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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 

BUDGET INITIATIVES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 30, 2010 

Serial No. 111–32 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget 

( 

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/budget/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina, Chairman 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut, 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin, 

Ranking Minority Member 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

MARIO DIAZ–BALART, Florida 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

THOMAS S. KAHN, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

AUSTIN SMYTHE, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, September 30, 2010 ........................................ 1 

Hon. Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Virginia ............................................................................................ 1 

Submissions for the record: 

Hon. Robert F. McDonnell, Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia, 

prepared statement of .................................................................... 3 

Hal Gehman, Admiral, USN (ret.): ‘‘Journey to Jointness is Not 

Complete,’’ article from the Norfolk, VA, Virginian-Pilot, September 26, 2010 .............................................................................. 9 

Hon. Robert J. Wittman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia ...................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 11 

Hon. Paul Ryan, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on the Budget, 

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 10 

Todd Harrison, senior fellow, defense budget studies, Center for Strategic 

Budget Assessments ..................................................................................... 14 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 17 

John R. (Bob) Wood, Lieutenant General, USA (ret.), Star Strategies 

Group ............................................................................................................. 21 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 25 

Stan Soloway, president & CEO, Professional Services Council .................. 28 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 30 

Jacqueline Simon, public policy director, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL–CIO .......................................................................... 36 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 37 

(1) 

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BUDGET INITIATIVES 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Robert C. Scott, presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCollum, Scott, and Connolly. 

Also Present: Representative Wittman. 

Mr. SCOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Representative Rob 

Wittman of Virginia be allowed to sit at the dais to receive testimony by witnesses, and that he also be allowed to ask questions 

of the witnesses after all Committee members have had a chance 

to do so. And without objection, so ordered. 

Today’s hearing is on the Defense Department’s efficiency initiatives announced on August 9, 2010. I would like to welcome our 

witnesses. Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments; Retired Army Lieutenant General Bob 

Wood; Mr. Stan Soloway, President and CEO of Professional Services Council and Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform; and Ms. Jacqueline Simon, the Public Policy Director of the American Federation of Government Employees. And 

I would like to thank Chairman Spratt for calling this hearing. He 

was unavoidably detained and will not be with us today. 

Due to our deteriorating fiscal situation many have suggested 

that the rate of growth in the base, or non-war, defense budget 

over the last decade many not be sustainable over the long term. 

In 2001 to 2010 the Defense Department’s base budget increased 

an average annual rate of between 6 percent and 7 percent, from 

roughly $300 billion in 2001 to $535 billion in 2010. Going forward, 

the President’s 2011 defense budget begins to reflect a more modest 

level of growth as more emphasis is placed on reducing the deficit. 

It reduces the average annual rate of growth in the Department of 

Defense’s budget to about 1 percent above inflation over five years, 

a rate many deem to be insufficient to both maintain current force 

levels and recapitalize aging weapons systems. 

In August Secretary Gates announced a Pentagon initiative to 

find overhead savings of $100 billion over five years in order reinvest them in higher priority defense programs. He maintains that 

finding these savings is necessary in order for the Pentagon to adequately support defense plans within the President’s budget. 

Although I commend and appreciate the Secretary of Defense’s 

desire to weed out wasteful spending and redundant bureaucratic 

functions, I have been alarmed at the lack of transparency and 
2 

basic analysis on how the Secretary arrived at these particular conclusions, and specifically on the decision to disestablish the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia. A decision of this magnitude must go through a thoughtful process which the Department 

appears determined to avoid. Since August 9 the Defense Department has failed to provide me or any of my colleagues in the Virginia Congressional Delegation, or the Governor of Virginia, any 

meaningful analytics to show how the Secretary arrived at his decision. There are no numbers to show what savings may be achieved, 

nor any briefing documents to Secretary Gates on how he arrived 

at his decision. 

Furthermore, it is unclear if the Secretary has the authority to 

eliminate such a large command without current congressional approval or going through a BRAC process. If the BRAC law is not 

specifically clear in this regard, as the Department’s legal analysis 

contends, it is still clear the decision is inconsistent with the spirit 

of the BRAC law. Additionally, closing JFCOM was mentioned nowhere in the latest quadrennial defense review, and if anything the 

QDR only stressed the importance of the branches of the military 

working together, a key function of the Joint Forces Command. 

Adding insult to injury, the Department’s rationale for closing 

JFCOM was been extremely inconsistent since August 9. In its prepared statement announcing his decision Secretary Gates stated 

that JFCOM costs at least $240 million to operate annually. However, just this week Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn indicated that JFCOM cost the Department nearly $1 billion annually to operate. On September 8 the Defense Department officials 

briefed the Virginia delegation staff and the only new information 

received was Comptroller Hale’s decision was philosophical and 

that the true savings are still being determined. 

Additionally Ms. Christina Fox from the Program Evaluation Office stated that the cost savings were not even a significant factor 

in the JFCOM decision. Instead, the Department now says its 

elimination would reduce redundant bureaucratic layers and make 

the Department more agile and efficient. And just this week in 

both meetings at the Pentagon with me, Governor Robert McDonnell, and other members of the Virginia Congressional Delegation, 

and before the hearings in the House and Senate Armed Services 

Committees, Deputy Secretary Lynn now submits that the decision 

to disestablish JFCOM was purely a military decision and even indicated there was no internal dissent, none. 

Even more interesting, General James Cartwright stated this 

week during questions and answers during the House Armed Services Committee that when the Department finally looks ‘‘at the full 

range course of action, status quo is an option.’’ Which leads me to 

believe that even after the announcement closing JFCOM may still 

be considered an option, or keeping it open may be an option. 

So even after seven weeks and no tangible analysis provided to 

Congress, the Department of Defense cannot even get its story 

straight. But if this decision is the right one for our military and 

our national security goals, and if it meets the Secretary’s efficiency goals, then the Department should be eager to explain and 

justify its decision before Congress, the President, and the men and 

women directly affected, and to respond to their invitation to testify 
3 

today before the Budget Committee. And after eleven years of testimony before Congress highlighting its critical importance and indoctrinating jointness among the military the Department should 

be prepared to explain what functions the Joint Forces Command 

will need to continue. 

Unfortunately, after this week’s hearing it now appears that the 

Secretary has made a decision based on who knows what and now 

the Department is scrambling to justify it. So I think Congress 

needs to focus on the documents that were prepared before August 

9 if we are to understand the real rationale for the decision. Anything prepared after August 9 only attempts to justify a decision 

that was already made. 

Although I appreciate the closed door briefing held earlier today 

with Comptroller Hale, I think it is very telling that the Department declined to allow him or any other official from the Department to testify before the Committee on the Budget on the budgetary implications of these efficiencies even seven weeks after their 

announcement. And seven weeks after the announcement we still 

have not been provided any documents with numbers on them that 

support the contention that any money will be saved at all. 

At this moment I ask unanimous consent to introduce into the 

record several documents. One, testimony from the Governor of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia Robert McDonnell outlining the impact 

of the proposed decisions on the Commonwealth of Virginia; as well 

as an op-ed by Retired Admiral Hal Gehman, a former of the Joint 

Forces Command, on the reasons why JFCOM is still critical and 

why the mission of jointness is still not complete. And without objection, those documents will be placed in the record. 

[The testimony of Robert McDonnell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. MCDONNELL, GOVERNOR, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Chairman Spratt, Ranking Member Ryan and other distinguished members of the 

Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, I thank 

you for inviting me to offer testimony today in this important hearing to consider 

the Efficiencies Initiative announced by the Secretary of Defense on August 9, 2010. 

The Commonwealth of Virginia is proud to be the home of many elements of this 

Country’s national defense establishment. The Pentagon—the headquarters and virtual epicenter of America’s military is located in Arlington County, and the Central 

Intelligence Agency Headquarters—the headquarters and virtual epicenter of America’s civilian foreign intelligence activities responsible for providing national security 

intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers—is located in Fairfax County. Virginia has 

a long and proud history of being a close and trusted partner with the United States 

military and national security agencies that goes back to 1608 when Captain John 

Smith recognized the importance of building a fort at Point Comfort in Hampton 

Roads, building Fort Algernourne with the mission of protecting the approaches to 

the colony at Jamestown. As a result of the War of 1812, Fort Monroe was built 

to protect the entrance to Hampton Roads and the several port cities that had access to its waters. 

As the United States grew its presence of military and national security facilities 

in the Commonwealth, Virginia was embraced as a full participating partner in that 

growth. The Commonwealth and many of her local governments located in the 

Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads regions, partnered with the United States 

to develop and build the infrastructure required to support the growth of these facilities. This infrastructure included not only roads, curbing and guttering to provide 

access to the expanding facilities of the military and national defense establishments, it included building and manning fire facilities, rescue and first responder 

facilities, schools and neighborhoods necessary for its maintenance and growth. It 

was the Arlington County Virginia Fire Department that served as the lead agency 

in the response to the attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. On that fate-
4 

ful day, the Arlington County Fire Department employed 279 men and women. As 

a result of the attack on the Pentagon, however, additional career firefighters were 

hired, bringing the total to 305 in 2005. Minimum staffing on the county’s engine 

companies was also increased to four firefighters from three in the months after the 

attack. The county trained CERT Teams—Community Emergency Response 

Teams—in cooperation with the federal Department of Homeland Security stepped 

up disaster preparedness programs. These additional components of local infrastructure were added as a full partner with the military to insure adequate first responder requirements to any future acts of terror against the Pentagon. 

Virginia, and her localities and local governments, have been, and continue to be, 

a willing, responsive partner with the United States in providing for the general 

welfare of all of the citizens of the Commonwealth, including those citizens who 

serve our Nation in both the military and the national security agencies, as well 

as their families to insure the best possible quality of life for each and every Virginia citizen. That high quality of life includes excellent school systems to educate 

the children, the police, fire and rescue resources required to protect our citizens 

and communities, and the facilities used to exercise the right to vote on each election day for the leaders of this Country and the Commonwealth. 

The Commonwealth has endured economic adversities as a result of the several 

rounds of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). Throughout the BRAC process, however, the Commonwealth was, as usual, treated as a full participating partner in giving input in the decisionmaking process of removing many federal government agencies from commercial leased space in both the Northern Virginia and 

Hampton Roads regions. While business owners of the commercial leased space have 

suffered adverse economic impact from the loss of federal government agency tenants in buildings that were largely built to accommodate past growth and additional 

requirements of the military and national security agencies, the BRAC process does 

provide the time and additional resources required to address those economic adversities. 

The BRAC process in 2005 that removed federal agencies from commercial leased 

properties resulted in those agencies being moved to military and national security 

properties at Fort Belvoir, Quantico Marine Operating Base, Fort Eustis, Fort Lee 

and many other facilities within the Commonwealth. Tremendous growth has occurred at these federal properties necessitating additional infrastructure—streets 

and roads, curbing, guttering and the like—to accommodate the growth generated 

by the movement of these agencies to the federal properties in the Commonwealth. 

Again, however, the Commonwealth was treated as a full partner in the decision 

making processes such that Virginia could address the needs of its citizens. 

On August 9, 2010, that cooperation, openness and partnership between the federal government and the Commonwealth was conspicuously absent with the announcement by the Secretary of Defense that it was his intent to close the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and reduce the use of defense contracts by a 

total of 30% over the next three (3) years. The Secretary of Defense did not provide, 

and has not provided since that time, any material information in support of his 

decision. In fact, the Department of Defense has told staff that the decision was 

‘‘philosophical’’ and now they are putting together a plan of action to justify and effectuate these decisions. He has directed several flag officers at USJFCOM to put 

together a plan to eliminate USJFCOM and provide to him an interim report by 

the middle of October, and a final report in December. Furthermore, he has directed 

that all personnel who participate in the formulation of a plan to support his decision must sign a nondisclosure statement—in essence, the Secretary of Defense has 

imposed an embargo on all information that is needed by the Commonwealth to 

evaluate and respond to the August 9th announcement. 

The Commonwealth, after over two hundred (200) plus years of partnership with 

the federal government in the development and growth of the military and national 

defense infrastructure, is not being treated as a partner with the federal government. The Commonwealth is no longer provided a seat at the table to be a part of 

the planning process for an announced closure of a major employer in the Hampton 

Roads and Northern Virginia regions. The Commonwealth has worked with a number of private sector employers that have announced plant closures affecting many 

Virginia citizens to minimize the adverse economic consequences of such closures— 

the most recent example being the 2008 Ford Motor Company closure of the F-150 

truck assembly plant in Norfolk that employed 2,433 workers. That plant had a direct payroll of $160 million, and drew parts from 17 local suppliers that employ 

about 2,700 people. 

After several letters requesting a meeting with the Secretary of Defense, followed 

up with repeated personal requests from the Virginia Congressional Delegation to 

members of the White House staff, as well as the President of the United States, 
5 

the Department of Defense has responded with an offer to meet with the Governor 

and the Congressional Delegation. The meeting is with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The state is still waiting 

for an opportunity to meet with Secretary Gates. 

The focus of the Secretary of Defense with reducing the overhead of his department, shrinking the number of military headquarters in the department and reducing the size of military headquarters staff is both a responsible and commendable 

goal given the current difficult economic and fiscal situation currently being experienced by our nation. It is important to achieve savings through reductions in overhead expenses, but not the best course for the security of the nation when achieved 

through the reduction of force structure or elimination of successful modernization 

programs—especially when this country is engaged in fighting determined and elusive adversaries that have chosen approaches to warfare that avoid our military’s 

conventional strengths. As Virginia’s Governor, I have undertaken a similar goal by 

appointing a Commission on Government Reform and Restructuring which I have 

challenged with putting forth bold and innovative ideas to ensure that duplicative, 

outdated, unnecessary and ineffective services and service delivery methods are 

eliminated, and that state revenues are dedicated to the core functions of government. These are good strategies. 

There is, however, a significant difference in the methods chosen by me and the 

Secretary to pursue the goal of achieving efficiencies in government operations. The 

term ‘‘transparency’’ generally refers to public access to information held by the government, including information upon which government relies in making its decisions. I have chosen to pursue the goal of eliminating government waste and achieving operational efficiencies by means of a transparent process involving public hearings of the Reform Commission and receiving input and ideas from the public. DoD 

has chosen to accomplish the goal of eliminating government waste and achieving 

efficiencies without being transparent to the public. No Virginia leaders, Congressmen, Senators, private contractors or JFCOM leaders appear to have been part of 

the planning or decision making process. 

During the last weeks of July, rumors began to circulate that the Defense Business Board, an advisory board of retired economic and business leaders, would recommend ways to reduce department costs. One such rumored recommendation was 

to eliminate the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk. At his news briefing on August 

9th, Secretary Gates announced, without any prior notice or warning, that he was 

recommending to the President the closure of the Joint Forces Command. 

As Governor of Virginia, I was asked by the President to serve on the Council 

of Governors, a group of ten governors appointed for the purpose of providing State 

Governors a forum to exchange views, information, or advice with the Department 

of Defense. I was told that the appointment was to establish an open and continuous 

dialogue with the Secretary of Defense, and achieve transparency in the exchange 

of ideas. Close cooperation and communication between the federal government and 

the individual states is absolutely vital if the most effective use of state and federal 

resources is to be achieved on matters of national defense and homeland security. 

In support of establishing an open and continuous dialogue, I appointed an active 

duty Air Force general officer as a member of the Virginia National Guard so that 

he could command the Joint Task Force responsible for the National Boy Scout Jamboree. The appointment of a Title 10 general officer as a member of the title 32 Virginia National Guard was the first time such an appointment had been made in the 

history of this nation. The recommendation relating to the closure of the Joint 

Forces Command was not taken with a similar spirit of cooperation nor was it as 

a result of open dialogue and transparency in the decision making process by the 

Secretary. 

I have twice asked DoD to provide answers to detailed questions pertaining to the 

reasons for the closure, its impact on national security and joint operations, and the 

implementation plan. Responses to date from Pentagon leadership have been wholly 

inadequate. In my letter of September 24, 2010, I inquired into six major areas of 

concern (copy attached) and I still await complete answers to this inquiry. 

The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), established in 1999 as the successor 

to the U.S. Atlantic Command, is uniquely organized and tasked for providing joint 

forces and developing joint training, joint concept development and experimentation, 

and the joint capabilities development needed to adjust to the demands of 21st-century military operations. It traces its origins to the shortcomings in joint operations 

revealed during the 1980s and Operation Desert Storm. Following the Gulf War, 

Gen. Colin L. Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others recognized that refining how each branch of the armed forces works together to train and 

deploy for joint operations was key to meeting future challenges. He felt that a single, U.S.-based unified command should be responsible for training forces from all 
6 

services for joint operations. Today, JFCOM is a forceful advocate for ‘‘jointness.’’ 

Retired Navy Admiral Hal Gehman, former Commander of the Joint Forces Command, had it right in his widely published article this past Sunday (September 26, 

2010) when he disagreed with Secretary Gate’s decision to close JFCOM. He said 

‘‘The core of work JFCOM does is essential to the future success of the United 

States military and, despite claims to the contrary, is not duplicated anywhere else 

in the department. History has proven this work certainly can not be accomplished 

inside the beltway’’. 

The 2005 Base Closure and Realignment process validated JFCOM’s mission and 

contributions to joint warfighting. The DoD panel reviewing the command recommended that JFCOM purchase its leased spaces to support its permanent presence. Congress has responded through the authorization and appropriation of funding for military construction projects at the command. In 2009, JFCOM opened a 

49,000-square-foot Joint Deployment Center and Maritime Operations Center 

shared with the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command. 

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke to 

the importance of JFCOM’s missions at a 2007 change command ceremony. Referring to the command’s work to develop ‘‘lessons learned’’ from ongoing military operations to preserve the experience of U.S. service men and women, he said, ‘‘It is 

vital that we capture that for the future health of our armed forces.’’ The 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review echoed this view, stating, ‘‘Perhaps more than ever before, the United States requires joint military forces able to function and succeed 

across a wide geographic and operational spectrum. Moreover, military forces must 

be capable of working effectively with a range of civilian and international partners.’’ 

Recent projections indicate that complete closure of the JFCOM function would 

eliminate more than 10,000 direct and indirect jobs and a loss of annual salaries 

of more than $200 million in Virginia. The decision to close Joint Forces Command 

will also result in the loss of numerous contractor jobs in both the Hampton Roads 

area and the Northern Virginia area. The recommendation to the President is a significant base realignment and closure action that should be treated as such. The 

transparent process that must be used by the Secretary is established by the Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation that was enacted by the Congress to 

ensure sufficient time and opportunity is available for review of such proposals in 

an open and transparent manner. The BRAC process ensures that such critical base 

infrastructure closure and realignment decisions are made only after a complete review, without political interference, and within the national strategic framework. 

The Department of Defense has previously used BRAC in the Commonwealth to reorganize its base and force structure to more efficiently and effectively support 

United States forces, increase operational readiness, and facilitate new ways of 

doing this nation’s business. 

The BRAC Commission is an independent body charged with the responsibility for 

reviewing the Secretary’s recommendations for closures such as this recommendation involving the Joint Forces Command. BRAC specifies the selection process for 

the Commissioners, and the President is required to consult with congressional leadership on nominations to serve on the Commission. The Commission has the authority to change the Department’s recommendations if it determines that the Secretary 

deviated substantially from the force structure plan and/or selection criteria. The 

Commission holds meetings to solicit public input prior to making its recommendations. 

I recognize the integral part the military and national security operations and facilities play in the economic vitality of our citizens. I intend on being proactive in 

identifying the appropriate strategies to both retain existing military operations and 

facilities that are so very vital to the security of this nation, and to identify and 

attract operations and facilities that should be located within Virginia. Therefore, 

last month I ordered the creation of a Commission on Military and National Security Facilities in the Commonwealth. The Commission consists of my Secretary of 

Commerce and Trade and my Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth Preparedness and distinguished members of the business community, including the defense contracting community, and retired senior military officers. 

I have charged the Commission with the following responsibilities: 

• Identify appropriate opportunities for relocating additional military commands 

and missions to the Commonwealth. 

• Identify appropriate opportunities for relocating additional federal facilities to 

the Commonwealth. 

• Recommend, as appropriate, the best business practices for the Commonwealth 

to retain its existing military installations and commands. 
7 

• Recommend, as appropriate, the best business practices for the Commonwealth 

to retain its existing non-military federal facilities. 

• Support and foster collaboration among local and regional entities in identifying 

appropriate opportunities for placement of additional federal facilities in the Commonwealth. 

• Determine the best and most efficient manner to foster and promote business, 

technology, transportation, education, economic development and other efforts to 

support, attract and retain existing military installations and commands in the 

Commonwealth. 

• Determine the best and most efficient manner to foster and promote business, 

technology, transportation, education, economic development and other efforts to 

support and retain existing non-military federal facilities in the Commonwealth. 

• Identify and track all federal government facilities located in the Commonwealth and their building plans. 

• Determine the best industrial and economic development for the localities included in or adjacent to military installations and commands in the Commonwealth. 

• Determine the best industrial and economic development for the localities included in or adjacent to federal facilities in the Commonwealth. 

• Inform the Governor on a regular basis on all pertinent findings and recommendations. 

I have asked Commission members to consider that this great Nation is in parlous 

times and under severe economic and fiscal stress. History records that hard times 

often force the policy makers in this Country into making ill considered decisions. 

It is my intent that the efforts of Commission members will result in better planning, more transparency in deliberations and recommendations that do not place 

our national security in jeopardy. 

Growing groups of business, senior retired military and political leaders are opposed to this decision, and are frustrated with the lack of available information to 

support it. The use of an independent commission and public meetings make the 

process as transparent, open and fair as possible. The last BRAC process in 2005 

did not recommend closure of the Joint Forces Command. Decisions regarding the 

future of the Joint Forces Command and the use of defense contractors located in 

the Commonwealth should be made in the context of the existing transparent, open 

and public process that is represented by BRAC. 

Thank you for your consideration of these important issues, and for doing what 

is best for the military and our nation. 

ATTACHMENT, AREAS OF CONCERN

1. Business case analysis of activities to be eliminated 

• Numerous documents and statements from DoD have indicated that a plan for 

disestablishment of JFCOM, including a determination of the functions that should 

continue to exist, should be eliminated, or should be moved, is being developed over 

the next several weeks. How does DoD justify making a decision to close JFCOM 

before first carrying out such an assessment? 

• What studies on cost savings has DoD conducted concerning the JFCOM closure 

and contractor reduction? Please provide details. 

• What studies on workload impacts has DoD conducted (e.g., what are impacts 

on JCS of force provider function shift)? Provide details. 

• Has DoD contacted contractors and civilians to determine their intent to move 

locations if their functions are moved? What impact on moving functions, and the 

service members who receive JFCOM training and operations support, could result 

from the loss of these personnel from the workforce? 

• What process was used to identify JFCOM for closure and what factors were 

considered in proposing the JFCOM closure? Why was it not done within the QDR 

completed this spring, or as part of a BRAC realignment? 

• What specific legal authority exists for such strategic closures outside of BRAC? 

• Jointness and joint interoperability give the U.S. military a great strategic advantage. How will such important characteristics of the modern military be met if 

JFCOM closes? 

• The modeling and simulation work done at JFCOM is a critical low cost test 

and evaluation function. How can it be done if JFCOM closes? 

2. Will the process to reduce/elimnate JFCOM and defense contractor support ever 

become transparent to the public? 

• Did OSD review the process and decision made by the OSD Headquarters and 

Support Activities Joint Cross Service Group during the 2005 BRAC process that 

resulted in the recommendation that JFCOM continue to exist and should in fact 
8 

purchase its leased facilities? How does DoD reconcile the recommendation to close 

JFCOM with the 2005 BRAC recommendation? 

• Various personnel at JFCOM have been directed to sign non-disclosure agreements relating to the review and closure process. Why does the Department not 

take a transparent review and decision-making process in this action? 

• The Secretary indicated that he authorized the services to consider additional 

closures, and Mr. Hale recently indicated that no ‘‘more’’ closures would be announced until at least February. Is DoD currently considering additional base or 

function closures or realignments that would affect Virginia? If so, what are the 

metrics and process being used in that review? 

• If the Secretary and the military departments are considering additional closures and realignments, does DoD believe that another round of the BRAC process 

is necessary? 

3. Impact of infrastructure in place within local communities 

• Have specific locations outside of Hampton Roads been identified to host any 

JFCOM mission that will remain intact after the proposed disestablishment of 

JFCOM? 

• Has DoD considered moving a new mission to backfill the sudden loss of this 

Command in the Hampton Roads region? For example, has DoD considered moving 

AFRICOM or other functions to the region? Which locations are being considered 

to host AFRICOM? 

• What specific JFCOM functions will remain in Suffolk and Norfolk? What are 

the estimated civilian, uniformed, and contract job positions at each location? Are 

these personnel assigned to specific billets at each location? 

• What is the DoD plan for use of leased space in Suffolk? Will the leases be terminated and what are the termination fees? 

4. What JFCOM functions are being relocated or left in place? 

• If similar functions to JFCOM exist within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other 

organizations, did DoD consider consolidation of those functions to JFCOM, rather 

than disestablishment? Should alternatives, such as expanding or strengthening the 

JFCOM function, have been considered instead of selecting the JFCOM closure option? 

• For those activities that DoD determines should continue to exist, what process 

will DoD use to determine whether they should remain in place or move elsewhere? 

• Was there consideration given to simply reducing the number of contractors and 

eliminating the duplication of missions versus eliminating the entire command? 

5. Economic impact 

• Has DoD calculated the extreme economic costs to Virginia of the contractor reduction; and what is the estimate? Where are the displaced contractor functions 

going to be performed? 

• Will the JFCOM closure make the region eligible for base closure assistance, 

including OEA grants, from the federal government? 

• Will the JFCOM closure result in an increase of personnel in the National Capital Region? 

6. Reduction in the use of defense contractors 

• What costs, and savings, are associated with the use of defense contractor personnel at JFCOM? What costs, and savings, are associated with the use of defense 

contractor personnel in the National Capital Region? How will DoD decide which 

defense contractors and contracts to cut or eliminate in order to achieve the announced reduction? 

• What studies has DoD conducted on both the short and long term real cost savings by reducing the use of defense contractors? Please include any existing examples where reducing the use of defense contractors—either by using uniformed personnel or by in-sourcing—has actually reduced costs to DoD. 

• If the Department is looking for efficiencies, why was the decision made to cut 

the government contracting services sector rather than finding efficiencies through 

the streamlining of administrative operations? 

• Upon what basis or analysis was the decision made to reduce the use of defense 

contractors by a total of 30% over the next three (3) years? Please provide a copy 

of any analysis conducted by DoD that forms the basis of this action. 

• What universe of service will the reduction affect? Will it be an across the 

board? If not, which categories of service will be targeted? 

• Will the reduction in the use of defense contractors be spread equally throughout the country or will any such reduction be confined to a specific region, such as 
9 

the National Capital Region of Northern Virginia, which appears to be hit extremely 

hard by this decision. 

[The statement of Hal Gehman follows:] 

[From the Norfolk, VA, Virginian-Pilot, September 26, 2010, Op-ed page] 

Journey to Jointness is Not Complete 

By ADMIRAL HAL GEHMAN, (Ret.) 

I DISAGREE with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ message to the staff at U.S. 

Joint Forces Command that jointness in military operations has already been 

achieved and the job is done. 

This is a journey, not a destination. Since efforts to achieve better cooperation in 

U.S. military operations must go on, Gates’ decision to close JFCOM is abandoning 

a decades-long effort, initiated and supported by multiple secretaries of defense and 

chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure the maximum effectiveness of our 

armed forces. 

The natural turnover of military personnel requires a continuous joint training 

program; new systems and equipment require continuous oversight to ensure joint 

interoperability; and new global threats require continuous development, testing 

and implementation of new joint doctrine and tactics. 

So, what is jointness, and how important is it? Many military operational tasks 

can be assigned to individual services. For example, there is little or no jointness 

involved in hunting submarines. 

But in a number of operational tasks, joint requirements outweigh service requirements. Integrated air defense, control of battlefield fires, combat search and rescue, 

ballistic missile defense and logistics are best done in a joint manner. Failure to get 

this right will result in at least ineffective employment of forces and, at worst, fratricide. 

A first requirement is to think about, develop, test and advocate for joint doctrine, 

tactics, techniques and procedures. There will be no joint procedures and doctrine 

if there is no organization responsible for developing them. 

JFCOM improved and perfected the process using newly developed modeling and 

simulation skills that are unique, saving millions of dollars and thousands of manyears of effort. Since joint procedures and doctrine underpin all our military operations, now and in the future, this work must go on by someone, somewhere. 

The second requirement is to ensure the compatibility and interoperability of systems and equipment. Service acquisition processes are built to optimize their own 

purchases. Even in the few cases where there are technical requirements that equipment be interoperable, the actual acquisition is left to the individual services. 

Detailed, independent testing of first-line systems has always been needed. Who 

will do the unbiased testing? Who will determine the interoperability standards? 

Who will advocate the expenditure of extra money to make systems not just meet 

service requirements but meet the requirements of the joint battlefield? 

Finally, once doctrine and procedures have been developed and approved, and 

interoperable systems are in the field, the force must be trained to operate in a joint 

environment. The services spend years teaching warriors to become proficient in 

their specialty. Joint operations are more complicated. 

When JFCOM was formed in 1999, there was no joint modeling and simulationbased war gaming tool. Now joint operations can be perfected in simulation, saving 

millions of dollars without burdening our already over-tasked forces. 

While the efforts to enhance jointness have been supported by top officials, they 

have had difficulty attracting a natural constituency. Except for some academic students of military affairs, a few members of Congress and one or two assistant secretaries, the mission of JFCOM has little or no institutional support, and has many 

detractors because it takes away resources and adds requirements. 

The core work JFCOM does is essential to the future success of the U.S. military 

and, despite claims to the contrary, is not duplicated anywhere else in the department. 

History has proven this work certainly cannot be accomplished inside the Beltway. The jointness journey must go on. 

Retired Navy Adm. Hal Gehman is former commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command. He also served as chairman of the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board. 

Mr. SCOTT. Again, I thank Chairman Spratt for convening this 

afternoon’s hearing and look forward to testimony from our distinguished panel of witnesses. I now turn to the Acting Ranking Mem-
10 

ber for the Subcommittee, Rob Wittman, for any statement he 

might want to make. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Chairman Scott. And I wanted to say 

good afternoon to our witnesses. Thank you so much for joining us 

today. I want to also thank Chairman Spratt for convening this 

meeting today so we can explore more the decision to recommend 

the closure of Joint Forces Command. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to first ask unanimous consent to 

submit Ranking Member Ryan’s statement for the record and to 

read a few comments for the benefit of the panel in the Committee. 

Mr. SCOTT. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Paul Ryan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL RYAN, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

Thank you Chairman Spratt for calling this hearing. 

I’d like to welcome our witnesses: Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, Stan Soloway of the Professional Services Council, Jacqueline Simon of the American Federation of Government Employees, and retired 

Army Lieutenant General Bob Wood, the former Deputy Commander of the Joint 

Forces Command. Thank you for your service, sir. 

The Defense Department is our largest discretionary expenditure, and has seen 

robust growth over the last decade. This growth is understandable—and in my opinion, justified—by the fact we were attacked on September 11th. 

We cannot lose sight that the Defense Department provides one of the most critical functions of the federal government—national security. The Chairman and I recently had a chance to go to Afghanistan, and witnessed firsthand the extraordinary 

accomplishments of our troops in harsh terrain against a fierce enemy. For the tireless sacrifice of our country’s bravest men and women, Congress must continue to 

make the funding for our troops and their families a top priority. 

The Defense budget should not, however, get a pass from a rigorous review of its 

budget. If there is waste, we need to eliminate it. If there are efficiencies we need 

to pursue them. 

I am concerned that some of the growth in the defense budget will prove difficult 

to slow. Tricare and the Defense Health Program—critical priorities aimed at caring 

for our nation’s heroes—are growing at unsustainable rates, as military and civilian 

pay and fuel costs continue to grow faster than inflation. I want to learn more from 

our witnesses on whether they believe the President’s budget, which provides for average real growth of about 1 percent annually over the next five years, is sufficient 

to fund its current mission. 

As deficits and debt continue their explosive growth—a challenge Admiral Mullen 

describes as our top national security threat, it is incumbent on the Department and 

Congress to address the fundamental cost drivers before they overwhelm DOD’s 

budget. 

The Efficiency Initiative announced by Secretary Gates over the past several 

months is a modest start in making it possible for the Defense Department to live 

within this budget. 

Congress needs more details about the rationale and analysis that support the 

specific elements of this Initiative. It’s for that reason that I am disappointed that 

the Defense Department declined to provide a witness for today’s hearing. Those of 

us who are supporters of a strong defense and would like to support the Secretary 

in his efforts to improve the Defense Department’s tooth-to-tail ratio are hamstrung 

when we lack the necessary details from DOD. 

Finally, in preparing for this hearing, I was struck by the contrast between the 

calls for reducing defense expenditures in the aggregate and the opposition to some 

of the specific efficiencies Secretary Gates is pursing. It appears the Appropriations 

Committee plans to reduce President Obama’s defense request by $7-8 billion, while 

others are objecting to the reductions Secretary Gates is trying to achieve to bring 

the DOD budget in-line with the President’s request. 

These are the sorts of tough choices that Congress will have to grapple with while 

ensuring our men and women in uniform get the resources they need. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today’s hearing. I look forward to the witnesses’ views on the Efficiency Initiative and on the broader question of how we can 
11 

better meet that the Federal government’s highest priority of providing for the common defense. 

Mr. WHITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue with 

brief opening remarks of my own. And in the midst of these serious 

economic challenges we face I know that we all face tough decisions 

in the coming years. And in many different areas of the government in order to reduce our deficit and our national debt we will 

need to really carefully examine the choices out there for us as 

members of Congress. And in fact, some of the initiatives made by 

Secretary Gates to find efficiencies within our Defense Department 

may turn out to be reasonable and good from a financial point of 

view. But until I see some sort of analysis on these initiatives I 

cannot support this unilateral, unchecked decision by Secretary 

Gates. 

And furthermore, I cannot support cuts to the top line of the 

budget of the Defense Department when I have yet to hear of similar cuts in other federal agencies. We certainly cannot find the solution to our currently budget deficit and national debt solely within the discretionary budget within the Department of Defense. And 

I am in favor of a common sense approach that uses a rational and 

objective analysis of our national security needs and requirement 

to determine our priorities, which should then drive the budget. 

Long term strategic planning documents like the quadrennial defense review, which was published earlier this spring, are perfect 

planning documents that can be used to drive the budget. 

Within this document there are no comments of inefficiencies, 

nor any mention of the need to cut defense contracts or eliminate 

Joint Forces Command, two very specific initiatives in the current 

plan by Secretary Gates. In fact, the QDR was criticized by some 

as actually being budget driven, which yields a potential train 

wreck for our national security, which is a quote from the Independent Panel of the QDR as requested by the House Armed Services Committee earlier this summer. And my common sense approach would have started with an objective analysis. And I have 

been told by the DOD that such an analysis exists. Yet after nearly 

two months have been unable to see a single document from that 

analysis. 

In the absence of that analysis I have started to deduce that 

these initiatives were well-intentioned but sorely misguided. And I 

fear that a potential result for our national security will put that 

at risk, and that’s something that I will not allow to happen. 

And again, I want to thank Chairman Spratt for allowing me to 

participate today, and Chairman Scott for his graciousness in today’s hearing, for allowing me to sit here and participate and also 

to stand as the Ranking Member. And I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Robert Wittman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Thank you, Chairman Spratt, and good afternoon to our witnesses. I want to 

thank the Chairman and the committee for having me here today on this most important issue. 

Mr. Chairman, I would first like to ask unanimous consent to submit Ranking 

Member Ryan’s statement for the record, and to read a few comments for the benefit 

of the panel and the committee: 
12 

BRIEF SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue with brief opening remarks of my own: 

In the midst of serious economic challenges, I know we will all face some tough 

decisions in the coming years, in many different areas of government, in order to 

reduce our deficit and our national debt. In fact, some of the initiatives made by 

Secretary Gates to find efficiencies within our Defense Department may turn out 

to be reasonable and good from a financial point of view. But until I see some sort 

of analysis on these initiatives I cannot support this unilateral, unchecked decision 

by Secretary Gates. 

Furthermore, I cannot support cuts to the top line budget of the defense department when I have yet to hear of similar cuts in any other federal agency. We certainly cannot find the solution to our current budget deficit and national debt solely 

within the discretionary budget within the Department of Defense. 

I am in favor of a common sense approach that uses a rational and objective analysis of our national security needs and requirements to determine our priorities, 

which would then drive the budget. Long-term strategic planning documents, like 

the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was published earlier this Spring, are perfect planning documents that can be used to drive the budget. 

Within this document there were no comments of inefficiencies, nor any mention 

of the need to cut defense contracts or eliminate Joint Forces Command, two very 

specific initiatives in the current plan by Secretary Gates. In fact, the QDR was 

criticized by some as actually being budget driven—which yields a potential train 

wreck for our national security which is a quote from an Independent Panel Review 

of the QDR as requested by the House Armed Services Committee earlier this summer. 

My common sense approach would have started with an objective analysis, and 

I have been told by DoD that such an analysis exists, yet after nearly two months 

have been unable to see one single document from that analysis. 

In the absence of that analysis, I have started to deduce that these initiatives 

were well-intentioned but sorely misguided. I fear that a potential result our national security will be put at risk and that I something I will NOT allow. 

Again, I thank Chairman Spratt for allowing me to participate in today’s hearing 

and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, 

and welcome to my friend and colleague Mr. Wittman for being 

with us today. And thanks to all the panelists for joining on what 

I think is a very important subject. My concern, of course, with this 

issue is not only about JFCOM but about the decision to bring in 

10 percent of outside contracts for the Pentagon every year for 

three years. Now, my concern with that is the same as what both 

you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Wittman, articulated about your concerns with JFCOM. There is no analysis to justify that decision. It 

is a number picked out of a hat. It may in fact be correct. It may 

be too big, it may be too little. We do not know. And essentially 

in the private meetings we have had, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, they have conceded as much. They have not to 

their credit tried to defend the indefensible. There is no analysis 

that went into that, it is a goal. 

But it is a goal that has consequences for contractors who have 

currently contracts, and men and women who serve our country 

through that mechanism who have reason to be concerned about 

employment now, lacking clarity. It is not clear that there is any 

sense of priorities about, well, which contracts are we talking 

about? Are we distinguishing between, you know, high end combat 

readiness related contracts and, you know, more service contracts 

that truly could be competed with the public sector, and fairly so. 

My own view is that on this kind of issue, insourcing/outsourcing, 

it cannot be a matter of theology. It has to be a matter of what 

works. Now, we have gone through the exercise of defining that 
13 

which is inherently governmental. And I think frankly the administration listened to labor, to business, to the public sector, and actually came up with a definition that is quite workable and that I 

think actually meets the concerns by and large of everybody involved. And I was heartened to hear in the closed session today 

with Comptroller Hale that that is what they are looking at, and 

that is good to hear. But it was not what we heard several weeks 

ago when this was just arbitrarily put out there. 

I also think we have to dispel the myth that this is designed to 

save money. It is designed, and everyone holding their fingers, to 

actually free up internal resources and reallocate them to other 

higher priority missions, recognizing that the growth in external 

resources will not be there the way it has been the last decade. 

And I applaud that. That shows initiative, identifying internal savings to help finance your priorities and their growth is, I think, a 

wise and prudent way to go. 

However, my word of caution, there is not a lot of evidence yet 

that this or the JFCOM decision will in fact free up those additional resources. If BRAC is at all instructive, it is a story of disappointments with respect to those kinds of expectations. The savings that we had originally projected in BRAC have in fact not materialized. They have been significantly eroded because there were 

ancillary costs and other upfront investment costs that greatly exceeded the original projections and significantly eroded the consequent savings as a result. 

So mine is a word of caution. But I believe that there has to be 

analytical rigor. This cannot be a matter of faith and theology that 

one is better than the other, insourcing or outsourcing. It is what 

makes sense. And if doing it inside because it is inherently governmental makes sense, great. If on the other hand the expertise and 

the economy are also on the outside then it has to be competed in 

a fair manner. And so I would hope, and the reason I mention that, 

Mr. Chairman, is that in listening to the Deputy Secretary he indicated that, well, we have grown out of balance. Outside contracting 

has grown to 39 percent, and its historic norm is 26 percent. Well, 

all right. I am certainly open to a fresh look at whether that balance makes sense. But to decide a priority, it does not. Based on 

what? Theology? Because I do not like it? That is not good enough. 

The same rigorous analysis that you called for, Mr. Chairman, 

and that you called for, Mr. Wittman, with respect to JFCOM, 

must also apply to this decision on contracting. Otherwise, the decision is being made for reasons unrelated, frankly, to cost savings 

or any kind of analysis as to whether it would work and improve 

the operation. And sadly, that is the testimony we are lacking from 

the Pentagon. So I am looking forward to this private sector panel, 

but I sure wish we could get the Pentagon to testify in open session 

not only here in the Budget Committee but they were also scheduled yesterday at the Oversight and Government Reform Committee and declined to participate as well. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony and rigorous 

questioning. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. Does the gentle lady from 

Minnesota have an opening statement? 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. No, Mr. Chairman. 
14 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, we are pleased to have you at the hearing. We will now begin with our witnesses and we will begin with 

Mr. Harrison. 

STATEMENTS OF TODD HARRISON, SENIOR FELLOW, DEFENSE BUDGET STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC BUDGET 

ASSESSMENTS; JOHN R. (BOB) WOOD, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA (RET.), STAR STRATEGIES GROUP; STAN Z. 

SOLOWAY, PRESIDENT & CEO, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 

COUNCIL; AND JACQUELINE SIMON, PUBLIC POLICY DIRECTOR, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL–CIO 

STATEMENT OF TODD HARRISON 

Mr. HARRISON. Thank you, and thank you for having me here 

today to testify before the Committee. As fiscal year 2010 draws to 

a close and the economy struggles to recover from the deepest recession since the Great Depression the federal government faces a 

number of fiscal challenges. The budget deficit is projected to exceed $1.4 trillion due in part to increased spending on fiscal stimulus programs and a sharp reduction in tax revenues due to the 

recession. But underlying the current fiscal situation is a structural 

deficit that the economic downturn only exacerbated. As Congress 

and the administration focus more attention on reducing the deficit 

all areas of the budget, including defense, have come under increased scrutiny. 

The defense budget is in many respects a microcosm of the rest 

of the federal budget, and the issues in the defense budget, such 

as the rising costs of pay, pensions, healthcare, contracting, infrastructure, and education are issues in other parts of the federal 

budget as well. What I hope to do today in my testimony is provide 

an overview of the trends and issues in the defense budget and 

what DOD is doing, or in some cases not doing, to address these 

issues. 

I want to begin by taking a look at defense spending from a historical perspective. The total national defense budget request for 

fiscal year 2011 adjusted for inflation is at the highest dollar 

amount since World War II, and it is higher than total defense 

spending at any point in the Vietnam or Korean Wars, even if the 

costs of the current Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are excluded. 

Defense spending rises and falls in cycles which are primarily driven by external events, such as the Wars in Korea and Vietnam and 

the Cold War arms buildup. After each up turn the budget tends 

to return to a floor and that floor is gradually rising over time. 

These two trends suggest that if the current cycle were to follow 

the same pattern, and there are reasons to think it may not, the 

defense budget could experience a significant decline over the coming decade. While such cycles are understandable given the everchanging threat environment that the nation faces, sharp rises and 

declines in the defense budget complicate long term defense planning. 

And just as the top line of the defense budget has varied over 

time the way in which money is allocated within the defense budget has also varied. At the previous peak in defense spending in fis-
15 

cal year 1985 the operations and maintenance and military personnel accounts together garnered 51 percent of the total DOD 

budget versus 45 percent for acquisition. Compared to today, in the 

fiscal year 2011 budget request 67 percent is allocated for operations and maintenance and military personnel compared to 30 

percent for acquisition. 

The rapid growth in personnel and operational costs is of particular concern because the total number of personnel has not varied significantly over the past decade and in fact it has come down 

significantly from the 1980’s. The 2011 budget request for military 

personnel totals $139 billion and that does not include War funding. What is not included in the military personnel budget is the 

defense health program, which is funded under operations and 

maintenance at a total of about $30 billion a year. Also not included in the military personnel budget is the cost of DOD civilian 

personnel, which adds another $77 billion. In total, DOD spends 

some $246 billion on the uniformed military and DOD civilian personnel. With a payroll of 2.3 million direct, full time employees 

DOD makes up 51 percent of the federal workforce and employs 

more Americans than Walmart and the United States Postal Service combined. I should note that these figures do not include the 

number or cost of support contractors. 

A growing portion of military compensation is consumed by noncash and deferred benefits. Military healthcare is a major contributor to this growth due in part to more and more military retirees 

and their dependents electing to use their military healthcare benefit. A total of 9.5 million Americans are now eligible beneficiaries 

in the military healthcare system. The fee charged to military retirees for enrollment in TRICARE, the military health plan, was set 

in 1995 at $460 a year for a family plan and has not increased one 

dollar since then. For comparison, the average annual premium 

paid by private sector workers, and this is the portion paid by the 

workers, is $3,500 a year for a family plan. About 70 percent of 

military retirees have access to private sector insurance. But because of this growing differential more and more of them are choosing to stay on the military system. 

Another factor in the rising cost of military healthcare is the enactment of the TRICARE for Life Program in 2001. This is a Medicare supplemental insurance program for military retirees over the 

age of sixty-five who are on Medicare. Accrual payments to this 

trust fund now total $11 billion annually out of the DOD budget. 

But personnel related costs are not the only area of the budget 

that has grown over the past decade. The budget for acquisitions 

has also grown by a total of 46 percent since 2001 adjusting for inflation and not including War funding. A notable trend within the 

acquisition budget is the relatively high level of funding allocated 

for the development of new weapons systems. The ratio of procurement to RDT&E has fallen from a peak of 3.5 to 1 in the early 

1980’s to its current level of 1.5 to 1 in the fiscal year 2011 base 

budget. What this trend indicates is that DOD continues to spend 

a greater share of its acquisition budget to develop new and sophisticated weapons systems but it does not adequately fund for the 

procurement of these systems in quantity. As a result DOD’s inventory of equipment, the planes, the ships, and the ground vehicles 
16 

that our military depends on, has gotten smaller and older over the 

past decade despite large increases in what we spend on acquisitions. 

However, DOD is attempting to reverse this trend. In the future 

year defense program submitted with the 2011 budget it projects 

a rise in procurement and a reduction in RDT&E funding over the 

coming years and this would increase the ratio to levels not seen 

since the early 1990’s. 

Classified funding in the DOD budget has also grown at a rapid 

pace. Total classified funding, including both the base and the war 

budgets, is nearly $58 billion in fiscal year 2011. Adjusting for inflation, this is a highest level seen since CSBA, my organization, 

began tracking it in 1987. The Air Force receives the largest share 

of DOD’s classified acquisition funding, nearly 80 percent of the 

total. The record for classified acquisition programs is mixed. There 

have been notable successes, such as the Corona program for reconnaissance satellites in the sixties and seventies. But some classified 

programs have had troubled histories, such as the National Reconnaissance Office’s Future Imagery Architecture Program that was 

to develop the next generation of spy satellites. This program was 

canceled in 2005 due to significant cost overruns and technical 

issues at a reported loss of $4 billion to the government. 

However, it should be noted that the mere existence of classified 

programs can create uncertainty in the minds of potential adversaries. Such uncertainty complicates their planning, and potentially compels them to divert resources to hedge against an unknown capability. Classified programs can therefore be a part of a 

cost imposing strategy on potential adversaries. 

Funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is also a significant share of the DOD budget, totaling some $159 billion in the fiscal year 2011 request. Funding for operations in Iraq continues to 

decline as troop levels there subside, and funding for Afghanistan 

continues to increase as the surge there is nearing completion. 

The budget request does not include a projection for war costs in 

future years. Instead it includes allowances of $50 billion per year 

for fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2015, an amount that is likely far 

below what will actually be needed. The future costs of the wars 

depends on a number of external factors that cannot be known in 

advance, such as operational tempo, fuel prices, and the number 

and composition of forces deployed in future years. But our analysis has demonstrated a strong correlation between the number of 

troops deployed and the total annual cost. The annual cost per 

troop since fiscal year 2005 has averaged $1.2 million per troop in 

Afghanistan, and $690,000 per troop in Iraq. Given current and 

projected troop levels it is likely the funding for the wars will exceed the $50 billion allowance per year for several years to come. 

In conclusion I would note that the trends in the defense budget 

I have outlined here, particularly the growth in military personnel 

costs and the low ratio of procurement to RDT&E funding are 

cause for concern. If these trends are not reversed it will not be 

possible for the Department to maintain its current force structure 

and capabilities without significant increases in funding above the 

current level. 
17 

Secretary Gates has made preserving the force structure a top 

priority. And as part of his efficiency initiatives has directed the 

Department to find savings in other parts of the budget that could 

be directed to force structure and acquisitions. However, efficiencies alone are not likely to result in the magnitude of savings 

required. The largest source of savings proposed is to reduce spending on support contractors by 30 percent over the next three years. 

According to congressional and research service estimates this 

could generate savings of $3.6 billion annually once it is fully implemented. For comparison, this is only enough to offset one year’s 

worth of growth in military healthcare costs. Smaller cuts include 

the elimination of the Networks and Information Integration, NII; 

J6; the Business Transformation Agency; and Joint Forces Command. While these eliminations appear to be justified the total savings achieved will depend greatly on how these decisions are implemented. If these organizations are eliminated without corresponding reductions in the head count of military personnel, 

DOD civilians, and support contractors, the savings will be limited. 

The initiatives announced by the Department so far I believe are 

a step in the right direction but they do not address some of the 

fundamental issues that plague the defense budget, such as the rising cost of military healthcare. To its credit, the Department has 

made specific, targeted cuts to programs and activities it has 

deemed to be a lower priority. This is a sound approach and if applied to the rest of the defense budget it is one that will make the 

military more efficient and effective in the long run. The alternative would be to simply spread cuts around evenly throughout 

the Department. The risk with spreading the cuts around evenly 

is that it does not prioritize programs and activities and could result in a military that looks and operates much like the one we 

have today but is smaller and less capable. 

The challenge for policy makers in such a constrained budget environmental is to adequately fund for the support and modernization of our national defense capabilities without spending one dollar more than is necessary. Rooting out waste, inefficiency, and low 

priority activities within the defense budget is a difficult and delicate task. In some cases it will mean lost jobs. In other cases it will 

require taking on vested interest, both within the Pentagon and 

outside the building. 

While the prospect of a flat or declining defense budget may 

seem like a daunting challenge, particularly while the nation is 

still engaged in two ongoing wars and unemployment is over 9 percent, it is also an opportunity. This moment provides both the fiscal 

and political imperative to jettison programs and activities that are 

no longer needed, budget artifacts from a bygone era, and focus 

more effectively on the capabilities needed to deter, fight, and win 

wars in the future. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Todd Harrison follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TODD HARRISON, SENIOR FELLOW, DEFENSE BUDGET

STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC BUDGET ASSESSMENTS

As fiscal year 2010 draws to a close and the economy struggles to recover from 

the deepest recession since the Great Depression, the federal government faces a 

number of fiscal challenges. The budget deficit is projected to exceed $1.4 trillion 

due in part to increased spending on fiscal stimulus programs and a sharp reduction 
18 

in tax revenues due to the recession. But underlying the current fiscal situation is 

a structural deficit that the economic downturn only exacerbated. As Congress and 

the administration focus more attention on reducing the deficit, all areas of the 

budget, including defense, have come under increased scrutiny. The Obama Administration’s FY 2011 budget request includes a total of $712 billion for the Department of Defense (DoD). The base budget for the Department includes $549 billion in discretionary funding and $4 billion in mandatory funding. An 

additional $159 billion is requested for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The budget also requests $19 billion for defense-related atomic energy programs, $8 billion 

for defense-related activities in other agencies, and $122 billion for veterans. Together these expenses total $861 billion, or 22 percent of the total federal budget. 

The defense budget, in many respects, is a microcosm of the rest of the federal 

budget, and the challenges facing DoD in pay, pensions, healthcare, infrastructure, 

contracting, and education, to name a few, are also issues in other areas of the 

budget. My testimony provides an overview of trends and issues in the defense 

budget and their potential impact on future defense spending and capabilities. I 

begin by providing an overview of defense spending from an historical perspective 

and explaining how the share of the defense budget devoted to acquisition and operations and support has varied over time. I then explore in more detail trends in 

military personnel costs, acquisition costs, classified funding, and war funding. 

While the issues I identify are not new, what makes these issues of more concern 

now is that in a constrained budget environment we no longer have the luxury of 

simply spending our way out of difficult decisions. 

The total national defense budget request for FY 2011, adjusted for inflation, is 

at the highest dollar amount since World War II and is higher than total defense 

spending at any point in the Vietnam or Korean Wars, even if the cost of the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan are excluded. However, defense spending as a percent of 

GDP is 4.8 percent in the FY 2011 budget request, below the post-World War II average of 6.5 percent. The apparent discrepancy between defense spending being at 

a peak level in inflation-adjusted dollars but not as percent of GDP is due to the 

different rates of growth in the defense budget and national economic output. From 

the previous peak in defense spending in FY 1985 to the FY 2011 budget request, 

defense spending grew by 37 percent in real terms compared to 102 percent real 

growth in GDP over the same period. As a result, the total defense budget as a percent of GDP has fallen from 7.1 to 4.8 percent over that time period because the 

denominator (GDP) has grown much faster than the numerator (defense spending). 

Looking at the defense spending over time, two trends become apparent. The first 

is that defense spending rises and falls in irregular cycles, which are primarily driven by external events. In the early 1950s, the budget increased sharply for the Korean War. During the Vietnam War, defense spending steadily increased for six 

years before it peaked in FY 1968 and then declined for the next seven years. The 

Cold War buildup of the 1980s saw the budget increase for six years until it peaked 

in FY 1985 and declined for the next ten years. The current cycle, however, is different in several respects: the budget may not have peaked yet, depending on how 

the war in Afghanistan progresses; and the global economic outlook and federal deficit are worse than in previous cycles. Moreover, the current buildup in defense 

spending has been a ‘‘hollow’’ buildup in many respects because the military’s end 

strength has remained nearly constant at 1.5 million in the active force, and the 

equipment inventory has gotten smaller and older in many areas. 

The second notable trend is that after each cycle the budget returns to a floor, 

and that floor is gradually rising over time. At the end of WWII, defense spending 

plummeted to less than $100 billion in today’s dollars. After the Korean War, the 

defense budget dropped again, but only to about $290 billion, this time due, in part, 

to the emergence of a peacetime defense industry. Following the Vietnam War, defense spending fell again to about $300 billion. After the end of the Cold War buildup, the defense budget never dropped below $350 billion. These two trends suggest 

that if the current cycle were to follow the same pattern—and there are reasons to 

think it may not—the defense budget could experience a significant decline over the 

coming decade. While such cycles are understandable given the ever-changing threat 

environment the nation faces, sharp rises and declines in the defense budget complicate long-term defense planning. 

Just as the topline of the defense budget has varied over time, the way in which 

money is allocated within the defense budget has also varied. In recent years, funding has shifted away from acquisition accounts toward operation and maintenance 

and military personnel accounts. At the previous peak in defense spending in FY 

1985, the operations and maintenance and military personnel accounts garnered 51 

percent of the total DoD budget versus 45 percent for acquisition. In the FY 2011 

budget request, 67 percent is allocated for operations and maintenance and military 
19 

personnel, compared to 30 percent for acquisition—or 62 percent and 34 percent, respectively, if war funding is excluded. 

The rapid growth in personnel costs is of particular concern because the total 

number of personnel has not varied significantly over the past decade. Since 2001, 

the military personnel budget has grown by a total of 46 percent, adjusting for inflation and not including war funding, to $139 billion in the FY 2011 request. What 

is not included in that figure is the Defense Health Program, which is funded under 

the operations and maintenance title of the budget at $30 billion. Also not included 

is the cost of DoD civilian personnel, which adds another $77 billion. In total, DoD 

spends some $246 billion on uniformed military and DoD civilian personnel—not including the cost of contractors. With a payroll of 2.3 million direct employees, DoD 

makes up 51 percent of the federal workforce and employs more Americans than 

Wal-Mart and the U.S. Postal Service combined. 

A notable trend in military personnel funding is the growing portion of military 

compensation that is consumed by noncash and deferred benefits. For comparison, 

in the private sector about 29 percent of total compensation costs go to non-cash and 

deferred benefits, such as healthcare and pensions. At General Motors, before it 

went into bankruptcy, noncash and deferred compensation made up 45 percent of 

total compensation costs. For DoD, the figure is 52 percent. Military healthcare is 

a major contributor to noncash and deferred compensation costs for DoD, due in 

part to more and more military retirees and their dependents electing to use their 

military healthcare benefit. A total of 9.5 million Americans are now eligible beneficiaries in the military healthcare system, including the active-duty military, military retirees, and their dependents, at a cost to DoD of $50.7 billion in the FY 2011 

budget request. 

The fee charged to military retirees for enrollment in TRICARE was set in 1995 at $460 for a family plan and has not increased since then. For comparison, the average annual premium paid by private-sector workers is $3500—not including the 

share of annual premiums paid by their employers. About 70 percent of military retirees have access to private-sector insurance, but because of this growing price differential more of them are choosing to stay in the military system. Another factor 

in the rising cost of military healthcare is the TRICARE for Life program, a Medicare supplemental insurance program for military retirees over the age of 65 that 

was enacted in 2001. Accrual payments to this trust fund now total $11 billion annually. 

But personnel-related costs are not the only area of the defense budget that has 

grown over the past decade. The budget for acquisitions, including research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement, has also grown by a total 

of 46 percent since FY 2001, adjusting for inflation and not including war funding. 

A notable trend within the acquisition budget is the relatively high level of funding 

allocated to RDT&E for the development of new weapon systems. Over time, this 

has undermined DoD’s ability to substantially fund for the procurement of new 

weapon systems and correct the lagging pace of procurements from the past two 

decades. The ratio of procurement to RDT&E has fallen from a peak of 3.5 to 1 during the early 1980s to its current level of 1.5 to 1 in the base budget request for 

FY 2011. What this trend indicates is that DoD continues to spend a greater share 

of its acquisition budget to develop new and sophisticated weapon systems but does 

not adequately fund the procurement of these systems in quantity. However, the future-year defense program submitted with the FY 2011 budget request begins to reverse this trend. Funding for procurement is projected to rise and RDT&E is projected to decline over the coming years. By FY 2015 the ratio of procurement to 

RDT&E in the base budget will reach 2.0 to 1, the highest level since FY 1990. 

Classified funding in the DoD budget has also been growing at a rapid pace. Total 

classified funding, including both base and war funding, is some $57.8 billion in the 

FY 2011 request. Adjusting for inflation, this is the highest level seen since CSBA 

began tracking it in FY 1987. Classified O&M funding has not been consistently reported in previous years, but this year’s budget request reveals that it is the fastestgrowing area within classified funding. Classified O&M increases 9.6 percent in real 

terms in the FY 2011 request over the previous year, which follows a similar 11.0 

percent real increase in FY 2010. 

The Air Force receives the largest share of DoD’s classified acquisition funding— 

nearly 80 percent of the total. Classified programs account for about 43 percent, or 

$19.1 billion, of the Air Force’s procurement request and 46 percent, or $12.6 billion, 

of its RDT&E request. The concentration of classified funding in the Air Force’s 

budget is the result of two factors. First, the Air Force acquisition budget is believed 

to contribute funds to a number of intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Second, the Air Force is responsible for most command, control, 
20 

communications, and intelligence (C3I) functions and related assets such as reconnaissance satellites and satellite launch and control facilities, which tend to be 

heavily classified programs. 

The record for classified acquisition programs is mixed. A notable success was the 

Corona program for reconnaissance satellites, which produced valuable imagery intelligence from 1960 to 1972. Several successful and effective aircraft have also been 

developed and even produced as black programs, including the F-117 stealth fighter, 

the B-2 stealth bomber, and the SR-71 reconnaissance plane. Some classified programs have had troubled histories, such as the National Reconnaissance Office’s Future Imagery Architecture program to develop the next generation of spy satellites, 

which was cancelled in 2005 due to significant cost overruns and technical issues 

at a reported $4 billion loss for the government. However, it should be noted that 

the mere existence of classified programs can create uncertainty in the minds of potential adversaries. Such uncertainly complicates their planning and, potentially, 

compels them to divert resources to hedge against an unknown capability. Classified 

programs can therefore be part of a cost-imposing strategy on potential adversaries. Funding for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq totals $159.3 billion in the FY 2011 

request. The budget request continues the trend of declining funding for Iraq, as 

troops levels there subside, and increasing funding for Afghanistan. The budget request does not include a projection for war costs in future years. Instead, it includes 

‘‘allowances’’ of $50 billion per year for FY 2012 to FY 2015, the same amount that 

was used in the FY 2010 budget request as a placeholder for future war funding. 

The future cost of the wars depends on a number of external factors that cannot 

be known in advance, such as operational tempo, fuel prices, and the number and 

composition of forces deployed in future years. While the cost of each conflict depends on many variables, previous analysis by CSBA has demonstrated a strong 

correlation between the number of troops deployed and the total annual cost. Based 

on the most current information on troop levels and costs, the annual cost per troop 

since FY 2005 has averaged $1.2 million in Afghanistan and $0.69 million in Iraq, 

in constant-year FY 2011 dollars. 

The trends in the defense budget outlined here, particularly growth in military 

personnel costs and the historically low ratio of procurement to RDT&E funding, are 

cause for concern. If these trends are not reversed, it will not be possible for the 

Department to maintain its current force structure and capabilities without significant increases in funding above the current level. Secretary Gates has made preserving the force structure a top priority, and as part of his efficiencies initiative 

has directed the Department to find savings in other parts of the budget that could 

be directed to force structure and acquisitions. However, efficiencies alone are not 

likely to result in the magnitude of savings required. 

The largest source of savings proposed is to reduce spending on support contractors by 30 percent over the next three years. According to Congressional Research 

Service estimates, this could generate savings of $3.6 billion annually once it is fully 

implemented. Smaller cuts include the elimination of Networks and Information Integration (NII), J6, Business Transformation Agency (BTA), and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). While these eliminations appear to be justified, the total savings 

achieved will depend greatly on how they are implemented. If these organizations 

are eliminated without corresponding reductions in the headcount of military personnel, DoD civilians, and support contractors, the savings will be limited. The initiatives announced by the Department so far are a step in the right direction, but 

they do not address some of the fundamental issues that plague the defense budget, 

such as the rising cost of military healthcare. 

To its credit, the Department has made specific, targeted cuts to programs and 

activities it has deemed to be a lower priority. This is a sound approach, and if applied to the rest of the defense budget it is one that will ultimately make the military more efficient and effective in the long run. The alternative is to simply spread 

the cuts around evenly throughout the Department. The risk with this approach is 

that it does not prioritize programs and activities within the budget and could result 

in a military that looks and operates much like the one we have today, but is smaller and less capable. 

The challenge for policy makers in such a constrained budget environment is to 

adequately fund for the support and modernization of our national defense capabilities without spending one dollar more than is necessary. Rooting out waste, inefficiency, and low-priority activities within the defense budget is a difficult and delicate task. In some cases, it will mean lost jobs. In other cases, it will require taking 

on vested interests both within the Pentagon and outside the building. While the 

prospect of a flat or declining defense budget may seem like a daunting challenge, 

particularly while the nation is still engaged in two ongoing wars and unemployment is over 9 percent, it should also be viewed as an opportunity. It can provide 
21 

both the fiscal and political imperative to jettison programs and activities that are 

no longer needed—budget artifacts from a bygone era—and focus more effectively 

on the capabilities needed to deter, fight, and win wars in the future. 

ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, 

nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and 

debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to 

enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation. 

CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers 

in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader 

national security community. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce 

human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focus on key questions 

related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these 

challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are 

devoted to helping achieve this end. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. General Wood? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. WOOD 

LTG WOOD. Mr. Chairman thank you for inviting me to testify 

before the Budget Committee. It is an honor to be here and to be 

afforded an opportunity to present my views and to answer your 

questions. My comments represent my personal opinion and are 

based on my own experience while on active duty in the United 

States Army. My duty concluded in 2009 after serving three years 

as the Deputy Commander of Joint Forces Command. 

On August 9, 2010 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced 

a number of initiatives to promote efficiencies and cost savings at 

the Department of Defense in advance of expected reductions in 

discretionary federal spending. Through these initiatives Secretary 

Gates wants to change the budget culture of the Department, promote affordable acquisition, become more efficient and eliminate 

redundancies or needless command staff, or functional layers where 

possible. 

While seeking more than $100 billion over the next several years 

in efficiency savings, the Department will seek some real growth in 

overall spending. More importantly, efficiency and cost savings will 

be invested in greater support to deploy troops and greater capabilities for this operating force. This shift of expenditures from the 

tail of supporting functions to the tooth of operating forces is a 

vital focus and a laudable objective. 

This notion of finding more capability output within given resources, this synergistic result, is crucially important in the face of 

severe resource constraints. Now these ideas of efficiency, reduction 

of organizational layers, elimination of redundancy, and achievement of synergy, underlie another prominent long term goal of the 

Department of Defense, the efforts to build a truly joint force. But 

Secretary Gates said that we have reached the point where we 

fully appreciate the value of a joint force and in his judgment we 

no longer need a four-star headquarters to advocate for the joint 

force. For that reason he has recommended the elimination of the 

Unites States Joint Forces Command. According to the Department 

elimination of this command will reduce a layer of headquarters, 

and return savings, an amount as yet undetermined, to the Department’s economies and efficiency efforts. 
22 

Now, this recommendation has attracted attention and review for 

good reason. The training of joint operational skills, the operation 

of joint command and control, and the development of joint capabilities are by objective and purpose economizing and efficient. Few 

other activities within the Department so naturally and closely 

align with the goals and objectives announced by Secretary Gates 

on August 9. The whole purpose of acting as a joint force is to capitalize on the synergy of complementary or integrated capabilities 

unified in action under the joint force commander. Why, then, 

eliminate a command like JFCOM that commits itself every day in 

every mission to achieve economical and more efficient joint objectives to support the combatant commanders? It is certainly within 

the authority of the Secretary to make such a recommendation, and 

it is certainly a military decision to establish and align headquarters to accomplish assigned missions. But it is a legitimate 

question to ask how the alternative solution to achieve joint readiness will not stop or reverse progress in this area? 

The ability of the U.S. military to act as a joint force resulted 

from difficult lessons learned in past conflicts and national missions, whether recovering from the aftermath of Desert I, overcoming command and control lessons learned in Operation Urgent 

Fury, or building speed or response required for the next Katrina, 

progress in this joint business has been difficult. Today’s ability for 

joint action is a hard won strength that sets our military apart 

from other militaries around the world. To act is the key idea. 

Joint is not a state of being, but instead is a state of action. We 

can be a soldier, sailor, airman, or marine, but we act jointly. This 

action is one that involves integration of functions, formations, and 

missions to achieve at a minimum unity of purpose, or optimally 

unity of effort. And typically one person, a joint commander, is in 

charge. 

All in the military and those who support it have worked hard 

to achieve this progress. Along the way we needed to alter the culture, build the doctrine, train the forces, and learn to integrate 

joint capabilities. Laws such as Goldwater-Nichols were passed to 

guide this journey. Successive chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and 

Secretaries of Defense gave guidance and emphasis on various aspects of joint integration or specific joint missions as the military 

proceeded. And through years of combat experience supported by 

adaptive joint training, we have now built a generation in the military who are proficient in the employment of joint fires, intelligence, mobility, logistics, command and control to combat today’s 

threats. 

Our success to act is evident in the remarkable performance of 

our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere 

in this global battle against terrorism. This outcome is no accident, 

nor has it been easy to accomplish. Now it is not false bravado or 

overstatement to simply say our historical approach to building 

joint force operational readiness by specifying such duties to a combatant commander contributed in real ways to our current state of 

joint war fighting success. 

Since 1947, from early roots in the naval commands of the Atlantic Fleet in NATO, until today, unified combatant commanders in 

Norfolk, Virginia have been in charge to build and sustain joint 
23 

force readiness and improve the joint war fighting qualifies of the 

nation’s military. Earlier designs of unified commands in Norfolk 

that combine this important task to promote joint action with geographic responsibilities, geopolitical tasks, or service specific missions, ultimately fell short of expectations. The operational, cultural, doctrinal, and material barriers to successful joint action demanded singular attention. 

Secretary Cohen recognized this and established USJFCOM in 

1999 with a clear mandate, to understand the future requirements 

of the joint force, and build or train the joint capabilities needed 

for success. With the elimination of all geographic responsibilities 

in 2002 JFCOM became even more focused on this mission. Just 

as the integrating functions for space, transportation, cyber, missile 

defense, and special operations found homes in today’s functional 

combatant commands, joint war fighting became the functional 

mission for JFCOM. The future became its area of responsibility. 

The makeup of JFCOM, its assigned missions, its many deployments, and its daily operations all were defined and driven by national level guidance, DOD mandate, or JCS directive. This activity 

was not a capricious choice or self-generated action. At each point 

in its growth as a command or change in its mission, strong rationale was presented by past chairmen and Secretaries of Defense as 

they directed changes to achieve better joint synergy, joint operational capability, or joint force integration. 

The many talented, military and civilian, who earlier served the 

U.S. Atlantic Command and today serve the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command answered this call to action and made a huge contribution to our nation’s military readiness and strength. And the civilian communities and their leaders broadly supported the command’s important work along the way. To mention just few examples, JFCOM joint training programs are perhaps best known. 

From combatant commander training support to expansion of network training capabilities, to federation of advanced modeling and 

simulation, command activities contributed repeatedly and materially to the training of all joint conventional and special operations 

headquarters and staffs in the wars of the last nine years. Less 

known are the activities of JFCOM’s ready forces. These smaller 

elements have repeatedly deployed worldwide to support Joint 

Commanders responding to crisis on behalf of national missions. 

They stand ready tonight to deploy again and immediately provide 

trained, critical operational capabilities such as command and control, public affairs, fires integration, personal recovery, and other 

special staff skills. Then there are the activities in JFCOM’s joint 

integration directorate, that attend to critical coordinating tasks 

confronting the joint force. Prevention of fratricide, elimination of 

redundant or competing IT systems, and promotion of coalition information sharing are just some examples of its daily work. The list 

goes on to include teams and subordinate commands under JFCOM 

that tackle tough integration tasks, all delegated down from the 

chairmen. Such as joint fires integration, irregular warfare competence, joint personnel recovery proficiency, and coordinated joint 

unmanned aerial system integration. And in the area of joint experimentation, JFCOM has kept a focus on future joint war fighting and operational needs. Interagency and coalition integration, 
24 

operational planning methods, and integration of advanced technologies into joint operations comprise a small part of its work. 

The joint force provider mission consumes a major part of the 

command’s energy, particularly as transitions continue in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Intense daily coordination with the services with 

uniquely skilled force managers permit JFCOM to develop and 

offer objective advice and specific force packages to answer every 

changing combatant commander requirements. The force management agility to accomplish the surge in Iraq, and now in Afghanistan, depended greatly on the quiet professionals working diligently in JFCOM. 

Finally, unique elements in the joint world, such as the Joint 

Warfare Analysis Center and the Joint Center for Operations Analysis, continue to provide key support to the combatant commanders 

and the Department of Defense. JWAC daily advances the art and 

science of targeting in both the kinetic and non-kinetic realm. The 

Joint Center for Operations Analysis has perfected an ability to not 

just record joint lessons learned but analyze and report why operational outcomes happen and why it matters to the proficiency of 

the joint force. Their reports and briefings have informed DOD and 

White House leaders. 

The Secretary’s clear recognition of the value of joint war fighting and his intention to keep many of the functions that reside 

within the Joint Forces Command are not insignificant points. He 

is stating what our military knows: we have and must retain our 

ability to act jointly. He has recommended pursuit of this final goal 

in a different way than through a unified command under four-star 

leadership. It will be the job of the nominated new commander, 

General Odierno, to do the analysis and propose a plan to do it. 

There is no better commander than General Odierno to lead this 

mission, with his wealth of experience in current joint operations. 

There is no real way to know what General Odierno will recommend in his plan, though. We can say that functions key to joint 

war fighting readiness will continue to exist. We do not know how 

large these activities will be or where they will be stationed. Activities such as joint training, joint capability integration, and joint 

doctrine development will likely continue. The Secretary has already suggested some functions, such as joint force management, 

could be returned to the Joint Staff. Joint experimentation could either be eliminated or transferred to the combatant commands. And 

the guesswork continues across the many other smaller activities 

that currently reside under JFCOM. 

But it is important again to assert that we must retain our hard 

won ability to act as a joint force. The merits of any plan going forward must be judged not by what we have achieved today or in the 

past, but what we can do tomorrow as a joint force against the very 

threats highlighted by Secretary Gates in August. Or stated differently, will we still be able to act as a joint force against these 

future threats with new capabilities, evolved doctrine, practiced 

techniques and procedures, and trained and ready leaders? 

Like any other military decision there must be an accounting for 

risk. The risk in this decision to eliminate JFCOM is about momentum, to a great extent. The question could be asked, do we need 

the structure and strength of a combatant command to sustain the 
25 

momentum of our progress towards enduring joint war fighting 

proficiency? I firmly believe the leadership of the Defense Department understands the risk of this decision, to choose a new model 

to ensure joint war fighting proficiency. I also know the troops who 

have learned to fight as a joint team will expect effective joint solutions. If we eliminate JFCOM we leave a solution that works, and 

works well. 

Going forward we must not, once again, confront old lessons 

learned in Vietnam, Desert I, Urgent Fury, or Desert Storm about 

inadequate joint training, joint force integration, and joint war 

fighting. It will be important to empower the next alternative approach with the authority, the responsibility, and the resources to 

succeed equally well if not better. And if it is more economical, 

more efficient, and more capable as evidenced by integrated action, 

not simply a general description, will know the momentum and the 

essential development of the nation’s joint force capability continues. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of John R. Wood follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN R. (BOB) WOOD, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA (RET.), 

STAR STRATEGIES GROUP

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before the Budget Committee. 

It is an honor to be here, to be afforded an opportunity to present my views, and 

to answer your questions. My comments represent my personal opinion and are 

based on my own experiences while on active duty in the U.S. Army. My duty concluded in 2009 after serving three years as the Deputy Commander of Joint Forces 

Command. 

On August 9th, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of 

initiatives to promote efficiencies and cost savings in the Department of Defense in 

advance of expected reductions in discretionary Federal spending. Through these 

initiatives, Secretary Gates wants to change the budget culture of the department, 

promote affordable acquisition, become more efficient, and eliminate redundancies 

or needless command, staff, or functional layers where possible. While seeking more than $100B over the next several years in efficiency savings, 

the Department still seeks some real growth in overall spending. More importantly, 

efficiency and cost savings will be invested in greater support to deployed troops and 

greater capabilities for this operating force. This shift of expenditures from the ‘‘tail’’ 

of supporting functions to the ‘‘tooth’’ of operating forces is a vital focus and a laudable objective. This notion of finding more capability output within given resources, 

this synergistic result, is crucially important in the face of severe resource constraints. 

These ideas of efficiency, reduction of organizational layers, elimination of redundancy and achievement of synergy underlie another prominent, long term goal of the 

Department of Defense * * * the efforts to build a truly Joint force. But Secretary 

Gates said that we have reached the point where we fully appreciate the value of 

a Joint force and, in his judgment, ‘‘we no longer need a four star headquarters’’ 

to advocate for the Joint force. For that reason, he has recommended the elimination of United States Joint Force Command. According to the Department of Defense, elimination of this command will reduce a layer of headquarters and return 

savings, an amount as yet undetermined, to the department’s economies and efficiency efforts. 

This recommendation has attracted attention and review for good reason. The 

training of Joint operational skills, exercise of Joint command and control, and the 

development of Joint capabilities are, by objective and purpose, economizing and efficient. Few other activities within the Department so naturally and closely align 

with the goals and objectives announced by Secretary Gates on August 9. The whole 

purpose of acting as a Joint force is to capitalize on the synergy of complimentary 

or integrated capabilities unified in action under the Joint force commander. Why 

then eliminate a command like JFCOM that commits itself every day in every mission to achieve economical and more efficient Joint objectives to support the Combatant Commanders? It is certainly within the authority of the Secretary to make 

such a recommendation. And, it is certainly a military decision to establish and 

align headquarters to accomplish assigned missions. But, it is a legitimate question 
26 

to ask how the alternative solution to achieve Joint readiness will not stop or reverse progress in this area. 

The ability of the US military to act as a Joint force resulted from difficult lessons 

learned in past conflicts and national missions. Whether recovering from the aftermath of Desert One, overcoming command and control lessons learned in Operation 

Urgent Fury, or building speed of response required for the next Katrina, progress 

in this Joint business has been difficult. Today’s ability for Joint action is a hard 

won strength that sets our military apart from other militaries around the world. 

To Act is the key idea. Joint is not a state of being but, instead, is a state of action. 

We can be a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine but we act jointly. 

All in the military and those who support it have worked hard to achieve this 

progress. Along the way, we needed to alter the culture, build the doctrine, train 

the forces, and learn to integrate joint capabilities. Laws such as Goldwater-Nichols 

were passed to guide this journey. Successive chairmen of the joint chiefs and Secretaries of Defense gave guidance and emphasis on various aspects of Joint integration or specific Joint missions as the military proceeded. And, through years of combat experience supported by adaptive Joint training, we’ve now built a generation 

in the military who are proficient in employment of Joint fires, intelligence, mobility, logistics, and command and control to combat today’s threats. Our success to 

act is evident in the remarkable performance of our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 

Horn of Africa and elsewhere in this global battle against terrorism. This outcome 

was no accident nor has it been easy to accomplish. 

It is not false bravado or overstatement to simply say our historical approach to 

building Joint force operational readiness by specifying such duties to a combatant 

commander contributed, in real ways, to our current state of Joint warfighting success. Since 1947, from early roots in the naval commands of the Atlantic Fleet and 

NATO until today, unified combatant commanders in Norfolk, Virginia, have been 

charged to build and sustain Joint force readiness and improve the Joint 

warfighting qualities of the nation’s military. Earlier designs of unified commands 

in Norfolk, that combined this important task to promote Joint action with geographic responsibilities, geo-political tasks, or Service specific missions, ultimately 

fell short of expectations. The operational, cultural, doctrinal, and material barriers 

to successful Joint action demanded singular attention. 

Secretary Cohen recognized this and established USJFCOM in 1999 with a clear 

mandate to understand the future requirements of the Joint force and build or train 

the Joint capabilities needed for success. With the elimination of all geographic responsibilities in 2002, JFCOM became even more focused on this mission. Just as 

the integrating functions for space, transportation, cyber, missile defense, and special operations found homes in today’s functional Combatant Commands, Joint 

warfighting became the functional mission for JFCOM. The future became its Area 

of Responsibility or AOR. 

The makeup of JFCOM, its assigned missions, its many deployments, and its 

daily operations all were defined and driven by national level guidance, DoD mandate, or JCS directive. This activity was not capricious choice or self generated action. At each point in its growth as a command or change in its mission, strong rationale was presented by past Chairmen and Secretaries of Defense as they directed 

changes to achieve better Joint synergy, Joint operational capability, or Joint force 

integration. 

The many talented military and civilians who earlier served the US Atlantic Command and today serve the US Joint Forces Command answered this call to action 

and made a huge contribution to our nation’s military readiness and strength. And, 

the civilian communities and their leaders broadly supported the command’s important work along the way. To mention just a few examples: 

• JFCOM’s Joint Training programs are perhaps best known. From Combatant 

Commander training support, to expansion of networked training capabilities, to 

federation of advanced Modeling and Simulation, command activities contributed repeatedly and materially to the training of all Joint conventional and special operations headquarters and staffs in the wars of the last 9 years. 

• Lesser known are the activities of JFCOM’s ready forces. These smaller elements have repeatedly deployed worldwide to support Joint commanders responding 

to crisis on behalf of national missions. They stand ready tonight to deploy again 

and immediately provide trained, critical operational capabilities such as command 

and control, public affairs, fires integration, personnel recovery, and other special 

staff skills. 

• Then, there are the activities in JFCOM’s Joint Integration directorate that attend to critical coordinating tasks confronting the Joint force. Prevention of fratricide, elimination of redundant or competing IT systems, and promotion of coalition 

information sharing are just some examples of its daily work. 
27 

• The list goes on to include teams and subordinate commands under JFCOM 

that tackle tough integration tasks delegated to them from the Chairman such as 

joint fires integration, irregular warfare competence, Joint personnel recovery proficiency, and coordinated Joint UAS operations. 

• And, in the area of Joint experimentation, JFCOM has kept a focus on future 

Joint warfighting and operational needs. Interagency and coalition integration, operational planning methods, and integration of advanced technologies into joint operations comprise a small part of its work. 

• The Joint Force Provider mission consumes a major part of the command’s energy, particularly as transitions continue in Iraq and Afghanistan. Intense, daily coordination with the Services by uniquely skilled force managers permit JFCOM to 

develop and offer objective advice and specific force packages to answer ever-changing Combatant Commander requirements. The force management agility to accomplish the surge in Iraq and now in Afghanistan depended greatly on the quiet professionals working diligently in JFCOM. 

• Finally, unique elements in the Joint world such as the Joint Warfare Analysis 

Center and the Joint Center for Operational Analysis continue to provide key support to the Combatant Commanders and the Department of Defense. JWAC daily 

advances the art and science of targeting in both the kinetic and non-kinetic realm. 

JCOA has perfected an ability to not just record Joint lessons learned but analyze 

and report why operational outcomes happened and why it matters to the proficiency of the Joint force. Their reports and briefings have informed DoD and White 

House leaders. 

The Secretary’s clear recognition of the value of Joint warfighting and his intention to keep many of the functions that reside within the Joint Forces Command 

are not insignificant points. He is stating what our military knows * * * we have 

and must retain our ability to act Jointly. He has recommended pursuit of this vital 

goal in a different way than through a Unified command under four-star leadership. 

It will be the job of the nominated new commander, General Odierno, to do the 

analysis and propose a plan to do it. There is no better commander than General 

Odierno to lead this mission, with his wealth of experience in current Joint operations. 

There is no real way to know what General Odierno will recommend in his plan. 

We can say that functions key to Joint warfighting readiness will continue to exist. 

We don’t know how large these activities will be or where they will be stationed. 

Activities such as Joint training, joint capability integration, and joint doctrine development will likely continue. The Secretary has already suggested some functions 

such as Joint Force management could be returned to the Joint Staff. Joint experimentation could either be eliminated or transferred to the Combatant Commands. 

And, the guesswork continues across the many other smaller activities that currently reside under JFCOM. 

But, it’s important again to assert that we must retain our hard won ability to 

act as a Joint force. The merits of any plan going forward must be judged not by 

what we’ve achieved today or in the past, but what we can do tomorrow as a Joint 

force against the very threats highlighted by Secretary Gates in August. Or, stated 

differently, will we still be able to act as a Joint force against these future threats, 

with new capabilities, evolved doctrine, practiced tactics, techniques, and procedures, and trained and ready leaders? 

Like any other military decision, there must be an accounting for risk. The risk 

in this decision to eliminate JFCOM is about momentum, to a great extent. The 

question could be asked, ‘‘Do we need the structure and strength of a Combatant 

Command to sustain the momentum of our progress toward enduring Joint 

warfighting proficiency?’’ 

I firmly believe the leadership of the Department of Defense understands the risk 

of this decision to choose a new model to insure Joint warfighting proficiency. I also 

know the troops who’ve learned to fight as a Joint team will expect effective Joint 

solutions. If we eliminate JFCOM, we leave a solution that works and works well. 

Going forward, we must not, once again, confront old lessons learned in Vietnam, 

Desert One, Urgent Fury, or Desert Storm about inadequate Joint training, Joint 

force integration, and Joint warfighting. It will be important to empower the next 

alternative approach with the authority, the responsibility, and the resources to succeed equally well if not better. And, if it is more economical, more efficient, and 

more capable as evidenced by action, not simply in description, we’ll know the momentum in the essential development of the nation’s Joint force capability continues. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Mr. Soloway? 
28 

STATEMENT OF STAN Z. SOLOWAY 

Mr. SOLOWAY. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today and 

share the views of the nearly 350 members of the Professional 

Services Council on the different and important efficiency and 

insourcing initiatives underway in the Defense Department. PSC is 

the largest organization of government services contractors in the 

nation with a membership that includes companies of all sizes performing services of all kinds across the government, very prominently including the Defense Department. 

Let me start by saying that I am not here today to challenge the 

intent or focus of Secretary Gates’ initiatives. The Secretary has set 

in motion a series of efforts that are most necessary and timely. 

The fiscal pressures faced by the government as a whole, and DOD 

in particular, coupled with the clear workforce challenges that have 

existed for some time, mandate that the Department move aggressively to both optimize its resources and balance its workforce. As 

such, our approach to each of these initiatives, which I will address 

individually in a moment, has been to seek a collaborative dialogue 

aimed at enabling success. 

As many have already pointed out this afternoon, in addition to 

being important initiatives they must be conducted in a manner 

that meets basic principles of analytical rigor, transparency, and 

collaboration. Unfortunately to varying degrees and in different 

ways none have fully met these basic tests. 

There are actually three separate but interconnected and interdependent initiatives underway today. The Secretary’s efficiency 

initiative, through which he has established an ambitious but 

achievable goal of some $100 billion in savings over the next three 

years. Under Secretary Carter’s acquisition improvement initiative, 

which is designed to ensure the Department gets best value in its 

acquisition process. And the Secretary’s insourcing initiative, which 

was designed to help DOD address shortfalls in critical workforce 

skills. 

Under Secretary Carter’s acquisition improvement initiative is 

very much a work in progress. And while many questions have 

arisen relative to some of the goals he has established, the process 

of defining the details associated with execution are just now underway. The Department has pledged to work with a number of different groups, including industry, in developing those details and 

we welcome that opportunity. As such, for the purposes of this 

hearing I will focus more on the Secretary’s efficiency initiative and 

the trend to insource. 

With regard to the Secretary’s efforts to find $100 billion in savings, our principal questions revolve around the analytics underpinning several of the specific actions. We take no position on organizational questions, such as the closure of JFCOM, BTA, or NII, 

but do agree with everyone that it would be helpful if the Department were to share more of the data that led to the specific decisions. I might add in addition to the comments, Mr. Chairman, 

that you made earlier this afternoon, in his comments on closing 

JFCOM the Secretary also made a major point of the fact that 

JFCOM is very ‘‘contractor heavy,’’ whatever that may mean. But 

that in and of itself does not seem to me to be a reason to close 
29 

a command. Who is performing the work is of far less significance 

than the nature, relevance, and quality of the work being performed. The core issue should be mission focused, not who focused. 

Similarly the Secretary has mandated a 10 percent per year reduction in contract support services for the next three years. This 

begs much the same question: what is magical about reducing contract services? Clearly if the work involved is inherently governmental that is one thing. But beyond that I think it is fair to ask 

why that directive was not targeted more holistically, to include 

the full range of departmental activities without regard to who is 

performing the work, a strategic mission focused approach. 

The record surrounding DOD’s insourcing initiative is far more 

troubling. In simple terms, the Secretary set out in April of 2009 

to address the Department’s workforce issues by adding 35,000 new 

positions, many of them in acquisition. Half of those positions were 

to come through insourcing currently contracted work, the other 

half through new hires. We strongly supported this initiative, even 

though many of our member companies would likely be affected. 

We all recognize the importance of ensuring DOD has the right 

skills in place to plan, manage, and oversee its missions. And to 

be fair, some progress has been made amongst the acquisition work 

force. But overall, the initiative has devolved into a quota-driven 

exercise tied to arbitrary budget assumptions that have little or no 

analytical data to support them. More than half of the positions 

identified for insourcing involve routine support services and will 

thus do nothing to help address the workforce issues the Secretary 

identified. 

In my written statement I have detailed some of what we have 

seen, and the lack of analysis and transparency that has underpinned those decisions. I would be happy to discuss it in more detail during the question period. 

As a result of this highly undisciplined process, insourcing is taking place that will actually increase cost to the taxpayer without 

addressing the Department’s workforce needs. Moreover, the Department has been entirely unwilling to share any of the analyses 

that are being done to support either individual insourcing decisions or the overall budgetary assumptions. In addition, no consideration is being given to the broader economic impacts associated 

with insourcing, particularly with regard to local and regional 

economies and the associated loss of tax and other revenues. 

Clearly, the government should not be a jobs program for the private sector, nor for the public sector for that matter. And where 

work must be done by federal employees the economic and cost impacts are what they are and must be accepted. But where options 

exist for performance those impacts should very much be a part of 

the analytical equation. When small businesses shutter their doors 

as a result of an undisciplined insourcing we should ask where the 

analyses are to support such effects. Likewise, when local tax revenues or investment bases are reduced as a result of this process we 

should ask how the trade offs and the analytics to support that 

have been structured and meet the best needs of the government 

and the taxpayer. And when insourcing decisions result in the government assuming vastly greater deferred liabilities than imme-
30 

diate savings it has projected, we should ensure that the analytics 

broadly support such decisions. 

Unfortunately, today that is not occurring. And as this process 

has unfolded the Department and the military services have refused to share publicly, or with the directly affected companies or 

unions, the analyses underpinning their decisions. Frankly, the unwillingness to do so is inexplicable and directly counter to the increased transparency Congress and the administration have been 

advocating. 

Mr. Chairman, as I said Secretary Gates and Under Secretary 

Carter have embarked on important and ambitious initiatives that 

we support and want to succeed as designed. Our hope as these 

processes unfold the degree of openness and dialogue will dramatically increase so that together we can ensure that success. Thank 

you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Stan Soloway follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STAN SOLOWAY, PRESIDENT & CEO, 

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. My name is Stan Soloway and I am the President and 

CEO of the Professional Services Council, the nation’s largest association of government services contractors. 

The Department of Defense has embarked on several important and ambitious 

initiatives to reduce its overhead costs, eliminate unnecessary work, and properly 

balance its workforce. I appreciate the opportunity to share our views on those initiatives. As these initiatives unfold, it is in everyone’s interests to ensure that they 

do so in a transparent, evidence-based, mission-focused manner. Moreover, those attributes should exist in advance of any decision or action, not as a post-hoc rationalization. 

Let me make clear that we fully recognize the imperatives the Secretary of Defense has identified and support his commitment to ensuring that the department 

optimizes its resources and appropriately aligns its workforce needs. There is no 

question that there are savings to be had and that, in this time of exceptional fiscal 

pressures, every effort needs to be made to identify and capitalize on those opportunities. Moreover, as we have made clear repeatedly to the department, the members 

and staff of the Professional Services Council stand ready to work closely with the 

department in the development and implementation of strategies that will enable 

the department to meet its goals. We already have had some of those discussions 

but many more are needed. Conversely, the Secretary’s ambitious objectives will not 

likely be met if the department attempts to operate in a vacuum, solely through directives, or on the basis of arbitrary goals. 

The department has set in motion three independent but interconnected objectives. These include the Secretary’s insourcing initiative, which was launched in 

early 2009; the department-wide efficiency initiative he announced earlier this year 

and elaborated on in his August 9 statement; and Undersecretary Carter’s acquisition improvement initiative which was initially announced on June 28 and more 

fully unveiled on September 14. Since the acquisition initiatives remain a work in 

progress, particularly with regards to improvements in what Dr. Carter called 

‘‘tradecraft’’ in services acquisition, I will focus most, but not all, of my remarks on 

the other two initiatives. In all cases much work remains to be done to ensure they 

truly meet the tests of transparency, rigorous analysis, and collaboration. 

THE ACQUISITION INITIATIVES: A WORK IN PROGRESS

We commend Undersecretary Carter for undertaking an acquisition improvement 

initiative and we look forward to engaging in substantive dialogue with the department as the details of the initiative unfold. Our goal is to engage with the department to identify ways to ensure the objectives of the initiatives are met. For now, 

let me make just a few brief comments on the initiatives as they currently stand. 

First, with regard to competition, Dr. Carter made clear his concern that competition for services is not what he would like it to be. In so doing, he mentioned that 

some 28 percent of awards that were solicited broadly and were intended to be 

awarded competitively, attracted only one bid. His stated goal is to lower that per-
31 

centage. While we would not disagree with him on the importance of competition 

and of maximizing the number of offers that the department receives, there are 

strong explanations for industry’s lack of response to some solicitations that should 

be disclosed and discussed. 

Improvements in performance work statements, genuine openness to innovation, 

and more are all key ingredients to enhancing competition and attracting more bidders. But we should also recognize that competition is not simply defined by the 

number of bidders. Every contractor performing on a services contract knows that 

his or her competitors are watching them constantly, and prepared to pounce on opportunities that emerge through recompetition for the work. At the same time, those 

competitors are simply not going to bid if they perceive that the incumbent is performing well and the contract appears to be competitively priced. Nonetheless, the 

very fact that they are prepared to bid when an incumbent stumbles or a new innovation opens a door, creates a kind of implied competition that must also be considered and appreciated. 

Second, it is important to recognize that the issues of competition and the market 

dynamics of the services sector are entirely different from the hardware or weapons 

system sectors and thus demand very different actions. As Dr. Carter noted, the department does not yet have an adequate taxonomy for defining services and developing the right kinds of acquisition strategies for each relevant case. We believe 

that a common taxonomy must be developed and in place before specific policy or 

strategy decisions are made. 

Finally, Dr. Carter appropriately discussed the need to drive more innovation. We 

agree, and we look forward to engaging with him and his team to affect acquisition 

practices that genuinely enable innovation. But let’s be clear, while the statutory 

and regulatory authority clearly exists to enable the department to make the valuebased decisions that are essential to attracting and rewarding innovation, the current environment is overtly hostile toward what is known as ‘‘best value’’ acquisitions. I believe it is fair to say that every one of our member companies is deeply 

concerned that the government has, over the last four or more years, regressed in 

its acquisition practices to the point where virtually every award decision is made 

on the basis of the lowest price—even if that is NOT what the request for proposal 

states. To some extent, this is a result of the ongoing fiscal pressures facing the department. To another extent, it is the direct result of the influence of elements of 

the oversight community that almost invariably criticize, sometimes very harshly, 

acquisition professionals who make value-based judgments and do not award to the 

lowest bidder. This dynamic serves no one’s best interests and must be reversed, 

at a minimum through specific policy guidance. 

INSOURCING: A GOOD IDEA GONE AWRY

In April 2009, Secretary Gates announced an initiative to rebuild the department’s critical workforce skills, particularly, but not solely, within the acquisition 

workforce. The Secretary expressed concern that a combination of factors, including 

workforce demographics and a broken hiring and personnel system, had created an 

over-reliance on contractors. At that time, the Secretary outlined a strategy to increase the department’s organic workforce with those critical skills by approximately 35,000 people. He said that roughly half of the increase would result from 

insourcing and the other half would represent new hires. As part of the implementation of the Secretary’s action, the DoD Comptroller issued a classified ‘‘Resource 

Management Decision 802’’ (RMD 802) that provided budgetary guidance to the 

military departments and defense agencies. That RMD has never been made public. 

There is no question that the department simply does not have adequate internal 

capability or skills to design, award, or manage contracts for its many and diverse 

missions. As such, PSC was supportive of the Secretary’s plan. Although a number 

of companies recognized that some of their work could be affected, the consensus 

among our member companies then was that the Secretary’s actions were on the 

right track. Unfortunately, the implementation of his plan has not accurately reflected either his stated intention or addressed the department’s most pressing 

needs. 

First, the Secretary’s numeric personnel targets were allocated across the military 

departments and other defense agencies, which, in turn created individual quotas 

for each component. Indeed, widely distributed Air Force Materiel Command 

(AFMC) documents confirm this fact. Those documents state that AFMC’s ‘‘share’’ 

of the Secretary’s directive is roughly 3,500 positions.’’ Similar statements were 

made by components of the Army and Navy. 

Second, the AFMC documents clarified that, through Resource Management Decision 802, the department was assuming a 40 percent savings for every position 
32 

1See the PSC June 16, 2010 letter to The Honorable Christine Fox, director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, available at http://www.pscouncil.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Policy—Issues&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=5562. 

insourced. If this extraordinary declaration was based on any analysis, it has never 

been publicly released, despite repeated requests from industry and, members of 

Congress. But the AFMC documents are enlightening on the question of how such 

savings could possibly be achieved. It says and I quote: ‘‘The objective is to replace 

contract costs with personnel costs.’’ 

In other words, the department was comparing fully burdened operational contract costs—which include salaries, benefits, equipment, hardware procured under 

a contract, other overhead and, of course, profit—with just the salaries and immediate benefits of a federal employee. No consideration was apparently given to any 

of the expense categories for contract performance that also apply to government 

performance, nor was consideration apparently given to unique government costs, 

principally post-employment costs such as retirement benefits and long-term health 

care. In January 2010, the department finally issued ‘‘guidance’’ in the form of a Directive Type Memorandum, or DTM, to provide a methodology that would enable a 

more accurate assessment of the relative costs of contract performance versus inhouse federal performance. However, as we outlined in an extensive analysis we 

provided to the department,1 the DTM provides neither a workable methodology nor 

a comprehensive listing of all of the identifiable costs that must be considered in 

any objective process. 

Other analyses have also concluded that the DTM contains a number of inexplicable contradictions. For example, in assessing the relative costs of performing 

work using uniform military or civil servants, the DTM requires that all post retirement and other benefits costs for each be considered. But in comparing the costs 

of civil service performance versus contractor performance, the DTM specifically prohibits the consideration of any costs that would not be incurred by DoD. What might 

those costs be? By far the biggest category would be the post retirement costs associated with the civil service since they become the responsibility of the Office of Personnel Management. Moreover, it is notable that the DTM was not issued until 

some nine months AFTER the Secretary issued his insourcing directive and six or 

more months after RMD 802 declared the savings that would be achieved. This led 

to funding decisions that were embedded in the budget before the cost comparison 

process, weak as it may be, was even developed. Obviously, the order of events 

should logically have been reversed. 

ANALYSES NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO AFFECTED PARTIES OR THE PUBLIC

Regrettably, while the department has acknowledged our analysis and concerns, 

it has not responded to any of the specific issues we raised. The same occurred in 

2009 when Congressman Jeff Miller wrote the Air Force requesting information 

about the insourcing of routine base support services—primarily because those actions resulted in a small business with nearly twenty years of service to DoD literally going out of business. In its response to Congressman Miller, the Air Force 

did not share any of the analytics underpinning that insourcing decision. 

With the combination of established numerical headcount quotas and specific dollars savings assumptions, along with the lack of a workable, analytically rigorous 

process for assessing relative costs, the department’s insourcing process has been 

marked more by efforts to meet those targets and survive presumptive budget cuts 

than by strategic workforce efforts focused on the kinds of skills the department 

needs most and that the Secretary set out to address. By the department’s own estimates, at least half of the positions identified to date for insourcing fall outside of 

the kinds of critical skills the Secretary was targeting in his original directive. That 

means that the department has based at least half of the insourcing decisions 

reached to date on incomplete and highly questionable cost analyses and thus is 

insourcing contracted positions performing entirely routine work rather than obtaining the critical skills that were identified by the Secretary in 2009. 

A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

In addition to the apparently arbitrary and undisciplined manner in which DoD 

insourcing has progressed, we are deeply concerned about the continued refusal of 

the department’s components to publicly share the analyses that have led to individual decisions. In virtually every case I am aware of, DoD activities have not even 

been willing to share the bottom line conclusions they reached in their analyses, let 

alone the analyses themselves. This is consistent with the AFMC guidance ref-
33 

erenced earlier that states that the analytical tools are only available at the major 

command level. But it is highly inconsistent with the government’s otherwise broad 

commitment to transparency and, indeed, to decades of tradition in contracting, 

where contract prices are announced at the time of contract award. Moreover, because the analyses do not involve competing proposals, there is no objective reason 

they cannot be shared with the affected incumbent contractors. 

This has left the affected parties, including companies and their workforces, with 

only the option of filing Freedom of Information Act requests. For example, the 

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers have filed numerous 

such requests. After the first of those requests was responded to in a relatively timely manner, they have been entirely unsuccessful with each of their subsequent requests. This simply does not need to be. Indeed, if there was more transparency in 

the process, the need for costly and time consuming FoIA requests would largely 

disappear. 

AIR FORCE DOCUMENTS REVEAL ANALYTICAL WEAKNESSES

However, the one FOIA request on which the IAM was successful was highly informative and may reflect one of the reasons there has been such resistance to responding to additional requests. 

In this case, the Air Force decided to insource a contract with an estimated five 

year value of approximately $225 million. The documents obtained as a result of the 

FOIA request show that the Air Force expects to save only $450,000 over the life 

of the contract, equal to 0.02 percent. This clearly contradicts the long-held consensus that a minimum savings of about 10 percent should be required for any 

insourcing OR outsourcing decision, just to cover the inevitable costs associated with 

the workforce churn that will take place. What is even more telling about this Air 

Force analysis are the details behind it. 

For instance, the Air Force assigned to the contract cost elements that were never 

executed; had just one of those elements been eliminated as they should have been, 

the result of the analysis would have been a net cost INCREASE resulting from the 

insourcing. In addition, the Air Force clearly did not include a wide range of training, personnel development and support costs that are covered under the contract 

and which will accrue similarly to the government. 

Even more telling however, are two other aspects of the analysis. First, the Air 

Force is planning to perform the work with approximately 15 percent fewer personnel than the contract calls for. In light of the fact that the Air Force’s own, highly questionable analysis shows that the savings from the insourcing will be negligible, one can fairly and clearly conclude that the cost per person associated with 

performing the work in house will be significantly higher than under the contract— 

and that’s before adding in the many cost elements ignored by the analysis. If, in 

fact, the work can be performed with fewer people, imagine the savings that would 

be possible if the Air Force and the contractor worked together to identify workforce 

efficiencies. 

Finally, the Air Force analysis did not include any assessment of post-retirement 

costs associated with the federal workforce. A simple calculation shows clearly that 

just post-retirement health insurance premiums will result in the government assuming tens of millions of dollars in deferred liabilities against a purported savings 

of less than a half million dollars. 

This example is one of the very few where data is available. But it is instructive 

and reflective of the broader departmental approach, as illustrated in the AFMC 

documents. And it is clear from this example that the only real explanation for continuing with this particular insourcing action is to meet pre-determined quotas— 

even if, as in this case, the real short and long term costs to the government will 

actually be higher. 

This is not a new finding. More than a decade ago, when the Army moved so 

heavily into contractor logistics support, it did so because it recognized that it is cost 

prohibitive for a permanent civil service to perform work that is variable in both 

nature and scope. Similarly, following the early phases of the Iraq war, the Navy 

realized that far too many of its sailors were engaged in out-of-theater support work 

at a cost the Navy could no longer afford. Since so much of that work was variable 

in scope and amount, the Navy also chose, in some but not all cases, to hire private 

contractors rather than incur the permanent and long-term costs of civil service employees. 

This is not to in any way demean the value or importance of the civil service. 

Rather, it is merely to reinforce the importance of conducting, on a case-by-case 

basis and in a manner consistent with the missions involved, meaningful and complete cost comparisons. 
34 

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT INSOURCING SAVINGS HAVE NOT

MATERIALIZED

In light of the issues and concerns outlined above, it is not surprising that the 

Secretary of Defense on August 9 acknowledged that insourcing has not resulted in 

the desired savings. As a result, with the appropriate exception of some critical acquisition skills, he announced a significant de-emphasis on insourcing as part of his 

efficiency initiative. However, the Secretary’s changed strategy applies only to the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commands and the defense agencies. It has no direct effect on insourcing activities within the military departments, 

which appear to be continuing apace, despite the clear and compelling evidence that 

real savings are illusory. 

ECONOMIC IMPACTS IGNORED

Finally, with regard to the current insourcing initiative, no consideration is being 

given to either the loss of imputed corporate tax and other revenues to local or state 

governments or the impacts associated with reducing well-paying, private-sector 

jobs at a time when such jobs are what the economy needs more than anything. 

While the government should not be a jobs program for either civil servants or contractor employees, it is reasonable to ask the critical question of how insourcing, in 

the cases where it involves routine commercial activities that do not need to be performed by federal employees, serves the nation’s broader economic interests or the 

interests of the local economies that are affected. 

Some would argue that this is a false premise and that, in fact, insourcing simply 

changes the identity of the employer and that employees keep their jobs. However 

that is simply not the case. Some work actually does change locations. Moreover, 

as noted explicitly in the AFMC guidance, incumbent contractor employees are not 

in any way assured of a continuation of their jobs, their salaries, or their employment status. Indeed, with the exception of the limited benefits associated with direct 

hire authority that has been granted for acquisition positions only, incumbent contractor employees face the very same gauntlet of employment processes and procedures as any other new government hire. 

In addition, insourcing actions have a very real effect on local governments and 

economies associated with reduced private sector revenues. Real estate taxes and 

development, local corporate use and sales taxes and other critically important 

sources of local revenue are eliminated when work is insourced. If the work involved 

is inherently governmental or so critical that it must be performed by a government 

employee, then we agree that it is a price that needs to be paid. But when it is not, 

such impacts cannot be ignored, particularly in the current difficult economic environment. 

TOWARD AN ACCURATE COMPARATIVE PROCESS

Given the track record thus far, and the extreme paucity of information being 

shared, we would propose that, for each insourcing action involving OTHER than 

inherently governmental functions or work that is otherwise deemed so critical that 

it must be performed by federal employees, the department be required to conduct 

an analysis of the total lifecycle costs borne now or in the future by the American 

taxpayer associated with performing the work in house. This analysis should also 

include an assessment, made on the basis of reasonable market research, of the potential benefits that might accrue through a new competitive award process or 

through contract adjustments negotiated with the incumbent contractor. Finally, 

there should be an analysis of the impact of an insourcing decision on small businesses prior to finalizing the decision. After all, as the President has said, small 

business is the engine of innovation and is critical to our economic recovery. As 

such, it seems counter-intuitive to take work away from small businesses unless 

doing so results in meaningful and measurable benefits for the American taxpayer. 

SECRETARY GATES’ EFFICIENCY INITIATIVE: SOME ANSWERS, SOME QUESTIONS

On August 9, Secretary Gates announced a new initiative to find $100 billion in 

defense budget savings over the next several fiscal years. Among the components 

of this initiative are a freeze on new hires within the Office of the Secretary, the 

defense agencies and combatant commands; reductions in the number of senior flag 

and general officers; proposed reductions in the general bureaucracy; and a 10 percent reduction in contract support services each year for the next three years. 

We support efforts to achieve the Secretary’s desired results. The department has 

no choice but to reduce its overhead costs and eliminate unnecessary spending if it 

is to meet its mission needs. While we take no position on his specific decisions to 
35 

2 ‘‘Policy for Communication with Industry’’ memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense 

William Lynn, attached. 

close Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the Business Transformation Agency (BTA), 

or the Network Information and Integration (NII) office, questions about the strategic analyses underpinning these decisions, much like many of the insourcing decisions discussed earlier. Regardless of whether those are decisions that are the discretion of the department or whether there are additional statutory procedures that 

must be followed, all stakeholders should be privy to the factors considered and the 

justification to shutter commands and programs. 

In his August 9 statement, the Secretary echoed the words of the Defense Business Board when, in explaining his decision to close JFCOM, he talked specifically 

about how the command was ‘‘contractor heavy.’’ Whether closing JFCOM is the 

right action or not, we find that justification wanting. In our view, WHO is doing 

the work has nothing to do with whether the work being done remains important 

and valuable to the mission. It is the mission need and not the badge of the worker 

that should drive such a decision. In that vein, it would be very helpful to understand more about the analytical underpinnings of this decision, particularly given 

the effect the JFCOM closure will have on the economy of the Tidewater region in 

Virginia. The same rigor should underpin the decision to close BTA and NII. 

The same concerns apply to the Secretary’s direction that contract support services be reduced by 10 percent each year for the next three years. There are already 

conflicting reports as to what contracted services are included in this directive. Is 

it all service contracting? Is it specific subcategories? How was the 10 percent goal 

determined? 

Most importantly, what is magical about contracted support services? Why target 

only contractor-performed work rather than the totality of the work being done by 

the department? Why does the directive not seek a more holistic approach to all 

work being performed by DoD in an effort to find areas of redundancy or changed 

needs, regardless of who is performing that work? 

In short, our principal concern with the 10 percent per year target is its arbitrary 

nature and its failure to look comprehensively and strategically within each defense 

activity at all of the work being performed by the total force of uniform military, 

civil servants and contractors. 

Finally, as these reductions are executed, questions remain as to whether the execution strategies will be developed through a collaborative process in which the contractors and the department work together to find ways to reduce the overall costs 

of performance or will be implemented through prescriptive direction. Again, the 

best hope for effective implementation is the kind of communication and collaboration that marks the best in customer/supplier relationships. Unfortunately, in today’s environment, our public-sector partners too often feel that they are under increasing pressure to reduce, not enhance, their communications with industry. This 

violates common sense and the most fundamental premises of good business relationships. In fact, the problem became so severe that Deputy Secretary of Defense 

William Lynn issued a memorandum in June reminding the department’s workforce 

of the essential importance of constant and open communication with their privatesector partners.2 Unfortunately, the pressure remains. And there is thus an abject 

need to not only remind the workforce of the importance of communication, but to 

insist that they engage in it. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, our goal today is not to question the objectives Secretary Gates 

has set forth through any of these initiatives. What he is seeking to do is the right 

thing to do and he deserves our strong support. At the same time, to the degree 

actions taken in the field run contrary either to his guidance or to the best chances 

of successfully implementing his initiatives, it is important for us to speak out. We 

have reached out to the department on many occasions with some limited success. 

And we look forward to more detailed and ongoing dialogue. The decisions being 

made today and in the months ahead will have enormous repercussions for the department, the taxpayer and the thousands of high performing companies supporting 

our national security mission. As such, those decisions must be analytically rigorous 

and the process behind them must be open and transparent to the degree our national security interests allow. Without such analyses or transparency, the likelihood of falling well short of the Secretary’s important goals is increased many times 

over. 

Thank you again for your time and the opportunity to provide this information 

and our perspective. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have. 
36 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Ms. Simon? 

STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE SIMON 

Ms. SIMON. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I 

want to thank you for the opportunity to present the views of federal employees on DOD’s efficiency initiative. The more than 

200,000 civilian DOD employees represented by AFGE support efforts to increase the efficiency of the Department’s operations that 

are consistent with its mission. We realize that the Department’s 

initiative involves many different tasks and we are here today to 

talk about three in particular: the freeze on civilian positions, the 

restrictions on insourcing, and the cuts in contractor spending. 

During the previous two administrations the civilian workforce 

experienced efficiency initiatives and in these cases efficiency 

turned out to be code for massive and indiscriminate privatization 

that increased costs to taxpayers and caused the outsourcing of 

many important and sensitive functions that should always be performed by civilian employees. So AFGE members understandably 

have questions about the Department’s most recent efficiency initiative, which include a three-year freeze on the size of the civilian 

workforce and a severe restriction in the effort underway to rebalance the federal workforce so as to reduce reliance on contractors. 

Both efforts appear to be contrary to laws that, number one, forbid 

the management of the civilian workforce by arbitrary constraints, 

and number two require DOD to use civilian employees, or at least 

give special consideration to using civilian employees, to perform 

various functions. 

Technically the Department’s initiatives apply to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the combatant commands, and the defense 

agencies, but not to the military departments which employ the 

bulk of the civilian workforce and which conduct the vast majority 

of insourcing efforts. However, because of the Department’s sometimes copycat corporate culture, there are some in the military departments who are using the efficiency initiatives to advance proposals to arbitrarily reduce the civilian workforce and to discourage 

meritorious insourcing efforts. 

Our AFGE members who work in acquisition have also questioned how the Department can implement cuts in service contractor costs, especially given the Department’s apparent inability 

to either implement the contractor inventory requirements or integrate the results into the budget process. 

Ultimately, AFGE members are very concerned that for the third 

administration in a row the civilian workforce will bear a significantly disproportionate share of the sacrifices necessary to achieve 

efficiencies. As history shows, DOD has repeatedly frozen and 

shrunk its civilian workforce, resulting in wasteful, wholesale privatization, as well as widespread losses of critical in-house capacities. At the same time DOD has been consistently unable to manage its contractors, let alone reduce their costs. Understandably, 

our members fear that the well-intentioned initiative announced by 

Secretary Gates last month will not turn out any differently. 

The case for insourcing functions that are inherently governmental, functions that are closely associated with inherently governmental work, and considering insourcing for government work 
37 

that was outsourced without competition, or that is being poorly 

performed by contractors, starts with the obligation to enforce current law. In part in reaction to the over-reliance on contractors and 

the excesses of outsourcing, Congress has enacted laws that require 

that inherently governmental functions be performed by civilian 

employees; that closely associated with inherently governmental 

functions be performed by civilian federal employees to the maximum extent practicable; and per the inventory law DOD is required to correct any unauthorized personal services contracts 

through elimination, modification, or insourcing. DOD must also 

give special consideration to insourcing functions that are closely 

associated to inherently governmental work, contracted out without 

competition, and contracted out but poorly performed either in 

terms of cost or quality. Finally, DOD is required by law to consider shifting work between its civilian contractor and military 

workforces depending on which one is least costly in a way that is 

consistent with military requirements. So how can insourcing that 

is required to be undertaken, or at least be given special consideration, or even mere consideration, actually occur if the civilian 

workforce is frozen for three years? 

The Army’s contractor inventory provides us with some keen insights. Of the 95,000 contractor jobs that were reviewed by the beginning of 2010 more than 2,000 were inherently governmental, another 41,000 were closely associated with inherently governmental, 

and another 1,500 were performed pursuant to unauthorized personal service contracts. This assessment does not include critical 

jobs performed by contractors that might need to be insourced and 

it also does not include the contractor jobs that should be insourced 

because the contracts involved were entered into without competition or are being poorly performed, again either for cost or quality 

reasons. 

There is nothing unique about the Army’s excessive reliance on 

contractors, unfortunately. What is unique is the extent to which 

the Army has documented the problem through its conscientious 

compliance with the fiscal year 2008 contractor inventory requirement. If the Army’s inventory is typical of the Department, how 

will DOD rebalance its overall workforce if a three-year freeze has 

been imposed on its civilian workforce? 

This concludes my statement and I will be happy to answer any 

questions members of the Committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Jacqueline Simon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE SIMON, PUBLIC POLICY DIRECTOR, 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL–CIO 

Thank you, Chairman Spratt, Ranking Member Ryan, and members of the House 

Budget Committee for this opportunity to present the views of federal employees at 

today’s hearing on the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efficiency initiative. The more 

than 200,000 civilian employees represented by AFGE support efforts to increase 

the efficiency of the department’s operation that are consistent with its mission. 

During the previous two Administrations, the civilian workforce experienced earlier efficiency initiatives—which turned out to be code for a massive and indiscriminate privatization that increased costs to taxpayers and caused the outsourcing of 

many important and sensitive functions that should always be performed by civilian 

employees. 

AFGE members understandably have questions about the department’s most recent efficiency initiative, which includes a three-year freeze on the size of the civilian workforce and a severe restriction on the vital effort underway to rebalance the 
38 

federal workforce so as to reduce reliance on contractors. Both efforts appear to be 

contrary to laws that forbid the management of the civilian workforce by arbitrary 

constraints and require the department to use civilian employees or at least give 

special consideration to using civilian employees to perform various functions. 

Technically, the department’s initiative applies to the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Combatant Commands, and the Defense Agencies—but not to the military departments which employ the bulk of the civilian workforce and which conduct the vast majority of insourcing efforts. However, because of the department’s 

sometimes copycat corporate culture, there are some in the military departments 

who are using the efficiency initiative to advance proposals to arbitrarily reduce the 

civilian workforce and to discourage meritorious insourcing efforts. 

AFGE members who work in acquisition are also skeptical of how the department 

can implement cuts in service contractor costs, especially given its inability to implement the contractor inventory requirement (and then integrate the results into the 

budget process) and the apparent counterproductive obsession on achieving reductions in just two particular categories of service contracting costs, object classes 25.1 

and 25.2.i 

Ultimately, AFGE members are very concerned that, for the third Administration 

in a row, the civilian workforce will bear a significantly disproportionate share of 

the sacrifices necessary to achieve efficiency. As history shows, DoD has repeatedly 

frozen and shrunk its civilian workforce, resulting in wasteful wholesale privatization as well as widespread losses of critical in-house capacities. At the same time, 

DoD has consistently been unable to manage its contractors, let alone reduce their 

costs. Understandably, our members fear that the well-intentioned initiative announced by Secretary Gates last month will not turn out any differently. 

1. THREE-YEAR FREEZE ON THE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

Historically, civilian personnel freezes have led to increased contracting out. Work 

still needs to be performed; if civilian employees can’t be used because of the freeze, 

then contracts must be undertaken instead. Indeed, in the absence of any consideration of in-house performance, contracting in such circumstances often leads to increased costs and contractor performance of functions that are too important or sensitive to outsource. 

Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has always striven to prevent DoD from imposing 

artificial constraints on its workforce. 10 U.S.C. 129 requires the department to 

manage its civilian workforce solely on the basis of workload and funding. Under 

the law, DoD is forbidden to impose any constraint or limitation in terms of man 

years, end strength, full-time equivalent positions, or maximum number of employees. Moreover, the military department secretaries must certify annually that their 

workforces are not managed by such constraints or limitations. A streamlined 

version of this law is also included in every Defense Appropriations Bill. No workload analysis was prepared by the department prior to the Secretary’s announcement that would justify a three-year freeze on the civilian workforce—and risk even 

more outsourcing that increases costs to taxpayers and further undermines performance. 

2. A SEVERE REDUCTION IN INSOURCING

Secretary Gates said last August that the department was not ‘‘seeing the savings 

we had hoped from insourcing’’. Consequently, contractors would not be replaced 

with federal employees except in extraordinary circumstances; rather, the positions 

held by contractors would simply be eliminated. Naturally, contractors chose to interpret this remark to mean that insourcing had failed. 

However, DoD officials continue to point out that civilian employees are generally 

cheaper than contractors. In July, Secretary Gates told The Washington Post that 

‘‘federal workers cost the government 25 percent less than contractors’’.ii During a 

Senate Armed Services Committee hearing earlier this week, Deputy Secretary of 

Defense William Lynn disputed the notion that contractors were cheaper than federal employees: ‘‘As a general statement, I don’t think that’s accurate, no’’.iii And 

DoD has clarified the record since the August 9 announcement, calling the effort 

‘‘highly successful’’iv, ‘‘a statutorily required workforce-shaping tool/process to appropriately align work between private and public sectors * * * that can generate savings or efficiencies’’ as well as ensure in-house performance of thousands of inherently governmental and closely associated with inherently governmental functions.v 

a. What happens to the contractor work? 

Obviously, greater savings are possible by eliminating contractor positions, rather 

than by replacing contractors with civilian employees. And if the work performed 
39 

by contractors need no longer be performed or can be performed without adding inhouse staff, then there is no reason to insource. However, it is difficult to believe 

that service contract dollars can be reduced by almost one-third—Secretary Gates 

called for 10% cuts during each of the next three years—without having an impact 

on mission, without it being necessary to hire at least some additional in-house staff 

to perform work that still needs to be done—unless the indiscriminate privatization 

perpetrated during the previous two administrations was far more wastefully ruinous than even its worst critics had believed. 

AFGE members in the Defense Agencies, who have been doing more and more 

with less and less for several years, are understandably concerned what a combination of real reductions in contractors and a freeze on the civilian workforce will 

mean for their ability to perform their missions. 

b. How can DoD measure the savings from insourcing? 

Most insourcing efforts are less than one year old. It is difficult to understand how 

any reliable assessments could be made about insourcing in such a short time. It 

is our understanding that DoD cannot say how much was saved from insourcing efforts. Rather, DoD has looked at two contract object classes, 25.1 (Advisory and Assistance Services) and 25.2 (Other Services), before insourcing efforts began and 

then again more recently, and determined that contract costs continued to grow. 

However, DoD is not capable of distinguishing insourcing savings from the usual explosive growth in contract spending in those two object classes. 

Moreover, it is not clear why DoD is focusing on those two object classes. [Object 

classes include, among others, 25.3 (Goods & Services from Government Accounts), 

25.4 (Operations and Maintenance-Facilities), 25.5 (Research & Development), 25.6 

(Medical Support), and 25.7 (Operations & Maintenance-Equipment).] Insourcing in 

DoD is not limited to just object classes 25.1 and 25.2. Moreover, contracts are often 

entered into the wrong object classes or are entered into more than one object class. 

c. How will DoD undertake insourcing (or at least consider undertaking) as required 

by law? 

Inherently governmental functions must be performed by civilian employees. 

Closely associated with inherently governmental functions, per the FY08 National 

Defense Authorization Act inventory law (Section 807), must be performed by federal employees ‘‘to the maximum extent practicable’’. 

Also per the inventory law, DoD must correct any unauthorized personal services 

contracts, through elimination, modification, or insourcing. 

Per the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act insourcing law (Section 324), 

DoD must give ‘‘special consideration’’ to insourcing functions that are ‘‘closely associated’’, contracted out without competition, and contracted out but poorly performed. 

Finally, 10 U.S.C. 129a requires DoD to consider shifting work between its civilian, contractor, and military workforces, depending on which one is least costly if 

that is consistent with military requirements. 

How can insourcing that’s required to be undertaken or at least be given ‘‘special 

consideration’’ or even mere consideration actually occur if the civilian workforce is 

frozen for three years? 

The Army’s contractor inventory provides us with some keen insights. Of the 

95,000 contractor jobs that were reviewed by the beginning of 2010, more than 2,000 

were inherently governmental, another 41,000 were ‘‘closely associated’’, and another 1,500 were performed pursuant to unauthorized personal services contracts.vi 

This assessment does not include ‘‘critical’’ jobs performed by contractors that might 

need to be insourced. And, obviously, it does not include the contractor jobs that 

should be insourced because the contracts involved were entered into without competition or the contracts are poorly performed. There is nothing unique about the 

Army’s excessive reliance on contractors. What’s unique is the extent to which the 

Army has documented the problem through its conscientious compliance with the 

FY08 contractor inventory requirement. If the Army’s inventory is typical of the department, how will DoD rebalance its overall workforce if a three-year freeze has 

been imposed on its civilian workforce? 

3. CUTTING SERVICE CONTRACTOR DOLLARS BY ONE-THIRD

If further progress had been made on the contractor inventory required by the 

FY08 NDAA, DoD could comprehensively review its contracts in order to reliably 

determine, specifically, where efficiencies could be realized—instead of using broad 

and arbitrary cuts. Unfortunately, contractors, realizing that greater visibility inevitably leads to increased accountability, have resisted the inventory and foiled DoD’s 

attempts to comply with the law. 
40 

However, even these broad and arbitrary cuts are unlikely to be realized because 

of the excessive focus on a pair of contract object classes. Whether or not this initiative is successful will apparently be determined by comparing costs for 25.1 and 

25.2, before and after. As noted earlier, there is no rigor as to how contracts are 

entered into object classes. By entering relevant contracts into different object classes, it would be easy to make it appear as if service contract spending in 25.1 and 

25.2 is decreasing even if, overall, service contract spending is actually increasing. 

(Indeed, some contracts are regularly entered into more than one object class.) 

Given the limitations in accounting for contracts, why not include the other contract 

object classes? 

Moreover, why not implement Section 803 of the FY10 NDAA (originally enacted 

as Section 806 in the FY08 NDAA) which would give the department greater visibility and thus greater accountability over its service contract costs?vii As the report 

language noted, this provision would require DoD to include in its ‘‘annual budget 

submission the total amounts for the procurement of services and the number of 

full-time equivalents requested by each component, installation, and activity * * * 

The information in the budget submission, together with the detail provided in the 

annual inventories, should provide the information needed for improved oversight 

by both the Department and Congress for the procurement of contractor services’’. 

Absent implementation of Section 803, how can DoD ensure that those contracts 

eliminated or reduced in scope are not subsequently revived or restored? And how 

can DoD ensure that other contracts are not subsequently undertaken to replace or 

supplement those contracts that were earlier eliminated or reduced? 

AFGE’s DoD members thank the House Budget Committee for this opportunity 

to discuss our views on DoD’s efficiency initiative. We look forward to answering 

your questions. 

INSOURCING BRIEF

In response to concerns: 

1. that the department’s contractor workforce had grown from 732,000 in FY01 

to 1,320,000 in FY06 (the last year for which this information was reported to Congress)viii, while, according to budget documents, the numbers of active duty military 

personnel increased by 2% and 7%, respectively, from FY2000 to FY2010; 

2. that DoD’s service contractor costs had increased by more than 100% during 

the Bush Administrationix; and 

3. that the Government Accountability Office had reported widespread outsourcing of functions by the department that reasonable people believe should be performed by civilian employees (e.g., developing budgets, preparing regulations, overseeing contractors)x, 

The FY08 National Defense Authorization Act included two historic reforms: 

1. a requirement that DoD inventory all of its service contracts in order to identify 

contracts that are being poorly performed or include functions too important or sensitive to outsource and then essentially integrate that information into the budget 

process; and 

2. a requirement that DoD establish a policy by which it could at least consider 

insourcing functions that are poorly performed, were contracted out without competition (because they might cost more than they should), or include functions too 

important or sensitive to be performed by contractors. 

In response to these requirements, DoD began, slowly, to compile its inventory of 

service contractors. In 2001, the department announced that it would insource more 

than 40,000 contractor jobs over five years.xi Despite the obvious necessity and 

modesty of DoD’s insourcing effort, reaction from contractors has been rather disproportionate. This excerpt from a May 27, 2010, letter to the Professional Services 

Council from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is one of 

the department’s many earnest attempts to placate contractors: ‘‘While the Department’s insourcing plans impact less than 1% of currently contracted services, the 

net growth in contracted services last year was more than $5 billion.’’ 

DoD did itself no favors by embracing insourcing as a five-year panacea for its 

chronic budget shortfalls. The Congress intended for insourcing to be an on-going 

effort to rebalance the department’s workforce—bringing back in-house functions 

which are too important or sensitive to outsource as well as commercial functions 

which might be performed more efficiently by civilian employees. As implemented, 

however, insourcing became a five-year budget drill with inordinate savings assumptions. 

Fortunately, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, have continued to provide necessary guidance 

to the department. In the FY10 National Defense Authorization Act, the HASC in-
41 

cluded a bipartisan provision that would prohibit DoD from using quotas or targets 

to promote insourcing. Quotas and targets were used openly and extensively by the 

previous Administration to promote outsourcing, which contractors enthusiastically 

supported. Fortunately, the Congress, on a bipartisan basis, outlawed the use of outsourcing quotas and targets. AFGE opposed the use of outsourcing quotas and targets and worked with the HASC on the provision (Section 325) in the House FY11 

National Defense Authorization Act that would ban insourcing quotas and targets. 

There are other instances in which contractors have been inconsistent. Contractors regularly recruited senior federal officials to work as contractor executives. 

Now, when agencies make job offers to rank-and-file contractor employees as part 

of the overall workforce rebalancing effort, contractors call that ‘‘poaching’’ and insist that the practice be forbidden. 

Contractors, without complaint, took tens of thousands of federal employee jobs 

during the previous two Administrations, without ever having to compete for our 

work. Now, they complain at the detailed costing methodology used for 

insourcing.xii 

Because of sole-sourcing, contractors infrequently compete with one another for 

work, and agencies have always been able to terminate contracts for convenience 

with few restrictions and to not renew contracts without any restrictions. Now, however, contractors want to impose unprecedented restrictions on the ability of agencies to insource. 

Contractors used to brag about their flexibility. Now, they insist on retaining contracts merely because they’ve held the contracts for several years. 

When federal employees lost their jobs because the competition process was 

flawed or wasn’t even used, or when they were veterans in work-therapy or even 

disabled, contractors said, ‘‘It’s business’’. Now, when contractors are losing their 

contracts, it has suddenly become personal. 

Contractors have alleged various ‘‘insourcing crimes’’. However, their allegations 

regularly turn out to be unfounded—the contract doesn’t exist, the contract was cancelled rather than insourced, the contract included closely associated with inherently governmental functions, the department’s analysis reliably concluded that the 

work performed under the contract was actually better performed in-house. There 

will, of course, be mistakes. However, such mistakes are no more grounds to shut 

down the promising but fledgling insourcing initiative than the seemingly endless 

waste, fraud, and abuse that is endemic to outsourcing is a justification for stopping 

all outsourcing. Indeed, if outsourcing had been held to the same standards that 

contractors would like to apply to insourcing, outsourcing would have been suspended no later than close of business on the first day of the Republic. Fortunately, 

the Congressional architects of insourcing have striven to make insourcing thoughtful, transparent, and apolitical—a stark contrast to the way the two previous administrations conducted outsourcing. 

ENDNOTES

i E.g., Army Guidance on Implementing Army Efficiency Initiatives (September 2, 2010). See 

Task #2: ‘‘ASA (FM&C) will develop a 10% reduction in contracts executed in object class 25.1 

and 25.2 for consideration for approval by the Secretary of the Army’’. iiThe Washington Post, ‘‘National Security Inc.’’ (July 20, 2010). 

iii Congressional Quarterly, Transcript of September 28, 2010, Hearing of Senate Armed Services Committee. ivFederal Times, ‘‘Can Gates get it done? His role key to success of cuts, experts say’’ (August 

16, 2010). vGovernment Executive, ‘‘Defense insourcing to continue at military services’’ (September 7, 

2010). viDepartment of the Army, Submission to the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee 

(January 28, 2010). viiDoD agrees that the integration of the inventory into the budget process is necessary to 

actually implement cuts in contractor costs and admits regret at not having complied earlier 

with the law. Nevertheless, DoD is still unprepared to commit to compliance. Here is an excerpt 

from the Congressional Quarterly transcript for the September 28, 2010, hearing of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee hearing with the relevant discussion between Chairman Carl Levin 

(D-MI) and Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn: 

LEVIN: 

* * * In the past, we’ve found that proposed cuts to contract services are nearly impossible 

to enforce because expenditures for service contracting are invisible in the department’s budget. 

For this reason, Section 806 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 

required that budget justification documents clearly and separately identify the amounts requested in each budget account for procurement of services. The department has not yet complied with that requirement. 

Will you—well, when are you going to comply with that requirement, Secretary Lynn? 

LYNN: 
42 

Well, part of—part of the effort I mentioned would be to comply with that requirement. And 

I would—would add I think your implication is right. 

We are regretting that the department hadn’t complied earlier. It would make the task that 

we’re undertaking easier if we had better data, and we’re endeavoring to—to develop that. 

LEVIN: 

So when will the department comply with that statutory requirement? Are you going to comply for the 2012 budget request? 

LYNN: 

We are trying. I can’t commit at that point—at this point that we will have all the data to 

be able to do it, but we’re going to do our very best. 

LEVIN: 

Well, it’s a couple years now overdue, so that’s not satisfactory. And I’m just wondering if you 

can give us a better handle on that, if necessary month by month. 

I mean, I don’t want to burden you with unnecessary requirements, but this is something in 

law, and it is essential that there be compliance on this. 

So would you let us know by the end of October—let’s just try report number one, whether 

or not the budget for 2012 will be complying with that requirement? Let us know by the end 

of October? 

LYNN: 

Yes. Yes, I’ll do that, Mr. Chairman. 

LEVIN: 

And if not, why not. 

viiiDoD Reports: Performance of Commercial Activities (2001 and 2006 submissions). ixPlease see Attachment 1. x E.g., Government Accountability Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Further Actions Needed 

to Address Weaknesses in DoD’s Management of Professional and Management Support Contracts (GAO-10-39). xi Contractors insist that this attempt to reduce reliance on contractors to pre-Bush Administration levels is arbitrary and wrong. They’re right, of course. DoD should have tried to reduce 

its reliance on contractors to pre-Clinton Administration levels. xii Recent contractor correspondence insists that DoD ‘‘is not considering the broad scope of 

other costs, borne by the taxpayer, and which are ineffably associated with the federal employee 

infrastructure (overhead, lifetime benefits, personnel support and systems, pay support, and systems, management/oversight, training, etc.).’’ Professional Services Council Letter to Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates of May 3, 2010. AFGE understandably approaches contractor claims 

of inadequate in-house overhead with a great deal of skepticism. It is not an exaggeration to 

say that many contractors would like to charge every in-house workforce involved in a sourcing 

decision with a fraction of the cost of running Air Force One. The DoD IG has pointed out that 

a significant amount of the overhead contractors have tried to attribute to federal employees 

in OMB Circular A-76 privatization studies is unjustified. DoD should be prepared to defend 

the costing methodology generally as well as its use in specific situations. However, let the 

record show that, contrary to contractor assertions, DoD’s costing methodology does indeed take 

into account ‘‘Recruitment, Advertising, Etc.’’, ‘‘Training’’, ‘‘Unfunded Civilian Retirement’’, 

‘‘Postretirement Health Benefit’’, and ‘‘Post Retirement Life Insurance’’. Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-007, ‘‘Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support’’, page 20. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. I want to thank all of our witnesses for their testimony, and now we will have a few questions 

for the panel. General Wood can you explain the significance of not 

mentioning the closure of JFCOM in the QDR? 

LTG WOOD. I think the QDR, which looks broadly at strategic requirements and then the resourcing and programs that back it, 

probably does not make its way down to the specifics of a command. It looks primarily at functions and priorities. And perhaps 

I would simply suggest that it was not in the scope of the work or 

the terms of reference of the particular study to take it to that level 

of detail. 

Mr. SCOTT. But they mentioned in the QDR the significance of 

jointness. 

LTG WOOD. Oh, without question. And I think that jointness is 

a recognized strength of the Department, it is a recognized 

strength of our military. And perhaps assumptions were made 

about, you know, the continuity in progress that we had made, and 

would continue to make, in that area. 

Mr. SCOTT. If such progress has been made, we heard yesterday 

a suggestion that the decision to disestablish JFCOM was unanimous, that there were no countervailing arguments. Is that credible? 
43 

LTG WOOD. As not part of that analysis it is hard to say. But 

I would suggest that it was likely a course of action, and all courses 

of action that are considered in this sort of analysis have pros and 

cons. So whether it was a statement of disapproval, or it was a 

summation of negative points versus positive points, I would imagine that there was a pro and con described with regard to the decision. So I do think likely they were measuring costs and benefits 

as they made this decision. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you were to ask the individuals services what they 

thought of it, what would their individuals reaction be to the idea 

of being able to keep all their funds to themselves and not have to 

share it with jointness? 

LTG WOOD. I think my answer would be hypothetical. I cannot 

really describe what each position of the services would be. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well I mean, how could you, if the explanation was 

that everyone they talked to supported the closure, could you explain how that could be? 

LTG WOOD. I can offer only a personal opinion. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

LTG WOOD. I think we have a natural tension, a constructive 

tension in fact, between what services are required to accomplish 

under their Title 10 responsibilities. And quite frankly, the responsibilities directed to the Department through Goldwater-Nichols to 

the combatant commanders. So there is a natural tension between 

what the services provide as trained and ready forces, and I would 

say a constructive tension, to what the combatant commanders require on a routine basis. So that tension simply causes people to 

come down in different positions as it relates to either a zero sum 

outcome of providing service or capabilities to the joint force, or 

those who think it is a synergistic outcome, where it is multiplicative in outcome as opposed to additive. And so it just really depends on where you sit, where you stand in that area. 

I think there is a broad in general, and I certainly agree with 

the Department’s point, that the appreciation of what joint can provide for our forces and the jointness of our forces has proceeded to 

a point today where it has daily validated itself in the combat, in 

the operations that we see. That is today. Tomorrow is another 

day, and the threat continues to change. And it is important, as I 

mentioned in my remarks, that we take a look at integrated action 

as opposed to the idea of simply claiming we are joint. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is there a natural inclination to revert to, to avoid 

jointness by the various services that would recommend that there 

be some countervailing force towards jointness? 

LTG WOOD. Again, they have interests that are described in Title 

10, trained and ready forces. But all of them are deeply and seriously and sincerely obligated to provide the best of available capabilities to joint commanders. It is a natural start of analysis in all 

of these decisions as to what are the impacts on the specific service 

to execute or provide capabilities as they do and do willingly. In 

many, many cases there is no problem and no tension. But there 

is a constructive tension overall that, in JFCOM’s case, we constantly helped and worked and tried to integrate solutions that 

were beneficial to the whole, in this case specifically to the combatant commanders. 
44 

Stovepiping does occur. But we are well past that point, I think, 

of days past. But it is perhaps a natural line of drift, that drifts 

back to an idea of service-specific solutions. 

Mr. SCOTT. And that is, the countervailing force in that natural 

reversion is JFCOM, is that right? 

LTG WOOD. I think it has played a very constructive role in that 

regard. 

Mr. SCOTT. The suggestion has been made that a four-star command is no longer necessary. What would be the problem with reducing the number of stars in the commander? 

LTG WOOD. Well I think it has to do a lot with, importantly 

there will be a commander and I think that point has been recognized and articulated by the Department. It will take someone who 

is in charge, who can provide focus and unity of effort to this important mission. So first of all it would be a commander. I leave 

it to the Department to determine the level and grade of that commander. But I would suggest that a four-star commander does have 

the ability to sit in council with other combatant commanders and 

understand their requirements, articulate the solutions, and frankly engage in the dialogue. It was, it is helpful to speak at that level 

and on that level with your peers. But the Department has made 

the decision, and I happen to think they will arrive at a correct assessment and analysis, where someone is in charge and charged 

with the authority, responsibility to accomplish the mission assigned. 

Mr. SCOTT. What relationship does JFCOM have with the international forces that are located in the same area? 

LTG WOOD. A very close relationship with Allied Command 

Transformation, the NATO Command. Up until I believe October, 

frankly September, the Joint Forces Commander was also the Commander of Allied Command Transformation. So there was a natural synergy between the NATO and NATO nations, and what we 

accomplished, and what they could benefit from. It is a constructive 

daily dialogue between the international presence at Allied Command Transformation and Joint Forces Command. Frankly a function of geography and common interest. 

Beyond Allied Command Transformation there are a number of 

nations who have a direct liaison relationship with Joint Forces 

Command. I believe we have nineteen nations with a bilateral 

memorandum of understanding, actually work with JFCOM with 

its integration, its training, and experimentation functions. And 

twenty-eight representatives on the ground with JFCOM from allied nations. There are additionally another fourteen nations who 

are pursuing a formal relationship. So it is a constant mix of multinational relationships that are growing, and have grown for a 

while, with Joint Forces Command as they recognize the importance of unifying action with our joint forces. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what would be the implications of disestablishing JFCOM to all of those relationships? 

LTG WOOD. I think those relationships would be continued but 

with a different arrangement as determined and described probably 

by General Odierno. I think the relationships are important 

enough, and multinational relationships in particular for our coali-
45 

tion operations are so critical, that that will likely be an aspect of 

whatever solution they arrive with. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Wittman? 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I would like to 

thank the panel members for joining us today. General Wood, I 

would like to focus some more of the discussion concerning strategic planning within our military. You know, recently the House 

Armed Services Committee received the quadrennial defense review. And there was a review of that by an independent panel that 

looked at that because there was some concern that our strategic 

planning should be driven by analysis of the strategic needs of this 

nation, not necessarily from a budgetary standpoint. And as you 

know the analysis by the independent panel was somewhat critical 

of that, in looking at whether it truly was a strategic needs document or whether it was indeed a budget-driven document. And 

their words, not mine, was that the QDR was a train wreck. So 

they had some issues about whether or not it was really driven by 

strategy. 

What we are hearing with the decisions being made under these 

efficiency initiatives is that they are indeed military decisions, that 

they are not being driven by budget considerations. Which sort of 

is counterintuitive when you term an exercise an efficiency initiative, it would lead you to believe that it is indeed driven by budgets. And when we ask those questions they say no, no consideration 

was given to business models or anything such as that in the decision, that it was all driven by military decision making. And my 

question to you, in looking at how this decision has come about, 

and of course there is not much information about how the decision 

came about. But I am going to ask for your assessment as to 

whether this truly is a military decision? Or does it appear as 

though this is a decision driven solely based on budgets? 

LTG WOOD. It is certainly an understood responsibility and authority within the military that the structuring of your commands 

is inherently a military task. So I believe they are starting from 

that line of logic, which says how you organize your forces, how you 

determine the chain of command and the command of control, is in 

fact inherently a military decision. So I believe that is where they 

are starting in terms of that explanation. 

It is cast in terms of an efficiency, in the case of Joint Forces 

Command, where it produces certain economies caused by delayering. And when the idea of savings and economies is presented, 

even premised on a military decision, I think it is a natural question to ask, ‘‘What analysis has been done that shows what savings 

are in hand, or could potentially be in hand?’’ And so I think they 

start at the right place. But in the context of an efficiencies program where the idea is to promote economies and provide savings, 

ultimately they are going to have to then describe those savings in 

real terms, and in real dollars, and likely real jobs. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. Let me ask this, then. In your experience, 

can you remember a situation where there was a determination 

that a recommendation would be made on a major issue like closing a command, and then after that saying, well, we will then do 

the analysis of the economic impact. We will then afterwards do 

the analysis of the strategic implications of this. In other words, 
46 

what does this mean to how we continue the concept of jointness? 

And then after the fact we will figure out how we implement that. 

Do you recall, in your experience do you recall a process that occurs 

like this with a decision or a recommendation being made up front? 

And then seemingly the analysis, and seemingly being that we 

can’t get any documentation prior to August 9 about how that analysis might have been performed. And then subsequent to that saying, well, we are going to be doing much of that analysis. Do you 

recall a decision there being made in that manner? Especially a decision of this magnitude? 

LTG WOOD. Well, that is a fair question. If you change the word 

‘‘recommendation’’ to ‘‘objective.’’ And they said, in fact we have an 

objective of de-layering headquarters, and in order to do that we 

are going to take a look at Joint Forces Command as an example 

and assess and evaluate what savings could occur. It does remind 

me a bit of what we did in reducing forces in Europe, where we 

had objectives with regard to the de-layering of headquarters under 

NATO. And those were stated as objectives, and the analysis determined ultimately which were the wise decisions, and which were 

the economical decisions, and which in fact were the tough decisions that we just had to make regardless. So perhaps that is as 

close as I can get to it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. But it seems in this situation that it is actually a level higher than objectives. I could understand if the objective was to look at efficiencies within JFCOM, those kinds of 

things. But to actually start with the recommendation of the disestablishment of JFCOM, and then move on from there and say, 

well, now we will figure out the details about how that happens, 

does seem to be a little bit different. 

Let me ask you this. The assertions that we have been given and 

what little bit of information we can get concerning the conversations, the analysis, or lack thereof in this decision making, is that 

jointness has become so ingrained in the service branches that 

JFCOM no longer has a purpose. And my question would be to you, 

do you believe from your observation and knowledge of the current 

status of all of our service branches, do you believe that the mission of jointness is complete? 

LTG WOOD. If specifically you are asking me, and I think you 

are, if the mission of jointness is complete, it is not. I would suggest that after seven and a half, eight years of combat, in a joint 

setting of CENTCOM and areas surrounding that, that we have 

learned, and our force almost a half generation now with multiple 

deployments, have learned the value of jointness and understand 

its execution very typically at the tactical level. At the operational 

level or the strategic level there remain lessons yet to be learned. 

And I would also suggest that one very obviously good way to build 

that expertise and ingrain that knowledge could be combat. There 

are likely less costly and less serious ways for that to occur. And 

the continuity of growth in the area of joint, this inflection point 

we are at in terms of missions as they are either transferring or 

transitioning, it is about the right time to draw some very necessary conclusions and institutionalize those conclusions so that we 

grow the next generation with equal knowledge and appreciation 
47 

focused now on threats that are in the future by threats that are 

present. 

So jointness will continue to be an important aspect of the training of the force. It will be an important element of the culture. And 

the work continues. And I do believe that the Department acknowledged and stated the same. They have chosen a different approach 

as to how to draw those lessons and institutionalize them in the 

force, in this case by the elimination of JFCOM. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, let me ask this then. Looking at it from that 

context, in that the mission of jointness not being complete, but 

that many aspects of it are indeed operationalized both at the tactical level and somewhat at the strategic level. But still looking at 

how do you continue to make sure that is put into place as objectives, as missions change? Do you believe then that the role of 

JFCOM under those conditions is complete? And that those roles 

could be assumed, as one of the suggestions is, by operations under 

the Joint Staff? 

LTG WOOD. My personal opinion is that staff responsibilities are 

dramatically different than command responsibilities. And to take 

functions and assign them to staff elements, as opposed to beneath 

a commander, dramatically alter the outcome. And as such, I think 

the point was made yesterday in particular by General Cartwright, 

where it does take a single commander, charged with the responsibility to produce and execute and provide solutions, in this case 

joint solutions, is something that will likely be one of the elements 

of whatever course of action they choose. It does take a commander. 

Mr. WITTMAN. And one last question before I yield. Is looking 

within that context of this whole realm of decision making, and 

looking at what we have been told. And that is that there were 

over thirty ‘‘meetings,’’ and I use meetings in quotes, there in the 

Pentagon in discussing this particular recommendation of the disestablishment of JFCOM. In your experience can you envision that 

with thirty meetings that there would not be a situation where 

there were notes, or proceedings, or any kind of written capturing 

of those meetings that would be available to provide to Congress 

or to others that may ask about that particular documentation 

about the whole effort of analysis there in the Pentagon, to get to 

the point where the Secretary has made that recommendation? And 

again, we were told of those thirty-plus meetings that had happened. I just want to get your thought about whether that is indeed 

a realistic scenario. 

LTG WOOD. I certainly believe that there are notes or briefings 

that were part of the analysis. I can imagine it only simply as a 

review of the entire program. This was a very major initiative that 

was announced, and I could just imagine that there were a number 

of meetings that dealt with not just JFCOM but a whole range of 

issues that were announced by the Secretary. So to answer your 

question directly, I would believe that there would be something 

that represented briefings or notes from those sessions. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all for 

your testimony. Mr. Harrison, in your testimony I believe you made 
48 

reference to I think a CRS study that showed that bringing it in 

would lead to fairly significant cost savings, although relative to 

need not all that big. What was the methodology used to make 

such an assertion? I have not seen any such analysis? 

Mr. HARRISON. I cannot recall the exact methodology they used. 

I believe what they did is looked at estimates of what Joint Forces 

Command costs today. That is a little difficult to do because each 

of the individual services provides personnel and resources to the 

Joint Forces Command. And so you have to go in and try to dig 

out of their personnel budgets and other budgets exactly what proportion is going into JFCOM. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am not only referring to JFCOM. 

Mr. HARRISON. In terms of the other savings initiatives, the largest one that I mentioned in terms of reducing the support contractors, it took an estimate of what we spend today on support contractors and then took a cut of that, and that came out to $3.6 billion annually. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But the functions would still have to be undertaken. 

Mr. HARRISON. Well I think that, and the report points this out, 

that that is the difficult question. Is would we actually realize that 

much in savings? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Or any? 

Mr. HARRISON. Or any. Now, the way that Secretary Gates announced it was, you know, he had previously said he had a goal 

of insourcing, and moving these jobs in house. And it was based on 

a head count, basically, a percentage of the workforce that was 

made up of support contractors. He wanted to bring that down to 

a different target. He said in his August announcement that he 

was not satisfied with progress doing it in that way so he decided 

to just cut the budget by a certain amount. 

So cutting the budget, you know, if that is your method then you 

can certainly achieve that. But what are the consequences? What 

is left undone? And there are certain risks associated with that. I 

would say that this is not really an ideal approach at all about how 

to go about doing it. First I think you would want to step back and 

say, okay, well who are the contractors? What are they doing? And 

how many are there? And DOD does not right now have a comprehensive answer across the Department to those questions. Once 

you have done that then you can go in and say, okay, on an individual basis what are they doing? Is that something that should be 

done by a government person? Is it more cost effective or is it inherently a government function? So then that is something that 

you would want to insource. You may look at it and find that some 

contractors are doing things that we want to have done by contractors. In that case, you leave them, let them do their job. And in 

some cases you may find that contractors are doing things that 

simply do not need to be done and then you can eliminate them. 

That requires a lot of work, though, and I do not think the Department is there at this point. I do not think they can do that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. Well, and again, as both of my colleagues 

have indicated, this is now my third session this week on this topic. 

Not once has the Pentagon even pretended that it did the analytics 

Mr. Soloway referred to to justify this decision. They are actually 
49 

going to do it after the fact. And that is a little bit like a corporation saying, you know, we have decided to eliminate a whole division of the company, the marketing division. And as an act of faith 

we are going to assume it will yield net reductions in cost and it 

will not appreciably affect our sales, not having a marketing division. And by the way, we expect the board to approve this decision, 

and we will provide them data on how well it worked after they 

approve it. So this is all, you know. 

No company on the planet would allow management to make 

such a decision. That is exactly what we are doing here. And it 

may make sense, but no proof has been provided to Congress, or 

to the public, or anybody else. And the reluctance of the Pentagon 

to appear at public hearings, with the one exception here in the 

House which was yesterday at the Armed Services Committee, I 

think gives some evidence of that fact. 

And the reason I asked about the methodology is, you know, we 

sometimes are a little too fast and loose with what is cheaper and 

what is not. And I have seen examples of both, you know? And 

what we have to make sure is that if we are going to be looking 

at personnel costs they are fully loaded. The government requires 

the private sector when it bids on a contract to have fully loaded 

costs, otherwise you are low balling it, and you may have an unfair 

competitive advantage over the competition, and it does not really 

give us an accurate picture of what the real costs are. Well, if we 

are going to be looking at this kind of question of insourcing/outsourcing, they have to be fully loaded costs. And unfortunately I 

just, I have not seen any methodology used in this decision and it 

is a fairly sweeping decision. This is not a marginal savings decision, presumably. 

Ms. Simon, thank you for your testimony. You talked about inherently governmental, and I was just wondering if you want to 

share a few examples of what you think clearly fall under that rubric that ought to be brought back into the Pentagon. 

Ms. SIMON. Well there are a number of positions that have been 

identified as inherently governmental having to do with the preparation of budgets, the writing approval of regulations that implement laws passed by Congress, and some contract oversight work. 

But if I may, with regard to insourcing, the procedures that the 

Defense Department is required by law to adhere to when it considers insourcing, there are rather rigorous analytics involved. It is 

really quite different from the outsourcing agenda that was pursued in the last two administrations. In fact, the Department is required annually to report to Congress the number of positions that 

have been insourced, the rationale in each case for the insourcing. 

And for example, they have to be able to show that it was either 

inherently governmental work, closely associated with inherently 

governmental work, or a cost comparison was conducted. You 

know, it could have been an illegal personal service contract. Or a 

cost comparison was conducted that demonstrated that it was less 

costly to perform the work in house. 

And I also would be more than happy to provide you with materials we have from the Department of Defense that do demonstrate 

that the cost comparison process DOD is using when it considers 

insourcing does not have any kind of quotas, and has what you 
50 

refer to as fully loaded costs. For example, it includes the lifetime 

cost for health insurance benefits provided to federal employees in 

retirement and retirement costs. They really are completely fully 

loaded costs. So I would be happy to provide you with those materials that we are in possession of. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would be glad to get them. 

Ms. SIMON. So, yeah. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me just say to you, though, Ms. Simon, I am 

sure you are aware of the fact though, and you just heard my two 

colleagues complain about the fact, correctly so, the Pentagon heretofore has not provided any analysis, any documentation to justify 

this decision. Now if that data you refer to is so readily available, 

why would they not have done that analysis to show compellingly, 

of course we are going to go this route because look at the savings 

it generates. And they have not. And they admit they did not do 

it. 

Ms. SIMON. Well, my answer was with respect to insourcing. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure. 

Ms. SIMON. You know, of course—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, but I am referring to insourcing on the, I’m 

sorry, on the contractual piece here. 

Ms. SIMON. One of the things that we are most fearful of is if 

contracts are cut by 30 percent over three years and none of those 

positions are insourced. Of course they will save money if they simply eliminate those contracts and do not replace any of the employees doing that work with civilian federal employees. There is probably some of that work that can be absorbed by the current workforce, but certainly not all of it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Ms. SIMON. And, you know, with the freeze on civilian employees, 

you know, we know what has happened historically when there are 

personnel ceilings and freezes on federal employees. It essentially 

eventually leads to outsourcing, and outsourcing often without competition. And of course outsourcing of inherently governmental 

work and work closely associated with inherently governmental 

work. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. And to underscore your point, what concerns 

many of us is the magnitude of this. Ten percent a year times three 

years is billions of billions of dollars and could affect tens of thousands of jobs. And I take your point. If they just, well, it depends 

on how they dispose of that, what happens to those functions and 

so forth, and whether it puts an additional burden on the existing 

workforce that may be already overstretched. And again, no plan 

has been provided to the public or to this Congress on how you 

would implement such a cut. And 10 percent is not trivial. It is 

very serious and very large. So I take your point. 

Ms. SIMON. Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Soloway, did you want to comment on that? 

Mr. SOLOWAY. Yes, I think that we are confusing a few different 

issues here. Maybe just to provide a little bit of factual context. 

First of all, the Secretary’s insourcing initiative, his 10 percent cut, 

and the broader efficiency initiative, none of what he has announced or done is inconsistent with statute that has been established by Congress. The Secretary’s guidance most recently about 
51 

not automatically providing one for one switches in insourcing jobs 

has nothing to do with whether the Department continues to still 

have to give consideration to whether, when, and how to insource 

certain kinds of positions. The Deputy Secretary of Defense guidance from May, 2009 is still in effect, which is merely a reflection 

of statute, almost a direct word for word reflection of statute. 

What the Secretary did last month is acknowledge that they are 

not achieving the savings expected from insourcing. Contrary to 

what some have suggested, in fact the data shows that it is just 

not there in many cases. That is not to say it is never there, it is 

to say that it is not there on a broad basis that one can just assume across the budgetary line. So the Secretary said they are no 

longer going to simply offer new positions on a one for one switch 

for positions, contracted positions, that are eliminated, with the exception of the acquisition community where there will be, where positions are inherently governmental as Ms. Simon said, they will 

be one for one created within the Department because that is such 

a critical workforce. 

With regard to the closely associated with inherently governmental functions that is covered in the statute and covered in the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense guidance I think it is important to 

recognize what the Obama administration has said about closely 

associated with inherently governmental activities. They have 

made it explicitly clear that those positions may be contracted if it 

is more cost effective, if the agency involved has adequate financial 

management and other controls in place to adequately manage and 

supervise and oversee its contractors, there is absolutely no reason 

why one could not actually continue to contract or increasingly contract for those positions. The issue is a matter of workforce balancing at OMB and its guidance that you referenced earlier actually makes very clear that it is that balance it is not a uniform 

closely associated with inherently governmental functions must 

come from in house. 

The third point I would make is with regard to analyses and 

cost, and let me share an actual case rather than—let me back up 

one step, sir. The Department initially announced that they were 

going to assume a 40 percent savings per position insourced. That 

was contained in resource management decision 802 which remains 

a classified document, has never been released, nor have the analytics underpinning it ever been released. That was followed by a 

directive type memorandum, a DTM, that was issued last January 

which purported to be a comprehensive methodology for comparing 

costs. It is neither comprehensive nor is it a methodology and it explicitly, although it is the ruling document, it explicitly excludes 

any costs that are not the responsibility of the Department of Defense. And by definition that would include many post-retirement 

and administrative and benefits costs that become the responsibility of the Office of Personnel Management. 

Third, it is instructive to look at specific cases for which data is 

available. And one I will just mention very briefly involved an Air 

Force insourcing of a contract valued at about $225 million with 

400-plus people performing the work at seven locations across the 

country. The Air Force decided to insource that contract on the 

basis of an analysis that it would not share. As a result, the union 
52 

involved submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to see the 

data, to see the analysis underpinning this decision, because many 

of its workers would lose their jobs. They were not coming into the 

government, they would not necessarily be eligible, and so forth. 

The data received from the Air Force through that FOIA request 

showed that on a $225 million contract the Air Force net savings 

was expected to be $450,000, .02 percent. Now one of the, Ms. 

Simon and I have often disagreed on many issues and I think there 

are two things we can agree on. Number one, arbitrary FTE ceilings are no smarter than arbitrary contract cuts. And number two, 

some reasonable savings for outsourcing or for insourcing better be 

shown just to cover the costs and chaos created by the churn of 

transition. 

What is even more constructive about this particular case is that 

according to Air Force documents that have been widely released, 

the details of which are in my testimony, the Air Force is only looking, as you said, at totally burdened contract costs versus internal 

personnel costs. There is a whole set of operation costs not being 

considered. In this particular case the Air Force is also proposing 

to do the work with 15 percent fewer people when they bring it in 

house. By their own estimate, since there is effectively no savings, 

the per person cost of performing the work in house is actually substantially higher than were they continuing to perform it through 

contract. Imagine what would be possible if they actually worked 

with the contractor to bring the contract requirements down to the 

level they believe the work would be performed and there you 

would have actual real savings. And finally, as I said, they specifically did not include post-retirement costs, and merely health insurance premiums for a workforce of 350 people would create costs 

that are in the millions. That in and of itself is not a reason not 

to insource the work if it was inherently governmental or so sensitive and critical as has to be performed by a federal employee. 

But in this case no one is even attempting to make that argument. 

It has been purely made as a ‘‘we are going to save money,’’ and 

the answer is they are not. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And final point, and just briefly, I assume there 

is actually a third area where you agree, I think, with Ms. Simon. 

Which would be the example she gave of inherently governmental 

work? 

Mr. SOLOWAY. We have always taken the position that inherently 

governmental work, no one is going to argue that it should continue to be outsourced. And to the extent a small number of positions that Army has found are inherently governmental that were 

inappropriately outsourced, they should be brought back in house. 

Where we depart significantly, where I think our position at PSC 

is more aligned with the administration view as OMB guidance has 

articulated over the last several months, is in this area of closely 

associated, if you will, with inherently governmental, those significant skills. We fully agree with OMB that the government has to 

have residual core capabilities that may not be by definition inherently governmental, but are nonetheless necessary to adequately 

and efficiently manage and oversee its missions. 

Beyond that, there is a choice to be made. And those choices 

must focus on cost, availability of skills, life cycle costs, not just to 
53 

the individual department but to the taxpayer totally, and competition for talent in the marketplace and so forth. Those are the kinds 

of considerations that are not currently being conducted at DOD in 

this particular mission. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. I understand Mr. Wittman has an additional question or two? 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, and I want to direct those to Mr. Harrison. 

I just want to get you to refine a little bit of your previous testimony. In your written testimony you state that in relation to the 

elimination of JFCOM you say that while these eliminations appear to be justified the total savings achieved will depend greatly 

on how they are implemented. Let me ask this. If the focus is really on the implementation, and that is critical to the validity of the 

decision of eliminating JFCOM, do you believe then that the process that has been pursued now by the Pentagon, and that is making the decision up front and then doing a post-analysis of that decision, do you believe that that is the proper sequence to really look 

at the utility of the decision itself to disestablish JFCOM? 

Mr. HARRISON. Well, I guess I would start by saying that, you 

know, the implementation of how the elimination of JFCOM comes 

about, the big savings when you eliminate an organization like that 

are really going to be in a reduction in head count, both military, 

civilian, and contractor employees, and the elimination of facilities, 

so that you no longer have to maintain them. So those are the big 

areas I would look for in terms of cost savings. And of course, the 

Department has not yet decided how they will do that. 

It is very likely that the military and the DOD civilians will just, 

those jobs will just be transferred elsewhere. So you will not save 

any money on reducing those items. The contractors, some of those 

would presumably go away if functions go away and you no longer 

need them. As functions get transferred to other areas within DOD, 

particularly within the Joint Staff, then those contractor jobs might 

just shift as well. So for that reason I think it is really hard to 

know up front how much money you will save, if you will save any 

money. 

You know, it was pitched as part of DOD’s efficiency initiative. 

And you could certainly make the argument that you could achieve 

some efficiencies by doing this. I do not think that they know yet 

how much they will save by doing this, if they will save anything 

at all. And they will not know until they have decided on an implementation plan. Now, should they have waited to make the decision until they had an implementation plan? Well, perhaps. But 

given the urgency that Secretary Gates has put on this initiative 

I do not think they simply have the time to do that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Again, I will go back to get you to give me your 

estimation of the process. And I think you got a little bit there, but 

I want to get you to further define that, looking at truly if there 

are going to be cost savings. And let us take a step back, too, and 

look at, looking at a strategic analysis. And that is, one of the overarching issues here, too, is strategically is this the right thing to 

do in maintaining jointness? So we look at that both strategically 

and from a business model cost efficiency standpoint. Is this process, and that is doing analysis of implementation, doing analysis of 
54 

the strategic implications after this recommendation has been 

made, do you believe that that is the best way for this decision to 

have taken place? 

Mr. HARRISON. I would say in an ideal world before you announce a decision like this you would want to be able to take the 

time to go through and figure out the best course of implementing 

such a change, cost that out, determine what the savings are, and 

then do your balance, your cost benefit balance. I think, and this 

is just my own, you know, personal opinion of the way the decision 

came about, was looking at some overall metrics for Joint Forces 

Command. And if you look at these they do cause, they are cause 

for concern. 

If you compare the total number of employees in JFCOM, which 

according to the Defense Business Board their analysis is over 

6,000 including DOD and contractor personnel. When you compare 

that to some of the other combatant commands it does raise a few 

eyebrows. In particular, if you look at CENTCOM they have less 

than 4,000 total employees. And we all know what CENTCOM 

does, they are fighting two major wars for the United States right 

now, and other DOD activities that are going on in their area of 

responsibility. And it does bring up the question, then, well, is 

whatever JFCOM is doing, is it 50 percent more important than 

what CENTCOM is doing? I think most people would agree, well, 

probably not. So why do they have 50 percent more people dedicated to those tasks? 

Now, that is just a very high level analysis that would just tell 

you, well, this is worth investigating more. I think when they start 

to dig in deeper, when General Odierno gets there and starts coming up with an implementation plan then we will be able to see 

more of what they plan to do and how they plan to implement this 

recommendation. 

Mr. WITTMAN. One last question, Mr. Chairman. I want to lead, 

then, to this question. In your experience in looking at decisions 

within the Pentagon, within the Department of Defense, do you recall a decision of this magnitude that is taking place like this? And 

that is with a post-decision analysis on the implementation, on the 

strategic impacts, and really on the economic implications or efficiency implications of a decision? 

Mr. HARRISON. Off the top of my head I could not name a comparable decision. That does not mean it does not exist. But off the 

top of my head I do not have one. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Connolly, do you have any additional questions? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Mr. Harrison, just following up on that, 

is it possible to cut costs without eliminating the whole command? 

Mr. HARRISON. Certainly it would be. You would still, it would 

still impact jobs because to really achieve any significant cost savings you would have to cut the number of personnel somehow, and 

so, you know, that would still have an impact on the local community and economy. But you could certainly downsize JFCOM and 

reduce costs. 
55 

Mr. SCOTT. And one of the things you talked about, the costs, if 

you eliminate the command and move the functions somewhere 

else, are there costs associated with that? 

Mr. HARRISON. Absolutely. There would be one-time upfront 

costs, you know, from just the movement of people and resources. 

But then there are the ongoing costs of the personnel wherever you 

have them. And you also have to consider, and I have not looked 

at this to know if this is significant, but the different costs of labor 

given different geographical areas. And so if you are moving them 

you could actually increase or decrease your costs just because of 

the costs of labor in the different markets. 

Mr. SCOTT. So if you closed JFCOM and moved all the functions 

somewhere else you might end up spending more money, and not 

saving anything at all? 

Mr. HARRISON. Especially if you continue all of the functions at 

the current level that they are today. If you really want to save 

money, as I said before, you cut head count. And when you cut 

head count you are cutting the amount of work that you are doing. 

And so that is really the way that you are going to generate savings. And if they do not do that there really will not be savings. 

Mr. SCOTT. And you could reduce functions without eliminating 

the command. 

Mr. HARRISON. You could. 

Mr. SCOTT. General Wood, could you give us an idea of what kind 

of functions would be eliminated and not continued at JFCOM? 

LTG WOOD. Well, I guess the, they have already described the 

force management function not to be eliminated but moved, likely 

to the Joint Staff. I think important to understand is the functions 

at JFCOM have been assigned either by Office of Secretary of Defense, by the Joint Staff, or collaboratively by services through 

JROC action. So we would essentially make a proposal that the 

function of fires integration, for instance, which is one of the elements of the command, or joint personnel recovery, or the lessons 

learned in operations analysis activity, can be now shifted to a location where it will not lose its essential aspects. You would make 

a recommendation in the Joint Staff, or the JROC, or the Chairman would approve it. So that is what General Odierno is going 

to do. I really do not want to presuppose functions that can be 

eliminated until that type of analysis has been completed. 

Let me say one other thing. As a command, if it stayed in place, 

if it did not go away, it would be subject to the 30 percent directive 

in terms of reduction of inservice contracts. That is, in this case if 

you looked at it, that is about 900 people. 900 people less of a 

JFCOM of whatever date in the future you look at will without 

question be likely more efficient, more focused on priorities, and it 

might even be therapeutic. It does not say the command goes away. 

It simply abides by the directives the Secretary has described. It 

remains with a commander in charge of Joint and jointness. It is 

now efficient in terms of decisions made by the commander. And 

then he will make an idea about likely which functions will go 

away. 

I would imagine that functions will realign inside the command 

and remain in place. Functions will reduce in terms of size and 

likely remain in place or be renamed. And then you will end up 
56 

with a smaller element to accomplish what has been directed, typically by the Department. So I do not want to presuppose—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well it seemed to me when this thing started the criticism of JFCOM said it had too many generals and too many contractors and therefore they said you needed to eliminate the command. It seemed to me another response could have been to reduce 

the number of generals and reduce the number of contractors, and 

keep everything else in place. If you dismantle it altogether and 

then reassemble some but not all you end up with what Mr. Harrison has suggested, you may end up by the time the dust settles 

spending as much or more where everybody lands than where you 

started off. You lost all the synergy that you have with the international force and all of the good parts of JFCOM. And it seems 

to me that if you are going to eliminate the functions, you can 

eliminate the function. You do not have to eliminate the command. 

LTG WOOD. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. And so one of the questions we had was, and we cannot know because we have not seen the analysis, we have not seen 

the arguments pro and con, we have not seen any document with 

any numbers on it. And so we are just unable to make any assessment. But there seem to be many other credible options other than 

just eliminating the command and regrouping somewhere else. 

LTG WOOD. General Odierno will be charged with that task, will 

look function by function, and the size of that function and where 

it needs to be positioned. And likely maintain the focus of a commander over whatever result he comes up with. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well if you have a commander, does that not suggest 

a command? 

LTG WOOD. It does. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. I ask unanimous consent that members 

who did not have the opportunity to ask questions of witnesses be 

given seven days to submit questions for the record and to submit 

opening statements for the record. Mr. Wittman, do you have further comment? 

Mr. WITTMAN. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. I want to thank all of our witnesses for being with 

us today. This has been extremely helpful. And we have a lot of 

work to do and information to get. Without more, the Committee 

now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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