MILLENNIUM 

CHALLENGE 

CORPORATION

Results of 

Transportation 

Infrastructure 

Projects in Seven 

Countries

Report to Congressional Committees

September 2012

GAO-12-631

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-631, a report to 

congressional committees 

September 2012 

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION 

Results of Transportation Infrastructure Projects in 

Seven Countries 

Why GAO Did This Study

To help developing countries reduce 

poverty and stimulate economic 

growth, MCC has approved 26 bilateral 

compact agreements totaling about 

$9.3 billion. In the seven compacts that 

ended in 2010 and 2011—Honduras, 

Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, 

Georgia, Armenia, and Benin—

transportation infrastructure projects 

generally received about 50 percent of 

the compact’s total funding. To 

measure the results of its compacts, 

MCC sets targets for various 

performance indicators—such as 

number of kilometers paved or volume 

of merchandise passing through a 

port—and estimates the number of 

beneficiaries. This report, responding

to a congressional mandate, examines 

the extent to which MCC has, for 

transportation infrastructure projects, 

(1) achieved expected performance 

targets and (2) consistently estimated 

numbers of beneficiaries. GAO 

analyzed MCC documents, interviewed 

MCC officials, and drew on fieldwork

completed for related work in four of 

the seven countries. 

What GAO Recommends

MCC should strengthen existing 

policies and practices regarding 

measuring and evaluating results data 

and formalize a quality review process 

to improve its beneficiary calculations. 

MCC agreed with all of our 

recommendations and outlined some 

steps the agency will take or has 

already taken to address them.

What GAO Found

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)—a U.S. government corporation— 

recognizes the importance of a disciplined, transparent, and accountable 

approach to tracking compact results. However, it reduced the scopes of its early 

transportation infrastructure projects and reports mixed success in meeting key 

performance targets. In addition, problems with data quality call into question the 

reliability of those reported results. GAO found the following for the seven

compacts ending in 2010 and 2011, each with a road project or a port project.

Road Projects

• MCC reduced kilometers to be paved under six compacts—Honduras, Cape 

Verde, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, Georgia, and Armenia—by a combined 63 

percent (from about 1,800 to 600 km) because of increased construction costs 

and political problems in partner governments. MCC reported meeting

reduced targets for five compacts. However, for three compacts, MCC did not 

consistently account for kilometers completed with funding from third parties.

• MCC reported meeting revised targets for road roughness—a measure of 

pavement quality—for five of the compacts. However, reported data have 

quality issues, including the inconsistent application of measurement 

methodologies and calculation errors that resulted in overstated results. 

• MCC reported meeting targets for annual average daily traffic—a measure of 

the volume of traffic using the road—for three of the compacts. However, 

weaknesses in traffic baseline estimates may have affected the establishment 

of targets and therefore MCC’s ability to measure results. 

Port Projects 

• In Cape Verde, MCC funding ($53.7 million) was insufficient to construct all 

planned port elements. As a result, MCC reduced the project’s scope and 

deferred measuring the results of key indicators. 

• In Benin, MCC completed most of the envisioned scope of the port project. 

MCC’s data show that the compact met the original target for one of three key

performance indicators, volume of merchandise. (The other two indicators 

relate to the measurement of shipping costs.) However, GAO found that 

MCC’s estimation of this indicator’s baseline may lead to overstated results. In 

addition, data quality reviews identified problems with the data used, which 

MCA-Benin did not formally address. 

In 2009, MCC improved its methodology for estimating beneficiaries—people 

who realize income gains or expenditure savings as a result of its investment—

by standardizing its approach. MCC subsequently revised its beneficiary 

numbers for all compacts. However, the new approach did not include a formal

quality review process. As a result, implementation of the new approach suffered 

from varying degrees of quality problems. For example, (1) MCC did not 

implement its beneficiary estimation methodology consistently across early 

transportation infrastructure projects; (2) beneficiary calculations contained 

incorrect formulas and numbers, and differed from supporting documents; and 

(3) beneficiary figures in MCC’s public documents were sometimes inaccurate. 

View GAO-12-631. For more information, 

contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or 

gootnickd@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Letter 1 

Background 4

MCC Data Show that Some Key Performance Targets Were Met, 

but Data Quality Problems Call into Question Reported Results 11

Data Resulting from Beneficiary Calculations May Not Be Valid 23

Conclusions 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 31

Appendix II Compact Timeframes 34

Appendix III Roads Data 36

Appendix IV Port Data 39

Appendix V Comments from the Millennium Challenge Corporation 40

Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Related GAO Products 44

Tables

Table 1: Key Performance Results for the Kilometers of Road 

Completed Indicator, MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 

and 2011 12

Table 2: Scope Revisions of Road Projects for MCC Compacts 

Ending in 2010 and 2011 13

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Table 3: Key Performance Results for the Road Roughness 

Indicator, Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011 14

Table 4: Key Performance Results for the Average Annual Daily 

Traffic Indicator, Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011 16

Table 5: Data Quality Reviews Performed for Road Project 

Common Indicators 18

Table 6: Key Performance Results for MCC Port Project in 

Cape Verde 20

Table 7: Key Performance Results for MCC Port Project in Benin 21

Table 8: Kilometers of Roads Completed for MCC Road Projects in 

Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011 36

Table 9: Road Roughness of MCC Road Projects in Compacts 

ending in 2010 and 2011, as Measured by the International 

Roughness Index (IRI) 36

Table 10: Average Annual Daily Traffic on MCC-Funded Roads in 

Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011 37

Table 11: Volume of Merchandise through Port for Projects in MCC 

Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011 39

Table 12: Container Ship Time at Berth for Port Projects in MCC 

Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011 39

Table 13: Container Ship Time at Anchor for Port Projects in MCC 

Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011 39

Figures

Figure 1: Funds for Transportation Infrastructure and Other 

Projects, by MCC Compact 6

Figure 2: Relationship between MCC Indicators, Baselines, Targets, 

and Results 8

Figure 3: Timeframes for MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011, 

by Date of Signature 35
Page iii GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Abbreviations

IRI International Roughness Index

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation

MCA Millennium Challenge Account

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

September 12, 2012

The Honorable Patrick Leahy

Chairman

The Honorable Lindsey Graham

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on the Department of State, 

Foreign Operations, and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Nita Lowey

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and 

Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a U.S. government 

corporation, was established in 2004 to provide aid to developing 

countries that have demonstrated a commitment to ruling justly, 

encouraging economic freedom, and investing in people. MCC provides 

assistance to eligible countries through multiyear compact agreements to 

fund specific projects aimed at reducing poverty and stimulating economic 

growth. MCC’s core principles include assessing the results of its funding 

to determine how its activities affect poverty and economic growth. To do 

this, MCC has instituted a monitoring and evaluation approach that 

includes identifying relevant indicators to measure results during and at 

the end of project implementation and establishing performance targets 

for each indicator. MCC’s efforts to determine how its activities will affect 

poverty and economic growth also include estimating the number of 

people who will benefit from its projects and analyzing the impact of its 

projects on populations of specific interest.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

As of June 2012, MCC had signed 26 compacts, committing a total of 

approximately $9.3 billion.1 Seven of these compacts ended in 2010 or 

2011: Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, Georgia, Armenia, 

and Benin.2

In the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress 

mandated that we review the results achieved by MCC compacts.

(See app. II for compact time frames.)

3 We 

have previously reported on the results of MCC’s transportation 

infrastructure projects in four countries. In July 2011, we reported that 

MCC had met reduced targets for its compacts with Cape Verde and 

Honduras, the first two compacts to reach completion.4 In June 2012, we 

reported that MCC transportation infrastructure projects in Georgia and 

Benin varied in quality and may not be sustainable.5

 

1

MCC commits funding when a compact is signed and obligates funds after the compact 

enters into force. As of June 2012, MCC had signed initial compacts with, in order of 

signature, Madagascar, Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, Benin, Vanuatu, 

Armenia, Ghana, Mali, El Salvador, Mozambique, Lesotho, Morocco, Mongolia, Tanzania, 

Burkina Faso, Namibia, Senegal, Moldova, the Philippines, Jordan, Malawi, Indonesia, 

and Zambia. In February 2012, MCC signed a second compact with Cape Verde.

Because much of 

MCC’s funding for compacts that ended in 2010 and 2011 focused on 

transportation infrastructure projects, this report examines the extent to 

which MCC has, for transportation infrastructure projects, (1) achieved 

expected performance targets and (2) used a consistent methodology to 

estimate numbers of beneficiaries.

2

We did not include the Madagascar compact in this review because, as the result of an 

undemocratic transfer of power in Madagascar in March 2009, MCC formally terminated 

the compact effective August 31, 2009, before the end of the 5-year statutory compact 

timeframe. 

3

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 668(d)(1)(A). The Act also 

required us to examine the financial control and procurement practices of MCC and its 

accountable entities. We responded to this requirement separately in GAO, Millennium 

Challenge Corporation: MCC Has Addressed a Number of Implementation Challenges, 

but Needs to Improve Financial Controls and Infrastructure Planning, GAO-10-52 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2009).

4

GAO, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Compacts in Cape Verde and Honduras 

Achieved Reduced Targets, GAO-11-728 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25, 2011).

5

GAO, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Georgia and Benin Transportation 

Infrastructure Projects Varied in Quality and May Not Be Sustainable, GAO-12-630 

(Washington, D.C.: Jun. 27, 2012).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

To assess the extent to which MCC has achieved its performance targets 

for transportation infrastructure projects under compacts that ended in 

2010 and 2011, we reviewed MCC guidance and policy documents and 

analyzed compact agreements, monitoring and evaluation plans, and 

results data. We compared actual results achieved at the end of the 

compact for select performance indicators with MCC’s original targets 

and, in some cases, with revised targets associated with each indicator. 

Since MCC tracks many performance indicators for each compact project, 

we selected a subset of indicators to examine for this report.

• For the road projects, we examined kilometers of road completed, 

roughness as a measure of road quality, and average annual daily 

traffic. We selected those road project indicators because they 

address the projects’ key objectives and because they are among the 

“common indicators” MCC requires for all road projects, so that it can 

aggregate results across countries.

• For the port projects, we examined the volume of merchandise 

through the port and two indicators related to the measurement of 

shipping costs: container ship time at berth and container ship time at 

anchor. Because MCC has not established common indicators for 

ports, we selected indicators that addressed the projects’ key 

objectives, corresponded to the common road indicators, and were 

originally included in both port projects.

Additionally, we interviewed MCC officials about data quality and indicator 

tracking tables. As part of our related engagements—focused on Cape 

Verde and Honduras, and on Georgia and Benin6

To assess the extent to which MCC has consistently applied its 

beneficiary estimation methodology, we reviewed MCC’s Guidelines for 

Economic and Beneficiary Analysis as well as its beneficiary calculations 

and accompanying supporting documents for the seven compacts that 

ended in 2010 and 2011. We compared original and revised beneficiary 

estimates for the transportation projects and assessed the justification 

—we visited compact 

projects in-country and met with partner country government officials, 

including those responsible for compact implementation, and with 

contractors, project managers, construction supervisors, and relevant 

private businesses.

 

6

GAO-11-728 and GAO-12-630. 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

behind any changes. Data are considered reliable when they are 

accurate, complete, consistent, and valid, given the uses for which they 

are intended.

MCC enters into a legal relationship with partner country governments 

that vest an accountable entity with responsibility for day-to-day 

management of compact project implementation, including monitoring 

and evaluation activities such as setting and revising performance 

targets. Because such actions require MCC’s direct oversight and 

approval, throughout this report, we attribute all decisions related to 

project rescoping and compact targets to MCC. (See app. I for further 

details of our objectives, scope, and methodology.)

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to September 

2012, as part of a body of work on this subject, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives.

MCC is managed by a chief executive officer, appointed by the President 

with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is overseen by a Board of 

Directors. The Secretary of State serves as board chair and the Secretary 

of the Treasury as vice-chair.7

 

7

Other board members are the U.S. Trade Representative, the Administrator of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of MCC, and up to four 

Senate-confirmed nongovernmental members appointed by the President from lists of 

individuals submitted by congressional leadership.

MCC’s model of providing foreign aid is 

based on a set of core principles deemed essential for effective 

development assistance, including good governance, country ownership, 

focus on results, and transparency. According to MCC, country ownership 

of an MCC compact occurs when a country’s national government 

controls the prioritization process during compact development, is 

responsible for implementation, and is accountable to its domestic 

Background

MCC Organization
 

Page 5 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

stakeholders for decision making and results. To implement the compact, 

the partner government establishes an accountable entity, referred to as 

a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).8 MCC provides the framework 

and guidance for compact implementation, monitoring, and evaluation 

that MCAs are to use in implementing compact projects.

The seven MCC compacts completed in 2010 and 2011 each included a 

transportation infrastructure project that—except in the case of Armenia—

received 50 percent or more of the compact’s total funding (see fig.1). For 

the purposes of this report, we have defined transportation infrastructure 

as public works that convey passengers or goods from one place to 

another; infrastructure includes structures such as roads, seaports, 

airports, and railways. We reviewed five compacts with road projects, one 

with a port project, and one with both types of projects.

 

8

MCC generally refers to each country’s accountable entity by combining MCA with the 

country’s name (e.g., MCA-Benin).

Transportation 

Infrastructure Projects
 

Page 6 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Figure 1: Funds for Transportation Infrastructure and Other Projects, by MCC Compact

Notes: Amount at signature is the amount allocated when MCC and the partner country sign the 

compact; amount disbursed is the actual amount disbursed by compact closure. Any undisbursed 

funds are returned to MCC. “Other projects” includes funds disbursed before the compact’s entry into 

force, to facilitate implementation of the compact. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

According to MCC’s Policy for Monitoring and Evaluation of Compacts 

and Threshold Programs,

9 performance monitoring helps track progress 

toward compact goals and objectives and serves as a management tool. 

Therefore, MCC requires partner countries to create a monitoring and 

evaluation plan that they update throughout the course of the compact. 

The plan’s monitoring component outlines the performance indicators by 

which the compact results will be measured. It also establishes a 

performance target for each indicator, including a baseline value (the 

starting value of an indicator) and the expected year by which the target 

will be achieved.10

 

9

MCC developed guidelines in 2006 to assist eligible countries in the preparation of 

monitoring and evaluation plans and issued an updated policy in 2009 and in 2012.

For some indicators, baseline measurements are 

necessary to establish interim and final targets. MCC and the MCAs 

monitor the progress of compact activities using an indicator tracking 

table, which is a reporting tool that displays targets and tracks progress 

against them. (See fig. 2.)

10In many cases, indicators are chosen because they relate to inputs for the economic 

rate of return analysis that MCC conducts to estimate a project’s likely impact on the 

partner country’s economic growth and poverty reduction prior to compact approval. More 

specifically, a project’s estimated economic rate of return is the expected annual average 

return to the country’s firms, individuals, or sectors for each dollar that MCC spends on the 

project.

MCC Monitoring and 

Evaluation Framework
 

Page 8 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Figure 2: Relationship between MCC Indicators, Baselines, Targets, and Results

Notes: The indicators shown are for a road project. The terms indicator, baseline values, actual 

results, performance targets, end-of-compact target, and data quality reviews pertain to all MCC 

projects. 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

MCC established common indicators in 2009 to aggregate results across 

countries.11 For road projects, MCC has established several common 

indicators, including the following:12

• Kilometers of road completed: A measure of the total length of road 

completed under a compact. This indicator is a cumulative measure of 

works completed.

• Road roughness: A measure of pavement quality that affects ride 

quality, vehicle delay costs, fuel consumption, and maintenance costs. 

Roughness is used to determine the reduction in road-user costs and 

indicates when resurfacing work is needed. New pavement roughness

ratings—as measured by the international roughness index (IRI)—

should range from 1.5 to 3.5; the higher the IRI, the rougher the 

pavement, with a roughness of 0 being perfectly smooth.

• Average annual daily traffic: A measure of the volume and type of 

traffic using a road.

MCC has not established common indicators for ports, because ports are 

a small part of its portfolio (it has funded port projects in only two 

countries). However, we selected certain key indicators to review 

because they addressed the projects’ key objective of economic growth:13

 

11MCC issued its Common Indicators Directive in 2009, establishing the common 

indicators and requiring MCAs to use them in project monitoring and evaluation plans. 

Although the seven compacts that we reviewed were signed before 2009, initial monitoring 

and evaluation plans for three of the six compacts with road projects included common 

indicators for kilometers completed, road roughness, and average annual daily traffic. The 

MCAs for the three remaining compacts introduced the common indicators into their 

monitoring and evaluation activities before the compacts ended.

12MCC has developed additional common indicators for roads, including the percentage of 

funds disbursed for contracted studies, value of signed contracts for road works, 

percentage of funds for contracted road works disbursed, kilometers of roads under works 

contracts, and value of signed contracts for feasibility design supervision and program 

management contracts. 

13MCC has developed other indicators for ports, including percentage of funds for 

contracted port works disbursed, average time for goods to clear customs, average 

duration of stay of trucks at port, tons of merchandise shipped per year, and whether the 

port is meeting the International Ship and Port Facility Code, which establishes security 

requirements for ports.

Transportation Infrastructure 

Indicators
 

Page 10 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

• Volume of merchandise through the port: A measure of the total 

volume of exports and imports passing through the port each year.

• Container ship time at berth: A measure of the average number of 

days a container ship spends at berth to load and/or unload its cargo. 

• Container ship time at anchor: A measure of the average number of 

hours a container ship spends at anchor waiting for a berth.

MCC requires that MCAs contract an independent entity (such as a local 

or international firm, research organization, or individual consultant) to 

review the quality of compact performance data. These reviews 

determine the utility, objectivity, and integrity of information gathered, 

identify problems with data quality, and recommend actions to remedy 

these issues. Reviews should ensure that data used to measure 

indicators meet the following criteria: validity, reliability, timeliness, 

precision, and integrity. MCC policy allows each country to determine the 

frequency and timing of each review as well as the indicators to be 

evaluated. This requirement was fulfilled for every compact except 

Nicaragua. MCC policy requires the MCA to comment on the review, 

including noting the recommendations it will implement. In addition, the 

MCA should reflect, in a subsequent monitoring and evaluation plan, any 

indicator changes made in response to data quality reviews. MCC policy 

also requires the MCA to make publically available on its website a 

summary of the final reviews and its comments. MCAs are responsible for 

ensuring that MCC-approved recommendations are implemented.

MCC defines beneficiaries as people who realize income gains or 

expenditure savings as a result of its investment.14

 

14According to its Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary Analysis, MCC takes the 

household as the unit of measurement, counting as beneficiaries all members of the 

household. MCC’s projects include targeted projects that benefit specific individuals or 

households—for example, projects focused on agricultural development or school 

construction—but also includes projects that are national or broad-based in scope and 

benefit people living in a large geographical area. Beneficiaries include everyone who 

realizes income gain or expenditure savings regardless of the magnitude of these 

changes, although the income gain or expenditure savings are likely to vary significantly 

across individuals and projects.

MCC’s authorizing 

legislation requires that compacts contain an identification of the intended 

beneficiaries, disaggregated by income level, gender, and age, to the 

Independent Data Quality 

Reviews 

Beneficiary Assessment
 

Page 11 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

maximum extent practicable. MCC notes that “the use of these 

[beneficiary] analyses and their availability to the general public are 

trademarks of MCC’s commitment to transparency and results-based 

aid.” In addition, MCC’s 2009 Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary 

Analysis maintain that identification of intended beneficiaries should not 

be limited to counting the number of people who benefit from compacts 

but should include a more detailed analysis of the effect of compacts on 

different subgroups, including the poor, the elderly, women, children, and 

ethnic subpopulations. MCC has not undertaken such detailed beneficiary 

analysis for the seven compacts completed in 2010 or 2011.15

MCC reduced the scope of early road and port projects and reports mixed 

success in meeting key performance targets. In addition, problems with 

data quality call those reported results into question.

In each of the six compacts with road projects, MCC reduced the number 

of kilometers to be completed. In addition, the roughness and annual 

average daily traffic indicators had data quality problems. Most compacts 

did not examine the three common road indicators in their data quality 

reviews. In addition, MCC did not consistently account for third-party

funding.

 

15MCC officials stated that detailed beneficiary analyses for its compacts are carried out 

retrospectively. MCC provided us with detailed beneficiary analyses, including “poverty 

scorecards” focusing on the impact of compacts on the poor, for six other compacts out of 

the 26 current and completed compacts.

MCC Data Show that 

Some Key 

Performance Targets 

Were Met, but Data 

Quality Problems Call 

into Question 

Reported Results

MCC Reduced Targets for 

Completed Roads by 63 

Percent and Had Data 

Quality Problems
 

Page 12 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

MCC reduced by 63 percent the total number of road kilometers to be 

completed for the six compacts with road projects, from an original 

combined target of 1,822.8 kilometers to a final combined target of 623.9 

kilometers.16

Table 1: Key Performance Results for the Kilometers of Road Completed Indicator, 

MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011

Five of six compacts met their reduced targets for kilometers 

completed. Honduras was the only compact that did not meet its target 

(see table 1).

Country

Original 

target

Revised 

target 

Percentage 

change

Final

result Target met

Hondurasa 200.0 174.5 -12.8 115.0 x

Cape Verde 63.0 39.3 -37.6 40.6 ○

Nicaragua 158.0 67.0 -57.6 74.0 ○

Georgia 245.0 220.2 -10.1 220.2b ○

Vanuatu 213.8 149.7 -30.0 149.7 ○

Armenia 943.0 24.4 -97.4 24.4 ○

Total 1,822.8 675.1 -63.0 623.9

Legend: 

● Met original target 

○ Met revised target 

x Did not meet original or revised target 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

Note: See appendix III for additional details on targets and results for the kilometers of road indicator 

in each country. 

a

Kilometers include secondary roads and sections 3 and 4 of the highway in Honduras. Sections 1 

and 2 of the highway were to be completed post-compact with additional funding provided by the 

Central American Bank for Economic Integration; as of March 9, 2012, construction of these 

segments was not complete. 

b

Of this amount, 217 kilometers were fully rehabilitated using MCC funds. For the remaining about 3 

kilometers, MCC funded maintenance items, such as road painting. 

In general, MCC decreased the scope of the road projects because of 

increased construction costs, changes in exchange rates, or actions 

taken by host country governments that were inconsistent with MCC’s 

 

16In response to a draft copy of this report, MCC noted that if one excludes road projects 

that MCC terminated or discontinued as a result of undemocratic behavior by the 

governments of Armenia and Nicaragua, the final target for kilometers of roads completed 

in Honduras, Georgia, Cape Verde, and Vanuatu is only 19 percent below the original 

target. See appendix V for a copy of MCC’s comments.

According to MCC Data, Most 

Compacts Met Reduced Targets 

for Kilometers of Roads 

Completed
 

Page 13 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

eligibility criteria. For example, MCC decreased the scope of the 

compacts in Nicaragua and Armenia because of concerns about 

democratic governance in the respective partner governments 

(see table 2).

Table 2: Scope Revisions of Road Projects for MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011

Compact Scope change Reason for scope change

Honduras Reduced kilometers of secondary roads completed. 

Removed two sections of the highway project, to be 

completed with additional funding from the Central 

American Bank for Economic Integration post-compact.

Increased construction costs. 

Cape Verde Eliminated two roads. Increased construction costs. 

Nicaragua In June 2009, MCC terminated funding for the 

transportation activities not already under contract. At this 

time, 74 kilometers of road were already under 

construction. 

Electoral irregularities in the municipal elections of 

November 2008, which were inconsistent with MCC 

eligibility criteria.a

Georgia Reduced kilometers of road to 70 percent of the original 

plan. 

Increased construction costs and changes in exchange 

rates.

Subsequently increased kilometers of road to roughly 90 

percent of the original plan.

MCC obligated an additional $100 million to the compact 

following the end of Georgia’s war with Russia over South 

Ossetia in 2008, $60 million of which went to the road 

project.

Vanuatu Reduced scope from the rehabilitation of several roads, 

airstrips and wharfs to two roads. 

Increased construction costs and changes in exchange 

rates.

Increased kilometers completed on road in Santo. New Zealand provided additional funding to support MCC 

road project in June 2009.

Armenia Reduced kilometers of road to roughly 32 percent of the 

original plan prior to June 2008.

Increased construction costs and changes in exchange 

rates.

In June 2009, MCC put an indefinite hold on funding for 

road construction that was not already underway. At this 

time, construction of 24.4 kilometers had been completed. 

Concerns about the status of democratic governance in 

Armenia, which were inconsistent with MCC’s eligibility 

criteria.a

Source: GAO analysis of MCC documents.

a

The country also failed to meet MCC’s corruption indicator, which measures the extent to which 

public power is exercised for private gain. 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

MCC data show that five of six compacts met original targets for road 

roughness. In addition, MCC reports that the Georgia and Armenia 

compacts surpassed their original roughness targets and built a smoother 

road than originally planned.17

Table 3: Key Performance Results for the Road Roughness Indicator, Compacts 

Ending in 2010 and 2011

Honduras did not did not meet its 

roughness target. (See table 3.)

Country Original target Revised target Final result Target met

Hondurasa 2.2 3.0 x

Cape Verde 2.3 2.3 ●

Nicaragua 3.1 2.5 ●

Georgia 3.2 2.5 1.5 ● ○

Vanuatu 3.5 3.0 ●

Armenia 5.0 4.0 3.5 ● ○

Legend: 

● Met original target 

○ Met revised target 

x Did not meet original or revised target 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

Notes: A higher roughness number indicates a rougher road, while zero is a perfectly smooth road. A 

missing value for the revised target indicates that the original target was not revised. See appendix III 

for additional details on targets and results for the roughness indicator in each country. 

a

The roughness measure includes secondary roads and sections 3 and 4 of the highway in Honduras. 

Sections 1 and 2 of the highway were to be completed post-compact with additional funding provided 

by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration; as of March 9, 2012, construction of these 

segments was not complete. 

We identified problems with the measurement of road roughness for 

some of the six compacts with road projects, including the use of 

 

17In Georgia, MCC reduced the roughness target to account for a delayed construction 

start date. A road’s surface is smoothest directly following construction. Because the delay 

in construction pushed the expected completion date closer to the compact end date, this 

reduced the amount of time MCC-funded roads could deteriorate before roughness 

measurements were taken at the end of the compact. Therefore, the roads were expected 

to have a better roughness measure than originally planned. In Armenia, MCC reduced 

the target for road roughness once the project was placed on indefinite hold. The 24.4 

kilometers that MCC completed before putting the project on hold had a lower roughness 

target than the full package of roads MCC originally planned to complete. Therefore, 

removing the terminated roads from the project resulted in a better roughness measure for 

the compact overall. 

MCC-Reported Results for 

Road Roughness Have Data 

Quality Issues
 

Page 15 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

inconsistent application of methodologies and calculation errors. These 

problems call into question MCC’s reported roughness results.

Inconsistent application of methodologies. MCC determined 

roughness using a visual scale for some roads and mechanical 

measurements for others. While both methods are legitimate means of 

measuring roughness, they have different degrees of accuracy. 

Moreover, MCC did not apply either measurement method consistently 

across compacts. First, for the two countries measuring roughness 

visually, Cape Verde and Vanuatu, MCC inappropriately provided the 

MCAs a World Bank scale for unpaved roads to assess the paved roads. 

Second, for compacts where roughness was measured mechanically, the 

MCAs used different machines that had varying levels of accuracy. Third, 

for three compacts—Nicaragua, Honduras, and Armenia—the MCAs 

measured roughness on both sides of the road and then averaged these 

measurements to calculate a final measure. In contrast, MCA-Georgia 

calculated roughness using measurements taken on one side of the road 

only, potentially producing a less accurate measurement since roughness 

can vary from one side of the road to the other.18

Calculation errors. We found that errors calculating roughness led to an 

overstatement of results. For example, MCA-Nicaragua recorded zeros—

an IRI rating for a perfectly smooth road—for sections that could not be 

measured, incorrectly lowering the overall roughness calculation from 4.8 

to 3.4 for one road and indicating that the road was smoother than it 

actually was.19

 

18During construction, because all lanes of a road often are not paved at the same time, 

uneven construction quality (e.g., nonuniform compaction of asphalt pavements), 

construction techniques that allow some variation in the surface, and other factors may 

lead to different roughness measures for each lane.

Additionally, MCA-Honduras did not account for the 

differing lengths of each segment of secondary road when aggregating 

the roughness values and therefore overstated its reported results at 3.2 

instead of 3.3. Although this difference is not large, consistent 

methodologies should be used across compacts to allow a valid basis for 

comparing and evaluating results.

19For two of the road segments, the nonmeasurable sections of road were left blank and 

the calculation of the final IRI used the value from the one measurable side of the road as 

the overall measure for that kilometer.
 

Page 16 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

MCC data show that three of the six compacts with road projects met 

original or revised targets for average annual daily traffic.20

Table 4: Key Performance Results for the Average Annual Daily Traffic Indicator, 

Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011

The 

Nicaragua and Armenia compacts met their original targets and the 

Vanuatu compact met a reduced target. For the other three compacts, 

Cape Verde did not meet its original target; Georgia did not meet its 

reduced target; and MCC stated that a final traffic measure in Honduras is 

not expected until late 2012. (See table 4.)

Country Original target Revised target Final result Target met

Hondurasa 3,772 N/A N/A

Cape Verdeb 559 295 x

Nicaragua 932 1,216 ●

Georgia 6,700 1,183 1,092 x

Vanuatu 969 196 334 ○

Armenia 460 706 735 ● ○

Legend: 

● Met original target 

○ Met revised target 

X Did not meet original or revised target 

N/A Not available 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

Notes: A missing value for the revised target indicates that the original target was not revised. See 

appendix III for additional details on targets and results for the traffic indicator in each country. 

a

The calculation for original and revised average annual daily traffic measures include the secondary 

roads and sections 3 and 4 of the highway in Honduras. Sections 1 and 2 of the highway were to be 

completed post-compact with additional funding provided by the Central American Bank for Economic 

Integration; as of March 9, 2012, construction of these segments was not complete. In addition, MCC 

officials stated that a final traffic measure in Honduras is not expected until late 2012. 

b

The final result for Cape Verde is not annualized. 

 

20MCC revised the original traffic targets for the Georgia, Vanuatu, and Armenia 

compacts. In Georgia and Vanuatu, MCC reduced traffic targets when it corrected the 

original baseline estimates. In Armenia, MCC increased the traffic target once the road 

project was placed on indefinite hold; the single road that MCC completed prior to the 

project hold had a higher traffic target than the full package of roads MCC originally 

planned to complete. 

MCC-Reported Results for 

Road Traffic Have Data Quality 

Issues
 

Page 17 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

MCC did not consistently update the baseline estimates for the annual 

average daily traffic indicator either by projecting growth or by using new 

information when it became available. Because MCC establishes the 

targets for some indicators by applying estimated growth rates to the 

baselines, these identified weaknesses may have affected MCC’s ability 

to create accurate traffic targets, thus affecting its reported results.

• For the secondary roads project in Nicaragua, MCC stated that it 

updated the baseline estimates established in 2007 by applying 1 

year’s growth rate to the traffic measures, because construction was 

expected to begin in fall 2008. However, MCC did not use this method 

in Cape Verde, where there was a similar time lag.21

• For the section of highway to be rehabilitated in Nicaragua, MCC 

retained a baseline calculated in a 2000 traffic study22

• In Honduras, MCC used a baseline established before 2005 despite 

the availability of data from a 2008 traffic survey. The 2008 traffic 

survey results showed that traffic volumes already met or exceeded 

the end-of-compact targets for most road segments. Because MCC 

used the 2005 data, the final results for the project indicate a larger 

change over the compact implementation timeframe than actually 

occurred.

even though it 

had 2007 data for the specific 18 kilometers of road it planned to 

rehabilitate.

The data quality reviews conducted for most compacts did not include the 

kilometers-paved, roughness, or average annual daily traffic indicators. 

MCC requires that MCAs contract an independent entity to review the 

quality of compact performance data. According to MCC, this requirement 

was fulfilled for every compact except Nicaragua. However, only the data 

quality reviews for Georgia included all three indicators. (The reviews did 

not identify any data problems with these indicators).23

 

21MCC used a traffic count from a study conducted in 2005; however, construction of the 

road project began in 2006. 

Although the data

22In addition, the 2000 traffic study was conducted for a 72-kilometer section of highway, 

rather than the 18 kilometers designated for the project.

23MCC policy allows each country to determine the frequency and timing of each review, 

along with which indicators will be evaluated.

Common Indicators for Road 

Projects Not Consistently 

Reviewed for Quality
 

Page 18 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

quality reviews for Armenia included two of the three indicators, the 

compact was put on hold before MCA-Armenia could fully correct 

identified problems. In Vanuatu, data quality reviews conducted in 2008 

and 2009 identified problems with the measurement of annual average 

daily traffic.24

Table 5: Data Quality Reviews Performed for Road Project Common Indicators

MCA-Vanuatu did not provide a response to either of the 

recommendations in the review and made no changes to the definition of 

the traffic indicator in the final monitoring and evaluation plan. The data 

quality reviews for the Honduras and Cape Verde compacts did not 

include any of the three road indicators. Table 5 summarizes the 

treatment of the three common road indicators we examined in data 

quality reviews for the six compacts.

Country

Kilometers of 

road 

completed

International 

roughness 

index

Average 

annual daily 

traffic 

Recommendations 

implemented

Honduras ○ ○ ○ N/A

Cape Verde ○ ○ ○ N/A

Nicaraguaa X X X N/A

Georgia ◓ ◓ ◓ N/A

Vanuatu ○ ○ ● No

Armenia ○ ● ● Nob

Legend: 

○ Indicator not reviewed 

◓ Indicator reviewed without recommendation 

● Indicator reviewed with recommendation 

X No data quality review performed 

N/A Not applicable 

Source: GAO analysis of MCA data quality reviews.

a

MCC officials stated that no data quality reviews were performed in Nicaragua. 

b

Recommendations were not implemented in Armenia, because the road project was put on hold in 

June 2009. 

 

24The 2008 review provided several recommendations on how to structure the traffic count 

survey. In addition, a 2009 review found that the Vanuatu compact was at risk of double 

counting vehicles and recommended that the monitoring and evaluation plan indicate that 

traffic refers to the sum of the average number of vehicles passing over checkpoints.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

The governments of three countries—Honduras, Cape Verde, and 

Vanuatu—secured funding from a third party to rehabilitate some of the 

road lengths that MCC removed from the scope of the compact.25

• The government of Honduras secured money from the Central 

American Bank for Economic Integration to complete 57.6 kilometers 

of the highway project, which MCC removed from the compact’s 

original scope.

However, we found that MCC did not consistently account for this thirdparty funding when reporting the final results of kilometers completed. As 

a result, MCC understated its results in Honduras and overstated them in 

Vanuatu.

26

• The government of Cape Verde secured funding from the government 

of Portugal to rehabilitate 22.9 kilometers of secondary roads that 

MCC removed from the scope of its compact. MCA-Cape Verde 

revised its kilometers-completed target to reflect this reduction in 

scope and did not report these 22.9 kilometers as a part of its final 

results. Therefore, MCC reports that it met the compact’s revised 

kilometers-completed target.

However, MCA-Honduras did not revise its 

kilometers-completed target to reflect this reduction in scope. 

Therefore, MCC reports that it did not meet the compact’s final 

kilometers-completed target, even though data suggest that the 

kilometers MCC funded were complete at the end of the compact

• The government of Vanuatu secured money from New Zealand to 

assist in rehabilitating a 57.2 kilometer road, because the MCC 

compact funds were not sufficient to complete all 57.2 kilometers. 

However, MCC reported all 57.2 kilometers as a part of its final 

results, even though it did not fund all of the work.

 

25Third-party funding is funding from a source other than MCC or the partner government.

26MCC originally planned to fund all reconstruction included in the four sections of the 

Honduras highway project. However, because estimated costs had increased, MCC 

determined that it would be unable to complete all four sections within the 5-year compact 

timeframe and within the funding allocation. As a result, MCC funded about 94 percent of 

construction on sections 3 and 4, funded 31 percent of section 2, and funded none of 

section 1. The third-party funding from the Central American Bank of Economic Integration

funded the difference. For more information on this project, see GAO-11-728. 

MCC Did Not Consistently 

Account for Third-Party 

Funding
 

Page 20 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

For the Cape Verde compact, MCC reduced the scope of the port project, 

deferred the measurement of key indicators, and therefore did not 

conduct any data quality reviews of those indicators. In Benin, MCC 

completed most of the originally envisioned port project scope, and its 

data show that the compact met the original target for one of the three 

key indicators. However, we identified issues with the indicators’ baseline 

estimates. In addition, data quality reviews identified problems with the 

data behind the indicators, which MCA-Benin did not formally address.

MCC split the Cape Verde project into two phases in May 2008 because, 

owing to increased construction costs, the $53.7 million allocated to the 

port projects was insufficient to fund all of the planned improvements. 

MCC funded phase 1 of the improvements, including construction of a 

cargo storage area and an access road, and rehabilitation of Wharf 2. 

The government of Cape Verde secured a loan from the government of 

Portugal for $87 million to complete phase 2, that is, those elements 

removed from the scope of the MCC project.27

MCC deferred the measurement of key performance indicators when it 

revised the project scope, because results for key indicators could be 

measured only after full completion of the port (see table 6). MCC intends 

to measure results for the key indicators when phase 2 is complete.

The MCC-funded portion 

of the construction (phase 1) represents about one-third of the total 

expected cost of both phases. Nearly 100 percent of the works for phase 

1 were completed by compact end. Phase 2 was awarded late in the 

compact, and work was under way as of July 2012.

Table 6: Key Performance Results for MCC Port Project in Cape Verde

Indicator

Original 

target

Revised 

target

Final 

result

Target 

met

Volume of merchandise (thousand 

tons/year)

710.5

Performance indicators were 

eliminated once the Cape 

Verde project was descoped. Container ship time at berth (days) 1.0

Container ship time at anchor (hours) 4.0

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

Note: See appendix IV for additional details on targets and results for key indicators in Cape Verde. 

 

27Phase 2 works included the expansion of Wharf 1 and construction of a new breakwater.

MCC Reduced the Cape 

Verde Port Project Scope 

and Did Not Meet Many 

Targets for the Benin Port 

Project

In Cape Verde, MCC Reduced 

the Port Project’s Scope and 

Deferred the Measurement of 

Key Indicators 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

MCA-Cape Verde contracted for data quality reviews in 2007 and 2010. 

The port project was reviewed in 2010; however, key indicators were not 

evaluated, because MCA-Cape Verde deferred measurement of those 

indicators until phase 2 was complete.

MCC data show that Benin maintained most of the original project scope 

and met the original target for one of three key indicators.28

Table 7: Key Performance Results for MCC Port Project in Benin

The project 

scope included constructing or rehabilitating a jetty, a new wharf, and port 

roads and installing lighting, security, and an electricity distribution 

system. MCC reports that the Benin compact met the original target for 

volume of merchandise through the port, but it did not meet targets for the 

other two key indicators, container ship waiting time at berth and 

container ship waiting time at anchor. See table 7 for a summary of key 

performance results for the Benin port project.

Indicator

Original 

target

Revised 

target 

Final 

result

Target 

met

Volume of merchandise (thousand tons/year) 6,944.6 7,605.9 ●

Container ship time at berth (days) 1.0 1.3 x

Container ship time at anchor (hours) 4.0 34.6 x

Legend: 

● Met original target 

○ Met revised target 

x Did not meet original or revised target 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

Note: A missing value for the revised target indicates that the original target was not revised. See 

appendix IV for additional details on targets and results for key indicators in Benin. 

 

28While the project was largely completed as planned, components for a proposed fourth 

lot—which included a storage facility for dry bulk goods such as grains and sand and a 

fish quality inspection station—were deemed not viable once MCA-Benin conducted its 

feasibility studies. As a result, MCA-Benin did not tender a bid for that lot. According to 

MCC officials, the funds originally planned for those items were shifted to the other 

infrastructure components. The funds also helped cover cost increases and additional 

work on the wharf such as increasing wall length and dredging the berth.

MCC’s Reported Results for the 

Benin Port Project Have Data 

Quality Issues
 

Page 22 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

We identified problems with MCC’s measurement of the volume-ofmerchandise indicators, and MCA-Benin’s data quality reviews identified 

additional problems with all three key indicators. For the volume-ofmerchandise indicator in Benin, MCC used 2004 data from the Port 

Authority to establish a baseline of 4.1 million metric tons in the compact’s 

monitoring and evaluation plans and indicator tracking tables. MCA-Benin 

did not subsequently update the baseline. However, the compact did not 

enter into force until October 2006 and port improvement construction did 

not begin until August 2009. Available annual data for Benin showed that 

in 2005 the volume of merchandise had already increased to 5.2 million 

metric tons. Without an updated baseline, the estimate may not 

accurately reflect preconstruction conditions and may lead MCC to 

overstate the degree to which port traffic increased because of the 

compact.

MCA-Benin contracted data quality reviews in 2008, 2009, and 2011. The 

2008 and 2009 data quality reviews identified issues with the three key 

port indicators that we reviewed, but MCC did not address all of the 

issues.29

• For the volume-of-merchandise indicator, MCA-contractors noted that 

although data collection methods were consistent and the data were 

valid, the Port Authority of Cotonou needed to improve the timeliness 

of data related to this indicator because the data entry and control 

procedures created delays in the availability of information. MCC 

policy indicates that data should be sufficiently current to inform 

management decisions because decisions depend on regular 

collection of performance information. In 2008 and 2009, the 

contractors recommended that MCA-Benin set up an automatic data 

transfer system for information collected on ship stopover, to avoid 

redundant data entry efforts by the port’s statistical services. Although 

the 2009 review indicated that the port was resolving problems 

The 2011 review did not examine these specific port indicators.

 

29Reviews also identified other port indicators for improvement in Benin. For example, the 

2008 and 2009 reviews indicated that the average duration of stay of trucks at port, which 

measures the reduction in time necessary for vehicles to cross the port due to reduced 

congestion, had a baseline value that was set with no justification of its actual level. The 

review recommended that this information be collected in the annual survey of port user 

satisfaction. MCA-Benin did so and determined that the baseline value was 7 hours. 

However, no changes were made to the final monitoring and evaluation plan to reflect this 

and MCC and MCA officials indicated that they agreed not to revise indicator baselines at 

the time. 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

through the creation of a port information system when the evaluation 

was conducted, we found that MCA-Benin did not resolve the issues 

identified for this indicator. No changes were made in the final 

monitoring and evaluation plan to indicate that adjustments were 

made in the data collection methods for this indicator. In addition, 

MCA-Benin responses to the review did not address this issue.

• For the container ship time at berth and container ship time at anchor 

indicators, the 2008 and 2009 reviews noted that, while the data 

collected were a direct measure of what the indicators were intended 

to capture and the data collection procedures were consistent, there 

were no historical data to support the baseline values for these 

indicators. The reviews recommended using baseline values 

established in a 2005 report by an international consulting firm. We 

found that MCA-Benin did not resolve issues identified for these two

indicators. MCC and MCA officials stated that they decided not to 

revise indicator baselines and targets as recommended, and no 

revisions were made to baseline figures in subsequent monitoring and 

evaluation plans. MCC and MCA officials provided no additional 

explanation.

In 2009, MCC improved its beneficiary estimates by adopting a more 

standardized approach, which it documented in its Guidelines for 

Economic and Beneficiary Analysis; however, the updated guidelines do 

not include a formal quality review process. MCC subsequently revised its 

beneficiary estimates for ongoing compacts, but the implementation of the 

new approach was not always consistent and suffered from varying 

degrees of quality control problems. Although some of the individual 

problems we identified were small in nature, taken as a whole they 

reduce confidence in MCC’s estimates.

Data Resulting from 

Beneficiary 

Calculations May Not 

Be Valid
 

Page 24 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

In our previous work, we found that MCC did not have a consistent 

methodology for estimating the number of beneficiaries across 

compacts.30 As a result, MCC adopted a new, more standardized 

approach, which it published in its 2009 Guidelines for Economic and 

Beneficiary Analysis. MCC subsequently conducted a “beneficiary scrub,” 

revising beneficiary numbers for ongoing compacts based on the 2009 

guidelines. However, we found errors and inconsistencies in the 

calculations. MCC stated that these scrubs are informally reviewed but 

that they do not undergo a formal quality review process.31 Such a 

process would ensure that the information and data provided have been 

verified for consistency and accuracy.

We identified three general weaknesses with MCC’s beneficiary 

calculations. First, the beneficiary calculations in MCC’s internal 

documents contain weaknesses such as incorrect formulas and numbers 

as well as discrepancies with supporting documents. Second, MCC did 

not apply a consistent methodology in estimating beneficiaries for its early 

transportation infrastructure projects. Third, the beneficiary figures in 

MCC’s public documents are sometimes inaccurate.

Some beneficiary calculations contained mistakes in the formulas used.

For example, the computations of the population growth rate for Georgia 

and Cape Verde contained an error in the mathematical formula, causing 

MCC to slightly overstate the growth rate in the first case and understate 

it in the second case. In addition, erroneous numbers were used in four of 

the seven compacts we reviewed.

• For the Georgia road project, MCC stated in the beneficiary 

calculation documents that “the original beneficiary estimate of 53,988 

people counts all households living in the four rayons, or districts, 

 

30See GAO, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Independent Review and Consistent 

Approaches Will Strengthen Projections of Program Impact, GAO-08-730 (Washington, 

D.C.: Jun. 17, 2008).

31According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, a variety of 

control activities should be used in information processing, including checking the data 

entered. In addition, GAO’s Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool states that 

data validation and editing should be performed to identify erroneous data, which need to 

be reported and promptly corrected (GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation 

Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).

MCC’s Updated 

Beneficiary Analysis 

Guidelines Do Not Include 

a Formal Quality Review 

Process

Weaknesses Call into 

Question the Validity and 

Reliability of MCC’s 

Beneficiary Data

MCC’s Beneficiary Calculations 

Contained Mistakes
 

Page 25 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

through which the road passes...The revised beneficiary estimate [of 

58,079] is based on a 5 km catchment area of the Road.” MCC thus 

originally claimed a lower number of beneficiaries for a larger 

geographic area (the districts) than the more limited catchment area—

the geographic area in which benefits may be expected to accrue—of 

5 kilometers on either side of the road.32

• For the Benin port project, the population projection in the beneficiary 

scrub began with a 2005 original baseline figure of 8,490,000, since 

the port project is expected to raise the incomes of the entire 

population of Benin. However, this number could not be derived from 

its purported source, the 2002 population census.33

• For the Armenia road project, the document supporting the beneficiary 

scrub calculation considered a catchment area for an erroneous 

revised road length of 68 kilometers rather than the correct figure of 

24.4 kilometers.

• In the Cape Verde roads and bridges activity, the original beneficiary 

numbers provided in the document supporting the beneficiary scrub 

spreadsheet did not match the figures in the spreadsheet.

In the 2009 revision of its Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary 

Analysis, MCC standardized its methodology to estimate beneficiaries 

and accordingly modified its beneficiary numbers in the spreadsheets for 

its beneficiary scrubs. However, the amount of detail in the analysis 

varied across compacts, and population growth rates were not always 

calculated in a consistent manner.

Of the beneficiary scrubs we reviewed, four of seven contained 

disaggregated data at the project level. Specifically, the Armenia, 

Georgia, Nicaragua, and Vanuatu scrubs are made up of multiple, 

relatively detailed spreadsheets. By contrast, one beneficiary scrub, for 

Honduras, contained one page of macro-level summary data with no 

 

32MCC officials told us that the original number of 53,988 beneficiaries was erroneous and 

should have been 111,442, in accordance with the 2004 Georgian Agricultural Census.

33The 2002 census indicates 6,769,914 for the population of Benin; adjusting population 

growth for 3 years leads to 7,419,235, not 8,490,000, in 2005. In addition, the supporting 

document that accompanied the beneficiary scrub spreadsheet and explained the 

computations had a different “original” baseline number—8,791,832—for 2005.

MCC’s Methodology to 

Estimate Beneficiaries Is Not 

Consistently Applied across 

Compacts
 

Page 26 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

explanation or sources for the figures. The remaining two of the seven 

scrubs contained additional data but were not as detailed as the first four. 

For example, the Cape Verde scrub included a second sheet of World 

Bank development indicators on the country, and the Benin scrub had 

some details on one of the compact projects. These varying levels of 

detail suggest that the scrubs were executed in an ad hoc, rather than 

consistent, manner.

MCC uses population growth rates to estimate the number of 

beneficiaries in a 20-year projection period; for each compact, MCC 

publicly presents the number of beneficiaries projected for the end of the 

20-year period.34

• For Honduras, MCC indicated that it took the population growth rates 

for 2005, 2006, and 2007 from World Bank data and averaged the 

three rates to get an average annual growth rate for the projection.

However, the scrub sheets we reviewed showed that 

MCC sometimes computed population growth rates differently across 

compacts, even when the scrubs provided the same underlying 

information.

35

• For Georgia and Cape Verde, MCC did not use the historical growth 

rates provided but instead took total population figures in 2005 and 

2007 and used them to compute an average annual growth rate for 

the beneficiary projection.

• For Vanuatu, MCC computed an average annual growth rate based 

on four historical growth rates without specifying a source or year.

In three of seven compacts, we found that some numbers in MCC’s public 

documents had not been updated or were inaccurate.

• In the case of the Georgia road, a December 2009 report and a July 

2011 close-out document used original beneficiary estimates 

(53,988), instead of using the revised estimate (58,079) from July 

2009, when MCC reported having recalculated the beneficiary 

numbers. In addition, in the 2011 status report, the total number of 

 

34MCC officials indicated that the standard time horizon for the beneficiary analysis is 

generally 20 years but that exceptions exist.

35In the case of Benin and Nicaragua, the growth rate for the year 2000 was added to the 

formula. 

For Some Countries, MCC Did 

Not Update Beneficiary 

Numbers or Reported Them 

Incorrectly 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

beneficiaries for the compact as a whole (143,000) was smaller than 

the beneficiaries of the infrastructure project alone (300,000).

• For the Benin port project, the beneficiary estimate that appeared in a 

2011 status report (8,791,832) was an original estimate from 2009 

instead of the revised estimate of 16,119,058. In addition, the 

supporting document accompanying the 2009 scrub spreadsheet 

mistakenly reported 13,421,086 beneficiaries for the port project by 

2026. However, the data in the scrub indicated that this figure referred 

to the number of beneficiaries in 2020; the correct number of 

projected beneficiaries for 2026 is 16,119,058.

• For Armenia, the beneficiary estimate for the road project in a 2011 

publication (6,216) did not reflect a revision of the estimate done in 

2009 (6,356).

MCC recognizes the importance of a disciplined, transparent, and 

accountable approach to tracking compact results to make well-informed 

decisions about U.S. investments. It has established an extensive 

monitoring and evaluation program that includes guidance and tools for 

the partner countries and controls on data quality. In addition, MCC has 

created and implemented a revised beneficiary calculation methodology 

to ensure standardization across projects and compacts.

Even with these steps, problems exist with the data behind several of 

MCC’s key performance indicators, limiting the reliability of MCC’s 

reported results.

• MCAs have not measured the results of common indicators in a 

uniform manner—including how they account for additional third-party 

funding—nor have they consistently reviewed the quality of data used 

to report the indicators’ results. As such, MCC cannot confidently 

compare or aggregate the results of these common indicators as 

intended.

• MCC requires the establishment of baselines to measure the impact 

its assistance has on partner countries. However, because some 

incorrect baselines were used, results may be over- or understated.

• MCAs have not consistently fulfilled the MCC requirements that they 

conduct independent data quality reviews and respond to issues the 

reviews raised. As a result, MCC and its partners have missed 

Conclusions
 

Page 28 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

opportunities to improve data quality and facilitate data reporting and 

aggregation.

In addition, MCC’s beneficiary calculations have problems that limit their 

usefulness. Because MCC’s new approach to estimating beneficiary 

numbers does not include a formal quality review process, the beneficiary 

estimates contain incorrect numbers and formulas and inconsistent 

calculations. While the impact of these problems is generally small, the 

lack of a robust, formal quality review process nonetheless calls into 

question the reliability of MCC’s estimates. Without a correct 

representation of the compacts’ results and beneficiaries, MCC, 

Congress, and other key stakeholders cannot accurately evaluate the 

extent to which MCC is achieving its goals of poverty reduction and 

economic growth.

We recommend that MCC’s Chief Executive Officer take the following 

four actions.

To improve the reliability of results measurement, MCC should

• improve guidance for common indicators by requiring that they are 

included in data quality reviews, measured uniformly across 

compacts, and reported in a standardized manner—including when 

third-party funding is used to complete the original scope of a project;

• improve guidance for baseline measurements by requiring MCAs to 

document the date, source, and methodology for establishing the 

baseline; and

• enforce current monitoring and evaluation policy requiring MCAs to 

conduct data quality reviews and to provide written comments in 

response to identified issues, discussing how recommendations will 

be implemented or explaining why changes may not be made.

To ensure more accurate beneficiary numbers, MCC should

• incorporate into the Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary Analysis

a formal process for reviewing beneficiary calculations and analysis.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 29 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

In written comments on a draft of this report, MCC stated that it agrees 

with our four recommendations and outlined steps it will take or has taken 

to address them. 

• With respect to our first recommendation—to improve guidance for 

common indicators—MCC stated that it has taken preliminary actions 

to address it. We reviewed MCC’s May 2012 Guidance on Common 

Indicators and found that it defines the indicators and specifies each 

indicator’s unit of measurement and how each should be 

disaggregated. In addition, when MCC activities are conducted jointly 

with other organizations (e.g. when the activities include third-party 

funding), MCC’s guidance instructs MCAs to report only MCC’s 

contribution to a particular common indicator. In addition, the 

guidance states that MCC will be explicit in reporting which changes 

in outcome indicators are more likely the result of MCC investments 

and which changes might also be influenced by other interventions. 

However, the guidance lacks enough specificity to address other 

weaknesses we identified. For example, when discussing road 

roughness, the guidance does not instruct MCAs to measure both 

sides of the road to account for variation in roughness from one side 

of the road to the other. In addition, this guidance does not specify 

that MCAs should include common indicators in their data quality 

reviews. 

• With respect to our second recommendation—to improve guidance for 

baseline measurements—MCC stated that its current monitoring and 

evaluation policy requires that compacts’ monitoring and evaluation 

plans document the date, source, and methodology for establishing 

baseline measurements. MCC further stated that current MCA 

monitoring and evaluation plans are compliant with this requirement.

• With respect to our third recommendation—to enforce current 

monitoring and evaluation policy requiring MCAs to conduct data 

quality reviews and to provide written comments in response to 

identified issues—MCC stated that it works with MCAs to ensure that 

recommendations of data quality reviews are incorporated into 

monitoring and evaluation plans and then implemented. 

• With respect to our fourth recommendation—to incorporate a formal 

process for reviewing beneficiary calculations and analysis—MCC 

noted that it will institute a formal process for reviewing beneficiary 

calculations and address the weaknesses we identified in this report.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 30 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

MCC asserted that the results of its compact investments are not 

diminished by the data quality challenges highlighted in this report. MCC 

noted, for example, that more than 623 kilometers of rehabilitated roads 

now serve poor and rural households in the countries we reviewed, 

linking farmers to markets and bolstering important regional trade routes. 

Regarding our finding that the total target for kilometers of road 

completed for the six compacts was reduced by 63 percent, MCC also 

noted that the final target for Honduras, Georgia, Cape Verde, and 

Vanuatu would be only 19 percent below the original target if we were to 

exclude the road projects that MCC terminated or discontinued as a result 

of the Armenian and Nicaraguan governments’ undemocratic behavior.

We have reprinted MCC’s comments in appendix V. We have also 

incorporated technical comments from MCC in our report where 

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. In addition, this 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact 

David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

David Gootnick

Director

International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 31 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

The fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Public Law 110-

161, mandated that GAO review the results of the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation’s (MCC) compacts. This report examines the extent to which 

MCC has, for transportation infrastructure projects in compacts ending in 

2010 and 2011, (1) achieved expected performance targets and (2) used 

a consistent methodology in estimating numbers of beneficiaries. The 

seven countries with compacts relevant to our scope are Honduras, Cape 

Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, Vanuatu, Armenia, and Benin.

MCC enters into a legal relationship with partner country governments, 

which vests responsibility for day-to-day management of compact project 

implementation with an accountable entity—a Millennium Challenge 

Account (MCA)—including monitoring and evaluation activities such as 

setting and revising targets. Because such MCA actions require MCC’s 

direct oversight and approval, throughout this report we attribute all 

decisions related to project rescoping and compact targets to MCC.

To assess the extent to which MCC has achieved its performance targets 

for transportation infrastructure projects in compacts ending in 2010 and 

2011, we reviewed MCC guidance and policy documents and analyzed 

compacts, monitoring and evaluation plans, and indicator tracking tables 

for the compacts with Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, 

Vanuatu, Armenia, and Benin. In assessing and reporting MCC’s results, 

we compared actual results achieved at the end of the compact for select 

performance indicators with the original and, in some cases, revised 

targets associated with each indicator. We considered the original target 

to be the one first documented for each performance indicator and the 

final target to be the one last documented in MCC monitoring documents.

Given that MCC tracks several performance indicators for each compact 

project, we selected a subset of indicators to examine for this report. For 

the roads projects, we examined kilometers of road completed, road 

roughness, and average annual daily traffic. We selected these road 

project indicators because (1) they address the projects’ key objectives 

and (2) they are among the “common indicators” that MCC requires all 

road projects to measure so that it can aggregate results across 

countries. For the port projects, we examined volume of merchandise 

through the port, container ship time at berth, and container ship time at 

anchor. Although MCC has not established common indicators for the 

port projects, we selected these port project indicators because they (1) 

addressed the projects’ key objectives, (2) corresponded to the common 

indicators established for the roads projects, and (3) were originally 

included in both port projects.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 32 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

To report the average value of targets and results for compact road 

projects, we calculated a weighted average using the length of each road 

segment. We performed this calculation for the average annual daily 

traffic and roughness indicators for Cape Verde, Honduras, Vanuatu, and 

Nicaragua because these MCAs report targets and results by road 

segment. For Honduras, we did not weight the indicators using values 

from sections 1 and 2 because the government of Honduras completed 

these sections with funding from the Central American Bank for Economic 

Integration. For Cape Verde, we did not include the average annual daily 

traffic and roughness for bridge projects, because the kilometer lengths of 

these sections were not available.

To determine the amount of funding used for transportation infrastructure 

projects, we reviewed MCC financial data. We included compact 

implementation funding—funds disbursed before entry into force to 

facilitate the implementation of the compact—with other projects not 

related to transportation infrastructure.

To determine which MCAs contracted for independent data quality 

reviews, which transportation infrastructure indicators were evaluated, 

and whether recommendations were made for common and key 

indicators, we reviewed third-party data quality review reports. To 

determine whether recommendations were implemented, we reviewed 

MCA comments on the data quality reviews that MCC provided to us and 

we reviewed final monitoring and evaluation plans.

To assess the extent to which MCC has consistently applied its 

beneficiary estimation methodology, we reviewed MCC’s beneficiary 

calculations and accompanying supporting documents for the seven 

compacts that ended in 2010 and 2011. In particular, we examined for 

consistency and accuracy the data and formulas on projected 

beneficiaries for road and port projects in the Excel spreadsheets that 

MCC used to update—or “scrub”—the beneficiary estimates. We 

reviewed the documents explaining the calculations. We compared 

original beneficiary figures for these transportation projects with the 

revised ones and assessed the justification behind the changes. We also 

examined quarterly status reports and the monitoring and evaluation 

plans for each compact to check the accuracy of the publicly reported 

beneficiary counts. We consulted with MCC officials when we found 

discrepancies and errors in the data.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 33 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

As part of related GAO engagements focusing on Cape Verde and 

Honduras1 and on Georgia and Benin,2

Data are considered reliable when they are accurate, complete, 

consistent and valid, given the uses for which they are intended. To 

assess the reliability of MCC indicator and beneficiary data, we (1) 

reviewed MCC policy for the monitoring and evaluation of compacts and 

for calculating beneficiary numbers, (2) interviewed MCC and MCA 

officials regarding the reliability and validity of the data, (3) reviewed 

independent data quality reviews required by MCC, (4) compared 

performance indicators across original and final monitoring and evaluation 

plans and indicator tracking tables to identify inconsistencies, and (5) 

reviewed beneficiary calculations for accuracy. We identified some 

weaknesses in the data that may affect the data’s reliability, as discussed 

in this report.

we visited compact projects incountry and met with MCA officials, partner country government officials, 

contractors, project managers, construction supervisors, and relevant 

private businesses.

Finally, some of the reports and documents referenced above were 

written in French and Spanish. We translated these documents as 

needed, creating English summaries to enable our analysis.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to September 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.3 Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 

to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

1

GAO-11-728. 

2

GAO-12-630. 

3

We began work for this report in 2010; however, the job was suspended while we 

conducted work for a related engagement.
Appendix II: Compact Timeframes

Page 34 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) completed seven compacts 

in 2010 and 2011—Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, Benin, 

Vanuatu, and Armenia (see fig. 3). MCC commits funding when it signs a 

compact, but MCC does not obligate funding until the compact enters into 

force. MCC funding that the partner country does not spend for compact 

activities by the end of the 5-year implementation timeframe must be 

deobligated.1

 

1

The statutory 5-year maximum timeframe begins once a compact enters into force.

Appendix II: Compact Timeframes
Appendix II: Compact Timeframes

Page 35 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Figure 3: Timeframes for MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011, by Date of 

Signature
Appendix III: Roads Data 

Page 36 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Table 8: Kilometers of Roads Completed for MCC Road Projects in Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011

Country Original target Final target Final result

Percentage of 

original target met

Percentage of final 

target met

Honduras 200.0 174.5a 115.0 57.5 65.9

Cape Verde 63.0 39.3 40.6 64.4 103.3

Nicaragua 158.0 67.0 74.0 46.8 110.4

Georgia 245.0 220.2 220.0 89.8 100.0

Vanuatu 213.8 149.7 149.7 70.0 100.0

Armeniab 943.0 24.4 24.4 2.6 100.0

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

a

After reducing the scope of the Honduras compact, MCC formally reduced the final target for the 

secondary road activities but did not reduce the final target for the highway activity. 

b

MCC provided documentation of kilometers completed; however, the documentation did not include 

takeover certificates from contractors, the data source for final kilometers in other countries. 

Table 9: Road Roughness of MCC Road Projects in Compacts ending in 2010 and 2011, as Measured by the International 

Roughness Index (IRI)

Country Road section

Roughness 

baseline

Original 

target Final target Final result

IRI 

methodologya

Hondurasb

CA-5 Highway: Section 1 4.7 1.9 1.9 N/C

CA-5 Highway: Section 2 4.4 1.9 1.9 N/C

CA-5 Highway: Section 3 4.0 1.9 1.9 2.2 Mechanical

CA-5 Highway: Section 4 4.0 1.9 1.9 3.2 Mechanical

Secondary roads 13.6 2.5 2.5 3.2 Mechanical

Cape Verde 

Road 1: Orgãos-Pedra Badejo 19.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Visual 

Road 2: Cruz Grande-Calhetona 18.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Visual 

Road 4: Assomada-Rincão 20.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 Visual 

Road: Vila das Pombas-Eito 18.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 Visual 

Nicaragua

Highway N-1: VillanuevaGuasaule12.0 3.4 3.4 1.8 Mechanical

S1: Somotillo-Cinco Pinos 13.2 3.0 3.0 3.4 Mechanical

S9: Leon-Poneloya 12.0 3.0 3.0 1.8 Mechanical

Georgia 16.6 3.2 2.5 1.5 Mechanical

Appendix III: Roads Data
Appendix III: Roads Data 

Page 37 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Country Road section

Roughness 

baseline

Original 

target Final target Final result

IRI 

methodologya

Vanuatu

Efate Ring Road 17.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 Visual 

Santo East Coast Road 22.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 Visual 

Armenia 14.2 5.0 4.0 3.5 Mechanical

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

N/C = not complete. 

Note: We found weaknesses in some of the reported data on road roughness, including the use of 

inconsistent application of methodologies and calculation errors. 

a

There are two standard methods for measuring IRI: mechanical reading and visual observation. 

Mechanical reading involves using a device such as a bump integrator, walking profiler, or carmounted software equipment to measure the IRI for each kilometer of road, which is then averaged 

across the length of the road to provide a single IRI estimate. The margin of error for mechanical 

readings differs depending on the type of device used. Visual observation is based on interpreting the 

smoothness of an observers’ drive of the road at different speeds in a standard passenger vehicle, as 

corresponding to an IRI visual assessment scale. The accuracy of the visual inspection varies with 

the experience of the observer. 

b

Because of the rescoping of the Honduras compact, sections 1 and 2 of the CA-5 Highway were 

completed post-compact with additional funding provided by the Central American Bank for Economic 

Integration; as of March 9, 2012, construction of these segments was not complete. 

Table 10: Average Annual Daily Traffic on MCC-Funded Roads in Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011

Country 

Average annual 

daily traffic 

baseline Original target Final target Final result

Hondurasa

CA-5 Highway: Section 1 8,374 9,447 9,447 N/C

CA-5 Highway: Section 2 5,411 6,104 6,104 N/C

CA-5 Highway: Sections 3 & 4 6,732 7,594 7,594 N/C

Secondary roads 676 887 887 N/C

Cape Verdeb

Road 1: Orgãos-Pedra Badejo 298 375 375 432

Road 2: Cruz Grande-Calhetona 440 554 554 235

Road 4: Assomada-Rincão 543 684 684 268

Road: Vila das Pombas-Eito 410 517 517 184

Bridge Ribeira Grande-Paul 552 695 695 76

Bridge Ribeira da Torre-Ponta de Sol 765 963 963 644

Bridge A Paul (Vila das Pombas) 671 845 845 50
Appendix III: Roads Data 

Page 38 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Country 

Average annual 

daily traffic 

baseline Original target Final target Final result

Nicaragua

Highway N-1: Villanueva-Guasaule 1,413 1,580 1,580 1,962

S1: Somotillo-Cinco Pinos 234 278 278 561

S9: Leon-Poneloya 1,103 1,276 1,276 1,462

Georgia 612 6,700 1,183 1,092

Vanuatu

Efate Ring Road 85 950 98 305

Santo East Coast Road 307 1,000 355 381

Armenia 637 460 706 735

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

N/C = not complete. 

Note: We found weaknesses in some of the reported data on average annual daily traffic, including 

inconsistent updating of baseline measurements. 

a

A traffic count for completed roads in Honduras was conducted from December 19, 2010, through 

January 25, 2011. MCC stated that it does not expect a final traffic measure in Honduras until late 

2012. 

b

As of January 2012, a final traffic study for completed roads in Cape Verde had not been conducted; 

results shown reflect traffic counts conducted at the compact end date and do not reflect annualized 

average daily traffic volumes.
Appendix IV: Port Data

Page 39 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Table 11: Volume of Merchandise through Port for Projects in MCC Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011

Thousand tons/year

Country Baseline Original target Final target Final result

Cape Verdea 482 711 711 N/C

Benin 4,519b 6,945 6,945 7,606

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

N/C = not complete. 

a

MCC eliminated performance indicators after decreasing the scope of the Cape Verde port project, 

because the indicators could not be measured prior to completion of the Phase II works, including the 

wharf 1, container yard, and breakwater. Phase II was funded by the government of Portugal and was 

expected to be completed after the compact closed. 

b

Baseline from 2004. According to MCC, the value in 2005 was 5,680 thousand tons. If MCC had 

used 2005 data for its baseline, the volume of merchandise would not show as large an increase. 

Table 12: Container Ship Time at Berth for Port Projects in MCC Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011

Days

Country Baseline Original target Final target Final result

Cape Verdea 1.41 1.01 1.01 N/C

Benin 2 1 1 1.31

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

N/C = not complete 

a

MCC eliminated performance indicators after descoping the Cape Verde port project, because the 

indicators could not be measured prior to completion of the Phase II works, including the wharf 1, 

container yard, and breakwater. Phase II was funded by the government of Portugal and was 

expected to be completed after the compact closed. 

Table 13: Container Ship Time at Anchor for Port Projects in MCC Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011

Hours

Country Baseline Original target Final target Final result

Cape Verdea 5 4 4 N/C

Benin 16 4 4 34.6

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data.

N/C = not complete. 

a

MCC eliminated performance indicators after descoping the Cape Verde Port project, because the 

indicators could not be measured prior to completion of the Phase II works, including the wharf 1, 

container yard, and breakwater. Phase II was funded by the government of Portugal and was 

expected to be completed after the compact closed. 

Appendix IV: Port Data
Appendix V: Comments from the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation 

Page 40 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Appendix V: Comments from the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation
Appendix V: Comments from the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation 

Page 41 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure
Appendix V: Comments from the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation 

Page 42 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 43 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Emil Friberg, Jr. (Assistant 

Director), Miriam Carroll Fenton, Aryn Ehlow, Heather Hampton, and 

Seyda Wentworth made key contributions to this report. In addition, 

Michael Armes, Lynn Cothern, Reid Lowe, Ernie Jackson, Leslie Locke, 

and Jena Sinkfield provided technical assistance.

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 44 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Georgian and Benin Transportation 

Infrastructure Projects Varied in Quality and May Not Be Sustainable. 

GAO-12-630. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2012.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Compacts in Cape Verde and 

Honduras Achieved Reduced Targets. GAO-11-728. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2011.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Summary Fact Sheet for 17 

Compacts. GAO-10-797R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: MCC Has Addressed a Number of 

Implementation Challenges, but Needs to Improve Financial Controls and 

Infrastructure Planning. GAO-10-52. Washington, D.C.: 

November 6, 2009.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Independent Reviews and Consistent 

Approaches Will Strengthen Projections of Program Impact. GAO-08-730. 

Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.

Management Letter: Recommendations for Improvements to MCC’s 

Internal Controls and Policies on Premium Class Air Travel. 

GAO-08-468R. Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2008.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Projected Impact of Vanuatu Compact 

Is Overstated. GAO-07-1122T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2007.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Vanuatu Compact Overstates 

Projected Program Impact. GAO-07-909. Washington, D.C.: 

July 11, 2007.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress and Challenges with 

Compacts in Africa. GAO-07-1049T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Compact Implementation Structures 

Are Being Established; Framework for Measuring Results Needs 

Improvement. GAO-06-805. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.

Analysis of Future Millennium Challenge Corporation Obligations. 

GAO-06-466R. Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2006.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 45 GAO-12-631 MCC Transportation Infrastructure

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress Made on Key Challenges in 

First Year of Operations. GAO-05-625T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 27, 2005.

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress Made on Key Challenges in 

First Year of Operations. GAO-05-455T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 26, 2005.

(320801)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, 

GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, 

go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.