GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1999 D.C. COURTS

Planning and 

Budgeting Difficulties 

During Fiscal Year 

1998

GAO/AIMD/OGC-99-226

Page 1 GAO/AIMD/OGC-99-226 DC Courts

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-283119 Letter

September 16, 1999

The Honorable Ernest J. Istook

Chairman

The Honorable James P. Moran

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on the District of Columbia

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Thomas M. Davis, III

Chairman

Subcommittee on the District of Columbia

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives

On May 18, 1999, we testified before the Subcommittee on the District of 

Columbia, House Committee on Appropriations, regarding the District of 

Columbia Courts’ (DC Courts) financial operations in fiscal year 1998, its 

first year of operations with direct federal funding.1

In our testimony, we reported that DC Courts had experienced difficulties 

in planning and budgeting during this transition year. Our review of DC 

Courts records showed that it had potentially overobligated its resources, 

which could violate the Anti-Deficiency Act. Following our testimony, we 

provided to the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, House 

Committee on Appropriations, a chronology of pertinent events related to 

the DC Courts appropriation and obligations for fiscal year 1998.2

 We also 

reviewed proposed deobligations submitted by DC Courts. This report

(1) supplements our testimony, providing additional detail on our findings, 

and (2) transmits our recommendations to the Congress and DC Courts. 

Our objectives were to address the following questions, which were also 

discussed at the testimony:

1. What were DC Courts obligations for fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998?

1

District of Columbia Courts: Financial Related Issues for Fiscal Year 1998 (GAO/T-AIMD/OGC-99-176).

2

District of Columbia Courts: Chronology of Events Related to DC Courts’ Appropriation and 

Obligations for Fiscal Year 1998 (GAO/AIMD-99-204R, June 7, 1999).

Letr
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2. Did DC Courts have a spending plan for fiscal year 1998 and obligate 

funds in accordance with available resources?

3. Why did DC Courts defer payments to court-appointed attorneys from 

late July 1998 through September 1998, and were those payments made in 

fiscal year 1998 processed in accordance with policies and procedures?

During the course of our review, we also identified an issue regarding DC 

Courts’ authority to spend money from the Crime Victims Fund for the 

Crime Victims Compensation Program.

Results in Brief DC Courts incurred obligations of $115.4 million, $119 million, and $125.6 

million in fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively. Fiscal year 1998 

obligations reflect a different scope of activities than prior year obligations, 

primarily because of changes necessitated by the Revitalization Act of 

1997. These changes included the transfer of a DC Courts function to 

another entity and increased costs of employee benefits during fiscal year 

1998. DC Courts also gave its nonjudicial employees a 7-percent pay raise 

and assumed responsibility for judges’ pension costs as part of its fiscal 

year 1998 appropriation for court operations.

DC Courts did not prepare and execute a budget based on amounts 

appropriated for fiscal year 1998. Records showed that throughout the 

year, DC Courts was aware that its spending was on pace to exceed 

available resources. However, rather than managing within its available 

funds, DC Courts incurred obligations in anticipation of receiving 

additional resources from the Congress and others to cover the difference.

Faced with an impending shortfall in operating funds, DC Courts officials 

deferred payments totaling $5.8 million owed to court-appointed attorneys 

and expert service providers during the last 3 months of fiscal year 1998. 

The Congress transferred $1.7 million in fiscal year 1998 funds to DC 

Courts that was used for deferred court-appointed attorney payments and 

authorized DC Courts to use the fiscal year 1999 appropriation to fund the 

remaining deferred amount of $4.1 million.

As of May 25, 1999, we found that DC Courts fiscal year 1998 obligations 

exceeded available resources by $4.6 million, in violation of the 

Anti-Deficiency Act. This funding shortfall reflected the $4.1 million in 

deferred payments to court-appointed attorneys that should have been 

recorded as fiscal year 1998 obligations and our assessment of 

Letr
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deobligations for fiscal year 1998 submitted by DC Courts. In addition, DC 

Courts treated $773,000 in interest—earned primarily on the bank balances 

from quarterly apportionments of its fiscal year 1998 appropriation—as an 

available budgetary resource for court operations without having 

legislative authority to do so. According to our overall evaluation, 

obligations and available funding for fiscal year 1998 were $125.6 million 

and $121 million, respectively.

In general, DC Courts processed vouchers for court-appointed attorneys 

and expert-service providers in accordance with established policies and 

procedures. However, its policies did not (1) include time frames for 

processing the vouchers and making payments or (2) require that judges 

document decisions to reduce claimed voucher amounts. Further, DC 

Courts did not have procedures for retaining data on vouchers reported as 

lost or missing. These deficiencies are of particular concern given that DC 

Courts became subject to the federal Prompt Payment Act in fiscal year 

1999. Under this act, DC Courts could be required to pay interest on any 

voucher payment made more than 30 days after submission of a proper 

invoice.

In addition, DC Courts did not have the requisite authority to spend funds 

in the Crime Victims Fund account. DC Courts’ records indicated that it 

spent about $1.8 million during fiscal year 1998.

This report includes recommendations to the Congress and DC Courts. In 

response to a draft of this report, DC Courts disagreed with our 

conclusions and the need for implementing three of our recommendations. 

They agreed to seek clarifying legislation to address two of our other 

recommendations. They did not directly address the other 

recommendations. Subsequent to DC Courts’ response, the Conference 

Committee on the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2000 adopted 

provisions that, if enacted, would address four of the recommendations.

Background The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 

(Court Reform Act) transferred jurisdiction over all local judicial matters to 

a unified court system for the District. This entity, known as DC Courts, 

includes

• the Superior Court, which is the trial court with general jurisdiction over 

virtually all local legal matters, including criminal, civil, juvenile, 

domestic relations, probate, and small claims cases, and
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• the Court of Appeals, the highest court of the District of Columbia, 

which reviews all appeals from the Superior Court, as well as decisions 

and orders of D.C. government administrative agencies.

The Court Reform Act provided for the creation of a policy-making body 

for DC Courts, the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration. The Joint 

Committee, comprised of the two chief judges and three associate judges 

elected annually by the judges of the Superior Court and Court of Appeals, 

submits DC Courts’ annual budget requests and is responsible for DC 

Courts’ general personnel policies, accounting and auditing, procurement 

and disbursement, development and coordination of statistical and 

management information systems and reports, and other related 

administrative matters. The Joint Committee appoints the executive 

officer, who manages the day-to-day administrative and financial 

management of the Court System on the Committee’s behalf. The fiscal 

officer, subject to the supervision of the executive officer, is responsible for 

maintaining accounting records and processing payments from the general 

appropriation. 

Impact of the 1997 

Revitalization Act on DC 

Courts

The Revitalization Act3 changed DC Courts’ funding process, nonjudicial 

employee compensation, and functional responsibilities. Under the 

Revitalization Act, the federal government took over certain financial 

responsibilities and roles previously held by DC Courts under the Court 

Reform Act. Some activities became federal government responsibilities, 

while others remained local government activities funded with federal 

dollars.

The Revitalization Act provides for direct federal funding of DC Courts. 

The Joint Committee submits the Courts’ budget request to the Congress 

through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The 

District’s fiscal years 1998 and 1999 appropriation acts contain a federal 

payment to the Joint Committee for operating DC Courts. The 

appropriation acts also require OMB to approve the apportionment of the 

federal payment to the Joint Committee on a quarterly basis for 

expenditures necessary to efficiently execute the functions vested in the 

courts.

3

National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Public Law No. 105-33, 

Title XI, 111 Stat. 712 (1997).
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Judges and nonjudicial employees of DC Courts are treated as federal 

employees solely for the purposes of eligibility in the federal health and life 

insurance and workers’ compensation plans. For nonjudicial employees, 

this eligibility extends to federal retirement plans as well. In fiscal year 

1998, the federal government also assumed responsibility for administering 

the judges’ retirement funds, and the DC Courts assumed responsibility for 

the judges’ pension costs as part of its fiscal year 1998 appropriation. 

The Revitalization Act also transferred the adult probation function from 

DC Courts to a new entity, the District of Columbia Court Services and 

Offender Supervision Agency (COSA),4

 with a requirement that COSA be 

certified as a federal agency by August 5, 2000. In the short term, the COSA 

Trustee, an independent officer of the D.C. government, manages all funds 

and personnel associated with the entity. 

Court-Appointed Attorneys DC Courts appoints and compensates attorneys to represent persons who 

are financially unable to obtain such representation on their own under 

three programs: (1) the Criminal Justice Act program (CJA),5

 (2) the 

Counsel for Child Abuse and Neglect (CCAN) program,6 and (3) the 

Guardianship program.7 Indigent persons who are charged with criminal 

offenses can obtain the assistance of court-appointed attorneys through 

CJA. In family proceedings where child neglect is alleged or where the 

termination of the parent and child relationship is under consideration and 

the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child is indigent, the child and/or 

parent, guardian, or custodian of the child can obtain the assistance of a 

court-appointed attorney through CCAN. The Guardianship program pays 

for the representation and protection of mentally incapacitated individuals 

and minors whose parents are deceased. In addition to legal 

representation, these programs offer indigent persons access to experts to 

provide services such as transcription of court proceedings, expert witness 

4

The Revitalization Act named the new federal agency the Offender Supervision, Defender and Court 

Services Agency, but it was renamed by the District of Columbia Courts and Justice Technical 

Corrections Act of 1998, Public Law No. 105-274, Section 7(c), 112 Stat. 2419, 2426, October 21, 1998.

5

D.C. Criminal Justice Act of 1974, as amended, D.C. Code Ann. Secs. 11-2601 through 11-2608 (1981) 

(1995 Replacement Volume, 1999 Supp.).

6

Neglect Representation Equity Act of 1984, as amended, D.C. Code Ann. Secs. 16-2304, 16-2326.1 (1981) 

(1997 Replacement Volume).

7

D.C. Guardianship Protective Proceedings, and Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1986, as amended, 

D.C. Code Ann. Secs. 21-2001 through 21-2085 (1981) (1997 Replacement Volume).
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testimony, foreign and sign language interpretation, and investigations and 

genetic testing. 

Attorneys and expert-service providers who work on CJA, CCAN and 

Guardianship cases submit vouchers to DC Courts detailing time and 

expenses involved in working on a case. Following an administrative 

review and approval by the presiding judge or hearing commissioner, the 

voucher is forwarded to DC Courts, which prepares a list of payments to be 

made. The list is electronically submitted to the General Services 

Administration (GSA), which prepares and issues checks8

 paid from DC 

Courts’ annual appropriation. During fiscal year 1998, DC Courts paid 

court-appointed attorneys at a rate of $50 per hour and reimbursed them 

for authorized expenses.

Crime Victims 

Compensation Program

A District law established the Crime Victims Compensation Program under 

DC Courts’ jurisdiction before the Congress passed the Revitalization Act. 

The District law (1) identifies fines, fees, and other moneys for DC Courts 

to deposit into a Crime Victims Fund and (2) provides that compensation 

totaling up to $25,000 can be made from the fund to crime victims for 

economic loss. Payments can also be made for shelter, burial costs, or 

medical expenses.

Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) compare DC Courts’ obligations for fiscal years 

1996, 1997, and 1998, (2) determine whether DC Courts had a spending plan 

and obligated funds consistent with available resources in fiscal year 1998, 

and (3) determine why DC Courts deferred payments to court-appointed 

attorneys in fiscal year 1998 and whether payments that were made were 

processed in accordance with policies and procedures. To accomplish our 

objectives, we 

• obtained and reviewed DC Courts’ general ledger account balances and 

other financial information for fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998;

• obtained and analyzed DC Courts’ budget requests, spending plans, and 

details supporting budget documentation for fiscal year 1998;

• obtained and reviewed financial information and correspondence 

between DC Courts, OMB, the Department of Justice, and the Congress;

8

Prior to March 1998, this processing was done through the District’s Financial Management System 

(FMS). 
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• obtained and compared court-appointed attorney payment information 

under CJA and CCAN for fiscal year 1998 and prior fiscal years;9

• reviewed policies and procedures for voucher payment and analyzed 

about 30,000 records in DC Courts’ tracking and payment databases that 

represent fiscal year 1998 payments through July; and

• interviewed the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration; DC Courts’ 

Executive Officer, Fiscal Officer, and Legal Counsel; CJA and CCAN 

program officials; officials in the Financial Operations Division who 

process voucher payments; officials from the Department of Justice, 

OMB, GSA and the COSA Trustee; officials from the District of 

Columbia’s Department of Administrative Services; and court-appointed 

attorneys. 

In order to compare budgeted and obligated amounts, we gathered 

financial information and analyzed obligations and funding resources 

reported by DC Courts. We used DC Courts’ unaudited financial 

information,10 which was compiled from various manual records and 

accounting and financial management systems, and held discussions with 

DC Courts officials to obtain additional clarification.

We did our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards between October 1998 and May 1999. We requested 

comments on a draft of this report from the Joint Committee on Judicial 

Administration in the District of Columbia. The Joint Committee provided 

us with written comments that are discussed in the “DC Courts Comments 

and Our Evaluation” section and are reprinted in appendix I.

Reported Obligations 

for Fiscal Years 1996 

Through 1998

DC Courts’ records indicated that total obligations in fiscal years 1996, 

1997, and 1998 were $115.4 million, $119 million, and $125.6 million, 

respectively. Fiscal year 1998 obligations reflect our adjustments, as 

discussed later, and a different scope of activity than the prior years’ 

obligations. This is primarily due to changes resulting from the 

Revitalization Act of 1997.

9

Our work on court-appointed attorneys focused on those appointed under the CJA and CCAN 

programs. The total payments of approximately $300,000 under the Guardianship program were not 

included since the amount was about 1 percent of the total payments to court-appointed attorneys and 

not deemed material to our review.

10On May 19, 1999, DC Courts awarded a contract to KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, to perform the first 

financial statement audit of its operations. The audit was for the year ended September 30, 1998, as 

required under the Revitalization Act.
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For example, the adult probation function was transferred from DC Courts 

to the District of Columbia Court Services and Offender Supervision 

Agency (COSA) in fiscal year 1998. While DC Courts no longer had 

operational responsibility for the adult probation function, it continued for 

several months to pay salaries and related costs on behalf of the COSA 

Trustee. In March 1998, the Trustee took over the payments for adult 

probation and subsequently reimbursed DC Courts $7.8 million for the 

costs DC Courts paid on the Trustee’s behalf. These costs and the related 

reimbursements were included in DC Courts’ fiscal year 1998 obligations 

and available funds.

Also as a result of the Revitalization Act, nonjudicial employees received 

federal benefits that increased DC Courts obligations for fiscal year 1998. 

DC Courts also assumed responsibility for the judges’ pension costs as part 

of its fiscal year 1998 appropriation for court operations and gave its 

nonjudicial employees a 7-percent pay raise.

DC Courts’ Spending 

Plan and Obligation of 

Funds

Prior to the decision to transfer the adult probation function to a new 

entity, DC Courts had requested $123.5 million to fund its fiscal year 1998 

operations. When DC Courts received $108 million in its fiscal year 1998 

appropriation, it was responsible for developing a spending plan to ensure 

that its obligations did not exceed available resources. However, DC 

Courts did not develop such a plan. It obligated funds throughout the year 

based on its expectation of receiving additional funds. While DC Courts 

received an additional $1.7 million in appropriated funds for the fiscal year, 

it did not receive all of the funding it anticipated. It also received $12.1 

million in grants, interest, and reimbursements, including the $7.8 million 

reimbursement from the COSA Trustee, during the fiscal year.

Letters between DC Courts and OMB during fiscal year 1998 reflect DC 

Courts officials’ expectations of receiving additional resources and OMB’s 

concern that if DC Courts did not lower its rate of spending, its obligations 

would exceed available funds. For example, in an April 1998 letter, OMB 

advised DC Courts that it was incurring obligations at a rate that would 

necessitate a deficiency or supplemental appropriation. For their part, DC 

Courts officials continued to seek additional funds during their discussions 

with the COSA Trustee, the Department of Justice, and OMB.

By the end of the fiscal year, DC Courts’ records showed that obligations 

exceeded available resources by about $350,000 for fiscal year 1998. 

Specifically, its records showed obligations of almost $122.2 million and 
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funds received of about $121.8 million. However, we found that 

adjustments needed to be made to those amounts:

• DC Courts deferred more than $4.1 million of court-appointed attorney 

payments that were eventually made with fiscal year 1999 funds but did 

not record these amounts as fiscal year 1998 obligations. Accordingly, 

we added this amount to DC Courts’ reported fiscal year 1998 

obligations.

• DC Courts treated interest earned primarily from quarterly 

apportionments of its appropriation as available budgetary resources 

for court operations. However, DC Courts did not have authority to 

spend this interest. For this reason, we reduced the amount that DC 

Courts reported as available resources for fiscal year 1998 by $773,000.

At our May 18 testimony, we reported that DC Courts’ recorded obligations 

and available funding for fiscal year 1998 as adjusted were about $126.3 and 

$121 million, respectively, resulting in a potential overobligation of more 

than $5.2 million, in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

Recently, DC Courts officials advised us that some obligations in their fiscal 

year 1998 records needed to be deobligated. DC Courts officials stated that 

these included amounts that the District should not have recorded as 

obligations, as well as amounts for services that were no longer 

anticipated. In May 1999, we evaluated more than $500,000 of the proposed 

$1 million in deobligations and determined that almost $200,000 

represented obligations for fiscal year 1998 that were still valid. For 

example, in three cases, these amounts represented contracted services 

that had been rendered during fiscal year 1998 for which the contractor had 

not yet billed DC Courts. In addition, we identified almost $200,000 of 

unrecorded fiscal year 1998 obligations. These changes reduced DC 

Courts’ overobligation for fiscal year 1998 by approximately $600,000, to 

about $4.6 million.

Adjustments to Fiscal Year 

1998 Obligations and 

Resources

We found that DC Courts needed to increase its reported fiscal year 1998 

obligations by more than $4.1 million to account for court-appointed 

attorney payments that had been deferred during fiscal year 1998 and not 

recorded as fiscal year 1998 obligations. DC Courts eventually made these 

payments with fiscal year 1999 funds as authorized by the District of 

Columbia Appropriations Act of 1999. However, this did not convert the 

deferred payments from fiscal year 1998 obligations to fiscal year 1999 

obligations.
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We also found that DC Courts needed to decrease its fiscal year 1998 

budgetary resources because it had treated $773,000 of fiscal year 1998 

interest income as an available budgetary resource for court operations 

without having explicit legislative authority to do so. DC Courts earned the 

interest primarily as a result of depositing quarterly apportionments of its 

appropriation for court operations in interest bearing accounts. 11 The 

District of Columbia Home Rule Act provides that no amount may be 

obligated or expended by a District government officer or employee unless 

the amount has been approved by an act of Congress and then only 

according to that act. Also, the Revitalization Act amended the Home Rule 

Act to expressly provide that moneys12 received by DC Courts be deposited 

in the U.S. Treasury or the Crime Victims Fund. 13 These statutory 

provisions support the general proposition that when the Congress 

appropriates funds for DC Courts, it establishes an authorized program 

level beyond which DC Courts may not operate. Accordingly, DC Courts 

may not augment its appropriation without specific statutory authority to 

do so.

The Home Rule Act provisions are clear and comprehensive. The 

provisions apply to all amounts and moneys received by DC Courts, and 

they are overcome only by the Congress granting the specific authority 

needed. We are unaware of any statute that authorizes DC Courts to retain 

and spend interest earned on appropriations for court operations. Further, 

it undermines the Home Rule Act provisions and the general proposition 

they support to infer that when Congress required the Treasury to quarterly 

pay apportioned amounts to DC Courts, the Congress also authorized DC 

Courts to retain and spend the interest it earns. Accordingly, DC Courts 

was not authorized to retain or use this interest income and should have 

remitted it to the U.S. Treasury.

Anti-Deficiency Act By combining the adjustments described above with DC Courts’ reported 

obligation balances, we determined that DC Courts had overobligated its 

budgetary resources by $4.6 million. The Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits 

District government officers and federal officials from making

11For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, the District of Columbia Appropriations Acts required the Treasury of 

the United States to pay appropriations quarterly to the DC Courts based on quarterly apportionments 

approved by OMB.

12These generally refer to funds received from nonfederal sources, such as fines and fees.

13Section 450 of the Home Rule Act, as amended.
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(1) obligations or expenditures in excess of amounts available in an 

appropriation or fund unless they are otherwise authorized to do so by law 

and (2) an obligation or expenditure in excess of an apportionment. 

Apportionments at increments throughout a fiscal year are intended to 

prevent obligations and expenditures at a rate indicating a necessity for a 

deficiency or supplemental appropriation. To the extent DC Courts 

overobligated its budgetary resources for fiscal year 1998, the 

overobligations violated the Anti-Deficiency Act.

Anti-Deficiency Act provisions constitute some of the fundamental 

financial management requirements for federal and District government 

activities subject to the congressional budget process.14 The act’s purpose 

is to ensure that agencies or activities funded by annual appropriations 

manage their affairs so as not to exhaust their appropriations before the 

end of the fiscal year and require additional funding for their annual 

operations. OMB and we have stated that officers or employees of the 

federal government subject to the Anti-Deficiency Act may not incur 

obligations against anticipated receipts, including supplemental 

appropriations requested but not yet enacted,15 because such receipts may 

not be realized. For example, the Congress may not enact a supplemental 

appropriation in the amount requested by an agency. 16 The official having 

administrative control of the appropriation is required to establish 

regulations to ensure compliance with the Anti-Deficiency Act and to 

identify the reasons for any obligation or expenditure exceeding an 

apportionment.

The Anti-Deficiency Act requires the head of an agency to report 

immediately to the President and the Congress any violation of the act 

including all relevant facts and a statement of actions taken. OMB Circular 

A-34, Instructions on Budget Execution, provides additional guidance on 

information that the agency is to include in its report to the President. 

OMB instructs agencies to include the primary reason or cause for the 

overobligation, any extenuating circumstances, the adequacy of the system 

1431 U.S.C. secs. 1341, 1342, 1349-1351, 1511-1519 (1994).

15B-230117-O.M., February 8, 1989, and OMB Circular No. A-34, sec. 21.4 (Rev., Nov. 7, 1997).

16OMB has made it clear that even in situations where OMB approves an apportionment request that 

would indicate the necessity for a supplemental or deficiency appropriation, it does not authorize the 

agency to exceed available resources. While an agency is required to submit a fully justified request for 

supplemental funding accompanying the deficiency apportionment request, OMB’s approval of such an 

apportionment request does not commit OMB to recommend that amount to the President or transmit 

that amount to Congress. OMB Cir. No. A-34, sec. 33.2 (Rev., Nov. 7, 1997).
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providing administrative control of funds, any changes necessary to ensure 

compliance with the Anti-Deficiency Act, and steps taken to prevent a 

recurrence of the same type of violation.

Violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act are generally the result of agencies 

incurring obligations of a discretionary nature in excess of available 

funding. An overobligation does not violate the Anti-Deficiency Act if it is, 

in the language of the act, otherwise authorized by law. However, no law 

explicitly authorized DC Courts to incur fiscal year 1998 obligations in 

excess of available resources. The argument that obligations for attorneys’ 

fees in excess of available resources are “otherwise authorized by law” 

finds support on the grounds that these obligations are mandatory in 

nature. When a law establishes an appropriation or fund for the sole 

purpose of paying obligations of a mandatory nature, obligations in excess 

of available funding are not generally viewed as being in violation of the 

requirements of the Anti-Deficiency Act.17

While the obligations for court-appointed attorneys might reasonably be 

viewed to be of a mandatory nature, the critical issue for applying the 

Anti-Deficiency Act in this case is whether the overobligations were 

entirely attributable to the mandatory obligations for court-appointed 

attorneys and consequently authorized by law. This task is complicated by 

the fact that court-appointed attorney programs are financed as part of the 

general appropriation for court operations. Under these circumstances, 

DC Courts should have considered the impact that the mandatory aspect of 

the program would have on the appropriation and managed the residual 

amounts prudently so that total obligations did not exceed the total amount 

appropriated. In other words, having funds for mandatory activities 

included in a lump sum appropriation available for discretionary activities 

did not relieve DC Courts of its responsibility to manage discretionary 

spending to avoid exceeding available resources and violating the 

Anti-Deficiency Act.18

While DC Courts’ overobligation of an appropriation that funds both 

mandatory and discretionary programs may not necessarily constitute an 

17See 65 Comp. Gen. 4 (1985).

18“District officials must supervise and manage the District’s financial transactions to insure that 

appropriations are not exceeded and the requirements of the Anti-Deficiency Act are met.” B-262069, 

August 1, 1995 (the District would violate the Anti-Deficiency Act if its discretionary decisions on the 

Medicaid and Aid to Families with Dependent Children programs led to overobligating its lump sum 

appropriation for Human Support Services).
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Anti-Deficiency Act violation, it at least creates a presumption of such a 

violation. To avoid violating the Anti-Deficiency Act, DC Courts would 

have to show that it took all reasonable steps to manage the account within 

the amounts appropriated and that any obligations in excess of available 

resources resulted from constitutional or statutory requirements.19 To 

support this argument, the burden is on DC Courts to provide evidence of 

unanticipated mandatory spending and efforts undertaken to cut 

discretionary spending.

The actions of DC Courts during fiscal year 1998 do not demonstrate that 

the overobligation of the fiscal year 1998 account resulted from obligations 

that were beyond its control. For example, the $4.1 million in payments for 

court-appointed attorneys clearly was not deferred because it was 

unexpected—the fiscal year 1998 obligations for court-appointed attorneys 

were similar to those in fiscal year 1997 and the estimates for fiscal year 

1998. Also, DC Courts granted a discretionary pay raise20 that took effect 

after the fiscal year 1998 appropriation was enacted into law even though 

the appropriation was more than $15 million less than the amount DC 

Courts initially requested. Finally, DC Courts did not base its spending 

during most of fiscal year 1998 on the appropriation it received.

DC Courts officials have stated that they did not violate the Anti-Deficiency 

Act because a provision in the fiscal year 1999 appropriation act authorized 

DC Courts to make court-appointed attorney payments that had been 

deferred from fiscal year 1998. The DC Courts’ view is that this provision 

authorized the deferral of these payments in fiscal year 1998 and allowed 

DC Courts to use fiscal year 1999 funds to liquidate these obligations, all 

without violating the Anti-Deficiency Act as long as DC Courts paid all 

fiscal year 1998 overobligations in accordance with the fiscal year 1999 

appropriation act. We disagree with this view. The provision in the fiscal 

year 1999 appropriation act merely authorizes DC Courts to use fiscal year 

1999 funds to pay obligations incurred in fiscal year 1998 and prior years 

for court-appointed attorneys. The fiscal year 1999 appropriation act had 

not been enacted when DC Courts deferred payments to court-appointed 

19B-262069, August 1, 1995.

20On November 13, 1997, the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration approved comparability of the 

DC Courts compensation schedule with the federal court’s schedule for nonjudicial employees, to be 

achieved over a 2 fiscal-year period, provided adequate funding was appropriated. The first salary 

adjustment of 7 percent became effective December 7, 1997, at a reported cost of almost $2.8 million 

for fiscal year 1998.
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attorneys and, according to its records, overobligated fiscal year 1998 

appropriations.

The Congress has long recognized that the timing of payments for 

court-appointed attorneys is not predictable and that claims attributable to 

a fiscal year may be submitted or approved after the end of the fiscal year 

when funds are no longer available. The provision in the fiscal year 1999 

appropriation act addresses this problem by making fiscal year 1999 funds 

available for such payments without regard to when the obligations were 

incurred. It does not, as DC Courts suggested to us, authorize DC Courts to 

defer paying obligations already identified and ready for payment.

Further, if such a position were to prevail, it would undermine 

congressional control of DC Courts’ appropriation. DC Courts has 

identified no limitations as a matter of law to its position that the provision 

is available whenever DC Courts’ costs exceed resources, as long as only 

costs for court-appointed attorneys are deferred. This position, if accepted, 

would allow DC Courts to respond to dissatisfaction with its appropriation 

by deferring court-appointed attorney payments at any time or in any 

amount throughout a fiscal year. This could lead to spending for court 

operations in excess of what the Congress intended and shift significant 

costs for court-appointed attorneys to the next fiscal year, all without 

violating the Anti-Deficiency Act. The language and purpose of the 

provision in the fiscal year 1999 appropriation act and the Anti-Deficiency 

Act support no such interpretation.

To ensure that in the future appropriated funds intended for 

court-appointed attorneys are not used for other purposes, the Congress 

could make a separate appropriation to DC Courts for payments to 

court-appointed attorneys. This appropriation could be similar to that 

provided to federal courts each year to fund payments to court-appointed 

attorneys, in which funds remain available until expended.

Payments to 

Court-Appointed 

Attorneys

Throughout fiscal year 1998, it was clear that unless DC Courts modified its 

spending or received additional funds, it was facing a shortfall. By the third 

quarter, when DC Courts had not received the additional funds it 

anticipated, there were limited options available for addressing the 

projected shortfall. DC Courts officials considered furloughing employees 

and closing the courts for a period of time during the summer, as well as 

deferring court-appointed attorney and expert service provider payments. 

In May 1998, OMB officials advised DC Courts to reduce nonpersonnel 
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costs instead of furloughing employees or closing the courts to avoid an 

Anti-Deficiency Act violation. On July 24, 1998, DC Courts began deferring 

payments for court-appointed attorneys for the remainder of the fiscal year, 

and it eventually used fiscal year 1999 appropriations to pay most of those 

amounts. As part of its budget request, DC Courts had estimated $31.6 

million for payments to court-appointed attorneys in fiscal year 1998, an 

amount that was similar to that in the previous year. As of July 1998, DC 

Courts had expended $25.8 million on court-appointed attorney payments.

Voucher Processing 

Procedures

We found that DC Courts processed voucher payments for court-appointed 

attorneys in accordance with its policies and procedures. However, these 

procedures did not address certain matters that were important to proper 

disposition of voucher claims, including

• time frames for making such payments, 

• procedures for maintaining data on vouchers reported as missing, and 

• procedures for notifying attorneys and expert-service providers when 

voucher amounts claimed were reduced.

Time Frames for Voucher 

Payments

For fiscal year 1998, DC Courts was not subject to the federal Prompt 

Payment Act or the District Quick Payment Act. However, the District’s 

fiscal year 1999 appropriation21 subjected DC Courts to the requirements of 

the federal Prompt Payment Act. Under the act, an entity that fails to pay 

promptly for goods and services accepted as satisfactory may be required 

to pay interest on amounts owed.

For fiscal year 1998, we analyzed payment timing from two different 

perspectives. First, we looked at the number of days from the vouchers 

first being submitted by the attorney or expert provider to the payment 

being made. Second, we looked at the number of days from the presiding 

judge or hearing commissioner approving the voucher for payment to the 

payment being made. Our analysis of DC Superior Courts’ fiscal year 1998

21Public Law No. 105-277, sec. 162, 112 Stat. 2681-148 (Oct. 21, 1998).
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paid voucher data22 through July 1998 showed that 48 percent of these 

vouchers were paid within 30 days of being submitted. Ninety-four percent 

of the vouchers for court-appointed attorneys and expert service providers 

were paid within 30 days of the presiding judge’s or hearing commissioner’s 

approval.

We also reviewed DC Courts’ implementation of the Prompt Payment Act in 

fiscal year 1999 as it applies to paying court-appointed attorneys. The 

purpose of the act is to encourage agencies to pay bills in a timely manner. 

If an agency fails to pay a bill by the “required payment date,” interest 

begins to accrue. Except for situations not relevant here, the required 

payment date under the act is 30 days after receipt of a “proper invoice.”23 

The Prompt Payment Act defines a proper invoice as one that contains or is 

accompanied by substantiating documentation required by regulation or 

contract that is necessary to permit the agency to approve the bill.24

On December 10, 1998, the Chief Judge of the Superior Court issued a 

memorandum to all judges and hearing commissioners stating that with 

regard to vouchers for CJA and CCAN payments, it had been determined 

that the date DC Courts receives a proper invoice is the date the 

authorizing judge or hearing commissioner approves the voucher. The 

Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association has raised concerns over this 

determination. We share their concern because if a proper invoice is 

“received” only when it is approved, DC Courts could avoid incurring 

interest on vouchers simply because the judge or hearing commissioner 

has not reviewed them. We understand that this matter is currently under 

discussion between DC Courts and the Superior Court Trial Lawyers 

Association.

As of June 1999, DC Courts did not have a mechanism for tracking 

vouchers from acceptance to due date to ensure that they were processed 

and paid in time and to avoid interest penalties. Further, the absence of 

policies or procedures for retaining data on the number of vouchers 

22To perform our analysis on the timeliness of voucher processing, we used data DC Courts merged 

from databases in its voucher tracking and voucher payment systems. Court of Appeal cases and 

vouchers for court transcribers are not tracked in the voucher tracking system. Therefore, they are not 

a part of this analysis. We excluded some records because of missing or erroneous data in data fields. 

DC Courts was unable to explain completely the reasons for the missing or erroneous data.

2331 U.S.C. 3902 (b), 3903 (a) (1) (B) (1994).

2431 U.S.C. 3901 (a) (3) (1994).
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reported as missing or the disposition of such vouchers created additional 

concern that a significant number of vouchers would not be paid until after 

the due date.

Lost or Missing Vouchers Prior to and during our review, court-appointed attorneys claimed that filed 

vouchers were sometimes lost and had to be refiled. The DC Courts 

accounting manager responsible for voucher processing and payment 

estimated that out of over 4,000 vouchers processed each month, about

50 vouchers were reported as missing. However, the accounting manager 

did not have any specific information. The underlying causes of this 

problem could not be explained. 

We noted that procedures in effect presented opportunities for vouchers to 

be misplaced or lost at two different stages during voucher processing. DC 

Courts date-stamps each voucher when it is received but does not maintain 

a log of these submissions. Further, DC Courts does not input voucher data 

into its tracking system until the voucher is audited for accuracy, a process 

that, according to the accounting manager, takes about 8 working days. 

Without logging in all vouchers upon receipt or immediately entering 

voucher data into the tracking system, DC Courts cannot ensure complete 

accountability for all vouchers. This increases the risk that vouchers lost 

or misplaced at this stage will not be recovered.

After a voucher is audited for accuracy, it is forwarded to the presiding 

judge or hearing commissioner for approval. Although DC Courts’ voucher 

tracking system identifies the date of specific events, vouchers are 

hand-delivered to and from the judges’ chambers, presenting additional 

opportunities for vouchers to be misplaced or lost.

Reduction of Voucher 

Amounts

During the final review of vouchers, the judge or hearing commissioner has 

the authority to reduce the amount of the voucher if he or she determines 

that some of the attorney’s or provider’s hours or expenses should be 

disallowed. DC Courts did not have procedures covering how judges or 

hearing commissioners were to document such decisions to the attorney or 

provider. However, DC Courts officials stated that this information was 

available to attorneys who requested it.

Our analysis of fiscal year 1998 paid voucher data showed that judges or 

hearing commissioners reduced voucher amounts in 9 percent of the cases, 

more than half of which involved reductions of $100 or less.
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Crime Victims 

Compensation 

Program

During our review, we identified a matter that, while not affecting DC 

Courts’ use of its fiscal year 1998 appropriation for court operations, needs 

to be addressed to provide DC Courts the requisite authority to make 

payments out of its Crime Victims Fund. A District law established the 

Crime Victims Compensation Program under DC Courts jurisdiction prior 

to the enactment of the Revitalization Act.25 The District law provides that 

the fund may be credited with (1) appropriations made to it, (2) fines 

assessed on persons convicted of serious traffic or misdemeanor offenses, 

or persons convicted or pleading guilty or no contest to felony offenses,

(3) amounts recovered by the District from offenders or third parties by 

subrogation to the victim’s rights as a result of payments of claims to 

victims, (4) repayments of overpayments or false claims payments from 

claimants, and (5) amounts received from any source, including grants 

from the federal government, for the purpose of the fund. The District law 

provides that compensation totaling up to $25,000 from the fund can be 

made to crime victims for economic loss. Payments can also be made for 

shelter, burial costs, or medical expenses. DC Courts’ records indicated 

that about $1.5 million in such payments plus almost $300,000 of 

administrative cost payments were made during fiscal year 1998 and that 

the balance of the fund at September 30, 1998, was about $6.8 million.

While the Revitalization Act amendment to the Home Rule Act supports the 

authority of DC Courts to deposit the fines, fees, and other money 

identified in the District law to the Crime Victims Fund, the Revitalization 

Act makes no mention of spending amounts deposited to the fund. Further, 

nothing in the language of the District’s fiscal years 1998 or 1999 

appropriation acts appropriates amounts from the Crime Victims Fund. 

Finally, we have not identified any other federal law authorizing payments 

from the fund. The District of Columbia Home Rule Act26 states that no 

officer or employee of the District of Columbia government may obligate or 

spend an amount unless it is approved by an act of the Congress and then 

only according to that act. Accordingly, we conclude that DC Courts did 

not have the requisite legislative authority to make payments from the 

fund.

25The Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act of 1996, D.C. Law 11-243, 44 DCR 1142, 2601 (April 9, 

1997), D.C. Code Ann. Secs. 3-421 through 3-438 (1998 Supp.).

26Section 446 of the Home Rule Act, as amended.
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Conclusions DC Courts experienced difficulties in planning and budgeting in fiscal year 

1998, its first year of operations with direct federal funding. In a transition 

year in which DC Courts underwent changes to its functions and 

responsibilities, DC Courts’ management did not properly execute its 

responsibility to operate within available resources. Appropriate 

recognition of obligations incurred and resources available and compliance 

with federal laws and guidelines addressing its financial management are 

crucial to improving DC Courts’ performance in this area. In addition, DC 

Courts did not have complete information in its voucher tracking system to 

ensure that all submitted vouchers were promptly tracked, processed, and 

paid. Revised procedures in this area and improvements to its voucher 

tracking system could improve DC Courts’ timeliness in making voucher 

payments and reduce the incidence of missing vouchers. Improvement in 

these areas has become critical in fiscal year 1999, now that DC Courts is 

subject to the federal Prompt Payment Act and may be required to pay 

interest on payments made more than 30 days after receipt of a proper 

invoice.

Recommendations to 

the Congress

If the Congress continues to require the U.S. Treasury to pay quarterly 

apportionments to DC Courts, we recommend that the Congress consider 

authorizing DC Courts to retain the interest earned and requiring DC 

Courts to include estimated interest in its annual budget request. This 

would alleviate the need for DC Courts and U.S. Treasury to process 

interest repayments to U.S. Treasury.

If the Congress wishes to ensure that appropriated funds intended for 

payment of court-appointed attorneys are not used for other purposes, we 

recommend that the Congress consider making a separate appropriation to 

DC Courts for payments to court-appointed attorneys.

Recommendations to 

DC Courts

We recommend that the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration

• perform all necessary investigation and reporting under the 

Anti-Deficiency Act related to DC Courts’ overobligation of its fiscal 

year 1998 appropriation, 

• transfer to the U.S. Treasury all interest earned on appropriated funds or 

seek legislative relief from repaying the interest that was improperly 

retained, 
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• issue guidance providing that interest is to be paid when vouchers 

containing or accompanied by all required substantiating 

documentation are not paid by the required payment date,

• establish procedures that require all vouchers to be logged and tracked 

immediately upon receipt, and

• seek legislation authorizing DC Courts to use the Crime Victims Fund to 

pay eligible claims under the Crime Victims Compensation Program.

DC Courts’ Comments 

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of the report, DC Courts disagreed with our 

findings concerning

• its violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act in fiscal year 1998 and

• its use of interest earned on its appropriation as a resource to fund court 

operations.

In addition, DC Courts disagreed with our conclusions and the need for 

implementing three of our recommendations. They agreed to seek 

clarifying legislation to address two of our other recommendations. DC 

Courts did provide technical comments which we have incorporated as 

appropriate but have not reproduced in our report.

In several meetings with us and in a written statement submitted to us in 

May 1999, DC Courts stated that it disagreed with the legal basis for our 

conclusion that DC Courts violated the Anti-Deficiency Act by 

overobligating its budgetary resources by approximately $4.6 million in 

fiscal year 1998.27 We considered DC Courts’ position in preparing the draft 

of this report. In summarizing its position in its comments on our draft, DC 

Courts stated two principal reasons why its actions were in conformity 

with the Anti-Deficiency Act.

First, DC Courts asserted that because it has the authority to defer attorney 

payments under its appropriation act, its actions constitute an exception to 

the Anti-Deficiency Act. As discussed in detail in this report, we disagreed 

with DC Courts’ position. We stated that the appropriation act provides 

authority to use current funds to pay prior year obligations and not the 

27In our testimony on May 18, 1999, we reported that the amount of the potential overobligation was 

$5.2 million. Subsequent to our testimony, DC Courts provided us with proposed deobligations for 

fiscal year 1998. We reviewed the proposed deobligations in May 1999 and, as a result, revised the 

amount of DC Courts’ overobligation for fiscal year 1998 to about $4.6 million.
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authority to decide to defer paying obligations already identified and ready 

for payment. The Congress’ granting of this authority in the fiscal year 1999 

appropriation act (and prior years’ acts) addressed the difficulty of 

attorney claims being submitted and approved in one fiscal year for 

services rendered in prior fiscal years and, therefore, being obligations 

chargeable to the prior fiscal years. This authority in the appropriation act 

is significant because without it, the fiscal year 1999 funds would not have 

been available to pay prior year obligations. DC Courts’ comments do not 

address this basic tenet of appropriations law but rather commingle the 

separate issues of whether DC Courts may (1) overobligate its fiscal year 

1998 appropriation to the extent of its attorney payments and (2) use its 

fiscal year 1999 appropriation to pay claims attributable to prior years.

Furthermore, we observed that DC Courts’ position establishes no limits as 

a matter of law and would undermine congressional control. DC Courts 

characterizes the appropriation as providing authority to defer attorney 

payments from one year to the next only when confronted with 

extraordinary circumstances. However, it offers no statutory basis for 

limiting the asserted authority only to extraordinary circumstances. As 

discussed in our report, DC Courts is authorized to obligate funds for 

court-appointed attorneys in excess of available resources without 

violating the Anti-Deficiency Act if overobligations are solely attributable 

to mandatory spending as evidenced by (1) unanticipated spending for 

attorneys and (2) reductions in discretionary spending designed to keep 

total obligations within total resources. This authority is very different 

than the authority to defer attorney payments from one year to the next and 

spend the “saved” attorney payments on court operations that DC Courts 

attempts to read into the appropriation act.

Second, DC Courts asserts that the Anti-Deficiency Act allows for a 

deficiency or supplemental request for appropriations where (1) the 

enactment of new laws after budget requests are submitted to the Congress 

results in increased costs or (2) the government’s continuation of essential 

functions for the safety of human life or the protection of property is 

required. DC Courts refers to 31 U.S.C. 1515 (b)(1)(A) and (B), a provision 

of the Anti-Deficiency Act. However, DC Courts’ reliance on this provision 

is misplaced. Section 1515 is not an exception to the Anti-Deficiency Act’s 

basic prohibition of obligating or spending in excess of or in advance of an 

appropriation. Rather, section 1515 is a statutory exception only to the 

general apportionment rule in 31 U.S.C. 1512, which prohibits apportioning 

funds at a rate indicating a deficiency or a need for a supplemental 

appropriation. This distinction is discussed in II GAO, Principles of Federal 
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Appropriations Law (GAO/OGC 92-13, December 1992, pp. 6-80 through 

6-83). Further, OMB Circular A-34, sec. 33.2 (Rev. Nov. 7, 1997) makes clear 

that an apportionment indicating a deficiency or a need for supplemental 

appropriation does not guarantee the agency that OMB, the President, or 

the Congress will support the agency’s request for supplemental funding. 

Even if DC Courts had met the conditions in section 1515(b) and received 

an apportionment indicating a need for supplemental funding, section 1515 

provides no legal basis for DC Courts to obligate funds in excess of the 

amount appropriated.28

One of the themes running through DC Courts’ comments is that DC Courts 

received inadequate funding and had limited options available for spending 

reductions. DC Courts asserts that our report needs more information on 

this matter because such information would make the report more 

complete and accurate and lead to different legal conclusions. In general, 

DC Courts’ comments about the Revitalization Act, as well as its dealings 

with the Congress, OMB, and other executive branch entities over the 

funding it believes it should have received for fiscal year 1998, may be 

among the factors DC Courts could offer as extenuating circumstances that 

resulted in its violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. However, none of the 

additional information DC Courts has offered affects our legal analysis of 

DC Courts’ Anti-Deficiency Act violation. In this regard, DC Courts 

commented that our report “overstates the very limited relevance of a 

modest pay increase.” However, we found that the discretionary pay raise 

was almost $3 million, or about 65 percent of DC Courts’ $4.6 million 

overobligation of its resources in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. 29

DC Courts also disagreed with our conclusion that it lacked the authority to 

retain and spend interest earned on the federal funds appropriated for 

28DC Courts’ reference to 31 U.S.C. 1515 is also misplaced for factual reasons. After passage of the 

Revitalization Act and before enactment of the District’s fiscal year 1998 appropriation act, the 

President submitted a revised budget request to the Congress that reflected the Revitalization Act’s 

changes. Accordingly, a request for supplemental funding under section 1515(b)(1)(A) could not be 

based on the Congress having passed a law affecting DC Courts after having received a budget request 

for DC Courts. Further, while DC Courts may have had funding difficulties in fiscal year 1998, those 

difficulties did not result, as section 1515(b)(1)(B) requires, from an “emergency.” Finally, when OMB’s 

last apportionment for the year to DC Courts was made in April 1998, OMB warned DC Courts that it 

needed to reduce its rate of spending to avoid violating the Anti-Deficiency Act.

29Our central point regarding the pay raise is that it represents discretionary spending that could have 

been postponed or eliminated. This is supported by the effective date of the pay raise, which was 

“subject to sufficient funds being available,” and which was awarded after DC Courts knew that the 

Congress had authorized an appropriation for fiscal year 1998 that was over $15 million less than the 

amount requested.
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court operations. As discussed in the report, our conclusion is based on 

the language of the Home Rule Act and the Revitalization Act consistent 

with basic principles of federal appropriations law. In contrast, DC Courts 

asserts that it may infer the authority to retain and spend the interest 

because the Congress “remained silent on the matter of interest” even 

though the Congress required the Department of the Treasury to make 

quarterly payments to DC Courts, and it was inevitable that DC Courts 

would deposit the payments in an interest-bearing account. DC Courts’ 

view is contrary to the fundamental principle of appropriation law that 

prohibits an agency from augmenting its appropriation from other sources 

unless specifically authorized by law. Because nothing in the language of 

any act, or even legislative history, indicates that the Congress wanted DC 

Courts to retain and spend interest earned on fiscal year 1998 

appropriations, we find no basis to impute to the Congress a grant of 

authority that overrides limitations found in law and grounded in principles 

of appropriations law. Accordingly, as discussed in this report, the interest 

should have been deposited to Treasury, as required by section 450 of the 

Home Rule Act as amended by the Revitalization Act.

During our review, we requested documentation from DC Courts regarding 

its preparation and execution of a spending plan tied to its fiscal year 1998 

appropriation. We found that when DC Courts received an appropriation 

that was over $15 million less than it requested, it did not take immediate 

steps to cut planned spending to reflect the actual level of funding but 

rather proceeded with a discretionary pay raise and continued to spend at a 

rate that would necessitate a deficiency or a supplemental appropriation. 

Other than not filling vacant positions (which, according to DC Courts, cut 

almost $3 million in operational costs), DC Courts did not propose the 

necessary spending cuts until the third quarter of the fiscal year and only 

after requests for supplemental funding did not materialize. At that point, 

as DC Courts officials pointed out, their options to make spending cuts 

were limited.

DC Courts took exception to our discussion of the Prompt Payment Act in 

relation to its processing of payment vouchers because, as we noted in our 

report, DC Courts was not subject to the Prompt Payment Act until fiscal 

year 1999. We found it useful to refer to the Prompt Payment Act because 

in the absence of any legal requirements to make timely payments, it 

provided a recognized standard and DC Courts payments were made 

subject to the Prompt Payment Act beginning in fiscal year 1999. 
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DC Courts also stated that our report did not accurately characterize the 

nature of communications between DC Courts and both OMB and 

Members of Congress. However, this report and our previously issued 

testimony and chronology of events30 fairly reflect all the relevant and 

critical documentation DC Courts provided to us. DC Courts did not 

include new or additional information in its comments that affects our legal 

positions and conclusions.

Subsequent 

Congressional Actions

Following the receipt of comments from DC Courts on a draft of this report 

and discussion of our recommendations with the House and Senate staff of 

the oversight and appropriations committees, the Conference Committee 

reported H.R. 2587, the District of Columbia appropriations bill for fiscal 

year 2000, on August 5, 1999.31 If enacted as reported by the Conference 

Committee, H.R. 2587 would address four of our recommendations as 

follows:

• It addresses the recommendation that the Congress consider 

authorizing DC Courts to retain interest earnings and reflect estimated 

interest in its budget requests if the Congress continues to require the 

U.S. Treasury to pay quarterly apportionments to DC Courts. The 

proposed language eliminates the requirement that the U.S. Treasury 

pay the apportionments quarterly to DC Courts and requires all amounts 

to be quarterly apportioned by OMB, obligated, and expended in the 

same manner as funds appropriated to other federal agencies.32 Thus, 

federal funds will remain with the Treasury until needed for authorized 

DC Courts activities, and disbursements for these authorized activities 

will be made directly from the Treasury. This change would eliminate 

the need for an interest-bearing bank account to handle the federal 

payment to DC Courts.

• It addresses the recommendation that the Congress consider making a 

separate appropriation to DC Courts for payments to court-appointed 

attorneys. The proposed language establishes a separate federal 

payment for “Defender Services in the District of Columbia Courts,” 

specifically for making payments to court-appointed attorneys under the 

30District of Columbia Courts: Chronology of Events Associated with DC Courts’ Financial-Related 

Issues for Fiscal Year 1998 (GAO/AIMD-99-204R, June 7, 1999).

31H.R. Rep. 106-299.

32H.R. Rep. 106-299, at 3.
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CJA, CCAN, and Guardianship programs, and requires that payroll and 

financial services be provided by GSA, which must submit monthly 

reports to the President and specific committees.33

• It addresses the recommendation that DC Courts pay the Treasury the 

interest already earned on prior federal payments. H.R. 2587 would 

authorize DC Courts to use up to $1.2 million of interest earned on the 

fiscal year 1999 federal payment to make certain payments to courtappointed attorneys for indigents.34 Our recommendation that DC 

Courts pay the Treasury interest earned on the fiscal year 1998 federal 

payment remains unaffected.

• It addresses the recommendation that DC Courts request legislative 

authority to spend money in the Crime Victims Fund. Section 160(b)(1) 

of H.R. 2587 would authorize DC Courts to spend moneys properly 

deposited in the Crime Victims Fund for purposes authorized by the 

Crime Victims Act, as amended. In addition, section 160(e) of H.R. 2587 

would ratify any payments made from the Crime Victims Fund on or 

after April 9, 1997, to the extent the amounts are authorized under the 

Crime Victims Compensation Act of 1996, as amended.

We are sending copies of this letter to Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, 

Chairwoman, Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, Senate 

Committee on Appropriations; Senator Richard Durbin, Ranking Minority 

Member, Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on 

Appropriations, and Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Senate 

Committee on Governmental Affairs; Senator George Voinovich, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on 

Governmental Affairs; and Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, 

House Committee on Government Reform. We are also sending copies to 

the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration, DC Courts, through the 

Honorable Annice Wagner, Chair; the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, 

Office of Management and Budget; and Grace Mastelli, Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, Department of Justice. Copies will be made available to 

others upon request.

33H.R. Rep. 106-299 at 3-4.

34H.R. Rep. 106-299 at 3-4.
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If you have any questions, please contact me or Steven Haughton at (202) 

512-4476. Key contributors to this assignment were Marcia Washington, 

Lou Fernheimer, Jeffrey Jacobson, and Richard Cambosos.

Gloria L. Jarmon

Director, Health, Education, & Human Services

 Accounting and Financial Management Issues
Page 27 GAO/AIMD/OGC-99-226 DC Courts
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Appendix I

Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts ApenxIdi
Appendix I

Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Appendix I

Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

Lret Page 33 GAO/AIMD/OGC-99-226 DC Courts
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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Appendix I

Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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Appendix I

Comments From the District of Columbia 

Courts

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