[Cite as State v. Montez, 2022-Ohio-640.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-21-1086 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR202001414 

 

v. 

 

Nathan Montez DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: March 4, 2022 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Alyssa Breyman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Joseph C. Patituce, Megan Patituce, and Aaron A. Schwartz, 

 for appellant 

* * * * * 

 MAYLE, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Nathan Montez, appeals the April 16, 2021 judgment 

of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, imposing a prison sentence of 30 months 
2. 

following his conviction of gross sexual imposition of a person less than 13 years of age. 

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment. 

I. Background 

{¶ 2} Nathan Montez was indicted on two counts of gross sexual imposition of a 

person less than 13 years of age, violations of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) and (C), third-degree 

felonies. These charges stemmed from allegations that Montez engaged in sexual contact 

with his then five- and six-year-old nieces while he was babysitting them. On March 2, 

2021, as part of a plea agreement, he entered a plea of no contest to one count and the 

other count was dismissed. The trial court sentenced Montez to 30 months in prison, five 

years’ mandatory post-release control, and various costs, and Montez was classified a 

Tier II child victim offender subject to registration requirements. His conviction and 

sentence were memorialized in a judgment journalized on April 16, 2021. 

{¶ 3} Montez appealed. He assigns the following errors for our review: 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR [I]: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

SENTENCING MR. MONTEZ TO A TERM OF THIRTY (30) MONTHS 

IN PRISON. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II: THE APPLICATION OF R.C. 

2929.13(D)(1) TO VIOLATIONS OF R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) IS 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 

 
3. 

II. Law and Analysis 

{¶ 4} In this appeal, Montez challenges his 30-month prison sentence and the 

constitutionality of R.C. 2929.13(D)(1) as applied to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). We consider 

each of his assignments in turn. 

 A. Montez’s Prison Sentence 

{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, Montez argues that the trial court erred when 

it sentenced him to 30 months in prison rather than imposing community control. He 

acknowledges that under R.C. 2907.05(C)(2), a conviction under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) 

carries with it a presumption of prison, but he insists that it is a rebuttable presumption 

that still requires consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. He contends that the trial 

court considered only factors “counting against” him and failed to consider mitigating 

circumstances. Montez suggests that the factors in R.C. 2929.13(D)(2)—which he 

acknowledges do not apply here—weighed against a prison sentence. He claims that he 

sufficiently rebutted the presumption in favor of prison, therefore, the imposition of a 30-

month sentence was improper. 

{¶ 6} The state responds that the court was not required to make any particular 

findings in order to impose a prison sentence. It explains that because R.C. 

2929.13(D)(2) is inapplicable to convictions under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), courts have 

generally reviewed the considerations in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 to determine whether 

the imposition of a prison sentence is supported by the record. But it emphasizes that 

under recent Ohio Supreme Court case law, appellate courts cannot conduct an 
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independent review of the record to determine whether the considerations in R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12 support the trial court’s sentence. Rather, an appellate court can 

consider only whether a sentence imposed is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. 

Here, the state maintains, the sentence imposed is not clearly and convincingly contrary 

to law. Finally, the state insists that even if we could conduct an independent review of 

the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 considerations, Montez has failed to demonstrate that those 

considerations support community control rather than a prison term. 

{¶ 7} We review a challenge to a felony sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify 

a sentence or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for 

resentencing if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings 

under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of 

section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, 

whichever, if any, is relevant; 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶ 8} In State v. Tammerine, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1081, 2014-Ohio- 425, ¶ 

15, we recognized that a sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law for 

purposes of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) where the trial court has considered the purposes and 

principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors listed 
5. 

in R.C. 2929.12, properly applied post-release control, and sentenced the defendant 

within the statutorily-permissible range. 

{¶ 9} Importantly, however, the Ohio Supreme Court has made clear that “neither 

R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial court to make any specific factual findings on 

the record.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 20. 

In fact, the trial court’s consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12 is presumed even on a silent record. State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-

Ohio-9423, 108 N.E.3d 1; State v. Cyrus, 63 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 586 N.E.2d 94, 95 

(1992). And an appellate court may not independently weigh the evidence and substitute 

its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the appropriate sentence under R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12, nor may it modify or vacate a sentence under R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2)(b) based on the lack of support in the record for the trial court’s findings 

under those statutes. Jones at ¶ 39, 41-42. 

{¶ 10} Montez was convicted of gross sexual imposition under R.C. 

2907.05(A)(4). Under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), “[n]o person shall have sexual contact with 

another, not the spouse of the offender * * * when * * * [t]he other person, or one of the 

other persons, is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the 

age of that person.” “Gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division [R.C. 

2907.05](A)(4) * * * is a felony of the third degree.” R.C. 2907.05(C)(2). “* * * [F]or 

gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division (A)(4) * * * there is a 

presumption that a prison term shall be imposed for the offense * * *.” Id. See also R.C. 
6. 

2929.13(D)(1) (“* * * [F]or a violation of division (A)(4) * * * of section 2907.05 of the 

Revised Code for which a presumption in favor of a prison term is specified as being 

applicable, it is presumed that a prison term is necessary in order to comply with the 

purposes and principles of sentencing under section 2929.11 of the Revised Code.”). 

{¶ 11} R.C. 2929.13(D)(2) sets forth circumstances under which the sentencing 

court may impose a community control sanction instead of a prison term on an offender 

for a first or second degree felony or for certain felony drug offenses for which a 

presumption in favor of a prison term is specified as being applicable. It identifies certain 

factors, the existence of which may overcome the presumption in favor of a prison 

sentence. But R.C. 2929.13(D)(2) is expressly not applicable to a conviction under R.C. 

2907.05(A)(4). See R.C. 2929.13(D)(1) (“Division (D)(2) of this section does not apply 

to a presumption established under this division for a violation of division (A)(4) of 

section 2907.05 of the Revised Code.”). 

{¶ 12} Because R.C. 2929.13(D) is inapplicable, and Montez does not challenge 

his sentence on the basis of R.C. 2929.13(B), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), 

there is no basis for vacating or modifying his sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). 

That leaves only R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)—whether Montez’s sentence is otherwise clearly 

and convincingly contrary to law. 

{¶ 13} Again, we have recognized that a sentence is not clearly and convincingly 

contrary to law for purposes of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) where the trial court has 

considered the purposes and principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness 
7. 

and recidivism factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly applied post-release control, and 

sentenced the defendant within the statutorily-permissible range. Here, the trial court 

expressly stated that it considered the purposes and principles of sentencing in R.C. 

2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors listed in R.C. 2929.12. Under R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(a), the court was permitted to impose a definite prison term of 12, 18, 24, 

30, 36, 42, 48, 54, or 60 months; here, the court imposed 30 months—within the 

statutorily-permissible range. And the court imposed a mandatory five-year period of 

post-release control. This was appropriate under R.C. 2967.28(B)(1). 

{¶ 14} At its heart, Montez’s challenge is to the trial court’s weighing of R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12. Under Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 

649, we may not independently weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that 

of the trial court regarding the appropriate sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, nor 

may we modify or vacate a sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) based on the lack of 

support in the record for the trial court’s findings under those statutes. Id. at ¶ 39, 41-42. 

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing Montez to a term 

of 30 months in prison. 

{¶ 15} We find Montez’s first assignment of error not well-taken. 

B. Constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(D)(1) 

{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, Montez argues that R.C. 2929.13(D)(1) 

is unconstitutional as applied to violations of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). He maintains that 

offenders convicted under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) are arbitrarily deprived a meaningful 
8. 

avenue to seek the imposition of a community-control sentence, effectively transforming 

the presumption of prison into an unwritten mandatory term. He insists that “the 

legislature created a system by which the right to due process is systematically denied to 

only a certain subset of presumptive-prison offenses.” 

{¶ 17} The state responds that Montez failed to raise his challenge to the 

constitutionality of R.C. 2929.13(D)(1) in the trial court, therefore, he has forfeited all but 

a plain-error review. It also contends that despite the inapplicability of R.C. 

2929.13(D)(1) to convictions under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a trial court maintains the 

discretion to impose a community-control sanction if a defendant demonstrates that 

imposition of a prison term is not necessary to comply with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. 

The state insists that Montez was provided the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 

time and in a meaningful manner, thus he was not deprived of his procedural due process 

rights. 

{¶ 18} The state correctly observes that Montez did not raise this argument in the 

trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “‘the question of the 

constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in a 

criminal prosecution, this means in the trial court.’” State v. Buttery, 162 Ohio St.3d 10, 

2020-Ohio-2998, 164 N.E.3d 294, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 

489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). Nevertheless, we may consider a forfeited constitutional 

challenge to a statute for plain error. Id., citing State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 

2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16. “To establish that plain error occurred, we require 
9. 

a showing that there was an error, that the error was plain or obvious, that but for the 

error the outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise, and that reversal must 

be necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id.

{¶ 19} Montez challenges the constitutionality of R.C. 2929.13(D) on the basis 

that it violates due process. He also claims that “the legislature created a system by 

which the right to due process is systematically denied to only a certain subset of 

presumptive-prison offenses.” 

{¶ 20} First, Ohio courts have recognized that “Ohio’s General Assembly 

certainly may differentiate between criminal offenders on the basis of the perceived 

seriousness of their crimes.” State v. Skapik, 2015-Ohio-4404, 42 N.E.3d 790, ¶ 24 (2d 

Dist.). In 2006, the legislature amended R.C. 2907.05(C) and R.C. 2929.13(D) to include 

a presumption of prison for offenders convicted of gross sexual imposition against a 

victim under 13 years of age, thereby making clear that it perceives gross sexual 

imposition to be more serious when that crime is committed against a young child. See 

2006 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 95; State v. DiMichele, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 09-JE-31, 2010-

Ohio-3169, ¶ 19, 22. We see no constitutional violation associated with the policy 

decision reflected—and how it is carried out—in R.C. 2907.05(C) and 2929.13(D). 

{¶ 21} Second, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 

provides: ‘No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 

process of law.’” In re A.G., 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA28, 2014-Ohio-5014, ¶ 12. “Due 
10. 

process under the Ohio and United States Constitutions demands that the right to notice 

and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 

manner where the state seeks to infringe a protected liberty or property interest.” 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 459, 668 N.E.2d 457 

(1996). 

{¶ 22} Under R.C. 2929.15(A)(1), “[i]f in sentencing an offender for a felony the 

court is not required to impose a prison term, a mandatory prison term, or a term of life 

imprisonment upon the offender, the court may directly impose a sentence that consists of 

one or more community control sanctions * * *.” There is no mandatory prison term for 

gross sexual imposition under the circumstances here—only a presumption. See State v. 

Stephens, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2018-P-0090, 2019-Ohio-3150, ¶ 15. “When there is a 

presumption of prison that may allow for a court to order community control, there is no 

requirement that the court do so.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing State v. Fetterolf, 11th Dist. 

Trumbull No. 2017-T-0109, 2018-Ohio-2454, ¶ 24. 

{¶ 23} Despite courts’ clear recognition that prison is not mandatory under the 

circumstances here,1

 Montez claims that by excluding convictions under R.C. 

1

 Under R.C. 2907.05(C)(2), however, prison is mandatory for a conviction under 

R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) or (B) if “(a) Evidence other than the testimony of the victim was 

admitted in the case corroborating the violation; [or] (b) The offender previously was 

convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section, rape, the former offense of 

felonious sexual penetration, or sexual battery, and the victim of the previous offense was 

less than thirteen years of age.” Notably, in State v. Bevly, 142 Ohio St.3d 41, 2015-

Ohio-475, 27 N.E.3d 516, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause there is no 

rational basis for the provision in R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) that requires a mandatory prison 

term for a defendant convicted of gross sexual imposition when the state has produced 
11. 

2907.05(A)(4) from R.C. 2929.13(D), the legislature has effectively transformed the 

presumption of prison into an unwritten mandatory term. But it is clear that the trial 

court did not believe that it was required to impose a mandatory prison term here. To the 

contrary, at the plea hearing, it noted that community control was among the potential 

sanctions that could be imposed, and at the sentencing hearing, it specifically found that 

Montez was not amenable to community control. 

{¶ 24} The Second District observed in State v. Jordan, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 

2016-CA-17, 2017-Ohio-5827, that given that the R.C. 2929.13(D)(2) factors are 

inapplicable in overcoming the presumption of prison for offenders convicted under R.C. 

2907.05(A)(4), it is not entirely clear how the presumption of prison can be overcome for 

violations of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). We, too, acknowledge this and note that it would be 

helpful if the legislature provided guidance on this point. But its failure to do so does not 

render the statutes unconstitutional. And our review of the case law indicates that courts 

simply consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in determining whether to impose the 

presumptive prison sentence or to impose a term of community control. See, e.g., State v. 

Tillett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-11-192, 2020-Ohio-3836, ¶ 13; State v. Kent, 7th 

evidence corroborating the crime, the statute violates the due-process protections of the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Id. at paragraph 

one of the syllabus. Moreover, the court held, “[i]n cases in which a defendant has pled 

guilty, imposing a mandatory prison term pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when 

corroborating evidence of the charge of gross sexual imposition is produced violates the 

defendant’s right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
12. 

Dist. Mahoning No. 21 MA 0049, 2021-Ohio-4593, ¶ 1-20; State v. Bennett, 2019-Ohio4937, 149 N.E.3d 1045, ¶ 63-70 (3d Dist.). 

{¶ 25} In order to declare a statute unconstitutional, the court must be convinced 

that the legislation and constitutional provisions are incompatible. (Citations omitted.) 

Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-2751, 890 N.E.2d 

307, ¶ 28. Here, we find that Montez has failed to demonstrate that R.C. 2929.13(D) (as 

applied to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)) is incompatible with the due-process protections afforded 

under the U.S. and Ohio constitutions. 

{¶ 26} Accordingly, we find Montez’s second assignment of error not well-taken. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 27} We find Montez’s first assignment of error not well-taken. In reviewing a 

felony sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), we may not independently weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court regarding the appropriate 

sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, nor may we modify or vacate a sentence based 

on the lack of support in the record for the trial court’s findings under those statutes. 

Montez’s sentence is not subject to review under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) because none of 

the statutes identified in that section—R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or 

(C)(4), or 2929.20(I)—are applicable here. 

{¶ 28} We find Montez’s second assignment of error not well-taken. He has failed 

to demonstrate that as applied to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), R.C. 2929.13(D) is incompatible 

with the due-process protections afforded under the U.S. and Ohio constitutions. 
13. 

{¶ 29} We affirm the April 16, 2021 judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas. Montez is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________ 

 JUDGE 

Christine E. Mayle, J. 

____________________________ 

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

____________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.