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Distribution Unlimited

NEWS FROM THE FRONT

September 2018

Filling Operational 

Capability Gaps in Theater

Planning considerations for leveraging

Over the Horizon Units

MAJ Elliot Miles

Military Analyst (forward)

Center for Army Lessons Learned
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News from the Front:

Over the Horizon

III Corps

Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve

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Forward

This News from the Front (NFTF) describes how the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation 

Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) worked toward implementing the Over the Horizon (OtH)

concept. In a changing operational environment (OE) with limited resources and the need to

seize opportunities, CJTF-OIR utilized available theater forces as an expeditious means to surge 

capacity where and when needed.

Observations, Insights, and Lessons came from:

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st Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division After Action Report (AAR)

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nd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division AAR

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rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division AAR

COL Charles Lombardo, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division Commander

LTC Matthew Bacon: 35th Engineer Brigade S3

LTC Andrew Inch: 28th Infantry Division G3 

CPT Douglas Dietrich: 28th Infantry Division G3 TCA Manager

Information from AARs and interviews have been paraphrased to enable public release and 

usefulness to future CJTFs. The full AAR from 2/1 AD is posted to the Joint Lessons Learned 

Information System (JLLIS) at https:www.jllis.mil. The Marine AARs are posted at:

https://www2.mccll.usmc.mil/index.cfm. JLLIS and MCCL sites are accessible by authorized 

users possessing a common access card.

Front Cover: U.S. Soldiers gather for a brief during a combined joint patrol rehearsal in 

Manbij, Syria, Nov. 7, 2018. Continued assistance to partner forces is essential for setting 

conditions for regional stability. The Coalition and its partners remain united and resolved to 

prevent the resurgence of ISIS and its violent extremist ideology. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. 

Zoe Garbarino) (Spc. Zoe Garbarino)
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Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve: 2017-2018

LTG Paul E. Funk II, Commander III Corps from Fort Hood, Texas, took command of CJTFOIR in September 2017. Operation Inherent Resolve recently concluded a major nine-month 

battle in Mosul, but was still in the midst of liberating the remaining pockets of the Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). During a dangerous and unpredictable year, the U.S. Central Command

(CENTCOM) directed a headquarters (HQ) evolution to a smaller footprint. CJTF-OIR, 

overcame challenges (force management levels, international politics, etc.) and leveraged 

capabilities exploiting opportunities and the development of the Over the Horizon (OtH) 

concept.

As a result of the HQ evolution, the CJTF-OIR headquarters took on OtH-like characteristics 

when the 10th Mountain Division ceased to be the Combined Joint Force Land Component 

Command – Iraq (CJFLCC-I) in early 2018. LTG Funk and his headquarters leaders moved to 

Baghdad, Iraq splitting the staff between Iraq and Kuwait. Staff members often traveled between 

the two countries to better manage efforts that now includes the “down and in” functions 

previously overseen by CJFLCC-I.

Army doctrine does not define “over the horizon.” However, FM 3-22, Army Support to Security 

Cooperation, January 2013 defines Regionally Aligned Forces as: “Those forces that provide a 

combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable 

capabilities to enable the [geographic] combatant commander (GCC) to shape the environment. 

They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a 

combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for 

combatant command regional missions.” It goes on to define Security Cooperation as: 

“interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships” that support US 

interests and assist allied military capabilities. Security Cooperation is similar to Foreign Internal 

Defense as these operations can occur during peacetime, unlike CJTF-OIR’s concept of OtH.

To understand what OtH is, it may also be helpful to understand what it is not. Just because 

United States and foreign partner nations are living or training together does not necessarily 

equate to OtH. The 8

th Army operations, activities, and actions in the Republic of Korea is not 

OtH as indicated by its existence on the peninsula throughout the Cold War. Operation Bright 

Star in Egypt or Operation Nautical Horizon in Kuwait, which has a maritime component are not 

accepted by CJTF-OIR as an OtH element. Similarly, a Marine Expeditionary Unit on a US 

Navy amphibious ship is not OtH, per se. International defense agreements require US Army 

elements to be stationed in Kuwait, but that is an enduring and large footprint and is not what 

OtH is about from US Army Central’s (ARCENT) perspective. 

OtH is generally not:

 A Humanitarian Aid mission 

 A rescue operation or Global Response Force

 A routine, enduring, and multinational military exercise
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Examples that could define OtH:

 Regionally Aligned Forces stationed in their GCC’s AOR, but not in the same country 

they could conduct an OtH mission.

 Security Force Assistance Brigades deployed from the US and stationed outside their 

assigned CJOA.

 Marines on ships in a theater of operations and near the designated country and assigned 

CJTF/CJFLCC.

 Any military element in the theater of operations that can provide a variety of capabilities 

ranging from offensive/defensive operations to training lasting from a few days to several 

months in support of a CJTF/CJFLCC.

CJTF-OIR considers the ground forces in Kuwait that will deploy forward to Iraq or Syria as 

OtH units. These ground forces include units that are organic (enduring) and units that are not 

organic (but still a viable option to fill a requirement). A critical component is to ensure organic 

units possess the legal authorities (established by the Secretary of Defense) to conduct operations 

in Iraq or Syria. Non-organic units require a Theater Coordinated Assistance (TCA) which is not 

CJTF-OIR’s optimal OtH solution. The CJTF-OIR Future Operations Cell conceptualizes several 

company-sized units (150-200 soldiers) with a battalion element as part of Advise, Assist, 

Enable (A2E) missions. The companies do not have to be from the same unit as the battalion 

headquarters as they are likely to deploy on different missions.

Most forces deployed forward in an OtH-like role were TCA as they were already deployed to 

CJTF-OIR’s theater, but supporting another CENTCOM operation. When a requirement is 

identified and the capability is confirmed to exist in the theater of operation (TOO), the CJ38

(Director, Force Management) submits the TCA request to CENTCOM. The request is staffed to 

the service components to validate and endorse the TCA. If the CENTCOM commander 

approves the TCA, the J3 cuts an order for 120-days. The entire process takes one to eight 

weeks. 

Several Special Purpose Marine Air 

Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 

battalions deployed to Syria and Iraq. The 

Marines were actually stationed in Kuwait 

and requested through CENTCOM based 

on the conditions in Iraq and Syria. The 

advantage of Kuwait is a better quality of 

life on enduring US bases and sufficient 

training areas to maintain combat readiness. 

While Marines typically embark and deploy 

on US Navy ships, the staging of Marines in 

Kuwait did not constrain CJTF-OIR to an 

Amphibious Readiness Group’s availability and proximity to the CJOA.

Caption: U.S. Marines, in support to CJTF-OIR, debark from an MV-22B 

Osprey at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, June 4, 2018. (U.S. Marine Corps photo 

by Cpl. Jered T. Stone)
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In CJTF-OIR’s TOO, Task Force (TF) Spartan has several brigades as part of a Theater Security 

Cooperation1for the region. They are the most convenient source of combat power that can also 

fulfill operations or training across all the warfighting functions and range of military operations. 

TF Spartan units conduct training on the gunnery ranges and support exercises throughout the 

CENTCOM AOR. A TCA is not a doctrinal term and other GCCs may have their own naming 

convention for identical means of sourcing combat or stability operations. 

Currently, the 28th Infantry Division leads Task Force Spartan. They conduct thorough mission 

analysis when a TCA “chop” comes down prior to CENTCOM cutting an order. If the TCA 

imposes too much risk to their mission, they would not concur with the request. The command 

relationship of a TCA is such that the OtH element that goes forward is under Tactical Control to 

CJTF-OIR, but remains under Operational Control to the 28th ID, so they have some amount of 

rapid means of recalling the unit if necessary. 

Observations, Lessons, and Insights

If you are a planner on a Combined Joint Task Force or Combined Joint Land Component 

Command staff, the first thing to determine is if the OtH must be only US or if coalition forces 

can be deployed OtH. One of the driving requirements behind OtH for CJTF-OIR was the 

maximum limit, or capacity in accordance with national policy, of US forces in Iraq. Some other

things you may want to consider are: 

 CJTF-OIR’s OtH concept is a deliberately planned, non-urgent mission. You will have to 

define the parameters for your OtH based on the commander’s intent. Because it is not 

doctrinal, you can make it what the commander wants. 

 Anticipate transitions in the military campaign or political atmospherics that makes an 

OtH a viable course of action. The CENTCOM AOR is fortunate to have Kuwait for an 

enduring staging area, but not every future CJTF/CJFLCC will have the luxury of a 

secure and stable country to stage immediately outside the CJOA, therefore navy ships 

may be the only option. 

 A Request for Forces (RFF) is used when the capability does not exist in the AOR or the 

Service Component Command needs that capability for other operations. However, 

changing priorities in US national strategies may require the Joint Staff to deny your 

RFF. CJTF-OIR still uses RFFs when necessary, but they can take longer to put forces on 

the ground.

 

1 Theater Security Cooperation is a nation to nation agreement in which US forces train with foreign partners or 

provide some sort of US power projection to the region. It includes a variety of things to include Foreign Military 

Sales and the US National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program (See FM 3-22). TCAs are US military service 

component to service component arrangements within a GCC to enable mission success.

...the first thing to determine is if the OtH must be only US or if coalition forces can be 

deployed OtH.
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 Theater Coordination Assistance can be challenging and limited in exact location, 

function, and duration. Requesting and using units assigned to other theater operations 

can pose a dilemma for the risk the parent unit accepts by giving up a resource, 

capability, and equipment.

 Better Staff Work: Know exactly what you want; clearly define your requirement. Ask

yourself what the second and third order effects of what you want will be on the force 

provider and funding. This may require you to network among the staff sections, 

especially the CJ8, and service component commands, so put effort in learning the joint 

staff—it is not like an army division staff. Panels that endorse an OtH requests can be 

more user-friendly if you do the staff work and pre-coordination in advance. 

 “To plan a TCA, first we would submit the requirement to the Capabilities and 

Requirements Working Group. Then if validated, the requirement goes to the 

Requirements and Sustainment Council of Colonels for endorsement. Afterwards, the 

request goes to the Requirements and Decision Board, which is chaired by a 1 or 2-star 

general officer. This whole process can take 3-5 weeks.2 This timeline can be hastened 

for valid operational reasons, rather than poor anticipation/staff work.”3

 Because TCAs are not doctrinal and the force provider has the ability to decline to 

support, the 28th ID maintains constant awareness of its forces to ensure mission creep 

does not become a problem. They treat the TCA as a contract to avoid misuse.4 CJTFOIR also voiced that their OtH would not perform certain duties simply because they are 

armed and could do something the Iraqi Army should already be capable of providing.

 Information Operations and Public Affairs messaging may also contribute to planning an 

OtH as the host nation may have concerns of US and coalition forces permanently 

stationed there. Just about any maneuver operation has messaging effects and the 

physical operation should be in parallel to the information operation the CJTF executes.

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 Depending on how austere your staging base is and necessary construction and life 

support, you may need to include Army Materiel Command assets like Logistics Civilian 

Augmentee Program (LOGCAP) and Operational Contract Support personnel in your 

planning.

 Long missions that surpass a unit’s Relief in Place require Theater Provided Equipment 

to facilitate redeployment of the unit’s equipment to the US.6 Some TCAs have been 

 

2 This 3-5 weeks is internal to CJTF-OIR and is the amount of time the request can clear the Requirements and 

Decision Board because it and the Council of Colonels do not meet every week. The TCA will still have to go to 

CENTCOM for staffing and approval or disapproval.

3 COL Gavin Stanford, Australian Army. Email and phone interview between COL Stanford and CALL. AUG 2018.

4 Conversation with 28 ID G3 and G3 TCA Manager, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 21 August 2018.

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Summarized from an interview with CJ39 Future Plans MAJ David Mortimer (UK) at Camp Arifjan, 25 August 2018.

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Ibid. Pg 3.
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extended multiple times so planners and parent units may need to consider this when 

tasked to support an operation.

 The base you deploy to may or may not have the level of maintenance support you have 

in the rear. Logisticians have to be creative to disseminate parts to units forward 

deployed.

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 Transporting equipment across international borders may require days or weeks. Each 

country has different requirements.8 Participating in multi-national exercises while also 

supporting an OtH will require deliberate planning and coordination with local national 

transportation resources.

 There are possible 2nd and 3rd order effects when a unit deploys forward with scarce 

resources. Either the OtH force or the remainder of the unit in Kuwait may have to 

process an Operational Needs Statement to acquire replacement equipment for things that 

are now in Iraq or Syria.9

 Advise, Assist, Accompany, Enable (A3E) missions require an officer in charge of 

appropriate rank to shadow a general officer of the host nation. Request a Worldwide 

Individual Augmentation Support (WIAS) requirement so a battalion commander is not 

removed from his command for prolonged periods of time.

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 Both the US Army and Marines have developed and implemented over the past several 

decade the Company Intelligence Support Team (Army) or Company Level Intelligence 

Cell (Marines). If a company is going forward as a SECFOR or to conduct offensive

missions, this capability will be value-added to an OtH element.

 

7 Paraphrased from 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division. After Action Report for Ground Combat Element 

Special Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command 17.2B – 18.1, 16 May 2018. Pg 13.

8 Paraphrased from 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. Operation Spartan Shield After 

Action Report, 17 JUN 2018. Pg 11.

9 Conversation with 28th ID G3 and G3 TCA Manager. Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 21 August 2018.

10 Paraphrased from 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. Operation Spartan Shield After 

Action Report, 17 JUN 2018. Pg 4.
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As III Corps transitions out of Iraq, CJTF-OIR is 

making progress to establish OtH as they 

envision it. Certainly, TCAs and RFFs will 

continue to be a means of putting capabilities 

and forces in the CJOA, but OtH with organic 

forces is the preferred course of action. 

Leadership, CJ3, the planners in CJ35, and the 

CJ38 team have worked hard to implement LTG

Funk’s vision and satisfy changes in national 

policy while continuing to conduct a variety of 

operations. Because of OtH’s contribution, Iraq 

was mostly cleared of ISIS by the Iraqi Security 

Forces, with CJTF-OIR’s support, and through 

the authorities granted from TCAs over the past 

twelve months.

Despite the cost to Task Force Spartan, TCAs and other exercises under the umbrella of Theater 

Security Cooperation do provide these units with opportunities to execute all the warfighting 

functions in a real-world environment. The recent 155th ABCT equipment draw from Army 

Prepositioned Stocks also provided an opportunity for the Army through the 401st Army Field 

Support Brigade to exercise a major logistics operation that has its own lessons learned that are 

applicable in other combatant commands.

Planning and executing an OtH force can be challenging enough, and TCAs are not always 

guaranteed. Some of these challenges are dispersion of mission command; equipment 

availability, transportation, and maintenance; and timeliness to take advantage of opportunities to 

place forces when needed. Despite the learning value in executing a major operation or 

participating in large-scale exercises, OtH or TCAs do come with a cost to their parent 

headquarters and operation and the void that is now created. There will always be leadership 

challenges and planning obstacles so the best lesson learned with respect to OtH is to be agile, 

resilient, and creative. A resource constrained environment requires leaders and staffs to adjust to 

changing priorities, exercise due diligence in staff work, and be resourceful to find solutions.

Despite the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the CJTF-OIR staff had to balance uncertain 

threats with changing priorities. Taking advantage of significant combat power in the theater of 

operations, the staff found ways to leverage CENTCOM assets to seize opportunities and achieve 

training milestones with the Iraqi Army.

Caption: U.S. Army Lt. Gen Paul E. Funk II, the commander of 

Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve 

conducts a key leader engagement with Jazirah Operations 

Command in Haditha, Iraq, July 18, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by 

Sgt. Zakia Gray)

There will always be leadership challenges and planning obstacles so the best lesson learned 

with respect to OtH is to be agile, resilient, and creative. A resource constrained environment 

requires leaders and staffs to adjust to changing priorities, exercise due diligence in staff 

work, and be resourceful to find solutions.