UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

DEJUAN CARTER, 

Plaintiff,

v.

REDFORD TOWNSHIP, et al.

Defendants.

 /

Case No. 15-11370

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Now before the court is Defendant Redford Township’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, (Dkt. # 19), on Plaintiff’s Monell claim. The matter has been fully briefed,

and the court concludes that a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). 

For the reasons detailed below, the court will grant the Defendant Township’s Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 20, 2013, Plaintiff DeJuan Carter attended the wedding reception of a

family member in Redford Township. (Dkt. # 15, Pg. ID 74; Dkt. # 17, Pg. ID 135.) The

evening did not go well, and at some point during the event, Plaintiff entered into a

verbal dispute with the groom. (Id.) The police were called, and when Defendant

Officer Jason Haas arrived on the scene, he saw Plaintiff standing outside in the parking

lot, screaming and being restrained by one or two individuals. (Id.) While the parties

disagree about the exact sequence of events, there is no dispute that Defendant Officer

Haas struck Plaintiff at least twice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this constituted an assault

and was unprovoked, (Dkt. # 17, Pg. ID 136), while Defendant Haas claims he did not

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punch Plaintiff until he “attempted to pull away and squared up . . . in an aggressive

posture,” (Dkt. # 15-3, Pg. ID 101.) As a result of this encounter, Plaintiff claims he

suffered an “acute nasal fracture” and was diagnosed with a “mild cerebral concussion

and post concussive syndrome.” (Dkt. # 17, Pg. ID 137.) He subsequently filed this

Complaint against Defendant Haas in his official and individual capacities and

Defendant Redford Township, (Dkt. # 1), seeking damages under § 1983 for Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment violations. 

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 497

(6th Cir. 2003). The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine

dispute as to a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

“[T]hat burden may be discharged by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810,

817 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must put forth enough evidence to

show that there exists “a genuine issue for trial.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909

(6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is not appropriate when “the

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 243 (1986). In evaluating a summary judgment

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motion, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the

truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial . . . . 

[C]redibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.” Moran v. Al Basit

LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Township violated his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by “failing to adequately train and/or supervise its police officers.” 

(Dkt. # 1, Pg. ID 6.) In Monell v. New York City Dept. Of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658

(1978), the Supreme Court held that civil rights plaintiffs could sue municipalities under

§ 1983 if they could show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom. 

Under Monell and its progeny, a municipality may be held liable only (1) “when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, and (2) when there is an “affirmative link between the

policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged,” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 823(1985); see also Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir.

2007). A plaintiff must establish that the municipality’s official policies or customs (or

lack thereof) were a “moving force” behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights and

arose as a result of “deliberate indifference” to his rights. See Doe v. Claiborne Cty.,

103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996). As the Sixth Circuit has phrased it,

The key inquiry thus becomes whether, in viewing the [municipality]’s

policy in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], there was sufficient evidence

for reasonable minds to find “a direct causal link” between the County’s

policy and the alleged denial of [Plaintiff’s] right . . . . See, e.g., Blackmore

v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A municipality

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can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the plaintiff can demonstrate

that his civil rights have been violated as a direct result of that

municipality’s policy or custom.”) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct.

2018); Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)

(“[T]o satisfy the Monell requirements[,] a plaintiff must identify the policy,

connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was

incurred because of the execution of that policy.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Ford, 535 F.3d at 497 (6th Cir. 2008). The court will address Plaintiff’s failure to train

and failure to supervise claims separately.

A. Failure to Train

Defendant Redford Township argues it is entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s “failure to train” claim because “Plaintiff cannot offer any evidence to show that

the Township’s training policies are inadequate . . . , much less that any alleged

inadequacy is the result of deliberate indifference.” (Dkt. # 15, Pg. ID 86.) For

inadequacy of police training to serve as the basis for § 1983 liability, it is not enough for

a plaintiff “to show that his injury could have been avoided if the officer had more or

better training.” Mayo v. Macomb Cty., 183 F.3d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 1999). He must

show the “failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by a municipality.” 

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff claims that it is “patently obvious that Defendant Redford Township has

routinely failed to properly train its officers as to the proper use of force,” (Dkt. # 17, Pg.

ID 145). This argument is hollow, and not supported by the evidence. In fact, the

evidence demonstrates without contradiction that Defendant Haas, and other officers,

received some training in the use of force. Defendant Township has provided the court

with Officer Haas’ certificates of completion for several courses related to use of force,

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such as a “PPCT Defensive Tactics System Basic Certification” course taught by PPCT

Management Systems, Inc., (Id. at Pg. ID 111); a “Criminal Law and Procedure” course

at Grand Valley State University (Id. at Pg. ID 112); and a “Range 3000 XP Use of

Force” training through Michigan Mobile Ranges, Inc., (Id. at Pg. ID 113). Indeed,

Plaintiff’s own argument agrees that “Haas and other Redford Township police officers .

. . have sporadically received use of force training.” (Dkt. # 17, Pg. ID 145).

Furthermore, the Redford Police Department’s official “Policy and Procedure”

with respect to “Less than Lethal Use of Force” dictates that the defensive tactics

“preferred by Redford Township Police Department are those from PPCT. These

techniques are required subjects in basic police training as mandated by the Michigan

Commission on Law enforcement [sic] Standards.” (Dkt. # 5-6, Pg. ID 119 (emphasis

added).) “The simple fact that [Redford Township] did have a written policy as to when

an officer” can engage in less than lethal force and requires officers to receive training

in the preferred methods of force before even being hired “seems to obviate the

plaintiff’s argument.” Mayo v. Macomb Cnty., 183 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has

failed raised a genuine dispute of material fact on this point. The court will grant

summary judgment on this aspect of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

B. Failure to Supervise

Defendant Township also claims it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

“failure to supervise” claim. This is a sub-species of Monell in which the allegedly

offensive government “custom” is one of inaction. Doe v. Claiborne Cty., 103, F.3d 495,

508 (6th Cir. 1996). For a municipality to be found liable under this theory, the plaintiff

must demonstrate:

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(1) The existence of a clear and persistent pattern of illegal activity;

(2) Notice or constructive notice on the part of the municipality;

(3) Tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that failure to act

constitutes deliberate indifference and amounts to an official policy of inaction;

and

(4) That the custom was the moving force or a direct causal link in the

constitutional deprivation.

Id. 

Plaintiff has failed to provide the court with evidence that raises a genuine issue

of material fact on any of these factors. Nothing in the record suggests that Defendant

Haas had a history of using excessive force or otherwise violating suspects’

constitutional rights, and no evidence shows that Defendant Township was aware of

any such conduct. Without such knowledge, no deliberation can occur, and inaction on

the part of the Township cannot be the product of deliberate indifference. It cannot be

the moving force behind any constitutional deprivation that may have occurred.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff still attempts to argue that the Defendant Township’s

“complete and utter failure to review its officers’ performances on the job” permitted

“officers to continuously violate individuals [sic] constitutional rights, thereby causing

severe physical injuries similar to what occurred in the instant matter.” (Dkt. # 17, Pg.

ID 144; see also, e.g. Dkt. # 17-4, Pg. ID 175-76.) Plaintiff supports his claim on a thin

reed: a single, unpublished case, Kammeyer v. City of Sharonville, No. 01-00649, 2006

WL 1133241 (S.D. Ohio April 27, 2006), in which the district court held that a lack of

performance reviews under the prevailing circumstances could show that a detective did

not receive needed supervision in the course of an allegedly faulty murder investigation;

the court therefore allowed Plaintiff’s Monell claim to be submitted to the jury. But unlike

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the instant action, in Kammeyer the municipality was fully briefed on the allegations

against the detective. Not only did several people “sen[d] letters to the mayor . . . which

should have put [the city] on notice of the need to supervise” the detective, the

department’s “entire command staff reported their dissatisfaction with [the detective’s]

arrogance, failure in communications, and failures to follow through on his policing

efforts.” Kammeyer, 2007 WL 1133241, at *11. No similar history or notices exist in the

case at hand. Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden. The court will grant this aspect of

Defendant’s Motion, as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to claims

against Redford Township (Dkt. # 19) is GRANTED. A separate judgment will issue at

the conclusion of this litigation.

 s/Robert H. Cleland

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: June 15, 2016

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record

on this date, June 15, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 s/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C1 ORDERS\15-11370.DEJUANCARTER.sj.jah2.wpd

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