SECURE 

COMMUNITIES

Criminal Alien 

Removals Increased, 

but Technology 

Planning 

Improvements Needed

Report to the Ranking Member, 

Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives

July 2012

GAO-12-708

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-708, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

July 2012

SECURE COMMUNITIES 

Criminal Alien Removals Increased, but Technology 

Planning Improvements Needed

Why GAO Did This Study

Initiated in 2008, Secure Communities 

is an ICE program designed to identify 

potentially removable aliens, 

particularly those with criminal 

convictions, in state and local law 

enforcement custody. Fingerprints 

checked against a Federal Bureau of 

Investigation criminal database are 

checked against DHS’s immigration 

database to help determine whether an 

arrested individual is removable. GAO 

was asked to review Secure 

Communities operations. This report 

addresses (1) enforcement trends 

under Secure Communities, (2) ICE’s 

adherence to best practices in

acquiring Secure Communities–related 

technology, and (3) ICE safeguards to

help protect against potential civil 

rights abuses under Secure 

Communities. GAO analyzed ICE data 

on removals from October 2008 

through March 2012, and arrest 

charges from October 2010 through 

March 2012; reviewed program 

guidance, policies, and reports; and 

interviewed ICE’s Law Enforcement 

Support Center and agency officials, 

local law enforcement and community 

groups in four locations selected for

geographic diversity, among other 

factors. These perspectives are not 

generalizable, but provided insights 

into Secure Communities operations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that ICE develop 

well-defined requirements and an 

integrated master schedule that 

accounts for all activities for its 

technology contracts, and a plan for 

workforce changes in preparation for 

full technology deployment. DHS 

concurred with the recommendations. 

What GAO Found

Data from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) indicate that the percentage of its removals 

attributable to Secure Communities increased from about 4 percent in fiscal year 

2009 to about 20 percent in fiscal year 2011. Of about 183,000 aliens removed 

under the program from October 2008 through March 2012, about 74 percent 

had a criminal conviction. ICE did not have state or local arrest charges for about 

56 percent of alien Secure Communities removals from October 2010 (when ICE 

began collecting arrest charges) through March 2012, so we were unable to 

determine the most frequent arrest charges under the program. For the 44 

percent of aliens removed on whom ICE collected arrest charge data, traffic 

offenses, including driving under the influence of alcohol, were the most frequent

arrest charges. ICE is taking steps to improve the collection of arrest charge 

data, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of its efforts.

ICE has not consistently followed best practices in acquiring technology to help 

determine the immigration status of aliens identified by Secure Communities. ICE 

awarded contracts to modernize its technology without fully defining 

requirements or developing an integrated master schedule—two best practices 

for managing capital programs. As a result, ICE encountered delays, cost 

increases, and products that did not meet ICE’s needs. For example, ICE spent 

$14.3 million for one contract to develop services that ICE found to be unusable. 

Establishing well-defined requirements and developing an integrated schedule 

for completing technology modernization could better position ICE to prevent 

delays and cost increases. Further, ICE plans to develop a workforce plan after 

the systems are deployed. Developing a workforce plan prior to full system 

deployment, consistent with internal controls, could better position ICE to 

effectively use staff when it deploys the modernized technology.

DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and ICE identified four safeguards to help protect 

aliens’ civil rights under Secure Communities, including providing detainees with 

a revised detainer form with telephone numbers to call when they feel their civil 

rights have been violated. Officials are also developing briefing materials on how 

to protect aliens’ civil rights, statistically analyzing arrest and other information to 

identify potential civil rights abuses, and using an existing DHS complaint 

process for addressing Secure Communities concerns. 

Number and Percentage of ICE’s Removals Attributed to Secure Communities, by Fiscal Year 

Year ICE removals

Removals

attributed to Secure 

Communities 

Percentage of ICE 

removals attributed to 

Secure Communities 

2009 389,834 14,363 4

2010 392,862 49,498 13

2011 396,606 79,876 20

2012: October 2011 

through March 2012 187,763 39,159 21

Total 1,367,065 182,896 13

View GAO-12-708. For more information, Source: GAO analysis of data provided by ICE. contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777

or gamblerr@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Letter 1 

Background 6

Most Secure Communities Removals Were Criminal Aliens, but 

Arrest Charge Data Are Incomplete 14

ICE Is Modernizing Its Technology System for Determining 

Immigration Status, but Acquisition and Implementation 

Planning Could Be Improved 24

ICE and CRCL Identified Safeguards to Help Address Potential 

Civil Rights Abuses under Secure Communities; Some Efforts 

Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented 35

Conclusions 44

Recommendations for Executive Action 44

Agency Comments and GAO’s Evaluation 45

Appendix I Alien Criminal Response Information Management Modernization 

Contracts 47

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 50

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 53

Tables

Table 1: ICE’s Civil Immigration Enforcement Removal Priorities 10

Table 2: Number and Percentage of ICE’s Removals Attributed to 

Secure Communities, by Fiscal Year 15

Table 3: Arrest Charge Information for Aliens That Secure 

Communities Identified and ICE Removed during Fiscal 

Year 2011 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2012, Including 

the Most Frequent Arrest Charge Categories 23

Table 4: ACRIMe Modernization Projects 26

Table 5: Comparison of Schedule and Cost Estimates 27

Table 6: ACRIMe Modernization Contracts 47

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Figures

Figure 1: The Secure Communities Process 9

Figure 2: Secure Communities Activation Status as of June 5, 2012 13

Figure 3: Classification of 182,896 Aliens Who Were Removed by 

ICE after Being Identified by Secure Communities from 

October 2008 through March 2012 17

Figure 4: Arrest Locations of Aliens Identified by Secure 

Communities and Removed by ICE, From October 2008 

through March 2012 19

Figure 5: Composition of Secure Communities Removals by Fiscal 

Year 21

Figure 6: Detainer Form Notice to Detainee 36
Page iii GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Abbreviations

ACRIMe Alien Criminal Response Information Management

ATP Automated Threat Prioritization

CAP Criminal Alien Program

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CRCL Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

DHS Department of Homeland Security

ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations

EWI entry without inspection

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System

IAQ Immigration Alien Query

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System

IRC Interoperability Response Center

LEA law enforcement agency

LESC Law Enforcement Support Center

NIBRS National Incident-Based Reporting System

NCIC National Crime Information Center

OIG Office of the Inspector General

OPR Office of Professional Responsibility

SDS Status Determination Support

UCR Uniform Crime Reporting

YTD year to date

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Page 1 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

July 13, 2012

The Honorable Bennie Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Thompson:

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated that as of 

January 2011 there were about 11.5 million aliens (non-U.S. citizens) 

living in the United States without lawful immigration status.1 DHS’s U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for 

apprehending and removing aliens who have violated immigration law. All 

aliens not lawfully present in the United States are potentially removable. 

Removal is a civil enforcement process that does not lead to a criminal 

conviction.2 A criminal alien is a noncitizen in the United States, who may 

be present on a lawful basis or not, who has been convicted of a crime. A 

criminal alien lawfully in the United States may be removable, depending 

on the nature of the particular offense of which the alien was convicted.3

 

1

See DHS, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United 

States: January 2011, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate, March 2012.

Secure Communities, initiated in 2008 and expected by DHS to be 

deployed nationwide by 2013, is one of ICE’s programs for identifying 

potentially removable aliens arrested by state or local law enforcement 

agencies, particularly those with criminal convictions. Under Secure 

Communities, the fingerprints that these agencies submit to the 

Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for criminal 

background checks are automatically forwarded to DHS for comparison 

with fingerprint records DHS maintains. If the fingerprints match DHS’s 

records, ICE is to use its information systems to access law enforcement 

and immigration databases to conduct additional analysis of the 

2

Aliens who are subject to removal for violating immigration law may be prosecuted 

criminally as well. For example, it is a criminal offense to enter or attempt to enter the 

United States at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers or to 

enter the United States after having been removed from the country. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1325, 1326.

3

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) for descriptions of criminal offenses that make any alien 

removable.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

individuals’ immigration status and criminal history, and determine 

whether to request that the law enforcement agency hold the subject so 

ICE can take custody for further enforcement action.

Secure Communities is one of four programs under ICE to identify 

criminal aliens who are subject to removal, a key agency enforcement 

priority. In addition to Secure Communities, ICE’s Criminal Alien Program 

(CAP) is designed to identify, process, and remove criminal aliens from 

prisons across the United States; the National Fugitive Operations 

Program is to pursue known at-large criminal aliens and fugitive aliens; 

and the 287(g) program, authorized by section 287(g) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act,4 is to provide state and local law enforcement agency 

officers with delegation of authority, training, and resources to perform 

certain functions of an immigration officer.5 While identifying criminal 

aliens is a priority for ICE, individuals identified by Secure Communities 

who are not convicted for the offense for which they are arrested and 

have no previous criminal conviction may be removed because they fall 

under other ICE priorities (such as previous violations of immigration 

laws).6

Different stakeholders have provided differing perspectives on the effects 

of Secure Communities. According to ICE, Secure Communities 

strengthens public safety by improving ICE’s ability to identify, detain, and 

ultimately remove criminal aliens nationwide. ICE has also reported that 

Secure Communities reduces the potential for racial or ethnic profiling by 

state and local law enforcement agencies because anyone who is 

arrested and fingerprinted is subject to the Secure Communities matching 

process. In contrast, some immigrant advocacy groups have expressed 

concern that the program encourages racial profiling because officers 

 

4

See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).

5

In 2009 GAO reported that the 287(g) program lacked documented objectives and some 

community members raised concerns about potential misuse of the program. GAO 

recommended and ICE agreed to document the 287(g) program objective, document and 

communicate supervisory activities, and specify data each agency is to collect and report. 

DHS has since implemented these recommendations. See GAO, Immigration 

Enforcement: Better Controls Needed over Program Authorizing State and Local 

Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws, GAO-09-109 (Washington, D.C: Jan. 30, 

2009).

6

Other ICE criminal alien–targeted programs may also identify aliens who are removable 

but have not been convicted of crimes.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

could find pretexts to arrest individuals based on their physical 

appearance, knowing that they will be screened for immigration status as 

a result of the arrest. Further, these groups believe that Secure 

Communities discourages witnesses of crimes and domestic violence 

victims from contacting law enforcement for fear of possible deportation. 

A DHS Advisory Task Force identified similar community concerns, based 

in part on forums held in communities across the country, and concluded 

that such fears could erode the police’s ability to build strong relationships 

with immigrant communities and engage in community policing.7

In March and April 2012, DHS’s Office of Inspector General issued two 

reports on Secure Communities, one of which reviewed how ICE 

communicated the intent and requirements for participation in Secure 

Communities to states and local jurisdictions, and the other reviewed 

ICE’s operation of Secure Communities.8

You asked us to review ICE’s implementation of the Secure Communities 

program. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What trends 

can be identified in ICE’s enforcement actions related to the Secure 

Communities program? (2) To what extent has ICE adhered to best 

practices to acquire Secure Communities–related technology? (3) What 

safeguards, if any, does ICE have in place to protect against potential civil 

rights abuses under Secure Communities?

ICE agreed with 

recommendations made in both reports.

To address these objectives, we conducted five site visits. Four visits 

were to ICE field offices in Washington, D.C.; Los Angeles, California; 

 

7

Homeland Security Advisory Council, Task Force on Secure Communities Findings and 

Recommendations, September 2011. In its response to the task force’s findings and 

recommendations, ICE, among other things, clarified its enforcement policy related to 

minor traffic violations. For individuals arrested solely for minor traffic offenses, who have 

not previously been convicted of other crimes and do not fall within any other ICE priority 

category, ICE said it will only consider making a detainer operative upon conviction for the 

minor criminal traffic offense. Minor traffic offenses do not include driving under the 

influence of alcohol, hit-and-run, reckless driving resulting in injury to persons, or other 

violations that have the potential for causing serious injury or harm to the public. (ICE, 

Protecting the Homeland: ICE Response to the Task Force on Secure Communities 

Findings and Recommendations, Apr. 27, 2012.) 

8

DHS, Office of the Inspector General, Communication Regarding Participation in Secure 

Communities, OIG-12-66 (Washington, D.C.: March 2012), and Operations of United 

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Secure Communities, OIG-12-64 

(Washington, D.C.: April 2012) (Revised).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Chicago, Illinois; and Miami, Florida, where we met with agency officials, 

local law enforcement officials, and community groups. We selected 

these field offices because they are geographically dispersed and would 

provide perspectives from different parts of the country, and because the 

Los Angeles, Chicago, and Miami field offices house three of ICE’s four 

Interoperability Response Centers where Secure Communities fingerprint 

match information is analyzed. The information obtained from these visits 

is not generalizable to other ICE field offices, but it provided valuable 

insights into Secure Communities implementation. We also visited ICE’s 

Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) in Williston, Vermont, where we 

met with officials responsible for determining the immigration status of 

individuals identified by Secure Communities as potentially removable.

To identify trends in ICE’s enforcement actions related to the Secure 

Communities program, we reviewed ICE’s progress reports for activating 

jurisdictions into the program and conducted interviews with ICE officials 

on each of our site visits. We reviewed ICE alien removal data from 

October 2008 through March 2012, and analyzed arrest charges for 

aliens removed from the United States during fiscal year 2011, when ICE 

began collecting arrest charge data, and the first half of fiscal year 2012. 

We also examined ICE’s policies and procedures for identifying and 

removing criminal aliens, and documents related to enforcement actions 

and detainers. We interviewed officials from ICE’s Secure Communities 

and Law Enforcement Systems and Analysis offices. We assessed the 

reliability of Secure Communities–related data by examining 

documentation about the various systems that ICE uses to analyze 

Secure Communities fingerprint submissions and maintain information on 

aliens it encounters, and confirming with ICE officials that the 

documentation is accurate and up to date. In doing so, we confirmed that 

ICE has controls in place to ensure that the data it maintains on aliens 

encountered by the program are entered accurately. We determined that 

the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To examine ICE’s efforts to plan and manage the acquisition of 

technology for determining the immigration status of aliens identified 

through Secure Communities, we reviewed documents, such as 

contracts, acquisition plans, and project schedules, from 2007 through 

2012, which corresponds to the time frame of ICE’s acquisition efforts. 

We reviewed ICE workforce documents related to Secure Communities 

technologies, such as LESC budget and staffing data and ICE’s 

Deployment Dashboard, a document listing each location where Secure 

Communities is activated or is planned to be activated. To obtain 

information on workload and staffing issues associated with planned 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

technology changes, we interviewed headquarters officials in ICE’s 

Enforcement and Removal Operations, officials responsible for 

overseeing technology procurements in ICE’s Office of the Chief 

Information Officer and Office of Acquisition Management, and

knowledgeable officials in the field offices we visited. We evaluated ICE’s 

plans for acquiring a modernized system for determining the immigration 

status of Secure Communities matches using GAO’s Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government, and best practices for 

managing capital investments.9

To determine the extent to which DHS has safeguards in place to protect 

against potential civil rights abuses, we reviewed ICE documents, such as 

the detainer form—the form that ICE sends to state and local law 

enforcement agencies to request that they maintain custody of a 

removable alien—met with community groups at each of our site visits 

regarding Secure Communities, interviewed ICE officials responsible for 

managing the Secure Communities program, and officials in DHS’s Office 

for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) responsible for addressing 

complaints and conducting monitoring activities related to Secure 

Communities. We viewed training videos CRCL developed for state and 

local law enforcement officials, and reviewed CRCL’s dissemination and 

completion plans for additional training videos. We examined documents 

and discussed the status of CRCL’s plans for monitoring arrests by state 

and local law enforcement with CRCL’s statistician. We discussed 

CRCL’s process for individuals to submit civil rights and civil liberties 

complaints associated with Secure Communities, and obtained 

summaries of complaint investigations under way. We reviewed LESC’s 

summary statistics for calls received on its detainee phone line from 

December 26, 2011(when it was initiated), through April 17, 2012. We 

also reviewed examples of call records from January, February, and 

March 2012, and picked three for illustrative purposes. The examples are 

not generalizable, but provided us with perspectives on the types of calls 

LESC receives. To assess the reliability of the call record data, we 

discussed the call receipt process with LESC officials, reviewed the 

 

9

See GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing 

and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009); 

Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve Major 

Weapon System Program Outcomes, GAO-08-619 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008); 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C: Nov. 1, 1999); and the Project Management Institute’s The Standard 

for Program Management (Newton Square, PA © 2006).
 

Page 6 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

relevant standard operating procedures, and reviewed the detainee 

phone line call categorization guidelines. We determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 through July 2012, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

ICE has received funding specifically designated for removing criminal 

aliens. For example, the fiscal year 2008 DHS appropriations act made 

$200 million of ICE’s salaries and expenses appropriation available 

through the end of fiscal year 2009 to “improve and modernize efforts to 

identify aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment, and who 

may be deportable, and remove them from the United States, once they 

are judged deportable.”10 In response, ICE initiated Secure Communities 

and issued a plan that detailed how ICE would implement policies and 

modernize technologies to accomplish its overall goal of identifying and 

removing criminal aliens.11

 

10Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2050 

(2007). DHS’s fiscal year 2009 appropriations act specified that not less than $1 billion 

was available for identifying and removing criminal aliens, including $150 million to be 

available until the end of fiscal year 2010, and directed DHS to “prioritize the identification 

and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime.” Consolidated 

Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-

329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659 (2008). In each of fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, DHS’s 

appropriations acts made almost $200 million of the funds directed to criminal alien 

enforcement available to ICE, and ICE allocated these funds to Secure Communities. See 

Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2149 (2009); Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 102-

03, 140-41 (2011); Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 949 (2011).

ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations 

(ERO) is responsible for identifying and apprehending removable aliens, 

detaining these individuals when it deems it necessary, and removing 

11The term “Secure Communities” is used to refer to ICE’s comprehensive plan to identify 

and remove criminal aliens (which includes detention facilities, transportation, and other 

aspects of the overall process). The term is also used to refer to a component of the 

Secure Communities comprehensive plan that focuses on using technology to improve the 

identification of removable criminal aliens. 

Background 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

them from the United States. ERO manages the Secure Communities 

program and has 24 field offices nationwide.

Under Secure Communities, when an individual is arrested by a state or 

local law enforcement agency, the individual’s fingerprints are taken and 

automatically checked against the Integrated Automated Fingerprint 

Identification System (IAFIS), a national fingerprint and criminal history 

system maintained by the FBI, and DHS’s Automated Biometric 

Identification System (IDENT) to identify a fingerprint match.12 IDENT 

contains fingerprint and other biometric information on immigration 

violators, known or suspected terrorists, criminal aliens, and foreign 

nationals who are enrolled in DHS’s United States Visitor and Immigrant 

Status Indicator Technology program, among others.13 When a law 

enforcement agency (LEA) arrests and books an individual on suspicion 

of committing a crime, the person’s fingerprints are routinely sent to the 

FBI for a criminal background check. FBI electronically forwards the 

fingerprints to DHS for a check against IDENT records. If there is a 

fingerprint match, ICE is to then determine whether the individual is 

subject to removal.14 On the basis of the match, the FBI is to send an 

Immigration Alien Query to ICE’s LESC.

15

 

12ICE labels this federal information sharing capability as IDENT/IAFIS interoperability. 

ICE’s Secure Communities program uses interoperability between these two systems to 

identify potentially removable aliens. For the purposes of this report, we use the term 

“Secure Communities” when referring to Secure Communities’ use of IDENT/IAFIS 

interoperability. 

Using the Alien Criminal 

Response Information Management (ACRIMe) system, LESC specialists 

are to search multiple databases, such as the FBI’s National Crime 

Information Center (NCIC) and the Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System for information on the individual’s criminal history and 

13DHS, in coordination with the Department of State, established the enrollment program 

to use biometric and biographic information to control and monitor the pre-entry, entry, 

status, and exit of certain foreign visitors and immigrants.

14Secure Communities does not identify all potentially removable aliens who are arrested 

because the IDENT database does not contain the fingerprints of all aliens; for example, 

aliens who cross the U.S. border illegally might not have their fingerprints in IDENT if they 

were never encountered by the Border Patrol or ICE. ICE is reviewing the results of a pilot 

to identify ways of determining the immigration status of arrested individuals whose 

fingerprints are not included in IDENT. 

15LESC provides immigration status and identity information and real-time assistance to 

local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies on aliens suspected, arrested or 

convicted of criminal activity, among other things.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

immigration status.16 LESC is to then send an Immigration Alien 

Response to the LEA and relevant ICE ERO field office or Interoperability 

Response Center (IRC)—offices established in the Los Angeles, Chicago, 

Miami, and Buffalo, New York, field offices to expand ICE’s ability to 

respond to Secure Communities matches.17

The ICE field office or response center is to then determine whether to 

send an immigration detainer (Form I-247) to the LEA that has custody of 

the individual.18

 

16ACRIMe is an information system used by ICE to receive and respond to immigration 

status inquiries from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies about individuals 

arrested, subject to background checks, or otherwise encountered by those agencies.

A detainer is an ICE request that the law enforcement 

agency maintain custody of the individual for up to 48 hours after that 

person would otherwise be released, excluding weekends and holidays, 

to allow ICE time to administratively arrest (i.e., assume custody of) the 

person. The decision whether to issue a detainer for a particular alien is 

based on whether the alien falls within ICE’s priorities for removal and 

other factors, such as whether ICE detention resources are available, and 

whether the individual is still in the custody of the arresting local or state 

law enforcement agency (under some circumstances a person may be 

held for only a few hours). If the individual is convicted and serves a 

criminal sentence, ICE is to wait until the sentence is completed to take 

the person into custody. Figure 1 describes the Secure Communities 

process.

17IRCs process Secure Communities responses for their own field offices. During evening 

hours, IRCs also process responses for other field offices that do not have 24 hour/7day a 

week capabilities. The IRCs are staffed, in part, by contractors who review LESC’s 

determination responses and by ICE agents who make detainer decisions.

18ICE also requests that law enforcement officials provide the subject with a copy of the 

detainer.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Figure 1: The Secure Communities Process

According to ICE, Secure Communities helps carry out ICE’s civil 

immigration enforcement priorities. In a March 2011 memorandum, ICE’s 

Director provided guidance to all ICE employees on ICE’s civil 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

immigration enforcement priorities as they relate to the apprehension, 

detention, and removal of aliens across all ICE programs.19

Table 1: ICE’s Civil Immigration Enforcement Removal Priorities

The types of 

crimes included under the different priority classifications are described in 

table 1.

Priority Priority description

1 The removal of aliens who pose a danger to national security or public safety, including aliens convicted of crimes, with an 

emphasis on violent criminals, felons, and repeat offenders. Convicted criminal aliens (as a subset of Priority 1) are further 

prioritized into 3 levels based on their criminal conviction history.a

Examples of types of crimes

Convicted Criminal Level 1:

Includes aliens convicted of “aggravated felonies,” as defined in § 101(a)(43) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or two or more crimes punishable by 

more than one year, commonly referred to as felonies

Homicide

Kidnapping

Rape

Robbery

Aggravated assault

Sexual exploitation of a minor

b

Convicted Criminal Level 2:

Includes aliens convicted of any felony or three or more offenses punishable 

by less than 1 year, commonly referred to as misdemeanors

Manslaughter

Extortion

Vehicle theft

Bribery 

Sex offenses (not involving assault or 

commercialized sex)

Convicted Criminal Level 3:

Includes aliens convicted of offenses punishable by less than 1 year

Simple Assault

Driving Under the Influence

Obstructing justice

Drug possession

Property crimes

2 The removal of aliens who have recently violated immigration controls at the border, at ports of entry or through the knowing 

abuse of visa programs.

3 The removal of aliens who are fugitives or have otherwise obstructed immigration controls. It includes aliens who reenter the

country illegally after removal or enter fraudulently.

Source: GAO analysis of ICE information.

a

Prior to fiscal year 2009, ICE did not categorize convicted criminal aliens by offense levels.

b

In a June 2011 memorandum, ICE’s Director provided guidance to ICE 

officers, agents, and attorneys on the exercise of “prosecutorial 

“Aggravated felonies” under § 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(43)) include various state and federal offenses ranging from murder, rape, and trafficking in 

controlled substances to theft, bribery, and obstruction of justice.

 

19ICE, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and 

Removal of Aliens, (Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2011).
 

Page 11 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

discretion” to ensure that the agency’s immigration enforcement 

resources are focused on its enforcement priorities.20 As noted in the 

memorandum, because the agency is confronted with more 

administrative violations than its resources can address, the agency must 

regularly exercise prosecutorial discretion to prioritize its efforts. The 

memorandum provides a list of criteria for ICE personnel to use when 

assessing whether an individual case is appropriate for an exercise of 

prosecutorial discretion. In a second memorandum, also issued in June 

2011, ICE provided additional guidance on the use of prosecutorial 

discretion for victims, witnesses, and plaintiffs.21 Specifically, the 

additional guidance stated that ICE is to exercise discretion on a case-bycase basis when making detention and enforcement decisions in the 

cases of (1) victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other 

serious crimes; (2) witnesses involved in pending criminal investigations, 

plaintiffs in nonfrivolous lawsuits regarding civil rights or civil liberties 

violations; and (3) individuals engaging in a protected activity related to 

civil or other rights, such as union organizing.22

 

20ICE, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 

Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of 

Aliens (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2011). Prosecutorial discretion is the authority of an 

agency charged with enforcing a law to decide to what degree to enforce the law against a 

particular individual.

In August 2011, DHS 

began to review all incoming cases in immigration court to identify the 

cases most clearly eligible and ineligible for exercising discretion to not 

pursue removal of the individual. DHS and DOJ launched pilot programs 

in which an intra-agency team of attorneys from ICE, U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection applied 

the June 2011 memorandums to its review of existing cases in the 

21ICE, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (Washington, 

D.C.: June 17, 2011).

22In 2007, GAO recommended that ICE consider analyzing trends in the use of 

prosecutorial discretion, but ICE determined that it was not feasible given the multiple 

points throughout the immigration enforcement process where discretion could be applied. 

ICE issued the aforementioned prosecutorial discretion guidance in June 2011 to better 

reflect ICE civil immigration enforcement priorities and ensure consistency throughout the 

field in its use and implementation. GAO, Immigration Enforcement: ICE Could Improve 

Controls to Help Guide Alien Removal Decision Making, GAO 08-67 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 15, 2007).
 

Page 12 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Denver and Baltimore immigration courts.23

ICE has followed an incremental approach to activating Secure 

Communities interoperability in jurisdictions nationwide.

On March 30, 2012, DHS 

announced that in the next phase of its pilot, beginning in April 2012, it 

would extend its case reviews to immigration courts in Seattle, Detroit, 

New Orleans, Orlando, New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.

24

As of June 5, 2012, ICE had fully activated Secure Communities in all 

jurisdictions in 48 states, the District of Columbia, and four United States 

territories.

Since August 

2011, ICE has been simultaneously activating all jurisdictions within a 

given state into Secure Communities. From October 2008 to August 

2011, ICE activated 1,508 jurisdictions after signing individual 

memorandums of agreement with their respective state governments. In 

August 2011, ICE terminated all existing memorandums of agreement, 

stating that they were not required because once a law enforcement 

agency voluntarily submits fingerprint data to the federal government, no 

agreement with the state is legally necessary for one part of the federal 

government to share it with another part.

25

 

23The ICE Principal Legal Advisor issued a memorandum to all Offices of Chief Counsel in 

the field providing guidance on these efforts. ICE, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, 

Case-by-Case Review of Incoming and Certain Pending Cases (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 

17, 2011).

Additionally, the program has been partially activated in 2 

states. The 50 states where Secure Communities has been fully or 

partially activated cover 97 percent of jurisdictions nationwide. ICE plans 

to have all jurisdictions in all 50 states and U.S. territories activated by 

March 2013. Figure 2 depicts the states activated under Secure 

Communities as of June 5, 2012.

24A jurisdiction is activated when interoperability between IAFIS and IDENT becomes 

functional for that location. For purposes of this report, jurisdiction is synonymous with 

county or a county-equivalent. 

25The four U.S. territories where Secure Communities is fully activated are American 

Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. ICE has not yet activated Secure 

Communities in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Figure 2: Secure Communities Activation Status as of June 5, 2012
 

Page 14 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

DHS’s CRCL is statutorily responsible for assisting DHS components in 

ensuring that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately 

incorporated into DHS activities and programs, including Secure 

Communities.26 CRCL is responsible, among other things, for 

investigating public complaints about DHS to ensure that DHS’s policies 

promote respect for civil rights and civil liberties both within DHS and in 

conjunction with state and local partners. Investigating and resolving civil 

rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the public, including claims of 

racial profiling, is an area of focus for CRCL.27

ICE data show that from October 2008 through March 2012, Secure 

Communities led to the removal of about 183,000 aliens, of which 

approximately 74 percent had a criminal conviction and 26 percent did not 

have a criminal conviction known to ICE. All four ICE field offices we 

visited were using agency policies to help determine which aliens 

identified by Secure Communities should be selected for detention and 

removal. Additionally, ICE did not have a record of the state or local arrest 

charges for about 56 percent of the aliens that Secure Communities 

identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of 

fiscal year 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest 

charges of aliens removed under the program. Of the data that ICE 

collected, traffic offenses were the most frequent arrest charges, of which 

over half were arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol.

ICE data indicate that the percentage of removals attributable to Secure 

Communities has increased from fiscal year 2009 through the first 6 

months of fiscal year 2012 and that nearly three-fourths of aliens removed 

under the program during this time frame had a criminal conviction. As 

shown in table 2, Secure Communities was responsible for identifying 

about 20 percent of the approximately 400,000 aliens that ICE removed in 

fiscal year 2011, up from approximately 4 percent of the aliens that ICE 

removed in fiscal year 2009. Other ICE enforcement programs such as 

CAP and 287(g) were responsible for identifying the majority of aliens that 

ICE removed in each year since fiscal year 2009.

 

266 U.S.C. § 345(a)(3).

276 U.S.C. § 345(a)(1), (4), (6).

Most Secure 

Communities 

Removals Were 

Criminal Aliens, but 

Arrest Charge Data 

Are Incomplete

Secure Communities 

Removals Have Increased, 

and ICE Data Show That 

the Majority of Aliens 

Removed Had Criminal 

Convictions 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Table 2: Number and Percentage of ICE’s Removals Attributed to Secure 

Communities, by Fiscal Year

Year

ICE 

removals

Removals attributed 

to Secure 

Communities 

Percentage of ICE 

removals attributed to 

Secure Communities 

2009 389,834 14,363 4%

2010 392,862 49,498 13%

2011 396,606 79,876 20%

2012: October 2011 

through March 2012 187,763 39,159 21%

Total 1,367,065 182,896 13%

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by ICE.

From October 2008 through March 2012, ICE removed 182,896 aliens 

identified by Secure Communities, as indicated by ICE’s data. According 

to ICE, all aliens removed committed an immigration violation and were 

removable on that basis. About 74 percent had been convicted of a 

criminal offense; that is, they were either convicted of the offense that led 

to their identification under Secure Communities or had a record of 

conviction for a previous offense.28 For these individuals, the current or 

prior criminal conviction served as the basis for ICE’s prioritization for 

removal. Twenty-one percent of aliens removed did not have a criminal 

conviction known to ICE prior to their removal, but were identified as one 

of ICE’s other removal priorities, including aliens who were fugitives or

who reentered the country illegally after removal.29

 

28In making removal determinations, ICE does not consider the period of time that has 

elapsed since the alien’s previous criminal conviction(s), according to an Assistant 

Director in ERO. 

The remaining 5 

percent of aliens removed also did not have a known criminal conviction 

prior to their removal but were nonetheless removable because, for 

example, they entered the United States without inspection or violated the 

terms of their admission. ICE reports its removal data for aliens without a 

criminal conviction under three categories: ICE fugitives; prior removals 

and returns; and entries without inspection (EWI) and visa violators. 

Figure 3 provides information on the overall composition of Secure 

29ICE officials indicated that there are several reasons why aliens identified by Secure 

Communities and removed may not have had a criminal conviction known to ICE at the 

time ICE took custody. For example, the aliens may not have been convicted of the 

current criminal charge(s) for which they were arrested; their criminal charge(s) were 

pending; or their criminal conviction(s) records were not available to ICE.
 

Page 16 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Communities removals by category and figure 4 provides this information 

for each activated state.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Figure 3: Classification of 182,896 Aliens Who Were Removed by ICE after Being Identified by Secure Communities from 

October 2008 through March 2012

Note: ICE fugitives, EWIs, visa violators, and prior removals and returns are not mutually exclusive 

categories. Therefore, for the approximately 26 percent of aliens removed without a confirmed 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

criminal conviction, ICE reported that it will use the highest priority category for reporting purposes. 

For example, an alien who enters the United States without inspection (EWI) who is also an ICE 

fugitive would be reported as an ICE fugitive.
Page 19 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Source: GAO anaylsis of data provided by ICE.

PA

OR

NV

ID

MT

WY

UT

AZ

NM

CO

ND

SD

NE

TX

KS

OK

MN

IA

MO

AR

LA

IL

MS

IN

KY

TN

AL

FL

GA

SC

NC

VA

OH

NH

MA

CT MI

CA

WA

WI

NY

NJ

MD

DC

DE

RI

ME

VT

WV

AK

HI

P.R.

> 0% < 50% of jurisdictions activated

≥ 50% < 100% of jurisdictions activated

100% of jurisdictions activated

Interactive graphic Figure 4: Arrest locations of Aliens Identified by Secure Communities and Removed by ICE, From 

October 2008 through March 2012

 Move mouse over the name of each state to view the percentage of aliens arrested in the state removed from the United States who were classified in each category.

Note: The number of Secure Communities removals for each state reflects, in part, the period of time the state has 

been activated under the program. 

Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

ICE reported that the total number of Secure Communities removals has 

increased each year since fiscal year 2009, but there has been some 

variation across fiscal years in the proportion of aliens removed by 

criminal level, as shown in figure 5. For example, there was a decrease in 

the proportion of convicted criminal Level 3 offenders removed, from 40 

percent of total removals in fiscal year 2009 to 26 percent during the first 

half of fiscal year 2012. According to ICE, the percentage of removals 

who are Level 3 offenders has been decreasing, in part because ICE has 

continued to prioritize its resources on the identification and removal of 

aliens convicted of felonies. Additionally, ICE redefined its criminal 

offense levels between fiscal years 2010 and 2011, causing some Level 3 

offenders to be reclassified as Level 2 offenders based upon repeat 

misdemeanor offenses, which ICE officials said resulted in an increase in 

the percentage of removals who were Level 2 offenders to 19 percent in 

fiscal year 2011 as compared with 13 percent in fiscal year 2010, and a 

decrease in the percentage classified as level 3.
 

Page 21 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Figure 5: Composition of Secure Communities Removals by Fiscal Year

a

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

For fiscal year 2012 year to date (YTD), data is through March 31, 2012.

ICE’s removal data do not reflect those aliens identified as removable 

through the Secure Communities program who are currently serving 

criminal sentences in state and local prisons, as ICE has not yet detained 

and removed them. For example, an alien arrested and identified through 

Secure Communities who is then convicted of a felony and classified by 

ICE as convicted criminal Level 1 offender is more likely to serve a longer 

criminal sentence than a Level 3 offender serving a sentence of less than 

1 year. As a result, according to ICE, the percentage of Secure 

Communities removals who are Level 1 offenders—ICE’s highest removal 

priority—could increase over time as Level 1 offenders complete their 

sentences and are removed.

Officials from the four ICE field offices we visited told us that they were 

following agency policies to help determine which aliens identified by 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Secure Communities should be selected for detention and removal, and 

establishing the criminal offense level for each alien. ICE officials said 

that aliens are initially classified as Level 1, 2, or 3, based on the offense 

category definitions explained in the March 2011 priorities memorandum, 

and available information on the aliens’ arrest charges and any previous 

convictions. ICE staff told us that they then use this offense level 

classification to prioritize which aliens should be detained.30

ICE did not have a record of the state or local arrest charges for about 56 

percent of the approximately 119,000 aliens that Secure Communities 

identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of 

fiscal year 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest 

charges of aliens removed under the program. ICE officials said that their 

records are incomplete because arrest charge information is not always 

available at the time ICE agents record aliens’ criminal encounters and 

because agents may not have been familiar with a requirement, instituted 

by ICE in October 2010, to enter this information into ICE’s database of 

investigations, arrests, bookings, detention, and removals. ICE issued 

guidance in August 2010 in advance of this requirement, and began 

offering training to its agents in the field on the agency’s process for 

entering criminal arrest charge information into ICE’s database. Further, 

ICE instituted a measure in November 2011 that calls for its data analysis 

unit to check on a monthly basis the criminal history database entries of 

aliens who did not have convictions at the time of their removal. If the 

check returns updated conviction data for these aliens, according to its 

ICE officials 

said that investigative actions are first focused on aliens who are initially 

classified as Level 1, but those classified as Level 2 and 3 may also be 

investigated if field offices have the resources to do so. At all four field 

offices we visited, ICE officials said that they generally have the 

resources to investigate the immigration and criminal histories of aliens 

initially classified as Level 1 and Level 2. Officials at three of the field 

offices said they also investigate aliens initially classified as Level 3, but 

do so only when the office has no one in the Level 1 or 2 category 

awaiting review. At the fourth field office, officials said that with their 

current resources, they can investigate all aliens initially classified as 

Level 1, 2, and 3.

 

30This initial classification may be different from the classification of an alien upon removal 

if ICE obtains additional information before the alien is removed. For example, ICE could 

change the classification if the alien’s charges are dropped or if previous convictions are 

identified. 

ICE Had Incomplete Data 

on Arrest Charges for Over 

Half of the Aliens It 

Removed under Secure 

Communities 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

guidance, ICE is to update its database to ensure that all available arrest 

and conviction data are included. ICE officials told us in May 2012 that 

going forward they expect to have arrest and conviction history data on a 

higher percentage of aliens as a result of these steps. As these efforts 

have only recently been initiated, it is too early to assess the 

effectiveness of ICE’s efforts to improve the collection of arrest charge 

data.

Of the data ICE did collect, about 37 percent of aliens identified by 

Secure Communities and removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first 

half of fiscal year 2012 were arrested for traffic offenses (of whom over 

half were charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol), about 

12 percent were arrested for drug offenses (of whom almost one-third 

were charged with marijuana offenses), about 10 percent were arrested 

for assault (of whom over half were arrested for unspecified assaults), 

and the remaining 40 percent were arrested for other offenses. Table 3 

provides the available arrest charge information of aliens that Secure 

Communities identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the 

first half of fiscal year 2012.

Table 3: Arrest Charge Information for Aliens That Secure Communities Identified 

and ICE Removed during Fiscal Year 2011 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2012, 

Including the Most Frequent Arrest Charge Categories 

Aliens that Secure Communities identified and 

ICE removed

Number Percent

Arrest charge information not 

available

66,855 56

Arrest charge information 

available

52,180 44

Total 119,035 100

Most frequent arrest charge categories of aliens on whom ICE had arrest charge 

information 

Traffic offensesa 19,526 37

Dangerous drugsb 6,489 12

Assaultc 5,185 10

Otherd 20,980 40

Total 52,180 100

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by ICE.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
 

Page 24 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

a

According to ICE’s data, the traffic offenses category includes the following crimes: driving under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs, hit and run, transporting dangerous material, and other unspecified 

traffic offenses. 

b

The dangerous drugs category includes arrests for amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, 

hallucinogens, heroin, marijuana, opium, synthetic narcotics, and other unspecified drug offenses.

c

The assault category includes the following crimes: unspecified assault, battery, domestic violence, 

intimidation, simple assault, and various aggravated assaults.

d

Other arrest charge categories include, for example, larceny; burglary; fraudulent activities; 

obstructing the police; forgery; weapon offenses; vehicle theft; sexual assault; robbery; kidnapping; 

homicide; smuggling; arson; embezzlement; and extortion.

ICE is modernizing its ACRIMe system to make the process of 

determining an individual’s immigration status more efficient, but these 

efforts have experienced delays and cost overruns, and developed 

products that did not meet mission needs. ICE could mitigate the risk of 

further delays and cost overruns by better defining the ACRIMe program’s 

requirements and developing an integrated master schedule. ICE could 

also better plan its future workforce needs to help realize the anticipated 

efficiency gains of the modernized ACRIMe system.

ICE is in the process of developing a modernized ACRIMe system to 

update its aging legacy system and meet the anticipated increase in the 

number of law enforcement queries as Secure Communities is 

implemented in more jurisdictions across the country. The modernized 

ACRIMe system is designed to be accessible throughout ICE and not just 

in LESC, as is currently the case. Additionally, to help determine an 

individual’s immigration status and offense category, modernized 

ACRIMe is intended to allow officials in LESC, ICE field offices, and 

response centers to automatically search multiple data sources with a 

single electronic query. Currently, LESC staff must conduct separate 

searches to obtain information from separate databases and, because of 

limitations in the legacy ACRIMe system, they cannot share the full 

results of their searches with staff in ICE field offices and response 

centers. Since the modernized ACRIMe system is intended to allow users 

to search, receive, distribute, and manage relevant immigration status 

information, ICE officials expect that the modernized system will eliminate 

the need for ICE field office and response center staff to duplicate LESC’s 

efforts to determine aliens’ immigration status.

ICE Is Modernizing Its 

Technology System 

for Determining 

Immigration Status, 

but Acquisition and 

Implementation 

Planning Could Be 

Improved 

ICE Is Modernizing Its 

ACRIMe System
 

Page 25 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

ICE initially planned to develop the modernized ACRIMe system through 

three contracts, each for a separate project. The first contract (referred to 

here as ACRIMe-1), awarded in March 2008, was to develop a 

modernized ACRIMe system so ICE staff could access multiple law 

enforcement and immigration databases to determine an individual’s 

immigration status and offense category.31 ICE awarded two additional 

contracts in September 2009 to develop six services to further enhance 

the functionality of the modernized ACRIMe system. One contract was to 

develop a web-based Automated Threat Prioritization (ATP) service that 

would allow modernized ACRIMe users to automatically retrieve prior 

conviction information from state and federal criminal history records to 

help prioritize ICE enforcement actions based on aliens’ criminal charges. 

The other contract, the Status Determination Support (SDS) contract, was 

to develop five web-based services to enhance the modernized ACRIMe 

system’s ability to determine immigration status. The five services were 

(1) Status Determination Support, (2) Automated National Crime 

Information Center Warrants, (3) Criminal Alien Tracking, (4) Jail 

Roster/Release Tracking, and (5) Integrated Case Management.32 Table 

4 provides summary information on the three ACRIMe modernization 

projects and the contracts issued in 2008 and 2009.

 

31The contract that ICE awarded in 2008 to acquire the modernized ACRIMe system was 

also to acquire other technology-related services. We use the term “ACRIMe-1” to refer to 

the portion of the contract related to acquiring the modernized ACRIMe system. 

32The Status Determination Support service (a subcomponent of the overall SDS contract) 

provides an automated search of multiple disparate databases and creates a most likely 

immigration status determination for verification by ICE officials. The Automated National 

Crime Information Center Warrants service automates the process for entering new 

warrants and searching, updating and revalidating existing warrants. Criminal Alien 

Tracking is a web service to automate the tracking of aliens to allow ICE to begin removal 

proceedings while aliens are in criminal custody. Jail Roster/Release Tracking is a web 

service to provide ICE the ability to receive rosters of jail inmates so it could determine the 

time frame for a criminal alien’s removability. The Integrated Case Management service 

automates the collection of criminal alien status information in designated case 

management systems. 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Table 4: ACRIMe Modernization Projects 

Dollars in millions

Project

Project baseline 

cost estimatea Contract

Date contract 

awarded

Modernized ACRIMe System: To develop a modernized ACRIMe system 

for accessing multiple law enforcement and immigration databases 

$10.3 ACRIMe-1 March 2008

ATP Service: To develop a web-based service to allow modernized 

ACRIMe users to automatically retrieve prior conviction information from 

state and federal criminal history records.

18.3 ATP September 2009

SDS Services: To develop web services to enhance modernized ACRIMe’s 

capability to determine immigration status:

• Status Determination Support

• Automated National Crime Information Center Warrants

• Criminal Alien Tracking

• Jail Roster/Release Tracking

• Integrated Case Management

41.7 SDS September 2009

Source: GAO analysis of ICE information.

a

The project baseline cost estimate for the Modernized ACRIMe System was an independent 

government cost estimate developed by ICE. The project baseline cost estimates for the ATP and 

SDS services were acquisition cost estimates that ICE issued in its July 2009 Criminal Alien 

Identification Initiative Acquisition Program Baseline plan.

Weaknesses in ICE’s acquisition planning contributed to delays, cost 

increases, and products provided under the contracts that did not meet 

mission needs. As of April 2012, ICE had spent approximately $4 million 

over its original cost estimate to develop the modernized ACRIMe 

system—without the ATP and SDS services—and expected that it would 

begin deploying the system in LESC in July 2012 and in ICE field offices 

in December 2012. This date is over 2 years after the initial planned 

deployment date of March 2010 for the ACRIMe system. Further, the 

contractor that ICE selected for the ACRIMe-1 contract did not develop a 

system that met ICE’s performance requirements. As a result, ICE 

canceled the ACRIMe-1 contract, selected a new contractor in September 

2011 to complete and deploy the modernized system, and expects to 

award another contract by September 2012 to develop call center 

functionalities within the modernized ACRIMe system that were originally 

supposed to be delivered through the ACRIMe-1 contract. In August 

2011, ICE also canceled the original SDS contract because of the delays 

encountered with the ACRIMe-1 contract. Further, because of its 

dissatisfaction with the quality of the work completed on the SDS 

contract, ICE now plans to award additional contracts to different 

contractors to start over with developing the services it requires. ICE has 

Weaknesses in ICE’s 

ACRIMe Modernization 

Planning Contributed to 

Delays, Cost Increases, 

and Products That Did Not 

Meet Mission Needs
 

Page 27 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

also reduced the scope of the SDS services’ capabilities (as discussed 

below). As a result, ICE expects that the SDS services will be completed 

for about $22 million less than the baseline cost estimate, even though it 

spent $14.3 million on a contract that did not produce useable services. In 

contrast, ICE has expanded the scope of the ATP requirements and 

expects to exceed its baseline cost estimate by about $7.8 million. ICE 

projects that for the ATP and SDS services, it will be able to meet and 

potentially finish ahead of its estimated deployment dates. See appendix I 

for additional information on all of ICE’s ACRIMe-related contracts. Table 

5 compares the baseline estimates for deployment and cost of the 

projects, and status as of April 2012.

Table 5: Comparison of Schedule and Cost Estimates

Dollars in millions

Scheduled deployment datea Project costs

Project

b

Baseline As of April 2012 Baseline

Estimate as of 

April 2012

Modernized ACRIMe Systemc March 2010 July 2012 $10.3 $21.8

ATP Service December 2013 December 2012 18.3 26.1

SDS Servicesd December 2013 June 2013 41.7 19.7

Source: GAO analysis of ICE information.

a

The deployment dates are the dates for the initial operational capability, rather than the final 

operational capability. ICE is using an iterative approach, and officials expect that some additional 

work will be needed after the initial deployment before the technology is fully functional. ICE officials 

told us they expect the three projects to be fully operational by March 2014.

b

The project baseline cost estimate for the modernized ACRIMe system was an independent 

government cost estimate developed by ICE. The project baseline cost estimates for the ATP and 

SDS services were acquisition cost estimates that ICE issued in its July 2009 Criminal Alien 

Identification Initiative Acquisition Program Baseline plan. The project cost estimates as of April 2012 

for the modernized ACRIMe System and the SDS services were calculated by adding the total 

amount ICE has funded on the canceled contracts (the ACRIME-1 and SDS contracts, respectively) 

to the estimated value of the contracts ICE has awarded or plans to award to complete the projects. 

For the ATP service, the estimated project cost is the value of the contract listed in the most recent 

contract modification as of April 2012.

c

The original contract was terminated and a new contractor hired for the work. The second contract is 

to complete and deploy the system as well as to provide ongoing operations and maintenance 

through August 2016. As of April 2012, ICE had spent $14.4 million on acquiring the modernized 

ACRIMe system under both contracts. ICE also plans to award another contract by September 2012, 

to develop call center functionalities within the modernized ACRIMe system.

d

The schedule delays and cost increases can be attributed in part to 

weaknesses in ICE’s planning, including ICE (1) not fully defining 

The original SDS contract was canceled without the services being delivered. ICE plans to award 

new contracts to develop the services.
 

Page 28 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

requirements before awarding contracts and (2) not developing an 

integrated master schedule.

According to ICE officials, the agency did not fully define its requirements 

before awarding the ACRIMe-1, ATP, or SDS contracts. We have 

previously reported that firm requirements should be established at the 

beginning of an acquisition program and that requirements should be well 

defined to ensure communication about what the government needs from 

the contractor providing services.33

Regarding the ACRIMe-1 contract, ICE officials stated that ICE’s 

requirements did not accurately reflect the needs of LESC system users 

or fully define technical expectations. Although ICE involved LESC users 

in the development of the system requirements, ICE officials told us that 

ICE did not ensure the users’ needs were clearly defined in the 

requirements documentation and the contractor did not routinely meet 

with the users to ensure its understanding of the requirements. As a 

result, the contractor misinterpreted some of the requirements, according 

to ICE officials. ICE revised the requirements after the contractor had 

already conducted a significant amount of work, contributing to delays. 

Further, ICE officials told us that ICE did not fully define its technical 

expectations of the contractor, such as specific requirements for the 

software code. According to the officials, ICE did not include more 

specific technical requirements because it wanted to encourage the 

contractor to develop innovative solutions and did not want to be too 

prescriptive. However, the officials also noted that not having more 

specific technical requirements contributed to the unsatisfactory 

performance by the contractor in producing software that did not meet 

ICE’s needs. Consequently, ICE deemed the modernized ACRIMe 

system the contractor delivered in April 2011 to be unusable, and ICE 

awarded a new contract in September 2011 to a different contractor to 

complete and deploy the system. ICE also plans to award another 

contract for $1.7 million by September 2012, to develop call center 

functionalities within the ACRIMe system that were originally supposed to 

be developed under the ACRIMe-1 contract.

 

33See GAO, Immigration Benefits: Consistent Adherence to DHS’s Acquisition Policy 

Could Help Improve Transformation Program, GAO-12-66 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 

2011), and GAO-08-619. 

Defining Requirements
 

Page 29 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Shortcomings in defining requirements and changes in the scope of the 

requirements also contributed to cost increases on the ATP contract. 

Specifically, cost increases occurred when, in August 2011, nearly 2 

years after the ATP contract was awarded, ICE added a new requirement 

that the contractor develop a “risk classification assessment score.” This 

score is meant to help standardize the method for determining if an alien 

should be detained by ICE or released on bond or other condition. 

According to ICE, the requirement for a risk classification assessment 

score was added to the ATP contract to support ICE detention reform 

initiatives based on revisions that were made in 2011 to ICE’s detention 

standards. Among other things, the 2011 detention standards call for 

detention facilities to take into account risk factors when making custody 

decisions.34

With respect to the SDS contract, in September 2010, about a year after 

the SDS contract was awarded (and over 2 years after ACRIMe-1 was 

awarded), ICE determined that the SDS contract requirements 

overlapped significantly with those of the ACRIMe-1 contract. In 

response, ICE expanded the scope of the SDS contract to include all of 

the requirements for aggregating data from multiple law enforcement and 

immigration databases that had previously been spread between the 

ACRIMe-1 and SDS contracts, and eliminated the requirements from the 

ACRIMe-1 contract. ICE officials stated that not clearly defining how the 

SDS services would be integrated with the ACRIMe system was an 

oversight. As with the ACRIMe-1 contract, ICE officials stated that the 

technical requirements for the contract were not well defined, and this 

contributed to the contractor producing poor-quality software. 

Consequently, ICE spent $14.3 million for the SDS contract to develop 

services that ICE found to be unusable. ICE terminated the SDS contract 

in August 2011. As of April 2012, ICE officials planned to award four new 

Officials told us it would be more efficient to add the risk 

classification assessment score requirement to the ATP contract than to 

develop this capability through a separate system. However, the officials 

also stated that ICE could do a better job of defining its requirements. As 

of April 2011, ICE had spent about $21.5 million on acquiring the ATP 

service, which is about 17 percent over ICE’s baseline cost estimate of 

$18.3 million. To complete the ATP service, ICE estimates that it may 

need to spend an additional $4.6 million, for a total cost of $26.1 million. 

This would be a 42 percent increase over ICE’s baseline cost estimate.

 

34ICE, Performance-Based National Detention Standards 2011. 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

contracts at an estimated total cost of $5.4 million that would involve the 

contractors starting over with developing services to enhance the 

functionality of the modernized ACRIMe system. In commenting on a draft 

of this report, in June 2012 ICE officials told us that to complete the SDS 

services, they now plan to award two (instead of four) new contracts and 

that they are incorporating the work that would have been done through 

the two other previously planned contracts into other ACRIMe 

modernization efforts.35

According to ICE officials, some of the documents the SDS contractor 

developed, such as the Concept of Operations, will be used to help inform 

future contractors’ work. ICE officials noted that despite spending $14.3 

million on the SDS contract, which did not produce useable 

functionalities, ICE expects to spend about $22 million less than the 

original cost estimate of $41.7 million because the scope of capabilities to 

be provided by the contractor have been reduced. Specifically, ICE found 

after awarding the SDS contract that it would be more technically 

complicated and costly to develop the criminal alien tracking service than 

it had anticipated, so ICE does not plan to pursue the development of this 

functionality further. ICE officials acknowledged the importance of 

establishing well-defined requirements going forward, but as of April 

2012, ICE had not developed the requirements for the contracts it 

planned to award starting in July 2012 through December 2012.

 

36

Although ICE anticipates meeting its baseline deployment dates for the 

SDS services that it plans to develop through new contracts, it has not 

developed an integrated master schedule for completing ACRIMe 

modernization. Rather, ICE has used the separate schedules developed 

for each contract to manage the modernization effort. We have previously 

reported that one critical management tool for complex systems that 

In light 

of the challenges it has experienced as a result of unclear and changing 

requirements, ICE could be better positioned to help prevent delays and 

cost increases by establishing well-defined requirements that accurately 

reflect both user and technical needs prior to awarding additional 

contracts.

 

35 The contracts to be awarded are for four of the five services initially to be delivered 

under the SDS contract. We will continue to monitor these efforts as part of our 

recommendation follow-up work. See appendix I for additional information. 

36See appendix I for additional information on the ACRIMe modernization contracts.

Developing an Integrated 

Master Schedule 
 

Page 31 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

involve the incorporation of a number of different projects—in this case, 

ACRIMe modernization—is an integrated master schedule that allows 

managers to monitor all work activities, how long the activities will take, 

and how the activities are related to one another.37

Even though ICE delayed deployment of the modernized ACRIMe system 

and canceled the original SDS contract, it projects that the ATP service 

will be deployed in December 2012, and the SDS services will be 

deployed by the end of June 2013, both ahead of ICE’s baseline initial 

deployment estimate of December 2013. ICE officials explained that the 

initial deployment dates were based on outdated information and that ICE 

has since reduced the scope of the requirements needed for the SDS 

services because it now has a better understanding of those 

requirements. Further, ICE officials said they have learned to work with 

contractors more effectively to produce results in a timely manner by 

using an incremental development approach.

Because ICE lacked 

an integrated master schedule when it issued the first three ACRIMe 

modernization contracts in 2008 and 2009, it was not well positioned to 

understand how schedule changes in each individual contract would 

affect the overall modernization effort. For example, ICE assumed that 

the modernized ACRIMe system would be completed before work began 

on the ATP and SDS contracts. However, the deployment of the 

modernized ACRIMe system was delayed, and because ICE did not have 

an integrated master schedule, ICE was not in a position to effectively 

identify and resolve the effects of delays in the deployment of the 

modernized ACRIMe system on the development of the SDS and ATP 

services. Subsequently, the delays with the deployment of the 

modernized ACRIMe system contributed to the cancellation of the SDS 

contract and delayed the integration of the ATP service with the 

modernized ACRIMe system, according to ICE officials.

38

 

37

ICE developed a

deployment schedule for ACRIMe and its SDS and ATP services, but this 

schedule did not include elements of a reliable integrated master 

schedule, such as listings of all activities to be completed. ICE officials 

stated that their estimate of deployment for the SDS and ATP services 

GAO-09-3SP. 

38ICE is using an incremental development approach called “Agile software development.” 

Agile software development is a philosophy based on selected values, such as the highest 

priority is to satisfy customers through early and continuous delivery of valuable software; 

delivering working software frequently; and that working software is the primary measure 

of progress. 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

was based on their knowledge of the remaining work to be done and past 

experience developing schedules. However, they acknowledged that by 

not developing an integrated master schedule, ICE did not meet best 

practices for managing capital programs and recognized the importance 

of having an integrated master schedule moving forward. Accordingly, 

ICE officials said they began developing an integrated master schedule in 

April 2012, during the course of our review. While we recognize this as a 

positive step, it is too early to tell if ICE’s efforts will result in an integrated 

master schedule that reflects all of the tasks to be completed by the 

agency and contractors. For example, as of May 2012, ICE had not 

incorporated detailed project schedules for the four SDS services into its 

integrated master schedule. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment 

Guide states that an integrated master schedule should include all tasks 

necessary to complete the project, including work to be performed by 

both the government and contractors.39 Given the number of new 

contracts ICE plans to award and its previous difficulties with accounting 

for all contract activities and their interrelationships, ICE could help 

ensure that its deployment schedule is reliable and mitigate schedule 

risks by developing an integrated master schedule that includes all 

activities and identifies dependencies among the complementary 

contracts it plans to award.

Various developments could change ICE’s workforce requirements for 

responding to state and local law enforcement’s queries about aliens’ 

immigration and criminal status, providing ICE with an opportunity to 

examine the most efficient number and location of staff to accomplish the 

task. One development is the anticipated deployment of modernized 

ACRIMe to ICE field offices in December 2012, which could help reduce 

the existing duplication of effort in analyzing immigration and criminal 

status information. This duplication of effort involves ICE field office staff 

repeating database searches that LESC has already conducted because 

ACRIMe, which LESC uses to determine individuals’ immigration status, 

cannot generate reports or electronically transmit the results of LESC’s 

 

39We have previously identified other characteristics necessary to develop reliable 

schedules, but because ICE did not develop an integrated master schedule, we did not 

review the extent to which ICE conformed to other scheduling best practices. Other best 

practices include identifying resources, such as labor, material, and costs, needed for 

each activity, and conducting a schedule risk analysis, among others. For further 

discussion of characteristics of reliable schedules, see GAO-09-3SP, 218-224.

Workforce Planning Could 

Improve Use of Resources 

under ACRIMe 

Modernization 
 

Page 33 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

database searches to field offices; and field offices do not have access to 

ACRIMe, necessitating that they conduct their own database searches. 

According to ICE officials, such duplication of effort is necessary not only 

because of the current ACRIMe system’s limitations, but also because it 

serves as a quality control to minimize the likelihood of ICE making an 

incorrect arrest or detention decision. Modernized ACRIMe is expected to 

reduce the total number of immigration status database searches 

because the system is intended to be able to generate a report on the 

databases searched and electronically transmit the results of those 

searches. Another development is the anticipated increase in Secure 

Communities matches as the program is activated nationwide. ICE 

estimates indicate that when Secure Communities interoperability is 

activated in all jurisdictions in fiscal year 2013, it expects an additional 

approximately 90,000 Secure Communities queries will be generated 

each year. In calendar year 2011, LESC conducted database searches 

based on about 423,550 Secure Communities matches.40

As of April 2012, ICE had not determined or planned for how many staff it 

will need to conduct these searches. The new system will be accessible 

not only to LESC, as is currently the case, but also to field offices and 

interoperability response centers ( which were set up primarily to analyze 

an increased number of immigration status queries resulting from Secure 

Communities), making it possible for multiple organizational entities in 

ICE to conduct the database searches. LESC officials said that if they had 

60 additional staff, LESC would be able to process all Secure 

Communities requests for database searches for the entire country when 

modernized ACRIMe is deployed; however, an expansion under way at 

the Los Angeles response center could also accommodate additional staff 

for processing Secure Communities database searches. ICE officials 

have not yet addressed the role that LESC, the field-based response 

centers, or other ICE components involved with immigration status 

determination will have after modernized ACRIMe becomes operational.

In its April 2012 report, DHS’s Inspector General recommended that ICE 

develop procedures to eliminate duplication in the process of identifying 

potentially removable criminal aliens. Further, congressional staff 

requested that ICE brief members in March 2012 regarding the efficient 

 

40This figure represents all biometric Immigration Alien Queries (IAQ) received in fiscal 

year 2011, which also includes U.S. citizen biometric IAQs.
 

Page 34 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

allocation of resources between LESC and the response centers; 

however, the briefing had not been scheduled as of June 8, 2012. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government identifies 

effective management of an organization’s workforce as essential to 

achieving results and maintaining internal control, and program 

management guidance states that successful execution of any program 

includes developing plans that include efficient use of workforce 

resources.41

ICE officials acknowledged the need for comprehensive workforce 

planning, but officials indicated to us and to DHS’s Office of Inspector 

General that the agency plans to wait until after Secure Communities is 

activated nationwide and modernized ACRIMe becomes operational in 

fiscal year 2013 to make decisions about how to effectively realign 

resources. In August 2011 ICE completed an Operational Workforce 

Analysis, which projected the additional ERO workforce needed for 

detention and removal when Secure Communities is fully activated. A 

separate ICE analysis provided estimates of the workforce needs at 

LESC for analyzing an additional 90,000 queries. ICE’s analyses, 

however, did not consider the impact of modernized ACRIMe on 

workforce requirements or how staff resources at response centers will be 

utilized for making status determinations. Agency officials also said that 

uncertainty about funding was a factor they would need to consider as 

part of their planning. While planning efforts can be subject to uncertainty 

about future funding, developing a workforce plan prior to full program 

and system deployment could help position ICE so it is ready to 

effectively align staff among components responding to law enforcement 

agency queries when the modernized ACRIMe system is deployed.

 

41See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 and the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for 

Program Management (Newton Square, PA © 2006). 
 

Page 35 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

ICE and CRCL jointly identified four safeguards used to help protect 

aliens’ civil rights under Secure Communities. These safeguards include 

providing detainees a revised detainer form with telephone numbers to 

call when they believe their civil rights have been violated or they are U.S. 

citizens or crime victims, developing training materials for state and local 

law enforcement and ICE officials on how to protect aliens’ civil rights, 

initiating a process to statistically monitor arrests under Secure 

Communities to identify and investigate potential patterns of civil rights 

abuses, and using DHS’s existing complaint process to investigate 

complaints about possible civil rights abuses related to Secure 

Communities.

ICE began using a revised detainer form in December 2011, in part as a 

safeguard against potential abuse of detainees. Changes on the form 

include a request that law enforcement officials provide the detainee a 

copy of the form, and to notify ICE if the individual may be the victim of a 

crime.42 The revised form also includes a Notice to Detainee section 

printed in six languages with telephone numbers for arrested individuals 

to call. Calls for one number go to the LESC for individuals who believe 

they are U.S. citizens or victims of a crime and have been inappropriately 

identified for removal. The other number goes to the Joint Intake Center 

for individuals who believe their civil rights have been violated.43 The 

detainer form is not specific to detainees identified under Secure 

Communities; ICE requests all detainees be given a copy of their 

detainer, regardless of how the detainees were identified. The English 

version of the notice is reproduced in figure 6.

 

42Officials from CRCL and ICE ERO stated that ICE does not have the authority to require 

that police departments or jails give a copy of the detainer form to the arrested individuals.

43The Joint Intake Center is operated by both ICE and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) personnel, and is responsible for receiving, classifying, and routing all 

misconduct allegations involving ICE and CBP employees, including those pertaining to 

detainee treatment. A list of all complaints received by the Center is sent monthly to CRCL 

for review under the DHS’s agency-wide complaint process.

ICE and CRCL 

Identified Safeguards 

to Help Address 

Potential Civil Rights 

Abuses under Secure 

Communities; Some 

Efforts Have Not Yet 

Been Fully 

Implemented 

ICE’s Revised Detainer 

Includes Phone Numbers 

for Detainees to Report 

Potential Abuse
 

Page 36 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Figure 6: Detainer Form Notice to Detainee 

Notice to Detainee

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has placed an immigration detainer on you. An immigration detainer is a notice from

DHS informing law enforcement agencies that DHS intends to assume custody of you after you otherwise would be released from 

custody. DHS has requested that the law enforcement agency which is currently detaining you maintain custody of you for a period 

not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) beyond the time when you would have been released by the 

state or local law enforcement authorities based on your criminal charges or convictions. If DHS does not take you into custody during 

that additional 48 hour period, not counting weekends or holidays, you should contact your custodian (the law enforcement agency or 

other entity that is holding you now) to inquire about your release from state or local custody. If you have a complaint regarding this 

detainer or related to violations of civil rights or civil liberties connected to DHS activities, please contact the ICE Joint Intake Center at 

1877- 2INTAKE (877-246-8253). If you believe you are a United States citizen or the victim of a crime, please advise DHS by calling 

the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center at (855) 448-6903.

Source: Abstract from DHS Form 1-247 (12/11).

ICE detention management division officials said that the detainer is not 

the only avenue for individuals to be informed of whom to contact if they 

believe their civil rights have been violated. For example, officials said 

that once in ICE custody, detainees are given a handbook with steps to 

follow if they believe they were sexually assaulted or abused, or if they 

want to report other misconduct. Further, officials indicated that each 

facility housing detainees in ICE custody displays informational posters in 

detainee common areas with information on how to contact the DHS 

Office of the Inspector General.44

According to ICE data, calls to the LESC telephone number on the 

detainer form have not primarily been from detainees, and the calls have 

not primarily been made to report that a detainee is a U.S. citizen or a 

victim of a crime. LESC specialists fielded about 4,500 calls from 

December 26, 2011, to April 17, 2012, primarily from detainee family 

members and attorneys, often inquiring about the location of the 

detainee.45

 

44Detainees may file external complaints directly with the Office of the Inspector General, 

either in writing or by phone using the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

complaint hotline. OIG may investigate the complaint or refer it to CRCL or DHS 

components such as the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for review and 

possible action.

LESC officials said that each call is recorded and a written log 

is created. Of the calls received, LESC data indicated that 97 percent of 

the calls were “other;” that is, primarily detainee location questions, hangups, or calls to provide information on persons the caller believed might 

45For such inquiries, callers are to be referred to ICE’s online Detainee Locator System 

(www.ice.gov/locator).
 

Page 37 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

be in the country illegally. Seventy-one, or 2 percent, of the calls 

concerned claims that the detainee was a U. S. citizen. According to 

LESC, of those claims, 11 of the 71 detainers were removed after the 

immigration status claim was investigated by LESC.46

Illustrative examples from the LESC message logs (with names removed) 

are transcribed below:

Fourteen callers 

stated that they were a victim of or witness to a crime, and the information 

was forwarded to the relevant local ICE office.

• “Caller wanted to report some information involving an individual who 

paid someone to marry them just to gain status in the [United States].” 

(Caller was referred to DHS’s TipLine.) 

• “Caller stated he wanted to know the status of his brother’s detainer. 

He had called yesterday and claimed his brother was a USC [United 

States Citizen]. The [agent] on site contacted the agent that placed 

the detainer yesterday, stating he would take the detainer off. After 

[agent X and agent Y] looked into it today the system did not show the 

detainer was lifted. It was lifted yesterday and updated in the system 

today. I advised caller he would need to call the local ICE office for 

more [information] to be able to ask the status of the case.” 

• “Caller stated she was looking for a friend that was being detained. I 

advised her to visit ICE.gov and use the detainee locator along with 

calling her local ICE office.” 

 

46LESC could not verify U.S. citizenship for 60 of the 71 calls relating to a claim of U.S. 

citizenship, and LESC did not remove the detainers for these individuals. LESC officials 

said they routed all 71 claims to the ICE field office that lodged the detainer to complete 

processing and conduct further analysis of the claim.
 

Page 38 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

CRCL and ICE are collaborating to develop a series of modules to 

educate LEAs on civil rights and civil liberties issues that may arise under 

Secure Communities, as well as to reintroduce the program and its 

purpose.47

The first completed video, an Introduction to Secure Communities for 

LEAs, provides an overview of the program, including the expectation that 

law enforcement will not base any enforcement actions on factors such as 

race or ethnicity. The second video, How to Respond to an Immigration 

Detainer, explains to law enforcement personnel their role in responding 

to the new detainer and sharing information found on the new detainer 

form with the arrestee. The third video, Consular Notification: Your Role 

when Detaining Foreign Nationals, reiterates the importance of notifying 

foreign consulates when detaining non-U.S. citizens, a preexisting 

obligation under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

The modules include videos and related materials, such as 

memorandums, legal materials, and handouts, for use by law 

enforcement agencies and training instructors. As of May 1, 2012, CRCL 

had released three of the eight videos that it plans to develop. These 

three videos are available on ICE’s website, and ICE plans to share them 

with the law enforcement community through conferences and direct 

mailing of dissemination materials, according to CRCL. The remaining 

videos are in production and are expected to be completed by the end of 

calendar year 2012.

48

• Avoiding Racial Profiling;

Other 

planned videos include the following:

• Explaining Secure Communities to Your Community;

• Witnesses, Refugees and Victims of Crime or Domestic Violence: 

Protecting Those in Need;

• Retaliation by Private Actors; and

• Speaking Their Language: Working with Non-English Speakers

 

47ICE officials acknowledge that there were limitations in communications regarding the 

purpose of the program when it was introduced in 2008. 

48Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77.

CRCL and ICE Are 

Developing Secure 

Communities Awareness 

Briefings for State and 

Local Law Enforcement 

Agencies
 

Page 39 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

In May 2012, DHS established a dissemination plan for the Secure 

Communities videos, noting that ICE and CRCL plan to distribute the 

Secure Communities videos and materials to state and local LEAs. CRCL 

envisions that these agencies will share the information with law 

enforcement officers during routinely held briefings or in other settings.49

Beginning in June 2011, CRCL distributed the first video to 117 LEAs and 

143 nongovernmental organizations during visits made to eight major 

cities and at major conferences, such as the National Sheriff’s 

Association conference. ICE also plans to provide the videos and 

materials to law enforcement training agencies and instructors in each 

state and to make the videos available as downloadable files on the 

Internet.

To help determine whether local law enforcement agencies may be 

making inappropriate or unlawful arrests that could lead to removal 

through Secure Communities, CRCL and ICE developed a monitoring 

process in which Secure Communities–related statistics are reviewed on 

a quarterly basis. The monitoring process is designed to take place in 

three phases. In the first phase, CRCL’s plan calls for analyzing crime, 

arrest, and demographic data from activated jurisdictions to determine the 

extent to which foreign-born individuals are arrested at a rate that is 

proportional to their representation in the jurisdiction’s population, and the 

extent to which the types of charges for which foreign-born individuals are 

arrested are proportional to the types of arrest charges for all individuals 

in that jurisdiction.50

In the second phase, CRCL is conducting additional in-depth analyses of 

arrest, crime, and demographic data on the 10 large jurisdictions (those 

with populations over 100,000 that had over 30 Secure Communities 

submissions for the quarter), and 5 smaller jurisdictions (those with 

populations under 100,000) that produced the most anomalous results in 

the first phase of the analysis. CRCL stated that anomalies may indicate 

 

49These materials are optional and provided free of charge, and are not required as part of 

state or local law enforcement training.

50To improve the reliability of its analyses, CRCL’s statistical monitoring does not include 

jurisdictions that submit fewer than 30 Secure Communities matches per quarter. For the 

third quarter of fiscal year 2011, this resulted in excluding 101 jurisdictions (10 percent of 

all Secure Communities jurisdictions and 0.4 percent of the population in counties where 

Secure Communities is activated from CRCL’s analyses).

Data Complexities a 

Challenge in Analyzing 

Potential Arrest Anomalies 

under Secure Communities 
 

Page 40 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

that police engaged in racial profiling, but they may also reflect local crime 

patterns and legitimate police practices. For example, they said, in a 

jurisdiction where highway patrol is a primary function, officers would be 

making more traffic stops, and higher rates of traffic offenses might be 

expected. According to CRCL, because its second-phase analysis relies 

in part on data collected by local and state law enforcement agencies, the 

data are frequently less consistent across jurisdictions. These variations 

present challenges for CRCL’s analysis.

In the third phase, CRCL, in conjunction with ICE, plans to conduct 

inquiries into relevant policing practices in jurisdictions where the in-depth 

statistical analyses were unable to account for the anomalies in the 

statistical results.51

CRCL had planned to begin reporting the results of its statistical 

monitoring beginning with data from early fiscal year 2011, but began with 

the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. As of May 2012, CRCL was 

completing its analysis under the second phase for the third and fourth 

quarters of 2011. CRCL said the work and report have not yet been 

completed because of challenges with using multiple sources of data that 

were not designed for real-time monitoring. Examples of the data 

limitations and how CRCL plans to take the limitations into account in 

their analysis include the following:

Officials said the decision to proceed with the third 

phase of monitoring will be made on a case-by-case basis, and could, 

among other things, involve interviewing law enforcement personnel or 

complainants, or requesting documents from a law enforcement agency. 

ICE and CRCL officials said they would decide what actions they may 

take at the conclusion of the inquiry phase.

• The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program summary 

reporting system (a FBI national crime database that includes the 

number and types of arrests by police department) is used by CRCL 

for its foreign-born arrest charge comparisons. However, participation 

in the UCR Program is voluntary and not all police departments in the 

United States participate, including, for example, 21 counties in 

Illinois. In such cases, CRCL plans to identify and use other data, 

such as the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), 

 

51CRCL also refers to this phase as “non-statistical review” because the term 

“investigation” may be misinterpreted as more comprehensive than what is actually 

involved.
 

Page 41 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

another FBI UCR Program method for collecting crime data, and 

arrest data, if available, that are publicly reported outside the 

summary UCR system, by some states, such as Florida, through its 

state UCR program.

• There is a lag between the time that the U.S. Census Bureau’s 

American Community Survey collects and releases demographic 

information on the foreign-born population in the United States. CRCL 

began working with the Community Survey data for the 2005-2009 

period, and shifted to the 2006-2010 data when it became available in 

December 2011.

• Noncitizens in different parts of the country have different rates of 

inclusion in the IDENT database, making careful comparisons 

important and more difficult. Foreign-born residents who have not 

interacted with federal immigration agencies would not have been 

included in the IDENT database. The CRCL monitoring statistics 

could underestimate potential civil rights abuses in such jurisdictions, 

compared with jurisdictions in which IDENT includes a larger 

proportion of the foreign-born population. ICE stated that officials are 

working to better understand variation in IDENT coverage for 

improved comparisons.

• CRCL officials also said that in working with the actual arrest data for 

the first time, they are discovering and resolving such data problems 

as incongruous categorizations of crimes. For example, definitions of 

“serious” or “aggravated” arrests vary between the UCR and LESC. 

Consequently, CRCL’s work with the first data set to account for such 

differences is taking longer than subsequent analysis is expected to 

take.

ICE, CRCL, and DHS headquarters officials met in May 2012 to assess 

the progress of the statistical monitoring effort, discuss potential changes 

to Secure Communities protocols as a result of the statistical analyses, 

determine what and how information from the monitoring effort will be 

reported, and decide on any actions to be taken at the conclusion of all 

monitoring phases. They determined that further development and 

analysis were required, and CRCL officials told us that follow-up sessions 

were scheduled for July 2012. CRCL officials explained that CRCL would 

issue its report when it is confident that everything possible had been 

done to resolve the statistical anomalies, because doing so would avoid 

inappropriately flagging jurisdictions whose statistics appeared 
 

Page 42 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

anomalous, but were later explained. Once the first report is issued, 

according to CRCL officials, they expect to report quarterly.

Under a complaint process applicable to all of DHS, CRCL has opened 

four investigations, all in fiscal year 2011, of civil rights complaints that 

CRCL identified as involving Secure Communities. CRCL has authority to 

review and assess civil rights or civil liberties complaints regarding DHS 

policies, activities, or actions taken by DHS personnel, and receives 

complaints submitted by mail, e-mail, fax, and the CRCL telephone 

hotline.52 CRCL also reviews a monthly list of complaints processed 

through the Joint Intake Center, and a complaint form is posted on the 

Secure Communities’ and CRCL’s websites.53

ICE and CRCL issued a joint memorandum on June 14, 2011, outlining 

how civil rights complaints involving state and local law enforcement and 

Secure Communities would be addressed.

CRCL officials stated they 

meet quarterly with community organizations and ask for allegations 

regarding Secure Communities to be forwarded.

54

 

52This authority is based on 6 U.S.C., §345(a)(1),(4) and (6); and 42 U.S.C. §2000ee1(a)(2). 

The memorandum noted that 

the strategy for Secure Communities differs from those of most other 

programs in that CRCL has no compulsory process that requires state 

and local LEAs to cooperate in CRCL investigations because CRCL and 

the LEAs do not have formal partnerships under Secure Communities. 

The memorandum stated that CRCL may initiate investigations based on 

complaints alleging misconduct, statistical information indicating 

anomalies in arrests that led to Secure Communities matches, or the 

results of third-party research. The investigation process can vary based 

on how the complaint was initiated and is described in the June 

memorandum.

53The number of complaints on the monthly list varies, for example, from 27 in December 

2011, to 64 in February 2012. The Joint Intake Center receives complaints from a variety 

of sources, and CRCL cannot identify whether a particular complaint call was based on 

the detainer form notice.

54Secure Communities complaints related to alleged misconduct of ICE contractors or 

employees are handled using standard procedures by ICE’s Office of Professional 

Responsibility.

Allegations of Civil Rights 

Abuses under Secure 

Communities Are 

Investigated under DHS’s 

Complaint Process
 

Page 43 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

CRCL categorizes complaints by issue (what the complaint is about) and 

by the situation in which the issue occurred. There are 21 categories of 

issues, such as use of excessive force, sexual assault, or abuse, and 16 

categories of situations, such as a complaint arising from a port of entry 

incident or a Secure Communities encounter. Knowing whether a 

complaint is actually related to Secure Communities is not always clear, 

CRCL officials stated. This is because not all of those who file complaints 

know that they were identified through Secure Communities, and 

conversely, some may mistakenly believe that Secure Communities was 

involved in their arrest when they were actually identified by other means. 

CRCL staff said they discuss each allegation to determine if it is related to 

Secure Communities by looking at the specifics of the complaint. CRCL 

officials said that under Secure Communities, likely complaint issues are 

those involving discrimination or profiling, Fourth Amendment rights, and 

language access issues.55 A CRCL Complaint Opening Meeting group, 

composed of CRCL management, including the Compliance Branch 

Deputy Director and other stakeholders, decides on a weekly basis 

whether to take further action on specific complaints, using their 

professional judgment.56

Four investigations have been initiated by CRCL based on complaints 

regarding Secure Communities, three of which were submitted by one 

nongovernmental organization in one region. The complaints involve 

allegations that each of the four arrests was made because the officers 

believed the individuals were in the country illegally, and the individuals 

were arrested to determine their immigration status.

CRCL’s Compliance Branch Director said there is no “standard” 

investigation process for a complaint because each complaint is fact 

specific; but, in each case, CRCL requests documents from ICE and the 

local law enforcement agency that arrested the complainant. If available, 

the complainant is interviewed, in addition to relevant DHS personnel and 

witnesses. CRCL officials stated that CRCL is currently working through 

 

55Fourth Amendment rights relate to the part of the Bill of Rights that guards against 

unreasonable searches and seizures (including arrests), along with requiring any arrest or 

search warrant to be judicially sanctioned and supported by probable cause. See U.S. 

Const. amend IV.

56CRCL may not initiate an investigation if the DHS Inspector General decides to 

investigate. All matters are first referred to the Inspector General for investigation, and if 

the Inspector General declines to investigate, the matter is referred back to CRCL. 
 

Page 44 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

procedures for investigating Secure Communities complaints with two 

local law enforcement agencies and requested that officers sit for 

voluntary interviews. These complaints are taking longer than what is 

normal for investigations of DHS policy and practices, officials said, in 

part because of the need to create new procedures with local law 

enforcement for investigating the allegations.

In 2009, about 11.5 million noncitizens were living in the United States 

without lawful immigration status, some of whom have been arrested and 

convicted of various crimes and incarcerated. Secure Communities 

assists in identifying those who have been incarcerated and are subject to 

removal. ICE has invested millions of dollars to modernize ACRIMe 

capabilities that are central to Secure Communities’ success, but has not 

followed best practices in its acquisition of the modernized technology. 

Effective management of future ACRIMe modernization efforts hinges on 

establishing well-defined requirements and the development of a reliable 

integrated master schedule. Likewise, a modernized ACRIMe, along with 

the extension of Secure Communities to all jurisdictions, will change ICE 

workforce requirements for the analysis of immigration status 

determinations. Developing a workforce plan to guide workforce resource 

decisions could help ensure workforce decisions are made in an effective 

and cost-efficient manner.

To help ensure that ICE acquires effective technology to support the 

Secure Communities program and effectively uses its workforce, we 

recommend that the Director of ICE take the following three actions to 

follow sound management practices:

• establish well-defined requirements prior to awarding additional 

ACRIMe modernization contracts;

• develop an integrated master schedule that identifies all tasks to be 

performed by the government and current and future contractors, and 

links activities being performed by different contractors; and

• develop a workforce plan to support the analysis of immigration status 

determinations under Secure Communities.

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 45 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for their review and

comment. DHS provided written comments which are reprinted in full in 

Appendix II. DHS concurred with our three recommendations and 

described efforts underway to address them. For example, with respect to 

establishing well-defined requirements prior to awarding additional 

ACRIMe modernization contracts, DHS stated that ICE is piloting an 

incremental development and requirements definition process within 

ACRIMe, including using smaller requirements teams to complete 

requirements by the end of July 2012, before additional contracts are 

issued. These actions are consistent with the intent of the 

recommendation and should help ICE manage future ACRIMe 

modernization efforts. With respect to developing an integrated master 

schedule, DHS reiterated that it began developing such a schedule in 

April 2012 and expects to complete it by the end of December 2012. This 

action is consistent with the intent of the recommendation and should 

improve ICE’s understanding of how schedule changes in individual 

contracts may affect the overall modernization effort. With respect to 

developing a workforce plan, DHS noted that ICE plans to complete a 

proposal for consolidating Interoperability Response Centers into one 

central location by the end of December 2012. DHS stated that it will 

determine what, if any, additional workforce plans are needed after it 

completes the proposal. While this is a step in the right direction, we 

continue to believe that ICE would benefit from comprehensive workforce 

planning that includes examining how to reduce the existing duplication of 

effort between LESC and ICE field offices when ICE deploys modernized 

ACRIMe. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated 

as appropriate.

DOJ did not have formal comments on our draft report, but provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security and other interested parties. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

and GAO’s Evaluation
 

Page 46 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Rebecca Gambler

Acting Director

Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Alien Criminal Response 

Information Management Modernization 

Contracts

Page 47 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

As of April 2012, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

had awarded four contracts and planned to award additional contracts to 

modernize its Alien Criminal Response Information Management 

(ACRIMe) system. In commenting on a draft of this report, in June 2012 

ICE officials told us that they now plan to award three new contracts and 

that the work for the previously planned ACRIMe/ENFORCE Integration 

and Batch Processing contracts would be incorporated into other ACRIMe 

modernization efforts.1

Table 6: ACRIMe Modernization Contracts

Table 6 provides summary information on these 

contracts as of April 2012. 

Dollars in millions

Contract Description Contract period

Estimated 

deployment as of 

April 2012

Contract value as 

of April 2012 a Funding as of April 2012 b

ACRIMe-1c To develop a modernized 

ACRIMe system for 

accessing multiple law 

enforcement and immigration 

databases

 June 2008-May 

2012

Canceled d $12.0

(actual)

$12.0

Automated Threat 

Prioritization (ATP)

To allow modernized 

ACRIMe users to 

automatically retrieve prior 

conviction information from 

state and federal criminal 

history records

September 2009-

August 2014

December 2012 26.1

(ICE estimate)

21.5

Status Determination 

Support (SDS)

To develop five web services 

to enhance modernized 

ACRIMe’s capability to 

determine immigration 

status:

• Status Determination 

Support

• Automated National 

Crime Information 

Center (NCIC) Warrants

• Criminal Alien Tracking

• Jail Roster/Release 

Tracking

• Integrated Case 

Management

September 2009-

August 2014

Canceled e 14.3

(actual)

14.3

 

1

We will continue to monitor these efforts as part of our recommendation follow-up work. 

Appendix I: Alien Criminal Response 

Information Management Modernization 

Contracts 
Appendix I: Alien Criminal Response 

Information Management Modernization 

Contracts

Page 48 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Dollars in millions

Contract Description Contract period

Estimated 

deployment as of 

April 2012

Contract value as 

of April 2012 a Funding as of April 2012 b

ACRIMe-2 To complete the 

development of the 

modernized ACRIMe system 

that had been developed 

under the ACRIMe-1 contract 

and provide ongoing 

operations and maintenance 

support 

September 2011-

August 2016

July 2012 8.1

(ICE estimate)

f 2.3

NCIC Wants and 

Warrants

To develop the service for 

processing NCIC warrants 

that ICE originally planned to 

develop in the SDS contract

ICE plans to award 

the contract by the 

end of September 

2012.

March 2013 1.7

(ICE estimate)

0 

Communications 

Center

To develop call center 

capability within the 

modernized ACRIMe system 

that ICE originally planned to 

develop with the ACRIMe-1 

contract

ICE plans to award 

the contract by the 

end of September 

2012.

March 2013 1.7

(ICE estimate)

0 

External Search 

Service 

To develop the status 

determination support 

service to search multiple 

databases that ICE originally 

planned to develop with the 

SDS contract 

ICE plans to award 

the contract by the 

end of December 

2012.

June 2013 1.1

(ICE estimate)

0 

ACRIMe/ ENFORCE 

Integration

To develop the integrated 

case management that ICE 

originally planned to develop 

with the SDS contract to 

allow modernized ACRIMe 

users to automatically export 

data into ENFORCE

g ICE plans to award 

the contract by the 

end of December 

2012.

June 2013 2.3

(ICE estimate)

0 

Batch Processing To develop the service for jail 

roster/release tracking 

service that ICE originally 

planned to develop with the 

SDS contract

h ICE plans to award 

the contract by the 

end of December 

2012.

June 2013 $.3

(ICE estimate)

0 

Source: GAO analysis of ICE information.

a

The deployment dates are the dates for the initial operational capability, rather than the final 

operational capability. ICE is using an iterative approach, and officials expect that some additional 

work will be needed after the initial deployment before the technology is fully functional.

b

For the two contracts that were canceled (ACRIME-1 and SDS), the contract value is equal to the 

total amount ICE spent on the contract. For the other two contracts that have been awarded (ATP 

and ACRIMe-2), the source of the estimated contract value is the most recent contract modification 

as of April 2012. For the remaining five contracts that have not been awarded, ICE officials provided 

the estimates for the contracts’ values.
Appendix I: Alien Criminal Response 

Information Management Modernization 

Contracts

Page 49 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

c

The contract that ICE awarded in 2008 to acquire the modernized ACRIMe system was also to 

acquire other technology-related services. We use the term “ACRIMe-1” to refer to just the portion of 

the contract related to acquiring the modernized ACRIMe system. 

d

ICE funded this contract through September 2011, since ICE decided not to continue using this 

contractor.

e

ICE canceled this contract in August 2011 because of delays with ACRIMe modernization.

f

ICE is incrementally deploying the modernized ACRIMe system. According to ICE, in February 2012, 

a version of the modernized ACRIMe system that could search the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

National Crime Information Center was deployed in the Law Enforcement Support Center. However, 

the system will not be able to process requests for immigration status determinations until July 2012, 

when ICE plans to deploy an updated modernized ACRIMe system to the Law Enforcement Support 

Center. ICE plans to deploy the modernized ACRIMe system with immigration status determination 

functionality across ICE in December 2012.

g

ENFORCE is a database that maintains information related to the investigation, arrest, booking, 

detention, and removal or persons encountered during immigration investigations and operations 

conducted by ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

in June 2012 ICE officials told us the work for the previously planned ACRIMe/ENFORCE Integration 

contract would be incorporated into other ACRIMe modernization efforts. We will continue to monitor 

these efforts as part of our recommendation follow-up work. 

h

In commenting on a draft of this report, in June 2012 ICE officials told us the work for Batch 

Processing contract would be incorporated into other ACRIMe modernization efforts. We will continue 

to monitor these efforts as part of our recommendation follow-up work.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 50 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 51 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 52 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 53 GAO-12-708 Secure Communities

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Evi Rezmovic (Assistant 

Director), David Alexander, Frances Cook, Kevin Craw, Dorian Dunbar, 

Monica Kelly, Jason Lee, Heather May, Linda Miller, Karen Richey, and 

Nate Tranquilli made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(440988)
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