.

Air Force 

Basic Doctrine,

Organization, and 

Command

Air Force Doctrine Document 1

14 October 2011

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 1,

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 1

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 14 OCTOBER 2011

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This revision not only updates and expands material from the previous version of 

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, but also incorporates much material from 

AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, due to a restructure of the doctrine document 

publication framework. As a result, this publication has been significantly restructured

and renamed Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command. The Preface is 

new to all AFDDs. The material presented in Chapter 1, Doctrine, has been revamped. 

Chapter 2, Airpower, is completely new and introduces new discussion on airpower and 

the Airman’s perspective. Chapter 3, War, substantially updates previous discussion,

and introduces irregular warfare and the role of culture in war. Chapter 4, Principles 

and Tenets, is largely unchanged except for the inclusion of four additional principles of 

operations previously found in AFDD 2. This chapter also contains a truncated

discussion on the range of military operations previously found in AFDD 2. Chapter 5, 

Air Force Functions, has been completely rewritten; the previous seventeen Operational 

Functions have been replaced by twelve new core functions. Most of the material in 

Chapter 6, Commanding and Organizing Air Force Forces, was pulled forward from 

AFDD 2; discussion has been appropriately updated. New material includes expanded 

discussion of air expeditionary task force organization, and integration of cyberspace 

and nuclear capabilities. Homeland organizational discussion has been expanded. 

Chapter 7, The Air Force Component within the Joint Force, was largely pulled forward 

from AFDD 2 and updated appropriately; new material consists of discussion on 

presenting forces at different levels within a theater. Appendix A now presents 

discussion on command authorities previously presented in the main text of AFDD 1. 

Appendices B and C were previously separate chapters in AFDD 2; the material was 

moved into appendices to aid the flow of discussion in the main text and the bulk of 

material was reduced. Appendix D contains updated discussion on the Air Reserve 

Components. Finally, historical references have been updated throughout for currency 

of discussion.

Supersedes: AFDD 1, 17 November 2003

OPR: LeMay Center/DDS

Certified by: LeMay Center/CC (Maj Gen Thomas K. Andersen)

Pages: 144

Accessibility: Publications are available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for

 downloading

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication

Approved by: Norton A. Schwartz, General, USAF

 Chief of Staff
FOREWORD

This document is the Air Force’s premier statement of warfighting principles and 

beliefs. It is the senior doctrine publication from which all other Air Force doctrine flows.

Historically, airpower has been associated with its more familiar and visible 

aspects, such as air-to-air combat, strategic bombing, and long-range heavy airlift. 

However, airpower has many less visible but equally important missions across the 

range of military operations: providing close air support and tactical mobility to our 

ground forces; positioning and resupplying remote forces; obtaining and providing 

detailed and timely intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; providing 

humanitarian relief; projecting world-wide command and control; and training of coalition 

partners in the use of airpower, just to name a few. Also, while many parts of the Air 

Force are visibly engaged in overseas expeditionary operations, other aspects of the Air 

Force are quietly at work day-to-day, overwatching the homeland. These include 

nuclear forces on alert; ground- and space-based national warning systems; 

cyberspace forces monitoring the security of military networks; and fighters on call to 

defend sovereign airspace. 

Much has transpired in the world since the previous edition of AFDD 1 was 

published in 2003. Irregular warfare and homeland defense have taken on more 

importance; the Air Force has recognized cyberspace as an operational domain and 

has renewed its commitment to nuclear operations; and we are now investing heavily in 

unmanned aircraft systems. Seven years ago, we could not have accurately foreseen 

these changes; looking forward, the future is equally unpredictable. While we cannot 

accurately predict where and how we’ll next be engaged, doctrine provides a leg up, 

outlining the basics of organization and command, providing guidance on how to think 

about and plan for different types of operations and missions. These foundational 

basics allow us to respond more quickly, freeing commanders and planners to think 

about larger issues such as strategy, operational art, and objectives.

The success of our Air Force in meeting the challenges of this rapidly changing

world depends on understanding our doctrine. I encourage you to read it, discuss it, 

and apply it.

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ

General, USAF

Chief of Staff
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ......................................................................................................................vii

CHAPTER ONE—Doctrine ............................................................................................. 1

Doctrine Defined.......................................................................................................... 1

Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine ..................................................................................... 3

Uses of Doctrine .......................................................................................................... 4

Sources of Doctrine ..................................................................................................... 6

Levels of Doctrine........................................................................................................ 8

Types of Doctrine ........................................................................................................ 9

Doctrine, Operating Concepts, and Vision................................................................... 9

CHAPTER TWO—Airpower.......................................................................................... 11

Airpower .................................................................................................................... 11

The Foundations of Airpower..................................................................................... 13

’Airmindedness’ ......................................................................................................... 18

The Airman’s Perspective.......................................................................................... 19

CHAPTER THREE—War.............................................................................................. 21

The Nature of War..................................................................................................... 22

Traditional and Irregular War..................................................................................... 23

Culture and War ........................................................................................................ 24

Levels of War............................................................................................................ 25

The Range of Military Operations .............................................................................. 26

CHAPTER FOUR—Principles and Tenets .................................................................... 29

Principles of Joint Operations.................................................................................... 29

Principles of War ....................................................................................................... 29

Unity of Command ................................................................................................. 30

Objective ................................................................................................................ 30

Offensive................................................................................................................ 31

Mass ...................................................................................................................... 32

Maneuver............................................................................................................... 33

Economy of Force.................................................................................................. 33

Security .................................................................................................................. 34

Surprise.................................................................................................................. 35

Simplicity................................................................................................................ 35

Additional Principles of Operations............................................................................ 35

Unity of Effort ......................................................................................................... 36

Restraint................................................................................................................. 36

Perseverance......................................................................................................... 36

Legitimacy.............................................................................................................. 37

Tenets of Airpower .................................................................................................... 37

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution.................................................. 38

Flexibility and Versatility......................................................................................... 39

Synergistic Effects.................................................................................................. 40

Persistence ............................................................................................................ 40
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Concentration......................................................................................................... 41

Priority.................................................................................................................... 41

Balance .................................................................................................................. 41

CHAPTER FIVE—Air Force Functions.......................................................................... 42

Roles ......................................................................................................................... 42

Missions..................................................................................................................... 42

Functions................................................................................................................... 43

Core Functions .......................................................................................................... 43

Nuclear Deterrence Operations.............................................................................. 43

Air Superiority......................................................................................................... 45

Space Superiority................................................................................................... 45

Cyberspace Superiority.......................................................................................... 46

Command and Control........................................................................................... 47

Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance........................ 48

Global Precision Attack .......................................................................................... 48

Special Operations................................................................................................. 49

Rapid Global Mobility ............................................................................................. 50

Personnel Recovery............................................................................................... 51

Agile Combat Support............................................................................................ 52

Building Partnerships ............................................................................................. 53

CHAPTER SIX—Commanding and Organizing Air Force Forces................................. 54

The Commander, Air Force Forces ........................................................................... 55

Operational Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR ................................................... 56

Service Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR.......................................................... 57

The Air Expeditionary Force ...................................................................................... 58

The Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF)................................................................. 59

Regional Organization and Control ........................................................................ 62

Functional Organization and Control...................................................................... 63

AETF Organization .................................................................................................... 63

Numbered Expeditionary Air Force ........................................................................ 63

Air Expeditionary Task Force-X.............................................................................. 64

Air Expeditionary Wing........................................................................................... 64

Air Expeditionary Group ......................................................................................... 64

Air Expeditionary Squadron ................................................................................... 65

Expeditionary Elements below Squadron Level ..................................................... 65

Provisional Units .................................................................................................... 67

Designation of Expeditionary Units ........................................................................ 67

Examples of AETFs................................................................................................... 68

Command and Control Mechanisms ......................................................................... 69

Air Operations Center (AOC) ................................................................................. 70

AFFOR Staff........................................................................................................... 71

Distributed/Split Operations....................................................................................... 72

Command Relationship Models for Air Force Forces ................................................ 73

In-Theater Forces................................................................................................... 74

Out-of-Theater Forces............................................................................................ 74

Functional Forces................................................................................................... 75
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Transient Forces .................................................................................................... 75

Forces in Exercises................................................................................................ 76

Transfer of Functional Forces to a Geographic Command........................................ 76

Integrating Regional and Functional Air Force Forces............................................... 78

Integrating Air Mobility Operations ......................................................................... 78

Integrating Space Operations ................................................................................ 79

Integrating Special Operations............................................................................... 80

Integrating Cyberspace Operations........................................................................ 82

Nuclear Support to Regional Commands .................................................................. 83

Integrating the Air Reserve Components................................................................... 83

Homeland Organizational Considerations ................................................................. 83

The Senior/Host Air Force Installation Commander .................................................. 85

CHAPTER SEVEN—The Air Force Component Within the Joint Force........................ 88

Joint Force Organizational Basics ............................................................................. 88

The Joint Force Air Component Commander ............................................................ 90

Control of Other Services’ Aviation Capabilities ........................................................ 92

Air Force Component Presentation Considerations................................................... 94

Levels of Force Presentation ................................................................................. 94

Theater-Level Component ..................................................................................... 95

Sub-Theater-Level Component.............................................................................. 96

Sub-Theater-Level AETF in Support of a JTF........................................................ 97

Force Attachment Considerations.......................................................................... 97

Achieving Unity of Effort......................................................................................... 98

Joint Air Component Coordination Element............................................................... 99

Air Component Relationships within a Joint Force .................................................. 100

Theater Air Component Command Mechanism....................................................... 101

Joint Liaisons in the AOC ........................................................................................ 101

Joint Staffs............................................................................................................... 103

Joint Staff Composition ........................................................................................ 103

Commanders and Staff ........................................................................................ 103

JFACC Staff ......................................................................................................... 103

Multi-Hatting Commanders/Span of Command ....................................................... 104

Multinational and Interagency Integration................................................................ 104

Multinational Operations ...................................................................................... 104

Interagency Coordination ..................................................................................... 106

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 107

APPENDIX A—Command Relationships and Authorities ........................................... 109

APPENDIX B—The Air Operations Center ................................................................. 114

APPENDIX C—The AFFOR Staff ............................................................................... 117

APPENDIX D—The Air Reserve Components............................................................ 121

REFERENCES............................................................................................................ 124

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................ 125
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PREFACE 

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, 

and Command, is the senior capstone document of Air Force doctrine. AFDD 1

discusses the fundamental beliefs that underpin the application of Air Force capabilities 

across the range of military operations. Its seven chapters range from the fundamentals 

of airpower to discussion on commanding and organizing Air Force forces. AFDD 1 

provides guidance on the proper employment of airpower, sets the foundation for 

educating Airmen on airpower, guides the development of all other AFDDs, and 

provides insight where personal experience may be lacking. 

Much has transpired in the overall operational environment since the previous 

edition of AFDD 1 was published in 2003. The character of contemporary and 

immediately foreseeable conflict has driven a significant shift in the US approach to 

warfighting. The large-scale, complex, force-on-force scenarios that drove much of 

Cold War planning, which were seen during Operation DESERT STORM and in the 

opening stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, are now viewed as the exception, 

replaced by the complex and unpredictable pace of irregular war against nontraditional 

enemies. Moreover, it appears that US engagement in such conflict may be ongoing for 

some time.

The Joint Operating Environment “provides a perspective on future trends, 

shocks, contexts, and implications” for the current and near-term security environment.

1

 

Some of its key points are summarized as follows:

 The nature of the human condition guarantees that uncertainty, ambiguity, and 

surprise will likely dominate the course of events.

 It is impossible to predict precisely how challenges may emerge and what form they 

might take. The US may find itself caught off guard by changes in the political, 

economic, technological, strategic, and operational environments. The US will likely 

find itself surprised by the creativity and capability of its adversaries. 

 1 Joint Operating Environment 2010, US Joint Forces Command/J59.

 At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents 

the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve 

victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and 

knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the 

pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It 

is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to 

sound judgment.

 

 — General Curtis E. LeMay
viii

 Changes in the strategic landscape, the introduction and employment of new 

technologies, and the adaptation and creativity of our adversaries may alter the 

character of joint operations.

 The causes of conflict will likely vary from rational political calculation to uncontrolled 

passion. The enemy’s capabilities may range from explosive vests worn by suicide 

bombers to long-range precision-guided cyberspace, space, and missile attacks. 

The threat of mass destruction from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons will 

likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state 

networks.

 It is also conceivable that combinations of regional powers with sophisticated 

regional capabilities could band together to form a powerful anti-US alliance. 

 The great difficulty US forces confront in facing irregular warfare is that irregular

conflicts require a thorough understanding of the cultural, religious, political, and 

historical context within which they are being fought, as well as substantial 

commitments of “boots on the ground” for sustained periods of time. There are no 

“rapid decisive operations” in irregular warfare that can achieve swift victory. 

 A defining element in military effectiveness lies in the ability to recognize when 

prewar visions and understanding of war are flawed and must change.

These changes have significant, long-term implications for the planning and 

conduct of US operations. Air Force studies of the likely future operating environment,

such as the Air Force Strategic Environmental Assessment, make the following key 

points: 

 The need for precision and detailed analysis has greatly expanded the scale of 

information collection and processing; extensive networks are as important as 

bullets or bombs. Sensors, shooters, and fusion centers are routinely 

interconnected worldwide in a unified battle rhythm.

 The nature of irregular conflicts requires patient, long-term commitment to a 

consistent, coherent strategic and political approach that integrates the diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic elements of US, ally, and partner nation power. 

This requires renewed emphasis on, and long-term institutional commitment to, 

investment in building and sustaining effective partnerships that assures allies and 

friends.

 The diffusion of lethal technologies in general and proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) creates new challenges to deterrence. The Cold War-era model 

of deterring a small number of nuclear-armed states has been replaced by the need 

to develop a range of deterrence strategies against multiple potential adversaries, 

some of which are transnational non-state actors. Also, the proliferation of WMD 

may make the US increasingly the subject of the deterrence operations of others. In 

spite of these changes, nuclear deterrence will remain relevant; US nuclear forces 
ix

will continue to play a critical role in deterring, and possibly countering, threats to our 

vital interests.

 Threats against the US homeland could very well increase. The US should expect 

future opponents to launch both terrorist and unconventional attacks on the US and 

its territories. Civil, military, and industrial cyberspace networks have, for example, 

already seen an upswing in probes and intrusions.

 Despite the current low probability of conflict escalating to major combat operations, 

the US should retain the capability to execute conventional campaigns. Peer and 

near-peer state actors will likely continue to challenge US access to the global 

commons. Non-state actors (and some state actors) will likely continue to seek 

asymmetric advantages. Their objectives may vary from regional hegemony to 

cultural and religious goals. Accordingly, the US should maintain the capability to 

successfully project military power and maintain superiority in all domains. 

 The proliferation of technology may allow adversaries to develop niche capabilities 

that may threaten, in varying degrees, the successful conduct of operations in areas 

where US forces were previously unchallenged. Space and cyberspace networks 

are increasingly vulnerable to a wide array of new threats. Adversary anti-access 

capabilities will continue to improve, challenging our ability to project power and 

influence. The spread of increasingly effective surface-to-air defenses poses special 

problems for our Air Force.

These changes and challenges have a ripple effect on doctrine. To be 

effective—and most importantly, relevant—doctrine should adapt and evolve. The Air 

Force doctrine publication framework has transitioned to an A-staff framework, to better 

align Air Force doctrine documents conceptually with their joint counterparts, and to 

revise their content based upon the rethinking of our Service’s core functions. In the 

end, Air Force doctrine should provide a better, more relevant baseline for ongoing and 

future operations.

Following the recent example of combining Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for 

the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, into a 

single joint capstone document, this revision to AFDD 1 combines material from the 

previous AFDD 1 and organizational discussion in the previous AFDD 2, Operations 

and Organization, into a single Air Force capstone doctrine document. 

As previously mentioned, a great deal of the material in this document is 

unchanged from the material in the previous editions of AFDDs 1 and 2; this is to be 

expected, if our foundational precepts are indeed enduring. Examples to support 

discussion may have been updated to reflect recent experience. 

A note on terminology in Air Force doctrine: The Air Force prefers—and in fact, 

plans and trains—to employ in the joint fight through a commander, Air Force 

forces (COMAFFOR) who is normally also dual-hatted as a joint force air 

component commander (JFACC); when involved in multinational operations, the 
x

JFACC may become a combined force air component commander (CFACC). However, 

to simplify nomenclature in doctrine, Air Force doctrine documents simply use the term 

"COMAFFOR" with the assumption that, unless stated otherwise, the COMAFFOR is 

dual-hatted as the JFACC and perhaps CFACC. Air Force doctrine recognizes that the 

two responsibilities are different and should be executed through different staffs. 

Similarly, Air Force doctrine recognizes that the air operations center (AOC), in joint or 

combined operations is correctly known as a joint AOC (JAOC) or combined AOC 

(CAOC). However, doctrine simply uses the term "AOC."

Air Force doctrine is compatible with existing joint doctrine, but expands and 

elaborates upon it, because joint doctrine does not explicitly describe the philosophical 

underpinnings of any one Service, nor does it describe how a Service organizes to 

support a joint force commander. These are Service, not joint, prerogatives. The ideas 

presented here should enable Airmen to better describe what the Air Force can provide 

to the joint effort. AFDD 1 should influence creation of corresponding joint and North

Atlantic Treaty Organization doctrine, and may inform the doctrine of other Services as 

well. 

The principal audience for this publication consists of all Airmen, both uniformed 

and civilian. 
1

CHAPTER ONE

DOCTRINE 

DOCTRINE DEFINED 

Doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles by which the military forces 

or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is 

authoritative but requires judgment in application” (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). This definition is 

explained in more detail below.

 “... fundamental principles...” 

Doctrine is a body of carefully developed, sanctioned ideas which has been 

officially approved or ratified corporately, and not dictated by any one individual. 

Doctrine establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that 

commanders use to solve military problems. It is what we believe to be true about the 

best way to do things based on the evidence to date. 

 “...military forces...” 

For the purposes of Air Force doctrine, this includes all Airmen, both uniformed 

and Department of the Air Force civilians. These constitute the uniformed warfighters, 

their commanders, and the capabilities and support that they employ. They operate 

across the range of military operations (ROMO) and can be task-organized into the 

“right force” for any particular joint contingency. 

 There is no end to the number of people who will 

line up to make flippant remarks that the doctrine is 

too long, too short, has too many pictures, is too 

academic, is not academic enough.... The acid test 

is do we read it, do we understand it, and do we use 

it, and DOES IT WORK? ... “all else is rubbish” to 

borrow from Baron von Richthofen. Our doctrine 

does not mirror the Navy’s, nor the Marine’s, nor the 

Army’s... it is aerospace doctrine... our best 

practices... and we should not be bashful about how 

we write it or what it says.

— From briefing notes by then-Brigadier

General Ronald Keys to a doctrine 

symposium, 1997
2

 We have identified 

danger, physical exertion, 

intelligence, and friction as 

the elements that coalesce 

to form the atmosphere of 

war, and turn it into a 

medium that impedes 

activity. In their restrictive 

effects they can be grouped 

into a single concept of 

general friction. Is there any 

lubricant that will reduce 

this abrasion? Only one: 

combat experience.

— Carl von Clausewitz, 

On War

 “...in support of national objectives...”

Military forces should always conduct operations in order to support objectives 

that create continuing advantage for our nation.

 “...guide their actions... authoritative... judgment...”

Doctrine is a guide to action, not a set of fixed rules; it recommends, but does not 

mandate, particular courses of action.

Air Force doctrine describes and guides the proper use of airpower in military 

operations. It is what we have come to understand, based on our experience to date. 

The Air Force promulgates and teaches its doctrine as a common frame of reference on 

the best way to prepare and employ Air Force forces. Subsequently, doctrine shapes 

the manner in which the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces. 

Doctrine prepares us for future uncertainties and provides a common set of 

understandings on which Airmen base their decisions. Doctrine consists of the 

fundamental principles by which military forces 

guide their actions in support of national 

objectives; it is the linchpin of successful 

military operations. It also provides us with 

common terminology, conveying precision in 

expressing our ideas. In application, doctrine 

should be used with judgment. It should 

never be dismissed out of hand or through 

ignorance of its principles, nor should it be 

employed blindly without due regard for the 

mission and situation at hand. On the other 

hand, following doctrine to the letter is not the 

fundamental intent. Rather, good doctrine 

is somewhat akin to a good 

“commander’s intent:” it provides 

sufficient information on what to do, but 

does not specifically say how to do it. 

Airmen should strive above all else to be 

doctrinally sound, not doctrinally bound.

In the current turbulent environment of 

expeditionary operations and the arena of homeland security, doctrine provides an 

informed starting point for the many decisions Airmen make in what seems to be a 

continuous series of deployments. Airmen no longer face the challenge of starting with 

a blank sheet of paper; with doctrine, Airmen now have a good outline that helps 

answer several basic questions:

 What is my mission? How should I approach it?

 What should my organization look like, and why?
3

 What are my lines of authority within my organization and within the joint force?

 What degrees of control do I have over my forces?

 How am I supported? Who do I call for more support?

 How should I articulate what the Air Force provides to the joint force?

From one operation to the next, many things are actually constant. 

Doctrine, properly applied, often can provide a 70-, 80-, or even 90-percent 

solution to most questions, allowing leaders to focus on the remainder, which 

usually involves tailoring for the specific operation. Good doctrine informs, 

provides a sound departure point, and allows flexibility.

A study of airpower doctrine should draw a distinction between theory and 

practice. Theory is less constrained by limited empirical context, and designed to 

encourage debate and introspection with an eye towards improving military advantage. 

It is part of a vital, iterative investigation of what works under particular circumstances, 

and why. Theoretical discussion is critical to a successful military. To date, however, a 

truly enduring, all-encompassing theory of airpower—one that is not merely a point in 

time—has yet to be developed. Thus, this publication does not present a 

comprehensive theory for airpower. Instead, it focuses on those ideas and validated 

concepts, grounded in experience and Service consensus. This is the heart of doctrine.

Finally, a study of airpower doctrine should also distinguish between doctrine and 

public relations-like pronouncements concerning the Air Force’s role. There have been 

many of the latter since the Air Force’s inception. Some have been developed with an 

eye towards influencing public and congressional perception of the Air Force’s role and 

value. Others have been made in a strategic planning context (e.g., a “vision-missiongoals” development process) that are a normal part of formal, long range corporate 

planning. Such statements are not enduring and not doctrine; they should be viewed in 

the context in which they were created. 

POLICY, STRATEGY, AND DOCTRINE 

The term “doctrine” is frequently (and incorrectly) used when referring to policy or 

strategy. These terms are not interchangeable; they are fundamentally different. 

Because policy and strategy may impact each other, it is important to first understand 

their differences before delving into a discussion of doctrine.

 Policy is guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be 

accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues and not 

others. Thus, while doctrine is held to be relatively enduring, policy is more mutable

and also directive. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership, 

political considerations, or for fiscal reasons. At the national level, policy may be 

expressed in such broad vehicles as the National Security Strategy or Presidential 

Executive Orders. Within military operations, policy may be expressed not only in 
4

 

 Although air officers have 

not been prolific writers, they 

have expressed their beliefs 

freely.... In fact, one may 

almost say that the Air Force 

has developed an oral rather 

than a written tradition.

— Frank Futrell, Ideas, 

Concepts, Doctrine: Basic 

Thinking in the United States 

Air Force, 1907 - 1960

terms of objectives, but also in rules of engagement (ROE)—what we may or may 

not strike, or under what circumstances we may strike particular targets.

 Strategy defines how operations should be conducted to accomplish national 

policy objectives. Strategy is the continuous process of matching ends, ways, and 

means to accomplish desired goals within acceptable levels of risk. Strategy 

originates in policy and addresses broad objectives, along with the designs and 

plans for achieving them.

 Doctrine presents considerations on 

how to accomplish military goals and 

objectives. It is a storehouse of 

analyzed experience and wisdom. 

Military doctrine is authoritative, but 

unlike policy, is not directive.

In practice, as leaders develop 

strategies for particular contingencies, 

political, economic, or social considerations 

may dictate strategic and operational 

approaches that modify or depart from 

accepted doctrine. As an example, doctrine 

may support long-range, air-to-air 

engagements beyond visual range, or high 

altitude interdiction of surface targets, both 

using long-range sensors; ROE, however, 

may require visual identification of all targets 

before firing due to political concerns over 

fratricide or collateral damage. If policy 

seriously affects the application of doctrine,

military commanders should describe for 

political leaders the military consequences 

of those adaptations. However, because 

war is “an instrument of policy,” military 

commanders should ensure that policy 

governs the employment of military power 

and thus tailor their operations accordingly.

USES OF DOCTRINE 

One way to explore good doctrine is to use a “compare and contrast” model to 

walk through some key issues. This technique also amplifies the point that doctrine 

should be written broadly, allowing decision makers latitude in interpretation and 

flexibility in application, yet be specific enough to provide informed guidance. This 

technique also illustrates the use of doctrine in explaining contentious issues and how 

doctrine can be used to think more effectively about the best means to integrate various 

aspects of military power and organization. In the following discussion, there may be 
5

overlap among some of the principles expressed; this is desirable in that often there are 

different aspects or nuances to a particular issue. In doctrine, language is important. 

Finally, the following discussion presents an Air Force perspective; not all Services may 

entirely agree with these points.

Doctrine is about warfighting, not physics. This principle specifically addresses 

the perceived differences between operations in air, space, and cyberspace. Air, 

space, and cyberspace are separate domains requiring exploitation of different sets of 

physical laws to operate in, but are linked by the effects they can produce together. To 

achieve a common purpose, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities need to be 

integrated. Therefore, Air Force doctrine focuses on the best means to obtain 

warfighting effects regardless of the medium in which a platform operates. As an 

example, Airmen should be concerned with the best means of employing intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, not whether a particular ISR 

platform is airborne or in orbit. This is requisite to achieving true integration across any 

given collection of forces.

Doctrine is about effects, not platforms. This focuses on the desired outcome 

of a particular action, not on the system or weapon itself that provides the effect. For 

example, doctrine states that Airmen should seek to achieve air superiority, but doctrine 

does not focus on which platforms should be used to achieve that effect. A parallel 

example of this is seen in the recognition that bombers are not “strategic,” nor are 

fighters “tactical.” Similarly, it does not matter if an F-16 or a B-52 accomplishes a given 

task, or whether a particular platform is manned or unmanned, or whether a C-17 or a 

C-130 delivers a certain load; the outcome of the mission, the effect achieved, is what’s 

important. Thus, Air Force doctrine does not explicitly tie specific weapon systems to 

specific tasks or effects.

Doctrine is about using mediums, not owning mediums. This illustrates the 

importance of properly using a medium to obtain the best warfighting effects, not of 

carving up the battlespace based on Service or functional parochialism. Focusing on 

using a medium is a vital first step to integration of efforts. “Ownership” arguments 

eventually lead to suboptimal (and usually at best tactical) application of efforts at the 

expense of the larger, total effort.

Doctrine is about organization, not organizations. Modern warfare demands 

that disparate parts of different Services, different nations, and even differing functions 

within a single Service be brought together intelligently to achieve unity of effort and 

unity of command. However, merely placing different organizations together in an area 

of operations is insufficient to meet these demands. A single, cohesive organization is 

required with clearly defined lines of command and commanders with requisite 

authorities at appropriate levels. Doctrine explains why certain organizational structures 

are preferred over others and describes effective command relationships and command 

authorities; this facilitates the rapid standup of joint and Service organizations during 

rapidly evolving situations. Ultimately, doctrine is not about whether one particular 

element of a joint force is more decisive than another, nor about positing that element 
6

as the centerpiece of joint operations; it’s the total, tailored joint force that’s decisive. 

Getting to that effective joint force requires smart organization and a thorough 

understanding of Service and joint doctrine.

Doctrine is about synergy, not segregation. True integration of effort cannot be 

achieved by merely carving up the operational environment. While segregation may 

have some benefit and may appear the simplest way, from a command and control 

viewpoint, to manage elements of a diverse joint force, it may actually suboptimize the 

overall effort. It guarantees that the whole will never be greater than the sum of its 

parts. For example, Airmen should have access to the entire theater of operations to 

maximize their ability to achieve joint force commander (JFC) objectives; they should 

not be restricted from any area due to unnecessarily restrictive fire control measures. 

Also, segregating the battlespace into smaller areas of operation may create 

competition for scarce, high-demand, low-density capabilities and reduce combat 

effectiveness.

Doctrine is about integration, not just synchronization. Synchronization is “the 

arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum 

relative combat power at a decisive place and time” (JP 1-02). Integration, by 

comparison, is “the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force 

that operates by engaging as a whole” (JP 1-02). Synchronization is, in essence, 

deconfliction in time and space between different units. It is a useful means to plan and 

execute operations and to prevent fratricide. However, it doesn’t scale up to the 

operational level and hence is not the best means for achieving the maximum potential 

of a joint force. Synchronization emphasizes timing, while integration considers priority 

and effect to be both efficient and effective with scarce resources. Synchronization is 

bottom-up; integration, on the other hand, starts at the top with a single cohesive plan 

and works downward. Synchronization is an additive “sum of the parts” model, while 

integration may produce geometric results. 

Doctrine is about the right force, not just equal shares of the force. This 

addresses the proper mix of Service components within a joint force. Some believe that 

a joint force requires equal parts of all the Services. This is an incorrect view. As one 

senior Air Force officer said, “joint warfighting is not like Little League baseball, where 

everybody gets a chance to play.” Any given joint force should be tailored appropriately 

for the task at hand. Some operations will be land-centric, others air-centric, others 

maritime-, cyberspace-, or information-centric. The composition of the joint force and 

the tasks assigned its various elements should reflect the needs of the situation.

SOURCES OF DOCTRINE 

Doctrine should be based in critical analysis and the lessons of warfare rather 

than driven by rapidly changing policies, promising technologies, individual 

personalities, budget battles, and politically trendy catch-phrases. Doctrine should not 

be written to backwards-justify a policy position or codify a uniquely-tailored 

organization. As such, doctrine reflects what has worked best with full consideration of 
7

 

 [Doctrine] reflects an 

official recognition of what 

has usually worked best from 

observation of numerous 

trials. These may be reports 

of actual combat operations, 

or they may be limited to 

tests, exercises, and 

maneuvers. Only when 

necessary will doctrine 

consist of extrapolations 

beyond actual experience of 

some sort, for example, in 

the use of nuclear weapons 

where the nature of the 

weapon normally precludes 

the gathering of experience 

in any but the most limited 

sense.

— Maj Gen I.B. Holley, 

Technology and 

Military Doctrine

what has worked poorly. In those less frequent instances in which experience is lacking 

or difficult to acquire, doctrine may be developed through analysis of exercises, 

wargames, and experiments. The military experience of other nations should also be 

considered.

It should be emphasized that doctrine 

development is never complete. Any given 

doctrine document is a snapshot in time—a 

reflection of the thinking at the time of its 

creation. Innovation has always been a key 

part of sound doctrinal development and 

continues to play a central role. Doctrine 

should evolve as new experiences and 

advances in technology point the way to the 

operations of the future.

Three constantly evolving variables 

affect doctrine: theory, experience, and 

technology. Sound doctrine strikes a 

balance among all three.

 Theory may be an excellent starting point, 

but doctrine based solely on theory may 

not survive contact with reality. An 

example of this is the Army Air Corps’ 

advocacy of daylight precision bombing; 

bombers initially had neither the 

necessary precision nor the survivability 

required to implement the theory. On the 

other hand, theory can support 

technological investment and 

experimentation, as in the German 

Wehrmacht’s decision in the interwar 

years to pursue air-ground integration. A 

good grasp of operational art can provide 

the flexibility to adapt new theories within 

real-world situations, and prevent doctrine 

from becoming dogma.

 While experience plays a major role in 

doctrine formulation, too great a reliance 

on past experience leaves one open to 

always fighting the last war. Experience 

must be tempered with current realities to 

develop future plans. New technology can provide solutions to long-standing 

problems, as the advent of mobile, mechanized forces and aviation overcame the 

stalemate of trench warfare. Theories of war, sufficiently taught, should be open to 
8

reinterpretation in light of current circumstance. The US military experienced this in 

its recent formulation of doctrine for irregular warfare.

 Technology constantly evolves, but by itself is not a panacea. While technology 

alone may be good at providing single-point solutions, technology should be 

acquired with due consideration for operational art and design, taking into 

consideration theory and experience; sound reasoning must accompany realistic 

projections of what capabilities will actually be available to warfighters. Discussion 

in the 1990s of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” pointed to a similar interplay of 

ideas involving technology, organization, and doctrine. Thinking at that time held 

that all three were necessary to achieve a “revolution.” Thus, technology should not 

be acquired in isolation.

LEVELS OF DOCTRINE

As implemented in the Air Force, doctrine affects operations at three levels: 

basic, operational, and tactical. These levels speak to the intellectual content of the 

doctrinal concepts, not to the architectural structure of doctrine publications. (Note that 

the Air Force doctrine publication architecture breaks Air Force Doctrine Documents 

(AFDDs) into levels of capstone, keystone, and sub-publications, but this does not 

explicitly address the content.)

 Basic doctrine states the most fundamental and enduring beliefs that describe and 

guide the proper use, presentation, and organization of forces in military action. It 

describes the “elemental properties” of airpower and provides the Airman’s 

perspective. Because of its fundamental and enduring character, basic doctrine 

provides broad and continuing guidance on how Air Force forces are organized, 

employed, equipped, and sustained. Because it expresses broad, enduring 

fundamentals, basic doctrine changes relatively slowly compared to the other levels 

of doctrine. As the foundation of all doctrine, basic doctrine also sets the tone and 

vision for doctrine development for the future. AFDD 1 is the Air Force’s basic

doctrine publication.

 Operational doctrine contained in AFDD X-0 series publications (e.g., AFDD 2-0, 

AFDD 3-0, etc.) describes more detailed organization of forces and applies the 

principles of basic doctrine to military actions. Operational doctrine guides the 

proper organization and employment of air, space, and cyberspace forces in the 

context of distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad functional areas, and 

operational environments. Operational doctrine provides the focus for developing 

the missions and tasks to be executed through tactical doctrine. Doctrine at this 

level changes a bit more rapidly than basic doctrine, but usually only after deliberate 

internal Service debate. 

 Tactical doctrine describes the proper employment of specific Air Force assets, 

individually or in concert with other assets, to accomplish detailed objectives. 

Tactical doctrine considers particular objectives (stopping the advance of an 

armored column) and conditions (threats, weather, and terrain) and describes how 
9

Air Force assets are employed to accomplish the tactical objective (B-1 bombers 

dropping anti-armor cluster munitions). Air Force tactical doctrine is codified as 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in Air Force TTP (AFTTP) -3 series 

manuals. Because tactical doctrine is closely associated with the employment of 

technology and emerging tactics, change will likely occur more rapidly than other 

levels of doctrine. Also, due to their sensitive nature, many TTPs are classified.

TYPES OF DOCTRINE

There are three types of doctrine: Service, joint, and multinational. 

 Service doctrine outlines Service capabilities and guides the application of Service 

forces.

 Joint doctrine, as it applies to airpower in joint operations, describes the best way 

to integrate and employ air, space, and cyberspace capabilities with land, maritime, 

and special operations forces in military action. 

 Multinational doctrine, as it applies to airpower, describes the best way to integrate 

and employ US air forces with the forces of allies in coalition warfare. It establishes 

principles, organization, and fundamental procedures agreed upon between or 

among allied forces. When developed as a result of a treaty, as in North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine, multinational doctrine is directive.

DOCTRINE, OPERATING CONCEPTS, AND VISION 

The doctrinal maxims of this document are based on experience, hard-won with 

the blood of Airmen, and tempered by advances in technology. If properly employed, 

doctrine can lead to great success, and if ignored, can lead (and has led) to disaster. 

Therein lies the challenge: doctrine should convey the lessons of the past to guide 

current operations, but should still be flexible enough to adapt to change. Yet while 

forming that baseline for current operations, doctrine also provides a baseline for future 

thinking. One way to put this relationship into perspective is to understand the different 

uses of vision, operating concepts, and doctrine.

If placed along a continuum, doctrine, operating concepts, and vision provide a 

model for thinking about future technology, operating constructs, and doctrine in a 

coherent temporal framework.

 Doctrine is focused on near-term operational issues and describes the proper 

employment of current capabilities and current organizations. Doctrine 

addresses how best to employ, how to organize, and how to command today’s 

capabilities. Doctrine is examined and validated during training, exercises, 

contingency operations, and times of war. Exercises, wargaming, and experiments 

allow us to test emerging doctrinal concepts and better align predicted capabilities 

with sound operational practices. Experience during conflict refines doctrine in real 
10

 

 A hiatus exists 

between inventors who 

know what they could 

invent, if they only knew 

what was wanted, and 

the soldiers who know, 

or ought to know, what 

they want, and would 

ask for it if they only 

knew how much science 

could do for them. 

— Winston Churchill,

The Great War

time. Encounters with unpredictable adversaries often highlight doctrinal gaps and 

provide fresh perspectives on historic and future challenges.

 Operating concepts generally look out from five to fifteen years, and postulate 

reasonable operating scenarios that, through a 

combination of analysis and the use of 

descriptive examples, examine a range of 

issues such as employment, operating 

environment, command and control, support, 

organization, and planning considerations. As 

new technologies mature to the point where their 

performance can be reasonably bounded as a 

new, separate system or part of another system, 

they can be examined within the framework of an 

operating concept. Depending on their purpose, 

operating concepts can speak to the present, near 

future, or distant future. Operating concepts 

define the parameters of envisioned capabilities. 

Experiments, wargames, and historical study, 

when honestly and rigorously conducted, are 

useful methods for evaluating new operating 

concepts and providing a basis for doctrinal 

considerations. 

 Vision statements describe key operating constructs and desired operational 

capabilities well in the future, usually fifteen years out and beyond. Vision serves 

to focus technology investments toward achieving these capabilities. Emerging 

concepts and technologies are best investigated through experimentation and 

wargaming techniques. As future concepts are envisioned, it is important to also 

examine doctrine to support these potential capabilities. Vision provides the basis 

for wargaming, and the results of wargaming may point to doctrinal considerations 

requiring further examination.

Using doctrine, operating concepts, and vision, the Air Force can look toward the 

future and consider the long-term impacts of advanced technologies such as directed 

energy weapons, new unmanned systems, new space capabilities, and conceptual 

advancements. As this framework builds from the general (long term) to the specific 

(near term), Airmen can investigate a wide range of doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities issues at the appropriate point during 

technology development, concept exploration, and systems acquisition.
11

CHAPTER TWO

AIRPOWER

This chapter introduces the fundamentals that guide the application of airpower. 

It is written primarily for members of the US Air Force, but it is also applicable to anyone 

with the appellation of “airman,” including those of other Services and nations who 

share the Air Force Airman’s perspective articulated in this document. Accordingly, the 

following discussion of airpower is intentionally not Service-specific; aspects of airpower 

are used across the joint force and by coalition partners. However, Airmen have a 

special appreciation for airpower’s broader potential. Unlike our counterparts in the 

other Services, Airmen do not view or study airpower as an auxiliary or complementary 

capability subordinate to some other branch of our Service necessary to accomplishing 

assigned functions or tasks. Instead, we view our expertise in the application of 

airpower as the main reason for the existence of an Air Force. The Air Force does not 

view or use airpower organically to support Service component objectives; the Air Force 

employs airpower to achieve the JFC’s objectives and to complement the other 

components of the joint force.

AIRPOWER 

Airpower is the ability to project military power or influence through the 

control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, 

operational, or tactical objectives. The proper application of airpower requires a 

comprehensive doctrine of employment and an Airman’s perspective. As the nation’s 

most comprehensive provider of military airpower, the Air Force conducts continuous 

and concurrent air, space, and cyberspace operations. The air, space, and cyberspace 

 The other services have air arms—magnificent air 

arms—but their air arms must fit within their services, 

each with a fundamentally different focus. So those air 

arms, when in competition with the primary focus of their 

services, will often end up on the short end, where the 

priorities for resources may lead to shortfalls or 

decisions that are suboptimum. It is therefore important 

to understand that the core competencies of [airpower]

are optional for the other services. They can elect to 

play or not play in that arena. But if the nation is to 

remain capable and competent in air and space [sic], 

someone must pay attention across the whole spectrum; 

that is why there is a US Air Force.

— General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, retired
12

Airpower

 This AFDD presents airpower 

as a unitary construct; this is a 

change from previous basic 

doctrine which talked to “air and 

space power.” Since publication of 

the previous edition of AFDD 1, the 

Air Force has acknowledged the 

importance of the cyberspace 

domain. However, Air Force

doctrine should address what 

unifies Airmen. Thus, in the Air 

Force’s capstone doctrine 

document, it is appropriate to use 

concepts and language that bind 

Airmen together instead of 

presenting the Air Force as a 

collection of tribes broken out in 

technological stovepipes according 

to the domains of air, space, and 

cyberspace. Other subordinate 

doctrine documents delve into the 

differences and interdependencies 

of the core functions and missions 

conducted within and across the air, 

space, and cyberspace domains, 

and within the context of more 

specific types of operations. Where 

appropriate, this AFDD will also 

mention air, space, and cyberspace 

forces or capabilities.

capabilities of the other Services serve primarily to support their organic maneuver 

paradigms; the Air Force employs air, space, and cyberspace capabilities with a 

broader focus on theater-wide and nationallevel objectives. Through airpower, the Air 

Force provides the versatile, wide-ranging 

means towards achieving national 

objectives with the ability to deter and 

respond immediately to crises anywhere in 

the world.

Airpower exploits the third

dimension of the operational 

environment; the electromagnetic 

spectrum; and time to leverage speed, 

range, flexibility, precision, tempo, and 

lethality to create effects from and 

within the air, space, and cyberspace

domains. From this multi-dimensional 

perspective, Airmen can apply military 

power against an enemy’s entire array of 

diplomatic, informational, military, and 

economic instruments of power, at long 

ranges and on short notice. Airpower can 

be applied across the strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels of war 

simultaneously, significantly increasing the 

options available to national leadership. 

Due to its range, speed, and flexibility, 

airpower can compress time, controlling 

the tempo of operations in our favor. 

Airpower should be employed with 

appropriate consideration of land and 

maritime power, not just during operations 

against enemy forces, but when used as 

part of a team that protects and aids 

friendly forces as well. 

Much of what airpower can accomplish 

from within these three domains is done to critically affect events in the land and 

maritime domains—this is the heart of joint-domain integration, a fundamental aspect of 

airpower’s contribution to US national interests. Airmen integrate capabilities across air, 

space, and cyberspace domains to achieve effects across all domains in support of JFC 

objectives. For example, a remotely piloted aircraft operating from a ground station in 

the continental US (CONUS) relies on space and cyberspace capabilities to support

operations overseas. While all Services rely more and more on such integration, cross-
13

domain integration is fundamental to how Airmen employ airpower to complement the 

joint force.

Airmen exploit the third dimension, which consists of the entire expanse above 

the earth’s surface. Its lower limit is the earth’s surface (land or water), and the upper 

limit reaches toward infinity. This third dimension consists of the air and space 

domains. From an operational perspective, the air domain can be described as that 

region above the earth’s surface in which aerodynamics generally govern the planning 

and conduct of military operations, while the space domain can be described as that 

region above the earth’s surface in which astrodynamics generally govern the planning 

and conduct of military operations.2

 Airmen also exploit operational capabilities in 

cyberspace. Cyberspace is “a global domain within the information environment 

consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, 

including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 

processors and controllers” (JP 1-02). In contrast to our surface-oriented sister 

Services, the Air Force uses air, space, and cyberspace capabilities to create effects, 

including many on land and in the maritime domains, that are ends unto themselves, not 

just in support of predominantly land or maritime force activities.

The evolution of contemporary airpower stems from the Airman’s original vision 

of combat from a distance, bypassing the force-on-force clash of surface combat. 

Originally manifest in long-range aircraft delivering kinetic weapons, airpower has 

evolved over time to include many long-range supporting capabilities, notably the 

conduct of networked information-related operations. This evolution has accelerated as 

Airmen conduct a greater percentage of operations not just over-the-horizon but 

globally, expanding operations first through space and now also in cyberspace. Just as 

airpower grew from its initial use as an adjunct to surface operations, space and 

cyberspace have likewise grown from their original manifestations as supporting 

capabilities into warfighting arenas in their own right.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF AIRPOWER 

Airpower provides the Nation and the joint force with unique and valuable 

capabilities. Airmen should understand the intellectual foundations behind 

airpower and articulate its proper application at all levels of conflict; translate the 

benefits of airpower into meaningful objectives and desired effects; and influence 

the overall operational planning effort from inception to whatever post-conflict 

operations are required. 

Airpower stems from the use of lethal and nonlethal means by air forces to 

achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The Air Force can rapidly provide 

 2 JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, formally defines the air domain as “the 

atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations 

become negligible.” The description offered above is used to more easily illustrate the difference between 

the air and space domains using parallel language.
14

 Upon the outbreak of war the 

offensive power of the Air 

Service should be ready for 

instant use, and the offensive in 

the air should be assumed 

immediately. During this period 

of hostilities offensive aerial 

operations will exert an 

important influence upon the 

future conduct of the campaign. 

It should be used offensively, 

primarily to secure the control 

of the air, and, secondarily, to 

disrupt and delay enemy 

communications and ground 

establishments.

— Training Regulation No. 440-

15, “Fundamental Principles for 

the Employment of the Air 

Service,” 1926

national leadership and joint commanders a wide range of military options for meeting 

national objectives and protecting national interests. 

Elevation above the earth’s surface provides relative advantages and has helped 

create a mindset that sees conflict more broadly than other forces. Broader 

perspective, greater potential speed and range, and three-dimensional movement

fundamentally change the dynamics of conflict in ways not well understood by those 

bound to the surface. The result is inherent flexibility and versatility based on greater 

mobility and responsiveness. Airpower’s 

speed, range, flexibility, and versatility are its 

outstanding attributes in both space and time. 

This combination of attributes provides the 

foundation for the employment concepts of 

airpower. 

With its speed, range, and threedimensional perspective, airpower operates 

in ways that are fundamentally different 

from other forms of military power. 

Airpower has the ability to conduct operations 

and impose effects throughout an entire 

theater and across the ROMO, unlike surface 

forces that typically divide up the battlefield 

into individual operating areas. Airmen 

generally view the application of force more 

from a functional than geographic standpoint, 

and classify targets by generated effects 

rather than physical location. 

By making effective use of the third

dimension, the electromagnetic spectrum, 

and time, airpower can seize the initiative, 

set the terms of battle, establish a 

dominant tempo of operations, better 

anticipate the enemy through superior observation, and take advantage of 

tactical, operational, and strategic opportunities. Thus, airpower can 

simultaneously strike directly at the adversary’s centers of gravity, vital centers, 

critical vulnerabilities, and strategy. Airpower’s ability to strike the enemy rapidly and 

unexpectedly across all of these critical points adds a significant impact to an enemy’s

will in addition to the physical blow. This capability allows airpower to achieve effects 

well beyond the tactical effects of individual actions, at a tempo that disrupts the

adversary’s decision cycle. 

Airpower can be used to rapidly express the national will wherever and 

whenever necessary. Within 36 hours of the deployment order, Air Force F-15s were 

flying combat air patrols over Saudi Arabia in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
15

1990. More recently, Air Force forces demonstrated that same rapid-response 

capability by airlifting desperately needed supplies into tsunami-stricken areas of South 

and Southeast Asia and earthquake-stricken Haiti. The world at large perceives 

American airpower to be a politically acceptable expression of national power which 

offers reasonable alternatives to long, bloody ground battles while making an impact on 

the international situation. While a “boots-on-the-ground” presence may often be 

required, airpower makes that presence more effective, in less time, and often with 

fewer casualties. Increasingly, US national power and international influence are 

gauged in terms of what we can or cannot accomplish with this capability.

The Air Force provides national leadership and joint commanders with 

options, the threat of which may accomplish political objectives without the 

application of lethal force. The means is embedded in the ability to respond rapidly to 

crises anywhere in the world and across the ROMO. An obvious example is the 

deterrent role played by the Air Force’s nuclear-armed bombers and intercontinental 

ballistic missiles against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. More recently, B-52 and 

B-2 bombers have rotated into Guam to provide a ready and visible presence.

The Air Force provides the unique ability to hold at risk a wide range of an 

adversary’s options and possible courses of action; this is increasingly the key to 

successful joint campaigns. Airpower is increasingly the first military instrument 

brought to bear against an enemy in order to favorably influence the overall campaign. 

Frequently, and especially during the opening days of a crisis, airpower may be the only 

military instrument available to use against an enemy; this may be especially true if 

friendly ground forces are not immediately present in a given region. 

Air Force forces can respond rapidly to apply effects. The same spacecraft 

which Airmen employ to observe hostile territory prior to the outbreak of hostilities 

provide key intelligence to battle planners. The same aircraft which provide visible 

deterrence to a potential aggressor can be employed immediately to defend or attack 

should deterrence fail. The shift from deterrent force to combat power is nearinstantaneous. From ready deterrent to bombs-on-target is only a question of command 

and control and flight time.

Airpower is more than dropping bombs, strafing targets, firing missiles, 

providing precision navigation and timing, or protecting networks. It is also a 

way of influencing world situations in ways which support national objectives. To 

most observers in the post-Cold War world, the use of military power is politically less 

acceptable than in previous times. This is true even if we act in a purely humanitarian 

endeavor or influence a given international political situation with a modest show of 

force. In international disasters, natural or man-made, from the Berlin Airlift to 

earthquake relief operations in Pakistan, the Air Force is the only military force in the 

world which has the airlift and air refueling capability to provide immediate relief 

supplies and personnel in response to global emergencies. Air Force aircraft delivering

relief supplies serve not only to alleviate the immediate situation, but also to provide a 

visible symbol of the care, concern, and capability of the US. Through careful building 
16

of partnerships, Air Force forces can favorably shape the strategic environment by 

assessing, advising, training, and assisting host nation air forces in their efforts to 

counter internal or external threats. The perception of credible US forces underpins 

many deterrence and assurance strategies. Such activities lead to greater regional 

stability and security. 

Within the broad sweep of history, the benefits of this instrument of military power 

are relatively new. Up until the latter part of the 20th century, naval forces provided the 

primary symbol of American military power and resolve; powerful warships making port 

calls throughout the world were visible symbols of the strength and capability of the US. 

Today, airpower plays a very similar role—and not just in those nations with major 

seaports. In numerous humanitarian operations, Airmen have provided relief, 

demonstrated resolve, and helped to shape the attitudes of world leaders and their 

people.

This influence is more than just airplanes. US space-based assets are a nonintrusive method of providing up-to-the-minute warning and information on the 

maneuver of hostile military forces or other potentially dangerous actions. The US often 

shares this information with friendly nations in response to potential adversaries to 

defuse points of conflict before they result in hostilities. US air, space, and cyberspace 

capabilities provide the means to alert allies of a potential aggressor's hostile intentions 

or impending attack when in-country physical presence is unwarranted. They can 

influence potential adversaries by stripping them of the ability to hide hostile military 

activity without violating national sovereignty. 

Airpower’s speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality provide a 

spectrum of employment options with effects that range from tactical to strategic. 

This range of effects is an important contribution. A surface-centric strategy often seeks 

its outcome through the destruction of hostile land forces and the occupation of territory. 

However, destruction of hostile land forces may be only a tactical or operational 

objective and may not achieve the desired strategic outcome. Further, territorial 

occupation, with its attendant large cultural footprint, may not be feasible or politically 

acceptable. Sea power, with its ability to project force and disrupt the economic lifeline 

of a maritime-capable adversary, also provides the potential for strategic results. 

However, slow surface speeds can constrain its capability to respond rapidly from one 

theater to another. In addition, it may be extremely vulnerable in littoral regions. Often, 

in such circumstances, the political risks outweigh the actual military risks. 

Airpower, on the other hand, has been successfully used to influence strategic 

political outcomes in many world crises since the Berlin Airlift of 1948. Throughout the 

Cold War, and continuing under various international arms control agreements, Air 

Force assets have been used to observe and verify compliance, leveraging our ability to 

negotiate and influence diplomatically. If force becomes necessary, Air Force assets 

can secure strategic outcomes at any time by overflying surface forces and thus 

bypassing geographical boundaries, or striking with precision at the critical 

vulnerabilities within an adversary's political, military, and industrial centers of gravity. 
17

Even in situations when joint strategy requires large-scale destruction of enemy surface 

forces, Air Force forces can deliver the bulk of that destruction. It can do these things 

sooner than can other military forces, and it has been demonstrated that the earlier the 

application of effects, usually the less total force required. In humanitarian cases, the 

earlier the relief, the better the effect.

Operating in a seamless medium, there are no natural boundaries to constrain 

air, space, and cyberspace operations. Through centralized control of Air Force assets 

and decentralized execution, commanders reap the benefits of airpower throughout the 

ROMO, wherever most needed at any given time.

Airpower has a degree of versatility not found in any other force. Many 

aircraft can be employed in a variety of roles and shift rapidly from the defense to the 

offense. Aircraft may conduct a close air support mission on one sortie, then be 

rearmed and subsequently used to suppress enemy surface-to-surface missile attacks 

or to interdict enemy supply routes on the next. In time-sensitive scenarios, aircraft en

route to one target, or air mobility aircraft in support of one mission, can be reassigned 

new targets or re-missioned as new opportunities emerge. Multirole manned and 

unmanned platforms may perform ISR, command and control (C2), and attack functions 

all during the same mission, providing more potential versatility per sortie. Finally, 

aircraft can be repositioned within a theater to provide more responsiveness, while 

space and cyberspace capabilities can be reprioritized.

Joint campaigns rely upon this versatility. However, many airpower capabilities 

are limited in number; dividing or parceling out airpower into "penny-packets" violate the 

tenet of synergy and principle of mass. To preserve unity of effort, JFCs normally vest a 

single air commander with control of all airpower capabilities. 

Historically, armies, navies, and air forces massed large numbers of troops,

ships, or aircraft to create significant impact on the enemy. Today, the technological 

impact of precision guided munitions enables a relatively small number of aircraft to 

directly achieve national as well as military strategy objectives. When combined with 

stealth technologies, airpower today can provide shock and surprise without 

unnecessarily exposing friendly forces. To destroy a single target, we no longer need 

the thousand-plane bomber raids of World War II or the hundreds of sorties of Vietnam. 

Today's air forces can provide accurate and assured destruction of vital targets with far 

fewer aircraft, sometimes multiple targets with a single aircraft. Moreover, that 

capability can be delivered from within the theater or around the globe if necessary. 

Whether in the skies of Iraq and Afghanistan, delivering United Nations peacekeeping 

troops to Africa, or monitoring nuclear weapons proliferation and development, Air 

Force forces have a far-reaching presence and the ability to produce direct and 

immediate effects.

With all those characteristics considered, one should remember that air, space, 

and cyberspace superiority are the essential first ingredients in any successful 

modern military operation. Military leaders recognize that successful military 
18

 “[Airmindedness] is a 

global, strategic mind-set 

providing perspective through 

which the battlespace is not 

constrained by geography, 

distance, location, or time. 

The air-mindedness lens 

enables Airmen to think 

about conflict in which forceon-force and armies in the 

field are only one element. It 

implies the ability to influence 

the links between adversary 

materiel and moral strength. 

Although Airmen rarely claim 

to target the enemy's will, 

they perceive a direct 

connection between his 

physical capacity and desire 

to continue the fight.”

— Dr. Dale L. Hayden, “AirMindedness,” Air & Space 

Power Journal, Winter 2008

operations can be conducted only when they have gained the required level of control of 

the domains above the surface domains. Freedom to conduct land and naval 

operations is substantially enhanced when friendly forces are assured that the enemy 

cannot disrupt operations from above.

Control of the air, space, and cyberspace domains is not a goal for its own sake, 

but rather a prerequisite for all other military operations. Air mastery has allowed 

American land, naval, and air forces to operate where they want, at their own tempo, 

while creating the environment for success. 

“AIRMINDEDNESS”

The perspective of Airmen is 

necessarily different; it reflects a unique 

appreciation of airpower’s potential, as well 

as the threats and survival imperatives 

unique to Airmen. The study of airpower 

leads to a particular expertise and a distinctive 

point of view that General Henry H. “Hap”

Arnold termed “airmindedness.” 

Airmen normally think of airpower 

and the application of force from a 

functional rather than geographical 

perspective. Airmen do not divide up the 

battlefield into operating areas as some

surface forces do; airmindedness entails 

thinking beyond two dimensions, into the 

dimensions of the vertical and the 

dimension of time. Airmen think spatially, 

from the surface to geosynchronous orbit. 

Airmen typically classify targets by the effect 

their destruction would have on the adversary 

instead of where the targets are physically 

located. This approach normally leads to more 

inclusive and comprehensive perspectives that 

favor strategic solutions over tactical ones. Finally, Airmen also think of power 

projection from inside the US to anywhere on the globe in hours (for air operations) and 

even nanoseconds (for space and cyberspace operations).

Airmindedness impacts Airmen’s thoughts throughout all phases of operations. It 

is neither platform- nor situation-specific. Airmindedness enables Airmen to think and 

act at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, simultaneously if called for. 

Thus, the flexibility and utility of airpower is best fully exploited by an air-minded Airman.
19

THE AIRMAN’S PERSPECTIVE

The practical application of “airmindedness” results in the Airman’s unique 

perspective, which can be summarized as follows.

 Control of the vertical dimension is generally a necessary precondition for 

control of the surface. The first mission of an air force is to defeat or neutralize the 

enemy air forces so friendly operations on land, sea, in the air, and in space can 

proceed unhindered, while at the same time one’s own military forces and critical 

vulnerabilities remain safe from air attack.

 Airpower is an inherently strategic force. War and peace are decided, organized, 

planned, supplied, and commanded at the strategic level of war. Air Force forces 

can hold an enemy’s strategic centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities directly at 

risk immediately and continuously. Airpower also has great strategic capability for 

non-lethal strategic influence, as in humanitarian relief and building partnership

activities. 

 Airpower can exploit the principles of mass and maneuver simultaneously to a 

far greater extent than surface forces. There are no natural lateral boundaries to 

prevent air, space, and cyberspace capabilities from quickly concentrating their 

power (physically or in terms of delivered effects) at any point, even when starting 

from widely dispersed locations. Airpower dominates the fourth dimension—time—

and compresses the tempo of events to produce physical and psychological shock. 

 Airpower can apply force against many facets of enemy power. Air Forceprovided capabilities can be brought to bear against any lawful target within an 

enemy’s diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and social structures 

simultaneously or separately. They can be employed in support of national, 

combined/joint, or other component objectives. They can be integrated with surface 

power or employed independently.

 Air Force forces are less culturally intrusive in many scenarios. Surface forces 

are composed of many people and vehicles which, when arrayed for operations, 

cover a significant area. Thus, their presence may be very visible to local 

populations and may create resentment during certain types of stability operations

and in counterinsurgency operations. Air Force forces, operating from bases over 

the horizon or from just a few bases in-country, have a smaller footprint for the 

effects they provide. Space and cyberspace forces have a negligible in-theater 

footprint relative to the capabilities they provide.

 Airpower’s inherent speed, range, and flexibility combine to make it one of the 

most versatile components of military power. Its versatility allows it to be rapidly 

employed against strategic, operational, and tactical objectives simultaneously. The 

versatility of airpower derives not only from the inherent characteristics of air forces 

themselves, but also from the manner in which they are organized and controlled. 
20

 Airpower results from the effective integration of capabilities, people, 

weapons, bases, logistics, and all supporting infrastructure. No one aspect of 

air, space, and cyberspace capabilities should be treated in isolation since each 

element is essential and interdependent. Ultimately, the Air Force depends on the 

performance of the people who operate, command, and sustain air, space, and 

cyberspace forces. 

 The choice of appropriate capabilities is a key aspect in the realization of 

airpower. Weapons should be selected based on their ability to create desired 

effects on an adversary’s capability and will. Achieving the full potential of airpower 

requires timely, actionable intelligence and sufficient command and control 

capabilities to permit commanders to exploit precision, speed, range, flexibility, and 

versatility. 

 Supporting bases with their people, systems, and facilities are essential to 

launch, recovery, and sustainment of Air Force forces. One of the most 

important aspects of the Air Force has proved to be its ability to move anywhere in 

the world quickly and then rapidly begin operations. However, the need for mobility 

should be balanced against the need to operate at the deployment site. The 

availability and operability of suitable bases can be the dominant factor in 

employment planning and execution. 

 Airpower’s unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by 

Airmen. Airpower can quickly intervene anywhere, regardless of whether it is used 

for strategic or tactical purposes. Thus, Airmen tend to take a broader view of war, 

because the capabilities they command have effects at broader levels of war. 

Airmen apply airpower through the tenet of centralized control and decentralized 

execution, discussed further in chapter 4.
21

CHAPTER THREE

WAR 

Because war underpins the reason for the Air Force’s existence, an 

understanding of doctrine should also include an understanding of war. The ultimate 

objective of peacetime preparation of forces is their employment as instruments of 

national power to deter or win wars. Therefore, Airmen should understand the nature 

and consequences of war.

War is a violent struggle between rival parties to attain competing objectives. 

War is just one means used by nation-states, sub-national groups, or supranational 

groups to achieve disputed objectives. War has been a basic aspect of human affairs 

throughout history. The modern Western tendency to view war as an aberration in 

human affairs, only occasionally necessary as an operation with limited aims or an allout campaign to destroy a clearly recognized evil, often distorts our understanding of 

warfare and its purposes. Warfare is ingrained in the very nature of certain cultures. 

While for nation states, war is an instrument of policy aiming at political objectives, it is 

also, even within this context, a phenomenon involving the full range of human emotions 

and irrationalities. War has a dynamic of its own, often fueled by pressures of the 

irrational: anger, fear, revenge, and hatred. Thus, the resort to violence rarely remains 

for long tied to cold, clear political objectives; it can—and has—moved in unexpected 

directions. 

Military professionals operate in war within an environment that cannot be 

replicated in peacetime. They are asked to perform their work perhaps only a few times 

in their careers and then under very different circumstances from those for which they 

have prepared. Moreover, the arena in which military professionals operate is a deadly 

one. Not only are they attempting, as General George Patton stated, to “make the other 

poor bastard die for his country,” the enemy is attempting to do the same to us. 

Consequently, war is an arena characterized by extraordinary fear, pain, and suffering 

and is further complicated by the effects of weather and terrain. 

 Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them: 

theory facilitates practice. The lifetime of one man is not long 

enough to enable him to acquire perfect knowledge and 

experience. Theory helps to supplement it; it provides a youth 

with premature experience and makes him skillful also 

through the mistakes of others. In the profession of war the 

rules of the art are never violated without drawing punishment 

from the enemy, who is delighted to find us at fault.

 

 — Frederick the Great
22

THE NATURE OF WAR 

Three enduring truths describe the nature of war. Despite technological 

advances and the best of plans and intentions, war will never be as straightforward in 

execution as planned, nor free of unintended consequences. The particular 

characteristics usually change from conflict to conflict, but the nature of war remains 

eternal.

 War is an instrument of policy, strategy, or culture. Victory in war is not 

measured by casualties inflicted, battles won or lost, number of tanks destroyed, or 

territory occupied, but by the achievement of (or failure to achieve) the strategy and 

policy objectives of nation states, and often the cultural objectives of all actors 

(including non- or supra-state entities). More than any other factor, these

objectives—one’s own and those of the enemy—shape the scope, intensity, and 

duration of war. To support US national policy objectives, military objectives and 

operations should be coordinated and orchestrated with nonmilitary and partner 

nation instruments of power. Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz 

emphasized that war is a continuation of the policies of nations, but not all 

belligerents in war are organized nation states.

 War is a complex and chaotic human endeavor. Irrational and non-rational 

human impulses and human frailties shape war’s nature—it is not deterministic. 

Uncertainty and unpredictability—what many call the “fog of war”—combine with 

danger, physical stress, and human fallibility to produce what Clausewitz called

“friction,” which makes even simple operations unexpectedly and sometimes even 

insurmountably difficult. 

 War is a clash of opposing wills. War is collision of two or more living forces.

War is not waged against an inanimate or static object, but against a living, 

calculating, interactively complex, adaptive opponent. The enemy often does not 

think as we think and often holds different values, motivations, and priorities than 

ours. Victory results from creating advantages against a thinking adversary bent on 

creating his own advantages. This produces a dynamic interplay of action and 

reaction. While physical factors are crucial in war, the will of the people and the 

character of their leaders are also critical components of war. Allied and enemy 

resolve—the determination to enforce one’s will on one side and to resist on the 

other—can be the decisive element.

Success in war requires mastery of the art of war as well as the science of war. 

Warfare is one of the most complex of human activities. Success depends more on 

intellectual superiority, morale, and determination than it does on numerical and 

technological superiority. Success thus demands an intricate combination of science 

(that which can be measured, studied, and controlled) and art (creativity, flexibility, 

intuition, and the ability to adapt). Sound doctrine, good leadership, effective 

organization, moral values, and realistic training can lessen the effects of uncertainty, 

unpredictability, and unreliability that are always present in war. 
23

TRADITIONAL AND IRREGULAR WAR 

The US’ overwhelming dominance in recent conventional wars has made it highly 

unlikely that most adversaries would choose to fight the US in a traditional, conventional

manner. Thus, for relatively weaker powers (including non-state entities) irregular 

warfare has become an attractive, if not more necessary, option. Irregular warfare 

presents different challenges to our military and to the Air Force. 

 Traditional warfare is characterized as “a confrontation between nation-states or 

coalitions/alliances of nation-states”3

 Irregular warfare is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors 

for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors 

indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military 

and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will” (JP 

1-02).

(JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States). This confrontation typically involves force-on-force military 

operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities 

against each other in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The 

objective may be to convince or coerce key military or political decision makers, 

defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or 

seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or 

policies.

Traditional warfare and irregular warfare differ primarily by the approach and 

strategy used to achieve the effects desired. Traditional warfare seeks a change in 

the policies and practices, if not in the outright existence, of a government by 

coercing key government leaders or defeating them militarily. Irregular warfare, 

conversely, seeks to undermine a group, government, and/or ideology by 

influencing the population, which is often the center of gravity. The focus of 

irregular warfare is not primarily on the military or destructive capability of an adversary 

(state or non-state).

Irregular warfare is not a lesser-included form of traditional warfare. 

Rather, irregular warfare encompasses a variety of operations where the nature and 

characteristics are significantly different from traditional war. There are principally five 

activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form 

in a coherent campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism, unconventional 

warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.

Traditional warfare and irregular warfare are not mutually exclusive; both 

forms of warfare may be present in a given conflict. Airmen should understand that 

the character of war may often change in the course of a conflict. This is especially true 

in irregular warfare where the conflict is often protracted and varies in intensity. 

 3 Joint doctrine does not formally define traditional war. However, JP 1 contains this characterization.
24

 When one is 

attempting to change 

minds, rather than blow 

them away, local beliefs 

and attitudes assume high 

strategic importance.

— Colin S. Gray, The 

Airpower Advantage in 

Future Warfare

Traditional warfare can rapidly evolve into an irregular war and vice versa, requiring the 

military force to adapt from one form to the other.

Refer to AFDD 3-24, Irregular Warfare, for detailed discussion on irregular 

warfare.

CULTURE AND WAR 

The role of culture in establishing the 

terms of conflict is another vital component 

that has increased in importance in recent 

operations. War among Western powers has 

always been seen as an adjunct to politics and 

commerce, and often as a dangerous distraction 

from them. The rewards of war are physical; 

psychological reinforcement comes predominantly 

from war’s spoils, not from war itself. In general, 

this view has led Western powers to try to force 

resolution as quickly and “cheaply” as practicable 

(in all but comparatively rare civil and religious 

wars), to seek decisive engagement with the 

enemy when possible, and to focus warfare upon 

defeat of the enemy’s fielded military forces. This 

was true even during Industrial Age conflicts, where 

the total moral and physical power of the nationstate was mobilized for war. This is the cultural 

legacy that has most heavily influenced the modern 

use of airpower.

People in other cultures often view things differently, and Airmen should be 

sensitive to these differences. In a number of non-Western societies around the globe, 

the cultural motivation for war is more deeply felt, causing them to fight in ways and for 

reasons that may seem strange to Americans. Some adhere to a warrior ethos, in 

which the act of waging war provides its own important psychological reinforcements. 

Some do not separate church, state, and popular culture in the Western manner, but 

see religion, politics, warfare, and even trade as part of a seamless whole. Thus, the 

wars they wage may take on the single-mindedness and ferocity of religious or civil 

wars.

US commanders should consider these factors when devising strategies to deal 

with adversaries from such cultures. They should seek to understand how the 

adversary thinks and not “mirror-image.” For example, during the Vietnam War the US 

assumed that North Vietnamese motivations, priorities, and interests were similar to our 

own. This incorrect assumption significantly hampered the process of devising a 

winning strategy and prolonged the war. The US should also carefully plan for stability 

and other operations that follow major combat, and constantly keep the conflict’s 
25

ultimate end state in mind during combat operations, considering all possible means for 

creating effects and achieving objectives, not just those conventionally used for 

destruction of fielded forces.

LEVELS OF WAR

Warfare is typically divided into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. 

These divisions have arisen because traditional war constrained forces to engage forceon-force, on the surface, at the tactical level, allowing effects to aggregate up from that 

level to the level of campaigns and other major operations, and finally to the level 

directly affecting an adversary’s ability to wage war altogether. However, Airmen should 

not define a given level by the specific weapons used, or on the targets attacked, but on 

the level of desired effects one wishes to create. A given aircraft, dropping a given 

weapon, could conduct a “tactical,” “operational,” or “strategic” mission, depending on 

the planned results. Given airpower’s inherent flexibility, any tactical mission with a 

given aircraft dropping given weapons can deliver a mix of intended effects, at all levels, 

from tactical to strategic. 

Effects at the strategic level of war impair the adversary’s ability to carry out 

war or hostilities in general. Strategic effects should neutralize the adversary’s centers 

of gravity (COGs). At this level the US determines national or multinational (alliance or 

coalition) security objectives and guidance, and uses all national resources to achieve 

objectives and desired end states. These national objectives in turn provide the 

direction for developing overall military objectives, which in turn are used to develop the 

military objectives and strategy for each theater or operation. Strategy is aimed at 

outcomes, thus strategic ends define this level. In some circumstances, there may be 

value in distinguishing between the nation’s strategy as a whole and what might be 

termed the “theater-strategic” level, at which particular combatant commanders 

(CCDRs) determine and direct the overall outcomes of major operations (or “wars”) 

taking place within their particular areas of responsibility (AORs), explicitly tying these 

“theater-strategic” aims to overarching national strategy and policy. In general terms, 

the strategic level of war addresses the issues of WHY and WITH WHAT we will 

fight and WHY the enemy fights against us.

The operational level of war lies between the strategic and tactical levels. At 

this level, campaigns and major operations are designed, planned, conducted, 

sustained, assessed, and adapted to accomplish strategic goals within theaters or areas 

of operations. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do 

tactics; they orchestrate tactical successes to achieve objectives at higher levels. The 

decision-making products at this level of planning identify required forces and resources 

balanced against operational risk. Operational effects such as air, space, and 

cyberspace superiority, defeat of enemy surface forces, isolation of enemy forces in the 

battlespace, and disruption or destruction of enemy leadership functions are the means 

with which the operational commander supports the overall strategy. Operations 

involve the integration of tactical military missions and engagements to achieve 

strategic ends. Planning at the operational level of war determines WHAT we will 
26

affect, with WHAT courses of action, in WHAT order, for WHAT duration, and with 

WHAT RESOURCES.

At the lowest end of the spectrum lies the tactical level of war, where individual 

battles and engagements are fought. While resulting effects may be described as 

operational or strategic, military actions occur almost entirely at the tactical level. Thus, 

even a global strike mission intended to produce a direct strategic effect on an 

adversary COG is ultimately a tactical action. To the Airman, the distinction between 

this level and higher levels of war is fairly clear-cut; Airmen tend not to fight large-scale 

battles (as surface forces use the term) but focus at the tactical level on individual 

engagements and “missions.” The tactical level of air, space, and cyberspace warfare 

deals with how forces are employed, and the specifics of how engagements are 

conducted. Tactics are concerned with the unique employment of force, so application 

defines this level. In short, the tactical level of war deals with HOW we fight.

THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Military operations slide along an imprecise scale of violence and scale of military 

involvement, from theater-wide major operations and campaigns; to smaller scale 

contingencies and crisis response operations; to engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence operations. See figure 3.1. No two conflicts are alike; scope, duration, 

tempo, and political context vary widely. Some conflicts may even change from one 

form to another, either escalating or de-escalating; several may exist simultaneously. 

Military leaders carefully assess the nature of the missions they may be assigned, not 

only to properly determine the appropriate mix of forces but also to discern implied 

requirements. Some operations involve open combat between regular forces; in others, 

combat may be tangential to the main effort. In some operations, the US military’s 

contribution may not involve combat at all; simply providing an organizational framework 

for an interagency force and key elements of infrastructure may be all that’s required. 

 The various discrete military tasks associated with the ROMO are not 

mutually exclusive; depending on the scenario, there may be some overlap 

among the tasks. They may also occur within the context of a larger major 

operation. For example, some tasks, such as nation assistance or combating 

terrorism, may be required as part of the post-conflict stabilization phase immediately 

following a major conflict, and may even be initiated before the cessation of major 

operations. Even though there are many types of operations typically not involving 

combat, Airmen must understand that violence (and casualties) may occur in virtually 

any type of operation and, therefore, must be ready and able at all times to defend 

themselves and their units.

Many of the challenges our armed forces face today are more ambiguous and 

regionally focused than during the Cold War. These challenges address multiple risks, 

such as: economic and political transitions; repressive regimes; the spread of weapons 

of mass destruction; proliferation of cutting-edge military technology; violent extremists; 

militant nationalism; ethnic and religious conflict; refugee overflows; narcotics trafficking; 
27

environmental degradation; population displacement; and terrorism. The military 

instrument of national power, either unilaterally or in combination with the economic, 

informational, and diplomatic instruments, may be called upon to meet these 

challenges. Under such circumstances, early intervention through contingency 

operations may deter war, resolve conflict, relieve suffering, promote peace, or support 

civil authorities.

Military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other 

instruments of national or international power. To leverage effectiveness, it is 

particularly important that actions be integrated, mutually reinforcing, and clearly 

focused on compatible objectives throughout the engaged force, whether US, allied, 

military, civilian, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The overall goal of any 

operation, regardless of scale, is to pursue US national policy objectives and to counter 

potential threats to US national security interests.

Airpower capabilities are adaptable across the ROMO. Certain assets may be 

applied to attain strategic-, operational-, or tactical-level effects against limited 

objectives as effectively as those mounted against more “traditional” wartime targets. 

Whether providing rapid, focused global mobility; conducting information operations that 

shape and influence the situation; isolating operations from air or ground interference; 

or providing the eyes and ears of a sophisticated command and control system, the 

flexibility of air, space, and cyberspace forces is integral to all operations. Within the 

joint force, air component forces can be the supported force for specific tasks (strategic 

attack; airlift or special operations providing foreign humanitarian assistance or to 

Major Operations and Campaigns

Contingencies and Crisis Response Operations 

Engagement, Security Cooperation, and 

Deterrence Operations

Figure 3.1. The Range of Military Operations

Military operations vary in purpose, scale, risk, and intensity. They include 

relatively benign, routine, and recurring military activities during peacetime; 

specific combat and non-combat responses to contingencies and crises as 

they occur; and less frequent, large-scale combat operations typical of 

wartime conditions. (Adapted from JP 3-0)

High

Intensity

Low
28

conduct a limited raid; counterair to enforce an air exclusion zone; or information 

operations to determine treaty compliance), an enhancing force (air- and space-based 

ISR), or a supporting force (close air support, some interdiction, and some suppression 

of enemy air defenses). The specific tasks involved in any given operation vary greatly, 

depending on the context of the larger conflict or contingency, national policies and 

objectives, forces available to do the job, and a host of other considerations. In a large, 

complex scenario, US forces may be performing several of these tasks simultaneously, 

in addition to combat operations.

 

For more detailed discussion on the ROMO, see AFDD 3-0, Operations and 

Planning, and JP 1. 
29

CHAPTER FOUR

PRINCIPLES AND TENETS 

The role of the Air Force is to defend the US and protect its interests through 

airpower, guided by the principles of joint operations and the tenets of airpower. Airmen 

should understand these fundamental beliefs as they apply to operations across all 

domains, not just air, space, and cyberspace. This chapter presents these principles 

and tenets.

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS 

In conducting contemporary operations, commanders generally consider 12 

broad principles collectively known as “the principles of joint operations.” They combine 

the long-standing principles of war and four other principles 4 developed through recent 

experience in irregular warfare. See figure 4.1.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR 

Throughout the history of conflict, military leaders have noted certain principles 

that tended to produce military victory. From ancient times to today, certain “truths” of 

warfare have emerged. Known as the principles of war, they are “those aspects of 

warfare that are universally true and relevant” (JP 1). As members of the joint team, 

Airmen should appreciate how these principles apply to all forces, but should most fully 

understand them as they pertain to Air Force forces. Airpower, no matter which Service 

operates the systems and no matter which type of platform is used, provides unique 

capabilities. The principles of war—unity of command, objective, offensive, mass, 

maneuver, economy of force, security, surprise, and simplicity—are guidelines that 

commanders can use to form and select courses of action and concepts of operation.

 4 Joint doctrine recognizes three additional principles. The Air Force recognizes Unity of Effort as a fourth 

additional principle to better highlight its importance.

 The military student does not seek to learn from 

history the minutiae of method and technique. In every 

age these are influenced by the characteristics of 

weapons currently available and the means at hand for 

maneuvering, supplying, and controlling combat forces. 

But research does bring to light those fundamental 

principles, and their combinations and applications, 

which, in the past, have produced success.

 

 — General Douglas MacArthur
30

Principles of War

• Unity of Command

• Objective

• Offensive

• Mass

• Maneuver

• Economy of Force

• Security

• Surprise

• Simplicity

Additional 

Principles 

of Operations

• Unity of Effort

• Restraint

• Perseverance

• Legitimacy

Figure 4.1. Principles of

Joint Operations

These principles represent generally 

accepted “truths” which have proven to be effective 

throughout history. Of course, even valid principles 

are no substitute for sound, professional judgment—

but to ignore them completely is to assume 

unnecessary risk. The complexity of war in general, 

and the unique character of each war in particular, 

preclude commanders from using these principles 

as a checklist to guarantee victory. Rather, they 

serve as valuable guides to evaluate potential 

courses of action. The principles are independent, 

but tightly fused in application. No one principle 

should be considered without due consideration of 

the others. These principles are not all-inclusive; 

the art of developing airpower strategies depends 

upon the Airman’s ability to view these principles 

from a three-dimensional perspective and integrate 

their application accordingly. The principles of war, 

combined with the additional tenets of airpower 

discussed later in this chapter, provide the basis for 

a sound and enduring doctrine for the air, space, 

and cyberspace forces of America’s joint force.

Unity of Command 

Unity of command ensures concentration 

of effort for every objective under one 

responsible commander. This principle 

emphasizes that all efforts should be directed and 

coordinated toward a common objective. Airpower’s 

operational-level perspective calls for unity of command to gain the most effective and 

efficient application. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best 

achieved by vesting a single commander with the authority and the capability to direct 

all force employment in pursuit of a common objective. In many operations, the wideranging interagency and nongovernmental organizations involved may dilute unity of 

command. Effective information-sharing arrangements may preserve unity of effort to 

ensure common focus and mutually supporting actions.

Unity of command is vital in employing airpower. Airpower is the product of 

multiple capabilities, and centralized control is essential to effectively fuse these 

capabilities and provide unity of command. Airmen inherently understand the entire 

range of airpower. 

Objective 

The principle of objective is to direct military operations toward a defined 

and attainable objective that contributes to strategic, operational, and tactical 
31

 Air operations, like any other 

military operations, are governed by 

the same fundamental principles that 

have governed warfare in the past. 

The selection of the objectives 

against which air operations are to be 

directed is thus of vital importance. 

Air operations must be pushed with 

energy and dispatch. Every 

opportunity must be seized to take full 

advantage of the element of surprise. 

Since the replacement of the 

personnel and equipment of air forces 

is both slow and costly, economy of 

force is specially important. Whereas 

it is always unwise to fritter away 

military forces, it is dangerous in the 

case of air forces. Air forces should 

accordingly be concentrated against 

the primary objective, the one most 

advantageous in the situation, and 

not dispersed or dissipated in minor 

or secondary operations.

— Training Regulation 440-15, 

“Employment of the 

Air Forces of the Army,” 1935

aims. In application, this principle refers to unity of effort in purpose, space, and time. 

In a broad sense, this principle holds that political and military goals should be 

complementary and clearly articulated. A clear National Military Strategy provides focus 

for defining campaign or theater objectives. At the operational level, campaign or 

theater objectives determine military priorities. 

The objective is important 

due to the versatility of airpower. 

From the outset, airpower can 

pursue tactical, operational, or 

strategic objectives, in any 

combination, or all three 

simultaneously. By integrating the 

potential offered by air, space, and 

cyberspace capabilities, Airmen can 

overcome the challenges imposed 

by distance and time. From an 

Airman’s perspective, then, the 

principle of objective shapes 

priorities to allow airpower to 

concentrate on theater or campaign 

priorities and seeks to avoid the

siphoning of force elements to

fragmented objectives.

Offensive 

The purpose of an 

offensive action is to seize, retain, 

and exploit the initiative. The 

offensive aim is to act rather than 

react and to dictate the time, place,

purpose, scope, intensity, and pace 

of operations. The initiative should

be seized as soon as possible. The 

principle of the offensive holds that 

offensive action, or initiative, provides 

the means for joint forces to dictate operations. Once seized, the initiative should be 

retained and fully exploited.

This principle is particularly significant to airpower because it is best used as an 

offensive weapon. While defense may be dictated by the combat situation, success in 

war is generally attained only while on the offensive. Even highly successful defensive 

air campaigns such as the World War II Battle of Britain were based upon selective 

offensive engagements. 
32

The speed and range of attacking airpower gives it a significant offensive 

advantage over other forces. In an air attack, for example, the defender often requires 

more forces to defend a given geospatial area than the attacker requires to strike a set 

of specific targets. The integration of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities enhances

the advantages of speed, range and persistence found in airpower.

Although all military forces have offensive capabilities, airpower’s ability to mass 

and maneuver, and its ability to operate independently or simultaneously at the tactical, 

operational, and/or strategic levels of warfare, provides JFCs a resource with global 

reach to directly and rapidly seize the initiative. Whether deploying forces and supplies 

into a region, conducting combat operations, or maintaining information assurance, 

airpower provides the JFC the means to take the offensive. Through prompt and 

sustained offensive actions designed to attain operational and strategic objectives, 

airpower causes the enemy to react rather than act, denies them the offensive, and 

shapes the remainder of the conflict.

Mass 

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the 

most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results. Concentration of 

military power is a fundamental consideration in all military operations. At the 

operational level, this principle suggests that superior, concentrated combat power is 

used to achieve decisive results.

Airpower is singularly able to launch an attack from widely dispersed locations 

and mass combat power at the objective, whether that objective is a single physical 

location or a widely dispersed enemy system or systems. From an Airman’s 

perspective, mass is not based solely on the quantity of forces and materiel committed. 

Airpower achieves mass through effectiveness of attack, not just overwhelming 

numbers. Contemporary airpower has altered the concept of massed forces. The 

speed, range, and flexibility of airpower—complemented by the accuracy and lethality of 

precision weapons and advances in information technologies—allow it to achieve mass 

faster than other forces. 

Air Force cyberspace capabilities, often enabled by space systems, allow 

dispersed forces to collaborate to rapidly find, fix, track, and target fleeting targets and 

mass a response in new ways. Previously, operators and planners worked in relative 

proximity within the same theater of operations; today, those same planners and 

operators leverage distributed capabilities to apply precise effects around the globe.

Airlift and air refueling provide a significant and critical capability to mass lethal 

and nonlethal forces on a global scale. The capability of airpower to act quickly and 

mass effects, along with its capability to mass other lethal and nonlethal military power, 

combine the principle of mass with the next principle, maneuver.
33

Maneuver

Maneuver places the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the 

flexible application of combat power in a multidimensional combat space. 

Airpower’s ability to conduct maneuver is not only a product of its speed and range, but 

also flows from its flexibility and versatility during the planning and execution of 

operations. Maneuver, like the principle of offensive, forces the enemy to react, 

allowing the exploitation of successful friendly operations and reducing friendly 

vulnerabilities. Airpower maneuver allows engagement anywhere, from any direction, at 

any time, forcing the adversary to be on guard everywhere. 

The principle of maneuver is not limited to simple weapons delivery. Maneuver 

may involve the strategic positioning of capabilities that bring potential airpower to bear 

within striking distance of potential or actual adversaries. Forward deployment of 

airpower assets is one example of maneuver that by its very presence can reassure 

allies and deter aggressors. Also, in airlift operations such as SUPPORT HOPE in 

Rwanda, PROVIDE HOPE in the former Soviet Union, or PROVIDE PROMISE in 

Bosnia; focused civil-military operations and exercises that support theater security 

cooperation goals, such as PACIFIC ANGEL; or combat operations such as ALLIED 

FORCE in Serbia, ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, or IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq, 

airpower has played a critical role in American national security by providing unmatched 

maneuverability. Whether it involves airlift or attack aircraft, in small or large numbers, 

the versatility and responsiveness of airpower allow the simultaneous application of 

mass and maneuver.

Economy of Force

Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces.

Its purpose is to allocate minimum essential resources to secondary efforts. This 

principle calls for the rational use of force by selecting the best mix of air, space, and 

cyberspace capabilities. To ensure overwhelming combat power is available, maximum 

effort should be devoted to primary objectives. At the operational level, commanders 

ensure that any effort made towards secondary objectives does not degrade 

achievement of the larger operational or strategic objectives. This principle requires 

Airmen to maintain a broader operational view even as they seek to obtain clearly 

articulated objectives and priorities.

Economy of force may require a commander to establish a balance in the 

application of airpower between attacking, defending, delaying, or conducting other 

operations such as information operations, depending on the importance of the area or 

the priority of the objective or objectives. Also, priorities may shift rapidly; friendly 

troops in contact might drive a change in priority from one type of mission (e.g., 

interdiction) to another (e.g., close air support). Although this principle suggests the use 

of overwhelming force in one sense, it also recommends guarding against the “overkill” 

inherent in the use of more force than reasonably necessary. This is particularly 

relevant when excessive force can diminish the legitimacy and support for an operation.
34

Security

The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire

unexpected advantage. Friendly forces and their operations should be protected from 

enemy action that could provide the enemy with unexpected advantage. The lethal 

consequences of enemy attack make the security of friendly forces a paramount 

concern. 

Critical to security is the understanding that it embraces physical security, 

operations security, and security of the information environment. Information has

always been part of air, land, and sea warfare; now, with the proliferation of advanced 

communications and computer technologies, it becomes even more central to the 

outcome of a conflict.

Aircraft are most vulnerable on the ground. Thus, force protection is an integral 

part of airpower employment. Fixed bases are especially vulnerable as they not only 

should withstand aerial, ground, and cyberspace attacks, but should also sustain 

concentrated and prolonged air, space, and cyberspace activities against the enemy. 

From an Airman’s perspective, security also may be obtained by staying beyond 

the enemy’s reach, physically and virtually. Airpower is uniquely suited to capitalize on 

this through its ability to operate over the horizon. Not only can airpower reach and 

strike at extended range, but it also can distribute data and analysis as well as 

command and control across a worldwide span.

Security from physical and electronic enemy intrusion conceals our capabilities 

and intentions, while allowing friendly forces the freedom to gather information on the 

adversary—the type of information that creates the opportunity to strike the enemy 

where they least expect it. By exploiting the vertical mediums of air and space, Airmen 

provide security for our nation and friendly forces by detecting enemy actions and 

determining intentions even in denied areas.

Commanders have an obligation to protect their forces, but the threat and the 

means for countering it are quite different in contingency operations. The threat varies

depending on local circumstances, but the commander must be aware that it always 

exists. Although US forces have a right to self-defense, Airmen must bear in mind the 

concepts of necessity and proportionality when exercising that right (as discussed in the 

standing ROE). Necessity exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force 

demonstrates hostile intent, and use of force is then authorized while the force 

continues to commit hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent. Proportionality means the use 

of force should be sufficient to respond decisively, and may exceed the means and 

intensity of the hostile act/intent, but the nature, duration and scope of force should not 

exceed what is required. 

The concepts of necessity and proportionality as applicable to self-defense 

should not be confused with those of military necessity and proportionality as applicable 

in the law of armed conflict, which together seek to minimize collateral damage during 
35

offensive or defensive operations during armed conflict. Indeed, the defense of friendly 

forces against enemy attack during armed conflict would not (subject to prevailing ROE) 

involve the concept of self-defense at all.

Surprise

Surprise leverages the security principle by attacking the enemy at a time, 

place, or in a manner for which they are not prepared. The speed and range of air, 

space, and cyberspace capabilities, coupled with their flexibility and versatility, allow air 

forces to achieve surprise more readily than other forces. The final choice of timing and 

tactics rests with the air component commander, because terrain and distance are not 

inhibiting factors.

Surprise is one of airpower’s strongest advantages. Operation EL DORADO 

CANYON (the US raid on Libya) and the opening day of the air campaign during 

Operation DESERT STORM highlight examples where airpower achieved surprise.

Airpower can enhance and empower other forces to achieve surprise as well. 

The rapid global reach of airpower can enable surface forces to reach foreign 

destinations quickly, thus seizing the initiative through surprise.

Simplicity

Simplicity calls for avoiding unnecessary complexity in organizing, 

preparing, planning, and conducting military operations. Simplicity ensures that 

guidance, plans, and orders are as simple and direct as the objective allows. Simple 

guidance allows subordinate commanders the freedom to operate creatively within their 

portion of the operational environment, supporting the concept of decentralized 

execution. Common equipment, a common understanding of Service and joint doctrine, 

and familiarity with procedures through joint exercises and training, can help overcome 

complexity. Straightforward plans and unambiguous organizational and command 

relationships are central to reducing complexity as well.

ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS 

An additional set of principles has been developed as a result of experience in 

contingency operations. These were first cast as “principles of military operations other 

than war” and later as “the political dimension of smaller-scale contingencies.” A 

distinguishing characteristic of such operations has been the degree to which political 

objectives influence operations and tactics. In addition to the traditionally-held 

principles of war, the political considerations and the nature of many of these operations 

require an Airman’s understanding of several additional principles: unity of effort, 

restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. (Note that joint doctrine does not contain unity 

of effort as an additional principle.)
36

Unity of Effort 

Often the military is not the sole, or even the lead, agency in contingency 

operations. Some operations are, by their nature, predominantly military. In most 

situations, however, the military will likely be one agency of many. As is especially 

common in stability operations, military forces often find themselves supporting the 

other instruments of national power. While unity of command is critical within the 

military forces, most of these operations demand unity of effort among a wide range of 

agencies to ensure that they coordinate their resources and focus on the same goal.

Unity of effort becomes critical during interagency operations and can best be 

achieved through consensus building. Whereas the main effort in military planning 

is on developing courses of action, the main effort in interagency planning should be to 

develop a shared, detailed understanding of the situation. This allows the various 

agencies to better understand how they can best apply their respective capabilities and 

measure success.

Restraint 

Restraint is the disciplined application of military force appropriate to the 

situation. Commanders should recognize that in some types of operations, use of 

more force than the minimum that is reasonably necessary (even though under or at the 

maximum permissible) may lead to escalation to a higher intensity conflict; could 

adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy; and may impede the attainment of 

both short- and long-term goals. Air component commanders should begin developing 

a force structure by outlining the necessary capabilities needed for an operation and 

then follow up by deploying the appropriate “tailored” air, space, and cyberspace force 

mix. In order to maintain effective security while also exercising restraint, commanders 

should develop very clear rules on the use of force and ROE. ROE for contingency 

operations often are more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in 

sustained combat operations. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during 

operations. For all operations, Airmen should understand that restraint in the use of 

force is appropriate and more easily justified. However, restraint does not preclude the 

ability to use armed force, both lethal and nonlethal, when necessary in self-defense.

Perseverance 

The principle of perseverance encompasses the patient, resolute, and 

persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to 

achieve them. Some contingency operations involve a one-time occurrence or a shortterm operation to maintain stability until local authorities can take over. Many missions, 

however, especially peace operations and building partner capacity, require a long-term 

commitment. The US should be prepared to stay involved in a region for a protracted 

time in order to achieve its strategic goals. Complex problems often cannot be solved 

quickly; if a situation has been building for a long time, it may take the same amount of 

time or longer to resolve it. With this in mind, objectives should be established for the 

conditions under which forces may leave, rather than simply by a timetable for 

departure.
37

• Centralized Control 

and Decentralized 

Execution

• Flexibility and 

Versatility

• Synergistic Effects

• Persistence

• Concentration

• Priority

• Balance

Figure 4.2. Tenets of 

Airpower

Legitimacy 

In order to reduce the threat to US forces and to enable them to work 

toward their objective, the US should be viewed as a legitimate actor in the 

mission, working towards multi-lateral interests including our own. While 

legitimacy is principally generated by US political leadership, legitimacy in the eyes of 

the host nation could be affected more by the actions of the military. One key means of 

promoting legitimacy for certain types of contingency operations is through robust and 

effective military public affairs operations. Commanders should work closely with the 

host-nation government (if, in fact, there is one) at all levels to help preserve and foster 

the sense of legitimacy of mission.

TENETS OF AIRPOWER

The application of airpower is refined by 

several fundamental guiding truths. These truths 

are known as tenets. They reflect not only the 

unique historical and doctrinal evolution of 

airpower, but also the specific current 

understanding of the nature of airpower. The 

tenets of airpower complement the principles of 

war. While the principles of war provide 

general guidance on the application of military 

forces, the tenets provide more specific 

considerations for the employment of air, 

space, and cyberspace capabilities. They 

reflect the specific lessons of air, space, and 

cyberspace capabilities throughout history. 

See figure 4.2.

The tenets of airpower employment are interconnected, overlapping, and often 

interlocking. Flexibility and versatility necessitate priorities. Priorities determine 

synergies, levels of concentration, and degrees of persistence. Balance calculations 

influence all operations. The combinations and permutations of interrelationships 

between the tenets are nearly endless, but none of the tenets is more than an empty 

phrase without the master tenet: centralized control and decentralized execution. The 

oldest tenet of airpower remains the keystone of success in modern warfare.

As with the principles of war, these tenets require informed judgment in 

application. They require a skillful blending to tailor them to the ever-changing 

operational environment. The competing demands of the principles and tenets (for 

example mass versus economy of force, concentration versus balance, and priority 

versus objective) require an Airman’s expert understanding in order to strike the 

required balance. In the last analysis, commanders accept the fact that war is incredibly 

complicated and no two operations are identical. Commanders should apply their 

professional judgment and experience to the principles and tenets as they employ 

airpower in a given situation.
38

Decentralized versus

Centralized Execution

 Some recent operations have caused 

some to perceive an apparent disconnect 

regarding the Airman’s stated preference 

for decentralized execution. Airmen 

should not misconstrue a given situation 

with what the Air Force generally believes 

about decentralized execution. 

Discipline demands that senior leaders 

resist the temptation to get involved 

with execution decisions that are 

normally best left to subordinate 

commanders and forward decision 

makers. 

 In general, once a sortie has been 

tasked through the air tasking order, a 

JFACC and AOC staff should not normally 

get involved in how the mission is 

executed. Even though the AOC may 

have planned most of the details, this does 

not constitute “centralized execution” since 

the operational unit accomplishes the full 

range of execution tasks necessary for the 

sortie to meet the commander’s objectives. 

 The challenge is most apparent when a 

decision is made to re-role a sortie. At 

such time, the JFACC is balancing 

campaign requirements against an 

unplanned need, such as prosecution of 

pop-up time-sensitive targets. In such 

cases, the JFACC and AOC may have 

information not immediately available to 

the sortie leader. In other instances, 

missions with the potential for yielding 

high-visibility strategic effects might also 

merit similar attention.

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution 

Centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower are critical to its 

effective employment. Indeed, they are the fundamental organizing principles for 

airpower, having been proven over 

decades of experience as the most 

effective and efficient means of 

employing it. Because of 

airpower’s unique potential to 

directly affect the strategic and 

operational levels of war, it should

be controlled by a single Airman 

who maintains the broad, strategic 

perspective necessary to balance 

and prioritize the use of a 

powerful, highly desired yet 

limited force. A single air 

component commander, focused on 

the broader aspects of an operation, 

can best mediate the competing 

demands for tactical support against 

the strategic and operational 

requirements of the conflict.

Centralized control is 

commanding airpower and should 

be accomplished by an Airman at the 

air component commander level who 

maintains a broad focus on the JFC’s 

objectives to direct, integrate, 

prioritize, plan, coordinate, and 

assess the use of air, space, and 

cyberspace assets in any 

contingency across the range of 

operations. Centralized control 

empowers the air component 

commander to respond to changes 

in the operational environment and 

take advantage of fleeting 

opportunities. Some would rather 

this be just “centralized planning and 

direction.” From an Airman’s 

perspective, “planning and directing” 

do not convey all aspects of control 

implied in “centralized control,” which 

maximizes the flexibility and 
39

effectiveness of airpower. Centralized control thus maximizes the flexibility and 

effectiveness of airpower; it is pivotal to the determination of continuing advantage. 

However, it should not become a recipe for micromanagement, stifling the

initiative subordinates need to deal with combat’s inevitable uncertainties.

Decentralized execution is the delegation of authority to designated lowerlevel commanders and other tactical-level decision makers to achieve effective span of 

control and to foster disciplined initiative and tactical flexibility. It allows subordinates, 

all the way down to the tactical level, to exploit situational responsiveness and fleeting 

opportunities in rapidly changing, fluid situations. The benefits inherent in decentralized 

execution, however, are maximized only when a commander clearly communicates 

intent.

Centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower provide broad global 

or theater-wide focus while allowing operational flexibility to meet military objectives. 

They assure concentration of effort while maintaining economy of force. They exploit 

airpower’s versatility and flexibility to ensure that it remains responsive, survivable, and 

sustainable.

Execution should be decentralized within a command and control 

architecture that exploits the ability of front-line decision makers (such as strike 

package leaders, air battle managers, forward air controllers) to make on-scene 

decisions during complex, rapidly unfolding operations. Modern communications 

technology may tempt commanders to take direct control of distant events and override 

the decisions of forward leaders, even when such control is not operationally warranted. 

This should be resisted at all costs in all functional components—not just air. Despite 

impressive gains in data exploitation and automated decision aids, a single person 

cannot, with confidence, achieve and maintain detailed situational awareness when 

fighting a conflict involving many simultaneous engagements taking place throughout a 

large area. 

That said, there may be some situations where there may be valid reasons for 

control of specific operations at higher levels, most notably when the JFC (or perhaps 

even higher authorities) may wish to control strategic effects, even at the sacrifice of 

tactical efficiency. However, such instances should be rare, as in the short notice 

prosecution of high-value, time-sensitive targets, or when the operational climate 

demands tighter control over selected missions due to political sensitivities, such as the 

potential for collateral damage or mistargeting, or in the case of nuclear employment. In 

all cases, senior commanders balance overall campaign execution against the pressing 

need for tactical effectiveness. As long as a subordinate’s decision supports the 

superior commander’s intent and meets campaign objectives, subordinates should be 

allowed to take the initiative during execution.

Flexibility and Versatility 

Although often used interchangeably, flexibility and versatility are different. 

Flexibility allows airpower to exploit mass and maneuver simultaneously.
40

 

 Air forces can be 

switched from one 

objective to another. 

They are not committed 

to any one course of 

action as an army is, by 

its bulk, complexity, and 

relatively low mobility. 

While their action should 

be concentrated, it can 

be quickly concentrated 

afresh against other 

objectives, not only in a 

different place, but of a 

different kind. 

—B.H. Liddell Hart

Flexibility allows airpower to shift from one campaign objective to another, quickly and 

decisively; to “go downtown” on one sortie, then hit fielded enemy forces the next; to rerole assets quickly from a preplanned mission to support an unanticipated need for 

close air support of friendly troops in contact with enemy forces. Versatility is the 

ability to employ airpower effectively at the 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 

warfare and provide a wide variety of tasks in 

concert with other joint force elements.

Airpower has the potential to achieve this 

unmatched synergy through asymmetric and 

parallel operations. Space and cyberspace 

capabilities are especially able to simultaneously 

support multiple taskings around the globe and 

support tasks at all levels of warfare. 

Synergistic Effects 

The proper application of a coordinated 

force across multiple domains can produce 

effects that exceed the contributions of forces 

employed individually. The destruction of a large

number of targets through attrition warfare is rarely 

the key objective in modern war. Instead, the 

objective is the precise, coordinated application of 

the various elements of airpower and surface power 

to bring disproportionate pressure on enemy leaders 

to comply with our national will (affecting their intent) or to cause functional defeat of the 

enemy forces (affecting their capability). Airpower’s ability to observe adversaries 

allows JFCs to counter enemy movements with unprecedented speed and agility. 

Airpower is unique in its ability to dictate the tempo and direction of an entire warfighting 

effort regardless of the scale of the operation.

Persistence 

Air, space, and cyberspace operations may be conducted continuously against a

broad spectrum of targets. Airpower’s exceptional speed and range allow its forces 

to visit and revisit wide ranges of targets nearly at will. Airpower does not have to 

occupy terrain or remain constantly in proximity to areas of operation to bring force upon 

targets. Space forces in particular hold the ultimate high ground, and as space systems

continue to advance and proliferate, they offer the potential for persistent overhead 

access; unmanned aircraft systems offer similar possibilities from the atmosphere. 

Examples of persistent operations might be maintaining a continuous flow of materiel to 

peacetime distressed areas; Air Force ISR capabilities monitoring adversaries to ensure 

they cannot conduct actions counter to those agreed upon; assuring that targets are 

kept continually out of commission; or ensuring that resources and facilities are denied 

an enemy or provided to an ally during a specified time. The end result would be to 

deny the opponent an opportunity to seize the initiative and to directly accomplish 

assigned tasks.
41

Concentration 

One of the most constant and important trends throughout military history has

been the effort to concentrate overwhelming power at the decisive time and place. The 

principles of mass and economy of force deal directly with concentrating overwhelming 

power at the right time and the right place (or places). The versatility of airpower with 

its lethality, speed, and persistence makes it an attractive option for many combat 

tasks. With capabilities as flexible and versatile as air, space, and cyberspace forces,

the demand for them often exceeds the available forces and may result in the 

fragmentation of the integrated airpower effort in attempts to fulfill the many demands of 

the operation. Depending on the operational situation, such a course of action may 

court the triple risk of failing to achieve operational-level objectives, delaying or 

diminishing the attainment of decisive effects, and increasing the attrition rate of air 

forces—and consequently risking defeat. Airmen should guard against the 

inadvertent dilution of airpower effects resulting from high demand.

Priority 

Commanders should establish clear priorities for the use of airpower. Due 

to its inherent flexibility, the demands for airpower may likely exceed available 

resources. If commanders fail to establish priorities, they can become 

ineffective. Commanders of all components need to effectively prioritize their 

requirements for coordinated airpower effects to the JFC, and only then can effective 

priorities for the use of airpower flow from an informed dialogue between the JFC and 

the air component commander. The air component commander should assess the 

possible uses of component forces and their strengths and capabilities to support the 

overall joint campaign. Limited resources require that airpower be applied where it can 

make the greatest contribution to the most critical current JFC requirements. The 

application of airpower should be balanced among its ability to conduct operations at all 

levels of war, often simultaneously. The principles of mass, offensive, and economy of 

force, the tenet of concentration, and the Airman’s strategic perspective all apply to 

prioritizing airpower.

Balance 

Balance is an essential guideline for air commanders. Much of the skill of an 

air component commander is reflected in the dynamic and correct balancing of 

the principles of war and the tenets of airpower to bring Air Force capabilities

together to produce a synergistic effect. An air component commander should 

balance combat opportunity, necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and the impact on 

accomplishing assigned objectives against the associated risk to friendly forces. An 

Airman is uniquely—and best—suited to determine the proper theater-wide balance 

between offensive and defensive air operations, and among strategic, operational, and 

tactical applications. Air, space, and cyberspace assets are normally available only in 

finite numbers; thus, balance is a crucial determinant for an air component commander.
42

CHAPTER FIVE

AIR FORCE FUNCTIONS 

In order to describe what airpower in general, and the Air Force in particular, 

bring to the Nation, Airmen should first understand the distinctions among roles, 

missions, and functions. Although these terms are frequently used interchangeably, 

each has a specific meaning.

In brief, the primary function of the Services is to organize, train, equip and 

administer military Service forces to perform a role—to be provided to and employed by 

a CCDR in the accomplishment of a mission to achieve a specific effect. Based upon 

the effect desired and the mission assigned, Airmen accomplish a series of discrete 

tasks that cumulatively deliver the desired effects.

ROLES 

Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were 

established by law. The role of the Air Force is to organize, train, and equip aviation 

forces “primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations” 

(National Security Act, 1947). This basic charter has essentially remained unchanged 

to the present.

MISSIONS 

Missions are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef) to the CCDRs. CCDRs take these assigned tasks and develop mission 

statements, operational objectives, and concepts of operations; they then in turn assign 

specific tasks to subordinate commanders. By tailoring these tasks to meet the 

commander’s guidance and desired objectives, Air Force component commanders in 

turn develop component mission statements, objectives, and concepts of operations at

their level.

 A modern, autonomous, and thoroughly trained Air 

Force in being at all times will not alone be sufficient, but 

without it there can be no national security.

 

 — General H. H. “Hap” Arnold
43

• Nuclear Deterrence 

Operations

• Air Superiority

• Space Superiority

• Cyberspace Superiority

• Command and Control

• Global Integrated ISR

• Global Precision Attack

• Special Operations

• Rapid Global Mobility

• Personnel Recovery 

• Agile Combat Support

• Building Partnerships

Figure 5.1. Core Functions 

FUNCTIONS 

The functions of the Military Departments are those specific responsibilities that 

enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles. The Air Force functions are 

based on the statutory responsibilities outlined in Title 10 United States Code (USC), 

which are known as “organize, train, and equip” activities. Specifically, these include 

“recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping; training; servicing; mobilizing; 

demobilizing; administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel);

maintaining; the construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment; and the 

construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities; the 

acquisition, management and disposal; and the management of real property or natural 

resources” (Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of 

Defense and its Major Components).

CORE FUNCTIONS 

Recently the Air Force refined its 

understanding of the core duties and 

responsibilities it performs as a Service, 

streamlining what previously were six 

distinctive capabilities and seventeen 

operational functions into twelve core 

functions to be used across the doctrine, 

organization, training, materiel, leadership 

and education, personnel, and facilities 

spectrum. These core functions express the 

ways in which the Air Force is particularly 

and appropriately suited to contribute to 

national security, but they do not necessarily 

express every aspect of what the Air Force 

contributes to the nation. It should be 

emphasized that the core functions, by 

themselves, are not doctrinal constructs. 

See figure 5.1.

Nuclear Deterrence Operations

The purpose of Nuclear Deterrence Operations (NDO) is to operate, maintain, 

and secure nuclear forces to achieve an assured capability to deter an adversary from 

taking action against vital US interests. In the event deterrence fails, the US should be 

able to appropriately respond with nuclear options. The sub-elements of this function

are:

 Assure/Dissuade/Deter. This is a mission set derived from the Air Force’s

readiness to carry out the nuclear strike operations mission as well as from specific 

actions taken to assure allies as a part of extended deterrence. Dissuading others 

from acquiring or proliferating WMD, and the means to deliver them, contributes to 
44

promoting security and is also an integral part of this mission. Moreover, different 

deterrence strategies are required to deter various adversaries, whether they are a 

nation state, or non-state/transnational actor. The Air Force maintains and presents

credible deterrent capabilities through successful visible demonstrations and 

exercises which assure allies, dissuade proliferation, deter potential adversaries 

from actions that threaten US national security or the populations and deployed 

military forces of the US, its allies and friends.

 Nuclear Strike. Nuclear strike is the ability of nuclear forces to rapidly and 

accurately strike targets which the enemy holds dear in a devastating manner. If a 

crisis occurs, rapid generation and, if necessary, deployment of nuclear strike 

capabilities will demonstrate US resolve and may prompt an adversary to alter the 

course of action deemed threatening to our national interest. Should deterrence fail, 

the President may authorize a precise, tailored response to terminate the conflict at 

the lowest possible level and lead to a rapid cessation of hostilities. Post-conflict, 

regeneration of a credible nuclear deterrent capability will deter further aggression. 

The Air Force may present a credible force posture in either the continental US, 

within a theater of operations, or both to effectively deter the range of potential 

adversaries envisioned in the 21st Century. This requires the ability to engage 

targets globally using a variety of methods; therefore, the Air Force should possess 

the ability to induct, train, assign, educate and exercise individuals and units to 

rapidly and effectively execute missions that support US NDO objectives. Finally, 

the Air Force regularly exercises and evaluates all aspects of nuclear operations to 

ensure high levels of performance.

 Nuclear Surety. Nuclear surety ensures the safety, security and effectiveness of 

nuclear operations. Because of their political and military importance, destructive 

power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act, nuclear 

weapons and nuclear weapon systems require special consideration and protection

against risks and threats inherent in their peacetime and wartime environments. The 

Air Force, in conjunction with other entities within the Departments of Defense or 

Energy, achieves a high standard of protection through a stringent nuclear surety 

program. This program applies to materiel, personnel, and procedures that 

contribute to the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons, thus assuring no 

nuclear accidents, incidents, loss, or unauthorized or accidental use. The Air Force 

continues to pursue safe, secure and effective nuclear weapons consistent with 

operational requirements. Adversaries, allies, and the American people must be 

highly confident of the Air Force’s ability to secure nuclear weapons from accidents, 

theft, loss, and accidental or unauthorized use. This day-to-day commitment to 

precise and reliable nuclear operations is the cornerstone of the credibility of the

NDO mission. Positive nuclear command, control, communications; effective 

nuclear weapons security; and robust combat support are essential to the overall

NDO function.
45

Air Superiority

Air Superiority is “that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over 

another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, 

air, and special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive 

interference by the opposing force” (JP 1-02). The sub-elements of this function are:

 Offensive Counterair. Offensive Counterair (OCA) is defined as "offensive 

operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch 

platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, 

but as close to their source as possible" (JP 1-02). OCA is the preferred method of 

countering air and missile threats, since it attempts to defeat the enemy closer to its 

source and typically enjoys the initiative. OCA comprises attack operations, sweep, 

escort, and suppression/destruction of enemy air defense.

 Defensive Counterair. Defensive Counterair (DCA) is defined as “all the defensive 

measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy 

forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace” (JP 1-02). A

major goal of DCA operations, in concert with OCA operations, is to provide an area 

from which forces can operate, secure from air and missile threats. The DCA 

mission comprises both active and passive defense measures. Active defense is 

“the employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested 

area or position to the enemy” (JP 1-02). It includes both ballistic missile defense 

and air breathing threat defense, and encompasses point defense, area defense, 

and high value airborne asset defense. Passive defense is “measures taken to 

reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage caused by hostile 

action without the intention of taking the initiative” (JP 1-02). It includes detection 

and warning; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; camouflage, 

concealment, and deception; hardening; reconstitution; dispersion; redundancy; and 

mobility, counter-measures, and stealth.

 Airspace Control. Airspace control is “a process used to increase operational 

effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace” (JP 1-02). 

It promotes the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace, mitigates the risk of

fratricide, enhances both offensive and defensive operations, and permits greater 

agility of air operations as a whole. It both deconflicts and facilitates integration of 

joint air operations.

Space Superiority

Space superiority is “the degree of dominance in space of one force over another 

that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, air, space, 

and special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference 

by the opposing force” (JP 1-02). Space superiority may be localized in time and space, 

or it may be broad and enduring. Space superiority provides freedom of action in space 

for friendly forces and, when directed, denies the same freedom to the adversary. The 

sub-elements of this function are:
46

 Space Force Enhancement. Space Force Enhancement is defined as the “combat 

support operations and force-multiplying capabilities delivered from space systems 

to improve the effectiveness of military forces as well as support other intelligence, 

civil, and commercial users. This mission area includes: intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance; integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; command, 

control, and communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; and environmental 

monitoring” (JP 1-02).

 Space Force Application. Space Force Application is defined as “combat 

operations in, through, and from space to influence the course and outcome of 

conflict. This mission area includes ballistic missile defense and force projection” 

(JP 1-02).

 Space Control. Space Control is defined as “operations to ensure freedom of 

action in space for the US and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary 

freedom of action in space. This mission area includes: operations conducted to 

protect friendly space capabilities from attack, interference, or unintentional hazards

(defensive space control); operations to deny an adversary’s use of space 

capabilities (offensive space control); and the requisite current and predictive 

knowledge of the space environment and the operational environment upon which 

space operations depend (space situational awareness)” (JP 1-02).

 Space Support. Space Support is defined as “operations to deploy and sustain 

military and intelligence systems in space. This mission area includes: launching 

and deploying space vehicles; maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit, 

rendezvous and proximity operations; disposing of (including de-orbiting and

recovering) space capabilities; and reconstitution of space forces, if required” 

(JP 1-02). 

Cyberspace Superiority

Cyberspace Superiority is “the operational advantage in, through, and from 

cyberspace to conduct operations at a given time and in a given domain without 

prohibitive interference” (AFDD 3-12, Cyberspace Operations). The sub-elements of 

this function are:

 Cyberspace Force Application. Cyberspace Force Application is combat 

operations in, through, and from cyberspace to achieve military objectives and 

influence the course and outcome of conflict by taking decisive actions against 

approved targets. It will incorporate computer network attack (CNA), computer 

network exploitation (CNE), and may involve aspects of influence operations. It is 

highly dependent on ISR, fused all-source intelligence, sophisticated attribution 

activities, situational awareness, and responsive C2.

 Cyberspace Defense. This is the passive, active, and dynamic employment of 

capabilities to respond to imminent or on-going actions against Air Force or Air 

Force-protected networks, the Air Force's portion of the Global Information Grid, or 

expeditionary communications assigned to the Air Force. Cyberspace defense 
47

incorporates CNE, computer network defense (CND), and CNA techniques and may 

be a contributor to influence operations. It is highly dependent upon ISR, fused allsource intelligence, automated indications and warning, sophisticated 

attribution/characterization, situational awareness, assessment, and responsive C2. 

 Cyberspace Support. Cyberspace Support is foundational, continuous, or 

responsive operations ensuring information integrity and availability in, through, and

from Air Force-controlled infrastructure and its interconnected analog and digital 

portion of the battle space. Inherent in this mission is the ability to establish, extend, 

secure, protect, and defend in order to sustain assigned networks and missions. 

This includes protection measures against supply chain components plus critical C2 

networks/communications links and nuclear C2 networks. The cyberspace support 

mission incorporates CNE and CND techniques. It incorporates all elements of Air 

Force Network Operations, information transport, enterprise management, and 

information assurance, and is dependent on ISR and all-source intelligence. 

Command and Control 

Command and control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 

the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 

commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 

the accomplishment of the mission” (JP 1-02). This core function includes all of the C2-

related capabilities and activities associated with air, space, cyberspace, nuclear, and 

agile combat support operations to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical 

objectives.

 Strategic Level Command and Control. At this level the US determines national 

or multinational security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national 

resources to accomplish these objectives. These national objectives in turn provide 

the direction for developing overall military objectives, which are used to develop the 

objectives and strategy for each theater.

 Operational Level Command and Control. At this level of war, campaigns and 

major operations are planned, conducted, sustained, and assessed to accomplish 

strategic goals within theaters or areas of operations. These activities imply a 

broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they provide the means by 

which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic and operational 

objectives.

 Tactical Level Command and Control. This is the level of war where individual 

battles and engagements are fought. The tactical level of war deals with how forces 

are employed, and the specifics of how engagements are conducted and targets 

attacked. The goal of tactical level C2 is to achieve commander's intent and desired 

effects by gaining and keeping offensive initiative.
48

Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Global Integrated ISR is the synchronization and integration of the planning and 

operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, dissemination systems 

across the globe to conduct current and future operations. The sub-elements of this 

function are:

 Planning and Directing. This is “the determination of intelligence requirements, 

development of appropriate intelligence architecture, preparation of a collection plan, 

and issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies” (JP 2-01,

Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations). These activities 

enable the synchronization and integration of collection, processing, exploitation, 

analysis, and dissemination activities/resources to meet information requirements of 

national and military decision makers. 

 Collection. Collection is “the acquisition of information and the provision of this 

information to processing elements” (JP 2-01). It provides the ability to obtain 

required information to satisfy intelligence needs (via use of sources and methods in 

all domains). Collection activities span the ROMO. 

 Processing and Exploitation. Processing and exploitation is “the conversion of 

collected information into forms suitable to the production of intelligence” (JP 2-01). 

It provides the ability, across the ROMO, to transform, extract, and make available 

collected information suitable for further analysis or action.

 Analysis and Production. Analysis and production is “the conversion of processed 

information into intelligence through the integration, evaluation, analysis, and 

interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in 

support of known or anticipated user requirements” (JP 2-01). It provides the ability 

to integrate, evaluate, and interpret information from available sources to create a 

finished intelligence product for presentation or dissemination to enable increased 

situational awareness. 

 Dissemination and Integration. This is “the delivery of intelligence to users in a 

suitable form and the application of the intelligence to appropriate missions, tasks, 

and functions” (JP 2-01). It provides the ability to present information and 

intelligence products across the ROMO enabling understanding of the operational 

environment to military and national decision makers.

Global Precision Attack 

Global Precision Attack is the ability to hold at risk or strike rapidly and 

persistently, with a wide range of munitions, any target and to create swift, decisive, and 

precise effects across multiple domains. The sub-elements of this function are:

 Strategic Attack. Strategic Attack is defined as “offensive action specifically 

selected to achieve national strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the 

adversary's ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives 
49

without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition” 

(AFDD 3-70, Strategic Attack).

 Air Interdiction. Air Interdiction is defined as “air operations conducted to divert, 

disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to 

bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve JFC objectives. Air 

lnterdiction is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed 

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not 

required” (AFDD 3-03, Counterland Operations). 

 Close Air Support. Close Air Support is defined as “air action by fixed- and rotarywinged aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces 

and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and 

movement of those forces” (JP 1-02). This can be as a pre-planned event or on 

demand from an alert posture (ground or airborne). It can be conducted across the 

ROMO.

Special Operations

Special Operations are “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 

sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic 

objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force 

requirement. These operations may require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility 

capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the ROMO. They can be 

conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or 

other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous 

or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of 

physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence 

from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 

indigenous assets” (JP 1-02). The sub-elements of this function are:

 Agile Combat Support. This is the capability to effectively create, prepare, deploy, 

employ, sustain, and protect Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)

Airmen, assets, and capabilities throughout the ROMO at a chosen initiative, speed, 

and tempo. 

 Aviation Foreign Internal Defense. These operations directly execute US security 

and foreign policy as lead airpower elements that shape the battlefield and conduct 

stability operations to enable global reach and strike. This is accomplished by 

applying the mission set (assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces) 

across a continuum of operating venues described as indirect assistance, direct 

assistance (not including combat) and combat operations. 

 Battlefield Air Operations. This is a unique set of combat proven capabilities 

(combat control, pararescue, combat weather, and tactical air control party) provided 

by regular and reserve component special operations forces (SOF) Battlefield 
50

Airmen who integrate, synchronize, and control manned and unmanned capabilities

to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. 

 Command and Control. This is the exercise of the commander’s authority and 

direction over assigned and attached forces by trained, organized, and equipped C2 

elements. Operational C2 elements consist of personnel and equipment with 

specialized capability to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces in the conduct of 

joint/combined special operations.

 Information Operations. This mission is the integrated employment of the 

capabilities of influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and network 

warfare operations, in concert with specified integrated control enablers, to 

influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision 

making while protecting one’s own.

 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. This is the synchronization and 

integration of platforms and sensors with the planning and direction, collection, 

processing and exploitation, analysis, and production and dissemination processes. 

These activities provide actionable intelligence, weather, environmental awareness,

and prediction across all SOF command echelons.

 Military Information Support Operations. These are planned operations to 

convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their 

emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 

governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of military 

information support operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 

behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. 

 Precision Strike. This mission provides CCDRs with an integrated capability to 

find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess targets using a single weapons system or 

a combination of systems. This includes close air support, air interdiction, and 

armed reconnaissance missions.

 Specialized Air Mobility. This is the conduct of rapid, global infiltration, exfiltration, 

and resupply of personnel, equipment, and materiel using specialized systems and 

tactics. These missions may be clandestine, low visibility, or overt and through 

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive airspace. 

 Specialized Refueling. This is the conduct of rapid, global refueling using 

specialized systems and tactics. This includes aerial refueling of vertical lift aircraft 

and ground refueling during forward arming and refueling point operations. These 

missions may be clandestine, low visibility, or overt and in hostile, denied, or 

politically sensitive environments.

Rapid Global Mobility 

Rapid Global Mobility is the timely deployment, employment, sustainment, 

augmentation, and redeployment of military forces and capabilities across the ROMO. 
51

It provides joint military forces the capability to move from place to place while retaining 

the ability to fulfill their primary mission. Rapid Global Mobility is essential to virtually 

every military operation, allowing forces to reach foreign or domestic destinations 

quickly, thus seizing the initiative through speed and surprise. The sub-elements of this 

function are:

 Airlift. Airlift is “operations to transport and deliver forces and materiel through the 

air in support of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives” (AFDD 3-17, Air Mobility

Operations). The rapid and flexible options afforded by airlift allow military forces and 

national leaders the ability to respond and operate in a variety of situations and time 

frames. The global reach capability of airlift provides the ability to apply US power 

worldwide by delivering forces to crisis locations. It serves as a US presence that 

demonstrates resolve and compassion in humanitarian crisis.

 Air Refueling. Air Refueling is “the refueling of an aircraft in flight by another 

aircraft” (JP 1-02). Air refueling extends presence, increases range, and serves as a 

force multiplier. It allows air assets to more rapidly reach any trouble spot around 

the world with less dependence on forward staging bases or overflight/landing 

clearances. Air refueling significantly expands the options available to a commander 

by increasing the range, payload, persistence, and flexibility of receiver aircraft. 

 Aeromedical Evacuation. Aeromedical Evacuation is “the movement of patients 

under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air 

transportation” (JP 1-02). JP 4-02, Health Service Support, further defines it as “the 

fixed wing movement of regulated casualties to and between medical treatment 

facilities, using organic and/or contracted mobility airframes, with aircrew trained 

explicitly for this mission.” Aeromedical evacuation forces can operate as far 

forward as fixed-wing aircraft are able to conduct airland operations.

Personnel Recovery 

Personnel Recovery (PR) is defined as “the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil 

efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel” 

(JP 1-02). It is the ability of the US government and its international partners to affect 

the recovery of isolated personnel across the ROMO and return those personnel to 

duty. PR also enhances the development of an effective, global capacity to protect and 

recover isolated personnel wherever they are placed at risk; deny an adversary‘s ability 

to exploit a nation through propaganda; and develop joint, interagency, and international 

capabilities that contribute to crisis response and regional stability. The sub-elements of 

this function are:

 Combat Search and Rescue. This is “the tactics, techniques, and procedures 

performed by forces to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during combat” (JP 

1-02). Combat search and rescue is the primary Air Force recovery method utilized 

to conduct PR taskings.
52

 Civil Search and Rescue. This is “the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, 

and specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed 

persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment” (JP 1-02).

 Disaster Response. Disaster Response can be described as the capability to 

support and assist US government agencies and embassies during national and 

international disasters with rapidly deployable and flexible air/ground rescue forces.

 Humanitarian Assistance Operations. These are “programs conducted to relieve

or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions 

such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious 

threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian 

assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance 

provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil 

authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing 

humanitarian assistance” (JP 1-02).

 Medical Evacuation/Casualty Evacuation. Medical evacuation refers to dedicated 

medical evacuation platforms staffed and equipped to provide en route medical care 

using predesignated tactical and logistic aircraft, boats, ships, and other watercraft 

temporarily equipped and staffed with medical attendants for en route care. Casualty 

evacuation involves the unregulated movement of casualties aboard ships, land 

vehicles, or aircraft (JP 4-02, Health Service Support).

Agile Combat Support

Agile Combat Support (ACS) is the ability to field, protect, and sustain Air Force 

forces across the ROMO to achieve joint effects. The sub-elements of this function are:

 Ready the Total Force. Mission elements include: organizing, training, and 

equipping forces; establishing quality of life and maintaining core security; and 

fielding and planning for the use of operational and support forces to meet global 

mission requirements.

 Prepare the Battlespace. Mission elements include: assessing, planning, and 

posturing for rapid employment; prepositioning resources and conditioning specific 

theaters and/or contingency locations in a manner to meet closure timing; and 

establishing sustainment levels for potential operations.

 Position the Total Force. Mission elements include: preparing to deploy, 

deploying, receiving, and bedding down tailored and prioritized forces; establishing 

initial operations and support cadres in a joint operations area; distributing prepositioned resources; establishing initial reachback connectivity; securing operating 

locations; and preparing for mission operations.

 Protect the Total Force. Protecting the Total Force key focus areas include 

personnel, critical assets, and information. These areas are the persistent detection 
53

and understanding of threats in the operational environment and the timely 

dissemination of accurate decisions, warnings and taskings to protect against 

attacks and/or threats.

 Employ Combat Support Forces. Mission elements include: engaging support 

forces in support of mission operations; initializing, launching, recovering, and 

regenerating operational elements; executing support through supporting-supported 

relationships; and commencing reachback operations to strategic levels of support. 

 Sustain the Total Force. Mission elements include: producing assured capacities 

and levels of support; accomplishing the long term mastery of an operational 

environment (peacetime and wartime) requiring persistent and effective materiel and 

personnel support through both local and reachback processes. 

 Recover the Total Force. Mission elements include: preparing forces to remain in 

place, redeploy, relocate, and be reconstituted to prescribed levels of readiness; 

restoring operating locations and/or environments to planned conditions; protecting

the dynamic levels of force structure; and ensuring Air Force mission elements can 

be effectively applied at the direction of national leadership.

Building Partnerships 

Building Partnerships is described as Airmen interacting with international airmen 

and other relevant actors to develop, guide, and sustain relationships for mutual benefit 

and security. Building Partnerships is about interacting with others and is therefore an 

inherently inter-personal and cross-cultural undertaking. Through both words and 

deeds, the majority of interaction is devoted to building trust-based relationships for 

mutual benefit. It includes both foreign partners as well as domestic partners and 

emphasizes collaboration with foreign governments, militaries and populations as well 

as US government departments, agencies, industry, and NGOs. To better facilitate 

partnering efforts, Airmen should be competent in the relevant language, region, and 

culture. The sub-elements of this function are:

 Communicate. Communicate refers to developing and presenting information to 

domestic audiences to improve understanding. It is also the ability to develop and 

present information to foreign adversary audiences to affect their perceptions, will, 

behavior and capabilities in order to further US national security and/or shared 

global security interests. 

 Shape. Shape refers to conducting activities to affect the perceptions, will, behavior, 

and capabilities of partners, military forces, and relevant populations to further US 

national security or shared global security interests. 
54

CHAPTER SIX

COMMANDING AND ORGANIZING AIR FORCE FORCES

This chapter presents the basics of commanding and organizing Air Force forces; 

chapter 7 presents further considerations for organizing and presenting Air Force forces 

in the joint context.

Organization is critically important to effective and efficient operations. 

Service and joint force organization and command relationships—literally, who 

owns what, and who can do what with whom, and when—easily create the most 

friction within any operation. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that Airmen 

understand the fundamentals of Air Force and joint organization, command 

relationships, and responsibilities of the senior Air Force commander. 

Air Force organization and preferred command arrangements are designed to 

address unity of command, a key principle of war. Clear lines of authority, with 

clearly identified commanders at appropriate echelons exercising appropriate 

control, are essential to achieving unity of effort, reducing confusion, and 

maintaining priorities. During numerous deployments in the last decade, the Air 

Force has learned a great deal about the nuances of commanding Service operations 

afield. 

The key to successful employment of Air Force forces as part of a joint 

force effort is providing a single Air Force commander with the responsibility and 

authority to properly organize, train, equip and employ Air Force forces to 

accomplish assigned functions and tasks. The title of this commander is 

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). Operationally, the COMAFFOR should 

be prepared to employ Air Force forces as directed by the JFC, and if directed be 

prepared to employ joint air forces as the joint force air component commander 

(JFACC). In either event, the COMAFFOR should also ensure that Air Force forces are 

prepared to execute the missions assigned by the JFC. The requirements and 

responsibilities of the COMAFFOR and JFACC are inextricably linked; both are critical 

to operational success. 

 It turned out to be another scrambled outfit...with so many 

lines of responsibility, control, and coordination that it resembled 

a can of worms. I made a note to tell Walker to take charge, tear 

up the chart, and have no one issue orders around there except 

himself. After he got things operating simply, quickly, and 

efficiently he could draw up a new chart if he wanted to.

— Lieutenant General George Kenney, 

Australia, 1942
55

THE COMMANDER, AIR FORCE FORCES 

Although all Air Force units, regardless of level, have an Air Force commander, 

the title of COMAFFOR is reserved exclusively to the single Air Force commander 

of an Air Force Service component assigned or attached to a JFC at the unified 

combatant command, subunified combatant command, or joint task force (JTF) 

level. At the unified combatant command level, the CCDR’s Air Force Service 

component is specified in the SecDef’s “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. 

The SecDef/CCDR may elect to permanently establish a subordinate unified combatant 

command (subunified command) or temporarily establish a subordinate JTF as part of 

his/her organizational structure. The commanders of these subordinate joint forces are, 

by joint and Air Force doctrine, JFCs at a lower level than the CCDR. If Air Force forces 

are assigned or attached to these subordinate JFCs, that action creates an Air Force 

Service component with a separate COMAFFOR directly responsible to the appropriate 

JFC. 

If Air Force forces are attached to a JFC, they should be presented as an air 

expeditionary task force (AETF). The AETF becomes the Air Force Service component 

to the JTF and the AETF commander is the COMAFFOR to the JTF commander. 

Thus, depending on the scenario, the position of COMAFFOR may exist 

simultaneously at different levels within a given theater as long as each 

COMAFFOR is separately assigned or attached to and under the operational 

control of a different JFC. In the case where Air Force forces are operating in support 

of a JTF but are not attached to it, they do not constitute a separate JTF-level Service 

component under a separate COMAFFOR. In this instance, there remains a single 

COMAFFOR at the theater level.

The COMAFFOR provides unity of command. To a JFC, a COMAFFOR 

provides a single face for all Air Force issues. Within the Air Force Service component, 

the COMAFFOR is the single commander who conveys commander’s intent and is 

responsible for operating and supporting all Air Force forces assigned or attached to 

that joint force. Thus, the COMAFFOR commands forces through two separate 

branches of the chain of command: the operational branch and the administrative 

branch. The operational branch runs through joint channels from the JFC and is 

expressed in terms such as operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and 

support. The administrative branch runs through Service channels only, from the AETF, 

up through the appropriate component numbered Air Force (C-NAF), major command 

(MAJCOM), to the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) and Secretary of the Air Force 

(SECAF); this authority is expressed as administrative control (ADCON). Command 

authorities are explained in more detail in appendix A.

The COMAFFOR should normally be designated at a command level above 

the operating forces and should not be dual-hatted as commander of one of the 

subordinate operating units. This allows the COMAFFOR to focus at the operational 

level of war, while subordinate commanders lead their units at the tactical level.
56

Operational Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR 

When Air Force forces are assigned or attached to a JFC, the JFC normally 

receives OPCON of these forces. This authority is best exercised through subordinate 

JFCs and Service component commanders and thus is normally delegated accordingly. 

If not delegated OPCON, or if the stated command authorities are not clear, the 

COMAFFOR should request delegation of OPCON. When the COMAFFOR is 

delegated OPCON of the Air Force component forces, and no JFACC has been 

designated, the COMAFFOR has the following operational and tactical responsibilities: 

(Note: if a JFACC is designated, many of these responsibilities belong to that functional 

component commander. Refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air 

Operations, for more complete discussion of the JFACC’s role and the planning 

processes that support joint air component employment. Also see related JFACC 

discussion in chapter 7.)

 Prepare component plans to support the JFC’s estimate.

 Develop and recommend courses of action (COAs) to the JFC.

 Develop a strategy and operations plan that states how the COMAFFOR plans to 

exploit Air Force capabilities to support the JFC’s objectives.

 Establish (or implement, when passed down by the JFC) theater ROEs for all 

assigned and attached forces. For those Service or functional components that 

operate organic air assets, it should be clearly defined when the air component 

ROEs also apply to their operations (this would normally be recommended).

 Make air apportionment recommendations to the JFC.

 Task, plan, coordinate, and allocate the daily Air Force component effort.

 Normally serve as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic 

attack, the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, most space control operations, theater 

airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and other operations as directed by the 

JFC. As the supported commander, the COMAFFOR has the authority to designate 

the target priority, effects, and timing of these operations and attack targets within 

the entire joint operations area (JOA).

 Function as a supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations such as 

close air support (CAS), air interdiction within other components’ areas of operations 

(AOs), and maritime support.

 Act as airspace control authority (ACA), area air defense commander (AADC), and 

space coordinating authority (SCA), if so designated.

 Coordinate personnel recovery operations, including combat search and rescue 

(CSAR).
57

 Direct intratheater air mobility operations and coordinate them with intertheater air 

mobility operations.

 Conduct joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other 

Services in joint operations for which the COMAFFOR has or may be assigned 

primary responsibility, or for which the Air Force component’s facilities and 

capabilities are suitable. 

Service Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR 

Commanders of Air Force components have responsibilities and authorities that 

derive from their roles in fulfilling the Service’s ADCON function. Within the operational 

branch, the JFC normally conducts operations by delegating OPCON of the Air Force 

component forces to the COMAFFOR. Within the administrative branch, the 

COMAFFOR has complete ADCON of all assigned Air Force component forces and 

specified ADCON of all attached Air Force component forces. The specified 

responsibilities listed below apply to all attached forces, regardless of MAJCOM or Air 

Force component (regular, Guard, or Reserve). The COMAFFOR also has some 

ADCON responsibilities for Air Force elements and personnel assigned to other joint 

force components (such as liaisons). The Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force 

Reserve Command retain all other ADCON responsibilities, such as Reserve 

Component activation, inactivation, partial mobilization, and length of tour. Additionally, 

intertheater forces, such as intertheater airlift and forces transiting another 

COMAFFOR’s area of interest, are subject to the ADCON authority of the respective 

COMAFFOR while transiting that COMAFFOR’s area for administrative reporting and 

for TACON for force protection requirements derived from the CCDR.

As the Service component commander to a JFC, the COMAFFOR has the 

following responsibilities:

 Make recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces in the 

Air Force component.

 Accomplish assigned tasks for operational missions.

 Organize, train, and sustain assigned and attached Air Force forces for CCDRassigned missions.

  Prescribe the chain of command within the AETF.

  Maintain reachback between the Air Force component and other supporting 

Air Force elements. Delineate responsibilities between forward and rear 

elements.

  Provide training in Service-unique doctrine, tactical methods, and techniques.

  Provide for logistics and mission support functions normal to the command.
58

 Inform the JFC (and the CCDR, if affected) of planning for changes in logistics 

support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability 

sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior 

to final decision or implementation.

 Provide lateral liaisons with Army, Navy, Marines, SOF, and coalition partners.

 Maintain internal administration and discipline, including application of the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

 Establish force protection and other local defense requirements.

 Provide Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities to ensure 

compliance with laws, executive orders, policies, and directives.

At the CCDR level, the Air Force Service component commander also has the 

following additional responsibilities:

 Develop program and budget requests that comply with CCDR guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities.

 Inform the CCDR (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions that 

may affect joint operation planning.

The COMAFFOR is responsible for overseeing the morale, welfare, safety, and 

security of assigned and attached forces. Subordinate commanders issue orders and 

direct actions in support of those responsibilities and ensure these orders and directives 

are consistent with the policies and directives of the COMAFFOR exercising ADCON of

those forces. The responsibilities of lead commands are to organize, train, equip, and 

provide forces; the responsibility of the COMAFFOR is to ensure specialized training is 

conducted based on mission needs. The COMAFFOR and properly designated 

subordinate commanders exercise disciplinary authority in accordance with the UCMJ 

and relevant Air Force Instructions (AFIs). These commanders advise parent 

MAJCOMs of any disciplinary action taken against deployed personnel. Because of the 

overlapping and interconnecting areas of ADCON that are shared among the various 

commanders, it is essential that the appropriate written orders clearly state which 

elements of ADCON authority and responsibility are executed by which commander.

THE AIR EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

To address growth in diverse regional commitments, the Air Force established 

the air expeditionary force (AEF) concept as a means to provide Air Force forces and 

support on a rotational, and thus, a relatively more predictable basis. These AEFs, 

however, only provide a source of readily trained operational and support forces. 

Because they do not provide for a commander (specifically, a COMAFFOR) or the 

necessary command and control mechanisms, AEFs, by themselves, are not discrete, 

employable entities. Forces sourced from AEFs should fall in on in-theater command 
59

structures, which are usually provided by regional numbered Air Forces (NAFs), and 

may link up with in-theater Air Force forces. Thus, while AEF forces may deploy, they 

stand up as part of an AETF, not as their own warfighting entity. In short, the AEF is the 

mechanism for managing and scheduling forces for expeditionary use; the AETF is the 

Air Force warfighting organization attached to a JFC.

Refer to AFI 10-401, Air Force Operations Planning and Execution, for further 

details.

THE AIR EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE 

The AETF is the organizational structure for Air Force forces in response to 

operational tasking. The AETF provides a task-organized, integrated package with 

the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force protection. While the 

task force model itself is not new, its emphasis within the Air Force is recent. To 

understand its basis, one should first look at the definition of a task force:

1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose 

of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. A semi-permanent organization 

of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a 

continuing specific task.

The AETF leverages this fundamental concept, presenting a scalable, tailorable 

organization with three elements: a single, clearly designated commander; appropriate 

command and control mechanisms; and tailored and fully supported forces. Each of 

these elements will be examined in detail.

AETFs may be established as an Air Force Service component to a JTF, or as a 

subordinate task force within a larger Air Force Service component to address specific 

internal tasks. If an AETF is formed as the former, the AETF commander is also a 

COMAFFOR. Otherwise, the AETF commander is not a COMAFFOR, but reports to a 

COMAFFOR. 

 “Single Commander . . .”

In the context of joint organization, a single commander presents a single Air 

Force face to the JFC and results in clear lines of authority both ways. Internal to the 

task force, there is only one person clearly in charge; for a JFC, there is only one 

person to deal with on matters regarding Air Force issues. The AETF commander is the 

senior Air Force warfighter and exercises the appropriate degree of control over the 

forces assigned, attached, or in support of the AETF. Within the joint force, these 

degrees of control are formally expressed as OPCON, TACON, or support. Within 

Service lines, the AETF commander exercises ADCON.
60

The Air Expeditionary Task Force

The air expeditionary task force (AETF) is a scalable, tailorable 

organization with three components: a single, clearly designated 

commander; appropriate command and control mechanisms; and tailored 

and fully supported forces. The elements of an AETF may be deployed 

forward in to a theater, or some may be available elsewhere, either in theater 

or even in the CONUS, available via reachback.

The AETF may be a fully combat capable, 

numbered Air Force-sized composite force 

fighting a major operation with a substantial intheater presence, as in Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM.

It may be a few squadrons of combat aircraft 

with associated support as part of a standing 

operation, as in Operation NOBLE EAGLE.

It may be an air mobility-centric operation 

delivering food and medical supplies in a relief 

operation, as in Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, 

the 2010 earthquake relief effort in Haiti.

An AETF’s desired effect might not directly 

involve combat airpower. After supporting the 

initial insertion of forces into Haiti in 1994, the Air 

Force’s main element in Operation UPHOLD 

DEMOCRACY was a medical unit.

AETFs will be sized for the assigned mission and force size, and may be as small 

as a group or as large as an expeditionary air force consisting of multiple wings. Thus, 

depending on the size of the AETF, the rank of the AETF commander may run from 

general to colonel. Within the AETF, units form up as expeditionary air forces, wings, 

groups, squadrons, flights, detachments, or elements, as necessary to provide 

reasonable spans of internal control and maintain unit cohesion. The AETF commander

commands the AETF with authorities as delegated from the JFC (the operational branch 

of command) and from the superior Air Force command (the administrative branch of 

command).
61

 “Appropriate Command and Control Mechanisms . . .”

The AETF commander requires command mechanisms to exercise appropriate 

operational control and Service control. If acting as a COMAFFOR, the AETF 

commander exercises command in both the operational and administrative branches of 

the chain of command through an AOC, an Air Force forces (AFFOR) staff (sometimes 

colloquially called an “A-staff”), and appropriate subordinate C2 elements. Because air, 

space, and cyberspace forces are not monolithic in execution and force presentation—

some are organized regionally, others functionally—the nature of AOCs has been 

tailored to better plan and execute this mix. For regionally-oriented Air Force 

components, the AOC may be one of the large, fixed combined AOCs (CAOCs) found 

overseas, or a tailored AOC or AOC slice deployed for that operation. For functionallyoriented components (e.g., space, air mobility), the AOC should be tailored accordingly. 

C2 elements subordinate to the AOC should also be appropriately tailored. 

Within the authorities and responsibilities of ADCON, the COMAFFOR oversees 

the deployment and sustainment of Air Force forces, normally through the AFFOR staff 

and subordinate Service organizations (e.g., wings, groups, squadrons, etc.). These 

sustainment activities, sometimes referred to as “beds, beans, and bullets,” are critical 

to the successful accomplishment of operational functions. These activities should be 

fully integrated with and complementary to the AOC’s operational activities.

The AOC and the AFFOR staff are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 

 “Tailored and Fully Supported Forces . . .”

The AETF should be tailored to the mission; this includes not only forces, but 

also the ability to command and control those forces for the missions assigned. It 

should draw first from in-theater resources, if available. If augmentation is needed, or if 

in-theater forces are not available, the AETF will likely draw as needed from the AEF 

currently on rotation. These forces, whether in-theater or deployed from out of theater, 

should be fully supported with the requisite maintenance, logistical, health services, and 

administrative elements. These forces form up within the AETF as expeditionary wings, 

groups, squadrons, flights, detachments, or elements, as necessary to provide 

reasonable spans of control and command elements at appropriate levels.

In summary, the AETF is an expeditionary force established for a 

temporary period of time to perform a specified mission. The AETF provides a 

tailored package of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities in a structure that 

preserves Air Force unity of command. An AETF can be tailored in size and 

composition as appropriate for the mission.
62

 It is important to understand 

that airpower is flexible in 

organization and presentation. 

Because it encompasses a wide 

range of capabilities and operating 

environments, it defies a single, 

general model for organization, 

planning, and employment. Some 

assets and capabilities provide 

relatively localized effects and 

generally are more easily deployable, 

and thus may organize and operate 

within a regional model. Other assets 

and capabilities transcend 

geographic areas of responsibility 

simultaneously, and thus have global 

responsibilities. Such forces may be 

better organized and controlled 

through a functional model. 

However, at the focus of 

operations within any region, it is 

possible to place the collective 

capabilities of airpower in the 

hands of a single Airman through 

skillful arrangement of command 

relationships, focused 

expeditionary organization, 

reachback, and forward 

deployment of specialized talent.

Regional Organization and Control

All military missions are 

ultimately under the authority of a JFC 

at the appropriate level. If the entire 

theater is engaged, the CCDR may be 

the JFC. If the situation is less than 

theater-wide, the CCDR may establish

a subordinate JTF commanded by a 

subordinate JFC. In either case, the 

CCDR should first look to assigned, intheater forces. If augmentation is 

required, the JFC should request 

additional forces through the SecDef. 

Upon SecDef approval, additional forces 

transfer into the theater and are attached 

to the gaining CCDR. The degree of 

control gained over those forces (i.e.,

OPCON or TACON) should be specified 

in the deployment orders. The gaining 

CCDR then normally delegates OPCON 

of these forces downward to the JTF

commander who should, in turn, delegate 

OPCON to the Service component

commanders within the gaining JTF. All 

Air Force forces should be organized and 

presented as an AETF.

 Within a joint force, the JFC may 

organize forces in a mix of Service 

and functional components. All joint 

forces contain Service components, 

because administrative and logistics support are provided through Service

components. Therefore, every joint force containing assigned or attached Air 

Force forces will have an Air Force Service component in the form of an AETF 

with a designated COMAFFOR.

 The JFC may also establish functional component commands when forces from two 

or more military Services operate in the same dimension or domain or there is a 

need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Functional component 

commanders, such as the JFACC, are established at the discretion of the JFC. 

 If functional component commands are established, the Service component 

commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked, and with the requisite 

ability to provide command and control, will normally be designated as that 

functional component commander. Functional component commanders normally 

exercise TACON of forces made available for tasking. Through the Air Force 
63

component, the Air Force provides a COMAFFOR who is trained, equipped, and 

prepared to also be the JFACC if so designated by the JFC to whom he/she is 

assigned or attached. This has been the normal and highly successful method of 

providing and employing air forces since Operation DESERT STORM.

Functional Organization and Control 

Not all Air Force forces employed in an operation may be attached forward to a 

geographic CCDR. Several aspects of airpower are capable of serving more than one 

geographic CCDR at a time. Such forces are organized under functional CCDRs to 

facilitate cross-AOR optimization of those functional forces. When such forces are 

deployed in a geographic CCDR’s AOR, they may remain under the OPCON of their

respective functional CCDR and operate in support of the geographic CCDR. Within a 

theater, this support relationship is facilitated through specially designated

representatives attached to regional AETFs. In some circumstances, after coordination 

with the owning commander and upon SecDef approval, control of such functional 

forces may be transferred to a geographic commander and attached with specification 

of OPCON or TACON. Detailed discussion of specific functional forces and their 

command relationships and liaisons are found later in this chapter.

There will usually be a tension between regionally-organized forces and

functionally-organized forces. The former seek effectiveness at the point of their

operation, while the latter seek effectiveness and efficiency across several 

regions. At critical times, the requirement for effectiveness may trump efficiency, 

and additional functional forces may be transferred to the regional command and 

organized accordingly (see related discussion later in this chapter). These situations 

require careful and continuing dialogue between competing senior commanders and 

their common superior commander.

AETF ORGANIZATION

AETFs can be sized and tailored to meet the specific requirements of the 

mission. The basic building block of an AETF is the squadron; however, a squadron 

normally does not have sufficient resources to operate independently. Thus, the 

smallest AETF is normally an air expeditionary group; larger AETFs may be composed 

of several expeditionary wings. Within an AETF, the AETF commander organizes 

forces as necessary into wings, groups, squadrons, flights, detachments, or elements to 

provide reasonable internal spans of control, command elements at appropriate levels, 

and to retain unit identity.

Numbered Expeditionary Air Force

Numbered expeditionary Air Force (NEAF) is the generic title for an AETF made 

up of multiple expeditionary wings and is the largest sized AETF. NEAFs normally carry 

an appropriate numerical designation based on NAFs historically associated with the 

region or command. Subordinate expeditionary units may retain their own numerical 

designations. Use of the NEAF designation is also intended to provide appropriate unit 
64

awards and honors credit for the units and staffs within the NEAF. The NEAF 

commander is normally a COMAFFOR.

Air Expeditionary Task Force-X

“Air Expeditionary Task Force - X” (AETF-X) is the generic title used when a 

provisional Air Force command echelon is needed between a NEAF and an air 

expeditionary wing (AEW). AETF-X is used when a NEAF-level AETF establishes a 

subordinate provisional command echelon consisting of two or more AEWs. An 

example of this usage is when the Commander, US Air Forces Central (USAFCENT) 

established two subordinate AETFs, AETF-Iraq (AETF-I) and AETF-Afghanistan (AETFA), to provide command over multiple AEWs in their respective JOAs.

Depending on why this echelon is established, and its relationship within Service 

and joint force organizations, the AETF-X commander may or may not be a 

COMAFFOR. See “Air Force Component Presentation Considerations” in chapter 7 for 

further discussion.

Air Expeditionary Wing

AEW is the generic title for a deployed wing or a wing slice within an AETF. An

AEW normally is composed of the wing command element and subordinate groups and

squadrons. AEWs normally carry the numerical designation of the wing providing the 

command element. Subordinate expeditionary groups and support squadrons carry the 

numerical designation of the parent AEW. Subordinate mission squadrons and direct 

combat support units retain their numeric designation in an expeditionary status. Use of 

the AEW designation is also intended to provide appropriate unit awards and honors 

credit for the parent unit. An AEW may be composed of units from different wings, but 

where possible, the AEW is formed from units of a single wing. AEW commanders 

report to the COMAFFOR.

Air Expeditionary Group

Air expeditionary group (AEG) is the generic title for a deployed group assigned 

to an AEW or a deployed independent group assigned to an AETF. Unlike traditional 

“home station” groups, which are functionally organized (i.e., operations group, 

maintenance group, etc.), expeditionary groups that are deployed independent of a wing 

structure should contain elements of all the functions to conduct semi-autonomous 

operations. An AEG is composed of a slice of the wing command element and some 

squadrons. Since Air Force groups are organized without significant staff support, a 

wing slice is needed to provide the command and control for echelons smaller than the 

normal wing. An AEG assigned to an AEW carries the numeric designation of the AEW. 

An independent AEG normally carries the numerical designation of the unit providing 

the command element and/or the largest portion of the expeditionary organization. 

Deployed squadrons (assigned or attached) retain their numerical designation and 

acquire the “expeditionary” designation. Use of the AEG designation is also intended to 

provide appropriate unit awards and honors credit for the parent unit. An AEG may be

composed of units from different wings, but where possible, the AEG is formed from
65

units of a single wing. If deployed as an independent group as part of a larger AETF 

with other AEGs and/or AEWs, the AEG commander normally reports to the 

COMAFFOR. If deployed as a group subordinate to an expeditionary wing, the AEG 

commander reports to the AEW commander. The AEG is normally the smallest 

independently deployable AETF.

Air Expeditionary Squadron

Air expeditionary squadron (AES) is the generic title for a deployed squadron 

within an AETF. Squadrons are configured to deploy and employ in support of taskings. 

However, an individual squadron is not designed to conduct independent operations; it 

normally requires support from other units to obtain the synergy needed for sustainable, 

effective operations. As such, an individual squadron or squadron element should not 

be presented by itself without provision for appropriate support and command elements.

If a single operational squadron or squadron element is all that is needed to provide the

desired operational effect (for example, an element of C-130s performing humanitarian

operations), it should deploy with provision for commensurate support and C2 elements. 

The structure of this AETF would appear similar to an AEG. In some operations, not all 

support and C2 elements need to deploy forward with the operational squadron. Some 

may be positioned “over the horizon,” constituting capabilities provided through 

reachback. A single squadron or squadron element may deploy without full support 

elements if it is planned to augment a deployed AEW or AEG, and would thus obtain 

necessary support from the larger units. 

Expeditionary Elements below Squadron Level 

In addition to expeditionary wings, groups, and squadrons, the Air Force may 

deploy elements below the squadron level for specific, limited functions. These include 

individuals and specialty teams such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams,

military working dog teams, security forces, liaison teams, etc. They may deploy as part 

of an AETF or independently of other Air Force units, in remote locations, and may 

operate directly with other Services. For ADCON purposes, these elements should 

normally be attached to the commander of a recognizable Air Force entity in the region, 

either a deployed AETF, the Air Force Service component to the engaged CCDR, or an 

Air Force entity specifically established for this purpose. Examples of such deployed 

elements might be an Air Force military information support planner augmenting a joint 

military information support task force, an EOD team augmenting a predominately 

surface force, or an Air Force element supplementing Army convoy operations. Air 

Force personnel assigned to a joint staff may also fall in this category.

In many circumstances, elements below squadron level and even individual 

persons may deploy to provide a specific capability. In such cases, formal 

establishment and designation of an AETF may not be warranted. However, the Air 

Force contingent should still be organized as a single entity (perhaps named simply an

“Air Force element”) and led by the senior Airman in the contingent. In any case, the 

AETF model should still be used as a template to answer some basic questions:
66

 Historically, when Airmen 

talked about augmentation, 

discussion was generally limited 

to augmenting the AOC or a joint 

staff. Recent experience has 

provided new examples of 

augmentation between Services, 

either to round out manpower or 

provide specific skills at a low 

echelon. Examples include 

Airmen supplementing Army 

convoy operations in Iraq and 

Army Guardsmen backfilling 

deployed Air Force security 

forces at Air Force installations in 

the CONUS. 

 When Airmen are tasked to 

augment another Service, the 

AETF model should be applied as 

a template to help focus 

discussion of organization and 

command arrangements. The 

operational (OPCON/TACON) 

and administrative (ADCON) 

chains of command should be 

carefully specified, and an Air 

Force element, with an Airman in 

charge, should be identified to 

fulfill ADCON responsibilities.

 What is the operational branch of the 

chain of command? Who is in charge of

the operational mission, and to whom 

does the Air Force contingent report?

 What is the Service administrative branch 

of the chain of command? Who is in

charge of the Air Force contingent, and to 

whom does that senior Airman look for 

Service support (which Air Force 

installation or unit)?

 What command and control mechanism 

does the contingent need? A small

planning cell? A slice of a squadron or 

wing operations center? Or just a cell

phone or radio link back to the home 

station?

 What formal orders are required to attach 

the contingent or personnel to another 

agency? Deployment orders, G-series 

orders or simple temporary duty orders?

 What additional Service and joint training 

may be required to enable the deploying 

Airmen to properly accomplish the 

mission?

For such small deployments, even 

though an AETF has not been formed, the 

senior Airman should still be identified to 

provide a clear chain of command. The 

senior Airman may be designated as, for 

example, detachment commander, team

chief, or officer or noncommissioned officer in 

charge. This formally identifies the senior Air 

Force member as leader of the deployed 

element.

Recent experience has revealed 

that tracking small, remotely located Air 

Force elements, especially in the distributed environment encountered in 

irregular warfare, has posed challenges for the Air Force component 

headquarters. These challenges may range from lack of administrative support to 

improper employment of small units and individual Airmen in tasks for which they have 
67

not been trained. The AFFOR staff should take special efforts to maintain effective 

oversight of such elements in order to fulfill proper ADCON oversight.

Provisional Units

In some instances, expeditionary forces may not form around active numbered

units. This may occur, for example, when there are insufficient active numbered units in

the AEF rotation to satisfy a very large operation or a single major force provider cannot

be identified. In such cases, provisional units may be created using predesignated

inactive units. A unit under a single provisional unit designation should also be

considered to provide continuity of operations for extended contingency operations in

which units are frequently rotated in and out (e.g., Operations NORTHERN and

SOUTHERN WATCH, and IRAQI FREEDOM). Upon completion of the operation for

which the unit was formed, the unit designation and history are inactivated. Provisional 

wings, groups, and squadrons are normally generically designated simply as AEWs, 

AEGs, and AESs.

Designation of Expeditionary Units

An AETF is named based on the unit providing the senior-echelon command 

function, its size, and the operation name.

 For a NAF-sized AETF, use the numerical designation of the engaged NAF, followed 

by “EAF,” then the name of the operation. For example, a NAF-sized AETF (two or 

more wings) established under 12 AF (AFSOUTH) for Operation SAMPLE NAME 

would be designated as “12 EAF—SAMPLE NAME.” A NEAF would normally be 

commanded by the component NAF commander.

 For AETF-X sized AETFs, use the term “AETF” followed by the operation name or 

regional identifier. For example, for an AETF-X established in Iraq, the title would be 

either AETF-Iraq or AETF-Operation NEW DAWN.

 For wing- or group-sized AETFs, use the number of the senior echelon, followed by 

“AEW” or “AEG,” then the name of the operation. Following the above example, a 

wing-sized AETF would be designated “XX AEW—SAMPLE NAME,” and a groupsized AETF would be “XX AEG—SAMPLE NAME.”

Wings, groups, and squadrons are designated “expeditionary” from the time they

are attached until no longer attached to an AETF. Within the task force, numbered units

simply add “expeditionary” to the normal designation of the unit. For example, the 123d

Fighter Wing becomes the 123d Expeditionary Fighter Wing; the 456th Mission Support

Group becomes the 456th Expeditionary Mission Support Group, and the 789th Air

Refueling Squadron becomes the 789th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron. For

planning purposes, wings, groups, and squadrons may be generically designated simply

as AEWs, AEGs, and AESs.

Units operating from their normally assigned, in-place location, such as

permanently assigned units in Korea under US Pacific Command (USPACOM), or North
68

America-based ANG units participating in homeland air defense within Operation

NOBLE EAGLE, need not adopt expeditionary nomenclature since they are not truly

expeditionary. The overall operation, however, should still be modeled as an AETF to

delineate clear chains of operational and administrative authority. Other deployed 

wings, groups, and squadrons that are not assigned or attached to the AETF, but 

provide significant support (such as airlift and tanker units in the intertheater air bridge 

or space and special operations units in direct support), may be designated 

“expeditionary” at the discretion of their owning MAJCOM or Service component 

commander. Normally, these “expeditionary” forces provide their support through their 

functional chains of command.

EXAMPLES OF AETFs

This section presents three recent usages of AETFs. AETFs may be attached to 

a joint force as an Air Force Service component; provided in direct support of a joint 

force in lieu of attachment; or temporarily established to address an internal operational 

Service requirement.

 Component AETF. When directed, an AETF may be formally attached to a joint 

force at the combatant command, subunified combatant command, or JTF level, 

usually with specification of OPCON, forming Service component commands. In 

these cases, the AETF commander is a COMAFFOR, and a separate AOC and Astaff are normally required to employ and support the AETF. Examples of these 

components are found in the form of component major commands (MAJCOMs) and 

component numbered Air Forces (NAFs) established to support the CCDRs. 

Component AETFs may also be attached to JTFs. These have historically been the 

most usual manifestation of the AETF. 

 “Subordinate AETF.” During some operations, especially when there may be 

multiple JOAs with multiple JTFs, it may not be feasible to attach AETFs to each JTF 

due to C2 resource constraints. In such cases, subordinate AETFs may be 

established and placed in support of JTFs. Examples of this structure occurred in 

the later phases of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM 

(redesignated Operation NEW DAWN), USAFCENT established subordinate task 

forces to directly support sub-theater-level JTFs operating in separate JOAs within 

US Central Command (USCENTCOM). With the approval of Commander, 

USCENTCOM (CDRUSCENTCOM), these subordinate task forces were not 

attached as separate Air Force components to those JTFs, but were established as 

supporting forces with OPCON retained by the CCDR-level COMAFFOR 

(Commander, USAFCENT). In this case, the USAFCENT commander delegated 

specified elements of OPCON and ADCON over forces to the subordinate task force 

commanders. These task forces were then provided in direct support of their 

respective JTF commanders. The USAFCENT commander, as the theater 

COMAFFOR/CFACC to CDRUSCENTCOM, maintained a theater-wide perspective 

and the ability to re-apportion airpower across the USCENTCOM AOR IAW CCDR 

priorities.
69

 “ADCON-only” AETF. On occasion, AETFs may be established to address a 

specific but purely internal Service challenge and may have no direct relation to a 

joint force. Examples can be found during the initial phase of Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM, the Air Force formed two task forces for ADCON purposes only, one in 

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) under 13 AF on Guam and one in US Air Forces in 

Europe (USAFE) under 16 AF in Turkey. These AETFs were formed to provide 

more direct oversight of support activities of those forces bedded down in the 

USPACOM and USEUCOM AORs and supporting USCENTCOM’s main effort. The 

operational branch of the chain of command ran through the commander charged 

with accomplishing the operational mission (i.e., Commander, USAFCENT, as 

delegated from CDRUSCENTCOM) while the administrative branch ran through the 

Air Force commander best positioned to provide the necessary support (i.e., 

Commander, 13 AF as delegated from Commander, PACAF, and Commander, 16 

AF as delegated from Commander, USAFE). This solution provided a closer degree 

of ADCON oversight due to size and complexity of the overall effort and, especially 

in PACAF’s case, the distance between Diego Garcia and PACAF headquarters in 

Hawaii. The designation of forward-located Air Force commanders provided more 

informed and timely decision making affecting those forward-based Air Force 

elements. In this case, these task forces commanders only exercised ADCON; they 

were not delegated any operational authorities.

(Note: the titles “subordinate AETF” and “ADCON-only AETF” above are descriptive, 

not formal.)

These are examples of extrapolating from baseline doctrinal concepts of 

organization and command relationships to tailor a solution to a particular set of 

circumstances. As with any tailored organization, there should be careful consultation 

among the Service and joint force commanders involved, and the CCDR retains final 

decision on the laydown of subordinate organization and distribution of command 

authorities.

COMMAND AND CONTROL MECHANISMS 

The COMAFFOR requires C2 assets to assist in exercising OPCON, TACON, 

and ADCON. The COMAFFOR normally uses some form of an AOC to exercise control

of operations and a Service component staff, commonly called the AFFOR staff, to 

exercise support operations and administrative control.

The core capabilities of the AOC and AFFOR staff are well established, but they 

should be tailored in size and function according to the operation. Not all operations 

require a “full-up” AOC with over 1,000 people or a large AFFOR staff. Smaller 

operations, such as some humanitarian operations, can in fact make do with a small 

control center that does little more than scheduling and reporting. Also, not all elements 

of the operations center or AFFOR staff need be forward; some may operate “over the 
70

 The AOC is the senior element 

within the theater air control 

system (TACS). The TACS includes 

the AOC plus subordinate ground and 

airborne elements, and is directly 

involved in the command and control 

of most air missions. Collectively, the 

TACS has the capability to plan, 

direct, integrate, and control all air, 

space, and cyberspace forces 

assigned, attached, or made available 

for tasking; monitor the actions of both 

friendly and enemy forces; plan, 

direct, coordinate, and control air 

defense and airspace control; and 

coordinate for required space and 

cyberspace support.

 While this discussion focuses on 

the AOC, it is important to remember 

that the entire TACS is necessary 

for the COMAFFOR’s effective 

command of airpower.

horizon,” using reachback to reduce the 

forward footprint. The goal is to 

maximize reachback and minimize 

forward presence as much as possible.

Air Operations Center 

In general terms, an AOC is the 

Air Force component commander’s C2 

center that provides the capability to 

plan, direct, and assess the activities of 

assigned and attached forces. AOCs 

do not work in isolation; they require 

appropriate connectivity to 

operations centers of higher 

headquarters (e.g., to the joint force 

headquarters for the operational 

branch, and to senior Air Force 

headquarters for the administrative 

branch), to lateral headquarters (e.g., 

other joint force components), to 

subordinate assigned and attached 

Air Force units, and to other 

functional and geographic AOCs as 

necessary. The overall C2 structure 

should make maximum use of 

reachback.

An AOC, along with subordinate 

C2 elements, should be tailored in size 

and capability to the mission. An AOC 

should generally be capable of the 

following basic tasks:

 Develop the component strategy 

and requisite planning products.

 Task, execute, and assess day-to-day component operations.

 Plan and execute ISR tasks appropriate to assigned missions.

 Conduct operational-level assessment.

Depending on the nature of the mission and the tailoring of the component, 

additional AOC tasks may include, but are not limited to, integrating inter-theater air 

mobility support; developing and issuing airspace control procedures; and providing 

overall direction of defense appropriate for the operating domains (e.g., theater air and 

missile defense; cyberspace defense; space defense). While these operations centers 
71

are organic to Air Force operations, with proper augmentation from the other Services 

and coalition partners they may evolve into a joint or combined AOC (JAOC or CAOC), 

depending on the type of operation and nature of the forces within the air component, 

and whether the COMAFFOR is also acting as the joint or combined force air 

component commander (JFACC or CFACC).

AOCs and their subordinate C2 elements may be geographically oriented or 

functionally oriented. To bring all the Air Force’s capabilities together for a given 

operation or activity, the AOCs normally work together in a mutually supporting 

command arrangement, with one of them designated as the supported center. 

See appendix B for a summary of baseline AOC organization. For more detailed

guidance on internal structure and procedures, refer to AFI 13-1AOC, volume 3, 

Operational Procedures—Air and Space Operations Center, and Air Force Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3 AOC, Operational Employment—Air and 

Space Operations Center.

AFFOR Staff 

An AETF also needs a command entity responsible for the deployment and

sustainment of Air Force forces. The AFFOR staff is the mechanism through which the

COMAFFOR exercises Service responsibilities. The AFFOR staff is also responsible 

for the long-range planning and theater engagement operations that fall outside the 

AOC’s current operational focus. The AFFOR staff should develop a habitual working 

relationship with the AOC to help fulfill the COMAFFOR’s full range of responsibilities 

and to integrate overall Service component staff efforts with the AOC battle rhythm.

An AFFOR staff should be ready to fill one or more roles: that of a theater-wide 

Air Force Service component, an Air Force warfighting component within a JTF, or the 

core or “plug” within a JTF headquarters. The COMAFFOR should avoid dual- or 

triple-hatting the AFFOR staff to the maximum extent possible. Dual- or triplehatting may have detrimental consequences as the staff struggles to focus at the 

right level of war at the right time. Manning and distribution of workload may 

limit the staff’s ability to cover all involved duties simultaneously and 

augmentation may be necessary.5

The AFFOR staff’s function is to support and assist the COMAFFOR in preparing 

the Air Force component to carry out the functions and tasks assigned by the JFC. The 

exact nature of the AFFOR staff’s responsibilities will vary depending on the level of the 

JFC to which the Air Force component is assigned or attached. An AFFOR staff may 

support the COMAFFOR at either the theater or the JTF level and must be prepared to 

adapt its focus accordingly.

 5 The note on workload distribution and the recommendation on augmentation are lessons observed 

during Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE 2010.
72

The structure and division of labor within an AFFOR staff that is dual-tasked as 

both a Service component to a unified CCDR and a Service component headquarters 

AFFOR staff supporting a JTF (for example, as currently found within the Air Force 

component in USCENTCOM) may find itself split between the broad theater-level 

Service responsibilities and the JTF-level operational responsibilities. This would likely 

require two groups within the AFFOR staff, one to focus on theater component staff 

activities and the other on operational warfighting issues. In accordance with Service 

and joint doctrinal admonitions against dual-hatting a commander vertically across 

different levels of war, it would similarly be a mistake to dual-hat a single AFFOR staff 

for both of these functions, as one function invariably suffers due to the inability to 

properly focus at the correct level of war at the right time; differences in battle rhythms 

within the joint force; differing levels of connection within interagency processes; and 

other similar challenges. 

 An AFFOR staff may have a third role in addition to operational staff and Service 

staff: forming the core for a JTF headquarters staff, as in scenarios when the 

COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFC. In such a scenario, the AFFOR staff, either in 

whole or in part, would be augmented by joint and coalition staff as required. Another 

option for staffing a JTF headquarters might be to pull a “plug” from the AFFOR staff as 

an add-on to another Service’s staff to form the core of the JTF staff. In either of these 

cases, the AFFOR staff would require augmentation from outside the theater to backfill 

the manning requirements. As with the previously-described division of labor between a 

theater-wide Service component and operational warfighting component, the same 

caveats apply: those AFFOR staff individuals functioning as a JTF headquarters should 

be separate from the other AFFOR staff activities. 

 See appendix C for a summary of baseline AFFOR staff organization. 

DISTRIBUTED/SPLIT OPERATIONS

Understanding distributed operations, split operations and reachback is important 

to a full understanding of C2 operations. Distributed operations involve conducting 

operations from independent or interdependent nodes in a teaming manner. Some 

operational planning or decision making may occur from outside the joint area of 

operations. Split operations is a type of distributed operations conducted by a single C2 

entity separated between two or more geographic locations. A single commander must 

have oversight of all aspects of a split C2 operation. Reachback, which can be applied 

to both distributed, and the more specific case of split operations, is the process of 

obtaining products, services, and applications or forces, equipment, or materiel from Air 

Force organizations that are not forward deployed.

The decision to establish distributed or split operations invokes several tradeoffs:

 The fewer the number of personnel/forces deployed forward, the less support is

required to be pushed across great distances; however, face-to-face interaction 
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between forward and rear decision makers may be limited, and decision making 

timelines may stretch.

 Fewer personnel/forces forward reduce security requirements; however, their

expertise is no longer immediately at hand for ad hoc problem solving. 

 Reachback requires more bandwidth for communications. These links then become 

vulnerabilities. However, a distributed operation may arguably be more survivable 

and less prone to single-point failure.

Refer to AFDD 6-0, Command and Control, for further discussion of split and

distributed operations.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP MODELS FOR AIR FORCE FORCES

When employing military forces, a CCDR first turns to those forces already 

assigned. Assigned forces are delineated in the SecDef’s “Forces for Unified 

Commands” memorandum, and the CCDR exercises combatant command authority 

(COCOM) over them. Additional forces beyond those assigned to the CCDR may be 

attached by SecDef action. These forces may come from one of two specific Global 

Force Management allocation supporting processes: rotational force allocation in 

support of CCDR annual force needs and emergent force allocation in support of CCDR 

emerging or crisis-based requests for capabilities and forces. Since the additional forces 

are normally assigned to a different CCDR, the deployment order should clearly 

delineate the degree of command authority to be exercised by the gaining commander. 

Forces temporarily transferred via SecDef action are normally attached with 

specification of OPCON to the gaining CCDR. 

The deployment order is the primary instrument for transferring forces and

establishing supported and supporting relationships between CCDRs. Forces 

may also be transferred by an execute order which executes an approved

operations plan. Other orders created during the planning process, such as warning, 

alert, planning, and fragmentary orders, may also specify or shape command 

relationships, but they do not transfer forces. The SecDef, as the only authority for 

transferring forces between CCDRs, normally approves deployment orders. This 

deployment order should specify to which CCDR the deployed forces are assigned or 

attached and the command relationship (OPCON or TACON) to be exercised by the 

gaining commander. Air Force component commanders may shape command and 

support relationships by working through their chains of command to shape the details 

of orders being drafted by the Joint Staff. While the JFC ultimately has the authority to 

determine the delegation of command among subordinates, Air Force commanders 

should make consistent recommendations and present forces in a consistent manner to 

the JFC.

For Air Force forces, there are four general models for command 

relationships. Considerations for these relationships should include the ability of 

gaining commands to receive the forces and to command and control them 
74

appropriately; the characteristics and support requirements of the forces involved; and 

the operating locations of the forces.

 Forces deployed and executing operations within the theater to which they are 

attached.

 Forces executing missions inside the theater of operations but based outside the 

theater (i.e., across AORs).

 Functional forces with global missions.

 Transient forces. 

These four models illustrate the most probable combinations in assigning

responsibility for operational control and administrative control; however, many nuances

are possible, and commanders must exercise sound professional judgment when

setting up command relationships. (Note: In the following examples, “supported

CCDR/JFC” specifically means the in-theater commander who is tasked with executing 

the operation for which the forces under discussion may be assigned or attached.)

In-Theater Forces

In general, when Air Force forces deploy into a theater to conduct operations,

OPCON of those forces should normally go forward to the CCDR to whom the President 

or SecDef has assigned responsibility for accomplishing the mission. To the maximum 

extent possible, specified elements of ADCON should also go forward to the regional 

COMAFFOR to whom the forces are attached. Since not all elements of ADCON 

authorities and responsibilities are transferred to the forward based gaining commander, 

ADCON can and does run concurrently between the gaining COMAFFOR and the 

parent organizations of the deployed forces. Which elements of ADCON are specified 

to the forward COMAFFOR and which are retained by the parent organization should be 

clearly specified in the G-series orders that establish the expeditionary organization and 

in the deployment orders that attach forces to that organization. The regional 

COMAFFOR already exercises OPCON and ADCON over forces assigned to that 

geographic CCDR.

Out-of-Theater Forces

There are two general cases in which Air Force forces may execute missions

inside a theater of operations while based outside the theater. These cases involve

CONUS-based forces, and forward-based forces operating outside the CONUS 

(OCONUS) and outside the AOR. In either case, operational control of forces should 

transfer forward to the commander responsible for executing the mission while ADCON 

is dependent upon where the forces are based.
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CONUS-Based Forces

CONUS-based forces that launch from their CONUS home station, conduct 

operations in another theater, and recover in CONUS should transfer OPCON to the 

supported CCDR/JFC upon sortie generation. ADCON should remain with the original 

component command. An example would be a bomber launching from CONUS, striking 

a target overseas under the command of a regional force, and returning to CONUS. In 

this example, OPCON should transfer to the supported CCDR/JFC who is executing the 

mission; this is the preferred arrangement. However, if the tasked CCDR/JFC is only 

granted TACON of these forces, OPCON in this case remains with the CCDR to whom 

the forces are assigned and ADCON remains with that CCDR’s COMAFFOR.

OCONUS Forces outside the AOR

For OCONUS units stationed outside the theater of operations tasked to conduct

sustained operations in that theater, OPCON should normally transfer forward to the

geographic CCDR/JFC executing the mission while ADCON is best held by the 

COMAFFOR of the geographic region in which they bed down. An example of this 

situation would be bombers stationed at Diego Garcia (in the USPACOM AOR), but 

conducting operations under the command of USCENTCOM. The CDRUSCENTCOM

would exercise OPCON of the bombers most likely through his COMAFFOR, the 

Commander, USAFCENT. The Commander, PACAF, would exercise ADCON through 

the established PACAF organizational structure but would have no operational 

responsibility or authority over the forces attached to CDRUSCENTCOM.

Functional Forces

Functional forces (such as air mobility and space forces) satisfy mission

requirements across multiple AORs and are thus best centrally controlled. For such

forces, the functional CCDR normally retains OPCON of assigned forces and executes

as a supporting commander to the supported geographic CCDR.

In those cases where functional forces bed down in a geographic commander’s

AOR, the Air Force host base commander (or senior Air Force officer present on the

installation, if the Air Force is a tenant) normally exercises a minimum degree of 

ADCON, usually only for force protection, UCMJ, dining and lodging, and some limited 

force reporting. (See the discussion on the ADCON responsibilities of host installation 

commanders earlier in this chapter). The extent and nature of the elements of ADCON 

to be exercised by the geographic commander should be specified in deployment 

orders and/or command-to-command agreements.

Transient Forces

Geographic or local commanders do not normally exercise OPCON of transient

forces (i.e., forces merely transiting an AOR or JOA and not part of an AETF, and not

participating in CCDR-sponsored joint exercises). However, such forces are subject to 

local force protection, UCMJ, lodging and dining, and administrative reporting 

requirements. Per JP 1, “Transient forces within the assigned AOR of a CCDR are
76

subject to that CCDR’s orders in some instances (e.g., for coordination of emergency 

defense, force protection, or allocation of local facilities).” Transient forces are not part 

of the area commander’s command, and the area commander is not in their normal 

chain of command.

Forces in Exercises

Forces participating in joint exercises under the orders of a CCDR or other

SecDef directed training should normally be under the OPCON of the sponsoring 

CCDR. Forces participating in such joint training should normally be attached to the 

CCDR with specification of OPCON via SecDef approved deployment orders.

Unless otherwise specified by the SecDef, and with the exception of the US

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, a geographic CCDR has TACON for 

exercise purposes whenever forces not assigned to that CCDR undertake exercises in 

that CCDR's AOR. TACON begins when the forces enter the AOR and is terminated 

upon completion of the exercise, after departing the AOR. In this context, TACON 

provides directive authority over exercising forces for purposes relating to that exercise 

only; it does not authorize operational employment of those forces. This blanket 

specification of TACON for exercise purposes does not apply to US Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM) assets within any AOR or to forces deployed for exercises 

in USNORTHCOM AOR. OPCON and TACON for USTRANSCOM forces or forces

exercising in USNORTHCOM AOR remain as established by the SecDef.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONAL FORCES TO A GEOGRAPHIC 

COMMAND 

In some situations, a geographic commander may request additional functional

forces beyond those apportioned or allocated during deliberate or crisis action planning. 

The decision to transfer functional forces, with specification of OPCON, to a geographic

CCDR should be balanced against competing needs across multiple AORs. In some 

cases, the requirement for OPCON over specific forces to accomplish the geographic 

CCDR’s missions may be of higher priority than the competing worldwide mission 

requirements of the functional CCDR. Therefore, after coordination with the owning 

functional commander and upon SecDef approval, functional forces may be transferred 

to the geographic command and organized accordingly. The decision to attach 

additional functional forces has two parts. First, the decision should consider whether:

 The geographic CCDR will use the forces at or near 100 percent of their capability 

with little or no residual capability for other global missions.

 The forces will be used regularly and frequently over a period of time, not just for a 

single mission employment.

 The geographic commander has the ability to effectively command and control the 

forces.
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If the answer to all three questions above is “yes,” then the functional 

forces should be attached to the geographic combatant command. If any of the 

above questions are answered “no,” then the functional forces should remain 

under the OPCON of the functional CCDR’s COMAFFOR and be tasked in

support.

If the decision is to attach forces, the second question is whether the forces 

should be attached with specification of either OPCON or TACON.

 Specification of OPCON: OPCON is the more complete—and preferred—choice of 

control. OPCON “normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces 

and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers

necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include

authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal 

organization, or unit training” (JP 1-02).

 Specification of TACON: TACON is the more limited choice of control. It is “limited 

to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the 

operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned” (JP 1-02). JP 

1 states “when transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be 

attached to the gaining commands and JFCs... will exercise OPCON over the 

attached forces.” Thus, transfer and attachment with specification of TACON is not 

the expected norm. While it is possible for the SecDef to attach forces across 

combatant command lines with the specification of TACON in lieu of OPCON, such 

action would deviate from the joint doctrine and policy established in JP 1 and would 

result in a more confused chain of command with OPCON and TACON split 

between two different CCDRs.

Regardless of which form of control is transferred, regional COMAFFORs have

inherent responsibilities for such issues as local force protection, lodging, and dining. 

Thus, if a regional COMAFFOR holds OPCON of forces outside the AOR, he or she is

not responsible for such issues—that is the responsibility of the COMAFFOR in the

region in which they are bedded down. In a parallel fashion, if such out-of-region forces

divert into bases in his/her region (for example, for emergencies), that COMAFFOR is

now responsible for basic support and protection.

As an example, a CCDR requests tankers in support of a regional operation. If 

the tankers are totally committed to that operation and are unavailable to perform any 

other missions, OPCON of these tankers may be transferred to the forward geographic

CCDR/JFC. If, on the other hand, the tankers are only partially employed in that 

operation and thus are available for other missions (such as support to the intertheater 

air bridge), the Commander, USTRANSCOM (CDRUSTRANSCOM) should retain 

OPCON to optimize overall tanker utilization. As another example, missile warning 

satellites can provide warning to the geographic CCDR/JFC through a direct support 

relationship, but the Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) retains 

OPCON to optimize missile warning mission requirements globally.
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INTEGRATING REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL AIR FORCE FORCES 

As previously stated, airpower is usually presented through a mix of regional and 

functional models, with the latter usually supporting the former. Functional forces 

usually maintain a separate organization from the supported regional organization, and 

are integrated in the theater through specially trained liaisons attached to the regional 

COMAFFOR. The most likely functional capabilities to be provided in such a supporting 

relationship are air mobility operations, space operations, special operations, 

cyberspace operations, and nuclear operations.

Integrating Air Mobility Operations

Because air mobility forces serve several regions concurrently, their employment

should be balanced between regional and intertheater requirements and priorities. At 

the same time, the air mobility systems performing intratheater and intertheater 

missions within a given region should operate in close coordination to provide 

responsive and integrated aerial movement to the supported CCDR.

Carefully constructed command relationships can allow an interlocking

arrangement to manage intratheater and intertheater air mobility operations. Normally,

intratheater air mobility forces are attached to the JFC, with OPCON as appropriate

delegated to the COMAFFOR. Intertheater air mobility forces normally remain under

the control of USTRANSCOM, delegated downward within Air Mobility Command 

(AMC) to Eighteenth Air Force (18 AF) as appropriate. Within a regional operation, the 

Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR), with the air mobility division (AMD) in the 

AOC, provides the pivotal link between the intertheater and intratheater air mobility 

operations.

The Director of Air Mobility Forces

Within an AETF, the DIRMOBFOR is the COMAFFOR’s designated coordinating

authority for air mobility operations. The DIRMOBFOR, normally a senior Air Force air 

mobility officer familiar with the AOR, coordinates on behalf of the COMAFFOR/JFACC 

with the AMD in the AOC. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced by the theater Air Force

component commander or nominated by the AMC commander. To ensure close

coordination with the overall theater effort, the DIRMOBFOR is normally assigned to the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC’s special staff. In those instances when no JFACC is designated, 

or the JFACC is from another Service, the DIRMOBFOR should normally report to the

COMAFFOR. The DIRMOBFOR’s specific authorities and responsibilities include:

 Coordinate the integration of intertheater air mobility support provided by

USTRANSCOM-assigned air mobility forces.

 Coordinate the tasking of USTRANSCOM air mobility forces (air and ground)

assigned or attached to the JFC.
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 Coordinate the tasking of intratheater air mobility forces (air and ground) attached to 

the theater or JTF.

 Coordinate with the AOC commander to ensure all air mobility operations attached

to and supporting the JFC are fully integrated with the air tasking cycle and

deconflicted with all other air operations.

 Coordinate with 18 AF, through the AMD and the 618 AOC (tanker/airlift control 

center) at Scott AFB, all intertheater air mobility missions to ensure the most 

effective use of these resources in accomplishing the JFC, theater, and 

USTRANSCOM missions.

Refer to AFDD 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, for more information.

Integrating Space Operations

Space presents another form of military operations that, much like air mobility,

usually are best presented functionally to a regional commander through a supporting

relationship if they are not attached. Space command and control brings another level

of complexity because many space assets that support military interests come from a

variety of organizations, some outside of the Department of Defense (DOD). These 

capabilities often have nontraditional chains of command. In some cases, authority may 

be split between organizations due to shared interagency responsibilities. Much like air 

mobility through the DIRMOBFOR, space capabilities within a regional operation are

normally focused within a JTF by the designation of a single authority for space 

operations.

Space Coordinating Authority

Within a regional operation, the JFC should designate SCA to facilitate unity of

effort with DOD-wide space operations and non-DOD space capabilities. Although

JFCs may retain authority at the JTF level, they should normally designate as SCA the 

component commander who provides the preponderance of military space capabilities, 

the requisite ability to command and control them, and the resident space expertise. In 

most cases, the COMAFFOR provides these capabilities through the Air Force’s organic 

space C2 infrastructure. Responsibilities of SCA include:

 Determine, deconflict, and prioritize military space requirements for the JTF.

 Recommend appropriate command relationships for space to the JFC.

 Help facilitate space target nomination.

 Maintain space situational awareness.

 Request space inputs from JTF staff and components during planning.

 Ensure optimum interoperability of space assets with coalition forces.
80

 Recommend JTF military space requirement priorities to JFC.

The Director of Space Forces

Within an AETF, the Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR) serves as the 

senior space advisor to the COMAFFOR. The DIRSPACEFOR, an Air Force space 

officer, coordinates, integrates, and staffs activities to tailor space support to the 

COMAFFOR (and the JFACC when the COMAFFOR is so designated). In addition, 

when the COMAFFOR/JFACC is designated SCA, the DIRSPACEFOR works the dayto-day SCA activities on behalf of the JFACC. If the COMAFFOR is neither SCA nor 

the JFACC, the COMAFFOR should establish a space liaison to the JFACC. The

DIRSPACEFOR is part of the COMAFFOR’s special staff. As is the case with the 

DIRMOBFOR, the COMAFFOR may choose to make the DIRSPACEFOR available to 

the JFACC in those cases when the COMAFFOR is not dual designated as the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC. Whether a permanent member of the theater MAJCOM staff or 

provided to the theater by Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), the DIRSPACEFOR 

should be pre-identified to allow that officer time to become familiar with that theater’s 

space requirements. The DIRSPACEFOR’s specific responsibilities include:

 Provide senior space perspective for strategy and daily guidance development,

target selection, force enhancement to terrestrial operations, and special technical 

operations activities relating to space operations.

 Facilitate AFSPC, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and national support to 

the JFC.

 Provide assistance to the COMAFFOR/JFACC in determining and achieving military 

space requirements.

 Assist regional AOC staff in developing and staffing space related operational

requirements and policy matters.

 Recommend appropriate command relationships for space to the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC.

Refer to AFDD 3-14, Space Operations, for more information.

 

Integrating Special Operations

The geographic CCDR normally exercises COCOM of assigned Air Force special 

operations forces (AFSOF) and OPCON of all attached AFSOF through the commander 

of the theater special operations command. For conventional missions, the JFACC may 

receive OPCON or TACON of AFSOF assets when directed by the JFC. However, in 

most cases, AFSOF will only normally be in a direct support relationship with 

conventional assets. When SOF operate in concert with “conventional” JTFs, they

normally take the form of a separate joint special operations task force (JSOTF) within 

the JTF, commanded by a joint force special operations component commander 
81

(JFSOCC). AFSOF, like all Air Force units, organize using the AETF construct. Due to 

their unique relationship with US Special Operations Command, AFSOF deployed unit 

designations differ slightly from the conventional Air Force model. Although the names 

differ (e.g., expeditionary special operations wing [ESOW] vice AEW), AFSOF 

organizational patterns are similar to conventional unit orientation and functionality. 

Once deployed, JTF commanders establish appropriate command and control for SOF 

units. AFSOC force presentation is discussed in AFDD 3-05, Special Operations.

SOF can enhance operations across the ROMO during irregular or traditional 

warfare. SOF normally pursue SOF-unique objectives which prepare, shape or 

enhance broader JFC objectives. Due to specialized training which includes cultural, 

regional, and language orientation, SOF Airmen can provide key capabilities across the 

spectrum of irregular warfare tasks: foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, 

counterterrorism, stability operations, and unconventional warfare. They may also be 

tasked to operate in support of conventional objectives or require conventional support 

of their objectives:

 SOF may act as an economy of force measure by applying SOF unique capabilities 

against conventional targets to enhance joint air asset efficiency and effectiveness.

 SOF may conduct specialized operations beyond the capabilities of joint air 

component forces. For example, they may strike against WMD production or

storage facilities inaccessible to joint air due to environmental or dispersal concerns.

 Because of unique training and multiple air/ground combat power delivery

capabilities, SOF may integrate with joint air component operations in a synergistic 

attack (e.g., terminal guidance operations).

 SOF may enhance joint air component operations with specialized personnel and 

platform capabilities to assist in locating deep targets.

Whether operating under control of the JFSOCC or in support of the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC, SOF aviation missions are integrated into other air activities 

supporting the theater campaign. Integration is crucial because the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC and the JFSOCC normally share common operational areas, and 

their assets routinely operate in the deep battlespace. To ensure SOF aviation and 

surface assets are closely integrated in all joint air operations, from planning through 

execution, the JFSOCC provides the COMAFFOR/JFACC a special operations liaison 

element (SOLE) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SOF operations, strategy, and 

plans with other air operations. In return, the COMAFFOR/JFACC may provide a joint 

air component coordination element (JACCE) to the JFSOCC.

The Special Operations Liaison Element

Whether operating autonomously or in conjunction with conventional forces, SOF

aviation and surface assets should be closely integrated into all joint air operations—
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from planning through execution—to provide coordination and deconfliction, prevent

fratricide, and exploit synergistic effects. 

The SOLE is a liaison team that represents the JFSOCC to the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC. The SOLE integrates all SOF air and surface operations with 

joint air operations via the air tasking process. Additionally, the SOLE deconflicts SOF 

operations with other component liaisons in the AOC. Specific functions include 

integration of SOF requirements into air tasking order (ATO) and airspace control order 

(ACO) generation; real time mission support within the AOC; operations and intelligence 

support for targeting; combat airspace control for prevention of fratricide; coordination 

with special plans functions; and coordination with the joint personnel recovery center. 

The SOLE also assists in the deconfliction of joint special operations areas and 

unconventional warfare operating areas with the COMAFFOR/JFACC.

Integrating Cyberspace Operations

As with air mobility and space operations, global cyberspace capabilities may be 

presented to a regional commander through a supporting relationship, to supplement 

regional cyberspace capabilities. US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), as a 

subordinate unified command under USSTRATCOM, is the focal point for providing 

cyberspace capabilities to other CCDRs. Within USCYBERCOM, the Air Force 

component is 24 AF (Air Forces Cyber [AFCYBER]). 24 AF provides support through 

the 624th Operations Center (624 OC). To support regional operations, 

USCYBERCOM may also provide cyberspace expertise to regional staffs if necessary.

The 624 OC uses a process similar to the air tasking cycle to develop a cyber 

tasking order (CTO) for planning, coordinating, apportioning, allocating, executing, and 

assessing cyberspace operations. The CTO is derived from CDRUSSTRATCOM and 

Commander, USCYBERCOM orders and supported JFC orders. Every cyberspace 

operation during that period should be on the CTO for situational awareness and 

deconfliction purposes.

When the 624 OC is supporting a theater operation, the CTO development 

process is coordinated and integrated with the theater ATO development process. The 

624 OC, using guidance from the supported COMAFFOR/JFACC, helps develop 

cyberspace COAs in support of theater operations. During the planning phase, the 624 

OC uses COMAFFOR/JFACC guidance, such as rules of engagement, the joint 

integrated prioritized target list, the target nomination list, and the approved master air 

attack plan (MAAP), to finalize the CTO. After the ATO is finalized, the theater AOC 

disseminates it to all required users, including the 624 OC. 24 AF (AFCYBER)

subsequently approves the CTO, ensuring it reflects theater taskings, and disseminates 

it to all required users including the theater AOC. The CTO tasks assigned and 

attached cyberspace forces to meet theater and global requirements for the next 24-

hour period. Within the 24-hour period of execution, cyberspace tasking can occur 

dynamically to meet the supported commander‘s requests.

For further discussion, see AFDD 3-12.
83

NUCLEAR SUPPORT TO REGIONAL COMMANDS 

The political and psychological effects of nuclear weapons confer upon them a 

unique nature. Therefore, the singular role of USSTRATCOM during planning and 

employment necessitates close coordination with regional commanders to achieve 

desired results. Air Force nuclear capabilities are central to these considerations, and 

require precise integration to ensure effective employment within a particular region 

taking into account the larger political ramifications.

Refer to AFDD 3-72, Nuclear Operations, for more information.

INTEGRATING THE AIR RESERVE COMPONENTS

The Air Force, under the Total Force construct, has a substantial part of its forces 

in the Air Reserve Components (ARC), which consists of the Air Force Reserve (AFR) 

and the ANG. The ARC provides a strategic reserve and a surge capacity for the Air 

Force; in some instances, the ARC has unique capabilities not resident within the 

regular component. The SecDef may make these forces available during the planning 

process. While they may seamlessly operate alongside the regular Air Force, they are 

subject to different levels of activation and different degrees of operational and 

administrative control. Furthermore, differences in tour length availability pose 

continuity challenges for a COMAFFOR, and planners should carefully consider such 

issues for any category of activation (whether by volunteerism or mobilization).

See appendix D for more discussion on ARC organization and accessing ARC 

forces. 

HOMELAND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Military operations inside the US and its Territories fall into two mission areas: 

homeland defense, for which DOD serves as the lead federal agency and military forces 

are used to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and civil support for 

which DOD serves in a supporting role to other agencies at the federal, state, tribal, and 

local levels.

For most homeland scenarios, Air Force forces should be presented as an AETF 

under the OPCON of a COMAFFOR, just as in any other theater. ANG forces, whether 

federalized and operating in Title 10 status or remaining under state control in Title 32 

or state active duty status, should still be organized and presented within an AETF or 

equivalent structure.

For homeland operations, First Air Force (as Air Forces Northern [AFNORTH]), 

at Tyndall AFB, FL, fulfills the role of the Air Force component to USNORTHCOM, the 

supported combatant command. The Commander, AFNORTH is also the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC within the North American Aerospace Defense Command 

(NORAD) chain for the CONUS NORAD region. 
84

The command relationships between a JFC and a COMAFFOR in a homeland 

context should be as previously described for any other region—although legal and 

interagency considerations may have significant impact, the CONUS is not a special 

case regarding C2 or organization of air, space, and cyberspace forces. The 

COMAFFOR should still be under direct OPCON of a designated JFC, should still 

normally exercise OPCON and ADCON over the Air Force Service component forces, 

and should still coordinate activities with other components and outside agencies to 

achieve JFC objectives. As noted previously, single-Service task forces may also be 

established in homeland operations. Additionally, when the ANG is operating in Title 32 

USC or state active duty status under the authority of a state governor, a similar 

command relationship exists between the state Adjutant General or JTF commander 

and the designated ANG air commander.

In some civil support operations, a JFC may elect to allocate combat support 

forces to subordinate functional task force commanders (TFCs) with a specification of 

OPCON to the TFC. For example, a JFC in a major disaster relief operation might 

organize his/her forces into separate engineering, transportation, and medical task 

forces. This organizational scheme—a legacy construct which sidesteps the role of 

Service components and Service component commanders—divides Air Force assets 

among other component commanders and fractures Service unity of command. This is

not the most operationally effective scheme for achieving unity of command and unity of

effort under a single Airman. Ideally, the JFC allows the COMAFFOR to retain OPCON

of all assigned and attached Air Force forces. The COMAFFOR then provides direct

support to the various functional TFCs with the COMAFFOR as a supporting

commander.

In disaster relief operations, particularly in consequence management of a

manmade or natural disaster, the Air Force contribution will likely include a Total Force

mix of capabilities. ANG forces may be federalized under Title 10 USC, or more 

normally operate under Title 32 USC or state active duty status under the authority of 

their governor.

Each state has a state joint force headquarters (JFHQ-State) that may provide a 

contingency C2 capability in support of homeland defense, civil support, and other 

related operations, and may thus function as a bridge between state and federal forces. 

Additionally, a governor may stand up a JTF-State to provide direction and control of 

assigned non-federalized National Guard forces and those attached from other states. 

ANG forces conducting operations in Title 32 or state active duty status should be 

organized as an AETF or equivalent within their state force structure to provide unity of 

command, with a single Airman in command of the ANG forces. 

State and federal military forces may adopt a parallel or dual status command 

structure. A parallel command structure exists when state and federal authorities have 

separate chains of command, and retain control of their deployed forces. Unity of effort 
85

and decisions of mutual interest are handled through a coordinated liaison effort of the 

political and senior military leadership of state and federal forces.

Federal statute now provides the capability for a dual status command structure, 

in which a commander is subject to both federal and state chains of command. This 

allows National Guard officers, familiar with the state and local area of operations, to 

operate within both state and federal chains of command to provide unity of effort. 

Command authorities for federal and state chains of command remain separate. 

Additionally, the statute requires both presidential authorization and a governor‘s 

consent to invest a commander with dual status. 

A similar situation may occur in a civil support scenario when a mix of medical 

and line Air Force forces are presented to a JTF commander. Because medical officers 

cannot command line forces, a senior line officer may have to be designated to serve as

COMAFFOR.

For more detailed discussion, see AFDD 3-27, Homeland Operations.

THE SENIOR/HOST AIR FORCE INSTALLATION COMMANDER

Recent operations, notably Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI 

FREEDOM, highlighted the nuances in on-base command arrangements and support 

requirements that result from mixed forces deploying forward, often to bare bases.

An installation commander, regardless of Service, always exercises some 

authority over and responsibility for forces on his/her base for protection of assigned 

forces and assets, lodging, dining, and administrative reporting, regardless of the 

command relations of those forces. These are inherent in his/her responsibilities as an 

installation commander.

Ultimately, the Air Force Service component commander within a region is 

responsible for fulfilling ADCON responsibilities and common logistics support for all Air 

Force forces within his/her region, regardless of organization of assignment of those 

forces. These ADCON responsibilities are exercised through commanders at 

subordinate echelons. The ADCON chain is clear for non-deployed forces at home 

station during peacetime. However, the ADCON chain during expeditionary operations 

requires some fundamental guidance, especially during those fluid times when forces 

are initially building up in remote deployed locations.

The senior Air Force commander on any base where Air Force forces are 

present has responsibilities for care and provisioning of the Air Force forces on that 

installation, regardless of organization. For example, a conceivable mix of host and 

tenant Air Force organizations at a single base could include:

 A small permanent party at the group or detachment level.
86

 A wing or group sized AETF conducting sustained operations from that base.

 AFSOC assets operating in-theater but not attached to the host AETF.

 Air mobility forces bedded down in-theater, supporting an air bridge under the 

OPCON of USTRANSCOM (through AMC).

 Transient forces using the base for a staging base for further deployment.

Other scenarios may have forces belonging to other Service components 

operating from an Air Force-owned base, such as Army SOF or Marine aviation units. 

Although the provision of logistics support is inherently a Service-specific responsibility, 

the senior Air Force commander, as the host base commander, has responsibility for 

providing protection and other base operating support as directed by the governing 

operations order or inter-service agreements. In scenarios where another Service is the 

host, clear lines of authority over critical issues, especially airfield operations, should be 

delineated, preferably in writing.

G-series orders should detail which commanders are responsible for providing 

specific elements of specified ADCON to deployed units and what authority that 

commander may use to carry out these responsibilities. The orders are not required to 

spell out all support and sustainment responsibilities. For a notional example, the 

orders might specify that lodging, dining, and force protection be provided by the 36 

AEW from Air Forces Pacific (AFPAC) and PACAF. The minimum ADCON 

responsibilities and authorities to go forward should be responsibility for UCMJ, 

protection of assigned forces and assets, lodging, dining, and force reporting. These 

responsibilities apply under a wide variety of basing situations:

 Whether the base is owned and operated by the Air Force, by another US Service, 

or by the host nation.

 Whether or not the senior Air Force officer on a given installation is the host 

installation commander.

 Whether or not the Air Force forces present on the installation are assigned or 

attached to the senior Air Force officer’s same expeditionary unit or even to the 

same AETF.

 Whether or not the Air Force forces present are regular, Guard, or Reserve, and 

regardless of whether or not the Guard forces are federalized.

For example, when Air Force aircraft are operating from a dual-use base where 

the installation commander is neither Air Force nor an Airman, clear lines of authority 

over airfield operations should be established.

To properly fulfill ADCON responsibilities on an installation, a senior Air Force 

line officer (preferably a commander of a designated echelon; that is, an “A-coded” 

commander) should be clearly identified. If such a senior officer is not clearly identified, 
87

either by position (as, for example, by his/her standing as the designated host 

installation commander) or otherwise in writing, the senior Air Force line commander 

present on an installation should assume responsibility for ADCON issues for all Air 

Force forces on that installation. The following guidelines are offered for further 

clarification:

 Preferably, the designated senior officer should also be the commander of a clearly 

identifiable echelon, such as an AEW or AEG, and not lower than squadron level 

(AES).

 When operational and support forces are present on the same base, the senior 

officer should normally be appointed or designated from the operational forces by 

the COMAFFOR.

 When two or more equally-sized units are present on the same installation, and a 

single host installation commander has not yet been formally designated, the seniorranking line officer commander should assume ADCON responsibilities for all Air 

Force forces on that installation until such time as either the COMAFFOR or JFC 

formally designates a host installation commander or host Service.

 This senior officer is responsible for coordinating all required aspects of support with 

the host nation, any supporting Service, and the owning MAJCOM or combatant 

command as required.

 Specified elements of ADCON should always be written in the G-series orders and 

clearly identify the support to be provided to a subordinate expeditionary or host unit.

 A commander’s UCMJ authority only extends to regular, Reserve, and federalized 

Guard forces.

 If support is provided to deployed units on a lengthy, recurring basis, Air Force 

MAJCOMs should specify ADCON relationships between MAJCOMs in standing 

command-to-command agreements.

Refer to AFI 38-101, Air Force Organization, for more specific policy guidance.
88

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE AIR FORCE COMPONENT WITHIN THE JOINT FORCE 

Modern warfare requires flexibility in execution to adapt to a wide variety of

scenarios; this drives a need to assemble the right mix of forces from the appropriate

Services to tailor the operation. This need to assemble the right forces drives a

corresponding need for proper organization, command and control mechanisms, and

appropriate command relationships. Current Service and joint doctrine provide much

useful guidance on organization; however, assembling a joint organization demands

careful, conscious thought. This chapter draws from doctrine and experience to provide

the basics of setting up and commanding a joint air component within a joint force.

JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL BASICS

When a crisis requires a military response, the geographic CCDR will usually 

form a tailored JTF. If Air Force forces are attached to the JTF, they stand up as an 

AETF within the JTF. The AETF commander, as the COMAFFOR, provides the single 

Air Force face to the JTF commander. Other Services may also provide forces, and 

normally stand up as separate Army, Navy, and Marine forces, each with their 

respective commander (Commander, Army forces [COMARFOR]; Commander, Navy 

forces [COMNAVFOR]; and Commander, Marine Corps forces [COMMARFOR]). This

JTF organization, along purely Service lines, is the most basic joint force organization. 

See figure 7.1. Each separate Service component commander normally exercises

OPCON over assigned and attached forces, as delegated from the JFC.

In all cases, the JFC is ultimately responsible for delineating the command 

relations of forces under his or her OPCON and empowering subordinate commanders 

appropriately. Normally, a JFC receives OPCON of assigned or attached forces and 

delegates that control (OPCON) to the appropriate Service component commanders. 

Delegation of OPCON allows Service component commanders the necessary 

authority to fully organize and employ their forces:

 The greatest lesson of this war has been the extent to 

which air, land, and sea operations can and must be 

coordinated by joint planning and unified command. The 

attainment of better coordination and balance than now exists 

between services is an essential of national security.

— General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold
89

“Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over 

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction 

necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative 

direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to 

accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be 

exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. 

Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force 

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.” (JP 

1-02) (Emphasis added)

Organizing and employing forces through Service components, however, does 

not allow for the true integration of key functional activities—especially airpower. 

Further, Army, Navy, and Marine forces are usually assigned individual AOs, which are 

subsets of the JFC’s JOA, which presents a less-than-total view of the theater. By 

comparison, an air component commander typically has a similar operational level, 

JOA-wide perspective as the JFC.

Because all four Services have forces that operate in the air domain, and two of

them have land forces, the designation of functional commanders allows greater

synergy by integrating similar activities across Service boundaries. Functional

component commanders can also focus their planning and execution above the tactical

level at the operational level of war. However, the designation of joint force air, land, 

maritime, and special operations component commanders (JFACC, joint force land 

component commander [JFLCC], joint force maritime component commander [JFMCC], 

and JFSOCC respectively) is at the discretion of the JFC. This functional component 

model has the added benefit in that, of all possible models, it most easily transitions to 

one that supports combined (coalition) employment, and the functional component 

commanders become combined component commanders (i.e., combined force air 

component commander [CFACC], combined force land component commander 

Navy

Forces

COMNAVFOR

Army 

Forces

Air Force 

Forces

COMAFFOR

Figure 7.1. Joint force organization along purely 

Service lines. This is the most basic joint force organization.

COMARFOR

Marine Corps

Forces

COMMARFOR

Joint Force 

Commander
90

[CFLCC], combined force maritime component commander [CFMCC], and combined 

force special operations component commander [CFSOCC]). See figure 7.2.

THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER 

Historically, when Air Force forces have been attached to a JTF, the 

COMAFFOR has normally been dual-hatted as the JFACC, not merely due to 

preponderance of forces but also due to the ability to command and control airpower 

through an AOC, which forms the core of the JFACC’s JAOC. This is why the 

COMAFFOR trains to act as the JFACC. The instances when sizeable Air Force forces 

have been present in a JTF, and the COMAFFOR has not been the JFACC, are very 

rare. While joint doctrine discusses the roles and responsibilities of the JFACC in 

adequate detail, it is important to present a basic discussion here in Service doctrine in 

parallel with discussion in JP 3-30.

If aviation assets from more than one Service are present within a joint force, the 

JFC normally designates a JFACC to exploit the full capabilities of joint operations. The 

JFACC should be the Service component commander with the preponderance of 

forces to be tasked and the ability to plan, task, and control joint air operations

(JP 3-30). If working with allies in a coalition or alliance operation, the JFACC may be 

designated as the CFACC. The JFACC recommends the proper employment of air 

component forces from multiple components. The JFACC also plans, coordinates, 

allocates, tasks, executes, and assesses joint air operations to accomplish assigned 

operational missions. Because of the wide scope of joint air operations, the JFACC 

Navy

Forces

COMNAVFOR

Army

Forces

COMARFOR

Air Force 

Forces

COMAFFOR

Marine Corps

Forces

COMMARFOR

JFACC

Forces Made 

Available

JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC

Joint Force 

Commander

Figure 7.2. Joint force organization with functional and 

Service components. This represents the Air Force’s 

preferred joint force organization.

Forces Made 

Available

Forces Made 

Available

Forces Made 

Available
91

 

 

 [General MacArthur] had 

finished his talk, when one of the 

correspondents said, "General, 

what is the Air Force doing 

today?" General MacArthur 

said, "Oh, I don't know. Go ask 

General Kenney.” The 

newspaperman said, “General, 

do you mean to say you don't 

know where the bombs are 

falling?" MacArthur turned to 

him, grinned, and said, "Of 

course I know where they are 

falling. They are falling in the 

right place. Go ask General 

Kenney where it is." 

— George C. Kenney, General 

Kenney Reports: A Personal 

History of the Pacific War

typically maintains a similar theaterwide or JOA-wide perspective as the JFC. 

The JFACC, as with any component commander, should not also be dual-hatted as the 

JFC, as the scope of command is usually too broad for any one commander and staff.

Functional component commanders normally exercise TACON of forces 

made available to them by the JFC. Thus, a COMAFFOR normally exercises 

OPCON of assigned and attached Air Force forces and, acting as a JFACC, normally 

exercises TACON of forces made available for tasking (i.e., those forces not retained for 

their own Service’s organic operations).

The JFACC should be prepared to 

assume the following responsibilities, as 

assigned by the JFC:

 Organize a JFACC staff manned with 

personnel from each component to reflect 

the composition of capabilities and forces 

controlled by the JFACC.

 Develop a joint air operations plan (JAOP)

to support the JFC’s objectives.

 Plan, coordinate, allocate, and task the 

joint capabilities and forces made 

available to the JFACC.

 Develop the air operations directive 

(AOD).

 Recommend apportionment of the joint air 

effort to the JFC.

 Control execution of current joint air 

component operations to include:

  Counterair, to include integrated air 

and missile defense.

  Strategic attack.

  Counterland.

  Countersea.

  Space control.

  Air mobility.
92

  Information operations.

  Personnel recovery operations, including CSAR, for assigned and attached 

forces.

 Coordinate SOF operations with the JFSOCC or the JSOTF commander.

 Perform assessment of joint air component operations at the operational 

(component) and tactical levels.

 Serve as ACA, AADC, and SCA and develop plans and products associated with 

these responsibilities. 

 Serve as the joint electronic warfare coordinator, if so appointed.

 Serve as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic attack, the 

JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, and theater airborne ISR. As the supported 

commander, the JFACC has the authority to designate the target priority, effects, 

and timing of these operations and attack targets across the entire JOA in 

accordance with JFC guidance, to include coordinated targets within land and 

maritime AOs.

 Serve as the supporting commander for operations such as CAS, air interdiction 

within the land and naval component AOs, and maritime support.

If the JFACC is ever appointed from another Service, the COMAFFOR passes

control of air component forces to be made available to the JFACC as directed by the 

JFC. In such cases, the COMAFFOR maintains an effective C2 structure to perform 

Service-specific functions. In addition, the COMAFFOR should coordinate with the 

JFACC through a liaison element.

Refer to JP 3-30 for more complete discussion of the JFACC’s role and the 

planning processes that support joint air component employment.

CONTROL OF OTHER SERVICES’ AVIATION CAPABILITIES

By definition, the JFACC may control aviation assets of other Services, in whole 

or in part, depending on the situation. However, the JFACC only controls those 

capabilities “made available for tasking” as directed by the JFC. The other Services 

have developed their air arms with differing doctrinal and operating constructs in mind, 

and may retain control of some or all of their assets to perform their organic scheme of 

maneuver. These tactical mission priorities (primarily support of surface forces) may 

constrain their availability to conduct the broader scope of joint air component

operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. Similar concerns also apply to 

the aviation arms of our allies. The JFACC should consider these differing philosophies 

when developing the air component portion of a joint campaign.
93

 Army aviation assets. These are normally are retained for employment as organic 

forces within its combined arms paradigm. However, some Army helicopters could 

be employed in CAS, interdiction, or other missions, in which case they may come 

under the purview of the JFACC when the JFACC has been tasked to plan and 

execute the theater interdiction effort. The same can hold true for other systems 

(such as the Army Tactical Missile System) when employed for interdiction or 

offensive counterair, depending on tasking and target location. As a minimum, Army 

aviation elements, including some unmanned systems, should comply with the ACO 

to deconflict airspace and friendly air defense planning. Placing Army aviation 

assets on the ATO/ACO reduces the risk of fratricide and provides better overall 

integration with other joint air component operations.

 Navy aviation assets. These include carrier-based aircraft, land-based naval 

aircraft, and cruise missiles. They provide a diverse array of power projection 

capabilities. Such assets, beyond those retained as needed for fleet defense and 

related naval missions, are usually available for tasking via the air tasking process. 

Additionally, Navy AEGIS capabilities may be integrated into the overall theater 

defensive counterair effort and may operate in a direct support role to the 

JFACC/AADC.

 Marine aviation assets. The primary mission of Marine aviation is support of the 

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) ground element. Sorties in excess of organic 

MAGTF direct support requirements should be provided to the JFC for ATO tasking 

through the JFACC. (Note: sorties provided to the JFC for tasking by the JFACC for 

such theater missions as long range reconnaissance, theater air interdiction or 

defensive counterair, are not considered “excess” sorties.)

 SOF aviation assets. The JFC may assign control of SOF aviation forces to either a 

Service or a functional component commander. When SOF air assets are employed 

as part of joint SOF operations, the JFC may assign control of those forces to the 

JFSOCC, who may in turn designate a joint special operations air component 

commander responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations. 

However, if SOF aviation assets are assigned primarily in support of the theater air 

operation, then the JFC should attach control of those assets to the COMAFFOR as 

part of the AETF. Whether operating autonomously or in conjunction with 

conventional forces, special operations should be integrated into, and closely 

coordinated with, other air activities supporting the theater campaign. In order to 

coordinate and deconflict operations in their common operating environment the 

JFSOCC and the JFACC exchange liaison teams. The JFSOCC provides the AOC 

a SOLE to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SOF operations, strategy, and plans 

with conventional air, and the JFSOCC in turn receives a JACCE from the JFACC, if 

required. 

Regardless of whether the JFACC exercises TACON of other Services’ forces, 

the JFACC, in the normally expected multi-hatted roles of ACA, AADC, and SCA, 

normally requires inclusion of such forces on the ATO and ACO. This provides 
94

situational awareness of all friendly aviation in the AOR/JOA, prevents fratricide, and 

deconflicts airspace. 

AIR FORCE COMPONENT PRESENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

There are many possible options for presenting forces in support of a JFC. To 

provide an initial baseline for organizational decisions, this section discusses three 

general models for presenting an Air Force component in support of a JFC: 6

 Theater-level component. This establishes an AETF at the CCDR level, attached 

with specification of OPCON and commanded by a theater COMAFFOR/JFACC. 

 Sub-theater-level component. This establishes an AETF at the subunified 

command or JTF level, attached with specification of OPCON, with a COMAFFOR 

(prepared to act as a JFACC) at a level below the CCDR.

 Sub-theater-level AETF in support of a JTF. This establishes a dedicated Air 

Force force in direct support of a subordinate JTF, with OPCON retained by the 

theater COMAFFOR/JFACC.

The placement of an Air Force component within the CCDR’s command 

structure, as well as the formal command relationships necessary to enable it to 

interface with other joint forces, requires careful deliberation based on the situation and 

capabilities available. At times, Air Force forces and capabilities may be best positioned 

at the theater (i.e., CCDR) level and at other times at the JTF level.

Levels of Force Presentation 

Joint and Service doctrine explicitly describe three levels for organizing joint 

forces within a geographic CCDR’s AOR: the CCDR level (i.e., the CCDR acts as the 

JFC), the subordinate unified command (subunified command) level, as in Korea; and at 

the subordinate JTF level. The three force presentation models discussed above are 

not meant to limit the CCDR’s authority to organize his/her forces to best accomplish 

assigned missions but instead to enable the Air Force to effectively support the CCDR 

and any subordinate organizations. Careful consultation between the respective JFCs 

and the Air Force component commanders is required. The following discussion 

summarizes some of the considerations that may affect the CCDR’s organizational 

construct and force attachment decisions. Each force presentation model will require 

an appropriately tailored C2 capability.

 6 There may be additional considerations during homeland operations that impact command 

arrangements and command relationships. See AFDD 3-27, Homeland Operations.
95

“Deputy Commander – Air” in 

the Afghanistan JOA 

 Due to the complexity of operations in 

the USCENTCOM AOR, the AFCENT 

commander created two subordinate 

AETFs (9th AETF-Iraq and 9th AETF 

Afghanistan) to better focus airpower 

support in those two JOAs. In 

Afghanistan, a NATO organization, the 

International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) also required a clearly identified 

command relationship with Air Force 

forces.

 To support US force presentation to 

ISAF, the commander of 9th AETFAfghanistan was also designated as the 

“Deputy Commander-Air” to the 

commander, US Forces-Afghanistan 

(USFOR-A), the US component to ISAF. 

This arrangement provided ISAF with an 

Air Force commander who could 

exercise command authorities over Air 

Force forces in support of ISAF.

 While a non-standard organization 

structure, the Deputy Commander-Air 

leverages basic doctrinal concepts to 

achieve unity of command within a 

complex command structure.

Theater-Level Component

This unified command-level model establishes an AETF and COMAFFOR at the 

CCDR level, with the COMAFFOR poised to act as a theater JFACC if so designated. 

This is known as the “theater COMAFFOR,” with the COMAFFOR poised to act as 

theater JFACC. This model optimizes allocation of scarce airpower assets against 

competing demands across the AOR. As the JFC, the CCDR establishes priorities for 

employment of all assigned and attached forces, and resolves competing demands 

among the subordinate commands. In this model, the AETF forms up under the 

CCDR’s Air Force component command.

The CCDR’s decision to use 

this model will likely incorporate many 

factors, including the demands of the 

strategic environment, the required 

integration of capabilities at the 

theater level, the character and 

availability of air, space, and 

cyberspace forces, and the ability to 

command and control those forces. 

When the CCDR decides the most 

effective way to accomplish the 

mission is by retaining forces at the 

theater level, the theater-level 

COMAFFOR/JFACC will operate in 

support of the subordinate JTF 

commander(s) according to the 

CCDR's theater-wide priorities. 

To support planning and 

operations with subordinate JTFs and 

other components, the theater-level 

JFACC may then deploy JACCEs to 

ensure the JTFs receive appropriate 

support. The JACCE provides onhand air component expertise and the 

direct link back to the theater 

COMAFFOR and the AOC. (See 

related discussion later in this chapter 

of the roles and responsibilities of the 

JACCE.)

The key advantage of this 

model is that it allows the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC to optimize CCDR 
96

priorities across the AOR. The key disadvantage is that the JACCE(s) may be 

inadequate if subordinate JTFs require detailed support and physical leadership 

presence. 

Sub-Theater-Level Component

This model establishes a subordinate AETF and COMAFFOR within a 

subordinate JTF, responsible for an operational area below the theater (i.e., CCDR) 

level. This model may be preferable when the span or scope of operations is less than 

theater-wide, or when operations are sufficiently fluid to require planning and execution 

at more tactical levels. 

Under this model, the CCDR-level COMAFFOR, as directed by the CCDR, 

relinquishes OPCON of the forces attached to the subordinate AETF, and the 

designated commander of the JTF accepts OPCON for the duration of the attachment. 

In accordance with joint and Air Force doctrine, the JTF commander then normally 

delegates OPCON of attached Air Force forces to the JTF COMAFFOR (i.e., the AETF 

commander). ADCON is retained within the Service chain from the CCDR-level 

COMAFFOR downward to the JTF-level COMAFFOR. The JTF-level COMAFFOR is 

poised to also act as the JFACC within the JTF, if so designated by the JTF 

commander. 

The key advantage of this model is that it provides fully integrated airpower to a 

subordinate JTF, while the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC maintains control of highdemand, low density capabilities. The key disadvantage is that Air Force forces 

attached to the JTF are not normally available to address demands outside their JTF.

Mix of Theater- and Sub-Theater-Level Components

Some theater requirements may drive a mix of the two previous models. This 

may be desirable when there are competing requirements for low density/high demand 

Service capabilities (e.g., ISR, remotely piloted aircraft, and air refueling) across the 

AOR, yet there is also sufficient demand for dedicated airpower at subordinate levels to 

drive attachment of Air Force forces to a subordinate JTF. 

In these circumstances, the theater COMAFFOR, as directed by the CCDR, 

relinquishes OPCON over those Air Force forces that are attached to the JTF as an 

AETF, but retains OPCON over all other Air Force forces assigned or attached to the 

CCDR. As a reminder, the theater COMAFFOR retains ADCON over all Air Force 

forces assigned or attached to the CCDR, either through the JTF level COMAFFORs for 

AETFs attached to the JTF or through established commanders for those Air Force 

forces that are retained at the CCDR level.

The key advantage of this model is that it provides fully integrated airpower to a 

subordinate JTF, while the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC maintains control of highdemand, low density capabilities. The key disadvantage is this model creates 
97

coordination challenges between the theater- and JTF-level COMAFFOR/JFACCs and 

their staffs. There may also be a scarcity of AOC and A-staff resources.

Sub-Theater-Level AETF in Support of a JTF 

When the CCDR establishes one or more sub-theater JTFs, but elects to retain 

all (or most) Air Force forces at the theater level, the size and complexity of the mission 

may lead the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC to determine the best way to support the 

JTF(s) is by establishing subordinate AETF(s) and designating them in direct support of 

the sub-theater JTF commander(s). 

When employing this construct, the theater COMAFFOR retains OPCON and 

delegates appropriate aspects of OPCON or TACON to the AETF commander, while 

maintaining theater-wide perspective and responsibility for recommending 

apportionment of airpower capabilities across the theater of operations to the CCDR. 

The AETF commander (who is not a separate COMAFFOR) remains subordinate to the 

theater COMAFFOR.

The key advantage of this model is that it provides an Airman empowered with 

command authorities to the JTF commander, vice a liaison role, while allowing the 

theater COMAFFOR/JFACC to retain OPCON of forces across the AOR to address the 

CCDR’s priorities. The key disadvantage to this model is that there is usually no 

dedicated AOC to fully integrate airpower with JTF operations; reachback to the theater 

AOC and A-staff are still required.

Force Attachment Considerations 

The CCDR decides whether effective accomplishment of the operational mission 

at the JTF level outweigh competing missions at the CCDR’s AOR level and can best 

be accomplished by attaching Air Force forces with specification of OPCON to a JTF 

commander. Deliberations should examine the interplay of priority, tempo, intensity, 

duration, and scope of operations. For example:

 Do the operational tempo, intensity, duration, and scope warrant near full-time use of 

an attached AETF?

 Do the operational tempo, intensity, duration, and scope justify a dedicated AETF

that, once attached to the JTF, may not be available to support operations 

elsewhere?

 Does the priority of the JTF mission, relative to other theater missions, justify a 

dedicated AETF that, once attached to the JTF, may not be available to support 

operations elsewhere?

 If the choice is to attach an AETF to a JTF, does the Air Force have the ability to 

provide the required command and control of Air Force forces?
98

 Does the provision of forces to a subordinate JTF, either by attachment or direct 

support, effectively demonstrate and enable the Air Force component’s commitment 

to the joint force effort? 

If the decision is to attach forces, the follow-on question is whether the forces 

should be attached with specification of either OPCON or TACON.

 Specification of OPCON: OPCON is the more complete—and preferred— choice 

of control because it includes organizing and employing commands and forces, 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary 

to accomplish the mission. 

 Specification of TACON: TACON is the more limited choice of control, as it is 

limited only to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers. 

TACON may provide sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application 

of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. 

Attaching forces with specification of only TACON may make for a more confused 

chain of command since OPCON and TACON would be split between two different 

commanders. However, that must be balanced against other needs, for example, 

the ability to quickly swing the forces elsewhere, based on the CCDR's directions.

These situations require careful and continuing dialogue between the 

respective joint and Service component commanders and their common superior 

commander. Finally, the decisions, including the delineation of operational and 

administrative authorities to be held among the involved commanders, should be 

captured in written orders such as operations orders, execute orders, or fragmentary 

orders; Air Force decisions may also be captured in G-series orders, such as those 

appointing the COMAFFOR.

Achieving Unity of Effort 

To achieve unity of effort across an AOR, the CCDR should provide the requisite 

guidance for the interaction between theater-level and subordinate components. This 

should include clarity of supported and supporting command relationships between the 

JTFs and theater COMAFFOR/JFACC, together with clear priorities of effort and 

support, and apportionment. The theater COMAFFOR/JFACC should then allocate 

effort across the AOR using CCDR guidance and priorities. 

The CCDR sets the conditions for success by clearly stating and emphasizing 

the supported command status of subordinate JTFs and the supporting command role 

of a theater-level COMAFFOR/JFACC and by providing sufficient guidance for the 

theater COMAFFOR/JFACC's subsequent allocation decision. The CCDR is the 

ultimate arbiter for prioritization and apportionment decisions among subordinate JTF 

commanders.
99

JOINT AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENT 

The JFACC may establish one or more JACCEs with other component 

commanders’ headquarters to better integrate the air component’s operations with their 

operations, and with the supported JTF headquarters (if the theater JFACC is 

designated in support to a JTF) to better integrate air component operations within the 

overall joint force. When established, these elements act as the JFACC’s primary 

representatives to the respective commanders and facilitate interaction among the 

respective staffs. (Note: in previous Air Force doctrine, the JACCE was simply known 

as the ACCE.)

The JACCE facilitates integration by exchanging current intelligence, operational 

data, and support requirements, and by coordinating the integration of JFACC 

requirements for airspace coordinating measures, joint fire support coordinating 

measures, close air support, air mobility, and space requirements. As such, the JACCE 

is a liaison element, not a C2 node; thus, the JACCE normally has no authority to direct 

or employ forces. The make-up of the JACCE is dependent on the scope of the 

operation and the size of the staff they liaise with. Element expertise may include plans, 

operations, intelligence, airspace management, logistics, space, and air mobility, as 

needed. The JACCE also communicates the JFC’s or component commander’s 

decisions and interests to the JFACC. However, the JACCE should not replace, 

replicate, or circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the 

component/JTF staffs, nor supplant normal planning performed by the AOC and AFFOR 

staff. The JACCE director is the JFACC’s personal and official representative, and as 

such should have sufficient rank to effectively work with the component or JTF 

commander to which he or she is attached. Finally, to maintain proper perspective and 

focus, the JACCE director should not normally be dual-hatted as the commander of a 

tactical unit.

Normally, the JACCE should:

 Ensure the JFACC is aware of each commander’s priorities and plans.

 Ensure the JFACC staff coordinates within their surface component/JTF 

headquarters counterparts to work issues.

 Ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the JFACC’s capabilities and 

limitations (constraints, restraints, and restrictions).

 Ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the JFACC’s plan to support the 

surface commander’s scheme of maneuver and the JFC’s intent and objectives.

 Facilitate JFACC staff processes with the surface/JTF commanders. Provide 

oversight of other JFACC liaisons to component/JTF headquarters staffs, if directed.

 Ensure information flows properly between the JAOC, sister components, and JFC.
100

 

 During World War II, 

General MacArthur and 

his senior Airman, Lt Gen 

Kenney, had a close 

working relationship. As a 

result, General Kenney 

enjoyed a high level of 

trust to employ air power 

as best fit his 

commander’s objectives.

AIR COMPONENT RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN A JOINT FORCE 

The JFC normally assigns broad missions to 

the component commanders; with each mission 

comes a specification of supported commander for 

that mission. As an example, the JFC may designate 

the COMAFFOR/JFACC as the supported 

commander for strategic attack, air interdiction, and 

theater airborne ISR (among other missions). As 

such, the COMAFFOR/JFACC is responsible to the 

JFC for planning, coordinating, and executing these 

missions, and other component commanders support 

the COMAFFOR/JFACC. When outlining 

supported/supporting relationships, the JFC usually 

does not specify the degree and timing for that 

support; the subordinate commanders normally work 

that out.

The commander responsible for a mission 

should be given the requisite authority to carry 

out that mission. For some missions or functions, 

specification of support alone may be insufficient in 

order for a functional component commander to fully 

integrate and employ forces made available. In such 

instances, the JFC may delegate to a subordinate 

commander TACON of specific elements of another 

component’s resources (this, in fact, is the usual 

command authority exercised by functional 

component commanders over forces made available to 

them). This provides that commander with a better degree of control. Finally, written 

establishing directives are extremely useful in clearly outlining the supporting/supported 

relationship between commanders and providing guidance for staffs.

The COMAFFOR/JFACC should establish a close working relationship with the 

JFC to ensure the best representation of airpower’s potential. When possible, the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC should co-locate with, or at least be positioned close to, the JFC, 

so they may benefit from frequent personal interaction. This fosters the personal trust 

between senior commanders essential to joint operations. It also helps keep a greater 

air component presence in the joint force headquarters, especially during planning, as 

well as keeping the joint force headquarters staff from trying to plan and run air 

component operations in the perceived absence of the JFC’s senior Airman. To 

facilitate this, in some situations the COMAFFOR/JFACC may even elect to co-locate 

with the JFC at the expense of residing in the AOC/JAOC.
101

THEATER AIR COMPONENT COMMAND MECHANISM

The theater air control system (TACS) is the Air Force’s mechanism for 

commanding and controlling theater airpower. It consists of airborne and ground 

elements to conduct tailored C2 of airpower operations throughout the spectrum of 

conflict, including counterair and counterland operations, airspace control, and 

coordination of space mission support not resident within theater. The structure and 

positioning of the TACS elements adapt as needed to effectively control airpower. As 

an organic Air Force system, the TACS remains under OPCON of the COMAFFOR. In 

multinational commands, the name and function of certain TACS elements may differ, 

but multinational air components have similar capabilities.

As the senior C2 element of the TACS, the AOC includes personnel and 

equipment of the necessary disciplines to ensure the effective conduct of air component

operations (e.g., communications, operations, intelligence, weather, etc.). When the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC is designated as the AADC, ACA, and SCA, these functions are 

also performed through the AOC. The AOC should have secure and redundant 

communications with higher and lateral headquarters, as well as subordinate units. The 

TACS provides the COMAFFOR/JFACC with connectivity from the theater strategic 

level down through control and reporting centers (CRCs) and expeditionary air support 

operations groups (EASOGs) or expeditionary air support operations squadrons

(EASOSs), and eventually to tactical air control parties (TACPs) and joint terminal 

attack controllers (JTACs).

When the TACS is combined with other components’ C2 elements, such as the 

Army air-ground system, the Navy tactical air control system, and the Marine Corps air 

command and control system, they become the theater air-ground system, and 

collectively support the JFACC.

See AFDDs 3-03, Counterland Operations, and 6-0, Command and Control, for 

more detailed discussion on these TACS elements.

JOINT LIAISONS IN THE AOC

Depending on the nature of the operation, the JFACC may have a number of

liaison teams within the AOC to facilitate planning and execution among the other

components in the joint force.

Component Liaisons. Component liaisons work for their respective component

commanders and with the COMAFFOR/JFACC and staff. Each component normally 

provides liaison elements that work within the AOC and AFFOR staff. These liaison 

elements consist of experienced specialists who provide component planning and 

tasking expertise and coordination capabilities. They help integrate, coordinate, and 

deconflict their component’s participation in joint air component operations. The air 

component may require other liaison augmentation to support AOC functions such as 

Coast Guard, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Central 
102

Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Air Force ISR Agency, 

National Reconnaissance Office, and Federal Aviation Administration in various 

operational and support areas.

Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). The BCD supports integration of 

air component operations with Army operations. BCD personnel are integrated into 

AOC divisions to support planning, operations, air defense, ISR, airlift/logistics, airspace 

control, and communications. In particular, the BCD coordinates ground force priorities, 

requests, and items of interest. One of the BCD’s most important functions is to 

coordinate boundary line and fire support coordination line changes and timing. The

BCD brings ground order of battle (both friendly and enemy) situational awareness and

expertise into the AOC and normally briefs the ground situation/intelligence update.

The BCD may also provide current ground situation inputs to AOC teams for

incorporation into daily briefings and intelligence summaries.

Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE). The NALE personnel from 

the maritime components support the AOC in integrating naval air, naval fires, and

amphibious operations into theater air operations and monitor and interpret the maritime

battle situation for the AOC.

Marine Liaison Element (MARLE). MARLEs are representatives of the 

COMMARFOR and the associated aviation combat element commander. The MARLEs 

support the COMAFFOR/JFACC in integrating MAGTF fires, maneuver, and Marine air 

into the theater campaign and supporting JAOP. This team should be well versed in the 

MAGTF commander’s guidance, intentions, schemes of maneuver, and direct support 

aviation plan.

Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE). The JFSOCC provides a SOLE 

to the COMAFFOR/JFACC (or appropriate Service component air C2 facility) to 

coordinate and integrate SOF air and surface operations within the AOR. The SOLE 

coordinates, integrates, and deconflicts all SOF air and surface activities through the 

JFACC’s air tasking order and airspace control order. The SOLE chief, serving as the

JFSOCC’s representative to the JFACC, places liaison officers (LNOs) throughout the 

AOC staff.

Coalition/Allied Liaison Officers. LNOs representing coalition/allied surface

forces may improve AOC situational awareness regarding the disposition of friendly

forces, especially when those forces do not have a mature TACS. They are also

essential for unity of effort for coalition air defense operations and airspace

deconfliction. When teamed with linguists, they can help overcome language barriers

with remote allied/coalition forces. In force projection scenarios into an immature

theater, AOC directors should anticipate the need for LNOs and actively seek them out

via the JFC staff, in-country military group, staff country team, or direct contact with 

coalition forces, if necessary.
103

JOINT STAFFS 

This section presents some considerations on composition and uses of joint 

staffs.

Joint Staff Composition

Effective joint operations require real integration of significant multi-Service

capabilities. The composition of a truly joint staff should reflect the composition of the

subordinate joint forces to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have

a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of assigned or attached forces.

The presence of liaisons on a single-Service staff does not transform that Service 

staff into a joint staff. The joint staff should be composed of appropriate members in 

key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having 

significant forces assigned to the command.

The same general guidelines for joint staffs apply to coalition operations. Key

staff positions ought to be a representative mix of US and allied officers. As with a joint

staff, the key concepts are shared responsibilities and trust. And as with a joint staff,

liaisons alone don’t make a Service staff into a coalition staff.

Commanders and Staff

“Commanders command, staffs support.” Within a joint force, only those with 

the title of “commander”—i.e., the JFC, the Service component commanders, and the

functional component commanders—may exercise any degree of operational control

over forces. Only commanders have the legal and moral authority to place

personnel in harm’s way. Under no circumstance should staff agencies,

including those of the JFC’s staff, attempt to command forces. Special cells

formed within a joint staff to oversee or advise the JFC on special interest activities

should not exercise direct control over component forces. In accordance with JP 1, it is 

permissible for joint staff agencies to issue orders and directives in the name of the 

commander of the higher command to the commander of the immediate subordinate 

command. Staff agencies should neither attempt to nor be permitted to directly 

command or control elements of the subordinate forces. As a final note, while this 

guidance is aimed at joint staffs, it also applies to Service staffs.

JFACC Staff

When the COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC, the JFACC may need to 

establish a small joint or combined staff to deal with joint issues beyond the purview of 

the AFFOR staff. Additionally, some AFFOR staff personnel may be present in the 

JAOC to provide the JFACC with access to Air Force component information; normally, 

such AFFOR staff personnel should not be dual-hatted within the JAOC. Augmentation 

within each JAOC directorate from relevant Service components and coalition partners 

ensures adequate joint representation on the JFACC staff. At the discretion of the 

JFACC, officers from other Services and coalition partners may fill key deputy and 

principal staff JFACC positions. Finally, for very large and complex operations, as might 
104

be encountered with large coalition operations, a COMAFFOR dual-hatted as a JFACC 

may delegate some aspects of COMAFFOR functions to a subordinate deputy 

COMAFFOR to ensure that they receive the proper attention

MULTI-HATTING COMMANDERS/SPAN OF COMMAND

Caution should be applied when multi-hatting commanders. Too many “hats”

may distract a commander from focusing on the right level of war at the right time, or

may simply overwhelm the commander with detail. Of equal importance is the fact that

a commander’s staff can usually operate effectively only at one level of war at a time. If

a commander wears several hats, it is preferable that the associated

responsibilities lie at the same level of war. While it is normally inappropriate for

either a Service or a functional component commander to also serve as the JFC, it is

entirely appropriate for a JFACC to also serve as the AADC, ACA, and SCA, since all

four functions lie at the operational level and all four functions are supported through the

same command node (the JAOC). To alleviate the overload, a multi-hatted commander 

may delegate some functions (but not the ultimate responsibility) to appropriate

deputies.

More challenging are those instances when a commander’s hats vertically span

several levels of war, as in the case when the JFC (normally acting at the theaterstrategic level) is also acting as a functional component commander (operational level),

and also as the commander of one of the operating (tactical) units. In such cases, the

commander may be inadvertently drawn to the tactical level of detail at the expense of

the operational-level fight. Also, dual- or multi-hatting a functional or Service

component commander as the JFC raises a special caution in itself:

“...dual-hatting a commander also means dual-hatting the commander’s staff that 

can result in forcing the staff to operate at the operational and tactical levels 

simultaneously” (JP 1). 

Thus, although this option is available to CCDRs when designing subordinate 

JTFs, caution is needed when vertically multi-hatting commanders, as it tends to create 

“part-time commanders.”

MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION 

Most operations today are not US-only. Many operations involve military forces 

of allies, and many operations also involve intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and 

regional organizations. Managing the myriad interrelationships is often challenging yet 

necessary. In many instances, direct command over these various entities is not

possible, and unity of effort rather than unity of command becomes the goal.

Multinational Operations

Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more 

nations, and are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. 
105

 An alliance is a relationship that results of a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) 

between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the 

common interests of the members (JP 1-02).

 A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for 

common action (JP 1-02). Coalitions are formed by different nations with different 

objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector 

of common interest. 

In a multinational force, the joint commanders become combined commanders; 

thus, the JFC becomes a CFC, the JFACC becomes a CFACC, etc. Similarly, the AOC 

(properly a JAOC in joint context) becomes a CAOC with representation that, as with a 

JAOC, reflects the composition of the force. An important point is that commanders 

may not have the same defined degree of control over forces (e.g., OPCON, 

TACON, etc.) as in a US-only force; degrees of control may have to be negotiated. 

Finally, each nation may retain its own chain of command over its forces and separate 

rules of engagement, again complicating unity of command. Thus, the challenge in 

multinational operations is the effective integration and synchronization of available 

capabilities toward the achievement of common objectives through unity of effort 

despite disparate (and occasionally incompatible) capabilities, equipment, and 

procedures. 

Per JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, commanders in multinational operations 

should consider the following: 

 Respect. In assigning missions, the commander must consider that national honor 

and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All 

partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be 

sought in mission assignment. 

 Rapport. US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their 

counterparts from partner countries, as well as the multinational force commander. 

This requires personal, direct relationships that only they can develop.

 Knowledge of partners. US commanders and their staffs should have an 

understanding of each member of the multinational force. Much time and effort is 

expended in learning about the enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the 

doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values 

of each partner.

 Patience. Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit 

of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires 

untiring, even-handed patience. This is easier to accomplish within alliances but is 

equally necessary regarding prospective coalition partners.

See JP 3-16 for more discussion. 
106

Interagency Coordination 

Interagency coordination is “the coordination that occurs between elements of 

DOD and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective” 

(JP 1-02). Attaining national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the 

diplomatic, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power 

supported by and coordinated with those of our allies and various intergovernmental, 

nongovernmental, and regional organizations.

 

“The integration of US political and military objectives and the subsequent 

translation of these objectives into action have always been essential to success at all 

levels of operation. Military operations must be coordinated with the activities of other 

agencies of the US Government, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, 

regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host 

nation agencies. Sometimes the JFC draws on the capabilities of other organizations; 

sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations; and sometimes the JFC 

merely deconflicts his activities with those of others. Interagency coordination forges 

the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic 

instruments of power of the US Government. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO 

coordination enables the US Government to build international support, conserve 

resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international 

goals.” (JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, vol I)

As with multinational operations, command and control is not as 

straightforward as within a US-only joint force, and unity of effort is the goal. 

“Coordinating and integrating efforts between the joint force and other government 

agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the command and control of a 

military operation. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often 

very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present 

significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various US Government agencies’ 

different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making 

techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some IGOs and NGOs 

may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the US Government, and 

particularly the US military” (JP 3-08, vol I).

See JP 3-08, volumes I and II, for further discussion, including planning, 

organization, and execution considerations. 
107

 

 I am tempted indeed to declare 

dogmatically that whatever doctrine the 

armed forces are working on now, that 

they have got it wrong. I am also 

tempted to declare that it does not 

matter that they have got it wrong. 

What matters is their capacity to get it 

right quickly when the moment arrives.

— Michael Howard, “Military 

Science in the Age of Peace,” 

Royal United Services Institute 

Journal (March 1974)

CONCLUSION

More and more often, our national leadership is calling upon airpower as the 

military instrument of first choice, and they are asking it to accomplish tasks previously 

held unworkable—to coerce and to compel. Airpower offers joint force commanders 

options, including the ability to go to the heart of an enemy and attain a variety of effects

directly at the strategic level. To support our national leadership, Airmen, as military 

professionals, must think about how to accomplish a spectrum of missions. We must 

understand the potential of airpower, and be able to plan and employ it to its maximum

effect, and to articulate it within the context of joint operations. This is especially true in 

contemporary irregular warfare operations, in which airpower plays an important role, 

but largely complementing surface operations.

Air Force doctrine 

development is never totally 

complete—it is a continuous work 

in progress. We must remain 

aware of the lessons of the past—

alert and receptive to future 

technologies and paradigms that

may alter the art of air, space, and 

cyberspace warfare. We should not 

assume that things have not or will 

not change; above all, doctrine 

should be continually interpreted in 

light of the present situation. A tooliteral reading of doctrine may fail to 

accommodate new operational 

realities. 

Doctrine application requires 

informed judgment. Certain principles—like unity of command, objective, and 

offensive—have stood the test of time. Other ideas—like unescorted daytime bombing, 

decentralized command, and the preeminence of nuclear weapons—have not. If we 

ignore the potential of integrated air, space, and cyberspace operations and the global 

 If there is one attitude more dangerous than to 

assume that a future war will be just like the last one, 

it is to imagine that it will be so utterly different that we 

can afford to ignore all the lessons of the last one.

— Air Marshall Sir John C. Slessor, 

Air Power and Armies
108

and strategic potential of airpower, we may commit the same sins as our forebears by 

preparing for the “wrong war.” If we ignore the reality that adaptive, thinking adversaries 

will seek asymmetric strategies, antiaccess capabilities, and favorable arenas within 

which to influence and engage us, we risk failure. Tomorrow, a new set of conditions 

and requirements will likely emerge. In fact, some new conditions and environments 

are already emerging, and national security requirements are changing. The best 

hedge is an institutional commitment to learn from experience and to exploit relevant 

ideas and new technologies so we may be ready for the future, while retaining those 

fundamental principles that remain constant over time.

AT THE HEART OF WARFARE LIES DOCTRINE...
109

APPENDIX A

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND AUTHORITIES

This appendix presents discussion on command relationships and command 

authorities. It supports discussion in the main text and complements discussion in joint 

doctrine.

Clear and effective command relationships are central to effective 

operations and organizations. In order to apply the principles of war and tenets of 

airpower to any organization, Airmen must fully understand the terms of command and 

support that underpin today’s organizations and operations. A working understanding of 

command terminology is essential to understanding the relationships among 

components and the responsibilities inherent in organizations.

The authority vested in a commander should be commensurate with the 

responsibility assigned. In other words, the commander with responsibility for a 

particular mission should have the necessary authority to carry out that mission. 

Levels of authority include the four types of command relationships—combatant 

command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control 

(TACON), and support. These are “warfighting” authorities that flow through joint 

channels, from the SecDef to the CCDRs, to JFCs, and to component commanders. 

The CCDR attaches various forces to the JFC and specifies the degree of control over 

each force element in terms of OPCON, TACON, or support. The JFC should in turn 

delegate appropriate authorities to the various component commanders. Thus, a 

COMAFFOR/JFACC actually exercises only those operational authorities delegated by 

the JFC.

Administrative control (ADCON) is a Service command authority, and flows 

through Service, not joint, channels. This authority is not an operational command 

authority, but provides the requisite authority for Services to execute their individual 

“organize, train, and equip” functions.

Combatant Command

Per JP 1, COCOM is “non-transferable command authority established by law 

(Title 10 [“Armed Forces”], United States Code, section 164). COCOM is exercised by 

commanders of combatant commands as directed by the President or the SecDef. 

COCOM cannot be delegated and is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions 

of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and 

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the 

missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the 

commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through 

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component 

commanders. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and 
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forces as the CCDR considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. 

Operational control is inherent in COCOM.” (Note that COCOM refers only to the 

command authority, not to an individual.)

Operational Control 

Per JP 1, OPCON is “command authority exercised by commanders at any 

echelon at or below the level of combatant command.” OPCON may be delegated 

within the chain of command. When forces are transferred between combatant 

commands, the command relationship the gaining commander exercises over these 

forces should be specified by the SecDef. OPCON normally provides full authority to 

organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in 

operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON 

should not, however, include the authority to change the Service’s internal organization 

of its forces. Component forces (e.g., the AETF and its subordinate mix of 

expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons) “should remain organized as designed and 

in the manner accustomed through training to maximize effectiveness” (JP 1). OPCON 

is inherent in COCOM. OPCON is “the authority to perform those functions of 

command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and 

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction 

necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions 

assigned to the command. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate 

JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally 

provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as 

the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned 

missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or 

matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training” (JP 1). 

Normally, JFCs exercise OPCON of assigned and attached Air Force forces through the 

COMAFFOR. 

Tactical Control 

TACON is the “command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is 

limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers 

necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON is inherent in 

OPCON. TACON may be delegated to, and exercised at, any level at or below the level 

of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and 

directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the 

assigned mission or task” (JP 1).

Unless otherwise specified, TACON involves no responsibilities for 

organization, logistics, training, or discipline. A visible example of TACON is the 

COMAFFOR, when acting as the JFACC, produces an ATO that provides detailed 
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instructions for joint air assets made available for tasking. TACON also includes the 

authority to command and position forces to achieve mission objectives. For example, 

a JFACC functioning as the AADC with TACON over Army PATRIOT surface-to-air 

missile forces would have the authority to specify which asset/battery would be 

responsible for providing which portion of the air defense coverage for the joint force 

(exact placement of the assets/battery necessary to achieve the required coverage 

should normally be left to the Army component commander). The commander 

exercising TACON is responsible for ensuring communications with the controlled unit.

Support 

Support is a command authority “that aids, protects, complements, or 

sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action” 

(JP 1). It is usually used when neither OPCON nor TACON is appropriate. The SecDef 

specifies support relationships between CCDRs; the CCDR may establish support 

relationships between components assigned or attached to the command. Over several 

years of experience, the most common example of this between CCDRs is seen when a 

functional CCDR (e.g., CDRUSTRANSCOM) is established by the SecDeF as a 

supporting commander and a geographic CCDR (e.g., CDRUSCENTCOM) is 

established as the supported commander. Within a combatant command, the best 

example is the last several years of experience within USCENTCOM, in which the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC (Commander, USAFCENT) is the supporting commander with the 

JFCs in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (redesignated Operation NEW DAWN) and 

ENDURING FREEDOM designated by CDRUSCENTCOM as supported commanders. 

The supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task 

assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operations planning 

authority. In the context of joint operations planning, this term refers to the commander

who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The supporting commander provides augmentation 

forces or other support to a “supported commander” or develops a supporting plan. 

This includes the designated combatant commands and defense agencies as 

appropriate.

There are four defined categories of support that a CCDR may direct over 

assigned or attached forces to ensure the appropriate level of support is provided to 

accomplish mission objectives. These include general support, mutual support, direct 

support, and close support (JP 1). 

 General support. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole 

rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.

 Mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy 

because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the 

enemy, and their inherent capabilities.
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 Direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and 

authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.

 Close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that 

are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or 

coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the 

supported force.

JFCs establish support relationships within their own organizations to 

emphasize or clarify priorities, provide a subordinate with an additional 

capability, and/or combine the effects of similar assets. This is normally done by 

directing one force (the “supporting force”) to provide support to another force (the 

“supported force”). The supported commander has the authority to exercise general 

direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and 

prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and 

other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. A supported relationship 

does not include authority to position supporting units but does include authority to 

direct missions or objectives for those units. In contrast to the previous TACON 

example, the JFACC/AADC (as supported commander for counterair) is interested in 

the support provided by other assets (e.g., Army surface-to-air missiles) rather than 

where they are positioned or which specific asset provides the support. Another 

example would be a JFACC’s request for a supporting COMARFOR or JFLCC to 

provide joint fire support to engage a time sensitive target (TST). It is up to the 

supporting commander to choose whether to use an Army Tactical Missile System, long 

range artillery, or some other weapon system as long as the TST is engaged with the 

effect and timing as directed by the supported commander. Under a supported 

relationship, the supporting unit is responsible for ensuring connectivity.

Administrative Control 

ADCON is the “direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other 

organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of 

Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit 

logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, 

and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other

organizations” (JP 1). 

ADCON is not a warfighting authority like that found in COCOM, OPCON, 

TACON, or support relationships. Normally the COMAFFOR exercises ADCON over 

assigned Air Force personnel and at least those elements of ADCON that are 

necessary to ensure mission accomplishment over those Air Force personnel attached 

to the Air Force component command. G-series orders implement Service ADCON 

authority by detailing those aspects of support that are necessary for the mission, and 

the relationship the gaining organization possesses over assigned or attached units and 

personnel. For example, the authority to exercise ADCON could include such elements 

as building a tent city, ordering supplies and equipment, authorizing training sorties, 

conducting exercises, working assignment actions for personnel, developing budget 
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requests, protecting personnel, and recommending awards and decorations. UCMJ 

authority is inherent in command authority, and is distinct from ADCON. However, Gseries orders implementing ADCON may incorporate references to UCMJ authority. In 

specific contingency operations, the G-series order may retain one or more of these 

authorities in the parent unit. For attached forces, those elements of ADCON that are 

not specified to be gained by the COMAFFOR to whom the forces are attached, are

retained by the parent Service organization to whom the Air Force forces are 

permanently assigned.

Coordinating Authority 

Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to “a commander or 

individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities

involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force 

components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual 

has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not 

have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot 

be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating 

authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be 

exercised” (JP 1). 

Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any 

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating authority may be 

granted and modified through a memorandum of agreement to provide unity of 

command and unity of effort for operations involving Reserve component and active 

component forces engaged in interagency activities. The common task to be 

coordinated should be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the 

normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is more 

applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is 

not in any way tied to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based 

on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

Direct Liaison Authorized 

Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) is “that authority granted by a 

commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an 

action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. 

DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the 

requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a 

coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised” 

(JP 1). DIRLAUTH is most appropriately used to streamline communications and

operations between tactical elements without relinquishing command by the higher 

authority.
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APPENDIX B

THE AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

This appendix supports discussion of the AOC in chapter Six.

The following discussion outlines the basic geographic AOC model as described 

in AFTTP 3-3 AOC, Operational Employment—Air and Space Operations Center and 

AFI 13-1AOC, volume 3, Operational Procedures—Air and Space Operations Center. 

These documents provide further detail concerning the structure, functions, processes, 

and personnel within the AOC.

The AOC provides operational-level C2 of air component forces as the focal point 

for planning, executing, and assessing air component operations. The AOC can be 

tailored and scaled to a specific or changing mission and to the associated task force 

the COMAFFOR presents to the JFC. Thus, for smaller scale operations, the Air Force 

may not necessarily provide all of the elements described in the following sections if the 

situation does not warrant them. 

The primary functions of the AOC are to:

 Develop air component operations strategy and planning documents that integrate 

air, space, and cyberspace operations to meet COMAFFOR/JFACC objectives and 

guidance.

 Task, execute, and assess day-to-day air component operations; provide rapid 

reaction, positive control, and coordinate and deconflict weapons employment as 

well as integrate the total air component effort.

 Receive, assemble, analyze, filter, and disseminate all-source intelligence and 

weather information to support air component operations planning, execution, and 

assessment.

 Integrate space capabilities and coordinate space activities for the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC when the COMAFFOR/JFACC is designated as SCA.

 Issue airspace control procedures and coordinate airspace control activities for the 

ACA when the JFACC is designated the ACA.

 Provide overall direction of air defense, including theater missile defense (TMD), for 

the AADC when the COMAFFOR/JFACC is designated the AADC.

 Plan, task, and execute the theater air- and space-borne ISR mission.

 Conduct component-level assessment to determine mission and overall air 

component operations effectiveness as required by the JFC to support the theater 

assessment effort.
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 Plan and task air mobility operations according to the theater priorities.

The baseline AOC organization includes an AOC commander, five divisions 

(strategy, combat plans, combat operations, ISR, and air mobility), and multiple 

support/specialty teams. Each integrates numerous disciplines in a cross-functional 

team approach to planning and execution. Liaisons from other Service and functional 

components may also be present to represent the full range of joint air, space, and 

cyberspace capabilities made available to the COMAFFOR/JFACC. The following 

provides a summary of the major elements of an AOC. 

The AOC Commander is charged with effectively managing air component 

operations and establishing the AOC battle rhythm. The AOC commander develops 

and directs processes to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, and assess air 

component operations in the AOR/JOA based on JFC and COMAFFOR/JFACC 

guidance. The AOC commander commands the AOC weapons system (but not AETF 

forces) and should be prepared to direct a C/JAOC when the COMAFFOR is 

designated as the C/JFACC.

The Strategy Division concentrates on long-range planning of air component 

operations to achieve theater objectives by developing, refining, disseminating, and 

assessing progress toward achieving the COMAFFOR/JFACC component strategy. 

The strategy division is normally task organized into four functionally oriented core 

teams: the strategy plans team, the strategy guidance team, the operational 

assessment team, and the information operations team. Key products include the 

JAOP, the AOD, and other COMAFFOR/JFACC guidance. 

 

The Combat Plans Division applies operational art to develop detailed 

execution plans for air component operations. The combat plans division is normally 

task organized into four functionally oriented core teams: the targeting effects team; the 

MAAP team; the ATO production team; and the C2 planning team. The division’s key 

products are an area air defense plan, airspace control plan, and a daily ATO, ACO, 

special instructions, and joint integrated prioritized target list. 

The Combat Operations Division monitors and executes current operations. 

The combat operations division is also the focal point for monitoring the execution of 

joint and combined operations, such as TST, TMD, joint suppression of enemy air 

defense supported by theater forces, and joint air attack team. The combat operations 

division is normally task-organized into four functionally oriented core teams: offensive 

operations, defensive operations, senior intelligence duty officer team, and interface 

control team. The division’s main products are daily ATO/ACO changes, the airspace 

control plan, and air defense plan. 

The ISR Division, in conjunction with the other AOC divisions, plans and 

executes airborne ISR operations and provides combat ISR support to air component 

planning, execution, and assessment activities. The ISR division has four core teams: 

the analysis, correlation and fusion team; the targets/tactical assessment team; the ISR 

operations team; and the processing, exploitation, and dissemination management 
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team. Major products include: the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 

annex to the ATO (or the ISR collection plan); updated intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment; air component target nomination list; and intelligence 

summaries. 

The Air Mobility Division plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes the theater air 

mobility mission. Unlike the other AOC divisions that work solely for the AOC 

commander, the AMD coordinates with the DIRMOBFOR but remains responsive to the 

tempo and timing of the AOC commander's operation. The DIRMOBFOR is responsible 

for integrating the total air mobility effort for the COMAFFOR/JFACC and, in this 

capacity, coordinates with the AMD on behalf of the COMAFFOR/JFACC to execute the 

air mobility mission. The AMD coordinates with the theater deployment distribution 

operations center and the 618 AOC. The AMD is comprised of four core teams: the 

airlift control team; the air refueling control team; the air mobility control team; and the 

aeromedical evacuation control team. Major products include airlift apportionment plans 

and air refueling inputs to the MAAP, ATO, ACO, and special instructions. 
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APPENDIX C

THE AFFOR STAFF

This appendix supports the basic discussion of the AFFOR staff in chapter 6. 

More specific guidance can be found in PAD 06-09, Implementation of the Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force Direction to Establish an Air Force Component Organization, 7 

November 2006.

Most AETFs provide for an AFFOR staff function to support the COMAFFOR. 

The AFFOR staff is the vehicle through which the COMAFFOR fulfills his/her 

operational and administrative responsibilities for assigned and attached forces, 

and is responsible for the long-range planning that occurs outside the air tasking 

cycle (e.g., deliberate planning). The AFFOR staff consists of functionally-oriented 

directorates, a command section, a personal staff, and any required liaisons. The 

AFFOR staff may issue traditional mission type orders on behalf of the COMAFFOR to 

direct subordinate units to execute actions outside of the scope of the ATO. Two 

examples of such orders include setting a baseline force protection condition or 

directing the move of a unit to another operating base. 

The following discussion of AFFOR staff duties is not intended to be all-inclusive. 

The differing mission requirements of any given operation may dictate different task 

emphasis and staff arrangements. Very large or complex operations, for example, may 

require all staff directorates. In some cases, senior component liaison elements may 

not be needed; in other cases, some of the required support may be obtained through 

reachback. For very small or limited operations, a full AFFOR staff may not be required. 

As a rule of thumb, the size and span of the AFFOR staff should normally be held to the 

smallest number of divisions necessary to handle the demands of the operation; in 

some cases, the COMAFFOR may combine some leadership positions (e.g., A-3/5; 

A-4/7). Other operations may employ an AFFOR staff split into forward and rear 

elements, using reachback to maintain unity of effort. In each case, based upon 

regional requirements, the COMAFFOR determines the size, shape, and location of the 

AFFOR staff and AOC to best support the operation. 

Command Section

The command section is normally composed of the commander (i.e., the 

COMAFFOR), vice commander, chief of staff, command chief master sergeant, 

executive assistant, and appropriate administrative support personnel. Within the 

command section, the chief of staff coordinates and directs the daily activities of the 

AFFOR staff; approves actions, orders, and plans, as authorized by the COMAFFOR; 

and ensures COMAFFOR decisions and concepts are implemented by directing and 

assigning staff responsibilities. 
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Personal Staff

The COMAFFOR has several staff activities that normally function outside the 

AFFOR staff directorates. These activities fulfill specific responsibilities usually related 

to providing close, personal advice or services to the commander, or assist the 

commander and the component staff with technical, administrative, or tactical matters. 

These activities may include the commander’s legal advisor; public affairs advisor; 

inspector general; protocol advisor; historian; chaplain; counterintelligence and special 

investigations; financial management; force protection; air mobility operations 

(DIRMOBFOR); space operations (DIRSPACEFOR); medical; and safety. Based on 

the needs of the operation and the requirements of the AFFOR staff, some of these 

activities may be located within the AFFOR staff directorates. 

 

Senior Component Liaisons 

The senior LNO from each component represents his or her respective 

commander to the COMAFFOR/JFACC. Subordinate LNOs from each component may 

perform duties throughout the staff as required, providing weapon system expertise. 

LNOs should be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of their units and 

Service.

Manpower, Personnel, and Services (A–1) 

The director of manpower, personnel, and services is the principal staff assistant 

to the COMAFFOR for total force accountability, personnel policy and procedures, the 

establishment and documentation of manpower requirements, organizational structures, 

mortuary affairs, food and force beddown operations, the coordination of exchange 

services, and the provision of quality of life programs to enable and sustain forces 

assigned and attached to the COMAFFOR.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (A–2) 

The director of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is the principal staff 

assistant to the COMAFFOR for policy and guidance for all Air Force ISR operational 

architectures, personnel, systems and training. The A–2 provides intelligence support 

to forces within the assigned area of operations. The A–2 does not normally direct ISR 

collection assets when an ISR Division is resident in the AOC; this is normally the 

province of the ISR division director. 

Operations (A–3) 

The director of operations serves as the principal staff assistant to the 

COMAFFOR in the direction and control of all assigned and attached Air Force forces. 

When OPCON of Air Force units is formally transferred to the COMAFFOR, the A-3 

ensures they are capable of performing tasked missions. This includes monitoring unit 

deployments and beddown locations, combat readiness, mission rehearsals, force 

protection, and training activities.
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Logistics (A–4) 

The director of logistics is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR for 

logistics and sustainment support of assigned and attached Air Force forces. This 

includes oversight, integration, and operational level planning for and management of 

logistics capabilities for deploying units and the AOC, and similar support to other US 

government agencies, NGOs, and private voluntary organizations as appropriate. Most 

of the challenges confronting this division will likely be Air Force component-unique. 

Plans and Requirements (A–5) 

The director of plans and requirements serves as the principal staff assistant to 

the COMAFFOR for all consolidated planning functions. In coordination with the A–4, 

the A–5 conducts comprehensive force-level movement and execution planning 

throughout the campaign. This involves preparation and subsequent refinement of the 

force flow, beddown, and redeployment in the time-phased force and deployment data. 

The A–5 may perform long-range theater engagement (deliberate planning) that falls 

outside of the AOC’s current operational focus. Close coordination should occur 

between A–5 and the strategy division to ensure planning efforts are complementary. In 

addition, the A-5 leads in the development of the organizational structure and command 

relationships for the Air Force component within the framework of the joint operation. 

The A–5 normally publishes the Air Force component operations order to support the 

JFC’s campaign. The A-5 develops the Air Force component’s Theater Security 

Cooperation plan and theater engagement activities.

Communications (A–6) 

The director of communications is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR 

for communications-electronics and information capabilities. This includes establishing 

the theater communications and automated systems architecture to support operational 

and command requirements.

Installations and Mission Support (A–7) 

The director of installations and mission support is the COMAFFOR’s primary 

advisor for installations, mission support, force protection, civil engineering, explosive 

ordnance disposal, fire fighting, emergency management, chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear passive defense and response, contracting, and all crossfunctional expeditionary combat support. Additionally, the A–7 works in coordination 

with the A–4 and A-1 on formulation of beddown plans and coordination and supervision 

of force beddown. 

Strategic Plans and Programs (A–8) 

The director of strategic plans and programs provides the COMAFFOR 

comprehensive advice on all aspects of strategic planning and programming. The A-8 

also conducts program assessment and provides coordinated resource inputs to the 

supporting MAJCOM’s Program Objective Memorandum processes.
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Studies, Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned (A–9) 

The director of studies, analyses, assessments, and lessons learned collects, 

documents, reports, and disseminates critical information necessary to analyze, assess, 

and document Air Force aspects of campaigns and contingencies, and to document 

lessons identified. (Note: A–9 functions do not include campaign operational 

assessment, a task performed within the AOC). This information provides the primary 

source documents for both contemporary and future Air Force planning and analysis. 

Moreover, they serve as an official permanent record of component mission 

accomplishment. 
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APPENDIX D

THE AIR RESERVE COMPONENTS

The Air Reserve Components (ARC) are the Air Force Reserve (AFR) and the 

Air National Guard of the United States (ANGUS). The ARC provides operational 

capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the ROMO. 

ARC forces are normally employed to take advantage of military opportunities, cover 

shortfalls in regular component critical skills, and to support short duration national 

priorities. The importance of this factor—the part-time nature of the force—should be 

fully considered. When evaluating which ongoing operational missions are best suited 

for ARC participation, factors such as predictability, tour length, and duty location should 

all be considered.

The AFR consists of the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired 

Reserve (which includes retirees from both the ARC and regular component). The 

Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. 

The ANGUS consists of members of the Air National Guard (ANG) who are on 

active duty under Title 10 USC. The ANG consist of the federally-recognized organized 

militia of the States and Territories, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. ADCON 

for Guardsmen not in federal status flows to their respective adjutant general and 

governor. When activated under Title 10 USC, ADCON is maintained through the ANG 

Readiness Center.

The AFR and the ANG both provide forces to the Selected Reserve, which the 

Air Force maintains at the same readiness level as the regular component. AFR and 

ANG are full partners ready to meet Air Force mission requirements at all times. This 

enables the ARC to provide operational capability on a continual basis.

Leveraging the ARC to provide operational capability involves a process of using 

both volunteer forces and/or forces mobilized as described below. The ARC provides 

sustainable, rotational support across numerous operational missions, such as airlift, air 

refueling, NORAD air sovereignty alert, and combat support. Voluntary duty is 

encouraged to meet mission requirements and volunteers provide the bulk of the ARC's 

sustainable rotational capability to operations. ARC forces may need to be mobilized

during a surge operation and for activities requiring critical skills. 

Historically, ARC forces were allocated to regular component MAJCOMS which

then managed, mobilized, and presented forces to fulfill operational requirements. With 

the increased operational commitment of the ARC, more of the roles and responsibilities 

currently performed by the regular component MAJCOMs related to generating ARC 

forces are shifting to the ARC. 
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ARC Organization

The majority of the ARC is organized into two types of units: unit-equipped or 

associate. Unit-equipped units have their own organic equipment; associate units share 

the weapon systems of an equipped host unit and train to perform the same mission. 

These unit associations allow for consistent training, leveraging of resources, and 

familiarization between the regular component and ARC. The associate models are:

 Classic Associate: A host regular unit retains principal responsibility for a weapon 

system that it shares with one or more associate ARC units. Each component 

exercises ADCON of it respective members.

 Active Associate: A host ARC unit has principal responsibility for a weapon system 

which it shares with one or more associate regular units. Reserve and regular units 

retain separate organizational structures and chains of command.

 ARC Associate: An ANG and an AFR unit train and operate integrally, with one 

retaining principal responsibility for the weapon system as host unit. Each unit 

retains separate organizational structures and chains of command.

Air Force Reserve

The AFR also provides individual reservists through the individual mobilization 

augmentee (IMA) program and the participating individual ready reserve (PIRR) 

program. IMAs are trained reservists who augment regular units to support mobilization 

requirements, contingency operations, or other specialized requirements. Their 

experience helps the regular component accomplish its mission by augmenting (or 

rounding out) the regular unit, backfilling positions that have been vacated by deploying 

regular component members, or performing missions at the normal duty station. IMAs 

perform the full range of Air Force missions. The ARC retains ADCON of IMAs and 

PIRR personnel.

Air National Guard

National Guard Airmen can be called to long-term active duty under five different 

statutes, as authorized in Title 10 USC. They range from full mobilization, which 

requires a declaration of war or national emergency by the Congress, to reserve 

component volunteers, which requires consent of the individual reserve component 

member and consent from the governor to activate individuals in the National Guard. 

The various mobilization statutes determine how many reservists can be called up, to 

whom the call up applies, and the duration of the call up.

Accessing ARC Forces

ARC forces can be activated both voluntarily and involuntarily to support national 

requirements. Once activated, there are different degrees of operational and 

administrative control applicable to ARC members. The ARC structure normally retains 
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full ADCON; the gaining COMAFFOR normally exercises specified elements of 

ADCON, which should be articulated in appropriate orders. OPCON transfers in 

accordance with SecDef orders. 

 Voluntary. Volunteers are placed on Federal active duty by the SECAF as 

authorized by Title 10 USC. 

 Involuntary: There are three authorities that outline the limits and requirements for 

involuntarily activating members of the ARC:

  Presidential Reserve Callup. This provides the President a means to 

activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 

members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (of whom 

not more than 30,000 may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve), for not 

more than 365 days to meet the requirements of any operational mission. 

Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to 

suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in 

circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial 

or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority 

can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may 

be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. (JP 1-02) 

  Partial Mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from 

action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 

1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve 

Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their 

support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving 

an external threat to the national security. (JP 1-02)

  Full Mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from 

action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units 

and individuals in the existing approved force structure, as well as all retired 

military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the 

requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to 

the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the 

duration of the emergency plus six months. (JP 1-02) Under full mobilization, 

ADCON transfers to the gaining COMAFFOR and OPCON transfers in 

accordance with SecDef orders. 
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REFERENCES

Air Force Publications 

All AFDDs are available at https://wwwmil.maxwell.af.mil/au/lemay/main.asp . 

All AFDDs, both draft and approved, are also available at the LeMay Center doctrine 

Community of Practice at: 

https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/community/views/home.aspx?Filter=OO-OP-AF-44

AFI 10-401, Air Force Operations Planning and Execution

AFI 13-1AOC, volume 3, Operational Procedures – Air and Space Operations Center

AFI 38-101, Air Force Organization

AFTTP 3-3 AOC, Operational Employment – Air and Space Operations Center

PAD 06-09, Implementation of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force Direction to Establish 

an Air Force Component Organization, 7 November 2006

Joint Publications

Note: All JPs are available at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp

Joint Operating Environment, 18 February 2010

Department of Defense

DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Professional Reading Program

The CSAF’s professional reading list, with links to book reviews, is available on the Air 

Force web site at: http://www.af.mil/information/csafreading/index.asp. The list is 

subject to revision. Readers are encouraged to check the Air Force web site 

(http://www.af.mil) for the most current information.
125

GLOSSARY

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AADC area air defense commander

ACA airspace control authority

ACO airspace control order

ACS Agile Combat Support

ADCON administrative control

AEF air expeditionary force

AEG air expeditionary group

AES air expeditionary squadron

AETF air expeditionary task force

AEW air expeditionary wing

AFCYBER Air Forces Cyber

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AFFOR Air Force forces

AFI Air Force Instruction

AFR Air Force Reserve

AFNORTH Air Forces Northern

AFPAC Air Forces Pacific

AFTTP Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces

AFSPC Air Force Space Command

ANG Air National Guard

ANGUS Air National Guard of the United States

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMD air mobility division

AO area of operations

AOC air operations center

AOD air operations directive

AOR area of responsibility

ARC Air Reserve Components

ATO air tasking order

BCD battlefield coordination detachment

C2 command and control

CAOC combined air operations center

CAS close air support

CCDR combatant commander

CDRUSCENTCOM Commander, United States Central Command

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command

CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command

CFACC combined force air component commander
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CFLCC combined force land component commander

CFMCC combined force maritime component commander

CFSOCC combined force special operations component 

commander

CNA computer network attack

C-NAF component numbered Air Force

CND computer network defense

CNE computer network exploitation

COA course of action

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COG center of gravity

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces

COMARFOR commander, Army forces

COMMARFOR commander, Marine forces

COMNAVFOR commander, Navy forces

CONUS continental United States

CRC control and reporting center

CSAF Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

CSAR combat search and rescue

CTO cyber tasking order

DCA defensive counterair

DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized

DIRMOBFOR director of mobility forces

DIRSPACEFOR director of space forces

DOD Department of Defense

EASOG expeditionary air support operations group

EASOS expeditionary air support operations squadron

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

ESOW expeditionary special operations wing

IGO intergovernmental organization

IMA individual mobilization augmentee

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JACCE joint air component coordination element

JAOC joint air operations center

JAOP joint air operations plan

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFHQ joint force headquarters

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
127

JOA joint operations area

JP Joint Publication

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTAC joint terminal attack controller

JTF joint task force

LNO liaison officer

MAAP master air attack plan

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MAJCOM major command

MARLE Marine liaison element

NAF numbered Air Force

NALE naval and amphibious liaison element

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDO nuclear deterrence operations

NEAF numbered expeditionary Air Force

NGO nongovernmental organization

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

OC operations center

OCA offensive counterair

OCONUS outside the continental United States

OPCON operational control

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PAD Program Action Directive

PIRR participating individual ready reserve

PR personnel recovery 

ROE rules of engagement

ROMO range of military operations

SCA space coordinating authority

SECAF Secretary of the Air Force

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SOF special operations forces

SOLE special operations liaison element

TACC tanker/airlift control center

TACON tactical control

TACP tactical air control party

TACS theater air control system

TFC task force commander

TMD theater missile defense
128

TST time sensitive target

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

USAFCENT United States Air Forces Central

USAFE US Air Forces in Europe

USC United States Code

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command

USFOR-A United States Forces-Afghanistan

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WMD weapon(s) of mass destruction

Definitions

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other 

organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of 

Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit 

logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, 

discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the 

subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

air expeditionary force. An organizational structure to provide Air Force forces and 

support on a rotational, and thus relatively more predictable basis. They are 

composed of force packages of capabilities that provide rapid and responsive 

airpower. Also called AEF. (AFDD 1)

air expeditionary task force. The organizational manifestation of Air Force forces 

afield. The AETF provides a joint force commander with a task-organized, integrated 

package with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force 

protection. Also called AETF. (AFDD 1) 

air domain. The air domain is described as the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s 

surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible. 

(JP 3-30)

Airman. The term Airman has historically been associated with uniformed members 

of the US Air Force (officer or enlisted; regular, reserve, or guard) regardless of rank, 

component, or specialty. Today, Department of the Air Force civilians are 

incorporated within the broader meaning of the term when there is a need to 

communicate to a larger audience within the Service, either for force development 
129

purposes or for clarity and inclusiveness by senior leaders when addressing a larger 

body of personnel. All Airmen, military and civilian, support and defend the 

Constitution of the United States and live by the Air Force core values. (AFDD 1-1)

airpower. Airpower is the ability to project military power or influence through the 

control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, 

operational, or tactical objectives. (AFDD 1)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant 

command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and 

conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is 

relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the 

units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the 

unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such 

duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such 

placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions 

where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for 

quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. (JP 1-02) 

centralized control. In joint air operations, placing within one commander the 

responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a military 

operation or group/category of operations. (JP 1-02) [The planning, direction, 

prioritization, synchronization, integration, and deconfliction of air, space, and 

cyberspace capabilities to achieve the objectives of the joint force commander.] 

(AFDD 1) {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for 

clarity.}

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing

mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, 

through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or 

functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02) 

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority 

established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised 

only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise 

directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command 

(command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant 

commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving 

organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating 

objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, 

joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the 
130

command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through 

the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised 

through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component 

commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to 

organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers 

necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in 

combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant 

commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 3-0)

command. 1. The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises 

over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority 

and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the 

employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for 

the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, 

welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a 

commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing 

about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the 

command of one individual. Also called CMD. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 

the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement 

of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 

commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations 

in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as 

well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; 

defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, 

tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02)

component. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. 

Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional 

components. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for 

coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military 

Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same 

Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation 

between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. 

In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred 

to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an 

authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more 

applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)
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coordination. The necessary action to ensure adequate exchange of information to 

integrate, synchronize, and deconflict operations between separate organizations. 

Coordination is not necessarily a process of gaining approval but is most often used 

for mutual exchange of information. Normally used between functions of a supporting 

staff. Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) is used to coordinate with an organization 

outside of the immediate staff or organization. (AFDD 1)

cyberspace. A global domain within the information environment consisting of the 

interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the 

Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors 

and controllers. (JP 1-02)

decentralized execution. Delegation of execution authority to subordinate 

commanders. (JP 1-02) [Decentralized execution of airpower is the delegation of 

execution authority to responsible and capable lower-level commanders to achieve 

effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, 

and tactical flexibility.] (AFDD 1) {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air 

Force and are offered for clarity.}

direct liaison authorized. That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a 

subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency 

within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable 

to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the 

commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a 

coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. 

Also called DIRLAUTH. (JP 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof 

guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires 

judgment in application (JP 1- 02)

effect. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set 

of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A 

change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, 

composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established 

across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that 

may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP1-02)

functions. The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of 

an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, 

as amended, the term “function” includes functions, powers, and duties (5 United 

States Code 171n (a)). (JP 1-02)
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joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military 

forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained in 

joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is 

authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, 

assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single 

joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint 

force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC.

(JP 1-02) 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise 

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. 

Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint publication. A publication containing joint doctrine that is prepared under the 

direction and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and applies to all 

Armed Forces of the United States. Also called JP. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of 

Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint force 

commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at 

any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is 

inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within 

the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of 

command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and 

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction 

necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative 

direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to 

accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be 

exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this 

authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or 

functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full 

authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the 

commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned 

missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or 
133

matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called

OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations 

are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters 

or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by 

establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, 

sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and 

applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. See also strategic level of 

war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component 

commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, 

organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that 

have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate 

unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a 

group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic 

security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to 

achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational 

military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of 

military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war 

plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in 

accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national 

power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 

multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains 

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps 

another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies 

other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all 

aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint 

operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers 

to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to 

requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a 

support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another 

commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the 

supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or 

other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This 
134

includes the designated combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies 

as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander 

who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is 

responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP

1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose 

to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the 

intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with 

the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements are answered in time to 

influence the decisions they support. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, 

or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area 

necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in 

operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at 

or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient 

authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat 

support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical doctrine. Describes the proper employment of specific Air Force assets, 

individually or in concert with other assets, to accomplish detailed objectives. Tactical 

doctrine considers particular objectives (stopping the advance of an armored column) 

and conditions (threats, weather, and terrain) and describes how Air Force assets are 

employed to accomplish the tactical objective (B-1s dropping anti-armor cluster 

munitions). Tactical doctrine is codified as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) 

in Air Force TTP (AFTTP). Because tactical doctrine is closely associated with 

employment of technology, change may occur more rapidly than to the other levels of 

doctrine. (AFDD 1)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned 

and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task 

forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of 

combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat 

objectives. (JP 1-02)

task force. 1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the 

purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. A semi-permanent 

organization of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a 

continuing specific task. (AFDD 1)