CRITICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE

DHS Needs to Refocus 

Its Efforts to Lead the 

Government Facilities 

Sector

Report to Congressional Requesters

August 2012

GAO-12-852

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-12-852, a report to 

congressional requesters

August 2012

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

DHS Needs to Refocus Its Efforts to Lead the 

Government Facilities Sector

Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. government facilities have been 

the target of foreign and domestic 

terrorists. Government facilities are 

one of 18 critical infrastructure sectors 

designated under Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). The 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) is responsible for identifying, 

prioritizing, and coordinating the 

protection of critical infrastructure that, 

if destroyed, could have a debilitating

impact on governance, the economy, 

national morale, or public health and 

safety. DHS defines critical 

infrastructure sector responsibilities in

the National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan (NIPP) and the Federal Protective 

Service (FPS) is the lead agency for 

the government facilities sector. As 

such, FPS is to develop and implement

a government facilities sector-specific 

plan, which was first issued in 2007 

and updated in 2010, in coordination 

with governmental partners. In this 

report, GAO assesses FPS’s efforts as 

the lead agency for the government 

facilities sector. To do this, GAO 

reviewed HSPD-7, the NIPP, the 2010 

plan and other related documents to 

compare FPS’s actions and the goals

for the sector. GAO also interviewed 

DHS agency officials and 16 selected 

sector partners about activities for, and 

coordination with, the sector. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of DHS direct FPS, in partnership with 

others, to develop and publish an 

action plan that identifies sector 

priorities and resource requirements, 

and addresses steps needed to 

implement a risk management 

approach and develop effective 

partnerships. DHS concurred with the 

recommendation.

What GAO Found

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has not been effective as the lead 

agency for the government facilities sector, which includes facilities at the 

federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level. Under the National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the 2010 sector-specific plan, FPS 

is responsible for establishing a risk management approach and developing 

effective partnerships for the sector. However, FPS has not implemented a 

risk management approach. According to FPS, it has not identified or 

obtained data on facilities at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level, 

which are fundamental for employing a risk management approach. In 

addition, despite providing information on the principles of threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence, FPS has not coordinated or assessed risk

across government facilities, another key element of risk management. FPS 

also lacks effective metrics and performance data to track progress toward 

implementing a risk management approach and for the overall resilience or 

protection of government facilities. Consequently, FPS does not have a risk 

management approach for prioritizing and safeguarding critical government 

facilities. Furthermore, FPS has not built effective partnerships across 

different levels of government. While FPS chairs the Government 

Coordinating Council (the Council)—a mechanism intended to help share 

activities and policy across different levels of government—the Council’s

membership lacks a full spectrum of sector partners, particularly non-federal. 

All five state and local government and non-governmental members of the 

Council that GAO contacted were unaware of, or did not consider themselves 

to be part of, the Council. FPS also has not leveraged the State, Local, Tribal 

and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, an existing mechanism to 

coordinate with non-federal government organizations, although FPS officials 

reported recent efforts aimed at enhancing this partnership. 

As the lead agency for the sector, FPS faces challenges associated with

funding and its lack of an action plan. According to FPS officials, FPS has no 

dedicated line of funding for its activities as the lead agency and resource 

constraints hinder FPS’s capacity to lead this large and diverse sector, which 

is comprised of more than 900,000 federal assets, as well as assets from 56 

states and territories; over 3,000 counties; 17,000 local governments; and 

564 federally recognized tribal nations. FPS’s use of fee-based revenue to 

perform homeland security activities not directly related to federal facility 

protection is inconsistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002. FPS does 

not have a full understanding of the resource requirements for serving as the 

lead agency, because it has not completed a cost estimate or an action plan 

to guide implementation of the 2010 plan. According to DHS officials, 

HSPD-7 will be updated, which may result in structural changes to the 

sector that could affect the lead agency’s responsibilities and available 

resources. An action plan could serve as a valuable tool for FPS and 

DHS to identify priorities that can be feasibly achieved and the resources 

required, in tandem with any potential structural changes. 

View GAO-12-852. For more information, 

contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or 

goldsteinm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Letter 1 

Background 3

FPS Is Not Effectively Leading the Sector 6

Conclusions 15

Recommendation for Executive Action 16

Agency Comments 16

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 18

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 20

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 22

Related GAO Products 23

Tables

Table 1: Sector’s Stated Goals and Objectives 5

Table 2: Council Member Agencies and Organizations Interviewed 19

Figure

Figure 1: Six Major Elements of Identifying, Prioritizing, and 

Measuring Critical Infrastructure Protection 3

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

FPS Federal Protective Service 

GSA General Services Administration

HSPD-7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7

IP Office of Infrastructure Protection 

ISC Interagency Security Committee 

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

RAMP Risk Assessment and Management Program 

SLTTGCC State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government 

 Coordinating Council

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Page 1 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

August 13, 2012

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Transportation Security

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

Foreign and domestic terrorists have targeted U.S. government facilities, 

including the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 1998 embassy bombings in 

East Africa, and 2001 attack on the Pentagon. More recent incidents at 

government facilities include shootings at a federal courthouse in Las 

Vegas and the state capitol of Texas. Government facilities are 1 of 18 

critical infrastructure sectors designated under Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which is designed to identify, prioritize, 

and coordinate protection of critical infrastructure.1

 

1

The 18 sectors are Food and Agriculture; Banking and Finance; Chemical; Commercial 

Facilities; Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; 

Emergency Services; Energy; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; 

Information Technology; National Monuments and Icons; Nuclear Reactors, Materials and 

Waste; Postal and Shipping; Transportation Systems; and Water.

Critical infrastructure 

is defined as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 

the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 

debilitating effect on governance, the economy, national morale, or public 

health and safety. HSPD-7 defines critical infrastructure sector 

responsibilities for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other 

federal agencies that lead coordination within and across the 18 sectors. 

As the lead agency for the government facilities sector, DHS is 

responsible for working with various partners—including other federal 

agencies; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as other 

sectors—to develop and implement the government facilities sectorspecific plan, which was last updated in 2010 (the 2010 plan), and issue 

annual reports on the status of DHS’s efforts.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

DHS has designated the Federal Protective Service (FPS) as the lead 

agency for the government facilities sector—a collateral duty to FPS’s 

traditional role protecting over 9,000 owned or leased federal facilities 

under the custody and control of the General Services Administration 

(GSA). FPS employs about 1,225 federal staff and oversees about 

14,000 contract security guards. Over the last decade, FPS has 

experienced well-documented management and funding challenges that 

have hampered its ability to protect federal facilities. Furthermore, we 

have reported on gaps and overlap with respect to DHS’s efforts to 

protect critical infrastructure.2

You asked us to assess DHS’s activities related to the government 

facilities sector; particularly FPS’s leadership of the sector. To meet this 

objective, we reviewed HSPD-7, DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan (NIPP), and the 2010 plan. Based on these documents, we identified 

the implementation of a risk management approach and development of 

effective partnerships as two key activities that lead agencies are 

responsible for. We also reviewed the 2010 and 2011 sector annual 

reports to identify what actions FPS had taken, and any gaps between 

these actions and the stated goals and activities in the 2010 plan. We 

interviewed DHS and FPS officials, and selected 16 of the 26 members of 

the Government Facilities Sector Government Coordinating Council (the 

Council) —a collaborative body, which shares approaches to 

infrastructure protection. We chose Council members based on their 

significant involvement within the sector, among other criteria, as well as 

all 5 state, local, and non-governmental members. Lastly, we reviewed 

our prior reports and DHS Office of Inspector General reports on critical 

infrastructure to identify any challenges FPS faces in leading the 

implementation the 2010 plan. See appendix I for a detailed description of 

our scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to August 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

 

2

Recent GAO products on FPS and critical infrastructure protection are listed at the end of 

this report.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In 2003, HSPD-7 established a national policy for critical infrastructure 

and key resources. HSPD-7 designated DHS as the agency responsible 

for coordinating the nation’s efforts to protect critical infrastructure. The 

Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within DHS fulfills the functions 

associated with managing and coordinating the national protection efforts. 

In June 2006, DHS issued the first NIPP as required by HSPD-7. The 

NIPP provides a risk management framework and sector partnership 

model for developing, implementing, and maintaining a coordinated 

national effort to manage the risks to critical infrastructure.

FPS is the lead agency for the government facilities sector (the sector), 

and assumes multiple roles and responsibilities for the sector, which is

comprised of a wide variety of facilities and assets owned or leased by 

federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial governments, located both 

domestically and overseas.3

Figure 1: Six Major Elements of Identifying, Prioritizing, and Measuring Critical Infrastructure Protection

Under the NIPP risk management 

framework, FPS is responsible for leading and coordinating six major 

elements sector-wide to identify, prioritize, and measure progress towards 

protecting critical infrastructure. See figure 1.

 

3

Some types of government facilities are exclusive to the sector, while other facilities exist 

in other sectors. Unlike other sectors, the government facilities sector does not include 

private sector participation. The government facilities sector also includes one subsector, 

the education facilities subsector, which represents both public and private educational 

institutions from pre-kindergarten through higher education. The Department of Education 

serves as the lead agency for the education facilities subsector and is responsible for 

developing and implementing a sector-specific plan in coordination with FPS. However, 

our work did not focus on the activities associated with this subsector.

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Additionally, the NIPP sector partnership model calls on FPS to form and 

chair a government coordinating council comprised of representatives 

from different levels of government to share activities, policy, and 

communications.4

• The State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating 

Council (SLTTGCC), which coordinates with non-federal government 

organizations across all 18 sectors;

FPS also participates in or interacts with the following 

cross-sector councils, which facilitate relationships within and among the 

18 sectors:

• the Regional Consortium Coordinating Council, which represents a 

variety of distinct collaborative efforts between state, local, and private 

sector partners focused on critical infrastructure found in multistate 

regions or within a given city;

• the NIPP Federal Senior Leadership Council, which is a DHS-chaired 

council that consists of federal department and agency 

representatives from lead agencies named in HSPD-7; and

• the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, which is a 

partnership between government and private sector owners and 

operators of critical infrastructure to effectively coordinate federal 

protective programs.

The NIPP requires each lead agency to develop and revise a sectorspecific plan that addresses critical infrastructure protection. FPS has 

responsibility for updating the plan to adequately represent the sector and 

involve Council members. Every 4 years,5

• identify gaps between the plan and guidance from IP, policy changes, 

and best practices;

FPS must:

 

4

The NIPP sector partnership model also encourages the formation of a sector 

coordinating council comprised of owners and operators, generally from the private sector. 

The sector coordinating council and the government coordinating council are intended to 

work in tandem to create a coordinated national framework for protection of critical 

infrastructure and resiliency across sectors. However, due to the governmental nature of 

the sector, the sector does not have a corresponding sector coordinating council. 

5

In 2012, IP changed the requirement for updating sector-specific plans from 3 years to 4 

years.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

• identify and develop a consolidated list of actions required to close 

gaps;

• obtain, and incorporate input from sector partners and the Council in 

multiple rounds; and

• obtain final approval from IP and release the plan to sector partners 

and the Council.

FPS and DHS issued the first sector-specific plan in 2007 and an update 

to the plan in 2010, in which they identified goals and objectives for the 

sector, shown in table 1.

Table 1: Sector’s Stated Goals and Objectives 

Goal Objectives

1. Implement a long-term government 

facility risk management program

• Identify and obtain appropriate data for facilities located domestically and overseas

• Coordinate a comprehensive risk assessment program for these facilities

• Build effective protective measures, programs, strategies, and related guidance

• Monitor performance

• Develop best practices and guidance for countermeasures

2. Organize and partner for government 

facility protection and resilience

• Understand and share information about threats and hazards

• Build effective sector partnerships for information-sharing and to help implement 

protection and resilience programs

• Coordinate the development of continuity programs 

3. Integrate government facility 

protection as part of the homeland 

security mission

• Integrate sector efforts with other national level efforts to deal with risk

4. Manage and develop the capabilities 

of the sector

• Promote awareness, education, training, and exercise programs

• Conduct research and development

• Develop and maintain the sector-specific plan

5. Maximize efficient use of resources for 

government facility protection

• Determine the sector priorities, program requirements, and funding needs for 

government facility protection

• Enable or augment protection for nationally critical government facilities and 

coordinate efforts of sector partners and pooling of different funding sources.

Source: FPS and DHS, 2010 Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan.

As the lead agency, HSPD-7 also requires FPS to provide the Secretary 

of Homeland Security with annual reports to assess progress and 

effectively prioritize sector-specific activities and gaps, among other 

things. This process involves consulting the Council, similar to the 2010 

update to the plan.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

FPS’s role as the lead agency for the sector is an additional duty beyond 

its traditional role of protecting over 9,000 owned or leased facilities under 

the custody and control of GSA.6 As part of its mission, FPS conducts risk 

assessments, recommends countermeasures, and performs law 

enforcement activities, such as incident response. FPS’s activities are 

funded by security fees collected from tenant federal agencies. As such, 

FPS charges each tenant agency a basic security fee per square foot of 

space occupied in a GSA facility, among other fees.7

The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), which was established in 

1995, develops policies and standards and facilitates security-related 

information exchanges. While domestic non-military federal facilities—

whether federally owned, leased, or managed—are required to adhere to

the ISC standards, these standards do not apply to state, local, tribal, and 

territorial government facilities. ISC membership consists of over 100 

senior executives from 51 federal agencies and departments, including 

FPS. DHS is responsible for chairing the ISC and is authorized to monitor 

federal agencies’ adherence to ISC standards.

FPS’s leadership has not resulted in implementation of a risk 

management approach for the sector, as called for under the NIPP 

framework. Specifically, a lack of facilities data, risk assessments, and 

effective metrics and performance data undermine the implementation of 

a risk management approach. Under FPS’s leadership, effective 

partnerships have also not developed. FPS faces challenges in leading 

the sector linked to the sector’s size, diversity, and FPS’s fee-based 

revenue structure. These challenges are compounded by the lack of an 

action plan.

 

6

Section 1315(a) of Title 40, United States Code, provides that: “To the extent provided for 

by transfers made pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security...shall protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, 

occupied, or secured by the Federal Government (including any agency, instrumentality, 

or wholly owned or mixed-ownership corporation thereof) and the persons on the 

property.” 

7

FPS’s enacted budget authority for fiscal year 2012 was $1.285 billion.

FPS Is Not Effectively 

Leading the Sector
 

Page 7 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Lack of facilities data: Asset identification is a crucial element for risk 

management as outlined by both the NIPP framework and the 2010 plan. 

According to the 2010 plan, the sector’s assets and systems must be 

identified to determine which of these, if damaged, would result in 

significant consequences for national economic security, public health or 

safety, morale, or governance. The 2010 plan also states that identifying 

and obtaining appropriate data on government facilities located 

domestically and overseas is a sector objective. However, FPS officials 

said that they have not identified or obtained data on federal, state, local, 

tribal and territorial government facilities for the sector. According to FPS 

officials, developing sector-wide data may be untenable and unwarranted, 

because most federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government 

facilities do not meet the threshold established by IP for the most critical 

infrastructure and government facilities generally remain the same year 

after year.8

While FPS officials said that they have neither identified nor obtained data 

on the sector, FPS has contributed to the development of a database 

maintained by IP, the IP Gateway / Infrastructure Information Collection 

Yet, the 2010 plan states that several circumstances may 

require frequent updates to data on government facilities, including 

changes in threat levels, large-scale facility renovations, or the 

identification of a facility as supporting a nationally critical function or 

critical asset. Moreover, the 2011 annual report states that functions 

carried out in one government facility often directly support the functions 

under way in many other government facilities. Thus, an incident at one 

facility could have cascading impact across a range of functions essential 

to governance. Without appropriate data on government facilities, FPS 

has limited awareness of the potentially evolving universe of government 

facilities as well as the interdependencies that may exist in the sector. As 

a result, FPS may be overlooking facilities whose failure or degradation 

could pose significant harm to the nation’s security, health, economy, or 

morale.

 

8

DHS has established a National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program with a tiered 

approach to identify critical infrastructure that if destroyed or disrupted, could cause some 

combination of significant casualties, major economic loss, or widespread and long-term 

disruptions to national well-being and governance capacity. The categorization of level 1 

and level 2 provide a basis on which DHS and its partners can implement protection 

programs.

No Overarching Risk 

Management Approach in 

Place
 

Page 8 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

System.

9 IP uses this database to identify critical infrastructure assets 

and systems. According to FPS officials, they periodically review and 

cross reference the information contained within the database against the 

dataset that FPS uses as part of its role of protecting federal facilities. 

However, FPS’s data do not encompass the full spectrum of sector 

facilities, in particular non-federal facilities. In addition, we have previously 

identified problems with FPS’s data, such as a lack of data on building 

jurisdictional authorities.10 Consequently, FPS’s efforts to corroborate the 

data contained within the IP Gateway / Infrastructure Information 

Collection System are undermined by the limited scope and quality of its 

data.11

No sector-wide risk assessments: FPS is not currently positioned to 

assess risk across the sector. Assessing risks and coordinating risk 

assessment programs are another key element of the NIPP framework 

and a sector objective. The plan and annual reports provide information 

about the principles of threat, vulnerability, and consequence as well as 

discuss different types of risks and threats faced by government facilities, 

but no standardized tool for performing risk assessments exists at the 

federal level, much less the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels.

To the extent that the IP Gateway / Infrastructure Information 

Collection System is used to prioritize critical infrastructure, this effort may 

also be detrimentally affected by weaknesses in FPS’s data.

12

 

9

The IP Gateway / Infrastructure Information Collection System, formerly referred to as the 

Infrastructure Data Warehouse, catalogs the national inventory of assets, systems, and 

networks that may be critical to the Nation’s well-being, economy and security and is 

maintained by DHS. It provides a framework to access and display descriptive data on 

critical infrastructure submitted by federal, state, and local agencies; the private sector; 

and integrated federal or commercial databases. FPS officials said that they helped 

develop a taxonomy to standardize the categorization of facilities and group critical 

infrastructure by sector in order to identify overlaps and interdependencies across sectors, 

which is used within the IP Gateway / Infrastructure Information Collection System.

FPS 

10GAO, Federal Protective Service: Better Data on Facility Jurisdictions Needed to 

Enhance Collaboration with State and Local Law Enforcement, GAO-12-434 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 27, 2012). 

11We have ongoing work looking at the data collection and reliability across the 18 

sectors.

12A variety of tools are used by government agencies to assess risks. For example, 

according to DHS officials, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate has developed a 

tool called the Integrated Rapid Visual Screening, which has been used by federal, state, 

and local government agencies to assess risks. However, according to FPS, this tool was 

not built to meet FPS or sector requirements. Nonetheless, FPS has not coordinated the 

use of any tools to assess risk across the sector. 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

promoted its Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) as a 

risk assessment tool in the 2010 plan and sector annual reports, as well 

as in past Council meetings. However, the scope of RAMP was not 

originally intended to address non-federal facilities and has never become 

fully operational. Therefore, its usefulness as a sector-wide risk 

assessment tool is not clear. In fact, RAMP has been terminated 

according to a senior FPS official, and FPS is working on developing a 

replacement.13 According to this official, a new risk assessment tool and 

methodology will be released for use by sector partners at a future, 

unspecified date. FPS officials acknowledged the absence of a sectorwide risk assessment. Without this, FPS cannot prioritize facilities or 

implement protective programs, both activities predicated on effective risk 

assessment.14

No effective metrics and performance data: FPS has not established 

effective metrics and performance data, which hampers its ability to 

monitor the sector’s progress toward the sector goal of implementing a 

long-term government facility risk management program as described in 

the 2010 plan. An effective metric is one that can adequately indicate 

progress toward a goal and that is objective, measureable, and 

quantifiable. Data to track metrics need to be sufficiently timely, complete, 

accurate, and consistent.15

 

13We have previously reported that FPS has struggled to operationalize RAMP. GAO, 

Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Resolve Delays and Inadequate Oversight 

Issues with FPS’s Risk Assessment and Management Program, 

Further, DHS has established guidance on 

metrics to assess improvements in the protection and resiliency of critical 

infrastructure, which lead agencies can use to guide these efforts in their 

respective sectors. We have reported that without effective performance 

data, decision makers may not have sufficient information to evaluate 

whether investments have improved security and reduced a facility’s 

GAO-11-705R 

(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2011).

14According to IP officials, IP has produced reports summarizing the protective activities 

used within each sector, including the government facilities sector, to monitor and help 

mitigate risks. According to FPS officials, they reviewed this report for situational 

awareness, but not for planning purposes or to mitigate risks, because it summarized 

protective measures implemented at only 91 facilities in the sector, a very small fraction of 

the total facilities. 

15GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1996); GAO, Managing for 

Results: Challenges in Producing Credible Performance Information, GAO/T-GGD/RCED00-134 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2000).
 

Page 10 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

vulnerability, or to determine funding priorities within and across 

agencies.16

To measure overall critical infrastructure protection or resilience within the 

sector, FPS identified 10 key activities that seek to reduce risk and 

enhance the sector’s overall security posture. However, all of these risk 

mitigation activities are focused solely on individual federal activities or 

facilities, which limit their usefulness for measuring progress sector-wide. 

For example, to measure its implementation of a long-term government 

facility risk management program, FPS identified 2 risk mitigation 

activities focused on completing timely and thorough building 

assessments and implementing security support services at 

MegaCenters,17

FPS officials stated that it is difficult to identify metrics or performance 

data that effectively indicate progress in the sector. In addition, FPS 

officials said that the risk mitigation activities they identified are interim 

measures and that they continue to refine the sector’s metrics and data. 

In 2011, FPS used qualitative statements to describe activities and 

progress made in the sector. However, these statements do not have 

associated outcome metrics or performance data that can be validated in 

services performed by FPS as part of its mission. While 

these ongoing efforts may contribute to the security efforts for facilities 

that FPS protects, they do not provide a risk management program for the 

sector. Moreover, although FPS has identified metrics for each risk 

mitigation activity, the corresponding performance data needed to track 

these metrics do not exist in several cases. For example, one risk 

mitigation activity aims to promote the development and implementation 

of the ISC security standards; the associated metric identified is the 

number of facilities that have implemented the ISC standards. According 

to the ISC executive director, there is currently no way to quantify how 

many facilities have implemented the ISC standards.

 

16GAO, Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring the 

Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts, GAO-06-612 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2006).

17In 2000, FPS transitioned all alarm-monitoring and dispatching capabilities from several 

regional control centers to four MegaCenters. Currently, each MegaCenter monitors 

multiple types of alarm systems, closed circuit television, and wireless dispatch 

communications within federal facilities throughout the nation. These centers—located in 

Michigan, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Maryland—are equipped with state-of-the-art 

communication systems and operate continuously. 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

terms of timeliness, completeness, accuracy, or consistency. Until it 

establishes quantifiable metrics and performance data, FPS will be 

unable to gauge progress toward implementing a risk management 

approach, specifically, and the protection or resiliency of critical 

government facilities, overall.

To effectively implement the NIPP and achieve the goals of the sector, 

partnerships are essential. As previously discussed, the NIPP sector 

partnership model integrates partners into the planning and operational 

activities for a collaborative approach to the protection of critical 

infrastructure. Likewise, the 2010 plan places a significant emphasis on 

the role of partnerships. However, of the 16 Council members we 

contacted, 13 indicated that they had little or no involvement in 

developing the sector plan and annual reports, and for at least 8 agencies 

these documents were of negligible value. To offset low Council member 

response, FPS officials reported relying on open source information (e.g., 

annual federal budget) to develop the annual report. Relying primarily on 

open source information does not fully or effectively leverage the 

knowledge and experience of Council members, potentially undermining 

the value of the plan as a means to promote collaboration in critical 

infrastructure protection.18

Furthermore, while FPS chairs the Council, the principle mechanism for 

engaging partners, FPS has not involved the full spectrum of sector 

Consequently, this key coordination goal of the 

2010 plan has not been met, and as a result, FPS is limited in its ability, 

as lead agency for the sector, to productively contribute to the larger DHS 

effort to prioritize and safeguard the nation’s most critical infrastructure. 

FPS’s role as lead agency for the government facilities sector is 

particularly critical because according to the 2011 annual report, 

government facilities have been the most frequently attacked sector since 

1968 and the sector involves a very dynamic threat environment. FPS’s 

compilation of reports that hold little value for sector partners, leaves FPS 

and its sector partners less able to engage in a comprehensive risk 

management framework that addresses this threat environment.

 

18GAO has defined key practices to enhance and sustain collaboration among 

governmental partners, including establishing joint strategies to help align partner 

agencies’ activities and resources to achieve a common outcome. GAO, Results Oriented 

Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal 

Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct 21, 2005). 

FPS Has Not Built 

Effective Partnerships 

across Different Levels of 

Government
 

Page 12 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

partners. FPS officials said that they use an informal process to manage 

the Council membership and have repeatedly reported that they actively 

seek to add members to expand state and local representation. Of the 

Council members identified by FPS, 21 of the 26 are federal agencies, 3 

are state or local agencies, and 2 are non-governmental organizations. 

Officials from all 5 state and local government and non-governmental 

organizations told us that they were either unaware or did not consider 

themselves to be members of the Council. Furthermore, the Council 

currently has no representation from tribal and territorial governments. 

Having active representation from state, local, tribal, and territorial 

governments on the Council would be particularly helpful, given that 

FPS’s interaction with the cross-sector councils that represent these 

perspectives has been limited or non-existent. As previously discussed, 

the SLTTGCC provides all 18 sectors a mechanism to coordinate with 

non-federal government organizations. According to the 2010 plan, the 

SLTTGCC had liaisons who were fully integrated into the Council.

However, both SLTTGCC officials and FPS officials indicated that there 

has been limited interaction. During our review, FPS reached out to the 

SLTTGCC to discuss opportunities to increase partnering activities. FPS 

officials reported having never worked with the Regional Consortium 

Coordinating Council, which includes state and local government 

representatives. With limited representation on the Council and little or no 

interaction with certain cross-sector councils, the sector is missing 

opportunities to engage and integrate the experience, knowledge, and 

priorities of state, local, tribal and territorial partners into the plan to help 

ensure buy-in for protecting critical infrastructure across all levels of 

government.

Moreover, the Council has become progressively less active over the 

years. According to the 2011 annual report, the lead agency convenes 

Council meetings quarterly and communicates information about threats,

incidents, and effective protection-related practices to sector partners. 

However, Council members indicated that the frequency of meetings has 

steadily declined over the years. In 2011, FPS held only one meeting in 

January; its next meeting was held in May 2012. No working groups or 

other activities occurred in the interim. At the 2011 meeting, there was a 

total of four non–DHS Council members who attended. FPS’s May 2012 

Council meeting may have reflected increased interest, with 14 agencies 

other than DHS in attendance. However, only one attendee represented 

state, local, tribal or territorial governments; all other attendees were from 

federal agencies. FPS officials acknowledged that participation of Council 

members has been decreasing every year. Most Council members 

representing federal agencies said that interaction with the sector had not 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

been helpful since their agencies actively participate in the ISC, which 

provides the guidance their agencies need to meet federal physical 

security standards. Nevertheless, some Council members said that the 

sector was valuable as a resource for coordinating security activities and 

potentially developing a uniform risk assessment tool. Since the sector 

covers a larger and broader set of government facilities than the ISC—

such as military, state, local, tribal and territorial facilities—the potential 

benefits of collaboration, as discussed earlier, could lead to a more 

comprehensive approach to protecting critical government facilities.

FPS has identified its limited resources as a significant challenge to 

leading a sector as large and diverse as the government facilities sector. 

The 2010 plan states that the sector includes more than 900,000 federal 

assets, as well as assets from 56 states and territories; more than 3,000 

counties; 17,000 local governments; and 564 federally recognized tribal 

nations. In addition, these facilities represent a wide variety of uses, both 

domestically and overseas, ranging from office buildings and courthouses 

to storage facilities and correctional facilities. FPS officials indicated that 

they have very limited staffing and no dedicated line of funding for 

activities related to leading the sector, and it was unclear if FPS’s security 

fees could be used to cover the costs of serving as the lead agency for 

the sector. Because of limited resources, FPS officials said that they 

could only meet the NIPP’s minimum reporting requirements and did not 

engage in other activities that could address the issues discussed earlier. 

For example, FPS officials said that they abandoned efforts related to 

strategic communications and marketing as described in the 2010 annual 

report, aimed at increasing awareness and participation across the sector 

because of resource constraints. FPS reported in 2010 that it did not have 

the capability to plan for any sector-specific agency investments. In 2011, 

FPS had less than one full-time equivalent employee engaged in sectorspecific agency activities, which represents a decline from prior years 

when FPS had a full-time equivalent employee and several contract 

employees assisting with its sector responsibilities.

As discussed above, FPS is funded using a fee-based structure in which 

it collects funds from federal tenant agencies for security and protective 

services. We have previously reported that FPS’s involvement in 

homeland security activities not directly related to facility protection is 

inconsistent with a requirement in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that 

FPS’s Capacity to Lead the 

Sector Hindered by Its Fee 

Structure and Lack of 

Action Plan
 

Page 14 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

FPS use funding from the fees it collects solely for the protection of 

federal government buildings and grounds.19

Notwithstanding issues related to how its fees may be used, FPS has not 

fully assessed the resource requirements for serving as the lead sector 

agency, because it has not completed an action plan or cost estimate for 

carrying out the 2010 plan. The 2010 plan states that determining the 

sector’s priorities, program requirements, and funding needs for 

government facility protection is a sector objective. FPS previously 

reported it was developing an action plan to guide its implementation of 

the 2010 plan, but according to FPS officials, they are no longer pursuing 

this, because identifying steps FPS can and will take is difficult without 

knowing what funding or resources are available. FPS officials also told 

us that they originally estimated the cost of serving as the lead agency to 

be around $1 million, but did not provide us with the analysis to support 

this estimate.

We recommended to DHS 

that if FPS continues its involvement in activities not directly related to the 

protection of federal buildings and grounds, a funding process would be 

needed that is consistent with the requirement regarding the use of funds 

from agency rents and fees.

20

According to DHS officials, HSPD-7 is in the process of being updated to 

reassess how the NIPP and the sectors are overseeing the protection of 

critical infrastructure, which may result in the sector being restructured. 

For example, according to DHS, GSA, and Department of the Interior 

officials, GSA will become a co-lead agency, the monuments and icons 

sector will be subsumed within the government facilities sector, and an 

executive committee that includes the ISC may be formed to help advise 

the sector. Such changes may affect FPS’s workload and resources as 

the lead agency.

An action plan could help FPS and DHS refocus efforts in the sector. We 

have recommended that agencies leading intergovernmental efforts use 

an action plan to establish priorities, provide rationale for resources, and 

 

19GAO, Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy Needed to Address Challenges 

Facing the Federal Protective Service, GAO-04-537 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004).

20According to FPS officials, half of the $1 million estimate was based on having three fulltime equivalent staff and contractor support. The other half ($500,000) was based on 

travel costs for conferences, training, assessments, and to potentially engage subject 

matter expertise from the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

to propose strategies for addressing challenges.21 An action plan could 

enable FPS and DHS to manage change by prioritizing the activities 

required of the sector’s lead agency and identifying those activities that 

can be feasibly carried out by FPS given its current resource constraints. 

An action plan may also be useful to FPS for justifying additional 

resources, which may help address the challenge posed by its fee-based 

revenue structure.

FPS is responsible for leading efforts to identify, prioritize, and protect 

critical government facilities across all levels of government under the 

NIPP. The loss of critical government facilities and the people who work 

in them because of terrorism, natural hazards, or other causes could lead 

to catastrophic consequences. The lack of facility information, the 

absence of sector-wide risk assessments, and ineffective metrics and 

data undermine the implementation of a risk management approach as 

outlined by the NIPP risk management framework and envisioned in the 

2010 plan. In addition, FPS has not effectively employed the NIPP sector 

partnership model to engage the Council and represent the depth, 

breadth, and interests of the sector, particularly non-federal partners.

Consequently, key goals of the 2010 plan have not been met, and FPS is 

limited in its ability to productively contribute to the larger DHS effort to 

prioritize and safeguard the nation’s most critical infrastructure. According 

to DHS officials, structural changes to the sector may already be under 

way. Yet, FPS and DHS do not have an informed understanding of the 

priorities and resources needed to fulfill the lead agency responsibilities, 

and structural changes may affect these priorities and available 

resources. An action plan could serve as a valuable tool for FPS and 

DHS to identify, in tandem with any structural changes, priorities that can 

be feasibly achieved and the associated resource requirements given 

FPS’s fee-based revenue structure. This may, in turn, help address the 

overall limited progress made to date in the sector with implementing a 

risk management approach and developing effective partnerships.

 

21GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ 

Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices, GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 30, 2004).

Conclusions 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

To enhance the effectiveness of the government facilities sector, we 

recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct FPS, in partnership with IP 

and Council members, to develop and publish an action plan that 

identifies sector priorities and the resources required to carry out these 

priorities. With consideration of FPS’s resource constraints, this plan 

should address FPS’s limited progress with implementing a risk 

management approach and developing effective partnerships within the 

sector. The plan should address, at a minimum, steps needed to:

1. develop appropriate data on critical government facilities;

2. develop or coordinate a sector-wide risk assessment;

3. identify effective metrics and performance data to track progress 

toward the sector’s strategic goals; and

4. increase the participation of and define the roles of non-federal 

Council members.

We provided a draft report to DHS, GSA, Department of Education, 

Department of Health and Human Services, Department of State, 

National Archives and Records Administration, National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

Department of the Interior, Environmental Protection Agency, and 

Department of Justice. DHS concurred with our recommendation to 

develop and publish an action plan for the sector. DHS’s full comments 

are reprinted in appendix II. The National Archives and Records 

Administration also agreed with our findings. DHS, GSA, and the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology provided technical 

comments, which we considered and incorporated, where appropriate.

The other agencies did not provide comments on our draft report. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other 

interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-2834 or GoldsteinM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Contact information and key contributors to the report 

are listed in appendix III.

Mark Goldstein

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 18 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

To assess the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) leadership of the 

government facilities sector, we reviewed Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 7, Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and the 2010 Government Facilities 

Sector-Specific Plan (the 2010 plan). Based on these documents, we 

identified the implementation of a risk management approach and 

development of effective partnerships as two key activities of the NIPP 

and the 2010 plan that lead agencies are responsible for. These activities 

form the foundation for identifying, prioritizing, and protecting critical 

infrastructure. We reviewed the outcomes reported in the 2010 and 2011 

sector annual reports to determine FPS’s actions, and identified gaps 

between these actions and the goals and activities in the 2010 plan. We 

reviewed prior GAO reports and DHS Office of Inspector General reports 

on critical infrastructure to identify any challenges that FPS faces in 

leading the implementation of the 2010 plan and key practices on 

establishing performance metrics and interagency collaboration.

In addition, we interviewed FPS officials in Washington, D.C., about the 

2010 plan, its sector-related activities as the lead agency, and any 

challenges to implementing the plan. We interviewed DHS officials from 

the Office of Infrastructure Protection and Interagency Security 

Committee about their role as sector partners and their interaction with 

FPS as the lead agency. We also interviewed members from the sector’s 

Council about their role and participation in the Council and their 

interaction with FPS. We selected 16 of the 26 members of the Council 

based on several criteria, including their level of activity as determined by 

contributions to the 2010 plan and sector annual reports, or participation 

in the 2011 Council meeting, and all 5 of the state and local government 

members, and non-governmental organization members. Among federal 

members of the Council, we also selected federal agencies that served as 

the lead agencies for the monuments and icons sector, water sector, 

commercial facilities sector, and education subsector, and federal 

executive branch agencies with expertise in law enforcement or physical 

security applicable to the protection of government facilities.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 19 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Table 2: Council Member Agencies and Organizations Interviewed

Federal Agencies

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Education

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of State

National Archives and Records Administration

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Department of Interior

Environmental Protection Agency

Department of Justice

State and Local Government 

City of Fort Worth, TX

City of Las Vegas, NV

New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Non-Governmental Organizations 

National Academy of Sciences

National Center for State Courts

Source: GAO.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to August 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 20 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 21 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 22 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or GoldsteinM@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, David Sausville, Assistant 

Director; Friendly Vang-Johnson; Jennifer DuBord; Delwen Jones; Steven 

Putansu; and Kathleen Gilhooly made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 23 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Federal Protective Service: Better Data on Facility Jurisdictions Needed 

to Enhance Collaboration with State and Local Law Enforcement. 

GAO-12-434. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2012.

Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Resolve Delays and 

Inadequate Oversight Issues with FPS’s Risk Assessment and 

Management Program. GAO-11-705R. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2011.

Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service. 

GAO-11-813T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2011.

Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Would Improve Federal Protective 

Service’s and Federal Agencies’ Planning and Budgeting for Security. 

GAO-11-492. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2011.

Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective 

Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. GAO-10-506T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 16, 2010.

Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve 

the Federal Protective Service’s Approach to Facility Protection. 

GAO-10-142. Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009.

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial 

Steps to Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist.

GAO-09-1047T. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2009.

Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several 

Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. 

GAO-08-683. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective 

Service’s Efforts to Protect Federal Property. GAO-08-476T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 8, 2008.

Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring 

the Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts. GAO-06-612. 

Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.

Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal 

Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices. 

GAO-05-49. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2004.

Related GAO Products

Federal Facility 

Protection 
Related GAO Products

Page 24 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy Needed to Address 

Challenges Facing the Federal Protective Service. GAO-04-537. 

Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Has Taken Action Designed to 

Identify and Address Overlaps and Gaps in Critical Infrastructure Security 

Activities. GAO-11-537R. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2011.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess and Promote 

Resiliency Are Evolving but Program Management Could Be 

Strengthened. GAO-10-772. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2010.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and 

Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Critical Infrastructure 

Protection Cost-Benefit Report. GAO-09-654R. Washington, D.C.: June 

26, 2009.

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical Infrastructure 

Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private Sector 

Coordination. GAO-08-36. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007.

Critical Infrastructure: Sector Plans Complete and Sector Councils 

Evolving. GAO-07-1075T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2007.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector Councils 

Continue to Evolve. GAO-07-706R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2007.

Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors. 

GAO-07-626T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government and 

Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics. GAO-07-39. 

Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2006.

Critical Infrastructure 

Protection 
Related GAO Products

Page 25 GAO-12-852 Government Facilities Sector

Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More 

Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical 

Infrastructure Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 

2006.

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