Comptroller General

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

of the United States

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The decision issued on the date below was subject to a 

GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has been 

approved for public release. 

Decision 

Matter of: FN Manufacturing, LLC 

File: B-402059.4; B-402059.5 

Date: March 22, 2010 

Joseph J. Dyer, Esq., Martin J. Golub, Esq., Amanda B. Weiner, Esq., and Daniel P. 

Wierzba, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, for the protester. 

Michael A. Hordell, Esq., Joyce K. Hackenbrach, Esq., Stanley R. Soya, Esq., and 

Heather Kilgore Weiner, Esq., Pepper Hamilton LLP, for the intervenor. 

Vera Meza, Esq., and Caridad Ramos, Esq., U.S. Army Materiel Command, for the 

agency. 

Edward Goldstein, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General 

Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision. 

DIGEST 

Agency’s evaluation of awardee’s past performance as relevant based on 

comparative complexity of awardee’s past performance references was reasonable 

and consistent with the terms of the solicitation which afforded the agency the 

discretion to consider “the degree to which contracts are of a comparable 

complexity, size or value to the proposed effort” in determining relevance. 

DECISION 

FN Manufacturing, LLC, of Columbia, South Carolina, protests the award of a 

contract to Colt Defense LLC, of West Hartford, Connecticut, under request for 

proposals (RFP) No. W56HZV-09-R-0402, issued by the U.S. Army Materiel Command 

for the supply of M240B machine guns. FN argues that the Army did not reasonably 

evaluate Colt’s past performance in accordance with the solicitation’s evaluation 

criteria, the Army’s technical evaluation was flawed, and its source selection 

decision was unreasonable. 

We deny the protest. 

The Army issued the RFP on April 7, 2009, contemplating the award of a 4-year 

fixed-price indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contract for the supply of 

M240B machine guns. Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal was 

determined to represent the best value to the government considering the following 

factors: technical, past performance, small business participation, and price. The 
RFP established that the technical factor was slightly more important than past 

performance and substantially more important that small business participation, 

while past performance was more important than small business participation. The 

non-price factors, when combined, were considered to be “slightly more important 

than Price.” RFP, § M.1.a. 

The technical factor was comprised of four subfactors: approach/schedule, 

facilities/equipment, quality system, and key personnel. The approach/schedule 

subfactor was “significantly more important” than the other subfactors, which were 

of equal importance. The technical factor and each of the subfactors were to be 

rated as “low risk,” “moderate risk,” or “high risk.” RFP, § M.2. 

As it relates to the protest, in responding to the technical factor, offerors were 

required to propose “a technical approach and pre-production schedule, and 

information demonstrating access by the Offeror (and [its] suppliers/subcontractors) 

to all resources necessary to fulfill the requirements of the Technical Data Package.” 

RFP, § L.2. Under the approach/schedule subfactor, offerors were to set forth the 

technical approach and pre-production schedule that they would use to “perform 

technical data package review, establish change management, fabrication and quality 

control processes, fabricate and evaluate First Article hardware (if applicable) and 

initiate production hardware fabrication and delivery in accordance with the 

required delivery schedule.” Id.

Under the facilities/equipment subfactor, offerors were to detail their “production 

facilities/equipment available (or plan and schedule to obtain same) to fabricate, 

inspect and test the M240B Machine Gun to the Technical Data Package, in its 

entirety and in accordance with the required delivery schedule.” Id. Offerors were 

also required to describe their “plant production capacity” under this subfactor, 

which was to include certain specific “minimum” information, to include, among 

other things, the extent to which specific “processes or items” were being 

subcontracted. Id.

Past performance was to be rated as “very low risk,” “low risk,” “moderate risk,” 

“high risk,” or “unknown risk.”1

 RFP, § M.3. In this regard, the RFP required offerors 

to submit contract references representing “recent, relevant performance.” The term 

“recent” was defined to mean within the last 3 years since the issuance of the 

solicitation. The term “relevant” was defined as follows: 

 

1

 “Very low risk” was defined to mean that there is “very little doubt” regarding an 

offeror’s ability to successfully perform the required effort, while “low risk” and 

“moderate risk” were defined to mean, respectively, that the agency has “little” or 

“some” doubt regarding the offeror’s ability to successfully perform the contract. 

RFP, § M.3. 

Page 2 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
Performance that demonstrates the offeror has successfully 

manufactured or provided the M240, 7.62mm Machine Gun or similar 

items. These are listed in descending order of importance from highly 

relevant to the somewhat relevant: 

• M240, 7.62MM Machine Gun produced to the U.S. Army’s 

Technical Data Package (TDP). 

• Gas operated, belt fed, machine guns produced to other Military 

technical data packages. 

• Other small arms weapons, machine gun parts, or experience in 

producing commercial small arms parts. 

The degree to which contracts are of a comparable complexity, size or 

value to the proposed effort may also be considered in determining 

relevance. 

RFP, § L.3. 

Small business participation was to be rated as “excellent,” “good,” “adequate,” 

“marginal,” or “poor” based, in part, on 

the extent to which offerors (both large and small businesses) 

identify and commit to small business (SB), veteran-owned small 

business (VOSB), service-disabled veteran-owned small business 

(SDVOSB), HUBZone small business, small disadvantaged business 

(SDB), woman-owned small business (WOSB), and historically 

black college and university/minority institution (HBCU/MI) 

participation in the contract, whether as the contractor or a 

subcontractor, or as a member of a joint venture or teaming 

arrangement. 

RFP, § M.5. A rating of “excellent” was appropriate where a proposal committed to 

having more than 20% of the dollar value of the contract performed by the above 

small business categories, either through the prime (if so qualified) or through 

subcontractors or team members. According to the RFP, the agency would also 

consider whether the offeror “has substantive evidence suggesting prior achievement 

of subcontracting plans or policy goals, and whether, based on the proposal and past 

performance risk history, the offeror’s proposal goals and/or actions are substantial 

and are considered very realistic (very low risk).” Id. 

The Army received two timely proposals in response to the RFP, from FN and Colt. 

For the purpose of evaluating proposals, the Army established a Source Selection 

Evaluation Board (SSEB). Upon completing an initial evaluation, the Army held 

discussions with the two offerors and obtained final proposal revisions. After 

evaluating the offerors’ final proposals, the Army selected Colt for award, which was 

Page 3 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
made on September 25, 2009. FN was notified that day of the Army’s decision and 

requested a debriefing on September 28. The Army provided FN with a debriefing on 

October 2 and, on October 6, FN filed a protest with our Office. Before submitting 

its agency report, the Army agreed to take corrective action in response to FN’s 

protest, including a reevaluation of the firms’ proposals and the issuance of a new 

source selection decision.2

 We dismissed the protest as academic on November 20. 

To implement the promised corrective action, the source selection authority (SSA) 

reevaluated the proposals and issued a new Integrated Assessment of Proposal and 

Source Selection Decision Document (SSDD). The new SSDD reflects the following 

ratings as determined by the SSA: 

Technical Risk 

Past 

Performance 

Small Business 

Participation Total Price 

FN Low Risk Very Low Risk 

Excellent, Very 

Low Risk $106,163,664.39

Colt Moderate Risk Low Risk 

Excellent, Very 

Low Risk $87,333,810.50 

Agency Report (AR), Tab III.1., SSDD, at 24. 

The record reflects that the SSA disagreed with the SSEB’s “low risk” rating for Colt 

as it related to “technical risk” and instead concluded that Colt should have been 

assigned a rating of “moderate risk,” in light of the fact that Colt has not produced an 

M240 machine gun. Id. at 13. Notwithstanding FN’s superior ratings under the 

technical and past performance factors, the SSA determined that Colt’s proposal 

represented the best value to the government. On December 9, the Army informed 

FN that the proposals had been reevaluated and the SSA had affirmed the Army’s 

prior award to Colt. FN requested a debriefing on December 11, which it received on 

December 18. FN filed an initial protest on December 21 and a supplemental protest 

on December 28, both of which are the subject of this decision. 

 

2

 While implementing its promised corrective action, the Army stayed performance of 

Colt’s contract.

Page 4 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
DISCUSSION 

FN challenges several aspects of the Army’s evaluation of Colt’s proposal. 

Specifically, FN argues that the Army did not reasonably evaluate Colt’s past 

performance in accordance with the evaluation criteria established under the RFP. 

In this regard, FN complains that the Army found contracts referenced by Colt to be 

relevant notwithstanding the fact that they did not meet the solicitation’s definition 

of relevant. In addition, FN argues that Colt’s proposal should have been 

downgraded under the technical evaluation factor because Colt did not include 

information demonstrating access by its suppliers and subcontractors to resources 

necessary to fulfill the requirements of the technical data package, and because Colt 

failed to identify its suppliers and subcontractors. FN challenges the Army’s 

evaluation of Colt’s proposal under the small business participation factor as well, 

arguing that the agency failed to consider Colt’s lack of demonstrated success in 

achieving subcontracting goals, and its failure to consistently identify its proposed 

subcontractors. As a final matter, FN asserts that the SSA’s selection decision was 

unreasonable. 

Timeliness 

As a threshold matter, Colt contends that FN’s December 28 supplemental protest is 

untimely.3

 Under our Bid Protest Regulations, protests other than those based on an 

alleged solicitation impropriety must be filed within 10 days after the basis of protest 

is known or should have been known, except when a required debriefing is 

requested. 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(1) and (2) (2009). In challenging the timeliness of FN’s 

supplemental protest, Colt first argues that FN did not file its protest within 10 days 

of when it knew or should have known its bases of protest. Colt asserts that FN 

knew, or should have known, of the bases for its December 28 supplemental protest 

from the evaluation record the Army provided to FN’s counsel in connection with its 

prior October 6 protest, coupled with the December 9 letter from the Army affirming 

its prior award decision to Colt. Because FN did not file its supplemental protest 

within 10 days of learning of the Army’s revised source selection decision, Colt 

maintains, the protest is untimely. 

 

Colt also contends that the debriefing exception in section 21.2(a)(2) of our 

Regulations does not apply in this case because the debriefing FN received on 

December 18 was not a “required debriefing” as defined by Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) § 15.506(a)(1), which provides as follows: 

 

3

 In its supplemental protest, FN specifically challenged the agency’s evaluation of 

Colt’s proposal under the technical and small business participation factors. In its 

initial protest, FN challenged the agency’s failure to reasonably evaluate Colt’s past 

performance. 

Page 5 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
An offeror, upon its written request received by the agency within 

3 days after the date on which that offeror has received notification 

of contract award in accordance with 15.503(b), shall be debriefed 

and furnished the basis for the selection decision and contract award. 

According to Colt, the Army’s December 9 letter advising FN of the results of its 

reevaluation and revised source selection decision was not a “notification of 

contract award”; rather, FN received the notice of the award decision on September 

25. Colt argues that, because FN’s December 11 debriefing request was not made 

within 3 days of the “notification of contract award,” the debriefing the Army 

provided in response to this request was not a “required debriefing,” thus rendering 

the debriefing exception under 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(2) inapplicable. 

Because we find that FN filed its supplemental protest within 10 days of when it 

knew, or should have known, of the bases of its supplemental protest, we need not 

address whether the debriefing exception to our timeliness rules applies here. In 

this regard, even where a disappointed offeror does not secure a required debriefing,

as Colt contends is the case here, it retains the right to file a protest within 10 days 

after its learns, or should have learned, the basis for protest, provided it has 

diligently pursued the matter; this includes the right to file a timely protest based on 

information obtained during a debriefing that was not “required” within the meaning 

of FAR § 15.506(a)(1). See Raith Eng’g & Mfg. Co., W.L.L., B-298333.3, Jan. 9, 2007, 

2007 CPD ¶ 9 at 3. 

Here, we find that FN diligently pursued the information that it learned at the 

debriefing and its protest based on the information learned at the debriefing thus is 

timely filed. Specifically, FN’s supplemental protest challenges the Army’s failure to 

properly evaluate Colt’s proposal under the technical and small business 

participation factors. The December 9 letter merely advised FN of the Army’s ratings 

for the offerors under the various factors and its determination that Colt’s proposal 

represented the best value to the government. It was not until FN received its 

debriefing on December 18, which included a detailed discussion of the agency’s 

reevaluation and revised selection decision, that FN had the facts needed to 

reasonably know its bases of protest.4

 Because FN’s supplemental protest was filed 

on December 28, within 10 days of its December 18 debriefing, it is timely. 

 

(continued...) 

4

 In reaching this conclusion we reject Colt’s assertion that FN was aware of or 

should have known its bases of protest from documents pertaining to the agency’s 

initial evaluation and selection decision, which FN received in connection with its 

protest of the Army’s initial award decision. The Army represented to our Office and 

the parties that it intended to perform a reevaluation of the offerors’ proposals and 

make a new selection decision. Based on these representations, it was reasonable 

for the protester to assume that the initial findings were not reflective of the agency’s 

revised evaluation and new selection decision. 

Page 6 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
Past Performance 

FN argues that the Army unreasonably evaluated Colt’s proposal as “low risk” under 

the past performance factor. According to FN, based on the terms of the RFP, none 

of Colt’s past performance references should have been considered relevant because 

they did not involve the manufacture of “belt-fed” machine guns, or indeed, machine 

guns at all. 

Where a solicitation calls for the evaluation of past performance, we will examine 

the record to ensure that the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the 

solicitation’s evaluation criteria and procurement statutes and regulations. Divakar 

Techs., Inc., B-402026, Dec. 2, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 247 at 5. The evaluation of past 

performance, by its very nature, is subjective; an offeror’s mere disagreement with 

the agency’s evaluation judgments does not demonstrate that those judgments are 

unreasonable. SDV Telecomms., B-279919, July 29, 1998, 98-2 CPD ¶ 34 at 2. 

Here, Colt submitted three references for evaluation: (1) a contract for the 

manufacture of M/4/M4A1 carbines, with a value of approximately $478 million; (2) a 

contract for the manufacture of the M16A4 rifle with a value of approximately $16 

million; and (3) a second contract for the manufacture of M4/M4A1 carbines with a 

value of approximately $6 million. The SSA determined all three references to be 

relevant since they were of “comparable complexity and value to the proposed 

effort.” AR, Tab III.1, SSDD, at 18. 

In documenting his relevance determination, the SSA concluded that the M4/M4A1 

and the M16 are considered machine guns because they are weapons which are 

capable of automatically shooting more than one shot by a single pull of the trigger 

without having to be manually reloaded.5 In this regard, the SSA further noted that 

 

(...continued) 

(continued...) 

5

 The record reflects that, in concluding that the M4 and M16 are “machine guns,” the 

SSA considered the National Firearms Act of 1934, specifically, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) 

(2006), which defines a “machine gun” as follows: 

any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily 

restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual 

reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also 

include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed 

and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed 

and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machine gun, and 

any combination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled 

if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. 

Page 7 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
“the M4A1 carbine is capable of full automatic fire at a rate of approximately 800 

rounds per minute from a 30 round detachable box magazine.” AR, Tab III.1, SSDD, 

at 17. Expressly recognizing that the referenced weapons are not “belt-fed” machine 

guns, the SSA determined that the complexity of a box magazine-fed machine gun, 

like the M4/M4A1 and M16, “requires a similar attention to strict government 

technical tolerances and specifications of a belt fed magazine” and further noted that 

“any effort to manufacture complete small caliber automatic weapons demonstrates 

greater knowledge and capability than the production of lesser weapons or weapon 

parts.” Id. at 17. According to the SSA, the weapons manufactured by Colt under 

these contracts “were made and tested to a weapon specification similar to the M240 

Machine Gun.” Id. at 18. 

The SSA also expressly considered the dollar values of the various contracts 

referenced by Colt as part of his relevance assessment. In this regard, the SSA 

highlighted the fact that the $478 million M4/M4A1 contract had a “significantly” 

greater value as compared to the estimated value of the M240 acquisition 

(approximately $187 million). Id. The SSA again noted that the M4/M4A1 weapon 

manufactured by Colt is made in accordance with a government-approved technical 

data package, which involves a “significant degree of complexity.” Id. 

Acknowledging that the other two contracts referenced by Colt were not equivalent 

in dollar value, the SSA similarly emphasized the complexity associated with the 

weapons manufactured under these contracts in justifying his determination that 

they should be considered relevant for the purposes of evaluating Colt’s past 

performance. 

FN principally argues that the SSA’s findings do not comport with the evaluation 

criteria established under the RFP, which defined “relevant” as “[g]as operated, belt 

fed machine guns produced to other Military technical data packages.” RFP, § L.3. 

According to FN, the M4/M4A1 and M16 weapons “in general parlance” are not 

considered machine guns. Protest at 8. FN asserts that, even if they can properly be 

considered machine guns, they are not “belt-fed,” and thus, by the terms of the RFP, 

Colt’s contracts for the manufacture of these weapons should not have been 

regarded as relevant. Instead, they should have been considered, at most, 

“somewhat relevant,” which was defined to encompass “other small arms weapons, 

machine gun parts, or experience in producing commercial small arms parts.” RFP, 

§ L.3. FN further argues that the SSA could not rely on the language in the 

solicitation indicating that “comparable complexity, size or value to the proposed 

effort may also be considered in determining relevance” for the purpose of finding 

Colt’s contracts for the M4/M4A1 and M16 weapons relevant. In FN’s view, such a 

finding would render the relevance categories meaningless since it would allow the 

Army to effectively redefine the specific relevance definitions identified in the RFP. 

 

(...continued) 

Page 8 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
We find that FN’s challenge to the agency’s past performance evaluation is based on 

an unreasonably narrow reading of the SSA’s evaluation and the evaluation criteria 

established under the RFP. First, as established by the record, the SSA expressly 

recognized the fact that Colt’s referenced contracts did not fit precisely within the 

definition of a belt-fed machine gun under the relevance categories identified in the 

RFP. Thus, whether the guns manufactured under Colt’s M4/M4A1 and M16 

contracts are in fact “machine guns” (a term not specifically defined in the RFP) or 

“belt-fed” weapons, is not relevant to assessing the reasonableness of the SSA’s 

analysis. Rather, the record shows that the SSA based his relevance assessment on 

the degree to which Colt’s contracts for the manufacture of the M4/M4A1 and the 

M16 weapons were of comparable complexity to the manufacture of the M240 

machine gun. 

Second, by its terms, the language of the RFP afforded the agency broad discretion 

in assessing relevance beyond the narrowly defined relevance categories identified 

by the RFP. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the discretionary language 

appears immediately after the defined relevance categories and expressly provides 

that “complexity, size or value to the proposed effort may also be considered in 

determining relevance.” RFP, § L.3 (emphasis added). Moreover, recognizing that 

the agency retained the discretion under the RFP to effectively look beyond the 

specific relevance categories does not render the defined categories meaningless, as 

FN asserts. Rather, it is FN’s rigid adherence to the defined relevance categories 

that would effectively read out the discretionary language set forth in the RFP. See

Northrup Grumman Info. Tech., Inc., B-401198, B-401198.2, June 2, 2009, 2009 CPD 

¶ 122 at 2 (in order for an interpretation to be reasonable, solicitation must be read 

as a whole and in a manner that gives effect to all of its provisions). The SSA 

reasonably understood the RFP language as affording him the overall discretion to 

consider a multitude of factors in making his final assessment regarding the 

relevance of offerors’ references in addition to the specific relevance categories 

established by the RFP. Because the agency’s evaluation was consistent with the 

evaluation criteria established by the terms of the RFP, we see no basis to find the 

agency’s past performance evaluation improper as FN has alleged. 

FN further argues that it was unreasonable to find Colt’s referenced contracts 

relevant since they are not of comparable complexity.6

 FN believes that the 

 

(continued...) 

6

 In its current protest FN argues that the Army unreasonably found Colt’s contract 

for the manufacture of the barrel for the M240/M240C machine gun to be relevant. 

This argument is a departure from the arguments raised in FN’s initial protests, 

before the agency implemented corrective action, which argued that the Army failed 

to properly consider Colt’s performance on its barrel contract, noting that the barrel 

is a “critical” component and it “is more relevant than Colt’s past contracts for the 

M4 and M16.” Supp. Protest, Oct. 13, 2009, at 8. FN speculated that Colt’s 

Page 9 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
manufacture of the M240 machine gun is significantly more complex as compared to 

the manufacture of Colt’s M4/M4A1 and M16, which are not belt-fed, and notes that 

this fact was expressly recognized by Colt in its proposal and the solicitation, which 

specifically defined relevant contracts as involving belt-fed machine guns. While 

Colt’s proposal highlights various similarities and recognizes the differences between 

the manufacture of the M4/M4A1 and M16 as compared to the manufacture of the 

M240, Colt’s proposal does not indicate, or otherwise suggest, that its activities 

under its referenced contracts were not of comparable complexity. In addition, FN’s 

reliance on the RFP to support its relevance argument simply rehashes its contention 

that the SSA’s relevance determination was contrary to the terms of the RFP. As 

explained above, the RFP afforded the Army the discretion to make judgments 

regarding the relative degree of complexity of a contract as compared to the M240B 

requirement when assessing relevance. While FN may ultimately disagree with the 

SSA’s assessments regarding the comparable complexity of Colt’s references and his 

determination that they were relevant for the purposes of evaluating Colt’s past 

performance, FN’s mere disagreement does not render the SSA’s evaluation findings 

unreasonable.7

 

 

(...continued) 

performance on its barrel contract had been “so difficult that it is likely that Colt will 

miss First Article Qualification” and, had the agency properly considered its 

performance under this contract, it would not have rated Colt’s past performance as 

low risk. Id. at 8-9. Upon receipt of the record in this case--which revealed that the 

SSA had in fact considered Colt’s performance under its M240 barrel contract, that 

Colt had completed its first article testing early, and that all indications were that the 

Army was completely satisfied with Colt’s performance--FN shifted its stance to 

argue that it was unreasonable for the agency to have considered Colt’s barrel 

contract relevant and that its performance under this contract could not justify Colt’s 

“low risk” rating. Given FN’s shifting views of the significance of Colt’s barrel 

contract, its arguments concerning the agency’s consideration of this contract are 

unpersuasive. 

7

 FN further maintains that the Army improperly considered information regarding 

Colt’s performance on other unspecified contracts; that information, which the 

agency obtained from databases like PPIRS, reflected that Colt did not have any 

performance problems. The record shows that some of the information in fact 

pertained to Colt’s performance under several of the contracts it referenced in its 

proposal. To the extent the databases had information about performance under 

other contracts, it appears from the record that the SSA considered that information 

as, in effect, a check on the evaluation, looking for any indication that might warrant 

reconsidering the ratings assigned. In our view, the SSA’s general consideration of 

this information was not improper or otherwise inconsistent with the RFP. To the 

extent FN argues that the Army’s consideration of the information was unfair 

because it did not consider such information in its evaluation of FN’s past 

performance, the record shows that the Army in fact did do an overall check of the 

(continued...) 

Page 10 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
Technical Evaluation 

FN also challenges the agency’s evaluation of Colt’s proposal under the technical 

factor. According to FN, Colt proposed to subcontract approximately 80% of the 

work, yet failed to consistently identify the suppliers/subcontractors it intended to 

use to perform the contract and, with respect to the suppliers and subcontractors it 

did identify, Colt, in many instances, did not provide necessary information 

concerning the resources of these firms. In sum, FN contends that “the SSA simply 

ignored the fact that Colt did not provide any information demonstrating its 

suppliers/subcontractors’ access to the necessary resources” to perform the 

contract. Protester’s Comments at 8. As a related matter, FN argues that the Army 

should have further downgraded Colt’s proposal based on the schedule risk 

associated with Colt’s failure to identify the suppliers/subcontractors it would use to 

manufacture the M240B machine gun. 

The record reflects that Colt proposed to subcontract the manufacture [DELTED] 

components of the M240B machine gun while assembling [DELETED]. Colt 

separately listed each major component of the M240B and described how the 

component would be manufactured. For example, Colt expressly identified the 

“receiver” as “the most critical assembly in the manufacture of the [M240B machine 

gun]” and specifically discusses how its expertise and knowledge is applied to the 

manufacture and assembly of this component. Colt’s Technical Proposal, at 22. Colt 

discusses the “barrel group” for the M240B and notes its current contract for the 

manufacture of 22,500 M240 spare barrels, explains that it has established the source 

plan needed to manufacture the barrels, and identifies the manufacturing processes 

it is incorporating to the manufacture of this barrel. Colt also identifies the “cover 

assembly” as a “critical” part, and explained that it would be the primary 

manufacturer [DELETED] and that it would assemble the components in-house. 

Colt further provided extensive details regarding the experience and capabilities for 

two of its critical suppliers [DELETED]. In addition to identifying its overall 

approach to the major components, Colt provided the Army with a detailed 

“make/buy” spreadsheet, which identified a specific subcontractor/supplier for every 

component part of the M240B machine gun as well as lead times for manufacture of 

the component. Colt further included a “partial listing of suppliers” (32 in total) 

which Colt was “expecting” to use in the manufacture of the M240B, with hyperlinks 

to several of the suppliers’ websites for further details regarding their capabilities. 

Id. at 31-33. 

 

(...continued) 

performance databases for FN similar to the check it did with regard to Colt. See

AR, Tab III.1, SSDD, at 15-20. 

Page 11 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
In its review of Colt’s technical proposal, the Army found Colt’s make/buy 

spreadsheet to be complete and determined that it substantiated its approach to 

manufacturing the M240B machine gun; however, it found some of the lead times to 

be “rather aggressive.” AR, Tab III.1, SSDD, at 9. The Army also concluded that 

Colt’s subcontracting approach, as set forth in its proposal and make/buy 

spreadsheet, is a “practical approach to the manufacture of an item as complex as 

the M240B, which reduces the risk [DELETED].” Id. at 10. As part of its evaluation, 

the Army noted Colt’s plan [DELETED] and found this to be a “reasonable risk 

reduction method.” Id. at 11. The Army also considered Colt’s strategic suppliers, 

their areas of expertise, the summary information on the facilities, equipment, 

quality system, and key personnel for Colt’s most significant supplier as well as 

general information regarding Colt’s second key supplier, and determined that Colt’s 

existing subcontractor base for its current small arms contracts will “facilitate the 

subcontract performance for the proposed contract.” Id. Ultimately, the SSA was 

“confident that Colt has the necessary technical and engineering skills, production 

capability, and the staff to produce the M240B MG.” Id. at 13. Notwithstanding this 

confidence, the SSA determined that Colt should receive a “moderate risk” rating 

since it has not in fact produced an M240B. Id. Based on this record, which reflects 

the Army’s detailed consideration of Colt’s proposal, there is no basis to sustain FN’s 

challenge to the technical evaluation of Colt’s proposal. 

Regarding certain alleged discrepancies associated with Colt’s identification of its 

subcontractor/suppliers, we think FN overstates the importance of any such 

discrepancies. As reflected in Colt’s proposal, the critical aspects of the work were 

to be performed by Colt and its major subcontractors, all of which are identified and 

fully described throughout Colt’s proposal.8 To the extent FN highlights the fact that 

Colt’s make/buy spreadsheet includes subcontractors that are not among the 32 

“expected” suppliers listed in Colt’s technical proposal, this list, by its terms, was 

only a “partial listing of suppliers,” as noted above. Colt’s Technical Proposal at 31. 

Thus, there does not appear to be any discrepancy on the face of Colt’s proposal in 

this regard. FN also contends that Colt’s subcontractors/suppliers were not firmly 

identified, since Colt indicated in its proposal that it would “do another final 

 

8

 As explained by Colt in its comments, [DELETED] of the work required by the 

contract would be carried out by Colt itself and four major subcontractors, all of 

which are among the 32 listed in its proposal and identified throughout its make/buy 

analysis. Moreover, Colt notes that since award of the contract, it has in fact 

contracted with [DELETED] subcontractors listed in its technical proposal and 

[DELETED] of its major subcontractors. Colt also acknowledges that some of its 

suppliers of minor components or parts are listed in its proposal, but not included in 

its make/buy analysis. This discrepancy, according to Colt, was due to the fact that 

the make/buy analysis listed only first-tier subcontractors, while some of the minor 

suppliers identified in Colt’s technical proposal are second-tier suppliers. Colt’s 

Comments at 18-19. 

Page 12 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
complete make-buy analysis” at “the time of contract award.” Id. at 7. The RFP, 

however, did not require firms to commit themselves to particular 

suppliers/subcontractors in their proposals. Rather, it simply asked firms to identify 

the items and processes that they intended to subcontract. RFP, § L.2.b(2)(e). 

Moreover, Colt added that it believed that [DELETED]. Id. In sum, FN’s allegations 

do not provide a basis for our Office to conclude that the Army acted unreasonably 

in assigning Colt a “moderate risk” rating under the technical evaluation factor. 

Small Business Subcontracting Plan 

FN argues that the Army unreasonably evaluated Colt’s plan for small business 

subcontracting as “excellent” and “very low risk.” According to FN, Colt’s ratings 

were unjustified because, as Colt indicates in its proposal, it does not have 

established procedures for achieving its goals and its list of intended small business 

suppliers was undefined as reflected by inconsistencies in identifying firms when 

compared to Colt’s make/buy analysis. 

Under the small business participation factor, a rating of “excellent” was reserved for 

offerors who proposed to subcontract more than 20% of the work, by dollar value, to 

small business concerns and where “the offeror’s proposal goals and/or actions are 

substantial and are considered very realistic (very low risk)” considering the 

proposal and the offeror’s “Past Performance Risk history.” RFP, § M.5. In assessing 

risk under this factor, the RFP provided for an evaluation of offerors’ performance in 

complying with requirements for the utilization of small business concerns, and for 

large business offerors, the RFP indicated that the agency would also consider their 

past performance in complying with FAR clause 52.219-9, Small Business 

Subcontracting Plan. Id.

As indicated in its proposal, Colt planned to subcontract approximately [DELETED] 

of the contract effort to small businesses and provided a listing of the specific small 

business firms that it intended to use to perform the work as well as the specific 

components or services that each firm would provide. Colt, which was a small 

business concern itself until 2009, did not have a history of compliance with FAR 

clause 52.219-9; however, Colt indicated that it has a history of promoting small 

business utilization, that it maintains a listing of small business suppliers, and that 

historically it has placed over [DELETED] of its requirements with small business 

concerns. AR, Tab 17b, Evaluation of Colt’s Small Business Participation Plan, at 28-

29. Colt further explained that it was “establishing internal efforts to guide and 

encourage buyers” which included having them attend small business workshops 

and training programs, as well as monitoring activities to ensure compliance with its 

subcontracting plan. Id. at 28. 

The record reflects that the Army considered Colt’s small business plan in detail and 

reasonably concluded that it warranted an “excellent” rating. In this regard, the 

Army noted that Colt planned to subcontract a “substantial portion” of the work to 

Page 13 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
small business concerns--specifically noting its plan to subcontract approximately 

56% of the contract to small business concerns, which was well in excess of the 20% 

needed to achieve a rating of excellent. Id. at 3. Moreover, recognizing that Colt did 

not have a past performance record in complying with FAR clause 52.219-9 given its 

recent status as a small business, the Army noted that Colt maintained a listing of its 

small business suppliers and that it had a [DELETED] historical rate of placing 

requirements with small business concerns. To the extent FN contends that Colt did 

not deserve an “excellent” rating due to Colt’s limited history with implementing 

small business subcontracting plans, its lack of firm procedures to implement its 

subcontracting plans, and its [DELETED] small business placement rate, FN’s 

arguments amount to little more than mere disagreement with the agency’s 

evaluation of Colt’s proposal under this factor and do not support a basis for 

sustaining its protest. 

Moreover, the discrepancies about which FN complains concerning Colt’s 

inconsistent listing of its small business suppliers under its small business utilization 

plan as compared with its make/buy analysis, are minimal and consist of at most two 

firms [DELETED] of the [DELETED] small business firms identified in Colt’s small 

business utilization plan. See id. at 12-14. While these two firms do appear on Colt’s 

small business plan as suppliers, and do not appear on Colt’s make/buy analysis 

spreadsheet, they do in fact appear on Colt’s listing of suppliers in its technical 

proposal. See Colt’s Technical Proposal, at 32-33. Given the limited nature of the 

alleged discrepancy,9 and the fact that the firms are in fact identified in Colt’s 

technical proposal, we conclude that FN’s allegation in this regard does not present a 

basis for our Office to conclude that the agency’s findings were unreasonable or 

otherwise improper. 

 

Source Selection Decision 

As a final matter, FN challenges the SSA’s best value tradeoff decision. In this 

regard, FN argues that the SSA’s decision to select Colt’s lower-priced proposal was 

unreasonable because it did not afford any weight to the superiority of FN’s proposal 

under the technical and past performance factors as compared to the proposal 

submitted by Colt. 

It is well-settled that an agency properly may select a lower-rated, lower-priced 

proposal, even where price is a less important evaluation factor than technical merit, 

where it reasonably concludes that the price premium involved in selecting the 

 

9

 There is nothing in the record to suggest that even if Colt did not intend to use 

these two firms that its small business participation plan would drop below the 20% 

threshold required for an “excellent” rating. Rather, much of work appears to be 

subcontracted to Colt’s critical suppliers, [DELETED] both of which are listed as 

small business concerns. 

Page 14 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 
Page 15 B-402059.4, B-402059.5 

higher-rated proposal is not justified in light of the acceptable level of technical 

competence available at a lower price. The extent of such tradeoffs is governed only 

by the test of rationality and consistency with the evaluation criteria. Thus, a 

protester’s disagreement with the agency’s determinations as to the relative merits of 

competing proposals, or disagreement with its judgment as to which proposal offers 

the best value to the agency, do not establish that the evaluation or source selection 

was unreasonable. General Dynamics--Ordnance & Tactical Sys., B-401658, 

B-401658.2, Oct. 26, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 217 at 8. 

 

Here, the record reflects that the SSA performed a detailed examination of the 

offerors’ proposals under each evaluation factor and subfactor identified in the RFP. 

The record further reflects that the SSA understood and recognized the lower 

performance risk associated with FN’s technical approach and past performance 

record largely based largely on FN having previously, and successfully, 

manufactured the M240B machine gun, as compared to the risk posed by Colt, which 

has not manufactured this weapon, but determined that the lower risk associated 

with FN’s proposal did not warrant a price premium of more than 21%. We see no 

basis to object to this determination. 

 

The protest is denied. 

Lynn H. Gibson 

Acting General Counsel