United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Honorable

Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Senate

March 1998 NAVY AVIATION

F/A-18E/F

Development and

Production Issues

GAO/NSIAD-98-61

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-277891 

March 13, 1998

The Honorable Russell D. Feingold

United States Senate

Dear Senator Feingold:

As you requested, we reviewed the F/A-18E/F development program. The

F/A-18E/F is intended to replace current F/A-18C/D aircraft and perform

Navy fighter escort, strike, fleet air defense, and close air support

missions. As you know, the primary focus of the F/A-18E/F program at this

time is the testing activities that are being performed by the Navy and the

contractors. This report addresses the (1) status of the E/F development

flight test program, (2) deficiencies that have been identified to date and

corrective actions planned, and (3) current cost estimate for the program.

Our report is based on data we obtained from Navy and contractor

management and test teams and from the Navy’s Operational Test and

Evaluation Force. Our scope and methodology are discussed in 

appendix I.

Background The F/A-18E/F is currently undergoing development flight testing as part

of its engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase of the

acquisition cycle.1

 The development flight test program is under the

responsibility of the Integrated Test Team, which consists of Navy and

contractor personnel. The team also receives support from the Navy’s

Operational Test and Evaluation Force.

The F/A-18E/F development flight test program began in February 1996 at

the Naval Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Lexington

Park, Maryland. The Integrated Test Team is using the seven test aircraft

provided by Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglas) under the EMD contract.

The seven aircraft consist of five single-seat E models and two 2-seat 

F models. Boeing has also built 3 ground test article aircraft to use in

conducting tests at its St. Louis, Missouri, facility, and General Electric

Corporation, Lynn, Massachusetts, has delivered 21 engines for flight

testing.

The Navy plans to procure 62 low-rate initial production aircraft in 3

separate procurement lots. In March 1997, the Navy received approval to

1

The primary objectives of the EMD phase are to translate the most promising design into a stable,

producible, cost-effective design; validate the manufacturing processes; and demonstrate system

capabilities through testing.

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procure 12 aircraft under the first low-rate initial production lot. The

decision to approve the procurement of the next 20 aircraft under the

second low-rate initial production lot was scheduled for the end of 1997,2

and the decision to approve the procurement of the final 30 aircraft under

the third low-rate initial production lot is scheduled for late 1998 or early

1999.

Results in Brief The Navy has revised the F/A-18E/F flight test program by decreasing the

data collection requirements that were originally planned. At the time of

our review, the flight test program was about 4 weeks behind the revised

test schedule. Program documents state that, although flight testing is

behind schedule, program decisions to reduce test points will enable the

Navy to regain lost time and complete development testing in

November 1998, as originally planned.

F/A-18E/F program documents identified numerous deficiencies relative to

the aircraft’s operational performance. The most challenging technical

issue is “wing drop,” a deficiency that causes the aircraft to rock back and

forth when it is flying at the altitude and speed at which air-to-air combat

maneuvers are expected to occur. This problem was experienced in

March 1996 during flight testing. As of March 1998, the Navy was

continuing to investigate the cause and potential solutions to the wing

drop problem. Other issues include deficiencies that could negatively

impact survivability improvements to the aircraft, engine problems that

could degrade performance and engine service life, and weapon

separation problems that require additional testing. Until these issues are

resolved through software or hardware changes that have been adequately

tested, the cost, schedule, and operational performance impact of

resolving these deficiencies cannot be determined. The Navy remains

confident that it can correct these deficiencies.

In addition, a Navy board that assesses risk areas in the E/F program

stated in July 1997, that operational testing may determine that the aircraft

is not operationally effective or suitable.3

 According to program officials,

this assessment means that the F/A-18E/F may not be as capable in a

number of operational performance areas as the most recently procured

2

This decision has been delayed pending identification of a solution to a wing drop problem. The wing

drop problem is discussed on page 6.

3

Operational effectiveness is the capability of a system to perform its mission in the fleet environment

and in the face of unexpected threats, including countermeasures. Operational suitability is the

capability of a system, when operated and maintained by typical fleet personnel in the expected

numbers and of the expected experience level, to be supportable when deployed.

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F/A-18C aircraft. A December 1997 preliminary operational assessment

report, which is classified and based on limited data and analysis,

identified 16 major deficiencies with the E/F aircraft but concluded that

the F/A-18E/F is potentially operationally effective and suitable. The report

also confirmed the Navy board’s concerns regarding certain classified

operational performance characteristics of the E/F compared with the

operational capabilities of the F/A-18C.

The Navy has consistently stated that the F/A-18E/F will be developed and

produced within the cost estimates established for the program. The

F/A-18E/F development effort has been capped by the Congress at

$4.88 billion (1990 base year dollars). Certain key assumptions on which

the cost estimate was made have been overtaken by events. Program

documents state that the current development effort is funded based on

the assumption that problems would not occur during testing.

Unanticipated aircraft deficiencies have occurred, and most of the

program’s management reserve has been depleted. Since the flight test

program has about 1 year remaining, it is probable that additional

deficiencies will develop. Correcting current and potential future

deficiencies could result in the development effort exceeding the

congressional cost cap.

Also, the Navy’s F/A-18E/F unit procurement cost estimates are

understated. These cost estimates were based on what has become

unrealistically high quantities of E/F aircraft that will be bought; the Navy

not factoring in the cost effect of its decision to buy more of the higher

cost F models than was factored into the original cost estimates; and

unrealistically low annual inflation factors for aircraft to be purchased in

the later years. More realistic assumptions indicate that, although the total

procurement cost will decrease, the F/A-18E/F unit cost will be more than

the Navy currently estimates.

Status of

Development Flight

Test Program

The primary purpose of the development test program is to identify system

deficiencies so they can be corrected and have a production

representative aircraft ready to begin Operational Test and Evaluation in

May 1999.4

 As the flight test program progressed, delays were encountered

due to events that normally occur during testing, such as inclement

weather conditions and required equipment maintenance. Testing delays

were also caused by unanticipated events. For example, in the summer of

4

Operational Test and Evaluation will be the field testing of the F/A-18E/F, under realistic conditions,

to determine the effectiveness and suitability of the aircraft, its equipment, and its weapons for use in

combat by typical military users

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1996, a 3-month machinist strike at the airframe contractor’s plant delayed

the delivery of the last three EMD aircraft and, in turn, delayed the testing

that was to be done on these aircraft. Also, in November 1996, an in-flight

engine failure occurred at the Patuxent River test range, which stopped

flight testing for 2 months on all but one EMD aircraft—an F model that was

being prepared for initial carrier qualification flights.

F/A-18E/F program management developed a revised flight test plan that

will help cope with the delays in the original flight test program.

Development of the revised plan began with an Integrated Test Team

meeting in September 1996. According to the minutes of that meeting, the

team reviewed flight test data and revised the original flight test plan by

identifying areas in which testing could be reduced but essential program

requirements and goals could still be met. At the time of our review,

however, the revised flight test program was about 4 weeks behind

schedule. Program documents predict that, although flight testing is

behind schedule, decisions to reduce test points will enable the Navy to

regain lost time. The documents state that the Navy anticipates completing

development testing in November 1998 and begin operational testing in

May 1999, as originally planned. In the meantime, program officials plan to

conduct monthly reviews to identify additional areas that can be deleted

from the flight test program. The Integrated Test Team and F/A-18E/F

program management officials stated that, while the elimination of some

data collection requirements might add some risk to the E/F program, the

risk is at an acceptable level.

F/A-18E/F

Deficiencies and

Program Risks

Identified During

Development Program

The Navy’s F/A-18E/F Integrated Test team established a system for

identifying deficiencies during the development program. That system,

which is described in appendix II, identified over 400 deficiencies as of

December 1997. The number of deficiencies changes constantly as some

are resolved and others are identified. The deficiencies include problems

with E/F flying qualities, structural concerns that could have a negative

impact on the aircraft’s service life, engine deficiencies that could impact

aircraft performance and engine life, and weapon separation problems

that cause bomb-to-bomb collisions that require additional testing.

The Navy also established a Program Risk Advisory Board.5

 The Board

identifies deficiencies from flight or ground test data and assesses the risk

that the deficiencies represent to the program. Boeing also identifies

deficiencies during flight or ground tests that it believes represent a risk to

5

The Program Risk Advisory Board is part of the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Integrated Test Team.

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the program and develops mitigation plans for resolving these risks. As of

September 1997, the Board and Boeing had identified 33 and 38 program

risks, respectively. A listing of risk items and their assigned level of risk by

the Board and Boeing is in appendix III.

Although many of the deficiencies have not been resolved, Navy program

management continues to project that the F/A-18E/F will be ready for

operational testing as scheduled in May 1999 and that the aircraft will meet

all operational performance requirements. On the other hand, the Navy’s

Program Risk Advisory Board stated in July 1997 that the Navy’s

Operational Test and Evaluation Force may find that the E/F is not

operationally effective or suitable. According to program officials who are

members of the Board, the Board’s assessment reflects the realization that

the F/A-18E/F may not be as capable in a number of operational

performance areas as the most recently procured C model aircraft, which

are equipped with an enhanced performance engine.

This issue was addressed in a classified December 1997 Operational Test

and Evaluation Force report. That report was requested by the F/A-18E/F

program office. The report is referred to as a Quick Look Report because

it represents the Operational Test and Evaluation Force’s preliminary

conclusions based on a limited analysis of data collected during its

operational assessment completed in November 1997. The Quick Look

Report identified 16 major deficiencies with the E/F, such as air-to-ground

sensor performance, air-to-ground weapons, air-to-air sensor performance,

and survivability. However, the report concluded that the F/A-18E/F is

potentially operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable.

The report also confirmed the Program Risk Advisory Board’s concerns

regarding certain classified operational performance characteristics of the

E/F compared with the operational capabilities of the F/A-18C. In addition,

the report indicated that the Operational Test and Evaluation Force’s final

report, scheduled to be issued in March 1998, will be based on more

detailed analysis of available data and may contain modified conclusions.

The following section discusses selected risk items that were identified by

program officials and documents as significant concerns, including items

discussed in our previous report on the F/A-18E/F program.6

 These items

are wing problems, new technology advances, engine challenges, weapons

separation problems, and horizontal and vertical tail problems.

6

Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost

(GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996).

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Wing Drop In March 1996, during flight testing at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station,

the F/A-18E/F experienced wing drop. The Navy and Boeing describe the

phenomenon as an unacceptable, uncommanded abrupt lateral roll that

randomly occurs at the altitude and speed at which air-to-air combat

maneuvers are expected to occur. A joint Navy/Boeing team concluded

that wing drop was caused by a loss of lift on one of the outer wing panels

during maneuvering.

According to Navy and Boeing officials, wing drop is the most challenging

technical risk to the F/A-18E/F program. The deficiency has been classified

by Boeing and the Program Risk Advisory Board as a medium technical,

schedule, and cost risk to the low-rate initial production phase of the E/F

program. Program officials consider wing drop to be a high-risk

deficiency.

The F/A-18E/F Integrated Test Team concluded that if wing drop is not

corrected, it will prevent or severely restrict the performance of the

F/A-18E/F during air-to-air combat maneuvering. The F/A-18E/F Program

Risk Advisory Board concluded that this deficiency would cause the

aircraft to be unacceptable for operational test and evaluation and could

result in a schedule slip.

Boeing and the Navy have continued their attempts to define the cause of

wing drop and identify potential solutions. For example, 25 potential wing

modifications have been tested in a wind tunnel. Flight hardware to test

two leading-edge wing modifications have been designed and fabricated,

and flight testing of the modifications has begun. One of the leading-edge

wing modifications provided no improvement. The other provided

improvement for turns above 20,000 feet, but improvements are still

needed for air-to-air tracking tasks and turns at 15,000 feet and below.

In September 1997, a Blue Ribbon panel concluded that an intermediate

solution to wing drop would be to fix both the leading and trailing edges of

the wing. The Blue Ribbon panel further proposed that a total wing

redesign should be considered as the long-term solution to wing drop.

In November 1997, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,

Development, and Acquisition advised the Secretary of the Navy that the

low-cost, quick fixes have improved aircraft performance but have not

completely resolved the wing drop issue. The Assistant Secretary also

stated that the best and worst case scenarios for resolving the problem

ranged from a combination of software changes with simple wing

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modifications, which should not impact production and acquisition plans,

to a more complex and lengthy wing redesign, which would impact

production and acquisition of the aircraft.

In January 1998, program officials told us that the F/A-18E/F will not

require a major wing redesign. This assessment is based on their

assumption that although wing modifications that are currently under

investigation might not entirely eliminate the possible occurrence of wing

drop, the modifications would reduce wing drop effects to an acceptable

level. Until the Navy identifies and completes its flight testing of these

wing modifications, their impact on such things as the F/A-18E/F’s speed

and maneuverability, range, weight, and the planned reduced radar cross

section of the aircraft to increase its survivability, will not be known.

Program officials estimated that they will be able to quantify these

performance impacts and decide on the best solution to the wing drop

problem by March 1998. This plan coincides with the next major funding

decision for the F/A-18E/F program, which will be a decision by the

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and

Acquisition on whether to approve full funding of the next 20 aircraft

under the second of three low-rate initial production decisions.

New Technology Advances New technology features (the details of which are classified) have been

incorporated into the F/A-18E/F to improve its survivability by reducing

the aircraft’s susceptibility to being detected by enemy radar. The

Integrated Test Team has documented new technology anomalies that

could negatively affect the new technology features to be incorporated

into the aircraft. In September 1997, Boeing and the Navy’s Program Risk

Advisory Board listed new technology concerns as a high risk to the

F/A-18E/F program.

The new technology anomalies include such things as seal failures,

damage to special coatings, door latches, wing delaminations, and the

aircraft’s wind screen. Efforts to correct these problems are ongoing. For

example, Boeing has been training its maintenance crews on the proper

cleaning and application methods of seals to reduce the failures that have

occurred. Longer term production fixes call for redesigning such things as

doors and hinges. Further, the test aircraft have received structural repairs

to address large delaminations that have occurred on the underside of the

aircraft from blown tires. However, these repairs used protruding

fasteners that would be unacceptable in operational aircraft because they

would negatively impact aircraft signature. Efforts are underway to

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develop better repair procedures for aircraft to be produced under the

second and third low-rate initial production phases of the program.

Boeing and the Navy have stated that there is currently no definitive

answer as to the impact these changes will have on the reduced radar

cross section of the E/F. They believe that the F/A-18E/F will have

unacceptable operational test and evaluation results if the fixes do not

work. However, if the fixes do work, they need to be included on the

aircraft being produced under the first lot of low-rate initial production,

because these aircraft will be used for Operational Test and Evaluation. If

these fixes are not included, it is likely that operational evaluation will be

unacceptable.

Engine Challenges The Program Risk Advisory Board has identified engine-related issues,

including engine warm-up time required before carrier launch, partial

engine flameouts during some test flights, visible engine smoke, and

engine failures during flight and ground tests. In addition, high-pressure

engine turbine blades that had been redesigned to reduce heat to achieve

the required engine service life caused an in-flight engine failure.

Consequently, the Navy decided to revert to the original turbine blade

design. The Navy generally views the engine anomalies as a medium risk

to the program. The engine contractor, on the other hand, is redesigning

certain portions of the engine and views the engine as a low-risk

component of the program.

The engine contractor stated that engine anomalies and component

redesign have delayed the EMD schedule by 6 to 8 months and increased

cost by 4 percent. However, the contractor believes that it will meet the

low-rate initial production schedule by extending the work schedule as

required. The Navy, however, has expressed concern over engine

problems. For example, the Integrated Test Team stated that (1) stalls that

occur prior to engine warm-up will preclude the performance of the deck

launch intercept mission, which is defined as 5 minutes from engine start

to launch; (2) visible engine smoke would increase the overall visibility of

the aircraft, which may result in earlier visual acquisition of the aircraft by

adversary pilots; and (3) engine flameouts and stalls could result in the

destruction of the engine. The Program Risk Advisory Board stated that

these engine deficiencies may make the F/A-18E/F unacceptable for

operational evaluation or may jeopardize successful operational

evaluation.

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Weapon Separation

Problems

The F/A-18E/F is designed to have more payload capacity than current

F/A-18C/Ds as a result of adding two new wing stations to carry external

stores.7

 Early wind tunnel tests conducted in July and August 1993 showed

that some stores would hit the side of the aircraft or other stores when

released. The Navy and Boeing identified the cause of weapon separation

problems as the adverse air flow created by the E/F airframe.

Boeing spent about 1 year developing and testing several improvement

concepts before selecting a redesigned pylon as the intended fix to the

stores separation problem.8

 Weapon separation testing with the

redesigned pylon began in February 1997 and is expected to continue

through November 1998.

As of September 1997, the weapon separation problem was classified by

Boeing and the Navy Program Risk Advisory Board as a medium technical

risk to the EMD phase of the E/F program. In its risk assessment, Boeing

stated that if stores separation problems continue to occur during testing,

additional changes would be required. In recent flight tests during

November and December 1997, bomb-to-bomb collisions occurred when

releasing certain weapons.

In addition to the weapon separation problems, recent tests have revealed

that noise and vibration may cause structural damage to stores being

carried under the wing. Currently, this problem is resulting in speed

limitations on the aircraft when carrying certain weapons.

Horizontal Stabilator

Delaminations

The F/A-18E/F experienced delaminations, or peeling, in its horizontal tail

stabilator.9

 This deficiency was first identified during pre-production

ground testing of the EMD aircraft design at the contractor plant in

July 1995. The testing showed small areas where the metal substructure

and the composite skin did not bond.

The contractor used fasteners to ensure that any delaminations of the

horizontal stabilator that occurred would not cause any in-flight failures.

The contractor also initiated an inspection program every 25 flight hours

7

In this case, a store is a weapon or any other item, such as a fuel tank, that is carried on the outside of

the aircraft.

8

The pylon is a structure on the underside of the aircraft’s wings to which such things as weapons and

external tanks can be attached.

9

The horizontal stabilator is a metal-composite bonded structure attached to the back end of the

aircraft’s fuselage located below the vertical tail and behind the wing.

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for the problem area. All seven EMD test aircraft have been equipped with

the redesigned horizontal stabilator. According to Boeing, no significant

delaminations were occurring, therefore, the inspection frequency is being

raised to 50 flight hours.

A redesign of the horizontal stabilator for the low-rate initial production

aircraft was completed in October 1996 and is currently undergoing

testing. In November 1997, delamination occurred during testing of the

redesigned stabilator. This resulted in a decision to stop production

pending completion of a review of the delamination problem.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD)

stated that additional testing and analysis since November 1997 led to the

conclusion that the original EMD stabilator design with fasteners is

acceptable. The EMD aircraft are in the process of testing this design and,

according to DOD, the low-rate initial production aircraft that will have this

design will have the stabilators tested prior to delivery. DOD also stated

that a slightly redesigned stabilator, to be used in aircraft that will be

produced subsequent to the first lot of low-rate production aircraft, is

undergoing testing that is scheduled to be completed this summer.

Vertical Tail Deficiencies The F/A-18E/F vertical tail has not been certified because it experienced

deficiencies during testing early in the test cycle. This deficiency has been

classified by both Boeing and the Program Risk Advisory Board as a

medium technical risk to the low-rate initial production phase of the

F/A-18E/F program. According to Boeing, all vertical tail design changes

will be incorporated in the aircraft to be procured during low-rate initial

production. However, the design changes resulted in a vertical tail weight

increase of 20 pounds.

An additional vertical tail redesign plan is in process. The purpose of the

second redesign is to incorporate weight savings of 29 pounds and

improve the tail’s producibility. The redesign is intended to provide a fully

certified vertical tail at the start of the third low-rate initial production lot.

Testing of the redesigned vertical tail is scheduled to be completed in late

1999.

F/A-18E/F Cost Estimate The Navy has consistently maintained that the F/A-18E/F will be

developed and produced within the cost estimates established for the

program. However, certain key assumptions on which the F/A-18E/F cost

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estimates were based have been overcome by events. These assumptions

relate to such things as: no unanticipated issues during the development

program; the number of aircraft to be bought, in total and on an annual

basis; the ratio of the E and F models to the total number of aircraft to be

bought; and inflation factors to be used in projecting future years’ costs.

Adjusting these assumptions to reflect recent events will likely result in

higher F/A-18E/F development and unit production costs than the Navy

currently estimates.

F/A-18E/F Development

Costs May Exceed Current

Estimates

The development cost for the F/A-18E/F program has been capped by the

Congress at $4.88 billion (1990 base year dollars).10 It will be a challenge

for the Navy to stay within this cost because, according to Navy

documents, that amount is adequate to fund the program based on the

assumption that problems would not occur during testing. However, the

program has experienced deficiencies; the development flight test

program still has about 1 more year, and additional deficiencies may be

identified during that time; and EMD funding reserves have nearly all been

used.

The Navy’s Program Executive Officer for tactical aircraft has raised

concerns about the ability of the F/A-18E/F development effort to fund the

correction of these deficiencies because the program’s EMD management

reserves have diminished significantly. For example, Boeing’s EMD

airframe management reserve has decreased from $256 million when the

program began to $56.7 million in October 1997. This reserve was used to

correct deficiencies as they developed. Of the $56.7 million, $50.9 million

has been targeted for known deficiencies that have not yet been corrected,

leaving a balance of $5.8 million.

In addition, the $28 million EMD engine management reserve at General

Electric has been depleted. According to an October 1997 F/A-18E/F

program management status report, the lack of engine management

reserve is a real concern considering that engine problems need to be

corrected. According to the report, General Electric has not yet quantified

the full cost impact, but future overruns are expected.

The development flight test program will not be completed for another

year. Program management has stated that the development flight test

program is normally the most risky portion of the development effort.

10Senate Report 102-352 on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 established

this ceiling for the EMD phase of the F/A-18E/F program. The conference report supported the Senate

report’s language.

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Therefore, if changes to correct known deficiencies fail or if additional

deficiencies develop, the cost of correcting them will likely cause the

$4.88 billion development cost estimate to be exceeded.

F/A-18E/F Procurement

Cost Estimates Are

Understated

The Navy also faces a challenge in procuring the F/A-18E/F within the unit

cost originally estimated. Its unit procurement cost estimates have been

based on what has become unrealistically high quantities of E/F aircraft

that will be bought, a lack of factoring in the cost effect of the Navy’s

decision to buy more of the higher cost F models than was factored into

the original cost estimates, and an unrealistically low inflation factor for

purchases in later years of the program.

Total Number of Aircraft 

to Be Procured Has

Decreased

Originally, Navy projections of F/A-18E/F unit procurement costs were

based on procuring 1,000 aircraft at a peak annual production rate of 

72 aircraft. Neither of these assumptions are likely to be realized.

The assumption that 1,000 E/F aircraft will be procured is not consistent

with the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense Review and current Defense

Planning Guidance. In May 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review

recommended that, due to funding constraints, the total procurement of

F/A-18E/Fs should be reduced to 548 aircraft. The October 1997 Defense

Acquisition Executive Summary Report revised the total F/A-18E/F

procurement to 548 aircraft.

In terms of the Navy’s assumed annual production rate of 72 aircraft, in

March 1997 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition indicated the

annual E/F production rates would be lower. He directed that he be given

the opportunity to review any plan to acquire production tooling that

would support producing more than 48 aircraft per year. The May 1997

Quadrennial Defense Review report also recommended an annual

production rate of 48 aircraft.

According to information provided to you in July 1997 by the Director of

Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

lower total buy will decrease the total procurement cost but increase the

E/F’s unit procurement cost from $57 million to $64 million (fiscal 

year 1997 dollars).

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More Higher Cost 

F Models Will Be Procured

When the F/A-18E/F program was approved in 1992, the procurement plan

called for the majority (820, or 82 percent) of the F/A-18E/F buy to be

single-seat E models. Only 180, or 18 percent, of the 1,000 aircraft buy

would be two-seat F models to be used for training purposes. However,

the Navy has since decided that the majority of the total buy will now be

two-seat F models that will require the crew members in the second seat

to perform operational as well as training functions. According to program

documents, the Navy is using a buy of 548 aircraft, as recommended in the

Quadrennial Defense Review, for planning purposes. This buy will consist

of 288 (about 53 percent) F model aircraft and 260 (about 47 percent) E

model aircraft.

This revised acquisition strategy has significant cost implications because,

according to program officials, the two-seat F model will cost about

$1.5 million more per aircraft than the single-seat E model. However, this

cost differential is expected to increase. According to program documents,

the back seat of the F will have to be upgraded to accomplish the

operational missions that will now be assigned to that model. The cost of

this upgrade, which is expected to be accomplished by 2005, has not been

estimated.

Inflation Rates Are

Understated

Navy unit procurement cost estimates for the 15-year F/A-18E/F

acquisition program assume an annual inflation rate that is provided by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense. The unit procurement cost estimates in

the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Selected Acquisition Reports from program approval

in 1992 through December 1995 were based on a 3-percent annual inflation

factor, which measures the general inflation of the U.S. economy rather

than the inflation rate for the aerospace industry. The December 1996

Selected Acquisition Report stated a lower projection of E/F unit

procurement cost based on a lower 2.2-percent annual inflation factor.

According to program documents, the inflation rates provided by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense for budget estimating are lower than

escalation indexes developed from historical escalation data published by

the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which uses the Data Resources

Incorporated econometric forecasting model for the aerospace industry.

According to E/F program management, the escalation factors generated

by the model will be used as a baseline to negotiate E/F procurement cost.

Table 1 compares the DOD annual inflation rates with aerospace industry

annual inflation rates.

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Table 1: Comparison of DOD and

Industry Annual Inflation Indexes Fiscal year DOD factor Industry factor

1997 2.2 2.9

1998 2.2 3.1

1999 2.2 3.2

2000 2.2 3.4

2001 2.2 3.3

2002 2.2 3.4

2003 2.2 3.5

2004 2.2 3.6

2005 2.2 3.5

2006 2.2 3.6

Using the higher aerospace industry inflation rates would substantially

increase the F/A-18E/F unit procurement cost estimate. The use of

understated inflation rates to estimate unit cost is not unique to the

F/A-18E/F program. We have issued reports that discuss the impact of

understated inflation rates.11

Conclusions and

Recommendations

The ongoing test program has identified numerous deficiencies with the

F/A-18E/F aircraft. The Navy’s system for identifying the program risk

associated with these deficiencies indicates that several of them are

significant. As of March 1998, the Navy had not decided how to resolve

some of the deficiencies or predicted the costs involved in resolving them.

A Navy board established to identify risks to the F/A-18E/F program has

stated that, until several of the deficiencies have been resolved, the

Operational Test and Evaluation portion of the F/A-18E/F program,

scheduled to begin in May 1999, might slip or that the F/A-18E/F will have

an unsuccessful Operational Test and Evaluation.

We recognize that the F/A-18E/F development test program has nearly 

1 year remaining before it is scheduled to be completed. Therefore, the

Navy still has time to try to resolve the deficiencies being identified during

the test program. However, additional deficiencies may be identified

before the test program is completed. The issue is how much time and

money will be required to satisfactorily resolve these deficiencies. This

will not be known until the E/F has completed its Operational Test and

Evaluation.

11F-22 Restructuring (GAO/NSIAD-97-100R, Feb. 28, 1997) and Future Years Defense Program: Lower

Inflation Outlook Was Most Significant Change From 1996 to 1997 Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-36,

Dec. 12, 1996).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
B-277891 

The deficiencies discussed in this report were identified prior to DOD’s

March 1997 decision to approve the E/F program to enter low-rate initial

production. DOD’s approval to advance the program into production

indicates its optimism and willingness to accept the risk that these

deficiencies, and any additional deficiencies that might arise, will be

resolved with little or no cost, schedule, or performance impact on the

program. Program documents indicate, however, that correcting some of

these deficiencies, such as the wing drop problem, could have significant

cost, schedule, and performance impacts on the F/A-18E/F program.

We believe that DOD and the Navy need to adopt a more cautious approach

as they make funding decisions for the E/F program and prepare for

Operational Test and Evaluation of the aircraft. Therefore, we recommend

that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to not

approve contracting for any additional F/A-18E/F aircraft beyond the 12

aircraft contracted for during the first low-rate production phase of the

program until the Navy demonstrates through flight testing that identified

aircraft deficiencies have been corrected. This will still provide the Navy

with the necessary aircraft to conduct operational testing of the F/A-18E/F.

We also recommend that the Navy not begin Operational Test and

Evaluation of the F/A-18E/F until corrections of deficiencies are

incorporated in the aircraft that will be used for the evaluation.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with both

of our recommendations. Regarding our recommendation that no

additional aircraft be contracted for until flight testing has demonstrated

that aircraft deficiencies have been corrected, DOD stated that its testing to

date has not identified any specific deficiencies that are predicted to

prevent achieving an operationally effective level of performance. DOD also

stated that it would ensure that the solution to the wing drop problem has

been demonstrated before proceeding with full funding of the second

low-rate production lot of the aircraft. DOD further stated that the

Secretary of Defense has said that these funds would not be released until

he is satisfied that the wing drop problem has been corrected. We believe

the same level of commitment is needed relative to the other deficiencies

that the F/A-18E/F Integrated Test Team has identified, such as the engine

and weapon separation problems.

Regarding our recommendation that Operational Test and Evaluation of

the F/A-18E/F not begin until correction of deficiencies are incorporated in

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
B-277891 

the aircraft to be used for operational evaluation, DOD stated that it agreed

that operational evaluation should begin in May 1999 with production

representative aircraft that have incorporated needed corrections. The

underlying basis of our recommendation is that the Navy needs to

demonstrate through flight testing that all the required fixes have been

made and incorporated in the test aircraft before beginning Operational

Test and Evaluation, even if the schedule needs to slip beyond May 1999.

This approach would provide a sound basis for evaluating and quantifying

the capabilities of the aircraft that will be provided to the fleet. This

evaluation is particularly important because the F/A-18E/F will be the

Navy’s primary fighter aircraft until the Joint Strike Fighter becomes

available. A realistic comparison on the operational capabilities of the E/F

with the newest F/A-18C/Ds currently in the fleet would provide the basis

for a decision on how many E/F aircraft the Navy should ultimately

procure as replacements for the C/D aircraft.

In addition to its comment on our recommendations, DOD provided specific

comments on other portions of our draft report. DOD’s comments and our

response appear in appendix IV.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional

committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy; and the Director,

Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Scope and

Methodology

20

Appendix II 

Navy System for

Identifying

Deficiencies

21

Appendix III 

Risk Items in the

F/A-18E/F Program

22

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

24

Appendix V 

Major Contributors to

This Report

39

Tables Table 1: Comparison of DOD and Industry Annual Inflation

Indexes

14

Table III.1: Risk Items Identified by Boeing and PRAB for the

F/A-18E/F Program

22

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

EMD engineering and manufacturing development

LRIP low-rate initial production

PRAB Program Risk Advisory Board

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

To evaluate the status of the test program, we gathered and evaluated all

F/A-18E/F flight test deficiency reports prepared as of December 4, 1997,

by the F/A-18E/F Integrated Test Team. We interviewed the team’s

management, the F/A-18E/F contractors (Boeing Corporation, St. Louis,

Missouri, and General Electric Corporation, Lynn, Massachusetts), E/F

program management, and the Navy’s Operational Test and Evaluation

Force’s test personnel about the implications of documented program

deficiencies on program cost, schedule, and performance.

To determine which deficiency areas the Navy and the Program Risk

Advisory Board determined to be risks to the F/A-18E/F program, we

obtained Program Risk Advisory Board risk assessments and interviewed

Board officials. We interviewed Navy program management and

contractor officials about the implications of these risks on program cost,

schedule, and performance. We discussed with the contractors their

identified F/A-18E/F engineering and manufacturing development (EMD)

and low-rate initial production program risks and the implications on

program cost, schedule, and performance. We obtained detailed

information on the potential cost, schedule, and performance impact of

medium- to high-risk areas. We interviewed Defense Contract Management

Command officials at Boeing and General Electric Corporations about

their role in on-site monitoring and evaluation of the contractors’

F/A-18E/F development efforts, E/F deficiencies, and development risks

facing the contractors. We also obtained documents in which the

Command formally reported its findings to Navy headquarters. We

interviewed Operational Test and Evaluation Force officials about their

role in evaluating the E/F and plans for conducting future operational

testing.

To address F/A-18E/F development and procurement cost issues, we

interviewed program and contractor officials responsible for financial

matters and received briefings and answers to our questions concerning

program cost.

We conducted our review from May 1997 to January 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix II 

Navy System for Identifying Deficiencies

The Integrated Test Team categorizes deficiencies it identifies during flight

testing in either watch item, white sheet, or deficiency reports. Watch item

reports document deficiencies that require design or software changes

that need management attention. White sheet reports document

deficiencies for which no fix has been identified, a fix has failed

re-evaluation, or a fix impacts significant test events. Deficiency reports

are submitted when an identified fix fails a second retest or time is needed

to develop a plan of action.

Initially, deficiencies are documented in watch item reports. If not

corrected, they are sequentially escalated to a white sheet report and

finally to a deficiency report. Therefore, the number of deficiencies in each

of these categories changes continually as new deficiencies are identified,

resolved, and moved among the categories. As of October 1997, the

Integrated Test Team had categorized 370 deficiencies in watch item

reports, 88 deficiencies in white sheet reports, and 30 deficiencies in

deficiency reports.

Deficiencies within each of these categories are also classified by their

severity. The most severe of these classifications is a deficiency in which

there is a high probability that it will cause aircraft control loss, equipment

destruction, or injury to flight test personnel.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix III 

Risk Items in the F/A-18E/F Program

Table III.1 shows the risks identified by Boeing in the F/A-18E/F EMD and

low-rate initial production (LRIP) program and by the Navy’s F/A-18E/F

Program Risk Advisory Board (PRAB) at the September 1997 Program

Management Review. Blank cells indicate that Boeing or PRAB did not

identify these as risk items as of September 1997.

Table III.1: Risk Items Identified by

Boeing and PRAB for the F/A-18e/F

Program Risk item

EMD risk

(Boeing)

LRIP risk

(Boeing)

Program risk

(PRAB)

ALE-47 flare ingestion Low

ALE-50 towed decoy Medium Medium

Airframe mounted accessory drive Low Low

Advanced quality system implementation Medium

Contractor quality assurance inspection

transition Medium

Aft center fuselage overheating Medium

Environmental control system aft center

fuselage overheating Low

Built-in-test false alarm rate Low Medium

Bleed cell 4 heat exchanger leak

detection system Medium Medium

Brake/auxiliary power unit accumulator Medium Medium

Canopy/windscreen Medium

Windscreen coating Low Medium

Drift-free pressure transmitter set sensors Medium Medium

Dry bay fire suppression Medium Medium

Electronic warfare:

Antenna Medium

Antenna performance Medium

Antenna producibility (Boeing) Low

Antenna producibility (Northrop) Medium

Proposed specification change notice

impact (Northrop) Medium

Engine full production qualification

schedule Medium

Engine blade containment Low

Engine exhaust smoke at LRIP Medium

LRIP engine life Medium

Engine bay fire extinguisher system High Medium

Follow-on test and evaluation program

definition Medium

Flight test interdependencies Low

(continued)

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix III 

Risk Items in the F/A-18E/F Program

Risk item

EMD risk

(Boeing)

LRIP risk

(Boeing)

Program risk

(PRAB)

Flight test schedule changes Low

Flutter program slip Low Low

Fuel thermal management performance Low

Thermal management Medium

Ground station automated maintenance

environment Low Medium

Horizontal stabilator Low

Horizontal tail Low

Hydraulic reservoir bay supportability Medium

Maintainability—actuals versus projected Low

Increased test requirements Medium

LRIP displays availability Medium

Multipurpose color display/up-front

control display Medium

New technology producibility and

performance High High

Onboard jammer Medium Medium

Operational test requirements versus

expected performance Medium

Operational test requirements versus

specification performance Medium

Parts obsolescence Medium High

F/A-18E/F as F-14 replacement Medium

Store separation Medium Medium

Technical evaluation reliability

performance High

Up/auto wing drop Medium Medium

Vertical tail certification Medium Medium

Water tightness Low Low

Engine mounts (spares) Medium Medium

Noise and vibration Medium Medium

Total number of risks listed 16 22 33

Source: Boeing.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 15.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 3.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 2.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 2.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Now on p. 2.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

Now on p. 3.

See comment 9.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 10.

Now on p. 6.

See comment 11.

Now on p. 7.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 12.

Now on p. 8.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 13.

Now on p. 9.

See comment 14.

Now on p. 9.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 15.

Now on p. 10.

See comment 16.

Now on p. 10.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 17.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments to DOD’s letter dated February 9, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. The first operational assessment, during which operational testers flew

the E/F aircraft, was conducted by the Operational Test and Evaluation

Force in November 1997. The preliminary report on that assessment,

referred to as a Quick Look Report, identified 16 major deficiencies that

must be corrected prior to the commencement of Operational Test and

Evaluation. Further, the statements in our report concerning the

possibility that the E/F might not achieve an operationally effective level

of performance until identified deficiencies are corrected were taken

directly from documents and reports prepared by the F/A-18E/F Integrated

Test Team.

2. DOD’s comments stated that our final report should compare the

consequences of not providing full funding for the second lot of LRIP

aircraft because this would result in a production break and involve

considerable costs. The Navy has not delivered any of the 12 aircraft being

built under the first LRIP contract. The first aircraft is scheduled to be

delivered in 1999, or about 20 months from the time of initial low-rate

production decision, followed by the production of 1 aircraft per month

until all 12 aircraft are completed. This schedule gives the Navy time to

reassess its F/A-18E/F production plans. This reassessment should

consider the cost and schedule tradeoffs of stretching out the production

of the first 12 aircraft compared with proceeding with the current

production schedule and accepting the potential for costly modifications

and retrofits that may be required to correct current and future

deficiencies.

3. We have revised the wording of our recommendation to clarify that we

were referring to delaying Operational Test and Evaluation until

corrections of deficiencies are incorporated in the aircraft that will be

used for the evaluation.

4. DOD’s comments addressed the original test plan. Our report addressed

the revised test plan. The point we make in our report is that the revised

development test plan is focused on maintaining a development test

schedule that will not cause delays in beginning the next phase of

testing—Operational Test and Evaluation. Maintaining the test schedule

will be a challenge because program documents state that E/F

management anticipates that the remainder of the flight test program will

experience an increase in testing requirements similar to what DOD’s

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

comments stated has already occurred. This issue was addressed in an

August 1997 flight test program review. The result of that review was that

further increases in test requirements will have to be offset with

corresponding reductions in the baseline test program.

5. We agree that finding discrepancies from predicted performance is the

purpose of flight testing. However, inherent in the flight test program

should be quantifying the effect that the correction of deficiencies will

have on the E/F’s ability to meet its Key Performance Parameters. That is

the underlying basis for our recommendation that no additional aircraft be

produced until flight testing has validated the Navy’s predictions that the

deficiencies being identified by the Integrated Test Team are resolved.

6. Our report addresses the need to determine the operational

performance of the E/F after the correction of deficiencies have been

incorporated in the aircraft. For example, the Blue Ribbon Panel that

studied the wing drop problem stated that proposed fixes are expected to

increase drag on the airplane, which could degrade the aircraft’s range.

This finding is significant because range is one of the E/F’s Key

Performance Parameters and one of the key improvements over the

existing F/A-18C/D that the Navy cited in justifying the procurement of the

E/F. Program management range estimates in January 1998 show that the

F/A-18E has a slight range margin compared with F/A-18E/F threshold

requirements (400 nautical miles versus 390 nautical miles with 2 external

fuel tanks and 450 nautical miles versus 430 nautical miles with 3 external

fuel tanks, respectively). The F/A-18F, which is heavier and has less

internal fuel capacity than the E model, will have less range than the E

model. The final operational performance of the E/F’s range and other Key

Performance Parameters will not be known until all deficiencies have

been corrected and their impact on the aircraft has been quantified.

7. We recognize that the March 1997 Operational Requirements Document

contains the Key Performance Parameters that will be measured when

evaluating the operational capabilities of the E/F. However, that document

stipulates that the aerodynamic performance of the E/F is required to be as

good as Lot XII F/A-18C/Ds. These C/D aircraft were built in the late 1980s

and early 1990s. They are not as operationally effective as the more

currently procured C/Ds that have been equipped with enhanced

performance engines.

8. We reviewed the Operational Test and Evaluation Force’s Quick Look

Report on the November 1997 operational assessment and could not verify

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

DOD’s statement that the assessment found that the slight reduction in

acceleration and maneuvering energy of the E/F had no significant tactical

impact. Therefore, we discussed DOD’s statement with Operational Test

and Evaluation Force officials who conducted the operational assessment.

According to those officials, the Quick Look Report did not contain the

cited conclusion. The officials cautioned, however, that they did not

disagree with DOD’s comment because the operational impact of the E/F’s

slight reduction in acceleration and maneuvering energy will depend on

the specific mission profile (e.g., altitude and speed) and aircraft

configuration (e.g., weapons being carried) that is being flown. In some

cases, the C/D will out perform the E/F and vice versa. The officials also

cautioned that its Quick Look Report was based on its preliminary analysis

of limited data and stated that its evaluation of E/F operational capabilities

might be modified after additional analyses are conducted.

9. We discussed the Cost Analysis Improvement Group’s March 1997 cost

estimate with group members who prepared the estimate. These officials

told us that the estimate was based on a total E/F buy of 1,000 aircraft and

an annual peak production of 72 aircraft. The estimate was not based on

the currently planned procurement of 548 aircraft and an annual peak

production of 48 aircraft. Additionally, the officials told us that they did

not factor in the increased development and procurement costs of

upgrading the back seat of the F model to enable it to perform its assigned

missions because the cost of the upgrade has not been determined.

Furthermore, the March 1997 estimate, like the E/F program management

estimate, used DOD-directed annual inflation rates and not the higher

aerospace industry inflation rates that we discussed in our report. All of

these factors understate the E/F cost estimates.

10. DOD’s December 1996 Selected Acquisition Report (the most currently

available) shows that operation and support costs for a 12-aircraft E/F

squadron will be about $3.2 million greater per year than a similar-sized

F/A-18C/D squadron. This estimate represents an increase of over

$1 billion when extrapolated over the E/F fleet and a 20- to 30-year service

life. Therefore, we disagree with DOD’s comment that lower E/F operation

and support costs will lower the E/F cost estimate.

11. In addition to the statements from the wing drop Blue Ribbon Panel

that DOD included in its comments, the Panel stated that more flight test

points are required in order to optimize the combination of fixes and to

confirm the fixes at all points in the flight envelope. The Panel stated that

this flight test approach was necessary because the underlying flow

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

mechanisms of wing drop are not well understood due to the lack of

adequate wind tunnel test techniques and practical computational

procedures. In addition, the Panel stated that, although it is optimistic that

an acceptable combination of fixes can be found, some of the more

promising fixes will increase drag to some extent, may impact the

observability characteristics, and may alter the design loads on the wing

and flap components. The Panel further stated that these impacts must be

quantified, and appropriate tradeoffs must be made to determine the

optimum configuration and to assess the performance impacts. The

Panel’s statements are consistent with the recommendations in our report.

12. DOD’s comment that the E/F program is committed to implementing all

required fixes on the aircraft prior to Operational Test and Evaluation is

based on DOD’s confidence that predictive tools will help resolve any radar

cross section issues that might arise as a result of incorporating solutions

to deficiencies. Our position is that solutions will not be known until they

are assessed during flight testing rather than through simulation and

modeling. Our position was substantiated by the Fiscal Year 1997 Annual

Report of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, dated

February 1998. The report stated that a challenge to the operational test

program will be to design a strategy that will be able to determine if the

F/A-18E/F will be more survivable than the F/A-18C/D, which is a key

requirement of the E/F program. According to the report, existing models

have many limitations in the ability to make this determination, and efforts

to improve these predictive tools will not likely be mature in time to

support the E/F program.

13. The engine fixes discussed in DOD’s comments have not yet been

demonstrated and validated during flight testing, and DOD’s statement that

the visible engine exhaust issue has been resolved for some time is not

supported by program documents. In December 1997, the PRAB listed

engine smoke as a medium-risk item that, if not corrected, will make the

aircraft unacceptable for or jeopardize successful Operational Test and

Evaluation. In addition, a December 1997 F/A-18E/F Propulsion and Power

Program status report raised a number of recent engine concerns. The

report stated that the major concern is keeping the engine development on

schedule. Engine schedule slips to date could affect delivery of engines for

the LRIP aircraft. Also, the engine is experiencing potentially problematic

weight growth. The engine has reached its specification weight, and

redesign changes to address a blade containment failure will cause the

engine to exceed its specification weight. The program office has initiated

a weight reduction study to identify ways to reduce engine weight by more

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

than 56 pounds. In addition, the status report raised concerns about the

engines inability to accept the growth necessary to accommodate the

electronically scanned array radar that is a pre-planned product

improvement for the E/F. According to the status report, a conscious

decision was made to not design the engine for additional growth

capability to avoid a major redesign of the back end of the aircraft to

relocate the vertical tail. Taken in combination, these factors portray a less

optimistic engine situation than indicated in DOD’s comments.

14. We discussed DOD’s statements with officials in the F/A-18E/F program

office. The officials told us that the modification of the bomb release

interval has not yet been flight tested. Also, weapon separation test data

show that only about 21-percent of the testing has been done. It will not be

known whether the weapon separation problem has been corrected until

the testing has been completed.

15. We have revised our report to incorporate this information.

16. DOD’s comments discussed components testing. However, the vertical

tail cannot be certified until the completion of tests of the tail attached to

the aircraft. These tests are not scheduled to be completed until late 1999.

17. In a January 1998 program status report, program funding was listed as

one of the major challenges facing the E/F program. The report stated that

the EMD program is still funded at the “nothing goes wrong” level. Whether

the EMD program will be completed within the congressional cost cap is

not currently known.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Steven F. Kuhta

Jerry W. Clark

William E. Petrick, Jr.

Kansas City Field

Office

Lawrence A. Dandridge

Lillian I. Slodkowski

(707258) Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-61 F/A-18E/F Program
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