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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

HASKELL G. GREER, et al., 

 

 Plaintiffs, Case No. 15-12444 

 Honorable Judith E. Levy 

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford 

 

CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, 

et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

ORDER FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL TO SHOW CAUSE WHY HE 

SHOULD NOT BE SANCTIONED FOR UNREASONABLY AND 

VEXATIOUSLY MULTIPLYING PROCEEDINGS BECAUSE OF HIS 

CONDUCT RELATING TO THE PARTIES’ SETTLEMENT EFFORTS 

 Upon referral from the Honorable Judith E. Levy, the Court will hold a 

hearing on January 7, 2019 on plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the parties’ 

agreed-upon settlement. [ECF No. 75]. Apart from considering whether 

the putative agreement can be enforced, the Court ORDERS defense 

counsel to SHOW CAUSE at the hearing why he should not be sanctioned 

for unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying proceedings because of his 

conduct relating to the parties’ settlement efforts. The legal authority under 

which the Court will consider sanctioning defense counsel is 18 U.S.C. § 

1927, Knopf v. Elite Moving Sys., 677 F. App’x 252, 257 (6th Cir. 2017) and 

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Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642, 

646 (6th Cir. 2006). 

The factual basis is as follows: 

 The Court’s settlement conference notice instructed that 

“[i]ndividuals with full settlement authority shall be 

personally present at settlement conferences. . . . For the 

defendant(s), ‘full settlement authority’ is defined as the full 

relief requested in the lawsuit and/or the relief requested by the 

last settlement demand.” [ECF No. 58, PageID.600 (emphasis 

in original)]. 

 The parties appeared for the settlement conference on August 

29, 2018 and negotiated from about 10:00 a.m. to about 1:00 

p.m. [See ECF No. 77, PageID.1071-72]. Counsel for 

defendants, James McGinnis, appeared “on behalf of 

Defendants,” and City Administrator Kathy Square was 

represented as having “authority to enter into a Settlement 

Agreement.” [Id., PageID.1071]. 

 The parties agreed to a settlement of $110,000 for all plaintiffs 

to be paid in three installments. [Id., PageID.1073]. McGinnis 

noted that “only the City Council can bind the municipality to a 

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contract, so [ ] this Settlement is subject to Council approval.” 

[Id.]. But he also said that Square had authorized him to enter 

into the agreement and that he understood “that the Council will 

meet some time in September and we would then get word of 

whether or not they have approved the settlement.” [Id.]. 

 Counsel for plaintiffs stated that he was unsure of whether he 

would need to obtain approval of the settlement on behalf of the 

minor child through this Court or through Oakland County 

Circuit Court; if the latter, he would be required to establish a 

conservatorship. [Id., PageID.1074]. McGinnis raised no 

concern at that juncture regarding moving forward with the 

settlement agreement pending approval of the settlement 

and/or the establishment of conservatorship.1

 

1 Research conducted after this hearing reveals that it is this Court, and not 

a state court, that must approve the settlement of the minor child under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii). See Green v. Nevers, 111 

F.3d 1295, 1302 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding district court’s decision to 

reduce contingency fee in settlement involving minor child); Kiel by Kiel v. 

Barton, No. 09-CV-15053, 2011 WL 13206189, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 

2011) (declining to rely on Michigan Court Rule 2.420 because federal 

rules applied to approval of a settlement of a minor in federal court); Hertz 

v. Miller, No. 07-14369, 2011 WL 4433763, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 

2011) (requiring parties to file motions to approve settlement because 

settlement involved a minor child). 

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 After much discussion, McGinnis agreed that plaintiffs could 

reopen the case to enforce the settlement against all of the 

defendants, including the individual officers, if the City did not 

complete its payments under the settlement. [Id., 

PageID.1078-81]. After this was made clear, Square confirmed 

her agreement to the settlement. [Id., PageID.1086]. 

 On September 6, 2018, McGinnis sent plaintiffs’ counsel a letter 

stating that there were two issues with the settlement. First, he 

asserted that a next friend had to be appointed because the 

minor child did not have capacity to sue, but he agreed that a 

portion of the settlement could be set aside for the minor child 

until the settlement was sanctioned by a court.2 [ECF No. 75-2, 

 

2 Defendants are mistaken in this regard, as Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 17(c) allows a parent to sue on a child’s behalf. See In re 

Brooks, 583 B.R. 443, 444–45 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2018) (“Because Mr. 

Bucceri may sue on behalf of his minor daughter as her parent without 

resort to any appointment as next friend or guardian ad litem under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 17(c)(2), the court will deny the Next Friend Petition as 

unnecessary.”); Communities for Equity v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic 

Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1006 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (“This contention is 

defeated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), however, which 

provides that a general guardian may sue on behalf of a minor. A parent is 

a guardian who may so sue.”); Bender v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Educ., No. 

3:13-CV-0470, 2013 WL 3777197, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2013) (“Under 

Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a parent or guardian 

may bring suit on behalf of his or her minor child.”); Cavanaugh ex rel. 

Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2005) 

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PageID.1065]. Second, McGinnis asserted, “[W]e had a 

provision of settlement that allows you (your clients) to collect 

against the individual officers if Highland Park defaults on 

payments. The individual officers have not consented to 

collections against them.” [Id.]. Yet, McGinnis appeared at the 

settlement conference on behalf of all of the defendants; none 

of the individual officers appeared. Consistent with this Court’s 

settlement conference notice that all parties with settlement 

authority must appear, the Court and plaintiffs believed that 

McGinnis and Square had full authority to agree to the 

settlement on behalf of all of the defendants pending City 

Council approval. 

 Plaintiffs’ counsel responded to McGinnis’s letter by agreeing 

that a conservatorship had to be approved. But he correctly 

noted that the ability to enforce the settlement against all of the 

defendants was a condition of the settlement. [ECF No. 75-3, 

PageID.1067]. Subsequently, the minor child’s father was 

 

(under Rule 17(c), parents “may sue or defend on their minor child’s 

behalf,” but not pro se). 

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appointed to be her conservator and has moved for the 

appointment of a next friend.3 [ECF Nos. 83, 83-2]. 

 Despite plaintiffs’ efforts to address the need for court approval 

for the settlement with respect to the minor child—an issue that 

was raised when the settlement was placed on the record with 

no objection from McGinnis—defendants are now objecting to 

going forward with the settlement. [ECF No. 73]. In fact, 

defendants have file a motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 78]. 

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11 and Section 1927 based on defendants’ belated filing of their 

motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 88]. Defendants have yet to address that 

motion, and the Court will hear it separately from the January 7 hearing. 

What the Court will consider at the January 7 hearing is whether 

McGinnis should be ordered to reimburse plaintiffs for their reasonable 

expenses incurred during the settlement conference and in subsequent 

attempts to finalize the settlement agreement. The Court will determine if 

McGinnis’s conduct as described above objectively fell short of his 

obligations to the Court and caused additional expense to plaintiffs, and if a 

 

3 Based on the authority set forth in footnotes 1 and 2, the Court does not 

believe that appointment of a next friend is necessary or warranted. 

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sanction is warranted to deter further wasteful settlement efforts. Knopf, 

677 F. App’x at 257; Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source Advantage, Ltd., 

465 F.3d at 642. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Elizabeth A. Stafford 

 ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

Dated: January 4, 2019 

NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

The parties’ attention is drawn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which 

provides a period of 14 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order 

within which to file objections for consideration by the district judge under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First-Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 4, 2019. 

 s/Marlena Williams 

 MARLENA WILLIAMS 

 Case Manager 

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