. Two of these groups are Le Labo’ Democratique (The Democracy Lab) and OpenGovTN. The 

Democracy Lab joined with DCAF to organize a conference on the management and disposition of the regime’s secret police files. OpenGovTN has focused its 

activities on the transparency of the National Constituent Assembly and the inclusion of Tunisian citizens 

during the constitution-drafting process, principally 

through unrestricted access to Assembly proceedings. 

Comprised of professional Tunisians and Tunisian 

expatriates, the organization has developed a series 

of transparency initiatives—a TV channel that broadcasts the Constituent Assembly meetings live; and 

publication of the reports of various governmental 

commissions, the records of the votes of each member 

of the Constituent Assembly, the record of attendance 

of Assembly delegates, and the record of the debates 

and speeches of every member of the Assembly. One 

goal of OpenGovTN is to provide citizens with information so that they can judge their representatives’ 
39

competence and hold them accountable in subsequent 

elections.

An explosion of media outlets is another positive sign of Tunisia’s transition to democratic rule. 

Widely viewed as a mouthpiece of the Ben Ali regime, 

the media are now adjusting to a freer climate after 

decades of censorship and repression. The proliferation of cable, radio, and print media is a positive step 

forward, but media companies claim that the government is dragging its heels during the licensing process. Ennahda has complained that the new Tunisian 

media establishment has tended toward sensationalist journalism and that it has negatively portrayed the 

achievements of the government.94 Some argue that 

government scrutiny of the media is necessary because 

the explosion of new media companies threatens journalistic integrity. Media advocacy groups such as the 

International Freedom of Expression Exchange have 

organized conferences on the role of the media in a 

democratic society, access to information, and media 

independence.95 Similarly, the Independent National 

Authority to Reform Information and Communication (INRIC), which seeks “protection of the right of 

the Tunisian people to a free, pluralistic and transparent media,” has submitted 14 recommendations for a 

press code to the government and has engaged in advocacy to establish new regulations to reorganize the 

media and to prevent the emergence of monopolies.96

Ennahda’s leadership has recognized the need for the 

reform of government control of the media, and has 

reached out to the British Broadcasting Corporation 

(BBC) as a potential model for Tunisia.97
40

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY AHEAD

Successful democratic transitions require the 

achievement of four key goals:98 First, sufficient agreement has to be reached about the political process 

to produce an elected government. This has been 

achieved. Second, the elected government must come 

to power through a free and fair vote. This, too, has 

been accomplished. Third, the government must have 

de facto authority to generate new policies. This, too, 

has been achieved by all three of Tunisia’s transition 

governments. Fourth, the executive, legislative, and 

judicial authorities of the new government cannot be 

required de jure to share power with other bodies (for 

example, the military, or in Tunisia, the police).99 This, 

too, has been accomplished, although in practice the 

government faces serious challenges asserting its legal authority over key elements of the Ben Ali regime, 

notably the Ministry of Interior and, to a lesser extent, 

the Ministry of Justice.

These accomplishments are remarkable. Tunisia 

has achieved in 1 year what none of the other Arab 

Spring states has been able to. This leaves Tunisia well 

poised to undertake serious security sector reform. 

Reform will be essential for Tunisia’s security sector 

to transition from a black box whose raison d’être was 

protecting the regime, to transparent and democratically accountable institutions whose primary mission 

is to protect the people. There are four priority actions 

to be accomplished:

1. The first priority is to restructure the internal 

security services and the Ministry of Interior. The 

labyrinth of internal security institutions and the lack 

of transparency over the most basic issues—a ministerial organizational chart, official numbers of interior 

forces—suggest that reform of the internal security 
41

sector must begin with a mapping of the institutions, 

the forces, and the personnel and assessing exactly 

what is required for effective reform. The white paper is a good start. The caretaker government should 

draw on the expertise of Tunisian and international 

experts to ensure that the mapping and assessment 

of the internal security forces and the Ministry of Interior are robust and that the proposed reforms meet 

Tunisia’s security needs. With greater transparency in 

place, it will be possible to address the three remaining reforms. 

The first is establishing democratic oversight over 

the Ministry of Interior, to include executive oversight 

by the minister and parliamentary oversight over the 

ministry’s practices, budgets, and reform plans. Implementing these reforms will require a fundamental 

reorientation of the ministry’s institutional culture 

and mission. The second needed internal security sector reform is divesting, reorganizing, and retraining 

the internal security and police forces to create a new 

police service that conducts humane, accountable, responsive, and capable policing. The third necessary 

reform is resolving the Ministry of Interior and the 

police forces’ “image problem.” The white paper suggests new uniforms, new logos, and more welcoming 

reception areas in police stations. These are important 

tangible indicators of change. They must be accompanied by real change; that is, fundamental reorientation 

in how the ministry and its forces engage with citizens 

and with the democratically elected executive authorities and parliament. The restoration of police services 

will also help restore both the confidence of the police 

and the public’s trust in the government.

2. A second priority is to establish the governance 

and democratic oversight of the security sector. The 
42

creation of bylaws to govern the constitution-drafting 

process, and recognition that the process needs to be 

transparent, are positive developments. As the National Constituent Assembly begins drafting a new 

constitution, critical issues for SSR include creating 

the legal framework that establishes permanent oversight by both the executive and the parliament over 

the security sector. A central element of this framework will be the creation of parliamentary committees on defense, security, and intelligence. One of 

the recently created constitutional commissions has 

drafting authority for the committees on law enforcement and security. A particular challenge during the 

coming year is how this oversight, particularly of the 

reform efforts of the security sector, will be conducted 

while the new constitution is being written. The one 

institution with a true electoral mandate during the 

transitional period is the National Constituent Assembly. Its oversight over the reform process during this 

transitional year will be important for the legitimacy 

of the SSR in Tunisia.

3. A third priority is to reform the justice sector, 

including the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, and 

prosecution services. Because there is no roadmap yet 

for the reform of the justice sector, developing an assessment is a good place to start. Discussions have already begun over prison reform and prosecutor training. The role of the Judicial Police and the apparent 

lack of investigative capabilities either in the MOI or 

the MOJ are clear priorities, and international technical assistance and training might be useful to begin addressing these gaps. As in the MOI, Ministry of Justice 

reform will likely require reorienting the institutional 

culture of the ministry and retraining judges, prosecutors, lawyers, court clerks, notaries, bailiffs, and many 
43

others. This is an enormous project that could well 

stretch over a decade.

4. The final priority is to manage the difficult issue 

of transitional justice. Although transitional justice is 

not itself part of security sector reform, it is intricately 

connected to it. Transitional justice involves resolving difficult, and often emotional, issues that resonate 

throughout Tunisia, including whether to prosecute 

members of the former Ben Ali regime, and if so, who 

exactly should be prosecuted; whether to purge the 

ministries and which ones; and whether and how to 

compensate the victims of the former regime. How 

transitional justice is addressed in Tunisia will have 

great bearing on how SSR efforts proceed. 

Closely related to transitional justice is the way to 

vet the state administration across all the ministries, 

but particularly Interior, Justice, and the Judiciary. 

The MOI’s inability to remove senior officials in the 

ministry suggests that civilian control over the ministry is a pressing issue. The lack of judicial independence, particularly the executive’s authority over the 

appointment, reassignment, and promotion of judges 

and prosecutors is another challenge. The vetting of 

the state administration is a delicate issue that involves 

balancing the need to purge certain key positions or 

senior levels of individuals tainted by the former regime against the risk of creating a new aggrieved minority—if the purges are too extensive—or of losing 

the ability to deliver major services. In the case of the 

Judiciary, the risk is to undermine the legitimacy of 

the judicial system and the rule of law.

Another related question is whether to prosecute 

those individuals who are to be purged and others for 

their activities under the previous regime, or to grant 

them amnesty. Transitional justice can provide a good 
44

foundation for longer-term judicial reform. Support 

from international experts with experience managing transitional justice elsewhere might be useful, if 

the Tunisian leadership should request the expertise. 

Ennahda’s leadership is certainly aware of the challenges, and has taken great pains to emphasize that 

anything that smacks of revenge will be counterproductive. Ennahda seeks reconciliation, not revenge.

That SSR is a highly political process is frequently 

underappreciated. In any political process, there are 

winners and losers, and the potential losers of Tunisian SSR were among the most privileged in Tunisian 

society. What is frequently overestimated is the value 

of security. The assumption is that once basic security 

is restored, “the rest will fall into place.” This is by 

no means a necessary given. While Tunisia’s relatively 

smooth transition from revolution to a democratically 

elected caretaker government is remarkable, much remains to be done. Serious reform of the security sector 

remains essential if Tunisia’s transition to democratic 

rule is to succeed in the long term.

ENDNOTES

1. Hernando de Soto, “The Real Mohammad Bouazizi,” 

Foreign Policy, December 16, 2011, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/16/the_real_mohamed_bouazizi; Rania 

Abouzeid, “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on 

Fire,” Time.com, January 21, 2011, available from www.time.com/

time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html. Early media reports 

mistakenly reported that Mohammad Bouazizi had a university 

degree.

2. “Al Arabiya Inquiry Reveals How Tunisia’s Ben Ali Escaped to Saudi Arabia,” Al Arabiya January 13, 2012, available 

from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/31/188093.html.
45

3. William MacLean, “Tunisia Army Pivotal to Ben Ali 

Ousting: Reports,” Reuters, January 17, 2011, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/17/us-tunisia-protests-army-idUSTRE70G52B20110117. 

4. Philippe Droz-Vincent, “A Return of Armies to the Forefront of Arab Politics?” IAI Working Papers 11/21, July 2011, p. 8.

5. Heiner Hänggi, “Conceptualising Security Sector Reform 

and Reconstruction,” in Allan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, eds., 

Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Münster: Lit, 2004; 

Sean McFate, “Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector 

Reform in Conflict Countries,” United States Institute of Peace 

Special Report 2009, September 2008.

6. Alexis Arieff, “Political Transition in Tunisia,” CRS Report 

for Congress RS 21666, December 16, 2011, p. 2.

7. Tunisian Ministry of Defense, “The Role of the Tunisian 

Armed Forces During the Revolution,” transcript of the ministry 

briefing, Tunis, January 24, 2012, p. 4.

Since February 2011, about 1,600,000 refugees, mostly 

from sub-Saharan Africa, have fled the fighting in Libya and have streamed across the Tunisia-Libya border 

crossing-points at Ras Jdir and Dhiba. The Tunisian 

Army is still playing an active role in managing this situation, knowing that more than 3,000 refugees from subSaharan countries are still present in the Choucha camp, 

while [an]other 325,000 Libyans are living in different 

regions within Tunisia [sic]. 

The refugee camps are located in Choucha, Ras Jedir, Tataouine, 

Remada, and Dhiba.

8. Author interviews with senior military officers, Tunis, Tunisia, January 23-25, 2012. (Hereafter, Author interview(s), January 23-25, 2012.)

9. Author Interview with Dr. Radwan Masmoudi, Tunis, Tunisia, January 23, 2012.

10. Author interview, Tunis, Tunisia, January 23, 2012.
46

11. Omar Mestiri, director of Radio Kalima, quoted in Asmar 

Ghribi, “Tunisia Media Reform: An Incomplete Process,” Tunisia-Live.net, December 30, 2011, available from www.tunisia-live.

net/2011/12/30/tunisian-media-reform-an-incomplete-process/.

12. Ibid.

13. Mark Sedra, “Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East,” United States Institute of Peace Special 

Report 296, November 2011. 

14. Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, “Security in 

Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality,” Chaillot Paper Series 

no. 25, September 1996, p. 24.

15. Ibid.

16. Author interviews, January 23-25, 2012. 

17. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Middle 

East and North Africa,” in The Military Balance 2012, Vol. 112, No. 

1, London, UK: Routledge, 2012, p. 352; Ellen Knickmeyer, “Just 

Whose Side Are Arab Armies On, Anyway?” Pulitzer Center on 

Crisis Reporting, January 28, 2011, available from pulitzercenter.

org/articles/arab-armies-tunisia-military-egypt-yemen?format=print. 

18. Tunisia Ministry of Defense Brief, January 24, 2012.

19. “Middle East and North Africa,” in The Military Balance 

2011, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 

2011, pp. 293-342. 

20. Author interviews, January 23-25, 2012.

21. Briefing and interview by author with a joint panel of senior military officers at the Ministry of Defense, Tunis, Tunisia, 

January 24, 2012.

22. Author interviews, January 23-25, 2012.

23. Author interview with Mohammad Lazhar Akremi, Tunis, Tunisia, January 25, 2012.
47

24. Author interview, Tunisia, January 23, 2012.

25. Charles Baeder, “Release of Unauthenticated PrisonSex Video Denounced in Defense of Tunisian Interior Minister,” Tunisia-Live.net, January 19, 2012, available from www.

tunisia-live.net/2012/01/19/release-of-unauthenticated-prison-sex-videodenounced-in-defense-of-tunisian-interior-minister/. 

26. “Al Arabiya Inquiry Reveals How Tunisia’s Ben Ali Escaped to Saudi Arabia,” Al Arabiya, January 13, 2012, available 

from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/31/188093.html. 

27. Author interview with members of the Tunisian Young 

Lawyer’s Association, Tunis, Tunisia, January 24, 2012.

28. H. Mzioudet, “Former Tunisian Chief of Presidential Security Reveals: ‘Gaddafi Provided Ben Ali Police With Tear Gas 

Bombs’,” TunisiaLive.Net, November 3, 2011, available from 

www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/03/former-tunisian-chief-of-presidentialsecurity-reveals-gaddafi-provided-ben-ali-police-with-tear-gas-bomb/.

29. “Al Arabiya Inquiry Reveals How Tunisia’s Ben Ali Escaped to Saudi Arabia.” 

30. Sana Ajmi, “In Tunis, Protest Against Security Forces 

Union Open Strike,” Live-Tunisia.net, February 2, 2012, available from www.tunisia-live.net/2012/02/02/in-tunis-protest-againstsecurity-forces-union-open-strike/. 

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Quoted in William G. O’Neill, “Police Reform in Tunisia: 

The Revolution Must Continue,” draft report, January 31, 2012. 

34. Author interview with senior Ennahda party official, Tunis, Tunisia, January 25, 2012.

35. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), “Assessment of the Communication of the Ministry of 
48

Interior,” DCAF-Tunisie.org, October 5, 2011, full report available 

from www.rapprochement.org, trans. by Google Translate, January 

19, 2012.

36. “Conference on Secret Police Archives,” DCAF-Tunisie.org, November 16, 2011, available from dcaf-tunisie.org/

en/2011/11/16/conference-on-the-archives-of-the-political-police/. 

37. Republic of Tunisia Ministry of Interior Mohammad 

Lazhar Akremi, “Security and Development: A White Paper for 

Democratic Security in Tunisia,” November 21, 2011, available 

from Graeme Carroll and Winnie Tsang, trans. Official copies in 

Arabic and French.

38. Author interview with Mohammad Lazhar Akremi, Tunis, Tunisia, January 25, 2012.

39. Akremi, “Preface,” in “Security and Development: A 

White Paper for Democratic Security in Tunisia,”, p. 4.

40. Ibid., p. 5.

41. Ibid., p. 6.

42. Ibid., p. 12.

43. Ibid., pp. 13-15.

44. Author interview with members of the Ennahda Political 

Bureau, Tunis, Tunisia, January 25, 2012.

45. “Security and Development: A White Paper for Democratic Security in Tunisia,” p. 27.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 29.

48. Author interviews, Tunis, Tunisia, January 24, 2012.

49. “Security and Development: A White Paper for Democratic Security in Tunisia,” p. 28.
49

50. Ibid., p. 30.

51. Author interview with DCAF, Tunis, Tunisia, January 23, 

2012.

52. Aidan Wills, Guidebook: Understanding Intelligence Oversight, Geneva, Switzerland: Center for the Democratic Control of 

Armed Forces, 2010, p. 9.

53. Amine Ghali, “Tunisia’s Moment of Opportunity,” Project 

on Middle East Democracy, January 28, 2011, p. 2, available from 

pomed.org/blog/2011/01/new-pomed-policy-brief-tunisias-moment-ofopportunity.html/.

54. “Timeline: Tunisia Goes to the Polls,” Reuters, October 23, 

2011, available from www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/23/us-tunisiavote-events-idUSTRE79M0ZI20111023. 

55. Jason Gluck, “Constitutional Reform in Transitional 

States: Challenges and Opportunities Facing Egypt and Tunisia,” 

USIP Peace Brief 92, April 29, 2011, p. 3.

56. “Tunisia’s Election Winners Form Interim Government after Uprising,” The Guardian, November 21, 2011, available from 

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/22/tunisia-election-winnersennahda-ettakatol.

57. Sana Ajmi, “Tunisia’s Populist Surprise Headed for Marginalization in Constituent Assembly,” TunisiaLive.net, November 10, 2011, available from www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/10/

the-position-of-al-aridha-in-the-tunisian-constituent-assembly/.

58. Tarek Amara, “Tunisia’s Constitutional Assembly, Elected after a Revolution that Inspired the ‘Arab Spring’ Uprisings, 

Held its Opening Session on Tuesday, Described by Officials as 

an Historic Step Toward Democracy,” Reuters, November 22, 

2011, available from www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/22/us-tunisiaassembly-idUSTRE7AL2AI20111122. 

59. Asma Ghribi, “Tunisian Prime Minister Declares Interim Government’s Intention to Hold Presidential Elections in 
50

18 Months,” Tunisia-Live.net, February 3, 2012, available from 

www.tunisia-live.net/2012/02/03/tunisian-prime-minister-declaresinterim-governments-intention-to-hold-presidential-elections-in18-months/. 

60. The possible timing of the elections remains uncertain. In 

an interview with Tunisian daily La Presse published on March 

28, 2012, Jebali recognized that conflicting statements had been 

made regarding the timing of the national elections. He noted 

that the government has asked the National Constituent Assembly to establish a timetable for its activities. “We sincerely hope 

that the Assembly accelerates the process of drafting the constitution. . . . As a government, we believe that the next elections 

should not exceed June 2013. It is preferable that they be held on 

April 9 or at the end of June after the completion of the school 

year. This would allow the new government to begin operations 

in September 2013 without any disruption.” See Samira Dami and 

Néjib Ouerghi, “Le combat du Tunisien n’est pas de savoir s’il 

est musulman ou non,”(“The struggle of the Tunisian person is 

not to know whether he is muslim or not.”) La Presse, Tunisia, 

March 28, 2012, available from www.lapresse.tn/28032012/47543/

le-combat-du-tunisien-nest-pas-de-savoir-sil-est-musulman-ou-non.

html. For an alternate timeline suggested by Jebali’s aide, see 

Kouichi Shirayangai, “Tunisia Scheduled to Hold Parliamentary 

Elections on or Before March 20, 2013,” Tunisia-Live.net, March 

24, 2012, available from www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/24/tunisiascheduled-to-hold-parliamentary-elections-on-or-beforemarch-20-2013/.

61. The Tunisian Government Portal, The Ministry of National 

Defense, available from www.tunisie.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_

ministeres&Itemid=382&task=view&id=28&lang=english.

62. Author interview with human rights activists, Tunisia, 

January 23, 2012.

63. Author interview, Tunis, Tunisia, January 24, 2012.

64. Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s election: counter-revolution 

or democratic transition?” New York: The Immanent Frame, 

Social Science Research Council, available from blogs.ssrc.org/

tif/2011/12/17/tunisia%E2%80%99s-election-counter-revolutionor-democratic-transition/.
51

65. Ibid.

66. Amine Ghali, “Tunisia’s Moment of Opportunity,” 

pp. 2-3.

67. Author interview, Tunis, Tunisia, January 25, 2012.

68. Rules of Procedure of the National Constituent Assembly, 

adopted January 20, 2012.

69. Author interview with Duncan Pickard, Washington, DC, 

February 29, 2012.

70. Helen Keskes, “Tunisia: Constituent Assembly Members 

Vote in Favor of Transparency,” AllAfrica.com, January 7, 2012, 

available from allafrica.com/stories/201201070044.html.

71. Ministry of Justice Portal, “Attributions,” available from 

www.e-justice.tn. 

72. Presidential Decree No. 74-1062. See Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ministry of Justice Portal, “General Directorate of Prisons 

and Rehabilitation,” available from www.e-justice.tn.

75. Author interview, Tunis, Tunisia, January 23, 2012.

76. Ministry of Justice Portal, “Prisons et Centres de Rééducation,” available from www.e-justice.tn.

77. Nathan Brown, “Arab Judicial Structures: Tunisia,” UNDP 

Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), available from www.pogar.org/publications/judiciary/nbrown/tunisia.html. 

78. Article 65, “Independence of Judiciary,” Constitution 

of the Republic of Tunisia, adopted June 1, 1959, and amended 

July 12, 1988, available from unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/

documents/cafrad/unpan004842.pdf. 
52

79. Luca Perilli, “Independent and Impartial Professional Justice,” Jean-Marie Beney, David Forest, Michael Groepper, Christian Johnson, James McManus, Luca Perilli, Marie-Francoise Verdun, and Pierre Weiss, Final Report: EU Diagnosis Mission of the 

Tunisian Judicial and Prison System, Peer Review, Brussels, Belgium: 

European Commission, December 2011, Chap. 4.

80. Ibid., “Executive Summary.”

81. Author interview with members of the Youth Lawyers 

Association and the Lawyers Union, Tunis, Tunisia, January 24, 

2012.

82. Ibid.

83. Author interview with the Tunisian League of Human 

Rights, Tunis, Tunisia, January 23, 2012.

84. “The Tunisian Ministry of Justice and DCAF Sign an 

Agreement Protocol for Cooperation in the Reform of the Penitentiary System,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 

Armed Forces, DCAF-Tunisie, October 5, 2011, available from 

dcaf-tunisie.org/en/2011/10/07/the-ministry-of-justice-and-dcafsign-a-memorandum-of-understanding-for-cooperation-inprison-system-reform/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&

utm_campaign=the-ministry-of-justice-and-dcaf-sign-a-memorandumof-understanding-for-cooperation-in-prison-system-reform.

85. “The Minister of Justice Speaks with DCAF about Prison 

Reform,” DCAF-Tunisie.org, January 26, 2011, available from 

www.DCAF-tunisie.org.

86. Author interviews with DCAF representatives in Tunis, 

Tunisia, January 23-25, 2012. Database is available from www.

legislation-securite.tn.

87. Author interview Tunisian Human Rights League, Tunis, 

Tunisia, January 23, 2012.

88. Author interviews with civil society activists and political 

party leaders, Tunis, Tunisia, January 23, 2012.
53

89. Author interviews, Tunis and Washington, DC, February 

2012.

90. Hanen Keskes, “Transitional Justice Process in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia,” Tunisia-Live.net, January 30, 2012, available 

from www.tunisia-live.net/2012/01/30/transitional-justice-process-inpost-revolutionary-tunisia/. 

91. Ibid.

92. Christopher Alexander, “Opportunities, Organizations, 

and Ideas: Islamists and Workers in Tunisia and Algeria,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, November 

2000, pp. 465-490.

93. Eric Lee and Benjamin Weinthal, “Trade Unions: The Revolutionary Social Network at Play in Egypt and Tunisia,” Guardian.co.uk, February 10, 2012, available from www.guardian.co.uk/

commentisfree/2011/feb/10/trade-unions-egypt-tunisia/print.

94. Author interview with Ennahda party members, January 

25, 2012.

95. Asma Ghribi, “Tunisian Media Reform: An Incomplete 

Process,” Tunisia Live-net, December 30, 2011, available from 

www.tunisia-live.net/2011/12/30/tunisian-media-reform-anincomplete-process/. 

96. “INRIC-Protect the Right of the Tunisians to a Free, Pluralistic and Fair Media,” September 1, 2011, available from www.

nawaat.org.

97. Author interview with members of the Ennahda Political 

Bureau, Tunis, Tunisia, January 25, 2012.

98. Stepan.

99. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems with Democratic 

Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and 

Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1996. See also Ibid.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

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