T he p o st ed s p eed l i m i t i s 6 5 m . p . h. 1 C O U R T O F A P P E A LS

EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEX AS ELPASO, TEXAS

MI CHAEL

L AVEL LJ ACKSON, Ap pe lla nt,

v. TH E ST AT E O F TE XA S, Appellee

. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 07 -0 00 61 -C R

Appea l from 422nd District Court of Ka ufman County , Texas (TC # 23223-422)

O P I N I O N Mic ha e l L a ve ll Ja c ks on

a pp e a ls his int oxic a tio n mans la ug hte r ( Count 1 ) a

nd tampe ri ngwi th

e v id e n c e ( Co u n t 2 ) c o n v ic ti o n s . A ju r y f o un d A p p e ll an t g u il ty o f e a c h o f f e n s e. B ased on Appellant’s plea of true, the jury found the e nhance ment alleg ation in eac h count true a nd assessed punishment at imprisonment for twenty -eig ht y ear s on the intox ication manslaug hter c onviction and at imprisonment for twenty -five y ear s on the tamperingwith evidence co nviction. The trial cour t enter ed a de adly

wea pon finding in the i ntox ication m anslaug hter judg ment. Finding no err or, we

a ff ir m. F ACTUAL SUMMA RY On August 9, 2004 at appr ox imately 2:30 p.m., Charlsie Flete s was traveling 70 m.p.h. on 1 I nterstate 20 a

nd prepa ring to the take the ne x t exi t w hen a For d F- 150 passed a nd then cut in front of her to take the same exit. The truc k cut Fle tes short when it moved into her la ne. The re a

re

wa rn ingsig ns a dv isi ng that the po ste d spe e d li mit fo r t he e xit r a mp i s 3 0 m. p. h. Th e e xit is i nit ia llyA p p e llan t suffe re d a b ro k e n fo o t i n the a c c id e n t. 2 straig ht, but there is an “S” curve in the roadway befor e the service road is rea ched. Fletes slowe d do wn to t a ke the e xit and

slo we d e ve n f

ur the r u po n th e se e ing the dr ive r of the tr uc k mi ss t

he “ S”

c ur ve . T he tr

uc k n e arl y

str uc k a lig ht p ole on

the lef t bef or e the dr ive r s we rv e d b a c k to the ri g ht. He ove rcor

rec ted and the tr

uck “kind of

tilted” and slammed int o a d ee p concr ete c ulvert. F letes

rec alled that it was a

hot, sunny

day and ther e wa s nothing on the r oadwa y whi ch made the r oad slippery or ca used her to lose control. Flete s stopped to a ssist and she saw Appellant climb out of the driver’s s i d e h al f-door. Appellant appe are d nervous and scar ed as might be expected and he was attempting to f ind a number on his cell phone. He t o l d Flete s he had e x ited beca use the woma

n with him needed to use the restroom a

nd could not wait unt il they g ot back to Dallas. Flete s looked down into the t ruck a nd saw that the woman inside had a cut on her fore head and appea red to be unconsc ious. Fletes diale d 911 and re main e d a t th e s c e n e u n ti l a f te r th e p o li c e an d e me r g e n c y s e r v ic e s h a d ar

r iv e d an d s h e had g iven her statement. Robert Abundez and his wife , Vane ssa M orin, wer e working at the Ex x on g as station located

near the s cene the accident. Abundez was outsi de painting a sig n when he hear d a hug e noise be hind him. He told his wife to call 911 and then r an over to the culver

t. The driver

emer g ed and be g an saying “ my

baby ,” re fer

ring to the woman still in the t ruck. Morin walked ove r to the ac cident and saw that Appe llant w as limping and had blood on his leg

. After the police a

nd ambulance arr ived, 2 Ab u n d ez an d

M o ri nre tu rn edt o t h e E x x o n . W h i l e th e po l i ce an d em er gen cy

s er v i ce s we re wo rk i n g, Ap pe lla nt e nte re d the Exxon and a sk e d if he c ou ld us e the re str oo m. Th e me n’ s re str oo m wa s in u se so Appellant we nt into the wome n ’s re s t ro o m . The police came into the Ex x on looking f or Ap p e ll an t a n d A b u n d e z to ld th e m h e w a s in th e w o me n ’ s r e s tr o o m. T h e y to ld A p p e ll an t tha t heshould not have left the a ccide nt scene and made him go ba ck o u t s i d e. No one else ha d used the

women’s r estroom that day

. Robert B arr

and his partne r, Anne Atkins, are pa rame dics employ ed by East Texas Medica l Center, a nd they wer e dispatche d to the acc ident. Ba rr de scribed the d amage to the truck a s extensive. Phot og raphs show that the front end of the t ruck w as cr

ushed by the impact with the

concr ete c ulvert. Once Barr deter mined that Appellant did not have any life t hreatening injuries, he climbed down to t h e truc k to chec k on the passeng er, Ma rily n Br idge s. Br idge s had an obvious injury to the rig ht side of her

head; she was not bre athing and did not have a p u l s e. Ba rr c limbed back out of

the ditch and looked for Appellant but could not find him. When Appellant was loc ated, Ba rr infor med him that the passeng er w as dec ease d. Ap p el l an t did not seem conce rned. B arr subsequently

hear d Appellant on the phone saying they wer e going to g et Bridg es out of t he truc k

and take he r t o th e ho sp ita l. B arr a g a in t old

Ap pe lla nt that Br idg e s had die d in the a c c ide nt. Whil e speakingwith A

ppellant, Ba

rr noticed that his pupils wer e extremely constricted. He ha d Appellant move into the back of

the ambulance where it was darker

. Appellant’s pupils rema ined constricte d as they had bee n in the brig ht light. T h i s indicated to B arr that Appellant mig ht be under the influence of some ty

pe of me dication or illeg al drugand he sha red his conc erns with the police office rs at the sc ene. Anne Atkin s o bs e rv e d that Ap pe lla nt wa s on the te le ph on e a lot and did no t w ant t o ta lk t o the par amedics or

the police. The y

told Appellant at least t wice that the passenge r had died. Eac h time he would ac knowledg e it but then he would for g et and a sk them ag ain. J oe Hobbs, a

Terr ell police off

icer , was one of the fir st office rs on the ac cident sce ne. He looked in the truck a

nd saw that the f

emale passeng er was not breathing. He immediately beg an a fata lity vehicle c rash a

nd possible manslaug hter investig ation. Hobbs deter mined that A

p p e ll ant hadbeen dr iving. He g ot Appellant’s drive r’s lice nse and w alked o v er clos er to the ve hicle to g et

information. He wanted additional information from Appellant, but Appellant ha d left the sce ne and

wa l k ed to the Ex x on. Hobbs and his supervisor, My les Hanks, wa lked over

to the Ex x on to find Appellant and c ontinue the investig ation. Upon learning Appellant wa s in the restroom, Hobbs hear d Appellant talking on the telephone . He knoc ked on the door and aske d Appellant what he was d o i n g. Ap p el l an to p en edt h e d o o r a n d wa l k edp as tHo b b s . W h en Ho b b s h ea rdt h e t o i l et ru n n i n g, he we nt i ns ide of

re str oo m and saw mari hu ana sw ir lin g aro un d in

the toi le t bo wl a s it

c on tin ue d to fill with water. The marihuana wa s d ry an d fl o ati ng on top of the water. Ha nks collecte d the marihuana

and bag g ed it as evide nce. When Hobbs r eturne d to the acc ident scene , Ba rr told him he suspected that Appellant was unde r the influenc e of some kind of drug

. Hobbs handc uffe d Appellant and transported hi m to the M edica l Center in Te rre ll for a mandatory blood specimen to be dr awn. Ap pe lla nt’ s in jur ie s w e re a lso tr e a te d at th e ho sp ita l. L e sli e Sho rt na c y dr e w the blo od

a t 3: 50 p. m. Testing of the blood spec imen showed th e p resence of tetrahydroca

nnabinol, which is the active c omponent of marihua na, and c arboxy

tetrahydrac annabinol, which is a metabolic bre akdown product of the pare nt drug . The prese nce of tetrahydroca nnabinol indicated that mar ihuana ha d been inge sted within a six hour period befor e the blood w as draw n. I n short, Appellant had i n gest ed marihuana

sometime betwee n 9:50 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. when the a ccide nt occur red. Scott Kepner

is a Ter rell police of

fice r traine d in acc ident investigation. He ar rived at the

acc ident scene at 2:50 p.m. The amount of damag e to A ppellant’s vehicle indicated that it was trave ling at a high rate of speed when it impacted the culver t. Kepne r, poi nting to the photogra phs admitted into evidence , descr ibed the bend in the r oadwa y as an “S” which was short but not sharp. He obse rved that Appellant drove into the gr ass on the left side of the r oadwa y but overc orre cted a

nd be g an s lid ingsid e wa

y s b e fo re imp a c tin g the c ulv e rt . K e pn e r w e nt t o the ho sp ita l to ta lk t oAppellant about the acc ident. Appellant’s behavior was unusual in that he fluctuate d b etween

emotional and indiffe rent. With the information available to him, Ke pner suspected that Appellant had bee n using controlled substances and questioned him. Appe llant admitted that he had smoked

mari hu ana

that mo rn ing a t 3 a .m. or 4 a .m. Ap pe lla

nt g a ve Ke pn e r a

vo lun tary

wr itt e n s ta te me nt. I n that statement, Appe llant said that the couple de cided to stop at the Exx on to use the re stroom and then g o to the outlet mall. W hen he e x ited, there was a n are a with new pa

vement which w as slick. The truc k beg an sliding a nd he lost control. Wil liam Kasper

is employ ed by

the Texas Depa

rtment of Public Safety . Three day s after the

acc ident, the Ter

rell Police Service s asked him t o assist in drawing the ac cident sce ne. Using equipment to measure the roa dway , Kaspe r examined th e s ce ne and r ender ed a dr awing . Kaspe r deter mined that the truck initially went off of the roadw ay to the left, over corr ecte d and beg an sliding sid e wa y s bef or e g oin g int o the c ulv e rt
. He fo un d no ev ide nc e the tr uc k ha d bra

ke d b e fo re the e xit and he c oncluded the dr iver ha d taken the e x it at an unsafe speed. Appellant’s investig ator, Rex Rey nolds, examined the ex it and roa dway and cha rac terized the exit as deceptive beca use i t had a “little dog leg ” which could cause a driver to lose control if he

wa s n o t c ar e f

u l o r th ink in g a

b o u t it

. I n h is o p in io n , th e r e w a s a g r e ate r d an g e r if a pe rson was

un fa mil iar w iththe e x it

. He te sti fi e d th a t an in toxic a te d p e rs on wh o w a s unf

a mil iar w iththe e xit

c ou ld h a ve a wr e c k be c a

us e of the “ do g le g ” bu t a dd e d th a t a so be r p e rs on

or a pe rs on wh o w a s in

a hurry and driving too f

ast could also have an acc ident at this ex it. On cross-e x amination, Rey nolds te sti fi e d th a t he ha d wor

ke d in nar c oti c s and kn e w that mar ihu ana slo we d a per so n’ s re fl e xes. I n h is op ini on , a pe rs on wh o w a s in toxic a te d o n ma ri hu ana and too k th e e xit a t 70 m.p. h. pla c e d h ims e lf and his passeng ers in g rave dang er. Appellant testified in his own def ense. H e had never

driven on that stre tch of I -20 bef ore a ndhe wa s unfamiliar with the ex it. Br idge s told him as they rea ched the exit that they should stop at the outlet mall so she could buy a g ift. He re called that he was trave ling at 60 or 65 m.p.h. and since the sp e e d li mit

fo r t he e xit wa s 4 0 m.p.h ., he slow e d d ow n. Whe n h e ste pp e d o n h is b ra ke s, ho we ve r, the ve hic le be g an s lid ingon loo se g ra ve l in a ne wl y patc he d s e c tio n o f ro a dw ay . He los t control and went into the culver t. He denied smoking marihuana on the day of t h e a cc i d en t and denied telling the offic ers that he had. When the State attempted to impeach Appe llant with a 1997 felony conviction for posse ssion of coca ine, he de n i ed havinga convic tion. The State utiliz ed fing erpr int evidence to prove that Appe llant had bee n convicted of possession of coc aine in 1997. The jury reje cted Appellant’s defe nse and found him guilty of intox ication manslaug hter a nd tampe ri ngwi th e vid e nc e a s a lle g e d in the ind ic tme nt. Th e jur y a lso found t

hat us e d a

de a dly

wea pon, namely , a motor vehicle, during the commission of intox ication manslaug hter. B ased on Appellant’s plea

of true, the jury

found the e nhance ment alleg ation in eac h count true a nd assessed punishment at imprisonment for twenty -eig ht y ear s on the intox ication manslaug hter c onviction and

a t i mp r is o n me n t f

o r tw e n ty
- f iv e y e ar s o nth e ta

mp e r in g w it

h e v id e n c e c o n v ic ti o n . T h e tr ia l c o urt

e nte re d a de a dly we a po n f ind ingin t

he int oxic a tio n ma

ns la ug hte r j ud g me nt. BLOO D T EST RESU LTS I n Po int of Er ro r O ne , App e lla

nt c on te nd s th e tr ia l c ou

rt e rr e d in ad mi tt in g the blo od te st results over his objec tion that L eslie Shortnacy , a g raduate nurse, was n o t q u alified to dra w the blood. The State re sponds that Shortnacy is a “qua lified technic ian” within the meaning of Se c tio n 7 24 .0 17 of

the Tr ans po rt a tio n Co de . T hat se c tio n p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , th a t: (a) Only a phy sician, qualified technicia n, chemist, reg istered pr ofessional nurse , or licensed voc ational nurse ma y take a b l ood specimen at the reque st or order of a peac e off icer under this cha

pter. T EX .T RA N SP .C ODE ANN . § 724.017(a) (Ve rnon 1999). The Transpor tat i o n Code does not def inequalified tec hnician, but subsection (c ) provides that “qualified te chnici an” does not include

emer g ency

medical se rvice s personne l. T EX .T RA N SP .C ODE ANN . § 724.017(c)

. We have not found any repor ted cases hol ding that a gra duate nurse is a qualified te chnician

un de r t he statut e . Co urt s hav e he ld, ho we ve r, tha t a ph le bo tom ist

is a qu a lif ie d te c hn ic ian w ith in the me anin g of Se c tio n 724 .0 17 (a ) wh e re the re is ev ide nc e sh ow ing the pe rs on ’s qu a lif ic a tio ns to draw a blood spec imen. Se e J

essu p v . S tat e , No. 13-02-00024- CR, 2004 WL2612958 (Tex.App.-- Corpus Christi Nov. 10, 2004, no pet.)(not desig nated for publication)(the evidenc e showe d that phlebotomist was a qualified te chnician unde r Section 724.017(a ) whe re the rec ord showed that he

was e mploy ed as a

phlebotomist at the hospital, his job r esponsibiliti es included draw ing blood, he h a d s u c c e s s f u ll y c o mp le te d

a c o u r s e in

th e dr aw in g o f

b lo o d an d h a d s u c c e s s f u ll y ta k e nthe h o s p i t al ’s ch ec k l i s tt es to nt h e dr aw i n g o f b l o o d , an d h e w as wi t h i nt h re e m o n t h s o f c o mp l et i n g a

c oll e g e c ours e to b e c ome a la bo rator y te c hn ic ian) ; Torre

s v . S tat e , 109 S.W .3d 602, 606 (Tex.App.-- For t Wo rth 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t. ) ( b e c a u s e n o o n e te s ti f

ie d r e g ar d in g qu a li f

ic a ti o n s o f p e r s o n who dre w blo od and re c or d c on ta ine d n o e vid e nc e blo od wa s dr awn by so me on e ho sp ita l ha d d e te rm ine d to be qualifie d, State failed to prove that person draw ing blood w as qualified under Section 724.017); State v. Bingham , 921 S.W .2d 494, 496 (Tex.App.--Waco 1996, pet. ref’d)( concluding that the term “qualifie d technicia

n” includes a

phlebotomist whom t he hospital has de te r mi n e d is q u a li f ie d to draw blood and whose c rede ntials were made pa rt of the r ecor d). Se e als o Co rd e ro v . S tat e , No. 08-05-00285- CR, 2007 W L4724675 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2007, Jan. 1 7 , 2007, pet. re f’d) (not de si g n a t e d f

o r p u b l i c a t i o n ) ( p h l e b o t o m i s t w a s a q u a l i f i e d t e c h n i c i an )

. T h e f

o c u s o f o u r i n qu i r

y is whether Shortnacy

is qualified by

the hospital which employ ed her to draw blood. Shortnacy had wor ked at the Medical Center in Terr ell for nine y ear s as a c ertified nur sing assistant and she ha d g raduated from nur sing school in May of 2004. She wa s a g raduate nurse atthe time she drew Appellant’s blood. As a cer tified nursing assistant, she had bee n trained to dra w blo od by the ho sp ita l nurs ing sta ff and the ho sp ita l ha d a c he c kli st w hic h Sh or tna c y ha d s uc c e ssf

ull y completed in orde r to be a llowed to drawblood. Draw ing blood had been part of Shortnacy ’s re g ular duties for a

pproxi mately

eig ht y ear s. Her nur sing school training and education included a skills lab in w hic h Sh or

tna c y and the oth e r s tud e nts we re tr a ine d to dra w blo od

. Sho rt

na c y wa s f

a mil iar w ith the hospital’s proce dure for draw ing blood a nd she followed it in this case . Be cause the evidenc e showed that Shortnac y

had bee n trained to dra w blood and wa s qualified un d er the hospital’s proce dures f

or dra wing a blood spe cimen, we conclude the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion by finding that sh e wa s a q ualified tec hnician under Section 724.017(a) of the Tr ansportation Code. Point of Error One is overrule d. SUF F ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE I n Point of Error Two, Appellant challeng es t he lega l and factual sufficiency of the e vidence

su pp or tin g his int oxic a tio n ma

ns la ug hte r c on vic tio n. Mo re sp e c if ic a lly , h e argue s th e e vid e nc e is ins uf fi c ie nt t o p ro ve that he wa s in toxic a te d an d tha t by re a so n o f t hat in toxic a tio n c a

us e d th e de a th of Ma ri ly n B ri dg e s. Standards of Review I n addre ssing leg al suffic iency , we r eview a ll the evidence , both S t ate and defe nse, in the light most favor able to the ve rdict to deter mine whether

any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the offense bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 31 8- 19 , 99 S.Ct

. 27 81 , 27 89 , 61 L .E d.2d 56 0 (1 97 9); Ge esa v . S tat e , 820 S.W .2d 154, 159 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) , o ve rruled on other grounds , Pa uls on v . S tat e , 28 S.W .3d 570 (Tex.Crim.App. 2 0 0 0 )

. We c onsider all of the evidenc e, whe ther a dmissibl e or ina dmissibl e. W ilson

v . S tat e , 7 S

. W

. 3 d

1 3 6 , 1 4 1 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) ; Joh ns on v . S tat e , 967 S.W .2d 410, 412(T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). We d o n ot r e so lve any c on fl ic t of

fa c t or a ssi g n c re dib ili ty

to the wi tne sse s, as it was the f

unction of the trier

of fa ct to do so. Se e Ad e lm an v . S

tat e , 828 S.W .2d 418, 421 (T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ); Ma tso n v . S tat e , 819 S.W .2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). I nstead, our duty is only to determine if both the expli cit and implicit findings of the trier of fac t are rational by viewing all of the e vidence admitted at trial in a light most favor able to the ve rdict. Adelman , 828 S.W. 2d a t 42 2. I n s o d oin g , a

ny inc on sis te nc ie s in the e vid e nc e are re so lve d in fa vo r o f t he ve rd ic t. Matson , 819 S.W .2d at 843. The standa rd of r eview is the same for both d i re ct evidenc e and circ umstantial evidence case s. Ge esa , 820 S.W .2d at 158. I n r e vie wi ngfa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt

a c on vic tio n, we are to v ie w a ll t h e ev idence in a neutra l light, favoring neither pa rty
. J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 7 (T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Cle wis v . S tat e , 922 S.W .2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) . I n perf orming

our re view, we are to g ive due defe renc e to the fac t f inder’s de terminations. See id. a t 8- 9; Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 136. The fac t f inder is the judge of the cre dibilit y of the witnesses and may “believe all, some, or none of

the testimony .” Se e Cha mb e rs v. Sta te , 805 S.W .2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App. 1 9 9 1 )

. E v id e n c e is f

a c tu a ll y in s u f

f ic ie n t if it is s o w e a k th a t it w o u ld b e c le ar ly w rong and manifestly

unjust to allow the verdict to stand, or the finding of g uilt is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the available evidence. Johnson , 2 3 S. W.3 d at 11 . T hu s, the qu e sti on we mus t consider in c onducting a fa ctual suff iciency revie w i s whether a neutral revie w of a ll the evidence , bo th f or and ag a ins t th e fi nd ing , d e mon str a te s th a t th e pr oo f o f guil t is so ob vio us ly we a k a s to

un de rm ine c on fi de nc e in t he fa c t f ind e r’ s d e te rm inatio n, or

the pr oo f o f g uil t, a lth ou g h a de qu a te if taken a lone, is g reatly

outweig hed by

contra ry proof. See id. Under the first prong of Johnson , we ca n n o tco n cl u d e t h ata c o n v i ct i o ni s “c l ea rl y wr o n g” or “ma nifestly unjust” simply beca

use, on the qua

ntum of evidenc e admitted, we would have vote dto acquit had we been on the jury

. W ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 417 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2006). Under the sec ond prong of

Johnson , we cannot decla re that a conf

lict in the evidence justifies a new trial simply beca

use we disag ree with the jury ' s resolution of that conf lict. Id

. Be fore finding that evidenc e is fac tually insufficient to support a verdict under the second pr ong of Johnson , w e mus t be able to say , with some objective basis in the record, that the gr eat we ight a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e contr adicts the jury ’s ver dict. Id. Eleme nts of Intoxication Manslaughter A per son commits int ox ication m anslaug hter if the per son (1) ope rate s a motor vehicle in a public place , (2) is intox icated, a nd (3) by rea son of that intox ication ca uses the death of another

by

acc ident or mistake. T EX .P EN A L C ODE A NN . § 49.08 (Ve rnon 2003). “ I ntox icated” means not having the normal use of mental or phy sical fa culties by rea son of t h e i n troduction of alc ohol, a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e , a dr ug , a da ng e ro us dr

ug , a c omb inatio n o f t

wo or mor e of tho se su bs tanc e s, or any other substanc e into the body . T EX .P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 49.01(2)( A). Count 1 o f t he indictment alleg ed that Appe llant was oper ating a motor vehic le in a public place while intox icated by rea son of the introduction of a controlled substanc e, a drug , or a da ng erous dr

ug into his body

and by re a so n o f t

hat in toxic a tio n c a

us e d th e de a th o f M ari ly

n B ri dg e s. Intoxication Appellant alleg es that the State fa iled to prove that he was int o x i ca t ed

. He maintains that while t he Sta

te ’ s e xp e rt w it

n e s s te s ti f

ie d th a t t e tr ah y dr o c an n a

b in o l w a s d e te c te d

in h is b lo o d , s he could not state that he was impaire d and ther e is no other e vidence of impairment of his mental or phy sical fa culties. Appellant is cor rec t that the blood test results only s h o w t h e p re sence of the

a c tiv e c omp on e nt o f m ari hu ana . T he State ’s e xpe rt te sti fi e d tha t, unl ike a lc oh ol, the re is n o w a y to

corr elate impair

ment with the level of a

ny drug detec ted in the blood spe cimen. But the State is notlimit ed to establishi n g i n t ox ication throug h expert testimony . I ntox ication may be esta blished by circ umstantial evidence

. Se e Sm ith ha rt v . S tat e , 503 S.W .2d 283, 285 (Tex. C ri m .App. 1974); He rn an de z Gue rre o v. Sta te , 7 7 3 S. W. 2 d 7 7 5 , 7 7 6 ( T e x. A p p . - - Co r p u s Ch r is ti 1 9 8 9 , n o p e t. )

. We be g in b y e xami nin g Ap pell ant ’s drivin g . E vid e nc e of e rr a tic dr ivi ng , a

c oll isi on , f

a ilure to a pp ly brake s in order to avoid a collision, and flee ing the scene of the a ccide nt is indi cative of impaired judgme nt. Se e Cha lou

pk a v . S tat e , 20 S.W .3d 172, 175 (Tex.App.--Te x arka na 2000, pet . ref

’d) (er ratic dr iving, a

collision, and fleeingscene ); Fr oh we in v . S tat e , N o . 0 8

- 0 3

- 0 0 4 8 8

- CR , 2 0 0 5 WL 14 13 21 0, *6 (T e x.Ap p. -- El Pa so June 16 , 20 05 , p e t. r e f’ d) (n ot d e signate d f or pu bli c a tio n) (e rr a tic dr ivi ng , f a ilure to a

pp ly br a ke s) ; Ma rk

e yv . S tate , No. 14-02-00281-C R , 2 0 0 3 WL 253299 *2 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] Fe bruar y 6, 2003, no pet.)(not designated for publication)(running a st op sign, nearly colliding with another vehicle, then landing in ditch and cr ashing throug h fenc e). Ap pe lla nt ma de an admit te dly la st- se c on d de c isi on to ta ke the e xit, he pa sse d an oth e r v e hic le wh ile dr ivi ngin e xce ss o f 7 0 m. p. h. and e xite d wi tho ut br a kin g un til he ra n o ff of the le ft sid e of the e xit. Both pa rame dics noted that Appe llant’s pupils were e x tremely constricted which ca n be ca used by medication or illeg al drug s. Even takinginto account the phy sical and e motional trauma of the

acc ident, Appellant’s be havior wa s unusual in that he swung from beingemotional to indiffere nt and the par amedics ha d to tell him m ore tha n once that Bridg es had die d. When one of the office rs beg an talking to Appe llant and investig ating the ac cident, Appe llant walked a way when the of

fice r wa s not looking a nd attempted to flush marihua na down the toilet. The g raduate nurse who drewAppellant’s blood smelled a fa int odor of marihua na on Appe llant’s clothes whe n she dre w th e b l o o d

. At the hospital, Appellant admitted to the offic ers that he had smoked mar ihuana e arly that morning but other e vidence showed that Appellant had consumed mar ihuana be tween 9:50 a .m. and the time of the ac cident. When the evide nce of impaired jud g ment is combined with evidenc e of ma rihuanac on su mpt ion , it is le g a lly su ff

ic ie nt to e sta

bli sh that the de fe nd ant did no t ha ve the no rm a l us e of

his

m e n t a l an d

p h ys i c a l f

a c u l t i e s d u e t o t h e i n t r o d

u c t i o no f m ar i h u an a

i n t o h i s b o dy. Turning to the fac tual sufficie ncy analy sis, there is evidenc e that Appe llant’s speec h was not slurred a nd he did not have poor

balanc e asi d e fr o m h i s injured leg . Vane ssa Morin testified that Appellant did not seem impaire d when he came into the Ex x on. On the other hand, Morin see med to have be en more focuse d on Appellant’s injure d leg as she mentioned it se vera l times during he r testimony

. At trial, Appellant denied smoking any marihuana that day but the blood test evidence belied his testimony . And Appellant a dmitted to the police that h e h ad s m o ked mar ihuana that morning . The pa

rame dic B arr

noted that Appellant’s constricted pupils c ould also have indicated a hea d injury , but there w as no evide nce Appellant s uffe red one. Appellant testified that he slowed do wn fo r the e xit and he bla me d the a c c ide nt on a ne wl y patc he d are a of the pave me nt and lo os e g ra ve l. Othe r ev ide nc e sh ow e d tha t App e lla nt too k the e xit a t a hig h ra te of sp e e d a nd did no t a pp ly h i s b r a k e s u n t i l h e r e a c h e d t h e “ S ” c u r

v e an d qu i c k l y l o s tc o n t r o l

. O t h e r t h anA p p e l l an t ’ s t e s t i m o n y, there is no evidenc e that the roadway had underg one rece nt repa irs and F letes testified that ther e wa s nothing on the r oadwa

y which made it sli ppery . Although there is conflicting evidenc e of intox ication, the evide nce of g uilt is not g reatly outweig hed by the contra

ry evidenc e. We conc lude that the evidenc e is fac tually sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding that Appellant wa s intox icated b y r e a s o no f

t h e i n t r o d

u c t i o no f m ar i h u an a

i n t o h i s b o dy. Causation Appellant also c halleng es the e vidence supporting the jury ’s finding that his intox ication

cause d Br idge s’ death. He ar g ues that the a ccide nt could have resulted from the construction of the exit ramp, his unfamiliarity with the road, and his unfamiliarity with the truck he was driving . He

rea sons that the State failed to prove that intox ication, standing alone, c aused the death.Se c tio n 6 .0 4 o f t he Te xas P e na l Co de pr ov ide s th a t: (a) A per son is criminally responsible if the result would not have occur red but for his conduct, oper ating either a lone or c oncurr ently with another cause , unless the concur rent c ause was clearly sufficie nt to produce the result and the conduct of the a c tor wa s c le arl y

ins uf fi c ie nt. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 6. 04 (a )( Ve rn on 20 03 ). Th e State is r e qu ir e d to pr ov e be y on d a re a so na ble doubt that Appellant’s intox ication, not just his operation of a vehicle, cause d the fata l r esult. See Da nie l v . S

tat e , 577 S.W .2d 231, 233-34 (Te x . C rim.App. [P anel Op.] 1979). The exis tence or nonexis tence of such a

causa l connec tio n i s normally a question for

the jury ’s deter

mination. Tho ma s v . S

tat e , 756 S.W .2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.--Te x arka na 1988, pet. r ef’ d). The “ but for” c ausal c onnection in Section 6.04(a ) must be established be tween the defe ndant’s conduc t and the re sulting har m. Ha le v . S

tat e , 194 S.W .3d 39, 42 (Tex.App.--Te x arka na 2006, no pet.). I f conc urre nt cause s are prese nt, two possible combinations ex ist to satisfy the “but fo r” re qu ir e me nt: (1 ) t

he de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t ma y be su ff ic ie nt b y its e lf to h a ve c a

us e d th e ha

rm , re g ard le ss of the e xiste nc e of a c on c ur re nt c a us e ; or (2 ) t he de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t and the oth e r c a

us e toge ther may

be suff icient to have c aused the harm. Id. Howeve r, Section 6.04(a ) fur ther limits the

“ bu t f or ” c a us a lity fo r c on c ur

re nt c a us e s b y the la st p hr a se , “ un le ss t

he c on c ur re nt c a us e wa s c le a rl y sufficie nt to produce the result and the c onduct of th e ac t o r cle arly insufficient.” Id. , quoting T EX .P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 6. 04 . I f t he ad di ti on al c aus e--o th er t han th e def end ant ’s c on du ct--i s c le a

rl y

su ff ic ie nt, by its e lf , to pr od uc e the re su lt a

nd the de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t, b y its e lf , is c le arl y ins uf fi c ie nt, t hen the de fenda

nt cannot be c onvicted. Ha le , 194 S.W .3d at 42, c i t i n g R o b b i n s v . Stat e , 717 S.W .2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Taking th e e v id e n c e in th e li g h t mo s t f a v o r a b le to th e v e r d ic t, th e ju

r y c o u ld h ave f

ound bey ond a re asonable doubt that Appellant’s intox ication was sufficie nt by itself to have c aused theacc ide n t an d B r id g e s ’ d e a th

. A lt e r n a ti v e ly , if th e ju

r y f o u n d th a t th e c o n s tr

u c ti o n o f th e r o ad and Appellant’s unf

amiliarity with it and the vehicle were concur rent causes a long w ith his i ntox ication, the evidenc e does not support a conclusi o n t h at the conc urre nt cause s were clea rly sufficie nt by the mse lve s to pr od

uc e the re su lt or that Ap pe lla nt’ s int oxic a tio n wa s c le arl y ins uf fi c ie nt by its e lf to have c aused the result. Consequently , the evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt to prove the c ausal link betwee n Appellant’s intoxi cation and B ridg es’ de ath. Se e Ha le , 194 S.W .3d at 44 (whe re the intox icated de fenda

nt was driving at a hig h rate of spee d and struck two ve hicles which w ere stopped in the middle of a two-la

ne road and a

pproxi mately

four- tenths of a mile beyond a hill, and wher e the expert testimony

showed that an intox icated person has slower r efle x es such that a n intox icated person dr iving at a hig h rate of spee d prese nts a g reater da ng er, the evidenc e wa s sufficient to prove that the concur

rent cause s, namely , the stopped ca r and the defe ndant’s intox ication, wer e suff icient tog e the r to ca

us e the vic tim ’s de a th) ; Gl au se r v . S tat e , 66 S.W .3d 307, 313-15 (Te x .App.--H ouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. re f’d) (whe re intox icated defe ndant was trave ling at a high rate of speed on a busy highw ay and struck a car that was near ly stopped in the roadw ay and killed both the p er son pu sh ingthe ve hic le and the on e wh o wa s ste e ri ng , a nd oth e r e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t a pe rs on wi th f ull

c omm and of his me nta l and ph y sic a l fa c ult ie s wo uld have be e n a ble to a pp ly his br a ke s a

nd a vo id hitting the disabled ve hicle, the c ourt of appe als held that althoug h the stopped car and dar k night may have been concur

rent cause s of the acc ident, the evidenc e wa s leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to pr ov e that the de fe nd ant’ s into xicatio n als o c a us e d th e de a th o f t

he vic tim s) ; Ma rti ne

z v . S tat e , 66 S.W .3d 467, 470 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. re f’d) (whe re the intox icated defe ndant was dr iving a

n eig hteen whe eler

above the speed limit and overtur ned while pa ssing the victims’ car

killing all but one of the occupa nts, the court of a

ppeals found that even thoug h the

acc ident may

have a lso been c aused by

the eig hteen whe eler ’s d e f e c ti v e f ront-stee ring axle, a shiftingloa d, and

de fe c tiv e br a ke s, the e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly and fa c tua lly su ff icien t to sh ow tha t hi s intox ication , co m b i n ed with driving a n eig hteen whe eler

above the leg al spee d limit , cause d the deaths) . We have a lso ex amined the evidence re levant to ca usation under the f

actua l sufficienc y standard. T he evidenc e establishing that Appellant’s intox ication alone c aused the acc ident is not too weak to support the jur y ’s finding on the ca

usation element. Assuming that the jury found that the oth e r c a

us e s c ite d b y

Ap pe lla nt w e re c on c ur

re nt c a us e s, the e vid e nc e do es no t su pp or t a conclusion that the c oncurr ent ca uses wer e cle arly sufficie nt by themselves to produce the re sult or that Appellant’s intoxi cation wa s clea rly insufficient by

itself to have c aused the result. Thus we conclude that t he evide nce w as fa ctually sufficie nt to support the jury ’s deter mination that Appellant’s intox ication cause d the ac cident and B ridg es’ de ath. We overr ule Point of Error Tw o. DEADLY WEAP ON F INDING I n Point of Error Thr ee, A

ppellant cha lleng es t he lega l and factual suff iciency of the e vidence

su pp or tin g the de a dly

we a po n f ind ingbe c a

us e no wi tne ss s pe c if

ic a lly te sti fi e d that th e tr

uc k w a s a deadly wea pon. Section 1.07 of the Te x as Penal Code de fines “de adly wea pon ” as me aning

“ any thi ngthat in

the mann e r o f i ts u se or

int e nd e d use is c a

pa ble of c a us ingde a th o r s e ri ou s b od ily i n j u ry .” T EX .P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1

. 0 7 ( a ) ( 1 7 ) ( B ) ( V e r n o nSu p p . 2 0 0 8 )

. T h e Co u rt o f Cr im ina l Appea ls has recog nized that any thing, including a motor vehicle, which i s actua lly used to ca

use the death of a human be ing is a

deadly wea pon. T y r a v . S t a te , 8 9 7 S

. W

. 2d 796, 798 (Tex.Crim.App. 19 95 ); Ex parte M

cKithan , 8 38 S.W. 2d

56 0, 56 1 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Th is i s n e c e ssa ri ly so beca use a thing which ac tually cause s death is by definition, “ca pable of causing death.” Ty ra, 897 S.W. 2d a t 798. Th e State is not re qu ir e d to off e r e xpe rt te sti mony

to p ro ve that an o bje c t is a de a dly

wea pon. Br own v . S

tat e , 7 16 S.W. 2d

93 9, 94 6 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); D a v i d s o n v . Sta te , 602S.W. 2d 27 2, 27 3 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. [Pan e l O p. ] 198 0) ; De nh am v . S tat e , 574 S.W .2d 129, 131 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). The e vi d en ce , t ak en in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, shows that Appellant was op e ratin g his tr

uc k w hil e int oxic a te d a

nd a t a hig h ra

te of sp e e d wh e n he los t c on tr ol on an e xit r a mp

and sla mme d in to a

c on c re te c ulv e rt , kill ing his pa sse ng e r ev e n thou g h she wa s we ari ng he r s e a t be lt and the a ir bagdeploy ed. This e vidence is leg ally sufficie nt to show that the truck, in the manne r of its use, was c apable of ca using de ath. Se e Ty ra , 897 S.W .2d at 798. The e vidence is also fac tually sufficie nt to sustain the deadly weap o n finding . Appellant argues that it was the c ondition of the roadwa y which ca used the a ccide nt rather

than his operation of th e v e h i c l e , a n d

t h e r e f o r e , h e d i d

n o t“ u s e ” t h e v e h i c l e i na d e a d l y m an n e r . W h i l e t h e r e is evidenc e that the “ S” curve may have been a concur rent cause of the accident, we cannot ignore the

e vid e nc e sh ow ingthat App e lla nt w a s in toxic a te d a

nd dr ivi nghis tr

uc k at a hig h r a te of

sp e e d in

e xce ss of t h e s p e e d

l i m i tw h e nh e l o s tc o n t r o l o f th e v e h i c l e . W e c o n c l u d e t h a tt h e e v i d e n c e is fac tual l y sufficie nt to prove that the truc k, in the manner of its use, was c apable of ca use death. Point of Error Thr ee is ove rruled. TAMP ERING WITH EVIDENCE I n his fourth point of err or, Appe llant challeng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the evidenc e supporting his tampering with evidence conviction. A p er s o n comm its the offense of tampe ri ngwi th ev ide nc e if , k no wi ngthat an inve sti g a tio n o r o ff ic ia l pr oc e e din g is p e nd ingor in pr og re ss, he a lte rs , d e str oy s, or c onceal s any

re c or d, do c ume nt, or

thi ngwi th i nte nt t o im

pa ir its verity , leg ibilit y , or availability as evidence in the i nvestig ation or off icial proc eeding . T EX .P EN AL C ODE ANN . § 37.09 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). The indictment a lleg ed that Appe llant intentionally or kn ow ing ly

de str oy e d o r co nc e a le d ev ide nc e , to- wi t: mari hu ana , with int e nt to impa ir its a va ila bil ityas evide nce in the inve stigation that was pending reg ardingthe death of M arily n Br idge s. The application par ag ra p h o f t he cour t’s char g e inquired w hether the evidenc e prove d bey ond a

rea sonable doubt t hat Appellant ha d intentionally or knowing ly

destroy ed or c oncea led evidenc e towit marihuana , with intent to impair its availability as evide nce in the inve stigation that was pending reg ardingthe death of Marily n Br idge s. Appellant ar g ues t h at an intox ication manslaug hter off ense w as not pending when he attempted to flush the mar ihuana. He direc ts us to Pa nn e ll v . S tat e , 7 S.W .3d 222 (Tex.App.--Da llas 19 9 9 , p et
. re f’d) in support of his argument. There , the Dallas Court of A ppeals he ld that the evidenc e wa s leg ally insufficient to support the defe ndant’s convic tion of tamperingwith evidence wh e re the de fe nd ant t

hr e w m ari jua na ou t of his ca

r win do w wh e n th e po lic e we re a tte mpt ingto p ull him over for

speeding

. Pa nn e ll , 7 S.W .3d at 223. The c ourt found that Section 37.09 re quires the defe ndant be a

war e that the thing he alter ed, destroy ed, or c once al ed wa s evidenc e in the investigation as it ex isted at the time of the a lteration, destruc tion, or conce alment. Id. Ap pe lla nt’ s a rgume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t f or tw o r e a so ns . F ir st, the State wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to prove that the office rs had de termined they woul d file cr iminal charg es ag ainst Appellant for intox ication manslaug hter at the time he d est roy ed the mar ihuana. The indictment alleg ed that Ap p el l an td es t ro y edt h e m ar i h u an a w h i l e a ni n v es t i gat i o n i n t o M ar i l y n Br i d ges ’ de at h wa s p en d i n g. Se c on d, the ins tant c a se is d ist inguis ha ble fr om Pa nn e ll

beca use, contra

ry to Appellant’s asse rtion, the re is e vid e nc e that th e po lic e of fi c e rs ha d b e g un

inv e sti g a tin g the a c c ide nt r e su lti ng in B ri dg e s’ death at the time A p p el l an t we n t to the Ex x on and attempted to f lush the marihuana . Offic er Joe Hobbs was one of the fir st office rs on the ac cident sce ne and, af t er se eing that Br idge s was not breathing a

nd appar ently

dece ased, he immediately beg an a fata lity vehicle cra sh and manslaug hter investigation. He deter

mined Appellant had be en driving and beg an obta i n i n g information fromAppellant, including his driver’ s license. A ppellant left the sc ene w hen Hobbs wa lked over to the vehicle. T he investig ation into the cause of the a ccide nt rema ined pendingat the time Appellant lef t the s cene . Thus, the evidence is l eg ally sufficie nt to show that Appellant knew that an investig ation into the acc ident and B ridg es’ de ath was pe nding w hen he attempted to flush the marihuana

. Th e re is n o e vid e nc e c on tr a dic tin g or imp e a c hin g Ho bb s o n this iss ue . Ev e n App e lla nt, in his own testimony , failed to addre ss what he knew about the pendinginvestigation or why he flushed the marihua

na down the t o i l et
. W e conclude that the evidenc e supporting this element is not too

weak to support the jury ’s findingof g uilt. W e over rule Point of Err or F our and a ffirm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt
. J une 3, 2009 ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, J ustice B e f o r e C h e w , C

. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d C ar r , JJ. Carr, J., not participating (Do Not Publish)