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FROM NPOESS TO JPSS: 

AN UPDATE ON THE NATION’S RESTRUCTURED 

POLAR WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

AND 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

ENVIRONMENT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2011 

Serial No. 112–39 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

VACANCY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HON. ANDY HARRIS, Maryland, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

September 23, 2011 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Statement by Representative Andy Harris, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 22 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23 

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 21 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of Commerce 

for Environmental Observation and Prediction and Deputy Administrator, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 25 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 27 

Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 43 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44 

Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 46 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 48 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

The Honorable Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of Commerce 

for Environmental Observation and Prediction and Deputy Administrator, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration .......................................... 76 

Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration .......................................................................................... 107 

Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 111 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Submitted Report for the Record, ‘‘NASA’s Management of the NPOESS 

Preparatory Project’’ ............................................................................................ 113 

(1) 

From NPOESS to JPSS: 

An Update on the Nation’s Restructured 

Polar Weather Satellite Program 

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Broun 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight] 

presiding. 
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Chairman BROUN. The Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight and the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment will 

come to order. 

Good morning, everyone. Welcome to today’s hearing entitled 

‘‘From NPOESS to JPSS: An Update on the Nation’s Restructured 

Polar Weather Satellite Program.’’ In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies and truth in testimony 

disclosures for today’s witness panel. 

Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing involving two 

subcommittees, I want to explain how we will operate procedurally 

so all Members understand how the question and answer period 

will be handled. As always, we will alternate between the majority 

and the minority Members and allow all Members an opportunity 

for questioning before recognizing a Member for a second round of 

questions, if we have time. We will recognize those Members of either Committee present at the gavel in order of seniority on the 

Full Committee and those coming in after the gavel will be recognized in the order of their arrival, and I recognize myself for myself 

for five minutes for an opening statement. 

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System, NPOESS, program was originally envisioned to reduce duplication and save $1.3 billion. Initial estimates for that program 

came in at $6.5 billion for six satellites, operating in three orbits, 

carrying 13 instruments, with the first satellite launched around 

2010. The costs of the new Joint Polar Satellite System, or JPSS, 

are now more than double the costs of the original program, but 

that doesn’t fully reflect the dire straits the program is truly in. 

With JPSS, NOAA is only planning to operate three satellites in 

one orbit, one of which is technically a NASA research satellite. If 

you were to add the costs of the Department of Defense and European portions of the system, which were originally parts of 

NPOESS, the costs would be much higher, roughly $17 billion 

when you add the Defense Weather Satellite System and well over 

$20 billion when you add the cost of what the Europeans spent on 

MetOp. Aside from cost, the schedules have been delayed, and gaps 

in data coverage are looming. 

To date, the Federal Government has spent over $6 billion on the 

NPOESS and JPSS programs, and the only thing we have to show 

for it is a modified research satellite that hopefully will launch next 

month. In the past, the program was troubled by interagency bickering, overly optimistic cost estimates, lax oversight and technical 

complexity. More recently, the uncertain fiscal environment has 

also challenged the program. 

NOAA’s testimony states the projected gap in services is due to 

‘‘the lack of adequate, timely and stable appropriated funds.’’ In my 

mind, if the program had actually delivered on its cost, schedule 

and performance, we would not be in this position right now. Unfortunately, we are in this position, and there is certainly enough 

blame to go around. Multiple Administrations and Congresses controlled by both Republicans and Democrats, numerous contractors, 

and multiple agencies all have had a hand in this program. The 

new problems faced by this program are the result of a perfect 

storm of factors: a drastic reorganization, a scheduled ramp-up in 

development costs and flat funding from Continuing Resolutions. 
19 

This Committee has been consistent in both its support, and its 

oversight of NPOESS and JPSS. This is evidenced by the Committee’s Views and Estimates that call for full funding of JPSS, and 

the fact that this is the Committee’s eighth hearing on the topic. 

At a hearing on NPOESS two years ago, I asked the questions 

‘‘how did we get here?’’ and ‘‘where do we go from here?’’ At last 

year’s hearing, I asked ‘‘where are we going?’’ Unfortunately, I still 

don’t have an answer to that question. 

Nearly two years after the President reorganized the program, 

we still do not have a baseline. As GAO will state in their testimony, ‘‘It is still not clear what the programs will deliver, when, 

and at what cost.’’ This is despite the fact that the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 

2008 requires both NASA and NOAA to provide program baselines. 

NOAA contends that they cannot develop a credible baseline for 

costs and capabilities without a stable and predictable budget horizon. On the other hand, Congress remains skeptical of entrusting 

the taxpayers’ money with a program that has proven to be a poor 

steward of scarce resources without having firm cost, schedule and 

performance metrics to hold the program accountable to. 

I look forward to working with the Administration as we move 

forward. As I have said at previous hearings, every American is impacted by this program whether they know it or not. It is our responsibility to ensure that the farmers, the fisherman, the hunters, 

the war fighters and everyday commuters continue to receive 

weather and climate information. But we must not forget to be 

good stewards of taxpayers’ money as well. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PAUL BROUN

The National Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program 

was originally envisioned to reduce duplication and save $1.3 billion dollars. Initial 

estimates for that program came in at $6.5 billion for six satellites, operating in 

three orbits, carrying 13 instruments, with the first satellite launched around 2010. 

The costs of the new Joint Polar-orbiting Satellite System (JPSS) are now more than 

double the costs of the original program, but that doesn’t fully reflect the dire straits 

the program is truly in. With JPSS, NOAA is only planning to operate three satellites in one orbit (one of which is technically a research satellite). If you were to 

add the costs of the Department of Defense (DOD) and European portions of the 

system, which were originally parts of NPOESS, the costs would be much higher— 

roughly $17 billion when you add the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), 

and well over $20 billion when you add the cost of what the Europeans spent on 

MetOp. Aside from cost, the schedules have been delayed, and gaps in data coverage 

are looming. 

To date, the federal government has spent over $6 billion on the NPOESS and 

JPSS programs, and the only thing we have to show for it is a modified research 

satellite that hopefully will launch next month. In the past, the program was troubled by inter-agency bickering, overly optimistic cost estimates, lax oversight, and 

technical complexity. More recently, the uncertain fiscal environment has also challenged the program. 

NOAA’s testimony states the projected gap in services is due to ‘‘the lack of adequate, timely, and stable appropriated funds.’’ In my mind, if the program had actually delivered on its cost, schedule, and performance, we wouldn’t be in this position. 

Unfortunately, we are in this position, and there is certainly enough blame to go 

around. Multiple Administrations and Congresses controlled by both Republicans 

and Democrats, numerous contractors, and multiple agencies all had a hand in this 

program. The new problems faced by this program are the result of a perfect storm 

of factors: a drastic reorganization, a scheduled ramp-up in development costs, and 

flat funding from Continuing Resolutions. This Committee has been consistent in 

both its support, and it’s oversight of NPOESS and JPSS. This is evidenced by the 
20 

Committee’s Views and Estimates that call for full funding of JPSS, and the fact 

that this is the Committee’s eighth hearing on the topic. 

At a hearing on NPOESS two years ago I asked the questions ‘how did we get 

here?’ and ‘where do we go from here?’ At last year’s hearing I asked ‘where are 

we going?’ Unfortunately, I still don’t have an answer to that question. Nearly two 

years after the President reorganized the program, we still do not have a baseline. 

As GAO will state in their testimony, ‘‘it is still not clear what the programs will 

deliver, when, and at what cost.’’ This is despite the fact that the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 requires both 

NASA and NOAA to provide program baselines. NOAA contends that they cannot 

develop a credible baseline for costs and capabilities without a stable and predictable budget horizon. On the other hand, Congress remains skeptical of entrusting 

the taxpayers money with a program that has proven to be a poor steward of scarce 

resources without having firm cost, schedule and performance metrics to hold the 

program accountable to. 

I look forward to working with the Administration as we move forward. As I’ve 

said at previous hearings, every American is impacted by this program whether 

they know it or not. It is our responsibility to ensure that the farmers, fisherman, 

war-fighters, and everyday commuters continue to receive weather and climate information. But we must not forget to be good stewards of taxpayers’ money as well. 

Chairman BROUN. Now the Chair recognizes Mr. Miller for an 

opening statement. Mr. Miller, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. Good morning. I want to 

thank the two Chairs of the Subcommittees for calling this hearing. 

This certainly continues to be a subject that needs our time and attention, and I know that Ms. Edwards may be late but she would 

join with me in congratulating NOAA and NASA on the good work 

they have done in the last year trying to get this project back on 

track. It is undoubtedly true, as Chairman Broun has said, that 

this remains a snake-bit project but it appears that because of your 

efforts, it is being bitten by fewer and less-venomous snakes, and 

sometimes you just have to celebrate small victories. This is a 

project that needs to succeed. We need the data that these satellites will promise. 

The Science Committee has devoted years of oversight to the satellite program. When I was Chairman of the Investigations and 

Oversight Subcommittee, I led much of the work on that with bipartisan support from Dr. Broun and from Mr. Sensenbrenner. The 

relentless pressure from this Committee and from GAO helped create the environment in which the program could be restructured 

and which we recognized the changes had to happen, and NOAA 

and NASA were put in charge of their own fates. 

Once in charge of their own fates, however, our friends on the 

Appropriations Committee did drop the ball by failing to fund this 

program fully. Decisions have consequences, and that one shortsighted choice means that there will be gaps in weather and climate forecasting data. I hope we can build consensus support for 

this program, for a reform program, so that we never again have 

to ask that NOAA and NASA push back delivery of the first JPSS 

satellite. 

This Committee’s first hearing on this subject was in 2003, my 

first year in Congress. It does feel like some things never change 

here. At that time, the launch date for the first NPOESS satellite 

was projected to be 2009, and here we are in 2011, as Chairman 

Broun has already said, and now the first JPSS satellite, the renamed satellite, is not scheduled to launch until 2017. We are eight 

years beyond our first hearing but remain six years away from the 

launch of the first next-generation power satellite. This pattern of 
21 

delay must change, and the decisions made by NOAA and NASA 

during the last year suggest that they do understand the importance of changing that. NOAA and NASA had made some smart 

choices as far, as we can tell, and they have put us on a path that 

will prevent a data gap in the next few months. However, the appropriations shortfall has ensured that a gap will happen, now projected for 2016 until 2017. That gap will mean that we will see a 

decline in the accuracy of forecasts beyond the two to four day window that our satellites and weather sensors support. We must do 

any and everything we can to ensure that American taxpayers, 

American travelers, American business sectors that are so dependent upon weather forecasts do get the short- and long-term forecasts that are critical to saving lives and protecting property and 

planning business activities around. 

This year alone, the country has witnessed in every region and 

on every coastline some of the most extreme record-breaking 

weather events. The more warning we have, the better decisions 

public officials can make about public safety and the better choices 

our businesses can make. The idea of not fully funding the satellite 

program is unacceptable. It is remarkably shortsighted. The delays, 

lack of baseline, and cost overruns we will hear about today are important; but the most important fact is that the budget shortfall delivered in the fiscal year 2011 budget is going to produce a weather 

data gap and any future shortfalls will create an even greater gap. 

In failing to support the program, we are putting our lives, our 

property, and critical infrastructure in danger, and without accurate and timely information, we would no longer see accurate, advanced warnings of extreme events. This will make it extremely 

difficult to conduct safe and strategic evacuations of American people from coastal areas and elsewhere. 

I hope we will spend our time today trying to deal with the needs 

of this program as it is, agreeing where we need to go and determining to make sure that we all work together to get there. This 

program in my first term was a program that was snake-bit and 

a Republican President but there was never any suggestion that 

this was a partisan failure and it is not a partisan failure now. It 

is something we should all be trying to make work because too 

much of America depends upon this data. 

Finally, I want to encourage NOAA and NASA to take every step 

they can responsibly, that they can responsibly take, to narrow the 

projected gap in data that we anticipate after March of 2016. If you 

need help in getting what you need, please tell us, please ask us 

to help. 

I now yield back to the Chairman my negative 26 seconds. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BRAD MILLER

Good morning. I want to thank both Chairs for calling this hearing today. This 

is certainly a subject worthy of our time. I also want to join my colleague, Ms. Edwards, in congratulating NOAA and NASA on the good work they have done 

throughout this past year getting this project back on track. 

The Science Committee has devoted years of oversight to this satellite program. 

During my tenure as Chairman of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, 

I led much of the work on this—with bipartisan support from my Ranking Members, 

both Mr. Sensenbrenner and Mr. Broun. The relentless pressure from this Committee and from GAO helped create the environment in which the program could 
22 

be restructured and NOAA and NASA put in charge of their own fates. Once in 

charge of their own fates however, our friends on Appropriations dropped the ball 

by failing to fully fund this program. 

Decisions have consequences, and that one short-sighted choice means that there 

will be gaps in weather and climate furcating data. I hope we can build consensus 

support for this program so that we never again have to ask the NOAA and NASA 

to push back delivery of the first JPSS satellite. 

The Committee’s first hearing on this subject was in 2003, my first year in Congress. At that time, the launch date for the first NPOESS satellite was projected 

to be 2009. Here we are in 2011 and now the first JPSS satellite is not slated to 

launch until 2017. We are eight years beyond our first hearing but remain six years 

away from the launch of the first next generation polar satellite. This pattern of 

delay is must change, and the decisions made by NOAA and NASA during the last 

year suggest that they understand this. 

They have made smart choices, as far as we can tell, and they have us on a path 

that will prevent a data gap in the next few months. 

However, the appropriations shortfall has ensured that a gap will occur—now projected for 2016 and into 2017. That gap will mean that we will see a decline in the 

accuracy of forecasts beyond the two to four day window that our other satellites 

and weather sensors support. 

We must do any and everything we can to ensure that American taxpayers, American travelers, and American business sectors are supplied the short—and long— 

term weather forecasts that are critical to saving lives and protecting property. This 

year alone, this country has witnessed in every region and on every coastline some 

of the most extreme, record-breaking weather events. The more warning we have 

the better decisions public officials can make about public safety and the better 

choices our businesses can make. 

The idea of not fully funding this satellite program is totally unacceptable. The 

delays, lack of a baseline, and cost overruns we will hear about today are important; 

but the most important fact is that the budget shortfall delivered up in FY2011 is 

going to produce a weather data gap and any future shortfalls will create an even 

greater gap. 

In failing to support this program, we are putting our lives, property, and critical 

infrastructure in danger. Without accurate and timely information, we would no 

longer see accurate advance warnings of extreme events. This will make it extremely difficult to conduct safe and strategic evacuations of American people. I 

hope we will spend our time today dealing with the needs of this program as it is, 

agreeing where we need to go, and determining to make sure we all work together 

to get there. 

Finally, I want to encourage NOAA and NASA to take every step they can responsibly take to narrow the projected gap in data that we anticipate after March of 

2016. If you need help in getting what you need, please ask us for that assistance. 

Yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, thank you, Mr. Miller. You know I have 

never kept a tight time clock on you. 

I now recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Environment, Dr. Harris, for his opening statement. Dr. Harris, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for being here 

today to testify on the Joint Polar Satellite System. I do appreciate 

you taking time from what have to be busy schedules to appear 

with us this morning. 

You know, the most critical issue facing our Nation today is outof-control spending by the Federal Government. Knowing that we 

cannot spend more than we have should seem like pretty simple 

math, but it has taken dire economic conditions for some folks to 

wake up and take notice. In these times, it is even more important 

than ever that the money we do spend is spent wisely and efficiently. 

You know, the JPSS program does appear to be the poster child 

of a runaway government program that has overpromised, is over 
23 

budget, and honestly has underperformed. While the White House’s 

decision to split apart the defense and civilian satellite programs 

last year may have been the correct one, the lack of understanding 

about the complexity of that transition and insufficient planning 

appears to have contributed to even further delays and what is 

turning into even a more costly program. 

Now, there is no doubt that weather satellites play a vital role 

in keeping the country informed and safe. However, given the number of problems this program has experienced, the time has come 

to talk about what is the best way for NOAA to obtain the necessary data to make these forecasts. And by best way, I do mean 

the most efficient and cost-effective way. As Chairman of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee, I want to understand what 

policies got us in this mess to begin with and how do we avoid the 

same problems in the future because as the Ranking Member said, 

this is a project that does need to succeed. 

The Executive Order to combine the defense and civilian satellite 

programs was issued in 1994 but the first satellite, a researchturned-operational satellite, is set to launch just this year. It has 

taken these government agencies 17 years to go from the initial 

order to the actual launching of a satellite. Given this record, it appears that NOAA actually needs to start thinking now what it will 

do to obtain the necessary data when the JPSS satellites are no 

longer functional 17 years from now, assuming they last that long. 

Honestly, we no longer have the luxury to blindly appropriate 

funding for any program in the government, no matter how essential. Careful planning, realistic expectations, and innovative, outside-the-box type of thinking will be required in order to ensure 

weather forecasting capabilities in the future. 

Thank you again for your time, and I yield back the balance of 

my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ANDY HARRIS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

ENVIRONMENT

Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to testify on 

the Joint Polar Satellite System, or JPSS. I appreciate you taking time from your 

busy schedules to appear before us this morning. 

The most critical issue facing our nation today is out-of-control spending by the 

Federal government. Knowing that we cannot spend more than we have should 

seem like pretty simple math, but it has taken dire economic conditions for some 

folks to wake up and notice. In these times, it is even more important that the 

money we do spend is spent wisely and efficiently. 

The JPSS program is the ultimate example of a runaway government program 

that has over promised, is over budget, and has underperformed. While the White 

House’s decision to split apart the defense and civilian satellite programs in February 2010 may have been the correct one, the lack of understanding about the complexity of transition and insufficient planning have contributed to even further 

delays and a more costly program. 

There is no doubt that weather satellites play a vital role in keeping the country 

informed and safe. Severe weather jeopardizes human health, costs billions of dollars every year, and has a significant impact on our economic vitality. The ability 

to do timely and accurate weather forecasting is not at question here, and should 

not be compromised. However, given the number of problems this program has experienced, the time has come to talk about what is the best way for NOAA to obtain 

the necessary data to do these forecasts. And by best way, I mean the most efficient 

and cost effective way. 

I am pleased we are having this hearing today, and I commend the Chairman of 

the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee on his continued work ensuring that 
24 

Federal science and technology programs are appropriate, cost-effective, and are 

managed properly. As Chairman of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee, I 

want to understand what policies got us in this mess to begin with, and how do we 

avoid the same problems in the future. The JPSS program will only give us two satellites for a cost of more than double its initial estimates. However, without a baseline for this program, it is impossible to say what the ultimate costs will be. 

The witnesses from this Administration will likely blame ‘‘budget uncertainty’’ 

from this Congress for the planning failures of JPSS, but providing a basic and reasonable baseline for a project is something that every business in the country has 

to do. 

The Executive Order to combine the defense and civilian satellite programs was 

issued in 1994. The first satellite—a research turned operational satellite—is set to 

launch later this year. It has taken these government agencies seventeen years to 

go from the initial order to the launching of a satellite. Given this record, NOAA 

needs to start thinking now what it will do to obtain the necessary data when the 

JPSS satellites are no longer functional seventeen years from now—assuming they 

last that long. 

We no longer have the luxury to continuously appropriate funding for programs 

like this. Careful planning, realistic expectations, and outside-the-box type of thinking will be required in order to ensure continued and advancing weather forecasting 

capabilities in the future. 

Thank you again for your time. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Harris. 

If there are any Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

At this point I would like to introduce our witness panel. Our 

first witness is the Hon. Kathryn Sullivan, Dr. Kathryn Sullivan, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Environmental Observation 

and Prediction, and Deputy Administrator at the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration. Our second witness is Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and our third and final witness 

is Mr. David Powner, Director of Information Technology Management Issues at the Government Accountability Office. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each after which the Members of the Committee will 

each have five minutes, or we may shorten that due to time and 

votes that are predicted to occur somewhere around 11:00. 

It is the practice of the Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight to receive testimony under oath. Do any of you have objections to taking an oath? No? Let the record reflect that all witnesses are willing to take an oath by their heads being shook from 

side to side in the traditional method of saying no. You may also 

be represented by counsel. Do any of you have counsel here today? 

They all shake their heads side to side again. So let the record reflect that none of the witnesses have counsel. 

If all of you would please now stand and raise your right hand? 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth, 

so help you God? Be seated, please. Let the record reflect that all 

the witnesses participating have taken the oath. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Sullivan. You may proceed. 

And as I said, we have got votes that are projected between 11:00 

and maybe a little after, so if you all could hold to your five minute 

times or maybe even if you could shorten it up, please. Dr. Sullivan. 
25 

TESTIMONY OF HON. KATHRYN SULLIVAN, PH.D., 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR 

ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATION AND PREDICTION, 

AND DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND 

ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you here today and discuss the status of the 

Joint Polar Satellite System. 

As was noted from the panel, the year 2011 has established itself 

in the record books as an historic year for weather-related disasters. Truly, every state and territory has experienced some kind of 

severe weather event that has cost lives and exacted a high economic toll. As Deputy Administrator and frankly as an ordinary 

citizen, I am very proud of the unfailing dedication of NOAA’s employees and contractors who provided the forecasts, watches and 

warnings that allowed people in these areas to take timely, lifesaving actions and enabled rapid response and recovery. 

Members of this Committee, as your remarks make clear, know 

all too well how critical the polar operational weather satellites are 

to our forecasting enterprise. Over 90 percent of the data that goes 

into numerical weather models comes from satellites and by far the 

largest proportion of that comes from the instruments aboard our 

polar orbiters. We would indeed lose the forecast reliability upon 

which preparedness response and the protection of life and property rest if we lost this unique source of critical environmental intelligence. 

I would like to take just a few moments to highlight some of the 

key developments that we have achieved during the past year. This 

week, NOAA completed the Level 1 Requirements Document for 

the JPSS program with formally validated and prioritized requirements and thus defines the scope and focus of the program. In 

order to collect and analyze these requirements, individuals from 

NOAA, NASA and the Defense Department were designated by 

their respective organizations to represent and communicate the 

needs of their users. With the recent transition of the Advanced 

Technology Microwave Sounder instrument through a NASA JPSS 

contract, NOAA and NASA have now completed the transition of 

all of the capabilities and assets that were designated for the JPSS 

program from the NPOESS program. This is a major accomplishment for both agencies, the Defense Department and our contractor 

companies. With this complete, NOAA and NASA have now returned to the weather satellite management and oversight structure that has served the Nation so well for many decades. Under 

this construct, NOAA retains the overall responsibility for the 

JPSS program while NASA serves as our acquisition agent. 

In addition, we are finalizing the management control plan that 

lays out in detail how the two agencies will work together to deliver JPSS. This document is currently being circulated for final review at both of our agencies and we expect to have it signed in the 

very near future. 

We all know that nothing gets done without talented staff, and 

the challenging meaningful work are what attract the best and 

brightest. NOAA and NASA management remain on constant alert 

to ensure that we have the right mix of skills and top-notch talent 
26 

working on this program in both the contractor and civil service 

ranks. We have been aided in this important task in fact by the 

NPP program. Put bluntly, NPP is not only bridging our data 

streams between our current polar orbiters and JPSS but frankly 

has served as a bridge for our workforce. I believe that this has 

helped us avert talent losses that we might otherwise have suffered 

due to budget uncertainties. 

Looking ahead, full funding at the President’s fiscal year 2012 

budget request level would permit us to ramp up the workforce to 

levels needed to meet the current launch readiness date. This 

would be an increase of over 500 high-quality STEM jobs. Fiscal 

year 2011 budget uncertainties prevented us from taking these actions during that year. 

I am also pleased to report that Harry CiKanek started on September 12th as the Director of the Joint Polar Satellite System Office. 

In addition to those milestones, we have stood up the JPSS program office, fully staffed it with a competent and experienced 

NOAA/NASA team that leverages the expertise that had been acquired in the former NPOESS Integrated Program Office. We selected a spacecraft bus contractor. We have accelerated the fielding 

and testing of the ground system in preparation for the NPP 

launch so that we can use that data operationally, and we have 

completed all of the testing and preparation activities to support an 

on-time launch on October 25th. I believe these milestones constitute a firm foundation for JPSS future program success. 

I would be remiss if I did not address the funding picture. The 

fiscal year 2011 Continuing Resolution levels fell well short of the 

amounts requested in the President’s budget, and even after reprogramming, the JPSS program was unable to move forward at 

the rate needed to assure continuity of data. As noted from the 

Chair, we now face a near-certain gap of data in the 2016 time 

frame. 

In conclusion, I would like to reflect on why we are here today. 

Very soon after coming aboard this past May, I visited Joplin, Missouri. My trip came just days after a major tornado ripped through 

the town, cutting a swath more than 6 miles long and up to a mile 

wild. The utter devastation was mind boggling and heart wrenching. I was standing the Red Cross emergency shelter filled with 

hundreds of now-homeless people when a woman came out of her 

way towards me, took my hand in both of hers and looked up at 

me with tear-filled eyes. She had spotted the NOAA logo on my 

polo shirt and wanted to thank me for the warnings our National 

Weather Service teams had provided. These had saved her life, 

quite literally, and also given her time to gather a dozen of her 

neighbors under a sheltering staircase as the building came down 

around them. She knew all too clearly how much worse things 

might have been without NOAA’s forecast and warning services. 

NOAA appreciates the Committee’s continued interest in the success of the agency satellite programs. They are very complicated 

and difficult systems to build and field. We believe we are now on 

the right track, and though funding uncertainties continue to be a 

serious challenge, we remain hopeful that the fiscal year 2012 ap-
27 

propriations process will put the program on sound footing for mission success, and I will be happy to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sullivan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KATHRYN SULLIVAN, PH.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF COMMERCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATION AND PREDICTION AND

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Sullivan. 
42 

I now recognize our second witness, Mr. Christopher Scolese. Sir, 

you may proceed. You are recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. CHRISTOPHER SCOLESE, 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 

AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. SCOLESE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Subcommittee for the opportunity to appear today to share information regarding NASA’s role in and commitment to NOAA’s Joint 

Polar Satellite System program, JPSS. 

As has been stated, JPSS is essential to the Nation’s weather 

forecasting system and is critical to the Nation’s research activities 

in earth science. As the Nation’s civil space agency, NASA is fully 

supporting JPSS on a reimbursable basis for NOAA. 

NOAA and NASA share a 40-year partnership developing the 

Nation’s polar and geosynchronous weather satellites. That partnership continues as NOAA and NASA implement the restructuring of the NPOESS program. The 2010 restructuring of 

NPOESS resulted in the establishment of JPSS, as has been noted. 

In April 2010, NASA established the Joint Agency Satellite Division within our science mission directorate to assure that NASA effectively supported NOAA’s requirements for JPSS. We refer to this 

office as JASD. This office is responsible for the cross-agency collaboration between NOAA and NASA and assures that senior 

NASA management up through the Administrator is aware of the 

progress and issues on this critical national program so they can 

be resolved quickly. The combined NOAA and NASA team is responsible for the formulation and implementation of all JPSS missions and their associated elements including the spacecraft, instruments, launch services, ground segments and post-launch support. Over the past year, NASA has worked closely with NOAA to 

put in place a high-caliber team of experienced personnel from both 

agencies to implement JPSS, and that team is working well. 

The initial focus of the JPSS team has been to complete activities 

required to support the upcoming launch of the NPOESS Preparatory Project satellite, NPP, as has been mentioned earlier. 

Originally, this was designed as a technology demonstration for 

NPOESS and to provide data continuity between key elements of 

NASA’s earth-observing satellites and NPOESS, which was to replace those. NPP will now also serve as an operational bridge mission for the current polar weather satellites until the launch of the 

first JPSS mission. 

In addition to supporting the NPP mission, the JPSS team has 

focused the last 12 months on completing the transition of the program and contract elements from the former NPOESS program to 

the new JPSS program. As has been mentioned, the JPSS program 

is now of control of and managing all the instruments and ground 

system contracts. In September 2010, the JPSS program awarded 

a fixed-price contract for the JPSS–1 spacecraft, a bus that is similar to the NPP spacecraft bus. That was done in order to reduce 

risk and uncertainty in both cost, schedule and technical. 

NASA shares NOAA’s commitment to the success of the JPSS, as 

evidenced by the caliber of personnel assigned to the program and 

the continued support from NASA senior management. The re-
43 

quirements are defined, the program is in place, and with the requested funding we are confident that we can implement the JPSS 

program as planned. NOAA and NASA are striving to ensure that 

the Nation’s weather and environmental requirements are met on 

the most efficient and predictable schedule without reducing system capabilities or further increasing risk. With the delivery of the 

NPP satellite to Vandenberg Air Force base on August 30th, the 

first fruits of the NOAA/NASA partnership for JPSS are undergoing final preparations for launch this October 25th. With your 

continued support, we expect this partnership to successfully develop and deliver the JPSS–1 mission for launch in fiscal year 

2017. 

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate the support of this Committee and the Congress for 

NASA’s programs and for JPSS and look forward to answering any 

of the questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scolese follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear today to share information regarding the NASA role in, and commitment, 

to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Program. JPSS is critical to the Nation’s weather forecasting 

system, climate monitoring and research activities. As the Nation’s civil space agency, NASA is fully supporting JPSS on a reimbursable basis for NOAA. 

Background 

In February 2010, in conjunction with the FY 2011 Budget Request, the Administration directed a major restructuring of the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). That decision was reaffirmed by the 

June 2012 National Space Policy. In April 2010, NASA established the Joint Agency 

Satellite Division (JASD) within its Science Mission Directorate to manage the 

NASA role as NOAA’s acquisition agent for JPSS systems. Specifically, JASD was 

charged with managing the transition of NPOESS to the new JPSS, as well as for 

formulation and implementation of all JPSS missions and their associated elements, 

including instruments, spacecraft, launch services, the ground segment, and postlaunch support. Since that time, NASA has worked with NOAA to put in place a 

high-caliber team of experienced personnel from both agencies to implement JPSS, 

and this team is working well. 

JPSS Organization 

NASA and NOAA have been partners for over 40 years in developing the Nation’s 

polar and geosynchronous weather satellites. With the President’s direction last 

year, NASA and NOAA have returned to this successful partnership where NASA 

serves as the acquisition agent. The establishment of dedicated teams at both NASA 

Headquarters and the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, 

has enabled a smooth transition to the new JPSS program. 

NASA and NOAA have established joint program management boards to direct 

JPSS, and have integrated their decision-making processes to efficiently and effectively manage this cooperative activity. The NASA and NOAA teams have demonstrated a strong working relationship over the last 18 months. 

NPP 

The initial focus of the JPSS team has been to complete the activities required 

to support the launch of the NASA NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite. 

NPP was originally designed as a technology demonstration for NPOESS and to provide data continuity between key elements of the NASA Earth Observing System 

(EOS) satellites and the first NPOESS satellite. NPP will fly the first copies of a 

new generation of Earth observing instruments, and we will spend the first 18 

months comparing their performance with legacy sensors flying on NASA and 

NOAA satellites currently in orbit. The NPP mission is intended to characterize performance of these new sensors, providing feedback to improve the development of 

the operational sensors that will fly on JPSS. As these sensors are characterized 
44 

and calibrated against the legacy sensors, data products from these sensors will be 

made available to the research and operational weather communities. While NPP 

was not intended to be used as an operational asset, our plan is to make data available to the NOAA operational weather community as soon as is practical, to serve 

as a bridge from the current polar weather satellites to the first JPSS mission in 

FY 2017. 

In support of the NPP mission, JPSS is providing engineering support for three 

critical instruments provided by the NPOESS program and is continuing the development of the ground system that will operate NPP (as well as subsequent JPSS 

and the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) spacecraft) and process the instrument data products. Last year, one of our major concerns with the transition 

from NPOESS to JPSS was the readiness of the JPSS ground system to support the 

NPP mission schedule. Upon the launch of NPP, the ground system will be responsible for command, control, communications, and data processing. I am pleased to 

report that the NASA-NOAA team has made significant progress over the past 12 

months to ensure the JPSS ground system will enable NPP to launch next month 

as planned. 

Since the ground system contracts were transferred last year from the Department of Defense (DOD) to NASA, the JPSS program has certified close to 1,500 

products ready for launch, completed twenty software releases, completed numerous 

operational exercises totaling almost 400 hours of spacecraft interface time and has 

closed more than 4,000 work requests. 

While the ground system was being readied for the launch of NPP, the JPSS program has fulfilled commitments previously made to both the DoD and European 

Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), including refurbishment of the MG1 antenna in McMurdo Station in Antarctica, to allow 

it to receive X-band data for EUMETSAT’s Meteorological Operational satellite programme (MetOp), cutting the data latency in half for the mid-morning orbit. The 

program also installed the first of the JPSS receptor sites in McMurdo, modified 

using DoD funds, allowing the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) to 

receive their mission data at McMurdo as well. These capabilities will also be used 

by the JPSS–1 mission when it launches in FY 2017. 

JPSS Transition Status 

In addition to supporting the NPP mission, the JPSS team has focused for the 

last 12 months on completing the transition from the NPOESS program and contracts to the new JPSS program and contracts. The transition to JPSS is now complete and NASA, as NOAA’s acquisition agent, is in control of, and managing, all 

of the JPSS instrument and ground system contracts, including a new NASA contract to produce the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS) signed last 

week. The change to NASA-held and managed contracts has been beneficial for a 

number of reasons, including, NASA’s expertise as an experienced space acquisition 

organization and government management of separate contracts for each major element (spacecraft, instruments and ground segments). Through the transition, the 

instrument vendors continued to make progress in the development of the flight 

units for JPSS–1, and a spacecraft contract was awarded to Ball Aerospace for 

JPSS–1. Assuming full funding of the President’s FY 2012 budget request for 

NOAA, it is anticipated that JPSS–1 will be ready to launch in the first quarter 

of FY 2017, five years after the planned October launch of NPP. 

Conclusion 

NASA and NOAA are committed to the JPSS program, and ensuring the success 

of this program is essential to both agencies and the Nation. The requirements are 

defined, the program is in place, and with the requested funding NASA and NOAA 

are confident that the agencies can implement the JPSS program as planned. NOAA 

and NASA are striving to ensure that weather and environmental requirements are 

met on the most efficient and predictable schedule without reducing system capabilities or further increasing risk. 

With the delivery of the NPP satellite to Vandenberg Air Force Base in Lompoc, 

California, on August 30, 2011, the first fruits of the NASA-NOAA partnership for 

JPSS are undergoing final preparations for a planned launch on October 25, 2011. 

With your continued support, NASA expects this partnership to successfully develop 

and deliver the JPSS-1 mission for launch in FY 2017, thus ensuring continued support of NOAA’s weather and environmental monitoring program. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate the 

continued support of this Subcommittee and the Congress, and I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 
45 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Scolese. 

I now recognize our final witness, Mr. David Powner. Sir, you 

may proceed. You are recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVID POWNER, DIRECTOR, 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. POWNER. Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, Ranking Member Miller and Members of the Subcommittees, we appreciate the 

opportunity to testify this morning on the JPSS program. 

Last summer when I testified before this Subcommittee, we 

stressed the importance of addressing key transition risks associated with the disbanding of NPOESS and establishing a new program. We also emphasized the importance of expediting decisions 

on the cost, launch schedules and the functionality to be delivered 

with this new satellite acquisition. NOAA and NASA have made 

solid progress transferring contracts and establishing an experienced program management team. To date, the contracts for the 

spacecraft and the five JPSS sensors have been transferred from 

NPOESS that was previously managed by DOD to NASA. 

Additionally, just last week, a new JPSS Director started bringing solid aerospace engineering and almost three decades of experience to the program. Although this progress is commendable, I 

would like to stress that transitioning program management to 

NASA alone does not guarantee success. In fact, we have listed 

NASA’s acquisition management as high risk since 1990, given its 

inconsistent performance in delivering large-scale projects. Given 

that, it is imperative that NOAA performs rigorous executive-level 

oversight of JPSS. The program management plan that Dr. Sullivan mentioned should lay out the details of the program’s needed 

governance structure. 

Although there is good news in the transferring of contracts and 

establishing an experienced management team, the JPSS program 

still needs to make firm decisions on the program’s cost, launch 

dates and the functionality to be delivered. Eighteen months have 

passed since the disbanding decision and there is still no baseline 

and NOAA does not plan to establish this baseline until later this 

year. Clearly, budget uncertainties have contributed to this. I 

would like to highlight why this baseline is so important. 

First, from a cost perspective, it is important that NOAA bases 

its cost estimate on realistic budget scenarios. The program has an 

internal cost estimate but is unwilling to disclose this until an 

independent cost estimate is completed. NOAA told us this estimate should be around $12 billion. If estimates come in higher 

than this $12 billion market, it appears NOAA is willing to reduce 

functionality to keep overall costs within this ballpark. 

Another reason the baseline is critical is to know exactly when 

the JPSS sensors will be launched so that potential gaps in satellite coverage can be managed. My written statement lays out 

these potential gaps. The bottom line is this: we are banking on 

NPP, the demonstration satellite now used for operations, to provide coverage from roughly 2012 to 2017. Due to a necessary onorbit checkout period, the anticipated gap in coverage between NPP 

and the first JPSS satellite is expected to be around 6 to 12 
46 

months. This gap will increase if NPP doesn’t last the full five 

years, and opinions on this vary. For example, some NASA engineers are concerned that selected NPP sensors will only last three 

years. This gap will also increase if the first JPSS launch is delayed beyond late 2016. These gaps are critical, Mr. Chairman. 

NOAA reports that data gaps could place lives, property and critical infrastructure in danger. 

My two key takeaways this morning are, one, baseline the program as soon as possible, and two, have contingency plans in place 

to manage the potential gaps in coverage. Regarding the gap, first 

and foremost is NPP performance and is ability to last roughly five 

years. We will get our first indication of this soon after next 

month’s launch. Also launching the first JPSS bird in late 2016 at 

a minimum is key. NOAA has been proactively managing this situation and is looking at options to remove functionality so that the 

first JPSS satellite is launched possibly sooner. Expediting these 

decisions and contingencies are critical to ensuring the continuity 

of weather and climate data. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you for your 

leadership and oversight of this acquisition. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:] 
47 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Powner. I appreciate the witnesses all holding their statements to five minutes just like we had 

a great example from Mr. Miller holding your statement to five 

minutes—well, we will call it five minutes. 

So anyway, I want to thank you all for your testimony. I am reminding Members that Committee rules limit questioning to five 

minutes, so please limit your questions to five minutes for the sake 

of expediency, and the witnesses will please answer in a short time 

so we can get through as many questions as possible because we 

still have votes looming. The Chair at this point will open the 

round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

Section 103(a)(1) of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 and Section 112(b)(1) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 prevent NASA and NOAA from entering into a contract for development of a major program unless the respective Administrators determine that the technical, cost and schedule risks of the program 

are clearly identified and the program has developed a plan to 

manage those risks. The laws also direct NASA and NOAA to 

transmit a report to this Committee at least 30 days before entering into a contract for development under a major program. Has 

NOAA or NASA provided a baseline for JPSS as required by the 

NASA Authorization Act of 2005 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, let us be clear, if we may, on the 

various usages of the word ‘‘baseline’’ because in some contexts it 

means different things. We have an established program estimate 

of the budget. We now have a firm requirements document, the 

Level 1 Requirements Document, and on the basis of those two parameters, we have moved forward with this program. I can’t speak 

to when reports were submitted prior to May of this year when I 

came aboard as NOAA Deputy Administrator but I would be happy 

to look into those matters for you. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, please do because the law requires a report to be submitted to the Committee 30 days before entering into 

a contract. 

Mr. Scolese, could you answer that question, please? 

Mr. SCOLESE. I will have to go off and take that for the record, 

sir. The plan was identified last year as we discussed, and I would 

have to go off and look at what was actually submitted. 

(Mr. Scolese’s response submitted after hearing pertaining to material requested for the record by Chairman Broun: ‘‘Not yet, as the report is due when 

an initial program baseline is established. NOAA will submit a baseline for JPSS 

in accordance with the direction provided in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 201. NASA, as the acquisition agent under a reimbursable agreement with NOAA, will be assisting NOAA in the preparation of those report. 

Consistent with NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements (NPR 7120.5), and the requirement in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, the baseline for the JPSS-1 mission will be established at its confirmation review (Key Decision Point C) in 2012.’’) 

Chairman BROUN. Mr. Powner during his testimony said that no 

baseline has been provided, and he also discussed very eloquently 

why that baseline is extremely important. GAO is saying that no 

baseline has been provided. Can you give us some time frame of 

when we can expect that baseline, Dr. Sullivan? 
64 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, with the L1RD, the requirements 

document in hand, and when we have our independent cost estimate completed, which should be later this year, those two will be 

reconciled. Laying that against the first-quarter fiscal year 2017 

current target launch date, we then can define for you a program 

path forward and we will get that to you as soon as we can. We 

will certainly reconcile that and accommodate that in the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request. 

Chairman BROUN. I would appreciate that. I know that you have 

some problems, as Ranking Member Miller said. There are a lot of 

snakebites going on in this program, and we need to cure the 

snakebites and go forward and get the flying birds, and that is 

what I think all of us on both sides of the aisle are extremely interested in doing. 

What are the differences between NPP and JPSS–1 and how 

much did the NPP cost, how much will JPSS cost and why is it so 

expensive to produce essentially a carbon copy, from my understanding, a satellite that is already built and prepared to launch 

in just a few weeks? Both of you, or either of you. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, we work very closely together so hopefully 

you will see that in our answers as well. To answer the last part 

first, the JPSS–1 satellite is not an identical clone of NPP. As we 

talked, as was mentioned earlier, NPP is a technology demonstration satellite. Its prime purpose was and still is to go off and verify 

the technologies, make sure that the measurements can be made 

so requirements for lifetime were not there. It was to go off and 

verify that we could do and meet the requirements. As Mr. Powner 

pointed out, there is some concern—— 

Chairman BROUN. Mr. Scolese, I have got about 30 seconds left, 

and I asked you about cost, and that is the important thing. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, the short answer then, sir, is that they are 

not identical. There is still additional work that needs to be done 

on the sensors to guarantee the seven-year life. And as far as the 

spacecraft is concerned, we did buy that fixed price so it is about 

the same price between NPP and JPSS–1, which is why you are 

not seeing a different price on that, but there is still development 

work on the sensors that has to be done. 

Chairman BROUN. My time is expired. I now recognize Mr. Miller 

for five minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn’t have objected if you had 

taken another 20 seconds. 

Dr. Broun asked about the first of Mr. Powner’s takeaways. I 

want to ask more about the second and that is the contingency 

planning for gaps in the data. Dr. Sullivan pointed out that we 

have had just about every extreme event imaginable in the last 

year—droughts, floods, fires, tornados, hurricanes. All of that 

would have been—it would have been very helpful to have as accurate a forecast as possible. Presumably the satellite would not have 

helped with the earthquake, but otherwise all the extreme events, 

the more information we had for forecasting, the better. Fortunately, there has been no evidence of locusts to this point. But we 

are on our 15th named hurricane. 

Dr. Sullivan, I know that we are pinning our hopes on the success and on the longevity of NPP but what are the other plans for 
65 

mitigating the potential gaps in coverage that we are facing over 

the next few years? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. We continue to work hard on that, Mr. Miller, and 

we will work contingencies as we go forward. I would like to just 

emphasize two factors that really drive our concern to have the 

afternoon orbit filled. One is weather forecast models are run on 

6-hour cycles, 7 a.m., 1 p.m. and then 7 p.m., 1 a.m., and as you 

can appreciate, a satellite that comes over just a few hours ahead 

of the 7 a.m. and 1 p.m. run give you fresh data, current data, a 

current snapshot of the earth similarly for the 7 p.m., 1 a.m. run, 

the afternoon data is very important. 

Second point of importance about the afternoon orbit has to do 

with the earth itself and in particular for the continental United 

States to sample the atmosphere early in the morning when it 

tends to be a bit quiescent from the overnight hours and then sample it again in more energetic and active convetive phase of the 

day. Those two very different snapshots are invaluable information, 

if you will. They are important information content for the models. 

That is why if there is not a satellite active in the afternoon orbit, 

it is not just as simple as taking the morning orbit bird or taking 

some other satellite. The time of day actually matters. 

We certainly will continue to use data from the morning orbit 

that is covered by the European MetOp satellite. We have and have 

had a number of bilateral and multilateral data exchange arrangements with other nations. Japan has a satellite coming along, 

GCOM–W1, that will host an instrument that bears some relevance 

to our needs. We are working on arrangements to take data from 

that satellite. Taking the data to our command center is one thing; 

making it possible technically in formatting and accuracy and precision to get that data into the numerical model is another not trivial technical challenge, but we are looking at that. So you name a 

nation that has a polar- orbiting satellite with a relevant instrument that has the accuracy, precision and stability needed to not 

degrade the forecast capability of our models and we will make 

every effort to take advantage of that data. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Powner, it does appear that the gap in coverage is connected 

to funding problems but also obviously the management issues. I 

mean, we have now been dealing with the problems in this program when we had a Republican President, a Republican Congress; 

when we had a Republican President and Democratic Congress; a 

Democratic Congress and a Democratic President; and now a 

Democratic President and Republican Congress. It seems like this 

is a program—this program’s problems are problems for all seasons. 

The criticisms of GAO—I know GAO remains critical of this program, but your criticisms do seem much less harsh than they have 

in the past, and there are management issues remaining. I know 

most of your criticism is about the need for a baseline, but do you 

think that the new management, the joint partnership between 

NOAA and NASA, versus the old management structure, or are 

you pretty confident that that is the management structure that 

can this program on track? 
66 

Mr. POWNER. Clearly, if you look historically when DOD was in 

the picture, it is a much more streamlined management structure. 

I think everyone is happier on both sides. We feel a lot more comfortable with that. I do think we would like to see specifics about 

how the executive oversight will occur on the program because historically looking at NPOESS, the executive oversight was very 

poor. There was a question earlier, Chairman Harris, you asked 

about the problems of the past. The problems of the past were poor 

executive oversight and poor program management, too much technical complexity, and all those things we can’t lose sight of and we 

need to stay on your toes from a program management point of 

view. So yes, we are more optimistic than we have been in the past 

but again, it is important to continue to keep everyone on their 

toes. Hearings like this clearly do that, so thank you, Ranking 

Member Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. My time has expired and I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 

Now I yield five minutes to my friend, Chairman Dr. Harris. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again, I 

thank the panel for coming here today. 

Dr. Sullivan, I just want to clear up one thing you said because, 

you know, it is obviously a heart-wrenching story you told about 

Joplin, but the polar satellites really have very little to do with tornado warnings, don’t they? I mean, in your testimony, I think it 

says they are 3 to 7 day, and I assume you didn’t give 3- to 7-day 

warnings to Joplin about that tornado. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. In both the Tuscaloosa outbreaks in April and the 

Joplin outbreaks, Dr. Harris, we did indeed warn those communities 3 days in advance of—— 

Mr. HARRIS. But that is not what that person responded to was 

not the 3-day warning. They responded to the ground-based warnings that you have. Let us just be honest. I understand the importance of telling that story but this hearing is about polar satellites 

and what data we need from polar satellites, so let us get to the 

core of that. 

You know, if I don’t have enough money to buy all the bells and 

whistles on a car because the economy is bad, I leave out the moon 

roof, maybe the sound system, maybe get the stripped-down model. 

How much of the climate change, the long-term climate change 

sensors on that JPSS, how much are they costing of that project, 

and in fact, wouldn’t eliminating the long-range climate sensors so 

that we can focus on the core mission, what I think the core mission of the weather service is, which is weather. Wouldn’t that in 

fact shorten the time frame to launch that satellite and decrease 

the cost? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Those sensors were in fact demanifested at an earlier milestone. I think Mr. Scolese can give you the accurate dates 

that predates my coming back to NOAA. So they are no longer carried on the JPSS program budget. 

Mr. HARRIS. Nothing at all to do with long-range climate? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. 

Mr. HARRIS. Good for you. 

Now, let me ask a question here. Mr. Powner, there is something 

disturbing in the GAO report because it says that part of this gap 
67 

is because some of the selected NPP sensors may only last three 

years because of workmanship issues. Am I missing something 

here? This isn’t in space yet. We are going to launch something up 

that has a workmanship issue and therefore potentially creating a 

gap in our knowledge? 

Mr. POWNER. Correct. There would have been questions about 

workmanship issues associated with several satellites. Their example is like CrIS, when you look at vibration testing, there was an 

issue with vibration testing, and we can go right on down the line. 

Many of these issues were highlighted over the years. The fundamental question is, due to some of those workmanship issues, it 

was originally to be a research satellite so it wasn’t built with the 

rigor that you would expect with an operational satellite, so keep 

that in mind. Some of those things are questionable, and if you listen to some of the internal NASA engineers, there is a question 

about whether it will last, some of those sensors, the full five years. 

Mr. HARRIS. So we are going to launch what amounts to a faulty 

satellite knowing that it is not going to—I mean, this is just mindboggling to me. I mean, did we pay the people who did this workmanship? Did we pay the engineers who designed it? I don’t get it. 

Maybe it is a rhetorical question. 

Let me ask, Dr. Sullivan, let me just go back to this issue of the 

gap because aren’t there—in fact, if this information is so valuable, 

and I know we share it with governments throughout the world, 

with other countries, so this information has value. Now, in the 

American system, when something has value, someone in the private sector’s ears usually go up and say wait a minute, I might be 

able to provide this. I scoured your testimony. I don’t see anything 

about how we might in fact involve the private sector in solving 

some of these issues that we have in getting this data gap filled. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I would be happy, Dr. Harris, to give you some information on requests for information that we have indeed put out 

to private sector companies exploring the possibility of providing 

data across the full spectrum of those mission needs. 

Mr. HARRIS. Then why isn’t it included in your testimony? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Omission on my part. It should have been—— 

Mr. HARRIS. Well, I mean, look, if this gap is so—what I need 

to know and I think the Committee needs to know is, you know, 

exactly all the things we are doing to fill that data gap, and that 

is a glaring omission, unless you believe that only the government 

can do the job. Now, that is—and I suspect that is the problem 

here. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I do believe, Dr. Harris, when it comes to the high 

precision, high accuracy and highly stable data of atmospheric 

sounding that is essential, that is truly the lifeblood of weather 

forecasting. We have seen no proposals or responders that demonstrate any sense of a market other than the United States government for instruments of that class. 

Mr. HARRIS. Okay. Well, I have got to tell you, you know, medical 

instruments, you know, we also need a little accuracy and the government doesn’t make any. You know, the private sector makes 

high-quality, dependable—when a constituent, a citizen in America’s life is at stake, true life is at stake on a daily basis, we trust 
68 

the private sector to gain data for them, so I suggest that you consider that as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Harris. 

Now the Chairman will recognize another physician, Dr. 

Benishek, for five minutes. Dr. Benishek. 

Mr. BENISHEK. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am just sort of amazed by the fact that these things are so expensive and we don’t seem to be able to manage the construction 

on a reasonable basis. It seems that we went from four satellites 

to two and it is costing more money. How is that possible? 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, I am not sure that there is a very good answer for that. NASA and NOAA really took over this program at 

the restructuring and we had to go off and look at what we could 

do within the resources that we have available and what we could 

project, and that is how we ended up where we were. The original 

program, as was stated, started in 1994 as principally a Department of Defense and a NOAA program that was formulated and finalized, I believe, in the late 1990s, early 2000s. So we are really 

talking two different programs here. 

Mr. BENISHEK. Well, it just seems that we are talking about $10 

billion, and we went from four satellites to two. I don’t know, how 

does it all get—how do we lose $5 billion? How do we go from, you 

know, $2.5 billion a satellite to $6 billion? I just don’t see how it 

could be such a cost overrun. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, I think we have to look at all the pieces that 

are in the program, and there is a ground system that is required 

to bring down the data or collect the data from the satellite. It 

comes down to the ground. That is a piece of the total program, so 

you can’t just divide it by the number of satellites. It is also the 

ground system there and they provide them to—and you have to 

help me here, I think four locations for the civil program as well 

as for the DOD programs. So there is more than just the satellites 

that are in there. It is also the ground systems and it is the software that will then take that data and turn it into useful products. 

Mr. BENISHEK. All right. What exactly are we getting with the 

new satellite that didn’t have with the old satellite? What is the 

upgrades? What is new about it that is costing us so much money? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. We are not really changing the set of measurements that we make, Mr. Benishek. The instruments that we have 

aboard or that are slated for NPP and JPSS are sounders, imagers, 

really the workhorse instruments that are the backbone of weather 

forecasting. The state of the art and the nature of current manufacturing, the complexity of those instruments increases incrementally 

every 10 or 20 years as the Nation goes into a new manufacturing 

phase for the polar satellites, but it is certainly not a mission creep 

and an expansion of what we are doing. The complexity in terms 

of spatial resolution, more fine-scaled measurement to support the 

accuracy of forecasting that we have today and the time limits of 

data again to sustain the accuracy of forecasting that we have 

today costs more nowadays than it did in the 1970s. 

Mr. BENISHEK. All right. Mr. Harris, would you like to have the 

rest of my time? 

Mr. HARRIS. No, that is fine. 
69 

Mr. BENISHEK. Then I will yield back. 

Mr. HARRIS. [Presiding] I would like to recognize for five minutes 

the gentlelady from Florida. 

Ms. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

You know, I was going through and listening to everything, and 

it says since the 1960s we have had the two separate operational 

polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems. Since 2003 there 

have been hearings to find out, you know, maintain some form of 

oversight of the JPSS program, which found itself significantly over 

budget, behind schedule and considerably descoped. I am listening 

to your discussion today, and then it goes on and says in 1993 

there was an attempt to streamline the programs. It brought them 

together, created the NPOESS, and then later on they say that the 

program was fraught with problems, delays, inefficiencies and severe cost overruns that in February 2010 the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy announced a fundamental reorganization of the 

program. So here we go. 

Then it goes back in and gives a little bit more detail about in 

2003 again the Committee began serious oversight because of the 

major performance problems, schedule delays for the primary imaging instruments, which caused significant overruns, all types of 

management structure that delayed rather than fostered decisions 

at critical moments. Again, fast forward, at a Science Committee 

hearing on June 17, 2009, witnesses testified before the Committee 

that the program leadership had deteriorated to the point that only 

White House intervention would assure that there would ever be 

any NPOESS satellites at all. 

So we are sitting here and I am listening to all of this discussion, 

and I have a few questions. What percentage of your budget is devoted to the GOES and JPSS programs essentially being run by 

NASA? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I am sorry, Ms. Adams. Are you asking that question with respect to the NOAA budget or—— 

Ms. ADAMS. Yes, NOAA’s budget. What percentage? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I can give you an estimate. We would be happy 

to provide you the precise figures. 

Ms. ADAMS. Well, can you tell me, is it essentially a pass-through 

to NASA? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. It is not a 100 percent pass-through of the appropriated funds. A sizable portion passes through for satellite acquisition but another portion stays with us for the ground system, for 

flight operations, for algorithm development. A portion of the total 

program that brings the data to the ground turns it into useful 

records that can be adjusted into the weather models. That portion 

is NOAA’s direct responsibility. 

Ms. ADAMS. Do we know if NASA is spending any of their funding on the JPSS program and how much it is? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. We do know that the NOAA funding passed 

through to NASA for the JPSS program is being spent to develop 

JPSS. I can let Mr. Scolese speak to the current budget numbers. 

Mr. SCOLESE. It is a fully reimbursable program so we are using 

NOAA funds. 

Ms. ADAMS. So there is no cross-agency support funds being 

used? 
70 

Mr. SCOLESE. That is correct. 

Ms. ADAMS. Okay. I am going to try to get as many of my questions answered as possible. 

Mr. SCOLESE. One point, on NPP, which was a research satellite, 

NASA did and is paying for the bus and for the launch. 

Ms. ADAMS. So you—— 

Mr. SCOLESE. But that was a different program. That wasn’t 

originally part—— 

Ms. ADAMS. But it is part of the NOAA issues, correct? 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, it is going to—— 

Ms. ADAMS. So there is some funding, NASA’s funding? 

Mr. SCOLESE. For NPP, yes, that is correct. 

Ms. ADAMS. Dr. Sullivan, it is fair to say that some JPSS sensors 

are more focused on providing data essential for weather forecasting, correct? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Yes, it is. 

Ms. ADAMS. While others are focused on long-term climate 

science, correct? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. No. The JPSS satellite is tailored to NOAA’s 

weather-observing requirements. 

Ms. ADAMS. So no sensors whatsoever? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. No, ma’am. 

Ms. ADAMS. Okay. That is not what we have been told, so I am 

just curious. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. There were climate sensors in an earlier version 

of the JPSS program definition. They were descoped. I would have 

to verify the time for you but a year or more ago. They are in a 

budget line within NOAA to try to launch those sensors on other 

platforms but they are not part of the JPSS program. 

Ms. ADAMS. So will they be launched on free flyers or something 

else? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. We are still evaluating options to try to support 

those on free flyers or hitchhiker payloads on commercial buses, 

and we expect to have some results from those evaluations by the 

end of the year or early into 2012. 

Ms. ADAMS. Will you have the costs associated with that? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Yes, we should. 

Ms. ADAMS. I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. I thank you, Ms. Adams. 

Now I recognize Dr. Benishek—not Dr. Benishek, Dr. Bucshon 

for five minutes. Go ahead, Dr. Bucshon. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have anything specific so 

if you want me to yield back my time to you, I can do that. 

Chairman BROUN. Very good. We will go through a second round 

of questions then, and because of votes now projected at 11:30, we 

will limit the round of questions to three minutes per Member, so 

I recognize myself for three minutes. 

Let us assume that the government will be funded by CRs for the 

remainder of the year and most likely through all of 2012. Unfortunately, I think that is a real good bet. How will NOAA and NASA 

prioritize the work on JPSS if it only gets CR funded? Both of you. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Well, JPSS is certainly one of the highest priorities in NOAA’s mission portfolio so it would get a very high ranking. It is not the only important and worthy thing the agency does 
71 

but I think you could see in our actions to date during fiscal year 

2011 the importance that we place on it. 

Chairman BROUN. And Mr. Scolese, I would assume same answer. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Yes, sir, and I think I would just add that part of 

those funds will be used with NPP and what we discover with NPP 

in orbit will also play into that as well as the level of funds in the 

CR. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, I certainly hope in spite of the warnings 

that we get from Mr. Powner about the workmanship from GAO 

that satellite lasts longer than it was originally designed to do. 

What options does this program have for operating in the funding environment of continuing CRs, Dr. Sullivan? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I am not sure I understand your question, Dr. 

Broun. 

Mr. BROUN. If we have continuing resolutions as I very firmly believe that we will have, what options do you have in that funding 

environment for continuing to try to get this program flying, get 

the birds in space so that we have this data that is necessary and 

hopefully so that these gaps will be as minimized as possible? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Well, within resources available under the CR, we 

would certainly focus on the long lead items and try to build in the 

capability to accelerate or continue to move at a steady pace. We 

would as we did in fiscal year 2011 keep a clear eye on contract 

viability and try to not have to go through not only the workforce 

churn but the incremental additional expense of terminating and 

then having to re-up contracts. I could ask Mr. Scolese to join in 

here with further comments if you would like. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Yes. As you know, one of the most difficult things 

for a project manager, and I have been there, is uncertainty in 

what your budget is going to be because you are constantly replanning, and so that is the difficulty we will have to do. We will have 

to work with NOAA to try and establish our priorities and see if 

we can’t stick with those, but the more replanning that we have 

to do, the more uncertainty there is, the more difficult it is to accomplish the goals that we all want to accomplish here. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, I appreciate that, and I think there are 

things that you really need to look at because I think the high certainty is that we are going to have CRs for the rest of this Congress, and depending on what the election in 2012 gives us, who 

knows where we are going to go from there. Only the Lord himself 

knows. But I think we are going to have CRs. I think this is going 

to be a huge issue for you guys and so I think you all need to look 

at every single option that is available because I want to see these 

birds flying. I want to see it done in the most cost-effective way. 

I want us to be good stewards of the hard-earned money of taxpayers that they are giving to this program. 

My time is expired and now I will recognize Mr. Miller for three 

minutes, and I took up almost 23 seconds in that one. 

Mr. MILLER. I think I am still a little ahead of you in going over. 

Dr. Sullivan, obviously you have received less funding for this 

program than what you forecast, what you expected, what you 

needed, what you were planning for, and you had to establish some 

priorities. How did you decide why the NPP satellite and the 
72 

ground station updates were the top priorities for NOAA in the fiscal year 2011 budget? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I would highlight two reasons, Mr. Miller. One 

was the time frame in which NPP is slated to fly and what we hope 

its life duration actually will be can serve as a very valuable data 

bridge. Secondly, it really still helps substantially in risk reduction, 

both improving the technology and the sensor designs that we have 

and that we intend for JPSS–1, and from a ground segment point 

of view, to be able to prepare to use the data operationally also 

puts us in a position to debug, to get ready for the long-term use 

of these instruments for the entire next generation of polar weather satellites, so it made good sense to us in a constrained funding 

environment to be sure we were ready to fly NPP with NASA, use 

the data operationally and get our feet wet, learn the lessons that 

we need to learn to really be able to use that system and evaluate 

its long-term future potential. 

We, as a near second priority, also worked very hard with our 

NASA counterparts to keep key—keep momentum and viable contracts on the key long lead items for the JPSS portion of the program. 

Mr. MILLER. With my remaining time, I will just point out that 

a century ago, I think 4,000 people in Galveston died in a hurricane because they had absolutely no forewarning that a hurricane 

was moving onto shore, was out there in Gulf, and actually hurricanes in which thousands of people died were fairly common 

throughout—until we developed our better forecasting abilities, and 

I know that this is a program we have all criticized. It has been 

worthy of our criticism. But the idea of launching a satellite into 

space and looking down at Earth and developing data from which 

we could forecast weather is actually kind of hard. Thank you. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 

Dr. Benishek, you are recognized for three minutes. 

Mr. BENISHEK. I will yield back the remainder of my time. 

Thanks. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, may I offer clarification to Ms. 

Adams? 

Chairman BROUN. She is fixing to be recognized for three minutes, so we will see what she wants to do that three minutes of 

time. 

Ms. Adams, you are recognized for three minutes. 

Ms. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, we have talked a lot about continuing resolutions and 

everything else and the cost and everything else. With what is 

going on with JPSS, we haven’t seen a request from the Administration, OMB or anything, an anomaly for the JPSS program. Why? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Well, I cannot speak for the OMB and the White 

House on that matter, Ms. Adams. I know we are in discussions 

actively with the Administration about ways in which we might 

jointly handle the program if indeed we go into extended continuing resolutions, and I am assured from my sources that it is 

recognized as a very high priority by the Administration, but I 

can’t speak to their decisions on strategy and CRs. 

Ms. ADAMS. How long does it take for POES and GOES satellites 

to check out after launch? 
73 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Well, the amount of time it takes currently is reflective of the length of time that we have been running the current 

NOAA K series of satellites, so it is a few months. If you will give 

me a moment, I can pull the exact data up for you. We estimate 

for NPP that that calibration, validation period will take a total of 

about 18 to 24 months to get to the point where we have the full, 

precise, what we call Environmental Data Records that are being 

pulled into numerical weather prediction models. 

Ms. ADAMS. So for GOES and POES, I have about six months. 

Is that correct? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Yes, for the current series of satellites which we 

have learned multiple lessons on, we—— 

Ms. ADAMS. How long did it take in the very beginning to calibrate them? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. It certainly was longer for the—— 

Ms. ADAMS. Can you get the Committee that amount? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. We can get you what the first run was. We estimate for—— 

Ms. ADAMS. Let me ask another question here. So you believe 

that the reason for the length of time is because it is a newer system? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Ms. ADAMS. And you didn’t learn a lot from the first systems that 

you think it is going to take a lot longer this time? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. We did learn a lot from the first systems but the 

algorithms, the actual software to accomplish the similar tasks is 

all new software. 

Ms. ADAMS. If I remember correctly, you told my colleague here 

that it was essentially the same, just a little upgrade. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. The software to handle the data streams are very 

different. We do expect to learn a lot between NPP and JPSS–1 

and have a shorter calibration, validation period then. 

Ms. ADAMS. Now, I would like to ask how confident GAO is that 

NASA and NOAA will be able to meet the late 2016 launch date 

for JPSS, given the past performances. 

Mr. POWNER. I think it is fair to say if you look at the NPOESS 

program, we never hit a date, so we feel good about the current 

program management team that is in place and the executives who 

are overseeing this program. We are hopeful they are going to hit 

it but based on past performance, it is less complicated not having 

DOD in the picture. Okay, that is clear, and I think what is important is, let us get that baseline, manage to the baseline and deliver 

in late 2016. That is what is really key, to minimize that gap. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Adams. I assume you yield 

back since your time has run out. 

Now the Chairman will recognize Dr. Bucshon if you have any 

questions. Okay. 

Dr. Sullivan, as well as all the witnesses, I am going to ask the 

Members to present written questions for you and you can at that 

time, if you would, please, go ahead and answer Ms. Adams’ question and fill in any gaps that may be there. 

I thank you all for you all’s valuable testimony today and I thank 

the Members for all you all’s questions. The Members of either 

Subcommittee may have additional questions, as I have already 
74 

mentioned, and please respond quickly with those questions, as I 

am sure you will. The record will remain open for two weeks for 

additional comments from Members. The witnesses are excused. 

I thank you all very much, and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 
(75) 

Appendix I: 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
76 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D., 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Environmental Observation 

and Prediction and Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration 

Questions Submitted by Chairman Paul Broun, Subcommittee on 

Investigations & Oversight and Chairman Andy Harris, 

Subcommittee on Energy & Environment 
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Responses by Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator, 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Questions Submitted by Chairman Paul Broun, Subcommittee on 

Investigations & Oversight and Chairman Andy Harris, 

Subcommittee on Energy & Environment 

Q1. Please describe, in detail, the differences between NPP and JPSS-1? 

• How much did NPP cost? 

A. The estimated life cycle cost to NASA for NPP is $895 million. In addition, the 

NPOESS program provided three instruments that are estimated to cost $656 million, excluding the non-recurring development costs from the NPOESS program. 

The total estimated cost of the NPP satellite, including launch, is $1551 million. 

• How much will JPSS cost? 

A. NASA establishes a cost baseline for programs and projects at Key Decision 

Point (KDP) C, which follows the Preliminary Design Review (PDR). PDR for JPSS1 is scheduled for December 2012, with KDP C following in January. At that point 

a formal baseline will be established for the ground and flight elements required 

for the JPSS-1 mission. NOAA will provide the formal baseline to Congress after 

the KDP C. 

• What are the differences in performance characteristics? 

A. The NPP and JPSS-1 satellites are very similar in design. As such, we expect 

their performance to be comparable except for JPSS-1’s improved reliability over 

NPP arising from NASA and NOAA’s experience gained from NPP, allowing the 

agencies to correct issues in design, manufacturing, and test processes. 

Though the NPP and JPSS-1 spacecraft buses are largely alike, there are some significant differences: 

• JPSS-1 has a Ka-band communications link (in addition to an X-band communications link) to broadcast the mission data to the JPSS Ground System. This 

communication link makes the spacecraft compatible with the Ground System’s 

worldwide receptor network to shorten the amount of time between data collection and subsequent transmission to the users. 

• JPSS-1 has an operational life of seven years versus NPP’s five years in order 

to meet NOAA’s Level 1 requirements. 

• NASA is building JPSS-1 to NASA mission class B standards versus NPP’s 

class C. The Class B standards have more stringent mission assurance standards in order to improve the spacecraft reliability and lifetime. 

• JPSS-1 has many changes to address obsolescence from the time that NPP was 

built a decade ago. These changes include newer solar array and battery technology, and product line updates to the Spacecraft computer, GPS receiver, and 

inertial reference sensor. 

Significant differences between the NPP and JPSS-1 instruments are: 

• NPP has two Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) sensors: one viewing 

Earth nadir and the other viewing the Earth limb. JPSS-1 has only the nadir 

sensor per the Nunn-McCurdy NPOESS descope review decision. 

• There were many small to medium changes made to the JPSS-1 instruments 

to address issues identified during the build and test of the NPP instruments. 

These include changes to improve reliability (e.g., cuts and jumpers eliminated 

from circuit cards, static-sensitive parts replaced, launch lock thermal tolerance 

increased), to improve manufacturability (e.g., brazed joint structure changed to 

single piece structure), and to correct performance waivers (e.g., eliminating optical crosstalk, improving calibration target for better accuracy, reducing electromagnetic sensitivity). 

Q2. How are management decisions made between NOAA, NASA Headquarters, and 

the Goddard Space Flight Center? 

A2. NASA and NOAA have been partners for more than 40 years in developing the 

United States’ polar and geosynchronous weather satellites. With the President’s direction last year to restructure the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), NASA and NOAA have returned to this successful partnership structure, with NOAA maintaining overall responsibility of the JPSS 
108 

program and NASA providing technical expertise and serving as the program acquisition agent. 

NASA and NOAA use the NASA Program and Project Management Processes and 

Requirements, NPR 7120.5, as the framework for managing JPSS. The relative roles 

between NASA Headquarters and GSFC are the same under JPSS as under typical 

NASA Science missions, while the headquarters functions are managed cooperatively between NASA and NOAA. NASA and NOAA co-chair both of the decisionmaking boards (Science Directorate Program Management Council and Agency Program Management Council) required to approve readiness to proceed at each of the 

Key Decision Point milestones. Both NASA and NOAA sign and control the Level 

1 Requirements Document, which defines the requirements for the program, and the 

Program Plan/Management Control Plan, which defines how the program operates. 

The ultimate decision authority for the program lies with NOAA. 

• Does a management control document between NOAA and NASA exist for the 

JPSS program? If so, please provide a copy. 

The Program Plan/Management Control Plan for JPSS will define the working relationships between NOAA and NASA, and between NASA Headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center. This document is currently undergoing final review and 

NOAA will provide it once complete. 

Q3. How much did The Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) cost for 

the NPP satellite? 

A3. Since NOAA’s NPOESS program developed the VIIRS instrument flown on 

NPP, NASA defers to NOAA on this question. 

• How much will the VIIRS instrument cost for JPSS-1? 

The KDP C, which will establish the project’s formal baseline, is scheduled for 

January 2013. NOAA will provide the formal baseline to Congress after the KDP 

C. 

Q4. Does all of the funding for NASA’s work on the JPSS program come directly 

from NOAA? If NASA provides funding for JPSS, please indicate the amount 

and what budget line it comes from. 

A4. All the funding for NASA’s work on JPSS comes from NOAA. JPSS is a fully 

reimbursable program, similar to GOES-R and the earlier POES weather program. 

NOAA funds the work performed by NASA Centers in support of these programs. 

NASA Headquarters has one full-time Program Executive for JPSS and varying portions of senior management providing oversight of the Center activities, which are 

funded by NASA’s Agency Management and Operations budget. 

Q5. How many Federal employees and contractors at NASA are involved in the 

JPSS program? 

A5. Currently there are 75 civil servants and 137 support contractors involved in 

JPSS. We expect to increase to 111 civil servants and 204 support contractors in 

FY12, assuming full funding of the FY12 budget. 

Q6. Reassigned to NOAA 

Q7. How does the JPSS acquisition model for NOAA compare to the acquisition 

model used by NASA to procure Landsat imagery satellites for the Department 

of the Interior? 

A7. NASA has developed both the operational weather satellites for NOAA and the 

Landsat satellites for the Department of the Interior (DOI) for more than 40 years. 

Historically, the weather satellites have been developed for NOAA under reimbursable agreements. On the other hand, NASA has developed Landsat satellites, including the now in-development Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)/Landsat 

8, within the NASA appropriation and then transferred operations to USGS. With 

the President’s FY 2012 budget request, NASA and DOI have proposed to develop 

Landsat 9 on a reimbursable basis similar to our successful historical approach with 

NOAA weather satellites. This both aligns ownership of the mission requirements 

and funding within the sponsoring agency and allows NASA to act as the acquisition agent for DOI. 
109 

Questions Submitted by Ranking Member Brad Miller, 

Subcommittee on Energy & Environment 

Q1. The NPOESS program had a history of cost over-runs and schedule delays that 

continued up to the day it was ended. How is NASA managing development of 

the JPSS flight and ground elements differently to reduce the likelihood of continued over-runs and delays? 

A1. NPOESS had a complicated management structure. While NOAA and DoD 

have similar weather system requirements, they differ in some areas, which made 

designing a single system for both uses a challenge. Additionally, NASA served as 

a third independent partner. The NPOESS prime contractor was responsible for development of all the instruments, ground system and spacecraft, and acted as the 

system integrator for all of these elements. Government oversight of the individual 

elements under development was limited. The Program Office for NPOESS was located in Silver Spring, MD, rather than in a spacecraft acquisition center and therefore lacked the proper personnel, processes and experience. 

For the JPSS program, NASA is the acquisition agent for a single customer, 

NOAA, with clearly defined priorities. NASA is acting as the system integrator and 

is contracting with each of the instrument, ground and spacecraft providers directly, 

allowing for rigorous technical and financial government oversight of each element. 

NASA has located the JPSS Program Office at Goddard Space Flight Center, which 

is NASA’s primary acquisition center for Earth-observing spacecraft and thus has 

the relevant expertise. This structure builds on the successful partnership between 

NASA and NOAA for the previous polar and geosynchronous weather satellites. 

In establishing the JPSS program, we have reduced the number of government 

organizations with decision authority over NOAA’s primary afternoon orbit requirements and eliminated layers of management between the Program and the contractor as it affects this orbit. These changes simplify priority-setting, decision-making, and accountability. 

The JPSS program has simplified the satellite architecture to use a smaller spacecraft bus based on a commercial platform, eliminating much of the risk of the new 

development in the NPOESS C1 spacecraft. The program has also undertaken a review of instrument and spacecraft spare hardware, and is making plans to procure 

critical and long-lead spare items to reduce the impact in the event of a hardware 

failure during development. 

NASA and NOAA have also established an independent Standing Review Board 

that will chair major reviews for JPSS starting in FY 2012, providing an independent assessment of the management and progress of the JPSS program to NASA 

and NOAA management. 

Q2. The NPOESS Program had a complicated executive and program management 

structure. Explain how the JPSS executive and program management structure 

is different, and why it will be more effective. 

A2. NOAA is the only organization providing strategic direction for the JPSS program, whereas three different agencies each provided strategic direction for 

NPOESS. Decision-making is not stymied because of conflicting priorities or budgeting strategies. NASA has established a new Joint Agency Satellite Division 

(JASD) within the Science Mission Directorate at Headquarters to manage all of the 

NOAA satellite developments within NASA. JASD has ready access to all of NASA 

senior management, providing quick resolution to any issues as they develop. 

Areas of authority are also clearly delineated. NOAA provides the interface with 

the user community and international partners and gives direction to NASA, which 

provides the acquisition and technical expertise to oversee the instrument, spacecraft, and ground system contracts. Under the NPOESS program, the prime contractor had direct control of the instrument and ground system development, which 

allowed few opportunities for the government to provide input and direction. Under 

JPSS, there is more program and acquisition oversight by the government on instrument and ground system development, since NASA has direct management of these 

contracts. NASA and NOAA report to the NOAA/NASA Agency Program Management Council (PMC) every month. NOAA co-chairs this council with NASA, and 

NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) 

has a monthly Management Status Review with NASA to ensure the project stays 

on track. 

Q3. The NPOESS instruments scheduled to fly on NPP have been described as less 

than perfect. How is NASA managing development of the instrument differently 

to ensure performance meets requirements? 
110 

A3. The new JPSS Program assigned program management to GSFC, which has extensive experience in managing flight projects and developing instruments. GSFC 

has a large, competent staff of engineers who have knowledge and experience in all 

aspects of instrument development. GSFC also has unique test and analysis facilities that support instrument development. 

GSFC has recruited and assigned personnel with extensive experience in the development of spaceflight instruments to manage the instruments. The Flight Project 

Instrument Management and Systems Engineering team includes senior personnel 

with a successful history in developing instruments for GOES, HST, SDO, TRMM, 

EOS, and Landsat. In addition, we have stationed government engineering and mission assurance personnel in the contractor’s VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS facilities to oversee and guide instrument development. 

As part of the transition from NPOESS, the JPSS team completed a review of 

all instrument anomalies, concerns, waivers, and risks associated with the NPP instruments. We worked methodically through these issues, determining which were 

relevant to the JPSS instruments, assessing the consequence of each, and determining the options to address or mitigate the issues. As a result of this process, approximately two-thirds of the issues from the NPP instruments have been eliminated for the JPSS instruments. Plans are underway to determine how to further 

reduce the risk of the remaining issues, and we expect many of them will be retired 

at the time of the launch, leading to improved performance and reliability of the 

JPSS-1 mission. Further improvements are already planned for the JPSS-2 instruments. 

The JPSS team has also conducted an extensive review of how well the instruments comply with NASA spaceflight engineering and mission assurance guidelines. 

Through a gap analysis process, we have identified differences between the previous 

processes used for instrument development and what the NASA standards recommend. We are also working methodically through this gap analysis to determine 

how best to address the differences. We have developed an Instrument Mission Assurance Requirements (IMAR) document that will be applicable to all future hardware builds. This IMAR will ensure that future developments use NASA-approved 

electronic parts, materials, and workmanship standards. It will dictate when government inspections are required. It also ensures that the instrument contractors 

have a robust mission assurance program with appropriate government insight. 

JPSS is also analyzing the instrument test programs to determine their compliance 

with NASA environmental verification and test standards; changes are now being 

implemented to make the instrument thermal-vacuum and electro-magnetic compatibility test programs more robust and bring them in line with NASA standards. 
111 

Responses by Mr. David A. Powner, Director, 

Information Technology Management Issues, 

Government Accountability Office 

Questions Submitted by Chairman Paul Broun, Subcommittee on 

Investigations & Oversight and Chairman Andy Harris, 

Subcommittee on Energy & Environment 

Q1. Has NOAA satisfied GAO’s inquiries concerning the new structure, budgets and 

timeline for the JPSS program? 

A1. Although the JPSS management control plan—which will likely describe the 

structure of the program—has been in development for about 21 months, it has not 

yet been signed, and neither NOAA nor NASA could provide a firm time frame for 

its completion. The JPSS cost and schedule baseline is still under development; 

thus, the expected cost of the JPSS program, and its anticipated launch dates, have 

not yet been finalized. The JPSS program estimates that its program baseline will 

be completed no earlier than July 2012. 

Questions Submitted by Representative Randy Neugebauer 

Q2. With such unreliable financial projections, I find it hard to justify spending 

seemingly unknown amounts of money that we don’t have for the JPSS program. Given our nation’s financial situation, with over $14 trillion in debt, how 

can we justify continuing to throw money at a program that has historically not 

proved to be a wise or effective steward of taxpayer dollars? 

A2. NOAA plans for the JPSS program to provide weather and climate data continuity in the afternoon orbit. According to NOAA, a gap in these data would lead 

to less accurate and timely weather prediction models used to support weather forecasting; and advanced warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm 

surges, and floods—would be diminished. The agency reported that this could place 

lives, property, and critical infrastructure in danger. However, because NOAA has 

not yet established a cost or schedule baseline for JPSS, it is not yet clear what will 

be delivered, by when, and at what cost. In May 2010, we recommended that NOAA 

expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of its planned satellite program. The JPSS program estimates that its program baseline will be completed no earlier than July 2012. 

(113) 

Appendix II: 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD: ‘‘NASA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE NPOESS 

PREPARATORY PROJECT,’’ NASA’S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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