U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

72–935 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–97] 

USE OF AFGHAN NATIONALS TO PROVIDE 

SECURITY TO U.S. FORCES, IN LIGHT OF 

THE ATTACK ON U.S. PERSONNEL AT 

FORWARD OPERATING BASE FRONTENAC, 

AFGHANISTAN, IN MARCH 2011 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 1, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JOHN CHAPLA, Professional Staff Member 

DEBRA WADA, Professional Staff Member 

JAMES WEISS, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 1, 2012, Use of Afghan Nationals To Provide Security 

to U.S. Forces, in Light of the Attack on U.S. Personnel at Forward Operating Base Frontenac, Afghanistan, in March 2011 ......................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 1, 2012 ................................................................................ 33 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 

USE OF AFGHAN NATIONALS TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO U.S. 

FORCES, IN LIGHT OF THE ATTACK ON U.S. PERSONNEL AT FORWARD OPERATING BASE FRONTENAC, AFGHANISTAN, IN MARCH 

2011 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Dahl, BG Kenneth R., USA, Deputy Commanding General for Support, 10th 

Mountain Division (LI), Fort Drum, New York ................................................. 5 

Motsek, Gary J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, U.S. Department of Defense .............. 7 

Sedney, David S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, 

Pakistan and Central Asia, U.S. Department of Defense ................................. 8 

Townsend, BG Stephen J., USA, Director, Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination 

Cell, Joint Chiefs of Staff .................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dahl, BG Kenneth R., joint with BG Stephen J. Townsend, Gary J. 

Motsek, and David S. Sedney ...................................................................... 40 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 37 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 53 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 53 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 53 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 58 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 57 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 60 
(1) 

USE OF AFGHAN NATIONALS TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO 

U.S. FORCES, IN LIGHT OF THE ATTACK ON U.S. PERSONNEL AT FORWARD OPERATING BASE FRONTENAC, 

AFGHANISTAN, IN MARCH 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 1, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in room 2218, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

In September last year, this committee explored the issue of attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Forces on U.S. 

and coalition personnel. The witnesses concluded that the DOD 

[Department of Defense] had mitigated the risk about to the degree 

we can in these few occasions when such attacks have occurred. 

Since then, the committee staff has continued to look into the 

factors behind attacks by Afghan nationals on coalition forces, including attacks conducted by Afghans hired by private security contractors to protect U.S. bases. 

The staff has used the attack in March 2011 at Forward Operating Base Frontenac as a case study to better understand the 

range of issues. In that attack, two soldiers died, including my constituent, Specialist Rudy Acosta, and four were wounded. 

I would like to note that Specialist Acosta’s father and mother, 

Dante and Carolyn Acosta, are with us here today. 

Private security contractors are used in Afghanistan to provide 

personal protective services for Department of State personnel and 

dignitaries, to guard construction sites, to ensure safe movement 

for other private companies doing business in Afghanistan, for 

guarding supply convoys, and to augment coalition forces by providing base security. 

In the case of base security, the Commander in Chief is responsible for determining the size of the U.S. force deployed to Afghanistan and other places around the world, the missions that the force 

will undertake, and the necessary contractor support. 

For different reasons, both President Bush and President Obama 

have chosen to limit the size of the U.S. force and to use private 

security contractors to enhance base security. 
2 

In contrast, it is Congress’ role, and the purpose of today’s hearing, to assess the advisability of these policies and whether the administration needs to change its approach. 

Complicating matters further, President Karzai has dictated that 

only Afghan nationals may be certified for employment as private 

security guards, and has not permitted U.S. citizen contractors. 

Karzai has also ordered the private security contractors to be disbanded. The Afghan Ministry of Interior will assume full responsibility for providing the Afghan Personal Protection Force, a new organization that from March 2012 onward, with a few exceptions, 

will replace private security contractors. 

The APPF [Afghan Personal Protection Force] will be available 

on a fee-for-service basis to coalition forces to perform the services 

that I just described. 

According to the DOD, the Afghan Ministry of Interior, in conjunction with U.S. and coalition forces, will use a vetting and 

screening process that will be the same for both the Afghan National Security Forces and the APPF. 

I recognize that it would be virtually impossible to establish a 

foolproof screening process. Our own national security screening 

system is not foolproof. 

Yet we must recognize that the existing processes failed to identify 42 attackers from 2007 to 2011. Thirty-nine of those attacks 

were by members of the Afghan National Security Force and three 

by contractor employees. 

Though less than 1 percent of Afghan forces and security guards 

have attacked coalition forces, this is 42 attacks too many, and the 

new process must do better. 

Another concern is that the screening and vetting has been tragically weak in picking up signs of threats after the Afghan joined 

either the Afghan National Security Force or a private security 

contractor. DOD data indicates that at least 60 percent of all the 

attacks appear to be motivated by personal matters arising after 

the hiring. 

So it was with the attacker at FOB [Forward Operating Base] 

Frontenac. In July 2010, at another forward operating base, his 

employer, Tundra Security, fired him for allegedly making statements about killing U.S. personnel and recommended that he not 

be rehired. 

The contractor’s chain of command did not enter that recommendation into the attacker’s file, and the attacker was rehired 

by the same contractor in 2011, just before the attack at Frontenac. 

Moreover, because a parallel U.S. investigation of the 2010 allegations concluded that the statements could not be substantiated, 

the U.S. official at the base decided not to enter the allegations 

about the attacker in the U.S. watchlist system. 

Adding to my concern about the vetting system not being focused 

in the right place, a U.S. rescreening of all Afghan security guards 

at Frontenac immediately after the attack resulted in several being 

dismissed as unworthy of employment. 

Finally, I am concerned about the Department’s September statement that its efforts have mitigated the risk about to the degree 

we can. At the time, the committee was not aware that the frequency of these attacks had dramatically increased in 2010 and 
3 

2011. In fact, 75 percent of all attacks have occurred in the last 2 

years. 

The Department attributes the increase with the growth of U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan. But we need to understand the contributing 

factors better, so that more effective steps can be taken to further 

mitigate attacks on U.S. and coalition personnel. 

Before introducing our witnesses, I would like to read Mr. 

Acosta’s statement into the record. This was written on Wednesday, February 1st, 2012. 

‘‘Last month, we received the U.S. Army A.R. 15–6 report regarding the March 19th, 2011 attack on U.S. Army FOB Frontenac, 

Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, which resulted in the death of 

our son, Specialist Rudy A. Acosta and Corporal Donald Mickler, 

and the wounding of four other soldiers. 

The report highlighted the fact that although the U.S. government allows private security contractors to provide base security in 

hostile lands, basic levels of safeguards were either not implemented or not followed. This allowed an Afghan national, who 

made prior threats against U.S. troops, to be reemployed by PSC 

[Private Security Contractor] Tundra Security and carry out a lethal attack. 

Our family and the Nation believe that this practice should be 

ended and rules be put in place so that only U.S. troops guard U.S. 

troops on these posts. However, as long as this practice continues, 

these PSCs, like Tundra, must follow rules put in place to safeguard our troops and there must be consequences if they fail to do 

so. 

We are disappointed that we were not allowed to testify in person before the House Armed Services Committee on this critical 

issue.’’ 

I would also inform members that some of the material provided 

to the committee is classified. The classified items are noted in the 

hearing memo. 

If any member wishes to discuss classified matters after the 

hearing, our witnesses have agreed to make themselves available 

in 2337 immediately following this hearing. If any member wishes 

to go to 2337 for this classified material, please let the committee 

staff know before our hearing ends today. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the chairman for having this hearing, and most 

importantly for his attention to this issue. I know this has been a 

huge priority for you and the majority staff and for this full committee. And I appreciate all the work on it because it is a critically 

important issue. 

As you look at the report and see the disturbing number of attacks committed by ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and 

Afghan contractors against our troops, it is indeed a very serious 
4 

and troubling situation. Our troops are in Afghanistan to protect 

the Afghan people and to protect their government. 

To be turned on by the very people they are fighting with and 

for undermines the entire operation, and places our troops at an 

unacceptable level of risk. 

And I think there has been a thorough study of this, but I think 

it is also clear that we can do more. 

More not just in the initial screening process determining who is 

going to be in proximity to our troops, armed and in a position to 

cause harm, but even after they are hired, after they have gone 

through the screening and vetting situation, to continue to monitor 

for problems and err on the side of interceding sooner, rather than 

later; that if we are not sure if someone is 100 percent with us and 

safe, then need to go find them a different job without a gun so 

close in proximity to our troops and soldiers that places them at 

risk. 

Clearly, there is more screening that could be done and more 

protection that can be done as we learn more about what motivated 

these attacks, and hopefully learn and see where those attacks 

come from. 

Certainly, some of them have been infiltration from the Taliban, 

and we need to make sure we do a better job of screening initially. 

But a lot of them simply come down to personal matters that arise 

during the course of their service, but these are things that can be 

seen by those who are observant. 

We need to keep a much keener eye for Afghan National Security 

Forces and Afghan contractors who may become a problem, and intervene, find ways to protect our troops and put that ANSF soldier 

who may be a problem in a place where they don’t have the proximity to do this kind of harm. 

So, I look forward to the testimony, to hear more about what we 

can do to better protect our troops from these kinds of attacks. And 

again, I want to thank Mr. McKeon especially for his attention to 

this issue and for the work. 

It is a critically important issue to protect our troops and a major 

problem right now in Afghanistan. 

I look forward to working with our witnesses and the committee 

to find solutions to better protect our troops in Afghanistan. 

And with that, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Our witnesses today are Mr. David S. Sedney, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, 

from the Department of Defense; and Mr. Gary J. Motsek, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support, Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics from the Department of Defense; Brigadier General Stephen Townsend, U.S. Army, Director, Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Brigadier General Kenneth Dahl, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding General for 

Support, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York. 

General Dahl, since you directed the A.R. 15–6 investigation into 

the attack at FOB Frontenac, we would like you to begin, and then 

we will just move down the row. 
5 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF BG KENNETH R. DAHL, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR SUPPORT, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION (LI), FORT DRUM, NEW YORK 

General DAHL. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and 

distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to appear 

before you. 

I welcome the opportunity to contribute to your understanding of 

the events that took place at FOB Frontenac and I appreciate your 

oversight of operations in general. 

I would like to begin by once again expressing my condolences 

to the families of the brave soldiers that we lost, and to honor the 

sacrifices of all service men and women and their families from 

whom we continue to ask so much. 

I am aware that you have previously been provided a full, unredacted version of the Army investigation conducted under Army 

Regulation 15–6. I am confident that I will be able to cover the key 

findings and recommendations of that investigation in this open 

session. 

While serving in Regional Command South in Afghanistan, I appointed an officer to investigate the circumstances of the 19 March 

2011 attack on FOB Frontenac. In addition to the standard scope 

of an investigation for any incident resulting in the death of a soldier, we directed this investigation to also specifically consider the 

role of the security contractor, in this case Tundra, the vetting 

process to hire local Afghans, and to make recommendations to improve our processes and prevent similar incidents in the future. 

The challenges identified in the investigation are complex and 

the implementation of those recommendations is deliberate and is 

ongoing. The investigation identified the assailant, a Tundra employee, as an insurgent who infiltrated the ranks of Tundra in 

order to execute an internal attack. 

The attack resulted in the tragic deaths of two great soldiers and 

the injury of four others. Due to the quick actions of two welltrained soldiers and the excellent response of medical personnel on 

the scene, the unit did mitigate the impact of this attack and prevented greater casualties. 

A key finding of the investigation was that the assailant had indeed been fired months prior for making unsubstantiated threats 

against U.S. soldiers at a FOB in a different location. Given that 

the threats were unsubstantiated, neither Tundra nor the command annotated those threats in an official record, which, had they 

been recorded may have prevented the assailant from being rehired. 

Additionally, the investigation revealed that the command found 

the orders and policies governing the personal security contractor— 

the vetting and hiring of those, to be vague and confusing. The recommendations from this investigation focused on clarifying pertinent guidance, creating a comprehensive background file for all 

local Afghan contract hires, and sharing the findings at all levels 

of the formation and throughout the chain of command to increase 

awareness and prevent similar incidents in the future. 
6 

I will point out that the investigation also made specific recommendations to recognize the courage and quick action of those 

soldiers who responded to the attack. 

The attack on FOB Frontenac was a tragic event. All commanders take very seriously their responsibility to protect our soldiers. 

We have taken steps to correct the errors in process and the confusing policies identified in the investigation. But sadly, in this 

case, these corrections would likely not have altered the outcome. 

Nonetheless, it is our duty to explore every avenue to protect our 

soldiers. And we welcome your leadership and the oversight of this 

committee, which causes us to examine ourselves and find ways to 

improve our operations. 

Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Dahl, General Townsend, Mr. Motsek, and Mr. Sedney can be found in the Appendix 

on page 40.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General Townsend. 

STATEMENT OF BG STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, DIRECTOR, 

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN COORDINATION CELL, JOINT 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General TOWNSEND. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

talk to you today about our efforts to assist the Afghan National 

Security Forces in ensuring their ranks are free from those who 

might seek to harm our troops, who are fighting alongside them to 

build an Afghanistan that will never again be a safe haven for terrorists. 

First, let me add my personal condolences to General Dahl’s for 

the family of the troops who lost their lives at FOB Frontenac, like 

the Acosta family who are here today. 

I would like to thank them publicly for their son’s service and 

their family’s sacrifice. 

And to the families of all our troops, both U.S. and allies, who 

have been killed or injured in other unfortunate attacks like this 

one during our mission in Afghanistan. 

Our bottom line up front is the protection of service members deployed in harm’s way against any threat remains one of our highest priorities for our commanders and leaders, both here in Washington and in the field. Although there is no such thing as perfect 

protection, especially in Afghanistan, we know we must continue to 

develop effective ways to combat the insider threat to our service 

members. 

To that end, we appreciate this committee’s support in exploring 

the best methods to provide security for Americans and our allies 

doing the Nation’s work in Afghanistan. 

As this committee is well aware, our efforts in Afghanistan have 

not been without great sacrifice. We still face a very determined 

enemy who uses asymmetric methods to harm our troops, including 

insider attacks. 

A major focus of our military campaign is developing an increasingly self-reliant Afghan National Security Force that can lead the 

fight in the near future. 
7 

We are working closely with Afghan leaders to reduce potential 

insider threats through a layered system that includes screening 

and vetting before an Afghan enters service, cultural training for 

Afghan service members, and growing an Afghan counterintelligence capability so they can detect potential insider threats before 

they come to fruition. 

Now, for our part, we are reinforcing the importance of cultural 

and language training prior to deployment for our forces, emphasizing the importance of our own conduct each day in reducing unnecessary frictions with our partners, reviewing our own counterintelligence efforts in theater, and finally, reminding our leaders 

and soldiers they must always have their own protection foremost 

in their minds and ultimately provide their own security. 

One important part of this approach involves an eight-step vetting process that uses both Afghan cultural practices, such as recommendations from village elders, as well as modern technology in 

the form of biometrics to help screen and vet Afghans before they 

enter service. 

Looking ahead to the transition of private security contractors to 

the Afghan Public Protection Force, we will see Afghan security 

guards undergoing a vetting process like this one. 

In these brief remarks, I have highlighted some of the efforts to 

address potential insider threats. As our campaign increasingly 

transition security lead to the Afghans, and as our role shifts from 

leading combat operations to a primary focus on security assistance, our military personnel will be increasingly employed as embedded trainers and advisers with Afghan units. 

While we can’t completely eliminate the potential for insider 

threats, we can greatly reduce them by using a multilayered approach that includes smart vetting procedures, cultural training, 

leader and soldier force protection awareness, and counterintelligence efforts. 

Again, thank you for your continuous support to our men and 

women in uniform. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Motsek. 

STATEMENT OF GARY J. MOTSEK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PROGRAM SUPPORT ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Mr. MOTSEK. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and 

members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to 

appear before you to discuss the use of Afghan nationals to provide 

security U.S. forces in light of the attack on U.S. personnel at Forward Operating Base Frontenac. 

I, too, would also like to extend my condolences to the families 

of our soldiers, and by extension, to all family members who have 

lost their lives and loved ones. Their deaths are all tragic. 

Generally speaking, contractors perform well and provide essential support to the conduct of our operations within Afghanistan. 

Without them, under the present conditions there, we would have 

to divert approximately 20,000 troops from essential combat tasks 
8 

to perform noncombat-related security functions. And our allies in 

Afghanistan are in a similar situation. 

In other words, we would have to move 30 percent of our force, 

whose primary mission is to offensively engage the enemies of our 

Nation, and are equipped and trained for that mission to provide 

basic security services oriented, primarily, frankly, against criminal 

elements. 

The investigation has clearly shown that although our basic policies are sound, there were weaknesses in execution, and we will 

continue to address these. 

DOD has a broad range of management policies and operational 

procedures to effect, provide, and achieve more effective oversight 

and coordination of contractor operations. 

Our oversight and responsibilities aren’t static, but constantly 

evolve as we apply insights from lessons learned. 

For example, regarding PSCs—and we when we first appeared 

before this committee regarding the oversight of PSCs, we have 

gone from a basic memorandum of agreement and the interagency 

process to a formal DOD instruction. 

We are now in the code of Federal regulations. And we are about 

to finalize an American Standards Institute standard on management and quality. And we will trust that will yield eventually an 

international standard that we can adopt internationally. 

DOD policy requires all contractor personnel, regardless of nationality, to comply with DOD regulations as well as the applicable 

laws of the United States and the host country. Biometrics is now 

an integral part of that oversight and vetting process. 

Incidents that involve local nationals attacking U.S. forces or allies are unacceptable, and we must do all we can to eliminate or 

minimize those risks. 

Frankly, as the chairman and ranking member have said, I don’t 

believe we can actually fully eliminate them, but we must do everything in our power to minimize them. Because our national objectives in Afghanistan include that our forces work side-by-side with 

those of the host nation. 

I assure you we will continue to assess our procedures and operations to minimize those risks, and improve where we can find and 

identify shortfalls. There is no end state to the way we review and 

implement our processes. 

Again, the incident at FOB Frontenac was an obvious tragedy, 

and no investigation or hearing can minimize or relieve that loss. 

Hopefully, this testimony provides a documentary baseline of the 

topics we were asked to address during this hearing. And as my 

fellow witnesses, we are prepared to address your questions. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sedney. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID S. SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND 

CENTRAL ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, 

distinguished members of the committee. And thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 
9 

I particularly thank you for your continued support for our 

troops. 

It is important in this hearing, and as we discuss Afghanistan, 

that we focus on why the United States is in Afghanistan. We are 

there to ensure that Afghanistan is never again used by our enemies to attack the United States. 

Our core goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda, and 

to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for such 

attacks. 

This is a mission that I know our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines understand. Their efforts and sacrifices allow the rest of 

us to enjoy the benefits of freedom that our military is dedicated 

to uphold. 

The conflict in Afghanistan has and remains a tough war in very 

difficult circumstances. However, our military has proven immensely adaptable as it has found ways to address those challenges, particularly in the past 3 years. 

The changes in the way we fight and partner with the Afghans 

is key to the success we are having. 

Three years ago, we submitted a report to Congress, a 1230 report, saying essentially that we were losing in Afghanistan. Our 

most recent report demonstrates that clearly the momentum has 

shifted to our side and the Taliban are on their back foot. 

Violence continues to decrease largely due to our close partnership with the Afghans and the Afghan security forces. The more 

the Afghans take the lead, the less effective the Taliban are. 

To a certain extent, the increased partnership may place our 

force at greater risk, particularly as the Taliban recognized the importance of that partnership and actively attempted to counter it. 

But partnership also decreases the risk and decreases the need for 

U.S. and coalition forces to be in Afghanistan over the long term 

as we move towards on transitioning to Afghan lead and protecting 

their own country. 

I would like to add my sincere and personal condolences to the 

families of the servicemen who lost their lives, have been wounded 

in support of these goals, and particularly, I offer condolences to 

the Mickler and Acosta family and their colleagues for this incident. 

Every loss of life is a tragedy, and our military and defense personnel work hard to prevent these incidents and protect our forces. 

And we also constantly look for ways to learn from past events to 

prevent further tragedies. 

The issue that we are discussing today, that of the insider threat, 

is larger than this instance of private security personnel killing 

U.S. service members. In the combat zone that is Afghanistan, 

similar incidents of violence have occurred, including Afghans attacking our allies, Afghan security forces attacking each other, and 

Afghan security forces attacking civilians. 

Every attack—every event in itself is tragic. And we are working 

with our allies and partners in Afghanistan and our Afghan partners in order to try to prevent them. 

Incidents such as what happened at FOB Frontenac are truly 

tragic. And as the chairman pointed out, there has been an increase in attacks over the past year, at the same time as we have 
10 

surged coalition forces and surged through to the number of Afghan security forces over the last 3 years. 

During that time, both our forces, our coalition allies, and Afghan security forces have suffered casualties. And I would add that 

the number of casualties that we have suffered, and our allies have 

suffered, and our Afghan allies have suffered is an evidence of the 

commitment to that core goal that I mentioned before that is 

shared by all who are involved. 

Not all of the insider threat attacks, of course, were caused by 

insurgent infiltration. In fact, as the chairman mentioned, our 

studies have shown that the majority are due to other circumstances. Personal issues, combat stress, and other factors, some 

of which we don’t fully understand in every individual case, often 

underlie these attacks. 

Combat stress that leads to use of violence by forces against their 

colleagues and their partners is something that is an unfortunate 

characteristic of war everywhere and something that we must do 

everything we can to prevent in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

However, I want to stress again that partnership with the Afghan security forces is a critical part of our strategy. And that is 

what is allowing us to make progress in Afghanistan, what is allowing us to have the prospect of transition to Afghan security 

lead. 

We are now in a position where half of the population of Afghanistan is in areas and provinces that are transitioning to Afghan security lead. And the capabilities that they have been able to build 

through this increased partnership is what is allowing that to happen and allowing the United States, as President Obama has already done, to reduce our presence in Afghanistan by 10,000 forces 

over the past year. 

We have also seen that the attacks on U.S. and our coalition allies by Afghan forces are more likely to happen where there is limited interaction between Afghans and U.S. and coalition forces. 

Where there was closer partnership, better interaction, understanding, better mentoring it is less likely that such an attack will 

occur. We continually need to look at the lessons that we are learning from these tragedies, both the one at FOB Frontenac and more 

recent ones, to find ways to prevent future ones. 

In order to do that, we have to work together with our Afghan 

colleagues. 

As the chairman pointed out in his opening statement, the vetting process for both the Afghan security forces and the follow-on 

to the security companies of the Afghan Public Protection Force is 

using vetting methods that we have developed. 

It is important that those vetting methods, both the initial vetting and, as the ranking member mentioned, continued vetting 

once the forces are in place are improved in order to prevent these 

incidents of attack on friendly forces. 

The Afghan Public Protection Force, which the chairman mentioned, is a force that will be under the control of the Ministry of 

Interior. 

As the chairman stated, this is a result of a decree from President Karzai saying that private security contractors, who provide 

protection to fixed sites, development projects, and convoys, will 
11 

transition to Afghanistan lead under the Afghan Protection Force. 

That will happen for private companies, non-governmental organizations, and other non-military activities this year, and it will happen for military activities in March of 2013, a year from now. 

To help build this force, ISAF [International Security Assistance 

Force] has set up an advisory group which will partner with the 

Public Protection Force and the Ministry of Interior to develop and 

train the force. That action is ongoing today in order to have it 

stood up and ready next month, in March of 2012. 

We are also actively looking at ways to improve the Ministry of 

Interior’s ability to oversee the Public Protection Force and the remaining private security contractors that will continue to protect 

diplomatic activities in Afghanistan. 

Vetting is very difficult in a country such as Afghanistan which 

lacks much of the infrastructure and information systems that we 

have here. So our vetting process includes use of Afghan traditional 

methods, such as having village elders provide recommendations on 

potential recruits, as well as more modern procedures, such as the 

biometrics that Mr. Motsek mentioned, drug testing and criminal 

background checks. 

In closing, I want to emphasize that we at the Department of Defense take the death or injury of every U.S. personnel in Afghanistan or elsewhere very seriously. The security of our troops and the 

success of our mission are our top priority. 

No system is perfect, but no system, as Mr. Motsek said, is static. We are continually looking at this, and we appreciate the opportunity in this hearing to have your ideas, Mr. Chairman, and those 

of your colleagues on how we can do a better job. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

As I said in my opening statement, going forward the screening 

and vetting process must overcome the shortcomings detailed in 

the AR 15–6 and the other reviews done following the attack at 

FOB Frontenac. 

What corrective actions were taken after the attack at FOB 

Frontenac and how will those actions and others mitigate the risks 

inherent in the new screening process? 

General TOWNSEND. Chairman, I will take that question. And 

maybe some of my colleagues will have some additional comment. 

There were a number of orders produced after that attack. There 

was an AAR [After Action Review], just like we always do—Mr. 

Sedney said we are a learning organization. So, we did an after action review in addition to these investigations, came up with a list 

of things that we could do better, and fragmentary orders, supplemental orders went out to the force to do that. 

Some of those things, specifically, related to some of the weaknesses that were identified in this investigation and a couple of 

others, specifically, the need for the private security companies to 

adhere to the same vetting process that we are using with the Afghan National Security Forces. 

A couple others that I think were very important were—and Mr. 

Motsek mentioned this in his opening statement—that we have 

added a requirement for a weekly screening. 
12 

So, they are not just now screened when they first enter service, 

but there is a requirement for the commanders on the FOBs to 

screen all local nationals that come on and off the FOB on a random basis at least weekly. That is done through biometrics. So that 

if new information emerges, there is a chance they will catch that 

if it wasn’t caught when they initially entered service. 

A couple other points were made about increasing force protection awareness for our soldiers themselves and their leaders. 

I will let General Dahl comment on—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask one question that goes along. 

Shia Ahmed had gone through the screening, but he had used a little bit different name each time. 

And how do you measure that against the biometrics? How do 

you pick that up? 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. 

The biometrics—a guy may report in with more than one name, 

which is not uncommon in Afghanistan, because frequently they 

have one name and they don’t know how to spell it. And it is not 

clear to us sometimes how to spell it exactly, so it might even be 

misspelled. 

The guy only has one set of fingerprints. He has only got one facial photograph. He has only got one iris scan. 

So, it doesn’t matter how many names are entered into the biometrics, we are going to know who he is, and we are going to be 

able to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. So using the different names—or he could have 

done that like unintentionally. 

General TOWNSEND. That is right. That is right. 

Which is not uncommon. 

The CHAIRMAN. But the name isn’t the important thing. It is the 

biometrics, how they—— 

General TOWNSEND. That is exactly right. 

And, sir, I will ask General Dahl to speak a little bit more about 

the lessons learned that were applied in Regional Command South. 

General DAHL. Yes, Chairman. 

As you saw in the report, we made a number of recommendations 

as a result of the 15–6 to our higher headquarters to be incorporated more broadly theater-wide, and then across the force, not 

just in the Army, and also for training. 

But specifically in Regional Command South immediately following the approval of the investigating officer’s findings and recommendations, in Regional Command South, where we had the authority to implement changes ourselves, we put several things into 

place. 

Our first intention was to close the gap between having people, 

Afghans, employed on our FOBs that had not been screened. So we 

set out to put in an order to our subordinate task forces and formations to immediately enroll and screen, as rapidly as possible, all 

those who are working on those FOBs, so we could control that 

piece. 

The second, sir, was that in a sustainment endeavor, once they 

were enrolled, we wanted to conduct monthly 50 percent of those 

working on that FOB would be continually screened at random, 50 

percent, against the current watchlist. 
13 

So the information had entered the watchlist since they had been 

vetted initially, there was an opportunity to pick up on that. And 

it wasn’t practical to do 100 percent weekly or monthly, but we 

chose 50 percent monthly at random against the current watchlist, 

so that we would have some sustainment mechanism to pick up on 

new information that would enter. 

And then finally, sir, we conducted training. And this was training of our contracting officer representatives, those young officers, 

in some cases noncommissioned officers, who are responsible for 

oversight of the local contract in that area, making sure that they 

were more familiar with their responsibilities, more familiar with 

the policies and the procedures that the investigation officer had 

determined were confusing. 

I will add, sir, that I am now back at Fort Drum. We still have 

soldiers who are downrange, and we are preparing others to go. 

And I had seen some of this incorporated into some of our pre-deployment training as well. 

But, again, I can only speak locally in that regard for Fort Drum 

and RC [Regional Command] South, and 10th Mountain Division. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Townsend, why do we need to have Afghan personnel 

guarding U.S. and coalition bases and soldiers? 

What are the implications of having U.S. personnel perform 

these security missions? 

General TOWNSEND. Well, sir, as Mr. Motsek mentioned in his 

opening statement, this is not a new phenomenon. Our use of contracted security guards goes back a long way in our history, into 

the 1800s and even before. 

And one of the reasons we do that is it reduces the burden on 

our soldiers, and allows them to focus. We never have enough soldiers. It reduces the burdens on the soldiers and allows them to 

focus on the primary tasks that they have to do. 

As Mr. Motsek said, it is the offensive operations and the complex counterinsurgency tasks that we need them to do. So if they 

are guarding convoys, or development projects, or fixed sites, or 

even standing watch on a perimeter, then they are not able to engage in those higher and more complex tasks. 

So that is one of the main reasons that we do it, probably the 

most significant reason that we do it, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Yes? 

Mr. MOTSEK. Yes, sir, if I could just say, there is always a 

misperception that we are using security guards everywhere. 

The use of security guards is condition-based. It doesn’t relieve 

the commander in the field for making the determination that this 

particular location, the threat is more of a military threat as opposed to a criminal threat, and therefore I choose not to use security contractors or eventually the APPF to provide this security. 

The commander is not relieved of that responsibility. And so just 

because we have an installation or just because we have a convoy, 

that doesn’t necessarily mean we default automatically to a contractor-based solution set. 

In my opening statement, I mentioned that 20,000 personnel 

would have to be diverted to this function. But I would also ask, 
14 

and the committee is painfully aware of this, that we have a rotational base that we have to use to provide support downrange. 

And so generally speaking, the rule of thumb is for every job you 

have downrange, there are two more in the rear, one who is returned and one is getting ready to go. 

So for the 20,000 personnel I was talking about that we presently 

use in Afghanistan to provide this security process, we would be 

talking up to 60,000 people in the force, the military force, that 

would have to be aligned to perform that function. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, just a question in terms of—security guards are certainly 

part of the problem, but we also train the ANSF. We train with 

them, and we fight alongside them. 

Of the incidents where they have attacked our troops, I don’t 

know if you know the numbers, how many have been security 

guard situations where it is people who have been supposedly protecting compounds or protecting areas? 

And how many of them have been ANSF forces that were fighting alongside or training with? 

Do you happen to know off the top of your head what the breakdown is on that? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Three of the cases are involving private security 

forces. The rest of them are Afghan National Police or Afghan National Army soldiers. 

Mr. SMITH. So that seems to be the bulk of the problem in the 

area. 

And I guess the big question I have is, so you go through the initial screening process and obviously it is not perfect. We don’t have 

a 100 percent database on every Afghan national who is signing up 

to be part of the ANSF or part of these contracting forces, but you 

do the best you can. 

But once they get in there, if there is a concern, a problem—and 

as you have gone through these cases, I guess two questions. 

And number one, have you gone back and found signs in most 

of those cases where after the fact some of our soldiers or marines 

have come forward and said, ‘‘Well, look, the guy was saying this 

and doing this. We knew he was squirrely for a long time. We were 

worried about him.’’ 

So have you discovered that? 

And second, if you do discover that kind of thing now, what are 

your options and what do you do? How do you respond? 

Do you take this person out of the unit? 

How do you respond to those sorts of threats as they become perceived before they actually turn into an attack? 

General TOWNSEND. Thank you, sir. 

The short answer to your first question is, yes, we have seen 

signs after the fact. Not in all cases. 

You know, we do a pretty deliberate postmortem, the investigations, the AARs. And they sometimes result in soldiers saying, ‘‘We 

saw signs.’’ 

Afghan soldiers will say it. Our soldiers will say it sometimes. 
15 

In other cases, there is no hint from any witness that there was 

any trouble with this soldier. 

So, once there are signs identified, if someone steps forward and 

provides those, then the commander there, the contractors and the 

commanders, can make decisions to remove that individual from 

the force. 

Let us talk about the ANSF in particular. 

I was at a FOB in Gardez, Afghanistan, where one day the Afghan intelligence officer came in and briefed the commander that 

there was a soldier he was concerned about. 

And he didn’t really have good information. It wasn’t really all 

that substantial. 

But the Afghan commander looked at me and said, ‘‘He is off this 

FOB today.’’ And he had him transferred away, just to remove the 

potential source of the problem. 

That is one example of Afghans taking a decision. 

Mr. SMITH. And as you have investigated this and learned more 

about how these incidents happen, have you taken steps in terms 

of training our troops to, okay, look for this, report it? 

I mean, have we upped the awareness in some way, and if so, 

how? 

General DAHL. Yes, sir. 

Your question speaks precisely to conducting the after-action report, conducting the lessons learned, and extracting those signals 

that we weren’t attending to previously. And post-mortem when 

you are conducting these investigations and the soldiers or the Afghans come forward and say, ‘‘You know, in hindsight, now it is 

clear to me that maybe we should have paid more attention to 

this.’’ 

Those are precisely the pieces of information that are incorporated into training so that—and it is spread widely across the 

formations, so that each soldier, each Afghan is now attentive to 

those indicators that weren’t there before. 

So we did incorporate those in Regional Command South locally, 

and now those are also things that I am seeing in our pre-deployment training for the formations that we are sending in the future. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here today, also for, Mr. and Mrs. 

Acosta, our sympathy with you. 

I am the father of four sons serving in the military, two who 

were in combat in Iraq. And so, I particularly have a great sympathy and identification. And I know, too, that our chairman has 

been deeply affected by your loss. 

At this time, General Townsend, I was very grateful. My former 

National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade of the South Carolina National Guard, served in Afghanistan 2007, 2008, led by General 

Bob Livingston, who has subsequently been elected the only elected 

adjutant general in the United States. 

But when I went to visit them, because I went every 3 months, 

I was so proud of their service and concerned. 
16 

But it was amazing to me. I thought the 1,600 troops, the largest 

deployment from our state since World War II, would be concentrated at Camp Phoenix and that the training would be a rotation to the camp. 

But to my surprise, our troops were at FOBs and military personnel all across the country. As it turned out, it was, again, such 

a positive experience that the net of this was that our personnel 

felt like they were working with Afghan brothers. 

So, we know that there can be incidents such as this, and I am 

just hoping that the persons that I have worked with, that in the 

future that we are vetting the other persons, the Afghan security 

forces who are serving. 

As we vet, is there any polygraph capability? Or is that used if 

there is some suspicion of someone being a threat to our troops? 

General TOWNSEND. Sir, there is a polygraph capability in theater. However, it is rarely used for this type of thing. 

It is a very complex procedure. We rarely employ it in our own 

security forces here for particular jobs. It is complex and just hard 

to do on a large scale. 

So, I would imagine that polygraph capability could be used in 

a particular investigation. But we don’t typically use it in screening 

folks for employment, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. And I would hope, though, that if a person has been 

identified as indicating a desire to kill Americans, that that might 

raise itself to where a polygraph could be used. And with the advances in technology today, I certainly hope that, and whatever biometric records there are, that could be considered. 

What is the military standard that is used by personnel to enter 

unfavorable data about Afghan nationals? 

General TOWNSEND. There are a couple of venues for that. 

The first—we will just take Afghan soldiers and police, for example. 

The first would be with their chain of command through the Afghan system. The Afghans also have a biometric system that we 

are helping them build and stand up. 

And we have our own biometric system. And that biometric 

watchlist is really a master database of all of our partners, and all 

of our known and suspected enemies also are in that database. 

They are entered into that with their name, and as I spoke about 

earlier, some of their biological data, identification data, is entered 

into that. 

There is actually a questionnaire that you fill out, address, where 

you are from, parents’ names, all that kind of stuff is entered. And 

that is probably the best place to put it. That is the watchlist that 

you hear us refer to. 

So if the information is entered into that and uploaded into the 

database, then all U.S. forces in theater will have access to that information. 

Mr. WILSON. And that is very encouraging. And indeed, with the 

technologies we have today, things that would have been unimaginable can be done. 

So, I appreciate that positive response. 
17 

I also want to know, what recourse do U.S. commanders have if 

they are unsatisfied with the Afghan Police Protection Force which 

has been supplied to a base? 

General TOWNSEND. The commanders have complete authority 

and freedom to secure their unit in any way they see fit. And so 

if they are any time unsatisfied with any aspect of the security, 

they are authorized to take whatever measure they need to take 

to ensure the security of their unit. 

Mr. WILSON. And so it could be reported that there is either an 

individual or maybe a whole unit could be replaced? 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. 

And in fact, General Dahl can probably speak more about it. 

In the specific incidence at FOB Frontenac, there was a new unit 

that had arrived. And there was in his contractor chain, the perpetrator was identified to be fired. 

But in the U.S. military chain, those facts weren’t quite as clear. 

That was a disconnect that we have sought to try to correct. 

And General Dahl—— 

Mr. WILSON. And, General, thank you, I would like to get your 

point, too. 

General DAHL. Yes, sir, two points, to readdress your earlier 

question. 

You were looking for what is the threshold or the standard that 

would require an entry to be made on the watchlist. 

And clearly, we did not have a defined standard to help our contracting officer representatives at the time, which caused some confusion. 

And a lot of that is left to the judgment of the individual, which 

is why we know we have to select the right individual who has the 

maturity and the training and the expertise to exercise that judgment. And we have to train them. 

Those are some of the powerful lessons we learned from this case 

that we have incorporated. 

To your second question, the local commander has the authority 

to remove anyone from his FOB, from his operating base. 

The contractor has the authority to fire. But whether the contractor fires or not, the commander has the authority to remove 

those people from his base. 

And then last, sir, just to reiterate a comment that was made 

earlier, I don’t want to give any impression that military commanders are absolving any responsibility for the security of their 

soldiers. 

These personal security contractors that are hired are integrated 

into that security plan. And they are placed in those places where 

they can perform that function and we save our very highly 

trained, well-equipped, combat-experienced soldiers for the larger 

tasks. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

General DAHL. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first add my condolences to Mr. and Mrs. Acosta. 
18 

Is there—and maybe just a yes or no answer from all four of 

you—is there a fail-safe system that we could institute that would 

give us any kind of a guarantee? 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir, there is a fail-safe system. And I 

will let my fellow witnesses reply, and I can then explain it a little 

bit. 

Mr. REYES. Okay. 

Who? 

General TOWNSEND. Okay, sir. 

So, the fail-safe system that you are referring to—and we have 

kind of talked about it here a little bit—is the commander is ultimately responsible for his unit security as are the individual troopers. 

And so that fail-safe system that is out there, it is a technique 

that is employed, is to make sure you post a guard for yourself. 

And that is always an option to these soldiers. 

And they can always post a guard to overwatch what they are 

doing if at any time they feel the threat warrants it. 

Also, there is a technique it is referred to as a ‘‘guardian angel.’’ 

And that is—I guess, a good analogy would be sort of like a designated driver. 

The guardian angel is not there to participate in the activity that 

is being done. He is there to watch out for his buddies while they 

do that activity, whether it be a meeting, or cleaning weapons, or 

undergoing physical training. 

This guardian angel is prepared to fight. And he is in a position 

of advantage to overwatch that activity. And that is what he does. 

And sometimes that can be done in an unobtrusive way by introducing a person into a meeting who just sits and watches what is 

going on in the room, and doesn’t really participate in the meeting. 

So, that is just an example of these fail-safes that are taught to 

our soldiers in training, and they are available to the commanders 

and any soldier. 

Mr. REYES. Yes, General. 

General DAHL. Yes, sir. If I could just—I am not going to disagree with my buddy, but I interpreted your question a little bit 

differently. 

Just to add, we should aspire to develop and implement a failsafe system. And that is precisely what we are doing, because we 

are going to meet our responsibilities to secure our formations. 

However, we have to remember that in combat environment, not 

everything turns out the way you expect it. And you simply cannot 

anticipate everything, and unfortunate events happen. It is a very, 

very risky environment. 

So, we are committed to meet that challenge and do everything 

we can. But we also have to recognize in that environment we just 

don’t control everything. 

Mr. REYES. But if I heard you correctly, this fail-safe system, as 

much as we can do it—and look, I just want to remind everybody, 

we had a horrible attack at Khost, right on the border with Pakistan, where we lost a number of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] 

personnel. 

But what you are saying is that the fail-safe system still requires 

our military being involved, correct? 
19 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, absolutely. And, of course, they are. 

And in fact, I didn’t mean to imply earlier that—and I thank 

General Dahl for pointing out that, there is no—I guess, it is probably improper to say there is a fail-safe system, because no system 

is perfect. 

Mr. REYES. Right. 

General TOWNSEND. So, this is a thinking enemy that we are 

dealing with here, a cunning enemy, who wants to hurt us. 

And every now and then, the enemy is going to have some success. 

So, what we are trying to do is eliminate as much as possible, 

reduce the possibility that that can happen. But we can’t eliminate 

it completely. 

I didn’t mean to imply, in any of our statements so far, that U.S. 

forces don’t pull security for themselves. They do. 

In fact, again, it is up to the local commanders. 

So, there are places where the commanders have made risk assessments that it is appropriate for either local security contractors 

or Afghan security forces to secure that area. 

In other places, they deem that it is more appropriate that we 

do it together. And in other places, it is very appropriate that we 

do it ourselves—— 

Mr. REYES. And if I can just interrupt you, because I wanted to 

get this other point in. 

Do we currently have any backlogs in the system for anyone that 

wants to know the potential for somebody being a threat? Are there 

any backlogs? 

Are we up-to-date on any inquiries of the system? 

General TOWNSEND. Sir, I think I understand your question. 

There is actually—it is almost instantaneous if someone wants to 

check the watchlist. There are some physical limitations to the system. 

For example, if I have gone out and enrolled some folks in biometrics, I actually have to go upload it into the master database. 

And that takes time. It takes resources. And sometimes I have got 

to have a good signal, a good bandwidth to get my upload out. 

So, there are some physical limitations that might be a delay. 

But we are talking here a matter of hours or days, not a significant 

backlog to enter data into the database and check the master 

watchlist. 

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, you bring up an excellent point. This technology helps us do this. 

And as General Townsend said, we are managing a bunch of different databases and linking them consistently. But you are all 

keyed to that piece of equipment down range which has had limited availability, to be blunt about it. 

They break. We have challenges. 

In light of that—again, trying to improve what we do and recognize what we have learned—next month the Army, for example, 

will be deploying for the first time. 

And, hopefully, we will be deploying in large numbers later this 

year, a biometric device that is much more simple to operate. It is 

based on a smartphone technology as opposed to the larger packages that you have seen previous to this. 
20 

And we could be much more free in the distribution of those 

downrange. 

So instead of having the existing chains of people providing access, we now give one to the contracting officer representative, him 

or herself, as opposed to having to go to an intelligence specialist 

or someone else at the installation. 

And that input now becomes multiplied as we proliferate the systems downrange. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also, Mr. and Mrs. 

Acosta, our condolences, as well. 

Fifty-eight percent of these incidences were not related to the 

enemy we faced necessarily, but would just appear to be personnel 

disputes between the Afghans and, I guess, somebody, either the 

Americans or someone else. 

The process of maintaining how those disputes are going on 

and—can you talk to us a little bit about how units are trained to 

watch for these kind of, for lack of a better place, workplace kind 

of incidences where somebody gets insulted, or they don’t get the 

job they thought they were going to get, and how do we watch for 

that. 

And then much of that is intuitive based on you were there, you 

understood what the fight was going on. 

How do we hand off in unit rotations, the information about the 

people who have left there that might be subject to some sort of 

a workplace issue that could develop into an armed response, so to 

speak? 

General TOWNSEND. Sir, if it is all right, I will take the question 

about how do we manage the frictions. And I will ask General Dahl 

to maybe address the question about battle handover of the information. 

On your question about the personal reasons, there are a number 

of personal reasons that cause this kind of a conflict to occur. You 

pointed out a couple of them yourself. 

One of them is just simple insults. Another one is combat stress 

that the individuals are under. 

Cultural misunderstandings, I kind of talked about that in my 

opening remarks. Those are some of the examples. 

Religious and ideological frictions, where I watch you do some activity and I perceive it in one way based on my religion or ideology. 

So these are all some of the reasons that go into the personal motivations that these Afghans—when they act out. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Looking at the 26 incidences that have happened 

so far related to that, do we analyze, kind of, what categories those 

fall into? And can we learn anything from it? 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. In fact, we do. 

And where we can identify that there are personal motivations, 

sometimes they are not discernible. Where we can discern those, 

you can categorize those. 

I just described some of the categories. Some of the things we can 

learn from it, first of all, and I kind of mentioned this in my open-
21 

ing remarks, is the importance of cultural training that all U.S. 

service members undergo before they deploy. 

And in fact, General Karimi, the chief of staff of the Armed Force 

of Afghanistan, has directed that his soldiers will start undergoing 

cultural training as well, so they understand a little. 

That is not something we have attended to in the past—making 

sure Afghans know how to deal with us as their partners. 

We have been training our side of that equation for a long time. 

The other one is our own conduct. Making sure that our own soldiers comport themselves the way we would expect U.S. soldiers to 

do that. 

And I will ask General Dahl if he can talk about, maybe, the 

transfer of that information about people. 

General DAHL. Congressman, two points. One is training, and 

the other one is leader involvement or leader over watch. 

And what we have done, in Afghanistan in particular to get after 

this, is to insert greater attention to the training and the leader 

oversight during what we call RSOI, the receiving and the staging 

and the onward integration of the forces. 

So when they arrive into Afghanistan, there is additional attention paid toward the cultural situation in that specific location. Because there are cultural differences as you go from district to district, province to province. 

So we will address those so that the soldier is aware and sensitive to cultural differences that could be a problem. 

And then also the awareness, but also the involvement of the 

leadership in that training and in the overwatch is important. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is there specifically in the checklist of handoff 

from one to—this issue about, here are the five individuals we have 

had some sort of a dustup with. We don’t know if it is going to result in anything. 

But I am watching him. You should, as well. 

Is there a formal kind of a handoff of that issue specifically between commanders? 

General DAHL. Sir at the unit level, the commander-to-commander and his non-commissioned officer 1st sergeant or command 

sergeant major, command sergeant major, will identify who are the 

strong soldiers and who are the weak soldiers. 

And I think that that applies not only to our own formations but 

to our partners, as well. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, you said you think that applies, but is it 

institutionalized so that we do, in fact, get some attention paid to 

this issue, since 26 percent of these incidents occurred not from 

guys who supported the Taliban or supported Al Qaeda, but are actually just got mad at us for their own reasons. 

General DAHL. I understand, sir. I can’t say that it has been institutionalized across the Army. 

General TOWNSEND. Sir, you make a great point here. And as 

General Dahl has pointed out, something that a lot of units are 

doing, but you are asking is everyone required to do it. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. 

General TOWNSEND. I can’t answer that affirmatively right now. 

But I have written it down. We will take that back. 
22 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 53.] 

General TOWNSEND. And if it is not, it is an easy add to the orders that I had talked about earlier. 

But is this on the relief in place battle handover checklist that 

there is a specific point in that relief in place where the outgoing 

commander and the incoming commander talk about potential insider threats, and people that have been identified as maybe being 

suspicious will check on that. 

If we can get you an answer on that before the end of the hearing we will. But I have written it down to follow up. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thanks. Gentleman yields back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on this matter that is critical to the safety and security of U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan. 

I want to also give my personal condolences to the Acostas for 

the sacrifice that you have made, and the sacrifice that your son 

made on behalf of this country. 

And isn’t it comforting to know that that sacrifice was made for 

the security of a country that you can now come to and petition the 

civilian authorities to look at the circumstances that led to your 

son’s sacrifice. 

You have that ability here in the United States. And that is what 

your son gave his life for. 

And for that we will appreciate him. And we appreciate you for 

taking your time and resources to petition your government to take 

a look at these circumstances, to see whether or not there is something that can prevent another family from having to go through 

what you have had to go through as a result of the same circumstances that resulted in your son’s sacrifice. 

So, I want to thank you all for being here. 

I also want to thank General Townsend and the rest of the folks 

on the panel today for being here to testify. I cite General Townsend since he is a Georgia native. He is my homeboy. 

So, welcome, sir. 

I do have a question. 

Can you define, General Townsend, what success is in Afghanistan? What would be our success? 

And also I would like to know from Mr. Sedney, whether or not 

we are on course to remove all of our forces from Afghanistan by 

the end of 2014. 

General TOWNSEND. Sir, that question you just asked me is pretty high up on the pay scale for me to answer. But I will just look 

at our national objectives in Afghanistan as I understand them. 

First of all is to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a 

safe haven for transnational—specifically Al Qaeda—but other 

transnational terrorists that might threaten our country. That is 

job one on the success list. 

Secondly is to do that, we have determined that what we want 

to do is establish a credible enough Afghan state and security force 

that they can secure themselves, and we don’t have to stay there 

forever to make sure it is not a safe haven. 
23 

So, those are my definitions of success. And I will turn it over 

to Mr. Sedney to talk about progress. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I would also add a comment. 

The fact that they, the Afghans, seem to not want us to be there 

does not mean that they are not interested in protecting their country from outside influence, aka Al Qaeda, or some other terrorist 

group that seeks to use the country as a base. 

Is that correct? 

General TOWNSEND. Sir, I would maybe express a little exception 

to your point of they don’t want us there. I have met a lot of Afghans in my three tours there. And there are a lot of Afghans that 

want us to be there and help them help themselves. 

There are certainly a number that don’t, but your point is exactly 

right, and I would agree that just because—even those that don’t 

want us there, don’t necessarily want Afghanistan to be a haven 

for international terrorists. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, your clarification is well taken. 

Mr. Sedney. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you, Congressman, and I will certainly fully 

associate myself with General Townsend’s point that we—and your 

point is accurate as well—we and the Afghans share a goal of having Afghanistan being responsible for its own security. 

Afghans don’t want their country to be used to attack other countries, with the small exception of those that support the Taliban, 

which is a very small amount. 

You asked if we are on track towards that goal. And I would say 

yes, we are. 

As the President stated in his remarks in June, when he announced that we would be withdrawing 10,000 troops by the end 

of this year, and we have—by the end of last year, and we did remove those 10,000 troops. 

We are on track towards achieving our goal of having an Afghanistan that is capable of defending itself from the threat of terrorism 

and from the possibility of safe havens. 

To do that, there is both a lot of fighting that needs to be done 

and a lot of training, advising, and assisting the Afghan security 

forces, because it is building the Afghan security forces through the 

partnership with them that is enabling that transition to take 

place. 

And already, as I said, almost 50 percent of the country, of the 

population of the country is in areas that are transitioning. 

The Afghans, as General Townsend said, do appreciate the advice and support and assistance that we are giving them, and I 

would say particularly in the military. 

I have met from the top of the Afghan military to the ordinary 

fighting Afghan, innumerable Afghans who expressed their appreciation for us. 

I have heard that from Mr. Wardak, and from the Afghan generals repeatedly, that they appreciate. But that they are also, to be 

frank, embarrassed by the fact that other countries have to come 

and do their fighting for them. 

They want to do their fighting on their own. We want to enable 

that. 
24 

So, we are on course to do that. And that will enable us to transition to Afghan security lead. 

There will be, of course, as the Secretary of Defense has said, a 

continuing need to train, advise, and assist the Afghan military 

after 2014, after that transition to their lead. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

And I am out of time. 

If I had more time, I would ask whether this screening process 

currently used by the Afghan National Security Forces to vet recruits to the Afghan Public Protection Force, whether or not it is 

adequate and practical. But perhaps someone else will ask that 

question. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Will you please take that question for the record? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 53.] 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sir, ma’am, I am sorry about your loss. And I want to thank you 

for coming today. 

I think it elevates the importance of the meeting and reinforces 

our need to fix the issues over there so that this doesn’t happen 

again. 

General Townsend, you mentioned that many times some of the 

Afghans who are applying for these positions cannot spell their 

name. One of the things that I was taken aback by when I was in 

Afghanistan—we were at a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] police training facility—is the extreme lack of education. 

And taking a man or a woman who can’t spell their name, or 

couldn’t read a book of the level of The Cat in the Hat, if you will, 

and handing that person an AK–47 [assault rifle] and expecting 

them to carry out security-related details. 

And my question gets back to, in these events that we have seen 

where we have had these tragedies, is the lack of education a common denominator, or are the attacks carried out by people who— 

Afghans who may very well be better educated? 

Is the education level, has that been a common denominator in 

the people who have carried out the attacks? 

General TOWNSEND. I will ask for General Dahl’s help a little bit 

on the education piece. 

I haven’t seen any data that associates level of education. I know 

that we have seen attacks by those who are illiterate, as well as 

attacks by those who are highly educated. 

I don’t know. I haven’t seen that trend. So, I can’t talk to that. 

Maybe General Dahl can. 

I will say that your point about education and literacy is a very 

important one. And it is something that we are tackling very explicitly. 

The NTM–A, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, has a very 

strong literacy program. GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] has a strong literacy program to—it is probably 

one of the most important social developments, I think, in all Afghanistan, is there is a very focused program to teach Afghan soldiers and policemen how to read. 
25 

Right now about half of the Afghan Army has been exposed to 

reading between a first and the third grade level. It has been—that 

target has been ratcheting up. 

But the goal is that all Afghan service members in the police or 

the army during the term of their enlistment, their first enlistment, learn how to read. 

And I think this has implications for the country that go far beyond a higher quality security force when they go back to their villages and are able to read after their term in service. 

And, General Dahl, can you help me about education. 

General DAHL. Yes, sir. 

Congressman, thank you for the question. 

I would just add that—and you are right. 

I was in the South, and in the South illiteracy is particularly 

high. I learned in my time over there that a lack of education, the 

lack of ability to read or write or add or subtract did not necessarily limit someone from performing a particular function or 

achieving a capability. 

But it severely challenges our efforts to train them, which—and 

we learned a lot of lessons about how to go about that in a way 

where we are communicating more effectively. 

It takes a little bit longer. You have to start at a very, very base 

level. 

But I guess we are learning just because someone can’t read and 

write doesn’t mean they are not capable, just means you have to 

go about it a little bit differently. 

So, I am not that concerned about that long-run. 

I would add that the training program, the literacy program that 

is part of the development of the ANSF forces is very, very good. 

It is possible that in the future that cadre of ANSF is—becomes 

some of the most literate people, at least in the South. 

I can say that that would be true. And I will leave it at that. 

Mr. SCOTT. I guess my question—and I will end with this and 

allow this process to move on. 

It seems to me that somebody who is less educated would be 

more susceptible to the rhetoric, if you will, and to be led down the 

path of carrying out an attack, or some type of terrorist attack by 

some other type of what they might refer to as a religious leader. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Congressman, on that you have asked an excellent 

question. We will go back and see if there is a connection between 

illiteracy and training in the carrying out of those attacks. 

I don’t think we have been asking that question, and based on 

your input, we will do that. 

Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 53.] 

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, if I may add one more thing, with regards to 

the security contractors. 

The reliability of the educated contractor is significantly greater. 

One of the reasons why we had a fracture early on between the police force and the security contractors is the very good security 

companies recognized very early if they offered education to their 

employees, they would have a better and more reliable employee. 
26 

Something as fundamental as to be able to count the money you 

are paid on a given day is extraordinarily important. When you 

give a person that capability, you have changed something. 

Several months ago, when I was in country, I saw a gate guard 

that I had seen before. He ran up to me and he literally handed 

me his AK–47. 

He handed it to because he read the serial number off the side 

of it to me. He was incapable of doing that before. 

So, I would argue that it is not a question of reliability so much 

as competency. You have a more competent individual if we follow 

the path that you have described. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Last year when I was in Afghanistan meeting with General 

Caldwell, he pointed out that vast majority of the country are illiterate. And the problem that they have of teaching—a sergeant trying to teach them how to fire a weapon, when he says, ‘‘Put four 

cartridges in,’’ they didn’t know what four was. 

But he told us at that time that the 70,000 they had recruited 

that year, most of them had gotten through that training up to the 

third grade, and vast improvement. 

And I think that will have long-lasting effects for the country, 

too. They felt very good about the fact that they were getting education, and as has been stated, they felt good about that. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the family, thank 

you for being here today. 

We lost a young man in 2010 in Iraq in a very similar situation. 

It is most troublesome, and our condolences and prayers are with 

you. 

I thank the gentlemen for being here today. 

General Townsend, a lot has been said about biometrics. And 

what happens when the machines don’t work? 

I read somewhere that there seemed to be a failure and not 

enough machines throughout the country. 

What happens when the machines don’t work? 

General TOWNSEND. That is a great point, sir, and thanks for 

that question. 

The biometrics is just one piece of a complex and layered system 

that I talked about in my opening remarks. There are actually four 

levels to this: prevent, educate, train, and protect. Those are the 

four levels. 

The biometrics comes into the prevent piece. The prevent piece 

is largely based on that eight-step vetting process. 

One step of that vetting process is biometrics. And then you have 

heard testimony here that we are continuing now with weekly 

screening. 

Mr. KISSELL. And General, if—and I apologize for interrupting. 

I do want to follow along this path for just a second. 

If there was not a machine working in one step for biometrics, 

checks could not be made. Would that be enough to at least pause 

somebody being in the process? So, you would not say okay, we 
27 

don’t have this today, but we will go ahead and bring him in anyway. 

General TOWNSEND. And that is a great point. And that is actually one that I think the outcomes of the investigation from the 

FOB Frontenac incident. And Mr. Motsek can talk about I think, 

here in a second, the arming process for security contractors. 

But no, the process stops when a person can’t be biometrically 

enrolled into the watchlist, his forward movement through the induction process stops. 

And if you would talk about arming—— 

Mr. MOTSEK. Right, as General Townsend said, it has got to be 

multilayered. And if you follow the procedures correctly, you have 

the biometric process. And indeed, you have two biometric processes now. 

You have the U.S. biometric process and you have an Afghan biometric process that are complementary. So you have got that. 

But the same process, you have an arming requirement as well. 

The Afghan Ministry of Interior is the one who provides you your 

arming authority from the Afghan government. And we should 

have the same corollary, and we had the same processes in place 

where we provide an arming authority as well. 

And in this particular instance, as you recall in the investigation, 

the local commander thought he had a window because this person 

had been previously employed and the like. He thought he had a 

window. 

My position as the DOD guy is that window does not exist. 

You are proper in your assessment that if you cannot properly 

biometrically enroll someone, if you cannot properly license them to 

be armed, because that infers training and knowledge on certain 

rules, that the process has to stop. And then you—— 

Mr. KISSELL. How complete is the biometric database from all 

people that are inputting and checking? 

How free of stovepiping is this information? 

Is it broad, so that various inputs, there is not, say, one department, one country, one unit that is not included or does not have 

access across the board? 

General TOWNSEND. There is an Afghan database and there is a 

U.S. database. And we share information. 

You might understand why we would have a separate database 

from the Afghans. But by and large, there is not that much difference, but we share information. So, there is a deliberate effort 

to prevent the stovepiping, sir, that you are talking about. 

Mr. KISSELL. Once someone is vetted and once they have been 

brought in, and I know you talk about the weekly checks, but how 

difficult would it be, for example, if someone was, say, looked like, 

if they were Taliban, they looked like someone who had been vetted. 

How difficult would it be for somebody else to come on base and 

assume the identification of somebody who has been vetted? 

Do we reach a comfort level? Do we have daily checks? 

How difficult would it be for me to come on base looking like 

somebody else, and have access to be able to do harm? 

General DAHL. Sir, I can say, just to refer to my comments earlier. 
28 

I know one of the things we did immediately afterwards was to 

ensure everyone, all of our contractors, not just the personal security contractors, but all of the Afghan contractors on our bases 

were enrolled and vetted. 

But then on a sustainment basis, we went with 50 percent on a 

monthly basis randomly. That is a case where we would pick on 

someone like that. 

But it is not perfect. We wouldn’t pick on them perhaps the day 

that they walked on and were impersonating someone else, if that 

is what you are alluding to. 

And really it is a material solution. It is how much time and how 

much equipment do you have to dedicate to this. 

So again, we want to aspire to the perfect solution, given the limitations that we have. And those are the measures that we have 

taken. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do have some other questions that I will forward for outside follow-up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, panel, 

and most of all, thank you for coming today, for your service and 

your sacrifice. 

Our prayers are with you and the Nation’s gratitude. So thank 

you, thank you. 

Regarding the incident, I want to kind of hone in on that a little 

bit. And it looks like, that first of all, the Tundra employees did 

an investigation and let this person go. 

But that recommendation was never incorporated into the Tundra personnel records. And then subsequently, the U.S. investigated also into the allegations, but they couldn’t substantiate the 

credibility of the statements, so the officer decided not to enter this 

information in. 

I would like to know, since this happened what change of procedures has there been, first of all, in U.S. policy at it relates to investigations of this kind? 

If they determine that somebody is unsubstantiated, then what 

is the process? 

Has that been changed? Or are they required now to enter that? 

Or—— 

General DAHL. Ma’am, I will start, and then I will hand it off. 

You are correct. Your read of the investigation is exactly correct. 

We had two different judgments that were made, one by the Tundra contractor, one by the officer who was responsible. And it 

speaks to the question that was raised earlier as to what is the 

threshold that would require a mandatory entry in there. 

I know that what we did afterwards locally was to essentially 

raise that threshold, raise any suspicion, that would cause an entry 

to be made and that person to be removed. 

And this partly explains why post the attack at FOB Frontenac, 

when we went and did that vetting of all the employees there, that 

some additional ones were removed. 
29 

I will ask my colleagues if they could talk about how we have institutionalized that beyond my experience. 

General TOWNSEND. I think it was Ranking Member Smith, who 

said earlier that we need to intercede earlier. If it is unclear, err 

on the side of safety, which I think kind of sums up what we are 

talking about here. 

But in the end, these are judgments by leaders and commanders 

on the battlefield. 

So if someone brings an allegation to me, I am going to hear it 

out and explore it. And at some point, I will make a decision that 

it is either substantiated and he is fired, or it is substantiated and 

he is fired or he is not fired, but it is put as a note in the watchlist. 

Or it is completely unfounded because this guy has got some— 

there is some conflict between the two of them. So, the person who 

is giving me the allegation is just unfounded. And so, I might make 

a decision not to enter it. 

Just because an allegation has been made, these leaders out 

there are making those judgment calls. 

But I think Mr. Smith’s point about err on the side of safety for 

the U.S. soldiers is a good rule to go by, ma’am. 

Mr. MOTSEK. The other thing that changed was that—again in 

the investigation, because it was unsubstantiated, the senior leadership of Tundra chose not to put it in the person’s file. 

We now require them to put ‘‘investigation concluded, it was unsubstantiated,’’ so it is not a non-response. It is not a non-placement. You have to make an affirmative decision, and record that 

affirmative decision now. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I am glad to hear that. 

General TOWNSEND. Can I add? 

One of my assistants here just handed me a note that says actually the USFOR–A [United States Forces–Afghanistan] order requires an entry to any incident that may pose a threat to U.S. personnel such as threats, if the person makes a threat or has a negligent discharge with their weapon. 

But again, there is going to be some line there where it is a commander’s call. Is that really a threat or is that not? 

And that is what we are talking about. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. I am a little confused as to what you just 

said. 

I thought you just said that it is procedure that it is entered. But 

then you say, it is up to the commander’s call. So is it or isn’t it? 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, such things, obvious things such as 

threats. So if I make a threat against an American force, they are 

required to enter. 

But if someone says, ‘‘I heard so-and-so make a threat to an 

American force,’’ there is going to be a commander who is going to 

investigate that, and he is going to make a decision. ‘‘Okay, I don’t 

think that is credible.’’ 

Is it credible or is it not credible? 

If I know that he threatened Americans, that is very credible. 

General DAHL. And, ma’am, just to tie it back to the investigation also, the officer who did not enter that in there determined 

that the threat was unsubstantiated. So, he was not required to 

make an entry at that time in his judgment. 
30 

Had he made the judgment that it was a substantiated threat, 

he would have made the entry. 

Now, it is a requirement to make that entry. But still there is 

a judgment that has to be exercised as to whether or not this is 

a credible threat, or if this is just someone who is—it is a family 

dispute and they are trying to cause problems for another. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So, you say he does have to enter it, though, 

even if he doesn’t let him go, he does enter it? 

General DAHL. Yes, ma’am. The policy requires the entry be 

made if the judgment is made that he is a threat. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Got you. I think that is good. 

It needs to be in there, even if it is unsubstantiated. People need 

to know. 

And I want to follow up on your earlier anecdotal story about the 

Afghan security officer. 

General, you said they came in and there was a soldier and they 

had some concerns about them, so they let him go and moved him 

out of that. 

What was done with him, besides just letting him go? I am a little concerned he might go to another FOB and do the same thing. 

General TOWNSEND. Right. In the case that I was referring to, 

that soldier had a personal conflict—reportedly had a personal conflict with a specific American soldier, not that he had a problem 

with all Americans. 

But there was a personal insult that was perceived by this Afghan soldier. And so the Afghan commander made a decision to 

move him away to a different location and remove him from that 

conflict. 

At the time, I thought that was an appropriate decision made by 

an Afghan leader dealing with an Afghan soldier. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. But hopefully note that conflict in his record 

that went with him. Yes? 

General TOWNSEND. I don’t know about that at the time, ma’am. 

This is about a year and a half ago. And even at that time, all of 

our Afghan security forces weren’t yet entered into biometrics. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I appreciate it. I just think we need to err on 

the side of caution and have a valid record that goes with people 

so that in the future people know of past instances to avoid any 

potential future negative incident. 

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Platts. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate your holding 

this important hearing. Certainly appreciate all the witnesses’ testimony and focus on this important issue. 

I want to add my words of personal sympathy and gratitude to 

the families who have lost loved ones. 

You know, we can often take for granted the freedoms we have, 

and the truth is, we only have the blessings of freedoms we do as 

Americans because of heroic selflessness of our men and women in 

uniform who are willing to go into harm’s way and give their lives 

in service to this Nation. 

So, we certainly have you in our prayers, and our gratitude for 

you giving your loved ones for all of us. 
31 

General Townsend, if you could comment—and I recognize we 

are in an open setting here, not a classified setting—but earlier 

today, Reuters reported the following: ‘‘The United States military 

said in a secret report that the Taliban, backed by Pakistan, are 

set to retake control of Afghanistan after NATO-led forces withdraw, raising the prospect of a major failure of Western policy after 

a costly war.’’ 

Again, knowing we are in an open setting, are you able to comment at all on the existence of this report, or the general characterization about the Taliban retaking control, anything in your knowledge that would relate to what is being reported today by Reuters? 

General TOWNSEND. I can comment a bit about it, but, as you 

said, not much because of the classified nature of the report. 

Mr. PLATTS. Understood. 

General TOWNSEND. The truth is I am aware of the existence of 

the report. I have received a copy of it. But I haven’t read it and 

digested it myself. 

What I do know is the report is taken from interrogations of 

Taliban prisoners. And so, these guys that were—you got to keep 

it in context. 

The folks that are quoted in this report are some of the most 

ideologically committed folks on the enemy side. So, I don’t think 

they are representative, one, of the Taliban as a whole, nor are 

they representative of the Afghan people. 

I think that is probably—best I know off of a quick glance at the 

cover of the report, that is about all I can say on it. 

Mr. PLATTS. So based on your knowledge and what we can talk 

about here in an open setting, the report isn’t a finding of our own 

intelligence gathering out there on the street, in essence, but more 

those who we have captured who are in a defiant manner saying 

this is what is going to happen. 

And so the credibility of the basis of that report needs to be 

maybe closely scrutinized? 

General TOWNSEND. I don’t want to attack the report because I 

haven’t read it. But I just want to keep it in context, that the reports are coming from enemy soldiers held in captivity—— 

Mr. PLATTS. And maybe say the credibility of the source or the 

basis of the report, not the report itself. 

General TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PLATTS. Okay. Thank you. 

And, again, appreciate all of our witnesses for your service to our 

Nation. And we are grateful for what you do. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

I want to thank you for being here today. I appreciate the testimony that you have given, the questions that have been asked. 

I believe we have received some of the answers that we have 

sought on how we can reduce the number of these attacks. 

The committee will continue to review and investigate these attacks and work with the DOD to constantly work on making improvement in this area with the DOD and with the Army. 

Thank you very much. 

This hearing then is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 1, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 1, 2012 

(37) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Use of Afghan Nationals To Provide Security to 

U.S. Forces, in Light of the Attack on U.S. Personnel 

at Forward Operating Base Frontenac, Afghanistan, 

in March 2011 

February 1, 2012 

In September last year, this committee explored the issue of attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Forces on U.S. 

and coalition personnel. The witnesses concluded that DOD had 

‘‘mitigated the risk about to the degree we can,’’ in ‘‘these few occasions’’ when such attacks have occurred. 

Since then, the committee staff has continued to look into the 

factors behind attacks by Afghan nationals on coalition forces, including attacks conducted by Afghans hired by private security contractors to protect U.S. bases. The staff has used the attack in 

March 2011 at Forward Operating Base Frontenac as a case study 

to better understand the range of issues. In that attack, two soldiers died, including my constituent, Specialist Rudy Acosta, and 

four were wounded. I would like to note that Specialist Acosta’s father and mother, Dante and Carolyn Acosta, are with us today. 

Private security contractors are used in Afghanistan to provide 

personal protective services for Department of State personnel and 

dignitaries, to guard construction sites, to ensure safe movement 

for other private companies doing business in Afghanistan, for 

guarding supply convoys, and to augment coalition forces by providing base security. In the case of base security, the Commander 

in Chief is responsible for determining the size of the U.S. force deployed to Afghanistan, the missions that force will undertake, and 

the necessary contractor support. For different reasons, both President Bush and President Obama have chosen to limit the size of 

the U.S. force and to use private security contractors to enhance 

base security. In contrast, it is Congress’ role, and the purpose of 

today’s hearing, to assess the advisability of these policies and 

whether the Administration needs to change its approach. 

Complicating matters further, President Karzai has dictated that 

only Afghan nationals may be certified for employment as private 

security guards and has not permitted U.S. citizen contractors. 

Karzai has also ordered the private security contractors to be disbanded. The Afghan Ministry of Interior will assume full responsi-
38 

bility for providing the Afghan Personal Protection Force (APPF), 

a new organization that from March 2012 onward, with a few exceptions, will replace private security contractors. The APPF will 

be available on a fee-for-service basis to coalition forces to perform 

the services I just described. 

According to DOD, the Afghan Ministry of Interior, in conjunction with U.S. and coalition forces, will use a vetting and screening 

process that will be the same for both the Afghan National Security 

Forces and the APPF. 

I recognize that it would be virtually impossible to establish a 

foolproof screening process. Our own national security screening 

system is not foolproof. Yet, we must recognize that the existing 

processes failed to identify 42 attackers in 2007 to 2011. Thirtynine of those attacks were by members of the Afghan National Security Force, and three by contractor employees. Though less than 

one percent of Afghan forces and security guards have attacked coalition forces, this is 42 attacks too many and the new process 

must do better. 

Another concern is that the screening and vetting has been tragically weak in picking up signs of threats after the Afghan joined 

either the Afghan National Security Force, or a private security 

contractor. DOD data indicates that at least 60 percent of all the 

attacks appear to be motivated by personal matters, arising after 

hiring. 

So it was with the attacker at FOB Frontenac. In July 2010 at 

another forward operating base, his employer, Tundra Security, 

fired him for allegedly making statements about killing U.S. personnel and recommended that he not be rehired. The contractor’s 

chain of command did not enter that recommendation into the 

attacker’s file, and the attacker was rehired by the same contractor 

in 2011, just before the attack at Frontenac. 

Moreover, because a parallel U.S. investigation of the 2010 allegations concluded that the statements could not be substantiated, 

the U.S. official at the base decided not to enter the allegations 

about the attacker in the U.S. watch list system. 

Adding to my concern about the vetting system not being focused 

in the right place, a U.S. rescreening of all Afghan security guards 

at Frontenac immediately after the attack resulted in several being 

dismissed as ‘‘unworthy’’ of employment. 

Finally, I am concerned about the Department’s September statement that its efforts have ‘‘mitigated the risk about to the degree 

we can.’’ At the time, the committee was not aware that the frequency of these attacks had dramatically increased in 2010 and 

2011—in fact, 75 percent of all attacks have occurred in the last 

2 years. The Department attributes the increase with the growth 

of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. But, we need to understand the contributing factors better, so that more effective steps can be taken 

to further mitigate attacks on U.S. and coalition personnel. 
39 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Use of Afghan Nationals To Provide Security to 

U.S. Forces, in Light of the Attack on U.S. Personnel 

at Forward Operating Base Frontenac, Afghanistan, 

in March 2011 

February 1, 2012 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I would like 

to thank our witnesses for agreeing to come before us to testify 

about this subject as well. 

We ask our brave men and women in uniform to take on many 

risks and dangers in wartime, and they should not have to be concerned about being attacked by those whom they serve with or seek 

to protect. 

We in Congress, and those in the Pentagon, owe it to our military personnel to do everything we can to reduce this sort of risk. 

Like the actions taken over time to reduce friendly fire casualties, 

eliminating the threat of ‘‘insider attacks’’ should be a high priority, whether from a private security contractor or member of the 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Hearings such as the one 

today are helpful in determining what drives these sorts of attacks, 

and what policymakers can do to prevent them from occurring in 

the future. It is our duty to do whatever we can to protect our men 

and women in uniform, and that includes preventing attacks from 

the Afghan troops that they serve with. 

In addition to presenting a security risk to our troops, attacks of 

this nature also undermine the trust between U.S. and Afghan personnel. That trust is a key ingredient in our efforts to build the 

ANSF, and those forces are a key factor in our plan to eventually 

wind down our involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Similarly, 

if our military personnel cannot rely on those hired to guard U.S. 

bases, they cannot be effective. 

Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing today 

and thank the Chairman for holding this hearing. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 1, 2012 

(53) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

General TOWNSEND. DOD has established a set of counterinsurgency training and 

operational standards to focus U.S. military units on specific requirements prior to 

and during their deployments to Afghanistan. Some of the skills are not Afghanistan-specific, such as ‘‘understand the operational environment’’ while others apply 

directly to current operations such as ‘‘establish combat outpost.’’ A specific requirement relative to enhancing force protection aboard U.S. forward operating bases is 

conducting a ‘‘relief in place’’ during unit turnovers. This task involves incoming/outgoing commanders reviewing all current security conditions and sharing relevant 

force protection information including standard operating procedures. This information sharing also includes reviewing the status of local Afghans or Afghan National 

Security Force personnel living and/or working aboard the base. [See page 21.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

General TOWNSEND. Part of the standardization of APPF is implementation of a 

screening process similar to ANSF’s eight-step process. The APPF vetting process 

includes the following: 

1) Valid Tazkera (Afghan identity card); 2) Two letters from elders and/or guarantors; 3) Personal information; 4) Criminal records check; 5) Drug screening; 6) Medical screening; and 7) Biometric collection and enrollment in MoI’s system for check 

against watch lists. 

The recruiting packet verification is the only step from ANSF’s eight-step process 

not included in the APPF system. As we begin to transition to APPF in the next 

few months we will be able to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of this vetting 

process in relation to recruitment and employment of APPF. The vetting process has 

been effective and adequate to screen ANSF and we have already turned away several APPF recruits using the seven-step process. A most recent example occurred 

within an APPF training class where 21 recruits were screened out due to vetting 

issues and drug screening failures. [See page 24.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SEDNEY. We do not specifically track this information. Afghanistan is a country in which the majority of the population is illiterate. More than 80 percent of all 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) recruits are illiterate when they enter the 

service. Less than 30 percent of the ANSF are literate to the international literacy 

standard. We have seen high-profile events such as the attack at Kabul International Airport conducted by educated Afghan officers. However, we have not directly studied whether literacy and education are correlated to the likelihood of attack. [See page 25.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 1, 2012 

(57) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. What department or agency was responsible for issuing the contract 

to Tundra and making sure it did what it promised to do in providing security for 

the base? 

Mr. MOTSEK. The Senior Contracting Official—Afghanistan (SCO–A) of the Joint 

Theater Support Contracting Command let the contract. The Defense Contract Management Agency—Afghanistan (DCMA–A) was responsible for the management of 

the contract (W91B4L–09–D–0024 and Task Order 00081C). 

Mr. MCKEON. It looked like Tundra (a Canadian company) may have had an Afghan subsidiary involved in paying the Afghan personnel. If the local hires were not 

directly employed by the Canadian company (Tundra) that received the contract 

from the U.S. Government (and paid for by our tax dollars), is the private contractor 

still required to be responsible for control and compliance with our rules of the security personnel on the ground (including the Afghan employee of Tundra that attacked our son and his fellow soldiers)? 

Mr. MOTSEK. Contract W91B4L–09–D–0024 was awarded to Tundra Security Consultants Afghanistan (Tundra SCA), which is the Afghan-owned subsidiary of Tundra Strategies of Canada. Although Afghan-owned and operating with a mostly Afghan staff, Tundra SCA operates with a Canadian management team. The contract 

was not awarded to Tundra Strategies of Canada, and Tundra SCA’s personnel were 

not hired by that company. Under the terms of the contract, Tundra SCA was responsible for control of security personnel on the ground and compliance with our 

rules and regulations, pursuant to the terms of its contract. 

Mr. MCKEON. Are these private security contractors like Tundra providing security at the base also allowed to participate in combat operations with our troops? 

Mr. MOTSEK. No. Private Security Company (PSC) contractors are restricted from 

performing combat functions per Department of Defense Instructions (DODI) 

1100.22, 3020.50, and 3020.41, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations 

(DFARs), and the terms of their contracts. Use of force by PSC personnel is limited 

to self-defense, the defense of others, and the preservation of designated critical or 

inherently dangerous property against unlawful attack. 

Mr. MCKEON. What actions were taken against the private security contractor for 

any failure to follow required procedures for vetting and supervision of their personnel? 

Mr. MOTSEK. Tundra SCA’s official records did not indicate that the perpetrator 

of the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Frontenac attack was previously terminated 

because he posed a threat, as the allegation was investigated and determined to be 

unsubstantiated. He had been biometrically enrolled during his previous term of 

employment with Tundra SCA, but had not yet been re-enrolled at the time of the 

incident, although a request for re-enrollment had been submitted. 

Based on the results of the review, DCMA–A issued a Level III Corrective Action 

Request (CAR) to Tundra SCA dated May 7, 2011. Tundra SCA responded to the 

CAR with a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) on June 15, 2011. After the review of all 

required documentation, DCMA–A fully accepted Tundra SCA’s CAP and closed the 

CAR on July 6, 2011. However, the contract continues to be audited by DCMA–A 

through the support of the Contracting Officer Representatives and the DCMA–A 

Quality Assurance Representatives. Additionally, DCMA–A has documented Tundra 

SCA’s unsatisfactory performance at FOB Frontenac in the Joint Contingency Contracting System for SCO–A’s use in evaluating contractor performance. 

Mr. MCKEON. What vetting was the private contractor (Tundra) required to perform before entrusting its guard with a weapon around our troops? 

Mr. MOTSEK. At the time of the FOB Frontenac incident, Tundra SCA was contracted to provide security at nine (9) installations in Afghanistan. Pursuant to the 

terms of its contract, Tundra SCA was required to submit a plan detailing its processes for hiring employees, performing background checks, and providing the results 

of the background check to the contracting officer for review and acceptance. 

The plan submitted by Tundra SCA required agency checks at both the local and 

national level. Local agency checks included identity verification via valid Tazkera 

(the Afghan identity card), verification of work history, address confirmation, 
58 

fingerprinting, and a local police check to receive a clearance certificate for each employee. National agency checks required the contractors to submit a completed employee information package to the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the 

Afghanistan National Directorate of Security (NDS), which investigates major crime 

and potential connections to terrorist organizations. Pending a successfully cleared 

background check, the Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs would then issue a 

certificate of successful vetting and acceptance. 

Additionally, Tundra SCA was required to support the Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) portion of the vetting process by submitting requests for biometric enrollment, ensuring the availability of language interpretation 

services during the screening and enrollment processes, and requesting Global 

Unique Identification numbers from GIRoA enrollers to verify each individual enrollment. The action with GIRoA was accomplished; the re-enrollment with the U.S. 

Government biometric database was pending. The individual was still in the U.S. 

database due to his previous employment. 

Prior to submission of an arming request, all local nationals and third-country nationals must submit to full biometric enrollment. Additional routine biometric 

screening then continues in accordance with local installation policies and procedures. Like all contractors, Tundra SCA is required to notify the contracting officer’s 

representative, the local installation Force Protection agency, and the theater arming approval authority immediately if individuals are revealed as potential security 

risks during biometric processing. 

Tundra SCA was also required to develop a process by which employee termination would be communicated to the contracting officer and local installation Force 

Protection agencies. The aim is to prevent unauthorized access, and to communicate 

potential security risks concerning individuals terminated for cause to NDS for biometric watch list consideration. To prevent the rehiring of high-risk personnel, all 

contractors were additionally required to develop a plan of action to address the 

tracking and communication of employee dismissals to all sites managed by the contractor. Finally, according to the terms of its contract, Tundra SCA was required 

to maintain records on the screening status of its employees for six months following 

termination. 

Mr. MCKEON. What can and needs to be done to insure that our troops are only 

guarded by fellow U.S. troops while on base in areas that we are conducting military actions such as Afghanistan? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The contractors’ ability to provide specific security functions frees up 

U.S. Forces to conduct more combat-focused missions. Contractors perform their 

missions well and provide essential support for the conduct of operations in Afghanistan as they do worldwide. Without contractors (20,000 presently performing the 

function today), we would have to divert forces from essential combat tasks to perform these security functions. The use of civilians to guard U.S. bases in Afghanistan, based upon threat analysis, is consistent with our use of them elsewhere in 

the world and in previous conflicts. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there any other related, recorded problems on this issue than 

those that led to a death? 

General DAHL. The investigation conducted by Regional Command-South identified a number of shortcomings in the policies governing the hiring and management 

of Afghan private security contractors and the execution of those policies. These 

problems are discussed in some detail in the investigation report, a copy of which 

was provided to the Committee before the hearing. Although the investigation found 

that those specific issues did not lead directly to the deaths of the Soldiers at FOB 

Frontenac, the command took immediate steps to correct the problems to provide 

an additional measure of security for our Soldiers. 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there other companies with similar security responsibilities as 

Tundra Strategies, which are setting good examples, such that U.S. forces would 

want to see emulated? Furthermore, how closely are U.S. forces monitoring these 

companies to ensure that there aren’t other up-and-coming potential assailants? 

General DAHL. I defer to the Joint Staff and OSD regarding current policies and 

the performance of private security contractors (PSCs) in theater. The policies in 

place at the time of the FOB Frontenac attack and the subsequent improvements 

implemented within Regional Command-South applied to all private security contractors, to include to requirement to screen PSC employees and to mitigate the 

risks associated with insider threats. 
59 

Mr. KISSELL. Once Afghan nationals are hired to provide security to U.S. Forces, 

how much access are they allowed throughout the forward operating base or military facility? Similarly, why aren’t there 10% random daily biometric checks for Afghan nationals accessing a U.S. facility with the purpose of providing security? 

General DAHL. I defer to the Joint Staff and OSD on current theater policies regarding access by private security contractors (PSCs). During the time I was deployed to Regional Command-South, access was based on contact performance requirements, with oversight provided by the local commander and contracting officer 

representative. Likewise, specific force protection measures were applied by local 

commanders consistent with theater policies and their own risk assessments. As 

noted in the materials provided to the Committee before the hearing, the Regional 

Command-South commander directed that all subordinate Task Forces conduct random, 50 percent monthly screening/verification of all PSC employees to ensure they 

were not on the Afghan Watch List. 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there any other related, recorded problems on this issue than 

those that led to a death? 

General TOWNSEND. Since May 2007, ISAF elements identified 42 ANSF and 3 

PSC related insider incidents. The cause of each event varies. We utilize the lessons 

learned in each attack to identify potential counter-measures and reduce the primary causes of insider attacks. 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there other companies with similar security responsibilities as 

Tundra Strategies, which are setting good examples, such that U.S. forces would 

want to see emulated? Furthermore, how closely are U.S. forces monitoring these 

companies to ensure that there aren’t other up-and-coming potential assailants? 

General TOWNSEND. USFOR–A FRAGO 11–128 sets specific standards for all of 

the private security companies supporting U.S. installations. As with all contracts, 

contractor’s performance is monitored against stated contract requirements and 

standards. Terms and conditions of the contract provide a means to ensure that the 

contractor is effectively performing, e.g., penalties, show cause (notice of non-performance), and termination. The IJC Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate 

(ACOD) monitors all of the PSCs in order to enforce compliance with US requirements. Each unit and installation commander is also responsible for monitoring and 

ensuring compliance by all PSC personnel in order to reduce the future insider 

threat. 

Mr. KISSELL. Once Afghan nationals are hired to provide security to U.S. Forces, 

how much access are they allowed throughout the forward operating base or military facility? Similarly, why aren’t there 10% random daily biometric checks for Afghan nationals accessing a U.S. facility with the purpose of providing security? 

General TOWNSEND. The level of access provided to U.S. Military facilities is 

based on the specific contract. USFOR–A FRAGOs 11–128 and 11–086 set specific 

requirements for units using contract security personnel. Contractors are required 

to wear access badges issued via biometric registration in order to ensure that they 

operate in areas authorized by their contract. 

USFOR–A FRAGO 11–086 now directs commanders to conduct weekly biometric 

screening of local national contractors. Commanders may use their discretion in determining how to execute the required weekly screening. The use of a 10% random 

check would be up to the discretion of the requiring activity commander. 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there any other related, recorded problems on this issue than 

those that led to a death? 

Mr. MOTSEK. Since May 2007, ISAF elements identified 42 ANSF and 3 PSC related insider incidents. The cause of each event varies. We utilize the lessons 

learned in each attack to identify potential counter-measures and reduce the primary causes of insider attacks. 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there other companies with similar security responsibilities as 

Tundra Strategies, which are setting good examples, such that U.S. forces would 

want to see emulated? Furthermore, how closely are U.S. forces monitoring these 

companies to ensure that there aren’t other up-and-coming potential assailants? 

Mr. MOTSEK. USFOR–A FRAGO 11–128 sets specific standards for all of the private security companies supporting U.S. installations. As with all contracts, contractor’s performance is monitored against stated contract requirements and standards. 

Terms and conditions of the contract provide a means to ensure that the contractor 

is effectively performing, e.g., penalties, show cause (notice of non-performance), and 

termination. The IJC Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate (ACOD) monitors all 

of the PSCs in order to enforce compliance with US requirements. Each unit and 

installation commander is also responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance 

by all PSC personnel in order to reduce the future insider threat. 
60 

Mr. KISSELL. Once Afghan nationals are hired to provide security to U.S. Forces, 

how much access are they allowed throughout the forward operating base or military facility? Similarly, why aren’t there 10% random daily biometric checks for Afghan nationals accessing a U.S. facility with the purpose of providing security? 

Mr. MOTSEK. The level of access provided to U.S. Military facilities is based on 

the specific contract. USFOR–A FRAGOs 11–128 and 11–086 set specific requirements for units using contract security personnel. Contractors are required to wear 

access badges issued via biometric registration in order to ensure that they operate 

in areas authorized by their contract. 

USFOR–A FRAGO 11–086 now directs commanders to conduct weekly biometric 

screening of local national contractors. Commanders may use their discretion in determining how to execute the required weekly screening. The use of a 10 percent 

random check would be up to the discretion of the requiring activity commander. 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there any other related, recorded problems on this issue than 

those that led to a death? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Since May 2007, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) elements have identified 42 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and 3 Private Security Contractor (PSC)-related insider incidents. The facts of each event are different. We utilize the lessons learned from such incidents to identify potential 

counter-measures and reduce the primary causes of insider attacks. 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there other companies with similar security responsibilities as 

Tundra Strategies, which are setting good examples, such that U.S. forces would 

want to see emulated? Furthermore, how closely are U.S. forces monitoring these 

companies to ensure that there aren’t other up-and-coming potential assailants? 

Mr. SEDNEY. USFOR–A Fragmentary Order 11–128 sets specific standards for all 

of the private security contractor (PSCs) supporting U.S. installations. As with all 

DoD contracts, the contractor’s performance is monitored against stated contract requirements and standards. The terms and conditions of the contract provide a 

means to ensure that the contractor is effectively performing, e.g., penalties, show 

cause (notice of non-performance), and termination. The U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate (ACOD) monitors all U.S. PSCs in order to 

enforce compliance with U.S. requirements. Each unit and installation commander 

is also responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance by all PSC personnel in 

order to reduce the future insider threat. 

Mr. KISSELL. Once Afghan nationals are hired to provide security to U.S. Forces, 

how much access are they allowed throughout the forward operating base or military facility? Similarly, why aren’t there 10% random daily biometric checks for Afghan nationals accessing a U.S. facility with the purpose of providing security? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The level of access provided to U.S. military facilities is based on 

the specific contract. USFOR–A Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) 11–128 and 11–086 

set specific requirements for units using contract security personnel. Contractors are 

required to wear access badges issued via biometric registration in order to ensure 

that they operate in areas authorized by their contract. 

USFOR–A FRAGO 11–086 now directs commanders to conduct weekly biometric 

screening of local national contractors. Commanders may use their discretion in determining how to conduct the required weekly screening. The use of a 10 percent 

random check would be up to the discretion of the requiring activity commander. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. A background investigation for U.S. personnel can range 

from a simple criminal records check to a more thorough review, like what is done 

for many in the Intelligence Community. When hiring Afghan Nationals to protect 

the personal security of U.S. forces and/or assets, it makes sense that background 

investigations should be done for them as well. However, it does not seem possible 

to do the same level of background investigation in Afghanistan as those done in 

the United States. Are some types of background investigation applied to Afghan 

Nationals, and how do you plan on incorporating those results into your employment decision? 

General TOWNSEND. Agency checks at both local and national level are required. 

Local agency checks include identity verification via valid Tazkera (the Afghan identity card), verification of work history, address confirmation, fingerprinting, and 

local police check to receive a clearance certificate for each employee. National agency checks require contractors to submit a completed employee information package 

to the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Afghanistan National Directorate of Security (NDS), which investigates major crime and potential connections 

to terrorist organizations. Pending a successfully cleared background check, the Af-
61 

ghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs would then issue a certificate of successful 

vetting and acceptance. 

Additionally, contractors are required to support the Afghan Government (GIRoA) 

portion of the vetting process by submitting requests for biometric enrollment, ensuring availability of language interpretation services during the screening and enrollment processes, and requesting Global Unique Identification number from 

GIRoA enrollers to verify each individual enrollment. 

Prior to submission of an arming request, all local nationals and third-country nationals must submit to full biometric enrollment. Additional routine biometric 

screening then continues in accordance with local installation policies and procedures. All contractors are required to immediately notify the contracting officer’s 

representative, the local installation Force Protection agency, and the theater arming approval authority of individuals who are revealed as potential security risks 

during biometric processing. 

Contractors are also required to develop a process by which employee termination 

would be communicated to the contracting officer and local installation Force Protection agencies. While the aim is to prevent unauthorized access, the process also communicates potential security risks to NDS for biometric watch list consideration. To 

prevent the rehiring of high-risk personnel, all contractors are additionally required 

to develop a plan of action to address the tracking and communication of employee 

dismissals to all sites managed by the contractor. Finally, according to the terms 

of its contract, contractors are required to maintain records on the screening status 

of its employees for six months following termination. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. A background investigation for U.S. personnel can range 

from a simple criminal records check to a more thorough review, like what is done 

for many in the Intelligence Community. When hiring Afghan Nationals to protect 

the personal security of U.S. forces and/or assets, it makes sense that background 

investigations should be done for them as well. However, it does not seem possible 

to do the same level of background investigation in Afghanistan as those done in 

the United States. Are some types of background investigation applied to Afghan 

Nationals, and how do you plan on incorporating those results into your employment decision? 

Mr. MOTSEK. Agency checks at both local and national level are required. Local 

agency checks include identity verification via valid Tazkera (the Afghan identity 

card), verification of work history, address confirmation, fingerprinting, and local police check to receive a clearance certificate for each employee. National agency 

checks require contractors to submit a completed employee information package to 

the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Afghanistan National Directorate 

of Security (NDS), which investigates major crime and potential connections to terrorist organizations. Pending a successfully cleared background check, the Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs would then issue a certificate of successful vetting 

and acceptance. 

Additionally, contractors are required to support the Afghan Government (GIRoA) 

portion of the vetting process by submitting requests for biometric enrollment, ensuring availability of language interpretation services during the screening and enrollment processes, and requesting Global Unique Identification number from 

GIRoA enrollers to verify each individual enrollment. 

Prior to submission of an arming request, all local nationals and third-country nationals must submit to full biometric enrollment. Additional routine biometric 

screening then continues in accordance with local installation policies and procedures. All contractors are required to immediately notify the contracting officer’s 

representative, the local installation Force Protection agency, and the theater arming approval authority of individuals who are revealed as potential security risks 

during biometric processing. 

Contractors are also required to develop a process by which employee termination 

would be communicated to the contracting officer and local installation Force Protection agencies. While the aim is to prevent unauthorized access, the process also communicates potential security risks to NDS for biometric watch list consideration. To 

prevent the rehiring of high-risk personnel, all contractors are additionally required 

to develop a plan of action to address the tracking and communication of employee 

dismissals to all sites managed by the contractor. Finally, according to the terms 

of its contract, contractors are required to maintain records on the screening status 

of its employees for six months following termination. 

Æ