Visit our website for other free publication 

downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic 

studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics 

having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of 

special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of 

conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation.
External Research Associates Program Monograph

STATE-BUILDING CHALLENGES

IN A POST-REVOLUTION LIBYA

Mohammed El-Katiri

October 2012

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them 

to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be 

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013. 

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.

army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of 

this report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies 

last by placing an order on the SSI website. SSI publications 

may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission 

and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 

Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research 

of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research 

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please 

subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.

army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-551-8
iii

FOREWORD

Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) inherited a difficult and volatile domestic situation following the overthrow of Muammar Qadhafi. The new 

leadership faces serious and simultaneous challenges 

in all areas of statehood. Libya’s key geostrategic position, and role in hydrocarbon production and exportation, means that the course of internal developments 

there is crucial not only to the Libyan people, but also 

to neighboring countries both in North Africa and 

across the Mediterranean in southern Europe. The 

mitigation or prevention of conditions that could lead 

to Libya becoming a failing or failed state is of vital 

importance. 

In this monograph, United Kingdom-based academic Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri reviews the major 

challenges to the new Libyan regime, including the 

continuing role of tribalism and the difficulty posed 

by the NTC’s lack of monopoly on ensuring security 

in Tripoli and beyond. Key issues of concern to foreign 

partners when engaging with the new Libyan leadership are highlighted, and a number of policy recommendations are made. Libya’s immediate future is of 

critical importance, and will determine whether the 

country faces state consolidation or state failure.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MOHAMMED EL-KATIRI, a British academic, is 

a Senior Research Analyst at the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), and a freelance political risk 

analyst for North Africa and the Gulf states, based in 

London, England. Before working for CSRC, he was a 

Research Fellow at the United Kingdom (UK) Defence 

Academy, and later covered North Africa as a Political 

Risk Analyst at the Eurasia Group. With more than 10 

years of regional experience, Dr. El-Katiri has research 

interests that include political and economic security in 

North Africa and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 

states, as well as North African relations with the European Union, and security policies around the Mediterranean. Dr. El-Katiri has published numerous internal 

and external UK Defence Academy reports, including 

reference reports on national and regional security issues in the GCC and the Mediterranean, and a monograph on the Algerian national oil and gas company, 

Sonatrach. In addition, his publications include commentaries and research papers for the Centro de Estudios y Documentacion Internacionales de Barcelona 

(CIDOB) and the Centre d’Études Internationales de 

Rabat, as well as various newspaper articles in and 

about the region. He is a frequent commentator in the 

media, including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Financial Times, and Al Jazeera.

vii

SUMMARY

A peaceful transition to a new form of government 

in Libya is of vital importance not only to the people 

of Libya, but to neighboring countries—and to security in the broad sense much farther afield. Yet, at the 

time of this writing, the new interim leadership remains fragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty, 

and the inability to enforce security is still a critical 

challenge. There is a risk of conditions being created 

that could lead to Libya becoming a fragile or indeed 

a failed state. 

Despite the mitigation of the threat from supporters of the old regime, the interim government has no 

monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The security risks of Libya’s uncontrolled armed militias are 

not restricted to within national borders. By jeopardizing state-building efforts, clashes between militias or 

between militias and government authorities threaten 

to undermine the security of neighboring countries 

and the international community. Risks include renewed waves of refugee flows to Tunisia, Egypt, and 

across the Mediterranean to Italy and beyond, and 

continuing disruption to oil production, which will 

once again deprive the international market of Libyan 

oil and harm the economic interests of U.S. and European companies. Furthermore, the current lack of a 

capable national army leaves Libya an open playing 

field to be exploited by international criminal or terrorist groups active in the region. 

A key challenge confronting the interim government in Libya is the creation of political institutions to 

provide for the functioning of an effective democratic 

state. The interim government is, in effect, inheriting 

a stateless state. Drawing up a constitution for Libya 
will not be straightforward. Political infighting between secularists and Islamists has already surfaced 

on varying issues of political significance to Libya’s 

future, including vital elements, such as the structure 

and religious identity of the state. Democratic culture 

deficit is another key challenge, since political parties 

and civil society institutions were absent from Libya 

for more than 4 decades. 

The socioeconomic and political factors that led 

people to revolt against the regime are equally pertinent to post-conflict stabilization, and require early 

attention. Unemployment was a significant long-term 

issue in Qadhafi’s Libya, as was frustration at the fall 

in standards of living while the country generated billions of dollars from hydrocarbon exports, much of 

which was spent on Qadhafi’s foreign policy adventures. Ordinary citizens argued that a country rich in 

energy resources with a relatively small population 

should be able to offer high living standards to its population, in the same manner as in the rich Gulf states. 

A rapid resumption of oil and gas production will not 

only assist in the rebuilding of Libya’s infrastructure 

and economy; it will alleviate economic pressures on 

neighboring countries, as the Libyan economy reabsorbs thousands of Egyptian and Tunisian workers in 

different sectors.

The political role of tribes cannot be understated 

in determining the future shape of Libya. A number 

of attempts to seize power from him prompted Qadhafi to accentuate tribalization, turning to his tribal 

kinsmen to counter increased political opposition and 

appointing several blood relatives and in-laws to key 

security and military positions. Manipulating tribes 

and building informal tribal alliances became an important part of Qadhafi’s internal political maneuverviii
ix

ing, with nepotism and favoritism becoming the pillars sustaining Qadhafi’s informal political alliances. 

Elements of these tribal dynamics remain in the postrevolution environment, and in the interests of stability and the avoidance of further conflict, their management and mitigation are every bit as important as 

they were during the reigns of King Idris and Qadhafi 

himself. The key nature of this challenge should not be 

underestimated by foreign partners engaging with the 

new Libyan regime. 

Recommendations. 

• As the Libyan interim government continues 

to struggle to maintain law and order while simultaneously facing the daunting tasks of statebuilding ab initio, the United States and other 

leading actors in the international community 

can assist in maintaining stability by engaging 

and providing vitally needed assistance essential to avoid destabilization and deterioration 

within Libya, gravid with consequences not 

only for Libyan citizens, but for neighbors and 

energy consumers both in North Africa and 

Europe. The involvement of the international 

community should be focused on what Libya 

needs in order to perform its functions as an effective sovereign state, both at a national and 

international level.

• The ambitions of the interim government are 

inhibited by the lack of a clear security reform 

strategy that includes specific measures for the 

disarmament and reintegration of revolutionary fighters, and the management of legacy 

armaments in general. The sooner the interim 
x

government launches its security reform plan, 

the better the chances of success for political 

transition. Assistance to the interim authorities 

in implementing security reform in order to 

mitigate the risks outlined above should therefore be a priority of the United States and other 

foreign partners.

• Tribes play an important role in the daily life 

of many Libyans, and are likely to continue to 

do so for the foreseeable future. Under a new 

regime that does not favor tribal politics, tribal 

leaders might agree to take a limited role at 

the national-political level, but will be likely to 

want to keep their political influence at the regional level. Leading tribes in different areas of 

the country will have great aspirations to play 

an important role in their respective regions. 

The United States and other foreign partners 

engaging with the new Libyan state need to 

be aware of the limitations on the power and 

reach of that state imposed by the tribal nature 

of its society.

• An important task for the interim government, 

and an important step for the stability of the 

country, is to organize a truth-recovery and reconciliation initiative. International experience 

shows that reconciliation initiatives in postconflict situations or following regime or political change constitute an important step toward 

healing the wounds of the past and strengthening political transitions. Given the importance 

of reconciliation initiatives for stability during 

transition, the United States and other foreign 

partners should encourage these efforts and 

provide targeted support for the process.
xi

• U.S. and United Nations (UN) expertise in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

(DDR) of armed fighters in post-conflict situations could be of pivotal help to Libya, but such 

support should be carefully provided. Although 

the situation on the ground at the time of this 

writing suggests that the interim government 

in Libya would appreciate external help with 

the armed militias, any level of visible foreign 

military presence in Libya risks igniting more 

political instability than it provides. Any DDR 

assistance would be best provided through 

diplomatic channels in the form of continuous 

advisory and monitoring support.

• Preventing the hostile exploitation of Libya’s 

vast territory and largely uncontrolled borders 

remains a key task for the international community while Libya still lacks an adequate 

national army. The new Libya needs wellequipped and well-trained military forces to 

protect and secure its borders and national territory. The new security apparatus that will be 

put in place should be trained to play a neutral 

role in internal political life, and specifically 

avoid domination by or favoritism toward specific tribes or clans over others. A new security 

system will reduce the risk of intimidation and 

violence during Libya’s political transition. The 

United States and other international partners 

with the experience of building security forces 

in Iraq and Afghanistan are well-placed to offer 

this experience to Libya.

• International nongovernmental organizations 

have much to offer the nascent democratic political culture and civil society in Libya. The new 
xii

Libya requires the establishment and strengthening of a party system, elections, media, and 

an independent judiciary. Technical assistance 

in setting up legal systems on political and 

economic fronts is an essential prerequisite for 

Libya’s transition toward democracy.
1

STATE-BUILDING CHALLENGES

IN A POST-REVOLUTION LIBYA

INTRODUCTION 

On October 20, 2011, 4 decades of authoritarian 

rule by a political regime controversial on both the 

regional and world stages came to an end. The killing 

of Muammar Qadhafi and the toppling of his regime 

marked the end of 8 months of civil war, but only the 

beginning of a new phase that promises to be even 

more difficult than the Libyan people’s struggle for 

political power. The transition toward democracy in 

Libya, if there is to be democracy there, and the building of a modern state present a daunting series of hurdles and tensions. The interim government faces the 

challenging task of simultaneously holding elections, 

demilitarizing and reintegrating militias, fostering 

national reconciliation, drafting a new constitution, 

restoring security, repairing the damage wrought by 

domestic combat operations and foreign airstrikes, 

and ensuring economic development to meet the aspirations of its population. 

From a political perspective, Libya is not a homogenous country, either ethnically or ideologically. Internal differences are a source of concern to both the 

local population and the international community. 

Tribal divisions across the country complicate still 

further the historical rivalry and divided loyalties between the East and West. Tribalism is a societal reality 

in Libya, and it would be naïve to hope that it will 

cease to be a critical influence on the post-Qadhafi political scene. Indeed, tribalism was also an important 

factor in the survival of that regime: The loyalty of 

certain tribes kept the fighting going for months, in-
2

cluding after the capital, Tripoli, fell into the hands of 

rebels; furthermore, remnants of the Qadhafi regime 

still have the potential to present a destabilizing threat 

during the transition period. Contradictions between 

domestic political forces, as well as interference by 

external parties, all suggest that the post-Qadhafi era 

will be complex and tense for the foreseeable future. 

If a transition period toward building an effective 

and democratic state is mishandled or simply takes 

too long, conditions could be created that risk Libya 

becoming a fragile, or indeed a failed, state. A peaceful transition is of vital importance not only to the 

people of Libya, but to neighboring countries and to 

security in the broad sense much farther afield. Libya’s geostrategic position is of critical importance not 

only to its neighbors in North Africa but also to those 

in southern Europe. Hydrocarbon resources and transit render Libya’s stability of even greater significance 

to the international community. A rapid resumption 

of oil and gas production will not only assist in the 

rebuilding of Libya’s infrastructure and economy; it 

will alleviate enormous economic pressures on neighboring countries, as the Libyan economy reabsorbs 

thousands of Egyptian and Tunisian workers in different sectors. 

This monograph will discuss the challenges of Libya’s political transition after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, and seek to highlight the key issues that should 

be of concern to the United States and its allies when 

engaging with post-Qadhafi Libya. First, the monograph explores the causes of the Libyan upheaval, focusing on the socioeconomic and political factors that 

led people to revolt against the regime—since these 

issues are equally pertinent to post-conflict stabilization. Second, it examines the tribes as a crucial element 
3

that crosscuts many of the political and security issues 

that Libya faces. Third, the monograph discusses the 

key post-revolution challenges facing the provisional 

government, such as ideological differences, armed 

militias and the collection of weapons, and national 

reconciliation. Democratic culture deficit is another 

key challenge, since political parties and civil society 

institutions were absent from Libya for more than 4 

decades. International experience shows that democratic transitions are not smooth and painless processes, and there is no reason to suspect that Libya will be 

an exception. 

The monograph draws on open-source material in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, and on 

interviews with Libyan nationals and foreign diplomats in Tripoli and Benghazi, all of whom requested 

anonymity. 

THE SEEDS OF LIBYA’S FEBRUARY 17, 2011, 

REVOLUTION 

The precedent set by the successful oustings of the 

Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, Zine El Abidine 

Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, gave weight and focus 

to a wide range of other factors that pushed Libyans 

to begin mass protests in the eastern cities of Benghazi 

and al-Baydaa in February 2011. Both economic grievances and resentment of the autocratic nature of the 

Qadhafi regime lay behind the rapid development of 

the protests and eventual open insurrection. 

The revolution that finally toppled Qadhafi was 

not the first uprising that Libya had experienced during his rule. Protests against his oppressive regime 

were relatively frequent, particularly in the eastern 

region of the country. These protests were always 
4

brutally quelled by military and security forces. Over 

more than 4 decades, Qadhafi faced several instances 

of serious political challenge by internal groups, foreign governments, and even from close colleagues 

aiming to overthrow him. He survived several failed 

coups d’état from the 1970s onward. The failed attempt 

with the most significant long-term consequences 

came in 1993, leading Qadhafi to make major changes 

in his security apparatus and to marginalize most of 

the remaining comrades-in-arms from his own 1969 

revolution. 

This section will examine the issues that triggered 

the February revolution, since addressing these same 

issues remains a key task for the new Libyan regime 

in transition. 

Limited Political Openings.

Rather than arising overnight, discontent with 

the pace and depth of political reform among Libyan intellectuals, and even some entrenched political 

elites, had been a constant factor—characterized by 

skepticism over the promises by the regime to introduce greater democracy. The democratization efforts 

of Saif al-Islam, Qadhafi’s second eldest son, clashed 

continuously with the authoritarian policies of the old 

guard. Reform-oriented transition toward democracy 

is by nature a lengthy process, requiring constant negotiation of changes to be introduced between the 

regime and democratizing elites; but after 4 decades 

of Qadhafi’s authoritarian rule, patience for a lengthy 

process was exhausted. 

The regime’s hardliners were concerned that largescale and rapid changes could undermine the country’s political stability. These groups included those 

who had benefited from the system economically and 
5

politically. The tussle between the two groups was 

demonstrated through various public events, such as 

the sidelining of ministers and senior officers or the 

closure of newspapers. Several journalists working 

for Saif al-Islam’s publishing company, al-Ghad, were 

arrested by the Libyan authorities and later released 

by Qadhafi in late 2010.1

 Tom Malinowski, director of 

Human Rights Watch in Washington, believed he observed the struggle between the reformers and hardliners first hand during an event organized to launch a 

report on the human rights situation in Libya in 2009. 

He commented that, “There are clearly forces pressing 

for greater openness. That’s why we’re here. But there 

are also powerful forces who don’t want this process 

to succeed.”2

Qadhafi’s unwillingness to change the political system not only frustrated broad sectors of the ordinary 

Libyan population, but also upset his former close 

collaborators from various periods of his rule. His 

one-man style of leadership left room for few friends 

around him. Many of his revolutionary colleagues, 

senior officers, and technocrats rebelled or quit their 

positions. In the 1970s and 1980s, some abandoned the 

country and joined opposition groups abroad. Key issues of disagreement between Qadhafi and his close 

associates varied over the years, but the most important ones included: 

• Spending on financing and training insurgencies abroad;

• Direct intervention in other countries’ internal 

affairs, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, by 

supporting coups and rebel groups over the 

course of decades;3

• The building of a large man-made river in the 

Libyan desert, seen as an irrational diversion 
6

of resources at a time of financial constraints in 

the 1980s;4

• Plans for the succession and repeated long-term 

speculation over the possible appointment of 

one of Qadhafi’s sons to take his position.

Over the last decade of Qadhafi’s rule, the prominent role of Saif al-Islam in public life and political 

spheres was perceived as a strong indication of his future political role. In addition to Saif al-Islam’s ownership of the al-Ghad media company, his position as 

head of the Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation had allowed him to engage in 

political initiatives nationally and internationally. In 

2009, a call by Qadhafi on Libyan regional and tribal 

leaders to find an official job for his son was well received: Saif al-Islam was appointed head of the Popular Social Leadership Committees, a position that allowed him broad legislative and executive powers. 

Following his election, he commented that this official 

position would allow him to deliver his political and 

economic reform plan entitled “Libya of Tomorrow.”5

At the same time, the lack of clarity over Qadhafi’s 

plans for succession of power created enemies among 

both his close collaborators and ordinary Libyans. Silence over the succession plan, combined with the rising star of Saif al-Islam, created animosities within Qadhafi’s inner circle of friends, known as the “men of the 

tent”—since the unspoken rule for decades had been 

that if Qadhafi were to disappear from the political 

scene, it would be one of his revolutionary colleagues 

who would be his successor. Saif al-Islam’s new political prominence was envied, because no other political 

figure was afforded the same opportunities; Qadhafi’s 

one-man style of leadership naturally precluded the 
7

emergence of any other leader in public spheres. The 

fact that Saif al-Islam was allowed to introduce new 

political initiatives and criticize his father’s regime—

in a context in which even Qadhafi’s close colleagues 

refrained from questioning his ideas—was perceived 

as a further implicit signal of Qadhafi’s intention to 

designate him as successor. 

Economic Factors. 

The limited market economy reforms introduced 

by Qadhafi in the late-1990s and during the 2000s were 

not sufficient to relieve poverty for a large number of 

ordinary Libyans, and instead were perceived as benefiting a small number of Qadhafi’s family members 

and his inner circle of loyal friends. This bred pessimism with regard to any likelihood of positive economic change in Libya under the former regime. 

Unemployment was a significant long-term issue 

in Qadhafi’s Libya. Official sources placed Libya’s 

2009 unemployment rate at 20.74 percent;6

 with the 

youth unemployment rate higher, at 27 percent;7

 at the 

time, 65 percent of the country’s population was less 

than 35 years old. In parallel with other Arab oil-rich 

countries, high unemployment in Libya results largely from a long-term mismatch between the education 

system and the skills needed by the growing private 

sector, further complicated by high job expectations 

by graduates. A high proportion of Libyan graduates 

lack the adequate job-related skills required in a variety of sectors and industries.8

 As a consequence, a 

large number of nationals, especially young ones, remained unemployed, despite the positive economic 

growth that followed the lifting of the United Nations 

(UN) sanctions in September 2003. 
8

The public investment spending of recent years on 

major infrastructure facilities, transport, housing and 

other construction, coupled with private investment 

in the oil and gas sectors, generated new job opportunities, but mainly in the low-skill sector that does not 

appeal to Libyans. Hence, until February 2011, some 

2.5 million foreign migrants worked in construction 

and agriculture jobs.9

 In addition, the scarcity of technical skills among Libyans meant that most of the limited available skilled jobs went to foreigners. To rectify 

this situation, Libyan authorities launched a package 

of incentives and measures for foreign companies to 

increase the number of Libyans in skilled positions. 

During a meeting of oil companies operating in Libya 

in 2009, Shukri Ghane, former Chairman of the Libyan National Oil Company, stressed the importance 

of training Libyan engineers for future tenders.10 The 

development of skilled human resources remains a 

priority for the Libyan government to achieve its economic development and diversification plans. 

High inflation rates caused by increasing food and 

housing prices, coupled with the unbalanced distribution of income, led to a deterioration of living conditions for many Libyan families and among unskilled 

foreign laborers. Libyans were particularly frustrated 

over the fall in standards of living, while the country 

had generated billions of dollars from hydrocarbon 

exports—many of which had been spent on Qadhafi’s 

foreign policy adventures of fighting imperialism or 

the unification of Africa. Ordinary citizens argued 

that a country rich in energy resources, with a relatively small population, should be able to offer high 

living standards to its population, in the same manner 

as in the rich Gulf states. 
9

To prevent the spread of food riots that hit Tunisia and Algeria in the first week of January 2011, the 

Libyan government lifted taxes and import tariffs on 

basic food staples.11 Further measures were also announced, including granting loans for new businesses 

and housing projects. This, however, was not enough 

to preempt dissent. Shortly after the flight of Tunisian president Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 

2011, protests erupted in Libyan cities. Socioeconomic 

grievances triggered riots in Benghazi and al-Baydaa. 

With the lack of affordable housing an acute problem 

in Libya for years, corruption and the government’s 

inability to deliver promised subsidized housing units 

in the scheduled timeframe had angered a broad section of the Libyan population in these cities and served 

as the direct trigger for protest action.12

TRIBES AND POLITICS DURING AND AFTER 

QADHAFI’S RULE 

Despite a belated realization of the importance of 

the tribes in Libyan social and political affairs,13 tribal 

dynamics in Libya still failed to take their proper place 

as a major theme of discussion and analysis during 

and after the civil war. The political role of tribes cannot be understated in determining the future shape 

of Libya. New political elites are currently discussing 

the feasibility and modalities of engaging the tribes in 

the future political system, while tensions along tribal 

lines remain a risk factor likely to complicate political 

transition in post-Qadhafi Libya. 

There are more than 100 tribes and clans across 

Libya, divided across three main ethnicities: Arab, 

Berber, and African. But it is important to stress that 

only a few are truly influential, and have dominated 
10

the political and social scene for decades. The leading 

tribes are the following: 

• Warfala: the largest tribe in the country, with 

members spread across different Libyan cities, 

but considering Bani Walid as its home base;

• Magarha: the second most populous of Libyan 

tribes, inhabiting the southern regions of Wadi 

al-Shati and Sebha;

• Zintan: concentrated in the Nafusa mountains 

region in the western part of Libya. Most of its 

members belong to the Amazigh minority;

• Obeidat: located in the northeastern cities;

• Zawiya: located in the oil-rich southeast;

• Qadhadhfa: Qadhafi’s own tribe, based in Sirte 

and Sebha regions.14

With tribalism in Libya a politically sensitive topic, 

there are few studies available that provide up-to-date 

detailed information on the tribes. One of these few 

was written by Amal Obeidi, a Libyan academic at the 

University of Garyounis in Benghazi, whose empirical 

study described the tribe as a still important element 

shaping the identity of Libyans not only in rural areas 

but also in urban centers.15 This runs counter to common expectations that the role of the tribe would have 

diminished among the youth or in the major cities of 

Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata; in fact, reference to 

tribe remains current and popular among young urban Libyans, just as among older rural generations. In 

particular, the role of Libya’s tribes in allocating socioeconomic benefits and security in the absence of effective state institutions reinforced the role of tribalism 

across all Libyan regions.16

Making sense of the ambivalent political situation 

of the tribes requires a brief review of Libya’s political 
11

history since its independence. The relation between 

tribes and politics was cemented in the early days of 

Libya’s struggle for independence. The power base for 

the rule of King Idris (1951-69) was an alliance between 

the Sanussi Order, a religious order, and Saadi tribes; 

the tribal nobility constituted a significant part of the 

King’s cabinet, serving as advisors and confidants.17

Over the course of the years following Qadhafi’s 

arrival in power as a result of a coup in 1969, he made 

attempts to dismantle the tribal alliances put in place 

by the previous regime. Qadhafi replaced tribal notables who had occupied administrative positions at 

regional level with young technocrats.18 The undermining and marginalization of the role of the tribes in 

the early days of Qadhafi’s revolutionary regime was 

driven both by tactical and ideological motives. Tactically, the aim was to remove any remaining elements 

loyal to the monarchy. Meanwhile, pan-Arab nationalism was a strong ideological driver to move on from 

tribalism to a political system ready to embrace not 

only all Libyans, but also other Arab countries. Qadhafi for years saw himself as successor to the late 

Egyptian president Jamal Abdel-Nasser in the Arab 

nationalist movement. Thus, when Qadhafi referred 

to “the tribe” in his Green Book, the distillation of his 

political views published in stages throughout the 

1970s—and omnipresent required reading in Libya 

under Qadhafi—it was without any distinct political connotation. Qadhafi envisaged the tribe as a key 

component of Libyan society in the same manner as 

the family, providing natural social protection to its 

members.19

This attempt at exclusion of tribalism from Libyan politics did not succeed for long. Several factors 

pushed Qadhafi to use the tribes politically in order 
12

to strengthen and stabilize his regime. The most important of these factors was a disagreement over key 

policy orientations and rifts among comrades of the 

Revolutionary Command Council, the supreme executive and legislative body that governed Libya after 

the 1969 coup and during the 1970s.20 In an open letter published in 1992, Abdul Moneim al-Honi, one of 

Qadhafi’s close confidants who had served in several 

important positions in the 1970s before defecting to 

Egypt in 1975, described Qadhafi’s manipulation of 

the tribal factions. He noted that the tribal infighting 

of the past had been buried after independence, but 

that Qadhafi had revived these social divisions again 

in order to strengthen his grip on power.21

A number of attempts to seize power prompted 

Qadhafi to accentuate tribalization still further. Most 

significant among these was the 1993 rebellion and 

coup attempt by military forces in Misratah, which 

led to incidents in other Libyan cities including alZawiya and Sirt. In addition to arresting a number of 

army officers, Qadhafi responded by turning to his 

tribal kinsmen to counter increased political opposition.22 Qadhafi appointed several blood relatives and 

in-laws to key security and military positions, including Brigadier Ahmad Qadhaf al-Damm and Abdullah 

Sanoussi, his cousin and brother-in-law, respectively. 

Al-Damm held several military and diplomatic positions including, finally, special envoy and representative of Qadhafi to some Arab countries. Sanoussi 

had an extended tenure as head of internal security. 

Several members of Qadhafi’s tribe also took senior 

positions in the armed forces.23

Manipulating tribes and building informal tribal 

alliances thus became an important part of Qadhafi’s 

internal political maneuvering. The small size of the 
13

Qadhadhfa tribe, and its light political and economic 

weight, led Qadhafi to seek informal and tacit alliances 

with other key tribes in the country such as the Warfala and Magarha. Nepotism and favoritism became 

the pillars sustaining Qadhafi’s informal political alliances. Appointing family members and key figures 

from allied tribes in important and leading positions 

was the norm, and trusted tribes were armed by the 

regime. Qadhafi strengthened his power by effectively 

playing the tribes against each other, promoting one 

tribe over the other in different parts of the country.24

In the 1990s, the role of tribes and clans in public 

life was reinforced still further with the establishment 

of a nationwide system of People’s Social Leadership 

Committees. Tribal and regional notables were the 

main members of these new committees, which took 

a number of social and bureaucratic functions over 

from the central state.25 These Committees provided 

welfare services to the local population, and served 

as a judicial forum to settle local conflicts. They also 

oversaw the implementation of socioeconomic programs in their own regions and localities.26

The military provides a case study demonstrating 

the importance of tribalism in Qadhafi’s political system. In addition to the appointments of relatives and 

members of loyal tribes to key military positions in 

response to failed attempts to topple the regime, particularly the one in 1993, Qadhafi created a parallel security system made up of several special military units 

that were assigned to persons of trust, including his 

sons. These units, known as “Kataeb al-Amnia” (“Security Brigades”), were well-trained and equipped 

compared to the regular army.27 The best-known 

unit of this type was the 32nd Reinforced Brigade, 

known as the “Khamis Brigade,” led by Qadhafi’s 
14

son Khamis. This unit was based close to Benghazi, 

a city that had seen the majority of the uprisings and 

revolts against Qadhafi’s regime over the previous 4 

decades—as well as being at the source of the most recent one, which eventually ended Qadhafi’s rule.28 In 

the event, Qadhafi’s security calculations were proved 

entirely correct. In the early days of the February 17 

revolution, several senior army officers defected and 

joined the rebel forces, including Chief of Staff AbuBakr Younes Jaber. Meanwhile, the Kataeb al-Amnia 

constituted the main fighting elements opposing the 

rebels over the 8 months of the civil war. 

The civil war period saw tribal leaders convening 

to discuss the security and political situation. A number of loyalty statements were issued, in favor either 

of Qadhafi’s regime or of the rebels. Tribal notables 

were keen to show their importance on the political 

scene, and that they were still a political force not to 

be ignored.29 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the capture of Tripoli by rebel forces, several tribal delegations travelled to Qatar to offer thanks to the Qatari 

rulers for their support during the fighting.30 These 

visits have continued during the establishment of the 

new Libyan state, despite criticism by Libyan nationalists and a political elite aspiring to build a modern 

and unified democracy.

Thus, in the interests of stability and the avoidance of further conflict, the management and mitigation of Libya’s tribal dynamics in the post-revolution 

environment is every bit as important as it was during 

the reigns of King Idris and Qadhafi himself, and the key 

nature of this challenge should not be underestimated 

by foreign partners engaging with the new Libyan 

regime. 
15

CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW LIBYA 

This section examines the key transitional challenges that lie ahead for the interim government in 

moving from the old order to a new, possibly democratic, system. It will highlight the problem of armed 

groups in post-Qadhafi Libya and the challenges they 

represent to the authority of the new political leadership and to the country’s stability. This section will 

also focus on the daunting task of building the fundamental pillars of democracy in a country that for more 

than 4 decades was run by an opaque political system, 

with limited civil institutions and no political parties. 

Drawing up a constitution for Libya will not be 

straightforward. Political infighting between secularists and Islamists has already surfaced on varying issues of political significance to Libya’s future, including vital elements such as the structure and religious 

identity of the state.31

Security Challenges.

Ensuring continued security in the broad sense is 

a critical concern for the new regime in building the 

foundation on which advances can be made in the 

political and socioeconomic spheres. Yet, at the time 

of this writing, the new interim government remains 

fragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty, and the 

inability to enforce security is still a critical challenge. 

Threats to security arising directly from the remaining supporters of the Qadhafi regime receded 

after the arrest of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi.32 Saif al-Islam 

had been a source of concern to Libya’s new political 

leadership and to the international community, be-
16

cause of his ability to seek contacts with his own tribe 

and other loyal groups to launch attacks on the new 

government. 

In addition to his importance within the old regime as detailed above, Saif al-Islam was his father’s 

“secrets keeper,” which afforded him intimate knowledge of the power dynamics of the regime. It would 

thus have been easy for him to gather support, particularly among those Qadhafi loyalists who suffered 

from reprisal atrocities perpetuated by the rebel forces 

during the civil war and after the death of Qadhafi. 

He could have easily exploited revenge calls from the 

Warfala tribe in Bani Walid against the National Transitional Council (NTC) and rebel forces.33

Saadi, Qadhafi’s third son, who escaped to Niger, 

does not constitute a threat to the new regime; neither 

do Qadhafi’s wife and daughter Aicha, who are now 

refugees in Algeria, since they had no political role or 

official position in the security apparatus. The arrest 

of Sanoussi, Qadhafi’s head of intelligence and brother-in-law, in Mauritania in March 2012 has weakened 

any potential threat from the old regime.34 At the time 

of this writing, the Mauritanian authorities have not 

responded to any of the extradition demands presented by Libya, France, and the International Criminal 

Court.

The Challenge of Armed Militias.

Despite the mitigation of the threat from supporters of the old regime, the interim government has 

no monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The 

establishment of the Tripoli Military Council by the 

NTC was intended to provide security in the capital 

of Libya, and to be the first step in setting up a professional national army. But the Council, led by com-
17

mander Abdel Hakim Belhaj, is not even able to exercise control over military affairs within Tripoli, let 

alone across the country.35

Hundreds of armed fighters belonging to different 

militias moved to Tripoli in September 2011. Dozens 

of separate armed groups took control of Tripoli’s key 

neighborhoods;36 as well as strategic infrastructure, 

such as ports, airports, and border crossings across the 

country. The militias still patrol the capital, setting up 

their own checkpoints in defiance of the governmentappointed authorities. For example, the Zintan militia 

is in control of the city’s airport and other areas within 

Tripoli.37 With the aim of maximizing their political 

power, some brigades have extended control to landmark buildings within Tripoli, such as those containing the diplomatic representations of important countries.38

The large number of distinct militias arose during 

the civil war because of the regional and tribal divisions within the country. The rebel forces were not 

all unified under a single command during the fights 

against pro-Qadhafi forces.39 Even in eastern Libya, 

where the NTC controlled the most organized rebel 

force, relations between rebel groups were far from 

cordial, and some militias continued their intention to 

act independently. The assassination of rebel leader 

General Abdelfattah Younes on July 28, 2011, by a 

radical faction of the rebel forces highlighted discord 

among the rebels, which constituted a major challenge 

to NTC cohesion.40 This issue remains unresolved, as 

the details of Younes’s murder have still not been released, nor any suspects named.

The militias, initially an instrument of liberation, 

very swiftly became a source of concern to the NTC 

and to the residents of Tripoli. Some of the militias are 
18

accused directly of the violence and vandalism that 

took place after the fall of the capital, and frequent 

clashes between members of the different brigades 

have become a norm there. During the first week of 

December 2011, Tripoli’s inhabitants protested, demanding the departure of armed militias from their 

city. A few days after these protests, gun battles 

erupted between members of the Zintan militia, who 

aimed to demonstrate their independence from the interim government and its institutions, and followers 

of Brigadier Khalifa Haftar, a commanding officer of 

the yet-to-be-built Libyan National Army.41 Renewed 

fighting between militias in the first week of January 

2012 led NTC leader Mustapha Abdeljalil to warn of 

the risks of another civil war.42

All of these factors cause continuing significant 

disruption to the lives of ordinary citizens, and dealing with the issue is a stated priority for the interim 

government. The establishment of the National Army’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is seen 

as the solution. 

Mahmud Jibril, the former interim head of the 

NTC’s executive board, who resigned on October 23, 

2011, listed a series of options to solve the issue of 

the rebel brigades. He suggested that the thousands 

of rebel fighters—most of whom joined the revolution with no military training—would be offered the 

chance to join the army or the Interior Ministry, which 

oversees the police. Another option would be to form 

Libyan security companies, which would help guard 

businesses and oil facilities.43

This is easier said than done. Most of the brigades 

are not willing to hand over their weapons or to leave 

Tripoli. They claim that their armed presence is necessary for the security of the state at this crucial moment, 
19

since they maintain security in view of the potential 

for insurgencies led by the remnants of the Qadhafi 

regime.44 In addition, the militias are concerned about 

their marginalization from the new political order—

learning from observation of the experiences of neighboring countries (Egypt and Tunisia) where the youth 

movements that led the revolutions were subsequently excluded from power. Maintaining an armed presence in Tripoli is to be used as political leverage to 

secure a role in the new Libya.45

Without the formation of a new army and the collecting of weapons, security will remain loose, and 

the NTC will remain a political formation without levers to implement its will. The inability to act and to 

control state affairs has been a source of frustration to 

many of the NTC’s members. Mahmud Jibril publicly 

listed several reasons for his resignation, including his 

lack of control not only of military but also of civilian 

affairs. In an interview with the pan-Arab news channel Al-Arabiya, he cited an example to demonstrate 

the ineffectiveness of NTC control: After the liberation of Tripoli, militias went into public institutions, 

banks, oil entities and other public companies and 

changed their boards of directors, without consultation with the NTC or its executive office. Jibril’s frustration also stemmed from the lack of strong support 

for secularists, compared to the Islamic factions of the 

NTC, which have the backing of Qatar.46 Decisions 

were made with no clarity as to who was behind them 

or how they were going to be implemented, such as 

the introduction of visa requirements.47 The current 

interim government has very limited administrative capacity to perform its duties as a sovereign and 

effective state. 
20

At the time of this writing, the interim government’s precise strategy with relation to the armed 

groups remains unclear. A number of attempts to 

persuade the armed groups to hand over their weapons appear to have convinced NTC leader Mustapha 

Abdejalil that the demilitarizing of these groups may 

not be as easy as first thought. He then decided to delay the collection of arms for the foreseeable future, in 

order, paradoxically, to avoid a renewed breakout of 

political violence.48

Yet, as time passes, the risk of increased low-level 

violence and criminal activities increases.49 The armed 

groups require sources of income to maintain their 

stay in Tripoli. The question then becomes how they 

are to generate the money. It is considered probable 

that at least some of the militias will become involved 

in further illegal activities, such as levying protection 

fees, trading in narcotics, or kidnapping for ransom. 

The security risks of Libya’s uncontrolled armed 

militias are not restricted to within the country’s national borders. By jeopardizing state-building efforts, 

clashes between militias or between militias and government authorities threaten to undermine the security of neighboring countries and the international 

community. Risks include renewed waves of refugee 

flows to Tunisia, Egypt, and across the Mediterranean 

to Italy and beyond, and disruption to oil production—depriving the international market of Libyan oil 

once again and harming the economic interests of U.S. 

and European companies. 

Furthermore, the current lack of a capable national army leaves Libya an open playing field to be 

exploited by international criminal groups active in 

the region. Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or other 

Jihadist groups based in North Africa, the Sahel, and 
21

Europe are expected to establish training camps in 

uncontrolled Libyan territory, as well as developing 

links with some of the militias to acquire arms. During 

several months of fighting, the revolutionary fighters 

had access to weapon storages. Late-2011 saw media 

reporting the trafficking of Libyan arms in the Sahel 

region.50

Uncontrolled stocks of weapons include systems 

that could be of immediate interest to terrorist groups 

and other entities hostile to the United States and 

its allies, such as man-portable air defense systems 

(MANPADS), including SA-24 Igla (GRINCH) missiles. Securing these systems should be treated as an 

immediate priority for both the Libyan government 

and its foreign partners.51

Armed militias are already directly affecting relations with Libya’s neighbors. In early-December 2011, 

as a response to continuous assaults on its citizens and 

territorial integrity by Libyan armed groups, Tunisia 

closed two crossing points and deployed additional 

military personnel to control its borders with Libya.52

The ambitions of the interim government are constrained by its lack of authority and capacity to influence the armed groups. But they are also inhibited by 

the lack of a clear security reform strategy that includes 

specific measures for the disarmament and reintegration of revolutionary fighters, and the management of 

legacy armaments in general. The sooner the interim 

government launches its security reform plan, the better the chances of success for political transition. Assistance to the interim authorities in implementing 

security reform in order to mitigate the risks outlined 

above should therefore be a key priority of the United 

States and other foreign partners. 
22

Political Transition: Avoiding the “Rotten Door” 

Democracy Fate.

The recent, and neighboring, cases of Egypt and 

Tunisia present vivid illustrations to demonstrate the 

risks and challenges that countries like Libya face in 

political transition. In both countries, post-revolution 

consolidation was not peaceful. The ousting of former 

leaders and the establishment of interim political bodies were not sufficient to appease public anger. The Tunisian and Egyptian peoples, seeing themselves as the 

guardians of their popular revolutions, regularly took 

to the streets presenting political demands. Growing 

disenchantment with the political performance of the 

Military Council in Egypt has led to new riots and political violence 10 months after the toppling of Hosni 

Mubarak. 

The circumstances of each country define precisely 

how political instability will manifest itself. This phenomenon is not limited to North Africa nor the Arab 

world: Examples are available from Europe, including 

the case of Portugal, whose transition toward democracy was full of societal tensions for 2 years following 

the military coup in 1974. Tensions abated only when 

the constitution was finally enacted and the first elections were held.53

In the case of Libya, the experience will be shaped 

by the lack of ordinary political institutions, a long 

civil war, and tribal and regional divisions. In September 2011, the Libyan NTC announced its political 

roadmap for the transitional period, with a program 

resembling Tunisia’s post-revolution transition. The 

Libyan provisional government seeks to hold its first 

elections for a constituent assembly in June 2012.54

Once elected, the constituent assembly will draft the 
23

country’s constitution and hold parliamentary elections in 1 year’s time—a very ambitious program that 

perhaps fails to take into account the special situation 

of Libya. 

There are many hurdles that are likely to make the 

transition lengthy and difficult, if not prevent its success altogether. Libyans could discover that they are 

facing an incomplete, “rotten-door” transition. Political scientists and experts in political transitions Steven 

Levitsky and Lucan Way define rotten-door transitions as those that “occur in a context of state, party, 

and civil society, weakness [where] new governments 

are often filled with elites from the old regime.”55 They 

argue that the collapse of autocratic regimes often 

does not ensure democracy, especially if the collapse 

takes place in a context of extreme state weakness or 

in a country with weak civil society. The rapid and 

chaotic nature of transitions by rupture often results 

in little real institutional change, Levitsky and Way 

argue, with post-transition governments often being led by politicians with no strong commitment to 

democracy.56 Although the overthrow of Qadhafi’s 

regime was neither swift nor easy, Libya presents a 

prime example of a state that lacks political parties, 

state institutions, and civil society. 

Building Legitimate Institutions.

A key challenge confronting the interim government in Libya is the creation of political institutions to 

provide for the functioning of an effective democratic 

state. The interim government is in effect inheriting a 

stateless state. 

After seizing power, Qadhafi dismantled all the 

political institutions that were in place under King 
24

Idris, and replaced them with people’s committees.57

This dismantling of the state was more of a process 

than a single event, with the latest development as recent as 2008, when Qadhafi announced a controversial 

plan to abolish most of the ministries as a measure to 

fight corruption. Instead, he promised to establish a 

system of wealth transfer directly into the hands of the 

people. This promise never came to fruition.58

In fact, the dismantling of the state went as far 

as abolishing the actual position of the head of state. 

With the effect from the replacement of the Revolution 

Command Council by the General People’s Council 

in the late-1970s, Qadhafi claimed to hold no official 

position. His official title was “Leader of the Revolution.” In reality, this allowed him to run the country 

with no formal responsibility or accountability whatsoever. Nonetheless, denial of any official position did 

not prevent Qadhafi from being represented as, and 

treated as, head of the Libyan state by the international community. In addition, Libya’s political system 

has known no constitution or political parties under 

Qadhafi’s rule. No separation of powers, or discussion 

thereof, has been attempted since the country’s independence. Several of Qadhafi’s political committees 

combined executive and legislative powers, with commonly overlapping powers and responsibilities and 

no clear division of agencies. The system of political 

accountability was unclear—which is not to say that 

it did not exist—and was manipulated to serve the 

interest of the ruling elite. Freedom of the press was 

absent for decades, with the only permitted media 

serving as an integral part of the regime’s propaganda 

machinery.59

Carciana del Castillo, an economist with expertise 

on post-crisis state building, argues that countries 

in Libya’s situation are confronted with a “multi-
25

pronged” transition. All aspects of this transition are 

closely interrelated and reinforce each other. Violence 

must give way to public security. Lawlessness, political exclusion, and violations of human rights must 

give way to the rule of law, inclusive and participatory government, and respect for human rights. Polarization among different groups must give way to national reconciliation. Castillo notes: “Failure in any of 

these areas will put the others at risk. Planning, management, coordination, and financing of this multipronged transition are highly burdensome.”60 The 

current lack of capacity of the interim government, 

therefore, is dangerous when it attempts to address 

all these challenges and create all these institutions, 

simultaneously. Even reconstruction of the public 

healthcare system in Libya is a pressing issue: In December 2011, an article in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine identified that rebuilding the public 

health system, seriously degraded during the civil 

war, had not even reached the stage of initial evaluation research of what exists and what is needed.61

The Democratic Culture Deficit.

Qadhafi’s regime opposed the idea of political parties from the very start of the revolution. Mahmoud 

al-Maghribi, Libya’s prime minister after the 1969 

revolution, noted during a press conference that “party organisations are unlikely to have any role in the 

Libyan Arab Republic.”62 This approach received ideological backing when Qadhafi published his political thoughts, known as the “Third Universal Theory,” 

which purported to pass power directly to the people 

without any need for other political agents. 

Abubaker Altajuri, a Libyan opposed to Qadhafi, 

described the situation eloquently in a letter com-
26

menting on a Foreign Policy magazine article in 1999. 

He noted: “In Libya, people are not only prevented 

from expressing independent opinions, they are prevented from even conceiving of them.”63 This situation 

remained unchanged, even during talks on political 

openness during the 2000s.

As result, there was no authorized opposition force 

in the country for 4 decades, and, in fact, the only organized political forces that opposed and threatened 

Qadhafi’s regime within Libya were illegal Islamist 

groups: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The regime’s response to this 

threat was brutal, including direct military intervention in 1996-97 to quell the Islamist threat in eastern 

Libyan cities.

Meanwhile, outside the country, several opposition groups and parties were formed in Egypt, Switzerland, the UK, and other Western states with the 

aim of campaigning against Qadhafi’s regime. Toppling the regime was the primary focus of all Libyan 

opposition groups’ activities.64

There is a consensus within Libya that one of the 

emblematic features of the new democratic era is going to be the establishment of political parties. At the 

time of this writing, several groups and movements 

are preparing to form political parties, and waiting 

for the appropriate law to be passed.65 But because the 

opposition to the previous regime had worked either 

clandestinely or from exile, its contact with and impact on the masses within Libya was extremely limited. As a consequence, most Libyans now have no 

experience or knowledge of the political dynamics of 

a democracy. Furthermore, the absence of freedoms of 

association and the press inhibited the development of 

any form of democratic culture among Libyans. This 
27

absence of culture will inevitably have an impact on 

the political transition and on state-building efforts. 

Some Libyan intellectuals say they are seeking democratization in its broad sense, limited not only to 

elections, but also to include freedom of expression, 

political plurality, promotion of civil society, and 

protection of human rights.66 There is a keen interest 

in avoiding the emergence of another authoritarian 

regime, or what Levitsky and Way call a “hybrid regime,” which combines elections with various degrees 

of authoritarianism.67

Achieving all these goals requires, in addition to 

good intentions, a change in people’s ways of thinking. International experience shows that a change in 

the behavioral patterns of the past is the most difficult 

part of political transition. Viktor Orban, the Hungarian politician, eloquently explained the difficulty of 

moving from communism to democracy in Hungary 

during the 1990s. He said the “the bricks of the Berlin 

Wall have been snapped up by Japanese and American tourists, while here the remains of the wall have 

remained in the people’s spirits, in their way of thinking, in the economy, in the social system, in the education system, and in many other areas of social life.”68

The Tribal Dilemma: Inclusion or Exclusion?

Despite the important role of the tribes in Libyan 

society, there is only a narrow base of support among 

the new Libyan political elite—constituted of members of the NTC, opposition abroad, and some academics—for a tribal-based political system. Despite 

the youth attitudes cited above, urban Libyan intellectuals are wary of tribal politics, as representing a 

regression to primordial political structures and an 
28

obstacle to creating a united and democratic Libya 

where all Libyans are treated equally. For many urban 

elites, a tribal system connotes dominance by elderly 

males, inhibiting societal development. Many Libyan 

intellectuals instead have expressed wishes for political allegiance in Libya to be based on the state and on 

the basis of citizenship, seeing the tribe instead as a 

social umbrella with only a limited role in national 

politics over the long term. This, however, remains a 

minority elite view. 

The early days of the revolution saw clear manifestations of this divergence in thinking. The statements of the NTC leaders and the slogans of protesters across Libyan cities, including Tripoli, were calling 

for a united Libya. These calls came also in reaction to 

Saif al-Islam’s warning of the country’s possible split 

into different regions in a controversial speech on February 20. In that speech, Saif al-Islam warned Libyans 

and the international community that Libya is a tribal 

society and that clashes could escalate into civil war, 

with a risk that the country would split into its three 

pre-independence regions. Calls for a united Libya 

appear to be based on strong political belief shared by 

nationalists, secularists, and Islamists.69

Furthermore, building a political system that is focused on tribalism rather than ideologies carries a risk 

of creating a societal hierarchy and territorial divisions. It creates tensions between those who are inside 

the political system and those who are not. In the view 

of the new political elite, the citizenship principle, 

regardless of tribal and ethnical affiliations, must be 

embodied in the new constitution. No political formation or other civil society institution should make reference to tribes or regions.70 However, the challenges 

of the political transition, and the strong role of the 

tribes as detailed above, dictate that the new interim 
29

government must necessarily take into account the 

demands of certain tribes and regions. Abdul Alhakim al-Feitouri, a Libyan academic, argues that failing 

to accommodate the tribes in the transitional period 

could lead to the “Balkanization of Libya.”71

The new interim government formed on November 21, 2011, has implicitly attempted to balance tribal, 

regional, and armed groups representations. It did not 

accommodate every faction that exists in the country, 

but managed to achieve a balanced distribution of ministerial posts. All political persuasions are represented 

in the interim government, including both Islamists 

and secularists. The important ministerial positions 

of Defence and Interior were allocated to Osama AlJuwali and Fawzi Abdelalai, representatives from the 

Zintan and Misrata militias, respectively.72 These two 

militias are considered the largest and best-armed in 

comparison with other groups. 

The outcome of the interim-leadership work in 

forming the new government did not satisfy all the 

factions. Several protests erupted again in Libyan 

cities. The Berber groups, long oppressed under Qadhafi’s regime, resented their exclusion from power. 

The perception among Berbers was that their significant numbers and substantial contribution during the 

civil war were not taken into account. Other protests 

over marginalization and the failure of the new government to recognize contributions to the toppling of 

Qadhafi’s rule took place in Benghazi and Ajdabya. 

In sum, tribes play an important role in the daily 

life of many Libyans, and are likely to continue to 

do so for the foreseeable future. Under a new regime 

that does not favor tribal politics, tribal leaders might 

agree to take a limited role at the national political 

level, but will likely want to keep their political influ-
30

ence at the regional level. Leading tribes in different 

areas of the country will have great aspirations to 

play an important role in their respective regions. It 

is likely that they will call for a decentralized political system that will accommodate their demands and 

aspirations. Any attempt to ignore and marginalize 

the tribes’ demands is certain to exacerbate the fragile 

transitional process toward a modern and democratic 

Libya. Once again, the United States and other foreign 

partners engaging with the new Libyan state need to 

be aware of the limitations on the power and reach of 

that state imposed by the tribal nature of its society. 

Handling Ideological and Political Differences.

Observation of political discussions among Libyan 

intellectuals in late-2011 only confirmed that political 

transition there is going to be laborious and intense. 

Opinions differ on the form of the state, its identity, 

and the administrative structures that have to be included in the country’s first constitution. The current 

debates among Libyans have revived memories of 

similar discussions that took place before Libya’s independence under the auspices of the UN. At that time, 

the main issue of discussion within the UN Council 

for Libya was over adopting a federal or unitary form 

for the state of Libya.73 The federalist voices, calling 

for the country’s division into three states, Cyrenaica, 

Fezzan, and Tripolitania, lost the debate. 

One could argue that differences of opinion are a 

healthy sign for a democracy in the making. But the 

lack of institutions and processes that regulate political debate in any country make political discord a risky 

undertaking. Different groups are wary of each other, 

and suspect each other of following foreign agendas. 
31

These fundamental differences are not limited to 

academic circles and intellectuals, but also exist within the provisional government. Factional infighting 

emerged in the early months of the existence of the 

NTC. As an interim political body for the rebels, the 

NTC included members from different political persuasions, including both those representing the opposition abroad, and those who had served their entire 

lives under Qadhafi’s regime. The entity thus lacked 

any cohesion among its members in the early stages. 

But the main division that has emerged at the time of 

this writing is ideological and/or religious: frictions 

between secularist- and Islamist-dominated NTC discussions in late-2011. 

The unifying factor that had kept the NTC from 

fissure was the fight against Qadhafi, with the result 

that a leadership battle resurfaced after the fall of 

Tripoli. The announcement by NTC leader Mustapha 

Abdeljalil that Islam was to be the basis for legislation 

brought divisions within the Council to the surface.74

Several secularist figures voiced grievances publicly, 

complaining of their alienation by the Islamist wing 

backed by external players. Libyan diplomat Abdulrahman Shalgam voiced his dissatisfaction with Qatar’s support of one side against other factions.75

Truth Recovery and Reconciliation.

Another important task for the interim government, and an important step for the stability of the 

country, is to organize a truth recovery and reconciliation initiative. International experience, including in 

the cases of South Africa and Morocco, shows that 

reconciliation initiatives in post-conflict situations or 

following regime or political change constitute an im-
32

portant step toward healing the wounds of the past, 

and that they strengthen political transitions.76

What and whom to reconcile in Libya are important questions. The new interim regime has not only 

to address atrocities committed over decades by the 

Qadhafi regime against individuals77 and tribal antagonism; it also has to deal with human rights violations 

that occurred during the conflict between rebel and 

pro-Qadhafi forces. Violations reported by international human rights organizations included torture of 

war prisoners, mass killing, and rape.78

At the time of this writing, the interim government is unable to launch a formal initiative, despite 

increasingly strident calls from Libyan intellectuals;79

it is inhibited by the lack of state institutions that are 

important for the working of any reconciliation process—such as a parliament, a functioning judiciary 

system, and forces of law and order. Truth recovery 

would be a risky endeavor if carried out by a provisional government that is still weak, as it could become a factor that deepens rifts in society. 

Nevertheless, at the end of November 2011, the 

NTC convened a national reconciliation meeting in 

the city of Zawiya, where representatives of tribes and 

clans from across the country discussed the importance of addressing the rifts of the past and the ways 

of doing so.80 The event was intended to convey a clear 

message to Libyans regarding the new government’s 

intentions to handle all the issues of the past that could 

fuel societal tensions. The event also aimed to raise 

awareness and familiarize Libyans with the concept of 

reconciliation, through discussion of other countries’ 

experiences—the intention being to reduce the risk of 

tension during the framing and implementation of the 

reconciliation process by ensuring that participants 
33

and the audience are familiar with the process and its 

philosophy. 

Given the crucial importance of reconciliation 

initiatives for stability during transition, the United 

States and other foreign partners should encourage 

these efforts and provide targeted support for the 

process. 

Economic Reconstruction Imperatives.

Delivering a degree of economic prosperity is a 

prerequisite for successful transition. With economic 

conditions degraded following the months of civil 

war, building an economy has become an immediate 

priority for the current and coming governments. The 

prolonged political crisis, and the ensuing uncertainty, 

pushed away both foreign and national investors. According to the Bank of International Settlements, $2.2 

billion of domestic capital left Libya in the first quarter 

of 2011.81 During the crisis, economic activity in Libya 

was paralyzed as a result of the closure of factories, 

ports, and roads for months. This disruption of business activity resulted in huge economic losses. The 

economic cost of Libya’s civil war has been estimated 

by the Libyan Central Bank at around $15 billion.82

Nevertheless, by some measures Libya is in a 

relatively strong economic situation compared with 

its neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt, both of which are 

expecting 2011 to show substantial falls in economic 

growth. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth 

in Egypt is expected to drop to 1 percent in 2011 from 

5.1 percent in 2010, and in Tunisia, the forecast GDP 

growth for 2011 is 1.3 percent against 3.7 percent the 

previous year.83 The governments in Tunisia and 
34

Egypt would like to stimulate the economy through 

public investments, but their capacity is limited by the 

lack of public funds; both countries need external financing to stabilize the worsening balance of payment 

situations. 

By contrast, Libya has a broad spread of projects 

and services to spend money on, and access to ready 

funds to do so, which is expected to lead to strong GDP 

growth once political stability is restored. Libya is fortunate to hold good reserves that will help the interim 

government meet the socioeconomic needs of its citizens, as well as pay for the reconstruction of the state 

without resorting to international borrowing. Over 

the recent years of high oil prices, Libya accumulated 

a large amount of wealth, and currently holds around 

$110 billion of foreign assets.84 By May 2012, most of 

the foreign assets held by Libyan Central Bank and 

some state-owned commercial institutions that were 

frozen internationally following the UN sanctions had 

been released, with part of them transferred to the 

current Libyan authorities. The process of unfreezing 

assets of Libyan origin in some African countries has 

been more complex due to political and transparency 

reasons. First, some African countries were reluctant 

to recognize the NTC as the legitimate representative 

of the Libyan people in the early months following the 

collapse of Qadhafi’s regime. 

Second, it remains unclear whether some parts of 

Libya’s investment in the African continent were the 

personal wealth of Qadhafi’s family, or holdings of 

the Libyan state.85 It is important to note that the UN 

lifting of sanctions on Libyan assets did not include 

assets of Qadhafi’s family and former members of 

his regime, which remain frozen. The future of such 

funds depends on the outcome of each member’s trial, 
35

and the restitution of some assets might prove impossible. A panel of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1973 highlighted in its report 

the difficulty of identifying, tracing, and repatriating 

assets of key members of the former regime and their 

families as result of embezzlement of public funds and 

corruption.86 It is to be hoped that the Libyan Investment Authority, with its $65 billion worth of assets 

and accumulated investment experience, should play 

a key role in the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and economy.87

In addition to reserves, the interim government 

can also rely on hydrocarbon production and exportation revenues—and is therefore understandably keen 

to restore hydrocarbon production. Oil production 

reached 840,000 barrels per day at the end of November 2011, only a few weeks after the fall of the Qadhafi 

regime, and there is optimism that the new regime 

might increase production to the pre-war level of 1.6 

million barrels a day by the end of 2012.88 Libya was 

lucky that war damage was limited only to support 

infrastructure and has not affected key production facilities.89 To return to the pre-war oil production level, 

Libya not only depends on the repair of infrastructure 

facilities, but also on the return of foreign skilled labor; part of the loss of production at the start of the 

civil war was due solely to the departure of international workers.90

The availability of adequate finances will reduce 

the number of challenges that the government is facing 

in the immediate and short term. But the essential economic development question for Libya remains precisely what type of development strategies to pursue. 

There is an urgent need for comprehensive plans to 

tackle the structural economic problems that triggered 
36

the revolution in the first place. This will include improving living standards for Libyans, and developing 

new sources of wealth away from the hydrocarbon 

sector in order to create enough jobs to meet the rising 

number of new entrants to the labor market. Unemployment in Libya, already high as noted above, was 

exacerbated still further by the paralysis of almost all 

economic activities during the civil war.91

LOOKING AHEAD: THE INTERNATIONAL 

COMMUNITY AND LIBYA 

As the Libyan interim government continues to 

struggle to maintain law and order while simultaneously facing the daunting tasks of state-building ab 

initio, the United States and other leading actors in the 

international community can assist in maintaining stability by engaging and providing vitally needed help. 

This assistance is essential to avoid destabilization and 

deterioration within Libya, gravid with consequences 

not only for Libyan citizens, but for neighbors and energy consumers both in North Africa and Europe. 

The involvement of the international community 

should be focused on what Libya needs in order to 

perform its functions as an effective sovereign state, 

both at a national and international level. U.S. and 

UN expertise in disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration (DDR) of armed fighters in post-conflict 

situations could be of pivotal help to Libya at this 

critical juncture, but such support should be provided 

carefully. Although the situation on the ground at the 

time of this writing suggests that the interim government in Libya would appreciate external help with the 

armed militias, any level of visible foreign military 

presence in Libya, particularly from the West, risks 
37

igniting more political instability than it resolves. Any 

DDR assistance would be best provided through diplomatic channels in the form of continuous advisory 

and monitoring support. Contributions could also be 

delivered in the form of special training courses to 

middle- and high-ranking military officers, provided 

in U.S. and/or European military colleges. The United 

States could also work in conjunction with other Arab 

countries such as Jordan and Morocco to train Libyan 

rebel fighters and integrate them into the national 

army. Training in other Arab countries seems a viable 

solution. In April 2012, Jordan started the training of 

10,000 policemen at its International Police Centre 

near the capital of Amman.92 But use or deployment 

of visible military assets by the United States or the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would 

have limited, or no, support within Libya and in the 

wider Arab region, and would serve only to fuel conspiracy theories about interest in Libyan oil and new 

colonialism. 

Preventing hostile exploitation of Libya’s vast 

territory and largely uncontrolled borders remains a 

key task for the international community while Libya 

still lacks a national army. The new Libya needs wellequipped and well-trained military forces to protect 

and secure its approximately 4,000 kilometer (km)-

long land border, shared with six countries, and its 

national territory. The new security apparatus that 

will be put in place should be trained to play a neutral role in internal political life, and specifically avoid 

domination by or favoritism toward specific tribes or 

clans over others. A new security system will reduce 

the risk of intimidation and violence during Libya’s 

political transition. The United States and other international partners with experience in building security 
38

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are well-placed to offer 

this experience to Libya. 

The United States and the international community can provide assistance in building state institutions and processes, once the political ambitions of 

the leading revolutionary commanders are satisfied 

or mitigated and the process of reintegration of excombatants is in an advanced stage. 

International nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) have much scope to support the nascent democratic political culture and civil society in Libya. The 

new Libya requires the establishment and strengthening of a party system, elections, media, and an independent judiciary. Technical assistance in setting up 

legal systems on political and economic fronts is an 

essential prerequisite for Libya’s transition toward

democracy. 

Libya occupies a strategically important position 

in the Maghreb and the Sahel, a region that is considered of increasing importance to U.S. global security 

strategy. In March 2012, the Libyan government hosted a regional conference on border security, with the 

aims of setting up collaboration mechanisms and procedures with neighboring countries and conveying a 

message to the international community that Libya 

takes its border issues very seriously.93 However, given the lack of financial and human resources primarily 

in countries like Chad and Nigeria, it is likely that the 

collaborative efforts with Libya’s southern neighbors 

will be less than fully effective. 

The porous state of Libyan borders is not only a 

threat to Libya’s stability, but also to other countries 

in its vicinity and beyond. Immigration, international 

terrorism, and transnational organized crime could affect the interests of European countries and the inter-
39

national community, in addition to their implications 

for Libya’s internal stability. Yet, the Libyan security 

forces in their present form do not have sufficient professional personnel, equipment, or surveillance technology to control Libya's borders effectively. 

This is not a task the new Libya can manage alone, 

and this is a key area in which international assistance 

is essential for Libya’s state-building efforts. There is 

a potentially important enabling role in this area for 

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), particularly in 

light of the improvement of the security environment 

in Africa being a key element of AFRICOM’s mission. 

In June 2012, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General 

Ray Odierno signaled increasing importance for the 

train and advise mission in Africa, in particular due 

to the fact that “terrorist elements around the world 

go to the areas they think [have] the least resistance 

. . . and right now, you could argue that’s Africa.”94

Libya is a prime example of this potential, and AFRICOM should consider the case of Libya as a priority, 

given the security repercussions already felt by neighboring countries. The flow of weapons and militants 

is increasingly destabilizing the Maghreb and Sahel 

regions, and prompt action to mitigate this situation 

would prove cost effective in restraining the further 

spread of instability.

The planned assignment of a Brigade Combat 

Team to AFRICOM in 2013 to act as a pilot program 

for the Regionally Aligned Force concept provides an 

opportunity to build on immediate mitigating action 

in conjunction with the Libyan authorities. Conversely, if AFRICOM fails to engage promptly in Libya, the 

credibility of AFRICOM as a reliable actor and partner 

for the security of Africa will come into question in 

the region. Given the U.S. concerns about internation-
40

al terrorism, many would find it incomprehensible if 

AFRICOM took no visible action to counter expanding instability resulting from Libya’s challenges.

The U.S. military is well-positioned to leverage its 

expertise and experience to design a comprehensive 

solution for border control and provide support in 

implementation. In particular, help could be offered 

to the Libyan authorities to control Libya’s southern 

borders, while a collaborative effort involving European partners would be conceivable for Libya’s sea 

borders with European neighbors.

The aim should be working together with the 

Libyan authorities in order to enhance their capabilities of providing for their own security. In addition 

to enhancing the security of neighboring states, a U.S. 

contribution of this type would strengthen the current 

fragile peace and help prevent any relapse into civil 

war. 

Time is of the essence in the case of Libya. Prompt 

engagement with and support for the current Libyan 

authorities is essential for a wide range of reasons. 

First, it will ensure that the continued confrontations 

among armed rival militants do not spread and develop into a second civil war. Second, engagement will 

curb the further spread of instability to other neighboring countries. Last, but not least, achieving political and economic stability will have a strong positive 

impact not only on Libya, but also on neighboring 

countries in North Africa and Europe—securing important long-term political and economic allies in a region key both for the United States and for long-term 

partners in Europe.
41

CONCLUSION 

It invites little controversy to say that removing 

Muammar Qadhafi was the easy part in Libya’s fight 

for liberation, compared with the daunting tasks of 

building a state in the post-Qadhafi era. Libya’s interim government is facing as difficult a moment as 

any other country in the region that has experienced 

a revolution. The new Libyan leadership inherits a 

distinctly messy political situation, with multiple, simultaneous, and urgent major challenges. In addition 

to building political institutions, maintaining security, 

withdrawing weapons, and creating a new national 

army, Libya has also to meet urgent demands to rectify both the crimes and the mistakes of the old regime. 

Initiating a truth-recovery process is essential to ensure victims that the crimes of Qadhafi’s regime or of 

the civil war will not go unaddressed or unpunished. 

The Libyan people have high expectations following the end of authoritarian rule by Qadhafi, but the 

provisional government is constrained by the absence 

of institutions to meet all the demands at once. One 

of the key challenges is the lack of experienced politicians who can lead a democratic transition. With the 

exception of those few figures who defected from 

Qadhafi’s regime, there is even a dearth of national 

figures with any experience in managing state affairs. Under Qadhafi, state affairs were managed by 

a handful of technocrats, who occupied, in rotation, 

ministerial and management positions in state-owned 

companies.

The government not only needs to build basic state 

institutions that allow it to exercise its duties as a provider of services to its own citizens, but it has yet to 

establish itself as the sole user of legitimate violence. 
42

In the aftermath of the fall of Tripoli, the interim government has announced its road map to democracy; 

a series of laws, procedures and institutions have to 

be put in place for the next elections. But simultaneously, a solution to the fundamental security issue has 

to be provided. Demilitarizing the armed militias and 

building a national army is a prerequisite not only for 

strengthening state capacity and credibility, but also 

essential for the achievement of other transitional reforms. 

One final and crucial point is that any exclusion 

of the reality of Libyan tribalism from the political 

calculus will be highly damaging and will inevitably 

trigger more tensions. Libya’s tribes are conscious of 

their importance and aspire to play a political role, 

at least on a regional level. The conventions of tribes 

in late-2011 to debate the future structure of the state 

and to discuss federation, central government, and a 

bicameral parliamentary system among other key issues, send a strong signal that the tribes want a political place in the new Libya. However progressive the 

instincts of the new government, it would be unwise 

to attempt to deny it.

ENDNOTES 

1. “Qadhafi Orders Release of Libyan Journalists,” The 

Guardian, November 9, 2010, available from www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2010/nov/09/gaddafi-orders-release-of-journalists.

2. Martin Fletcher, “Hardliners Break up meeting as Gaddafi’s son reaches out,” The Times, December 14, 2009. 

3. Qadhafi was involved in the internal politics of many subSaharan countries. For instance, he took sides in the Chad civil 

war, and supported the Polisario in their war against Morocco 

over Western Sahara territory. For more information on Qadhafi’s 
43

foreign policy in Africa, see Eric Gobe, “L’Afrique ou le nouvel 

horizon de la politique extérieure libyenne” (“Africa or the New 

Horizon of the Libyan Foreign Policy”), Annuaire de l’ Afrique du 

Nord, 1999, Paris, France: Éd. CNRS, pp. 195-200. Also see Asteris 

Huliaras, “Qadhafi Comes Back: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in 

the 1990s,” African Affairs, Vol. 100, No. 398, 2001, pp. 5-25. 

4. Robert Bruce St John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002, 

pp. 129-130.

5. “Monasseq al-qeyada Alsha’biya al-ijtima’iya: Libya Tatroqu Abwab al-islah maa Saif al-Islam” (“Coordinator of Popular 

Social Leadership: Libya Knocks on Reform Doors with Saif al-Islam”), Al-Arab newspaper, October 10, 2009, available from www.

alarab.co.uk/Previouspages/Alarab%20Weekly/2009/10/17-10/p06.pdf.

6. “Mu’adalu al-bitala fi Libya Yasilu 20,74%” (“Unemployment Rate in Libya Reaches 20.74%”), Aleqtesadia, March 1, 2009, 

available from www.aleqt.com/2009/03/01/article_200734.html. 

7. United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Programme 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab 

Countries, New York: United Nations Publications, 2010, p. 109.

8. Sami Zapita, “Opinion: Workshop on the Role of Education 

in the Workplace,” The Tripoli Post, March 9, 2010, available from 

www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=5&i=4185&archive=1. 

9. Christine Aghazarm et al., “Migrants Caught in Crisis: The 

IOM Experience in Libya,” International Organization for Migration, 

Geneva, Switzerland, 2012. 

10. Sami Zapita, “Foreign Oil Companies Must Help in Libyanizing Engineering Projects,” The Tripoli Post, February 28, 2009, 

available from www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=2&i=2892. 

11. “Libya Lifts Taxes on Foodstuffs,” Agence France Presse, 

January 1, 2011. 

12. Walid Nayri, “Azmat Assakan fi Libya Ila mata?” (“Housing Crisis in Libya: Until When?”), al-Hewar Mutamaden, No-
44

vember 28, 2010, available from www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.

asp?aid=236567. 

13. The author was approached by NATO’s Joint Task Force 

in Naples in late-April 2011 with an urgent request for consultations on the Libyan tribal system, and formed the strong impression that the issue had not been considered by NATO during the 

previous 2 months of civil war. 

14. Author’s own resources, confirmed in interview with 

Tripoli-based Libyan academic, November 15, 2011. 

15. Amal Obeidi, Political Culture in Libya, Surrey, UK: Curzon 

Press, 2001. 

16. Naeem Al-Achibi, “Al-qabila wa al-qabaliya fi Libya: Muhadara li Amal ‘ubaidi” (“Tribe and Tribalism in Libya: Amal 

Obeidi’s Lecture”), Libya Alyoum, September 18, 2010, available 

from www.libya-alyoum.com/news/index.php?id=21&textid=410. 

17. Lisa Anderson, “Tribe and State: Libya Anomalies,” Phillip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in 

the Middle East, Oxford, UK: University of California Press, 1990, 

pp. 288-302. 

18. Omar Fathaly and Monte Plamer, “Opposition to Change 

in Rural Libya,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 11, 

No. 2, 1980, pp. 247-261.

19. Muammar al-Gathafi (Qadhafi), The Green Book: The Solution to the Problems of Democracy, the Solution to the Economic 

Problem, the Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory, Reading, UK: 

Ithaca Press, 2005. 

20. Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge, 

UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 99. 

21. “Opposition Letter Urges Qadhafi’s Resignation,” Al-Hayat, March 31, 1992. 

22. Anderson, p.297.
45

23. Hanspeter Mattes, “Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East: The Libyan Case,” Conference Paper 

presented at Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 

Forces, “Challenges of Security Sector Reform in the Middle East,” 

Geneva, Switzerland, July 12-14, 2004. 

24. Mathieu von Rohr, “Tribal Rivalries Complicate Libyan 

War,” Spiegel International, July 26, 2011, available from www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,776695-2,00.html. 

25. Vandewalle, p. 149. 

26. Wanis Otman and Erling Karlberg, The Libyan Economy: 

Economic Diversification and International Repositioning, Berlin/

Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2007, p. 21.. 

27. Ahmad Rahim, “Kataib al-qadhafi al-amniya Tashakalat li 

Tahmishi al-jaysh” (“Qadhafi’s Kataeb al-Amnia was Formed to 

Marginalise the Army”), Al-Hayat, March 6, 2011, available from 

international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/241132.

28. “Khamis Gadhafi: Agent of Fear,” Afrol News, February 23, 

2011, available from www.afrol.com/articles/37412.

29. “Les tribus libyennes soutiennent Kaddafi mais sont favorable a une loi d’amnistie” (“ Libyan Tribes Support Qadhafi but 

They Prefer an Amnesty Law”), Jeune Afrique, May 7, 2011, available from www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/DEPAFP20110507111233/. 

30. Mohamed Chayadhmi, “Tamim: Mawkifuna Tujaha 

Libya Mabdaiyy wa Laysa Siyasiyy” (“Tamim Says That Qatar’s Stance Towards Libya Is Based On Principles Not Politics”), 

Al-Arab, October 7, 2011, available from www.alarab.qa/details.

php?issueId=1392&artid=153811.

31. Mary Beth Sheridan, “Libya Declares Liberation with 

an Islamic Tone,” The Washington Post, October 24, 2011, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/libya-declaresliberation-with-an-islamic-tone/2011/10/23/gIQA4VsbAM_story.html. 

32. “Saif al-Islam Gaddafi Arrested in Libya,” Aljazeera Net,

November 19, 2011, available from, www.aljazeera.com/news/

middleeast/2011/11/20111119111936535209.html. 
46

33. “Qabilat Warfala fi bani walid tatawa’adu bil’intiqam 

min quwat al-majlis al-intikali” (“Warfala Tribe in Bani Walid 

Threatens Revenge against National Transitional Council”), AlAnba, November 2, 2011, available from www.alanba.com.kw/

AbsoluteNMNEW/templates/international2010.aspx?articleid=23956

9&zoneid=377&m=0.

34. “Muammar Gaddafi’s Spy Chief Senussi Arrested in 

Mauritania,” The Telegraph, March 17, 2012, available from www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/9150099/

Muammar-Gaddafis-spy-chief-Senussi-arrested-in-Mauritania.html.

35. Kahlid Mahmud, “Libya: tasa’ud aljadal hawla tawhyd 

alqiyadah al’askariyah fi tarablus.. wa msa’i litawhidiha bi’emrati 

belhaj” (“Libya: Growing Controversy Over Unifying Military 

Command In Tripoli; Efforts Made To Unify Command Under 

Belhaj”), al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 9, 2011, available from www.

aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=644125&issueno=12003. 

36. Pierre Prier, “L’inquiétant poids des milices dans la ‘nouvelle Libye’” (“The Worrisome Weight of Militias in the ‘New 

Libya’”), Le Figaro, December 08, 2011, available from www.

lefigaro.fr/international/2011/12/08/01003-20111208ARTFIG00801-

l-inquietant-poids-des-milices-dans-la-nouvelle-libye.php.

37. Chris Stephen, “Libyan Scramble for £100bn in Assets 

Fractures the Peace at Tripoli Airport,” The Guardian, December 

17, 2011, available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/17/

libya-tripoli-airport-assets-un. 

38. Interview with Libyan political activist, November 

10, 2011. 

39. Juan Miguel Munoz,” Libya Aceelara la formacion 

de su Ejercito ante la Reiterada de OTAN,” (“Libya will Accelerate the Formation of its Army before the Withdrawal of 

NATO”), El Pais, October 31, 2011, available from www.elpais.com/

articulo/internacional/Libia/acelera/formacion/Ejercito/retirada/

OTAN/elpepiint/20111031elpepiint_3/Tes. 
47

40. Renaud Gerard, “L’inquietant division des rebelles Libyens,” (“The Worrisome Division of Libyan Rebels”), Le Figaro, July 29, 2011, available from www.

lefigaro.fr/international/2011/07/29/01003-20110729ARTFIG00562-linquietante-division-des-rebelles-libyens.php. 

41. “Gunfight Erupts near Tripoli Airport in Libya,” BBC 

News, December 11, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-africa-16128837. 

42. David Goodman, “Libyan Leader Says Militia Clashes 

Could Create Civil War,” The New York Times, January 4, 2012, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/world/africa/libyanleader-mustafa-abdel-jalil-warns-militias-could-create-civil-war.html. 

43. Vivienne Walt, “In Tripoli, Libya’s Interim Leader Says he 

is Quitting,” Time, October 19, 2011, available from www.time.com/

time/world/article/0,8599,2097333,00.html. 

44. “Thuwar Libya: Sanahtafidhu bisila’h Lida’mi Al’amn fi 

al-waqt al-rahin” (“Libya Rebels: We Will Keep Arms to Reinforce Security”), Al-Anba, November 9, 2011, available from www.

alanba.com.kw/AbsoluteNMNEW/templates/international2010.aspx?

articleid=241169&zoneid=377&m=0. 

45. Clifford Krauss, “Militias and Army Jostles for Influence in 

Libya,” New York Times, November 18, 2011, available from www.

nytimes.com/2011/11/19/world/africa/militias-and-army-compete-forinfluence-in-libya.html?ref=libya. 

46. “Barnamaj Ithaat,” (Spotlights Programme), Al-Arabiya 

TV, November 10, 2011. 

47. Interview with Tripoli-based Libyan academic, November 

15, 2011. 

48. “Libya Rebel Head Gives Gaddafi Bastions Week to Surrender,” Reuters, September 3, 2011, available from af.reuters.com/

article/topNews/idAFJOE7820B820110903. 

49. Florence Gaub, “Libya: Avoiding State Failure,” Research Division, NATO Defence College, Rome, Italy, September 

2011, p. 1.
48

50. Fidet Mansour, “Libya Arms Circulation Spurs 

Sahel Co-operation,” Magharebia, September 23, 2011, available from magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/

features/2011/09/23/feature-01. 

51. Paul McLeary, “Fires Sale,” Defense Technology 

International, December 2011, pp. 32-33. 

52. “Tunis Tughliku Ma’barayha ma’a Libya” (“Tunisia Closes Two Border Crossings with Libya”), Aljazeera Net, December 3, 

2011, available from www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/9BC648B7-D349-

4B69-9B81-CD371BDD413C.htm?GoogleStatID=9. 

53. Antonio Costa Pinto, “Settling Accounts with the Past in 

a Troubled Transition to Democracy: The Portuguese Case,” in 

Alexandra Barahona De Brito, Carmen Gonzalez Enrique, and 

Ploma Aguilar, eds., The Politics of Memory and Democratization,

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 65-91. 

54. “Libya Polls in Eight Months,” Gulf News, October 23, 

2011, available from gulfnews.com/news/region/libya/libya-pollsin-eight-months-1.914040. 

55. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “Why ‘Democratic 

Breakthroughs’ often Fail to Create Democracies: Modes of Transition and the Prospects for Democratic Change,” Background 

paper presented at Johns Hopkins University SAIS conference, 

“Countering Democratic Regression in a Newly Divided Europe 

and Eurasia,” Washington, DC, October 16, 2009. 

56. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2010, pp. 25-26. 

57. Sami Hajjar, “The Jamahiriy Experiment in Libya: Qadhafi 

and Rousseau,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 

2, 1980, pp. 181-200. 

58. Bertelsmann Stiftung, “Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010: Libya Country Report,” Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009.
49

59. Kimberly L. Sullivan, Muammar Al-Qadhafi’s Libya, Minneapolis, MN: Twenty-First Century Books, 2009, pp. 80-84.

60. Craciana del Castillo, Rebuilding War-torn States: the 

Challenges of Post-conflict Economic Reconstruction, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 16.

61. R. Sullivan, B. McQuinn and A. Purushotham, “How are 

we going to rebuild public health in Libya?” Journal of the Royal 

Society of Medicine, Vol. 104, 2011, pp. 490-492. 

62. “The Libyan Revolution in the Words of its Leaders,” 

Middle East Journal, Vol., 42, No. 2, Spring 1970, pp. 203-219. 

63. Abubaker O. Altajuri, “Qadhafi: Still a Dictator,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July-August 1999, pp. 154-155. 

64. “Libya: New Political Challenges,” Strategic Comment, 

Institute of International Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 

1996, pp. 1-2. 

65. “Libya: New Leaders Legalise Political Parties,” Tripoli 

Post, January 5, 2012, available from tripolipost.com/articledetail.

asp?c=1&i=7616.

66. Author’s own views following discussions in Libyan circles, interviews, and review of leading Libyan newspapers. More 

details on the views of different Libyan intellectuals are available 

from www.libyaalmostakbal.net/news/clicked/17332. 

67. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 7. 

68. Bill Lomax “Obstacles to the Development of Democratic 

Politics,” Terry Cox and Andy Forlong, eds., Hungary: The Politics 

of Transition, London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1995, pp. 81-82. 

69. “Libya Rebels Form Council, Oppose Foreign Intervention,” Reuters, February 27, 2011, available from af.reuters.com/

article/libyaNews/idAFLDE71Q0DM20110227. 
50

70. Nasr Abu Saif Yasin, “ Libya Qabila Wahida . . . kayf?” (“Libya is One Tribe . . . How?”) Al-Watan Libiya, October 24, 2011, available from www.alwatan-libya.com/more.php?newsid=17546&catid=2. 

71. Abdul Hakim al-Feitouri, “Al-machru’ al-libiyy wa Khuturat Inzilaqehi Ila Dawlat al-qabila” (“The Libyan Project and the 

Danger of a Tribal State”), al-Hewar Mutamaden, June 3, 2011, 

available from www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=261647. 

72. Essam Mohamed, “El-Keib Announces Libyan Interim Government,” Magharebia, November 23, 2011, available from magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/

features/2011/11/23/feature-03. 

73. Frank R. Golino, “Patterns of Libyan National Identity,” 

Middle East Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1970, pp. 338-352. 

74. Mohamed Madi, “Libya Looks Set to Chart Moderate 

Course on Islam,” BBC News, November 4, 2011, available from 

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15500682. 

75. “Shalgam: Qatar Tasna’u Milishyatiha al-islamiya fi Libya,” (“Shalgam: Qatar Creates its Own Islamic Militias in Libya”), 

Middle East Online, November 18, 2011, available from www.

middle-east-online.com/?id=120624. 

76. Luke Wilcox, “Reshaping Civil Society Through a Truth 

Commission: Human Rights in Morocco’s Process of Political Reform,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, No. 1, 

2009, pp. 49-68. 

77. See, for example, the description by Hicham Matar, a 

Libyan novelist, of the killing of more than 1,000 prisoners in the 

courtyard of Abu Salim prison during reprisals in 1996. Hisham 

Matar, “Libya’s Fragile Dream,” Africa Report, No. 30, May 2011, 

pp. 29-31. 

78. “The Battle for Libya: Killing, Disappearances, and Torture,” September 2011, London, UK: Amnesty International. 

79. Abid A. Rakik, “Limaslahati man Tata’kharu al-musalaha 

al-wataniya?” (“Who Benefits from Delaying National Reconcili-
51

ation”), Alwatan Libya, November 19, 2011, available from www.

alwatan-libya.com/more.asp?ThisID=18108&ThisCat=22. 

80. “Al-zawiyah Tasta’idu li’htidhani Fa ‘aliyat al-multaqa alawal Limajalis al-Hukama’ wa Shuraa Bi Libya” (“Zawiya hosts 

the first meeting of wise men and consultative councils in Libya”), 

Al Watan Libya, November 22, 2011, available from www.alwatanlibya.com/more.php?newsid=18153&catid=1. 

81. Gregor Hunter, “Capital Flight from Egypt and Libya Hit 

$8 Billion during the Arab Spring,” The National, September 19, 

2011, available from www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/

industry-insights/finance/capital-flight-from-egypt-and-libya-hit-8-billion-during-arab-spring. 

82. “Libya Waits for New Government before Seeking Release 

of More Frozen Assets,” The Tripoli Post, November 3, 2011, available from tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=72311. 

83. “Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central 

Asia,” April 2011, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 

p. 37.

84. George T. Abed et al., “The Arab World: Navigating 

through the Turbulence,” Institute of International Finance Regional 

Overview, October 19, 2011, p. 15. 

85. Julius Barigaba and Isaak Khisa, “Gaddafi Ghost Haunts 

Libyan Assets in EAC,” Saturday Monitor, February 25, 2012, 

available from www.monitor.co.ug/News/World/-/688340/1334180/-

/1222xhg/-/index.html. 

86. UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts 

in Accordance with Paragraph 24 (d) of Resolution 1973 (2011),” 

S/2012/163, February 17, 2012, available from www.un.org/ga/

search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/163. 

87. Mahmoud Habboush, “Libya Wealth Fund Cash 

to Finance Reconstruction,” Reuters, November 10, 2011, 

available from www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/us-libya-swfidUSTRE7A94IW20111110. 
52

88. “Libya’s Homegrown Revival,” Energy Intelligence Finance, 

December 7, 2011. 

89. Erik Watkins, “Agoco to Restart two Refineries by 

Late September,” Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 109, September 26, 

2011, p. 25. 

90. “Libya Oil Production Halved: State Oil Boss,” AlArabiya, March 3, 2011, available from www.alarabiya.net/

articles/2011/03/03/140055.html.

91. “Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central 

Asia,” October 2011, Washington, DC: International Monetary 

Fund, p. 14. 

92. “Jordan Begins Libya Police Training Programme,” 

BBC News, April 25, 2012, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-middle-east-17841672. 

93. Gamal Nkrumah, “Turning up in Tripoli,” Al-Ahram 

Weekly Online, No. 1089, March 15-21, 2012, available from 

weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1089/re7.htm. 

94. Paul McLeary, “U.S. Army Will Focus on Training, Partnering With SOF: Odierno,” DefenseNews.com, June 20, 2012.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil