If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re F. P. SMITH, Minor. December 22, 2022

No. 361708

Oakland Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2020-881961-NA

In re P. P. SMITH, Minor. No. 361709

Oakland Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2019-872718-NA

In re P. P. CURRIE, Minor. No. 361712

Oakland Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2017-856084-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, respondent-father1appeals of right the termination of his 

parental rights to three children, FPS (Docket No. 361708), PPS (Docket No. 361709), and PPC 

(Docket No. 361712). The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to PPC and PPS

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist), and the court 

terminated respondent’s parental rights to all three children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure 

 

1

In separate orders issued earlier, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s 

mother. She is not a participant in this appeal. “Respondent” refers solely to respondent-father.
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to provide proper care and custody) and (3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child is returned). 

Finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm in each appeal.

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Respondent is the legal father of the children at issue in these appeals. Shortly after PPC 

was born, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the trial 

court to remove the child from the mother’s care and to terminate her parental rights. In an 

amended petition, the DHHS asserted, on the basis of allegations of domestic violence between 

respondent and the mother, as well as respondent’s recent criminal history, that PPC was not safe 

in respondent’s care. Respondent pleaded no contest to the allegations. At the initial disposition 

hearing, petitioner recommended that respondent participate in domestic-violence counseling, 

parenting classes, and supervised parenting time after his release from jail. These 

recommendations were incorporated into an initial Parent-Agency Treatment Plan (PATP).

Respondent was released from jail in March 2018, and he began to make progress on the 

PATP’s requirements. He obtained employment, completed his parenting skills program by 

November 2018, and had appropriate housing by early 2019. However, shortly after supervised 

parenting time began in 2018, issues emerged that would persist throughout the proceedings. 

Respondent was often late to parenting times, or failed to show at all. He frequently failed to bring 

to parenting time basic childcare items such as diapers, wipes, the right kind of food or enough 

food; he repeatedly needed help with things like properly mixing formula; and he sometimes 

forwent routine childcare tasks, such as changing diapers. At the hearing to determine whether 

there existed statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights, the foster-care mother

recounted a parenting time incident that occurred in a park. Respondent brought the children to 

her car and said that both of them soiled their diapers. When she told respondent that she had 

diapers in the car and would give him a couple so that he could change them out of their soiled 

diapers, respondent said, “[N]o, we’ll just pick this up next week.” When she pointed out that he 

had 45 minutes of parenting time remaining, he said that he was going to go buy diapers and shoes 

and that he would change diapers next week. She testified that respondent would bring food to 

parenting time that the children could not eat, or he would bring food, but no spoon; formula, but 

no bottle; or a bottle, but no formula.

The high point of respondent’s progress toward reunification came in January 2020. 

Although respondent had lost his housing in September 2019, he had reacquired appropriate 

housing by January 2020. Respondent continued to be tardy to parenting times and to lack one or 

two things that he was supposed to have, but the caseworker hoped that these matters would be 

resolved when they began unsupervised parenting time at respondent’s home, where it was 

anticipated that respondent would have everything he needed for a successful, unsupervised 

parenting time. New concerns arose when PPC and PPS, both of whom had asthma, were twice 

returned to the foster family smelling of smoke after unsupervised parenting time in respondent’s 

home. Petitioner also expressed concern that respondent’s girlfriend, Ashley Brown, was around 

the children before petitioner had been able to investigate her. The last unsupervised parenting 

time was on March 14. Video parenting time was instituted. The record shows that when virtual 

parenting time was instituted, presumably because of concerns with COVID, respondent 

frequently arrived late for the visit, or left early, or attended the visit while he was engaged in 

activities in the community.
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By July 2020, nearly two years after the removal of PPC, and more than one year after the 

removal of PPS, respondent’s persistent problems demonstrating any benefit from the services he 

was receiving prompted petitioner to recommend that respondent submit to a psychological 

evaluation so that petitioner could gain insight into respondent’s comprehension and decisionmaking process and determine whether there were other services from which respondent might 

benefit. Respondent’s attorney opposed the recommendation, asserting that he saw nothing in 

particular that required a psychological evaluation and that respondent had done everything that 

petitioner had asked of him and had completed his PATP. Petitioner explained that the 

psychological evaluation was to determine if there was a psychological reason why respondent did 

not appear to have benefited from services. The trial court ordered the psychological evaluation.

In December 2020, respondent became the legal father of FPS when he and the child’s 

mother signed an affidavit of parentage. The DHHS petitioned the trial court to remove FPS from 

respondent’s care, and, in January 2021, respondent pleaded no contest to the allegations in the 

petition. Sometime during this reporting period, petitioner received the results of respondent’s 

psychological evaluation. The evaluator diagnosed respondent with “borderline intellectual 

functioning,” and made a number of general recommendations, such as developing an individual 

plan of service that included “[l]iving options/supports for living” and “[s]upports for childcare.” 

Petitioner reported these results to the referee at a February 2021 review and permanency planning 

hearing and asked the referee to allow more time for specialized services.2 The children’s lawyerguardian ad litem opposed the recommendation, in part on the basis of the children’s need for 

finality and stability. The referee took the matter under advisement, recommended that respondent 

participate in an intake assessment with Detroit Wayne Integrated Health Network as soon as 

possible, and adjourned the hearing.

When the hearing resumed the following month, petitioner reported that it had reevaluated 

its previous recommendations and would be filing a supplemental petition seeking the termination 

of respondent’s parental rights to all three children. The referee confirmed his previous 

recommendation to file a supplemental petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights to PPC

and PPS, and he instructed petitioner to include FPS in the petition. Petitioner filed supplemental 

petitions in each case, seeking to terminate respondent’s parental rights to PPC and PPS under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), and to terminate respondent’s parental rights to all three children under 

§§ 19b(3)(g) and 19b(3)(j). Regarding PPC and PPS, petitioner alleged that respondent: failed to 

benefit from parenting classes, had not demonstrated proper parenting skills, visited his children 

inconsistently throughout the case, failed to demonstrate the focus and commitment necessary to 

use parenting time to strengthen his bond with the children, and failed to demonstrate during 

parenting time that he could meet the needs of the children without requiring the assistance of 

others. Petitioner also alleged that respondent had not presented evidence of a legal source of 

income, had not presented a budget that demonstrated that he could care for himself and the 

 

2 Respondent was not present at the hearing, having been arrested four days earlier and charged 

with three counts of selling cocaine to an undercover officer and one count of maintaining a drug 

house. Respondent pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to the 52 days he had served 

in jail and two years’ probation.
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children financially, and had not presented proof of safe and stable housing for himself and the 

children.

After a nine-day hearing, the referee recommended terminating respondent’s parental 

rights to PPC and PPS under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), and to all three children under §§ 19b(3)(g) 

and 19b(3)(j). The trial court adopted the referee’s recommendation.

II. REASONABLE EFFORTS

Respondent first argues on appeal that the trial court erred by finding that petitioner made 

reasonable efforts to reunite him with his children because petitioner did not offer him services to 

accommodate his disability. Specifically, respondent argues that the trial court erred by not 

allowing respondent the opportunity to go to an intake appointment with Detroit Wayne Integrated 

Health Network and learn what, if any, accommodations were necessary to position respondent to 

successfully parent his children. We disagree.

This Court “review[s] for clear error a trial court’s decision regarding reasonable efforts.” 

In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 258; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). “Clear error exists when some 

evidence supports a finding, but a review of the entire record leaves the reviewing court with the 

definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a mistake.” In re Baham, 331 Mich App 

737, 751; 954 NW2d 529 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Under Michigan’s Probate Code, the [DHHS] has an affirmative duty to make reasonable 

efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 

Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c), and MCL 712A.19a(2). 

To that end, the DHHS “must create a case service plan outlining the steps that it and the parent 

will take to rectify the conditions that led to court intervention and to achieve reunification.” In re 

Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86. In addition, the DHHS “has obligations under the ADA that 

dovetail with its obligation under the Probate Code.” Id. at 86. The DHHS “must make reasonable 

modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid 

discrimination on the basis of disability, unless . . . the modifications would fundamentally 

alter . . . the service provided.” Id. (quotations marks and citation omitted). If the DHHS does not 

make such modifications, then the DHHS fails to fulfill its obligations under the ADA and under 

“the Probate Code to offer services designed to facilitate the child’s return to his or her home, see 

MCL 712A.18f(3)(d), and has, therefore, failed in its duty to make reasonable efforts at 

reunification under MCL 712A.19a(2).” Id.

Initially, we note that respondent’s argument that petitioner was ordered to file a 

supplemental petition before respondent could follow up on the trial court’s order to contact 

Detroit Wayne Integrated Health Network to do an intake assessment is not entirely incorrect. 

Respondent’s attorney informed the referee at a May 6, 2021 hearing that respondent went to the 

assessment at Detroit Wayne Integrated Health Network on April 22. The DHHS caseworker

confirmed counsel’s information and stated that respondent expected to go to Detroit Wayne

Integrated Health Network weekly. Therefore, contrary to respondent’s argument on appeal, 

although the referee affirmed in March 2021 his earlier recommendation that petitioner file a 

supplemental petition, respondent attended the intake assessment before the supplemental petition 

was filed, and he continued to receive additional services after the supplemental petition was filed.
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In addition, when challenging the services offered, a respondent must establish that he or 

she would have fared better if other services had been offered. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 

at 266. Respondent tacitly acknowledged that petitioner’s efforts were reasonable and that the 

services offered were sufficient to help respondent overcome the barriers to reunification when he 

argued in the trial court that a psychological evaluation was unnecessary. Respondent has not 

provided any substantive argument on the deficiencies of the services that he received or about 

how they were not reasonable or appropriate in light of the results of his psychological evaluation. 

See id. Further, unlike In re Hicks/Brown, the record in the present case does not establish that 

respondent identified specific services that would have accommodated his disability, even after 

his intake assessment at Detroit Wayne Integrated Health Network.

In light of respondent’s tacit admission that the services he received were sufficient to help 

him overcome the barriers to reunification with his children, his failure to identify any way in 

which the services were deficient or, having been assessed at Detroit Wayne Integrated Health 

Network, to identify services that would have been more appropriate, given the results of his 

psychological evaluation, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that 

petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with his children.

III. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent next argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that clear and 

convincing evidence established statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights to his children. 

Again, we disagree.

An appellate court “review[s] for clear error . . . the court’s decision that a ground for 

termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence . . . .” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 

341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). See also MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if, 

although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that 

a mistake was made. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be “more than maybe or probably 

wrong.” In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “Further, regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 

111 (2011). “Appellate courts are obliged to defer to a trial court’s factual findings at termination 

proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 

NW2d 587 (2009). “If the trial court did not clearly err by finding one statutory ground existed, 

then that one ground is sufficient to affirm the termination of the respondent’s parental rights.” In 

re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273.

Natural parents have a “fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management 

of their child[ren],” and this interest “does not evaporate simply because they have not been model 

parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 

745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). However, “[a] parent’s right to control the 

custody and care of [his or] her children is not absolute, as the state has a legitimate interest in 

protecting ‘the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor’ and in some 

circumstances ‘neglectful parents may be separated from their children.’ ” In re Sanders, 495 

Mich 394, 409-410; 852 NW2d 524 (2014), quoting Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 652; 92 S Ct 
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1208; 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972). “In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by 

clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in 

MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 

(2011).

Evidence is clear and convincing if it

produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction 

as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence 

so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the 

factfinder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.

[In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704 (2020), quoting In re 

Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227; 538 NW2d 399 (1995) (quotation marks, citation, and 

brackets omitted).]

The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to PPC and PPS under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(g), and (3)(j).

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), provides grounds for termination when the following conditions 

are established by clear and convincing evidence:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court 

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

* * *

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

Termination under § 19b(3)(g) is appropriate when “[t]he parent, although, in the court’s 

discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there 

is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within 

a reasonable time considering the child’s age.”

Termination under § 19b(3)(j) is appropriate when “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, 

based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is 

returned to the home of the parent.” “[A] parent’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions 

of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home.” 

In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 711; 846 NW2d 61 (2014); see also In re Kaczkowski, 325 Mich 

App 69, 77; 924 NW2d 1 (2018); In re Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 49; 919 NW2d 427 (2018).
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Turning first to § 19b(3)(j), the referee found that respondent’s failure to comply with the 

parenting-time requirements of the PATPs and to demonstrate that he had benefited from the 

parenting services he received was dispositive. Respondent was incarcerated shortly after PPC 

was removed in August 2017 and was released in March 2018. Five months after his release from 

jail, respondent signed an updated PATP, agreeing, among other things, to “follow the 

recommendations of his parenting coach,” to “display the skills he learns during parenting time 

visits,” “to be on time for all parenting skills appointments and parenting time visits,” and “to give 

advance notice if he is unable to make an appointment.” Similarly, respondent signed a PATP in 

PPS’s case in which respondent agreed to “display the parenting skills he learned [at class] during 

parenting time.” In an updated service plan for all three children, respondent’s goal was to practice 

appropriate parenting skills so that he could parent his children successfully without assistance.

Respondent completed two parenting classes, one of which was an in-home class;

participated in the Parent Partner Program; and received one-on-one instruction and guidance from 

the caseworker and the parenting-time supervisor. Respondent successfully completed his 

parenting classes. However, successful completion of these services was not necessarily evidence 

that respondent benefited from the services. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 

569 (2012) (indicating that parents must both comply with, and benefit from, services).

The record evidence that respondent did not comply with the parenting requirements of his 

PATPs by benefiting from the services he received is clear and convincing. Kathy Spatafora, a 

clinical psychologist who conducted respondent’s evaluation at the Oakland Circuit Court 

Psychological Clinic for purposes of the best-interest hearing, testified on the basis of information 

available to her that respondent had not benefited from the parenting services that he received. 

Respondent displayed little insight into why the children were removed from his care or of the 

stability and structure needed by his children, two of whom were diagnosed with autism spectrum 

disorder and all with significant physical needs.

In addition, after successful completion of at least two parenting classes and year-long 

participation in the Parent Partner Program, respondent had not demonstrated that he could 

consistently provide the items necessary for parenting time. For example, Garrett Elliott, the 

caseworker to whom the cases were assigned at the time of the termination hearing, testified that 

respondent would bring food that the children could not eat or diapers that were the wrong size, or 

he would forgo routine childcare tasks such as changing diapers. Elliott acknowledged that

respondent did not come to every parenting time unprepared or forgo necessary childcare tasks at 

every visit. However, there were a lot of times when respondent forgot at least one basic necessity. 

Elliott testified that, after parenting services and opportunities to demonstrate that he benefited 

from the services, there was no observable improvement in respondent’s parenting skills. 

Respondent failed to show that he could care for the children longer than one or two hours, and 

even then, he needed assistance. Respondent’s parenting skills never progressed to the point at 

which he could have unsupervised, overnight visits with the children.

Respondent’s ability to demonstrate whatever parenting skills he may have had was 

impeded by his irregular attendance at parenting time. Despite agreeing to be on time for all 

parenting-time visits, testimony at the termination hearing established that respondent attended 

approximately two-thirds of his opportunities for parenting time overall, and his attendance at 

parenting time decreased as the cases progressed. Elliott’s testimony established that respondent 
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attended approximately 76% of his opportunities for parenting time from 2017 until April 2020, 

but from April 2020 until November 2021, he attended only 54% of his parenting-time 

opportunities. Elliot testified that visits were made virtual at respondent’s request, but from 

August 2021 until March or April 2022, respondent attended only three virtual parenting times. 

In-person visits with PPS and FPS were supposed to resume in March 2022, but none of the three 

scheduled visits occurred: two did not occur because respondent failed timely to confirm his 

attendance, and the third did not occur because of a problem with his car’s brake lights.

Respondent argues on appeal that transportation and his work schedule were barriers to his 

consistent participation in parenting time. The record indicates, however, that petitioner provided 

respondent with bus passes and accommodated his request for virtual visits. In addition, there is 

evidence that respondent lost opportunities for parenting time through his own actions, most 

notably, by not timely confirming that he would attend parenting time. Respondent suggests that 

COVID impeded his attendance at parenting time. However, respondent does not make clear how 

COVID impeded his attendance at virtual parenting time, nor does he explain why it prevented 

him from demonstrating—virtually or in person—that he benefited from the parenting services 

that he received. Respondent also contends that petitioner’s alleged failure to offer services that 

accommodated his disability also impacted his consistent participation in parenting time. As 

discussed earlier, respondent has not provided any substantive argument on the deficiencies of the 

services in light of his disability. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 266.

Whether respondent benefited from his parenting services and his attendance at parenting

time were major concerns throughout these proceedings. Respondent was aware of, and agreed 

to, the parenting requirements of the PATPs. The record shows that petitioner repeatedly stressed 

to respondent the importance of timely and regular attendance at parenting time, of bringing the 

necessary supplies, and of actively engaging his children. The record also suggests that respondent 

had one-on-one assistance. The Parent Partner reinforced the PATP requirements, the DHHS 

caseworker and the foster-care mother provided respondent with instructions and aids to help him 

succeed during parenting time, and the parenting-time supervisor and others modeled how to 

interact with the children. Nevertheless, respondent was unable to substantially comply with his

PATPs by regularly attending parenting time and showing that he benefited from parenting classes. 

Tellingly, respondent never demonstrated that he could have unsupervised, overnight parenting 

time with his children. Because respondent’s failure to comply with the terms of his PATP is 

evidence that the children will be harmed if returned to his home, we conclude that the trial court’s 

decision that a ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was proven by clear and 

convincing evidence. See In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich at 356-357.

Having concluded that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provided a statutory ground for the termination of respondent’s parental 

rights, we need not discuss the remaining grounds for termination. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich 

App at 273.

IV. BEST INTERESTS

Lastly, respondent contends the trial court clearly erred by finding that the termination of 

his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We disagree.
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If the trial court finds “that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be 

made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 

NW2d 182 (2013). In making its best-interest determination, a trial court may consider “the child’s 

bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and 

finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Gonzales/Martinez, 

310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court 

may also consider “the parent’s compliance with treatment plans, the child’s well-being in care, 

and the possibility of adoption.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 277. In making a best-interest 

determination, the focus is on the child, not the parent. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 

890 NW2d 676 (2016).

As to the bond between respondent and his children, see In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 

Mich App at 434, Elliott testified that there was no observable bond between respondent and the 

children, and he attributed the lack of a bond largely to respondent not having participated in 

parenting time in a way that would facilitate a parent-child bond. Elliott testified that, at the time 

of the best-interest hearing in March 2022, respondent had not had in-person parenting time with 

PPS and FPS in eight months, and it had been even longer since he had seen PPC in person. 

Respondent asked to have visits by Zoom, but he had had only three Zoom visits in seven or eight 

months.

Similarly, Spatafora concluded from respondent’s lack of consistent contact with the

children and from reports of the children’s behavior that a strong parent-child bond did not exist. 

She observed that respondent seemed to lack insight into the difference between in-person and 

virtual parenting time and how it affected bonding. In addition, the fact that respondent tried to 

see the children only once since September 2021 raised concerns regarding his insight into how 

contact with a child affects the parent-child bond, particularly when it comes to young children 

with special needs.

Testimony regarding parenting time supported Elliott’s and Spatafora’s conclusions that 

there was little to no parent-child bond between respondent and the children. Cotrena Chambliss, 

an Infant Mental Health therapist who worked with PPC and PPS during 2020, testified that

respondent would sit in a chair for the majority of his parenting time; he would hold FPS the whole 

time, but he never had one-on-one time with PPC or PPS. She said that food provided a connection 

between respondent and the children and that she heard respondent tell the children that he loved 

them, but there was no hugging or physical affection, and she saw “a lot of disconnect.” Chambliss 

testified that respondent was often distracted during parenting time by phone calls or, when 

parenting time was virtual, by things happening around him.

As to compliance with the PATPs, see In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 277, respondent

completed parenting classes and substance-abuse counseling, and petitioner’s concerns about 

domestic violence were resolved. However, the record is replete with evidence that, even with the 

help of a Parent Partner and guidance from the caseworker and parenting-time supervisor, 

respondent was unable to demonstrate that he benefited from parenting instruction. Tellingly,

respondent’s parenting time never progressed to unsupervised, overnight visits. Elliott testified 
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that, although respondent clearly loved his children, he had been unable to demonstrate his

capacity to take care of the children on his own.

As to the children’s need for permanency and stability, see In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 

Mich App at 434, testimony at the termination hearing indicated that a lack of stability and 

structure could be detrimental to the children. PPC and FPS were diagnosed with autism spectrum 

disorder, and all three children had cognitive and developmental deficiencies. Wilson testified 

that children with autism spectrum disorder need routine and structure if they are to progress 

developmentally. Spatafora testified that respondent was not able to meet his own needs 

consistently, she did not believe that he could provide the structure and permanence that his 

children needed, and she thought it unlikely that respondent would be able to rectify the current 

barriers to reunification within a reasonable time. Spatafora’s testimony finds support in 

respondent’s spotty attendance at parenting time and his inability to care for the children for more 

than one or two hours without assistance, as well as the fact that, throughout these proceedings, 

respondent was unable to maintain housing in one location for more than seven months.

The advantages of foster home were clear. See id. Elliott testified that the children were 

bonded with the foster parents and called them “mom” and “dad.” The foster-care mother

confirmed this, testifying in addition that the children looked to her and her husband for comfort, 

that the children seemed happy, and that their needs were met. The foster-care mother described 

the spacious house where she lived with her husband, their daughter, and the respondent’s children, 

and said that she took respondent’s children to all their appointments and had a strong support 

system to provide help when needed. Stephanie Wiersma, a special education/early intervention 

teacher who worked with PPS and FPS, testified that the success of the children’s therapy was 

“highly dependent on the parent,” and she could tell from the children’s progress that the foster 

parents had been working with them at home. Respondent’s attorney implied by his questions that 

respondent could get the children to their various therapies if given the chance. Given that

respondent did not consistently attend parenting time, did not consistently call to confirm parenting 

time, did not consistently bring the necessary supplies to parenting time, and did not consistently 

have employment or housing, the suggestion that he might suddenly act contrary to his consistent 

inconsistencies seems unreasonably optimistic.

There was no dispute that the children were doing well in their foster parents’ care. Elliott 

testified that the children were in a safe, stable, appropriate, nonrelative placement where they 

were doing very well, were “extremely bonded” to their foster parents, and were participating in 

services. Elliott further testified that the foster parents arranged their schedules around the 

children’s schedules; were able to care for them financially; and expressed their willingness to 

provide the children, who had been in foster care practically their entire lives, with permanency, 

stability, and finality through adoption.

On the basis of the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding 

that the termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of all three children by 

a preponderance of the evidence. An observable parent-child bond between respondent and his 

children was lacking, and respondent had shown no improvement in his parenting abilities, despite 

receiving numerous services and opportunities for parenting time. The children had been in care 

for most of their lives, and there was no reasonable expectation that respondent could provide them

with the stability and permanence that they needed within a reasonable time. By contrast, evidence 
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established that the children were bonded to the foster parent; that they were thriving in the foster

parents’ care and that their needs were being met; and that the foster parents were willing to 

provide the children with stability, permanence, and finality through adoption. The trial court did 

not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence established a statutory ground for 

termination and that a preponderance of the evidence established that termination was in the 

children’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett