By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

U.S. Army Engineer School

(573) 563-8080/DSN 676-8080

COMMANDANT

BG Anthony C. Funkhouser 

563-6192

<anthony.c.funkhouser.mil@mail.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

COL David Theisen

563-6192

<david.t.theisen.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY COMMANDANT

Mr. James R. Rowan

563-8080

<james.r.rowan4.civ@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

CSM Butler J. Kendrick, Jr.

563-8060

<butler.j.kendrick.mil@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

CW5 Scott R. Owens

563-4088

<scott.r.owens.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR

COL Ricardo A. Javier 

563-8045

<ricardo.a.javier.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG

LTC Adam M. Calderon 

563-8046

<adam.m.calderon3.mil@mail.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF

COL Philip M. Secrist III

563-7116

<philip.m.secrist.mil@mail.mil>

COMMANDER, 1ST ENGINEER BRIGADE

COL Daniel S. Larsen

596-0224, DSN 581-0224

<daniel.s.larsen.mil@mail.mil>

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

COL Jason L. Smallfield

563-4093

<jason.l.smallfield.mil@mail.mil>

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION

Mr. Robert F. Danner

563-2845

<robert.f.danner.civ@mail.mil>

COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS CENTER

COL Darryl McDowell 

563-8142

<darryl.d.mcdowell.mil@mail.mil>

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER

Mr. Jonathan D. Green

563-6199

<jonathan.d.green.civ@mail.mil>

ENGINEER DOCTRINE, MSCoE CDID, CODDD

LTC John C. Morrow

563-2717

<john.c.morrow2.mil@mail.mil>

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GERALD B. O’KEEFE

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1333801
E R

DEPARTMENTS

02 Clear the Way

By Brigadier General 

Anthony C. Funkhouser

04 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major 

Butler J. Kendrick, Jr.

05 Show the Way

By Chief Warrant Officer Five

Scott R. Owens

20 Engineer Doctrine Update

23 Engineer Writer’s Guide

Inside back cover: GPO Order Form

MANAGING EDITOR

Diane E. Eidson

EDITOR

Rick Brunk

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

Jennifer Morgan

COMMANDANT

Brigadier General Anthony C. Funkhouser

Volume 44 PB 5-14-1 Headquarters, Department of the Army January–April 2014

NGINEE

U.S. ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

January–April 2014 Engineer 1

Front and back covers: U.S. Army photos

FEATURES

07 Strategic Landpower for the Company Commander: Leading 

the U.S. Army Into the 21st Century

By General Robert W. Cone

11 Engineer Company Commanders and Strategic Landpower

By Captain Loren C. Baldwin

14 Net Zero for Training Through Construction

By Colonel Adam S. Roth

17 Lessons Learned: Power and Energy Usage at Contingency 

Base Camps 

 By Mr. John L. Vavrin and Mr. William T. Brown III

22 The Engineers’ Creed: A Statement of Precision and Integrity

 By Staff Sergeant Cole A. Williams

24 Thoughts for Future BEB Commanders

 By Lieutenant Colonel Larry F. Dillard, Jr.

28 Engineer School Environmental Training: Value Added for

the Engineer Regiment

By Mr. Albert M. Vargesko

30 Careful Cleanup: USACE Removes World War I Era Munitions

 By Ms. Brenda M. Barber, Mr. Clem Gaines, and Ms. Andrea 

M. Takash

32 Joint Service Bridge Exercise

By First Lieutenant Michael C. Crimmins

34 Incorporating the Five Breaching Tenets

By Lieutenant Colonel Gerald S. Law

39 Explosive Hazards Team: Final Chapter

By Major Glen A. MacDonald, Captain Vincent T. Ramos, and 

First Lieutenant Kathleen L. Rose

42 Closing FOBs in Afghanistan

By Major Brian D. Sawser

47 Applying Gap-Crossing Fundamentals to Joint Operations:

Enduring Bridging Solutions By, With, and Through Afghan

Partners

By Captain Dane M. Hanson

51 Educating Geospatial Engineers for Tactical Operations

By Lieutenant Colonel Jared L. Ware
2 Engineer January–April 2014

 

Clear the Way

Brigadier General Anthony C. Funkhouser 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

Happy New Year! I hope that everyone had a safe and enjoyable holiday season with their Families or, 

if deployed, that you were able to phone 

Family and friends. After 4 months in the 

position of commandant, I can honestly 

say that the Regiment is off and running 

in this new year and that there is a lot 

going on across the force. I used the recent 

Fall 2013 Engineer Regimental Command Council to update the field on our 

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) efforts for Army 

2020. If you were not able to participate, 

you can find the transcripts and slides on 

the Engineer School Knowledge Network, Fort Leonard 

Wood Web site, <http://www.wood.army.mil/usaes/>. 

In this issue of Engineer, I want to focus on a topic that 

has been the centerpiece at recent warfighter, maneuver, and Association of the U.S. Army conferences. If you 

have heard General Robert W. Cone, commander of U.S. 

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), speak 

recently, you may have heard him talking about the Army’s 

focus on strategic landpower and its relevance to the world 

in which we live. If not, I want to ensure that you are aware 

of what our senior leaders are discussing and what it means 

to our Regiment. Landpower is defined by Army Doctrine 

Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, as the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to 

gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and 

people.1

 General Cone said, “There are times in our Nation’s 

interest where boots on the ground are absolutely essential 

to those outcomes.”2

 There are many outside the Army and 

U.S. Marine Corps who believe that wars can potentially be 

decided through technology without involving land forces. 

U.S. Marine General James N. Mattis has said, “The enduring nature of war as a human endeavor will remain largely 

unchanged.”3

Historically, we have seen that it takes Soldiers and 

Marines engaged on the ground with an understanding of 

the human dimension to affect the will 

of the enemy and the affected population. We have repeatedly learned the 

benefit of understanding the region, culture, language, beliefs, and the human 

network, which all contribute to building relationships and trust. This on-theground understanding has a long-term, 

direct relationship to our potential success. General Cone also said, “Working on 

strategies like regionally aligned forces 

will be what young Soldiers and leaders 

do to maintain their wartime intellectual 

acuity and their desire to be engaged 

when they are back on U.S. soil. Our 

young generation is used to solving realworld problems. They are not interested in coming back to a 

training environment that washes away all that complexity 

and focuses on a handful of tasks.”4

 Please take the time to 

read General Cone’s article in this issue of Engineer (see 

page 7). 

Our emphasis in TRADOC and within the Engineer Regiment is on developing young leaders and ensuring that we 

accentuate the importance of continued leadership development and the capabilities that good leaders bring to their 

units. I have heard Army Chief of Staff General Raymond 

T. Odierno stress the importance of leader development 

often, saying that it is one of his top priorities and the greatest asymmetric advantage our Army brings to the fight. He 

wants to return the combat training centers as venues for 

leader development as opposed to a resource that has been 

focused on generating unit readiness to support Army force 

generation requirements. Our very own Chief of Engineers, 

Lieutenant General Thomas P. Bostick, also sees building 

professionals and proactively managing our most talented 

leaders as a top priority. Within the Regiment, we are ready 

to launch a credentialing program for our noncommissioned 

officers, warrant officers, and commissioned officers. We are 

proactively informing our best officers of opportunities to 

expand their skills via the Army’s advanced civil schooling, training with industry, and broadening programs. 

“Within the Regiment, we are ready to launch a credentialing 

program for our noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, 

and commissioned officers.”
January–April 2014 Engineer 3

 

Focused talent management and leader development at all 

levels are essential during this era of resource constraints 

to ensure that our Army is postured to overcome future 

challenges.

The future force will need to prepare for a wide range of 

capabilities, to include decisive action, stability operations, 

and domestic response. Our armor and Stryker forces will 

need to think of themselves as more expeditionary—deploying on short notice, building a lodgment from scratch, and 

expanding and moving out for decisive operations. We will 

have to execute all this with a fiscally constrained budget 

in the field and in the schoolhouse. We are looking at ways 

to prepare the Regiment and our leaders for the future. 

In the operational Army, across the Regular Army and 

the Army National Guard, we are transitioning the Engineer Regiment through brigade engineer battalions (BEBs) 

inside the brigade combat teams (BCTs). The personnel, 

organization, and materiel efforts are moving forward. But 

now we are looking at retraining the force with updated 

doctrine, updated battle drills, and reeducation on the 

role of the task force engineer. BEB commanders have 

an increased responsibility to the BCT with the military 

intelligence company; the signal company; and the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance 

platoon (and the antitank company in the Stryker BCT). 

We’ve started to address some of the additional training 

requirements in our precommand course and will continue 

to improve our partnership with these other branches. 

Major General Leslie C. Smith, Maneuver Support Center 

of Excellence commanding general, and I recently sent out 

a BEB Executive Summary to educate the Army’s senior 

leaders on the BEB and its capabilities.5

 The feedback 

was very positive and appreciated as our Army prepares 

to refocus on decisive actions to dominate in unified land 

operations. As I noted during the Regimental Command 

Council, the Army is excited about the BEB and it’s our job 

to execute violently and implement this change as quickly 

and professionally as possible. 

In the institution, we will publish the new Field Manual 

3-34, Engineer Operations,

6

 and ensure that the doctrine is 

disseminated in the classroom and throughout the Army. 

I am convinced that our boxtop provides us with a clear 

and relevant doctrinal framework and that the four lines 

of engineer support are in synch with the strategic landpower construct. We are focusing on being more adaptive 

as a school and are linking in our Directorate of Training 

and Leader Development with the combat training centers and the centers of excellence to ensure that we are 

teaching the most current doctrine, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. 

General Cone views the importance of individual Soldier 

preparedness, coupled with leader development, as critical 

to the overall success of our organizations. Our Soldiers on 

the ground need to be able to use all of the organization’s 

capabilities to meet mission requirements. We are working 

to educate and train in support of the strategic landpower 

effort to ensure that, as General Cone said, “We are the 

best Army in the world, and when you put people on the 

ground somewhere, they need to be prepared.”7

The Regiment is here to prepare you and your units 

in this time of transition. We are doing our part; now we 

need our junior and senior leaders to take advantage of the 

opportunities we are providing so that they can be problem 

solvers and also leaders of strategic landpower.

As I close this column, I want to recognize the loss of 

four giants of our Regiment who have recently passed 

away. Lieutenant General Elvin R. Heiberg III, Lieutenant General John (Jack) W. Morris II, Command Sergeant 

Major Micheal L. Buxbaum, and Command Sergeant Major 

Arthur L. Laughlin. These leaders all had significant 

impacts on our Regiment and the Army. This year, our 

Army theme is America’s Army—Our Profession “Stand 

Strong,” and it is important that we remember their contributions to our profession as we soldier on in their absence. 

We plan to have a tribute to these gentlemen at our annual 

Engineer Week in April. 

Essayons!

Endnotes:

1

ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2013.

2

Nicole Randall, “Strategic Landpower Must Remain 

Focus,” 18 September 2013, <http://www.army.mil

/article/111590/Strategic_landpower_must_remain

_focus/>, accessed on 17 January 2014.

3

James N. Mattis, “Address to House Armed Services 

Committee, Washington, D.C., 18 March 2009.

4

Nicole Randall, “Strategic Landpower Must Remain 

Focus for Army,” 11 September 2013, <http://www.army

.mil/article/111125/Strategic_Landpower_must_remain

_focus_for_Army/>, accessed on 17 January 2014.

5

“BEB Executive Summary,” 3 October 2013, <https://

www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/41366026>, accessed on

22 January 2014.

6

Field Manual 3-34, Engineer Operations, 4 August 

2011.

7

Nicole Randall, “Strategic Landpower Must Remain 

Focus for Army,” 11 September 2013.
4 Engineer

 

Lead the Way

Command Sergeant Major Butler J. Kendrick, Jr. 

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

January–April 2014

(Continued on page 6)

Greetings to the best regiment in 

the U. S. Army as we continue to 

be Engineer Strong. The last few 

months of 2013 definitely provided the 

Army with multiple challenges and uncertainty about our forces: How many Soldiers 

will be cut, how many will remain, and what 

opportunities will we have in the future?

The 1st Engineer Brigade consistently 

leads the Army as the predominant force 

for training. On average, the brigade trains 

more than 2,000 Soldiers at Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri, every week, including 

commissioned officers, warrant officers, 

NCOs, Soldiers in training, counter explosive hazards classes, and Sapper Leader 

Course attendees. Despite the hectic schedule, the organization still finds the time, personnel, and 

resources to conduct training outside Fort Leonard Wood. 

The Urban Master Breacher Course mobile training team 

from the 35th Engineer Battalion is training Soldiers from 

the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the 27th 

Engineer Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. We continue to receive excellent feedback on the training.

Due to budget constraints, I have not been able to visit 

as many units as I’d like, but what a great visit the commandant, Brigadier General Anthony C. Funkhouser, 

and I had as we spent time with the Sapper Eagles of the 

326th Engineer Battalion (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky. Transitioning to the recently implemented brigade engineer battalion (BEB), newly assigned Screaming 

Eagles conducted a patch ceremony for their former—but 

now new—101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) patch. 

The morning started with an awesome session of Sapper 

athlete warrior physical training. The event featured fantastic team building and strenuous effort displayed by all 

levels of leadership. The day finished with an address to 

the outstanding officers and NCOs of the battalion.

It was my great pleasure to visit the U.S. Army Human 

Resources Command and discuss key issues about the 

manning of the BEB and other key components of the 

Regiment with the engineer team. While at Fort Knox, 

Kentucky, I visited the Soldiers of the 19th Engineer (Seahorse) Battalion during their deployment ceremony. It was 

great to see the activation of the 42d Engineer Company 

and the casing of the battalion colors. The 19th Engineer 

Battalion has always enjoyed tremendous support from its 

veteran population—old and new, near and far—and this 

extraordinary ceremony was no exception. Well done, 

Seahorse Battalion.

“The military organization we know 

today as the National Guard came into 

existence with a direct declaration on 

December 13, 1636. On this date, the 

Massachusetts General Court in Salem, 

for the first time in the history of the 

North American continent, established 

that all able-bodied men between the 

ages of 16 and 60 were required to join 

the militia. The North, South, and East 

Regiments were established.”1

The Army National Guard celebrated its 377th birthday on 13 December 2013. Best wishes to the great 

National Guard portion of the Engineer Regiment.

The BEB is off to a great start, and the engineer leadership is embracing change as it comes. The BEB continues 

to be the main effort for the Regiment. As of now, the plan 

is to stand up 13 BEBs in 2014 and 19 in 2015. The following four Regular Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and 

their respective BEBs will activate in October 2014:

■ 91st BEB, 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry Division.

■ 3d BEB, 3d BCT, 1st Cavalry Division.

■ 127th BEB, 1st BCT, 82d Airborne Division.

■ 37th BEB, 2d BCT, 82d Airborne Division.

The Army National Guard BEB implementation will 

occur from fiscal year 2014 to 2018. The U.S. Army Engineer School is working closely with the National Guard 

Bureau to identify key lessons as the Regular Army BCTs 

restructure so that the lessons can be applied to the Army 

National Guard BCTs. 

With the great depth and history of our Regiment, it 

is inevitable that many of our greatest will depart before 

we are ready to see them go. I am saddened by the loss 

of some great Soldiers who have eternally departed our 

formation, and I would feel remorse if I did not take the 

time to mention these great heroes that we have lost. The 

Regiment should take the time to salute and recognize the 

significant contributions by, and the loss of, the following

legendary leaders:

■ Lieutenant General (Retired) John “Jack” W. Morris II, 

91, 44th Chief of Engineers, died 20 August 2013.

■ Lieutenant General (Retired) Elvin R. Heiberg III, 81, 

46th Chief of Engineers, died 27 September 2013.
January–April 2014 Engineer 5

Chief Warrant Officer Five Scott R. Owens

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer 

Show the Way 

There is an old Chinese curse that 

says, “May you live in interesting 

times.” The times we are living in 

now certainly are interesting, but I believe 

that with turmoil also comes opportunity. 

The drastically shrinking defense budget 

is impacting every aspect of our operations and I’m sure this is causing many of 

you to wonder about the future. Without a 

doubt, the next few years will be challenging, but engineers are experts at assessing and overcoming obstacles. We will 

meet these challenges and help shape the 

terrain of the future just as we shape the 

terrain on the battlefield. Engineer warrant officers, with their years of technical 

expertise and tactical experience, will be 

there to advise commanders, contribute to the mission, and 

be the trainers and systems integrators of emerging technologies and equipment. 

As I write this, we have just concluded the Fall 2013 

Engineer Regimental Command Council, but you will be 

reading this as ENFORCE 2014 is kicking off. Budgetary 

problems caused us to adapt and modify the venue of the 

council to a virtual conference via Defense Connect Online 

(DCO). ENFORCE will also be scaled down using a DCO 

component so that we can conduct dialogue with the field. 

This is a good news–bad news story: the good news is that 

we were able to get information out to the field; the bad news 

is that we were not able to conduct face-to-face dialogue, 

which is essential for ensuring that the message relays the 

correct context and enables understanding. Nothing beats 

looking someone in the eye while exchanging ideas, because 

you can get immediate feedback on whether your message 

is getting across. For ENFORCE, I challenge you to take 

this as an opportunity to engage via the alternate methods 

we will set in place: DCO, teleconferences, video teleconferences, Engineer School Knowledge Network, milSuite, and 

others. Thoroughly ingest the read-ahead materials, listen 

to the conversations and presentations, and follow up with 

us at the U.S. Army Engineer School so that we can hear 

your ideas and gain your insights. Your input serves as an 

azimuth check for our long-range planning.

So what does the future hold for engineer warrant officers? How will the drawdown affect us? Again, this is a good 

news–bad news story. Since we are currently understrength 

in both warrant officer military occupational specialties, 

engineer warrant officers will be at 

about 100 percent when the initial Army 

end strength targets are achieved. Additionally, the Department of the Army 

is adjusting annual accession targets 

slightly downward so that we do not 

create too many warrant officers and 

place them at risk in the future. That’s 

the good news. The bad news is that 

as the Army shrinks, so will our feeder 

enlisted accession pool, which will make 

it that much harder to reach our accession goals. Initially, this will be a benefit because as quality noncommissioned 

officers find that their reenlistment 

options are limited, many of them will 

consider applying to be warrant officers. 

But once the turmoil has settled and the Army end strength 

reaches equilibrium, the ratio of the enlisted feeder pool 

to warrant officer accession requirements may be insufficient to reach our targets. We will have to monitor the 

trends closely and develop a plan to deal with that when 

the time comes. This is just one of the things that I think 

about when I wake up in the middle of the night! 

To navigate through this time of change, you should 

study the terrain. By that, I mean read emerging doctrine, 

keep abreast of current events, and participate in milSuite 

discussions and other venues of intellectual exchange. Periodically check the Engineer Warrant Officer MilBook sites 

at <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/senior-engineer

-warrant-officer-group> and <https://www.milsuite.mil

/book/groups/125d-geospatial-engineering-technician>. 

Along with that, continue to self-develop. Further your 

military and civilian education, seek broadening assignments, integrate yourselves into your unit staff processes, 

advertise your capabilities and, most of all, do not confuse 

being the quiet professional with being the silent professional. Your commander or supervisor relies on you to 

understand your unit mission and interject your counsel 

where appropriate. So be visible, be vocal, and be flexible. 

As my first warrant officer mentor, retired Chief Warrant 

Officer Three Fred Pessaro told me years ago, “Flexibility 

equals survivability.” None of this is new, and most of you 

have mastered these traits already—that is also part of the 

good news story. 

Finally, since the next promotion board for chief warrant officers three, four, and five will be held shortly after 
6 Engineer January–April 2014

■ Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Micheal L. Buxbaum,

53, 10th Command Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, died 9 November 2013.

■ Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Arthur L. Laughlin, 

62, 11th Regimental Command Sergeant Major, died

11 October 2013.

As I conclude my comments to the Engineer Family, 

I would ask that you consider the following thought: As 

a Soldier, I have no doubt that we can conquer every foe 

we are facing, but I would remind you that we are never 

very good at predicting the future—as we discovered on 

11 September 2001. Most of the time, we don’t choose our 

adversary; but every time, we can choose our response. 

The same applies to our everyday life. Regardless of the 

circumstances you find yourself in, please respond in a positive manner in all your actions. It speaks volumes about 

who you are as an American, a Soldier, and an engineer. 

Thank you to all the Soldiers, Families, and Civilians for 

your service, commitment, and dedication to the Regiment, 

the U.S. Army, and the greatest country in the world. Stay 

Engineer Strong.

Endnote:

1Bill Boehm, “Born From Humble Beginnings, the 

National Guard Celebrates Its 376th Birthday,” <http://

www.nationalguard.mil/features/birth_2012/index.html>,

accessed on 21 November 2013.

(“Lead the Way,” continued from page 4)

ENFORCE, I would like to leave you with observations and 

feedback I received from an engineer colonel who served on 

the last promotion board. He noticed that many of our engineer warrant officer records were not as strong as those in 

several other branches. Some of the shortcomings were in 

the following areas:

■ Ratings and rating schemes, with raters and senior raters

not senior enough in rank. 

■ Civilian education, with many chief warrant officers 

three and four from other branches (including aviation

and special operations) holding master’s degrees.

■ A general lack of visibility at higher staff levels, resulting in warrant officers from other branches (especially 

field artillery targeting technicians) getting higher

ratings. 

The bottom line is that your Officer Evaluation Report1

 is 

the single most important factor in your file as you compete 

against warrant officers from all other branches except aviation. You need to ensure that you demonstrate how important your capabilities are to the mission and that your senior 

rater knows the full scope of your contributions so that you 

get due credit for your performance. It’s not enough to be a 

quiet professional—you need to be visible and vocal so that 

your leaders recognize you for the professional and unquestionable expert that you are. Until we meet again, stay safe. 

Essayons!

Endnote:

1

Department of the Army Form 67-9, Officer Evaluation 

Report, 1 October 2011.
January–April 2014 Engineer 7

I

n Iraq and Afghanistan, a generation of officers grew up solving 

strategic dilemmas at the company 

and platoon levels. Well versed in the 

requirements and responsibilities of 

an Army at war, this generation must 

guide the Army into an ever-evolving 

and uncertain future. In order to navigate through the complexities in front of 

us, the Army needs capable, adaptable 

leaders—now more than ever—who 

champion the Army’s strategic purpose 

and goals. With that, one of the most 

important discussions over the next few 

years will be how company commanders 

understand and implement the Army’s 

central role in strategic landpower.

Over the last 2 years, the Army has 

put a lot of great people to work examining every facet of our training, doctrine, and warfighting capability. We 

did not do this to examine where we 

stand today. Rather, all of this effort was aimed at figuring 

out two things—what kind of Army we will need to meet 

future challenges and what we have to do to build that Army 

even as we continue fighting in Afghanistan and remain 

engaged throughout the world. Much of what we concluded 

is available in a single brief document—U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-0, The U.S. 

Army Capstone Concept.

1

 If you have 

not read it yet, please do so.

I won’t summarize an already brief 

document in this article. Instead, I will 

discuss how the newest and most vital 

ideas relate to the execution level—the 

company. While things have been written about strategic maneuver, nothing 

has been written about its application 

at the tactical level. Although some 

ideas may be new, much of what must 

be done remains the same—training, 

standards, and the understanding 

of the human environment. This is a 

result of the unchanging character of 

the Army’s basic strategic problem and 

mission. As in prior eras, as part of the 

joint force, our Army must retain its 

ability to protect U.S. national interests, execute any mission assigned to 

us, and win on any battlefield around the world. 

Given our national strategy, we are required to field an 

Army capable of waging war decisively. Fielding a ready 

and responsive force with sufficient depth and resilience 

to wage sustained land combat is central to our mission, 

and that force must be able to conduct both combined arms 

General Robert W. Cone

Commanding General, U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command
8 Engineer January–April 2014

maneuver and wide area security. A ready, robust, responsive force deters adversaries, reassures allies and, when 

necessary, compels our enemies to change their behavior. 

Maintaining such a force requires high levels of adaptability throughout each echelon of the Army. Only Soldiers 

with tactical skill and operational flexibility can effectively 

respond to changing tactical situations in support of our 

Nation’s strategic goals and interests.

This is where company commanders fit into the concept 

of strategic landpower. Much like company grade officers 

did in Iraq and Afghanistan, the company commander of 

the future must be mentally agile enough to thrive within 

the parameters of mission command. Developing leaders 

who can do so, while providing clear task and purpose to 

their subordinates, will be critical to the success of any mission across the range of military operations. Effective Army 

commanders, including those at the company level, do not 

use fiscal constraints as an excuse for failing to develop 

the best possible mix of training, equipment, and regional 

expertise they can within their formations. Rather, they 

motivate their people and guide their units in a way that 

makes optimal use of available resources to create adaptive, 

effective forces.

Our Army has three primary and interconnected roles—

prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and 

win the Nation’s wars. The company commander has important responsibilities in each of these.

Prevent Conflict

I

t is prudent here to define what a conflict is. Since the 

term gets thrown around a lot and attached to a lot of 

different situations, it is easy to misunderstand the 

doctrinal meaning. Conflict is an armed struggle or clash 

between organized groups within a nation or between nations 

in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. 

Irregular forces frequently make up the majority of enemy 

combatants we face now and may continue to do so in the 

future. Conflict is often protracted, geographically confined, 

and constrained in the level of violence. 

Each one also holds the potential to escalate into major combat operations.

Many of the contingencies to which the 

United States responded militarily in the 

past 50 years have been appropriately 

defined as conflicts. The same can reasonably be expected in the future, but with 

the addition of cyberspace.

As was true during the Cold War, many 

of our greatest successes in the future 

will not occur on the battlefield; rather, 

maintaining peace may be our greatest 

achievement. This will be no easy task as 

global tensions and instability increase in 

ungoverned or weakly governed spaces 

around the world. History has taught us 

that without a capable, highly trained 

land force, the United States has little influence in many of 

those spaces. That land force, our Army, must remain the 

best equipped, best trained, and most combat-ready force in 

the world if it is to have the strategic effect we seek. That 

readiness is built from the bottom up. 

This is the first critical point where company commanders must help shape the future. As owners of the training 

schedule, commanders have a critical role in developing 

team, squad, and platoon skills. Commanders ensure that 

broadening training—like language, geographical, and 

cultural familiarization—is done effectively, in a rigorous 

manner. Soldiers from the generation that fought in Iraq 

and Afghanistan will not be satisfied with training that is 

focused on artificial scenarios and made-up adversaries, 

so their commanders need to be innovative about preparing well-coordinated, realistic training. Subordinates must 

be challenged, and they have to feel that their challenges 

have a direct link to future operations. In order not to lose

12 years of combat-proven leader development, company 

grade officers must find a balance between building an Army 

prepared for the range of military operations and succumbing to pressure to “get back to the way it used to be.” 

Unfortunately, the possession of such a trained and 

ready force is useless if it cannot affect regions where 

trouble is brewing. As units reposition from overseas bases 

and return to the United States, it becomes more crucial 

than ever for the Army to adopt an expeditionary mindset and improve its expeditionary capability. To do so, the 

Army is aligning units to specific geographical regions and 

arranging them into scalable and tailored expeditionary 

force packages that meet the needs of the joint force commander across the range of military operations. In short, 

our Army will be better postured to generate strategic influence anywhere in the world and, as part of the joint force, 

to deter aggression. 

In this construct, company commanders must conduct 

operational environment training specific to their region. 

Becoming familiar with the people, cultures, and languages 

A team leader from the 370th Engineer Company, 54th Engineer Battalion, 

prepares the initiator for an explosive charge while other members of his 

team pull security during military operations on urbanized terrain training.
Engineer 9

of the region in which one’s unit will operate is 

critical to the success of a continental U.S.-based 

Army. Conventional-force companies learned much 

over the past 12 years as they executed missions 

historically reserved for special forces. War is fundamentally a human endeavor, and understanding 

the people involved is critically important. Company commanders cannot now ignore the hardwon lessons of their predecessors by ignoring one 

of the special forces’ key tasks of understanding 

the operational environment. Those who meet this 

intent and enforce standards during this training 

will ensure that we pay those lessons forward to the 

next generation.

Shape the Operational Environment 

During peacetime, the Army is continuously 

engaged in shaping the global environment 

to promote stability and partner nation capabilities. 

We do this for several reasons—the most important of which 

is maintaining peace in pursuance of American national 

security interests. Where conflict has already broken out, 

engagement helps keep it contained and may even lead to 

a peaceful resolution. By helping to build partner capacity and trust, forward-engaged Army units greatly add to 

regional and global stability. Moreover, by building strong 

relationships of mutual trust, we facilitate access and set 

the conditions for success in any future combined operation 

in a particular region or country.

But what are shaping operations, and how are they 

executed at the company level? Shaping operations are 

defined as those operations, occurring at any echelon, that 

create or preserve conditions for the success of the decisive 

operation. Thus, engagement by regionally aligned forces 

positively shapes the environment in which the Army operates throughout the range of military operations. This 

aligns with the notion of the “strategic corporal,” which 

recognizes that in the information age, the actions of 

individuals and small groups can have widespread impact 

well beyond what was intended at the time. Every action 

has a reaction, and it is necessary for junior officers to be 

aware of the role their Soldiers and units play in the overall strategic goals of our Nation.

As part of regionally aligned shaping operations, the 

Army will employ a careful mix of rotational and forwarddeployed forces, develop relationships with foreign militaries, and conduct recurring training exercises with foreign 

partners to demonstrate the Nation’s enduring commitment 

to allies and friends. Where we share mutually beneficial 

interests with an ally, the Army enhances that partner’s 

self-defense capacity and improves its ability to serve as a 

capable member of a future military coalition. More-capable 

allies generate a stabilizing influence in their regions, tending to reduce the need for American military interventions 

over time.

Shaping operations do not end with planned training 

engagements by forward-deployed units. Other actions that 

the units, or even small groups of individual Soldiers, take 

can have a shaping effect. Those actions will run the 

gamut from brigade- or division-size assistance after a 

natural disaster, to a single act of kindness to a foreign 

student in an Army school who later rises to high levels 

in his nation’s armed forces. All of the specific activities that we conduct which have a shaping effect should 

convey to our intended audiences the clear message 

that, while we are committed to peace, our Nation protects its friends and defends its interests. Instilling this 

understanding among our Soldiers and junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is one of the vital roles that 

company grade officers play in the execution of strategic 

landpower. 

But there is a caveat. What may be the standard 

for us is not necessarily useful or welcome with our 

host nation partners. So, shaping also entails tailoring our delivery of security assistance to our counterparts in ways appropriate for their culture and military capabilities. Company commanders can gain great 

A U.S. Army engineer speaks with soldiers from the 33d Light 

Infantry Battalion, Republic of Georgia.

A Soldier with the 591st Engineer Company provides overwatch security for U.S. Air Force explosive ordnance disposal 

personnel outside an Afghan Border Police checkpoint.

January–April 2014
10 Engineer January–April 2014

success here by applying key interpersonal skills to know 

and understand officers, NCOs, and soldiers from other 

armies and to be humble when dealing with them.

Win the Nation’s Wars 

Despite our best efforts to shape a stable global environment and prevent conflict, violence is likely to 

remain endemic to the human condition. It has been 

said that “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”2

 While 

we do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of war, 

we must ensure that there never will be a day when the 

U.S. Army is not ready to fight and win wars in defense of 

our Nation.

What is a war? Historically, war has been defined as a 

conflict carried out by force of arms, either between nations 

or between parties within a nation. However, as we consider hostile acts in cyberspace, the definitions of war and 

acts of war will continue to evolve. For example, large-scale 

cyberattacks against government operations or critical 

infrastructure—such as those in the 2008 Russian-Georgian 

conflict—can reasonably be considered acts of war. Leveraging the technological savvy of today’s Soldiers requires that 

leaders have an engaged interest in their development. This 

will require junior leaders from the same generation who 

are as adept at leader development as they are technologically competent.

To defend our Nation, the Army must maintain the capacity to conduct strategically decisive land operations anywhere 

in the world. Though we will always conduct such operations 

as part of a joint force, we also acknowledge that war is a 

clash of wills that requires the ethical application of violence 

to compel change in human behavior. Here, company commanders make a dramatic contribution to the application of 

strategic landpower by being tactically and technically proficient in the execution of combined arms maneuver and wide 

area security. Without successful tactical execution, the best 

strategic concepts are doomed to failure. 

The U.S. Army capstone concept lays out the details of 

what capabilities the Army must sustain and provides some 

guidance on how the force may be employed in the future. 

But it all boils down to one crucial point: An Army that cannot win on the battlefield is of little worth to the security 

of the Nation. As everyone is aware, we are facing austere 

times ahead. This fiscal reality cannot be an excuse for not 

doing our duty or losing sight of our purpose. In the final 

analysis, this country will one day—maybe soon—ask us 

to deploy to some distant land, close with and destroy an 

enemy, and then build a secure and lasting peace. Our 

Army is uniquely qualified to ensure the training necessary to make those things happen, thanks to the strength 

of our NCO Corps. Commanders must leverage the experience of their senior NCOs and find creative ways to properly 

train the fundamentals despite resource constraints. We’ve 

successfully done it before in our Army, and we are counting 

on our young leaders to do it again. 

Conclusion

I

t was often platoon and company leaders who took the 

lead in solving strategic issues in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will continue to be platoon and company leaders 

who keep the Army the well-trained and globally responsive force that our Nation needs to deter our adversaries, 

protect our friends, and defeat our enemies in the 21st century. The U.S. Army must have company commanders who 

understand strategic landpower and their role in it. Seek 

out opportunities to ingrain your training events within 

the framework of strategic landpower. Write articles for 

your branch professional bulletin, discussing the impacts 

of strategic landpower for your specialty. You can find the 

strategic landpower white paper on the TRADOC Web site 

at <http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/Strategic

-Landpower-White-Paper-06MAY2013.pdf>3

 and on company commander discussion forums. This white paper is the 

primary reference for strategic landpower concepts and the 

one jointly approved by the Army Chief of Staff, the Marine 

Corps Commandant, and the commander of U.S. Special 

Operations Command.

It is the responsibility of senior Army leaders to set the 

conditions to make you and our Army successful. Your 

senior leaders appreciate what you do every day. These will 

be challenging, but exciting times; and I thank you for your 

service and sacrifice as we move toward making the Army of 

2020 and beyond the best in the world.

Acknowledgement: Captain Jon D. Mohundro, Commander’s Planning Group, TRADOC, contributed to the 

development of this article.

Endnotes:

1

TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept, 19 December 2012, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil

/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf>, accessed on 29 January 2014.

2

Although this quote is widely attributed to the Greek 

philosopher Plato, the source has never been definitively 

confirmed. 

3“Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills,” 

Strategic Landpower Task Force, <http://www.arcic.army

.mil/app_Documents/Strategic-Landpower-White-Paper

-06MAY2013.pdf>, accessed on 29 January 2014.

“While we do everything possible 

to prevent the outbreak of war, 

we must ensure that there never 

will be a day when the U.S. Army 

is not ready to fight and win 

wars in defense of our Nation.”
January–April 2014 Engineer 11

Army engineers are renowned for their resourcefulness and ability to make things happen. It is a hall-.mark of who they are and what they do. This reputation doesn’t happen by chance; it comes through executing 

tough, realistic training; critically thinking through challenges; and understanding and appreciating the impact that 

our efforts will have on echelons above our own. Throughout history and in our current operating environment, engineers have been at the forefront of operations. Who has been the center of gravity 

for ensuring that skill sets remain sharp, 

that engineers stand ready to deploy in 

support of the range of military operations, 

and that they retain the operational and 

institutional knowledge that has been built 

over the past 12 years of conflict? Engineer 

company commanders are pivotal in the 

Army’s ability to prevent conflict, shape 

the operational environment, and win the 

Nation’s wars.

Prevent Conflict

Commanders are ultimately responsible for the training of their formations. Commanders are the officers 

who plan and resource the training that 

they feel is necessary to accomplish their 

unit missions. However, the ability to 

train is frequently constrained by scarce 

resources in the engineer realm, especially 

in the Reserve Component. Environmental issues and the availability of land limit 

horizontal unit training when it comes to 

earthmoving, road construction, and ditch digging. Vertical 

units frequently are unable to swing hammers, lay bricks, 

string wire, or sweat pipe due to a lack of funds to buy materials or perform an approved project. Mobility augmentation 

companies are part of combined arms maneuvers, yet find it 

difficult to practice their tasks if they do not have combined 

arms units to work with. These are real-life issues that engineer company commanders face today. 

By Captain Loren C. Baldwin

U.S. Army engineers remove a dilapidated schoolhouse window as part of 

Beyond the Horizon, an exercise that provides infrastructure renovation to 

rural areas of Central America.
12 Engineer January–April 2014

To get around these obstacles, construction commanders may elect to have their units deployed for overseas duty 

training in El Salvador, Ecuador, or Panama for exercises 

such as Nuevos Horizontes and Beyond the Horizons. These 

company level exercises give commanders the opportunity 

to execute job-specific training and create the opportunity 

to conduct the language and cultural training that are 

vital to any combat deployment. These exercises are tough; 

the Soldiers don’t deploy just to execute 

training. They go to help construct infrastructure, build or repair roads, and 

share the goodwill of the American people. By doing so, conflict prevention can 

result as a benefit from the Army’s presence. Related to this is shaping the international operational environment, which 

is achieved by building partnership 

capacity and trust. We build strong relationships with the local populace by providing them with much-needed schools, 

wells, or new roads, showing them that 

the Army is not solely for warfighting.

Shape the Operational 

Environment

Engineers help to shape the operational environment through infrastructure building and stability

operations with partner nations. These 

tasks are vital for national interests

because they allow company commanders, as representatives of the United

States, to build relationships with the 

local nationals. If, during a shura with the local imam, a 

commander learns that insurgents have placed improvised explosive devices under area overpasses, then that 

commander’s route clearance company can now assure 

mobility to the maneuver commander by successfully 

defeating those devices. In this example, the shura is a 

shaping operation as the outcome created a condition for the 

success of an operation. 

Soldiers from the 

775th Engineer 

Detachment (Well 

Drilling), drill a well 

in Dijbouti in support of Combined 

Joint Task Force–

Horn of Africa.

Soldiers with the 829th Engineer Company, along with Colombian soldiers, 

remove lumber from a construction site in Las Marias, El Salvador.
Another way engineers shape the operational environment is through training with host nation militaries. 

Throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, engineer companies have trained their host nation counterparts 

on U.S. engineer doctrine. Training foreign militaries is a 

force multiplier since it provides better-trained partners 

and helps assure our security in the region. Even when not 

forward-deployed to a theater of operations, Army engineers continue to shape the operational environment via the 

international exchange student program. Hosting officers 

from partner, allied, and coalition militaries provides us an 

opportunity to share the American perspective that we want 

to live peacefully, but will defend our national interests and 

allies if necessary.

Win the Nation’s Wars

Winning wars is the Army’s primary mission, and 

we train for it. The Engineer Regiment is the 

most diverse of all Army branches, with roles 

in the warfighting functions of movement and maneuver, 

protection, and even intelligence. Within those functions, 

engineers perform combat roles and support roles through 

horizontal, vertical, and geospatial expertise. While each 

company specializes in one of these areas, it is critical for 

the engineer company commander to understand and know 

how to employ each with respect to unified land operations. 

As recent conflicts have shown, we win wars at the company level.

It is within the strategic-operational-tactical framework 

where engineer company commanders show their understanding of how their mission most affects the mission of the 

next higher level and must communicate it to their subordinates. Many of the operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan were company-executed. Whether that mission was 

rebuilding the local market, creating a new road, or clearing 

a route, it was vital to the strategic goals of the combatant 

commander. The ability to execute missions results from 

company commanders being able to set the right conditions 

during training and knowing how to employ the talents and 

expertise of their subordinates.

Conclusion

Engineer company commanders do not have it easy 

when it comes to training their units. This is because 

of the specific mission of each company (and its components), the constraints of budget and training space available, and the need to comprehend how tactical operations 

affect strategic goals. When engineers are able to properly 

execute training, it is both technical and tactical. Understanding the role that engineers play in the joint operating environment is critical to the success of the unit and, 

in many cases, of the large-scale operation itself. Without 

this strategic perspective at the engineer company level, it 

is difficult for the Army to accomplish its mission. After all, 

we clear the way.

Captain Baldwin attends Engineer Captains Career 

Course 1-14 at the U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri. He is a graduate of the Heavy Construction 

Equipment Operators Course, the Joint Engineer Operations 

Course, and the Master Resilience Trainer Course. He holds 

a bachelor’s degree in operations management from the University of Cincinnati and is pursuing a master’s degree in 

management and leadership from Webster University.

January–April 2014 Engineer 13

Soldiers of 

the 41st Engineer Company 

provide security 

during a route 

clearance mission along the 

Konar River in 

Afghanistan.
14 Engineer January–April 2014

I

n an era of declining resources, numerous measures 

have been taken to reduce costs. These have led to a 

decrease in available training opportunities and dollars, 

with a corresponding decrease in readiness. The establishment of the U.S. Army Installation Management Command 

(IMCOM) fundamentally changed the way that U.S. Army 

installations were funded and managed, and it created a 

physical divide between engineers and the installations they 

support. Due to the demands of more than 12 years of conflict, duties such as gate guard and dining facility worker 

have been contracted, in part to free uniformed Soldiers for 

combat. These contracts, though necessary, are costly. In 

light of current fiscal realities, a process of regreening is taking place. Military police Soldiers are manning installation 

gates. Army cooks are preparing food in dining facilities. This 

article asks, “Why not do the same with our engineers, 

irrespective of component?”

Background

Our Army is a brigade combat team (BCT)-centric 

Army. BCTs are our most important platform,

serving as our “aircraft carriers.” They conduct 

training such as company and battalion task force green 

weeks that culminate in a decisive-action training environment rotation at one of the combat training centers, which 

costs roughly $23 million per rotation. The Army has spent 

an enormous amount of money to attain a certain level of 

readiness; but at the end of that pathway, all we have is 

readiness. Senior Army leaders say that we should not pay 

for readiness we will not use. In the future, if you are not performing a specific mission (especially as Operation Enduring 

Freedom winds down), then what will the Army be paying 

you to do? Engineers must also attain a level of readiness, 

but the pathway to that readiness and how we will use it are 

markedly different. That is the thrust of this article.

Net Zero for Training

When one thinks of net zero, the first images that arise 

are green roofs, motion-sensitive light switches,

rainwater reuse, and photovoltaic devices. Using 

the BCT training example above, can we not apply a net 

zero approach to engineer training that would provide readiness and a material cost savings to the U.S. government for 

operations and maintenance; sustainment, restoration, and 

modernization; minor construction; and even civil works 

projects? Perhaps we could call this Net Zero for Training. 

By Colonel Adam S. Roth

Engineers level a concrete pad while helping with construction at a training site.
January–April 2014 Engineer 15

If we assume that pay and allowances are set costs and 

examine a project that would normally cost $1 million, it 

would be reasonable to assume that direct and indirect labor 

would account for more than 70 percent of that cost, with the 

remainder attributed to materials. If an Army construction 

unit were able to accomplish that project, the results would 

include—

■ Theoretical savings of $700,000 (less travel and life support costs).

■ Increased readiness for the construction unit.

■ Cost neutrality (or savings) in unit training costs.

■ Satisfaction on the installation served. 

This approach would always raise questions about 

what the training actually accomplished, how much the 

training increased readiness, and how much it saved the

government.

Two Tribes

Within the Engineer Regiment, there exist two separate tribes that frequently spin in vastly separate orbits: the modified table of organization and 

equipment unit orbit (which centers around training, missions, and deployments) and the facilities engineering orbit 

(which centers around directorates of public works [DPWs] 

and the civil works missions of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers [USACE], where the languages spoken include 

money, contracting, and legal oversight). Net Zero for Training could serve as a bridge between these two tribes. It 

could form the basis of a mutually beneficial program to 

take the demand signals of the facilities engineering community and turn them into opportunities to improve the 

training and readiness of components on the green-suit side 

of the Engineer Regiment. My last article (“One Regiment: 

Breaking Down the Stovepipes,” Engineer)

1

 spoke to the 

potential of viewing the U.S. Army Installation Command 

as the Army’s seventh Army service component command, 

meaning that its demand signals could be filled by the 

U.S. Army Forces Command, National 

Guard Bureau, and U.S. Army Reserve 

Command, based on the training objectives of commanders. Could this be 

applicable across the entire spectrum of 

engineer requirements, leading to training and readiness opportunities and cost 

savings?

Current Practice

No doubt there are units from 

all components that interact 

with their local DPW. This 

will always be the bread and butter of 

company commanders and other leaders in the construction world. The challenges in making such opportunities 

happen are usually local in nature. Often, the problems 

relate to installation construction always taking second 

place to other missions, such as deployments, combat training center rotations, and other requirements. The sole job 

of an Air Force installation engineering unit is to provide 

support to the installation. Why does the Army see things 

so very differently? One factor may be the reluctance of 

a DPW to use troop labor due to perceived threats to the 

civilian or contractor work force. The money for critical programs has long been flatlined, but what will happen when 

those funds take a precipitous nosedive? During the past 

12 years of war, engineers have consistently practiced

the mantra of “no engineers in reserve” while deployed, 

regularly performing construction and maintenance projects efficiently. However, what happens when the engineers are back at their stateside installation is vastly different. Shouldn’t it be the same for stateside and overseas jobs?

“Hidden” Military Construction

Anew enhanced-performance round was discussed at 

a recent council-of-colonels meeting. This new ser-

.vice grade ammunition offers many environmental 

benefits, but it also has a major implication. The ricochet 

angle created by the impact of the round on a target is much 

larger than that of current ammunition, creating a safety 

concern. The challenge is that there is now an unforeseen 

military construction requirement to modify the protective 

berms at ranges to make them safe. This would be a great 

opportunity for a unit to get training in design and horizontal construction at low or even no cost to the government. In 

an era of declining resources, we need to start looking within 

and see the training opportunities that such challenges create, rather than immediately hitting our instinctive contractor button.

The Way Ahead

What is needed is a much larger approach to the 

articulation of requirements (via demand signals) and the programming of funds to complete

A Soldier uses a circular saw to cut a block for a bond beam.
16 Engineer January–April 2014

the projects that emanate from those requirements. The

following are thoughts for further consideration:

■ Explore component level discussions with IMCOM about

the risks of budget cuts and how comprehensive risk 

management strategies can be developed for operations 

and management (for demand work orders and scheduled maintenance); for sustainment, restoration, and 

modernization; and for minor construction using and 

programming contributions by the uniformed side of the 

Engineer Regiment.

■ Explore the potential of green-suit participation in civil

works and military construction projects. This doesn’t

suggest that an Army unit would construct the next

Hoover Dam. But units could participate in major civil 

works projects by simply clearing and grubbing as site

preparation (something that could be accomplished 

by sapper units with chain saws), taking part in an existing project such as routine maintenance of USACEowned levees, or performing emergency hazard mitigation during floods. A proof of principle is in the planning stages at the Folsom Dam in California, where 

there is potential for Army units to reestablish an access 

roadway and demolish an existing temporary access 

bridge as part of a much larger project. 

■ Continue the integration process of broadening and 

increasing connectivity between the tribes of the Engineer Regiment. Perhaps some IMCOM or USACE projects might interest the green-suit side of the Regiment

if they can lead to material cost savings for the government. The USACE technical-development program is 

just one point of light in this vein that allows engineer 

officers to train at a USACE district and then receive a

guaranteed seat at the Engineer Captains Career

Course. How often do we allow branch-qualified officers 

to intern with USACE or a garrison DPW before taking

their next critical career step?

■ The authoritative regulation,

Army Regulation 415-32, Engi- 

 neer Troop Unit Construction

 in Connection With Training

 Activities,

2

 was last revised on

15 April 1998. The changes

 the Army has experienced in 

 that time should feed a new

 revision that creates pathways

 rather than barriers to realiz-

 ing this concept.

■ The biggest takeaway must

 be that the potential exists for

 a change in mind-set for Net

 Zero for Training to take place.

 If this mind-set can be adop-

 ted, it will assure a higher level 

of readiness for the Engineer

Regiment and will ensure its

 indispensability to our Army

and our Nation at a time when they need us most.

Conclusion

This article is meant to stir discussion about how to 

create low- to no-cost training opportunities under 

the tight budgets of the future. It is by no means allinclusive. It is apparent that the total Engineer Regiment 

will need to bridge the gaps in funding and thinking to create 

conditions for building readiness and solving larger infrastructural challenges. Above all, we must not stop thinking 

and discussing due to retrenchment into our basic tribes. It 

will be a combination of relationships, proximity, and good 

engineer economical methods that will carry us through the 

coming era of declining resources. Net Zero for Training may 

be one way to help us get there. As always, the author welcomes vociferous debate and can be reached at <adam.roth

@us.army.mil>. 

Endnotes:

1

Adam S. Roth, “One Regiment: Breaking Down the 

Stovepipes,” Engineer, Volume 43, May–August 2013,

pp. 6–8.

2

Army Regulation 415-32, Engineer Troop Unit Construction in Connection With Training Activities, 15 April 1998.

Colonel Roth serves as the Chief of Staff (Reserve Affairs) 

at the Office of the Chief of Engineers at the Pentagon. He is 

a resident graduate of the U.S. Army War College and previously served as the Deputy Assistant Commandant (Army 

Reserve) at the U.S. Army Engineer School. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

and holds a master’s degree in mechanical engineering from 

Boston University. 

National Guard Soldiers hammer a truss into place during the construction of a 

building that will be used as living quarters for Soldiers on Forward Operating Base 

Lightning, Afghanistan. 
January–April 2014 Engineer 17

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, 

Energy, and Environment defines operational energy 

(OE) as “the energy and associated systems, information, and processes required to train, move, and sustain 

forces and systems for military operations.”1

Managing OE at contingency bases is a challenging task 

for senior commanders, base camp mayors, and their staffs. 

They must satisfy competing demands across all areas of an 

operational environment and base camp functions. Energy 

management is further complicated by the interdependency 

among power, water, wastewater, and solid waste, which 

must be handled carefully under difficult and dangerous 

conditions. Moreover, most contingency bases depend on 

lengthy, hazardous air and ground lines of communication 

in areas with unimproved ground transportation networks. 

Under certain conditions—primarily weather-related—the 

bases can only be resupplied by airdrop.

A survey developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) Engineer Research and Development Center, Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (ERDC-CERL) 

was distributed to key stakeholders, subject matter experts, 

and other USACE personnel. Information was also gathered 

from recent after action reviews, engineer initial impression reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 

Enduring Freedom, and other technical reports. The results 

led to specific recommendations for improvements to all 

facility life cycle phases and to overall OE management for 

contingency bases.

Survey respondents reiterated the long-recognized fact 

that a major inefficiency and contributor to excessive fuel 

consumption at contingency bases is a disproportionate 

use of inefficient spot generation. During the early phases 

of operations, units that initiate and develop base camps 

A mobile solar light cart provides safety and 

security at Bagram Airfield.

By Mr. John L. Vavrin and Mr. William T. Brown III
18 Engineer January–April 2014

bring with them tactical generators, their single reliable 

source of power during this phase. Unless the command can 

identify enough subject matter experts with the knowledge, 

skills, abilities, tools, and equipment to manage power, spot 

generation will continue and will even expand as the base 

camp grows and matures into a potentially enduring site. 

To compound the situation, spot generation takes away 

valuable resources, including the personnel and ancillary 

equipment required for operations, maintenance, and fuel 

delivery. These requirements, multiplied by hundreds of 

existing combat outposts and forward operating bases in a 

large, combined joint operational area, clearly illustrate the 

enormity of the issue.

Survey results indicate that USACE can improve processes and programs that deliver OE management capabilities to the warfighter by—

■ Promoting and implementing sustainability practices

across projects funded for operations and maintenance

(those costing under $750,000) and military construction

(those costing more than $750,000).

■ Providing dedicated OE subject matter experts during

the planning and design phase of construction projects.

■ Assuming proponency for U.S. Army and Department of 

Defense base camp master planning and OE management for contingency bases.

■ Improving the commissioning and/or postconstruction

verification process.

■ Providing a robust reachback capability above what is

currently offered.

■ Providing the requisite number of qualified individuals 

to conduct oversight during all phases of construction.

The Department of Defense has expended significant 

resources and made considerable progress in OE management for contingency bases, primarily through the doctrine, 

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) business process. 

The OE management of contingency bases can be further 

improved by—

■ Providing a dedicated budget to the OE managers and

staffs.

■ Incorporating a task force power and energy organization

into the theater level joint engineering directorate at the 

beginning of a campaign.

■ Scaling the size (not the functions), based on current and

anticipated future theater requirements.

■ Developing and implementing an energy conservation/

awareness program for officers and enlisted professional

military education and predeployment training.

■ Offering incentives to the Logistics Civil Augmentation

Program or other contractors to propose and implement

energy- and water-saving projects, essentially making it

a type of performance contract program for energy

savings.

■ Investing in power distribution training.

■ Developing and improving an OE reporting process at all

command levels within an operational area.

Survey respondents also indicated that one of the

successful initiatives at the outlying locations for OE energy 

management for contingency bases in Afghanistan occurred 

during Operation Dynamo, in which tactical, quiet generators were replaced with tactical power distribution equipment and improved generators and environmental control 

A 46-megawatt central power plant and fuel storage tanks light up Bagram Airfield.
January–April 2014 Engineer 19

units. During this operation, energy-inefficient facilities and 

tents were also replaced.

In addition, the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force initiated the Energy to the Edge Program, which deployed alternative and renewable energy systems to remote sites. They 

provided photovoltaic and energy storage systems, conducted 

energy assessments at combat outposts, and optimized their 

power systems. The Project Manager–Force Sustainment 

Systems also provided advanced energy-efficient systems 

with improved tent liners, light-emitting diode lighting, 

vestibules, solar shades, and improved environmental control units.

Survey respondents also noted that allowing senior 249th 

Prime Power Battalion noncommissioned officers, warrant 

officers, and mid-level captains to serve as OE advisors can 

pay great dividends. Military OE advisors can advise contingency base camp leaders on ways to maintain a reliable 

prime power grid; minimize spot generation; implement 

demand-reduction measures; and provide well-informed, 

energy-related information to the commander and staff to 

help them make sound decisions without reducing mission 

readiness or Soldier quality of life. They would also have the 

skills and capabilities to make necessary changes on-site 

if needed. 

A final report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction in March 20132

 addressed lessons learned 

from the Iraq reconstruction program to help improve the 

U.S. approach to future stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. The report addressed seven best practices for 

stabilization and reconstruction audit programs. The best 

practices that are relevant to OE management for contingency bases include—

■ Focus early audit attention on contracting, quality assurance, and quality control resources dedicated to programs and projects.

■ Develop a systematic approach to reporting on the sustainability of projects.

■ Develop an integrated database of contracts, grants, and

projects to keep track of procurements and deliveries.

■ Develop close working relationships with senior reconstruction managers to encourage improved program

implementation.

These best practices suggest that to ensure proper quality assurance and quality control in all phases of construction, an adequate number of qualified contracting officer 

representatives must be in place.

Base camps require large supplies of energy and clean 

water, along with an environment that has clean air and 

is largely free of disease and disease vectors. The failure 

to properly manage wastes hinders mission readiness, 

increases resource requirements, increases liabilities, and 

negatively affects the health of Soldiers and local populations (causing damage to relations with the host nation). 

Proactively addressing these requirements will allow operations to develop fully in the most effective, efficient, and sustainable manner while enabling mission accomplishment 

without sacrificing Soldier quality of life. Most importantly, 

strong OE management for contingency bases saves lives 

by—

■ Reducing the logistical footprint.

■ Denying enemy access to a critical resource.

■ Allowing commanders to shift significant fiscal resources 

to support other warfighting priorities. 

Efficient OE contingency base energy management is a 

true force multiplier.

Endnote

1“Operational Energy,” <http://www.asaie.army.mil

/Public/ES/operationalenergy.html>, accessed on 04 March 

2014.

2

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., “Learning for Iraq: A Final Report 

from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, 

Arlington, Virginia, March 2013, <http://www.sigir.mil

/learningfromiraq/>, accessed on 11 September 2013.

Mr. Vavrin is a researcher and project manager with 

ERDC-CERL in Champaign, Illinois. He is a retired Army 

engineer officer, is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, 

holds a master’s degree in mechanical engineering from 

Southern Illinois University–Carbondale, and holds a master’s degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is a registered professional engineer in Illinois.

Mr. Brown is a researcher with ERDC-CERL. He holds 

bachelor’s and master’s degrees in mechanical engineering from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State 

University.

“Proactively addressing [OE contingency base energy management] 

requirements will allow operations to develop fully in the most effective, efficient, and sustainable manner while enabling mission accomplishment without sacrificing Soldier quality of life.”
20 Engineer January–April 2014

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description 

(and Current Status)

ATP 3-34.22

(FM 3-34.22)

Feb 09

FM 3-34 Aug 11

Publication Revisions

Combat Engineering

ATP 3-34.20

(FM 3-34.210)

Explosive Hazard 

Operations

Mar 07 This is a multi-Service manual and conversion from FM 3-34.210, Explosive Hazards 

Operations, to ATP 3-34.20. 

Status: Staffing of the final draft is complete, and the final approved draft is being 

prepared. To be published 3d quarter, FY 14.

Engineer Operations—

Brigade Combat Team and 

Below

Engineer Operations 

This is a revision and conversion of Field Manual (FM) 3-34.22, Engineer Operations—

Brigade Combat Team and Below, to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-34.22. It is 

under development and will include information on the brigade engineer battalion (BEB).

Status: Anticipate the final draft to be sent for worldwide staffing 2d quarter, FY 14. To 

be published 4th quarter, FY 14.

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate 

Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division 

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update pdate

ATP 3-34.23

(ATTP 3-34.23)

Engineer Operations— 

Echelons Above Brigade 

Combat Team

Jul 10 This is a revision and conversion from Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 

3-34.23, Engineer Operations—Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team, to ATP 3-34.23. 

Status: Anticipate the final draft to be sent for worldwide staffing 2d quarter, FY 14. To be 

published 4th quarter, FY 14. 

Brigade Special Troops 

Battalion

Dec 06 This is a revision and conversion from FM 3-90.61, The Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 

to ATP 3-90.61. 

Status: Anticipate the final draft to be sent for worldwide staffing 3d quarter, FY 14. To be 

published 1st quarter, FY 15.

ATP 3-90.61

(FM 3-90.61)

This revised version contains the “box top” as our doctrinal framework; integrates the 

three engineer disciplines of combat, general, and geospatial engineering; and introduces 

the four lines of engineer support for decisive actions.

Status: The revised version has been approved by the U.S. Army Engineer School 

(USAES) commandant and is awaiting publishing at the Army Publishing Directorate 

(APD). Anticipate publication in 2d quarter, fiscal year (FY) 2014.

ATP 3-90.4

(ATTP 3-90.4)

Combined Arms Mobility

Operations

Aug 11 This is a multi-Service manual and conversion from ATTP 3-90.4, Combined Arms 

Mobility Operations, to ATP 3-90.4.

Status: Anticipate the final draft to be sent for worldwide staffing 2d quarter, FY 14. To be 

published 4th quarter, FY 14.

ATP 3-90.8

(FM 3-90)

(FM 5-102)

(FM 90-7)

Combined Arms 

Countermobility 

Operations

Jul 01 

Mar 85

Sep 94

This multi-Service manual is a full revision that consolidates FM 3-90, Tactics; FM 

5-102, Countermobility; and FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. It discusses 

countermobility and combined arms obstacle integration and their relationship to the 

combined arms defense and warfighting functions with regard to wide area security.

Status: The final draft has been approved by the USAES commandant and is now 

awaiting U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) approval. To be published 2d quarter, FY 14.

ATP 3-90.37

(FM 3-90.119)

Combined Arms 

Improvised Explosive 

Device Operations

Sep 07 This is a conversion from FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device 

Defeat Operations, to ATP 3-90.37. 

Status: Staffing of the final draft is complete, and the final approved draft is being 

prepared. To be published 3d quarter, FY 14.
January–April 2014 Engineer 21

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description 

(and Current Status)

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate 

Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division 

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update

ATP 3-34.40

(FM 3-34.400)

General Engineering Dec 08

Notes: 

1. Current engineer publications can be downloaded from the Army Publishing Directorate Web site at <http://www.apd.army.mil>. The manuals 

discussed in this article are currently under development and/or recently published. Drafts may be obtained during the staffing process by contacting the Engineer Doctrine Branch at commercial (573) 563-0003, DSN 676-0003, or <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcodddengdoc@mail 

.mil>. The development status of these manuals was current as of 5 December 2013.

2. Items in parentheses are publication numbers of current publications, which will be superseded by the new number at the top of the entry. 

Multiple numbers in parentheses indicate consolidation into one manual.

3. Currently, all 30 Army doctrine publications/Army doctrine reference publications have been published. Every Army professional should have a 

basic knowledge of our fundamental principles since they rarely change quickly. They can be downloaded from the Army Publishing Directorate 

Web site at <http://www.apd.army.mil>.

ATP 3-34.81

(FM 3-34.170)

Engineer 

Reconnaissance

Mar 08 This is a conversion from FM 3-34.170, Engineer Reconnaissance, to ATP 3-34.81.

Status: Anticipate the final draft to be sent for worldwide staffing 3d quarter, FY 14. To 

be published 1st quarter, FY 15.

Geospatial Engineering

ATP 3-34.80

(FM 3-34.230)

Geospatial Engineering Mar 08 This is a conversion from FM 3-34.230, Topographic Operations, to ATP 3-34.80. 

Status: Staffing of the final draft is complete, and the final approved draft is being 

prepared. To be published 3d quarter, FY 14.

This is a conversion from FM 3-100.4, Environmental Considerations in Military 

Operations, to ATP 3-34.5. 

Status: Staffing of the final draft is complete, and the final approved draft is being 

prepared. To be published 3d quarter, FY 14.

ATP 3-34.5

(FM 3-100.4)

Environmental 

Considerations

Feb 10

ATP 3-34.45

(FM 3-34.480)

Power Generation/ 

Distribution

Apr 07 This multi-Service manual is a conversion from FM 3-34.480, Engineer Prime Power 

Operations, to ATP 3-34.45.

Status: Anticipate the final draft to be sent for worldwide staffing 3d quarter, FY 14. To be 

published 1st quarter, FY 15.

General Engineering

“One of the best ways to keep peace is to be prepared for war.”

—George Washington

This multi-Service manual is a conversion from FM 3-34.400, General Engineering, to 

ATP 3-34.40. 

Status: Staffing of the final draft is complete, and the final approved draft is being 

prepared. To be published 3d quarter, FY 14.
22 Engineer January–April 2014

As a professional engineer, I dedicate my professional knowledge and skill to 

the advancement and betterment of human welfare.

I pledge—

■ To give the utmost of performance. 

■ To participate in none but honest enterprise. 

■ To live and work according to the laws of man and the highest standards of 

professional conduct. 

■ To place service before profit, the honor and standing of the profession before 

personal advantage, and the public welfare above all other considerations.

In humility and with need for divine guidance, I make this pledge.

I

n most professions, it is the goal of the professional to 

reach the highest level of achievement and present an 

unparalleled level of quality. During this quest, many 

morals and ethics are often overlooked. In the Army, we as 

professionals are not offered that option. This is brought to 

light when reading the Engineers’ Creed. The creed outlines a hard path for all engineers to follow. It includes the 

perfection of the craft, a pledge to deliver at the highest 

production levels, and a promise to perform at this level 

with integrity.

The creed states that an engineer dedicates his or her 

knowledge and skills to the advancement and betterment 

of human welfare. The information and skills learned from 

the grade of private all the way to general are to be used 

to benefit mankind. It relates that the mind-set of an engineer should be one of generosity. Engineers have a duty—

not only to our own, but to the whole of humanity—to create a world that is more convenient and proficient. We do 

these things with no need for recognition. Fanfare and 

The Engineers’ Creed:

A Statement of Precision and Integrity

By Staff Sergeant Cole A. Williams

celebration are by-products of our actions. If presented with 

these accolades, we accept them and carry on with the knowledge that the standard has been raised. When our actions 

are not praised, an internal review occurs to evaluate what 

can be done better the next time we are asked to assist. We 

continue to strive to be more professional and altruistic in 

each endeavor we undertake.

The second stanza relates the pledge under which all 

engineers operate. The Engineers’ Creed promises—

■ To give the utmost of performance.

■ To participate in none but honest enterprise.

■ To live and work according to the laws of man and the 

highest standards of professional conduct.

■ To place service before profit, the honor and standing

of the profession before personal advantage, and the 

public welfare above all other considerations. 
January–April 2014 Engineer 23

Simply, these promises mean that engineers will provide 

the very best at all times while maintaining a strong moral 

compass. An engineer’s business is not underhanded. The 

use of poor materials, out-of-date practices, and dishonest 

reports is not tolerated. The pride that is taken in an engineer’s performance is sizable. This is shown by the craftsmanship and attention to detail we put into the projects we 

complete. The second line stresses the importance of the way 

we work as well as the way we live. We will not only follow 

the rules while at work, but also in our personal lives. We 

are to be an all-around example, rather than simply having a specialized persona during times of review. Continuing down the list, emphasis is placed on the goodwill of the 

engineer. This is truly the most important part of the creed. 

The measure of a man is not what he has, but how much he 

can give. As engineers, we have a plethora of knowledge and 

expertise. We have a responsibility to help those who cannot 

help themselves. By choosing to do this, instead of selling 

out to the highest bidder, we set ourselves apart and hold 

each other to a higher standard than most.

The final line of the creed is an affirmation of the lines 

that precede it. The Engineers’ Creed explains that we cannot do this without the guidance of a higher power. This is 

most true. With whatever faith engineers are affiliated, one 

standard holds true—we are merely the hands of the One 

who guides humanity. We have been charged to create in an 

earthly sense. We have been given the opportunity to learn, 

design, and create works of efficiency and productivity. By 

recognizing that we could not do this without the power of a 

divine presence, we make this pledge while asking for guidance from the One who created all.

In summary, the Engineers’ Creed is not one that is followed by the weak. It takes a strong heart and a fluid mind 

to live up to every part of this creed. Professionalism, generosity, and integrity are the words that underline this text. 

As engineers, we strive to keep up these standards in everything we try to accomplish. As in everything else in life, we 

as humans are not perfect. We are not expected to adhere to 

the principles of this creed 100 percent of the time. But when 

we stumble, engineers have merely to look at this creed and 

find our way back to plumb. 

Staff Sergeant Williams is a squad leader with Charlie 

Company, 4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas. 

He wrote this article while attending the Engineer Advanced 

Leader Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Engineer Writer’ s guide ’

Engineer is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army 

engineer community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted 

Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, 

and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas 

of general interest to engineers. Articles may share good ideas and 

lessons learned or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If

they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the

text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 

words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after action type

articles and reviews of books on engineer topics are also welome.

Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate 

information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not 

embed photos in Microsoft PowerPoint® or Word®. If illustrations are 

in PowerPoint, avoid the excessive use of color and shading. Save 

digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied 

from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission (see 

our photographer’s guide at <http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag

/Photograph%20Illustration%20Guide.htm>).

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including your full name, rank, current unit, job title, and education; your mailing address; a fax number; 

and a commercial daytime telephone number.

Articles submitted to Engineer must be accompanied by a written 

release by the author’s unit or activity security manager prior to publication (see <http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/writersguide.htm>). All 

information contained in the article must be unclassified, nonsensitive, 

and releasable to the public. Engineer is distributed to military units 

worldwide and is also available for sale by the Government Printing 

Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment and foreign 

individuals and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles, photographs, or illustrations. They are accepted for publication only after 

thorough review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we 

will notify you. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes 

in your e-mail address and telephone number. All articles accepted for 

publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well 

as editing for style.

Engineer is published three times a year: April (article deadline 

1 December), August (article deadline 1 April), and December (article 

deadline 1 August). Send submissions by e-mail to <usarmy.leonard

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along with a double-spaced copy of the manuscript, to: Managing 

Editor, Engineer Professional Bulletin, 14010 MSCoE Loop, Building 

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Note: Please indicate if your manuscript is being considered for 

publication elsewhere. Due to the limited space per issue, we usually 

do not print articles that have been accepted for publication in other 

Army venues.
24 Engineer January–April 2014

The Army’s recent announcement of the conversion of 

brigade special troops battalions (BSTBs) into brigade engineer battalions (BEBs) represents a great 

opportunity for the Engineer Regiment to solidify its place 

as an essential member of the combined arms team. The 

BEB will provide brigade combat team (BCT) commanders 

with a robust set of organic combat engineer capabilities 

and adequate mission command capacity to receive additional enablers tailored for specific missions. Also, the BEB 

structure corrects some of the organizational deficiencies 

in the BSTB structure, especially the absence of a forward 

support company. Despite these improvements, BEB commanders will face many of the same challenges that BSTB 

commanders have faced in the 9 years since the Army introduced the BSTB. As a combat engineer who has commanded 

4th BSTB, 101st Airborne Division, for the past 2 years in 

training and in combat, I offer this list of my top 10 recommendations to future BEB commanders. 

1. Command the Entire Battalion

I

t is important for commanders to remember that they 

are not commanding an engineer battalion with a few 

enablers attached for administrative oversight. The 

Army has decided to entrust engineer senior leaders with 

the training, development, and operational employment of 

organic chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological; military intelligence (MI); and signal formations of the BCTs, so 

commanders must develop expertise in the capabilities and 

requirements of these units. To add to the challenge, these 

units are much more complicated to train than the engineer 

companies. In the BSTB, every platoon is unique, except for 

the two sapper platoons. The additional engineer company 

in the BEB will give the sappers even 

greater commonality and shared 

training opportunities. Moreover, 

sapper training is relatively straightforward compared to the functional 

MI, signal, and support platoons. Give 

a sapper platoon some time, a piece 

of land, and a case or two of rations 

and they can have a great training event. For example, the tactical 

unmanned aircraft system platoon 

requires all of the above, plus an airfield, aviation gas (which is likely not 

available through the brigade Class 

III commodity manager), Federal 

Aviation Administration-approved 

flight plans that are deconflicted with 

aircraft and artillery, a qualified 

instructor-operator, and more. These 

complicated operations require 

that the battalion commander and 

staff are well versed in the basics 

of each specialty platoon in the

battalion.

By Lieutenant Colonel Larry F. Dillard, Jr.

Soldiers from the 19th Engineer Battalion string concertina wire in Afghanistan.
January–April 2014 Engineer 25

My advice is to forget about the engineer companies—for 

a little while. In the new BEB structure, the commander, 

command sergeant major, and operations (S-3) officer are 

engineers. Without having a deliberate plan, the commander runs a risk of neglecting the nonengineer units in 

the battalion. Especially during the first 6 months, spend 

more time with the units you know less about. The forward 

support company, MI company, and signal companies will be 

full of smart and technically proficient Soldiers who will love 

to explain what they do. Give them the opportunity. This 

will demonstrate that you are invested in them, and it will 

be invaluable later when the brigade commander expects 

you to advise him on the capabilities and limitations of your 

logistics, MI, and signal companies. 

2. Do Not Abdicate Command to 

Brigade Staff Officers

Battalion commanders are responsible for training 

their MI and signal companies, but the functional 

experts for these formations reside in the brigade 

intelligence (S-2) and communications (S-6) shops. Consequently, there is a tendency for the companies to bypass the 

battalion and work everything directly through the brigade 

staff. While a high degree of direct coordination between 

the companies and brigade staff is necessary and desirable, 

coordination can veer into an encroachment of command 

authorities. 

The best advice on handling these relationships is to 

encourage direct coordination between the companies and 

their respective staff functional experts, but clearly establish red lines for subordinate commanders and the brigade 

staff. My experience has been that brigade staff officers are 

invaluable resources to my battalion and to me, and they 

always act with the best intentions. The following business 

rules will set conditions for productive teamwork among 

brigade, battalions, and companies: 

■ The brigade engineer, S-2, and S-6 have no tasking 

authority. All tasks should come through S-3 channels to 

the battalion, never to companies directly. It sounds obvious, but remember that the staff proponent for a maneuver element is the S-3, so it’s natural that maneuver tasks

come through the S-3. Frequently, the brigade engineer,

S-2, or S-6 has tried to task BSTB companies directly

without going through the battalion, always with good

intentions, but never with good results.

■ Brigade staff officers recommend proper employment, 

location, and command relationships for BEB enablers 

in consultation with the BEB staff, but commanders 

decide.

■ Commanders make all personnel decisions.

3. Constantly Manage Officer Talent

Typical functional battalions receive newly minted 

lieutenants and grow them into company executive 

officers and junior staff officers. They also receive 

new captains as battalion staff officers and grow them into 

company commanders. In a multifunctional battalion like 

the BSTB, most of the officers come in lateral moves from 

adjacent battalions, with engineers being the exception. Brigade commanders typically choose the best maneuver battalion S-2 to command the MI company. MI platoon leaders 

may spend their first year in the brigade as the assistant 

S-2 in a sister battalion, and signal officers follow a similar 

pattern. The result is that battalion commanders generally 

can’t grow their own leaders. 

BEB commanders should take an active interest in the 

MI Corps, Signal Corps, and Chemical Corps officers in the 

brigade. The brigade S-2 and S-6 will probably develop the 

assignment slate for the MI Corps and Signal Corps officers, 

but it is helpful for them to involve the battalion commander 

before they present the slate to the brigade commander. Rely 

on the S-2 and S-6 to help mentor and counsel these officers. 

Branch-specific, brigade officer professional development 

classes can help keep these officers connected to their craft 

and deepen the battalion commander’s understanding of 

their capabilities. 

Soldiers from the 65th 

Engineer Battalion 

clear a potential improvised explosive device 

while performing route 

clearance.
26 Engineer January–April 2014

4. Devise Inclusive Team-Building

Activities

New BEB commanders inherit the lineage and honors 

of storied engineer battalions. Respect that heritage, 

but figure out ways to celebrate the contributions 

of the rest of the team. Commanders can’t rewrite history, 

but they can alter ceremonies and traditions to make them 

inclusive. There will be a natural camaraderie among the 

engineers, born from a shared set of experiences and assignment patterns. Platoon leaders from one engineer company 

will move to be the executive officers of a sister company or 

to the battalion S-3 shop. Engineer captains on the battalion staff will move down to take command of the engineer 

companies. These patterns will stitch the engineers together 

by establishing natural lines of communication and cooperation. The same patterns do not exist with the other companies, so it takes deliberate command emphasis to build a 

cohesive team. 

Shared training, competitions, and social events are effective in building greater cohesion across the formation. When 

structuring competitions, commanders need to ensure that 

they provide every formation an opportunity to play to their 

strengths. The great diversity of the BEB companies will 

bring diverse skills. Some companies will have an advantage 

in physical activities, while others will shine in skill-based 

competitions. For example, instead of conducting a simple 

litter relay, a contest could require teams to use a radio to 

call for a medical evacuation first. Likewise, ceremonies and 

traditions can be adjusted to include the other branches. 

5. Develop Clear Command and 

Support Relationships

The adage that “good fences make good neighbors” 

could read “clearly defined command and support 

relationships make good neighbors.” In Afghanistan, my BSTB had 18 separate entities working with or for 

adjacent battalions. 

Clearly defining each 

of these relationships 

is the commander’s 

business. Staff officers 

tend to use the terms 

attached, direct support, tactical control, 

and operational control interchangeably 

and loosely. In one 

case, during battalion train-up, a draft 

brigade task organization showed half of my 

signal company was 

under the operational 

control of the brigade 

S-6. Not only is this 

doctrinally impossible, 

it is operationally problematic. I recommend that BEB commanders be personally involved in the development of the 

brigade’s task organization. Throughout our brigade’s preparation for deployment, my battalion S-3 and I routinely 

discussed task organization with the brigade engineer, S-2, 

S-3, and S-6 to ensure that subordinate units were providing proper support with the proper command/support 

relationship. 

6. Prepare to Function as an Alternate 

Brigade Command Post

Embrace nonstandard missions. Part of the beauty 

of the BSTB is its ability to cover down on nonstandard missions for the BCT commander. Because a 

significant part of the battalion is typically task-organized 

under the operational control of other battalions, the BSTB 

becomes something of an extra mission command node for 

the brigade commander. This may be slightly less true for 

the BEB than the BSTB, but the battalion still provides the 

brigade commander with a complete staff that can exercise 

mission command over missions such as base defense; area 

security; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; and training for enablers (female engagement teams, 

military working dogs). Although the BEB has the smallest battalion staff, it also has the most functionally diverse 

one. This diversity increases the ability to execute a diverse 

range of missions effectively.

7. Find Ways to Train the 

Battalion Together

The unique squads and platoons of the BSTB make 

it challenging to structure a shared training experience for the battalion for anything beyond common 

warrior tasks. In earlier engineer battalions, it was typical 

for the battalion to centrally organize and execute squad 

and platoon training lanes for each identical sapper platoon, often with a best squad/platoon designation at the end. 

Soldiers from the 65th Engineer Battalion conduct an after action review.
January–April 2014 Engineer 27

In addition to the cohesion that naturally flows from such 

events, these external evaluations provided a valuable opportunity for the commander to evaluate and coach subordinate 

leaders and certify the readiness of platoons. There are also 

efficiencies in planning, resourcing, and executing the training by running every platoon through a standard set of training lanes. Unfortunately, this is not feasible when there are

12 platoons with unique training paths.

Commanders should seek opportunities to train the battalion companies together. When our maneuver battalions 

were doing their squad and platoon live-fire exercises, the 

BSTB conducted a week-long field training exercise that 

pulled sappers; signal and human intelligence specialists; 

tactical unmanned aircraft system specialists; military 

police Soldiers; joint network node platoons; and company 

and battalion command posts into a reasonable scenario. 

On a typical day, the engineers provided route clearance 

support to a signal reconnaissance mission to determine 

a suitable location for a brigade retransmission site while 

unmanned aircraft reconnoitered known improvised explosive device engagement areas ahead of the route clearance 

patrol. Meanwhile, the signal intelligence platoon collected 

opposing-force communications intelligence to support a 

military police platoon raid. While these scenarios may 

not be completely realistic, the field training exercise gave 

each platoon the opportunity to employ its unique skills as 

an enabler supporting a maneuver element. It was a great 

training event for company and battalion command posts in 

preparation for the battalion role as an operational environment integrator in Afghanistan.

8. Train Units to Be Good Attachments

I

t is typical for the BSTB to have two- to three-Soldier 

teams operating in distant locations supporting maneuver battalions. While deployed, we had human intelligence control teams, female engagement teams, and 

joint fires observer teams (from the brigade fires section) 

operating at combat outposts and forward operating bases 

throughout two provinces in Afghanistan, frequently with 

no other BSTB element at their location. The units that 

BEB platoons support will generally be unfamiliar with 

the capabilities and support requirements of your specialty 

teams. To address this challenge, we developed a standardized enabler in-brief to inform the supported unit about 

the capabilities and support requirements for our supporting teams. We trained junior noncommissioned officers to 

present this information to a battalion commander or staff. 

These steps didn’t eliminate all friction, but they helped 

minimize it.

9. Emphasize Military Occupational

Specialty Training Early

I

n the latter part of the train force pool of the brigade 

Army force generation cycle, all specialty enablers 

should be embedded with their supported maneuver 

units. Accomplishing this objective requires that specialty 

training be conducted for BSTB Soldiers earlier in the Army 

force generation cycle than many of the other units in the 

brigade. My predecessor in command programmed U.S. 

Army Project Foundry Advanced Geospatial–Intelligence 

training for the military intelligence company to start before 

the battalion came out of reset. While most of the rest of 

the brigade was doing individual warrior task training, 

4th BSTB Soldiers were engaged in military occupational 

specialty-specific training for individuals, teams, and platoons. This paid dividends later in the Army force generation cycle when we integrated enablers for platoon and 

company live-fire exercises and then deployed teams with 

habitual support relationships to the Joint Readiness Training Center for the brigade mission readiness exercise. BEB 

commanders should lean on the functional expertise of the 

brigade S-2 and S-6 to ensure that training for the military 

intelligence and signal companies is properly prioritized 

and resourced.

10. Establish the Role of the Brigade 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

I

t has become common practice for the BSTB commander 

to serve as the commander for the brigade headquarters and headquarters company, particularly if the brigade doesn’t have a former battalion commander serving as 

the deputy commander. This practice makes sense and will 

likely continue with the BEB because it frees the brigade 

commander and his staff from a great deal of administrative 

workload. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, 

however, this can be a minefield for the company and the 

battalion commander.

New BEB commanders should discuss this topic with 

the brigade commander before assuming command and 

should establish clear terms of reference for all three commander levels: brigade, battalion, and company. Topics to 

cover explicitly include the Uniform Code of Military Justice 

jurisdiction, rating chain, reporting chain, and family readiness groups. There aren’t any right or wrong answers, but 

early and frequent communication can minimize the inevitable frictions. 

Conclusion

Like the BSTB before it, BEB command will offer 

unique challenges and exciting opportunities for 

future engineers. The BEB will be a diverse, dynamic, 

and essential organization that serves an integral role in our 

Army’s central formation—the BCT. Those who embrace the 

rich diversity of their units will find it to be the most rewarding assignment of their careers.

Lieutenant Colonel Dillard commands the 4th BSTB, 

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He holds a bachelor of 

science degree in economics from the U.S. Military Academy, 

a master of science degree in engineering management from 

the University of Missouri–Rolla (now Missouri University of 

Science and Technology), and a master of business administration degree from Stanford University. He welcomes comments or questions at <larry.dillard@us.army.mil>. 
28 Engineer January–April 2014

I

n the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, waste management was not a 

priority in U.S. base camps. Since there was no other 

solution at the time, the U.S. Army used burn pits, with all 

their associated problems. Years later, there is still a need 

for cost-effective solutions for waste management, especially when it is time for the transfer or closure of a 

base camp.

One of the goals of a doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 

and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis is to close capability gaps without looking to a costly materiel solution as the first option. Additional training by the 

Directorate of Environmental Integration (DEI), 

at the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri, can sometimes close a capability 

gap. As part of the building great engineers effort 

at the Engineer School, DEI personnel analyzed the 

problems, studied lessons learned, and visited the 

battlefield and U.S. base camps to develop training 

solutions. They quickly put together a 3-day course 

of environmental training following the Army Learning Model for 2015.1 Members of the DEI environmental training team began teaching the 3 days of 

training to the Engineer Warrant Officer Basic and 

Advanced Courses. Soon after, they began teaching 

at the Engineer Captains Career Course and now 

By Mr. Albert M. Vargesko

Engineer students use ENFIRE kit devices during an environmental baseline survey.
January–April 2014 Engineer 29

teach at all the engineer officer courses, including

1 hour at the Engineer Precommand Course and 3 days at 

the Engineer Basic Officer Leader Course. Steady improvements, based on class critiques, lead DEI trainers to think 

that they have excellent content and delivery methods.

Training consists of a healthy mix of environmental presentations, performance evaluations, and out-of-classroom 

field work. Student teams are required to produce a base 

camp environmental baseline survey (EBS) and an integrated waste management plan. DEI facilitators coach 

the students and facilitate their training rather than just 

spout information from the platform. The DEI staff uses 

the tactical training base at Training Area 246 to conduct EBSs. This state-of-the-art base camp—also known 

as the Contingency Basing Integration Technology Evaluation Center—includes a 100-kilowatt solar panel array, 

barracks huts with maximum insulation to reduce the 

energy required for heating and cooling, energy efficient 

“smart” generators, an electricity microgrid, and solar 

water heaters. Once students have been on the ground at 

the training area for the EBS, they have a better feel for 

preparing an integrated waste management plan for the 

proposed base camp. They consider proper placement for 

the hazardous waste storage area, recycling area, landfill, 

sanitary waste lagoons, gray water evaporation pond and, 

if needed, the compost site. They complete their design as a 

team and must explain and defend their solution in a 15- to 

20-minute briefing.

A visit to a U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management 

Command motor pool is another chance to get students out 

of the classroom, and it is sometimes their first visit to an 

Army maintenance facility. This tour gives them ideas about 

what systems are possible and practical in a motor pool that 

welcomes sustainable practices. They get to see antifreeze 

recycling, waste oil reutilization, battery maintenance, an 

oil/water separator, and other ideas that can stretch dollars 

and support sustainability.

Tools used in the course include Turning Point®

technology to keep the students engaged with video 

simulations developed by the U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command Training Brain Operations Center 

at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and many components from the 

Instrument Set, Reconnaissance and Surveying (ENFIRE) 

kit. Students also get an Environmental Deployment Toolbox compact disk, which reinforces the classroom training. DEI also uses the Digital Training Facility to conduct 

virtual EBSs during inclement weather. 

Finally, the DEI staff developed online courses that can 

be accessed by Soldiers at any time. The Environmental 

Officer Course on Blackboard at <https://www.blackboard

.wood.army.mil/> has trained thousands of Soldiers. An 

online Cultural Property Protection Course launched in 

2013 takes only about an hour to complete.2

 Other environmental training products such as lesson plans and graphic 

training aids can be downloaded from the Army Training 

Network at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/atn/> or the Central Army Registry at < http://www.adtdl.army.mil/>.

For more information, contact DEI by phone at (573) 

563-7673, via the Internet at <www.wood.army.mil/dei>, or 

by e-mail at <usarmy.leonardwood.engineer-schl.mbx.dei

@mail.mil>.

Endnotes:

1

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 

525-8-2, The Army Learning Concept for 2015, 20 January 

2011.

2

Cultural Property Protection for Military Personnel 

in Deployed Setting, <http://www.blackboard.wood.army

.mil/>.

Mr. Vargesko is the chief of the Doctrine and Training 

Division, Directorate of Environmental Integration, U.S. 

Army Engineer School. A retired engineer officer, he received 

his environmental experience working for the Missouri 

Department of Natural Resources from 2001 to 2003. He 

holds a bachelor of science degree from Indiana University 

of Pennsylvania and a master’s degree from the U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College.

Students examine the contents of a container during an environmental baseline survey.
30 Engineer January–April 2014

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Baltimore 

District, has spent two decades investigating and 

cleaning up Spring Valley, a community in northwest 

Washington, D.C. Around the time of World War I, the U.S. 

government used the American University Experiment Station site to research and test chemical agents, equipment, 

and munitions. Today, the site encompasses about 1,600 

private properties, including the homes of U.S. government 

officials and public figures, foreign embassies, and facilities 

for American University.

In 2000, USACE discovered that one of the properties 

contained a burial pit. After two investigations recovered 

large quantities of munitions, glassware, and soil contaminated by arsenic and other chemical agents, it was 

determined that other items of concern could be present in 

uninvestigated areas, particularly around and beneath one 

particular structure. Following extensive reviews and a public comment period, USACE decided to remove the house 

and clean up the property. People passing by the property 

during the last year probably noticed the site’s enormous 

transformation. A stately colonial brick house once stood on 

the half-acre property, now owned by American University. 

After thorough coordination and input, the house was razed 

in November 2012, making it the first house to be removed 

from a former defense site. 

Once crews demolished the house, they began preparing 

the site for high-probability operations. The team uses the 

phrase high probability to emphasize the likelihood that it 

will find and remove chemical warfare materiel in specified 

areas of the property. Site preparation included digging test 

pits in several areas of the property, relocating utilities, and 

installing the engineering controls needed to safely remove 

debris. Removal operations began in September 2013 and 

will last approximately 1 year, depending on the types and 

amounts of debris encountered. The goal is to completely 

remove any remaining World War I era debris and restore 

the property to residential standards by late 2014.

Staffs from across USACE, Department of the Army, U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, District Department of 

the Environment, and American University have worked on 

the investigation, said the project manager. She said that 

the team is prepared for the discovery of potentially dangerous debris throughout the project and is using proven 

engineering control technologies to protect workers and the 

community throughout the complex environmental cleanup 

process. 

The property rises approximately 30 to 40 feet on three 

plateaus, making it challenging to place equipment for the 

operations. Each of the key pieces of equipment has been 

tested and used for years at other defense sites across the 

country. Where the house once stood, there 

is now an engineering control structure 

(ECS), a large tent of polyurethane material pulled taut over a metal skeleton. The 

ECS is secured to the ground and kept 

under negative air pressure by chemical 

agent filtration systems, which ensure 

that no air will escape from it. Assurance 

that the ECS is under negative pressure 

has been tested and proven by Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, part of

the U.S. Army Research, Development, 

and Engineering Command. Under the

structure, workers in full personal protection equipment remove soil by excavator 

and sometimes by hand, digging down to 

bedrock to find and remove debris.

By Ms. Brenda M. Barber, Mr. Clem Gaines, and Ms. Andrea M. Takash

USACE Removes World War I Era Munitions

A dig team trains inside the engineering 

control structure wearing full personal 

protective equipment.

Careful Cleanup:
January–April 2014 Engineer 31

A large aluminum tube, similar to heating, ventilation, 

and air-conditioning ducting, transfers air from the ECS to 

large pieces of filtration equipment, each with multiple carbon filters where the air is cleaned. Noise dampeners ensure 

that the operating noise level is within the Washington, 

D.C., guidelines of 55 decibels at the edge of the project. 

A continuous air-monitoring system analyzes the air 

emitting from the ECS, looking for key chemicals in the 

airflow. If a sensor notes a chemical of concern, technicians 

from the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center alert leaders at the site. Coordinated protocols have been established, 

with extensive training on how to respond.

From a command trailer that serves as the nerve center 

for the entire site, project leaders have radio communications and visual oversight of the project area. In addition, 

cameras with 360° views inside the ECS provide leaders 

with an immediate update on excavation operations as the 

dig team works deeper and deeper into the soil. Members of 

the team wear a full personal protective equipment ensemble, including a breathing apparatus. Site leaders carefully 

review the weather each day and adjust work schedules if 

local conditions such as heat and humidity could cause a 

safety issue.

A site crew of approximately 50 workers, representing 

multiple agencies and organizations, is on-site every day 

during the project. This includes USACE colleagues from 

the U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville, 

Alabama; Army representatives from the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center and 20th Support Command; and District of Columbia police personnel. For safety, an ambulance 

is parked nearby, ready to respond to any injuries that may 

occur on the site. 

During the almost 21-year Spring Valley Formerly Used 

Defense Site Project, nearby residents have not needed to 

shelter in place to avoid a chemical release. However, as an 

added safety layer, USACE has implemented a shelter-inplace system that includes an evacuation zone, a notification system with a strobe light and siren alerting system to 

alert residents, and a system to automatically call people on 

a roster. 

If any chemicals of concern are released into the atmosphere, eight residences and designated American University staff will be notified. Project leaders have met with 

these families and tested telephonic and e-mail notification 

systems in English and Spanish. The system will be tested 

monthly throughout high-probability operations. Recognizing that this is a high-profile project, project leaders have 

maintained a robust and transparent communications effort, 

to include meetings with community members, weekly 

updates on the District’s Web site, and multiple news media 

interviews emphasizing project safety. 

To see an interactive tour of the 4825 Glenbrook Road 

project, visit <http://youtube/yVws5UnBuZw>. 

Ms. Barber is a project manager with USACE, 

Baltimore District. She holds a bachelor’s degree 

in civil engineering from Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville. She is a licensed professional engineer.

Mr. Gaines is a public affairs specialist with 

USACE, Baltimore District. He holds a bachelor’s 

degree in communications from the University 

of Wisconsin–Madison and a master’s degree in 

human resources management from Golden Gate 

University.

Ms. Takash is a public affairs specialist with 

USACE, Baltimore District. She holds a bachelor’s degree in communications studies from 

Youngstown State University and a master’s 

degree in business administration from Columbia 

College.

Multiple layers of engineering controls address safety at the cleanup site.

The ECS occupies the space where the house stood at the cleanup 

site.
32 Engineer January–April 2014

During the disaster relief response after Hurricane 

Sandy, Soldiers of the 19th Engineer Battalion, 

Fort Knox, Kentucky, developed a very good working relationship with the U.S. Marines of the 8th Engineer 

Support Battalion, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina. No units have benefited more from this link than 

the 502d Multirole Bridge Company (MRBC), 19th Engineer 

Battalion, and the Bridge Company, 8th Engineer Support 

Battalion. In March 2013, the improved ribbon bridge (IRB) 

platoon from the U.S. Marine battalion traveled to Fort Knox 

to take part in the boat live-fire exercise conducted by the 

502d. The exercise included IRB rafting operations on the 

Ohio River and live-fire training on one of the few riverine 

ranges in the United States. The cooperation between the 

Soldiers and Marines was quickly recognized as invaluable, 

and the 8th Engineer Support Battalion promptly invited 

the 502d Engineers to their home turf at Camp Lejeune to 

take part in a 1,000-foot, full-enclosure exercise.

In the Army, military occupational specialty (MOS) 12C 

designates a career of bridge building. However, the Marines do not have a designated bridge-building MOS, which 

means that a Marine bridge company is fundamentally different from an Army bridge company. While an Army MRBC 

platoon can bridge wet and dry gaps using the IRB, the 

medium girder bridge (MGB), or the dry support bridge, a Marine Corps bridge company 

has an IRB platoon that is responsible only for 

wet gaps and an MGB platoon that is responsible only for dry gaps. Because the Marines 

have no specific bridge-building MOS, this 

distinction halves the amount of equipment 

that Marines must learn to use. Therefore, 

they can become combat-effective much faster.

On the morning of 27 July, the Soldiers of 

2d Platoon, 502d MRBC loaded up for an 

800-mile convoy to Camp Lejeune. The convoy consisted of common bridge transporters

loaded with interior bays for the IRB, fuel

trucks, a wrecker, and a contact truck. With

a few exceptions, the Soldiers had never

driven their vehicles on the interstate highway system, so the drive was a valuable training experience. After a 2-day trip (with an 

Soldiers wade through an obstacle on the endurance course. overnight stay at a truck stop), the platoon 

By First Lieutenant Michael C. Crimmins
January–April 2014 Engineer 33

arrived safely at Camp Lejeune, ready to 

begin training the next day.

The training schedule for the week split 

2d Platoon into two sections. The first section 

would work with the Marine MGB platoon for 

2 days and then train with the IRB platoon 

for another 2 days. Training for the second 

section mirrored that schedule. On the first 

day, physical training was conducted at 0500. 

Soldiers and Marines formed up side by side 

to quickly march 3 miles to the endurance 

course, which is a 4-mile route through a 

swamp with mud pits and obstacles to traverse. After completing the grueling course 

and getting a quick shower, the platoon split 

into sections to train with the two Marine 

platoons. The 502d cannot train with the 

MGB regularly because it is not a part of the unit inventory 

at Fort Knox. Since training on the MGB usually consists of 

an annual trip to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, any extra 

hands-on time is invaluable in keeping Soldier skills up 

to standard. 

The main event, however, was training on the IRB. At 

Fort Knox, there is only one good location—the Ohio River—

to train with the IRB. While the fast current and a small 

boat slip make the river an ideal location for raft operations 

training, it is simply too wide and busy with civilian traffic 

to use for bridge operations training. At Camp Lejeune, the 

distance from the boat slip at Engineer Point to the other 

side of the waterway is 1,000 feet—the longest distance the 

Marine Corps expects to bridge. The seven interior bays that 

the Army platoon brought with them were needed to help 

bridge the span because the equipment organic to the Marine 

Bridge Company can only span about 800 feet. Soldiers and 

Marines worked hand in hand to drop the bays into the 

water, where the Marine bridge erection boats maneuvered 

them. After about 2 hours of intense labor, the full enclosure 

was complete and vehicles began to move across the bridge. 

Normally, a 2-hour construction time would be too long 

for a bridge of this size, but the Soldiers and Marines had 

to get acclimated to the techniques used by their counterparts. This is the main reason that more units should crosstrain with other Services and units at different posts. Not 

only would units be able to take advantage of training areas 

and opportunities not normally available to them, but they 

would also get to learn how different people operate. “Train 

as you fight” has become the mantra for the U.S. military, 

and Soldiers do not fight exclusively alongside other Army 

personnel. Soldiers and Marines need more training time 

together in garrison to work together more effectively while 

overseas.

Training at Camp Lejeune was an invaluable experience 

for the Soldiers of the 502d MRBC. It gave them valuable 

insight into the way Marines work and let Soldiers have 

hands-on experience with a newer type of bridge erection 

boat. Training like this could easily shave minutes 

from a joint bridge build. At a build site that is susceptible to direct and indirect fire, those few minutes could mean the difference between life and 

death. Cutting the amount of time that Soldiers 

and Marines are exposed on the water is an 

extremely important factor in the success of any 

bridging mission.

The 502d MRBC is excited to continue the relationship formed during Hurricane Sandy disaster 

relief operations last year and is planning another 

bridge exercise with the Marine Bridge Company. 

This will enable further cross-training as Marines 

from the MGB platoon get experience working on 

the Army’s dry support bridge.

First Lieutenant Crimmins is a platoon leader 

with the 502d MRBC, 19th Engineer Battalion. 

He holds a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering 

Soldiers and Marines haul a piece of an MGB during training. from the U.S. Military Academy.

Soldiers and Marines prepare to start the Marine Corps endurance course.
34 Engineer January–April 2014

By Lieutenant Colonel Gerald S. Law

The support force moves into position during a combined arms breach at the National Training Center.

This article presents a way for leaders who are 

supporting a maneuver task force and for task force 

engineers and operations officers to understand, 

incorporate, and execute the five breaching tenets. It also 

describes the breaching tenets and presents breaching 

trends observed at the National Training Center, Fort 

Irwin, California. Finally, it presents tools and methods to 

assist leaders during the planning and rehearsal process of 

combined arms breaching. 

The breaching tenets are—

■ Intelligence.

■ Breaching fundamentals.

■ Breaching organization.

■ Mass.

■ Synchronization.1

Intelligence consists of developing obstacle information 

requirements such as location, size, type of mines, and 

potential point of breach (POB). To gather the intelligence 

necessary for success in combined arms breaching, it 

is necessary to determine the available reconnaissance 

capabilities, such as an unmanned aerial vehicle, scout 

platoon, scout weapons team, or engineer reconnaissance 

team. Once identified, the assets must be focused on 

developing obstacle intelligence. It is critical that task 

force engineers work closely with battalion intelligence 

officers to ensure that information collection assets focus 

on intelligence, which provides the critical information 

necessary to plan and execute the second breaching tenet—

breaching fundamentals. 

Breaching fundamentals describe actions on the objective, 

otherwise known as SOSRA:

■ Suppress means to provide effective direct and indirect

suppressive fires on the objective.

■ Obscure means to employ smoke on and between enemy

positions and the reduction area.

■ Secure means to hold the obstacle with appropriate 

combat power.

■ Reduce means to use explosive, mechanical, and/or

physical means to destroy the obstacle.

■ Assault means to destroy the enemy on the far side of 

the obstacle.2
January–April 2014 Engineer 35

SOSRA actions are vital to combined arms breaching, but 

they can only be accomplished if the maneuver task force is 

task-organized properly using the third breaching tenet—

breaching organization. 

Breaching organization consists of three main forces: 

support, breach, and assault. The support force suppresses 

all direct and observed indirect enemy fires in and around 

the POB or reduction area. The breach force consists of a 

reduction element and a security element. The reduction 

element reduces the obstacle by creating and marking lanes; 

and the security element secures the near side and far side of 

the obstacle. The assault force attacks through the obstacle 

and seizes the objective. 

Intelligence, breaching fundamentals, and breaching 

organization have to work together in space and time to 

be effective. This is accomplished through the two final 

breaching tenets—mass and synchronization. 

Mass consists of inflicting overwhelming combat effects 

at the right location to create an enemy weakness at the 

POB or reduction site. 

Synchronization entails massing those forces and effects 

at the right time by communicating clear instructions to 

subordinate units. Synchronization brings all breaching 

tenets together through effective mission command. 

Trends

Breaching trends observed at the National Training 

Center from spring 2012 to spring 2013 can be 

divided into two categories—planning and execution. 

One common trend during planning relates to intelligence, 

the first breaching tenet. Most task forces struggled to 

obtain obstacle intelligence during the planning process. 

This was due to their failure to employ reconnaissance 

assets at echelons in support of the combined arms breach. 

Using reconnaissance assets to gain obstacle intelligence 

facilitates planning. It allows the unit conducting the breach 

to determine the POB; the size, type, and makeup of the 

obstacle size; enemy locations; the identity of key terrain 

surrounding the obstacle; and possible bypass locations. 

A second trend observed during planning involved the 

lack of engineer-specific input during course-of-action 

development and war games. These trends included—

■ Failure to develop or reference engineer assets and

tasks in the maneuver task force execution synchronization matrix (ESM). 

■ Failure to develop decision points related to the support, 

breach, and assault forces or failure to place decision

points on a decision support matrix. 

A cavalry unit conducts a combined arms rehearsal before a live-fire exercise.

“[Using reconnaissance] allows the unit conducting the 

breach to determine the POB; the size, type, and makeup of 

the obstacle size; enemy locations; the identity of key terrain 

surrounding the obstacle; and possible bypass locations.”
36 Engineer January–April 2014

■ Failure to show graphics of decision points associated

with the breach on a decision support template. 

Better attention to these planning deliverables will 

greatly help units synchronize the support, breach, and 

assault forces and implement the breaching fundamentals.

The final trend observed during the planning process 

involved rehearsals; specifically, the lack of participation 

by engineer leaders as briefers on terrain models. Engineer 

leaders or task force operations officers often do not brief 

necessary details of the breaching tenets during the 

combined arms rehearsal. Engineer-specific icons often were 

not developed or placed on the terrain model. If they were, 

the icons themselves were not referenced or used during the 

combined arms rehearsal. 

During the execution of the combined arms breach, 

maneuver task forces struggled to synchronize the support, 

breach, and assault forces. This contributed to an inability 

to execute SOSRA. The following are observations obtained 

from numerous executions of combined arms breaches 

during several decisive action training environment 

rotations—

■ The breach force moved toward the POB before the

support force suppressed the objective. 

■ The support force fired obscuration smoke too early or too

late.

■ The breach force began reduction without adequate

obscuration. 

■ The breach and assault forces failed to secure the breach

site.

■ The breach force began obstacle reduction before the

breach site was secured. 

■ The breach and assault forces struggled to mass at the

POB. 

■ The assault force failed to understand the marking

technique used. 

■ The assault force moved through the breach lane before

the lane was marked

■ The assault force stalled at the breach. 

Planning Tools

Several tools help leaders incorporate the breaching 

tenets during planning to ensure that the maneuver 

task force employs them during execution. 

The ESM records war game results and helps the staff 

synchronize a course of action across time and space.3 Here, 

the engineer leader or planner ensures that the support, 

breach, and assault forces—each with its associated task 

and purpose in relation to time and space—are captured 

on the ESM. Populating the ESM during the military 

decisionmaking process begins synchronization. The ESM 

allows the staff to visualize the breach organization, task, 

and purpose. Most importantly, it shows how the support, 

breach, and assault forces relate to each other in time and 

space. The proper use of the ESM also confirms the results 

of reverse breach planning, develops instructions to subordinate units, and helps determine effective mission command 

node composition and locations. The ESM describes any 

decision points determined by the staff that lead to the 

development of the second and third tools—the decision 

support matrix and decision support template. 

The matrix and template facilitate the synchronization 

of the combined arms breach. The template depicts decision 

points, timelines associated with the movement of forces, 

and the flow of the operation. 

The assault force moves through the point of breach.
January–April 2014 Engineer 37

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations 

Process, defines a decision point as “a point in space or time 

the commander of staff anticipates making a key decision 

concerning a specific course of action.”4

 A decision support 

matrix describes those decision points and associated actions. 

The matrix is part of the template, and they work together 

to portray key decisions and potential actions that are likely 

to arise during execution.5

 Developing a matrix and template 

forces engineer and maneuver planners to anticipate any 

questions that may arise during a combined arms breach, such 

as where the point of penetration is, when the support force 

starts suppression, and when the support force starts obscuration fires.

Once a decision is made, the next step is to develop a 

trigger to help the commander make the decision. The 

point at which the engineer reconnaissance team identifies 

obstacle and enemy positions would be the trigger to help 

decide where the point of penetration should be located. 

Below are additional recommended decisions with their 

respective criteria:

■ When does the support force occupy the support-

	 by-fire position? The recommended criteria are when 

obscuration assets are set and the support force is

set to move to the support-by-fire position. 

■ When should the breach force be committed? The

recommended criteria are when suppression and

obscuration measures are adjusted and effective,

 engineer preparations are complete, fire control measures

are in effect, air defense artillery is in position, and 

casualty evacuation assets are ready to accept casualties.

■ When should the reduction element be committed?

The recommended criteria are when the breach force

near side security is in position and the security element 

controls the reduction site by force.

■ When should the assault force be committed? The

recommended criteria are when the lane is reduced,

proofed, and marked and far side security is in position.

Effective planning results when the staff develops an 

ESM and a decision support matrix and template.6 These 

tools help commanders visualize key decisions and potential 

actions related to the combined arms breach.7 

They also help synchronize the support, breach, and 

assault forces. The ESM and the decision support matrix 

and template contain decisions and their related triggers, 

which contribute to the execution of subtasks that 

accomplish SOSRA. These triggers provide the basis for the 

execution checklist, another tool available for commanders 

and planners to synchronize efforts. 

The breach force marks a lane in support of an assault onto the objective.
Execution Checklist

An execution checklist helps synchronize units and 

efforts by sequentially listing critical tasks that 

.must be accomplished. The checklist typically 

describes the unit, tasks, anticipated time of completion, 

and associated procedure words. A common trend in most 

execution checklists is to list only the main tasks to be 

accomplished. However, listing subtasks contributes to 

the overall synchronization of efforts. Therefore, subtasks 

and associated procedure words that help achieve SOSRA 

should be developed. For example, most execution checklists 

note when suppression is accomplished, when obscuration 

is completed, or when the assault force has moved through 

the breach. (This assumes that everything is synchronized.) 

Commanders should use the execution checklist together 

with the decision support matrix. Therefore, the triggers 

developed for the matrix and template should be listed and 

then codified into a standard breach drill standing operating 

procedure to be used across the brigade combat team. 

Example 1. Instead of listing “suppression of breach site 

completed,” the execution checklist should list “support force 

at support-by-fire position 1,” followed by “breach force at 

attack-by-fire position 1,” and then “support force begins 

suppression of objective.” This will synchronize the support 

and breach forces by ensuring that they are at their proper 

locations before the support force suppresses the objective. 

Also, a breach drill standing operating procedure that 

standardizes those actions and code words will contribute 

to a mutual understanding across the brigade combat team. 

Example 2. Instead of listing “obscuration of breach 

site completed,” the execution checklist could note “support 

force at support-by-fire position 1,” followed by “breach force 

crosses Phase Line Green,” and then by “support force fires 

obscuration on objective.” Phase Line Green is a graphic 

control measure determined through 

the time/distance analysis for the breach 

force to move from a specified location to 

the breach site. It was determined that 

Phase Line Green is where the breach 

force must be located before the support 

force fires obscuration on the objective. 

This ensures that the breach force is not 

too far away or too close for obscuration 

to adequately cover the objective. 

Finally, the combined arms rehearsal (CAR) is the last tool to assist engineer leaders during the planning and

rehearsal process. Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5.0-1,

Command and Staff Officer Guide, 

states that “A combined arms rehearsal 

is a rehearsal in which subordinate 

units synchronize their plans with each 

other.”8

 The CAR is the last opportunity 

for the efforts of a maneuver task force 

to be synchronized. Done properly, it 

will ensure that all breaching tenets are addressed. 

Recommendations for engineer platoon leaders or company commanders to prepare for the CAR include—

■ Ensuring that the engineer platoon leader or company 

commander has a speaking part at the CAR. 

■ Placing engineer icons (such as units, triggers, graphic 

control measures, and fire control measures) on the terrain model meant to help synchronize the combined arms

breach.

■ Briefing engineer composition, disposition, task, and 

purpose.

■ Briefing primary and secondary methods of breaching

with associated impacts. 

■ Briefing primary and secondary methods of proofing with

 associated impacts.

■ Ensuring that the schemes of maneuver for support,

breach, and assault forces are addressed. 

■ Briefing the marking system with an example set up for 

participants to reference. 

Conclusion

Recent trends observed during the conduct of 

combined arms breaches at the National Training 

Center point to one major observation: maneuver 

task forces routinely struggle to synchronize the support, 

breach, and assault forces, contributing to an inability to 

execute SOSRA. Battalion operations officers and task 

force engineers need to understand the breaching tenets 

and incorporate them into the planning and rehearsal 

process. Breaching fundamentals are only one breaching 

tenet; therefore, addressing SOSRA alone is not enough. An 

ESM, decision support matrix and template, and execution 

(continued on page 41)

38 Engineer January–April 2014

The breach force uses a mine-clearing line charge as the primary method of 

breach at the National Training Center.
Final Chapter

January–April 2014 Engineer 39

The 15th Explosive Hazards Team (EHT) is embedded within the 130th Engineer Brigade headquarters 

in Afghanistan, giving it a sphere of influence that 

spans the theater. After 5 years of nondoctrinal manning, 

this is the first properly manned EHT led by an explosive 

ordnance disposal (EOD) officer, as described by the Army 

modified table of organization and equipment. The team 

manages and conducts blow-in-place (BIP) training for the 

theater; synchronizes tactical needs with the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) for sourcing solutions; and gathers and 

coordinates tactics, techniques, and procedures between 

route clearance battalions. Operating under the theater 

engineer brigade, it feeds the theater common operational 

picture for mobility. What was a tactical-level unit when the 

EHT concept was born in 2008 is now an operational-level 

plug-in with a theater-wide problem set. 

Five years ago, doctrine was new and evolving, the team 

was not manned appropriately, the mission was unknown, 

and the Iraq combat theater was baffled by the arrival of 

the first EHT. EHT capabilities were misunderstood, and 

the team struggled to find validity and relevance in the combat theater. The ensuing combat proof of concept did little 

to improve the situation. In fact, multiple EHTs have been 

deployed nondoctrinally since. However, the proof of concept 

resulted in some focused after action review comments to 

the Engineer Regiment, the U.S. Army Engineer School, and 

the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Ideally, these comments helped improve subsequent deployments and refinements of the EHT concept. A look at the EHT today adds 

validity to this assumption, as it looks very little like its 

2008 predecessor. 

The EHT concept today is the result of a significant evolution. Doctrine and employment have changed considerably 

in the past 5 years. Multiple units have deployed as EHTs at 

different levels within the theater task organization. Some 

have been manned more appropriately than others. But 

until now, none have included the requisite EOD personnel. 

As fate would have it, the current, appropriately manned 

theater EHT will also be the last deployed to Afghanistan 

and possibly the last deployed to combat. 

Doctrine

The first appearance of the EHT in doctrine was in 

Army engineer field manuals published around 2006 

to 2007. As early as 2003, the engineer and ordnance 

branches had begun formulating plans for the EHT through 

By Major Glen A. MacDonald, Captain Vincent T. Ramos, and First Lieutenant Kathleen L. Rose

Final Chapter

Explosive Hazards Team: Explosive Hazards Team:
40 Engineer January–April 2014

the Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, EOD fusion cell. As the 

improvised explosive device (IED) threat continued to skyrocket in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the EHT concept slowly 

crystallized, ultimately being captured in doctrine and published in 2007.1

Doctrine today envisions a significantly modified capability in the EHT. It is no longer the tactical-level fusion of 

EOD and engineer effort foreseen in 2007. Instead, the EHT 

is expected to operate at theater echelon, the operational 

level of combat. According to Field Manual 3-34, Engineer 

Operations,

2

 the EHT embeds at brigade, division, or corps 

level. The current unit on the ground, the 15th EHT, operates in line with this construct through its organization 

within the Afghanistan Theater Engineer Brigade. 

Team Manning

The 15th EHT was originally scheduled to deploy as 

an explosive hazards coordination cell, a unit similar 

to the EHT but slightly larger and usually manned 

by more senior personnel. However, the theater manning 

requirement was slightly decreased before deployment. By 

doctrine, an EHT and an explosive hazards coordination cell 

are virtually interchangeable in terms of employment, so the 

adjustment in team type had little impact on predeployment 

training. The team was composed of EOD and engineer 

Soldiers, augmented by a military intelligence officer. The 

engineer noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were selected 

because each was qualified through the Engineer Explosive 

Ordnance Clearance Agent Course and had route clearance 

experience. The blend of training and real-world experience 

among team members could not have been more comprehensive. Although there was a plan to add another engineer officer to the team upon arrival in-theater, other requirements 

prevented it. 

The team was split between two major bases. The team 

officer, the NCO in charge, a military intelligence officer, and the NCOs in charge of operations and BIP were 

located at one base. A mobile assistance team (MAT), consisting of an NCO, a Soldier, and a senior EOD NCO who 

managed theater-specific BIP training were located at the 

second base. 

The 15th EHT manning represents the first doctrinal 

personnel deployment to a combat theater. EOD and engineer fusion was finally accomplished as envisioned, effectively bridging the gap between EOD and engineers intheater through a number of means. Specifically, the EHT 

implemented theater-specific BIP training, MATs, and REF 

equipment solutions.

Bridging the Gap

BIP. Though required in theater, BIP is not standard 

Army training outside Afghanistan. It is also not a 

doctrinal role of the EHT; but in 2009, its importance to route clearance units was recognized. U.S. Forces–

Afghanistan published an order directing the theater explosive hazards coordination cell (predecessor to the EHT) to 

conduct mandatory, theater-specific BIP training for all 

explosive ordnance clearance agent-qualified engineers. 

The 15th EHT inherited this responsibility upon arrival intheater, and the training certified route clearance engineers 

for their mission through the dissemination of current and 

relevant, theater-specific information and tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

BIP training was conducted at Kandahar Airfield and 

at Bagram Airfield. Both sites were managed by the EHT 

and supplemented with contract trainers. The contractors 

were prior service engineer and EOD Soldiers, giving them 

immediate credibility with Soldiers. Focus areas included 

ordnance identification, IED components, and hands-on 

familiarization with the robot systems in use. Soldiers in 

key leadership positions left the course certified for their 

role in combat and better prepared for the IED threat they 

would encounter on the ground. 

MAT. Before deployment, the 15th EHT drafted a plan 

to transition the earlier-employed theater mobile observation teams to a new construct—MATs. This plan was based 

on feedback from ground units where mobile observation 

teams had been perceived as outsiders with the sole purpose 

of highlighting mistakes made by units. Those teams had 

focused on observing and critiquing. In contrast, an MAT 

embedded for two to three missions with each unit visited, 

with full participation as the rule. 

The 15th EHT executed a solutions-based approach 

through its MATs. MATs lived, patrolled, collected, developed TTP, exchanged intelligence, and ate with the unit in 

which they were embedded, becoming virtual members of 

the unit. Issues identified through this process were refined 

with the unit and, if necessary, brought to the attention 

of higher headquarters or other theater organizations for 

assistance. The partnership with the REF effectively solved 

many equipment and material problems. 

REF and Equipment Solutions. Working with the REF 

was invaluable for the EHT. By creating a working relationship with the REF laboratory, the 15th EHT implemented 

solutions that were developed and tested based on requirements, input, and feedback from units conducting clearance 

missions. 

An IED command wire detector that proved useful at 

night is a great example of rapid equipping success; an 

increase in night patrols and a need for increased lighting 

capability led to its development. Through the REF and its 

three-dimensional printer, the EHT provided a quick turnaround on prototypes for testing by units. These prototypes 

became the proof of concept for future equipping solution 

partnerships with the REF. On average, each product took 

about a month to go from prototype to an 80 percent complete product in the hands of units on the ground. 

In addition to working with the REF, the EHT worked 

with Combined Joint Task Force Paladin to ensure that each 

route clearance company received the proper equipment 

based on requirements specific to its own area of operations. 

Through that task force, the team was able to assist in filling shortfalls and providing required equipment quickly and 
January–April 2014 Engineer 41

effectively. Electronic warfare equipment was also pushed 

to the route clearance companies through the efforts of the 

EHT senior NCO. Through his actions and connections, the 

EHT established an unprecedented link between tactical 

units and theater solutions. Though nondoctrinal in nature, 

the result was clearly beneficial. 

Way Ahead

After 5 years of struggling to establish and employ a 

truly doctrinal team, the Army has charted a very 

.simple .way ahead. The EHT ceases to exist in the 

Regular Army or the Reserve Component in 2016. This 

means that the first doctrinally manned EHT will also be 

the final team deployed to combat. However, the authors 

of this article strongly agree with the decision to end the 

EHT concept. 

The EHT was designed to close the gap between EOD Soldiers and engineers at the tactical level. That vision never 

came to pass. However, while the doctrinal vision for the 

team may have never found true value in its employment, 

the men and women who participated in this long proof of 

concept clearly did bring value to the theaters where they 

served. As the Army closes the book on EHTs over the next 

few years, it ends a concept that has been challenged since 

the day it was first envisioned. The concept was employed on 

multiple battlefields in two wars but never closed the operational gap it was created to fill. It is with a sense of relief 

that the authors close the final chapter on this small piece of 

U.S. Army history. 

Endnotes:

1

Glen A. MacDonald, “Explosive Hazards Team: Concept, 

Employment, and the Way Ahead,” Engineer, September–

December 2009, pp. 18–22. 

2

Field Manual 3-34, Engineer Operations, 4 August 2011. 

Major MacDonald is the plans officer for the 130th Engineer Brigade. He is a graduate of Intermediate Level Education and the basic and advanced engineer officer courses. He 

holds a bachelor’s degree in fine arts from the University of 

Connecticut, a master’s degree in public policy administration, and a master’s degree in legislative affairs from George 

Washington University, Washington, D.C. 

Captain Ramos is the commander of the 15th Engineer 

Detachment (EHT), deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. He is a graduate of the ordnance basic officer 

leader course and explosive ordnance disposal training. He 

holds a bachelor’s degree in accounting and information systems from the University of Alaska at Fairbanks.

First Lieutenant Rose is the knowledge management 

officer for the 130th Engineer Brigade, deployed in support 

of Operation Enduring Freedom. She is a graduate of the 

basic engineer officer and engineer explosive ordnance clearance agent courses. She holds a bachelor’s degree in cultural 

anthropology and a master’s degree in geography from the 

University of California at Santa Barbara.

checklist developed during planning are tools that facilitate 

the incorporation of the breaching tenets and should be used 

during execution. The engineer platoon leader or engineer 

company commander provides input into the ESM, the 

decision support matrix and template, and execution checklist. Battalion operations officers and task force engineers 

ensure that a proper CAR addressing the breaching tenets 

is conducted. The CAR addresses engineer assets with task 

and purpose; primary and secondary methods of breaching 

and proofing; graphic control measures and triggers that 

facilitate synchronization; marking technique; and scheme 

of maneuver for the breach, support, and assault forces. 

The five breaching tenets are vital for the combined arms 

breach. If not incorporated into the planning and rehearsal 

process, the maneuver task force will struggle, or even fail, 

to implement them during execution. 

Endnotes:

1

ATTP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility Operations, 

10 August 2011.

2

Ibid.

3

ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, 

14 September 2011. 

4

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

5

ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, 

14 September 2011.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.

8 bid.

References:

ATTP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility Operations, 

10 August 2011.

ATTP 5.0-1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, 

14 September 2011.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land 

Operations, 16 May 2012. 

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012. 

Lieutenant Colonel Law is a common core instructor at 

the Department of Distance Learning at the Command and 

General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

He is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Basic Course, the 

Engineer Captains Career Course, the Combined Arms 

Service Staff School, and Intermediate Level Education 

at CGSC. He holds a bachelor’s degree in industrial 

engineering from Utah State University, a master’s degree 

in geology and geophysics from the University of Missouri–

Rolla (now Missouri University of Science and Technology), 

and a master of military arts and science degree from CGSC.

(“Breaching Tenets” continued from page 38)
42 Engineer January–April 2014

While providing sanctuary for military forces and 

civilians, forward operating bases (FOBs) are one 

of the most recognizable products from the wars 

of Afghanistan and Iraq. For more than a decade, FOBs 

hosted multiple rotations of military and civilian organizations, collecting legacy materiel along the way. In providing 

a safe haven for refit and regroup, FOBs have little incentive 

to reduce excess when the focus is on warfighting. Reducing excess is an afterthought; and FOBs tend to grow, not 

shrink, over the years. Further accelerating the growth in 

FOBs are special projects that come to the combat theater, 

serve their purpose, and then never completely leave. Such 

was the case with FOB Salerno 

in the Khost Province of Afghanistan in April 2013. More than 

10 years of war had left the FOB 

bloated with stuff, often with no 

current, accountable tenant.

As the executive officer of 

the 4th Brigade Special Troops 

Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat 

Team (Currahee), 101st Airborne

Division, I experienced the unique 

challenge of closing a modern military base while forward-deployed 

in hostile territory. Located 

approximately 20 kilometers from 

the Pakistan border, the battalion 

oversaw an operational environment with the mission of defending 

FOB Salerno, previously known 

as Rocket City, while simultaneously preparing it for closure. 

These missions alone were challenging enough, but the battalion 

also executed the traditional mission set of a brigade special troops Soldiers from the 864th Engineer Battalion provide demolition and deconstruction 

services at FOB Salerno.
January–April 2014 Engineer 43

battalion—performing route clearance and providing military intelligence and signal operations in support of the 

brigade mission command. Given all of these missions, the 

battalion commander directed the battalion operations officer to oversee the security mission, while I had the task 

of preparing the FOB for closure. The brigade commander 

directed that FOB Salerno be closed before winter came 

to the notorious Khost-Gardez Pass, which would severely 

restrict ground retrograde. This left approximately 6 months 

to complete the closure. Fortunately, our predecessors had 

significantly reduced the container count and consolidated 

personnel on the FOB before our arrival. 

As a former instructor in the systems department at the 

U.S. Military Academy, I used a problem-solving methodology to attack FOB closure, truncating the design process 

taught at West Point to three distinct phases—problem definition, solution design, and execution.

Problem Definition

On its surface, FOB closure seems to be a straightforward proposition: find out who lives on the base 

and help them retrograde personnel and equipment, 

while simultaneously and systematically off-loading life 

support systems. Since most life support systems such as 

field feeding, power, water production, wastewater removal, 

and trash collection were provided or managed by a single 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contractor, finding bridging strategies to replace these services 

was straightforward. The real challenge was identifying 

the stakeholders and synchronizing them to depart in an 

organized manner. The months of May and June 2013 were 

primarily consumed with this stakeholder analysis. Using 

broad categories, the following stakeholders existed on 

FOB Salerno:

■ Decisionmakers. The U.S. Army clearly establishes

commanders as decisionmakers. Essentially there were

two—the battalion commander, who was the FOB commander; and the brigade commander, who also resided

on the FOB.

■ Owners. The owners were the battalion staff and the

brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company,

which fell under our battalion and served as the base

operations node on the FOB. The brigade staff and brigade support battalion (both on FOB Salerno) fell 

into this category. The contracted LOGCAP provider was 

involved in all life support systems on the base and also

had an ownership stake in this problem.

■ Clients. All major tenants on FOB Salerno (such as 

4th Brigade Combat Team task forces, Special Operations Command elements, other government agency

partners, and other military units) comprised this category. Unlike owners, clients shouldered defined mission 

sets that were unaligned with FOB closure. Thus, while

the closure of FOB Salerno affected their future operations, they were participants rather than driving forces 

in the process.

■ Users. Composed of more than 50 somewhat detached

agencies on FOB Salerno, users included field service

representatives; special contractors unaligned with any

FOB military organization; and transients, some of whom

could be described as squatters.

Starting work at 0500 daily, Soldiers recover a 300-meter section of metal aircraft landing panels in just 

2 days.
44 Engineer January–April 2014

FOB Salerno had a population of about 4,000 personnel 

in May 2013, and it took nearly 2 months to get a detailed 

list of these parties. By early July, it became evident under 

which label each tenant belonged. This informal stakeholder 

analysis and the decision that FOB Salerno would be transferred to Afghan National Security Force control clarified 

the problem set faced by the battalion.

In accordance with Army Doctrine Reference Publication 

5-0, The Operations Process,

1

 the problem could be framed 

by three basic questions:

■ How should the exodus of units and agencies be synchronized while maintaining operations during the

summer fighting season?

■ What would be the most efficient way to off-load life support services to support FOB closure?

■ How should the FOB be prepared for eventual transfer 

to Afghan control while maintaining the necessary level

of force protection?

To address those questions and perform the complex 

planning required, the brigade commander directed the brigade staff to execute a full military decisionmaking process 

on the closure of FOB Salerno. Since the staff was deployed, 

planning time was not a factor. Led by the brigade executive officer, the brigade staff spent many nights developing 

a plan that addressed the three framing questions. As the 

executive officer of the battalion tasked with the closure, 

I was also involved in planning. With the brigade commander’s direction, we had the authority and approved timelines 

to complete the mission.

Solution Design

Three working groups were established to meet and 

execute the plan.

Force Protection/Facilities Utilization. A legacy of 

the previous task force, this working group was known as 

FP/FU. Originally created to publish force protection command messages in the style of a town hall meeting, these 

meetings were expanded to cast as wide a net as possible and 

were held every 2 weeks. Through exhaustive personal interactions and mass e-mails, as many of the FOB users as possible were assembled. To avoid problems with security clearances, the information presented was unclassified. Publicly, 

the meetings were presented as a way for tenants to learn 

about the closure. Privately, the meetings were meant to 

learn about the disparate agencies that showed up. The signin rosters proved critical since they yielded contact information and internal departure timelines that were often at odds 

with aggressive closure deadlines. At their peak, these meetings drew more than 35 agencies to one sitting and proved to 

be very effective during the early phases of execution. 

Executive Officer/Base Operations. This meeting 

brought together clients and owners who formed the core 

group tasked with reducing the FOB to the point of transfer. Participants included commissioned and noncommissioned officers from the engineer horizontal company 

(tasked with demolition operations), the forward retrograde 

element, prime power providers, strategic signal elements, 

the logistics support office, and the movement control team. 

Additionally, key force protection field service representatives and brigade representatives (such as the brigade engineer, transportation officer, and base operations officer) 

also attended. 

Designating the right assortment of attendees took time; 

but eventually, the key players who made the physical reduction of FOB Salerno possible were identified. This group met 

twice weekly, with a focus on the next 72 hours of the reduction fight. A grand task list, sorted by date and associated 

with a FOB Salerno grid reference graphic, helped maintain an internal common operational picture. This was a 

sausage-making meeting that kept us ahead of the timeline.

FOB Salerno Closure. The meeting included the battalion executive officer of each 4th Brigade Combat Team 

task force, officers from the Special Operations Command, 

representatives from other government agencies, critical 

sustainment representatives such as the brigade logistics 

support team and brigade security and plans officer, and the 

officer representing the 401st Army Field Support Brigade. 

Afghan workers complete a portion of the enduring 

perimeter.
January–April 2014 Engineer 45

Given the size and scope of responsibility, the LOGCAP site supervisor was 

also invited. The purpose of this meeting 

was to have the major tenants on FOB 

Salerno provide the base commander 

with a progress update and establish 

projected personnel and equipment retrograde moves, essentially establishing 

a contract between landlord and tenant. 

This allowed the staff to forecast logistic bottlenecks weeks ahead of time and 

recommend the allocation of reduction 

and retrograde assets. The meeting also 

served as an excellent venue to broadcast critical information and gain buy-in 

from all the major clients.

Additional working groups were occasionally set up to deal with special problems such as LOGCAP cessation, the 

transition to spot power generation, and airfield closure; but 

the three main working groups proved to be the most valuable. Armed with a brigade order and these focused working 

groups, we were then able to get down to the business of closing the FOB.

Execution

After reaching an understanding of the problem and 

establishing the means to track progress and receive 

.the commander’s guidance, we began the business 

of execution. Rather than dictate the exact techniques and 

procedures used in executing the plan, the following three 

beneficial approaches are highlighted:

■ Maintaining a sense of urgency.

■ Winning the ground game.

■ Harnessing the benefits of “going expeditionary.”

Our predecessors had established systems for identifying and removing hundreds of excess containers and consolidating personnel to open up billeting and operational 

space. Maintaining that momentum was critical. Decision 

makers needed to provide guidance, and staffs had to build 

tracking mechanisms. Therefore, during the initial months, 

the following steps were taken to build up a general sense 

of urgency:

■ Publication of guidance reducing the number of nontactical vehicles.

■ Establishment of a program forcing FOB civilians to be

sponsored by a Currahee leader.

■ Imposition of restrictions on the previously free-flowing

passenger terminal at the flight line.

■ Consolidation of retrograde nodes into one corner of 

the FOB.

Army engineers and LOGCAP contractors disassemble a large area maintenance shelter.

A b-hut reaches the end of its life cycle.
46 Engineer January–April 2014

These steps were intended to reestablish a more expeditionary lifestyle with the distinct purpose of informing FOB 

tenants that closure was a clear and imminent reality.

Every FOB has unique personalities and stories. FOB 

Salerno was no different. In one case, a civilian contractor 

had lived in a secluded, gated compound of several buildings 

for more than 5 years. The building he lived in was cooled by 

19 air conditioners affixed to the walls. Although the tenant 

provided value to the FOB, he lived alone with mountains 

of stuff stacked up around him. He was surprised when I 

informed him that he had 4 weeks to vacate the base. In 

many ways, he had truly gone native and was reluctant to 

change. This was exactly the type of user that we needed to 

find, inform, and assist in leaving the FOB.

Nobody can close an FOB from behind a desk. Over the 

summer, I strove to interact with people daily. I normally got 

to the point quickly: “Who are you? What do you do? Where 

do you live? When are you leaving? Please give me your 

e-mail and phone contacts. You need to come to our FP/FU 

meeting on Wednesday.” I tried to impart a sense of urgency 

and let people know that I was holding them accountable 

for clearing the FOB. Soon, most contractors and smaller 

military agencies were scrambling to resource and execute 

their own retrogrades. 

This last point is straightforward. Miraculously, as the 

quality of life on the FOB decreased, people wanted to 

leave. Suddenly, groups of people were leaving faster than 

planned. Harnessing the benefits of going expeditionary was 

critical. The goal was to make life harder, sooner. Services 

had to be reduced and eventually stopped, or the FOB would 

never close. Shutting down the shelter that served as the 

gymnasium truly kicked off the expeditionary phase during 

the first week of August. Then, the coffee shop; post exchange; 

U.S. Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation computer facility; and finance office closed. Shortly thereafter, we closed 

the dining facility, simultaneously canceling two hot meals. 

Laundry, post office, and private Internet services ceased, 

followed by central electrical power. Life was very different 

on FOB Salerno 40 days from closure. Through the working groups, e-mails to account holders, posted signs, and 

word of mouth, we harnessed the effects of these changes to 

our benefit. 

Closing an FOB requires an understanding of the problem, systems to track progress and enforce directives, 

and dedicated personnel empowered to act. Leaders with 

authority, staffs with plans, and Soldiers with bolt cutters made FOB closure possible. There are countless officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers who made the 

closure of FOB Salerno possible—on time and beyond initial expectations.

Endnote: 

1

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

Major Sawser is the executive officer of the 4th Brigade 

Special Troops Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st 

Airborne Division. He holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering management from the U.S. Military Academy, a master’s 

degree in civil engineering from the University of Missouri–

Rolla (now Missouri University of Science and Technology), 

and a master’s degree in industrial engineering from Texas 

A&M University.

Afghan contractors disassemble 

the FOB Salerno 

incinerator for 

repurposing on 

the local ecomony.
January–April 2014 Engineer 47

Assuring mobility is the cornerstone of the Task 

Force Bayonet mission in Afghanistan. An integral 

.part of this robust task force are the “Otters” of the 

1438th Multirole Bridge Company (MRBC). From conducting monthly bridge inspections along Highway 1 throughout each regional command, retrograding bridge equipment, 

training Afghan partners in the Ministry of Public Works, 

and being constantly prepared to execute theater emergency 

bridge repairs, the 1438th MRBC bridges the gap to create 

enduring solutions. 

The Tom Bridge in Helmand Province is key to maintaining lines of communication along Highway 1. Built across 

the Helmand River in 1964 by the Soviet Union, the bridge 

is an essential artery, providing commerce for local nationals and facilitating combat and retrograde operations in 

Regional Command–Southwest. After an improvised explosive device struck a logistic convoy in the spring of 2012, 

damage to the bridge needed repairs. Overbridging was 

the best temporary course of action, but a long-term solution was critical for future operations. Overbridging is the 

primary means to rapidly restore a line of communication 

by augmenting existing bridges or spans using standard or 

tactical bridging.1

 A previous MRBC had emplaced a six-bay 

Mabey-Johnson bridge. As local work progressed through 

the regional Department of Public Works, the bridge had 

to be moved 1 meter to allow the contractor to work underneath it. After conducting several reconnaissance missions, 

the 1438th added a span to the existing overbridge to allow 

the contractor to complete his work. This shift of the bridge 

then facilitated a permanent Afghan solution to Tom Bridge. 

Approximately a month later, the 1438th removed the overbridge from the repaired section. 

Gap-Crossing Planning and Doctrine

We never truly appreciate gap-crossing operations

until faced with these natural obstacles in a 

deployed environment. A unit must observe the 

following six fundamentals for gap-crossing operations:

■ Surprise.

■ Extensive preparation.

■ Flexible planning.

■ Traffic management.

■ Organization.

■ Speed.2

Task Force Bayonet achieved these fundamentals 

through persistent communication and representation at the

combined and joint levels. Communication was critical to

By Captain Dane M. Hanson
48 Engineer January–April 2014

understand, visualize, describe, direct, and assess the operation. The use of gap-crossing terminology and graphics displayed how the mission was planned, resourced, and executed. Understanding doctrine enabled multiple intertwined 

players to communicate modifications due to the mission, 

enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil 

considerations. 

Planning for this operation required cooperation from 

a variety of personnel ranging from Regional Command–

Southwest down to the crossing site commander. Task Force 

Bayonet worked with the civil affairs section of the provincial reconstruction team at Lashkar Gah, the operations and 

engineer staffs of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Force, and 

Task Force Helmand and Manoeuvre Battlegroup at Camp 

Bastion. Due to the amount of information being transferred 

among players, the operations staff from Regional Command–Southwest gathered everyone into an operational 

planning team to ensure that the mission was coordinated, 

synchronized, and supported. Task Force Bayonet worked 

closely with Task Force Helmand and North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization authorities under the 4th Battalion, Royal Regiment of Scotland. To support clearance operations around 

the bridge, Task Force Bayonet brought in a U.S. Marine 

Corps explosive ordnance disposal unit and a Regional 

Command–Southwest dog team. Task Force Bayonet also

provided a squad-size element of sappers from the 82d 

Engineer Support Company to support route and 

area clearance and provide inner cordon security 

at the crossing site. Through participation in mission analysis, course of action development, and 

war games, the maneuver battle group clearly 

understood the capabilities of the 1438th MRBC 

and how the bridge repair force planned to execute 

the mission. Task Force Bayonet provided support to all planning processes, to include intelligence products about past significant activity and 

potential route bypasses in the worst-case scenario 

for the bridge repair. The efforts by the Task

Force Bayonet team contributed to a shared understanding with the joint partners.

Before the operation, the crossing area commander offered the following Cs for everyone to 

focus on:

■ Complexity. Understand the mission, friendly

force locations, and the scheme of maneuver.

■ Complacency. Focus on security during a

controlled withdrawal since the mission will

extend into the early hours of the morning.

■ Communication. Ensure that rehearsals are

conducted, that systems can work with each

other, and that liaisons are placed with

key leaders.

■ Coordination. Work with the same maps

and graphics so that reporting is not confused.

■ Composure. Remain cool under pressure; be

wary of the threat of suicide, vehicle-borne, improvised

explosive devices; and be prepared to engage, with force, 

if necessary.

The joint operational team adhered to these five Cs in 

accordance with combined arms gap-crossing doctrine in the 

execution phase.3

Execution

Phase I: Advance to the gap. Before executing this 

phase, an extensive reconnaissance was conducted 

with imagery, maps, and previous on-site visits to 

the bridge. The 1438th MRBC platoon leader (the crossing 

site commander) was responsible for the crossing means and 

the command of the engineers operating within the crossing 

area. He was familiar with the site and planned the location 

of the modified engineer equipment park. 

An engineer equipment park should be located close 

enough to the bridging site for assembling, preparing, and 

storing bridging equipment and material without interfering with traffic at the site. In this case, the advance to the 

gap did not require an extensive amount of bridging equipment, since the overbridge was already emplaced. However, 

since this route was highly traveled, understanding population density, traffic patterns, and timing was paramount for 

the advance to the gap. Following the timely movement of 

A Soldier observes the initial phase of Afghan contractor construction of the structure beneath the Tom Bridge overbridge.
Engineer 49

joint maneuver forces securing the near side and the establishment of traffic control posts by Afghanistan National 

Security Forces and Afghan Uniform Police partners, the 

conditions were set for the 1438th MRBC Soldiers to conduct 

bridging operations. 

Phase II: Assault across the gap. Unlike the case in 

traditional gap-crossing operations, we had the benefit of 

friendly forces on the far side. Objectives on the near side 

and far side were secured simultaneously. Our Afghan partners set up traffic control points 

at major intersections leading 

into the bridgehead to prevent 

local traffic interference while 

the 1438th was on-site completing 

bridge repairs. 

Phase III: Advance from the

far side. During the entire operation, constant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance were 

available. The crossing area commander and the joint staff had 

visualization of the avenues of 

approach toward the bridgehead 

and of the bridgehead itself. (The 

bridgehead is an area on the enemy’s side of the obstacle that is large 

enough to accommodate most of the 

crossing force, has adequate terrain 

to permit defense of the crossing 

sites, provides security from enemy 

direct fire for the crossing force, 

and provides a base for continuing the attack.) The friendly forces 

on the far side secured areas that 

could be defined as exit bank 

objectives, further denying 

and interdicting any insurgent 

threats or local national unrest 

outside the crossing area. 

Phase IV: Secure the 

bridgehead line. The bridgehead line was already secured 

and maintained by active 

Afghan patrols and traffic 

control points. The local face 

to this operation was imperative. The Afghan National 

Security Force and Afghan 

Uniform Police understood 

the importance of maintaining security around the critical infrastructure. This effort 

was furthered by an aggressive information operations 

campaign by the operational 

environment owner. Messages

were announced on local radio, through local shura councils, 

during meetings with the Department of Public Works, by 

provincial and local government authorities, and by word of 

mouth on the street. An information operations campaign 

spread the understanding that coalition forces were working 

with the Afghan people to provide an Afghan solution. Fortunately, local inhabitants were still upset that the insurgents had damaged the bridge, which was key to everyone’s 

livelihood. To their surprise, the 1438th completed bridge 

repairs in less than 8 hours after an initial estimate of 

January–April 2014

Soldiers from the 1438th MRBC inspect decking on an overbridge ramp.

Soldiers conduct reconnaissance of the Tom Bridge to determine the best course of 

action to remove the overbridge.
January–April 2014

10 hours, to the joy of local populace. Freedom of movement 

was restored before the morning rush hour traffic. 

Phase V: Continue the attack. This phase was strictly 

dependent on the success of the other four phases of the 

operation. While there was no attack involved, the positioning of friendly forces within the crossing area and bridgehead could have dealt with any threat. As a joint planning 

team, we recognized that the most likely time to encounter 

an insurgent threat was during withdrawal from the objective. The withdrawal plan was synchronized through communication from the crossing site commander’s updates to 

the forward command post. If a unit can withdraw to secure 

locations on both sides of the gap, it will have a smooth transition off the objective since the commander will need less 

combat power to travel back across the gap. 

Conclusion

Bridging is a combined arms effort and, in this case, was 

also a joint endeavor. Following doctrine and doctrinal templates not only worked but also helped make 

the operation easily articulated and understood. The mission 

was synchronized through a simple and clear decision support matrix. Mission command was clear. When planning for 

gap-crossing operations in combat, in general engineering, or 

during an exercise, it is imperative to use doctrine to bridge 

the gap in knowledge and experience. It is critical for the 

Engineer Regiment to ensure that its focus remains on what 

is so often neglected—bridging. This operation succeeded 

due to a degree of surprise; extensive preparation, coordination, and representation with coalition partners; flexible 

planning, with decision points identified by clear criteria; 

the ability to adjust schedules; traffic management through 

successful blocking and traffic control points implemented 

by Afghan and coalition partners; organization by effective 

mission command and liaison vehicles located with the tactical command post and crossing site commander; and the 

speed with which all parties fulfilled their respective tasks 

within the crossing area and bridgehead line.

Endnotes:

1

Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility Operations, 10 August 2011, p. F-8. 

2

Ibid., p. 4-5.

3

Lieutenant Colonel James Roddis, commanding officer, 

the Highlanders, 4th Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Scotland, Manoeuver Battlegroup, briefing presented at Camp 

Bastion, Afghanistan, November 2013.

Captain Hanson is the commander of the 34th Sapper 

Company, 84th Engineer Battalion. He holds a master’s 

degree in engineering management from Missouri University of Science and Technology at Rolla, and a bachelor’s 

degree in government and law from Lafayette College, 

Easton, Pennsylvania. When he wrote this article, he was 

the officer in charge of the Task Force Bayonet tactical command post at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan.

50 Engineer

Webster defines ready

As being prepared mentally or physically

For some experience or action,

Prepared for immediate use.

But with all due respect to Webster,

There’s ready,

And there’s Engineer Ready.

It’s a physical readiness.

It’s an emotional readiness.

It’s a readiness of character,

And a readiness of purpose.

It’s a readiness to do good today,

And a readiness to do well tomorrow.

It’s a readiness to obey,

And a readiness to command.

It’s a readiness to build,

And a readiness to tear down.

It’s a readiness to get yourself over,

And a readiness to get over yourself.

There is nothing on this green earth

That is more ready

Than the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Because there is nothing on this green earth

That’s more ready

Than the Soldiers and civilians 

Of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Army Strong, Engineer Ready!

—Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr.
January–April 2014 Engineer 51

The idea of educating engineers to understand geospatial engineering in support of tactical operations is 

not a new one. Over the past three decades, the Engineer Regiment has advocated that engineer officers become 

terrain experts at the tactical level. However, there has 

never been a dedicated training curriculum for officers for 

the application of geospatial engineering to tactical operations. The military occupational specialty-producing courses 

for warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted 

Soldiers provide excellent individual technical skills in geospatial engineering. The National Geospatial–Intelligence 

Agency previously offered joint-level courses on various 

geospatial topics, which included everything from learning 

to use FalconView® software in the Geospatial Information 

and Services for the Warrior Course to training topographic 

engineer officers to supervise the development of hardcopy 

mapping products in the legacy Topographic Officer Management Course at the National Geospatial–Intelligence 

Agency. Yet, no single course offered a complete understanding of how Army engineer officers could use geospatial engineering capabilities to address the full spectrum of tactical 

operations in which engineers could be involved. 

Development of Tactical 

Geospatial Knowledge

There is no course available that is dedicated to training Army personnel to use geospatial data for planning or conducting operations at the tactical level. No 

specific training on using geospatial engineering at the tactical level existed for commissioned officers. To address this 

gap in training, the 20th Engineer Brigade (Combat) developed a 24-hour course focused on educating officers assigned 

to positions requiring the application of geospatial engineering for tactical operations. The Geospatial Engineer Tactical 

Operations Course (GETOC) was developed by field grade 

officers who possessed operational and academic experience 

in the fields of tactical combat engineering and geospatial 

intelligence. 

The GETOC is a course “for geospatial engineers by geospatial engineers” that focuses on developing the geospatial 

knowledge of company grade Army engineer officers assigned 

to positions where a significant amount of geospatial engineering is applied to tactical operations. The course was 

designed to prepare new lieutenants to attain a level of baseline geospatial expertise to lead platoons in a geospatial engineer company. It was also designed to provide junior warrant 

officers with an understanding of how geospatial information and services can be applied to tactical operations in 

wartime, contingency, and disaster relief environments.

The objectives of the GETOC are—

■ Provide company grade geospatial engineering officers

with a fundamental understanding of how geospatial 

information and services are used for tactical military 

operations.

■ Familiarize students with common geospatial hardware,

software, and data.

■ Provide company grade leaders with fundamental geospatial concepts for planning and leading geospatial

operations at the tactical level.

Course Overview

The GETOC is a 3-day (24-hour), tactically based 

course that focuses on geospatial engineering support to warfighters engaged in land-based operations. It provides a fundamental understanding of geospatial engineering and common geospatial products. It also 

provides tactical-level leaders with a basic understanding of 

their roles and responsibilities concerning geospatial information and services. The course focuses on the application 

of geospatial information and products to tactical-level military operations. 

The GETOC does not provide any executive-level training or U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command military 

occupational specialty certification. That type of training is 

outside the charter of a tactical-level combat engineer brigade. The GETOC is not a joint, strategic, academic, or theoretical course; but it does introduce various concepts in those 

domains as they relate to tactical military operations. The 

GETOC does not educate students specifically on geospatial 

“First, the engineer officer must be able to connect geospatial engineering with tactical operations.” 

—Major R. Wendell Stevens1

By Lieutenant Colonel Jared L. Ware
52 Engineer January–April 2014

hardware or software packages, but provides an overview of 

Army geospatial systems and common geospatial software 

packages used by Army personnel at the tactical level. Also, 

the GETOC is not a geospatial intelligence course but it does 

explain what geospatial engineers do with respect to tactical 

geospatial intelligence operations. Although the course does 

not train students to conduct in-depth geospatial analysis, it 

does outline what is required to develop geospatial products 

that best enable tactical-level (squad to corps) mission sets.

The GETOC educates students in nine fundamental 

concepts and one capstone exercise: 

■ Geospatial information and services.

■ Geospatial data accuracy and data error.

■ Formats for digital geospatial data.

■ Geographic information systems.

■ Satellite imagery and remote sensing.

■ Global positioning system and digital surveying.

■ Digital terrain modeling.

■ Digital mapping.

■ Geospatial analysis.

■ Operation Caspian Tiger.

For the capstone exercise, Operation Caspian Tiger, students apply their geospatial knowledge to develop a geospatial operations brief for a Stryker brigade combat team 

movement to contact into an urban environment. The exercise challenges students to use real-world geospatial data in 

the area of interest. Students use Esri ArcReader® software 

for basic geospatial analysis. ArcReader is a free viewer 

that is compatible with Esri ArcGIS® software, which is resident on the Digital Topographic Support System and will 

remain as the geospatial suite of software embedded in the 

Distributed Common Ground System–Army. Students are 

required to work in small teams and complete the capstone 

exercise brief to receive full credit for the GETOC. The scenario further challenges students to support the brigade 

combat team civil affairs mission in subsequent phases of 

the operation.

Lessons Learned

Graduates from the GETOC have measurably 

improved their geospatial engineering aptitude, 

based on the results of the course examination. 

Based on the course after action review, 24 hours provide 

the proper amount of time and information to meet the 

baseline requirements for an introductory geospatial engineering course. This is also optimal for any Army National 

Guard and U.S. Army Reserve personnel who want to use 

the course as a flexible option for their geospatial engineering training. The nine fundamental concepts can be covered over a training weekend using certified instructors. 

The final exercise can be completed later, at a subsequent 

drill weekend or via digital media, at the discretion of the 

course director.

To add an element of credentialing, students who 

achieve all course requirements will receive a certificate of 

completion (suitable for framing) signed by the course 

director and a signed Department of the Army Form 87, 

Certificate of Training.

2

 Also, personnel who require documentation for geographic information systems professional 

certification requirements will receive a memorandum 

signed by the course director, who is a certified geographic 

systems professional.

Impact of GETOC

Acritical responsibility of any senior commander is to 

train junior officers on the engineering requirements 

.expected of them, and a concern in our brigade was 

the minimal amount of geospatial engineering curriculum 

currently available to officers. Major Stevens stated “the 

expert understands the limits and capabilities of [geospatial information and services] and can integrate them into 

the appropriate tactical language and processes.”3

 It is not 

expected that company grade officers will become technical geospatial experts or software gurus, but it is expected 

that they will possess a baseline expertise on the application of geospatial engineering when working within a brigade combat team, on a joint exercise with partner services 

or nations, or with a federal agency such as the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency in disaster relief operations. Educating engineer officers in geospatial engineering is nothing new. However, given the current resourceconstrained environment, geospatial engineer education 

is an area that requires more immediate solutions while 

expending minimum funding and resources. The catalyst for the GETOC was to present company grade officers assigned to the brigade with the relevant geospatial 

engineering knowledge required for Army- and land-based 

operations at the tactical level. With the development and 

implementation of the GETOC, graduates of the course 

can use what they learn to confidently tailor their future 

geospatial knowledge to what is required across the full 

spectrum of tactical operations, with the benefit of receiving a quality educational course at a cost of just 24 hours of 

their time.

Endnotes:

1

R. Wendell Stevens, “Enabling Engineer Officers as Terrain Experts,” thesis for master’s degree in military art and 

science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 June 2003, p. 23.

2

Department of the Army Form 87, Certificate of Training, 1 October 1978.

3

Stevens, p. 24.

Lieutenant Colonel Ware serves as the deputy brigade 

commander, 20th Engineer Brigade (Combat), Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. He holds an advanced degree in defense 

geographic information from the Royal School of Military 

Survey, Hermitage, England. 

PIN: 103077