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i 

75–146 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–137] 

EXPERT ASSESSMENTS ON THE 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: 

RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE 

FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 29, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHRISTOPHER BRIGHT, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

ARTHUR MILIKH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Friday, June 29, 2012, Expert Assessments on the Afghan National Security 

Forces: Resources, Strategy, and Timetable for Security Lead Transition ..... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Friday, June 29, 2012 .............................................................................................. 21 

FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 2012 

EXPERT ASSESSMENTS ON THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY 

FORCES: RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY 

LEAD TRANSITION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Critz, Hon. Mark S., a Representative from Pennsylvania, Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations .............................................................................. 2 

Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations ......................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Boot, Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, 

Council on Foreign Relations .............................................................................. 2 

Keane, GEN John M., USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........ 4 

O’Hanlon, Dr. Michael, Director of Research, Senior Fellow, The Sydney 

Stein, Jr. Chair of the Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution ........... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Boot, Max .......................................................................................................... 26 

Keane, GEN John M. ....................................................................................... 37 

O’Hanlon, Dr. Michael ..................................................................................... 48 

Wittman, Hon. Rob ........................................................................................... 25 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 59 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Critz ............................................................................................................ 63 

(1) 

EXPERT ASSESSMENTS ON THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Friday, June 29, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:03 a.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. WITTMAN. I want to call to order the House Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. I want to welcome 

folks this morning. 

And today our subcommittee convenes the second of a series of 

hearings related to the Afghan National Security Forces. And at 

this hearing we will receive testimony from outside experts about 

the resources and strategy which the U.S. and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] are devoting to training the ANSF [Afghan 

National Security Forces] and the timetable for transitioning security lead responsibility to the ANSF. 

Our panel today includes Max Boot, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations—Mr. Boot, welcome; Retired General Jack Keane, 

former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; and Michael O’Hanlon, 

Director of Research and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. 

General Keane, Dr. O’Hanlon, thank you so much for joining us 

today. We look forward to your testimony. 

My views on these issues have been informed by a recent trip to 

Afghanistan. And during my visit I had several opportunities to 

talk with folks in provinces and met with local leaders, including 

the chiefs of police. I also had the opportunity to talk to our military commanders on the ground, who provided their impressions of 

the level of support that will be needed to create a self-sustaining 

ANSF. It is my hope that our witnesses today can provide us some 

further context to these important issues. 

And before we move on, I want to take a moment to highlight 

the extraordinary efforts of our All-Volunteer Force serving in Afghanistan. These brave men and women are conducting daily combat operations against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and associated terrorist networks. And earlier this month, I saw their sacrifice first-
2 

hand, and want to convey my appreciation for their service here 

today, thank them and their families for the service and sacrifice 

they provide to our Nation. 

As an administrative note, I recognize that members of other 

subcommittees have joined us: Mr. Thornberry, our Vice Chairman 

of the House Armed Services Committee. 

Mr. Thornberry, thank you for joining us. 

Pursuant to the committee rules, I will recognize these members 

after all O&I Subcommittee members have had an opportunity to 

question the witnesses. 

And, with that, I will turn to Mr. Critz, our acting ranking member, for any opening statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK S. CRITZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM PENNSYLVANIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I just want to say thanks, gentlemen, for coming in. As we 

move forward with the transition in Afghanistan, what we are trying to do is make sure we have as much information so that we 

can make the best decision for our country, for our men and women 

in uniform, and for Afghanistan, for the effort made there. 

And I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Critz. 

And we will begin with the testimony of the witnesses. 

Mr. Boot. 

STATEMENT OF MAX BOOT, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK SENIOR 

FELLOW FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. BOOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for convening 

these hearings. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Is your microphone on? 

Mr. BOOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for convening 

these hearings and casting such an important spotlight on these 

vital issues which I fear get short shrift in our political culture. 

Since the focus of the hearings is the ANSF, let me just say very 

briefly that I think ANSF capabilities are increasing but we must 

not exaggerate what they can do. And they still need considerable 

support from American forces in terms of intelligence, medevac 

[medical evacuation], air, fire support, clearance packages, all sorts 

of other things, without which they would not be nearly as effective 

as they are. And they still have tremendous challenges in securing 

a country of 30 million people with a force that is only going to 

grow to about 350,000 in the course of this year. 

Now, the Council on Foreign Relations issued this week a policy 

innovation memo in which I suggested seven concrete steps that we 

need to take to secure the gains that have been made by our 

troops—to whom you have rightly paid tribute—the gains secured 

by our troops, by our allies, and by Afghan troops over the course 

of the last couple years during the Afghan surge. I fear that if we 

don’t do enough follow-up, the gains will be lost, and we will be 
3 

placing too much of a burden on the Afghan security forces to try 

to expand the tenuous security gains that have been made. 

I realize our time is very limited, so let me just run down very 

briefly the seven steps that I think are important. 

The first and the most important is not to reduce funding for the 

ANSF. This is something that causes me the greatest concern, the 

fact that currently the Administration plans to reduce funding from 

about $6 billion a year down to $4.1 billion a year after 2014, 

which will necessitate a reduction in the ranks of the ANSF by 

about 120,000 soldiers and police. 

It is far from clear where these 120,000 could possibly find gainful and legal employment in Afghanistan’s economy. Many would 

no doubt wind up working for drug lords or insurgents. This is perhaps the most calamitous step we could possibly take to destabilize 

the situation in Afghanistan. And I really do not see the necessity 

of doing so when all we would be saving is approximately $2 billion 

a year, which I realize in the real world is a lot of money but 

around here is not a significant portion of the Federal budget. 

In any case, we don’t have to contribute the entire amount ourselves; we should certainly do more to try to get our allies to pay. 

But I think it is incumbent on us not to reduce and shortchange 

the ANSF, which could have calamitous consequences for Afghanistan’s security. 

The second most important recommendation that I would make 

is not to reduce our own force levels precipitously. By the end of 

September, we are going to have 68,000 troops in Afghanistan. And 

unless there is a substantial improvement in the situation on the 

ground between now and the end of 2014, I would recommend that 

we keep those force levels at about 68,000. 

Because what the troops have been able to do in the last couple 

of years is to vastly improve the security situation in the south. We 

have not seen any such improvement in the east, where Haqqani 

sanctuaries remain intact only a few hours’ drive from Kabul, as 

I am sure you heard, Mr. Chairman, during your visit. This is a 

very dangerous situation to leave behind which could potentially 

destabilize and, in fact, lead to the overthrow of the current government unless we do more to establish conditions of security, 

which will be difficult enough to do with even 68,000 troops and 

I fear impossible if we go substantially below that number. 

We also need to make sure—and this is my third recommendation—we need to make sure that we don’t precipitously cut our 

force levels after 2014. In some quarters of this town, there is some 

magical thinking going on, I fear, that leaving only a handful of 

special operators out there by themselves can secure all of our interests in Afghanistan, which is far from the case. 

Even if we want to maintain the Joint Special Operations Command at their current or close to their current level of operations, 

it requires a vast infrastructure of forward operating bases, 

medevac, air support, all sorts of platforms to enable the men and 

women of the Special Operations Forces to be as effective as they 

are. And if we get force levels below, let’s say, 30,000 after 2014, 

I fear we will not have the infrastructure in place to enable us to 

carry out even the minimal advisory and special operations missions that I think most of us agree need to be performed. 
4 

In terms of other recommendations, I will run through them 

very, very quickly. 

I think we need to go slow on peace talks, not try to force the 

Karzai government into an ill-advised deal with the Taliban that 

would lead to a backlash from the Northern Alliance. 

We need to identify and groom a successor to President Karzai, 

who is due to leave office in 2014. 

We need to end U.S. subsidies for the Pakistani military, which 

is, in effect, subsidizing the other side. 

And, finally, I believe we need to launch drone and/or special operations strikes on Haqqani and Afghan Taliban leadership targets 

within Pakistan. They cannot have impunity to operate within Afghanistan, as they currently have, if we expect to be at all successful in the long run in Afghanistan. 

That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boot can be found in the Appendix on page 26.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Boot. We appreciate your testimony. Thank you for your viewpoints, and we look forward to questioning. 

General Keane. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER 

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General KEANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

and the other members of the committee, for inviting me to testify 

today. It is a pleasure always to be back in front of the House 

Armed Services Committee and also to talk about an important 

subject, the Afghan National Security Forces. 

I am delighted to be up here with Michael O’Hanlon and Max 

Boot. I have known these guys for years, and I truly admire and 

thank them for their continued contribution to national security. 

As you know from the submission to the record, I have done four 

assessments in Afghanistan in the last 18 months for our commanders, and the last one was for General Mattis and General 

Allen in January. And I spent a considerable amount of time with 

our forces down at the platoon and company level and the Afghan 

National Security Forces who are their counterparts. 

And I will just say upfront that, you know, we have had much 

success in the security situation since we applied the surge forces, 

and particularly in the south, which was the priority of those surge 

forces. And we have begun, just begun, to turn the momentum in 

the east. The frustration there is we don’t have the force generation, because of the pullout of our surge forces, that we had in the 

south and southwest, I think, to be able to achieve the same kind 

of end state. 

Also, the other thing is, I believe the ANSF is a capable force, 

and it is beginning to stand up to the task of taking over from the 

United States and NATO forces. However, there are many challenges. You know 2014 is a major transition year for us, politically, 

economic, and also from a security perspective. 

Just let me say that on the political and economic side there has 

been considerable less effort in a successful transition than there 

has been on the security side, from my perspective, even though 
5 

that was not the major part of my assessment in Afghanistan; it 

has always been security. But you cannot be immune to what is 

going on around the security situation. 

I think there are four key decisions that are facing us in the next 

year, maybe a year and a half, that are going to be made that will 

dramatically influence the stability and security of Afghanistan, 

some of which Max has mentioned. And all four of them will impact dramatically on the ANSF success. 

Key decision one is the post-surge U.S. forces. That is the 68,000 

that Max mentioned. I totally agree that we cannot prematurely reduce that force. If we do, we drive the risk up far too much in 

terms of what we are trying to achieve in the east with the forces 

we have and the side-by-side operations that are so critical to the 

Afghans. When they are training side-by-side with us, what they 

get out of that in terms of their own performance and their own 

growth and development is exponential as opposed to just providing 

them advice, because they see what ‘‘right’’ looks like every single 

day from sergeants, soldiers, and officers. 

Key decision number two is the funding for the ANSF. You know 

our plans are a force level of 352,000, which we are about at. We 

maintain that through 2015 at a cost of $6 billion, largely provided 

by U.S. dollars. Discussions are taking place, as we know, right 

now with options on the table to reduce that to a force of 230,000 

beginning in 2016. 

Now, think about that. I mean, this makes no sense. How can 

we expect the ANSF to protect the people with one-third less force 

only a year after we almost zero out the U.S. NATO force of 

100,000? And the issue is about $2 billion a year. We spent over 

a decade investing in the training and equipping of the ANSF. By 

2014, we will have the results of that investment: an ANSF capable 

of protecting its people. So why, after all these years of investing, 

would we gut that force and put the entire security mission at risk? 

In terms of the timetable, the ANSF funding should remain 

through 2020, in my view, as part of our strategic partnership 

agreement. And, of course, as Afghans are able to pay an even 

greater share, then that should be expected. And we can reduce 

that force in size prior to 2020 based on the conditions, but let it 

be the conditions and not an arbitrary financial number. A 230,000 

ANSF force beginning in 2016 would have a disastrous impact on 

the morale of that force and, I believe, in and of itself, almost certainly guarantees the return of Taliban domination. 

The third key decision is the residual U.S. NATO force post-2014. 

This force should be sized for the missions that are vital to continued success; it should not be an arbitrary number. Those missions 

are counterterrorism, training assistance, security—those are 

forces to protect the force itself, which will be largely defensive— 

and then you need the enablers. The enablers are needed for all 

three of the forces. For counterterrorism, we need enablers. For 

training assistance, we do. And we also need enablers for the international community residual forces and the ANSF. 

Now, what are some of the things that the ANSF truly needs? 

Well, first of all, it is primarily Army. And when you look at the 

Army that is on the battlefield today, it is largely a maneuver 

force. So it needs major functional support for sometime beyond 
6 

2014. What am I talking about? Intelligence, artillery, aviation, engineers, and logistics, to include medical evacuation. 

The intelligence function is almost exclusively human intelligence. They are good at it, but they have no technology—no UAVs 

[unmanned aerial vehicles], no sensors, no listening devices to monitor cell phone communication and radios. And their aviation fleet, 

some of which is there, is mostly Russian-made and Italian-made 

C–27s. Every one of those C–27 aircraft has been broke, on the 

tarmac, for months. At some point, not initially, but at some point, 

we should transition them out of those aircraft to U.S. helicopters 

and C–130s as part of a long-term partnership with the Afghans, 

some of which, in time, they will be able to pay for themselves. 

The other thing is that the ANSF has no route- and mine-clearing equipment, none. And this should be part of an anti-IED [improvised explosive device] package that is provided. If we shut 

down our intel systems, don’t have anti-IED for them, and they are 

left out there by themselves, their casualty rate will spike rather 

dramatically. 

The last decision is the Afghan Taliban sanctuaries. You know 

we have one at Miram Shah and one also in Quetta. 

And the way you should think about this, think of these sanctuaries as loosely knitted military bases with the following functions resident in both: command and control; intelligence; training; 

logistics, to include family housing and barracks. At these bases, 

leaders set the strategy in Afghanistan, brief middle-level leaders 

to return from the fight to Afghanistan, plan for future operations, 

provide intelligence to field commanders, train and refit fighters 

and bombers, and provide resources and logistics. 

Furthermore, the Pakistan Army, particularly the ISI [InterServices Intelligence], provides intelligence on U.S. NATO operations in those sanctuaries to those commanders. They provide 

training and logistics. And as a result, the Taliban have managed 

to protract a war for over 8 years, which has eroded the political 

and moral will of the American people and our NATO partners. 

Something must be done about these sanctuaries if we intend to 

succeed beyond 2014. We should start building the target folders 

now, which would become a major collection item for our intelligence services, which it is not. And then we should start conducting drone attacks against those leaders in the same way we 

have had success against the Al Qaeda leaders in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]. 

What would be the result? Well, look at what has happened to 

the Al Qaeda after systematic attacks on leadership. They became 

largely a defensive organization in Pakistan, no longer able to control their operations or project power outside of it. That would be 

an absolute game changer in Afghanistan, if we started to systematically change the behavior of the Taliban leadership both at 

Quetta and Haqqani leadership also at Miram Shah. 

Let me conclude by saying that these four decisions that are in 

front of us are going to determine whether we are going to be successful in Afghanistan or not. We are on the cusp of ending our 

participation in our longest war. Never before in our Nation have 

so few served for so long on behalf of so many. 
7 

And war is fundamentally a test of wills, and that is why leadership is always at a premium. This effort has enjoyed your support, 

and it begs for your continued leadership and support as we begin 

to write the final chapters. 

You know, Ryan Crocker, who you all know well, our distinguished and capable Ambassador in Afghanistan and former Ambassador in Iraq and Pakistan, has said, ‘‘How we leave a war and 

what we leave behind is far more important than how we began 

it.’’ 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Keane. 

Dr. O’Hanlon. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL O’HANLON, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, SENIOR FELLOW, THE SYDNEY STEIN, JR. CHAIR 

OF THE FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Dr. O’HANLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you and the 

General and Max have framed the discussion beautifully, so I am 

just going to pick up on one or two points and be brief. 

First of all, I would like to underscore my concern, as well, about 

the projected intention to downsize the Afghan security forces 

quickly after 2014 or 2015. And I agree, by the way, with the argument that we have to be careful about our own forces. But I am 

especially concerned about what we are saying now about the potential downsizing of the Afghan forces. 

And I just want to give a quick anecdote based on my trips to 

Afghanistan of how this concept of downsizing rapidly began and, 

I think, how it has been misconstrued in the ensuing discussion. 

As I understood things from discussions at the U.S. part of the 

training command, the United States initiated a discussion about 

what long-term Afghan forces might have to be, in terms of their 

size and capability and cost, and did not work through NATO or 

with the Afghans, just tried to get some notional concepts on the 

table, one of which was this famous option to go to 230,000 Afghan 

forces or, in a suspiciously precise formulation, 228,500 Afghan 

Army and police. 

That was one of four scenarios based on a certain assumed threat 

environment, a relatively favorable one, because, of course, 228,500 

is a lot less than we have now. Right now we have about 130,000 

NATO troops and about 300,000 Afghan forces in the field, plus another 40,000 or so that are training. So right now we have more 

than 400,000 combined forces. We are intending to go down, perhaps, to 230,000. 

Again, this was one of four scenarios, which the United States 

did not intend to be a prediction of where we should go, but the 

idea was to give some concreteness to the planning exercise and 

also give our diplomats in the State Department, who I think have 

done a very good job with a difficult portfolio, something to plan 

for with NATO allies; going to our allies and saying, can you at 

least consider this to be a minimal requirement, and therefore try 
8 

to pony up some fraction of the cost even for this minimal requirement. 

But, unfortunately, what was designed as an illustrative scenario 

and a way to go out and elicit some help from allies has become 

the default plan. And I don’t quite know when or how that happened, but I think it is a bad idea. I think we should assume the 

Afghan forces need to stay at 350,000 for some number of years 

after 2015 until proven otherwise. And Max’s point is right on the money, that the $2 billion, plus 

or minus, that is at issue here, while it is real money, is nothing 

compared to the $100 billion a year we are spending now on our 

own operations in the field. And if we even had to add 2,000 more 

American troops post-2014 to compensate for an insufficiently sized 

Afghan force, that would consume all the savings right there because of the enormous expense of our forces in the field. 

So I just wanted to add my voice—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

Dr. O’HANLON [continuing].and also explain the genesis of what 

I think has become, you know, misconstrued. It was supposed to be 

an option or a scenario. Now it has become the default plan. 

Just four more quick points, then I will be done. And this is in 

the spirit of reminding some of the broader debate and discussion 

about some of the good news from Afghanistan. We are all aware 

of the bad news. I don’t in any way trivialize it. I think the bad 

news is being accurately reported, and it is real. But the good news 

needs to also be kept in mind. And I think the General and Dr. 

Boot have done a good job, as have you, of reminding the country 

in this discussion of what we are able to make progress up against, 

but let me add four more specific points. 

One is—and it is a point that General Allen has made, and others—the Afghan forces are now leading about 40 percent of all operations. And these are typically the easier ones, so, you know, we 

have to be clear and transparent about that. But they are doing a 

fair amount even with the more difficult missions—for example, 

the April 15th coordinated attacks in Kabul and elsewhere, which 

were handled primarily by the Afghan security forces. And I believe that was also the case in the tragic attacks last week at the 

hotel resort near Kabul in which Afghan forces took the primary 

role. Their special forces are getting pretty good, by all accounts, 

and I think that is worth bearing in mind, as well. 

Secondly, the Afghan local police, they tend to make the news 

when they do something wrong or when somebody else, some militia claims to be Afghan local police and goes out and does something wrong. And I think, however, this force, on balance, is doing 

extremely well. There have been some investigations of the various 

alleged misdoings of some of the individual units. 

And for those who aren’t familiar, perhaps C–SPAN viewers, 

with exactly what this concept is, these Afghan local police are essentially community-watch organizations under government supervision with American training but, nonetheless, different than the 

Army or the police. And they defend their own communities; they 

are not allowed to go beyond their communities, as you well know. 

And there have been some cases of abuse, but—there were, I 

think, nine alleged cases last year. Subsequent investigations sug-
9 

gested that one or two were serious violations of proper procedure 

or law by the Afghan local police. Overwhelmingly, however, these 

forces are operating well, and they are holding their own. They are 

taking the highest number of casualties, percentage-wise, of any 

Afghan force. And even when they are overmatched, they are holding their ground 80 percent of the time against insurgents, even 

when they don’t have help quickly from Afghan Army or NATO 

Army forces. So I think they deserve credit. 

The bad news here is that the reason they are good is because 

we are being very careful in how we build them up. And, again, I 

think members of this committee are well aware of this fact, but 

that this is not an out-of-control reincarnation of the Afghan militias. We are having American and other NATO special forces operate in the field with these folks for several months at a time before 

we certify them as ready to go on with their own missions. And 

that is why there are only 12,000 of them right now. 

So I do think we have to bear in mind, this is not going to be 

the silver bullet that the Sons of Iraq, to some extent, were in 

Anbar Province. It is not going to be that big of a contribution to 

Afghan security. But it is still a useful one. That is my second 

point. 

Third point: People talk about sometimes in very loose ways how 

the Afghan security forces are dominated by the Tajiks or other minority groups. And it is true that we have too high of a dependence 

on Tajik officers in certain parts of the Afghan security forces. But 

the overall ethnic composition of the Afghan security forces almost 

exactly mirrors the demographics of Afghanistan. And, of course, 

that is because of people like General Caldwell and General Bolger 

and their associates in the Afghan forces making great effort to ensure that this is so. 

And then, finally, my last point: Where we do see misbehavior, 

corruption, nepotism, and, to some extent, ethnic partiality in the 

behavior of Afghan leaders, the Afghan leadership and the NATO 

leadership are trying to get rid of these people and replace them. 

And, again, as you know from your recent trip, and some of the 

things I was told on my trip in May, 50 Afghan Army leaders in 

the east of Afghanistan have been replaced in just the last year— 

50. And this is often the Americans, having eyes on the operations 

of these Afghans, reporting up the chain of command, and then 

General Allen or someone else may go see General Karimi or Minister Wardak or President Karzai, and there is an exchange of 

views. And the Afghans ultimately make the decisions, they control 

their own security forces, but we provide them with information, 

and they take it seriously. 

And then, finally, B.K. Mohammadi, the Minister of Interior, 

some people think that he is a little too aggressive in how he fires 

people. Some people think he is a Tajik, you know, nationalist of 

some type. But, for the most part, what appears to be the case is 

he is firing incompetent leaders of whatever ethnic persuasion they 

may be. And he has just replaced 70 in Herat, including a number 

of his own fellow Tajiks. 

So I see a lot of signs of hopefulness in the Afghan security 

forces. The title of my testimony was that the glass is about 55 percent full, and that is the point I will finish on. Thank you. 
10 

[The prepared statement of Dr. O’Hanlon can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Dr. O’Hanlon. 

Members of the panel, thank you so much. And we will begin 

with our line of questioning. 

I want to go back to my conversations when I was in theater 

with General Allen and Ambassador Crocker and their assessment 

of where we are, where they see the need going forward. One of the 

concerns that I have in looking at, strategically, the plan going forward, as you know, now we are in a situation of a force of 68,000 

at the end of 2012, and then making the decision through 2013 as 

to where we progress by 2014, and doing that in a transition of five 

tranches. 

Now, the concern to me is that, as you look at those tranches, 

the easier transition points take place up front, the more difficult 

transition points take place in the end, which, to me, is 

counterintuitive to drawing down our forces, having less capability 

there. So you have less capability facing a more difficult transition 

time, and then not having a full complement there in place of 

ANSF. 

So my concern is, does that logically make sense in how the transition is to take place? So I got their perspective there. They have 

proposed making some changes, moving some of the more difficult 

areas of transition into tranche three, which is what they are beginning that effort now. 

That being said, as you said, the interesting point is a somewhat 

of a different approach as far as the total number of ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] forces after 2014 and then a 

drawdown, as you said, with ANSF forces not long after they are 

up to the full 350,000. My conversations, too, with Defense Minister Wardak is that he feels that going to 230,000 at that point 

in time, at the end of 2016, will leave a power vacuum and that 

they are concerned about being able to transition those 120,000 

people into some productive element of society there and not have 

them become part of the insurgency. 

So I think there are a number of different areas there where it 

looks like, to me, there is some counterintuitiveness about the plan 

going forward. 

All of you all touched on certain parts of that. I want to get your 

thoughts about what impact that has on our success on the current 

track and what the contingency should be if these scenarios, as 

they are planned now, knowing what has been proposed, what 

should the contingency be if those elements of the plan don’t work 

out as proposed. 

And I will go—I will start with Mr. Boot. 

Mr. BOOT. Well, I would just reiterate what General Keane said, 

which is that all of our decisions need to be conditions-based. They 

should not be imposed based on a timeline dictated in Washington 

or on budget decisions made in Washington for purely Washington 

reasons. I think they ought to correspond to the conditions on the 

ground. 

And I think we need to be, as General Keane suggested and I 

think as Mike would certainly agree, I think we need to be very 

careful about the drawdown and managing that in a responsible 
11 

way so that we don’t leave a power vacuum. And I am afraid that 

could well be the result of the current trajectory that we are on. 

So I think we need to be very careful, go slow, and make sure 

that we are not shrinking the ANSF or shrinking our force presence prematurely, even if conditions have not improved a good 

deal. And there has been some improvement, certainly, in the last 

couple of years, but it is very uneven. It has been mostly focused 

on the south. The east remains very dangerous and still in need 

of considerable pacification. 

So I would, you know, as my colleague said, I would urge a goslow, conditions-based approach. 

General KEANE. You know, it is pretty interesting what has happened to us. I think if the Administration at the beginning asked 

one of the generals, ‘‘I will give you 5 years to solve this war, and 

I will give you the resources to do it,’’ I think anybody would have 

taken that. And that is what we have; 2009 to 2014, it is 5 years. 

But what is the problem? The problem is, right from the beginning, we start tying their hand. The first tying of the hand was 

Petraeus and McChrystal recommended a minimal force of 40,000; 

they got 30,000, which was 25 percent less. What did that do to us? 

They wanted to conduct a simultaneous campaign in the south and 

in the east to collapse the enemy, put as much pressure on it. 

Without that additional 10,000, could not do it. We had to do it sequentially. What did that do? Protracts the war, drives up casualties, evaporates more political will at home. 

Second problem we have, another handcuff, is Petraeus wants to 

keep the surge forces that the President gave him, the 30,000, 

much longer at a much higher level. They are all gone before this 

year is out. 

So that is where we are at the point of your question now. Given 

those two things, those dynamics have already happened—and 

there is pressure on the commanders to stay on a schedule that 

transitions our combat forces in 2013 totally, not 2014, and then 

be out of there by 2014. In my judgment, what is happening to support that is far from conditions-based. That is a date that we are 

moving to, and, by God, we are doing it. 

We should take that pressure off of them so that they can come 

back and say, look, we have to slow this down a little bit. That is 

the major issue. We have—two major issues, to answer your question, in terms of contingencies is: slow down that transition if the 

commanders are having problems with it, which I think they will, 

particularly in the east; and, also, keep the ANSF at the resource 

level it should be at with its enablers. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Dr. O’Hanlon. 

Dr. O’HANLON. Chairman, I will put it in these terms because I 

agree with what my colleagues have said. 

As we all remember, when President Obama was inaugurated, 

he had been adamantly against the Iraq war but he gave his field 

commanders time to execute the drawdown over the next 19 

months and wound up keeping 50,000 troops, which I think was a 

good decision on his part, rather than the original intention to go 

very small. And he gave the field commanders time, as well, to figure out what the drawdown path would be. And as we all recall, 
12 

they were allowed to keep the forces through the Iraqi elections of 

early 2010 and do most of the drawdown a year and a half into the 

Obama presidency. 

I think something similar is going to be necessary and advisable 

with whoever is in the White House come January. Whoever does 

a policy review in the late fall, early winter, I hope they give the 

field commanders the same leeway. Because the answer to your 

question, in my mind, is that as we do this transition to Afghan 

lead, we need to have substantial capability that we still retain to 

be able to back them up if they get into trouble, as they likely will. 

So what I would anticipate is that, if we stay at 68,000 through 

the fall, which I hope will be the case, then we do a review by the 

newly elected President, whether it is Governor Romney or President Obama, and then early in 2013 the President largely defers 

to field commanders and keeps probably most of those 68,000 

through much of the fighting season of 2014, if that is what field 

commanders recommend. That is my instinct about where I think 

we need to go to address the problem that you mentioned. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good, members of the panel. 

I want to welcome Ranking Member Mr. Cooper and turn to him 

if he has any opening statements, and if not, turn to him for questions. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since I was late 

getting here, let me defer to my colleague, Mr. Critz, who was more 

prompt than I was. I apologize for having been slow. 

Mr. WITTMAN. No problem. 

Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. O’Hanlon, you made a statement that there has been, I 

guess, some issue that maybe more of the commanders were Tajik, 

but if you look at the entire force, it really, demographically, 

matches the country. 

Is the leadership geographic? In other words, is the Tajik leadership in Tajik areas? Is it tribal almost in the way it is set up, that 

maybe we are looking at something further down the road, that 

Tajiks are in command in Tajik areas and then other tribal areas 

have other commanders? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Thank you, Congressman. Let me briefly answer 

and, if you don’t mind, invite my colleagues who may know certain 

aspects of this better than I do to correct me if they see any place 

where I am wrong. 

Generally speaking, I believe that while many of the Tajik leaders of course come from the northern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, they are deployed throughout the country in current operations. And the main additional problem—I mean, there are ethnic 

issues, as you well know, and challenges. The other one is that it 

is hard to recruit southern Pashtun from the provinces like 

Kandahar. And we haven’t been able to do very well with that, 

even when we try to incentivize them, feeling that they can stay 

in their own home district or province for a certain period of time. 

So there are challenges. I don’t want to trivialize that. And sometimes we have to rely on commanders or recruits from other provinces to fill more of a given part of the south than we would like. 
13 

But, overall, the Tajiks, even though they come from the north 

and east, they are deployed throughout the country. And they are 

serving well throughout the country, as best I know. 

Mr. CRITZ. And you are saying that we have—maybe we are lacking in Pashtun commanders, then? 

Dr. O’HANLON. In certain parts of the force. I think, for example, 

the Afghan police, the ANCOP [Afghan National Civil Order Police] 

forces, sort of the elite paramilitary, I think those are 50 percentplus Tajik-led, if I am remembering my statistics correctly. That is 

not true of every kind of unit in the Afghan security forces, but 

that is one concrete example. And that causes you some concern. 

Mr. CRITZ. Yeah. 

Dr. O’HANLON. But on the other hand, the units are individually 

integrated. And there is a balance, a relatively good balance, if you 

look throughout the force. There is still, I think, 40 percent 

Pashtun leadership out of a Pashtun population of 45 percent. 

So it is not bad if you look nationwide across all different aspects 

of the Afghan security forces. But the Uzbeks and the Hazara are 

somewhat underrepresented, and the Tajiks are overrepresented, 

especially in a couple wings of the military. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. 

Mr. Boot, you made a statement that part of the seven points 

was that—one of them was that we should discontinue subsidy to 

the Pakistan military. What is your prediction as to what that 

would yield? 

Mr. BOOT. Well, I can’t say for certain what would happen if we 

stopped subsidizing the Pakistani military, but I do know that we 

have given them tens of billions of dollars in subsidy over the 

course of—— 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, if you are going to make that statement, though, 

you have to figure out it is going to have some impact. So—— 

Mr. BOOT. No, no. Absolutely. 

Mr. CRITZ [continuing]. What is the impact? 

Mr. BOOT. What I was going to say is that we have tried very 

heavily subsidizing them over the course of the last decade, an effort basically to wean them away from the Taliban, the Haqqanis, 

to basically bribe them, in a way, into becoming our allies, and that 

effort has totally failed. And I think, as a starting point, we need 

to recognize that effort has failed, that the Pakistanis remain as 

deeply committed to the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network now 

as they were a decade ago. And so, for that reason, I think it has 

been counterproductive to give all the subsidies that we have given 

to the Pakistani military, which, in essence, has been basically indirectly subsidizing the very forces that are killing our personnel 

in Afghanistan. 

So I think—I am not saying cut off all aid to the state of Pakistan. I think we should certainly continue to fund civil society in 

Pakistan and an alternative to the military-dominated, ISI-dominated foreign and national security policy they pursue. But I think 

we need to recognize that Pakistan is not our friend here and that 

giving further subsidies to the military will be counterproductive. 

And I don’t think it would lead to the kind of consequences that 

some people fear, such as a jihadist takeover of the State, because 

I believe that the Pakistani military is still very good at internal 
14 

control and will still be able to remain in power. But the resources 

that they use in large part for preparing for war against India and 

for subsidizing jihadist groups that attack ourselves and our allies, 

those resources will be decreased. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. Thank you. I have no further questions. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Critz. 

We will go to Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In reviewing your written statements that have been provided to 

our staff, one thing stands out, in particular, by Dr. O’Hanlon: ‘‘I 

do not believe it likely that this Congress or a future Congress will 

sustain up to 20,000 GIs in Afghanistan at a cost of perhaps $25 

billion a year and add another $3 billion to $5 billion annually in 

direct security and economic support for the Afghan Government 

and people.’’ Then he concludes with, ‘‘But given American politics 

and budget constraints, it would be likely that we are not going to 

be able to do some of the things that have been suggested.’’ 

On the other hand, I am looking at other testimony of Mr. Boot and General Keane. One wants us to ‘‘provide $6 billion a year for 

the Afghan National Security Forces.’’ We also have a request of 

perhaps up to ‘‘$25 billion to $35 billion’’ annually for United 

States support personnel and Special Operations Forces. We have 

the comment that it ‘‘costs approximately $6 billion’’ to properly 

fund the ANSF. ‘‘Discussions are ongoing to reduce the funding to 

approximately $4 billion, which results in an ANSF reduction from 

352,000 to 230,000 beginning in 2016. This makes no sense.’’ 

That is quoting from some of the excerpts of the testimonies provided. 

Let me see if I can try to interject some financial reality to the 

position that the United States of America is in. Then I am going 

to ask you to think about where the money is going to come from 

that you are asking for. We blew through the $15 trillion debt mark in November. This 

year we are going to blow through the $16 trillion debt mark. We 

have had three consecutive deficits in excess of a trillion dollars a 

year. We are going into our fourth one of a trillion dollars a year. 

We have seen what has been going on in Italy, Greece, and Spain; 

they are on the verge of insolvency and bankruptcy. But for other 

communities in Europe, they would have already been in insolvency and bankruptcy. I don’t know of anyone similarly situated 

that would help the United States avoid insolvency and bankruptcy 

if we continue on this path. 

If we do continue on this path, there is one outcome and one outcome only, and that is an American insolvency and bankruptcy, 

which, in turn, means that we may have no money for national defense. Think about that. No military personnel at all. Even with 

the sequestration, which is a tip-of-the-iceberg kind of situation, 

you are looking at laying off 700,000 American uniformed personnel and/or civilian DOD support workers and/or private contractors who are supporting our military with a gee-whiz-bang weaponry that is so desired by other nations elsewhere but they don’t 

have and which gives our military capabilities far above and beyond what our enemies typically can field. 
15 

So, given this kind of situation, given the Afghan economy—I 

have been to Afghanistan, as have you. Personally, I don’t think 

that their economy in the next decade will be able to support their 

own defense needs, which means it is going to have to be America, 

if we are going to continue to put money into this, as you all acknowledge in your testimony. 

Where do you think the money ought to come from to pay for the 

sums that you suggest are desirable or needed to stabilize the Afghan situation as we continue to draw down our troops? Do you 

want to cut other parts of national defense? If so, where? Do you 

want to cut the welfare programs, entitlement programs? If so, 

which ones? Please give me ammunition or guidance on the priorities so that we can get our financial house in order and do what 

you want us to do. 

Mr. Boot first, then General Keane, and then Dr. O’Hanlon. 

Mr. BOOT. Well, Congressman, I agree with you about the dire 

state of our finances, but I don’t agree that defense is the primary 

contributing factor to it. Clearly, as we all know, it is entitlement 

spending. Defense is only taking about 4 percent of our gross domestic product and less than 20 percent of the Federal budget. 

That is the entire defense budget; that is not the part for Afghanistan. 

And no matter what happens, we are going to dramatically re- duce our spending in Afghanistan from about $100 billion today 

down to some lesser level. And even at the levels that General 

Keane and I and Michael O’Hanlon recommend, you are talking 

about a two-thirds reduction in the amount of money that we are 

spending in Afghanistan, down to, let’s say, $30 billion, $35 billion 

a year. And, yes, that is a lot of money, but the question in my 

mind is, what is the alternative? 

And if we are, in fact, trying to desperately stabilize the situation 

in Afghanistan, and not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan— 

because our presence in Afghanistan also allows us to effect developments in Pakistan, which, if that were to fall, would be the ultimate nightmare, a nuclear-armed state—and we are able to prevent Afghanistan from falling back under the control of the Taliban 

and their Al Qaeda allies, in effect, to prevent—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Boot—— 

Mr. BOOT [continuing]. A recurrence of the conditions that led to 

9/11. 

Mr. BROOKS [continuing]. I am going to interject for just a moment. I agree with you that national defense shouldn’t take the hit 

that it has taken. That is why I voted against the Budget Control 

Act that imposes the sequestration. 

You have mentioned entitlements. Is that where you think we 

ought to cut because you believe that is a lesser priority than national defense? That is my question. Where would you cut? 

Mr. BOOT. Well, I think entitlements are driving the out-of-control deficits. And so, if we are going to address the deficits, we need 

to go where the money is, which is in entitlements, not in defense. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, you other two, the gavel has hammered, so 

you all get off the hook. 

Thank you, Mr. Boot. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Brooks. 
16 

I will ask that the witnesses, if you would, provide your comments in writing back to the committee for Mr. Brooks’ question. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. And we will go to Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank the witnesses. 

In view of the pending vote, I want to be brief. I want to explore 

two issues: one, the vulnerability of our troops to cutoff of supply 

through Pakistan, particularly if we make a dramatic curtailment 

in aid to Pakistan; and, second, the allegiance of ANSF troops. 

What risk do we face that we may be training a force that could 

turn against us? 

So if you would help me with both of those questions, that would 

be great. 

General KEANE. I will be glad to jump in. 

Well, obviously, we have had our main supply route closed for a 

number of months now, and we are able to sustain the force that 

we have. Two means to do that is the other supply route in the 

north and also the air line of communication that we have established. I think it is overstated, our dependency on that main supply 

route. It certainly is desirable because it is a lot easier to use, it 

is less costly, although the Pakistanis certainly want us to pay 

through the nose for the challenges that we had between them. 

So I think we could actually take the issue off the table, in my 

judgment, in terms of our relationship with Pakistan on this issue 

because we do have alternatives. And, most dramatically, our force 

size is coming down rather significantly, and therefore there is less 

requirement. 

And we have issues inside the ANSF, clearly, in terms of what 

we refer to as green-on-blue atrocities. And there is no doubt that 

the Taliban have looked at, how do we get at U.S. forces? Their 

major means of doing that has been, by and large, on the roads or 

on footpaths using explosive devices. And we are painfully aware 

of that. Their other strategy is infiltration into the security forces 

to be able to attack U.S. forces. And that has taken place. 

The good news is, in talking last night to General Bolger and 

also to Minister Wardak, General Wardak, who you know is—they 

believe that they are stopping about 75 percent of what has happened by increasing their intelligence, by vetting people better, et 

cetera. They are very much aware of the challenge that we have. 

And I think the way our forces look at it is, as debilitating as 

that is, it is something that—a tool that the enemy is using. As the 

enemy is using an IED against us, they are using that kind of infiltration against our forces. It is frustrating for our forces to deal 

with that, but at the same time, look, our soldiers are pretty tough, 

and their resilience is extraordinary. And that does not diminish 

their performance nor the quality of that performance nor the extraordinary morale that they have had for all these years. 

Mr. COOPER. Would the witnesses generally agree with General 

Keane’s assessment there, that we should take the Pakistan supply 

route off the table in negotiations with the Pakistanis and that 

there is not that significant a worry about green-on-blue? 
17 

Dr. O’HANLON. Well, I certainly agree that, logistically speaking, 

we are in a much better place vis-a`-vis Pakistan. And my hat is 

off to our military logisticians and our diplomats who have developed the Northern Distribution Network. It is an amazing alternative. It still increases slightly uncomfortably our dependence on 

Vladimir Putin, but some of those routes don’t require his explicit 

permission, and, in any event, we are in a much better place. 

I think the green-on-blue situation is still very troublesome. I 

don’t think the General would trivialize it either. And I think it 

does run a risk of really eroding our ability to cooperate well with 

Afghan forces. General Allen was very concerned about it when he 

testified in March. I think it has risen to being a strategic concern. 

But I agree with General Keane that there are serious efforts being 

undertaken to try to at least cap it. That is not good enough, but 

that may be the best we can do in the short term. That would be 

my reflection there. 

If I could briefly comment on to whom the Afghan forces are 

loyal, because I think you asked a great question on that, Congressman, as well. A lot of this is going to turn on the 2014 elections in Afghanistan, which are crucial, as we all recognize. 

I talked to a top Afghan general when I was visiting last month, 

and we asked him, what is your number-one concern about security 

in Afghanistan? And he said the 2014 elections, because we get the 

wrong person elected and all bets are off. 

And even though I don’t think President Karzai has been a stellar leader, there are a couple of things he has done correctly that 

I believe the next leader needs to emulate, and one of them is to 

have non-Pashtun vice presidents. Now, preferably someone of 

greater repute than Fahim Khan, who is, of course, his first vice 

president. But the basic concept of having maybe a Tajik as the 

first vice president and made a Hazara or Uzbek as the second is 

a solid concept that I think probably needs to be adopted. I think 

a Pashtun will win in 2014. 

Then the other point is in terms of the ministers of security. You 

need at least one non-Pashtun in those top two positions, as well. 

These are some of the elements that I think will be important. 

And then, of course, the President can’t be more corrupt than 

Karzai’s family. There are two or three people whose names I 

heard mentioned frequently as potential contenders who I think we 

need to find a way, quietly or explicitly, to veto. And that is the 

point I was trying to get at in my testimony, where I can’t imagine 

this Congress funding $5 billion a year for Afghan aid if the next 

President of Afghanistan is even more problematic in this domain 

than the Karzai regime. And I think we need to send that message 

soon. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

We will go to Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank the witnesses for their preparation and their testimony 

this morning. 

Dr. O’Hanlon, especially thank you for the advice you have given 

us over the weeks and years on strategic issues. You have been invaluable. We appreciate that very much. 
18 

Mr. Boot, in the last sentence of your testimony, you say, ‘‘Most 

Afghans have no desire to be ruled by the Taliban. They simply 

need our continuing aid to consolidate their post-2001 efforts to create a more inclusive and more moderate state.’’ 

How committed to a more inclusive and moderate state do you 

think the Karzai regime is in Afghanistan? 

Mr. BOOT. Well, as Mike suggested, obviously President Karzai 

and his family are deeply problematic. There are obviously deep 

issues of corruption there, although it is possible to work with 

them, as we have seen in the recent agreements that were reached 

on night raids and the handover of the Parwan Detention Facility. 

And, basically, at the end of the day, I mean, I think there is no 

question that the Karzais, like a lot of the elites in Afghanistan, 

are trying to get the most they can out of the state. And a lot of 

them are doing very well, with Dubai bank accounts and so forth. 

But I think we are, in a lot of ways, encouraging that by not having good controls over our spending. And by also setting deadlines 

for our departure, what you are basically saying is, get as much as 

you can now because the country is going to go—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. But isn’t the other half of that argument saying 

that, you know, we will stay indefinitely and keep writing checks, 

isn’t it encouraging that kind of behavior? 

Let me ask you this question: I completely agree that, obviously, 

an extension of Taliban rule in any part of that country is wholly 

undesirable, and it is the reason we are still there; it is what we 

are trying to prevent. I am concerned, though—I want to know if 

any of the witnesses are concerned—that the present regime might 

find it quite acceptable to have an unwritten agreement where they 

would stay in power but there would, in fact, be parts of the country that would be ruled by the Taliban and do whatever they want. 

I mean, aren’t we at risk that this regime would double-bank us, 

preserve their own control of the country, their own wealth, and 

just look the other way as the Taliban rules certain parts of the 

country and perhaps once again is the host for the Al Qaeda parasite? What is wrong with that hypothesis? 

Any of the witnesses. 

General KEANE. Well, first of all, this regime is going, and thank 

God for that. You know, Ryan Crocker, I think, has worked—you 

know how capable he is as an ambassador. He is the best in the 

business—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. He sure is. 

General KEANE [continuing]. In this part of the world. And he is 

confident that there will be a political transition. And that was not 

always the view. There was some speculation, as you know, that 

Karzai would find some means to sort of hang on here by constitutional reform. Not happening. He is going. 

I don’t think we will get a transformational leader, but I do believe we will get a leader who clearly understands the legacy of the 

past and the problems it has caused his country and they will try 

to make some incremental improvements, much more along the 

lines of what we had seen take place in Korea over a number of 

years. 

So I am not of the mind that the regime is going to get worse, 

although there is potential for that. And I clearly believe that we 
19 

should be all-in helping to influence that situation, as Michael has 

suggested, and do a much better job of it here than what we did 

in Iraq. 

Mr. ANDREWS. If I could paraphrase my question, what I am 

really asking is, how confident are we that the Afghan regime’s interests are truly aligned with ours? And to the extent that they are 

not, what can we do to influence the regime in becoming aligned 

with it? 

And the specificity of this is that it is absolutely not in our best 

interests for the Taliban to control a square inch of Afghanistan. 

I agree with that. But they may see it as being somewhat in theirs. 

How do we make sure that our interests are aligned? 

General KEANE. Well, I don’t know—just to finish up, I was going 

to answer that question. I don’t know political leaders in Afghanistan that I have dealt with who would be willing to cede any of 

that country to the Taliban, and for all the obvious reasons in 

terms of tyrannical rule, violation of human and civil rights, and 

what that would mean inside of their country. There would be absolutely no toleration for political leaders doing something like 

that, in my view. 

You know, one of the most remarkable things that took place was 

the loya jirga that took place last summer asking for the special 

relationship with the United States. The participation in that came 

from virtually every province in the country—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. My time is about to expire. I appreciate the answer. 

Let me just close, Mr. Chairman, by saying this, that I sometimes think, through our majority and yours and through the Republican administration and the Democratic administration, we 

have been asking the wrong question, which is, how competent are 

we at transitioning over to Afghan security? I think the question 

is, how willing are they to accept it? 

And, you know, our troops are doing a fantastic job there under 

very difficult circumstances. I think these gentlemen have given us 

very sage tactical advice on how to achieve it. But tactical measures fail if there isn’t strategic uniformity, and I really wonder if 

it exists here. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. We appreciate that. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for spending your time with us 

today. As you can see, we are on the front end of a vote series, and 

I want to make sure that we have an opportunity, if there are any 

questions that the panel has to ask, that they be able to submit 

those in writing and to ask that you be able to answer those for 

the committee. 

Mr. WITTMAN. And, with that, again, thank you for appearing before us today. 

And, with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 29, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 29, 2012 

(25) 

Statement of Hon. Rob Wittman 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations 

Hearing on 

Expert Assessments on the Afghan National 

Security Forces: Resources, Strategy, and 

Timetable for Security Lead Transition 

June 29, 2012 

Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee convenes 

the second of a series of hearings related to the Afghan National 

Security Forces. 

At this hearing, we will receive testimony from outside experts 

about the resources and strategy which the U.S. and NATO are devoting to training the ANSF and the timetable for transitioning security lead responsibility to the ANSF. 

Our panel today includes: 

 Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National 

Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; 

 Retired General Jack Keane, Former Vice Chief of Staff of 

the U.S. Army; and 

 Michael O’Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow at 

the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. 

Thank you for your participation. We look forward to your testimony. 

My views on these issues have been informed by a recent trip to 

Afghanistan. During my visit, I traveled to several provinces and 

met with local leaders, including the chiefs of police. I also had the 

opportunity to talk to military commanders, who provided their impressions of the level of support that will be needed to create a selfsustaining ANSF. It is my hope that our witnesses today can provide further context on these important issues. 

Before we move on, I want to take a moment to highlight the extraordinary efforts of our All-Volunteer Force serving in Afghanistan. These brave men and women are conducting daily combat operations against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and associated terrorist 

networks. Earlier this month, I saw their sacrifice firsthand, and 

I want to convey my appreciation for their service here today. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 29, 2012 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Dr. O’HANLON. I believe that deficit reduction must be broad-based to be politically feasible and mathematically practical and economically wise. That means entitlement spending, discretionary spending, and revenues must all be on the table. 

Our current deficit is roughly $1 trillion a year, perhaps a bit less if one adjusts 

for where we stand in the economic recovery. I believe that, beyond declining war 

costs in Afghanistan, the core defense budget can absorb those cuts scheduled in the 

first tranche of the Budget Control Act without serious prejudice to our national security, as I explained in detail last year in my book The Wounded Giant: America’s 

Armed Forces in an Age of Austerity. 

I agree that American deficits and the economic weakness they engender have become a major threat not only to our economy and our future way of life, but to our 

national security as well. Admiral Mike Mullen was right on this point. Indeed, this 

has been an important theme of my two latest books—The Wounded Giant in 2011, 

where I looked for economies in the defense budget, and Bending History: Barack 

Obama’s Foreign Policy this year (with Martin Indyk and Kenneth Lieberthal), 

where we argued that even though President Obama’s foreign policy record is reasonably good in one sense, it is built on the shaky pillar of an American economy 

that is going through extremely difficult times. Economic renewal must be the agenda of the next Congress and the next presidential term, be it under Governor Romney or President Obama. Otherwise our national security will likely suffer. 

In terms of deficit reduction strategies, I believe on policy and political grounds 

that the only way to move forward is to create a climate of shared sacrifice. While 

I support the defense cuts in the first tranche of the Budget Control Act, as reflected 

in the Obama administration defense strategy document of 2012 and budget proposal for FY 2013, I am troubled by the BCA’s almost exclusive focus on so-called 

discretionary budget accounts. More effective deficit reduction efforts require tax 

and entitlement reform that slow the growth of the latter and lead to net revenue 

increases in regard to the former, in my judgment. The entitlement reforms need 

not be cuts per se, and the tax reform need not involve higher rates if sufficient 

loopholes are closed, but we need to spend less and take in more revenue than current projections imply. 

On Afghanistan, we need to do what it takes to prevent the return of Al Qaeda 

to a sanctuary in that country, as the threat of Al Qaeda is much greater than the 

$25 billion a year in steady state costs I would project for the mission there from 

2015 through 2020. But this continued investment in Afghanistan only makes sense 

if Afghans do their part as well, particularly with their 2014 election and governance reforms. [See page 16.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 29, 2012 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ 

Mr. CRITZ. What is your understanding of the breakdown of $4.1B spending proposed for ANSF? Does it include train and equip, SFA (Security Assistance Force) 

or only direct costs to train, equip, and pay for salaries and operations of the ANSF? 

Dr. O’HANLON. The $4.1 billion/year figure for post-2014 expenses is for just the 

Afghan security forces. I consider it unrealistically low by comparison with likely 

needs. 

Mr. CRITZ. What are your thoughts on the Security Force Assistance (SFA) model: 

numbers, ROE, etc. Where are we with the planning for this? Do you think it will 

work? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I believe we will need some 20,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 

2014 to do the job right—at least for a few years, or until Pakistan begins to clamp 

down more effectively on the Taliban sanctuaries on its soil, or until there is a peace 

accord between major elements of the Afghan Taliban and Afghan government. 

Mr. CRITZ. Is the ANSF respected by Afghans? Is it respected by the Taliban? Are 

there differences in perceptions about the various elements of the ANSF? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Yes the ANSF is generally respected by Afghans according to all 

polls I have seen, but there are also concerns about corruption within its ranks. I 

believe the Taliban is gaining more respect for the ANSF, particularly its special 

forces and certain other units. But the Taliban also probably still thinks that on balance it can defeat the ANSF once NATO is gone. 

Mr. CRITZ. What are your thoughts on why the poppy crop is down? How much 

is due to environmental factors (drought, blight, etc.) and how much due to ISAF 

or GIROA efforts? Can this lower level of production be sustained once U.S. forces 

withdraw? 

Dr. O’HANLON. My understanding of the reasons for reduced poppy production 

suggest that we should consider this only a modest success to date (in other words, 

blight and related causes account for much of the decline—and production is in fact 

still rather high). 

Mr. CRITZ. How do we deal with the Pakistan safe havens? Is Pakistan currently 

taking actions to eliminate safe havens for the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura 

Taliban, or HiG? Do we expect such actions in the future? Why or why not? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Pakistan is not doing much yet to shut down sanctuaries on its 

soil. Bruce Riedel and I wrote about our ideas in a new Brookings book, Campaign 

2012. Basically we advocated being tougher on the Pakistani military (e.g., less aid) 

and more supportive of the Pakistani economy and civil society (e.g., more development aid and greater efforts to move to a free-trade accord) 

Mr. CRITZ. How do we deal with Afghan government corruption? What are the impacts of corruption? What level of confidence should NATO members have that corruption will be controlled post-2014? Does corruption currently undermine the effectiveness of GIROA and the ANSF? Is governmental corruption linked at all to the 

Taliban’s ability to recruit new fighters? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Yes Afghan government corruption is still serious and yes it helps 

the insurgency. I favor focusing on the looming 2014 elections in Afghanistan and 

underscoring to President Karzai how important it is that he and his supporters 

NOT try to engineer the election of a successor who may make the problem worse. 

I also believe that modest reductions in our aid budget are a good thing not a bad 

thing, for this same reason. 

Mr. CRITZ. In your opinion, what will determine ANSF success? What factors 

could undermine ANSF capability and success in the future? 

Dr. O’HANLON. To be successful, the ANSF needs to avoid ethnic fights from within its ranks, have adequate western financial support and mentoring and combat 

backup even after 2014, and get a little help from Islamabad in terms of Pakistan 

at least partially curtailing the ability of the Afghan insurgency to use Pakistani 

sanctuaries. 

Mr. CRITZ. Can the Afghan Local Police (ALP) be sustained when we leave? Who 

will fund and train? Does the Afghan Ministry of the Interior have the ability to 

effectively oversee and control the ALP sites and units in the absence of USSOF? 
64 

Dr. O’HANLON. I am a supporter of the ALP, yes, but I would not grow it so much 

that we can’t help oversee it after 2014 ourselves, at least to a degree. 

Mr. CRITZ. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ALP? 

Dr. O’HANLON. The ALP is a good fighting force overall but it can be sucked into 

tribal politics locally and its effectiveness can be compromised as a result, or it can 

even be used to settle tribal scores rather than fight the Taliban. Also negative perceptions of the ALP can grow even if the ALP units themselves get better, because 

of the rumor mill. 

Mr. CRITZ. Can you please explain your understanding of the procedures by which 

we control ALP funding and make sure it won’t be misspent. 

Dr. O’HANLON. The ALP is a good fighting force overall but it can be sucked into 

tribal politics locally and its effectiveness can be compromised as a result, or it can 

even be used to settle tribal scores rather than fight the Taliban. Also negative perceptions of the ALP can grow even if the ALP units themselves get better, because 

of the rumor mill. 

Mr. CRITZ. General Allen has stated there are three key factors for successful 

transition in Afghanistan: 1) security, 2) governance, and 3) development. Do you 

agree? Are there any other factors that you believe are significant? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Yes, beyond what General Allen has cited, Pakistani help, or at 

least less Pakistani damage to our efforts, would be a 4th leg of the effort in my 

eyes. 

Mr. CRITZ. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Taliban insurgency? 

Dr. O’HANLON. The Taliban is unsophisticated and has lost lots of its midlevel 

commanders over the years and has an unappealing ideology for most Afghans. But 

it has intact high-level commanders and sanctuaries in Pakistan, great tenacity, the 

ability to play off perceptions of Afghan government corruption to recruit, and a 

smart use of tactics that minimize harm to most of the population while employing 

assassination and precise strikes against government officials and security forces. 

It is alas an impressive enemy on balance. 

Mr. CRITZ. How would you define a successful outcome of the American/coalition 

effort in Afghanistan? 

Dr. O’HANLON. A minimal but perhaps adequate definition of success is an Afghanistan that does not fall apart and that controls most of its territory and thereby 

precludes return of extremist sanctuaries (at least big ones) to its own territory. To 

make this sustainable, the government will need greater legitimacy among its own 

people, too. 

Mr. CRITZ. Lieutenant General Bolger stated that if the ANSF is reduced below 

352,000 he believed many of those that leave ANSF will go into civilian positions 

with the Afghanistan government. Do you agree? Will there be any program to facilitate such placements? Do those personnel have skills that would be directly applicable to such positions? Can GIROA support such an increased number of personnel? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I think unemployment will be a big problem in Afghanistan for 

many years to come. Many will compete for government jobs because the private 

sector is weak and will remain weak for a long time to come. I am not sure that 

most soldiers who leave the ANSF will find other government work. 

Mr. CRITZ. Please describe your understanding of the operational assessment 

process used to evaluate the ANSF in the 1230 reports? What data is collected? Who 

evaluates the data? What method of analysis is used to evaluate the data? Who 

makes the final decision as to a CUAT determination? Is there any additional information the 1230 reports should include in the future? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I think the CUAT system is better than what preceded it but still 

relies too much on the judgment of the NATO commanders who work with any 

given Afghan unit. This unintentionally biases the data. I am more interested in 

demonstrated field performance by Afghan units than in CUAT scores. 

Mr. CRITZ. What areas of ANSF should the subcommittee focus its investigation 

on? 

Dr. O’HANLON. The subcommittee should keep focusing on ANSF field performance, corruption, and ethnic cohesion. 

Mr. CRITZ. How willing is the Afghan government to accept the transition? 

Dr. O’HANLON. The Afghan government wants the transition. At least it feels that 

way now! 

Mr. CRITZ. How confident are we that the Afghan government is aligned with U.S. 

interests? How do we make sure our interests are aligned? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Our interests are adequately aligned over the long term because 

we both want a functional, stable Afghanistan. But on the means to get there, we 

often diverge a good deal. 
65 

Mr. CRITZ. Is there any evidence that old members of Northern Alliance are rearming for possible civil war after transition, as suggested by CRS? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I do believe the worries of civil war among Afghans are greater 

now than say 5 years ago. I do not believe they are acute or continuously worsening, 

however. At least not at this point. 

Mr. CRITZ. Could you please identify any provinces or locations where you are concerned local militia may cause problems for the national Afghan government? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I am most worried about the south and east, naturally, but also 

Baghlan and parts of the north where there are Pashtun pockets of population. 

Mr. CRITZ. How have the most recent Parliamentary elections (2010) impacted the 

opinion on Afghans on the legitimacy of the government and the its ability to provide security? 

Dr. O’HANLON. I am a guarded optimist about the Afghan parliament. I think it 

is gradually doing a better job. I would encourage the U.S. Congress to ‘‘partner’’ 

more with the parliament to help it develop further. 

Mr. CRITZ. What is your opinion about governing capacity at local levels? 

Dr. O’HANLON. Provincial governance is getting better all the time, as I learned 

from a visit to the Asia Foundation (among other research efforts) when last in Afghanistan in May. District governance is still spotty and very uneven. 

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