GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

August 2, 2012

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett

Chairman

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Subject: Cancellation of the Army’s Autonomous Navigation System

The Army intended the Autonomous Navigation System (ANS) to enable ground 

robotic vehicles to partially drive and navigate themselves and to do so in remote 

areas with difficult terrain, by integrating sensors, processors, and software. Initially, 

the Army was developing the system as part of manned and unmanned ground 

vehicles (UGV) that were part of the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) program. 

But after the cancellation of various FCS vehicles beginning in 2009, the Army 

planned to couple ANS with the yet-to-be developed Multi-Mission Unmanned 

Ground Vehicle (MM-UGV), which among many uses was intended to counter 

roadside bombs – or improvised explosive devices (IED) – in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

General Dynamics Robotic Systems (GDRS) was the contractor for ANS.1

The Army made considerable effort to develop and validate a requirement for the 

MM-UGV and ANS; however, both were cancelled in 2011. With the cancellation of 

these efforts, you expressed interest in the impact on Army future autonomous 

unmanned ground capabilities. In response, we examined:

• To what extent did the Army demonstrate ANS capabilities prior to 

cancellation?

• What methods did the Army use to compare ANS to commercially available 

and other alternatives, particularly in the area of field demonstrations?

 

1 Boeing was the prime contractor for the FCS program, with subcontractor GDRS responsible for the 

ANS portion of the program.
Page 2 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

• To what extent does a validated requirement exist for this capability, and how 

does it fit in with other UGV initiatives?

To conduct our work, we obtained and analyzed Army and contractor documents

and test reports to determine ANS progress prior to cancellation, methodology used 

in comparing ANS to other alternatives, and validated need for vehicles and 

autonomous capability. We also interviewed officials from a variety of Army and 

Department of Defense (DOD) offices as well as GDRS.

We conducted this performance audit from February to August 2012 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed 

description of our scope and methodology is presented in the enclosure. 

Results in Brief

Almost all ANS hardware and most software development were completed prior to 

its cancellation, according to the Army and GDRS. The software for the most 

advanced capabilities was not completed, which potentially presented the greatest 

complexities. GDRS had demonstrated many of ANS’s capabilities to some extent, 

including its capability to avoid obstacles and follow a leading vehicle through 

varying terrain. ANS had not yet progressed to the independent testing phase, 

however. In cancelling ANS and MM-UGV, the Army estimated that approximately

$2.5 billion in planned funding for fiscal years 2013 to 2017 could be made available 

for other Army efforts. According to Army officials, the government owns the work 

completed on ANS to date. 

To compare ANS to other alternatives, the Army engaged a team (the Red Team) to 

perform a functional comparison of the demonstrated capabilities of ANS and six 

other military and commercial systems. The Red Team, comprised of robotics 

experts with prior knowledge of the systems, found that ANS did not provide a 

unique capability relative to the other systems evaluated with respect to basic 

navigation functionality. However, the Red Team noted that ANS was designed for 

and had demonstrated capabilities for operating in an off-road environment, unlike 

some of the other systems. The Red Team, which had previously witnessed 

demonstrations of some of the systems, did not conduct field evaluations for the 

study due to time constraints, nor did the team rely on testing data and reports on 

the different systems.

DOD has not validated a requirement for a UGV with an ANS-like capability using 

the traditional requirement processes, despite attempts to do so. On the other hand, 
Page 3 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

urgent needs statements from battlefield commanders indicate some desire for 

unmanned ground capabilities—especially in countering IEDs. Several efforts have 

been underway to address these urgent needs, but nothing has yet resulted in a full 

scale development program.

Background

Initially, the Army intended for ANS to serve as the autonomous navigation system 

for as many as 13 manned and unmanned vehicle types as part of the FCS. Since it 

started in 2003, FCS had been at the center of the Army’s efforts to modernize into a 

lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. The FCS concept involved 

replacing existing combat systems with a family of manned and unmanned vehicles 

and systems linked by an advanced information network. In support of FCS, the 

Army planned for ANS to provide UGVs with various capabilities, including remote 

operation, the ability to follow roads, and the ability to follow other vehicles or a 

walking soldier. Over time, development on FCS vehicles was deferred or cancelled, 

and the requirements documents supporting the FCS program were discontinued 

due to shifting priorities in the Army.

Figure 1 shows the timeline of the ANS program as well as the various vehicle 

options that were considered through the cancellation of the ANS in 2011.

Figure 1: Timeline of ANS from 2003 to 2011
Page 4 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

Despite cancellation of the FCS vehicles, ANS continued development as a potential 

add-on package for future vehicles including the MM-UGV. The goal of the MM-UGV 

was to develop an UGV platform that could accept multiple mission packages, 

including sensors, weapons, counter-IED, and other mission packages. Several 

analyses of ANS have been conducted over the years to study its utility, including 

the Red Team analysis in 2011.

2

The Army assembled the Red Team in 2011 to provide a top-level, independent look 

at ANS and provide a recommendation to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on 

whether continued investment was warranted. The Red Team report addressed 

topics such as whether there were existing requirements for an autonomous 

navigation capability; if ANS was unique compared to demonstrated basic 

autonomous navigation capabilities from the military and commercial sectors; and 

whether the unique qualities of ANS might make it worthy of continued development 

under the current contract.

Army Made Progress with ANS, but Development Was Incomplete When 

Cancelled

The Army made considerable progress developing ANS by the time of its 

cancellation, including completing its Critical Design Review and releasing its

technical drawings. The Army and GDRS generally agree that the development of 

about 90 percent of ANS hardware was complete, as was about 75 percent of the 

ANS software. GDRS was developing ANS in three planned software phases with 

each phase building upon the previous phase to increase autonomous capability. Of 

the three phases, the first was complete, the second mostly completed, and some 

work had started on the third. However, some of the remaining software work was 

for the most advanced capabilities—operating at higher speeds and safely following 

a soldier—which may have been costly and time consuming to complete because of 

the increasing complexity.

The Army and GDRS had completed initial demonstrations of ANS hardware and 

software on nine different vehicles.

3

 

2 Autonomous Navigation System Assessment. 

For example, GDRS had conducted multiple 

demonstrations of ANS’s capability to avoid obstacles and follow a vehicle leader or 

a route through varying terrain at moderate but not the higher, required speeds. To 

fully demonstrate ANS capabilities, however, would have required its participation in 

independent operational testing with a fully developed software suite. Operational 

testing provides independent assessment of a system’s capabilities outside of a 

contractor’s or Army’s controlled environment by an objective third party. The Army 

cancelled ANS before these tests could be conducted, since such testing occurs 

closer to the beginning of production, which ANS had not yet reached. 

3 All of the ANS demonstrations were on non-FCS vehicles because FCS vehicles were unavailable 

to GDRS.
Page 5 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

Although the Army did not have a separate cost estimate to complete ANS 

development at the time of cancellation, estimates anticipated that an additional $50 

million would be spent for planned development work in fiscal year 2012. Separately, 

GDRS proposed a reduced scope of work for $35 million in fiscal year 2012 to

complete development work that had already been started. The Army did not accept 

this proposal. According to the Army, cancellation of MM-UGV (and ANS) was 

expected to make about $2.5 billion in funds available for fiscal years 2013 to 2017 

for reinvestment by the Army. In addition, the Army has not yet determined the costs 

of terminating ANS.

According to Army officials, the Army owns the ANS hardware completed prior to its 

cancellation. In addition, according to the Army, they have government purpose 

rights to certain software and hardware technical data, which allows the government 

to use it for its own purposes. 

Functional Comparison Found ANS Not Unique in Basic Autonomous 

Navigation Compared to Other Alternatives

For the most part, ANS did not provide unique capabilities relative to six other 

systems for completing basic semi-autonomous navigation tasks, according to the 

Army’s Red Team study done over a 10-day period in 2011. ANS’s ability to operate 

in structured and predictable environments was similar to that of the compared 

systems. That, coupled with a lack of existing Army requirements, led to the Red 

Team to conclude that a justification did not exist for continued investment in ANS.

The other six military and commercial systems are described in table 1. 
Page 6 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

Table 1: ANS-like Systems Evaluated by Army Red Team

System Name Sponsor ANS-Like Capabilities

Cargo-UGV Marine Warfighting Lab

Remote Operation, Vehicle 

Leader/Follower, Road 

Following

Ground Unmanned 

Support Surrogate Marine Warfighting Lab Remote Operation, Soldier Leader/Follower

Convoy Active Safety 

Technologies

Army Tank and 

Automotive Research, 

Development, and 

Engineering Command

Remote Operation, Vehicle 

Leader/Follower, Road 

Following

Mobile Autonomous

Robotics Technology 

Initiative

Southwest Research 

Institute

Remote Operation, Solider and 

Vehicle Leader/Follower, Road 

Following

Commercial Auto/Truck Various Vehicle Leader/Follower, Road 

Following

Google Driverless 

Vehicle Google Road Following

Source: GAO presentation of data from Red Team Study report.

The study compared ANS functionality to these systems in terms of three critical 

autonomy areas: External Sensing, Intelligence and Behaviors, and Modes of 

Operations and Terrains. In addition, the study included Technical Maturity and 

Testing and System Cost metrics. The Red Team reviewed and evaluated the 

systems based on demonstrated capabilities to date, not planned or intended 

capabilities. Team members were subject matter experts in robotics, had knowledge 

of the systems being compared, and had previously witnessed numerous 

evaluations of ANS and the comparative systems. The Red Team did not conduct 

field evaluations of the systems for the study due to time constraints, nor did they 

draw upon testing data and reports. 

While comparative systems provided similar basic autonomous navigation 

capabilities, the Red Team also found that ANS had other capabilities. For example, 

ANS provided a fuller range of capabilities and had undergone more demonstrations 

and military hardening, such as the ability to operate in a combat environment and 

protect against electromagnetic interference, which was the most significant overall 

cost driver. In addition, ANS had been designed and had demonstrated capability for 

operating in an off-road environment, unlike some of the other efforts. The 
Page 7 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

commercial systems evaluated had been operated almost exclusively on paved 

roads and in structured environments. 

The study also found that ANS was not out of line with the cost range of the other 

military and commercial systems evaluated. ANS’s anticipated production cost of 

about $250,000 per system was somewhat less than the Marine Warfighting Lab’s 

Cargo-UGV and Ground Unmanned Support Surrogate, both of which are estimated 

to cost over $300,000 per system. However, Google’s Driverless Vehicle and the 

Southwest Research Institute’s Mobile Autonomous Robotics Technology Initiative, 

which are expected to cost $150,000 each, would be less expensive than the 

estimate for ANS. Red Team members noted, however, that five of the systems that 

were evaluated against ANS used cost estimates based on prototypes, while only 

the commercial automotive systems and ANS had production cost estimates. 

Part of the ANS’s higher cost was due to the pursuit of the original FCS 

requirements—to fit ANS into the broader FCS network. Some of the FCS 

requirements were as follows:

• Modified sensors to avoid enemy detection;

• More sensors to be able to drive backwards at speeds equal to driving 

forwards; 

• Global Positioning System designed to work in combat environments; and

• Hardened components to protect the system in a combat environment against 

shock and electromagnetic interference. 

GDRS was directed to continue to develop ANS to these original requirements even 

after FCS was cancelled. Some of these requirements went well beyond the 

capabilities of comparative systems. However, these requirements and capabilities 

fell outside of the consideration range of the five metrics that were used to evaluate 

the systems in the Red Team report.

DOD Did Not Have Validated Requirements for ANS; Other Initiatives in Earlier 

Stages

Despite several attempts to do so, DOD does not have a validated requirement for a 

UGV with an ANS-like capability. When development efforts become formal

acquisition programs, they are generally based on requirements validated by the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or another delegated validation 

authority. Since the cancellation of FCS, no validated requirements exist for an 

autonomous UGV. The cancellation of MM-UGV was due, at least in part, to the 

inability to validate its requirements because of changing user priorities.
Page 8 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

The Army is currently leading an effort to complete an Unmanned Initial Capabilities 

Document for Air, Land, and Sea, which is a prerequisite to obtaining JROCvalidated requirements. However, this effort has been underway since November 

2009 and the Army is still in the process of resolving comments and the document is 

still being revised. According to Army officials, it is uncertain when it will be finished. 

Yet, defining common unmanned capabilities for all of the services is essential. In a 

March 2010 testimony, we noted that DOD recognizes that to more effectively 

leverage its acquisition resources, it must achieve greater commonality and 

efficiency among the military services’ various unmanned system acquisition 

programs.4 We also noted that DOD stated in its Unmanned System Roadmap there 

is the potential for an unprecedented level of collaboration to meet capability needs 

and reduce acquisition costs by requiring greater commonality among the military 

services’ unmanned systems.

An alternative approach to validating requirements through the JROC is the process 

set up by DOD to rapidly acquire solutions for urgent operational needs.5 The 

objective of this process is to validate an urgent need, identify a source of funding, 

and promptly field a ready solution. Compared with traditional acquisitions, which 

can take at least several years, rapid acquisitions can be completed within 24 

months. Both the Army and DOD, which was supported by the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization, have identified urgent operational needs for a 

UGV with the capability to counter IEDs. However, when these initiatives were 

prioritized relative to other needs, it was determined that they were not high enough 

on the priority list to warrant pursuing due, in part, to the maturity of the counter-IED 

sensors. 

Despite the cancellation of ANS and the lack of a validated requirement, there are 

several UGV initiatives in the research stage. These include the Squad Mission 

Support System which recently completed testing in Afghanistan; the Safe 

Operations of Unmanned Systems for Reconnaissance in Complex Environments 

which is in testing; and the Supervised Autonomy to Neutralize and Detect IEDs 

which will be safety tested and then cancelled. We found that all were in the 

preliminary stages of development but most were not close to achieving the 

developmental progress of ANS.

 

4 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Could Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies Among its 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems, GAO-10-508T (Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2010)

5 GAO, Urgent Warfighter Needs: Opportunities Exist to Expedite Development and Fielding of Joint 

Capabilities, GAO-12-385 (Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2012).
Page 9 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review. DOD provided technical 

comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and 

the Secretaries of Defense and the Army. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any 

questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or 

martinb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 

Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 

report were Bill Graveline, Assistant Director; James Kim; Ioan Ifrim; Bob Swierczek; 

Alyssa Weir; and Roxanna Sun.

Belva Martin, Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Enclosure
Page 10 GAO-12-851R Autonomous Navigation System

Enclosure

Scope and Methodology

To conduct our work, we obtained and analyzed Army and contractor documents, 

and test reports to determine ANS progress prior to cancellation, methodology used 

in comparing ANS to other alternatives, and validated need for vehicles and 

autonomous capability.

We interviewed officials from the following offices.

• U.S. Army: Tank Automotive and Armaments Command—Tank Automotive 

Research, Development and Engineering Center; Program Executive Office—

Ground Combat Systems; Training and Doctrine Command—Army 

Capabilities Integration Center; Army G-3/5/7—Operations, Plans and 

Training; Rapid Equipping Force; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; and the Army Audit Agency.

• Robotic Systems Joint Program Office; Office of the Undersecretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Joint Ground Robotics 

Enterprise; Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory; and the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization.

We also interviewed Red Team members at the following offices: U.S. Army Tank 

Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center—Ground Vehicle 

Robotics; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology—Research and Technology; and the Office of the Undersecretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics / Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Tactical Systems, Land Warfare and 

Munitions—Joint Ground Robotics Enterprise.

We also visited and interviewed officials at General Dynamics Robotic Systems. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to August 2012, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(121034)
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