‘, 

No. 91-335 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2000 MT 6 

STA IE OF MONTANA, 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Madison, 

The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding. 

COIINSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Jack H. Morris, Jardine & Morris, Whitehall, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Joseph P. Mazurek, Montana Attorney General, Patricia J. Jordan, 

Assistant Montana Attorney General; Robert R. Zenker, Madison 

County Attorney, Virginia City, Montana 

Filet 1: 

Submitted on Briefs: June 3, 1999 

Decided: January 11,200O 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

81 Appellant Travis McLees, (Travis) appeals from the Order of the District Court of the 

Fifth Judicial District of the State of Montana, Madison County, denying his motion to 

suppress evidence and admitting evidence obtained in a search of Travis’s apartment. We 

reverse. 

72 Did the District Court err in denying Travis’s motion to suppress evidence obtained 

when his grandfather consented to the warrantless search of Travis’s apartment? 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

ll3 On November 25, 1995, the Madison County Sheriffs Department received reports 

of two burglaries and thefts. Chief Deputy Sheriff, Merlin Ehlers (Deputy Ehlers) 

investigated the break-ins, one at the Harrison school, the other at the studio of Michelle 

Walker in Harrison, Montana. Travis had been at Walker’s studio the day before to deliver 

wooden doll bases his father had made for her. Walker indicated that while in her studio, 

Travis had paid an unusual amount of attention to a stereo which was now missing. At the 

time, Travis also had a pending charge in Gallatin County for the burglary of a Three Forks 

school and was known to have broken into the Harrison school when he was a student there. 

74 Deputy Ehlers went to the home ofTravis’s mother, Jennifer Flesch (Flesch), in Pony, 

Montana. Flesch told Deputy Ehlers that Travis was living with his grandfather Earl McLees 

(Earl) in Three Forks, Montana. Deputy Ehlers had known Earl for years and had been to 

2 
Earl’s home before on personal business. On November 26, 1995, Deputy Ehlers went to 

Earl’s residence at 55 Frontage Road, in Three Forks, to look for Travis. 

ll5 Upon arriving at Earl’s residence, Deputy Ehlers asked whether Travis was staying 

there. Earl informed Deputy Ehlers that Travis was living in the apartment which Earl 

owned next door at 59 Frontage Road. Earl told Deputy Ehlers that Travis had slept in the 

apartment the night before but had left that morning. Deputy Ehlers did not have a search 

warrant but asked Earl if he could look in the apartment for possible evidence of the Harrison 

school burglary. Earl and Deputy Ehlers went to the front door of the apartment, but found 

it locked. Because Earl did not have a key to the front door, he and Deputy Ehlers went 

around to the shop which adjoined the apartment from the rear. The two then entered the 

apartment through an unlocked door leading from the shop to the apartment. 

76 Upon entering the apartment, Deputy Ehlers noticed some drug paraphernalia and 

what he believed to be items taken from the Harrison school. Ehlers then telephoned the 

Gallatin County Sheriffs Office to have them send out an officer from that jurisdiction, 

Three Forks Marshall, Keith King (Officer King) responded to the scene and entered the 

apartment. At that time, Officer King and Deputy Ehlers discussed whether they should have 

a search warrant. Officer King returned to his office in Three Forks where he called the 

Gallatin County Attorney’s office and received the opinion that based on Officer King’s 

description of the situation, a consent search would be sufficient. During Officer King’s 

absence, Deputy Ehlers stayed at the apartment to secure the site. 
17 Officer King returned to the apartment with a consent-to-search form, which Earl 

signed. Deputy Ehlers and Officer King then searched and photographed the apartment, and 

seized several items of evidence. A few days later, Deputy Ehlers returned without a 

warrant, and Earl again allowed him to enter the apartment. A warrant for Travis’s arrest 

was issued on November 30, 1995, and Travis was arrested several months later. Reserving 

the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, Travis pleaded guilty to two counts 

of burglary, two counts of theft, and one count of criminal mischief. 

ll8 Did the District Court err in denying Travis’s motion to suppress evidence obtained 

when his grandfather consented to the warrantless search of Travis’s apartment? 

19 The standard of review of a district court's denial of a motion to suppress is whether 

the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were correctly 

applied as a matter of law. Stnte v. &gal (1997), 281 Mont. 250, 257, 934 P.2d 176, 180 

(ovewuled inpart by State v. KunefA 1998 MT 287, 291 Mont. 474, 970 P.2d 556). 

7llO “[Wlatrantless searches conducted inside a home are per se unreasonable, ‘subject 

only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.“’ State v. Hubbe 

(1997), 286 Mont. 200,212,951 P.2d 971,978 (citing Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 

347,357, 88 SCt. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576, 585). “One such exception is when the search 

is conducted pursuant to a consent that is freely and voluntarily given.” Hubbel, 286 Mont. 

at 212, 951 P.2d at 978 (citing Sclzneclzlotlz v. Bustanzonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 

S.Ct. 2041, 2045, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 860). “[Wlhen the prosecution seeks to justify a 

4 
warrantless search by proof of a voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was 

given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third 

party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises 

or effects sought to be inspected.” State v. Sourenson (1979), 180 Mont. 269,275, 590 P.2d 

136, 140 (citing UnitedStates v. A4atlock(1974), 415 U.S. 164, 171,94 S.Ct. 988,993,39 

L.Ed.2d. 249-50). The State has the burden of showing that the consent was voluntary. Stnte 

v. Kim (1989), 239 Mont. 189, 196,779 P.2d 512, 517. 

711 The District Court found that Earl had “common authority to consent to a search of 

the premises. [and] gave that consent voluntarily. .” Travis argues that Earl did not have 

sufficient joint control over the apartment at 59 Frontage Road to consent to the search. We 

agree. As Travis points out, Earl’s residence at 55 Frontage Road and the apartment at 59 

Frontage Road are physically separate buildings. Earl lived in his home but did not reside 

in, and did not have a key to, Travis’s apartment. The record reflects that Earl would 

sometimes enter the apartment to watch television with his son, Scott McLees (Scott), or 

perhaps to wake Travis for work. Earl testified that he would knock and amrounce himself 

before entering the apartment. 

712 In order to let Deputy Ehlers into the apartment, Earl had to take him around to the 

back of the building, into the attached workshop and through an unlocked back door to the 

apartment. Travis had been living in the apartment with Scott, his father, for approximately 

six months and Scott had given him permission to stay there while he was gone; this was an 

5 
agreement Earl was not involved in. Scott paid no rent to Earl and there was no rental 

agreement. Scott usually resided in the apartment but was out of the state at the time and had 

left the back door to the workshop unlocked because no one could ‘rind a key to it. 

713 The State argues that Earl’s consent was valid because no landlord-tenant relationship 

existed between Earl and Travis; Travis’s living arrangement was with Scott, not Earl, and 

therefore Earl never relinquished authority or control of the apartment to him. It claims that 

Travis was a temporary guest in Earl’s apartment, that he paid no rent or utilities, and that 

he lived out of a duffel bag. The State also maintains that a special relationship between a 

defendant and the owner of an apartment together with no formal landlord-tenant agreement 

are “important benchmarks” under these circumstances. We note that the cases cited by the 

State for this proposition are not controlling, and they are distinguishable from the case at 

bar. None of the cited cases concern one family member renting a separate residence to 

another, but rather reflect instances where one family member has permitted another to stay 

in their home as a guest. In all but one case cited by the State, (Adams v. State (Okla. Crim. 

Ct. App. 1982), 645 P.2d 1028)(defendant staying in sister’s garage apartment), the owner 

of the home and the defendant lived together in the same residence. In People v. Lucero 

(Colo. Ct. App. 1985), 720 P.2d 604, also cited by the State, the court relied on the fact that 

there was no landlord-tenant relationship and no rent paid, referring to the defendant as a 

“tenant at sufferance.” LLK~YO at 606. However, as the United States Supreme Court pointed 

out in Matlock, 
[clommon authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property 

interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the 

third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant 

historical and legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the 

property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, 

so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right 

to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the 

risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. 

Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993, 39 L.Ed.2d at 250 n.7. 

1714 In Matlock, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the third party who had 

consented to the search of the bedroom where Matlock was staying had a relationship to the 

room sufficient to make her consent valid against Matlock. The Court found that the third 

party’s consent to search the bedroom was sufficient where; 1) the room bore every evidence 

that it was also occupied by a woman; 2) she indicated that she and Matlock slept in the 

bedroom regularly, including that morning; 3) she told police that she and Matlock shared 

a dresser in the room; and 4) she told police that the women’s clothing in the room was hers. 

SeeMatlock, 415 U.S. at 161-172, 94 S.Ct. at 990-93,39 L.Ed.2d at 247-50. 

115 We begin our analysis of whether Earl had authority to consent to the search of the 

apartment, by noting that Travis claims Earl was coerced into giving his consent. After a 

review of the record, however, we agree with the District Court that although Earl was 

possibly intimidated and let Deputy Ehlers into the apartment “on a friendly basis,” there is 

no evidence to suggest his consent was coerced. As a result, we must analyze only whether 

Earl’s consent to the search was valid at the time he permitted Deputy Ehlers to enter the 

apartment. 
716 In determining that Earl had “common authority to consent to a search of the 

premises,” the District Court relied on the fact that Travis did not pay rent or utilities, did not 

have a rental agreement with Earl, did not furnish the apartment with his own property, and 

kept his belongings in duffel bags while his father’s personal belongings were in the dresser 

drawers. Based on these facts, the District Court found that “it is reasonable to conclude that 

Travis assumed the risk that his grandfather could and would assert his own control over the 

premises at any time Earl exercised his authority as owner, grandfather, and host to 

enter the apartment at will regularly for a number of reasons - all known to Travis .” 

l/17 We conclude that the evidence in the record is insufticient to show that Earl had 

common authority over the apartment. Although Earl was the owner of the apartment, and 

no rental agreement existed between Travis and Earl, these factors do not create “mutual use 

of the property,” or “joint access and control for most purposes,” which would create 

common authority. Earl testified that he never went to the apartment if Scott was not around. 

He said he did not have free access and would knock before he went in. Earl was obviously 

not a cohabitant ofthe apartment, did not share in its use, and could not consent to a search 

on that basis. Scott was the regular inhabitant of the apartment, and while he may have had 

joint authority and control to consent to the search, Earl did not. We conclude that it was not 

reasonable for the District Court to find that Travis “assumed the risk that Earl could and 

would assert control over the premises at any time.” The State failed to meet its burden of 
establishing that Earl had common authority over Travis’s apartment. Unless Earl had other 

“sufficient relationship” to the apartment, his consent was invalid. 

118 Earl testified that he, at times, gained access to the apartment in order to visit with 

Scott or to watch a ball game. The fact that Earl owned the apartment is not dispositive 

where Travis, who was living in the apartment, had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 

Assuming Earl had authority to access the apartment for such purposes, it was limited to 

those activities. See Sol-renson, 180 Mont. at 276,590 P.2d 141 (Authority of neighbor to 

enter defendant’s home to water plants in defendant’s absence was not authority to consent 

to a search of the home). Earl, therefore, did not possess a “sufficient relationship” with the 

apartment which would give him authority to consent to a search. Therefore, the District 

Court erroneously concluded that based on these facts, Earl had common authority over the 

apartment sufficient to consent to the search. 

119 The State contends that even if Earl did not have authority to give consent, 

representations made by Earl to the officers at the time of the search support a finding that 

the officers believed Earl had authority to consent, even if he did not. They maintain that 

under the doctrine of “apparent authority,” a search is valid if consent is given by a person 

who police reasonably, but mistakenly, believe has joint authority over the premises. This 

issue was first addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), 

497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148. 
g20 In Rodriguez, Gail Fischer told police that Rodriguez had assaulted her in a certain 

apartment in Chicago, Illinois. She referred to this apartment as “our apartment” and said 

that she had clothes and furniture there. She then traveled to the apartment with police, 

unlocked the door with her key, and gave the officers permission to enter. The police didn’t 

have an arrest warrant for Rodriguez, or a search warrant for the apartment. Upon entering 

the apartment, the officers observed drugs and drug paraphernalia and found Rodriguez 

asleep in the bedroom. There, they discovered more drugs, arrested Rodriguez, and seized 

the drugs and paraphernalia. After being charged with possession of a controlled substance 

Rodriguez moved to suppress all evidence seized at the time of his arrest, claiming that 

Fischer had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and therefore had no authority to 

consent to the entry. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180, 110 S.Ct. at 2796-97, 111 L.Ed.2d at 155- 

56. 

72 1 Finding that Fischer had no “joint access or control for most purposes,” the Supreme 

Court explained what it called the “general rule” with respect to what is necessary to satisfy 

the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment: 

[i]t is apparent that in order to satisfy the “reasonableness” requirement of the 

Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual 

determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government-- 

whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a 

warrant, or the police officer conducting a search and seizure under one of the 

exceptions to the warrant requirement--is not that they always be correct, but 

that they always be reasonable. [B] ecause many situations which confront 

officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, 

room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must 

10 
be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their 

conclusions of probability (citation omitted). 

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-86, 110 S.Ct. at 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d at 159-60 

122 The majority then stated that it saw “no reason to depart from this general rule with 

respect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent to a search,” and set forth a test for 

determining the constitutional validity of a warrantless search pursuant to the consent 

exception to the warrant requirement: 

determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective 

standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment. ‘warrant a 

man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the consenting party had 

authority over the premises? If not, then the warrantless entry without 

further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the 

search is valid. 

Rodriguez, at 188-89, 110 S.Ct. at 2801, 111 L.Ed.2d at 161 (citation omitted). 

723 Although this Court has previously examined the issue of third-party consent, the 

doctrine of apparent authority as it applies to third-party consent searches has never been 

substantively addressed in Montana. Travis argues that the warrantless search of the 

apartment absent Earl’s actual authority to consent violated his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well as under Article II. Sections 10 and 11 of the 

Montana Constitution. “Because Montana’s unique constitutional scheme affords citizens 

broader protection of their right to privacy than does the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, we usually need not consider the Fourth Amendment issue.” Hubbel, 

286 Mont. at 211, 951 P.2d at 977. However, because Article II, Section 11 of the Montana 

11 
Constitution mirrors the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we analyze 

most search and seizure questions arising under Article II, Section 11 using traditional Fourth 

Amendment principles. Siegd, 281 Mont. at 264, 934 P.2d at 184, 

124 Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution provide: 

Section 10. Right of privacy. The right of individual privacy is essential to 

the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing 

of a compelling state interest. 

Art. II, Sec. 10, Mont.Const. 

Section 11. Searches and seizures. The people shall be secure in their 

persons, papers, homes and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. 

No warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without 

describing the place to be searched or the person to be seized, or without 

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. 

Art. II, Sec. 11, Mont.Const. 

125 To determine whether there has been an unlawful search pursuant to Montana’s 

Constitution, we look to two factors: (1) whether the person has an actual expectation of 

privacy that society is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable; and (2) the nature of 

the state’s intrusion. Hubbel, 286 Mont. at 208, 951 P.2d at 975-76. “At the risk of 

belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally 

expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by warrant, and that 

expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.” State V. 

Sclzeetz, 186 Mont. 41,48-49, 950 P.2d 722,726. “The fundamental purpose of the Fourth 

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is to protect the privacy 

12 
and security of individuals and safeguard the sanctity of the home against arbitrary invasions 

by governmental officials.” Dorwart v. Caruwny, 1998 MT 191,1] 21,290 Mont. 196,121, 

966 P.2d 1121,121. 

726 The State does not claim that exigent circumstances existed which would have 

prevented Ehlers from obtaining a search warrant prior to the entry and search of Travis’s 

apartment. Courts have indicated the rationale behind the warrant requirement; 

[t]he presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave 

emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the 

citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the 

home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind 

might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The 

right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those 

whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. 

Sorrenson, 180 Mont at 274, 590 P.2d at 140. The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule 

is to “deter future unlawful police conduct” by making evidence which the State obtains 

through a search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, inadmissable in criminal 

proceedings. State v. Pipkin, 1998 MT 143,l 12,289 Mont. 240,T 12,961 P.2d 733,l 12. 

The result is that in the absence of one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant 

requirement, a search made without a warrant is unlawful and any evidence which results 

from the search should be suppressed. Pipkin, 7 12. 

127 In adopting the apparent authority rule in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court explained 

what the exclusionary rule provides under the Fourth Amendment; 

[w]hat Rodriguez is assured by the trial right of the exclusionary rule, where 

it applies, is that no evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment will 

13 
be introduced at his trial unless he consents. What he is assured by the Fourth 

Amendment itself, however, is not that no government search of his house will 

occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is 

“unreasonable.. .” 

Ro&iguez, 497 U.S. at 183-84, 110 S.Ct. at 2799, 111 L.Ed. 2d at 158. 

There are various elements, of course, that can make a search of a person’s 

house “reasonable” - one of which is the consent of the person or his cotenant 

Here, we also have not held that the Fourth Amendment requires factual 

accuracy. 

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185, 110 S.Ct. at 2799, 111 L.Ed. 2d at 159 

The Constitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant 

because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has 

consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when 

they enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) 

believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape. 

Rodriguez,497U.S.at 186, llOS.Ct.at2800, 111 L.Ed.2dat 160. 

128 In Montana, however, we analyze such a situation in light of our citizens’ enhanced 

right to privacy. “[Elxcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of property 

without proper consent is ‘u727ws072nble unless it has been authorized by a valid search 

warrant.” Do7wa7~~, 121 (emphasis added). Unlike its federal counterpart, Article II, Section 

10 protects against invasions of privacy. Hawai’i, whose constitution also specifically grants 

the right of privacy to its citizens has declined to follow Rodriguez, based on that 

constitutional provision. In declining to adopt the doctrine of apparent authority, the Hawai’i 

Supreme Court stated; 

[alllowing warrantless searches of an individual’s home without the consent 

of someone authorized to give it, absent any exigent circumstances, would fly 

14 
in the face of this protection. Indeed, an invasion of privacy is no less of an 

“invasion” if the governmental officials are “reasonable” in their mistaken 

belief that the third party possesses the authority to consent. This is because, 

regardless of whether the police acted in good faith, the individual’s “privacy” 

is still invaded when the police search his or her personal belongings without 

permission. 

State v. Lopez (Haw. 1995), 896 P.2d 889, 902. 

729 In Lopez, police were called to investigate a robbery at the house of Daniel and Kelly 

Hauanio. See Lopez, 896 P.2d at 893-95. Detective Guilleimo, who was assigned to 

continue the investigation, later telephoned Kelly’s mother and told her he wanted to 

interview Kelly and Daniel and go into the Hauanios’ house to continue the investigation. 

Kelly’s mother told Detective Guillermo that the Hauanios were staying at a hotel in Hilo, 

Hawai’i. 

730 Without the Hauanios’ permission, Kelly’s mother volunteered to take Guillermo to 

the house herself. She met him there and they entered through a closed door which was not 

able to be locked. While there Guillermo confiscated a cellophane container filled with 

cocaine which he found on the floor of the master bedroom. Based on this information alone, 

the police obtained a warrant to search the Hauanios’ home. While executing the warrant, 

police found evidence linking the Hauanios to a large cocaine delivery already under 

investigation. The circuit court granted the Hauanios motion to suppress the evidence seized 

by the police, concluding that the state had not established that Kelly granted her mother the 

authority to consent to Guillermo’s entry. Because the entry was without consent, the 

evidence he recovered from the Hauanio house was suppressed. Lopez, 896 P.2d at 896. On 

15 
appeal, the prosecution conceded that Kelly’s mother did not have “actual authority” to 

consent to Detective Guillemro’s entrance into the house, but argued that she had “apparent 

authority.” Lopez, 896 P.2d at 899. 

131 The Supreme Court of Hawai’i declined to adopt the federal concept of apparent 

authority from Rodriguez stating; 

[o]ur willingness to afford greater protection of individual privacy rights than 

is provided on the federal level arises from “our view [that] the right to be free 

of ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures under article I, section 5 [which later 

became article I, section 71 of the Hawai’i Constitution is enforceable by a rule 

of reason which requires that governmental intrusions into the personnl 

pvivncy of citizens of this State be no greater in intensity than absolutely 

necessmy. .” At this point, we simply cannot say that it is “necessary” to 

allow third parties to consent to searches of an individual’s personal and 

private belongings when they are devoid of any authority to do so. Our 

constitution guarantees more to the citizens of the State of Hawai’i. 

Lopez, 896 P.2d at 901-902 (emphasis in original). 

732 Article I, section 7 of Hawai’i’s Constitution specifically protects against “invasions 

of privacy.” Lopez, 896 P.2d at 897. We agree with the Hawai’i court’s refusal to extend the 

doctrine of apparent authority based on this right to privacy. In light of Montana citizens’ 

similar increased right to privacy under Article II, Sections 10 and 11, we now hold that for 

third-party consent to be valid as against the defendant, the consenting party must have actual 

authority to do so. Because Deputy Ehlers’ search of Travis’s apartment was not consented 

to by an individual possessing actual authority, the search violated Article II, Sections 10 and 

11 of the Montana Constitution. The evidence seized in that search should be suppressed. 

16 
733 The State argued in the District Court that if Earl’s consent was invalid then the 

evidence should be admitted under the “independent source” and “inevitable discovery” 

rules. The District Court did not rule on these issues. 

734 We reverse the judgment of the District Court as to the evidence obtained in the 

warrantless search of Travis’s apartment and remand to the District Court for a detennination 

of whether the evidence is admissible under the independent source or inevitable discovery 

rules. 

735 Reversed and remanded. 7 u /&L&-i&-, 

Justice 

We Concur: 
January 11,200O 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the attached document was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following 

named: 

JACK H MORRIS ESQ 

JARDINE AND MORRIS 

BOX 488 

WHITEHALL MT 59759-0488 

HON JOSEPH P MAZUREK ATTORNEY GENERAL 

MIKE WELLENSTEIN ASSISTANT 

2 15 NORTH SANDERS 

HELENA MT 59620 

ROBERT R ZENKER 32 ‘. 

DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 

BOX 36 

VIRGlNIA CITY MT 59755-0036 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA 

BY: 06: 

Deputy u