ENGI

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

NEER

 Engineer 1

COMMANDANT

Major General

Randal R. Castro

April-June 2005

FEATURES

05 Expeditionary Engineer Mission Force

 By Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Crall

11 Rebuilding Baghdad: An Engineer Battalion’s Contribution

 By Lieutenant Colonel Brian L. Dosa, Major Brian J. Davis, and

Captain Brad A. Morgan

15 On Top of the World: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Supports

an Arctic Mission

 By Dr. JoAnne Castagna

17 Bridging the Gap in Homeland Security: 62d Engineer Battalion

Helps Secure the Nation’s Borders

By Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Riera and Captain Richard T. Childers

21 Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agent—Closing the UXO Gap

By Command Sergeant Major David M. Clark

24 The 420th Engineer Brigade: Builders in Battle

By Major Keith A. Dotts

28 The 44th Engineer Battalion Deploys Again

By Second Lieutenant Patrick J. Anderson and Second Lieutenant

Jennifer Sanford-Hayes

34 2005 Army Deployment Excellence Awards

By Mr. Charles K. Ledebuhr

April-June 2005 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 35 PB 5-05-2

UNITED STATES ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

Front Cover:

U.S. Army Engineer

Soldiers

Back Cover:

Illustration by Paul

McGehee - Multimedia

Visual Information

Service Center

DEPARTMENTS

02 Clear the Way

By Major General Randal R. Castro

03 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major Clinton J. Pearson

26 Engineer Safety – “The Army’s New Protective

Eyewear”

By Mr. Larry T. Hasty

30 Personal Viewpoint – “Strengthening Army

Leadership Courses by Training Adaptability”

By Members of the First Engineer Command and

Staff Course

33 Dedication

36 Past in Review – “Joint-Service Beach

Obstacle Demolition in World War II”

By Mr. James Douglas O’Dell

41 Subscription Order Form

Jennifer Morgan

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Cheryl Green

Susan Groth

Kathy Webber

MANAGING EDITOR

Shirley Bridges
April-June 2005 Engineer 5

O.

n a cold day in March 2004 at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, a telephone rang in the headquarters of

the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Airborne),

and a voice on the other end outlined a requirement to

enhance the maneuver of a joint task force (JTF) that was

taking the fight to the enemy along the Afghanistan-Pakistan

border. The mission was to rapidly deploy by air with a

tailored battalion engineer mission force (EMF) to construct

a forward operating site (FOS) in a remote area of

Afghanistan. Site capabilities must include a C-17 airfield

with the ability to land several C-17s simultaneously,

accommodate several rotary-wing aircraft, and include a

matted taxiway; an 80,000-gallon forward area arming and

refueling point (FAARP); and a base camp.

 “Can you do it?” asked the JTF liaison officer (LNO).

“And by the way, this is a nonpermissive environment, the

road network is virtually nonexistent, you must have an

airstrip that allows a short takeoff and landing (STOL), and

your mission force must secure itself.”

“Sounds like a challenge. But why the Tiger Battalion?”

asked the command representative.

 “I forgot to mention that the only way to get the engineer

equipment in there is by parachute,” responded the JTF LNO.

 “Our motto is, ‘To do all things well’,” replied the

command representative. “When do we leave?”

And so began the short-fuse planning to establish FOS

Carlson in Afghanistan, with the goal of providing the

supported JTF freedom to maneuver and operate in this

austere, high-altitude region; it was expeditionary

engineering at its best.

Versatility

The 27th Engineer Battalion had been supporting the

Global War on Terrorism on many fronts since

11 September 2001. Having provided support to the

3d Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, during an airborne

seizure of an airfield in Iraq and an area mine-clearing mission

for the Combined Joint Task Force-180 in Afghanistan, the

battalion was now supporting the 82d Airborne Division in

Iraq and a U.S. Southern Command mission in Honduras. To

execute the new mission, an engineer force had to be

organized—using the uncommitted battalion assets and JTF

combat enablers/forces—to form a combined arms team that

could secure the terrain and construct and sustain an FOS.

The multifunctional engineer capability and deployability

of the corps combat airborne organization made the 27th the

unit of choice to form the nucleus of the mission force. With

each line company consisting of two combat engineer platoons,

a light equipment platoon, a maintenance section, and a

headquarters section, flexibility is a hallmark of the force

structure. Additionally, the Headquarters and Headquarters

Company includes a vertical construction platoon, a medical

section, a support platoon, an organizational maintenance

section, a direct-support maintenance section, and staff

elements that add to the battalion’s multifunctionality. The

deployment capabilities are also critical: an ability to

strategically deploy by air, conduct a parachute insertion of

equipment and personnel, and tactically move personnel and

equipment by rotary-wing assets.

Given the mission requirements and assets that were

deployed to support other missions, an EMF using the

available assets was essential. The troops that were to design

Expeditionary Engineer

Mission Force

By Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Crall

A C-17 taxiing on the ramp parking area
6 Engineer April-June 2005

the force began by using specified tasks, which were refined

based on requests for information and intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (ISR) data gathered from the task force.

The EMF-specified tasks were to—

 Protect the force.

 Rapidly deploy by air to multiple intermediate staging bases

(ISBs) in Germany and Afghanistan.

 Conduct a rotary-wing assault to secure a drop zone (DZ).

 Execute a parachute drop of an airfield construction package

by C-17 aircraft.

 Employ a ground assault convoy (GAC).

 Construct a STOL airstrip; upgrade to C-130 assault landing

zone (ALZ) capability.

 Construct a C-17 ALZ, taxiway, and cargo ramp.

 Construct a heavy landing zone taxiway with AM2 matting

and staging area.

 Construct an 80,000-gallon FAARP.

 Construct a base camp with life support.

 Provide command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR);

force sustainment; and JTF liaison.

 Provide engineer support to the JTF.

With the remaining uncommitted battalion assets, the EMF

was formed around the battalion headquarters, Charlie

Company, and Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The

EMF task breakdown was evident: Charlie Company would

secure the force, Headquarters and Headquarters Company

would build and sustain the FOS, and the battalion

headquarters would provide C4ISR and liaison to the task

force.

Additionally, the task force provided combat enablers to

operate as a combined arms team to include a U.S. Air Force

Special Tactics Squadron for the Air Traffic Control, joint fires,

tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, and an ALZ assessment; an

information operations team; a civil affairs team; a FAARP

team; an air liaison officer; a joint communications support

element; and an embedded British Broadcasting Corporation/

public affairs team. On order, the task force would provide

additional combat forces for both fire support and ground

maneuver, as the threat evolved.

Deployability

With the personnel and equipment ready, plans

refined, equipment rigged to airdrop, and mounted

rehearsals completed on similar terrain at Fort

Bragg, the EMF deployed via C-17 to the ISB at Baghram

Airfield, Afghanistan, while C-17s with the airdrop engineer

equipment staged at an ISB in Germany. Because of the timesensitive nature of the mission, a battalion assault command

post was sent to Baghram Airfield to refine the plan as the

force closed. Since there was no time for a predeployment site

survey, the task force focused ISR assets to facilitate battlefield

visualization. This included not only the enemy situational

template but also detailed terrain analysis along with in situ

soil conditions to ensure that we could construct the FOS—

specifically the ALZ. We had detailed digital terrain products

of the area, which allowed us to see the battlespace and

effectively array initial-entry security forces on the objective.

Refinement of the EMF occurred until the wheels went up on

the last aircraft to ensure package fidelity based on the ISR

pull. With a limited number of deployment aircraft, all C-17s

were filled to maximum capacity. This constrained airlift drove

the organization of the EMF considerably, requiring the right

mix of equipment and personnel to execute the mission with

Paratroopers onboard a CH-47

en route to secure the DZ
April-June 2005 Engineer 7

the proper redundancy—especially with the airdrop of

equipment.

The additional task force assets were integrated into the

EMF as final troop-leading procedures took place. Reception,

staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and force

closure at Baghram Airfield took 3 days, giving paratroopers a

chance to get acclimated and perform final precombat checks

and inspections and rehearsals. Refinement of the plan

continued with the task force—specifically the rotary-wing

assault and airdrop operation—to ensure the survivability of

the platforms into the small DZ, which was surrounded by

wadi complexes and 6,200-foot ridgelines. Briefbacks and rock

drills of the plan were provided to the JTF commander to

ensure the seamless synchronization of fires, C4ISR, and

maneuverability. The evening before initial entry, paratroopers

gathered around a football-field-size terrain model of the

objective to view the final rock drill. The stage was set; the

force, ready; the weather, ideal; and all understood the task

and purpose of the mission.

The EMF deployed to the objective area by rotary-wing

assault, GAC, heavy-equipment airdrop, and airland operation.

Battalion personnel boarded CH-47 and MH-53 aircraft for the

initial entry. Tasks of the initial-entry force were to secure the

objective area, establish the DZ, and lay out the survey control

points for the airstrip to facilitate construction of the ALZ.

AH-64s were added to the initial-entry package to provide inflight security, as well as to clear the objective landing zone.

MH-47 aircraft were scheduled to bring in Class I and IV

provisions to support the force.

Initial assault was executed unopposed. Upon landing,

Charlie Company established blocking positions to secure the

DZ, while the survey team established the ALZ geometry. The

battalion assault command post established secure voice and

data communications with the task force while controlling ISR

and close air support assets to support initial-entry security

operations. Heavy drop of the engineer equipment was planned

for after the assault—once the DZ was established and

secured, the ALZ surveyed, and the light equipment derig

teams staged.

On 25 April 2004, a heavy airfield construction package

was airdropped from C-17 aircraft onto a 2,000- by 800-foot DZ

6,000 feet in elevation—the largest heavy drop of engineer

equipment since World War II. All platforms landed safely due

to the precise planning of heavy drop points of impact by the

task force airlift planners, the EMF, and the Air Force Special

Tactics Squadron. One grader was nonmission-capable due

to three flat tires, but all the other equipment was fully mission

capable. The airdrop was supported by robust fires and an

ISR package to ensure C-17 survivability and the security of

the ground force. Following the airdrop, derig teams swarmed

to the marked platforms, expertly removing parachutes,

lashings, and rigging. Forty-three hours after the last platform

was derigged, a STOL Air Force aircraft landed on a newly

constructed ALZ—a credit to the detailed planning,

preparation, and execution of the initial-entry force. FOS

Carlson was beginning to take shape. The JTF commander

now had more flexibility to operate in this remote border region.

Simultaneously with the pickup zone of the initial-entry

force, a GAC departed from Baghram Airfield with several

wheeled vehicles. The route was more than 300 kilometers

through severely restricted terrain and areas that had strong

anticoalition militant (ACM) support. Each vehicle had a crewserved weapon. More than 120 personnel were in the convoy,

making it a force to contend with. It was also equipped with

ALZ construction

12 hours after the

airborne operation
8 Engineer April-June 2005

the Engineer Research and Development Center Automated

Route Reconnaissance Kit to assist in navigating and

documenting the route. The convoy encountered traffic

ramming and attempts by local personnel to board the vehicles

as they passed through downtown Kabul. Unfortunately, the

international security force that was tasked to man traffic

control points in Kabul was called away, responding to an

improvised explosive device (IED) in another part of the city.

Nonlethal force and speed ensured that the convoy’s passage

through Kabul was successful.

After the convoy encountered additional armed groups

along the route (which required that the armed personnel be

detained until a coalition force arrived to verify their

legitimacy), it continued through the restricted terrain.

Ambushed at a choke point, the convoy focused direct fires

and called for close air support to neutralize the ACM fourpoint attack. Through fire, maneuver, and focused air support,

the militants were destroyed with no damage or injury to the

convoy, and the convoy proceeded into the objective area,

linking up with the initial-entry forces.

Lethality

T.

he EMF continued to secure the objective and expand

the STOL ALZ to C-130/C-17 capability. Charlie

Company established platoon battle positions and a

series of observation points and traffic-control points, which

allowed the light-equipment platoons to operate continuously.

Sappers dug in and arrayed weapon systems to defeat a direct

attack or to survive an indirect attack. Traffic-control points

were established due to an unimproved road passing through

the objective area. This road was used by ACMs as an

infiltration route to and from Pakistan and by locals passing

through the region. Traffic control on the road was essential

to the security of the area. Mounted and dismounted patrols;

area-of-operations presence patrols; and aggressive shows

of force synchronizing direct, indirect, and aerial fires were

executed to prevent ACM attacks or infiltration via the FOS.

The decisive operation, however, became the expansion of

the STOL ALZ to allow the task force to conduct operations

from the FOS. One light-equipment platoon constructed the

C-130 ALZ, while another one constructed the helicopter

taxiway, landing zones, and FAARP. The S3 of the technical

and survey section stayed 24 to 48 hours ahead of the

constructive force to finalize site layout of the ALZ, taxiways,

and base camp.

As the ALZ was being expanded, the platoons encountered

numerous obstacles. No water was available within 10 kilometers, and the extremely large rocks in the silt/sand material

made soil strength readings difficult. Although the STOL

airstrip was constructed without water, achieving the required

C-130 and C-17 soil strength and surface functionality required

several thousand gallons of construction water per day. A

recon of an area 3 kilometers south of the site yielded a potential

water source in a wadi under a lime rock outcropping. After

digging a 6-foot-deep hole with a small emplacement excavator,

water pooled, which allowed a water distributor to upload and

deliver water to the site. The cycle time was one hour per 2,500

gallons, requiring this equipment to initially run continuously,

with a mounted security force protecting the route and upload

site.

Because of the large rocks that were 2 to 6 feet below the

surface, dynamic cone penetrometer (DCP) readings used to

determine the soil bearing capacity of the ALZ became a

concern. Engineer Technical Letter 01-6 (published jointly by

The ALZ evolution: left, Day 1; right, Day 90, C-17 capable
the Army and Air Force) defines the standards for which small

austere airfields (SAAFs) are built.1 These standards include

not only dimensional requirements but also soil strength

requirements. High, potentially inaccurate DCP readings

became a concern of the Air Force Special Tactics Squadron,

who believed that the strength of the soil between these large

rocks would not support C-130 loading. Although the EMF

was experienced in ALZ construction and deemed it ready for

landing, a consultation was required to determine the way

ahead. Using a TeleEngineering Kit to conduct a video

teleconference with the Engineer Research and Development

Center in Vicksburg, Mississippi; the Air Force Civil

Engineering Support Agency at Tyndall Air Force Base,

Florida; and FOS Carlson, it was determined—based on

analyzed data—that the ALZ was suitable for both C-130 and

C-17 landings. The EMF continued construction, culminating

with the assault landing of a C-130 after 2 weeks on the ground.

Simultaneous to the construction of the ALZ, the base camp

began to take shape. More than 100 truck loads of a joint

operational set (JOS) base camp—which included inflatable

shower facilities, cots, and tents (to be used as a mess hall, a

gym, an aid station, and for command and control)—and

essential classes of supply were scheduled to arrive beginning

on Day 3 and continue throughout the buildup. Unfortunately,

the first trucks did not arrive until Day 14, requiring the

sustainment of the FOS by a combination of containerized

delivery system C-130 parachute drops, CH-47, and airland

aircraft to bring in water, food, and fuel daily. The vertical

construction platoon initially served as the assault command

post security force, but with the arrival of the JOS by truck,

began the construction of the base camp. With the completion

of force-protection berms, initial guard towers, and bunkers,

the EMF moved from foxholes to environmentally controlled

Alaskan tents by Day 24—a major improvement to force

protection and quality of life, especially since the temperature

at the FOS reached 120 degrees Fahrenheit daily.

By Day 30, the JTF could project combat power from an

expeditionary FOS to conduct operations in Afghanistan. The

site was now capable of landing C-130 aircraft, parking rotarywing aircraft on an AM2 matted taxiway, fueling rotary-wing

aircraft from a 40,000-gallon FAARP, and sustaining additional

personnel with quality-of-life enhancements.

Sustainability

T.

he bottom line was that the EMF had to support (fuel,

fix, feed, and sustain) itself and additional forces. This

was achieved with the flexible design of the EMF and

the push of logistics from the liaison team at Baghram Airfield.

Due to the remoteness of the area, the maintenance platoon

and the support platoon were essential to the mission success.

Combining the two company organizational maintenance

sections and the battalion direct-support maintenance section

into one platoon, the maintenance platoon was able to sustain

the equipment under harsh conditions—even with the supply

hub hours away by air or days away by ground through ACM

country.

The support platoon was split between the FOS and

Baghram Airfield to push and receive essential supplies. The

liaison team gathered the necessary supplies and pushed them

via air or ground to the FOS. Due to the uniqueness of the

airborne engineer equipment, reachback to Fort Bragg became

essential for Class IX supplies not available in Afghanistan;

just-in-time logistics took on a new meaning. Initially, a tailored

Class II/III/V/IX package was airdropped during entry

operations that sustained the force until linkup with the GAC.

Long lead times became the norm, but the innovation of the

sustainers ensured that the operation continued with no

significant shortfalls. After Day 30, the base camp provided

bare-bones beddown for personnel with the erection of the

JOS. As trucks continuously arrived—bringing additional

equipment, construction materials, and supplies—the vertical

construction platoon upgraded facilities to increase quality of

life and force protection.

Due to the location, finding contractors to provide basic

services became impossible. Most contractors were located

in Kabul, Baghram, or Kandahar and wanted nothing to do

with this region. Engagement with local elders led to the hiring

of laborers, water tankers, and farm tractors with trailers to

augment the EMF equipment. Laborers performed tasks such

as filling sandbags, burning excrement, emplacing AM2

matting, erecting tents, and removing rocks from the ALZ

surface during grading operations.

Farm tractors with trailers hauled clay material to sites on

the ALZ to augment the fill effort and hauled gravel from local

dry riverbeds to use in the base camp and between the rotarywing parking areas for dust control. Water trucks topped off

multiple 20,000-gallon storage bags, providing the daily

construction water and nonpotable water requirements. At

the height of the operation, the FOS employed more than 100

local nationals, 60 tractors, 10 water trucks, and 10 pickup

trucks; this economic boost to the local economy had a

secondary impact—force protection. Because of this, an

assistant S3 officer and noncommissioned officer were

dedicated full time to orchestrate the local labor, equipment

support, and contracting. The FOS became the “employment

factory” for the area.

Flexibility

T.

he area of operation was relatively small, nestled in the

middle of an east-west ACM infiltration route in the

porous border region of Afghanistan. Multiple

dismounted ACM recon patrols, attempting to assess force

disposition, approached the FOS through the wadi complexes

but were defeated after brief exchanges of direct fire and

airborne fires. Although the primary tasks were to build, sustain,

and secure the FOS, the ability to increase security in the

entire area was essential to force protection. The plan was to

engage the local government and tribal elders by establishing

 April-June 2005 Engineer 9
weekly council meetings to discuss issues and promote

coalition information operations themes, demonstrate military

resolve through shows of force and presence, and economically

tie our force protection with local prosperity.

This engagement plan required an engineer staff to function

as a combined arms battlestaff, integrating all Battlefield

Operating Systems to develop executable combat plans and

orders. Raids, village cordon and searches, civil affairs village

assessments, the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP),

mobile traffic-control points, and weapon and ammunition

cache seizure/destruction were the typical operations

conducted by the EMF outside the FOS. The destruction of

captured enemy ammunition became a weekly task for Charlie

Company, who destroyed a total of more than six tons of

rockets, mines, mortars, artillery rounds, demolitions, and small

arms ammunition. Nightly, FOS security battle drills (integrating

direct fire from guard towers, observation points, and the quickresponse force with the mortar team and aerial fires) not only

kept skills sharp but also sent an audible message to the local

populace not to come near the FOS.

Although not a specified task for the EMF, polling-site

security for the Afghanistan presidential elections became an

implied task turned essential, due to our engagement in the

area. Another coalition force was tasked for election security,

but local elders and voting officials turned to the EMF to

secure the polling sites. In conjunction with additional coalition

forces, the EMF successfully secured twelve polling sites

without incident. Flexibility became the hallmark of the

operation: combat engineers executing infantry tasks or

destroying enemy ammunition; equipment operators using

bucket loaders with forks to download C-130s; supporters

refueling MC-130s or MH-53s; mechanics welding fortified

post gates; or tactical operations center noncommissioned

officers synchronizing JTF ISR assets to see battlespace in

real time—adaptive, innovative leaders and Soldiers thinking

in three-dimension and making it happen.

Conclusion

By Day 120, the FOS was built to the master-plan

standard, and the 27th Engineer Battalion facilitated

the assault landing of a C-17. The battalion had

successfully shaped terrain to enhance the maneuver of the

JTF, and the FOS enabled JTF combat operations in this remote

region of Afghanistan at a time and place of their choosing.

The success of this operation was due to three factors: the

Warrior Ethos of the airborne engineer Soldiers, the versatile

organizational structure of a corps airborne engineer battalion,

and aggressive engagement in the area of operations. The

paratroopers of this task force overcame seemingly

insurmountable odds to execute this operation. Their drive,

spirit, and tenacity shaped this piece of terrain into a force

projection platform, enabling the JTF to take the fight to the

enemy. The future expeditionary engineer force—it’s here, it’s

now, it works.

Lieutenant Colonel Crall is the Commander of the 27th

Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Airborne) at Fort Bragg,

North Carolina.

Endnote

1

Engineer Technical Letter 01-6, Contingency Airfield

Pavement Specifications, 12 June 2001.

10 Engineer April-June 2005

Soldiers examine captured enemy weapons

and ammunition
April-June 2005 Engineer 11

The 8th Engineer Battalion deployed to Baghdad for

Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 2004 to March

2005. Although the unit performed a wide range of

combat engineer and security tasks, its primary mission was

to rebuild the infrastructure and restore essential services in

the two districts covered by its brigade combat team (BCT).

The reconstruction contributed to 1st Cavalry Division’s

objective of creating a stable and secure environment in Iraq.

During its deployment, the battalion completed more than

$15 million in projects and turned over another $35 million of

ongoing work to the 3d Infantry Division.

Goals

Rebuild the Infrastructure

Focusing on sewer, water, electrical,

and trash (SWET) projects, the battalion

worked to restore essential services in its

area of Baghdad. The existing systems

had suffered from years of neglect and

were seriously degraded or nonoperational. Many neighborhoods were

without functioning sewer systems,

reliable electricity, clean drinking water,

or trash collection services.

Empower Iraqis to Rebuild

The battalion quickly learned that

Baghdad’s engineers and officials knew

the problems—and the solutions—but

lacked the resources and organizational

structure to fix them. The goal was to work

with the Iraqis to rebuild their country—

not impose American solutions to their

problems. After all, the Iraqis would have

to maintain the projects long after the

battalion left the country.

Provide Work for Iraqis

An important part of creating stability was reducing

unemployment. These infrastructure projects created

numerous local employment opportunities, stimulated the

economy, and reduced the ability of anti-Iraqi forces to recruit.

Show Immediate Progress

Since the rebuilding of Iraq’s infrastructure would be a long

endeavor, it was critical to demonstrate the battalion’s plan

and show its commitment to the task. As the project

progressed, the Iraqi people were able to see their quality of

life improving. This also built confidence in the interim Iraqi

government and reduced support for the insurgency among

the general populace.

By Lieutenant Colonel Brian L. Dosa, Major Brian J. Davis, and Captain Brad A. Morgan

Iraqi contractors construct a new high-tension line in Baghdad.

Rebuilding Baghdad:

An Engineer Battalion’s Contribution
12 Engineer April-June 2005

Organization

The battalion established an infrastructure coordination

element (ICE) (see the figure above) from within its

S3 section that was composed of four engineer captains

(each responsible for one SWET focus area), a noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), and a computer

operations specialist. The battalion also employed a staff of

ten local Iraqi engineers and interpreters. The battalion

commander and his personal security detachment conducted

most of the coordination with city and district leaders. Baghdad

has an organized system of public works. Each of the nine city

districts has a public works director general who has sewer,

water, and solid waste superintendents and a staff. In addition,

there are established departments at Amanat Baghdad (city

government) for SWET. Although most of these departments

are staffed with capable engineers and staff, sometimes they

are not able to make significant progress on their own.

Contributions

The battalion’s biggest contribution was its mission

focus and project management skills. The ICE officers

fully embraced the reconstruction mission and worked

with Iraqi engineers and local leaders to establish priorities

and organize efforts. The battalion leadership, drive, and

project management skills proved invaluable throughout its

tenure in Baghdad. The battalion was able to access all levels

of the ministry and city government directly with the help of

the 1st Cavalry Division’s Governance Support Team.

The battalion played a critical role in securing funds

required to start reconstruction. Amanat Baghdad did not have

the resources to conduct routine maintenance and repairs, let

alone start large improvement projects. Although the interim

Iraqi government received funds from international donors,

the funds were not available at local levels. The battalion was

able to obtain the necessary funding from a variety of sources,

including the Commander’s Emergency Relief Program,

appropriated funds, and donated international funds. While

money was available to perform this critical work, time and effort

were required to communicate the needs and commit the funds.

The battalion worked to ensure that projects were not based

on political or personal gain. It targeted projects for the parts

of Baghdad that posed the biggest security challenges. Not

surprisingly, these areas had some of the worst services, and

the residents lived in substandard conditions. As a result, a

greater percentage of funds was applied directly to actual

construction.

Project Management

Development

Because the battalion’s focus was on SWET, most projects

were identified by district and city engineers. The battalion

commander interfaced directly with the district councils in

weekly meetings and received input on the required work and

priority areas. Landowning task forces worked with

neighborhood councils on non-SWET projects such as school

and hospital renovations. Iraqi engineers at the city and

Infrastructure Coordination Element Organization
April-June 2005 Engineer 13

ministry completed designs and plans, thus ensuring

continuity, synchronization, and adherence to Iraqi standards

and specifications. The battalion’s BCT deliberately focused

resources on the areas where the insurgency was most active.

The commander’s intent was to bring kinetic and nonkinetic

operations to the enemy simultaneously, in order to defeat

anti-Iraqi forces and eliminate enemy support from the local

population.

Contractor Selection

Reconstruction projects were completed by Iraqi

contractors who employed Iraqi workers. The ICE held regular

bidding conferences to announce and distribute bid packages

for upcoming work. The battalion found that simple and

standardized packets, in both Arabic and English, were

essential to solicit clear and accurate bid proposals.

Contractors also appreciated the use of compact disks and

e-mail, which helped them increase their computer skills. After

receiving the bids, the battalion formed selection committees

to choose the best contractor for the job. The committees

consisted of a city engineer, a district engineer, a local council

member, and officers from the corresponding task force and

the battalion. Selections were based on the contractor’s

previous experience and his local labor and security plans—

not just the lowest bidder. Since many of the projects were

located in dangerous parts of the city, the contractor’s security

plan and commitment to use local labor were often the

difference between success and failure.

Quality Control

Quality control was an Iraqi responsibility. This was

normally accomplished by a team responsible for day-to-day

project oversight. The team consisted of engineers appointed

by Amanat Baghdad and district and Iraqi engineers. The

battalion and the director generals were responsible for quality

assurance. A team of engineers from Baghdad University also

conducted quality assurance inspections. In some areas,

project visits were not always possible due to security

concerns. Since most of the contractors worked under the

pretext of Amanat Baghdad, regular site visits would have

jeopardized their safety. Reports from the contractors and the

quality control teams were submitted at weekly project

coordination meetings. These meetings were invaluable in

coordinating for local labor and security and interfacing with

neighborhood residents.

Visibility

The battalion ensured that the local populace was informed

about the ongoing reconstruction in their neighborhood. The

battalion Public Affairs Officer coordinated for media coverage,

which ranged from local to international media. Regular

coverage included contract-signing, groundbreaking, and

ribbon-cutting ceremonies. District and neighborhood council

members, along with Amanat Baghdad and district engineers,

were encouraged to attend these events and interface with

the media. Although the ceremonies were occasionally

bumped, there was very positive media coverage in Iraqi

newspapers, television, and radio.

The battalion also presented regular project status reports

at the weekly district council meetings. This kept council

members informed, helped develop local ownership of ongoing

construction, and furthered the goal of getting the word out

to the people about the reconstruction.

A new sewer

main line in

southern

Baghdad

improves the

Iraqi quality

of life.
14 Engineer April-June 2005

Sheikh Maruf Project

One of the most difficult neighborhoods was Sheikh

Maruf—located about two miles north of the

International Zone and plagued by gangs, criminals,

and terrorists. Haifa Street, the main road through the area,

was the scene of numerous attacks and assassinations. Sheikh

Maruf contained approximately 250,000 people. The citizens

were extremely poor, often living in buildings that should have

been condemned. The area, known as the “Old City,” was

built in the early 1900s.

 The battalion learned of the poor living conditions during

its first visit to Sheikh Maruf. Escorted by a local sheikh, the

unit trudged through ankle-deep sewage that flooded entire

neighborhoods. Since there was no sewer system in place,

household sewage flowed down the middle of the street. The

battalion decided that this area needed its attention right away,

so it requested designs and bills of material from the Amanat

Sewer Department and began fighting for funds for the project.

The battalion secured more than $11 million from donated

and appropriated funds to execute new sewer collection

networks for the four worst neighborhoods in the Sheik Maruf

area. As part of the new sewer construction, the battalion also

rehabilitated the major sewer lift station. Committees selected

contractors who were willing and able to complete the work,

using the maximum number of local workers.

Because of the frequent attacks in the area, the battalion’s

ability to visit the area was limited. A quality control team

composed of Amanat Baghdad and battalion-hired Iraqi

engineers handled the oversight of day-to-day operations.

The battalion conducted weekly progress meetings, which

helped identify and solve problems. Neighborhood

representatives were invaluable to contractor security, local

labor coordination, and communication with the other

residents.

Construction began in early August 2004 and was completed at the end of March 2005. The Iraqi contractors worked

through numerous raids and other combat operations that

were conducted in the area. In total, these projects employed

more than 1,000 Iraqis, most of them from the very same

neighborhoods. The residents realized several benefits:

improved services, greater employment opportunities, and

improved security.

Conclusion

The 8th Engineer Battalion’s reconstruction efforts

restored essential services to more than a million people

in two districts of the city. The battalion saw Iraqis

take ownership of the rebuilding process, which will pay

dividends in the years to come. Showing immediate and visible

progress garnered the support of the new government and

encouraged patience among the people as major infrastructure

work continues. Thousands of Iraqis contributed to the

economy, also reducing the insurgency base of support.

Although much work remains, reconstruction and restoration

of essential services are well on their way.

Lieutenant Colonel Dosa commands the 8th Engineer

Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. His past assignments include

Commander, B Company, 8th Engineer Battalion; S3, 937th

Engineer Group; and executive officer, 70th Engineer

Battalion, 1st Armored Division. He is a graduate of the

United States Military Academy, Cornell University, and the

Command and General Staff College.

Major Davis is the S3 of the 8th Engineer Battalion. His

past assignments include Commander, Headquarters and

Headquarters Company, 588th Engineer Battalion, and

platoon leader and executive officer assignments in the 1st

and 70th Engineer Battalions. He is a graduate of Virginia

Tech, the University of Missouri-Rolla, and the Command

and General Staff College.

Captain Morgan is the construction officer of the 8th

Engineer Battalion. His past assignments include platoon

leader and executive officer of Alpha Company, 8th Engineer

Battalion. He is a graduate of the United States Military

Academy.

Lessons Learned

 Involve stakeholders in the entire project process.

Iraqis want to rebuild their country, and giving them

ownership—from project identification to contractor

selection to construction oversight—furthers the goal

of creating stability and security.

 Work reconstruction operations simultaneously with

combat operations. Applying both kinetic and

nonkinetic operations improved both security and

quality of life in two of the worst neighborhoods.

 Ensure that project designs are synchronized with

the city plans. In most cases, the Amanat Baghdad

prepared the SWET designs; however, in some

cases the contractor completed the design and

received city approval before execution.

 Bureaucracy with local government and ministries

is unavoidable, but including them in the beginning

helped gain their support. Government officials can

help or hinder—depending on how and when they

are included—so identify the “power brokers” early.

 The ministries and Amanat Baghdad have capable

engineers, but it is important to check the designs

and bills of material before putting a contract out

for bid. Specifically, review the scopes of work and

define contractor and city responsibilities.
April-June 2005 Engineer 15

Up north near the Arctic Circle is Greenland, a province

of Denmark. Greenland is the world’s largest island,

slightly three times larger than Texas. It sits 900 miles

south of the North Pole, between northeastern Canada and

Europe. More than 80 percent of the sparsely populated island

is covered with flat, sloping ice caps and small glaciers. In the

northwestern corner of Greenland, in a coastal valley nestled

between two mountains and surrounded by miles of icebergs

and glaciers, is Thule Air Base, the northernmost U.S. military

installation. Thule (pronounced “Two Lee”) is Latin for

“northernmost part of the inhabitable world.” The air base is

home to hundreds of personnel, including active duty Air Force

members, U.S. contractors, and Danish and Greenlandic

personnel.

In this remote area of the world, you will also find personnel

from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers® (USACE). They

volunteer to stay at the base, for months at a time, to supervise

new construction and renovation projects that keep the

installation fully operational and mission-ready. Some USACE

projects have included an aircraft runway and taxiway, new

living quarters, a firefighting training facility and, most recently,

a new medical center.

Earlier this winter, Thule Air Base unveiled its new state-ofthe-art structure—a single-story, 1,900-square-meter medical

center. The medical center was built by a Denmark-based firm

under a design/build contract and supervised and quality

assured by the USACE New York District. The previous medical

center, which was built 50 years ago, was becoming too

expensive to operate and was located far from the current

housing facilities of the main base population. Besides saving

the U.S. Air Force money on costly utility services, the base

personnel—as well as residents of local West Greenland

communities—benefit from the services of the new facility.

Some of the new services the medical center provides are

outpatient and inpatient care, surgical services, and mortuary

facilities. An additional service is digital X-rays that supply a

quicker product to doctors and have lower radiation dosages

and no adverse effects on the environment.

Overseas projects, like the new medical center at Thule Air

Base, can prove to be very challenging, but also rewarding.

For USACE personnel, working on overseas projects allows

them to experience different cultures, visit various parts of the

world and, most importantly, broaden their construction skills

and experiences. The construction of the new medical center

was a project that did just that.

The severe weather at Thule Air Base can create a lot of

logistical challenges and result in construction that is very

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Supports an Arctic Mission

By Dr. JoAnne Castagna

Thule Air Base, Greenland, the northernmost

U.S. military installation.

Thule Air Base
16 Engineer April-June 2005

unique and fast-paced. There is a limited exterior construction

season because Thule is above the Arctic Circle. There are 24

hours of sunlight from June to August and 24 hours of darkness

from November to February. During the summer season, high

temperatures are in the mid-50s. It was during these warmer

months that the USACE team was able to receive its

construction materials because the island is locked in by ice

the other 9 months of the year. But in the summer, Greenland’s

frozen shipping lanes can be broken up to allow supply ships

in. During the winter, the weather is too severe to work

outdoors, so construction of the medical center took place

during the summer and fall months between May 2003 and

October 2004.

Due to the harsh arctic environment, the medical center

had to be constructed differently than a typical building. Twothirds of the northern portion of Greenland, where Thule Air

Base is located, is covered by 6 to12 feet of permafrost—

permanently frozen ground at variable depths below the earth’s

surface. Most structures in Thule, including the medical center,

are elevated because of the presence of permafrost. Buildings

must be constructed off the ground or have air corridors

separating the buildings from the ground, because the heat

from inside the buildings can melt the permafrost, causing the

buildings to sink. Materials used to build the new elevated

facility included preinsulated metal panels for the underside

of the flooring, walls, and roof; composite gypsum; and a

metal decking system for the interior floors.

Construction on the medical center was performed in

collaboration with teams from various agencies, to include

engineers from both the USACE New York and Europe

Districts. The on-site manager for the new medical center, who

was from the USACE New York District, was familiar with the

working conditions at Thule Air Base, because he has worked

on various construction projects at the base, both as a military

officer and civilian employee, for the last 20 years. Because of

the strong working relationship between all the agencies, they

were able to resolve issues that arose due to the

many challenges Thule’s limited logistics, severe

weather, unique construction activities, and short

construction season brought to the project. The

collaboration between the agencies produced a

great finished product that both Thule Air Base

and the engineers involved are proud of. Completing

a project under severe climatic conditions in such a

remote area of the world is a dream come true.

 For additional information about Thule Air Base,

visit its Web site at <www.thule.af.mil>; for

information on the USACE military construction

program, contact the author at <joanne.castagna

@usace.army.mil>.

Dr. Castagna is a technical writer with the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, New York District.

The new medical center at Thule Air Base

Preparing and insulating the medical center’s foundation

Photo courtesy Resident Office, USACE

Photo courtesy Resident Office, USACE
April-June 2005 Engineer 17

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 pushed the

patrol of U.S. borders to the front line of national

security. And today, security efforts along the

southwest and northern borders continue to expand. The U.S.

Border Patrol’s heightened presence along the southwest

border has burdened narcotic traffickers, alien smugglers, and

other transnational threats to our country. In fiscal year 2004,

border patrol agents seized more than 20,000 pounds of cocaine

and more than 1.5 million pounds of marijuana—a street value

of more than $1.9 billion.

Request for Assistance

I

.

n late summer of 2003, the U.S. Border Patrol, Del Rio

(Texas) Sector Headquarters, requested assistance from

Joint Task Force-North (formerly known as Joint Task

Force-Six) to have a military engineer unit construct a bridge

over Cuevas Creek on the U.S.-Mexican border near El Indio,

Texas. The bridge would reduce the response time between

two border patrol stations, increasing the capability to

apprehend illegal immigrants of many nationalities and to

interdict drug traffic.

The U.S. Border Patrol frequently requests military support

from Joint Task Force-North, which detects, monitors, and

supports the interdiction of suspected transnational threats

within and along the approaches to the continental United

States. The task force fuses and disseminates intelligence,

contributes to the common operating picture, coordinates

support to lead federal agencies, and supports security

cooperation initiatives to secure the homeland and enhance

regional security.

Bridging the Gap

in Homeland Security:

62d Engineer Battalion Helps Secure

the Nation’s Borders

By Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Riera and Captain Richard T. Childers
18 Engineer April-June 2005

The 62d Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy) accepted the

construction challenge and assigned the mission to its heavyconstruction company (Alpha Company). The battalion, a III

Corps Army engineer asset, is one of few active-duty heavyconstruction battalions; therefore, it is a highly sought-after

resource.

Mission

I

.

n addition to erecting a three-span, nonstandard fixed

Bailey bridge, the construction mission would include

upgrading two access roads, operating a quarry pit,

performing excavation and filling operations, complying with

environmental requirements, placing hundreds of cubic yards

of concrete, and constructing approach roads.

Project Planning

The project was a joint venture between the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers® (USACE) Fort Worth District, Joint Task

Force-North, and the U.S. Border Patrol. USACE contracted a

project management firm to coordinate the efforts of the project

delivery team. Alpha Company developed the construction

schedule, bill of materials (BOM), and equipment requirements.

Due to logistics and time constraints, much of the required

equipment was contracted from rental vendors. Construction

materials were procured through USACE, using U.S. Border

Patrol funding programmed specifically for border

infrastructure.

Force Providers

On 14 July 2004, Joint Task Force-North and unit leaders

coordinated the arrival of the advance party at the site, as well

as all of the earthmoving equipment (both organic and rental).

These force providers—made up of U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers

from New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Minnesota—set up

the base camp and prepared the ground work

for the main body of Soldiers, cycling

personnel on their annual training periods

throughout the duration of the project. The

Soldiers hit the ground running and organized

into construction groups based on specific

tasks. They erected and maintained all tents,

shower and laundry facilities, and power and

water systems. While the force providers

maintained the camp and quality of life, the

62d Engineer Battalion concentrated on the

construction mission.

Earthwork

The banks of Cuevas Creek were extremely

steep, unstable, and covered in dense

vegetation due to the unseasonable amount

of rain the area had received during the

3-month project—more than is typically

expected in a 5-year period. The earthmoving

platoon created a borrow pit 6 miles away to

provide material for the patrol road base and

nonstructural areas of the project. Each pier and abutment

location was overexcavated and built back with engineered

fill, distributing the load of the shallow spread or “floating”

footers. The engineered fill, which had to conform to Texas

Department of Transportation standards, was delivered from

a certified quarry. To minimize the excavation required along

the banks, the Pro-TecTM shoring system was used as an

alternative to a standard trench box due to its ability to be

advanced to greater depths and provide an open excavation,

which was necessary to place the bridge piers.

Soldiers from the equipment platoon of the 62d’s

Headquarters and Support Company improved the existing

trails on either side of the bridge into suitable all-weather patrol

roads. More than 45,000 cubic yards of borrow pit, select fill,

and native material was displaced and stockpiled during the

initial earthwork phase. This material was used to restore the

site’s finished grade to its natural state at the end of the project.

Foundation System

The substructure design of the bridge was identical to a

commercial-grade highway overpass—designed and built

according to Texas Department of Transportation standards.

The piers and abutments on either side of the gap were

constructed roughly in the same phases. Accuracy was

paramount during this period; any error made on the ground

would be magnified as the structures went vertical. A maximum

deviance was allowed (1/8-inch horizontal and 2-inch vertical)

to ensure that the bridge would match the support points. The

reinforced concrete substructure used more than 1,000 cubic

yards of concrete and 22 tons of steel reinforcement.

 The bridge abutments were built on a shallow spread

foundation bearing on 4 feet of engineered fill, compacted to

100 percent maximum dry density according to worldwide

Aerial view of scour apron preparation
April-June 2005 Engineer 19

standards. Standing 15 feet tall, they were topped by a cap

and corbel that allowed the finished bridge deck to sit even

with a reinforced concrete approach slab. The abutments were

finished by placing multitier wingwalls to confine the base of

the approach road.

The two bridge piers also used shallow spread foundations

resting on 5-foot subfooters of engineered backfill. The

reinforcing steel for each pier stem was preassembled into six

7- by 30-foot rigid mats, which were placed using a 40-ton

crane. The 33-foot piers had to be placed in four phases—

footers, lower pier stem, upper pier stem, and pier cap—

according to the limits of the SymonsTM forms rented for the

project.

Erosion Control

The project site was located in a flood plain at the lowest

point in the watershed. The height of the bridge’s

superstructure was designed to be above the flood elevation

level of the 50-year storm (equivalent to receiving 2.7 inches

of rain in 3 hours). Erosion control was particularly important,

especially with the shallow spread foundations of the piers

and abutments. The risk, as with any bridge over a water

feature, is that moving water will erode the engineered fill from

under the piers or abutments, undermining the footings and

causing the bridge to fail. To ensure that this would not occur,

a 50- by 150-foot scour apron was constructed on either bank,

6 feet under the finished grade. The most important feature of

this scour apron was the 6-foot cutoff walls that bordered the

perimeter of the apron below the maximum calculated scour

depth. To further protect the integrity of the finished slope,

the unit anchored Pyramat® (a geosynthetic lining material)

over the finished grade to prevent erosion while the slope

becomes revegetated.

Bridge Launch

The bridge came directly from the company, with some tailormade components to match the substructure. The rocking

rollers on the abutment seats and the pier caps had to be

raised on nearly 3 feet of cribbing to meet the elevation of the

abutment corbel and approach slabs. Two John DeereTM 410

tractors were used to position the panel trusses during

assembly; however, the tried and true “lay-hold-heave” method

was used for all other components. Once the bridge had

spanned the gap and was jacked down onto the bridge shoes,

the company placed the stringers, decking, and curbs.

Lessons Learned

During this project many quality-control lessons were

learned. Unlike most missions, many external civilian

and military quality assurance/quality control (QA/

QC) personnel were on hand to bridge the gap between the

Soldiers’ skill level going into the project and the civilian

industry standard. When many parties are involved in

oversight of a project, all QA/QC personnel have to agree on

the standards before the work is completed. One way to ensure

that this happens is to have Soldiers build a mock-up, or test

section, before full-scale construction begins. This ensures

that everyone knows exactly what is required and prevents

undue frustration and needless work. Other considerations

include the following:

 Keep a daily QA/QC log; use it to identify trends and stop

potential problems.

 Get approved modifications in writing; keep them on hand.

On any project of this magnitude, proper BOM management

is critical. Material should flow in and out of a centralized

An engineer flag flying high

during the launch
20 Engineer April-June 2005

point where it is accounted for and protected from the elements.

Important considerations include the following:

 Assign a BOM manager who is responsible for accepting,

inventorying, and safeguarding materials.

 Develop a material-tracking matrix that incorporates

fabrication and/or shipping lead times.

 Beware of the temptation to use the material for purposes

other than what it is specified for.

Using prefabricated, hand-set panel forms has its pluses

and minuses. On the plus side, their cost effectiveness, light

weight, and strength allow large-scale projects to be

constructed quickly using fewer man-hours than standard

timber forms. Panel forms can be used as “slip” forms; the

bottom sections can be stripped off, then reused to place

sections above as soon as the concrete achieves a specified

strength. The risk with using panel forms is that they will

“float” up when concrete is being placed, primarily due to

their light weight. A solid connection with the base or footer is

critical. Other considerations include the following:

 Check all pinned panel connections before placement.

 Do not overvibrate concrete during placement.

Project Completion

Although project completion was originally planned for

2 months, heavy rains and technical problems added

another month to the schedule. But the project

provided a training and leadership opportunity that would be

difficult to duplicate within the military training environment.

The Soldiers were able to greatly increase their survey, design,

and horizontal and vertical construction skills. The result is a

highly confident group of engineer Soldiers who will take these

experiences and use them during future military missions.

The mission incorporated specialists from other military

services and agencies to make it a true joint and interagency

operation. Joint Task Force-North Marines provided logistical

planning and construction support, while Army planners

assisted with base camp setup and teardown.

A great partnership developed among Joint Task ForceNorth, the 62d Engineer Battalion, the U.S. Border Patrol, and

the members of the project delivery team. The mission—a winwin situation for all involved—was a complete success.

Thanks to the great efforts of our brave men and women in

uniform and the professionals of our civilian workforce, one

more gap at our nation’s borders has been bridged.

Lieutenant Colonel Riera is the Joint Task Force-North

Engineer Division Chief in Fort Bliss, Texas. He served as the

Texas-New Mexico engineer mission planner for the task

force during construction of the bridge. He was previously

the S3 of the 82d Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division,

Bamberg, Germany, and the Director of Public Works for the

Mannheim military community, Germany. He is a graduate of

the University of Toledo and Troy State University.

Captain Childers is the civil engineer for the 62d Engineer

Battalion. He served as the construction officer, Alpha

Company, 62d Engineer Battalion, during the construction

of the bridge. Previous assignments include platoon leader,

Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry, Georgia Army

National Guard, and assistant S3 of the 62d Engineer

Battalion. He holds a bachelor’s in environmental

engineering from Mercer University.

Finished bridge launch
April-June 2005 Engineer 21

T.

he Global War on Terrorism and the contemporary

operating environment continue to demonstrate an

increased need for the destruction of unexploded

ordnance (UXO) on the battlefield. UXO is found throughout

the operational area, often in theaters with poor infrastructure

and severely restricted terrain, which limits movement. Moving

explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams on the battlefield

may require dedication from rotary-wing assets, because the

lack of roads prevents rapid movement by ground. Also,

maneuver commanders need an increased capability to destroy

in-place UXO that endangers the mission or personnel.

EOCA Course Creation

To close the gap between EOD personnel and combat

engineers, the EOD Integration Working Group,

consisting of members from both the engineer and EOD

communities, recommended the creation of an Explosive

Ordnance Clearance Agent (EOCA) Course to train engineers

and increase the force’s ability to deal with UXO on the

battlefield.

Explosive ordnance clearance is defined as the investigation, detection, location, marking, reporting, and

preparation of protective works for UXO. It also includes the

in-place disposal of UXO identified in the EOCA Identification

Guide and theater-specific UXO handbook. EOCA training

does not authorize or qualify engineers to clear or dispose of

caches and captured enemy ammunition without EOD clearance

and direction, nor does it qualify or authorize engineers to

deal with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The role of

EOCA-qualified engineers is to dispose of in-place, selected

UXO that is positively identified in their EOCA handbook,

while performing combat engineer missions. EOCA-trained

personnel are not responders—this mission remains with EODqualified personnel.

EOCA Course Purpose

The purpose of the EOCA Course is to teach skill levels

10 and 20 (from promotable specialists to staff

sergeants) combat engineers and selected engineer

officers (from second lieutenants to captains) the basic skills

and knowledge required to perform as EOCAs. The course

is challenging and demanding because it requires students

to learn and retain a vast amount of information in a short

amount of time. Requirements for attendance at the EOCA

resident course—now offered at Redstone Arsenal,

Alabama—are a qualified combat engineer military occupational specialty; an Armed Services Vocational Aptitude

Battery (ASVAB) test score of 105 or above; a grade of

specialist (promotable) or sergeant, or company grade

officer; an interim secret or secret security clearance; and

normal color vision. The intent of the course is to train two

EOCAs per combat engineer squad, preferably one being a

squad leader, team leader, or specialist (promotable) from

the same squad with 1 year of retainability. A minimum of

one qualified engineer officer in the company should be

trained as well.

By Command Sergeant Major David M. Clark
22 Engineer April-June 2005

Upon approval by the Department of the Army and the

Army Training Requirements and Resourcing System (ATRRS),

EOCA graduates receive training qualification and an

additional skill identifier. The EOCA certification will be valid

for one year from graduation, and graduates will be required

to be recertified by qualified EOD and EOCA instructors. The

Army Safety Policy for Captured Enemy Ammunition, approved

by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army,

Installations and Environment (28 June 2004), should be

updated to include EOCA capabilities and authority to deal

with selected UXO. Check your local command policy to

determine the authorized level for dealing with UXO by EOCAqualified engineers in the combat zone or area of operations.

 EOCA Course Description

Working with the United States Army Engineer

School; the Ordnance Munitions and Electronics

Maintenance School; the Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Training Department at Redstone Arsenal; and the

Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)

Engineer Section (C7), the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-

76 requested and received approval to conduct the pilot EOCA

Course in Afghanistan. The CJTF-76 engineer staff (CJ7)

identified combat engineers throughout the combined and joint

operational area to attend the first two EOCA Courses. This

training enabled Soldiers in theater to share their experience

with the instructors about UXO they encountered on patrols,

route and area clearance operations, and other combat

missions throughout Afghanistan. The first course was

conducted from 29 December 2004 to 1 February 2005, and

graduates included engineers from the Active Army and

Reserve Component and the U.S. Marine Corps. A second

course was conducted in March 2005 with more engineers

completing the rigorous course. The courses consisted of four

phases:

Phase 1, Annex A. The first phase included an EOCA

ammunition terminology examination (a closed-book examination concerning EOCA general safety precautions with

UXO), a block of instruction on safety, ordnance color codes

and markings, explosives and explosive effects, and basic

demolition procedures. The ordnance color codes and markings

block of instruction covered how to properly identify ordnance,

type, filler, and markings of both U.S. and foreign ordnance,

using information learned from the color code/markings charts.

The block on explosives and explosive effects covered the

characteristics, properties, and explosive effects and principles,

including basic explosive firing training, properties, and

components. There was also an examination on basic

demolition procedures in which students had to properly

identify explosive electric, nonelectric, and modernized

demolition initiator firing systems; demolition equipment; and

procedures for preparing a demolition firing system, to include

various firing system components, equipment, and setups.

The end-of-block examination for Annex A was a closed-book,

EOCA students going

over protective

measures
April-June 2005 Engineer 23

comprehensive written examination encompassing all subject

matter learned in this annex.

Phase 2, Annex B. This phase was known as the

Identification of Munitions (Ordnance Identification). This

block of instruction covered thrown, projected, dropped, and

placed ordnance. Students also learned about protective

measures after identifying the different types of munitions.

After receiving the EOCA Identification Guide, the students

were engaged in daily practical exercises (eight ordnance items

per day) to reinforce the contents of the guide.

Phase 3, Annex C. This phase was a hands-on, performancebased test that required students to conduct EOCA reconnaissance of UXO in a safe and proper manner. There was also

a block of instruction where the students determined

disposition of ordnance items while conducting EOCA

operations. Positive identification of ordnance items and EOCA

reporting was also reinforced during this lesson.

Phase 4, Annex D. The last phase of the course encompassed a combined practical exercise on the demolitions

range, destroying live enemy munitions in theater.

EOCA Course Results

General feedback from the students was very positive.

When the course began, nearly all the students rated

their training level on UXO a low 1 out of a possible 5,

but after the training the rating improved to a 5. Many combat

engineers recommended the addition of more threat mine

information to the EOCA handbook and that the Engineer

School consider adding more threat mine training or familiarization to Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and Basic

Noncommissioned Officer Courses (BNCOC).

The EOCA Course definitely increased the proficiency of

our combat engineers on explosives and increased their

capabilities in dealing with selected UXO in a tactical

environment. Based on the training received, these engineers

are now a more effective combat multiplier and viable force

protection asset available to their commanders. They have an

enhanced ability to positively identify UXO, recommend

protective measures to on-site commanders, report more

accurately, and construct protective works if necessary. The

training completed by these engineers will enable them to

perform safer and more effective route and area clearance

operations.

Command Sergeant Major Clark is the command sergeant

major of the 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division

(Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He is a Sapper Leader

Course graduate and has served in both Operation Enduring

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Instructors with students of the EOCA course at the range
April-June 2005 Engineer 25

 Completion of the unpaved section of Highway 1

 Emplacement of 12 military-type bridge structures

 Emplacement of wells

 Construction of force protection facilities

 Construction of enduring base camp facilities

 Construction of schools, clinics, airfields, and roadways

 Support to the captured enemy ammunition (CEA) missions

that destroyed more than 6,000 tons of enemy caches of

explosives and weapons

 Support to combat operations in Fallujah

 Conduct of combat convoy operations

 Conduct of dive team recovery operations

 Completion of domestic action projects

 Training on Interim Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detection

(IVMMD) Systems

 Training of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (now the Iraqi

National Guard)

 Conduct of Task Force Right-of-Way

 Conduct of Task Force Pathfinder

 Support to Jordan’s Task Force Haul

 Development and maintainance responsibility for

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

(RSOI) of engineer units

The 420th Engineer Brigade redeployed in December 2004

and, after completing its demobilization requirements on

22 December, was released from active duty. No matter what

the mission, the 420th is always ready and willing to complete

all assigned combat operations. The brigade truly epitomizes

the engineer motto of Essayons, “Let us try.”

Major Dotts is the Active Army S3 Chief of Operations of

the 420th Engineer Brigade, III Corps. He served as the C7

Operations Officer for Combined Joint Task Force-180 in

Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and

then deployed with the 420th Engineer Brigade as the S3

Chief of Operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Other assignments include command of Bravo Company,

841st Engineer Battalion (Corps) (Wheeled). He holds a

bachelor’s in history and is working on a master’s in strategic

The 420th Engineer Brigade destroys enemy leadership from Mountain State University.

ammunition.

Soldiers from the 285th Engineer Company (CSE) construct a forward operating base.
28 Engineer April-June 2005

The 44th Engineer Battalion

deployed from Korea in August

2004 to serve in Iraq under the

2d Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry

Division. The deployment of the 44th

marked the first time that any unit serving

in a deployed environment was redeployed to another theater of operation.

This deployment set historic precedents

not experienced by any other Army unit

during the Global War on Terrorism—or

any other conflict.

The 44th Engineer Battalion—also

known as the “Broken Heart” Battalion—

deployed to Korea from Fort Bragg,

North Carolina, and landed with the

historic invasion force at Inchon, in

September 1950. The 44th served on the

Korean Peninsula for more than 50 years,

making it the longest continuously

serving battalion in Korea. With the

battalion’s departure, it has left behind a

great legacy that will be remembered for

years to come.

The Soldiers of the 44th and the rest

of the 2d Brigade Combat Team prepared

for departure with only a few months

notice—a monumental achievement.

Getting the Soldiers ready for Operation

Iraqi Freedom required not only the

efforts of the leaders and the troops

deploying but also the support and

tireless efforts of those staying behind.

In an effort to recreate the conditions

the troops would face in Iraq, the 2d

Infantry Division set up contemporary

operational environments throughout

the western corridor of Korea. The

Korean Training Center was the site of a

mass conglomeration of units, including

infantry, artillery, aviation, and engineers.

Contractors posing as Iraqi civilians

moved all through the camp, testing the

defenses and readiness of forward

operating bases (FOBs). A military

operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT)

village was constructed with the help of

the Korean Service Corps to augment the

already formidable MOUT training site

on the Korean Training Center.

Soldiers getting ready to deploy to

Iraq were sent through as much realistic

training as possible. They had to react

to ambushes; identify and clear

improvised explosive devices (IEDs),

mines, and booby traps; and conduct

MOUT training. Patrolling and handling

crowds of inquisitive civilians—any of

which could be potential enemies—were

heavily emphasized.

Once the 44th Engineer Battalion set

foot on the ground in the Middle East,

its immediate priority became terrain

familiarization and acclimatization at

Camp Buehring, Kuwait. Major tasks it

performed included receiving its

vehicles and equipment, as well as new

equipment that would allow it to operate

in the harsh desert environment. The

main focus in Kuwait was combat

preparations. There were numerous livefire exercises, combat loading of all

equipment, and rehearsals for the tactical

movement into Iraq. Upon completion of

these preparations, the 44th conducted

a tactical convoy to its FOB in Ar Ramadi,

the provincial capital of Al Anbar

Province, located west of Fallujah and

Baghdad along the Euphrates River.

Army engineers were engaged in a

variety of diverse missions during the

course of the Global War on Terrorism

that encompassed the full spectrum of

military engineering. The 44th was also

prepared for a variety of missions. These

missions included managing, maintaining, and repairing all facilities for two

FOBs; performing enemy cache searches

throughout the brigade area of operations; performing route clearance

missions and IED searches and

neutralization; building barriers to

protect local government facilities;

By Second Lieutenant Patrick J. Anderson and Second Lieutenant Jennifer Sanford-Hayes

The 44Th engineer

BaTTalion Deploys again

Iraqi weapons in front of the battalion headquarters
April-June 2005 Engineer 29

supporting infantry task forces with

engineer support and demolition

missions; and performing traditional

infantry-type tasks.

As the days became weeks, the 44th

developed a better understanding of

what their time in Iraq would be like. In

September 2004, the 2d Brigade Combat

Team of the 2d Infantry Division was

given responsibility for Ar Ramadi and

the surrounding areas. The 44th

contributed significantly to providing a

safe and secure environment for the

freedom-seeking Iraqi people.

An unexpected task was preparing

the Ar Ramadi area for the Iraqi elections

held in January 2005. The successful

implementation of the democratic

process in Iraq stands as a testament to

the Soldiers of the 44th. Their efforts in

Ar Ramadi helped ensure that the

citizens of Iraq were afforded the

opportunity to vote. The Soldiers put in

long, stressful days constructing

fortifications around polling centers, as

well as providing security on the day of

the elections. Thanks in part to their

tireless efforts, no Ar Ramadi citizens

were injured by enemy activity while

casting their ballet on election day. The

Soldiers of the 44th also trained members

of the new Iraqi security forces to

support the elected government of Iraq

and assume responsibility for ensuring

a safe and secure environment for the

citizens of Iraq. This historic work was

critical to our nation’s efforts in the

Global War on Terrorism.

The missions of the 44th Engineer

Battalion gave its Soldiers an opportunity to work with a variety of other

military organizations. Members of the

Iraqi security forces served beside the

Broken Heart Soldiers during the

elections. These Iraqi soldiers were

integral in providing security to the Iraqi

people and demonstrating to them that

they are on their way to self-reliance.

Members of Bravo Company, 44th

Engineer Battalion were also able to

work beside engineers from the U.S.

Marine Corps, who fought right by their

side on many missions.

The mission of the 44th Engineer

Battalion continues. Recently, the

Soldiers received news of their reassignment. Instead of returning to Korea,

the 44th will be reassigned to Fort

Carson, Colorado. This will mark the first

time the 44th has returned to the United

States since it departed from Fort Bragg

in 1948.

Second Lieutenant Anderson is the

construction officer of the 2d Infantry

Division Engineer Brigade. He received

his commission into the U.S. Army in

May 2003. He holds a bachelor’s in

history from the University of Delaware.

Second Lieutenant Sanford-Hayes is

the chemical officer of the 2d Infantry

Division Engineer Brigade. She entered

the Army Officer Candidate School after

college. She holds a bachelor’s in

agricultural science from California

Polytechnic State University.

This article is dedicated to seven

Soldiers from the 44th Engineer

Battalion who lost their lives while

defending freedom from the threat of

terrorism. They are Private First Class

Mark A. Barbret, Private First Class

Aaron J. Rusin, Private First Class

Andrew M. Ward, Specialist Robert O.

Unruh, Sergeant Bennie J. Washington,

Staff Sergeant Omer T. Hawkins, and

Staff Sergeant Arthur C. Williams.

Soldiers receiving a convoy brief before departing Camp Buehring,

Kuwait

Detonation of an IED discovered by members of the 44th Engineer

Battalion
34 Engineer April-June 2005

The Army’s Deployment Excellence Award (DEA)

program witnessed a year of firsts in 2005. The program,

established by the Army Chief of Staff in 2001 to

recognize Active, Reserve, and National Guard Army units

and installations for deployment excellence, has grown in

participation every year since then. The Army’s operational

tempo, coupled with growing unit awareness of the DEA

program, made it a banner year with the largest level of

participation ever—fifty-eight units and installations—

competing in the following categories:

 Large unit (battalion and above)

 Small unit (company and below)

 Supporting unit

 Installation (all Army)

 Operational deployment

For the first time, the Army Supply, Maintenance, and

Deployment Award programs were combined into one

ceremony—the Combined Logistics Excellence Award

ceremony. Held on 19 May 2005 at the Marriott Wardman Park

Hotel in Washington, D.C., the ceremony was part of the

Association of the United States Army Logistics Symposium

and Exhibition. The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard

A. Cody, presented the DEAs to the honored units. He was

assisted by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G4,

Lieutenant General Claude V. Christianson, and the Army Chief

of Transportation, Major General Brian I. Geehan. The awards

banquet was highlighted with a speech by the Sergeant Major

of the Army, Kenneth O. Preston.

Also for the first time, the program recognized a division as

the winner of the Active Army large-unit category. This year,

the 10th Mountain Division—from Fort Drum, New York—

competed and won as the Army’s best large deploying unit,

based on a nomination package prepared by the Division

Transportation Officer. This groundbreaking action by the 10th

opens the way for other divisions to compete as large

deploying units. Another first was that a single state—

Oregon— swept the National Guard large and small deploying

categories. Oregon entered and placed two units in each

category. The Joint Forces Headquarters–Oregon deserves a

hearty congratulation for this exceptional achievement and

presents a challenge for other states to showcase the

deployment success of their units.

The combination of an installation winner and a supporting

unit winner with a common mission was another first for the

DEA program. This honor was shared by Fort Hood, Texas,

and the 4003d Garrison Support Unit. Fort Hood won in the all

Army installation category, while the 4003d won the Reserve

supporting unit category for its support of deployment

operations at Fort Hood, Texas.

In the operational deployment category—which is open to

all Army units that deploy on missions such as the Global War

on Terrorism, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and other

operational deployments—units can contend for either the

large- or small-unit category. This year the first unit from

overseas won in the operational deployment category. In fact,

the 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery Regiment, is the first unit

from Korea to win any DEA. And although 2005 was a year of

many firsts, representatives from combat, combat support, and

combat service support units were in the winner’s circle again.

Command emphasis on deployment training, both collective

and individual, was common to the winning units. Additionally,

winning units treated deployment and deployment support as

an operation, rather than as a logistics function.

Key dates for the 2006 DEA competition are as follows:

 Competition period: 1 December 2005–30 November 2006

 DEA operational on-site visits: 1 December 2005–

1 February 2006

 Nomination packet due to unit’s major command

(MACOM): 1 January 2006

 MACOM nominations due to DEA board: 31 January 2006

 DEA board convenes: 6–17 February 2006

 Department of the Army (DA) releases message announcing

semifinalists: 26 February 2006

 DEA validation teams visit: 1–25 March 2006

 DA releases message announcing winners: 1 April 2006

By Mr. Charles K. Ledebuhr
April-June 2005 Engineer 35

2005 Deployment Excellence Award Recipients

Category Winner Runner-Up

Active Large Unit 10th Mountain Division

Fort Drum, New York

84th Engineer Battalion

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

Active Small Unit 96th Transportation Company

Fort Hood, Texas

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

89th Military Police Brigade

Fort Hood, Texas

Active Support Unit 842d Transportation Battalion

Beaumont, Texas

39th Transportation Battalion

Kaiserslautern, Germany

National Guard Large Unit

2d Battalion

162d Infantry Regiment

Eugene, Oregon

3d Battalion

116th Armored Cavalry Regiment

LaGrande, Oregon

National Guard Small Unit

G Troop

82d Cavalry Regiment

Redmond, Orgeon

1186th Military Police Company

Salem, Oregon

National Guard Support Unit Camp Atterbury

Edinburgh, Indiana

Joint Forces Headquarters—Illinois

Springfield, Illinois

Army Reserve Large Unit 1179th Transportation Brigade

Fort Hamilton, New York

1190th Deployment Support Brigade

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Army Reserve Small Unit 319th Transportation Detachment

Dover, Delaware

281st Transportation Company

Las Cruces, New Mexico

Army Reserve Support Unit 4003d Garrison Support Unit

Fort Hood, Texas

139th Deployment Support Brigade

Oceanside, California

All Army Installation Fort Hood, Texas Fort Drum, New York

Operational Deployment

Large Unit 

1st Battalion

38th Field Artillery Regiment

2d Infantry Division

Camp Stanley, Uijeongbu, Korea

NA

Operational Deployment

Small Unit

F Company

3d Battalion

69th Armored Regiment

3d Infantry Division

Fort Stewart, Georgia

NA

DEA program guidance and evaluation criteria are available

on the DEA Web site at <http://www.deploy.eustis.army.mil/

DEA/default.htm>. For additional information, call your

MACOM DEA point of contact or the DEA Program Manager,

Mr. Henry H. Johnson, at DSN 927-1833 or commercial (757)

878-1833.

Mr. Ledebuhr is Chief of the Operations and Training

Branch of the Deployment Process Modernization Office at

Fort Eustis, Virginia. Retired from the Army, his service as a

Transportation Corps officer included assignments with the

3d Armored Division, III Corps, Training With Industry, and

1st Armored Division.
26 Engineer April-June 2005

During the past few years, the U.S. Army has adopted

several new types of commercial protective eyewear

to help minimize the number of eye injuries during

combat missions and training. Until recently, the choices were

limited to the old sun, wind, and dust goggles (SWDG); the

ballistic laser protective spectacles (BLPS); and the special

protective eyewear, cylindrical system (SPECS). The new types

of eyewear are commercial, off-the-shelf items that have passed

the U.S. Army’s testing criteria and are currently being issued

to deploying Soldiers through the Army’s rapid-fielding

initiative. Units can order the authorized commercial eyewear

using the national stock number. Funded military standard

requisitioning and issue procedure (MILSTRIP) requisitions

need to be submitted through normal supply channels to the

Defense Supply Center, Philadelphia, General and Industrial.

The new eyewear is categorized as either spectacles or

goggles, according to the test criteria each must pass to be

authorized for use by Soldiers:

 Spectacles are required to stop a 5.8-grain fragment

simulating projectile moving at a speed of 640 feet per

second.

 Goggles are required to stop a 17-grain fragment simulating

projectile moving at a speed of 550 feet per second

(approximately twice the energy impact of spectacles).

Although some of the approved spectacles may meet the

testing requirements of goggles, combat-vehicle crewmen

should choose from the list of approved goggles in order to

receive the appropriate level of fragmentation protection, as

well as added sun, wind, and dust protection.

Although these new commercial items provide excellent

ballistic protection, none of them protect the eyes from lasers.

If an operation or a training mission requires laser eye

protection, the SWDG, BLPS, or SPECS with laser lens must be

worn. For Soldiers who require prescription lenses, the Uvex

XCTM spectacle with prescription lens carrier (PLC), the eye

safety system (ESS) Interchangeable Component Eyeshield

(ICE) 2TM spectacle with PLC, and the Revision II SawflyTM

with PLC are authorized alternatives to the BLPS.

An updated authorized protective eyewear list, published

by the Program Manager-Clothing and Individual Equipment

(PM-CIE), provides information for ordering the new eyewear.

The list can be found on the Program Executive Office Soldier

Web site at <http://www.peosoldier.army.mil/index.php?

section=product>. The list can be accessed by opening the

“Commercial Eyewear Fact Sheet” link located on the righthand side of the page, directly below the graphic of the new

“Army Combat Uniform.”

Following is a detailed description of the authorized

commercial goggle kits. All of the goggles are one size fits all,

and all the kits include two ballistic protective lenses, one

clear and one tinted. These lenses are made with antiscratch

and antifogging coatings and provide protection from

ultraviolet rays. Each kit has an antireflective sleeve that

reduces glint when the goggles are not in use.

 ESS Land OpsTM goggles can be worn by Soldiers who

wear prescription lenses and those who do not. These

goggles fit over the standard Army-issued eyeglasses. The

kit includes a rubber frame with a foam backing that wicks

away moisture and increases comfort for long periods of

use. Foam-covered holes allow ventilation and help

eliminate fogging, while keeping out dust.

The Army’s New

Protective Eyewear

By Mr. Larry T. Hasty

ESS Land Ops Goggles
April-June 2005 Engineer 27

 ESS Profile NVGTM (night vision goggles) are strictly for

Soldiers who do not require prescription lenses. These

goggles fit closer to the face (because of their rubber

backing) and are more compatible with night vision goggles.

A thin fleece backing, which may improve comfort when

wearing the goggles in very cold weather, is being evaluated

at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Outrigger clips on the strap allow

optimal helmet compatibility without breaking the face seal.

Like the ESS land operations goggles, foam-covered holes

in the frame allow ventilation, while keeping out dust. The

kit can be ordered in one of three frame colors—black,

olive drab, or desert tan.

 ESS Vehicle OpsTM goggles are used for vehicle

operations involving excessive dust. The high-density,

restricted-perimeter filtration provides protection against

airborne debris while traveling at high speeds. These

goggles fit over most eyeglasses, and the frame has a foam

backing that wicks away moisture.

ESS Profile NVG

 Arena FlakjakTM goggles are designed for Soldiers who

do not wear eyeglasses. These goggles consist of a molded

frame with a ventilation screen, which allows air to flow

through to minimize lens fogging. The frame has a foam

backing that fits to the face and wicks away moisture.

Soldiers in combat and training run a high risk of losing

their eyesight. Sixteen percent of the casualties of the coalition

forces are attributed to eye injuries. Several reports from these

Soldiers indicate that the Army’s new protective eyewear has

protected their eyes from shrapnel numerous times. Although

flying shrapnel from an enemy weapon blast is the most

dangerous threat to a Soldier’s eyes, many other hazards—

such as flying sand, dust and debris from helicopters, high

winds or overpressure, flash fires, and lasers—threaten eye

safety as well. The new types of commercial protective

eyewear are the ideal solution for minimizing those hazards.

For additional information about any of the protective

eyewear, contact Mr. Larry T. Hasty at DSN 464-3662,

commercial (502) 624-3662, or e-mail <larry.hasty@

knox.army.mil>; Mr. Myron Pross, PM-CIE, at DSN 444-2510,

commercial (215) 737-2510, or e-mail <MyronPross@dla.mil>;

or Mr. Frank Cole at DSN 645-9907, commercial (256) 955-9907,

or e-mail <frank.cole@logsa.redstone.army.mil>.

Mr. Hasty is the Soldier Project Officer assigned to the

Science and Technology Division of the Unit of Action

Maneuver Battle Lab at the U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort

Knox, Kentucky.

ESS Vehicle Ops Goggles

Arena Flakjak Goggles
30 Engineer April-June 2005

Recently, Dr. Leonard Wong published a monograph

examining the adaptability of deployed junior officers.

“Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible

Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom” provides an insightful

look into the minds of today’s young leaders. In his

monograph, Dr. Wong challenges the Army to “acknowledge

and encourage this newly developed adaptability in our junior

officers or risk stifling the innovation critically needed in the

Army’s future leaders.”2 His work is significant because it

confronts the Army’s senior leadership with a problem that

may greatly affect the force during future deployments. This

article uses the framework from Dr. Wong’s monograph to

provide recommendations for improvement to officer

leadership courses. In order to prepare future leaders for the

conventional battlefield, leadership courses should train on

nontraditional leadership roles (for example, civil affairs, project

management, and fund management), provide a compilation

of after-action reviews (AARs) and lessons learned from

deployments, and establish a more in-depth mentor program.

Dealing With Complexity

Analysis

Structured training does not foster adaptive leadership.

Current missions in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi

Freedom, in many cases, are not mission-essential tasks. Over

the last few years, junior officers have grown accustomed to

executing missions with only a task and purpose. This change

in mission structure has created a new breed of creative,

adaptable leaders.

Company grade officers will serve as a catalyst for change

because of the full spectrum of operations encountered in

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. It is critical

that senior leaders recognize the method by which their junior

officers accomplished real-world missions. Further, it is

essential for senior leaders to support the ideas of their junior

officers in the garrison and training environment.

Dr. Wong describes four major areas that necessitate

adaptable leaders:

 Complex Roles. Deployed company grade officers operate

in a dynamic environment. As well, they have additional

duties in which they have little formal training. In the span

of a day, these officers are required to be leaders, warriors,

peacekeepers, and nation builders.

 Cultural Complexity. Deployed company grade officers

become increasingly aware of the cultural impacts on their

mission. Neglecting to train Soldiers on the effects of culture

can have large-scale implications for today’s military.

 Complex Warfare. Today’s battlefield presents complex

situations. Junior officers have to balance between

restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), civilians on the

battlefield, and a need to accomplish the mission.

 Complexity Through Change. Contemporary enemy forces

are adaptive and innovative. They seek to create instability

and havoc at the tactical level. To maintain situational

control and gain tactical surprise, coalition forces engage

in high-payoff, short-notice missions.

Recommendations

Complex Roles. The overarching situation is how to produce

adaptive leaders in the Army. The first step starts in the U.S.

Army Engineer School by teaching our junior leaders roles other

than traditional engineer leadership (for example, squad leaders,

platoon leaders, and company commanders). For the second step,

we must understand that regardless of our military occupational

specialty (MOS), we are Soldiers first. The third step is to

allow all Soldiers involvement in and access to AARs.

 The most notable areas currently neglected by the Army’s

Junior Officer Development Program relate to civil affairs

operations and funds management (outside of the

company’s budget). Civil affairs serves a wide spectrum of

operations, which many junior leaders face daily during a

deployment. Likewise, funds management deals with pay

agent issues such as workforce management of local

nationals. Junior leaders must have, at a minimum, baseline

information (involving money from higher echelons) to

allow adaptation to any situation.

As leaders, our experiences are valuable to junior leaders.

We should share these experiences with future leaders.

Near- and long-term solutions are mentoring programs,

small-group meetings, and training exercises without troops

(TEWTs). In addition, captains in the Engineer Command

and Staff Course (ECSC) can write professional papers on

lessons learned during deployment or in garrison, with the

opportunity for publishing.3

 In the second step, Soldiers must understand that they are

Soldiers first, regardless of the MOS. While deployed, the

Strengthening Army Leadership Courses

by Training Adaptability

By Members of the First Engineer Command and Staff Course1

Personal Viewpoint
April-June 2005 Engineer 31

operating environment is dynamic; one minute you may

be handing out pencils to school children and the next

minute be caught in a firefight. Company-level training must

reflect this element and be supported two levels higher,

unlike the traditional “trickle-down” training driven by

higher echelons. The training must excite Soldiers. Soldiers

are not set up for success when every field exercise is

identical. During a deployment, Soldiers are functioning

outside the job description of their MOS. Junior leaders

must be prepared for this and should implement the

diversions and real-world application into training.

 The third way to get all Soldiers involved is by allowing

participation in and examination of AARs. When higher

echelons withhold lessons learned, company grade leaders

are forced to “reinvent the wheel” by designing tactics,

techniques, and procedures that already exist. Leaders of

all levels need access to AARs, which—by definition—

are for future training through implementation of specific

problem-solving methods.

Junior leaders need flexibility. Given the tools, they should

be allowed to “wander off of the reservation” during

training. They must train in garrison without excessive

influence from higher headquarters, which prepares them

for the real-world theater of operations.

Cultural Complexity. When deploying outside of the

United States, almost every facet of life is drastically different

from life in America. Many U.S. Soldiers have never been

outside of the country, let alone had to deal with people who

are often scared of or hate Americans. Junior leaders must set

the example for how to act toward local nationals.

Consequently, cultural training for junior leaders is crucial to

the success of a deployment.

It is unrealistic to expect that training will completely prepare

a Soldier for a deployment. However, it is important for junior

leaders to have training to “know what they don’t know.” A

possible fix is for Soldiers who have deployed to the theater of

operations—within the recent past—to brief units preparing

to deploy. In addition, the Soldiers could include simple issues

such as eating, greeting, working with men/women, and

controlling crowds.

An immediate addition to ECSC should be a class during

the leadership foundations module to discuss cultural

awareness. It is likely our generation of officers will continue

to face conflicts at the company level in the Middle East. There

is sufficient experience to teach such a class among students

who have recently deployed. A possible long-term solution is

for students to compile cultural lessons learned, complete with

scenarios. These scenarios will challenge junior officers during

the tactics phase of ECSC. They will force captains to learn

how to apply doctrinal thinking while thinking creatively, based

on a region’s customs and courtesies.

Complex Warfare. ROE take on many forms and vary from

mission to mission. The problem for leaders becomes how to

enforce and abide by the ROE. The critical component of

establishing and enforcing the ROE is communicating a higher

Speedway forward arming and refueling point
32 Engineer April-June 2005

echelon’s intent. Too often on the nonlinear battlefield, the

situation changes quickly from nation building to tactical

engagement and back again. The Soldier must quickly

determine who is the enemy. Improperly crossing this delicate

line will disrupt months of work and effort spent on fostering

a positive relationship with the local nationals. It is essential

for leaders to war-game scenarios, which provides guidance

on potential situations.

The immediate and near-term action at the U.S. Army

Engineer School should be to place a greater importance on

discussing the ROE while conducting the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Although time is limited in the

training environment, any increase in incorporating the ROE

into the scenarios will help leaders. The long-term solution

involves collecting and compiling lessons learned from the

AARs of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. A

collection of real situations, the actions taken, and the lessons

learned from those actions would be a valuable tool that

company grade officers could take away. It would facilitate indepth discussions and provide leaders with a practical training

tool for various ROE scenarios.

Complexity Through Change. A near- and long-term

response to this issue could be the implementation of a

leadership mentor program for ECSC. Throughout each module,

(common core, leadership fundamentals, tactics, and

construction) captains need direct input to the MDMP—formal

and informal, mundane and exciting. The end state is for field

grade officers (focusing on the battalion commander) to take a

team under their “mentorship wing.” Mentors could focus

discussions on tactical and garrison topics and provide vital

input on what they think is important for success as a company

commander and as a future leader in today’s (and tomorrow’s)

Army.

During the common-core module, mentors could come in—

at least once—and meet with smaller groups (divide the class

in half or thirds) in a seminar format. The mentors could lead

the discussion, focusing strictly on topics of recent discussion

in class. This would require that the small-group leaders send

read-ahead packets to the mentors, ensuring that both the

captains and the mentors were discussing the same topics.

The leadership fundamentals module mimics the previous

process. However, the focus would shift to garrison-type

scenarios, which the mentor would discuss with the captains.

As with the first module, small-group leaders would ensure

that the mentors received read-ahead packets and would

coordinate for time available to conduct the mentor sessions.

During the tactics module, the mentors (divided into teams,

which would require four or five mentors) could spot-check

the planning, as the captains learned the MDMP. The class

would receive the mission and begin to plan, with input from

the team’s assigned mentor. The input would pertain to the

mission and planning (teacher/trainer). The first mission

analysis brief should be a walk-through with the mentor to

ensure that the captains are heading in the right direction.

There would be times established for when the mentor would

be available to assist in the MDMP with the captains, for

either the current or the next mission. The mentor would receive

at least one brief (mission analysis, course of action analysis/

approval, or operation order [OPORD]), and for each mission

during the phase, would assist with refining the team’s planning

process. Additionally, with the availability of a mentor, the

team would be able to plan the more complex/full-spectrum

operations that the Army is facing worldwide. The mentor

would assist the small-group leader by providing input on

potential missions and training conducted with the captains.

The capstone for this portion of training would be an OPORD

brief to the mentor from the captains on the final task force

mission.

Mentorship during the construction module could focus

again on the more mundane, yet time-consuming activities of

company command. The mentors would again meet with the

captains, at least twice during the module, to discuss the issues

of taking command and making that command successful—

through topics at the discretion of the mentor. The last sessions

with the mentor would allow the captains to ask questions not

conceived of earlier in the course, helping to send the captains

forward with confidence. The captains would also have a point

of contact that they feel comfortable with after they leave the

ECSC—should issues arise.

In addition, the ECSC student would establish a command

relationship with the battalion commander or a senior leader

of the student’s follow-on unit. The receiving commander

should send the student the command philosophy, top five

training focus areas, and additional information to help the

student. This commander could also be involved in the

incoming captain’s command philosophy developed during

the common core module. Instead of a “check-the-block”

memo, there would now be a document, approved by the

captain’s future commander.

The mentoring process needs to extend throughout the

ECSC, from the first weeks of common core and leadership

fundamentals, through tactics, and then finish with

construction. It would ensure that captains understood their

battalion commanders’ intent and philosophies before

conducting those first crucial inventories upon assuming

command.

To maximize the opportunities created by the captain

mentorship program, all captains must be involved in mentoring

lieutenants attending the Officer Basic Course. Captains

should discuss personal lessons learned, as well as

secondhand experiences from their mentors and future

commanders. Lieutenants now have a point of contact to ask

questions and gain useful insights into their future jobs. The

class schedule should allot time for the mentorship program.

In addition, captains and lieutenants should get together at

functions such as leader lunches and right-arm nights (where

everyone meets at the officers club). The program would be a

success if school leaders made it a priority.
April-June 2005 Engineer 33

Summary

A new breed of creative, adaptable leaders exists in the

Army’s junior officer ranks. It is vital that senior

leaders recognize and support the methodology by

which their junior officers accomplish real-world missions.

Further, it is essential for Army leadership courses to encourage

adaptable thinking and to prepare young officers for

nontraditional leadership roles. In order to better train leaders

on adaptability, leadership courses should train on irregular

leadership roles, provide a compilation of AARs and lessons

learned from deployments, and establish a more in-depth

mentor program.

Captain Dickey serves as battalion S4 for the 30th

Engineer Battalion. His previous assignments include

platoon leader, assault and obstacle platoon leader, S2, S4,

and executive officer. He holds a bachelor’s in construction

management from East Carolina University and a master’s in

engineer management from the University of Missouri-Rolla.

Captain Evans serves as the engineer reconstruction cell

liaison officer to the International Zone. His previous

assignments include Sapper platoon leader, light-equipment

platoon leader, battalion S1, and work in the Battalion

Assistant Division Engineer Cell. He holds a bachelor’s in

psychology and criminal justice from the University of

Georgia and a master’s in public administration from Webster

University.

Captain K. Lewison serves as the S1 for 164th Air Traffic

Services Group in Korea. Previous assignments include

aviation line company platoon leader and battalion S4. She

holds a master’s in public policy administration from the

University of Missouri-St. Louis.

Captain T. Lewison serves as an aviation operations officer

for the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. Previous assignments

include aviation line company platoon leader and executive

officer. He holds a master’s in public policy administration

from the University of Missouri-St. Louis.

Captain Miletich serves as an observer-controller/trainer

team chief in a training support battalion. Previous

assignments include platoon leader, task force engineer, and

executive officer for the 3d Infantry Division. He holds a

bachelor’s in business administration from Presbyterian

College and a master’s in public administration from Webster

University.

Captain Nye serves as a small-group instructor for the

Engineer Officer Basic Course. Previous assignments include

line platoon leader and assault and obstacle platoon leader.

He holds a bachelor’s in biology from Baker University.

Captain Rose is a training, assessment, and counseling

officer for Bravo Company, 3-11 Infantry Regiment (OCS) at

Fort Benning, Georgia. Previous assignments include line

platoon leader and assistant S3. He holds a bachelor’s in

English literature from Washington University and a master’s

in public policy from Webster University.

Captain Russell is a planner in the Future Plans G3,

Eighth U.S. Army Korea. Previous assignments include task

force engineer in Kosovo. He holds a master’s in public

administration from Webster University.

Endnote

1

 The authors are members of ECSC 03-04: Captain Jason

Dickey, Captain David Evans, Captain Katrina Gier Lewison,

Captain Tyler Lewison, Captain Matthew Miletich, Captain

William Nye, Captain Tim Rose, and Captain Timothy Russell.

2

 Leonard Wong, “Developing Adaptive Leaders: The

Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Carlisle

Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, p. v.

3

Engineer encourages submission of articles. Check the

Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/submit

%20article.htm> for the Engineer Writers Guide, which gives

more information on article requirements.

Dedication

The following members of the Engineer Regiment have been lost in the Global War on Terrorism since the last issue of Engineer.

We dedicate this issue to them.

Staff Sergeant Christopher W. Dill 1st Brigade, 98th Division Pennsauken, New Jersey

First Sergeant Timothy J. Millsap 70th Engineer Battalion Fort Riley, Kansas

Corporal John W. Miller 224th Engineer Battalion Burlington, Iowa

Sergeant Timothy C. Kiser 340th Forward Support Battalion Red Bluff, California

Specialist Derrick J. Lutters 891st Engineer Battalion Pittsburg, Kansas

Sergeant Gary A. Eckert, Jr. 983d Engineer Battalion Monclova, Ohio
36 Engineer April-June 2005

Combined into gap assault teams

to clear beach and underwater

obstacles in the landings at

Normandy in June 1944, Army combat

engineers and naval combat demolition

units (NCDUs) experienced D-Day like

everyone else—terrified beyond

measure. What they have yet to receive

is full recognition for their joint

accomplishment. Some accounts say

that the engineers were augmented by

NCDUs, while others say that the naval

units were augmented by engineers.

Both accounts are correct—it was a team

performance.

A gap assault team consisted of

twenty-eight Army engineers and an

NCDU made up of a Navy officer and

twelve enlisted men—seven Navy and

five Army. Also called boat teams, the

NCDUs went into action with engineer

combat battalions, assigned to regimental combat teams (RCTs). As part of

Assault Force “O,” the 299th Engineer

Combat Battalion was attached to the

16th RCT and the 146th Engineer Combat

Battalion to the 116th RCT. Assault

Force “U,” operating from VII Corps, was

organized along the same lines.

Before World War II, no one had

experimented with the demolition of

massed obstacles in amphibious assault.

Tasked with developing the use of

obstacles in defense between the World

Wars, the Corps of Engineers had a

grasp of practical problems by the end

of 1942. They had been experimenting

with underwater demolition for two

months at an amphibious training base

in Florida, when in May 1943 the Navy

announced the creation of its own

combat demolition program.

Striving to develop a joint amphibious

doctrine, the Army and the Navy joined

forces, each surrendering some of its

traditional autonomy, but never

unconditionally. To the dismay of

political leaders intent on controlling the

cost of the war, the two services

continued to inaugurate duplicate

programs. Wherever the Army went, the

Navy was sure to follow, straining to take

the lead in all things amphibious.

The Navy’s ascendancy in landing

operations put the future of the Engineer

Amphibian Command in doubt.

Acquiescing to the transfer of authority,

one engineer expressed optimism, seeing

it as a challenge for the Navy not to undo

previous achievements, but to build on

them. In a memo dated 25 February 1943,

Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Thompson

stressed the need for trained personnel

who were fully aware of American

amphibian doctrine at assault training

centers in England. Seeking to promote

continuity, he noted that the Engineer

Amphibian Command had developed “a

workable doctrine.” His understanding

of the impending change was that the

Navy would “simply absorb the

personnel and facilities of the Engineer

Amphibian Command,” basically

adhering to the established doctrine and

Joint-Service Beach Obstacle

Demolition in World War II

Past in Review

By Mr. James Douglas O’Dell

Captain Alfred G. Hoel Jr., Corp of Engineers was instrumental in

the establishment of the Joint Army-Navy Experimental and

Testing Board (JANET).

Photo in This is JANET, October 1945
April-June 2005 Engineer 37

technique. In sum, he anticipated “a

change in form rather than in

substance.”1

With respect to the demolition of

beach and underwater obstacles, the

Navy elected to start from scratch,

disregarding what the engineers had

previously accomplished. The engineers

made significant contributions, beginning with obstacle experiments predating

the amphibious exercises that nurtured

the Fleet Marine Force in the 1930s.

Beginning in 1923, the Corps of Engineers developed beach and underwater obstacles for island defense in the

Philippines and Hawaii—starting with

steel chevaux-de-frise, barbed wire, and

small mines. Coral formations off Oahu

and Corregidor made it difficult to install

heavy steel obstacles, but by August

1933—with the armed forces of various

nations using heavier equipment—the

engineers were forced to reconsider

heavier obstacles.

While keeping tabs on German and

Japanese amphibious operations, the

engineers accumulated useful data on

tactics and equipment. In February 1941,

the Engineer Board started a project to

investigate general demolitions. On

8 May 1941, the Chief of Engineers

proposed that the board find a location

for experiments in beach and underwater

obstacle techniques. In late August and

early September 1942, to guide research,

the board composed a list of the military

characteristics of effective underwater

obstacles. A study of a working classification of existing types resulted and

convinced the Chief of Engineers to

authorize Project DM 361, Underwater

Obstacles, on 22 September.

Beginning in late 1942, experiments

were conducted at a temporary site at

Camp Bradford, five miles northeast of

Norfolk, facing the Chesapeake Bay.

Over the winter of 1942–43, a variety of

obstacles were tested, including horned

scullies.2

 Based on work at Camp

Bradford, the board made preparations

for establishing a test site at Fort Pierce,

Florida, authorizing a survey of North

Island (now known as Hutchinson),

conducted on 25–26 February 1943. A

newly established naval amphibious

training base on South Island (also

known as Hutchinson), combined with

excellent beach and surf conditions,

made North Island ideal for a jointservice program—where the Army began

a demolition school.

On 8 March, the Chief of Engineers

specified that the test area be located

close to the naval base, directing the

board to coordinate work with a similar

project in the United Kingdom. On that

same day, Report 740, Project DM 361,

Underwater Obstacles (covering the

work at Camp Bradford), was completed,

and the board opened Project DM 361E,

Demolition Equipment for Removing

Beach and Underwater Obstacles. At

Fort Pierce, engineers experimented with

ways of blasting channels through

sandbars—at that juncture, the only

underwater obstacles known to exist at

potential landing beaches in Axis

(Germany, Italy, and Japan) territory.

Since offshore bars were obstacles to

boat traffic, the Navy argued for

jurisdiction. Heavily engaged in the

development of their own landing craft,

the engineers sought a compromise

based on joint responsibility. The

elimination of obstacles, extending to

natural features, was a logical adjunct to

combat engineering, Army or Navy. Both

services coveted the capability and the

freedom to operate according to their

respective doctrines. Acquiring

responsibility for all amphibious training

and landing craft production, the Navy

sought total control over landing

operations. Essentially, the Navy was

responsible for getting troops and

supplies on the beaches, while the Army

was responsible for getting them off the

beaches. From that perspective, the

elimination of all obstacles to navigation

was a logical extension of naval activity.

In the sense that a landing beach could

develop into a makeshift port, the

clearance of underwater obstacles fell

under an existing interservice arrangement, but there was a problem.

In the spring of 1943, the Navy had

nothing comparable to the obstacle

research base compiled by the engineers

over the previous two decades—or a

demolition school. Responsible for port

clearance—principally, the removal of

mines, torpedoes, and wrecked

vehicles—the Navy did have training

facilities for ordnance disposal. In

addition to the Mine Disposal School,

as of late 1941, there was the Bomb

Disposal School—established and

headed by Lieutenant Commander

Draper Laurence Kauffman, U.S. Navy

Reserve (USNR). He knew something

about demolition specific to ordnance

disposal, but he was not a demolitions

expert. For expertise on demolitions,

Engineers launch into the surf with a nitrostarch charge, preparing to blast a

sandbar, 1 March 1943. Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet Photo AFAF-X 735.

Photo courtesy Kenneth B. Reynolds
38 Engineer April-June 2005

planners could look to the Naval

Construction Battalions, or Seabees,

skilled in the use of explosives for

building purposes.

Neither bomb disposal technicians

nor Seabee builders were classed as

combat troops trained for assault. The

Marines were, but the Navy wanted to

confine them to the seizure of ports, their

traditional assignment. In the Pacific, that

came to include entire islands, such as

the Solomon Islands where Marine

engineers experimented with combat

demolition. Given their assignment to

secure ports, and considering that

landing beaches could serve as ports,

Marines were logical candidates for

demolition training. Nevertheless, Navy

planners thought of Marines as an inert

force until they actually hit the beach. In

that sense, the only active units in the

surf zone were landing crafts, which

included amphibious tractors, able to

surmount a coral reef but having a limited

capacity to deal with artificial obstacles.

In the wake of the landings in North

Africa in November 1942, the Allies gave

some thought to the possibility that the

Axis might make greater use of artificial

barriers extended into the surf zone.

Examining the results of beach marking

by amphibious scouts in Operation

Torch, Admiral H. Kent Hewitt decided

to expand their capabilities to include onshore reconnaissance. In a

memorandum to the Commanding

General of the Army Ground Forces,

dated 18 February 1943, he requested a

specially organized company of

engineers (including a demolition

platoon) to assist in the development of

particular projects in amphibious

technique. He wanted the unit to be

available by 1 March at the latest. At the

top of the list was “the training of Scouts

and Raiders in the technique of

investigating and destroying beach and

underwater obstacles.”3

Established in September 1942 at Little

Creek, Virginia, and moved to Fort Pierce

in January 1943, the joint-service

Amphibious Scout and Raider School

was not designed to train raiders in the

usual sense, but as reconnaissance

specialists, skilled at gathering intelligence behind enemy lines without

revealing their presence. The fact that

Admiral Hewitt directed his request to

the Army, and not the Navy, is

significant. Clearly, he saw the need for

a combat demolition capability with

respect to underwater obstacles,

recognizing that the Navy, as yet, did

not have one.

On 17 March 1943, the Engineer Board

informed the Chief of Engineers that

Captain Clarence C. Gulbranson—U.S.

Navy Commandant of the Amphibious

Training Base, Fort Pierce—had

submitted a request for “the immediate

construction of a sample underwater

obstacle course” for use in the preliminary training of combat personnel in

the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet

(AFAF). Supervised by the district

engineer, civilian contractors completed

the course by the end of April.

 By early spring, the Army and the

Navy had begun to discuss joint

responsibility for the passage of beach

and underwater obstacles in the assault.

In a memo to Army Ground Forces, dated

17 April 1943, an officer of the General

Staff, Army Service Forces, wrote, “Steps

to obtain a joint decision on the

delineation of responsibilities have been

This experimental beach and underwater obstacle course was constructed at North Island, Fort

Pierce, Florida, in April 1943.

Photo courtsy Albert J. Stankie
April-June 2005 Engineer 39

initiated by the Navy, and a decision is

expected in the near future.”4

On 1 May, the engineers recommended the immediate construction of

an obstacle course, and by 1 July, it was

ready for experimental testing. Colonel

James H. Stratton, head of the

Engineering Division, on 29 June wrote

that the course would not be used to

train troops. The Chief of Engineers

requested a revised plan for Project DM

361E, with emphasis on the passage of

beach obstacles and continued cooperation with the AFAF, in developing

techniques in the passage of underwater

obstacles. Submitted on 7 July, the

revised plan was approved within twelve

days.

The emphasis on beach obstacles did

not herald a total shift away from

underwater obstacles, although another

critical development in early May 1943

applied pressure in that direction.

Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval

Operations (CNO), formally announced

a plan to establish a program to train

NCDUs. With no reference to the Army’s

efforts, the CNO said simply that it made

sense to prepare for the eventuality of

having to achieve passage through

underwater obstacles on enemy

beaches—basically, the Navy thought

it was a good idea.

Citing an “urgent” requirement, the

CNO tasked Lieutenant Commander

Kauffman to find a suitable location and

commence training. Kauffman organized

a training cadre and established the

NCDU Project at the Amphibious

Training Base, Fort Pierce, in early June.

The engineers appeared to take the

situation calmly. Speaking to an

assembly at the Assault Training Center,

European Theater of Operations, on

31 May 1943, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin

P. Lock, Corps of Engineers said, “I

understand that this task is assigned to

units of naval demolition engineers.” He

assured his colleagues in the United

Kingdom that “the program for the

development and means of passing

underwater obstacles is being undertaken jointly by the Army engineers and

the Navy.” In reference to the longstanding arrangement, Lock explained,

“The Army engineers are responsible for

the technique of underwater obstacles

in the defense, hence their interest in the

project.”5

The Army did not want to transfer all

responsibility for removing underwater

obstacles to the Navy. As Colonel Lock

explained, “In an operation of this nature,

it is wrong to assume that one or the

other service is assigned full responsibility, since the planning and

training are joint responsibilities.” More

pointedly, “Planning must designate the

removal of specific obstacles by

specifically designated units.”6 At this

point, a problem arose in the negotiations over the division of labor.

Depending on the state of the tide,

obstacles on the foreshore rested upon

dry land. The Navy wanted jurisdiction

over anything that, by definition, was

an obstacle to navigation. Basically, that

included everything below the highwater mark. The Army thought it made

more sense for the Navy to tackle

obstacles that were submerged at the

time of the landing. According to the

engineers’ definition, those were truly

underwater obstacles.

Eventually, Admiral King had to

concede that shifting tides made it

difficult to referee responsibility for

removing underwater obstacles: “The

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, agrees

that underwater obstacles may, under

certain conditions, be above water and

also may not be technically separable

from other obstacles in the landing

This is a portion

of an actual

chart used by a

naval combat

demolition unit

officer in the

assault on

Omaha Beach,

6 June 1944.

Photo courtesy Mr. James Douglas O’Dell
area.”7 The engineers sought to avoid

duplication of effort, either with respect

to cooperation with the Navy or their

own demolition research projects. The

prime directive was to maintain close

coordination of all amphibious

preparations.

As stated on 21 January 1941,

Admiral King’s philosophy of command

embraced the concept of individual

initiative within the framework of an effort

coordinated with other components of

the fleet. Echelon commanders were to

be told what to do, but not how to do it,

unless circumstances warranted

otherwise. Clarifying this position three

months later, he said, “When told ‘what’

to do—make sure that ‘how’ you do it is

effective, not only in itself but as an

intelligent, essential, and correlated

part of a comprehensive and connected

whole.”8 On the surface, this would seem

to have placed the Army and the Navy

on the same page, but beneath the tacit

agreement to cooperate in amphibious

preparations lay the determination to

continue separate efforts at separate, if

also contiguous, sites. Duplication was

the order of the day, but so was

interdependence. In a letter dated

3 August 1943, Brigadier General C. L.

Sturdevant noted, “The passage of beach

and underwater obstacles is a subject

about which little is known.”

Emphasizing the importance of the

experimental work at Fort Pierce, he

wrote, “The Navy, for the time being, is

largely dependent upon the Chief of

Engineers for such development.”9

At Fort Pierce, the 299th learned

techniques from the NCDUs,

demonstrated there in February 1944.

Otherwise, the Army and the Navy

maintained separate training regimes and

sites on North Island. It was nearly the

eleventh hour before Army engineers

and Navy demolition units participated

in joint exercises on a realistic scale in

the United Kingdom.

According to the final draft of the

operational plan for Normandy, Navy

personnel were “entirely responsible” for

removing obstacles that were

submerged at the time of the landing—

as the engineers had wanted from the

start. Army personnel were not expected

to disengage from work on obstacles that

were being engulfed by the tide. The

arrangement proved satisfactory. A Navy

observer rated the cooperation between

Army and Navy demolition units on

D-Day as “virtually perfect.”10

Mr. O’Dell is a freelance writer and

former editor of FIRE IN THE HOLE!,

the newsletter of the UDT-SEAL Museum

Association, Inc. He holds a bachelor’s

in anthropology and a master’s in

history.

Endnotes

1Lieutenant Colonel Paul W.

Thompson, Corps of Engineers, Memo

No. 8 to General Barker, 25 February

1943, p. 1 (National Archives, Textual

Reference Division, Military Reference

Branch, Suitland, Maryland.).

2Report 740, Project DM 361,

Underwater Obstacles, Engineer Board

Study No. DM 361, 8 March 1943,

submitted to the Engineer Board, Fort

Belvoir, Virginia. File AD-B957 600,

records of U.S. Army Engineer School,

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

3

Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U.S.

Navy, Commander, Amphibious Force,

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, to Commanding

General, Army Ground Forces, Army War

College, Washington, D.C., 18 February

1943. Records of U.S. Army Engineer

School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

4

Memorandum for the Commanding

General, Army Ground Forces: Subject:

Beach Assault Training, 17 April 1943.

Records of U.S. Army Engineer School,

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

5

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin P. Lock,

Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army,

Discussion of address of 31 May 1943,

Assault Training Center, European

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

(National Archives, Textual Reference

Division, Military Reference Branch,

Suitland, Maryland.), pp. 3-4.

6

Ibid., 3.

7

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic

Fleet, “A History of the Amphibious

Force,” p. 81.

8

Commander Walter Muir Whitehill,

USNR, “A history of the organization

and administration of Headquarters,

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,

December 1941 to October 1945.”

Headquarters (Operational Archives,

Naval Historical Center, Washington,

D.C., 1946, microfiche, pp. 7-12).

9

Brigadier General Clarence L.

Sturdevant, Corps of Engineers, to

Commanding General, Fort Belvoir,

3 August 1943. Records of U.S. Army

Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri.

10Operational Order No. 3-44, 15 May

1944, p. 1; Lieutenant (jg) H.L. Blackwell

Jr., Report on Naval Combat Demolition

Units in Operation Overlord, July 1944

(Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.),

p.16; Lieutenant Commander Herbert A.

Peterson, D-V(G), USNR, Commander,

Task Group 125.2.3, to Naval Commander,

Western Task Force, Report of

Operations (Operational Archives, Naval

Historical Center, Washington, D.C.),

p. 3.

Note: This article is condensed from

The Water Is Never Cold: The Origins of

the U.S. Navy’s Combat Demolition

Units, UDTs, and SEALs by James

Douglas O’Dell (Brassey’s, Inc., 2000,

2001), and unpublished data from a work

in progress.

40 Engineer April-June 2005