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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED APRIL 18, 2001
 

PETRONELLA BATSHON and BENSON
 

RUBIN,
 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
 

v No. 116895
 

MAR-QUE GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC.,


DEWEY STEWART and EXPERT PLUMBING,


INC.,
 

Defendants-Appellees.
 

PER CURIAM
 

The plaintiffs sued the defendants, who successfully
 

interposed a release executed by the plaintiffs and an
 

insurance company. Summary disposition was granted in favor
 

of the defendants, and the circuit court and the Court of
 

Appeals affirmed. We reverse on the ground that the release
 

did not limit the potential liability of the defendants.
 

I
 

Plaintiffs Petronella Batshon and Benson Rubin owned a
 
house in Southfield.1 An October 1993 fire did substantial
 

damage to the structure. Working from several trucks,
 

firefighters evidently pumped a significant amount of water
 

into the building. Perhaps in connection with the fire, the
 

basement flooded knee-deep several weeks later. 


Substantial reconstruction work was done in early 1994.
 

The cost was apparently borne by AAA of Michigan, the insurer
 

of the house. 


As the reconstruction work was being done, the plaintiffs
 

decided to connect with the city water line. They contracted
 

with Mar-Que General Contractors. Mar-Que, in turn,
 

subcontracted with Dewey Stewart to dig a trench for the pipe,
 

and with Expert Plumbing, Inc., to install the water line. 


In March 1994, the basement walls of the house buckled,
 

causing additional damage. This suit is premised on the
 

plaintiffs’ allegation that this damage was caused by the
 

negligence of Mar-Que and its subcontractors (Stewart and
 

Expert Plumbing) in the course of installing the water line.
 

Evidently, the plaintiffs’ initial conclusion had been
 

that the collapse of the walls was the result of the fire and
 

the efforts of the fire department. With the assistance of
 

counsel, they sent AAA an April 1994 letter demanding that AAA
 

pay a significant portion of the $27,900 bill for repairing
 

the walls. 


1
 We present the facts from the materials at hand,


cautioning that this case has not been tried.
 

2
 
The negotiations with AAA led to a $3,000 settlement, in
 

exchange for a May 1994 release. The meaning of that release
 

is the central question in this case.
 

In October 1995, the plaintiffs filed in district court
 

a complaint against Mar-Que, Stewart, and Expert Plumbing.2
 

The defendants responded with motions for summary disposition
 

under MCR 2.116(C)(7), saying that the language of the release
 

barred the plaintiffs’ claim. 


The district court granted the motions, agreeing that the
 

release barred the claims against the present defendants. The
 

court later denied reconsideration. The plaintiffs appealed,
 

but the circuit court affirmed. 


The Court of Appeals also affirmed,3 and the plaintiffs
 

now seek leave to appeal in this Court.
 

II
 

The release was executed on a generic printed form that
 

bore the title, “RELEASE COVERING ALL CLAIMS.” AAA’s name was
 

typed into a blank space, so that the plaintiffs were
 

releasing “AAA of Michigan, his/her/their executors,
 

administrators, and all persons or organizations responsible
 

2
 The materials at hand indicate that Expert Plumbing


filed a cross-claim against Mar-Que and Stewart. 


3 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 25, 2000


(Docket No. 212062). Initially, the Court of Appeals had


denied leave to appeal. Unpublished order, entered June 30,


1997 (Docket No. 201729). However, this Court remanded the


case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave


granted. 457 Mich 875 (1998).
 

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for his/her/their acts from all claims and causes of action
 

for all injuries, losses, and damages sustained by [the
 

plaintiffs], arising from an incident, all or part of which
 

occurred on or about the 23rd day of March, 1994, at or near
 

[the plaintiffs’ Southfield address].” The printed form also
 

contained the language, “I intend this document to operate as
 

a release for all consequences of the injuries, losses and
 

damages sustained by me,” after which were typed the words “in
 

regards to the basement walls whether or not I am presently
 

aware of such consequences.” 


The defendants argue that the release covers “all
 

persons.” Agreeing, the Court of Appeals said that “[t]he
 

word ‘all’ encompasses the broadest possible classification.”
 

The plain language of the release does not, however, cover all
 

persons and organizations.4 The key sentence in the release
 

agreement provides for a “release of AAA of Michigan,
 

4 We agree with these statements made by the Court of


Appeals in the present case:
 

We review a trial court’s decision on a motion
 

for summary disposition de novo. Harrison v Olde
 

Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679
 

(1997). 


The validity of a release turns on the intent


of the parties. A release must be fairly and


knowingly made to be valid. Skotak v Vic Tanny
 

Int’l, Inc, 203 Mich App 616, 618; 513 NW2d 428


(1994). If the language of a release is clear and


unambiguous, the intent of the parties is
 

ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of


the language. Wyrembelski v St Clair Shores, 218


Mich App 125, 127; 553 NW2d 651 (1996).
 

4
 
his/her/their executors, administrators, and all persons or
 

organizations responsible for his/her/their acts.” The first
 

use of the term “his/her/their”5 unmistakably is as a
 

substitute for repeating AAA of Michigan. It is likewise
 

plain that when the term “his/her/their” is used again in the
 

same sentence that it is also a substitute for AAA of
 

Michigan. See Henderson v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 460
 

Mich 348, 356; 596 NW2d 190 (1999) (explaining that a court
 

should “give contextual meaning to [a contractual] phrase to
 

determine what the phrase conveys to those familiar with our
 

language and its contemporary usage”). It follows that this
 

printed release form is not a complete release of liability
 

with respect to all parties in connection with the incident
 

underlying the release, but rather pertains to “all persons or
 

organizations” only insofar as they might be “responsible for
 

[AAA’s] acts.”6
 

The nature of the potential claim being released was
 

stated in terms that were expansive (“I intend this document
 

to operate as a release for all consequences of the injuries,
 

losses and damages sustained by me in regards to the basement
 

5
 The drafters of this form alternatively linked male,


female, and plural pronouns, but if the drafters had thought


to include “its” (“his/her/its/their”), the antecedent would


have been more clear. 


6 By contrast, consider the broad wording of the releases
 

in Romska v Opper, 234 Mich App 512, 514; 594 NW2d 853 (1999),


and Meridian Mut Ins Co v Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc (On Remand),


242 Mich App 645, 649-650; 620 NW2d 310 (2000).
 

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walls whether or not I am presently aware of such
 

consequences”). Because this document more narrowly
 

identifies the persons and entities being released, however,
 

only they can invoke this broad language. Again, the release
 

plainly states that AAA of Michigan and certain parties
 

connected to AAA were released. The present defendants were
 

not among those covered by the expansively worded release of
 

potential liability unless they can be fitted within the
 

phrase “all persons or organizations responsible for [AAA’s]
 

acts.”
 

For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the
 

district court, circuit court, and Court of Appeals, and
 

remand this case to the district court for further proceedings
 

that are consistent with this opinion. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and
 

MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
 

6