OPERATIONAL 

CONTRACT SUPPORT

Sustained DOD Leadership 

Needed to Better Prepare 

for Future Contingencies

Statement of Timothy J. DiNapoli, Acting Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

GAO-12-1026T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-1026T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives.

September 12, 2012

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 

Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for 

Future Contingencies

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has relied heavily on contractors 

to support its operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and is likely to continue to 

depend on contractors in future 

operations. For over 15 years, GAO 

has made recommendations intended 

to improve DOD’s ability to manage 

and oversee operational contract 

support in deployed locations, which 

DOD has taken some actions to 

address. GAO has called for a cultural 

change within DOD to emphasize the 

importance of institutionalizing

operational contract support across the 

department. As DOD’s current efforts 

in Afghanistan draw closer to a 

conclusion and DOD turns its attention 

to other challenges, the department

needs to guard against allowing the 

lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan to 

be forgotten. 

This testimony addresses three areas 

where sustained leadership is needed 

if DOD is to effectively prepare for the 

next contingency. These areas pertain 

to (1) planning for the use of 

operational contract support, 

(2) ensuring that DOD possesses the 

workforce needed to effectively 

manage and oversee contracts and 

contractors, and (3) improving DOD’s 

ability to account for contracts and 

contractors.

This statement is drawn from GAO’s

broad body of work on DOD’s efforts to 

plan for operational contract support 

and manage and account for 

contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan—

including work reflected in GAO’s

February 2011 high-risk update, GAO’s

related testimonies, and GAO’s recent 

reports on operational contract support 

and other contracting issues. 

What GAO Found

Future overseas contingencies are inherently uncertain, but effective planning for 

operational contract support can help reduce the risks posed by those 

uncertainties. The Department of Defense (DOD) has made an effort to 

emphasize the importance of operational contract support at the strategic level

through new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts. For example, in January 

2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum outlining actions and 

indicating a need to influence a cultural shift in how the department manages 

contracted support in a contingency environment. DOD has also recognized the 

need to translate strategic requirements into plans at the operational level, but 

GAO’s past work has shown that DOD’s progress in anticipating contractor 

support in sufficient detail in operation plans has been slow. As a result, DOD 

has risked not fully understanding the extent to which it will be relying on 

contractors to support combat operations and being unprepared to provide the 

necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. One 

way to help address this risk is to ensure military commanders and senior 

leaders are cognizant of the roles contractors have in supporting DOD’s efforts 

and the role that military personnel have in managing and overseeing 

contractors. While DOD has taken steps to develop additional training, we have 

reported that commanders and senior leaders are not required to take these 

courses before assuming their contract management roles and responsibilities.

In contingencies, DOD relies on a wide range of individuals to play critical roles in 

defining requirements, overseeing contractors, and helping to ensure that the 

warfighter receives the goods and services needed in a timely manner. GAO and 

others have identified numerous instances in Iraq and Afghanistan where these 

individuals were in short supply, were not properly trained, or were not fully 

aware of their responsibilities. DOD leadership has recognized the need to 

rebuild, train, and support a highly qualified and knowledgeable acquisition 

workforce. While DOD has made some progress in growing the workforce, it 

continues to face challenges in its strategic planning efforts. Further, in March 

2012, GAO reported that although DOD had taken steps to enhance training for 

oversight personnel, the department continued to experience challenges 

ensuring that it had a sufficient number of oversight personnel with the subjectmatter expertise and training needed to perform their contract management and 

oversight duties in Afghanistan.

DOD’s ability to effectively leverage operational contract support in contingency 

environments also depends on having appropriate tools to account for contracts 

and contractor personnel. These tools can provide information that DOD can use

to help mitigate risks, including tracking which contracts DOD has awarded, 

where contractor personnel are located, and whether potential vendors or 

contractor personnel may pose a potential risk to U.S. interests. DOD has made 

efforts to develop such tools, but it is not certain that these efforts will result in 

long-term solutions. For example, while DOD has designated a system for 

tracking specific information on certain contracts and associated personnel in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the department lacks reliable data sources to report on its 

contracts and contractor personnel. Without attention to improving the tools 

needed to effectively account for contracts and contractor personnel, DOD may

continue to face challenges in future contingencies.

View GAO-12-1026T. For more information, 

contact Timothy J. DiNapoli at (202) 512-4841 

or dinapolit@gao.gov.
 

Page 1 GAO-12-1026T 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the 

Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss how the Department of Defense 

(DOD) can enhance its ability to effectively use contractors in future 

contingencies. Over the past decade, DOD, along with other federal 

agencies, has relied extensively on contractors for operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. According to DOD, at the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

the number of contractor personnel exceeded the number of military 

personnel in Iraq, and a similar situation is occurring in support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom. For over 15 years, GAO has made 

numerous recommendations intended to improve DOD’s ability to 

manage and oversee operational contract support, which DOD has taken 

some actions to address. While the operational contract support-related 

challenges that GAO has identified are, in many respects, emblematic of 

broader systemic issues that DOD faces, the significance and impact of 

these challenges are heightened in a contingency environment. Since 

1992, we have designated DOD contract management as a high-risk 

area.1

Given the longstanding and recurring nature of the issues we identified, in 

June 2010 we called for a cultural change in DOD—one that emphasized 

an awareness of operational contract support throughout all entities of the 

department to help address the challenges faced in ongoing and future 

contingency operations.

In our February 2011 report on high-risk areas, we reported that 

DOD needed to, among other things, ensure that its acquisition workforce 

was sized, trained, and equipped to meet the department’s needs and 

fully integrate operational contract support throughout the department 

through education and predeployment training. 

2 We recognize that effecting a cultural change is 

a major undertaking for organizations, especially for an organization as 

large and multi-faceted as DOD. Effecting a cultural change involves, for 

example, developing and communicating a vision for the future, 

neutralizing impediments to change, identifying stakeholders in the 

change process, and promoting continued support from senior leaders.3

 

1

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2011).

2

GAO, Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and 

Manages Operational Contract Support, GAO-10-829T (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2010). 

3

GAO, Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for Cultural Change at 

FAA, GAO/RCED-96-159 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 1996). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-1026T 

Further, achieving a cultural change is time-consuming—efforts typically 

take 5 or more years to fully implement. DOD appears to share our view 

of needing to make fundamental changes in how it approaches the issue 

of operational contract support. In January 2011, the Secretary of 

Defense issued a memorandum in which he expressed concern about the 

risks introduced by DOD’s current level of dependency on contractors and 

the need to better plan for operational contract support in the future. The 

Secretary outlined a number of actions and indicated a need to 

institutionalize the changes necessary to influence a cultural shift in how 

the department views, and accounts and plans for contracted support in a 

contingency environment while the lessons learned from recent 

operations are fresh.

In my statement today, I will highlight three interrelated areas of 

operational contract support in which sustained leadership is needed if 

DOD is to achieve meaningful change and effectively prepare for the next 

contingency. These areas pertain to (1) planning for the use of 

operational contract support, (2) ensuring that DOD possesses the 

workforce needed to effectively manage and oversee contracts and 

contractors, and (3) improving DOD’s ability to account for contracts and 

contractors. My statement is based on our broad body of work on DOD’s 

efforts to plan for operational contract support in Iraq and Afghanistan and 

contract management issues—including work reflected in our February 

2011 high-risk update, our related April 2011 and June 2010 testimonies, 

and our recent reports on operational contract support and other 

contracting issues.4 This work was conducted in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

 

4

GAO, Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address Systemic 

Challenges, GAO-11-580 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2011). Also see the Related GAO 

Products at the end of this statement. 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-1026T 

Future overseas contingencies are inherently uncertain, but effective 

planning—at both the strategic and operational levels—can help DOD 

reduce the risks posed by those uncertainties. At a strategic level, 

planning is an important element in a results-oriented framework; it can 

help DOD clarify priorities and unify the department in pursuit of common 

goals for operational contract support. Similarly, at an operational level, 

effective planning can help better define contract support requirements to 

avoid potential waste and abuse and facilitate the continuity of services. 

In Iraq and Afghanistan, we previously reported that insufficient planning 

for operational contract support may lead to shortages in contractor 

personnel available to perform key functions, such as not having enough 

personnel to maintain and repair mission essential vehicles and 

equipment.5 Additionally, due in part to limited operational planning for 

contracted support, we previously reported that DOD faced challenges 

planning for certain aspects of contracting and contractor management in 

Iraq during the drawdown.6

DOD has recognized the need to improve its planning for operational 

contract support. In addition to the Secretary’s January 2011 

memorandum, DOD has communicated and emphasized the importance 

of operational contract support at the strategic level through the issuance 

of new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts.7

• In December 2011, DOD issued regulations establishing policy, 

assigning responsibilities, and providing procedures for operational 

contract support. The regulations were issued as an interim final rule 

published in the Federal Register and as Department of Defense 

For example:

 

5

GAO, Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and 

Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations, GAO-10-551T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2010). 

6

GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of 

U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq, GAO-10-376 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2010) 

and Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor 

Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role, GAO-11-774 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 16, 2011). 

7

We are currently assessing DOD’s efforts to implement the Secretary’s January 2011 

memorandum and expect to issue a report in early 2013. 

Planning for the Use 

of Operational 

Contract Support
 

Page 4 GAO-12-1026T 

Instruction 3020.41.8

• According to DOD officials, in 2011, the department revised its 

Guidance for Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plan to emphasize contractor management, and it is 

currently revising another core piece of guidance, Joint Publication 4-

10, to help further integrate operational contract support into planning 

efforts.

• In 2010, DOD established the Operational Contract Support 

Functional Capability Integration Board, which is responsible for a 

variety of tasks including conducting independent assessments and 

analysis of operational contract support capabilities of the military; 

advocating for operational contract support capability development in 

a variety of venues; and establishing and assessing ways to improve 

measures of performance, metrics, and processes for measuring 

operational contract support readiness. This board is drafting an 

Operational Contract Support Action Plan to outline steps the 

department plans to take to close identified gaps in operational 

contract support capabilities.

DOD guidance has recognized the need to translate strategic 

requirements into operation plans for some time. In this regard, guidance 

indicates that military commanders must ensure that requisite operational 

contract support planning and guidance are in place for applicable 

contingency operations; one joint publication even suggests that planning 

for contractors should be at a level of detail on par with that for military 

forces. Our past work, however, has shown that DOD’s progress in 

anticipating contractor support in operation plans at a sufficient level of 

detail has been slow. For example, we have previously reported that 

since February 2006, DOD has required planners to include an 

operational contract support annex—known as Annex W—in the 

combatant commands’ most detailed operation plans, if applicable to the 

plan. However, as of February 2010, only 4 operation plans with Annex 

Ws had been approved by DOD and planners had drafted an additional 

30 Annex Ws for plans.9

 

8

Operational Contract Support, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,807 (Dec. 29, 2011) (to be codified at 32 

C.F.R. pt. 158); Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support 

(OCS) (Dec. 20, 2011).

Further, according to combatant command 

9

GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to 

Support Future Military Operations, GAO-10-472 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).
 

Page 5 GAO-12-1026T 

officials, most of the annexes that had been drafted at that time restated 

broad language from existing DOD guidance on the use of contractors to 

support deployed forces but included few details on the type of 

contractors needed to execute a given plan. We also found shortcomings 

in guidance for planners on how and when to develop contract support 

annexes, which resulted in a mismatch of expectations between senior 

DOD leadership and combatant command planners regarding the degree 

to which Annex Ws would contain specific information on contract support 

requirements.

Overall, we found that requiring consideration of potential contract 

support requirements raised awareness of the importance of operational 

contract support and led to some improvements in planning for contract 

support. Nevertheless, we found that DOD still risked not fully 

understanding the extent to which it would be relying on contractors to 

support combat operations and being unprepared to provide the 

necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. 

One way to help address this risk is to ensure military commanders and 

senior leaders are cognizant of the roles contractors have in supporting 

DOD’s efforts, as well as the role that DOD military personnel have in 

managing and overseeing contractors. In 2006 and again in 2012, we 

recommended that operational contract support training, with a particular 

emphasis on contingency operations, be included in professional military 

education to ensure that all military personnel expected to perform 

contract or contractor management duties, including commanders and 

senior leaders, receive training prior to deployment.10

 

10GAO, Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements Needed 

in Afghanistan,

Military 

commanders and senior leaders have used contractors to perform a 

variety of services to help their units execute the mission, including life 

support, security, and communications support. We previously found that 

DOD officials in Afghanistan did not always receive training that 

adequately prepared them for their contract management and oversight 

duties, and according to DOD officials, the training did not necessarily 

make them sufficiently capable for their particular assignments. Further, 

contracting personnel have told us that commanders, particularly those in 

combat units, do not perceive operational contract support as a warfighter 

GAO-12-290, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2012) and Military Operations: 

High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management 

and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145 (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 18, 2006). 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-1026T 

task. DOD has developed a program of instruction on contingency 

acquisition to be taught at some of the military and senior staff colleges. 

However, we have previously reported that commanders and senior 

leaders are not required to take these courses before assuming their 

contract management roles and responsibilities.

In contingencies, having the right people, with the right skills, in the right 

numbers can make the difference between success and failure. These 

individuals—whether acquisition professionals or non-acquisition 

personnel, including military commanders—play critical roles in defining 

requirements, managing and overseeing contracts and contractors, and 

helping to ensure that the warfighter receives the goods and services 

needed in a timely manner while serving to mitigate the risks of fraud, 

waste, and abuse.

Our work, as well as the work of others in the accountability community, 

has identified numerous instances in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere 

where these individuals were in short supply, were not properly trained, or 

were not fully aware of their responsibilities. For example, in 2010, we 

found that DOD relied on contractors to support contract administration 

functions in Iraq and Afghanistan, in part because of a shortage of 

government personnel to perform these functions.11 In March 2012, we 

reported that DOD oversight personnel in Afghanistan did not always 

receive adequate training for their contract management duties, and that 

DOD continued to lack a sufficient number of oversight personnel for 

contracts in Afghanistan, which in some cases resulted in projects being

completed without sufficient government oversight and problems not 

being identified until projects were already completed.12

DOD leadership has recognized the need to rebuild, train, and support a 

highly qualified and knowledgeable acquisition workforce as a strategic 

Further, we have 

found in the past that some commanders had to be advised by contract 

oversight personnel that they had to provide certain support, such as 

housing, force protection, and meals, to contractors.

 

11GAO, Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of Contractors 

Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-10-357 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2010).

12 GAO-12-290. 

Ensuring That DOD 

Possesses the 

Workforce Needed to 

Effectively Manage 

and Oversee 

Contracts and 

Contractors 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-1026T 

priority. This workforce, which was downsized considerably through the 

1990s, has faced increases in the volume and complexity of work 

because of increases in services contracting, ongoing contingency 

operations, and other critical missions. We reported in June 2012 that, 

according to DOD, the size of DOD’s civilian acquisition workforce 

increased from 118,445 in fiscal year 2009 to about 135,981 in December 

2011, a gain of 17,536.13 According to DOD officials, 5,855 individuals 

were hired using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund 

with other growth attributed to hiring new staff using other funding 

sources, moving contracted work to government employees through 

insourcing, and reclassifying existing DOD staff as acquisition staff. For 

example, DOD provided $321 million from the fund to help support 

increasing the size of the Defense Contract Management Agency 

(DCMA) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), two key 

contract oversight organizations. Last year, we reported that DCMA 

officials identified a number of ways deployments of DCMA personnel in 

support of contingencies—which more than tripled over the past 5 

years—have affected the agency’s other missions, which include 

providing contract administration services for DOD buying activities and 

working directly with defense contractors to help ensure that goods and 

services are delivered on time, at projected cost, and that they meet 

performance requirements.14

Similarly, while DOD has recognized the important role that nonacquisition personnel—those outside the defense acquisition workforce—

play in the acquisition process, DOD continues to face a number of 

challenges in ensuring that these individuals are identified and have the 

training and resources needed to perform their roles, in particular as 

DCAA has also faced challenges in recent 

years given its limited workforce and growing workload. DOD continues to 

face challenges in strategic workforce planning for its acquisition 

workforce. Further, DOD’s ability to effectively execute hiring and other 

initiatives has been hindered by delays in the Defense Acquisition 

Workforce Development Fund funding process and the absence of clear 

guidance on the availability and use of related funds.

 

13GAO, Defense Acquisition Workforce: Improved Processes, Guidance, and Planning 

Needed to Enhance Use of Workforce Funds, GAO-12-747R (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 

2012). 

14GAO, Defense Contract Management Agency: Amid Ongoing Efforts to Rebuild 

Capacity, Several Factors Present Challenges in Meeting Its Missions, GAO-12-83 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3, 2011). 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-1026T 

contracting officer’s representatives (CORs). CORs are generally military 

or civilian DOD personnel that manage and oversee contracts and serve 

as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the unit 

receiving support or services. While the contracting officer is ultimately 

responsible for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements set forth 

in the contract, CORs serve as the eyes and ears of contracting officers. 

However, earlier this year, we reported that DOD has experienced 

challenges ensuring that (1) it has a sufficient number of CORs and (2) 

the CORs have the subject-matter expertise and training needed to 

perform their contract management and oversight duties, in particular for 

construction projects. DOD has taken some actions to enhance training 

programs to prepare CORs to manage and oversee contracts in 

contingency operations.15 For example, DOD developed a new training 

course for CORs, with a focus on contingency operations and developed 

a more general certification program for CORs, including the contingency 

operations course as a training requirement when it is applicable. 

Continued attention in this area will help DOD ensure better contract 

management and oversight in future contingencies.

DOD’s ability to effectively leverage operational contract support in 

contingency environments not only depends on having effective plans in 

place and having a skilled acquisition and oversight workforce, but also 

on having appropriate tools to account for contracts and contractor 

personnel. These tools can provide information that DOD can use to help 

mitigate risks associated with relying on contractors in contingency 

environments, including tracking which contracts DOD has awarded, 

where contractor personnel are located, and whether potential vendors or 

contractor personnel may pose a risk to U.S. interests. Our prior work has 

shown that a lack of complete and accurate information on contracts and 

contractor personnel may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce 

unnecessary risk in contingency environments. Our work has further 

shown that DOD faced significant contract management challenges as a 

result of not having the mechanisms or tools in place to obtain and track 

such information at the start of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

DOD has made efforts to develop tools to improve its ability to account for 

contracts and contractors, but it is not certain that these efforts will result 

 

15GAO-12-290. 

Improving DOD’s 

Ability to Account for 

Contracts and 

Contractors 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-1026T 

in long-term solutions that will be available at the start of future 

contingencies. For example, in 2008, DOD designated the Synchronized 

Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as its system for 

tracking specific information on certain contracts and associated 

personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. While recent efforts have been made 

to improve SPOT’s tracking of contractor personnel, in reports issued 

annually since 2008, including in a report we plan to issue today, we have 

consistently found that DOD has lacked reliable data and systems to 

report on its contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.16

Practical and technical challenges continue to affect SPOT’s ability to fully 

track certain information about contracts and contractor personnel. 

Additionally, DOD has experienced challenges in closing out contracts 

partly due to the fact that the contracting organization that awarded the 

majority of DOD’s contracts in Iraq lacked a contract writing and 

management information system between 2003 and 2008.17

Similarly, we previously reported on limitations in DOD policies and 

procedures related to vetting vendors and ensuring that contractor 

personnel—particularly local nationals and third-country nationals—have 

been screened. These policies and procedures can help ensure that DOD 

will be able to take reasonable steps, in both current and future 

This 

contributed to incomplete or inaccurate information that hindered 

management oversight of contracting activities. Although the contracting 

organization adopted an automated contract writing and management 

information system in fiscal year 2009 that officials stated improved the 

quality of data, DOD announced in October 2011 its goal to phase out the 

use of this system in part because of challenges associated with 

maintaining and updating it.

 

16GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting 

but Need to Standardize Reporting, GAO-12-977R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012); 

Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, 

Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, GAO-11-886 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 15, 2011); Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued 

Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, 

GAO-11-1 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2010); Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and 

USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-10-1 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2009); and Contingency 

Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, GAO-09-19 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2008). 

17GAO, Contingency Contracting: Improved Planning and Management Oversight Needed 

to Address Challenges with Closing Contracts, GAO-11-891 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 

2011). 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-1026T 

contingencies, to minimize the risks to the military posed by contractor 

personnel. DOD’s U.S. Central Command established a vetting cell in 

2010 to vet non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan to minimize the risk of 

insurgents or criminal groups using contracts to fund their operations. 

However, we reported in 2011 that DOD’s then-current approach for 

selecting vendors to vet had gaps, such as not routinely vetting contracts 

below a certain dollar threshold.18 We also reported in 2009 that the 

system used in Iraq and Afghanistan to screen local and third-country 

national contractor personnel by checking names and biometric data 

relied primarily upon U.S.-based databases of criminal and terrorist 

information, which may not be effective in screening foreign nationals who 

have not lived in or traveled to the United States.19

Without attention to improving the tools needed to effectively account for 

contracts and contractor personnel, DOD may continue to face similar 

challenges in future contingencies. Having the tools with the requisite 

capabilities in place before the next contingency can help military and 

acquisition officials properly plan for, manage, and oversee contracts and 

contractors in future contingencies.

For the past 10 years, DOD has focused its attention on contingency 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The challenges encountered in those 

contingencies highlighted the need for better strategic and operational 

planning when it comes to the use of operational contract support, as well 

as to ensure that DOD’s workforce is sufficiently trained and staffed and 

has the tools needed to effectively account for contracts and contractors. 

As reflected in the Secretary’s January 2011 memorandum regarding 

operational contract support, DOD leadership has recognized that it is 

imperative for the department to learn from these experiences while they 

are still fresh and to set forth a commitment to encourage cultural change 

with respect to operational contract support throughout the department. 

We agree. The challenge for DOD is to sustain this effort over the long 

term, as effecting a cultural change is by no means easy and takes time. 

 

18GAO, Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors Need Improvement, 

GAO-11-355 (Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2011).

19GAO, Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and Finalize 

Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security Contractors, 

GAO-09-351 (Washington D.C.: July 31, 2009). 

Concluding 

Observations 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-1026T 

It will take the sustained commitment by DOD leadership to ensure that 

they continue down the path that they have set out for the department. As 

DOD’s current efforts in Afghanistan draw closer to a conclusion and 

DOD turns its attention to other challenges, DOD needs to guard against 

allowing the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan to be forgotten. Focusing 

on the areas my statement highlighted today will better position DOD to 

effectively use contractors in future contingencies.

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the 

Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

answer any questions that you may have at this time.

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Timothy J. 

DiNapoli at (202) 512-4841 or dinapolit@gao.gov. In addition, contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Alissa Czyz, Assistant Director; Johana 

Ayers; Rajiv D’Cruz; Melissa Hermes; Mae Jones; Anne McDonoughHughes; Cary Russell; Michael Shaughnessy; Yong Song; and Alyssa 

Weir.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 12 GAO-12-1026T 

The following is a list of related products. For a full list of the most recent 

publications related to Iraq and Afghanistan, see 

http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html. 

Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on 

Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. GAO-12-977R

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).

Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency 

Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law.

GAO-12-750 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2012).

Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations 

by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

GAO-12-854R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012).

Defense Acquisition Workforce: Improved Processes, Guidance, and 

Planning Needed to Enhance Use of Workforce Funds. GAO-12-747R 

(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2012).

Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements 

Needed in Afghanistan. GAO-12-290 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2012).

Acquisition Workforce: DOD’s Efforts to Rebuild Capacity Have Shown 

Some Progress. GAO-12-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov.16, 2011).

Defense Contract Management Agency: Amid Ongoing Efforts to Rebuild 

Capacity, Several Factors Present Challenges in Meeting Its Missions.

GAO-12-83 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3, 2011).

Defense Acquisition Workforce: Better Identification, Development, and 

Oversight Needed for Personnel Involved in Acquiring Services.

GAO-11-892 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2011).

Contingency Contracting: Improved Planning and Management Oversight 

Needed to Address Challenges with Closing Contracts. GAO-11-891 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2011).

Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, 

Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role.

GAO-11-774 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2011).

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 13 GAO-12-1026T 

Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for 

Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel. 

GAO-11-886 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2011).

Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Address Contract 

Oversight and Vetting of Non-U.S. Vendors in Afghanistan. GAO-11-771T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011).

Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors Need Improvement. 

GAO-11-355 (Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2011).

Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address 

Systemic Challenges. GAO-11-580 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2011).

Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued 

Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and 

Associated Personnel. GAO-11-1 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2010).

Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans 

for and Manages Operational Contract Support. GAO-10-829T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2010).

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient 

Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq. GAO-10-376 

(Washington, D.C: Apr. 19, 2010).

Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of 

Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. GAO-10-357 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2010).

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using 

Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. GAO-10-472 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).

Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Face Challenges in Tracking Contracts, 

Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Associated Personnel.

GAO-10-509T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2010).

Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and 

Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations. 

GAO-10-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2010).
Related GAO Products

Page 14 GAO-12-1026T 

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face 

Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and

Afghanistan. GAO-10-1 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2009).

Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and Finalize 

Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security 

Contractors. GAO-09-351 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009).

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and 

Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO-09-19 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 1, 2008).

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance 

on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. 

GAO-08-572T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008).

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