GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

December 1999 BATTLEFIELD 

AUTOMATION

Army’s Restructured 

Land Warrior Program 

Needs More Oversight

GAO/NSIAD-00-28

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 24

Appendix II: Comparison of Land Warrior Unique 

Developments Original Design and Revised Design 28

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-281494 Letr

December 15, 1999

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

According to the President’s fiscal year 2000 budget request, the Army 

plans to invest $20.8 billion in digitization over the next 6 fiscal years. 

Digitization involves the application of information technologies that 

enable battlefield systems to acquire, exchange, and employ timely 

information throughout the battlespace. This report responds to the 

Subcommittee’s request that we evaluate the Army’s efforts to develop and 

acquire command and control systems to digitize the battlefield. 

Specifically, this report addresses the Land Warrior system.

Land Warrior, with an expected cost of $2.1 billion, is the Army’s key 

command and control system for infantry soldiers on the digitized 

battlefield. It is intended to enable the soldier to know where both friendly 

and enemy soldiers are located and to facilitate communication between 

the soldier and higher command levels. The system is comprised mainly of 

a computer/radio, weapon, and helmet-mounted display eyepiece that are 

linked together for transmission of messages (voice and data) and imagery 

between soldiers and other battlefield systems. It also includes protective 

clothing, body armor, and a carrying harness to support the weight of the 

equipment. 

The Army set a goal of fielding Land Warrior by September 2000. As 

requested, we assessed the Army’s progress in implementing this system. 

Specifically, we 

• identified the status of the system;

• evaluated whether the current level of monitoring and oversight is 

sufficient based on projected Land Warrior development costs;

• determined how the Army is ensuring that Land Warrior will be able to 

operate with other digitized battlefield systems; and

• assessed whether technical and human factor problems still need 

resolution.
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We previously reported on this program in September 1996.1 At that time, 

we were concerned about the high risk of the acquisition strategy in view of 

significant technical and human factor problems.

Results in Brief The Land Warrior system, which has been in development since January 

1996, will not be fielded by September 2000 because Land Warrior 

technologies could not be developed in time. The estimated cost of 

acquiring 34,000 units, including research, development, test, evaluation, 

and procurement, has increased from $1.4 billion to $2.1 billion. Although 

originally planning to use only mature technologies to permit expeditious 

fielding, the Army’s design incorporated technologies that had to be 

developed specifically for Land Warrior, the effect of which has been to 

extend development and delay fielding until fiscal year 2004. 

Oversight of the Land Warrior program is not sufficient based on its 

projected development costs. Department of Defense Regulation

5000.2R provides the general criteria for managing the acquisition process 

for systems such as Land Warrior and requires program managers to 

structure their program to reduce risk, ensure affordability, and provide 

information for decision-making. In general, Department of Defense 

programs that are costly, complex, and risky receive greater oversight and 

program officials must provide more information for decision-making. 

Also, programs with estimated research, development, test, and evaluation 

costs over $355 million are to receive departmental oversight. Land 

Warrior’s estimate of $588.8 million meets these criteria. Despite its claim 

that Land Warrior is urgently needed, the Army grouped Land Warrior with 

less complex and less costly acquisitions, resulting in the program 

receiving routine Army attention. Oversight responsibility remained 

unchanged despite development problems that threatened to lengthen the 

acquisition schedule and the inability of system prototypes to pass 

certification tests. 

At present, Land Warrior will not operate with a key digitized battlefield 

system—Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below—the Army’s 

principal digital command and control system at and below brigade level. 

Further, when this capability will be incorporated into the Land Warrior 

system has not been determined. In March 1999, Army officials obtained a 

1

Army Land Warrior Program Acquisition Strategy May Be Too Ambitious

(GAO/NSIAD-96-190, Sept.11, 1996).
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waiver, which allowed them to defer developing the necessary software to 

make Land Warrior able to interoperate (communicate) with Battle 

Command Brigade and Below until well after Land Warrior equipment is 

fielded. To be effective, Land Warrior must be able to transmit data to and 

receive data from higher command levels, thereby providing the soldier 

with a relevant common picture of the battlefield and ensuring an 

integrated communications link from soldier to higher command. This link 

has not been established. According to program officials, the waiver was 

needed because the Land Warrior computer architecture was not 

compatible with the Battle Command Brigade and Below system software. 

Although the waiver is in effect, the Land Warrior program manager 

contends that the most recent program revision will achieve the desired 

operability without the need for a waiver. However, he concedes that 

considerable hardware and software development will be needed before 

this can be assured. 

The Land Warrior Program has not resolved technical and human factor 

problems that may render the system ineffective. For example, problems 

include overweight equipment, inadequate battery power, uncertain battery 

logistics, inadequate load-carrying design and comfort, and 

electromagnetic interference. Typical of the problems encountered in field 

tests were those associated with the load-carrying harness. During tests, 

soldiers had problems raising their heads to fire their weapons from the 

prone position because the pack attached to the harness would ride up and 

press against the back of their helmets. Army officials believe that the 

load-carrying system contemplated in the most recent program revision 

should solve this problem. However, the current Land Warrior system 

design has not been sufficiently field tested to ensure that old problems 

have been resolved and new ones have been avoided.

This report contains recommendations directed at improving program 

monitoring, oversight, testing, and operability with other key Army 

digitized battlefield systems. 

Background The Land Warrior system is intended to significantly improve the lethality, 

mobility, survivability, command and control, and sustainability of infantry 

soldiers by integrating a variety of components and technologies. Land 

Warrior includes a computer/radio, software, integrated headgear, 

including an imaging display, weapon subsystem, and protective clothing 

and equipment to be integrated on the individual soldier (see fig.1). When 

fielded, Land Warrior is expected to operate with digitized battlefield 
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systems, such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below.2

Furthermore, the Army plans to introduce additional technologies later on 

to enhance the soldier’s battlefield performance.

Figure 1: The Land Warrior System

Source: PM Soldier, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

In September 1996, we reported that (1) the Land Warrior program was 

based on a high risk and costly acquisition strategy, (2) Land Warrior’s 

ability to function with other components of the digital battlefield had not 

been demonstrated, and (3) technology and human factor problems needed 

2

Acquisition Issues Facing the Army Battle Command, Brigade and Below Program

(GAO/NSIAD- 98-140, June 30, 1998).
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to be resolved. For example, the computer/radio battery provided less than 

2 of an expected 12 hours of continuous operation and the equipment 

weighed so much that soldier movement was impeded and comfort 

compromised. At that time, we recommended that the Secretary of the 

Army defer or restrict the purchase of Land Warrior systems until the Army 

• determined the Army Acquisition Objective—that is, the total number of 

units to be acquired;

• resolved critical technical and human factor problems;

• demonstrated successful digital battlefield integration; and 

• ensured through testing that Land Warrior-equipped soldiers would 

outperform standard-equipped soldiers. 

The Army has established its acquisition objective of 34,000 systems, but 

has not implemented our other recommendations. 

There have been two major revisions to the Land Warrior program, which 

originally called for fielding the system in fiscal year 2000. The effect of 

both the interim revision in August 1998 and the current plan, developed in 

February 1999, has been to delay fielding. Land Warrior officials have not 

submitted the current plan for Army Acquisition Review Council approval. 

This senior-level review authority provides guidance and recommends 

program revisions to the Army Acquisition Executive and Army Vice Chief 

of Staff for referral to the Defense Acquisition Board. 

Program Has Not 

Progressed as Planned

The Land Warrior program has not progressed as planned. The program’s 

research, development, test, evaluation and procurement cost estimate has 

increased from $1.4 billion to $2.1 billion. Fielding has been delayed from 

fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004. Development has been ongoing since 

January 1996 and has not yet yielded workable prototypes. The Army 

initially intended to use mature technologies to ensure that it could field 

Land Warrior expeditiously, but it has increasingly relied on technologies 

that had to be developed specifically for Land Warrior. Problems in 

completing these Land Warrior-unique developments prevented the Army 

from meeting its acquisition schedule and successfully developing working 

prototypes. 
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Testing Problems With 

Prototypes Led to Major 

Program Revisions

In April 1998, contractor-delivered Land Warrior prototypes failed several 

basic certification tests that would have permitted the system to proceed 

with development testing. Failed tests included an airborne certification 

test, an electromagnetic interference test, and a water immersion test. 

Consequently, the Army rejected the prototypes and began restructuring 

the program. For example,

• The airborne certification test was to assure that soldiers could 

parachute with Land Warrior equipment. With the load-carrying design 

then being used, the containerized computer/radio could not be worn 

under the parachute. This necessitated placing the system in a bag 

tethered to the soldier and dropping it just prior to the jump. However, 

the equipment required too much space on the aircraft and was too rigid 

and heavy to maneuver comfortably. In addition, the prototypes 

experienced hardware failures from the stress induced by landing 

shock. Moreover, the Army became concerned about soldier safety 

when several soldiers became tangled in the gear when getting ready to 

jump.

• Electromagnetic interference occurs when various pieces or types of 

electrical equipment are operated in close proximity to one another. 

Land Warrior electronic emissions exceeded the military standard for 

such emissions, raising the likelihood of electromagnetic interference 

with other electrical devices. Program officials contend that 

electromagnetic interference problems are common in the development 

phase. 

• On April 30, 1998, the contractor conducted a water immersion test, one 

of the requirements of the Land Warrior system. The purpose of the test 

was to ensure that the system could be operated after exposure to the 

immersion environment typically encountered in the field. The system 

failed the test. Substantial water leakage was observed in the interiors of 

many system components, including the squad radio, soldier radio, 

computer, and Integrated Helmet Assembly Subsystem display 

components.
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Program Revision Is Not 

Complete

As of September 1999, the Land Warrior Program has been in the 

Engineering and Manufacturing Development3

 phase for 45 months. In 

January 1996, when Land Warrior entered Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development; the Army planned to use mature technologies—technologies 

requiring minimal development—to meet an urgent need to field equipment 

by September 2000. However, as development proceeded, the Army moved 

away from this strategy. It began pursuing technologies requiring 

considerable development. Ultimately, the Land Warrior program became 

more technologically challenging than the Army projected. 

In April 1998, when prototypes failed their basic certification tests, the 

Land Warrior system included (1) laser range finder/digital compass, 

(2) wiring harness, (3) video sight, (4) helmet and helmet-mounted 

computer display, (5) modular body armor, (6) load-carrying equipment, 

(7) computer (hardware and software), and (8) radio (leader and soldier). 

All major Land Warrior subsystems featured some Land Warrior-unique 

components (see app. II).

In August 1998, the Army proposed an interim strategy based on the 

original design. The interim strategy would have extended development 

and delayed fielding by about 15 months. However, the interim strategy was 

never implemented and in January and February of 1999, the Army began 

examining a new open system design strategy—one that relied more on 

equipment that was either commercially available or already in military 

use. Accordingly, the Army began seeking alternative approaches, with the 

goal of avoiding proprietary solutions to Land Warrior development 

problems.

Although not yet formally approved, the Army is proceeding with its 

current revision of Land Warrior, which emphasizes commercially available 

technology, such as Windows-based operating system software. The plan’s 

3

Department of Defense Regulation 5000.2R describes the four major acquisition phases. 

The second—Program Definition and Risk Reduction—precedes Engineering and 

Manufacturing Development. During this phase, the program becomes defined as one or 

more concepts, design approaches, and /or parallel technologies are considered. This phase 

includes assessments of advantages and disadvantages of alternative concepts, and includes 

prototyping, demonstrations, and early operational assessments as necessary so that 

technology, manufacturing, and support risks are well in hand before the next decision 

point. The third—Engineering and Manufacturing Development—translates the most 

promising design approach into a stable, interoperable, producible, supportable, and 

cost-effective design and demonstrates system capabilities through testing and prototyping.
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features include a new load carrying harness and computer/radio 

subsystem (see app. II). Land Warrior will now incorporate the same loadcarrying system being adopted by the rest of the Army, known as Modular 

Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment. This load carrying equipment is still 

being tested, but it is already considered “jump-qualified,” according to 

Army officials. However, the new load carrying equipment configuration 

will require redesign of the computer housing and various cable connectors 

to the carrying frame. It also will mean that soldiers must evaluate the 

form, fit, and function as they did with the previous 

load-carrying design.

The Army believes that the current revised plan, which resulted from the 

process of evaluating alternative designs, requires fewer Land 

Warrior-unique developments. Program officials believe they will be better 

able to decide on necessary interfaces and technical additions. The Army 

plans to assume the role of systems engineer and integrator, a role that had 

been initially performed by the Raytheon Corporation. Raytheon will retain 

responsibility for developing the Integrated Helmet Assembly System, laser 

range finder, and daylight video sight.

Program Cost Has Increased 

and Fielding Has Been 

Delayed 

In November 1998, Land Warrior’s estimated cost for research, 

development, test, evaluation and procurement increased from 

$1.4 billion to $2.1 billion for 34,000 systems. In August 1999, the Army 

reduced Land Warrior procurement funding by about $340 million because 

of competing priorities and Land Warrior’s development problems. At the 

time of our review, the Army could not provide a reliable total program cost 

estimate for the current revised program because the design is still evolving 

and funding issues are not resolved. The November 1998 cost estimate for 

research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement was $2.1 billion, 

and total program cost was $3.5 billion. The $1.4 billion difference 

represented estimated operations and maintenance cost, much of which is 

for battery supplies and resupply, storage, and disposal. 

A Land Warrior Program official told us that procurement funding was to 

have begun in fiscal year 2000, when the original program called for Land 

Warrior fielding. However, procurement funding has been eliminated until 

fiscal year 2004. Congress has already reduced Land Warrior fiscal 

year 2000 research, development, test, and evaluation funding by 

$50 million. The official said that the Army, sensitive to congressional 

concerns, wants time to allow program officials to explore new technical 

approaches. According to Army officials, Land Warrior will not be fielded 
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until fiscal year 2004, at the earliest, which is a 4-year delay from the 

original milestone. 

Land Warrior Oversight 

Is Not Sufficient Based 

on Projected Costs and 

Complexity

Land Warrior has not received the management monitoring and oversight 

needed based on its projected development cost, complexity, and urgency 

of need. Department of Defense (DOD) Regulation 5000.2R provides 

general criteria for managing the acquisition process for programs such as 

Land Warrior. The regulation requires program managers to structure their 

program to reduce risk, ensure affordability, and provide adequate 

information for decision-making. Program acquisitions are classified as 

Categories I, II, or III, depending on cost and complexity. Generally, 

Category I programs are major systems that receive more scrutiny in terms 

of increased oversight and monitoring, as well as requiring milestone 

decisions at the DOD level.4

 Category II programs are also considered 

major acquisitions, but milestone decision authority is at the service level. 

Acquisition Category III programs are not considered major systems and 

milestone decisions are made within the service at the lowest appropriate 

level.

In general, DOD programs that are costly, complex, and risky receive 

greater oversight and program officials must provide more information for 

decision-making. For example, for an acquisition Category I program, the 

program manager must regularly report key cost, schedule, and 

performance milestones. If certain parameters are breached, the DOD 

acquisition executive conducts a program review at the Vice Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. This review determines whether there is a 

continuing need for programs that are behind schedule, over budget, or not 

in compliance with performance or capability requirements. The review 

results in a recommendation to the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition and Technology regarding suitable action to be taken.

The Army classified the Land Warrior Program as an acquisition 

Category III from the beginning of Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development in January 1996 until January 1997. In our September 1996 

report, we recommended that the program be upgraded to acquisition 

Category II status because the projected cost of the program met the basic 

Category II requirement at that time. The Army implemented our 

4

The Secretary of Defense also has the authority to delegate this oversight.
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recommendation in January 1997 and Land Warrior has remained in 

Category II to the present. 

Land Warrior’s Category II classification was not changed when 

development problems threatened the acquisition schedule during the 

remainder of calendar year 1997. Further, the classification was not 

changed after the prototypes failed certification testing in April 1998. The 

most recent research, development, test, and evaluation cost estimate of 

$588.8 million now exceeds the basic $355 million requirement for an 

acquisition Category I. While another program classification cannot by 

itself resolve technical issues or ensure better management, a Category I 

designation would ensure that development problems are surfaced to 

higher levels of the department. Army officials told us in November 1998 

that the Army was in the process of reclassifying Land Warrior as an 

acquistion Category I. However, as of November 30, 1999, this had not been 

accomplished.

Land Warrior Lacks the 

Ability to 

Communicate With a 

Key Battlefield 

Component System

Land Warrior has not demonstrated the ability to communicate with the 

Army’s digitization linchpin—Battle Command Brigade and Below—and it 

is uncertain when this will be accomplished.5

 Similarly, Land Warrior has 

not demonstrated that it can communicate with other digitized battlefield 

systems, a capability needed to ensure optimum situational awareness. For 

example, Land Warrior must communicate with artillery systems to provide 

or receive mapping data on both enemy and friendly positions.

Communication Ability With 

Battle Command Brigade 

and Below Has to Be 

Established

In December 1996, the Army required that Land Warrior and other digitized 

infantry platforms operate with Battle Command Brigade and Below and its 

Embedded Battle Command software. Battle Command Brigade and Below 

is the principal digital command and control system for the Army at brigade 

level and below. Battlefield data flows between Battle Command Brigade

5

In September 1996, we reported that Land Warrior had not demonstrated its ability to 

function with other components of the digitized battlefield, including Force XXI Battle 

Command Brigade and Below.
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and Below and Land Warrior through the Tactical Internet. 6 This provides 

the Army with a common picture of the battlefield. Without this capability, 

Land Warrior-equipped soldiers cannot receive messages from higher 

commands and will not be able to transmit critical information, such as the 

sighting of an enemy tank column, to higher command. However, Land 

Warrior and Battle Command Brigade and Below cannot communicate with 

each other primarily because Land Warrior’s computer/radio subsystem 

cannot accommodate Battle Command Brigade and Below software 

without added memory and associated cooling capacity. The added 

memory and cooling capacity would have significantly increased weight. 

Land Warrior is a soldier-worn, battery-powered infantry-fighting system 

for which weight and power are critical design parameters. In contrast, 

Battle Command Brigade and Below development has largely focused on 

mechanized platforms (trucks, tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, etc.) on 

which the Applique computer, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 

System, and Internet Network Controller hardware are mounted and where 

weight and power issues are not as challenging. According to a Land 

Warrior official, the vehicle-mounted equipment would be prohibitively 

heavy to carry. Soldiers must carry their own batteries and are unable to 

draw operating power from vehicle generators. 

In March 1999, the Land Warrior Program obtained a waiver from the Army 

Digitization Office that would postpone the need to address operability 

requirements. Battle Command Brigade and Below includes Embedded 

Battle Command software. Program managers of other Army systems are 

expected to modify this software to interface with their systems. The 

waiver request cited inconsistencies with Battle Command Brigade and 

Below, which included: (1) Embedded Battle Command software did not 

accommodate real time management of the system;7

 (2) the demand for 

computing resources required to meet Embedded Battle Command 

software implementation exceeded available system resources and 

translates to increased power consumption, weight, and cost; and 

6

The Tactical Internet is a radio network comprising the Enhanced Position Location 

Reporting System and the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System. When 

platforms are connected through the Tactical Internet, commanders at all levels of the 

Army’s Battle Command System receive data needed for battlefield situational awareness 

and command and control decisions.

7

This refers to the ability to preempt and prioritize processes so critical messages have 

system priority over noncritical messages.
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(3) implementation of Embedded Battle Command software functionality 

did not match Land Warrior requirements.8

The Army Digitization Office granted the waiver subject to the approval of 

a plan to integrate the system into the digitized battlefield. The plan must 

address (1) Land Warrior requirements for operating with the Tactical 

Internet and Battle Command Brigade and Below, (2) a technical 

implementation approach for meeting the requirements (to include critical 

milestones), and (3) a test strategy to demonstrate that technical 

requirements are accurately implemented. As of November 30, 1999, Land 

Warrior had not responded to the conditions.

Land Warrior and Battle Command Brigade and Below use different 

computer operating systems, which further complicates operability. Both 

programs plan to eventually use the Windows operating system, but Battle 

Command Brigade and Below will not be able to use the Windows 

operating system software until fiscal year 2002, at the earliest. According 

to Land Warrior program officials, they have discussed the possibility of 

Land Warrior funding Battle Command Brigade and Below to begin earlier 

movement to Windows-based software. According to a Battle Command 

Brigade and Below official, the program has not initiated an assessment of 

the magnitude of this effort. 

In our opinion, ensuring that Land Warrior will operate successfully with 

Battle Command Brigade and Below will be challenging. Considering that 

Land Warrior funding for Battle Command Brigade and Below operability 

will not be available until fiscal year 2002, it is likely that such a 

demonstration is several years away. Although the program has been 

granted the operability waiver, the Land Warrior program manager told us 

that he wants to redesign the computer/radio subsystem and make better 

use of commercially available computer technology. He believes that using 

commercial software and hardware will eliminate the original need for the 

waiver and reduce the cost of developing, maintaining, and upgrading the 

subsystem to commercial standards. However, he concedes that 

8

For example, the Embedded Battle Command Communications Manager module works 

with a vehicle-mounted Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System—System 

Improvement Program or Enhanced Position Location Radio System. It does not provide the 

necessary interface or control to soldier-worn Land Warrior Single Channel Ground and 

Airborne Radio System—System Improvement Program compatible radio or the Land 

Warrior squad radio. The Command and Control message parser module does not address 

all the message requirements of the Land Warrior system.
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considerable hardware and software development will be needed before 

this can be assured. 

Demonstration of 

Operability With Other 

Digitized Systems Is Several 

Years Away 

Land Warrior’s ability to function with other digitized systems was to have 

been demonstrated in previously conducted Advanced Warfighting 

Experiments, such as the Task Force XXI experiment in March 1997 and 

the Division experiment in November 1997. However, Land Warrior 

prototypes were not ready at the time and did not participate. Because of 

budgeting problems, program officials were not certain about the extent to 

which Land Warrior will participate in the Joint Contingency Force 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment9

 scheduled to begin in September 2000.

Technology and 

Human Factor 

Problems Remain

Certain technology and human factor problems have not been resolved. In 

December 1996, the Army completed an Early Operational Experiment that 

showed that power, equipment weight, and human factor issues still 

needed to be addressed. Until April 1998, when the Land Warrior 

prototypes failed their tests, the Army had been conducting risk reduction 

exercises to resolve the problems. Although the Army has not met its 

equipment weight and battery power requirements, it has made progress. 

Soldiers experienced weight shifting and other comfort problems during 

and after an Early Operational Experiment that were so troublesome that 

the Army decided to change its load-carrying equipment configuration. 

Electromagnetic interference problems happened because the original 

design’s cable connectors and cable shields did not prevent unacceptably 

high emissions. 

Equipment Weight 

Requirement Is Being 

Redefined

Program officials told us that the Land Warrior Operational Requirements 

Document is being revised and will not specify a numeric weight 

requirement. Land Warrior will replace equipment items and enhance 

equipment capabilities without increasing the weight of a typical soldier’s 

combat load, which has been redefined as 91 pounds. The current Land 

Warrior weight is about 90.5 pounds. Land Warrior officials said that the 

difference from the previous requirement of 80 pounds comes as a result of 

9

The purpose of the Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment is to 

improve the warfighting capability for light contingency forces by determining which new 

systems or linkages improve battlefield communication and increase the lethality and 

survivability of the forces.
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reassessing the equipment to be carried and actually weighing instead of 

estimating the equipment normally carried on an extended patrol. The new 

requirement will also permit the Army to accept greater weight if it results 

in sufficiently improved functionality. 

Land Warrior Will Use New 

Load-Carrying System 

The initial Land Warrior load-carrying design consisted of an over-theshoulder and around-the-waist harness, plus accompanying backpack. 

Weight distribution was centered near the middle of the back, which 

worked in some situations, but not in others. For example, in Early 

Operational Experiment field tests held from October through December 

1996, soldiers experienced problems lifting their heads to fire from the 

prone position because the backpack would ride up and press against the 

rear of the helmet. In addition, when soldiers rolled onto their backs to 

execute ground maneuvers, the system’s bulk held them too far from the 

ground, resulting in temporary helplessness—the so-called “turtle-on-itsshell effect.” 

The Army recently decided to move to a load-carrying system called the 

Modular Lightweight Load Carrying Equipment system, which shifts the 

weight load to achieve more soldier comfort. According to Land Warrior 

officials, initial testing has been promising. If the Modular Lightweight 

Load-Carrying Equipment system becomes the load-carrying system for the 

current Land Warrior revision, the waist belt will have to be redesigned to 

accommodate a new computer and battery pack.

Battery Power and Logistics 

Remain Problematic 

The final power source has not yet been determined for Land Warrior and 

program officials are still exploring alternatives. Land Warrior is required 

to sustain continuous operations for 12 hours using battery power. 

Batteries tested to date have produced about 4 or 5 hours of continuous 

operations. The Army has made technological advances using lithiummanganese batteries that, in controlled testing, have achieved the required 

continuous operating times at various temperature extremes. However, the 

batteries have yet to be field tested in Land Warrior or in any totally 

integrated systems environment. 

Other battery issues relate to usage and replacement. Specifically, the 

problems of how the Army will get the needed quantities of replacement 

batteries to the field, store them until needed, and dispose of the spent 

batteries have not been solved. Batteries will have to be dispensed on the 

battlefield in the same manner as ammunition and food and disposed of as 
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hazardous material. Whatever the solution, battery logistics will be very 

expensive. The Army estimates that over half the $1.4 billion of estimated 

operations and maintenance costs are related to Land Warrior battery 

resupply, storage, and disposal. Although the Army is considering using 

rechargeable batteries for training purposes, it plans to field disposable 

batteries. 

Electromagnetic Emission 

Problems Persist 

According to program officials, the electromagnetic emission problems are 

the result of the Land Warrior’s cable connector and cable shield design, 

which leak too much electricity. The program manager believes that the 

risk of not meeting the standard has been reduced as a result of recent 

improvements to the cable connectors and cable shielding. 

Conclusions Land Warrior is no closer to fielding today than it was when development 

began in January 1996. The program has been in the Engineering and 

Manufacturing Development phase for 45 months and program officials are 

still evaluating alternative designs and attempting to resolve technical 

problems. The Army has not demonstrated that it can deliver workable 

Land Warrior prototypes that meet test requirements with the requisite 

safety and comfort to the soldier. We believe that the Program Definition 

and Risk Reduction phase more accurately reflects Land Warrior’s status 

than does the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.

The Land Warrior program has been solely overseen by the Army even 

though projected research, development, test, and evaluation costs 

justified DOD oversight. We believe that Land Warrior would benefit from 

the higher level departmental oversight accorded acquisition Category I 

systems. If more management attention is not focused on Land Warrior, the 

Army may face the same problems in fiscal year 2004 when fielding is now 

scheduled.

If Land Warrior/Battle Command Brigade and Below operability is not 

assured before fielding, the full value of Land Warrior cannot be realized. 

Land Warrior-equipped soldiers run the risk of not having the required 

battlefield situational awareness and not being fully integrated with higher 

command levels as currently required. Further, if Land Warrior does not 

meaningfully participate in the Army’s Advanced Warfighting Experiments, 

the Army cannot test the system’s ability to operate with other components 

of the digitized battlefield. 
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Land Warrior continues to be challenged by technical and human factor 

issues. Although progress has been made, we believe that high priority 

should be given to building fully functional prototypes that meet all basic 

requirements and should include thorough field testing. Otherwise, the 

Army runs the risk of costly changes after committing to production.

Recommendations In order to ensure that Land Warrior development is completed before 

systems are fielded, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Secretary of the Army to return the Land Warrior program to the 

Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase until workable prototypes 

are produced. Further, we recommend that Land Warrior be 

1. reclassified as an acquisition Category I system to ensure appropriate 

program monitoring and oversight; 

2. required to demonstrate operability with Force XXI Battle Command 

Brigade and Below before any systems are fielded to minimize the risk of 

Land Warrior-equipped soldiers not having adequate battlefield situational 

awareness; and 

3. required to thoroughly field test prototypes and ensure that they pass 

water immersion, electromagnetic interference, and airborne certification 

tests before any systems are fielded.

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

In view of the significant changes and revised design to the Land Warrior 

system, Congress may wish to consider withholding further funding until 

the Army determines what it plans to develop and provides a detailed 

approach, including revised cost, schedule, and performance estimates, to 

acquire and field the system.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with two of our 

four recommendations. The Department’s comments are included as 

appendix I. 

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to return Land Warrior to the 

Program Definition and Risk Reduction acquisition phase, stating that 

doing so would set the program back 1 to 2 years and result in increased 

costs due to the delay. DOD also stated that Land Warrior has been 
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Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

demonstrated successfully by field soldiers, that it is continuing its drive to 

integrate off-the-shelf products, and that the program conducted 

competitive prototype demonstrations of a fully integrated computer/radio 

subsystem at the end of October 1999 to further improve the system—

reducing weight and costs. 

We continue to believe that Land Warrior should return to the Program 

Definition and Risk Reduction acquisition phase until workable prototypes 

are produced. Land Warrior development and testing results to date are 

characteristic of activities in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction 

acquisition phase rather than the Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development phase. As defined in DOD Regulation 5000.2R, the Program 

Definition and Risk Reduction acquisition phase includes prototyping, 

demonstrations, and early operational assessments so that technology, 

manufacturing, and support risks are well in hand before the next decision 

point—Engineering and Manufacturing Development. For Land Warrior to 

be legitimately in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, 

application of the same DOD regulation would require the Army to be able 

to translate the most promising design approach into a stable, 

interoperable, producible, supportable, and cost-effective design and to 

demonstrate system capabilities through testing and prototyping. The 

Army is not in such a position. Stability, interoperability, and supportability 

are yet to be achieved. The Army has not produced and demonstrated any 

complete and workable prototypes that meet test requirements with the 

requisite safety and comfort to the soldier. However, the issue is larger than 

one of categorization. Since the Army is currently exploring new technical 

approaches, returning Land Warrior to the Program Definition and Risk 

Reduction phase would reduce the risk of prematurely committing to an 

unproven or unsupportable design. 

Further, regarding DOD’s point on delay and costs caused by return to the 

Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase, we note that the Land 

Warrior program has already experienced substantial cost growth and a 

4-year delay from the original estimated fielding date. In addition, the Army 

will need to conduct additional testing prior to production regardless of 

acquisition phase. Doing so during the Program Definition and Risk 

Reduction phase would provide the Army with greater flexibility if designs 

need to be changed. We believe that investing in additional development 

will provide greater assurance that fielded Land Warrior systems will be 

cost-effective. While it is encouraging that the Army recently found 

demonstrations of off-the-shelf Land Warrior components to be successful, 
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we believe that the unavailability of a complete Land Warrior prototype for 

testing purposes supports the need for our recommendation. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that Land Warrior be 

reclassified as an acquisition Category I system, stating that the Army has 

reached a similar conclusion and is currently staffing a recommendation to 

do so. 

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to require that Land Warrior 

demonstrate operability (interoperability) with Force XXI Battle Command 

Brigade and Below before any systems are fielded. DOD stated that the 

draft report we provided for comment assumes that the Land Warrior 

system must run the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 

application. The Department’s response stated that some Force XXI Battle 

Command Brigade and Below functions are of value to the Land Warrior 

systems, as this would maximize government-off-the-shelf reuse. However, 

it stated that the Land Warrior system is a weapons systems first, while 

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below is a command and control 

software application. 

We believe that DOD’s response indicates misunderstanding of our 

recommendation. Our central issue in this recommendation focuses on 

operability (interoperability), not commonality. As stated in our draft 

report, if Land Warrior and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 

interoperability is not assured before fielding, the full value of the Land 

Warrior system cannot be realized. Land Warrior-equipped soldiers run the 

risk of not having the required battlefield situational awareness and not 

being fully integrated with higher command levels as is currently required. 

While maximizing government-off-the-shelf reuse is a worthy goal if 

practical, our concern is that operability of Land Warrior with 

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below may not be assured before 

fielding. In December 1996, the Army required that Land Warrior operate 

with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, and its Embedded 

Battle Command software. In March 1999, the Land Warrior Program 

obtained a conditional waiver from this requirement, citing fundamental 

incompatibilities. The waiver was granted subject to the approval of a plan 

to integrate the system into the digitized battlefield. The plan was to 

address (1) Land Warrior requirements for operating with the Tactical 

Internet and Battle Command Brigade and Below, (2) a technical 

implementation approach for meeting the requirements (to include critical 

milestones), and (3) a test strategy to demonstrate that technical 

requirements are accurately implemented. As of November 30, 1999, the 
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Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

plan had not been submitted for approval. Operability with Force XXI 

Battle Command Brigade and Below can be achieved either by using 

Embedded Battle Command software or by designing a Land Warriorunique software application interface. If Embedded Battle Command 

software is not used, the Land Warrior−unique application must result in 

software that allows the systems to work together. We have clarified our 

recommendation to make clear that we are concerned about the lack of 

interoperability between Land Warrior and Force XXI Battle Command 

Brigade and Below and that we continue to feel that this interoperability 

needs to be demonstrated before any systems are fielded.

DOD agreed with our recommendation that Land Warrior prototypes must 

be fully tested with soldiers in field environments and that it must 

successfully undergo water immersion, electromagnetic interference, and 

airborne certification tests. DOD further stated that other stringent tests by 

components and of the fully Land Warfare integrated system must and will 

be conducted. We note that the Department’s response does not state when 

such testing will be completed. Our recommendation specifies that field 

tests should be accomplished before any systems are fielded.

Based on the Army’s negative response regarding our recommendations 

concerning the proper acquisition phase for this program and the need for 

interoperability with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, we 

have added a matter for congressional consideration. We ask Congress to 

consider withholding further funding until the Army determines what it 

plans to develop and provides a detailed approach, including revised cost, 

schedule, and performance estimates, to acquire and field the system.

Scope and 

Methodology 

To identify the status of the Land Warrior program, we interviewed 

responsible officials, collected pertinent documentation, and analyzed 

plans from both DOD and the Army. In the course of our work, we also 

visited the Program Manager-Soldier and Program Manager-Land Warrior at 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and the U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical 

Command, Natick, Massachusetts. With Army officials, including those 

from the Training and Doctrine Command System Manager for Land 

Warrior and the Combat Development Division, U.S. Infantry School, Fort 

Benning, Georgia, we discussed the status of the Army’s revised Land 

Warrior acquisition strategy, including the program events that necessitated 

the restructuring, alternative developments, and design strategies. We also 

reviewed plans for low-rate initial production, and revised fielding 
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Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

schedules. Additionally, we analyzed changes to the cost, schedule, and 

performance milestones.

To evaluate whether the current level of program monitoring and oversight 

is appropriate, we interviewed responsible officials in DOD and the Army 

and reviewed Land Warrior program documentation, including program 

cost estimates and DOD and Army acquisition regulations. In the course of 

this work, we also visited the Program Manager-Soldier and Program 

Manager-Land Warrior at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. We also discussed related 

matters with officials from the DOD Office of the Director, Test Systems 

Engineering and Evaluation, and Office of the Director, Operational Test 

and Evaluation.

To determine how the Army is ensuring that Land Warrior will operate with 

other command and control systems, particularly Battle Command Brigade 

and Below, we reviewed Land Warrior program interoperability 

requirements with Army officials, the Land Warrior prime contractor—

Raytheon Corporation in El Segundo, California, and subcontractor 

officials. We reviewed the Army’s plan for obtaining a waiver from using the 

Battle Command Brigade and Below Embedded Battle Command software 

and assessed its impact on interoperability. We visited the above facilities 

and also witnessed a Land Warrior/ Battle Command Brigade and Below 

interoperability demonstration at the Land Warrior contractor software test 

facility, Fullerton, California.

To assess the technical and human factor problems requiring resolution 

before the Army makes a production decision, we discussed related 

technical issues with Army program officials. We also discussed test and 

evaluation issues with DOD officials from the Director of Operation, Test, 

and Evaluation and Director Test Systems Engineering and Evaluation, and 

the Army’s Operational Test and Evaluation Command and Test and 

Experimentation Command, as well as contractor personnel. We reviewed 

the results of the Early Operational Experiment conducted from October to 

December 1996 and the ensuing risk-reduction exercises. We also reviewed 

the Army’s plans for addressing outstanding technical and human factor 

problems prior to entering production. 

We performed our review from November 1998 through November 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
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Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

We are sending copies of this report to Representative John Murtha, 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee 

on Appropriations; C.W. Bill Young, Chairman, and Representative David 

Obey, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Appropriations; 

Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Senator Robert C. Byrd, Ranking 

Minority Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations; and other 

interested congressional committees. We are also sending copies to the 

Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis 

Caldera, Secretary of the Army; General James L. Jones, Commandant of 

the Marine Corps; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon 

request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Charles F. 

Rey at (202) 512-4174 or Arthur S. Fine at (617) 565-7571. A key contributor 

to this report was Joseph Rizzo, Jr.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense AAppenednxidxeIis

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the end 

of this appendix.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

See p. 18.

See comment 1.

See p. 18.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

See p. 20.

See comment 2.

See p. 20.

See comment 3.

See p. 21.
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter 

dated November 30, 1999.

GAO Comments 1. Our report recognizes that the Army has begun examining a new open 

system design strategy—one that relies more on equipment that was either 

commercially available or already in military use. However, we also 

indicate that, at the time of our review, such a strategy was not yet formally 

approved. While we are encouraged that the Army recently found 

demonstrations of off-the-shelf Land Warrior components to be successful, 

we note that the unavailability of a complete prototype for testing purposes 

reinforces our position regarding returning Land Warrior to the 

Program/Risk Reduction acquisition phase.

2. Although DOD concurred with our recommendation that Land Warrior 

be designated an acquisition Category I system, we remain concerned that 

this has yet to be accomplished. When we began our work in December 

1998, we were told that the Land Warrior program was in the process of 

being designated a Category I system. 

3. We are concerned that operability of Land Warrior with Force XXI Battle 

Command Brigade and Below be assured before fielding. The waiver 

granted to the Army postponed the need to address operability 

requirements. The waiver was granted subject to the approval of a plan to 

integrate the system into the digitized battlefield. Such a plan would 

include Land Warrior requirements for operating with Tactical Internet and 

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below. As of November 30, 1999, 

the waiver conditions had not been met.
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-28 Battlefield Automation

Appendix II

Comparison of Land Warrior Unique 

Developments Original Design and Revised 

Design ApendxiI

System/component Original design Revised design

Software

Program language Land Warrior unique

Land Warrior unique but minimized with emphasis 

on commercial and customized software

 Software operating system

Weapon Subsystem

 Weapon 

 Laser rangefinder and digital compass Land Warrior unique Land Warrior unique

 Wiring harness Land Warrior unique Land Warrior unique

 Video sight Land Warrior unique Land Warrior unique

 Thermal Weapon Sight

 Close Combat Optic

 Laser Aiming Light

Integrated Helmet Assembly Subystem

 Helmet Land Warrior unique Considering Standard Army helmet or variant

 Helmet display

 Day/night sensor w/ display

Personal Clothing and Individual 

Equipment

 Modular body armor Land Warrior unique Adopting Marine/Army Program body armor

Load carrying equipment Land Warrior unique

Adopting Marine/Army load carrying equipment and 

adapting for Land Warrior

 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Suit

 Ballistic Laser Eye Protection

Computer Radio Subsystem

 Computer Land Warrior unique Commercial item

 Soldier radio Land Warrior unique Commercial Wireless Network Card Radio

 Leader radio Land Warrior unique Repackaged Army radio or commercial radio

 Global Positioning System

 System Control Module Land Warrior unique Land Warrior unique

 Hand held display Land Warrior unique Commercial touchscreen

 (707393) Letr
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