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October 2018

(U) 2018 Information Sharing Environment

 

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Contents 

(U) BACKGROUND – LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENT.................................................................... 3

(U) PURPOSE AND SCOPE ..................................................................................................................... 3

(U) SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................... 3

(U) PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................... 4

(U) ISE INVESTMENTS ........................................................................................................................... 5

(U) TERRORISM WATCHLISTING AND SCREENING.................................................................... 6

(U) STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL PARTICIPATION IN THE ISE..............................................11

(U) PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ISE...................................................................15

(U) ACCURACY OF INFORMATION..................................................................................................16

(U) PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTIONS..................................17

(U) INFORMATION SECURITY PROTECTIONS.............................................................................17

(U) WAY AHEAD.....................................................................................................................................19

(U) APPENDIX A - ACRONYMS...........................................................................................................20

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(U) BACKGROUND – LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENT 

(U) The Annual Report to the Congress on the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) is 

submitted in accordance with requirements in Section 1016(h) of the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended (IRTPA) and serves as “a progress report on 

the extent to which the ISE has been implemented.”1

 

(U) PURPOSE AND SCOPE 

(U) This report highlights continued enhancements to the ISE by selected federal, state, local, tribal 

(FSLT), and private sector partners. Information in this report not only illustrates the value of the ISE 

in sharing terrorism related information, as intended by the IRTPA, but also how the policies, 

procedures, technologies, and agreements that have matured with the ISE can be applied to other 

national security related threats. 

(U) SUMMARY

(U) In the past year, continued progress has been accomplished across the ISE in achieving goals and 

objectives to improve interoperability and expand information access among FSLT, and private sector 

partners.

(U) Within watchlisting and screening processes, significant improvements were achieved, 

particularly with the establishment of updated minimum screening data standards for travelers or 

certain benefit applicants and the implementation of the concept of a “consolidated initial check.” 

Additionally, the United States Government (USG) continues to expand information sharing with

foreign partners, to include sharing data on criminal history, known or suspected terrorists (KST), and 

foreign fighters, either through existing or new bilateral information sharing arrangements. 

(U) Information sharing partnerships among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field offices, 

deployed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel, fusion centers, and other field-based 

partners improved through the implementation of the regional integration and coordination plans and 

information technology improvements which support enhanced engagement for analysis and

operations. 

(U) Information sharing networks such as the FBI’s National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System and 

Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers continue to enable collaboration among 

federal, state, and local partners. DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network’s (HSIN) 

partnerships with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and the National Network of Fusion Centers 

 

1 IRTPA, §1016(b) (1) (A). The scope of the ISE was originally limited to “terrorism information” as defined in §1016. 

In August 2007, The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110‐53), included 

amendments to §1016 that expanded the scope of the ISE to explicitly include homeland security and weapons of 

mass destruction information. 

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(National Network) have resulted in increased information access through HSIN Exchange. 

Additionally, a nationwide communications infrastructure, built specifically for the Nation’s first 

responder community – FirstNet – was launched providing dedicated communications. 

(U) The protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties remains a priority across the ISE. The 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) published in 2018 an Intelligence Community 

Directive (ICD 107) that provides for the oversight and guidance to the Intelligence Community (IC) 

on privacy, civil liberties, and transparency with respect to intelligence activities conducted by IC 

elements. 

(U) Finally, the attributes of the ISE were recognized as valuable to meet the information sharing 

needs associated with other national security related threats. For example, the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO),

2 described the importance of information sharing between FSLT law 

enforcement and the private sector as key to countering the distribution and use of illicit opioids.

Officials have realized the ISE related information sharing policies, procedures, technologies, and 

agreements can be leveraged to mitigate other national security related threats.

(U) PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 

(U) The goals in the 2012 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (NSISS) continue 

to provide the focus for federal departments’ and agencies’ information sharing efforts:

• drive collective action through collaboration and accountability; 

• improve information discovery and access through common standards; 

• optimize mission effectiveness through shared services and interoperability; 

• strengthen information safeguarding through structural reform, policy, and technical solutions; 

and 

• protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties through consistency and compliance. 

(U) Within the IC, the 2016-2020 Information Technology Enterprise Strategy and the 2017-2021 IC 

Information Environment Data Strategy together provide additional implementation guidance: 

• enhance intelligence integration; 

• optimize information assurance to secure and safeguard the IC enterprise; 

• operate as an efficient, effective IC enterprise; 

• develop and institutionalize a strategic data framework across the multi-fabric IC information 

environment; 

• ensure data is appropriately protected, shared, and handled across all fabrics; 

 

2 GAO-18-205 Combating Synthetic Opioids, March 2018

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• create, resource, and leverage secured, scalable and shared data services that meet the IC’s needs 

for variety, velocity, volume, and veracity; and 

• champion a culture that encourages and rewards data-centric behaviors that effectively balance 

sharing and safeguarding. 

(U) ISE objectives designed to improve Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) information sharing include: 

• enhance interoperability between ISE partners on the SBU fabric; 

• validate SBU objective architecture, standard operating procedures, policies, and protocols for 

ISE partners;

• expand SBU information access through common agreements, standard protocols, and 

information technology advancements;

• ensure availability of common SBU applications for ISE partners; and 

• migrate shared services to a common space (e.g., an SBU cloud).

(U) ISE INVESTMENTS 

(U) As reported in 2017, ISE-related investments are included in agency information technology (IT) 

investment portfolios which are reported via the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) annual 

IT portfolio data request.3 Each agency’s budget year IT investments are displayed on OMB’s IT 

Dashboard - https://myit-2017.itdashboard.gov. For this reason, since 2013, there has been no attempt 

to delineate ISE specific investments within department and agency IT investments. In 2015, the 

GAO further recognized that federal department and agency ISE investments inherently are part of 

their overall IT investment portfolios, as noted here: 

“... In 2014, officials from each of the five key departments said that information sharing activities are 

a daily activity that go hand in hand with the mission of the agency and related budgets, and are not 

separate mandates to fund. Therefore, there is no need to separately identify incremental costs since 

information sharing activities and costs are embedded within the agency’s mission operations. “ 4

(U) ISE Initiatives Program 

(U) The Program Manager Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), through the Information 

Sharing Council (ISC), annually solicits proposals for information sharing projects that enable 

responsible information sharing across the ISE and expand collaboration efforts with federal, state, 

local, and tribal partners while preserving civil liberties and privacy. 

 

3 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget Circular A‐11 Preparation, Submission, and 

Execution of the Budget, Exhibit 53 Agency Information Technology Investments

4 GAO-15-290 High Risk Series, February 2015, p. 223

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(U) The ISE Initiatives Program (IIP) allows the PM-ISE to prioritize partner requirements, optimize 

SBU5 information sharing with state and local partners, and implement information sharing and 

safeguarding solutions to protect the homeland. Since 2015, the PM-ISE has provided project funds 

enabling a wide range of federal, state, and local information sharing projects. 

(U) In the coming year, PM-ISE is prioritizing projects that: further improve terrorism-related 

information discovery and access; optimize interoperability; enable improved accuracy of information 

about individuals; and further advance information sharing among federal, state, and local partners 

using existing systems. All of these efforts align with IRTPA information sharing attributes, and 

support both the 2012 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding and the current 

National Security Strategy. 

(U) TERRORISM WATCHLISTING AND SCREENING

(U) National Counterterrorism Center 

(U) The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has continued to play a critical role in the ISE by 

responsibly and securely sharing classified terrorism information with screening partners and 

adjudicators. In response to Executive Order (EO) 137806

, NCTC, in cooperation with its screening 

partners, expanded the scope of counterterrorism (CT) screening in 2018 to access a broader range of 

derogatory information. 

(U//FOUO) NCTC visa application assessments are shared with screening partners and include 

relevant biometric data, biographic information, and any derogatory information. These data sets are 

incorporated into Terrorist Identity Datamart Environment (TIDE), while the biometric data and 

biographic information are subsequently sent to TSC for enhancing records in the Terrorist Screening 

Database (TSDB). The TSC makes the appropriate screening information available to FSLT and 

international partners, including front line screeners, to share identity intelligence information and 

constrain global terrorist travel.

(U) In June 2017, NCTC and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched an improved screening 

system resulting in the automation of CT checks for travelers from visa waiver countries, who are 

eligible to use the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to apply for travel to the U.S. 

The screening change provides CBP near real time TIDE CT checks. Through NCTC’s Kingfisher 

Expansion ESTA (KFE-E) platform, ESTA applications are screened against TIDE before the ESTA 

 

5 Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information” (CUI), November 4, 2010, standardizes the way the 

Executive branch handles unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls pursuant to 

and consistent with law, regulations, and Government-wide policies. State and local partners refer to CUI as 

Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU).

6 EO 13780 “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”, March 9, 2017, requires the 

Executive Branch to implement uniform screening and vetting standards in connection with immigration programs, 

including the visa adjudication process and the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).

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approvals are issued. This aligns ESTA with the other visa and immigrant benefit screening 

processes. Prior to the KFE-E launch, some of the individuals who were able to travel to the U.S. 

before the TIDE check were later identified as having connection to terrorism. The upgraded program 

closes this national security risk and supports NCTC's review of more than 14 million ESTA requests 

annually. 

(U//FOUO) NCTC continues to exercise consistent standards in reviewing TIDE records for quality 

assurance purposes, and coordinates with TSC on the removal of subjects from TIDE or the watchlist. 

Such removals are based on, for example, a determination that the subject has no association with 

terrorism; the accuracy, credibility, or reliability of the information; the availability of unique 

identifying data; or the existence of mitigating factors or extenuating circumstances. 

(U) Other important enhancements to the watchlisting and screening enterprise include the 

establishment of minimum screening data standards for personal information submitted by travelers 

or benefit applicants, and the implementation of a “consolidated initial check.” The minimum 

required personal information reflects the type of high-value data that creates a clear biographic datarepresentation or picture of the individual, which will enable greater automated matching to 

terrorism-related threat information, while minimizing false positive matches. The clearer datapicture will increase the accuracy of the information on individuals, reduces identification errors, and 

facilitates legitimate travel and benefit authorizations. 

(U) Terrorist Screening Center 

(U//FOUO) In addition to providing watchlisting information to TSC’s FSLT partners, the TSC 

manages and maintains the USG’s terrorism screening information sharing arrangements with 

international partners. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6)7

, the TSC shares 

USG terrorism-related biographic and encounter information, including the identities of high-risk 

foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), with our international partners to facilitate screening, vetting, law 

enforcement investigations, and intelligence sharing. 

(U//FOUO) In the past year, the TSC, in cooperation with the Department of State, made substantial 

gains in the number of its partnerships with international entities, thereby increasing the number of 

international partners receiving and utilizing a subset of the TSDB to over 70; 12 of those partnership 

agreements were signed or implemented in 2017. In addition, the TSC is engaged in discussions with 

more than 20 potential partner nations regarding future HSPD-6 relationships. Over the past year, 

more than half of the TSC’s partner nations have shown an increase in sharing; either through their 

submissions of KST identities, or through reporting of encounters with terrorism-related identities 

provided by the TSC. 

(U//FOUO) TSC is committed to strengthening international information sharing arrangements. In 

2018, the TSC sent delegations to seven partner nations to provide additional training and technical 

 

7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD–6, “Directive on Integration and Use of Screening Information To 

Protect Against Terrorism”, September 16, 2003

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support in an effort to improve the sharing of international biographic and encounter information. 

These sustainment missions have contributed to the over 140% increase in identities reported by 

international partners in the past year. By strengthening the capabilities of our foreign partners, the 

TSC expands the reach of the U.S. watchlisting enterprise and improves its ability to monitor global 

terrorist travel. 

(U//FOUO) Additionally, the TSC recently entered into an arrangement with International Criminal 

Police Organization (INTERPOL) Washington, U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB), DOJ, by 

which FTF information is provided to the USNCB and then disseminated to specific international 

partners via the INTERPOL’s network. This arrangement and a similar agreement with EUROPOL, 

allow an expanded screening capability against TSDB holdings. Another arrangement with the 

USNCB facilitates a pilot project to transfer information on stolen or lost travel documents via 

INTERPOL, a key element in securing U.S. borders. 

(U) The U.S. Government is committed to ensuring that the watchlisting process is implemented 

consistent with law and is subject to numerous reviews, oversight, and provides the opportunity to 

seek redress, while also ensuring the information is appropriately used to vigorously protect the 

American public from terrorist threats, while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties. 

(U) Department of State 

(U//FOUO) In 2018, the Department of State (DOS) established a Nomination Cell that centralizes all 

of the Department’s watchlist nomination reporting for potential KST identities in the Bureau of 

Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (DOS/CT). DOS/CT, in coordination with 

Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security, and other relevant DOS bureaus, assesses the information for 

accuracy, thoroughness, and reliability as a watchlist nomination. If the information meets 

interagency watchlisting standards, DOS/CT nominates the identity to NCTC for inclusion in TIDE 

and the TSDB. DOS/CT also works with its interagency partners to complete watchlisting redress and 

quality control requests, ensuring continued integrity of the data submitted and used by DOS. 

(U) Department of Homeland Security 

(U) In response to Executive Order 13780 and Presidential Proclamation 9645, DHS, in consultation 

with DOS, DOJ, and ODNI, developed baseline information-sharing, identity-management, and riskfactor criteria related to U.S. immigration screening and vetting against which the adequacy of 

foreign government cooperation is assessed on an ongoing basis. More specifically, DHS leads an 

interagency effort to determine whether certain and appropriate entry limitations or suspensions 

should be imposed, continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented, in accordance with Section 

212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Crucial to this effort is strategic and sustained 

U.S. engagement with foreign governments to encourage continued and/or improved cooperation as it 

relates to the baseline criteria.

(U) DHS employs a suite of information sharing tools and programs to facilitate the exchange of 

traveler information with foreign partners. The suite is not limited to only those tools and programs 

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directly controlled by DHS, but also incorporates travel-related programs under the responsibility of 

DOS and DOJ, thereby allowing for an enhanced whole-of-government capability that partner 

governments may similarly undertake. The following is a representative sample of key DHS 

information sharing programs and activities designed to enhance the protection of the homeland. 

(U) Automated Targeting System-Global (ATS-G) 

(U) CBP offers the Automated Targeting System-Global (ATS) to potential foreign partner 

governments as a decision support tool to evaluate passengers and crewmembers prior to arrival or 

departure. ATS-G assists foreign government officials in the decision-making process about whether 

a passenger or crewmember should receive additional screening prior to entry into or departure from 

the country based on whether the traveler poses a potential risk for violation of the foreign country's 

laws and or regulations. ATS-G matches traveler data against a foreign partner’s watchlist, the 

HSPD-6 Foreign Partner Export, INTERPOL notices, or scenario-based targeting rules.

 (U) Global Travel Assessment System (GTAS) 

(U) CBP developed GTAS as a secondary option for governments unwilling or unable to enter into 

information sharing arrangements with the U.S. CBP developed GTAS as a free, open source 

platform that can receive and store air traveler information enabling real-time risk-modeling. CBP 

donated GTAS to the World Customs Organization (WCO) in July 2017 so that it can offer GTAS to 

its Member Administrations at no cost and without obligation. CBP provides subject matter experts to 

support WCO staff in the assessment and deployment of GTAS to its members. 

(U) Separately, in August 2018, DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) announced it will 

begin testing a prototype for GTAS through a commercial award under DHS S&T’s Silicon Valley 

Innovation Program (SVIP).8 Developing predictive models in GTAS currently requires data 

scientists and specialists to work at a pace that risks obsolescence by the time a model is completed. 

The machine-learning prototype will test the application to GTAS of automated machine-learning to 

expedite model development. 

 (U) Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) 

(U) BITMAP is an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations 

(HSI) program in which partner-country law enforcement officers collect and share biometric and 

biographic data on special interest individuals to address and reduce national security, border security, 

and terrorist threats before such threats reach the U.S. border. BITMAP provides U.S. law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies targeted information on foreign partners’ law enforcement 

encounters of persons of interest who may pose a potential threat to the U.S. or its citizens. 

Additionally, ICE HSI uses BITMAP to identify and map illicit pathways and emerging trends among 

 

8 DHS News Release: DHS Awards Virginia Company $200K to Begin Automated Machine Learning Prototype Test, 

August 20, 2018. https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2018/08/20/news-release-dhs-awards-vacompany-200k-begin-automated 

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transnational criminal organizations; associate derogatory information with individuals; and identify 

known or suspected terrorists, criminals, and other persons of interest. 

(U) Secure Real-Time Platform (SRTP) 

(U//FOUO) SRTP is a technology platform that was originally designed to support the exchange of 

biometric data among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the U.S. under Visa 

and Immigration Information Sharing Agreements. It is now 

offered to current Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries or 

those countries aspiring to join VWP, and other technically 

capable partner countries, allowing the foreign partners to query 

fingerprints they collect at the border or pursuant to a criminal 

investigation against DHS’s Office of Biometric Identity 

Management’s (OBIM) Automated Biometric Identification 

System (IDENT) (including DHS, DoD, and FBI data) and 

allows DHS components to compare fingerprints they collect 

against foreign data. 

(U//FOUO) The SRTP technology allows VWP countries and 

aspirants to more effectively implement Preventing and 

Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) bilateral agreements. PCSC 

agreements provide reciprocal access to the partner’s fingerprint 

databases for the purposes of preventing, detecting and 

investigating crime, including terrorism. Currently, the U.S. has 

42 PCSC agreements which are managed by collaboratively by 

DHS and DOJ, and DOS. 

(U) Of note, since October 2017, DHS has received over one million queries from Australian, New 

Zealand, and Canadian immigration authorities; in turn, DHS compares biometric submissions for 

matches against select DHS component galleries.

 (U) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

(U) The Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) is a single 

point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they 

experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs - like airports - or crossing U.S. 

borders. This includes:

• watchlist issues; 

• screening problems at ports of entry; and 

• situations where travelers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly delayed, denied boarding 

or identified for additional screening at our nation’s transportation hubs.

(U) Biometric Data Sharing 

Program (BDSP)

(U//FOUO) In countries where DHS 

seeks the level of cooperation possible 

under SRTP but the partner country 

lacks a suitable biometric database, 

DHS, DOS and DoD have deployed 

BDSP to build partner capacity and 

establish interoperability between DHS 

and the foreign government. 

(U//FOUO) Currently deployed in 

Mexico, through BDSP-M, the 

biometric data collected by the 

Government of Mexico’s Instituto 

Nacional de Migración is made 

available to DHS’s Automated 

Biometric IDENT system and 

compared against DHS, DoD, and DOJ 

data. 

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(U) DHS TRIP is part of a U.S. Government effort to welcome legitimate travelers while still 

securing the Nation. DHS safeguards the privacy of any personal information provided through DHS 

TRIP.

(U) STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL PARTICIPATION IN THE ISE

(U) Intelligence Guide for First Responders 

(U) The Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) is a NCTC-led group of public safety 

personnel and intelligence officers that facilitates increased information sharing with state and local 

public safety partners. JCAT products serve both domestic and international audiences. In 2017, 

JCAT published both Spanish-language First Responder-products, as well as English-language 

versions that are routinely shared with international partners. JCAT reference materials, such as the 

Intelligence Guide for First Responders and the CT Guide for Public Safety Personnel are 

unclassified and publicly available on the Internet. 

(U) Enhanced Engagement Initiative 

(U) The FBI, DHS, and the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) identified a need to provide 

additional guidance on how the FBI can increase its engagement across the National Network to 

expand information and intelligence sharing and collaboration in producing timely analytic products. 

In coordination with NFCA and other federal partners, the FBI developed and released in Fiscal Year 

(FY) 18 the Enhanced Engagement Initiative (EEI) designed to provide FBI field offices and fusion 

centers with a common set of recommendations to ensure greater continuity and standardization of 

terrorism information sharing procedures. 

(U) By focusing on key areas of engagement such as Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) participation 

and coordination, suspicious activity reporting, and intelligence analysis, production, and 

dissemination, the EEI supports the FBI and its efforts to ensure that fusion centers have a thorough 

understanding of the terrorism threat, and are appropriately integrated with other field-based 

information sharing partners to address the ever changing threat landscape. 

(U) Regional Integration and Coordination Plans 

(U) In FY18, the Office of the PM-ISE, along with regional ISE partners, developed and coordinated 

the implementation of Regional Integration and Coordination (RIC) plans in the Northeast and 

Southeast regions. The RIC plans for the Western and Central regions are now under development 

with expected implementation later this year.9

 

(U) The RIC plans codified field-based relationships among primarily law enforcement partners and 

facilitates terrorism and other national security related information sharing. The plans clarify roles 

and responsibilities for information sharing, document coordination, and identifies interoperable 

 

9 The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, December 2017 Meeting Highlights and Next Steps

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communications systems to improve information sharing during steady-state and crisis environments. 

Field-based partners include fusion centers, RISS centers, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 

(HIDTAs), and federal law enforcement partners. Specific components of a plan include: 

• Investigative support;

• Intelligence analysis;

• Situational and threat awareness;

• Suspicious activity reporting;

• Requests for information (RFI);

• Information sharing and dissemination; and 

• Special event support. 

(U) Connecting Federal, State, Local, and Tribal ISE Partners 

(U) Efforts by agencies and activities to connect existing systems to enable information sharing 

among agencies and between levels of government, an IRTPA attribute, continue among the ISE 

partners. The focus of these efforts includes connecting data holdings related to the following 

information sharing systems, all of which contribute to the implementation of a terrorism related 

ISE: 

(U) National Data Exchange 

(U) The N-DEx System is an unclassified criminal justice information sharing system, which 

ensures DOJ criminal law enforcement information is available to users at all levels of 

government so that they can more effectively investigate, disrupt, and deter criminal actively, 

including terrorism, and protect national security. In FY17, N-DEx System usage increased 

significantly to more than 13 million searches, nearly doubling the activity recorded in FY16. In 

addition, the N-DEx Program Office continues to improve system access to FSLT partners, 

notably working with the RISS Program to enable N-DEx System access to RISS users. 

(U) Regional Information Sharing Systems Program 

(U) The RISS program, an integral part of the ISE, assists law enforcement partners by providing 

capabilities that facilitate information sharing, supports criminal investigations that may have a 

nexus to terrorism, and promotes officer safety through event deconfliction. RISS is expanding 

the ISE by connecting stand-alone, state and local criminal intelligence databases to the RISS 

Criminal Intelligence Database (RISSIntel) to more widely share criminal intelligence 

information.10 In 2016 alone, RISS reported more than 10 million criminal intelligence system-tosystem queries and over 350,000 views nationwide. 

 

10 28 CFR Part 23 is a federal regulation that provides guidance to law enforcement agencies on the implementation 

standards for operating multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems funded under the Omnibus Crime Control 

and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (Crime Control Act). The purpose of the regulation is to ensure the 

protection of constitutional (civil rights and civil liberties) rights and further an individual’s reasonable expectation of 

privacy.

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(U) Currently RISSIntel provides a real-time, online, federated search of more than 35 connected 

RISS and law enforcement partner criminal intelligence systems, including the Northeast region 

criminal intelligence data sets added in FY17. Between 2018 and 2019, RISS will add 11 

additional criminal intelligence databases in the Southeast to share across the National Network, 

and across the RISS network. DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis (I&A) partners with the RISS 

Program to enable HSIN-Intel users to access RISSNET. 

(U) Homeland Security Information Network 

(U) In 2017, ISE partners across the FSLT and private sector landscape relied on HSIN for 

information sharing and collaboration. A large part of the HSIN Program’s growth (2,000+ new 

users join every month11 ) is due to enhanced partnerships and increased operational users across 

all sectors. New partnerships with TSC in 2017 resulted in increased information sharing through 

HSIN Exchange. 

(U) HSIN provides state and local officials and authorities with essential resources for use in 

daily operations, public safety and incident management, and supported planned and unplanned 

events ranging from the inauguration and high-profile sporting events, to disaster response and 

recovery efforts. HSIN is used in narcotics interdiction in conjunction with the HIDTA program, 

and relies on HSIN to support its daily operations. Law enforcement personnel now routinely use 

HSIN to share drug interdiction and confiscation information.12

(U) Homeland Security Information Network- Intelligence 

(U) In 2018, the HSIN-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) Governance Board, composed of DHS, RISS, 

and State/local stakeholders, planned for a multitude of technical and administrative 

enhancements to the HSIN-Intel portal, making the portal the primary destination for sharing 

unclassified products across all levels of government. Collective action by the board resulted in 

the implementation of major technical enhancements to HSIN-Intel’s analytic collaboration 

capabilities, including advanced search, production planning and reporting tools, and online 

training. These enhancements have substantially increased support to the 4,000-plus HSIN-Intel

users.

(U) HSIN Center of Best Practices 

(U) In 2017, PM-ISE assisted the National Fusion Center Association in deploying a “Center of

Best Practices” platform on HSIN-Intel that is designed to provide fusion center directors, 

intelligence analysts, federal partners, and other key stakeholders with easy access to program 

information and proven practices that have been used successfully across the national network, in

support of protecting the homeland. 

 

11 DHS HSIN Fact Sheet, December 18, 2017 12 Homeland Security Information Network, FY17 Annual Report, p. 15

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(U) Additional benefits include an easy mechanism for 

sharing fusion center best practices, model policies and 

procedures, analytic tradecraft, as well as a suite of 

outreach materials to assist centers in educating public 

safety partners, private sectors partners, and the public.

(U) HSIN Exchange

(U) HSIN Exchange streamlines how fusions centers 

manage RFIs, which are a fundamental part of fusion 

center daily operations. 

(U) Through HSIN Exchange, analysts are able to send 

an RFI to a specific source, track progress, identify the 

person who has responded, analyze the information, 

and close the request. HSIN Exchange provides a 

secure environment that enables more efficient 

decision-making, removes duplication of systems and 

effort, and connects law enforcement and intelligence agencies to de-conflict activities. 

(U) Plans for expanding the user base in 2018 include adding other partners, such as RISS 

centers, HIDTAs, DHS I&A, and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).13

(U) HSIN – Critical Infrastructure 

(U) Thousands of private sector organizations rely on HSIN Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI) as 

their trusted source for SBU information to secure the nation’s critical infrastructure assets. 

During the past year, HSIN-CI provided a more robust information sharing mechanism through 

an expansion of mission-focused communities of interest and enhanced content. 

(U) Several new HSIN-CI communities facilitate government and industry collaboration, 

including Election Infrastructure Subsector, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Chemical Medical 

Countermeasures, and Dams Threat Analysis Task Group, among others. In addition, the National 

Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) provided partners with additional products and 

resources for risk mitigation and incident response.

(U) The Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire) 

TRIPwire (https://tripwire.dhs.gov) is the DHS Office for Bombing Prevention’s online, 

collaborative information and resource-sharing portal for the nation’s security and emergency 

services professionals across the FSLT sectors to increase awareness of evolving improvised 

 

13 Ibid, p. 22

(U) Expanding Information Sharing 

using HSIN

(U) In 2017, DHS expanded the 

Southwest Border (SWB) Intelligence 

and Information Sharing Community of 

Interest (COI) on HSIN from a SWBfocused sharing environment to one that 

includes all North America-based 

transnational organized crime (TOC) 

issues. 

(U) The multi-agency information 

sharing environment, which can be 

accessed by federal, state, and local 

officials, contains finished intelligence 

on, among other topics, illicit financial 

transactions, drug trafficking, and 

human smuggling, all of which have 

documented ties to terrorism. 

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explosive device (IED) tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as incident lessons learned and 

counter-IED preparedness information. 

(U) The First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) 

(U) FirstNet is the nation’s first public safety community wireless broadband network that 

enables improved communications during emergencies and other public safety related events. 

Congress passed legislation to establish the network in 

2012, and for the past five years, the First Responder 

Network Authority14 has worked closely with the public 

safety community to develop customized plans for 

building the Network in each state and territory. 

(U) As of December 2017, 50 states, five territories, and 

the District of Columbia have joined FirstNet. In March 

2018, the First Responder Network Authority gave its 

private sector partner, AT&T, approval to build and 

deploy a public safety dedicated spectrum – Band 14 - 

across statewide radio networks across the country.15 

(U) An ISC sub-committee, co-chaired by PM-ISE, 

consisting of representatives from within federal, state, local, and academic communities, is 

focused on developing FirstNet Identity Credential and Access Management (ICAM) technology 

and policies, to include developing ICAM acquisition guidance for state and local officials. These 

ICAM technologies will support FirstNet collaboration with the DHS Office of Emergency 

Communications.

(U) PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ISE

(U) DHS Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program 

(U) The Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program (AEP), sponsored by DHS’s Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&A), on behalf of ODNI, facilitates collaborative partnerships 

between members of the private sector and teams of experienced U.S. government analysts to form a 

number of subcommittees. This annual program provides U.S. government analysts and private sector 

partners with a better understanding of select national security and homeland security issues. 

(U) The AEP enables U.S. government analysts and private sector partners to gain a greater 

understanding of how their disparate, yet complementary, roles can work in tandem to ensure mission 

 

14 The First Responder Network Authority is an independent authority within the U.S. Department of Commerce. 

Chartered in 2012, its mission is to ensure the building, deployment, and operation of the nationwide, broadband 

network that equips first responders to save lives and protect U.S. communities.

15 FirstNet First Responder Network Authority, Press Release, March 7, 2018

(U) Public Safety Advisory

Committee (PSAC)

(U) The 2012 Act also required 

FirstNet to establish a standing Public 

Safety Advisory Committee (PSAC) 

to offer FirstNet guidance and subject 

matter expertise and conduct outreach 

to the PSAC’s membership—

primarily comprising associations that 

represent different levels of 

government and public safety 

disciplines—on FirstNet’s network 

development.

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success. Participants work to create joint analytic products of interest to both the private sector and 

the U.S. Government. For example, past AEP efforts include identifying opportunities in applying 

private sector media strategies to fight terrorism. In 2018, AEP teams will focus on the following 

topics: 

• Artificial Intelligence; 

• Cyber Resilience and Response; 

• Emerging Technologies and National Security; and 

• Using Blockchain to store and protect data and systems. 

(U) Classified Intelligence Forum 

(U) The Classified Intelligence Forum is a collaborative effort between DHS/I&A and DHS National 

Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) intended to provide intelligence analysts with an 

opportunity to get direct feedback and insights from critical infrastructure owners and operators. This 

regularly-scheduled engagement brings together appropriately-cleared and identified members of the 

critical infrastructure community under the auspices of the Critical Infrastructure Partnership 

Advisory Council, providing them with access to draft or finished intelligence products. 

(U) Secure Video Teleconference

(U) Secure Video Teleconferences (SVTCs) are regularly scheduled between DHS/I&A and 

DHS/NPPD. These engagements are designed to facilitate collaboration between fusion centers and 

private sector partners by providing periodic threat briefings targeting specific sectors, while also 

exercising processes to clear individuals to access classified space. The SVTCs are designed to 

provide fusion centers with an opportunity to establish and maintain relationships with private sector 

security representatives in their respective areas of responsibility.

(U) ACCURACY OF INFORMATION 

(U) As discussed above, in the context of watchlisting and screening, special consideration and 

scrutiny is applied by departments and agencies associated with the watchlisting and screening 

processes to ensure that information about persons suspected to have a connection with terrorism is as 

complete, accurate, and up-to-date as possible.

(U) Further, in addition to Privacy Act16 requirements that apply to federal departments and agencies, 

ISE Privacy Guidelines require each department and agency to establish data accuracy, quality, and 

retention procedures that facilitate the prevention, identification, and correction of any errors in 

 

16 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, establishes a code of fair information practices that governs the collection, 

maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by 

federal agencies.

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protected information. The objective of these efforts is to ensure such information is accurate and not 

erroneously shared through the ISE. Further, each federal department and agency must ensure that 

when it is determined that protected information originating from another agency may be erroneous, 

includes incorrectly merged information, or lacks adequate context, such that the rights of the 

individual may be affected, the potential error or deficiency must be communicated in writing to the 

other agency’s privacy office.

(U) PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTIONS 

(U) Intelligence Community Privacy Policy 

(U) Protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties remains an ISE priority. Civil Liberties and 

Privacy Officers across all levels of government continue to oversee common ISE training, standards 

and activities to ensure compliance. 

(U) In 2018, ODNI revised previous guidance and published a policy that addresses civil liberties and 

privacy as well as transparency.17 The policy requires IC elements to ensure that civil liberties and 

privacy protections are integral considerations when planning and conducting intelligence activities. 

IC elements are also required to integrate, share, and safeguard information in a manner that protects 

civil liberties and privacy. Additionally, the policy institutionalizes the principle of providing greater 

transparency to the public, without causing damage to national security, to enhance understanding and 

trust concerning intelligence activities and the IC’s governance framework. As such, the policy 

advises IC elements to support the robust implementation of the Principles of Intelligence 

Transparency for the Intelligence Community. 

(U) Separately, ODNI’s Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency (CLPT) is actively

engaged with IC stakeholders in their ongoing efforts to fully implement all requirements mandated 

by EO 13587 including continued implementation of the ODNI insider threat program.18

(U) INFORMATION SECURITY PROTECTIONS 

(U) Safeguarding Data 

(U) The Intelligence Community (IC) continues to focus on executing the IC Directive (ICD) 501, 

Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the Intelligence Community, 

Strategic Implementation Plan. ICD 501 implementation is linked to the IC’s effort to adopt the IC 

Information Technology Enterprise, (ITE) and as a result, compliance with the ICD directly supports 

efforts to integrate and modernize the IC’s information sharing and safeguarding environment. 

 

17 Intelligence Community Directive 107, Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, February 28, 2018 18 EO 13587 - Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and 

Safeguarding of Classified Information, October 7, 2011

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(U) Information that is relevant and usable by multiple entities must be discoverable, accessible, and 

usable, in a manner where data stewards can protect sources, methods, and activities, as well as 

reduce the risk of unauthorized or unintentional disclosure. Data stewards are responsible for 

evaluating the risks associated with providing information against the risks associated with denying 

requests for information. 

(U) To facilitate data migration in 2017, the IC established 

and chartered the IC Chief Data Officer Council (CDOC). 

The IC CDOC facilitates and supports achievement of 

information sharing and safeguarding in conjunction with 

the IC Information Sharing and Safeguarding Executive 

and the Information Sharing Steering Committee by 

serving as a key collaboration forum to achieve those 

objectives. The IC CDOC serves as the IC’s strategic 

enterprise data governance body, and worked in 

conjunction with ODNI to publish the first IC Information 

Environment (IE) Data Strategy.

(U) The IC IE Data Strategy is intended to guide the IC 

toward a common, more secure, and more integrated 

enterprise by leveraging the vision and framework of the 

IC IE to operationalize a data-centric community. 

(U) The Data Strategy encourages the IC to embrace a more disciplined approach to intelligence 

integration by ensuring that data is sharable, discoverable, accessible, retrievable, and protected. All 

of the strategic goals are in direct support of Information Safeguarding. 

(U) Advancing Cybersecurity 

(U) The far-reaching cybersecurity incidents of 2017 demonstrate that the Nation cannot ignore the 

impact of poor cybersecurity practices. These incidents demonstrate that effective cybersecurity 

protection requires any organization — whether a Federal agency or a public or private company — 

to identify, prioritize, and manage cyber risks across its enterprise.19

(U) In response, the President signed EO 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal 

Networks and Critical Infrastructure, to enhance cybersecurity risk management practices across the 

Federal Government. EO 13800 recognizes that the Government must ensure that it can secure 

citizens’ information and that agencies can deliver on their core missions and services even as 

malicious cyber actors seek to disrupt those services. Accordingly, EO 13800 required every agency 

to conduct comprehensive reviews of their cybersecurity programs.

 

19 Executive Office of the President, Federal Information Security Management Act, Annual Report to Congress, 

FY17

(U) IC IE Data Strategy Strategic 

Goals

(U) Develop and institutionalize a 

strategic data framework across the multifabric IC Information Environment. 

(U) Ensure data is appropriately 

protected, shared, and handled across all 

fabrics. 

(U) Create, resource, and leverage 

secured, scalable shared data services that 

meet the IC’s needs for variety, velocity, 

volume, and veracity. 

(U) Champion a culture that encourages 

and rewards data-centric behaviors, and 

effectively balances sharing and 

safeguarding. 

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(U) While EO 13800 is the catalyst for securely modernizing Federal IT systems over the coming 

years, OMB and DHS’s long-running efforts to instill disciplined cyber practices across government 

helped safeguard agency IT systems in the past year. As an example, DHS’s efforts ensured that 

Federal agencies had already patched their IT systems to protect against ransomware attacks. 

Agencies also expanded their use of continuous monitoring tools and multi-factor authentication 

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards throughout the year. 

(U) Within the IC, in 2017, the IC Security Coordination Center deployed the IC Analysis and 

Signature Tool (ICOAST) to increase sharing of cybersecurity threat intelligence including indicators 

of compromise (IoCs) and malware signatures across the IC information environment. Since 

ICOAST’s deployment, over 450 cyber analysts from 85 IC and other federal departments and 

agencies have adopted the ICOAST capability and have contributed over 120K IoCs to date. As a 

result, IC cyber analysts are able to more rapidly deploy cybersecurity capabilities to enable analytic 

collaboration across the IC.

(U) WAY AHEAD 

(U) The U.S. Government’s ability to effectively share terrorism-related information and other 

information related to multiple threat actors, as well as their networks, and then use that information 

to support a broad array of national security related missions and activities is essential in protecting 

the homeland. 

(U) As terrorism-related information sharing among key federal departments and agencies has 

matured, ISE partners are continuing to expand and promote collaboration on homeland security

information sharing initiatives with state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. PM-ISE, in 

collaboration with the members of the Information Sharing Council, will continue promoting the use 

of interoperable systems, such as N-DEx, RISS and HSIN Exchange, and providing best practices for 

sharing terrorism-related and homeland security information.

(U) In collaboration with our federal partners, PM-ISE is devising ways to assess the effectiveness of 

the ISE on terrorism information sharing and in an effort to determine if the lessons learned can be 

applied to address other threats to the homeland. Further, PM-ISE is developing performance metrics 

for information-sharing initiatives used by various stakeholders to receive and share information

across SBU networks. 

(U) While the ISE was originally conceived to address the information sharing gaps that contributed 

to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the attributes of the ISE, as established in the IRTPA, apply equally to 

the rapidly changing nature of all our national security related threats. As the Nation confronts new 

threats, PM-ISE, through the Information Sharing Council and consistent with the IRTPA, will assess 

and recommend whether or not, and by which means, the ISE should be expanded to allow the future 

integration of other relevant categories of information. 

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(U) APPENDIX A - ACRONYMS 

AEP Analytic Exchange Program 

ATS-G Automated Targeting System

BITMAP Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program

BDSP Biometric Data Sharing Program

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CDOC Chief Data Officer Council

CLPT Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency (ODNI)

CT Counterterrorism 

CT/CVE Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (DOS) 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DNI Director of National Intelligence

DOS Department of State

EEI Enhanced Engagement Initiative 

EPIC El Paso Regional Intelligence Center

ESTA Electronic System for Travel Authorization

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FSLT Federal, State, Local, and Tribal 

FTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters

FY Fiscal Year

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GTAS Global Travel Assessment System

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network (DHS) 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

I&A Intelligence and Analysis (DHS)

IC Intelligence Community

ICAM Identity Credential and Access Management

ICD Intelligence Community Directive

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ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System (DHS)

IE Information Environment 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

INA Immigration and Nationality Act

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization

IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

ISC Information Sharing Council 

ISE Information Sharing Environment 

IT Information Technology

JCAT Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

KFE-E Kingfisher Expansion ESTA 

KST Known or Suspected Terrorist 

N-DEx National Data Exchange (FBI)

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NFCA National Fusion Center Association

OBIM Office of Biometric Identity Management (DHS) 

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PCSC Preventing and Combating Serious Crime

PM-ISE Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment 

RFI Request for Information 

RISS Regional Information Sharing System 

SBU Sensitive But Unclassified

SRTP Secure Real-Time Platform (DHS)

TRIP Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS)

TSC Terrorist Screening Center

USG United States Government 

VWP Visa Waiver Program

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