UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DALC GEAR & BEARING SUPPLY CORP., 

MCGUIRE BEARING COMPANY, AND 

SHERMAN BEARINGS INC., 

Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 

situated, 

 Plaintiffs,, 

v. 

KOYO FRANCE SA, KOYO DEUTSCHLAND 

GMBH, NACHI TECHNOLOGY, INC., NACHI 

EUROPE GMBH, NSK EUROPE LTD., 

SCHAEFFLER TECHNOLOGIES GMBH & CO. 

KG, FAG KUGELFISCHER GMBH, AB SKF, SKF 

GMBH, SKF USA INC.,NTN WÄLZLAGER 

(EUROPA) GMBH, AND NTN-SNR 

ROULEMENTS SA,

 Defendants. 

Case No. 2:15-cv-12068 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

Plaintiffs DALC Gear & Bearing Supply Corp., McGuire Bearing Company, and 

Sherman Bearings Inc., individually and on behalf of the Class of direct purchasers described 

below, bring this action against Defendants for damages and injunctive relief under the antitrust 

laws of the United States and upon information and belief, hereby allege as follows: 

SUMMARY OF THE CASE 

1. Defendants are manufacturers and suppliers of automotive and industrial 

machinery bearings (“Bearings”) sold in the United States. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 

were part of and engaged in a global conspiracy that effectively operated to artificially inflate, 

fix, raise, maintain, or stabilize prices of Bearings sold in the United States from January 1, 2000 

through the present. Plaintiffs further allege that they could not have discovered, and did not 

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discover, Defendants’ conspiracy at a time earlier than March 2014, and that Defendants 

fraudulently concealed their conspiracy. 

2. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of direct purchasers who, 

during the Class Period, purchased Bearings in the United States from one or more of the 

Defendants or their co-conspirators. This action is brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 

to enjoin Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct and recover damages suffered by the Class. 

3. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the 

proposed Class (as defined below) paid higher prices for Bearings than they would have paid in a 

competitive market, and therefore have suffered injury to their business and property. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

4. Plaintiffs bring this action to obtain injunctive relief and to recover damages, 

including treble damages, and costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees, resulting from 

Defendants’ violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 

5. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 

Sections 4(a) and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 and 26, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1337. 

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, and 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) and (d) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ 

claims occurred in this District, a substantial portion of the affected interstate trade and 

commerce discussed below has been carried out in this District, and one or more of the 

Defendants reside in this District. 

6. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each of the Defendants because each 

Defendant, either directly or through the ownership or control of its United States subsidiaries: 

(a) transacted business in the United States, including in this District; (b) directly or indirectly 

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sold or marketed substantial quantities of Bearings throughout the United States, including in this 

District; (c) had substantial aggregate contacts with the United States as a whole, including in 

this District; or (d) was engaged in an illegal price-fixing conspiracy that was directed at, and 

had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable and intended effect of causing injury to, the 

business or property of persons and entities residing in, located in, or doing business throughout 

the United States, including in this District. Defendants conduct business throughout the United 

States, including in this District, and they have purposefully availed themselves of the laws of 

the United States. 

7. Defendants engaged in conduct both inside and outside of the United States that 

caused direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable and intended anticompetitive effects upon 

interstate commerce within the United States. 

8. By virtue of their nationwide contacts and activities, Defendants are subject to the 

jurisdiction of this Court. Alternatively, there is jurisdiction over the foreign Defendants 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

DEFINITIONS

9. The term “Class Period,” as used in this complaint, refers to the time period from 

January 1, 2000, through the present. 

10. The term “Bearings,” as used in this complaint, refers to both automotive and 

industrial machinery bearings. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following products: 

ball bearings; tapered roller bearings; roller bearings; and, mounted bearings. 

11. The term “co-conspirators,” as used in this complaint, refers to at least the 

following entities: JTEKT Corporation (“JTEKT”); Koyo Corporation of U.S.A. (“Koyo”); 

Nachi-Fujikoshi Corp. (“Nachi-Fujikoshi”); Nachi America Inc. (“Nachi America”); NSK Ltd. 

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(“NSK”); NSK Americas, Inc. (“NSK Americas”); Schaeffler AG, Schaeffler Group USA Inc. 

(“Schaeffler Group USA”); NTN Corporation (“NTN”); and NTN USA Corporation (“NTN 

USA”). The Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the acts of their co-conspirators 

regardless of whether or not they are named in this Complaint. 

12. The term “Defendant” or “Defendants,” as used in this complaint, refers to, in 

addition to those named specifically below, all of the named Defendants’ predecessors, including 

Bearings manufacturers merged with or acquired by the named Defendants, and each named 

Defendant’s parents, subsidiaries, divisions, and affiliates. 

13. References made herein to any corporate entity include any predecessors, 

successors, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, and divisions of that entity. 

TRADE AND COMMERCE

14. During the Class Period, each Defendant sold Bearings in the United States in a 

continuous and uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce. 

15. The business activities of the Defendants substantially affected interstate trade 

and commerce in the United States. 

PARTIES 

Plaintiffs 

16. Plaintiff DALC Gear & Bearing Supply Corp. is a New York corporation with its 

principal place of business in Brewster, New York. Plaintiff purchased Bearings directly from 

one or more of the Defendants during the Class Period and suffered injury as a result of 

Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 

17. Plaintiff McGuire Bearing Company is an Oregon corporation with its principal 

place of business in Portland, Oregon. Plaintiff purchased Bearings directly from one or more of 

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the Defendants during the Class Period and suffered injury as a result of Defendants’ unlawful 

conduct. 

18. Plaintiff Sherman Bearings Inc. is a Texas corporation with its principal place of 

business in Houston, Texas. Plaintiff purchased Bearings directly from one or more of the 

Defendants during the Class Period and suffered injury as a result of Defendants’ unlawful 

conduct. 

Defendants 

19. Defendant Koyo France SA (“Koyo France”) is a French corporation with its 

principal place of business in Argenteuil, France. It is a subsidiary of, and wholly-owned or 

controlled by, its parent, JTEKT. Defendant Koyo France’s Bearings were imported into and 

sold in the United States, including in this District, during the Class Period. During the Class 

Period, Koyo France’s activities were under the control and direction of JTEKT. 

20. Defendant Koyo Deutschland GmbH (“Koyo Deutschland”) is a German 

corporation with its principal place of business in Hamburg, Germany. It is a subsidiary of, and 

wholly-owned or controlled by, its parent, JTEKT. Defendant Koyo Deutschland’s Bearings 

were imported into and sold in the United States, including in this District, during the Class 

Period. During the Class Period, Koyo Deutschland’s activities were under the control and 

direction of JTEKT. 

21. Defendant Nachi Technology, Inc. (“NTI”) is an Indiana corporation with its 

principal place of business in Greenwood, Indiana. It is a subsidiary of, and wholly-owned or 

controlled by, its parent, Nachi-Fujikoshi. Defendant NTI sold Bearings to purchasers 

throughout the United States, including in this District, during the Class Period. During the 

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Class Period, NTI’s activities in the United States were under the control and direction of NachiFujikoshi. 

22. Defendant Nachi Europe GmbH (“Nachi Europe”) is a German corporation with 

its principal place of business in Krefeld, Germany. It is a subsidiary of, and wholly-owned or 

controlled by, its parent, Nachi-Fujikoshi. Defendant Nachi Europe’s Bearings were imported 

into and sold in the United States, including in this District, during the Class Period. During the 

Class Period, Nachi Europe’s activities were under the control and direction of Nachi-Fujikoshi. 

23. Defendant NSK Europe Ltd. (“NSK Europe”) is a British corporation with its 

principal place of business in Maidenhead, Berkshire, England. It is a subsidiary of, and whollyowned or controlled by, its parent, NSK. Defendant NSK Europe’s Bearings were imported into 

and sold in the United States, including in this District, during the Class Period. During the 

Class Period, NSK Europe’s activities were under the control and direction of NSK. 

24. Defendant Schaeffler Technologies GmbH & Co. KG (“Schaeffler Tech GmbH”) 

is a German corporation with its principal place of business in Herzogenaurach, Germany. 

Schaeffler Tech GmbH was registered in Germany on November 3, 2013. It is a subsidiary of 

INA-Holding Schaeffler GmbH & Co. KG. Defendant Schaeffler Tech GmbH is the legal 

successor to Schaeffler Technologies AG & Co. KG, which ceased to exist as of January 1, 2014. 

Defendant Schaeffler Tech GmbH, directly or through other Schaeffler-related entities (which 

collectively are referred to as the “Schaeffler Group” by those companies and as “Schaeffler” in 

this Complaint), manufactured, marketed, or sold Bearings that were purchased throughout the 

United States, including in this District, during the Class Period. According to U.S. customs 

records, Defendant Schaeffler Tech GmbH exported Bearings to Schaeffler Group USA in the 

United States. In 2012, 15% of the Schaeffler Group’s sales were in North America. 

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25. Defendant FAG Kugelfischer GmbH (“FAG Kugelfischer”) is a German 

corporation with its principal place of business in Schweinfurt, Germany. It is part of the 

Schaeffler Group. Defendant FAG Kugelfischer’s Bearings were imported into and sold in the 

United States, including in this District, during the Class Period. 

26. Defendants Schaeffler Tech GmbH and FAG Kugelfischer are two of five 

Schaeffler Group entities that were fined 370.5 million euros, jointly and severally, by the 

European Commission. 

27. Defendant Schaeffler Tech GmbH admitted in filings before the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that it produced or exported Bearings that entered into 

the United States for consumption on or between May 1, 2010 and April 30, 2011. 

28. Schaeffler Technologies AG & Co. KG has purposely availed itself of the courts 

of the United States in the lawsuit Schaeffler Technologies Ag &Co., KG v. Imex Service, Inc. 

No. 1:13-cv-20707 (S.D. Fla.), filing a verified complaint for trademark infringement, unfair 

competition, and dilution on February 27, 2013. In its complaint, Schaeffler Technologies AG 

& Co., KG alleges: 

Plaintiff Schaeffler [Schaeffler Technologies AG & Co., KG] is a 

corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Federal Republic 

of Germany, and has its principal place of business at Industriestrasse 1-3, 

D-91074 Herzogenaurach, Germany. Through various wholly-owned 

subsidiaries in the United States, Schaeffler [Schaeffler Technologies AG 

& Co., KG] does business in the United States including in this judicial 

district, by selling and servicing products sold under the brand names 

FAG®, INA®, and LUK®. 

29. Defendant Schaeffler Tech GmbH and Schaeffler Group USA shared at least one 

officer/director during the Class Period. Dr. Jüergen Geissinger served as Chief Executive 

Officer, President, and Chairman and Member of the Managing Board of Schaeffler 

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Technologies AG & Co., KG, until October 4, 2013 and, at least as of 2012, was also a director 

at Schaeffler Group USA. 

30. Defendant AB SKF (“SKF”) is a Swedish corporation with its principal place of 

business in Göteborg, Sweden. According to SKF’s website, “[t]wenty-eight of SKF’s 140 

global manufacturing sites are located in the U.S. including facilities for the production 

of...roller bearings.” In 2012, 22% of SKF Group’s sales were in North America. U.S. sites 

include, but are not limited, to Plymouth, Michigan and Highland Heights, Ohio. Defendant 

SKF – through its wholly owned and controlled subsidiaries – manufactured, marketed, or sold 

Bearings that were purchased throughout the United States, including in this District, during the 

Class Period. 

31. Defendant SKF GmbH is a German corporation with its principal place of 

business in Schweinfurt, Germany. Defendant SKF GmbH is wholly-owned by an SKF 

subsidiary in the Netherlands, which in turn is owned by Defendant SKF. Defendant SKF 

GmbH is controlled by SKF and, directly or through other SKF-related entities, manufactured, 

marketed or sold Bearings that were imported into and purchased in the United States, including 

in this District, during the Class Period. According to U.S. customs records, Defendant SKF 

GmbH exported Bearings to the United States. 

32. Defendant SKF USA Inc. (“SKFUS”) is a Delaware corporation with its principal 

place of business in Lansdale, Pennsylvania. Defendant SKF USA Inc. is a subsidiary of AB 

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SKF. Defendant SKFUS is controlled by SKF and sold Bearings to purchasers throughout the U. 

S, including in this District, during the Class Period. 

33. Defendants SKF, SKF GmbH and SKFUS are collectively referred to herein as 

the “SKF Group.” Although not a distinct legal entity, these entities hold themselves out 

publicly as one functioning unit called “SKF Group.” SKF Group has its own headquarters at 

SE-415 50 Goteborg, Sweden, see http://www.skf.com/group/our-company/skf-locationsglobal/index.html and http://www.skf.com/group/our-company/organization/index.html (last 

accessed 9/18/14) and its own LinkedIn profile, see https://www.linkedin.com/company/skf (last 

accessed 9/18/14). SKF “is the parent company of the SKF Group.” 

34. SKF’s President and CEO, Tom Johnstone, was on SKF GmbH’s board of 

directors and was the President and CEO of SKF from at least 2005 until recently. As of January 

1, 2014, he was also a member of the SKF Group Executive Committee, along with Poul 

Jeppesen, who as of that date was the President and CEO of SKF USA. According to its website, 

SKF USA is “the U.S. subsidiary of the SKF Group.” Mr. Johnstone, who was appointed as 

President and CEO of SKF by the company’s Board of Directors, “handles the day-to-day 

management of the company’s business in accordance with the guidelines and instructions from 

the Board.” 

35.

36. Defendant NTN Wälzlager (Europa) GmbH (“NTN Wälzlager”) is a German 

corporation with its principal place of business in Erkrath, Germany. It is a subsidiary of, and 

wholly-owned or controlled by, its parent, NTN. Defendant NTN Wälzlager’s Bearings were 

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imported into and sold in the United State, including in this District, during the Class Period. 

During the Class Period, NTN Wälzlager’s activities were under the control and direction of 

NTN. 

37. Defendant NTN-SNR Roulements SA (“SNR”) is a French corporation with its 

principal place of business in Annecy, France. It is a subsidiary of, and wholly-owned or 

controlled by, its parent, NTN. Defendant SNR’s Bearings were imported into and sold in the 

United State, including in this District, during the Class Period. During the Class Period, SNR’s 

activities were under the control and direction of NTN. 

38. To the extent that parents, subsidiaries, divisions, and other affiliates within 

Defendants’ corporate families sold Bearings, these related entities played a material role in the 

conspiracy alleged in this complaint because Defendants wished to ensure that the prices paid for 

such Bearings would not undercut the artificially raised and inflated pricing that was the aim and 

intended result of Defendants’ coordinated and collusive behavior as alleged herein. Thus, all 

such entities within the corporate family were active, knowing participants in the conspiracy 

alleged herein, and their conduct in selling, pricing, distributing or collecting monies from 

Plaintiffs and the members of the Class was, authorized, ordered, known to and approved by 

their respective corporate parents. 

DEFENDANTS’ CO-CONSPIRATORS AND AGENTS 

39. The acts alleged in this complaint to have been done by Koyo France, Koyo 

Deutschland, NTI, Nachi Europe, NSK Europe, Schaeffler Tech GmbH, FAG Kugelfischer, SKF 

GmbH, SKFUS, NTN Wälzlager and SNR were authorized, ordered, and condoned by their 

parent companies and the acts alleged to have been done by each Defendant were authorized, 

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ordered, and performed by their officers, directors, agents, employees, or representatives while 

engaged in the management, direction, control, or transaction of their business affairs. 

40. Various persons or firms not named as Defendants have participated as coconspirators in the violations alleged herein and have performed acts and made statements in 

furtherance thereof. The Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the acts of their coconspirators regardless of whether or not the co-conspirators are named in this Complaint. 

41. Each Defendant acted as the agent or joint venturer of or for other Defendants 

with respect to the acts, violations and common course of conduct alleged herein. 

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 

42. Plaintiffs bring this action both on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 

situated individuals and entities (the “Class”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 

23(b)(2) and (b)(3). The Class is defined as follows: 

All individuals and entities who or that purchased Bearings in the 

United States directly from one or more Defendants or their coconspirators (or their controlled subsidiaries, affiliates, or joint 

ventures) from January 1, 2000 through the present. 

43. Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of Class members, such information 

being in the exclusive control of Defendants. Due to the nature of the trade and commerce 

involved, however, Plaintiffs believe that the Class is so numerous and geographically dispersed 

throughout the United States that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 

44. There are questions of law or fact common to the class, including, but not limited 

to, the following: 

a. Whether Defendants engaged in a contract, combination, or conspiracy to 

fix, raise, maintain, or stabilize prices of Bearings sold in the United 

States; 

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b. The identity of the participants of the alleged conspiracy; 

c. The duration of the alleged conspiracy and the acts carried out by 

Defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy; 

d. Whether the alleged conspiracy violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act; 

e. Whether the contract, combination, or conspiracy caused Bearings prices 

to be higher than they would have been in the absence of Defendants’ 

conduct; 

f. Whether the conduct of Defendants and their co-conspirators, as alleged in 

this Complaint, caused injury to the business or property of Plaintiffs and 

the other Class members; 

g. Whether the Defendants and their co-conspirators fraudulently concealed 

the conspiracy’s existence from the Plaintiffs and other Class members; 

h. Whether Plaintiffs and other Class members are entitled to injunctive 

relief and, if so, the nature and extent of such relief; and 

i. The appropriate class-wide measure of damages. 

45. These and other questions of law and fact are common to the Class and 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. 

46. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiffs directly 

purchased Bearings from a Defendant, all Class members were damaged by the same conspiracy 

alleged herein, and the relief sought by Plaintiffs is common to the Class. 

47. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class in that 

Plaintiffs are direct purchasers of Bearings and have no conflict with any other members of the 

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Class. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in antitrust, class 

action, and other complex litigation. 

48. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby 

making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. 

49. A class action is superior to the alternatives, if any, for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of this controversy. Prosecution of this matter as a class action will eliminate the 

possibility of repetitive litigation and there are no inherent barriers to managing the case as a 

class action. 

50. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create the 

risk of inconsistent or varying outcomes. 

51. The Class is also readily definable and is one for which records likely exist in the 

files of Defendants. 

INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 

Bearings Background and Market Size 

52. Bearings are friction-reducing devices that allow one moving part to glide past 

another moving part. Rolling bearings include both ball bearings and roller bearings. 

53. Ball bearings, also known as anti-friction bearings, are the most common type of 

bearing and are small metallic or ceramic spheres used to reduce friction between axles and 

shafts in numerous applications. Ball bearings are commonly found in fans, motors, wheel 

bearings, and in multiple car components. (See Figure 1.) 

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Figure 1 

54. Roller bearings, unlike ball bearings, use various shapes other than spheres. 

Therefore, the load is spread over a larger area enabling the bearing to handle greater loads than 

ball bearings. Roller bearings include spherical roller bearings, needle roller bearings, 

cylindrical roller bearings, thrust roller bearings, and tapered roller bearings. 

55. Tapered roller bearings are the second most popular bearing type, with only deep 

groove ball bearings being more common. Tapered roller bearings are generally found in heavy 

industrial, truck and wheel applications with combined radial and axial loads. Some examples 

are manual transmissions, gearboxes, power generation and other process equipment. These 

bearings use conical rollers that run on inner and outer conical “races” that contain the bearings. 

Due to manufacturing complexities, tapered roller bearings are generally more expensive than 

ball bearings. (See Figure 2.) 

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Figure 2 

56. Sales of Bearings in the U.S. totaled approximately $7.1 billion in 2008 and 

approximately $8.5 billion in 2012. The automotive industry has been the primary user of 

tapered roller bearings and ball bearings. 

57. Defendants and their co-conspirators manufactured Bearings: (a) in the United 

States for installation in vehicles and industrial machinery manufactured and sold in the United 

States and (b) abroad for export to the United States and installation in vehicles and industrial 

machinery sold in the United States. 

The Bearings Industry

58. The structure of the Bearings market makes it particularly conducive to price 

fixing and market allocation. The Bearings market exhibits many of the qualities that facilitate 

collusion, including: (1) substantial barriers to entry (2) high, and increasing, market 

concentration; (3) inelastic demand; (4) homogeneous or commoditized products; (5) excess 

capacity, and (6) opportunities to conspire. Together, these characteristics vastly increase the 

feasibility of anticompetitive conduct in the Bearings market. 

59. There are substantial barriers to entry in the market for Bearings. A new entrant 

into this market faces significant startup costs, which include investments in plants, machinery, 

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distribution infrastructure, a skilled labor and sales force, and research and development. The 

strong pre-existing relationships between market players create an additional deterrent to 

potential new entrants. Moreover, the minimum efficient scale for Bearings production is large 

and increasing, thereby discouraging new entrants into the market. 

60. The Bearings industry has become highly concentrated. For the past decade the 

number of firms has been steadily decreasing and market share is continually shifting towards 

the Bearings industry’s largest participants. 

61. In 2011, Defendants and their co-conspirators had a combined global market 

share exceeding 60%. 

62. A majority of ball bearings products are standardized, meaning that the design 

and function of most bearings products can be produced by any of the Defendants. One of the 

most important determinants in the purchase of Bearings is price. 

63. In fact, Defendants and their co-conspirators routinely purchase Bearings from 

each other to meet customer demand. 

64. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants’ and Defendants’ co-conspirators 

annual sales in the United States totaled several billion dollars, comprising much of the total U.S. 

sales during the same period. 

65. The demand for Bearings is highly inelastic because there are no close substitutes. 

In a market where demand is inelastic, collusion is facilitated as consumers cannot substitute 

products. Thus, producers can raise prices to supra-competitive levels and increase profits. In a 

market where demand is inelastic, purchasers are forced to pay these supra-competitive prices. 

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66. Because Bearings are essential components in the manufacturing and 

transportation markets, Class Members were forced to purchase these products at supracompetitive prices throughout the Class Period. 

67. As more fully set forth below, Defendants and their co-conspirators had many 

opportunities to collude, including high level agreements between them to supply each other with 

lines of Bearings, at industry or trade meetings, at distributor-organized events, and in 

connection with false industry-wide campaigns. 

68. During the Class Period, contraction in demand and consolidation in the Bearings 

industry led to an overabundance of production capacity. Excess capacity for production 

indicates that a market is susceptible to collusive anticompetitive behavior. 

DEFENDANTS’ ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY 

Government Investigations 

69. Globally-coordinated antitrust investigations are taking place in the United States, 

Japan, Europe, Australia, Canada, Singapore, Korea and China regarding industrial and 

automotive Bearings. There has not only been an investigation in Japan, but also a successful 

amnesty applicant, criminal prosecution, and guilty verdicts against NSK and Nachi-Fujikoshi. 

Thus far, the United States’ investigation has led to three guilty pleas, the European 

Commission’s investigation has resulted in the assessment of over $1.3 billion USD in fines, and 

Canada’s investigation has produced one guilty plea. The Korean investigation has resulted in 

the imposition of fines of over $70.7 million USD. 

United States 

70. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is conducting an investigation 

into the Bearings industry. 

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71. In its 2012 Annual Report, NTN stated: “[I]n November 2011 our United States 

consolidated subsidiary received a subpoena from the United States Department of Justice 

requesting the submission of information related to transactions in bearings.” 

72. In its 2011 Annual Report, Schaeffler similarly reported that it was a subject of 

the DOJ’s Bearings antitrust investigation. 

73. In its 2012 Annual Report, NSK stated that on November 9, 2011, its subsidiary 

in the U.S. received a subpoena from the DOJ, which requested that it provide information 

regarding sales of Bearings. 

74. In its 2012 Annual Report, SKF stated that it was being investigated by the DOJ 

and other government agencies “regarding a possible violation of antitrust rules.” 

75. On September 26, 2013, the DOJ announced that JTEKT agreed to pay a $103.27 

million fine and plead guilty to a two-count criminal information charging JTEKT with, among 

other things, “participat[ing] in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate 

competition in the automotive parts industry by agreeing to allocate markets, rig bids for, and to 

fix, stabilize, and maintain the prices of” Bearings sold to Japanese automobile and component 

manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere from at least as early as 2000 and continuing 

until at least July 2011 in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Later that day, JTEKT 

pleaded guilty to these charges. 

76. According to the DOJ, JTEKT and its co-conspirators manufactured and sold 

Bearings (a) in the United States and elsewhere for installation in vehicles manufactured and sold 

in the United States, (b) in Japan for export to the United States and installation in vehicles 

manufactured and sold in the United States, and (c) in Japan and elsewhere for installation in 

vehicles manufactured in Japan and elsewhere for export to and sale in the United States. 

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77. The DOJ alleged that JTEKT and its co-conspirators: (a) had meetings and 

communications in the United States to discuss bids and price quotations to be submitted to 

Japanese automobile and component manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere, (b) 

agreed on bids and price quotations to be submitted to Japanese automobile and component 

manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere, (c) agreed to allocate the supply of bearings 

sold to Japanese automobile and component manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere, 

(d) agreed to coordinate price adjustments requested by Japanese automobile and component 

manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere, (e) submitted bids, price quotations, and price 

adjustments to Japanese automobile and component manufacturers in the United States and 

elsewhere in accordance with the agreements reached, (f) sold bearings to Japanese automobile 

and component manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere at collusive and 

noncompetitive prices, and (g) participated in meetings and communications to monitor the 

conspiracy and conceal their unlawful conduct, including but not limited to using code names 

and meeting at remote locations. 

78. Also on September 26, 2013, the DOJ announced that NSK agreed to pay a $68.2 

million fine and to plead guilty to a one-count criminal information charging NSK with 

“participat[ing] in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition in the 

automotive parts industry by agreeing to allocate markets, rig bids for, and to fix, stabilize, and 

maintain the prices of” Bearings sold to Japanese automobile and component manufacturers in 

the United States and elsewhere from at least as early as 2000 and continuing until at least July 

2011 in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Later that day, NSK pleaded guilty to this 

charge. 

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79. On November 14, 2014, a federal grand jury in Covington, Kentucky, indicted 

executives of NSK and JTEKT, Hiroya Hirose and Masakazu Iwami, respectively, for price 

fixing Bearings. As of November 21, 2014, Hirose was still employed as the section head of 

NSK’s West Japan Automotive Unit. 

Japan Investigation and Convictions 

80. The Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”) launched an investigation in July 

2011 after JTEKT sought leniency by alerting the regulatory agency of the Bearings conspiracy. 

Japan’s leniency program grants full immunity from prosecution to the applicant if it admits its 

participation in the cartel and provides the JFTC with relevant information detailing the 

anticompetitive violation. Because of its admission and cooperation, JTEKT was not prosecuted 

criminally by the JFTC. 

81. On July 26 and 27, 2011, the JFTC conducted on-site inspections of NSK, NTN, 

JTEKT and Nachi-Fujikoshi amid suspicions that the companies had violated Japan’s antimonopoly law in relation to their sales of Bearings. 

82. NTN confirmed in its 2012 Financial Report that in July 2011, the Company 

underwent an on-site inspection by the JFTC, on suspicion that the Company had decided to 

raise sale prices of bearings in cooperation with other manufacturers, and further reported that in 

April of 2012 a search was conducted by special investigators from Tokyo District Public 

Prosecutor’s Office and the JFTC. 

83. In its 2012 Annual Report, NSK confirmed that its “headquarters and relevant 

sales branches of NSK were investigated on July 26 and 27, 2011, by the JFTC in relation to the 

Japan Antimonopoly Act regarding the sales of bearings of NSK.” 

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84. On April 20, 2012, the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District 

Public Prosecutors Office and the JFTC raided NSK facilities regarding a potential violation of 

the Antimonopoly Act of Japan (“AMA”). 

85. On May 18, 2012, the Japan Times reported that certain NTN officials have made 

statements admitting their participation in the Bearings price-fixing conspiracy during voluntary 

questioning by Japanese prosecutors. This article also noted that officials of NSK, JTEKT and 

Nachi-Fujikoshi had already admitted to their roles in the conspiracy. 

86. As a result of these raids and its investigation, on June 14, 2012, the JFTC filed a 

criminal accusation with the Public Prosecutor General against NSK, NTN and Nachi-Fujikoshi 

and seven individuals engaged in the sale of Bearings for violating Japan’s AMA. The JFTC 

alleged that “these companies, as for the products at issue, in cooperation with one another, 

contrary to the public interest, substantially restrained competition in the field of trade on sales 

for the product at issue by mutually restricting their business activities.” According to the article 

that appeared in the Japan Times on June 15, 2012 reporting these charges, the three companies 

raised bearings prices five times since 2004 and the JFTC believes that these price increases 

were the result of cartel activity. 

87. On December 28, 2012, the Tokyo District Court found Nachi-Fujikoshi and two 

former officials guilty of participating in a price-fixing cartel to increase the prices of industrial 

machinery bearings in violation of Japan’s antimonopoly laws. Keiichi Ogino, a former member 

of the board of directors, was sentenced to fourteen months in prison and suspended for three 

years, and Michio Murai, a former deputy chief of the bearings division, was sentenced to twelve 

months and also suspended for three years. The Tokyo District Court also issued a 180 million 

yen (approximately $2 million USD) criminal fine against Nachi-Fujikoshi. 

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88. The Court found that NSK, NTN, JTEKT and Nachi-Fujikoshi: 

[M]et during the end of May 2010 and August 2010 in the Tokyo 

Bay area at the “E Hall” and other places and through their 

subsidiary companies and agents negotiated higher prices for ball 

bearings (excluding miniature ball bearings) used in industrial 

machinery (excluding cars and car parts) (hereinafter, the 

“Industrial Bearings”). Acting in cooperation and with the purpose 

of raising prices, the Four Defendant Companies held meetings and 

conferences. On or after July 1, 2010, the Four Defendant 

Companies raised prices of regular ball bearings by 8 percentage 

points and large ball bearings by 10 percentage points, citing an 

increase in steel prices. The result of this price increase is 

increased prices for industrial machinery and other industrial 

prices. Employees from these Defendants, acting in concert, 

contacted sales areas and important customers to get their 

approvals for the price increases. The result was restriction on 

market activity, a restraint on free competition and an adverse 

affect (sic) to the public welfare. 

89. Two months later, on February 25, 2013, the Tokyo District Court found NSK 

and three former executives guilty of participating in a price-fixing cartel for automotive and 

industrial machinery bearings. Keisuke Takagawa and Katsumi Kuwabata, former senior vice 

presidents, were sentenced to fourteen months in prison, while Yoshi Nishiyama, a former head 

of the industrial machinery business division, was sentenced to twelve months. The Tokyo 

District Court also issued a 380 million yen (approximately $4 million USD) criminal fine 

against NSK. 

90. On February 25, 2013, Nikkei Japan Business Newspaper reported that the 

presiding judge stated, “[t]he crime is malicious – large in scope and carried out systematically. 

Having the largest market share, NSK carried out the central role in this cartel.” 

91. On the same day, NSK President and CEO Norio Otsuka issued a press release 

stating: “[w]e express our sincere regret for the concern this matter has caused our shareholders, 

customers, and other stakeholders. NSK regards the situation with the utmost gravity and will 

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take comprehensive measures to ensure strict compliance with all applicable laws and 

regulations during our corporate activities.” 

92. On March 29, 2013, the JFTC issued cease and desist orders and surcharge 

payment orders to NTN, NSK, and Nachi-Fujikoshi for their involvement in a price-fixing 

conspiracy in connection with the sale of industrial machinery bearings and automotive bearings 

in violation of Article 3 of the AMA. The JFTC fined NTN approximately 7.2 billion yen, NSK 

5.6 billion yen, and Nachi-Fujikoshi 509 million yen (totaling approximately $142 million USD). 

JTEKT admitted to its participation in a price-fixing conspiracy, but was not fined because it had 

provided information to the JFTC that led to the investigation after it applied to the leniency 

program in June 2011. 

93. On the same day, JTEKT President Shoji Ikawa stated that “we express our 

deepest regrets for the fact that the JFTC named JTEKT CORPORATION as one of the 

companies involved in conduct which violated the AMA. We would like to take this opportunity 

to again offer our sincere apologies to all of our customers, shareholders and stakeholders for the 

concerns that this has caused.” 

94. On April 1, 2013, NTN followed suit and issued a press release stating that “NTN 

sincerely regrets the great deal of concern caused to shareholders, customers and all relevant 

personnel by this matter notwithstanding the fact that NTN has been committed to complying 

with the laws and regulations.” 

95. On February 4, 2015, NTN was sentenced to a penalty of 400 million yen 

(approximately $3.4 million USD) by the Tokyo District Court, and two of its executives were 

sentenced to 18 and 12 months in prison, respectively. 

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European Commission

96. This global antitrust investigation originated in Europe as the result of several 

European Original Equipment Manufacturers coming together to bring a complaint to the 

European Commission (“EC”). Throughout 2010 and 2011, the EC executed surprise raids at the 

European offices of certain Defendants and/or their respective parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates 

as part of an investigation into anticompetitive conduct related to the manufacturing and sale of 

automotive parts, including Bearings. 

97. Subsequently, on November 8, 2011, the EC announced that it had made 

unannounced inspections at the premises of companies that manufacture Bearings over concerns 

that these companies may have violated antitrust rules. Defendant SKF and the Schaeffler Group 

have admitted that their facilities were raided by European Union regulators. 

98. A number of Defendants and/or their respective parents, subsidiaries, and 

affiliates have acknowledged that they are subjects of the Bearings investigations. JTEKT has 

admitted that the EC is investigating its Dutch unit as part of the EC’s Bearings antitrust 

investigation. 

99. In its 2012 Annual Report, NSK stated that its sales subsidiary in Germany was 

inspected on November 8, 2011, by the EC in relation to European Union (“EU”) competition 

law regarding the sales of Bearings. 

100. Likewise, in its 2011 Annual Report, SKF explained that, along with other 

companies in the Bearing industry, it is “part of an investigation by the European Commission 

regarding a possible violation of EU antitrust rules.” SKF has also acknowledged that EU 

officials have visited its Gothenburg, Sweden and Schweinfurt, Germany facilities. SKF’s 2012 

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Annual Report further stated that “[i]t is likely that the European Commission will impose a fine 

on SKF.” 

101. Schaeffler AG’s 2011 Annual Report also acknowledges the worldwide Bearings 

antitrust investigation, noting, “[t]he European Commission as well as the US Department of 

Justice have commenced antitrust investigations of various manufacturers of rolling bearings, 

including Schaeffler. The European and the U.S. competition authorities are investigating 

whether manufacturers of rolling bearings participated in unlawful agreements and/or concerted 

practices concerning rolling or plain bearings.” 

102. NTN reported in its 2012 Financial Report that: “[i]n November 2011, our 

European consolidated subsidiaries also received an on-site inspection by the European 

Commission into transactions in bearings, on suspicion of noncompliance with the EU 

Competition Law.” 

103. NTN’s operations in France and Germany were also probed by the EC as part of 

its antitrust investigation into the automotive Bearings industry. 

104. On March 19, 2014, the EC issued fines against NTN, NSK, Nachi-Fujikoshi, 

Schaeffler, and SKF for their involvement in a price-fixing conspiracy in connection with the 

sale of automotive bearings in violation of EU antitrust rules. The EC fined NTN approximately 

201.4 million euros, NSK 62.4 million euros, Nachi-Fujikoshi 4 million euros, Schaeffler 370.5 

million euros, and SKF 315.1 million euros (totaling approximately $1.3 billion USD). JTEKT 

admitted to its participation in a price-fixing conspiracy, but was not fined. JTEKT provided 

information to the EC that led to the investigation after it applied for leniency. 

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105. According to the EC’s March 19, 2014 decision, during the Class Period, JTEKT, 

NTN, NSK, Nachi-Fujikoshi, Schaeffler, and SKF engaged in numerous anticompetitive acts in 

furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, as described below. 

106. Defendants coordinated the passing on of increases in the costs of steel to 

automotive customers. 

107. Defendants coordinated responses to certain requests for quotations (“RFQs”) 

issued by automotive customers, including determining which Defendants would submit a quote, 

the price at which each Defendant would quote, and the timing at which quotes would be 

submitted in response to such RFQs. 

108. Defendants coordinated responses to requests from automotive customers for 

annual price reductions. 

109. Defendants participated in multilateral, bilateral, and trilateral meetings to fix the 

prices of automotive bearings. During those meetings, Defendants exchanged commercially 

sensitive information and reached conspiratorial agreements in furtherance of their illegal pricefixing conspiracy. 

110. Defendant SKF applied for leniency and was granted a 20% reduction in its fine. 

According to the EC’s decision, “SKF gave additional information that enabled the Commission 

to conclusively interpret several documents in an incriminating manner. SKF submitted new 

evidence enabling the Commission to better demonstrate the single and continuous nature of the 

infringement and significantly strengthening the case against other cartel members.” The 

decision also noted that Defendant SKF GmbH “clearly and unequivocally acknowledged 

liability for its direct involvement in the infringement.” 

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111. Schaeffler also applied for leniency and was granted a 20% reduction in its fine. 

According to the EC’s decision, “Schaeffler reported on a number of new bilateral and trilateral 

contacts (concerning also the follow up of multilateral meetings) that enabled the Commission to 

strengthen its findings of a single and continuous infringement concerning automotive bearings.” 

The decision also noted that Defendants Schaeffler Tech GmbH and FAG Kugelfischer “clearly 

and unequivocally acknowledged liability for [their] direct involvement in the infringement.” 

112. Defendants Nachi Europe, Koyo France, Koyo Deutschland, NSK Europe, NTN 

Wälzlager, and SNR also “clearly and unequivocally acknowledged liability for [their] own 

direct involvement in the infringement.” 

Australia

113. On July 15, 2013, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 

(“ACCC”) announced that it had instituted civil proceedings in the Federal Court against Koyo 

Australia Pty Ltd (Koyo Australia), a subsidiary of JTEKT, for alleged cartel conduct relating to 

the supply of ball and roller bearings for use in motor vehicles and industrial applications. The 

ACCC alleges that in 2008 and 2009, Koyo Australia and at least two of its competitors made 

and gave effect to two separate cartel arrangements for an increase to the price of Bearings to 

their aftermarket customers. 

Canada 

114. On July 12, 2013, the Competition Bureau of Canada (“CBC”) announced that 

JTEKT pleaded guilty to two counts of bid-rigging and was fined $5 million by the Superior 

Court of Quebec for its participation in an international bid-rigging cartel, making it the first 

party to plead guilty in relation to the investigation into automotive bearings. JTEKT's plea 

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relates to automotive wheel hub unit bearings supplied to Toyota Motor Corporation (“Toyota”) 

and its North American affiliates between 2007 and 2013. 

115. On or about the same day, JTEKT and the CBC filed a statement of admissions 

(the “Statement of Admissions”) with the Superior Court of Quebec which included an 

admission by JTEKT of the facts constituting an offence under Canada’s Competition Act. 

According to the Statement of Admissions, JTEKT secretly conspired with NSK to submit bids 

or tenders in response to RFQs to supply Toyota that were predetermined by agreement. These 

agreements were reached, at least in part, through direct communications between JTEKT sales 

management level personnel and their counterparts at NSK where the employees discussed, 

among other things, Toyota’s RFQs and how to coordinate their respective responses to Toyota. 

These discussions resulted in an agreement whereby JTEKT would win certain RFQs while NSK 

would win others. Both JTEKT and NSK submitted bids to Toyota in accordance with the 

agreement. 

116. The CBC became aware of the Bearings cartel by way of its Immunity Program. 

Under this Immunity Program, the first party to disclose to the Bureau an offense not yet 

detected or to provide evidence leading to a referral of evidence to the Public Prosecution 

Service of Canada (“PPSC”) may receive immunity from the PPSC, provided that it fully 

cooperates with the Bureau’s investigation and any ensuing prosecution. Subsequent 

cooperating parties may also receive lenient treatment under the CBC’s Leniency Program. 

JTEKT participated in the CBC’s Leniency Program and provided substantial assistance to the 

Bureau and the PPSC. 

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Singapore 

117. The Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) commenced an 

investigation into the Bearings industry in December 2011 after receiving an immunity 

application from JTEKT’s Singaporean subsidiary, Koyo Singapore Bearing Ltd. 

118. On February 6, 2013, NSK Ltd.’s Singapore-based sales subsidiary received an 

on-the-spot inspection from the CCS. 

119. Also on February 6, 2013, NTN issued a press release stating that its Singaporebased subsidiary underwent an on-site inspection by CCS “to gather information about possible 

anti-competitive behaviors among certain bearing manufacturers.” 

120. On May 27, 2014, CCS announced that it had issued an Infringement Decision 

against JTEKT, NSK, NTN, Nachi, and their respective Singaporean subsidiaries for violating 

Singapore’s competition laws “by engaging in anti-competitive agreements and unlawful 

exchange of information in respect of the price and sale of ball and roller bearings sold to 

aftermarket customers in Singapore.” As a result, these entities were fined 9,306,977 Singapore 

dollars. 

121. In its Infringement Decision announcement, the CCS also revealed that these 

entities repeatedly met in Japan between at least 1980 until 2011, where they “agreed on sales 

prices for Bearings” and “discussed and agreed on the overall strategies” for their “Market Share 

and Profit Protection Initiative”—an initiative designed to “maintain each participant’s market 

share and protect their profits and sales.” 

122. CCS further noted that, “to give effect to the Market Share and Profit Protection 

Initiative,” the parties took a series of actions over the years, including “setting an agreed price 

list and making a minimum price agreement for Singapore, agreeing on relevant exchange rates 

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to be applied to derive the minimum prices for Singapore, and when the price of steel began to 

increase, the Parties agreed on percentage price increases and exchanged information on 

percentage price increases to be applied to Aftermarket Customers in Singapore.” 

123. As a result, these companies were found to have engaged in conduct “which 

includes, amongst other things, price-fixing agreement and exchanges of strategic information 

including future pricing intentions, [that] amounts to a single overall infringement with the object 

of preventing, restricting and distorting competition.” But for this conduct, “uncertainty would 

have forced the Parties to compete for market shares via more competitive prices or non-price 

strategies.” 

Korea 

124. NTN reported in its 2012 Financial Report that: “[i]n July 2012, a consolidated 

subsidiary of the Company in South Korea underwent an on-site inspection from the Korea Fair 

Trade Commission (“KFTC”) on suspicion of a violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair 

Trade Act in connection with bearings business.” 

125. Likewise, NSK’s 2012 Annual Report stated: “in July 2012, the KFTC conducted 

an on-site investigation against NSK’s Korean subsidiary regarding a potential violation of the 

Monopoly Regulations and Fair Trade Act of Korea in transactions involving bearings products.” 

126. SKF’s 2012 Annual Report also stated it was being investigated by the KFTC and 

other government agencies “regarding a possible violation of antitrust rules.” 

127. On November 16, 2014, the KFTC imposed fines of 77.8 billion won ($70.7 

million) on nine Japanese and German ball bearing producers for price fixing during the period 

1998 to 2012. The affected companies included NSK, JTEKT, Nachi-Fujikoshi, and Schaeffler 

Korea. 

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128. On April 13, 2015, the KFTC imposed fines of 7.5 billion won ($6.85 million 

USD) on Schaeffler Korea (5.48 billion won) and JTEKT (2.20 billion won) for price fixing and 

market allocation during the period 2001 to 2008 of double tapering Bearings used to build 

automatic transmissions. In reporting the fines, the KFTC stated that “the global bearings market 

is effectively controlled by a handful of specialized companies” and noted that “the margin ratio 

of bearings products should be at the 40% range but the two companies have intentionally 

manipulated the prices to take over 70% margin.” 

China 

129. In August 2014, it was reported that China’s National Development and Reform 

Commission (“NDRC”) had completed its investigation with respect to alleged antitrust 

violations. The NDRC levied fines against NSK, NTN, and JTEKT. 

Global Scope of the Conspiracy 

130. The coordinated government investigations discussed above reflect the global 

nature of Defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ conspiracy, which, in turn, reflects the global 

nature of the Bearings industry. Bearings are highly transportable and fungible products, and 

thus, they are readily exportable worldwide. 

131. The nature of the Bearings industry makes it difficult to price-fix products in one 

geographic market without also fixing prices in other geographic markets. This is because, 

absent such a global agreement, purchasers could simply fulfill their Bearings needs by 

importing lower-priced Bearings from elsewhere. 

132.

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138.

 

Opportunities to Conspire

139.

140.

141.

 

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142.

 

 

143.

144. Defendants and their co-conspirators also had opportunities to meet and perform 

acts in furtherance of the conspiracy while attending industry events. Defendants and their coconspirators (and/or their parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates) had opportunities to meet privately 

at annual or semi-annual trade association meetings, including, but not limited to, the 

Association of Steel and Iron Engineers, the Bearings Specialties Association, the Small Motors 

Manufacturers Association, and the Electric Motor Repair Group. 

145. NSK, NTN, Schaeffler, Nachi, Koyo (JKEKT) and SKF are six of the seven 

manufacturing members of the World Bearing Association (“WBA”). The WBA was founded in 

2006 by the American Bearing Manufacturers Association, the Japan Bearing Industrial 

Association and the Federation of European Bearing Manufacturers’ Association. 

146. The WBA afforded Defendants and their co-conspirators additional opportunities 

to discuss and perform acts in furtherance of their price-fixing conspiracy. The WBA has been 

referred to as the “World Cartel of Bearing manufacturers.” As of September 2011, it was 

reportedly on the verge of “extinction”: it was not registered, not incorporated, had no Articles of 

Association, had no record of any meetings, and had not filed documents with any government 

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department globally. The WBA no longer has a president, contact information, place of 

identification, or postal address. 

147. The WBA initiated a campaign, “Stop Fake Bearings,” (found online at 

http://www.stopfakebearings.com) ostensibly to identify and prevent counterfeiting in the 

Bearings industry. The WBA provided another avenue through which these Bearings 

manufacturers could conspire, as well as cover for their collusive activities. 

148. Golf outings organized by distributors presented additional opportunities for 

employees of the co-conspirators to conspire. It was not uncommon for the golf outings to draw 

more employees from bearings manufacturers than from distributors. Thus, manufacturers’ 

employees had an opportunity to meet and were often paired together as part of the golf outing. 

149. During such meetings or golf outings, co-conspirators had the opportunity to 

engage in private meetings, conversations and communications to discuss pricing and customer 

allocation for Bearings sold in the United States. 

150.

 

151.

 

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152.

153. Defendants and their co-conspirators also routinely produced and sold Bearings to 

each other. For example, at times, a particular manufacturer would shut down a product line (i.e. 

cease production of a particular size or type of bearing) while maintaining the item on its price 

list. If a customer ordered a product that was no longer being produced, the nonproducing 

manufacturer would purchase it from a competitor. To facilitate such purchase and sales 

transactions, senior level employees, a General Manager or President of the Defendant or 

coconspirator manufacturer, would meet or communicate to discuss and finalize these 

arrangements. These transactions provided numerous additional opportunities for Defendants and 

their co-conspirators to collude on customer allocation and pricing structures in the U.S. 

Bearings market. 

154. The above referenced meetings, conversations, and communications provided 

ample opportunity for Defendants and their co-conspirators to coordinate pricing, sales, and 

market allocation with respect to Bearings sold in the United States. 

Pricing Data Supports Plaintiffs’ Claims 

155. There is substantial evidence that prices in the U.S. increased during the same 

period that the Japanese and other Bearings manufacturers have admitted or were found to have 

conspired to raise bearings prices outside the U.S. Government data confirm that ball and roller 

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bearings prices in the U.S. increased substantially during the time period of the admitted 

conspiracy in Japan, particularly when compared to prior to the conspiracy. And additional data 

sources confirm that prices of both Japanese exports of ball and roller bearings and U.S. imports 

from Japan of ball and roller bearings also increased substantially during the time period of the 

admitted conspiracy in Japan, particularly when compared to prior to the conspiracy. 

156. Price increases in Japan during the Class Period have been higher on average than 

before the Class Period. Japanese roller bearing export prices increased at a higher rate during 

the Class Period than before the Class Period. Likewise, Japanese ball bearing export prices 

increased at a higher rate during the Class Period, than before the Class Period. 

157. U.S. government data on imports from Japan to the United States also 

demonstrate that the price of Japanese ball and tapered roller bearings (in U.S. dollars) increased 

more to U.S. customers during the Class Period than before the Class Period. 

158. The Producer Price Index (PPI) for ball and roller bearings also demonstrates 

prices increasing in the United State substantially more during the Class Period than before it. 

The aggregate data of ball and roller bearings demonstrates annual PPI increases from 1996 to 

2003 of 1.18% while during the 2004 to 2012 time period, there were annual price increases of 

3.97%. The PPI pricing data for tapered roller bearings during the Class Period shows increases 

of 5.63% annually, compared with 0.95% annually for the eight years prior. 

159. The increase in bearings prices in the United States is also not explained by 

increased costs for bearings production during the Class Period, a fact which is also confirmed 

by U.S. government data. 

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History of Collusion 

160. The JFTC has stated that it “believes the culture of collusion is ingrained in the 

bearing industry.” In 1973, the JFTC similarly found that NSK, Koyo Seiko Co. (currently 

JTEKT), Nachi-Fujikoshi and NTN Toyo Bearing Co. (currently NTN) formed a cartel and held 

secret meetings at which they fixed bearings prices. Through a significant portion of the 1980s, 

collusion on price and market division took place among NSK, Koyo Seiko Co., NachiFujikoshi, and NTN Toyo Bearing Co. In 2002, the French Conseil de la Concurrence 

(Competition Council) fined four bearings manufacturers €19 million for their participation in a 

price-fixing cartel that was active from 1993 through 1997. The cartel included three 

participants in the present Bearings price-fixing cartel, SKF, Schaeffler and NSK, and caused a 

cumulative increase in gross industry prices of bearings of 16.4%. 

161.

162.

 

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THE U.S. BEARINGS MARKET 

163. Co-conspirators NTN, NSK, Nachi-Fujikoshi, and JTEKT on average export 

approximately 55% of their Bearings to the United States and Europe. The United States imports 

40% of its Bearings from Asia. Koyo France, Koyo Deutschland, NSK Europe, Nachi Europe, 

SKF GmbH, Schaeffler Technologies GmbH, FAG Kugelfischer, NTN Wälzlager and SNR all 

exported Bearings to the United States during the Class Period. 

164. Prices in the U.S. increased during the same period that the Japanese and 

European Bearings manufacturers have admitted to conspiring to raise Bearings prices outside 

the U.S. 

165. Throughout the Class Period, the U.S. subsidiaries of the Japanese-based 

Defendant entities have been controlled by their foreign parents. The control is either asserted 

directly through orders from Japanese executives or indirectly through the use of shadow 

management teams and Japanese expatriates who report directly to executives in Japan. The 

control used by Japanese parent corporations over their subsidiaries ensured that pricing 

decisions that were issued in Japan were enforced in the U.S. Bearings market. 

166. For example, Nachi rotated in Japanese executives to fill top positions in the 

United States every two to three years. The Japanese parent, an admitted member of the pricefixing conspiracy, would implement U.S. price increases through these agents. Nachi America 

sometimes was forced to negotiate its pricing structure with the foreign parent. 

167. Similarly, NSK Americas and NTN each had complete shadow management 

structures to oversee sale of Bearings in the United States. Defendants’ and their coconspirators’ U.S. pricing was also controlled by foreign parents where the foreign entity acted 

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as supplier to the domestic subsidiary. For example, JTEKT charged Koyo USA for Japanesemade Bearings, establishing a floor for domestic pricing. 

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

168. Defendants and their co-conspirators affirmatively and wrongfully concealed their 

anticompetitive conduct from Plaintiffs and the Class from at least January 1, 2000 through at 

least March 2014, when the antitrust investigations of Bearings manufacturers became public. 

During that time, Plaintiffs and the Class did not learn or discover the operative facts giving rise 

to their claims, despite due diligence. Thus, Defendants’ fraudulent concealment tolled the 

statute of limitations through at least March 2014. 

169. Defendants and their co-conspirators’ successful contract, combination, or 

conspiracy was by its nature inherently self-concealing. 

170. Defendants and their co-conspirators represented publicly, both to customers and 

otherwise, that their pricing activities were unilateral. In making those false representations, 

Defendants and their co-conspirators misled Plaintiffs and members of the Class as to the true, 

collusive, and coordinated nature of their price-fixing activities. 

171. Defendants and their co-conspirators’ wrongful conduct was carried out in part 

through means and methods that were designed to avoid detection, and which, in fact, 

successfully precluded detection. 

172. In particular, Defendants and their co-conspirators participated in meetings, 

conversations, and communications to discuss price-fixing and customer and market allocation 

that affected customers in the United States and elsewhere. 

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173. During these secret meetings, conversations, and communications, Defendants 

and their co-conspirators agreed upon prices affecting customers in the United States and 

elsewhere. 

174. As a result of their secret coordinated actions, and unbeknownst to Plaintiffs and 

the Class, Defendants and their co-conspirators sold Bearings to purchasers in the United States 

at collusive and supra-competitive prices. 

175. Despite due diligence, Plaintiffs had no knowledge of Defendants and their coconspirators’ unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy. 

176. Plaintiffs received pricing information from one or more of Defendants or their 

co-conspirators. Plaintiffs had no way to know that these prices were higher than they should 

have been due to the conspiracy alleged herein. 

177. Plaintiffs did not and could not have discovered Defendants and their coconspirators’ unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy at any earlier date, despite due 

diligence. Defendants and their co-conspirators undertook affirmative acts of concealment of 

their contract, combination, or conspiracy, including their attendance at secret meetings, making 

misrepresentations to Plaintiffs and the Class of the reasons for the prices charged, and engaging 

in secret conversations concerning the price-fixing of Bearings. 

178. Specifically, price increases were often attributed to increases in cost of inputs, 

such as steel, when in fact they were the direct result of the conspiracy’s secret collusion. 

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ANTITRUST INJURY 

179. Defendants’ conspiracy caused injury to Plaintiffs and members of the Class by 

suppressing price competition among Bearings manufacturers, thereby depriving all direct 

purchasers of Bearings of the benefits of a competitive market, and resulting in the setting of 

prices of Bearings at artificially high levels. 

180. As a direct result of the conspiracy, Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been 

injured in their business or property in that they paid more for Bearings than they would have 

paid in a competitive market. 

181. Defendants and their co-conspirators knew and intended that their pricing actions 

regarding their sales of Bearings would have a direct impact on prices for Bearings for all direct 

purchasers of Bearings throughout the United States. 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

(Sherman Act Section 1 – Horizontal Price-Fixing Against All Defendants)

182. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all the above allegations as if fully set forth 

herein. 

183. During the Class Period, Defendants and their co-conspirators entered into a 

continuing agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade to artificially raise, fix, 

maintain, or stabilize prices for Bearings sold in the United States, and/or to allocate markets and 

customers for Bearings sold in the United States, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 

15 U.S.C. §1. 

184. The contract, combination or conspiracy resulted in an agreement, understanding 

or concerted action between and among the Defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance 

of which the Defendants and their co-conspirators fixed, raised, maintained, or stabilized prices, 

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and/or allocated markets and customers, for Bearings sold in or into the United States. Such 

contract, combination, or conspiracy constitutes a per se violation of the federal antitrust laws. 

185. Defendants and their co-conspirators succeeded in fixing, raising, maintaining, 

and stabilizing the prices, as well as allocating markets and/or customers for Bearings sold in the 

United States during the Class Period. 

186. For purposes of formulating and effectuating their conspiracy, Defendants and 

their co-conspirators did those things they contracted, combined, or conspired to do, including: 

a. Restraining trade or commerce by fixing, controlling or maintaining, at 

artificial and supra-competitive levels, the prices at which Bearings were sold 

in the United States; 

b. Depriving direct purchasers of free and open competition; 

c. Selling Bearings to direct purchasers in the United States at supra-competitive 

prices; and 

d. Employing measures to conceal the true nature of their unlawful conduct from 

Plaintiffs and other members of the Class in furtherance of the conspiracy.

187. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and 

the other members of the Class have been injured in their businesses and property in that they 

have paid more for Bearings than they otherwise would have paid in a competitive market. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Court enter judgment on their behalf and on 

behalf of the Class herein, and respectfully request the following relief: 

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A. That the Court determine that this action may proceed as a class action under Rule 

23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with Plaintiffs as the designated Class representatives 

and their counsel as Class Counsel; 

B. That the contract, combination or conspiracy, and the acts done in furtherance 

thereof by Defendants and their co-conspirators as alleged in this complaint, be adjudicated and 

decreed a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1; 

C. That Plaintiffs and members of the Class recover damages sustained by them, as 

provided by the federal antitrust laws, and that a joint and several judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 

and the Class be entered against the Defendants in an amount to be trebled in accordance with 

the antitrust laws pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §15(a); 

D. That Defendants, their subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, transferees, assignees 

and the respective officers, directors, partners, agents and employees thereof and all other 

persons acting or claiming to act on their behalf be permanently enjoined and restrained from 

continuing and maintaining the combination, conspiracy or agreement alleged herein; 

E. That Plaintiffs and members of the Class recover their costs of this suit, including 

reasonable attorneys’ fees as provided by law; 

F. That Plaintiffs and members of the Class be awarded pre-judgment and postjudgment interest in accordance with law; and 

 G. That Plaintiffs and members of the Class receive such other or further relief as 

may be just and proper. 

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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury of all of the claims 

asserted in this Complaint so triable. 

Dated: June 26, 2015 /s/ David H. Fink 

David H. Fink (P28235) 

Darryl Bressack (P67820) 

FINK + ASSOCIATES LAW 

100 West Long Lake Road: Ste. 111 

Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 

Telephone: (248) 971-2500 

dfink@finkandassociateslaw.com 

dbressack@finkandassociateslaw.com 

Interim Liaison Counsel for 

Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs

Joseph C. Kohn Steven A. Kanner 

William E. Hoese William H. London 

Douglas A. Abrahams Michael E. Moskovitz 

KOHN SWIFT & GRAF, P.C. FREED KANNER LONDON 

One South Broad Street, Suite 2100 & MILLEN LLC 

Philadelphia, PA 19107 2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130 

Telephone: (215) 238-1700 Bannockburn, IL 60015 

jkohn@kohnswift.com Telephone: (224) 632-4500 

whoese@kohnswift.com skanner@fklmlaw.com 

dabrahams@kohnswift.com wlondon@fklmlaw.com 

 mmoskovitz@fklmlaw.com 

Eugene A. Spector Gregory P. Hansel 

William G. Caldes Randall B. Weill 

Jonathan M. Jagher Michael S. Smith 

Jeffrey L. Spector PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIEVAU 

SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF & PACHIOS LLP 

 & WILLIS, P.C. One City Center, P.O. Box 9546 

1818 Market Street, Suite 2500 Portland, ME 04112-9546 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (207) 791-3000 

Telephone: (215) 496-0300 ghansel @preti.com 

espector@srkw-law.com rweill@preti.com 

bcaldes@srkw-law.com msmithl@preti.com 

jjagher@srkw-law.com 

jspector@srkw-law.com 

Interim Lead Counsel for Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs 

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M. John Dominguez 

COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS 

& TOLL PLLC 

2925 PGA Boulevard, Suite 200 

Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 

(561) 515-1431 

Matthew W. Ruan 

COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS 

& TOLL PLLC 

88 Pine Street, 14th Floor 

New York, NY 10005 

(212) 838-7797 

Ruthanne Gordon 

BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C. 

1622 Locust Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

(215) 875-3000 

Irwin B. Levin 

COHEN & MALAD, LLP 

One Indiana Square, Suite 1400 

Indianapolis, IN 46204 

(317) 636-6481 

Bruce E. Gerstein 

GARWIN GERSTEIN & FISHER, LLP 

1501 Broadway, Suite 1416 

New York, NY 10036 

(212) 398-0055 

Lee Albert 

GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG LLP 

77 Water Street, 7th Floor 

New York, NY 10015 

(646) 722-4180 

Solomon B. Cera 

Thomas C. Bright 

Pamela A. Markert 

CERA LLP 

595 Market Street, Suite 2300 

San Francisco, CA 94105-2835 

(415) 777-2230 

Melissa Maxman 

Ronald F. Wick 

COZEN O’CONNOR 

The Army and Navy Building 

1627 I Street, NW 

Suite 1100 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

(202) 912-4800 

Linda P. Nussbaum 

NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C. 

570 Lexington Avenue, 19th Floor 

New York, NY 10022 

(212) 702-7053 

Vincent J. Esades 

HEINS MILLS & OLSON, P.L.C. 

310 Clifton Avenue 

Minneapolis, MN 55403 

(612) 338-4605 

Robert N. Kaplan 

KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP 

850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor 

New York, NY 10022 

(212) 687-1980 

Daniel Hume 

KIRBY MCINERNEY LLP 

825 Third Avenue 

New York, NY 10022 

(212) 371-6600 

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W. Joseph Bruckner 

LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL 

NAUEN P.L.L.P.

100 Washington Avenue South 

Minneapolis, MN 55401 

(612) 339-6900 

Lewis Goldfarb 

MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY 

& CARPENTER, LLP 

1300 Mount Kemble Avenue 

P.O. Box 2075 

Morristown, NJ 07962-2075 

(973) 425-8689 

Marvin A. Miller 

MILLER LAW LLC 

115 S. LaSalle Street, Suite 2910 

Chicago, IL 60603 

(312) 332-3400 

Jayne A. Goldstein 

POMERANTZ GROSSMAN HUFFORD 

DAHLSTROM & GROSS LLP 

1792 Bell Tower Lane, Suite 203 

Weston, FL 33326 

(954) 315-3454 

Jeffrey S. Goldenberg 

GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, LPA 

35 East Seventh Street, Suite 600 

Cincinnati, OH 45202 

(513) 345-8291 

Steven D. Irwin 

LEECH TISHMAN FUSCALDO 

& LAMPL, LLC 

525 William Penn Place, 30th Floor 

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

(412) 261-1600 

Steve Greenfogel 

LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC 

1521 Locust Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

(215) 564-5182 

Garret Blanchfield 

REINHARDT, WENDORF 

& BLANCHFIELD 

E-1250 First National Bank Bldg. 

332 Minnesota St. 

St. Paul, MN 55101 

(651) 287-2100 

R. Alexander Saveri 

SAVERI & SAVERI, INC. 

706 Sansome Street 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

(415) 217-6810 

Jason J. Thompson 

SOMMERS SCHWARTZ PC 

2000 Town Center, Suite 900 

Southfield, MI 48075 

(248) 355-0300 

Daniel J. Mogin 

THE MOGIN LAW FIRM, P.C. 

707 Broadway, Suite 1000 

San Diego, CA 92101 

(619) 687-6611 

Additional Counsel

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