UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Abdullah Shrif Amir, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15-cv-12502 

Judith E. Levy 

United States District Judge 

Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS 

TO THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [23], ADOPTING 

THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION [22], DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [18], AND GRANTING THE 

COMMISSION’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [19] 

 On June 28, 2016, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 

Recommendation, recommending that the Court deny plaintiff Abdullah 

Shrif Amir’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 18) and grant the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 

19). (Dkt. 22.) Plaintiff timely filed objections (Dkt. 23), and the 

Commissioner filed a response. (Dkt. 25.) For the reasons set forth 

below, plaintiff’s objections are denied, and the Magistrate Judge’s 

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Report and Recommendation to deny plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment and grant the Commission’s motion for summary judgment is 

adopted in full. 

I. Background 

The Court has reviewed the background in light of the record and 

finds that the Magistrate Judge’s description of this case is accurate. In 

addition, plaintiff has not specifically objected to the background as 

described in the Report and Recommendation. It is thus adopted in full. 

(Dkt. 22 at 2-8.) Any disputes as to the facts are addressed in the 

analysis. 

II. Standard 

An applicant for disability benefits who is not satisfied with the 

Commissioner’s final decision may obtain review in federal district 

court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court “must affirm the 

Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the 

Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has 

made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the 

record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 

2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court may affirm, 

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modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision, and may also choose to 

remand the case for rehearing when appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The Commissioner’s findings of fact are given substantial 

deference on review and are conclusive if supported by substantial 

evidence. Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). If there is substantial evidence 

to support the Commissioner’s decision, the district court must affirm it 

even if substantial evidence also supports a contrary conclusion. Bass 

v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Wright v. Massanari, 

321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health and 

Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (if the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, “it must be affirmed even if the 

reviewing court would decide the matter differently . . . and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion”). 

When deciding whether there is substantial evidence to support 

the Commissioner’s factual findings, the district court is limited to an 

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examination of the record and should consider the record as a whole. 

Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 

974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). However, neither the Commissioner 

nor the reviewing court must discuss every piece of evidence in the 

administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 

496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). 

When a Magistrate Judge has submitted a Report and 

Recommendation and a party has filed timely objections, the district 

court conducts a de novo review of those parts of the Report and 

Recommendation to which the party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

III. Analysis 

a. Objection 1 

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by relying on a 

vocational expert’s testimony because plaintiff’s limitations place him 

between two grid rules that both direct a finding of disabled. (Dkt. 23 

at 2-3.) According to plaintiff, reliance on the vocational expert is only 

appropriate when a plaintiff’s limitations place him between grid rules 

that direct opposite findings of disabled and not disabled. (Id. at 2.) 

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Specifically, plaintiff argues that he was between grid rules 

because the findings placed him between sedentary and light work, but 

even the applicable light-work grid would direct a finding of disabled. 

(Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Table 2, 

§ 202.09).) Rule 202.09, cited by plaintiff, applies if plaintiff has the 

following limitations: ability to perform light work, illiteracy or 

inability to communicate in English, previous unskilled work, and an 

age range approaching advanced age (fifty to fifty-four). 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Table 2, § 202.09. 

Plaintiff’s argument assumes that plaintiff should have been 

considered approaching advanced age. But at the time of the ALJ’s 

decision, plaintiff was forty-nine. (See Dkt. 13-2 at 35 (“[H]e’s 49 now, 

he’ll be 50 next spring.”); see also id. at 24-25, 30 (plaintiff born May 14, 

1964, hearing decision February 6, 2014).) The Magistrate Judge 

rejected plaintiff’s argument that he should have been considered 

within the fifty to fifty-four age category. (Dkt. 22 at 14-15.) As set 

forth below in the analysis of objection 2, the Magistrate Judge’s 

decision was not clearly erroneous. Thus, plaintiff’s first objection is 

denied. 

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b. Objection 2 

Necessary to support plaintiff’s first objection, plaintiff argues 

that the Magistrate Judge erred by accepting the ALJ’s “mechanical 

approach to [plaintiff]’s age category.” (Dkt. 23 at 3-7.) According to 

plaintiff, “the ALJ was required to consider [plaintiff]’s borderline age 

before determining whether the Grids needed to be applied.” (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b), which directs that: 

If [claimants] are within a few days to a few months of 

reaching an older age category, and using the older age 

category would result in a determination or decision that 

[claimant is] disabled, we will consider whether to use the 

older age category after evaluating the overall impact of all 

the factors of [claimant’s] case. 

Plaintiff argues that this requires a remand “with instructions to 

address the borderline age issue in the decision.” (Dkt.23 at 7.) 

 First, as directed in the regulation, the ALJ need consider the 

borderline age issue only when “using the older age category would 

result in a determination or decision that” plaintiff is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1563(b). But even if plaintiff were considered “approaching 

advanced age,” as required by Rule 202.09, he does not otherwise fulfill 

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all of the other requirements. Thus, the ALJ did not err by considering 

plaintiff as a younger individual (less than fifty years old). 

 Rule 202.09 requires a claimant to be closely approaching 

advanced age, to be illiterate or unable to communicate in English, to 

have unskilled or no previous work experience, and to have a maximum 

sustained work capacity limited to light work. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 2, Table 2, § 202.09. The ALJ found that although 

limited, plaintiff had at least some ability to read, write, understand, 

and speak English. Moreover, the ALJ noted that plaintiff’s previously 

relevant work experience in food preparation was semi-skilled. Thus, 

even if plaintiff had been considered approaching advanced age, he 

would not have fully fit within Rule 202.09. 

Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that “the ALJ 

erroneously leaped to an assumption that [plaintiff] is ‘at least literate 

and able to communicate in English.’” (Dkt. 23 at 4 (Comm’r Br. at 17).) 

But at the hearing, the ALJ asked plaintiff if he could “read and write 

in English,” to which plaintiff replied “[n]ot much.” (Dkt. 13-2 at 38.) 

The ALJ also asked plaintiff if he could “understand and speak 

English,” to which plaintiff replied “[a] little bit, not very much.” (Id.) 

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Thereafter, the ALJ indicated “[w]e’re going to go with the interpreter 

anyway, but I just needed to get that information.” (Id.) The preceding 

exchange occurred without the aid of the interpreter. The ALJ’s finding 

that plaintiff “has a limited education and is able to communicate in 

English” (Dkt. 13-2 at 24) is based on plaintiff’s testimony, and this 

finding is more than the illiteracy or inability to communicate in 

English required by Rule 202.09. 

Moreover, the vocational expert testified and the ALJ noted that 

plaintiff’s previous work experience was semi-skilled. (Id. at 24 (“The 

claimant has past relevant work as a food preparer . . . , having a 

medium exertional level designation and a specific vocational 

preparation factor of three.”); id. at 46 (“[VE:] I believe he was food 

prep . . . . SVP skill level 3, semi-skilled. [ALJ:] So it’s semi-skilled? 

[VE:] Yes, sir.”).) Plaintiff does not dispute this. His previous semiskilled relevant work experience is more than the unskilled to no past 

relevant work experience required by Rule 202.09. 

The Magistrate Judge correctly noted that plaintiff going from “‘a 

younger individual’ at age 49 to ‘closely approaching advanced age’ 

when he turned 50 several months after the hearing” would require 

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application of Rule 202.09 “if [his] vocational factors and RFC coincided 

with all of the criteria of a given rule.” (Dkt. 22 at 15); see Bowie v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 539 F.3d 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2008); Gilliam v. 

Colvin, No. 2:14-cv-12335, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72987, at *70 (E.D. 

Mich. Apr. 17, 2015) (ALJ did not mechanically apply age category 

when plaintiff did not present additional vocational adversities). 

Because plaintiff’s vocational factors did not coincide with the 

remaining criteria of Rule 202.09, substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s categorization of plaintiff in the “younger individual” category, 

that is, less than fifty years old. 

 Relatedly, the Sixth Circuit directs that 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b) 

“does not impose on ALJs a per se procedural requirement to address 

borderline age categorization in every borderline case.” Bowie, 539 F.3d 

at 399. 

Although ALJs are obligated by this text not to apply the age 

categories mechanically and to consider whether use of an 

older age category would be appropriate in a borderline case, 

nothing in this language obligates an ALJ to address a 

claimant’s borderline age situation in his opinion or explain 

his thought process in arriving at a particular age-category 

determination. 

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Id. When a “claimant’s additional vocational adversities would be 

significant . . . [,] some discussion of proper age categorization” is 

merited “in order to meet the substantial-evidence threshold.” Id. at 

401 (citing HALLEX § II-5-3 to note that “substantial evidence might be 

lacking where an ALJ, with no explanation, places a claimant in the 

‘younger individual’ age category who is 49 years and 11 months, 

unskilled, sedentary, barely literate, and whose only previous work 

experience was in the fishing industry”). 

 Here, the ALJ acknowledged plaintiff’s birthdate, noted that 

plaintiff was forty-seven years old “on the alleged disability onset date,” 

and cited the applicable age category. (Dkt. 13-2 at 24.) To be sure, 

plaintiff was months away from “reaching an older age category.” See 

Bowie, 539 F.3d at 401 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Van Der Maas v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 198 F. App’x 521, 528 (6th Cir. 2006)). But here, 

for the reasons noted above, the ALJ did “not move h[im] to the higher 

category, presumably because the ALJ did not find that [plaintiff] had 

demonstrated the ‘additional vocational adversities’ required to do so.” 

Id. (quoting Van Der Maas, 198 F. App’x at 528). 

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Plaintiff would not have fully aligned with Rule 202.09 even if the 

ALJ had explicitly considered his borderline age, because plaintiff had 

previous semi-skilled work experience and some, albeit limited, ability 

to read, write, understand, and speak English. Thus, plaintiff’s second 

objection is denied. 

c. Objection 3 

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by finding that 

“the ALJ relied on the testimony of the VE,” because “where the Grids 

apply, VE testimony is irrelevant.” (Dkt. 23 at 7-8.) According to 

plaintiff, “so long as proper evaluation by the ALJ addressed to 

remedying his errors may lead to applying a Grid rule directing 

disability, there is no occasion to consider VE testimony.” (Id. at 8.) 

But as set forth above, the ALJ did not err when he found that 

plaintiff did not fall squarely within any grid rule. In a footnote, 

plaintiff argues that although the Magistrate Judge “does not propose 

reliance on the government’s argument regarding [plaintiff]’s [] 

difficulties communicating in English . . . . , this argument was 

misguided.” (Id. at n.6.) As set forth above, the ALJ’s opinion was 

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based on plaintiff’s responses to his questions during the hearing, and 

was thus supported by substantial evidence. 

Moreover, even if plaintiff were illiterate and unable to speak or 

understand any English, plaintiff fails to argue why the ALJ erred in 

finding that plaintiff’s past relevant work as a food preparer has a 

specific vocation preparation factor of three, that is, semi-skilled. (Dkt. 

13-2 at 24.) The grid rule plaintiff argues is appropriate, Rule 202.09, 

requires unskilled or no past relevant work experience. Because 

plaintiff did not otherwise fit in any grid rule, the ALJ properly elicited 

vocational expert testimony. Thus, plaintiff’s third objection is denied. 

d. Objection 4 

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by finding that 

the ALJ properly evaluated plaintiff’s subjective complaints and 

credibility. (Dkt. 23 at 8-15.) Specifically, plaintiff takes issue with the 

findings as they related to his physical therapy, medication compliance, 

daily activities, and purported symptom magnification. (Id.) 

As to physical therapy, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ 

did not err by using the inconsistency between the physical therapist’s 

report (that physical therapy had improved plaintiff’s condition) and 

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plaintiff’s later contradictory testimony (that physical therapy “did not 

help him”) as a factor weighing against plaintiff’s credibility. (Dkt. 22 

at 20.) Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ’s finding is [] not supported by the 

record, and the R&R’s repeated failures to confront the actual 

arguments raised cannot be adopted.” (Dkt. 23 at 10.) Plaintiff 

highlights that “the self-report from [June 17, 2013] is just one of many 

pieces of evidence identified by [plaintiff], most of which were not selfreports.” (Id. at 9-10.) 

As to medication compliance, the Magistrate Judge found that the 

ALJ did not err by concluding that although plaintiff “follows a range of 

painkilling medications . . . the record indicates that [he] uses these 

medications on an intermittent basis.” (Dkt. 22 at 21.) Plaintiff argues 

that “the only note which indicated that [plaintiff] was not taking his 

medication was the January 18, 2013 progress note from Dr. Suleiman,” 

plaintiff’s treating physician. (Dkt. 23 at 10.) According to plaintiff, the 

“R&R wholly fails to explain how a single notation in the entire record 

. . . adequately supports an ALJ’s sweeping claim that the claimant 

merely uses his medications ‘on an intermittent basis.’” (Id.) 

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As to daily activities, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ’s 

consideration of plaintiff’s activities of daily living were not per se in 

error. (Dkt. 22 at 23-24.) The ALJ found that plaintiff engaged in 

hygiene and grooming, engaged in child rearing activity, was the 

primary caregiver for another member of the household, engaged in 

routine household chores, managed his own finances, medication, and 

appointments, exercised, landscaped, read, watched television, and 

visited his local community center regularly. (Dkt. 13-2 at 22.) 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s findings were based on a “grossly 

selective citation of the record,” given that they were mostly based on 

an older version of multiple submitted Social Work Questionnaires. 

(Dkt. 23 at 11.) A later version of the same questionnaire “noted that 

[plaintiff] was unable to prepare his own food or do housekeeping.” (Id.) 

And one completed by plaintiff’s brother supported, rather than 

contradicted, plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. (Id. at 11-12.) 

As to purported symptom magnification, the Magistrate Judge 

found that although the ALJ could not use a positive Waddell’s Sign1 of 

 

1 The Sixth Circuit has explained that Waddell’s Signs: 

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overreaction on its own as strong evidence that plaintiff was 

malingering or exaggerating his symptoms, it was not in error for the 

ALJ to consider such evidence. (Dkt. 22 at 24-25.) In addition, the 

Magistrate Judge noted that even assuming the ALJ committed error 

by relying on an instance of positive Waddell’s Sign in the record, such 

error would be harmless given the rest of the ALJ’s extensive credibility 

analysis. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff argues that it was in error, and 

moreover, the error was not harmless because “it should not be assumed 

that a determination is unaffected by reliance on an erroneous basis 

merely because it is not the only one offered.” (Dkt. 23 at 14-15.) 

 

are the most well known of several tests developed to detect 

non-organic causes of low back pain. A positive Waddell’s 

sign may indicate that the patient’s pain has a psychological 

component rather than organic causes. While it is a common 

perception in the litigation arena that these signs are proof 

of malingering and fraud, they merely describe a 

constellation of signs used to identify pain in those who need 

more detailed psychological assessments. The literature . . . 

reveals that there is no association between positive Waddell 

signs and the identification of secondary pain and 

malingering. Patients with strong psychological components 

to their pain often display these signs as well. 

Minor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 513 F. App’x 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2013). 

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“An administrative decision is not subject to reversal merely 

because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite 

decision.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). “If 

supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be 

affirmed, even if [the reviewing court] would have arrived at a different 

result.” VanSingel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 26 F. App’x 488, 489 (6th Cir. 

2002). The fact that there may be record evidence that supports 

plaintiff does not negate the multiple inconsistencies noted by the ALJ. 

Looking at any specific instance noted above may look like “cherry 

picking,” as plaintiff argues, but when looking at the inconsistencies in 

their totality, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding as to 

credibility. Moreover, plaintiff is incorrect that these were all only 

isolated incidents in the record. As to physical therapy, plaintiff’s 

testimony did not only conflict with the June 17, 2013 report. As the 

ALJ noted, it also conflicted with notes from a July 2, 2013 examination 

that plaintiff “reported pain at a level of ‘seven’ on a one-to-ten scale, 

yet on examination was pleasant and appeared in no apparent distress.” 

(Dkt. 13-2 at 22.) And as to the positive Waddell’s Sign, plaintiff fails to 

consider that the Magistrate Judge correctly noted there was not only 

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one instance of a positive Waddell’s Sign. (Dkt. 22 at 25.) The 

Magistrate Judge did not err by finding that the ALJ’s decision was 

supported by substantial evidence. (Id. (citing Haynes v. Astrue, No. 

1:11-cv-185, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6755, at *23 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 

2012)).) 

On the whole, the inconsistencies between the objective medical 

evidence and plaintiff’s testimony as to his pain are numerous. When 

viewed not in isolation, but together, there was a physical therapy note 

that was inconsistent with plaintiff’s testimony and another doctor’s 

observation of plaintiff’s demeanor, a notation that plaintiff was not on 

medication at a time he was complaining of severe pain, a daily 

activities questionnaire (among conflicting questionnaires) that 

suggested plaintiff was able to do a number of activities inconsistent 

with his complaints of pain, and more than one positive Waddell’s Sign 

suggesting that his complaints of pain were exaggerated. 

The ALJ permissibly applied “ordinary techniques of credibility 

evaluation” when assessing plaintiff’s credibility. Adams v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-CV-503, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72356, at *3 (W.D. 

Mich. July 6, 2011). “[C]onservative treatment of his pain with 

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prescription medication” is “inconsistent with [plaintiff’s] allegations of 

severe pain.” See Carter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-14529, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 93511, at *12 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2014) (citing Myatt v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 251 F. App’x 332, 334-35 (6th Cir. 2007)). And the 

responses to questionnaires regarding plaintiff’s daily activities, albeit 

inconsistent, support the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s “subjective 

complaints were not credible in light of her ability to perform other 

tasks.” See Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 

2001). 

Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s credibility 

determination. Thus, plaintiff’s fourth objection is denied. 

e. Objection 5 

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by finding that 

the ALJ properly weighed the opinion evidence. (Dkt. 23 at 15.) The 

ALJ discounted the opinion of Dr. Suleiman, plaintiff’s treating 

physician, for two reasons: “1) it was issued to a different governmental 

agency in furtherance of a different program; and 2) it was not 

consistent with objective studies, physical examinations, and activities 

of daily living.” (Dkt. 22 at 30.) According to plaintiff, these are 

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insufficient reasons to reject Dr. Suleiman’s opinion. (Dkt. 23 at 17-18.) 

Plaintiff raised the same arguments in his motion for summary 

judgment. (See Dkt. 18 at 27-29.) 

 Under the regulations, treating physicians “are likely to be the 

medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal 

picture of [a patient’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique 

perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the 

objective medical findings alone.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). Thus, 

under the “treating physician rule,” the ALJ must “generally give 

greater deference to the opinions of treating physicians than to the 

opinions of non-treating physicians.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009). But “[i]t is an error to give an opinion 

controlling weight simply because it is the opinion of a treating source if 

it is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques or if it is inconsistent the [sic] with other 

substantial evidence in the case record.” Id. (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-

2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9, at *5 (July 2, 1996)). 

When, as here, the ALJ does not give controlling weight to a 

treating physician’s opinion, the “ALJ must apply certain factors[,] 

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namely, the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of 

examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, 

supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record 

as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source,” to determine 

how much weight to give the opinion.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). But this does not apply to opinions 

on issues reserved to the Commissioner, which “are never entitled to 

controlling weight or special significance.” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-5p, 1996 

SSR LEXIS 2, at *1 (July 2, 1996). 

Finally, even if the ALJ fails to discuss the requisite factors, the 

finding is harmless error if “a treating source’s opinion is so patently 

deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it,” “if the 

Commissioner adopts the opinion of the treating source or makes 

findings consistent with the opinion,” or “the Commissioner has met the 

goal of [§ 1527(c)]—the provision of the procedural safeguard of 

reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the 

regulation.” Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462, 470 (6th 

Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547). 

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The Magistrate Judge noted that plaintiff provided no cases, and 

the Magistrate Judge’s independent research did not reveal any law or 

opinions, supporting plaintiff’s assertion that “the fact the assessment 

was completed for another governmental program is not sufficient 

reason to discount it.” (Dkt. 22 at 30.) In his objection, plaintiff still 

fails to provide any such case law, instead arguing that “logic plainly 

reveals that this is wholly irrelevant to the weight given a physician’s 

opinion about a claimant’s functional abilities.” (Dkt. 23 at 16.) 

In fact, the regulations and case law suggest that this is a proper 

consideration when deciding how much weight to give a treating 

physician’s opinion. “[T]he amount of understanding of our disability 

programs and their evidentiary requirements that an acceptable 

medical source has . . . are relevant factors that we will consider in 

deciding the weight to give to a medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(6). Thus, it is relevant whether a treating physician 

prepared an opinion for a different program, especially when that 

opinion “contains no indication that [the physician] bears even a 

passing familiarity with the disability process.” Edmond v. Colvin, No. 

EDCV 13-1108-AS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167763, at *17 (C.D. Cal. 

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Dec. 3, 2014) (finding that ALJ properly discounted weight of treating 

physician opinion regarding claimant’s limitations prepared for 

worker’s compensation claim). 

Notably, the ALJ did consider Dr. Suleiman’s opinion. Giving the 

opinion “little weight” is not the same as giving it no weight. Cf. 

Trentini v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-5238 (DLI), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

137379, at *38 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2016) (“[W]hile an opinion of 

disability rendered for a different agency cannot bind the 

Commissioner, an ALJ, nevertheless, is compelled to consider the 

physician’s statements . . . .”); Davies v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-01115 (GLS), 

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70401, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010), adopted 

by 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70418 (N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010) (“Thus, it is 

clear from the ALJ’s decision, that she did not ignore the evidence 

submitted by [the treating physician], despite the fact that any opinions 

regarding [p]laintiff’s ability to work were created in a Workers’ 

Compensation context.”) (citing Soc. Sec. Rul. 06-03p, 2006 SSR LEXIS 

5, at *17 (Jan. 1, 2006)). 

In any case, that Dr. Suleiman prepared the opinion for another 

purpose was not the only reason the ALJ discounted the opinion. The 

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ALJ also found that the opinion was contradicted by the objective 

medical evidence. On this ground, plaintiff argues that Dr. Suleiman’s 

opinion was supported by imaging testing obtained at his request, and 

was “not inconsistent with the opinion of examining physician Amjad 

Shidyak, M.D., who found that [plaintiff]’s impairments cause ‘mild 

limitations on physical activity.’” (Dkt. 23 at 16-17.) 

Dr. Suleiman opined that plaintiff was “unable to work, could not 

lift or carry ten pounds, [and] could not stand or walk for two hours,” 

and that plaintiff was “significantly limited.” (Dkt. 13-2 at 23.) Dr. 

Suleiman’s opinion is not entitled to special deference because his 

conclusions relate to issues reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(d). Moreover, the ALJ highlighted that Dr. Suleiman’s 

treatment notes showed that plaintiff had “tenderness to palpation but 

good range of motion,” that he was “neurovascularly intact, with no 

motor or sensory deficits,” had “no erythema or edema,” and had 

“normal gait.” (Dkt. 13-2 at 24.) Even though other evidence might 

have supported a contrary conclusion, the ALJ gave “good reasons” why 

the opinion should be assigned little weight. See Nelson, 195 F. App’x 

at 470. Thus, plaintiff’s fifth objection is denied. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s objection (Dkt. 23) is 

DENIED, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 

22) is ADOPTED, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 18) is 

DENIED, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 

19) is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 6, 2016 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on December 6, 2016. 

s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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