IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

DARREL SCOTT FRANCIS,

Appellant.

No. CR-17-0062-PR

Filed February 5, 2018

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County

The Honorable Dale P. Nielson, Judge

Nos. CR-2015-00087; CR-2015-000700

_________________

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

241 Ariz. 449 (App. 2017)

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL:

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Dominic Draye, Solicitor 

General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Michael Valenzuela (argued), 

Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Attorneys 

for State of Arizona

Criss E. Candelaria (argued), Criss Candelaria Law Office P.C., Concho, 

Attorneys for Darrel Scott Francis
STATE V. FRANCIS

Opinion of the Court

2

Randy McDonald (argued), Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix; Keith J.

Hilzendeger, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Phoenix; and Carol 

Lamoureux, Law Offices of Hernandez & Hamilton, PC, Tucson, Attorneys 

for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICES 

BRUTINEL, TIMMER, and GOULD, and JUDGE MORAN joined.*

JUSTICE BOLICK, opinion of the Court:

¶1 We consider in this case whether the state must prove that a 

defendant knew an item he possessed was “contraband” to convict the 

defendant under A.R.S. § 13-2505(A) of knowingly possessing contraband 

while being confined in a correctional facility or transported to it. We hold 

that when such a defendant possesses an item that is statutorily defined as 

contraband, the state need prove only that the defendant knowingly 

possessed the item, not that the defendant knew it was contraband.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In October 2014, officers booked Darrel Scott Francis into the 

Navajo County Jail Annex on charges unrelated to this case. Upon booking, 

officers took and bagged Francis’ personal property, including clothing and

a cellphone. The next day, Francis asked to call his attorney. When the 

officer could not find the attorney’s number, Francis told her he had it in 

his cellphone, which the officer retrieved to obtain the number. Later, 

Francis was transferred to the main jail, where an officer confiscated a 

cellphone held by Francis.

¶3 The State charged Francis under A.R.S. § 13-2505(A)(1) and

(A)(3) with two counts of promoting prison contraband, one for obtaining 

 

*

Justice John R. Lopez IV has recused himself from this case. Pursuant to 

article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Mark R. 

Moran, Presiding Judge of the Coconino County Superior Court, was 

designated to sit in this matter.
STATE V. FRANCIS

Opinion of the Court

3

or possessing the cellphone in the jail annex or during transport and the 

other for taking it inside the jail grounds. Before trial, the superior court 

ruled that the State need not prove that Francis knew the cellphone was 

contraband. The jury found Francis guilty, and the court sentenced him to 

two concurrent five-year prison terms.

¶4 The court of appeals reversed Francis’ convictions and 

sentences, applying A.R.S. § 13-202(A) to conclude that the State had to 

prove that Francis knew that the cellphone was contraband. State v. Francis, 

241 Ariz. 449, 452–54 ¶¶ 12–21 (App. 2017). In light of its ruling, the court 

of appeals declined to address Francis’ argument that the trial court also 

erred by allowing the State to call his former lawyer to testify about Francis’

prior convictions. Id. at 454 ¶ 24 n.6.

¶5 We granted review to clarify what the state must prove to 

convict a defendant under A.R.S. § 13-2505(A), a recurring issue of 

statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of 

the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. 

Fitzgerald v. Myers, 243 Ariz. 84, 88 ¶ 8 (2017). When the statutory language 

is clear and has only one reasonable construction, we apply it according to 

its plain meaning. State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145, 147 ¶ 7 (2017). As this case 

involves the intersection of multiple statutes, we construe them together, id. 

at 148 ¶ 13, seeking to give meaning to all provisions. Collins v. Stockwell, 

137 Ariz. 416, 419 (1983).

¶7 Francis was convicted of promoting prison contraband by

“knowingly taking contraband into a correctional facility or the grounds of 

a correctional facility” and “knowingly . . . obtaining or possessing 

contraband while being confined in a correctional facility or while being 

lawfully transported or moved incident to correctional facility 

confinement.” A.R.S. § 13-2505(A)(1), (A)(3). Section 13-2501(1) defines 

“contraband” as “any dangerous drug, narcotic drug, marijuana, 

intoxicating liquor of any kind, deadly weapon, dangerous instrument, 

explosive, wireless communication device, multimedia storage device or 

other article whose use or possession would endanger the safety, security 

or preservation of order in a correctional facility.” It is uncontested that 

Francis knew he possessed a cellphone at the relevant times and that a 

cellphone is a “wireless communication device” defined as contraband 
STATE V. FRANCIS

Opinion of the Court

4

under § 13-2501(1).

¶8 Francis argues, and the court of appeals majority agreed, that 

the State had to prove that he knew that the cellphone was contraband. The 

court of appeals relied on A.R.S. § 13-202(A), which provides that “[i]f a 

statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is 

sufficient for commission of the offense without distinguishing among the 

elements of such offense, the prescribed mental state shall apply to each 

such element unless a contrary legislative purpose plainly appears.” 

Francis, 241 Ariz. at 452 ¶ 12. Because § 13-2505(A) requires a defendant to 

“knowingly” obtain or possess contraband, the court construed it “to 

require proof not only that the defendant knowingly obtained or possessed 

a proscribed object, but also that the defendant knew the object was 

contraband, within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 453 ¶ 16.

¶9 The statutory scheme as a whole, however, does not require

proof that Francis knew the cellphone was statutorily defined as 

“contraband.” Section 13-105(10)(b) defines “knowingly” in this context to 

mean “that a person is aware or believes that the person’s conduct is of that 

nature or that the circumstance exists. It does not require any knowledge 

of the unlawfulness of the act or omission.” Section 13-204(B) further 

establishes that “[i]gnorance or mistake as to a matter of law does not 

relieve a person of criminal responsibility.”

¶10 Reading the statutes together refutes Francis’ argument and 

the court of appeals’ conclusion that it was necessary for the State, in 

addition to proving that Francis knew he had a cellphone, to also prove he 

knew it was contraband. Had § 13-2505(A) proscribed possession of 

wireless communication devices instead of listing it among other items 

under the category “contraband,” there would be no question that the State 

would only have to prove that Francis knew he possessed a cellphone

because “knowingly” would relate directly to the wireless communications 

device. The outcome is not different merely because the legislature defined 

contraband in a separate section. Because “contraband” is a statutorily 

defined term, § 13-2505(A) effectively prohibits the “knowing” possession 

of the items listed in § 13-2501(1). It does not by its terms require a 

defendant to know that such items cannot be lawfully possessed while in a 

correctional facility or while being transported to one, which comports with 

the other statutes generally declaring that knowledge of unlawfulness is not 

an element of crimes and that ignorance of the law is not a defense. Francis’ 

unawareness that his cellphone was contraband was “ignorance or mistake 

as to a matter of law,” which is not a defense and thus knowledge of his 
STATE V. FRANCIS

Opinion of the Court

5

cellphone’s legal status is not an element of the crime unless the legislature 

clearly so states. See § 13-204(B).

¶11 This construction gives effect to all five statutes at issue. It 

requires proof that Francis knowingly committed every element of the 

crime (§ 13-202(A)), including that he knowingly obtained or possessed 

(and took into a correctional facility) contraband (§ 13-2505(A)(1), (A)(3)), 

the definition of which includes cellphones (§ 13-2501(1)), but knowledge 

of its unlawfulness is not an element of the crime (§ 13-105(10)(b)), and 

about which Francis’ ignorance or mistake is not a defense (§ 13-204(B)).

¶12 Our decision is in line with United States Supreme Court

jurisprudence. That Court has repeatedly held that knowledge of an act, 

even without understanding its legal significance, can establish the 

culpable mental state necessary for conviction of a crime that must be 

“knowingly” committed. See McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 

(2015); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994). In 

McFadden, the statute at issue made it unlawful to knowingly manufacture, 

distribute, or possess with intent to distribute the “analogues” to the 

substances listed on the federal controlled substances schedules. 135 S. Ct. 

at 2302. The Court held that the requisite culpable mental state could be 

established in two ways. The government could show that the defendant 

knew that the substance was controlled or an analogue, even if he did not 

know its identity. Id. Or, more relevant here, he could be convicted if he

“knew the specific features of the substance that make it a ‘controlled 

substance analogue.’” Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C § 802(32)(A)). As the Court 

explained, “[a] defendant who possesses a substance with knowledge of 

those features knows all of the facts that make his conduct illegal,” and need 

not know of the statute making it a controlled substance. Id. at 2305. See 

also Posters ‘N’ Things, 511 U.S. at 524 (“[A]lthough the government must 

establish that the defendant knew that the items at issue are likely to be 

used with illegal drugs, it need not prove specific knowledge that the items 

are ‘drug paraphernalia’ within the meaning of the statute.”); Hamling v. 

United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974) (“[T]o require proof of a defendant’s 

knowledge of the legal status of the materials would permit the defendant 

to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the 

law.”).

¶13 State v. Bloomer, 156 Ariz. 276 (App. 1987), on which Francis

and the court of appeals rely, does not persuade us to reach a different 

result. Bloomer involved a slightly different context. There the defendant 

believed that the substance concealed in his body was marijuana, but it was 
STATE V. FRANCIS

Opinion of the Court

6

actually gunpowder. Id. at 278. Section 13-204(A)(1) provides a defense for 

mistake of fact if “it negates the culpable mental state required for 

commission of the offense.” Because both marijuana and gunpowder were 

statutorily defined as contraband, and the defendant knew that marijuana 

was contraband, the court concluded that the defendant knowingly 

possessed contraband. Bloomer, 156 Ariz. at 278–79. Bloomer reached the 

right result, but the opinion was incorrect to the extent it held that a 

defendant may be convicted only if he knows a particular item is 

contraband.

¶14 We hold that a defendant is guilty of possessing contraband 

if he knowingly possesses one of the items specifically proscribed by 

§ 13-2505(A), and the trial court correctly ruled that the State did not have 

to prove that Francis knew the cellphone was contraband.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the court of appeals’

opinion and remand the case to that court to consider the second issue not 

previously decided.