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71–203 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–145 

EMERGING THREATS TO RAIL SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 14, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

BRUCE H. ANDREWS, General Counsel 

BRIAN M. HENDRICKS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

TODD BERTOSON, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 14, 2011 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 3 

Statement of Senator Udall .................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Wicker .................................................................................. 24 

Statement of Senator Boozman .............................................................................. 28 

Statement of Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................ 30 

WITNESSES

Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

John O’Connor, Vice President and Chief of Police, Amtrak Police Department, National Railroad Passenger Corporation ............................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to 

Hon. John S. Pistole ............................................................................................. 37 

Brian Michael Jenkins, Director, National Transportation Security Center 

of Excellence, Mineta Transportation Institute, prepared statement .............. 38 

(1) 

EMERGING THREATS TO RAIL SECURITY 

TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:53 p.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, 

presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. My profound apologies. I know each one of 

you has worked hard to bring the information that we’re looking 

for today to the forefront, and so again, my apologies. And the lack 

of presence here in no way suggests a lack of interest, but we did 

have a fairly difficult discussion that took place before the vote, so 

that’s why there are some delays here. 

But we’re pleased to see you. And I don’t think I have to strike 

the gavel to get order in the room. It looks like a pretty orderly 

group, so it counts. 

Anyway, I thank you all for being here. 

Six weeks after the American military’s courageous and daring 

raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound, one thing is clear: the ruthless killer is dead and gone, but al Qaeda, as we know, remains 

determined to strike the U.S. again. According to reports, documents recovered from bin Laden’s compound show that he wanted 

to mark the 10th anniversary of 9/11 by attacking trains, surface 

transportation, in our country. 

This discovery sends tremors down our spines, but it shouldn’t 

surprise us. The choices they make for targets are those that have 

lots of people in the area and where they can inflict damage that 

will be felt throughout the area, throughout the country, even 

though it’s in a relatively small bit of geography. 

Terrorists have been focused on trains for years, and we’ve seen 

attacks overseas, including bombings in London, Mumbai, Madrid, 

and Moscow. Terrorists have attacked trains and buses 1,700 

times—hard to imagine—worldwide since 9/11, and the attacks unfortunately took 3,700 lives. And trains have been targeted here in 

our country. Since 9/11, we’ve foiled several planned attacks on our 

public transportation network, including one last fall when the FBI 

arrested a man who was plotting to blow up four stations in Washington, D.C.’s own Metro system. We’ve got to recognize that our 

surface transportation network is enormous, heavily traveled, and 

is therefore an attractive target. 

2 

Americans take more trips on trains than other public transportation, than they do on commercial airliners. The public takes 700 

million flights a year. But compared to 10 billion trips aboard subways, buses, trains, and other forms of public transportation, it 

shows you a relationship that should not and cannot be ignored. 

Consider Amtrak’s success. Last year, nearly 29 million passengers traveled aboard Amtrak, an all-time high, and a number 

Amtrak is projected to beat this year, and I can verify that because 

I use Amtrak regularly. 

I came down yesterday. And forgive the light moment, but last 

week, while someone tried to get a couple of bags aboard, legitimate, the attendant in the train was left standing on the platform 

when the train left. So the bags were in, but the person working 

in the train, on the train itself was left behind. So I think there 

was a little bit of imbalance in terms of what was required. 

Amtrak’s passengers travel on 21,000 miles of track through 500 

train stations. Our rail network is as vast as it is open, making 

trains appealing targets for terrorists. 

Simply put, rail offers easy access and a chance to strike with 

high casualties. Make no mistake, the threat to America’s rail network is real, and we’ve got to do whatever we can to keep it secure. 

At the federal level, this responsibility largely rests with TSA, 

Transportation Security Administration. 

When we think of TSA, many only consider its work to secure 

aviation. But this vital agency has to protect our entire transportation system, including trains. Despite this, 98 percent of TSA’s 

budget is dedicated to aviation security, leaving less than 2 percent 

for rail security. 

So for years, I’ve been sounding the alarm that our attention has 

been too lopsided, too one-sided rather, and that we can’t only focus 

on aviation security. 

The Government Accountability Office agrees and has issued 

multiple recommendations in recent years calling on TSA to do 

more to safeguard rail and other surface transportation networks. 

TSA is taking steps to strengthen rail security, but the agency and 

the Department of Homeland Security still haven’t carried out the 

many requirements outlined in the 9/11 Act, which became law in 

2007. 

Now, I’m committed to helping these agencies get the resources 

they need, but it’s no surprise it’s an uphill fight right now. The 

House majority, the House Republicans, recently voted to slash 

Homeland Security grant funding, including funding for public 

transportation security grants, in a move that would seriously undermine our efforts to keep Americans safe when they travel. 

I want to be clear. We’re going to do what we can to fight to defeat those cuts. 

But we also need to know what TSA is doing to improve rail security now, including training employees, improving technology and 

infrastructure. So I look forward to hearing from Amtrak about 

what they and other train operators are doing to keep their passengers safe and secure. But I want to be sure that we cannot 

stand to take large cuts in resource, reductions in funding, and tell 

the American public honestly that we’re doing whatever we can to 

protect them, and that’s a fight that we all have to be engaged in. 

3 

Cuts are interesting. But if they’re cuts to your body, to your 

basic operations, to the things that you do, they hurt, and we have 

to figure out a way not just to do the cuts but to do more to reduce 

our deficit and not contribute more to debt. 

So it’s a subject I take a great deal of interest in, and I’m going 

to work to see what we can do about making certain that we have 

the resources available to provide the quality and the kind of security that’s necessary, and I know all of you agree. 

So I look forward to hearing, as I said, from what Amtrak and 

other operators are going to do to keep passengers, or are doing 

presently to keep their passengers safe and secure. 

And the timely arrival of our distinguished colleague, Senator 

Hutchison, and I would ask, if you have an opening statement, 

please offer that now, and we’ll continue our process. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. I won’t read my whole statement, Mr. 

Chairman, except to say that I’m glad that you’re having the hearing. I won’t be able to stay for all of it, but I think we all know 

that rail transportation has not been in the forefront of our transportation security efforts. I think aviation certainly has been dominant, and I do think that we need to see how we can do that more 

with the resources that we have, and I realize that the responsibility for all transportation is challenging, to say the least. 

In addition to aviation, you’ve got trucks. You’ve got rail. You’ve 

got freight. So there is a big challenge, which we understand, but 

I am very concerned that we not leave it to chance and certainly 

that we put the effort into it, and especially I hope that you will 

address the issue of the DHS Inspector General recommending that 

the surface inspectors report to an official with surface responsibilities, as opposed to the aviation person, because there are differences. And I think with management, we certainly ought to be 

able to focus more efforts at the specific needs of surface, particularly in this case rail. 

So thank you for calling the hearing, and I will look forward to 

seeing the testimony if I don’t get it. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Senator Udall, your opening statement, if 

you’d like to make one. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. We’ll put the opening statement in the record, 

and let’s get to the witnesses. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That’s an uncommon but kind gesture. 

And so now I acknowledge the presence of the witnesses, each 

one bringing significant expertise to the issue of rail security. 

Mr. John Pistole, Administrator of the TSA, the Transportation 

Security Administration, and he will update us on TSA’s rail security efforts. 

Mr. Stephen Lord, Director of Homeland Security and Justice 

Issues for the GAO, the Government Accountability Office, and 

we’ll listen with interest to your recommendations. 

4 

Mr. O’Connor, John O’Connor, Amtrak’s Chief of Police, Acting 

Vice President of the Office of Security and Special Operations. 

Chief O’Connor will discuss with us the challenges facing Amtrak 

and the steps it’s taking in light of emerging threats. 

I thank all of you for being here. 

Mr. Pistole, if you would, please begin, and we ask you to try to 

keep your remarks confined to 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg and Ranking 

Member Hutchison, Senator Udall. And thank you for your strong 

support for not only what TSA does but for our partners as we try 

to address the surface transportation issues that we’re all so aware 

of. 

So I’m pleased to appear before the Committee today to discuss 

the efforts of TSA in partnership with DHS, FEMA and Amtrak, 

and many industry leaders to provide mass transit and passenger 

rail security. 

Last month the President announced the U.S. operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, and this effort marked an 

historic counterterrorism success for our country and for the world, 

as have the recently announced deaths of Ilyas Kashmiri in Pakistan and Harun Fazul in Somalia. Of course, we believe Kashmiri 

has been responsible for most of the western operations for alQaeda core, and then Harun Fazul, leader of the 1998 embassy 

bombings in East Africa and much of the al-Qaeda in East Africa 

work. 

But our efforts to combat terrorism go well beyond any one individual, or any one of these three, which is why we remain focused 

on our critical mission of protecting the traveling public and our 

transportation systems. TSA will continue to evaluate security protocols based on the latest intelligence, and will continue to share 

information with stakeholders to enable them to enhance protective 

measures and surge resources, as appropriate. And, of course, we 

ask the traveling public to remain vigilant and report any suspicious activity to the police. 

So, today I’m honored to appear with Chief O’Connor and Steve 

Lord to focus on mass transit systems and passenger railroads, 

which include subways, bus transit systems, ferries, Amtrak, commuter railroads, all of which, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, accounted for more than 10 billion trips for Americans last year 

alone. These systems are a critical part of the transportation network TSA works with our partners to protect. 

They also remain a target, as you noted, for terrorist groups, and 

have been the subject of numerous plots in the U.S., unsuccessful, 

fortunately, as well as the successful attacks that you noted overseas in Spain, the U.K., India, Moscow and elsewhere. These systems serve large populations and major metropolitan areas, and 

many have substantial underground infrastructures. Bridges and 

transportation staging areas are hubs which can also be attacked. 

And, of course, the consequences of an attack on any one of these 

systems in our country could be devastating. 

5 

A critical component of TSA security efforts for mass transit and 

passenger rail is our partnerships with industry and local and regional stakeholders. DHS’ comprehensive Transit Security Grant 

Program is currently the primary vehicle providing funding assistance for security enhancements to eligible transit agencies, supporting state and local government initiatives to improve security. 

TSA works with FEMA to fund projects that most effectively mitigate risk at the highest-risk systems. 

For example, in 2010 DHS awarded nearly $274 million to the 

transit and passenger rail industry, bringing the total since 2006 

to nearly $1.6 billion. In addition to grant funding, TSA supports 

the security of mass transit and rail systems by deploying Visible 

Intermodal Prevention Response teams, or VIPR teams, to augment local security efforts. And as you know, we currently have 25 

dedicated VIPR teams in operation, and the fiscal 2012 budget request includes funding for an additional 12 teams. 

In addition, TSA performs baseline and collaborative site-specific 

risk assessments for mass transit and passenger rail systems, engaging state and local partners on how to reduce their individual 

vulnerabilities, assess risk, and improve security efforts. These assessments are conducted with emphasis on the 100 largest mass 

transit and passenger rail systems in terms of passenger volume, 

which collectively account for over 80 percent of all users of public 

transportation. And, of course, among these assessments is a Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement, or BASE, B-A-S-E, 

which is a comprehensive security assessment program designed to 

evaluate 17 security and emergency management action items that 

form the foundation of an effective security program. 

We also work with our partners to assess risk and vulnerabilities 

in a number of other venues. We also work with the Federal Transit Authority and the Federal Railroad Administration, trade 

groups representing mass transit and passenger rail interests, and 

the transit and passenger rail agencies to improve security. 

In closing, I would like to stress again that collaboration is crucial for the success of mass transit and passenger rail security operations. TSA will continue to partner with law enforcement, industry, state, local and tribal officials, emergency responders and federal agencies to foster regional security collaboration to integrate 

resources for enhanced deterrence and response capabilities. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, thanks for the opportunity to be here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and distinguished members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before 

you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) surface 

transportation programs. 

As you know, TSA’s efforts in the surface transportation domain are undertaken 

to reduce security vulnerabilities and to strengthen resilience against terrorist attacks. In this domain, which includes mass transit systems, ferries, trucking, freight 

rail, and passenger rail, we work collaboratively with public and private sector partners to develop and to implement programs that promote commerce while enhancing 

security and mitigating the risk to our nation’s transportation systems. We strive 

6 

to maximize participation from state, local, tribal, and industry interests with a 

common goal of securing all modes of transportation. 

DHS’s Mission to Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security 

TSA secures and safeguards mass transit and railroad operations through a variety of programs. Many of these programs enhance security by addressing policy 

gaps, enhancing coordination, and maximizing the use of partner strengths and capabilities as addressed in the March 2010 Surface Transportation Security Priority 

Assessment. The primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)— 

Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security—is strongly supported by TSA and 

is aligned with DHS’s programmatic activities and organizational structure as found 

in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and corresponding Bottom-Up 

Review Report. 

Due to the large populations and substantial infrastructure served by mass transit and national railroad systems, these networks remain a target for terrorist 

groups. Moreover, an open architecture connecting millions of passengers in major 

metropolitan areas creates inherent potential security vulnerabilities. TSA thus employs advanced risk-based, intelligence-driven techniques to prevent terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the nation’s transportation systems to terrorism. 

Recognizing that the risk from terrorism and other hazards to surface transportation demands a coordinated approach involving all sector partners and stakeholders, the federal government initiated a comprehensive review of U.S. surface 

transportation security efforts across all modes of surface transportation in 2009. 

The resulting Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment (STSPA), released in April 2010, identified interagency priorities for the following four years 

and provided concrete recommendations on how to enhance security efforts and 

maximize the use of partnerships to optimize public safety, facilitate commerce, and 

strengthen the resiliency of the country’s surface transportation system. 

DHS has completed risk-based implementation plans for each of the 20 consensus 

recommendations of the STSPA, further addressing the potential risks to the surface transportation system and its four subsectors (mass transit and passenger rail, 

highways and motor carriers, freight rail, and pipelines). These plans focus on improving information sharing, increasing coordination among federal agencies involved in the transportation sector, and improving the effectiveness and efficiency 

of the grants process. As of May 2011, 10 recommendations have been fully implemented and the implementation of the others is underway. 

Collaboration with Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Private Entities 

Over the past several years, DHS has been working to establish a new architecture in order to better defend against these evolving terrorist threats. This new architecture includes an emphasis on collaboration across government as well as in 

concert with private industry and the American public. 

In 2005, DHS and the Department of Transportation (DOT) signed the Public 

Transportation Security Annex to the DHS/DOT Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU). This agreement promotes security collaboration between federal, state, local, 

tribal, and private entities. To implement the Annex, TSA—in collaboration with 

DOT’s Federal Transit Administration and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Grant Programs Directorate—develops a framework to leverage each agency’s unique resources and capabilities. The Annex also identifies specific areas of coordination among the parties including citizen awareness, information sharing, security standards, data collection and analysis, and technical resource documents. 

In 2010, in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice and Amtrak, TSA 

announced a significant step toward enhancing the security of the nation transportation infrastructure with the implementation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 

Reporting Initiative (NSI) capability throughout the entire Amtrak rail system. The 

NSI is a partnership among federal, state, and local law enforcement to establish 

a standard process for law enforcement to identify and report suspicious incidents 

or activity and share that information nationally so it can be analyzed to identify 

broader trends. Under this collaborative program, Amtrak officers are also utilizing 

an upgraded reporting system—made available by TSA—to refer suspicious activity 

reports to DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for analysis and follow-up. 

DHS fosters regional security coordination and to integrate the spectrum of available resources for enhanced deterrent and response capabilities while empowering 

our state and local partners through training and exercise grant programs like the 

Department’s Transit Security Grant Program. TSA works to improve security with 

security stakeholders outside of the federal government. Key partners include trade 

7 

1 76 Fed. Reg. 22625 (April 22, 2011). 

groups representing mass transit and passenger railroad interests and the mass 

transit and passenger railroad agencies as well as senior executives, law enforcement chiefs, and emergency responders. The sector partnership model under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides a strong framework for TSA 

to work with other Federal, state, local, and private sector partners on critical infrastructure protection and resilience, especially in the area of surface transportation. 

We are also making considerable progress engaging the public in transportation 

security. DHS launched the ‘‘If You See Something, Say Something TM ’’ campaign 

last summer to raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism, crime and other 

threats, and emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to law enforcement authorities. This campaign is being expanded to places where the NSI is 

being implemented, to ensure that calls to authorities will be handled appropriately, 

in an environment where privacy and civil liberties protections are in place. The 

NSI is currently active in 15 states (California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) and 15 major cities (Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, District of Columbia, Houston, Kansas City, MO, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, 

Miami, Milwaukee, Phoenix, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle). 

To protect the public in this effort, TSA promulgated a final rule that strengthens 

the process by which individuals can report problems, deficiencies, or vulnerabilities 

related to transportation security including the security of aviation, commercial 

motor vehicles, maritime, pipelines, public transportation, and railroad carriers.1

The rule establishes a mechanism by which an individual who makes such a report 

to the TSA Contact Center will receive either a written receipt or a call identification number. The receipt mechanism will allow individuals who spot deficiencies in 

security measures to have documentation in case they receive any retaliation for reporting their concerns to TSA. 

Using Intelligence to Improve Surface Transportation Security 

Information sharing is critical to getting resources and intelligence out of Washington, D.C. and into the hands of state and local law enforcement, giving those on 

the frontlines the tools they need to protect local communities. Timely, accurate intelligence and security information is provided by TSA to mass transit and passenger railroad agency officials through joint efforts among DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, TSA Office of Intelligence, and FBI classified intelligence and 

analysis briefings. Consumers of such information include mass transit and passenger railroad security directors and law enforcement chiefs in major metropolitan 

areas as well as Amtrak. 

Intelligence products are provided to partners through TSA Mass Transit Security 

Awareness Messages as well as through the Joint Terrorism Task Force network’s 

secure video teleconferencing system. TSA is constantly working with our partners 

to enhance the scope, accuracy, timeliness, and efficiency of information sharing in 

order to develop a comprehensive intelligence and security information sharing platform. 

Collaborative Risk Assessment Initiatives 

TSA is developing and fielding a risk assessment capability focused on individual 

mass transit and passenger railroad agencies, their regional security partners, and 

connecting and adjoining transportation systems. This effort aims to produce several 

risk and vulnerability assessment tools integrated into a single platform so that 

TSA and its component security partners in DHS can conduct joint assessments of 

mass transit and passenger railroad agencies, employing resources more efficiently 

and improving the audit process. In addition, structural vulnerability assessments 

are currently being conducted on the Nation’s most critical highway, bridge and tunnel infrastructure. These assessments, performed for TSA by the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, are the most comprehensive assessments that have ever been performed. 

By performing baseline and collaborative risk assessments in the mass transit 

and passenger railroad domains, TSA is able to engage state and local partners to 

identify ways to reduce vulnerabilities, assess risk, and improve security efforts. 

These assessments are conducted with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit 

and passenger railroad systems in terms of passenger volume. This group accounts 

for over 80 percent of all users of public transportation. 

TSA uses the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA) to evaluate threat, vulnerability, and potential consequences for more than 200 terrorist attack scenarios for mass transit and passenger railroads. TSSRAs rate threat capaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Nov 18, 2011 Jkt 71203 PO 00000 Frm 000011 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06621 S:\GPO\DOCS\71203.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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bilities and likelihood of execution as well as vulnerabilities of rail and bus systems 

and infrastructure while considering casualties, property damage, and impacts on 

the transportation network. TSA uses the assessments to inform mitigation priorities, both across the sector and by individual mode, for collaborative security strategies, program development, and resource allocations. 

The Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) is a comprehensive 

security assessment program designed to evaluate 17 security and emergency management action items that form the foundation of an effective security program. 

BASE is intended to elevate the security posture and readiness throughout the mass 

transit and passenger railroad network by implementing and sustaining baseline security measures applicable to the operating environment and characteristics of mass 

transit systems and passenger railroads. TSA implements this continuous improvement process through its Transportation Security Inspectors, who conduct the assessments in partnership with the mass transit and passenger railroad agencies’ security chiefs and directors. These evaluations have significantly contributed to an 

elevation in the mass transit and passenger railroad security posture. 

Promoting Surface Transportation Security 

In compliance with federal law, TSA has created the Intermodal Security Training 

and Exercise Program (I–STEP). I–STEP enhances the preparedness of our nation’s 

surface-transportation sector network with meaningful evaluations of prevention, 

preparedness, and ability to respond to terrorist-related incidents. TSA has assembled a team of federal agencies and commercial vendors to provide planning and 

strategic support as well as analytical and technical services for transportation security training and exercises under the I–STEP program. 

Through outreach, TSA engages all modes of the intermodal transportation community to continuously improve security readiness. I–STEP offers an intermodal 

transportation-security training and exercise program for our Nation’s transportation network communities. The program improves the transportation industry’s 

ability to prepare for and respond to a transportation security incident by increasing 

awareness, improving processes, creating partnerships, and delivering transportation network security training and exercises. 

In addition to I–STEP, 25 Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) 

multi-modal teams are currently being operated by TSA while the FY 2012 budget 

request includes funding for 12 additional VIPR teams. These teams consist of personnel with expertise in inspection, behavior detection, security screening, and law 

enforcement for random, unpredictable deployments throughout the transportation 

sector to deter potential terrorist acts. Working alongside local law enforcement 

agencies throughout the transportation domain, TSA’s VIPR teams enhance the 

agency’s ability to leverage a variety of resources quickly in order to increase security in any mode of transportation anywhere in the country. TSA conducted more 

than 8,000 VIPR operations in the past 12 months, including more than 3,700 operations in mass transit and passenger railroad venues. VIPR operational plans are 

developed with a risk-based methodology in conjunction with local transportation security stakeholders and conducted jointly by TSA, local law enforcement, and transportation security resources. 

TSA and the representatives of the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory 

Group work together to enhance coordination and deterrent effects of VIPR team operations. This cooperation has grown since the mutually agreed upon operating 

guidelines for ‘‘Effective Employment of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response 

Teams in Mass Transit and Passenger Rail’’ were implemented in October 2007. 

Advancing Security Initiatives through Federal Grants 

As I previously mentioned, DHS employs a comprehensive transportation security 

grant program (TSGP) to provide awards to eligible transit agencies to assist state 

and local governments in devising and implementing initiatives to improve security. 

The TSGP promotes a sustainable, risk-based effort to protect critical surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of terrorism. The program is the primary vehicle providing funding assistance for security enhancements 

to eligible domestic mass transit and passenger railroad agencies and employs riskbased prioritization for funding decisions. 

In 2010, the TSGP provided $273.4 million to the transit and passenger railroad 

industry and a total of $1.6 billion since 2006. Similar, but smaller grant programs 

have supported overthe-road bus operations. Approximately $175 million has been 

awarded through TSGP for operational deterrence activities, which include public 

awareness campaigns, training, drills, and exercises since FY 2006. TSGP funding 

also supports non-federal law enforcement positions for anti-terrorism activities. 

DHS has awarded $29.9 million since FY 2006 for 60 canine teams and $93.6 milVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Nov 18, 2011 Jkt 71203 PO 00000 Frm 000012 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06621 S:\GPO\DOCS\71203.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
9 

lion for 304 officers to create 77 anti-terrorism teams. These officers enhance security, provide a visible deterrent and augment our nimble, risk-based approach to 

provide assistance where it can best be put to use. Transit, passenger railroad, and 

law enforcement agencies have also been provided TSGP funds to hire non-federal 

officers to serve as mobile explosives detection screeners. The officers for each of 

these teams are employees of the transit system/passenger railroad/law enforcement 

agency and are deployed according to security needs within the local transit or passenger railroad system. 

In an effort to further harden critical surface transportation infrastructure, in 

2010, TSA, in coordination with DOT and other DHS offices, developed and implemented the ‘‘National Strategy for Highway Bridge Security,’’ to conduct the most 

comprehensive structural security assessments to date on more than 60 of the Nation’s most significant highway structures, including bridges, tunnels and terminals. 

DHS is making strides across the department to improve critical infrastructure protection activities. Grants have been used to support intrusion detection, physical 

hardening, and surveillance measures for underwater tunnels, bridges, and multiuser high-volume stations. The TSGP has funded $155.2 million for underwater tunnel hardening, $168.5 million for critical station physical security measures, and 

over $28 million for suspension bridge hardening since FY 2006. 

Conclusion 

Our goal at all times is to maximize transportation security to stay ahead of the 

evolving terrorist threat while protecting passengers’ privacy and facilitating the 

flow of legitimate commerce. TSA works collaboratively with industry partners to 

develop and implement programs that promote commerce while enhancing security 

and mitigating the risk to our Nation’s transportation system. I want to thank the 

Committee for its continued assistance to TSA and for the opportunity to discuss 

the important issues related to surface transportation security. I am pleased to answer any questions you might have. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much, Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. Lord, your opportunity, please. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LORD. Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member 

Hutchison, and Senator Udall. I’m pleased to be here today to discuss TSA’s efforts to enhance rail security. 

This is an important issue given the recent intelligence recovered 

from the bin Laden compound and the prior unsuccessful plots to 

bomb the New York Transit and D.C. Metro systems. As you know, 

these systems are vulnerable to attack because they rely on the 

open architecture that is difficult to monitor and secure. 

Today I’d like to discuss three issues: first, the DHS risk assessment process used to focus its security efforts; second, the status 

of TSA’s efforts to provide security training for public transportation and front-line rail employees; and third, TSA’s efforts to 

streamline the vast amount of security information it provides to 

rail stakeholders. 

Regarding the first point, as we reported today in our written 

statement, TSA has made steady progress in improving the risk assessments across all modes of transportation, including rail. For example, last June, in response to a prior GAO recommendation, TSA 

completed a comprehensive assessment of security risk across the 

entire transportation sector, including the passenger and freight 

rail modes. And although TSA’s assessment excluded some important types of threats such as the threat of the lone wolf attack, this 

was a good first step. And TSA will issue an updated assessment 

later this year that will reportedly address some of the limitations 

we noted. 

10 

TSA has also expanded efforts to assess the risks of mass transit, 

passenger rail, and freight rail systems. For example, TSA has 

completed additional assessments of potential security threats to 

freight rail bridges and tunnels in response to one of our prior report recommendations, and as of June 2011, this month, the agency 

reported it had completed assessments of 77 bridges and 26 freight 

rail tunnels. These are positive steps. 

I would now like to discuss TSA’s efforts to develop security 

training programs for public transportation rail employees. This is 

an important issue because in 2007 TSA identified the need for 

more consistent, systematic security training of mass transit and 

passenger rail personnel. The 9/11 Act also mandated that TSA develop regulations for providing training to public transportation 

and front-line rail employees. 

During our recent discussions with TSA about actions to meet 

the mandate, the agency reported it will issue a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking for public comment by November of this year, and although that’s a positive step, it’s also worth noting this is over 4 

years past the original mandated deadline. 

This training is important because it’s designed to improve the 

consistency of the training and the quality of the training provided 

to these personnel, including training in coordination, communications, and evacuation procedures. 

The last issue I’d like to address is information sharing. Our past 

work has identified significant streamlining opportunities in this 

area. For example, our September 2010 report identified potential 

overlap among three key federal mechanisms used to share security information with public transit agencies. And to help improve 

information sharing, TSA and key industry groups have developed 

the so-called Transit and Rail Intelligence Awareness Daily, or 

TRIAD, report. We think this is a positive development to streamline the exchange of intelligence and security information. 

However, our ongoing work also indicates that freight rail agencies still have concerns about federal information-sharing efforts. 

Our concerns center around two issues, the analytical content of reports, and the actionability of the information provided. For example, security officials at three Class 1 railroads we interviewed recently raised significant concerns about the actionability of the provided information. TSA officials agreed that improvements are 

needed in this area and are taking steps to address them, and 

we’re going to report, we’re going to issue a report on this issue 

later this year. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I look forward to 

answering any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND

JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss security 

issues related to the U.S. rail system, including mass transit, intercity passenger 

rail (Amtrak), and freight rail. Rail systems in the United States have received 

heightened attention as several alleged terrorists’ plots have been uncovered, includVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Nov 18, 2011 Jkt 71203 PO 00000 Frm 000014 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06621 S:\GPO\DOCS\71203.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
11 

1The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies was 

established by the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102– 

240, § 6024, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991). The institute’s transportation policy work is centered on, 

among other things, research into transportation security, planning, and policy development. 2Surface transportation security includes the mass transit and passenger rail, freight rail, 

highway and commercial vehicle, and pipeline modes. Please see the list of related products at 

the end of this testimony statement. 3This work is being conducted in response to a mandate in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Commission Act). Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1203(a), 121 Stat. 

266, 383 (2007). 4 As defined by revenue, for 2009, Class I railroads are freight rail carriers having annual operating revenues of $379 million or more. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1201, General Instructions 1–1. The 

railroads include CSX Transportation (CSX), BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), Union Pacific 

Railroad Company (Union Pacific), Norfolk Southern, Kansas City Southern Railway Company, 

Canadian National Railway, and Canadian Pacific Railway. 

ing plots against transit systems in the New York City and Washington, D.C., areas. 

Intelligence recovered from Osama bin Laden’s compound indicates that U.S. rail 

systems were a suggested target as recently as February 2010, although there has 

been no indication of a specific or imminent threat to carry out such an attack. Terrorist attacks on rail systems around the world—such as the March 2010 Moscow, 

Russia, subway bombings, and the May 2010 passenger train derailment near 

Mumbai, India, that resulted in approximately 150 fatalities—highlight the vulnerability of these systems to terrorist attacks. Further, the Mineta Transportation Institute has reported that terrorists attempted to derail trains on at least 144 occasions between 1995 and 2010, many of which were in South Asia and mostly 

through the use of track bombs.1

One of the critical challenges facing rail system operators—and the federal agencies that regulate and oversee them—is finding ways to protect rail systems from 

potential terrorist attacks without compromising the accessibility and efficiency of 

rail travel. The systems are vulnerable to attack in part because they rely on an 

open architecture that is difficult to monitor and secure due to its multiple access 

points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, no barriers to access. 

Further, rail systems’ high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location in large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations make them 

attractive targets for terrorists. In addition, the multiple access points along extended routes make the costs of securing each location potentially prohibitive. 

My testimony today focuses on the following issues: (1) To what extent has the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted comprehensive risk assessments to inform its security efforts across all modes of transportation, including 

rail? (2) What technologies are available to assist rail operators in securing their 

systems? (3) What is the status of Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) 

efforts regarding security training for frontline rail employees? (4) How satisfied are 

rail stakeholders with the quality of security-related information TSA is providing? 

This statement is based on related GAO reports issued from March 2009 through 

September 2010, including selected updates conducted from May 2011 through June 

2011, on TSA’s efforts to implement our prior recommendations regarding surface 

transportation security.2 In conducting these updates, we obtained information from 

TSA regarding the agency’s efforts to develop regulations for security training programs for rail employees and to enhance its overall risk management approach to 

rail security, among other things. Our previous reports incorporated information we 

obtained and analyzed from officials from various components of DHS, the Department of Transportation (DOT), state and local transportation and law enforcement 

agencies, and industry associations, as well as a survey of 96 U.S. public transit 

agencies (that represented about 91 percent of total 2008 ridership). Our previously 

published products contain additional details on the scope and methodology, including data reliability, for those reviews. In addition, this statement includes preliminary observations based on ongoing work, the results of which will be issued in a 

report later this year, assessing the extent to which freight rail carriers that receive 

security-related information are satisfied with the products and mechanisms that 

TSA uses to disseminate this information, among other things.3 As part of this ongoing work, we surveyed all seven Class I freight rail carriers.4 We also interviewed 

security officials from three Class I freight rail carriers selected on the basis of their 

location. While the results of our interviews are not generalizable to all Class I rail 

carriers, the responses provide perspectives and examples to expand on survey findings. All of our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

12 

5 A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk through a series 

of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. 6Pub. L. No. 110–53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007). 

7GAO, Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation, GAO–09–492 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 

2009). 8 According to TSA officials, passenger rail is included with mass transit in the TSSRA, although Amtrak is not listed in the TSSRA report as a participant. In June 2011, TSA officials 

stated that passenger rail would be more clearly broken out in the next version of TSSRA. 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. 

For new information that was based on work not previously reported, we obtained 

TSA views on our findings and incorporated technical comments where appropriate. 

Background 

TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the security of the 

mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail systems. However, several other agencies, including DOT’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), also play a role in helping to oversee these systems. Since 

it is not practical or feasible to protect all assets and systems against every possible 

terrorist threat, DHS has called for using risk-informed approaches to prioritize its 

security-related investments and for developing plans and allocating resources in a 

way that balances security and commerce.5

In June 2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 

which established a six-step risk management framework to establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources protection so that federal funding and resources are applied in the most cost-effective 

manner to deter threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and minimize the consequences of 

attacks and other incidents. The NIPP, updated in 2009, defines risk as a function 

of three elements: 

• threat—an indication of the likelihood that a specific type of attack will be initiated against a specific target or class of targets; 

• vulnerability—the probability that a particular attempted attack will succeed 

against a particular target or class of targets; and 

• consequence—the effect of a successful attack. 

In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

(9/11 Commission Act) was signed into law, which included provisions that task 

DHS with actions related to surface transportation security.6 Among other things, 

these provisions include mandates for developing and issuing regulations for transportation security training programs and ensuring that transportation modal security plans include threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for transportation infrastructure assets including rail. 

TSA Has Made Progress in Conducting Comprehensive Risk Assessments 

Across All Modes of Transportation, Including Rail 

In response to our previous recommendations, TSA has taken steps to conduct 

comprehensive risk assessments across the transportation sector and within the 

passenger and freight rail modes that are based on assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. In March 2009, we reported that TSA had taken some actions to implement a risk management approach but had not conducted comprehensive risk assessments that integrate threat, vulnerability, and consequence for each 

mode or the transportation sector as a whole, as called for by the NIPP.7 We recommended that TSA conduct risk assessments that combine these three elements 

to help the agency produce a comparative analysis of risk across the entire transportation sector, which the agency could use to inform current and future investment 

decisions. 

DHS concurred with this recommendation, and in June 2010 TSA produced the 

Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA), which assessed risk within and across the various aviation and surface transportation modes, including rail, 

and incorporated threat, vulnerability, and consequence.8 A September 2009 letter 

from the Director of DHS’s Office of Risk Management and Analysis noted that in 

developing the TSSRA, TSA was making progress toward developing a strategic and 

comprehensive risk management approach that would better align with DHS’s risk 

management framework and address our recommendations. However, TSA noted 

limitations in the June 2010 TSSRA report that could limit its usefulness in guiding 

investment decisions across the transportation sector as a whole. For example, the 

TSSRA excluded the maritime sector and certain types of threats, such as from 

13 

9We have reviewed the U.S. Coast Guard’s risk assessment model as part of previous work. 

For example, see GAO, Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port 

Security, GAO–10–940T (Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010). We are also reviewing it as part of 

our current review of integrated port security being conducted for your committee and expect 

to issue a report on the results of this effort later this year. 10GAO, Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass Transit and 

Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs, GAO–09–678 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2009). 11GAO, Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal 

Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored, GAO–09–243 (Washington, 

D.C.: April 21, 2009). 12TIH include chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, which can be fatal if inhaled. Shipments of 

TIH, especially chlorine, frequently move through densely populated areas to reach, for example, 

water treatment facilities that use these products. We reported that TSA focused on securing 

TIH materials for several reasons, including limited resources and a decision in 2004 to 

prioritize TIH as a key risk requiring federal attention. Other federal and industry freight rail 

stakeholders agreed that focusing on TIH was a sound initial strategy because it is a key potential rail security threat and an overall transportation safety concern. 13GAO, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk, but Its Risk 

Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight Can Be Strengthened, GAO–09–491 

(Washington, D.C.: June 2009). The TSGP provides grant funding to the nation’s key high-threat 

urban areas to enhance security measures for their critical transit infrastructure, including rail 

systems. 

‘‘lone wolf’’ operators. In June 2011, agency officials stated that TSA is working to 

address these limitations in the next version, which is scheduled for completion by 

the end of calendar year 2011. TSA also said that it is strengthening and enhancing 

the TSSRA methodology based on an ongoing independent verification and validation that is scheduled for completion later this year. In addition, TSA officials noted 

that other DHS components, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, conduct risk assessments of the maritime sector that complement the TSSRA.9

With regard to assessments of mass transit and passenger rail transportation, we 

reported in June 2009 that although TSA had contributed to DHS’s risk assessment 

effort, it had not conducted its own risk assessment of mass transit and passenger 

rail systems.10 We recommended that TSA conduct a risk assessment that integrates all three elements of risk. DHS officials concurred with the recommendation, 

and in March 2010 said that they had developed a mass transit risk assessment tool 

to assess risk to mass transit and passenger rail systems using threat, vulnerability, 

and consequence, in addition to the TSSRA. According to TSA, they have completed 

pilot tests of this tool on three transit systems as of June 2011 and anticipate assessing six additional transit systems by the end of the calendar year. 

Similarly, in April 2009, we reported that TSA’s efforts to address freight rail security were limited and did not focus on a range of threats identified by federal and 

industry assessments.11 TSA’s security efforts focused almost entirely on transportation of Toxic Inhalation Hazards (TIH); however, other federal and industry assessments had identified additional potential security threats, such as risks to 

bridges and tunnels.12 We reported that although TSA’s focus on TIH had been a 

reasonable initial approach, there are other security threats for TSA to consider and 

evaluate, including potential sabotage to critical infrastructure. We recommended 

that TSA expand its efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security 

strategy. TSA concurred and reported that it had developed a Critical Infrastructure 

Risk Tool to measure the criticality and vulnerability of freight railroad bridges. As 

of June 2011, the agency has used this tool to assess 77 bridges, some of which 

transverse either the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers, and 26 freight rail tunnels. 

Our prior work has also assessed TSA’s efforts to incorporate risk management 

principles into the grant allocation process, and we reported that transit grant funding decisions could be improved with better assessments of vulnerability. For example, we reported in June 2009 that the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) risk 

model included all three elements of risk, but could be strengthened by measuring 

variations in vulnerability.13 DHS held vulnerability constant in its assessments, 

which limits the model’s overall ability to assess risk. We recommended that DHS 

strengthen its methodology for determining risk by developing a cost-effective method for incorporating vulnerability information in its TSGP risk model. DHS concurred with the recommendation, and in April 2010 TSA stated that it is reevaluating the risk model for the Fiscal Year 2011 grant cycle. In June 2011, TSA stated 

that it is considering asset-specific vulnerability when looking at risk, although TSA 

noted that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has ownership of 

the TSGP risk model. TSA provides input into the model, however. We are currently 

assessing DHS and FEMA efforts to improve the TSGP grant-allocation process as 

14 

14GAO–09–243. 15GAO–09–678. 16We also reported that TSA collaborates with DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate to 

research, develop, and test various security technologies for applicability in mass transit and 

passenger rail systems, including explosive trace detection technologies, infrastructure protection measures, and behavior based and advanced imaging technologies. 17GAO, Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection Technologies to Protect Passenger Rail, GAO–10–898 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010). 18GAO–10–898. 19DHS considers certain details regarding the ability of particular technologies to detect explosives and any limitations in their ability to detect certain types of explosives to be Sensitive 

Security Information or classified. 20 ETP are used in screening for access to buildings. The operation of these systems generally 

involves a screener directing an individual to the ETP and the ETP sensing his presence and, 

when ready, instructing the individual to enter. The portal then blows short puffs of air onto 

the individual being screened to help displace particles and attempts to collect these particles 

with a vacuum system. The particle sample is then preconcentrated and fed into the detector 

for analysis. Standoff detection systems allow for the screening of rail passengers from a distance. When applied to passenger rail, their distinguishing feature is they attempt to screen 

passengers with minimal to no effect on normal passenger flow. There is no standard definition 

part of our current review of DHS grant programs being conducted for your committee and expect to issue a report on the results of this effort later this year. 

Technologies Are Available to Strengthen Rail Security, but Challenges in 

the Rail Environment and Low Maturity of Some Technologies May 

Limit Implementation 

Industry stakeholders have examined and implemented various technologies to 

enhance the security of the rail system. For example, in April 2009, we reported 

that several freight rail carriers we met with installed security cameras and monitoring equipment at some of their key facilities to better monitor the activities in 

and around these areas.14 We also reported that officials from three railroads and 

two chemical companies we met with stated that they had taken steps to attempt 

to better track the movements of their TIH rail shipments by installing Global Positioning System technology on their locomotives and tank cars. Similarly, in June 

2009, we reported that many mass transit and passenger rail agencies reported 

making capital improvements to secure their systems.15 For example, 19 of the 30 

transit agencies we interviewed had embarked on programs since 2004 to upgrade 

their existing security technology, including upgrading closed circuit television at 

key station locations with video surveillance systems that alert personnel to suspicious activities and abandoned packages and installing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives detection equipment and laser intrusion detection 

systems in critical areas.16

While industry has taken these steps to implement technology to enhance rail security, the nature of the rail system has presented challenges to further implementation. For example, we reported in July 2010 that in commuter or light rail systems, many stations may be unmanned outdoor platforms without barriers between 

public areas and trains.17 Stations may also have few natural locations to place 

technologies to be able to screen passengers. With limited existing chokepoints, implementation of certain technologies may require station infrastructure modifications to aid in funneling passengers for screening. Similarly, challenges to using 

technology to secure the freight rail system include the size and open nature of the 

system, the need for railcars to be able to continuously move, and limited resources. 

We have also reported that several technologies are available to help address rail 

security challenges, but they are at varying levels of maturity and using them involves trade-offs in mobility, cost, and privacy. For example, in July 2010, we reported that the ability of explosives detection technologies to help protect the passenger rail environment depends both upon their detection performance and how effectively the technologies can be deployed in that environment.18 Detection performance of these technologies varies across the different technologies and additional 

limitations—such as limited screening throughput, privacy, openness, physical infrastructure, cost, and mobility concerns—have restricted their more widespread or 

more effective use in passenger rail. More-established explosives detection technologies—such as handheld explosive trace detection systems, X-raying imaging systems, and canines—have demonstrated good performance against many conventional explosives threats but are challenged by threats from certain explosives.19

Newer technologies—such as Explosive Trace Portals (ETP), standoff detection systems, and Advanced Imaging Technologies (AIT)—while available, are in various 

stages of maturity and more operational experience would be required to determine 

whether they can be effectively implemented in a rail environment.20 For example, 

15 

of standoff detection and separation distances can be less than a meter to tens of meters and 

beyond. AIT portals are used for screening people for building access and, to an increasing extent, airport access. The AIT portal then takes images of the individual, which are displayed 

to another officer who inspects the images. The inspecting officer views the image to determine 

if there are threats present. 21Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1408, 1517, 121 Stat. 266, 409, 439 (2007). 22GAO–09–678. 23Despite the absence of the TSA security training regulations required by the 9/11 Commission Act, railroad organizations are subject to established regulations such as the Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) security training regulations for hazmat 

(hazardous materials) employees. Among other things, the PHMSA security regulations require 

that hazmat employee training provide an awareness of security risks associated with hazardous 

materials transportation and methods designed to enhance transportation security. The training 

must also include a component covering how to recognize and respond to possible security 

threats. 49 C.F.R. § 172.704. In addition, FRA regulations require railroads that operate or provide intercity or commuter passenger train service or that host the operation of that service to 

adopt and comply with a written emergency preparedness plan, which must provide for employee training as well as training of, and coordination with, emergency responders. 49 C.F.R. 

§ 239.101. 

24DHS also established the Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP), which provides 

funds for training programs, among other things. 

AIT technologies have the ability to detect hidden objects; however, they are walkthrough devices that would require rail passengers to be funneled through the 

equipment, limiting passenger throughput with long screening times. Standoff technology can be used to detect hidden objects on an individual from a significant distance and is attractive because it may have less effect on passenger throughput 

than other new technologies. However, certain types of standoff systems, as well as 

AIT technologies raise privacy concerns because they create images of individuals 

underneath their clothing. 

In our July 2010 report, we did not make any recommendations regarding the explosives detection technologies available or in development that could help secure 

passenger rail systems, but we raised various policy considerations. Among other 

things, we noted that securing passenger rail involves multiple security measures, 

with explosives detection technologies just one of several components that policymakers can consider as part of the overall security environment. In determining 

whether and how to implement these technologies, federal agencies and rail operators will likely be confronted with challenges related to the costs versus the benefits 

of a given technology and the potential privacy and legal implications of using explosives detection technologies. 

TSA Has Not Issued Rail Security Training Regulations but Has Provided 

Funding and Guidance for Training 

In 2007, TSA officials identified the need for increased security training at mass 

transit and passenger rail systems because the extent of training provided varied 

greatly—with a majority providing an introductory level of safety and security training for new hires, but not refresher training. In addition, TSA identified security 

awareness training and a lack of a robust, standardized corporate security planning 

for freight railroads as systematic security gaps. The 9/11 Commission Act mandates 

TSA to develop and issue regulations for a public transportation security training 

program and for a railroad security training program.21 In June 2009, we reported 

that TSA had not implemented this requirement or several others related to mass 

transit and passenger rail security, and recommended that DHS develop a plan with 

milestones for doing so.22 DHS concurred with this recommendation, and in June 

2011, TSA stated that it had developed a plan and milestones for addressing 

uncompleted 9/11 Commission Act requirements. TSA also stated that it is finalizing 

the security training program regulations and expects to issue a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking for public comment by November 2011.23 A TSA official indicated that 

the delay was due, in part, to difficulties incurred in trying to address multiple 

modes of transportation in one regulation. 

To address identified training deficiencies, TSA supports security training through 

its TSGP and voluntary security awareness programs. TSA established a Mass 

Transit Security Training program in 2007 to provide curriculum guidelines for 

basic and follow-on security training areas and makes funding available through 

TSGP.24 For example, TSA offers mass transit and passenger rail agencies the option of using grant funding to cover costs for training to employees that is supplied 

by either: (1) training providers that are federally funded or sponsored or (2) other 

16 

25For 2011, the TSGP prioritizes employee training, drills and exercises, public awareness, 

and security planning. Among other things, Fiscal Year 2011 funds may be used for training 

activities including workshops and conferences and employing contractors to support training 

related activities. 26GAO–09–678. 27The security program was funded, in part, by $13 million from the TSGP and was originally 

implemented by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 28GAO, Public Transit Security Information Sharing: DHS Could Improve Information Sharing through Streamlining and Increased Outreach, GAO–10–895 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2010). 

training providers.25 However, in June 2009 we reported that opportunities exist for 

TSA to strengthen its process for ensuring consistency in the performance of nonfederal training vendors that mass transit and passenger rail agencies use to obtain 

training through the program.26 We recommended that to better ensure that DHS 

consistently funds sound and valid security training delivery programs for mass 

transit and passenger rail employees, TSA should consider enhancing its criteria for 

evaluating whether security training vendors meet the performance standards of 

federally sponsored training providers and whether the non-federally sponsored providers could be used by transit agencies for training under the transit security grant 

program. DHS concurred with the recommendation, noting that TSA would work 

with the FTA through an existing joint working group to develop criteria for reviewing new vendor-provided training courses. In February 2010, TSA stated that it had 

proposed a joint task group with the FTA to define evaluation criteria for courses 

submitted by mass transit or passenger rail agencies, academic institutions, or other 

entities. In June 2011, TSA stated that the joint task group—which is being led by 

TSA and will include members from the FTA and industry—is in the process of organizing its first meeting. According to TSA, the group will use the criteria it develops to evaluate vendor training courses by the fall of 2011. 

DHS, DOT, and others have also taken steps to enhance rail and transit security 

awareness in partnership with the public and private entities that own and operate 

the Nation’s transit and rail systems through voluntary security awareness programs. For example, the Transit Watch Program, co-led by TSA and the FTA, provides a nationwide safety and security awareness program designed to encourage 

the active participation of transit passengers and employees. By means of this program, the federal government, in collaboration with industry, created templates for 

transit agencies to develop or enhance their own public awareness programs. In 

July 2010, DHS launched the ‘‘If You See Something, Say Something,’’ campaign as 

a way to raise public and frontline employee awareness of indicators of terrorism, 

crime, and other threats and emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper transportation and law enforcement authorities.27

Opportunities Exist to Streamline Security Information for Transit 

Agencies, and Preliminary Results Indicate Some Freight Rail Agencies 

Do Not Receive Actionable Information and Analysis from TSA 

While TSA is taking steps to improve information sharing with freight and passenger rail stakeholders, potential overlap could complicate stakeholder efforts to 

discern relevant information and take appropriate actions to enhance security. In 

September 2010, we identified the potential for overlap among three federal information-sharing mechanisms: the public transit portal on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN–PT), TSA Office of Intelligence’s page on HSIN, and the 

Public Transit Information Sharing and Analysis Center (PT–ISAC).28 Each of these 

receives funding from DHS to share security threats and other types of security-related information with public transit agencies. We recommended that DHS establish 

time frames for a working group of federal and industry officials to assess opportunities to streamline information-sharing mechanisms to reduce any unneeded overlap. DHS concurred with this recommendation. 

In response to our recommendation, DHS and the rail industry have taken steps 

to streamline the information distributed to stakeholders. TSA and key industry 

groups have developed the Transit and Rail Intelligence Awareness Daily (TRIAD) 

Report and associated Transportation Information Library. The overall intent of 

TRIAD is to streamline the analysis, sharing, and exchange of intelligence and security information that had been disseminated by multiple sources. TRIAD includes 

a daily publication to enhance situational awareness, an alert message to provide 

immediate awareness of a developing threat or incident, and a catalogue of supporting reports and related documents. According to TSA and its industry partners, 

HSIN–PT will supplement TRIAD by serving as a reference source to house crosssector best practices, additional intelligence, and threat information as well as transit security standards and all-hazards information. The TSA Office of Intelligence 

stated that it will continue to have a portal on HSIN that supplements the informaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Nov 18, 2011 Jkt 71203 PO 00000 Frm 000020 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06621 S:\GPO\DOCS\71203.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
17 

29GAO–10–895. 

tion on the PT–ISAC and HSIN–PT. While the TRIAD report may reduce the number of security-related e-mails that transit agencies receive, it does not reduce overlap among the three information-sharing mechanisms. In June 2011, TSA officials 

stated that they are continuing to coordinate with other members of the working 

group to identify actions and time frames for addressing our recommendation. 

Our recent work indicates that some rail stakeholders do not receive security information from TSA. In September 2010, we reported that less than half of public 

transit agencies (34 of 77) responding to our 2010 survey reported that they had 

log-in access to HSIN, TSA’s primary mechanism for sharing open-source securityrelated information with transportation stakeholders, and had not lost or forgotten 

their log-in information.29 Our survey also identified that, of the 19 transit agencies 

that did not have HSIN access, 12 had never heard of the mechanism, and an additional 11 agencies did not know whether they had access to HSIN. We recommended 

that TSA establish timeframe for the transit-sector public-private working group to 

conduct targeted outreach efforts to increase awareness of HSIN among agencies 

that are not currently using or aware of this system. DHS officials concurred with 

this recommendation and in January 2011 provided an implementation plan with 

target dates for addressing it. However, the plan was insufficiently detailed for us 

to determine whether it fully addresses the recommendation. For example, the plan 

stated that TSA officials created a consolidated ‘‘superlist’’ of current PT–ISAC and 

HSIN–PT members and transit agencies on a TSA distribution list and intend to 

encourage all entities on this superlist to join the PT–ISAC and HSIN–PT. However, 

the plan did not indicate how TSA would target its outreach efforts to those entities 

not already on one of those lists. In June 2011, a TSA official stated that the publicprivate working group plans to reach out to other transit entities, such as small 

agencies, to encourage them to join the PT–ISAC and HSIN–PT. As noted above, 

TSA officials stated that they are continuing to coordinate with other members of 

the working group to identify actions and time frames for addressing our recommendation. 

Preliminary observations from our ongoing work also indicate that some freight 

rail stakeholders would prefer to receive more analysis or actionable security information from TSA. The federal government’s National Strategy for Information Sharing discusses the need to improve the two-way sharing of terrorism-related information on incidents, threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities, including enhancing 

the quantity and quality of specific, timely, and actionable information provided by 

the federal government to critical infrastructure sectors. According to three Class 

I rail stakeholders that we interviewed, TSA distributes information on rail security 

that is generally used for situational awareness. However, rail security stakeholders 

from three of the seven Class I railroads that we surveyed indicated that TSA’s security information products lack analysis, such as trend analysis, that could help 

predict how certain events may affect freight rail. In follow-up interviews, security 

officials at three Class I railroads stated that security information provided by TSA 

does not offer actionable information that could allow them to develop or adjust 

their current countermeasures against potential terrorist threats. These security officials added that they have often received the same information that TSA provides 

from the media or other sources before it is distributed from TSA. For example, two 

of these officials told us that they received little or no security-related information 

from TSA in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death. However, security officials 

at two of the three rail carriers that we interviewed stated that they felt confident 

that someone from the federal government would alert them of any direct threat to 

that carrier. TSA officials agree that improvements are needed in the products and 

mechanisms by which they alert rail agencies of security-related information and intelligence. For example, a TSA official stated in June 2011 that the agency is in the 

process of revising its reports on suspicious incidents to regionalize the information 

provided to rail carriers, in response to feedback from those carriers. We will continue to assess TSA’s efforts related to security information-sharing and will report 

the final results later this year. 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I look forward to responding to any 

questions you may have. 

Related GAO Products 

Public Transit Security Information Sharing: DHS Could Improve Information 

Sharing through Streamlining and Increased Outreach. GAO–10–895. Washington, 

D.C.: September 22, 2010. 

18 

Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection Technologies to Protect Passenger 

Rail. GAO–10–898. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010. 

Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Manage Risk, Improve 

Coordination, and Measure Performance, but Additional Actions Would Enhance Its 

Efforts. GAO–10–650T. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2010. 

Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass Transit 

and Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy 

and Programs. GAO–09–678. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2009. 

Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk, but Its 

Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight Can Be Strengthened. GAO–09–491. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2009. 

Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored. GAO–09– 

243. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2009. 

Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger Internal 

Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation. GAO–09–492. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2009. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Lord. 

Now we’ll hear from Chief O’Connor, please. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN O’CONNOR, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF POLICE, AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Hutchison, Senator Udall, Senator Wicker. 

My testimony today is in response to the emerging threat to rail 

in this country that was recently highlighted by information obtained from the Osama bin Laden compound. During a prior appearance before this committee, I testified that the threat against 

rail was very real, and I described the manner in which Amtrak 

had responded by focusing on threats related to improvised explosive devices in stations, on board a train, or by an active shooter 

scenario. 

The recent events after the death of bin Laden serve as a stark 

reminder that these threats continue to be viable and that a new 

twist was added, that terrorists are considering derailing trains. 

This is of particular concern to Amtrak, who operates high-speed 

rail trains where catastrophic losses could occur. This begs the 

question: Are we doing enough to detect and deter terrorist acts on 

surface transportation, and can we do more to prevent a terrorist 

rail tragedy from happening? 

Upon receipt of the intelligence information from the UBL compound, a meeting was held with TSA officials to discuss what was 

uncovered and to evaluate how to proceed regarding the threats to 

the right-of-way and the derailment of trains. Amtrak also collaborated with other Federal, state and local agencies and initiated a 

response that addressed right-of-way threats. 

These steps included increasing right-of-way patrols, focusing on 

bridge and tunnel infrastructure; shifting the strategy of Operation 

RAIL SAFE, or ‘‘Regional Alliance Including Local, State and Federal Efforts,’’ to include right-of-way patrols; requesting law enforcement air and marine support for critical infrastructure; ensuring current capital security planning included right-of-way risk assessments; deploying Special Operations personnel to the right-ofway and coordinating with other Amtrak departments; last, alerting employees and reinforcing security programs and vigilance 

messages. 

19 

While Amtrak was undertaking these counter-measures, it still 

remained committed to existing programs such as our Explosive 

Canine Detection Program. We currently have 46 explosive teams 

that last year did more than 11,000 train rides and 25 weekly 

surges across the nation. 

Our Security Inspection Program. We conducted more than 3,000 

random passenger baggage screening operations. 

Active Shooter Training. All APD sworn personnel have been 

trained in active shooter training, and we also trained more than 

45 agencies in SWAT tactics in responding to the rail environment. 

Corporate security. Amtrak has leveraged grant funding to improve protection for passengers, employees, and critical infrastructure, including CCTV, fencing and other security improvements, 

mostly with grant funding from the TSA. 

Amtrak continues to work closely with the TSA. We’ve conducted 

more than 800 VIPR programs, the Visual Intermodal Protection 

and Response deployments. We’ve also conducted joint screening 

operations, continued improvement of security efforts through the 

Suspicious Activity Reporting Program and the Baseline Assessment Security Enhancement program. 

In the Northeast Corridor, we continue to work with major law 

enforcement and DHS officials from the Northeast Corridor in a 

collaborative way to enhance public safety on surface transportation. I mentioned RAIL SAFE before. This effort is a grassroots 

effort that has now included hundreds of agencies across the country helping to protect rail. Our last major operation on May 19, 

where more than 155 U.S. agencies, as well as several Canadian 

agencies, across 34 states and more than 1,000 law enforcement 

personnel deployed to over 200 rail stations. 

A key to our security is front-line employee training. Amtrak has 

been active in providing security training for front-line employees, 

and in 2011, 8,300 front-line transportation employees are receiving classroom training by way of an interactive simulated course, 

including an active shooter situation. 

Technology is also a big part of our efforts. 

In conclusion, we are very concerned about the recent events, 

and we will continue to work with the federal government to do all 

that we can to protect America’s rails. 

We will work with DHS, TSA, and the Committee to identify 

funding sources for additional front-line employee training and advanced technology to address these threats. 

The security of our system is our top priority, and I look forward 

to working with the Committee in the coming months to make sure 

that we have the people, the training, technology, and the intelligence we need to keep our system safe and secure. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Connor follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN O’CONNOR, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF POLICE, 

AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much for the opportunity to 

testify. My name is John O’Connor, and I am currently Vice President and Chief 

of the Amtrak Police Department (APD). The Department’s strength is more than 

500 sworn and civilian personnel at more than 30 locations spread across the 46 

states in which Amtrak operates the passenger rail system. I speak to you as someone who has more than 38 years police experience in the passenger rail and mass 

20 

transit environment. My testimony today is in response to the emerging threat to 

rail in this country that was recently highlighted by information obtained from the 

UBL compound. 

During a prior appearance before this Committee, I testified that the threat 

against rail was very real and I described the manner in which Amtrak had responded by focusing on threats related to the use of IEDs in a station or on a train 

or by an active shooter scenario. The recent events after the death of bin Laden 

serve as a stark reminder that these threats continue to be viable and that a new 

twist was added—that terrorists are considering derailing trains. This is of particular concern to Amtrak who operates high speed rail trains where catastrophic 

losses could occur. This begs the question—are we doing enough to detect and deter 

terrorist acts on surface transportation, and can we do more to try to prevent a terrorist rail tragedy from happening? 

Upon receipt of the intelligence information from the UBL compound, a meeting 

was held with TSA officials where discussion took place regarding what was uncovered, and evaluated how to proceed and address threats regarding the right of way 

and derailment of trains. Amtrak also collaborated with other Federal, state and 

local agencies and initiated a response that addressed right of way threats. These 

steps included: 

• Increasing right of way patrols focusing on bridge and tunnel infrastructure and 

to report such checks. 

• Shifting Operation Regional Alliance Including Local, State and Federal Efforts 

(RAIL SAFE) strategy to include right of way patrols. 

• Requesting law enforcement air and marine support for critical infrastructure 

and right of way patrols when possible. 

• Reviewing our current Capital Security Plan to ensure our right of way risks 

are being adequately addressed. 

• Deploying special operations personnel to right of way coverage in conjunction 

with uniform patrol. 

• Coordinating with other Amtrak departments (Engineering, and Mechanical) to 

ensure employee reporting of unusual occurrences and to ensure gates are 

locked, buildings secured, liaison with bridge tenders etc. 

• Alerting employees and reinforcing security programs and vigilance messages. 

While Amtrak was undertaking these new countermeasures, it still remained committed to existing programs, such as: 

Explosive Canine Detection Program 

Amtrak now has 47 bomb-detecting canine teams. Included in this group are specially trained ‘‘vapor wake’’ canine teams that can actually detect the presence of 

fumes left after someone passes through with an explosive device. Amtrak has 

moved to the forefront of the field with use of this unique canine application and 

continues to work to build this counter-terror capability and has about one third of 

the canine teams vapor wake trained. In Fiscal Year 2010, Amtrak canine teams 

performed over 11,000 train rides in protection of the traveling public. These activities were in addition to the 34,000 train rides and over a 100,000 gate/platform 

checks performed by APD patrol officers. Canine teams also conducted 25 coordinated surge operations where groups of bomb-detecting canine teams unpredictably 

appeared at various locations throughout the entire Amtrak system to show increased security and a law enforcement presence. 

Security Inspection Program 

In 2008, Amtrak began a random baggage screening program similar to one pioneered by the NYPD. Using technology, screening teams deploy in an unpredictable 

fashion designed to make it harder for a terrorist to predict the level of security. 

In 2010, APD’s Special Operations Unit performed over 3,000 passenger baggage 

screening operations in which thousands of trains were screened, resulting in tens 

of thousands of passengers being randomly selected for screening. Through an 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act/Transportation Security Grant program 

(ARRA/TSGP) Amtrak expanded this screening program by adding two additional 

screening teams in the Northeast Corridor. 

Active Shooter Training 

The APD has performed SWAT-type training in the rail environment with over 

45 agencies since 2008 and has expanded the program to include a Passenger Rail 

Tactical Training component in order to increase state and local law enforcement 

21 

personnel’s awareness and ability to respond and deploy in a rail station or on a 

passenger rail train car and in extremis responses. 

All APD sworn personnel are receiving training on active shooter type incidents. 

Corporate Security 

Amtrak has leveraged the Transit Security Grant and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) grant programs to improve protection for passengers, employees, and critical infrastructure. 

We will never stop assessing Amtrak’s vulnerabilities. Many of the projects have 

built upon earlier risk assessments performed for Amtrak and will be closely focused 

on addressing these individual vulnerabilities. Use of grant funds to install fences, 

closed circuit TV and other security improvements is directly tied to Amtrak’s commitment to let our risk assessments drive security investment. 

The security program is managed in part by Station Action Team personnel. They 

work closely with the Operations Department to ensure Amtrak security and emergency response policies are followed and coordinated as part of a larger risk reduction strategy that incorporates recovery, continuity of operations processes and drills 

and exercises. These Station Action Teams along with Regional Security Coordinating Committees have involved our station staffs in the security planning process. 

This integration has improved coordination and raised employee awareness of potential security threats. 

Collaboration with TSA 

Amtrak has had a very good relationship with TSA and appreciates the support 

and assistance it has received over the years from this agency. 

Since 2007, Amtrak and TSA started joint deployments with TSA’s ‘‘Visible Intermodal Protection and Response’’ (VIPR) team program, which was developed to augment the integral security operations of various transportation modes, such as the 

Amtrak Police or transit security. These provide a visible uniformed presence and 

can help dedicated law enforcement to deter or detect suspicious activity, and they 

provide the traveling public with a reassuring police presence. These operations 

have basically involved the unannounced ‘‘surge’’ of TSA personnel onto Amtrak 

trains and stations at various points, and are designed to test the ability of TSA 

to flex support to surface transportation. A total of 858 VIPR operations have been 

held since inception. 

Amtrak leveraged the success of VIPR operations in 2009 and collaborated with 

TSA to expand their presence by conducting joint passenger screening operations, 

using additional TSA assets, including Bomb Appraisal Officers, Behavior Screening 

Officers and Surface Transportation Security Inspectors to augment Amtrak screening forces. 

We have continued to positively develop this relationship by coordinating the Suspicious Activity Reporting Program (SAR) to help identify potential emerging terrorist trends or activities and are presently going through the Baseline Assessment 

for Security Enhancement (BASE) process with TSA Surface Transportation Inspection Officials. 

Northeast Corridor (NEC) Coalition 

Amtrak continues to work with major law enforcement and DHS officials from 

Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. 

to work in a collaborative way to enhance public safety on surface transportation, 

particularly for communities on Amtrak’s NEC. A meeting was held at the request 

of NYPD Commissioner Kelly to coordinate and reinforce efforts to protect the public using surface transportation after notification of intelligence information received 

from the UBL raid. 

Operation RAIL SAFE (Regional Alliance Including Local, State and Federal 

Efforts) 

This program, developed in partnership with Amtrak, NYPD and TSA, involves 

the coordinated efforts of multiple jurisdictions to heighten station patrols, increase 

police presence on trains, by deploying assets in both uniform and undercover capacity. These operations allow for Federal, state and local agencies to exercise counterterrorism and incident response capabilities. 

For example, on May 19, 2011, a RAILSAFE Operation was conducted that involved 155 agencies, 34 states, including Washington, D.C., Canadian cities Vancouver and Montreal and 1,035 law enforcement personnel at 204 stations (107 Amtrak). This was aligned in Europe through RAILPOL with their 24 BLUE European 

Rail Operation. 

22 

Front-line Employee Training 

Amtrak has been actively focusing on providing security training to our frontline 

employees recognizing that they are the eyes and ears of the railroad. 

Amtrak employees will continue to be a key piece of our security strategy. They 

are valuable sources of information that can ‘‘cue’’ the law enforcement system. Amtrak benefits from the services and operational knowledge of upwards of 19,000 people who work on the railroad. They are reminded daily of the importance of their 

diligence and alertness to suspicious activity, how to recognize suspicious activity 

and who to report to by way of Daily Crime tips. An Employee Security Handbook 

and Employee Security Updates are additional resources that outline awareness information. 

In 2007, approximately 14,000 frontline employees received classroom training. 

In 2009, refresh classroom security training which included civilian version of 

BASS training was provided to 7,700 Transportation frontline employees. During 

this year, 2011, about 8,300 frontline Transportation employees are receiving classroom training by way of an interactive simulated course. Along with refresh training 

on recognizing and reporting suspicious activity, the 2011 training includes a firsttime presented scenario on an active shooter incident. 

An updated strategic Employee Security Training Plan is being developed which 

will outline the way forward for security training for all employees, to include a robust multi-year exercise program against a broad spectrum of threats. 

Technology 

Amtrak has a range of mitigation strategies and solutions in place and planned 

for the future. Various types of remediation are implemented based upon risk and 

vulnerability assessments and best practices. Amtrak has focused on a range of 

strategies including target hardening (high security fencing, bollards, blast curtain/ 

Mylar protection, access control, etc.) and has most recently implemented more technologically driven initiatives. These initiatives have historically been applied to stations, bridges and tunnels however, in light of recent events, Amtrak is exploring 

expanding these strategies to include right-of-way protection. 

Amtrak used the following technologies to prevent, detect and deter terrorist acts: 

Blast/Mitigation Studies 

• Engineering assessments of structural designs of critical infrastructure (bridges, 

tunnels, stations and facilities) 

• Focus on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives (CBRNE) threats 

and asymmetric modes of attack 

• Advanced simulation and modeling techniques to identify exploitable single/ 

multi points of failure and reduce/eliminate the risk of catastrophic consequences, such as loss of life or operational functionality, from an attack 

Smart ID Cards (HSPD12—Homeland Security Presidential Directive #12) 

• Implementation of HSPD12 compatible employee identification cards to reduce 

unauthorized access to restricted areas 

• The computer chip on the card can be used for security enhancements (e.g., digital signing of e-mails and data) 

• Smart ID program has enabled Amtrak to enhance security through identifying 

and remedying security gaps, and has provided an opportunity to enforce existing access control and employee identification polices 

CCTV 

• Several CCTV systems are in place throughout the rail network 

• CCTV enhances APD’s situational awareness and communication capabilities 

• Amtrak is looking to augment its CCTV capabilities by utilizing integrated advanced technology (cameras, sensors, fencing, and access control instruments) 

to protect critical infrastructure 

• Potential technology will result in an automated state-of-the-art remote surveillance and intuitive, user-friendly 3–D Graphical User Interface (GUI) 

• The systems will be designed using proprietary algorithms and will be ruled 

based driven to detect anomalies in the camera view 

23 

Access Control 

• Several access control systems are in place throughout the rail network and 

APD expects to expand upon current solutions as advancements in access control and intrusion detection when they become available 

Radiological Pagers 

• Portable trace detector that can detect explosives, chemical warfare agents, 

toxic industrial chemicals and can do so in approximately 20 seconds 

• APD sworn personnel are equipped with radiological pagers while on patrol 

Amtrak is developing the following technologies to improve upon existing security 

strategy and operations, enhance interagency information sharing and local agency 

response to Amtrak incidents: 

iCOP—Integrated Communication and Operations Program 

• GIS based incident and response planning tool to enhance situational awareness 

• Visually displays integrated data on an interactive multi-user touch screen or 

desktop system including when officers are on patrol near the right of way 

• Utilizes critical infrastructure, homeland security, law enforcement, and Amtrak data for simulations, modeling, alerts and analysis 

• Makes crucial data available simultaneously, in real-time, to multiple key decisionmakers to plan appropriate response scenarios and implement operating 

procedures 

• Capabilities include train and officer tracking, access to CCTV feeds, response 

plans, public safety and law enforcement alerts, floor plans, access control integration, etc. 

• Similar to systems recently launched at the Department of Defense—Knowledge 

Display and Aggregation System (KDAS) and FEMA—Integrated Situational 

Awareness Visualization Environment (iSAVE) 

ROMAN—Risk Operating Management Analysis Network (Secure Network) 

• APD’s Secure Network is nearing end of development and will provide support 

for security related technology projects (i.e., iCOP, CCTV, Access Control, etc.) 

• Robust and redundant network backbone 

• Provides a platform for secure communications & information sharing 

• Support CCTV and Video command centers aggregating and displaying internal 

and external information 

• Federalized and centrally managed system 

Right-of-Way (ROW) 

• Amtrak is currently working with TSA to examine potential technology based 

ROW intrusion detection solutions 

• Solutions would include integrated sensor technology with cameras to monitor 

for intrusion along the ROW 

In conclusion, we are very concerned about recent events and we will continue to 

work with the federal government to do all that we can to protect America’s rails. 

We will work with DHS, TSA and the Committee to identify funding sources for additional frontline employee training and advanced technology to address threats. 

The security of our system is our top priority, and I look forward to working with 

the Committee in coming months to make sure that we have the people, the training, the technology and the intelligence we need to keep our system safe and secure. 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss security at Amtrak and I look forward to 

any questions. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

I would note now that we’re joined by Senator Wicker. Senator 

Wicker is not new to the Surface Transportation Subcommittee, but 

he is now the Ranking Member of this subcommittee. I welcome 

him and I look forward to working with him on the Subcommittee. 

24 

What we’ll do, Senator Wicker, if you have something very short, 

you can do it now. Otherwise, use the time when the questions 

are—— 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI 

Senator WICKER. I would prefer the latter. Thank you very much, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Senator WICKER. I’m glad to be joining you in that position on 

the Subcommittee. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We look forward to working with you. We 

know you have a serious interest in rail safety, and we want to 

pursue that interest with you. 

I just got a news report that came out today, and it talks about 

tampering on the rail system in Iowa. It says that on a recent Sunday morning, an observant Iowa Interstate Railroad crew member 

on a westbound train spotted something that didn’t look right at 

a switch just west of a town called Menlo, and they immediately 

stopped traffic there and were able to deal with the problem as 

they saw it. 

It was designed to be an attack, and it was interrupted by the 

heightened interest of a rail employee, and it was turned over to 

the federal authorities to pursue what was intended there and 

helped us in registering more concern, more interest in these kinds 

of things, even as we talk to them this very day. 

So I start by asking Administrator Pistole, the TSA budget request continues to designate 98 percent of the funds to aviation, 

and we want that care to continue. But it leaves a relatively small 

percentage of the funds for surface transportation security. And as 

I mentioned in my commentary, 700 million passengers fly on airlines each year, compared to the 10 billion who use public transportation. And news reports indicate that al-Qaeda has been plotting 

an attack on a U.S. rail line. 

So how does the TSA budget request reflect our concern and our 

actions against rail system attack, Mr. Pistole? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, we would be 

very much interested in applying more resources to surface transportation and rail transportation, in particular to the security aspects. We try to be risk-based and intelligence-driven in our process of recognizing both al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s interest in particular as to aviation, and the catastrophic effects as we saw from both the attempted bombing on Christmas 

Day, 2009, and then the cargo plots that we saw only cost al-Qaeda 

$4,200 for those two toner cartridge printer devices and the shipping of those two packages. And we saw bin Laden’s statements 

about that and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s statements 

about the economic impact, and recognizing that at least two of bin 

Laden’s fatwas prior to his death concerned the economic impact. 

That’s not to say that there’s not an economic impact if a train is 

derailed or anything along those lines. 

But what we try to do is recognize the exceptional efforts of both 

the Amtrak Police and then those in state and local law enforcement and in the rail industry that have taken efforts and measures 

25 

on their own simply in terms of risk mitigation to do those things 

that they know are prudent in terms of whether it is the additional 

police officers or canines, such as what Chief O’Connor testified to; 

whether it is augmenting with transportation security grant funds, 

which I mentioned, that we try to do in terms of operational deterrence; training; and then other things such as the VIPR programs 

that we mentioned. 

So we try to do all those things, recognizing that we can’t be all 

places, all people, all times. So how can we leverage federal government resources with state and local and Amtrak to provide the best 

possible security posture? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, the question is, as raised further, in 

the past year law enforcement has uncovered plots against both the 

New York City subway and the D.C. Metro, and yet what the 

House sent over, recommends funding that’s carelessly established 

to support the public transportation security grants by 55 percent 

below this year’s recommended levels. 

Now, what would an impact like that do to transportation security grants that we have to have for the safety and security of the 

traveling public? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Mr. Chairman, it would have a serious and significant impact if that were to go forward in several areas. One would 

be the training, which we would be unable to do. For example, we 

recently had a conference call with the chiefs of police from many 

of the metro police departments. We call it the Policy Advisory 

Group, including Chief O’Connor. And one of the things they requested as a result of the bin Laden raid was some video training, 

basically a videotape that could be provided, that we could produce 

and provide to, for example, the engineers, those who work on the 

lines, that deals with sabotage, and particularly what can be done 

in terms of trying to take preventive steps to prevent sabotage; and 

in the event there is, then what steps can be taken to avoid the 

impact of that. So that would be one area. 

The operational deterrence, another area. The critical infrastructure would be another area. As you know, some of the PATH, the 

Port Authority Trans-Hudson lines between New Jersey and New 

York have some issues that we have talked about previously. Some 

of that funding may adversely affect some of the continued risk 

mitigation efforts being done in those areas. And then there may 

be reduced funding for, for example, the operational efforts that 

Amtrak and others would have with additional canine teams or 

uniformed officers that can do the random, unpredictable patrols. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. I’m extending the time that I have for 

asking questions. I’m going to come back to you, Mr. Pistole, because what I hear you saying is that there are many things that 

we could do, and the question is what is missing from the application of these ideas that leaves us with more risk than I think we 

ought to be accepting. 

With that, I ask Senator Hutchison to take—— 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you. 

We understand the stretch that you have across all the transportation modes. So I’m not going to rail on you about how much of 

your budget you are allocating to rail, but I am going to rail on you 

to this extent. And that is what, for instance, are you doing about 

26 

hiring the inspectors that you do have in this area with some mass 

transit or rail experience which had not been done as of April of 

2010 when we had a hearing like this? 

Second, what about the 400 FRA inspectors? They’re doing safety, but what about adding security to their portfolio and coordinating with the Federal Rail Administration? 

And last, I would just ask this of you, Mr. Pistole. What is the 

association and cooperation between TSA and DOT? How would 

you rate that, and can you do more with what you have that would 

help this situation? 

And I’m glad you all mentioned about Osama bin Laden’s information on his computers that we found, because clearly they saw 

that there was a void of interest in this area, so now we are forewarned. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. In terms of your first question 

on the transportation security inspectors, obviously we are looking 

for the best qualified, and I think there are things we can do and 

are doing to always recruit and then retain those with exceptional 

backgrounds and experience. And so there’s more we can do in 

terms of specializing, I think to your point, that will address some 

of those issues that perhaps have been raised in the past. I wasn’t 

present for that April 2010 hearing, but I understand some of the 

issues that were raised. 

Senator HUTCHISON. But do you think we are doing that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I think we are, but we can do more, yes. 

On your second point in terms of the FRA, the 400 inspectors, 

I’ll take that back. I don’t see any reason why we can’t add that 

training that we are providing, whether it is for Amtrak or other 

rail, passenger and freight rail providers, to add the security aspect 

to their safety issues. But I’ll take that back and look at that. 

And then on the last issue, I didn’t write that one down. I apologize. 

Senator HUTCHISON. The cooperation—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Oh, yes, with the DOT, right. I think it’s good. Secretary Napolitano and Chief O’Connor and I had a meeting with 

Secretary LaHood, last month I guess it was, to talk about some 

of the issues involving particularly passenger rail. I think there are 

a lot of things that we are doing well. I think we could probably 

streamline and leverage some of those relationships in a more effective way, so that’s something I’m interested in looking at, basically to get the best return on our U.S. taxpayers’ investment in 

freight and passenger rail security. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks. 

Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service and for your testimony. 

Let me ask you about the incident that happened yesterday here 

in the Washington area, and I would reference a story in the Washington Post. It has been on the television and radio also in the last 

24 hours. 

A 51-year-old McLean woman is being held at an undisclosed 

mental health facility after she allegedly made bomb threats on a 

27 

Red Line train Monday morning. Passengers fled the train. Some 

riders evacuated on the track bed, according to eye-witnesses. The 

Rockville station was closed for about 2 hours while K9 units 

searched. No explosives were found, and apparently this woman 

was more of an emotional case than a terrorist threat. 

But she reportedly got down on her knees, said you killed my 

family, now I’m going to kill you all, and a melee ensued. Passengers pressed the call button, one rider called the transit police, 

and a number of people just jumped off and ran at a place that was 

not a station. Panicked passengers used emergency release levers 

to open train doors manually, jumped on the track and began walking toward the nearest station. 

Have any of you looked at this? Do you have an opinion about 

what worked well and what didn’t work well, and can the Committee learn any lessons from the incident that occurred yesterday? 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Senator, I am familiar with the incident. I 

haven’t seen the official reports, but what is described there does 

not surprise me. In a previous career, my department dealt with 

an incident with a gunman on board a train, Colin Ferguson on the 

Long Island Rail Road back in 1993, who actually killed the husband of a Member of Congress. And the response by the passengers 

on board the train was certainly very similar to what you’re describing now. 

It appears that the woman was very credible, very believable, 

and those people truly believed that their lives were imminently in 

danger, and they took what action they thought was literally going 

to save their lives. 

One of the things we do at Amtrak is actually try to teach passengers evacuation plans, both in the stations and on board the 

trains. I think probably all agencies should take a look at their programs and see whether or not we need to reinforce that and put 

additional training out there for the passengers. In today’s world 

we have active shooter situations, we have situations that require 

rapid responses on the part of the public, and they need to be part 

of the solution, and we need to provide the training for them. 

Senator WICKER. Mr. Lord? 

Mr. LORD. Yes, I would agree with Mr. O’Connor. I think the entire incident underscores the importance of providing additional 

training on emergency response and evacuation procedures. A lot 

of the time and attention is focused on deterring an attack, preventing an attack. But once an attack happens or it appears imminent, I think there needs to be increased focus in that area. In my 

statement today, that was one of the issues we highlighted, the 

TSA’s efforts to introduce new regulations that would set up programs for the training of front-line rail employees. We think that’s 

important, because the program requirements stipulate various requirements, one of which is training and evacuation procedures. 

Senator WICKER. Do either of you have an opinion as to what 

would have been the best response of alarmed passengers at this 

incident? Did they endanger themselves? Did they risk electrocution by jumping off at that particular spot? 

Mr. O’CONNOR. They did, yes. 

Senator WICKER. What would you have liked for them to have 

done? 

28 

Mr. O’CONNOR. It would have been preferable if they could escape to the platform if that were possible. But when there’s a mad 

dash to the door, sometimes that’s not possible. Clearly, in a panic 

situation like that, you want to try to do whatever you can to quell 

the panic and direct people to a safe evacuation. 

Senator WICKER. Well, thank you. I think I’ll take another round 

later on, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Senator Boozman, welcome. And please 

take your opportunity to ask any questions that you have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pistole, I’d like to follow up just a little bit on what Senator 

Hutchison asked in terms of the responsibilities of TSA versus others. I know there has been some statements that TSA has stated 

that they’re not the lead and it’s others’ responsibility. We all understand that. Are we clear on those lines of who does what? 

And then the other thing is you mentioned a few minutes ago in 

response to your question that you saw some areas where we could 

do a better job. Could you elaborate on that and perhaps tell us a 

little bit more? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure, Senator. So I think there’s clear understanding of those in the government and industry in terms of TSA’s 

responsibility as it relates to security; and then, for example, DOT’s 

responsibilities in the areas of safety, similar to what FAA has on 

the aviation side on safety and TSA has for security. So I think 

there’s clear understanding in most respects. 

Part of what I was referring to on some of the streamlining is 

just, for example, the training facilities that DOT has. For example, there’s an outstanding training facility for rail safety and security in response to, for example, a freight rail with toxic inhalation 

hazard, a derailment, which is located in Pueblo, Colorado. There 

are other locations. There’s one that the National Guard runs in 

Harpers Ferry, West Virginia that there may be some efficiencies 

achieved by doing some things. In fact, I’m visiting that with OMB 

on Friday to look at that. 

So that’s one thing on the training side. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Can I ask about that, then? If you establish 

that that were the case, is that something that you all could work 

out, or would you need our help in fixing that, or is that an administrative thing? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. I think that would be worked out within the 

Administration just to say, OK, here’s—the question is are we providing services to different audiences? So it’s one more focus. I visited Pueblo. I have not visited the West Virginia one, so I just don’t 

have all that information right now. 

Senator BOOZMAN. OK. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Senator Boozman. 

I want to ask a question of Mr. O’Connor, as well as Mr. Lord. 

One of the primary benefits of rail travel is the ability to move easily, efficiently, get on the train, get moving to your destination. 

How is it going to be as efficient, as rapid for us to be able to balVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Nov 18, 2011 Jkt 71203 PO 00000 Frm 000032 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06601 S:\GPO\DOCS\71203.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
29 

ance the security needs with a more detailed review of who is 

boarding the trains? 

Mr. Lord or Mr. O’Connor, let me ask you first because you’ve 

got the force out there. 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Sure, Senator. It’s critical that our systems remain open and free. It’s part of who we are as Americans. That 

being said, there are layers of security that can be applied in the 

transit environment that reduce the vulnerability, and we’re doing 

that by training our police officers in behavioral assessment, by 

training our employees in how to spot suspicious behavior and activity, and also layering in random screening of bags, K9s both in 

the stations and on board the trains, as well as the use of technology, and technology is improving all the time, and we’re working 

with the TSA on new technology. 

So I think it’s important that we keep the system open and free 

but layer in these random, unpredictable security activities as to 

disrupt anybody who might be planning something untoward. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Lord, I may be stretching your responsibility here, but do we know enough about the systems? If you’re 

not familiar with this, please feel free to say so. With the systems 

that are available, the technology that’s around, how do you apply 

that to the millions of people who daily get on a train in a very 

short period of time? As the day moves across the country, the load 

stays about the same. You’re talking about millions of people moving each day. So I’d love to have an answer that Mr. O’Connor suggested can be applicable, but you do have the time factor on the 

other side. 

Mr. LORD. Given the multiple access points and open architecture of the system, it would be extremely difficult to screen all passengers against—I believe you’re referring to a terrorism watch 

list, something analogous to what’s being done on the aviation side 

of the House. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Even more than that. But now we find 

this erratic person who challenged the system just the other day. 

How do you prevent people who would bring harm from being able 

to get into the train, get on the train, and cause the mayhem? 

Mr. Pistole, is there anything that you see that wouldn’t violate 

the security obligations that we all have here that can so rapidly 

discern problems when you’ve got millions of people moving that 

would enable you to provide the kind of risk aversion that we’d like 

to see? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, the short answer is, as you know, it’s very difficult. It’s problematic. What we do try to focus on are those areas, 

those points of vulnerability and, as Chief O’Connor mentioned, 

using canines, random unpredictable patrols, the undercover officers who may be looking for suspicious activity, and then recognizing that, at least from the TSA perspective, part of our job is 

to promote the free movement of goods and people with the best 

possible security. So it’s a balance between that commerce moving, 

people moving, with security. 

So the idea, and we talked about this last year in your office, 

about trying to do individual screening just does not make sense 

from our perspective on the rails. 

30 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, and you have to walk away with one 

conclusion that I think is fairly obvious, and that is the presence 

of a security apparatus, including people, has to be obvious. They 

have to know that there are people who are watching, whether it’s 

the K9 or their presence. I love seeing them. The problem I found 

out is that the dogs get more tired than the officers who are handling them. You’ve got a problem. I see a dog stretched out there, 

and the poor dog, I want to pick him up and give him a little hug 

and a little water to get him going again. 

But the fact of the matter is I think it has to be obvious that 

there is a presence. The TSA has a program, ‘‘See Something, Say 

Something,’’ but there have to be reminders that there are people 

who are looking out for our interests, and the fact that it’s randomized I think has a value of its own. So, thanks. 

Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. It is—I would yield to Ms. Klobuchar for questions if she has questions. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That’s very kind of you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. Thank you very much. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I would have had I had the time, too. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. That’s very good. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I really appreciate that. 

Thank you, all of you, for being here for this important hearing. 

And thank you, Chair, for having this hearing. I think it’s incredibly important. We are very focused obviously on air safety, but I 

think as the Chairman knows, we have to always be very diligent 

with our rail system. It’s so critical with goods and the flow of people across our nation, and an attack could cause not only high casualties but also severe disruption to interstate commerce. So I appreciate hearing from you on this today. 

I have a question. First of all, I used to be a prosecutor, Director 

Pistole, so I’m very focused on coordination with local law enforcement. And I know you discussed several of the initiatives that TSA 

has undertaken to streamline coordination with local law enforcement. And could you expand on that and discuss them more in detail? And to what extent does TSA not just direct local law enforcement but also integrate their expertise into its own oversight and 

assistance programs? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. I would describe it 

in three ways. One is on information sharing. What can we provide 

on a timely basis to state and local law enforcement, and obviously 

rail security police, such as we did on Monday, the day literally 

within 12 hours of President Obama’s announcement about the 

killing of bin Laden? And so we convened a conference call with all 

the major stakeholders in local law enforcement and the Metro police, transit police, to say here’s what happened, be aware of possible retaliatory actions that may take place, no specific intelligence about that. And then on Wednesday of that week, when we 

received the information about the plot on the 10th anniversary of 

31 

9/11 to derail a train, we provided that information. So that’s one 

area, information sharing. 

The second is in training, recognizing that state and locals, as in 

your experience as a prosecutor, my experience as an FBI agent, 

state and locals usually have the best resources locally and the best 

information, intelligence in connection with the community that 

they can do the best possible job if we in the federal government 

can enable them, whether it is through grants such as the Transit 

Security Grant Program, or with specific training they can augment, or it might be through the VIPR teams where we can engage 

with state and local law enforcement to say, OK, here’s some operational deterrence things that we can do. 

The last is in—the third area is in the critical infrastructure improvement. So if there are critical infrastructures in the particular 

locale, how can we be informed by state and local police and transit 

authorities to say here’s what they assess as being the vulnerable 

points? How can we work collectively to shore up those 

vulnerabilities? 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And also I know that TSA works with the 

rail stakeholders in the private sector, and according to the GAO, 

many stakeholders don’t have the computer access they need to receive TSA security updates, and they don’t quite know what to do 

with them. Can you discuss your understanding on the current 

state with those stakeholders? 

I just remember from the aviation issues, working with Delta, 

which has a hub in Minnesota, when things came up at the beginning about the change in the aviation security standards, that 

there were some issues there. So if you could comment with rail. 

Mr. PISTOLE. We have taken a number of steps, and GAO identified some of those areas that we could improve upon over the last 

several years, and I think we’ve made some good improvement, recognizing that we can do better. But there is an interdependency, 

as you note, with the stakeholders on their ability to receive the 

information, especially if there’s classified information which we 

want to provide. 

But it really comes down to several things. I actually brought a 

folder of intelligence bulletins that we share with both stakeholders 

and state and local and transit police; different bulletins, whether 

it’s about, for example, the Mumbai attack, the active shooter scenario, or the Moscow attack, both the subway attack and at the airport. We have a bulletin which Steve Lord mentioned, TRIAD. It’s 

a daily intel report that we are developing. 

But what we’re really looking for is input from industry and the 

stakeholders as to that actual intelligence, what they are really 

looking for, and recognizing that there’s very little actionable intelligence. Mostly the strategic intelligence about, OK, al-Qaeda 

wants to hurt us, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula particularly. 

Here are things they’ve done in the past. Here’s what they may do. 

But other than the 10th anniversary of 9/11, that’s the really only 

actionable intelligence as to a specific plot, other than those that 

the Chairman mentioned earlier about Zazi in New York City or 

the individual here in D.C. for the Metro, which is really an aspirational plot as opposed to something that was operational. 

32 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Just one last question. I know during your 

nomination hearing you and I talked in my office, as well as at the 

hearing, about worker morale with TSA. And I have to tell you, we 

talked about this before but I’ve seen some improvement, just talking to people, and it’s just anecdotal, that work at the airports. 

Some of it has to do with when you stood and defended their honor 

during the whole pat-down controversy, when they were just doing 

their jobs. But I wondered about morale among rail security TSA 

workers and if you have any thoughts on that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, I have the perspective only from the Transportation Security Inspectors, those TSA employees who work with 

industry. I would defer to Chief O’Connor and Steve Lord in terms 

of what they have received. But I believe overall that morale is improving within TSA. There are a number of initiatives that we 

have going, and I think we have a lot of good things that people 

are proud of doing. I’m glad to hear your anecdotal information. 

That’s even with your particular situation and—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. You mean the fact that my hip is checked 

all the time? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I was not going to raise that, Senator, but, yes—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. It’s a chronic sort of—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. I’m glad to know—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. It sounded sort of—‘‘your particular situation’’ sounded—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. I’m glad to know that there have been some positive encounters there, Senator. Thank you. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Chief? 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Yes. Every day the TSA sends us screeners to 

work with our officers in multiple cities across the nation, and the 

screeners that come are well trained, and they actually enjoy the 

break from the airports, working with us. So they get a little bit 

closer and a little bit more interactive. They don’t have to go 

through the whole pat-down routine, but they do help us with explosive detection, as well as behavioral detection, and they work 

very good in the rail environment. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. Mr. Pistole, did I understand you 

to say that the Zazi plot in New York City was more aspirational 

than real? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. I’m sorry, Senator. That was a very real plot. 

The one that was disrupted here locally in Washington, D.C., the 

Metro last fall—— 

Senator WICKER. That was Farooq Ahmed. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. And I say aspirational only from the standpoint of he was interested in doing something, but he was doing it 

with an undercover FBI agent, and he did not have the means of 

doing it, whereas Zazi clearly had the means, the motive, the opportunity. But because of good information and intelligence sharing, that plot was disrupted. 

Senator WICKER. Yes, sir. Zazi had homemade bombs, materials, 

with an intent to detonate them right there in Manhattan. What 

33 

can you tell us in a public hearing about how we detected these two 

plots, speaking in general terms? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I can say that it was because of very good intelligence sharing in the Zazi case. Of course, I was with the FBI at 

the time and helped to oversee that investigation, and it was very 

collaborative work between the Joint Terrorism Task Force in Denver. Of course, Zazi was in Aurora, Colorado. There, he and relatives had been buying ammonium peroxide from several beauty 

supply stores, and so there were actually some trip wires in place 

to have that identified if somebody was buying suspicious amounts 

of peroxide, for example. 

That did not work as effectively as it should have, but then because of the information sharing with state police and actually 

tracking him as he drove through the night from Colorado to New 

York City, and then working with NYPD, there were some issues 

that could have been improved in that regard in terms of how that 

was all actioned. 

But the bottom line was he and his two co-conspirators were 

tracked and were disrupted before they were able to carry out their 

plots with the backpacks. There were nine backpacks found in the 

apartment they were staying in, and we believe they were going to 

put those, the devices, the peroxide-based bombs in those 

backpacks and go in the New York City subways. 

Senator WICKER. Do you view that as an attack that actually 

could have been brought to fruition—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Senator WICKER.—had authorities not intervened? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. He was clearly intent on doing that. He 

had built a device at a hotel in the Denver suburbs, and he was 

prepared to go about doing that. He had been trained back in Afghanistan. So, yes, he was ready to go. Pakistan; I’m sorry. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. Let me just shift in the 

remaining moments to requirements contained in the implementing recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 

Am I informed correctly that mandated security training requirements are still not final, and that background and immigration 

checks of front-line public transportation rail employees are still 

not finalized? Am I correct in that information? 

Mr. PISTOLE. You are. 

Senator WICKER. Why is it taking so long? 2007, and here it is 

2011, and the training requirements are not in place, and the background and immigration checks are not in place. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So for some context, Senator, out of the 118 provisions of the 9/11 Act, 74 have been complete, 14 are overdue, and 

you’ve mentioned 2 of those. The training has actually taken place, 

but the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which was mentioned earlier has taken much longer, in my mind, than it should have, and 

that is in process. 

So the substance has actually taken place, but the process for the 

NPRM has not been finalized, and so that’s still in progress. As you 

know, that is a several-year process. 

The other one, we should have that out by December, by the end 

of this year, is what I understand. But again, I agree, it has taken 

too long. We did focus on the top-tier priorities, and those have 

34 

been addressed and successfully completed. Training is a top priority, but it just was not done on as timely a basis as it should 

have. 

Senator WICKER. Do I understand the rulemaking process for 

something of a national security issue such as this is really the 

same as the process for the implementation of a rule involving a 

labor law or an environmental law? It’s the same process? 

Mr. PISTOLE. It can—yes, it’s generally the same process. Yes. 

Senator WICKER. Do you—would you advocate, in cases of national security legislation, would you advocate a streamlined rulemaking process—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Senator WICKER.—for that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely, and I would appreciate support on that. 

Senator WICKER. Are you aware of any proposal coming from the 

administration in that regard? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Not off the top of my head. I could look at that and 

get back with you, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, it just seems to me, when 

we have our allies suffering from attacks in London and Madrid, 

when we see 40-plus fatalities in Moscow, 200-plus fatalities in 

India, and there’s a national security issue, it seems that the rulemaking should be different than the rulemaking with regard to the 

construction of toys or a new way of looking at labor laws. 

But in conclusion, let me just observe, Mr. Chairman, that somebody must be doing something right in the fact that we’ve not had 

these incidents I mentioned as in the other four locations. It’s 

something to be proud of. That’s not to say that something won’t 

happen this afternoon or tomorrow, because the threat is ongoing. 

But I think we are very fortunate in that we have escaped this 

type of attack for as long as we have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much. I think it’s fair to say 

that we have been diligent, that we’ve intercepted many plans for 

people who wanted to bring destruction to the system, and I congratulate all branches of the area that are concerned, whether it’s 

GAO or the Amtrak police, Mr. Pistole and the TSA. Your people 

are hard at work, that I genuinely believe, and we urge you to keep 

on the diligence. 

Something happened in the last couple of—things happened in 

the last couple of weeks which are distressful, and I address this 

to Mr. O’Connor, about the walk-through from New York to New 

Jersey through the PATH train tunnel without being detected by 

security. Others came, were walking through secure passageways. 

I don’t know what measures Amtrak has in place to prevent 

something similar from happening in its rail tunnels, but obviously 

it has got to be there. We need to know that these access ways are 

secure and that we’re not going to have people just wandering 

through there and doing whatever they want, as well as bringing 

terrible risk to the passengers or the system itself, that we are not 

missing the evidence that we’ve seen in front of us and not curbing 

it before it takes place. 

Mr. O’CONNOR. I agree, Senator. Funding that has been provided 

by DHS TSA to New Jersey Transit, as well as to Amtrak has been 

used to put some systems, some surveillance systems in that have 

35 

been helpful to us in protecting those entrances to those tunnels. 

But given the recent information coming out of the bin Laden compound, we’re looking to do even more, and we’ve been in discussion 

with the TSA in terms of operationalizing some of the grant funding to put additional security personnel out at critical infrastructure until we can target-harden some more bridges and tunnels 

that we’re concerned about. 

So in short order, there will be, besides the additional patrols 

we’re doing, there will be some additional fixed security areas that 

will help further protect critical infrastructure. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Because I think it’s obvious that fairly 

simple technology is available to provide the camera views of these 

access points, and somebody sitting in a facility, an office, can 

maintain watch on lots of these places without a lot of trouble. So 

I would urge that. 

Before I came to the Senate I was a commissioner of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and I’m not sure what 

prompted me as I look back because this was some years ago, 1978 

specifically. I decided that I would walk through the tunnel, not 

unescorted, and I did, through the PATH train, New York and New 

Jersey, as you mentioned, and I found some distressing things. 

Emergency doors were locked, fire exits locked, electric light systems that were antiquated and resulted in lots of lights going out. 

If one of them went out, it was the whole system not in use anymore, but at that point in time it was. 

So surveillance of those facilities has to be there, and as inviting 

as they might be for the curious, they’re even more inviting for 

those who would bring terror or mayhem to our public. 

I thank you all for your participation today, and we’re to make 

an announcement that we’ll keep the record open for a couple of 

weeks. We’d ask that any questions you get, please respond to 

them as promptly as you can. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(37) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Under TSA’s current command structure, Transportation Security Inspectors report to a Federal Security Director (FSD) at a nearby airport. In the past, 

the Inspector General has recommended that TSA place surface inspectors under 

the authority of a TSA headquarters official responsible for surface transportation. 

TSA has rejected this recommendation every time. Can you assure us that surface 

transportation security remains a priority despite this aviation-centered structure? 

Answer. Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Federal Security Directors (FSD) deploy Transportation Security Inspectors—Surface through a risk-based 

approach and ensure coverage of key passenger rail and mass transit facilities in 

their regions. FSDs and Assistant Federal Security Directors-Inspection (AFSD–I) 

undergo surface transportation-related training, such as Rail Road 101, Highway 

Motor Carrier Safety, and Visible Inter-modal Prevention and Response, at the 

Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado. Additionally, FSDs participate in various workshops and conferences focusing on surface transportation security issues, roles, responsibilities, and the agencies’ regulatory authority. Surface 

Regional Security Inspectors monitor and report local FSD/AFSD–I activity to ensure it meets TSA’s oversight requirements in the surface mode. TSA’s cadres of inspectors assess compliance, national program delivery, and provide outreach on security assets in the surface transportation system. TSA headquarters provides program oversight to ensure work products at each location meet the frequency and 

quality mandated in the Regulatory Activities Plan. 

TSA remains committed to prioritizing the functions of inspectors in surface 

transportation under the oversight of its FSDs and in line with the latest Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment. This effort is further solidified through the 

deployment of six Regional Security Inspectors for Surface Transportation (RSIs–S) 

who report to TSA headquarters. RSIs average more than 33 years of surface transportation experience and are recognized by the Association of American Railroads 

(AAR) as the surface security subject matter experts in the field. The team of RSIs, 

including an RSI dedicated to Amtrak and an RSI Coordinator, provides day-to-day 

support to field Area Directors (AD), with the Office of Compliance Programs at TSA 

headquarters providing overall program strategy and supervision. TSIs are responsible for all surface-related inspection, compliance, and enforcement activity within 

the areas of responsibility of the FSD offices. RSIs are responsible for strategy 

across the country and have direct corporate interactions with TSA’s major stakeholders. Their positioning throughout the country provides active oversight of surface transportation security enhancement activities. One of the ongoing goals of 

TSA’s Surface program is to continue an enhanced relationship with mass transit 

entities to identify effective practices that will lead to improving security in the 

midst of an evolving and changing adversary and threat stream. 

Question 2. At a hearing in April of 2010 I expressed concerns about TSA’s hiring 

of inspectors with no rail or mass transit experience. Assistant Secretary Heyman 

assured me that TSA was making an effort to focus more on surface transportation 

experience when hiring inspectors. Has any progress been made in this area over 

the past year? 

Answer. Yes, employment eligibility now requires certification of surface transportation experience at each level with more substantial experience required for the 

higher pay bands. The employment of all TSIs, regardless of the transportation 

mode, is now processed at the airport through the Assistant Federal Security Director-Inspection (AFSD–I), who is the first-line supervisor and the recommending official for selections and at some locations the selecting official. At airports where an 

AFSD–I is not physically located the Federal Security Director (FSD) makes the selection. 

38 

1This testimony draws on research sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Office of University Programs, and the Department of Transportation’s Research and Innovative 

Technology Administration. 

Question 3. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has about 400 inspectors 

around the country. Would it be possible for these inspectors to be trained to handle 

some of the responsibilities of TSA inspectors to improve efficiency and lower the 

cost of inspections to the taxpayers? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the Sector-Specific 

Agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsible for the security of the nation’s transportation systems. DHS and TSA have engaged the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the FRA in several memoranda of understanding (MOU) and memoranda of agreement (MOA) which include roles, duties 

and responsibilities of the inspector workforce, and the sharing of information between the two agencies. TSA inspectors have worked with FRA inspectors in the 

past in an effort to minimize the number of inspections for a specific stakeholder/ 

location. In the event a possible safety violation is identified, TSA security inspectors notify FRA safety inspectors, and vice versa, with regard to possible security 

violations. Regional Security Inspectors for Surface Transportation (RSIs–S) attend 

the regional FRA Safety Conferences, where they provide an overview of the TSA 

inspector’s roles and responsibilities. RSIs continue to share information at the appropriate level in the field at every opportunity. Both TSA and FRA use data-driven 

models to assign inspection resources to areas with higher risks with respect to security for TSA inspectors and safety for FRA inspectors; assigning FRA’s inspectors 

additional security duties would dilute the ability to focus on both types of risks. 

While responsibilities regarding safety and security remain separate, both the TSA 

and FRA continue to work in leveraging their respective workforces. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE, MINETA TRANSPORTATION

INSTITUTE

Public surface transportation—trains, buses, stations, even groups of people waiting at bus stops—offers terrorists an attractive target: easy access and easy escape; 

concentrations of people that enable attackers to achieve high body counts; confined 

environments that enhance the effects of explosives and unconventional weapons; 

opportunities to cause great disruption.1

The terrorist threat to public surface transportation is real. Since September 11, 

2001, terrorists have carried out 75 attacks on airliners and airports worldwide 

causing 157 deaths. During the same period, terrorists (as of May 22, 2011) carried 

out 1,804 attacks against bus and train targets, killing more than 3,900 people. 

Terrorist attacks on surface transportation have increased in volume and in 

lethality. While terrorists remain obsessed with attacking aviation targets, the number of terrorist hijackings and sabotage attempts has declined. At the same time, 

however, terrorist attacks on trains and buses have increased. Counting only incidents with fatalities to avoid increases due solely to better reporting, terrorists carried out a total of just 15 attacks with fatalities between 1970 and 1979. The number grew to 43 attacks with fatalities in the 1980s, 281 in the 1990s, and 465 between 2000 and 2009. 

Terrorists see surface transportation as a killing field. Eleven of the attacks since 

9/11 resulted in 50 or more deaths and three of the attacks killed nearly 200 people. 

The total number of fatalities in these 14 attacks is the approximate equivalent of 

seven airline crashes. 

The West is not immune. Most of the attacks and the more lethal attacks have 

occurred in the developing countries like India and Pakistan, but there have been 

significant terrorist attacks on trains in Spain, the United Kingdom, Russia and 

Japan. Further terrorist attacks have failed in the United Kingdom and Germany 

and serious terrorist plots have been uncovered in several countries. 

It can happen here. Since 9/11, there have been seven reported terrorist plots involving attacks on trains in the United States. 

The Mineta Transportation Institute’s database shows that: 

• Bombs were used in 74 percent of all attacks. 

• There were more attacks against bus targets than train targets (49 versus 26 

percent) but attacks on trains are on average more lethal with 5 fatalities per 

attack versus 3 fatalities per attack for buses. 

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• Suicide attacks are less lethal than concealed bombs left behind in passenger 

compartments, which are the most lethal form of attack. (This has important 

security consequences.) 

• Jihadist terrorist attacks on surface transportation are most lethal. More of 

their attacks involve fatalities; and nearly 9 percent of these involve more than 

25 fatalities each. 

We should not fixate on suicide bombers. Obviously, not all security measures 

work against suicide bombers, but recruiting suicide bombers is difficult and significantly raises the threshold for attackers. Only two of all of the jihadist terrorist 

plots in the United States involved suicide attacks. And the deadliest terrorist attacks on trains in Madrid and Mumbai involved bombs concealed in abandoned 

backpacks and suitcases. 

Employee and passenger awareness counts: 16 percent of bomb attacks have been 

stopped prior to their detonation because of an aware public. More can be done here. 

High-Speed Rail—Tomorrow’s Terrorist Target? 

Terrorist attacks on high-speed rail systems have occurred in France, Germany, 

Japan, Russia, Spain and Switzerland. In Europe, Asia and North America, highspeed rail trains are seen as icons of a country’s identity and economic power, and 

typically they serve a customer base that represents the country’s government and 

business elite. 

When terrorists attack high-speed rail systems, they seem to prefer to derail trains. 

When they go after non-high-speed rail systems, they more often try to detonate 

bombs in passenger compartment. Most attacks on high-speed rail systems target 

the tracks (66 percent) versus the passenger compartment (17 percent). More attacks on non-high-speed rail systems target the passenger compartment than the 

tracks. 

Terrorists choose between volume and velocity. Passenger loads on high-speed rail 

trains, per-car and per-train are less than slower-speed commuter or regional trains. 

This explains why high lethality with bombs detonated in passenger compartments 

is more achievable on a non-high-speed train. On the other hand, train velocity is 

obviously much greater on high-speed trains, making collisions or derailments a 

more attractive and effective choice of attack method. 

Was Osama bin Laden on the right track? Based on a statistical review of outcomes from accidents on high-speed rail systems, the ultimate tactical goal for terrorists most likely would be to focus on a derailment that forces the train to either 

collide at high speed with another train, bridge abutment or wall, or go off a bridge 

or embankment into a body of water or fall/roll down a significant elevation. 

Bombs placed on the tracks are on average twice as lethal for high-speed rail than 

those placed in the passenger compartments. For non-high-speed rail, bombs in passenger compartments have proved to be more lethal than bombs on the tracks. 

Overall, derailments involving mechanical means of sabotage have proved that 

they can be more lethal than bombs on the tracks. Technology, particularly on highspeed rail systems, will cause train operations to cease if a bomb detonates and 

causes catastrophic destruction prior to train arrival. Effective use of explosives, as 

in the Russian Nevsky Express attack in 2009, requires the detonation to be timed 

perfectly with a train’s passage. Even in this attack, more casualties were crush and 

impact injuries and fatalities, occurring in the derailing rear cars (numbers 12, 13, 

and 14) of the train than those caused by the explosion under the 9th car. 

High-speed rail track and equipment safety enhancements have made accidental 

derailments less lethal. High-speed train sets are designed with relatively rigid, 

semi-permanent connections while slower-speed trains rely on traditional ‘‘knuckle’’ 

couplers. These more rigid connections greatly reduce the probability of a train 

‘‘jackknifing,’’ or of partially or completely rolling over. Non-high-speed passenger 

trains tend to jackknife or flip over, causing a significantly high number of injuries 

and fatalities. Track designs have incorporated enhancements to guide and guard 

rails which keep a derailed train moving upright, along the right of way, keeping 

it from going off bridges, down hills, and away from trains on other tracks or bridge 

abutments and walls. Brackets have been added to high-speed train wheel sets in 

Japan to keep a derailed train on the track, reducing the probability significant casualties in an accidental or intentional derailment. 

Causing a derailment and/or collision by compromising the track structure or signal system might be an effective attack to execute. This could be done through mechanical sabotage or cyber attacks on the controlling computer systems. 

The most catastrophic accident outcomes have been due to higher speed (80 to 100 

mph+) collisions with other trains or fixed objects. While it hasn’t been used as an 

attack method to date, moving a locomotive or a string of cars into the path of an 

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oncoming high-speed train is a tactic that should be considered and prevented. In 

the 2010 derailment of the Bengal Express, which killed 148 people, moments after 

the passenger train derailed, a freight train going in the opposite direction plowed 

into the derailed passenger coaches. It is not certain if the saboteurs intended this 

to happen. 

A Realistic Approach 

With federal assistance, transportation security clearly has improved during the 

last 10 years. More can be done, of course, but security proposals must be realistic. 

Security for surface transportation must comprise the entire spectrum of measures 

from deterrence and detection to mitigation and emergency response. Aviation security is ‘‘front-loaded,’’ that is, it aims at prevention. There are few opportunities to 

save lives after a plane crashes. Surface transportation security cannot be frontloaded, but there is much that can be done to mitigate casualties and to save lives 

after an attack, as well as minimizing damage and expediting recovery process. 

Protecting public places that, by their very nature, require easy access is difficult 

and costly. To be worthwhile, security must provide a net security benefit. The result cannot be a mere diversion of the attack to another accessible public place 

where the attacker can achieve the same results in casualties. 

Security must take into account economic realities. Federal resources will be limited. Many local governments are broke. Transportation systems’ operators are hard 

pressed to keep costs down. We need not just more, but smarter security. We need 

low-cost solutions. 

Security must be sustainable. We cannot look forward to the end of terrorism 

when the security structures erected over the past several decades can be dismantled. Security measures put into place today are likely to become a permanent feature of the landscape. Therefore, they must be sustainable in terms of public acceptance, disruption, and costs for operation, maintenance, upgrades, evaluation, and replacement. 

The aviation security model will not work for surface transportation. Surface 

transportation systems are too diverse. Screening of all passengers would be nearly 

impossible. Train stations have too many access points. The volumes of passengers 

are too great. The number of screeners required would run to the hundreds of thousands. The costs would be prohibitive, the delays intolerable. 

There is no near-term technological solution. New explosives detection technologies 

are being developed, but their probability of detection with acceptable false alarm 

and throughput rates in a real operating environment are not clear. In addition, 

their deployment will require thorough application evaluation, new policies, and 

training. What do we do when ‘‘Stand-off’’ detection identifies a possible suicide 

bomber in a corridor packed with passengers? 

Americans must be realistic about security. One hundred percent security in surface transportation is not possible. Some risk is unavoidable, just as when we drive 

our automobiles, but the risk to individual citizens from terrorism is minuscule. 

Some Easy Gains 

The role of the federal government will be to lead in research, develop and test new 

security technology, evaluate security policies and practices, disseminate information 

pertaining to the threat and best security practices, and assist local governments in 

acquisition and training. Canines specifically trained in explosive vapor wake detection are a new and important development. 

More resources are required at the local level for security enhancements and training. In today’s environment, these will necessarily be limited. 

Initial and ongoing security training is required for frontline transportation employees—train drivers, conductors, station personnel, not just managers, as well as 

emergency responders. But providing it raises cost and logistical issues. 

Passengers can be enlisted as partners in their own security. Current ‘‘see something, say something’’ campaigns are a first step. They need to be evaluated to see 

if the message is getting through and how better to engage the public. Communications have to be facilitated. Procedures have to be established to ensure rapid diagnosis and response. Callers need to be acknowledged, for their efforts, even when 

it turns out to be a false alarm. Disruptions must be minimized. 

Synergies between safety and security measures as well as between crime prevention and counter-terrorism efforts need to be identified and exploited to increase efficiencies in resource deployment and allocation. 

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