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53–840 PDF 2010

S. Hrg. 111–757 

WORLD AT RISK: THE WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND 

PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2009 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

OF THE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 


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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

KEVIN J. LANDY, Chief Counsel 

GORDON N. LEDERMAN, Counsel 

AARON M. FIROVED, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

ASHA A. MATHEW, Minority Senior Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 4 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 19 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 22 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 33 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 35 

Senator Bennet ................................................................................................. 38 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 

Hon. Bob Graham, Chairman, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism ............................................. 6 

Hon. Jim Talent, Vice Chairman, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism ............................................. 10 

Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S. Government Accountability Office ................................................... 12 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Graham, Hon. Bob: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Talent ..................................................... 39 

Kutz, Gregory D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

Talent, Hon. Jim: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Graham .................................................. 39 

APPENDIX 

Letter submitted by Senator Graham from the Business Executives for National Security (BENS), dated September 17, 2009 .......................................... 66 

Chart submitted by Mr. Kutz ................................................................................. 70 

Letter from American Society for Microbiology (ASM), dated September 18, 

2009 ....................................................................................................................... 71 

Letter from Galveston National Laboratory (GNL), dated September 18, 2009 77 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from Mr. Kutz ................... 83 


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WORLD AT RISK: THE WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND 

PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2009 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Pryor, McCaskill, Bennet, 

and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning and the hearing will come 

to order. Today, we are going to hear testimony on legislation that 

Senator Collins and I introduced earlier this month to prevent and 

prepare to respond to attacks against our homeland by weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD), particularly biological weapons. 

Our legislation has a focus on heightening security at laboratories that handle the world’s most dangerous pathogens, dangerous because they are those that can most easily be weaponized. 

But, of course, the legislation is more comprehensive. It is as comprehensive as the Commission report was and as our own Committee’s deliberations on this subject warrant. 

In December of last year, then-Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI) Mike McConnell publicly stated his conclusion that a WMD 

terrorist attack is more likely than not to occur somewhere in the 

world between now and 2013—that is obviously within the next 4 

years—and that a biological attack is much more likely than a nuclear or chemical attack. 

The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, chaired by our former colleagues, 

Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, reached a similar conclusion 

and went well beyond in what I believe was an extraordinary piece 

of work documenting the problem and making very significant recommendations. 

The fact is from all this that it is hard not to conclude that we 

are still not properly prepared to counter the threat of a weapons 

of mass destruction attack against the United States and particularly the bioterrorist threat, despite measures taken after the 2001 


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anthrax attacks. In sum, and as the Graham-Talent Commission 

concluded, we are a Nation and world at risk. 

For anyone who thinks that in the work of this Committee and 

in discussions that go on in our homeland security community that 

we are being overly zealous, that we are perhaps imagining threats 

to America that don’t really exist, one need only follow the media 

coverage over the last several days of the investigation and now apprehension of these people here in this country. People who apparently were directly connected to al-Qaeda and apparently were 

planning very significant attacks within our country again, apparently within the greater New York City area. 

So the threat is real. It goes back to, if there is a capital of world 

Islamist terrorism, it is in the mountainous areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan and spreads in different cells throughout Pakistan. They continue to want to do us harm. 

What the Commission’s report convinced me again is that if they 

want to do us harm, one way they can manage to do it with devastation is through a biological attack, and that is why the legislation 

that Senator Collins and I have introduced based on the Commission report, we think is so critically important to the homeland security of the people of the United States of America. 

This legislation, which we call the Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009, S. 1649, would provide 

a multi-layered approach across the full spectrum of prevention, 

preparedness, and response to this threat. Our legislation, as I 

mentioned, implements the Commission’s recommendations and 

our Committee’s conclusions from our ongoing investigation into 

the Nation’s defense against a WMD attack. 

I want to briefly describe some key elements of the legislation 

and their origin in the Graham-Talent Commission report and our 

Committee’s work. 

First, this bill would identify and categorize the most dangerous 

pathogens, that is, those that are easiest, that have the greatest 

potential to be turned into weapons to be used in a biological terrorist attack, and that therefore require improved security, a 

heightened level of security at the laboratories that handle them. 

We think that our approach ensures that we focus our security efforts where they are needed most and not burden the wider range 

of scientific research unnecessarily. 

Our Committee’s interest in laboratory security was informed 

greatly by the Commission’s report and the commissioners’ testimony before our Committee last December. The report cited findings on inadequate security at our Nation’s laboratories and concluded, ‘‘when it comes to materials of bioterrorism, America’s vulnerability may well begin at home.’’ Through this legislation, we 

seek to close this vulnerability. 

Second, our bill would build the culture of preparedness as called 

for by the Commission by requiring a national strategy for dispensing antibiotics and other medicines to the public to respond to 

a biological attack. We would also expand the use of the Postal 

Service in the distribution of these countermeasures. Right now, we 

are spending billions of dollars to stockpile these supplies, and 

those are very important investments, but our Committee has 

found that we lack an adequate plan for distributing those supplies 


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and countermeasures, quickly and efficiently if an attack occurs. 

The bill would also provide medical kits to emergency responders 

so that they can protect themselves in order to be able to protect 

us in responding quickly to a WMD attack. 

Third, our bill acts on the Commission’s call for improved public 

information. It would put in place specific communication plans to 

inform the public of what to do during the critical moments after 

an attack, and we have learned from testimony before the Committee that communications to the public can have an extraordinary effect on diminishing the number of victims of a WMD attack. 

Our bill also requires the development of pre-scripted, adaptable 

messages, as recommended by the Commission, so that appropriate 

information can be disseminated swiftly. Such information would 

include the direction of a deadly radioactive or biological plume and 

instructions about whether it is better to shelter in place, stay in 

your home, stay in your worksite, or to evacuate quickly, and we 

think that kind of information could save thousands of lives. 

Fourth, the legislation would direct the Secretary of State to 

build an international biosecurity coalition by providing training 

and assistance to other countries in laboratory security and global 

disease surveillance. 

Finally, the legislation would also require the Director of National Intelligence to improve intelligence on WMD and terrorism, 

particularly by increasing his hiring of scientists and improving 

foreign language capabilities. 

Senator Graham, Senator Talent, you and your fellow commissioners and your staff have done a great service for our country in 

this report and that is why we look forward so much to hearing 

your views regarding the legislation that has resulted from it. 

I am also pleased to welcome again a return appearance by Greg 

Kutz, Managing Director for Forensic Audits and Special Investigations at the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Mr. Kutz and 

his team have spent the past 2 years investigating the state of security at our Nation’s five most elite laboratories, that is, the laboratories that handle the world’s most dangerous pathogens. In a 

2008 report, and then in a follow-up report released a couple of 

months ago, GAO draws a disconcerting picture of the poor security 

regulations governing these laboratories and of the state of physical security at these laboratories, which Mr. Kutz will describe for 

us and which energize even more our consideration of this legislation and remedial action. 

Bottom line, we have to be direct and honest with the American 

people about the risk facing this country from a weapon of mass 

destruction attack by a terrorist organization. As the Graham-Talent Commission noted, ‘‘America’s margin of safety is shrinking, 

not growing.’’ 

Senator Collins and I are hopeful and believe that our Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009, S. 

1649, will close many of the existing gaps and thereby grow our 

margin of safety. 

Senator Collins. 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As the Chairman has indicated, the recent arrest of a terrorism 

suspect in Colorado is a sobering reminder of the continued threat 

to our Nation. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have 

publicly declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of 

mass destruction against the United States. 

Just last week, another media report highlighted how terrorists 

might join forces with global drug traffickers in order to take advantage of the traffickers’ vast networks of tunnels, black markets, 

technology, and human intelligence. The terrorists have noted the 

ease with which traffickers smuggle illegal drugs across our borders. In the words of a former U.S. Embassy official in Afghanistan, ‘‘When you get to the point where you can smuggle tons of 

drugs through one border, then you certainly have the capacity to 

smuggle in weapons of mass destruction or agents.’’ 

Clearly, this threat is real, urgent, and evolving. On September 

8, the Chairman and I introduced legislation to help counter this 

threat. Our bill would improve our Nation’s ability to prevent and 

respond to WMD attacks. It would enact many of the recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, the Commission that the 

Chairman and I helped to establish in 2007. 

I am certainly pleased to see once again the leaders of that Commission, our former colleagues, Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, here today. Their report warns us that it is more likely than 

not that a weapons of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist 

attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. We have repeated that warning a lot in our public statements, but I think we 

cannot say it often enough to convey to the public how urgent action is. The Commission’s report is a call to action. Our bill is the 

answer. 

The Commission’s findings reinforce the urgency felt by this 

Committee during our many hearings regarding the terrorist threat 

to our Nation. We have examined many deadly threats targeting 

the American people, and to respond to these threats, our Committee has led numerous reform efforts since the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001. Our work has strengthened intelligence 

gathering efforts, tightened security at our ports and chemical facilities, and vastly improved our emergency preparedness. 

Nevertheless, the Commission’s report provides a chilling reminder that the terrorists have been active, too. Nuclear proliferation and advances in biotechnology are giving terrorists new methods and new means to commit mass murder, so we, in turn, must 

continue our efforts to identify risks and to increase security. 

As the Commission’s report explains, the most likely WMD 

threat to the United States is a biological weapon. It is easier to 

develop and disseminate bioweapons and gain access to lethal 

pathogens. Furthermore, terrorists know that a bioweapon can be 

a stealth attack. We may not immediately recognize that such an 

attack has even occurred until hundreds of people have been 

sickened or even died. 

Despite this threat, some of the world’s most dangerous pathogens are not secure, and that includes pathogens housed in biologiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:53 Dec 16, 2010 Jkt 053840 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\53840.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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cal laboratories right here in the United States. The GAO’s alarming report shows that there are deficiencies in basic perimeter security at facilities that house the world’s most dangerous biological 

agents, diseases such as the Ebola virus and smallpox. The GAO 

also pointed out that lab regulation, for the most part, relies on 

self-policing. 

The fact is that thousands of people right here in our country 

have access to the most dangerous pathogens. More than 400 research facilities and nearly 15,000 individuals are on the Select 

Agent List, an authorization to handle the most deadly pathogens. 

We needn’t look far. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has 

determined that a cleared scientist at a regulated research lab 

most likely carried out the 2001 anthrax attacks. 

To counter this threat, we must increase the security at biological laboratories, and our bill seeks to accomplish that goal by identifying those pathogens that terrorists are most likely to use and 

increasing the security standards at the labs that handle them. A 

negotiated rulemaking with Federal agencies and research institutions at the table would develop these standards. This collaboration 

would ensure that the regulations that make our Nation’s biological 

labs more secure do not have the unintended consequence of deterring legitimate research. In addition, we provide a 4-year grant 

program to help fund the security enhancements. 

Let me just mention one other part of our bill that I think is very 

important, and then since the Chairman has outlined the rest, I 

will just submit the remainder of my statement. 

The Commission also found that the Federal Government is unaware of some research facilities that handle less strictly controlled 

but still dangerous pathogens. To close that gap, our bill would require registration of those labs and facility security requirements 

that would be tiered based on the risk that terrorists might use a 

particular pathogen from a biological lab. That is the kind of approach that we used successfully in our chemical facility law, 

where we had a tiered approach with greater mandates for security 

to apply to the most high-risk facilities. 

Again, I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses 

today and I am eager for us to move forward and advance this bill 

to the full Senate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Graham, Senator Talent, thank you. I am very pleased 

that your Commission, in some sense, took a good lesson from the 

9/11 Commission—and to some extent so did Congress because we 

provided appropriations to continue your work because in some 

ways this is the most important chapter because unless something 

is done with your report, it is not going to matter much. So your 

capacity and that of your staff to continue to be involved in informing and advocating about this problem and a solution to it is gratefully appreciated. 

Senator Graham, welcome back. Good to see you. 


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1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Graham and Mr. Talent appears in the Appendix on 

page 39. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. BOB GRAHAM,1 CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION 

ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, other Members of the Committee. We very much appreciate this opportunity to discuss a critically important dimension of our report, securing against a biological weapon of mass destruction. 

I wish to say to all the Members of this Committee that it is our 

intent to issue an interim progress report next month as to how far 

we have proceeded. There are some critical words in that 2013 

statement, which is that if we continue at the same pace, it is more 

likely than not that a WMD attack will occur somewhere in the 

world by the end of 2013, and that attack will be biological rather 

than nuclear. We have the opportunity to change the probabilities 

based on action. The reality is, our report was issued approximately 10 months ago. Ten months of our limited time to reach a 

position where we can reduce the vulnerability of the American 

people have now passed and we will be reporting as to whether we 

think we have used those 10 months prudently. We expect to have 

a final report early in 2010, prior to the ending of this Commission, 

which will be in February 2010. 

I can give you, I hope, the happy news that we anticipate that 

this Committee is going to get very good grades in our progress report. In fact, by far, you have been the most energetic Committee 

in the Congress relative to dealing with this critical and urgent 

issue, for which we are deeply appreciative. 

I would also like to thank Senator Akaka for his recent introduction of the Energy Development Program Implementation Act of 

2009, which puts in place an Alternative Energy Peace Corps as 

was called for 31 years ago by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 

1978. We wish to also alert Senator Akaka that he is likely to get 

a good grade in our interim progress report. 

As we review our recommendations, while we feel positive about 

what is happening in this Committee, one of our major concerns 

continues to be, as it was with the 9/11 Commission and other previous commissions, the question of congressional reform. ‘‘A World 

At Risk’’ offers a recommendation which reads, ‘‘Congress should 

reform its oversight, both structurally and substantively, to better 

address intelligence, homeland security, and cross-cutting 21st 

Century national security missions.’’ 

Today is a good example of why we made that recommendation. 

Today, in addition to this Committee, there are two other committees of Congress holding hearings on this very subject of laboratory 

security. When the Department of Homeland Security was formed, 

there were 86 different committees and subcommittees overseeing 

the new Department. Today, that number has been reduced from 

86 to 82. There are signs of the continued dysfunction of congressional oversight identified not only by our Commission, but by a series of citizens’ commissions. Congress has been appropriately 


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forceful in demanding reform in the Executive Branch. We believe 

it is time to include the House and Senate in this process. 

And you should be pleased that our action plan, one of our action 

steps under congressional reform is that the Senate and House 

Homeland Security Committees should be empowered as the sole 

authorizing oversight committees for the Department of Homeland 

Security and all agencies under that Department’s jurisdiction. I 

would hope that objective would be achieved and thus place the full 

responsibility where we believe it should be, with this Committee 

and your counterpart in the House. 

I use the word ‘‘urgency.’’ We think there are three clocks ticking. One, the Chairman has already discussed, and that is the 2013 

clock. In addition to that preface, that assuming things stay as 

they are, that it is more likely than not that there will be a weapon 

of mass destruction used on earth before 2013, but that probability, 

which we found in December 2008 to be somewhat greater than 

50–50, can go up if time is wasted and is not followed by effective 

action. 

As Senator Collins said, our adversaries are not sitting in the 

stands waiting to see what we do. The reason that we have been 

falling behind is because as much effort as we have made to increase our security, it has not been as great as the effort our adversaries have made in order to penetrate that security. We think that 

relationship continues, and therefore, the probability of a weapon 

of mass destruction may be greater today than it was 10 months 

ago. 

But 2013 is not the only clock. There also is a 2010 clock. It is 

a nuclear clock. Every 5 years, the signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Agreement meet to review what has happened in the 

last 5 years and to plan for the next 5 years. We think that the 

meeting that is going to occur in 2010 is of special importance. We 

have made a number of recommendations to improve our security 

against a nuclear attack. Most of those recommendations require 

executive action. The Congress has devoted a great deal of attention through things such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Program to increasing our security on the nuclear side. 

The other clock, the third clock, is the 2011 clock. There will be 

a similar meeting in 2011 reviewing the 1972 Biological Weapons 

Convention. We have made recommendations of what the United 

States should be prepared to do at that conference. One of our action items is the United States should reaffirm the critical importance of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention to international 

peace and security by proposing a new action plan for achieving 

universal adherence and effective national implementation to be 

adopted at the next review conference in 2011. 

The relevance of that to this Committee’s action is that if the 

United States is going to present itself as being the world leader 

on issues of control of biological weapons, we need to be the gold 

standard of such actions on a universal basis. This legislation and 

appropriate implementation, we believe, would give us that status. 

So we think it is critical that this legislation be passed and then 

a sufficient amount of time provided for implementation, so that 

when we get to the 2011 conference, we will hold the moral, legal, 


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and policy high ground to encourage other countries to follow our 

example. 

So those are the three clocks that we think dominate this discussion. 

Now turning specifically to the biological threat, we see our adversary as having a continued energized will to use biological 

weapons and increasing capabilities to do so. These characteristics 

of the biological threat include, first, the fact that the development 

and dispersing of biological weapons is not expensive. In fact, it is 

getting cheaper and scientifically easier. 

Second, a biological weapon could rival or exceed the damage 

caused by an improvised nuclear device (IED). 

And third, there are fewer hurdles to creating an effective bioweapon than a nuclear device. Virtually all dangerous pathogens 

are available in nature. The equipment needed to produce a large 

quantity from a small seedstock and then weaponize the materials 

is readily available today on the Internet. The most effective delivery methods are well known in the pharmaceutical, agriculture, 

and insect control industries. 

This is not speculation. Al-Qaeda was well down the road to producing such weapons prior to September 11, 2001. Due to the ease 

in creating a clandestine production capability, our intelligence 

community had no knowledge of two such facilities in Afghanistan 

prior to their capture by U.S. troops. Facilities with more sophisticated equipment than those found could be in operation today, 

again without our knowledge. 

I would like today to focus on two of the titles in your legislation, 

Title I and V. Senator Talent will discuss the other titles. Title I, 

Enhanced Biosecurity Measures in U.S. Laboratories, responds to 

our recommendation in ‘‘World at Risk.’’ Certain principles animated the section of our report dealing with laboratory security. 

We are concerned about the proliferation of high containment labs, 

which were not only unregulated, but often unknown to the government. And just this week, the Government Accountability Office 

has issued yet another report entitled, ‘‘High Containment Laboratories: National Strategy for Oversight Is Needed.’’ We have been 

at this business at least since the anthrax attack in October 2001, 

8 years ago, and still a national strategy is not available. 

The fragmentation of government oversight among agencies, the 

need for a thorough review and update of the Select Agent programs, and the importance of regulating labs in a way that did not 

discourage robust scientific research in the United States are all 

reasons why we give the issue that you have labeled as Title I such 

primacy. 

Enhanced biosecurity measures should improve security, streamline oversight, and focus our resources on the real risks. By correctly applying risk management principles, the United States can 

increase security without impeding science or critical U.S. industries. 

The legislation calls for the establishment of Tier I pathogens, 

which would be those that could be most readily weaponized and 

which would receive the most rigorous level of review. We would 

also recommend that there be a Tier II and III, each of which 


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1The letter submitted by Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on page 66. 

would represent a somewhat declining level of risk with an appropriate level of regulation relating to that risk. 

Title V of the legislation deals with the issue of citizen involvement. We believe that it is critically important that the American 

people feel a greater sense of engagement in this issue. We strongly 

believe that a well informed, organized, and mobilized citizenry has 

long been one of our Nation’s greatest resources. An engaged citizenry, in fact, is the foundation for national resilience in the event 

of a natural disaster or a WMD attack. 

I recently visited with intelligence, military, law enforcement, 

and parliamentary officials in the United Kingdom and they unanimously said there had never been a WMD or other terrorist plot 

in the United Kingdom which had been broken without significant 

citizen involvement. We believe there are models to be followed. 

I will present for the record a letter from the Business Executives for National Security (BENS),1 a nonpartisan organization 

with a 27-year history of facilitating public-private collaboration. 

This includes 7 years of building security and resilience-focused 

partnerships at the State and local level. This organization has 

been active in many places in the country. It has been particularly 

effective in its work in Iowa, which occurred approximately 18 

months before the very devastating floods of last year, and while 

that was natural, not a manmade disaster, the benefits of having 

developed such a private-public partnership were in evidence. 

In conclusion, we commend you for introducing this extremely 

important piece of legislation and we look forward to participating 

in a robust discussion on Capitol Hill and with the Administration 

and the stakeholders as we move towards passage and implementation. 

We stand ready to help where we can to promote this very important stride for our national security. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Graham. 

That was very helpful testimony. I particularly appreciate the 

three clocks that are ticking because you help us put our work on 

this in the context of ongoing events that have dates that are associated with them. 

I don’t want to take a lot of time on this, but I also appreciate 

your going back to the question of congressional reform of the handling of homeland security issues. Senator Collins and I, and this 

Committee, are proud of the work that we did with the House on 

the 9/11 Commission Report because we really put into legislation 

almost every one of the recommendations that the 9/11 Commission 

made to do everything we could to avoid another September 11, 

2001. 

But the one that we suffered a total and embarrassing failure on 

was the attempt to reform us. We are very good at reforming the 

Executive Branch, but this gets into turf battles here. I appreciate 

your mentioning it. At some point, you and Senator Talent and 

Members of the Committee ought to talk about how we could try 

this again. 

We appreciate that you say that the Homeland Security Committee should clearly have jurisdiction here, but it is really the 


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1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Talent and Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on 

page 39. 

question that Tom Ridge first raised, which was he was spending 

too much of his time as Secretary of Homeland Security going to 

too many committees and subcommittees and they were redundant. 

It wasn’t that he was avoiding oversight. 

So, anyway, I appreciate your mentioning it. Hope springs eternal. Senator Collins and I are both very stubborn people and we 

are not going to give up on this, so you encourage us to be even 

more stubborn. 

Senator Talent, thanks for being here. Thanks for all your work, 

and we welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JIM TALENT,1 VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

Mr. TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and just a follow-up on 

that. Not only does the redundant oversight consume too much of 

the executive’s time, but as we point out in the report, oversight 

done properly can be hugely helpful. This Committee is a perfect 

example of that. But you can’t do it properly when you have dozens 

and dozens of different committees doing it. So we would not only 

stop doing something that is interfering with the Executive Branch, 

but Congress could really play an even more effective role if we got 

the oversight correct. 

I have a written statement which I will submit for the record and 

then just make a few comments. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Mr. TALENT. I have to echo and want to echo what Senator 

Graham said about this Committee’s work. The biggest enemy I 

think we confront in this is inertia, and to defeat inertia, it takes 

tremendous leadership and perseverance—stubbornness I think 

you just called it—and this Committee has shown that kind of perseverance from the day we issued the report. And really, in fairness, although everybody has been supportive—I don’t think anybody on the Hill has not supported our report—but you are the 

only ones who have done that, which is the reason why we are here 

with this bill today. So I want to congratulate you on that. 

I think part of the reason is that the Committee understands and 

keeps in front of it the strategic nature of this threat. I find in the 

public and even within government, it is just so easy to slip into 

the idea that because the enemy, or the people that we are opposing in this, don’t represent a first world economy, don’t even have 

a nation-state, that therefore they can’t really be that dangerous. 

But I think they have a more accurate strategic view of the world 

than we do. They understand that the world is a matrix of systems 

that are very important to not just the quality of life, but the ability of the average American, and person throughout the world to 

live, and that those systems are easy to attack particularly using 

asymmetric weapons. They understand the concept of asymmetric 

weapons very well. 

That is one of the reasons why what the intelligence community 

was telling us, what the expert opinions, the actual evidence we 


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saw, the development of this threat to me was so plausible because 

it is logical for them to be trying to get weapons of mass destruction given their strategic view of the world. I would be, in a way, 

surprised if they weren’t trying to do so. And you all know we have 

evidence that they think it is a priority for them. 

So this Committee gets that. I think part of our job is to try and 

make certain everybody else does. 

The other thing that is so important is to understand that we 

have to do something, even at the risk that doing something may 

produce some side effects that we didn’t intend, rather than do 

nothing out of fear of the side effects. We have to move forward. 

If we don’t do something—I mean, the current trajectory of risk 

does not favor us, so we have to disturb the inertia and move forward, and you all understand that. And also, it is across a broad 

front. It isn’t any one thing. It is a series of incremental things that 

need to be done at the same time, and I think the bill represents 

that and I am very strongly supportive of it and appreciative of 

your leadership. 

Just a few individual comments with the time that I have, and 

this is reflected in my statement. The bill addresses the issue of 

how we distribute medical countermeasures, which is hugely important. I think the bill is going to help achieve progress in that 

area. But I just want to remind the Committee, we have to have 

the medical countermeasures to distribute, as well. In essence, we 

have to have the vaccines and the antibiotics to distribute or the 

distribution system doesn’t do us any good. 

There are a couple of programs that have been established to accomplish that, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 

Authority (BARDA) and Project BioShield, to encourage investment 

or to provide for government investment in the development of 

these vaccines. We want to point out that the Office of Management and Budget (OPM) seems to have gotten it into its institutional head to try and cut those programs. I understand that they 

are there to watch the budget, and that is a good thing, but those 

programs are hugely necessary and I would ask the Committee to 

watch for it, and those of you who are also appropriators to particularly watch for that. 

And I will just add one thing. There is a pretty direct and proven 

connection between funding development of vaccines and actual 

vaccines. The scientific community knows how to produce vaccines 

for these kinds of pathogens if they have the money to do it. So we 

really will get something for this investment. We will get the vaccines and anthrax and the medical countermeasures, etc. 

Second, I really want to applaud the Committee for taking on the 

workforce issue in the bill, how we can plus-up the personnel we 

have who have language skills, who have knowledge of nuclear 

issues and biological issues. We found all throughout the government people sounding the warning that we don’t have enough of 

those people already. Unfortunately, there is a cohort of people in 

the government about 5 years away from retirement who possess 

a lot of the knowledge that we have, and we really have got to find 

people to take their place and we are not replacing them. 

And again, I think a big part of the problem, Mr. Chairman, is 

the fear of doing something because we have these security regulaVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:53 Dec 16, 2010 Jkt 053840 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\53840.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Kutz appears in the Appendix on page 50. 

tions in place so that we are so worried about hiring somebody who 

might be off in some respect that we don’t hire anybody. We have 

to—particularly with language skills. It takes years and years in 

many cases to process people through security so that we can hire 

someone. Well, people aren’t going to wait around necessarily for 

years to get hired. So this is an issue that needs to be addressed 

and the bill addresses that. 

I am particularly pleased at how the bill addresses the issue of 

citizen awareness and response, which I think is a huge untapped 

resource in this whole field, though not completely untapped. You 

all, I am sure, have talked with the authorities in New York City, 

for example, where they do a much better job of this. There is a 

lot of awareness there. The public is cooperating. That just adds to 

our ability to deal with this. 

I really like the medical kits idea that you have put in here and 

I hope there is a way, and believe there is a way, to work with that 

so the general public can begin accessing it, as well. I think it is 

a hugely important idea that you have. 

And finally, I will just close with one thing. The Chairman mentioned that there are people who tend to discount the danger of a 

biological attack. The Department of Defense, as you all know, had 

biological weapons programs in the 1950s and 1960s. I think it 

ended in the Nixon Administration. President Nixon just decided 

we weren’t going to pursue them anymore. And they did a number 

of important tests on the efficacy of bioweapons, and this is using 

1950s and 1960s technology. I just suggest if the Committee has 

not had a brief on those, ask the Department of Defense—I don’t 

think they have ever studied them and put it all together in one 

brief, but it is a real eye-opener. 

It was effective even then. And people who think that this is not 

a weapon that this will be effective against civilian populations just 

need to look at those studies and what we ourselves were doing. 

Now, as a battlefield weapon, it is questionable, because a lot of 

them don’t take effect quickly enough in battlefield terms. But as 

a way of attacking civilian populations, it is extremely plausible 

and very effective, and I am grateful that you have a strong omnibus bill to deal with it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Talent. Very 

helpful testimony. 

Mr. Kutz, welcome back. Thanks for all your service. A somewhat 

different look at this problem, but directly relevant, and we welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF GREGORY D. KUTZ,1 MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

FORENSIC AUDITS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. KUTZ. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to discuss biosafety laboratories. Today’s 

testimony highlights the results of our assessment of perimeter security for Level 4 labs. My testimony has two parts. First, I will 

discuss our findings, and second, I will discuss our recommendation. 


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1The chart referenced by Mr. Kutz appears in the Appendix on page 66. 

First, we found significant differences in perimeter security at 

the Nation’s five Level 4 labs. These labs handle the world’s most 

dangerous agents and toxins that cause incurable and deadly disease. As requested by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), our report and my testimony do not specifically name 

these labs. 

The poster board which is on my right,1 and for Senator Bennet, 

you should have this in your packet since you can’t see, if you have 

got it—— 

Senator BENNET. I have it. Thank you. 

Mr. KUTZ. The poster board here on my right shows the results 

of our assessment of controls at these five labs. The black circles 

indicate the controls in place during our 2008 assessment. As you 

can see, three of these five labs had all or nearly all of the 15 key 

controls that we evaluated. Specifically, what we refer to as Lab B 

had all 15 controls in place, while Lab A had 14 and Lab D had 

13. 

The presence of multiple layers of security at these three labs reduces the risk of unauthorized access to the labs. Examples of controls in place at all three of the labs include: A blast stand-off area 

between the labs and perimeter barriers; barriers to prevent vehicles from approaching; a command and control center; roving arm 

guard patrols; and x-ray screening at building entrances. 

The poster board also shows that in stark contrast to these three 

labs, the other two labs had little to no perimeter security. Specifically, what is shown as Lab C had only three of the 15 controls in 

place, while Lab E had four. Examples of controls that these two 

labs did not have in place include: A blast stand-off area between 

the lab and perimeter barriers; barriers to prevent vehicles from 

approaching; a command and control center; x-ray screening at 

building entrances; and vehicle screening. 

Moving on to my second point, based on our 2008 assessment, we 

recommended that CDC take actions to enhance perimeter security 

at these Level 4 labs. CDC agreed that perimeter security was important, but noted that the differences you see in security here 

were the result of risk-based planning. They also questioned 

whether the 15 controls that we looked at were relevant and appropriate for these labs. One year later, in response to our second report, CDC told us that they will consider our recommendations in 

developing future security plans. 

We understand the perimeter security is only one piece of the 

overall security picture and that a comprehensive approach to Select Agent security should be taken. However, it is discouraging 

that CDC would question the relevance of basic controls, such as 

blast stand-off areas, intrusion detection systems, x-ray screening 

at building entrances, and visitor and vehicle screening. 

Despite CDC’s limited actions in the last year, three of these labs 

have enhanced their perimeter security. For example, as shown by 

the red circles on the poster board, Lab C now has a command and 

control center, camera coverage of exterior lab entrances, and visitor screening. Other initiatives underway at this lab would leave 


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them with eight of the 15 controls in place and two others partially 

in place. 

Also, as you can see, Lab E made improvements and now has six 

of the 15 controls in place. Further, Lab D recently informed us 

that they have made improvements and have all 15 of the controls 

in place. 

In conclusion, we are encouraged that three of these labs have 

made improvements in perimeter security in the last year. We believe that an active and layered system of security can prevent unauthorized access to these labs. This is particularly important as 

several new Level 4 labs are either operating today or will be in 

the near future. 

Mr. Chairman, this ends my statement and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Kutz. That was your normal 

good job from you. We will do 7-minute rounds of questions. 

Let me start with you, just to follow up what you have said. This 

is very disappointing, that two of the five labs with the most dangerous pathogens, meaning that they are the most likely to be 

weaponized, even on their own, still have great gaps in their security. I am particularly disappointed in what you say is the nonchalant attitude—I am characterizing it that way—of the Centers 

for Disease Control about this. First, how do you explain that reaction by CDC? 

Mr. KUTZ. I can’t explain the reaction by CDC with respect to perimeter security because I believe that these controls we are talking about are fairly basic and I think most security experts would 

agree that they would reduce the risk of unauthorized attacks on 

these labs So I can’t explain that. 

I can explain the differences, to some extent. If you look at, for 

example, I think Lab B there, they have additional requirements 

outside of the CDC for security at those labs. So the actual base 

requirements that all three met, look at that, all three met the 

baseline requirements, which is hard to believe. But actually, these 

other labs, like Lab A and B, had other requirements from the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Institutes of Health 

(NIH), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 

So what you saw there were more stringent requirements from 

other parts of the Federal Government than for the Select Agent 

program. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So Lab C and Lab E were the only two 

of the five that were only part of the Select Agent program under 

CDC? 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes, Lab C and Lab E. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And those were the ones that are really 

lacking. Well, I will state my own intention, and maybe the Committee can do it, to express our displeasure to CDC about this state 

of affairs, because these two labs, which have very dangerous 

pathogens in them, are at risk, and when they are at risk, so are 

we. 

Let me go to Senator Graham and Senator Talent and ask a few 

baseline questions. We are particularly focusing, and I think for 

good reason, based on your report, on security at the laboratories. 

But let me step back and ask you to answer a question I know you 


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considered. Accepting your premise that a WMD attack is probable 

somewhere in the world in the next 4 years and that it is more 

likely to be biological than nuclear, I am going to mention three 

ways in which the components for such an attack against the 

United States could be brought together. 

One obviously is to manufacture the actual biological agent for 

attack elsewhere in the world. As you said, Senator Graham, we 

know that there were two active laboratories in Afghanistan that 

al-Qaeda was running. 

A second, I suppose, would be to, going to Mr. Kutz’s point, to 

steal pathogens from an existing laboratory supervised by the government, well or not so well, and take it somewhere else, to a secret location, and develop it into a weapon. 

And the third—of course, this is the case we had with anthrax, 

where the Department of Justice determined in 2008 that Army biological researcher Bruce Ivins was the sole perpetrator of the 2001 

anthrax attacks—is for somebody within the labs to be compromised, I mean, basically to be doing conversion to weapons 

within the labs. 

We are focused here on the security of the labs. I want you to 

talk a little bit about your evaluation and the Commission’s of the 

probabilities here, or is it impossible to do that? From which of the 

three courses I have mentioned is it most likely that a terrorist intending to do a biological attack against the United States would 

get the biological materials? 

Mr. GRAHAM. The Commission did not attempt to make such an 

assessment. I will be sufficiently either indiscrete or courageous to 

try to do so. I would suggest it is the third option. That is the only 

one to which we have been exposed. That is, a scientist inside the 

lab—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. GRAHAM [continuing]. Who had passed a plethora of security 

background checks and then takes this material. He weaponized 

them in a crude manner such that they could be sent through the 

mail and ended up killing five people and creating significant disruption in our lives, including those of us who worked in these 

buildings. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. GRAHAM. So I think, while all three of those are potentials 

that need to be protected against, of the three, the more likely is 

the one that has already occurred, which is the rogue scientist. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your directness in that, and 

that is the evidence we have. So not to say that there is any sole 

path to this. Obviously, better perimeter security would not impact 

that individual or would not stop that individual. And, of course, 

in the case of Mr. Ivins, presumably, he went through all the personal security checks. What more can we do to deter or discover 

that kind of exploitation of the system for anti-American purposes? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, as you know, the Department of Homeland 

Security has a program which is specifically targeted at the rogue 

scientist. That in itself has been a source of some controversy because it has resulted in what many would describe as an overly bureaucratic and delayed process to get people cleared to work in our 

scientific laboratories. 


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While security is our principal concern, we are not unaware of 

the fact that the vast majority of what goes on in these laboratories 

is very positive, contributing to our health. Therefore, we don’t 

want to make these centers of creativity and innovation so entangled with restraints that they can’t carry out their basic mission. 

I wish, Mr. Chairman, I could give you five specific things that 

we could do to increase the confidence in the individuals who are 

working in the laboratories. I can’t do so, but I think the kind of 

recommendations that you are making for comprehensive oversight 

of these facilities, while this report focuses on the physical aspect, 

that comprehensiveness of oversight is also needed for the personnel issues, that would lead us to some thoughtful and constructive proposals to avoid another Bruce Ivins. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that answer. Senator Talent. 

Mr. TALENT. Yes. I would add a couple things, Mr. Chairman. I 

agree with Senator Graham, by the way, that if I had to guess, 

that they would get it from a lab, because as we emphasized in the 

report, they will likely try to recruit bioscientists, life scientists, 

and the people that they are going to try and recruit are going to 

be the people who are active in the field, which means they are 

working someplace. And it just seems to me logical that the first 

thing such a person would try and do is to see if they could get the 

material from the lab where they are working. So I think that is 

a string of assumptions, but I think they are reasonably plausible. 

I would say three things that we can do, agreeing with what Senator Graham said—but what the bill is doing is hugely important. 

I mean, for the first time, we are going to have comprehensive rulemaking in which all the various agencies are involved. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. TALENT. That is going to promote, I hope—I think this is 

very important—a culture of cooperation within the private scientific community and the agencies who are responsible for this. So 

they are going to begin talking, not that they are not now, there 

is a task force, I know, but more systematically and formally really 

talking about this, and you are going to see better regulation and 

better procedures growing out of that, almost in an evolutionary 

way. I think it is one of the geniuses of the bill. 

And I hope what that does, then, is create within the scientific 

community a real acceptance of the need for an enhanced culture 

of security. I think there is still resistance—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

Mr. TALENT [continuing]. But a sense of, look, we really do have 

to be aware about what the person next to us is doing because that 

is how you get somebody like Ivins. If somebody is next to him saying—now, it is hard, because as they pointed out, you can just put 

your pencil down and get a pathogen, and this is hard, but I think 

these are incremental steps that will help. 

And then I do want to point out again the importance of having 

an effective system for producing and distributing countermeasures, because the better we are at responding, the more we 

tend to deter an attack. The Chairman and I made a decision when 

we started up the Commission that we would focus on prevention 

rather than remediation because you can’t do everything, but this 


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is an area where the two are linked because the better you remediate, the more likely you are to prevent. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. That is a form of deterrence. I 

appreciate your answer. It seems to me, also, in this matter, we are 

dealing again with a tension that we have dealt with from the beginning of America, which is between security and liberty. This is 

in a very specific way. Obviously, we don’t want to discourage the 

extraordinary advances that come from the liberty of research and 

innovation, but on the other hand, we have got to create surveillance monitoring and measures to try to ferret out anybody who 

has gone astray and gone wild. 

I do think that the idea that we share, and it is in the bill, of 

tiering the regulation is important and perhaps sends a message 

to the scientific community, too. We are trying to isolate here for 

the most intense scrutiny the relatively small number of labs 

where the highest risk pathogens are, the ones that can be turned 

most easily into the most devastating weapons, and, frankly, to let 

up a little on surveillance at a lot of the other labs where the experts judge that the risk of conversion to weapons is less serious, 

and I think that may be a good balance as we go forward. 

Yes, Mr. Graham. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, if I could just offer a couple of rays 

of hope, there has been a fairly distinct divide between the nuclear 

scientists and the biological scientists. The nuclear scientists largely came in existence after the first two nuclear weapons were actually utilized and, therefore, there has been from the beginning this 

culture of security. It was clear that the mushroom cloud was a potential outgrowth of nuclear technology and, therefore, security was 

an assumed part of the scientific community. We have had no similar iconic figure for the biological side. So we can take some lessons 

from how the nuclear scientists have managed this joint issue of 

innovation and creativity versus appropriate security and maybe 

apply those lessons to the biological. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good point. 

Mr. GRAHAM. A second thing, some of the most scientifically committed universities in this country, over 20, have now formed a coalition to work precisely on this issue of the culture of security within our university setting, and I commend those institutions for 

their initiative. I hope that what they are doing will not only be 

successful in the member institutions, but will help set a standard 

for other higher education institutions that are engaged in this 

work, as we have seen recently, sadly, from your alma mater—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. GRAHAM [continuing]. The potential of consequences of inappropriate action by people in these laboratories. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Graham. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kutz, Senator Graham’s last comment is actually a good 

lead-in to a series of questions that I want to ask you because he 

talks about that nuclear scientists have a culture of security. That 

is their focus and that has not always been the case with scientists 

who are dealing with biological agents. 


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I suspect that the cultural differences are also reflected in the 

regulators. I don’t think that it is a coincidence that labs that were 

doing work for DOD had higher security than labs that were under 

the sole jurisdiction of the CDC. Did you find in dealing with the 

CDC that there was more focus on biosafety than on security? 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes, there was more of a focus on safety, which isn’t 

a bad focus, by the way, but there were no people that had actual 

security backgrounds that were doing the oversight and that were 

going out and approving the actual plans for security at these five 

Level 4 labs. So that clearly was something that we noted. 

Senator COLLINS. And indeed, it is my understanding that the 15 

standards that you used as an assessment were developed by the 

GAO, is that correct? In other words, did the CDC have a similar 

set of mandatory standards that needed to be met? 

Mr. KUTZ. No. Theirs were more guidelines and they were much 

easier to meet. Ours were more stringent, more specific, and ours 

were more consistent with what you saw from DOD, for example. 

Senator COLLINS. And when your report was issued a year ago 

and found such serious deficiencies in two of the labs that answered to the CDC, did the CDC order security improvements at 

the two labs? 

Mr. KUTZ. No. They tried to explain that what we saw was actually part of a plan that was resulted from risk-based analysis. So 

they tried to actually rationalize or justify it rather than say that 

something needed to be done. 

So as I mentioned, the three labs that have made improvements 

since then, they did it all on their own. There was no government 

assistance with respect to that. It was the labs themselves. 

Senator COLLINS. That is really worrisome to me. It seems to me 

that when you went to the CDC a year ago and showed such glaring deficiencies in just basic security measures, that the agency 

should have acted immediately. And are you telling us that the improvements that were made, such as they are, were initiated by the 

labs themselves, not as a result of any order or even direction by 

the CDC? 

Mr. KUTZ. Correct. The six red dots you see on that board were 

all self-initiated by Labs C and E, and as I mentioned, Lab D also 

went from having 13 to 15, and that was on their own. 

Senator COLLINS. And I think that demonstrates why it is so important that the Department of Homeland Security be involved in 

the regulation, because that Department, as one of the Commissioners, Robin Cleveland, mentioned to us previously, has as a 

focus and a mission of homeland security. It is startling to me that 

you could present the regulator with the report showing such serious problems and no action was taken, but that is what happened. 

Mr. KUTZ. That is correct. That is what happened. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator Talent and Senator Graham, I want you both to respond 

to this issue. We have talked a lot this morning about the worry 

that terrorists could gain access to pathogens at these biolabs and 

we have talked about the possibility of the rogue scientist. But isn’t 

there also a concern that these labs may contain specialized equipment and technology that could be valuable to terrorists in 

weaponizing a pathogen? In other words, it is not just the people. 


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It is not just the biological agents. It is the specialized equipment, 

as well, is it not? Senator Graham. 

Mr. GRAHAM. It is, and one of the many strengths of your legislation is to recognize that and begin the process of registering and 

providing some control over this equipment. It goes beyond equipment which is capable of weaponizing. It also relates to equipment 

which can actually be used to produce pathogens. Most of these 

high-risk pathogens occur in nature. Anthrax, for instance, is the 

product of decaying cattle, primarily. The word ‘‘anthrax’’ is a Russian word that means Siberian boil, because the first place anthrax 

was discovered was dead cows in Siberia. But there are other 

pathogens which are now being man-created and the equipment to 

do so is also a security risk. Your legislation would provide for 

some registration and control over who has access to that equipment. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Talent. 

Mr. TALENT. I really agree. I think it is one of the major steps 

forward in the bill, is the provision of the registration authority 

and the focus not just on the pathogen, but on the equipment that 

could be misused. Right now, if the lab is not handling something 

on the Select Agent list, then the government just does not know 

anything about them. We do not know who is out there, and that, 

to me, is irresponsible. 

And I think it should be done in a way—and this is very important, we believe—that whoever is directing that lab who is now 

going to have to register because of the equipment doesn’t think of 

it as this is another dumb government thing I have to do. I will 

just fill this out as quickly as I can, send it in, and hope they never 

contact me again and hope I never have to do anything ever again 

having to do with this subject. 

I hope that this is done in such a way—and you all, by providing 

for negotiated kind of rulemaking, I hope will achieve that—where 

that person says, you know what? Maybe this is something I need 

to not just comply with in the most bare minimum way possible 

but take an interest in. Maybe I need to start reading some industry things about this and be a little more concerned and circulate 

something to my employees about this because this is something I 

need to care about. That is the attitude we want out there, and the 

way to get it is the cooperative kind of rulemaking which you provide for in the legislation. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Akaka, and then Senator McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank you very much for holding this hearing and I want to add 

my welcome to Senator Graham, Senator Talent, and Mr. Kutz as 

you give your testimony and commitment to increasing our ability 

to counter WMD threats to our national security. 

I am pleased that President Obama has implemented some of the 

Commission’s recommendations. He has appointed a coordinator for 

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curity Council. And still more can be done. It is important that we 

continue to focus on the greatest threats to our national security. 

We should remember that the Commission warned that the terrorists’ use of WMD somewhere in the world is more likely than not 

by the end of 2013. 

All levels of government, along with the private sector and individual citizens, really need to work in concert to provide capabilities and readiness to prevent catastrophic attacks and to limit the 

consequences if such attacks occur. Senators Lieberman and Collins have taken a strong leadership role in introducing the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act and I 

look forward to working with them on this bill. 

Senator Graham, I recently introduced the Energy Development 

Program Implementation Act, which would put in place a mechanism to implement Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 

1978. Under my bill, the United States would work with developing 

nations to foster non-nuclear alternative energy sources, which 

would provide economic and environmental benefits and also reduce the risk of nuclear technology ending up in the wrong hands. 

Your Commission’s World at Risk report recommended implementing this program. You also recommend actions by the Executive Branch. Are there other recommendations about nuclear proliferation and terrorism from your report that this Committee 

should consider? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. We are in what has been referred to as a nuclear renaissance. After 30 or 40 years in which there was relatively little development of new nuclear capabilities, particularly 

for civilian purposes, suddenly, a number of countries, including 

the United States, are either considering expanding our current 

base of nuclear capability and some countries which have never 

had nuclear before are expressing interest. 

The fact that the Congress is now considering a number of what 

are referred to as 1-2-3 agreements, which are the agreements required by the Atomic Energy Act for the United States to cooperate 

in civilian nuclear with a foreign country, is itself illustrative of 

this nuclear renaissance. 

It does pose some significant challenges. Let me just mention a 

few. One, the countries that have never had nuclear power before, 

therefore, have no system of regulatory standards or enforcement 

capabilities, either for safety or security. It is going to be a particular responsibility of the international community, particularly 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is the regulating institution for the Nonproliferation Treaty, to see that those 

new entrants into the nuclear club do so under safe and secure circumstances. We have a number of recommendations for strengthening the authorities of the IAEA for this and other purposes. 

Second, in our report, we suggest that the United States should 

be economically neutral on the expansion of nuclear power for civilian purposes, specifically, that we should not subsidize nuclear expansion in foreign countries. If a foreign country decides based on 

its own analysis that nuclear is an appropriate part of its energy 

construct, we should honor that, but we shouldn’t subsidize it, 

thereby creating incentives for further expansion of nuclear with 


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the almost inevitable expansion of the potential of diversion of that 

nuclear to military purposes. 

Senator AKAKA. For too long, the Federal Government has not invested enough in supporting foreign language competency, as was 

mentioned earlier. This week, the Government Accountability Office will be releasing a report about serious proficiency gaps in languages critical to our national security at the State Department. 

Earlier this year, I introduced the National Foreign Language 

Coordination Act to put in place a national strategy for foreign languages because Americans need to understand other languages and 

cultures to ensure our national and economic security. I am encouraged that the bill we are considering today has a provision for an 

intelligence community language capability strategy. 

Do you believe this provision is sufficient, or is a broader national strategy for foreign languages needed? 

Mr. TALENT. I think the provision in the bill is a really good step, 

Senator, and this is one of these areas where I think there is a 

limit to what Congress can do. This really requires vigor and energy in the executive, somebody taking this and running with it 

and taking the responsibility for making certain decisions. 

Part of it is that we don’t have the skills out there. Part of it is 

that we are not vigorously pursuing the people who have the language skills. And part of it is that we have set up requirements 

that really discourage those people from joining up. I mean, somebody who has the kind of language skills and cultural knowledge, 

for example, of Iran probably has had some connection to Iran. So 

if that is a disqualifier from a security standpoint, then you are 

never going to be able to recruit anybody. 

And so there are huge, national communities around the country 

that want to help out, that have people who know how to help out, 

and we are not letting them help out. I just think it is going to take 

somebody high enough up to make a decision to say, look, we are 

going to start accessing these people. If there is some fallout or 

some baggage, I will bear it. Let us just go and do it. I don’t think 

that decision has yet been made, but I don’t know what you all can 

do other than what you are doing in this bill. They are going to 

have to take it up and run with it. You can do oversight and keep 

pushing, but this is an executive thing, I believe. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yesterday, I attended a briefing and the conditions 

of the briefing are such that I can’t say who was the principal presenter, but I can say it was a very high person in our U.S. military, 

and he made the observation that in dealing with the kind of warfare that we are engaged in in Afghanistan, that intelligence is the 

very pointy end of the spear. You are trying to isolate the bad people from the civilians, because if you don’t, you will end up harming civilians and therefore severely damaging your ability to carry 

out the mission. Intelligence is the key to being able to make that 

and a set of other good judgments. 

He went on to say that good intelligence is predicated on knowledge, that you can’t provide good intelligence if you don’t have a 

knowledge of the history and culture of the area in which you are 

operating, if you don’t have a knowledge of the language that the 

people speak, or if you don’t have some understanding of the demographic composition of the area in which you are operating. 


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So I think what you are pointing to is we are going to build up 

the knowledge base which will then make it possible to have superior intelligence capabilities. So I commend you for your prescience 

in identifying this as an important national security issue. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. Thanks for those 

thoughtful questions. Thanks for the legislation you introduced. 

Senator McCaskill, let me thank you for two things. First, for deciding to cosponsor the legislation that Senator Collins and I have 

introduced to prevent a WMD attack, and second, thank you for the 

work you did in 2006 to free up Jim Talent so he could do the great 

service he has done for our country as Co-Chair of this Commission. [Laughter.] 

Mr. TALENT. I retain a few mixed emotions about that. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You look pretty good. You look pretty 

happy. 

Mr. TALENT. I am grateful for Senator McCaskill’s presence here 

and wonder if she took the late flight in. I didn’t see you on it—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. No. Actually, I did the 4:30 alarm this 

morning. I rolled in on the early flight. 

Mr. TALENT. Yes. Your two choices of coming in from Missouri 

to make a Tuesday morning hearing are not either one of them 

very palatable. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So there are opportunities for service 

after the Senate and you have done that in an exemplary fashion. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And Senator Lieberman, let me just say, to 

follow up on your comments, I think he is doing such great work 

there, I think it is very important he continue in that work for the 

long haul. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Got it. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. I want to thank both Senator Graham and 

Senator Talent for their work in this area. I think that both of you 

understand this place very well and you understand what works 

and what does not. I think you are being very kind to use the word 

‘‘inertia,’’ Senator Talent, because I think it is a little worse than 

inertia. We don’t have a whole lot of people at the press table over 

there today. We don’t have the best attendance that we would hope 

for in this Committee hearing this morning. 

And partially that is about the attention span of this place and 

what drives it. Right now, we are in the midst of a very heated and 

drawn battle over health care reform, and in those moments, it is 

really hard to get people’s attention around here on anything else. 

I think the bill that has been introduced, which I am pleased to 

be able to cosponsor with Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman 

is incredibly important to the security of this Nation and I stand 

ready to do whatever I can to fight the fact that no one is giving 

it much attention right now, talking about this important topic. If 

this hearing had occurred in 2002, we would have had a line outside. But now, it has drifted away from the front of people’s consideration and therefore we are going to have more difficulty getting 


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it across the finish line. But I know with the leadership of this 

Committee, particularly our Chairman and Ranking Member, we 

can do it. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Kutz, without going into specifically where 

the labs are located, was there any connection between the perimeter security that GAO found, between those labs that were government-owned and those that were privately-owned? 

Mr. KUTZ. The two labs that had the weakest security were notfor-profit and university, so they were private. Two of the best were 

government operated and owned. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And is the sixth biosafety Level 4 lab that 

has just recently become operational, is that a private or is that a 

government? Do you guys know? 

Mr. KUTZ. I know it is in Montana. I don’t know which. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The reason I ask that is it seems to me 

that, as much as I don’t like it in some instances, it would be fairly 

simple, maybe, to amend our bill to talk about funding from the 

government being contingent upon this perimeter security being 

present—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a good idea. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. And any other—because I am 

sure all of these labs, whether it is in the efforts that you all referred to in terms of government funding, of trying to get the 

BARDA and the BioShield that Senator Talent referred to in terms 

of investment in the vaccination, that we ought to be able to hook 

up the contingency of public money with the requirement of these 

securities, and I will try to follow up for that. 

It is interesting that you both agree that our most likely problem 

is going to be with a rogue scientist and, therefore, that would 

seem to dictate incredibly aggressive screening procedures and an 

incredibly aggressive mental health screening and all of that. On 

the other hand, Senator Talent, you said that part of our problem 

is our fear in taking that risk is paralyzing our ability to get good 

people in the door that we desperately need for their scientific acumen and backgrounds. And you said just, I think, a few minutes 

ago that the Executive Branch is going to need to take the lead on 

this. 

Do you think there is anything else that we can do in Congress 

or you can do in your Committee to give the Executive Branch 

cover, because if it is about a political risk—— 

Mr. TALENT. Yes. It is interesting that you said that word, because I was just thinking that one of the things that Congress 

could do, and almost informally, is approach the key decision makers and say, look, if you feel you need to take some responsibility 

for saying, we are going to hire somebody who has language skills 

and complete the security review—hire them on a preliminary 

basis and complete the security review so we can get them in the 

door, we are going to protect you. We are not going to hang you 

up for making that kind of a decision. I think that might happen. 

The key here, though, is that the bill is designed to get everybody at the same table and talking about this so what will emerge 

from there is the right balance that I don’t think you can prescriptively in a bill say. And you can go wrong in either direction. 


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I mean, Fort Detrick, in response to the Ivins case, imposed such 

strong security measures that they have stopped doing any research. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. TALENT. Well, that is not a good result, and neither is a good 

result to have labs that are saying, well, we are going to ignore 

what the GAO is telling us. We don’t want to have x-ray machines. 

I mean, I don’t get why you couldn’t have x-ray machines. 

So I think what the bill is aiming at is to create a cooperative 

process where reasonable people are getting together and recognizing that even if they come from the scientific community, security is important. Even if they come from the security community, 

science is important. 

It gives me a chance to just propose—you had an addition you 

suggested, Senator. I think if you created some kind of a council 

on lab security and said you want the representatives from the key 

nonprofits and the agencies, and they have to get together on a regular basis and they have to talk, and then you all oversaw that, 

I think that would be useful as an integrator, as a way of creating 

that kind of community of interest across institutional lines that 

we are trying to get at. That, I think, would be helpful, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there anything else, Senator Graham or 

Senator Talent, that we have not included in this bill that you 

think needs to be included? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I think the basic structure of this bill is not 

to fall in the trap of being overly prescriptive. This is a rapidly 

evolving area of science. The issues that are probably going to be 

our biggest challenge 20 years from now, we can’t even conceptualize today. What you are doing is you are setting in place a series of institutions that will have the capacity over time to respond 

to emerging threats. There may be some details that we could discuss, but I think the basic approach of this as a matter of good 

public administration is sound and therefore we give it our strong 

support. 

Mr. TALENT. The model is what you did in this Committee with 

the intelligence community. That, to me, is the model, where you 

set in motion forces within the intelligence community that have 

caused them to work together, and, in fact, that is one of the really 

good news stories of the last 3 or 4 years. The increase in our intelligence capabilities is, I think, directly as a result of what you all 

did in that bill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If I could, we are going to have a hearing 

on another topic that you all have obviously talked about in your 

assignment, and I know that, Senator Talent, you have written 

about it. We are going to have a hearing, I think, in the Armed 

Services Committee on Thursday on missile defense. I would like, 

Senator Talent, just to ask you your reaction to Secretary Gates’s 

recommendation that we rely on the SM-3s in the short run with 

switching our emphasis in the long run to improved technology 

that would not be reflected in what had been planned by the Bush 

Administration—— 

Mr. TALENT. For Czech Republic and Poland. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. For Czech Republic and Poland. 


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Mr. TALENT. And I am happy to do that, Senator. I think we 

should both say this is—we are taking off our hats now, our Commission hats, because this is something we didn’t feel was part of 

our mandate, missile defense, and we didn’t get into it, and deliberately so. And Senator Graham and I have talked a lot about this 

individually. He may have slightly or greatly different views. 

I didn’t like it, the decision, for a number of reasons. Part of it 

is missile defense, I think, the ground-based interceptors, we know 

will work. We were far along in that process. It is the less expensive and the quicker way of doing it. The intelligence assessment 

that the Iranians may be moving more slowly than we think, I 

think is questionable, and in any event, I don’t want to take that 

chance. And this is a subject where I would like to see redundancy 

rather than choosing one from another. And then there are serious 

foreign policy implications, as well. 

So it was not something I liked to see happen, but I say that as 

a private individual and maybe as a commentator on foreign policy 

in general, not as the vice chairman of the Commission. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Mr. GRAHAM. As Senator Talent has said, we are taking off our 

Commission hats, where we were very collegial and our report had 

the unanimous support of all of the nine members of the Commission. I have had some concerns about the concept of missile defense 

in the context that our stated national policy is that if a country 

uses a nuclear weapon against the United States or an ally, the result of that will be massive retaliation. If a reasonable country feels 

that we are serious about that, you would think that they would 

be extremely reticent to use such a weapon against the United 

States, particularly reticent to use it in a form that has their signature all over it. 

I have sat in a signals intelligence facility thousands of miles 

away from the site and seen a foreign government launch its missiles. We have the capability of monitoring missiles all over the 

world and would know within seconds of launch who was responsible. There are many other ways today that a state which wanted 

to deliver a nuclear weapon against the United States could do so 

without putting its signature on it, such as delivering it in a cargo 

container. That is why I think seaport security is, among other reasons, such an important element. So I think it is a defense against 

an increasingly unlikely event. 

Second, we state in our report the importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Between us, we control about 95 percent of the 

nuclear weapons in the world. There is no relationship that is more 

important to restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons than 

that between the United States and Russia. We are two big, powerful countries and we will periodically have disagreements, but we 

need to try to manage our relationship in the context of the primacy of avoiding contributing to a nuclear conflagration. 

So the fact that this was such a sensitive thing to the Russians, 

and understandably so—if they had facilities like this located in 

Cuba, we know how we would react—we knew what, in fact, we did 

do back in the early 1960s—were the benefits to us in terms of our 

defense against nuclear weapons worth the risk to our relationship 

with the Russians that the sites in the Czech Republic and Poland 


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represented? I personally think not, so I believe that we have made 

a wise decision and that the overall security of the country is 

heightened. 

Some of the test of that will be what do we do now with this new 

approach that Secretary Gates is discussing of a different way to 

defend ourselves against missiles and how we use maybe some of 

the resources that we would have spent there to do a better job of 

defending those places such as our seaports, which I think are 

much more likely to be the gateway to get a nuclear weapon into 

the United States than by launching it with a missile that has your 

name written on the side of it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I am glad I was able to get this bipartisan agreement to divide opinion here before we finished. [Laughter.] 

Thank you very much for your indulgence on that question. They 

are both very knowledgeable and I wanted to get both of their 

takes on it. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am glad you did. It was helpful. Thank 

you. 

We are going to do a second round, quickly, of 5 minutes. We 

have got a vote at noon. 

Let me focus here on another part of your Commission report 

and of the bill. I think you have done a great service in focusing 

on the development of a robust response capability to a bioterrorist 

attack as one of the best things we can do to deter such attack, as 

we said before. 

I would also say, parenthetically, as we are geared up now to 

deal with the H1N1 pandemic and its potential spread in our country that whatever we do to set up systems to respond to a bioterrorist attack will also enable us to use those same systems to respond to an epidemic or a pandemic or an outbreak of disease of 

one kind or another. 

Let me ask you a baseline question as to where we are now, 

which is whether you think any of our major metropolitan areas 

today are ready to get antibiotics or countermeasures out to people 

at risk within a reasonable amount of time, or really a necessary 

amount of time, after a biological weapon attack. I gather some 

people have the standard of 48 hours. Of course, that seems like 

a long time to me, 2 days. So the question is, are any of our major 

metropolitan areas really ready to dispense the countermeasures 

that people will need to minimize the impact of a biological attack? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Probably not, at least, I am not aware of any. And 

it is a more complicated problem than the act of dispersing the 

medications. One is knowing that you are under attack. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. GRAHAM. There are probably, within a 50-mile radius of 

where we sit today, 75 hospitals. If each one of those 75 had three 

people show up with symptoms that might be associated with a lethal pathogen, they might conclude that it was an aberration. It is 

only when you aggregate three times 75 that you begin to appreciate that this is not just a random incident, that we are under attack, and then begin the processes that are necessary. 

I am, frankly, not aware of anyplace that has a fully coordinated 

means by which that could be done within the time frame necVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:53 Dec 16, 2010 Jkt 053840 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\53840.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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essary to then start the process of getting medications out to people. 

The reason that we think that in the area of biological that prevention equals preparation to respond to the attack is that there, 

you do have the potential of making biological—they are still a 

weapon of destruction, but you might be able to eliminate the middle word, ‘‘mass.’’ If you are able to respond sufficiently, you can 

contain the effect of a biological attack. With a nuclear attack, tens 

or hundreds of thousands of people are going to be killed and there 

is no way to reduce that number. 

We also, in some discussions with our intelligence agencies, in 

their assessment of the mentality of our adversary, that our adversary, once they come into possession of the capability of a biological 

attack, are probably going to use that fairly quickly. They are not 

in the business of stockpiling materials for some future attack, like 

maybe the North Koreans are trying to do with their nuclear capability. So they will want to use it quickly. 

They will assess a range of targets, both in the United States 

and worldwide, and are likely to use it against the target that they 

think will result in the highest kill rate. So if you have prepared 

yourself and your adversary is aware of the preparation that you 

have done, you are probably going to be down the pecking order in 

the likelihood that you will be the site selected to target that to be 

used soon after acquisition of a biological weapon. So that is why 

we think that one of the most important deterrents in the biological area is how well you are prepared to deal with the event itself. 

Mr. TALENT. Mr. Chairman, I should say I just snuck around and 

asked the staff, and they tell me that there are models out there 

that are pretty far advanced. I don’t think anybody feels like they 

are as prepared as they want to be, but the Postal Service with its 

model has been working with localities. I think our statement says 

Seattle, Philadelphia, and Boston. They have been pleased about 

the tests that they have run there. So I think we are making 

progress—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. This is on the ability of those communities to respond quickly. 

Mr. TALENT. The overwhelming point that we kept getting, and 

it makes great sense, is that whatever the Federal Government 

does, it has to adopt an attitude of working with the local authorities and let them adjust to what they think they need to do. And 

this is, of course, how first responders are—they have all these 

kinds of sharing and partnership agreements locally and mutual 

support agreements and we have to make that work for us rather 

than DHS saying, this is how you will do it everywhere, because 

that won’t work. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks to both of you. That is why we 

have a separate title on what the Federal Government can do to 

incentivize and support, rather than demand that response capability, because that ultimately, as you said, both of you, very convincingly, is the best deterrent we can have. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just following up on that point, we have done a lot of work with 

State and local governments, and with our private sector partners 

to improve the response because obviously if you are a terrorist and 


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you think a community is unable to respond, that gives you even 

more of an incentive to choose a particular method of attack. 

But there is also some discouraging news in that area. Earlier 

this month, the Inspector General (IG) for the Department of 

Health and Human Services released a report that looked at the 

ability of local communities to effectively and efficiently distribute 

medical countermeasures in the event of a pandemic flu. Well, obviously that possibility is here right now. 

The IG examined 10 localities and found that most of them had 

not completed planning for countermeasures distribution and dispensing. They found, for example, that there weren’t formal agreements that had been worked out between the local hospitals and 

the communities, and that they failed to identify alternative 

sources of staffing to cope with the absentee rate that would be associated with a pandemic. 

That really concerns me, that this many years have passed and 

we still don’t have the measures and the planning in place. Could 

you both comment a little more on what specifically you think that 

we need to be doing in this area? I will start with you, Senator Talent, since you addressed this in your opening comments. 

Mr. TALENT. Sure. What you said doesn’t surprise me, and I 

think it is consistent with what Senator Graham and I were saying. I am not confident that any place in the country is where it 

needs to be or really close to where it needs to be. Now, there are 

some areas that are ahead of others and I think we can look at 

what they are doing and try and model. 

But what you said and what the IG said is perfectly consistent 

with what we found, that we are not ready in this area. It is, I 

don’t want to say inviting attack, but it is an avenue of deterrence 

of which we are not taking advantage. And I think it goes back to 

what Senator Lieberman opened up the hearing with, which is how 

do you create an ongoing sense of urgency within this government 

and local governments, as well. 

Senator Graham has talked about the fact that we, as a Commission are looking at doing this, providing a citizen check-list—you 

may want to talk about this, Senator Graham—for how folks can 

check up on what their local government is doing. What are the 10 

things your local government should be doing? And I think that 

will be helpful. 

But everything that we can continue to do to raise the awareness 

that this is really a possibility and, in fact, will become a probability—it is the insidious nature of terrorism. It is one of the reasons it is an effective form of conflict against first world countries. 

It is shadowy, it is beneath the surface, and so we just tend to forget that it is there until they jump up and attack us, and how do 

you promote that in a society where people are doing what we want 

them to do? They are off with their families and their jobs and 

doing good things and they are not waking up every morning worrying about this, and I really don’t want them to, but I do want 

a stronger sense of urgency, and I think you put your finger on one 

of the real difficulties. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Graham. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Just to pick up on what Senator Talent said, one 

of the things that our Commission has done during this second 


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phase of our life, the post-report phase, is we have commissioned 

various studies. One of those has been with Texas A&M University, 

which has a Center for Homeland Security, to develop a Guide for 

Citizens. If, let us say, you are a citizen of Camden, Maine, and 

you want to know how well prepared is Camden in the event of either a natural or a terrorist-caused biological incident in your community, how would you as a citizen find out? Well, what we hope 

to give to citizens is a list of the right questions to answer and 

some idea of the metrics to be used in evaluating the answers that 

you get so that there can be an informed citizenry, if necessary, 

pushing its governmental agencies to higher standards of action in 

order to protect the people of that specific community. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator 

Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Graham, in March, you testified at a hearing I held to 

examine the creation of a National Security Service Workforce. It 

seems that personnel plays a huge part in what we are trying to 

do. You articulated the Commission’s findings and recommendations regarding workforce challenges in the area of national security, particularly in the intelligence community. 

I have been considering legislation alongside other Members of 

this Committee to strengthen the national security workforce. My 

question to you is, how might this Committee encourage the development of national security professionals government-wide? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, if I could focus, as I did in March, on the specific area of the intelligence community, although I believe the 

principles are applicable elsewhere, in my judgment, one of the 

most effective role models of developing human capital is the military’s Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. Over half 

the commissioned officers in every branch of the United States 

military comes through a ROTC program. 

The program has the opportunity that, let us say, if the Navy is 

looking 10 years down the road and they say, anticipating some 

new technology, we are going to need more officers with a particular set of scientific knowledge, they can begin to adjust their selection process of persons who will be entering the Navy ROTC to 

prioritize students who are going to be studying in the areas where 

they will acquire that knowledge. So it has a flexibility and a responsiveness to both current and anticipated conditions. 

Second, it has the requirement that people commit to a certain 

number of years of service as a consequence of receiving the Federal assistance in securing their education. So there is a reliability 

that you can depend on the fact that you will have a certain number of years of service from these individuals. 

Third, it tends to promote a concept that the military has been 

emphasizing and which we believe our intelligence agencies need 

to further emphasize, and that is jointness, that people who get to 

know each other as students, whether they end up in the Army infantry or the armor or other specific area of the Army, they are 

going to have had a common shared experience during their ROTC 

years. 


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So I think that is a model, and let me say, there is a provision 

in the intelligence authorization bill that will move towards establishing such a program for the intelligence agencies. I would recommend it to your attention, and at such time, I hope that as you 

consider and vote on the future intelligence authorization bill with 

that provision, that you will be supportive. 

Senator AKAKA. Before my time runs out, this question goes to 

either Senator Graham or Senator Talent. I took a particular interest in the Commission’s recommendations to strengthen United 

States public diplomacy efforts. Last September, I held a hearing 

on public diplomacy reform and found that despite the existence of 

a strategic plan, there was little support for it across the government. This is an area where improvement is needed. 

Would you please elaborate on the Commission’s recommendations for developing a new public diplomacy strategy and how it 

could reduce the risks associated with bioterrorism and the misuse 

of technology? Senator Talent. 

Mr. TALENT. It is the last question and you have introduced a 

really important subject, and I am grateful to you for your leadership on this. Senator Graham and I have talked a lot about this. 

We talked a lot about it at the Commission, particularly in the context of our recommendations regarding Pakistan. 

We could not agree with you more. I mean, it is obvious. We have 

now seen this across a number of administrations. We saw it in 

Bosnia, saw it in Iraq, and we are seeing it now in Afghanistan, 

that our government needs the capability to do what you call public 

diplomacy, what Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has called 

smart power or soft power, a range of capabilities that are primarily civilian in nature that will assist us, either assist the military or operate outside the military context, and they include the 

ability to effectively communicate America’s intentions. 

And we have a President who is popular abroad. He goes and 

gives speeches. That is a very good thing. But we have all run in 

campaigns here. You can’t just give a speech and then expect that 

the message is going to—you have to follow it up with a kind of 

campaign that effectively communicates your intentions. We don’t 

have that capability organically as a government. We just don’t, not 

to mention the ability to systematically build local economic and 

democratic grassroots institutions that we have seen we need that 

ability over and over and over again and we don’t have it. And all 

that is connected up with the public diplomacy piece. 

So I will just say I think we need an effort across the civilian 

agencies, led by the Secretary of State—we say this in the report— 

similar to what the military did over a generation ago with the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act, what you all are causing the intelligence 

community to do, where they canvas what the requirements are for 

this community as a whole, inventory the capabilities they have, 

and then have a concerted plan for developing the necessary capabilities, and it will mean working together and sharing culture. 

But I agree with you. They haven’t really started, and I don’t— 

it would be a great subject—I guess you need the Foreign Affairs 

Committee and some of the others to do it, but this is an area 

where Congress, I think, if you really show an interest over time, 

they will have to respond, and otherwise, I am concerned that it 


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isn’t going to happen. But kudos to you for continuing to push it, 

Senator. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. 

I agree with you, Senator Talent, for the kudos to Senator 

Akaka. He has been really noble in this pursuit. 

I will say, and I appreciate the reference to the intelligence community. In the briefings that we have received on this ongoing terrorist plot here in the United States, Colorado, New York, apart 

from being unsettled by the clearest evidence we have received in 

a long time of an attempt that is at least connected to al-Qaeda 

and Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the remarkable cooperation 

among law enforcement agencies of the United States and intelligence agencies, both global and domestic has been really quite reassuring. 

This has been a very productive morning for our Committee. I 

thank you very much for your continuing efforts, Senator Graham, 

Senator Talent, and Mr. Kutz. 

This Committee has a sense of urgency about this. We take this 

legislation that we have introduced very seriously. Incidentally, not 

only Senator McCaskill has joined, but Senator Bob Bennet of Utah 

has come on as a cosponsor. Senator Collins and I intend to mark 

this bill up at a business meeting of our Committee next month. 

So we are going to really move it quickly. I suppose that is a notice 

to anybody out there who has any input they want to give our 

Committee before we go to markup that we intend to move this 

with speed, because that is what the reality of our world requires. 

We will keep the record of this hearing open for 10 days for any 

additional statements or questions that anybody might have. 

Senator Collins, would you like to say anything in conclusion? 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just again want 

to thank our witnesses for all of their work—they have all been 

working on it for quite some time—and to assure you of our determination to get the kinds of reforms that we all believe are needed 

signed into law. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


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