___________ No. 95-2854

___________ Barbara R. Burns, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Aon Corporation, a corporation * chartered in Delaware, with * corporate headquarters at * Chicago, Illinois; Frank B. * Hall & Company, Inc., a wholly * owned subsidiary of Reliance * Group Holdings, plc, a * Appeal from the United States corporation chartered in * District Court for the Delaware, with corporate offices* District of Minnesota. at Briarcliff Manor, New York; * Rollins Hudig Hall, its * [UNPUBLISHED] affiliates and subsidiaries, * including Rollins Hudig Hall of * MN a successor in interest to * Frank B. Hall and Co. of MN, * Inc.; David J. Duddleston, * Esq., individually, and in his * capacity as agent of Frank B. * Hall and Co. of MN, Inc., * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 5, 1996 Filed: April 23, 1996

___________ Before FAGG, HENLEY, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________
PER CURIAM.

### The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States Distric t 1 

### Jud ge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the reports an d recomm endations of the Honorable Franklin L. Noel, United State s Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. -2- Barbara R. Burns appeals the judgment entered by the District Court 1 after it dismissed some defendants and granted summary judgment to th e remaining defendants in Burns's action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994); the Minnesota Humans Right Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 363.01 to 363.2 0 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); and Minnesota common law. We affirm.

Burns was formerly employed by Frank B. Hall & Company of Minnesota (FBH-MN), for whom she sold insurance. Burns named as corporate defendant s Frank B. Hall and Company (FBH), of which FBH-MN was formerly a wholl y owned subsidiary; Rollins Hudig Hall of Minnesota (RHH-MN), successor in interest to FBH-MN; Rollins Hudig Hall (RHH), of which RHH-MN is a whollyowned subsidiary; andAon Corporation, parent corporation of FBH and RHH.

Burns alleged that in 1991 she was sexually harassed by a mal e employee of FBH-MN. She also alleged that, imme diately after she reported the harassment, FBH-MN senior management personn el placed her on probation for unsubstantiated performance problems, and that defendant Donald S

. Schneider, Senior Vic e President of Human Resources for FBH, told her she would be fired if she did not sign a settlement agreement. In June 1991, Burn s--withthe advice of counsel--signed the settlement agreement, i n which the parties agreed to the terms of Burns's severance and furthe r agreed that Burns released all claims against FBH-MN and its successors. The settlement agreem ent also required that the parties keep the terms of the agreement and the totality of their employment relationshi p confidential.

### -3- According to Burns, FBH-MN subsequently breached the terms of th e settlement agreement by disparaging her within the business community, by falselyrepresenting her employment with FBH-MN, and by interfering with her efforts to become re-employed. She alleged that her termination and FBH-MN's subsequent conduct violated Title VII and the MHRA, and that a FBH -MNemployee defamed her during a deposition. Burns further allege d that defendant David D. Duddleston, an attorney for FBH-MN, attempted to prevent her from exercising her rights under the MHRA by telling her she
wou ld be sued if she pursued any of the released claims, and tha t Duddl eston defamed her during statements to a judge. She also allege d claims of promissory estoppel and interference with prospective business relations.

The D istrict Court dismissed defendant Duddleston and granted th e corporate defendants summary judgment. The Court subsequently dismissed defendant Schneider, the only remaining defendant, because Burns had faile d to serv e him within 120 days of filing her complaint. On appeal, Burn s argues that summary judgment was not proper as to the corporate defendants , and that Schneider should not have been dismissed. She further claims tha t the District Court's decisions were influenced by judicial bias.

We revi ew de novo the grant of summary judgment, applying the sam e standar d as the District Court. Demming v. Housing and Redevelopmen t Auth. , 66 F.3d 950, 953 (8th Cir. 1995). We conclude the District Court properly granted the corporate defendants summary judgment.
First, wi th regard to Burns's discriminatory discharge claims, Aon, RHH, and FBH were not proper Title VII or MHRA defendants, because the y were not Burns's employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994); Minn. Stat

. Ann. § 36 3.03 (West Supp. 1996). Burns failed to present evidence tha t overcame the "strong presumption that a

### -4-

parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary's employees." Se e Frank v. U.S. West, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1993).
Assuming RHH-MN, as FBH-MN's successor in interest, was a prope r Title VII or MHRA defendant, RHH-MN was nevertheless entitled to summary judgm ent on Burns's claims of discriminatory discharge, because sh e relea sed these claims in the settlement agreement. We do not conside r Burns's argument raised for the first time on appeal that the settlement agreement was voidabl e. See Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist. , 7 F.3d 729 , 734 (8th Cir. 1993). While the District Court did not expressl y address Burns's allegations that FBH-MN breachedthe settlement agreement, summary judgment was proper as to this claim because Burns failed to alleg e or provide evidence of the specific conduct constituting a breach. Although the settlement agreement did not release FBH-MN fro m liabilityfor claims arising after the agreement was signed, see Minn

. Stat. Ann. § 363.031 (West 1991) (prohibiting pr ospective waiver), summary judgment w as also proper as to Burns's reprisal claim under the MHRA , because Burns failed to allege or provide eviden ce of the specific acts of reprisal or when they occurred. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03 subd. 7(2) (West Su pp. 1996). To the extent this claim could be interpreted as a Titl e VII retaliation claim, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994), summar y judgment was proper b ecause Title VII does not provide former employees a
cause of action against their former employers for post-employmen t retaliation. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 70 F.3d 325, 329-31 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed , 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1996) (No
. 95-1376).
Summary j udgment was also proper as to the defamation claim for the deposit ion statements of an FBH-MN employee during a deposition in a n unrelated case, because statements made during a deposition are absolutely privileged. Cf. LeBa ron v. Minnesota Bd. of Pub. Defense , 499 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding

### -5-

"the employer has an absolute privilege to defame the employee due to lega l compulsion"). Finally, we agree with the District Court that Burns's vagu e and conclusory allega tions failed to state a claim of promissory estoppel or interference with prospective business relati ons. See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. , 999 F.2d 1319, 1320 (8th Cir. 1993) (discussing elements of promissor y estoppel under Minnesota law); Hough Transit, Ltd.
v. Nation al Farmers Org. , 472 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991 ) (analyzing elements of tortious interference).

As to defendant Schneider, we conclude the District Court did no t abuse its discretion in dismissing Burns's claims for failure to serve a
summons and complaint within the time requirements of Federal Rule of Civi l Procedure 4(m). See Edwards v. Edwards , 754 F.2 d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Burns' s argument that an attorney of a corporate defendant was an agent of Schne ider is without merit, see Nelson v. Swift , 271 F.2d 504, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam), and Burns failed to show good caus e to excuse her failure to serve Schneider.

As to defendant Duddleston, Burns did not address Duddleston' s dismissal in her mainbrief. See Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co. , 29 F.3d 362, 367 n.6 (8th Cir. 1994). In any event, the District Cour t correctly dismissed Burns's MHRA claims against Duddleston as time-barred, and her defamation claim against him because the alleged statements made during an unrelated legal proceeding were not ac tionable. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.06(3) (West 1991) (one year MHRA statute of limitations) ; McGo vern v. Cargill, Inc. , 463 N.W.2d 556, 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990 ) (stating statements made in court proceedings are absolutely privileged).

We conclude all of Burns's post-appeal motions are without merit

. As to Burns's motion to disqualify Judge Rosenba um and petition for a writ of mandamus, Burns ha s not substantiated her claim of judicial bias. Cf. Nerison v. Solem , 715 F.2d 415, 416-17

### -6-

(8th Cir. 1983) (stating affidavit asserting jud ge was familiar with party and hi s prior legal proceedings does not automatically or inferentiall y esta blishjudicial bias; claim must be factually substantiated), cert
. denied , 464 U.S. 1072, and cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).

Accordin gly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court and den y all pending post-appeal motions, as well as Burn s's petition for a writ of mandamus.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.