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PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: HOW CAN DHS 

USE DOD TECHNOLOGY TO SECURE THE BORDER? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 15, 2011 

Serial No. 112–56 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Chairwoman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona, Vice Chair 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

PAUL ANSTINE, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 9 

WITNESSES

Mr. Paul N. Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and America’s Security Affairs, Office of Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, U.S. Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Mr. Mark S. Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 17 

Mr. Adam Cox, Deputy Director (Acting), Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 26 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 17 

Mr. Michael Tangora, Deputy Assistant Commandant and Director of Acquisition Services, United States Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 28 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 17 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Letter ..................................................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX

Questions for Paul N. Stockton From Honorable Michael T. McCaul ................ 47 

Questions for the Department of Homeland Security From Honorable Mike 

Rogers .................................................................................................................... 48 

Questions for the Department of Homeland Security From Honorable Michael 

T. McCaul ............................................................................................................. 48 

(1) 

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: HOW CAN DHS 

USE DOD TECHNOLOGY TO SECURE THE 

BORDER? 

Tuesday, November 15, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Miller, Rogers, McCaul, Duncan, 

Cuellar, Sanchez, Jackson Lee, Clarke of Michigan, and Thompson. 

Mrs. MILLER. Good morning, everyone. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will 

come to order. 

The subcommittee today is meeting to hear testimony from Paul 

Stockton, the assistant secretary of defense for Homeland Defense 

and America’s Security Affairs; Mark Borkowski, who is CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition chair; Dr. Adam Cox, 

acting deputy director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects; and Michael Tangora, of the U.S. Coast Guard— 

he is the deputy assistant commandant for acquisition on the use 

of Department of Defense technology by the Department of Homeland Security. So, fantastic witnesses that we have here today. 

Let me just recognize myself for an opening statement. 

We think that three main tools have really been brought to bear 

to help secure our Nation’s porous border: Personnel, of course; infrastructure; and technology. We have nearly doubled the size of 

the U.S. Border Patrol since 2004, and we have built nearly 650 

miles of vehicle and pedestrian fence. We have spent nearly $1 billion as a Nation on the now-cancelled Secure Border Initiative, 

SBInet, and we have had a number of hearings on that in this committee and our full committee, as well. 

Today we are having this hearing. We have called it today to examine how the Department of Homeland Security can use off-theshelf hardware, innovative Department of Defense technology and 

hardware to address the needs of the men and women who are 

charged with securing our Nation’s border. 

For years we have been trying the same basic technology on the 

borders: Some variation of cameras mounted onto towers. The 

SBInet was just the latest version of really a similar technology 

that we have been using on the Southwest Border for many years, 
2 

starting with ISIS, and then P28, and of course, the SBInet, and 

the successor, Integrated Fixed Towers. 

GAO’s recent report casts some doubt on CBP’s ability to accurately forecast the 10-year life-cycle cost for the Integrated Fixed 

Towers, roughly estimated at $1.5 billion, and add to that, of 

course, $1 billion, as I mentioned, already spent on SBInet where 

we just have coverage for about 53 miles of virtual fence, and this, 

of course, is a very serious investment by the American taxpayer 

thus far. 

Congress needs to be able to justify to the American people that 

our border is tangibly more secure as a result of that spending and 

other spending that we are doing, and I think that the budget situation, obviously, that we face is—all of us are painfully aware of 

what is happening at the Federal level here, and Federal funding 

levels are heading in one direction—down—and we need to be good 

stewards of very scarce taxpayer dollars to provide the security the 

American people demand. Again, keeping, in fact, in mind, being 

very cognizant of the fiscal restraints that we currently are operating under. 

My hope is that CBP will be listening to the concerns of GAO 

and that we look at possibilities of cost overruns and delays as we 

field the Integrated Fixed Towers and the mix of technologies selected to replace SBInet. Although we face challenges with the 

technology on the border, I am absolutely convinced that America 

certainly needs a robust technology solution for the border because 

we can’t build enough fence or afford thousands of additional 

agents to link arms to prevent illegal crossings or do drug interdiction and other kinds of things. Technology, if properly applied, can 

leverage the Nation’s previous investment in manpower and infrastructure to more effectively secure our borders. 

For some time myself, along with many of my colleagues here on 

the dais, have been advocating for the use of the Department of Defense—the DOD’s technology to be tested and, where appropriate, 

to be used where it has application along our Nation’s borders. Of 

course, again, we are thinking of this because the American taxpayer has already spent their money—they spent billions of dollars 

on R&D, on research and development, to test, to prove, to field all 

kinds of various types of equipment. 

I think as our military is now drawing down in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan we should, certainly at a minimum, consider using 

DOD equipment to determine if it can fill a capabilities gap right 

here at home instead of, perhaps, just putting it out into a warehouse or looking at other uses for it. I think there are some real 

applications for DOD in regards to DHS. 

The Predator B, the drone, is perhaps the best example of how 

DOD technology can be successfully utilized along the border. It 

has literally revolutionized how we fight insurgents in the border 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the officials at the Department of Homeland rightly saw the potential for its use here at 

home, and now we have eight unmanned aerial vehicles patrolling 

the skies over the Northern Border, the Southern Border, the 

Coastal Borders, as well. Again, my colleagues and I have had a 

number of hearings on the UAVs. 
3 

Aerostats are another surveillance platform that has been used 

successfully in theater, being currently used along the border, and 

I think if surplus aerostats come back from theater that they could 

be used to increase our central awareness along the Southwest Border. That was actually an amendment filed to the reauthorization 

that this committee recently did by my Ranking Member and Mr. 

McCaul, in regards to the aerostats. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine the process that the 

Department of Homeland Security uses to locate—what they call 

foraging—forage for technology that has application for the homeland environment. Science and Technology has an important role 

to play in helping the Department of Homeland Security component understand what technology is available for use and what 

technology is being developed to meet our capability gaps. 

DOD has some small-scale technology transfer programs for the 

Nation’s first responders, and I certainly commend them for the 

work that they do through that program. But it is also our intent 

to see what Congress can do to facilitate the transfer of larger, 

more sophisticated technology solutions, as I mentioned, like the 

Predator drone, tunnel detection, and a wide area of surveillance 

platforms. 

DOD is obviously a huge organization, and I think we are somewhat concerned that there is not one single office that the Department of Homeland Security can go to to find technology solutions 

that may have applicability for our border security efforts, and we 

will be asking some questions about that today. Certainly not every 

piece of equipment within the DOD inventory will work on the border or be affordable by the Department of Homeland, but there 

should be some sort of a formal structure to facilitate the testing 

and the evaluation of equipment to see what works and what 

doesn’t. 

DHS should be constantly searching for technology already purchased by the Government to help our agents better secure the Nation, both at home and—at our borders and between the ports of 

entry, as well. So I certainly look forward to the testimony of all 

of our witnesses. 

That really is the predicate for our hearing this morning, as we 

keep thinking about an evolving world and less money at the Federal level, and how we can actually utilize so many of these various 

things that I say are sort of off-the-shelf hardware from the Department of Defense that have application for securing our border. 

I think we have a lot of fertile territory there to till, and especially, 

as we have mentioned, in light of the fact of the drawdown in theater in Iraq and Afghanistan. How can we utilize some of these 

things very, very effectively? 

With that, I would recognize my Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Cuellar, for his opening statements. 

[The statement of Chairwoman Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN CANDICE S. MILLER

NOVEMBER 15, 2011 

Three main tools have been brought to bear to help secure the Nation’s porous 

border: Personnel, infrastructure, and technology. We have nearly doubled the size 

of the U.S. Border Patrol since 2004, we have built nearly 650 miles of vehicle and 
4 

pedestrian fence, and we have spent nearly $1 billion on the now-cancelled Secure 

Border Initiative. I have called this hearing today to examine how DHS can use offthe-shelf, innovative Department of Defense technology and hardware to address 

the needs of the men and women who are charged with securing our border. 

For years we have been using the same basic technology on the borders—cameras 

mounted on towers. SBInet was just the latest version of the same technology we 

have been using on the Southwest Border for years starting with ISIS, P–28, 

SBInet, and the successor—Integrated Fixed Towers. All of these high-technology 

solutions have a less than stellar track record on the Southwest Border due to a 

combination of mismanagement, poor planning, and a top-down approach that failed 

to take into account the actual needs of the Border Patrol Agents on the ground. 

GAO’s recent report casts some more doubt on CBP’s ability to accurately forecast 

the 10-year life-cycle cost for the Integrated Fixed Towers—roughly estimated at 

$1.5 billion dollars. Add that to the $1 billion already spent on SBInet for just 53 

miles of virtual fence and we are talking about a serious investment by the American taxpayer. Congress needs to be able to justify to the American people that our 

border is tangibly more secure as a result of that spending. My hope is that CBP 

will listen to the concerns of GAO and will not lead us down that same path with 

cost overruns and delays as we field the Integrated Fixed Towers. 

Although we have faced challenges with technology on the border, America still 

needs a robust technological solution because we can’t build enough fence or afford 

thousands of additional agents to link arms to prevent illegal crossings. Technology, 

if properly applied, can leverage the Nation’s previous investment in manpower and 

infrastructure to more effectively secure our borders. However, let us be under no 

illusion, the budget situation is dire, and we need to be good stewards of scarce taxpayer dollars to provide the security the American people demand, without breaking 

the bank. 

For some time I, along with some of my colleagues here on the dais, have been 

advocating for the use of Department of Defense technology to be tested, and where 

appropriate, used along the Nation’s borders. The reason is simple, the American 

taxpayer has already spent billions of research and development dollars to test, 

prove, and field such equipment. As our military draws down in Iraq and Afghanistan we should, at a minimum, consider using Department of Defense equipment 

to determine if it can fill a capabilities gap here at home instead of collecting dust 

on a shelf or in a warehouse. 

The Predator B is perhaps the best example of how DOD technology can be successfully used along the border. It has literally revolutionized how we fight insurgents in the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Officials at DHS rightly saw 

the potential for its use here at home and now we have eight unmanned aerial vehicles patrolling the skies over the Northern, Southern, and Coastal Borders. 

Aerostats are another surveillance platform that has been used successfully in theater, and should be tested along the border. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine the process that DHS uses to locate 

technology that has application for the homeland environment. I have no doubt 

there are other technologies waiting to be found and applied to defend the homeland. The Science and Technology Directorate has an important role to play in helping DHS components understand what technology is available for use, and what 

technology is being developed to meet our capability gaps. 

I understand that DOD has some small-scale technology transfer programs for the 

Nation’s first responders, and I commend them for the work they do through that 

program, but my intent is to see what Congress can do to facilitate the transfer of 

sophisticated technology solutions specifically for use by DHS. 

DOD is a huge organization and I am concerned that there is not one single office 

that DHS can go to and find technology solutions that may have applicability for 

our border security efforts. Not every piece of equipment within the DOD inventory 

will work on the border, but there should be a formal structure to facilitate the testing and evaluation of equipment to see what works, and what doesn’t. DHS should 

be constantly searching for technology already purchased by Government to help our 

agents better secure the Nation both at and between the ports of entry. 

I look forward to the witness’s testimony. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for 

holding this meeting today. 

Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

Madam Chairwoman, if you would ask me just—I mean, allow 

me just for a point I just noticed that my brother, who is a sheriff 

on the border, Martin Cuellar, who served with DPS, Narcotics, 
5 

and Intelligence, I believe, for about 27 years, just walked in. So 

if you don’t mind, just to keep family harmony together, I would 

ask my brother, and I think he has got some of his deputies also 

here. 

So, Martin Cuellar, up there. Just—— 

Mrs. MILLER. Welcome. Welcome. We appreciate your service— 

and your brother. Everyone in your family. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Let me, again, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

As a Member of Congress representing a district along the 

Southern Border I have had the opportunity to see first-hand the 

benefits of the Department of Homeland Security’s collaboration 

with the Department of Defense, with the—working with Mr. 

Borkowski, also, and other folks there, and of course the Coast 

Guard, also, along on our border security technology. Last year 

both Mr. McCaul and some of the Members who were down there, 

and we saw a DHS-DOD operation on Laredo, Texas, where technology was used to secure the border. 

Mr. Borkowski, thank you, again, for being there with us at that 

time. 

DIA, I believe, was the other partner. Again, I think this is something that, you know, we have been on it, as the Chairwoman said. 

We have been asking the SBI and the Science and Technology 

parts of DHS to look at what taxpayers have paid already and see 

what the Department of Defense has so we can go ahead and use 

that as much as possible along the Southern Border. 

I truly understand, some things we can use, some things we can’t 

use. But working together, I think, it will be important. 

Along with, again, with my other colleagues from Texas, Mr. 

McCaul and myself, we have been supporters of the DHS use of unmanned aerial systems, the UAS, along the border. We just got our 

second one down there. We will be working with General Kostelnik 

on that one. 

Again, this is another example of how technology developed for 

the DOD has been a proven invaluable DHS border security mission. Most recently, with Chairman McCaul, we traveled on a Congressional delegation—Mr. Duncan, I believe—well, Mr. Duncan 

was with us, also, and we traveled to the Middle East down there, 

and when we were in Iraq and Afghanistan we saw some of the 

technology that I think will have an application for Homeland Security. 

As the military drawdown in Iraq continues there may be technology and equipment that is no longer needed there but may be 

used through DHS, and I think the questions that I asked there 

was, ‘‘What are we going to do with the billions of dollars of assets, 

which includes technology?’’ The answer that General Austin there 

gave us there, and the ambassador, was that: No. 1, part of it will 

be transferred to Afghanistan; No. 2, some of it will be repositioned 

in Kuwait or wherever the case might be; and No. 3, the rest will 

be—or the—part of it will be coming down to the United States. 

Of course, our question is: No. 1, how does DHS use that? No. 

2, how do we have State officials—for example, the Texas National 

Guard has communicated both to McCaul and myself that they are 

interested in some of the equipment resources that they can certainly use for the border, and certainly in California, Arizona, New 
6 

Mexico, or other areas, and the northern area, also, that can be 

used also. 

One of the issues that came up—and I believe, Assistant Secretary Stockton, you will address this issue—was how do we pay 

for this? Because most of it is—for example, a sheriff or police can 

get on a website and say, ‘‘This is equipment that we want.’’ 

But the understanding, at least what they told us in Iraq, and 

I think you gave us a—you are going to give us an answer, was 

that, who is going to pay for this technology? I mean, you are going 

to have a small town sheriff that is going to say, ‘‘I want this technology, but how much would it cost to bring it from Iraq all the 

way down to Arizona?’’, for example, and it might be prohibitive. 

But my understanding is it might be where there is excess space 

that they can put on, and we certainly would like for the committee 

to hear this is something that the Northern Border, the Southern 

Border can certainly use. Whether it is DHS, Mr. Borkowski, 

whether it is a sheriff, or National Guard, I think this is something 

that we certainly want to look at as to how we can do that. Because 

I was talking to Mr. Norm Dicks about putting some language 

there in the appropriation bill to see if we can take care of it, but 

if it is something that you all could handle, or it is something that 

we might have to follow up, I would ask you to do that. 

So again, I am also pleased that we also have the Coast Guard 

present here. You know, when we talk about border security technology that facilitates the interdiction, whether it is narcotics, or 

undocumented aliens, or those who wish to do harm to us, we know 

that people will take the route where they perceive to offer the best 

opportunity to enter the country. If we secure the land borders and 

the maritime borders people will, you know, if we take care of the 

land they will go through the maritime, or push on the maritime 

they will come in. It is like a balloon that you press, and they will 

pop up somewhere else. 

So we have got to make sure that we are all working along, and 

certainly the maritime, the Coast Guard, is something, and certainly on the Texas border we have the Rio Grande. It is an area 

of international waters. We had a little discussion with Coast 

Guard, and I think you have, I think we are all on the same page 

that it is international waters. 

I think you all are doing some pulse—especially in Lake Falcon, 

as you remember, Madam Chairwoman, that is where the individual got killed, which happened 21⁄2 miles on the Mexican side— 

not on the U.S. side, for emphasis. Then you have Lake Amistad, 

also, where you do some of that work, also, there. 

Last year’s Coast Guard authorization I added some language— 

authored some language that directed the Coast Guard to prepare 

a mission requirement analysis for the navigable parts of Rio 

Grande, which includes those two large lakes. We finally got a 

copy, little late, but we finally got a copy of this. Members, I am 

going to provide to you, for official use only; this is not to be shared 

with the public, but for official use, and this will be handed out to 

the committee Members. 

But I asked Coast Guard to put something out that we can put 

out in public, so I would ask, Madam Chairwoman, that this letter 
7 

that is addressed to me from the Coast Guard to be made part of 

the record. 

Mrs. MILLER. Without objection. 
8 

Mr. CUELLAR. Basically there are, because we want to use technology, and we will look at the risk, but the main thing that came 

out of this—and this is important for you to note—this is the Coast 

Guard saying this, this is no—this is the Coast Guard. Let me just 

leave it like this. 

But the main thing is, when they talked about the drug cartels 

and what sort of violence they provide, they said on the Mexican 

side the drug cartels it is a high threat; on the U.S. side—and I 

emphasize this—on the U.S. side the Coast Guard said that it was 

a moderate threat to the United States, at least on the navigable 

part, on the lake part of it. 

So when you look at the drug trafficking organizations and what 

challenges they have—and as you know, they have a low, a moderate, and I think it is a high one, there are about four of them— 

just for the record, the Coast Guard said it was a moderate threat 

on the U.S. side. When we asked them, also, about smuggling of 

migrants, at least on the water side of it, on the border Rio Grande 

and the lakes, they said that the level of migrant activity has been 

relatively low compared to other parts of the country itself. 

So therefore, when we were asking—the reason I put this assessment, because I wanted to get an assessment so we can get the 

Coast Guard involved a lot more instead of a pulse—I think you 

all go, like, every quarter, you do your fly-overs and put your boats 

out there. 

Based on this report, Members, they are saying, what we are 

doing now, the pulse, is sufficient, and therefore, this is what they 

are doing. So I would ask you to look at this report. 

Finally, just to go ahead and conclude, we know that we are in 

particularly tough budgetary times, but again, as the Madam 

Chairwoman and a lot of us have been saying for a long time, if 

there are taxpayers’ dollars that are being used for Defense let’s 

use that for Homeland Security. So I certainly look forward to listening to the witnesses, and I thank you all very much. 
9 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank the gentleman. The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman 

from Mississippi, for his opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, for 

holding this hearing. I welcome and look forward to the testimony 

of our witnesses. 

This committee has a long history of oversight of the Department 

of Homeland Security’s efforts to deploy technology along our Nation’s border. Since the inception of DHS’s efforts, Department of 

Defense technology and expertise has played an important role. 

To the extent that the DoD has technology or equipment that 

may be useful to DHS’s mission to secure the homeland, it makes 

sense that DHS take advantage of those sources whenever possible. 

Particularly in the current budget environment, the Federal Government must make taxpayers’ dollars go further. 

I hope to hear from our witnesses today about the existing relationship between DoD and DHS regarding security technologies. I 

would also like to hear whether the witnesses believe a more formal, comprehensive process for technology transfer between the 

agencies would be advantageous. 

That being said, we should be mindful that there are limitations 

to this approach to border security technology. DHS and DoD have 

different missions, so it stands to reason their technologies may differ. In some cases, a less elaborate, more affordable technology may 

fully meet DHS’s requirement, and those kind of technologies 

should not be overlooked. 

Even where the agencies’ needs align, there are likely to be obstacles. For example, just because a technology works in Afghanistan does not mean it will work in Arizona. Technology may have 

to be adapted due to differences in terrain and climate, or it may 

simply be inappropriate for use in the homeland. 

Also, just because a technology fits within DoD’s budget does not 

necessarily mean it will fit within DHS’s budget. DoD’s technology 

acquisition budget is orders of magnitude greater than DHS’s, so 

what is affordable for one agency may not be for the other. 

I hope to hear from our DHS witnesses about these challenges 

and how they address them as they examine the array of available 

security technologies. 

Also, since we are here today to discuss border security technology, I would be remiss if I did not address a report released this 

month by GAO on Customs and Border Protection’s Arizona Border 

Surveillance Technology Plan. In short, GAO found that DHS does 

not have the information necessary to fully support and implement 

the estimated $1.5 billion plan, which is the successor to the cancelled SBInet program. 

More specifically, the report states that DHS does not yet demonstrate the effectiveness and suitability of its new approach for 

deploying surveillance technology in Arizona and that it needs to 

document how, where, and why it plans to deploy specific combinations of technology prior to its acquisition and deployment. Also, 

GAO found that $1.5 billion 10-year cost estimate for the program 

may not be reliable. 

I have said that the similarities GAO found between the failed 

SBInet program and aspects of the planned Arizona Border Sur-
10 

veillance Technology Plan are both striking and troubling. There is 

still time for DHS to avoid another failed border security technology project, but DHS must heed GAO’s recommendation by conducting a thorough and accurate cost analysis and carefully planning the purchase and deployment of technology. 

I certainly hope CBP is following through on GAO’s recommendation, and I would ask Mr. Borkowski to speak to that issue today. 

I thank our witnesses for joining us, and I look forward to their 

testimony. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank the gentleman very much for his opening 

statement. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that their opening statements may be submitted for the record. Then what I am 

going to do is go through the bios of each one of our witnesses 

today, and then we will start with Mr. Stockton. 

Paul Stockton is the assistant secretary of defense for Homeland 

Defense and America’s Security Affairs. In this position he is responsible for the supervision of homeland defense activities, defense support for civilian authorities, and Western Hemisphere security affairs for the Department of Defense. Prior to his confirmation, Assistant Secretary Stockton was a senior research scholar at 

Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. 

Mark Borkowski became the assistant commissioner for the Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition with U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection in July 2010. He is responsible for ensuring 

technology efforts are properly focused on mission and well-integrated across CBP and for strengthening effectiveness in acquisition and program management. 

Prior to his appointment as the assistant commissioner Mr. 

Borkowski was named executive director of the SBInet. As executive director, he oversees the Department of Homeland Security’s 

implementation of SBI at U.S. Customs and Border Protection and 

oversees the continued efforts to develop border security resources 

that will provide enhanced situational awareness for front-line CBP 

personnel. 

Mr. Borkowski served over 23 years on active duty in the United 

States Air Force, retiring at the rank of colonel. 

Dr. Adam Cox is currently the acting deputy director of the 

Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency. Formerly, 

he was the chief of staff for the Strategy, Policy, and Budget Division. In this role he acted as a principal liaison with Congressional 

staff and OMB and worked to align DHS S&T programs with the 

priorities and goals of the administration, Congress, and the Department. 

Michael Tangora is the deputy assistant commandant for acquisition and director of acquisition services for the United States Coast 

Guard. Prior to assuming this role he served as deputy program executive officer for the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System. 

A Level 3 acquisition and program management professional, he 

came to the Coast Guard from the Navy, where he served as the 

deputy program manager for the Navy’s aircraft carrier programs. 

He was previously assigned as the assistant program manager 

and technical director for surface mine warfare systems programs, 
11 

where he was responsible for the Navy’s total mine inventory, as 

well as all mine warfare sonar and autonomous vehicles used to 

persecute enemy mines. 

Very, very distinguished panel, so we appreciate all of you coming today and look forward to your testimony and Q&A, as well. 

We will start with Mr. Stockton. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL N. STOCKTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND AMERICA’S SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. STOCKTON. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I am going to cut to the 

chase right now: We have an historic opportunity with the drawdown of operations outside the United States to continue to press 

forward to find ways of supporting the Department of Homeland 

Security, our other Federal partners, State and local first responders, so the military technology that you pointed out, Chairwoman, 

that the taxpayers already pay to develop, that we find ways of 

transferring that technology at a time when the budgets of our 

State and local first responders are under incredible pressure. 

This is a great opportunity. We have a one-stop shopping opportunity for our Federal partners and for the State and local first responders with whom we coordinate. That is me. That is what I do. 

It is a responsibility I take very, very seriously, and I will be happy 

to talk a little bit more about how that process works a little bit 

later. 

But first, let me take just a couple of moments to briefly summarize the programs that we have underway, especially those programs, Ranking Member Cuellar, that recognize the problem of affordability. First of all, we have acquisition programs in the Department of Defense to facilitate Federal, State, and local agency 

acquisition of equipment from the Department of Defense. So we, 

in summary, for certain scarce types of technology and equipment, 

we make it possible to buy these pieces of equipment from the Department of Defense. 

I think more valuable, given the kind of budget crunch that 

States and localities are in today, are our excess property programs. We operate programs to transfer excess DoD equipment to 

Federal, State, and local agencies. In 50 States and more than 

1,700 Federal, State, and local agencies they have received over 

$2.6 billion worth of donated excess DoD equipment for use in 

counterdrug, counterterrorism activities, border security. 

Let me emphasize that we are drastically ramping up the pace 

at which we are able to provide this equipment that our first responders and our Federal partners say they need. This year alone 

we have gone—my testimony says $500 million—we have just 

passed $600 million worth of equipment in this fiscal year alone 

that is required by States and localities and our Federal partners 

in order to do their jobs, including support to border security. 

Let me give you some examples: 27 light armored vehicles provided to law enforcement organizations in 10 States; three C–12 

aircraft worth $4 million each to California’s Department of Forestry, fire protection; tactical vehicles and helicopters worth $5 mil-
12 

lion that went to DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement; robots, radiological detection equipment. Lots and lots of valuable 

equipment that DoD was able to acquire thanks to the taxpayers 

we are now transferring to our Federal partners and our State and 

local first responders, recognizing the budget crunch that they are 

in. 

We also have another way of transferring DoD equipment to our 

partners that is low-cost, and that is equipment loan-lease programs. So, for example, robotics for IEDs and other explosive ordinance disposal—very, very expensive to have these robots for local 

governments to purchase them; instead, we loan these robots to 

local law enforcement agencies, other public safety organizations. 

We enable bomb squads to meet their certification requirements. 

We have a night vision loan pool that provides very expensive 

night vision equipment to local law enforcement jurisdictions on a 

loan basis. We maintain the pool. We provide it to those agencies 

in 48 States. 

Then we have expertise-sharing. You pointed out, Chairman, 

that the Department of Defense has acquired enormous expertise 

in dealing with explosive ordinance disposal, other kinds of challenges that we have faced abroad. Now we provide that kind of 

training, for example, to the Hazardous Devices School, an FBI investigation facility which is operated in Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. 

I will point out that I have had the honor of supporting the Center for Domestic Preparedness in my past life. It is a wonderful institution, and in my old job in the Department of Defense we really 

enjoyed having an opportunity to support the curriculum development and the very important work that CDP continues to do. 

We have dual-use technologies that I hope to be able to speak to 

later. It is all in my testimony, and I see my time is up. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stockton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL N. STOCKTON

NOVEMBER 15, 2011 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the Department 

of Defense’s (DoD’s) programs for transferring capabilities and equipment to its Federal, State, and local partners. 

DoD supports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other Federal 

partners, as part of a whole-of-Government, whole-of-Nation approach to both domestic security and domestic incident response. One of the pillars of the Department’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is to promote the integrating and sharing of applicable DoD capabilities, equipment, technologies, and 

technical expertise with Federal, State, local, Tribal, and private sector partners. 

This sharing arrangement strengthens the Nation’s ability to respond to threats and 

domestic emergencies. DoD continues to work closely with its interagency partners, 

in particular DHS, to build capacity vertically from the Federal level down to the 

local level, and horizontally across the Federal Government. I want to thank Congress for providing DoD with the tools that are absolutely essential to making this 

possible. 

In accordance with Section 1401 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Pub. L. 107–314), I serve as the senior DoD official 

responsible for coordinating ‘‘all Department of Defense efforts to identify, evaluate, 

deploy, and transfer to Federal, State, and local first responders technology items 

and equipment in support of homeland security.’’ To this end, I established what 
13 

1 10 U.S.C. § 2576, which was established by section 403(a) of an Act to authorize appropriations for DoD for Fiscal Year 1969 (Pub. L. 90–500). 2Section 1072 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 

(Pub. L. 111–383). 3 10 U.S.C. § 381, which was established by section 1122 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Pub. L. 103–160). 4Section 885 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 

(Pub. L. 110–417). 5 10 U.S.C. § 2576a, which was established by section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Pub. L. 104–201). 6 10 U.S.C. § 2576b, which was established by section 1706 of Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. 106–398). 7 10 U.S.C. § 2576a, which was established by section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Pub. L. 104–201). 8 10 U.S.C. § 2576b, which was established by section 1706 of Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. 106–398). 9Original Acquisition Value. 

I call the ‘‘DoD Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative.’’ Through this program, 

I work closely with DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and our other Federal, 

State, and local partners. 

The Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative focuses on five approaches: Acquisition programs; excess property programs; equipment loan-lease programs; expertise 

sharing; and the leveraging of dual-use technologies developed by DoD. 

ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

DoD operates several programs to facilitate Federal, State, and local agency acquisition of equipment from DoD. For instance, in September 1968, Congress authorized DoD to sell 2 suitable surplus equipment to State and local law enforcement and firefighting agencies.1 In 2010, DoD championed, and Congress passed, 

an expansion of this authority to include homeland security and emergency management agencies.2 In November 1993, Congress authorized State and local governments to purchase law enforcement equipment suitable for counter-drug activities 

through DoD.3 In 2008, DoD championed, and Congress passed, an expansion of this 

authority to include equipment suitable for homeland security and emergency response activities.4 In September 1996, Congress authorized DoD to sell or donate 

to Federal and State law enforcement agencies excess property suitable for use by 

the agencies in law enforcement activities, including counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities.5 In October 2000, Congress authorized DoD to sell or donate to 

State firefighting agencies excess property suitable for use in fire and emergency 

medical services.6

At least 43 States access DoD procurement contracts through these programs, allowing law enforcement agencies to purchase weapons and ammunition; chemical 

and biological defense equipment (e.g., decontamination, full body protection, shelter 

protection, and respiration protection); aviation support equipment (e.g., aviation 

parts and support items); and communications and electronics equipment (e.g., early 

warning systems, tactical radios, and night vision goggles). 

EXCESS PROPERTY PROGRAMS

DoD also operates programs to transfer excess DoD equipment to Federal, State, 

and local agencies. For example, as noted above, in September 1996, Congress authorized DoD to donate to Federal and State law enforcement agencies excess property suitable for use in counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities.7 Also, as noted 

above, in October 2000, Congress authorized DoD to donate State firefighting agencies excess property suitable for use in firefighting activities.8

All 50 States and more than 17,000 Federal, State, and local agencies have re- ceived more than $2.6 billion 9 worth of donated excess DoD equipment for use in counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities, almost $500 million of this in fiscal 

year 2011 alone. More than 2,200 Fire Departments and State Forestry Departments in at least 32 States have received excess DoD equipment for use in firefighting activities. From fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2010, these States received 

more than $382 million worth of equipment, including more than 5,927 vehicles and 

trailers. Other donations included: • Twenty-seven light armored vehicles (V–150s and V–300s), worth $500,000 

each, that went to 10 States (in 2007 and 2009). • Three C–12 aircraft, worth $4 million each, that went to California’s Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (in 2008). • Winches, hoists, and cranes; tents and tarps; guns up to .30 caliber; and field 

litters, worth approximately $638,000, that went to DHS/Customs and Border 
14 

Protection (CBP) (in 2010). In addition, 34 snowmobiles to patrol the border, 

thereby saving more than $150,000, also went to DHS/CBP (also in 2010). • Tactical vehicles and five helicopters, worth approximately $5 million, that went 

to DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). • An excess DoD Mark II robot, originally valued at $55,000, that went to the 

Ashland County Bomb Squad in Ohio. • Through a partnership with DHS, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the 

Health Physics Society (the Homeland Defense Equipment Reuse (HDER) Program), excess DoD radiological detection instrumentation and other equipment, 

as well as no-cost training and long-term technical support, that went to emergency responders. 

EQUIPMENT LOAN-LEASE PROGRAMS

DoD’s equipment loan-lease program provides Federal, State, and local agencies 

access to valuable capabilities. These agencies then have an opportunity to use, 

evaluate, and experiment with these capabilities in return for feedback on their effectiveness in the field. For example, DoD’s Robotics Loan Pool loaned robotic systems to public safety organizations. Currently, five robots are on loan in Massachusetts and Hawaii. Over the life of this program, more than 100 Government organizations, mostly State and local agencies, and 22 commercial entities participated in 

this program. In many cases, Government organizations used this loan program to 

enable bomb squads to meet their certification requirements. In general, commercial 

entities used this program to develop new payloads for use by the military and first 

responders. DoD’s Night Vision Loan Pool provides State law enforcement agencies 

with a low-cost (i.e., $300 annually), low-maintenance alternative to purchasing 

night vision devices. Currently, approximately 1,231 night vision devices are on loan 

to 429 agencies in 48 States. 

EXPERTISE SHARING

By sharing DoD’s expertise with our Federal, State, and local partners we help 

improve their capabilities. In return, DoD can readily leverage the expertise and experience of its partners to improve DoD’s capabilities. The Hazardous Devices 

School (HDS), a Federal Bureau of Investigation facility, which is operated by the 

Army’s Ordnance Munitions and Electronics Maintenance School at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, trains Federal, State, and local bomb squads. Since 1971, HDS has 

trained and accredited thousands of technicians, including more than 50 new bomb 

squads since September 11, 2011. The Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical 

Assistance Program (DPETAP), which is executed by the Army’s Pine Bluff Arsenal, 

Arkansas, provides mobile teams to provide on-site technical assistance to first responders for selecting, operating, and maintaining radiological, chemical, and biological equipment. The Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP), which is executed by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 

(SPAWAR) Pacific, has helped more than 75 States and metropolitan areas to develop and implement regional communications plans using the Communication 

Asset Survey and Mapping Tool (CASM). ICTAP addresses interoperability issues, 

including governance and planning, technical needs and solutions, and exercising 

and training. 

DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES

DoD research and development has led to the production of many items that are 

now routinely used by our Federal, State, and local partners. DoD works closely 

with its partners to leverage potential ‘‘dual-use technologies’’ originally developed 

for military application for civilian applications. As an example, DoD assisted the 

U.S. Coast Guard in evaluating sensors and platforms that could enhance its ability 

to conduct wide area surveillance to detect, identify, and track vessels of interest. 

Likewise, in 2003, a Predator B Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), scheduled for future delivery to DoD, operated in support of DHS/ICE Operation SAFEGUARD, a 

joint humanitarian/law enforcement effort along the Southwest Border. Operation 

SAFEGUARD provided an opportunity for DoD to demonstrate UAV capabilities to 

border authorities and also served to highlight the policy, legal, and infrastructure 

issues that must be examined in tandem with technology development. These include challenges associated with the use of UAVs in controlled domestic airspace as 

well as the extensive infrastructure (e.g., communications, exploitation tools, and 

imagery analysts) required to process and exploit information collected by UAVs. In 

addition, in 2008, DoD developed and installed a fiber optic-based seismic acoustic 

sensor prototype system in the San Diego area. In 2009, DHS purchased this system 

and continues to support its operational evaluation by the San Diego Tunnel Task 
15 

10The bulk of TSWG core funding is provided by DoD. Additional funding is supplied by the 

Department of State, while other Federal departments and agencies share the costs of selected 

projects. 

Force. Also in 2009, DoD supported DHS’s proof-of-concept demonstration for an advanced ground penetrating radar technology for use in cross-border tunnel detection. 

The results of this demonstration warranted continued development and testing efforts in 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, DoD and DHS are cosponsoring a ‘‘Tunnel Detection’’ Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). U.S. Northern Command is the DoD proponent for this demonstration, and as the technologies mature, 

they are expected to be fielded for use by DoD and DHS organizations at home and 

abroad. 

DoD’s Counterterrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO), which oversees the 

interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) (85 Federal agencies, including DHS, DOJ, DOE, and the Department of Health and Human Services, work together to research and develop, test and evaluate, and deliver combating terrorism 

capabilities to the National interagency community rapidly),10 is currently developing capabilities to detect, locate, monitor, and disrupt subterranean operations in 

semi-permissive and non-permissive environments to allow tactical forces to conduct 

operations and counter hostile and/or criminal networks. Current, CTTSO countertunnel projects of interest include: • Portable Ground-Penetrating Radar.—Battery powered, man-portable, 

ruggedized system to detect subterranean structures (tunnels, bunkers, and 

caches) to a minimum depth of 15 feet, with antenna configuration to allow for 

operation by one person and be employable in any terrain. • Improved Underground Communications.—A planned proof-of-concept involving 

multiple technology demonstrations, which is currently investigating if further 

funding is warranted. 

• Remote Imaging and Detection of Underground Anomalies.—A proven prototype 

that implements laser technology to identify buried objects (e.g., caches and improvised explosive devices). In fiscal year 2011, development of this prototype 

was expanded to determine if the technology is capable of detecting voids. 

• Seismic-Acoustic Sensor Kit.—A mobile seismic acoustic sensor system designed 

to detect underground activity with the intent of easy deployment and operation 

in a temporary environment (though permanent installation is also an option). 

CONCLUSION

At the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin is reported 

to have said, ‘‘We must, indeed, all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang 

separately.’’ Similarly, as we—Federal, State, and local government agencies, the 

public sector and the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and individual 

citizens—share the burden of the threats challenging our Nation, so too must we 

share our strengths and capabilities to meet these challenges more effectively. If we 

do not, assuredly we shall all hang separately. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished Members of the subcommittee: I commend you for your leadership, continued interest, efforts, and support in DoD’s defense of the United States and support to civil authorities here at 

home. I look forward to working with you in the future. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Borkowski for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MARK S. BORKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Thank you. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, Ranking Member 

Thompson, distinguished Members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here before you again to talk about CBP’s plans for technology and how we interact with DoD. My two colleagues and I 

have submitted joint written testimony, but we will each have brief 

opening remarks from our own perspective on this issue. 
16 

If you do look at that written technology you will see that what 

we did is we tried to cast a picture to show that we have had a 

long and extensive and very broad relationship with the Department of Defense, looking at a whole range of technologies, and ability to evaluate them, and operational concepts. In fact, from that 

relationship we have derived our plan going forward—the plan that 

replaced—I am not so sure I am prepared to say succeeds—replaced SBInet. Because that plan itself is a plan that is based on 

existing technology, many elements of which come from DoD. 

Elements of that are, in fact, systems that Congressman Cuellar, 

Congressman McCaul, and I went and looked and in Laredo in November. So I think it is important to start with that. This is a different technology approach. 

When we talk about things like the GAO report, where we are 

contrasted with SBInet, I would just call the committee’s attention 

to the fact that another contrast might be with the way we bought 

remote video surveillance systems for the Northern Border. Didn’t 

hear a lot of problems with that because we changed our method 

of buying them, and that method we applied to the Northern Border is the method we are applying now to the Southern Border. 

Also, interestingly enough, what we bought on the Northern Border are systems we are buying and estimated the cost for on the 

Southern Border. So while it is true that we need to be attentive 

to the risks in the plan going forward, it is a much different plan, 

and it is a plan that is based on existing available technologies. 

Even the IFT—the Integrated Fixed Towers, which are one element 

of that plan—is not SBInet. It is not a successor. It is not a development program. It is a program that is based on available systems, including systems that are available in the Department of 

Defense today. 

So our whole approach to the initial deployment of technology on 

the border is based very much with the kinds of concepts that I 

think this committee is interested in, and we will continue to do 

that. 

It is interesting, because I have had a little trouble explaining 

this, and perhaps I am not as eloquent, perhaps, as General 

Schwartz, but I was reminded of something that General Schwartz, 

the chief of staff of the Air Force, had said. I thought, if I may, I— 

because this is our view—I would share this. He said, although historically we have had more trade space to advance the state-of-theart we now must be more calibrated in pushing the technological 

envelope. We must be ruthlessly honest and disciplined when our 

operational requirements allow for more modest, less exquisite, and 

higher confidence acquisition programs. 

He goes on to say, Government must ensure stable requirements 

and reliable funding streams, while industry must bid realistically 

and resist offering to sell more than what is operationally required. 

In a time of robust funding we lost the ability to differentiate what 

is essential and what is nice to have. 

That is exactly where we are. So I think we and the Department 

of Defense also share a view of how best to proceed in getting focused on what we need, not what is the shiniest thing in the box. 

We are aware that many of those systems exist today from DoD. 
17 

Going forward, there are systems that we are interested in, going 

forward. We have flexibility in our planning that will require additional evaluation and additional work, but it may be worth it. We 

continue to evaluate those, and we will hear more from the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology because we 

rely on them to help us in that regard. 

In my remaining minute I did—I think I have a remaining 

minute—I did want to address the GAO report briefly, and I will 

look forward to questions. But certainly when we look at the GAO 

report I have two views of it. One is, it is actually rather good. It 

is rather good in the sense that it identifies and confirms risks that 

we ourselves had identified and, frankly, believe we have managed. 

It is probably less good in setting context. As you can imagine, 

when you have a risk all kinds—there is a whole range of things 

that can happen, from nothing bad to tremendously bad, and the 

GAO report focuses on the range that is tremendously bad. I will 

tell you that we don’t think that it is likely that we will be on that 

end of the risk. 

I will give you, for example, in terms of cost—we understood the 

issues that the GAO recognized in cost and we provided for that. 

While we maybe didn’t measure the risk, we certainly did accommodate it, and to this point, what we are actually finding—keep 

your fingers crossed—but what we are actually finding is that the 

actual costs that we seem to be incurring are likely to be less than 

we identified in those rough order magnitude costs because we did 

accommodate the risk. 

So I will look forward to the questions. I do think that the GAO 

did a nice job of identifying risks, but I would say those were risks 

that we were aware of and we believe we have plans in place that 

will minimize the likelihood that getting that risk will get us to the 

far bad end of the spectrum. 

With that, I will look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Borkowski, Mr. Benda, and 

Mr. Tangora follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK S. BORKOWSKI, PAUL BENDA, AND MICHAEL

TANGORA

NOVEMBER 15, 2011 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the 

committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) on-going collaboration with the Department of Defense (DoD) to secure our Nation’s borders and particularly the role U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP), the Science and Technology Directorate 

(S&T), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have played in such cooperative efforts. 

I am Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner of CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA) and the CBP Component Acquisition Executive. I am 

pleased to offer this joint statement with my colleagues Paul Benda, Chief of Staff 

for DHS S&T and Director of the S&T Homeland Security Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (HSARPA), and Michael Tangora, Deputy Assistant Commandant 

for Acquisition in the U.S. Coast Guard. 

As America’s front-line border agency, CBP’s priority mission is to protect the 

American public while facilitating lawful travel and trade. To do this, CBP has deployed a multi-layered, risk-based approach to enhance the security of our borders 

while facilitating the flow of lawful people and goods entering the United States. 

This layered approach to security reduces our reliance on any single point or program that could be compromised. It also extends our zone of security outward, en-
18 

suring that our physical border is not the first or last line of defense, but one of 

many. 

Technology plays a critical role in this layered approach. My role, as assistant 

commissioner and CBP’s component acquisition executive, is to ensure our technology efforts are mission-oriented and well-integrated across agencies and Departments. To support us in our mission, we have developed extensive partnerships with 

DHS S&T and DoD. 

OVERVIEW OF CBP, DHS, S&T, AND DOD INTERACTIONS

CBP is one of many components within DHS that work with DoD on a regular 

basis. In many cases, CBP partners with DHS S&T and together we work with DoD 

to leverage their investments and experiences to help identify potential solutions for 

CBP programs. DHS S&T plays a key role in many CBP activities including funding, co-founding, and providing technical expertise to many of the projects discussed 

throughout this testimony. 

Together, CBP and S&T enjoy a close working relationship with our DoD counterparts. Many of the technologies CBP needs to support our officers and agents in the 

field have already been put into practice by DoD. There are many similarities, but 

also differences, between DoD and CBP missions and objectives. Through our history of close collaboration, we have been able to take advantage of what we have 

in common. 

There are also opportunities for us to further refine our partnership with DoD. 

We look forward to continuing to work closely with DoD to develop a comprehensive 

view of the opportunities and technologies we can leverage together, while keeping 

in mind the different missions, objectives, and needs for the two departments. 

As we look back over our extensive history and relationship with DoD, we have 

found four general types of collaboration. They are: • Joint Development and Demonstration; • Test Support; • Deployed Systems; • Joint Operations. 

The following examples are testament to the breadth and depth of our work with 

DoD. The examples are a snapshot in time; we find new opportunities every day. 

We look forward to continuing to build these relationships and seek new ones with 

those offices that have the technology and capability to help us perform our critical 

missions. 

JOINT DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION

‘‘Development and Demonstration’’ is the creation of a technology and the demonstration of the applicability of that technology in a particular mission setting. We 

often work with DoD to tailor already-existing technology (originally designed for a 

DoD application) to CBP’s mission. We also benefit from joint opportunities to evaluate potential future technologies. In some cases, we work with an acquisition command with specific expertise like the U.S. Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors 

Directorate. In other instances, we work with an OSD organization such as Rapid 

Reaction Technology Office, an organization that coordinates across Service organizations. We also conduct cooperative demonstrations to assess DoD technology in a 

joint or CBP unique mission area. The examples listed below describe a variety of 

projects and concepts that have arisen through collaborations with DoD. 

DoD Organization: OSD Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) 

Joint Effort.—Due to RRTO’s extensive history of demonstrating technology for 

rapid deployment to the field, DHS has been able to leverage RRTO’s efforts instead 

of creating new demonstrations. For example, knowledge we gained from RRTO research is currently informing our acquisition strategy for the sensor systems we will 

be deploying as part of our Arizona Technology Deployment Plan. 

DoD Organization: Joint Project Manager Guardian (JPMG) 

Joint Effort.—Joint Program Manager Guardian acts as a clearinghouse for information about a wide range of technology systems, including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) detection, tunnel detection, and monitoring technologies. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Northern Command 

Joint Effort.—The Rapid Reaction Tunnel Detection (R2TD) Joint Capabilities 

Technology Demonstration (JCTD) is a DoD program to evaluate a readily available 

technology for tunnel detection. Working with Northern Command, we have been 

able to apply the system as a demonstrator for tunnel detection at the border as 

well as to collect data for DoD’s purposes. The Border Tunnel Activity Detection 
19 

System (BTADS), part of the R2TD initiative, is a multi-sensor system utilizing a 

combination of sensors and mobile equipment to detect general tunnel activity and 

find its specific location. The system has undergone extensive testing in the San 

Diego Sector and other locations within and outside the United States. We continue 

to use it while we complete our effectiveness evaluations. The result of those evaluations will also help inform the development of requirements for future tunnel detection projects. 

DoD Organization: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 

Joint Effort.—Our experience with tunnel detection and unattended ground sensors has shown that it is critical to understand the geophysical characteristics of a 

particular area in order to design effective detection systems. This on-going project 

with DTRA is developing a detailed understanding of the subsurface geophysical 

characteristics and their effect on seismic, acoustic, and electro-magnetic signal 

sources. The result of this effort will be a 3–D modeling program that will assist 

in the deployment and use of tunnel detection technologies. 

DoD Organization: Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO), Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) 

Joint Effort.—This is another on-going project focused on tunnel detection. It will 

include evaluations of various technologies including a portable seismic acoustic sensor kit, advanced ground penetrating radar, thermal cameras, robot platforms for 

remote illicit tunnel inspection, and 360-degree video systems. 

DoD Organization: Army Communications Electronic Research Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC) 

Joint Effort.—Between 2009 and into the summer of 2011, DHS and CERDEC 

(along with several other supporting DoD organizations) evaluated the Vehicle and 

Dismount Exploitation Radar (VaDER) on both fixed-wing and DHS’s Predator 

drone aircraft. VaDER offers the potential for an affordable sensor package that can 

detect small moving objects on the ground. Its operation on the DHS Predator offered proof-of-concept for both DoD and DHS. In addition, during the evaluation, 

VaDER successfully supported the detection and interdiction of illicit border incursions. The results to date have demonstrated the significant potential of VaDER as 

applied to CBP’s mission. 

DoD Organization: Army Research Lab, Acoustic Signal Processing Branch 

Joint Effort.—Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) have long been a staple of our 

border surveillance technology. Understanding how and where they work, and what 

we can do to improve their performance, has value to both DoD and DHS. We have 

worked with this laboratory since 2006 to expand our understanding and continue 

to gain useful insights as a result of this collaboration. 

DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab (NRL) 

Joint Effort.—Since 2005, we have collaborated with NRL on algorithm development to distinguish tripwire activity so that we are able to differentiate among 

human, animals, and vehicle movement. 

DoD Organization: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 

Joint Effort.—This on-going collaboration with the Defense Intelligence Agency 

will develop sensor technology capable of distinguishing between human, animal 

and vehicle traffic. 

DoD Organization: Sandia National Lab 

Joint Effort.—Sandia is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) laboratory with expertise in Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology. NII systems help us detect hidden contraband quickly and effectively. Both DHS and DoD use Sandia’s expertise 

to support research, development, and evaluation of the Non-Intrusive Inspection 

(NII) technology and detector designs. 

DoD Organization: OSD Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) 

Joint Effort.—The Thunderstorm program was established to test evolving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) architectures, emerging technologies, 

and transformational concepts. The first generation testing of Thunderstorm included Border Patrol using DoD sensor data to provide a more complete operational 

picture in Southern Arizona. Future planning will include demonstration of two-way 

communication capability to provide a common operational picture (and improved, 

integrated command and control) among multiple agencies. 
20 

DoD Organization: Army Communications—Electronics Research and Development 

Center—U.S. Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD) 

Joint Effort.—Radars are becoming increasingly important elements of our border 

security technology suite. There are many types of radars available so characterization of them in our border environment helps us to select among them. This collaboration is assisting with performance analysis and test and evaluation of radars and 

their associated signal processing suite, and the integration and test and evaluation 

of imagery sensors to include assessment of image performance characteristics and 

life-cycle costs. 

DoD Organization: Institute for Defense Analyses (an OSD Federally-Funded Research and Development Center) 

Joint Effort.—We depend on well-established and recognized experts to advise us 

about existing and potential technologies for application to our missions. Since 2007, 

the Institute for Defense Analyses has provided subject matter expertise for market 

research, radar recommendations, test site and test methodology planning, test support and data analysis assistance on improving detection and tracking of ground 

surveillance radars in challenging border environments. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Naval Air Systems Command 

Joint Effort.—Part of any technology deployment plan should be a strong and effective logistics support strategy. DHS and CBP have limited expertise in this area, 

so we have solicited assistance from DoD experts. This effort is developing logistics 

and sustainment plans and processes for SBInet Block 1 and other CBP acquisitions. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Joint Effort.—Many DoD organizations have tools and extensive experience in 

Mission Analysis and Operations Research, which CBP has leveraged to augment 

our own capabilities. Together, this collaboration completed a study to determine 

the sensor mix that maximizes the probability and efficiency of detecting existing 

tunnels and tunnel construction activity on the U.S. border according to geographic 

location, infrastructure, and historical data. Also addressed in the study was a business model for illegal cross-border tunnels based on production rates of interceded 

narcotic quantities. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Northern Command, Department of State, Government of 

Mexico 

Joint Effort.—We have an on-going effort to develop a Cross-Border Secure Communications Network (CBSCN) Project with Mexico. This project is designed to enhance international cooperation and interoperability, which in turn should enhance 

our overall border security. This collaboration supports the installation of microwave 

equipment at 10 city pairs along the U.S.-Mexico border for the purpose of addressing the need for a long-term solution to cross-border communications. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Air Force (USAF)—Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), in partnership with USAF Test Pilot School 

Joint Effort.—Starting in 2010, the two agencies worked together on a joint demonstration to determine the effectiveness of current CBP air assets to detect and 

track small, dark aircraft. The demonstration showed how CBP air assets could increase their ability to detect these aircraft by changing their patrol strategies. 

DoD Organization: USAF Edwards AFB, in partnership with USAF Test Pilot 

School 

Joint Effort.—This project is focused on developing innovative technologies that 

can detect and track small dark aircraft along the Northwest Border of the United 

States. To date, exercises/testing have/has identified three promising, low-cost sensor technologies that can detect these aircraft at significant standoff ranges. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Northern Command 

Joint Effort.—Low-flying aircraft are a concern for border security because they 

are difficult to detect with existing radars. In this collaboration, we studied the use 

of Sentinel DoD radars during demonstrations along the Northern Border to evaluate their ability to detect low-flying aircraft. 

DoD Organization: Joint Interagency Task Force, South (JIATF–S), U.S. Pacific 

Command, and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, 

Pacific 

Joint Effort.—CBP’s mission includes requirements to detect small items of interest in large expanses of oceans—for example, to detect potential drug smugglers. 
21 

The Tipsheet Review and Correlation EnhanceR (TRACER) is a software application 

that enables an intelligence imagery analyst to quickly find and characterize small 

maritime vessels in an image showing over 1,000 square miles of ocean. The value 

of TRACER stems from the speed with which it finds small vessels in large areas 

of ocean and shares critical information about those vessels. 

DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab and Naval Systems Warfare Center (NSWC) 

Joint Effort.—The Small Vessel Tracking system consists of a system to fuse and 

present multiple vessel information sources to law enforcement operators, through 

a laptop, into real-time tracking and mobile field kit software. This effort also evaluated RFID tags for tracking small vessels in a port/coastal environment. The core 

technology was developed by DoD to assist in mission planning for interdiction efforts. NSWC program management continues to provide support and technical expertise for the development of these sensor and surveillance technologies; a Small 

Business Innovation Research (SBIR) effort. 

DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab (NRL) 

Joint Effort.—This on-going effort began in 2010. Shipboard Automated Automatic 

Identification System (AIS) Radar Contact Reporting (SARCR) is a NRL Rapid Prototype System developed to deploy on-board U.S.-flagged commercial vessels, USCG 

costal patrol boats, and select naval support vessels with a feed to DoD and DHS 

operational components including CBP. The purpose of the SARCR System is to capture and relay vessel radar and AIS data from the ship to a land-based central processing center for distribution to DoD/DHS operating agencies. SARCR addresses the 

DHS maritime capability gap associated with wide-area surveillance against illegal 

traffic which includes GO FAST boats, chugs, yolas, and potentially self-propelled 

semi-submersibles (SPSS). These non-radiating targets are often referred to as 

‘‘dark’’ targets and separation of AIS contacts from non-radiating targets is the first 

level of filtering in determining suspicious behavior. 

DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab and USAF Air Combat Command (ACC) 

Joint Effort.—This collaboration conducted over the past year was a demonstration of Tethered Aerostat System Adjunct Radar Processor (TARP) by leveraging the 

existing USAF ACC Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) radar surveillance capability in the region (optimized to detect low, slow-flying aircraft) to provide enhanced maritime surface coverage and tracking capability. DHS adapted a new, 

highly-capable maritime radar processor to function with L-band radar designed 

specifically for detecting low- and slow-flying aircraft and making that surface contact data available to the appropriate action agency via the web-based radar display. 

DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab and NSWC 

Joint Effort.—The Modular Sensor System/Improved Imaging Technology Project 

is a sensor and processing suite used for persistent wide-area surveillance and target tracking for port, harbor, and coastal environments. The Improved Imaging 

Technology (IIT) camera was developed over the last year at NRL as an Office of 

Naval Research (ONR) Future Naval Capability (FNC) program. This project integrated the camera system into an established port/coastal surveillance system used 

by the USCG, but also has applicability to the CBP maritime mission area. 

DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab (NRL) 

Joint Effort.—This on-going effort is focused on leveraging existing weather radars for ocean surveillance. The National High Frequency (HF) Radar Network, 

component of U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) led by NOAA, provides beyond the horizon surface current data. The HF radars are also capable of 

detecting the speed and location of vessels at sea, using algorithms developed by 

Rutgers. HF radar are currently monitoring approaches to New York Harbor. 

DoD Organization: Naval Underwater Warfare Center Newport (NUWC Newport) 

Joint Effort.—Between 2008 and 2010, The NUWC Newport conducted a test and 

evaluation of an improved radar capability to enhance ocean surveillance. The effort 

focused on the potential applicability and effectiveness of low-cost, commercially 

available radars to the detection and tracking of large and small vessels in port and 

coastal regions. 

TEST SUPPORT

The Department of Defense has extensive test facilities, test ranges, and subject 

matter experts that DHS can use for checkout, demonstration, and operational evaluation of technology solutions and tactics. Use of these DoD capabilities offers a 

‘‘try-before-buy’’ opportunity that reduces the risk of technology acquisition and in-
22 

creases the likelihood that selected technologies will be operationally useful. The 

DoD has not only offered testing environments for our new assets, but also provided 

experts to conduct the tests. The use of DoD facilities for testing purposes will continue to support DHS efforts to test and accredit technology as the following examples demonstrate. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) 

Joint Effort.—DHS solicited support from ATEC for the structured, quantitative, 

and comprehensive operational test and evaluation of our SBInet Block 1 effort. 

ATEC conducted the test in late 2010, performed data analysis, summarized test results, and provided recommendations for improved system effectiveness and suitability. In the process, DHS also gained valuable experience in performing this type 

of robust operational test and evaluation. 

DoD Organization: Joint Technology Assessment Activity (JTAA), Naval Systems 

Warfare Center (NSWC) 

Joint Effort.—DHS has a continuing need for support to conduct operational test 

and evaluation activities. NSWC signed a 5-year Interagency Agreement that will 

provide Operational Test Agent support so that we can better ensure our technology 

provides value to our law enforcement personnel. 

DoD Organization: Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force 

(COMOPTEVFOR) 

Joint Effort.—As we deploy the Integrated Fixed Towers (one of the systems within the technology portfolio selected as part of the new Arizona Technology Deployment Plan), we have asked and received support from COMOPTEVFOR. 

COMPOMTEVFOR will serve as our formal ‘‘Operational Test Agent.’’ 

DoD Organization.—U.S. Army’s Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) 

Joint Effort.—We have a strong interest in maintaining awareness of the capabilities and availabilities of sensor systems. This awareness, in turn, advises our acquisition strategies and plans for technology along the border. The JITC has provided 

facilities, ranges, and personnel for several radar tests to characterize and compare 

systems for their potential effectiveness along the border. 

DoD Organization: Naval Facilities Engineering Support Center, Space and Naval 

Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Center Pacific 

Joint Effort.—As part of our approach to secure the maritime environment, we are 

interested in capabilities to detect small, underwater targets. The Center supported 

test and evaluation of a Low-Cost Underwater Swimmer/Diver Detection Systems 

[a Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) project] and provided field support 

for testing of this technology and marine engineering technical support including 

analysis and recommendations. 

DEPLOYED SYSTEMS

Many of the systems DHS currently uses for surveillance and situational awareness along the border come directly from DoD development and heritage. These systems include: 

• Predator Drone—MQ–9 

• Blackhawk—UH–60 

• Orion P–3 

• KingAir—Beechcraft 

• Mobile Surveillance System (MSS) 

• Agent Portable Sensor System (APSS) 

• Remote Video Surveillance System (legacy system) 

• Unattended Ground Sensors (Monitron, McQ Omnisense) 

• Night Vision Camera (FLIR Night Ranger) 

• SBInet Block 1 Laser Illuminator 

• SBInet Block 1 Radar 

Other examples include: 

DoD Organization: U.S. Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 

(SPAWAR) 

Joint Effort.—The Advanced Wireless System is an upgrade of our CBP communications infrastructure to correct obsolescence and shift frequencies. SPAWAR supports us by providing project management expertise and support, especially for 

tower construction. 
23 

DoD Organization: SPAWAR 

Joint Effort.—SPAWAR and CBP have entered an Interagency Agreement with 

the Northern Border for the Law Enforcement Technical Collection project. 

DoD Organization: Biometric Identification Management Agency (BIMA) 

Joint Effort.—This collaboration developed the Automated Biometric Identification 

System (ABIS)—an application to process and identify all apprehended subjects. As 

part of normal processing, the fingerprints are searched against the FBI and DHS’s 

biometric databases. The Border Patrol now has the ability to automatically search 

the fingerprints and facial images against the DoD’s ABIS database, which has resulted in positive identifications of apprehended subjects. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate 

Joint Effort.—DoD developed the Agent Portable Sensor System (APSS) and demonstrated its effectiveness during collaborative operations along the border. Based 

on this collaboration, DHS selected the APSS systems as part of the technology portfolio for the new Arizona Technology Deployment Plan. The Directorate also supported DHS by providing an Army contract for DHS procurements, which accelerated deployment of this capability to the border. 

JOINT OPERATIONS

In addition to efforts that support development, evaluation, and deployment of 

technology systems, DHS collaborates with DoD and other agencies in direct support 

of the border security mission. DoD and other agency resources and personnel operate alongside our DHS personnel, providing expertise and support that increase our 

mission effectiveness. Examples include: 

DoD Organization: Joint Task Force North (JTFN) 

Joint Effort.—DHS has an extensive history of operational collaboration with 

JTFN. This collaboration provides a wide variety of capabilities in operations, engineering, training, intelligence, and application of technology. Some recent examples 

include: • Operations.—JTFN has aided CBP in operations dealing with ground sensors, 

radar, aviation FLIR, and air reconnaissance. • Engineering.—JTFN has supported CBP in construction of border tactical infrastructure such as roads, lights, bridges, and barriers. • Training.—Mobile training teams have provided 92 classroom instruction missions that have covered planning, intelligence and field craft, and survival. • Intelligence.—JTFN has provided support in the form of intelligence analysts, 

mapping, and imagery. • Technology.—JTFN has supported 10 missions relating to tunnel detection. Currently, 62 JTFN support missions are tentatively planned for execution in fiscal 

year 2012. 

Other Organization: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) 

Joint Effort.—This is an enforcement collaboration which leverages the capabilities and resources of more than 60 Federal, State, local, and Tribal agencies in Arizona, and the Mexican government, to combat individuals and criminal organizations that pose a threat to communities on either side of the border. This collaboration has resulted in the seizure of more than 2.2 million pounds of marijuana, 8,200 

pounds of cocaine, and 2,700 pounds of methamphetamine; the seizure of more than 

$18 million in undeclared U.S. currency and 343 weapons; over 16,000 aliens denied 

entry to the United States at Arizona ports of entry due to criminal background or 

other disqualifying factors; and approximately 342,000 apprehensions between ports 

of entry. 

DoD/Other Organization: DHS, DoD, and DOJ 

Joint Effort.—Within the El Paso Intelligence Center, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis established the Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS) as 

a collaborative effort among DHS, DOJ, and DoD, which enables the integration and 

synthesis of all available Southwest Border intelligence from Federal, State, local, 

and Tribal partners. The result is a common intelligence picture that supports enforcement activities on the Southwest Border. 

DoD Organization: DoD Central Command (CENTCOM) 

Joint Effort.—Where DoD and DHS have a shared interest in Port Security, we 

can combine our resources to increase our effectiveness. For example, in 2008 CBP 

and CENTCOM entered an agreement to scan all U.S.-bound DoD containers at 

Port Shuaiba, Kuwait prior to landing in the United States. 
24 

DoD Organization: U.S. Northern Command and JTFN 

Joint Effort.—CBP recognizes that we can increase our mission effectiveness by 

better operational integration among our front-line law enforcement components. 

While the concept is relatively new to us, DoD has extensive experience in designing 

and leveraging joint, multi-service capabilities. This collaboration has provided 

CBP’s Joint Operations Directorate (JOD) Joint Field Command (JFC) DoD’s experience with unification efforts to ensure CBP has a joint and integrated approach to 

border security, commercial enforcement, and trade facilitation missions in the Arizona area of responsibility. As a result of working together, CBP has benefited with 

assistance in processes, procedures, technology solutions, and received support. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Navy Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) 

Joint Effort.—Conducted intermittently since 2009 and continuing today, this effort has provided personnel of the Rangeley Station in Houlton Sector with cold 

weather survival training and detection and interdiction of Special Interest Targets 

using Advance Evasive Tactics training. 

DoD Organization: U.S. Southern Command and JIATF–S 

Joint Effort.—The groups have worked closely with the Homeland Security Task 

Force—Southeast (HSTF–SE) in coordinating multi-component/multi-agency prevention of potential or full-scale Caribbean mass migration, achieved through supporting criminal prosecutions and maintaining an active air, land, and sea presence. 

Other Organization: JTFN, New York and Vermont National Guard 

Joint Effort.—The first of three operations, Operation Maple Guard I (conducted 

in 2008), combined CBP and DoD’s assets in a concentrated interdiction effort. 

Ground-based radar sensors were deployed at two locations within Border Patrol’s 

Swanton Sector in order to gather intelligence on aircraft incursions. Interdiction 

aircraft and crews were deployed as a means of apprehending any identified incursions. 

Other Organization: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 

Joint Effort.—Operation Maple Guard II (conducted in 2008) supported CBP in 

an initiative aimed at identifying, limiting, and disrupting the ability of terrorists, 

traffickers, and immigration law violators to smuggle in the Swanton Sector area 

of responsibility using low-flying non-commercial aircraft. 

Other Organization: RCMP, JTFN, Vermont National Guard and State Police 

Joint Effort.—Operation Maple Guard III (conducted in 2010) facilitated collaboration and synchronization of assets from Canada, DoD, and CBP assets. Groundbased radar was deployed at 5 locations to gather intelligence on aircraft incursions. 

Interdiction aircraft and crews were on stand-by as a means of apprehending the 

identified incursions. 

Other Organization: RCMP, Canadian Armed Forces, and the Canadian Network 

Operation Center (NOC) 

Joint Effort.—This collaboration combined CBP and Canadian assets in a concentrated interdiction effort. A ground-based radar sensor was deployed in Canada 

in order to gather intelligence on aircraft incursions. Interdiction aircraft and crews 

were deployed as a means of apprehending any identified incursions. 

Other Organization: DoD and National Guard 

Joint Effort.—This collaboration provided assets and sensors towards Operation 

Southeast Watch, a multi-agency coordination effort to detect and interdict suspect 

targets of interests seeking to penetrate the border of the United States. 

Other Organization: Washington National Guard Counter Drug Task Force (CDTF) 

and the Washington Air Guard CDTF 

Joint Effort.—This collaboration, conducted between 2007 and 2010, provided additional personnel and deployed the DoD Beechcraft ‘‘Big Crow’’ to Spokane Sector, 

greatly enhancing the Sector’s situational awareness and overall detection capabilities. 

Other Organization: JTFN, Northeast Counterdrug Training Center (NCTC), and 

Wisconsin National Guard 

Joint Effort.—As a result of working together, DHS received training courses during fiscal year 2011 including courses in Interview and Interrogation, Intelligence 

and Link Analysis, and Intelligence and Preparation of the Operational Environment. 
25 

Other Organization: Vermont National Guard Civil Support Team (CST) 

Joint Effort.—In 2011, the CST provided training to Border Patrol Agents stationed in Vermont, as well as local law enforcement agents. Courses covered WMD 

awareness, Officer Safety, Basic Combat Medic, and CST Awareness and Capabilities. 

Other Organization: California National Guard (CALGUARD) 

Joint Effort.—CALGUARD supports the engineering missions of Border Patrol’s 

San Diego Sector. They have supported the construction of border tactical infrastructure and facilities, such as drainage structure installation, landing mat fence, 

vehicle maintenance facility, two heavy equipment loading docks, and maintenance 

on over 90 miles of border road. Between 2006 and 2010, CALGUARD conducted 

26 missions with us. 

Other Organization: National Guard 

Joint Effort.—DHS (including CBP) and the various elements of the National 

Guard often collaborate in responding to natural disasters. As one recent example, 

the North Dakota Army National Guard provided mutual support and engagement 

response to natural disasters in North Dakota. 

DoD Organization: Army National Guard 1–188th Air Defense Artillery Battalion 

(North Dakota) 

Joint Effort.—The battalion provided support through the use of their facilities. 

There is potential for expansion into an operational role if the unit’s Avenger 

GBASR is viable and utilized for short-term border security missions. 

Other Organization: Minnesota Air National Guard 

Joint Effort.—This collaboration provided an established operational intelligencesharing environment between the Duluth Border Patrol Station and the 148th 

Fighter Wing. Duluth Station provides law enforcement support to wing Security 

Forces conducting immigration and criminal record checks for entrance via the Duluth International Airport. This venture has led to the arrest of undocumented 

aliens and one U.S. Citizen on an extraditable warrant. 

Other Organization: Maine Army National Guard (ARNG) 

Joint Effort.—Between 2006 and 2007, the Maine ARNG Counterdrug Program 

aircraft supported the sector’s counterdrug operations with aerial observation, interagency communications, and other capabilities using rotary-wing assets. 

Other Organization: Puerto Rican National Guard 

Joint Effort.—The Puerto Rican National Guard assigned a radio technician to 

Border Patrol’s Ramey Sector. They have supported Operation Southeast Watch 

(2009) in eastern Puerto Rico with an Athena maritime radar platform, and Operation Island Hopper III (2011). Additionally, they have provided sniper training and 

use of their firing range to BORTAC agents. 

OVERVIEW OF USCG AND DOD INTERACTIONS

The Coast Guard has long partnered with the Department of Defense, the U.S. 

Navy and the other military services to develop joint systems and capabilities for 

its cutters, aircraft, and information and communications systems. These partnerships are vital to the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its defense readiness mission 

requirements and deploy in support of Combatant Commanders. In addition, the 

Coast Guard is working with other DHS agencies to develop assets and capabilities 

that have applications across shared areas of responsibility such as border security 

and other law enforcement operations. In order to support these partnerships, the 

Coast Guard employs Coast Guard liaisons in the Department of Defense and other 

partner organizations. 

The purpose of the Coast Guard’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

(RDT&E) Program is to support Coast Guard operational, regulatory, and acquisition activities by leveraging innovative scientific and technological solutions. The 

primary organization that performs RDT&E in support of Coast Guard programs is 

the Research and Development Center (RDC), located in New London, Connecticut. 

The Coast Guard also works in close cooperation with the other military services 

and DHS. These partnerships are providing the Coast Guard with additional capabilities to meet its RDT&E needs. 
26 

CONCLUSION

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, we thank you for this opportunity to testify about the work of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard and our collaboration 

with DoD—across nearly 40 agencies and organizations—to help secure our borders. 

We look forward to finding new ways to collaborate in the coming months and 

years. CBP and the USCG recognize the importance of eliminating redundancies 

and increasing efficiency within the Government, and collaboration is paramount to 

our overall success. The complexity and shared interests of the Northern, Southern, 

and Coastal Borders have spurred many long-standing partnerships and such initiatives strengthen manpower, technology, and intelligence. 

We look forward to answering your questions at this time. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Dr. Cox, for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ADAM COX, DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ACTING), 

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS 

AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. COX. Thank you. 

Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, 

Ranking Member Thompson, and the rest of the distinguished 

Members of the committee. The director, of course, regrets he 

couldn’t be here today as he is celebrating the birth of his first 

child, Quinn Isabella Benda, who was born yesterday morning. 

As you know, S&T strives to strengthen American security and 

resiliency by providing innovative technology solutions and knowledge products to the homeland security enterprise. HSARPA is the 

primary R&D entity within S&T and it includes six technical divisions, one of which is our borders and maritime division, whose primary focus is the technology needs of CBP, the Coast Guard, and 

ICE in their missions to secure our border at and between the 

ports of entry. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear today before you, and I 

would like to use the remainder of my time to quickly cover three 

topics: Our close working relationship with CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, the formal mechanisms with 

which we coordinate R&D and collaborate with DoD, and why 

transitioning technology from the battlefield to the border is not 

simply plug-and-play. 

The collaboration and interaction we have at S&T with OTIA is 

strong and getting stronger. We are both young, maturing organizations and we are building upon the strong working relationship 

S&T has enjoyed and established with CBP over the last 8 years. 

First, S&T has established a permanent liaison position within 

OTIA. This person currently serves as the director of technology 

management and is responsible for building the CBP technology 

roadmap that will drive the future S&T–OTIA R&D activities. 

We also co-fund and collaborate on many projects across the TRL 

spectrum. We share funding, resources, and subject matter expertise. 

Finally, we are establishing a formal set of roles and responsibilities for S&T and OTIA through an MOA on the evaluation of cost 

technology for use in CBP operations. 

Since the formation of DHS, S&T has always looked to DoD as 

a source of technology and to partner in R&D, and in this environment and this budget climate this is especially critical. We use the 
27 

multiple formal interactions we have with R&D agencies across 

DoD to coordinate and collaborate to—excuse me—our future plans 

and our R&D activities. 

The majority of these interactions are through interagency working groups and committees, where we have shared mission space, 

such as chem and bio defense, explosives detection, cybersecurity, 

and of course, physical security. Participation on these committees 

and the working groups ranges from our under secretary to individual program managers. 

For example, Under Secretary O’Toole co-chairs the National 

Science and Technology Council’s Committee on Homeland and National Security, along with our counterparts at DoD and OSTP. 

Other examples include the DoD–DHS capability development 

working group, TSWG, and a laundry list of policy coordinating 

committees and working groups across those shared DoD–DHS 

mission spaces. 

DHS, and specifically CBP, rely on S&T to be the transition path 

for DoD technology. We evaluate DoD technologies and adapt them, 

when applicable, to homeland mission. 

While the interaction between DoD and DHS is robust in many 

areas and the terrains do look similar in Arizona and Afghanistan, 

the transition of technology from battlefield to border is not as simple as it looks. DHS is primarily a law enforcement and public safety agency, and our cops and needs can be very different from those 

of soldiers in a war zone. 

Then when technology from DoD does appear to be directly applicable there are several steps required to move that technology between the two agencies. DoD technologies are designed to work 

within DoD systems, within DoD operations, and DoD has the resources to dedicate support personnel to operate technology systems that DHS typically does not or is not able to afford. 

These differences all require additional development for DHS to 

deploy DoD technology. So as much as we would like to pick up 

those systems and—that appear to meet our technology needs we 

must ensure that we have done our due diligence and determined 

that they are effective for our mission and not only meet our needs 

but make operational and financial sense, as well. 

To that end, we are currently evaluating and leveraging multiple 

DoD technologies and R&D investments, including sensor management systems that we are using in the Port of L.A.-Long Beach and 

are soon to be deployed along the Northern Border; airborne border 

monitoring technologies; unmanned aerial systems; and detection 

technologies for semi-submersible maritime vessels. The list goes 

on, but uncertain budgets are also detrimental to our relationships 

with DoD. When we do collaborate on R&D projects they need to 

be able to depend on our investment commitments that we made. 

In closing, I would like to thank you, again, for the opportunity 

to join this conversation today. This is a critical topic. I believe that 

S&T is providing the much-needed technology development and 

evaluation services needed to leverage DoD and other interagency 

technologies and bring them to bear on the DHS mission. 

Thank you, and I am happy to answer any further questions. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Dr. Cox. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Tangora for his testimony. 
28 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL TANGORA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT AND DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION SERVICES, 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. TANGORA. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss 

the Coast Guard’s close relationship with the Department of Defense and our on-going utilization of DoD’s capabilities and programs in support of Coast Guard acquisition and research and development. 

The Coast Guard operates at all times as both an armed force 

and a component of Department of Homeland Security. Our statutory authorities under Titles 10 and 14 provide the Coast Guard 

with extensive security, law enforcement, and regulatory responsibilities throughout the maritime domain. 

The Coast Guard has developed strategies to meet its mission requirements, including arrangements with the other military services in support of our acquisition projects. Additionally, our R&D 

program provides critical support across the Coast Guard’s unique 

mission set. 

The Coast Guard’s Acquisition Directorate, where our research 

and development efforts are managed, is addressing its mission requirements through a multi-billion dollar recapitalization of Coast 

Guard’s cutters, boats, aircraft, and command-and-control systems. 

In the process of carrying out more than 20 major and non-major 

acquisition programs we are using a wide variety of organic and external resources to provide oversight and assistance at all points 

throughout the acquisition life-cycle of our projects. 

In the past 5 years we have entered into 62 different interagency 

agreements with DoD activities, and nine with our partners in Department of Homeland Security. These agreements facilitate development, testing, evaluation, and certification of Coast Guard assets. These partnerships are an integral component of our strategy 

to establish effective governance and cost efficiency over all aspects 

of our acquisition programs. 

In addition to our agreements and memoranda of understanding 

the Coast Guard has placed liaison officers throughout the DHS 

and DoD enterprises. Our liaison officers provide the Coast Guard 

with information on new and on-going acquisition and research and 

development initiatives. 

We use this information to determine whether or not the Coast 

Guard has equities that can be capitalized, and if they are identified early enough, whether we can work with DoD and DHS activities to tailor the research initiative to address the specific Coast 

Guard requirement. Leveraging DoD research and development 

programs has enabled the Coast Guard to assess technologies for 

potential applicability for a fraction of the cost that a Coast Guardunique R&D effort would entail. 

Coast Guard liaison officers are currently placed in strategic locations, including the Pentagon, DHS Science and Technology Directorate, Customs and Border Protection, the Unified Combatant 

Commands, U.S. Navy System Commands, and others. These liaisons officers have had a significant and positive benefit to the 

Coast Guard. 
29 

In addition to our extensive engagement with DoD research and 

development programs the Coast Guard maintains an internal 

R&D program as part of the Acquisition Directorate. The program 

directly supports Coast Guard’s specific needs across its full range 

of operational, regulatory, and acquisition activities. Our R&D 

projects are designed to minimize risk and maximize mission effectiveness across the Coast Guard activities by leveraging and applying innovative, scientific, and technological solutions. 

One such partnership with the Office of Naval Research has resulted in the development of numerous mission-enabling technologies, including running gear entanglement systems designed to 

foul and ultimately stop non-compliant vessels. Through our collective efforts we are effectively meeting our requirements for continued development of enhanced technologies and capabilities. 

Our recent research and development efforts build on the longstanding relationships and partnerships that we have with our fellow sea service, the U.S. Navy, and other military services to develop joint systems and capabilities for Coast Guard platforms to 

maintain readiness in the event that the Coast Guard is required 

to operate jointly with or under the direction of the U.S. Navy. 

We continue to partner with the Navy to install common sensors, 

weapons, intelligence collection, and processing systems aboard our 

major cutters. Today approximately half of our command and control and communication capabilities installed aboard Coast Guard 

platforms are Navy-type, which enables us to interoperate under a 

joint operational conditions. 

We are also collaborating with DoD and DHS to align our biometrics concept of operations and assess biometrics capabilities 

currently used by U.S. Coast Guard boarding teams in the Persian 

Gulf and the Caribbean Sea for potential use across a wider scope 

of DHS homeland security missions. The Coast Guard is working 

to translate our experience gained from our on-going work with 

DoD’s services to support expanding efforts under the lead of 

Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. 

The Coast Guard is committed to continuing with our departmental partners and other military services to support complex 

projects with the potential application across military and government. The approach maximizes the limited resources that we have 

to address the research and development priorities of the U.S. 

Coast Guard. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard’s effort 

and association with our partners in DHS and DoD, and I am 

ready to answer your questions. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. We are ready to ask you 

some questions, as well. 

So we appreciate all the testimony. 

You know, I have been sort of on this thing for—ever since I 

came to Congress, quite frankly, because as somebody said, we 

have an historic opportunity now, with the drawdown in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, et cetera, to really look at how we can best utilize so 

much of this equipment that has been used very effectively in theater. I always remind myself that the first and foremost responsi-
30 

bility of the Federal Government is to provide for the common defense. 

That is actually in the preamble of the Constitution. It doesn’t 

say that we are to be doing a lot of other things that we do, not 

that they are not priorities, but the common defense, in my opinion, is National defense, is National security, homeland security, 

and a big part of that is securing our border, and that is what this 

committee’s mission is. 

So, how can we think about all of this DoD equipment that might 

be able to be utilized? You know, as well, of course, we all have 

copies of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I have a copy 

right on my desk; I try to make sure it doesn’t become just 

shelfware and collect dust, but we look at it all the time. One of 

the principal recommendations of the 9/11 Commission recommendation was that we need to move from the need-to-know to 

the need-to-share. I think whether that is intel or equipment, 

whatever, the taxpayer is not always making the assumption that 

we are in these silos that we all do here on Capitol Hill. So I think 

it is for us to look at how we can actually share some of these 

things. 

In fact, that is my thought about having this committee hearing 

today. Actually, when we did the recent DoD defense reauthorization bill I actually had an amendment that I offered that I was delighted passed that required the DoD and the DHS to look at these 

kinds of things and what each agency may be able to bring to bear 

to the best utilization of the taxpayers’ bang for the buck. So I am 

glad about all of that. 

You know, I say a historic time and an opportunity that could 

be missed here because in my mind we missed an opportunity as 

a Congress when we did the last BRAC—the base realignment and 

closure commission. Quite frankly, as we were looking at how we 

could best utilize inventory domestically, in particular—military inventory—and I am not sure exactly the wiring diagram with the 

Department of Homeland Security as far as looking out regionally 

and renting office space and everything else, I think we should be 

using military facilities, quite frankly, as a physical footprint for a 

lot of DHS, as well. 

We have that, just for a moment, in my area—Mr. Borkowski is 

well aware of—where we have recently stood up the Great Lakes 

branch of the Northern Border wing, and as we look at, on the 

Northern Border security that is more personnel from CBP, air assets, both fixed-wings and rotor, it is water assets, as we have the 

unique circumstances and dynamics of a long liquid border there. 

It is also something we call an OIC, which is an operational integration center pilot program for the Northern Border that can be 

replicated along the Southern Border, as well, where we had, actually, very good success with the SBInet in our area, but this thing 

is state-of-the-art data analyzing feed by all of the various stakeholders. 

Again, it is the need-to-know, the need-to-share, where you have 

got the Federal Government, the State government, even the emergency management directors of our local counties, marine divisions 

all feeding in assessments of a threat that can be then used. The 

Coast Guard is there, as well, but the Coast Guard Air Station De-
31 

troit is there, as Mr. Tangora knows, all feeding their information 

in that can be utilized by our brave men and women out in the 

field to assess the threat. 

So I guess I sort of want to know how—and I suppose this is for 

Mr. Stockton and Mr. Borkowski, as well—the DHS sort-of calls 

this foraging, which I thought was an interesting term, sort of reminds you of an animal out in the woods foraging for nuts, I guess. 

But you are sort of foraging through DoD to see what kind of technology can be utilized, and if you have a one-stop shop how does 

it all work? Is there a necessity for a stronger structural system 

throughout the wiring diagram so that it can be used—because it 

is such a huge department—DoD, and now DHS, as well. How can 

this be utilized most effectively? So I throw that question out—either gentleman. 

Mr. STOCKTON. I will be happy to speak to it first. The Domestic 

Preparedness Support Initiative is the program that we have put 

together in order to provide for that one-stop shopping. Let me tell 

you how it works. 

We work in two directions, both to identify capabilities that we 

can transfer to our DHS partners in response to their requests for 

assistance, but also to State and local public safety organizations 

who work very closely with the armed services and other components of the Department of Defense to find out which kinds of articles are likely to be declared to be excess that might actually be 

needed by our partners. So we work that very, very closely with 

our lead partners, the Defense Logistics Agency. 

Let me just add my praise to an organization that doesn’t get 

enough. DLA does a great job in this regard. 

So we look at the supply. Then we work very closely with DHS, 

CBP, all of our partners, and also aggressive outreach to State and 

local first responders to find out what are their highest priority requirements. We have built a web-based system to identify what 

they need, and with the help of DLA, match that up to the capabilities that are acquired in excess property. 

That is the way that we work, but with TSWG and a variety of 

other opportunities to be in support of DHS in ways that make 

sense for the taxpayer, that add great value at marginal cost to the 

Department of Defense—— 

Mrs. MILLER. So, if I might, you are not advocating any change. 

You are saying that what you are doing right now is adequate? 

If that is the case, let me just ask you this: What is the criteria, 

for instance, when you go to local first responders, or through the 

State coordinators, or however you are determining how you are 

giving some of this excess to first responders, as an example? Because our Congress has had a huge debate, for instance, about firefighters’ assistance grants and whether or not we should be sending it to New York, or Nebraska, or who gets it—or what is the criteria, et cetera? 

Mr. STOCKTON. The specific criteria I would be happy to provide 

for the record—— 

Mrs. MILLER. Okay. 

Mr. STOCKTON [continuing]. But what I do, for example, is last 

week I met with Jim Schwartz, the fire chief for Arlington, and we 

talked about what his priority needs were in that jurisdiction. I 
32 

have a team of folks who conduct this aggressive outreach. We rack 

and stack their prioritized requests for assistance, and then we, 

with the help of the Defense Logistics Agency, try to match up 

their requirements with what we have. 

I will say this, though, that there are some assets that are very 

scarce and very expensive, such as night vision devices. That is 

why we have this pool of equipment to lend out, to loan, to lease, 

again, at very low cost, because we know that demand for this 

equipment vastly outstrips the supply that we have available. That 

is why we have had this particular program. 

Mrs. MILLER. In the interest of time, just one follow-up question 

to that: One of the things I have a huge interest in, as we mentioned, about the Predator drones, which is a great technology that 

has application for DoD and DHS, have you looked at land systems, some of these land systems? You look at these robots that 

they are using on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Again, you know, you get somebody sitting in a cubicle drinking a 

Starbucks that are running these things. Too bad if they get 

knocked off, but the—if the robot gets shot, but we didn’t lose a 

person so it is wonderful technology. 

But these have the ability to, again, send back the information 

to the individual about assessing the threat, what the environment 

is, et cetera, et cetera, and if we can utilize those kinds of things 

in theater certainly we could use that on the Southern Border, as 

well, and the Northern Border, for that matter. Is there any movement in regard, specifically, to land systems? 

Mr. STOCKTON. There is, but I would defer to my friends from 

CBP to talk about that, and then I will also follow up as needed. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Part of the issue with connectivity, by the way, 

is on our side of the equation. One of the reasons that my office 

was created a little more than a year ago was because we needed 

to collect to come up with a single point of entry into CBP, and we 

are still evolving that. So part of the—there is an issue on our side. 

I don’t think everybody really understands all the time that DHS 

Science and Technology is a key part of that, so I think we have 

some marketing to do on our—— 

But the challenge that I have is that I do understand that there 

are these points of contact in the Department of Defense, but I 

have things that come to me outside of those chains. Often they are 

interesting, and I don’t think that it would be appropriate to try 

to shut that dialogue down. So I am a little skeptical about the 

likelihood of success of defining rigidly, you know, an infrastructure 

that connects DHS and DoD because I think it would shut down— 

the best I can do is make it clear that I am willing to receive as 

much as someone is willing to offer. 

Just so you know, I am probably up to, like, 1,000 meetings, and 

some of those are DoD, and some of those are industry, including, 

by the way, ground systems that you talk about, which we are interested in. The question for us is going to be, what do I do first? 

Those are the kinds of trays that we have going forward, but we 

do have capacity to pilot things. We have included within CBP the 

capacity to pilot, so we take things like ground systems that are 

available to us, or identified to us, show them to the Border Patrol, 

show them to the Office of Field Operations, show them to Air and 
33 

Marine, and say, is this something you would like us to check out 

as one of our first priorities? 

If it is we will go do it, but we do have that dialogue with ground 

systems; we have that dialogue with the communications systems; 

we have that dialogue with aerostats. 

I would also say that at a lower level than some of the discussions that we are talking about here we have tried to create some 

networks. For example, Joint Program Manager Guardian is a 

clearinghouse of sorts for the Department of Defense for systems. 

So I have co-chaired with them some conferences to bring in—by 

the way, not just DoD and DHS; we have had FBI—other Federal 

agencies with common technology interests to at least start the dialogue of what is available. 

So I think we need a little more structure, but I am a little skeptical that we can make it too structured. The best approach that 

I have found is let people know that we are willing to hear what 

is available and then invite those discussions and expose them to 

our operational users. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. 

I am over my time here, but I would just say, we also had discussion between Mr. Clarke, who is a Member of the full committee 

and this subcommittee, as well, from Detroit, and myself, and he 

was offering an amendment. We decided not to do it, but we are 

going to pursue it in the reauthorization on the floor, about test 

bedding, whether or not—and I don’t know if that maybe gets in 

the way of your structure, or if it is a—an assist for the Department to be able to test bed in various locales, whether it is the 

Southern Border or the Northern Border, on these kinds of things. 

I would like to talk to you, maybe, after the committee hearing a 

little bit more about that, if that is something that is of value to 

you. 

At this time I would recognize the Ranking Member. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Assistant Secretary Stockton, let me follow up on what the 

Chairwoman said. Since the Southern Border, as you know, is the 

emphasis of a lot of the Members I would ask you, first of all, 

would you be willing to go down there and meet—if I can put border sheriffs and border policemen, DPS, and other folks from me, 

would you be willing to travel down to the border to go meet with 

them? 

Mr. STOCKTON. It would be an honor. I have been there before, 

but the facts on the ground continue to evolve, and so a chance to 

go down there, listen to local law enforcement, listen to our CBP 

partners, it would be an honor. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. What we will do is we will have, of course— 

Homeland Security, we will have the Coast Guard, also, since they 

have a presence there on the border, and certainly, you know, we 

will bring border sheriffs and border police at some place there 

where we would love to have you there, No. 1, so thank you for 

that, No. 1. 

No. 2, give me—and following what the Chairwoman said, let’s 

say that I am a policeman in Mission, Texas, border county—I 

mean, border area. Where do I start? If you were me—I didn’t 

know you until now, and I was looking that you have the—under 
34 

the defense authorization you are the key person to share with the 

State and local folks and Federal folks on homeland security assets 

and technology. 

If I was a police commissioner in a border area, where do I get 

started? Could you give us a one, two, three, because I am sure if 

a police chief tried to get ahold of you it might be a little difficult, 

might be different lines before they can get ahold of you. Tell me, 

what is—how does somebody get started? 

Mr. STOCKTON. Well, I meet as many police chiefs and sheriffs 

as I can. We have an aggressive outreach effort. We bring people 

here to the National Capitol region by the thousands. I also travel. 

But web-based outreach is especially effective. We have done a 

very aggressive job of trying to make it easy to get to my team so 

that we can then engage with DLA, engage with the services, and 

match up the supply of excess defense articles with what is required by our DHS partners, but also, ultimately, cops on the beat. 

In the State of Texas I am proud to say that thus far this fiscal year we have already transferred almost $16 million worth of 

equipment—tactical vehicles—62 vehicles this year, almost 1,200 

weapons—specialized weapons for law enforcement, watercraft. 

These are coming to the State of Texas based on requests that we 

get from local law enforcement and the State interloculars that we 

have in the great State of Texas. 

We have got a system that is working well. It has gone from $200 million in transfer of excess materials to almost $600 million 

thus far this fiscal year, compared to last. We are ramping up. 

That gets back to the question of whether structurally we need 

help. I don’t believe we do. We need continued, dedicated focus of 

the Department of Defense to be in support of our DHS partners 

and the State and local public safety organizations, ultimately 

whom we are in support of, at no cost to the Department of Defense or marginal cost, because that is—we are in a very difficult 

budget situation, as well, and so we are looking to maximize the 

efficiency and the effectiveness of this program rather than adding 

burdens on the American taxpayer. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Do you know what cities they went to when you mentioned Texas, just out of—— 

Mr. STOCKTON. I do not know, but I would be happy to provide 

that material for the record. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Okay. I mean, I am just—you know, Texas 

is a large State—— 

Mr. STOCKTON. Yes. 

Mr. CUELLAR [continuing]. And I know that when we provide 

homeland security dollars in the millions of dollars and people emphasize the border, what is it, 9, 10, 11 percent only goes to the 

border, and everything goes—and again, I support the whole State 

of Texas, but—so I am just wondering if that is going to border, 

or it is going to the Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston areas, and I would 

be just curious. But I certainly want to—there is a lot of emphasis 

on the border, and I certainly want to do my job in representing 

the whole border in the State of Texas. 

So we are going to follow up on that meeting, and we will get 

you border sheriffs and police, and other folks, and certainly the 

other partners here, because we are very interested in your work. 
35 

Especially, the more I look at this sentence, your, you know, your 

authorization and you are key—I think you are going to be very 

key to the Northern Border, and to the Southern Border, and we 

are going to have to get out the word on what you do in our own 

way. 

So we thank you. 

So, Madam Chairwoman, I don’t have any questions. I just want 

to thank the Secretary for being here, and of course, the other 

Members here that are present here today. 

Mrs. MILLER. Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from 

Mississippi. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Good hearing. 

I wanted to move it a little bit from the 1401 arena, which is 

good, but let’s talk about accessing DoD technology, okay? The 

equipment is fine, absolutely. I have seen it rust on military bases 

for years. 

But how—what is a formal process that a border sheriff or somebody who is looking for a specific technology—what will they have 

to do with DoD? 

Mr. STOCKTON. For technology outreach, much of what we do is 

in support of our Federal partners through the TSWG and for the 

other kinds of Federal partner support, for DHS, above all, that 

then they can provide to the emergency managers in States and localities. So our primary technology support is for our Federal partners. 

But I would say that for wound treatment, for many of the other 

capabilities that we have built to win our wars abroad, that technology then does get applied for support for our first responders. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So is that a formalized process for this technology access? 

Mr. STOCKTON. It is, and I would invite my partners from the 

Department of Homeland Security to talk about that process, and 

then I will have a specific example, also, to offer. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, I would just offer that we are aware 

that—I think what you are talking about is when equipment might 

be excess and might be available, and there is a formal process. I 

believe the acronym is DRMO, the defense reutilization—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. No, I am not talking about—— 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Oh, okay. All right. 

Mr. THOMPSON. We understand the hardware piece. But this 

hearing is to talk about DoD technology and how we can use it to 

secure the border, and we have kind of moved toward the equipment side of the conversation rather than the technology side. 

I am trying to figure out how—what is the process by which a 

local official makes a request for a specific technology, if we have 

that process defined, and if so, what is it? 

Mr. STOCKTON. That may be an opportunity to make further 

progress, because to the best of my knowledge most of the technology focus that we have is in direct support and partnership with 

the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal department partners, as opposed to providing technology directly to local 

law enforcement. Equipment goes to law enforcement; our technology partnership—and I take your point—is primarily with our 
36 

Federal partners, as opposed to building that same two-way system 

that exists for equipment with State and locals for technology. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. Well, is there a formal process for DoD to 

use that technology with CBP, for instance? What is the process? 

Mr. STOCKTON. Well, on the Southwest Border, above all, we 

have Joint Task Force North that provides technical expertise in 

support to CBP. So that involves demonstration projects that enable the CBP to understand how to use Predators effectively, 

ground-based radars, tunnel detection technology, both acoustic 

and non-acoustic. So we have intensive technology sharing between 

the Department of Defense and our partners at CBP, ICE, and 

DHS as a whole. That is very robust. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Right. 

So, Mr. Borkowski, the process is you define a technology that 

you, for whatever reason, need. Do you make that formal request 

to DoD? What do you do? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes. We have a process where we have a frequent dialogue—and in fact, in some cases it is an organized meeting—with JTF North, Joint Task Force North, and Joint Task 

Force North and our folks on the border get together and say, what 

have you got? What are you interested in? So they have a little bit 

back and forth, these are the technologies we could bring to bear; 

these are the operations we would like to conduct. 

Joint Task Force North will reach out to the rest of the Department of Defense. Many times this becomes part of a training exercise for an element of the Department of Defense. 

In fact, the technologies that Representative McCaul and Ranking Member Cuellar and I went and saw at Laredo were part of 

one of those operations. It was an agreement reached between JTF 

North and, in that case, the Border Patrol to conduct an operation 

with technology in support of Border Patrol operations in Laredo. 

So there is a process. We have that dialogue routinely, and then 

JTF North will schedule operations in support of those discussions. 

Mr. THOMPSON. If I might, so if you do that—— 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. THOMPSON [continuing]. Do you shift the cost of that operation to CBP or is it still within the budget of DoD? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Typically we do not, and I want to get specific 

answers to you so let me double-check. But I believe the answer is 

no; DoD does this as part of a DoD then training exercise, so it 

usually gets covered under a training exercise for DoD that we are 

able to take advantage of operationally. So for the most part I believe we do not pick up the cost of that. I would like to confirm 

that, but I am pretty sure that is true. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Beyond the training, does it become an on-going 

integral part of CBP or is it just for the training? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. It is training for the military. There is a continuing relationship. So we don’t have the same operations all the 

time with the same technology and the same units of the military 

all the time, but we do have a continuing relationship with Joint 

Task Force North, which we have come to depend and rely on. 

Joint Task Force North will apply different resources, different 

units, different technologies based on those discussions. So there is 
37 

a continuing relationship but the specific thing we might be doing 

will change over time. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from 

South Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to commend you for making the comments about the 9/11 Commission report. 

Some of my own thoughts of integration and sharing of information—and let me remind the panelists and the committee, we are 

all in this together. Whether you are working for DHS or DoD or 

are Members of Congress, we are all in this together to protect the 

sovereignty of this great Nation, to enforce the laws that we have 

here, to stop illegal and illicit drugs from coming in, and other 

things that could possibly come and cross the border. So I hope 

that the information sharing does take place, that the equipment, 

technology, research, all that is shared across agency lines, because 

that is how it should be done and that is what the American people 

expect. 

I just came back from a trip over to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan where the border situation was a topic of discussion many, 

many times, whether we were meeting with the military folks coming out of Iraq, with folks charged with securing and enforcing the 

border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Mr. Cuellar asking 

the Pakistani president about the border, and the question back 

and forth—Pakistan—the Pakistan president asked Mr. Cuellar 

how much we spend on securing our border. 

So it is an interesting opportunity today to have this hearing following up on that, and I want to commend the Chairman McCaul 

for inviting me to go on that trip that was very worthwhile. 

So having come back from talking with the military leaders that 

are coming out of Iraq and understanding there is a lot of technology, a lot of lessons learned in that theater—lessons learned 

every day in Afghanistan—and many Members of this committee 

continue to advocate the acquisition of proven technologies used by 

the DoD and learning from those lessons in those theaters, and 

also hearing today of the deployment of some of those technologies 

on the Southwest Border as we wind down those operations. 

While I understand DoD has a much larger budget for researching and developing new technologies and a large group of personnel 

who are trained using certain technologies, I guess, Mr. Borkowski, 

can you describe some of DHS’s challenges in transferring or receiving some of those technologies from DoD? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Sure. In terms of technologies that are fairly 

self-contained, like the—what we call the agent portable sensor 

systems are the things that we looked at in Laredo and that we 

are actually buying, there isn’t too much of a challenge. We do 

have to train our agents to use that, but that is typically not terribly difficult. We can do that. 

The difficulty comes when I bring in a DoD system that I have 

to plug into my command-and-control system. Typically DoD systems, for example, will use satellite communications fairly routinely. Satellite communications are expensive for us if done on a 
38 

persistent basis. We also need to plug that into our command-andcontrol system, which may not be the same as DoD’s commandand-control system, and that can be a challenging technical development activity. 

If it is an extensive technology, something like aerostats—which, 

by the way, look very promising to us—but they require crews. 

They have significant operational costs associated with them, and 

that is often missed in here. So I also have to be able to absorb 

the cost to operate and maintain the systems, which, again, I have 

a different budget threshold for that than maybe the Department 

of Defense does. 

So the challenges are if they are not self-contained and I have 

to plug them into my current operational system I will have engineering development that I will have to do, which can be expensive. 

I do have to be sensitive to the operations and support costs of the 

systems. 

For very—relatively, not very—relatively complex systems I do 

have to worry about the training and the development of crews to 

operate them as I bring them in. Having—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Along that line, though, we have got a huge number of personnel coming out of the military. As the deployments 

transition and we wind down the theater in Iraq, there is an opportunity there to hire already-trained DoD personnel to run these 

systems. 

Are you all looking into that? What are the hiring guidelines and 

practices that you are putting in place? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We haven’t quite gotten to the point where we 

are buying the systems yet, but I think you are absolutely right. 

If we get to that situation we would need to look at that opportunity to bring in these trained people if, in fact, they are available. 

We would need allocation of funds to pay their salaries and we 

would probably need some kind of expedited authorities to hire 

them, but that is something we would be very interested in talking 

to you about. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. 

I don’t have any further questions, Madam Chairwoman. I yield 

back. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. 

Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and Ranking 

Member, for holding the hearing on this issue. I think it is one we 

have been focused on for a while. I think it makes a lot of sense. 

Mr. Borkowski, you mentioned previously our trip down to the 

border and we were looking at that time the Defense Intelligence 

Agency technology. Can you tell me where we are today with deploying that technology on the Southwest Border? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes, sir. In the Arizona Technology Plan, which, 

as you know, is kind of a down-payment for the Southwest Border, 

we are buying 15 of those systems. We are actually buying them 

from the Army. I believe four are already delivered, and all of them 

should be delivered by December. 

We are also developing plans, obviously, for the rest of the border, which will include future procurements of those, as well, but 

that is the current status. 
39 

Mr. MCCAUL. You know, we are always talking about securing 

the border. I think the physical infrastructure has been put in 

place, for the most part; it is the technology piece that has been 

lacking. 

Where do you—I mean, UAVs, you know, we have been working 

hard to get those down there, these fixed towers, sensor surveillance equipment. Can you tell me kind of where you are with your 

game plan and how long it is going to take before we can say, you 

know, that the technology piece has been fulfilled? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, first of all, it is going to be many years 

at the current, you know, funding profile. But in terms of the plan, 

we have shown you in the past the lay down, essentially a map of 

Arizona and what we intend to put in Arizona. These are, again, 

available systems, many of which leverage DoD. 

We have built at my level—that is important to understand— 

that map for the whole Southwest Border. We are currently in the 

process of, you know, reviewing that with the senior management 

in the Department, but we are well along in having a map along 

the whole Southwest Border. 

The next element—we are also going to do the Northern Border, 

and we have done the early process of the Northern Border, but if 

I could start with the Southwest Border, because I want to talk 

about things like UAVs and such—the analysis that we did, which 

followed from SBInet answer to sort of the question that said, if we 

want something to replace SBInet what should it be? But that ‘‘if 

we want something to replace SBInet’’ is a very important kind of 

predicate to that discussion, right? 

The next thing we need to do is test that, ‘‘if we want.’’ That is 

where things like UAV or aerostats come into play, because there 

may be areas of the border where it makes less sense to put in persistent fixed infrastructure and more sense to put intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets that can assess whether things 

are changing, and in response to those changes adjust our technology plans. 

So over the next probably 9 months we will baseline that map 

of the Southwest Border, but then we will test that map against 

the—test the ‘‘if’’ question, if it makes sense to do this, against 

things like more persistent use of UAVs, aerostats, fixed-wing ISR 

kind of capabilities, so that is what we will be doing for about the 

next 9 months. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. Stockton, we, as I think the Ranking Member mentioned, we 

had a very interesting trip to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. 

General Austin, in Iraq, pledged his support through our delegation 

to assist in any way the DoD can with assets as we wind down 

those operations overseas towards the Southwest Border and 

Northern, as well. 

Where do you see—you are sitting down with General Austin, 

what would you say that we need, and what is available to transfer 

to the border? 

Mr. STOCKTON. Let me talk about both sides of those equations 

in turn. First of all, when we analyze what the requirements are 

we depend on our partners in CBP and the Department of Homeland Security, our other lead Federal agency departments, to speci-
40 

fy what their requirements are. Border security is a law enforcement mission, not a military mission, and this is an opportunity to 

be in support of our closest partners. 

So we listen hard to Commissioner Bersin, all of our friends at 

CBP and at DHS as a whole, so that we can make sure that scarce 

DoD resources are used in a way that has the biggest bang for the 

buck, but also fits the integrated vision that CBP is developing for 

the future. That is their vision. We are in support, although the 

scarcity of DoD resources, of course, is very much in our minds. 

Turning to the other side of the question, how do we source these 

potential requirements that we get from our lead Federal partners, 

there we work very closely with the armed forces, with the military 

departments, with the Defense Logistics Agency to understand 

what are the priority demands on equipment that may be coming 

back, and what could be most useful that is available to support 

Department of Homeland Security? 

So the challenge, of course, as you were to understand, is there 

is only so many assets to go around, and it is a harsh process of 

prioritization that we have to go through at levels above mine, 

frankly, to decide where some of these scarce assets are going to 

go. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I think this committee would like to be a part 

of that decision-making process, and I think the idea of bringing 

you all down to the border is actually a very good one, and I hope 

we can follow up on that with the Chairwoman and Ranking Member. I think a visit to the Joint Task Force North, which seems to 

be the plug-in between the DoD and the Southwest Border and 

DHS, would be very productive. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank the gentleman. 

Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. 

Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Appreciate your 

leadership on this. 

Mr. Tangora, given the growing risks of pirates and other interdiction efforts that are going on by our Coast Guard—for example, 

semi-submersibles, and other things—I believe that our Coast 

Guard’s men and women need a quick way to identify who they 

have got on their hands when they have stopped them, for example, to see if those individuals are on watch lists and to take whatever appropriate action that they need to do. 

I am also a Member of the Armed Services Committee, and I am 

very familiar with DoD’s biometric efforts, their technologies that 

they are using in particular in the remote areas of Afghanistan 

to—the technologies that they use to biometrically identify high— 

and look at and enroll high-risk individuals they have picked up. 

So my question to you would be: Have you been looking at some 

of the technology that DoD has that you might be able to leverage, 

and where would you see—I mean, I am thinking in particular of 

people that we catch as they are trying to land on our beaches, et 

cetera, but where else might that be applied? What are the constraints in your ability to be able to get that technology and use 

it for the Department of Homeland? 

Mr. TANGORA. Thank you, Congresswoman. 
41 

The biometrics initiative that we have been now doing for approximately 8 years have been yielding outstanding success. I 

mean, we have cut down immigration in the Mona Pass with biometrics—two-print biometrics—by 80 percent. You know, we are 

being able to spread our assets a lot further in the Caribbean because of the success of that. We are able to get the right people 

identified and prosecuted—I think we have prosecuted over 400 

people in the last 6 years in migrant interdiction based primarily 

upon what we are getting out of the biometrics. 

The challenge is we have very small cutters that are interdicting 

these boats in the Caribbean, and we do not have a large pipe or 

a large satellite feed down to these small units, and so we go with 

a two-print, but we want to get further into what the DoD uses, 

which is—and the FBI uses—which is the 10-print. We are going 

to be able to use that technology to better aid our men and women 

being able to quickly identify exactly that people have known criminal backgrounds when we interdict them, especially in the Caribbean. 

We use the technology in the Persian Gulf, also. It is absolutely 

a game-changer, and it is a force-multiplier. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. If you gentlemen would talk to me about, I know 

one of the things that we saw—I was the Chairwoman of the Border, Counterterrorism Subcommittee of this committee when the 

Democrats were in charge, and under that fell SBInet. One of the 

issues that we had was the cellular towers that we had up, and the 

sabotaging of that technology by coyotes or whomever—drug dealers, let’s say. Talk to me about communications for these systems, 

and what are the difficulties? 

I mean, I can think, wouldn’t it be great if we had this biometric 

handheld thing that, you know, when we have found somebody out 

in international waters, or what have you, and we thought they 

were drug dealers, and we wanted to scan them, is there a technology—what cell towers, how are we going to get that done and 

what are the drawbacks to having that technology based on that? 

Mr. COX. Thank you for the question. We actually have been 

working for several years now with DoD and the Department of 

Justice to bring biometrics to the field. A lot of the issue is actually 

getting the heavy prisms and other collection methods to get beyond the two-print into the field and make it sort of man-portable 

and ruggedized for deployment along the border or in a maritime 

environment. 

Then we will have to address the complicated nature of having 

these systems transmit their information to all of the databases 

that contain—please—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. But the ruggedized is done in the DoD, isn’t it? I 

mean, that is what we have. They are actually in remote areas in 

Afghanistan with handheld rugged. 

Why aren’t we moving that technology or those instruments—— 

Mr. COX. We are. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. Over to DHS? 

Mr. COX. We are. We are—those investments, but it is also the 

marinization, everything—making it affordable for our mission and 

making the connection to the multiple databases across law en-
42 

forcement agencies that have this information that you are asking 

about. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Detroit, Mr. 

Clarke. 

Mr. CLARKE of Michigan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and 

thank you for acknowledging the city that I am born and raised 

and currently represent. 

Also, I want to thank you for holding this hearing because, you 

know, as you are aware, the region that I represent is at high risk 

of an attack, or the economic consequences of any type of natural 

disaster impacting that region could be great, and by looking at the 

possible synergy of DoD technology to protect that region and that 

border, wanted to get your opinions on if you feel that this could 

create an opportunity to build the capacity of local businesses in 

metro Detroit, and thereby creating jobs. Let me just give you an 

example. 

First, just to share with you my view of the risk of an attack at 

that border: We have the busiest international border crossing of 

North America, so our bridge, our tunnel, they are targets; our 

drinking water plant there could be vulnerable to a bioterrorism attack; as a matter of fact, our international regional airport has already been a target of an attempted bombing. The infamous Christmas day bomber attempted to bring down a plane that landed in 

the Detroit Metropolitan Airport. 

While we have that risk, that region also has the capacity, I believe, to respond. We have DoD contractors in the region, primarily 

in the area that the Chairwoman represents. 

This is Detroit. We still have the manufacturing know-how. We 

also have some of the best-trained engineers in the country. 

We also have strong research universities. As a matter of fact, 

right within the heart of the city we have Wayne State University, 

and in Detroit we have large parcels of vacant land that are ready 

to develop—it already has the infrastructure needed to serve a facility there. 

So my question is: Do you see the possibility of the city of Detroit 

being a site for testing and evaluating homeland security technology or DoD technology that could have an application to homeland security uses, such as—let me give an example—video surveillance to monitor our borders, cybersecurity, as well, and preparing—preparedness against a bioterrorist attack? That is No. 1, 

and then if I have time I have a follow-up related to that question. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes. Thank you for that question, Congressman 

Clarke. 

The short answer to your question is, do we see Detroit as a potential—yes, we do. Now, to be fair, as a member of the Executive 

branch I can’t, you know, be—favor one part of the country as opposed to another, so to be fair we have often asked the same question about other parts of the border. 

We do see that Detroit has some unique characteristics, including the fact that it has got the largest port of entry, and that 

makes it attractive in some ways, compared to some other places, 
43 

for particular parts of the mission. So to the degree we are able to 

look at tailoring that—because it is also true we have test beds in 

a lot of other areas. 

We don’t want to be overly redundant, but we recognize the characteristics of Detroit; we recognize the existence of heavy industry 

there that perhaps is unique; we recognize that it is the largest 

port of entry. We think those things taken together make it worth 

at least having a dialogue about whether or not we ought to put 

something in Detroit. 

But again, there is a lot more homework to be done on that, and 

to be fair, there are similar situations with characteristics on other 

parts of the border that we also have to be sensitive to. 

Mr. CLARKE of Michigan. Well, thank you. I would be willing to 

work directly with you to help you better see those opportunities 

there. 

One thing I will say is that, you know, Detroit has been very 

hard-hit. We have lost more jobs and more homes, more capital 

over the last 10 years than virtually any other metropolitan city in 

the country. 

But here is the difference, though: Our region has the best potential, though, for job growth, just because of the capacity that we 

have in manufacturing, and the universities, and the vacant land, 

and the trained engineers, and also with the DoD contractors that 

are there. 

So the second part of my question is: Do any of you see a way 

that our current DoD contractors in metro Detroit or other businesses could benefit from some type of a procurement or acquisition 

preference, especially since those businesses are located in areas 

that have high unemployment rates, like Oakland County, 

Macomb, Wayne County, and the city of Detroit—so some type of 

acquisition preference that would give them an edge in getting 

work with the Department of Defense or with the Department of 

Homeland Security, you know, considering all things equal? 

They have got to have the capability to do the job and they have 

got to be scored, you know, well in the evaluation process, but especially if they are going to be delivering the technology right there 

in metropolitan Detroit, it would be great to have a metro Detroit 

company hiring metro Detroit employees to actually help protect 

our country. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Certainly, Congress has the capability to develop acquisition and procurement preferences, and subject to the 

fact that the systems actually meet the needs, we are sort of, 

frankly, agnostic to that. That is a policy decision that we are perfectly comfortable and prepared to execute as long as we can get 

the products that we need. 

So I don’t think it is appropriate for us to comment on that determination, but clearly, if there are preferences they do have—they 

do tend to affect the way that we buy things, and our only real interest is in making sure that what we ask for gets delivered to us. 

Mr. TANGORA. If I could add, I mean, there is socioeconomic goals 

that we do, and the Coast Guard hit every one of them—all of our 

hub zone, all of our small, disadvantaged businesses, all of our 

women-owned businesses. All of those different socioeconomic goals 

that the Department lays on us, you know, we try and do that. 
44 

So, you know, looking at Detroit, it is a—in parts of Detroit it 

is a perfect hub zone type of thing, and I would think you would 

be able to exploit that and—in a lot of different Federal contracting 

initiatives. 

Mr. CLARKE of Michigan. Thank you. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 

Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

More than just protocol, I want to stress my appreciation for this 

hearing, to the Ranking Member, as well, for his insight and very 

constructive letter that I know you must have written to get a response that we have gotten from the Coast Guard. Thank you for 

that leadership. 

I have always said that the role of—even in this quiet room, the 

role of this committee and its counterpart on the other—in the 

other body, and the Department, and all of you who are sitting 

here is to ensure with every fiber in our body, if possible, that another attack on the homeland does not occur. Many times we sit 

in quiet hearing rooms away from the thunderous cloud of fear and 

potential threats that many of our soldiers see on the battlefield, 

it looks as if we are doing mundane work. I think that this is crucial work, and I am very concerned that we are confronting it the 

way we should. 

I am going to start with Secretary Stockton, on the return home 

of—and how are you? Return home of throngs of soldiers from Iraq, 

with the pending return of those from Afghanistan—some of us 

would ask for them to come home earlier than they are. They will 

be coming home with a great degree of expertise. I would like to 

know the Defense Department’s thoughts and plans for taking that 

expertise and cross-pollinating with departments such as the Department of Homeland Security, which is the closest partner to 

that, a possibility of DOJ, so that these resources can be used. 

I am not so apt—I am a big believer in small businesses, but I 

am not so inclined to ignore this talent, use of technology, and let 

it dissipate when we are confronting threats unknown. 

Secretary. 

Mr. STOCKTON. That is a terrific question. Portions of the answer 

go beyond my portfolio, but some of it is right on. 

First of all, I want to talk about the benefit of having these returning soldiers, sailors, and airmen continue to serve the Nation, 

continue to serve States and localities by virtue of joining the National Guard and the Title 10 Reserves, because Mother Nature is 

going to continue to confront the United States with severe hazards; as you pointed out, Congresswoman, the threat of attack is 

always there. So to have the terrific expertise that our forces have 

gained abroad and be able to serve in the homeland, for me that 

is an extremely important opportunity. 

But also, to have these returning soldiers be able to serve in public safety organizations in States and localities, again, to leverage 

the expertise, the leadership skills they have provided. We are 

building programs to facilitate that as well as into related industry. 

I know this is a priority for the First Lady, for the Vice President, 
45 

and for the President, and it is a priority for my boss and all of 

us in the Department of Defense. 

It is a terrific opportunity. Let’s not miss it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. 

I ask the Chairwoman my indulgence. I see my time is almost 

running, and I have a couple of more questions, but I will—do want 

to say this: I come from the largest—fourth-largest city in the Nation with a lot of influence in the energy industry, which crippled, 

would be a terrible blow for this country. I would like to extend an 

invitation for you to visit Houston and to talk to many of our leaders in the security area on just some of the ways of collaboration. 

So I would like to extend that invitation to you and work with your 

office. 

Mr. STOCKTON. It would be an honor to visit your district and get 

to know your community better. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Let me go quickly to Mr. Borkowski, quickly. Would you tell me 

how a collaboration with the DoD would be helpful to Customs and 

Border Protection? 

Could I get the Coast Guard—I am going to ask these questions, 

and then if you would just answer them—to indicate what the cuts 

in budget—the proposed budget cuts would do to your operations? 

I do want to thank you for helping us find a domestic abuser who 

killed his wife and who was out on the waters off of the Atlantic 

Ocean. Thank you for the kind of work that you do. 

Mr. Borkowski. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Very quickly, and there are multiple ways that 

we collaborate with DoD that add value to us. One is in helping 

us to learn how to operate as an integrated force. One is in using 

their test facilities to test out the capabilities of various systems for 

our purposes, and one is actually to have developed systems and 

technologies that are fairly immediately transportable to our use. 

But one last that I would like to add is we do conduct joint operations, and we talked about that to some degree earlier with Joint 

Task Force North. That is another way that we collaborate, and 

those things actually operate to support surge capability and support border security activities. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Very good. 

Mr. Tangora. 

Mr. TANGORA. I stand with my commandant, who has been on 

record saying that the President’s budget in fiscal year 2012 is adequate for the Coast Guard, and we recognize that there are a lot 

of discussions about looming budget cuts, and—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, that is the question. The further budget 

cuts, how would that impact your operations? Having seen you operate off the coast—the Pacific Coast, or off the coast of some of our 

Central American countries, dealing with drug interdiction? 

Mr. TANGORA. Right. It becomes a matter of capacity. I mean, 

you pay for what you are going to get, and at this point in time 

it would be purely speculative, you know, based on what we know, 

what the cuts would be and what that impact would be to the 

Coast Guard. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chairwoman, let me just inquire to 

you or comment as I close, thanking you for your kindness. I think 
46 

* The document has been retained in committee files and is available at http://www.gao.gov/ 

products/GAO-12-22. 

there is much room for the combined witnesses that represent the 

different organizations to collaborate. 

I hope this hearing will encourage further collaboration and I 

hope it will be noted that cuts to the Coast Guard budget, I think, 

would be severe. I have seen it in operation, and I see what would 

happen if they were cut even more than they have already been 

cut. 

With that, I thank the Chairwoman and I yield back. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. Thank the gentlelady. 

Thank all the Members that were here today, and all of their 

questions, and certainly the testimony from all of our witnesses, as 

well, which I think was very, very enlightening for all of us here. 

Again, when I started thinking about this hearing it was because 

of the historic opportunity that is staring us right in the face, and 

sometimes we don’t recognize these opportunities as readily as we 

should, or certainly advantage ourselves as we should with them. 

So because of that, I think many of the questions today, and sort 

of getting right at the heart of the matter, specifically of what we 

need to be able to do jointly, and the total force concept is something that the military looks at and the Department of Homeland 

Security needs to continue to look at, as well. It is for those of us 

in Congress as we exercise our role in the whole overall, with oversight and having hearings such as this and asking questions that 

we all start thinking about better ways to do what is our joint mission. 

So I thank all of you. 

I appreciate your question, as well, about the budgetary constraints and what it would do to the Coast Guard, or anybody else, 

for that matter. 

We are all painfully aware, as I say, of the economic transition 

that has occurred in our country and what it means to every level 

of government, and which is one of the principal drivers of the impetus for this hearing, again, is how can we do a better job with 

the existing resources, those that have already been paid for, to secure our Nation? That is our common goal and our common mission, certainly. 

I would just mention for the other Members that the hearing 

record will be held open for 10 days, and if they have any additional questions they can submit them for the record, and we will 

have the witnesses answer those questions as they can, and we will 

appreciate it, and without—now recognize the Ranking Member. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, ma’am. Mr. Thompson, who had to leave, 

asked me if I can introduce into the records the Arizona Border 

Surveillance Technology GAO report that he was referring to. 

Mrs. MILLER. Very well. Without objection.* 

Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(47) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FOR PAUL N. STOCKTON FROM HONORABLE MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

LAWS AND REGULATIONS

Question 1. Are there any changes to laws or regulations that would make it easier for DHS to receive transfers of DoD technology or make it easier for DHS to leverage DoD research? How can this process be made smoother? 

Answer. As noted in my statement for the record, DoD has proposed, and the administration and Congress have supported, expanding the laws permitting State 

and local law enforcement and firefighting agencies, including State and local homeland security and emergency management agencies, to receive excess DoD equipment or to purchase DoD equipment. DoD donated almost $500 million worth of excess equipment to Federal, State, and local agencies for use in counter-drug and 

counter-terrorism activities in fiscal year 2011. Additionally, DoD donated $1.7 million worth of excess equipment to DHS during that same period. To the extent that 

any such laws remain that have not been similarly expanded, DoD would support 

changes to these laws to expand them. 

DoD continues to work closely with its interagency partners, in particular DHS, 

to build capacity vertically from the Federal level down to the local level, and horizontally across the Federal Government. Pursuant to my responsibilities as the Secretary of Defense-designated senior DoD official responsible for coordinating ‘‘all Department of Defense efforts to identify, evaluate, deploy, and transfer to Federal, 

State, and local first responders technology items and equipment in support of 

homeland security,’’ in accordance with section 1401 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Pub. L. 107–314), I established the 

DoD Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative to facilitate Federal, State, and local 

awareness of the availability of DoD technology and equipment, as well as DoD research initiatives. I would appreciate continued support from Congress for the DoD 

Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative. 

ASSISTANCE FROM CONGRESS

Question 2. What can Congress do to further assist DHS in leveraging DoD research and development? 

Answer. As illustrated in my statement, and those of my colleagues from DHS, 

DHS has been very successful at leveraging DoD research and development, as well 

as working cooperatively with DoD on research and the development, testing, and 

evaluation of technologies. At this time, I cannot identify any additional assistance 

that DoD or DHS require beyond the already vital leadership and support we have 

received from the Congress. 

EXPEDITED HIRING AUTHORITY

Question 3. Would it be helpful to give DHS an expedited hiring authority for returning armed services members to operate DoD equipment that has been transferred from use in the Middle East to the DHS components? How would this hiring 

authority work? 

Answer. It would be best to ask DHS whether it requires an expedited hiring authority. My understanding is that DHS has sufficient authorities to hire members 

of the Armed Forces, who are retiring or separating from military service. 

As for members of the Armed Forces returning from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to note that most of these members remain in the Armed 

Forces after their return. DoD would not support any change in law that would diminish the retention of members of the Armed Forces. Such a change would seriously threaten the military preparedness of the Armed Forces. 
48 

QUESTIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FROM HONORABLE MIKE

ROGERS

Question 1. Has DHS coordinated with DoD to identify existing command-and-control technologies or techniques that allow for large-scale data integration and processing from ground sensors, video cameras, radar arrays, and other devices? 

Answer. The response, containing sensitive information, is retained in the committee files. 

Question 2. Has DHS explored integrating more advanced imaging systems onto 

its current manned and unmanned air assets? 

Answer. The response, containing sensitive information, is retained in the committee files. 

Question 3. Has DHS fully reviewed DoD’s use of unmanned airships as persistent 

sensor platforms and communications relays? Has DHS conducted a cost comparison 

between various types of unmanned air platforms? 

Answer. The response, containing sensitive information, is retained in the committee files. 

QUESTIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FROM HONORABLE

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

Question 1a. Are there any changes to laws or regulations that would make it 

easier for DHS to receive transfers of DoD technology or make it easier for DHS 

to leverage DoD research? 

Question 1b. How can this process be made smoother? 

Question 2. What can Congress do to further assist DHS in leveraging DoD research and development? 

Question 4a. Would it be helpful to give DHS an expedited hiring authority for 

returning armed services members to operate DoD equipment that has been transferred from use in the Middle East to the DHS components? 

Question 4b. How would this hiring authority work? 

Answer. DHS is a key partner in the President’s Export Control Reform Initiative, 

of which the cornerstone of the effort is the rebuilding of the export control lists. 

The administration is currently in the process of publishing proposed regulations to 

solicit input on the draft rebuilt control lists, which prioritize those defense articles 

that should remain controlled on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) administered by 

State and those that should be moved to the more flexible authorities of the Commerce Control List (CCL) administered by Commerce. Once all the proposed rebuilt 

categories of the control lists are published for public input, State and Commerce 

will publish these regulations in final throughout the course of 2012. DHS supports 

this effort, as the prioritization of U.S. export controls will facilitate DHS use of controlled items and technologies. 

DHS appreciates the interest of the committee in ensuring that the Department 

has the authorities and mechanisms necessary to accomplish its mission. However, 

sufficient authorities exist allowing for the transfer of technologies, the sharing of 

research, and the hiring of veterans to fulfill critical needs. Section 1401, Pub. L. 

107–314, along with other laws regarding government use rights and disposed 

equipment, already allow DHS access to newly developed technology and retired 

military hardware that it deems appropriate to the mission. DoD has established 

the ‘‘Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative’’ which addresses the requirements 

set forth in section 1401 and the formal relationships between DHS Science and 

Technology and DoD provide the interagency mechanisms needed to ensure DHS is 

aware of technologies and that they are shared. Additionally, existing hiring authorities and preferences for veterans, in conjunction with the specialized experience 

required to perform duties in this arena, are sufficient to attract and appoint the 

talent with the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities. 

Question 3. DHS S&T and the Department generally rely heavily upon personal 

relationships, the individual experiences of its workforce, many of whom previously 

worked at DoD, and a reliance on detailed employees to liaison between components 

and DoD. Should the process be more formalized, in the event that the people retire, 

move on, and are replaced, in order to maximize collaboration, technology transfers, 

and research and development investment between DoD and DHS? 

Answer. Since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) has looked to the Department of 

Defense (DoD) as a source of technology and partner in research and development, 

and formal interactions to do so are especially critical in this budget climate. S&T 

currently uses an established and formalized mechanism for these interagency relationships. These formalized relationships include established Memoranda of Understanding with other Federal agencies; working groups, and committees established 
49 

through the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP); and joint programmatic 

investments and reviews with organizations such as the Technical Support Working 

Group, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, and the United 

States Special Operations Command. 

The majority of these interactions are conducted through formal interagency 

working groups and committees in areas of shared mission space such as chemical 

and biological defense, explosives detection, cybersecurity, and physical security. 

Participation on these committees and working groups ranges from the Under Secretary to individual program managers. Under Secretary O’Toole currently co-chairs 

the National Science and Technology Council’s Committee on Homeland and National Security, along with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs 

within OSTP. In particular cases, such as port and coastal security, S&T is the lead 

organization of these larger agency working groups that include DoD and their subsequent areas of interest. 

S&T has worked with the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology (US–VISIT) Program, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Naval Postgraduate School to test new technologies. That 

includes facial and iris recognition in both laboratory and field settings and testing 

on how to successfully link these technologies to fingerprint biometrics stored in 

US–VISIT’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). 

S&T has successfully leveraged multiple DoD technologies over the years in the 

biometric, chemical/biological, and explosives fields and S&T has established a formal technology foraging office that leverages opportunities from other agencies, universities, the private sector, etc. to increase the field of view and ensure confidence 

that all potential possibilities are explored. 

Æ