PEACEW RKS

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ 

PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Jérôme Tubiana

Victor Tanner

Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil

[[

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR TUBIANA

TANNER

AND ABDUL

JALIL
Cover photo: The shartay Suleiman 

Hasaballah Suleiman, displaced in the rebel 

area. All photos by Jérôme Tubiana.

The views expressed in this report are 

those of the authors alone. They do not 

necessarily reflect the views of the United 

States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 83. First published 2012.

© 2012 by the United States Institute of 

Peace

About the Report

The violence that has raged in Darfur for a decade is 

both a crisis of governance and a problem of law and 

order. As broader peace efforts have faltered, interest 

has increased in the capacity of local communities in 

Darfur to regulate conflict in their midst. All hope that 

traditional leaders, working within the framework of 

traditional justice, can be more successful in restoring 

some semblance of normalcy and security to Darfur. This 

report outlines the background to the conflict and the 

challenges in resolving it.

About the Authors

Victor Tanner has worked with war-affected populations 

in Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans, both as an 

aid worker and a researcher, for more than twenty years. 

He first lived and worked in Darfur in 1988. Since 2002, 

he has conducted field research on local social and political dynamics in the Darfur conflict, visiting many parts of 

Darfur and eastern Chad as well. He speaks Sudanese 

Arabic. Jérôme Tubiana is an independent researcher 

specializing in Darfur, Sudan, and Chad, where he 

has worked as a consultant for various humanitarian 

organizations and research institutions, International 

Crisis Group, the Small Arms Survey, USIP, USAID, and 

AU-UN institutions. He is the author or coauthor of various articles, studies, and books, notably Chroniques du 

Darfour (2010). He holds a doctorate in African studies.

The royal swords of the malik Ali Mohamedein 

of Am Boru, damaged by the Janjawid.

Melik Rahamtallah Mahmoud Ali al-Dadingawi, 

the king of El Fasher, head of its customary 

court and recognized ajwad (mediator).
PEACEWORKS • NOVEMBER 2012 • NO. 83

CONTENTS

[The concept of justice in Darfur is rendered blurry 

by its very flexibility, which can actually be less a 

disadvantage and more an opportunity for conflict 

resolution at all levels.]

Native Administration ... 5

The Concept ... 5

A Short History ... 7

Impact of the War ... 23

Traditional Justice and Reconciliation ... 35

The Customary Court ... 38

Judiya ... 53

Government-Sponsored Reconciliation Processes ... 70

Rebel-Arab Agreements ... 79

Traditional Leaders and the Peace Process ... 80

Perceptions and Facts ... 82

Darfurian Wishes ... 82

Lessons Learned ... 85

Appendix ... 88

3

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Summary

■ The violence in Darfur is simultaneously a crisis of governance and a problem of law and 

order. 

■ The Native Administration is a century-old and evolutive system of traditional leaders 

that underpins the traditional justice sector.

■ Traditional justice and statutory law are and have long been intertwined, but the terms 

of the exchange have changed. 

■ The Native Administration has been compromised, disempowered, and delegitimized. 

■ Many courts have been shut down by either the government or the rebels. 

■ The war has made it harder for traditional mechanisms to resolve disputes across tribal 

lines.

■ Affiliation to tribe and party are necessary for both survival and success. 

■ As broader peace efforts have faltered, interest has increased in the capacity of local 

communities to regulate conflict in their midst.

■ Darfurians believe that the first step in addressing a conflict should be a mediation and 

that the government should be the last resort. 

■ Traditional justice mechanisms are evolving rather than disappearing. 

■ Judiya is the main reconciliation and justice mechanism.

■ The ajawid are elders or notables from a family, clan, or tribe not involved in the dispute. 

Government officials and judicial officers can serve. Neutrality is key.

■ The principle of judiya is that all sides agree to abide by the recommendations before hearing them. If one party is dissatisfied, the ajawid may decide to review their decisions.

■ Reconciliation is a central component of judiya and involves buy-in from both sides.

■ The chief element in acknowledging responsibility is collective payment of compensation. 

■ Darfurians favor judiya over the courts in part because it is faster and in part because it is 

more free of governmental interference.

■ Darfurians want the government to endorse and support reconciliation, but not to vet or 

control it.

Introduction

In early 2003, simmering violence broke out in a long-forgotten province of western Sudan. 

Obscure rebel groups, alleging years of neglect and repression by the central government, 

attacked government convoys and outposts and briefly overran one of the area’s main towns. 

The Arab-dominated regime in Khartoum organized a vicious counterinsurgency campaign 

that ended up engulfing mostly non-Arab communities across the territory, including areas 

where the rebellion was all but inactive. Over the following twelve months, hundreds of 

thousands were killed and millions were displaced. By early 2004, the world had (re)discovered Darfur.1

International aid agencies scrambled to respond to the displacement crisis. Later, peacekeepers, first from the African Union (AU) and then under the joint aegis of the AU and 
4

PEACEWORKS 83

the United Nations, sought to provide security across the (then) three states of Darfur,for 

the most part unsuccessfully.2 But Darfur, remote and under the control of a pariah regime, 

had been a long-ignored part of the world. Among the international relief and peacekeeping 

personnel deployed there, firsthand knowledge of its peoples, society, and local politics was 

scant. There was especially little understanding of traditional leaders—key players in a territory mostly left to itself by successive governments in Khartoum.

Yet this international intervention relied heavily on community leaders, whether traditional 

leaders in communities of origin or leaders among the millions of Darfurians displaced by 

the war. Especially in the displaced camps, community leaders became the unavoidable link 

between the Darfurian population and international aid operation. But foreign actors tend to 

misconstrue the nature of what was known as the Native Administration (idara ahliya) system. 

They imagine hierarchies frozen in time that apply Darfur-wide and neglect the complex, 

dynamic and highly diverse history of which the idara ahliya is the product.3

A number of trends must be explored and understood to make sense of traditional authority and justice in Darfur. Since colonial times, parallel systems of governance and justice 

have coexisted: Native Administration and local government, traditional justice and modern 

justice, traditional reconciliation mechanisms and government-sponsored conferences. But all 

the while, the influence of the central government has grown at the expense of local structures. 

That process accelerated under the current regime.

It is difficult to integrate customary law, procedures, and systems—all of which are oral 

and flexible—into modern, statutory law systems that proceed from the modern state and are 

written and, at least in theory, driven by institutions. The process of integration has started 

in some domains, in particular for management of the natural habitat: the management of 

land, migratory routes, and water points has been unevenly integrated into local government 

bylaws, with varying degrees of consistency and success. This integration was a provision of 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 in Naivasha, Kenya, but the only one 

that has not been implemented.

A by-product of integration is often the quest for standardization, which is problematic. 

Darfur is a large territory with different natural conditions, peoples, and economic systems. 

Disparate customs in space and time have evolved. Standardizing customary laws can come at 

the price of their elasticity and flexibility, which is one of their major strengths.

A few points must be made on terminology. The term traditional—traditional leadership, 

traditional land tenure, traditional conflict-resolution, traditional justice—is highly ambiguous. Nothing is in fact traditional. Darfur has no golden age to revert to. Local traditional 

authority has constantly evolved, whether under the Fur Sultanate, the Turco-Egyptian domination (often called the Turkiya), colonial rule, or the influence of the modern ideologies 

and power lust of post-independence governments in Khartoum. What today we refer to as 

traditional authorities reflect the compromise between Darfurian communities on the one 

hand and successive governments representing the modern state on the other. A form of this 

compromise had already been struck by the sultans of Darfur, who ruled over diverse tribes 

with different leaders and customs. The compromise then shifted form to meet the needs of 

British policies of indirect rule.4

 Both the sultanate and the colonial authorities had to seek 

alliances with leaders they could not overcome by force. When these leaders were reluctant, 

the authorities appointed new ones—some of the great ruling families of Darfur are often 

relatively recent dynasties created during the Turkiya, Mahdist, and British periods. The legitimacy of individual leaders still reflects these changes, the older and more traditional often 

being considered the more legitimate.5
5

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

As to traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms, again nothing is truly traditional. 

What does seem fixed in Darfur society is the absence of a border between justice and reconciliation: both overlap to a great extent. Even relatively distinct mechanisms are sometimes 

confused, even by the traditional leaders and other major players. This confusion seems to have 

increased during the current conflict as more established practices have been abandoned in the 

wake of violence and displacement. It represents a major difficulty in understanding (and researching) the topic today. It is also important not to consider local justice mechanisms in Darfur as an equivalent to what is meant by justice in the West. The concept of justice is far more 

practical, for want of a better term, in the Darfur context than it is in the West and has been 

further blurred by the war. It is also rendered blurry by its very flexibility, which in this context 

can actually be less a disadvantage and more an opportunity for conflict resolution at all levels.

Native Administration

It is impossible to examine traditional justice and reconciliation processes in Darfur today 

without first understanding the Native Administration and its historical evolution, particularly 

over the past two decades of national Islamic rule.

The Concept

The Native Administration is and has been a key institution in the history of governance in 

Sudan over the last hundred years.6 In Darfur, the Native Administration was installed by 

the British reprising elements and individuals of the sultanate—the centralized state that had 

ruled much of Darfur since the mid-seventeenth century. The sultanate “in Sudanic terms 

[was] . . . a rich and well-run state with an effective and literate bureaucracy that was able to 

enforce its will over the administrative system.”7

At its core, the purpose of the Native Administration is threefold: to manage that most 

precious commodity (land), to render justice, and to represent both the state, in the various 

and diverse parts of the territory inhabited by diverse communities, and the interests of those 

constituencies to the authorities. The first two functions, managing the land and administering justice, are deeply intertwined in that many disagreements between individuals or groups 

relate, both historically and today, to land use and land ownership. The justice function also involved (and still involves) a strong reconciliation component; the land administration included 

management of natural resources (water, pastures, wood) as well as migratory routes. The third 

function, defending the area against outside attackers, in particular livestock raiders, was the 

particular role of the agid (war leader, see table 1) but became increasingly problematic under 

statutory law because it now fell within the responsibility of other more official institutions.

The Native Administration is a hierarchical system. Today—the titles have evolved, in particular during the colonial period—sheikhs (village or nomadic camp headmen) report to omdas

(mid-level administrators), but the numbers of each vary greatly from place to place. It is said, 

for example, that an omda can preside over as many as a hundred sheikhs.

8

 Depending on the 

location and the community, omdas report to shartays, nazirs, maliks, sultans, furshas, or amirs. 

The number of omdas under each also vary considerably. Those shartays, nazirs, and so on can be 

paramount leaders, or in some areas report to other, more important paramount leaders, such 

as the magdum or the dimangawi.

One dichotomy is key to understanding the Native Administration—the difference between 

territorial and tribal leaders. Territorial leaders have control over a given territory (dar, pl. diyar). 

This territory is generally multi-ethnic: many tribes live in it in addition to the leader’s tribe, 
6

PEACEWORKS 83

which is not necessarily the majority tribe. Thus, various leaders—some ruling smaller, often less 

diverse territories, and other purely tribal leaders—submit to the territorial leader, who often but 

not always belongs to the dominant tribe. A territorial leader may not actually own any of the 

land of the territory he is administering, but he is the paramount chief, and other leaders, even 

landowners who may have more land than he does, must defer to him. He is the one to allocate 

land of relatively large sizes to leaders of communities (notably looking for resettlement) while 

he only sanctions the allocation of smaller plots to individuals or families. Tribal leaders, on the 

other hand, have authority over people and may be senior and powerful but cannot allocate land.

Thus the Native Administration is deeply connected with the land-tenure system. Historically, most leaders in Darfur, at all levels of the hierarchy, were territorial leaders, and most of 

the territory was divided into entities administered by them. Most leaders are also often but 

not necessarily owners of land, sometimes equivalent to the territory they administer, but often 

smaller. They also play a role in resolving both intercommunity conflict over large territories, 

often in the context of reconciliation conferences, and individual conflicts over smaller plots of 

land, directly or through the customary courts.

Table 1. Ranks and Titles

agid (pl. ugada’) a war leader who may also, in times of peace, mobilize men of 

fighting age for posses (faza‘) after livestock raiding, for work in 

the fields, for erecting communal structures, or for festivals; a 

senior agid with authority over all agids in one area is an agid 

al-ugada’

dimangawi paramount leader of the Fur heartlands of southwestern Darfur; 

his capital used to be Kas in South Darfur but became Zalingei, 

now the capital of the newly created state of central Darfur

dimlij (pl. damalij) a title historically prevalent among non-Arab groups for midrank leaders, most of whom are now called omdas (see below), 

sometimes used for subordinate specific functions, notably 

collecting the diya (payment for the blood’s price) among 

members of a tribe10

faqi (pl. fuqara) a religious scholar or holy man

fursha or firsha (pl. furash) title historically used by Tama-speaking communities of the 

northern part of western Darfur—Gimir, Erenga, and Missiriya 

Jebel—that became the name for the mid-rank leaders under 

the sultan of Dar Masalit

magdum under the sultanate, mostly military envoys of the sultan; over 

time became paramount administrative leaders in southern 

Darfur (where they belong to the dynasty of the Fur leader 

Adam Rijal) and in northern Darfur (where a Meidob magdum

replaced the Tunjur takanyawi); only active magdum is now the 

one of South Darfur, based in Nyala

malik (pl. muluk) title commonly used by non-Arab groups; at the time, mostly 

used by local chiefs of a lesser rank than shartays, though today 

the two titles are equal in rank

nazir (pl. nuzzar) title introduced by the British for Arab paramount leaders, 

equivalent to the rank of shartay

omda (pl. ‘omad) a mid-level leader for all tribes; the rank is an Egyptian import 

introduced by the British; oversees an omudiya

shartay (pl. sharati) the most common title for a senior-level ruler among non-Arab 

groups; oversees a shartaya

sheikh (pl. shuyukh) the lowest level native administrator, a village-headman, or the 

leader of a small group of nomads
7

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

This intermingling of power and land became increasingly problematic for the nomadic 

abbala (camel-herding) Arab tribes, whose leaders only administered a tribe or a clan, and had 

to submit to territorial leaders from other tribes along their migratory routes. To some extent, 

communities that had migrated to Darfur from other countries, in particular from Chad and 

other countries west of Sudan, as well as communities that had resettled inside Darfur, faced 

similar problems. Beginning in the colonial period, however, they began to acquire positions 

in the Native Administration hierarchy that enabled them to legally challenge the authority of 

territorial leaders (see table 1).9

A Short History

The Native Administration today is the result of nearly a hundred years of interaction with successive central governments in Khartoum—governments that have sought to impose their political 

writ in Darfur as cheaply as possible and at the same time have provided traditional leaders with 

their main portal to the modern world. Exposure to education and government service has been 

both an opportunity and a challenge for traditional leaders. But the last twenty-odd years of repressive national Islamic rule in Sudan have deeply transformed the Native Administration in Darfur 

from an institution that administered land, taxes, and justice—often neither very efficiently nor 

very equitably—to a group of leaders largely beholden to the current regime in Khartoum. Darfur’s 

traditional leaders have had to either submit to the ruling party or pay onerous consequences.

Since colonial times, and over the last twenty years in particular, successive governments 

in Khartoum have relentlessly manipulated and undermined the traditional administrative 

system throughout Sudan. Darfur has been a special target because the enduring power of 

traditional Darfurian leaders, as well as the region’s relatively late incorporation into modern 

Sudan, have historically constrained Khartoum’s writ in the region. The destabilization of the 

traditional leadership systems witnessed today in Darfur is nothing new, but rather the result 

of a progressive and deep-seated process.

Colonial Period

In 1916, the British invaded Darfur, hunted down and killed Sultan Ali Dinar, and brought 

down the sultanate. This was a rearguard action carried out at a time when Britain’s focus and 

brawn were engaged on more pressing fronts. British aims in Darfur were to pacify the region 

on the cheap, counter rising Egyptian nationalism and other unpleasant modern ideologies, 

and resolve the western border issue with France.11 On the ground, because British-led forces 

lacked the military power to challenge powerful local leaders, they established alliances with 

those leaders they could not overcome. Relying on a policy of indirect rule through local leaders reduced the need for more costly British or Egyptian administrators. This met the twin 

goals of keeping budget outlays low and countering Egyptian influence, but resulted in often 

inadequate governance and sowed the seeds for future conflict.

Breaking with the Sultanate

A common misperception is that the British merely removed Sultan Ali Dinar and confirmed 

the prerogatives of the traditional leadership system that existed under the sultanate, with the 

exception of the sultan himself, under the name Native Administration. In fact, despite the 

element of continuity, in that many administrators from the sultanate rapidly submitted to 

the British and continued in their functions, the change the British introduced to traditional 

leadership structures was momentous.

The destabilization of 

the traditional leadership 

systems witnessed today 

in Darfur is nothing new, 

but rather the result of 

a progressive and deepseated process.
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PEACEWORKS 83

First, under the newly created Native Administration, so-called traditional leaders carried out 

a number of formal functions they had not filled before the fall of the sultanate and the arrival 

of the British. These included administrative powers (and involvement in the delivery of new 

services such as education and health), judicial functions through the so-called native courts, 

the management of land and natural resources (including pastures, water, wood, and migratory 

routes), tax assessment and collection, community labor conscription for roads and other infrastructure, the oversight of markets, and border control.12

Second, when the British encountered resistance, armed or otherwise, they did away with 

recalcitrant individuals, promoting new leaders and establishing new dynasties. Predictably, in 

so doing, they also created internal power struggles, some of which continue to this day.13

Third, when a given Native Administration set-up proved too intricate for practical political control, the British sought to simplify it, introducing new hierarchical structures that were 

generally more pyramidal and thus easier to control. In particular, they united territories seen 

as too small or disparate to be viable for rule and taxation. For instance, Dar Dima, one of the 

most ancient of the sultanate, was made up of eighteen chieftaincies each held by a malik and 

capped by the dimangawi. Colonial archives show that the British merged the eighteen into 

four larger entities, and appointed a Fur dimlij (the Fur are the largest ethnic group in Darfur), 

chosen among and by the maliks, to head each one. Similarly, in Dar Masalit (the Masalit 

are another major ethnic group), they gathered maliks (also called dala in the area) into small 

groups of five or six, and appointed one of them to be a fursha above them.14

Fourth, the British also sought to afford greater and more systematic representation to the 

main Arab groups as a way of controlling the fractious Arab tribes. Until this period, some of 

the large Arab tribes were largely decentralized and led by sheikhs, whose power was often limited to a camp or a village. The first of a series of laws reorganizing the Native Administration 

was the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, passed in 1922, which gave judicial powers to 

nomad sheikhs within their tribes.15 Although no administrative powers were mentioned, this 

ordinance was clearly the start of a process to separate Arab and non-Arab communities, their 

leaderships, and their justice systems.

Another policy was to create new titles. The British introduced that of nazir for several 

Arab paramount leaders, equivalent to the traditional rank of shartay. They also created omdas 

as mid-level leaders for all tribes, from which the Arab tribes especially benefitted because 

they were in principle gaining leaders of the same level that their sheikhs had previously depended on. Under the sultanate, most traditional leaders—mostly Fur leaders, but also others 

who were in essence deputized—held sway over all communities living on the territory under 

their control, even those who belonged to other groups. Leaders allocated land or delegated 

its allocation to lesser chiefs beholden to them. As mentioned, the consensus on their control 

over land was one of the few factors of stability in precolonial Darfur. Brutally or gradually, the 

newly created omdas and nazirs stopped reporting to the old shartays, which led to confusion 

and competition between territory leaders and community leaders. The seeds for the tribalization of local leaders and subsequent conflict in Darfur were thus sown under the British.

Even when the British sought to establish more modern governance institutions, such 

as technical committees and courts, they did so only in the towns. Policy was a de facto dual 

system. Towns benefitted to some extent from the new institutions, later regularized under 

the local government ordinances of 1937 and 1951, leading to the creation of the Ministry of 

Local Government in 1954.16 By giving them greater autonomy, these policies institutionalized the historical tendency of the powerful Arab dynasties of southern Darfur to thumb 

their nose at the authority of the sultan and his surrogates. More generally, the push for local 
9

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

government as well as electoral democracy contradicted the initial support to dynastic, often 

uneducated leaders.17

Local British administrators couched their indirect rule approach in terms of bold experiments in local governance. But budgetary miserliness remained in fact the driving force 

behind the reliance on the Native Administration, and both the Great Depression and World 

War II did as much as anything to keep indirect rule in place.18 “Despite the radical language, 

only three native administrations in Darfur (Dar Masalit, the ‘Zalingei Emirate,’ [a colonial 

invention] and the Rizayqat Nazirate) had budgets of their own on the eve of the Second 

World War.”19

Myth of Indirect Rule as Good Governance

The preternaturally competent British administrator in Darfur is a myth. Indirect rule may 

have addressed colonial budgetary concerns, but the governance that the British and their local surrogates provided was poor, inefficient, and often iniquitous. Indirect rule was in fact a 

policy of “institutionalized neglect,” both “panacea and problem.”20 Subservience, rather than 

competence, was the key to acquiring titles and establishing dynasties. Leaders the colonial 

authorities did not hold in high regard stagnated or were removed.21

The British were particularly consumed by a fear of a revival in Darfur of Mahdism—the 

messianic Islamic movement that originated in the early 1880s and, with strong support from 

Arab tribes in Darfur, ended Turco-Egyptian rule in Sudan. As a result, the British were ready 

to excuse the worst excesses on the part of traditional leaders who opposed the Mahdi’s descendants. In a twist of circular logic, they also ascribed to Mahdism revolts such as the bloody 1921 

revolt in Nyala in which the British resident was killed—uprisings very likely triggered by the 

consequences of their own inept administration, including high taxes, local conflicts, and so on.

In Dar Masalit, the British resident forced the Masalit sultan to reorganize his administration in ways that sometimes resulted in double taxation: dismissed leaders continued to levy 

taxes, as did new leaders named in their stead.

In 1934, a “taxpayer’s strike” finally revealed the [colonial] Government’s ignorance of a 

dynamic system in which position, titles, blood relations, and personality interplayed and 

in which the theoretically aloof [British] resident, like a bumbling anthropologist, was a 

major factor.22

Dar Masalit is often quoted as the laboratory of indirect rule in Sudan: it “had a ‘resident,’ 

that is, a British official who ‘advised’ the Masalit sultan following Indian or Northern Nigerian 

models, the only such official in the Sudan.”23 However, James Morton argues, in the rest of 

Darfur, neither of the two theoretical models of indirect rule was ever implemented. The one 

that was, in South Sudan—gathering tribal units “into larger, more manageable units”—was to 

some extent also implemented in some areas in Darfur. One model did seem to especially suit 

to an area like Darfur where a precolonial state had functioned—to have a colonial resident 

acting as an adviser to existing institutions. It was not implemented outside Dar Masalit, however, except once, in a brief and unsuccessful attempt to revive the Fur sultanate by appointing 

a descendant of the late sultan, Ibrahim Garad, as amir of Zalingei. “Once the Fur Sultan was 

gone . . . the British were left with the institutions but no state in which to put them . . . with a 

workable idarat al ahlia [sic] but no Indirect Rule.”24

The real achievement of the first twenty years of colonial rule in Darfur and of indirect 

rule was not good administration and governance. It was security—not a small contribution, 

one might add, given the four or five brutally dismal decades that had preceded the arrival of 

the British.
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After Independence

After Sudan gained independence in 1956, the policies of successive central authorities in 

Khartoum progressively eroded the influence of local leaders. This reflected the will, both 

ideological and practical, of the central government to build a modern Sudan and to establish 

control over the periphery of the country—notably over long-restive Darfur. These policies 

reached their peak during the Marxist period of the military regime of Ja‘far Nimeiri in the 

late 1960s and early 1970s. The past forty years, then, have been stressful for traditional leaders in Darfur.

At the start of the second half of the twentieth century, Islamists and communists emerged 

as powerful players in Sudanese politics. Although highly different and bitterly opposed, both 

groups were ideological. They presented themselves as modern forces—quwat haditha—that 

were alternatives to the two dynastical, Sufi-inspired, and Arab-dominated parties that had 

long lorded over Sudanese politics. These were the Umma Party with its Mahdist tradition and 

influence in western Sudan, and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) so deeply rooted in the 

Khatmiyya Sufi order (tariqa). Communists and Islamists throve. The Sudanese Communist 

Party grew into one of the most powerful in Africa—at least until Ja‘far Nimeiri decapitated it 

in 1971. The Sudanese Muslim Brothers have been among the most politically successful radical Islamists in the Muslim world, having succeeded in capturing power in 1989. Communists 

and Islamists both saw themselves as advocates of social change. They shared an ideological 

hostility to traditional leaders as incarnations of a feudal past. One of the few things the secular 

and religious modern forces agreed on during the October 1964 revolution was the need to 

abolish the Native Administration. Ultimately, the interim government did not follow through 

on the measure. The Umma Party prevailed in the 1965 elections and shelved plans for abolition. But emerging educated elites in Central Sudan kept pushing against the idara ahliya, 

which they saw as both archaic and a colonial legacy.25

Beyond the ideological motivations lay political ones. Traditional leaders in Sudan overwhelmingly support the Umma and the DUP. The Native Administration has been historically instrumental in securing votes for the two parties, and especially for the Umma in Darfur. 

The modern forces were also opposed to the Islamic tariqas (Sufi brotherhoods), which were 

very close to the religious parties and instrumental in getting popular support to them. For the 

modern forces, doing way with the Native Administration was both an ideological struggle 

and a political necessity.

At this time, even the educated scions of traditional leaders who had moved to the cities themselves condemned the institution or remained ambivalent, creating tensions in 

leading ruling families. One of the early political groups to focus on the issue of Darfur, 

the Darfur Renaissance Front (jabhat nahdat darfur) of the mid-1960s, was against the Native 

Administration.

Military strongman Ja‘far Nimeiri seized power in 1969 with the help of the Communists. 

In keeping with his then leftist leanings, he simply dissolved the Native Administration with 

the stroke of a pen by signing the People’s Local Government Act in 1971.26 A year earlier, 

the Unregistered Lands Act had formally abolished the traditional land tenure system, which, 

as explained, is closely connected to the traditional leadership system. The act was a legislated 

land grab. It “transferred to the Government in full ownership of unregistered lands, whether 

waste, forest, occupied or unoccupied, which had not been registered before the commencement of the Act on 6 April 1970.”27 It abolished the rights of traditional authorities to allocate land and bequeathed them on the state. A string of laws over the past four decades had 

made it possible for “investors” to expropriate rural communities in South Kordofan, Blue 
11

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Nile, Gedaref, and Upper Nile.28 Darfur, however, managed to escape the mechanized farming 

schemes because of the enduring power of traditional leaders and the strong social and political 

consensus around community control over land that underpins their authority. Darfur farmers 

thus never had to deal with the aggressive encroachment of mechanized farming schemes that 

Nuba villagers faced. But the Unregistered Lands Act nevertheless strengthened the trend of 

landless tribes and their purely tribal leaders gaining greater autonomy, and the land leaders 

and landowning tribes losing it. This created tensions that remain unresolved.29

In abolishing the Native Administration, the Nimeiri regime deprived traditional leaders of the government resources and local taxes they relied on to operate. But Nimeiri only 

formally abolished the most important leaders, that is, the shartays, sultans, and nazirs. The 

mid-level and lower-level ranks—the omdas and sheikhs—remained. Nimeiri’s move was not 

so much an abolition as an attempt to politically sideline native administrators. The attempt 

proved not to be practically viable inasmuch as the so-called modern state administrators had 

neither the knowledge nor the ties in the community to replace the Native Administration. 

True, some rare traditional leaders retreated from public life, recalling the early 1970s as a period of inactivity.30 And certainly the government’s move to abolish was a symbolic blow. The 

abolition “lessened the dignity of the idara ahliya,” one Mararit sheikh recalled.31 But many local leaders, even the paramount ones, retained substantial influence. They continued to perform 

certain functions, in particular with regard to land, because of their knowledge and the respect 

they commanded in their communities. “Officially there was no more idara ahliya, but in an 

indirect way (bil-liffa) we were running our affairs as if Nimeiri [had] said nothing.”32

As early as 1960, the Local Government Act had made the basis of local administration 

not the Native Administration, but instead local councils provided with an executive staff recruited by the ministry of local government in Khartoum.33 But, even twenty years afterward, 

local leaders kept benefitting from the fact that the authorities (commissioners, but also police 

and army commanders), lacked resources, staff, and knowledge of the communities, and continued to consult them and associate them with their decisions, especially with regard to land, 

justice, local conflict, and reconciliation.

The dearth of resources also affected the judicial system, and, as early as 1976, the government asked many traditional leaders to serve as court staff in the new popular courts (mahakim 

sha‘biya). For instance, the then malik of the Zaghawa territory of Am Boru, Ali Mohammedein, who had left his area, was called back by the government to resume his job “because the 

new people could not run the court,” a Zaghawa sheikh in Chad explained, “the old ones had 

a long history and experience.”34 The terrible droughts of the 1970s and 1980s increased local 

tensions, and local administrators became even more reliant on traditional leaders to help them 

solve these conflicts.

In the early 1980s, Governor Ahmed Direij, the first native governor of the then-unified 

province of Darfur and himself a Fur shartay, began to advocate for a formal restoration of 

the Native Administration system.35 The regional governments installed by Nimeiri in 1981 

under the regional governance reforms (al-hukm al-iqlimi) gave governors some autonomy, 

and Direij was able to reinstate the upper tier of the idara ahliya in Darfur in 1984. The Native Administration was also reinstated in Kordofan and in the east in 1982, but not in central 

Sudan. The idara ahliya was in fact never reinstated at the national level, which is why there is 

no homogeneity across Sudan.

In 1986, during the so-called Second Democracy, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi 

enacted the Native Administration Act, which reinstated certain powers of the Native Administration. In 1988, he appointed Tijani Sese as governor of Darfur, himself the son of 
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dimangawi Sese Mohammed Atim and the brother of the present dimangawi, Fadil Sese, 

who was active in restoring traditional leaders. The concept of elections for the appointment 

of new leaders at level of omda and above was introduced: sheikhs elect their omda, omdas elect 

their shartay or nazir, and the shartays potentially elect a paramount leader above them, either 

dimangawi or magdum. In principle, these elections all took place within the established tribes 

and dynasties, but as will come to be seen, the Islamic regime later manipulated this practice 

to reshape the Native Administration in accordance with its needs.

After 15 years, we understood we could no longer continue, and we decided to return 

backwards [restore the Native Administration]. Unfortunately, many chiefs were very old 

or dead. We have named young leaders to replace them, but they are unable to control 

their people. This is one of the causes of the conflict.36

The National Islamic Regime

In 1989, the Islamists of the National Islamic Front (NIF) overthrew Prime Minister Sadiq 

al-Mahdi in a bloodless coup. On seizing power, the NIF formally disbanded, leaving power 

to a Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC), headed by an army general, Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The new regime is known in Sudan as the Ingaz, or Salvation.37

Behind the RCC, however, real power was wielded by the ideological leader of the Sudanese 

Islamists, Hassan at-Turabi.38 Like most other governments in Khartoum, the Islamists have 

defended the interests of the Nile valley elites. And, in keeping with central governments in 

Khartoum since the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was established in 1899, starting with 

British colonial authorities, the regime’s priority in Darfur has been clear: to maintain control, 

on the cheap, over populations the center does not trust.39

The Sudanese Islamic movement had originally advocated the abolition of the Native 

Administration. But, once in power, it rediscovered tribalism. The evening news would show 

a governor or a minister or even the president meeting with a delegation of such-and-such a 

tribe, where before only the area of origin would have been mentioned. The images included 

pictures of educated elites and senior Native Administration members sitting side by side, 

both co-opted by the government. The new regime understood how valuable a tool the Native 

Administration could be. It focused on reshaping the Native Administration to suit its needs, 

at the same time ensuring that it was weakened through manipulation and co-optation. The 

regime has, over the past twenty-odd years, ceaselessly created new positions and abolished 

others, reorganized territories and lines of reporting, bought off and intimidated individual 

leaders, and imposed illegitimate leaders on local people. This has led to major changes in the 

structure of traditional leaders, in particular in the early 1990s.

Life under the Islamic nationalist regime has been difficult for Darfurian traditional leaders. They are caught in a vise between the needs of their people on the one hand and the 

requirements of the central government on the other. Political tensions are aggravated by local 

rivalries—at the tribal, clan, and even family level. Conflicts arise over shrinking resources, primarily land, water, and grazing. Social tensions are also acute—for example, rich and educated 

versus poor and uneducated—as well as intergenerational tensions. The government plays on 

all of these conflicts to undermine local leaders and assert its power, forcing people to focus 

more on local rivalries than on national politics or on the struggle for their collective rights.40

Na‘ima and Soba Conferences

In October 1992, the NIF organized a discreet conference in the remote village of Na‘ima, near 

Geteina in White Nile province, to discuss what should be an Islamic approach to the Native 

Administration. The Na‘ima conference was followed in 1995 by a more public follow-up 

Conflicts arise over 

shrinking resources, 

primarily land, water, 

and grazing. 
13

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

conference in a large complex in Soba, south of Khartoum—a venue where traditional leaders 

and government officials used to receive reeducation in so-called Islamic values from Islamist 

ideologues. The Soba conference brought together traditional leaders, government officials, 

politicians, and Islamist intellectuals.

The conferences concluded that, rather than abolishing the Native Administration, the 

regime would gain politically from controlling it, and ideologically from incorporating it 

into the NIF so-called civilization project (al-mashru‘ al-hadhari), the overarching strategy 

of which was to islamicize Sudan and areas beyond. Key to this was a redefinition of the role 

of the native administrator in clearly religious terms: the Islamic traditional leader was to 

be both a leader and have a missionary (risali) role. The “new” traditional leaders would lead 

people in prayer, teach in mosques, collect state-imposed “religious” taxes, and mobilize the 

community for jihad. At the time, jihad referred to the wars in South Sudan and the Nuba 

Mountains. Later, during the war in Darfur, some leaders fulfilled the military aspect of their 

role, but often with less religious connotation, because the enemy was Muslim. As is true of 

all ideologically motivated policies, implementing these new roles implied a need to reeducate 

traditional leaders.

Beyond the emphasis on ideological realignment, the three “most important recommendations” issued in Na‘ima all had to do with the functions of the Native Administration: “the 

mobilization of citizens,” “the maintenance of security in cooperation with the relevant security 

agencies,” and “an active participation in the collection of public funds.” These recommendations leave little doubt as to the political intent of the conference organizers.41

A central idea of the Soba conference was to standardize “the many names used for the 

members of the Native Administration in the various states.”42 The conference suggested using 

a single title, that of naqib, a term referred to in the Quran that also refers to the rank of captain 

in the Sudanese and most Arab armies.43 The double meaning—Islamic and military—is telling 

in its echo of the regime’s double intent—ideological and political—for the Native Administration. But equally telling is that the term naqib was, for all intents and purposes never heard of 

again, bearing witness to the resilience of tradition (subsequently the term amir was adopted). 

The conference also recommended that the rank of omda be eliminated as unnecessary, another 

recommendation that remained moot.44

This religious redefinition came in sharp contrast with Darfur culture. In Darfur, traditional 

leaders, even the sultan, were not religious leaders. Historically, they had often converted to 

Islam before the bulk of their population, but they did not lead prayers or teach Islam—a role 

left to faqis, or religious men. They also had to remain neutral about surviving pre-Islamic practices and to accept syncretism, notably in induction ceremonies for new traditional leaders, as 

well as in the cohabitation in their entourage between Muslim faqis and pre-Islamic religious 

leaders. In sum, a traditional leader in Darfur is a temporal rather than a spiritual leader.

The NIF also promoted new rules for appointing leaders. Traditionally, new leaders were 

required to be the son of a former leader who had held the same position—generally the son, 

brother, or paternal uncle of their predecessor. This mechanism tended to create competition 

for the post, competition most often resolved within the family—by consultation, consensus, 

through some manner of vote, or sometimes simply with a power play. The will of the former 

leader was typically also taken into account, especially if he was still alive and had decided 

to step down, or had expressed it before his death. A common practice was to designate a khalifa

(pl. khulafa’, deputy and possible successor) among his sons or brothers, whom he would mentor.

The Condominium, in place from 1899 to 1955, had introduced the idea that the lowerlevel leaders should be consulted on the appointment of a new leader above them. Ruling 
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lineages were, however, mostly respected, and ethnic and tribal belonging even more so. But 

the NIF emphasized that all leaders above the rank of sheikh were to be elected by lower-rank 

leaders. The Soba conference called for “the selection [to take place] by way of election and not 

in a hereditary manner, so as to guarantee that [the native administrator] is the best qualified 

and the most capable,” with no mention of right of inheritance or tribal origin.45 In a number 

of dars, newcomers, mostly Arabs and Zaghawa from North Darfur, had often achieved a 

numeric majority, sometimes acquiring more sheikhs and omdas than those of the tribe of the 

ruling dynasty. Elections raised the possibility of breaking up dynasties, even opening the door 

to new leaders outside the ruling family or even the ruling tribe.

Moreover, whatever the results of the consultations and elections, the government, in the 

person of the wali (governor) or the local commissioner, or sometimes central government, 

retained the power to dismiss sitting traditional leaders and approve newly elected ones. The 

NIF began to co-opt new leaders, sometimes without even consulting lower-level leaders. 

For the most part, governors and commissioners respected the lineages, vesting power in 

someone with at least the theoretical legitimacy to serve as a leader, which often gave rise to 

bitter intrafamily quarrels. Other times, the government simply appointed new leaders from 

outside the lineages of chiefs.

The regime also sought to reinforce the security function of the Native Administration. The Na‘ima conference in particular recommended “grant[ing] of police powers to 

Native Administration guards in order to provide them with protection in the performance of 

their duties.”46 This led to an increase in the numbers of guards, in particular for Arab tribes.

As the 1990s wore on, the Islamists tended to give up on the more radical of their ideological recommendations with regards to the Native Administration as in other arenas, for 

instance, total jihad in the Nuba Mountains. This was a reflection, among other things, of the 

Bashir-Turabi split. But the desire to harness and transform the structures of the Native Administration was unmistakable, in Darfur and elsewhere.

Controlling the National Capita: Nizam Ahli in Khartoum

One novelty the regime did successfully carry through with was outside Darfur—and momentous. Concerned with the explosive population growth in Khartoum, especially by rural 

migrants from the west and the south of the country, the government set up a system of tribal 

leaders that mimicked the Native Administration but was not part of it. The initiative, reportedly the work of Majzub al-Khalifa when he was governor of Khartoum in the latter half of 

the 1990s, is called this an-nizam al-ahli, the traditional or native system—a term that echoes 

the Arabic for Native Administration (idara ahliya). The purpose of the sheikhs and omdas of 

the nizam ahli is solely to control the swelling population of the national capital, and mobilize them—for elections, for jihad, for rallies. They typically have an office and governmentissued cards, can serve as witnesses for the issuance of ID cards, and are readily summoned by 

state security services. Bureaucratically, they report to the Native System Department (qism 

an-nizam al-ahli) at the Khartoum governorate offices, and later obtained a liaison office in 

the Directorate of Federal Affairs (diwan al-hukm al-ittihadi, which replaced the Ministry 

of Local Government). While these leaders are tribal by definition, they are not part of the 

structure of the Native Administration of their respective tribes, and certainly do not report 

to the paramount leaders of their tribes. Of course, more genuine traditional leaders exist 

among these communities, but they are most often not government sanctioned, though they 

may claim allegiance to paramount traditional leaders who are sanctioned by the regime and 

are often regime supporters.
15

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Change on the Ground: 1994 and Beyond

In the mid-1990s, at the time of the Soba Conference, the NIF’s Darfur policy had begun to 

focus on an alliance with the Arabs. This was a reversal from a decade earlier, and especially 

from before the 1986 parliamentary elections, for which Hassan at-Turabi had sought to build 

an electoral base among the non-Arab tribes by campaigning on how little the Umma had 

done for them over the years. The effort had failed, and Turabi was said to be very bitter.47

Once in power, the NIF swung toward the Arabs of Darfur. South Darfur Arabs had also been 

using their lead role in the 1987 to 1989 war with the Fur to argue for favorable changes to 

the Native Administration—changes that are now permanent in local political life in Darfur. 

When these same South Darfur Arabs helped defeat an SPLA foray into Darfur in 1991 by 

a Fur former NIF activist, Daud Yahya Bowlad, their demands increased. The regime began 

favoring them, and this was the beginning of the end of the South Darfur magdumiya. In the 

mid-1990s, in West Darfur, landless Arab groups and newcomers from Chad demanded, as 

price for their support to the regime, a restructuring of the idara ahliya and land tenure systems 

in a way that would challenge the historical domination of the Masalit and the Fur. Specifically, some Arab groups demanded more traditional leaders in higher positions, and insisted 

that these leaders be granted land rights.48 The result was that a number of locations witnessed 

extensive changes in Native Administration structures.

Fur leaders, as the historically dominant group, were the first victims of those changes. In 

1992, partly in response to the Bowlad raid, which the government feared might embolden the 

Fur, the regime began looking for allies in the Fur community. It found support in the effort 

by pro-regime Fur intellectuals to create a Fur shura, or consultative council. The first president 

of the Fur shura, Hussein Ayoub Ali Dinar, a grandson of the last sultan of Darfur, Ali Dinar, 

appointed himself sultan of the Fur (sultan al-Fur), and was endorsed by the government. But 

the new sultan had no court, no land, no omdas—in short, no power. Whether the government 

led Hussein Ayoub’s moves or simply endorsed them, his claims to be sultan for all the Fur of 

Sudan suited Khartoum’s desire to tribalize—and deterritorialize—the Fur traditional leadership. 

The position was purely honorific and ended up not amounting to much politically. Since then, 

Ibrahim Yusuf Ali Dinar, who reportedly does not speak the Fur language and has never lived 

in Darfur, succeeded Hussein in this position and pushed things further: with the support of the 

government, he calls himself the sultan of the nations of Darfur (sultan umum Darfur).49

Multiplication of Omdas and Regional Changes

The NIF policy to create new omdas was, on the face of it, a follow-through on the recommendations made by the reconciliation conference that followed the Fur-Arab war of 1987 to 1989. 

This bloody conflict in and around Jebel Marra pitted Fur farming communities against an 

unprecedented alliance of twenty-seven Arab tribes, supported by the Sudanese government. 

It was in many ways a forerunner of the current conflict: it involved the wholesale destruction 

of Fur villages and agriculture (orchards, irrigation channels, pumps), and deliberate murder 

and rape to terrorize and restrict people’s movement.50

The reconciliation conference called for new omdas for all the tribes. The Fur also received new omudiyas, but the agreement especially benefitted smaller Arab groups, which 

had had little previous weight within the existing idara ahliya system (such as the Ta’alba 

and Hottya around Kas) or no omdas at all (such as visiting abbala from northern Darfur). With the new omdas, these groups were now on the map, and they could offset Fur 

power in the Fur heartland. The theory was that all the omdas would report to more senior 

leaders—maliks, shartays, and nazirs—who had tenure rights over the land. But today, the 
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PEACEWORKS 83

great majority of Arab omdas no longer defer to the shartays and maliks, and have done so 

even less since the current conflict spread in 2002 and 2003. The new omdas, often formerly 

sheikhs, of course no longer follow the omdas who once had authority over them and to 

whom they are now equal in rank.

The creation of new omudiyas intensified the schism between tribal and territorial chiefs. 

The power of the new leader extends over a given group, members of which may be established on the territory and using the land of another, longer established traditional leader. The 

multiplication of omdas allowed the tribal leaders (often Arab) to find emancipation from the 

territorial leaders (often Fur or Masalit) and claim their own territory.

Having more senior leaders is one way for groups to claim greater access to land rights. 

Baggara (cattle-herding) Arab groups—Rizeigat, Habbaniya, Bani Halba, and Ta‘aisha—who 

had dars in southern Darfur under the sultanate had received the title nazir from the British 

in the 1930s—and since then this title has been associated with the detention of land rights. 

Similarly, the appointment of new omdas among landless Arabs allowed those to separate from 

landowning leaders to claim their own territories.

Dar Dima

In 1994, the Sudanese government divided Darfur into three states: North, South, and West 

Darfur.51 The division cut the Fur territories, Darfur’s center of political and demographic 

gravity, into three parts. It also wrought havoc on territories such as Dar Dima.

Kas locality, in the plains south of Jebel Marra, became part of South Darfur, as did most 

of its traditional territory, Dar Dima. Some Fur in South Darfur actually supported the move 

because it increased their numbers and power within the new state. But the move also cut Dar 

Dima from its historical traditional leader, the dimangawi, whose capital Zalingei was now 

in West Darfur, as was much of his territory. This suited the ambitions of the local Fur chief, 

Mansur Abdel-Qadir, also known as Abu Mansur. His story illustrates how a minor chief 

can rise by gaining the endorsement of the central government, as well as the impact of such 

changes on power relations between tribes.

Abu Mansur’s grandfather had been one of the eighteen maliks of Dar Dima. His father 

had ingratiated himself to the British, who then made him one of the four dimlijs when they 

restructured Dar Dima in 1931. Abu Mansur, also popular with the British, became shartay

of Dar Dima in 1951. When the Native Administration was reinstated in 1983, the historical owner of the hakura (land estate) that included Kas town, rather than Mansur, was named 

shartay. But in 1994, Mansur, now close to the NIF regime, made his comeback. During 

a government-sponsored conference of local leaders, he was elected—following the stillexperimental principles for appointing leaders—as amir al-gaba’il (prince of the tribes) of Kas 

locality, making him the leader of all the tribes in the locality.52

The title of amir is not new in Darfur. Military leaders were amirs during the Mahdiyya, 

and the British had tried to create an emirate in Zalingei in the 1930s. But in the mid-1990s, 

when the NIF began appointing amirs across Darfur, mostly among Arab tribes, the ring of 

the word was unmistakable: it both echoed the Mahdist military term and sounded foreign, 

Arab rather than Darfurian. In Kas, as in Dar Masalit at the same period, the creation of 

emirates gave the Arab tribes what they were asking for, more power. Arab leaders of Kas 

locality had decided to vote for a Fur and not to challenge yet the Fur historical domination. In reward, Abu Mansur had chosen an Arab leader as his deputy (na’ib), outranking 

the region’s three Fur shartays.

53 And, in 2008, Abu Mansur, by now quite old, stepped down 

in favor of his son. A number of Arab chiefs have challenged this, arguing that the function 
17

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

is not hereditary and even claiming that, in virtue of an agreement struck in the mid-1990s, 

Abu Mansur’s successor should be Arab, and his deputy, Fur.54

NIF policies, playing on intra-Fur rivalries, had managed to call into question Fur control 

over a part of the Fur heartland.

The Magdumiya

The magdum of southern Darfur is one of the most powerful traditional leaders of Darfur, along 

with the dimangawi. Both are historically Fur, and embodied the power of the sultan. The magdum was a commissioner or military commander appointed by the sultan for a fixed purpose and 

“who operated over and above the old-established territorial administration.”55 As time went 

on, the office tended to become more permanent and even hereditary. In southern Darfur, continuous wars with the baggara in the nineteenth century, and the continuous campaigns, led by 

successive magdums, led to the establishment of a more permanent entity, or magdumate, in the 

South.56 It was established by Sultan Ali Dinar in 1900, when he named his long-time military 

chief and chief minister Adam Rijal as the magdum, replacing another high-ranking traditional 

leader, the umangawi.

57 The office was dismantled with the fall of the sultanate, but the British revived it in 1928, plucking a little-known Fur prince from Kosti on the White Nile to serve as the 

new magdum. Some initial success was clearly linked to the personal qualities of the new magdum, 

and on his death in 1934, the situation in southern Darfur quickly deteriorated.58

Although chosen in a Fur dynasty, the magdum is traditionally a multi-ethnic leader. He ruled 

over a broad swath of the Fur and non-Fur—the Birgid, Dajo, and Beigo communities across the 

fertile lands of southeastern Darfur—as well as over small groups of baggara Arabs, mainly 

Missiriya and related groups. In 1958, Mohammed al-Fadul Adam Rijal was chosen as magdum, within the dynasty, by leaders of the various tribes of the region.

After 1994, the government renamed the magdumate the magdumiyat al-Fur—symbolically limiting the magdum’s power to his sole tribe. In the new arrangement, under the magdum were only five shartays, all Fur: the three previous Fur shartays and two Fur omdas who 

were promoted to the rank of shartay. Non-Fur leaders holding rank of shartay or nazir who 

had been under the magdum—the Dajo, the Birgid, and the Missiriya Arabs—became independent. The leader of the Dajo, an ancient community said to have been the founders of the 

first sultanate, assumed the title of sultan in 2006. The Bego also obtained an independent sultan. And Tarjam Arabs, who historically controlled no territory, were given a nazir. Finally, 

the abbala Rizeigat, who had come from northern Darfur fleeing drought and seeking pasture, obtained six omdas, of which four behaved as self-standing leaders, despite living in Fur shartayas and 

dars. The Fur managed to resist the demands of Sa‘ada Arabs and Mararit for independent leaders, 

and, in response to the appointment of new Arab nazirs and omdas, obtained new Fur omudiyas.

Thus the result of the breaking up of the magdumate has been the creation of independent 

leaders at the expense of the magdum and, in general, a multiplication and fragmentation of local chieftaincies. Not only did this policy aggravate and create conflict, between Fur and Arabs 

and between competing Arab tribes, it also created parallel and competing administrative and 

judiciary systems, complicating the resolution of intertribal conflicts, and ultimately making 

the administration and the provision of justice in territories with a unique ethnic diversity (as 

is clearly the case of the lowlands south and east and Jebel Marra) virtually impossible.

Dar Masalit

The Masalit are a farming people who live in the fertile lands of western Darfur, traditionally 

at the fringes of the Darfur sultanate. In the mid-1800s, the Fur sultan appointed a magdum
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there to serve as liaison with Masalit leaders. In the 1880s, during the Mahdiyya upheaval, a 

local holy man, Tajeddin, carved out an independent Masalit sultanate.59 After the fall of the 

sultanate, Dar Masalit became a central feature of the British policy of indirect rule.

The Masalit sultanate is traditionally highly hierarchical. Before 1994, the sultan oversaw 

twenty-one Masalit furshas, nine furshas from other non-Arab communities (five Erenga, one 

Missiriya Jebel, one Gimir, one Mararit, and one Marasi), and five Arab omdas with the rank 

of fursha (one Tarjam, one Hotiya, one Otriya, one Mahadi, and one Darok). These Arab communities were long settled, mostly in eastern Dar Masalit, near Saraf Umra.60 Certain nomadic 

Arab communities were also granted omdas by the Masalit sultan—cross-border communities 

that historically moved between Chad and Sudan, but in the 1980s and 1990s increasingly 

began to settle in Dar Masalit for both livelihood and political reasons.

After 1994, the government asked the Masalit sultan to take the title of amir al-umara’

(prince of princes)—although the title of sultan never ceased to be used, including officially. 

Some of the furshas and senior omdas below him became amirs. Of the twenty-one Masalit 

furshas, six became amirs and the others remained furshas under the six amirs. Nine Arab amirs

were appointed, chosen mostly among the leaders of newcomer Arab communities—groups 

that had come from Chad since the 1960s. Only one, the Mahadi amir, was an established 

community leader in Dar Masalit; the leaders of other long-settled Arab or non-Arab communities came under the Mahadi amir.

This change in structure was a massive political and social development. It elevated Arab 

leaders in terms of salary, protocol, and prestige. It also gave the Arabs in Dar Masalit a clear 

majority over the Masalit in the electoral college, composed of all the amirs, which was supposed to elect the amir al-umara’, that is, the sultan. It also had an impact on land: the newly 

appointed Arab amirs were tribal leaders, not territorial leaders, yet they now held sway over 

territories on which the Masalit amirs had in principle authority. In short, some parts of Dar 

Masalit were now no longer controlled by a Masalit leader—a revolutionary change.

Take the example of a newly named Arab amir who assumes control in an area. He will 

manage the affairs of the Arabs in that area. But, as the highest ranking traditional leader, he 

will also have his say in overseeing disputes between Arabs and non-Arabs. This was very upsetting to the Masalit: they did not want their affairs, especially with regard to land, adjudicated 

by someone who did not belong to them, and whose fealty to the sultan was unclear.

The resulting tensions, and the political and military support given to Arab militias, almost 

immediately triggered the 1995 to 1997 wars between Masalit and Arabs.

Dar Rizeigat

The large Arab dars of southern Darfur were also affected by NIF changes, in particular, Dar 

Rizeigat. Traditionally, all the southern Rizeigat, who are baggara (cattle herders), came under 

the rule of the old and powerful Madibbo family. The Madibbo, from the Mahariya Um Dahiya clan and based in ed-Da‘ein east of Nyala, have presided over the baggara Rizeigat since 

the nineteenth century. In 1928, the British attempted to carve out a single nazirate in an 

unsuccessful attempt to unite the southern and northern (abbala) Rizeigat in one political unit 

under the leadership of nazir Ibrahim Musa Madibbo of the southern Rizeigat.61 The abbala

(camel-herding) Rizeigat groups remained in northern Darfur under their sheikhs, and their 

unresolved claims to control over land have been one of the single most powerful driving factors in the current conflict.

In 1992, the regime in Khartoum initiated a plan to carve out three new nazirates from the 

existing southern Rizeigat nazirate: two for the two other main branches of the Rizeigat, the 
19

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Mahamid and the Nawayba, and one for another clan of the Mahariya, the Um Ahmad. This 

was clearly a bid by the NIF to consolidate political power by targeting the Umma party, of 

which the Madibbo family is a historical supporter and a strong source of power. But Rizeigat 

leaders, including some affiliated with the NIF, rejected the NIF proposals.

In 2003, Khartoum gave an independent nazir to longtime rivals of the Rizeigat, the 

Ma‘aliya of Adila, who until then had only one of the three wukala’ (sing. wakil, representatives) under the Rizeigat nazir.

62 As in other dars, the NCP regime has multiplied the nomination of omdas in Dar Rizeigat as well. In 1970, Dar Rizeigat had thirteen omdas, including three 

Ma‘aliya. In 2010, it had sixty-three.

Politicization and Tribal Polarization

Since colonial times, although not part of the civil service, native administrators have been 

virtual government employees. They received salaries, notably to discourage them from plundering the taxes they collected, one of their most important functions since the sultanate. As 

early as the 1920s, leaving omdas and sheikhs to continue paying themselves on shares of the 

taxes collected (a practice that continued until today for leaders of all ranks, legally or not), the 

colonial administration began to pay fixed salaries to high-rank native administrators.63

 After independence, to ensure continued political and material support, traditional leaders 

would gravitate toward the party in power, as well as keep the government from supporting 

rivals. This became even especially vital under the NIF/NCP government. It was only under 

the current regime that it has become acceptable to hold an idara ahliya position and government office at the same time, though it remains unclear what the law is.64

The current regime has many tools of control over the Native Administration. The commissioner or the wali appoints or approves traditional leaders. Leaders receive salaries—in 

North Darfur, since 2004, it is 1,500 Sudanese pounds (SDG) for a senior leader (shartay, 

malik, nazir) and SDG 300 for an omda. But the perks of the job are what really make the 

positions worthwhile on a personal level—perks both tangible (vehicle, fuel, a thuraya phone, 

phone credit, travel costs) and intangible (connections, opportunities for education and health 

care, business and per diem prospects, jobs for family members, and so on). The regime dispenses and can of course withdraw these perks at will. As increased exposure with the modern 

world has brought leaders to develop greater needs, they have become more dependent on 

government largesse.

One important feature is the permission to employ a small retinue of armed men (ghafir, 

pl. ghufara’ ), who serve as bodyguards. They also played an important role in traditional leaders’ 

judicial functions: delivered summons, kept order during mediation meetings, and on occasion 

helped enforce the traditional leader’s judgments; they were officially incorporated into the 

civil service under Nimeiri. In these more uncertain times, leaders increasingly feel that they 

need ghufara’ to demonstrate authority and get their decisions implemented. In the 1990s, 

leaders supported by the NIF/NCP regime were allowed to employ larger number of ghufara’, 

who formally organized as haras al-idara al-ahliya (Native Administration guard). Their numbers increased, and the process paved the road for recruiting militias during the war.

Shartay Suleiman Hasaballah of Kidingir, in east Jebel Marra, described the situation in 

the 1990s: “All the traditional leaders have armed guards, but Juma’a Dagolo [a new Mahariya 

Arab omda recently arrived from North Darfur who had set up in the shartay’s land] had sixty of 

them, much more than normal, armed with G3 and AK [assault rifles], and horses and camels. 

I only had three guards, with garabina [old bolt-action rifles]. And so, in the early 1990s, the 

Mahariya started attacking us Fur, raping women, looting our camels, and taking our land.”65

Since colonial times, 

although not part of 

the civil service, native 

administrators have 

been virtual government 

employees. 
20

PEACEWORKS 83

As non-NCP leaders increasingly tended to be considered as rebels and many, including 

some of the most important ones, were thus sacked to be replaced by clear NCP members, 

chosen among their rivals or not, traditional leaders feel they more than ever need the support 

of the ruling party to prosper, and even survive (personal security is a real issue).

Idara Ahliya and Party Politics

To view the Native Administration and party politics in Darfur as separate spheres would 

be a serious misperception of the current political reality. The two are in fact closely intertwined. Traditional leaders embrace or reject a given party, and sometimes do both, based 

on tradition, interest, fear, or loyalty. Many leaders, including non-Arabs, have remained 

members of the NCP despite the latter’s appalling record in Darfur—a clear symptom of 

their weakness. But at the same time, their legitimacy is an asset that the ruling party covets 

and seeks to harness for its purposes—by cajoling, co-opting, constraining, and intimidating traditional leaders.

The Magdumiya of South Darfur is a case in point. The Magdumiya has historically been 

favorable to the Umma. However, as the Umma was preparing to run (and win) the 1986 

elections, the Adam Rijal lineage was offered no winnable seat in parliament. The unionists, 

however, did offer a seat, and the family switched its support to Sayyid Mirghani’s DUP. 

Magdum Ahmad Abder-Rahman Adam Rijal, in office since 1997, was thus DUP. He was 

in clear opposition to the NCP, notably during the first years of the war, and Khartoum dismissed him in 2006, so that he joined the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 

2008. His successor, his cousin Salaheddin Mohammed al-Fadul Adam Rijal, was chosen by 

the governor of South Darfur and appointed by the government after consulting the elders 

of the family, but without an election. Salaheddin had been close to the Islamists since his 

student days; he joined the NIF in 1996 on being offered the position of commissioner in 

Lagawa, West Kordofan. He chose the NCP after the split between Omar al-Bashir and 

Turabi. According to him, “we respect the party which brought our family to government 

because we want a share of power, so as to solve the problems of our people.” Many traditional 

families have similar speeches and stories.

Education

Education has been a critical issue in Darfur. Under the Condominium, British administrators 

in Darfur pressured leading families to receive some education so that the next generation of 

traditional leaders could perform the minimal functions of indirect rule.66 Many traditional 

leaders in Darfur initially rejected British schools, which they saw as non-Muslim, and refused 

to enroll their children. But the authorities pressured them to educate at least some of their 

children—first, so that the next generation of traditional leaders would be itself educated, and, 

second, to have members of influential families working in the colonial administration. Under 

this pressure, and because they soon grasped the benefits of having their sons working within 

the colonial administration, some leading families took to sending their boys, and sometimes 

their girls, to elementary school.

This was notably the case of some of the main Zaghawa dynasties, in particular the sultan 

of Tina and the malik of Am Boru, as well as the shartays of Kornoy and Dor. In the 1930s, 

sultan Dawsa from Tina sent his sons Mahmoud and Bishara (the latter eventually became 

sultan) to the elementary school in Kutum. Malik Mohammedein sent his son Ali, later to 

become sultan, to school in El Fasher at the same time. This first generation of educated Darfurians did not continue after elementary school; there was no intermediary school in Darfur 
21

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

at the time, and their fathers did not want them to leave Darfur. They wanted them only to receive enough instruction to be able to read and write, officiate and serve as clerks in traditional 

courts, and interact with the British. Sons would learn the skills deemed important to become 

leaders—land knowledge, mediation—from their elders.

During colonial times and in the years after independence, when education was harder to 

come by, families would sometimes establish a division of roles. Some sons stayed in the Native 

Administration, and others joined more modern sectors of society. Sultan Dawsa, for example, 

sent his sons to school, but among them, he chose Bishara as his khalifa; Bishara thus went on 

to become sultan, and the others became government employees and physicians.

From the 1960s on, as more scions of illustrious Darfur families gained access to university, 

divisions began appearing within leading families. Some of the educated youth continued to 

support the Native Administration institution. Others were influenced by more modern ideas 

from the political left and right, and rejected the idara ahliya. Since the 1990s, however, as 

the Islamist regime has consolidated its power in Sudan, the interests of the educated elites 

and the traditional leadership have increasingly merged. The political domination of the NIF 

and then the NCP—and the heavy hand they had in their dealings with the idara ahliya in 

Darfur—meant that traditional leaders who wanted to retain access to resources and government recognition had less choice but to support the ruling party.

The notion of fracture between the old elite of traditional leaders and new, educated 

elite must, however, be carefully nuanced. Elites in Darfur today—professionals, intellectuals, 

politicians, army officers—come largely from the leading traditional families.67 At the same 

time, today’s traditional leaders are increasingly chosen from among the more educated of the 

chiefly families. Before becoming leaders, they often have exercised professions of administrators, government employees, army or police officers, businessmen, teachers, and so on. Some 

can be reluctant to leave their positions and the towns where they have settled to go live with 

their communities in rural areas. Even when they accept an appointment, senior traditional 

leaders increasingly want to spend more time in the state capitals, or Khartoum, where they 

often keep a house and enjoy greater access to modern amenities, medical care, and politics.68

One example of recent magdums illustrates the evolution of the relationship with education in a leading Darfurian family. Mohammed al-Fadul Adam Rijal, the magdum between 

1958 and 1979, attended only elementary school—his desire to serve in the military under 

the British was opposed by his brother and then magdum, Abder-Rahman Adam Rijal, who 

instead made him clerk of his court. By contrast, Ahmad Abder-Rahman Adam Rijal (magdum from 1997 to 2006) was one of the first Darfurians to graduate from Khartoum University (1956), then served as administrator in various parts of Sudan. His successor and cousin, 

Salaheddin Mohammed al-Fadul, the present magdum, studied Islamic law at the Islamic 

University in Omdurman, where he was a student leader active in Islamist circles. He is a 

career politician and, shortly after graduating in 1981, became the youngest member of the 

(then) Darfur Legislative Assembly.

Education remains a hot topic in Darfur today. The NCP government has, since the 2000s, 

opened a number of schools and even small universities, but these efforts fall well short of 

the massive investment necessary to provide even basic schooling to a majority of children in 

Darfur. The lack of schooling facilities and the poor state they are in is a painful symptom of 

the neglect of the province by the central government. Even groups that are pro-government, 

such as the abbala Arabs, demand greater opportunities (in their case, boarding schools that 

suit their nomadic lifestyle) and explain elements of the present conflict by the lack of education of their people.
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PEACEWORKS 83

Tribal Polarization

The tribalization of the Native Administration is one of the most important trends in Darfur 

since the early 1990s. As mentioned, with the exception of a few ethnically homogenous areas, 

most traditional leaders in Darfur had been the leaders of multitribal territories. The NIF/NCP 

created many new leaders and provided them political and often military support. These amirs, 

nazirs and especially mid-level omdas, ceased to follow the older, established land leaders.69

This has led to an increase in conflict over land, both at the local level and at the broader 

dar level. The new leaders wanted the positions precisely because they believed the titles would 

lend legal support to their claim on land. At the same time, the established territorial leaders 

are increasingly also becoming tribal leaders as they lose control over other tribes living in their 

territories: many now have authority only over their tribe and small minority groups who live 

in their territory. This is a huge transformation in local power relations: the traditional landbased consensus that cut across ethnic lines has been replaced by a norm of confusion and 

lawlessness in which anyone with a gun can lay claim to land.

Tribal Shuras

The shura councils (majlis ash-shura, pl. majalis ash-shura) or consultative councils, are an invention of the current regime. As with many NIF initiatives, their aim is both to mobilize and to 

repress: the shuras help the regime further the ideological goals of the Islamic movement in 

Sudan, as well as impose greater control over society, particularly over the educated elites. The 

term shura carries a strong Islamic connotation. There are different kinds of shura councils: the 

Islamic Movement shura (shura al-haraka al-islamiya), which is the shura of the National Congress. Tribal shuras are conferences or federations that cover a given ethnic group across all of 

Sudan. According to Suliman Baldo, “tribal associations, built around traditional tribal leaders 

and other influential community elders are known as the Consultative Councils and are seen 

as the traditional custodians of the collective interests.”70 They bring together not only traditional leaders, but also educated elites, politicians from all parties, civil society organizations 

(themselves increasingly monoethnic), and members of the diaspora. To progress in society—

in government, politics, the armed forces, and business—educated individuals increasingly feel 

they need the support of their tribe, and are reverting to their tribal affiliation. Claiming affiliation to one’s tribe and gaining its support requires the support of the Native Administration. 

For leading politicians and intellectuals, coming from a traditional dynasty—as most of them 

do—remains important ingredient for success. Tribal shura councils have a council of elders 

(majlis al-a‘yan), most if not all of whom also belong to the Native Administration, which 

elects the shura council president. It is nonetheless the educated elites who tend to dominate in 

the shura, including the many new senior traditional leaders who are educated and have moved 

away from their ancestral lands. For practical reasons, the shuras tend to be very Khartoumcentric—thus modeling the centralist pattern of the Sudanese power system—and headed by 

people living in Khartoum, most of the time not members of the Native Administration.

The tribal shuras address the dispersion of tribes to other parts of Darfur and even outside 

Darfur—Khartoum, the Gezira and central Sudan, and Gedaref and eastern Sudan. The great 

droughts of the 1970s and 1980s triggered widespread migration, and some tribes have fewer 

people in their home area than outside. In the past, members of these migrant communities tended to lose their tribal affiliation. They became more generically Sudanese: they forwent indigenous cultural practices such as dance and brewing, turned to more orthodox versions of Islam, 

and privileged Nile valley Arabic over their native languages. They were key drivers in a process 

of Sudanization that swept over Darfurian towns.71 But in the 1990s and 2000s, the return to 
23

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

the tribe has been unmistakable. The Zaghawa shura was headed for several years by an educated 

member of the Zaghawa Kajmar, a branch of the tribe settled in Kordofan before colonization. 

The Darfurian Native Administration now stretches well beyond Darfur and has come to the 

towns: the Zaghawa omda in Umbadda, a suburb of Omdurman with a strong Zaghawa population, for example, is now part of the new nizam ahli (native system) described earlier. 

The tribal shuras do not, however, provide protection from interference by the regime. If 

anything, they make leading members of various tribal groups more vulnerable to political 

pressure by gathering them in a centralized institution. Nor are the shuras a source of unity 

within the tribe. One of the purposes of the regime’s policy of retribalization is to ensure that, 

through manipulation, the ruling party can divide and conquer. Until 2011, the Fur elite had 

been divided into three shuras. One headed by magdum Salaheddin of the NCP also included 

various Fur opposition politicians. The other two were closer to the NCP: one headed by sultan Ibrahim Yusuf and supported by shartay Ja‘far Abdel-Hakam, the NCP governor of West 

Darfur until January 2012, and the other headed by Mohammed Yusif, an NCP member of 

parliament from Zalingei. The three finally managed to unite in the summer of 2011.

Recent years have also seen a proliferation of tribally based student associations. As with 

the shuras, the student associations are a tool with which the regime can both mobilize support 

and control dissent. Like many other universities, al-Nilein University in Khartoum boasts 

many associations representing different Darfur tribes and approved by the general student 

union, which is controlled by the NCP. Purportedly, the role of these organizations is to help 

students from a given region navigate life in the big city, as well as channel assistance (in the 

form of cultural events, small development programs, technical support) to their home areas. 

But their real purpose is control and mobilization: the associations help the government monitor the students, as well as organize them for rallies, elections, military service, and so on. The 

names of these associations are telling. The Zaghawa organization downplays its tribal affiliation by calling itself rabitat abna dar wadi hawar (the Association of the Sons of Dar Wadi 

Hawar), Wadi Hawar being a large seasonal river that runs through Dar Zaghawa—perhaps 

a reflection of the difficulty of being Zaghawa in times when the main rebel groups in Darfur 

are Zaghawa. Other tribes, on the other hand, assert their tribes even though they come from 

mixed areas, such as the Birgid rabitat abna al-birgid or the Dajo rabitat abna ad-dajo. The ruling party monitors these groups carefully, encouraging NCP students to seek top positions and 

giving them resources when they do.

Impact of the War

The current conflict broke out in earnest in the early 2000s with a spate of rebel attacks on 

government targets, but earlier conflicts in the 1980s (Fur-Arab) and 1990s (Masalit-Arab) 

foreshadowed the violence to come. By the time the world took notice of the conflict in 2003 

and 2004, large areas of Darfur had been in a state of open war for several years. The violence 

of the past decade may have been new in scale, but it was not unprecedented.72

After the Sudan Liberation Army attacked and briefly held El Fasher in April 2003, the 

government responded with a vicious counterinsurgency campaign that mobilized abbala

Arab nomads to attack non-Arab communities—predominantly Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit. 

In western Darfur, where rebel activity had been limited, the violence was more land-grab 

than counterinsurgency—a continuation of a decade of government-sponsored Arab attacks 

on the Masalit.73 The high-water mark of the violence lasted from April 2003 through late 

2004, during which as many as two million people were displaced, including 200,000 refugees 

in Chad. By 2005, one Darfur resident in three had been forced from his or her home. In 
24

PEACEWORKS 83

subsequent years, despite occasional spikes, the violence ebbed somewhat; in essence, most of the 

good land had been vacated and few people were left to usefully displace. One such spike was the 

bloody intra-Arab violence of 2007 and 2008. There have been no large-scale permanent returns.

The war that has so brutally affected communities has also deeply affected community 

leaders. For traditional leaders in Darfur, the upheaval has further aggravated the tribalization 

and politicization of the Native Administration. More than ever, affiliation to tribe and party 

(the NCP) are necessary, not only for success but also for survival. Traditional leaders have also 

been displaced, imprisoned, and sometimes tortured and killed. They have had to find a modus 

vivendi with rebel groups that sometimes exercised control over their territories, but still engage with NCP-dominated government institutions.

Aggravated Tribal Polarization

The war has enhanced the decline of the territorial leaders already under way, to the benefit 

of purely tribal chiefs. This process itself leads to conflict, as was the case with the fierce intraArab violence Darfur has witnessed since 2007.

A striking example of how the upheaval of past years has triggered change that leads to 

future conflict is the emergence of a pan-Darfur Missiriya chieftaincy. The Missiriya Arabs 

are mostly present in Kordofan and Chad, with only small pockets in Darfur around Niteiga, 

north of Nyala. The area had been part of the magdumiya, but is now the center of an independent Missiriya nazirate. A number of small Arab groups claim a Missiriya connection, particularly in southern and western Darfur—the Ta‘alba (Kas area), the Hotiya (Kas and Zalingei), 

the Sa‘ada (Gardud, north of Nyala), the Nei‘mat (Kas), and others. To these must be added the 

Missiriya Jebel of Jebel Mun, north of Geneina; they speak their own language (Milerinkiya) 

and are traditionally considered non-Arab, but some of their leaders have of late begun to stress 

a link with the Missiriya Arabs. Some Missiriya leaders claim that united, the Missiriya would 

be the most powerful Arab group in Darfur, more numerous even than the Rizeigat.

One of the more outspoken has been Haroun Imam, a Missiriya Jebel from an Umma family in Kas, whom nazir Tijani Abdel-Gadir of the Missiriya has named deputy nazir. Nazir

Tijani’s authority is limited to the Missiriya community of Niteiga; the choice of a Missiriya Jebel as his deputy seems to be a move to broaden his base, which is challenged by other 

Missiriya. Haroun Imam, on his end, claims to be the nazir’s khalifa, or successor designate, and 

to have authority over all Missiriya between Kas and the Chadian border. His brother Hassan 

Imam, an Umma politician, has engaged on a similar though more peaceful path with the creation of one of the many Darfurian civil society forums, the Darfur Peace Block (kutlat salam 

darfur), which seeks to mobilize smaller tribes that are less involved in the conflict into a sort of 

antiwar front. Both initiatives have run into the opposition of autonomous Missiriya branches 

who do not consider Haroun Imam to be true Arab, let alone defer to his leadership. The Ta‘alba 

in particular hope for a nazirate of their own to be headed by Adam Hamza Teirab, son of the 

Ta‘alba omda of Nyala and an NCP member. The Ta‘alba even have ambitions of dominating 

other smaller neighboring groups of Kas locality, Arab (Awatfe, Bani Hussein, Ruhas) and nonArab (Gimir, Borgo, Masalit) alike. Missiriya ambitions have contributed to bloody clashes with 

the Rizeigat in recent years.74 These developments all show how tribal identity is an increasingly 

valuable a tool for political ambitions, to the point of becoming an end in and of itself.

Government Control and Politicization

The war has also heightened another trend of the NIF/NCP years: the politicization of the 

Native Administration. With the violence, the political stakes are higher and everyday life less 

The war has enhanced the 

decline of the territorial 

leaders already under 

way, to the benefit of 

purely tribal chiefs. 
25

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

secure. The choice between being with or against the regime is starker and more necessary. “We 

have to follow all governments. Even if the power is taken by the communists, we will have to 

follow them, because the system obliges us to do so,” a non-Arab chief interviewed in 2004 said 

regretfully. “We are chiefs because are ancestors were chiefs,” he added, “but with this government, we cannot say what we are thinking, or they would destitute us.”75 

At the beginning of the conflict some traditional leaders suspected of pro-rebel sympathies 

were imprisoned, such as shartay Sherif Adam Tahir of Dar Sueini in North Darfur, after he 

had complained of the destruction of his dar and his town of Dor, including his own house.76

Non-Arab traditional leaders, as well as their houses and possessions, were particularly targeted by government forces, in particular abbala Arab militias. This was notably the case of the 

house, royal drums, swords, and archives of the Zaghawa malik of Dar Tuer, which were burnt, 

destroyed, or looted during the attack of Dar Tuer’s capital Am Boru in January 2004. That 

destruction of the symbols of the traditional power were clearly seen by the victims as designed 

to collectively humiliate the community and to erase its history.77

Many anti-NCP or simply non-NCP leaders are suspected of pro-rebel sympathies and 

sacked, to be replaced by NCP members, often chosen among their rivals. Examples include 

that of magdum Ahmad Abder-Rahman Adam Rijal, who often received international visitors 

and was very critical of government violence; shartay Mohammed Siraj of Shattaya, displaced 

since 2004 and a member of the opposition Islamist Popular Congress Party (PCP), was replaced in 2011 by Omar Ganduli, who is pro-NCP but not from the dynasty; dimangawi

Fadul Sese Mohammed Atim of Zalingei was sacked after the 2010 elections for lending his 

support to the DUP candidate. Some sacked leaders remained more respected by the communities than their official replacements, which is adding to the general confusion undermining 

the Native Administration system as a whole.78

To get ahead, local notables must play on all political fronts, modern and traditional, local 

and national. The legitimacy and local support that comes with a Native Administration position 

can help launch and sustain a political career. Recent developments in West Darfur illustrate the 

complex interplay between modern politics and intrigue over traditional leadership positions. 

During the 2010 elections, competition for the position of wali (pl. wulah), or governor, of West 

Darfur was intense. The NCP candidate was the outgoing governor, shartay Ja‘far Abdel-Hakam, 

of the Fur tribe. The local NCP had reportedly elected the Masalit sultan Sa‘d Bahreddin as a 

candidate, so that Ja‘far had to be imposed by a decision from Khartoum. He had then to compete with As‘ad Bahreddin, brother of the Masalit sultan and DUP candidate. The dimangawi of 

Zalingei, one of the most senior Fur traditional leaders and a longtime Umma supporter recently 

turned NCP, nevertheless lent his support to the DUP Masalit candidate—to oppose Ja‘far, his 

kinsman and subordinate, as shartay in the Native Administration hierarchy who had been openly undermining his authority. The election period had seen renewed government attacks on local 

leaders who openly supported traditional parties, and the dimangawi was soon sacked, in early 

2011, by the newly elected Ja‘far Abdel-Hakam, who pushed Fur shartays to oppose their leader 

to justify the sacking.

The dimangawi position now open, in mid-2011, the new governor managed to get himself named leader of the Fur shura council of West Darfur. He tried to have this council elect 

him as dimangawi and worked to change West Darfur law to make the move legal. This move 

was significant because Ja‘far is only the son of the omda of Dileij, the capital of Dar Kule, a 

Fur chieftancy in the Wadi Saleh area. In 2000, on the death of the then shartay of Dar Kule, 

himself an Umma man and the scion of a long-established dynasty, Ja‘far was commissioner 

of Mukjar (Wadi Saleh) and thus had the power to appoint a new shartay. He pressured 
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PEACEWORKS 83

local omdas to name him shartay, despite the fact that he did not come from the original 

royal lineage.

His attempt to become dimangawi has so far failed, not least because of the return to 

Sudan of Tijani Sese—former governor of Darfur, brother of the former dimangawi, and 

leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), and sole rebel signatory of the July 

2011 Doha Document for peace in Darfur (DDPD). Sese was also appointed as chairman 

of the Darfur Regional (formerly Transitional) Authority in September 2011—of which 

Ja‘far was a previous chairman. After failing to become dimangawi, Ja‘far did manage to 

get himself named as president of the Fur shura council of Zalingei, a politically influential 

position. Ja‘far was also recently relieved as governor of West Darfur and replaced by Haydar Galukoma, the main LJM Masalit leader, in accord with the Doha agreement. After 

the separation of the Fur area from West Darfur to create the new state of Central Darfur 

in January 2012, it would have been difficult to maintain a Fur governor in what is now 

essentially a Masalit state.

The tale may be complex and multilayered, but its very intricacy shows how political leaders compete in a wide range of arenas—village, state, party, and rebel group, and national and 

even international levels—to achieve power. Each sphere serves as a platform to perform in the 

other spheres. But the Native Administration remains a key tool with which to build constituencies and mobilize support.

Urbanization of Traditional Leaders

Another consequence of the war is the urbanization of the main traditional leaders, displaced 

or not. Because of insecurity, most senior leaders spend most of their time in the state capitals 

and even in Khartoum, handing off their local administrative and justice functions to their 

na’ib (deputy), wakil (agent), mandub (representative), or khalifa (successor). Senior leaders 

have become intermediaries with the central government. This is not necessarily negative: local 

communities need to be represented at the centers of power, at the state and national levels, 

especially in these uncertain times. But it has also changed the way ordinary people, especially 

those who have been displaced, relate to their leaders.

In the past, the native administrators lived in their areas and reflected the concerns of their 

people to outsiders. Now, they are out, in contact with party politics. They are more aware and 

also more ambitious. They draw on their local base to pursue political careers (see also box 1). 

Conversely, ambitious educated elites who live in the cities fall back on their home areas, 

seeking alliances with traditional leaders to make them more credible in their pursuit of political positions in the center—the state capitals and Khartoum. This is a recent development: in 

the 1960s and 1970s, educated elites, often Communists or Islamists, were usually against the 

Native Administration.

At the same time, tribal groups now increasingly require their senior leaders to represent them in the big cities. They select educated individuals to replace those who have died, 

even seeking individuals who are long established in the state capitals or Khartoum and have 

weak roots in the home areas. The recent leaders of the Berti of northeastern Darfur are an 

eloquent example of this. The previous malik, Husein Ahmaday Adam Tamim, was a longestablished merchant in Omdurman before he was selected. When his people approached 

him, he said he did not want to go to Mellit, the Berti capital. But the Berti elders told him 

that it was perfectly acceptable for him to stay in Omdurman, to name a deputy who would 

reside in Mellit and handle affairs there while he visited Darfur on occasion. The elders’ goal 

was representation and status at the center—in Khartoum. Husein’s son Yassir, the new king 

Tribal groups now 

increasingly require 

their senior leaders to 

represent them in the 

big cities.
27

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

of the Berti, is a Khartoum-raised electrical engineer, and will clearly never live in Mellit. 

He is married to the daughter of General Ibrahim Suleiman, a powerful and respected Berti 

army officer, formerly federal minister of defense, chief of staff, and the last pre-war governor 

of North Darfur. The lavish wedding, held at the Khartoum international fairgrounds in late 

2011, saw an unusual move: Berti elders brought the sacred drum (nahas) of malik Ahmaday 

to Khartoum. Beating the drum outside Berti territory, and in the national capital, was a powerful symbol of self-assertion at the center. The wedding, clearly staged to impress, reversed 

the old idea of Darfurians keeping a low profile in the towns and symbolized a momentous 

political transformation: people are now aware that politics is not made in their area and that 

they need representation in the center.

This trend started before the war, but the conflict strongly accelerated it. The war heightened the desire to achieve representation at the center because failing to be represented during 

a time of conflict could be fatal.

Box 1. Will Women Become Traditional Leaders?

On January 1, 2011, Fatima Mohammed al-Fadul Adam Rijal was appointed by the governor of 

South Darfur omda of Nyala city to be the first and sole female member of Darfur’s Native Administration, a new position. She has a strong familial legitimacy as the daughter of former magdum

Mohammed al-Fadul Adam Rijal and the sister of the current magdum Salaheddin, under which 

she is placed in the hierarchy. She has also a strong political legitimacy, having been elected three 

times a member of the federal parliament since 2000, the last time in 2010 on the women quota. 

She is also educated, having earned a master’s in sustainable development from Ahfad University for 

Women in Khartoum—one of the earliest education facilities for women in Africa.

Under her are five (male) sheikhs transferred to her from the shartay of Gusanjamat. She said that 

some of those sheikhs, as well as some higher members of the Native Administration, initially disagreed with her appointment, but that others said, “There are already women judges who can draft 

laws and put men in prison, so why not women in the Native Administration?”In 2011, she explained 

that women need to fight to change the law: “Since the British, the law speaks about the ‘men’ of 

the idara ahliya, and the latest South Darfur law specifies women can’t be part of the native administration. Women members of the state parliament want to change this, but the men are reluctant. The 

women wrote to the governor [Abdel-Hamid Musa Kasha] and obtained a new discussion of the law. 

If it remains as it is, it would be a problem for other women to become chiefs. I want to make a law 

which will ensure that my successor can be a woman only.”

Fatima’s experience demonstrates that the government, or at least some (male) officials, understand well how gender-friendly policies might also be media-friendly, and useful in terms of relations 

with international players. The traditional system is not about individuals, however, but about communities and dynasties representing them—and Fatima is first and foremost the heir of one of the 

most important families. Thus even if women are not necessarily leaders (or customary judges or 

mediators), it would be simplistic to believe that male leaders do not represent them as members of 

their communities, in particular, in justice and reconciliation forums. Quantitative data are not available, but our observations (including those from the customary court of El Fasher), show that women 

often win cases of conflict between a man and a woman and that the male judges who preside over 

such cases are thus not necessarily a disadvantage to the women. The gender inequalities in those 

forums seem much less prevalent than the ethnic divides (in particular in this war) and even more 

the social hierarchy. Thus currently a woman from a big family or a powerful tribe has certainly more 

chances at court than a man of poor origin or from a tribe labeled as pro-rebel.

However, it is likely that Fatima’s appointment is a step in a slow process of women’s empowerment, though for the time being this empowerment generally involves women taking care of their 

own affairs, and only rarely ruling men. Thus, in parallel to her male sheikhs, Fatima also appointed 

some women as sheikha, in charge only of women’s affairs—a development mirrored in the emergence of similar sheikhas, also generally in charge of women’s affairs, in the displaced and refugee 

camps. This latter development was clearly made possible by the higher proportion of women in the 

camp populations—many men having stayed behind, joined the rebel movements, or been killed. 

As often in wars, the conflict thus gave women new opportunities, particularly in displaced communities. Uncertainty on the future role of women once the displaced return to their homelands, however, 

is considerable. 

Source: Interview with Fatima Mohammed al-Fadul Adam Rijal, Khartoum, August 2012.
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Leaders Displaced and Not Displaced

Many traditional leaders have been displaced, some with their communities, some because 

they were targeted, by the government, the militias (janjawid), or the rebels (especially Minni 

Minawi’s group in their home area of Dar Zaghawa). They were almost all unable to provide 

protection to their people. Once displaced, many senior and mid-ranking traditional leaders 

shunned the displaced camps and took refuge in government-controlled towns, where some 

already had houses, for both security and comfort. They have better resources or contacts than 

ordinary citizens and live safer and more comfortable lives. But this creates additional distance 

with their people, in that travel between towns and the neighboring camps can be expensive 

and dangerous. The war has driven a physical wedge between many traditional leaders and 

their people in the displaced camps. According to an omda living in a displaced camp, “The 

sheikhs and omdas in the towns are on the side of the Government; the displaced want their 

leaders with them, but they live in the towns”79 (see also box 2).

Among the most senior leaders, at-Tahir Adam Abdul-Jalil, the Tunjur malik of Inga in 

North Darfur, is exceedingly rare in that he has a wife in Abu Shok camp (near El Fasher) and 

maintains a house there.

Many displaced also view their old leaders as pro-regime—because they are in fact so, 

because they are on the government payroll, or because they live in the towns and seldom visit 

the camps. The camp sheikhs are, by contrast, often closer to the rebels, especially SLA-AbdelWahid (SLA-AW).

But it is important not to overstate the tension between the displaced and their senior 

traditional leaders. Many international actors believe the latter have no longer any influence on 

the displaced. This is not the case: many displaced retain strong ties—often through family or 

clan links—with the older traditional leadership.80

At the same time, new leaders have emerged in the camps. Some were already sheikhs or omdas

before the conflict, but many are not. They have achieved greater power because they were better 

educated than the junior chiefs they had been subordinate to, or had skills that were more useful 

in the context of displacement and relief programs: better literacy, numeracy, and basic management skills, better Arabic and sometimes even English, and generally greater exposure to the 

world beyond rural Darfur.81 A sheikh ash-shuyukh (head sheikh) of a displaced camp explained,

I am stronger than the traditional leaders, the sheikhs, the omdas, the shartays. They have 

government salaries and cars, and they don’t come see the displaced. They are guilty for 

letting the problems get worse. A camp sheikh has nothing, no salary, only his ration card 

to get relief food, he lives in the camp, he works for the people for free, he spends all his 

time resolving problems. That’s why I’m stronger than the old leaders. I live with the 

people night and day, I know what each person has to deal with.82

But when it comes time to return, the new sheikhs will not know how to handle certain issues, especially those related to land—allocating land, granting access to pasture, where to sink 

a well and how to manage it, negotiating the timing and location for the passage of nomads 

and their livestock, disputes, and so on. In this sense, the war has accelerated in Darfur a trend 

present across the continent by which community leaders emerge among migrant communities in large towns but often do not assume leadership positions when they return to the village.

Idara Ahliya and the Rebels

Anecdotic evidence from many years of research and countless conversations in Darfur shows 

an evolution in how non-Arab Darfurian traditional leaders, and intellectuals, have viewed 

the rebels since the beginning of the violence. In the early years of extreme brutality, 2003 

and 2004, non-Arab leaders supported the goal of bringing more development to Darfur 
29

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

and bitterly condemned the regime’s violence. But they also blamed the rebels for starting a 

war that would predictably bring violence on civilians. By mid-2006 and the regime’s cynical 

response to the ill-fated Abuja peace agreement, views had changed. A fleeting union among 

the rebel groups led to a stunning string of military victories over government forces, and 

many Darfurian leaders started believing that, because the government would never work for 

a return to peace in Darfur, the rebels were the only hope. But the rebels rapidly fragmented 

and their military might dissolved, allowing government forces to gain the upper hand. NonArab traditional leaders are now deeply skeptical of any rebel enterprise.83

Non-Arab leaders feel that they are targeted by the security forces and militias. They also 

come under strong government pressure to act as government policy agents—pressuring the 

rebels to accept a negotiated solution, encouraging the return of displaced people, and facilitating 

the movement of Arab herds through non-Arab territory. Some have resisted, often silently, but 

others have been more acquiescent in the face of government threats. The pliancy of some leaders 

has created tensions between the Native Administration as a whole and the rebel groups: rebels 

initially suspected any leader living in government-held territory of active collaboration with the 

regime. “Some traditional leaders are part of the problem. The government buys them off and 

they give information on us,” an SLA leader said in 2004.84 Some traditional leaders voiced open 

hostility to the rebels: “These people who started the war, they didn’t consult with us. They don’t 

respect us, they don’t even talk to us.”85 In the beginning of the conflict, traditional leaders clearly 

felt trapped between two evils: “if we speak like the government, the rebels blame us. And if we 

speak like the rebels, the government arrests us,” one of them complained in 2004.86

Relations were especially tense between rebels and traditional leaders. Not only because the 

Native Administration is appointed and paid by the government, many leaders, without necessarily being pro-government, opposed a rebellion they saw as a violent choice for solving local 

conflicts they were themselves trying to resolve over the past decade or two (often without 

much success)—conflicts in which many rebels had fought as local militias. The rebels were 

largely recruited among uneducated youth from low-rank clans or class; to this day, the chieftaincy families are underrepresented in the rebel movements. “Some of the rebels are poor, they 

don’t like the chiefs and think there’s no need for chiefs anymore.”87 These tensions echoed 

discord between elites and lower classes, as well as intergenerational and interclan competition, 

and led to a series of kidnappings and murders—many by the Zaghawa faction of SLA, later 

known as SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), who were especially hostile to the elites.

In Dar Zaghawa, for instance, the rebel-traditional chief divide obscured long-simmering interclan rivalries. Malik Abder-Rahman Ali Mohammadein, the king of Am Boru, was 

Box 2. Abu Shok Leaders in Prison

Over the years, a number of traditional leaders living in the displaced camps and camp leaders have 

been threatened or arrested for their opposition to the government. A notorious case was that of 

omda Ishaq Yahya Hussein “Saju,” a Fur omda from Kutum area who became the omda of omdas

(and thus the paramount leader) of the Abu Shok displaced camp in El Fasher and was always vocal 

in his criticism of government policies, especially with the international community. The government 

started by supporting rival leaders, a common technique Khartoum adopts with leaders considered 

hostile. In 2008, Saju and two other omdas were victims of an assassination attempt by a pro-NCP 

camp youth leader. Saju was wounded and another omda, Ahmad Hajar, killed. In August 2009, Saju 

and some twenty other camp leaders were accused of the murder of Omar “Sarukh,” a rival leader 

who enjoyed both government and UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur) support. Saju and Adam Yahya, his counterpart in neighboring Al-Salam camp, remained in prison in El 

Fasher despite public calls for their release by the civil society gatherings during the Doha peace 

negotiations. They were released later in 2011.

Source: UN Security Council, “Letter dated 24 January 2012 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan,” http://bit.ly/Ixp1ba (New York: UNSC, 2012), 27. For a portrait of omda Sajo, see Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 50–57.
30

PEACEWORKS 83

killed in 2004 by Minni Minawi’s forces, who accused him of being pro-NCP. The backdrop, 

though, was perhaps more telling: an old conflict for the chieftaincy between the royal clan of 

the malik, the Agaba, and Minni Minawi’s clan, the Awlad Digen.88 Similarly, shartay Adam 

Sabi Tijani at-Tayyib of Kornoy was abducted by the SLA in 2004 and only released on payment of a ransom. Again, though, the real background was a conflict between the Kaliba, the 

royal clan of the shartay, and the Geligerge, one of the most prevalent clans in the SLA.

On other occasions, attacks against traditional leaders seemed motivated by greed. Omda

Hamid al-Manna of Dor, for instance, was abducted by the SLA in 2003 and released 

for a ransom; he remained in the rebel area, with his people who had been displaced by 

the violence.89

In yet other cases, the violence was motivated by suspicions of collaboration with the government. In Jebel Marra, the SLA killed two successive shartays of Rokero: Yusef Yahya in 

2003 and his nephew Yahya Suleiman; Rokero is an enclave in the middle of the Jebel Marra 

that government forces hold in part thanks to a local Fur militia, which both shartays were accused of mobilizing for.90

At times, rebel violence was driven by intertribal differences. Abdallah Ali Ishaq Jiddu, 

the Tunjur shartay of Dar Kherban, a small territory near El Fasher, was arrested by the SLA 

in 2003 for sending taxes to the government; his family paid a ransom equivalent to what he 

had given the government (SDG 5 million) but the rebels still executed him. One explanation 

given for his death was that the SLA supported demands from Berti villages in Dar Kherban 

to obtain their own omda, a demand the shartay had countered by arming the Meidob, traditional enemies of the Berti.91 Similarly, various non-Zaghawa (in particular Birgid) chiefs were 

killed by the Zaghawa faction of the SLA in She‘eria area, in Dar Birgid, which is one of the 

reasons for the ongoing conflict between Zaghawa and other non-Arab tribes in the area.

Many of these abuses were committed by the Zaghawa faction of SLA (later SLA-Minni 

Minawi), which was especially hostile to the elites. Minni Minnawi signed the Abuja peace 

agreement in 2006 and joined the government, leaving it again in late 2010. Interestingly, since 

then, NCP Zaghawa encouraged the family of malik Abder-Rahman of Am Boru to attack 

Minni in court for his murder; the family seems more inclined to revenge.92

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), also initially dominated by Zaghawa members, had a much more friendly attitude toward the Native Administration. Many JEM leaders 

and founders are related to the family of the sultan of Tina, and in spite of their animosity 

toward the current sultan Mansour Dawsa, they have been cautious not to confront the Native Administration as a whole. In addition, the JEM, unlike the SLA, never took control 

of important areas and thus did not have to compete with the traditional authority over the 

administration of those areas.

Despite rebel hostility, some Native Administration leaders have remained in rebel areas, 

often with part of their population. This is especially true of leaders whose people have stayed 

or even fled to rebel areas rather than to the displaced camps in government territory—especially the Fur in Jebel Marra and the Zaghawa in Dar Zaghawa. Among the Fur are two 

paramount chiefs—the shartay of Kidingir, south of Jebel Marra, and the shartay of Suni, east 

of Jebel Marra. Others include the omdas of Tur, Torong Tawra, and Tore, south of Jebel Marra, 

as well as various sheikhs. These are strong personalities who have had to juggle both their traditional functions and the political realities of the conflict, and at the same time adapt to the 

changes wrought by the violence and displacement.

The shartay of Kidingir, Suleiman Hasaballah Suleiman, was especially famous among the 

Fur SLA rebels (SLA-AW). The longest-ruling shartay in Darfur and the most prominent 
31

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

traditional leader in the rebel areas, he was appointed by the SLA-AW as “sultan of Darfur” in 

an attempt to revive the memory of the Fur sultanate.93 He played a role in rebel-Arab negotiations despite his history of conflict with Arab newcomers in his shartaya.

94 He also participated 

in the failed SLA reunification conference of Ammaray (Dar Zaghawa).95 Reports in late 2011 

indicated that the shartay was disappointed by Abdel-Wahid and thinking of supporting LJM.96

Omda Khidir Ali Abder-Rahman of Tur also played an important role in negotiations 

between SLA-AW and Arabs. Despite having himself been a prisoner, for one year, of Arab 

militia leader Musa Hilal in his stronghold of Misteriha, omda Khidir became chairman of the 

SLA-AW Committee of Tribes (lajnat al-gaba’il) which presided over the negotiations.97After 

the internal SLA-AW conflict of January 2010, between commanders critical of AbdelWahid’s dogged refusal to join any peace talks and others unwaveringly loyal to him, omda

Khidir and several commanders left the Jebel to join the LJM in Uganda.98 Similarly, omda

Hashim Abul-Bashar from Tore joined a splinter faction that ultimately joined the government.

In Dar Zaghawa, only one of the eight paramount leaders, malik Abbakar Hassab an-Nabi 

of Dar Artaj, remained in his homeland.99 Some sons of other paramount leaders—including malik Ali Mohammedein of Am Boru, malik Adam Mohammed Nur of Dar Beire, and 

former malik Bakhit Yaqub of Dar Artaj—have joined the rebels. Some omdas and sheikhs

remained, but not many.

The leaders who remain in rebel areas retain strong influence with the population (displaced and not), not least because of their ties to SLA. Not only has the SLA endorsed them 

as their Native Administration, but some of these Native Administration members are even 

military commanders of the SLA.

Emergence of the War Leaders

The conflict has also undermined traditional leaders by causing the rise of traditional military 

leaders (agids) at the expense of sheikhs and omdas, a common occurrence in wartime Darfur. 

This shift is seen especially in SLA areas, where the agids played a critical role in the initial 

rise of the group and the mobilization of fighters. Many were subsequently incorporated into 

SLA structures.

Pre-war, most tribes had a military structure that mirrored the civilian idara ahliya. Villages 

had sheikh-level agids. They mobilized men and especially youth for nafir—community work that 

can include terracing, harvesting, well-digging, house building, and other activities. They organized festivals in time of peace, raised posses against livestock rustlers (faza‘), and fought in time 

of war. Above the village, omudiyas and shartayas (furshawiyas among the Masalit) had their own 

agids. There was often an agid al-ugada, or head agid. Among the Fur, Masalit, Dajo, and BorgoWaddayans in Darfur and Eastern Chad, the agid is often known as a warnang (or ornang).100

Many agids became leaders of tribal militias and later joined rebel movements where some 

became commanders, especially in the SLA. Some also backed government-sponsored militias, and some were given officer ranks in paramilitary forces or the army.101

Omar Mohammed Yusif, the Fur agid al-ugada of Torang Tawra, in south Jebel Marra, 

became agid in 1988, chosen by the entire community, men and women, and was named head 

agid in 1989, during the Fur-Arab war. He has about twenty agids under him. “Sometimes, in 

war time, the agid here is more powerful than the omda. When there is peace, it is the other way 

around. Now all the shartays and the omdas ran away, they left the villages to the agids. Then the 

agids started supporting the SLA.”102

Abdel-Latif Ishaq Ali Abdullahi Omar, the agid al-ugada of the Masalit tribe, became a 

refugee in Chad where he helped recruiting fighters for JEM. He became a warnang in 1989, 

The conflict has also 

undermined traditional 

leaders by causing the 

rise of traditional military 

leaders (agids) at the 

expense of sheikhs

and omdas, a common 

occurrence in wartime 

Darfur. 
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PEACEWORKS 83

an agid in 1993, and was made agid al-ugada of all Dar Masalit in 2002 after his predecessor 

Saleh Dakuru was killed by the government.103

There was no warnang when there was no problem. But after the looting of the animals by 

the janjawid and the rape of the girls, we brought many complaints to the government. But 

they did not care. And the traditional leaders were afraid of the government. Some had 

been bought by the government. We, the villagers and the imams, had a meeting to choose 

a warnang to defend ourselves. [JEM leader] Dr. Khalil said if you join me all the refugees 

and displaced will find their rights, and the warnangs will be named first lieutenants, the 

agids would be named colonel, and the agid al-ugada grade would be a major general.104

The war also triggered a militarization of the official Native Administration, especially 

among Arabs (box 3). The process started in the mid-1980s when the government of Sadiq 

al-Mahdi started relying on traditional leaders to mobilize Arabs to fight in South Sudan 

under the banner of the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). These are paramilitary militias that 

operate alongside the military, mostly to harass and subdue civilian populations considered 

hostile. They have been used extensively by the current government in Khartoum, mostly in 

southern Sudan, but also in the Nuba Mountains and Darfur, at times in the tens of thousands. 

President Bashir is said to have used them extensively when he was military commander of 

the Muglad area in South Kordofan in the late 1980s; the newly installed RCC made their 

existence official with the Popular Defense Act of late 1989.105

In the current conflict, the government encouraged competition between leaders as to 

which one would be able to recruit more fursan (knights, in the NCP’s exalted terminology) 

for pro-government militias.

Smaller traditional leaders, including those from non-Arab tribes, also saw their functions 

militarized during the years of the conflict. The non-Arab leaders of Shangal Tobay, an ethnically mixed area of North Darfur south of El Fasher, are a recent example. The area “belongs” 

to shartay Adam Abbakar Rashid, from the Tunjur (non-Arab) tribe and close to the NCP. The 

shartaya includes some thirty tribes, represented by twelve omdas: one Tunjur, three Zaghawa, 

three Arab (Ereigat, Bani Fadl, and Jime), two Fur, one Mima, one Fellata, and one Mararit. 

The three Zaghawa omdas reflect the demographic importance of Zaghawa migrants in the 

area, even if the other tribes still view them as newcomers. Zaghawa began settling the area 

in waves (the 1940s, 1970s, and 1980s), because of drought in Dar Zaghawa, but also because 

they wanted to escape the authority of the traditional leadership in their homeland. In particular, many of the Shangal Tobay Zaghawa came originally from Dar Tuer and Dar Artaj—areas 

of Dar Zaghawa where people were unhappy with the idara ahliya clans who held power—and 

belong largely to nonroyal clans of those areas. When the SLA first formed, it recruited heavily among some of these Zaghawa clans that had been cut out from power, such as the Awlad 

Digein, Lilla, and Bideyat Boronga in Dar Tuer.106 When Dar Zaghawa came under heavy 

attack from the government in 2003 and 2004, the Zaghawa part of the SLA (to become later 

SLA-MM) expanded out of Dar Zaghawa to the same goz (sandy grassland) areas of eastern 

Darfur, which had been heavily populated by Zaghawa migrants in the 1970s and 1980s. The 

SLA took control in Shangal Tobay in early 2004, relying on the support of the Zaghawa population there. Other communities suffered taxation, looting, arrests, and killings at the hands 

of the rebels—even though those same communities had suffered the attacks of Arab militias 

and had initially been open to the cause of the rebellion. Zaghawa omdas gained power, and 

other leaders were forced to take refuge in government-controlled towns. After Minni Minawi 

signed the Abuja agreement in May 2006, Khartoum left SLA-MM in control of the area. 

Abuse against non-Zaghawa continued, feeding growing anti-Zaghawa hostility.107

At the end of 2010, SLA-MM left the government and abandoned the area of Shangal 

Tobay, ending its patronage and protection of the Zaghawa community. The Tunjur shartay
33

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Box 3. Musa Hilal, Monster or Leader at War?

Some traditional leaders became war leaders. The Arab militia leader Musa Hilal is himself the nazir

of the Mahamid (northern Rizeigat abbala)—although he and his followers, like many Arab communities and leaders, prefer to use the old term sheikh, which Hilal inherited from his father. In 1997, he 

was arrested with other Arab and Fur traditional leaders and notables for his involvement in a murderous Arab-Fur conflict. In 1998, he was accused of helping organize a notorious bank robbery in 

Nyala and was replaced by a weaker rival, Ahmad al-Badur. In 2003, he was released from prison following the SLA raid on El Fasher; after reclaiming his position of nazir, he was asked by the government to recruit and coordinate militias (the so-called janjawid) from his tribe and other abbala Arabs, 

mostly in North Darfur, around Kabkabiya, Saraf Omra, Kutum, and all around Jebel Marra. Later he 

received more formal government positions—to reward him, but also no doubt to control him. In 

2008, he was appointed as special advisor to the minister of federal affairs—in charge of tribal and 

local affairs. “I initially refused to come to Khartoum as the responsibilities were unclear,” Musa Hilal 

explained. In 2010, he was elected to the federal parliament. “I didn’t want to be candidate, but 

my community started to blame me and pushed me to come. I felt guilty and came.” He appears to 

view his role in Khartoum as an extension of his role as a tribal leader. Musa Hilal has always retained 

autonomy and has even been critical of the government—the behavior a tribe expects of traditional 

leaders. From 2005 on, he was in touch with all rebel movements, contacts which the government 

never cleared and which earned him a measure of credibility with civilian and rebel leaders in Jebel 

Marra, and even among UNAMID officials and Western diplomats. It also earned him the distrust 

from the government. In late 2011, he told visitors, “In spite of everything, I am a tribal leader and 

whatever peace process can emerge on Darfur that does not involve me means nothing. Many 

people follow me and keeping me outside of the scope of political initiatives is equivalent to refusing to involve all the people I represent [as idara ahliya].”

Musa Hilal has also maintained the typical behavior of a traditional leader in both “eating” and 

redistributing to his tribesmen the considerable resources obtained from the government and other 

backers—including, reportedly, Chadian president Idriss Déby.* (In early 2012, Déby married Musa 

Hilal’s daughter in a lavish ceremony at a Khartoum hotel; Sudanese newspapers reported that Déby 

paid Musa Hilal a dowry of $25 million.) But he has gone about it in a destructive manner, showing 

the inherent difficulties of bringing the two functions—tribal leader and militia leader—together. He 

has excluded tribes who followed him militarily but did not defer to him as a traditional leader (the 

Mahariya and the Awlad Rashid, for instance). Within his own tribe, the Mahamid, he favored his 

clan, the Awlad Mablul, and even his family, triggering dissent. The government has encouraged 

such interclan conflict to counter the power of leaders such as Musa Hilal.

Even in a militarized context, when leaders are militia commanders, ordinary people can follow 

the traditional pattern of switching allegiances if a leader proves too oppressive. As Morton rightly 

notes, “Another key word [in Darfur history] is zulm, or oppression. Communities which wished to 

overthrow their leader might claim he was an oppressor, zalim, and they were oppressed, mazlumin. 

. . . The British were sensitive to these accusations, but never quite sure what constituted oppression. It is not ‘eating’ which is bad. It only becomes zulm, or oppression, when it is unfair; above 

all, when the ‘eater’ does not share the results with his constituency.”Zulm is actually the concept 

used by ex-militia members from the Mahamid tribe, protesting Musa Hilal’s unfair doling out of 

government money or positions in the border guard corps (haras al-hudud). Thus, jundi mazlum

(Oppressed Soldier, sometimes weakly translated as Neglected Soldier), a diffuse antigovernment 

protest movement of former janjawid actually began in reaction to Musa Hilal’s oppression in 2005 

and 2006.

Sources: Interviews with Musa Hila, date and location withheld; Rebecca Hamilton, “The Monster of Darfur,” The New Republic (December 3, 

2009); Emily Wax, “In Sudan, ‘A Big Sheik’ Roams Free,” Washington Post (July 18, 2004); Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History 

of a Long War (London: Zed Books, 2005), 35–40, 64–66; UN Security Council, “Letter from the Panel,” 33–34; Sudan Tribune, “Wikileaks: 

Janjaweed leader slams VP Taha & Nafie, blames NCP for Darfur crimes,” September 3, 2011, www.sudantribune.com/Wikileaks-Janjaweedleader-slams,40033; Jérôme Tubiana, “‘Seule une tortue peut mordre une tortue’: accords entre groupes rebelles et communautés arabes 

au Darfour,” Politique Africaine 118 (June 2010): 205–24, 216–17; Claudio Gramizzi, Michael Lewis, and Jerome Tubiana, “Report of Former 

Members of the Panel of Experts on the Republic of Sudan” (unpublished report, January 24, 2011), 47–48, http://bit.ly/Ijpkqp; interviews with 

Chadian rebel leaders, various locations, 2010; James Morton, “How to Govern Darfur,” (lecture, Durham University, Sir William Luce Publication 

Series no. 12, 2011).

*Note: Sudanese Arabic, like so many other African vernaculars, uses the verb to eat (akal/yakul) to refer to graft or the taking of wealth 

by force, and especially by abusing formal powers. See Jean-François Bayart, L’Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1989). 

James Morton describes at length how traditional leaders in Darfur eat in “How to Govern Darfur.” “‘Eating’ is another loaded word. For 

some reason British officials always translated this one into English. On face value it means the embezzlement of tax and court revenues” (9).

and some non-Zaghawa omdas began to mobilize their communities and recruit militias, with 

the help of local agids. This was a new trend in an area where local inhabitants say that selfdefense traditions had been lost. The shartay obtained training and material support from the 

North Darfur governor, enough for a militia several hundred strong. Tunjur politicians close 
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PEACEWORKS 83

to the governor supported the process. Fighters who volunteered through the non-Zaghawa 

Native Administration were then integrated into the Popular Defense Forces. The shartay and 

some omdas were the de facto leaders of these units. The shartay is also a member of the recently established Security Committee of Shangal Tobay, alongside representatives of the security agencies present on the ground (the army, the police, the PDF, and National Intelligence 

and Security Services). In addition, more than five hundred private citizens of Shangal Tobay, 

mobilized by the agids, have acquired weapons for which the idara ahliya was able to obtain 

government licenses. 

These non-Arab militias have since violently abused Zaghawa communities in the areas, 

forcing most to flee. In the first half of 2011, seventy thousand to eighty thousand displaced 

people, almost exclusively Zaghawa from Shangal Tobay, fled to the Zamzam displaced camp, 

south of El Fasher, and to Abu Zereiga town, the only remaining Zaghawa stronghold south 

of El Fasher.108

The International Community

Many international entities working on Darfur—aid outfits, human rights and advocacy 

groups, UN agencies, analysis and press groups—have little depth of understanding of the 

history, politics, and social dynamics of Darfur. Their views of traditional leaders tend to be 

unrealistically optimistic and their approach unabashedly utilitarian.

The prevailing expatriate view of traditional leaders is that they are weak but mostly committed to peace, a throwback to some vague and idealized past—before the conflict, before the 

NIF, under the British, under the sultan—when “natural” relations were the norm and peace 

somehow prevailed under the wise stewardship of traditional leaders. International views often 

underestimate the responsibility of traditional leaders in the violence.

Consider the following example. Voices of Darfur is a glossy monthly magazine put out by 

UNAMID in English and Arabic, with striking color photographs, “designed to present the 

everyday life of the people of Darfur.”109 After the violence in Shangal Tobay, Voices published 

an interview with the Tunjur shartay, under the sunny title “Shangil Tobaya—A Town of Social 

Harmony.” When asked, “There has been some fighting lately in Shangil Tobaya that has been 

of concern. What exactly happened there?” the shartay replied simply, “I cannot say whether 

or not the attack was organized against certain groups as I wasn’t in the place when the attack 

happened, but during armed conflict anything can be expected.”110 This is not at all what he 

told various interlocutors throughout 2011. In those interviews, he claimed responsibility, and 

that of the government, in the creation of the militias. He also defended the targeting of Zaghawa communities, but condemned (though not very energetically) certain killings.111

Foreign organizations in Darfur also view traditional leaders in crudely utilitarian terms. 

Aid groups in particular want to use the Native Administration as an entry point to communities, whether to implement programs, or pass on messages to the community or the outside 

world (for instance, UNAMID’s relentless message that progress in being achieved), or canvas 

communities on their views, or build acceptance for an international initiative.

On their side, as during colonial times, traditional leaders have used the external interloper 

to gain support, financial or political, including in the context of rivalries for chieftaincies. 

Although the British understanding of local dynamics and personalities was imperfect, it was 

clearly far better than that of foreign actors in Darfur today.

One of the main problems encountered by international actors even since colonial times is 

the difficulty in understanding the complexity and the fluidity of the Native Administration, 

which leads to clumsy attempts at simplification.

One of the main 

problems encountered by 

international actors even 

since colonial times is the 

difficulty in understanding 

the complexity and the 

fluidity of the Native 

Administration, which 

leads to clumsy attempts 

at simplification.
35

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

For example, the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on the Sudan recommended that 

a Ta‘alba omda, Mansour Ishaq Tuer, be subjected to individual sanctions, calling him the “chief 

omda” of the Ta‘alba tribe.112 The truth, however is that omda Mansour is only one of four 

Ta‘alba omdas in the Kas area. The allegation that he led “hundreds of armed men” who attacked local displaced camps is based only on the testimony of displaced people. This raises the 

question of whether it is appropriate or effective to sanction a traditional leader living between 

the small town of Kas and his village of Tabufoto, north of Kas, with an international travel 

ban and asset freeze.

Last is the other reason international actors, humanitarian and political, often fail to understand the complexity of local leadership dynamics: they do not speak to the more representative leaders. Internationals typically seek out interlocutors who are available during their short 

visits to given locations and neglect more important leaders who may not be present at the 

time of their visit. Internationals tend to focus on the new leaders in the displaced and refugee 

camps that are easy to visit or are near main towns—the plastic sheeting bias may be Darfur’s 

answer to Robert Chambers’ tarmac bias. Low- and mid-rank old native administrators may 

be lying low in the camps, or the war may have separated them from their people, or they may 

have remained in their area of origin, or they may oversee a vast territory or a nomadic population. International interlocutors prefer dealing with individuals who have some education, who 

speak articulate Arabic or even English—but who may not have the best knowledge of traditional dynamics. They often do not know how to identify representative leaders, and they do 

not always know how to engage them. In the meantime, mere contact with the international 

actors empowers new leaders. Their prestige and power increases when they are integrated in 

relief programs on distribution committees, or hired as local staff. This can aggravate tensions 

within a community, between the traditional leadership and new leaders, a dynamic that is 

viewed with alarm by local observers: “The NGOs should be very careful with this type of 

conflict, they should not be trying to create new leaders.”113

Morton notes that two UN projects have attempted “to address issues [that] would come 

under the banner” of the Native Administration. One is the Darfur Rule of Law Program, which 

is described as “blind” to the Native Administration and its judiciary role. The other is the Darfur 

Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF), under which NGOs are working with native 

administrators, in some cases funding their activities. Morton remarks, “It took the British many 

years to achieve a rather imperfect understanding of the institutions underlying the idarat al 

ahliya [sic], and the highly political personalities which led it. An NGO which was working on 

humanitarian aid until last year, and which is only funded for two years anyway, cannot hope to 

achieve the same. The result is the embarrassing sight of Darfuri shaykhs and omdas, who have 

been brought up in a centuries-old tradition of conflict management, being taught ‘How to Work 

with Conflict’ out of a glossy manual printed in Birmingham.”114

Traditional Justice and Reconciliation

It is difficult to separate traditional justice and reconciliation in the context of Darfur. 

The mechanisms are the same, but needs are different at different levels. Five levels can be 

defined:

■ within the family;

■ within the village, for sedentary communities, or the damra or feriq, for nomads or 

semi-nomads;115
36

PEACEWORKS 83

■ within a broader geographic or even identity community spread out over several 

locations;

■ within the tribe; and

■ between different tribes.

Nuances, of course, are countless: a problem can occur between two villages or even two 

individuals of different tribes. Some tribes are more hierarchical. Others, in particular among 

the nomads, are scattered over large territories that may straddle provincial or even international boundaries.

Several key definitions and concepts both underpin and are critical to understanding traditional justice in Darfur and to putting the conflict and reconciliation there in context.

The mahkama ahliya is a traditional, customary, or native court that operates under customary rather than statutory law. It typically handles disputes over land, damage to farms and livestock, minor violence, family problems such as inheritance and divorce, and small commercial 

matters.116 It is presided over by traditional leaders who deal with individual cases. The term 

ahliya comes from ahal, or family, and denotes something local, customary, or tribal. It can also 

refer to a settlement that does not involve an official court or the presence of a government 

official (ittifagiya ahliya).

Traditional courts have a variety of names, which causes confusion, even among local users of 

these courts.117 Under the Nimeiri regime, the traditional courts were given a new name, mahkama sha‘biya, or popular court, in deference to leftist leanings of the regime’s early years. Under 

the present Islamist regime, the 2004 Town and Rural Courts Act describes a traditional court as 

being either a rural (mahkama rifiya) or a town (mahkamat al-madina) court, according to its location. The term mahkama ahliya is the most commonly used, though mahkama sha‘biya remains 

used, even officially (the adjective sha‘bi now carries the connotation of popular, as in nongovernmental, rather than of the people in the political sense). Some higher courts carry the name of the 

presiding authority: mahkmat al-malik, the king’s court, or mahkamat as-sultan, the sultan’s court.

The lowest court is that of a shartay or, in Dar Masalit, of a fursha, as well as of some omdas

in charge of large territories.118 In conversation, people may also refer to the court of a lower 

level leader—mahkamat al-omda or mahkamat ash-sheikh—not referring to a place, but rather 

to a traditional leader’s authority, and by extension, the action of adjudication: “the omda’s court 

decided that.” In other words, the omda, acting in his capacity as a holder of judicial authority 

on minor disputes, rendered a decision.

The court structure in Darfur is hierarchical. The customary courts normally defer to the 

court of the most senior paramount chief in the state: the court of malik Rahamtallah Mahmoud Ali ad-Dadingawi in El Fasher, the court of the sultan in Geneina, and the court of the 

magdum in Nyala. The recent creation of the new states of East and Central Darfur will likely 

result in the courts of nazir Madibbo of the Rizeigat in ed-Da‘ein and that of the dimangawi

in Zalingei being de facto elevated or re-elevated. Those paramount courts have been labeled 

by the 2004 Act “central rural courts,” which give them powers of appeal, though their older 

names are often more commonly used.119

The mahkama wusta (middle court) acts as a sort of appeals court for first-tier customary courts and is convened by higher level Native Administration leaders on an ad hoc basis 

whenever a complex case arises that requires attention based of customary law, something that 

neither the customary court nor the statutory court can resolve. The cases concerned relate 

especially to complex land disputes (such as on land straddling territories) for which the statutory judge is not trained, or intertribal cases that are outside the jurisdiction of the statutory 
37

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

judge. Also, litigants who refuse a ruling by the customary court and whose appeal to the statutory judge cannot be resolved go to the middle court. One infamous land case has dragged on 

for a decade in El Fasher and is sent back again and again to malik Rahamtallah. Middle courts 

do not have a physical location.

Judiya is the main term for traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms in Darfur. The 

term is derived from jud, which translates to generosity or magnanimity in Arabic. The judiya

process is facilitated by ajawid (sing. ajwad). The central tenet is that of a consensual mediation 

that brings together a commonly acceptable outcome for the parties. Problems are not solved 

by punishment, but by a common acceptance of social ties.

The term judiya has now become a generic term for mediation, to the point of being confused with other processes such as musalaha (reconciliation) or mediation conferences involving government. It is true that such conferences often involve individuals who are recognized 

ajawid in the community—precisely because they are recognized as skilled and experienced 

mediators—but they do not perform exactly ajawid-like functions during reconciliation conferences. When Darfurians want to say that a mediator is good, they will label him an ajwad, 

and when they want to indicate that a conference was good, they will call it a judiya. Both 

terms are strongly positive.

A rakuba is, literally, a modest, open wooden structure. Figuratively, it is a customary precedent between two parties, normally set by a successful past judiya, that is applied to future 

disputes between the same parties. The rakuba, in essence, dictates subsequent agreements—

often keeping blood money and compensation to minimal levels. The word rakuba itself can 

be used to design the specific amount of a discount on what would be a normal compensation 

for a given offence.

Musalaha or suluh are the most commonly used terms for reconciliation. By extension, they 

also refer to reconciliation conferences (mu’tamar suluh), in particular the larger, more formal 

intra- or intertribal events organized by the government. A musalaha process will often involve 

government officials; ideally the government is a guarantor of the agreement and compensation, and contributes to the compensation payments. The present government’s failure, in the 

late 1990s and early 2000s, to either enforce or contribute to compensation owed by Arab abbala groups to Zaghawa in North Darfur—out of neglect and parsimony, but one must assume 

maybe also by design—was an important trigger to the formation of the rebel movements, 

especially the SLA.120

The foundational component of customary justice and reconciliation is material compensation: the offending party must compensate the aggrieved party for the offense. If there was loss 

of limb or life, the compensation comes in lieu of blood. Compensation is also, and implicitly, 

the recognition of responsibility, and can therefore lead to reconciliation. Compensation can be 

ordered by the court, recommended by ajawid or other mediators, or agreed by consensus by 

the parties. It comes in three forms: diya (blood money), ta‘wid (compensation for nonhuman 

losses), and khasarat (costs).

Diya is paid only in compensation for human injuries or death. It is based on sharia (Islamic) law, but as is the case in most traditional Muslim societies, it has in practice merged with 

local customs. A typical diya amount is SDG 100,000 or one hundred animals (usually expressed in terms of camels) to compensate for the death of a man, and fifty for a woman. Historically, variance was considerable from area to area and tribe to tribe. This began to change as 

sharia spread before, during and after colonial times. The British wanted to standardize varying 

customs and saw Islamic law as a useful tool. The homogenizing trend continued after independence. The hundred- or fifty-animal rate for the death of a man or a woman respectively 
38

PEACEWORKS 83

holds, for example, on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border despite very different colonial 

and postcolonial histories with regard to judicial policies (and everything else). The amount 

in SDG is purely Sudanese, and is official. Subsequent devaluations and revaluations of the 

Sudanese currency over the past two or three decades, as well as switches from pound to dinar 

and back again, mean that Sudanese are able to continue to calculate the cost of daily life, from 

a glass of tea in the market to the amount of diya, in pounds.

Traditionally, livestock served as a yardstick for practical purposes, because livestock were 

the main source of wealth. But because of price variance, the ratio of SDG 1,000 per animal 

was established by modern courts when they began to incorporate sharia into the Sudanese 

code after the adoption by the Nimeiri regime of the so-called September laws in 1983.

The anthropologist Ladislav Holy found that among the Berti, the term diya can be used 

for compensations for damage to property or the loss of livestock, such as the killing of a 

camel.121 During the war, stronger groups claimed diya for animals, but this was considered 

an abuse by the weaker groups being forced to pay. For example, recently, in Millagat, north of 

Kutum, pro-government Arab militias arrested Tunjur and Fur civilians and accused them of 

looting Arab camels. They demanded payment of SDG 50,000 per camel. The non-Arabs did 

not see this as compensation, diya or otherwise, as much as ransom for a kidnapping. It was 

also seen as a break of the security agreement that existed between Arabs and non-Arabs in the 

area.122 There is no individual diya during larger conflicts, be it tribal affrays or war. “In war, no 

one says ‘you killed my son.’ That is war.”123 Losses, compensation, and diya will be addressed 

between groups at reconciliation conferences.

Ta‘wid is compensation for material or livestock losses, stolen, damaged, or destroyed. The 

rates depend on the estimations made during the judiya process or reconciliation conferences, 

by ajawid or mediators, and agreed to by the parties. Bargaining and discounts at the demand 

of the mediators or the parties, also affect the final monetary outcome.

Khasarat (sing. khasar 124) are costs the victim incurred related to the offense, especially 

medical treatment for injuries, as well as travel and food costs for the mediation meetings or 

peace conference. Khasarat are due immediately on reaching an agreement, whereas payment 

of diya is made on a timetable. Although the amount of diya to be paid is in principle limited by 

law and custom, the stronger party may ask for excessive khasarat—knowing that the weaker 

party will either pay to avoid further violence, or not be able to pay—thus creating a semilegal 

casus belli for the stronger party to take by force what it could not get through negotiation.

The Customary Court

The current legal foundation for customary courts is the Town and Rural Courts Act of 2004, 

which mirrors the Local Government Act.125 North Darfur currently has seventy-two of these 

town and rural courts, South Darfur ninety-four, and West Darfur forty-one. At the end of 

2011, thirty-two were functioning in North Darfur, sixty-nine in South Darfur, and twenty in 

West Darfur —the others are “stopped” (mutawaggifa).126

The judiciary function is among the most important of the Native Administration. The 

Native Courts Ordinance of 1932, which came at the tail end of a series of ordinances passed 

by the British in the 1920s, formalized the customary justice system.127 Customary courts were 

given a legal base in official law, but it would be wrong to think that they were left uncontrolled 

by the central authorities. The colonial authorities monitored native administrators carefully. 

Moreover, “in all the Ordinances right up to the 1932 Native Courts Ordinance the ultimate 

responsibility for enforcement lay with the Government, not the idarat al ahlia [sic]. . . . The 

Native Court had the full power of government behind it.”128

The judiciary function 

is among the most 

important of the 

Native Administration. 
39

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

The continuity between the foundational NCP Act of 2004 and the colonial ordinance 

of 1932 is striking: “The District Commissioner,” the ordinance stipulated, “may enforce the 

execution of any sentence or judgement of a Native Court on the request of the court or of the 

aggrieved party in the same manner as if it were a sentence or judgment of an ordinary court 

of law.”129

Even during the Nimeiri regime, when in the early 1970s the government dismissed senior 

traditional leaders and the customary courts were replaced by so-called popular courts, the 

customary courts quickly resumed, either officially or unofficially. One example is that of then 

Zaghawa malik of Am Boru, whom the government asked to resume his job because the new 

court was not functional.130

Today, as noted, the rural and town courts—the customary courts—are legally part of the 

formal court system, the lowest tier. Some court members are native administrators, thus appointed by the government. Moreover, all customary court members are appointed by the chief 

justice on recommendation of the district judge and after consultation with the local Native 

Administration (which will generally propose names) and the state governor. The chief justice 

has the power to replace members.131

The trend seems to be toward a weakened role of the judiciary in favor of the executive. For 

instance, the 2007 South Darfur state law on customary courts gave the governor the right, 

after consulting the state judiciary, to form a customary court anywhere in the state.

Judges of local statutory courts (the district judges) supervise the work of the rural and 

town courts. Although these customary court decisions have to be endorsed by the statutory 

judges, their records, in return, are maintained for possible examination by representatives of 

the justice system.132 Thus the formal justice system, from local courts up to the Supreme Court 

in Khartoum, has “powers to check” all customary court proceedings.133 Parties in traditional 

court cases can appeal these cases in the formal courts.134

Those local courts are customary in that they use custom, but only if those customs do not 

contradict either statutory law or sharia. The customary courts also use statutory law, as well 

as sharia.135 The courts adjudicate everyday disputes, personal matters, and petty criminal cases. 

Darfur is a rural society, and the most common cases are conflicts over land, disputes over farming, grazing or watering agreements, and claims for damage to farms (commonly by migrating 

pastoralists), pasture and livestock. The centrality of the traditional leaders to the judicial system 

reflects the agricultural nature of many of the disputes. Other common cases include family 

matters (inheritance disputes, domestic violence, divorce), minor violent offenses that include no 

serious injury (a market brawl, fisticuffs between neighbors), minor financial or commercial issues 

(an unpaid debt, a dispute over a lease), and petty crime.136

The courts have the power to issue summons and arrest warrants, including when someone fails to reply to a court summons. They can sentence convicted parties provided the sentences contradict neither formal statutes nor sharia.137 Punishments include fines that can go 

to a maximum of 400,000 dinars (SDG 4,000), corporal punishment (with a maximum of 

twenty-five lashes, forty for the consumption of alcohol), and imprisonment (in government 

prisons) for up to seven years. The seven-year limit on imprisonment is in line with the fact 

that offenses that could lead to more than seven years in jail are referred to the formal court.

Sharia

Since the sultanate, all courts have had a faqi, or holy man, among their members. Known as 

the sharia member (al-‘udu ash-shari‘i), his function is to oversee cases such as divorce, inheritance, and paternity cases where sharia applies. The judicial system thus confirms the division 
40

PEACEWORKS 83

of labor between religious and traditional leaders: maliks and shartays do not typically have the 

required knowledge in Islamic law.

The Condominium had established sharia courts in the towns, separate from the customary courts and the statutory courts, which were specialized in inheritance and other personal 

cases and handled only sharia matters. When the Nimeiri regime introduced sharia in 1983, 

the town-based sharia courts merged with the statutory courts. Statutory judges received sharia training. Sharia courts, like statutory courts, had general jurisdiction. At the same time, both 

statutory and customary courts were allowed to handle usual sharia matters. In rural areas, the 

sharia member compensates for the lack of sharia courts.

Structure

The chair of a customary court is almost always a member of the Native Administration—even 

though the 2004 Rural and Town Courts Act states only that the president and vice president 

“shall be aware of the customs and traditions of the citizens who are resident in the area.”138For 

instance, the mahkama ahliya of Kutum in North Darfur is chaired by malik Adam Mohammed Nur of Dar Beire, northeast of Kutum, which belongs to the Kaytinga.139 Malik Adam 

became chief in 1953 when he was fifteen years old and is the longest-ruling chief of the area. 

His deputy is the younger malik Hassan Mohammed Abder-Rahman, known as malik Fathi, 

the Tunjur chief of Dar Hamra, just south of Kutum. In the Kutum mahkama ahliya, both the 

head and his deputy are among the most senior native administrators in the area, but some 

among the pool of ten members of the court are not from the idara ahliya. Rather, they are, in 

the words of court chair, malik Adam Mohammed Nur, “wise people who know the traditions 

of their tribe,” echoing the language of the 2004 act.140 The members of the Kutum mahkama 

ahliya belong to both non-Arab tribes and small Arab tribes, such as the Tarjam, who are 

settled and well integrated among non-Arab communities.141

The court members function as a pool. Some courts have an established rotation system, 

others function on an ad hoc basis with whoever showing up constituting the court that day. In 

many cases, however, the president of the court, or often the president and the deputy, must be 

present, or otherwise a deputized member. The rotation is seen as important to ensure that the 

tribal diversity of an area is represented. Members other than the sharia member do not have 

specific functions. There is no quorum required. They function as a group in the court—when 

in session, anyone can talk. Decisions are taken by consensus (ijma‘).

A court can operate with only two-thirds of its members present and without the head. 

For example, El Fasher’s mahkama ahliya operates with three members (including its chair, 

malik Rahamtallah), chosen among some twenty-five potential members, all traditional leaders (box 4). Membership in the court shifts every three months, when two new members sit 

(the chair remains the same). In theory, according to the 2004 act, courts need at least three 

members—the chair or, in his absence, his deputy and two members—to function.142 But, as 

observed in the summer of 2011, the court in El Fasher was operational with only the deputy 

and one member present.

A Day in Court

The chair, malik Rahamtallah Mahmoud Ali al-Dadingawi, is absent. In his stead, his wakil

or na’ib (representative or deputy), Ibrahim Mohammed az-Zubeir, presides. He sits at a large 

desk in the middle of the small room that constitutes the court, in the compound gathering all 

El Fasher–based judiciary institutions. Only one other member of the court is present today: a 

very old man, omda Ishaq Abbiker Ahmad, of the Dar Hamid Arabs. He sits on a bench to the 
41

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

right of the judge. The plaintiffs sit on another bench to the left of the judge. Defendants stand 

before the judge. The session starts shortly before eleven, and lasts three hours.

First case—Dispute over a farm143

The judge, Ibrahim Mohammed az-Zubeir, the deputy head of the court reads the petition. 

A woman, Asha, accuses a man who has a six-acre farm to the east of El Fasher town of having taken her land. She says she has been farming this farm for forty years. She mentions the 

names of her neighbors: Adam A. to the east, Abubakar I. and Hamid S. to the north, and 

Adam Y. to the south. She claims she fell ill and had to travel to Khartoum to seek treatment. 

Box 4. The El Fasher Mahkama Ahliya

The customary court in El Fasher was ratified by the Native Courts Ordinance in 1932 as a mahkama

ahliya. It was renamed a mahkama sha‘biya (popular court) under Nimeiri and is still referred to as 

such, though the chair of the court, malik Rahamtallah, gently indicates that “we like ahliya more 

than sha‘biya.”But local people also call it the mahkama raisiya, or head court. Another court in El 

Fasher is mahkamat al-madina, which is more statutory than customary and with the city is its sole 

jurisdiction, whereas the mahkama ahliya covers all the localities (districts) around El Fasher. The two 

courts coordinate informally, sometimes using each other as an appeal court.

The El Fasher mahkama ahliya is headed by malik Rahamtallah Mahmoud Ali al-Dadingawi. 

Malik Rahamtallah is the longest serving native administrator and court chair in Darfur—he succeeded his brother as both malik and chair of the mahkama ahliya in 1943—and is the heir of an old 

dynasty (he is the twelfth of his line). This makes him one of the most respected traditional leaders in 

Darfur, along with the magdum of Nyala and the dimangawi of Zalingei. He belongs to a small Fur 

subgroup, believed to be originally from South Sudan, which makes him less threatening to other 

groups. His wakil (representative) and na’ib (deputy) is his cousin Ibrahim Mohammed az-Zubeir.

Below him, the members of the court are chosen among twenty-four people, all members of the 

Native Administration of the El Fasher area, including important territories around the state capital—

Korma, Tawila, Simeyat, Shangal Tobay, Dar es-Salam, Wada’a—most of which are under the authority of malik Rahamtallah, although his authority is more moral than real. The El Fasher court covers all 

these areas. In principle, the leaders of the group can all chair smaller, more local courts. The number 

of members varies: there are currently twenty-four, but can easily change. People may be added if 

they are believed to be good judges, or when there is a need for someone from a particular area or 

tribe. They are likely to remain on the list until their death. A dead member may be replaced by a 

son or a relative, or may simply not be replaced.

Before the war, the leaders based outside of El Fasher town did chair smaller courts in their 

respective areas, and in the past the court of El Fasher was their court of appeal. However, since the 

war, these courts have generally ceased to function.

Among the twenty-four native administrators, six are shartays, a senior rank. They are all nonArab and include three Tunjur.a

 Seventeen are omdas (mid-level rank): the majority (eleven) from various non-Arab tribes, and five from small Arab tribes originally from Kordofan (Dar Hamid, Jawa’ma, 

Bani Fadl) or central Sudan (Jallaba) who settled in and around El Fasher during the sultanate and 

have long held omodiyas.

b Only one of the omdas is from a Darfurian Arab tribe, the Ereigat, who 

hold a special position among the Abbala Arabs of North Darfur.An Ereigat sheikh is also a member 

of the court.

Source: Interview with malik Rahamtallah, El Fasher, August 2011.

a. The Tunjur are believed to have been the rulers of the second kingdom of Darfur in the sixteenth century, after the Dajo and before the 

Fur. In the seventeenth century, according to oral history, the Fur overran the Tunjur and founded their own sultanate the same way many 

Sahelan kingdoms were founded, mixing violent displacement of some Tunjur communities (for example, in Shangal Tobay), the replacement 

of some of their main leaders by Fur leaders (for example, in the Ain Siro area), the disappearance of the Tunjur language, and the co-optation 

of other Tunjur dynasties in the new Fur sultanate hierarchy, with the appointment of the Tunjur takanyawi as ruler of the northern part of the 

sultanate, where the Tunjur kingdom was originally based.

b. In present-day Darfur as well as South Kordofan and South Sudan, jallaba is a term with a strongly pejorative connotation that refers to riverine 

Arabs and even sometimes non-Arabs, such as the Nubians, all foreign to Darfur. But the word also refers to communities of people from central 

Sudan who settled in Darfur, and especially around the sultan’s capital El Fasher (al-fashir, the encampment of the Sultan), as merchants, bureaucrats, soldiers, and so on. These communities are recognized as Darfurian and have their place in the Native Administration.

c. The Ereigat are the only group among the abbala Arabs of northern Darfur to have settled before colonial times. They were given small 

hakuras (royal estates) by the sultan, in particular around El Fasher. Having been more sedentary, the Ereigat also received better access to 

schooling during the colonial and early independence periods.
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PEACEWORKS 83

Before traveling, she entrusted the land to the defendant with the promise he would farm it 

only during her absence. But when she was back, he refused to return the farm.

Judge: Now let’s listen to the statement of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff: I gave this man a farm for one year, until I came back from Khartoum. Now I 

want it back.

Judge: Are there any witnesses?

Plaintiff: Yes, I have the sheikh of the land, and another man, Ahmad I., and Mohammed 

D., and Idris A.144 Those are the sheikhs.

Judge: Now we want to hear the defendant. You can sit down.

Defendant: This is not true: she didn’t give me this farm, Ismail A. is the one who gave 

it to me.

Judge: First introduce yourself.

Defendant: My name is Ibrahim O.

Judge: Who is this man who gave you this farm. Is he a sheikh?

Defendant: Ismail is not a sheikh, but he says the farm belongs to him. He told me to pay 

‘ushur [a customary tax of one tenth of the harvest] to sheikh Musa for three years.

Judge: The court will adjourn the case until the plaintive brings her witnesses and the 

defendant brings Ismail. You have to be back here on September 12.

Second case—Inheritance problem

A man claims to be the heir of a woman. First the judge takes a Quran from his desk and asks 

that the man swear on it, “to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.” The 

judge questions him rapidly.

Judge: When did she die?

Man: In 1998.

Judge: What’s your name?

Man: My name is Khalil A.

Judge: Where? She died at home?

Man: Yes.

Judge: Her father and mother are alive? Her husband?

Man: No.

Judge: She has brothers and sisters alive?

Man: Her sister died.

Judge: She left a house in district 5?

Man: Yes.

The judge writes a note and gives it to Khalil. It seems that, on the basis of the oath, the 

judge accepted the claim, and Khalil can now use the note from the judge to claim the legacy 

from the state administration.

Third case—Dispute over the registration of a piece of land

A dozen men enter the room, mostly young men, who appear quite self-confident against 

an old man, who is accompanied by his family. The young men, represented by a lawyer who 

carries a leather suitcase full of documents, accuse the old man of farming part of a land par-
43

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

cel they had registered as an agricultural scheme, or project (mashru‘). In an aside, the judge 

explains that, during the rainy season, the courts receive many cases of conflict for land between farmers, including conflict between people who took care to register land as commercial 

agricultural projects and others who did not, and conflicts between displaced and newcomers 

occupying land they had to leave.145 The judge begins with a roll call:

Judge: Abdallah A.?

Answer: Yes.

Judge: Abdelkarim M.?

Answer: Yes.

Judge: Mohammed A.?

Answer: He left to search for gold.

And so on.

The judge notes many of the people who should be there, mostly from the accused side, 

are not present.

Judge: We will call these people for a later session.

A plaintiff: This is the fourth time this case is adjourned, but those people just don’t want 

to come.

Judge: I am issuing an arrest warrant for them all. If they don’t come, we will take them 

to prison. [To the defendant] Tell them to come to court! Try to convince them so that 

we can end this case. You always come and then the case is adjourned, is it not a damage 

to you? I can’t hear people when some are absent. Who didn’t come? Fatima A., did she 

come? No.

A man: Four of them didn’t come.

Other man: Six didn’t come at all. [He quotes six names, all women.]

Judge: Let us hear the statements of the three who came.

Most people are asked to leave the room; the defendant and two young men from the 

plaintiffs’ party remain.

Judge, to the defendant [the old man]: Bokor A.? This man came and found you were 

cultivating his farm?

Defendant: The land is ours, and the right to farm is also ours.

Judge: You claim the land is yours, and he claims the land is his.

A young man from the plaintiffs’ party: Let him bring his witnesses.

Judge, to the defendant: Who gave you the land?

Defendant: The land is mine, and the [agricultural] project is mine. I have my neighbors 

as witnesses. Since my grandfather, I inherited this land.

Judge: Who are your neighbors?

The defendant gives names.

Judge: What’s the name of your land?

Defendant: Laoda.

The judge, pointing to the plaintiffs: Are they your neighbors?

Defendant: No, I don’t know them.

Judge: Let us hear all witnesses. Is your project registered?

It seems only the young men, the plaintiffs, had bothered registering their land.

Judge: Let’s call the first witness. Abdel-Karim!
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PEACEWORKS 83

Abdel-Karim enters the room. He is a witness of the plaintiffs, but seems to also be one 

of them.

Abdel-Karim: The land is our land. We are cultivating our project.

Judge: What’s the name of your project?

Abdel-Karim: Gobo.

Judge: When did your register it?

The lawyer takes a document from his suitcase and shows it to the judge.

Judge: Did you trespass on the project of the accused?

Plaintiffs: No. We didn’t farm his land.

Judge: Does he have a project near you?

Plaintiffs: No, his project is in Wadi Gara and Laoda.

The judge, to the defendant: Do you have witnesses?

The defendant hands a paper to the judge.

Defendant: These are the witnesses. 

It seems most of them are absent. 

The defendant, pointing at the plaintiffs: Those guys came to my farm and threatened 

to kill me.

The lawyer for the plaintiffs: This is [my clients’] farm. I brought the plan of the project, 

the feasibility study and a letter from the shartay.

The judge, to the defendant, looking at the shartay’s letter: Shartay Tijani [Tijani 

Mohammed Saleh Mindi, the Tunjur paramount leader of Korma area, also a member 

of the court], is he not your shartay? Why did he write this letter [supporting the plaintiffs’ claim], if it were not true?

Defendant: We need justice. We’re living together in the same village.

A plaintiff: No, we don’t know him.

Judge: How big are your farms?

Defendant: My area is 307 feddan [about 129 hectares].146

A plaintiff: Ours is 2,200 feddan [924 hectares].

Defendant: They’ve taken their people and their children, they farm all together and 

threaten to kill me. [To the lawyer] You, if you’re defending those people, you’re not doing 

respectable work!

The judge, trying to calm the assembly: People, you’re people from the same land, don’t 

let the land divide you.

Defendant: They are my people, we live in the same area.

The judge asks them to leave. The case is adjourned once more.

A young man from the defendant’s side threatens as he leaves the room: It’s a conspiracy, 

they want to start war again!

Fourth case—Unpaid debts

A vegetable seller, a woman, accuses another vegetable seller, a man, of owing her SDG 1,020. 

He says he owes her only SDG 820.

Judge: Will you swear on the holy Quran you don’t owe her those 200?

Defendant: No, I won’t swear.

Judge: Then the court will order you to pay the whole amount.

The judge firmly informs one of the authors that “any person who refuses to swear will lose 

his case.”
45

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Judge: The court will give you seven days to pay.

Defendant: I’m ill. . . . 

Judge: The court doesn’t care whether you’re ill or not. On August 29, you have to bring 

the money or you’ll go to prison. [To both the accused and the plaintiff] You two have 

[business] relations with each other, don’t let money spoil your relationship.

Both seem satisfied when they leave the room.

Fifth case—Unpaid debt

The defendant owes SDG 4,000 to the plaintiff. The same (customary) court has already sent 

him to prison for this. During a Ramadan visit by the governor to the prison, the defendant 

was able to tell the governor about his unpaid debt. The governor agreed to pay for it, taking 

the money from a fund called kis as-sa’im, generally used for those who do not have enough 

money for the fasting month. The plaintiff is now receiving payments.

Judge: So, do you realize prison is sometimes useful? Had you not been in prison, you 

wouldn’t have found the money to pay your debt. . . .

The convict remains silent.

Judge: How long were you in prison?

Convict: Six days.

The judge, to the plaintiff: Is all the money there?

Plaintiff: No, it is not. I received SDG 4,755 instead of 4,855.

A woman working with the court, who gave the money to the plaintiff, addresses him: 

Do you know where this money comes from ? Leave what’s missing!

The plaintiff agrees to forgo the remaining SDG 100.

Judge: The same plaintiff also claims SDG 2,000 from the same accused, but in this case, 

the accused swore on the Quran it was not true.

The plaintiff, leaving: You will see, it’s another falsehood. But God will see to this.

Sixth case—Burglary

A man comes with his chains on his feet, escorted by two policemen, one behind him and one 

beside him. He stands where the defendant usually stands. He is not the accused, however. He 

was condemned to two months in prison for another case, but today he is the plaintiff. He is a 

displaced man from the Zamzam camp, close to El Fasher, as is the defendant.

Plaintiff: While I was in jail, they broke the door of my house in Zamzam camp at night 

and stole some of my belongings.

He is asked to swear on the Quran. A policeman puts the holy book before him.

Plaintiff: I swear on God to tell the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth. They 

left nothing in my home—they took bricks that were inside the house and sand for construction. [Fingering the defendant] I don’t know whether it’s him or somebody else, but 

my suspicion is that it is him.

Judge: Do you have witnesses or proof?

Plaintiff: Yes, both.

Judge: Who are the witnesses?

Plaintiff: Adam Daw-al-Beit, Ismail, Hamid. Four omdas have made a report on my 

case.

Judge, to the accused: Ibrahim, he said you broke into his house.

Defendant: No, he’s living in a place that doesn’t belong to him anymore. He left it 

and went somewhere else. I know this well, I’m a sheikh of Zam Zam camp, I was the 

one who divided all this area of the camp into plots. At that time, the plaintiff was 
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PEACEWORKS 83

absent. His sons were there, they made some problems. I gave this house to his fatherin-law.

Judge: Did you break into it?

Defendant: No, I didn’t. They just left the area. Then when he left he was put in 

prison. On the same day, his wife came and broke into the house. He and his wife don’t 

have good relations. I didn’t know what she intended to take in the house but I asked 

people to be witnesses.

Plaintiff: No, my wife didn’t break into the house.

Defendant: How do you know? You were in prison. You talk too much. Do you have 

documents proving this house is yours?

A policeman repeatedly enjoins the gathering to soften their tone.

Judge: Please calm down. We are here to solve problems and render justice, for you and 

for any other. About the witnesses: who are those omdas? They are not registered as omdas

here. Are they omdas for the displaced?

Defendant: Yes.

Judge: His wife had moved to another place. The question is now whether she or someone else has entered the house after this.

The case is adjourned to allow further investigation. The plaintiff carries his chains as he 

walks out the room.

Seventh case—Trespassing

Abdallah, the owner of a farm in Um Marahik, east of El Fasher, accuses a man of having 

threatened Isma‘il, a laborer working for him on his farm. All are from the same ethnic group, 

the Berti Simeyat. The laborer stands before the judge, in front of the landowner. The defendant sits.

Judge: This case was sent to us by the prosecutor. The prosecution had examined this 

case and found it could fall under two articles: Article 183, attack, and Article 144, terrorism. But according to us, it’s just a simple case.

The laborer: The story is true. I was clearing the land. He came and told me to stop 

working in this place. So I left and didn’t come back.

Judge: Are there any witnesses?

Laborer: No.

Judge: To whom belongs the land?

Laborer: Abdallah is the one who took me to that place.

Judge: You need another witness.

Laborer: He told me to leave!

Judge: “Go” is not a threat. If a person comes with a stick or a knife, that’s a threat.

Laborer: He was carrying a sword on his donkey.

The owner, Abdallah, intervenes: His brother also threatened me.

Judge: It’s not an attack. You can’t say this is an attack. It’s normal for farmers to pass 

through the fields of each other.

Defendant: His field is on the road, I was just passing by.

Laborer, to the accused: Did you not tell me: “This field is my grandmother’s field, don’t 

work here”?

For the first time that day, the judge consults the sole member of the court present today, 

the old omda Ishaq Abbiker Ahmad, of the Dar Hamid Arabs.

Judge: It’s not his right to go to other people and prevent them to work.

Member: It’s a very simple case, just fine him SDG 50.
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

The judge turns inquisitively to the policeman sitting on the other side of the room, opposite the member.

Policeman: No, fine him SDG 150 and, if he’s unable to pay, four months in prison.

Judge: That’s too much. [To the accused] The court condemns you to pay the plaintiff 

SDG 100 or, if you are unable to pay, fifteen days in jail.

The accused man protests. The judge notices a stone in his hand; it might be an amulet to 

protect him or cause harm to his enemies.

Judge: Put that stone in your pocket and leave the room.

Eighth and Ninth Cases

A woman wants to bring a complaint.

Judge: Come back tomorrow, today is not the day for petitions, only for cases.

Another woman brings a complaint.

Judge: Bring witnesses and come back tomorrow.

Analysis 

The judge conducts court sessions at a swift pace. The process appears messy, with a wide range 

of practices used on what appears to be an ad hoc basis. Similar cases seem to be addressed in 

remarkably different ways. For instance, an oath on the Quran (see the fourth case), which was 

apparently quite effective, is not resorted to systematically.

The connection between the court and state institutions—especially the police—is evident, 

for instance, in the judge’s issuance of arrest warrants for people who fail to obey his summons to appear in court (see the third case). Additionally, the seventh case was referred to 

the mahkama ahliya by the prosecutor’s office, but the customary judge challenges the formal 

justice’s appreciation of the case, and gives a much milder opinion. It is also interesting, in the 

same case, that the judge canvasses other officials present—the sole member of his court and a 

policeman—before offering a decision halfway between the two opinions. The other member 

of the court, the Arab omda, speaks only once.

The third case is especially interesting in that it is not only a land conflict, but also a 

conflict between the traditional land tenure system based on communal ownership and 

modern practices and laws encouraged by the government. The government favors the 

registration of land as agricultural projects with a commercial value. Another conflict at 

play here is generational, between young people who were careful to register their farm, 

and an old man with a smaller farm who was oblivious to the statutory land regulations. 

(One of the plaintiffs has left “to search for gold,” another highly destructive extractive 

practice enabled by modern laws at the expense of rural populations, which saw a rush in 

South and North Darfur in 2011. Clearly, the plaintiffs are economically ambitious young 

men.) In remarks to one of the authors, the judge also recognized that conflicts between 

modern investors and traditional farmers, as well as between customary and modern land 

law, are common in his court. But the case may have a darker side: a land grab by individuals with political connections. This is something the judge also recognized as commonplace. The old man (the defendant) belongs to the Fur tribe who, with the Tunjur, are 

the landowners in the Korma area. The young investors on the other hand, are Tama—a 

landless, non-Arab group generally seen as newcomers from Chad, who have generally 

sided with the NCP and, during the conflict, with pro-government militias. Although the 

judge recognized these aspects of the case, he remained focused on evidence of who owned 

the land, which was to the disadvantage of the old man who could rely only on oral wit-
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PEACEWORKS 83

nesses who were absent. On their side, the young men had not only modern law behind 

them—registration of their project, written documents, a lawyer—but also customary 

law, with a letter from the shartay, the traditional administrator of the area. Shartay Tijani 

Mohammed Saleh Mindi is Tunjur and is generally considered pro-government. In this 

context, the parting comment of one of the defendant’s relatives—“It’s a conspiracy, they 

want to start war again!”—is ominous, showing how quickly tensions rise and how much 

Darfurians believe that the conflict has been about land.

It is common practice for the mahkama ahliya to ask parties to produce letters from traditional chiefs of all ranks, or even ask them to appear as witnesses, regardless of whether some 

may be members of the court or hierarchically above members of the court. But it can be difficult for the displaced to do so: their camp omdas and sheikhs are often not part of the official 

Native Administration (as the judge noted in the sixth case), and their original leaders may 

be displaced elsewhere, or dead, or simply lack the means to come to the court on a regular 

basis. Conflicts among displaced are not uncommon in the court, though the displaced often 

prefer to rely on their own unofficial justice and reconciliation mechanisms in the camps—it is 

cheaper for them and they believe they will get a better hearing.147

That the judge repeatedly calls for reconciliation and social harmony is significant.

Impact of the War 

Many traditional courts have been shut down, either by the government or by the rebels, 

or are simply frozen by the violence and displacement. For instance, the mahkama ahliya in 

Kutum, chaired by malik Adam Mohammed Nur from Dar Beire, was closed for about a year 

after the SLA’s attack of Kutum in August 2003, which damaged the court furniture and archives. Most functioning customary courts are in towns; the rural customary courts (mahkama 

rifiya) have been largely abandoned.

Of the seventy-two courts in North Darfur, two are town courts: one in El Fasher 

and one in Mellit. Eleven are middle courts (mahkama wusta), and many of these are new. 

Thirty-two are functioning and forty are idle, especially around El Fasher, rural Kutum, and 

al-La‘eit south of Taweisha. The functioning customary courts are in the main government 

towns, run by some of the most important paramount leaders of the region: El Fasher, 

Kutum, Mellit, Malha, Kutum, Kabkabiya, Taweisha, and Um Kaddada. In the greater El 

Fasher area—including Korma, Tawila, Shangal Tobay, and Dar-es-Salam—twelve customary courts were functional before 2003. Now the only working court is in El Fasher. 

Cases from the outlying localities are adjudicated in El Fasher as a first court, whereas 

before the war, parties came to El Fasher only on appeal. In the western part of North 

Darfur, all the courts in Dar Zaghawa are shut, as is the one in Fatta Borno, near Kutum. 

The customary court in Kuma, the center of the Zayadiya Arab nomads in northeastern 

Darfur, is still working—indeed, there is no formal court in El Kuma. The nomad courts 

in the damras—Masri, Damrat ash-Sheikh Abdel-Bagi, Um Sayala, Ghreir, Bor Said—are 

also idle. By contrast, all the courts of Kabkabiya locality are operating, at least according to 

the judicial offices in El Fasher.148

In South Darfur, all the courts in the magdumiya have been shut down, including those of 

the magdum in Nyala and of the five shartayas whose leaders have been either displaced into 

government towns or remained in rebel-held areas of eastern Jebel Marra.149

Of the forty-one courts in West Darfur, two—one in Geneina and one in Kulbus—are 

town courts. Only twenty are functioning. Most of the idle courts are in Fur areas, which implies a heavier conflict-resolution gap in Fur areas.

Conflicts among displaced 

are not uncommon in 

the court, though the 

displaced often prefer to 

rely on their own unofficial 

justice and reconciliation 

mechanisms in the camps.
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Rebel Courts

In some areas they controlled, the rebels allowed the old customary courts to continue operating. Thus, in Jebel Marra areas controlled by SLA-AW, the most important traditional leaders 

who had remained on their land have continued to chair their courts. Three kept operating: 

that of shartay (sultan) Suleiman Hasaballah, whose venue had only moved from governmentcontrolled Kidingir to rebel-held Feina; that of shartay Adam Suleiman in Jawa; and that of 

omda Ibrahim Suleiman in Dirbat. SLA-AW was clearly playing the government’s role in 

overseeing and sometimes interfering in court proceedings.150

In rebel areas, the rebels often replaced the customary courts with military-like courts 

that judged fighters and civilians alike. Some customary courts were still allowed but essentially abandoned because the complaints went only to where the power now was—the new 

SLA courts.151 In some areas, the old courts were stopped by the rebels, sometimes brutally. A 

Zaghawa omda who chose to remain in the rebel area complained that since the SLA takeover 

of Dar Zaghawa in May 2003, “they stopped the customary court to replace it by an SLA 

court,” thereby weakening the traditional administration.152 Another omda in the rebel area, 

Hamid al-Manna, used to be the vice president of the customary court of Dor, north of Kutum, which was chaired by shartay Sherif Adam Tahir. In August 2003, the village was burnt to 

the ground by government forces. Omda Hamid was arrested at the court by the SLA in 2003 

but released after payment of a ransom. The case is hardly isolated: between 2003 and 2012, 

the rebels arrested numerous customary court judges, members and clerks, as well as notables 

active in mediation (ajawid), and possibly killed some of them.

Following the Abuja peace and after Minni Minawi joined the government in 2006, Dar 

Zaghawa passed under the control of nonsignatory Zaghawa SLA factions. The leaders of 

these groups had better relations with the traditional leaders, and some customary courts were 

restored in the area. Hamid al-Manna was given a court in Bakaore, where he had been displaced after the destruction of Dor; he also became deputy of the court in neighboring Disa, 

chaired by Yusif Dilli, the local omda.

153 The area has witnessed ongoing fighting between 

government and rebels, and whether these courts are still operational today is uncertain.

Many SLA courts were known for their iniquity. They favored combatants over civilians, 

and rebel commanders ensured the court meted out favorable treatment to their ethnic groups. 

The SLA-MM court in Shangal Tobay, for example, though headed by a local Fur notable, 

actually came under the authority of the Zaghawa commanders who held the area. These commanders of course favored the Zaghawa over other tribes. Rebel courts even reopened cases 

adjudicated long before the conflict—sometimes as many as twenty years earlier—by official 

or customary courts in decisions that had displeased individuals who were now rebels or rebel 

sympathizers. For example, in 2005 the SLA court of Shangal Tobay reopened a case from 

the mid-1980s in which two Zaghawa had been convicted of armed robbery for looting the 

camel of a Birgid man. Based on witness testimony, the court in El Fasher had ordered the 

thieves to return the camel. The two Zaghawa, now SLA combatants, successfully petitioned 

the SLA court to annul the sentence and order the Birgid to give a camel to the Zaghawa.154

Also in 2005, another case from the mid-1980s was reopened in Shangal Tobay in favor of the 

Zaghawa community. A Fur-owned fruit lorry had provoked a road accident in which three 

Zaghawa had been killed. Traditional leaders in Shangal Tobay had invoked a past rakuba

to settle the issue without payment of blood money. The SLA court reopened the case and 

ordered the payment of diya of SDG 70,000 per victim, which was judged excessive by the 

other communities. The high-handed, abusive behavior of the SLA courts contributed to the 

virulent anti-Zaghawa sentiment among other non-Arab tribes of eastern Darfur.
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Various factions of the SLA had in their ranks lawyers or former law students they used 

to judge cases more or less formally. This is particularly true of SLA-AW, whose leader is 

himself a lawyer and managed to recruit various colleagues. SLA-AW had a “legal office” 

headed by lawyer Osman az-Zein. In 2008, it had twenty-nine legal “advisers” (mustashar), 

who were acting mostly as judges in the rebel areas. Among them, Ali Haroun Dud became 

the legal supervisor, or judge, of all rebel areas in North Darfur (“Northern sectors”) in 2007, 

when nonsignatory SLA factions and JEM briefly attempted to unite under the banner of 

NRF (National Redemption Front). The coordination mostly worked in North Darfur, but the 

core of SLA-AW, in Jebel Marra, remained largely reluctant.155 Ali Haroun briefly replaced 

Osman az-Zein in 2008, by order of SLA-AW chief of staff Abdel-Gadir Abder-Rahman 

(“Gaddura”), before gradually taking its distance from the movement, as did many of the legal 

advisers. One of the reasons for the lawyers’ dissatisfaction was that their decisions were often 

not respected by the military leaders, both in the case of conflicts between civilians and combatants, and between rebels (notably involving killing combatants known for being critical of 

the movement’s leadership).

Despite such conflicts, Ali Haroun Dud believes that SLA-AW legal advisers played a useful role in the rebel-held areas, where “the idara ahliya was unable to solve problems between 

rebels. We were solving them, as well as every crime to which a party was a rebel soldier.”156

Members of the Native Administration may no longer have had their old courts, but those 

who had stayed in SLA-AW areas generally participated in the rebel courts. Traditional reconciliation mechanisms (judiya) were also used.

The judiciary system in the rebel areas largely duplicated that of the government-controlled 

areas. It had three levels:

■ The first-level court (mahkamat awwal daraja) could be found, in principle, in every rebel 

sector. Thus, the mountains of Ain Siro, an SLA sector northwest of Kutum, had one 

court of this kind, the only one in the area. These are staffed by traditional leaders (omdas 

and sheikhs) who have remained or taken refuge in the Ain Siro SLA area—the latter 

from Dar Siref Umaro, an area whose residents have partly been displaced to Ain Siro; 

many were members of the customary court of Dar Siref Umaro under the malik

Addouma Adam Mohammed Umaro, who himself displaced with another part of his 

population to Kassab camp near Kutum. Some of the Ain Siro court members are at the 

same time traditional leaders and SLA commanders, or relatives of the local rebel leadership—such as sheikh Hasan Haroun, the brother of Ali Haroun. This court is said to be 

still operational today. Court members of different sectors also traveled on occasion to 

serve in other SLA courts.157

■ Cases that a first-level court could not resolve, for whatever reason, went to the appeal 

court (mahkamat al-isti’naf), which, again in principle, covered all SLA-AW areas. Like 

its counterpart in government areas, it was mobile and gathered in an ad hoc basis in the 

location judged suitable to solve a particular case. Its three or four members included a 

chairman, who was an SLA legal adviser. The others were commanders. The role of the 

Native Administration was much more limited than in the first-level courts: they were 

only occasional members, and also often played, like other commanders, a role of witnesses. The middle court of Northern Darfur SLA areas is said to have stopped functioning in 2009.158

■ The third and last level was the high court (mahkama al-uliya), which seems to have rarely 

been operational.

SLA courts even judged some cases involving people living in government areas. In 2005 

in Dirbat, the main town in rebel-controlled Jebel Marra, two high school students, age nine-
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

teen and twenty-two, had a dispute in which one killed the other with a stone. Both were of 

the Fur tribe, one from Jebel Marra and the other from government-controlled Zalingei. The 

youth from Jebel Marra did not deny his responsibility and was arrested by the SLA police, 

on the orders of the omda of Dirbat, and jailed in Jawa village in the main SLA prison. Possibly because the victim was from a government area and the killing might therefore affect 

SLA-AW’s standing in the Zalingei area, the case was considered grave enough to be judged 

in the high court. Probably for the same reason, the high court, which normally included only 

SLA legal advisers, for this case also included members of the Native Administration, who 

were members of the customary courts still operating in Jebel Marra. Thus the court gathered 

in Jawa was composed of two SLA legal advisers, the shartay of Jawa, three omdas, and various sheikhs. The judges began by contacting the victim’s family in Zalingei, but because his 

father had gone to Libya for work, the court had to wait a year for him to return to Sudan 

and come to Jebel Marra with his wife and his daughter, as well as one sheikh from Zalingei 

to act as a counterpart of the Native Administration in Jebel Marra. Once the court resumed 

its proceedings, the victim’s father offered his forgiveness “because we are at war and we are 

one tribe.” For this forgiveness, the killer, his family, and their sheikh had to admit the guilt 

publicly. Although the forgiveness meant the killer’s side did not have to pay the diya, the native administrators insisted that they did need to pay karama (generosity, or alms, used for the 

Islamic mourning ceremony), smaller than the diya (it can consist only of the khasarat)—in 

this case roughly SDG 12,000. As the diya would have been, this was paid by both the killer’s 

family and their (Dirbat) Native Administration. Second, even though the payment meant 

that the case was resolved, the court still sentenced the killer to four years in prison.159

Janjawid Courts

Before the war, nomads relied less on their tribal chiefs for judicial services than on the (often non-Arab) traditional leaders of territories they were passing through or had relations 

with—economic, commercial, and religious relations, as well intermarriage and simply friendship. Having a choice of leaders to turn to allowed nomads to shop for courts that offered the 

strongest support. If unhappy, they would seek another court. This changed radically with the 

war. Arab nomads have refused not only to be administered by the territorial leaders of other 

tribes, but also to be judged in such leaders’ courts. Many traditional courts have thus lost their 

ethnic mix. “It used to be that the [Fur] malik’s court worked for everyone, and Arabs would 

bring their criminals there. Now, that is out of the question.”160 In West Darfur, Arab amirs and 

their people have stopped addressing their problems to the courts of the furshas, even though 

they have not all created their own courts.161

Some increasingly autonomous Arab leaders have not only begun to create courts for 

their tribes, but have also sought to create territorial courts that claim jurisdiction over other 

tribes living in the area. Non-Arab observers see this as an effort to gain legitimacy as leaders 

of the territories they have occupied by force. Musa Hilal is a case in point. He inherited his 

court from his father in Amo, the damra that was historically the headquarters of the Jalul 

tribe west of Kutum. In 2003, at the beginning of the war, his new stronghold of Misteriha 

west of Kabkabiya was being transformed into a base of the haras el-hudud (border guard) and 

also became the seat of police headquarters and a customary court. This court had broader 

ambitions than that in Amo, and aimed at judging all tribes in the area, which was inhabited 

primarily by Fur farmers. To reflect those multi-ethnic ambitions, the court was chaired by 

Musa Hilal, but his deputy was Ahmad Arda, a local Fur notable loyal to him, who chaired 

the court in Hilal’s absence. All other members were said to be Arab. Many non-Arabs call 
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such courts janjawid courts and claim their decisions are biased.162 At the height of the conflict, in 2003 and 2004, reports circulated of courts chaired by Arab militia leaders that ran 

especially abusive “justice” against non-Arab civilians. One such instance was Kailek, a South 

Darfur town where residents and displaced spent several months as hostages of Arab militias 

in the first half of 2004.163

Some senior Arab militia leaders, such as Musa Hilal, want to convince local people as well 

as international opinion that they are able to administer areas where Arabs and non-Arabs 

live together. Some reports have been made of Arab courts with less of a pro-Arab bias. What 

clearly dominates, however, is increasing tribal polarization. This trend makes administration, 

justice, and general security almost impossible in a still very diverse Darfur.

Customary Courts and Statutory Justice

According to UN sources, roughly 70 percent of court cases in West Darfur would be dealt by 

customary courts.164 Although few quantitative data are available, Darfurians seem to generally agree that traditional justice is more important to them than the statutory system.165 But 

traditional justice is more than the customary courts: it is also the various, variably formal 

justice and reconciliation mechanisms that Darfurians use in addressing conflict, and in particular judiya.

Customary courts do not work in isolation from the formal justice system, however. The 

process in fact often starts with the formal system. The plaintiff goes first to the police or to the 

prosecutor, which may trigger a police investigation. If so, the case is taken up by the formal 

court, which will then decide whether to take the case on itself, to refer it to the customary 

court, or to recommend another mechanism. The customary court may also ask the formal 

court to take on a case if it deems that the better path of action.

The formal and customary courts both complement one another and compete to some degree. In the towns, even before the war, people increasingly tended to favor the modern court. 

The popularity of the customary courts in Darfur was largely due to presence: they were more 

numerous generally and more present in rural areas.

However, the choice of which path to follow does not depend primarily on users, but 

rather on the nature of the case. This, too, has been affected by the conflict. Previously, only 

big cases—armed robbery, especially livestock rustling, murders, tribal conflicts—went to the 

statutory courts. Now, although civil cases and minor criminal cases still go to the mahkama 

ahliya, and more significant crimes continue to go to the formal court, even some small ones—

including those related to sharia, such as divorces, and those involving mental problems. In rural areas, people marry and divorce without court papers, whereas in the towns, where literacy 

and statutory institutions and practices are more present, people tend to register their actions. 

The equivalent of a divorce certificate is the gasema al-talag, and it is necessary for women or 

for men who have already married four times to have one in order to remarry. People may need 

marriage or divorce certificates for other procedures involving land management or inheritance. The rural population is thus at a disadvantage.

In El Fasher, the mahkama sha‘biya interacts with the formal court, often referred to as the 

mahkamat al-qadi, the judge’s court.166 There is also the mahkamat al-medina, the city court, 

which only covers El Fasher town. The city court seems to be in a middle position—although 

legally part of the same rural and town courts, like the mahkama ahliya, and governed by the 2004 

act, it is far less traditional in its composition and proceedings. It uses modern criminal law and 

hears criminal cases under the supervision of the formal justice system. Its head and members are 

rotated every three months, like the mahkama ahliya, but the judge never comes from the Native 

What clearly dominates, 

however, is increasing 

tribal polarization. 

This trend makes 

administration, justice, 

and general security 

almost impossible in a 

still very diverse Darfur.
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Administration—most often, he is a retired police or military officer. Members are local notables, 

often retired from the police or army, or businessmen; they can also include native administrators, 

but generally not of high rank (sheikhs). Some interactions with the mahkama ahliya are involved: 

if the latter does not have enough members, it may call on members from the mahkamat almedina. Sometimes the mahkamat al-medina, like the formal court, refers cases to the mahkama 

ahliya, which can act as an appeals court for the mahkamat al-medina.

The multiplicity of courts also provides the opportunity for those unhappy with one court’s 

verdict to call, legally, on another court.167 Since the war began, customary courts have lost 

influence: people tend to respect their rulings less, and, when unsatisfied by a customary court’s 

ruling they sometimes try their luck with the formal court. In conversation, many Darfurians 

also mention that since the war, most cases never get to court—any court—because many 

victims are afraid to complain, or feel there is no point (box 5).

Judiya

Judiya is the main reconciliation and justice mechanism, at all levels—from domestic strife, to 

disputes over access to land and water, to violent conflicts involving injuries or deaths, to large 

intertribal conflicts.168 The process of judiya—and the name—are a hallmark of western Sudan 

(Kordofan and Darfur) but are especially popular in Darfur.

Judiya is not a court or judicial proceeding, but rather an arbitration and mediation process. Unlike a court, it aims to achieve compromise rather than mete punishment. Either 

party has the right to reject a judiya offer from the opposing party, from traditional or modern 

authorities, or from a third party.169 But once the offer is accepted, the rulings of the judiya

are binding. The basic principle is that all sides agree to abide by the recommendations of the 

ajawid, or mediators, before hearing them. However, if one party is dissatisfied by the findings, the ajawid may decide to sit again and review their decisions, for instance, by decreasing 

or increasing the diya.

The ajawid are elders or notables. They usually come from a family, clan, or tribe not involved in the dispute.170 In a small, private case, the ajwad might simply be someone who is 

well respected in the village or neighborhood. In a dispute between two families, the ajwad

could be the elder of a third family. In a larger, intertribal conflict, the ajawid normally hail 

from tribes not involved in the dispute. This is not, however, always the case. During the sultanate, “inter-tribal disputes or affrays, leading to homicide or injury, would probably involve 

the tribal leadership on both sides plus ajawid from both communities.”171 This is less common today, but a party may still accept ajawid who belong to the same tribe as the other party. 

An ajwad in El Fasher recently made the point that neutrality, one of the key qualities of any 

ajwad, “is not necessarily about your tribe, it is about your character.”172 The ajawid will swear 

on the Quran to be neutral.

Parties will reject ajawid they suspect of not being neutral. During a 2000 judiya between 

the Berti and the Meidob, in Madu, north of Mellit, both parties rejected several ajawid. The 

conference was run in part by the government, who had selected ajawid. Among those rejected 

was a retired government employee.173

The Process

A dispute is usually first reported to the local sheikh, whether in the village, damra, town neighborhood, or camp. If it is a very minor problem—a trivial dispute over a farm, a small debt, a 

disagreement between husband and wife, a market altercation, an argument between neighbors—the sheikh will either try to solve the problem himself or ask someone respected in the 
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PEACEWORKS 83

community to mediate—in effect, an ajwad. If he or his mediator are unsuccessful, or the 

problem is clearly beyond their ability to solve, the sheikh will refer the case to the omda above 

Box 5. Committee of Investigation, Abu Zereiga

An appallingly violent incident in May 2011 in Abu Zereiga, just south of El Fasher, is a powerful 

illustration that tribal leaders can sometimes still play a strong role, including in proceedings usually 

the sole domain of the police and formal justice. The Abu Zereiga incident marked a paroxysm in the 

brutal conflict that pitted an array of indigenous non-Arab tribes against Zaghawa newcomer communities in the area of Shangal Tobay.

Abu Zereiga is one of the main Zaghawa towns in the area. The conflict with other tribes in the 

region had, in recent months, forced thousands of Zaghawa south of the town to take refuge there. 

On May 31, 2011, several hundred of those civilians, raised a faza‘ (an armed posse) to recover livestock looted from them by the newly established Popular Defense Forces of Shangal Tobay, recruited 

mostly among the Tunjur and Birgid tribes. The faza‘ dispersed only after an army intervention, which 

had been called by nearby PDF. Twenty members of the faza‘ who were returning to Abu Zereiga 

were then arrested, and seventeen of them executed.

Such incidents are not uncommon in Darfur. What was less common was the immediate reaction 

of the Zaghawa community, including their shura council, who mobilized both their politicians in the 

government and their traditional leaders. An investigation committee of seventeen members was 

formed, chaired by Adam Hari Bosh, himself a Zaghawa and the North Darfur Minister of Animal 

Resources. Among its members were four of the eight paramount leaders of Dar Zaghawa: shartay

Adam Sabi Tijani at-Tayyib of Dar Gala, shartay Sherif Adam Tahir of Dar Sueini, malik Daoud Salem 

Tagel of Muzbat, and malik Adam Abbakar Hasab-en-Nebi from Dar Artaj. Except for Hasab-enNebi, these chiefs are generally considered close to the government. In the circumstances, however, 

tribal affiliation upstaged political loyalties. Another traditional leader was present in the committee, sheikh Ibrahim Abdallah Ja‘dallah, the paramount leader of the Eteifat Arabs of the northern 

Rizeigat, a group generally neutral in conflicts among non-Arabs.

The leader of the area in question, the Tunjur shartay Adam Abbakar Rashid, was also asked to 

be part of the committee, but he refused, saying that he had been given too little notice. However, 

once the committee released its findings, he argued that it was dominated by Zaghawa and thus not 

neutral. Many observers consider the shartay to be one of the main instigators of the anti-Zaghawa 

violence of 2011, and Abbakar Rashid has taken credit for his role in creating the anti-Zaghawa PDF 

militias in his area. The committee found the bodies of three Zaghawa civilians, most likely executed 

by the PDF, on land farmed by the shartay, a fact potentially embarrassing for him.

In addition, the committee found a fourth body in another location and ascertained the indications of fourteen other bodies that had been removed quickly before their arrival, most likely by 

the local PDF. The committee was also able to gain the release of the three Zaghawa civilians arrested by the regular military and to order the arrest of six PDF leaders and members suspected of 

involvement. The committee issued a detailed report on June 7, presenting its conclusions to the 

government and submitting all the information it gathered to the judiciary. It is not clear whether any 

prosecutions are likely, and the committee has not paid much attention to the follow-up.

The point seems to have been to show non-Zaghawa communities, including the Tunjur, that the 

Zaghawa would not remain quiet in the face of aggression and were not totally without influence 

in government. The power of this anecdote is that it proves not only that traditional leaders could 

achieve representation when they wanted to, but also that they felt compelled to do so to prove to 

their own communities that they were not (totally) abandoning them. Beyond that, the elite did not 

trust how the judiciary would follow up, or possibly did not even care if they did. Indeed the effort 

for a resolution of the crisis through judicial channels, strongly supported by Zaghawa traditional and 

political leaders, was lackadaisical. It certainly failed to prevent retaliation: ten days after the committee report was issued, in the night of June 17, Zaghawa SLA-MM rebels and armed civilians attacked 

the PDF main base in Shangal Tobay with vehicles and on camelback. Some 150 houses were burnt 

and nineteen people killed, including thirteen civilians. The intent was clearly retribution—radd at-tar 

(the answer of revenge), as quoted by a Zaghawa rebel commanders from the area—and was not 

really condemned by Zaghawa community leaders.The retaliation was complementary to the legal 

process led by the investigation committee, however, not in competition with it: the Zaghawa community combined both legal and violent means of redress in the aim of showing the resistance of 

their community and halting the escalation of the violence—an uncertain outcome.

Source: The Abu Zereiga anecdote is based on interviews, notably with Zaghawa rebel commanders, Juba, December 2011. See “16 Members 

of the Zaghawa Tribe Summarily Executed and Buried in Mass Graves in North Darfur,” Darfur Daily News, June 11, 2011, http://darfurdaily.

blogspot.com/2011/06/16-members-of-zaghawa-tribe-summarily.html; Amnesty International, Sudan: No End to Violence; UN Security Council, “Letter from the Panel,” 22, 26–28; Gramizi, Lewis, and Tubiana, “Report of Former Members of the Panel of Experts,” 10–11; Gramizzi and 

Tubiana, “Forgotten Darfur,” 25–28.
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

him. The omda will do the same thing: try to address it locally or refer it to the paramount 

leader (shartay, malik, nazir) above him. At each step of the way, the traditional leaders will 

contact the parties as quickly as possible to ease tensions. If it is a sizeable problem, mid- or 

high-ranking traditional leaders will select one or several ajawid and call on them to form an 

ad hoc ajawid council.

Ajawid may also be requested by nontraditional authorities, such as the government or the 

judiciary. They can also be invited to intervene by one or both of the parties, or by their relatives 

or neighbors, though the parties will generally proceed through the Native Administration.174

Finally, ajawid may also volunteer to solve a case.175 In a murder case, ajawid may start suggesting a judiya during the karama, the mourning ceremony.

In the end, the foundational principle is that all parties to the dispute accept the ajawid and 

commit consensually to their recommendations.

To lead a judiya is an art—and a show, as the meeting is open to all, even passing guests.176

The ajawid rely heavily on symbolism, quotes from the Quran or Hadith, and popular sayings 

and wisdom to extract apologies and forgiveness.177 They will recall memories of past harmony 

between the parties—real or fictional.178 A good ajwad–bad ajwad division of labor often takes 

place: some ajawid will seek to flatter the parties, and others will play the opposite role, warning of terrible problems to come, or threatening to leave if no progress is made.

The ajawid normally question the aggrieved party first, then the accused. Those with greater 

casualties are the aggrieved, even if they initiated the conflict. Each side appoints a spokesman. 

Only that spokesman can speak for his side. He can neither point with his hand nor provoke 

the other side in any way.

In the beginning, good ajawid typically give a chance to parties to vent their anger by calling 

on one spokesman or several appointed by each side. At this point, the parties generally make 

unreasonably high demands. Different individuals from the parties are allowed to take the floor, 

but only the spokesman is allowed to speak for his side. The ajawid then try to calm the tone, 

remember past relations, and focus on the benefits of future cooperation. The victims and offenders 

do not necessarily speak and may not even be present. Witnesses may be called, but not always.

Judiya processes increasingly appear to be adopting court procedures such as calling witnesses or visiting incident scenes. This is likely the result of a number of trends, including the 

increasing impact of formal education—especially law—among elites, the increasing influence of sharia since 1983, and the general urbanization and modernization of traditional rural 

Darfur society. This points to the high adaptability of a traditional mechanism that responds to 

new conditions in ways both positive and negative. For example, the Ajawid Committee of El 

Fasher is highly untraditional in that it is a standing pool of mediators and reflects the needs 

of a growing and modernizing town.

Reconciliation is a central component of judiya. Judiya combines psychological healing 

with decisions on material compensation for losses incurred—diya (blood money) for the dead 

and ta‘wid for material or livestock losses. Compensation will be calculated, collected, and 

handed over to individuals or groups recognized as victims. The process involves buy-in from 

both sides: the accused must acknowledge guilt and the ajawid in turn ask the aggrieved for 

concessions on the diya and ta‘wid. The two parties shake hands and forgive each other: according to Adam Azzain Mohammed, “reconciliation would not be regarded complete without the two parties bursting into tears and hands shaking, signaling that the enmity between 

them is over.”179 Normally, a good judiya takes place in one sitting.

Ajawid generally do not impose punitive sanction, and may recommend arrangements of 

coexistence, such as sharing water resources or agreeing on migration routes and on when to 
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activate them. But in intertribal disputes, and especially when the government is involved, they 

may impose punishments.180 Moreover, it seems that historically their power was largely moral, 

allowing them to order social punishment, especially on someone who refuses the decisions of 

the judiya. He will be labeled kassar al-khawatir (breaker of feelings) and ostracized by his own 

community, to the point he might have to leave the area.181

Rakubas

The concessions made on compensation give way to a rakuba. Literally, a rakuba is a modest, 

often open, wooden structure with unfinished beams and a matted straw roof that provides 

shelter from the midday sun and shade where visitors can be received. Nearly every dwelling or 

compound in Darfur, no matter how poor, has one, as do market places and open spaces. The 

image conveyed is one of safety, hospitality and good neighborliness. Figuratively, a rakuba is a 

precedent between two parties, typically originating in a successful past judiya, that is applied 

to any future disputes they may have. The rakuba, in essence, dictates subsequent agreements—

often keeping blood money and compensation to minimal levels. It plays a role similar to that 

of precedent in common law countries. It deals only with loss of human life.

The word rakuba itself can be used to design the specific amount of a discount on what 

would be a normal compensation for a given offence. In western Sudan and eastern Chad, 

people will describe the absence of blood money between two tribes, saying of another group, 

“we have a rakuba with them” (‘andana rakuba ma‘ahum). People from western Sudan will invoke it even for a traffic accident in Khartoum. The rakuba is theoretically mandatory once its 

existence is established, even if one party continues with its aggressive behavior. Rakuba precedents have lost in vitality in recent decades because, in the absence of security, they do little 

to discourage aggressive groups from offending again. The impact of the war has lessened the 

strength of rakuba in Darfur, because the constant violence makes it more difficult to apply (see 

box 6). But it continues to function among Darfurians in Khartoum and elsewhere.

The rakuba is typically announced only at the end of a successful conference, as attendants 

prepare to leave: the ajawid, or the spokesman of the aggrieved party, will propose, now that 

the accused party has accepted its responsibility, to abandon or discount the diya and compensation, and take only the khasarat (the costs of the conference and medical treatment for the 

injured) as rakuba. The offending party will accept to pay the khasarat. The aggrieved party will 

be asked to invest in the future—the saying in Darfur is gaddim as-sabbit, talga al-ahad (“give 

[on] Saturday, you’ll find [on] Sunday”). If the aggrieved party refuses to claim the diya, they 

will say nuwaggif rakuba (“let us set up a rakuba”).

If a preceding rakuba already exists between two parties, it is invoked as well. It is quite 

common for there to be rakuba in intertribal conflicts, as many tribes had agreed to reduce or 

abolish diya during colonial times arrangements that are considered rakubas. In some cases, the 

party more responsible for the violence (who has to pay more) will remind both the ajawid

and the other side of an existing rakuba. If it is a first-time rakuba, it becomes a precedent for 

future disputes.

An aggrieved party may challenge a rakuba, disagreeing that one exists with the other party. 

Elders will be asked to verify. If people recall a rakuba and bear witness to its existence, then 

the aggrieved party must accept it. It would be exceedingly shameful to accept diya if a recognized rakuba is in place. Rakubas are not written—they live on in the collective memory of the 

community. Of course, the law of large numbers suggests that by now a rakuba should exist 

between every group in Darfur. But a rakuba stands only as long as it is remembered. When 

people forget about it, it dies.
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

After a rakuba is invoked and accepted on both sides, the parties talk about support for the 

family of the deceased, especially if the latter was a breadwinner—in essence, compensation 

for the cancelled diya that goes to elderly parents, widow or widows, children, or other dependents. Typically, the guilty party gives 5 or 10 percent of what the diya was. The parties then eat 

together, pray together, and sit together. Revenge is not expected. It would be shameful to take 

revenge after a rakuba is invoked.

Before the rakuba, bargaining on the various payments takes place and can lead to other 

forms of discount, for instance, on the amount of individual diya, which may be discounted. 

This discount also establishes a precedent but is not in itself a rakuba.

182 The bargaining process takes into account aspects of modern life: in car accidents, an increasingly frequent subject of judiya, the parties negotiate to subtract auto insurance payments from the diya and still 

apply the rakuba.

Who Are the Ajawid?

Traditionally, ajawid are chosen among elders and notables known for both their neutrality 

and their competence in traditional matters. Elders or notables will put themselves forward 

to serve as ajawid, or be recommended by leading members of the community.183 Being an 

ajwad is not a permanent position, nor is it a formal one. Informal ajawid groups, however, are 

possible, especially in larger towns. Heredity does not apply to ajawid as it does to traditional 

leaders. Ajawid are, however, sometimes sons of former ajawid. This reflects the fact that some 

of the qualities required of an ajwad—respectability, wealth, social prestige, and coming from 

an acceptable tribe—are qualities one inherits from one’s family.

Knowledge of traditional matters is desirable, but ajawid are not necessarily traditional 

leaders. The latter’s waning power and the increasing suspicion that many are in the pocket 

of the government help explain why they are no longer very popular as ajawid in individual 

cases. Increasingly, ajawid are professionals who have prestige and money, and individuals with 

knowledge of statutory law and even sharia. A legal background is important as judiya settlements are increasingly registered with the formal court.

It is, however, not uncommon for a mediation committee to include a sheikh or an omda. 

The traditional leader brings knowledge of past conflicts and, in theory, has the power to enforce judiya decisions. For these reasons, he often holds a special position on the committee 

that other ajawid defer to. But this is somewhat symbolic now, because power has switched 

from the Native Administration to the government itself. For their part, agids—traditional war 

Box 6. Rakubas and the Weakening of Traditional Authority

The non-Arab Gimir ethnic group is divided into two branches: one in the sultanate of Dar Gimir, the 

capital of which is Kulbus, in northern West Darfur; and the other around Katila, in South Darfur.

In June 2011, a soldier driving a military vehicle had an accident in which a man was killed. The 

driver was a Bani Halba Arab and the victim a Gimir from West Darfur. The driver was jailed despite 

being a soldier driving an army vehicle and ordered to drive without a driver’s license. The Bani 

Halba tribe of South Darfur had had a rakuba with the Gimir of Katila in South Darfur from a similar 

accident—a Katila Gimir had killed a Bani Halba and paid only half the diya (twelve cows or SDG 

12,000). But the Gimir of West Darfur refused to replicate the arrangement, saying it concerned 

only their South Darfur kin. The Bani Halba approached the Gimir sultan of West Darfur and asked 

him whether the Gimir of South Darfur were under him. He replied that they were. (The Katila Gimir 

often say that they do not report to the sultan, and that their omda is in fact a nazir.) In the end, 

the aggrieved party—the West Darfur Gimir—accepted a sort of rakuba. The Bani Halba received a 

further discount because the Sudan armed forces auto insurance provided an important sum to the 

aggrieved party. However, as of August 2011, the soldier was still in jail, even though the diya had 

already been paid.
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leaders who are directly involved in intertribal violence—are seldom invited to take part in 

judiya proceedings, even if they were not involved in the conflict under discussion.184

In principle, native administrators cannot be both ajawid and members of a customary 

court at the same time. However, some paramount leaders who preside over a mahkama ahliya 

court are popular ajawid, such as malik Rahamtallah of El Fasher or malik Adam Mohammed 

Nur of Dar Beire. Malik Rahamtallah says he has been involved, since the 1940s, in thirtyseven large intertribal judiya in both Darfur and Kordofan, including government-sponsored 

conferences.

Leaders from tribes often caught up in conflict are avoided as ajawid. Abbala Arabs and 

Zaghawa leaders, for instance, were seldom called on to serve as ajawid, with the exception of 

the nazir of the Mahariya Rizeigat, Mohamedin Ad-Dud Mahdi, and the late Zaghawa malik

Ali Mohammadein.185 By contrast, ajawid from groups that have many traditional leaders, that 

have historical control over ethnically mixed areas, and that have a history of intermarriage 

with neighbors—the Tunjur, for example—are popular in judiyas.

An imam or a faqi may also be included on a mediation committee as respected leaders 

within the community and, in some cases, to draw on their knowledge of sharia, if needed. 

Ajawid can also be old women, but only to solve problems between women, usually limited to 

one or several families.186

Paradoxically, although weakened, polarized, and increasingly unpopular in ordinary judiyas, ajawid in intertribal conflicts have often been traditional leaders, particularly in the 

increasingly common government-sponsored reconciliation conferences that use judiya

processes. The apparently promising reconciliation conference held in March 2011 that addressed the separate conflicts between the Meidob, the Berti, and the Zayadiya Arabs of 

North Darfur is one such example. Each of these tribes has a separate dispute with the other 

two, and this knot of discord in Darfur’s northeast corner is one of the territory’s oldest ongoing conflicts. The conference took place in Mellit, 50 km north of El Fasher, and lasted three 

days. An ad hoc ajawid council had been formed, with six members, all paramount leaders 

from tribes not involved in the conflicts: Fur, Zaghawa, Tunjur, Mima, and Eteifat Arabs. 

The ajawid served mostly as witnesses, intervening occasionally with comments. Educated 

individuals were also acting as facilitators, playing a role similar to that of ajawid, such as 

reminding the parties of their history of good relations. Those modern ajawid were also from 

neutral tribes: Nawaiba Arabs and Fur. One of them, Ahmad Adam Yusif, was a former commissioner of Mellit with a good knowledge of the area and of the issues at stake and has been 

active in promoting traditional conflict resolution.187 The event was not a traditional judiya, 

but neither was it a typical government-sponsored conference: the government presence was 

symbolic, with only a short speech by the Mellit commissioner at the opening session. And 

even this was a compromise the organizers had agreed to in order to gain permission from 

national security for the conference to proceed. The conference concluded with the creation 

of a novel mechanism, a twenty-one-person committee (seven from each tribe), the aim of 

which is to warn of signs that violence may erupt anew. The facilitators admit they have yet 

to reach full reconciliation.188

Sometimes only one arbitrator is present—al-hakim al-wahid, the sole judge. In the 

past, this was a traditional leader who had the prestige to influence decisions and the power 

to enforce them. Paramount leaders such as malik Rahamtallah or the late Masalit sultan Bahreddin Abubakar Isma‘il are known to have played this role. But as the power of 

such leaders has waned, the mechanism grew less popular, though it is still used in minor 

disputes.189
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

The last large single-mediator judiya is said to have been the conference that ended the 

1969 Abbala-Zaghawa conflict of Jineik, in northern Darfur, where the hakim wahid was 

Sultan Bahreddin of the Masalit—the government also played a significant role. The conflict 

is notorious for being quoted as the first conflict in Darfur in which both sides had firearms, 

a symbolic but not necessarily accurate claim. Twelve died on each side. The resolution process combined a traditional mediation by a senior traditional leader from an ethnic group not 

involved in the dispute, with punitive statutory justice: ten men from each side were sent to 

prison for ten years. Some of those jailed later acknowledged the effectiveness of the punitive 

aspect: in 2007, the individual thought to have triggered the conflict declared that, after five 

years in jail, he had never again bought a gun.190

El Fasher Ajawid Committee

The ajawid committee in El Fasher illustrates many of the characteristics of who ajawid are 

and how they work (see table A2). In El Fasher, some ten men known as regular ajawid on 

important cases have formed an informal group. This ajawid committee has a head (ra’is) and 

a secretary. Not all members will be used in every judiya, and some judiyas in El Fasher will 

involve ajawid who are not part of the group. A potential ajwad whose tribe is involved in 

a conflict will recuse himself. And one of the parties might also reject proposed ajawid. The 

group was self-constituted; new members are recruited by the more senior ones, who sometimes ask a given tribe to recommend men of wisdom. For instance, the group invited Idris 

Abdallah to join in 1982 on the recommendation of the Zaghawa community in El Fasher. 

The most important qualities for being an ajwad are personal: age, neutrality, respectability, 

and politeness—the last of great importance in Darfurian and Sudanese social norms.

Only one member of the network (Musa Sabur Bishara, the Zaghawa omda of Ab 

Dileg, south of El Fasher) is a native administrator—a reflection of the idara ahliya’s waning 

importance in judiya processes other than intertribal conferences. Malik Rahamtallah has on 

occasion joined the group as a simple member, though his preeminence gives him primus inter 

pares status on any given committee. The other members are educated people. Three are clerks 

of donkis (water yards)—a position that gives them considerable experience in dealing with 

tribes and the conflicts that arise around access to water.191 The group also includes two policemen, a teacher (who is the ra’is), and a member of North Darfur parliament. No imams or faqis

are part of the committee, but they may participate in the judiya process.

Idris Abdallah, one of the members of El Fasher group, is himself the son and grandson 

of ajawid. His grandfather was the mandub (representative) of the Zaghawa malik of Dar 

Tuer (Am Boru) in the remote and traditionally restive village of Muzbat, where he was also 

a mosque imam and ajwad. His father migrated south to El Fasher area, and became the 

malik’s mandub and damin (guarantor for livestock exchanges in the market, an important and 

prestigious function in Darfur society) in El Fasher, then moved to Chegru, a village outside 

El Fasher, where he helped establish a Zaghawa community and was also a frequent ajwad. As 

a child, Idris Abdallah would bring tea for his father’s guests and listen to judiya proceedings. 

He later became a policeman.

As in the customary court, most of the El Fasher ajawid committee belong to minority 

tribes in the area, and especially those whose origins are outside the area: South Darfur (Habbaniya, Fellata), Kordofan (Jawa‘ma), or outside Sudan (Fellata, Borgo). These groups settled 

in El Fasher long ago—they are well integrated and mostly part of town society, thus are rarely 

involved in local rural conflicts. The ajawid from these groups are therefore more readily accepted in most reconciliation processes.
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The idea of having a standing pool of ajawid is a novel one that confirms the syncretism 

between traditional and modern practices and the adaptability of custom to new environments.

Judiya, Traditional Justice, and Modern Justice

Historically, syncretism between traditional mechanisms and statutory law in Darfur has been 

significant. Whether a neighborhood quarrel or an intertribal dispute, conflict in Darfur is 

never solved entirely by either traditional mechanisms or statutory law alone. The two are intertwined. But the terms of the exchange have changed. Given the waning power of the idara 

ahliya over the past three or four decades, traditional mechanisms have become less influential. 

Additionally, the violent upheaval of recent years has led to increased government intervention, 

the aim of which is to enhance the political control of the government as much as it is to resolve conflicts. In fact, the government has at times actually stoked conflict through would-be 

mediation efforts in its bid to divide and rule Darfurian tribes.

Traditional justice mechanisms nevertheless remain very present in Darfurian society. They 

are by no means disappearing. They are evolving, however, and government interference with 

them has increased.

Reciprocal Referrals

Darfurians usually say that the first step in any dispute resolution should be a judiya. Ajawid may proceed without first informing the government or the formal justice system. 

If the parties fail to accept the judiya, or it fails to work, or the ajawid’s decisions are 

not implemented, the case will go to the mahkama ahliya. If the customary court cannot 

find a solution, the case goes either to the statutory court or, in the case of intertribal conflicts, to a government-sponsored reconciliation conference. In essence, the government is 

the last resort.

An intermediary venue if the judiya does not work is a complaint (shakwa) to the relevant 

idara ahliya leader: a sheikh or omda for a small or local conflict, a higher-ranked leader for an 

intertribal problem. This will lead not to another judiya, but instead to an arbitration with a 

native administrator as hakim wahid (sole judge), outside the customary court, regardless of 

whether the selected hakim wahid presides over a court.

Two individuals can choose a single arbitrator for a minor matter, pledging to both accept the judgment of the chosen person, based on competence and neutrality. This process 

is called tahkim (arbitration), and usually happens in interpersonal cases that do not involve 

violence.

A court, whether customary or statutory, may refer a case already before it to a judiya—

mostly when the court determines that mediation is more likely to restore good relations 

between the parties (see box 7).192 This often happens with disputes within families, in 

which social norms dictate that reconciliation is the priority. But it can also happen in 

intertribal disputes, where it is believed a courtroom procedure—especially in the formal 

court—could be damaging to future relations between the parties. Intertribal conflicts have 

remained solved by ajawid, but with more and more government interference, which has at 

times undermined the process—either by imposing ineffective ajawid or by undercutting 

the work of genuine ajawid.

Ajawid may also come to the (formal or customary) judge or the prosecutor and request 

permission to take on a particular case that is already before the court.193 Conversely, for high 

crimes such as murder or armed robbery, ajawid may send to the court a case that had been 

given to them.

Conflict in Darfur is never 

solved entirely by either 

traditional mechanisms or 

statutory law alone. The 

two are intertwined.
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Stopping the Violence

The first priority of the ajawid is to stop ongoing violence. Today, the first step is often to call 

the police, at least in government-held areas, where most of the population lives. This is in 

keeping with a tradition now so distant it has become a legend, according to which elders of 

both sides would physically restrain their youth with rope to stop the violence and allow a judiya. Using police rather than rope began during colonial times—perhaps more an opportunity 

to show the military power of the hakuma, the government, than any attempt at Solomonic 

justice.194Since then, state institutions such as the police and other security forces, the judiciary, 

and local authorities have increasingly intervened with traditional reconciliation mechanisms. 

In many cases, intervention came at the request of the idara ahliya, the ajawid or the community, to help in implementing judiya decisions.195

Collaboration on Outcomes

Examples of collaboration between the traditional and modern justice sectors on the outcome of cases are numerous. The formal justice system usually accepts the outcome of a 

judiya. Only rarely will it pursue a defendant who has gone through a successful judiya.

196

In practice, the modern court defers to the Darfurian emphasis on reconciliation over 

punishment.

An example of the rare exception is the 1969 Jinek conflict. The recommendations of the 

sole arbitrator, Sultan Bahreddin, were complemented (but not supplanted) by the government’s decision to jail perpetrators. By jailing individuals from both sides, the government was 

proving both its commitment to halting the conflict and its neutrality.

People unhappy with a judiya outcome may still petition the formal justice system, but 

statutory courts are loath to contradict a judiya, even at the request of one of the parties. 

A land dispute in the Kutum area illustrates this last point. A man co-owned a piece of 

land with his brothers and sisters. He sold his part of the land to a merchant. The merchant 

closed off the area with a zariba (thorn enclosure), blocking the road that led to the land 

of one of the seller’s sisters. He also dug a well on this road and installed water pumps. 

The sister complained to the police, who referred the case to the formal judge, who in turn 

chose to call on ajawid. The ajawid visited the area, and then asked the merchant to remove 

the zariba and the pumps, and fill in the well. Displeased, the merchant went to the statutory court of Kutum, but they refused to receive his complaint. He then went to El Fasher, 

where the court also denied his complaint.197 Conversely, ajawid can intervene in a case 

when the formal justice system has already rendered a verdict. In particular, perpetrators 

convicted under statutory law may be set free if so requested by ajawid, following a comprehensive settlement between the two parties that is subsequent to the formal judgment.198

Judges will often assent.

Box 7. Neighborhood Conflict Referred by Court to Judiya

In the spring of 2010, a case of two women quarrelling over a goat was brought to the Kutum police, 

who referred it to the mahkama ahliya headed by malik Adam Mohammed Nur. One woman said 

she bought the goat in the market; the other said it was born in her house. The malik asked both to 

bring witnesses. When they brought the witnesses, neighbors who knew both of them suggested 

a judiya, which the malik accepted. The ajawid asked the woman who claimed to have bought the 

goat to bring the seller. She was unable to do so, and the goat was returned to the second woman. 

In this case, community members favored a judiya process because they feared the woman who had 

no proof could have been sent to prison for stealing and lying to the customary court.

Source: Interview with malik Adam Mohammed Nur, date and location withheld.
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Forum Preferences

Darfurians agree that they favor judiya over any court because it is more efficient and swifter—

not least because, unlike the courts, it has no appeal process. Above all, judiya is less risky and less 

divisive. It is less risky because the outcome is the result of a negotiation, and therefore the process 

offers more control than that depending on an unpredictable court process. It is less damaging 

because it offers an opportunity to manage relations with an individual or group one is likely to 

have to deal with in the future. “When the government [that is, the statutory court] imposes a 

sentence, it is cutting ties between people,” a camp leader in eastern Chad explained.199

Social pressure, from the community and from the Native Administration, not to go to the 

formal court first is considerable. This view comes out in a saying often used during the judiya

process itself: sukk al-hadjar, ma tsukk al-ajwad (“kick the stone, don’t kick the ajwad”). The 

meaning is that one does not refuse mediation, for fear of being labeled a kassar al-khawatir 

(breaker of feelings).

The main argument is that judiya is based on compromise rather than punishment. In 

2001, Suleiman, a farmer from a Tawila village, west of El Fasher in North Darfur, had built 

a small dam to irrigate his farm. A neighbor broke it to use the water for his own farm. On 

seeing this, the farmer who had built the dam took an axe and killed his neighbor. The victim’s 

relatives complained to a statutory court, which held nineteen sessions on the case over three 

years. In 2004, the judge sentenced the accused to death. In the meantime, the relatives of the 

killer had approached some ajawid, expressing their wish to pay diya to the victim’s family. The 

relatives of the victim refused the diya. Ajawid intervened and went to the father and mother 

of the victim—the mother lived in nearby Tawila, but to meet the father they had to travel 

to Sinja, on the Blue Nile, where he lived. At first, the relatives continued to refuse the diya. 

After many attempts, the father accepted but the mother and brother still refused. The ajawid

told them, “if you want to keep living with Suleiman’s family as neighbors, although Suleiman 

killed your son, it is better to accept diya.” Finally both father and mother accepted. The ajawid

informed the judge, but he told them that Suleiman was about to hang. They found him in the 

waiting room by the gallows. A missing medical report had delayed the execution. The judge 

ordered a stay of execution. The parties returned to court and stated their agreement of the diya. 

Suleiman was released after the diya was paid, after three years in prison.200

The courts are said to make one side happy and the other unhappy. The deputy of malik

Rahamtallah, who heads the mahkama ahliya of El Fasher, said, “Usually judiya solves the conflicts, while the court leaves a pain in the heart.”201

The corollary is that judiya plaintiffs must often accept settlement well shy of full justice. 

Malik Adam Mohammed Nur, the chair of the Kutum mahkama ahliya explained it this way: 

“If I lose my camel, the ajawid will not give me my camel back, but [they will give me] a 

compromise, maybe some money equivalent to half of my camel.”202 Various sayings on judiya, 

sometimes used in judiya itself to make it acceptable to parties in conflict, emphasize this aspect: zey ash-shi iddaffag, ma bitkhamm kullu (“like something that spilled, you can’t gather it all 

up”), or al-ajawid zey as-sir wa ar-ruga (“the ajawid are like the stitch and the patch”)—meaning that the ajawid can put you back together, but things won’t be like before.

The judiya allows all to save face. The parties receive some satisfaction, which relieves 

the victimized party of his duty to retaliate. The social pressure for judiya and reconciliation 

competes with another strong form of social pressure, that which encourages retaliation, even 

disproportionate retaliation. As the saying goes, ar-rashshak bil-moya, rashshu bid-dam (“he 

who sprinkles you with water, spray him with blood”). As James Morton points out, “Sharia 

allows a victim’s family to refuse diya and insist on qisas (vengeance) in the case of premeditated 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

murder proven in front of a qadi (or judge).”203 But even in cases that are far less clear cut and 

don’t meet the legal standards of sharia, revenge is not legal but it is entirely legitimate. Several 

times during the present conflict, before an attack, militia would pretend to have taken casualties and would ask their intended victims for a huge diya to be paid in very short time, warning 

that if their terms were not met, they would attack. When the other side refused or was unable 

to pay, the attack was launched.

Sometimes contrasting pressures come from different elements of a society. The youth and 

the agids will push for violence, as may the victim and direct relatives. Elders and the Native 

Administration will normally push for reconciliation. This can lead to a strategic division of 

labor: the elders may turn a blind eye to some violent action on the part of the youth in order 

to put the opposing party under pressure, and only then push for reconciliation. Darfurians 

ponder that the war upset this delicate balance because of the support of a major external 

actor—the government—to communities ready for violence.

Ajawid also accept cases that would likely be rejected by a court. In 1967, a man from Muzbat in Dar Zaghawa, northern Darfur, had two sons and a daughter. He chose to send the boys 

to school and, because he needed someone to tend his herd, gave the task to his daughter. He 

then decided that a son would be better to watch the animals, so he asked the headmaster the 

permission to withdraw one of his sons from the school. The headmaster agreed on condition 

it would be for one year only. The father, however, failed to bring his second son back to school. 

After a year or so, the great droughts of the early 1970s had killed the animals. The shepherd 

son, who had married in the meantime, migrated and resettled in Sag an-Na’am, a well-known 

agricultural area south of El Fasher. His brother, who had finished his education, had settled 

in El Fasher, where he held a good job. One day, the shepherd sent his wife to El Fasher for 

medical treatment, and told her to stay with his brother. But the wife of the brother did not 

welcome the shepherd’s wife. Back in Sag an-Na’am, the shepherd’s wife told her husband of 

the mistreatment, and that his brother had done nothing to solve the problem. Many years 

later, in 2005, the shepherd came to El Fasher and went to the ajawid committee of El Fasher 

to complain against his father. He said that his brother had been educated, thanks to the wealth 

obtained from his efforts tending the family’s livestock, but he did not respect him. He said he 

had wasted his life, and he asked for a compensation. The ajawid gathered the father, who was 

still alive, and the two brothers to solve the problem. The aggrieved brother was complaining 

against his father, not his brother. But the ajawid addressed the problem by asking the educated brother to pay a salary of SDG 300 per month to the shepherd brother.204

Although Darfurian people still favor judiya as the best way to solve conflicts, the war has 

made it harder for ajawid to solve disputes that cross tribal lines. Many cases that would usually 

have been solved by judiya now go to courts, considered as less archaic. The independence of 

the courts themselves, however, has weakened. When a dispute involves a group that is clearly 

stronger, has more weaponry, and enjoys the support of the government, that group has a feeling of impunity. It becomes very difficult for ajawid to reach a balanced settlement and for that 

settlement to be enforced.

Consider the following example of a recent judiya in Dar Masalit. In 2009, a Masalit had 

killed accidentally an Arab of the Naja‘ branch of the Mahamid. Naja‘ Arabs, headed by their 

amir, demanded a large diya—more than SDG 125,000, though by a mix of statutory law and 

custom, diya for a man should not exceed SDG 100,000, and that for an intentional crime. 

Arab leaders from other tribes, in particular amir Abdallah Abu Shinebat (Bani Halba, head of 

the official ajawid committee of West Darfur) and amir Mohammed Matar Yunis (Missiriya) 

convinced the Naja‘ amir to accept a judiya. However, according to a witness, “it was not a real 

Although Darfurian 

people still favor judiya

as the best way to solve 

conflicts, the war has 

made it harder for ajawid

to solve disputes that 

cross tribal lines. 
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judiya.” It did not involve neutral ajawid, but mostly low- or mid-rank traditional leaders of 

both parties. The Masalit sultan was the guarantor. The Masalit representatives remained silent, 

and the Arabs consented only to a discount on the diya, reducing it to SDG 90,000. There was 

no truth telling.

A recent study of traditional justice mechanisms in Darfur states that “the past two years 

have already seen an increase in the use of judiya to settle inter-tribal disputes.”206 However, 

Darfurians say that this is not proper judiya, but government-sponsored—and often insincere—reconciliation (musalaha). This increased government intervention is in itself a major 

reason of the weakening of the traditional mechanisms.

Judiya in the Camps

Little quantitative data are available on whether the displaced still use the judiya. People who 

were accustomed to small rural communities, many of whom lived in fairly sparsely populated 

areas, are confronted with new disputes that come with having been brutally forced into quasiurban camps with populations that range in the tens of thousands. At the same time, they 

experience far fewer land-related disputes of the kind they were familiar with before being 

displaced. Disputes over land between residents and the displaced do take place as the latter 

try to farm, especially after eight and nine years of displacement. But the area and context are 

different, and without roots in their areas of displacement, it is hard for the displaced to gain 

justice through either traditional or formal mechanisms.

Other social changes that have taken place in the camps, notably the emergence of youth 

leaders, are challenging the legitimacy of judiya and the ability of elders to settle disputes. But 

paradoxically, those new authorities, including the youth, still recognize the importance of judiya—their main criticism of the old leadership is that they were unable to prevent or solve the 

conflict.205 It would, however, be rash to say that there is no judiya in the displaced camps. Judiya

is a highly adaptable process, and can be owned and is at times indeed owned by the new leaders who have emerged in the camps and even by the youth, especially for small matters. It is the 

upper level of judiya, the one that deals with intercommunal relations, that is under challenge.

The situation for Darfurian refugees in Chad is somewhat different from that of the displaced: although cut off from their country and often their Native Administration structures, 

they enjoy greater freedom and face less repression than their counterparts inside Darfur. The 

Darfurian Voices survey, based on interviews with more than twenty-one hundred Darfur 

refugees in Chad found that 91 percent of the respondents were familiar with the traditional 

justice mechanisms of judiya, ahliya, suluh (reconciliation), and diya. The majority of respondents believed that judiya, ahliya, and suluh (87 percent) and diya (85 percent) are very important for enabling the people of Darfur to live in peace. However, nearly no one (6 percent) believed that these methods alone would be sufficient to deal with the crimes that have occurred 

during the current conflict. Leaders who did not were asked why. Their responses fell into two 

categories. First, traditional justice mechanisms were never meant to deal with crimes of this 

magnitude. Second, traditional justice mechanisms were designed for disputes between tribes 

or between individuals, not between tribes or individuals and the government.207

In the refugee camps, judiya remains the process for resolving local conflicts among the 

refugees. Of course, things are easier in settings when the parties hail from the same tribe. 

Many of the camps are multitribal, and the blokkat (camp blocks) were settled on a first-come, 

first-serve basis, ensuring that the blocs are indeed very mixed and that people interact on a 

daily basis. Some refugees say that this poses no problem and that relations between different Darfurian communities in exile are, at the camp block level, easy because of their shared 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Darfurian origin. In many cases, people have been living together since 2003 or 2004, and 

true neighborly relations have developed. But others stressed that although problems were addressed, it was not always easy to find solutions because of new types of problems linked to life 

in the camps, different behavior, and different customs.208

“If we have problems we solve it in our community,” a Fur refugee in eastern Chad explained. If it is an anodyne case, the parties will find an ajwad to resolve the dispute: “we solve 

it like we would in Sudan.”209 If the case is more complicated (more public, more strident), the 

chefs de bloc (camp section leaders) are called.210 They will either mediate themselves or ensure 

that a trusted ajwad is tapped to resolve the case. Early on, in 2003, elders in the Touloum 

camp created a Committee to Solve Problems (lajnat hall al-mashakil) to address problems 

within the camp. Refugees in Touloum say that it is more important for them to have good 

ajawid than a court. They have appointed a head of ajawid for the camp, who is permanent. 

Sometimes ajawid are called from neighboring camps and even from the neighboring resident 

population.211 In Am Nabak, the refugees appointed an ajawid committee (lajnat al-ajawid), 

which brings together appointed (standing) ajawid from each zone: there are also appointed 

ajawid for each block (there are five blocks to a zone in Am Nabak). Am Nabak also has a 

mixed court (mahkama mustaraka) that brings together twenty-two refugees and twenty-two 

local residents. The refugees focus on problems internal to the camp, but the full forty-four 

members address disputes between refugees and local residents.212

In most cases, previous members of the Native Administration, especially sheikhs, play a role 

as ajawid, especially for small disputes. But some refugees who had a role in the traditional judiciary in Darfur point out that they have little or none in the Chad camps. “As a representative of 

the rural court [the customary court in Darfur], I have no responsibility in the camp; if there is a 

problem in the bloc, it goes to the camp leaders, then to CNAR [Commission nationale d’appui 

aux refugiés, or National Commission of Support to the Refugees, which is the Chadian governmental office in charge of coordinating assistance to the camps], then the sous-préfet.”213

In cases that involve real violence (grave injury or death), the case is handed over the Chadian authorities—the sous-préfet (subcommissioner) or even the préfet (commissioner), depending on the location of the camp or the gravity of the incident, who in turn either refer the case 

to the judicial authorities or adjudicate. This is done through CNAR, DIS, the Détachement 

integré de sécurité, a UN-supported Chadian law enforcement body deployed to each camp 

to provide law and order there. Some refugee leaders say that complaints to DIS are to little 

avail.214 Refugees across the camps say that the different legal system in Chad—civil law rather 

than common law—makes it hard for them to find their rights. Some refugee leaders also 

point out that they want to sort their problems out “between Sudanese” rather than go to the 

Chadian authorities, who are often unpredictable.215

Refugee leaders do, however, complain of cases when camp residents are involved in disputes with local residents, especially land issues. First, the chefs de bloc will try to solve the issue, then the camp leader; if that fails, the refugees will go to CNAR.216 These cases, too, are 

referred to DIS and the Chadian authorities. But the refugees say that the authorities favor 

the local residents. In the so-called middle-cluster camps (between Abéche and Adré to the 

east), and especially Breidjing and Tredjing, where both the refugee and the host communities 

are Masalit, some of the disputes are mediated with the Chadian Masalit leaders. The refugees 

have set up a Peaceful Coexistence Committee (lajnat at-ta‘ayush as-silmi) to address such 

conflicts for the Breidjing and Treidjing camps.217 It works with the Masalit chef de canton, the 

local paramount chief in the Chadian Native Administration, to resolve conflicts: “it is easier 

because we are both Masalit,” explained a refugee teacher in Breidjing. “If they fail to solve, the 
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problem goes to the sous-préfet, but it is best to avoid that.”218 Refugees nonetheless complain 

that the local Masalit treat them unfairly, especially when it comes to land—that they are given 

poor land that is far from the camp.219 In Touloum camp, refugees and local people set up a 

joint committee (lajna mushtaraka) to address disputes between refugees and local residents; it 

meets once a month.220

Truth-Telling, Forgiveness, Reconciliation

Darfurians will say that a successful judiya involves truth-telling, which in turn allows for, and 

obliges the other party to, discount in the compensation, forgiveness, and a lasting reconciliation.221 “It is very important to tell the truth. To be forgiven, you must tell the truth,” said a Fur 

intellectual who has been a close observer of reconciliation processes.222

However, truth-telling, with its Western and somehow legal connotation, might not be the 

best term to describe the acknowledgement of responsibility and guilt that is considered necessary for a judiya to lead to reconciliation rather than just a temporary compromise.

First, a judiya involves people, such as the ajawid, who are from third parties and whom the 

conflicting parties may wish to keep ignorant of things they both know—such as information 

about old conflicts that might still be relevant to the conflict at hand. Past or present truths may 

appear and disappear in the course of the process, used by the parties to push their advantage 

in the bargaining that judiya often involves. At the beginning, and at other times of the mediation, the parties will often deny the accusations against them.

Second, and more important, judiya does not involve a public confession of guilt. It is more 

symbolic admission of responsibility, the chief element of which is payment of compensation. 

Compensation, and especially diya, is not only a material benefit, but also a tangible recognition of responsibility on the part of the side paying it. As the Fur omda Khidir Ali AbderRahman, deeply involved in local dialogue, said, “we can’t forgive them [the Arabs] unless 

they give us back all what they have looted and pay for those they killed.”223 Many in Darfur 

consider that payment of compensation makes full truth-telling unnecessary: forgiving makes 

it possible to forget.

Forgiveness (afu in Arabic) is possible in Darfur, and encouraged by both ajawid and courts, 

but implies generally the payment of diya or at least karamat. It can even allow a sentence, even 

to death, to be cancelled—as in the case described earlier—although the statutory justice still 

holds the right to maintain a condemnation—as in several other described cases.

A third point is that compensation and diya are not paid by the defendant or defendants, 

but by the group responsible for them—that is, the clan or the tribe. The family, even extended, is not the reference point for diya. Diya paying is a governance issue that relates to the 

group and its identity. It binds the tribe, clan, or subclan together and is especially important 

in systems of segmentary lineage such as Darfur.224 The entire group admits responsibility, 

while, on the other side, the victim is also represented by the group.225 Often, the individual or 

individuals who committed crimes might not be present and their name not even disclosed: 

even when there is public spoken admittance of guilt, it is by a spokesperson. Nor are the 

victims—if they are still alive—necessarily present.226 The responsibility is taken collectively—

generally by the tribe and the Native Administration of the tribe those responsible belong to, 

sometimes by the Native Administration of the area they belong to, or sometimes simply by 

the Native Administration of the area where the crime was committed or where the criminal 

or criminals escaped to after committing the crime. A traditional leader of an area where a 

crime has been committed will not necessarily disclose the name of the criminal; he might not 

even know him. But he may still have to pay the diya to the victim’s kin.
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In certain cases, people can be ostracized. This is called tard (rejection): taradoho, they (the 

group) rejected him, disowned him, send him away, threw him out. Tard may occur when the 

crime is inexcusable or ugly (a gratuitous crime, a rape, a repeated offense) to an extent that 

the wider group wants to disassociate itself from the crime and the individual who committed it. Tard removes the cover of the group, tribe, or clan, and the ghaieb—literally a stranger, 

a person who has left his group or been thrown out—must seek a life somewhere else. Every 

village in Darfur has at least one ghaieb who was either ostracized or left his community out 

of shame. Local people will accept the ghaieb, the common wisdom being that without the 

protection of his group he will behave—even if that may not be how things play out. Custom 

has adapted to modern life and produced other ways for communities to deal with wayward 

members. We were told of the story of a Sudanese Zaghawa Kobé lorry driver in Chad who 

was both a reckless driver and prone to drink. He caused several fatal road accidents. His 

clan wearied of paying diya and told his immediate family to pass the message on to him 

that it was time for him to find another profession—or else. Expelling him was impractical 

because everyone knew his clan identity and he was on the road in any case. Not paying diya

was unthinkable. Encouraging him to adopt another livelihood (under duress) was an acceptable solution.227

This principle of collective responsibility, and that of territorial responsibility—has applied 

to recent judiyas, and shows that traditional leaders can play a decisive role in reconciliation. In 

April 2011, two abbala Arabs had been killed while passing through Zaghawa areas close to 

Korma, northwest of El Fasher. The killers were unknown, but the kin of the Arabs nonetheless accused the Zaghawa. Eight ajawid intervened. Five were educated men from a tribe not 

involved in the conflict, and three were native administrators: malik Adam Mohammed Nur 

from Dar Beire (Kaytinga), the wakil of malik Rahamtallah (Fur Dadinga) and malik Ja‘far Ali 

Mohammadein (Zaghawa, the only one of the eight to belong to one of the tribes involved). 

The ajawid referred the matter to the leader of the area, the Tunjur malik Tijani Mohammed 

Saleh Mindi, who agreed to represent the accused party—asserting his position as a territorial 

rather than tribal leader. The judiya then turned into a more formal process—a conference under the aegis of the North Darfur Higher Council for Tribal Co-existence and Reconciliation, 

chaired by the (Zaghawa) shartay Adam Sabi Tijani at-Tayyib of Kornoy. The tribes of Korma were collectively represented by malik Tijani, and the delegation of the Rizeigat Arabs of 

al-Waha locality was headed by the Mahamid omda Mohammed Ali Juma’, from so-called 

Damrat Gubba close to Kutum.228 Malik Tijani agreed that blood money should be paid, not 

only by the accused party, the Zaghawa, but also by all tribes of the area—Tunjur, Zaghawa, 

Berti, all under his control. The written agreement between the two sides, signed on March 

24, 2011, is considered by shartay Adam Sabi as the best of all the reconciliation processes his 

committee was involved in. It decided, given that the murderers had not been identified, that 

“all tribes of Korma” should pay a diya of SDG 100,000. Malik Tijani collected and handed 

over the diya.

229

Collective responsibility is often invoked in livestock rustling. When livestock is looted, the 

owners and their tribesmen, and sometimes neighbors from different tribes, will raise a posse 

(faza‘) following the prints of the looters and the looted livestock. As soon as the prints enter 

another territory, the local leader is involved: he must join the faza‘ until the prints leave his territory. Or, if he doesn’t want armed men from another territory on the warpath in his territory, 

he must stop the faza‘ and raise his own posse. Regardless of whether he recovers the looted 

livestock or the looters are under his authority or even known to him, he will be expected to 

compensate the owner of the looted livestock with his own.
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In 2001, thieves stole camels in Dar Hamar in Kordofan and moved toward North Darfur. 

The Hamar, an Arab tribe with a light presence in Darfur, raised a faza‘. They followed the prints 

to Madu, which marks the southern boundary of Dar Meidob, where the local Meidob omda

joined them. Later they connected with the thieves in Dar Meidob, and two Hamar men were 

killed in the ensuing clash. A delegation of Hamar leaders traveled to Mellit, south of Madu on 

the road from El Fasher. Its head, the Hamar nazir, Abdel-Gadir Mansour, said the Meidob were 

responsible for the crimes committed in their territory, and asked the Meidob malik to produce 

the criminals and the looted livestock. The Hamar threatened to take revenge on Meidob villages, 

of which there are said to be dozens, including thousands of civilians, living in Dar Hamar. The 

Mellit commissioner took the initiative of organizing a meeting to resolve the issue between the 

traditional leaders of both tribes.230 The meeting was not strictly speaking a judiya and did not 

involve ajawid. But the authorities also invited traditional leaders from a third tribe, the Berti, as 

a lajnat al-masa‘hi al-hamida, a goodwill committee that played an ajawid-like role. The tone of 

the parties was initially aggressive. The Meidob malik first said that because the thieves were not 

Meidob and he did not know them, he would not take any responsibility or pay any diya. In reply, 

the Hamar nazir threatened to drive all Meidob out of Dar Hamar. The goodwill committee then 

intervened much as a judiya would; the Berti malik, Hussein Ahmaday Adam Tamim, pointed out 

that, according to tradition, the Meidob would have to pay diya as long as the criminals had not 

been caught. The Meidob king accepted the argument. In the meantime, the authorities received 

information that the thieves were from the Awlad Digein clan of the Zaghawa and were making 

their way to Muzbat, their home area. Even then, the Meidob malik did not break his engagement 

to pay the diya. It is unusual that the Meidob malik should pay the diya even after the rustlers left 

his territory, because once the Awlad Digein did so, customary practice relieved him of his obligation. Did he not want to go back on his word given to the Berti, with whom the Meidob have 

traditionally tense relations? Did he not want to seem cheap with his Kordofan neighbors?

Making an incident the responsibility of many people creates powerful social disincentives 

for violence. Darfurians of all sides are quick to point out that the conflicts of the past twentyfive years show what happens when a powerful external actor—the government—enables local 

groups to become immune to traditional conflict mitigation processes by arming them, giving 

them political support, and undermining the mechanisms that should provide a disincentive 

to violence. This is particularly so among groups that have been militarized by the government and gradually integrated into official armed forces. According to lawyer Sarah Nouwen, 

“immunity is a big thing in Sudan. It is one of the attractions of holding a government job. In 

the years since independence, the entire spectrum of state officials, from the President, ministers and members of the national legislature to the rank and file of the armed forces, police 

and National Intelligence and Security Services, have come to be protected by some form of 

immunity.”231 Nouwen notes that this process has been confirmed or extended by the peace 

agreements with an amnesty provision, including the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

(CPA) and the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA): 

Decree 114 provided a general amnesty for those belonging to armed movements that had 

signed or adhered to the DPA and to parties which participated in officially endorsed tribal 

reconciliation procedures. Whether the decree applies only to those who took up arms 

against the government or also to those who fought on the government’s behalf remains 

controversial: no policy document on its application or overview of its beneficiaries has been 

made available. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it has been given a wide interpretation 

and applied in instances in which the government wished to amnesty persons.232

That this particular provision could be granted in return for participation in intertribal 

reconciliation processes shows, beyond an attempt to protect and reward old or new allies, a 

Making an incident the 

responsibility of many 

people creates powerful 

social disincentives 

for violence. 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

will to encourage local reconciliation. However, this kind of amnesty can work only if it is accepted, and if the agreement formalizing it is accepted, by the victims—which was clearly not 

the case for the DPA.233

Indeed, the present conflict raises mixed feelings about collective responsibility. On one 

hand, the breadth and scope of the crimes committed, and that whole groups and their 

traditional leaders were involved, makes collective responsibility a natural path for addressing major issues like responsibility and compensation. On the other hand, the very scope 

and breath of the crimes also makes compensation and diya—the bedrock of forgiveness 

under judiya—unthinkable. In the words of a Masalit politician, “it would take rivers of 

diya to pay for the crimes that were committed.”234 Moreover, the nontraditional nature 

of the violence, and the involvement of the government, has many Darfurians thirsting for 

nontraditional justice, specifically, individual acknowledgment of personal responsibility and 

personal punishment.235

Many Arabs refuse collective responsibility for crimes committed by individuals from 

their groups, including leaders.236 “Sheikh Musa [Hilal] has committed crimes against humanity and he is a member of my tribe. It’s a shame for me,” said Zakaria Musa “ad-Dush,” 

an ex-janjawid leader who had joined JEM.237 “In your country, when somebody commits a 

crime, is the blame on him or on all his family?” was the rhetorical question Hafiz Madiri, 

another Mahamid Arab war leader, asked in 2008—after he had also distanced himself from 

his Sudanese government backers.238 That the crimes of the past war in Darfur so clearly 

involve government responsibility also pushes Darfurians, from all sides, to slide part or all of 

the blame to the government—collectively or individually.

Attempts by international organizations, or the modern Sudanese organizations they fund, 

to turn traditional authorities and mechanisms into tools for an externally conceptualized 

blueprint for peace in Darfur often underestimate the complexity and fluidity of those traditions. They pounce on fleeting parallels between traditional and Western institutions, between 

judiya and Western notions of mediation and truth-telling, without realizing how different 

they are. According to Morton,

the Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue took place in Khartoum and Heidelberg, not Darfur, 

between 2008 and 2010. The outcome was a “Draft Darfur Peace Agreement”. This 

presents great detail, in legalistic terms, about power-sharing, revenue sharing, human 

rights, etc. The Native Administration is allocated just one page, in wording which 

makes it very clear that it is regarded as a historical curiosity, as an exhibit in the 

museum of cultural heritage: “The Native Administration of Darfur is part of its 

cultural heritage and provides for the Darfurian identity. The establishment of the 

Native Administration shall follow the tradition and customs of the community concerned.” All serious local government is to be in the hands of bureaucratic local councils with professional staff recruited on ability alone. On the judicial side:

“The Ajawid, a traditional procedure for the resolution of conflicts, shall be institutionalized and assume the function of a truth and reconciliation mechanism. . . . the Ajawid

shall engage in the procedures foreseen in their specific local traditions for the purpose 

of facilitating the search for peace, truth and reconciliation. Within the limits of the 

specific local cultural tradition and as far as this enhances the search for peace, truth 

and reconciliation, the Ajawid shall conduct their procedures with a view to facilitate 

confessions and apologies.”

It would be difficult to match this as a comprehensive misreading of the institutions it took 

the Fur Sultanate and the tribes of Darfur centuries to develop, a misreading designed to 

fit those institutions into Western conceptions of society, peace, and justice.239

Morton focuses his criticism on the Heidelberg document, though considerable Western 

literature has “discovered” Darfurian conflict resolution mechanisms and extolled their relevance to the conflict in decidedly uncautious tones. To add to his criticism, the Heidelberg 
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document’s idea of using judiya as a truth and reconciliation commission that could extract 

confession seems especially specious. One, judiya does not lead to detailed confessions, and, 

two, it would automatically enter into competition with other mechanisms, in particular those 

based on punitive justice, including the International Criminal Court.240

Government-Sponsored Reconciliation Processes

Until the early 1970s, the role of the government and, before it of the colonial authorities, 

was limited to facilitating a venue for the judiya and transport of participants as well as 

investigating and listing the losses.241 Otherwise the government would keep its distance, 

not even visiting the proceedings until they were complete. But as government interference with the traditional leaders increased after the Nimeiri regime’s 1971 abolition of 

the so-called Native Administration, authorities increasingly politicized judiya processes. 

The government resorted heavily to judiya to address conflicts that followed the droughtinduced migrations of the 1980s. In the 1990s, the NIF regime established village peace 

committees to take up the functions of the ajawid, as well as judiya councils at the level of 

localities and state capitals.242 These more or less permanent institutions were not always 

accepted, especially in rural communities. But when local communities try to come up with 

their own judiya councils, they are harassed.243

The government has also increasingly interfered in the main mechanism for resolving 

conflict—the payment of diya. Throughout the 1980s, conflicts became more and more 

murderous, not least because of the proliferation of automatic weapons.244 Diya amounts 

increased until they sometimes were too great for the parties to afford. Parties started invoking the responsibility of the government in failing to ensure law and order and in distributing weapons. To tamp down conflict and show good faith, the government promised to 

pay the diya instead of the parties. The problem is that the government was not fully committed, especially when it came to paying diya to groups it considered hostile, such as the 

Zaghawa. On the other hand, groups that no longer had to pay diya did not feel punished. 

Diya payments were missed, and conflicts often resumed soon after peace conferences. The 

failure of the government to follow up on its commitments in the conferences following the 

abbala Arab and Zaghawa wars of the late 1990s and early 2000s led to renewed conflict, 

escalating violence and counterviolence, and ultimately the creation of the SLA.

The government has taken stock of these problems, and seems to be pulling back on the 

payment of diya since the 2010 elections. Abdel-Hamid Musa Kasha, the newly elected 

wali of South Darfur, a state where the proliferation of ineffective peace conferences was 

especially notable, has indicated in public speeches and media it would no longer pay for 

diya in intertribal conflicts.245 The government had also started to appoint specific ajawid

for intertribal conferences.246 The judiya process has been incorporated into governmentsponsored reconciliation, though nongovernment-sponsored judiya has continued.247 Darfurians consider independent judiya processes to be more genuine because they are free of 

governmental interference.

Intertribal Conferences

Broad tribal reconciliation conferences and agreements take place on an ongoing basis, mostly 

under governmental patronage and supervision, though in recent years a number have also 

resulted from grassroots initiatives. These agreements are quite wide ranging: they ostensibly 

address problems between larger groups (often entire tribes) and therefore involve senior-level 

traditional leaders. Many have taken place between warring Arab communities, mostly in 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

South Darfur, where Arab-Arab violence has been rampant. The government, although it has 

sides in intra-Arab conflicts, has also been keen to contain them because they have been very 

bloody and have involved tribes who had been allied with the government during the height 

of the Darfur war in 2003 and 2004. At the same time, the government and its appointed 

traditional leaders have also actively undermined broader tribal processes that did not concern 

Arab groups.248

Government Interference

One example of the latter is the festering conflict between Zaghawa and non-Zaghawa in 

southeastern Darfur and the string of ineffectual peace conferences the government ran, ostensibly to address the conflict, but quite clearly to assert its power and undermine rivals.

In May and June 2005, the three-day Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence Conference 

for the tribes of She‘eria was held in Nyala under government patronage. Virtually all participants blamed the trouble in the area on the Zaghawa; everyone had good relations with 

everyone else, except the Zaghawa. The problem was that the Zaghawa had not been invited to 

the talks.249 The finding clearly sat well with the government, given its fight with the Zaghawa 

SLA in the area at the time.

In 2007, a reconciliation conference was held. In attendance were Abdel-Sahfi‘ Gardya, 

head of Zaghawa shura council for South Darfur, the Zaghawa omda of She‘eria, the Birgid nazir of She‘eria, the commissioner of She‘eria, Majzub al-Khalifa (who was responsible for the 

Darfur File in the presidency), Ali Hussein Daosa (a federal member of parliament, representing Minni Minnawi), and Omar Abu Kisha (JEM Peace Wing, a Birgid DPA signatory rebel 

movement). The Birgid leadership kept very close to government positions, and the conference 

failed. Not long after, Birgid militias killed Zaghawa civilians, including the Zaghawa omda’s 

sister. The war continued and is and now part of a larger conflict between various non-Arab 

landowning tribes and Zaghawa newcomers in eastern Darfur.

In the past, judiya was the main mechanism in musalaha (reconciliation). Today, Darfurians 

contrast the two. They see judiya as genuine and free of government interference, and large 

reconciliation conferences as failures. Darfurians, including those close to the NCP, concur 

that if reconciliation processes are to work, the government must not be part of them. At the 

same time, and this is something that foreign actors sometimes fail to fully grasp, Darfurians 

also want to see the government play a role in assisting and following up on the reconciliation 

process. The government is welcome and even expected to provide security during the conference and in the area in question, guarantee (but not vet) the agreement, contribute to diya and 

compensation payments, and provide development (water, education), always a key demand in 

genuine suluh conferences.

Intertribal conferences today differ in many ways from those of the past. Previously, they 

would always include neutral ajawid agreed to by the parties. Today, government-sponsored 

conferences also use judiya-like mechanisms and involve neutral ajawid (increasingly from the 

Native Administration), but the ajawid must now not only be accepted by the parties but also 

pass muster with the authorities.250 And although the parties do retain somewhat of a right of 

veto over the ajawid, the process is now distorted.251 In a tense political and security climate, it 

may be difficult for one party or the other to reject a government ajwad.

For example, in April 2011 the governor of North Darfur sponsored a one-week “peaceful coexistence meeting” in El Fasher between the non-Arab tribes of Hashaba, the main center of Dar 

Beire, east of Kutum, and a stronghold of the SLA, and the abbala Arabs of so-called Damrat 

Gubba, a newly created (early 2009) base for Arab militias now integrated into the Sudan armed 
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forces.252 According to malik Adam Mohammed Nur of Dar Beire, this meeting was “like a judiya” in the sense that it involved neutral ajawid. Each side selected ten ajawid. The government 

validated each list and submitted it to the other party. The parties agreed to the selection. Of the 

twenty ajawid, some were elders, others were members of the Native Administration, such as nazir as-Sadiq Abbas Daw-el-Beit, the Berti chief of Taweisha in eastern Darfur, and shartay Adam 

Sabi Tijani at-Tayyib, the Zaghawa leader of Dar Galla (Kornoy). Some belonged to tribes living 

in the conflict area (Tunjur, Berti, Zaghawa) but were not from the area, and were considered as 

sufficiently neutral, even though members of those tribes were involved in the conflict. Groups 

as the Kaytinga, a Fur-Zaghawa clan that holds the chieftaincy of Hashaba (Dar Beire), and the 

Awlad Bileyla, the Arab Mahamid clan settled in Damrat Gubba, were not among those ajawid.

Apart from the presence of neutral ajawid, this conference was typical of governmentsponsored conferences between militarized communities—in that case, people from an SLA 

area and government-backed militias. The ajawid were thus less mediators than witnesses. 

They intervened to calm the parties when the tone of the conference grew harsh, as ajawid

under a normal judiya would, but they spoke little more during the proceedings, whereas in 

a classical judiya they would have facilitated the negotiations. At the end of the conference, 

on hearing the claims of both parties, they offered conclusions and recommendations. But, 

unlike in a nongovernmental judiya, those recommendations would be implemented only if 

the government were to validate them. At the Hashaba-Gubba conference, the government 

did what it usually does, which is to choose from among the ajawid recommendations those 

it was prepared to implement. These were then designated as “decisions” in the final document. The text asked each party to abide by the ceasefire, to reopen the roads closed by the 

violence, and to pay the same amount of SDG 50,000 to the other party “in compensation 

for the families of those who were killed,” as well as for the injured persons SDG 50 per day 

spent in the hospital. In addition, the government estimated that camels had been the cause 

of the dispute, referring specifically to livestock rustling that had taken place in March 2011, 

and ordered the people of Hashaba to return thirty-five camels to Gubba, and the people of 

Gubba to return thirty-nine camels to Hashaba. The government thus avoided the decision of 

which side had been more aggrieved, except that the state government added to what the parties paid a compensation of SDG 25,000 for the “people of the Hashaba region as a gesture 

towards reconciliation and coexistence.”

All in all, the first and primary government recommendation was that the parties should 

revert to an earlier “document of peaceful coexistence” signed in July 2010 as the point of reference for the new agreement, as if nothing had happened.253 This agreement included a ceasefire, restitution of looted livestock, and a joint faza‘ to recover it (the Arabs had been frequently 

accused of raiding livestock since they had settled in Gubba). This agreement had been signed 

by native administrators representing the two parties: the Mahamid omda Mohammed Ali 

Juma’ for the abbala, and malik Adam Mohammed Nur for the other tribes—despite his being 

leader of all tribes of Dar Beire. That the parties were militarized is clear from the two other 

signatories: an-Nur Ahmad, the Mahamid leader of Gubba militias now integrated into the 

army, representing the Sudan armed forces,254 and Faysal Adam Mohammed Nur (also called 

Faysal al-malik), son of malik Adam Mohammed Nur and the main rebel leader of the area, 

representing the SLA.

As often the case in government-sponsored reconciliation, the 2011 talks left the main 

issue unaddressed: in March 2011, after reciprocal livestock rustling and murders had been 

committed, Faysal al-malik, who had come to Gubba to resolve the problems peacefully in 

the wake of the 2010 agreement, had been assassinated by the abbala. Even though the final 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

agreement provided precise compensations for the dead, the Hashaba side considered that no 

diya had been paid for Faysal, and chose to separate his case from the reconciliation conference by bringing it to the formal justice system. The Hashaba side, even though Faysal was 

from a traditional chief ’s family, clearly considered the traditional mechanisms inadequate to 

bring justice. However, at the time of writing, no one had been yet arrested. The suspects, as 

members of the Sudan armed forces, could benefit from immunity; at the conference itself, 

representatives of the Arab side had declared that, no matter which agreement he had signed, 

Faysal was still a rebel leader and thus a legitimate target. According to representatives from 

Hashaba, one Arab leader declared in the conference that the Arabs “can kill anyone in Hashaba and none can ask them except God.” The Hashaba side claimed that Arabs clearly did 

not respect the new agreement, and accused them of being responsible for at least twenty 

incidents—more livestock looted and at least ten people killed—between April and November 2011. Government-sponsored meetings between the parties were continual during this 

period, without much result.255

Differences: Then and Now 

As in the Hashaba-Gubba case, government-sponsored conferences have also involved other 

types of actors, sometimes ajawid but sometimes not: native administrators belonging to the 

parties, either as representatives of their side, or sometimes as mediators;256 government authorities, mostly those related to maintaining law and order;257 and educated Darfurian professionals, mostly close to the NCP, who sometimes carry out technical roles (note taking, 

presentations, facilitation). At the 1997 Rizeigat-Zaghawa conference, which is often quoted 

as a rare example of a successful government-sponsored conference, the government selected 

twenty-six individuals as ajawid. Many traditional leaders were from Darfur, but also from 

Kordofan, central, and eastern Sudan, and thus perfectly neutral.258 The security agencies and 

the judiciary were also represented.259 Indeed, one role people want to see the government play 

is guaranteeing implementation of conference resolutions, some of which are the responsibility 

of the government to begin with, such as security and development, or helping with diya.

260

Another difference between intertribal conferences of then and today is that governmentsponsored conference agreements are generally written, whereas under judiya they are generally not. In the past, writing was rare because of both custom and illiteracy, especially in small 

judiyas about minor matters. Agreements were sealed by the word given in the presence of 

witnesses. The word of men (kalam rujjal) is valued, and a man cannot go back on his word 

without losing face. But as government has become more involved, the tendency has been to 

put things in writing, especially in towns where people are adopting statutory practices or if 

one of the party is not from the area.

However, modern practices in fact overlap with tradition more than it might seem. On 

the one hand, parties write and sign an agreement. On the other, they swear on the Quran, 

even before the conference, to abide by its recommendations. Many of the highly localized 

security agreements between hostile groups that began to appear in Darfur in 2008 and 2009 

in response to the ongoing insecurity included handwritten minutes and a signature page even 

though they occurred at the grassroots level without government intervention.

Even during the current conflict, some conferences have reached an important level 

of syncretism between judiya and modern mechanisms. One example is the May 2005 

conference between the Zayadiya Arabs and the Berti in Um Kaddada, in eastern Darfur. 

The main problems were looting of Berti livestock, the destruction of Berti farms, and 

killings on both sides. The conference involved neutral ajawid from the El Fasher group 

Another difference 

between intertribal 

conferences of then 

and today is that 

government-sponsored 

conference agreements 

are generally written, 

whereas under judiya

they are generally not. 
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PEACEWORKS 83

mentioned earlier and local ajawid from neutral tribes. Native administrators from neutral 

tribes were also involved as witnesses, such as the Zaghawa malik Daud Salem Tagel of 

Muzbat and the Rizeigat Mahamid sheikh, Ahmad al-Badur, as well as a Kababish Arab 

delegation from Kordofan. Other native administrators were representatives of the parties: 

nazir Abbas Daw-el-Beit of the Berti and nazir Abdallah Adam Jizzu for the Zayadiya. 

The government was also well represented, in different roles: shartay Ibrahim Abdallah, a 

Fur traditional leader who was then deputy governor of North Darfur (before to become 

the special advisor to the South Darfur governor on reconciliation processes) joined the 

ajawid, and First Vice President Ali Osman Taha attended as a witness. Representatives of 

the international community (the European Union, France, Holland, and others) also attended as witnesses, a practice that had begun in 2004 with the international involvement 

in the Darfur conflict. The recommendations of the ajawid tasked the government with 

paying diya and compensation, and the parties (primarily the Zayadiya) with returning 

looted livestock. An ajwad who participated in this conference described the interaction 

as progressive, saying that it “started as a judiya and finished as a mu’tamar as-suluh”—the 

implication being that a government-led process was less genuine. By the end of the conference, the government’s role had increased.261

A government-sponsored conference is generally “preceded by a number of government 

activities, commensurate to making the conference a success.”262 Some relate to security, such 

as the deployment of police or army elements to force a ceasefire, a role that is generally accepted. Another role is that of “arresting perpetrators and even bringing them to trial in state 

courts,” investigating the incidents, and documenting the material and human losses. 

The government has been also increasingly providing logistical support, “including deciding the venue and financing the conference,” a function more or less accepted depending on 

the circumstances.

Current, that is, government-sponsored, reconciliation is characterized by six stages:

■ During the calming-down period (tahdia) the authorities and ajawid focus on preventing 

further violence. Traditionally, the ajawid would ask elders of either party to physically 

restrain young men of their respective communities. Since colonial times, they work with 

the police to arrest those involved in the violence and talk with the parties to try to prevent any vengeance.

■ The investigation (tahqiq) focuses on fact-finding: what happened, the timetable of 

events, who was involved, who was hurt, the background to the case, and other important 

contextual questions.

■ Listing the losses (hasr al-khasa’ir) itemizes the losses, human and material. This exercise 

is not a monetary evaluation.

■ The assessment committee (lajnat at-tagdirat) assigns a monetary value to the losses 

established by the listing exercise. This is a time for bargaining, especially for the material 

losses.

■ The reconciliation conference (mu’tamar al-musalaha or mu’tamar as-suluh) is the core of 

the judiya process, during which the ajawid gather the parties, address them, and begin 

working out a consensus over the mediated outcome.

■ The follow-up committee (lajnat al-mutaba‘a) oversees that the agreement is respected by 

all parties. Most important, it oversees the payment of diya (blood money), ta‘wid

(compensation), khasarat (expenses), and karamat (compensation to the family of the 

victim if diya is waived under a rakuba or other agreement).
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Government Roles

As noted, the 1997 Rizeigat Baggara-Zaghawa conference offers a good example of the various government roles before, during, and after a government conference. The bloody 1996 

conflict in South Darfur had taken place in September, resulted in more than one hundred 

deaths, and was resolved by a meeting often cited as the best example of a successful government-sponsored reconciliation.263 The primary cause of the conflict was that Zaghawa who 

had settled in Dar Rizeigat, mostly in the 1970s and 1980s, were challenging Rizeigat preeminence by supporting non-Rizeigat (Borno and Zaghawa) candidates during the national 

elections.264 The conference took place in March 1997 in ed-Da‘ein, the capital of Dar Rizeigat.

Preparatory committees were critical. A cooling-off period between the clashes and the 

conference was put to use by four committees, the work of which helped convince the parties 

to accept the conference:265

■ A good-will committee (lajnat al-masa‘i al-hamida), though not composed of ajawid, 

had—in leading the transition from conflict to reconciliation talks—a similar role.

■ An investigative committee (lajnat at-tahqiq), established by presidential decree, was 

tasked with documenting the causes of the conflict. Led by a high court judge, the 

investigative committee included a representative of the attorney general’s office, a senior 

police officer, and knowledgeable people from outside the area. For it to be neutral, its 

members came from outside South Darfur.

■ A technical committee of enumeration of the losses (lajnat hasr al-khasa’ir) verified the 

claims of deaths, injuries, damages, and material losses (including looting) of the parties. 

Headed by provincial magistrate, its members included representatives of the local government, the attorney general, and the security forces.266

■ An ajawid committee (lajnat al-ajawid) selected by the government actually ran the 

judiya conference.

The committees included not only government officials, but also ajawid and native administrators, both from the area and from outside (except in the investigative committee, where 

government officials from outside the state dominated).

The use of preparatory committees began in colonial times as the government intervened 

in tribal conflicts, and expanded after independence, especially in the 1970s.267 The committees 

were widely used in the 1980s and 1990s, but not in the 2000s. Observers point to the committee 

system as a major ingredient in the success of the Rizeigat-Zaghawa conference and a few others, 

and its absence is often cited as a reason for the failure of later conferences, especially since 2003.

Government involvement in the follow-up of the Rizeigat-Zaghawa conference was significant. The end of the conference saw the formation of another committee: the follow-up (or 

implementation) committee, also established by presidential decree and headed by at-Tayyib 

Abder-Rahman Mukhtar, a police general in Khartoum. At-Tayyib remained head of the committee for the seven years it took to implement the conference recommendations, and during 

that time he served as commissioner in Kosti, deputy governor in South Darfur, and governor 

in West Kordofan. The follow-up committee also included mid-ranking native administrators 

(omdas) who represented both sides (Amin Issa Aliyo of the Rizeigat and Mohammed AbdelGadir, the leader of the Zaghawa community of ed-Da‘ein town), local government officials 

(the executive directors of Nyala and ed-Da‘ein localities), representatives of the army and 

police, as well as ajawid and dignitaries from neutral tribes (such as the Ta’aisha Arabs). The 

presence of local government and police officials in the four preparatory committees allowed 

them to make a better follow-up of the conference recommendations.
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The collection of diya and maintenance of peace in general was traditionally the responsibility of the Native Administration, but the follow-up committee took on that role in this 

case.268 Its task was primarily to ensure the conference’s many recommendations were implemented in both the short and the long term, which ultimately took seven years. A central recommendation was the payment of sizeable compensation—the result of the looting of wealthy 

Zaghawa shops in ed-Da‘ein town. It was the first time in the recorded history of peace conferences in Darfur that compensation exceeded SDG 1 billion, though since then such amounts 

have become common.269 It was partly paid by the government.

On one occasion, the Rizeigat failed to respect the payment schedule, and the Follow-Up 

Committee threatened to arrest nazir Sa‘id Mahmoud Musa Madibbo, the paramount chief of 

Dar Rizeigat, a signatory and guarantor of the agreement. The nazir paid only an hour before 

the deadline. Shortly after, the committee forced Zaghawa farmers to clear groundnut farms 

they had planted in Rizeigat marahil (sing. murhal, corridors for livestock migration). By pressuring both sides, the committee established its bona fides as a neutral actor.

Part of the mission of the committee was also to set up conflict mitigation measures, such 

as monitoring any farming on the marahil and deploying police in markets where Rizeigat 

had attacked Zaghawa businesses. The presence of the police on the Follow-Up Committee 

facilitated its security role. Likewise, the government presence on the committee was useful to the implementation of service-related recommendations such the provision of water 

points, schools, roads, and so on. Similar recommendations have repeatedly emerged in later 

conferences, with final agreements that state that both security and services are the responsibility of the government. The role of the government in following up on reconciliation 

conferences is central.

Like the preparatory committees, the presence of a strong follow-up committee is credited 

for the implementation of many of the recommendations of the Rizeigat-Zaghawa conference.270 The lack of follow-up committees in later conferences is often quoted as a major reason 

for their lack of success. Many Darfurians believe that most conferences that followed have 

been a failure because of the lack of government commitment to preparation and follow-up.

The government was also present during the Rizeigat-Zaghawa conference, but in a relatively minor role. The main representative was First Vice President az-Zubeir Mohammed 

Saleh, who attended the closing session as a symbolic witness.271 The conference was chaired by 

Ambassador ash-Shafi‘ Ahmad Mohammed, but he acted more in his capacity as a educated 

Darfurian from a neutral tribe than as a government representative.

Government-Sponsored Conferences in South Darfur

According to Darfur historian Rex Sean O’Fahey, 

during the forty years of British rule, [the British] found it necessary to orchestrate indirectly only two inter-tribal reconciliation (sulh or musalaha) meetings, in 1924 between 

the Rizayqat Arab cattle nomads and their southern neighbours, the Dinka, and again 

in 1932 between the Kababish of Kordofan and their Darfur neighbours, the Zayyadiyya, 

Berti and Meidob. In both cases, the reconciliation meetings involved communities from 

outside Darfur. The general rule for the British, whether it concerned major reconciliation meetings or minor settlements of intra- or inter-tribal conflicts, was to keep a low 

profile and leave the resolution of such conflicts to the local authorities.272

Recent years have seen a dramatic proliferation of government conferences. Often, however, the same groups repeat reconciliation conferences each year, a clear indicator of failure.

In recent years, conferences have been particularly numerous in South Darfur, where Governor Abdel-Hamid Musa Kasha, in the year following his election in April 2010, claimed to 

have organized sixty-four, all successful. Traditional leaders who participated in this process, 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

even those from the NCP, bring some nuance to such claims, however. Some explain that most 

of those processes had begun before the 2010 elections, some as early as 2007, and that the new 

governor, Abdel-Hamid Musa Kasha, had incorporated all of them in a global reconciliation 

process for the state endorsed by the central government. Others assert that few of those sixtyfour conflicts have actually been resolved.

In fact, the conferences seem to have been expedited with respect to similar earlier 

processes, such as that between Rizeigat and Zaghawa. Of the sixty-four, the longest, held 

between two subgroups of the Gimir tribe, lasted barely a month. According to Deputy 

Governor Abdel-Karim Musa, it was also the most difficult, precisely because it involved 

members of the same group, namely the Gimir-Katila, based in Katila south of Nyala in 

South Darfur, and the Gimir-Sesabal, who had come from Kulbus in North Darfur to 

settle more recently than the Gimir-Katila in a neighboring area of South Darfur—a conflict between first settlers and newcomers, no matter that they were from the same ethnic 

group. “We thought it would be the simplest one, but no. It was very inhumane—it had 

made hundreds of deaths and brought divisions inside the families—for instance, two sisters, married of different sides, had not met since five years. But now it’s the most successful 

reconciliation.”273

The South Darfur governor claims to have experimented with new methods of managing 

tribal reconciliation, including strong intervention of the state government.

Before the Gimir conference began, the government asked all traditional leaders to sign 

a preapproval of the principles of the conference, namely, that they would engage to reconcile. Following the terms of deputy governor Abdel-Karim Musa, “we made reconciliation 

mandatory, under the threat of imprisonment. Those who refused the approach were arrested 

on the spot.” Haroun Imam, a Missiriya leader from Kas known for his hostility toward the 

Rizeigat abbala and for his leading role in the conflict, is one such example: he refused publicly to agree with the principle of the reconciliation and rejected an agreement made between 

the parties in Kas in September 2010. He was arrested and detained in Nyala for two months 

from late 2010 to early 2011.274 Similarly, later in 2011, Fellata nazir Ahmad As-Sammani 

was arrested for his lack of commitment to the reconciliation between his tribe and the 

Habbaniya Arabs—but apparently quickly released after some of his relations in the government intervened, demonstrating that the new rules were not equally tough for everyone.

The government conferences assigned the Native Administration a primary role as mediator. Some eighty members (paramount leaders and numerous omdas) formed a council, itself 

headed by a six-member “council of the wise” (majlis al-hukama’), headed by shartay Ibrahim 

Abdallah, both a Fur traditional leader and the minister of reconciliation in South Darfur. Created in June 2010, the council has also selected ajawid, some from the Native Administration, 

for all conferences, although those ajawid still had to be accepted by the parties.

The government also agreed to implement certain conference decisions, such as providing 

services and developing water resources, for which it is hoping to obtain international support. 

South Darfur state claims to have budgeted $5 million for the effort in services and development recommended by the sixty-four conferences.

It also, however, took a new strong stance in deciding that the government should no 

longer participate in paying any diya or compensation, because doing so had clearly proved 

damaging to sustainable reconciliation in that parties in conflict, freed from the obligation 

of diya, ceased to feel a need for restraint. This decision was announced by Governor AbdelHamid Musa Kasha in his first speech immediately after his election, in which he said, “I 

refuse to give the money of the Sudanese people to criminals.” All diyas were now to be paid 
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PEACEWORKS 83

by the parties involved, and government intervention would be limited to establishing binding 

deadlines and modalities for the payment, and eventually imprisoning bad or late payers. The 

government agreed to continue with payment of some diyas, but only when consensus could 

not be reached on losses, in which case, to prevent the reconciliation process from failing, it 

would pay the difference.

The South Darfur governor attempted to merge the sixty-four conferences into a single, 

global reconciliation process, and in March 2011, leaders of most if not all tribes of South Darfur, even those not in conflict with another one, committed themselves to peaceful coexistence 

in signing, together with an oath on the Quran, a wasigat ash-sharaf (agreement of the nobles). 

This was also signed by the members of the South Darfur Legislative Council, representatives 

of political parties, women and youth associations, students unions, intellectuals, and other 

representatives of civil society.

The South Darfur authorities believe, or at least hope, that this document should put an 

end to the proliferation of costly reconciliation conferences, and to traditional mechanisms 

such as judiya to solve tribal conflicts. From this point forward, all new cases of violence 

should be dealt according to formal legal principles and procedures. Individual punishment 

should overrule tribal collective responsibility. “We want to start from scratch, to stop using 

traditional mediation. No judiya or traditional court. Law only. We want to impose the law, 

otherwise people will not feel that there is a government,” the deputy governor of South 

Darfur explained.275

The government began to implement the new strategy almost immediately. Then, in July 

2011, the conflict between Salamat and Habbaniya Arabs erupted again. The government created a Crisis Management Committee, which this time was clearly governmental, chaired by 

the deputy governor and composed of ministers, including shartay Ibrahim Abdallah (this time 

clearly in his governmental role) and commissioners, who visited the affected area with a convoy of twenty-two police Land Cruisers with mounted DshK machine-guns (“Doshkas”)—a 

clear demonstration of force. The committee did not call any ajwad or start a reconciliation 

process, as had often been done in similar cases, but instead—based on the incident NISS report—arrested those listed as responsible, releasing those against whom no evidence could be 

found, and detaining the remainder. The deputy governor meanwhile refused the reconciliation 

process requested by representatives of the two tribes.

However, the parties in conflict recognize this process as successful. First, they acknowledged that the arrests of the instigators and their being brought in due course before the court 

helped stop the violence. Second, they approve of the creation of an implementation committee led by the governor and composed of government mediators of the majlis al hukama’ 

led by shartay Ibrahim Abdallah, and of ajawid from neutral tribes (Fellata, Rizeigat Arabs), 

because they know that the conflict has erupted again primarily because recommendations 

of a former conference—in particular, regarding diya—had not been implemented. The July 

2011 conference was thus mostly a follow-up session to implement the recommendations of 

the earlier one. “If there is no government involvement,” a Salamat leader asserted, “there is no 

implementation of the ajawid’s decisions.”276

If many accept and even demand the involvement of the government in implementation 

specifically, similar intervention in other stages of reconciliation is much less unanimously approved. Additionally, nothing yet indicates whether such an abrupt shift from much weakened 

traditional mechanisms to a more modern justice system will be smooth or successful, given 

the poor record of the police and the justice system and the lack of trust in the neutrality of the 

authorities. However, the same deputy governor claims that “traditional leaders are, in general, 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

supportive of this approach and cooperate with us. At the end of the day, they all are employees 

of the government, because we’re paying their salary, and cannot refuse to implement government policies. Before they felt they were not part of the government. Now those who will not 

comply with their obligations will have to face disciplinary measures.”277 This is also a clear recognition of the power of the government to fire and appoint leaders, which the South Darfur 

government might use even more now than in the past.

Rebel-Arab Agreements

Moreover, in spite of the proliferation of government-sponsored conferences, as attitudes 

among ordinary Darfurians change and they become more demanding of solutions that address immediate security and livelihood issues, local and often quite junior traditional leaders increasingly find themselves involved in local agreements made without the government. 

These agreements do not offer solutions to the conflict as a whole, but they respond to the 

needs of ordinary residents in a new way.

Particularly notable are agreements between armed groups. Since 2006, SLA-AW rebels 

and Arab groups, first baggara and then abbala, have negotiated numerous security agreements 

in and around Jebel Marra. Agreements between fiercely divided opponents may appear counterintuitive, but in fact serve both sides. They revolve around different needs: economic (access 

to markets, water, fields and grazing), security (nonaggression pacts of groups anxious to secure 

the borders of their areas of control), and political (for leaders such as Musa Hilal and AbdelWahid who feel under pressure from various sides and are jockeying for allies and support). The 

government is, of course, not involved in such agreements.278

The economic side is essential: joint markets, situated on the border between government 

and rebel areas, and recreating exchanges between both, on the model of the suq as-salam 

(peace markets) instigated between Arabs and SPLA during the North-South war, are particularly interesting for both sides. The Fur sell grain, fruit, and vegetables to the Arabs. Arabs 

sell livestock, meat, milk, and butter to the Fur. According to a Fur displaced in rebel-held 

Jebel Marra, “Each tribe benefits from this, Arabs need grazing areas and the Fur to open their 

markets. But the agreement is not strong, it relies only on interest.”279

Those agreements differ from traditional mechanisms, judiya in particular. Even though 

some traditional mechanisms (such as an oath on the Quran) are used in Arab-rebels talks, 

they generally do not involve either compensation or punishment. They do, however, imply a 

kind of amnesty—not forgiveness—which is a strong incentive to negotiate for tribes whose 

members committed crimes. “We will never forget what they have done,” said Omar Mohammed, a Fur agid who took part in negotiations with ex-janjawid in southern Jebel Marra, “but 

we signed this agreement because we want to survive.”280

Such agreements are therefore particularly fragile. Many failed because of government interference, prevailing lawlessness, and, given such a volatile context, of unprepared local or 

international programming, notably in terms of development. Thus Ain Siro rebels explain the 

failure of their agreements with abbala Arabs not so much because of frequent violent incidents 

as by the construction of a dam for the abbala community of Damrat ash-sheikn Abdel-Bagi 

northwest of Kutum, a government project (involving notably the council of the nomads led 

by General Abdallah Ali Safi an-Nur, known for his projects for the development of the abbala, which, not necessarily voluntarily, triggered tribal conflicts in the 1990s), supported by 

UNAMID. Non-Arabs from the area protest that this project for a landless community was 

made, as often, without consulting the territorial Native Administration (in that case malik

Adam Mohammed Nur of Dar Beire as well as the local non-Arab omdas and sheikhs). Non-
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PEACEWORKS 83

Arabs also claim that the displaced from the Kassab camp near Kutum who wanted to farm in 

the area of the dam were sometimes prevented from doing so, sometimes allowed to cultivate 

their own farms in the area on the condition they would pay “protection rights” to abbala in 

exchange for security. Ain Siro rebels consider this a violation of their agreement with the 

abbala, which specifically provided the right for the displaced from the Kassab camp to move 

safely and return to their lands.

Traditional Leaders and the Peace Process

Deciphering public perceptions is notoriously difficult in Darfur, given the dearth of quantitative data on what people think on issues such as race, politics, the role of government 

in everyday life, or indeed the Native Administration or traditional justice venues. Preconceived notions of Darfurian opinions—be it in Western advocacy publications and media or among riverine elites in Khartoum—are often simplistic and sometimes misleading. 

What quantitative data does exist—in-depth assessments by aid agencies, systematic interview 

initiatives—must be used with caution. It is never easy to achieve real representation (let alone 

random sampling) in a highly insecure environment, and quantitative questionnaires sometimes simplify to the point of distortion the complexity of issues such as traditional authority, 

justice, and reconciliation.

This caveat notwithstanding, one can draw a number of key findings from the few available 

surveys—and from the hundreds of interviews and conversations that the authors have held 

with Darfurians across Darfur since the early 2000s.

The first is the depth and breadth of the destabilizing effect that central government policies have had, over decades, on the Native Administration. The chief aim of these policies—

whether in the form of legislation or simple practices by the authorities or other government 

agents—has been to weaken the influence of traditional leaders. The NIF/NCP regime has 

been especially active in its efforts to co-opt traditional leaders across, perhaps nowhere more 

than in Darfur since the start of the conflict there.

An example of the prevailing confusion is clear in a systematic survey conducted in 2008 in 

the North Kas area. Over several weeks, some thirty sheikhs and omdas were interviewed—most 

Baggara but others from associated non-Arab groups, as well as Fur leaders from the rebel area 

and displaced camps—on how they perceived the Native Administration hierarchy and the 

structures above them.281

The unsettling conclusion is that each sheikh, each omda, some from the same tribe, has his 

own vision of the traditional hierarchy based on personal or tribal affinities rather than any 

historical or official legitimacy. Some recognize the Fur shartays who have been the historical 

leaders in the area based on their control over the land, and who officially still administer the 

area. Others do not recognize them. Some recognize the Fur amir the government installed 

in 1994 as a paramount leader for the whole locality. Others do not. And though some do 

not recognize the Fur amir, they do recognize the Arab deputy amir. Among those who 

do not recognize the new amir, some still recognize the dimangawi Fadul Sese of Zalingei 

(even if Kas is officially outside his geographic authority). Others recognize the Missiriya 

leader Haroun Imam—a leader with little legitimacy in terms of either history or government 

backing. Some of the Baggara sheikhs admitted that they do not know well the leaders they 

described as being above them.

New leaders among the displaced Fur (unlike former traditional leaders) claim to not recognize any leader above them, a clear sign that they have ceased to defer to the old hierarchy. 

The unsettling conclusion 

is that each sheikh, 

each omda, some from 

the same tribe, has 

his own vision of the 

traditional hierarchy 

based on personal or 

tribal affinities rather 

than any historical or 

official legitimacy.
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Fur traditional leaders who remained in SLA-controlled areas mentioned the SLA, rather than 

the Native Administration hierarchy, as being the paramount authority above them—though 

it is possible that political considerations may have brought some bias to their responses. In 

recent months, however, a number of Fur leaders have moved away from SLA-AW, toward the 

LJM and ultimately the government.

Abbala leaders also challenged both the official and the historical hierarchy, saying that they 

did not recognize any official territorial leader from any tribe other than their own as being 

above them. The result is that they declare Musa Hilal to be their paramount leader, despite his 

having no official role outside North Darfur.282

These results illustrate the outcome of policies by successive governments in Khartoum, but 

particularly by the NIF/NCP regime, to undermine traditional leaders. The aim was to create 

acephalous communities in which the state has direct control over detribalized citizens, but the 

outcome has been quite different. Yes, the power of traditional leaders is much undermined, 

but Darfurian communities are far from acephalous—they suffer instead from a surfeit of 

heads and are deeply tribalized.

This conclusion is not explicitly supported by the few quantitative surveys available, but 

neither were these designed to pick up on it. They do, however, show the divorce between the 

old Native Administration and the new leaders in the displaced and refugee camps.

Particularly relevant for this is the Darfurian Voices Survey quoted earlier. Only 38.9 percent of the refugees interviewed reported having the same leaders in the camps in Chad as they 

had had in Darfur. Even this perception might be exaggerated: of the refugees who presented 

themselves as leaders in the Chadian camps, only 23.5 percent had been a leader in Darfur 

before being displaced.283

The other quantitative survey that yields information on perceptions of the traditional 

leadership is a 2010 pilot survey (the final survey was never completed) conducted by the 

Annenberg School for Communication (University of Pennsylvania) and Albany Associates. Their ample was broad in reach, if shallow in numbers; it included displaced as well as 

not displaced communities, in both urban and rural areas, and including nomads (mostly 

abbala Arabs). It should be treated with caution, however, because the sample was of only 

147 individuals, and the sedentary-nomad and rural-urban lines are especially blurry in the 

Darfur context.284 The data gathered are nevertheless interesting. The survey concludes that 

“there is a high degree of trust in the Native Administration and the Sudanese government 

by both sedentary and nomadic populations. Nomads have slightly higher levels of trust in 

these groups.”285 It is difficult to comment on the issue of trust in the government, especially given that the nature of this trust is not made clear: trust to solve the conflict, to ensure 

security, to provide services? What is interesting, however, is that on the issue of local peace 

the finding seems to contradict those of another survey conducted by Afia Sudan, a local 

organization supported by Albany Associates. Afia Sudan found that around 40 percent of 

interviewees said tribal leaders retain an important role in stopping the violence in their 

community, versus 25 percent for displaced leaders, and only 15 percent for local government.286 One wonders whether the interviewees, when asked of the Native Administration, 

think of their own leaders only, or of the institution in general—including hostile leaders. 

More specific questions will yield different outcomes. For instance, distinguishing nonArab tribal leadership, which the refugees clearly understand as their own, from Arab tribal 

leadership, the Darfurian Voices Survey found important differences: not surprisingly, 69 

percent of the refugees said that the non-Arab leadership was committed to peace, and 95 

percent said that the Arab tribal leadership was not.287
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Perceptions and Facts

Both qualitative interviews and quantitative surveys offer greater clarity in perceptions of 

the participation of traditional leaders in the peace process. According to the AnnenbergAlbany Survey, “Both the sedentary and nomadic groups believe that tribal, religious and 

Native Administration leaders should be included at some level in future peace negotiations.” 

More specifically, 66.7 percent of the Annenberg-Albany interviewees thought the Native 

Administration should be included in future peace negotiations. Conversely, only 10.4 percent 

(and no one among nomads) thought that sheikhs in the camps should be included.288 This 

may be because of an underrepresentation of the displaced in the Annenberg-Albany survey. 

However, Darfurian Voices’ findings among refugees in Chad were comparable on the issue of 

the role of the displaced leaders: only 7 percent said the camp sheikhs needed to be included in 

future peace negotiations for their interests to be represented. At the same time, the Darfurian 

Voices survey also found that only 11 percent of the refugees thought that traditional leaders 

should be represented. On the other hand, a full 46 percent thought that “for their interests to 

be represented,” the negotiations should be attended by SLA-AW, an armed group that has 

systematically refused since 2006 to join negotiations.

It is also interesting to compare findings with regard to compensation. This is the traditional task of the Native Administration or the ajawid, and over 85 percent of the Annenberg-Albany interviewees trust them to do so—more trust than garnered by the national 

government (81 percent) or the international community (56 percent), and far more than 

by refugee and displaced leaders (27 percent).289 On the contrary, the refugees had very 

strong trust in the international community (98 percent), followed by camp leaders (71 

percent), (their own) Native Administration (54 percent), and the Sudanese government 

(9 percent).290

With a more specific question, the Darfurian Voices survey showed that the refugees may 

trust one player for a particular role (rebels for peace negotiations, or the international community for compensation), and not for another one. For example, “interviewees were asked whom, 

if anybody, from inside Sudan they trusted to resolve land disputes,” also a traditional task of 

the Native Administration. “No one” was the most frequent response (61 percent), and only 25 

percent trusted the Native Administration to keep performing this role fairly.

Darfurian Wishes

Darfurians, including traditional leaders, generally agree that the conflict is too broad to be resolved by traditional leaders or through traditional mechanisms. However, the many, successive 

peace processes have shared a conclusion among stakeholders that the restoration of traditional 

conflict resolution mechanisms, of traditional justice, and of the traditional land tenure system 

is critical to addressing the central issues of security and land in Darfur.

Early Involvement of the Native Administration

The involvement of the Native Administration in Darfur peace processes started first at 

the initiative of local civil society forums, in particular the Minbar Darfur which brought 

together a mostly Khartoum-based Darfur elite. These groups participated in several meetings in Libya in 2004 and 2005, along with leaders from various ethnic groups and rebels. 

The meetings narrowed the gap between traditional leaders and rebels. Other civil society 

gatherings favored the Khartoum-based elites at the expense of the Native Administration 

and camps leadership.
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Abuja 2006

The Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Abuja in 2006 between the government and SLAMinni Minawi recognized some secondary roles for the Native Administration, notably in 

determining compensation. The Native Administration’s general role was summarized in very 

vague terms: “Native administration shall have regard, where appropriate, to the established 

historical and community traditions, customs and practices. Where these are contrary to the 

provisions of the National or State Constitution or law, the latter shall prevail.” The agreement 

contains no provision to enhance complementarity between the Native Administration and 

the government rather than competition, and it is clear from other provisions in the agreement 

that any competition would always play out in favor of the government. The agreement refers, 

repeatedly but vaguely, to “traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution.”

The Abuja agreement allowed for the creation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), the main task of which was to provide “a mechanism to connect this Agreement to social and political issues in Darfur so that social mechanisms traditionally established 

to resolve conflicts can play their role in creating and sustaining social peace.”291

The DDDC held consultations among Darfurians, pooling them in categories: tribal 

leaders, civil society organizations, students and youth, women, nomads, and displaced. These 

groups almost unanimously agreed on the necessity to “empower Native Administrations with 

the authority and required capacity to actively participate in helping maintain security,” as well 

as to restore judiya to promote reconciliation.292

AU-UN Mediation

Starting in 2009, the African Union–United Nations (AU-UN) Mediation team for the peace 

process in Darfur, led by Jibril Bassolé, attempted to launch a civil society track parallel to the 

negotiations between government and rebels. Traditional leaders were one of the important 

categories of the civil society as defined by the mediation. Of course, the Native Administration, with most of its members appointed and paid for by the government, hardly met the 

generic definition of civil society as a nonstate actor. UNDP has argued that the Native 

Administration is to be considered “historically the earliest form of civil society institution” 

in Darfur.293

The mediation’s approach was more of a practical gamble: could the Native Administration support mediation efforts by helping bring reluctant rebel movements to the Doha talks 

to sign an agreement? In that regard, the two civil society conferences in Qatar in November 2009 and July 2010 were no more successful than the various international and Sudanese attempts to have traditional leaders visit rebel leaders of the same tribe to push for unity 

or a softer negotiating stance.294 Only paramount traditional leaders living in governmentcontrolled areas attended the two Doha conferences (some of those living in rebel areas or in 

refugee camps in Chad were invited by the rebels to attend negotiations between rebels and 

the government, but not the civil society conferences), and even the main leaders from North 

and West Darfur were both absent from the second one.295 It was even worse during the All 

Darfur Stakeholders Conference in May 2011, where the already politicized participants of the 

two former civil society conferences mixed with hundreds of government officials and political 

party members. The traditional leaders of the three ethnic groups most involved in the conflict 

and thus most important to the talks—the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the abbala Arabs—were 

even less represented than in the civil society conferences, with only one Fur and one Zaghawa 

paramount leader.
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PEACEWORKS 83

The failure to recruit representative traditional leaders did not prevent, however, most participants in all the meetings from agreeing that the Native Administration should have a strong 

role, both in the peace process and after peace is attained. Interestingly, support for this position also came from rebels and the more modern end of the civil society spectrum, including 

educated elites, youth, and the displaced, who all tend to portray the Native Administration as 

archaic. Thus, in November 2009, at the end of the first Doha conference, the final declaration 

suggested “activating the role of leaders of the Native Administration at all levels including 

inside [displaced] Camps [where their power is often contested by new leaders]. There is need 

to restore legal, administrative powers and financial resources to these leaders in order to play 

their role in the maintenance of security in their areas in accordance with the customary laws 

in Darfur taking into account the reality of Darfur.” It defined the Native Administration as “a 

partner in power” of the government, and recommended “not to politicize” the institution, and 

“not to impose a new Native Administration without the consent of the old administration.”296

Doha Document

The Sudanese government and the Liberation and Justice Movement signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur on July 14, 2011. It was to have been strongly inspired by civil society 

consultations in Doha and elsewhere. At first view, it presents a stronger acknowledgment of 

the Native Administration and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. One of the general principles states that “recognition of the role that independent and impartial traditional 

mechanisms can play in complementing processes of justice and reconciliation and the importance of making full use of their potential while maintaining international human rights 

standards.”297

But even here, the main provisions on the Native Administration and the need to strengthen its role remain vague and confusing: “Native Administration shall respect, where appropriate, the established historical and community traditions, customs and practices that have 

played vital roles in the community. The Parties agree that Local Government and the Native 

Administration have been adversely affected by the conflict in Darfur and shall therefore, be 

empowered to address the consequences of the conflict, including environmental degradation 

and desertification.” In that regard, the terms of reference of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and 

Consultation (DIDC) merely echo of its predecessor, the DDDC, by stating the DIDC’s role 

in “enhancing the status of Native Administration including restoring its authority and building its capacity” and “enhancing time tested traditional practices regarding settlement of local 

disputes, land ownership, pastures, transhumance, water and natural resources”298 might remain 

once again wishful thinking.

Actually, the Doha agreement leaves the issue of the role of the Native Administration to 

the parties to solve later within the framework of a future truth and reconciliation process. Interestingly, under Article 58, on “truth and reconciliation,” the agreement states that, to foster 

reconciliation, the parties agree to address several “causes of the conflict,” among which the 

“weakness of the Native Administration,” and that the “reconciliation process” will aim notably 

at “strengthening the Native Administration system.” Oddly, however, traditional justice and 

reconciliation mechanisms are not mentioned here. According to Nouwen, “The DDPD gives 

little attention to what traditional justice in Darfur actually entails.”299

The general principles also recommend that both the Native Administration and ajawid

councils serve as complementary mechanisms of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee 

(TRC) to be established pursuant to the agreement. The agreement only says the ajawid councils “shall be strengthened,” and is no more specific on the role that judiya or other traditional 

The Doha agreement 

leaves the issue of 

the role of the Native 

Administration to the 

parties to solve later 

within the framework 

of a future truth and 

reconciliation process. 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

mechanisms could play in reconciliation processes. The text defines the ajawid councils as 

“a Mediation Council which consists of the Native Administration and community leaders.” 

Setting it up as a standing institution is unfortunate: the historical strength of judiya has been 

its flexibility, and recent attempts to institutionalize peace committees were attempts by the 

Khartoum government to control the process, which lost in efficiency and legitimacy.

Otherwise, the Doha agreement wistfully reiterates the terms traditional and customary mechanisms without defining them, leaving largely unaddressed the issue of competition with other 

legal mechanisms. Only on the land issue does the text provide more specificity, stating that 

“without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the courts, parties to land disputes shall be encouraged to 

exhaust traditional methods of dispute settlement, including arbitration, before going to court.”300

The competition between traditional institutions and mechanisms and governmental ones 

however appeared in some of the civil society consultations and surveys. Thus the AnnenbergAlbany survey found a majority of the interviewees agreed to give more power and authority 

to Native Administration and that it should be elected, but another majority agreed that it was 

unacceptable to have a Native Administration independent from the government. The survey 

is not detailed enough to tell us how the interviewees see the balance between the Native Administration and the government, and the government’s role.301

The Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue, the group of Khartoum-based Darfurian intellectuals, 

is another example of misperception of the strengths of traditional mechanisms. As noted 

earlier, the group’s draft proposals, which the crafters of Doha agreement claimed was a major source of inspiration, suggest institutionalizing the ajawid into “truth and reconciliation” 

mechanisms.302 Morton has strongly criticized this provision as “a comprehensive misreading 

of the institutions it took the Fur Sultanate and the tribes of Darfur centuries to develop,” and 

notes that the Heidelberg Outcome Document only paid lip service to the Native Administration.303 He sees the provision as an example of “the depth of the international community’s lack 

of knowledge and understanding about the idarat al ahlia [sic].” But the Heidelberg Group, 

though supported by non-Sudanese lawyers, is primarily an initiative by Darfurian intellectuals 

to reconcile Darfurian aspirations with international legal standards. The views of these Khartoum-based elites are clearly more modernist than those of other Darfurian groups. Beyond 

the glib consensus on the restoration of the Native Administration and its traditional conflictresolution mechanisms that one finds in various roadmaps, declaration of principles, and peace 

agreements, Darfurian elites remain deeply divided on the matter. The state of confusion that 

the Native Administration finds itself in after decades of destabilizing policies, oppression, 

and violence only compounds these divisions. Some Darfurians, if not openly abolitionist, are 

of the view that, in a modern state government institutions should prevail. Others, without 

necessarily advocating a return to an idealized precolonial or colonial golden age, see Darfur as 

a sociopolitical and cultural exception that today cannot be governed without the Native Administration, traditional courts and reconciliation mechanisms. As Abdullahi al-Tom observed, 

future judiya (and the same could be said of Native Administration and customary courts) “will 

undoubtedly be a hybrid defying purists of traditional customs and disappointing those who 

aspire for unadulterated modern judicial system.”304

Lessons Learned

Government interference—past and present—is the main factor in the systemic failure of the 

Native Administration and traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms to address the 

current conflict and those that led up to it. This view was already widespread in Darfur when 
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PEACEWORKS 83

the conflict began. “I can solve the conflicts between the Arabs and us,” an important nonArab chief said back in 2004, for example. “In March 2004, we had reached a local agreement 

with the Missiriya Arabs, but two months afterward, they attacked villages again and looted 

livestock, with the help of the janjawid and the government. The peace agreement was broken 

because the government accused us of being rebels.” At the same time, even Arab leaders 

claimed, as this Zayadiya omda did, that “the chiefs are able to solve the problems, big or small, 

but as soon as the government interferes, all becomes more complicated.”305

However, it would be a grievous mistake to think, as many international actors do, that 

it is necessary or even possible to empower traditional governance and judicial structures independently of the government. Doing so would only reinforce the conflict between Darfur 

and the central government. It is also not what most Darfurians people seem to want. In the 

context of the conflict, it is true that Darfurians often say that the Native Administration 

and local reconciliation work only when the government is absent. This doesn’t mean they 

do not want any role for the government—on the contrary, they want the government to 

take a strong role—just not the one it is playing today.306 They insist in particular that the 

government should be neutral in its relations with traditional leaders and in the management of local disputes, shedding its ethnic, tribal, and political biases. They want government 

support, especially financial support, for the Native Administration and for the reconciliation processes. As was said during a DDDC consultation, “It is critical that the authority of 

Native Administration is supported so that it can effectively impose its powers to help control 

illegal weapons, deal firmly with outlaws, etc., until peace prevails and peaceful coexistence is 

reached between concerned parties.”307

Darfurians do not want the government to interfere in the processes themselves, but rather 

play a role in their preparation and their follow-up. The government’s security role, exercised 

through the security forces as well as the formal judiciary, is seen as especially important: the 

government is to reestablish security after a conflict and ensure that the necessary security 

measures are in place for the reconciliation process to proceed. The government’s role in ensuring the implementation of the conclusions of a reconciliation conference is also seen as vital, 

whether in terms of security, the provision of development services, or help with the payment 

of blood money. Local conflict resolution depends on local leaders reaching agreement, of 

course, but it also requires government support and follow-up.308 In that regard, the Native 

Administration, if duly supported and empowered by the government, can play an important 

role in implementation of reconciliation and prevention of new conflicts, as well as an intermediary between the citizens and the state. Dynastic leaders should become source of power 

and stability that is complementary to the modern State, rather than in conflict with it. As 

magdum Ahmad Abder-Rahman Rijal said in 2004, “In Britain, we traditional leaders would 

be members of the House of Lords. Here [in Sudan], the government rejects us.”309 A few 

months later, the regime forced him from his position.

There is tension between the traditional Darfurian conflict-resolution mechanisms and 

the precepts of Western justice—including international judicial mechanisms ranging from 

the International Criminal Court (ICC) to truth-telling commissions proposed for Darfur 

(such as in the DDPD) and elsewhere. Traditional reconciliation mechanisms imply forgiveness or amnesty, with compensation paid not only to make up for tangible but also to 

symbolize a recognition of guilt that is otherwise not necessarily openly articulated, unlike in 

Western truth-telling processes. The contradiction has not been lost on the Sudanese government, which has promoted judiya as an alternative to the ICC. President Bashir himself had 

Darfurians do not 

want the government 

to interfere in the 

processes themselves, 

but rather play a role in 

their preparation and 

their follow-up. 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

invoked “our traditions in the reconciliation councils and mediations led by elders,” exacerbating suspicion among some in Darfurian society that judiya could be manipulated to the 

regime’s benefit.310

Abdullahi at-Tom advocates a division of labor: “While the ICC and Sudan’s National Justice System (NJS) can deal with the higher level crimes, the lower level crimes which are more 

numerous can only be dealt with within the traditional legal system (the Judi[y]a). In comparison to both the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the NJS the Judi[y]a is more efficient, 

but above all conducive for future co-existence and reconciliation.”311 He also observes that the 

amnesty provision in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for war criminals in the 

North-South war might have encouraged impunity in Darfur.

Today, the processes taking place on the ground in Darfur—from government-backed 

tribal conferences to the backdoor agreements between Arabs and rebels—also differ from 

traditional mechanisms, especially judiya. Even though some trappings of the traditional 

processes are still used, many current local agreements do not involve compensation or punishment. They do offer a form of amnesty, but not forgiveness. In essence, the process of reconciliation is put on hold for a more propitious time, allowing for practical measures to take 

place in the meantime, such as opening markets, protecting livestock, and allowing freedom 

of movement. These limited agreements also offer an incentive for the groups that committed 

crimes to negotiate.

In a way, the ICC is also pushing Arabs to negotiate or even to change sides. But in the 

ICC process, the displaced and refugees lost their possibility of offering amnesty, forgiveness, 

and compensation in exchange for peace. The ICC prevents the victims from granting amnesty. 

Why, then, would groups that committed crimes negotiate with them, and eventually disarm, 

if the ICC hangs over their head? An SLA leader involved in negotiations with Arabs groups 

said in 2008 that “when we discuss with the janjawid, we don’t ask them which crimes they 

committed. They come because we don’t talk about the past.”312

To say that peace and justice go hand in hand is a commonplace that borders on platitude. 

But the words of that SLA leader reveal the depth of the dilemma between justice and peace 

in Darfur, as well as difficulty of the task ahead.
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PEACEWORKS 83

Ethnic Group Top Leader Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

Fur sultan (purely honorific): 

magdum (Nyala), dimangawi

(Zalingei), dadingawi or malik

(El Fasher), amir-al-gaba’il (Kas)

shartay, malik omda (dimlij) sheikh

Masalit sultan (West Darfur), malik or 

sultan (South Darfur)

fursha fursha, omda 

(dimlij)

sheikh

Zaghawa sultan, malik, shartay omda sheikh

Berti malik (Mellit), nazir (Taweisha), 

shartay

omda sheikh

Meidob malik omda sheikh

Tunjur malik, shartay omda sheikh

Dajo sultan or shartay omda sheikh

Birgid nazir (Birgid Kajar), shartay

(Birgid Dali)

shartay omda sheikh

Gimir, Beigo sultan omda sheikh

Borgo, Tama sultan (Chad) omda sheikh

Mima nazir or shartay omda sheikh

Erenga, Misseriya 

Jebel, Sinyar

amir omda sheikh

Fellata nazir omda sheikh

Arab nazir or amir omda sheikh

Table A1. Native Administration Titles

Name

Professional 

Background Ethnic Group Area/Location

Idris Atta-el-bari (ra’is) teacher Jawa`ma (Arab) El Fasher

Ibrahim Saleh Sharafeddin 

(secretary)

water-yard (donki) 

clerk

Jawa`ma (Arab) El Fasher

Adam an-Nur water-yard (donki) 

clerk

Fur El Fasher

Abdallah Ahmad at-Tayyib water-yard (donki) 

clerk

Fellata (Pula) Dar es-Salam

Mohammad al-Hajj Omar Fellata (Pula) El Fasher

Mohammad az-Zein 

Abdallah

state politician/MP Borgo El Fasher

Musa Sabur Bishara omda (Native 

Administration)

Zaghawa Ab Dileg

Idris Abdallah policeman Zaghawa El Fasher

Bosha Zerif Abu Kalam policeman Habbaniya (Arab) El Fasher

Table A2. Ajawid Committee of El Fasher

Appendix
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

Name Title Ethnic group Area/location

Rahamtallah Mahmoud Ali 

al-Dadingawi

malik (head of 

the court)

Fur (Dadinga 

sub-group)

El Fasher, Goz Beyna

Mohammed Az-Zubeir wakil/na’ib 

(representative/deputy) 

of the malik

Fur (Dadinga 

sub-group)

El Fasher, Goz Beyna

Ahmad Sabil shartay Berti Simeyat

Tijani Mohammed Saleh 

Mindi

shartay Tunjur Korma

Adam Abbakar Rashid shartay Tunjur Shangal Tobay

Abdallah Ali Ishaq Jiddu shartay (abducted by 

the SLA in 2003 and 

replaced by his son)

Tunjur Dar Kherban

Ishaq Abbakar Ishaq shartay Fur Tawila, Tarne

Hamid Adam shartay Mima Wada’a

Ishaq Abbiker Ahmad omda Dar Hamid (Arab) Garne

Najmeddin Abubakar omda Jawama (Arab) Jedida Sel

Ahmad As-Safi omda Beshir (Arab) El Fasher

Ibrahim Bannaga omda Beni Fadl (Arab) Sanikarow

Adam Ahmad Fadil omda Jima’wi (Arab) Kosti

Mahadi Shahid omda Ereigat (Arab) Ab Dileg

Musa Sabur omda Zaghawa Sag an-Na’am

Sam Adam omda Zaghawa Tawila

Hisein Ibrahim omda Kinnin (Tuareg) Suelinga

Hisein Mohammed Ibrahim omda Fellata (Pula) Karyo (Dar es-Salam)

Mahmoud Adam Ahmad omda Fur (Dadinga 

sub-group)

Goz Beyna

Al-Hadi Abderahman omda Fur Tarne, Tawila

Mokhtar Ishaq omda Fur Dobo al-Omda

Abderahman Abbo omda Fur Keylu

Ibrahim Adam Addimo 

“Kuyuko”

omda Mima Am Dresaya 

(Shangal Tobay)

Abdallah Haroun omda Mararit Arkud Mararit

Mahmoud Ibrahim omda Berti Korma

Mohammed Adduma sheikh Ereigat (Arab) Korma

Table A3. Members of El Fasher’s mahkama shabiya (August 2011)
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PEACEWORKS 83

Acknowledgments

The authors particularly thank Colin Robertson, who was at the origin of this project, John Ryle, who supported 

it since the start, and Jon Temin and Tim Luccaro, who followed it until its achievement. The authors are also 

especially grateful to Ahmad Adam Yusif for his input to this research, as well as to Suliman Baldo, Kenny Gluck, 

Jonathan Loeb, and Sarah Nouwen for their support and informed comments. In Chad, warm and special thanks 

go to Dr. Abdel-Hadi Siddig Hashim, Ibrahim Moussa, Mahamat al-Fatih Oumar, Jonathan Loeb, and Khamis 

Hassan Djimé of Abeché. Without their support and wisdom, the field work there would not have been possible. 

We would also like to thank Omer Ismail in Washington D.C. for his advice and friendship. Finally, particular 

acknowledgments have to go to the many Darfurians, including traditional leaders, who unfortunately cannot be 

named here but without whom this research would not have been possible.

Notes

1. Arabic is a difficult language to transliterate. We opted for a simplified rendition. In the text, we observe a 

few basic rules.

•	 First, we chose not to use complicated diacritical marks typical of academic works. Instead, for the most 

part, we wrote Arabic words as they are pronounced in Sudanese Arabic, for instance nazir (Arab paramount chief) or wasiga (document). For the letter qaf (ق(, we mostly use a hard g (as in golf) as that is 

how it is how it is usually pronounced in Sudanese Arabic; in some rare cases, especially for formal words, 

we left the more standard q.)

•	 Second, we did not differentiate between long and short vowels. Nor did we differentiate so-called 

emphatic consonants (e.g., ض, ط, ظ, ح (from their regular counterparts s, d, t, z, or h.

•	 Third, we used ‘ (backquote) for ‘ayn (ع (and ’ (apostrophe) for the hamza (ء(. But we do not give the 

initial ‘ayn or hamza in proper nouns. (‘Ayn and hamza are often not strongly pronounced in Sudanese 

Arabic, and even less so in Darfur.)

•	 Fourth, we transcribed the definite article with so-called sun letters as pronounced, for example asSudan (rather than al-Sudan) or ed-Da‘ein (rather than el-Da‘ein).

•	 Fifth, we followed English usage in dropping the initial article in certain place names that carry the 

article in Arabic (for example, Geneina, Khartoum).

•	 Sixth, for readability, we have used the English plural of the Arabic singular, but included the Arabic 

plural form in parentheses on first use.

•	 Finally, we hyphenated names based on the pattern Abdel-Wahid or Abdel-Karim; this seemed the least 

unwieldy solution and preferable to Abdelwahid, Abd el-Wahid, or Abdel Wahid.

Inconsistencies inevitably remain in the text; we apologize for them in advance.

2. Since January 2012, those three states have been further divided into five.

3. Jérôme Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes d’un conflit: fractures locales et actions internationales au cœur du 

Darfour,” Afrique contemporaine 232, no. 4 (2009): 88–92.

4. John Howell, ed. Local Government and Politics in the Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1974).

5. Cherry Leonardi and Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority, Local Government and Justice,” in 

The Sudan Handbook, ed. John Ryle (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: James Currey, 2011), 110–11.

6. The term Native Administration may sound mildly offensive and colonial to an ear unfamiliar with Sudan, 

and it is indeed a colonial term, but in spite of its connotations it has remained widely used until today by 

Sudanese and foreigners, in and out of academia and government. 

7. Rex Sean O’Fahey and Jérôme Tubiana, “Darfur: Historical and Contemporary Aspects” (Bergen, Norway: 

Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2007), 9, www.smi.uib.no/darfur/A%20DARFUR%20

WHOS%20WHO3.pdf. 

8. Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, “From War to Peace and Reconciliation in Darfur” (paper presented at the 

conference Peace and Reconciliation in the Horn of Africa, Stockholm (May 2009), www.sudantribune.

com/From-war-to-peace-and,31624.

9. See Jérôme Tubiana, “Darfur: A Conflict for Land?” in War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, ed. Alex de 

Waal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 68–91.

10. El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

11. Martin Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 114, 122.

12. Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 111; James Morton, “How to Govern Darfur” (lecture, 

Durham University, Sir William Luce Publication Series no. 12, 2011), www.dur.ac.uk/resources/sgia/

imeis/lucefund/DarfurMortonfinal.pdf.

13. Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 110–11.

14. Rex Sean O’Fahey, Darfur and the British (London: C. Hurst, 2012). 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

15. Helen Young, Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat (Medford, MA: 

Feinstein International Center, 2009); Morton, “How to Govern Darfur.” 

16. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow, 125–26, 151; Morton, “How to Govern Darfur.” 

17. Morton, “How to Govern Darfur.”

18. Darfur was surprisingly well integrated into world markets, notably with the export of hides. The Great 

Depression, with its collapse of demand and of prices, hit Darfur very hard, especially as it coincided with 

several years of poor rains and locust infestations (Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow).

19. Ibid., 127. 

20. Ibid., 125.

21. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow; Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes,” 89.

22. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow, 128.

23. O’Fahey and Tubiana, “Darfur: Historical and Contemporary Aspects,” 12.

24. Morton, “How to Govern Darfur.”

25. Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 112.

26. Ibid.; Jérôme Tubiana, “Le Darfour, un conflit identitaire?” Afrique contemporaine 214 (2005): 165–206.

27. Alex de Waal and Yohannes Ajawin, eds., When Peace Comes: Civil Society and Development in Sudan, 

(Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2002), 121. 

28. African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism (London: Justice Africa, 1997), 

www.justiceafrica.org/publishing/online-books/food-and-power-in-sudan-a-critique-of-humanitarianism; 

see also African Rights, Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan (London: Justice Africa, 1994), www.justiceafrica.org/publishing/online-books/facing-genocide-the-nuba-of-sudan. 

29. Tubiana, “Darfur: A Conflict;” Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 112.

30. An old Zaghawa sheikh, interviewed in Touloum refugee camp (eastern Chad) in August 2011, was one of 

the rare traditional leaders to tell us he had abandoned most of his official functions as a result of the 

abolition. 

31. Interview, Mararit sheikh, Kounoungo refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. The Mararit are a small 

non-Arab tribe straddling the Darfur-Chad border.

32. Interview, Zaghawa sheikhs, Am Nabak refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

33. Morton, “How to Govern Darfur.”

34. Interview, Zaghawa sheikh, Kounoungo refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011.

35. Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 113.

36. Interview with a South Darfur government official, quoted in Tubiana, “Le Darfour.”

37. The modern standard Arabic inqadh is pronounced ingaz or inghaz in Sudanese Arabic. 

38. Bashir and Turabi vied for power throughout the 1990s until the former, by then president, finally managed 

to sideline Turabi in 1999 and 2000; Bashir retained control of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), 

and Turabi went on to form the breakaway Popular Congress Party.

39. The 1899 Condominium agreement restored Egyptian rule in Sudan under joint British and Egyptian 

authority, with Britain clearly the primary partner. Egyptian rule had been interrupted when Mahdist forces 

took Khartoum in 1885.

40. Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 116.

41. Government of Sudan (GoS), “Traditional System Conference: Final Declaration and Recommendations,” 

January 9–30, 1995, Soba Camp (Hakumat as-Sudan, “Mu’tamar an-nitham al-ahli, al-bayan al-khatimi 

w-at-tawsiat,” 9–30 yana’ir 1995, ardh al-mu’askarat bi-Soba).

42. GoS, “Traditional System Conference.” 

43. “An auspicious borrowing from the naqibs of the Prophet—may peace be upon him—in Madina” (GoS, 

“Traditional System Conference”). In the fifth sura of the Quran, Allah appoints twelve leaders (naqib) to 

lead the twelve tribes of Israel (The Holy Quran, “Surat al-Ma’ida” [the Table Spread], v. 12). 

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. 

46. Ibid.

47. Alex de Waal and A. H. Abdelsalam, “Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan,” in Islamism and its 

Enemies in the Horn of Africa, ed. Alex de Waal (London: C. Hurst, 2004).

48. Tubiana, “Darfur: A Conflict.”

49. Interview with Idris Yusif, Fur intellectual and one of the founders of the Fur shura, Khartoum, March 

2012.

50. See Sharif Harir, “‘Arab Belt’ versus ‘African Belt’: Ethno-Political Conflict in Dar Fur and the Regional 

Cultural Factors,” in Sudan: Shortcut to Decay, eds. Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (Uppsala: Nordiska 

Africainstitutet, 1994).
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51. In the new federal structure, states (wilaya, pl. wilayat) replaced provinces. In August 2011, Khartoum 

announced the creation of two new states: East Darfur, with its capital in ed-Da‘ein, the capital of the 

Rizeigat Arabs, and Central Darfur, with Zalingei as its capital. Governors were named in early 2012. 

For the official announcements for Central and East Darfur states, see www.sudan.gov.sd/en/index.php?

option=com_content&view=article&id=1005:central-darfur-state-&catid=43:2008-06-06-15-2459&

Itemid=71 and www.sudan.gov.sd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1006:east-darfurstate-&catid=43:2008-06-06-15-24-59&Itemid=71.

52. Amir (pl. umara’), means prince. Qabila (pl. qaba’il) is tribe, and is pronounced with a hard g in Sudanese 

Arabic.

53. This was Mohammed Abu Shamma Shatta, son of the first Ta‘alba omda, also popular with the British. 

54. Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes,” 89.

55. Rex Sean O’Fahey, State and Society in Dar Fur (London: C. Hurst, 1980), 90.

56. Ibid., 89, 152.

57. For a long period, the sultanate had been divided into four large administrative areas encompassing several 

dars, each headed by a paramount leader: the umangawi in the South, the dimangawi in the West, the ab 

sheikh dali in the East, and the takanyawi in the North. The three others belonged to Fur dynasty, but the 

takanyawi was a Tunjur, acknowledging that a Tunjur sultanate preceded the Fur rule in northern Darfur. 

Of those four offices, only the dimangawi still exists (though with a reduced territory), and the umangawi

became a simple shartay under the magdum (O’Fahey and Tubiana, “Darfur: Historical and Contemporary 

Aspects”). 

58. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow, 129.

59. Lidwien Kapteijns, Mahdist Faith and Sudanic Tradition: The History of the Masalit Sultanate 1870–1930 

(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 148, 248. 

60. They are also known by the derogatory term, Kuzi Arabs (from guttiya, a hut). Arabs sometimes divide 

themselves between nas al-kuzi (the sedentary) and nas as-suf (people of the wool, or the nomads, who 

traveled with their wool hats)—becoming a kuzi implies a degradation of status. 

61. Darfur’s Sorrow, 130.

62. A wakil (pl. wukala’) is a deputy, like a na’ib.

63. Morton, “How to Govern Darfur.”

64. Members of the federal parliament elected in 2010 include sultan Ibrahim Yusif Ali Dinar, federal MP for 

Khartoum South; magdum Salaheddin Mohammed al-Fadul Adam Rijal; shartay Mohammed al-Fadul 

Ja‘far, of the Birgid (Dali); omda Fatima Mohammed al-Fadul Adam Rijal, Fur omda of Nyala and sole 

female native administrator in Darfur; omda al Mon‘eim of the Ta’aisha Arabs; sheikh (nazir) Musa Hilal, 

leader of the Arab Jalul (Mahamid), North Darfur. At the Council of States (elected from state parliaments): 

Nazir Saleh Ali al-Ghali, chief of the Habbaniya Arabs, and nazir Musa Jalis, of the Birgid (Kajar), both 

from South Darfur. Shartay Ja‘far Abdul-Hakam was governor of West Darfur until January 2012, and 

shartay Ibrahim Abdallah is a state minister in South Darfur. In North Darfur, state law makes the native 

administration de facto members of the state assembly .

65. Interview in March 2007 in Ammaray, North Darfur, quoted in Jérôme Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour 

(Grenoble: Glénat, 2010), 202–03. 

66. Tension was acute in the 1930s between British administrators in Darfur—who wanted to limit education 

investments in the province and make it available essentially only to the leading families (“educating people 

that matter”)—and the Education Department in Khartoum, which wanted to spread education throughout 

Sudan, including Darfur. In the end, budgetary constraints and pre-independence inertia spelled victory for 

the minimalists (Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow, 133–37). 

67. Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 113.

68. Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and Ahmed Adam Yusif, “Native Administration and 

Local Governance in Darfur, in War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 2007), 39–47.

69. Tubiana, “Le Darfour.”

70. Suliman Baldo, The Role of the African Union in Transitional Justice in Africa: Sudan Case Study, 

forthcoming.

71. A process memorably described by Paul Doornbos in a seminal paper, “On Becoming Sudanese,” in Sudan: 

State, Capital and Transformation, eds. Tony Barnett and Abbas Abdelkarim (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 

99–120.

72. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (London: Zed Books, 2005), 76; Victor 

Tanner, “Rule of Lawlessness: Roots and Repercussions of the Darfur Crisis” (Sudan Advocacy Coalition, 

2005), 13, www.darfurcentre.ch/images/00_DRDC_documents/Other_Docs_Reports/Rule_of_Lawlessness_Roots_and_Repercussions_of_the_Darfur_Crisis.pdf. 

73. Tanner, “Rule of Lawlessness,” 26. 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

74. Julie Flint, “The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur” (working paper no. 22, Small Arms Survey, 

Geneva, 2010), 25; Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes,” 92.

75. Quoted in “Is Darfur an Identity Conflict?” (Paris: Action contre la faim, 2005).

76. Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 63.

77. Ibid., 11–23.

78. Sarah Nouwen, “Traditional Justice: Improving Access to Justice in Darfur” (unpublished manuscript, 

2010), 50.

79. Interview, North Darfur, September 2008.

80. Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes,” 92.

81. Approximately 36 percent of the Darfur refugees in Chad identifying themselves as leaders graduated from 

primary school, versus 22 percent of their civilian counterparts (unpublished data from the Darfurian Voices 

Survey, on file with the authors).

82. Interview, South Darfur, September 2008. This sheikh had not previously belonged to the native administration, and was elected by the displaced in 2004. 

83. Tanner, “Rule of Lawlessness,” 13; Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The 

Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups” (working paper no. 6, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2007). 

84. Quoted in Tubiana, “Le Darfour.”

85. 2004 interview with a non-Arab leader, quoted in Tubiana, “Le Darfour,” 176. 

86. Quoted in Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 67.

87. Interview with a Zaghawa leader, North Darfur, August 2004. He concluded, “But without chiefs, you can’t 

control Darfur!”

88. Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 24–28.

89. Ibid., 99–105.

90. Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall,” 26. It was called fifth column (tabur khamis), an expression 

Sudanese are fond of and use to refer to governmental militias in rebel areas. 

91. Interview with Mohammed Ali Ishaq Jiddu, brother of the late shartay, Ammaray, North Darfur, March 

2007.

92. Interview, family member of the slain malik, Abéché, Chad, August 2011. 

93. Similarly, they gave the names of former sultans to combat units on the ground. 

94. On the unusual local security arrangements struck between rebels and Arabs linked to the janjawid in Jebel 

Marra, see Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, “The Emergence of Local Security and Livelihood Agreements 

in Darfur” (Washington, DC: USAID, 2010), 32–39. 

95. Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 199–204; Flint and de Waal, Darfur: A Short History, 66–67; Tanner and 

Tubiana, “Divided They Fall,” 62–63. 

96. Interviews with rebel leaders, Juba, December 2011.

97. Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 243–50.

98. Interviews with rebel leaders, Kampala and Juba, December 2011.

99. The eight paramount leaders of Dar Zaghawa are the sultans of Tina and Tundubay, the maliks of Dar Tuer 

(Am Boru), Muzbat, Dar Artaj and Dar Beire, and the shartays of Dar Galla (Kornoy) and Dar Sueini. 

100. In some areas, agids and warnangs coexist, with the former above several of the latter.

101. Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall,” 18.

102. Interview, Torong Tawra, South Darfur, September 2008.

103. Flint and de Waal, Darfur: A Short History, 118.

104. Interview, Hajer Hadid, eastern Chad, May 2009. The Arabic word for the military rank of colonel is also 

agid. 

105. Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), 83, 140.

106. Jérôme Tubiana, “Land and Power: The Case of the Zaghawa,” Making Sense of Sudan, SSRC Blog, May 28, 

2008, http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2008/05/28/land-and-power-the-case-of-the-zaghawa/; Musa Adam 

Abdul-Jalil, “Some Political Aspects of Zaghawa Migration and Resettlement,” in Rural-Urban Migration 

and Identity Change: Case Studies from the Sudan, eds. Fouad Ibrahim and Helmut Ruppert (Bayreuth: 

Bayreuther Geowissenschaftliche Arbeiten, 1988).

107. Anti-Zaghawa violence has been one of the main trends in the conflict since the Abuja agreement. See 

Abdul-Jabbar Fadul and Victor Tanner, “Darfur after Abuja: A View from the Ground,” in War in Darfur 

and the Search for Peace, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Tanner and 

Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 21–22, 31; Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana, “Forgotten Darfur: Old 

Tactics, New Players” (working paper no. 28, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2012). 

108. African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, “Rendered Invisible: Darfur Deteriorates as International 

Pressure Shifts to the Referendum Process” (London: ACJPS, February 2011); Human Rights Watch, 
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PEACEWORKS 83

“Darfur in the Shadows” (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2011); Amnesty International, Sudan: No 

End to Violence in Darfur (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2012); Gramizzi, Lewis, and 

Tubiana, “Report from Former Members,” 8–11; Gramizzi and Tubiana, “Forgotten Darfur,” 21–24.

109. http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4492 

110. Voices of Darfur, February 2011, http://unamid.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMID/Voices/vod_february_

en_web.pdf. 

111. Gramizzi and Tubiana, “Forgotten Darfur”; Gramizzi, Lewis, and Tubiana, “Report from Former 

Members,” 12–13.

112. See UN Security Council, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) 

Concerning the Sudan,” S/2011/111 (New York: UNSC, March 2011). Similarly uninformed, the following 

UNSC Panel report labeled the magdum of South Darfur “Viceroy of the Fur tribe” [sic]. See UN Security 

Council, “Letter dated 24 January 2012 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to 

Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan” (unpublished document, January 2012), 33–34.

113. Interview, Fur intellectual, Khartoum, August 2008. See Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes,” 92.

114. Morton, “How to Govern Darfur.” 

115. Damras and feriqs are small settlements of nomadic groups. Damras are often the location of nomads’ dryseason farms that host those who do not accompany the herds to more distant pastures. In Darfur today, a 

damra describes semi-permanent or even permanent encampment where a Koranic school, a basic elementary school or a primary health center may be available.

116. The word farm (mazra’) is to be understood here in the Sudanese (indeed African) sense of the word which 

is field or fields (no buildings).

117. Sarah Nouwen, “Traditional Justice: Improving Access to Justice in Darfur” (unpublished manuscript, 

2010), 41.

118. El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

119. Government of Sudan (GoS), “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act,” Khartoum 2004 (translated from 

Arabic).

120. Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall,” 19.

121. Ladislav Holy, Neighbours and Kinsmen: A Study of the Berti People of Darfur (London: C. Hurst, 1974).

122. Interview with North Darfur rebel representatives, date and location withheld.

123. Interview, JEM official from an illustrious Am Boru family, Abéché (Chad), August 2011.

124. From the verb khasira, to incur a loss (the plural in standard Arabic is khasa’ir).

125. GoS, “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act”; Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed, and Yusif, “Native Administration 

and Local Governance.” 

126. According to the judiciary offices in Nyala and El Fasher, visited in October and November 2011. These 

figures do not reflect the subsequent creation of Eastern and Central Darfur states in January 2012. 

127. Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 111.

128. Morton, “How to Govern Darfur,” 12–14.

129. 1932 Native Courts Ordinance, Sudan Government Gazette, 558.

130. Interview, Zaghawa sheikh, Kounoungo refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011.

131. GoS, “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act”; Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 45. Based in Khartoum, 

the Chief Justice represents the judiciary power, and is in theory independent from both the ministry of 

Justice and the attorney general (who represents the state).

132. El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

133. GoS, “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act.”

134. Ibid.; Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 41.

135. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 40; GoS, “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act.”

136. GoS 2004; Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 49.

137. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 41, 44; GoS, “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act.”

138. GoS, “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act.”

139. The Kaytinga are a Fur clan that partly migrated north and were granted two dars (Dar Beire and Dar 

Sueini) on the southeastern edge of Dar Zaghawa; they are now generally considered Zaghawa.

140. Interview, date and location withheld.

141. The Tarjem are well integrated in the Kutum area, though the South Darfur Tarjem have much far conflictual relations with the Fur, notably over land.

142. GoS, “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act.”

143. Farm (mazra’) as in field.

144. This is not the Idris Abdallah, policeman and member of the El Fasher ajawid committee, referred to later 

in the report. 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

145. For an explanation of the context to this case, see the analysis.

146. One feddan is 0.42 hectares. 

147. Interviews, Chad refugee camps, August 2011.

148. There would be courts operating even in Jebel Si, although this area is practically empty, its population now 

refugees in the El Fasher and Kabkabiya displaced camps. The operating courts might be only for the 

nomadic population. 

149. According to the judiciary offices in Nyala and El Fasher, visited in October and November 2011.

150. Interviews with rebel legal advisers, Juba, December 2011.

151. Ibid.

152. Interview, Dar Zaghawa, March 2007.

153. Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 99.

154. Interviews, dates and locations withheld. 

155. Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 208.

156. Interview, Juba, December 2011.

157. Interviews with rebel legal advisers, Juba, December 2011.

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160. Interview, Fur leader, El Fasher, August 2004.

161. Multiple interviews with Masalit traditional leaders in exile, Farshana, Breidjing, Treidjing refugee camps, 

eastern Chad, August 2011. 

162. Interviews with Darfur rebel leaders, Juba, December 2011. See Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 248.

163. Interviews with displaced leader from Kailek, Kas, September 2008.

164. Interview with an ex-UN official in West Darfur.

165. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 12.

166. Judge is qadi (pl. qada’), pronounced gadi or even ghadi in Sudanese Arabic.

167. GoS, “Urban and Rural Courts Regulation Act.”

168. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 15.

169. Ibid., 16.

170. Ibid.

171. Rex Sean O’Fahey, “Tribal Reconciliation in Darfur” (Khartoum: United Nations Mission in Sudan, 2005).

172. Interview with an El Fasher ajwad, date and location withheld.

173. Interview with Ahmad Adam Yusif, ex-commissioner of Mellit, North Darfur, October 2011. Ahmad 

Adam contributed to this research.

174. El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

175. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 14.

176. El-Tom, “From War to Peace.” 

177. See Adam Azzain Mohammed, “Darfur Crisis: Three Conflicts not One” (unpublished manuscript, Public 

Administration and Federalism Studies Institute, University of Khartoum, 2008).

178. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 16.

179. Mohammed, “Darfur Crisis.”

180. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 14.

181. Adam Azzain Mohammed and Balghis Badri, Inter-Communal Conflict in Sudan, Causes, Resolution 

Mechanisms and Transformations: A Case Study of Darfur Region (Omdurman: Ahfad University for Women, 

2004), 52; El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

182. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 17.

183. Mohammed and Badri, Inter-Communal Conflict, 94.

184. Although they are the unofficial traditional leaders who directly represent the force, the agids (war leaders), 

who are often associated to the violence itself, are not invited in reconciliation processes, but in rare cases, 

old agids became ajawid. Outside the judiya, agids of tribes not involved in the conflict can also be mediators 

and bring an end to conflicts using similar mechanisms.

185. Tubiana, Chroniques du Darfour, 151–53. The Kaytinga, a Zaghawa clan of Fur origin, are often called upon 

for judiyas. 

186. Interview, former and current sheikhs, Mile refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

187. Ahmad Adam Yusif contributed research to this report. 

188. Interview with facilitators, Khartoum, October 2011.

189. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 15.
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PEACEWORKS 83

190. Jérôme Tubiana, “The War in the West,” in Sudan Handbook (London: James Currey and Rift Valley 

Institute, 2011), 133–44.

191. A donki (pl., dawanki) is a water yard that typically has a diesel-powered pump, an elevated water tank, and 

troughs for animals to drink for, enclosed by a fenced enclosure. Residents and visiting nomads (and their 

livestock) share access, which is carefully regulated in agreements with the Native Administration. The clerk 

oversees access and is responsible for collecting dues, which go to fuel and maintenance. The word comes 

from tank, as many water yards were installed during colonial times (and not from donkey, as is often 

assumed). 

192. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 14.

193. Ibid., 18.

194. The tale of Assistant District Commissioner (Nyala) Henry Luce and the Gimr in southern Darfur in 1934 

is beautifully told in Morton, “How to Govern Darfur,” 1.

195. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 19.

196. Ibid., 14, 18.

197. Interview with malik Adam Mohammed Nur, date and location withheld.

198. See Mohammed, “Darfur Crisis.”

199. Interview, Masalit sheikh ash-shuyukh, Breidjing refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

200. Interview with malik Rahamtallah Mahmoud, El Fasher, August 2011.

201. Interview, El Fasher, August 2011.

202. Interview, date and location withheld.

203. Qisas is the Arabic term for talion (“an eye for an eye, a life for a life”), which in most Islamic settings is 

generally limited to death. 

204. Private sources and conversations.

205. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 26.

206. Ibid., 31.

207. 24 Hours for Darfur, Darfurian Voices (New York: 24 Hours for Darfur, 2010), 39–40, www.darfurianvoices.org.

208. Interview, camp leaders and elders, Touloum refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

209. Interview, Fur resident, Gaga refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011; interviews, a teacher and ordinary 

camp residents, Breidjing refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

210. Interview, Fur resident, Gaga refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. Chefs de bloc is the French expression that the refugees have reprised from the francophone Chadian authorities and UNHCR for camp 

sheikhs, some of whom were sheikhs back in Sudan, but often are new leaders. In Gaga, residents said that 

very few if any current camp leaders had been in the Native Administration in Darfur. 

211. Interviews, camp leaders and elders, Touloum refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

212. Interviews, camp leaders and elders, Am Nabak refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

213. Interview, deputy head of Adukong-Gokar Rural Court (rural Geneina Council, West Darfur State), now 

a refugee in Farchana camp, Farchana refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

214. Interview, deputy head of Adukong-Gokar Rural Court, Farchana refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 

2011. 

215. Interviews, Masalit leaders, Farchana refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

216. Interview, Masalit sheikh, Gaga refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011.

217. Interviews, Masalit teacher, Breidjing refugee camp, eastern Chad, and Masalit Chef de Canton, Hadjer 

Hadid town, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

218. Interview, Masalit teacher, Breidjing refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011.

219. Conversation, Masalit refugee, Treidjing refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

220. Interviews, camp leaders and elders, Touloum refugee camp, eastern Chad, August 2011. 

221. Jérôme Tubiana, “Legal Limbo: How the International Criminal Court Is Freezing the Conflict in Darfur,” 

Foreign Policy (February 23, 2011).

222. Interview, Khartoum, August 2011.

223. Tubiana, “Legal Limbo.”

224. El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

225. Sarah Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

226. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 16.

227. Personal communication, Zaghawa Kobé community member, N’Djaména (Chad), August 2011. 

228. Al-Waha (the oasis) is a shadow locality without a given territory that has been gradually taking in charge 

the administration of the abbala settlements (damras) of North Darfur, contributing to cut the abbala from 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

the non-Arab traditional leaders of the territories where their settlements are situated. See Abdul-Jalil, 

Mohammed, and Yusif, “Native Administration and Local Governance.” The name Damrat Gubba is 

abusive. The fertile area of Gubba was cleansed of its mostly Tunjur inhabitants by abbala militias in August 

and September 2003. In recent years, abbala leaders and Sudanese government officials have started referring to the place as Damrat Gubba in an attempt to import an invented Arab and nomadic identity on the 

area. In early 2009, Arab militias, now integrated into the Sudanese armed forces, established a base in 

Gubba, calling it Damrat Gubba. 

229. Interviews with shartay Adam Sabi Tijani at-Tayyib and malik Adam Mohammed Nur, dates and locations 

withheld. North Darfur Higher Council for Tribal Co-existence and Reconciliation, diya settlement 

between the Rizeigat Arabs of El Waha Locality and the leadership of the tribes of Korma, March 24, 2011.

230. The commissioner of Mellit at the time, Ahmad Adam Yusif, contributed research to this report. 

231. Nouwen, Complementarity.

232. Ibid.; see also El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

233. Taking into account the ICC, the 2012 DDPD offers a much more limited amnesty provision, as it is, for 

the first time in the history of Sudanese peace agreements, excluding “war crimes, crimes against humanity, 

crimes of genocide, crimes of sexual violence, and gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law.” 

If this is preventing the mediators to be accused of encouraging the impunity, it can however complicate local 

reconciliation efforts. See DDPD and Nouwen, Complementarity.

234. Interview, El Geneina, May–June 2006. 

235. Darfurian Voices, 41.

236. Tubiana, “Legal Limbo”; “Learning from Darfur,” Dispatches no. 4, “Out of Poverty” (May 2009): 

195–218.

237. Interview, Birak, March 2010. Ad-Dush is actually from an Awlad Rashid father, but he grew up in 

Misteriha, Musa Hilal’s stronghold, with his mother’s family, Mahamid relatives of Musa Hilal. See 

Tubiana, “Legal Limbo.”

238. Quoted in Tubiana, “Learning from Darfur,” 213.

239. Morton, “How to Govern Darfur”, 24–25. The document cited is Max Planck Institute and Khartoum 

Peace Institute, “Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue Outcome Document” (Heidelberg/Khartoum: MPI/KPI, 

2010).

240. Tubiana, “Legal Limbo.”

241. Mark Bradbury, John Ryle, et al., Local Peace Processes in Sudan (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2006).

242. CARE, “Peace in the Community: Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Darfur” (August 2008). 

243. The preceding paragraph is adapted from Tanner and Tubiana, “Emergence of Local Security.”

244. The 1969 Jineik war between Zaghawa and Abbala Arabs is widely cited in Darfur as the point when violence 

with firearms on both sides first started. In fact, it was a fairly isolated occurrence; violence using automatic 

weapons really developed in the 1980s with arms pouring in from the Chadian wars. 

245. Nouwen, “Traditional Justice,” 29. Following the Doha agreement, a new governor was named for South 

Darfur with the creation in January 2012 of the Eastern Darfur State, of which Kasha refused to become 

the governor.

246. Ibid., 12.

247. See Mohammed, “Darfur Crisis.”

248. Adapted from Tanner and Tubiana, “Emergence of Local Security.”

249. O’Fahey, “Tribal Reconciliation in Darfur.”

250. Mohammed, “Darfur Crisis.”

251. Mohammed and Badri, Inter-Communal Conflict, 93.

252. North Darfur State, “Mechanism for Peaceful Coexistence and Reconciliation between the Regions of 

Gubba and Hashaba” (April 2011).

253. Ibid.

254. An-Nur Ahmad was a Mahamid agid under Musa Hilal. In late 2006, he was one of the first janjawid

leaders to take his distance with Musa Hilal and turn against the government, signing an agreement with 

SLA-AW. He came back with his troops to the government’s side in late 2008, in exchange of the integration of his men into the army and their relocation into the new base of Gubba. He is reported being 

responsible of the raid on the market of Tabara in September 2010, one of the most violent attacks in Darfur 

since 2005, in which at least thirty-seven people were killed.

255. Interviews with civilians and rebels from Hashaba area and with abbala leaders, various locations in North 

and South Sudan, August-December 2011.

256. Mohammed, “Darfur Crisis,” 2.

257. Ibid., 2.

258. Including the nazir of the Hamar Arabs and one of the nazirs of the Missiriya Arabs—both from Kordofan. 
98

PEACEWORKS 83

259. Mohammed and Badri, Inter-Communal Conflict, 93–94.

260. Mohammed, “Darfur Crisis,” 3.

261. Interview, El Fasher, 2008.

262. Mohammed, “Darfur Crisis,” 2.

263. This material is based on interviews with participants and members of the follow-up committee of the 

conference, in particular General at-Tayyib Abder-Rahman Mukhtar, Khartoum, August 2011. General 

at-Tayyib was a member of the conference and member of the follow-up committee. He handed over the last 

money years later. A detailed study of the conflict and the reconciliation conference can be found in 

Mohammed and Badri, Inter-Communal Conflict, 75–105. 

264. Ibid., 83, 88–89.

265. Ibid., 93. 

266. Ibid., 95.

267. Bradbury et al, 88.

268. Mohammed and Badri, Inter-Communal Conflict, 101.

269. Ibid., 77.

270. Some Darfurian observers contend that the Rizeigat-Zaghawa reconciliation of 1997 was not genuine—a 

government-imposed solution that did not address the root causes of the conflict. See Mohammed and 

Badri, Inter-Communal Conflict, 104. However, in late 2011, that the Rizeigat nazir welcomed in his territory several hundred Zaghawa displaced from Taweisha area of Dar Berti in North Darfur by local Berti 

PDF showed that Zaghawa migrant communities now enjoy a much better relation with the Rizeigat, at 

least with their leadership, than with other tribes. Interview with Zaghawas from Taweisha area, Juba, 

February 2012.

271. Mohammed and Badri, Inter-Communal Conflict, 94.

272. O’Fahey, “Tribal Reconciliation in Darfur.”

273. Author interview with Abdel-Karim Musa, date and location withheld.

274. Flint, “The Other War,” 20; Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes,” 95.

275. Author interview with Abdel-Karim Musa, date and location withheld.

276. Author interview with Salamat leader, date and location withheld.

277. Author interview with Abdel-Karim Musa, date and location withheld.

278. See Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes”; Tanner and Tubiana, “Emergence of Local Security.”

279. Quoted in Tubiana, “Lire entre les lignes,” 95.

280. Quoted in Tubiana, “Learning from Darfur,” 218.

281. The leaders interviewed constituted a representative cross-section of postconflict ethnic map of North Kas. 

282. “Etude anthropologique sur les zones rurales au nord de Kas” (Paris: Action contre la faim, 2008).

283. Unpublished data from the Darfurian Voices Survey, on file with the authors.

284. Tubiana, “Learning from Darfur,” 180–81.

285. Center for Global Communication Studies, “Assessing Attitudes and Public Opinion in Darfur: 

Frameworks for Moving Forward and Advancing Dialogue”(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania and 

Albany Associates, 2010), 35.

286. Afia Sudan survey, seen by the authors.

287. Darfurian Voices, 30.

288. Center for Global Communication Studies, “Assessing Attitudes,” 38.

289. Ibid., 37.

290. Darfurian Voices, 35.

291. DDDC (Darfur-Darfur Dialogue & Consultation), www.dddc.org

292. Ibid.

293. United Nations Development Programme, “Mapping and Capacity Assessment of Civil Society Organizations 

(CSOs) in Darfur,” 2009, 2.4.6. 

294. Abdel-Wahid Mohammed Nur famously rebuffed magdum Ahmad Abder-Rahman Rijal, who had come to 

meet him in Paris in 2007.

295. U.S. Institute of Peace, “Civil Society in Darfur: The Missing Peace” (September 2010), www.usip.org/

resources/civil-society-in-darfur.

296. Final Declaration of the Consultative Meeting of the Darfurian Civil Society, November 20, 2009, Doha, 

Qatar, www.darfurinfo.org/doha-english-rough.pdf.

297. Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), July 15, 2011.

298. DDPD.

299. Nouwen, Complementarity. 
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TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES’ PEACEMAKING ROLE IN DARFUR

300. DDPD.

301. Center for Global Communication Studies, “Assessing Attitudes,” 51. 

302. Max Planck Institute and Khartoum Peace Institute, “Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue Outcome Document” 

(Heidelberg/Khartoum: MPI/KPI, 2010); various interviews with government and LJM representatives in 

the talks as well as members of the mediation team, Doha and Sudan, 2010–2012.

303. Morton, “How to Govern Darfur,” 25.

304. El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

305. Quoted in “Is Darfur an Identity Conflict?” 

306. Abdul-Jabbar and Tanner, “Darfur After Abuja,” in War in Darfur; Alex de Waal, “Bringing Back the State,” 

Making Sense of Sudan, SSRC Blog, July 22, 2009, http://afraicanarguments.org/2009/07/22/

bringing-back-the-state/.

307. DDDC. Quoted in Morton, “How to Govern Darfur,” who concludes that the native administration “cannot work without effective support from Government.”

308. Leonardi and Abdul-Jalil, “Traditional Authority,” 119.

309. Quoted in Tubiana, “Le Darfour”.

310. Nouwen, Complementarity.

311. El-Tom, “From War to Peace.”

312. Tubiana, “Legal Limbo.”

 5

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. •

George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George 

Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant 

to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George 

W. Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • 

Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev

• Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International 

Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, 

Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, 

Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, 

International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin,

Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human 

Rights, Washington, D.C.

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. 

Army; President, National Defense University • Jim Marshall, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

Agid-al-ugada’ (traditional war leader) and faqi (religious 

leader) mobilizing Masalit refugees for the rebel movements in a Chadian refugee camp.

The id-al-nahas or festival of the drums: regularly, the family 

of Ali Dinar, Darfur’s last sultan, gather in his palace’s court 

in El Fasher to recover his royal drums with new skins.
2 Looking for Justice UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE • 2301 CONSTITUTION AVE. NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20037 • USIP.ORG 

The violence that has raged in Darfur for a decade—having 

simmered for far longer—is both a crisis of governance and 

a problem of law and order. As broader peace efforts have 

faltered, interest has increased in the capacity of local 

communities in Darfur to regulate conflict in their midst. All 

hope that traditional leaders, working within the framework 

of traditional justice, can be more successful in restoring 

some semblance of normalcy and security to Darfur. This 

report frames the background, challenges, and efforts to 

end the conflict. 

Related Links 

■ Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies ed. Deborah 

Isser (2011)

■ Local Justice in Southern Sudan by Cherry Leonardi, Leben Nelson Moro, 

Martina Santschi, Deborah H. Isser (Peaceworks, September 2010)

■ Civil Society in Darfur: The Missing Peace by Theodore Murphy and Jérôme 

Tubiana (Special Report, September 2010) 

■ Informal Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan by Noah Coburn and John 

Dempsey (Special Report, August 2010)

■ Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences with and Perceptions of Local Justice 

Options by Deborah H. Isser, Stephen C. Lubkemann, Saah N’Tow, with 

Adeo Addison, Johnny Ndebe, George Saye, Tim Luccaro (Peaceworks, 

November 2009)

PEACEWORKS • NOVEMBER 2012 • NO. 83