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75–861PDF 2012

ASSESSING U.S. POLICY ON PEACEKEEPING

OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012

Serial No. 112–186

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................................... 5

The Honorable Esther Brimmer, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International 

Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................... 20

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement ........................................... 8

The Honorable Esther Brimmer: Prepared statement ......................................... 23

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights: 

Report to Congress on United Nations Efforts to Prevent Trafficking in 

Persons and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions ................................................................................................................... 60

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse ........................................................................... 68

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

Written response from the Honorable Esther Brimmer to question submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith .................................... 74

(1)

ASSESSING U.S. POLICY ON PEACEKEEPING 

OPERATIONS IN AFRICA 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order, and good afternoon. And let me first apologize for being a bit late. We did have 

votes and then all of us had a little trouble getting back because 

there is so much going on the floor, so again I apologize to you. 

Good afternoon. Today’s hearing will examine U.S. policy on 

international peacekeeping operations in Africa, our material support, and other support for peacekeeping operations in African 

countries. 

The U.S. Government contributes more than $1 billion annually 

for African peacekeeping, most recently dedicating $1.6 billion for 

Fiscal Year 2012. Today’s hearing offers an opportunity to look at 

how we evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations that 

we support in Africa. 

There are several current peacekeeping operations in Africa encouraged and/or supported by the U.S. Government, and others are 

being planned even now. The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations have been called into question in terms of planning and execution. This is critical at a time when important peacekeeping operations in Mali are in the planning stage. Eventually the length 

of peacekeeping operations often run into decades, and new models 

of peacekeeping operations such as hybrids will be discussed. 

Finally, but also of significant importance, we will be inquiring 

as to how well the United Nations is implementing its zero tolerance policy with respect to human trafficking and other forms of 

sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel. I personally have chaired seven hearings—that is seven—that highlighted 

that issue and other peacekeeping issues in this, the 112th Congress, alone, most recently a June 29, 2012, hearing on Mali. The 

Trafficking Victims Protection Act that I sponsored in 2000, and its 

reauthorizations, also contain provisions related to peacekeeping 

operations including the prevention of human trafficking by peacekeeping personnel as part of the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons. 

2

Peacekeeping refers to activities that create conditions favoring 

lasting peace. However, it is often associated with other related 

concepts, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Peacemaking involves 

dealing with conflicts in progress and focuses on diplomatic action 

to bring hostile parties to a negotiated settlement. Peacebuilding 

describes outside interventions designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable peace. As the concept of peacekeeping has evolved, it now includes all three elements. 

The first U.N. peacekeeping mission was in 1948, when a small, 

armed observer force was sent to monitor a buffer zone between 

Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East. Between then and the end 

of the Cold War in the early 1990s, there were 18 U.N. peacekeeping missions. Since 1990, however, the U.N. peacekeeping has 

risen to more than 50 missions and the number of peacekeepers 

worldwide has grown to nearly 100,000. The record of success of 

U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa has been mixed. A few of 

them have been credited as qualified successes, such as the U.N. 

mission in Sierra Leone. The U.N. operation in Cote d’Ivoire also 

was considered successful but remains incomplete. 

Unfortunately other U.N. operations have not been as successful. 

For example, the U.N. mission in Somalia which operated from 

1992 to 1993 is clearly seen as such as a failure. We all remember 

the infamous Black Hawk Down incident in which 18 U.S. soldiers 

were killed following the shooting down of an American helicopter. 

The repercussions of that disaster have affected the subsequent, I 

believe, unwillingness of the U.S. Government to commit U.S. 

troops to peacekeeping operations in Africa. And I remember so 

well, personally, when Les Aspin came before the Hill and was 

asked in a pointed way, why weren’t the recommendations by the 

commanders on the ground for more capabilities given credence? 

And he said he didn’t think it would fly in the Congress. We 

weren’t asked. And I think it would have flown and it would have 

been supported robustly, but regrettably it was not. And we now 

have regional organizations developing and managing peacekeeping 

operations, sometimes in concert with U.N. or sometimes on their 

own. The African Union, the Economic Community of West African 

States, and even NATO have engaged in peacekeeping operations 

on the African continent. The changes in peacekeeping operations 

in Africa will have a profound impact on U.S. policy and financial 

and other support for such operations. 

As I mentioned earlier, sex trafficking and other forms of sexual 

exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping personnel are issues 

of serious concern. U.N. peacekeeping missions have been subject 

to repeated accusations of sexual exploitation and abuse of local 

women and young girls by foreign peacekeepers since at least 2001. 

The U.N. claims it has effectively addressed this problem, but we 

need to ensure that the blue helmets that are supposed to instill 

hope that peace is at hand don’t create fear, abuse, and exploitation by the very protectors sent to help. 

And finally I would say paranthetically to that, we have held in 

this subcommittee, three hearings on what was going on in Democratic Republic of the Congo. I went there and met with peacekeepers as well many of the women who had been exploited, and 

3

young girls in shelters, and was shocked, frankly, how for $1 or a 

loaf of bread, young 13- and 14-year-olds were being abused by 

U.N. peacekeepers. I am happy to say that at the time, Jane Holl 

Lute, who was then working for the U.N. and who had pushed 

hard within the U.N. system for the zero tolerance policy, made a 

major difference, and she is now as we all know, number two over 

at Department of Homeland Security. So U.S. leadership there was 

very robust and very, I think, effective, but there still is a persistent problem. Kofi Annan, to his credit, announced a zero tolerance policy, just like George Bush did for our military and deployments overseas, NATO did the same thing. But at the time we 

weren’t talking about zero tolerance, but zero compliance, and perhaps you might want to speak whether or not there have been real 

gains made in ensuring that U.N. and AU peacekeepers are not 

complicit in any way. 

I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, 

the ranking member, for any comments she might have. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and once again of course, 

thank you for holding this hearing and for your leadership on this 

issue. 

I wanted to just take a moment, of course, to offer my deepest 

sympathies to our friends from the State Department. I am sure 

that both of you knew the Ambassador, and all of us have been 

shocked by what occurred, but also what is occurring. And I know 

it is not the subject of this hearing, but if there is some update that 

you could provide about the status of our Embassies in Yemen and 

Tunisia and Egypt, that would be appreciated. 

Today’s hearing on peacekeeping operations is timely as we continue to see a serious need for these missions across the continent, 

especially in the Sudans, the Great Lakes region and in West Africa. It is my hope that today’s hearing will not merely bring to the 

surface how we further strengthen these peacekeeping commitments and coordination but that we can acknowledge the tremendous benefit that peacekeepers play in preventing and addressing 

conflict in rapidly changing environments where there is clearly a 

need to promote and sustain peace, stability and security. 

I want to offer my appreciation to Ambassador Carson and Assistant Secretary Brimmer for participating in today’s hearing, and 

for your steadfast efforts on this and many other areas that are 

bettered in no small part to your leadership and your vision. 

The United Nations reports that in 2012 and 2013, the U.N. 

peacekeeping operations budget, which just began, is estimated at 

$7.23 billion. As we will hear from the witnesses today, I would appreciate greater clarity on the success of U.S. funds in supporting 

peacekeeping efforts across Africa, and in what ways the Global 

Peace Operations Initiative, peacekeeping operations and the contributions for international peacekeeping account budget requests 

are coordinated. As we make tough budget decisions while at the 

same time see protracted conflicts across the continent, I certainly 

don’t believe that now is the time to turn our backs on peacekeeping, particularly as tensions grow in places like Mali. I am interested in making sure that with limited resources we spend them 

effectively to protect populations in harm’s way and promote security toward greater freedom and lasting peace. 

4

Let me add that U.N. peacekeeping has a long history as was described by my colleague. The benefits of peacekeeping have definitely been clear. I will just give one example. A GAO report notes 

that U.N. peacekeeping is eight times less expensive than funding 

U.S. forces with a similar mandate. These benefits have also long 

been recognized by both political parties. Over the last decade the 

U.N. Security Council, with support from both the Bush and 

Obama administrations, authorized a nearly three-fold increase in 

the number of peacekeeping personnel serving in the field. And the 

reason for this of course is clear. U.N. peacekeeping operations are 

firmly in America’s interest. Countries undergoing conflict threaten 

the national and economic security of the U.S., risk becoming safe 

havens for terrorists and criminals and often feature serious problems of human rights abuses and human deprivation. By allowing 

the U.S. to share the burden for addressing these issues it is clear 

that the success of these missions is in our long-term interest. 

I also wanted to raise, as my colleague did, the sexual exploitation that we of course believe must continue to be prioritized, and 

wanted to know if you would comment on the assessment of training programs of military and police personnel, the compliance that 

Congressman Smith was talking about. Are the peacekeepers that 

perpetuate and exploit those that are charged, actually are they 

charged and held accountable? With the implementation of the relatively new global field support strategy, reforms appear to be underway to more effectively address the management of global inventories and logistics. Are you satisfied with these reforms? Are 

they hitting their benchmarks? Are the various missions getting 

the resources they need to credibly fulfill their mandate? 

I also wanted to raise Mali. We talked about Mali before, but 

also next week we are going to look at developments and growing 

tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, and both of these provide 

serious concerns for us. The Mali situation calls for a peacekeeping 

force. And secondarily, in the DRC, do you believe a neutral force 

to monitor the DRC/Rwanda border is needed, and would the U.N. 

mission in DRC be the appropriate force to undertake such a mission? 

Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass, thank you very much. 

Mr. Turner? 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to offer my 

condolences to the members of State for the loss of your colleague 

and some American heroes. I am interested in hearing what you 

have to say. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. 

I would like to now introduce our very distinguished panel, beginning first with Ambassador Johnnie Carson, who serves as Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs, a position he has held since May 2009. Ambassador Carson has a long 

and distinguished career in public policy. Over 37 years in the Foreign Service including time as our Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, 

and Zimbabwe. Ambassador Carson has also served as the staff director of this subcommittee, so it is always great to have you here, 

anytime you want go back to the other side of the dais—and as a 

Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania. Ambassador Carson is a recipiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:31 Nov 29, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\091312\75861 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

ent of numerous prestigious awards for his service from the U.S. 

Department of State. 

Then we will hear from Dr. Esther Brimmer. She currently 

serves as the Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, a position she has held since April 

2009. Dr. Brimmer previously worked in the State Department in 

the Office of Policy Planning, and for the Undersecretary of Political Affairs where her portfolio included peacekeeping. Dr. Brimmer has also worked for the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing 

Deadly Conflict, here in the House of Representatives, and with 

McKinsey & Company, a global management consulting firm. 

Ambassador Carson, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. CARSON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Congresswoman 

Bass, Congressman Turner, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to talk about peacekeeping in Africa. As members of the 

committee are aware, President Obama’s recent presidential policy 

directive identified our efforts to advance peace and security on the 

continent as one of the four pillars of the administration’s new Africa strategy. This is an area where we have witnessed both 

signifant progress and major challenges over the past decade. Angola, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 

have progressed from periods of prolonged civil conflict to new eras 

of relative peace and stability. Nonetheless, this progress remains 

fragile in many countries, and all too many states are mired still 

in serious conflict including Somalia, the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan. 

Moreover, as illustrated by the ongoing situation in Mali, the 

fragile nature of democratic institutions on the continent means 

that even relatively stable countries can quickly unravel and fall 

back into conflict. 

If we are to assist our African partners in achieving a more 

democratic, prosperous and stable Africa, we must address these 

conflicts. Conflict destabilizes states and borders, stifles economic 

growth and investment and robs young Africans of opportunity for 

an education and better life. To address these conflicts we need 

well resourced U.N., African Union, and regional peacekeeping operations. 

My colleague, Assistant Secretary Brimmer, will be focusing on 

the U.N. element of peacekeeping in Africa, and therefore I would 

like to focus my testimony on the efforts of the African Union and 

the subregional organizations to develop their own peacekeeping 

capacities and to conduct operations in support of peace and security objectives on the continent. I also want to discuss U.S. Government efforts to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity at the regional, subregional, and national levels. 

The founding of the African Union, or AU, in 2002, brought with 

it the promise of a more robust African regional architecture that 

would one day be capable of addressing and coordinating responses 

to the myriad challenges facing the continent. This newfound promVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:31 Nov 29, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\091312\75861 HFA PsN: SHIRL
6

ise extended to the area of peace and security, where the AU set 

forth a vision for an African Peace and Security Architecture. Partially modeled after the United Nations and other regional organizations, this architecture is designed to enable the African Union 

to act as an active and dynamic adjunct to the work of the United 

Nations in its mission to maintain international peace and security 

including in Africa. The centerpiece of this architecture is the AU’s 

African Standby Force, which is comprised of five regional standby 

brigades ready to respond to a range of contingencies from providing support to political missions, to robust military interventions 

to prevent genocide. The five brigades are the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force, the Eastern African 

Standby Force, the Southern African Development Community Brigade, the Central African Multinational Force, and the North African Standby Brigade. 

All four sub-Saharan African brigades have taken initial steps toward becoming operational including setting up headquarters and 

identifying pledged units from member states. They have also participated in a number of multinational exercises. The North African 

Standby Brigade has made considerably less progress than the 

other four sub-Saharan brigades. However, none of the brigades is 

currently capable of conducting the range of operations contained 

within the African Standby Forces mandate without significant and 

ongoing external support. 

Although the African Standby Force remains a work in progress, 

the AU and the subregional organizations like ECOWAS have not 

stood idly by in the face of persistent conflict. In fact, in many 

cases the African Union and the subregional organizations have 

proven to be more responsive than the broader international community in attempting to address serious conflicts in Africa quickly. 

The African Union deployed its first peacekeeping operation to Burundi in 2003, in support of the international effort to end the longrunning civil war there. In 2004, the African Union Mission in 

Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in response to the horrific conflict 

gripping Darfur. Despite the immense challenges and obstructions 

that faced the troop contributors in the mission area, AMIS helped 

to set the conditions and prepare the ground for the deployment for 

a larger and more complex U.N./AU hybrid operation called 

UNAMID, which remains deployed in Darfur to this day. The AU 

authorized, Tanzanian-led intervention, in the Comoros in 2008 

was another example of the region stepping up quickly in response 

to a regional security challenge. 

Somalia best demonstrates the valuable role that the African 

Union can play in terms of regional peacekeeping. The African 

Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has now been operating for 

5 years in what has been one of the most volatile conflict environments in Africa. Over those 5 years, AMISOM, comprised of troops 

from Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, has gradually extended its area 

of operations from a small enclave near the international airport in 

Mogadishu to encompass all of Mogadishu and the surrounding 

towns. It has done so with the support of the United Nations in the 

form of a logistic support package provided through the U.N. 

Support Office for AMISOM. AMISOM is now in the process of 

deploying to additional regions in southwestern Somalia, and the 

7

recent incorporation of Kenyan forces into AMISOM has further extended the mission’s reach. 

We think AMISOM has been a relatively strong success story, 

and as many of you know, on Monday of this week the Transitional 

Federal Government effectively went out of business in Mogadishu. 

And over the past year as a result of the gains that have been 

made militarily by AMISOM, we have seen a new Constitution 

written and approved. We have seen the election of a new Parliament of approximately 250 members, half the size of the old Parliament. We have seen the election of a new speaker of Parliament, 

and on Monday we saw the election of a new President. We expect 

a prime minister and a cabinet to be named shortly. None of this 

would have been possible without the work of AMISOM. 

African subregional organizations have also played an important 

role in responding to armed conflicts on the continent. ECOWAS 

responded to the crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and set the 

stage for the subsequent U.N. action. 

The examples I have cited reflect the commitment of the African 

Union, the subregional organizations and member states to undertake and participate in peacekeeping missions across the continent. 

However, their participation exposes the enormous challenges that 

many African states face. These challenges are a lack of resources. 

The African Union and subregional organizations remain dependent on support from the donor community for specialized training 

for transport and equipment, for logistics, for medical facilities, and 

even in some cases for salaries. Sometimes, AU member states also 

lack the capacity to undertake the complex mission planning and 

management that is required to execute complex multinational and 

multiunit operations. 

While these challenges are significant and in some instances systemic, I can assure the committee that we in Washington and the 

administration are committed to helping our African partners to 

overcome them. Our peacekeeping assistance programs, which are 

primarily funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, 

sometimes called GPOI, and the broader Account, PKO, focus on 

addressing the capability gaps of our African partners as well as 

strengthening the ability of our African partners to plan, to train 

and to deploy and sustain peacekeeping operations on their own. 

These deployment support and capacity-building activities are executed through a close partnership between the Department of State 

and the Department of Defense. We continue to build on these programs and to expand them out. Should we falter in our commitment to developing African peacekeeping capacity, the consequences will be heavier burdens on the international community 

as a whole, on the United States and our partners whether through 

deployment of more U.N. blue helmet operations or even direct 

military interventions in the cases where our own national security 

is at stake. 

It is clearly in our interest to support U.N. peacekeeping programs across Africa. It is in our interest to support the AU’s capacity building in this area, and it is in our interest to support the 

subregional efforts which are designed to maintain the peace and 

prevent greater crises from occurring. 

8

I want to thank the committee again for the opportunity to address you on this important issue. I have a longer written statement that has been given to you. I welcome the opportunity to be 

here and to take your questions after my colleague speaks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]


75861a-1.eps
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75861a-2.eps

If we are to assist our African partners in achieving a more democratic, 

prosperous, stable, and secure Africa, we must address these conflicts. Conflict 

destabilizes states and borders, stit1es economic growth and investment, and robs 

young Africans of the opportlmity for an education and a better life. To address 

these cont1icts, we need well-resourced UN, African Union (AU), and regional 

peacekeeping operations. That is why the topic ofthis hearing is so vitally 

important. 

My colleague, Assistant Secretary Brimmer, will be focusing on the UN 

element of peacekeeping in Africa, and therefore I want to focus my testimony on 

the efforts of the African Union and sub-regional organizations to develop their 

own peacekeeping capacities and conduct operations in support of peace and 

security objectives on the continent T also want to discuss U.S. Government 

efforts to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity at the regional, sub-regional, 

and national levels. 

The African Peace and Security Architecture 

The founding of the African Union or "AU" in 2002 brought with it the 

promise of a more robust African regional architecture that would one day be 

capable of addressing and coordinating responses to the myriad challenges facing 

the continent. This newfOlmd promise extended to the area of peace and security, 

-2-
10


75861a-3.eps

where the AU set forth a vision for an African Peace and Security Architecture. 

Partially modeled after the UN and other regional organizations, this architecture is 

designed to enable the AU to act as an active and dynamic adj unct to the work of 

the UN in its mission to maintain intemational peace and security. The centerpiece 

of this architecture is the AU's African Standby Force (ASF), which is composed 

of five regional standby brigades ready to respond to a range of contingencies, 

from providing support to political missions, to robust military interventions to 

prevent genocide. The five brigades are the Economic Community of West 

African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force, the Eastem African Standby Force, the 

Southem African Development Community (SADC) Brigade, the Central African 

Multinational Force (FOMAC), and the North African Standby Brigade Capability 

(NARC). 

All four sub-Sallaran African brigades have taken initial steps towards 

becoming operational, including setting up headquarters, identifying pledged lmits 

from member states, and conducting multinational exercises. The North African 

Standby Brigade has made considerably less progress towards achieving full 

operational capability, and progress may be further delayed by the events of the 

Arab Spring. 

The ASF remains a work in progress. The five brigades are in varying 

stages of readiness. None of the brigades is currently capable of conducting the 

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75861a-4.eps

range of operations contained within the ASF' s mandate without significant 

external support in the fonll of financial resources, training, logistical assistance, 

and equipment. While most ofthe brigades have identified sites for their mandated 

logistics depots, they either have made no progress in establishing the depots 

themselves, or have not fully stocked their depots to address the range of 

contingencies. Capacity at the level of AU headquarters, specifically the Peace 

Support Operations Division, to manage and direct the force remains limited due to 

resource and staffing constraints. 

A U and Regional Operations 

Although the ASF remains a work in progress, the AU and sub-regional 

organizations like ECOWAS have not stood idly by in the face of persistent 

contlict. In fact, in many cases, the AU and the sub-regional organizations have 

proven to be more responsive than the broader international community in ternlS of 

addressing conflict quickly. The AU deployed its first peacekeeping operation to 

Bunmdi in 2003 in support ofthe international effort to end the long-running civil 

war there, and this helped set the stage for a successful follow-on UN operation in 

2004. In 2004, a larger and more ambitious mission, the African Union Mission in 

Sudan (AMIS), was deployed in response to the horrific conflict gripping Darfur. 

Despite the immense challenges and obstructions that faced the troop contributors 

in the mission area, AMIS helped to set the conditions and prepare the grOlmd for 

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12


75861a-5.eps

the deployment of a larger and more complex UN-AU hybrid operation, 

UNAMID, which remains deployed in Darfur to this day. The AU-authorized, 

Tanzanian-led intervention in Comoros in 2008 was another example of the region 

stepping up qnickly in response to a regional security challenge. 

Somalia best demonstrates the valuable role the AU can play in teons of 

regional peacekeeping. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has 

now been operating for more than five years in the most volatile conflict 

enviromnent on the continent. The AU troop contributors, including Uganda, 

Bunmdi, and Kenya, have paid a high price in tenns of lives and national treasure. 

But the progress AMISOM has achieved since its modest beginning in 2007 is 

remarkable. 

Over the past tlve years, AMISOM has gradually extended its area of 

operations from a small enclave near the international airport in Mogadishu to 

encompass all of Mogadishu and the surrounding towns. It has done so with 

support from the UN in the foon of the logistics support package provided through 

the UN Support Office for AMlSOM. AMISOM is now in the process of 

deploying to additional regions in southwestern Somalia, and the recent 

incorporation of Kenyan forces into AMISOM has further extended the mission's 

reach. The UN Monitoring Group reported in June 2012 that the Somali terrorist 

group al-Shabaab "has sutlered dramatic reverses over the past year, experiencing 

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75861a-6.eps

military defeats, the loss of territory and the erosion of its revenue base, setbacks 

that have exacerbated rifts within the group's senior leadership." This is directly 

attributable to the success of the African-led AMISOM. It is no exaggeration to 

say that through AMISOM, the AU has given Somalia and its long-suffering 

people their best chance for sustained peace and stability in over a generation. 

African sub-regional organizations have also played an important role in 

responding to armed conflicts on the continent. In particular, ECOWAS has 

repeatedly shown that it can help to reestablish stability and set the stage for 

follow-on UN peacekeeping operations within West Africa, as it did in Liberia and 

Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of Central African States - usually 

referred to by its French acronym CEEAC - has also made a small but notable 

contribution to regional peace and security by deploying the mission known as 

MICOP AX to the Central African Republic Lllder the auspices Central African 

brigade of the ASF - FOMAC - since 2008. The Eastern Africa Standby Force, 

which is supported by 10 East African cOLlltries, is currently supporting AMISOM 

through the deployment of staff officers to AMI SOM' s headquarters in 

Mogadishu. 

Challenges Facing AU Peacekeeping 

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These examples demonstrate the level of political will that underlies the 

commitment ofthe AU, the sub-regional organizations, and member states to 

peacekeeping on the continent. These experiences also demonstrate the immense 

array of challenges facing African peacekeepers. These challenges include 

increasingly dangerous and complex conflict environments in which African 

peacekeepers are serving, and systemic weaknesses within African militaries and 

the regional organizations themselves. 

AMISOM best exemplifies the danger and complexity of mission 

environments. In no other mission on the continent are peacekeepers facing such a 

challenging operational environment. While the mission has succeeded in driving 

al-Shabaab further from Mogadishu and surrounding towns, al-Shabaab remains a 

dangerous enemy that possesses the will and the capability to wreak havoc across 

southem and central Somalia. In confronting AMISOM, al-Shabaab has utilized 

an array of tactics that mirror those facing U.S. forces in lraq and Afghanistan, 

including increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive devices, suicide 

bombers, and sniper fire. 

With respect to systemic weaknesses, a lack of resources has proven to be 

the most significant obstacle to effective African peacekeeping missions. The AU 

and sub-regional organizations remain dependent on support from the donor 

comrmmity for a broad range of mission requirements, including training, 

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equipment, logistics support, and salaries. Oftentimes, AU member states lack the 

trained persomlel or equipment required to conduct specialized tasks, such as 

combat engineering, logistics resupply, medical support, and vehicle maintenance. 

The limited mission plmming mId mmlagement capabilities at AU headquarters can 

sometimes reinforce the tendency of individual country contingents to plan and 

execute operations with only minimal or ad-hoc coordination with the contingents 

from other troop contributors. 

How the United States is Helping to Address these Challenges 

While these challenges are significant, [ can assure the Committee that we 

are committed to helping our AfricmI partners overcome them. Our peacekeeping 

assistance progra111s, which are primarily funded through the Global Peace 

Operations Initiative (GPO!) mId the broader Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 

Account, focus on addressing the capability gaps of our African partners, as well as 

strengthening the ability of our African partners to plan, train for, deploy, and 

sustain peacekeeping operations on their own. These deployment support and 

capacity-building activities are executed through a close partnership between the 

Department of State mId the Department of Defense. 

This whole-of-govemment commitment is most evident in the case of 

AMISOM. Since 2007, the U.S. Govemment has provided more thmI $355 million 

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for equipment, training, and logistical support to AMISOM troop contributors, to 

help AMISOM overcome the threat of al-Shabaab and safeguard the Somali 

political process. We have tailored this support to meet the unique challenges of 

the AMISOM mission. For instance, the peacekeeping training provided through 

the Department of State's Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 

(ACOTA) program has been expanded and lengthened for AMISOM troop 

contributors, and covers topics such as protection of civilians, human rights, 

countering improvised explosive devices, maritime security, and mechanized 

infantry operations. The Department of Defense is contributing complementary, 

specialized counterterrorism training and equipment under Section 1206 authority, 

including combat engineering training and equipment, Raven unmamled aerial 

vehicles, and secure conll11lmications. 

Our joint support is not restricted to just AMISOM, however. We are 

heavily engaged in building African peacekeeping capacity at three different 

levels: at the level of the AU's headquarters, at the level of sub-regional 

organizations, and at the level of individual member states. Through GPO!, we 

have provided a peace and security advisor to the AU's Peace Support Operations 

Division (PSOD) since 2005 to assist the AU in its effort to develop the ASF, as 

well as office equipment to support daily operations at the PSOD. The Department 

of Defense has provided training to AU staff on managing defense resources, and 

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is helping the AU to develop a connnunications network that links the headquarters 

to the regional brigades. 

We are also providing targeted assistance at the level of sub-regional 

organizations and the ASF brigades designed to help bring those brigades closer to 

full operational capability. Through GPOI, we have provided extensive support to 

ECOWAS and its standby brigade, to include advisory assistance, communications 

equipment, logistics training, support for ECOWAS multinational exercises, and 

assistance to ECOWAS' regional training centers. In East Africa, ACOTA offers 

staff officer training for member states that comprise the East African Standby 

Brigade (EASBRIG), and U.S. Africa Command provided support for the 

EASBRIG's first major exercise in Djibouti. Our engagement has been more 

I imited with the other three brigades, but we are still supporting their development 

through bilateral train-and-equip initiatives in their respective member states. 

The military units of African member states that receive U.S. training and 

equipment participate in ongoing operations and can contribute to the success of 

the ASF. These units have the greatest positive impact on African peacekeeping. 

ACOTA is the centerpiece of our effort to build capacity and self-sufficiency in 

partner countries by training and equipping battalions and other units that are 

deploying to active peace support operations. ACOTA, which is funded primarily 

through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, succeeded the earlier Africa Crisis 

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Response Initiative in 2004. Sixteen member states from across the continent are 

active partners in the ACOTA program, and the program has directly trained over 

229,000 African peacekeepers just since 2005. More importantly, ACOT A 

conducts a "train-the-trainer" program building a cadre of host nation 

trainerslinstructors who are taking a leading role in conducting pre-deployment 

training for their own contingents. U.S. Africa Command is also making a 

significant contribution at the bilateral level, not only through the course of normal 

military-to-military engagement, but also by participating in ACOT A events 

through the provision of military mentors and trainers, and conducting specialized 

logistics training activities through programs such as the Africa Deployment 

Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT). 

Conclusion 

We will continue to work closely with our partners on the continent and in 

the donor community to build the capacity ofthe AU, sub-regional organizations, 

and individual member states to conduct peacekeeping operations more eftectively 

and thereby contribute to global efforts to address fragility. Should we falter in our 

commitment to developing African peacekeeping capacity, the consequence will 

be heavier burdens on the international community as a whole, whether through the 

deployment of more UN "blue-helmet" operations, or even direct military 

intervention in cases where national security is at stake. We strongly believe that 

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the only way to achieve sustainable, long-term stability on the continent is to 

provide our African partners with the tools needed to bring about that stability 

themselves. 

I want to thank the Committee again for the opportunity to address this 

important issue. 

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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Carson, thank you very much. 

Dr. Brimmer? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ESTHER BRIMMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. BRIMMER. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members of the subcommittee, thank you for convening this hearing on 

United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. I appreciate the 

subcommittee’s attention to these important issues, and I am 

pleased to discuss the Obama administration’s commitment to promoting peace and security across Africa through multilateral action 

and shared responsibility. 

Mr. Chairman, U.N. peacekeeping missions are a key tool to help 

bring stability to countries emerging from violent conflict, and to 

prevent conflict’s return. This administration’s support for U.N. 

peacekeeping is deep, and builds on a strong, decades long bipartisan effort to improve these operations’ effectiveness. That support 

is rooted in the fact that peacekeeping is not a policy in itself. It 

is a key tool to deliver on U.S. policy goals. U.N. missions deploy 

to promote lasting political settlements that can in turn bring a durable peace. They provide backing for those who agree to put down 

their guns and to support the rule of law. 

Assistant Secretary Carson has laid out an approach to some of 

these very peace and security issues in Africa. In my brief comments this afternoon, I will note a few highlights of the seven U.N. 

peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa. And I appreciate 

the committee’s consideration of my longer submitted testimony 

which includes a more expansive discussion of these missions, their 

objectives and the priorities that they reflect. These peacekeeping 

missions serve critical purposes: Supporting new country such as 

South Sudan; helping run elections in Liberia; promoting stability 

in Cote d’Ivoire; and trying to stem renewed violence in Eastern 

Congo. These missions are challenging and risky, but they unquestionably contribute to peace and stability across the continent. 

They are also cost effective, and in this era of increasing fiscal 

restraint that fact is worth noting. Over 70 percent of the annual 

cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations is paid by the rest of the 

world. Clearly the cost of any unilateral action would be far greater, and because U.N. peacekeeping takes advantage of collective action that leverages the unique expertise of the U.N., we ensure the 

efficient use of taxpayers’ dollars while significantly advancing U.S. 

national interests. 

These missions are often the international community’s last resort, and we know they face acute challenges especially in Africa. 

As you know, currently, roughly half of all U.N. peacekeeping operations are in Africa, comprising over 71,000 peacekeepers, thus approximately three-quarters of the people, the blue helmets, are now 

serving. 

But these are not your father’s or your mother’s peacekeeping 

missions. Instead of simply observing a ceasefire or some political 

settlement under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter as was often the 

case in decades past, and still is the case in several of the older 

missions, today’s operations frequently have complex mandates. ToVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:31 Nov 29, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\091312\75861 HFA PsN: SHIRL
21

day’s operations have a range of tasks and operate, at least in the 

case of all the missions in sub-Saharan Africa, under Chapter VII 

authority. These articles of the U.N. Charter authorize the use of 

force as part of the mission’s primary responsibility to restore and 

maintain peace and security, including the protection of civilians. 

These missions often operate in difficult environments where state 

authority is weak and peacekeepers are themselves the targets of 

violence. Yet in spite of these enhanced responsibilities and great 

challenges, U.N. peacekeeping missions have played pivotal roles 

across Africa. 

I will briefly touch on the missions and begin with Sudan and 

South Sudan. U.N. peacekeepers were instrumental in supporting 

South Sudan’s independence under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement and UNMISS is working with the new government to 

assist with strengthening its government institutions and its security sector. Also in Sudan, as with South Sudan, in Darfur the 

U.N./African Union hybrid operation, UNAMID, continues to play 

a critical role in the safety and security of Darfuris, taking a leading role in supporting the implementation of the Doha Document 

for Peace and helping ensure that humanitarian conditions don’t 

deteriorate further. 

And then Abyei, along the tense Sudan/South Sudan border, 

UNISFA has been critical to maintaining the stability despite aerial bombardments by the Sudanis’ armed forces, militia activities 

and ground attacks that have plagued the border area. There are 

also critical peacekeeping missions in West Africa, including Liberia where the UNMIL mission has assisted the government in 

strengthening its security sector and promoting the rule of law following years of devastating civil war. UNMIL has helped disarm 

over 100,000 ex-combatants including some 11,000 child soldiers, 

providing training for thousands of police officers and delivering 

critical support to the 2011 national elections which brought President Johnson Sirleaf a second term. 

UNMIL also boasts the first U.S. flag officer in a U.N. peacekeeping mission in nearly 20 years. U.S. Army Brigadier General 

Hugh Van Roosen is serving as the chief of staff, and he is one of 

28 U.S. personnel currently serving in U.N. peacekeeping missions 

worldwide. And today with our support UNMIL is evolving as 

needs change. It is beginning to shift in personnel from a focus on 

military to more police and civilian personnel as it works to complete its task and transition responsibility for security to the Government of Liberia. In another operation, in Cote d’Ivoire, UNOCI 

peacekeepers assist government efforts on security sector reform. 

They lead on demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation of 

former combatants, an effort that has been successful enough to 

allow the mission to gradually reduce its military component. 

Turning to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO, 

the second largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in the world, pursues an ambitious mandate to protect civilians and to support stability in a highly volatile, conflict-prone region. Renewed fighting 

in the eastern province of North Kivu has undermined the progress 

of the past few years, and reminds us that much work remains to 

be done to eliminate the threat to civilians posed by armed groups, 

and to take enduring action to provide effective governance in that 

22

region to address the legitimate grievances of stakeholders and arrive at a durable political agreement. 

And finally, as my colleague has already noted, in Somalia the 

United Nations provides a critical administrative support to the African Union through UNSOA, the support office to AMISOM and 

its field office. And this relationship demonstrates how multilateral 

engagement in conjunction with bilateral partners can assist regional partners in their efforts to support Somali authorities to effectively eliminate the threat from al-Shabaab. 

Mr. Chairman, no two missions are the same, but across the missions we see both best practices and critical challenges that deserve 

attention, and we need to continue to work to improve operations 

and to enhance their effectiveness. We need to continue work on 

the protection of civilians. It is a core task for all peacekeepers, 

military, police and civilian throughout the life of a mission. We 

need to work crucially on dealing with sexual and gender-based violence. And in the question and answer I would go into more detail 

about how we are addressing this incredibly important issue and 

how to further work to enforce the U.N.’s zero tolerance policy on 

exploitation. It is extremely important. We also need to work to 

support the rule of law and policing to ensure successful transition 

back to governments. We need experienced leadership. It is crucial 

to these operations to carry out their mandates. And we think more 

women need to be included in missions. 

And finally, we need to maintain fiscal discipline in peacekeeping 

budgets particularly in the current economic climate. The United 

States has led this charge, and overall budgets this year are approximately $500 million less than they were last year, saving the 

United States taxpayer nearly $141 million. 

I thank the committee for their support over the years in helping 

ensure the United Nations peacekeeping operations remain a useful and cost effective tool that serves U.S. foreign policy goals 

throughout Africa and the world, and I look forward to discussing 

these issues further and welcome any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brimmer follows:]

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Testimony by Dr. Esther D. Brimmer, 

Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs 

Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Africa Subcommittee, 

On "Peacekeeping in Africa" 

Thursday, September 13, 2012 

Chainnan Smith, Ranking Member Bass, distinguished Members ofthe 

Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on United Nations peacekeeping 

operations in Africa. T appreciate the Committee's attention to these important 

issues, and am pleased to discuss the Obama Administration's commitment to 

promoting peace and security across Africa through multilateral action and shared 

responsibility. 

As President Obama has said, "UN peacekeeping can deliver important 

results by protecting civilians, helping to rebuild society, and advancing peace 

around the world. From Sudan to Liberia to Haiti, peacekeeping operations are a 

cost-effective means for the United States and all nations to share the burden of 

promoting peace and security." UN peacekeeping missions are a key tool to help 

bring stability to countries emerging from violent connict - and to prevent a return 

to such violence. This Administration's support for UN peacekeeping operations 

is deep, and builds on a strong, decades-long, bipartisan effort to improve its 

etlectiveness. 
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75861b-2.eps

My colleague, Assistant Secretary Carson, has laid out our approach to 

peace and security in Africa, and to the regional, sub-regional and national enarts 

for peacekeeping capacity. I will focus on the role of missions led by the United 

Nations - today, the seven UN-led or supported peacekeeping missions in subSalmra Africa - and our work to back eiIective peacekeeping. We have seen the 

recent - and critical- role of peacekeepers across Africa. Supporting a new 

country in South Sudan. Helping run elections in Liberia. Promoting stability in 

Cote d'ivoire. Trying to stem renewed violence in eastern Congo. These missions 

are challenging and risky, but we recognize their contributions to peace and 

stability throughout the continent. 

In this era of increasing fiscal restraint, I would also like to highlight the 

cost-effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Over 70 percent ofthe aIIDual cost of UN 

peacekeeping operations is paid by the rest ofthe world. Perhaps more 

importantly, the cost of any unilateral action would be far greater. According to a 

2007 Government Accountability otIke study, the cost of deploying one U.S. 

solider in Haiti would cost us eight times more thaI1 deploying a UN peacekeeper. 

As the largest financial contributor to the UN system, we are conscious that 

we must ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are used efficiently, transparently and 

accountably. For example, the U.S. was instrumental in gaining General Assembly 
25


75861b-3.eps

approval for the Global Field Support Strategy, a five-year project to tum the UN's 

previous piecemeal administrative and logistical operations support system into a 

tightly and comprehensively integrated one. The U.S. continues to strongly 

support its implementation, and, to date, this initiative has resulted in savings of 

$62 million. By taking advantage of collective action and leveraging the lU1ique 

expertise of the United Nations we ensure the efficient use of taxpayer dollars 

while significantly advancing U.S. national interests. 

CORE GOALS, l\1AJOR CHALLENGES 

First, let's be clear that peacekeeping is not a policy in itself: but rather a key 

tool to deliver on policy goals. UN missions deploy to reinforce efforts to create 

the conditions for lasting political settlements that can bring a durable peace, 

working in places that have faced-or are still facing-violent conflict and war. 

They provide backing for those who agree to put down their guns and to support 

the rule of law. 

Our approach starts with strong resol utions in the Security Council, but it 

doesn't stop there. We look deeply at what will happen next - to make sure that 

missions can carry out their mandates, that they have the capacity, leadership, and 
26


75861b-4.eps

support needed to succeed. We look at the challenges that face each mission, and 

what is common across operations. 

These missions are often the international community's last resort to bring 

the parties to a peace that will work, and succeed, at preventing a return to conflict. 

Their mandates range from the protection of civilians to electoral assistance, from 

police training to observing ceasefires. None ofthis is easy, but they are critical 

tasks. We know, from the begilming, that missions will face tough challenges. Our 

job is to help them succeed and to keep focused on the larger political aim that 

each mission deploys to support. 

Indeed, since the first UN peacekeeping operation was authorized in 1948, 

the UN has deployed 67 missions worldwide, including 22 in Africa, to assist 

countries as they transition from periods of contlict to times of peace. UN 

peacekeepers have worked in some ofthe most remote regions of the world, with 

documented successes across five continents helping countries emerge from 

protracted conflict and insecurity to build a foundation for longer-term peace, 

stability, and development. 

In Africa, UN peacekeepers have faced particularly acute challenges. 

Currently, roughly half of all UN peacekeeping operations are in Africa, 

4 
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comprising over 71,000 peacekeepers - approximately three-quarters of all "blue 

helmets" currently serving. They have complex mandates, including the protection 

of civilians from active threats. They often operate in environments with weak 

state authority - or worse, are targeted by noncompliant states or their proxies. 

They are tasked with patrolling enonnous expanses of desert, dense jungle, and 

mountainous terrain, regions often without much infrastructure such as roads, 

communications, even electricity. 

As you know, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the 

United States plays a pivotal role in the establishment of any peacekeeping 

operation. Lam1ching a peacekeeping operation requires our consent, the 

agreement of the UN Security COlllcil, and the backing ofthe parties to the peace. 

Once we decide to authorize a peacekeeping mission, it is in our national interest to 

see it succeed. 

Over the past 60 years, we've seen both the potential and the shortcomings 

of multilateral peacekeeping operations. We've learned critical lessons about the 

effectiveness and limits of peacekeeping. We've seen the results when the 

mandate isn't appropriate to the need, or when violence escalates and UN 

peacekeeping missions either aren't able to or don't respond etlectively. We 

know the problem when peacekeepers themselves abuse others. In short, we know 
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75861b-6.eps

that each mission must have the leadership, resources, personnel, and capacities to 

act etlectively. 

As we confront the specific challenges faced by these missions, we recall the 

lessons leamed from operations and are mindful ofthe goal for every mission we 

authorize: the successful completion of the mission, the responsible drawdown of 

forces, and the transition ofmission responsibilities to the host government. And 

we work continually with our Security COlU1cil partners to improve mission 

mandates, identify cost savings, and close missions which have achieved their 

intended goals. In Mozambique, for example, a United Nations operation in the 

1990s helped implement the general peace agreement and monitor a fragile ceasefire following 17 years of civil war. UN peacekeepers provided the necessary 

political space for fomler enemies to begin a dialogue and build trust among each 

other, with the result that Mozambique today is on a path of sustained peace. 

Since 2000, UN peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Burundi have also 

transitioned to peace-building or political offices, respectively. Sierra Leone, 

which as recently as 2005 was host to a UN peacekeeping mission, is now prepared 

to send troops of its own to support AMISOM operations in Somalia. 

KEY UN MISSIONS IN AFRICA 

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75861b-7.eps

Let me touch on the seven UN-led or supported peacekeeping operations in 

Sub-Saharan Africa. Each plays a critical role and supports the peace and security 

ofthe continent. 

I will start with Sudan - and now, South Sudan - where UN missions have 

been pivotal. UN peacekeepers were instnunental in supporting implementation of 

the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which, just over one year ago, led to 

the creation of South Sudan as the world's newest COlUltry. After a lengthy civil 

war that left an estimated two million South Sudanese dead, the international 

community supported this peace agreement, which the United States helped 

broker. Last year, with the independence of South Sudan, the UN Mission in the 

Republic of South Sudan (UNMlSS) was established to work with the new 

government to assist with strengthening its government institutions and its security 

sector. The mission is implementing this ambitious mandate, tmder incredibly 

difficult circumstances, including an ongoing economic crisis in South Sudan, 

renewed inter-communal violence in remote areas of the country, and increased 

tensions between the Government of Sudan and the Govenunent of South Sudan 

along their shared border. Significant numbers of internally displaced people 

(IDPs), widespread food insecurity, and other humanitarian crises present 

additional challenges in a cOlmtry lacking the most basic infrastmcture, such as 

7 
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roads. Yet with our full support, UNMTSS continues to support humanitarian 

work, monitor and investigate human rights violations, and protect civilians 

through an early warning system and a civilian and military presence in the 

country's most volatile areas. 

More needs to be done to ensure UNMlSS's success going forward. We 

will continue to work with the UN and other member states to ensure that the 

mission has sufficient military helicopters and waterborne craft to get troops, 

police, and relief workers to security and humanitarian hotspots as quickly as 

possible. 

Let me turn now to Darfur, where the United States has been a strong 

supporter of a robust UN peacekeeping presence. 

UNAMlD - a hybrid UN/African Union operation - has faced significant 

obstacles to fulfilling its ambitious mandate focused on the protection of civilians. 

Despite its authorized force strength of nearly 21,000, Sudanese authorities and, to 

a lesser extent, rebel groups have regularly denied UNAMID access to areas where 

it needs to go, limiting the mission's ability to fully implement its mandate. Direct 

attacks on the mission by armed elements in the region have resulted in the deaths 

of37 UNAMlD-affiliated personnel since 2008. 

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Yet even in this insecure environment where the Govemment of Sudan fails 

to ensure the conditions for true peace and Darfuri armed movements remain 

outside the peace process, UNAMID forces continue to playa critical role in the 

safety and security of Darfur's inhabitants. UNAMTD has taken a leading role in 

supporting the implementation ofthe Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and 

UNAMlD is working to prevent humanitarian conditions from deteriorating 

further. 

For example, UNAMlD provides protection to humanitarian actors operating 

in Darfur, advocates tor the provision of greater humanitarian access by the 

Sudanese govemment, and, in some cases, assists with the delivery of critical 

supplies to the region. Of equal importance, UNAMlD provides security to 

approximately 1.7 million displaced persons living in camps, who are especially 

vulnerable to attacks. UNAMID has a special tocus on women's political 

participation and safety, with particular attention to addressing sexual and genderbased violence. 

Yet the future of Darfur remains lllcertain, and, as recent incidents have 

demonstrated, UNAMTD is not equipped or able to be everywhere at once. A third 

UN peacekeeping mission in the region - the UN Interim Security Force tor Abyei 

- is mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat in this contested border 

9 
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area of Abyei, which is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. The presence of 

approximately 4,000 tmiformed UNISF A personnel has been critical to 

maintaining stability despite the aerial bombardments from the Sudanese Armed 

Forces, militia activities, and ground attacks that have plagued the border area writ 

large. UNISF A is actively supporting demining efforts along the border in the 

Abyei area, and has been instrumental in preparing for deployment of the Joint 

Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, which will see Sudanese, South 

Sudanese, and international monitors monitoring a demilitarized border. This 

support will prove critical as the two countries continue with negotiations and 

confidence-building measures. 

Moving from the Sudans to West Africa, several UN peacekeeping missions 

provide critical bulwarks against a return to the broader anned conflicts and 

instability that plagued the region over the past two decades. 

These post-conflict operations include the UN Mission in Liberia, UNMIL, 

which is tasked with helping Liberia strengthen its security sector and promote the 

nue oflaw following years of devastating civil war. It boasts about 9,000 

unifomled personnel, including US. Army Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen, 

who is serving as the mission Chief of Staff He is the first US. flag otlicer to 

10 
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serve in a UN peacekeeping mission in nearly 20 years, and one of28 U.S. military 

personnel serving in UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. 

Today, with our support, UNM[L is beginning a shift in its personnel, from a 

focus on military to more police and civilian persOlmel, as it works to complete its 

tasks and transition responsibility for security to the government of Liberia. Its 

successes to date include helping disann over 100,000 ex-combatants including 

some 11,000 child soldiers, providing training to thousands of police ofticers, and 

delivering critical support to the 2011 national elections which brought President 

lolmson-Sirleaf a second tenn. 

Missions can experience sudden change, however, as the UNOCI mission in 

neighboring Cote d'Tvoire did in late 2010 and early 2011. Post-electoral violence 

required UNOCI, a peacekeeping mission tlrst deployed in 2004 to assist in 

implementing a 2003 peace agreement, to help ensure that power was ultimately 

ceded to the democratically elected president, Alasanne Ouattara, and to robustly 

implement its protection of civilians mandate. Today, with about 11,000 

uniformed personnel, UNOCI is tasked with assisting government efforts on 

security sector ref0f111 and leading efforts at demobilization, disarmament, and 

rehabilitation of former combatants. Regional stability was threatened during the 

Cote d'[voire crisis, when an estimated 190,000 refugees flowed into Liberia, 

11 
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straining recipient communities. Due to increased stability in Cote d'Tvoire, and 

with the support of its neighboring UN peacekeeping mission, approximately 

169,000 ofthose refugees have now voluntarily returned. 

So UNOCI is adjusting to the improved security situation, and we recently 

supported the UN Security Council reduction of one battalion from the Abidjan 

area. Today, we urge that UNOCT remains focused on the security situation, as it 

begins a transition to a reduction in its military component. 

As with UNOCT, UNMTL also is on a path for eventual completion of its 

mandate. Our expectation is that UN forces will draw down over the next few 

years, and hand over their security responsibilities to the Liberian government. 

Concerns remain, however, including over instability along the Liberian-Cote 

d'Ivoire border, where the two missions are intensitying their cooperation with 

their host governments. 

Let me tum next to the Democratic Republic of Congo. With an authorized 

force strength of over 19,000, the UN operation - called MONUSCO - is today the 

second largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. The mission is tasked 

with an ambitious mandate to protect civilians and support stability in a highly 

volatile, conflict-prone region. It is worth noting that the eastern DRC alone is 

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twice the size of Cali fomi a, with little infrastructure. The country has faced 

intractable contlict and violence, and hosts more than a million internally displaced 

persons, along with hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighboring cOlmtries 

Despite its challenges, MONUSCO has advanced peace and security in the 

DRC, pioneering innovative measures to lmderstand the threats and vulnerabilities 

facing the population, and putting together teams to try and support communities 

that face violence. MONUSCO has for several years used joint protection tean1S -

including military, police and civilian members - to build relationships with local 

confllmnities, provide their leaders with mobile phones to notify the UN of 

possible threats, and enable peacekeepers to respond quickly with both deterrent 

force and medical and other support as needed. To address some ofthe sources of 

illicit funding that help fuel the ongoing conflict, MONUSCO is partnering with 

the Government of the DRC to establish several mineral trading centers to help 

regulate and control the industry, particularly in North and South Kivu. This work 

is in addition to MONUSCO's more traditional tasks: to support DDRdisarn1ament, demobilization, and reintegration- offorn1er combatants, to train 

police officers, and to help the Govemment ofthe ORC promote stability and rule 

oflaw. 

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Today, however, renewed fighting in the eastern province of North Kivu 

has undermined the progress of the past few years. The principal challenge there is 

now one of physical security, as the mutineers who make up the M23 militia have 

chased out DRC arnled forces in a swath of the province, taking towns by force 

and conunitting gross hLUnan rights violations. Ongoing violence is precipitating a 

humanitarian crisis that the ORC Government and MONUSCO are hard-pressed to 

address alone, as they were already contending with other criminal anned groups 

posing a threat to civilians in the area, such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of 

Rwanda (FDLR) and Mai Mai rebel groups. Until the current crisis is alleviated, it 

will be difficult to pursue longer term security sector refornl and governance to 

ensure the Government can protect its population and establish State authority 

throughout the ORe. These are necessary predicates for any kind of MONUSCO 

reconfiguration or drawdown. 

Members of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region - which 

includes the DRC and Rwanda - have called for creation of a "neutral international 

torce" that will "eradicate" the M23 and other "negative torces" in eastern DRe. 

How to accomplish this goal and build an enduring peace is a huge challenge, and 

it is not at all clear from where the resources or authority tor such a torce would 

come. 

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What is clear is that the DRC - with support from MONUSCO -must 

continue its work to eliminate the threat to civilians posed by the M23 and other 

armed groups, and to take enduring action to provide effective governance in the 

eastern DRC, address the legitimate grievances of stakeholders, and arrive at a 

durable political agreement with its neighbors. As Secretary Clinton has said, "we 

support the efforts of the DRC, and we urge all the states in the region, including 

Rwanda, to work together to cut off support for the rebels in the M-23, to disann 

them and to bring their leaders to justice." These challenges require the parties to 

the conflict to address underlying causes, while in the interim ensure clear support 

to MONUSCO. 

Finally, let me tum to Somalia, where the United Nations provides critical 

administrative support to the African Union peacekeeping mission there through a 

field support office known as UNSOA. Peace and stability in Somalia has been a 

vexing challenge for more than 20 years now, and one that with the rise of alShabaab has grown to include direct threats to U.S. national security interests. 

That is why we have supported both AMISOM and the UN role backstopping 

African Union efforts to reform the Somali state. 

UNSOA provides dedicated support to AMISOM as part ofthe UN's Global 

Field Support Strategy, aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in the 

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delivery of support services to missions. UNSOA, in coordination with the UN 

Political Oftice for Somalia, directs logistical support from Nairobi, Kenya, and 

Entebbe, Uganda, due to the particularly difficult nature ofthe AMlSOM mission. 

We believe that UNSOA, however, highlights how multilateral engagement, in 

conjunction with bilateral partners, can assist regional partners in their efforts to 

support the Somali authorities and mitigate the threat from al-Shabaab. This 

support oftice is an excellent example of how burden sharing through the UN can 

directly contribute to our collective national security interests. 

CORE CHALENGES 

No two missions are the same. But across missions, we see both best 

practices and critical challenges that deserve attention to improve operations, and 

enhance their effectiveness. 

First, protection of civilians is a core task for all peacekeepers - military, 

police, and civilian - throughout the life of a mission. This is true even when it is 

not a specifically mandated task - in the sense that civilians expect, rightly, that the 

UN's arrival means they will be safer. Anything less damages a mission's 

credibility and effectiveness. That is easy to say. In practice, peacekeeping 

operations need more than the authorization to take action, they need a strateh'Y 

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based on reliable information and analysis ofthe local situation, member states to 

contribute troops, capacity -which includes funding, equipment, training, and 

information - as well as effective leadership to operationalize the mandate ofthe 

mission. 

So we are working to support mission-wide strategies for the protection of 

civilians, including support for standardized training for peacekeepers on the 

protection of civilians, to improve the ability of missions to anticipate, prevent and 

mitigate violence. We have also made substantial progress in providing 

peacekeepers with the tools they need to respond switlly and etfectively to sexual 

and gender-based violence. UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 were 

ftmdamental international agreements that enabled and empowered UN and 

regional peacekeeping missions and the humanitarian cOllli1lUnity to combat the 

imminent threat of sexual violence within the context of conflict. The protection 

of civilians is one of the toughest jobs for missions. To be successful, we must 

reduce the space between the Security Council's intentions and the ability of 

missions to protect civilians in the tield, whether in the DRC or Cote d'Ivoire, 

Darfur or South Sudan. The United States has funded the UN to support better 

analysis of what missions are doing, and together with others, to improve the 

missions' ability to protect vulnerable groups. Also, through the Global Peace 

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Operations Initiative (GPOI), we are further undertaking initiatives to build UN 

training capacity on the protection of civilians. And we are deepening the focus on 

civilian protection in the peacekeeping training we provide to partner cOlmtries. 

Second, we are focused on missions succeeding and transitioning out of a 

job - and handing over the reins to governments. That means operations need to 

get right a core task - the support to the rule oflaw and policing, a challenging 

prospect in cOlmtries emerging from conflict or where the rule oflaw previously 

did not exist. We continue to support efforts to increase civilian and policing 

capacities for UN missions. To date, more skilled corrections, judicial, police, and 

civilian experts are needed. We have worked with our colleagues in the State 

Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to 

increase U.S. support to policing in peacekeeping missions and to build partner 

countries' policing capacity through the International Police Peacekeeping 

Operations Support (TPPOS) program. Today, we have more than 155 American 

police officers and corrections and justice advisors serving in Liberia and South 

Sudan (as well as in Haiti). IPPOS training and equipment have enhanced the 

ability of Togo, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Nepal to contribute effective fomled 

police units and individual police officers to UN peacekeeping operations. In 

addition, IPPOS helps train trainers in police-contributing cOlmtries. 

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Third, a core principle across all missions is the effective implementation of 

the UN's policy ofzero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). This 

must be upheld by all categories of UN personnel- military, police and civilian. 

The United States has pressed hard to develop procedures and programs on 

training and guidance, oversight, investigation, accountability and assistance to 

victims of sexual misconduct. This is an important issue, and efforts continue to 

deal with it. We have seen progress over the past few years in reducing the 

incidence of SEA, along with some commendable, swift and appropriate responses 

by governments whose peacekeepers have committed such offenses - including the 

actions of the governments of Uruguay and Pakistan to put their personnel on trial 

for egregious misconduct. The UN itself is revising its internal procedures for 

tracking cases, and actively exploring ways to improve both its screening process 

and its ability to follow-up on actions taken by governnlents. We also successfully 

have pressed the UN to implement measures that withhold reimbursement to TCCs 

for troops who have engaged in sexual exploitation and abuse-the first time that a 

direct linkage has been made between performance and reimbursement in UN 

peacekeeping. 

Fourth, we recognize that leadership ofthese missions is vital. Both in New 

York and in the field, effective, experienced leadership is a determining factor in 

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whether UN operations can carry out their mandates, and the lack of such 

leadership can lmdermine a mission. For example, strong leadership in the DRC 

has made it possible for peacekeepers to better prevent and respond to violence 

against civilians. The United Nations has increased its focus over the past two or 

three years on building leadership capacity among military, police and civilian 

staffthrough both specific and integrated training. 

In addition, we are encouraging more women to be included in missions. As 

Secretary Clinton has said, "We recognize that when we think about peacemaking, 

which is, after all, one of the critical tasks of any of us in intemational security, 

that something is missing. And that is women. There are not enough women at the 

table, not enough women's voices being heard." The UN encourages nomination 

of women for peacekeeping operations, which can lay a foundation for their later 

service in leadership roles, and now ensures that the short lists of candidates for 

senior positions include women with peacekeeping experience. 

Fifth, we believe that peacekeeping needs to be managed in a marmer that 

reflects the current economic climate. We have led the charge in the General 

Assembly on landmark refomls to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of how 

peacekeeping missions are supported, and we have consistently advocated fiscal 

discipline in peacekeeping budgets. Due in large part to these efforts, the overall 

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budgets this year are approximately $500 million less than they were last year, 

which will save U.S. taxpayers nearly $140 million. 

CONCLUSION 

UN peacekeeping missions in Africa also provide important opportunities 

tor military partnerships with African govemments. Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, 

for example, as well as those that once benefitted from international peacekeeping 

missions like Ethiopia and Burundi, now contribute troops and police to help other 

states pursue their path to peace and security, both in Africa and beyond. We 

appreciate this Committee's support for critical nmding, including tor programs 

like the Global Peace Operations Tnitiative (GPOT) - funded through the 

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account - which the United States uses to 

develop the capacity of these peacekeeping partners. Building this capacity will 

help ensure the UN is able to draw from a more well-trained and professional pool 

oftroops, who are better able to carry out the challenging mandates the Security 

COlllCil asks them to achieve. 

Despite the incredible challenges faced by these missions, UN peacekeeping 

operations can deliver results in even the most challenging enviro111llents and 

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conflict zones, in Africa and elsewhere. We support these missions not only 

because they advance US. national interests, but because they are a reflection of 

critical American values. These missions prevent further conflict, protect 

vulnerable civilians, and defend basic human rights. They provide critical support 

during fragile political transitions and to fledgling state institutions. We are all 

familiar with the devastating effects an unstable country far from our borders can 

pose to our national security. Where governments fail to meet the basic needs of 

their citizens or their responsibilities to protect civilians and provide security 

within their borders, the consequences can be far-reaching, including to the 

American people. 

Mr. Chairman, 1 appreciate your support for our broader multilateral 

engagement across the United Nations system, including the strong support you 

and this Committee have given over the years to US. leadership on UN 

peacekeeping missions. As T said before, this Administration's support for UN 

peacekeeping builds on an etfort that has grown since the deep challenges of the 

1990s, and the failures in Rwanda and Bosnia, and the US. eftort to prevent such 

horrors again. Our reform agenda builds on that common goal - to support 

peacekeeping missions' success, but never lose sight ofthe larger risk. Like 

Members ofthis Committee, we recognize the high cost of these missions and will 

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continue our efforts to ensure that we are careful stewards oftaxpayer resources 

throughout the UN system. 

I look forward to continuing to work with the Committee to ensure UN 

peacekeeping operations remain a useful and cost-effective tool that serves U.S. 

foreign policy goals throughout Africa and around the world. 1 look forward to 

discussing these issues further, and welcome any questions you may have. 

23 
46

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Brimmer, thank you so very much, and for your 

and Ambassador Carson’s service to our country and to the world, 

especially Africa. 

Let me just ask a couple of questions and then yield to my distinguished colleagues. Again, both of you, especially you, highlighted 

the issue of a budget and what is being spent and what is not. I 

wonder if you could provide, and this might be better for the 

record, but for the current peacekeeping operations, the unmet 

needs for each of them, I know we get fact sheets all the time from 

the U.N. about troop strength and how much is being spent, but 

we don’t always get the information about what the real needs are. 

That way, we know where the gaps are and whether or not a more 

robust effort could be made with the other donors, but as well as 

ourselves, to ensure that adequate funds are there so that those 

peacekeeping strengths are not less effective due to insufficient 

personnel. That would be a very helpful, where the unmet need is. 

And it is a question I always ask of UNHCR and others so that 

we really have a guide. The numbers don’t mean as much if you 

don’t know what is not being done because of lack of resources. So 

if you could provide that for us or maybe speak to it now that 

would be very, very helpful on that unmet need. 

And secondly, Ambassador Carson, thank you for underscoring in 

your testimony that the U.N. monitoring group reported in June of 

this year that Somali terrorists, al-Shabaab, and you quoted them, 

quoted the monitoring group, ‘‘has suffered dramatic reverses over 

the past year, experiencing military defeats, the loss of territory,’’ 

and we have all been applauding as that has been happening, ‘‘and 

the erosion of its revenue base, setbacks that have exacerbated risk 

within the group’s leadership,’’ and as you point out, this is directly 

attributable to the success of African-led AMISOM. It is no exaggeration, you point out, that through the peacekeeping efforts the 

AU has given Somalia and its long-suffering people their best 

chance for sustained peace. And I mean that is a success story that 

this committee and members of this committee follow closely, but 

from the press point of view and so many others it is hard pressed 

to accept that allAfrica and perhaps a few other places to find that 

really highlighted and underscored. 

We limited the defects and the failures. We all remember 

UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and the utter disaster that 

was, what happened in Rwanda when key triggers and red flags 

were ignored, but here you have a great success story, and perhaps 

we should all bring much more attention to that and I hope the 

press will likewise amplify peacekeeping works. And it has saved 

many, many lives for the long-suffering people of Somalia, so you 

might want to just elaborate a little bit on that. 

And next if I could on the very critical issue of rules of engagement, it is always a key question of protection of civilians, which 

you both emphasize, which sometimes is less than stellar, and it 

is not the troops in the field but it is the people that write the rules 

of engagement. If you might want to speak to how robust those efforts are so that those civilians can indeed be protected. 

And I would ask you, Dr. Brimmer, maybe you wanted to touch 

on this, to get further into the trafficking side. Where was it? There 

was a U.N. report that made it very clear that last month U.N. 

47

says that it withholds payments for peacekeepers involved in sexual abuse or trafficking of persons. That was put out last month. 

If you can tell us how well that appears to working, and if you 

could also just speak to the issue of what kinds of training packets, 

what kind of training are peacekeepers actually given? 

Everywhere I go I ask to meet with leaders in various countries 

to find out exactly what their country does when a peacekeeper or 

any member of their armed forces is complicit in human trafficking. I wrote the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and in 2005, 

the minimum standards update said that we will assess, for purposes of assigning tier ratings, how well or poorly a country’s military is doing. That is a very important part of it if they are deployed soldiers. So if you could give us a real insight into what are 

they telling peacekeepers they must do to ensure that they get the 

right human rights training in general and human trafficking part 

in particular. 

And then finally, if you could speak, Ambassador Carson perhaps, to the African Standby Force, the ASF, as you talked about. 

You mentioned various stages of readiness or lack of. What does 

that really mean; how deployable are they; when will they be 

deployable for missions? 

I yield to my very distinguished friends for answers. 

Mr. CARSON. I think the first question, I think, was clearly for 

Dr. Brimmer, and that is with respect to broad, ummet needs, and 

she can do that one. I will be glad to take the second issue that 

you raised with respect to the Somolia AMISOM peacekeeping operation and really what that signifies and means. Dr. Brimmer, 

maybe trafficking and then finally, trafficking and sexual exploitation. And the last one, African Standby Force, I will be glad to 

talk to. 

Ms. BRIMMER. Certainly. 

Mr. CARSON. Good division of labor? 

Ms. BRIMMER. That sounds very good. All right, Chairman, with 

your permission I will jump in on the response. 

The first off is as you say, it is very important to try to understand what are the needs of the different operations to make sure 

that we are continuing to tailor the operations to what the actual 

needs on the ground are, as I said earlier that peacekeeping is a 

tool to accomplish other activities. And so what we do in addition 

to working with the U.N. itself is we are also now ourselves trying 

to look at what is needed in these operations, to look what is actually happening. And I can share with you that even from the State 

Department’s point of view, my own deputies actually travel to look 

at peacekeeping operations, to look under the hood to see what is 

actually happening. So I had my deputy travel to West Africa to 

look at key operations. And actually now as we speak, Ambassador 

Torsella, who covers the administrative and budget issues at our 

mission in New York, is actually en route and actually flying now 

and he will be going out to look at both at UNAMID and at 

UNISFA, again to understand what is happening and what needs 

may not be covered so that we stay current. Because indeed, we 

have to make sure that we are tailoring the operations to address 

what is actually going to benefit people on the ground. 

Mr. SMITH. As that analysis is done——

48

Ms. BRIMMER. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. I know having been in office 32 years 

that very often you find real needs and then get conveyed at OMB, 

a redlined number of what is doable or not doable. We need to 

know, frankly, to be real partners in this effort, what really is the 

unmet need? So as much of that raw information that you can convey to the committee, it would be very helpful. 

Ms. BRIMMER. Mr. Chairman, we very much appreciate that opportunity and we look forward to working with you and your staff 

on putting that material together. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ESTHER BRIMMER TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Every peacekeeping operation is different, but there are common challenges across 

missions that could benefit from greater support. Some cross-cutting issues are systemic in UN peacekeeping missions. First, there is an urgent need for expanded access to relatively scarce ‘‘niche’’ capabilities—in particular in aviation, engineering, 

and medical capacity—in many missions. Second, there is an ongoing need for mission-specific and scenario-based training, particularly in new missions like the 

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), to help missions 

implement their goals. This is especially needed for missions mandated to protect 

civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Third, there is a need for dialogue 

with both the UN and troop and police contributing countries on the operational 

readiness, performance, and evaluation of troops and police, to help ensure that the 

personnel deploying to missions are fully prepared and fully briefed on human 

rights and the requirements for appropriate conduct, particularly with regard to 

sexual exploitation and abuse. Fourth, there must be measures in place for the safety and security of UN personnel and strategies for risk management, especially 

when operating environments are non-permissive, such as in Darfur. Fifth, there 

must be increased integration between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so that the 

gains that the missions achieve in the field are made sustainable through the 

strengthening of institutions that promote the rule of law, human rights, and good 

governance, elements which are key to establishing a stable peace. And finally, 

there is a strategic need for effective transitions, so that the UN can retain best 

practices and lessons learned. We are working to help missions and the UN address 

these issues, and are prepared to brief on any of these elements.

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for highlighting the success that has been achieved in Somalia and in Mogadishu. As I 

noted in my initial comments, we believe that a great deal of 

progress has been achieved in Somalia over the last 31⁄2 years. For 

the first time in 2 decades and 2 years, we now have in place in 

Mogadishu, a government which has a firmer foundation and greater legitimacy than at any time since the late 1990s. 

I myself had an opportunity about 6 weeks ago to travel to 

Mogadishu. I was the highest ranking U.S. official from the State 

Department to visit Somalia and that part of Somalia in close to 

two decades, since the Black Hawk Down scenario event that you 

mentioned. 

As I said, a great deal of progress has been achieved. We have 

a new Constitution, a new Parliament, a new speaker and a new 

President. And we have for the first time in two decades a real opportunity for greater stability, and all of this has been achieved in 

part due to the efforts of AMISOM, primarily the troops from 

Uganda, Burundi, now Kenya, and troops from Djibouti. We expect 

by mid-October they will be joined by troops from Sierra Leone. Almost all of these troops have benefited from training and funding 

and equipping from the United States through our GPOI program 

49

and through our ACOTA program, which is a part of that. We, in 

doing this, have been able to degrade and to effectively disperse 

and make significantly less effective a fighting force, al-Shabaab, 

and this is clearly in our interest. We have been able to achieve 

this with Africans and African governments and African troops in 

the lead. We have been a consistent and a strong supporter of their 

efforts, but it has been the Africans who have recognized that the 

instability in Somalia constitutes a threat to them as well as the 

region and the international community. And they have taken the 

lead in defeating this threat with us in the lead. We have contributed a substantial amount financially to this effort, but we haven’t 

lost a soldier or a man or a woman in the process. And I think we 

are all better off for this operation. 

Moreover, I might add that we have been the largest, single, bilateral contributor to the AMISOM effort. Although the European 

Union and the U.N. through its AMISOM support program have 

been strong partners in the effort, we have helped to resource what 

is a collective achievement led by Africans on the ground to respond to a crisis in their region and one that impacts them. It is 

a real success out there because it helps to stabilize that country. 

Helps to defeat al-Shabaab, who has had some of its top leadership 

associated and affiliated with al-Qaeda. It has led to the deaths of 

the top leadership in al-Qaeda, East African individuals who were 

associated with the bombing of our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar 

es Salaam in 1998. And this is quite a significant achievement. We 

hope that we can build on it, but it does show what can be done 

in a strong collaborative effort with us working with Africans and 

African institutions supporting a hybrid peacekeeping operation. 

So we are very pleased by what has happened. It is not the end 

of the book, it is just the end of one of the early chapters in a book 

that will have many other chapters of recovery and rehabilitation 

associated with it. But this is serious and significant progress that 

has been achieved. 

Mr. SMITH. Several questions that I asked, if I could just get 

back to them. The ASF, varying degrees of readiness, if you could 

just touch on that. And this issue of, what exactly does the human 

rights training look like? And I mentioned the U.N. policy of withholding payments. Is that working? Mali also, if you could touch on 

that. 

And one last thing you mentioned, Ambassador Carson, the Dar 

es Salaam and the Nairobi bombings. For the record, I held all the 

hearings, in the House at least, that followed that terrible, terrible 

loss of life especially in Kenya and Tanzania. And I will never forget when Admiral Crowe sat where you sit and talked about the 

lack of readiness on the part—even though we had al-Qaeda doing 

some horrific things before that we didn’t think transnational terrorism, as Secretary Carpenter testified at the time, would go after 

what were thought of as more secure U.S. missions or outposts. 

And from that I actually wrote what is called the Admiral James 

W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Years 

2000 and 2001, which had a heavy emphasis on setbacks and Embassy security. 

And one of the questions I am going to be asking and you might 

want to do something for the record on this, I mean we still have 

50

deficiencies no matter how much we try to shore up, review setbacks, protect our ambassadors, and we are all heartbroken over 

the loss of our Ambassador to Libya as well as the other three individuals who are heroes, all four, but we really have to get to the 

bottom of what can we do better to ensure that no one else is hurt. 

It is why we have danger pay, because we know that divisions 

worth of people called the Foreign Service who are in absolutely 

hazardous places all over the world. But we might be able to do 

a better job in Congress to ensure that those threats are further 

mitigated. But you might want to get back to us on that. I am 

thinking of a hearing itself focused more on what do we do, what 

are we missing? But anything you can suggest to us, if there are 

law changes, something that needs to be done, and I know the administration is looking very seriously into what did happen. But if 

you could speak on those issues, ASF, the training packets. 

And then I will go to my colleague. 

Ms. BRIMMER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I thought I would take 

up the question on the rules of engagement. 

Mr. SMITH. Please. 

Ms. BRIMMER. And then I will turn to the trafficking issues and 

then maybe just touch on the training issues, to many of those 

questions, and respond to some of the points that you both made 

in your opening statements. 

Just in terms of the rules of engagement, one thing to notice as 

I say that over the past generation looking at peacekeeping issues 

is that we see a more robust use of the use of force by peacekeepers. They are of course authorized to use the use of force to 

protect themselves and their mission, and now most crucially to try 

to protect civilians. That is a huge job. And we recognize that there 

is so much more to try to do. They are often working in countries 

that are very large. But I thought I might highlight some of the 

efforts in this area in particular. That we notice that they are I say 

engaged in more difficult places. We even note that even in the 

case of Somalia in the hybrid mission that most recently there was 

an attempt on the life of the new President, but it was the African 

Union troops that actually helped defend him. One was actually 

killed in that point. But they were using robust use of force. 

But I think we should also note that there have been efforts in 

important areas, for example, like, I will just take MONUSCO in 

particular in the Congo that has also used, has had independent 

military operations to work on dealing with sexual violence in that 

country. They have also tried to be much more robust in their efforts of trying to free children from armed groups. There is a much 

greater understanding of the efforts to try to use the tools of the 

peacekeeping operations in what is still an extremely difficult and 

extreme situation. But again it is kind of the creative use of understanding appropriate use of force for peacekeeping operations. 

If I may turn to the trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse 

issues and just take a few minutes to maybe to develop this. This 

is such an extremely important area. As you noted that this year 

for the very first time we have been able to get into on the funding 

side of peacekeeping, a link, that does withhold funds from troopcontributing countries based on if there is misbehavior by particular troops. That is the first time we have actually been able to 

51

get passed through in the U.N. system. That is a new mechanism. 

And that is what demonstrates we are trying to look at every tool 

we can use to try to combat this particular scourge. Will this build 

on our efforts in other areas as well? And we start all the way upstream. How do we work on improving the training for the peacekeepers that are actually being deployed in the field? And as my 

colleague has already outlined that of course there is important 

training provided by the United States. Other things we do are we 

also talk to other countries that are providing training for peacekeepers. We visit peacekeeping training centers. We see the curriculum. Myself and my colleagues have been briefed on the curriculum, how sexual exploitation is being dealt with and explained 

in key troop training centers around the world. 

We also raise this issue bilaterally in our regular conversations 

with other countries. So if I just take the example of Uruguay. Now 

with Uruguay as you know that there was an incident with their 

troops, and I say no country is perfect here, but I will note that 

they did bring their troops home and try them. Because ultimately, 

the United Nations can’t enforce the behavior of individual militaries. National governments have to do that. So we make sure we 

raise that to, as the United States. So when I was actually in Uruguay talking to them because they are important troop contributors, I raised this issue. It is something my colleagues and I do on 

a regular basis. We also look at how well the U.N. as well works 

the troop contributing countries, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has a package of materials that they provide 

to countries when they are going to contribute troops that also contains these materials. So these are important steps upstream. 

But then we also think it is important to look at what actually 

happens when we unfortunately have incidents. And there again 

the question is what national governments do is extremely important, and they have to work both with all of the peacekeeping personnel. Military personnel, police personnel and civilians, and there 

are slightly different rules for those. Most importantly that the 

military personnel are usually governed by the rules that govern 

their own national military, so it is important that they in their national systems use those mechanisms. Civilians, depending on 

whether or not they have diplomatic immunity, may be subject to 

the laws of the country. So in each of these we are trying to look 

at what are all the tools we can deal with in the address of this, 

it is still extremely serious. There is still a lot more work to do. 

We are still trying to see what else we can do to continue to work 

on this issue, but we take it extremely seriously. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, just a quick sentence on the five brigades. As I said in my testimony, none of the brigades are fully 

operational. The weakest of the five standby brigades is in North 

Africa, and because of the developments of the Arab Spring over 

the last year, year and a half, they are focused inward and not on 

the standby force. The Eastern African Standby Force is probably 

the most robust and capable. It has some of Africa’s better armies, 

Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya. It has provided the command and staff 

headquarters for the AMISOM operations in Mogadishu, and it has 

been able to carry out both field and headquarters exercises. 

52

The Economic Community of West Africa also has a number of 

large armies. They have shown some capabilities, but they too 

would require enormous outside assistance to be able to effectively 

mobilize as an operational brigade. The central African multilateral, multinational force would probably rank just above the North 

African force in terms of its limited capabilities and operational capacities. And the Southern African Development Community does 

also have a number of very capable armies, South Africa and Botswana, that could be drawn upon to carry out peacekeeping operations. They have engaged in joint training and some training operations and exercises. 

Ms. BASS. Yes, thank you very much for your testimony, and 

many of the questions I asked in the beginning you did touch upon. 

I wanted to follow up though on the individuals that are peacekeepers that might have committed crimes, especially sexually oriented crimes. So when they are caught, what happens? Are they 

sent back home? Are they incarcerated? And I understand in part 

it depends on the country that they are in, but maybe you could 

give a few examples. 

Ms. BRIMMER. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. I will give 

some examples and we can also follow up with a sort of fuller, if 

I may, fuller treatment or fuller examples as well. That indeed as 

I mentioned that you, in a sense, have to look at peacekeepers in 

three groups. The military, the police and the civilians, and that 

the question is when they are caught that they go back to their national contingent. Some countries at that point then will ship them 

home, some may then have their own national procedures. But it 

goes back to the military command for those particular individuals. 

The police, in some cases the police have their own separate command. In some cases the police are then under with the military, 

again depending by country. And then for civilians that depends 

who the civilian is and who they are working for. Is this a civilian 

who is working directly for the United Nations? Then that is a direct issue it it is their own staff member. If it is a civilian working 

in some other capacity, there again it may be possible to prosecute 

them under the individual laws. 

What I would like to do is be able to, I can actually just spell 

out in greater detail, if you would like me to do a follow-up, with 

some of the examples of what has happened in different cases. And 

it really has varied by country, I mentioned Uruguay. In a different 

case, Pakistan actually flew out a judge from Pakistan to Haiti. 

Different region, but there was an issue in Haiti, and they then 

sent their own judge out to then conduct the legal proceedings in 

Haiti even before they sent them back with the peacekeepers. So 

different countries have followed different models, and those are 

some countries where countries actually took on board the issue 

and tried to address it. Other countries have not had that same 

strong record. We will be happy to follow up on greater detail and 

send that to you. 

[The information referred to follows:]

53

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ESTHER BRIMMER TO QUES- TION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE KAREN BASS, A REP- RESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

First, we share your deep concern about this problem, and are working to support 

needed reforms. Second, as you know, disposition of serious cases depends on the 

category of the individual. Military personnel are subject to discipline by their own 

chain of command. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services investigates allegations of misconduct against police personnel. Civilian staff may be dismissed and, 

depending on circumstances, tried locally or in their country of residence or nationality. The results can vary due to a number of factors. Actions illegal in one country 

may not be illegal in another; alternatively the host country or country of residence 

may choose not to pursue a case, and so on. The UN regularly requests updates 

from sending countries on their disposition of cases, but does not have the authority 

to enforce reporting. 

We are concerned that proper action be taken in such cases, and we follow up bilaterally whenever we are aware of a serious violation of the code of conduct. In one 

example, our Embassy in Rabat communicated with the Government of Morocco 

after learning that members of a Moroccan military contingent serving in Cote 

d’Ivoire were accused of patronizing prostitutes. In response to our communications, 

Morocco informed the Embassy that it had withdrawn and replaced the whole contingent, reviewed the case under military procedures, and disciplined those individuals found to be guilty of misconduct. 

There was also a very troubling case involving an American citizen serving as a 

UN international civilian employee in Liberia who was charged with molesting underage girls. The Liberian government, the UN mission, and the U.S. Embassy cooperated during the investigation. The UN was prepared to waive his immunity, if 

any; the U.S. Government made arrangements to fly him home for prosecution 

under Federal law; and the Liberian government placed him under house arrest 

pending the transfer to U.S. authorities. Regrettably, the individual committed suicide while in custody in Monrovia. The UN offered medical and legal assistance to 

the girls he had molested, which was accepted in one case. Although the circumstances of the whole case were distressing, in fact the system worked—the allegations were made and investigated, the perpetrator taken into custody and facing 

trial, and the victims given appropriate support.

Ms. BASS. Do you have situations of countries where that is not 

viewed in the same way we would view it, where they make light 

of it or send the person to another country or another division or 

cover it up? And if that happens what can be done? 

Ms. BRIMMER. Well, I think first, I mean no country wants to 

have a reputation for particularly problematic units. I think some 

countries have had more innovative approaches, who have actually 

thought about how to do it. As I mentioned, some countries have 

brought them home and had a process, others have said, no, we 

will deal with it right in this situation. So it is varied. And what 

we try to look at is particularly those who have taken it seriously, 

which might be models for others, and as I say, we also try to follow up in the bilateral context to stress that the United States 

takes this very seriously. So this is something that we raise regularly with our interlocutors when we are talking about peacekeeping and on making it better. 

Ms. BASS. I appreciate that. Well, on another subject, I wanted 

to know if either one of you could talk to me about the cap that 

Congress actually has on U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping 

that some describe as arbitrary, because I don’t understand very 

much about it. If you could explain that I would like to know why 

it is considered arbitrary. And then also if it isn’t, I understand it 

isn’t a new issue, but that it also causes us problems, compromises 

how we are viewed in other parts of the world. 

Ms. BRIMMER. If I may I will jump in on this question. Ranking 

Member Bass, as you know that the United Nations budget is diVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:31 Nov 29, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGH\091312\75861 HFA PsN: SHIRL
54

vided into the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget. At the 

regular budget the United States pays 22 percent of all costs. 

On the peacekeeping side, the five countries that are permanent 

members of the Security Council pay an additional amount, in a 

sense, an additional premium. They have additional rights and responsibilities for international peace and security. Under that there 

is then a formula that is set every few years about what the rate 

will be for all the members that contribute, but we will actually 

focus particularly on ours and what is happening with that. It is 

based on the calculation of relative economic strength of the actual 

U.N. member states. So that calculation is then raised by, is recommended by the secretariat, it then goes to the General Assembly 

that then approves the whole process with that. 

But ultimately it is an allocation that looks at the actual cost for 

peacekeeping and actually looks at the actual strength, economic 

strength of the different countries. So under that we pay over 27 

percent currently. It is currently under discussion about what will 

be the next rate. The challenge of having a line set for the peacekeeping rate is that that is below the rate which was actually set 

for the United States. It means that operations are not fully or 

properly funded, and it doesn’t directly relate to what is actually 

the relative strength, economic strength of different countries. 

So I note that while the issue is now currently under discussion 

for the next 2 years about what will be the rate for the next 2 

years, it is important to note that one of the conversations is the 

relative strength. So one of the things that we would expect is that 

the rates for Russia and especially China will increase, because obviously they are in a different economic situation even than 3 years 

ago when we last looked at it, and we think it is important that 

their rates do increase, as we expect they will. But the challenge 

here is that if we set a rate below what is actually mandated it 

means there will be a gap and key operations would not be funded. 

And there will be key operations in areas that we think are important. 

Ms. BASS. So you are saying we set that. 

Ms. BRIMMER. Oh, the United States plays——

Ms. BASS. I know you are talking about the formula, but you are 

also saying then that the U.S. comes in and sets a level that is——

Ms. BRIMMER. Well, I am saying that if there were to be legislation that were to set a level below the level which is actually where 

the United Nations has set for the United States, there would be 

a gap between what the real cost of the operation is——

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ms. BRIMMER [continuing]. And what we are saying we are willing to pay. If we don’t meet our actual legal commitment to the 

right level, key operations won’t be funded. And we try to make 

sure that of course that rate be as appropriate as possible, but we 

recognize it is based on, what are the costs of these actual operations, and what are the relative economic health of the different 

countries that contribute to the United Nations system? 

Ms. BASS. Okay. And then finally, I just can’t sit here and not 

ask you to comment on the current situation. And I don’t know if 

that is appropriate for you, Ambassador Carson, but what can you 

55

share about what is going on? And I mean again it is just really 

hard to believe that some wacky YouTube video——

Mr. CARSON. Let me say that, first of all, I am not focused on 

a day-to-day basis on the events in the Middle East, and the 

Maghreb which is a part of Africa falls under the jurisdiction of the 

Middle Eastern bureau at the Department of State. But I can say 

that we are, as a department and a nation, deeply troubled by any 

attacks that are undertaken against our Embassies and our personnel abroad, our American citizens as well as host country nationals who work with us in those countries. And we don’t think 

that any political or regional or religious justification exists for attacking American diplomats. 

In the case of what we are seeing across the Middle East, we believe that there are probably different and complex reasons for the 

kinds of reactions that we are seeing in different countries. We see, 

first of all, a region that is in transition, a region that is troubled, 

a region that is moving toward greater openness and democracy. 

We see fragile new governments that are trying to establish authority, and trying to put in place institutions and have weak control over their security services. 

The second thing I would say broadly is that in some of the countries, particularly in what we have seen in Egypt, we are clearly 

seeing the population there react to a couple of videos which have 

been released here. One by a religious figure in this country, another quite frankly, by unknown individuals. These videos have 

mocked and degraded the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and it 

has led to reactions and street demonstrations and violence against 

U.S. institutions. It is deeply unfortunate that people would use 

this as a reason for attacking our facilities or our people. And certainly in Egypt that is the case. But I would say that there are 

probably underlying reasons too of transition, weakness of government authorities and frustration on the street about other elements 

of society. 

In Libya, the situation is far more complex. And increasingly it 

appears that the attack against our facilities there may have been 

motivated by political considerations and that it was not these degradations of the Prophet Muhammad that led to these. There is a 

thorough investigation underway, but these might turn out to be 

terrorist attacks that were well planned and well orchestrated and 

therefore resulted in the very tragic and unfortunate deaths of our 

colleagues in the State Department. 

I think from country to country there is a difference, as to say 

Egypt and Libya present two different kinds of situations, just as 

the situation in Yemen and in other places in the Maghreb have 

different causes for concern. But we are going through a period of 

turbulence there as we see authoritarian and autocratic governments being replaced by new institutions, some stronger in their 

democratic adherence and commitment than others. But many are 

not only weak but new, and grappling with the ability to control 

the fast-moving events of their societies. 

Ms. BASS. All I have had a chance to do is catch the news coverage, and especially today in between hearings. And I guess a few 

things that were very disturbing to me were in Egypt, apparently 

the President didn’t come out and really condemn the violence. And 

56

then there was some question about whether or not the Muslim 

Brotherhood was going to take the lead in organizing a protest. 

Again, the problem with up-to-the-minute news is that it might 

have been a fictitious report, but that is what I heard last. And 

then the concern about Libya just makes me wonder about Mali in 

terms of what happened with the folks leaving from Libya going 

into Mali. Is this going to have implications for problems that are 

already happening there? And I don’t know if there has been any 

report of that. 

Ms. BRIMMER. If I may just add particularly as well that just the 

outpouring support that we have seen, as well as the Security 

Council immediately took up this issue yesterday and immediately 

condemned the attacks. So I think it is important to note that all 

15 combined consensus’ immediately understood the import of the 

issue. And as you mentioned already, the leadership in Libya has 

spoken out rejecting the violence. 

I think it is also important to note that how we honor the fallen 

by remembering their mission. So in this also we are recalling, and 

I am just looking back at the President’s words yesterday where he 

talked about the legacy of the Ambassador ‘‘will endure wherever 

human beings search for liberty and justice.’’ I think as also we 

have seen in the outpouring at least from our colleagues at the 

U.N. that we hear from who are remembering the work we are still 

doing in Libya. There is an important political mission in Libya, a 

U.N. political mission there, and recommitting to the goals that 

they are working on. So I think as part of the both condolences, we 

are hearing also is again support for the very mission that our governments are working on from many of our colleagues. I know that 

Ambassador Carson is seeing the same thing in his post where we 

are seeing in all the multilateral posts, condolences coming, but 

again committing to the values of the Libyan people and trying to 

reject those who are turning to violence. I think that is an important component of the global reaction to the tragedy. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask a few final questions, and beginning 

first with, maybe it is you, Ambassador Carson, or either of you, 

Dr. Brimmer. 

Is there a peacekeeping mission not yet constituted that needs to 

be established? 

Mr. CARSON. Speaking from the African perspective, we believe 

that the current peacekeeping missions that exist, plus those that 

are being led by the Africans themselves are addressing the key 

and fundamental issues that Africa faces. Clearly the one area 

where there is a possibility of African countries on a subregional 

basis coming together to work is in Mali. ECOWAS has indicated 

a desire to be supportive and helpful in putting together a force 

that would go in and assist the Malian Government. But at this 

point, this is only in the very, very early planning stages, and like 

other subregional peacekeeping regions that are in existence and 

that I have spoken about would have to be well resourced and well 

planned in order for it to be effective. 

Mr. SMITH. [Inaudible.] 

Mr. CARSON. Pardon me? No specific region. And I just focus on 

what ECOWAS is discussing preliminarily about Mali. They at this 

57

point have not approached the AU nor the U.N. for the kind of detail of support resources that would be necessary to get this underway. Still in its very, very initial stages. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just say a word or two—or did you, Dr. Brimmer? I don’t want to—please. 

Ms. BRIMMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You had asked both 

about Mali, and of course Ambassador Carson has talked particularly about the early stages that we are looking at. And I would 

just say that it perhaps includes insights into some of the thinking 

about peacekeeping operations that as I mentioned earlier we think 

about how you fit the right tool to the situation. And as we look 

at the questions, what is the right tool? That we look at, of course 

there is a humanitarian crisis and there is important engagement 

by both the United States that is providing humanitarian assistance, but also even through the U.N. we are providing much assistance on the humanitarian side. There are both counterterrorism 

issues as well as security issues. So trying to fit the tool to the situation is so important, and that is why we are looking at, what are 

all the different arrangements? A peacekeeping operation may or 

may not be the right one. Maybe a political operation is the right 

one. Maybe it is another tool. And so we are trying to think about 

what are the global tools, the regional tools, the bilateral, what is 

the right mix? Because there is no one model that fits everything 

and we try to figure out, see what is appropriate. And that is 

where it came back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. As we all know, U.N. peacekeeping is 

hazardous. And the blue helmets, a few years back, were rightly 

cited for the Nobel Peace Prize, for the bravery which often goes 

unheralded, and the deficiencies obviously focused upon to the detriment of all the good that they accomplish. 

And I am wondering, since there are deaths, we know how hazardous it is, there are wounded peacekeepers, could you perhaps 

for the record, or if you have it available now, give us a sense of 

how many peacekeepers have been injured, whether or not there is 

a PTSD component as we have had with every war we have been 

engaged in, and there has to be, I think. There are peacekeepers, 

just like any deployed man or a woman service member, who see 

things that no one should see. 

And just for the record, I chaired the Veterans’ Affairs Committee for a number of years, and wrote a number of laws on the 

health care side including the establishment of polytrauma centers. 

And the closest one to here in Washington is in Richmond. And I 

have been amazed as those polytrauma centers deal as DoD hands 

off to the VA, men and women who have deep brain injuries, loss 

of limbs, where otherwise they might have died in the past, are 

brought back by the coordination of the treatment of their injuries 

by a group of doctors, nurses, and highly skilled personnel to ensure the greatest possibility of a life with less handicap going forward. And I really don’t know this, what do we do to assist those 

men and women who are injured who might be PTSD? Our VA, as 

you know, has written the book on how to deal with that issue, and 

it goes back obviously to the work to help our Vietnam veterans 

when it really burst onto the scene in the early ’80s, if not before. 

But polytrauma, do we do any sharing through our personnel? 

58

And I would just say paranthetically, I will never forget in the 

early 1980s, making trips down to El Salvador during the years 

that the FMLN, when mines were being used, foot taker-offer 

mines that they called them, that the FMLN was using, and it was 

right here in Washington that our military hospitals provided and 

helped with prosthetic devices, especially to the children who were 

losing limbs. 

So do we help these peacekeepers? Saying nothing detrimental 

whatsoever to health care that might be provided in various African countries, but again when it comes to dealing with battlefield 

injuries no one does it better, in my humble opinion, than the VA. 

Ms. BRIMMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that 

question. If I may provide some information at this point and then 

follow up for the record with additional information. That just a 

data point is that the total number of fatalities from peacekeeping 

operations since 1948 is 3,017. But of course we will respond with 

a fuller discussion of that. 

Mr. SMITH. With a break out to Africa and especially the recent 

ones that would be very helpful. 

Ms. BRIMMER. We would be happy to give you more detail broken 

out by region. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ESTHER BRIMMER TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Thank you for asking this question. Peacekeepers do face challenges in the field 

that require greater attention. The UN has kept statistics since 1948 on deaths in 

peacekeeping missions, broken out in various configurations. The total number of 

fatalities in UN peacekeeping missions from 1948 through August 31, 2012 (the 

most recent compilation), is 3,025. The total number of fatalities for all UN peace 

operations in Africa since 1948 is 1,477. Of the current missions in Africa, the totals 

since their date of creation are: UNMIS/UNMISS (Sudan/South Sudan): 61; UNOCI 

(Cote d’Ivoire): 98; UNMIL (Liberia) 168; MONUC/MONUSCO (Democratic Republic 

of Congo): 208; UNAMID (Darfur): 124; UNISFA (Abyei): 7; and MINURSO (Western Sahara) 15. These figures include deaths by accident, illness, malicious intent 

and other causes. 

Additionally, we note significant gaps in health care and medical treatment for 

troops from various countries and in missions while in active service. The UN has 

consistently asked troop contributors to provide field hospitals for the missions in 

more challenging environments, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

Assuming that local medical facilities do not meet UN standards, contingent-deployed medical facilities provide care to all categories of personnel, including UN civilian staff; arrangements are generally made with a nearby country to provide 

more specialized medical care, as required. The Medical Services Division of the 

UN’s Office of Human Resource Management plays a coordinating role and performs 

periodic on-site assessments of field medical capabilities. 

Civilian staff are covered under health insurance plans, whereas uniformed personnel qualify for payments for death and disability incurred as a result of UN service (up to $70,000 USD, paid to troop-contributing countries in the case of military 

contingent personnel and to individuals or their beneficiaries in the case of UNPOL 

and military observers).

Ms. BRIMMER. If I may also note that it does remind us of some 

of the capacity gaps, and you raised an important point. What happens to the peacekeeping veterans? That reminds us that even 

when they are serving there are significant gaps. One of them is 

in some of the medical care. One of the things we think which 

would actually strengthen peacekeeping are more medical units. 

These are often something that, for example, countries with very 

advanced militaries can supply are the medical units, to make sure 

59

people at the time of critical injury are getting the best care available. Because often the medical units may not be at the same 

standard that we associate obviously with our U.S. military. Being 

able to be sure that we are able to strengthen the police units, even 

as you know there is a long issue of getting the right helicopters 

to allow for the transport of peacekeepers. We think these are the 

sort of capacity gaps we would like to improve. We would even like 

to make sure that we are bringing in more women who would be 

able to work, particularly since they are working with civilian 

groups, thinking about what are the real capacity gaps for dealing 

with peacekeeping. 

We also think that there are resource gaps. And one of our concerns with the idea of a cap on peacekeeping, which has been 

raised before, is we think we need to—and we have been able to 

benefit from Congress lifting the cap at 25 percent each year recognizing we need to meet our treaty obligations. So as we think about 

the capacity gaps that we recognize it affects the abilities of peacekeepers to do their job on the ground and to follow up. So we will 

follow up for the record to those questions again as we try to work 

to strengthen peacekeeping. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. And I would just conclude, unless my friend and colleague has anything. 

That without objection I would like to put into our record the report to Congress on U.N. efforts to prevent trafficking in persons. 

[The information referred to follows:]

60


75861c-1.eps

Report to Congress 

on United Nations Efforts to Prevent Trafficking in Persons 

and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions 

Submission 

to 

The Committee on Foreign Relations 

of the United States Senate 

and to 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs 

of the United States House of Representatives 
61


75861c-2.eps

United Nations Efforts to Prevent Sexllall!:xploitation and Abuse (SEA) 

And Trafficking in Persons (TIP) in UN Peacekeeping Missions 

This report, consistent with Section 104(e) of the Trafficking Victims Protection 

Reauthorization Act of200S (P.L. 109-164), covers UN peacekeeping missions 

whose mandates are likely to be renewed or reauthorized between September 1, 

2012 and Febmary 1,2013: UNISFA (Abyei), UNFICYP (Cyprus), MINUSTAH 

(Haiti), UNMIL (Liberia), UNDOF (Syria), and UNMIT (Timor-Lestc). 

c: Measures Taken by the UN to Prevent SEA and TIP 

The United States is a leader in international efforts to address violence against 

women and trafficking in persons. We have long supported the United Nations in 

creating and implementing its zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and 

abuse of vulnerable populations by UN peacckeeping personnel, including the 

adoption ofthe measures described below. In late 2011, the UN launched an 

internal review of CUlTent practices and procedures in peacekeeping missions to 

~nsure all peacekeeping missions are complying with the regulations and 

procedures recommended in the 2005 repOlt by Prince Zeid of Jordan, the UN 

Secl'etary-General's Adviser on SEA. In addition, this past June the General 

Assembly mandated that payments he withheld for those troops who are repatriated 

due to allegations of SEA. The United States is encouraging a rigorous and 

transparent approach to this persistent problem. 

The UN uses a three-pronged stmtegy to combat SEA and TIP that consists of 

prevention, enforcement, and remedial action. Peacekeeping personnel in all 

categories (civilian, police, and military) sign a code of conduct on SEA that 

forbids sex with minors regardless of the local age of consent, sex with prostitutes, 

and offering favors 01' goods in exchange for sex. Furthermore, the UN strongly 

discourages sexual relationships between UN staff and beneficiaries of assistance. 

Such relationships are based on inherently unequal power dynamics and can 

undermine the integrity and credibility ofthe peacekeeping mission within the 

community. A number of peacekeeping missions have strict no-fraternization 

policies forbidding sexual relationships with host country nationals. 

The UN supplies troop- and police-contributing countries with instmctional 

material on preventing exploitation and abuse to use in pre-deployment training. 

International civilian staff receive this training under direct UN auspices before 

deploying. All categories of peacekeepers are required to receive mandatory 
62


75861c-3.eps

- 2-, 

training on SEA upon arrival at their post, includJng specific briefings on the UN 

Code of Conduct, the Secretary-General's 2003 Bulletin, and mission-specific 

rules (such as prohibited areas).' Following this initial training, the Conduct and 

Discipline Team (eDT) in each mission is required to provide ongoing training 

and refresher courses in addition to mission-specific training. Peacekeeping 

missions must also conduct periodic information campaigns to raise public 

awareness of the standards of conduct and procedures for reporting abuse. 

Common methods of community outreach include a range of techniques, such as 

senior mission leadership addresses, newsletters, brochures, radio broadcasts, and 

interaction with community groups. 

In addition, the UN's induction training program for CDT members, which 

provides instruction on their responsibilities, is now linked to an advisory 

document for conduct and discipline personnel. This document provides step-bystep guidance for conduct and discipline practitioners in the field and is being 

transformed into official guidelines to be shared with all stakeholders. The 

document's purpose is to enhance leadership, managerial, and individual 

understanding of this process. 

The seriousness of SEA and TIP requires specific pojjcies to enforce compliance 

with the guidelines. UN policies include establishing curfews, requiring soldiers 

and police to weal' uniforms when outside barracks, and designating places 

frequented by prostitutes as off-limits. Further, all UN staff members are required 

to report any concerns or suspicions they have regarding potential SEA by a fellow 

worker to the CDT for their mission. CDTs refer these allegations to UN internal 

bodies or to the member state contributing troops or police, as appropriate. For 

UN civilian staff, the disciplinary process takes place within the context of the new 

UN system of Administration of Justice, in which the Office ofIntemal Oversight 

Services carOS) investigates allegations of serious offenses. For formed police 

units, OIGS is responsible for investigation, though the police-contributing country 

retains authority for discipline. For military contingents, the troop-contributing 

country retains both primary jurisdiction and disciplinary authority. SEA are 

considered acts of grave misconduct and are grounds for prompt disciplinary 

. action, up to and including summary dismissal for civilian staff and repatriation for 

unifonned personnel. Therefore, when aI!egations of misconduct involving 

military and police personnel are substantiated, the UN can send the individuals 

home. Repatriation can also occur before allegations are substantiated on the basis 

of bilateral consultations between the UN and the troop/police-contributing country 

in question. The UN requests, but has no ability to compel, reports from member 
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- 3 -

states on action taken to discipline those unifonned persollilel sent home for 

misconduct. 

The UN established a Misconduct Tracking System in 2007, which tracks cases of 

misconduct, including SEA, for all categories of per SOl mel in peacekeeping, 

including civilians, individual police, members offormed police units, and 

members ofmilitaty contingents. The system also facilitates the banning of 

offenders [rom assignment to subsequent missions, though for military contingent 

personnel the UN is largely reliant upon member states for such screening. This is 

due largely to the size of militaty deployments, the responsibility of member states 

for disciplining military personnel, and the absence of biometric identifiers by 

which the UN can track personnel deployed. Statistics are maintained and 

published by the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) in the Department ofField 

SUppOlt in New York Peacekeeping missions, whore SEA allegations have been 

more prevalent, have conducted campaigns to combat prostitution and 

transactional sex involving UN personnel. They have also implemented victim 

assistance programs. 

Over the past year, the UN has undertaken a more strategic approach to conduct 

and discipline as functions of global management goals to strengthen 

accountability and ensure continued efficient and transparent management of 

personnel conduct. This framework is comprised of four strategic pillars: 

(1) integration - roles and responsibilities in the discharge of conduct and 

discipline and how to work more efficiently and effectively at mission, regional, 

and hcadqumters levels; (2) capacity building - strengthening conduct and 

discipline in field missions in order to respond and address prevention, 

enforcement, and remedial matters; (3) performance-based accountability -

leadership, managerial, and individual responsibility, how this is assessed and 

measured, and how challenges and risks are identified, monitored, and evaluated; 

and finally (4) outreach, information dissemination, and communication -

enhancing the understanding by staff, leaders, and the public at large on matters of 

conduct and discipline. 

In June 2012, these pillars were endorsed in a Conduct and Discipline Workshop 

which included Chiefs and Senior Officers from the 12 CDTs in peacekeeping 

missions. The strategic plan is currently being finalized. Initiatives already taking 

place under this global approach include a program to improve the quality and 

standardize investigations. 

The CDU in New York is actively engaged in efforts to strengthen its own 

accountability for the management of cases of misconduct. The CDU has 
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- 4-, 

introduced a correspondence intake and case assignment workflow system, with 

specific timejines, key performance indicators, and a time sheet system, to allow 

greater oversight of productivity and the investment of time and effort. There is a 

prioritization system in place, with SEA cases having thc highest priority. 

The UN is' also updating existing guidelines on SEA-related communications, and 

putting in place a strategic plan for disseminating information to field mission 

stakeholders. 

Effcctivcness of Measures Taken by UNPeacekeeping Missions to Prevent 

SEA and TIP 

. The numbers of SEA violation allegations per year, in all missions, are the. 

following: 127 (2007),83 (2008), 112 (2009), 85 (2010), and 74 (2011). In 2012, 

30 cases have been reported through July 12. Allegations of SEA cases involving 

minors (under the age of 18) have decreased each year since 2009. In 2008 there 

were 34 cases, followed by 51 in 2009, 30 in 2010, and 22 in 2011. In 2012, there 

have been 10 cases of SEA involving minors reported through July 12. 

The UN Secrctariat has been working to strengthen the overall zero tolerance 

framework through increased and more targeted training, community outreach, and 

effective leadership. There is also work to be done to foster greater understanding 

of UN SEA and TIP policy, procedures; and reporting mechanisms within local 

communities. UN and NGO partners continue to recognize the problem of 

underreporting in cases of SEA. Particularly in places where discussions of sexual. 

and gender-based violence (SGBV) are taboo or politically contentious, more 

efforts must be made to normalize and encourage frank dialogue among 

peacekeepers and the local population regarding expectations and consequences of 

misconduct. 

More progress is needed in CDU's investigations; in general, the total nwnber of 

investigations concluded has decreased while tho number of cumulatively 

backlogged cases has increased. In 2008,138 investigations were completed while 

44 remained pending; in 2009, 124 investigations Were completed while 43 

remained pending; in 2010, 74 investigations were completed while 37 remained 

pending; and in 2011,33 investigations were completed while 51 remained' 

pending. One reason for this trend is the continued difficulty the eDU experiences 

in obtaining information on the results ofinvestigations by troop-contributing 

countries (Tees) of allegations related to their military personnel, as the Tee has 

exclusive jurisdiction over its soldiers. 
65


75861c-6.eps

- 5-, 

The following details with respect to the peacekeeping missions covered by this 

report are based on reporting from the respective U.S. embassies and missions, as 

well as statistics covering t]1e period since the previous report on those UN 

missions. The statistics in the chart at the end of this report are from CDU. The 

report uses May 2012 UN figures for troop and police strengths. Since we have 

summarized required procedures above, discussion of individual missions will note 

only exceptions and measures that havc proved particularly successful. The six 

missions covered by this report received a total of 40 allegations of SEA as of 

December 31, 201 L 

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) (120 military 

observers and 3 813 contingent troops); 'UNISFA, a relatively new mission 

established in June 2011, reported no cases of sexual exploitation or abuse (SEA) 

or trafficking in persons (TIP) violations by UNISF A mission staff. NOOs 

operating in close coordination with UNISF A did not know of any complaints 

against the mission and assessed the mission's personnel as professional and 

competent. UNISFA has not yet established clear mission-specific policies for 

addressing and preventing any SEA or TIP violations, including establishing outof-bounds areas. UNISFA leadership attributes the mission's lack of violations 

both to officers' limited interaction with the host population, as Abyei town was, 

until recently, entirely deserted, and the intense nature ofthe operation that keeps 

the mission's staff busy and focused. 

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus CUNFICYP) (858 military personnel 

and 698 police): There have been no allegations of any SEA involving UNFICYP 

personnel from Cypriot authorities, NOOs, or local media during the reporting 

period. 

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (7,340 military 

personnel and 3 126 police): MINUSTAH's Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) 

reports 27 allegations of SEA for MTNUSTAH in2011, of which five were 

substantiated, seven are unsubstantiated, and 15 are still pending investigation. 

Their reporting shows four allegations in 2012, only one of which is pending 

investigation. There were two major cases of sexual exploitation involving 

MlNUST AH soldiers and police between July 2011 and July 2012. In September 

2011, five members of a Uruguayan MINUST AH contingent stationed in the 

southern town of Port SaM were accused of sexually assaulting a young Haitian 

boy; a cell phone video ofthe incident"was circulated internationally. Uruguay 

promptly repatriated its personnel to begin military and civilian judicial 
66


75861c-7.eps

- 6-, 

proceedings. The complainant and his att011ley were recently flown at Uruguayan 

expense to testify in the trial of the accused soldiers. The civil case remains open. 

In January 2012, till'ee FPU personnel from the Pakistani contingent in the central 

coast town of Gonaives were accused of sexually assaulting a Haitian teenager. 

Pakistani authorities flew a Pakistani judge to Haiti and conducted an immediate 

trial. All three personnel were convicted, dishonorably discharged, and flown back 

to Pakistan to serve prison sentences. Embassy Port-au-Prince reports that 

MINUSTAH appears to have tightened its discipline in the wake of these incidents. 

United N'ltiQl)s Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (7,750 militmy Qersonnel and 1 313 

police): Eleven cases involving 12 allegations of SEA were repOlted from July 

2011 to June 2012, up from 10 cases reported the previous year. Of the 11 cases, 

two were unsubstantiated and two were substantiated, while the remaining seven 

cases are pending investigation. The majority of the cases involve transactional 

sex, while two cases involved sex with minors. UNMIL management believes that 

internal reporting processes, including a database that maintains records of 

misconduct, continue to discourage U1\1MIL personnel from engaging in SEA. 

Liberian government and non-governmental sources were not aware of UNMILrelated SEA or TIP allegations over the past year. Embassy Monrovia reports 

sources saying that UNMIL has strengthened its implementation of the zerotolerance policy since the 2005 and 2006 reports of widespread misconduct. 

UNMIL is seeking to assess the effectiveness of its procedures and public 

information programs. The enu created a competition among schools in two 

UNMIL sectors to develop dramatizations that illustrated the meaning of SEA. 

The enu also used the activity to dctennine if the local populationstmly 

understood the zero-tolerance policy. The winning team was awarded dictionaries 

while other participants received T-shirts. The program was so popular and 

instructive that the enu is replicating the competition in other a~·eas. The enu is 

also looking to engage community radio more frequently, especially in more 

remote areas. Public repOlting mechanisms currently include walk-in reporting, a 

telephone hotline, and complaint bo~es at UNMlL sites; the eDU recently added 

complaint box locations in hospitals. Most complaints continue to come through 

the telephone hotline. eDU-posted messages are visible throughout Liberia, 

including at UNMIL gucsthouses in the interior. . 

United Nations Diseng~!lm\<J:lt Observer Force (UNDOF) (1,055 militmy 

persoillle]): There have been no allegations of SEA involving UNDOF 

peacekeepers for the last five years, 
67

Mr. SMITH. And also a very brief, but very good, sexual exploitation and abuse prevention and accountability with the prevention 

enforcement and remedial action. Without objection it will be made 

a part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]


75861c-8.eps
68


75861d-1.eps

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 

Prevention and accountability are key 

I In 2011,74 allegations of SEA were received from 8 peacekeeping missions 

and none from special political missions. 

This figure represents a 

steady dectine; from 340 

insfances in 2005 to 74 In 

2011.tn 2011 the number 

of allifgations.decreased 

by 34% from 2009. 

Between 2008 and 2011, 

after investigation, 54% of 

. allegations were reported to 

.b~substantiilted. . A 

Member States'. response rate to ". 

requests made by the Secret~rli't 

to Investigate allegations and . 

take disciplinary actions . 

continued to increase in 2011, . 

with an overall response rate of , 

58%, as compared with 39 per . 

centin 2010, 17 per centin 2009 

. and 11 per cent in 2008. . 

~ 

In 2011, 63% of the instances 

involveq unifQnned personnel; 

34% inv'oived Civilian personnel.~ 

f.or the .first time in 2011, less 

. )han half (42%) of the allegations 

con'eamed the most egregious 

fprins of sexual exploitation and 

')buse; Ihe remaining 58% 

c9ry.c;;[ned prohibited consensual 

"activities (transactional andlor 

explcii\a,~\('!; sexu~1 relations) or 

'ls~istarJ.ce i,n the procurement of . 

sexuaf favours.··. ~ 

To address SEA, 12 \:6~ridHqt 

and Discipline' Teanis (COT) are 

covering 19 peacekeeping a~9 .. 

special political missions. ',,~ 

So far In 2012, 30 allegaUons of SEA were received from 7 peacekeepil1g .nissions, 1 was received from 

a special political missions. . . ~ 

DPKO and DFS continue to implement their three-pronged strategy 

P,r7ve~lion of misconduct Enforcement of UN 

standards of conduct Remedial actions 

" Prevention 

Training • Mandatory since 2005 for all personnel before deploying and upon arrival 

to a UN peacekeeping mission. 

Awareness raising m Designed to explain the rights, obligations and ti,e standards of conduct 

as well as mechanisms to address misconduct. 

Preventive measures • Restriction of movement 

• Curfews 

• Off·limit areas 

iii Non-fraternization pollcies 

• Increased patrols around high risks areas 

• Decentralization of COT personnel into locations With high risk of misconduct 

• Mandatory signature of code of conduct for all UN personnel including 

experts, volunteers, consultants, and contractors 
69

Mr. SMITH. And I want to thank you again for your leadership. 

I look forward to working with you going forward. And with some 

of the information, if you can convey it as soon as possible, that 

way we can work together to work on these issues. 

And so thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


75861d-2.eps
(71)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

72

f


75861n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

September 6, 2012 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights, to be held in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Omce Building (and available 

live via the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.hollse.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, September 13, 2012 

300 p.m 

Assessing US. Policy on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson 

Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of African Affairs 

U.S Department of State 

The Honorable Esther Brimmer 

Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of International Organization AfTairs 

U.S. Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 
73

f


75861m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ____ ~A"'Jic::'ic:.::",'_'(,:::ilo:.:b:::."I:.:H:.:ec:.«I:.::tI"_', :::a1:,::ld-=11:::l:.::",c:."=-" ':.:/I",1::.::/",,-s ____ HEARING 

Day_--",T.!.!11",u""I'.""tl",IILv __ Dat. Septelllbel' 13.2012 Ruum 2200 Rllvbul'll 

Starting Time 1,78 n HI FJl1ding Time 4:41 p.m. 

Roe .. se. l ~'O~ :J L-to ----.J L-to _) ( 

PI'f.,iding Membel'(s) 

Rep. Chds Smith 

Clteck ali qflltefollowlllg Ilta/ "pply: 

Open Session [{] 

ExecuHve (closed) Session D Televised [{] 

TITJ ,F. OF HRARING: 

,to , __ ) L-to __ ) L-lo ----.J L-lo __ ) 

Rlectl'OJlically Recol'd~taped) [{] 

Stenographic Record LiJ 

A,\'seS,\'/lIg U.S. Policy all Pe(lce/ceeping Operatiolls ill Africtl 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS l'UKSENT: 

Rep, Chris Smith, Rep, Robert TlIJ'J/el; Rep, ](are1l Bass, Rep. Russ CIII'II(lhall, Rep, Theodore Deutch 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark willi <III * iflhey are 1101lllemhel's affilll cOll/miltee.) 

Rep. She/hi Jlleksoll Lee* 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes IZl No D 

(If "JlO ", please list beloU' alld incfude title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS ,FOR THE RECORD: ([,;s/ allY sl(f/emellts s""lIliftedf01' Ihe record.) 

Report to Congress 011 Ullited Naliolls Effort,. to Prevellt Traffickillg Persolls alUl Se.nucl Expioi/Mioll (l1U/ 

Abu,'e ill UN Petlckeepillg Afiss;olls 

Docl/ment 011 Se.'(lltll Exploitation tIIltl AbJ/Ses /tilt/ UN Peacekeepers 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 4:41 p.m, 
74

Æ


75861e.eps

Question: 

Question for the Record Submitted to 

Assistant Secretary Esther Brimmer by 

Representative Christopher Smith (#1) 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

September 13,2012 

MTNlJRSO, the UN mission for Western Sahara, has been deployed since 1991 to allow 

for the resolution of the dispute over the former Spanish colony between Morocco and 

the Saharawi people, as represented by the PolisaTi0 Front. More than 20 years later, 

MINlJRSO is still in place, and the referendum supported by the United Nations 

continues to be frustrated by Morocco's refusal to allow that vote. African nations have 

supported Polisario's call for the referendum. Why has the UN continued to prolong this 

peacekeeping mission without insisting on its goal being met? 

Answer: 

The United States fully supports current efforts by the UN Secretary General and 

his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Ambassador Christopher Ross, to find a 

peaceful, sustainable, and mutually agreed solution on the Western Sahara conflict. The 

United States considers the Moroccan autonomy proposal for Western Sahara to be a 

serious, credible, and realistic proposal-a potential option for the way forward to resolve 

the conflict. The United States has consistently encouraged the parties to work with the 

United Nations and with each other, in a spirit of flexibility and compromise, to find a 

mutually acceptable settlement 

The lJN continues to play an important role in addressing the situation in Western 

Sahara. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has made 

significant contributions toward stabilizing the situation in Western Sahara. MINURSO 

is mandated to monitor the ceasefire; verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in Western 

Sahara; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops in 

designated locations; take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western 

Sahara political prisoners or detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (lCRC); 

implement the repatriation program (lJNHCR); identify and register all qualified voters; 

and organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results. UNHCR's 

confidence-building measures program to facilitate Sahrawi family visits via air resumed 

last year and to date has benefited 13,560 people. The United States continues to urge the 

parties to make progress on additional confidence-building measures, including agreeing 

on an overland route for family visits. By monitoring the ceaseiire, MINURSO 

maintains the environment that allows the UN-facilitated negotiations between the parties 

to take place.