RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1817-18T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.O.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

H.J., F.T.A., R.K.M. and K.H.,

Defendants.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF O.S.J.,

J.T.O., M.O., M.O., and B.O.,

Minors.

_____________________________

Argued telephonically November 22, 2019 –

Decided January 14, 2020

Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-1817-18T3

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County, 

Docket No. FN-21-0116-18.

David Anthony Gies, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel; David Anthony Gies, on the 

briefs).

Amy M. Mc Kinsey, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Amy M. Mc Kinsey, on the brief).

Noel Christian Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for minors (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; 

Olivia Belfatto Crisp, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) filed this 

Title 9 action charging defendant J.O. with abuse and neglect of four of her six

children who were between the ages of one and thirteen when she voluntarily 

stopped taking her methadone treatment, triggering a week-long psychotic 

episode, in which she failed to seek proper assistance. Following a two-day 

fact-finding hearing, Judge Haekyoung Suh issued an order and a twenty-nine-
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page written decision on October 30, 2018, determining defendant's 1conduct 

constituted abuse and neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).2 

Defendant argues on appeal:

POINT ONE

THE FAMILY PART JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT 

J.O.'S CONDUCT WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IS 

ERRONEOUS WHERE IT CATEGORICALLY 

THEORIZED THAT SHE SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT 

HELP GIVEN HER MENTAL HEALTH STATUS.

POINT TWO

WITHOUT CHALLENGING THE CREDIBILITY OF 

WITNESSES, THE FAMILY PART JUDGE'S 

FINDINGS OF HARM AND OF IMMINENT RISK 

OF HARM WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY 

COMPETENT, RELEVANT AND CREDIBLE 

EVIDENCE.

 

The Law Guardian supports the finding of abuse and neglect on appeal as it did 

before the trial judge.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's interactions with 

defendant and the children. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual 

1

 Although this case lists multiple defendants, unless otherwise indicated, any 

reference to defendant is only to J.O. 

2

 On November 15, 2018, the matter was dismissed in order to proceed under a 

Title 30 termination of parental rights complaint. 
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findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge Suh's decision. Based on our 

review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that the evidence in 

favor of the abuse and neglect charges strongly supports Judge Suh's findings. 

We add the following brief comments and highlight some significant

conclusions in the judge's decision.

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) provides:

"Abused or neglected child" means . . . a child whose 

physical, mental, or emotional condition has been 

impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming 

impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or 

guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . .

in providing the child with proper supervision or 

guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to 

be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including 

the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by 

any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the 

aid of the court.

[(Emphasis added).]

In her thoughtful opinion, Judge Suh found defendant's failure to comply 

with her substance abuse treatment, then not seek proper help, "reach[ed] a 

different level," that constituted abuse and neglect. Ibid. The judge wrote:

The court finds [defendant] failed to exercise a 

minimum degree of care when she unilaterally stopped 

her methadone maintenance treatment program, which 

triggered her psychosis. She could have reported the 

hallucinations to her . . . therapist and received 

immediate care had she adhered to the court's . . . order 
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and engaged in individual counseling. Instead, she 

allowed the delusions to consume her and her children 

for days. [Defendant] is hardly the first defendant to 

conceal a potential problem to the Division. But given 

the extent of perceived dangers in the home, namely 

demons, spirits and ghosts, she had an affirmative duty 

to seek help. 

Judge Suh agreed with the defense that ceasing to take medication 

voluntarily ordinarily does not rise to abuse or neglect, however in this situation 

the children's mental health was jeopardized. The judge held:

When [defendant] experienced psychosis after she 

stopped taking her methadone treatment, [she] did not 

contact her therapist, the police, her doctors or the 

Division as she should have done. Instead, she called a 

friend and the landlord to help exorcise the evil spirits 

from the house. Her bizarre behavior, compounded by 

her failure to seek assistance, presents as a failure to 

exercise a minimum degree of care. If one gauge of 

abuse and neglect is the refusal to obtain mental health 

treatment when necessary, the needle here is in the red 

zone.

In recounting the harm to the children, Judge Suh wrote:

. . . [Defendant] mentioned fears of her house being 

haunted to the children which not only upset and scared 

the children, but made them believe the house was in 

fact possessed by demons, spirits, [defendant's] 

deceased mother, and wizards. The children were not 

able to sleep upstairs for fear of the ghosts and spirits 

that [defendant] told them about. And when they slept 

downstairs, the children remained afraid. The impact 

on the children was significant.
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The judge found defendant unreasonably inflicted harm on the children's 

mental and emotional health citing the testimony of the Division's expert 

licensed psychologist regarding his evaluation of her nine-year-old son. The 

judge continued: 

[Defendant's six-year-old daughter] informed the 

Division's caseworker that [defendant] was afraid of a 

wizard or spirits in the home, and [defendant's fouryear-old son] expressed hysteria about how his mother 

hears voices in the basement. . . . Only time will tell 

the full impact of the emotional damage to them as a 

result of their exposure to [defendant].

In this appeal, our review of the judge's decision is limited. We defer to 

her expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998), 

and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 

N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super 172, 188 

(App. Div. 1993)).

Applying these principles, we conclude that Judge Suh's factual findings 

are fully supported by the record and, considering those facts, her legal 

conclusions are unassailable.

Affirmed.