UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANTHONY THREATT,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-12585

 Honorable Linda V. Parker

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

MICHELLE WILLIAMSWARD, et al., 

Defendants. 

___________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [R. 35], 

DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND [R. 50], AND 

DISMISS THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anthony Threatt, a Michigan Department of Corrections 

(“MDOC”) prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging multiple violations of his constitutional rights by 

various Macomb Correctional Facility (“MRF”) officials.

1 [R. 1]. Defendants 

Assistant Residential Unit Supervisor (“ARUS”) Michelle Williams-Ward, 

Wafaa Hanna, Robert Artman, Brandon Spezia, Marsharie Stubbs, 

Christopher Schwandt, James Odom, Max Abelman, M.D., Susan George, 

 1 The Honorable Linda V. Parker referred this action to the undersigned to 

resolve all pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). [R. 31].

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M.D., Residential Unit Supervisor (“RUM”) Regina Jenkins-Grant, Kirkwood 

Coleman, Caroline Rivard-Babisch, and William Bridges (“defendants”)2

move for summary judgment, arguing that Threatt did not properly exhaust 

his administrative remedies. [R. 35]. The Court agrees, and therefore 

RECOMMENDS that defendants’ motion for summary judgment [R. 35] be 

GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

II. BACKGROUND

Threatt’s claims arise out of a slew of incidents that took place

between March and July 2015, while he was housed at MRF. [R. 1, PgID 

7]. Threatt alleges that Hanna, a nurse at MRF, along with several other 

nurses at the facility, began retaliating against him after he filed a grievance 

against her on March 14, 2015 for denying him access to medication. [Id., 

PgID 7-8, 10-11, 26-27]. Threatt also alleges that Hanna and other MRF 

nurses acted with deliberate indifference to his health by providing him 

incorrect treatment for his diabetes. [Id., PgID 7-8, 10-11].

Threatt alleges that he was retaliated against on several other 

occasions by doctors, officers, and other MRF personnel. Beyond alleging

that he was the target of a “retaliation plot” carried out by ARUS WilliamsWard and Officers Spezia, Odom and Artman, Threatt contends that

 2 Threatt named four other defendants in the complaint, Dr. Tumada, Dr. 

K.R. Farris, Dr. John Doe and Nurse Nickle, who have not appeared.

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Officers Odom and Schwandt retaliated against him, and denied him 

medical care, by refusing him access to items on his medical detail order. 

[R. 1, PgID 9-10, 13, 17]. He also alleges that Odom retaliated by closing 

him in his cell door. [Id., PgID 14].

In addition, Threatt asserts that Dr. George and Dr. Abelman acted 

with deliberate indifference to his health by attempting to put him on

medication that would have him “drugged out.” [Id., PgID 17-20]. He 

claims this was in retaliation for his efforts to report MRF staff for “bringing 

in drugs and weed” and “abusing mentally ill prisoners.” [Id.].

Threatt further alleges that from March through June 2015, ARUS

Williams-Ward retaliated against him by refusing to notarize his documents, 

acting with deliberate indifference to his health by placing “gangbangers”

and “unclean people” in his cell, and denying him access to the courts by 

refusing to send out his legal mail. [R. 1, PgID 21-22]. He accuses RUM 

Jenkins-Grant of retaliation, claiming that she erroneously rejected several 

of his grievances against Williams-Ward and instructed MRF personnel to 

deny him notary services. [Id., PgID 21]. On separate occasions in July 

2015, Threatt alleges that Officer Coleman and Hearing Investigator

Bridges threatened him. [Id., PgID 14, 22]. 

Threatt also claims that because he required multiple doctors’

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appointments for the same, persistent medical conditions, he had

“problems that [went] untreated,” such that he was denied access to 

medical care and erroneously charged co-pays for appointments. [R. 1, 

PgID 15]. He further alleges that the eye doctor at MRF, who he identifies 

as Dr. John Doe, denied him adequate medical care because he received 

no eye examinations between April and July 2015. [Id., PgID 23].

Finally, Threatt claims that he was exposed to cruel and unusual 

punishment at the hands of several MRF doctors and officers when they 

acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety. He says Dr. 

Tumada and Dr. Farris were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by

giving him incorrect medication for his diabetes and high blood pressure, 

failing to prescribe him pain medication, and refusing to provide him with 

adequate gym shoes and a walking cane. [R. 1, PgID 10, 12-13, 15]. 

Additionally, Threatt alleges that Dr. Abelman failed to protect him by

refusing to remove him from segregation and ignoring his claims that 

officers were harassing him. [Id., PgID 16-20]. He also claims that on July 

8, 2015, Officers Artman, Spezia, Stubbs, and Schwandt failed to protect 

him and acted with deliberate indifference to his health by ignoring his

emergency call, and calls of other prisoners, when his blood sugar was

allegedly dropping to an unsafe level. [Id., PgID 8-10].

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III. ANALYSIS

A.

Defendants argue for summary judgment based on Threatt’s failure to 

exhaust his administrative remedies. [R. 35]. Summary judgment should 

be granted if defendants show that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986); Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Dep’t of Children & 

Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011). A fact is material if it 

could affect the outcome of the case based on the governing substantive 

law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, 

the Court must view the factual evidence and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); 

McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). 

Although a “summary judgment motion is especially well suited to 

pretrial adjudication of an exhaustion defense, because proof of lack of 

exhaustion generally requires resort to matters outside the pleadings,” 

Anderson v. Jutzy, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 15-11727, 2016 WL 1211747, 

at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2016), granting summary judgment due to failure 

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to exhaust administrative remedies is not on the merits, and requires 

dismissal without prejudice. Adams v. Smith, 166 Fed. Appx. 201, 204 (6th 

Cir. 2006).

B.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires prisoners to 

“properly” exhaust all “available” administrative remedies prior to filing a 

lawsuit challenging prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. 

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-90, 93 (2006). Requiring exhaustion allows prison 

officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their 

responsibilities before being haled into court and produces a useful 

administrative record. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).

Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies “means using all steps 

that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency 

addresses the issues on the merits).” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90, 93

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The PLRA does not detail what 

“proper exhaustion” entails because “it is the prison’s requirements, and not 

the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 

U.S. at 218. “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with 

the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to 

claim,” but it is self-evident that an untimely or otherwise improperly filed 

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grievance does not fulfill the exhaustion requirement. Id.; see also

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 97. Finding otherwise “would permit a prisoner to 

bypass deliberately and flagrantly administrative review without any risk of 

sanction.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 97.

Relevant here, MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 sets forth a threestep procedure prisoners must follow in order to complete the 

administrative review process and properly exhaust grievances. A prisoner 

must attempt to informally resolve the problem with the allegedly offending 

staff, and then may file a Step I grievance regarding any unresolved issues. 

MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶ P and R (effective July 9, 2007).3

 The 

prisoner may then file a Step II grievance appeal within ten days of 

receiving the Step I response or, if no response was received, within ten 

business days after the date the response was due. Id. at ¶ BB. The same 

schedule applies to a Step III appeal – it is due within ten business days of 

receiving the Step II response or, if no response was received, within ten 

business days after the date the response was due. Id. at ¶ FF. Prison 

officials have 120 calendar days from the date a Step I grievance is filed,

plus any applicable extensions, to provide a Step III response to a grievant. 

Id. at ¶ S. Prisoners must appeal their grievances through Step III and wait 

 3 The Policy Directive is available at: 

https://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/03_02_130_200872_7.pdf

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until receipt of a Step III response, or until the response is past due, before 

filing suit. 

C.

Defendants argue that Threatt failed to file grievances for some of his 

claims, and that the grievances he did file were not appealed through the 

entire administrative review process prior to filing suit. [R. 35, PgID 312]. 

The Court agrees. 

i. Grievances Threatt Filed After Filing the Lawsuit and 

Grievances Not Related to Claims in the Complaint

Before addressing the claims and grievances that are relevant to the 

exhaustion analysis, the Court notes that eight of the grievances Threatt 

relies on are irrelevant to the question of exhaustion. In both the complaint 

and his response to the motion for summary judgment, Threatt provides 

evidence of twenty-seven grievances filed both within and outside the 

timeline alleged in the complaint. [See R. 1; R. 1-1; R. 1-2; R. 36; R. 36-1]. 

Of those, six were filed after Threatt filed the current lawsuit, [R. 36, PgID 

448; R. 36-1, PgID 466, 468, 470, 474, 478], and are therefore immaterial 

to the current analysis. See Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th 

Cir. 1999) (holding that prisoners “may not exhaust administrative remedies 

during the pendency of [a] federal suit” because it “ignores the clear 

mandate of § 1997e(a) which requires exhaustion ... prior to filing suit”) 

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(citation omitted and emphasis in original). Additionally, two grievances

filed between March and July 2015 are irrelevant to any claims alleged in 

the complaint. [R. 36-1, PgID 454, 493]. These eight grievances will 

therefore not be further addressed.

ii. Claims in the Complaint that Threatt Never Grieved 

Of the nineteen remaining grievances, none relate to Threatt’s claim 

that doctors Tumada and Farris acted with deliberate indifference to his 

health. Additionally, there is no evidence that Threatt filed any grievances 

related to his claims that Officer Coleman threatened him or that the MRF 

eye doctor denied him medical care. These claims should be dismissed.

Threatt filed grievances relating to the remaining assertions in the 

complaint, but he did not exhaust any of them through Step III of the 

grievance process prior to filing suit on July 20, 2015.

iii. Grievances that Threatt Only Filed Through Steps I or II

Grievances MRF 15-05-00862-028E, MRF 15-04-00721-001G, and 

MRF 15-05-00925-001G relate to Threatt’s claims that he should not have 

to pay co-pays for multiple doctor’s appointments concerning the same 

medical conditions. [R. 1, PgID 41, 46, 48]. After receiving Step I 

responses to these grievances on May 12, June 5, and June 5, 2015, 

respectively, [id.], there is no evidence that he exhausted them by 

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appealing to the next step of the process.

Threatt filed a slew of grievances related to his claims that ARUS

Williams-Ward retaliated against him, barred him from accessing the 

courts, and acted with deliberate indifference to his health. Threatt 

received Step I responses to grievance MRF 15-05-00889-015B on May 

20, and grievances MRF 15-06-01151-028A and MRF 15-06-01152-028A

on June 26, 2015. [R. 1-1, PgID 93; R. 1-2, PgID 110, 112]. There is no 

evidence that he appealed these responses to Step II. 

In addition, Threatt filed two other grievances against Williams-Ward, 

including MRF 15-06-01150-017B on June 22, 2015, and MRF 15-07-

01303-015B on July 11, 2015. [R. 36, PgID 432, 440]. But he filed suit 

prior to receiving Step I responses to these grievances on August 3, 2015. 

[Id.]. 

Threatt filed grievances MRF 15-06-01154-028A and MRF 15-07-

01343-028B against RUM Jenkins-Grant for retaliation. [R. 1-2, PgID 108; 

R. 36, PgID 444]. He received a Step I response to grievance 028A on 

June 26, 2015, but provided no evidence that he filed a Step II appeal. [R. 

1-2, PgID 108]. Threatt filed grievance 028B on July 19, 2015, only one 

day before filing suit and, therefore, did not allow MRF personnel adequate 

time to respond prior to filing suit. [R. 36, PgID 444].

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Similarly, Threatt filed grievance MRF 15-07-01248-017Z on July 6, 

2015, against Officer Odom for retaliation and denial of medical care, [id., 

PgID 436]; grievance MRF 15-07-01368-017A on July 17, 2015, against 

Hearing Investigator Bridges for allegedly threatening him, [R. 36-1, PgID 

487]; grievance MRF 15-07-01317-012B on July 14, 2015, against Dr. 

George and Dr. Abelman for retaliation and deliberate indifference, [id., 

PgID 472]; grievance MRF 15-07-01283-028I on July 8, 2015, against 

Officers Artman, Spezia, Stubbs, and Schwandt for failure to protect, [id, 

PgID 456]; and grievance MRF 15-07-01311-012B on July 13, 2015, 

against Dr. Abelman for deliberate indifference and failure to protect, [id., 

PgID 476]. He filed all of these grievances in the two weeks prior to filing 

the complaint in this action, providing MRF officials no time to complete the 

grievances process. 

Finally, Threatt filed two Step II grievance appeals that did not 

proceed to Step III. Threatt received a Step I response to grievance MRF 

15-06-01155-017Z on July 1, 2015, and filed a Step II appeal on July 6, 

2015. [R. 36-1, PgID 489, 491]. He did not receive a response to his Step 

II grievance appeal until January 25, 2016, well after the due date. [Id., 

PgID 491]. However, having not received a timely response, Threatt was 

required to file a Step III appeal within 10 business days after the date the 

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Step II response was due. See MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶ FF. 

He failed to do this, and instead waited until after he received the late Step 

II response; this was not proper exhaustion. More importantly, Threatt did 

not exhaust this grievance prior to filing his complaint.

The other Step II appeal is grievance MRF 15-06-0993-01C. [R. 1-2, 

PgID 123, 128]. Threatt provides no evidence that he appealed this

grievance beyond Step II of the grievance process and, additionally, it is 

not listed in his MDOC Prisoner Step III Grievance Report.4

 [R. 35-2].

In response to defendants’ argument that no grievances were 

properly appealed prior to filing suit, Threatt argues that MRF personnel 

interfered with his ability to follow the grievance process by sending him

blank Step II appeal forms after the date his Step II appeals were due for 

grievances MRF 15-06-01150-017B, MRF 15-07-01248-017Z, MRF 15-07-

01303-015B, and MRF 15-07-01343-028B. [R. 36, PgID 413, 430]. This 

argument lacks merit because Threatt filed suit before he even requested 

the blank Step II appeal forms; whether or not MRF personnel returned the 

forms on time had no impact on his failure to exhaust these grievances 

 4 The MDOC Step III Grievance Report is a consolidated list of every Step I 

grievance Threatt has appealed through Step III of the MDOC Grievance 

Process. [See R. 35-2]. 

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prior to filing the July 20 complaint.5 

Threatt further argues that he was barred from exhausting his 

administrative remedies because he was threatened, intimidated, and put 

in imminent danger by MRF personnel. [R. 36, PgID 417]. But the PLRA 

requires exhaustion of all “available” administrative remedies prior to filing 

suit even when a prisoner alleges that he or she is in imminent danger of 

serious physical injury. Arbuckle v. Bouchard, 92 Fed. Appx. 289, 291 (6th 

Cir. 2004). And factually, although Threatt alleges he failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies because Hearing Investigator Bridges threatened 

him, [R. 1, PgID 14], the record shows that Threatt filed a grievance related

to this claim on July 8, 2015, and continued to file various other grievances 

after this date.6

 

Threatt further contends that he was unable to properly exhaust his 

administrative remedies because Officer Coleman threatened him by 

calling him names and Officer Odom intimidated him by staring at him and 

 5 Threatt further argues that he was confined to a mental hospital at the 

time he received the above appeal forms and he should have received 

additional time to file Step II appeals. [R. 36, PgID 414]. This argument is 

irrelevant because he filed suit before receiving Step I responses.

6 In response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Threatt alleges 

that on November 19, 2015, his cellmate hit him in the face and asked him 

why he was suing Officers Spezia and Artman. [R. 36, PgID 418].

However, there is no evidence that his alleged attack is related to Bridges’ 

alleged threats and, regardless, it occurred after Threatt filed suit.

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rolling his eyes, [R. 1, PgID 22], but those actions would not prevent a 

person of ordinary firmness from pursuing the grievance process.

Himmelreich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 766 F.3d 576, 578 (6th Cir. 2014)

(claim that prisoner did not exhaust because of threat requires proof of a 

threat that would deter a person of ordinary firmness). In Himmelreich, the 

plaintiff alleged that a prison official threatened to transfer him and have 

him physically attacked if he grieved. Id. at 577. Name-calling and eyerolling are not comparable to the Himmelreich allegations. 

Because Threatt failed to properly exhaust his available 

administrative remedies for the above grievances, the related claims should 

be dismissed. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88.

iv. Grievances that Threatt Filed Through Step III

Prior to filing suit, Threatt only filed Step III appeals for two

grievances: MRF 15-03-00514-12E4 (“12E4”) and MRF 15-04-00782-012B 

(“012B”). However, defendants correctly point out that as of July 20, 2015, 

the date Threatt filed suit, MRF officials had not returned Step III responses

for either of these grievances, and the due date for their responses had not 

yet passed. 

Moreover, Grievance 12E4 is irrelevant because it alleges an 

unrelated denial of medical care claim that took place prior to the events 

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alleged in the complaint. [R. 1, PgID 26]. However, even if Threatt alleged 

a claim based on the assertions in grievance 12E4, the claim should still be 

dismissed because Threatt did not properly exhaust his administrative 

remedies for this grievance. Threatt filed grievance 12E4 on March 14, 

2015. [R. 1, PgID 26]. Based upon the 120-day time limit in MDOC Policy 

Directive 03.02.130 ¶ S, the Step III response would have been due July 

12, 2015, but an extension was approved for this grievance at Step I, giving 

MRF staff until at least July 31, 2015 to provide Threatt with a Step III 

response. [R. 1, PgID 27]. Because Threatt filed this suit before receiving 

a Step III response to this grievance, and before the Step III response was

due, he failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies.

Threatt filed grievance 012B on April 28, 2015. [R. 1-1, PgID 53]. At 

the time he filed suit, Threatt had not received a Step III response for this 

grievance, and the 120-day deadline for the response was not due until 

August 26, 2015, after he filed suit. Therefore, Threatt failed to properly 

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and the claims 

related to this grievance should be dismissed. 

Threatt contends that MRF officials interfered with his efforts to 

exhaust the above Step III grievances, pointing out that the grievance 

identifier numbers for grievances 12E4 and 012B vary between documents

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in the record, and arguing that the grievance coordinator changed them in 

order to thwart his attempts to properly complete the grievance process. 

[R. 36, PgID 412]. But there is no evidence that the minute differences in 

grievance identifier numbers between the grievance forms had any impact 

on Threatt’s ability to complete the grievance process. Although the 

grievance identifier number for 12E4 varies by one digit from documents at

Step I to Step III, [compare R. 1, PgID 26, with R. 35-2, PgID 318], and the 

grievance identifier number for 012B varies by two digits from documents at 

Step I to Step III, [compare R. 1-1, PgID 53, with R. 35-2, PgID 318], 

Threatt was still able to timely appeal both grievances through Step III of 

the grievance process. [R. 35-2, PgID 318].

Because Threatt failed to properly exhaust his administrative 

remedies prior to filing suit, the claims related to these grievances should 

be dismissed. See Freeman, 196 F.3d at 645.

v. Sua Sponte Dismissal of Remaining Defendants

Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, the Court has an 

obligation to dismiss complaints sua sponte when they fail to state a claim, 

are frivolous, or seek monetary relief from immune defendants. In re 

Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997). Threatt’s 

claims against defendants who have not appeared – Dr. Tumada, Dr. 

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Farris, Dr. John Doe, and Nurse Nickle – are the same as his claims 

against defendants who have appeared, and they arise from the same 

grievances. Thus, for the same reasons explained above, Threatt failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies for his claims against defendants who 

have not appeared, such that they should be sua sponte dismissed 

pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment [R. 35] be GRANTED, and that 

this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Furthermore, because 

the Court is recommending dismissal of this action, Threatt’s motion to 

amend [R. 50]

7 should be DENIED as MOOT. 

s/Elizabeth A. Stafford

 7 In Threatt’s motion to amend he seeks to join case number 14-14129, 

which he filed on October 17, 2014, against ten defendants, none of whom 

are being sued in the present complaint. [See Threatt v. Shields, E.D. 

Mich. Case No. 14-14129, R. 1]. The Honorable Bernard A. Friedman 

dismissed the case without prejudice on November 4, 2014, upon finding 

that Threatt failed to allege facts showing that he was in danger of 

imminent physical injury at the time he filed suit. [Id., R. 3, PgID 5]. A 

showing of imminent danger at the time of filing is an exception to the three 

strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which prevents a prisoner from 

filing suit in forma pauperis after three of his cases have previously been 

dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim. Even 

if Threatt survived summary judgement, the Court should not allow him to 

join various unrelated claims because, among other reasons, it would 

create an avenue for prisoners to circumvent the three strikes provision.

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ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: July 13, 2016

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this 

Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service 

of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Sec’y of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail 

to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of HHS, 

931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 

231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection must be 

served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).

Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” 

etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than fourteen days after 

service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a response to 

the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in 

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the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to 

Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in 

length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page 

limitation. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it 

may rule without awaiting the response.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on July 13, 2016.

s/Marlena Williams

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

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