United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Research and Development

Committee on National Security, House

of Representatives

April 1998 AIM-9X ACQUISITION

Missile Risk Reduction

Underway But System

Production Plans Need

to be Reexamined

GAO/NSIAD-98-45

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-274600 

April 28, 1998

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military

 Research and Development

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you requested, this report addresses the development status of the AIM-9X missile program

and our concerns about the testing and production of all elements of the AIM-9X weapon

system.

We are sending copies of this report to the other defense committees and subcommittees; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Air Force, and the Navy; the Director, Office of Management and

Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please call me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report.

Major contributors to this report were William Graveline, Matthew Mongin, and Gerald Wood.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose The Navy and the Air Force are jointly developing the AIM-9X short-range

air-to-air missile to replace the AIM-9M missile. The Chairman,

Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, House Committee

on National Security, requested that GAO provide an independent

assessment of the program’s status. Accordingly, this report discusses the

(1) services’ efforts to reduce missile development risk, (2) missile

program’s plan to transition from development to production, and

(3) importance of separately managed but essential supporting systems.

Background The U.S. Navy-designed and -built AIM-9 Sidewinder family of air-to-air

missiles has protected U.S. fighter pilots for over 40 years. These

short-range missiles are carried on all tactical fighter aircraft and are used

when target aircraft are too close for mid-range missiles to be effective.

The current missile is the AIM-9M, which evolved in 1978, but this missile

is becoming outdated. In April 1996, the Air Force Chief of Staff testified

before Congress that U.S. pilots carrying the AIM-9M have the fourth best

short-range missile in the world. According to the Naval Intelligence

Service, modern missiles, such as the Russian AA-11 and Israeli PYTHON

4, both with their helmet-mounted cueing/targeting systems, are very

capable. The services have for several years sought to provide a better

short-range missile system for U.S. forces. Before beginning the AIM-9X

program, the services considered acquiring a modern foreign missile but,

after a lengthy study, concluded that none met all of the U.S. requirements.

The AIM-9X missile system is to be a highly maneuverable missile, with

full day and night capability and helmet-mounted cueing capability. The

missile is designed to have increased resistance to countermeasures and

improved target acquisition capability over the AIM-9M. It will have a new

infrared seeker, sophisticated target tracking software to interpret what

the seeker sees, a streamlined missile body, and thrust-aided steering for

improved maneuvering. It is to be carried on all U.S. fighter aircraft,

including the F-22. The AIM-9X helmet-mounted cueing system will allow

U.S. pilots to aim the missile by turning their heads and looking at the

target. Importantly, however, the helmet-mounted cueing system is

currently being developed under a separate, parallel program from the

missile. Another effort is developing the necessary hardware and software

modifications to integrate the missile and helmet into the aircraft.

In late 1996, after an 18-month competitive demonstration and validation

program, Hughes Missile Systems Company (now the Raytheon

Corporation) was selected to be the prime contractor for the AIM-9X

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Executive Summary

missile. Hughes has total missile performance responsibility, including

development, production, and lifetime maintenance support. The

engineering and manufacturing development effort began in January 1997

and is scheduled to end in 2001. The services plan to buy a total of 10,000

missiles at an average unit production cost of $264,000 (then-year dollars).

Results in Brief The AIM-9X missile program includes many initiatives to reduce the risk of

technical, cost, and schedule problems. It uses many existing subsystems,

components, and items not requiring development, and government and

contractor technical experts have joined together in integrated product

teams. In addition, the services conducted a competitive demonstration

and validation of new technologies to reduce technical risk.

GAO is concerned, however, about two situations. First, that the plan to

start missile low-rate initial production about 1 year before completing

development flight testing and before operational testing of production

representative missiles will risk later discovery of technical or operational

suitability problems. Accordingly, at this critical juncture, Department of

Defense (DOD) decisionmakers will not have enough verifiable information

on the system’s key performance parameters in an operational

environment to make an informed production decision.

Second, GAO is concerned that the helmet-mounted cueing system is being

developed under a separate program from the missile even though U.S.

fighter pilots need both the AIM-9X missile and the helmet-mounted

cueing system to ensure that they can prevail in air-to-air combat against

modern threat missiles. While the separate development programs are

being coordinated, there is no requirement that the missile, helmet, and

aircraft modifications be thoroughly and realistically tested and evaluated

together as a system of systems prior to initiating AIM-9X missile

production. Until the weapon system is tested and evaluated using

production representative missiles and helmets, DOD decisionmakers will

not have information on whether the AIM-9X weapon system’s key

performance parameters—such as the ability to acquire, track, and fire on

targets over a wider area than the AIM-9M—are achievable. Further, if all

elements of the system are not produced and deployed together, the

AIM-9X may not be able to prevail in aerial combat against modern threat

missiles.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

Missile Development

Program Uses Risk

Reduction Strategies

The services plan to reduce technical risk in developing the AIM-9X

missile by using several existing subsystems from the AIM-9M, including

the warhead, rocket motor, and fuze. The Hughes’ AIM-9X design also

includes nondevelopmental items—such as the airframe and engine

control system—which were developed and tested previously by the Air

Force. To ensure low technical risk for the sensor, guidance and control

subsystem, and other critical subsystems, the services conducted an

18-month competitive demonstration and validation program. Because of

this program’s success, both Hughes and the program manager consider

the AIM-9X missile’s overall technical risk to be low as it enters

engineering and manufacturing development. There are some individual

areas of technical risk, now considered to be moderate to low, that could

pose development problems. For example, since target acquisition and

tracking can take place in the presence of countermeasures, the

development of the guidance and control software is a complex and

challenging task. Program and contractor officials understand these risks

and believe adequate time and resources are available within the program

to resolve any problems that may emerge during development.

The effectiveness of the program’s efforts to reduce technical, cost, and

schedule risk will not be known for at least another year when the missile

design is to be finalized and flight testing is underway. If the program

remains on the planned schedule, both program and contractor managers

believe any remaining development risk will be well understood. At that

time, the program’s progress and readiness to begin low-rate initial

production can be considered, together with the services’ fiscal year 2000

budget request for initial production funds.

Missile Low-Rate Initial

Production to Start

Prematurely

Low-rate initial production of the AIM-9X missile is planned to start in

March 2000, before sufficient testing is accomplished. Production would

begin before demonstration by realistic flight testing that the AIM-9X

system’s key performance parameters are achievable. The services plan to

begin production about 1 year prior to the completion of developmental

flight testing. All of the flight tests to be conducted before the missile

low-rate initial production decision, including those to be conducted as

part of the preliminary operational testing, will use engineering

development missiles. After the initial production decision, additional

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Executive Summary

developmental flight tests and all of the operational testing with

production representative missiles—which are development missiles but

very close in physical configuration and performance to production

missiles—are to be conducted for the following 2 years. Developmental

flight tests will not be complete and no results of operational testing of

production representative missiles will be available before the low-rate

initial production decision. Accordingly, the test results may not

accurately reflect the capabilities of the final production configuration of

the system. Making a production decision on the basis of such incomplete

testing risks the discovery of technical problems during later

developmental and operational testing that may require costly design

changes after production begins.

AIM-9X System of Systems

Needs to Be Tested,

Produced, and Deployed

Together

All elements of the AIM-9X weapon system—the missile, the helmet, and

associated aircraft modifications—must be present and working together

for the system to prevail against modern missile threats. The services are

trying to closely coordinate the separate development of the AIM-9X

missile, the helmet-mounted cueing system, and associated hardware and

software modifications to their aircraft. However, DOD does not require

that production representative versions of all three elements of the

weapon system be tested together as a single system of systems prior to

the AIM-9X missile’s low-rate initial production decision. Without this

testing, DOD will not have data to determine the extent to which the

AIM-9X weapon system’s key performance parameters are achievable.

In addition, although the services have approved an AIM-9X missile

production plan and made long-term funding commitments to buy the

missiles, there are no approved production plans or funding for the helmet

or associated aircraft modifications. The helmet program manager told us

the individual aircraft program offices, such as the F-15 and F-16, are

expected to separately budget for and buy helmets and modification kits

consistent with their other aircraft improvement plans. If DOD is making a

commitment to the AIM-9X system, that commitment needs to extend

beyond the missile and include the helmet cueing system and the

associated aircraft modifications. Navy and Air Force officials have stated

that their fighters need both the AIM-9X missile and helmet-mounted

cueing system to ensure that they can prevail against modern threat

missiles.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Executive Summary

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of

the Navy and the Air Force to revise the AIM-9X missile’s acquisition

strategy and production plan to allow for all developmental flight testing

and enough operational testing of the AIM-9X missile, helmet, and aircraft

modifications to be accomplished using production representative

hardware and software to demonstrate that the AIM-9X weapon system

can meet its minimum performance requirements before low-rate initial

production begins. GAO also recommends that they achieve a single,

coordinated production, deployment, and funding plan for the AIM-9X

missile, helmet-mounted cueing system, and associated aircraft

modifications at the low-rate initial production decision.

Agency Comments

and GAO Evaluation

In response to a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with most of GAO’s

recommendations. DOD believes that the risks associated with AIM-9X

missile development are well characterized and mitigation plans are in

place to address the risks. Accordingly, DOD believes current test plans are

adequate to provide an informed decision at the low-rate initial production

milestone. DOD agrees that all elements of the AIM-9X weapon system are

needed for the full capability of the system to be realized. However,

because of the current disadvantage warfighters face, DOD states that it is

unwilling to delay missile production should technical problems with the

helmet occur. DOD stated the AIM-9X missile by itself offers a significant

improvement over the current operational system that should not be

withheld. Finally, DOD pointed out that while there is no formal

requirement to tie these programs together, it agreed that it is extremely

important to achieve an integrated system as soon as possible and will

continue to emphasize coordination and review efforts.

GAO recognizes that DOD has done much to anticipate and manage risk in

the AIM-9X development program. In GAO’s view, however, DOD is willing to

enter production with many unknowns. As DOD stated in its comments, a

basic tenet of the AIM-9X program is that all elements of the AIM-9X

system are necessary to eliminate the disadvantage currently faced by U.S.

warfighters. Yet, in its response, DOD states that, if the aircraft radar were

used for cueing purposes, the AIM-9X—even without the helmet-mounted

cueing system—offers an increased capability against fielded threat

systems. It is important to note, however, that to take advantage of this

potential capability, pilots would be required to follow yet to be developed

procedures and tactics that would be considerably different than current

practices for aerial combat. Moreover, DOD officials GAO spoke with agreed

that it is questionable whether DOD can meet its own positive identification

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Executive Summary

requirement using the aircraft radar for cueing purposes. In addition, at

this time of limited defense resources, GAO continues to believe that

specific consideration of coordinated funding and production plans at the

low-rate initial production decision point is necessary to ensure that all

elements of the AIM-9X system, once tested, are produced and deployed

together.

DOD’s entire comments on the draft report are included in appendix I. DOD’s

specific comments and GAO’s evaluation appear at the end of each report

chapter.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

The AIM-9M Is No Longer the Best Short-Range Missile in the

World

10

Foreign-Made Missiles Do Not Meet U.S. Requirements 11

The AIM-9X Weapon System Is to Have Enhanced Capabilities 11

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 14

Chapter 2 

Strategies to Reduce

Missile Technical,

Cost, and Schedule

Risks

16

Strategies to Reduce Technical Risk 16

Strategies to Reduce AIM-9X Cost 17

Strategies to Ensure Schedule Performance 18

Conclusions 19

Chapter 3 

AIM-9X Missile

Low-Rate Initial

Production Appears

to Be Premature

20

Low-Rate Initial Production Planned Before Testing of

Production Representative Missiles

20

Flight Testing to Continue for 2 Years After Start of Low-Rate

Initial Production

22

Recommendation 23

Agency Comments and Our Response 23

Chapter 4 

AIM-9X System of

Systems Needs to Be

Tested, Produced, and

Deployed Together

24

All Elements Are Needed to Field a Superior System 24

Development Programs Are Separate but Closely Coordinated 26

Production Plans and Funding Are Not Fully Coordinated 27

Conclusions 27

Recommendations 28

DOD Comments and Our Response 28

Appendix Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 30

Figures Figure 1.1: AIM-9X Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile 13

Figure 3.1: AIM-9X Flight Test and Low-Rate Initial Production

Schedule

21

Figure 4.1: Comparison of Short Range Missiles’ Lethal Range 25

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Contents

Abbreviations

ASRAAM Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile

DOD Department of Defense

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The AIM-9 family of air-to-air missiles has protected U.S. fighter aircraft

for over 40 years, but now there are more modern foreign missiles that

may present a threat to U.S. aircraft. The U.S. Navy and Air Force

considered buying a foreign missile but determined that the best solution

to meet U.S. requirements was to extensively upgrade the current AIM-9M

missile. The services selected Hughes Missile Systems Company (now the

Raytheon Corporation) to develop and produce a very maneuverable

missile that, together with a new helmet-mounted cueing system, is

expected to be the best in the world.

The AIM-9M Is No

Longer the Best

Short-Range Missile in

the World

The AIM-9 Sidewinder family of air-to-air missiles is carried on all tactical

fighter aircraft and is used at short ranges when target aircraft are too

close for radar-guided missiles to be effective. The Sidewinder was first

deployed in the 1950s—as the AIM-9B. Over the years, improvements were

made as new models were introduced. The missiles have been sold to

many friendly countries. The current missile, the AIM-9M, evolved in 1978.

U.S. fighter aircraft equipped with the AIM-9M missile, however, are facing

modern foreign-built missiles and advanced cueing/targeting systems.

The rules of engagement for U.S. pilots require that, in many situations,

they make a positive identification before firing on an adversary. This

results in the pilot’s not being able to fire until the target aircraft is well

within visual range. At combat speeds such an encounter can quickly

evolve into a close-in fight,1

 during which a short-range missile is required.

A joint Navy and Air Force study predicts that a significant percentage of

air-to-air encounters will result in a close-in flight.

In April 1996, the Air Force Chief of Staff testified that U.S. pilots have the

fourth best short-range missile in the world. Modern short-range missile

systems with their cueing/targeting systems can engage targets throughout

the forward hemisphere of the aircraft, providing a decisive advantage in a

close-in fight. The services are trying to develop tactics and

countermeasures to neutralize these threats, but there is general

agreement that a more capable U.S. short-range missile system is needed

as soon as possible.

1

In “close-in fight,” combatants are within visual range of each other.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Foreign-Made Missiles

Do Not Meet U.S.

Requirements

In the 1970s, the United States and several European countries signed a

Memorandum of Agreement that specified that the Europeans would

develop a new short-range missile to replace the AIM-9 Sidewinder series.

That missile became the Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile

(ASRAAM). In the late 1980s, however, the European consortium dissolved.

When the consortium dissolved, the Navy and the Air Force reexamined

U.S. requirements and determined that the ASRAAM did not have the

capability they required. The United States subsequently left the ASRAAM

program. The two services then worked on separate upgrades to the

AIM-9M. After false starts with their separate programs, a joint Navy and

Air Force program with the Navy as lead service was started to extensively

upgrade the AIM-9M. The upgraded missile is the AIM-9X.

As a part of the alternative evaluation process before starting the AIM-9X

program, the services considered acquiring one of the modern foreign

missiles such as the Russian AA-11, the Israeli PYTHON 4, or the British

ASRAAM as an alternative to developing a new U.S. missile. DOD determined,

however, that none of these missiles was able to meet all of the U.S.

requirements.

The services conducted an evaluation of the ASRAAM, including a 6-month

Foreign Comparison Test that included firing the missile from a U.S. F-16

aircraft. The ASRAAM is electrically and physically compatible with U.S.

aircraft and uses the same infrared sensor as the AIM-9X. The evaluation,

however, showed that ASRAAM does not meet all of the U. S. performance

requirements. Also, the evaluation showed that, because of the additional

time and cost that would be needed to upgrade, test, and integrate ASRAAM

for U.S. aircraft, it offered no advantage over the proposed AIM-9X missile.

The AIM-9X Weapon

System Is to Have

Enhanced Capabilities

During the 2-year AIM-9X concept development phase, the services

analyzed user needs, current and future threats, and available technology

to determine the requirements for the new missile. The resulting AIM-9X

system requirement has five key performance parameters:

• the ability to operate during the day or at night;

• the ability to operate over land and at sea in the presence of infrared

countermeasures;

• weight, size, and electrical compatibility with all current U.S. fighters and

the F-22;

• the ability to acquire, track, and fire on targets over a wider area than the

AIM-9M; and

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• a high probability that a missile launched will reach and kill its target.

The analyses showed that user requirements could be met and that

technical risk could be reduced, by modifying the existing AIM-9M and

developing a new targeting/cueing system.

The AIM-9X missile is planned to have increased resistance to

countermeasures and improved target acquisition capability over the

AIM-9M. It will have a new infrared seeker, a tracker to interpret what the

seeker sees, a streamlined missile body, and rocket motor thrust vectoring

for improved maneuvering. It will be carried on all U.S. fighter aircraft,

including the F/A-18, F-15, F-16, and F-22.

An 18-month AIM-9X competitive demonstration and validation program

began in 1994 with the Hughes Missile Systems Company and the

Raytheon Corporation as the competing contractors. Both companies

demonstrated, among other things, how they would reduce the technical

risk of developing the AIM-9X missile. Examples of demonstration and

validation work include trade studies, simulating missile performance,

analyzing missile compatibility with Navy and Air Force aircraft, and flight

testing target-tracking capability. Additionally, the contractors were

required to plan for manufacturing the missile, including identifying new

or unique processes and special tooling and facilities requirements.

Hughes was selected as the AIM-9X missile contractor in December 1996.

Hughes has total performance responsibility, including development,

production, and maintenance support for the missile. Engineering and

manufacturing development began in January 1997 and is planned to end

in 2001. The services plan to buy a total of 10,000 missiles at an average

unit cost of $264,000 (then-year dollars). The AIM-9X missile is shown in

figure 1.1.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: AIM-9X Short-Range

Air-to-Air Missile

Source: Hughes Missile Systems.

A separate, parallel program is developing a helmet-mounted cueing

system that would allow U.S. pilots to aim the AIM-9X missile seeker

toward a target aircraft by turning their heads and looking at the target.

The pilot can then fire the missile without having to turn the aircraft

toward the target, increasing the probability of killing a hostile aircraft

before it can launch a missile. Another effort is developing the necessary

hardware and software modifications to integrate the missile and helmet

into the aircraft. All three elements of the AIM-9X weapon system—the

missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications—are seen as critical to

countering the capabilities of modern threat missiles.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development,

House Committee on National Security, requested that we provide an

independent assessment of the AIM-9X program’s status. Our objectives

were to determine (1) the services’ efforts to reduce missile development

risk, (2) the missile program’s plan to transition from development to

production, and (3) the importance of separately managed but essential

supporting systems.

To evaluate the missile’s development risk, we visited the program office

and the contractor where we discussed technology and schedule risk. We

reviewed the program acquisition and test plans. We visited the Naval Air

Weapons Center at China Lake, California, where we discussed the missile

program’s technology and schedule with the government short-range

missile experts. We reviewed reports prepared by the contractors during

the program demonstration and validation phase. We also reviewed

several studies of foreign missiles, including the Senior Review Team

analysis of the ASRAAM program.

To assess the missile program’s plan to transition from development to

production, we examined the planned development and operational test

schedules and production plans. We considered the amount and type of

testing that is planned to be accomplished before the first and subsequent

production decisions. We discussed test plans and potential risks with

program, contractor, and DOD officials charged with managing and

overseeing missile flight testing. We also reviewed our previous reports on

other major acquisition systems with regard to readiness to enter low-rate

initial production.

We reviewed the helmet-mounted cueing system, a separately managed

but essential supporting system, to determine its importance to the

AIM-9X system. We discussed program technical issues with program

managers. We also compared schedule plans for the AIM-9X missile,

helmet-mounted cueing system, and associated aircraft modifications.

During the course of this review, we met with representatives from the

DOD Inspector General, Naval Air Systems Command, and Air Force

Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet,

Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Air Weapons Center, China Lake, California; Air

Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Aeronautical Systems

Center and National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force

Base, Ohio; ASRAAM Senior Review Team, Baltimore, Maryland; and Hughes

Missile Systems Company, Tucson, Arizona.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

We performed our audit between July 1996 and October 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 2 

Strategies to Reduce Missile Technical, Cost,

and Schedule Risks

The AIM-9X missile development program is designed to balance the

requirements for a more capable short-range missile with the users’ limited

resources and the need to field the new missile as soon as possible. Key

elements of the approved development plan are strategies to reduce

technical risk and incentives to lower cost and ensure schedule

performance. By early 1999, when the AIM-9X missile design is expected

to be finalized and flight tests are underway, a more accurate assessment

of the program status can be made.

Strategies to Reduce

Technical Risk

Technology problems are often the cause of cost growth and schedule

delays in development programs. To help ensure a successful AIM-9X

missile development program, the services have adopted several strategies

to minimize technical risk. Among these are:

• using existing subsystems, components, and items not requiring

development;

• conducting a competitive demonstration and validation of new technology;

and

• combining government and contractor technical expertise through

integrated product teams.

The AIM-9X missile will use some existing subsystems that do not require

development. For example, several key components are identical to those

used in the AIM-9M missile, including the warhead, rocket motor, and fuze.

These components satisfy user requirements and can be obtained either

from existing inventory missiles or from new production. In either case,

the design and production processes for these items are tested and proven.

The winning Hughes missile design also includes many nondevelopmental

items. For example, Hughes will use fins, an airframe, and an engine

control system previously developed and tested by the Air Force. The

cryoengine, which cools the missile sensor, is a modified version of a

similar device used in other systems. These components do not require

lengthy development and testing but will require some modification for the

AIM-9X. Hughes officials told us that over 70 percent of the missile design

uses parts that do not require development. The company also estimates

that 66 percent of AIM-9X missile software can be obtained from existing

programs.

To help anticipate, identify, and solve technical problems, the

government’s technical experts in short-range missile development have

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 2 

Strategies to Reduce Missile Technical,

Cost, and Schedule Risks

been added to the Hughes AIM-9X development team as a part of the

integrated product teams concept. Technical experts from the Naval Air

Warfare Center at China Lake, California, and the Aeronautical Systems

Center at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, are now a part of the AIM-9X

team. Under this teaming approach, the combined knowledge and efforts

of both contractor and government are focused on the development

process.

Hughes has also implemented a comprehensive technical risk assessment

system that identifies and tracks all known technical risks in the program.

Each risk is described, quantified, monitored, and reported. For example,

Hughes has assessed the guidance and control and thrust vectoring system

as moderate to low-risk items. The company has developed management

plans to address these risks.

Strategies to Reduce

AIM-9X Cost

Affordability is a central objective of the AIM-9X missile program. The

emphasis on cost began during the requirements definition process,

continued through the demonstration and validation phase, was a factor in

the selection of the development contractor, and is an integral part of the

program acquisition strategy. As a DOD flagship program for the Cost as an

Independent Variable Initiative—under which cost is considered more as a

constraint and less as a variable—the AIM-9X program has incorporated a

series of acquisition reforms to focus both government and contractor

efforts to reduce and control program costs.

As a program objective, AIM-9X affordability is second only to achieving

the missile’s key performance characteristics. Low cost was and remains

one of the users’ critical requirements for the system. During the concept

development phase, an assessment of needed capabilities and anticipated

cost considered the projected threat, available and emerging technologies,

and projected resources. Performance and cost trade studies identified the

minimum essential performance requirements and determined they could

be obtained at an acceptable cost if the AIM-9M was upgraded with a new

sensor and airframe instead of developing an entirely new missile.

Reducing AIM-9X missile development and production cost and obtaining

high confidence in the contractors’ cost estimates and cost management

approach were key objectives of the 18-month demonstration phase.

Under the competitive pressure of the winner-take-all development

contract, the government required the contractors to establish

design-to-cost goals and implementation plans, conduct affordability and

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 2 

Strategies to Reduce Missile Technical,

Cost, and Schedule Risks

producibility studies, and propose a production quantity and price

structure. According to the program manager, this emphasis on cost

control and cost management both reduced the expected cost of the

program and increased the program office’s confidence that the

contractor’s development and production cost proposal was sound and

likely to be achieved.

Eight initiatives were pursued during the demonstration phase to reduce

program costs with only minor changes to the system’s performance

requirements resulting in an estimated cost avoidance of $1.2 billion.

Examples of successful reductions include relaxing computer processing

time requirements (which eliminated one circuit board) and standardizing

missile seeker cooling methods (which eliminated the need for two

different cooling systems).

Strategies to Ensure

Schedule

Performance

The AIM-9X missile program has adopted several strategies to establish a

realistic and achievable development schedule that provides the first

missiles to Navy and Air Force fighter units as soon as possible. Principal

among these strategies is the requirement that Hughes develop and follow

a detailed integrated master plan and master schedule.

The program manager told us that the government strategy for reducing

schedule risk on the AIM-9X program has been to encourage the

contractor to develop and follow soundly based development plans.

Accordingly, both contractors were required to develop and submit

integrated master plans and schedules for development and low-rate initial

production during the demonstration phase.

Following the successful demonstration phase, Hughes and the missile

program office reexamined the proposed development schedule. On the

bases of that reexamination, they agreed to reduce the development

schedule from 68 to 61 months and to begin low-rate initial production a

year earlier, thereby lowering development cost by $35 million. This

reduction, according to the program manager, was made possible by the

Hughes comprehensive development and test schedule.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 2 

Strategies to Reduce Missile Technical,

Cost, and Schedule Risks

Conclusions The AIM-9X missile development program contains a series of strategies to

reduce technical risk and incentives to lower cost and ensure schedule

performance. Whether program efforts to reduce technical, cost, and

schedule risk will succeed will not be known for at least another year.

Both program and contractor officials told us that most of the AIM-9X

missile development will be completed by the spring of 1999. At that time,

the AIM-9X design will be finalized, assembly of engineering development

missiles underway, and development flight testing in process. The missile

program manager believes any remaining development risk will be well

understood at that time.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 3 

AIM-9X Missile Low-Rate Initial Production

Appears to Be Premature

In an effort to initiate AIM-9X missile production as soon as practical, the

services plan to make the low-rate initial production decision in early

2000. This production decision is to be made before completing

development flight tests, before adequately testing production

representative missiles, and before full operational testing begins. This

plan risks later discovery of problems requiring design changes and the

associated cost, schedule, and performance impacts. We believe initiating

low-rate initial production before developmental flight testing is complete

and before there is some operational testing with production

representative missiles adds unnecessary risk to the production program.

Low-Rate Initial

Production Planned

Before Testing of

Production

Representative

Missiles

The services plan to begin AIM-9X missile low-rate initial production in

early 2000 by exercising the first production contract option for 

150 missiles. A year later, the second production contract option for 250

missiles is to be exercised. Figure 3.1 shows the program’s planned test

and production decision schedule.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 3 

AIM-9X Missile Low-Rate Initial Production

Appears to Be Premature

Figure 3.1: AIM-9X Flight Test and Low-Rate Initial Production Schedule

Development Flight

Tests

Preliminary Operational

Flight Tests

Operational Flight

Test

Task Name

Lot 1 Decision ( ) &

Deliveries

Lot 2 Decision ( ) &

Deliveries

11

12

ID

10

9

7

6

5

4

3

2

1 AIM-9X Flight Test

8

Operational Test

Low Rate Initial

Production

Helmet-Mounted

Cueing System

1999

Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2000

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2001

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2002

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2003

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Production Representative Missiles

Engineering Development Missiles

Legend:

Initial Production Deliveries

11 Missiles 11 Missiles

5 Missiles

22 Missiles

150 Missiles

250 Missiles

Calendar Years

Source: AIM-9X Program Office.

As figure 3.1 shows, the low-rate initial production decision for the AIM-9X

missile is to be made about 1 year before completion of the planned

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 3 

AIM-9X Missile Low-Rate Initial Production

Appears to Be Premature

developmental flight test program. All of the flight tests to be conducted

before the missile low-rate initial production decision, including those to

be conducted as part of the preliminary operational testing, will use

engineering development missiles. These missiles are manufactured early

in the development program and represent the contractor’s design before

any significant flight testing begins. These flight tests will also use

development level software and may not incorporate the helmet until the

last several flights.

Later in the development program, changes to the missile design are likely

as the test results and manufacturing improvements are incorporated in

production representative missiles. These test missiles are intended to be

very close in physical configuration and performance to the AIM-9X

production missile. They are to be used during the last phase of the

developmental flight tests and for all of the operational flight tests.

Flight Testing to

Continue for 2 Years

After Start of

Low-Rate Initial

Production

Developmental and independent operational flight testing using

production representative missiles is scheduled to begin at about the same

time as the low-rate initial production decision and continue for about 

2 years. These tests expand upon earlier developmental testing, verify

design changes incorporated in the production representative missiles,

and focus on the system’s operational effectiveness and suitability.1

 These

test results, however, will not be available until after low-rate initial

missile production begins, with most operational flight tests occurring

after the second missile production contract is exercised. Indeed, the first

low-rate initial production missiles are expected to be delivered before the

operational testing is complete.

The significant body of developmental and operational flight testing

planned after the low-rate initial production decision point is important to

realistically demonstrate and assess the AIM-9X weapon system’s ability to

meet its minimum acceptable requirements for performance and suitability

without major or costly design changes. Should problems be disclosed in

these tests necessitating changes to the missile design, the missile cost,

schedule, and performance may be adversely affected. Moreover, because

1

DOD defines “operational effectiveness” as the overall degree of mission accomplishment of a system

when used by representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational

employment of the system considering organization, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and

threat. DOD defines “operational suitability” as the degree to which a system can be placed

satisfactorily in field use with consideration given to such factors as availability, compatibility,

transportability, interoperability, reliability, wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, and

supportability.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 3 

AIM-9X Missile Low-Rate Initial Production

Appears to Be Premature

the low-rate initial production missiles are to be deployed directly to

operational units, such changes would directly affect operating units.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the

Navy and the Air Force to revise the AIM-9X missile’s acquisition strategy

to allow for the completion of all developmental flight tests and enough

operational flight tests with production representative missiles to

demonstrate that the missile can meet its minimum performance

requirements before low-rate initial production begins.

Agency Comments

and Our Response

DOD did not concur with the recommendation, stating that adequate testing

is planned prior to the low-rate initial production decision for an informed

decision.

The performance data to support the low-rate initial production decision

will be based on incomplete testing of developmental missiles and

software. Flight testing of the production representative missiles and

associated systems is scheduled to begin more than a year after the

planned production decision. As we have reported previously, many of the

weapon systems that start production without performing operational

tests to gain assurance that the systems will perform satisfactorily later

experience significant operational effectiveness and/or suitability

problems.2

2

Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely

(GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994).

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 4 

AIM-9X System of Systems Needs to Be

Tested, Produced, and Deployed Together

All three elements of the AIM-9X weapon system—the missile, the

helmet-mounted cueing system, and the associated aircraft

modifications—must be present and properly working together to ensure

that U.S. fighters can prevail against modern threat missiles. The services

are closely coordinating the separate development programs and plan to

test all of the elements together during AIM-9X flight testing. However,

there is no requirement that production representative versions of the

missile, helmet, and associated aircraft modifications be successfully

demonstrated together before the AIM-9X missile goes into low-rate initial

production. Moreover, helmets and associated aircraft modifications are

not linked to the approved AIM-9X missile production and funding plans.

By not requiring that the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications be

tested, produced, and deployed together, as a “system of systems,” DOD

risks fielding a missile unable to prevail in aerial combat.

All Elements Are

Needed to Field a

Superior System

To help them prevail in the close-in air battle, U.S. pilots are going to need

not only the AIM-9X missile, but also the helmet and associated aircraft

modifications. The Russians and Israelis have already developed,

produced, and deployed short-range missile systems with helmet-mounted

cueing systems. The Russian AA-11 missile and helmet system have been

widely exported. The British, French, and other nations are also

developing modern missiles. While the AIM-9X missile with the helmet is

expected to be superior to all of them, the missile alone is not. Figure 4.1

illustrates the relative capabilities of the AIM-9X system of systems, the

AA-11, and the AIM-9M, which is currently operational.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 4 

AIM-9X System of Systems Needs to Be

Tested, Produced, and Deployed Together

Figure 4.1: Comparison of Short Range Missiles’ Lethal Range (not to scale)

AIM-9X

AA-11

AIM-9M

AIM -9X with helmet cueing system

AIM -9X with radar cue

AIM -9X without helmet cueing system

AIM-9X

Source: Hughes Missile Systems.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 4 

AIM-9X System of Systems Needs to Be

Tested, Produced, and Deployed Together

Service officials told us that the rules for engaging enemy aircraft and the

requirement for positive identification of targets increase the likelihood of

close-in air battles in the future. While the AIM-9X and other missiles can

be used at longer ranges, the positive identification requirement, together

with the speed and agility of modern fighter aircraft, can quickly transform

the fight into a close-in air battle where the advantage is held by the

aircraft that can lock-on to its adversary and shoot first.

As figure 4.1 shows, the AIM-9X missile without a helmet is expected to

have greater lethal range than the AIM-9M and the AA-11. Without the

helmet, however, a U.S. pilot would be unable to take full advantage of the

AIM-9X capability to take the critical first shot that often determines the

survivor in a close-in air battle. This first shot capability is achieved by the

combination of the (1) helmet and the missile sensor acquiring a target

well off to the side of the aircraft, as well as in front of it and (2) computer

software that links the pilot’s helmet, the missile, and the aircraft fire

control system. As shown in the figure, the AIM-9X system (missile,

helmet, and aircraft modifications) is expected to have a distinct

advantage over the AA-11 missile.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the projected

range and sensor tracking capability of AIM-9X without the

helmet-mounted cueing system is equivalent to the capability of the AA-11

threat missile in azimuth and exceeds the capability of the AA-11 in range.

DOD’s position is based on using the fighter aircraft radar to cue the

AIM-9X missile to the target of interest when it is beyond the view of the

aircraft’s heads-up display. Using the radar to cue the missile, however,

will take more time and be less certain than with the helmet and will

require DOD to train pilots in yet to be developed procedures and tactics

that would be considerably different than current practices for aerial

combat. Moreover, DOD officials we spoke with agreed that it is

questionable whether DOD can meet its own positive identification

requirement using the aircraft radar for cueing purposes.

Development

Programs Are

Separate but Closely

Coordinated

The AIM-9X missile, helmet, and associated aircraft modifications are

being developed under separate but closely coordinated programs. The

missile and helmet contractors have negotiated detailed working

agreements to ensure the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications are

developed to operate together and to be fully compatible with both Navy

and Air Force aircraft. While each development program will test its

system independently, the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications are

also planned to be tested together as a part of AIM-9X missile flight testing.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 4 

AIM-9X System of Systems Needs to Be

Tested, Produced, and Deployed Together

An early operational assessment of the combined system, including five

flight tests, is planned prior to the AIM-9X low-rate initial production

decision. Then, for the next 2 years, production representative missiles,

helmets, and aircraft software are to be tested under both developmental

and realistic operating conditions.

While plans are in place to perform total system testing with the missile,

helmet, and aircraft modifications prior to the initial AIM-9X missile

low-rate initial production decision, those tests will not be done using

production representative hardware and software. Moreover, there is no

formal requirement that sufficient total system testing take place prior to

starting missile low-rate initial production to demonstrate that the AIM-9X

weapon system can meet its key performance parameters. We are

concerned about this because of the criticality that all three elements

work together to ensure that the AIM-9X system will prevail against

modern threat missiles. If technical problems delay development of the

helmet or aircraft modifications, missile testing will proceed to support

the low-rate initial production decision. At that time, the ability of the

AIM-9X system to achieve its performance parameters will not be known.

Production Plans and

Funding Are Not Fully

Coordinated

There is an approved and funded AIM-9X production plan to acquire

10,000 missiles over 18 years beginning in 2000; however, no such

production plan or approved funding exists for the helmet or for the

associated aircraft modifications. We were told by the helmet program

manager that each of the aircraft program offices must plan and budget for

helmets and associated modifications consistent with their needs and

resources.

Conclusions All elements of the AIM-9X weapon system must be in place to achieve the

program’s objective, which is to ensure that Navy and Air Force fighters

prevail in close-in aerial combat. Without a requirement that all elements

of this system of systems be tested together, produced together, and

deployed together, the full capability of the system will not be realized.

Until the weapon system is tested and evaluated using production

representative missiles and helmets, DOD decisionmakers will not have

information on whether the AIM-9X weapon system’s key performance

parameters are achievable.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Chapter 4 

AIM-9X System of Systems Needs to Be

Tested, Produced, and Deployed Together

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the

Navy and the Air Force to revise the AIM-9X missile acquisition strategy to

allow for enough operational testing of the missile, helmet, and associated

aircraft modifications to be accomplished, using production representative

hardware and software, to demonstrate that the AIM-9X system can meet

its minimum performance requirements before low-rate initial production

begins. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the

services to provide a coordinated production, deployment, and funding

plan for all three elements of the system.

DOD Comments and

Our Response

On the first recommendation, DOD did not concur and stated that

significant improvement over the current operational system is possible

with just the AIM-9X missile only. DOD added that it would not be prudent

to delay the missile development and testing to provide concurrent

development and test demonstration with the helmet and aircraft

modifications. On the second recommendation, DOD partially concurred

and stated that it would continue to coordinate all three elements of the

system but would not formally tie the three elements together. DOD

expressed concern that insisting that the schedules for the missile, helmet,

and aircraft modifications remain synchronized risks burdening it with

higher costs if one element falls behind schedule and the other elements

have to proceed at a reduced, inefficient level.

The objective of the AIM-9X program has been to develop a system that

will provide the capability to prevail in aerial combat against modern

threat missiles. Using the missile without the helmet will not provide that

capability and will require DOD to train pilots in yet to be developed

procedures and tactics that would be considerably different than current

practices for aerial combat. Although there are risks in continuing to

synchronize the helmet and missile schedules, we believe that DOD would

be accepting more risk than necessary by committing to low-rate initial

production of the missiles before demonstrating, using production

representative hardware and software, that the total AIM-9X system can

meet its minimum performance requirements.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6 and 23.

See comment 1.

Now on pp. 6 and 28.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 25.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Now on pp. 6 and 28.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Following are our comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter

dated January 16, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. The last AIM-9X schedule that we reviewed indicated that one test firing

of a production representative missile is planned to occur within days of

the low-rate initial production decision. Should these two development

(vice operational) tests be accomplished as DOD now proposes, the

detailed assessment of the test results will not be available to

decisionmakers.

2. Figure 4.1 has been modified to indicate the potentially greater level of

lethal azimuth of the AIM-9X when the missile is cued by the aircraft radar.

However, that radar cueing of the missile is neither as fast nor as certain

as with the helmet. Also, procedures and tactics for using the radar cueing

capability with the AIM-9X would have to be developed and pilots would

have to be trained.

3. Our recommendation addresses only those aircraft modifications

needed to integrate the AIM-9X missile and the new helmet into each

aircraft. Other aspects of the operational flight program should not be

affected.

(707185) Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-45 AIM-9X Acquisition
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