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76–271 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–568 

THE SITUATION IN SYRIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 7, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

ANN E. SAUER, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

MARCH 7, 2012

Page 

Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary Of Defense ....................................................... 6 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ...................... 11 

(III) 

(1) 

THE SITUATION IN SYRIA 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in room SD– 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Nelson, Webb, Hagan, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, and 

Cornyn. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Jason W. 

Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. 

Noblet, professional staff member; and Roy F. Phillips, professional 

staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, professional 

staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Paul 

C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; and Daniel A. Lerner, 

professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd, Brian F. Sebold, and 

Bradley S. Watson. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator 

Reed; Ryan Ehly, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator 

Begich; Patrick Day, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana 

Broitman, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant 

to Senator Blumenthal; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator 

Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph 

Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan 

Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Sergio Sarkany, assistant to 

Senator Graham; and Dave Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to hear from Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, to 

update the committee on the situation in Syria and to discuss the 

policies of the administration with respect to Syria. 

2 

It was nearly a year ago that demonstrators in Syria peacefully 

took to the streets to call for an end to the rule of President Assad 

and demand an opportunity to choose a leader through a free and 

fair democratic process. Since those first days of the uprising, the 

world has watched as the Syrian people have continued to challenge the Assad regime’s tyrannical ways. As the weeks and 

months have passed, peaceful demonstrators have been killed. The 

tragedy unfolds daily. 

According to the United Nations’ (U.N.) most recent estimates, 

more than 7,500 people in Syria have been killed and at least 100 

more people are being killed each day. The Assad regime’s brutal 

crackdown has included gross human rights violations, use of force 

against civilians, torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary executions, sexual violence, and interference with access to medical 

treatment and other humanitarian assistance. These acts, when 

committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 

against civilian populations, as is the case in Syria, amount, in my 

view, to crimes against humanity. 

President Obama’s efforts to build a broad international coalition 

to put massive pressure on Assad have been met with opposition 

from China and Russia. They vetoed a proposal brought to the U.N. 

Security Council by the Arab League to establish a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, pluralistic political system. Despite 

these vetoes, the U.N. General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to 

condemn the Assad regime’s brutal use of force against civilians. 

Last week the Friends of Syria, which included representatives 

of the Syrian National Council, Secretary Clinton, and leaders from 

more than 60 other countries, came together in Tunis, the home of 

the first Arab Spring uprising, to forge a way forward in Syria, including a call for the Assad regime to end the violence, withdraw 

its forces from cities and towns, and ensure unhindered access for 

Arab League monitors. 

The Friends also praised the work of the Syrian National Council 

to form a broad and inclusive body and lay the groundwork for a 

political transition. Importantly, they agreed to continue to ratchet 

up the economic pressure through tough sanctions on the Assad 

family and its supporters. The dialogue in Tunis also included a robust dialogue about whether there is a feasible way to help those 

that are under assault by the Assad regime in order to defend 

themselves. 

As the international community continues to search for an avenue, there are a number of questions which we must ask about the 

nature of the conflict in Syria: what is the makeup of the Syrian 

opposition? How unified are they and would they be a force for democracy and humane governance should they succeed? What are 

the objectives of the opposition and who are their benefactors? Is 

there a political entity, such as the Syrian National Council, that 

is capable of uniting the small bands of fighters across Syria and 

then coordinating the efforts of the opposition groups against the 

Syrian military? Have violent extremist elements infiltrated the opposition movement? 

The military questions are, of course, equally important: what 

are the military options available? What are the military actions 

that could be taken and who would they need to be taken by to 

3 

maximize the chances of success, and what are the risks and down 

sides to each option? These are just a few of the questions that we 

hope to discuss with our witnesses this morning. 

Just as was the case with Libya, there is a broad consensus 

among regional leaders and organizations on the preferred outcome 

in Syria: Assad and his cronies must go. There is not, however, a 

consensus about how this goal can be achieved. Each situation is 

different. Unlike Qadhafi, who prevented the formation of a capable and professional fighting force, President Assad and his father 

before him built a substantial and professional military with a 

modern air defense capability, a large deadly stockpile of chemical 

weapons, and well-trained troops. So far, this military establishment has remained mainly cohesive and willing to carry out 

Assad’s brutal order to conduct a violent campaign against his people. 

Some observers believe the uprising in Syria, which is led by the 

Sunni majority, could aggravate sectarian tensions beyond Syria’s 

borders in a region already riven by religious and ethnic divisions 

over power and territory. Syria is also home to an ethnically and 

religiously diverse population that includes minority Christian, 

Alawite, and Druze populations. Some religious leaders are raising 

concerns about the situation in Syria devolving to the point where 

there is little tolerance for religious minorities, a situation all too 

familiar to us following the invasion of Iraq. 

We must also try to understand the impact of the conflict in 

Syria on the region. Elements of Hezbollah and Hamas call Syria 

home. Perhaps more importantly, it is Iran’s sole ally in the Arab 

world. Iran uses Syria and the terrorist organizations it protects to 

carry out its destabilizing agenda in the region. Syria is also home 

to a Russian naval installation, Russia’s only regular port of call 

in the Mediterranean. These are but some aspects of the situation 

that need to be considered as we develop a path forward. 

Our witnesses have the responsibility to provide the President 

options to address these challenges and to provide him their best 

professional advice as to the pros and cons of such options. As the 

committee heard from General Dempsey last month, the Joint Staff 

has already begun the careful planning necessary to support a full 

range of potential operations, including, I’m sure, humanitarian 

airlifts, naval monitoring of multilateral sanctions, aerial surveillance of the Syrian military, and aerial enforcement of safe havens. 

We look forward to discussing these options and many others with 

our witnesses this morning. 

We thank you both for being here this morning. We are grateful 

for your steady leadership and we also appreciate your very positive relationship with this committee and its members. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in 

welcoming our distinguished witnesses. Let me thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for convening today’s hearing on the horrific situation 

in Syria. The urgency of this hearing has only grown more important over the past several weeks. It’s estimated that nearly 7,500 

4 

lives have been lost and many informed observers even think that 

that figure could be low. 

Syria today is the scene of some of the worst state-sponsored violence since the Balkans. What is all the more astonishing is that 

the violence continues despite the severe international pressure 

that has been brought against Assad and his regime. Syria is almost completely isolated diplomatically and the regime is facing a 

punishing array of economic sanctions imposed by the United 

States, the European Union (EU), the Arab League, and others. 

This has been an impressive international effort and the administration deserves credit for helping to orchestrate it. Unfortunately, the violence continues and, worse, it appears to be escalating. Assad seems to be accelerating his fight to the finish, and 

he’s doing so with the active support thus far of Russia, China, and 

Iran. A steady supply of weapons, ammunition, and other assistance is flowing to Assad from Moscow and Teheran and, as the 

Washington Post reported on Sunday, Iranian military and intelligence operatives are likely working in Syria to strengthen the regime’s crackdown. 

General Mattis testified to this committee yesterday that ‘‘Assad 

is clearly achieving what he wants to achieve,’’ that Assad’s military campaign is ‘‘gaining physical momentum on the battlefield,’’ 

and that in General Mattis’ opinion Assad will ‘‘continue to employ 

heavier and heavier weapons on his people.’’ 

Similarly, General Ronald Burgess, the Director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, and James Clapper, the Director of National 

Intelligence, both told this committee recently that, absent some 

kind of external intervention, Assad would likely remain in power 

for the foreseeable future. 

The United States has a clear national security interest in stopping the slaughter in Syria and forcing Assad to leave power. The 

end of the Assad regime could sever Hezbollah’s lifeline to Iran, 

eliminate a longstanding threat to Israel, bolster Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, and remove a committed state sponsor 

of terrorism that is engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction. It would be a geopolitical success of the first order and, 

as General Mattis told this committee yesterday, ‘‘the biggest strategic setback for Iran in 25 years.’’ 

The President has made it an objective of the United States that 

the killing in Syria must stop and that Assad must go. The President has committed our prestige and our credibility to that goal 

and it is the right goal. But the killing continues. 

What opposition groups in Syria need most urgently is relief 

from Assad’s tank and artillery sieges in the many cities that are 

still contested. But time is running out. Assad’s forces are on the 

march. Providing military assistance to the Free Syrian Army 

(FSA) and other opposition groups is necessary, but at this late 

hour that alone will not be sufficient to stop the slaughter and save 

innocent lives. 

The only realistic way to do so is with foreign air power, which 

could break Assad’s siege of contested cities in Syria, protect key 

population centers, and help the opposition to Assad on the ground 

to establish and defend safe havens in Syria where they can organize and plan their political and military activities against Assad. 

5 

At the request of the Syrian National Council, the FSA, and local 

coordinating committees inside the country, the United States 

should help to lead such a military effort in Syria. But, as I have 

repeatedly said, this does not mean we should go it alone. We 

should not. We should seek the active involvement of key Arab 

partners such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, and Qatar, and willing allies in the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), the most important of which in this case is Turkey. 

Rather than closing off the prospects for a negotiated transition 

that is acceptable to Syria’s opposition, military intervention is now 

needed to strengthen this option. Assad needs to know that he will 

not win and, unfortunately, that is not the case now. 

To the contrary, Assad seems convinced that he can wipe out the 

opposition through violence and is fully committed to doing so. The 

ideal political outcome of military intervention would be to change 

this dynamic, to prevent a long and bloody fight to the finish by 

compelling Assad and his top lieutenants to give up power without 

further bloodshed, thereby creating the opportunity for a peaceful 

transition to democracy, possibly along the lines proposed by the 

Arab League. 

To be sure, there are legitimate questions about the efficacy of 

military options in Syria and equally legitimate concerns about 

their risks and uncertainties. It is understandable that the administration is reluctant to move beyond diplomacy and sanctions. Unfortunately, this policy is increasingly disconnected from the dire 

conditions on the ground in Syria, which has become a full state 

of armed conflict. 

Secretary Panetta, you were Chief of Staff to President Clinton 

during much of the debate over Bosnia in the 1990s, including the 

NATO bombing campaign. More than any of us, perhaps, you remember the many painful years when the U.N. and the EU kept 

sending envoys to Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs pleading with 

them to agree to reasonable requests, such as lifting the siege of 

Sarajevo and allowing access to humanitarian assistance. You also 

remember how the Serb leaders cynically used these diplomatic entreaties to buy time to continue their killing. 

In Bosnia and later in Kosovo, we heard many arguments 

against military intervention. It was said there was no international consensus for action, that the situation on the ground was 

messy and confused, that it was not clear who we would actually 

be helping on the ground, and that our involvement could actually 

make matters worse. 

We heard all these arguments about Bosnia, Mr. Secretary, and 

now we hear them about Syria again today. We overcame them in 

Bosnia, thank God, and now we must overcome them in the case 

of Syria. 

I want to close by reading how President Clinton described Bosnia in 1995: ‘‘Nowhere today is the need for American leadership 

more stark or more immediate than in Bosnia. For nearly 4 years, 

a terrible war has torn Bosnia apart. Horrors we prayed had been 

banished from Europe forever had been seared into our minds 

again.’’ 

President Clinton went on to say, ‘‘There are times and places 

where our leadership can mean the difference between peace and 

6 

war and where we can defend our fundamental values as a people 

and serve our most basic strategic interests. There are still times 

when America and America alone can and should make the difference for peace.’’ 

Those were the words of a Democratic President who led America 

to do the right thing in helping stop mass atrocities in the Balkans. 

I remember working with my Republican friend and leader Bob 

Dole to support President Clinton in that endeavor. The question 

for another Democratic President today and for all of us in positions of leadership and responsibility is whether we will allow similar mass atrocities to continue in Syria or whether we will do what 

it takes to stop them. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Secretary Panetta. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary PANETTA. Chairman Levin and Senator McCain: Thank 

you for the opportunity to be able to discuss with you the ongoing 

violence in Syria. This tragedy has justifiably evoked the concern 

and outrage of the U.S. Government, the American people, and 

much of the world. 

At the outset, I would like to stress that the President and a 

broad cross-section of the international community have stated unequivocally that Bashar Al-Assad must halt his campaign of killing 

and crimes against his own people now. He must step aside and 

he must allow a democratic transition to proceed immediately. Furthermore, through its repeated violations of human rights any government that indiscriminately kills its own people loses its legitimacy. This regime has lost its legitimacy and its right to rule the 

country. 

This situation demands an international response and for that 

reason the United States has been leading efforts within the international community to pressure Assad to stop his violence against 

the Syrian people and to step aside. Unfortunately, this terrible situation has no simple answers, and so the result is a great deal of 

anger and frustration that we all share. There are some members 

who are concerned about whether we are doing enough to stem the 

violence in Syria, and that’s understandable. There are others who 

are concerned about the dangers of involving ourselves in still another conflict in that part of the world, and that too is understandable. 

Let me try and address these concerns by providing some context 

for what is guiding the administration’s views on Syria and our actions in response to the violence. The turmoil in Syria is clearly 

part of a larger transformation that has been reshaping the Arab 

world for more than a year. The change we’ve seen has manifested 

itself in different ways, sometimes through peaceful protests and 

negotiations aimed at a more responsive government, but also in 

other cases in violent uprisings and brutal crackdowns from repressive regimes. 

Many countries have been affected by these changes and, although each conflict has its own dynamic, it is part of a broader 

7 

trend that is fundamentally and irreversibly reshaping the politics 

of the Arab world. Although this is clearly a challenging and unpredictable period of time, our goal must be to encourage governments to do more to ensure that their people can live in peace and 

prosperity. 

As a global leader with a vital interest in the stability of the 

broader Middle East, this administration has been determined to 

do everything we can to positively shape the course of events in the 

Middle East. But each situation by virtue of the politics, geography, 

and history of each country is unique and demands a unique response. There can be no cookie-cutter approach for a region as complex and volatile as the Middle East. 

Nevertheless, from the outset we have made clear that our response has been guided by three fundamental principles. First, we 

oppose the use of violence and repression by regimes against their 

own people. Second, we have supported the exercise of universal 

rights—right to freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, the 

prohibition against discrimination, and the right to vote through 

genuine elections that express the will of the electorate. Third, we 

support political and economic reforms that can meet the legitimate 

aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region. These basic 

principles have shaped our response to Tunisia, to Egypt, to Libya, 

and now Syria. 

The violence there has become increasingly dire and outrageous. 

As Secretary Clinton has noted, the Assad regime has ignored 

every warning, squandered every opportunity, and broken every 

agreement. We are forging an international consensus that the 

Assad regime’s brutality must end and that a democratic transition 

in Syria must begin. 

Although China and Russia have repeatedly blocked the U.N. Security Council from taking action, the U.N. General Assembly has 

given full support to the Arab League’s transition plan, delivering 

a clear message from the international community that the Assad 

regime has lost its legitimacy, and there are continuing efforts to 

try and agree on a Security Council resolution as we speak. 

The administration’s focus now is on translating that international consensus into action along four tracks. First, we are 

working to increase the diplomatic and political isolation of the 

Assad regime and encouraging other countries to join the United 

States, the EU, and the Arab League in imposing sanctions on the 

Assad regime. These sanctions are having a significant impact. 

Second, we are providing emergency humanitarian assistance to 

the Syrian people, with an initial commitment of $10 million, and 

we are working to broaden our efforts at relief. 

Third, we are working with the Friends of Syria and other 

groups to help strengthen the opposition, to try to encourage the 

various opposing groups to unify and lay a groundwork for a peaceful, orderly transition to a democratic government, a government 

that recognizes and respects the rights of all Syrians, including minorities. 

Fourth, we are reviewing all possible additional steps that can be 

taken with our international partners to support the efforts to proVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:46 Oct 19, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76271.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
8 

tect the Syrian people, to end the violence and ensure regional stability, including potential military options, if necessary. 

This approach has succeeded in putting unprecedented pressure 

on Assad, but it is clear that there is no simple or quick solution 

to this crisis. We believe that the best resolution to this crisis will 

be a peaceful political, democratic transition led by the Syrian people along the lines suggested by the Arab League. We believe 

there’s still an opportunity to try to achieve that goal. 

Although we will not rule out any future course of action, currently the administration is focusing on diplomatic and political approaches, rather than military intervention. Guided by our approach from Libya and elsewhere, we believe it is important in this 

instance that we do the following: that we build multilateral international consensus for any action that is taken; two, that we maintain clear regional support from the Arab world; three, that we 

make substantial U.S. contributions to the international effort, especially where the United States has unique resources that can be 

brought to bear; four, we need to have a clear legal basis for any 

action that we take; and five, keep all options on the table, but recognize that there are limitations of military force, especially with 

U.S. boots-on-the-ground. 

Each situation, as I said, is unique and, as I’ve said, there is no 

simple solution here. The reasons for the differences between our 

approach with Libya and the current approach to Syria are clear. 

Although there has been widespread support in the Security Council and the Arab League for military intervention in Libya, no such 

consensus currently exists with regards to Syria. 

For us to act unilaterally would be a mistake. It is not clear what 

constitutes the Syrian armed opposition. There has been no single 

unifying military alternative that can be recognized, appointed, or 

contacted. While the opposition is fighting back and military defections and desertions are on the rise, the Syrian regime continues 

to maintain a strong military. As Secretary Clinton has noted, 

there is every possibility of a civil war, and a direct outside intervention in these conditions not only would not prevent that, but 

could make it worse. 

Even though our current approach is focused on achieving a political solution to this crisis, the Assad regime should take no comfort. The pressure is building on the regime every day, and make 

no mistake, one way or another this regime will meet its end. We 

will continue to evaluate the situation and we will adjust our approach as necessary. 

Let me close by briefly addressing the United States’ broader 

strategic interest in Syria and the region. The stability of Syria is 

vital to this region and to Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel. All 

of these countries and the United States have a strong interest in 

preventing a humanitarian crisis in Syria. But perhaps most notably, Syria is a pivotal country for Iran. As Senator McCain pointed 

out, Syria is Iran’s only state ally in the region and is crucial to 

Iran’s efforts to support those militants throughout the region who 

threaten Israel and threaten regional stability. 

Unrest in Syria has already greatly weakened Iran’s position in 

the region and it is clear that Iran only stands to lose further as 

Assad is weakened further. As groups such as Hamas distance 

9 

themselves from the Assad regime, Iran is quickly becoming the 

Assad regime’s lone backer. This shows the world the hypocrisy of 

Teheran. 

I cannot predict how this volatile situation in Syria will unfold, 

but the United States has made clear that we are on the side of 

the Syrian people. They must know that the international community has not underestimated either their suffering or their impatience. We all wish there was a clear and unambiguous way forward to directly influence the events in Syria. That unfortunately 

is not the case. That is not an excuse; that is reality. 

Our only clear path is to keep moving in a resolute, determined, 

but deliberate, manner with the international community to find a 

way to return Syria to the Syrian people. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. LEON E. PANETTA

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain. Thank you for calling this hearing to discuss 

the ongoing violence in Syria, which has justifiably evoked the concern and outrage 

of the U.S. Government, the American people, and much of the world. 

At the outset, I would like to stress that President Obama has stated unequivocally that Bashar al-Assad must halt his campaign of killing and crimes against his 

own people now. He must step aside and allow a democratic transition to proceed 

immediately. Furthermore, through its repeated violations of human rights, the regime has lost its legitimacy, and its right to rule the country. This situation demands an international response, and for that reason the United States has been 

leading efforts within the international community to pressure Assad to stop his violence against the Syrian people and step aside. 

I know that there are some members who are concerned about whether we are 

doing enough to stem the violence in Syria and that is understandable. There are 

others who are concerned about the dangers of involving ourselves in still another 

conflict in this part of the world and that too is understandable. 

Let me address these concerns by providing some context for what is guiding the 

administration’s views on Syria and our actions in response to the violence. 

The turmoil in Syria is clearly part of a larger transformation that has been reshaping the Arab world for more than a year. The change we’ve seen manifests 

itself through peaceful protests and negotiations aimed at more responsive governments in some cases, but also in violent uprisings and brutal crackdowns from repressive regimes in other cases. Many countries have been affected by these 

changes. Although each situation has been unique, it is part of a broader trend that 

is fundamentally and irreversibly reshaping the politics of the Arab world. 

Although this is clearly a challenging and unpredictable period of time, our goal 

must be governments that will do more to ensure that their people live in peace and 

prosperity. 

As a global leader with a vital interest in the stability of the broader Middle East, 

this administration has been determined to do everything we can to positively shape 

the course of events in the Middle East. Each situation—by virtue of the politics, 

geography, and history of each country—is unique, and demands a unique response. 

There can be no cookie cutter approach for a region as complex and volatile as the 

Middle East. 

Nevertheless, from the outset, we have made clear that our response has been 

guided by three fundamental principles: 

• First, we oppose the use of violence and repression by regimes against 

their own people; 

• Second, we have supported the exercise of universal human rights— 

which include the right to freedom of expression, the right of peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the prohibition against discrimination, and the right to vote through genuine elections that express the will of the electorate, and; 

• Third, we support political and economic reforms that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region. 

These basic principles have shaped our response to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and 

now Syria. The violence there has become increasingly dire and outrageous. As SecVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:46 Oct 19, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76271.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
10 

retary Clinton has noted, the Assad regime has ignored every warning, squandered 

every opportunity, and broken every agreement. We are forging an international 

consensus that the Assad regime’s brutality must end and that a democratic transition in Syria must begin. Although China and Russia have repeatedly blocked the 

UN Security Council from taking action, the U.N. General Assembly has given full 

support to the Arab League’s transition plan—delivering a clear message from the 

international community that the Assad regime has lost its legitimacy. 

The administration’s focus now is on translating that international consensus into 

action, along four tracks: 

• First, we are working to increase the diplomatic and political isolation of 

the Assad regime—and encouraging other countries to join the United 

States, European Union, and Arab League in imposing sanctions on the 

Assad regime; 

• Second, we are providing emergency humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people, with an initial commitment of $10 million; 

• Third, we are working with the Friends of Syria and other groups to help 

strengthen the opposition, encouraging it to unify and lay the groundwork 

for a peaceful, orderly transition to a democratic government that recognizes and respects the rights of all Syrians, including minorities; and 

• Fourth, we are reviewing all possible additional steps that can be taken 

with our international partners to support efforts to protect the Syrian people, end the violence, and ensure regional stability, including potential military options if necessary. 

This approach has succeeded in putting unprecedented pressure on Assad, but it 

is clear that there is no simple or quick solution to this crisis. We believe that the 

best resolution to this crisis will be a peaceful, political, democratic transition led 

by the Syrian people and along the lines suggested by the Arab League. We believe 

there is still an opportunity to achieve that goal. 

Although we will not rule out any future course of action, currently the administration is focusing on diplomatic and political approaches rather than a military 

intervention. Guided by our approach from Libya and elsewhere, we believe it is important in this instance that we: 

• Build multi-lateral, international consensus for any action taken; 

• Maintain clear regional support from the Arab world; 

• Make substantial U.S. contributions to the international effort, especially 

where the United States has unique resources that can be brought to bear; 

• Have a clear legal basis for any action; and 

• Keep all options on the table, but recognize the limitation of military 

force, especially U.S. boots-on-the-ground. 

However, each situation is unique and there is no simple solution to the situation 

in Syria. The reasons for a different approach between our approach with Libya and 

current approach to Syria are clear: 

• Although there was widespread support in the Security Council and the 

Arab League for military intervention in Libya, no such consensus currently 

exists regarding Syria; 

• It is not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed opposition—there has 

been no single unifying military alternative that can be recognized, appointed, or contacted. While the opposition is fighting back and military defections and desertions are on the rise, the Syrian regime continues to 

maintain a strong military. For us to act unilaterally would be a mistake; 

• As Secretary Clinton has noted, there is every possibility of a civil war, 

and an outside intervention in these conditions would not prevent that, but 

could expedite it and make it worse. 

Even though our current approach is focused on achieving a political solution to 

this crisis, the Assad regime should take no comfort. The pressure is building on 

the regime every day. Make no mistake—one way or another, this regime will meet 

its end. We will continue to evaluate the situation and adjust our approach as necessary. 

Let me close by briefly addressing the United States’ broader strategic interests 

in Syria and the region. The stability of Syria is vital to the region—and to Turkey, 

Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel. All of these countries and the United States have a 

strong interest in preventing a humanitarian crisis in Syria. 

But perhaps most notably, Syria is a pivotal country for Iran. Syria is Iran’s only 

state ally in the region, and is crucial to Iran’s efforts to support those militants 

throughout the region who threaten Israel and regional stability. Unrest in Syria 

has already greatly weakened Iran’s position in the region, and it is clear that Iran 

11 

only stands to lose further as Assad is weakened further. As groups such as Hamas 

distance themselves from the Assad regime, Iran is quickly becoming the Assad regime’s lone backer. This shows the world the hypocrisy of Tehran. 

I cannot predict how this volatile situation in Sryia will unfold, but the United 

States has made clear that we are on the side of the Syrian people. They must know 

that the international community has not underestimated either their suffering or 

their impatience. We all wish there was a clear and unambiguous way forward to 

directly influence the events in Syria. That unfortunately is not the case. That is 

not a excuse—that is the reality. Our only clear path is to keep moving in a resolute, determined but deliberate manner with the international community to find 

a way to return Syria to the Syrian people. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

General Dempsey. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, 

distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today and discuss the evolving situation 

in Syria. The situation is tragic for the people of Syria and for the 

region. Real democratic reform should have been the Assad regime’s response to last year’s peaceful protests. Instead, the regime 

responded with brutality. 

Syria’s internal convulsions are having consequences for a region 

already in turmoil. Refugees are fleeing. Spillover into neighboring 

countries is an increasing concern. We also need to be alert to the 

movement of extremists and other hostile actors seeking to exploit 

this situation. We need to be especially alert to the fate of Syria’s 

chemical and biological weapons. They must stay exactly where 

they are. 

With other conscientious nations, the United States is applying 

diplomatic and economic pressure on the regime to compel Assad 

and his accomplices to stop killing their own. Our military’s role 

has been limited to this point to sharing information with our regional partners. But should we be called on to help secure U.S. interests in other ways, we will be ready. We maintain an agile regional and global posture. We have solid military relationships 

with every country on Syria’s borders. 

Should we be called, our responsibility is clear: Provide the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States with options. All options will be judged in terms of their suitability, their 

feasibility, and their acceptability. We have a further responsibility 

to articulate risk and the potential implications for our other global 

commitments. 

In closing, I want to assure this committee, you, and the Nation 

that America’s Armed Forces are always ready to answer our Nation’s call. I am prepared to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA 

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee, I 

appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the evolving situation in Syria. 

The situation is tragic—for the people of Syria and for the region. Real democratic 

reform should have been the Assad regime’s response to last year’s peaceful protests. Instead, the regime responded with brutality. When ordinary Syrians tried to 

defend their homes, the regime opened up with an arsenal of heavy weapons. When 

12 

the Arab League acted to end the bloodshed, Damascus actually escalated the violence. 

The Syrian people are suffering. These internal convulsions are having consequences for a region already in turmoil. Refugees are fleeing. Spillover into neighboring countries—each one a partner or ally of ours—is an increasing concern. 

We also need to be alert to extremists—who may return to well-trod ratlines running through Damascus—and other hostile actors—including Iran—which has been 

exploiting the situation and expanding its support to the regime. We need to be especially alert to the fate of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons. They need to 

stay exactly where they are. 

The regime’s brutality has catalyzed a growing international consensus to compel 

Assad and his accomplices to stop killing their own. With other conscientious nations, the United States is applying diplomatic and economic pressure on the regime, supporting the opposition, and providing humanitarian assistance. 

Our military’s role has been limited to sharing information with our regional partners—each one very capable in its own right. 

Should the Armed Forces of the United States be called on to help secure U.S. 

interests in other ways, we will be ready. We maintain an agile regional and global 

posture. We have solid military relationships with every country on Syria’s border. 

We know how to integrate our unique capabilities with others. 

Should we be called, our responsibility is clear—provide the Secretary of Defense 

and the President with options. This is what the Nation expects of us. 

Any potential option needs to be judged in terms of several criteria. One is suitability—whether the actions will help produce the intended outcome. Another is feasibility—whether we can accomplish the mission with the time and resources available. We will also consider its acceptability—whether the action is worth the cost 

and is consistent with law. 

We have a further responsibility to articulate risk. All options require us to take 

some risk—time and capacity have limits. All options also come with unintended 

consequences. We can anticipate some, but many we cannot. Therefore, we need to 

be clear-eyed about the potential implications for our other global responsibilities. 

In closing, I want to assure you and the Nation. America’s Armed Forces are always ready to answer our Nation’s call. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. 

Let’s try 7-minute rounds for questions. 

Secretary Panetta, the Arab League has proposed a transition 

plan. Has the Arab League requested military intervention in 

Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. It has not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did they support military intervention in 

Libya? 

Secretary PANETTA. They did. 

Chairman LEVIN. What explains the difference? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think they share some of the same concerns 

that we do with regards to the situation in Syria and just exactly 

what kind of military action would have the kind of impact that we 

all desire. Because of the divisions within the opposition, because 

of the situation that is occurring there and it’s volatile and unpredictable, I think that those concerns have impacted on their decisionmaking here. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Dempsey, you’ve made reference to 

putting together options for the President should he decide to move 

in one direction or another. Without telling us what you would recommend, can you give us a menu of military options which might 

be available? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I can actually discuss them in greater detail in closed session if you choose to do that. But you mentioned 

the principal options in your opening statement, which would include humanitarian relief, no-fly zone, maritime interdiction, humanitarian corridor, and limited aerial strikes, for example. 

13 

We’re at what I would describe the commander’s estimate level 

of detail, not detailed planning; have not been briefed to the President, have been discussed with the President’s National Security 

staff, and, as General Mattis testified yesterday, the next step 

would be to take whatever options we deem to be feasible into the 

next level of planning. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would the use of air power against their troops 

be an option? Tell us about the air defenses that Syria has? 

General DEMPSEY. First of all, we’re extraordinarily capable and 

we can do just about anything we’re asked to do. In doing it, we 

have some considerations that we would make in terms of whether 

we would do it alone or with partners, as Senator McCain said 

clearly. We generally, in fact always, provide a better outcome and 

a more enduring outcome when we work with partners, especially 

in that part of the world. 

The ability to do a single raid-like strike would be accessible to 

us. The ability to do a longer-term sustained campaign would be 

challenging and would have to be made in the context of other commitments around the globe. I’ll just say this about their air defenses: they have—and again, I can speak more openly in a closed 

session about their exact capabilities, approximately five times 

more sophisticated air defense systems than existed in Libya, covering one-fifth of the terrain. All of their air defenses are arrayed 

on their western border, which is their population center. So 5 

times the air defense of Libya, covering one-fifth of the terrain, and 

about 10 times more than we experienced in Serbia. 

Chairman LEVIN. Has NATO taken up the issue of some kind of 

an intervention militarily in Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. Not at this point. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would it not be useful as a either preliminary 

consideration or as an important signal to the Libyan regime that 

at least NATO take up the question? 

Secretary PANETTA. I believe that NATO ought to take up the 

question. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you make sure that that happens, or recommend at least to the President that that be done? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think that would be an important signal to 

the Syrian regime. 

General Mattis recently indicated to the committee that President Assad’s regime is going to fall, and he said it’s just a matter 

of when and not if. Do you share that assessment and are you as 

confident that that will happen, and do you attach any conditions 

to that happening? Secretary, let me start with you. 

Secretary PANETTA. I’ve heard the intelligence and I share the 

assessment that it isn’t a matter of if he’ll fall, but when. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that dependent on our actions or other actions against him, or is that going to happen even with the current 

momentum and the current status quo continuing? 

Secretary PANETTA. I’ve asked the same question of our Intelligence Community and I think their view is that the state of this 

insurgency is so deep right now and will continue into the future 

that ultimately he will fall one way or the other. 

14 

Chairman LEVIN. General, can you tell us what capabilities there 

are to get additional weapons to the insurgents or the opposition, 

and also tell us what weapons Assad is getting and from what 

source? If you can try to give us as best you can the type of weapons that could be provided to the opposition and what weapons are 

actually going into Assad and from where? 

General DEMPSEY. I can’t speak in open session about the source 

of his weapons, except to say that he has some security arrangements with others, both in the region and outside the region, to 

provide weapons, what we would describe in our situation as a foreign military sales (FMS) program. He has an existing FMS agreement with at least two nations, that I can discuss in closed session. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you able to tell us what Iran is supplying? 

General DEMPSEY. I can in closed session. 

Chairman LEVIN. Could you give us some idea in open session? 

In other words, are you able to give us, if not precisely, can you 

give us just some general estimate or idea as to what’s going in 

from Iran, types of weapons and quantity, without being too precise? 

General DEMPSEY. If Iran succeeds in some of their movements 

of weapons to Syria, and they have, then it would be largely smaller caliber rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank weapons. 

The other actors who have open FMS agreements are generally 

upper-tier stuff, including air defense. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you both. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Dempsey, are the reports in the Washington Post accurate about Iranian involvement? We don’t need a 

closed session, I don’t think, for you to say whether the Washington 

Post is correct or not. 

General DEMPSEY. Parts of the Washington Post reports are accurate, yes, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Secretary, General Mattis testified before the committee yesterday that the departure of Assad from power, as you stated, would 

be the ‘‘biggest strategic setback for Iran in 25 years.’’ You’re basically in agreement with that statement? 

Secretary PANETTA. I agree with that. 

Senator MCCAIN. By the way, the Kuwaiti parliament has called 

for arming the opposition. The Saudi foreign minister called for it. 

Other elements of the Arab League are calling for it. Clearly, it’s 

just a matter of time before the Arab League takes a stronger position on it. 

General Mattis told us, General Dempsey, yesterday that Assad’s 

crackdown is ‘‘gaining physical momentum.’’ Do you agree with 

General Mattis’ statement? 

General DEMPSEY. I do. He has increasingly used heavier weapons. 

Senator MCCAIN. So even though you agree that sooner or later 

Assad will fall, at the moment he happens to be, including regaining control of Homs, gaining momentum; is that correct? 

General DEMPSEY. That is correct. 

15 

Senator MCCAIN. So would you characterize this as a fair fight, 

when he’s using artillery and tanks to kill Syrians? 

General DEMPSEY. I would characterize the Assad regime as brutalizing their own citizens. 

Senator MCCAIN. I see. But since sooner or later he will fall, we 

don’t have to act? 

The President said yesterday he has taken no options off the 

table. Mr. Panetta, in the case of Syria you said in your opening 

statement that includes ‘‘potential military options if necessary.’’ 

Yet, Admiral Stavridis and General Mattis stated that there had 

been no contingency planning either in NATO or U.S. Central Command. Will there be some contingency planning? 

Secretary PANETTA. We have looked at a number of options that 

could be involved here. 

Senator MCCAIN. But will there be contingency planning? 

Secretary PANETTA. We have not done the detailed planning because we are waiting for the direction of the President to do that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Secretary, President Obama issued a presidential directive stating: ‘‘The prevention of mass atrocities is a 

core national security interest of the United States.’’ That’s the administration’s policy. With at least 7,500 and possibly more than 

10,000 dead, with Assad using tanks, ‘‘gaining momentum’’ according to General Mattis, would you agree that mass atrocities have 

occurred and are occurring in Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. I don’t think there’s any question that we’re 

experiencing mass atrocities there. 

Senator MCCAIN. So the President said yesterday he’s taken no 

options off the table, and you said in your opening statement that 

includes, as I mentioned, potential military options, if necessary. 

Can you tell us how much longer the killing would have to continue, how many additional civilian lives would have to be lost, in 

order to convince you that military measures of this kind that we 

are proposing necessary to end the killing and force to leave power, 

how many more have to die? 10,000 more? 20,000 more? How many 

more? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think the question, as you stated yourself, 

Senator, is the effort to try to build an international consensus as 

to what action we do take. That makes the most sense. What 

doesn’t make sense is to take unilateral action at this point. 

As Secretary of Defense, before I recommend that we put our 

sons and daughters in uniform in harm’s way, I have to make very 

sure that we know what the mission is. I have to make very sure 

that we know whether we can achieve that mission, at what price, 

and whether or not it will make matters better or worse. Those are 

the considerations that I have to engage in, and obviously the administration believes that every effort ought to be made to deal 

with those concerns in the international setting to try to build the 

kind of international consensus that worked in Libya and that can 

work in Syria if we can develop that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Let me tell you what’s wrong with your statement. You don’t mention American leadership. Americans should 

lead in this. America should be standing up. America should be 

building coalitions. We shouldn’t have statements like that we are 

not going to intervene no matter what the situation is. Such has 

16 

been, at least up until now, the statements by the administration 

and the President. 

In past experiences, those that I mentioned before, America has 

led. Yes, it has been multilateral and multinational, as is absolutely vital. We’re not leading, Mr. Secretary. 

General Dempsey, again I hear the same old refrain that I’ve 

heard for many, many years: ‘‘It’s not clear what constitutes the 

Syrian armed opposition.’’ That was the same argument that this 

administration used for not intervening in Libya at the beginning. 

By the way, I might add that the prime minister and deputy 

prime minister of Libya are former professors at the University of 

Alabama, far better than being from Senator Lieberman’s alma 

mater. But anyway. [Laughter.] 

We can find out who they are. They’re not fighting and dying because they’re al Qaeda. They’re not fighting and dying and sacrificing their lives because they’re Muslim extremists. They’re fighting and dying because they want the same universal rights and 

freedom that we are guaranteed in our Constitution. 

So I reject the argument that we ‘‘don’t know who they are.’’ We 

spend a lot of money on defense and we spend a lot of money on 

intelligence. We should know who these people are and it would be 

easy enough to find out. The best way, of course, to help them organize is to provide them with a safe haven where they can organize 

and train and equip. 

I was interested in your answer, and I’ll conclude with this, that 

sooner or later Assad will fall. I don’t disagree with that. In the 

meantime, he’s gaining momentum. He’s regained Homs. The death 

count goes up and the atrocities continue. 

Yet the President says a core national security interest of the 

United States is the prevention of mass atrocities. Mass atrocities 

are going on. I would hope that America could lead and exercise 

the options necessary to stop these atrocities, as has been the actions of the United States of America in the past in both Republican and Democratic administrations. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey. On this question 

of what to do in Syria, I’m of like mind with Senator McCain, except on the unfortunate reference to the brave graduates of Yale 

University. I’ll have to talk to him later about that. [Laughter.] 

Perhaps we are of like mind because we went through in the 

1990s together similar circumstances in Bosnia and Kosovo. Secretary Panetta, certainly in Bosnia you were there in the White 

House. In each case, the American entrance into that conflict was 

late, but had a very constructive effect and a civil war was terminated. 

In my opinion, the humanitarian and strategic arguments for the 

United States to be involved, to help lead an international effort 

which is military to stop the slaughter in Syria are actually greater 

than they were in the case of either Bosnia or Kosovo. As great as 

those were, there obviously is the humanitarian crisis, which is 

that, as we’ve all agreed, Assad is slaughtering his people. He has 

17 

them out-gunned and for all we know he’ll keep doing it and not 

leave office until he’s worn them down. 

Beyond that are all the strategic reasons that I think we also 

agree on, which is how positive it would be if Assad, who’s the only 

ally of Iran, at this critical moment is taken down, how liberating 

it would be to the Lebanese people next door, who have suffered 

under Syrian repression. 

There’s another element to this, too, which perhaps is so unique 

and different that we’re not giving it enough weight. In our foreign 

policy, we’ve done a lot of things over the years, including in recent 

years, to try to essentially regain the confidence of the Arab world, 

of the Muslim world. We have here a moment where the Arab 

League, the Gulf Coordinating Council, Turkey, are out there—I 

know Turkey’s not the Arab world, but in the region—against 

what’s happening in Syria. I think if we seem to be holding back— 

and incidentally, I think those countries are out there both because 

they see their own strategic interest in this, but also because their 

people are demanding it, because of the wave of change sweeping 

across the region. 

So to me this is both humanitarian, strategic in terms of its negative effect on Iran if we can help bring Assad down, but also can 

help improve our relations with not just our allies in the Arab 

world, but the so-called Arab street. When I’ve been to Libya, as 

an example, the United States and NATO are naturally extremely 

popular and there’s a lot of appreciation for them because in their 

hour of need we were there. I hope and pray that we can come to 

do that again with regard to Syria. 

I agree this is not something we should do alone. But the truth 

is without American leadership helping to organize this coalition 

and being prepared, as you’ve suggested, to provide some of the 

critical resources that we have, it won’t happen in a timely way 

and it won’t be successful. 

I want to say very briefly, to me, I have kept saying that the factors that led us into Libya with an international coalition are here. 

They’re happening. We worried about mostly, about a humanitarian disaster. They’re here. 

But, Secretary Panetta, you’ve cited a few reasons why Syria is 

different from Libya and, respectfully, I want to offer a different 

view. One is that there was widespread support in the Security 

Council and the Arab League for military intervention in Libya. No 

such consensus exists regarding Syria. That’s literally true, and 

that’s particularly because of Russia and China and what they’re 

doing in the U.N. But within the Arab League there’s clearly a lot 

of interest in a military intervention in Syria. The same is true of 

the Gulf Coordinating Council. I take it that the Saudis and 

Qataris are thinking of beginning to arm the Syrian opposition as 

well. 

The other thing I want to say is that in Kosovo, as we all remember, the U.S. with a coalition of the willing acted without U.N. Security Council approval because again there were one or two nations blocking it. So that shouldn’t stop us from acting. 

The second concern is that we hear all the time the Syrian 

armed opposition is—we’re not sure who they are, they have no 

single coordinating person at the top or group at the top. Again, I 

18 

agree, but that was true in Libya as well. The militias that formed 

in different parts of the country were not connected. In some sense 

they were hostile to one another. You can see that playing out in 

some ways in Libya today. 

But when the international community came in it gave 

strength—with military assistance, to the Transitional National 

Council there and they worked together with our assistance to 

bring about the change that occurred. 

Finally, the statement that military intervention would not prevent civil war, but could expedite it. I know Secretary Clinton said 

something to that effect. Obviously, there is a civil war going on 

now, and recent history shows that foreign military intervention in 

Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya has actually, Libya most recently, been 

critical in ending civil wars in those countries and the absence of 

foreign military intervention in countries like Rwanda, the Congo, 

Somalia, and others has doomed those countries to suffer through 

extended civil wars. 

I think the clock is running. People are being killed in great 

numbers every day. I think if we don’t get the international community together in a coalition of the willing soon, we’re going to 

look back and say we not only didn’t do the right thing morally to 

stop innocents from being killed, we missed an extraordinary strategic opportunity to strengthen our position and the position of free 

people in the Middle East. 

I want to give you an opportunity to respond if you will, without 

asking a specific question. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, I want to make the point that the 

concerns that Senator McCain and you and others have expressed 

are exactly the concerns of the administration. We’re not divided 

here and we are not holding back. This administration has led in 

Iraq, we’ve led in Afghanistan, we’ve led in the war on terrorism, 

we led in Libya, and we’re leading in Syria. We are working with 

those elements to try to bring them together. 

If the agreement here is that we ought not to just simply go in 

unilaterally, then we have to build a multilateral coalition. We 

have to be able to work at that. It’s not that easy to deal with some 

of the concerns that are out there. But nevertheless we’re working 

at it. Secretary Clinton is working at it every day. There are diplomats that are engaged on this issue. We are trying to engage 

with NATO. We are trying to engage with these other countries. 

There are other countries that are interested in trying to provide 

provisions. We are working with them, we are talking with them. 

We are looking at every option to try to put that in place. 

Can it happen today? Can it happen now? No. It’s going to take 

some work. It’s going to take some time. But when we do it we’ll 

do it right. We will not do it in a way that will make the situation 

worse. That’s what we have to be careful of. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you for the statement. I’m encouraged by it, and all I can do is plead with you and other nations 

that we’re reaching out to to move as quickly as possible, because 

people are dying every day and strategic opportunities are being 

lost. 

The fact is that we have an opportunity here and it’s also a responsibility, and I think it’s critically important that we exercise it. 

19 

I’d say finally that I know some people continue to hope that a 

way can be found for President Assad to leave the country and 

usher in the democratic process of transformation that we’ve talked 

about. From everything I hear, everything I see, he will only do 

that if he thinks his life, his regime, is really in jeopardy. Right 

now, I think he thinks he’s dominant and has the kind of momentum, physical momentum, that General Dempsey spoke about 

today. 

So the sooner we put international military pressure on the 

Assad regime, the sooner we have a chance to end this peacefully. 

Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, you said we’re leading in Iraq, Afghanistan. I 

don’t disagree with that. Leading in Syria, I haven’t really seen it 

yet, and maybe that’s because we’re not privy to the information 

you are. 

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, based on some of the intelligence 

that we would need to make those determinations, that we set up 

a secure briefing so we can better understand the intricacies of 

what’s happening, because right now I agree with everything, surprisingly, that Senator Lieberman said, and that is, I think, very 

important. It was very well said about we’re missing a potential opportunity. 

That being said also, I’d like to shift to General Dempsey. We 

know that Syria has substantial chemical and biological weapons 

stockpiles. We also know that the regime will eventually collapse. 

That seems to be the general consensus. Is there a plan available 

to address that weaponry and do we have an elimination plan of 

any kind set up? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, I would very much like the chance to 

talk with you about it, but not in an open hearing. But I’ll give you 

the magnitude: 100 times more than we experienced in Libya. 

Senator BROWN. Great. Thank you. I would like that opportunity 

to get that briefing, once again. 

Sir, based on what you saw in Libya, what are some of the lessons that we learned, that we need to apply to any thoughtful consideration of military intervention in Syria? Because ultimately, I 

recognize everyone basically hated Qadhafi. They wanted to get 

him out. We had the Arab League. We had a broad coalition. I 

know the U.N. problems that we’re having. 

But I recognize what Senator Lieberman and Senator McCain 

said, that we do have a lot of thoughtful, concerned partners in 

that part of the region that want to step up. Is there a chance we 

would move without the U.N. and just with those partners to take 

advantage of that leadership role that we should have? 

General DEMPSEY. My job, Senator, is to place military options 

in context. So when you asked me about lessons learned that are 

transferable from Libya to Syria, sure, there are some tactically for 

sure: how to enable indigenous forces on the ground without bootson-the-ground. 

20 

But I very much want to elevate our thinking here about this. 

We’re talking about Syria, but we’re looking at it through a soda 

straw. It doesn’t exist as an individual, isolated country. It’s in the 

context of the region. It’s in the context even of actors outside the 

region. The inside of Syria is a far different demographic, ethnic, 

religious mix than it was in Libya. We need to understand that before we seek to use a particular template to solve the challenges 

they face. 

It’s not just about the military. The Secretary and I happen to 

be the face of the military, but this issue has to be dealt with in 

context and we’re looking at it through a soda straw. 

Senator BROWN. Mr. Secretary, who aside from the United States 

do you think is in the best position right now to exert the most effective pressure on the Assad regime? 

Secretary PANETTA. There’s no question in my mind that Russia 

could play a very significant role in putting pressure on Assad. 

They have a port there. They have influence there. They have dealings there. Unfortunately, the position they’ve taken in the U.N. 

was to oppose the resolution, and that’s a shame. 

But there’s no question that they and the Chinese, if they wanted to advance the cause of the Syrian people, they could bring 

great pressure on them to do the right thing. 

Senator BROWN. I’m presuming Secretary Clinton is working and 

reaching out? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

I’m all set, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Brown. 

Senator Reed is not here. Senator Nelson is next. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your distinguished service. 

It’s been reported that al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri and 

other violent extremists have called on members of their group to 

support the uprising in Syria. General Mattis before the committee 

yesterday stated that there is already evidence that the terrorist 

network is involved in supporting the opposition. 

Do we have an idea regarding the number of violent extremists 

that are engaged in the uprising, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary PANETTA. We do, but I would prefer to discuss that in 

closed session. 

Senator NELSON. I understand. But we do have an idea, so it’s 

not that we don’t have the intelligence. 

Secretary PANETTA. We have intelligence. 

Senator NELSON. We have the intelligence. Do we have an idea 

of what sort of outside assistance they’re getting as well? You don’t 

have to tell me what it is necessarily. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator NELSON. Do we have some idea of what Iran is providing 

in the way of outside assistance? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator NELSON. To the level of detail that we need to have? 

Secretary PANETTA. As a former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I would like a lot better detail. 

21 

Senator NELSON. Always one more detail. I understand that, of 

course, yes. 

If the decision to arm the Syrian opposition force is predicated 

on defining the force, how long do you think it might take us to 

be able to have that definition of the force if a decision is made on 

a multinational basis to engage in arming that force internally? 

General DEMPSEY. Again, in open session I’ll say there’s approximately 100 groups that we’ve identified as part of the opposition, 

rough numbers. 

Senator NELSON. Some of them aren’t necessarily terrorist organizations? 

General DEMPSEY. No, no. In fact, we can go into that more in 

closed session as well, but we’re not suggesting that that part of 

al Qaeda that has made its way to Syria has aligned itself or is 

in bed with the opposition. But they’re there trying to exploit it, 

and so that’s a factor that we have to consider. 

Of those groups, to your question about how long would it take 

us if we chose to do something through the opposition, the question 

would be not how quickly we could, let’s say, vet them all, but how 

quickly we could vet enough of them that could form some kind of 

coherent core. But it doesn’t exist today. Despite our aspirations 

and hopes that it would, it doesn’t exist. 

Senator NELSON. It hasn’t occurred yet, but it could occur on its 

own, but there is some concern about it getting worse before it gets 

better, more people dying in the interim. So obviously time is of the 

essence in trying to get international interest in this, given the fact 

that we have two of the largest countries in the world not supporting our efforts. 

If we made the decision and we have a multinational force and 

we have 100 groups to go through, how reasonable do you think it 

is that you’ll get a coalescence of those groups? Will providing the 

arms and providing support, if we don’t put boots-on-the-ground, 

that that coalescence will occur? Do we think that it will happen 

that way, or will they be just disparate and devolve into some sort 

of a civil war? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, I really wish we could predict that. 

But it’s dangerous to do that. We faced somewhat the same situation in Libya. In heading up the intelligence operation there, it was 

one of the first orders of business, was to try to figure out who the 

opposition was and where they were located and what they were 

doing, what kind of coordination they have. 

Here you have triple the problem because there are so many diverse groups that are involved. Whether or not they can find that 

one leader, whether they can find that one effort to try to bring 

them together in some kind of council, there are efforts to try to 

make that happen, but frankly they have not been successful. 

Senator NELSON. Are we in a position where we have plans in 

place in the event that we engage in Syria to some extent or another to deal with the potential of the chemical weapons that they 

currently have? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think, as General Dempsey has pointed 

out, that is clearly one of our great concerns and we have developed options to try to address those concerns. 

22 

General DEMPSEY. If I could reinforce, if you think it’s a concern 

of ours, you can imagine the concern it is of Syria’s neighbors. So 

we are in consultation with them about that challenge. 

Senator NELSON. What are the chances of neighbors in the region 

working with us—perhaps they are—to get multinational interest 

in this? 

Secretary PANETTA. There are efforts to try to engage the neighbors with regards to the issues in Syria, and the neighbors clearly 

share the concerns that we all have with regards to the situation 

there. Two neighbors are being directly impacted by refugee problems, both in Turkey and Jordan. We’re engaging with both of 

them. We’re engaging with others to try to see what we can do to 

try to build at least a coalition of those countries to try to engage 

with regards to some of the issues there. 

Senator NELSON. In our efforts to do that do we think that 

they’re getting sufficiently motivated and sufficiently concerned to 

engage in some joint effort with their neighbor, Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. There is great concern, and they’re experiencing directly the concern, not only from the refugees, but from 

the fallout of what’s going on in Syria. They too are concerned 

about what ultimately happens there when Assad is removed or 

steps aside, what are going to be the consequences within Syria 

itself, because that could have a huge impact on them as well. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you both and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary Panetta. Thank you, General Dempsey. 

I would like to ask about the role of China and Russia here. Let 

me just say upfront—I’m sure you’ll agree—that it’s outrageous 

that China and Russia blocked the U.N. resolutions, both of them, 

also most recently in February. As I understand it, according to the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies report that was 

issued in June 2010, the arms imports from Russia to Syria between 1997 and 2008, that Russia’s been a leading arms supplier 

to the Assad regime. Is that the case? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s true. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do they continue to provide arms to the Assad 

regime now? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Senator, they do. 

Senator AYOTTE. So Russia is continuing to provide arms to the 

Assad regime as they murder their own people? 

General DEMPSEY. They have a longstanding FMS relationship 

with them and it continues on unabated. 

Senator AYOTTE. It doesn’t seem to matter to Russia at all that 

they are using these arms to murder their own people. It’s outrageous. 

As I understand it, China has also provided in the past arms to 

the Assad regime as well, to a lesser extent. 

Secretary PANETTA. Let me get back to you, because there are 

other areas of assistance, but I’m not sure about arms. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. I would appreciate a follow-up to that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

23 

During the past 8 years, China has been the second largest arms supplier to the 

Syrian military; however, its arms trade with Syria lags far behind Russian sales 

to Damascus. 

Senator AYOTTE. They certainly to some extent have provided assistance to the Assad regime in the past. Do we know if they’re providing any assistance now of any type? 

General DEMPSEY. No, I haven’t been tracking intelligence on 

China’s role in arms sales, Iran, and you noted Russia, from the 

report. 

Secretary PANETTA. But I think economically they have had ties 

into Syria that they still are trying to maintain. 

Senator AYOTTE. Is it not true also that, with respect to our posture with Iran in terms of wanting to impose the toughest economic 

sanctions possible to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear 

weapons capability, that Russia and China are a key to that, because we know that Russia has actually an economic interest, unfortunately, in the Iranian nuclear program and that China relies 

heavily on Iran for oil exports? Is that not true? 

Secretary PANETTA. Correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. Yet they have failed also to step up to the plate 

to impose the types of tougher sanctions we would like them to do 

so that the world is together to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear 

weapons capability; is that not true? 

Secretary PANETTA. You’re correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. What can we do to be tougher on Russia and 

China if they are going to take their position in the world as part 

of the world leadership? I view their behavior in blocking the U.N. 

resolution as irresponsible and also the fact that they haven’t 

stepped up to the plate to make sure that we stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. It’s all related and it’s obviously very detrimental to the safety of the world. What should we 

be doing there to be tougher on them? 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, you should hear this directly from 

Secretary Clinton, but my knowledge is that Secretary Clinton is 

exhausting every effort to try to engage both Russia and China in 

this effort, particularly Russia because of its longstanding relationship there, because it owns a harbor in Syria and has the record 

that you just described with Syria, that Russia could, if they wanted to accept the responsibility that they should, they could be helpful here in the effort to try to remove Assad. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate those efforts. Mr. Putin just got reelected and I would hope that he wouldn’t want the blood of the 

deaths of Syrians on his hand and that he would stop selling arms 

to the Assad regime, and, of course, that both Russia and China 

would step up, support the U.N. resolution. Both those countries, 

in my view, I don’t know why they would not want to pursue every 

possible means to stop what is happening and the bloodshed there. 

I appreciate all of your efforts on it and I hope that they understand that we’re very serious about that. We will, in Congress, look 

at actions we can take, too, because this is really wrong and they’re 

on the wrong side of history, both with respect to the Syrian regime. They’re on the wrong side of history with respect to Iran, and 

they will look back at this as a big mistake by both of these countries if they don’t step up to the plate right now. 

24 

I also wanted to ask about the Assad regime’s relationship just 

with some of the groups that we have labeled terrorist groups. 

What’s the Assad regime’s relationship with Hezbollah? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s probably better addressed in a closed 

session in terms of the specific relationship, but there has been a 

longstanding relationship between Hezbollah and Syria. It’s actually diminished of late. Hezbollah has stood aside and hasn’t directly been involved in some of the violence that’s taken place in 

Syria. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Also with Hamas? 

Secretary PANETTA. Hamas the same, the same thing. 

Senator AYOTTE. In fact, as I understand, at least based on public reports, Hamas is actually stepping back from the situation. Yet 

Iran has not stepped back? 

Secretary PANETTA. Correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. They’re continuing to push forward. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator AYOTTE. Let me ask you, does the violence that’s happening in Syria have any impact on stability in Iraq? 

Secretary PANETTA. Interestingly, there was a point at which, obviously, Iraq was standing to the side and not engaged. I think, as 

a result of what they’ve seen happening in Syria, that Iraq itself 

has now asked for Assad to step down and they are more engaged 

than they were in the past. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you view this as a positive step? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you both. My time is up. I appreciate 

your being before the committee today on such an important issue. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

We are planning on a closed session immediately following this, 

and if we succeed that means surely that there will only be one 

round here, and it is our plan to succeed. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, and General Dempsey. 

General Dempsey, all of the military options which are beginning 

to be contemplated—the humanitarian corridors, limited aerial 

strikes, safe havens—all would presume that we would have complete control of the air space over Syria. Given what we know 

about their air defense systems, that would presume—I don’t know 

if you can comment openly—that the first step in any type of military operation would be a campaign to suppress their air defense 

systems. Can you give us some general notion about how long that 

would take and how challenging it would be? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, as I mentioned, we’ve demonstrated 

the capability to penetrate air defense systems for a discrete purpose in a very limited amount of time, and that stays; we still have 

that capability. As I mentioned, to conduct an enduring or a sustained campaign we would have to suppress the air defense. In 

closed session, we do have an estimate, based on gaming and modeling, of how long it would take to do that, given the density and 

the sophistication of their air defense system. But it would be an 

extended period of time and a great number of aircraft. 

25 

Senator REED. It would be, by the nature of our capability, presumptively led by the United States, rather than our NATO allies, 

because of our capabilities? 

General DEMPSEY. Almost unquestionably. We have the electronic warfare capabilities necessary to do that. 

Senator REED. So from a perceptual view alone, the opening 

stages in any military operation would be an extended, almost exclusively air campaign by the United States against Syria, presumably supported politically by the Arab League, NATO, the EU, and 

everyone else. But the first kinetic part of the operation would be 

ours for several weeks before we actually started even going in and 

effectively protecting Syrians. Is that a fair judgment? 

General DEMPSEY. It is a fair judgment. We can only act with the 

authorized use of military force either with the consent of a nation, 

in our national self-defense, or with an U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). So we would have to have some legal basis. It 

would be my military advice that, whatever we do, we be part of 

a coalition, both because we increase our capability and capacity, 

but also we’ve shown that that produces an enduring outcome. 

Then we’d have to balance it against risk elsewhere in the region. 

Senator REED. The other aspect is that in testimony yesterday 

General Mattis indicated that, unlike Iraq, there were no natural 

safe haven areas, the mountains. Also, I think unlike Iraq, there’s 

no force, very well-organized that could provide even a limited selfdefense. So creating these safe havens, there’s a geographic challenge and there’s also an institutional challenge. Who’s going to 

physically defend them? 

We could have air power and try to interdict Syrian military convoys and tank columns, but that wouldn’t work 100 percent. So is 

that another challenge that you’re considering? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, it is a challenge. Again, in the context of 

this, as you note, the border with Iraq, the border with Jordan, the 

border with Israel, and the border with Turkey all have their own 

unique complexities. So I think we’d have to go through that. 

But I want to be clear. We can do anything. It’s not about can 

we do it, but it’s should we do it and what are the opportunity costs 

elsewhere and what are the risks. 

Senator REED. In terms of opportunity costs, there are costs in 

collateral civilian casualties to air operations. There are costs in 

terms of time, a lot of time or some time to set up the operations. 

So that the notion that we can in a few hours or days quickly go 

in and establish superiority, stop the fighting, is not accurate. 

General DEMPSEY. You obviously have a military background, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. I show up on time most times, if that’s it. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, if I could just point out, again we 

can discuss this in closed session, but what we’ve talked about is 

that air defense system that is pretty sophisticated. But more importantly, a lot of it is located in populated areas. There would be 

severe collateral damage in going after those areas. 

Senator REED. Let me change the subject, Mr. Secretary, because 

we’ve talked on the military aspects, but there’s a political aspect 

here. I’m not at all an expert on Syria, but what struck me in some 

26 

of my reading is that there is a small Alawite clan of Shia who 

dominate the government, but the other minority sectors, the Syrian Kurds, the Syrian Christians, also seem to see their future 

most closely allied with Assad and his group. They are very influential, even though a minority, very influential. There has yet to 

be the creation of a truly national and credible opposition to Assad. 

So it’s awfully difficult to build this or to get him off when there’s 

nobody to take his place and there’s still strong support in areas, 

in communities, that you wouldn’t necessarily think would be supporting him. 

Is that part of the analysis that you looked at? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct, and that’s part of the problem. Having worked pretty closely on the Libyan situation, when 

there were some leaders that came to the front and were able to 

organize a council and it had credibility with the opposition, and 

unfortunately that’s not the case here. There are some outside 

groups that are trying to organize, but there isn’t the relationship 

with regards to what’s happening in the country. As a result, it’s 

very difficult to be able to know who we deal with there in terms 

of an opposition. 

Senator REED. The only, the final point I’d make, is that, going 

back to military capacity in Libya—and again, I think the first 

point is we have to assume Syria is not Libya. But there, there 

seemed to be tribal paramilitary organizations. I don’t get the same 

impression that outside the military there’s any type of security 

forces, there’s any kind of counterpoint; and that we would have to, 

unless there was a political solution to force Assad off, if he was 

going to be deposed it would have to be organized. We’d have to 

organize a force and that would take many, many months. 

General DEMPSEY. That’s the current state of our thinking about 

how we might do this. If you think about two recent experiences: 

Libya, we had tribal forces on the east and west collapsing onto the 

center, essentially. Even in Afghanistan, we had the Northern Alliance collapsing on the center. There’s no geographic density of opposition to collapse anywhere. They’re all intermingled. 

By the way, it’s 70 percent Sunni and 30 percent Druze, Christians, Alawi Shia. The Alawites have been in control and have essentially protected the others. So there is that dynamic as well. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, you discussed briefly with Senator Ayotte Russia’s 

role in Syria. 

Mr. Chairman, I have an article in Reuters February 21, 2012. 

The title is ‘‘Russia boosts arms sales to Syria despite world pressure.’’ I’d ask unanimous consent that that be made part of the 

record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

27 


307ful1.eps
28 

Senator CORNYN. I’m grateful to you for that. 

This article suggests that Russia has continued to supply a variety of weapons to Syria through an arms exporter by the name of 

Rosoboronexport. I guess, General Dempsey, I’m catching myself 

because I know you suggested some of this you’d like to go into in 

closed session. 

But let me ask, Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, does Russia have a physical presence in Syria as part of their arms sales 

business? 

Secretary PANETTA. They do. 


307ful2.eps
29 

Senator CORNYN. What specifically, Secretary Panetta, is Russia’s interest in Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. They’ve had a longstanding economic and 

military relationship in Syria. As we said, the port there in Syria 

is owned by the Russians. It’s their port. So they’ve had a lot of 

shipping that’s gone in there over the years. They’ve transferred 

not only military aid, but also economic assistance as well. So 

they’ve had a very longstanding relationship with Syria that makes 

them one of the key players. If they really wanted to assert the 

kind of responsibility they should, they would be a key player in 

bringing pressure on Assad. 

Senator CORNYN. Let me transition just a little bit to the Department of Defense’s (DOD) business transactions with this same firm 

I mentioned to you earlier, Rosoboronexport, that is engaged in 

military sales of Russian weapons to Assad’s regime. Reportedly, 

this company has signed a deal with the Syrian government to sell 

it 36 combat jets capable of hitting civilian ground targets. 

Can you confirm that? 

Secretary PANETTA. I can’t. I’d have to look into that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

We cannot confirm that such a deal was signed. According to Russian press reports—citing a source close to Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms export corporation—in late 2011, Moscow signed an agreement to sell 36 Yak-130 jet trainer aircraft to Syria. Senior Russia Government officials, when questioned about this deal, 

have reiterated that arms sales to Syria remain legal under international law, 

though they have not confirmed the agreement. 

Senator CORNYN. I don’t mean to blind-side you. I’ll certainly 

share this article with you, and I’d be interested in following up in 

greater detail. 

Rosoboronexport was sanctioned by the United States in October 

2008 for assisting Iran’s nuclear program, but those sanctions were 

lifted by the Department of State in May 2010. This is what I 

wanted to get to. It’s my understanding the DOD has, through an 

initiative led by the U.S. Army, is currently buying dual-use Mi– 

17 helicopters for the Afghan military from this very same company. 

I’d like to know whether either one of you can confirm that at 

this point? 

General DEMPSEY. No, but I can certainly take that for the 

record. I can confirm we are buying Mi–17s for the Afghan military, but I can’t confirm that that’s the corporation providing them. 

Senator CORNYN. I understand that and I look forward to following up with you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Yes, the U.S. Army is purchasing Russian Mi-17 helicopters for use by the ANSF 

from Rosoboronexport. A response to the 12 March written inquiry on this same 

subject from Senator Cornyn and 16 other U.S. Senators is also forthcoming from 

the Secretary of Defense. 

The U.S. Army entered into a contract to procure 21 Mi-17 helicopters from 

Rosoboronexport. Nine have been delivered, 6 are complete awaiting shipment, and 

the remaining 6 will be ready for delivery by the end of May. We have completed 

payment for all. The Department has also exercised an option for two additional aircraft and has a requirement from the NATO Aviation Training Command-Afghanistan for an additional 10 aircraft. Once this option is exercised, the contract will 

be complete. These aircraft are delivered in a full military mission ready configuration, including spare parts and a 1-year warranty. The Mi-17 acquisition effort is 

critical to building the capacity of the ANSF. Our acquisition of these Mi-17 heliVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:46 Oct 19, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76271.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
30 

copters is part of our strategy to hand over the security of Afghanistan to the Afghan people. Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of military Mi-17 

helicopters. 

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan identified an operational requirement, which was validated by the Commander, U.S. Central Command, for acquisition of Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan Air Force (AAF). The decision to procure Mi-17s was made after considering and eliminating the Bell Huey 

II as an option. The Mi-17 has proven operational capabilities in the extreme environments of Afghanistan. The Mi-17 has low technical complexity compared to other 

platforms, making it easier for AAF members to maintain and operate, while being 

supportable within Afghan educational limitations. A change in acquisition strategy 

would add additional aircraft types to the fleet and would complicate the maintenance, sustainment, and supply systems required to support the fleet. Introduction 

of a new helicopter to the AAF might require two additional years of U.S. assistance 

to Afghanistan. 

The purchase of Mi-17s from Rosoboronexport has reduced the risk of acquiring 

counterfeit aircraft or spare parts and has given us unprecedented access to original 

equipment manufacturer technical data that we would not otherwise receive. This 

ensures the safe operation and airworthiness of these aircraft, which are routinely 

flown by U.S. aircrews mentoring the AAF. Options for procuring used Mi-17s on 

the secondary market exist, but new Mi-17s are only manufactured in Russia. Since 

Mi-17s have fixed flight hour life limits that cannot be extended, sustained support 

to Afghanistan may require replacements for their oldest Mi-17s. 

Note: The termination of sanctions imposed on Rosoboronexport pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act was effective 21 May 

2010. 

Senator CORNYN. General Dempsey, can you explain why we 

would buy helicopters for the Afghan military from this arms exporter that’s been sanctioned by the U.S. Government for its illicit 

activities with Iran, and which is the principal means by which 

Russia is arming Assad’s regime and killing so many Syrians? 

General DEMPSEY. Assuming we are, because again I have to 

confirm or deny that we are, but assuming we are, as the process 

goes in a competition, if they’re not sanctioned and enter the competition it could very well be that they ended up being the lowest 

bidder and therefore they could very well have been selected. But 

I can’t confirm that. I have to get back to you, Senator. 

Senator CORNYN. I understand that. 

If, in fact, this article is correct, this means that, instead of creating jobs and selling American helicopters to the Afghan military, 

we are working with a Russian arms exporter to sell these Mi–17 

helicopters, which makes absolutely no sense to me. But as you 

said and as I’ve said, I don’t want to blind-side you with this information. I’d like to get an explanation. 

But if, in fact, if this report is true that this same arms dealer 

is arming Assad’s regime and killing innocent Syrians and also 

under a contract with DOD to provide helicopters to the Afghan 

military, that causes me significant concerns, and I bet it does you, 

too. So I’d like to get to the bottom of that, if you will help me do 

that. 

General Dempsey, you talked about the need to balance the risks 

of intervening in Syria with other parts of the region. What would 

happen if Assad were to fall and the forces of democracy begin to, 

hopefully, take root in Syria? What would that do to Iran’s aspirations in the region? What would that do to Hezbollah, a terrorist 

organization supported by Iran? What would that do to Hamas and 

what would that do to Lebanon? What would be the impact that 

you would hope for in the region? 

31 

General DEMPSEY. As General Mattis testified yesterday, it 

would certainly diminish Iran’s influence in the region and set back 

their aspirations of becoming a regional hegemon dramatically. 

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Blumenthal is next. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your very forthright and also careful and cautious approach to this problem. I think many of us are approaching 

this issue with a high degree of humility, given the lack of complete or even reliable information and looking forward to knowing 

more as you brief us in a more secure setting. 

But even with all that care and caution, I’m struck, Mr. Secretary, by the certitude of your prediction that this regime will fall. 

You say: ‘‘Make no mistake. One way or the other, this regime will 

meet its end.’’ There are very few things in life that are inevitable 

and right now the Assad regime seems on the march. It seems to 

have momentum on its side. You have described very graphically 

how this opposition is less organized than the Libyan. 

So I think that’s the reason that many of us here feel that we 

need to do more, that the United States needs to take a more aggressive and proactive role in this fight without—and I should 

stress—without American troops on the ground, no boots-on-theground. 

That’s the reason that Senator Graham and I are planning to introduce and cosponsor a resolution that will ask for condemnation 

of Assad for the war crimes that he is inflicting on his own people, 

the brutal and barbaric criminal actions against his own people, 

and the slaughter and massacre that’s taking place, that will seek 

to send that message that you describe in your testimony that the 

United States will support the Syrian people. 

But, of course, there really need to be more than just words here. 

So let me begin by asking whether there is currently planning for 

the delivery of medical and other humanitarian aid to the opposition? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes, there is. Let me also mention, with regards to your prefacing remarks, it’s always dangerous to make 

predictions in that part of the world, and what I’m giving you is 

the best assessment by our intelligence community as to the situation there in Syrian. 

But I also think that you shouldn’t take it for granted that somehow we’re going to sit back and allow the status quo to be the case. 

We are working very hard at trying to build the international coalition that we need. We’re working hard at humanitarian aid. We’re 

working hard at trying to do everything we can to try to bring additional pressure on Syria in order to ensure that Assad does step 

aside. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Is humanitarian aid being delivered now? 

Secretary PANETTA. We are delivering elements of humanitarian 

aid as we speak. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. How much? Can you quantify it? 

Secretary PANETTA. $10 million was the case that we had. In 

Homs alone, we have U.S. Government partners that have delivVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:46 Oct 19, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76271.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
32 

ered food for 4,000 households, and they’ve also delivered medical 

supplies. We’re working with the international community to try to 

gain greater access, and the International Committee of the Red 

Cross and the World Food Program are working with the Syrian 

Arab Red Crescent to provide additional aid. So we’re trying to do 

that on a broader front. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I appreciate that information. 

How quickly and in what quantities could that humanitarian aid 

be increased? 

Secretary PANETTA. I’m going to have to look at that and give 

you a more direct answer based on what the State Department and 

U.S. Agency for International Development are doing right now to 

try to increase that aid. I can give you a more explicit answer 

based on getting that information from them. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Our priority, before and after Assad’s departure, is getting humanitarian assist- ance into Syria. As you know, Secretary of State Clinton pledged $10 million in U.S. 

humanitarian assistance for Syria in the March Friends of Syria meeting in Tunisia, 

and she indicated that more aid would follow. These funds will help support makeshift medical facilities, train emergency medical staff, and get clean water, food, 

blankets, heaters, and hygiene kits to Syrian civilians in need. This assistance includes $3.5 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, $3 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross, $3 million to the World Food 

Program, and support for other international nongovernmental partners. 

U.S. humanitarian efforts also include bolstering existing regional stockpiles of 

humanitarian supplies and equipment to be delivered to those Syrian communities 

in greatest need. The build-up of stockpiles of food and other emergency relief supplies are a result of the growing international effort to rush humanitarian aid into 

Syria to alleviate the suffering of vulnerable communities as access and conditions 

allow. 

Our ability to provide more humanitarian aid depends substantially on the conditions on the ground. The primary constraint facing the humanitarian organizations 

through and with which we work is a lack of safe, continuous access to affected populations—not a lack of funding, medical supplies, or other provisions. 

Over the coming weeks, we will continue to explore how we can best support humanitarian efforts in Syria, including whether and how to increase humanitarian 

assistance. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Is planning underway to increase that 

aid? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. On communications equipment, which 

seems essential for a diverse and divided opposition to really 

launch a coordinated defense and offense, what is being done to 

provide communications equipment? 

Secretary PANETTA. I’d prefer to discuss that in a closed session, 

but I can tell you that we are considering an array of non-lethal 

assistance. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Is it fair to say that planning is ongoing 

to provide that assistance? 

Secretary PANETTA. That is correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Even though right now as we speak none 

is being provided? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. With respect to other technical assistance, 

putting aside for the moment the air strike capability, is other 

technical assistance being provided? 

Secretary PANETTA. Plans are being made to provide an array of 

non-lethal assistance, including technical assistance. 

33 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Dempsey has very well described 

the time that it would take to suppress the aerial defense, but I 

take it that issue is not an obstacle to providing these other kinds 

of assistance? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. It could be done immediately? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would appreciate additional information 

to this committee as to what can be done, within what timeframes, 

short of air strikes. 

Is there support among any of the potential allies in military action for the kind of planning that you are doing? In other words, 

are specific countries volunteering specific contributions in potential military action? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s again something I think we’d prefer 

to discuss in closed session. But there have been discussions in 

other countries about that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So that planning is underway, fair to say? 

Secretary PANETTA. I’d rather discuss that in closed session. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

U.S. Government assistance-humanitarian supplies and communications equipment—includes items that the Syrian opposition has indicated would help in their 

efforts to organize. As implemented by the Department of State and U.S. Agency 

for International Development, we view this non-lethal assistance as critical to supporting our policy to hasten the fall of the Assad regime, and to move forward with 

a Syrian-led democratic transition. 

We are working closely with our allies and partners, particularly Jordan and Turkey, to understand the dynamic composition of all elements of the Syrian opposition. 

Providing arms is not something we are considering now, as we believe it could 

heighten and prolong the violence in Syria. We remain focused on diplomatic efforts 

to increase pressure on, and the isolation of, the Assad regime. 

There is still no consensus within the international community regarding possible 

military intervention in Syria. However, the United States continues to plan for a 

range of contingencies with allies and partners. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I’d say it’s risen to the level of collaboration; consultation, not planning. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. In order to do planning you would have to 

engage in that consultation; is that fair to say? 

Turning to the resolution that Senator Graham and I have proposed, do you think, a sense of the Senate that there should be an 

investigation and prosecution of Assad for war crimes would have 

an encouraging and positive effect on the determination of the Syrian people to resist this regime? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, I’d prefer that you direct that question to the State Department because of the negotiating they’re 

doing on a broader international front. I think you need to ask 

them the question whether this would be helpful. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. We’ll do that. 

Let me just close, because my time has expired, by saying that 

I very strongly share Senator Cornyn’s concerns about the sales of 

equipment by the same company that is arming the Syrians to the 

Afghan Government, helicopters that are being sold to the Afghanistan Government, by the very same company that is acting on behalf of the Russian Government to arm the Syrians. I share his 

concern that there appears to be a less than compelling reason to 

34 

use Russian helicopters sold by Rosoboronexport in Afghanistan 

when we could be selling our own helicopters to them. 

I also ask, Mr. Chairman, that an additional article on that subject be made a part of the record. It is a July 24, 2011, article from 

the Washington Times titled: ‘‘Pro-Russia policy stalls Afghan 

copters.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made a part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


307ful3.eps
35 


307ful4.eps
36 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, we need to look at those reports. If 

those reports are true, we would share your same concern. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. There’s no denial in the reports, for what 

it’s worth, that it is true. There’s no denial from any official 

sources. I would hope that we would have a response. 

Thank you so much for your service to the country and your very 

helpful testimony here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Because we would all be very much concerned with the issue 

that Senator Cornyn has raised and Senator Blumenthal just mentioned, we would hope that you’d give us the detail on that forthwith. Thank you. 

Senator Graham is next. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 


307ful5.eps
37 

I’m no helicopter expert, but I asked that question when I was 

over in Afghanistan about a year or 2 ago, and I was told that the 

helicopter in question is just a better fit for the Afghan military in 

terms of maintenance and capability. So that may not be the case. 

If there’s an American helicopter that fits the needs of this, I’m all 

for them buying from us. But that’s what I was told. So I’d like to 

hear more. 

Senator Blumenthal made a very good observation. I don’t think 

any of us who want to be more involved in Syria believe that bootson-the-ground is a good idea. They haven’t been requested and certainly we’re not anywhere near that point for me. 

I would like to build on what Senator Blumenthal asked. He 

asked a very good question. You basically said, Mr. Secretary, that 

Assad should be viewed as a war criminal. I think that’s a good 

analysis to take. 

The U.N. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on 

Syria in February issued a report, 72 pages, but this is the sum 

and substance of it to me: ‘‘Such violations’’—talking about atrocities, gross human rights violations—‘‘originated from policies and 

directives issued at the highest levels of the Armed Forces and the 

government.’’ 

Do you agree with that? Is that a pretty good characterization? 

Secretary PANETTA. In Syria? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

Secretary PANETTA. In Syria, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think it is. Senator Collins and I were talking. The dilemma is if you go after him maybe it entrenches him. 

I’ve come to believe in situations like this that he’s going to do 

what he’s going to do, and if he were rational he wouldn’t be doing 

what he’s doing. But from his point of view, he obviously believes 

he’s rational, and he’s trying to just wait us all out and kill as 

many people as he can and hope we get tired of it and walk away. 

It would be really good for the Syrian people to know that the 

international community views what’s being done to them as an 

outrage and that they would get support, morally and otherwise, 

from the idea that we all saw the abuses against them as unacceptable. So I don’t know how it affects Assad, but I sure think it would 

help them. 

Now, let’s get into the situation of what happens after he leaves. 

Do you really believe, Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, 

that the people are going through this pain and suffering at the 

end of the day to replace Assad with al Qaeda? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. 

General DEMPSEY. No, nor do I. 

Senator GRAHAM. The real concern we have is that there are minorities in the country, the Alawites in particular, that could really 

be on the receiving end of some reprisals if we don’t think about 

this; is that right? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. In our efforts to find out what happens next, 

are we guiding the Syrian opposition in any way to form a plan? 

Are we involved with them? 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously that’s the biggest challenge, because we are dealing with a pretty disparate group. 

38 

Senator GRAHAM. Are we trying to create order out of chaos? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. See, somebody’s going to bet on the stock that 

follows Assad and I want to be on the ground floor of this new enterprise. I don’t want to just show up after it’s over. I want to get 

ready now and try to mold the outcome, and you don’t have to have 

boots-on-the-ground to do that. 

But when it comes to what happens next, do you believe that if 

Assad were replaced by the will of the international community, 

led by the United States, that that may do more good regarding 

Iran’s ambitions for nuclear weapons than sanctions, if they saw 

the international community take their ally down, that we had the 

resolve to do it? 

Secretary PANETTA. It would certainly add to the impact of the 

sanctions to have this happen in convincing Iran that they’re alone. 

Senator GRAHAM. I just can’t help but believe if their ally Syria 

went down because the international community led by the United 

States said enough is enough and did reasonable things to take 

him down, that that wouldn’t have a positive impact. 

Now, when it comes to planning, Senator Blumenthal asked a lot 

of good questions about what we’re doing and what we’re planning. 

Am I wrong to assume that from your testimony the President of 

the United States has not requested a military plan regarding engaging Syria? 

General DEMPSEY. No, that’s not correct. The President of the 

United States, through the National Security Staff, has asked us 

to begin the commander’s estimate, the estimate of the situation. 

Senator GRAHAM. That’s good. So there is movement in process 

in DOD to provide the President some options; is that correct? 

Secretary PANETTA. Correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, when it comes to China and Russia, do 

you believe they will ever change their tune at the U.N., that we’ll 

ever get them on board for a U.N. resolution like we had in Libya 

regarding Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. I don’t think it’s totally out of the question. 

Both countries have been embarrassed, I think, by the stand that 

they took on the U.N. resolution. 

Senator GRAHAM. But they can withstand a lot of embarrassment. 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. If you were a betting man, do you believe that 

they will ever come on board? 

Secretary PANETTA. If Russia wants to maintain its contacts with 

Syria, maintain their port, and have some involvement with whatever government replaces Assad, they might be thinking about an 

approach that would allow them to have some impact on where this 

goes. So I don’t rule it out that they wouldn’t—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you say that should not be our only option, that we should come up with a contingency plan in case Russia doesn’t wake up one day and realize they’re on the wrong side 

of history, that we have another way of engaging without China 

and Russia? 

Secretary PANETTA. Absolutely. 

39 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, let’s talk about the Arab League. The 

Arab League has changed mightily in the last year, haven’t they, 

given their involvement in the Mideast? 

Secretary PANETTA. They sure have. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe it’s generated by the Arab 

Spring; that the Arab League was an association of dictatorial regimes that now are betting on the right side of history, and they 

see Assad as being on the wrong side of history, and that’s incredibly encouraging? 

Secretary PANETTA. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Don’t you think in our long-term national security interests we have a window in time here to marry up with the 

Arab League in terms of military, humanitarian, economic, followon assistance to the countries that have people who are saying, I’m 

tired of being led by dictators? Are we doing enough to seize that 

moment in history? 

Secretary PANETTA. I can assure you that Secretary Clinton and 

I are working with our Arab League partners to try to do everything we can to develop and maintain the coalition that was established with Libya, but to maintain it as a continuing influence over 

what happens elsewhere in that region. 

Senator GRAHAM. My final thought is that if the slaughter continues I do believe that the world, including the United States, has 

the capability to neutralize the slaughter through air power. Given 

the way the world is and the way Syria is, is there a likelihood, 

even a remote possibility, that if we engaged the artillery forces 

and the tank drivers who are killing people who basically have 

AK–47s, that maybe the other people in tanks would get out and 

quit if we blew up a few of them? 

General DEMPSEY. There’s certainly that possibility. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think that is a high likelihood. 

Thank you both for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, thank you both very much 

for being here. 

I want to follow up on the issues that have been raised about 

arms shipments from Russia and China. Reports are that 30 percent of Syrian arms come from China and North Korea. You talked 

a little bit about the Russian perspective, but I’m not clear whether 

we think there is any way to engage the Chinese on this issue. Is 

this something the international community has developed a strategy on for how to prevent or reduce future arms shipments from 

Russia and China? 

Secretary PANETTA. The international community is concerned 

about what you just discussed, and the international community, 

led by the United States, is trying to engage both Russia and 

China to try to see if we can change their approach to Syria. 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, if I could, we said here this morning 

that it’s very clear and documented that Russia has an arms sale 

agreement with Syria. We’ve also said we need to get back to you 

on whether China does. I don’t know the answer to that question. 

Senator SHAHEEN. That comes from published reports. 

40 

I appreciated what you both had to say about our efforts around 

humanitarian aid. I think most of us looking at the pictures, the 

reports on the news, the pictures in the newspapers of the slaughter that’s going on inside Syria, are very concerned about the cost 

in human lives, particularly for civilians, the women and children 

who have been killed. 

Obviously, as the result there have been a lot, thousands of refugees who are going over the borders. First of all, is there more that 

we can or should be doing to address those refugees who are fleeing, as well as the humanitarian efforts on the ground in Syria 

that you talked about? 

Then can you also address concerns that we might have about 

the destabilizing effect that refugees might have, particularly in 

Lebanon? 

Secretary PANETTA. We are doing everything we can to expand 

the humanitarian effort. There is more that can be done and that 

needs to be done. Indeed, one of the options we’re looking at is 

whether or not to establish these humanitarian zones to try to assist the refugees in a more effective way. 

The refugee flows, if they continue at the rate that we see are 

clearly going to have an impact on the neighboring countries. We’ve 

already seen that happening. 

General DEMPSEY. Could I add, Senator? Having lived over there 

for more than 5 years, refugees, because of family and tribal relationships, they’re hard to pin down actually, how many and where 

they are, because they blend in. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Sure. 

General DEMPSEY. So during the Iraq war there were many Iraqi 

Sunni al Anbar refugees that flowed into Syria, and what we’re 

seeing is some of them are flowing back now. We think maybe 

15,000 from Syria into Jordan, maybe 10,000 into Lebanon, maybe 

10,000 into Turkey. The way you first learn about it is when they 

put demands on the host nation medical system and some other 

things. 

So the answer to the question is yes, of course there’s more we 

can do and should. We have to do it through the host nations because they really understand this in a way that we can’t. 

Senator SHAHEEN. How engaged are the Arab League and the 

European community in supporting these kinds of humanitarian efforts? 

Secretary PANETTA. They’re very engaged, and we are working 

with the international community and the Arab League in addressing the humanitarian issue. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

To go on to Syria’s weapons arsenal, I know that there have been 

reports that they have the biggest chemical weapon arsenal in the 

world. I had a chance to ask General Mattis about this yesterday, 

about what concerns we have should Assad fall, about the security 

of those arsenals and what potential threat to the rest of the region 

they might present. Can you address that? 

General DEMPSEY. I can address it in great detail in closed session. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Okay. I appreciate that. 

41 

Senator Collins, Senator Gillibrand, and I sent a letter to the administration expressing our concerns about this. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, there’s no question that they have 

huge stockpiles and that if it got into the wrong hands it would 

really be a threat to the security, not only of the regional countries, 

but to the United States. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Recognizing that you don’t want to address 

this in an open session, but can you compare it to the situation 

that we found in Libya last year? I know 20,000 Manportable AirDefense System (MANPADS) disappeared in Libya. So how do we 

compare this situation? 

Secretary PANETTA. It’s 100 times worse than what we dealt with 

in Libya, and for that reason that’s why it’s raised even greater 

concerns about our ability to address how we can secure those 

sites. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Are there new sanctions the administration and Congress could enact that would further dissuade 

other countries who might be assisting Syria either directly or inadvertently to try and continue to isolate Syria and those countries 

who are helping? 

Secretary PANETTA. There are. I have to tell you, one of the 

things that has really come together are the sanctions that have 

been put in place. They target senior leadership and their assets. 

They’re hampering foreign transactions. There’s been a gross domestic product (GDP) decline from a minus 2 to a minus 8 percent. 

So the GDP has taken a hit from the sanctions. There’s a loss of 

revenue, 30 percent loss of revenue due to the oil embargo that’s 

taking place, and that’s continuing to have an impact. There’s been 

almost a 20 percent currency depreciation. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So do we think there’s a possibility that Assad 

is just going to run out of money if this continues indefinitely? 

Secretary PANETTA. They’ll always struggle to find ways around 

some of this, but this is squeezing him badly and they are at least 

in the process of running out of money. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Thank you, both of you, for your service to the country. 

I had the opportunity to travel a few weeks ago with Senators 

McCain and Graham and Blumenthal and others to the Middle 

East. I think there is a sense, in Senator McCain’s vast experience 

in this region, that the United States’ position clearly spoken does 

impact people. Revolutions and people are standing up against oppressive regimes are encouraged and emboldened if they sense the 

United States clearly articulates the justice of their cause. 

I think we’ve been a bit weak on that. In Iran, when we had the 

revolution there, the protests there, that was a window of opportunity I am really, really disappointed we didn’t somehow participate more positively in. 

So I don’t know. I believe you said, Secretary Panetta, or maybe 

General Dempsey, there’s a difference between contingency planning and a commander’s estimate. What is the difference? 

42 

General DEMPSEY. The commander’s estimate, the acronym is 

‘‘METTT.’’ What are the potential missions, what is the enemy 

order of battle, what are the enemy’s capabilities or potential enemies, what are the troops we have available, and how much time? 

So mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time or METTT. That’s a 

commander’s estimate. 

Senator SESSIONS. You’re looking at that? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Have you completed that? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. You said, Secretary Panetta, that you’re waiting on the President before doing contingency planning. What 

would be the contingency planning? What would be the next level? 

General DEMPSEY. The next level of detail would be for us to 

take actual units from someplace else and apply them against that 

template in order to come up with operational concepts, how would 

we do it. 

Senator SESSIONS. If you were another nation that was potentially interested in helping in this situation, wouldn’t you be a little 

more impressed if we’d gone further in our detail? Does it not suggest that we are really not that interested in taking action if we 

have not gone further? 

Secretary PANETTA. No, not at all. I think the assumptions that 

we’ve worked through, we’ve discussed them with the President, 

we’ve discussed them with the National Security Council. We are 

in the process of developing even further ideas with regards to 

some of those options. Ultimately, obviously, when the President 

makes the decision as to what course he wants to take in line, obviously, with our international partners, we’ll be ready to go. 

Senator SESSIONS. You said that we’ll take our time earlier, and 

when we do, it will be well-prepared. But I have to say, Senator 

Blumenthal and others have raised the question of whether or not 

this window is not already closing. Dictators have successfully 

crushed revolutions many times in history. How confident are you 

that this—I know you have an estimate, but I don’t see how an estimate that this country—that Assad’s about to be toppled can be 

justified based on what we’re seeing just publicly on the ground. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, the fundamental issue that is before 

us is whether or not the United States will go ahead and act unilaterally in that part of the world and engage in another war in 

the Muslim world unilaterally, or whether or not we will work with 

others in determining what action we take. That’s the fundamental 

decision that needs to be made. 

Senator SESSIONS. Isn’t there a window, and can you say with 

certainty that, even in a matter of a few weeks, that Assad may 

have reestablished his control in the country and there would be 

no likelihood of his regime toppling? 

Secretary PANETTA. According to the intelligence estimates that 

I have seen, this insurgency is not only continuing, but it’s growing 

wider. When that happens, it’s going to continue to put a tremendous amount of pressure on Assad. 

Senator SESSIONS. Maybe that’s—I hope that’s true and I hope 

that we don’t miss an opportunity here. I know Senator Kerry and 

Senator McCain said use a no-fly zone over Libya. A long time 

43 

went by before that was done. Many believe, I think Senator 

McCain believes, I believe, that had they been listened to early 

there might have been fewer casualties and the regime might have 

collapsed sooner. 

So I just would say I value your opinion on this, because you 

know more detail than I do. 

General Dempsey, in one of your criteria for determining what 

we might do militarily you say you have to ask the question of 

whether the action is worth the cost and is consistent with law. 

What law does the U.S. military look to? 

General DEMPSEY. If I could, I’d like to address both since they 

are related. So cost, resources, risk incurred elsewhere by the use 

of force one other place. It’s a zero-sum game. We take them from 

someplace else, we use them for how long. That’s the kind of issue 

of cost, and the question of blood and treasure. 

The issue of legal basis is important, though. Again, we act with 

the authorized use of military force either at the consent of a government, so when we’re invited in, or out of national self-defense, 

and there’s a very clear criteria for that. Then the last one is with 

some kind of international legal basis, an UNSCR. 

Senator SESSIONS. Wait a minute. Let’s talk about an international legal basis. You answer under the Constitution to the U.S. 

Government, do you not? You don’t need any international support 

before you would carry out a military operation authorized by the 

Commander in Chief. 

General DEMPSEY. No, of course not. That’s the second one. 

Senator SESSIONS. I just want to know that, because there’s a lot 

of references in here to international matters before we make a decision. I want to be sure that the U.S. military understands, and 

I know you do, that we’re not dependent on a NATO resolution or 

a U.N. resolution to execute policies consistent with the national 

security of the United States. 

Now, Secretary Panetta, in your talk, in your remarks, you talk 

about: first, we are working to increase diplomatic isolation and encouraging other countries to join the EU and the Arab League in 

imposing sanctions. Then you note that China and Russia have repeatedly blocked the U.N. Security Council from taking action. 

Are you saying and is the President taking the position he would 

not act, if it was in our interest to do so, if the U.N. Security Council did not agree? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, when it comes to our national defense, we act based on protecting the security of this country and 

we don’t look for permission from anybody else when it comes to 

our national defense. 

When it comes to the kind of military action where we want to 

build a coalition and work with our international partners, then obviously we would like to have some kind of legal basis on which to 

do it, as we did in Libya. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, some sort of legal basis. We’re worried 

about international legal basis, but nobody worried about the fundamental constitutional legal basis that this Congress has over 

war. We were not asked, stunningly, in direct violation of the War 

Powers Act. Whether or not you believe it’s constitutional, you certainly didn’t comply with it. We spent our time worrying about the 

44 

U.N., the Arab League, NATO, and too little time, in my opinion, 

worrying about the elected representatives of the United States. 

As you go forward, will you consult with the United States Congress, and can we be assured that you will have more consultation 

and more participation and legal authority from the duly elected 

representatives? 

Secretary PANETTA. Believe me, we will. We don’t have a corner 

on the market with regards to issues involving our defense. We 

want to consult with Congress. We want to get your best advice 

and your guidance. When we take action, we want to do it together. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you think that you can act without Congress and initiate a no-fly zone in Syria, without congressional approval? 

Secretary PANETTA. Again, our goal would be to seek international permission and we would come to Congress and inform 

you and determine how best to approach this. Whether or not we 

would want to get permission from Congress, I think those are 

issues we would have to discuss as we decide what to do here. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m almost breathless about that, because 

what I heard you say is: We’re going to seek international approval 

and we will come and tell Congress what we might do, and we 

might seek congressional approval. I want to just say to you, that’s 

a big—wouldn’t you agree? You served in Congress. Wouldn’t you 

agree that that would be pretty breathtaking to the average American? So would you like to clarify that? 

Secretary PANETTA. I served with Republican Presidents and 

Democratic Presidents, who always reserved the right to defend 

this country, if necessary. 

Senator SESSIONS. But before we do this you would seek permission of the international authorities? 

Secretary PANETTA. If we’re working with an international coalition and we’re working with NATO, we would want to be able to 

get appropriate permissions in order to be able to do that. That’s 

something that all of these countries would want to have some kind 

of legal basis on which to act. 

Senator SESSIONS. What legal basis are you looking for? What 

entity? 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, if NATO made the decision to go 

in that would be one. If we developed an international coalition beyond NATO, then obviously some kind of U.N. Security Resolution—— 

Senator SESSIONS. So a coalition of—so you’re saying NATO 

would give you a legal basis and an ad hoc coalition of nations 

would provide a legal basis? 

Secretary PANETTA. If we were able to put together a coalition 

and were able to move together, then obviously we would seek 

whatever legal basis we would need in order to make that justified. 

We can’t just pull them all together in a combat operation without 

getting the legal basis on which to act. 

Senator SESSIONS. Who are you asking for the legal basis from? 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, if the U.N. passed a Security 

Council Resolution, as it did in Libya, we would do that. If NATO 

came together, as we did in Bosnia, we would rely on that. So we 

45 

have options here if we want to build the kind of international approach to dealing with the situation. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m all for having international support, but 

I’m really baffled by the idea that somehow an international assembly provides a legal basis for the U.S. military to be deployed 

in combat. I don’t believe it’s close to being correct. They provide 

no legal authority. The only legal authority that’s required to deploy the U.S. military is Congress and the President and the law 

and the Constitution. 

Secretary PANETTA. Let me just for the record be clear again, 

Senator, so there’s no misunderstanding. When it comes to the national defense of this country, the President of the United States 

has the authority under the Constitution to act to defend this country and he will. If it comes to an operation where we’re trying to 

build a coalition of nations to work together to go in and operate, 

as we did in Libya or Bosnia, for that matter Afghanistan, we want 

to do it with permissions either by NATO or by the international 

community. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m troubled by that. I think that it does 

weaken the ability of the United States to lead. If we believe something ought to be done, I’d be thinking we would be going more aggressively to NATO and other allies, seeking every ally that we can 

get. But I do think ultimately you need a legal authority from the 

United States of America, not from any other extraterritorial group 

that might assemble. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. I wonder, Senator Webb, if you would yield to 

me just for one moment. I won’t take it off your time. 

Senator WEBB. Certainly, certainly. 

Chairman LEVIN. I would just like to clarify that last point, because you used the word ‘‘permission’’ at times as being helpful to 

achieving an international coalition. You don’t need any authority 

from anybody else, any permission from anybody else, if we’re 

going to act alone. You’ve made that clear. You said it three times. 

I think that’s essential. 

But what you, as I understand it, are saying is that if you’re 

seeking an international coalition it would help if there is a legal 

basis internationally in order to help obtain that legal coalition. I 

don’t think the word ‘‘permission’’ is appropriate even in that context, by the way. I think you really corrected it when you said a 

legal basis in international law would help you achieve an international coalition. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you’re seeking an international coalition, 

having that kind of international legal basis will help. I think 

that’s what you’re trying to say and I hope that is what you’re trying to say. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s what I’m trying to say. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Secretary PANETTA. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Webb. 

Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions is raising an important point. 

46 

Senator WEBB. Senator Sessions is. I don’t want to eat up too 

much of my own clock on this, but—— 

Chairman LEVIN. You have the time that’s allotted. 

Senator WEBB.—I would like to clarify a point that has been a 

concern to me on this very same issue. That is the difference between the United States acting unilaterally if we decide it’s within 

our national interest and it’s something that you, Mr. Secretary, 

have raised in terms of the situation in Syria—there’s a difference 

between that and the President deciding to act unilaterally in an 

area that arguably has not been defined as a national security interest. 

I made floor remarks on this. I have a great deal of concern when 

you look at the Libya model, where the basic justification has been 

humanitarian assistance, which is very vague and it’s not under 

the historical precepts that we have otherwise used, like a treaty 

if you’re talking about NATO, or defending Americans who have 

been captured, as in Grenada, or retaliating for a certain act, as 

we did in Libya, say, in 1986, when I was in the Pentagon. 

So, I think, Senator Sessions has raised a point of concern, and 

I would like to just put a parentheses around that, but hold the 

thought. I think there definitely is room for some very serious discussion here in Congress on the way that the President, any President, can decide unilaterally to use military action in this rather 

vague concept of humanitarian assistance. 

But to set that aside, what I really would like to talk about today 

are my thoughts about your testimony, and I would like to say very 

specifically that I found both of your testimonies with respect to 

the situation in Syria very reassuring. It was very careful and 

forthright. I think there’s a lot of wisdom in the approach that 

you’re taking on this. 

I think when people are talking about the need for leadership, 

we need to understand and we need to have a little sense of history 

here. Leadership is not always taking precipitate action when the 

emotions are going. It’s in achieving results that will bring about 

long-term objectives. Probably the greatest strategic victory in our 

lifetime was the Cold War. That was conscious, decades-long application of strategy with the right signals with respect to our national security apparatus. 

There’s no one in the world that will doubt the ability of the 

United States to put lethality on the battlefield if we decide to do 

it. But that’s not really always the question when we’re developing 

these kinds of policies, at least not the first question. I thought 

your testimonies were very clear on that from both of you. 

Secretary Panetta, your comment about each situation is unique. 

General Dempsey, I think your example of the danger of looking 

at this through a straw is probably the best way to put it. We have 

to look at all of the ramifications in these sorts of matters. 

I think the principles that you’ve laid down, we should all support this type of logic: to forge an international consensus, to translate the consensus into acts, and to at least express our hope that 

this change can be brought about through a peaceful political transition. I was taking notes as you made your testimony, Secretary 

Panetta. 

47 

I want to ask you about one thing that you said because I think 

we all need to think about it. You said, I think this is a direct 

quote, I’m an old journalist here, I can write fast: ‘‘Any government 

that indiscriminately kills its own people loses its legitimacy.’’ 

Would you say that is a statement of the policy of the United 

States? 

Secretary PANETTA. I would. 

Senator WEBB. Would you believe that with the circumstances in 

Tiananmen Square 1989, when the Chinese government turned its 

own soldiers loose and its own tanks loose on its own people and 

killed more than 1,000 people, would you say that fits into this 

statement? 

Secretary PANETTA. Let me put this on a personal view. My personal view would be that that was the case there. 

Senator WEBB. I think it also illustrates your comment that in 

policy terms each situation is unique and that we have to try to 

use the best building blocks we can in order to best address these 

types of situations, depending on where they happen and what 

other capabilities any one of these governments might have. 

This is something, I actually held a hearing on this in the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, talking about what might be viewed 

as the situational ethics in terms of American foreign policy. But 

it clearly demonstrates that you can’t—there’s no one template 

here when we’re attempting to resolve differences in philosophy 

and policies with different countries. 

So I would say that I do believe your exchange with Senator Sessions may have been lost in translation because it went back and 

forth so much, but I do believe Senator Sessions has a very valid 

point in terms of presidential authority. But I strongly support the 

analytical matrix, the policy matrix, that you are putting into place 

with respect to Syria. 

I thank you for your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I think that this hearing and discussion this 

morning, as well as yesterday, demonstrate how difficult the challenge is that is posed by Syria. I don’t think this lends itself to an 

easy solution, as appalled as we all are by the slaughter of the innocent civilians in Syria. 

One of the options that I’d like to return to which has been discussed today is whether or not we should try to arm elements of 

the Syrian opposition. I think this too is a difficult issue. Although, 

Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, you both responded to a question from Senator Graham that you don’t think al Qaeda’s the ultimate victor, if you will, once the regime falls. When Secretary Clinton testified at a House hearing last week, she raised the question 

of, if we arm, who are we arming? She specifically noted that 

Zawahiri of al Qaeda is backing the Syrian opposition. 

Her comment recalled to me the situation in Afghanistan, where 

some of the groups that we armed in the 1980s are now some of 

the same people who are attacking American soldiers today, perhaps using some of those same arms. 

48 

So, General, if the United States or another country or even an 

international coalition chose to arm opposition groups in Syria, 

what’s your assessment of the risk that we might be taking that 

we could end up arming terrorist groups or other enemies that are 

hostile to the United States or to Israel or to other allies in the region? 

General DEMPSEY. If you sense any reluctance on my part at this 

point, it’s because I can’t get my intellect around that risk. I just 

can’t understand it yet. But I will tell you that the President’s been 

very directive with the intelligence community that that’s what has 

to happen, that we have to be able to understand the opposition. 

To the extent we can, we should help it coalesce into something 

that’s understandable and definable, coherent enough. Then if we 

ever do reach a decision to arm the opposition, it just can’t simply 

be arming them without any command and control, without any 

communications, because then it becomes a roving band of rebels, 

and I think we can do better than that. But we’re not there right 

now. 

Senator COLLINS. Secretary Panetta? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, one thing we found in this region of 

the world is that once you provide these arms, there are no boundaries as to where they can wind up. We saw that happen in Libya 

and we are seeing evidence of some of the weapons used there popping up in the Sinai and elsewhere. If we provide arms in Syria, 

we have to have some sense that they aren’t just automatically 

going to wind up going to Hezbollah, going to Hamas, going to al 

Qaeda, going to other groups that would then use those weapons 

for other purposes. 

Senator COLLINS. I think that’s an extremely difficult issue as we 

look at whether or not to encourage the provision of arms or to provide arms ourselves. 

Senator Shaheen and I have been working on the MANPADS 

issue with Libya. We’ve been very concerned about that. As you 

say, the situation in Syria makes the Libyan situation pale by comparison, plus Syria has, as I understand it, large stockpiles of 

chemical and biological weapons as well. So it’s a very difficult 

issue. 

I want to get your assessment of the NATO Secretary General’s 

comment last week when he said that NATO would not get involved in Syria because western assistance would be insufficient to 

solve the crisis. He said that: ‘‘NATO could not bring about a sustainable solution to the problem,’’ and instead he advocated for an 

Arab League-led effort to the crisis. 

First, I would ask what your general reaction to the Secretary 

General’s statement was, Mr. Secretary. Second, can we expect 

military and humanitarian assistance from the Arab League? 

Secretary PANETTA. First of all, I understand his concerns about 

the situation in Syria from a military perspective, because we 

share some of the same concerns. At the same time, I think that 

NATO in the very least ought to take a look at the situation there 

and determine whether or not they could play an important role 

there. 

The fact is, when you look at Libya, even though NATO was 

there, we had partners in the Arab community that joined that coaVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:46 Oct 19, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76271.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
49 

lition that were very helpful to the operation there. It’s that kind 

of coalition that can work very effectively. 

Turning to the Arab League, the Arab League obviously is working to try to develop an approach here. Individual nations are looking at different ways to try to provide assistance of one kind or another. But the Arab League itself doesn’t have the capability that 

NATO has to be able to engage militarily, if necessary. 

Senator COLLINS. I was in Turkey recently and obviously Turkey 

historically had good relationships with Syria, but the Prime Minister has been very strong in calling for Assad to step aside and 

indeed has provided sanctuary for the FSA within its borders. 

What advice are we getting from the Turks on what approach we 

should be taking towards Syria? Are there conversations ongoing 

with Turkey? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes, there are. Turkey has actually exercised 

very responsible leadership with regards to the issue. Obviously, 

they have a direct concern because it is a border country, but they 

have called for Assad to step down. We have engaged with them 

on consultation with regards to the concern over the chemical and 

biological sites that are located there, and we’re continuing to consult with them with regards to refugees as well. 

But the answer to your question is that Turkey is playing a very 

responsible role in dealing with this issue. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, would you allow me one very quick final question? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, please. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, is Iraq playing a positive role in actually 

interdicting the transshipment of supplies, ammunition, and weapons? It’s really straddling the communications and transportation 

lines between the two countries. 

General DEMPSEY. Iraq has done two things that I view as quite 

positive. One was, as the Secretary mentioned, the statement that 

they too now advocate Assad stepping down. So that’s on the political side. 

On the issue of Iranian shipments crossing through their air 

space, they have, in fact, demarched Iran to cease doing that. They 

have requested—remember now, they don’t have the ability to control their air space. They can’t interdict anyone crossing it. But 

they have on more than one occasion insisted that Iranian air 

flights across Iraq would land to be inspected, and at their insistence once that occurred the flights were delayed and in some cases 

we believe to allow the offloading of the shipment, so that it wasn’t 

identified when it landed in Iraq. 

So they are, they are trying. But again, they don’t have much capability to do anything beyond diplomatic engagement. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

We’re now going to move directly to SVC–217 in the Capitol Visitor Center for our closed session. Thank you both. This hearing 

stands adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

50 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

SYRIAN WEAPONS

1. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, the outcome of the current conflict in 

Syria will have strategic repercussions throughout the region. We know the Syrian 

regime has a substantial chemical-biological weapons capability, a significant integrated air defense system, thousands of shoulder-launched anti-air missiles, and a 

wholly unsustainable political hierarchy. The Syrian security situation continues to 

deteriorate as the Assad regime escalates the level of lethal force employed upon 

its own people. As a result, the regime is battling for its survival against a popular 

uprising, raising the prospect of a civil war. Also, according to your testimony, the 

options available to address the situation are extremely challenging. Based on our 

intelligence of the make-up of the opposition, would it be possible for the international community to provide arms to the rebels without running the risk that 

those weapons could fall into the hands of al Qaeda forces operating in Syria? 

General DEMPSEY. Based on our understanding of the armed Syrian opposition 

and deteriorating economic conditions inside Syria, it would be impossible to eliminate the risk of foreign-provided weapons falling into the hands of any of the various extremist groups operating inside Syria, to include al Qaeda. Although al 

Qaeda is operating in Syria, our assessment is that the opposition forces may be 

unaware that they have al Qaeda cells in their midst. The international community 

could certainly take a variety of actions to ensure that weapons are initially delivered to the ‘‘right’’ opposition forces. However, the nature of the fight and the lack 

of organization and cohesion among the opposition forces could lead to weapons finding their way into the wrong hands. 

2. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, what are the most significant risks of 

providing arms to the Syrian opposition? 

General DEMPSEY. A significant risk is that foreign-provided arms might fall into 

the hands of any of the various extremist organizations that are currently operating 

in and around Syria. Such groups, including al Qaeda, seek to exploit deteriorating 

security conditions in Syria, exacerbate sectarian tensions, and threaten U.S. interests by destabilizing our allies in neighboring countries. An additional concern is 

that those weapons might empower elements of the opposition who do not share our 

interests in a democratic, pluralistic, and inclusive Syria that respects the rights of 

Syria’s substantial minority communities. Finally, there is a substantial risk that 

better armed opposition elements operating independently of any political process 

would simply increase levels of violence in Syria and further inflame sectarian tensions—making any eventual political reconciliation that much harder to achieve. 

3. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, what other options should the international community consider that would reduce the chance of providing support to 

groups that run counter to U.S. security interests, such as al Qaeda, while still applying pressure against the Assad regime? 

General DEMPSEY. The United States is working with the international community to increase pressure against the Assad regime and all options remain on the 

table. Currently, the Assad regime is conflating the opposition’s use of force with 

al Qaeda-type terrorist attacks in order to discredit the opposition and promote a 

self-serving narrative that regime forces are actually defending—rather than oppressing—Syria’s people. We are also aware of violent extremist intentions to exploit 

any security vacuum in Syria to further their own political objectives. Consequently, 

I believe the international community should exhaust all options for facilitating a 

managed political transition in Syria before seeking to effect such a transition via 

military means. 

4. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, should the Syrian regime collapse, have 

precautions been taken or are there plans in place to ensure that the Syrian stockpile of chemical-biological weapons will not fall into the hands of groups that oppose 

U.S. interests? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. We have a plan in place that covers a wide range of potential scenarios and provides options to address those scenarios. We also continue to 

work with our allies and regional partners to share information and coordinate activities. The United States and our allies are closely watching the security and disposition of Syria’s unconventional weapons. 

51 

5. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, if the United States decided to support 

airstrikes on Syria, how much of a risk does the air defense system and anti-air 

missiles pose to our aircraft? 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

6. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, can we mitigate the risk posed to our 

aircraft by the Syrian air defense system and anti-air missiles? 

General DEMPSEY. We can best mitigate the risk posed to our aircraft from these 

systems by destroying them. Any other course of action would result in an enduring 

risk to our aircraft. Destruction would require attacking surface-to-air missile (SAM) 

launchers, radars, and their command and control. Mobile SAM systems would be 

challenging and would require our aircraft to rely heavily on onboard defensive systems and tactics for protection until the mobile SAMs were engaged. With the large 

number of mobile SAMs in Syria, it will be challenging to ensure we have destroyed 

every mobile SAM. 

Attacking mobile SAM systems may provoke retaliation in the form of ballistic 

missile attacks on U.S. forces or allies and risk widening the conflict. There is the 

possibility of collateral damage if targeted SAM sites are located in populated areas. 

However, a sustained air presence over Syria to protect humanitarian corridors or 

establish a no-fly zone would require a sustained air campaign to defeat the integrated air defense systems. 

SYRIAN REGIME CHANGE

7. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, is it reasonable to think that if the 

Assad regime collapses, with or without U.S. assistance, that the Syrian Government that arises after the collapse will cooperate with the United States and the 

international community? 

General DEMPSEY. Depending on how long it takes for the Assad regime to collapse, and how much damage is done to the multi-confessional fabric of Syrian society during the process, it is possible that no cohesive Syrian Government will 

emerge with which the United States and international community could cooperate. 

If the Assad regime were replaced by a government that manages to maintain Syria’s national unity such a government might be inclined to cooperate with the international community in exchange for economic and security assistance. 

8. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, what players already exist in Syria that 

will almost certainly vie for power if the Assad regime collapses? 

General DEMPSEY. Information on opposition groups operating inside Syria’s cities 

and villages is limited, and it cannot be ruled out that local leaders and groups, of 

which we currently know little, could emerge to compete for power should the Assad 

regime fall. Likewise, the means by which Assad is eventually removed will have 

an impact on who is best positioned to compete for power. If Assad is removed 

through military force, the armed groups responsible for his overthrow are likely to 

demand the largest share of power in a post-Assad Syria. 

If the conflict in Syria is settled peacefully or through negotiations, the groups 

best placed to vie for power are senior members of the Syrian National Council, the 

Free Syrian Army (FSA), the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, National Coordination 

Board, Local Coordination Committees, Kurdish groups, the Sunni business class, 

or various current regime officials. 

9. Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, are these players friendly to the United 

States? 

General DEMPSEY. Most elements of Syrian political and military opposition are 

actively seeking foreign support and would welcome financial or material assistance 

from the United States. It is not yet clear what a post-Assad Government, could 

look like or what its international relations priorities would be. 

Much of the leadership of the Syrian National Council would welcome friendly relations with the United States. There is little information on the FSA’s views of the 

United States. Additionally, it is too soon to predict what position the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would take on improving relations with the United States. 

52 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F.WICKER

ROLE OF NATO IN SYRIA

10. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the March edition 

of Foreign Affairs contains an essay by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Ambassador Ivo Daalder and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Stavridis, titled: 

‘‘NATO’s Victory in Libya’’. This piece highlights the successes and lessons learned 

from Operation Odyssey Dawn. The U.S. and NATO intervention in Libya serves 

very much as an exemplar for similar intervention in Syria. Their essay explicitly 

notes that: ‘‘When a group of countries wants to launch a joint intervention as a 

coalition—which confers political legitimacy—only NATO can provide the common 

command structure and capabilities necessary to plan and execute complex operations. Multilateral coalitions built on an as-needed basis, by contrast, have no common doctrine for conducting military operations, no common capabilities or command structure for quickly integrating national forces into a cohesive campaign, and 

no standing mechanisms for debating and then deciding on an agreed course of action.’’ Have you had any discussions or consultations with our NATO allies on contingency planning regarding Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. First, I would like to emphasize that the United States is 

committed to bringing an end to the atrocities perpetuated by the Assad regime as 

soon as possible. Our focus has been and continues to be on diplomatic and political 

approaches to this situation, rather than military intervention. But we have not 

ruled out any course of action. We remain engaged with our allies and partners as 

we determine how best to resolve the crisis in Syria. 

We have not started planning within NATO for military contingency operations. 

For NATO to take action, including formal military planning, all 28 members must 

agree to do so. As we saw in Libya, many allies would be hesitant to commit NATO 

as an organization to intervene militarily in Syria without clear support from countries in the region and a proper international legal basis, such as a Chapter VII 

U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). 

In the case of Syria, a consensus for military intervention does not exist at this 

time in the Arab League, the U.N. Security Council, or NATO. There are also concerns about the effect of military intervention on Syria’s neighbors, potential refugee 

flows across the borders with Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, and the possibility that 

violence may spread into these countries or along Israel’s borders. 

Although the objective of protecting civilians and supporting universal human 

rights are similar in these two cases, we do not believe the same means employed 

in Libya are available or advisable at the current time in Syria. Several factors— 

including demographic, ethnic, geographic, religious, and military capability—distinguish the challenges posed by the situation in Syria, as compared to the situation 

in Libya prior to Operation Odyssey Dawn. On February 29, 2012, NATO Security 

General Rasmussen stated: ‘‘We haven’t had any discussions in NATO about a 

NATO role in Syria and I don’t envision such a role for the alliance,’’ and that 

‘‘Syria is ethnically, politically, religiously much more complicated than Libya. This 

is the reason why the right way forward is different.’’ Likewise, it is important to 

note that the Syrian regime has approximately five times more sophisticated air defense systems than existed in Libya, covering one-fifth of the terrain, in addition 

to much larger conventional and chemical weapons stockpiles. 

The U.S. Government continues to pursue a range of non-military options, such 

as increased sanctions, to increase pressure on the Syrian regime, in addition to our 

work at the U.N. Security Council and with our international partners, including 

the Arab League and U.N.-Arab League Envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan. As I noted, 

we are committed to bringing an end to the atrocities perpetuated by the Assad regime as soon as possible. 

General DEMPSEY. I have discussed the current situation in Syria with some 

NATO allies. However, we have not discussed contingency planning with any other 

members of NATO. To date, NATO has not discussed any possible future role that 

the alliance could play with regard to the situation in Syria. 

11. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has increased their rhetoric about arming the Syrian opposition 

forces. What options exist for NATO and the GCC to expedite arms assistance to 

the Syrian opposition? 

Secretary PANETTA. In order for NATO to take action, all 28 members must agree 

to do so. Many allies would be hesitant to commit NATO as an organization to intervene militarily in Syria, without clear support from countries in the region and a 

53 

proper international legal basis, such as a Chapter VII UNSCR. In addition, NATO, 

as an organization, does not provide arms to any nation or opposition entity. 

GCC member states have offered critical support and participation in international efforts to stop the violence in Syria, and to develop a political solution to 

the crisis. Although we continue to assess options and the feasibility of providing 

security assistance to the Syrian opposition, we do not believe it is appropriate to 

provide lethal assistance, at this time. We encourage the GCC and other interested 

parties to use diplomatic influence and resources to pressure the Assad regime and 

encourage the Syrian opposition to halt violence, and to begin the orderly transition 

to democracy. 

General DEMPSEY. To date, NATO has not discussed any possible future role that 

the alliance could play with regard to situation in Syria. The provision of lethal aid 

to the opposition is problematic for a variety of reasons to include: opposition unity 

and vetting, achieving the requisite legal basis to preclude lethal aid, and avoiding 

transfers to various extremist organizations operating within Syria. Some members 

of the GCC have publically advocated providing arms to the Syrian opposition but 

this is presently a problematic option for the United States. We are not aware of 

any NATO options to expedite arms assistance to the Syrian opposition. 

12. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, similar to our efforts in Libya, do you currently believe there is sufficient consensus within NATO 

to support alliance-led airstrikes to establish humanitarian safe-havens for civilians 

in Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. I do not believe there is sufficient consensus at this time. 

For NATO to take action, all 28 members must agree to do so. As we saw in 

Libya, many allies would be hesitant to commit NATO as an organization to intervene militarily in Syria without clear support from countries in the region and a 

proper international legal basis, such as a Chapter VII UNSCR. 

General DEMPSEY. Currently, I do not believe there is consensus within NATO for 

such action. To date, NATO has not discussed any possible future role that the alliance could play with regard to the situation in Syria. 

SYRIAN REFUGEES

13. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, on Monday, March 

5, 2012, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

reported that over 2,000 Syrian refugees—including Christians—have fled to border 

towns in Southern Syria in the hopes of crossing to Lebanon. For those who make 

it to Lebanon, many Syrian refugees fear agents from their own country’s security 

services. Anecdotal stories have circulated of kidnappings and collaboration between 

Lebanese and Syrian security forces. Turkey says it hosts more than 11,000 Syrians 

in camps along the border with Syria, including more than 1,000 who crossed in the 

last month. Jordan has more than 80,000 Syrian refugees, according to the government. About 100 have entered Jordan in the last 2 days. I continue to be concerned 

about the crisis regarding Syrian refugees seeking refuge in Lebanon, Jordan, and 

Turkey. For instance, our NATO ally Turkey is hosting over 11,000 Syrian refugees 

while Jordan is reportedly hosting over 80,000 Syrian refugees. What is the Department of Defense (DOD) prepared to do in terms of food or logistical assistance to 

help address this regional refugee crisis in the Levant? 

Secretary PANETTA. The State Department and USAID are the lead U.S. Government agencies for foreign humanitarian assistance. They are providing substantial 

support to the humanitarian relief effort in Syria and the surrounding countries 

through a number of humanitarian organizations. 

It is DOD’s job to ensure the President has a range of viable options at his disposal, and that we have fully considered all contingencies. This does not imply, however, an intent or recommendation to execute any particular contingency plan. 

General DEMPSEY. DOD is actively engaged with both our allies and the U.S. Government interagency to evaluate and address the refugee situation. Recent bilateral 

discussions with both Turkey and Jordan included the refugee concern and all parties continue to share information related to this topic. U.S. interagency, including 

DOD, Department of State, USAID and other elements continue to plan for assistance as it may be required to support the UNHCR and related efforts on the ground 

within the region. UNHCR leader Valerie Amos assessed the situation on the 

ground concurrently with U.N. envoy Kofi Annan’s visit to Syria and the United 

States continues to fully support UNHCR efforts on refugees throughout the region. 

54 

SYRIAN DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIA

14. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, it is no surprise 

given Vladimir Putin’s so-called presidential victory over the weekend that Russia 

continues to be an ardent supporter of the Syrian regime’s survival. Russia and 

China have blocked measures in October and February supporting an Arab Leaguedrafted transition plan. According to the Moscow Times, Russia’s current economic 

investment in Syria totaled $19.4 billion in 2009. In recent years Syria purchased 

modern anti-tank and anti-air missile systems from Russia. In 2008, Syria agreed 

to purchase advanced fighters, air-defense systems, tactical missile systems, and 

submarines from Russia. These sales are not limited to equipment and also extend 

to personnel training and other activities. As such, what is the level of Syria’s economic and military dependency on Russia for towards the Assad regime’s survival? 

Secretary PANETTA. Russia is the largest supplier of military equipment to Syria, 

and is also an important economic partner. Unfortunately, Russia continues to supply weapons to Syria. The United States has repeatedly raised our concerns regarding Russia’s decision to continue these weapons deliveries. However, Assad’s survival does not solely hinge on further Russian military or financial aid. Russian political support for Syria, particularly in the U.N. Security Council, has shielded 

Syria from international efforts to stop the violence and to hold the Assad regime 

accountable. However, we have recently been encouraged by Russian support for 

U.N.-Arab League envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan. 

General DEMPSEY. The survival of the Syrian regime is not ultimately contingent 

on Russian financial and military support. However, this support does place Damascus in a more confident position when attempting to weather unrest and the regime 

continues to value Russia as one of its most important foreign allies. Russian top 

cover at the U.N. has further solidified the regime’s intransigence while continued 

arms supplies, including advanced defensive systems, likely bolster Damascus’ confidence it can deter foreign military intervention. 

Beyond the arms trade, Russian companies have made a number of investments 

in Syria, including some from Russia’s powerful energy sector, such as a natural gas 

production facility and pipeline. Russia exported $1.1 billion worth of goods to Syria 

in 2010, about 6.3 percent of Syria’s imports. 

15. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, can you elaborate 

on the ongoing military-to-military cooperation between Syria and Russia? 

Secretary PANETTA. Syria continues to be one of Russia’s closest military partners 

in the Middle East, and Russia remains Syria’s largest supplier of military equipment. Despite the international condemnation of Assad’s harsh crackdown on Syria’s own population, Russian arms deliveries continue. Russia has military advisors 

in Syria and a naval logistics base in the Syrian Port of Tartus. The United States 

has repeatedly raised our concerns regarding the continued deliveries of weapons to 

Syria and we will continue to do so as long as the violence continues and Assad remains in power. 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

16. Senator WICKER. What level of intelligence cooperation do you believe exists 

between the Syrian and Russian security services? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN SYRIA

17. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, in late January 2012, General Qassem 

Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force (an elite unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards), visited the Syrian capital. This visit represents the most prominent 

signs of Iran’s assistance to Syria, including military equipment. Additionally, recently General Mattis, while describing a deteriorating situation in Syria, stated 

that it was fueled in part by Iran. In what capacity has Iran and/or al Qaeda contributed to these horrific events taking place in Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

18. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, would a collapse of President Assad’s rule 

likely end Iran’s cozy ties with Syria and potentially redraw the Mideast’s pathways 

of influence? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

55 

19. Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, would the Assad regime’s demise choke 

off aid to Tehran’s main anti-Israel faction, Hezbollah in Lebanon? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

SYRIAN FORCES

20. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, Syrian forces reportedly executed 47 Syrian soldiers who tried to defect in the city of Idlib just this past week. The regime 

of President Assad is currently beset by an armed insurgency mounted by the FSA. 

The FSA, which consists of some 20,000 army defectors armed as light infantry, has 

mounted numerous lethal ambushes and hit-and-run raids on loyalist troops. What 

is your assessment of the Syrian military and what is the level of loyalty towards 

Assad? 

General DEMPSEY. The Syrian military maintains a force of over 300,000 Active 

Duty personnel and a robust Reserve Duty Force, which can be drawn upon at need. 

The majority of Syria’s armed forces remain loyal to Assad. The Syrian military has 

been beset by regular defections of soldiers since unrest began, but overall its capabilities remain strong. To date, neither senior military officers nor members of 

Assad’s inner circle have defected. The highest ranking defectors to date have held 

the rank of brigadier general. 

21. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, what is your opinion on the capabilities 

of the FSA? 

General DEMPSEY. The capabilities of the FSA have steadily grown in recent 

months; however, the organization remains beset by logistical shortfalls and lack of 

unity among its leadership. 

The ability, or inability, of the FSA to exercise operational control over the armed 

opposition bears continued monitoring. In recent months, the FSA has issued several calls for the armed opposition operating within Syria to unite under the FSA’s 

banner, suggesting the group has had difficulties exercising control over disparate 

armed groups throughout Syria. 

FSA members are actively seeking military aid from foreign sponsors, including 

ammunition, small arms, and advanced weapons systems. 

22. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, what can the United States and NATO 

do to help these opposition forces? 

General DEMPSEY. Alliance political leaders must answer the question regarding 

what NATO can do to help the opposition forces. However, to date, NATO has not 

discussed any possible future role that the alliance could play with regard to helping 

the opposition forces in Syria. 

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

Æ