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THE TUAREG REVOLT AND THE MALI COUP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 29, 2012

Serial No. 112–173

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................... 5

The Honorable Earl Gast, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, U.S. 

Agency for International Development .............................................................. 16

Mr. Nii Akuetteh, independent Africa analyst (former Georgetown University 

professor of African affairs) ................................................................................. 32

Mr. Rudolph Atallah, senior fellow, Michael S. Ansari Center, Atlantic Council ........................................................................................................................... 42

Mr. Dave Peterson, senior director, Africa, National Endowment for Democracy ........................................................................................................................ 57

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement ........................................... 8

The Honorable Earl Gast: Prepared statement ..................................................... 18

Mr. Nii Akuetteh: Prepared statement .................................................................. 34

Mr. Rudolph Atallah: Prepared statement ............................................................ 45

Mr. Dave Peterson: Prepared statement ............................................................... 60

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 68

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 69

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights: Written statement by Michael Gabaudan, M.D., 

President, Refugees International ...................................................................... 70

Written response from the Honorable Johnnie Carson to question submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas .................................................................. 76

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith 

and written responses from: 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson .......................................................................... 77

Mr. Nii Akuetteh .................................................................................................. 80

Mr. Rudolph Atallah ............................................................................................ 86

Mr. Dave Peterson ............................................................................................... 89

(1)

THE TUAREG REVOLT AND THE MALI COUP 

FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. Today’s hearing will examine current U.S. policy and U.S. policy options in response to the recent military coup in Malawi and the 

larger revolt of the Tuareg people in Northern Malawi. 

The Tuaregs have been in conflict with the Central Government 

in Bamako, Mali for many years, but following the service of some 

Tuaregs as mercenaries for the late Muammar Ghadafi of Libya, 

the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons from the Libyan conflict and increasing ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, they 

now pose a danger, not only to Mali, but also to Algeria, Niger, 

Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and perhaps even Nigeria. 

Meanwhile, Mali, in recent years, has been a model of African 

democracy, now finds itself struggling to resurrect democratic governance and put the military back in its proper role as part of the 

government. The downfall of Mali’s democracy could have a negative impact on the future of Mali as well as the entire Sahel region 

of Africa. 

Amadou Toumani Toure, popularly known as ATT, led a military 

coup in 1991 that created a transitional government and democratic elections in 1992. Mali’s growing reputation for democratic 

rule was enhanced in 2002 when President Alpha Oumar Konare, 

having served the two terms permitted under the Constitution, 

stepped down, and ATT, running as an independent and leveraging 

his reputation as Mali’s soldier of democracy, was elected President. 

Unfortunately, two issues eroded ATT’s initial popularity. The 

first was a political system in which there appears to have been incentives for corruption. Certainly, there was a growing public perception that the system was corrupt. The second was popular anger 

toward the government’s handling of the Tuareg rebellion in the 

North. Weeks of protests at the government’s response to the 

Northern rebellion dropped ATT’s popularity to a new low. 

On March 21, 2012, mutinying Malian soldiers displeased with 

the management of the Tuareg rebellion, attacked several locations 

2

in the capital of Bamako, including the Presidential Palace, state 

television, and military barracks. The soldiers said they had 

formed the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy 

and State, and declared the following day that they had overthrown the government. This forced ATT into hiding. 

As a consequence of the instability following the coup, Mali’s 

three largest northern cities, Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu were overrun by the rebels on 3 consecutive days. On April 5, 2012, after the 

capture of the town of Duwenza, the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad, or the MNLA, said that it had accomplished its 

goals and called off its offensive. 

The following day, it proclaimed independence of their homeland, 

Azawad, from Mali. The Islamic Group, Ansar al-Dine, was later 

part of the rebellion, claiming control of swaths of territory, although this control was disputed by the MNLA. On May 26, 2012, 

the MNLA and Ansar al-Dine announced that they had signed a 

pact to join their respective territories and form an Islamic state. 

Will this alliance last? Perhaps not. The MNLA is an offshoot of 

a previous nationalist political movement and is dedicated to a separate homeland for the Tuaregs and Moors who comprise its membership. Ansar al-Dine, whose name means ‘‘Defenders of Faith,’’ is 

an Islamic group believed to have links with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other Islamic groups. 

Ansar al-Dine is dedicated to establishing Shariah law, not only 

in Azawad, but also in the rest of Mali as well. Disputes between 

the two groups already have resulted in gunfire involving the supposed allies. As we hold this hearing, the Economic Community of 

West African States, the African Union, and the United Nations 

are discussing the viability of a peacekeeping mission in Mali. 

Such a mission would look to secure and protect civilian institutions and help restructure the Mali military. However, it will also 

focus on the situation in the North, which will be a tremendously 

sensitive matter, especially if the mission of the peacekeeping force 

is to retake territory from the MNLA and Ansar al-Dine. To add 

further to the problematic nature of the response of the Mali coup, 

and the Tuareg revolt, there is the matter of providing humanitarian aid to the 210,000 Malian refugees in Niger, Mauritania, 

Burkina Faso, and Algeria. 

Another 167,000 Malians are internally displaced. Many of them 

are in remote areas and are difficult to reach with food and medical 

supplies. There is the question of how effective our aid efforts will 

be in such a challenging situation. But no matter how difficult this 

matter is to address, there are too many people affected for the 

United States to fail to provide leadership in the effort to solve this 

political, and social, and humanitarian crisis. 

To discuss this effort, to devise a satisfactory solution to a problematic situation, we have a very distinguished panel of leaders, 

and in a moment, we will introduce them, but it is my privilege 

and honor to yield such time as she may consume to the ranking 

member, Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I especially want to thank you 

for working with me today to hold today’s hearing on the very serious developments that are unfolding in Mali and the Sahel. While 

we have held recent hearings on the economic growth and investVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Oct 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\AGH\062912\74863 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ment opportunities that exist across the continent as a result of 

AGOA, we turn our focus today to a country and region in the 

midst of a crisis and one that requires our focused attention. 

Thank you as well for your continued leadership and I look forward to working with you on this and other issues as we touch 

upon, not only the continent’s challenges, but the very real opportunities that showcase Africa’s rise and continued emergence on 

the global stage. 

Prior to the current crisis in Mali, many considered the country 

a bright star in West Africa. Mali had been holding free and fair 

elections since 1991 and Foreign Affairs extolled the Malian Government as a ‘‘reassuring symbol of Africa’s commitment to democracy.’’ The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 

has also made positive remarks on Mali’s democracy, saying that 

Mali had a ‘‘good record of democratic elections over the last two 

decades.’’ The U.S. Government developed a strong and positive relationship with Bamako, and our teams worked diligently on a 

range of efforts from development to regional security. This, unfortunately, all came to an abrupt and unfortunate halt in the brutal 

and bloody events in late March. 

Before the coup, Mali was an important partner in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership. The Partnership was established to strengthen regional government capacity to address the 

growing threats posed by terrorists and extremist groups, particularly those in the northern part of Mali, including, and importantly, AQIM. 

Our bilateral efforts through USAID were significant, focusing on 

good governance, agricultural development, health, education, and 

security assistance. The Millenium Challenge Corporation also had 

significant investments. The MCC compact was intended to serve 

as a catalyst for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction through key infrastructure developments, including the 

Bamako-Se ́nou International Airport, a gateway for regional and 

international trade, and the Niger River for irrigated agriculture. 

These and other programs have been terminated due to legal restrictions placed on countries that are experiencing, or have undergone, non-peaceful or non-democratic transitions, and I look forward to your testimony to see the impact of that interruption in 

support. This has resulted, of course, in the immediate halting of 

approximately $160 million in State Department and USAID-administered aid, a gap that adds negative pressure to an already 

dire situation. 

Since the March coup, I have followed very closely what is an expanding and complex set of events that has involved numerous 

players and a constellation of actors and interests. If there is to be 

sustained peace and stability in Bamako, Northern Mali, and the 

broader region, I believe concerted diplomatic efforts must be 

brought to bear in response to this evolving crisis. All efforts must 

be made to get Mali back on track toward a democratically-elected 

government. This must include setting a realistic date for elections. 

I urge our colleagues at the State Department and our international partners to redouble efforts toward a mediated solution, 

while working closely to preserve the unity and territorial integrity 

4

of Mali. I believe Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice have 

been unequivocal on this point. 

I also want to express deep concern for the conflict in the North, 

including what appear to be the advancing interests of AQIM as 

well as the emboldened Tuareg movement. 

With the fall of Tripoli, the flight of hundreds of thousands from 

Libya, and the coup in Bamako, a political and military vacuum 

has created conditions that have taken a deadly turn. This includes 

the imposition of harsh Sharia law on local populations and I hope 

that our panelists will address that to the extent that that is happening and what is going on. 

CRS reports that ‘‘increasingly brazen presence of AQIM commanders in Northern Mali, along with unconfirmed reports of fighters from Nigeria and Pakistan, have raised acute regional and 

Western concerns that Mali could become a launching pad for 

transnational terrorist attacks.’’ Some of these groups appear ready 

to cut ties with AQIM and some of the more extreme elements. We 

must work with our international partners toward a solution that 

sees the disassociation of these ties and the start of negotiations. 

ECOWAS, the U.N., and others are leading efforts toward addressing these very serious concerns extolled by various factions. In 

closing, let me briefly highlight my serious concern for the humanitarian crisis that is compounding a grim and difficult reality 

throughout the Sahel. Refugees International, Save the Children, 

Human Rights Watch reports claim that armed conflict in Mali has 

compounded an already desperate humanitarian situation in the 

Sahel, where over a 175,000 children are suffering from severe 

acute malnutrition. 

To date, the political and humanitarian crisis has led 325,000 

people to flee their homes and a 180,000 to cross borders to seek 

safety and basic access to food and water. Fifty-nine percent of 

these refugees are children. Various agencies have quickly scaled 

up its operations to address this crisis, but additional resources are 

critical for an effective and prompt delivery of aid, and hopefully 

also, you will address that in terms of the interruption and the potential impact on this. 

I understand it is not supposed to be interrupted in this area, 

but maybe you could address that. Displaced persons in Northern 

Mali are particularly at risk as rebel groups have prevented aid 

groups from operating in the region. Protection and security concerns are also looming as frequent banditry, kidnappings, and attacks on displaced populations and their host communities threaten to undermine an already fragile coexistence. 

Humanitarian assistance must be accompanied with long-term 

solutions that address the varied and complex threats that food insecurity, climate change, and regional instability presents in the 

Sahel region. Thank you and I look forward to today’s witness panels. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass, thank you very much. I would like to now 

introduce our very distinguished panel, beginning first with 

Johnnie Carson. Ambassador Johnnie Carson has been a frequent 

witness before this subcommittee. He currently serves as Assistant 

Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs, a position he 

has held since May 2009. Ambassador Carson has a long and disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Oct 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\AGH\062912\74863 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tinguished career in public service, including 37 years in the foreign service, including time as Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, and 

Zimbabwe. 

Ambassador Carson has also served as the staff director of this 

subcommittee and as a Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania. Ambassador Carson is also the recipient of numerous awards for his service from the State Department. 

We will then hear from Earl Gast, who is making his first appearance before our subcommittee since taking over his current 

post. He is USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Africa and has a 

21-year career working with USAID and leading development programming, especially in post-conflict in transitioning societies. 

Prior to his position, Mr. Gast served in Afghanistan, Columbia, 

Eastern Europe, and Rome. Mr. Gast was also one of the first 

USAID employees stationed in Iraq. 

He played an equally important role in developing the post-crisis 

strategy for Kosovo, monitoring all mission operations, most prominently, he received the agency award for heroism and distinguished 

unit award. Thank you for your service and, Ambassador Carson, 

if you would proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much 

for the kind introduction and thank you also for holding this very 

important hearing. I also want to acknowledge the presence of the 

ranking member on the subcommittee, Congresswoman Bass, and 

also Congressman Turner. We appreciate your support, and assistance, and your interest in Africa. 

Mali today is grappling with four overlapping crises that have 

compromised its stability as well as the security of neighboring 

countries in the Sahel. Mali is struggling to restore democracy and 

constitutional rule, to bring an end to the political rebellion of the 

Tuareg people, to actively combat the radical Islamic threat posed 

by AQIM and Ansar al-Dine, and to respond effectively to an expanding humanitarian crisis in the northern part of the country. 

A military coup d’etat on March 21 broke Mali’s 20-year tradition 

of democracy. In the aftermath, Tuareg groups that were leading 

a rebellion in the North of the country since January, used the political crisis to effectively partition the country in two. The terrorism threat with which Mali had been struggling prior to the outbreak of the rebellion has grown as al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb, known as AQIM, and other extremist groups have taken 

advantage of the power vacuum that exists in the northern part of 

Mali. 

Finally, the fighting and resulting instability has exacerbated the 

situation of food and security in Mali and the Sahel, and more than 

370,000 Malians have been displaced. These problems challenge 

not only the countries in the region, but also run counter to U.S. 

principles of good governance, civilian control over the military, 

and respect for human rights. In addition, the vast territory of 

Northern Mali provides a haven for AQIM and other extremist 

6

groups that may prove increasingly effective at targeting Western 

interests. 

These challenges are interrelated, yet the urgency of the situation demands that we address them simultaneously. Our engagement on Mali is based on two pillars of the administration’s African 

policy—strengthening democratic institutions and advancing peace 

and security. We also support the principle of regional ownership 

in the belief that sustainable solutions can only be derived from 

communication and cooperation with those most directly affected 

by the problem. 

On the political crisis, we are maintaining pressure on the coup 

leaders and the military to respect civilian leadership, to withdraw 

completely from politics, and to permit the full restoration of a 

democratically-elected government. At the same time, we are supporting the interim government in holding Presidential elections 

before the end of the interim government’s mandate in May 2013, 

as no lasting solution to the problems in Northern Mali will be possible without a legitimate interlocutor in Bamako. 

We believe the Tuareg rebellion is largely a political problem 

that requires addressing the legitimate and longstanding grievances of the Tuareg groups in Northern Mali. We support regional 

and international efforts to negotiate a resolution with these 

groups who have expressed a willingness to enter into dialog with 

the Malian Government. We reaffirm our commitment to the unity 

and the territorial integrity of Mali and will provide unequivocal 

support for a negotiated settlement along those principles. 

The key to successfully containing the insecurity emanating from 

Mali will be to immediately strengthen regional partners, such as 

Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria, and in the longer term, to work 

closely on a common international political approach to legitimize, 

and then to strengthen the political and security forces inside of 

Mali itself. 

The humanitarian crisis will require a sustained and coordinated 

response from the international community. We have provided 

more than $315 million in humanitarian and food assistance to 

those displaced by the conflict in the North and those affected by 

the region’s food crisis. We have provided $13.5 million in support 

to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other U.N. 

agencies to address the needs of Malian refugees. 

We are urging host countries to maintain their hospitality toward Malian refugees and to maintain the principle of first asylum. 

While the United States Government has made positive strides in 

working with regional neighbors to resolve this conflict, the ongoing and overlapping conflicts outlined above are far from being resolved. If Mali is going to effectively counter the Tuareg rebellion, 

the terrorist threats in the North, and return to a democratic example in the region, it will require sustained and dedicated efforts 

from the United States Government as well as those in the international community. 

Specifically, we will need to provide assistance consistent with 

U.S. law to increase economic and development assistance, and provide economic opportunities to disaffected young populations across 

Northern Mali. We will need to continue to build the capacity of 

7

Mali’s neighbors to control and protect their borders. Finally, we 

will need to help build resilience in Mali’s democratic institutions 

so that they are better able to represent the Malian people and to 

withstand the kinds of pressures that they have come under in the 

recent past. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you this morning. This is a summary of my longer statement, 

which you and the other committee members have. 

Mr. SMITH. And without objection, it will be made a part of the 

record. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. I have to announce there are two votes on the floor 

right now. We will take a very short recess and then come back 

and hear Mr. Gast. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your testimony. 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will resume its sitting. And, Mr. 

Gast, again, I apologize for the delay, but the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. GAST. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and Congressman Turner, thank you for inviting me to speak with you 

today. We are deeply concerned about the ongoing situation in 

Mali, the immediate threat to human lives and safety, prospects for 

a peaceful and democratic society, and future opportunities for economic prosperity. I would like to provide an update on the current 

situation and how it has affected our development program as well 

as outline the key factors that are needed for development to 

progress. 

Mali is facing a complex emergency that consists of a political 

crisis, a major drought, and threats to internal and regional security. These interrelated crises call for a careful and comprehensive 

response. It is important to emphasize that the situation in Mali 

is fluid and dynamic. Though we are closely monitoring the situation and consulting with other donors and key stakeholders, it is 

extremely difficult to get a complete picture of the situation in the 

North. 

As of early-June, 4.6 million persons throughout Mali are facing 

food insecurity. It is estimated that more than 159,000 persons are 

displaced within Mali and an additional 182,000 have fled to neighboring Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. In the North, violence 

and division are exacerbating the food crisis and access to medicine 

and health services is practically non-existent. Government revenues are one-quarter the level they were just 1 year ago, and accordingly, government provision of basic social services has fallen 

sharply throughout the country. 

Though USAID has made significant contributions to Malian development through its long engagement in the country, and the 

hard work and diligence of the Malian people, recent events stand 

to reverse these gains. Prior to the coup, USAID’s broad development portfolio included activities to strengthen democratic institutions, grow the agricultural sector, support literacy and education, 

improve community health and health systems, and manage instability and threats in the North. 

And Mali had made significant gains over the past decade. Annual economic growth had averaged more than 5 percent and poverty had been reduced from 56 percent in 2001 to 44 percent in 

2010. In the same time period, child mortality had been cut in half, 

Mali liberalized its cereals market, opened up trade routes, and improved conditions for doing business. Agricultural production increased, particularly in areas where USAID has been active. 

On April 10, 2012, the United States Government formally terminated assistance to the Government of Mali, consistent with coup 

17

restrictions in the appropriations act. The activities that were terminated included public school construction as well as capacity 

building for the Government of Mali. However, USAID continues to 

address the emergency health, nutrition, and food needs of the Malian people. To date, in Fiscal Year 2012, we have provided more 

than $50 million to address humanitarian needs within Mali. 

Other lifesaving health and food security programs are under 

consideration for resumption as part of a case-by-case policy and 

legal review. In evaluating which programs can move forward in 

light of the applicable legal restrictions, we consider whether they 

provide essential lifesaving assistance, whether they support children, whether they strengthen food security, or advance U.S. foreign policy. We also consider operational issues, including efficient 

oversight and management. 

This case-by-case analysis ensures that there is careful consideration of the context, including how to protect previous U.S. Government investments. Before the coup, USAID was the largest donor 

supporting Mali’s planned April 2012 elections, with activities that 

provided training of poll workers, political party strengthening, 

elections monitoring, and voter education. If the electoral support 

activities resume, assistance would help support a foundation for 

free and fair elections in Mali and a peaceful political exit from the 

current situation. 

The only USAID-supported economic growth activities that are 

continuing in Mali are those that address food security. Agricultural assistance has focused on supporting farmers and herders to 

increase production in the current planting season. Particularly, in 

light of dire food needs, this assistance is critical to improve access 

to inputs, increase production, and increase resilience to drought. 

Some health sector activities have been approved to continue in 

order to provide lifesaving interventions. 

These programs include preventing maternal and child mortality, 

identifying and treating malaria, and other critical communitybased health interventions. The restoration of democracy with a return to a development focus in Mali is important to the region and 

to Africa as a whole. Lives and livelihoods are at great risk without 

the prompt resolution of the current political, security, and food crises. 

Under the right conditions, Mali has the potential to be a major 

food producer for the region as well as advanced trade and economic growth. Its history of partnership with the United States to 

improve health, education, and living conditions is noteworthy. As 

the situation evolves, we remain vigilant to changes in the operating environment and the risks and opportunities involved. While 

USAID can provide immediate relief to the people, help set the 

foundations for democratic elections, and provide basic services in 

the interim, Mali’s future development must be led by the Malian 

people. 

This can only be achieved through a duly elected and 

participatory government along with peace and stability. Thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I welcome 

any questions you might have. 

18

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Gast, thank you so very much for that testimony. 

And without objection, your full statement, and any other materials 

you’d like to have added, will be made a part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]


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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Carson, if I could just ask you with regard to the peacekeeping mission, the estimates are that some 

3000 peacekeepers would be needed. You did speak about it to 

some extent in your testimony. If you could just elaborate on 

whether ECOWAS can provide a sufficient number of troops. 

Where will the money come from? How much do we expect that we 

might bear, or provide I should say, to that effort? And when it 

comes to the parameters of the mission, could give us some details 

as to what U.S. policy and U.S. hopes and recommendations would 

be for them, including the rules of engagement for such a peacekeeping mission? 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for 

that question. We, ourselves, are waiting to hear from ECOWAS 

about precisely what they plan to do, and how they plan to do it, 

and how they intend to fund it. We have maintained an open mind 

about what they are going to do, although we do recognize that 

there are different scenarios of complexity that could be undertaken. The reality is that ECOWAS should not undertake a mission 

that is not properly planned, that is not adequately financed, and 

one that does not adequately consider the long term. 

Generally speaking, I think that it is important for ECOWAS to 

think first about ensuring the safety and the integrity of those officials in Bamako who are responsible for leading a transition back 

to a full constitutional and democratically-elected government. And 

I think that would be a much more definable, limited, and supportable operation rather than looking at the complexities of immediately trying to do anything in the North. 

One has to take into account that the government in the South 

has no effective military now. It lost over half of its equipment 

when it left the northern part of the country. And so any effort to 

look at retaking the North would be a significant undertaking for 

ECOWAS and for the states there. It must be thought out carefully, and planned well, and resourced appropriately. But I think 

the focus should be on the South at this point. 

Mr. SMITH. Can I just ask you about rules of engagement? I will 

never forget on a trip to Darfur, meeting with a Major Ajumbo who 

was very upset with the rules of engagement of that deployment, 

it was early in the deployment, and he had also been deployed to 

Sarajevo during the Yugoslavian crisis, and said, for him, it was 

like deja vu. It was like we were not here to protect, we are here 

to provide the appearance of protection. I never forgot those words. 

And given the fact that, the U.N., and even the AU, but especially the U.N., has had some major catastrophies, UNPROFOR in 

Yugoslavia, for example, the problems in Rwanda when General 

Dallaire certainly had sent that famous fax that went unattended 

to at the United Nations, and of course, the killing fields in Rwanda are infamous forever. And it might have been in whole or in 

part prevented by adequate interventions. 

So the rules of engagement are something that I know you and 

all of us are very concerned about. What would be your sense as 

to where this peacekeeping mission would be when it comes to the 

rules of engagement? 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to prejudge 

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ward, but I do want to underscore that undertaking a military operation in the North of Mali, an area that is the size of France, 

would require a major effort——

Mr. SMITH. Well, I am speaking, Mr. Ambassador, even about 

protection of other areas where hostilities could ensue. Remember 

Srebrenica, the so-called safe haven where, within the scope of a 

week, 8000 Muslims, in that case, were butchered as the Dutch 

peacekeepers handed off protection of those men to Mladic. 

Ambassador CARSON. Yes. No, understood. Again, I am not going 

to presume even what the rules of engagement would be in the 

South, but I do believe that there is probably, at this immediate 

time, more of a role to be played in the South than there is in the 

North, leaving open the prospect, at sometime, that there will need 

to be an engagement in the North to help reconstitute the state 

and to deal with the terrorist problem that AQIM and Ansar alDine pose. 

Mr. SMITH. You know, I do have about a dozen questions, but we 

do have votes at 12 o’clock and a second panel, so I will ask only 

one to Mr. Gast. You talked about the $50 million, and obviously, 

the situation in terms of protecting our own USAID people, you 

know, has to be a very high priority and a concern. How much are 

we providing for refugees and for IDPs? And what is the unmet 

need, perhaps according to you, or HCR or any other entity that 

has come up with a number? 

Mr. GAST. Thank you for the question and it is difficult to target 

just the IDPs because what we have is a crisis throughout the——

Mr. SMITH. And the refugees too. 

Mr. GAST. What we have is a crisis throughout the Sahel and I 

know, Congressman, that you are very concerned about the situation. And there are 19 million people who are in need of food aid 

throughout the Sahel. So before the coup had taken place, and before the security conditions had worsened, and before we had the 

refugees, the estimate of those who were food insecure in Mali was 

about 3 million. And now that figure has nearly doubled, about 5.5 

million persons are food insecure. 

Obviously, the IDPs who have remained in country, and roughly 

a 140,000 are food insecure, and part of that larger number. So 

part of our $50 million response, it is not just for the 140,000 who 

are displaced internally, it is for the larger population. PRM is supporting refugees, roughly a 160,000 to a 180,000, in Niger and 

Burkina Faso, and the amount of money that they have programmed to date is roughly $10 million. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Ms. Bass? 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Once again, I want to thank our two representatives here for your testimony today and as I mentioned to 

you, Mr. Gast, it was great to see you over here and I appreciate 

you hosting us when we were in Uganda. It was just a short time 

period, but it was very eye-opening; appreciate that. And also appreciate the time the Ambassador took the other day in giving me 

an overall briefing of the Africa section. 

I wanted to ask you a few questions about the Tuareg. Ambassador, you mentioned that they are primarily a political problem 

and I wanted to know if you could describe a little bit more in deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Oct 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\AGH\062912\74863 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tail about what you mean. What is the political problem and then 

what might a solution be? 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you very much. The Tuareg are only 

one of many groups that occupy Northern Mali, but they are a nomadic group that has felt politically marginalized by a government 

which has been largely dominated by Southerners. They have felt 

that their economic, and social, and political needs have not been 

catered to. Not enough positions in government and in the civil 

service. 

Ms. BASS. Were they restricted from running for office or anything? 

Ambassador CARSON. No. 

Ms. BASS. No? 

Ambassador CARSON. No, they are not, but because they are nomadic, issues of education were a part of this. But there has also 

been a feeling that not enough development assistance has flowed 

into the Tuareg regions, not enough money put into education, not 

enough money put into health care, not enough money put into 

roads and to infrastructure, and not enough money put into economic development. 

This is a political problem that has existed, not just since Mali’s 

independence over the last 10 years, but is a problem that has existed going back to the era of French Colonialism. The Tuaregs felt 

disadvantaged, even under the French, and they have felt disadvantaged since independence. They have frequently rebelled and 

in 2006/2007, the government in Mali and the Tuareg came to an 

agreement called the Algiers Accord, negotiated by the Algerians, 

to address some of the many social, economic, and political 

marginalization issues of the Tuareg. 

The Tuareg felt that this agreement was not honored and that 

led to a resumption of combat and fighting. But the reality is, is 

that, this is a political issue, a feeling of marginalization, lack of 

inclusion, and a lack of economic and social services in the northern part of the country. 

Ms. BASS. So if it wasn’t dealt with appropriately when Mali was 

doing well, what would you envision, you know, the future being? 

How would, or should, can, it be resolved? 

Ambassador CARSON. Absolutely. Very good question. I think 

there need to be more guarantees from the international community to support those development projects, which the government 

in Bamako agrees to undertake with respect to the Tuareg. If, in 

fact, there is a political agreement that says that there are going 

to be X number of schools, hospitals, and kilometers of road built, 

X number of wells, I think that the international community needs 

to come forward to serve as one of the guarantors, one of the financiers of the projects that are undertaken. 

On the political side, I think there needs to be more transparency 

to ensure that more Tuareg citizens, more citizens of the North 

who have Tuareg ethnicity, are included in the civil service and are 

included in government positions. But on the economic side, I think 

there is a way to ensure that money is allocated and is appropriately used for the North. And I do make a very sharp and clear 

distinction of the Tuareg issue as a political issue. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

27

Ambassador CARSON. The issue of AQIM and Ansar is a terrorist 

issue. They need to be handled separately. And we should not, in 

the effort to respond to the Tuareg issue, drive them into the hands 

of Ansar al-Dine or into the hands of the Islamists. 

Ms. BASS. Well, and it leads me to another question because I 

believe you, or it might have been Mr. Gast, mentioned that one 

of the things that needs to be done is we need to build resilience 

in the institutions, but yet at the same time, we are restricted, 

right? I mean, the aid that you talked about we are limited to, I 

know, is the humanitarian aid, and we are not allowed to contribute resources to the very thing that you said. So my additional 

question is, do you think it is too restrictive? Is there something 

that we need to do legislatively to provide more flexibility? 

Mr. GAST. So we are authorized to work on food security and the 

big concern. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. GAST. The problem that we have is one of access. Because 

it is so dangerous in the North because fighting continues, it is 

very difficult for us to have access. 

Ms. BASS. But I wasn’t referring to the humanitarian part because I understood that that was okay. It was the part about us 

building institutions, the schools, you know, whatever, that we are 

not allowed to now, right? 

Mr. GAST. So we are not building schools. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. GAST. We are not supporting government operations, which 

would include education, at this point. We are working in the 

health sector because that is providing lifesaving support. We are 

working, in addition to humanitarian assistance, food security and 

working with private farmers and associations to try and strengthen food security. 

Ambassador CARSON. Congresswoman Bass, may I just add to 

that to say that we do have the capacity to use funding to help the 

government move back toward democracy. And if there is a roadmap and a timetable for the return to democracy, including for support to elections, we have the latitude to work in that democratic 

space. And certainly, after there is a return to a civilian and democratic government, then we would be able to do more beyond just 

support of elections and then look at ways to put money into 

strengthening the other democratic institutions, the independence 

of the judiciary, the capacity of the legislature, strengthening civil 

society, and media. 

But we do have the capacity, even today, if there is an appropriate roadmap presented that is credible and that we believe will 

lead toward elections, we do have the flexibility to jump back in to 

that small democratic space to begin the process. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you. I wanted to ask you about ECOWAS 

and I wanted to know your opinion if the U.S. should push for the 

formation of an international group on Mali that would allow actors from ECOWAS, from SENSAD, the EU, Organization of Islamic Conference, to all come together and engage on this? Do you 

think that that would be useful? What role should the United 

States play if it is? 

28

Ambassador CARSON. Congresswoman Bass, again, thank you for 

the question. We believe that an international contact group of 

Friends of Mali, if one wants to use that term, or some kind of a 

grouping that helps to bring together key stakeholders and participants in the process of helping Mali return to democracy. We believe that ECOWAS needs to continue to play the primary role as 

the leading subregional organization, but ECOWAS does not, in 

fact, include several other very important partners; partners who 

have long borders with Mali, and share ethnic groups with Mali, 

who are not a part of this. 

Two of the most important, of course, are Algeria and Mauritania. We also need to ensure that other international players who 

can play a supporting role can be a part of the discussions and in 

that group I include the United States, I include France, I include, 

particularly, the European Union. Those organizations and countries that can be instrumental in helping to facilitate and guarantee things like I mentioned before with respect to being able to 

help fund, perhaps, programs in the northern part of the country 

to deal with the grievances of the Tuareg. 

So there needs to be a place where all of these groups can, in 

fact, come to the table and talk. I think this is something that the 

ECOWAS leadership and the AU, the African Union, leadership 

are working on and thinking about. And of course, the other major 

player in all of this has to be the United Nations. So what you are 

talking about does make sense and is something that we are constantly encouraging so that all important players and partners are 

at the table, with ECOWAS continuing to be a lead in all of this. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Turner? 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A question for Ambassador Carson. We have had ethnic economic political factors here 

for many years. The one wild card, it seems to me, religious. Could 

you fill us in a bit on the background and what are the factors at 

work here and is this being address or should it be? 

Ambassador CARSON. Many of the problems of radicalism in 

Northern Mali are a spillover from other countries. The AQIM, 

which is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, is comprised, not simply 

of Malians, but its leadership is largely drawn from individuals 

who have come from Algiers, from Mauritania, and from Libya, and 

from other countries in the region. 

We know that a number of AQIM leaders and supporters have 

come down from Algeria, and as Algeria has effectively dealt with 

its Islamic extremists and terrorist problem, many of those people 

have drifted down across the Algerian border into Northern Mali, 

which is a very, very large territory and very, very sparsely populated, not traversed by many roads and not inhabited by many 

towns, and so those individuals have come into this large space. 

Malians, as a whole, and especially including the Tuareg, are 

moderate Muslims not extremists, but individuals who have been 

open and tolerant toward Christians and others. So AQIM, again, 

is very, very different and its agenda and politics are quite different from those of the Tuareg as a whole. 

Mr. TURNER. Is their ideology gaining any traction in other ethnic groups besides those that are coming down from the North? 

29

Ambassador CARSON. I don’t think so. I think that both AQIM 

and Ansar al-Dine are really relatively small groups. That doesn’t 

mean that they are benign. They are, in fact, dangerous and lethal, 

but they are not representative of the vast overwhelming majority 

of Malians in the North and they certainly don’t represent the majority view of the way Islam should be practiced in Mali. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. We are joined by Ms. Jackson 

Lee, not a member of the committee, but we welcome her, if you 

have a question or two. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and I 

recognize your courtesies of both you and Ms. Bass. I appreciate 

being a former member of the committee and appreciating the 

work. Let me say to the two witnesses, and I was delayed with 

business on the floor of the House, but I am delighted of your presence here, and I wanted to first, Ambassador Carson, wrap questions together that then will relate to Mali and the present status. 

My initial question is to assess, basically, the health of Africa as 

it relates to U.S.-African relationships, and are we doing what we 

are supposed to do? And I will follow up now with the present situation in Mali, and I certainly appreciate that the Administrator 

Gast would also ask. As I recall, and I may not be correct, that the 

Malian population is somewhat nomadic, moving around, and so I 

am asking in this 2012 atmosphere whether or not this new uprising conflict has created population displacement, whether or not we 

are seeing a severe impact, a more sever impact, on women and 

children, and then lastly, it’s a difficult role for the United States 

to play. 

If you read the basis of the rebellion it is to suggest that the government in place was despotic and unfair. How conflicting is our 

position of supporting the existing sovereign government to the 

issues of the values that we promote, which are those of democracy? And I would appreciate, I think there are three wrapped in 

there, and I appreciate your answers. Thank you. 

Ambassador CARSON. Congresswoman Jackson Lee, thank you 

very much for the questions. I will attempt to take a couple of 

those on and then allow my colleague to address those which concern humanitarian and refugee issues, but will also weigh-in if required. Your first question was about the health of the U.S.-Africa 

relations. I think that U.S.-Africa relations are strong and vibrant, 

that the United States remains well-respected and admired across 

the continent with the exception of a couple of rogue states and 

rogue leaders. 

Consistent polling that we do through large established polling 

organizations as well as the polls that we do through the U.S. Embassies and U.S. Government, show that the United States is favorably liked by higher levels than almost any other nation in the 

world. And in Africa, our polling is consistently more favorable 

than it is in any other part of the world—Latin America, Europe, 

the Middle East, or South Asia. And that polling data is quite significant and we can share it with you, but the relationship is 

healthy. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would appreciate that. Thank you. 

30

Ambassador CARSON. The relationship is healthy. I think that 

there is a great appreciation for what we do in the area of development assistance. Our overall development assistance to Africa 

amounts to somewhere in the neighborhood of $8.5 billion to $9 billion. This includes what we do in development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and food aid through the Millenium Challenge 

Corporation. And we continue to be the single largest provider of 

development assistance across the continent, and ours is open and 

transparent. 

Equally, we have been very strongly engaged in advancing an 

agenda which has just been redefined by the President and the national security staff to do everything that we can to continue to 

promote democracy and good governance across the continent. And 

I would say that, despite the difficulties of a Mali, I would say that 

democracy is on the advance across Africa. One can look back over 

the last 3 years and identify, not just one, or two, or a half a dozen, 

but dozens of indications where this is, in fact, the case. 

There have been successful elections in Nigeria, the largest country in Africa; the peaceful transition and handover of power in 

places like Senegal, where President Wade stood aside after losing; 

and in Zambia where President Banda stood aside to allow President Sata to come in; the movement away from military regimes 

into democracy; Niger, where we saw 2 years ago, the return to democracy after a sitting President attempted to hijack the Constitution, and then was overthrown by a military government, and then 

returned to power, a civilian government. 

We also saw within the last 2 years, for the first time in its history, democratic elections in Guinea-Conakry, which had been 

under military and authoritarian rule since its independence from 

France in 1960. Across the continent, we see a commitment to democracy and we almost take for granted elections in places like 

Botswana, places like Ghana, places like Namibia, places like Mozambique and Mauritius, all of which have democratic foundations, 

and which are making great progress. 

So the democracy agenda is moving forward. No question that 

there are hiccups out there. They are a problem. But a part of the 

second pillar of the administration’s commitment is to do everything that we can do to spur economic growth, trade, and investment in Africa, recognizing that it is going to be the creation of economic opportunities, driven by private sector investment, that is 

going to create the jobs and create the factories that are going to 

grow economies. And we are committed in this area as well. 

And I would argue that there is, in fact, a lot happening there. 

One can look at the McKinsey Study Report, one can look at reports from Oxford Analytica, the World Bank, which show the 

strong growth of Africa as a market and potential market. Everyone has heard that six of the ten fastest growing economies in the 

world are in Africa. The return on private investment in the African marketplace is higher than it is in any other part of the world. 

And I could go on and on about what is, in fact, happening there. 

What we need to do is to sustain it and to push it forward. And 

we are also engaged in two other areas, and that is to do as much 

as we can to promote peace and stability across the continent, and 

31

we are engaged in Sudan. We are engaged in Somalia, just as we 

are engaged with the ECOWAS leadership on Mali. 

And then finally, the preserve of my colleague here, and that is 

to help to promote opportunity and to support the initiatives that 

the administration has underway in promoting greater food security, the green agricultural revolution that Africa needs, and also 

to support global health. I think the relationship is healthy. 

I think that, despite what we see as the drumbeat of the occasional headline of a distressing situation in one African country, we 

need to reorient our thinking to not focus on the one, or two, or 

three problems that we see in the 55 different states across Africa, 

but to focus on the promise and potential that we see in Africa, and 

recognize that this Africa is a continent with 55 different states, 

and quite honestly, some of those states have never been in turmoil, and some of those states have always been democratic, and 

some of those states are doing quite well. 

Mr. GAST. Congresswoman, Mali, over the last 10 years, has had 

significant growth; 5 percent, on average, year-on-year growth. And 

that has helped to lift a sizable portion of the population out of 

poverty, which is significant. Unfortunately, a majority of the population has benefitted from that, but a minority has not. And the minority that has not is in the North. As Ambassador Carson mentioned, the size of the North is approximately the size of France 

and the population of the North, before the displacement, was 

roughly 1.5 million persons. 

So access is extremely difficult; opportunities for employment, 

very few; opportunities for growth, given the harsh terrain of the 

Sahara Desert, also very, very few; and that has helped exacerbate 

the crisis in the North. Now, the problem is that this crisis also 

threatens to undermine the progress that has been made in the 

South with agriculture and with growth. With the displacements 

and the inability of the government to continue financing services 

that it would normally finance the economy is going to contract. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, government revenues 

are down considerably from last year. So it, at a time when it is 

not being financed by external actors, cannot finance its own needs. 

So we are very concerned about that. You raised the issue of 

women and children, and unfortunately, women and children do 

suffer far more greatly than the men in times of crisis. And Mali 

has made significant gains over the last 10 years. It has been able 

to cut child mortality rates and maternal mortality rates by half, 

but still, it ranks near the bottom. Only Somalia has higher maternal and child mortality rates. So we are concerned about that. 

It is very, very difficult in this environment for us to have access 

in the North. There are only a few actors, international NGOs, that 

are operating in the North, and each has to negotiate access with 

each community and rebel group operating in the North. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, both of you, for your testimony 

and we do have——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Several members of the committee, a 

number of questions we will submit for the record, and again, I 

thank you. 

32

I would like to now invite our second panel to the witness table, 

beginning with Nii Akuetteh. Mr. Akuetteh is an independent policy researcher and analyst who specializes in U.S. foreign policy, 

African development, and international relations. He’s often published in American journals on Africa and appears on Aljazeera, 

Voice of America, the BBC, and other television and radio outlets 

analyzing African issues. 

He has done a stint as a Georgetown professor, a journal editor, 

and leader of advocacy organizations working on three continents. 

He created and led two organizations focusing on democracy and 

the conflict in Mali. 

We will then hear from Mr. Rudolph Atallah, who is a 21-year 

veteran of the United States Air Force who retired as a lieutenant 

colonel. He served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Africa Counter-Terrorism Director, where his responsibilities, included 

advising the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials on 

counterterrorism policy and strategy, and serving as an advisor to 

the State Department and numerous Embassies across Africa. 

He has been a featured guest on programs, NPR, C–SPAN, and 

National Geographic Channel, where he discussed African counterpiracy and successful resolution of the 2009 Maersk Alabama incident. 

We will then hear from Mr. Dave Peterson, who is the senior director of the Africa Program for the National Endowment for Democracy. Since 1988, he has been responsible for NED’s program 

to identify and assist hundreds of African non-governmental organizations and activists working for democracy, human rights, press 

freedom, justice, and peace. He was the former executive director 

of the Project South Africa of the A. Phillip Randolph Educational 

Fund, and a freelance journalist in Africa as well as in Turkey. 

He has visited more the 40 African countries since ’84 and has 

published numerous articles on African politics. Mr. Akuetteh, if 

you could begin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. NII AKUETTEH, INDEPENDENT AFRICA 

ANALYST (FORMER GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR 

OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS) 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ranking 

Member Bass, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, I very much appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and share my opinion, 

but I am particularly grateful that you have taken the time to consider an issue in Africa that I think is extremely important and 

has a lot of dangerous potential and requires attention and assistance. My full written statement I would like to request to be part 

of the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered, as well as all of your 

full statements. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. So I just want to summarize the main points. My 

recommendation, looking at the Mali situation, is that the U.S. 

should respond with two initiatives. One is that I believe the situation is very urgent and dangerous, and the regional body ECOWAS 

has stepped up. As I look at the situation and also watch the news, 

I am reminded of the fires going on in Colorado and the image that 

jumps to my mind is that the Pentagon, it seems to me, will rush 

33

to the aid of the firefighters because the Air Force Training Academy is threatened. 

I do believe that this is an analogy for what is going on in Mali. 

A lot of Malians are affected, a lot of West Africans are affected, 

but I also think that important American interests can be harmed 

if the situation deteriorates. And therefore, it seems to me it is 

both ethical and very good for the United States to help ECOWAS 

deal with the situation. 

My second recommendation, and I listened carefully to the presentation by the preceding panel, the Federal officials, it seems to 

me that the elephant in the room is the potential for terrorism in 

Africa, and United States’ response, and U.S. policy since 9/11, and 

the creation of AFRICOM. Now, I think AFRICOM had a strong 

presence and programs with the democratic government of Mali, 

and therefore, I think the U.S. Government should take this as an 

opportunity to review the policies followed since 9/11 to see areas 

that require improvement so that Africa policy and U.S.-Africa relations can be stronger. 

Good policy review, in my view, will require a comprehensive exercise, but I do think there are things that one can see even now. 

And among those is that, democracy should play a much bigger role 

in U.S. policy, even when it comes to dealing with issues of terrorism. The 55 African countries are extremely complex, so of 

course, you always have grievances, but it seems to me that democracy is the way to go rather than strengthening Africa militaries. 

So I think U.S. policy should emphasize democracy and de-emphasize, particularly, military assistance except in emergency situations, and of course, the thing to be avoided is that no U.S. troops 

required anywhere on the continent except in very rare cases. 

Also, I think the training that the United States gives African 

soldiers, militaries, need to start with training that asks them to 

respect the democratic institutions of their countries. I do think 

that too many Africa militaries take for themselves the right to determine who should govern their countries or not. The continent 

has been moving away from that and it will be good if U.S. military 

assistance and training pushes soldiers to understand that they 

must respect the democratic choices of their populations, that it is 

not their job to select who runs their countries. 

And I think that the United States’ AFRICOM, there is a question of where its headquarters are to be located. I think that it 

would be a good idea if the headquarters are brought to the United 

States because there is worry in many African countries as to 

whether there will be large bases and military headquarters. And 

therefore, I think to deal with those worries, it would be good if, 

like some other U.S. commands, they are based in the United 

States. I think that will go a long way to ease worries about the 

U.S. military presence, because the relationship between the two 

areas, the U.S. and Africa, will thrive on civilian bases. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to end here and I will look forward to expanding on any of my points in the question period. I thank you 

very much, again, for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akuetteh follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much Mr. Akuetteh. I would like to 

ask Mr. Atallah if he would proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RUDOLPH ATALLAH, SENIOR FELLOW, 

MICHAEL S. ANSARI CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. ATALLAH. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to come before you today and speak about this important 

topic. And thank you for adding my analysis and summary into the 

records. While I come today in a personal capacity, the analysis 

and views, which are my own, were shaped by my 21 years of military service. Between 2001 and 2003, I spent extensive time with 

the Tuaregs in the North, specifically in Gao, Kidal, and Tessalit. 

As a native Arabic speaker I got the chance to sit down and speak 

with many of the senior Tuareg leaders and local imams, so my 

ideas are shaped by that time. Also, more recently, with my private 

company, White Mountain Research, I have spent extensive time in 

the region keeping track of the current situation. 

To fully understand what is going on, I would like to just dive 

into a brief history. The January 17, 2012, Tuareg uprising is the 

fourth since Mali’s independence in 1960 and a continuation of, basically, a half a century of ongoing differences between the Tuaregs 

and the Government of Mali. The differences are between a Tuareg, whose identity is in their Tamasheq language, and Bamako in 

the South. To understand how we arrived at the current crisis in 

Mali, it is important to briefly mention the third Tuareg rebellion, 

which was launched in 2006 by a defiant Tuareg leader named 

Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. 

The rebellion lasted for 3 years while Algeria attempted to 

broker peace between the government and the rebels. In 2009, Mali 

dispatched troops to the North to stop Bahanga and he was exiled 

to Libya. He returned in January 2011. During his time in Libya, 

Bahanga made contact with Tuareg officers and tribesmen from 

Ghadafi’s military. When Ghadafi’s regime began to fall, Bahanga 

convinced his tribesmen to abandon their military posts and go 

after Ghadafi’s weapons. Tuareg defectors raided the large stockpiles of Ghadafi’s arms and ammunitions, loaded trucks, and 

jumped in convoys, and headed South. 

Bahanga’s ambitions to fuel another uprising in Northern Mali 

took root among a well-trained and a well-equipped Tuareg force. 

Bahanga was killed in a mysterious car accident in the summer of 

2011. And in October of that same year, in the oasis town of Zakak, 

near the border of Algeria on the Malian side, Tuareg youth, intellectuals, Malian Army deserters, Libyan-trained Tuareg soldiers 

formed the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad, or 

MNLA as we like to call it today; Azawad being the land, or the 

northern part of Mali. 

During this meeting, another Tuareg named Iyad Ag Ghaly, who 

was leader in the first rebellion in the 1990s, and had also joined 

Bahanga in the third rebellion in 2006, tried to join the MNLA but 

they rejected him. And they rejected him for many reasons. One, 

he plays both sides of the fence, and he has done that before. He 

is one of AQIM has deep relationships with them, and he has got 

very radical beliefs. So he went on to form his own organization, 

43

of Salafist Islamic group called Ansar al-Dine, or Defenders of the 

Faith. 

MNLA’s primary objective for liberating Azawad, as they like to 

call it, was the creation of a secular democratic state that represents all ethnic groups in Northern Mali, not just the Tuaregs. 

It was fighting, basically, for culture, pride, and self-determination. 

Despite its swift victory, MNLA’s agenda was quickly undermined 

by the threat of militant Islamic dominance. At the helm of the 

threat was the Ansar al-Dine of Ag Ghaly. And so with Ansar alDine putting a Tuareg face on AQIM, if that didn’t exist, there 

would be more resistance to the Salafist presence and a broader 

support for MNLA. 

In recent weeks, Tuaregs tolerant of Ansar al-Dine began to 

learn the truth about the organization. Reports conveyed on 26 

June from Tuareg families living in Timbuktu said that local boys 

as young as 11 and 12 years old are being deceived and lured into 

Salafist training camps over promises to receive food and money in 

return for doing odd jobs. One father went to one of these camps 

to bring his son back and was told by the leader of Ansar al-Dine 

running the camp that he can have his boy back after he had fulfilled his duties to Allah. 

The harsh reality is, people without money rely on handouts 

from Ansar al-Dine, which has full support of AQIM, is well-funded, and well-equipped. In return, families have to send their sons 

to newly militarized madrasas where they are taught to fire AK–

47s and are indoctrinated into harsh interpretation of Islam. Two 

days ago, fighters from an AQIM splinter group clashed with 

MNLA in the city of Gao. Reports indicate that 20 people were 

killed, and a day after the clash, leaders of the various Islamist 

groups got together, took over Gao, and had discussions that are 

still unknown. If the information is accurate, we are getting down 

to a showdown between the MNLA and the Islamists, which is unfolding as we speak. 

Although the international community would never entertain the 

idea of an Azawadian independence, efforts need to be made to support MNLA and Tuaregs who oppose the extremist groups from operating in the Sahel. Tuaregs are masters of their environment. 

They can play a key role in stabilizing the region by driving out 

these groups. And they have the will to do so, but they can’t do it 

on their own. Unfortunately, the present situation is getting bleak. 

Mali is becoming a magnet for foreign fighters who are flocking in 

to train recruits to use sophisticated weapons pilfered and taken 

from Ghadafi’s arsenal. 

So what is the endgame for the extremist groups? AQIM leadership wants to take advantage of the shifting political landscape in 

North Africa. To accomplish this goal, it has to rely on its regional 

affiliate AQIM. However, the setbacks AQIM has suffered over the 

last few years are significant. Its ability to recruit is, basically, 

down to zero. To survive and remain effective, AQIM needs money 

and soldiers. The Sahel has become an ideal ground for both and 

the Tuareg function as collateral. 

Until now, Mali’s military has been ineffective to drive out AQIM 

from the northern part of the country. The international community and Mali’s neighbors should not support the current Bamako 

44

regime to conduct military intervention on its own. This will be 

counterproductive and could force locals to support Ansar al-Dine 

and AQIM. The best approach to counter the crisis is to create a 

buffer zone around the areas where the Salafists operate. The buffer zone should restrict movement by air and ground of illegal goods 

entering and leaving the area. 

On a larger scale, a systematic regional approach aimed at targeting illegal drug trafficking, tobacco, and weapons should be addressed to curb terrorists’ access to money, and diminish their 

cashflow to recruit, and buy more weapons. Further, an effective 

information campaign is indispensable to discredit AQIM and 

Ansar al-Dine and reinforce local distrust of their motives. However, direct intervention by Western states will reinforce the extremists’ raison d’Etat and will exacerbate the crisis. The solution 

must be brokered by regional actors and guided by regional experts. 

There also must be support for border control and 

counterterrorism programs for the Sahelian states, where intelligence collection and info sharing requires significant improvement. Furthermore, these states do not have the ability to respond 

to security threats in remote areas distant from their capitals. This 

is the reason why Mali has been ineffective at maintaining control 

of the North. Although AQIM’s southern zone battalion is no more 

than 300 strong, the vast operational area makes it very difficult 

to target these individuals absent of regional state collaboration. 

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Atallah follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Atallah, for your very extensive recommendations and the wisdom, I think, you bring to this committee given, especially, your contacts in the North. Thank you so 

much for that. I would now like to ask, Mr. Peterson, if you would 

proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVE PETERSON, SENIOR DIRECTOR, 

AFRICA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 

Mr. PETERSON. Thank you. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 

Bass, and members of the subcommittee. It is a great privilege to 

testify before you this morning regarding the recent crisis in Mali. 

In the 5 minutes I have been given this morning I would like to 

make two essential points. The first emphasizes the political importance of Mali. The second describes the Endowment’s efforts to contribute to the restoration of democracy. I congratulate the committee for demonstrating its concern about Mali by holding this 

hearing. Although I am not able to speak to the strategic threat of 

al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and the Tuareg rebels to American interests, I would like to emphasize the grave setback the military coup 

and division of Mali has made to the democratic movement in West 

Africa, and indeed, for the entire continent. 

Mali was among the very first African countries to lead the second wave of independence in 1991 when a popular uprising and the 

military’s refusal to fire on protestors led to the downfall of the 

longtime dictator Moussa Traore, followed by a sovereign national 

conference and free and fair elections in 1992. Although one of the 

poorest countries in the world, Mali remained at the forefront of 

democratic reforms in the region, pioneering a vibrant independent 

broadcast media and civil society, adopting democratic innovations 

such as the public democratic questioning space for government officials, implementing one of the first decentralization reforms in Africa, and leading ECOWAS and the AU in promoting democratic 

government throughout the continent. 

In 2007, aided by modest NED support, Mali hosted the world 

conference of the Community of Democracies. Mali seemed to disprove the contention that only rich countries can be free and its 

relative stability for two decades served as a touchstone for the 

slow, but steady democratic progress we have seen throughout 

West Africa. This is not to say that Malian democracy was perfect. 

Participation in elections has rarely been above 30 percent. Corruption has grown steadily as a problem, undermining faith in democratic government. Terrorist activity and discontent among the 

Tuareg have repeatedly plagued Mali. Yet, those of us working to 

support democratic development in Africa were caught off-guard by 

the sudden reversal of democracy’s fortunes in Mali. 

The coup was a huge blow to democracy, although the resolute 

opposition of ECOWAS and the international community has been 

encouraging. Unfortunately, the coup leaders seem to be controlling 

the agenda and the capacity of ECOWAS to intervene in a forceful 

way seems limited. Even worse, is the secession of the North. Not 

only has the sovereignty of Mali been abandoned, but the new rulers don’t even pretend to respect democracy. According to Sanda 

Ould Boubama, Ansar al-Dine’s spokesman in Timbuktu, I quote, 

‘‘Sharia has to be applied whether the people like it or not. We will 

58

enforce it. We are not asking anybody’s opinion. We are not democrats. We are servants of Allah who demand Sharia.’’

In recent years, NED has supported programs by the International Republican Institute to strengthen Mali’s decentralization 

and by the National Democratic Institute to support the Malian 

legislature. USAID funding has also been provided to NDI to assist 

the electoral process, but due to the coup, that is currently suspended. Nevertheless, based on our assessment that Mali was a 

reasonably stable and functioning democracy prior to the coup, 

until recently, that country has not been a high priority, given the 

vast needs across the region. Obviously, this is no longer the case. 

And with the blessing of the NED’s Board of Directors, it will be 

necessary to shift funding from programs budgeted for other parts 

of West Africa to address the new situation in Mali. Mr. Chairman, 

the Endowment does not design projects here in Washington and 

attempt to implement them on the ground, rather, we provide 

funding for proposals that are not formally solicited that we receive 

from indigenous NGOs. We have already received proposals and I 

expect staff to travel to Mali in the coming months to assess the 

situation and meet with potential partners. 

Indeed, the outlines of our strategy for Mali are already beginning to take shape. First, we will support the restoration of democratic legitimacy in the South, and second, we will seek ways to 

help Malians engage with the North to promote reconciliation and 

ultimately, reunification and democracy. At this stage it is difficult 

to estimate our budget for Mali, but I would hope it would amount 

to at least several hundred thousand dollars by next year. 

The transitional government in Mali has agreed to hold elections 

within a year and my colleagues at NDI who had been working on 

the elections before the coup suggests that it would be better for 

these elections to happen within the next 6 months rather than at 

the end of that time frame. Past elections have been troubled by 

boycotts, fraud, and poor management. And NED will seek to support domestic election observation efforts and other transparency 

initiatives. Disaffection with politicians and corruption has contributed to low voter turnout and NED will also support projects that 

provide voter education, advocate accountability, and promote popular participation. 

Malians were shocked and confused by the sudden disappearance 

of their democracy and NED will seek to support efforts to rebuild 

their understanding and commitment to democratic values. Public 

opinion polling and focus groups can probe what happened to Malian citizens’ commitment to democracy, and could serve as a basis 

for designing such civic education programs. Mali has had a vibrant women’s movement. NED will particularly target programs 

mobilizing women as voters and political leaders. Mali has had 

nearly 200 radio stations, eight daily newspapers, and 40 periodicals, but recent attacks against the press are troubling. NED will 

seek to address this problem. 

Human rights abuses have also reportedly escalated and NED 

will consider support to Mali’s well-established human rights movement for human rights monitoring, education, and advocacy. Finally, given the apparent problems with the Malian military, notwithstanding the assistance it has received from the U.S. military, 

59

NED will consider innovative proposals from civil society organizations assisting with security sector reform. 

In the northern part of the country, as has been noted, the new 

rulers have little regard for democracy. Yet the Tuareg, who have 

led the rebellion, represent an ethnic minority in the North, and 

even among the Tuareg, the separatist’s agenda has a questionable 

level of support, and the radical Islamic agenda of Ansar al-Dine 

and AQIM, even less. Few of the rebels seem to have experience 

with governance and are more comfortable with their nomadic traditions than the settled culture of towns and villages. Although the 

presence of civil society and independent media is thinner in the 

North than in the South, NED will seek to support those organizations and radio stations that do exist in the North on a range of 

initiatives. 

Our experience in Somalia, for example, has found considerable 

traction supporting radio broadcasts promoting democratic values. 

Projects strengthening the capacity of traditional leaders and other 

community authorities, vis-a`-vis extremists, have also had some 

success. Hundreds of thousands of Malians are fleeing the North 

due to drought, locusts, and the repression and bizarre edicts of the 

rebels. Projects helping these internally displaced persons can protect their rights in the vulnerable conditions in which they now 

find themselves, enable them to participate in democratic processes 

such as elections, as well as lay the foundations for their eventual 

return home. 

Mr. Chairman, the Malian crisis may be more effectively resolved 

through the battle for hearts and minds than through military confrontation. NED is not so presumptuous as to pretend that our 

modest resources alone can fix what ails the country. We trust that 

other international donors will also become more involved. The crisis in Mali is unlikely to be resolved easily, it may take many 

years, but as I hope I have convinced you this morning, much can 

be done to address the many challenges faced by its people. 

There is already much in recent Malian history and institutions 

that can provide the basis for democratic renewal. Thank you and 

I would be pleased to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Peterson, thank you very much for your testimony and thank you for the great work that NED does throughout 

Africa and around the world. Let me just ask you, we have about 

14 minutes left and then there is 1 hour and 20 minutes worth of 

votes, so I thought we would propose questions, and as best you 

can, answer rapid fire, from the three of us. Very quickly, to Mr. 

Atallah, you mentioned that Tuaregs have seen flirtation with militant Islam as temporary, when does this friendship, this alliance, 

break apart? Does it become armed? 

You heard the earlier question that I had asked about the 

ECOWAS peacekeeping, is 3000 enough? How quickly do they need 

to be deployed to be efficacious in mitigating all this horrible bloodshed and danger? Rules of engagement, could you want to touch on 

that one as well? The issue of the Tuaregs who have felt 

disenfranchised and discriminated for so long, have we blown it? 

Has the West, the United States and others, not taken their concerns adequately into consideration or were we doing much on 

that? And finally, I have lots of questions, but we are running out 

of time. Ms. Bass, if you could offer your questions. 

Ms. BASS. Sure. My questions center on AFRICOM and really are 

directed to the first two speakers, because I kind of heard, maybe 

something different, and I am not really sure, because you were referring to difficulties within AFRICOM. You mentioned that 

AFRICOM, maybe, should be centered here as opposed to Stuttgart. You talked about, you know, the role of the U.S. in terms of 

beefing up militaries, and maybe that isn’t the best way to go. 

Then on the other hand, you described the serious security concerns. And so I am just wondering, kind of, from both of you, if you 

could address AFRICOM, where you feel it could be better; what 

could it do differently? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Bass, thank you for 

your questions. I will try to address them as quickly as possible 

just from my experience. First of all, let me start off with the 

ECOWAS question. I completely agree with Ambassador Carson. 

We need to take care of the South first before we look at the—I 

mean, the North is obviously an incredibly important question, but 

the South needs to get its act together in order to effectively, you 

know, answer the problems in the North. 

Speaking specifically of the Tuareg, they are a secular people. I 

have spent enough time with them to know. As an example, back 

in 2002, there were militant Islamists coming in from Pakistan 

that were trying to recruit from within the ranks of the Tuaregs, 

primarily focused on the youth. The Tuareg leaders that were with 

me said, ‘‘This will never happen in our culture. We are a tolerant 

people. We accept everybody. If they are going to take the backbone 

of our people, our youth, then we are going to fight them.’’

The case still stands today, although you have an anomaly right 

now, a guy named Ag Ghaly, who is on the Salafist side of the 

house, he is the only one projecting an extremist face within the 

Tuareg. Not a lot of Tuaregs support that. As a matter of fact, recent days are showing a major rift between them. So have we 

blown it? I think we could do a lot more for them. Typical grievances that Ambassador Carson covered are spot on. If you talk to 

Tuareg in the North, they say the fact that paved roads end up 

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Mopti, in the center part of the country, embodies how we are left 

alone and nobody really cares. They rely on tourism. That is part 

of their culture. 

And so now it has all been hijacked by the extremists and, you 

know, they have never had anything. They don’t have, you know, 

good health care, no infrastructure, all the things that Ambassador 

Carson addressed. So in terms of how do we address the North and 

what can AFRICOM do, I think we need to step up the regional 

involvement. Better intel sharing. It has been very weak; very, very 

weak. States don’t trust states. Algeria doesn’t trust its neighbors 

and vice versa. We have to crack the code on that because, actionable intelligence to go after these individuals is key. 

AQIM and al-Qaeda want to take advantage of what is going on 

politically in North Africa and the region. I don’t want to eat up 

all the time, but one more point is, if you look at the letters that 

came out of the Bin Laden compound, 17 of them were already 

translated by CTC and West Point. Bin Laden was very focused in 

working with AQIM as to hijack the Arab Spring and start making 

missionaries. Their sole goal, essentially, is to regroup, reinforce, 

make enough money, bring enough recruits, and come back after 

the United States and its allies. Something we have to pay attention to. AFRICOM can play a big role. 

We need to tighten that noose around where the radicals are 

working and take away, primarily, their cashflow, which comes 

through drugs, extortions, kidnappings, and whatnot. And so, effectively, not only intelligence, but having all state actors work together, and I will leave it at that. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Thank you very much. To begin with AFRICOM, 

it is true that the problems in Mali just deteriorated very fast since 

January, but some of us who have been admiring and looking at 

Mali were concerned that before this time, for the past few years, 

a lot of U.S. relations and activities with the Amadou Toumani 

Toure government was largely military assistance and military exercises. Nobody’s prescient, but if you look at that government’s 

record, and as has been said, the problem with the Tuaregs has 

been there for a long time. There were eruptions even before independence. 

So some of us thought that U.S. relations with Mali should have 

emphasized democracy, should have emphasized ways to deal with 

the Tuareg problem. I would call that democracy reconciliation and 

development. Now, I am not unmindful of the terrorism problems 

in Africa. I think terrorists have caused havoc in Africa from the 

Embassy bombings, Boko Haram, and others, but the idea is that, 

given the complexity of African countries, perhaps emphasizing democracy, and development, and reconciliation would quiet down 

problems in the area and then you isolate extremists who have to 

be dealt with. 

So frankly, some of us were concerned that, for the past few 

years, the Amadou Toumani Toure government was incentivized to 

ignore some of the internal problems and focus on military engagement against the AQIM and the other groups in the North. That 

has been the concern. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Akuetteh, in your testimony you suggested that 

the U.S. military training is not providing respect for democratic 

65

institutions, could you provide the committee the information on 

that and does that also apply to human rights training and antihuman trafficking training? Is the U.S. military training sufficiently inculcating that attitude that human rights matter; respect 

for democratic institutions? I would love to get the evidence of that 

if you could provide that for us. 

Mr. AKUETTEH. I would be glad to provide what I can come up 

with. My concern has been that African soldiers, number one, if I 

had anything to do with who gets trained, we would prioritize soldiers in democracies, rather than soldiers who are serving 

unelected strongmen, because that causes a problem. That is my 

first concern. And then, of course, what exactly are they being 

trained about? They should be trained to respect their democratically-elected leaders. 

If I might make a quick comment on how quickly the problem 

in Bamako gets resolved versus the problem in the North. I did 

hear and listen carefully to what Ambassador Carson said, and 

what Mr. Atallah has said, but part of my worry is the security 

concern that, by the time the problem in the South, if we take too 

much time, the problem in the North would have become much bigger. And I do think, therefore, that ECOWAS needs the support to 

get up to speed to make sure that things don’t deteriorate quickly 

in the North before the South gets its act together. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. We do have, again, as I said to our outstanding 

panel, a number of written questions we would like to convey to 

you and if you could get back to us as quickly as possible. 

And thank you for your extraordinary insights. It provides this 

committee a very, very useful way forward. Thank you so very 

much. I am sorry that we do have to break. There is 1 hour and 

20 minutes worth of votes on the floor. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS


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