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76–512 PDF 2012

SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: WHY IS 

A JOB-CREATING, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP MEETING RESISTANCE AT TSA? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 7, 2012 and FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

Serial No. 112–68 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois, Vice Chair 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

AMANDA PARIKH, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

VACANT, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2012 

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security ......... 1 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security ................................................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 5 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security ......... 23 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2012 

Mr. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

Mr. Mark VanLoh, A.A.E., Director, Aviation Department, Kansas City International Airport: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 26 

Mr. Stephen D. Amitay, Esq., Federal Legislative Counsel, National Association of Security Companies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 29 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 31 

Mr. John Gage, National President, American Federation of Government 

Employees: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 39 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40 

FOR THE RECORD 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2012 

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security: 

Letter From Chairman Rogers to Administrator Pistole .................................. 9 

(1) 

SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: WHY IS 

A JOB-CREATING, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP MEETING RESISTANCE AT TSA? 

Tuesday, February 7, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Rogers, Lungren, Walberg, Cravaack, 

Turner, Jackson Lee, and Thompson. 

Also present: Representative Mica. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. 

This subcommittee is meeting today to examine the Transportation Security Administration’s Screening Partnership Program. I 

apologize for the delay, but they don’t let me have any say-so over 

when votes are called on the floor. But I do appreciate your patience and your participation. 

I will start by recognizing myself for an opening statement. I 

want to thank Administrator Pistole for being here and the time 

it takes to prepare for this. 

Today the subcommittee will examine the Screening Partnership 

Program and TSA’s willingness to work with the private sector to 

improve transportation security. 

Let me state first and foremost that I am a strong supporter of 

the Screening Partnership Program, or SPP, and was disappointed 

with the TSA’s decision last January not to expand the program beyond the existing 16 airports utilizing private screening services. 

I am aware that last week the TSA approved one airport but denied two others from participating in the SPP. Limiting SPP’s 

growth is the wrong approach, in my opinion, especially since both 

TSA and GAO have determined that the performance of Federal 

screeners and private screeners are roughly the same and that the 

security standards set for the SPP and non-SPP airports are completely identical. 

Rather than trying to insulate a giant Federal workforce, TSA 

should be working to strengthen and improve the private screening 

program and make it more cost-efficient so that U.S. businesses 

can take on a more meaningful role. Then TSA could concentrate 
2 

on implementing the management, oversight, contracting, procurement, and training reforms it desperately needs. 

Last April, the full committee Chairman and I introduced H.R. 

1586, the Security Enhancement and Jobs Act of 2011. The bill requires TSA to approve any SPP application that would not compromise security and provide a written explanation to Congress 

and the airport concerned if an SPP application is denied. I am 

pleased that language similar to our bill was included in the FAA 

reauthorization conference report, which recently passed the 

House. 

In addition, the huge number of TSA personnel working in airports that do have private screeners troubles me. Recent data provided to the committee reveals that at certain airports where contractors do screening and TSA is just there to oversee the screening 

process, there are upwards of 50 TSA employees on the payroll. 

While we can agree that strong oversight in this area is critically 

important, having 50-plus TSA officials in a single airport where 

they are not responsible for conducting screening is just plain overkill, and it is costing taxpayers huge amounts of money. We will 

look at this issue and other contracting and management issues 

throughout the hearing. 

I look forward to all the witnesses and now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, my friend, the gentlelady from 

Texas, for any opening statement she may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are 

friends. We have worked on this committee because we both have 

an abiding commitment to the security of this Nation. 

I am delighted to see Administrator Pistole and thank him before 

he even starts for his leadership. This is a time for tough choices, 

tough decisions, and strong commitments to secure this Nation. 

I would offer to say that, because of this committee and the leadership of Ranking Member and Chairman, that in actuality the 

United States has through some very, very difficult times managed 

to secure itself since 9/11, a horrific act that no one will ever forget 

throughout history and the annals of history of this Nation. It was 

on that day that the security of this Nation through airports was 

privatized. It was on that day that private security entities allowed 

individuals who ultimately sent planes into the towers in New 

York to kill thousands of persons. 

So I have a vigorous disagreement, and I am hoping that the administration will courageously hold the line. This is not a time for 

politicizing and making people happy, and it is not a time for humoring small businesses. I am, in my mind, in the work that I have 

done, considered an avid supporter of small businesses, mediumsize businesses, large businesses, and the work that is done in procurement to ensure that the American business has an opportunity 

to serve its Nation. 

But on this one, I believe in one point of the Chairman; he is 

right that we need to be fiscally responsible. We need to assess our 

needs. We need to ensure that individuals are placed and utilized 

in the TSA structure and the transportation security officer structure in the most efficient, appropriate, and secure manner that we 

possibly can have. 
3 

Mr. Chairman, you were right about that question. But I cannot 

adhere to a massive reform that would provide for an expansion of 

the Screening Partnership Program without the appropriate limitations that are presently in place today. 

So I would like to thank the witness and witnesses for joining 

us today to discuss TSA’s Screening Partnership Program, commonly referred to SPP. Under this program, airports may apply to 

opt out of using the Federal screening workforce. 

In January 2011, based on their review, Administrator Pistole 

decided not to expand the SPP beyond the 16 currently participating airports unless there was a clear and substantial benefit to 

doing so. I might add, there should be a security analysis in this, 

as well. I hope my words, ‘‘substantial benefit,’’ in his testimony or 

questioning, we will discern that ‘‘substantial benefit’’ or ‘‘clear and 

substantial benefit’’ does not ignore the security ramifications. 

According to TSA, operating the SPP costs taxpayers more than 

using the Federal screener workforce. In light of that fact, in these 

tight budgetary times, that would be reason enough to support the 

administrator’s decision not to expand the program, but the list 

goes on. 

Further expansion of privatized screening hampers TSA’s ability 

to push out intelligence information to front-line workers. It adds 

to inconsistency. It makes changing procedures based on threat 

more complex. That means you not only have to vet the front-line 

officers, you have to vet the company, vet the executives of the 

company, vet the ownership, vet the financial structure of this, vet 

the banks that the private company goes to, who is paying whom 

to turn their head and to overlook some dastardly act that is prepared to attack American citizens as they travel the skies of America. 

There has been much discussion of whether privatized screeners 

perform better than their Federal counterparts. I am always supportive of making sure that our Federal employees across the board 

are respected but also do their job. There is no conflict with insisting on excellence in performance to the idea that I have that 

privatized screeners are not adequate. Make the Federal employees 

excellent. That has been done in many, many places. 

We certainly don’t criticize our first responders in terms of their 

service, and we have no criticism of the young men and women 

who have come into our military service, non-privatized, who have 

offered themselves to serve. We would expect no less from transportation security officers. They are on the front line. 

TSA informs us that the performance of privatized screeners is 

comparable to that of the Federalized workforce. I want our TSO 

to be better than privatized workers, and I believe our focus should 

be on how we achieve that. We don’t need equals in this business; 

the Federal Government is always expected to be better than. We 

have the responsibility of millions of Americans all across this Nation. They look to us, this great Nation who uses the terminology 

‘‘great,’’ to be great and to be excellent. 

The reality is that security incidents have occurred at both airports with privatized and Federalized screeners. Under the watch 

of privatized screeners at San Francisco International Airport, a 
4 

woman pushed through a closed checkpoint lane, boarded a plane, 

and flew to Baltimore without ever being screened. 

The statute establishing the SPP did not endeavor to micromanage TSA’s decision to include or exclude an airport from participation. It was to show a sense of openness. Sixteen is enough. 

Rather, it gave proper deference to the administrator’s judgment by 

stating that he may approve an application. 

Now, I know from this very hearing we will see the potential 

amendments coming in, Mr. Administrator, trying to demand and 

say that you shall, just as we have seen in the language of the FAA 

bill. That is unfortunate. I am sorry that we are having this hearing after the fact. But I will live to rise again, and I will find a 

way, just like others did, to undo that, because I think it is wrong. 

Unfortunately, despite having never been debated by this committee, the committee of jurisdiction, and no Members being appointed as conferees on behalf of the committee, the controlling 

statute was amended in the FAA Reauthorization Act, which will 

soon become law. That is called midnight legislating—in the dark, 

no transparency, and adhering to the voices of one tune. 

The new standard limits TSA’s flexibility to approve or deny an 

application from an airport to opt out, places a time limitation of 

120 days on TSA to determine whether to approve an application, 

and provides a waiver for the requirement that a private contracted screening company be owned and controlled by a United 

States citizen. 

Now, just a few years ago, everyone was up in arms about the 

potential of ports being owned by foreign entities. We have resolved 

and/or studied that issue, and I assume that it is still being studied. But there is no doubt that aviation still remains one of the 

most attractive entities for individual franchise terrorists. Now we 

suggest waivers, even if the company is owned by a foreign entity 

or the airport is owned by a foreign entity? How outrageous. 

I look forward to hearing from the administrator on his views of 

the changes to the SPP statute and how he intends to continue to 

develop TSA into the Federal counterterrorism network he envisioned. He comes with years of experience with the FBI, who I understand and he knows full well are meticulous in their responsibilities, ensuring the security domestically. We can do no less when 

it comes to this Nation’s skies and as well for those who travel 

internationally on our soil, into our area. 

As we look forward to what I hope will be a productive year, Mr. 

Chairman, let us not forget the lessons of the past, one of which 

is that the system of privatized screeners failed us on 9/11. There 

is no further sentence that I need to make. The 9/11 day of horror 

was partly on the watch of privatized screeners. 

The wisdom of the United States Congress in the immediacy of 

those tragic days was to come together and find a way to ensure 

that TSO was a Federal system over which we had the opportunity 

to provide intelligence, training, oversight, and, yes, security for 

the American people. I see nothing has changed today, and I would 

hope we change nothing in spite of the FAA legislation. I ask the 

administration to reject the premise of that legislation, even as it 

has been signed. 

I yield back. 
5 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady. 

We have been advised we are going to be called for votes between 

3:45 and 4:00, so we will try to move. 

But now I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. Thompson, for any statement he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am pleased that Administrator Pistole could join us today to 

discuss TSA’s Screening Partnership Program. I would like to also 

extend a welcome to our second panel of witnesses. 

It is my hope that some of the myths and rhetoric surrounding 

this program can be put to bed today. 

By this hearing title, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 

have implied that the current use of Federal screeners impedes job 

growth. There is no proof in law or fact for that assertion. The 

number of screeners at an airport is determined by an analysis of 

the risk threat and volume at that airport. These factors will not 

change based on whether the screeners are private contractors or 

Federal employees, so the number of jobs will not change based on 

whether the screeners are public- or private-sector employees. 

Under the Republican suggestion, the only thing that will change 

is whether the jobs will be public or private. We know that both 

types of screeners are effective and face challenges, follow the same 

rules, and receive the same training. We also know that private 

screeners cost up to 9 percent more than Federal screeners. We 

know that public and private screeners can join unions. So the only 

real difference is cost. What we want to know is why the Republicans seem to be willing to pay more for the same service and how 

doing so will create jobs. 

If the added cost to taxpayers fails to convince you that this program should not be expanded, consider that it takes us back to a 

model similar to the one in place during 9/11. Administrator Pistole 

performed a full review of TSA’s policies and practices and determined that the SPP should not be expanded unless there was a 

clear and substantial advantage to doing so. 

Contrary to claims made at the time, the administrator did not 

shut down the program. Rather, he set a reasonable standard for 

expansion. That standard was met last week by a low-risk seasonal 

airport in Montana, and TSA approved their application. TSA did 

so because the net impact was advantageous to Government. 

On the same day, TSA denied the applications of two airports because they failed to demonstrate an operational, security, or cost 

advantage over Federalized screening applications. Both of these 

directions are perfectly logical. 

Regrettably, this hearing comes a day late and a dollar short for 

the committee. Last week, the FAA Reauthorization Act was 

passed by the House and soon will be signed into law. As described 

by subcommittee Ranking Member Jackson Lee, that aviation safety bill contained a security provision within this committee’s sole 

jurisdiction altering the law controlling the SPP. In summarizing 

this provision, it amounts to a Congressional attempt to micromanage the SPP by stripping the administrator of his discretion. 

Without this committee having held one hearing, markup, or debate on the changes proposed, Homeland Security Members were 
6 

denied a seat at the table by the Speaker when the provisions went 

to Congress. Chairman King and I sent a letter to the Speaker just 

2 weeks ago requesting that jurisdiction over DHS be consolidated. 

Apparently, under this leadership, even when you have jurisdiction 

you get left out. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank my colleague from Mississippi. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that the opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have two distinguished panels of witnesses 

with us today. 

The first panel, we would like to welcome the Honorable John 

Pistole. He has been the administrator of the TSA at the Department of Homeland Security since 2010. As the administrator, he 

oversees the management of approximately 60,000 employees, the 

security operations of more than 450 Federalized airports throughout the United States, the Federal Air Marshal Service, and the security of our highways, railroads, ports, mass transit systems, and 

pipelines. 

Welcome, Mr. Pistole. The floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Rogers, 

and Ranking Members Jackson Lee and Thompson, Members of the 

committee. It is good to see you. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration’s mission to protect the freedom of movement for people and commerce. I also appreciate the opportunity to update the committee on the progress 

we continue to make in our efforts to develop and deploy a range 

of risk-based intelligence-driven initiatives to prevent terrorist attacks while facilitating the movement of people and goods across 

the United States and internationally. 

Our goal and No. 1 priority is to provide the most effective security in the most efficient way. TSA accomplishes this vital National 

security mission through a series of public-private partnerships. 

For example, last year alone, TSA invested nearly $2.5 billion in 

the private sector in critical services, technology, and equipment 

across all transportation modes. Since 2002, our experienced workforce has safely screened more than 5 billion passengers through 

a multi-layered security system. 

Throughout 2011, we began evaluating the benefits of several 

risk-based security screening concepts, including TSA PreCheck, an 

initiative which, as many of you know and some have experienced, 

began last fall and is currently operating in seven of our country’s 

busiest airports. Participation in TSA PreCheck is currently open 

to U.S. citizens who are members of existing Customs and Border 

Protection trusted traveller programs as well as certain airline frequent fliers. 

In the few months since we began this initiative, over 310,000 

passengers have gone through TSA PreCheck, and the feedback we 

have been receiving from participants has been consistently posi-
7 

tive. As a result, we have plans to expand this initiative to other 

airports and other U.S. airlines throughout 2012. 

There is much more to risk-based security than just TSA 

PreCheck. Other efforts recently developed and deployed include S– 

90 screening of over 300,000 airline pilots in 10 airports, changes 

in screening procedures for the 60,000 or so children 12 and under 

traveling by air every day, and the expanded use of behavior detection techniques in 2 airports. Additionally, we are taking steps to 

further develop our layered approach to security through state-ofthe-art technologies, additional canine teams, better passenger 

identification techniques, and other actions which strengthen our 

capability to keep terrorists off aircraft. 

By continuing our efforts to move away from a one-size-fits-all 

approach, risk-based security is helping to move TSA toward becoming a high-performing organization with a counterterrorism 

focus. The goal behind all of this is to look for ways to conduct the 

most effective security in the most efficient way. Doing so allows 

us to focus our resources on those travelers we know the least 

about or those on the terrorist watchlist, thereby reducing the size 

of the haystack in which a terrorist may hide. Combine that focus 

with a more comprehensive use of classified and other intelligence 

and we are in a better position to inform the security screening 

process. 

As has been mentioned, through ATSA, Congress also created a 

means to assess the effectiveness of privatized screening through 

the SPP program beginning in 2002 with five airports. Currently, 

among the more than 450 airports with security overseen by TSA, 

there are, as has been mentioned, the 16 airports in the SPP. As 

you may know and as was noted, I recently approved one more application, West Yellowstone, and if a contract for private screening 

is awarded, the number will be 17. I have also recently denied two 

applications that did not provide a clear and substantial advantage 

to the taxpayers and our ability to achieve our mission. 

Given Senate passage of the FAA bill last night and assuming 

the President’s signature, we will assess the implications of the 

new law, and I will direct appropriate resources and engagement 

to carry out its intent, all in coordination with this and other oversight committees. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

[The statement of Mr. Pistole follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE

FEBRUARY 7, 2012 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of the subcommittee, 

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Screening Partnership Program (SPP). TSA employs risk-based, 

intelligence-driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation’s transportation system to terrorism. Our goal at all times is 

to maximize transportation security to stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while 

protecting passengers’ privacy and facilitating the secure and efficient flow of legitimate commerce. TSA’s current security measures create a multi-layered system of 

transportation security that identifies, manages, and mitigates risk. No layer on its 

own solves all our challenges, but, in combination, they create a strong and formidable system. 

TSA has an experienced Federal workforce that has safely screened more than 5 

billion passengers since TSA was created and has established a multi-layered avia-
8 

tion security system reaching from the time a ticket is purchased, throughout a passenger’s flight, to the time the passenger exits the secure area of their destination 

airport. Every day we see the effectiveness of these security measures with TSA Officers (TSO) detecting hundreds of prohibited items. In fact, over the past decade 

TSOs have confiscated approximately 50 million prohibited items, and last year 

alone TSOs prevented more than 1,200 guns from being brought onto passenger aircraft. 

As our risk-based approach evolves, we must ensure that each new step we take 

strengthens security. In addition to exploring new ways of focusing our attention 

where it is most needed, we are continually reevaluating existing programs to ensure that our resources are directed in a manner that yields the greatest level of 

security overall. This continued reevaluation includes the SPP. 

Along with the creation of TSA itself, Congress determined that aviation security 

would be most effectively served by having passenger screening as a predominantly 

Federal responsibility. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (Pub. 

L. 107–71) nevertheless established a privatized security screening pilot program 

(see 49 U.S.C. 44919). Under the pilot program, TSA was required to select five airports from five airport security risk categories, as defined by the administrator, to 

participate. Screening companies that met statutory qualifications were selected to 

provide comparable screening services through contract with the Federal Government, using employees who met the same qualifications and were compensated at 

the same level as Federal Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), and who met the 

same rigorous security standards as those in effect at airports with Federal security 

staffs. In addition, ATSA established a program through which the administrator 

could contract with additional qualified private screening companies for screening 

at other U.S. airports after completion of the pilot program (see 49 U.S.C. 44920). 

Under the SPP, airports may apply to TSA to have screening carried out by a qualified private screening company. As with the pilot program, private screeners must 

meet the same qualifications as TSOs and must be provided compensation and benefits at a level equal to or greater than the compensation and benefits provided to 

TSOs. Still, regardless of whether an airport has private or Federal screeners, TSA 

remains ultimately responsible for security, with Federal Security Directors overseeing the contracted operations as well as the other airport security operations, 

such as air cargo and facility security compliance inspections that continue to be 

conducted only by Federal employees. 

Currently, among our 450 airports with Federal screening, there are 16 airports 

participating in the SPP. These include the original five pilot airports—San Francisco International; Kansas City International; Greater Rochester International; 

Jackson Hole; and Tupelo Regional—and 11 others—Sioux Falls Regional; Key West 

International; Charles M. Schultz-Sonoma County; Roswell Industrial Air Center; 

and seven small Montana airports: Frank Wiley Field; Sidney Richland Regional; 

Dawson Community; L.M. Clayton; Wokal Field; Havre City County; and Lewiston 

Municipal. In the most recent study conducted by TSA and examined by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) comparing the cost of screening at SPP airports 

and airports with a Federal screener workforce, we estimated that the cost to TSA 

of contracted screening is generally between 3 and 9 percent more than the cost of 

Federal screening. While GAO identified limitations in our initial cost estimates, 

their updated review in March 2011 noted that they believed ‘‘TSA has made 

progress in addressing three of seven limitations related to cost we identified in our 

January 2009 report and now has a more reasonable basis for comparing the cost 

of SPP and non-SPP airports.’’ 

Shortly after I was confirmed as TSA Administrator, I directed a full review of 

TSA policies and programs with an eye toward helping the agency evolve into a 

more agile, high-performing organization that can detect and respond to evolving security threats. The SPP is just one program that I reviewed. At the time, I did not 

see any clear and substantial advantage to expanding the program, though I remained committed to maintaining contractor screening where it then existed. Now, 

as then, I am open to approving new applications where a clear and substantial benefit could be realized. 

That being said, TSA remains a U.S. Government counterterrorism agency. To 

fulfill our responsibility in this mission, it is important to maintain our flexibility— 

as new and emerging threats are identified, we must be able to adapt and modify 

our procedures quickly to protect the traveling public and promote the flow of legitimate commerce. As such, contracts with private service providers must include the 

flexibility to deliver screening comparable to that provided by Federal screening. Additionally, with a Federal workforce we have greater flexibility to more easily augment staff in the event of exigent circumstances such as natural disasters, or for 

surge capabilities, with National Deployment Office (NDO) screeners or screeners 
9 

from nearby TSA-operated airports. Nevertheless, as noted above, I remain committed to maintaining a contractor workforce where such existed as of January of 

2011, as appropriate. 

As noted at the outset, we strive to maximize security not only by keeping ahead 

of current threats identified by intelligence, but by maintaining security systems 

that focus our resources on areas where they will yield the optimal benefit. This is 

consistent with our risk-based approach to security and critical in times of budget 

austerity. The SPP, no less than any other security program, must be implemented 

in a manner determined by cost as well as demonstrable benefits. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I will be happy to answer 

any questions that you may have. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize myself first for questions, and then we will alternate from side to side in the order Members arrived. 

Mr. Pistole, about 4 months ago, I sent a letter to you. 

By the way, I would like to ask unanimous consent to offer that 

for the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN ROGERS TO ADMINISTRATOR PISTOLE

OCTOBER 14, 2011,Washington, DC. 

The Honorable JOHN S. PISTOLE, 

Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598. 

DEAR ADMINISTRATOR PISTOLE: I am writing to express my strong concerns regarding the September 27, 2011 ruling of the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in the case of FirstLine Transportation Security, Inc. (FirstLine) vs. The United 

States and Akal Security, Inc. 

According to the ruling, the Court found that TSA’s acquisitions process in this 

case was fundamentally flawed and must be set aside. The Court specifically found 

that TSA awarded a Screening Partnership Program (SPP) contract to Akal Security 

to provide screening services at Kansas City International Airport in Kansas City, 

Missouri (MCI) despite the fact that its proposal was found to be significantly weaker overall than the proposal submitted by FirstLine, the contractor currently providing screening services at MCr. The Court specifically cited, among other criticisms, that: 

• The best-value analysis performed by TSA’s Source Selection Evaluation Board 

was both irrational and inconsistent with the evaluation criteria set forth in the 

Request for Proposal (RFP), and that the award to Akal Security was fundamentally unfair; and 

• TSA not only ignored the dramatic difference in the number of strengths assigned to each of the proposals, but that it also irrationally minimized the significant differences between the proposals. 

These findings call into question TSA’s ability to make responsible contracting decisions, and whether taxpayer dollars were unnecessarily wasted in this process. 

Moreover, I am deeply concerned that a contractor was selected to screen passengers 

and help secure our aviation system despite TSA’s own admission, according to the 

Court’s ruling, that it would pose more operational risk and require Governmental 

intervention. This type of poor judgment is unacceptable in my view, considering the 

continued threats to aviation security. I hope you will agree that TSA runs the unnecessary risk of endangering travelers and causing serious economic damage by 

narrowly focusing on the cost advantages of one SPP proposal over another, rather 

than a true comparison in the ability to carry out security screening services. 

SPP was authorized by Congress in 2001 and it has been a successful program 

over the last 10 years. TSA has repeatedly certified that all private screeners perform at or above the level of Transportation Security Officers. Kansas City International Airport is one of the largest U.S. airports participating in SPP, first entering the program in 2002. I am concerned that, particularly in light of your decision 

in January to limit expansion of this program, TSA’s improper contracting decision 

involving one of the programs largest airports and one of its highest-performing private screening companies seems to indicate that TSA is not serious about the program and would rather see it fail than succeed. I continue to feel strongly that the 
10 

private sector has an important role to play in security and must be properly leveraged, not forced out of the process in favor of a larger Federal workforce. 

While it is my sincere hope that the poor handling of this RFP resulted from 

human error and was not intentionally flawed, I am requesting your full cooperation 

and assistance to bring greater transparency to the rationale behind this decision 

and ensure that any deficiencies are addressed quickly. I request that you provide 

by no later than October 24, 2011, copies of all documents and communications created by or in the possession of TSA that pertain to the RFP issued by TSA on April 

2, 2010, and the subsequent related contract award decision made on March 17, 

2011, to perform SPP contract screening services at the Kansas City International 

Airport. The terms ‘‘documents’’ and ‘‘communications’’ are intended to mean all 

records including, but not limited to, files, reports, analysis, assessments, memoranda, notes, and presentations, in all forms of media, including emails or other 

electronic communications, and including any archived materials. 

Additionally, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, I intend to hold a hearing on SPP and the handling of the MCI contract in the coming 

weeks, and I respectfully request that you provide testimony at this hearing. I understand that TSA has already made a decision to issue a new RFP for the MCI 

contract following the Court’s ruling. I urge you to postpone any action on this RFP 

until the subcommittee can complete a review of the documents requested and conduct necessary oversight of TSA’s acquisitions process in support of a robust SPP 

and proper use of taxpayer dollars. 

Thank you for your prompt and personal attention to this matter. I appreciate 

your continuing efforts to secure the Nation’s transportation systems and look forward to working with you to improve TSA’s performance in carrying out its critical 

mission. 

Sincerely, 

MIKE ROGERS, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security. 

Mr. ROGERS. I sent a letter to you expressing my concern over 

the ruling of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in the case of 

FirstLine v. U.S. and Akal Security, Inc. I have just submitted that 

for the record. 

The curious thing about the SPP contracting problem at Kansas 

City is the timing of it. Specifically, it came on the heels of your 

public statement that SPP doesn’t fit into your vision for a Federal 

workforce. My concern is whether the decision made in the Kansas 

City case could have been affected in some way by the fact that 

TSA does not want SPP to be successful and an integral part of its 

operations. 

We have the director of the Kansas City aviation here today, who 

will offer his perspective on the second panel, but before we hear 

him, I would like for you to address this concern. Why did the Kansas City contract go so wrong? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There were several issues that we found in the Court of Federal 

Claim’s decision where we could have done a better job. Part of 

that was in our assessment of not only the best value but the cost 

and the security aspects that were inherent. Of course, this was an 

SPP airport that was continuing as an SPP airport; it was just a 

question of which private screener was the best value to the taxpayers and could provide the best security. 

The other finding that the court made was that we did not do 

as good a job as we could have—and I agree with this—in documenting our findings, both between the board that reviewed this 

and then the source selection authority. 

I do note that the court ruled in our favor on six of eight issues, 

but the key takeaways were we could have done a better job on 
11 

both our analysis and our documentation. Then the question became, how should we move forward? 

So, clearly, we and I am supportive of Kansas City. They have 

had a good provider there, in terms of their private screening. The 

whole intent, as evidenced by this, was to continue that. It was a 

question of which private company was best suited to provide those 

services. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

The former Federal security director of Kansas City Airport, Mr. 

Richard Curasi, was working as an advisor for Akal Security at the 

time the company submitted its proposal and won the bid to take 

the screening services at the Kansas City Airport. Were you aware 

of that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I was not. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, did anyone at TSA who was involved in making the award have direct contact with Mr. Curasi starting from 

the time the RFP was issued until the contract was awarded? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you concerned at all about the influence a 

former senior TSA employee could have had on the contracting 

process given his connections inside your agency? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, given that I was not aware of that—obviously, 

there is always the appearance that we need to be mindful of. But 

I was assured, in terms of review of this and looking at the court 

decision, that there was no improper influence, that everything was 

done according to the procurement, the acquisition process. 

But with the court’s findings, in terms of both our assessment 

and our documentation of our findings, we could have and should 

have done a better job. So, as a result of that court decision, I have 

changed the procedures to ensure that that does happen and that 

we don’t repeat the mistakes that we did in that instance. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

In the same letter I referenced earlier, I also urged you to postpone any action on the new RFP for Kansas City until the subcommittee could conduct necessary oversight. Despite my request, 

I understand that TSA intends to issue a full recompete of the 

Kansas City SPP contract. 

Why did you decide to go back to square one on that contract? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I looked at the court opinion, Mr. Chairman, and, 

in that, they noted that the permanent injunction was in the public 

interest because, and I quote, ‘‘It will promote full and open competition in the procurement process.’’ That is from page 73 of the 

decision. 

So, given that and the belief that by opening it up again we 

would have the opportunity to look at perhaps another contractor 

that could come in and do at least as good, if not a better, job than 

the two who had competed, that, coupled with several changes in 

the statement of work from 2010, added to my belief that we 

should simply open it back up. 

As I would also note from the court decision, they concluded, the 

judge concluded, ‘‘What course of action TSA chooses to pursue 

after the contract is cancelled in order to maintain security screening services at MCI’’—Kansas City—‘‘is not for this court to decide.’’ So I took that discretionary function and exercised it. 
12 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you know how much it has cost so far for this 

recompete and how much it will cost? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I don’t know the details. I would be glad to get that 

and get back with you on that. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that. 

I see my time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Ms. Jackson Lee, for any questions she may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much, and 

thank you to all the Members. 

Mr. Pistole, I am going to be speaking quite quickly so I can get 

some quick answers from you. Thank you, first of all, for your testimony and your service. 

Administrator Pistole, you state in your prepared testimony that 

TSA is a U.S. counterterrorism agency. What other domestic 

counterterrorism agency has outsourced the work of their front-line 

employees at an extra expense to taxpayers? Do you know of any? 

Mr. PISTOLE. None that I am aware of, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

As I addressed in my opening statement, a provision fundamentally altering your discretion to approve or deny an application to 

participate in the SPP will soon become law via the FAA Reauthorization Act. Since this committee never debated these changes and 

was shut out of the conference by the Republican leadership, I 

would like to take the time to review some of the key changes 

made and to get your response. 

I also want to join my colleague, Mr. Thompson, and indicate 

that I am aghast at the emphasis of lack of employment, when obviously people who work in the Federal Government—you might 

just answer this, Mr. Pistole—are they people who are not unemployed? If they are working for you, they are not unemployed. Is 

that my understanding? If someone is working for the Federal Government, they are not in the unemployment line. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, in essence, we are creating necessary jobs. 

Is that—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. 

The language of this specific legislation requires you to approve 

an airport’s application to the SPP if the approval would not compromise security or detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency or the effectiveness of the screening of passengers or property at the airport. 

What impact will this language have on your decision not to expand the SPP unless there is a clear and substantial benefit to do 

so? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, let me first say, ma’am, that obviously we are 

just assessing this at this point. So this is just an initial response. 

But, obviously, it is changing the burden, if you will, on—and the 

discretion that I have in terms of making that decision, which is 

to be in the taxpayers’ best interest in terms of cost, but also, obviously, the bottom line is who is providing best security. So if I am 

required to accept something unless I can prove affirmatively that 

it does not meet that criteria, it obviously changes the standard. 
13 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That burden, I think, makes everyone—well, 

makes your job more difficult, not that you are opposed to difficulty, but more difficult in securing this country. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, obviously, Congress has passed this law and 

the President is intending to sign it, I believe. So I look forward 

to working with the committee to figure out the best way forward 

on this. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I would argue to say that a non-security 

committee passed the bill. So I would make that point. 

Does this language have the potential to increase the cost to taxpayers for administering the SPP due to the need for increased 

oversight and management? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, clearly, if there is a flood of applications that 

come in, we will have to increase our headquarters staffing to handle those, as we have a small staff now to handle the 16 and now 

17, potentially 17, SPP airports. But, yes, hypothetically, if every 

airport, all 450, or the remaining came in, then, yes, we would 

have to increase our staffing substantially. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So now this process opens it up to all 450 airports in the United States; is that correct? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is my understanding, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, then, my comment, we are looking forward 

to returning to 9/11. 

The language requires you to approve or deny an airport’s application within 120 days. Does that pose a stressful time frame? Is 

that adequate for you to conduct full review of the security implications? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, there are a lot of aspects to that, but, yes, 

that is a compressed time schedule. For example, if there is one application, it is much easier to comply with that than if there are 

10 or if there are 100. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want to go back to the thought that I raised 

in my opening statement. The language contains a provision 

waiving the requirement that any company contracted with for 

screening services be owned and controlled by a United States citizen. Thankfully, that language contains a clause that affords you 

complete discretion to reject any application that requires this 

waiver. 

As you well know, Administrator Pistole, we live in a complex 

world with shifts in allegiances and a dynamic threat environment. 

One need look no further than to some of the activities that are 

going on with our neighbors in the Mideast, the pending complexity 

of Iran and its nuclear weaponization; some of the individual franchise terrorist acts that have occurred over the last decade, even 

after 9/11, though this Nation has been very fortunate; and, of 

course, the concern about, as you mentioned, the idea of sharing intelligence. 

My question to you: Will you commit to us today that during 

your tenure as administrator you will not approve any application 

that requires a waiver of the citizenship requirement on the basis 

of the need for the securing of intelligence and the securing of this 

Nation? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, clearly, madam, I would need to review any 

application. The fact that it would be a foreign-owned company, I 
14 

would need to look at the intent of Congress, but that does give me 

concern about the—potential concern about the issues that might 

be inherent in that business. 

But, again, I am just seeing this language for the first time, so 

I need some more time to assess that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I just have—let me just follow 

up with him—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, we have—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. For a moment. 

Mr. Lungren [continuing]. Fifteen minutes until we are supposed 

to have a vote. There are four Members who would like to ask 

questions. Could we proceed in regular order, please? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me do this, Mr. Lungren. Mr. Chairman, I will defer to you, but let me just put this question on the 

record. 

Mr. Lungren, you are not the Chairman at this time. 

Mr. ROGERS. The time has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Excuse me. 

Mr. LUNGREN. We have four other Members—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Regular order. 

Mr. LUNGREN [continuing]. Who would like to ask questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Excuse me, Mr. Lungren—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Out of respect to other Members—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. You are not the Chairman. 

I am asking to put this question on the record. I will not ask for 

an answer, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lungren is not the Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would just ask you to submit it for the record. 

Let’s go to Mr. Thompson for any questions he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pistole, I am concerned that comments by some lobbying for 

the expansion of privatized screening has resulted in a misunderstanding of what this would mean for the flying public. 

We created this entity, TSA, after 9/11. If a similar incident occurred today, would you have the authority to direct private screeners to other locations? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Under the existing contracts, no. They would be 

limited to the airport to which they are assigned. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, basically, the ability to respond based on an 

incident is hampered by your inability to move private screeners 

where that situation could potentially be. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, that is one of the limitations that is part of 

the contract process which we could address in future contracts. 

But under existing contracts, that would be a voluntary aspect of 

that, so I cannot direct them. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

In your experience in negotiating public and private contracts, 

has it been your experience that private contracts for screeners cost 

more than Federal contracted screeners? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Under the existing SPP contracts, they have all, I 

believe, except for one, cost more than it would have cost for the 

Federal Government to have the TSOs there. 

The incidence last week where I approved the application from 

West Yellowstone is another exception because they—I believe they 

will be able to come in with a bid that will be less than what we 
15 

would be able to do because we are sending people in on temporary 

duty assignment for the 4 months that West Yellowstone is open. 

So that would be another exception. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you clarify for us what screening protocols 

must be followed by privatized screeners? 

Mr. PISTOLE. The same as for all other Federalized airports. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Do privatized screeners, in your experience, perform better than their Federal counterparts? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I believe that they—every assessment is that they 

perform comparably to the Federalized workforce, both in terms of 

security and in terms of customer engagement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, again, all things being equal, at this point 

your experience is, other than the cost associated with private 

screeners versus Federal contracted screeners, we are pretty much 

on par. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Now, one other issue. Does maintaining a mixed-use, public-private model of screening cost taxpayers more or less if the entire 

system is Federalized? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, it costs us slightly more to have both the Federal and the SPP airports. Is that what—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, it does. 

Mr. THOMPSON. What your testimony basically is, is that one system would allow the taxpayers a greater savings than managing a 

two-part system? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, yeah, I mean, the taxpayers are paying either 

way, whether it is to the Federal employees, the TSOs, or to the 

privatized screeners, who also have overhead for a private company. 

Mr. THOMPSON. But they are paying more. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. So, in the past—and now we have driven 

that down, but, in the past, it has been anywhere from 3 to 9 percent more than the Federal approach. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Does the gentleman yield? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield back. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. THOMPSON. We need to go on with some of the—— 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Minnesota is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to yield— 

I will not yield at this time. 

Mr. Pistole, thank you very much for coming. I appreciate it. 

Just in the spirit of what I believe this committee should be all 

about, which is finding solutions to the problems, I would like to 

yield 30 seconds of my time to answer Ms. Jackson Lee’s question. 

Would that be all right? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is fine with me. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Jackson Lee, you are recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 
16 

Mr. Pistole, TSA has a veterans preference. In privatizing, would 

you be able to ensure that there would be a veterans preference for 

private companies? 

Mr. PISTOLE. We would be able to negotiate that as part of the 

contract. As I think you are aware, approximately 24 percent of the 

overall TSA workforce are veterans. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would it be an extra cost, sir, for privatized? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I don’t know that. I would have to look into that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. We appreciate the yielding of the 

gentleman, and I will pursue that further with the administrator. 

I thank the Chairman for his kindness. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I will reclaim my time. 

First off, thank you very much, sir. I appreciate everything you 

have done. I have gone through that PreCheck. It is slick. What it 

does—it is fantastic—it concentrates our limited resources on 

known and unknown threats, and it is just absolutely awesome. I 

commend you on that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. One of the things I want to bring up, too, is there 

is a big difference between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 security, whether 

you are privatized or you are a Federal employee. As an airline 

pilot that went pre-9/11, I can dramatically see the difference. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. So it is a completely different ball game—much 

more professional group, much more adherence and concentrating 

on security. As an airline pilot for 17 years, I can see the big difference. 

One of the questions that I want to just really bring out relatively quickly is, a while back, SPP applications for six airports 

in February 2011, TSA denied the applications for the six, indicated that they did not allow the expansion for the program. Later 

in 2011, we walked it back a little bit and we said there had to 

be a clear and substantial advantage to the TSA airport, like you 

had said. 

How did the TSA determine the threshold for the airport participating in the SPP, in that the airport must demonstrate that there 

is a clear and substantial advantage in order to create that determination? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you for your comments about PreCheck. The men and women of TSA are excited by 

that because of the service they are able to provide, which, frankly, 

they had been hampered on previously. So thank you for that. 

So, obviously, the process is an airport applies. Thus far, you 

know, in the 10-plus years that TSA has been in existence, we have 

only had 30 or so airports actually apply for the SPP status. Now, 

some of those, a couple times because they were denied. So only 30 

out of the 450-plus airports. 

So when they apply, then we evaluate that. Under this new criteria, it would be: Is there a clear and substantial advantage to the 

taxpayer, for the one? So is there a cost benefit that is improved 

in some way that we can show that there is a savings to the taxpayer? Then obviously they have to comply with all the security 

protocols and regimens. 
17 

So it really comes down to, unless there is a clear and substantial advantage, then what benefit is there in changing if it would 

cost more and simply provide the same level of security? 

Mr. CRAVAACK. The metrics that you were applying, do you have 

a copy? Can you forward those metrics to us? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I basically outlined what they are. In terms of the 

cost, and so what do we assess the cost as being? Then the security 

protocols should be absolutely the same, if not better than the current standard operating procedures for TSA. So that is really what 

it comes down to. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. For the private organizations that did 

apply for the SPP program, did you get back to them on telling how 

their applications could be improved, why they were deficient? 

Mr. PISTOLE. What we asked them to do is come in and provide 

what they believed would be the clear, substantial indicia or information that would indicate why they would be a better proposition 

than the Federal—so we didn’t go back and say, ‘‘A, B, C, D, E, address these issues,’’ if that is what you are asking. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay, you did not do that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Did not do that. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. 

I am running quickly out of time, but I guess the big thing for 

us is we want to make—everybody here on this panel wants to 

make sure that we have an effective and efficient TSA. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I appreciate that. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. You know—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is my goal also. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Yeah, I know it. It is a bipartisan issue. We have 

worked on a lot of different issues regarding transportation as well. 

The big thing I think we want to make sure that we have public 

is that there is a beneficial cost associated with the privatized, if 

there is one; and, No. 2, that we have an effective system that you 

are able to manage. 

So, with that, I am out of time and I will yield back. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

We are supposed to be called for votes soon, but I understand 

that Mr. Mica has joined us, the Chairman of the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, and would like to sit at the 

dais. So I would ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to 

do so. 

Without objection. 

Welcome, Mr. Mica. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, is recognized. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, Mr, Pistole, thank you for the PreCheck program. I 

think that is a move in the right direction. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Having said that, though, you know my consternation with respect to this program. Let me ask you, is there any 

statutory language that reads that you must find clear and substantial advantage before you can approve a private contractor? 

Mr. PISTOLE. None that I am aware of, no. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So it is not part of the statute; it is something—— 
18 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. 

Mr. LUNGREN [continuing.] That you have put as your additional 

requirement. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. Trying to understand what I believed the Congressional intent was in terms of creating TSA, you know, after 

9/11 as a Federalized workforce, with the exception of the SPP, you 

know, the initial five and that assessment of whether privatized 

airports could add value. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Right. So it is not part of the statute. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Not my knowledge, no. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Would you think it unreasonable for an airport 

such as the one in my district to not have applied for this yet because they believe this is disfavored by you and by TSA? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, I would hope that each airport would make 

a business decision to assess what would be best for their passengers, for their—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. I understand that. But let me ask you, if you were 

told that they have to prove a clear and substantial advantage, 

even though everything else must be equal—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Uh-huh. 

Mr. LUNGREN [continuing]. If you observe that the TSA, in trying 

to make a comparison of the costs, initially said they were doubledigit, but Government Accounting Office when they looked at it 

said, you know, ‘‘TSA, you have forgotten about the cost of Federal 

retirement,’’ and then you brought that in and you brought, I 

think, the difference down to about 3 percent; and if you saw what 

happened in Kansas City where the court—frankly, I would be embarrassed if a court said this about me or my client, that—it was 

an 81-page decision which reversed, in the court’s words, ‘‘a fundamentally flawed source selection by the TSA.’’ 

They said, the TSA did not conduct a proper best-value analysis. 

The court found, TSA arbitrarily deviated from their own procedures that they had put in place. It said that TSA did not document its evaluation and decision. It said that TSA’s price evaluation scheme was irrational. The only way you could overturn something like this is if you find it arbitrary and capricious. They found, 

frankly, TSA to be arbitrary and capricious. 

Then it is extended out over time, and if I am an operator of an 

airport, that doesn’t suggest to me that TSA is going to be objective 

in this; it sounds to me like TSA is going to make it extremely difficult for me. 

So, I mean, I have an airport in my district that would want to 

do it. They have not applied to you, at this point in time. But I just 

want to set for the record that that is not because they do not wish 

to. 

So you keep quoting this number that, out of 400-and-some-odd 

airports, only so many have applied. Then you have told me you 

don’t want to approve very many—you just approved West Yellowstone? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. How many flights do they have a day? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I don’t know. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Have you ever been to West Yellowstone? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Never been there. 
19 

Mr. LUNGREN. I have been to West Yellowstone. It is not one of 

the large metropolises of America. Although I did get good ice shaving there one time. If you ever want to find some good ice shaving 

and you are coming out of Yellowstone, you will find that that 

works very, very well. 

There have been things that have been said on this dais today 

that don’t insult the Federal employee, and I do not wish to insult 

the Federal employee, but to insult the private employee I think is 

irresponsible, to suggest that the private employee cannot do a 

good job. 

Are you suggesting to us that the security at San Francisco 

International Airport, the largest airport that has a private contractor, is less than what it is at any other airport? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely not. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Would you allow that to be the case? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely not. If they didn’t do the job, then we 

would seek another company or whatever other options. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I mean, I do not understand why we have to sit 

here and suggest that if you have a private employee, that private 

employee is less than a public employee. Frankly, we ought to Federalize the entire American workforce and have 138 million people 

all working for the Federal Government if that happens to be the 

case. 

I know that you oppose the proposition that was in the law, but 

you have said that you will work to enforce that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I know, from your record, that you will do that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I just hope you will not add any additional things, 

such as ‘‘clear and substantial advantage’’ or whatever else you 

would come up with, to undo the intent of Congress, as you suggest 

that we are trying to follow the intent of Congress. 

With that, I see my time is over, and I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

We have been called for votes, but I want to recognize Mr. Mica 

for his set of questions. 

You are recognized for 5 minutes. Thanks for joining us. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Thompson, 

Members of the committee, for affording me a few minutes. Hopefully—well, I will definitely finish within my 5. 

I am pleased to have Administrator Pistole. He has probably one 

of the toughest jobs in Washington. It is very difficult. 

Of course, you know my history, having been involved—I was 

chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee. The good Lord gave me 

that task in 2001, and the President wanted a bill on his desk by 

Thanksgiving after the attacks in September. Of course, we don’t 

have jurisdiction. I try to conduct oversight. I am also on Government Reform and try to do our, you know, good job in protecting 

the taxpayer and the flying public. It is an important mission. 

But that being said, we are here now, and there is great frustration, as you know. You have probably heard some of it today. We 

have talked, and I think that we need to get to a risk-based system. I was pleased also—I wasn’t here but I heard of your willingness to work with the committee to implement the new language, 
20 

and that is important. I will work with you. We want this to be 

successful. We want to work with you, tried to work with Members 

of the Homeland Security Committee in that regard. 

But, you know, I have the most recent meltdowns—Honolulu, 

you know, was a meltdown; Charlotte Douglas; most recently, Liberty International. It is not just a couple, it is quite a few of the 

TSA employees you had problems with. Every time you pick up the 

paper—here is just last week’s headlines: ‘‘TSA Workers: The Theft 

Cops’’ and then ‘‘TSA Agent Arrested for Stealing iPads.’’ Those are 

a couple from last week. Then the recruitment and training, we spent $2.4 billion on recruitment and training. We trained 137,000 people. Actually, more 

people have left. I think we need to find a more efficient way. If 

we can incorporate that into the SPP model, I think we can have 

great savings there. That is something that I don’t think was in the 

GAO report. 

Then, you know, you have resorted—I know the difficulty in hiring people. You have advertised on the top of pizza boxes. This is 

pizza boxes. This was on the top of—I saw this on a National— 

well, I buy cheap gas. I went to a discount gas station and actually 

took that picture. I was stunned to find that Washington Reagan 

National, one of our most-targeted probably, and need-to-be-secure 

airports, is now hiring transportation security officers—it tells all 

the benefits—above the ‘‘cheapest gas in town’’ pump ad. 

You have gone to a huge number of screeners, 51,000; pretty substantial administrative staff, somewhere between 12,000 and 

14,000 out there. But right now, folks, for everyone in the administrative realm, we are looking at about 30 people—well, I will say 

25 people, just a little lower, in administrative—because have you 

marshals and others, we don’t want to count them in—overseeing 

this. 

We have looked at all the models. I looked at them before; I have 

looked at them around the country. The United States is now one 

of only a few Western countries—Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and 

the United States. Libya did have an all-Federal screening force. 

But you went and saw the models in Israel. I went before, I went 

back after you went there, and Napolitano. The United Kingdom, 

which had huge incidents of terrorists, probably faced terrorism far 

worse than we did, they all retain private screenings. 

No one is saying, do away with the Federal Government. No one 

is saying Federal employees do a bad job. But I want to get you 

out of the personnel business and into the security business—and 

I think that is so important, because we do have a threat—so you 

can focus. 

So, again—and the union issue. You know, the SPPs they joined 

unions before the Federal employees. Those in San Francisco and 

other places we looked at, sometimes the private screeners pay 

more money to retain people. The turnover is great. Maybe we 

could submit this comparison if it has it between San Francisco 

and Los Angeles. There is room for that. 

My only question, sir, is—you had stated to the committee that 

you would work with us, and I hope you will work with me, to try 

to improve this and implement the law that the President, we expect, will sign in a few days. 
21 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yeah. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I would like to ask you open-endedly before we go to vote, where 

do you see this going? Do you envision a time horizon in which you 

see an expansion of SPPs? Or is that something you really don’t 

want to see? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I think it is hard to forecast, Mr. Chairman. It is 

a good question because we, frankly, don’t know. 

You know, before my decision last year not to expand beyond the 

16 unless there is some clear and substantial benefit, as I mentioned, there had only been the handful, less than three dozen, that 

had applied. So even before that decision, it wasn’t like they were 

knocking down our doors. Now, to Congressman Lungren’s point, 

maybe there was a belief that we wouldn’t accept them. 

So I, frankly, don’t know what it will look like, but obviously we 

have to be prepared for any substantial number. 

If I could comment—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly. 

Mr. PISTOLE [continuing]. On Congressman Mica’s points, you 

raised a number of good points and, obviously, some philosophical 

differences. I don’t know, I don’t have visibility into the private 

workforces, but just as there are some outstanding security officers 

within the Federal Government and not so, I assume that is the 

same in the private sector. 

What we don’t hear about, for example, are some of the great stories. For example, the security officer at Newark who found $5,000 

and turned it in. Another officer saw a second officer taking the 

$5,000 and reported that. So, you know, good with the bad there. 

Then just last week in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a security officer 

whose apartment that he lived in caught on fire, the apartment 

building. He went back in and helped saved the lives of 10 people. 

So those things aren’t out there, but it just demonstrates that we 

have great people within the Federal Government. There are great 

people in the private sector. But, yeah, so, to answer your question, 

it is—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah, I don’t argue that. I mean, I think we all admire the great employees that we have in the Federal system. But 

we do have some good examples, like in San Francisco, where the 

private contractors are working wonderfully. 

So I am anxious to see, as the next few months unfold, if more 

people do pursue it, and if so, you know, how you view it. Because 

I just don’t want to close the door. I think there are some great opportunities out there for us to transition, as long as we can maintain comfort—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. That it is being done well. 

There is a real concern on my part, though, that we have seen 

the ratio of supervisors at the airports where we have SPP programs be pretty high—40 or 50 folks supervising at one airport. 

Can you speak to that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yeah—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you know what the ratio is? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, for example, at SFO, with over 1,000 security 

officers, TSOs, I don’t know the exact figure, but I think that 40 
22 

to 50 is probably right. Because the private company is simply 

doing the front-line workers and what we call the leads and I believe the supervisors. But all the managers and all the, as Congressman Mica refers to, the administrative staff, those things still 

have to be done. The private companies aren’t paying for that; we 

are paying for that. So—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Is that because you have contracted that you want 

to keep those responsibilities? So the private company could do it 

but you chose to maintain that authority? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I don’t know the specific contract provision on that, 

Chairman, so I will have to take that back and look at that. But 

that is the model. Whether that is by design or simply—and, obviously, the Federal security directors and the deputies in all the airports are still TSA employees. 

But there is a certain efficiency of doing that. So, for example, 

whether it is one of the small, Montana 7 or something, yeah, there 

has to be some TSA presence in order for us to oversee and make 

sure the protocols are being followed accordingly. 

So I will look into that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, and I will probably need to get back with you 

in a classified setting, because I have some pretty glaring examples 

that—they may be legitimate, they may be wrong, but also they 

may have some security reasons why. But I would like to know 

more about this ratio of TSA personnel to contract personnel in airports, as well as some TSA folks that are in other roles at airports. 

But I don’t want to bring that up in a public setting and—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. I appreciate that. 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. Compromise anything that might be inappropriate from your perspective. 

I hate that votes have been called. I have a whole lot of things 

I want to talk to you about, and these other guys and gals did too. 

But we don’t have control, and I don’t want to inconvenience you 

any further. 

I hate to delay the second panel, but I have to go vote. As soon 

as we get back, we will have our second panel. 

So, with that, Mr. Pistole, thank you for being here. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. We are in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.] 
(23) 

SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: WHY IS 

A JOB-CREATING, PUBLIC-PRIVATE RELATIONSHIP MEETING RESISTANCE AT TSA? 

DAY II 

Thursday, February 16, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:07 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Rogers, Cravaack, Turner, Jackson Lee, 

and Richmond. 

Mr. ROGERS. The subcommittee will come to order. I would like 

to welcome everybody back to this important hearing, and thank 

our witnesses for not only being here, but being so patient and accommodating to our schedule. Today the subcommittee will continue to examine the Screening Partnership Program and TSA’s 

willingness to work with the private sector to improve transportation security. Last week we had a very productive dialogue with 

Administrator Pistole on the role of private screeners under the 

SPP program. I appreciated Administrator Pistole’s testimony and 

candid responses to my questions and other Members’ questions. 

I now look forward to hearing from individuals who are directly 

impacted by the decisions TSA makes with regard to this important program. I hope that we can identify ways to improve this program and TSA’s relationship with the private sector. I now would 

like to recognize our panelists. 

We have Mr. Mark VanLoh is the director of aviation for the city 

of Kansas City. Mr. VanLoh oversees all aspects of the management, development, operation and maintenance of Kansas City 

International Airport and Charles B. Wheeler Downtown Airport. 

Prior to his tenure in Kansas City, Mr. VanLoh served with Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport Authority, where he was president 

and CEO since 2001. From 1998 to 2001, Mr. VanLoh was commissioner of airports for Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and 

Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, Ohio. Previously, he served 

as director of airports for the Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority 

in Toledo, Ohio, and director of aviation for the Greater Rockford 

Airport Authority in Rockford, Illinois. Mr. VanLoh is an accredited 

member of the American Association of Airport Executives, and 

serves on the board of directors for Airports Council International. 
24 

Mr. Steven Amitay is the Federal legislative counsel for the National Association of Security Companies, NASCO, the Nation’s 

largest contract security association. For the past 12 years, Mr. 

Amitay has represented ASIS International, the world’s largest association of security professionals, and was involved in the Congressional passage of the Private Security Officers Employment 

Authorization Act. Mr. Amitay previously served as a professional 

staff member of the then-Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Federalism, and the District of Columbia. 

Also Mr. John Gage is with us. He is the national president of 

the American Federation of Government Employees, the largest 

Federal employee union, representing 600,000 Federal and D.C. 

government workers Nation-wide and overseas. He has held this 

position since 2003. Mr. Gage has been involved in the American 

Federation of Government Employees and the labor movement for 

more than 25 years. Welcome all of you. 

Again, thank you for being here and devoting your time and attention to this effort. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. VanLoh 

for his summarization of your testimony for 5 minutes. Your full 

statement will be put in the record. 

STATEMENT OF MARK VAN LOH, A.A.E., DIRECTOR, AVIATION 

DEPARTMENT, KANSAS CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 

Mr. VANLOH. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I am Mark 

VanLoh, as you said, director of aviation for the city of Kansas 

City. Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee 

today to discuss the airport Screener Partnership Program. First I 

want to describe Kansas City International Airport. It is one of the 

country’s major medium hubs. We are served by 23 passenger and 

cargo airlines, with approximately 200 daily flights, and generate 

over 10 million passengers a year. Kansas City International Airport is particularly conducive to Screening Partnership Program 

because of its unique configuration. Designed in the late 1960s, we 

have three separate semicircular passenger terminals that are not 

connected. It was designed so that the distance between the curb 

and the jet bridge is 75 feet. 

The lack of a central concourse also creates the need for multiple 

security screening locations, and does not allow for a central 

screening checkpoint that most modern airports have. My testimony today addresses the airport Screener Partnership Program 

based upon Kansas City’s nearly 10 years of experience under this 

program since it began shortly after 9/11. In the aftermath of 9/11, 

Congress made fundamental changes to the way airport passengers 

and property are screened. It took screening out of the hands of the 

airlines and Federalized it under TSA. 

However, Congress wisely decided to allow private screening in 

two ways: First, it established a pilot program covering five airports. Second, it established an opt-out program. Once the pilot 

program expired, airports had the ability to opt out. 

Kansas City was selected by TSA in 2002 under the pilot program, along with four other airports, San Francisco, Rochester, 

Tupelo, and Jackson Hole. It has been a partnership that has 

worked extremely well at Kansas City. I have been an airport oper-
25 

ator for 28 years. In my view, the Screening Partnership Program 

has provided a level of screening services and security protection 

at least as good as, indeed we think better than, levels that TSA 

would have provided using Federal personnel. It has done so with 

operational efficiency and high levels of customer satisfaction. By 

‘‘customer,’’ I mean the traveling public, the airport, and TSA. Because of the success of the pilot program, we enthusiastically elected to continue the Screening Partnership Program under the optout program. In fact, all the original five airports selected have also 

elected to continue to participate in this program. The advantage 

of the Screening Partnership Program can be summarized as follows: Enhanced flexibility and efficiencies in personnel use and deployment; greater flexibility to respond to increased or decreased 

service requirements; greater flexibility to cross-train and cross-utilize personnel. We are not subject to the Federal employee hiring 

freezes or employment caps that we have all come to know. More 

effective in dealing with nonperformers. That is key. 

The private screening company has greater flexibility than the 

Federal Government to redeploy screeners on short notice, to reschedule screeners’ shifts to and from off-hours, to add or delete 

checkpoints on short notice. In fact, several airport directors have 

recently complained about a decrease in staffing and an increase 

in wait times at their Federalized airports. I have the luxury in 

Kansas City of making one local phone call to resolve any issue at 

my airport, and make immediate changes without having to wait 

on a response from Washington. 

Based on our nearly 10 years of experience under the private 

program, I can report that the Screening Partnership Program has 

been very effective in providing high-quality service to our passengers at a security level equal to, if not better than, that level 

using Federal Government employees. It is a cost-effective program 

that can be used to increase private sector opportunities and reduce costs to the Federal Government. Using private contractors to 

perform critical safety and security missions is quite common. 

There are many safety and security functions carried out by private 

entities with strong Federal oversight, as my written testimony 

points out. One comes to mind is there are 200 private air traffic 

control towers in the United States run by private operators under 

the supervision of the air traffic control system. 

While I firmly believe the program has worked well for Kansas 

City, there are a number of areas I think it can be improved. First, 

TSA needs to be more flexible in its supervision of private screening companies as to better foster improvements and innovation. 

TSA should set minimum levels of security standards and operational procedures, but give the private screeners the flexibility to 

provide security in a new and innovative and creative way. However, as we understand it, TSA requires all Federal and private 

screeners to operate under the same procedures, including centralized procedures for screener hiring and assessments, and coordinating all of it through TSA headquarters. 

I do not believe that the law requires a one-size-fits-all approach. 

Second, TSA should develop staffing resources based on the operational requirements of each airport, not on some arbitrarily wide 

system capping based on salary caps and staffing caps that it uses 
26 

for the Federal workforce. Such an approach would more effectively 

account for the unique requirements of each airport, including the 

need for part-time screeners. Once again, one size doesn’t fit all. 

For example, staffing requirements in Kansas City, which does not 

have a single checkpoint, as I mentioned, would be markedly different than the requirements for airports that have these facilities. 

Third, private screening companies should have the flexibility to 

vary compensation and benefits to enhance screener performance. 

The law requires only that the private screeners receive compensation and benefits not less than the Federal screeners. But private 

screening companies should have the flexibility to develop their 

own compensation plans, especially when we compare the costs of 

living for Kansas City as compared to Washington, DC, or the New 

York areas. 

Fourth, there needs to be greater coordination with the airport 

operator. Of course, TSA has the ultimate legal and operational responsibility for screening. But more can be done to get the airport 

operator’s input on rational procedures, staffing, and other critical 

activities. For example, TSA recently chose to replace Kansas City’s 

long-time private screening company, yet they never asked us for 

our input on the incumbent’s prior performance, even though Kansas City International received first place in the J.D. Power awards 

for passenger satisfaction in 2010. We were not unhappy when the 

TSA’s decision to switch providers was challenged and overturned 

in the United States Court of Federal Claims. 

Fifth, the choice of screening companies should be based largely 

on technical capabilities and performance, not on cost. Basing selection primarily on cost considerations, we will return to the poor 

performing system we had prior to 9/11, where contracts were generally awarded to the lowest bidder, manned by screeners who 

lacked experience, critical skills, and performance incentives. 

In conclusion, the Screening Partnership Program has worked 

very well at Kansas City International Airport. It has shown that 

private screeners under the direct control and supervision of the 

TSA will perform excellent security and customer service at a reasonable cost. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be 

pleased to address any questions you or Members of the subcommittee may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. VanLoh follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK VANLOH

FEBRUARY 7, 2012 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the Transportation Security Subcommittee, I am Mark VanLoh and I am the Director of Aviation 

for the City of Kansas City, Missouri. Thank you for inviting me to participate in 

today’s hearing on the airport screener partnership program. 

My testimony today addresses the airport screener partnership program based 

upon Kansas City’s nearly 10 years of experience under the program since it began 

in June 2002. Kansas City International Airport is one of the country’s major medium-hub airports. We are served by 23 passenger and cargo airlines with approximately 200 daily flights and generate over 10 million annual passengers. 

Based on our experience, the screening partnership program has worked extremely well at Kansas City. It has provided a level of screening services and security protection at least as good as, indeed, we think better than, the levels that TSA 

would have provided using Federal personnel. It has done so with operational effi-
27 

ciency and high levels of customer satisfaction. As I will discuss later on, there are 

a number of areas of improvement that TSA should implement to make the program 

even more effective and efficient. 

Prescreening of airline passengers and baggage had been a component of the commercial aviation landscape for almost 40 years. The FAA implemented universal 

prescreening on January 5, 1973, placing prescreening responsibility on the airlines. 

Since this became a component of airline costs, this approach resulted in a security 

screening workforce based generally on the lowest-cost bidder, with employees paid 

at minimum wage, lacking experience, skills, and performance incentives, and with 

relatively poor training. In addition to the United States, only two other countries 

in the world—Canada and Bermuda—relied on air carriers to foot the responsibility 

for aviation security screening. 

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress promptly began to address enhancements to aviation security and made fundamental 

changes in the way airport passengers and property are screened. On September 21, 

2001, a bill was introduced in the Senate that would place security screening responsibility in the hands of the Federal Government, manned by a Federal security 

workforce. A competing House bill proposed to utilize private screening companies 

under the direct supervision and control of the Federal Government. The Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was passed by Congress on November 16, 

2001 and signed by the President on November 19, 2001. 

ATSA created a new Federal agency, the Transportation Security Administration 

within the Department of Transportation (subsequently transferred to the Department of Homeland Security), with responsibility for security of all transportation 

modes. ATSA Federalized security screening at more than 440 commercial airports 

in the United States. 

As a compromise between the Senate and the House approaches to private versus 

Federal security screeners the ATSA provided for two private screening options: 

First, under 49 U.S.C. § 44919, Congress created a mandatory 2-year ‘‘pilot program’’ directing the TSA to establish a ‘‘pilot program’’ for private screening involving not more than five airports (one from each of the five security risk categories 

defined by TSA). Under that program, TSA, not the airport or the airlines, is required to contract with a private screening company at the selected airports. 

Second, under 49 U.S.C. § 44920, Congress authorized a ‘‘security screening optout program’’ beginning November 19, 2004, under which airports can ‘‘opt out’’ of 

the Federal screening program and have security screening performed by qualified 

private screening company under a contract with the TSA rather than Federal 

screeners. Kansas City applied for participation in the pilot program in May 2002 and was 

selected on June 10, 2002, as one of the five airports to participate in the pilot program, also known as PP5, along with San Francisco, Rochester, Tupalo, and Jackson 

Hole. These airports represented a balanced cross-section of the different airport security risk categories. 

At the end of the pilot program, Kansas City had the automatic right to ‘‘elect 

to continue to have screening carried out by screening personnel of a qualified private screening company’’, and Kansas City enthusiastically chose to continue with 

private screening through the ‘‘opt-out’’ program. Actually, all of the original five 

airports in the program have elected to continue this partnership. 

It is vitally important for Congress and TSA to recognize that a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ 

approach to airport security would not work. There are vast differences in the physical layouts among the Nation’s airports. One of the reasons we believe Kansas City 

International Airport was a perfect candidate for the pilot program was because of 

the airport’s unique physical layout and the unique requirements for security facilities and personnel. 

Kansas City International Airport has three separate semi-circular passenger terminals. The airport was designed in the 1960’s with the passenger convenience objective of shortening the distance between the terminal entrance and the points at 

which passengers board aircraft. Consequently, Kansas City International Airport 

is unique among major airports as it is configured so that the distance between 

curbside and boarding bridge is only 75 feet. This unique design minimizes the distance between curbside and gate, shortens the time between arrival and boarding, 

and maximizes customer convenience. The lack of a central concourse also creates 

the need for multiple security screening locations and does not allow for central security screening that is common with more modern airport designs. 

Although the airlines and our passengers are well-served by the current configuration, we are in the initial design-stage of a program to modernize Kansas City 

International Airport which, when completed, will have one large terminal, rather 

than three separate terminals. However, that project is many year away. 
28 

Based on our nearly 10 years of experience under the private screening program, 

we think that the public-private screening program is very effective in providing 

high-quality service to our passengers at a level of security equal to, if not better 

than, the level that would be provided at the airport using Federal Government employees. It is a cost-effective program that can be used to increase private-sector job 

opportunities and reduce costs to the Federal Government. The private screening 

program at Kansas City has been a success and is a model for expansion of the public-private screening program for other airports throughout the country. 

Relying on private entities to perform critical safety and security missions is common. There are many safety and security functions carried out by private entities 

with strong Federal oversight. These include consumer products and medical products manufacturing, travel through the National airspace, physical security at Federal facilities (like the U.S. DOT and FAA, for example) are activities that are conducted by private companies. These products and services are important to the safety and security of U.S. citizens but are conducted by private entities under the appropriate supervision of Federal regulation, certification, inspection, and enforcement. There is no sound reason why screening services at U.S. airports cannot be 

delegated to private entities. We think that the public-private program has proved 

that it can be done so successfully, safely, and with the highest level of security. 

The ATSA statute ensures that the level of security provided under the private 

screening program remains high. This is because the law mandates that the level 

of screening provided at the airport under the contract program ‘‘will be equal to 

or greater than the level that would be provided at the airport by Federal Government personnel.’’ 49 U.S.C. 44920(d)(1). 

The advantages of public-private screening can be summarized as follows: 

• enhanced flexibility and efficiencies in personnel use and deployment. • greater flexibility to respond to increased or decreased service requirements. • greater flexibility to cross-train and cross-utilize personnel. • not subject to Federal employee ‘‘hiring freezes’’ and employment caps. • more effective in dealing with non-performers. • less expensive to the Federal Government. 

Kansas City has been quite satisfied with the level of performance of the private 

screener at Kansas City International Airport—Firstline Transportation Security, 

Inc., a company with long-standing experience in providing security. The quality of 

screener performance is high and they have demonstrated a commitment to providing a high level of customer service while not sacrificing their over-arching security responsibilities. 

At the outset of the pilot program, we provided input to the TSA Federal Security 

Director on the critical goals and objectives for the private screening program, focusing on the external customer service issues, short lines, courteous behavior and professionalism, efficiency coupled with thorough and quality screening of our customers. Based upon the experience to date, the quality of performance of the private 

screeners has been very good. Kansas City is particularly conducive to a private 

screening workforce because of the need for flexibility to re-deploy screeners on 

short notice, to reschedule screener shifts to and from off-hours, and to add or delete 

screening checkpoints on short notice as airline services increase or decrease. In 

fact, several fellow airport directors have recently complained about a decrease in 

staffing and an increase in passenger wait times at their airports. I have the luxury 

in Kansas City of making one local phone call to resolve any issues and make immediate changes without the need to wait for a response from Washington. 

While we believe the program has worked well for Kansas City, there are a number of areas in the way TSA oversees the private security program that should be 

improved. 

First, TSA needs to be more flexible in its supervision of private screening companies so as to better foster improvements and innovation. The law provides for TSA 

oversight and requires that TSA ensures that the level of screening services and the 

protection afforded ‘‘will be equal to or greater than the level that would be provided 

at the airport by Federal Government personnel.’’ To fulfill that responsibility, TSA 

should set minimum levels of security standards and operational procedures, but 

give the private screeners the flexibility to provide the security in new, different, 

innovative, and creative ways. However, as we understand it, TSA requires Federal 

and private screeners to operate under the same procedures, including centralized 

procedures and facilities for screener hiring and assessments, and coordination or 

hiring through TSA headquarters. The law doesn’t mandate a one-size-fits-all approach. 

Second, with respect to screener staffing, instead of establishing arbitrary staffing 

caps based on a system-wide staffing model, TSA should conduct staffing analysis 

and operational requirements for each specific airport. We believe that this ap-
29 

proach does not effectively account for the unique requirements of each airport, including the need for part-time screeners. Again, one size doesn’t fit all. For example, 

staffing requirements for Kansas City International Airport’s, which does not have 

a single central security location but are spread throughout several terminals, will 

be markedly different than the requirements for airports that have centralized security screening facilities. 

Third, private screening companies should have the flexibility to vary compensation/benefits to enhance screener performance. The law requires only that the private screeners receive compensation and benefits ‘‘not less than’’ Federal screeners, 

but private screening companies should have flexibility to develop their own compensation plans—especially when comparing the cost of living in areas such as New 

York with the Midwest. 

Fourth, there needs to be greater coordination with the airport operator. While 

TSA has the ultimate legal and operational responsibility for screening, more can 

be done to get the airport operator’s input in the operational procedures, staffing, 

and other critical activities. 

Fifth, screening companies must be selected on the basis of technical capabilities, 

performance and not just on cost. When our long-term private screening company’s 

contract expired, TSA selected another company in large part based on price. That 

company TSA selected did not match the incumbent’s experience and technical capabilities. These decisions simply should not be based primarily on cost otherwise we 

will return to the system that existed pre-9/11 where contracts were generally 

awarded to the lowest-cost bidder, with employees paid at minimum wage, lacking 

experience, critical skills, and performance incentives. The low-cost bidder would be 

hard-pressed to retain experienced workers because of the need to reduce salaries/ 

staff. And, TSA never asked Kansas City for our input on the incumbent’s prior performance. The TSA’s decision was challenged and eventually overturned by the 

United States Court of Federal Claims. Firstline Transportation Security, Inc. v. 

United States, No. 11–375C, issues September 27, 2011. 

In conclusion, the public-private airport screening program has worked well and 

has demonstrated that under appropriate circumstances private screeners under the 

direct control and supervision of the TSA will provide high levels of security, on an 

efficient and cost-effective basis, with enhanced customer service. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks and I would be pleased to address any questions you and the Members of the subcommittee may have. Thank 

you for this opportunity to present Kansas City’s views on this important topic. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Amitay for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. AMITAY, ESQ., FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY 

COMPANIES 

Mr. AMITAY. Chairman Rogers, distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee. As the Chairman said, my name is Stephen Amitay, 

and I am Federal legislative counsel to NASCO, the National Association of Security Companies. Founded in 1972, NASCO is the Nation’s largest contract security trade association, and NASCO 

works with legislators and officials at every level of government on 

issues that affect the use of private security. NASCO strives to increase awareness and understanding of the important role of private security in safeguarding persons and property, and supporting 

law enforcement and government entities. At the same time, 

NASCO has been the leading advocate for raising standards for the 

licensing of private security officers and for firms. Across the Nation, almost 2 million armed and unarmed security officers are employed by private companies. Private security is providing protection and screening of employees and visitors at thousands of Federal facilities, including DSA and TSA headquarters, CIA and FBI 

offices, NASA launch sites, Federal courthouses, National labs, and 

National heritage sites. 
30 

Private security officers are also on duty at numerous U.S. military installations. Private security protects the vast majority of 

critical infrastructure facilities in the United States. Today’s hearing addresses the use of private companies to provide passenger 

and baggage screening at U.S. airports under the Screening Partnership Program, SPP. More specifically, the subcommittee is examining why, after 9 years of a successful partnership with private 

screening companies, TSA now believes the expansion of the SPP 

program will essentially inhibit TSA’s ability to provide effective 

aviation security. 

First off, the stated justifications for this new non-expansion policy relating to potentially lessened ability to modify procedures, redeploy screeners, and distribute intelligence are alternatively unsubstantiated, or as Mr. Pistole stated last week, can be addressed 

through contract modifications. Furthermore, while anyone can 

come up with fanciful what-if scenarios, there is absolutely no tangible evidence in the almost 10-year history of the SPP that an 

SPP contractor has not effectively served the needs of the TSA. 

For instance, when TSA virtually overnight implemented the 3– 

1–1 liquid and gel screening procedures at all airports, the SPP 

contractors were right on top of it. There is no indication that the 

TSA’s needs cannot be similarly met in the future by private companies if the SPP expands. As to the more general issue of whether 

private screeners should be used at all at U.S. airports, which was 

a major focus of last week’s hearing, putting aside that using private screeners allows TSA to focus more on aviation security and 

less on personnel management, putting aside that private companies are more adept at screener management and motivation, hiring, and retaining employees, and are much more customer-service 

focused, which also has a security benefit, putting aside that all 

cargo screening in the United States is done by private companies 

under TSA oversight, putting aside that virtually all other Western 

countries have determined that private screening under Federal 

oversight is the most effective screening model, and putting aside 

that if TSA was ever able to account for all its costs and conduct 

a true cost comparison, it would find SPP airports to be less costly 

to operate than non-SPP airports, but for opponents of the SPP to 

claim that using private screeners is not as secure or effective as 

using Federal screeners is completely unfounded and contradicted 

by independent evaluations, covert testing, and TSA performance 

metrics. 

It came as no surprise then when credit for the TSA’s decision 

to halt the expansion of the SPP was not claimed by aviation security experts, but by the union now representing Federal screeners. 

At a minimum, and I repeat a minimum, under the SPP, private 

screeners must meet the same employment screening, proficiency, 

and training requirements of Federal screeners. They must be provided compensation and benefits at a level no less than Federal 

screeners. 

Finally, the level of screening services and protection provided by 

the private screening company must be equal to or greater than the 

level that would be provided at an airport by Federal screeners. In 

fact, as is often the case, private screeners undergo more employment screening and training, their pay and benefits equal or exceed 
31 

those of Federal screeners, and most significantly, as mentioned, 

covert testing, independent evaluations, and the awarding of contract performance bonuses provide clear evidence that the level of 

screening provided by private screeners is superior to that of Federal screeners. Therefore, for anyone to characterize the possible 

expansion of the SPP as a ‘‘return to the pre-9/11 screening workforce,’’ such a statement not only defies credulity and shows a complete lack of understanding of how the SPP operates and is governed, but is also an insult to the highly-trained, hard-working 

men and women working as screeners at SPP companies. 

Passenger and baggage screening is not an inherently Governmental function. Like with many other complex services, qualified 

private screening companies possess the real-world experience, 

management, and cost accounting tools, flexibility, and motivation 

that allows them to provide equal or better service more efficiently 

than the Federal Government. 

From the experiences and lessons learned in the SPP, it is clear 

that the use of private screening companies has proven to be a viable and effective option for airports. Private screening can effectively be overseen by TSA. It is therefore unfortunate, and indeed 

ironic, that at a time with unprecedented interest and emphasis on 

Government efficiency and sustained and meaningful job growth 

that TSA is trying to limit and marginalize a successful public-private partnership that is exceedingly efficient, effective, and customer-focused. 

Far from ignoring the SPP and its mission to provide the best 

possible aviation security, the TSA should be embracing the SPP. 

Private security companies stand ready to work with TSA to improve passenger and baggage screening at U.S. airports. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Amitay follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. AMITAY

FEBRUARY 7, 2012 

NASCO AND PRIVATE SECURITY

NASCO is the Nation’s largest contract security trade association, whose member 

companies employ more than 300,000 security officers. Across the Nation almost 2 

million private security officers, both contract and proprietary are at work protecting (and often screening persons and bags) at Federal buildings, courthouses, 

military installations, critical infrastructure facilities, businesses, schools, and public areas. In addition, as the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) has demonstrated, private companies are also effectively providing passenger and baggage 

screening services to U.S. airports. Formed in 1972, NASCO strives to increase 

awareness and understanding among policy-makers, consumers, the media and the 

general public of the important role of private security in safeguarding persons and 

property. At the same time, NASCO has been the leading advocate for raising 

standards for the licensing of private security firms and the registration, screening 

and training of security officers. At every level of government, NASCO has worked 

with legislators and officials to put in place higher standards for companies and officers. As the recognized source of information and views for the contract security industry, NASCO regularly holds seminars and other events for industry which provide a forum for information and interaction with Members of Congress, Congressional staff, Federal officials, legal and policy experts on issues and activities affecting the private security industry. NASCO recently formed a ‘‘Government Security 

Contractor Caucus’’ to widen and strengthen its efforts to improve the working relationship between Federal agencies and private security companies and since the inception of the SPP, NASCO has worked with companies and policy-makers involved 

and interested in the program. Most significantly, over the past several years 
32 

1 Aviation Transportation and Security Act, Section 108, 49 USC 44920. 

2TSA website, ‘‘Screening Partnership Program’’ FAQs. http://www.tsa.gov/whatlweldo/ 

optout/spplfaqs.shtm. 3The TSO Voice; January 20, 2010. 

4See House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations, 

Staff Report: TSA Ignores More Cost Effective Screening Model, June 3, 2011, [hereinafter T&I 

SPP Report]. 

NASCO has been very active in working with Congress and the Federal Protective 

Service (FPS) to strengthen the ‘‘public-private partnership’’ that is the FPS Contract Guard Program. 

BACKGROUND ON THE SPP

After 9/11 Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 

which stood up TSA and authorized it to assume responsibility for security in all 

modes of transportation, including the creation of a Federal workforce to conduct 

passenger and baggage screening at U.S. airports. However, Congress did not make 

a blanket judgment that in going forward with more stringent airport screening only 

a Federal workforce could provide effective screening. As such, the ATSA also required TSA to set up a parallel screening program (the SPP) that would allow airport operators to ‘‘opt out’’ of using Federal screeners. Instead, these airports could 

have their screening conducted by personnel from a qualified private screening company chosen by TSA operating under strict Federal standards, supervision, and 

oversight. The SPP was made available to all U.S. airports in November 2004, after 

a required 2-year SPP pilot program involving five airports, one from each of the 

five ‘‘airport security risk categories.’’ 

Currently, sixteen airports, including all five of the airports in the original pilot 

program, have opted out of the use of Federal screeners with the largest being San 

Francisco International Airport (SFO) in California and Kansas City International 

Airport (KCI) in Missouri. 

For a company to be ‘‘qualified to provide screening services’’ under the SPP, the 

company must only employ individuals ‘‘who meet all the requirements applicable 

to Federal Government personnel who perform screening services at airports.’’ The 

company must ‘‘provide compensation and other benefits to such individuals that 

are not less than the level of compensation and other benefits provided to such Federal Government personnel.’’ Finally, a private company can only provide screening 

at an airport if TSA determines and certifies to Congress that ‘‘the level of screening 

services and protection provided at the airport under the contract will be equal to 

or greater than the level that would be provided at the airport by Federal Government personnel.’’1

To reiterate, at airports where private screening companies are used: (1) The 

screeners at a minimum have met the same employment screening, proficiency, and 

training requirements of Federal screeners, (2) the screeners are provided compensation and benefits at a level no less than Federal screeners (in fact on its 

website TSA states that it has ‘‘conducted an extensive review of the private contractors and found overall the private screening companies are providing pay and 

benefits that equal or exceed the pay and benefits provided by the Federal Government’’),2 and (3) the level of screening services and protection provided by the company must be equal to or greater than the level that would be provided at the airport by Federal screeners. Therefore, when John Gage, the head of the AFGE which 

represents ‘‘competing’’ Federal screeners, characterizes the SPP as ‘‘a return to the 

pre-9/11 screening workforce of low paid and poorly trained non-Federal employees’’ 

such criticism defies credulity and shows a complete lack of understanding of how 

the SPP operates and is governed.3

Furthermore, the inference that the use of private screeners at airports allowed 

for the tragedy of 9/11 to take place is plain wrong. FAA regulations in place on 

9/11 permitted the weapons the terrorists used to take over the planes to be brought 

on board, and the 9/11 Commission Report found that each security layer relevant 

to hijackings—intelligence, passenger prescreening, checkpoint screening, and onboard security—was seriously flawed prior to 9/11. 

In fact, over the past 9 years since airports have been using private screeners 

under the SPP there is considerable evidence from covert testing results, GAO reports, independent evaluations, reports from airport operators, anecdotal information, and other sources that the public-private partnership of utilizing private 

screeners under Federal regulation and oversight is a superior and more cost-effective security option for airports than using Federal screeners.4
33 

5http://www.tsa.gov/whatlweldo/optout/whatlislspp.shtm. 6TSA Press Release; ‘‘Private Screening Contract Awarded for Roswell International Air Center’’ July 16, 2009. 7FirstLine Transportation Security Inc. v. United States, 2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1945 (September 27, 2011). 

TSA RESISTANCE TO THE SPP

TSA has described the SPP as a way ‘‘to benefit from private expertise and know 

how.’’5 Accordingly, during the pilot and the first several years of the program the 

screening companies involved truly felt the SPP was being used by TSA as a ‘‘laboratory’’ to see how the private sector could help improve and innovate airport 

screening and the management of screeners. TSA would both bring SPP company 

officials to Washington and send TSA ‘‘tiger teams’’ to SPP airports to observe and 

learn about the screening methods and operations of the companies. In 2007, TSA 

even encouraged some smaller airports in Montana to apply to join the SPP, as the 

rigid TSA staffing model was inefficient to staff those airports. Even as recently as 

2009, in awarding an SPP contract to continue private screening for Roswell Air 

Center in New Mexico, the TSA Federal Security Director overseeing the airport 

called it an ‘‘excellent example of an effective public-private partnership’’ and he 

‘‘looked forward to working’’ with the private screening company.6 However, while 

TSA has never fully embraced the SPP, as the title of today’s hearing notes, this 

public-private partnership is now (and has been for the last couple years) encountering serious resistance at TSA. 

TSA resistance related to the SPP and SPP companies has taken many forms. 

There are no more ‘‘lessons learned’’ meetings with SPP companies. The process for 

SPP companies to submit innovations to TSA, a component of SPP contracts, is now 

ignored or ideas are summarily dismissed as unworkable. While the level of communication between SPP companies and local TSA officials, program managers, and 

contracting officials remains high, the flow of information from TSA headquarters 

to screening companies, and airports, has diminished. The ability for the screening 

companies, airports, and TSA to work together has been limited by a lack of TSA 

sharing of important performance and service data and the agency often taking a 

‘‘my way or the highway approach’’ to doing things. In addition, as TSA gets more 

secretive and guarded with its information, TSA is now seeking to limit the ability 

of SPP companies to share information. In a recent SPP contract, TSA, without any 

notice or explanation, inserted a provision that prohibits the SPP from publicly disseminating ‘‘any information, oral or written, concerning the results or conclusions 

made pursuant to the performance’’ of the contract ‘‘without prior written consent 

of the Contracting Officer.’’ This includes seminars, professional society meeting/conferences, and even requests for information from Congress. Before this ‘‘gag order’’ 

was put in place, SPP companies were already prohibited from releasing protected 

Government information under both previous contract language and various Federal 

laws. Given the broadness of this clause, SPP companies are now reticent to discuss 

almost any aspect of their performance with anyone without first receiving TSA’s 

written permission. This could severely restrict the amount of information available 

to airports, Congress, and the public about the SPP. 

TSA’s mishandling last year of the SPP contract award for the Kansas City airport could also be seen as resistance to the SPP or perhaps just incompetence. Either way it showed an irrational lack of consideration for quality service. TSA was 

required to make the award based on a ‘‘best-value analysis tradeoff’’ using price 

and six non-price factors. However, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims determined 

that the TSA award was ‘‘essentially made on a lowest-cost technically acceptable 

basis not pursuant to the best-value determination required by the RFP.’’7

In ordering the award to be stopped, the Court concluded that it was ‘‘clear that 

the Source Selection Evaluation Board failed to account for the significant differences between the competing proposals with respect to technical quality including 

the four most important technical evaluation factors in the tradeoff analysis (Management Approach, Screening Services, Security Training, and Pre-Transition/Transition).’’ In addition, the losing proposal was assigned 33 strengths and not a single 

weakness, while winning proposal received only one strength and one weakness. It 

goes without saying that it is in the public’s best interest for TSA to properly award 

airport screening contracts using a ‘‘best value’’ analysis, which places a premium 

on performance capabilities as opposed to a ‘‘low price technically acceptable’’ basis. 

The greatest TSA ‘‘resistance’’ though related to the SPP though is the now yearold TSA policy that it will not approve new airports for the SPP unless there can 

be demonstrated a ‘‘clear and substantial advantage’’ to do so. This new policy was 

announced in the wake of the denial of 5 SPP airport applications for which TSA 
34 

8 Even though the current TSA administrator has not been known to have ever visited any 

SPP airport since assuming his position, as documented in the House T&I SPP Report, he did 

make a visit to the Sanford Orlando Airport to try to personally talk the airport director out 

of joining the SPP. 9 H.R. 658, FAA Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2011, Section 830. APPROVAL OF APPLICATIONS FOR THE AIRPORT SECURITY SCREENING OPT-OUT PROGRAM. 

provided no details. It was also preceded by attempts of TSA officials, from the administrator on down, to discourage airports from joining the SPP.8

While a plain reading of ATSA language governing the SPP gives TSA complete 

discretion in approving application (‘‘The Under Secretary may approve any application submitted... ’’); nonetheless, the intent of Congress seemed clear that if a 

screening company could provide a level of services and protection equal to or greater than that of Federal screeners, and the airport making an application had a good 

safety and security record, then that airport would be accepted into the program. 

While TSA never embraced the SPP, this interpretation of the SPP statutory language was followed by TSA—until last January. Essentially now, airports are cut 

off from the SPP. 

The vague justifications provided for the new policy relating to agility, cohesive 

and intelligence sharing, as will be discussed later, are alternatively unsubstantiated or can be addressed through TSA working with SPP companies and modifying 

SPP contracts. And to no surprise, credit for this new dubious policy was not 

claimed by aviation security experts but by the union now representing Federal 

screeners. Fortunately though, help is on the way for new airports wishing to join the SPP 

and benefit from more effective, efficient, and customer service-oriented private 

screening companies. Under the FAA Reauthorization bill about to be enacted, Congress has amended the ATSA to add criteria and time lines under which the administrator must act in considering SPP applications. Specifically, TSA: 

‘‘Shall approve an application submitted by an airport operator under subsection (a) 

if the Under Secretary determines that the approval would not compromise security 

or detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency or the effectiveness of the screening of passengers or property at the airport. 

‘‘Shall provide to the airport operator, not later than 60 days following the date of 

the denial, a written report that sets forth the findings that served as the basis for 

the denial; the results of any cost or security analysis conducted in considering the 

application; and recommendations on how the airport operator can address the reasons for the denial.’’9

The Act also give airports a voice as to which qualified screening company would 

best meet its screening needs and the Act gives the administrator the discretion to 

waive the SPP requirement that a screening company be ‘‘owned and controlled by 

a citizen of the U.S.’’ in the case of U.S. subsidiaries ‘‘with a parent company that 

has implemented a foreign ownership, control, or influence mitigation plan that has 

been approved by the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense.’’ 

The expected results of these changes to the SPP seem clear. More applying airports will be accepted into the SPP in a timely fashion with more qualified screening companies available to them. As described below, it seems virtually impossible 

based on the past and current performance of screening companies in the SPP that 

the administrator will reasonably determine that using a private screening company 

will ‘‘compromise security or detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency or the effectiveness of the screening’’ at an airport. We will soon find out though as FAA bill also 

requires the TSA to reconsider those applications that were pending before it limited the program and denied five applications last January. 

MERITS OF THE SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

The merits and effectiveness of the Screening Partnership Program and a publicprivate partnership for airport screening can be viewed on policy, operational, and 

other levels. 

On a policy level, with private companies doing airport screening, TSA is not both 

the regulator and operator. The reasons supporting lessening TSA’s direct role and 

conflicting mission in screening are two-fold. First, the enormous task of managing 

the 50,000 or more TSA employees involved in airport screening diverts and denigrates TSA’s ability to focus on critical transportation security-related functions 

such as setting security standards, technology adoption, conducting risk management analyses, performing oversight, enforcing standards and regulations, analyzing 

intelligence, auditing screening operations, and doing more to stop aviation-related 

terror before the terrorists get to the airport. Second, as the entity both conducting 
35 

10Dennis Cauchon ‘‘Some federal workers more likely to die than lose jobs’’ USA TODAY July 

19, 2011. Recently, a TSA screener who was caught on tape stealing $5,000 in cash from an 

air passenger’s jacket at a TSA screening checkpoint and was arrested for grand larceny was 

‘‘suspended pending investigation.’’ At an SPP company, that screener would be ‘‘suspended 

pending termination’’ and likely be fired much sooner than at TSA. SPP companies, while in 

compliance with all DoL standards, have considerably more capability to discipline progressively 

and remove ineffective employees than TSA. 

the screening and overseeing the screening, there are inherently greater risks of 

poor screener performance going uncorrected or even worse being encouraged or covered up by management. 

Last year an investigation at Hawaii’s Honolulu International Airport uncovered 

a massive on-going security breech involving improper (lack of) screening of checked 

bags for explosives. Forty-five TSA workers at the airport were fired or suspended 

including screeners, their supervisors, and the Federal Security Director. The TSA 

screeners claimed they were forced to abandon required screening practices because 

of TSA management pressure. Could TSA managers at an SPP airport, operating 

at ‘‘arm’s length’’, be able to pressure a private screening company to abandon required screening practices putting the company in clear default of its entire contract? Not likely. The potential loss of a contract and hundreds of jobs is a strong 

incentive for a company, and everyone in the company, to make sure that all employees are compliant with the requirements of the contract. At the Hawaii airport, 

the malfeasant Federal screeners, managers, and security director were simply replaced by other Federal employees. 

On an operational level, the reasons why using private screeners is more effective 

and efficient are numerous and well-documented. While private and Federal screeners are required to meet the same minimum training/screening standards and are 

compensated comparably, there are many advantages in using private screeners and 

private screening companies. In providing many services, the private sector is much 

more innovative, efficient, and effective than the Federal sector and airport screening is no exception. The same can be said for the managing of such services. 

Private screening companies at SPP airports have come up with numerous innovations, some which TSA adopted Nation-wide, and are doing things to improve 

screener quality and performance (and airport satisfaction) that TSA does not or 

cannot do. SPP companies came up with better configurations for processing passengers through screening. An SPP company came up with dual functioning screeners (certified for both checkpoint and baggage screening), which facilitated flexibility 

in scheduling. To address widespread baggage screener injuries and related costs, 

an SPP company created a non-certified position assigned only to lift bags for the 

certified baggage screeners (significantly reducing screener injuries and workers 

compensation costs). At a Federalized airport a new OPM job classification would 

first be required. SPP companies employ full-time health and safety professionals 

on-site to investigate and study injuries and devise ways to mitigate them. SPP 

companies competitively bid for materials and support services. Screeners that are 

better at image recognition are paired with new screeners in a ‘‘mentor’’ arrangement. SPP companies do their own covert testing of screeners in addition to TSA 

coverts tests and provide remedial training on-site—something that TSA cannot provide. 

In terms of better hiring and retention of screeners, SPP companies also do many 

things that TSA does not or cannot do. In hiring screeners, SPP companies do their 

own local recruiting and screen applicants before submitting them for the formal 

TSA screening process. Even after a prospective screener passes the TSA screening 

process, he or she can still go through a company interview with supervisors before 

being hired. At airports using Federal screeners, screeners can show up for work, 

sight-unseen, already hired. The additional screening that SPP companies apply to 

the recruitment process results in more successful new-hire completion rates and 

on-going on-the-job success. At Federal airports, TSA headquarters sets compensation for screeners and managers and screeners have no real financial incentives to 

perform beyond the minimum requirements and barring the commission of a crime 

or serious violation of standards, Federal screeners and managers—like all Federal 

workers—have great job security.10

At SPP airports, the screening operation is a business, and better performance is 

good for business both tangibly (award fees) and intangibly (reputation and future 

business). SPP company site mangers are very vested in hiring the right people, 

monitoring performance, and striving for better-than-average performance. Bonuses 

are provided for perfect attendance and robust attendance policies are maintained 

(recognizing that just one late screener can prevent the ‘‘critical mass’’ needed to 

open a check point). Does TSA even have an attendance policy for its screeners? Pri-
36 

11 Id at Appendix I. 12http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/detail/HS10. 13DHS OIG Report ‘‘The TSA National Deployment Force’’ April 2008. OIG–08–09. 14Thomas Frank, ‘‘Most Fake Bombs Missed by Screeners’’, USA Today, Oct. 22, 2007. 15Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of 

Private-Sector Airport Screening (Jan. 9, 2009) (GAO–09–27R). 

vate screeners can also be immediately counseled and can be provided with remedial 

training if needed. A culture of cohesion and teamwork within the workforce and 

peer expectations are encouraged. 

SPP companies also use a pre-hire physical testing protocol coupled with other 

working initiatives that minimize on-the-job injuries, and allow for faster return to 

work and lower workers compensation rates. SPP companies will provide monetary 

and other incentives to retain screeners. SPP companies fully realize that a stable 

workforce is more efficient, effective, and motivated. The House T&I SPP Report calculated that the turnover rate at the non-SPP LAX airport was 13.8% compared to 

8.7% at the SPP San Francisco (SFO) airport.11 Supporting the notion that TSA is 

not as effective at managing/motivating/retaining its screener workforce is the recent ranking of TSA at 232 (out of 240) as the ‘‘Best Places to Work’’ in the Federal 

Government.12

A major advantage that SPP companies have over TSA is in scheduling and managing its screener force. At Federally screened airports, the number of full-time and 

part-time screeners (actually FTE’s) is dictated to TSA airport directors by TSA 

headquarters. At SPP airports, the SPP company site manager can hire more 

screeners as needed in order to meet the contract requirement for total screener 

hours. They can more flexibly schedule screeners in ways to provide better service 

without increasing costs. For instance, at most larger airports, the terminals are 

open for 20 hours. Under TSA’s staffing model, this would require two full-time 

screeners at 8 hours per shift and one part-time screener for 4 hours to staff the 

position, with all three screeners receiving fixed benefits. On the other hand, at one 

SPP airport with such terminal operating hours, the SPP company is able to schedule two screeners at two 10-hour shifts reducing personnel and costs. TSA does not 

utilize such an option. 

For most airports, the No. 1 concern is wait time and SPP companies are much 

attuned to this concern. SPP companies use sophisticated airline industry-based 

scheduling tools, which efficiently schedule and manage staffing in real-time. They 

make the screening schedules and can make pinpoint adjustments using optimization software and airline data. They have decision support systems that allow managers to be proactive. Scheduling is also tied in directly with payroll, HR, and training systems, which ensure full visibility of manpower resources. For TSA, effective 

and efficient scheduling is a problem due to centralization of the scheduling system 

and institutional inflexibility. Airports are told when to open lanes and checkpoints 

with little local TSA (or airport) input. As evidence of the scheduling problems at 

TSA, in 2008 the DHS Inspector General found that TSA is ‘‘overly reliant on the 

(National mobile) deployment force to fill chronic staffing shortages at specific airports in lieu of more cost-effective strategies and solutions to handle screening demands.’’13 In the House T&I SPP Report, it was estimated that SPP screeners 

(based on a comparison between two similarly-sized airports) are 65 percent more 

efficient than their TSA Federal counterparts. 

While private screeners and private screening companies are more efficient, there 

is also a strong case to be made that they are more effective. While not much data 

is publicly made available, from what is available, screener performance is better 

at SPP airports than non-SPP airports. In 2007, USA Today uncovered covert TSA 

tests results that showed significantly higher screener detection capabilities at an 

SPP airport (SFO) than at a comparably-sized non-SPP airport (LAX). According to 

the test results, investigators successfully smuggled 75 percent of fake bombs 

through checkpoints at Los Angeles International Airport... and 20 percent at 

San Francisco International Airport.’’14 As reported by the GAO in a 2009 report, 

in December of 2007, Catapult Consultants issued a report to TSA (which was never 

publically released) that found private screeners performed at a level that was 

‘‘equal to or greater’’ than that of the average Federal screeners. TSA was also advised to ‘‘explore the use of the SPP model as a tool to improve performance at lowperforming fully Federal airports.’’15 In addition, in SPP contracts, TSA measures 

a company’s performance against the average performance of airports in the same 

category through a quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP). In order for a company to get an award fee they must score higher than the Federal average. In other 

words, SPP companies simply cannot meet the goal, they must exceed the performance metric in order to earn their award fee. SPP companies consistently earn 
37 

16To no surprise, even after TSA revised its estimate to 3% the AFGE continued to use the 

discredited 17% figure. See AFGE press release ‘‘AFGE’s Efforts Put SPP on Ice TSA Ends Expansion of Airport Privatization Program’’ January 19, 2011. 17GAO Letter to Congress ‘‘Aviation Security: TSA’s Revised Cost Comparison Provides a 

More Reasonable Basis for Comparing the Costs of Private Sector and TSA Screeners’’ March 

4, 2011. 18See footnote 9, GAO–09–27R). 19T&I SPP Report, page 25. 20See T&I SPP Report. Appendix 12 SPP Testimonials. 21May 20, 2011 Letter to House T&I Committee from Springfield-Branson National Airport. 

award fees meaning they are consistently exceeding the average performance of 

similar non-SPP airports. This accords with the ATSA requirement that in order for 

an SPP company to maintain its contracts/certification it must be equal to or better 

in performance than similar Federal airports. 

Private screening companies are also cost-efficient. A commonly-cited, yet thoroughly debunked, alleged disadvantage of the SPP is that it costs more to use 

screening companies at Federal airports than it does Federal screeners. The source 

of this allegation is a 2007 internal TSA estimate that SPP airports would cost 

about 17 percent more to operate than airports using Federal screeners. A GAO review of that estimate found its methodology to be severely flawed and TSA agreed 

to redo the estimate using better data and methods. In January 2011, TSA released 

a revised estimate that SPP airports would cost 3 percent more to operate SPP airports.16 Even then, the renewed estimate only partially addressed four of seven 

‘‘cost analysis limitations’’ that the GAO had identified.17 In addition, adjustments 

TSA made to calculate workers compensation, liability insurance, retirement cost, 

and revenue generated from corporate income taxes were only ‘‘generally accepted’’ 

by GAO and never substantiated. Data on the costs of deploying TSA National Deployment Force was also lacking from the estimate. In fact, TSA has no idea of the 

exact costs of screener operations at Federally-screened airports while SPP companies know their costs to the penny. 

TSA also has refused to address the wasteful issue of duplicative staff at SPP airports. In 2007, an independent evaluator hired by TSA recommended that TSA 

‘‘(e)xplore reducing the redundant general and administrative and overhead costs at 

SPP airports.’’ However, a 2009 GAO study found that TSA has ‘‘not consider[ed] 

the impact of overlapping administrative personnel on the costs of SPP airports.’’18

And while TSA has told Congress more recently that it has addressed the issue of 

duplicative staffing, Congressional investigators continue to find multiple instances 

of TSA employees holding similar or identical positions to those held by the private 

screening company at the airport.19

It is very likely that under a detailed analysis, TSA would find the cost of operating an SPP airport to be less expensive than an non-SPP airport, and in fact 

House T&I SPP Report found that taxpayers would save $1 billion over 5 years if 

the Nation’s top 35 airports operated as efficiently as the San Francisco International airport under the SPP program. 

Greater effectiveness and efficiency are not the only advantages in using private 

screeners, another demonstrable advantage—one that TSA does consider a performance metric—is customer service and accountability. At SPP airports, while TSA is 

the client, the airport is the customer as are the passengers. Better customer service 

also has a security benefit. Avoiding incidents and maintaining a calmer passenger 

base makes it easier for screeners and behavior detection officers to spot aberrant 

behavior. SPP companies realize the value of customer service and they teach and 

reinforce customer service constantly. Even with the difficult protocols, SPP screeners are taught to implement them with customer service empathy. It is no surprise 

that Kansas City International Airport, an SPP location has earned the J.D. Power 

and Associates award for highest customer satisfaction of all medium-sized North 

American airports twice in the last 4 years. Security checks provided by the SPP 

contractor were cited as a critical factor in making both awards. That airport’s 

screening services as well as other SPP companies have garnered much praise from 

their airport directors for customer service and other innovations that have improved screening operations.20 For those airports wanting to join the SPP, greater 

customer service and greater accountability are major reasons. Said one airport official whose airport had applied to the SPP, ‘‘As we have documented, TSA employees 

frequently have no concern for customer service. We feel that participating in the 

SPP will increase screening efficiency and flexibility and improve the customer service experience.’’21 Critics of the SPP also try to fall back on the dubious claim that 

airport screening is an inherently Governmental function ‘‘so intimately related to 
38 

22 As defined in Section 5 of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act ‘‘inherently Governmental function’’ means a function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government (Pub. L. 105–270). 23OMB Office of Federal Procurement Policy Publication of the Office of the Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11–01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and 

Critical Functions. 24The United States has multiple sites around the country that are American Heritage sites 

and potential targets for terrorists interested in ‘‘making a statement.’’ One such site is the Statue of Liberty. This site is controlled by the U.S. Park Police in concert with a contract security 

firm who provides unarmed screeners to efficiently process up to 15,000 visitors per day. This 

requirement has multiple lanes of visitors flowing through magnetometers, hand wands, and Xray machines, very similar to those processes used by TSA. 25 House T&I SPP Report, page 15. 

the public interest’’ that Federal personnel must provide it.22 Putting aside that allowing airports to use non-Federal screeners is required under the ATSA, and putting aside the evidence that private screeners are more effective than Federal 

screeners, there is virtually no legal, policy, or practical support for the argument 

that passenger and baggage screening is inherently Governmental. 

First off, assertions that a private screening company’s desire to make a profit 

and reduce costs means its screeners will not perform as well as ‘‘non-profit’’ Federal 

screeners are not only outright false, but a specious accusation. While seeking to 

reduce costs and eliminate waste in operations is one way for a contractor to increase profits, what also increases a contractor’s profits is better performance. Better performance translates into award fees and more contracts. Also, in the private 

sector, constant competition from other contractors creates an incentive to perform 

well, employ best practices, reduce waste, and seek to constantly improve. These 

performance and cost-containment drivers (especially in the area of reducing overtime costs) are not present in the Federal sector and the Federal workplace is beset 

with its own host of employee performance and motivation issues. 

Second, in the area of security services, OMB has specifically defined as ‘‘inherently Governmental’’ security operations in certain situations connected with combat 

or potential combat.23 Accordingly, below this very high threshold, many types of 

security and screening services can and are being performed by contractors on behalf of the U.S. Government. Federal agencies have consistently and successfully 

utilized private security and screening services at Government facilities (including 

Level 4 and 5 secured facilities) and to protect Federally-regulated critical infrastructure sites. From DoD locations requiring Top Secret and above clearances to 

the Department of Homeland Security Headquarters, NASA launch sites, nuclear 

facilities, Federal Courts, military installations, and FBI offices around the country, 

the U.S. Government has relied upon contractors to provide security and screening 

across the spectrum of sites. Everyday, contracted officers protect, screen, and provide access control at sensitive sites to millions of visitors, U.S. Government employees and invited guests each day.24

Also, as documented in the House T&I SPP Report, in other countries where the 

danger of aviation terrorism is equally of great National concern ‘‘Federal oversight 

of qualified private contract screeners has shown to be effective all over the world 

(and) almost all Western countries operate civil aviation security through the use 

of Federal oversight of private contract screeners. Other than Romania, Poland, and 

Bulgaria, the United States has the only government in the Western world that 

functions as the airport security operator, administrator, regulator, and auditor.’’25

And if the TSA and critics of the SPP do not feel that private companies are as 

effective as Federal screeners to prevent a terrorist act on an airplane, then why 

are they not similarly concerned about cargo screening? Currently, all cargo screening is conducted by private screeners in compliance with TSA procedures, processes, 

certifications, and standards—the same model of TSA oversight for passenger 

screening under the SPP. It would seem hypocritical for TSA to treat passenger and 

baggage screening as ‘‘inherently governmental’’ when the all of the cargo placed on 

commercial airlines is screened by private companies. 

Finally, TSA can and does provide effective oversight of private screening services. 

Among the tools that TSA uses to track screener performance are daily TSA manager reports, monthly Performance Management Reviews calculated against challenging metrics, and twice-yearly award fee reviews also calculated against challenging performance metrics. TSA can be assured, and indeed constantly assures 

itself, that SPP companies perform at a very high level. 

TSA CONCERNS WITH THE SPP

In the House T&I SPP Report, the operational justifications that Administrator 

Pistole and TSA used to limit the scope of the SPP program to the current airports 
39 

are reviewed. They included: Administrative burden—disproportionate amount of resources are spent on SPP airports; Intelligence—TSA can tailor and provide direct 

information to Federal employees; Direct control—another layer is involved when 

FSDs order direction action; Flexibility and use of resources—TSA can use its own 

resources for emergency events, but cannot utilize SPP; and Impact on workforce— 

TSOs at potential SPP airports face uncertainty about their job status, benefits, 

leave, and salary. 

While the T&I Committee staff notes that SPP Program Office officials have informed them that TSA was amending SPP contracts to eliminate any existing challenges related to the operational concerns, some of these concerns are not even substantiated by the facts. For example, the ‘‘intelligence concern’’ is negated by the 

fact that the managers employed by the SPP companies undergo the same SECRET 

clearance process as TSA employees and are capable of receiving the same intelligence as their Federal counterparts. The question of the flexibility of resources for 

emergency events is negated by the fact that the SPP contracts currently include 

programs such as the TSA VIPR program that allows SPP contractors to provide 

additional security outside of the airports where they work and that TSA’s SPP contracts already include a ‘‘surge clause’’ that allows the TSA to direct SPP contractors 

to immediately support emergency situations. 

As to the concern that allowing more SPP airports will hinder the ‘‘agility’’ of 

TSA, SPP companies vigorously disagree with this notion. While perhaps their 

screeners cannot, ‘‘on paper’’ be currently deployed directly by TSA, in many past 

instances SPP companies have demonstrated their agility and responsiveness to address staffing emergencies and a change in procedures due to a heightened security 

risk. In fact, neither the TSA nor SPP critics can point to a single actual situation 

where a SPP contractor has been less agile than the TSA. And although anyone can 

come up with fanciful ‘‘what-if’’ scenarios, there is absolutely no tangible evidence 

in the almost 10-year history of the SPP where an SPP contractor has not served 

the needs of the TSA and the flying public completely and absolutely. Finally, as 

with other Federal security service contracts, additional deployment of staff to meet 

emergency requirements can be built into those contracts to facilitate additional 

agility in meeting unforeseen needs. 

CONCLUSION

Many airports are satisfied with their Federal screening force and the ATSA language establishing the SPP in no way pushes or even encourages airports to use 

private screening companies. However, it is clear that Congress wanted airports to 

at least have the opportunity to utilize private screening which by law has to be 

equal to or greater in the level of security provided. From the experiences and lessons learned in the SPP, it is clear that the use of private screening companies has 

proven to be a viable and effective option for airports, and private screening can be 

effectively overseen by TSA. It is therefore unfortunate and indeed ironic that at 

a time with unprecedented interest and emphasis on Government efficiency and sustained and meaningful job growth, the TSA continues its attempts to limit and 

marginalize a successful public-private partnership program that is exceedingly efficient, effective, and customer-focused. Far from ignoring the SPP, in its mission to 

provide the best possible aviation security, the TSA should be embracing it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Gage is recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN GAGE, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 

Mr. GAGE. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, committee Members. 

Thanks for the opportunity to testify today. Also, Chairman Rogers, 

thank you, you have my thanks and Everett Kelley’s thanks for 

your questions yesterday at the Armed Services Committee on behalf of Federal civilian workforce at Anniston Army Depot. Sir, the 

vital mission of air travel security is an inherently Governmental 

function. It is an important piece of an integrated National security 

system. It is no different than local, State law enforcement, the 

Federal Government’s mission in securing our borders and ports of 

entry with Border Patrol agents and CBP officers, or even the mission of the U.S. Capitol Police to provide security for the U.S. Con-
40 

gress. It is disturbing that the Congress is moving to give the mission of providing air travel security to private corporations. The 

mission of corporations is to make profits for their shareholders. 

That is in direct conflict with the single-focused mission of air travel security for Americans. Corporations belong in the private sector, 

where the focus on profits is appropriate. The real need to make 

profits inevitably leads to cutting corners on security. TSA will be 

significantly hampered by the fact that it would lose its fundamental security integration as one unit. Conceivably, privatization 

could mean hundreds of corporations at the airports, creating a 

nightmare for security coordination when speed and quick information sharing through the system is necessary. A hodgepodge of corporate entities will prevent TSA from acting quickly when it needs 

to do so. 

TSA will lose flexibility. For instance, TSOs will no longer be 

able to be deployed from one airport to another as they can do now. 

We are also concerned that the FAA legislation sponsored by Congressman Mica will allow corporations to be owned by foreigners or 

perhaps foreign governments. Outsourcing to foreign entities will 

undermine our security even further. Americans were outraged by 

the Dubai ports scandal, and they will be outraged when they learn 

of this giveaway. 

As Congresswoman Jackson Lee indicated, further privatization 

makes assuring internal security more complex and more costly. In 

addition to vetting of front-line officers, you have got to vet the 

company, vet the executives of the companies, vet the ownership, 

vet the financial structure of this, vetting their banks, if necessary. 

This becomes an intelligence and coordination nightmare, and 

would actually increase TSA’s management cost. Then there is the 

cost of creating RFPs, reviewing contract proposals, and post-award 

litigation. 

As more airports become open to privatization, TSA will have to 

spend more resources on the initial bid and review process. Indeed, 

TSA will need hundreds of contracting officers, attorneys, and auditors. Conceivably every contract could be litigated into the courts, 

costing tens of thousands to defend each decision. Since the Congress has moved to privatize TSA, the corporations also should not 

be shielded from liability. I feel it is wrong to extend resources to 

cover claims. In summary, privatization will be more costly, will 

undermine air traffic safety and security. Corporations do not bring 

any added value. Their mission of profit is in direct conflict with 

the mission of protecting the flying public, and Americans will be 

at risk to a much greater degree. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of John Gage follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN GAGE

FEBRUARY 7, 2012 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Committee members: On 

behalf of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL–CIO (AFGE), 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the Screening Partnership 

Program (SPP) of the Transportation Security Administration. 

After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, America learned that the system of private 

screening companies and the private screeners in place on that fateful day were incompetent to perform the task of keeping terrorists off our passenger aircraft. As 

a result, Congress Federalized airport screening in recognition that the job of 
41 

screening airline passengers and maintaining the security of the commercial aviation system was fundamental to our security as a Nation. Since then, our skies have 

been kept safe, despite constant threats. 

There isn’t much that scares me. But the thought of returning to the days prior 

to 9/11, and to the expanded use of private contractors who are forced to cut corners 

to increase profits... that scares me. 

Aviation security is too important to be left to the private sector. I know the freemarket advocates will recoil when I say that, but as we have seen over and over 

since 9/11, the terrorists will never quit trying to attack us. Private contractors 

must by their very nature keep their eyes on the bottom line. That consideration 

cannot help but bleed over into decisions on staffing, training, recruitment, retention, and operations. As a frequent flyer myself—and I know the Members of this 

committee are as well—it seems beyond question to me that we should want the 

Federal Government to continue to provide the focus, the consistency, and the stability that this mission requires. If we learned nothing else from 9/11, I would hope 

we learned that. 

SPP is not new, and the problems with SPP are not new. Airports have had the 

ability to ‘‘opt out’’ of the Federal screener system since TSA was created, but in 

those 10 years only a handful of 450 have chosen to do so. Opting out means opting 

in to the lowest bidder, which is not how homeland security should operate. It is 

too important to be left to companies that would not be accountable to the American 

people. There is no contracting out of the Secret Service, FBI, Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection Officers, or the Capitol Police who protect Members of 

Congress and their staffs. Those agencies are all part of an integrated network designed to keep Americans safe. TSA should be no different. I think most Members 

of Congress would be reluctant to have the Capitol Police splintered into five or six 

private security companies, with each operating a different section of the Capitol 

complex. 

SPP is not about creating jobs as the topic of this hearing implies. TSA has created almost 50,000 jobs. These are good jobs, although the pay is still too low and 

working conditions need to improve. Moving these jobs to the private sector is, at 

best, a zero sum game after the private contractors take their profit off the top. 

The drumbeat to privatize security screening operations runs contrary to laws enacted by Congress in recent years requiring Government agencies to in-source functions that are inherently Governmental. Recent efforts to reform procurement practices at Government agencies and reduce their over-reliance on private contracting 

also argue against privatizing TSA’s screening work. 

The Federal Government is obligated to the American taxpayers to perform its 

functions efficiently and spend taxpayer money wisely. Generally, before privatizing 

Federal employee work, agencies are required to demonstrate that a contractor is 

more efficient. Under TSA’s Screening Partnership Program, the agency keeps the 

transportation screening managers but hires a contractor to create an additional 

layer of management, and converts the front-line homeland security Federal employees to contract workers. 

There is no doubt that TSA and its Federal screening workforce have protected 

our Nation from a repeat of the horror of 9/11. Rather than calling for the dismantling of an agency that is living up to its mission, despite constant challenges, proponents of private screeners should instead work to empower Federal screeners to 

do their jobs better. Only a well-trained, well-paid, fully empowered professional 

public workforce can provide the protection the American people need. 

TSOs receive constant and on-going training, including changing protocols or 

using new technology at a moment’s notice to address new terrorist threats. These 

protocols can change from day-to-day or even shift-to-shift. The training TSOs receive is conducted by Government employees and based on threat detection and risk 

assessment from the Federal Government’s National security, homeland security, 

and intelligence agencies. TSA may be required to renegotiate contracts when deploying new technology, resulting in delays, increased costs, and holes in the aviation security net. It is not credible that screeners working for private contractors 

have the same capability to adjust procedures to address emergent threats as TSOs 

working for Administrator Pistole. 

In conclusion, every single day America’s patriotic TSOs are more than diligent 

at their duties because the last thing they want is for a terrorist to slip through 

on their watch. This is the same goal as TSA management. A TSO workforce with 

workplace rights and protections—including the ability to have AFGE speak on 

their behalf—is empowered to report problems with procedures or gaps in security. 

The goal of keeping air travel safe for the flying public is mutual between TSA and 

its employees. 
42 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address the issues surrounding SPP. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the Members 

of the committee may have. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. You all did a great job. I recognize myself for the first questions. Mr. Amitay, Mr. Gage just made some 

pretty good observations that I would love to hear your thoughts 

on. For example, how do you make a profit when you have got to 

pay the exact same thing or more for your employees in an SPP 

program as the Government employees? Just address his comments. I am interested in your thoughts. 

Mr. AMITAY. Chair, I think the primary cost saver for private 

companies doing screening as opposed to TSA is the ability of private companies to utilize cost accounting and management tools 

that either the Federal Government does not possess or does not 

even know how to utilize. It is in the oversight of its workforce and 

having to account to the last penny where private companies are 

much, much more efficient than TSA. For instance, take with the 

hiring and training process, the private companies are doing it 

more effectively so that, (A), it will be less expensive even though 

they are providing the same training if not more, and then (B), in 

their vetting process, they are selecting screeners who are more 

likely to stay, and therefore they are saving money on attrition 

costs. 

Then finally, another major area is overtime and workers compensation costs. These are costs that for the Federal Government 

are virtually unaccountable for, and are claimed at a much, much 

higher rate than with private companies. 

Mr. ROGERS. What about Mr. Gage’s assertion that this is an inherently Governmental function? 

Mr. AMITAY. I completely disagree with that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why? 

Mr. AMITAY. Because private security officers are, as I mentioned 

in my oral and written testimony, they are stationed and doing 

screening at DHS and TSA headquarters. They are doing screening 

of visitors and employees at cleared facilities, at top secret facilities. They have top secret clearances. They are doing screening at 

military installations. That is not an inherently Governmental 

function. Also, the recent OMB guidance on what is considered inherently Governmental did not mention at all these types of security services. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Mr. Gage, why is he wrong? 

Mr. GAGE. Well, first of all, I think the profit motive there, I 

didn’t hear Mr. Amitay really say anything specifically on how the 

private sector makes money off these service contracts. But if—— 

Mr. ROGERS. No, he did. He went through a litany of things. I 

am interested in why this is inherently Governmental, though. 

Mr. GAGE. Well, it is, because it is part of an integrated National 

security—and it is not just the screening and the baggage checks, 

the BDOs, for instance, the people who walk the—I mean, there is 

a lot more being done there that you just can’t—how do you coordinate that in 400 airports, 450 airports if you have all these private 

companies? You can’t do screening operations in one airport different than in another. 
43 

Mr. ROGERS. But my understanding, and I may be in error, my 

understanding is all these SPP participants are under the supervision of TSA. 

Mr. GAGE. That is true. But when there is 16, that is one thing. 

When there is hundreds, I think that is why Pistole is saying can’t 

do it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Mr. VanLoh, one of the things that Mr. Pistole pushed back on me, because as you know, I am a proponent 

of more of this privatization, one of the things he pushed back with 

me was to say, listen, there is not that much of a demand. We only 

had three airports ask, and we gave one of them the green light. 

So what do you say to that? Why are more airports not requesting to move in that direction? 

Mr. VANLOH. More airports are, I get that every week from fellow airport directors all around the country. There are about 400 

of us in the United States that run airports of any size. Early on 

in the program, there was word out that if you privatized your 

screening and something happened, and somebody maybe got a 

weapon through and an aircraft went down, your airport would be 

sued out of existence. That scared a lot of cities away from this program. Well, that was false. That is not the case. Lately, a lot of airports were concerned about TSA’s oversight going forward if they 

wanted to elect out. So there are, in fact, many airports that want 

to do this today. 

Mr. ROGERS. You mentioned in your opening statement the cumbersomeness of the oversight that exists. One of the things that you 

would like to see is some relief on that front. I have heard criticisms that at these airports where we have these SPP programs, 

there are too many TSA folks overseeing. What has been your experience? What is the ratio of TSA personnel to your private personnel per airport? 

Mr. VANLOH. Mr. Chairman, that is information that I am not 

privy to, but I can guess that we have approximately 500 screeners 

in Kansas City, and we have 50 TSA employees. 

Mr. ROGERS. For what? 

Mr. VANLOH. I am not sure, I am not told. 

Mr. ROGERS. My time has expired, but I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Cravaack. Mr. Richmond has joined us, you are recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. RICHMOND. I will start with Mr. Amitay. This is not directly 

an SPP, but I think it is analogous, and I would like to hear your 

thoughts on it. Last year, well, in 2010, GAO released a report 

pointing to significant challenges across DHS contracting practices 

with FPS contract guardsmen such as the lack of training and decentralized operations. In one case in Detroit, a private security 

guard brought in a backpack with an explosive in it and left in it 

in storage for 2 weeks. Will we face the same challenges with SPP 

as we do with FPS? 

Mr. AMITAY. That was an individual incident. I would just comment that also last year, 45 TSA employees at Honolulu airport 

were either fired or suspended because of a massive security 

breach that went from the screener level all the way up to the airport’s Federal security director level. They are all implicated, fired, 

or suspended. So pointing to examples of individual instances 
44 

where a security breach happened, I don’t think that is inherently 

Governmental or inherently private. 

Mr. RICHMOND. I think you bring up a good point that all of them 

were fired. Do you know the company that the employees worked 

for in Detroit, that company is still on the job because it is hard 

for us to terminate a company once they are working with us, no 

matter what we find? 

Mr. AMITAY. Sure. As the GAO testified last year, FPS, I think 

they took action against six or seven employees of the company involved, they were fired, and FPS and GAO both thought that that 

was sufficient punishment. 

Mr. RICHMOND. But we can’t have zero tolerance with the company. See, part of what I am asking is, it is easy to dismiss and 

get rid of the employee, but if we find that it is a company that 

just lacks our confidence and through examples, we don’t have 

much we can do about it. 

Let me ask you another question because I hear it thrown out 

all the time that private-sector employees are much more customer-friendly. Who does that survey and who—how do we come 

up with that? Because I will tell you, as someone who flies through 

airports and travels through the Capitol and a bunch of other 

places, I don’t necessarily find that to be the case. So I am just 

wondering what authority determined that? 

Mr. AMITAY. As Mr. VanLoh mentioned, J.D. Powers, they do an 

annual survey of performance at airports, including customer satisfaction and the private screening company at the Kansas City Airport won the J.D. Powers’ award, I think last 3 out of 4 years for 

medium-sized airports. I think also in the 2007 study commissioned by TSA with Catapult Consultants, they also determined 

that customer service was higher at SPP airports than at non-SPP 

airports. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Well, I would just tell you as a person who frequents Federal buildings that have private security and airports 

that are TSA, being a young African-American male, I see no difference in either. You have your good actors and your bad actors, 

and I would hate for us to lump anybody in. I think it goes against 

the morale. 

Mr. Gage, I will ask you a question about that. When we talk 

about our Federal employees and my colleagues on the other side 

of the aisle, some on my side of aisle, were pushing for consistent 

pay freezes for Federal employees, and at the same time, we consistently look to privatize and get rid of as many Federal workers 

as we can. How does that affect the morale in TSA? 

Mr. GAGE. It is not good. I am really surprised that the morale 

in TSA is as high as it is. People like the job, they really have a 

dedication, and I think that comes from being a public employee. 

I think TSA really does a nice job of getting some allegiance of the 

employees of sticking together and realize the importance of their 

job. So this idea that it that the private sector always does it better, I don’t think so. There are many functions in Government, Social Security, for instance, or the VA where I think the Government 

employees simply, we do it better. I think TSA is an example. 

Again, I want to emphasize, running a system that big, 450 airports is tough enough with a single—with TSA as an agency, to 
45 

have hundreds of contractors out there. Mr. Pistole, I think, says 

it consistently every time, that is a management nightmare and it 

will lead to more and more risk in our flying security. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Chairman, I see that my time has expired, 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman recognizes 

the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. Mr. 

Amitay, Mr. Gates brings up a point that I hadn’t really considered 

before regarding outsourcing of companies that may have foreign 

entities that own them, background checks regarding that information that may increase the costs associated with a private entity 

versus a public entity. How would you respond to that? 

Mr. AMITAY. Well, first of all, FOCI companies, foreign-owned 

controlled and influenced, are already doing a lot of work for the 

Federal Government. Their U.S. subsidiaries are doing a lot of 

work. What the waiver says is that for any company that is a 

United States subsidiary with a parent company that is implemented a foreign ownership control or influence mitigation plan 

that has been proved by the defense security service of the Department of Defense prior to submission of the application. So in other 

words, DSS is already vetting the U.S. subs of these foreign countries, and in fact, these U.S. subs of these foreign countries are already doing a lot of classified and very important stuff for the U.S. 

Government and the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security and elsewhere. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay, thank you for the clarification. Mr. Gage, 

along with—Administrator Pistole brought up another point that I 

wanted to verify with you, in saying that it is extremely important 

for the TSA to maintain, it is important to maintain flexibility, and 

that TSA must be able to respond and adopt to modify procedures 

quickly, as well as be able to augment staff in certain circumstances, natural disasters, certain of capabilities. Mr. Gage also 

brought up not able to transfer accordingly, could you comment on 

that as well? 

Mr. AMITAY. In terms of the ability to surge and the ability to 

provide extra screeners, first of all, TSA already has a National deployment force of screeners that can be transferred to any location. 

Second of all, as Mr. Pistole mentioned last week, surge clauses 

and transfer clauses, these are all things that can be incorporated 

into contracts with private companies. Third, right now the private 

companies, they have never not responded to any TSA need. So 

again, engaging in these hypothetical situations, I think: (A), they 

are covered by the National deployment force, the ability to modify 

the contracts, and the fact that the screening companies are partners with TSA and they will get the job done. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I don’t mean to be, like, picking on you I am trying to clarify and get more information from you. Opponents of the 

SPP contend that training of contractors at TSOs is less than received of Federal screeners. Can you comment on that or how do 

you respond to that? 

Mr. AMITAY. I would think it is the opposite. Right now, the 

training of contract screeners is at a minimum, the same as the 

Federal screeners. In fact, the contract companies, maybe not in 
46 

* The information has been retained in committee files. 

the initial training, but once they are on the job, they have programs, training programs, remedial training programs that they 

utilize that the Federal screeners are not part of. 

For instance, at some of the private screening companies they 

will match their top performers with some of their lower performers, and they will provide the remedial training and mentoring 

services. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. Mr. Gage, you testified the SPP program 

will cost the Government 3 to 9 percent more than the Federal 

workers. What are you basing this—how do you base these numbers on? 

Mr. GAGE. Profits. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Profits? 

Mr. GAGE. Yep. I think, too, it will require a lot more oversight 

from TSA management. In other words, the overhead of TSA—if all 

the screeners are private, to make sure there is consistency across 

the airports, and when you say there is 50 TSA folks at the airport 

with 600 private screeners, I think that would be about right. I 

think you—it is not that you give, TSA gives an airports a minimum qualification standard for security and let them do whatever 

they want from that, that is not the way National security ought 

to go. This is not a minimum type of operation, it is constantly to 

get better and better, and to be able to keep a consistent—you can’t 

have a good airport security and another airport that does bad security, they have to be consistent. 

I think TSA really has made the mark on making our airport 

screeners and security very consistent from airport to airport. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Can you respond to that, Mr. Amitay? 

Mr. AMITAY. I agree there needs to be consistency and, in fact, 

the way the SPP is set up, is that the private screening company 

can only be used at an airport if its performance will equal or exceed that of the average for the category class of airport. It has 

been proven through independent evaluations, covert testing, and 

then the awarding of contract performance bonuses based on performance metrics that the private screening companies are exceeding beyond the TSA standards. You are right, there are good airports and there are bad airports, but for the SPP airports, they are 

at the middle or above. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. My time has expired. I ask unanimous consent 

to materials I brought in for the Chairman of the Transportation 

Committee be submitted for the record. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered.* 

The Chairman now recognizes my friend and colleague from New 

York and somebody who knows something about running big organizations, Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am still stuck on this 

3 to 9 percent more efficient for the TSA. Who did this study and 

how is it done? 

Mr. GAGE. It was TSA who did the study, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Oh. 

Mr. AMITAY. I might just add that the 9 percent is not a valid 

figure. The GAO, in a letter to Congress in March 2011, they said 
47 

that after TSA had taken in three out of seven GAO’s recommendations, TSA produced a cost comparison in 2007, that said that the 

SPP airports are 17 percent more costly to operate. GAO severely 

criticized that. They asked TSA to relook at it and to consider, I 

think, 10 different factors. 

In 2009 then, TSA came back having only then addressed, they 

said they only addressed three out of the seven recommendations. 

They said that TSA estimated that SPP airports would cost 3 percent more to operate in 2011 than airports using Federal screeners. 

However, GAO noted that TSA needs to take additional action or 

provide additional documentation to address the remaining four 

limitations related to cost, and the three limitations related to performance. In addition, that didn’t even take into the issue that was 

raised by GAO of TSA addressing the additional costs of overlapping administrative personnel at SPP airports. 

Mr. TURNER. Perhaps Mr. VanLoh can help us here. Kansas City, 

there is an Orlin number, the TSA sends you a check for security, 

is that fair? 

Mr. VANLOH. I never see any of the deals to companies. 

Mr. TURNER. It is somewhere, I am sure. What airport is comparable in size to Kansas City? 

Mr. VANLOH. We are the—I believe, we are the 32nd-largest airport in the country so perhaps Cleveland, Ohio is similar. We are 

a little bigger now than Cincinnati; Nashville is a little smaller 

than us, so we are medium-size airport in the United States. 

Mr. TURNER. Any of those configured pretty much the same way? 

Mr. VANLOH. No one in the world is configured like Kansas City. 

As a matter of fact, Chairman Mica came to Kansas City a few 

years ago because he couldn’t believe how the airport was set up, 

and after he left, he became a believer on how we operate with the 

private screening companies. 

Mr. TURNER. All right. So a apples-to-apples comparison would 

be pretty difficult? 

Mr. VANLOH. It is. 

Mr. TURNER. Wildly difficult? 

Mr. VANLOH. I would say so, I believe with our current configuration, we have more screeners than most major airports do. 

Mr. TURNER. The other privatized airports, perhaps a little too 

small. 

Mr. VANLOH. San Francisco is one of them, and is many times 

larger than we are. 

Mr. TURNER. Oh, San Francisco. 

Mr. VANLOH. They were one of the original five, yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Perhaps San Francisco and Boston or Philadelphia, 

comparisons could be made? 

Mr. AMITAY. The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee did a cost comparison with LAX which is a similar-sized airport, and they found that it was 35 percent less expensive at SFO. 

Mr. TURNER. That is about the number I would expect private to 

public. But thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlemen. I want to go back to the line 

of questioning I was pursuing a while ago, Mr. VanLoh. That is, 

the frequency, or the number of airports applying, am I interpreting your answer correctly in that you think more now are going 
48 

to apply, that some of the concerns that they had initially they discovered were unfounded? 

Mr. VANLOH. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I believe that is true. 

Mr. ROGERS. So give me an idea in the next year, do you think 

we will have five airports make application or 50? 

Mr. VANLOH. I think those are both extremes. I would estimate 

you could have 20 airports that would be immediately come—to the 

process. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is interesting. That does—Mr. Pistole has been 

making a good point that there is no big clamor to come. 

One question I had a few minutes ago, in talking about the minimum standards that you have to meet as far as pay and training, 

does TSA at an SPP airport, does TSA tell you the minimum number of personnel you must have as well? That is for either one of 

you two gentleman. 

Mr. AMITAY. No, TSA does not do that that with the SPP reports. 

Essentially, there is, for lack of better terminology, an overall hour 

security requirement, and then the SPP company then staffs it sufficiently, being able to use part-time, full-time, whereas the TSA 

model is a specific amount of FTEs and part-time employees that 

are assigned to each airport under a screening allocation model. 

Mr. ROGERS. I had asked Mr. VanLoh earlier about the number 

of personnel that are overseeing the SPP airports. Have you observed the same ratio that he has talked about, because I heard it 

from other people too that there are large numbers of TSA personnel overseeing these contractors. Have you seen that ratio as 

well that he described? 

Mr. AMITAY. Well, that is something—I talked with some of the 

SPP companies, and they have raised that, they think it is an issue 

at the airport, but more importantly, the GAO has raised that as 

an issue. 

Mr. ROGERS. What does the GAO say they are doing? 

Mr. AMITAY. Well, the GAO says that TSA needs to include the 

impact of potential overlapping of administrative staff on the costs 

of SPP airports. So they identified this issue of overlapping staff, 

so did the TSA contractor who did a comparison. But as of yet, TSA 

really has not really addressed—and we are talking administrative 

staff, we are not talking security staff. We are talking administrative staff that is overlapping. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Gage, earlier you made the comment that you 

thought that 50 overseeing 600 was a sound number. Tell me why 

you think—is there a methodology to that? 

Mr. GAGE. No, no, I think that it is very important that there 

be strong oversight over the contractors, and 50 in an airport of 

600, or 600 screeners, doesn’t, to me, sound outrageous, but I think 

the key thing here is not cost, it is consistency, and it is security, 

and that there has to be very strong oversight by TSA to make 

sure that procedures are followed, that the SOPs are rigorously enforced and that is just the nature of the business. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it your opinion, based on any objective evidence, 

that any of the SPP airports have provided a lower quality of 

screening? 

Mr. GAGE. No. 
49 

Mr. ROGERS. Going back to this issue about the number of employees, what I—I hear a lot from folks that know that I am on 

this committee, whenever we are talking about over at TSA, they 

start complaining about the number of TSA agents standing 

around when they go through screenings. It just drives them nuts, 

that they are standing in line and they see all these people standing around apparently doing nothing. 

I know some of those are BDOs, and they are actually paying attention to some things, but there are folks who stand around. That 

has been one of my concerns is we aren’t doing more to make at 

least the appearance of efficiencies. Is it your experience that is one 

way you can make these ventures profitable is to right-size the 

staffing as opposed to having a bloated staffing. I ask Mr. Amitay. 

Mr. AMITAY. Yeah, that is exactly right. One advantage of the 

private sector is that with their scheduling tools, they are able to 

anticipate when there will be high demand and when there will be 

low demand. They are able then to adeptly match the screening 

workforce needed to the needs of the airport at the time. That is 

why there are shorter wait lines at SPP airports, and there is 

greater customer satisfaction, but the flexibility that the private 

companies have in terms of scheduling, it is a huge cost-saver, yet 

the security is not diminished at all because, as you mentioned, you 

don’t get these occasions where there might be a dozen screeners 

standing around when obviously the requirements at that time do 

not require a dozen screeners. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. VanLoh, in your testimony, you stated TSA 

never asked Kansas City for its input on the contractor’s prior performance during contract award decision-making process. If Kansas 

City had been given the opportunity to provide its input to TSA, 

what would it have been? 

Mr. VANLOH. I would have explained much that I have explained 

to the committee today. We are winning passenger service awards, 

very few complaints, very low turnover. I think it is 2 percent, is 

our turnover rate right now. It is not broken, and let’s keep going, 

it is working well. 

Mr. ROGERS. Last, Mr. Gage, I wanted to raise an issue, you 

made the point that while TSA’s morale has been questioned, that 

you are surprised it is as good as it is. Mr. Pistole had written to 

this committee saying data from employee surveys has repeatedly 

shown TSA ranking poorly in terms of employee morale and engagement. Employee engagement and security are interrelated and 

therefore, directly affect our capacity to carry out our mission. We 

must ensure TSOs are motivated and engaged as is their judgement, and discretionary efforts are critical to achieving a superior 

security. We must continue to do better, and by our employees, ensure we continue to accomplish this mission. 

What would you recommend that we do to deal with this TSA 

morale problem? 

Mr. GAGE. A lot of the morale problem is pay, they are under a 

pay system that nobody understands, nobody likes, they are not 

under the GS system which is fair and people do understand it. I 

think the pay issue, Congressman, is really a very large one with 

our members. 
50 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. But I would make the point, private 

screeners are paid the same thing as these folks and we don’t have 

the same morale problems. I want to recognize my friend and colleague from Texas, the Ranking Member who has joined us. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank 

the witnesses for their patience. I was called to duty in my other 

committee, which I was introducing amendments and so I was delayed in coming here. This is an important hearing, and I truly 

wanted to have the opportunity to pose a number of questions. Let 

me quickly go to Mr. VanLoh. What size in the schedule of airports 

where they have top 10, what number are you in the Nation? 

Mr. VANLOH. I believe we are thirty-third in the Nation, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Have you been privatized since 9/11? 

Mr. VANLOH. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Were you privatized before 9/11? 

Mr. VANLOH. Yes, all our airports were. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So there has not been any great altering of 

your structure. So you have employees that have been there for 10 

years? 

Mr. VANLOH. We could have a few that are close to 10-year employees, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Anybody longer that that? 

Mr. VANLOH. Not to my knowledge. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you given oversight by the Transportation 

Security Administration? 

Mr. VANLOH. I personally, my organization, the City of Kansas 

City has no oversight whatsoever. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you in compliance with the Transportation Security Administration requirements? 

Mr. VANLOH. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you are doing pat-downs and private 

screening? 

Mr. VANLOH. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you handle individuals who are in a wheelchair or who may have an artificial limb in any way differently 

from the way the TSO officers do? 

Mr. VANLOH. No. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So at the time when it was required to pat 

down children, you were patting down children? 

Mr. VANLOH. Yes, they were. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. As we look forward to some overview and rearrangement of some of these issues, you will then follow the TSO, 

TSA mandate? 

Mr. VANLOH. Immediately, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So the question of whether or not you have 

happier passengers, it may be that you live in a happy community, 

it may be that the sun shines on the day they come in, it may be 

a lot of variables; is that correct? 

Mr. VANLOH. I am not the census taker, but it could be very 

well, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me congratulate you for it. The fact you 

have it, I am glad that you do have it. I believe that those, even 

though I question the change in language that says you shall, I 

have no quarrel with the existing airport private screener struc-
51 

ture. I have a quarrel with whether or not we privatize the entire 

Nation. 

Let me go to Mr. Gage, and say to you, Mr. Gage, what can we 

do—have you had an opportunity, or do you have some of your 

leadership, have had the opportunity, you fly, of course, to view 

some of other front-line agents, TSO officers on the front lines? 

What is your general perception? 

Mr. GAGE. I am very impressed with them. Many of them have 

law enforcement backgrounds, military backgrounds, they are career law enforcement people. I think they are paid less than the 

rest of the Federal Government, border patrol agents, for instance, 

ICE agents, other Federal law enforcement. I think that is a big 

problem. I have gotten to know a lot, hundreds and hundreds of 

them. We have almost 14,000 members, and they are extremely 

dedicated people, and the turnover—as the turnover rate slowed, 

and you have more and more experience, they are really top-notch 

employees who know their job and can react to virtually anything. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me emphasize what you just said. In my 

visiting airports, as the Chairwoman and now Ranking Member for 

a number of years on this committee, I have seen an enormous 

amount of professionalism, but you are absolutely right, they are 

former police or law enforcement individuals, they are certainly 

former military with a great sense of pride and they are just Americans who desire to work hard. I want to join my Chairman and 

say that we should always be looking to improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of those Federal employees paid by Federal dollars 

that serve the American public, but Mr. Gage, and then I will ask 

Mr. Amitay, would you want to have the TSO officers give out lollipops and paint a smile on their face, or would you rather ensure 

that we have the kind of security professional treating everybody 

with dignity that is necessary? 

Mr. Gage, do you think that the work that we do, and I say ‘‘we’’ 

in dealing with Homeland Security sometimes is not a friendly 

word. Let me say personally, I have experienced sometimes the 

strictness of the security check, but is it not, from your perspective, 

extremely important to have that kind of oversight as we utilize 

the Nation’s transportation system? 

Mr. GAGE. It is serious business, it has to be done professionally, 

it can’t be sloppy, the people have to pay attention every minute 

in their jobs. I think that we have come a long way in airport security since the days before 9/11. Really, when I look at this workforce, I am proud of it. I think the Nation should be proud of it and 

if it is not broke, don’t fix it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What I would say in being honest in my assessment in saying that I want to work with the Chairman, would 

you welcome increased professional training, increased or a review 

of the pay scale, and what I have been advocating for is professional development where the TSO officers would have the opportunity for promotion, promotion throughout the system. Would you 

welcome that? 

Mr. GAGE. They really have to have the promotional potential 

into other Federal agencies too, even within the Department of 

Homeland Security. That is important when you are any worker 

that you are looking to better yourself and to do a good job so that 
52 

you could be picked up as an ICE agent or another law enforcement officer somewhere else in the Federal Government. Right now 

those connections don’t exist, and I am very concerned about it and 

we are working with Homeland Security to provide more promotional opportunity for TSOs. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me pointedly ask you, the TSO officers 

could stand the enhanced professional development in training. Do 

you see that as an opportunity? 

Mr. GAGE. I do. It is a constant training situation, as techniques 

evolve, almost sometimes weekly, where it seems to be getting better and better, smoother and smoother, and more and more professional. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. As well, you would argue, I don’t want to say 

that you would argue—but that we should look seriously at the pay 

structure? 

Mr. GAGE. No question, they lag way behind in pay. Someone 

dreamed up the pay structure they are in. It hasn’t worked, it 

doesn’t work. They need a consistent pay scale such as the general 

schedule. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If I could conclude, Mr. Chairman, with Mr. 

Amitay. Are you suggesting, Mr. Amitay, and I have no quarrel 

with small contractors and business empowerment, and small businesses, and large businesses, but are you suggesting that something as important and serious as the massive securing of our airports should go back to 9/11, which is when the airports, through 

the airlines, were, in essence, secured by private companies, which, 

if not contributed to, were there on the day that those individuals 

traveled on 9/11? Is that what you are here to encourage us to do? 

Mr. AMITAY. I think to make any comparisons of the current 

level of screening and security at airports now, using private 

screeners, to compare that to pre-9/11 when private screening essentially was regulated by the FAA, who then delegated the airlines to take care of it. To say that that is the same, that that system then, which was only one part of the reason for 9/11, box cutters were allowed onto planes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You are correct that it was one part, you are 

correct. Go ahead. 

Mr. AMITAY. So that part now has been radically changed and 

radically improved. To say that the private sector does not have the 

ability to provide enhanced screening under TSA, strict TSA standards and requirements. In fact, the level—in order for a private 

company even to be able to provide screening at an airport, the 

level of screening services and protection provided by the private 

screening company must be equal to or greater than the level that 

would be provided at the airports by Federal screeners. That is the 

law. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You didn’t answer my question. The question 

is are you calling for the complete privatization of all airports in 

the country? 

Mr. AMITAY. What recently—right now, airports have the option, 

if they so desire, to opt out of using Federal screeners. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you calling for the privatization of all airports, yes or no? 

Mr. AMITAY. Am I personally calling for it? No. 
53 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is your organization calling for it? 

Mr. AMITAY. No, we are calling for the law to be abided by. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you so very much. I agree with you, we 

should not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. VanLoh, it has 

been noted that a former Federal security director of Kansas City 

was involved in a proposal team for one of the contract contenders; 

is that correct? 

Mr. VANLOH. Yes. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Further, the committee has learned that he may 

have contacted city officials as much as 4 months in advance regarding an award, would that be correct? 

Mr. VANLOH. Yes, it is. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Now, Administrator Pistole in the last hearing 

said that he was apparently unaware of this FSD’s actions, others 

in the TSA, however, did know about the employment of one of the 

contract contenders and his efforts to contact city officials. In your 

opinion, would such actions raise concern as a director of an airport 

or any other airport? 

Mr. VANLOH. Well, they certainly did at the time, when he contacted my Mayor Pro Tem of Kansas City and told him his company was going to be taking over screening at Kansas City International 6 months before the award was made, I was very concerned. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. That raises an eyebrow or two, doesn’t it? 

Mr. VANLOH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. With regard to a selection process of an SPP provider for Kansas City, were you or any other Kansas City officials 

ever contacted for your opinions solicited prior to the—— 

Mr. VANLOH. Never. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. That is another eyebrow. How would you view 

the selection of the security provider for Kansas City who had no 

prior SPP or airport screening experience? How would you view 

that selection? 

Mr. VANLOH. I was very concerned. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay, that is something else I think we should 

investigate. If you don’t mind, I just have a couple more. Opponents of SPP contend that the performance by contractors is, at 

best, the same as Federal screeners. How do you respond, Mr. 

Amitay? 

Mr. AMITAY. As I have stated before, I would say in order for private screeners to be used, the level of screening services protection 

must be equal to or greater, in covert testing, independent evaluations, and the awarding of contract performance bonuses based on 

performance metrics have shown that it actually is equal to or 

greater. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Mr. Gage, do you believe that the private contractors are less qualified and less trained? 

Mr. GAGE. I think they probably are, but I think that is really 

not the issue. It is hard to look at one airport and say private or 

public in that airport. The big argument and the logic for public is 

the whole-country system, that you have to be running this to-
54 

gether in an integrated way and with private contractors, perhaps 

hundreds of them. That is impossible. I think Pistole and TSA have 

consistently said that. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Isn’t it true the SPC TSOs must implement the 

protocols and meet the same stringent requirements for all TSA? 

Mr. GAGE. I would hope so, yes. But—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. All right. I thank you. In going back pre-, post9/11, I was a pilot that flew pre- and post-9/11. There is a dramatic 

difference between the type of security because it did go out to the 

lowest bidder back then. Now it does not go out to the lowest bidder, but it goes out to—what is the word I am looking for, best 

value. So there is a huge difference between a lot of times you go 

through the security, and the person couldn’t even speak English 

in a lot of cases. 

So there is a huge difference, and who is in charge, being the 

TSA has made a huge, huge difference in regards to that. So opponents of Mr. Amitay and opponents of the SPP include some Members of the committee that have asserted that expansion of this 

program is unnecessary risk and tantamount to returning to 9/11. 

I just want to make sure that it is clear there is a huge difference 

because of who is in charge now in overseeing TSA agents. Mr. 

Gage, TSA agents, like in Minneapolis, I have got to give a shout 

out for those guys. They are great, they truly are, they a fantastic 

group, extremely professional. They try to get you through the line 

as quickly as possible. 

So there is a fine balance that can be reached here and I hope 

we all can reach that balance and have the most efficient, effective, 

and most secure system in the world. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman, thank our witnesses. Again, 

appreciate you being here. This has been a very interesting hearing 

for me. For a couple of main reasons. One is the information by Mr. 

VanLoh that more people will be making applications, I will be 

watching for that. But the other thing is this staffing level issue, 

that has been very interesting to me to hear about these numbers 

of people who are assigned by TSA to oversee the private contractors, and then the bloated numbers that are being used in the airports the TSA screens with as opposed to private. 

So I am going to pursue a hearing or maybe two to maybe look 

at that. Now that we have got a model of some airports that have 

used private contractors to compare these staffing levels to see 

what is the right size, and also to try to figure out what in the 

world people are doing that are overseeing the contracts because I 

have yet to have anybody tell me what they are doing. It is my 

hope that maybe if we can right-size some of the staffing levels in 

the TSA airports, maybe we can pay a little better with the money 

we can save. But with this country in the financial straits it is in, 

it is pretty hard to see waste and not do something about it. You 

all have been very helpful. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. May I inquire of the Chair? Mr. Chairman, I 

would like for us to work together on it. Obviously I have a very 

strong position about privatization, but there is a provision in place 

that allows it. I raise the point and would like to join you on is the 

professional development, the question of structuring TSA for its 

most enhanced performance, and to also recognize that when you 
55 

do privatize, the airports pay nothing, we take taxpayer dollars to 

pay private security companies. That, in and of itself, may be an 

expense and become an expense when you expand the privatization. 

So I think we can find some common ground on how we professionalize, train, look at the pay scale of the TSO officers and get 

them the way my good friend, Mr. Cravaack, has indicated in the 

airport Minnesota, I believe, that he commented. I will say that in 

the many airports that I traveled, Houston, Texas, many in Alabama, Boston, New York and other places have found, if not a 

group, individually competent persons that are serving our country. 

So I would like to work with you on that and maybe we will find 

common ground. I yield back to the Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentlelady. Thank the witnesses and this 

hearing is finally adjourned, 2 weeks later. 

[Whereupon, at 2:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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