```

[Journal of the House of Representatives, 1995]
[Thursday, May 18, 1995 (69), Para 69.24 Message from the President--National Emergency with Respect to Nuclear and Biological Weapons]
[Pages 800-801]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

para.69.24  message from the president--national emergency with respect 
          to nuclear and biological weapons

  The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. WALKER, laid before the House a message 
from the President, which was read as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:
  On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery 
(``weapons of mass destruction''), I issued Executive Order No. 12938 
and declared a national emergency under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
  As I described in the report transmitting Executive Order No. 12938, 
the new Executive order consolidated the functions of and revoked 
Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, which declared a 
national emergency with respect to the proliferation of chemical and 
biological weapons, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, 
which declared a national emergency with respect to nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons, and their means of delivery. The new Executive 
order also expanded certain existing authorities in order to strengthen 
the U.S. ability to respond to proliferation problems.
  The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and section 401(c) of the 
National Emergencies Act regarding activities taken and money spent 
pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional information on 
nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) 
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the annual report on the 
proliferation of missiles and essential components of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to 
section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation 
Report,'' and the annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to 
section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182).
  The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) are fully in force and continue 
to be used to control the export of items with potential use in chemical 
or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction.

  In the 6 months since I issued Executive Order No. 12938, the number 
of countries that have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
has reached 27 (out of 159 signatory countries). I am urging the Senate 
to give its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible. The 
CWC is a critical element of U.S. nonproliferation policy that will 
significantly enhance our security and that of our friends and allies. I 
believe that U.S. ratification will help to encourage the ratification 
process in other countries and, ultimately, the CWC's entry into force.
  The United States actively participates in the CWC Preparatory 
Commission in The Hague, the deliberative body drafting administrative 
and implementing procedures for the CWC. Last month, this body accepted 
the U.S. offer of an information management system for the future 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that will implement 
the CWC. The United States also is playing a leading role in developing 
a training program for international inspectors.
  The United States strongly supports international efforts to 
strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). In 
January 1995, the Ad Hoc Group mandated by the September 1994 BWC 
Special Conference to draft a legally binding instrument to strengthen 
the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BWC held its 
first meeting. The Group agreed on a program of work and schedule of 
substantive meetings, the first of which will occur in July 1995. The 
United States is pressing for completion of the Ad Hoc Group's work and 
consideration of the legally binding instrument by the next BWC Review 
Conference in 1996.
  The United States maintained its active participation in the 29-member 
Australia Group (AG), which now includes the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Romania. The AG reaffirmed in December the members' 
collective belief that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC provides 
the only means to achieve a permanent global ban on CBW, and that all 
states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to ensure that 
their national activities support these goals.
  The AG also reiterated its conviction that harmonized AG export 
licensing measures are consistent with, and indeed actively support, the 
requirement under Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, 
in any way, the manufacture of chemical weapons. These measures also are 
consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to facilitate 
the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials and related 
information for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, as they focus 
solely on preventing assistance to activities banned under the CWC. 
Similarly, such efforts also support existing nonproliferation 
obligations under the BWC.
  The United States Government determined that three foreign nationals 
(Luciano Moscatelli, Manfred Felber, and Gerhard Merz) had engaged in 
chemical weapons proliferation activities that required the imposition 
of sanctions against them, effective on November 19, 1994. Similar 
determinations were made against three foreign companies (Asian Ways 
Limited, Mainway International, and Worldco) effective on February 18, 
1995, and imposed sanctions against them. Additional information on 
these determinations is contained in a classified report to the 
Congress, provided pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. The United States 
Government continues to monitor closely activities that may be subject 
to CBW sanctions provisions.
  The United States continued to control vigilantly U.S. exports that 
could make a contribution to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of 
mass destruction, exercising restraint in considering all such transfers 
consistent with the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR). The MTCR Partners shared information not only with each other 
but with other possible supplier, consumer, and transshipment states 
about proliferation problems and also stressed the importance of 
implementing effective export control systems.

  The United States initiated unilateral efforts and coordinated with 
MTCR Partners in multilateral efforts, aimed at combatting missile 
proliferation by nonmembers and at encouraging nonmembers to adopt 
responsible export behavior and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. On 
October 4, 1994, the United States and China signed a Joint Statement on 
Missile Nonproliferation in which China reiterated

[[Page 801]]

its 1992 commitment to the MTCR Guidelines and agreed to ban the export 
of ground-to-ground MTCR-class missiles. In 1995, the United States met 
bilaterally with Ukraine in January, and with Russia in April, to 
discuss missile nonproliferation and the implementation of the MTCR 
Guidelines. In May 1995, the United States will participate with other 
MTCR Partners in a regime approach to Ukraine to discuss missile 
nonproliferation and to share information about the MTCR.
  The United States actively encouraged its MTCR Partners and fellow AG 
participants to adopt ``catch-all'' provisions, similar to that of the 
United States and EPCI, for items not subject to specific export 
controls. Austria, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom actually have 
such provisions in place. The European Union (EU) issued a directive in 
1994 calling on member countries to adopt ``catch-all'' controls. These 
controls will be implemented July 1, 1995. In line with this 
harmonization move, several countries, including European States that 
are not actually members of the EU, have adopted or are considering 
putting similar provisions in place.
  The United States has continued to pursue this Administration's 
nuclear nonproliferation goals. More than 170 nations joined in the 
indefinite, unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) on May 11, 1995. This historic decision strengthens the 
security of all countries, nuclear weapons states and nonweapons states 
alike.
  South Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), increasing NSG 
membership to 31 countries. The NSG held a plenary in Helsinki, April 5-
7, 1995, which focused on membership issues and the NSG's relationship 
to the NPT Conference. A separate, dual-use consultation meeting agreed 
upon 32 changes to the dual-use list.
  Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, I report 
that there were no expenses directly attributable to the exercise of 
authorities conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in 
Executive Order No. 12938 during the period from November 14, 1994, 
through May 14, 1995.

                                                   William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, May 18, 1995.

  By unanimous consent, the message was referred to the Committee on 
International Relations and ordered to be printed (H. Doc. 104-76).
```