United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1998 MILITARY

READINESS

Reports to Congress

Provide Few Details on

Deficiencies and

Solutions

GAO/NSIAD-98-68

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278930 

March 30, 1998

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman, Chairman

The Honorable Solomon Ortiz

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Procurement

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

This report responds to your request that we review the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts

to improve its readiness assessment and reporting process. Specifically, we assessed whether

(1) DOD plans to make improvements in its unit readiness database, including adding specific

readiness indicators; (2) a monthly review process instituted by the Joint Staff has improved

DOD’s ability to assess readiness; and (3) DOD’s quarterly readiness reports to Congress

accurately reflect readiness information briefed to senior DOD officials and provide information

needed for oversight of military readiness.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the

Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. We

will also make copies available to others upon request.

If you have questions concerning this report, please contact William C. Meredith, Assistant

Director, at (202) 512-4275. Other major contributors to this report were Carol R. Schuster,

Christine D. Frye, and Thomas W. Gosling.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose For more than a decade, various audit and oversight organizations have

questioned the thoroughness and reliability of Department of Defense

(DOD) reports on the readiness of U.S. military forces. Also, Congress has

expressed concern regarding apparent inconsistencies between DOD’s

official readiness reports and the actual readiness of units in the field. Due

to these concerns, the Senate and House military readiness subcommittees

asked GAO to review DOD’s efforts to improve its readiness assessment and

reporting process. Specifically, GAO assessed whether (1) DOD plans to

make improvements to its unit readiness database, including adding

specific readiness indicators; (2) a monthly review process instituted by

the Joint Staff has improved DOD’s ability to assess readiness; and (3) DOD’s

quarterly readiness reports to Congress accurately reflect readiness

information briefed to senior DOD officials and provide information needed

for oversight of military readiness.

Background DOD’s readiness assessment system is designed to assess and report on

military readiness at three levels—(1) at the individual unit level; (2) at the

joint force level; and (3) at the aggregate, or strategic, level. “Unit

readiness” refers to the ability of units, such as Army divisions, Navy ships,

and Air Force wings, to provide capabilities required of the combatant

commands and is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the

outputs for which it was designed. “Joint readiness” is the combatant

commands’ ability to integrate and synchronize units from one or more

services to execute missions. “Strategic readiness” is a synthesis of unit

and joint readiness and concerns the ability of the armed forces as a

whole, to include the services, the combatant commands, and the combat

support agencies, to fight and meet the demands of the national security

strategy. Strategic readiness focuses on broad functional areas, such as

intelligence and mobility, that meet worldwide demands.

The foundation of DOD’s unit readiness assessment process is the Joint

Staff’s Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). This automated

system functions as the central listing for more than 9,000 military units.

The system’s database indicates, at a selected point in time, the extent to

which these units possess the required resources and training to

undertake their wartime missions. Units regularly report this information

using a rating system that comprises various indicators on the status of

personnel, equipment, supplies, and training. SORTS is intended to enable

the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the military services to,

among other things, prepare lists of units readily available, assist in

identifying or confirming major constraints on the employment of units,

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Executive Summary

and confirm shortfalls and distribution problems with unit resources.

Limitations to unit readiness reporting through SORTS have been well

documented for many years by various audit and oversight organizations.

For example, prior reviews by GAO and others have found that (1) SORTS

ratings include subjective inputs, as well as objective measures; (2) SORTS

data is not standardized among the services; and (3) SORTS ratings may be

misleading because they are based on broad measurements that can mask

underlying problems. The Joint Staff and the services have identified other

needed improvements to the system.

To assess readiness at the joint level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff established the Joint Monthly Readiness Review in late 1994. During

the review process, the Joint Staff compiles readiness assessments from

the combatant commands, the combat support agencies, and the military

services. These DOD components assess their overall readiness to

undertake current and near-term operations and to meet the demands of a

wartime scenario. The scenario changes for each assessment period.

The Joint Staff and the services use the joint review assessments to brief

DOD’s leadership on the Senior Readiness Oversight Council—an

executive-level forum for monitoring emerging readiness issues. The

briefings to the Council are intended to present a view of readiness at the

aggregate force level. For instance, the Joint Staff reports on elements of

strategic concern, such as mobility shortfalls, that are based on readiness

deficiencies reported through the joint review. Similarly, the services

report on the readiness of major combat units and on broad trends in

personnel, equipment, and training. In addition, the Deputy Secretary of

Defense periodically tasks the Joint Staff and the services to provide

information on special readiness topics.

DOD is required under 10 U.S.C. 482 to prepare a quarterly readiness report

to Congress. Under 10 U.S.C. 482(b), DOD must “specifically describe

(1) each readiness problem and deficiency identified . . . (2) planned

remedial actions; and (3) the key indicators and other relevant information

related to each identified problem and deficiency.” In mandating the

report, Congress hoped to enhance its oversight of military readiness. The

reporting requirement was expanded in 1997 to require DOD to include

additional readiness indicators in the quarterly reports beginning in late

1998.1

 Examples of these indicators are historical and projected personnel

trends, operations tempo, and equipment availability. A typical quarterly

report is fewer than 20 pages, of which about two-fifths is devoted to

1

Section 322 of the fiscal year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997).

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Executive Summary

sections that quote the legislative reporting requirement, describe DOD’s

readiness assessment process, and list abbreviations. The remaining

sections of the report highlight major readiness issues and summarize

current readiness. Each report includes a classified annex that, among

other things, provides the Chairman’s overall risk assessment based on the

wartime scenario used in the joint review.

Results in Brief Over the last few years, DOD has, on the whole, taken action to improve its

readiness assessment system. These improvements include technical

enhancements to the unit readiness system as well as the establishment of

formal DOD-wide forums for evaluating current readiness at the joint and

strategic levels. GAO believes these changes represent progress; however,

limitations to DOD’s unit readiness system remain and may be reflected in

DOD’s readiness assessments. Additionally, DOD’s quarterly reports to

Congress provide only a vague description of readiness problems and

remedial actions; consequently, they are not effective as a congressional

oversight tool.

Both the Joint Staff and the services have initiated various efforts to

improve the technical aspects of the Status of Resources and Training

System. For example, they are developing software for entering data into

the system to improve timeliness and accuracy. However, these efforts will

not address other known system limitations, such as the lack of precision

in reporting the status of unit resources and training. Further, the Joint

Staff currently does not plan to add indicators to the system that were

identified by a 1994 DOD-funded study as having potential value for

monitoring readiness. These indicators, such as the availability of

ordnance and spares and personnel stability, are similar to those required

in the expanded 10 U.S.C. 482 reporting requirements added by Congress

in 1997. The 1994 study did not recommend that the indicators be added to

the unit readiness database, and Joint Staff officials said some of the

indicators were not appropriate for inclusion in this database because they

measure the readiness of forces at an aggregate level. DOD recently issued

an implementation plan for responding to the new requirements to include

additional readiness indicators in the quarterly readiness reports to

Congress.

The Joint Monthly Readiness Review has added a new dimension to DOD’s

capability to assess readiness because it goes beyond the traditional unit

perspective that was previously the focus of the readiness assessment

system. During the review, for example, the Joint Staff brings together

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Executive Summary

readiness assessments from a broad range of DOD organizations and

elevates readiness concerns to senior military officials. The review also

has expanded DOD’s readiness assessment capability by following a

recurring cycle, adding a joint perspective, incorporating wartime

scenarios, and tracking and addressing deficiencies. This review process,

however, depends heavily on the judgment of military commanders

because many of the readiness measures it captures cannot be quantified.

In addition, because the services obtain data from the unit readiness

system, any limitations to that system may be reflected in their joint

review assessments.

DOD’s quarterly readiness reports do not fulfill the legislative reporting

requirements under 10 U.S.C. 482 because they lack specific detail on

deficiencies and remedial actions. As a result, these reports do not provide

information needed for effective oversight of military readiness. These

reports accurately reflect information from briefings to the Senior

Readiness Oversight Council and present a highly aggregated view of

readiness, focusing on generalized strategic concerns. They are not

intended to and do not highlight problems at the individual combatant

command or unit level. DOD officials offered this as an explanation for why

visits to individual units may yield impressions of readiness that are not

consistent with the quarterly reports.

Principal Findings

DOD’s Plans to Improve

SORTS Will Not Address

All Known Limitations

The Joint Staff is implementing a phased approach for improving the

overall readiness assessment system, including SORTS. The first phase

involves mostly technical changes to address SORTS software problems.

One objective is to ensure that a single database is available DOD-wide.

Currently, various versions of SORTS exist at any one time because the

services, the Joint Staff, and other DOD components maintain their own

databases. The second phase is a $5.5 million effort to link SORTS with a

database used for planning and executing joint operations and to make the

system easier to use. Other Joint Staff plans call for connecting databases

involving such functional areas as logistics, training, and personnel. The

overall objective of this effort is to give commanders easy access to a wide

range of readiness data within a common computer architecture. The

services also have various efforts underway to improve the timeliness and

accuracy of the SORTS database. Specifically, each of the services is

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Executive Summary

developing or implementing computer software to automate the process of

entering SORTS data. The Joint Staff and service upgrades address many of

the technical limitations to the database, but they will not address other

SORTS limitations. For example, the upgrades will not address the

subjective input to SORTS ratings, the lack of standardization of data among

the services, and the lack of precision in measuring unit resources and

training. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials pointed out

that much of the information in SORTS is objective and quantifiable, and

they viewed the subjective input of unit commanders as a strength of the

system because it is based on their professional judgment.

DOD funded a contractor study in 1994 that identified 19 indicators that

were not in the SORTS unit readiness database but would be of potential

value to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for monitoring readiness.

The study did not recommend that the indicators be added to SORTS. Joint

Staff officials said they did not plan to add the 19 indicators to SORTS

because some of the indicators, such as recruiting status and equipment

maintenance backlogs, measure readiness at the aggregate level and thus

would not be appropriate for inclusion in SORTS. In February 1998, DOD

issued an implementation plan for responding to the reporting requirement

in 10 U.S.C. 482 to incorporate 19 additional indicators into the quarterly

readiness reports to Congress. These 19 indicators are similar to those

identified by the 1994 DOD-funded study.

Joint Review Has

Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment

Capability

The Joint Monthly Readiness Review has enabled DOD to make a more

comprehensive assessment of readiness than it made before the review

was established in 1994. It looks beyond the traditional snapshot in time of

unit readiness provided by SORTS, although SORTS data continues to be used

in the assessment process. For example, the joint review provides a

broad-based view of current readiness because it incorporates

assessments from a wide range of DOD components. Combatant commands

assess joint operational readiness, combat support agencies assess their

joint support capability, and the military services assess unit-level

readiness. On the basis of these inputs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff determines a level of risk associated with meeting the demands of the

national military strategy.

The joint review has helped to institutionalize the process of assessing

military readiness because it follows a recurring cycle. Each quarter,

participating DOD components conduct readiness assessments and provide

their reports to the Joint Staff. To provide a real-world assessment of

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Executive Summary

readiness, each component determines its ability to meet the demands of

specified wartime scenarios. Past scenarios, for example, have included

two major theater wars or a single major theater war and a smaller scale

contingency as well as special threats such as terrorism. To determine

readiness from a joint perspective, the combatant commands assess their

readiness in eight functional areas: joint personnel; intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance; special operations; mobility; logistics

and sustainment; infrastructure; command, control, communications, and

computers; and joint headquarters capability.

The outcome of the joint review is a list of deficiencies that fall under the

eight functional areas. As an example of a deficiency, one combatant

command reported insufficient mapping for major portions of his

geographical area. The joint review has added a formal process for

addressing identified deficiencies. The deficiencies are entered into a

database for tracking purposes and are assigned to a Joint Staff

directorate, which coordinates and facilitates corrective actions. For each

deficiency, the database includes the source of the deficiency, its status,

and the estimated completion date for any remedial actions. As of

January 1998, 237 deficiencies had been entered into the database, and 91

had been closed. Officials said that many deficiencies remain open

because they require significant funding over the long term.

Joint Staff policy allows considerable flexibility to participating DOD

components in how they conduct their joint review assessments. The Joint

Staff has prescribed standard readiness ratings to be used by the

combatant commands. However, they have allowed the combatant

commands to independently develop measures for each of the eight

functional areas. Although direct comparisons among the commands in

the functional areas are not possible, officials told us that the flexibility is

appropriate because of the differing functions of the commands and their

areas of responsibility. The services derive the majority of their data from

SORTS. Although they supplement this data through various other

indicators, such as personnel and logistics data, the inherent limitations to

SORTS may be reflected in their joint review assessments.

Both combatant command and service officials told us that despite the use

of indicators, these assessments are fundamentally subjective. Officials

said subjectivity was critical to obtaining a sound assessment of readiness

because of the inherent problems of quantifying and measuring all factors

affecting readiness.

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Executive Summary

Quarterly Readiness

Reports Are Not Effective

for Congressional

Oversight

DOD’s quarterly readiness reports to Congress reflect briefings provided to

the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. Because no written record of the

Council’s meetings are maintained, GAO compared selected Joint Staff and

service briefing documents provided to the Council with the

corresponding quarterly reports to Congress. GAO’s analysis showed that

the information in these documents was accurately portrayed in the

quarterly reports. In fact, the quarterly reports often described the issues

using the same wording contained in the briefings to the Council. The

briefings to the Council provide a highly summarized picture of DOD’s

readiness concerns, and the quarterly reports to Congress reflect the same

broad-based discussion of readiness. Joint Staff and service officials

described the briefings to the Council as executive-level summaries of

readiness concerns. In addition, the Council tends to focus on a few

specific topics at each meeting rather than all readiness indicators. The

briefing format is intended to allow all participants to highlight and brief

any readiness issues.

DOD’s quarterly reports do not fulfill the requirements under 

10 U.S.C. 482(b) to specifically describe identified readiness deficiencies

and to provide key indicators and other relevant information. Lacking such

detail, the quarterly reports provide Congress with only a vague picture of

DOD’s readiness problems. For example, one report stated that Army

personnel readiness was a problem, but it did not provide data on the

numbers of personnel or units involved. Further, the report did not discuss

how the deficiency affected readiness. The quarterly reports also do not

specifically describe planned remedial actions, as required under 

10 U.S.C. 482(b). Rather, they discuss remedial actions only in general

terms, with few specific details, and provide little insight into how DOD

plans to correct the deficiencies.

Recommendation To enhance the effectiveness of DOD’s quarterly readiness report as a

congressional oversight tool, GAO recommends that the Secretary of

Defense take steps to better fulfill legislative reporting requirements under

10 U.S.C. 482 by providing (1) supporting data on key readiness

deficiencies and (2) specific information on planned remedial actions.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the

recommendation and stated that it was taking action. Specifically, DOD

stated that the Senior Readiness Oversight Council had begun to focus

greater attention on specific issues that can have significant effects on

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Executive Summary

readiness. As these issues are addressed, they will be included in the

quarterly report. In addition, DOD stated that the reports will include any

possible remedial actions required.

DOD’s comments appear in their entirety in appendix I. DOD also provided

technical comments, which GAO has incorporated as appropriate.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

SORTS Is the Foundation of DOD’s Unit Readiness Assessments 15

Senior-Level DOD Forums Review Current Readiness 16

DOD Is Required to Report Readiness Problems to Congress 16

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 17

Chapter 2 

DOD’s Plans to

Improve SORTS Will

Not Address All

Known Limitations

20

Limitations to SORTS Identified in Prior Reviews 20

DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Focus on Technical Changes 22

Other SORTS Improvements Identified by OSD 24

Joint Staff Has No Plans to Add Recommended Indicators to

SORTS

25

Conclusions 27

Chapter 3 

Joint Review Has

Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment

Process

28

Senior Officials Acquire a Broad-Based View of Current

Readiness

28

Cyclical Schedule Institutionalizes Readiness Assessment 30

JMRR Incorporates Wartime Scenarios 32

Combatant Commands Provide a Joint Perspective 32

JMRR Process Tracks and Addresses Deficiencies 33

Assessments Are Not Standardized and Are Subjective by Design 35

Conclusions 37

Chapter 4 

Quarterly Reports

Provide Vague

Description of

Readiness Problems

and Remedial Actions

38

Reports Accurately Reflect Briefing Documents 38

Reports Reflect Strategic-Level Briefings Provided to SROC 39

Reports Do Not Provide Supporting Data for Identified Problems 40

Reports Address Planned Remedial Actions to a Limited Extent 41

Conclusions and Recommendation 42

Agency Comments 42

Appendix Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 44

Table Table 2.1: Indicators Identified in 1994 LMI Study 26

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Contents

Figures Figure 1.1: DOD’s Readiness Assessment Process 14

Figure 3.1: DOD Components Providing Input to the JMRR 29

Figure 3.2: Annual Schedule for the Full JMRR and Feedback

JMRR

30

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

GSORTS Global Status of Resources and Training System

JMRR Joint Monthly Readiness Review

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

LMI Logistics Management Institute

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

SROC Senior Readiness Oversight Council

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) operations and maintenance accounts

represent a significant portion of the defense budget (37 percent of the

budget in fiscal year 1998) and support key aspects of readiness, including

field training exercises and the maintenance of equipment. While the

Secretary of Defense has stated that he wants to provide enough funding

in future programs and budgets to ensure forces are ready to carry out

missions at acceptable levels of risk, there is uncertainty whether

readiness accounts will be fully funded. In particular, DOD has sought to

increase procurement funding for weapon system modernization and has

acknowledged that it must reduce its operations and maintenance

accounts to free up dollars for modernization. For this reason, DOD

officials will need to closely monitor readiness levels to detect any

emerging problems.

DOD’s readiness assessment system is designed to assess and report on

military readiness at three levels—(1) at the individual unit level; (2) at the

joint force level; and (3) at the aggregate, or strategic, level. “Unit

readiness” refers to the ability of units, such as Army divisions, Navy ships,

and Air Force wings, to provide capabilities required of the combatant

commands and is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the

outputs for which it was designed. “Joint readiness” is the combatant

commands’ ability to integrate and synchronize units from one or more of

the services to execute missions. “Strategic readiness” is a synthesis of

unit and joint readiness and concerns the ability of the armed forces as a

whole, to include the services, the combatant commands, and the combat

support agencies, to fight and meet the demands of the national security

strategy. Strategic readiness focuses on broad functional areas, such as

intelligence and mobility, that meet worldwide demands.

The foundation for assessing readiness at the unit level is the Status of

Resources and Training System (SORTS),1

 an automated system for

measuring the extent to which individual military units possess the

required resources and training to undertake their wartime missions. To

address joint readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

established the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) in 1994. During this

review process, the Joint Staff compiles readiness assessments from the

combatant commands, the combat support agencies, and the military

services. The Joint Staff and the services use the JMRR assessments to brief

DOD’s leadership on the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)—an

executive-level forum for monitoring emerging readiness issues at the

1

SORTS officially evolved into the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) with the

advent of the Global Command and Control System. We use the term SORTS throughout this report

because it is more familiar and continues to be commonly used.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 1 

Introduction

strategic level. From these briefings to the Council, DOD prepares a

legislatively mandated quarterly readiness report to Congress. Figure 1.1

provides an overview of DOD’s readiness assessment process.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: DOD’s Readiness Assessment Process

Services

Assess unit readiness

Prepare briefings

Combatant Commands

Assess joint readiness

Prepare message to 

joint staff

Joint Monthly

Readiness Review

Considers current and 

near-term readiness

Address/ track deficiencies

Service 

Briefings Message

Combat Support Agencies

Assess joint support

capability

Prepare message to joint staff

Joint Staff 

Briefing

Joint Staff

Prepare briefing based

 on input received

Services

Prepare briefing 

 based on JMRR

Joint Staff

Prepare briefing

 based on JMRR

Senior Readiness 

Oversight Council

Considers strategic and 

topical readiness issues

Joint Staff

Drafts quarterly readiness

report based on SROC

Final approval

Congress

Message

Service 

Briefings

Joint Staff 

Briefing

Draft

 Readiness 

Report

Final

 Readiness 

Report

Office of the

Secretary of 

Defense

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 1 

Introduction

SORTS Is the

Foundation of DOD’s

Unit Readiness

Assessments

The readiness of individual military units has long been the focus of DOD’s

readiness assessment process. The foundation for assessing unit readiness

is SORTS, an automated reporting system that functions as the central

listing of more than 9,000 operational units.2 SORTS indicates, at a selected

point in time, the status of personnel; equipment and supplies on hand;

equipment condition; and training, as reported by each unit. In their

reports, each unit commander also assess the unit’s ability to execute its

wartime mission, indicated by one of five “C” levels.3

 Units are required to

submit their SORTS reports on a regular basis or when there is a change in

their C level or location.

As a resource and unit monitoring system, SORTS is designed to support the

information requirements of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and

military services for crisis response planning, peacetime planning, and

management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces. For

example, SORTS is intended to give users the ability to prepare lists of units

that are readily available; estimate the time for earliest commitment of

units based on their location relative to the situation; assist in identifying

or confirming major constraints on the employment of units; track the

location and resource status of assigned units; provide unit data for other

automated systems; confirm shortfalls and distribution problems with unit

resources; confirm which units are best able to support the redistribution

of resources; and monitor corrections to shortfalls and problems.

The Joint Staff has overall responsibility for policies and procedures

governing SORTS. The services and the U.S. Special Operations Command

are required to ensure that all units comply with joint SORTS reporting

policies and have issued implementing instructions to supplement these

policies. The services, with the exception of the Marine Corps, require

additional service-unique information to be included in unit SORTS reports.

2

The requirement to submit SORTS reports applies to all combat, combat support, and combat service

support units, including active and reserve units, tasked in the Single Integrated Operational Plan, an

operations plan, or a service war planning document. Examples of reporting units are Army divisions,

brigades, and battalions; Navy ships, submarines, and aircraft squadrons; Air Force wings, groups, and

squadrons; and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and related elements.

3

A C-1 unit can undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized and designed; a C-2 unit

can undertake the bulk of its wartime mission; a C-3 unit can undertake major portions of its wartime

mission; a C-4 unit requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime mission but, if the

situation dictates, may be required to undertake portions of the mission with resources on hand; and a

C-5 unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared to undertake its wartime

mission.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Senior-Level DOD

Forums Review

Current Readiness

Senior military and civilian officials within DOD are briefed on current

readiness through two forums—the JMRR and the SROC. The JMRR was

instituted in late 1994 in response to a directive from the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to define, measure, and fix readiness. The Joint Staff’s

Readiness Division, established in the fall of 1994, is the proponent for the

JMRR. The JMRR is designed, among other things, to alert the Joint Staff to

any critical problems that affect readiness and to analyze the military’s

ability to execute wartime scenarios. The Vice Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff chairs the JMRR meetings, and a wide range of military

officials attend.

The JMRR forms the basis for briefings to the SROC, a group of senior DOD

officials who meet monthly to review current readiness issues. The

Council, which was in existence before the JMRR, changed its focus from

future readiness to current readiness about the same time the JMRR was

instituted. The Deputy Secretary of Defense chairs the Council, and senior

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the services,

and the Joint Staff attend. During SROC meetings, the services provide their

assessments of unit readiness, and the Joint Staff provides a joint

readiness assessment. The briefings to the Council are intended to present

a view of readiness at the strategic level. For instance, the Joint Staff

reports on elements of strategic concern, such as mobility shortfalls, that

are based on readiness deficiencies reported through the JMRR. Similarly,

the services report on the readiness of major combat units and on broad

trends in personnel, equipment, and training. In addition, the Deputy

Secretary of Defense periodically tasks the Joint Staff and the services to

brief the SROC on special readiness topics. In April 1997, for instance, the

services briefed the SROC on personnel shortfalls and pilot attrition.

DOD Is Required to

Report Readiness

Problems to Congress

DOD is required under 10 U.S.C. 482 to prepare a quarterly readiness report

to Congress.4

 Under 10 U.S.C. 482(b), DOD must “specifically describe

(1) each readiness problem and deficiency identified . . . (2) planned

remedial actions; and (3) the key indicators and other relevant information

related to each identified problem and deficiency.” In mandating the

report, Congress hoped to enhance its oversight of military readiness. The

reporting requirement was expanded in 1997 to require DOD to include

4

The law states that the information in the report shall be based on readiness assessments that are

provided that quarter (1) to any council, committee, or other body of DOD that has responsibility for

readiness oversight and whose membership includes at least one civilian officer in OSD at the level of

Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher; (2) by senior civilian and military officers of the military

departments and the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and (3) as part of any

regularly established process of periodic readiness reviews for DOD as a whole.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 1 

Introduction

additional readiness indicators in the quarterly reports beginning in late

1998.5

 Examples of these indicators are historical and projected personnel

trends, operations tempo, and equipment availability.

DOD submitted its first quarterly report in May 1996. The reports are

unclassified, but a classified annex is also submitted. A typical quarterly

report is fewer than 20 pages, of which about two-fifths is devoted to

sections that quote the legislative reporting requirement, describe DOD’s

readiness assessment process, and list abbreviations. The remaining

sections of the report highlight major readiness issues and summarize

current readiness. The classified annex, among other things, provides the

Chairman’s overall risk assessment based on the wartime scenario used in

the JMRR.

On the basis of the briefings presented to the SROC, Joint Staff officials

write the first draft of the quarterly report and send it for informal review

to an OSD official responsible for readiness assessment. This official

reviews the report for accuracy and completeness and may suggest

changes. Service readiness officials also review the first draft. After

incorporating changes, the Joint Staff sends the revised report back to OSD

for formal approval. The report is first approved by the Under Secretary of

Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Then it is transmitted to senior

officials in the services, other OSD offices, and the defense agencies for

their concurrence. Once this concurrence is received, the report is sent to

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,

the Secretary of Defense, and finally to Congress.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Congress has expressed concern regarding apparent inconsistencies

between DOD’s official readiness reports and the actual readiness of units

in the field. Due to these concerns, the Senate and House military

readiness subcommittees asked us to review DOD’s efforts to improve its

process of assessing and reporting readiness. Specifically, we assessed

whether (1) DOD plans to make improvements to SORTS, including adding

specific readiness indicators; (2) the JMRR process has improved DOD’s

ability to assess readiness; and (3) the quarterly readiness reports to

Congress accurately reflect readiness information briefed to senior DOD

officials and provide information needed for oversight of military

readiness.

5

Section 322 of the fiscal year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997).

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 1 

Introduction

We reviewed previous studies by our office, DOD, and other organizations

to identify reported problems with SORTS and recommendations to improve

the system. To evaluate DOD’s plans to improve the system and to add

readiness indicators, we interviewed officials and reviewed pertinent

documentation at the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), the

Joint Staff, and service headquarters. We also interviewed the DOD

contractor that assisted OSD in studying the readiness assessment system.

We did not test the reliability of the SORTS database to report the readiness

status of units.

To understand how DOD assesses and reports readiness at the joint and

strategic levels, we met with cognizant officials at OSD, the Joint Staff, and

the services to discuss the JMRR and SROC processes and the development

of the quarterly readiness reports to Congress. To determine how

accurately the quarterly reports reflect briefings to senior DOD officials, we

reviewed briefings to the SROC that supported the May and July 1997

quarterly reports to Congress. We selected these quarterly reports because

they were the most recently completed reports at the time we began our

audit work. Because minutes of the SROC meetings are not maintained, we

discussed the format and content of SROC meetings with cognizant

officials. We also traced information provided to the SROC to briefings

provided to the JMRR. Specifically, we reviewed service, combatant

command, and combat support agency input to the January and April 1997

JMRRs. To understand how the services develop their input, we traced

selected input and supporting analyses to the service readiness offices and

interviewed cognizant officials. To obtain a combatant command

perspective on the JMRR, we interviewed or obtained information from

officials at the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Central Command, the

U.S. European Command, and the U.S. Pacific Command who are

responsible for coordinating JMRR reports submitted to the Joint Staff.

However, we did not evaluate their assessment process.

To determine whether the quarterly reports meet the informational

requirements under 10 U.S.C. 482, we reviewed all six quarterly reports

that had been issued at the time of our review to determine whether

(1) identified deficiencies were specifically described and supported by

data and (2) planned remedial actions were discussed and specifically

described. We also analyzed the reports to determine trends in identified

deficiencies and the extent that the discussion of readiness problems

varied from report to report. We conducted a more in-depth analysis of the

May 1997 report.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 1 

Introduction

We performed our review from June 1997 to January 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not

Address All Known Limitations

For more than a decade, audit and oversight organizations, including our

office, have identified limitations to the SORTS unit readiness system. Some

of these limitations, such as the inability of SORTS to signal impending

changes in readiness, are inherent in the system. Other limitations can be

characterized as technical because they involve computer technology. Still

other limitations reflect problems in the content of unit SORTS reports, such

as the lack of precision in reporting the status of unit resources and

training.

The Joint Staff and the military services are working to improve the

technical aspects of the SORTS database. For example, they are developing

new software for entering data into the system to improve timeliness and

accuracy. However, these upgrades will not address other limitations to

unit SORTS reports that have been identified in prior reviews. OSD suggested

further improvements to SORTS, but the Joint Staff was not pursuing these

ideas at the time of our review. Additionally, the Joint Staff does not plan

to add indicators to SORTS that were identified by a 1994 DOD-funded study

as having potential value for monitoring readiness. According to DOD

officials, further review of these indicators found that some were not

appropriate for inclusion in a unit readiness database because they

measure the readiness of forces at an aggregate level. DOD recently issued

an implementation plan for responding to the new requirement in 

10 U.S.C. 482 to include additional readiness indicators in the quarterly

readiness reports to Congress. These required indicators are very similar

to those identified in the 1994 DOD-funded study.

Limitations to SORTS

Identified in Prior

Reviews

Limitations to SORTS have been well documented for many years by various

audit and oversight organizations, including our office. The DOD Inspector

General surveyed past evaluations by various audit and oversight

organizations and identified at least 41 reports issued between 1984 and

1996 that, in part, discussed the effectiveness of SORTS or its immediate

predecessor, the Unit Status and Identity Report. An overwhelming

majority of these reports discussed systemic limitations that, according to

the Inspector General, continued to plague the system. The following is a

partial listing of SORTS limitations identified in the most recent reviews by

our office or the DOD Inspector General:1

1

Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107,

Mar. 11, 1997); Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement

System (GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994); and Evaluation Report on the Status of Resources and

Training System, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense (Report No. 96-086; 

Mar. 15, 1996).

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• SORTS represents a snapshot in time and does not signal impending

changes in readiness.

• SORTS relies on military judgment for certain ratings, including the

commanders’ overall rating of unit readiness. In some cases, SORTS ratings

reflect a higher or lower rating than the reported analytical measures

support. In addition, ratings may be at odds with commanders’ remarks

submitted with the SORTS reports or may be inconsistent with information

obtained from officials in the field.

• Broad measurements for SORTS ratings may be misleading indicators of

resource availability because they can mask underlying problems. For

example, SORTS allows units to report the same rating for personnel

strength even though their personnel strength may differ by 10 percent.

• SORTS data is maintained in multiple databases located at combatant

commands, major commands, and service headquarters and is not

synchronized across the databases.

• SORTS is complex, time-consuming, and difficult to learn and understand.

• Services interpret SORTS reporting requirements differently, with the result

that SORTS data is not standardized.

• Army SORTS procedures requiring review of unit reports up the chain of

command delay the submission of SORTS data to the Joint Staff.

• SORTS reporting has been suspended during operational contingencies

because of the difficulty in using the system, the reporting burden on

units, and the failure to enforce reporting requirements.

• SORTS data may be out-of-date or nonexistent for some units registered in

the database because reporting requirements are not enforced.

• Joint users cannot rely on SORTS to obtain authoritative unit status or

location information, to plan deployments, to assess the execution of

operations plans, or to assist in making time-sensitive decisions.

DOD has identified needed improvements to SORTS, which are discussed in

the following section. However, in commenting on a draft of this report,

DOD officials pointed out that some progress had been made in addressing

these issues. They viewed subjectivity in SORTS reports as a strength

because the commander’s judgment provides a professional military

assessment of unit readiness. They also noted that much of the

information in the database is objective and quantitative. DOD officials also

said a recent change in SORTS policy will require units to continue reporting

during operational contingencies. Finally, the officials stated that SORTS

was, in fact, authoritative.

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DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not

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DOD’s Plans to

Improve SORTS

Focus on Technical

Changes

Both the Joint Staff and the services have various upgrades underway to

address problems with SORTS that they have identified. These upgrades,

however, focus on improving the technical aspects of the database. They

do not address other known limitations identified in reviews by our office

or the DOD Inspector General. Some of these limitations are inherent in the

system. For instance, the upgrades will not address the system’s inability

to forecast impending changes in readiness. The upgrades also will not

affect the subjectivity of SORTS ratings. Commanders may still raise or

lower the unit’s overall readiness rating based on their professional

judgment. Also, the upgrades will not (1) require uniform service

interpretations of SORTS reporting requirements or (2) require more precise

reporting of resource availability.

Joint Staff Efforts The Joint Staff is implementing a phased approach for improving the

overall readiness assessment system, including SORTS. The improvements

are described in a “business” plan that was developed by the Joint Staff in

response to the Quadrennial Defense Review. The plan had not been

approved at the time we conducted our review.

The first phase of the plan is to improve the SORTS database, which

involves mostly technical matters such as software problems affecting

data input, retention, and access. According to officials, these SORTS

improvements were identified by a users review panel that meets annually

with SORTS users at the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the services,

and the combat support agencies.

One of the Joint Staff’s main objectives during this phase is to ensure data

is synchronized across the multiple SORTS databases. As stated earlier, this

issue has been identified in prior reports as a system limitation. In

addition, the database is being modified to retain only the most current

remarks of a unit commander. Before this change, the database retained

remarks from prior reports, commingling past and current remarks, which

made analysis of SORTS reports more difficult. Also, service-unique data

maintained in the SORTS database has been made available DOD-wide, Joint

Staff officials said. The Joint Staff plans to make additional improvements

to the database in fiscal year 1998. For example, Joint Staff officials told us

that SORTS input fields will be changed to permit users to selectively edit

data without retyping the entire entry. Another planned enhancement is to

provide DOD-wide access to historical SORTS data. Currently, the services

maintain separate historical SORTS files.

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DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not

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Joint Staff officials also said they were working with Army officials to

improve the timeliness of Army SORTS reports. The Air Force, the Marine

Corps, and the Navy have agreed to the Joint Staff requirement to report

changes in unit C levels or location within 24 hours, but the Army has not,

according to Joint Staff officials. Army officials told us that their computer

hardware does not support the 24-hour reporting requirement and

estimated it would cost $56 million to acquire needed hardware. In

addition, Army SORTS reports are forwarded up the chain of command

before they are transmitted to the Joint Staff, thereby delaying their entry

into the database. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials

said the Army has agreed to submit SORTS reports within 96 hours and will

submit the reports within 24 hours when it has the tools to enable it to do

so.

The second phase of the plan is to implement a project aimed at

facilitating the use of SORTS data for operational planning and making the

system easier to use. The project, called Global SORTS Enhanced, was

initiated in June 1997. It is expected to take 32 months to complete at a

cost of $5.5 million, according to officials. A primary objective of Global

SORTS Enhanced is to provide a more direct connection between the SORTS

database and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

database in order to expedite readiness analysis for various contingencies.

JOPES contains the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data portion of

operations plans, including the units to be deployed, their desired

sequence for arrival in theater, and routing information. The organization

of data in Global SORTS Enhanced will allow for various types of readiness

analyses and graphic presentations. Furthermore, the use of web

technology will simplify data entry and enable units to confirm the

accuracy of the data they submit, which officials believe should reduce

database errors.

Other planned improvements to the readiness assessment system are

designed to give commanders easy and quick access to a wide range of

readiness data within a common computer architecture. For example, the

Joint Staff plans to connect existing databases involving various functional

areas such as logistics, training, and personnel. The plan calls for full

implementation, dependent on funding, by fiscal year 2003.

Service Efforts The Air Force has developed a computer application to standardize and

facilitate SORTS data input. The SORTS input tool was made available to all

Air Force reporting units in 1996, and currently about two-thirds use the

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DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not

Address All Known Limitations

tool. According to Air Force officials, the input tool minimizes errors in

SORTS data entry by simplifying the input process. The input tool

automatically calculates unit readiness ratings and allows a user to input

data directly into the SORTS database.

The Army has also developed an automated SORTS input tool; however, it is

not fully integrated to all units. Many reserve units still report on paper, an

Army official said. The Army also is developing a computer application

that is to facilitate analysis of SORTS data and, eventually, to integrate SORTS

data with other databases. According to Army officials, the application

being developed is scheduled to be operational about fiscal year 2000.

In 1997, the Marine Corps implemented its own automated SORTS input

tool. Marine Corps officials told us that the system allows units to report

SORTS data electronically and directly to the DOD database, instead of

reporting through the service chain of command.

The Navy does not have an automated SORTS input tool. Units manually

submit SORTS reports to the DOD database though the Atlantic and Pacific

fleet commands. The Navy plans to implement direct unit reporting into

SORTS by July 1998.

Other SORTS

Improvements

Identified by OSD

At the same time the Joint Staff was developing a plan to improve

readiness assessment, as discussed earlier, OSD conducted its own

requirements study. An OSD readiness official said the Joint Staff plan is a

step in the right direction. However, this official said the Joint Staff plan

mainly addresses technical problems with the SORTS database and does not

address other problems identified by OSD. While the Joint Staff does not

intend to pursue OSD’s suggested improvements at this time, OSD will

continue to work with the Joint Staff to promote its suggestions, the

official said.

The following are the potential improvements to SORTS identified by OSD:

• The Joint Staff and the services could modify SORTS reporting to permit

units to indicate their readiness to meet assigned tasks linked to specific

missions, such as a major theater war or a peace operation. Units could

report separate ratings based on the requirements of these different

missions.

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DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not

Address All Known Limitations

• The Joint Staff and the services could change SORTS reporting so that units

report their readiness to meet service tasks using the same task definitions

as those used in the joint arena.

• The Joint Staff and the services could require unit commanders to report

in SORTS the time required to deploy. Currently, Army units report only the

number of days of training required to be ready. OSD concluded that the

calculation of deployment time also should include mobilization

considerations such as personnel and equipment.

• Units could identify assets key to warfighting and report on the readiness

of such assets individually. Combat crews and pilots are examples of key

warfighting assets.

• Units could report the actual percentage of required resources for

personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and

training. The current ratings represent broad bands of readiness. For

example, two units could report the same rating for available personnel

strength even though one may have 89 percent of required personnel while

the other may have as little as 80 percent. Reporting the actual percentage

of required resources would, according to OSD, provide better detail on a

unit’s readiness status and have more meaning to senior leadership.

Joint Staff Has No

Plans to Add

Recommended

Indicators to SORTS

In 1994, we found that SORTS did not provide information on several factors

that military officials believed were needed for a comprehensive

assessment of readiness—factors such as mobility, operating tempo,

morale, and leadership. We reported on 26 indicators that were not in

SORTS but that DOD commanders said were important for a comprehensive

assessment of readiness. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense

direct that his office determine which indicators were most relevant to

building a comprehensive readiness system, develop criteria to evaluate

the selected indicators, prescribe how often the indicators should be

reported to supplement SORTS data, and ensure comparable data is

maintained by the services to facilitate trend analyses.

A 1994 DOD-funded study by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI)

reviewed the indicators discussed in our report and found that 19 of them

could help OSD monitor critical aspects of readiness.2

 (See table 2.1 for a

list of these 19 indicators.) Some of the indicators were considered to be

of high value for monitoring readiness, and others of medium value. The

study recommended that DOD (1) identify and assess other potential

indicators of readiness, (2) determine the availability of data to monitor

2

An Initial Assessment of GAO Collected Readiness Indicators: Their Value in Monitoring Mid-Term

Readiness and Avoiding Hollowness, Logistics Management Institute (Oct. 1994).

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
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DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not

Address All Known Limitations

indicators selected, and (3) estimate benchmarks to assess the indicators.

Although our study and the LMI study concluded that a broader range of

readiness indicators was needed, both left open how DOD could best

integrate additional measures into its readiness reporting.

Table 2.1: Indicators Identified in 1994

LMI Study Category Indicator Value

Personnel strength Individual personnel status Medium

Historical and projected

personnel trends

High

Personnel turbulence Recruit quality High

Borrowed manpower Medium

Personnel stability Medium

Personnel—other Personnel morale High

Medical and dental

readiness

Medium

Recruiting shortfalls High

Training Unit readiness and

proficiency

Medium

Operational tempo High

Funding High

Commitments and

deployments

High

Logistics—equipment fill Deployed equipment Medium

Equipment availability Medium

Not mission capable Medium

Age of equipment on hand High

Condition of non-pacing

items

Medium

Logistics—equipment

maintenance

Maintenance backlog High

Logistics—supply Availability of ordnance and

spares

Medium

Joint Staff officials said they had no plans to add the indicators to SORTS

that were identified in the 1994 LMI study. In February 1998, DOD issued an

implementation plan for responding to the reporting requirement in 

10 U.S.C. 482 to incorporate additional indicators into the quarterly

readiness reports to Congress. The new requirement, which takes effect

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DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not

Address All Known Limitations

beginning in October 1998, specifies 19 indicators that are very similar to

those identified in the 1994 LMI study.3

The new reporting requirement does not require DOD to incorporate the

indicators into SORTS, and various DOD readiness officials said they did not

believe it would be appropriate to do so. According to these officials, some

of the indicators measure readiness at an aggregate level rather than at the

unit level. For instance, historical and projected personnel trends,

recruiting status, and equipment maintenance backlogs measure readiness

on an aggregated basis rather than on a unit-level basis. Data on such

indicators would be available from higher level commands, not from the

unit level. Readiness officials, for example, said they can obtain data on

deployed equipment, nonmission-capable equipment, and availability of

ordnance and spares from service logistics offices at the headquarters

level. Moreover, the officials said some of these indicators are used to

prepare readiness briefings for the JMRR and the SROC. They also

emphasized that while SORTS is the foundation of the readiness assessment

process, it is not the only source of data used to assess readiness.

Conclusions While the current Joint Staff and service upgrades to SORTS address the

technical aspects of the database, they will not address other limitations

that have been identified in prior reviews. Thus, it is likely that questions

will continue to be raised about the reliability of SORTS in reporting unit

readiness. Furthermore, while the services use other data in addition to

SORTS, they still rely heavily on this database for their readiness

assessments at the joint and strategic levels. Thus, any inherent limitations

to SORTS may be reflected in their assessments.

The additional improvements to SORTS suggested by OSD could help to

clarify the information in the database and enhance its usefulness to OSD

and other users such as the combatant commands. For instance, by

reporting actual percentages along with their resource ratings, units could

provide more definitive information on the actual status of their resources.

Likewise, a requirement to report separately on key warfighting assets

could provide better visibility of these assets. It remains to be seen,

however, whether these proposals will lead to concrete actions to improve

the system.

3

The new legislative requirement deletes the medical and dental readiness indicator and adds a new

indicator on prepositioned equipment. Also, the individual personnel status indicator is expanded to

include personnel skills.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 3 

Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

The Joint Monthly Readiness Review represents progress toward a more

encompassing readiness measurement process. The review goes beyond

the traditional unit perspective that was previously the focus of the

readiness assessment system. During the review, for example, the Joint

Staff brings together readiness assessments of current and near-term

readiness from a broad range of DOD organizations and elevates concerns

to senior military officials. The JMRR is conducted on a recurring basis,

which has helped to institutionalize the process of assessing readiness at

DOD. It also has added a new dimension to DOD’s readiness assessment

capability by including wartime scenarios, which are intended to provide

insight into whether U.S. forces are ready for their most demanding

missions as well as other threats. The JMRR adds a joint perspective by

incorporating assessments from the combatant commands. Finally, the

review has added procedures for tracking and addressing reported

deficiencies. While DOD components are required to report on specific

readiness areas using a common rating scale, the assessment process itself

is not standardized. In addition, the assessments are subjective by design,

ultimately reflecting the judgment of senior military commanders.

Senior Officials

Acquire a

Broad-Based View of

Current Readiness

The JMRR considers readiness from a broad-based operational and strategic

viewpoint. While unit readiness is considered, the primary focus of the

review is to identify and address deficiencies that may reduce or preclude

a combatant command’s ability to perform assigned missions. JMRR

assessments encompass 11 combatant commands, 6 combat support

agencies, and the 4 military services (see fig. 3.1). The combatant

commands assess their joint operational readiness, the combat support

agencies assess their joint support capability, and the military services

assess unit-level readiness. On the basis of these inputs, the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates the overall risk associated with meeting

the demands of the national military strategy.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 3 

Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

Figure 3.1: DOD Components Providing Input to the JMRR

Combatant 

commands

Combat 

support

 agencies

Military 

services

European Command

Central Command

Pacific Command

Atlantic Command

Southern Command

Combined Forces Command

Special Operations 

Command

Space Command

Transportation Command

Strategic Command

North American Aerospace

 Defense Command

National Security Agency

Defense Information 

Systems Agency

Defense Logistics Agency

National Imaging and 

Mapping Agency

Defense Intelligence 

Agency

Defense Special Weapons

Agency

Army

Air Force

Navy

Marine Corps

The JMRR has enabled DOD to make a more comprehensive assessment of

readiness than was the case prior to its establishment in 1994. It looks

beyond the traditional snapshot in time of unit readiness provided by

SORTS, although SORTS data is used in the assessment process. Officials

involved in the review said readiness problems at the unit level may not

surface through the JMRR because the services discuss broad-brush

readiness issues in their briefings.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
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Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

A distinctive feature of the JMRR is its emphasis on current and near-term

readiness. The participating DOD components assess their readiness to

meet ongoing commitments, project near-term readiness over the next 

12 months, and assess their preparedness to meet the demands of a

wartime scenario (discussed later in this chapter). While current readiness

deficiencies often require long-term, programmatic solutions, the JMRR

seeks mitigating actions that can be implemented within the next 2 years.

The JMRR elevates current readiness deficiencies to the attention of senior

military officials. The senior leadership of the participating DOD

components reviews and approves the JMRR assessments. The Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairs the JMRR meetings. The service

operations deputies and the Joint Staff directors give the briefings.

Officials at the action officer level said these senior officials go through an

education process in preparing for the JMRR, a process that focuses their

attention on current readiness issues.

Cyclical Schedule

Institutionalizes

Readiness Assessment

The JMRR follows a recurring cycle in which the participating DOD

components conduct their readiness assessments and provide their

reports to the Joint Staff every 3 months. Within this quarterly cycle, the

JMRR has two distinct formats—a Full JMRR and a Feedback JMRR. (Fig. 3.2

shows the annual schedule for the two formats.)

Figure 3.2: Annual Schedule for the Full JMRR and Feedback JMRR

Feedback JMRR

Full JMRR

September

January April July October

March June December

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
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Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

At the beginning of each quarterly cycle, a Full JMRR is held to get input

from the DOD components on their readiness status and deficiencies. The

assessment process leading up to the Full JMRR begins when the Joint Staff

Readiness Division issues planning guidance describing the scenario to be

assessed. The combatant commands and the combat support agencies

conduct their readiness assessments and provide their reports to the Joint

Staff. The Joint Staff analyzes these reports and summarizes them in a

briefing. The military services conduct separate readiness assessments

and develop their own briefings. The joint and service briefings are given

at the quarterly Full JMRR meeting. In the 2 months of each quarter that a

Full JMRR is not held, the DOD components are required to report any major

changes in their readiness.

After the Full JMRR meeting, the Director Joint Staff assigns newly

identified deficiencies to the appropriate Joint Staff directorates. For

instance, deficiencies related to joint personnel are assigned to the

Directorate for Manpower and Personnel. A joint personnel deficiency

may involve the level of peacetime staffing of a command headquarters

organization. The Joint Staff directorates are responsible for tracking the

deficiencies assigned to them and coordinating corrective actions. A

Feedback JMRR is held 2 months after each Full JMRR as a forum for the

Joint Staff directorates to report on the new deficiencies identified in the

previous Full JMRR and to give an update on progress addressing

deficiencies.

The routine, cyclical nature of the JMRR has institutionalized the readiness

assessment process at DOD. The JMRR requires regular input from a broad

spectrum of officials across the agency. To participate in the JMRR, DOD

components have established internal processes for gathering readiness

information, conducting their assessments, and obtaining approval of the

assessments from senior leaders. The preparation for the Full JMRR and

Feedback JMRR meetings involves extensive discussions and regular

meetings among various participants in the process.

Officials said the JMRR has undergone some changes since its inception in

1994 but has matured over the past year or so. One significant change, in

1996, was a requirement that the Joint Staff directorates conduct the

Feedback JMRR briefings on the deficiencies for which they are

responsible. In the early Feedback JMRRs, the Readiness Division had

conducted these briefings. An official at one Joint Staff directorate said

this change promoted more ownership of the issues by the directorates.

The JMRR is still being refined. In May 1997, for instance, the services were

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Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

required to provide regular assessments of (1) antiterrorism/force

protection readiness and (2) special-interest areas such as maritime

prepositioning and war reserve stocks.

JMRR Incorporates

Wartime Scenarios

Planning guidance issued by the Joint Staff Readiness Division prior to

each Full JMRR provides details on the wartime scenario to be assessed.

Past scenarios have involved two major theater wars or a single major

theater war plus a smaller scale contingency. In a few cases, a scenario

has incorporated other threats such as terrorism. The planning guidance

identifies the war plans and taskings the components are to use in their

assessments. The guidance also specifies key dates, such as the day the

scenario is to commence, and discusses assumptions regarding the

availability of reserve forces and strategic lift assets.

Joint Staff Readiness Division officials said a scenario may be based on

guidance from the Director for Operations or other senior Joint Staff

officials. Alternatively, Readiness Division officials may suggest a

scenario. The key planning documents used in drafting the scenario are

the National Military Strategy, Defense Planning Guidance, and Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan. In addition, Readiness Division officials said

they receive input from intelligence officials and from the combatant

commands.

Various readiness officials viewed the wartime scenario as an important

aspect of the JMRR. They said it raises “what if” questions and provides

insight on whether U.S. forces would be ready today to carry out a war

plan with existing resources. According to readiness officials, most of the

JMRR deficiencies identified by the combatant commands have been related

to a scenario.

Combatant

Commands Provide a

Joint Perspective

In our 1994 report, we criticized the lack of a joint perspective in DOD’s

readiness assessment process. Also in 1994, the Defense Science Board

task force on readiness found that DOD lacked a clear definition of joint

readiness and a system to measure it. While combatant commands

reported periodically to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a

range of joint force readiness subjects, there was no defined

comprehensive approach to assigning responsibilities and matching

control of resources to these responsibilities, the task force said.1

1

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness (June 1994).

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
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Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

The JMRR is structured to incorporate the joint readiness concerns of the

combatant commands. The commands assess their readiness in eight

functional areas—joint personnel; intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance; special operations; mobility; logistics and sustainment;

infrastructure; command, control, communications, and computers; and

joint headquarters capability. A rating scale is used to rank the readiness

of each functional area. Separate ratings are assessed for current

readiness, projected readiness, and readiness to meet the demands of each

conflict or threat in the scenario. The scale runs from C-1 (most ready) to

C-4 (least ready). JMRR officials at the combatant commands told us that

the eight functional areas cover the key areas of joint readiness that need

to be assessed.

JMRR Process Tracks

and Addresses

Deficiencies

The outcome of the JMRR is a list of deficiencies that fall under the eight

functional areas. Readiness concerns that are rated by the combatant

commands or the combat support agencies as C-3 or below are considered

to be JMRR deficiencies.2

 For instance, one combatant command rated its

readiness for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as C-3 because

of insufficient mapping for major portions of his geographical area. The

Joint Staff enters such deficiencies into its deficiency database so they can

be tracked. The database assigns a control number to each deficiency and

contains a number of data fields, such as a short description of the

deficiency, its source, impact, status, date opened, and estimated

completion date for corrective actions. The Joint Staff directorates

responsible for tracking deficiencies update the database, which is made

available to all JMRR participants.

We checked selected deficiencies reported by the combatant commands

and found that they were included in the database. The entries in the

database often contained more detail than the original input because the

Joint Staff directorates documented new information as they addressed

the issue. As of January 1998, 237 deficiencies had been entered into the

database. Most deficiencies were reported by either the U.S. Central

Command or the Combined Forces Command, the leading combatant

commands in a scenario involving two major theater wars.

Although the combatant commands report service-related deficiencies, the

database generally does not include readiness deficiencies identified by

the military services. For example, one service reported that its readiness

2

A C-3 rating indicates that the command or agency has significant deficiencies that reduce its

capability to perform assigned missions.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 3 

Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

to respond to a worldwide terrorism threat was C-3 because it did not have

enough special security units. Such service-identified deficiencies are not

entered into the database to be monitored or addressed by the Joint Staff.

The officials said that the services are responsible for addressing their

own deficiencies independent of the Joint Staff. At the same time,

however, the services are actively involved in addressing deficiencies

reported by the combatant commands.

Deficiencies in the database are categorized as either readiness

deficiencies or capabilities deficiencies. A “readiness deficiency” is one in

which existing resources are not prepared to accomplish assigned tasks. A

typical readiness deficiency involves personnel who lack required training.

A “capability deficiency,” on the other hand, denotes a lack of resources

within DOD to meet mission requirements. For example, a combatant

command may not have sufficient reconnaissance assets to monitor its key

geographical areas. More than three-fourths of all deficiencies identified

through the JMRR have been capability deficiencies.

Some service officials we interviewed said that the combatant commands

clog the JMRR process by reporting a large number of capability

deficiencies, diverting attention from readiness deficiencies. Some of the

reported deficiencies are, in their opinion, of relatively minor importance.

JMRR officials at the combatant commands rejected this criticism. They

said the JMRR is their vehicle for reporting all deficiencies, including

capability deficiencies, and a combatant commander would not report a

deficiency he deems to be trivial.

A deficiency in the database may be closed with the approval of the

Director Joint Staff or through an annual revalidation process in which the

combatant commands review their previously reported deficiencies to

ensure they are still relevant. As of January 1998, 91 of the 237 (38 percent)

deficiencies in the database had been closed. For example, a combatant

command reported that the wartime staffing authorization for one of its

service components was too low. In response, the service designated staff

to the component headquarters for wartime, and this deficiency was

closed. Joint Staff officials, however, said relatively few deficiencies are

solved quickly. Most of the deficiencies reflect major, long-term problems

for which mitigating countermeasures are sought. In some cases, DOD has

decided not to address the deficiency but to understand and live with the

risk it poses. In other cases, programmatic action is required to address

the deficiency.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 3 

Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

For JMRR deficiencies requiring programmatic action within DOD, a linkage

has been established with another Joint Staff process—the Joint

Warfighting Capabilities Assessment. This capabilities assessment is

intended to help the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff influence DOD

funding decisions. Functionally oriented teams study military capability

issues that require significant expenditures. The teams’ findings and

recommendations are used to formulate the Chairman’s Program

Recommendations and Chairman’s Program Assessment, which in turn

influence the Defense Planning Guidance. Twice a year, the Director Joint

Staff nominates JMRR deficiencies for study by the Joint Warfighting

Capabilities Assessment. In August 1997, for example, 18 JMRR deficiencies

were nominated. The nominated deficiencies compete for attention with

other resource needs reported by the combatant commands.

Assessments Are Not

Standardized and Are

Subjective by Design

Joint Staff policies on the JMRR provide considerable flexibility to the

participating DOD components in how they conduct their assessments. As a

result, the components have developed their own JMRR assessment

processes to comply with the Joint Staff’s reporting requirements.

At the combatant commands, the JMRR assessments are based on input

from the headquarters staff directorates and from the service component

commands. An assessment for each of the eight functional areas is

approved by the responsible staff director. The functional area

assessments are then combined into an overall JMRR assessment that is

reviewed by the chain of command. Once approved, the assessment is

reported to the Joint Staff. To conduct their readiness assessments, the

combatant commands have independently developed measures for each of

the eight functional areas. For instance, U.S. Central Command officials

said they have developed three to five measures for most of the functional

areas. Officials told us this flexibility is appropriate because of the

differing missions of the commands and their areas of responsibility.

The services, like the combatant commands, draw JMRR input from a

variety of sources. Service readiness officials said the predominant

indicators they use are derived from SORTS, which they found useful for a

variety of analyses. However, they added that SORTS data often does not

stand on its own, and service headquarters officials must investigate the

reasons that a unit reports degraded readiness. JMRR officials in the service

operations directorates seek input as needed from other directorates, such

as personnel and logistics. These directorates, in turn, have developed

their own processes for gathering JMRR input. The logistics directorates at

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 3 

Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

the Air Force and the Navy, for example, gather SORTS data and other data

for various critical support enablers, such as sustainment, maintenance,

and engineering. This information is used to develop C ratings similar to

those the combatant commands use for their eight functional areas.

Despite the use of various readiness indicators, JMRR assessments are

fundamentally subjective. Readiness officials said subjectivity was critical

to obtaining a sound assessment of readiness because of the inherent

problems of quantifying and measuring all factors affecting readiness.

Readiness indicators are tools to be used by commanders. JMRR

assessments are subject to change throughout the review and approval

process, and the final assessment ultimately represents each commander’s

military judgment.

Service officials told us they may improve their overall readiness ratings

by substituting units for those apportioned in war plans. For example, a

unit may have key equipment in maintenance that is not available for the

scenario. In such cases, another unit would be chosen for the scenario.

The officials said such substitutions would occur in the event of a real

crisis. In addition, service officials may use more optimistic assumptions

to improve a unit’s readiness rating. For example, one service official told

us that he recalculated the readiness rating for some units by assuming

that the units could travel faster and arrive in theater sooner. The

command that made the initial calculation agreed with these changes, he

said.

The JMRR relies on the voluntary participation of DOD components to offer

realistic assessments of their readiness. No procedures exist to validate

the components’ assessments. Furthermore, the services do not provide

backup data to the Joint Staff in support of their JMRR assessments. Joint

Staff officials, however, said they were satisfied with the level of service

involvement in the process. In addition, the Joint Staff independently

monitors unit readiness through SORTS and gathers information on specific

service-related readiness issues as they arise.

According to the OSD readiness office, the objectivity of JMRR assessments

could be improved by integrating the review with the joint training system.

The joint training system evaluates the capabilities of joint forces based on

an approved set of tasks, conditions, and standards, and the combatant

commands could be required to evaluate their readiness based on these

same tasks, conditions, and standards. According to OSD, the JMRR

assessments also could be made more objective by using simulation

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Chapter 3 

Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s

Readiness Assessment Process

models to verify a unit’s mobilization capability and its ability to move to

the designated port of embarkation. This information would enhance the

credibility of war plans and improve JMRR assessments of scenario

readiness, they said. An OSD official told us, however, that there were no

current plans to implement these ideas.

Conclusions Since its establishment in 1994, the JMRR has enabled DOD to make a more

comprehensive assessment of readiness by looking beyond the traditional

view of unit readiness provided by SORTS. On a recurring basis, combatant

commands, combat support agencies, and the military services provide

current and near-term readiness assessments to senior military officials.

However, the JMRR assessments are largely subjective by design, and

standard measures are not used to assess the eight functional areas. As a

result, JMRR results cannot be used to make direct comparisons among the

commands in the eight functional areas. Nevertheless, we believe the JMRR

represents progress toward a more encompassing readiness assessment

process in DOD.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 4 

Quarterly Reports Provide Vague

Description of Readiness Problems and

Remedial Actions

DOD’s quarterly reports to Congress provide only a vague description of

readiness issues; consequently, they are not effective as a congressional

oversight tool. The reports accurately reflect information from briefings to

the Senior Readiness Oversight Council and present a highly summarized

view of readiness, focusing on generalized strategic concerns. They are not

intended to, and do not, highlight problems at the individual combatant

command or unit level. DOD officials offered this as an explanation for why

visits to individual units may yield impressions of readiness that are not

consistent with the quarterly reports. While the reports identify readiness

problems, they do not fulfill the legislative reporting requirements under

10 U.S.C. 482 because they lack specific detail on the problems and

planned remedial actions.

Reports Accurately

Reflect Briefing

Documents

A comparison of DOD’s May and July 1997 quarterly readiness reports to

Congress with the corresponding SROC briefings showed that the reports

accurately reflected the briefings. In fact, the quarterly reports often

described the issues using the same wording contained in the briefings to

the Council. Examples follow:

• The two most significant issues highlighted in the May quarterly report

were based on briefings to the April 1997 SROC. One concerned problems

with Air Force pilot retention, and the other concerned Army personnel

shortfalls.

• In the May 1997 quarterly report, service forecasts of unit readiness,

designated by trend arrows pointing up, down, or even, accurately

reflected briefings provided to the March 1997 SROC. Service forecasts in

the July 1997 quarterly report also accurately reflected service briefings to

the May 1997 SROC.

• The overall risk assessment provided in the May 1997 quarterly report

accurately reflected the Joint Staff assessment provided in a briefing to the

SROC in April 1997. Similarly, the overall risk assessment in the July 1997

quarterly report accurately reflected the Joint Staff assessment provided in

a briefing to the SROC in May 1997.

As part of our review, we traced selected information in the March and

April 1997 SROC briefings to the information discussed in the January and

April 1997 JMRR briefings. We confirmed that the information in the SROC

briefings was based on Joint Staff and service briefings. Finally, we traced

selected information in the Joint Staff and service JMRR briefings to the

supporting input. We found that the JMRR briefings prepared by the Joint

Staff accurately captured combatant command and support agency input

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 4 

Quarterly Reports Provide Vague

Description of Readiness Problems and

Remedial Actions

and that the JMRR briefings prepared by the services accurately

incorporated input from their directorates and field commands. Because

minutes of the SROC meetings are not maintained, we could not determine

how accurately the quarterly reports reflected actual discussion at these

meetings.

Reports Reflect

Strategic-Level

Briefings Provided to

SROC

As a senior-level forum, the SROC focuses on the preparedness of U.S.

military forces to carry out the national military strategy. A typical SROC

meeting is scheduled for 1 hour and includes briefings from the Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service chiefs, or their

designated representatives. The SROC briefings are basically summaries of

the information discussed in the JMRR or are in response to requests from

the Deputy Secretary of Defense for infomation on special readiness

topics. Our review of selected service JMRR and SROC briefings showed the

services did not include all information presented to the SROC that was

briefed to the JMRR. For example, the readiness of critical support

functions, such as engineering, field services, theater mobility support, and

security, which is briefed to the JMRR, was not included in the SROC briefing

documents.

The SROC is designed to promote open discussion among the senior-level

participants. The discussion centers around a few readiness topics and

does not consistently cover all readiness indicators. In the past, testimony,

the news media, congressional reports, and OSD trip reports from visits to

units in the field have provided the basis for SROC topics. The format of the

SROC also allows service chiefs the discretion to highlight and brief any

readiness deficiency they choose. Furthermore, senior-level service

officials may update information briefed to the SROC from what was briefed

to the JMRR. During our review, for instance, we found that one service

made updates to emphasize the need for timely reimbursement of funds

spent on contingency operations.

Since the quarterly readiness report flows from the SROC, it too contains

readiness information at the strategic level. Further, information excluded

from SROC briefing documents, such as the readiness of critical support

functions, is also excluded from the quarterly reports. As a result, the

aggregated information in DOD’s quarterly report does not include specific

deficiencies. Officials said this was an explanation for why visits to

individual units may yield impressions of readiness that differ from those

given in official reports. Some officials said the quarterly report was too

aggregated and bland to be of any use. Other DOD officials, on the other

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 4 

Quarterly Reports Provide Vague

Description of Readiness Problems and

Remedial Actions

hand, said the quarterly report does a good job of summarizing the current

state of readiness in the armed forces. Officials emphasized that the

quarterly report is not the only medium for providing readiness

information to Congress. Readiness information is also provided in

testimony, reports, and discussions with congressional staff.

Our review of six quarterly reports issued since May 1996 disclosed that

forecasts of service readiness tended to reflect a stable or positive

readiness situation. In each of these reports, the services made forecasts

in three assessment areas—personnel, equipment, and training—for a total

of 72 forecasts. Of these forecasts, only 10 (about 14 percent) were

negative. The remaining forecasts showed a fixed or positive readiness

trend. Further, DOD’s overall assessment of current readiness remained

generally constant from report to report. For example, every quarterly

report stated that “U.S. forces remain ready to execute their assigned

mission” and “short-term degradation of readiness can be expected as

units redeploy from contingencies or modernize.”

An OSD official estimated that 70 to 80 percent of the quarterly report is

routine narrative with little variation between reports. Officials conceded

that major readiness concerns do not change significantly from one

quarter to the next. Officials pointed to the large funding commitments

and time needed to address major readiness deficiencies. Shortfalls in

equipment and spare parts, for example, may require long-term funding to

fix the problem. Such deficiencies, because they are not resolved, will

appear in DOD’s readiness report each quarter.

Reports Do Not

Provide Supporting

Data for Identified

Problems

The quarterly readiness reports make general references to readiness

problems, but they do not specifically describe the problems or provide

supporting data as required under 10 U.S.C. 482(b). In the May 1997

quarterly report, for example, DOD identified several broad areas of

readiness deficiencies. For each, the report referred to one or more actual

deficiencies. Omitted, however, were the precise nature of these problems,

the data to support them, and their effect on readiness. Examples follow:

• The report cited Army personnel readiness as a problem, followed by a

listing of three deficiencies: (1) personnel shortfalls and turbulence,

(2) units with unstaffed squads, and (3) reassignment of soldiers to critical

support fields. The report did not, however, provide any other supporting

narrative or data, such as figures on the personnel or units involved. In

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Chapter 4 

Quarterly Reports Provide Vague

Description of Readiness Problems and

Remedial Actions

addition, the report did not discuss how these deficiencies affected

readiness.

• The report cited Air Force equipment readiness as a problem, noting

deficiencies in the (1) availability of bare base assets, (2) reduced aircraft

mission-capable rates, and (3) readiness of spare package fill rates. No

other supporting narrative or data was included, such as figures on the

availability of mission-capable aircraft.

• The report cited joint readiness for ongoing operations as a concern with

respect to (1) high operations tempo for some systems and (2) personnel

tempo. However, narrative or supporting data to illustrate the extent of

operations tempo, such as the numbers of tank miles and flight hours

executed, was absent.

Our review of other quarterly reports showed a similar lack of supporting

data for identified readiness deficiencies. The classified annex to the

reports contained additional information on some deficiencies but lacked

specific descriptions and supporting data.

Reports Address

Planned Remedial

Actions to a Limited

Extent

DOD is required under 10 U.S.C. 482(b) to specifically describe planned

remedial actions for readiness deficiencies, but we found the reports

addressed remedial actions only to a limited extent. The discussion of

remedial actions is in general terms, with few specific details, providing

little insight into how DOD plans to correct the problems. The reports, for

instance, do not address remedial action timelines, specific objectives,

responsible offices, or funding requirements, as the following examples

from the May 1997 report show.

• To correct a problem with Army training readiness, DOD reported that the

service was “working on solutions” to address staffing problems caused by

force structure imbalance. From this description, it is unclear exactly what

actions DOD was considering or implementing to correct the problems or

when they would be fixed.

• To address a problem with Air Force personnel readiness, DOD’s report

stated that to increase the number of pilots in the service, the Air Force

had formed teams to start corrective actions using compensation, quality

of life, staff conversions, and so on. DOD did not report what these

corrective actions would cost, the number of pilots targeted, and when the

problem would be fixed.

• To correct a problem with joint readiness for mobility, DOD reported that a

wartime evacuation plan had been reworked and key sealift and aircraft

assets would be acquired over the upcoming 6-year budget period. While

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
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Quarterly Reports Provide Vague

Description of Readiness Problems and

Remedial Actions

the quarterly report identified a planned remedial action, the report did

not provide all the information necessary to fully understand the

corrective action, such as the numbers and types of assets to be acquired

and the associated costs.

In a few cases, the classified annex to the report contained further

information on planned remedial actions. However, information such as

time frames and funding requirements was not included.

Conclusions and

Recommendation

DOD is required under 10 U.S.C. 482 to specifically describe readiness

problems and provide indicators and other relevant information, yet DOD’s

quarterly reports do not discuss the precise nature of each identified

deficiency, the data supporting the deficiency, and its effect on readiness.

Further, while DOD is required to provide information on planned remedial

actions, the quarterly reports could be more complete and detailed. For

example, they could include specific details on timelines, objectives,

responsible offices, or funding requirements. Lacking such detail, the

quarterly reports provide Congress with only a vague picture of DOD’s

readiness problems. To enhance the effectiveness of the quarterly

readiness report as a congressional oversight tool, we recommend that the

Secretary of Defense take steps to better fulfill the legislative reporting

requirements under 10 U.S.C. 482 by providing (1) supporting data on key

readiness deficiencies and (2) specific information on planned remedial

actions.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the

recommendation and stated that it was taking action. Specifically, DOD

stated that the Senior Readiness Oversight Council had begun to focus

greater attention on specific issues that can have significant effects on

readiness. As these issues are addressed, they will be included in the

quarterly report. In addition, DOD stated that the reports will include any

possible remedial actions required.

DOD’s comments appear in their entirety in appendix I. DOD also provided

technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Now on p. 42.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated March 13, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. We recognize that sources of quantitative readiness information other

than the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) exist, and the

report refers to these sources. Furthermore, the 1994 review conducted by

our office and the 1994 DOD-funded study by the Logistics Management

Institute concluded that a broader range of readiness indicators was

needed, but both left open how DOD could best integrate additional

measures into its readiness reporting.

2. We recognize that much of the information in SORTS is objective and

quantitative. Furthermore, we agree that it is appropriate for commanders

to apply subjective judgments to SORTS ratings. The judgment of a unit

commander based on professional military expertise may result in a more

accurate report of readiness than would be the case if only quantitative

measures were used. However, we have previously reported instances

where, because of subjectivity, SORTS ratings appeared to paint a rosier

picture of readiness than did various military officials, who expressed

concerns about readiness in their discussions with us, or even in

correspondence with higher headquarters. Specifically, our past work has

demonstrated that commanders rarely degrade their unit’s overall

readiness rating to reflect these concerns when they are not portrayed in

the quantitative portion of SORTS.

(703217) Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-98-68 Military Readiness
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