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i 

62–162 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–173] 

JAPAN: RECENT SECURITY 

DEVELOPMENTS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 27, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

LEONARD BOSWELL, Iowa 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii 

PAUL ARCANGELI, Staff Director 

DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, July 27, 2010, Japan: Recent Security Developments .......................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, July 27, 2010 ............................................................................................ 35 

TUESDAY, JULY 27, 2010 

JAPAN: RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Campbell, Hon. Kurt M., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................... 6 

Gregson, Hon. Wallace C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 

Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ....................................... 4 

Pfannenstiel, Hon. Jackalyne, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, 

Installations, and Environment .......................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Campbell, Hon. Kurt M. .................................................................................. 51 

Gregson, Hon. Wallace C. ................................................................................ 41 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 38 

Pfannenstiel, Hon. Jackalyne .......................................................................... 58 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 67 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

JAPAN: RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 27, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services 

Committee meets to receive testimony on recent security developments in Japan. Our witnesses today, the Honorable Chip Gregson, 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security 

Affairs, the Honorable Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of 

State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and the Honorable 

Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Energy, Installations and Environment. And we welcome you and 

thank you for being with us. 

There is little doubt that the alliance between our country and 

Japan represents a cornerstone for peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region, because I am convinced that the Asia-Pacific region 

will be increasingly central to the concern of America’s national interests. And in this century, I believe it is essential that the U.S.- 

Japan alliance continue to grow based on shared interests and 

shared values. 

U.S.-Japan alliance has clearly been undergoing a period of transition in recent years, which has not come without complications. 

Rhetoric and occasional disagreements aside, though, our two nations clearly remain partners. Japan has obligated $900 million to 

provide assistance to Afghan national security forces, part of a $5 

billion package of aid to Afghanistan. Japan has also pledged $1 

billion to support international assistance efforts in Pakistan. 

Japan has supported South Korea and the United States in the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan. The Japanese have also been instrumental in Six-Party negotiations with North Korea. And finally, Japan has worked diligently 

to address many longstanding grievances with its East Asian 

neighbors. Clearly, one of the most apparent issues of concern between our nations has been stationed U.S. forces on Okinawa. I 

strongly support the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa, one that 

the U.S. has long maintained and over time, some U.S. bases have 

become significantly encroached. This encroachment has led to sig-
2 

nificant issues regarding the burden of the facilities on the civilian 

population. 

Accordingly, the U.S. and Japan entered into an agreement in 

2006 to relocate 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and to construct a new base in Northeast Okinawa far from major population 

centers. Both sides will make significant financial contributions to 

the effort. When the current ruling party in Japan recently assumed control, however, they expressed concern about the nature 

of the agreement and initially sought to modify the 2006 roadmap. 

After significant discussions by the Administration with Japan, I 

am pleased that they have recently reaffirmed the roadmap. 

Let me be clear. It is essential that the U.S. retain the ability 

to project forces in the East Asian theater to ensure regional stability and prosperity. U.S. forces on Okinawa are central to this capability. Japan also benefits substantially from this partnership. 

They are able to devote less than 1 percent of their gross domestic 

product toward their national defense. Given the benefits of both 

nations, I see little need for major changes to the current Status 

of Forces Agreement. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the 

U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. If both nations stay true to their national interests, I believe we can look forward to at least another 50 years of such mutual cooperation. Before I turn to my good friend, our ranking member, the gentleman 

from California, Buck McKeon for any comments he might care to 

make, let me mention my disappointment at the failure of the Department of Defense and the Department of State to submit witness testimony for this hearing in a timely manner. Arrangements 

for this hearing were made many weeks in advance, and I cannot 

imagine how it came to pass that we did not receive testimony 

until just yesterday. Mr. McKeon. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to our 

witnesses. We appreciate your being here this morning. Mr. Chairman, this is a very timely and important hearing considering the 

most recent saber rattling from North Korea and the continued 

equivocation from the Government of Japan concerning the ultimate location of the Marine airfield on Okinawa. Much of today’s 

hearing will focus on the multitude of unresolved issues concerning 

the realignment of the Marine forces in the Pacific, particularly the 

move of approximately 8,000 Marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam, and associated moves on Okinawa itself. 

Make no mistake, these are important questions, but what is 

more important, however, is the reason we are undertaking this 

upheaval. The United States has long been focused on Europe. In 

recent years, our attention has naturally shifted to the Middle East 

and South Asia in our continual fight to stamp out Al Qaeda and 

its allies. We cannot, for a moment, forget, however, how critical 

the Pacific and the Pacific Rim countries are to our national security. While we have friends along the Pacific Rim, Japan among 
3 

them, they are fewer and scattered over a vast ocean. The threats 

are ominous, with China rapidly increasing in both military and 

economic power. Even worse, North Korea, a failing state led by an 

unstable dictator possessing nuclear weapons, has just threatened 

military action if we even conduct military exercises with the South 

Koreans. Against this backdrop, Japan is a friend, but a friend who 

relies on our military power to protect them. 

In exchange, the Government of Japan provides military bases as 

well as some funding to establish and operate these bases. In my 

view, Japan is getting quite a bargain. And sometimes fails to recognize the great benefit the United States provides, provides them 

with our conventional forces and nuclear shield. Even so, we have 

agreed to reduce our footprint in Japan by moving a substantial 

number of Marines to Guam with Japanese financial assistance. 

We have agreed to this move in order to assure our ability to station the III Marine Expeditionary Force in the western Pacific and 

ensure our strategic-ready, forward-deployed land force is able to 

deploy at a moment’s notice where needed. 

With elements of this corps-sized land force split among small 

bases in Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa, each island thousands of 

miles from the others, we need to resolve the remaining questions 

and get on with executing this plan. Last year the Chairman and 

I, accompanied by several other members, traveled to all three locations. Space on each island is limited. The training needs of the 

military are often difficult to reconcile with the needs of the local 

populace. 

Nonetheless, our Marines are there for the national security of 

Americans, Japanese and South Koreans alike. With American 

lives on the line, the least the Japanese can do is provide credible 

installations for our forces. While much progress has been made 

since our February 2009 trip, far too much is still unresolved. I was 

dismayed to read in the press that the new Prime Minister of 

Japan may delay the decision on the new Marine airfield on Okinawa until November. We understand the issue is politically sensitive on Okinawa, but the resolution of that issue is the key to the 

whole puzzle. Furthermore, we still do not have a U.S. Government 

plan for developing the infrastructure of Guam. Guam and her people are patriotic, welcoming and generous, but they do not have the 

resources to build the roads, power plants, water and wastewater 

infrastructure necessary to support such a large influx of people. 

Despite repeated emphasis by this committee, there is no plan 

other than the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] will assign responsibility and provide funding to concerned agencies in 

the fiscal year 2012 budget. The idea of putting OMB in charge is 

not only not reassuring, it is frightening. I look forward to hearing 

the witnesses’ perspective on these matters and yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General Gregson, please. 
4 

STATEMENT OF HON. WALLACE C. GREGSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary GREGSON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you for the privilege of appearing 

before you today to discuss recent security developments with 

Japan. As the Chairman mentioned, this is the 50th anniversary 

of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. It is a unique 

alliance relationship built on common interests, shared values and 

complementary contributions that bind together two very different 

nations. Within this alliance, there are other unique relationships 

with Okinawa prefecture, for example, which is much in the news 

recently. The Japanese election last fall called for a thorough revalidation of our alliance structure and its operation. 

The conclusion is that the essential purpose and structure of the 

alliance remains vital. Our relationship with Japan includes a 

number of bilateral security activities beyond management of our 

bases. The U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation is now a central 

element in our defense relationship. Japan’s investments in four 

BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense]-capable Aegis destroyers, upgrades 

of its Patriot battalion PAC [Patriot Advanced Capability]-3 capability and installation of an X–Band radar aid in that missile defense. 

Cooperation is growing in humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief. Japanese Self-Defense Forces deployed alongside American 

partners to address humanitarian challenges, such as the 2004 tsunami response and providing relief to Haiti. 

We consult on strategic issues. Throughout the past 18 months, 

we collaborated with our Japanese counterparts on the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], the Nuclear Posture Review [NPR], 

and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review [BMDR]. We will discuss 

extended deterrents and we are planning space and cyberspace discussions. We are working closely with Japan on their development 

of their National Defense Program Guidelines. 

Japan is strengthening security ties with countries in the region. 

The current trilateral ties among the United States, Japan and 

South Korea are unprecedented. Internationally, Japan is a valuable partner in Afghanistan and maritime security operations. Japan’s cooperation helped construct the Afghan Ring Road and pay 

the salaries of the Afghan National Police. Japan’s $5 billion pledge 

supporting civil sector efforts will support building civilian capacity, reintegration of militants, demilitarization and economic development, all critical components of our Afghan strategy. Japan’s 

Maritime Self-Defense Force remains active in counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa. 

Japan also provides forces to U.N. missions in Nepal, the Sudan, 

Haiti and the Golan Heights. For the past 6 years or more, Japan 

and the United States made historic progress in revalidating, modernizing and realigning our alliance, presence and capabilities in 

Japan and the region. A series of progressively more detailed 

agreements since early 2005 created the foundation for the most 

complex changes in the operation of our alliance since the signing 

of the treaty in 1960. 
5 

Focus on relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has, 

for certain, been intense. Lost in that focus is that most of the 

2005–2006 plans for realignment are moving forward with little 

controversy. We are collocating air and missile defense command to 

Yokota Air Base, bringing permanent Japanese presence for the 

first time on to a base that houses our U.S. forces, Japan headquarters. The headquarters of the Ground Self-Defense Forces Central Readiness Force will be moved on to Camp Zama to be collocated with the transformed U.S. Army command and control structure. We will relocate Carrier Air Wing Five currently at Atsugi 

Naval Air Station to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, reducing 

the impact of our presence in a very densely populated community. 

In September of 2008, the USS George Washington arrived in 

Japan sparking little opposition. We are expanding opportunities 

for bilateral training and operations in Guam, the Commonwealth 

of the Northern Marianas and in the Compact States, as well as 

within Japan, making our presence at the same time more politically sustainable. The sinking of the Cheonan and the deployment 

of a large PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Navy Surface Action 

Group through waters near Okinawa reminded Japan and the region of the vital deterrent role played by U.S. forces in Okinawa 

and across Japan. 

The joint statement issued May 28th by Secretary Gates and 

Secretary Clinton and her Japanese counterparts designates the location of the FRF [Futenma Replacement Facility] in Camp 

Schwab area and tasks a bilateral experts group to develop a specific plan by the end of August. That effort is well underway and 

we expect the group to complete its efforts on schedule. Of course, 

the FRF at Camp Schwab is a single component of a larger plan 

to consolidate the U.S. presence on Okinawa and move our forces 

away from the densely populated southern portion of the island. 

The full Okinawa realignment package will allow us to reposition 

approximately 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam and return 

nearly 70 percent of the urbanized land south of Kadena Air Base. 

This will ensure a much more sustainable and enduring presence 

for U.S. forces on Okinawa and also enhance the alliance’s operational needs and capabilities. Most importantly to the Okinawans, 

it directly affects their noise, safety and environmental concerns. 

At the same time, the American community on Okinawa, both 

uniformed and civilian, continues to expand our efforts to be productive members of that community. Okinawa has been shaped by 

powerful historic and geographic factors making military matters 

the dominant theme. It was annexed by Japan in 1879. In 1945, 

Okinawa suffered from the ‘‘rain of steel’’ in the last bitter battle 

of a very bitter war. One-third to one-half of the civilians alive before the battle perished, caught between the contending forces. The 

year 1972 brought reversion to Japan. Throughout, this island community has held unrealized economic and educational potential. 

The Obuchi Fellowship created on the occasion of the ClintonObuchi Summit in 2000 provides important opportunities for Okinawan students to study in the United States. The Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology was conceived and announced in 

2000. It is now formally open and is a quality institution. The U.S. 

universities in Okinawa have continued to expand their local schol-
6 

arships. The American Chamber of Commerce is making major contributions to English language education in the secondary schools. 

Many service members and their spouses teach English in the 

grade schools, establishing enduring cross-cultural relationships in 

the process. Our Ambassador to Japan has worked hard to ensure 

that Okinawa will be a part of our broader bilateral initiatives to 

promote science, renewable energy and entrepreneurship. 

Okinawa offers great opportunities for U.S.-Japanese investment 

and cooperation. The Government of Prime Minister Kan has recently made clear its commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance and 

to our presence on Okinawa. President Obama said that this anniversary year represents an important opportunity to step back and 

reflect on what we have achieved, celebrate our friendship but also 

find ways to renew this alliance to refresh it for the 21st century. 

We are doing exactly that. Thank you, and I await your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gregson can be found in 

the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. [Presiding.] Secretary Campbell. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KURT M. CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

I thank all the members of the committee. It is an honor to be here 

today. Let me submit, if I may, my full statement for the record. 

And I also want to take a moment to thank my dear friend and 

colleague, Chip Gregson, for the honor to be able to work with him 

over these many years. I would also like to thank the comment 

made by the ranking member, Congressman McKeon. I think the 

point he underscored about the drama that is playing out in the 

Asia-Pacific region is something we should not forget. I spent a lot 

of time in Asia, traveled, talked with a lot of friends and there are 

continuing concerns about American preoccupation, that we are focused rightly on urgent challenges in South Asia and the Middle 

East. But the truth is there is a drama playing out in the AsiaPacific region, and we need to demonstrate at all times to our 

friends and potential foes that the United States remains completely committed to the Asia-Pacific region during this incredibly 

dynamic period in which global politics, global economics is increasingly shifting to the Asia-Pacific arena. With that as context, let 

me just say one of the things that has been underscored to us over 

the course of the last several years, is that the very foundation of 

our ability to operate in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to the 

foundation for peace and stability and the ability for us to project 

power outside of the Asia-Pacific region resides in a strong, enduring partnership between the United States and Japan. 

As General Gregson has already stated, we are this year celebrating our 50th anniversary, the signing of the Treaty of Mutual 

Security between the United States and Japan. It has been essential to both of our countries, but not just Japan and the United 

States. It has been the central feature that has led to the most dramatic period of economic dynamism in the history of the world over 

the course of the last 30 years in the Asia-Pacific region. And the 

U.S.-Japan security partnership can take substantial credit for that 
7 

and it has served our interests, it has served the interests of Japan 

and other countries in the region very substantially. 

I think one of the things that has been critical has been that the 

alliance and the relationship has had very strong bipartisan support over a range of administrations and also between both parties 

in Congress. I think there is a deep and profound recognition that 

this relationship serves the interests of the United States, and indeed of our allies in the region. When President Obama came to 

power, he sought to underscore this essential reality. His first 

meeting with a foreign leader was with the Japanese Prime Minister, Prime Minister Aso, who has been subsequently replaced 

twice now, and also Secretary Clinton’s first trip abroad included 

a first stop in Japan. 

Our consultations on a range of security and political issues over 

the course of the last 10 months, in particular, have been extraordinarily deep and detailed since the new Japanese Government has 

come into power. One of the things that we have been working on 

as General Gregson again has underscored, is the mechanisms of 

our alliance, how to secure and stabilize our forward-deployed 

forces in Okinawa. I also share the views of the members about 

how critical this forward deployment is of our Marine forces in Okinawa and the steps that are needed to secure that going forward. 

We have also worked very closely with Japan since the tragic 

sinking of the South Korean frigate, the Cheonan, by the brutal, 

provocative act on the part of the North Koreans. We have worked 

closely with the Japanese at every stage on extending OPCON 

[Operational Control] into the future with Korea on our maritime 

exercises that are now going on. Those exercises that you are seeing now at sea, most of those forces, most of those naval forces deploy from Japanese bases. We are grateful for that support going 

forward. We have also worked closely with Japanese friends on a 

dialogue about how best to engage a rising power in the Pacific. In 

China, we share a mutual interest in trying to assure that a rising 

China plays a strong and responsible role in the Asia-Pacific region. We are working closely to coordinate in Southeast Asia, trying to engage a very challenging and brutal regime in Burma. We 

have worked to deal with some of the political and security challenges in Thailand and a range of other countries. 

As the Chairman stated before he left, Japan has been one of the 

strongest supporters of our out-of-area engagements. Right now, 

Japan is number two in terms of monies committed in Afghanistan 

and they have also been behind the United States, extraordinarily 

gracious and generous in our activities in Pakistan as well. They 

worked with us in arenas such as piracy, and they have been very 

substantially engaged in new security challenges like climate 

change and other transnational issues. 

I would say that the alliance has become deeper, more entrenched, recent opinion polls in Japan reflect—and Japan is one 

of the most polled populations in the world. One of the things we 

have seen in recent months is that the percentage of Japanese citizens that support the United States and the U.S.-Japan alliance 

are stronger today than in history, almost 80 percent of the Japanese population supports the United States in our alliance. That is 

something that we have worked hard for and we are grateful for 
8 

and we want to keep that strong support and respect going forward. 

This fall, when we celebrate the 50th anniversary formally, it 

will be an opportunity for us to look back and to celebrate and to 

reflect on our achievements, but we can’t rest on our laurels. We 

have to think about going forward. This alliance is critical for the 

United States going forward. It bears repeating. It is truly our 

foundation and it gives us stability to be able to do the kinds of 

things that we seek to as a nation in the Asia-Pacific region. Thank 

you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to taking your questions going forward. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Campbell can be found in 

the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. 

Secretary Pfannenstiel. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKALYNE PFANNENSTIEL, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS, 

AND ENVIRONMENT 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, distinguished members of committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to report to you on the status of our planning efforts for the realignment of forces on Guam. And thank you for 

your continued support of our troops. Last week I had the opportunity to visit Guam and meet with several of the island’s leaders 

and members of the community to discuss our Final Environmental 

Impact Statement, which is now available for public review. I was 

joined by Counsel on Environmental Quality Chair, Nancy Sutley, 

Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Tony Babauta, Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense Dorothy Robyn, and representatives of other 

Federal agencies such as the U.S. EPA [Environmental Protection 

Agency] and USDA [United States Department of Agriculture]. 

We took this trip together so that we could demonstrate firsthand to the people in Guam how critical it is for the Administration to get this effort right. It is this desire to get it right that 

brought agency leaders together to develop our Final EIS [Environmental Impact Statement]. Under CEQ [Council on Environmental 

Quality] Chair Sutley’s leadership, we have successfully used the 

interagency process to address issues raised by resource agencies 

and the public on our Draft Environmental Impact Statement. 

Working together, we have satisfactorily resolved the most significant issues and have reached consensus in the Final EIS regarding 

how to handle these concerns. 

For example, we have decided in our Final EIS to defer our decision on the placement of the transient CVN [Nuclear-powered Aircraft Carrier] pier until we conduct additional Marine resources 

analysis. In addition, we have put forward a process for ensuring 

that the impacts of induced population growth do not overwhelm 

the island. Our Final EIS also identifies sources for nearly a billion 

dollars in improvements to Guam’s utility systems, ports and roadways which will both prepare the island for the build-up and support its long-term growth. We are continuing to stay within the capacity—we are committing to staying within the capacity constraints of Guam’s infrastructure, and will coordinate closely with 
9 

Guam’s leaders, Federal and Guam agencies and other parties to 

do so. 

As a result of this successful interagency coordination, we are 

confident we can sign a Record of Decision [ROD] and begin construction projects within this fiscal year. Central to the successful 

execution of this program is our ability to coordinate with key 

stakeholders on Guam and across the Federal Government. As discussed with Guam’s leaders, our planning efforts do not end after 

the Record of Decision. We understand there is still more to be 

done. However, working together with Guam’s leaders, we can ensure that conditions on and off the base will be comparable and we 

believe we can satisfactorily resolve issues such as land acquisition. 

As you can see, we have made great progress in our planning 

and are now ready to execute. Working with our agency counterparts and Guam’s leadership, we are confident we can execute the 

program in a manner that achieves long-term mutual success. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for 

your continued support of this program. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Pfannenstiel can be found 

in the Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much for your testimony this morning. 

And it is good to see you, Madam Secretary. We have had a great 

relationship with Japan. We enjoy their friendship and then, of 

course, we talk about the balance of power and having a forward 

presence. And I think that is very, very important. But Secretary 

Pfannenstiel, Secretary Gregson and Secretary Campbell, we want 

to say thank you for joining us this morning and explaining the efforts to move Marines to the strategic island of Guam and the ongoing developments with the Japanese Government. 

Madam Secretary Pfannenstiel, I have had the opportunity to 

travel to Guam several times, but most recently with Chairman 

Skelton to visit the beautiful island and it is nice. I wish I could 

stay there a few weeks and enjoy a vacation there. And to discuss, 

of course, the strategic importance of the movement of forces from 

Okinawa to Guam, I believe that the movement of forces is definitely the right thing to do. I did notice in your testimony that you 

recommended a whole-of-government approach be adopted to address community infrastructure limitations that exist in Guam 

today. Yet this is—from my own personal experience—I see no indication of this support from the other resource agencies when I look 

at the budget request. In fact, the only request from the Administration was from the Department of Defense to support a Department of Transportation requirement at the Port of Guam. 

What tangible steps has the executive branch taken to address 

the whole-of-government approach? And where are the budget requests from the various resources agencies to support the Marine 

Corps training bases requirement? I think this is very, very important. This is something we are going to see later on. Maybe you can 

enlighten us a little bit. 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Yes, thank you, Mr. Ortiz. We are 

working with the other agencies, the other resources agencies, 

other Federal agencies, to look at the whole of Guam, to look at the 

needs across the infrastructure, across the business community, 
10 

and we have done so in a couple ways. First, we worked very specifically with the resources agencies in developing the Final Environmental Impact Statement. And we aligned our interest and our 

program so that we not only overcame the concerns with the Draft 

Environmental Impact Statement in such a way that the resources 

agencies were supportive of where we ended up. But we also are 

looking towards going beyond what is just the minimum necessary. 

There is a group called the Economic Adjustment Committee that 

is working within the Department of Defense looking across Guam 

at the economic impact, not just the environmental impacts associated with the buildup and looking at what level of funding might 

be needed and where it might be available. So that is work that 

is ongoing. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I wonder if anybody else, Secretary Gregson or Campbell, would like to add or maybe respond to my question? Have you 

seen any other agencies that is going to—coming up with a budget 

request because we haven’t seen one yet? 

Secretary GREGSON. I can pass a more detailed report back for 

the record later, but I am aware that the Department of Agriculture helped contribute to the resources necessary to rehabilitate 

the port facilities, and we are in discussion with the Department 

of Transportation for other resources. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

In addition, part of the Japanese money that is pledged for the buildup in Guam is some $740-some million dollars for utilities and 

on a most urgent need basis, the first projects that will be undertaken with those resources are rehabilitation of the Northern District wastewater treatment plant and the Agana wastewater treatment plant. These are judged the most critical infrastructure improvements needed to support the temporary workforce that is 

going to be doing the base construction. 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. I could add, in addition, that we have 

been working with the Department of Energy on some possible renewable energy investments on Guam, either for a pilot program 

or, in fact, to replace some of their existing generation. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Another thing that worries me is when you have an 

increase in population because of the Marines coming in there. 

What are we going to do about hospitals and health care? And then 

at the same time you did mention transportation, but do you think 

they are going to come across, they are going to be able to provide 

those services that are very essential? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. We have been, and we will continue to 

look at the roads and the roadways for Defense Access Road funding as necessary. And we have money in the fiscal year 2010 and 

proposal fiscal year 2011 budget for that. As for the health care 

problems of the increased population, the workers who will be coming to the island from off-island, the way that health care will be 

taken care of is through the contractors who bring them there. 

That is part of the requirements of the contractors is that they provide health care for the workers. 

As for the Marines coming, we have dollars programmed for the 

hospital improvement for the base. So that will also be part of the 

program that we have going forward. 
11 

Mr. ORTIZ. So when we talk about the health needs of the people 

coming in to work, the money will come in through the contract 

that we give them, and they will get a portion of that money on 

the contract to pay for the health care? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Yes, the contractors are required to 

provide health care for their workers. And they will have to do that 

through the contracts that they sign. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I have other questions, but I will wait. I would like 

for my other colleagues. I yield to my good friend, Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gregson, 

Secretary Campbell, as you know, this committee has been in full 

support of the Defense Policy Review Initiative and the move of the 

8,000 Marines and their families to Okinawa. While we have had 

questions about training opportunities for those Marines and the 

adequacy of the new Marine airfield at Camp Schwab, we have not 

wavered. At this point, we have seen one Japanese Prime Minister 

from the newly elected Government delay his decision on the airfield and ultimately resign over the siting of the Futenma replacement facility. And now the new Prime Minister is reportedly engaged in a similar delay. Is the so-called expert group still making 

progress on a mutually agreeable solution to the FRF that protects 

the equities of the Marine Corps? What is the way ahead if we cannot agree on the FRF? 

Secretary GREGSON. The experts group is, in fact, meeting as we 

speak. This is about the third or the fourth in a series of meetings 

and more are scheduled. Yes, they are making progress. A goingin condition is that all of the requirements necessary for the operation and the functioning of the airfield be met. The subsequent 

discussions can involve details of the method of construction, the 

exact configuration of the airfield and the other infrastructure 

needed. 

But let me stress, Mr. McKeon, in response to one of the thrusts 

of your questions, that a going-in condition that is necessary to be 

present throughout any other considerations is that all of the operational requirements be met. And we have every expectation that 

we will have results on schedule by the end of August. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Let me just add one thing if I could, Congressman, to that. One of the first things that the new Prime Minister, Prime Minister Kan, underscored when he took office as the 

Prime Minister late in the spring was that he would stand by the 

agreement between the United States and Japan, and he thought 

that that was, indeed, the foundation for our partnership going forward. And so we actually have substantial confidence in both the 

public and private reassurances that we received from the Japanese Government. 

It is also the case that there are a number of very challenging 

political issues that are going on domestically in Japan and we 

have sought simultaneously to be understanding about those political dynamics, but also to be quite clear and firm about what our 

needs and expectations are going forward. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. The reason we have installations in 

Japan and negotiated this latest agreement is to assure the forward presence of our forces in a strategically important area of the 

world. The two principal threats in the Pacific region today are 
12 

North Korea and China, though the threat posed by each is very 

different. Given the reluctance of this new Japanese Government 

to fully embrace the agreement to realign forces on Okinawa, can 

we be confident the Japanese will allow use of our bases should 

North Korea provoke a crisis requiring a military response? No less 

important given the dire state of the Japanese economy, the importance of China as a trading partner and the recent quadrupling of 

Chinese investment in Japan, are we confident that the Japanese 

Government would allow us to use our bases to undertake an action that the Chinese disapproved of? 

Secretary GREGSON. We are absolutely confident we would be 

able to use Japanese bases in response to a North Korean threat. 

The recent Cheonan incident did nothing to diminish Japanese concern about the North Korean threat. Looking back over time, the 

Japanese have suffered at the hands of North Korea with having 

their citizens kidnapped, and with incursions into their territory. 

There is a monument in Japan that is very frequently visited of 

a North Korean infiltration vessel that was sunk a few years ago 

by the Maritime Safety Agency in Japanese territorial waters attempting an infiltration. I have no doubt that they are fully aware 

of the threat from North Korea and fully supportive of all of the 

provisions of our treaty to support operations, should they be necessary in Korea. On China, China is a valuable trading partner for 

Japan, just as China is a valuable trading partner for us. I think 

the attitude is similar, that we seek a cooperative, constructive relationship with China for all the right reasons, but we remain concerned about many other aspects. China’s extraordinary military 

build-up, various actions that China has taken without as we judge 

satisfactory explanation. So I would judge their approach to this as 

similar to ours. 

At the same time, they have—and Secretary Campbell can expand on this—at the same time, they have disputes—wrong word— 

they have items of concern with China over mineral rights in the 

East China Sea and through and on various territorial claims. So 

the attitude there is one of, I think, proper concern. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Congressman, I would simply say that, first 

of all, I agree with General Gregson about the confidence that we 

have in our partnership on the security side with Japan and the 

confidence we would have in a crisis. I think one of the things that 

the new Government has asked for in Japan is a closer consultation on issues associated with the potential use of force. I think it 

is fair to say that sometimes previous governments in Japan have 

been very comfortable to leave those decisions largely to the United 

States. And they have not been deeply engaged in some of the very 

quiet consultations. The new Government that has come to power, 

the DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan], wants to play a closer and 

deeper role with the United States on some of these consultations 

and we have to adjust and adapt to that. We have been seeking to 

do so as we go forward. I would simply say on the China front, it 

is true that Japan and China have had substantial tensions on and 

off over the course of the last many years. 

And I think one of the things we have seen in the recent period 

is the Japanese Government has sought to build a better relationship with China. And some have suggested that this potentially 
13 

comes at the expense of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. We 

don’t think that is the case. We think that our relationship will remain very strong, and we do have an interest in Tokyo and Beijing 

improving relations, establishing more trust and trying to get beyond a history that, in some respects, has been quite challenging. 

So overall in terms of our assurances and commitments, we feel 

quite well served by the security partnership and we think it will 

endure as sort of the guiding framework for how we do business 

in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The chair recognizes Mr. Snyder from Arkansas. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Skelton is not here, 

but both Mr. Skelton and Mr. McKeon have been pushing in a bipartisan manner to get the supplemental done, and I saw it on the 

suspension calendar today, and hopefully we will get that work 

completed this week. I don’t have much time. We are now on the 

clock. So I need you all not to do expansive answers, but quick answers because I have four questions. The first one to you, Secretary 

Gregson. 

The Japanese are about to complete their first foreign military 

base outside of Japan since World War II in Djibouti. It seems to 

me that it is a win-win situation. It is a win for the international 

community because the Japanese know how to patrol coastlines 

and the full focus of this base is piracy, and it seems like a win 

for the Japanese people in that it is consistent with the constitutional restrictions on waging wars since it is clearly targeting piracy, do you agree with that analysis? 

Secretary GREGSON. Yes. 

Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Campbell, what does it mean in terms of 

continuity of policy and the challenge for the Japanese Government 

and the Japanese people to have four prime ministers in two years? 

It is their form of government and every form has its own inadequacies. But four prime ministers in two years, what kind of challenges has that presented for them in defense policy? 

Secretary CAMPBELL. I will try to be very quick with it. Thank 

you very much. Very good questions. Look, it is important for us 

not to comment publicly on domestic dynamics of a close ally. I 

think we can say, however, that rapid turnover in prime ministers 

and ministers makes it very difficult to establish the kinds of relationships and the confidence that is necessary in government. Government is about institutions, but it is also about individuals. It is 

hard to build up that kind of understanding about how people will 

operate in certain circumstances. So it does raise some concerns for 

us. And that is why we often ask what is the stability of this person or that or this institution. We would very much like to see 

some continuity in Japanese politics, not just for the U.S.-Japan security relationship, but also for the important work that needs to 

be done on the economic and other sides inside Japan. 

Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Campbell, any comment you want to 

make on this issue of trying to resolve the unresolved territorial 

disputes over islands? I think the specific one—and I cannot pronounce the names—I think in the Japanese it is the Senkaku Islands. Any comment about that in view of Secretary Clinton’s comments a few days ago? 
14 

Secretary CAMPBELL. I would refer you to the comment, very 

clearly worded statement that Secretary Clinton has underscored 

at the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Regional 

Forum in Vietnam. I should just simply say that the United States 

stands very strongly behind our security assurances and guarantees to our allies in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Dr. SNYDER. In terms of the development of the area, it is fair 

to say that as long as there are territorial disputes, the development of those areas is held back. Is that a fair statement? 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Certainly in the South China Sea, that has 

been one of the challenges. What Secretary Clinton tried to lay out 

in Vietnam is a very clear U.S. statement that maintains and underscores our traditional desire to maintain freedom of navigation, 

freedom of the seas. We also believe that the appropriate and legal 

opportunities for economic commerce and extraction of mineral resources is important. And we seek that those operations can be 

conducted without fear of political or other kinds of pressure. 

Dr. SNYDER. And my last question to you, Secretary Campbell. 

And this is an Arkansas-based question, because of the great service of Senator Fulbright with regard to the Fulbright scholarships. 

Of course, there are other programs, the Mansfield program. Do we 

have an adequate number of exchanges at the student level between Japan and the United States, or would we benefit from 

more? How do you see those numbers today? 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Let me just underscore, these are excellent 

questions, and it is a source of very real concern to me that the 

number of Japanese students that come to the United States over 

the course of the last few years to study has fallen off a cliff and 

the number of Americans that are going to Japan to study in the 

JET [Japan Exchange and Teaching] program and other programs 

have also gone down. 

Dr. SNYDER. Why is that? 

Secretary CAMPBELL. I think there are a variety of reasons. I 

think there have been some economic issues on both sides. I think 

there are some other areas of interest. But it is absolutely clear, 

given how strong the partnership is between our two countries that 

we need to recommit ourselves to programs like Fulbright, like the 

JET [Japan Exchange and Teaching] program. We need continuing 

support from the Japanese Government’s other foundations to ensure that our young people are building strong ties with our most 

durable and strongest Democratic partner in Asia. 

Secretary GREGSON. I would like to very briefly and heartily endorse those comments. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a follow-up question? Is 

the problem funding from the—is there something we need to be 

doing or is it a lack of interest? 

Secretary CAMPBELL. No. Funding issues are quite substantial on 

both sides in this environment, yes. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. My next question is do they have problems getting 

visas to come? The reason I ask is because we had a group of businessmen who want to come and invest here in the United States, 
15 

it took them six, seven months to get a visa. I am just wondering 

if the students go through the same problem? 

Secretary CAMPBELL. I would say, again, thank you very much, 

Mr. Chairman. I had the honor of working in the Pentagon for 

many, many years. It is my first opportunity to work at the State 

Department. The thing that has surprised me the most in my work 

to date is how often, how regular I hear from foreign friends, particularly friends in Asia, how difficult it is for businessmen, students, even people in the government to travel to the United States 

through visas and other problems. And we try very hard to work 

on these problems but it has been much more challenging than I 

had anticipated. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Anything you can do to help out because we know 

there is a lot of young students going to other countries, even 

though they would like to come to the United States, but it is so 

hard for them to get a student visa to come to the United States. 

Now, the chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Campbell, 

you mentioned very positive polling in Japan relative to their relationship with the United States. I wonder if you can discuss with 

us just a bit the similar polling in Okinawa, because that is where 

the current problems are focused. 

If you will, differentiate between generic support for JapaneseAmerican relations and specific support for what we want to do in 

Okinawa. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. I will answer the question generally, Congressman, and then I will ask General Gregson to expand upon 

that. I think it would be fair to say that there is generic much 

higher support for the overall aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance 

and the United States in terms of Japanese polling. And there 

probably is less strong support but still quite strong in Japan for 

certain aspects of the situation on Okinawa. That being said, I 

think there is also a recognition that at a fundamental level, the 

maintenance of a strong security relationship between the United 

States and Japan, of which I would argue, and I think many in 

Japan recognize that the ability to sustain a Marine presence in 

Okinawa is central, overcomes some of the issues that have traditionally caused problems in terms of the kind of public attitudes 

and public polling. 

I will also say that under General Gregson’s leadership and others, that the United States Government and Japan have taken 

enormous steps to try to not only ease the burdens but create 

greater opportunities and build deeper partnership between Americans and the Okinawan people. General Gregson talked about the 

Obuchi fellowships. We need to do more, but overall, I think the 

attitudes have improved substantially in the last decade or so. 

Secretary GREGSON. Thank you for the question, Mr. Bartlett. 

Sometimes anecdotes, although dangerous, are illustrative. In 

2000, I moved to Okinawa. One of my first requirements, or one 

of my first duties was to represent the Department of Defense at 

the rollout of the Obuchi Fellowship as a result of the Obuchi-Clinton Summit. I was stunned by the gratitude of the Okinawans my 

age, the parents, that the United States saw fit to provide this 
16 

scholarship for Okinawan students to study in the United States. 

They have a huge regard for education. 

As I mentioned in my oral remarks, Okinawa’s particular history, Okinawa’s particular vital strategic location has conspired to 

make the conversation about Okinawa primarily about military 

matters. The door is wide open, and Ambassador Roos, our Ambassador to Japan, is running through it to create cooperative U.S.- 

Japan bilateral programs to bring needed educational, entrepreneurial development to Okinawa and this is entirely proper and 

will do nothing except build on the already strong relations between the American community and the Okinawan community. 

There are items of concern between the two communities, but I 

can assure you that the relationship and the cooperation between 

the Americans on Okinawa and the Japanese citizens living on 

Okinawa vastly exceeds its reputation in the media. It is warm, it 

is friendly, it is supportive. Like the U.S. does, every place that we 

are stationed, we need to take better care of the population that 

surrounds our bases there, and we need to have better and stronger bonds with them. The Obuchi Fellowship, the educational programs that Mr. Ortiz mentioned, these types of things are most 

valued by the Okinawans, most valued by the Japanese and most 

valued by our Asian friends all over. This is not a one-way thing. 

Bringing these students to America enriches our schools, is in our 

interest. 

I second Secretary Campbell’s comments about doing whatever 

we need to do to ease the visa application process for students from 

these countries to study in the United States and to establish exchange programs where our students can study in their country. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, folks, for 

being here today. 

Madam Secretary, you said in your remarks the importance in 

what we are doing for the Administration to get it right, as we proceed. Are we getting it right? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Yes, sir, I believe that we are. I think 

that working together with the Federal agencies but with the Government of Guam on what their needs are and how this can work 

for them. I think that the Draft EIS that came out was weak in 

several areas, and I think that by bringing together the people 

from the Federal agencies who are involved in this but also going 

out to Guam as we have done several times now to meet with the 

Government of Guam, the agencies in Guam, to talk to the people, 

see what the needs are, I think that the plan that is being brought 

together now will work for the people of Guam. 

Mr. KISSELL. And this will happen on a timely basis, is the time 

that we need for it to happen? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Yes, sir. We have agreed that the program going forward will be paced according to the infrastructure 

capabilities of Guam. Therefore, if we are able to move faster than 

we have projected, if the infrastructure allows us to move faster 

with the construction, we will do so. If we need to slow down parts 
17 

of it, we will do that. But we will pace our—both the construction 

and the movement of forces to the capabilities of the island. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you. 

Secretary Campbell, you talked about that the concerns of some 

of the people in the Pacific-Asian part of the world, that the United 

States may, as you said, rightfully so, be focused in other areas, 

but there are a lot of things taking place there that should be of 

interest to us. 

Is there anything in particular that you feel has taken place that 

we are not paying enough attention to in terms of a way that it 

will become an issue sooner or later down the road? 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Let me try to answer the question this way, 

if I could, Congressman. I think if you ask most Americans, and 

in fact most people in the executive branch, what is the most challenging issues that we are facing right now, most people will say, 

look, really, it is in the Middle East, it is in Afghanistan, it is in 

Iraq, issues that are deeply difficult, challenging, nation-building, 

issues associated with proliferation, questions associated with dealing with Al Qaeda and other radical groups. 

If you look back on this period in 20 or 30 years, I think what 

we might find is the historians will view this period is that the bigger drama is actually what is playing out in the Asia-Pacific region, 

a dramatic rise in economic and political and strategic capabilities 

of which the United States has been involved but perhaps we have 

been involved in other areas geographically more. 

I think my overall general concern would be that the key institutions of our Government—the executive branch, the legislative 

branch and, in fact, others—need to recognize—and I think, generally, we do—that the Asia-Pacific region has an enormous 

amount of drama playing out and that the scarcest resources in our 

Government is really the time and attention of our senior-most people. 

And I would just simply underscore for you, look at the number 

of hearings that are held up on Capitol Hill and explore how many 

are done on the Asia-Pacific region in comparison with, for instance, the critical issues that we are facing elsewhere. So that is 

one of the reasons I think this sort of hearing is so welcome and 

it is so appropriate. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I have got two questions related to our forces in Okinawa 

and the difficulties that we are confronting there. 

And I think the first question is to the strategic importance of 

how having those forces there and couldn’t we accomplish the same 

in terms of our presence in the Asian-Pacific theater as—doing 

joint maneuvers, bringing our forces over periodically, and particularly when conditions warrant in terms of concerns about the stability of the region, and then putting forces in play, as opposed to 

having a permanent presence? 

And the second question is related to that, and that is that if, 

in fact, in a worst-case scenario, given the trend line in terms of 

Japanese politics that seems to be increasingly opposed to having 

our permanent presence in Okinawa, what is the alternative in 
18 

terms of placing those forces on U.S. soil? We are obviously looking 

at 8,000 now in Guam. We would still, I understand, have 10,000 

in Okinawa if that is the appropriate number. Are there facilities 

that could absorb that population in Hawaii and in California say 

at Camp Pendleton in California? 

Secretary GREGSON. Thank you for the questions. I think they 

are quite apt. 

Our forward presence, our forward stationing makes a political 

statement long before it makes a military statement; and the basing arrangements that we share with Japan provide a profound political and strategic anchor for our positions there. 

As to the position of Okinawa, Okinawa has been blessed or 

cursed, depending on the point of view, with being in a tremendously strategic location. Having our forces on Okinawa allows us 

to react to many things very quickly. 

Short of war, the many activities that go on from Okinawa in the 

areas of disaster response indicate one of the many values of having forces forward. The first 24 hours in response to fire, flood, volcano, tsunami, forest fire, whatever, have proven to be exceptionally valuable; and our ability to project force quickly and bring aid 

to those who are in dire straits as a result of some natural or potentially manmade incident make a profound statement on our 

commitment and our capabilities to both friends and others alike 

in Asia. 

So I would state that our position, our forward presence in the 

Pacific is important. I think the importance is growing. I would 

argue that we need more, not less, in the future, given the way 

things are developing. 

Besides Northeast Asia we also need to worry about Southeast 

Asia and, increasingly, South Asia and the Indian Ocean area. All 

of these things are considerations within the realignment. 

Within Okinawa, the particular situation on Okinawa, the battle 

started April 1, 1945; it ended about June 23. Most of our forces 

were in the southern part of the island by the time it ended, so 

most of our bases grew up in the southern part of the island. 

Since that time, Okinawa has had tremendous growth. Most of 

the population lives in the southern third of the island. As part of 

the realignment, we are not only moving part of the Marines to 

Guam but we are closing all or portions of the base or all of the 

bases south of Kadena Air Force base, meaning we get the military 

presence away from the most crowded, urbanized area of Okinawa 

and into an area that is much more conducive to our operations 

and much more conducive to the further development of the economy, the businesses in Okinawa. 

The movement to Guam repositions not just Americans but it 

repositions alliance forces. We will be providing on Guam for the 

continuous presence of Japanese air and ground units and naval 

units for training, bilateral training, with the United States. Secretary Gates has said that our facilities in Guam and other nearby 

areas in the Pacific, the Commonwealth and the Compact Islands, 

will be increasingly bilateral in nature, enabling us to do extraordinarily sophisticated training with our allies and friends in areas 

that are relatively unencumbered by urban sprawl and the other 

things that make training in other places much more difficult. 
19 

I see this as not only a positive development on the political and 

the strategic side but eventually this will contribute greatly on the 

operational side, enabling our alliance forces to operate much more 

effectively and much more efficiently together. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could, the second question as 

to relocation of our forces, if he can answer that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure. Go ahead and answer that question. 

Secretary GREGSON. As far as our ability to remain base-forward? 

Mr. COFFMAN. As an alternative to relocate those forces on U.S. 

soil. 

Secretary GREGSON. Relocating to U.S. soil would put us days 

away from most confrontations. I think between Hawaii, Guam, 

and Japan and the sustainment base in the United States, we 

achieve the ability to best balance force generation, force development with forward positions, forward-deployed forces ready to react 

immediately. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Congressman Coffman, I can think of few 

decisions that we would regret more than pulling back our forces 

from the Asia-Pacific region. It is not only that they are able to respond more quickly militarily and strategically, but it is also really 

the political role they play. 

Asia is extraordinarily, acutely aware of our forward-deployed 

forces. I know that these kind of comparisons are difficult to make, 

but it is very much like a neighborhood that is a little bit uncertain, and if you are seeing a patrol car there on a very regular 

basis, it is reassuring. That is the role that American forces play 

in the Asian-Pacific region and will play for years, perhaps decades, to come. I can think of no more important commitment to 

maintain than our forward-deployed capabilities. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mrs. Davis, the gentlelady from California. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here. 

I appreciate the discussion of trying to—I don’t know whether it 

is refocus, because that is not exactly what you are saying, except 

that our attention really shouldn’t stray I think from the relations 

there. And, clearly, there have been some bumps in the road over 

the years, and I think that all of the people that we work with acknowledge that but are very strong in their continuing support. 

I wondered if you could address—I don’t know if this has even 

come on your radar necessarily—the issue of the rise in the Japanese yen and the impacts that can have, not so much in I think 

in specific relationships that you have been discussing but going 

beyond that in terms of exchanges and even the opportunity for 

Americans to travel to Japan now, which I understand has been literally cut off because of the cost. 

Can you address that? Is that something that is of concern? And 

is there any way that we might look at this and be aware of it as 

a concern? There are pluses and minuses, of course, to that rise. 

But I wonder if you could address that. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Can I just say that one of the things that— 

one of the operating procedures of every Administration, Republican and Democrat, now for decades, is that there is really only 
20 

one institution of government that speaks about currency matters, 

and that is the Department of the Treasury. My wife happens to 

be the Under Secretary, so she reminds me of this on a regular 

basis. So I think the better part of valor would be to ask you to 

direct those questions about any currency issues between the 

United States and other currencies in Asia to appropriate folks inside the Treasury. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I appreciate that, but I think it was brought to my 

attention just recently and I was really quite surprised to hear the 

difficulty with which we could have exchanges in the future. So it 

is something that we might want to think about. 

Could you comment in a little more detail on the Status of Forces 

Agreement and the discussions around that as it relates to our 

forces there in Japan? 

Secretary GREGSON. The Status of Forces Agreement is raised 

periodically. In the past, upon examination, calls for revision of the 

Status of Forces Agreement generally fall away in favor of improving the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement. 

Our Status of Forces Agreement with Japan has proven extraordinarily durable in the past. In my past life, one of my most valuable officers was somebody called the Foreign Jurisdiction Officer; 

and this person would be involved in working-level negotiations 

upon any incident that fell within the purview of the Status of 

Forces Agreement. No matter how strictly we write it, something 

is always going to happen that is not quite anticipated in the Status of Forces Agreement. 

It is currently not one of the items that is a matter of current 

discussion with Japan. It may come up again in the future. If so, 

we will discuss it in a close, collaborative, and forthright way with 

our Japanese colleagues, as we have before. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate that response. 

We all have some opportunity I think to have discussions, whether it is with the Embassy, Japanese Embassy, the Ambassador, 

and also certainly among any of the Parliamentarians from Japan, 

and I think one of the issues that does could tend to come up is 

financial obligations as it relates to Guam and certainly to Okinawa. And I am just wondering, is there anything in particular you 

think that would be helpful or even hurtful for Congress to convey 

to our counterparts when we are in discussions with them? What 

would you like us to be talking mostly about? 

Secretary GREGSON. On the financial contributions within Japan, 

we are in host nation support discussions with our Japanese colleagues now. The current host nation support agreement which 

calls for some $1.7 billion per year runs out in 2011. We are looking for another 5-year agreement. 

I would offer that, from our point of view, the $1.7 billion, almost 

all of which cycles through the military and comes back to Japan 

in the forms of salaries for workers aboard the base, to include, interestingly, emergency services—fire departments, paramedics, security guards are all local employees. 

It is also cycled back to the Japanese in forms of construction 

and services. So this is support to the U.S. forces, yes, but, again, 

the vast majority of it is reinvestment back in Japan. 
21 

To the investment in Guam, this agreement was arrived at over 

at least 5 years of negotiations. Secretary Campbell and I were 

present at the initial incarnation of this from 1996 on, so one could 

say that this agreement has been arrived at over 14 years and the 

financial considerations were very carefully considered. 

And this is also an opportunity investment for Japan. Part of 

their money goes directly to the U.S. Treasury, yes, for us to spend 

as we see fit, but another large part of the money goes towards 

utilities and housing, which the Japanese are looking at as an investment not only for eventual recoverability perhaps in the future 

but also as a way to highlight and showcase Japanese leading-edge 

technologies in the area of, for example, renewable energy generation. This is also supporting U.S. forces that are sworn to defend 

Japan. 

So it is a bargain in that case, and it is also an agreement openly 

arrived at and, at least with the colleagues that we are talking 

with and the negotiations we are doing over Guam and other matters, willingly supported. 

I would add that with all the worries about Japan decision making, Japan re-examining decisions that they have made, every financial contribution they are obligated to make to date, and the 

next one is in the works now, and we are trying to figure out how 

to solve the notes and get it in there—there are no issues blocking 

it. We are just going through the bureaucracy to get the transfer 

of notes done. So all of this is a positive story. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you and thank you all for being here today. 

I am so happy we are discussing our relationship and partnership 

with the people of Japan. We are appreciate them so much. 

My family has a special appreciation of Okinawa. My late brother-in-law received the Navy Cross for helping seize Shuri Castle 

there. And I have visited, and it is just—again, the people of Okinawa, Japan, we greatly appreciate. 

But as we are thinking about restructuring at Okinawa to 

Guam—and I have been very fortunate to have visited Guam several times with Congresswoman Bordallo. How extraordinary, how 

patriotic the people are, of Guam. They have, of any American 

State or territory, the highest percentage of membership in the National Guard of any State or territory of the United States. The 

people are very, very patriotic; and the strategic location of Guam 

is so important to maintain and promote peace in the Pacific. 

With that, as we are hopefully going to be relocating troops and 

Marines, Secretary Pfannenstiel, does the Marine Corps support 

the realignment? And what are the plans for off-island and off-territory training? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Congressman. 

Yes, the Marine Corps does support the movement. I think we 

are making sure that the needs of the Marines, both in terms of 

housing and facilities and training ranges, are met and that the facilities that are in Guam are adequate. 

In terms of off-island training, there has been some discussion. 

The major issues tend to be logistical. If you are moving the Marines to Guam, trying to train, for example, on Tinian becomes just 
22 

a logistical and, to some extent, a very expensive problem, trying 

to move people as needed. So the primary focus and what we are 

working on right now is to develop the necessary training bases on 

Guam. 

Mr. WILSON. And for families, too, it has been—I was so impressed. I have a son serving in the Navy as a doctor, and I would 

be thrilled if he and his family were there at Guam. 

General Gregson, again, our relationship is so important with the 

people of Japan and Japan has a real commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Does this complicate its being included in the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella? 

Secretary GREGSON. Thank you for the question. 

No. The short answer is no. I don’t think it complicates Japan— 

the United States commitment to extend a deterrence with Japan. 

I would also note that Japan has been a very active supporter 

of the proliferation security initiative and has actually held some 

exercises with this in cooperation with the United States. In the 

wake of recent North Korean actions, both last year and this year, 

we have taken pains to assure Japan of our commitment to extend 

the deterrence. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Thank you, Congressman. I would say two 

things. 

I think it is also the case that particularly the current Government, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and others, have 

very much welcomed efforts by the United States to diminish the 

role of nuclear weapons in global politics. So they, as the only country to have experienced the tragedy of nuclear use, they appreciate 

that commitment, recognize that it is a distant one. But, at the 

same time, given the neighborhood and world that we live in today, 

the desire on the part of Japan and the United States to underscore that the deterrence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan 

remains robust and strong is extraordinarily important; and we try 

to underscore that in all of our statements and all of our private 

consultations with our Japanese friends. So they maintain both 

these goals and desires to diminish the role of nuclear weapons but 

also to recognize that extended deterrence on the part of the 

United States over Japan is an absolutely essential component of 

their overarching security needs. 

Mr. WILSON. As we conclude, another deterrence is a missile defense system. And I sincerely hope that we are making every effort 

to work with our Japanese allies to develop the most effective. We 

are dealing with an irrational situation in North Korea. I have actually gone and visited Pyongyang with Chairman Ortiz. And so we 

need—the best way to preserve peace in Northeast Asia truly to me 

is a very effective missile defense system. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to open this up to the panel. I am curious what the 

Japanese Government reaction was to the sinking of the Cheonan. 

Has it called for any changes within the Japanese defense forces? 

Has it led to any additional concerns? I just open that up. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. Congressman, to many friends in Asia, 

alas, it did not come as a surprise, given the very provocative ac-
23 

tions we have seen over decades from North Korea. I think sometimes we forget the takedown of the Korean Airlines, the brutal attack against the cabinet in which most were killed. These were all 

perpetrated by the North Korean Government. 

I think it would be fair to say that it has led to much stronger 

consultations on the part of the United States and Japan and 

South Korea. We met trilaterally last week in Seoul to underscore 

the steps we are taking. General Gregson has had a number of 

meetings with his counterparts. 

I think you will be seeing, particularly in South Korea, very clear 

commitments to new procurements in the arena of anti-submarine 

warfare and other kinds of military procurements. 

Japan has made similar commitments, and I think you are going 

to see a renewed effort at exercises and other training designed to 

protect against these kinds of attacks, both from the blue or from 

the lurking submarines; and it is also a reminder of the importance 

of vigilance just across the spectrum in the Asian-Pacific arena. 

Secretary GREGSON. There are historic problems between Korea 

and Japan. But I would add, in addition to Secretary Campbell’s 

remarks, that trilateral cooperation in the security arena really accelerated after last year’s North Korea nuclear episode and has 

continued to accelerate and has been given even more impetus by 

the sinking of the Cheonan, which served as a reminder to all of 

us that that is a very dangerous neighborhood that we all live in. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, if I could, there are, as we sadly know, 

copycat crimes. You would imagine there would therefore be copycat terrorism. So if there is a successful act somewhere, perpetrators get away. Who is tracking the proliferation of that type of submarine by the North Koreans? Who are they selling them to? How 

many are they making? Where are they going? 

Secretary GREGSON. We have an extensive effort to track North 

Korean arms sales. I would be happy to provide details for the 

record. 

Mr. TAYLOR. If you would, please. 

Secretary GREGSON. Okay. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last question, if I may, I still have a couple minutes. Tell me 

what, if anything, is the Japanese Government doing to participate 

in our efforts in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GREGSON. The Japanese are the second-largest contributor to our efforts in Afghanistan. Their financial contributions— 

their previous financial contributions helped to rebuild the Afghan 

Ring Road and to pay the salaries of the Afghanistan National Police. They pledged an additional $5 billion that will go to support 

the pillars of our—many of the pillars of our Afghanistan policy 

and strategy, the reintegration, the development, education, a 

number of things. We are very happy with Japan’s contribution 

there. 

And I would add also that Japan is a contributor to the maritime 

security operations in the Gulf of Aden in the North Arabian Sea, 

and they also provide forces for a number of U.N. security missions 

that we support. 
24 

Secretary CAMPBELL. The truth is, if I could say, Congressman, 

is that Japan has not gotten enough credit for actually very generous support on a range of issues. 

And what is different, if I may say, about this particular commitment than certain things in the past is sometimes in the past we 

have had to go to the Japanese and say, can you support us in this 

endeavor or that endeavor? This was a Japanese initiative. They 

came to us in the fall and said, we would like to support you. Here 

are the things that we can think would make sense. Do you have 

any recommendations or suggestions? 

We have altered a few of these things, but if all of our allies 

stepped up in this way, we would be in a very different situation 

than we are today in Afghanistan. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. ORTIZ. We will go to the lady from Guam, Congresswoman 

Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. This is a very important hearing for me. 

Secretary Gregson, Secretary Pfannenstiel, and Secretary Campbell, thank you for your testimonies. 

The realignment of Marines from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam is 

a critical part of our relationship with the Japanese. The realignment of military forces was first signed in 2006 by the Bush administration and was reaffirmed by Secretary Clinton when she signed 

the so-called Guam International Agreement in February of 2009. 

Our relationship with the Government of Japan has significant impacts for Guam. 

The realignment of Marines, positioning of a transient carrier 

berth, and a placement of a missile defense system will place a significant burden on my constituents. We must do all that we can to 

ensure that we get this done right; and this is what Mr. Skelton, 

our Chairman, has said from the very beginning. 

Secretary Pfannenstiel, I appreciated your leadership in working 

with Nancy Sutley, Chairwoman of the White House Council on 

Environmental Quality; Under Secretary Dorothy Robyn; and Assistant Secretary Tony Babauta in providing presentations to local 

elected leaders and the public on Guam about the findings in the 

Final EIS. I just arrived from Guam, and I was there during all 

of the meetings. 

Your presence on Guam for these presentations highlights the attention and the support that this Administration has for getting 

the build-up done right. However, I have continued to have significant concerns about the findings in the Final EIS. 

We have made significant progress in identifying funds for infrastructure improvements; and while I applaud the progress made in 

using Japanese funds for upgrades to our infrastructure, this Congress must understand how these funds will be used and what 

strings are attached. We made it clear that we want to understand 

this new construct before funds are used according to a reporting 

requirement in the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill. 

Further, I will reiterate my skepticism that the Department of 

the Navy will be successful in obtaining private or Government of 

Guam lands in the Pagat area to develop a training range for the 
25 

Marine Corps. While I appreciate the readiness requirements of the 

Marines, I believe more creative options are available to meet these 

training requirements, including moving this training range entirely to Tinian or to areas at Anderson Air Force base or Naval 

Magazine. I request that the Department of the Navy work to develop alternative plans, because I, frankly, remain very skeptical 

that the preferred alternative will be achieved, and I am adamantly opposed to the use of eminent domain to acquire these 

lands if local landowners are not willing to sell or lease. 

I am very supportive and I have been all along of the military 

build-up, but we need, again, to get this done right. 

With that said, I would like to ask a few questions. 

First to you, Secretary Pfannenstiel, a recent report in Guam 

News indicates that the National Historic Preservation Trust has 

retained legal counsel and is considering a legal challenge to the 

placement of the training range on Pagat cliff line. Can I assume 

that the Department will work collaboratively with the Preservation Trust to better understand the decision to locate at Pagat? 

And, similarly, how will the Record of Decision address the matter of a training range on Pagat and how the Department plans to 

acquire land? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Congresswoman. Thank 

you for your support of the build-up, your help last week in communicating with the elected officials and the people of Guam. It 

was, as always, a real treat to be there, and I really appreciated 

your help in that. 

In specific answer to your questions, first, let me take the one 

about the National Historic Preservation Trust. I also just saw a 

reference to the possibility of legal counsel. 

I want to assure you we have been working with the National 

Historic Preservation Trust and will continue to do so. As we discussed last week, we believe that the preservation of the Pagat Village site as a very special cultural place for Guam is consistent 

with the training range. I think that we need to work very closely 

with the community in assuring that the community has the access 

they need, that there is nothing in the training range that will 

damage in any way or interfere with the use of that site. 

I believe, as we discussed last week, that that can be done. I 

know it requires some additional work, and we are there to do that. 

As far as how the Record of Decision will deal with the acquisition of the property, we do have more work to do on the property 

needs, the property needs primarily for the training ranges. I think 

there are other property needs, but the one that is of most concern 

at the moment is for the training ranges. We are working on that. 

We need to both define what the requirements specifically are so 

that we can examine throughout whether there are other possibilities. We put in our preferred alternative. We believe that will still 

work, and we need to look at how that will happen. 

In terms of acquiring the land, we have not begun discussions 

with landowners. We are waiting for the Final EIS to define that 

and then for the ROD to come out. But we will engage in discussions with landowners. We are committed to purchasing whatever 

land we need if we do need to purchase additional land, purchase 

or lease or exchange if that would work. So we believe that there 
26 

are a number of ways we can achieve what we need to achieve 

meeting the needs of the people of Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, since this is so vitally important, 

I have one last question. 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] We will come back to you very quickly and give you another 5 minutes. Be right back. 

General Gregson, at the end of the realignment, will the Marine 

Corps requirements be met and will their capabilities be enhanced 

by moving from Okinawa to Guam? 

Secretary GREGSON. I think I would defer to Marine Corps representatives to state whether their requirements will be met. However, it is the Defense Department’s goal that we do meet all of the 

requirements. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. I am asking you in your professional 

opinion, General. I will repeat the question. 

Secretary GREGSON. No, sir. Yes, they will be met. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ortiz, and then we will return to—— 

Oh, excuse me. Excuse me, Mr. Wilson. Did you have a question? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

One final question with regard to missile defense. With the increased capability of range from North Korea, we have all known 

that South Korea, that Japan are at risk, possibly Taiwan. But I 

am very concerned that, in fact, Hawaii, Alaska are now within 

range; and how can we assure the people of Hawaii that we are 

proceeding with a missile defense that can protect the people of 

that State? 

Secretary GREGSON. We are doing everything we can to provide 

a solid missile defense regime. We are also in cooperation with our 

friends in both Korea and Japan on this. 

Japan, as we mentioned, has invested in BMD-capable Aegis destroyers. We recently completed the cooperative development of the 

Standard Missile-3 Block II upgrade to those missiles which will 

allow the Japanese ships to engage much longer range than they 

would have been able to otherwise. We are working with the Republic of Korea on missile defense. 

This has to be a cooperative effort. No nation can protect itself 

as well as it should be without cooperation from other countries, 

and that is the direction that we are going with this. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am just so hopeful with people as technologically proficient as the people in Japan working together we can 

protect our American States of Hawaii and Alaska. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know how we can work this out. We have been 

one big family for a long time; and I think that the forward presence is very, very important to me and to our military. But I am 

just wondering, does all this realignment, is it supported by the 

Marine Corps, this realignment? Do they support it? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Yes, sir, they do. They need to have 

their needs met. They need to have their training needs fully met. 

And, with that, with housing that is the right housing, with housing and facilities that work for them, the training ranges that meet 

their training needs, yes, they will support this. 
27 

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the things that we have seen in the past few 

years during these two wars is that before we send our young men 

and women into harm’s way we need to be sure that they have the 

proper training, that they have the proper equipment. And how 

long will it take for them to get the training areas solved before— 

do we have any idea? 

Secretary GREGSON. If I could. Thanks to the efforts of the members of this committee and many other colleagues up here on the 

Hill, we have in the United States an absolutely unparalleled, outstanding training and force generation base. With the number of 

installations we have in the continental United States, Hawaii, and 

Alaska, it is simply impossible to recreate that whole capability 

anyplace other than where it is now. 

But what we will be able to do is, as Secretary Gates has said, 

make our training capabilities in the Pacific as competent as it can 

be and make it increasingly bilateral in nature so that we have the 

ability not only to do training ourselves but to train with our allies 

and friends. 

We will expand the training areas available to our forces in the 

Pacific as much as we can, but these, as we all realize, get into 

some complex international negotiations. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas just 

north of Guam has a covenant with the United States, but it is 

treated like a territory. We still have a lease on the major portion 

of Tinian Island. The Compact States, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republics of the Marshalls and Palau, have a compact 

with the United States that obliges them to make training areas 

available for the United States. We plan on taking advantage of 

that much more than we have in the past. 

To support our forces in Korea as well as forces in Japan now, 

we have a mix of training that is done locally and also the rotation 

of units from the United States to Japan or to Korea for a period 

of duty and then back to the United States again so that we can 

take advantage of the force generation capabilities, the training capabilities that are available here that may not in their fullest 

measure be available overseas. 

So to the Chairman’s previous question about will the Marines 

requirements be taken care of, yes. There is a longer answer that 

involves all the details about how the Department of Defense, with 

the full cooperation of the Department of the Navy, the Marine 

Corps, the Navy, the Air Force, and their associated departments 

to manage the training and the rotation of forces overseas. So we 

have absolutely our best foot forward in a very difficult and dangerous region, and also before we put young Americans in harm’s 

way we assure they have the absolute best training and qualifications that we can get them. 

Mr. ORTIZ. One last question. If I understand correctly, we have 

a new Governor in Okinawa? 

Secretary GREGSON. No. I forget when the election was. His 

name is Governor Nakaima. He is, in my opinion, a very strong 

leader. We look forward to working with him. 

Mr. ORTIZ. He is running for reelection—I was just corrected. He 

is running for reelection in November as well. 
28 

Secretary GREGSON. November 28th is the election date, to my 

understanding. 

Mr. ORTIZ. He is receptive to the idea of what we are planning 

on doing? 

Secretary GREGSON. He is a champion for his constituents. So, 

within that limit, he is receptive to the ideas and what we are 

doing. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Now back to Ms. Bordallo for another 5 minutes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Pfannenstiel, I just want to further—you answered my 

question by saying things are being worked out. Well, I was there 

during the protests, and there was strong opposition to the Pagat 

site, and I didn’t feel very comfortable about it. If things can be 

worked out, fine. It didn’t look very promising to me. But do you 

have an alternative? Are you working on some kind of an alternative site? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Congresswoman, we are always looking 

at available land, trying to determine whether we can find land 

that would meet the needs in a very safe manner. 

We have examined the use of the site near Pagat to make sure 

that it is both safe and in no way will affect the site. However, we 

do recognize that there is a community issue, and we want to be 

responsive to that. 

We started initially by looking at many other sites, and this was 

the one that was recommended to us that seemed to meet all of the 

criteria that we needed in terms of size and safety and traffic and 

accessibility and convenience to both the Marines and not interfering with the community. If it turns out this one doesn’t work, 

then we will, of course, continue to look. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Look for an alternative. I hope so. Because I do 

want it to work. And we knew that when the Final EIS would come 

out that this and also the port, the berthing area, there would be 

a problem. But this in particular really made the news, and I was 

there with the protesters, so I realized that they are in strong opposition. 

I have one more question here. Secretary Gregson or Secretary 

Campbell, there have been cuts to the military construction budget 

for Guam in the Senate as well as from our appropriator friends 

in the House. One item that is cited for the cuts is the lack of tangible progress on the replacement Futenma facility in Okinawa. In 

the past, we have been led to believe that tangible progress meant 

the Governor signing a permit for a new landfill. Has what constitutes tangible progress shifted? 

Furthermore, what impact do the military construction cuts have 

on the Guam International Agreement, and do you have any concerns that these cuts will cause hurdles in implementing fiscal year 

2010 and 2011 funding for Guam? 

Secretary GREGSON. Thank you for the question. I will defer to 

Secretary Pfannenstiel on the executability of the funds in the proposed budget. 
29 

My concern on the cuts is that—well, let me address the tangible 

progress first. 

With the new Government coming to power in Japan, we obviously went through a period of re-examination and revalidation. 

That re-examination and revalidation is over. The essential character and the operations of the alliance have been revalidated. 

Most importantly, very senior Japanese leadership has endorsed 

the U.S. presence in Japan and specifically in Okinawa. Minister 

Kan—Prime Minister Kan has pledged a solution to the Futenma 

replacement problem. The May 28th agreement that was signed at 

the Secretary of Defense/Secretary of State level with their counterparts established the location for the new facility to be Camp 

Schwab, as it was originally planned, and mandated an experts’ 

group to work through the rest of the details. That group is very 

active. It is meeting as we speak. 

The remaining details to be worked out are details of the method 

of construction and the exact configuration of the facilities that will 

be constructed and where exactly the runways will be. 

We do not yet have tangible progress. We are confident we will 

get there. 

And my worry about on the policy side with the proposed cuts 

to the budget are that this will induce some doubt within the Japanese body politic on whether we are committed to our part of the 

agreement. So, from that manner, if asked, I would counsel against 

those cuts. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. There being no further questions, we certainly 

thank the panel for being with us and for your testimony. We look 

forward to seeing you again. 

The hearing has ended. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 27, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 27, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 27, 2010 

(67) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Secretary GREGSON. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), through the 

Federal Highway Administration and the Maritime Administration (MARAD), and 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have begun to address Guam’s infrastructure deficiencies and future needs. USDA has already provided $15 million in 

grants and $88 million in pending loans for landfill and utilities improvements. 

USDA is poised to provide $50 million in grants and matching loans to the $50 

million the Department of Defense has requested for improvement to Guam’s sole 

commercial port. These funds would be used for the planning, design, and construction of projects to improve facilities, relieve port congestion, and provide greater access to port facilities, and would be managed by MARAD under the Port of Guam 

Improvement Enterprise Program. [See page 10.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Secretary GREGSON. Our extensive effort to deter, track, and stop North Korean 

arms sales includes working closely with the international community. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 prohibits North Korea from transferring all conventional arms; however, illicit North Korean shipments interdicted 

since May 2009 suggest that sanctions have not deterred Pyongyang from attempting such transfers. Illicit activities represent an important source of North Korean 

hard currency—indicating that Pyongyang is unlikely to cease arms export activity. 

According to a UN report, there are at least four cases involving interdicted arms 

exports from North Korea since the adoption of UNSCR 1874. 

• In July 2009, UAE authorities seized containers of the cargo ship ANL Australia carrying conventional arms cargo from North Korea to a Middle East customer. According to open source reports, the seized cargo included 122mm rockets and rocket propelled grenades. 

• In October 2009, South Korea seized four containers of North Korean-origin 

chemical warfare protective suits destined for Syria. 

• In December 2009, Thailand seized 35 tons of North Korean-origin weapons, including 240mm rockets, RPG–7s, and MANPADS, aboard an IL–76 cargo aircraft ultimately bound for Iran. 

• In February 2010, South Africa seized North Korea-origin tanks spare parts onboard a cargo vessel in the port of Durban. The T54/55 components were bound 

for the Republic of Congo. 

According to a UN panel of experts report, North Korea uses various methods to 

circumvent UNSCRs 1718 and 1874 and ship conventional weapons, including falsifying end user certificates and mislabeling crates, sending cargo through multiple 

front companies and intermediaries, and using air cargo to handle high value and 

sensitive arms exports. In addition to shipping complete conventional weapons systems, North Korea also transports conventional arms in the form of knock-down 

kits, which can be transported along with North Korean technicians to provide a 

country with a weapons assembly capability. If desired by the Committee, I would 

be happy to provide additional classified information on the export of submarine and 

submarine technology by North Korea. [See page 23.] 

Æ