UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

DISTRICT L OCK & HARDWARE, INC., et al., P laintif

fs,
v. Civil Action No. 10-1774 (JD B) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendan ts.

MEMORAN DUM OP INION District L ock and H ardw are , Inc., and its principa l shareholde r, Michae l Horwatt (collec tively

"pla intiffs") , have br oug ht suit aga inst the District of Columbi a and D .C. Office of Tax Revenue Of

fice rs Sabrina Cobb and B eddell Te rry (collec tively

"de fenda nts") r eg arding

the defe ndants' tax s ale of

District L ock and H ardw are proper ty . Plaintiffs seek dama g es pursua nt to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-law theor ies of neg lige nt training , neg lige nt and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conve rsion. Plaintiffs origina lly broug ht suit i n the Superior 1 Court of the District of Columbia, but defe ndants remove d the ac tion based on the fe dera l § 1983 claim. Def

endants have now moved to dismiss for fa ilure to state a c laim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)( 6), or, in the a lternative, f or summary

judgme nt, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). Def endants a lso argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the Fe dera l Tax I njunction Act, 28 Although pla intiffs' Amended Complaint only alleg es a § 1983 c laim ag ainst 1 defe ndants Cobb and Ter ry , plaintiffs neve rtheless c ontend that they have not " withdr[awn] t heir . . . § 1983 claim ag ainst the District" of Columbia. Pls .' Opp. [Docket Entry 26] at 2 n.1 (citing Am. Compl. [ Docke t Entry 11] ¶¶ 27-37). Eve n if plaintiffs had include d the District as a defe ndant in their § 1983 cla im in their amended c omplaint, that claim would be bar red f or the rea sons set forth in this opinion. -1-U.S.C. § 1341, and under the r elated pr inciple of c omity . This Court will remand this case to the

Superior Court of the D istrict of Columbia based on comity in defe renc e to the District of Columbi a tax sy stem. BACK GR OUND Plaintiffs' c laims arise fr om defe ndants' tax s ale of District L ock and H ardw are proper ty to rec over ba ck sale s tax es. The f ocus of plaintiffs' argument is that defenda nts "fa il[ ed] to give [t hem] any

written notice of

a tax bill ." A m. Compl . ¶ 14. Plaintiffs do not deny that defe ndants "inf ormed [them] that [Dist rict L ock and H ardw are ] owed . . . $975,117.85 in back sale s tax es." I d. ¶ 11. Nor do the y

deny defe ndants " notified [them] . . . that the business was g oing to be seized and auc tioned off," even if they contend that the notific ation was " cry ptic[] and hurr ied[] ." I d. ¶ 16. Plaintiffs, however , do take issue with the a dequac y of def endants' notification, the amount of their pur

ported tax liabili ty , and irre g ularities in the neg otiation and the tax sale proce sses. Specifica lly , plaintiffs alleg e that def endants infor

med them ora lly , but never in writing , reg ardingthe business' s tax liability and the tax sale. More over, the y contend that the business' s "outstandingtax debt was less than . . . $75,000" and that the " [a] mount repre sented to [t hem] . . . was signific antly inflated, e rrone ous, unfounded, a nd fra udulent." I d. ¶¶ 22- 23. Reg ardingthe neg otiation process, plaintiffs a lleg e that " [d] efe ndants . . . steadf astly and repe atedly

ref used to allow them to enter into a neg otiation of their purporte d tax debt unless . . . they paid up front . . . $50,000." I d. ¶ 13. As to the tax sale, plaintiffs claim that it was " irregular and suspec t" be cause "the re [wer e] in effe ct two auc tions" and " one of [p]l aintiffs' business competitors" won the auc tion. I d. ¶ 19. Ba sed on these a lleg ations, plaintiffs broug ht suit i n the Superior Court of the District of -2-Columbi a see king da mag es under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various common law the ories. Def endants re moved the ac tion due to the fede ral c laim. Defe ndants have now moved to dismiss for f ailure to state a

claim, Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6), or, in the a lternative, f or summary

judgme nt, Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(b). Althoug h defe ndants do not specific ally move pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) to dismiss for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction, defenda

nts contend that this "Court lac ks subject matter jurisdiction under the Fe dera l Tax I njunction Act" and " under the principle[] of comity ." Def s.' Mot. to Dismi ss [ Docke t Entry 19] at 9, 15. STANDARD OF REVIEW Be cause the Court rema

nds for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction, the Rule 12(b)(1) standard is the only

rele vant standar d of re view. Unde r that rule, the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a fe dera l court – plaintiffs her e – bea rs the burde n of establishingthat the cour t has jurisdiction. See US Ecolog y , Inc. v. U.S. Dep' t of Interior, 231 F .3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citingSteel Co. v. Cit izens for a B etter Env' t, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998)); se e also Gr and L odg e of F rate rnal Or der of Police v. Ashcrof

t, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001) ( "[A] Rul e 12(b)( 1) motion imposes on the court an a ffirmative obligation to ensure that it is actingwithin the scope of its jurisdictional authority .") ; Pit ney Bow es, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 27 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 1998). A lthough a court must acc ept as true all the fa ctual alleg ations contained in the complaint when r eviewinga motion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) , L eathe rman v. Tarr ant Cnty . Nar cotics Intellige nce & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993),

"' plaintiff[s'] factua l alleg ations in the complaint . . . will bear c loser scr utiny in resolvinga 12(b)( 1) motion' tha

n in resolvinga 12(b) (6) motion for f ailure to state a

claim." Gra

nd L odg e, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14 ( quoting 5A Cha rles Alan Wrig ht & Ar

thur R. Mill er, F eder al Prac tice

-3-and Proce dure § 1350 ( 2d ed. 1990)) . At the stag e of litig ation when dismissal is sought, a

plaintiff' s complaint must be construed liber ally , and the plaintiff should re ceive the bene fit of all favor able infe renc es that ca n be dra wn from the a lleg ed fa cts. See EEO C v. St . Fr ancis Xa vier Parochia l Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D .C. Cir. 1997). Additionally , a cour t may consider material other than the alleg ations of the complaint in deter mining whe ther it has jurisdiction to hear the

case , as longas it still acc epts the fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint as true. See J erome Stevens Pharmac euticals, Inc. v. F DA, 402 F .3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005); St. Fra ncis Xavier Parochia l Sch., 117 F.3d at 624- 25 n.3; Herbe rt v. Nat' l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir.1992). DISCUSSIO N Although de fenda

nts have re moved this case f rom the Superior Court of the District of Columbi a base d on fede ral que stion jurisdi ction, they now ar g ue that this "Court lac ks subject matter jurisdiction under the Fe dera l Tax I njunction Act" and " under the principle[] of comity ." Def s.' Mot. to Dismi ss 9, 15. The F eder al Tax Injunction Act (" FTIA" ) provides that "[t] he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or re strain the asse ssment, levy or collec tion of any

tax under State la

w wher e a pla in, speedy

and ef ficient re medy

may be had in the c ourts of such State." 28 U .S.C. § 1341. P laintiffs' action, howe ver, doe s not fall within the plain lang uag e of the FT IA bec ause the y

seek to re cover

damag es rather than to " enjoin, suspend or re strain the assessment, levy

or collec tion of any

tax." I d. Although the Supreme Court has not dec ided

2

Simi larly , beca

use plaintiffs only

seek da mag es, their a ction is not barre d by the plain 2 languag e of the District of Columbia Tax I njunction Act. See D.C. Code § 47- 3307 (“N o suit shall be filed to enjoin the a ssessment or collec tion by the District of Columbia or any of its office rs, ag ents, or employ ees of any tax.”). -4-"whether

the Act [itself] covers damag es suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," Wrig ht v. Pappas, 256 F.3d 635, 636 ( 7th Cir. 2001), the Supreme Court has f ound "that tax pay ers a

re ba rre d by the principle of c omity

from asse rting § 1983 actions ag ainst the validity of state tax sy stems in fede ral c ourts," F air Asse ssment in Real Estate Ass' n, Inc. v. McN ary , 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981). As the Supreme Court e x plained in McNa ry , the principle of

comity embodies " Our F eder alism" and re flec ts "' a prope r re spect for state func tions" in " the belief that the National Gove rnment will fare best if the States and the ir institut ions are le ft fre e to per form their se para te func tions in separ ate wa

y s.' " I d. at 112 (quotingYoung er v. H arr is, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). J urisdiction over plaintiffs' suit turns on whether the D istrict of Columbia tax sy stem is entitled to comity , whether comity prec ludes fede ral c ourt jurisdiction over loca l tax sale challeng es, and whether

defe ndants waive d a comity argument by

removingthe ca se. The D .C. Circuit has not y et addr essed whe ther the F TIA, let alone the related principle of comity , bars fede ral c ourt cha lleng es to District of Columbia tax es in the same ma nner that it bars fede ral court c halleng es to state taxes. Be cause the D.C. Circuit treats the D istrict of Columbia as a state for pur poses of a ssessing c omity in the Young er a

bstention context , this Court concludes that comity bars c halleng es to District of Columbia tax es in fede ral c ourt such as pla intiffs pursue here . There is some divisi on of authority reg ardingwhether

a fe dera l court may

enter tain a challeng e to the ade quacy of the proc ess in a loca l tax sale. This Court, howeve r, has pr eviously found, and ma intains despite Second Circuit pre cede nt to the contrar y , that considerations of comity bar c halleng es to the ade quacy of the proc ess in tax s ales be cause a cha lleng e to the proce ss of a tax sale is eff ectively a cha lleng e to the " collection of a [] tax." 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Finally , there is the question here whether the District of Columbia waived a ny jurisdictional

-5-objection base d on comity by removingthis case f

rom Superior Court. Althoug h the District of Columbi a may

theore tically

waive a n objection base d on the principle of comity , it would be inappropriate for this Court to find waiver when ne ither par

ty believes the case should be in this Court. Accor dingly , this Court concludes that plaintiffs' action does not prope rly lie in this Court, and will remand the case to Superior Court. A. The Districtof Colu m bia T ax System is En titled to the Sam e Considerations of Com ity as a State Tax System . No cour t has resolve d whether

the principle of

comity bars " § 1983 actions ag ainst the validity of [the District of Columbia] tax s y stem[] ." Mc Nar y , 454 U.S. at 116. In fac t, "the D .C. Circuit has not definitively resolved whether

the District of Columbia qualifies as a state for purposes of the [FTI A]." Miller v. District of Columbia, 2007 WL1748890, at *3 n.1 (D.D .C. 2007). Ne verthe less, this Court has previously found that the F TIA " appl[ies] to case s involving District taxes" bec ause " courts have g ener ally indicated that the D istrict of Columbia resembles a state within the fra

mework of

a comity analy sis." Jenkins v. W ashing ton Convention Ct r., 59 F

. Supp. 2d 78, 81-82 (D.D.C. 1999) ( aff irmed on other grounds by J enkins v. Washington Convention Ctr., 236 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also Miller, 2007 WL1748890, at *3 n.1 (" This Court would be inclined to ag ree with th[ e] conclusion . . . that the District . . . qualif[ies] as a state under the statute." ). Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has g ener ally "tr eate d the District of Columbia courts as state courts" pursuant to the ver y same princ iple of comity in the Young er a

bstention context . J MM Corp. v. District of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117, 1124 (D .C. Cir. 2004). I n announcingthat "tax pay ers a

re ba rre d by the principle of

comity from asse rting § 1983 actions ag ainst the validity

-6-of state tax sy stems in feder al cour ts," the Supre me Court in McNar y explained that this was the same princ iple of comity

descr ibed in Young er: " ' a prope r re spect for state func tions . . . [ in] the belief that the National Gove rnment will far e best if the States a nd their instituti ons are left fr ee to perfor m their separ ate f

unctions in separate way s.' " 454 U .S. at 112, 116 (quoting Y oung er, 401 U.S. at 44). In concludingthat the District of Columbia should be treated as a state for Young er abstention purposes, the D .C. Circuit ex plained that both it "a nd the Supreme Court have noted [t hat] 'fr om [ the passag e of the District of Columbia Court Reorg anization Act of 1970] onward, the re lationship of the fede ral to the loca l judiciary was to be a

kin to that hist orica lly

exis tent in the states.' " JMM Corp., 378 F.3d at 1124 (quotingSteorts v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 647 F .2d 194, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Thus, "both our case law and othe r fe dera l statutes treat the D .C. courts 3 like state cour

ts," includingfor Pullman and Colorado River a bstention purposes, as we ll as for Young er a

bstention purposes. I d. Be cause "Cong ress ha s made c lear that it intends feder al courts g ener ally

to treat the D istrict of Columbia judicial sy stem as if it were a state sy stem," J MM Corp., 378 F.3d at 1125, the pr inciple of c omity bars " taxpay ers . . . f

rom asser ting § 1983 actions ag ainst the validity of [the District of Columbia] tax s y stem[] in fede ral c ourts," McNar y , 454 U.S. at 115.

In 1970, Congr ess re org anized the cour ts of the District of Columbia throug h the 3 District of Columbia Court Reorg anization Act of 1970 (" DCCRA"). Pub. L . No. 91-358, tit. I , § 111, 84 Stat. 473, 475-521 (1970). Prior to passa g e of that act, the loca l court sy stem had limited jurisdiction, and this Court "had c oncurr ent jurisdiction . . . over most . . . criminal and c ivil matters." Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 392 n.2 (1973) ( citing D .C. Code Ann. §§ 11-521 throug h 523 (1967)) . The DCCRA transfe rre d "a ll 'loca l' jur isdiction . . . from the Fe dera l courts to a ne w Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appea ls." H.R. Rep. No. 91- 907 at 23 (1970). -7-B. Com ity Bars F ederal Court Jurisdi ction overthis Chall enge to a Tax Sale

. Although the re is some disagree ment reg ardingwhether plaintiffs may

bringchalleng es to local tax sales in fede ral c ourt, this Court maintains i ts positi on that fede ral c ourts do not have "subje ct-matter

jurisdiction over . . . suit[ s] s eekingto set aside or undo the sale of . . . pr opert[y ] at a tax auction" beca

use " a tax sale . . . ' is a mode of tax collection' " a nd the FT IA bar s challeng es to the " collection" of taxes. Mill er, 2007 WL 1748890, at *3 (quotingWright v. Pappas, 256 F .3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also Daw son v. Childs , 665 F.2d 705, 710 ( 5th Cir.1982) (holdingthat fede ral c ourts do not have jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin a tax l ien). 4 Miller specific ally

relies on the F TIA, rather than c omity , but comity at a minimum bars damag es actions that would otherw ise be ba rre d by the FT I A itself. See, e .g ., Wright, 256 F .3d at 636-37 (explaining that the Supre me Court employ ed the pr inciple of c omity in McNar

y to avoid "a

n end

run ar ound the statutory

prohibition" of the F TIA).

In Miller, this Court held that a challeng e to a tax sale wa s barr ed both by Congr ess' s 4 g rant of e x clusive jurisdiction to District of Columbi a cour ts over tax challeng es and by the FTIA. 2007 WL1748890, at *3 (c iting Jenkins, 236 F.3d 6). The pla in lang uag e of the D.C. Code, howeve r, ca lls int o question whether Congr ess has g rante d exclusive jurisdiction t o District of Columbia courts over challeng es to tax sales. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, "Cong ress ha s g rante d exclusive jurisdiction over challeng es to District of Columbia tax assessments" and " claims for r efunds" to the District of Columbia courts. J enkins, 236 F.3d at 7, 12 (citingD.C. Code §§ 11-921(a )(3) (B ), 11-1201, 11- 1202; 47-3310). Miller did not specific ally

analy ze whether

the statutory

languag e applies to tax sales, but it is unl ikely that a challeng e to a tax sale is either a "c halleng e[] to [ a] tax assessment[] " or a " claim[] for [a] ref und[] ." Jenkins, 236 F.3d at 12. A tax sale is not an asse ssment beca use " [i ]n § 1341 and tax law g ener ally , an asse ssment is . . . the official re cordingof liability that trig g ers levy

and collection ef

forts." Hibbs v. Wi nn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004). More over, a challeng e to a tax sale is not a claim for a

ref und beca use the c oncept of

a re fund conte mplates " the over pay ment of a[] tax." D.C. Code § 47-3310; see a lso Blac k' s L aw Dic tionary (9th ed. 2009) ( defining"r efund" as "[t]he return of mone y

to a per son who overpa id, such as a tax pay er who overe stimated tax liability ") . Acc ording ly , this Court relies only on the FT I A in concludingthat it does not have subject matter jur isdiction over a c halleng e to a tax sale. -8-The Sec ond Circuit, however , has conc luded that the F TIA does not bar a suit "c halleng [i ng ] t he ade quacy of the notice provided" in a tax sale. Luessenhop v. Clinton Cnty ., 466 F.3d 259, 264 ( 2d Cir. 2006). In so finding, L uessenhop c orre ctly

reje cts the proposition that the FT IA bar s an ac tion merely "be cause [i t] perta in[ s] t o state tax administ ration in the most g ener al sense." I d. at 265. B y passingthe text of the statute, however , Luessenhop f ocuses instead on the Cong ressional purpose of the Ac t—to bar " ' case s in which state taxpay ers se ek fede ral-c ourt order s enablingthem to avoid paying state taxes.'" I d. at 266 (quotingHibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S . 88, 107 (2004)) . Fr om this perceive d Congr essional purpose, L uessenhop deter mined that fede ral c ourt cha lleng es to the ade quacy of notice in a

tax s ale we re not ba

rre d when plaintiffs do not " dispute the assessments or a mounts owed." I d. at 268. The Sec ond Circuit asserte d that beca use plaintiffs did not dispute that the tax was due, such c halleng es did "not r aise the spe cter

of fe dera l courts re ducingthe flow of mone y into state coff

ers." I d. Henc e, the cour t found that the cha lleng es we re not ba rre d by the FT I A. I d. The de cision in Luessenhop ne g lects the text of the FTIA; moreove r, a c halleng e to the proce ss of tax collection will alway s "r aise the spe cter of fe dera l courts re ducingthe flow of money into state coff

ers." I d. The F TIA plainly bars c halleng es to state tax "collec tion," and 5 Luessenhop ne ver a ddresse s why a cha lleng e to the ade quacy of notice in a

tax s ale is not a challeng e to " collection." Rather, the Sec ond Circuit merely relies on the Cong ressional purpose of the F TIA. Moreove r, eve n g rantingLuessenhop its premise that jurisdiction hinges on

Although L

uessenhop only

relied on the FTIA and is thus technica lly distinguishable 5 from this Court's de cision which re lies on comity , the Second Circuit nonethe less found fe dera l jurisdiction in a state tax sale challeng e see king da mag es—the same challeng e plaintiffs bring here . Luessenhop, 466 F .3d at 262-64. -9-whether

an ac tion seeks to empty state cof fer s, a dama g es ac tion plainly seeks money

from state coff ers. Althoug h L

uessenhop make s much of the f act that plaintiffs the re did not " dispute the assessments or a

mounts owed," those plaintiffs still sought damag es that ef fec tively would offse t the taxes recove red. Indeed, L uessenhop make s the worr ies of the Supre me Court in the "a ssessment" c ontext come to fr uition in t he collec tion context : "State tax collection offic ials could be summoned into fede ral c ourt to defe nd their [collections] . . . m ere ly on the asser

tion that the tax" was unla

wfully collecte d, and the f

eder al cour

t would thus become " a sourc e of appellate revie w of a ll state" c ollection claims. McNa ry , 454 U.S. at 114. Acc ording ly , this Court finds no rea son to depart f rom its earlier

deter mination in Mi ller that the F TIA, and by extension t he re lated princ iple of comity , bar tax sale c halleng es such a s plaintiffs bringhere

. C. Waiver of a Com ity Argum ent The re maining que stion is whether def endants wa ived the prote ction of the princ iple of comity by removingthis case f

rom Superior Court. Althoug h at least one court ha s sugg ested waiver applies in that context, no court has held that a fede ral c ourt is require d to enterta in a suit beca use a c omity

argument was wa ived throug h remova l. I n fac t, most courts have found that a defe ndant ca

nnot waive the pr otection of the pr inciple of c omity in the state tax arena . Be cause plaintiffs here orig inally

filed in Superior Court, and be cause defe ndants now ar g ue that jurisdiction is i mproper in this Court in any event, the Court will re mand the ca se to Superior Court. The Six th Circuit has conclude d that a state c an wa ive the comity protec tions underlying the FT IA by

removinga ca se, but it did not sugg est that a fe dera l court wa s require d to enterta in the ac tion. I n Howar d v. City of De troit, the court stated that defe ndants " waived" the ar g ument

-10-that "the comity conce rns desc ribed" in McNar y "pr eclude d the [non-injunctive] relief soug ht." 73 F. App' x 90, 94 (6th Cir. 2003). The c ourt explained that McNar y was " based not on a

lack of subject matter jur isdiction, but on principles of fede ralism and comity enfor cea ble in equity ," a

nd that "[a]n objection to the equity jurisdiction of a cour

t, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, ca n be waived." I d. at 94 n.1 (c iting Atlas L ife Ins. Co. v. W .I . Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 n.1 (1939))

. Although the Howar d court c oncluded the c omity argument was wa ived, it did not 6 provide a ny specific support for wa iver through remova l, and the cour t did not sugg est that a fede ral c ourt there fore had to enter tain the ac tion. Moreove r, the How ard c ourt' s observation goe s ag ainst the weight of the circ uits in finding that the principle of comity can be waived in the tax injunction context . Every other fede ral c ourt to consider the matter ha s found that a state cannot wa ive the prote ction of the principle of c omity

in state tax m atters, e ven if the state is willi ng . See B alazik v. Cnty . of Dauphin, 44 F .3d 209, 218 n.11 (3d Cir. 1995) (holdingthat althoug h "the state taxing authorities themselves . . . re moved the ca se[,] . . . the comity rational of Mc Nar

y acts a s a re striction on the power of the c ourts") ; Hardw ick v. Cuomo, 891 F.2d 1097, 1104 (3d Cir. 1989) ( holding that suit was barr ed as a

matter of c omity

even " though the State of Ne w York . . . indicates that it would waive the bar of

the Tax I njunction Act" ); Campbell v. Hilton Head No. 1 Pub. Serv. Dist., 114 F. Supp. 2d 482, 488 (D.S.C. 1999) (holding that "r emand is prope r, despite the

Dec isions in t he Young er a bstention line sugg est that the principle of comity may be 6 waived. See , e.g ., Guillemard-G inorio v. Contreras- Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 517 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that Young er " abstention is a waiva ble def ense" ); Guttman v. NewMexi co, 325 F . App' x 687, 693 (10th Cir. 2009) (e x plaining that "a state may

waive its Young er a

rgument") . But these are not "wa iver through remova l" tax injunction cases; ce rtainly waiver may be applica

ble in other setting s. And like in the tax i njunction context, no court has sug g ested that a court must enter tain a suit when the c omity arg ument is arguably

waived. -11-defe ndants' willingness to wa ive the princ iple of comity ") ; Howar d v. Br y an, 1994 WL721415, at *3 (N.D . Cal. 1994) (Althoug h "[c]ity defe ndants argue that bec ause the y remove d, . . . comity should not bar jurisdiction[ ,] . . . t hey cannot wa ive its jurisdictional bar." ); Cox Cable Hampton Rd., I nc. v. City

of Norf olk, 739 F.Supp. 1074, 1077 (E.D. Va . 1990) (" I t clear ly would be improper f

or this court to waive the principle of comity . . . even when the state itself is willi ngto waive the jurisdictional limi tations."). This Court need not dec ide whethe r wa iver a pplies here when de fenda nts are unw illing to waive c omity ' s protection. It would make little sense for this Court t o reta in this case whe n neither pa rty actua lly wants the c ase be fore this Court. Defenda nts argue that the F TIA bar s the suit, and plaintiffs orig inally filed in Superior Court, and nowfocus pr imarily on the merits of the

case , only respondingto defe ndants' subject matter jur isdiction arguments by asser ting that "[d]efenda

nts mischarac terize the ca se." Pls.' Opp. [Docket Entry 26] at 1. To entertain this case over de fenda

nts' obje ction would contravene the "long standing policy to limi t drastically

fede ral interfe renc e in the administration of state tax es." California v. Gr ace Br ethre n Church, 457 U.S. 393, 419 (1982). This Court has previously found, and de fenda

nts do not disput e, that for challeng es to tax sales, " District of Columbia law supplies the re quired re medies in the for m of a de tailed statutory scheme (found at Chapter 13A of Title 47 of the D.C. Code) g overningthe re demption and fore closure of

proper ty ." Miller, 2006 WL

3361504, at *3 (c iting D.C. Code §§ 47-1360 to -1385). More over, D istrict of Columbia law provides that " [i ]f the District fails to comply in

ever y respe ct with the statute and r egulations, the sale is invalid and must be set aside." Keatts v. Robinson, 544 A.2d 716, 719 (D.C. 1988). Acc ording ly , this Court wil l apply the principle of

-12-comity

and re turn this challeng e to the application of the District of Columbia tax sy stem to the District of Columbia courts. 7 CONCLUSION For the re asons explained above, the Court will remand the c ase to Superior Court. A separ ate Or der a ccompa

nies this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/ J OHN D. B ATES United States District J udg e Dated: August 24, 2011

To the extent plaintiffs' D .C.-law base d claims are not barre d by the principle of

comity , 7 this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. See Amiri v. Ge lman Mg mt. Co., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) ( quoting Car neg ie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)) (" Gene rally , a fe dera l court ' should decline the e x erc ise of jurisdiction' . . . wher e the f eder al claims are resolved e arly

in the litigation leavingonly state law c laims."). -13-