THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent-Petitioner, 

v. 

Stephon Robinson, Petitioner-Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000990 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Barnwell County 

Doyet A. Early III, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27883 

Heard January 10, 2019 – Filed May 8, 2019 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

Appellate Defender Victor R. Seeger, of Columbia, for 

Petitioner-Respondent. 

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Deputy Attorney

General Donald J. Zelenka and Senior Assistant Deputy 

Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin, all of Columbia; and 

Solicitor James Strom Thurmond Jr., of Aiken, all for 

Respondent-Petitioner. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUSTICE JAMES: Stephon Robinson was convicted of first-degree burglary and 

possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Robinson 

appealed, and the court of appeals remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct 

an on-the-record balancing test regarding the admissibility of certain prior

convictions the State used to impeach Robinson's credibility pursuant to Rule

609(a)(1) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. State v. Robinson, Op. No. 2014-

UP-068 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 19, 2014). After the remand hearing, the trial court

ruled Robinson's prior convictions were properly admitted; consequently, the 

burglary and weapon convictions remained in place. 

Robinson appealed again, and the court of appeals issued an unpublished 

opinion holding that although the trial court erred in applying two of the five factors

we set forth in State v. Colf,

1 any error in the admission of Robinson's prior 

convictions for impeachment was harmless. State v. Robinson, Op. No. 2017-UP065 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 1, 2017). We granted cross-petitions for writs of

certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. We affirm the court of appeals as 

modified. The court of appeals reached the correct result by affirming Robinson's 

convictions; however, as we will discuss below, the court of appeals' analysis of the 

admissibility of the prior convictions was erroneous.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At around 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, February 20, 2011, Eddie Williams was

relaxing in his home when he heard a car pull into his driveway. Williams testified 

he heard a knock at the front door, looked through a window, and saw Robinson and 

the white car Robinson had driven to his house on prior occasions. Williams ignored 

the knock at the door because he figured Robinson had come to the house to play 

video games with his nephew, who was not home. Williams testified Robinson got

back into the car and left. Williams made his lunch and retired to his bedroom to

watch a NASCAR race. 

Williams testified that about ten minutes later, he again heard a car pull into 

his driveway and then heard his front door being kicked in. He grabbed a handgun 

from his nightstand and went to investigate. Williams testified he started down the 

hallway and confronted Robinson face-to-face. Williams testified he also saw

1 337 S.C. 622, 627, 525 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2000) (adopting the five-factor test used

by federal courts to assist in determining whether the probative value of a prior

conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect for purposes of impeachment under Rule 

609, SCRE). 
 

 

 

 

 

Robinson's brother (Reginald Felder) and another individual he did not recognize 

inside his home. Williams fired his handgun, and the intruders ran away. Williams 

testified Robinson also had a handgun and fired it in his direction while fleeing the 

home. Williams testified he then retrieved a shotgun and fired it into the air outside

the house as the three individuals escaped in a white car. Williams called law 

enforcement around 2:20 p.m. and told police the intruders were driving a white

four-door vehicle he thought to be a Pontiac. In two separate photo lineups,

Williams identified Robinson and Robinson's brother as two of the three intruders. 

The third intruder was never identified.

On cross-examination, Robinson attacked Williams' credibility, establishing 

that Williams initially failed to tell law enforcement he had fired his handgun. 

Williams admitted that on the day of the incident, he falsely informed law 

enforcement that the bullet holes in his home were not from the burglary but had 

been there since he purchased the home. Williams testified he was not truthful with 

law enforcement because he thought his handgun had to be registered in order for it 

to be legal. The gun had been reported stolen in Beaufort County, but Williams

testified he was unaware of this when he purchased the gun. 

Shelly Leanna Gunnels testified she had been in an "on and off" relationship 

with Robinson for the last six or seven years. She testified she allowed Robinson to 

use her white Pontiac sedan "whenever he wanted to use it." Gunnels testified 

Robinson borrowed her car on February 19 and returned it on February 20 (the day 

of the incident) "around that afternoon."

At the close of the State's case-in-chief, the trial court informed Robinson of 

his right to testify in his defense and warned him the State might be permitted to 

impeach his credibility with his prior criminal convictions. When Robinson stated 

he wanted to testify, the State requested to impeach him pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), 

SCRE, using 2009 convictions for second-degree burglary and attempted strong arm 

robbery and two 2007 Georgia convictions for breaking into an automobile. As we 

will discuss, Rule 609(a)(1) provides that prior convictions punishable by 

imprisonment for more than one year "shall be admitted" to impeach the credibility 

of a defendant who testifies, "if the court determines that the probative value of 

admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused." This test

places the burden on the State to convince the trial court the evidence should be

admitted. 

Robinson objected, arguing "the prejudicial value outweighs the probative 

value." Without conducting the requisite on-the-record analysis of the Colf factors, 
 

 

 

 

the trial court ruled the strong arm robbery conviction and the two breaking and 

entering into an automobile convictions were admissible. The trial court ruled the 

second-degree burglary conviction was also admissible but ruled it had to be referred 

to generically as a "prior felony conviction carrying more than one year in prison." 

The use of the burglary conviction for impeachment is not an issue in this appeal. 

Robinson testified and denied any involvement in the incident but admitted to 

knowing Williams and previously going to Williams' house a "good bit of times" to 

"get things from [him]." Robinson later clarified he knew Williams because

Williams sold him marijuana. Robinson testified he was at his own house with his 

brother and cousin at the time of the incident. Robinson testified he borrowed 

Gunnels' vehicle the night before the burglary so he, his brother, and his cousin could

go to a club that night. Robinson testified he took the car back to Gunnels around 

noon or 1:00 p.m. the next day, which would have been prior to the burglary. 

On cross-examination, the State questioned Robinson about his prior 

convictions as follows: 

Q: Are you the same Stephon Robinson that was convicted of strong 

arm robbery in 2009?2

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: And you're the same Stephon Robinson that had another felony 

conviction in 2009 that carried more than a year, aren't you? 

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: And you're the same Stephon Robinson that in 2007 had two 

convictions for breaking and entering automobiles with the intent to 

commit a felony or theft? 

A: Yes, sir. 

2

 As noted above, the State originally informed the trial court this was an attempted 

strong arm robbery conviction but then told the jury it was a strong arm robbery 

conviction. There was no objection to this distinction by Robinson, and there is no 

sentencing sheet in the record to allow us to discern which offense is correct. This 

discrepancy does not affect our analysis. For consistency, we will refer to this prior

conviction as a strong arm robbery conviction. 
 

 

 

Q: But you want this jury to believe that you don't know anything about

this? 

A: Yes, sir, because for one, I plead guilty to all of my charges and 

take my responsibility because I know I was guilty of those charges. 

And two, that was back in my past when I did stupid things to get a

little money to do things because I didn't have. But my parents recently

passed away and we got insurance money and all kind of money back

off that, and I have no reason to kick in this man's door. Nothing. 

Q: Let me ask you this, in 2007, was your brother with you whenever 

you broke into the cars? 

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: Did he plead guilty to his charges? 

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: And in 2009, with the strong arm robbery, was your brother with

you then? 

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: Who else was with you?

A: No one. 

Q: You and your brother? 

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: And that other felony charge from 2009, was your brother with you 

then? 

A: No, sir. 

Q: He wasn't? 

A: No, sir. You talking about the burglary, right? 

Q: The charge that you pled guilty to in 2009, the felony charge that

carried more than a year. 
 

 

 

 

A: Yes, sir, yes, sir. 

Q: Was your brother with you on that? 

A: No, sir. 

Q: Okay. So in three out of the four times when you committed a

crime, your brother was with you? 

A: Yes, sir. 

Arthur Wallace, Robinson's cousin, testified he, Robinson, and Reginald 

Felder went to the club together the night before the incident in Gunnels' vehicle and 

that Robinson returned Gunnels' vehicle to her around noon or 1:00 p.m., which 

would have been before the burglary. Wallace denied their involvement in the

burglary and testified that he, Robinson, and Felder all hung out together at

Robinson's house that day. The State impeached Wallace's credibility with a 2008 

second-degree burglary conviction. Robinson does not challenge Wallace's 

impeachment in this appeal. 

Reginald Felder (Robinson's brother) similarly recounted the three going to 

the club the previous night and hanging out together at Robinson's house on the day 

of the incident. Felder testified Robinson returned Gunnels' vehicle around 1:00 

p.m. the day of the burglary. The State impeached Felder's credibility with the same 

2007 Georgia convictions for breaking into an automobile and the same 2009 

conviction for strong arm robbery that were used to impeach Robinson. Robinson 

does not challenge Felder's impeachment in this appeal. 

During Robinson's closing argument, Robinson attacked Williams' credibility.

During the State's closing argument, the State acknowledged the importance of 

credibility in the case and commented on the credibility of each of the witnesses.

The trial court gave the following limiting instruction on Robinson's prior 

convictions in its charge to the jury:

You also heard in this case evidence that the defendant had 

been, in the past, convicted of crimes other than the one 

for which he is now on trial. This evidence may be 

considered by you if you conclude it's true only in deciding 

whether the defendant's testimony is believable or credible 

and for no other purpose. You must not consider the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

defendant's prior record as any evidence of the defendant's 

guilt of the charge we are trying here today. 

Robinson appealed his convictions. The court of appeals found the trial court 

erred by failing to conduct a meaningful on-the-record balancing test when deciding 

whether to admit Robinson's prior convictions and remanded the matter to the trial

court for the sole purpose of conducting the balancing test.3 State v. Robinson, Op. 

No. 2014-UP-068 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 19, 2014). On remand, the trial court 

conducted a hearing and heard arguments as to whether Robinson's prior convictions 

were admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) and State v. Colf. After the hearing, the trial

court issued an order addressing each of the Colf factors and concluded "the 

probative value of the introduction of [Robinson's] prior record outweighed any 

prejudice to him under Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE." The trial court denied Robinson's 

motion for a new trial. 

Robinson again appealed. The court of appeals addressed only two of the five

Colf factors, held the trial court erred in its application of those two factors, but 

affirmed Robinson's convictions because "any error in the admission of Robinson's 

prior convictions was harmless." State v. Robinson, Op. No. 2017-UP-065 (S.C. Ct. 

App. filed Feb. 1, 2017). The court of appeals did not address the remaining three 

Colf factors and thus did not determine whether the prior convictions were properly 

admitted after an analysis of all five Colf factors. We granted both Robinson's and 

the State's petitions for writs of certiorari. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only. State v. 

Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "The admission of evidence 

concerning past convictions for impeachment purposes remains within the trial

[court's] discretion, provided the [trial court] conducts the analysis mandated by the

evidence rules and case law." State v. Dunlap, 346 S.C. 312, 324, 550 S.E.2d 889, 

896 (Ct. App. 2001). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the 

trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." State 

v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429-30, 632 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2006).

3 See State v. Scriven, 339 S.C. 333, 344, 529 S.E.2d 71, 76 (Ct. App. 2000) 

(providing a trial court must conduct "a meaningful analysis to balance the 

impeachment value of [a defendant's] prior convictions, if any, against the

prejudicial impact, as clearly required under Rule 609(a)(1)").
 

III. DISCUSSION 

Both Robinson's and the State's arguments revolve around their perception of 

a correct application of the Colf factors in determining whether Robinson's prior 

convictions were ultimately admissible at trial pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE. 

Robinson argues the court of appeals correctly applied the two factors it discussed 

but erred by not addressing the remaining factors and not ruling on the ultimate 

admissibility of his prior convictions. Robinson also argues the error in admitting 

the prior convictions was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues 

the court of appeals erred in its application of the two factors it did discuss. 

In discussing the issues pertinent to this appeal, we will attempt to clarify the 

approach that must be undertaken by a trial court when determining whether to admit

or exclude evidence of prior convictions of a witness for impeachment purposes. 

A. Rule 609, SCRE 

Rule 609 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility 

of a witness's prior convictions for purposes of impeachment. Rule 609 prescribes 

varying standards for admissibility of evidence of prior convictions. In pertinent 

part, Rule 609 provides: 

(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the 

credibility of a witness, 

(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been

convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 

403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment 

in excess of one year under the law under which the 

witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has 

been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the

court determines that the probative value of admitting this 

evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; 

and 

(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a 

crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 

statement, regardless of the punishment. 

. . . . 
 

 

 

(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule 

is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has

elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of 

the witness from the confinement imposed for that 

conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court 

determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative 

value of the conviction supported by specific facts and 

circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial 

effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 

years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the 

proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 

written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the 

adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of 

such evidence. 

Rule 609(a) invokes three impeachment scenarios. First, under Rule

609(a)(1), evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a 

crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year (in the 

jurisdiction where the conviction occurred) is admissible, subject to Rule 403, 

SCRE. Under Rule 403, evidence of such a conviction "may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The Rule 403 test 

places the burden upon the opponent of the evidence to establish inadmissibility 

pursuant to Rule 403. Second, under Rule 609(a)(1), when the accused chooses to 

testify during his trial, if the State seeks to introduce impeachment evidence that the 

accused has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 

one year, the evidence is admissible if the State establishes the probative value of 

admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect upon the accused. Third, 

under Rule 609(a)(2), if a witness, even an accused, has been convicted of a crime 

involving dishonesty or false statement, evidence of such a conviction shall be 

admitted regardless of the maximum punishment and regardless of the probative 

value or prejudicial effect of the evidence. See State v. Bryant, 369 S.C. 511, 517, 

633 S.E.2d 152, 155 (2006). 

Rule 609(b) invokes one impeachment scenario. Evidence of a conviction of 

any kind is not admissible if more than ten years has elapsed from the date of 

conviction or the release of the witness from confinement for that conviction, 

whichever is the later date, unless the proponent of the evidence establishes that the 

probative value of the conviction, supported by specific facts and circumstances, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Rule 609(b) includes notice 

requirements and establishes a presumption against the admissibility of these 

"remote" convictions, and the State bears the burden of substantially overcoming the 

presumption. 

Rule 609(a)(2) requires no balancing test for admissibility of a prior 

conviction for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. However, Rule 

609(a)(1) and Rule 609(b) require the trial court to balance—in three varying 

degrees—the probative value of evidence of a prior conviction and the degree of 

prejudice to the opponent of the evidence (as noted, the Rule 403 test also requires 

the trial court to consider confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, etc.). Even 

though these three Rule 609 admissibility tests differ from one another, we have, 

through State v. Colf, provided a uniform set of factors for the trial court to consider

when applying each test. 

In State v. Colf, we considered the admissibility of a criminal defendant's

convictions under Rule 609(b), as the defendant's trial took place more than ten years

from the defendant's release from confinement for the prior convictions. 337 S.C.

622, 625-26, 525 S.E.2d 246, 247-48 (2000). In Colf, we adopted the five-factor 

analysis employed by federal courts when weighing the probative value of prior

convictions against the prejudicial effect to the accused. Id. at 627, 525 S.E.2d at 

248. These factors include: 

1) The impeachment value of the prior crime. 

2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness's subsequent

history.

3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime. 

4) The importance of the defendant's testimony. 

5) The centrality of the credibility issue.

Id. "These factors are not exclusive; trial courts should exercise their discretion in 

light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Id. Although Colf 

focused on the admission of prior convictions more than ten years old under Rule

609(b), our courts have also consistently applied these factors for purposes of a Rule 

609(a)(1) analysis. See, e.g., Bryant, 369 S.C. at 517 n.1, 633 S.E.2d at 155 n.1.
 

 

To summarize, Rule 609(a)(2) contemplates one impeachment scenario, that 

being for convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement, with 

automatic admissibility regardless of who the witness is and regardless of 

punishment or resulting prejudice. Rule 609(a)(1) and Rule 609(b) contemplate 

three impeachment scenarios with three different admissibility standards: (1) under 

Rule 609(a)(1), if the witness is someone other than the accused and has a prior 

conviction of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year, 

the trial court must balance the Colf factors and determine whether, under Rule 403, 

the probative value of the conviction is substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice and/or other relevant considerations set forth in Rule 403. The 

burden of establishing inadmissibility of the conviction is upon the opponent of the 

evidence; (2) under Rule 609(a)(1), if the witness is the accused and has a prior 

conviction of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year, 

the trial court must balance the Colf factors and determine whether the probative 

value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused. The burden 

of establishing admissibility is upon the State, the proponent of the evidence; (3) 

under Rule 609(b), if the conviction is a "remote" conviction (even a conviction of 

a crime involving dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2)), the trial court 

must balance the Colf factors and determine whether the probative value of the 

conviction, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs 

its prejudicial effect. Rule 609(b) establishes a presumption against the admissibility 

of a remote conviction and places the burden of establishing admissibility of the

conviction upon the proponent of the evidence. 

While the same Colf factors are to be considered in determining admissibility 

under all three of the 609(a)(1) and 609(b) impeachment scenarios, the practitioner 

and the trial bench should be mindful of the different admissibility standards in the

three scenarios. We also note that these rules apply in civil cases, except of course 

the portion of Rule 609(a)(1) prescribing the standard to be applied when the witness 

is the accused in a criminal case. This Court and the court of appeals have 

encountered various circumstances under which a Rule 609/Colf analysis was

required. In the instant case, we have the opportunity to clarify some of the issues 

faced by both trial courts and appellate courts when Rule 609(a)(1) is in play. 

In Bryant, the defendant was on trial for murder and unlawful possession of a

weapon by a convicted felon; he testified at trial and was impeached with two prior 

firearms convictions. 369 S.C. at 514-15, 633 S.E.2d at 154-55. When considering 

whether those convictions were automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) as 

crimes of dishonesty or false statement, we stated: "Violations of narcotics laws are

generally not probative of truthfulness. Furthermore, a conviction for robbery, 
 

 

 

 

burglary, theft, and drug possession, beyond the basic crime itself, is not probative 

of truthfulness. Likewise, firearms violations also are not generally probative of 

truthfulness." Id. at 517, 633 S.E.2d at 155-56 (internal citations omitted). Finding 

the defendant's prior firearm convictions did not involve dishonesty or false 

statement, we explained the probative value of the convictions should have been 

weighed against their prejudicial effect prior to their admission under Rule 

609(a)(1). Id. at 517, 633 S.E.2d at 156. We ultimately held it was error for the trial

court to admit the defendant's prior firearm convictions. Id. at 518, 633 S.E.2d at 

156. We reasoned the defendant's prior firearms convictions "had nothing to do with 

[the defendant's] credibility and, their admission was more prejudicial than 

probative, especially in light of the offenses for which he was on trial."4 Id. 

In State v. Broadnax, the defendant was on trial for armed robbery and 

kidnapping; he testified at trial and was impeached with his prior armed robbery 

convictions. 414 S.C. 468, 471-72, 779 S.E.2d 789, 790-91 (2015). The trial court

admitted the defendant's armed robbery convictions pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2) and 

the court of appeals' prior decision in State v. Al-Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 

(Ct. App. 2003). Broadnax, 414 S.C. at 471, 779 S.E.2d at 790. Overruling Al-Amin 

and reaffirming the rule articulated in Bryant, we held armed robbery is not a crime 

of dishonesty or false statement and, therefore, the defendant's prior convictions 

were not admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). Broadnax, 414 S.C. at 476, 779 S.E.2d 

at 793. We explained that "for impeachment purposes, crimes of 'dishonesty or false 

statement' are crimes in the nature of crimen falsi 'that bear upon a witness's 

propensity to testify truthfully.'" Id. (quoting Adams v. State, 644 S.E.2d 426, 432 

(Ga. Ct. App. 2007)). We emphasized our holding did "not preclude the admission 

of prior convictions for armed robbery; rather, it merely enables a trial judge to 

conduct a balancing test pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1) when the State seeks prior

convictions for armed robbery to impeach a criminal defendant's testimony." Id. at 

478, 779 S.E.2d at 794. 

B. Application of the Colf Factors and Rule 609(a)(1) in this Case 

4

 Perhaps a clearer statement in Bryant would have been that the prior firearms

convictions "had little" to do with the defendant's credibility, as we did not intend to 

hold prior firearms convictions are per se inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(1) and 

Rule 609(b). We can envision circumstances in which such prior convictions may 

well be admissible, provided the trial court conducts the requisite balancing test and

rules accordingly. 
 

 

 

 

Robinson's prior convictions include a 2009 conviction for second-degree 

burglary, a 2009 conviction for strong arm robbery, and two 2007 Georgia 

convictions for breaking and entering into an automobile with the intent to commit 

a felony or theft. As previously noted, the 2009 second-degree burglary conviction 

was "sanitized" when the trial court allowed the State to elicit testimony that 

Robinson had a prior felony conviction carrying more than one year in prison. The 

introduction of this conviction is not an issue in this appeal.

The parties obviously disagree as to the admissibility of the strong arm 

robbery conviction and the two breaking and entering into an automobile 

convictions. Robinson's strong arm robbery conviction and his two breaking into an 

automobile convictions are not automatically admissible as crimes of dishonesty or 

false statement under Rule 609(a)(2); therefore, the trial court was required to 

conduct an analysis under Rule 609(a)(1) and State v. Colf to determine whether the 

probative value of admitting these prior convictions outweighed the prejudicial 

effect to Robinson. As we noted above, on remand, the trial court considered all five 

Colf factors and determined the convictions were admissible under Rule 609(a)(1);

however, the court of appeals reviewed only two of the five factors. 

1. The impeachment value of the prior crime. 

"The starting point in the analysis is the degree to which the prior convictions 

have probative value, meaning the tendency to prove the issue at hand—the witness's 

propensity for truthfulness, or credibility." State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 21, 732 

S.E.2d 880, 886 (2012). "The tendency to impact credibility . . . determines the 

impeachment value of the prior conviction. Impeachment value refers to how 

strongly the nature of the conviction bears on the veracity, or credibility, of the 

witness." Id. at 21-22, 732 S.E.2d at 887. The purpose of the impeachment is not 

to show the witnessis a bad person but rather to show background facts which impact 

the witness's credibility. Id. at 22, 732 S.E.2d at 887. 

The trial court provided the following analysis regarding the impeachment 

value of Robinson's prior crimes: 

This Court finds the admission of the four prior 

convictions has value for impeachment purposes and that 

the prejudicial effect of the admission of the prior 

convictions, if any, is not outweighed by their admission.

While no specific details of the prior convictions were 

provided to this Court or the jury in this case, the mere fact 
 

 

 

 

 

 

that the Defendant had twice been convicted of serious 

crimes within a few years of the alleged offense would 

tend to impact the Defendant's credibility. Simply put,

convictions for breaking into motor vehicles and strongarm robbery don't imply that the accused was an armed 

burglar, as was alleged in this case, but they do imply that 

the accused is not someone to be trusted - that he might 

not be credible. 

Citing Black, 400 S.C. at 21-22, 732 S.E.2d at 887, and Bryant, 369 S.C. at 517, 633 

S.E.2d at 155, the court of appeals concluded the trial court erred in finding

Robinson's prior convictions had impeachment value, reasoning South Carolina 

courts have found prior convictions for robbery, burglary, and theft are not probative

of truthfulness. This was error. 

In Black, the defendant's only corroborating witness was impeached using 

two manslaughter convictions that were more than ten years old. 400 S.C. at 15, 732 

S.E.2d at 883. Because of the remoteness of the prior convictions, under Rule 

609(b), the convictions were only admissible if the probative value "substantially" 

outweighed the prejudicial effect. Id. at 18, 732 S.E.2d at 885. This is a more 

strenuous admissibility test than the one called for under Rule 609(a)(1). When 

employing a Colf analysis and addressing the impeachment value factor, we stated, 

"A rule of thumb is that convictions that rest on dishonest conduct relate to

credibility, whereas crimes of violence, which may result from a myriad of causes,

generally do not." Id. at 22, 732 S.E.2d at 887. We noted that although the prior 

convictions arguably raised concerns regarding the witness's general character, it is 

more narrowly the witness's propensity for telling the truth that is properly placed at

issue under Rule 609. Id. at 23, 732 S.E.2d at 887. We held, "The manslaughter 

convictions, while crimes of violence, are not particularly probative of the specific 

trait of truthfulness; consequently, their impeachment value is limited. . . . In this 

case, the trial court did not relate any specific facts or circumstances, other than the 

mere existence of the convictions, that made them particularly probative of [the 

witness's] credibility." Id. at 23-24, 732 S.E.2d at 887-88.

As mentioned above, in Bryant, when we discussed the possibility of a prior 

conviction's automatic admissibility under Rule 609(a)(2), we stated, "[A] 

conviction for robbery, burglary, theft, and drug possession, beyond the basic crime 

itself, is not probative of truthfulness." 369 S.C. at 517, 633 S.E.2d at 155. Here, 

the court of appeals applied our statement out of context in finding Robinson's prior 

convictions were not probative of credibility for purposes of a Rule 609(a)(1) 
 

analysis. Although prior convictions for robbery, burglary, theft, and drug 

possession are not crimes of dishonesty or false statement, which would result in 

automatic admissibility under Rule 609(a)(2), such convictions may still have 

impeachment value under Rule 609(a)(1). If the court of appeals' conclusion 

regarding this factor is carried to its logical extreme, no convictions would ever have 

impeachment value under Rule 609 unless they were crimes of dishonesty or false 

statement admitted under Rule 609(a)(2). Rule 609(a)(2) would inevitably swallow 

Rule 609(a)(1). 

Even though Robinson's convictions for strong arm robbery and breaking and

entering automobiles are not crimes involving dishonesty or false statement within 

the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2), that does not rule out the existence of impeachment 

value in each one of these prior offenses. The trial court observed, "Simply put, 

convictions for breaking into motor vehicles and strong-arm robbery don't imply that

the accused was an armed burglar, as was alleged in this case, but they do imply that 

the accused is not someone to be trusted - that he might not be credible." It was

within the trial court's discretion to conclude that because Robinson has prior 

convictions for such offenses, he legitimately might not be considered credible. See 

Black, 400 S.C. at 21-22, 732 S.E.2d at 887 ("Impeachment value refers to how 

strongly the nature of the conviction bears on the veracity, or credibility, of the 

witness."). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Robinson's prior 

convictions had impeachment value. 

2. The point in time of the conviction and the witness's subsequent 

history.

Robinson's prior convictions were in 2007 and 2009. He was tried for the 

burglary of Williams' residence in 2011. The trial court found Robinson's prior 

convictions revealed a continuing pattern of criminal behavior that could 

legitimately impact his credibility in the eyes of the jury. The court of appeals did 

not address this factor. 

Robinson acknowledges the temporal proximity of his prior convictions to his 

current charges. However, Robinson contends the trial court erred by mentioning in 

its remand order what the sentences were for his convictions, arguing that while there

was temporal proximity, "the jury did not and should not have known what the 

sentences were for each of Robinson's prior convictions." This argument has no 

merit, as the jury heard no evidence of the length of the sentences for the prior 

convictions. The trial court simply addressed the "subsequent history" portion of 

this Colf factor by comparing Robinson's prior releases from confinement to the 
 

 

 

timing of the instant crime. An analysis of the sentences illustrates closeness in time

between the prior offenses and the offense for which Robinson was on trial, 

revealing a pattern of behavior that legitimately evoked questions of Robinson's 

credibility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this factor as it 

did. 

3. The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime. 

"[E]vidence of similar offenses inevitably suggests to the jury the defendant's

propensity to commit the crime with which he is charged. This risk is not eliminated 

by limiting instructions." Colf, 337 S.C. at 628, 525 S.E.2d at 249. "[W]hen the 

prior offense is similar to the offense for which the defendant is on trial, the danger 

of unfair prejudice to the defendant from impeachment by that prior offense weighs 

against its admission." Bryant, 369 S.C. at 517-18, 633 S.E.2d at 156.

Robinson dwells heavily on this point and claims the trial court erred in its 

application of this factor. The trial court found there was very little similarity

between the past crimes and the charged crimes. The trial court reasoned: 

[T]he State was prohibited from mentioning the 

Defendant's 2009 burglary conviction during the trial. 

Instead, the State was required to simply refer to the

conviction as "a felony conviction that carries more than a

year." There is nothing about that characterization of the 

prior conviction to make it similar to the offense that the 

Defendant faced. As to the strong-arm robbery and 

breaking into motor vehicles charges, there is no 

indication that any of those charges involved the use of a 

deadly weapon (a crucial element of the burglary charge),

or that they involved entering someone's home (also an 

element of the burglary charge). Despite defense counsel's 

claim, there is no similarity between the prior convictions 

and the offenses for which the Defendant was on trial in 

this case. 

The court of appeals did not address this factor.

First-degree burglary is defined, as applied to this case, as entering "a dwelling

without consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling" and "when, in 

effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight, he or another 

participant in the crime . . . is armed with a deadly weapon." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-
 

11-311(A)(1)(a) (2015). "Strong armed robbery is defined as the felonious or 

unlawful taking of money, goods, or other personal property of any value from the 

person of another or in his presence by violence or by putting such person in fear."

State v. Rosemond, 356 S.C. 426, 430, 589 S.E.2d 757, 758 (2003). The Georgia 

breaking and entering into an automobile convictions are violations of section 16-8-

18 of the Georgia Code (2018), which provides: "If any person shall enter any

automobile or other motor vehicle with the intent to commit a theft or a felony, he 

shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by 

imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or, in the discretion of 

the trial judge, as for a misdemeanor." 

Robinson argues the similarity of his prior convictions to the instant burglary 

charge weighs against admissibility. He contends the common thread between the 

burglary charge and the prior convictions is the taking of the property of another. 

Robinson asserts the jury became aware of his prior stealing habits and his pattern 

of escalating conduct. 

Robinson also points to another similarity between his prior convictions and 

the charged offense that he contends requires exclusion of the prior convictions—

his brother being with him during his commission of the prior crimes and the charged

crime. The State cross-examined Robinson on this point, but Robinson did not 

object to that line of questioning; therefore, this narrow argument is not preserved 

for our review. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 

(2003) (providing an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must 

have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for 

appeal). 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in analyzing the similarity factor as 

it did. Robbery and breaking and entering into automobiles involve different 

conduct than burglary and possession of a weapon during the commission of a

violent crime, and neither the robbery nor the breaking into automobiles involved 

being armed with a deadly weapon or entering a dwelling. The fact that breaking 

and entering automobiles and first-degree burglary both involve entering into 

someone's property without consent was not, in the trial court's judgment, a

determinative factor. Neither was the fact that robbery and burglary are overly 

similar just because, according to Robinson, most burglaries are undertaken with an

eye towards stealing something. In this case, the trial court's limiting instruction 

sufficiently addressed Robinson's fear that the evidence would be inappropriately 

used as propensity evidence. The trial court acted within its discretion in weighing 

this factor as it did.
 

4. The importance of the defendant's testimony. 

Robinson's defense at trial was an alibi defense. When analyzing the 

importance of Robinson's testimony, the trial court reasoned: 

Given the fact that the Defendant's testimony was entirely 

cumulative to the testimony of the other two defense 

witnesses, it was not necessary for the Defendant to take 

the stand in his defense. In fact, the only thing the

Defendant testified to that his other witnesses did not

confirm was that he [Robinson] had bought marijuana 

from Mr. Williams at the home prior to the date of the 

burglary. 

The court of appeals did not address this factor. 

Robinson argues the trial court's evaluation of the importance of his testimony 

ignored the constitutional significance of his right to testify in his own defense and 

the State's efforts to undermine his alibi defense. He contends there is often a no 

more powerful witness for the defense than the defendant himself. Robinson argues, 

"To characterize [his] testimony as cumulative because he presented other alibi 

witnesses is far too simplistic." Robinson contends the "most compelling portion" 

of his testimony was his explanation that he had taken responsibility for his past

crimes, as well as noting his lack of motive to steal. He maintains the importance of

his testimony increased the potential prejudice of admitting his prior convictions and 

should have weighed against their admission. 

The trial court acted within its discretion in analyzing this factor. Robinson's

direct examination was brief; his testimony largely echoed the testimony of his 

brother and cousin, who were both able to communicate the alibi upon which 

Robinson's defense relied. Though Robinson communicated a couple of additional 

points, his testimony was largely cumulative to that of other witnesses. See Brooke 

v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (finding there was no abuse of 

discretion in ruling a defendant's prior convictions could be used for impeachment 

in the event he testified because defendant would have given a version that was 

substantially the same as the version given by another defense witness). 

Additionally, Robinson's testimony was not necessary to explain his mindset 

at the time of the alleged crime. Cf. United States v. Smith, 181 F. Supp. 2d 904, 

910 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding the importance of a defendant's testimony was 

enhanced when the State was required to prove his intent to defraud, thus, this factor 
 

 

cut against the admission of the defendant's prior convictions). With or without

Robinson's testimony, the jury had to resolve the issue of Williams' credibility, since 

his testimony was the only direct evidence of Robinson's guilt.

Robinson also contends the trial court ignored his argument that it was

important for him to testify so he could explain to the jury that his prior convictions

were guilty pleas, which showed he admits responsibility for the crimes he commits, 

and that his refusal to plead to the instant charges would tend to establish he was not 

guilty of the instant charges. This argument is quite illogical. Following Robinson's 

rationale to its logical extreme, he should want the prior convictions to be introduced 

so he could explain to the jury that he accepts responsibility when he is guilty but 

denies responsibility when he is not guilty. 

Robinson also cites authority discussing the constitutional right of an accused 

to testify in his defense regarding criminal matters. A defendant's right to testify is 

indeed fundamental. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 402 S.C. 225, 241, 741 S.E.2d 694, 

702 (2013) (declaring a criminal defendant's right to testify is a well-established right 

in South Carolina). However, this right does not preclude the State from impeaching 

a defendant's credibility with prior convictions. If the defendant's right to testify 

were to trump all other considerations relevant to Colf and Rule 609, then a 

defendant could never be impeached with prior convictions. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in weighing this factor as it did. 

5. The centrality of the credibility issue. 

Acknowledging the lack of physical evidence in this case, the trial court found 

the credibility of Williams, Robinson, and Robinson's other witnesses "was central 

to the case." The trial court explained this factor weighed in favor of admitting 

Robinson's prior convictions. However, the court of appeals disagreed, explaining 

it was error for the trial court to find this factor weighed in favor of admitting the 

prior convictions "because our courts are hesitant to admit evidence of prior 

convictions when credibility is central to the case." The court of appeals relied on 

Green v. State, 338 S.C. 428, 433-34, 527 S.E.2d 98, 101 (2000), for this proposition.

In Green, we affirmed the post-conviction relief (PCR) court's finding that 

defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the probative value of the 

defendant's prior convictions for possession of crack cocaine was outweighed by 

their prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), when the defendant was on trial 

for distributing crack cocaine within proximity of a school. 338 S.C. at 432, 527 

S.E.2d at 100. We noted the novelty of the issue: "whether the probative value of a 
prior conviction, similar to the crime charged, not involving dishonesty or false

statement, outweighs its prejudicial effect, where credibility is critical." Id. at 432-

33, 527 S.E.2d at 100. After listing the Colf factors and noting the trial court should 

have considered them, we reasoned:

In the instant case, evidence in the record supports the 

PCR court's ruling that [the defendant] was prejudiced by 

defense counsel's failure to argue the prejudicial effect of 

the convictions outweighed their probative value. [The 

defendant] was impeached with evidence of two

convictions for possession of cocaine that were four and 

five years old. His credibility was critical, as the jury had 

to choose between his version of events and that of the 

SLED agents. 

Id. at 433-34, 527 S.E.2d at 101. 

The court of appeals' analysis and reliance on Green is flawed. In Green, we 

were primarily concerned with the similarity of the prior convictions to the current

charges. Further, we did not make a ruling as to which direction the credibility factor 

would turn, only recognizing "credibility was critical." This analysis did not 

constitute a broad conclusion that our courts are hesitant to admit evidence of prior 

convictions when credibility is central to a case. 

Robinson also argues the following statement in Bryant supports the court of 

appeals' proposition: "[T]he State should not be allowed to attack the defendant's 

credibility with inadmissible prior convictions; especially where the [defendant's] 

credibility was essential to his defense." 369 S.C. at 518-19, 633 S.E.2d at 156. 

Importantly, Robinson overlooks our use of the word "inadmissible" in this passage. 

We made this statement in Bryant during a harmless error analysis. It goes without 

saying that an "inadmissible" conviction should never be admitted into evidence. 

Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, when credibility is central to a 

case, the introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes becomes even 

more legitimate. Rule 609 is entitled "Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of 

Crime." Attacking the accused's credibility forms the entire basis for a party seeking

introduction of prior conviction evidence under Rule 609. If the jury must choose

between the defendant's credibility and that of another witness, there would be a high 

probative value in admitting evidence of prior convictions to impeach the

defendant's credibility. On the other hand, if credibility is not central to the case, 
 

 

then the prior convictions would have less probative value, and the risk of a jury

improperly using the prior convictions in an inappropriate manner, despite a limiting 

instruction, could be higher. 

Other jurisdictions favor admissibility when witness credibility is central to a 

jury's deliberation. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 696 F.2d 578, 589 (8th Cir. 

1982) (finding the probative value of a prior conviction was further enhanced by the 

critical role a defendant's credibility would have played if he had chosen to testify);

United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2014) (providing that when 

credibility is important, this factor weighs in favor of admissibility); United States 

v. Smith, 181 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("[C]redibility will be critical. 

This factor tilts significantly in favor of admitting the prior convictions."); State v. 

Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655-56 (Minn. 2006) ("Because credibility was a central

issue here, the fourth and fifth [] factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior 

convictions."); Jordan v. State, 592 So. 2d 522, 524 (Miss. 1991) ("The importance 

of the defendant's credibility weighs in favor of admissibility of the prior 

convictions."); State v. Bohe, 447 N.W.2d 277, 281 (N.D. 1989) ("[I]n light of the 

nature of [the defendant's] prior felonies and of the fact that the credibility of the 

witnesses was the main issue in the case, the probative impeachment value of [the 

defendant's] prior felony convictions appears to outweigh the prejudicial effect of 

their admission into evidence."). 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this factor as it did. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the Colf factors as it

did and in concluding Robinson's prior convictions were admissible under Rule 

609(a)(1), SCRE. In any given case involving the same indicted charges, two

different trial courts could examine the same prior conviction(s), evaluate the same 

five Colf factors, and perhaps reach opposite conclusions as to the admissibility of 

the prior convictions. In such an instance, it is conceivable that under our standard 

of review, both trial courts would be affirmed. This is the nature of our standard of 

review in Rule 609(a)(1) cases when a trial court weighs the probative value of a

prior conviction against its prejudicial effect. 

We affirm the court of appeals' decision to uphold Robinson's convictions for 

first-degree burglary and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent 

crime. However, we modify the court of appeals' opinion by holding the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in admitting Robinson's prior convictions under Rule 
609(a)(1), SCRE. In light of our holding, we need not examine Robinson's harmless 

error argument. See State v. Allen, 370 S.C. 88, 102, 634 S.E.2d 653, 660 (2006) 

(declining to address remaining issues when the disposition of a prior issue is 

dispositive of the appeal). 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW, JJ., and Acting Justice Thomas E. Huff 

concur.