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Achieving Unity of Effort

A Case Study in Leadership

35th Combat Aviation Brigade Perspective

News from the Front

MAJ Elliot Miles

CALL, Military Analyst (forward)

April 2019

he National Guard, 35th Combat Aviation 

Brigade (CAB) Headquarters (HQ), is from 

Sedalia, Missouri, with the 2-211th General 

Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB) in Utah. The 

headquarters and three of its battalions, the GSAB, 

the 1-108th Assault Helicopter Battalion and the 935th

Aviation Support Battalion, deployed to Kuwait in 

support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR)

with the headquarters in the fall of 2018. Brigade 

commander, COL Charles D. Hausman and CSM 

Richard. J. Acosta also led aviation task forces from 

the 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 3rd

Cavalry, 10th Mountain, an Italian, and Spanish 

aviators.

During their deployment the lessons learned were:

1) Deployments in a dispersed environment require

junior leaders to step up. Senior leaders must take a 

vested interest in identify and mentoring junior 

leaders to set the conditions to ensure they have the 

knowledge, skills, and attributes to operate under 

mission orders and “alone and unafraid.”

2) Physical distance and weather makes sustainment 

problematic in this operational environment (OE). A 

strong Support Operations (SPO) team is critical to 

push parts as fast as possible to keep aircraft flying. 

3) The modified table of organization and equipment 

should be modified for units deploying to dispersed

OEs like OIR. The maintenance soldiers and test 

pilots must be stationed throughout the area of 

operation; not having this diverse capability can 

constrain flexibility should a contingency arise.

4) The use of the force tracking number (FTN)

improves the sourcing and tracking of request for 

forces and rotational force requirements throughout 

the deployment process and enhances force-closure 

reporting. However, when deploying units based on a 

FTN for one mission, with knowledge they will 

perform other missions adds to pre-deployment staff 

work. To mitigate this flexibility should be built into 

the mission using “on-order” or “be prepared to” 

language to ensure the unit can adequately prepare.

5) Leadership, team-building, standards and 

discipline are critical to integrating cross-leveled 

soldiers and deploying as a single cohesive team.

Before the 35th CAB deployed, the leadership 

arranged for the National Guard Bureau’s Mission 

Command Training Support Program, Mobile 

Training Team (MTT) to train the brigade staff. This 

was excellent training and we recommended it to our 

battalions, said COL Hausman. The skills learned 

during the MTT were applied to real-world staff 

challenges—deploying 1,500 trained and missionready soldiers and their rolling-stock to a combat 

zone.

The 35th CAB deployed half-way around the world. 

That was the easy part. The hard part for COL

Hausman and CSM Acosta, was molding these 

Soldiers from 15 different states into a cohesive team.

To do this, they established a single standard 

operating procedure (SOP), a command presence that 

overcame soldiers’ natural habit of working through 

their previous chains of command and parent unit’s 

SOP, and enforced a single standard and discipline 

among the entire formation.

T

A U.S. Army Soldier surveys the ground from a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter at the Udairi Landing Zone, Camp Buehring, Kuwait, Feb. 9, 2019. 

(U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. Emily Finn)
Center for Army Lessons Learned

News From the Front | April 2019

2

The 60 days of post mobilization1training at Fort 

Hood, Texas (FHTX) enabled the whole formation to 

begin achieving unity and cohesiveness of a single 

command climate, and identify leaders. The 

dispersed OE required Soldiers to be out there “alone 

and unafraid,” said COL Hausman. CSM Acosta 

wanted to put the junior soldiers in a leadership role 

from the beginning. Pre-deployment preparations and 

the training at FHTX enabled senior leaders to 

identify and mentor junior soldiers for leadership 

positions they would fill in theater.

Leader development in the Army, especially after 

almost two decades of war, resulted in something 

CSM Acosta calls “rank maturity.” Soldiers, despite a 

junior rank on his/her uniform, routinely demonstrate 

their leadership abilities and thus earn the trust of the 

command team. National Guard Soldiers are unique 

from their active duty counterparts because they may 

not have the opportunity to stand in front of a 

formation as often, but many times in their civilian 

lives they hold positions of responsibility 

commensurate with a higher rank.

In preparation for deployment, the 35th CAB 

completed the Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) 

process to validate a Soldier’s ability to deploy. Some 

states, such as Missouri, conducted a SRP as soon as 

they received their deployment order (about 18

months out). While many issues identified during the 

SRP can be resolved, sometimes soldiers have to be 

replaced. The brigade headquarters held a second 

SRP which was optimal to double-check the battle 

roster. The states that waited to the last minute to 

hold their SRP generated addition churn with late 

additions to the battle roster, which also meant less 

time to build and mold the team.

The 35th is dispersed among 13 different sites in four 

countries in the U.S. Army Central area of 

responsibility. They have command relationships 

with CJTF-OIR and to TF Spartan,2currently led by 

the 34th Infantry Division.

Units that deploy to Kuwait and even Iraq tend to 

move through reception, staging, onward-movement, 

and integration fairly efficiently. For the 35th CAB 

 

1 Post mobilization for National Guard and Reserve units is after

the unit is on orders, or mobilized, but prior to their departure 

to go down-range.

2 As of 2019, there are two TF Spartans in the CENTCOM AO: 

34th ID and a Marine battalion with separate missions.

Second-person up

“The biggest lesson is

talent management and

figuring out the skill sets

people have and who can

do it more so than the rank.

Those young soldiers that

are exercising those traits

tend to do well and they

had the opportunity to

exercise initiative here. It’s

been a great learning

opportunity and it’s been

great to watch their

success.”

~ COL Hausman ~

“It is very important to let 

the E4s and E5s take lead 

because the middle 

managers are the ones on 

the front lines. The E6s and 

E7s are so dispersed that 

the junior NCOs have to 

step up. If you don’t help 

them build confidence and 

help them get technically 

and tactically proficient, 

you will have holes in your 

operation, so you have to 

train them early.”

~ CSM Acosta ~ 
Center for Army Lessons Learned

News From the Front | April 2019

3

with Soldiers at so many remote locations, the 

standard two-week relief in place model is 

insufficient. Outgoing units, particularly National 

Guard or Reserve units that have a release from 

active duty date, have to move together, and delays—

which can occur all too easily with bad weather—can 

result in minimal left-seat/right-seat with those 

knowledgeable of the lay of the land.

While deployed, the 35th CAB conducted offensive, 

defensive, and stability missions. Additionally, they 

were part of the building partner capacity effort with 

the Iraqis and Theater Security Cooperation with the 

Jordanians. 

To offset the lack of an attack and reconnaissance 

battalion, the 35th CAB leveraged the offensive 

capabilities of the 4-4 CAB and their AH-64 Apache 

Air Weapons Team. The Apaches conduct deliberate 

strikes for Special Operations Joint Task Force-OIR. 

An element the 10th Mountain Division provides is an 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

capability with the MQ-1 Predator3unmanned aerial 

system or Gray Eagle. 

Defensive missions took the form of armed 

overwatch during key leader engagements and 

convoy movement.

Because of the internally displaced persons that were 

in the Middle Euphrates River Valley, the 35th and 

their heavy lift capability, the CH-47 Chinook, also 

conducted stability missions.

 

3 The predator can function in a dual-role capacity-offensive 

and persistent ISR.

They moved personnel and equipment around the

combined joint operations area. Many of these flights 

are between major hubs and smaller outlying bases 

that do not see fixed-wing aircraft on a frequent or 

routine basis.

The CAB supported ground commanders through the 

full range of military operations with 24/7 medical 

evacuation at seven locations and an Aerial Reaction 

Force of one UH-60 Black Hawk, one CH-47, and a 

platoon of infantry from the 101st Airborne Division 

TF Bastogne. The 35th has a tactical control 

command relationship with the infantry platoon.

Helicopters are highly complex machines and failing 

parts can result in the tragic death of the crew or 

bystanders on the ground. To ensure proper 

maintenance is conducted, two Supply Support 

Activities are maintained: one in Camp Arifjan, 

Kuwait and the other at Camp Taji, Iraq. Intra-theater 

travel is difficult, so getting the parts to the helicopter 

was a challenge despite the best intentions of the 

brigade’s SPO team.

“[The SPO] has been critical to setting up the ground 

lines of communication. Everywhere we land, the 

SPO shop has two or three soldiers that we call ‘parts 

expediters,” said COL Hausman.

Moving parts was not only hampered by ground or 

air movement and weather, but also by international 

borders. It takes 5-7 days to obtain a country 

clearance to cross a border and with the 35th in four 

different countries, there was a lot of paperwork 

being processed. The team tried to mitigate this by 

having a constant flow of clearance documentation 

working its way through the diplomatic process, so 

they could always move something once a week. 

Unfortunately, if the clearance is for Friday and a 

helicopter goes down on Saturday, then there is an 

inevitable delay.

“The biggest challenge is getting the part to the 

aircraft, not getting the part into theater.”

 - COL Hausman -

Soldiers from the 35th Aviation Brigade conduct medical evacuation 

training at Kuwait Naval Base, Kuwait, Feb. 21, 2019 (U.S. Army Reserve 

photo by Capt. Jerry Duong)
Center for Army Lessons Learned

News From the Front | April 2019

4

The Theater Aviation Support Maintenance Group 

with a general support relationship to the 35th, liaised 

with the government contractor to coordinate 

maintenance contract support and the shipment of 

helicopters into and out of theater. As helicopters in 

Iraq perform about three rotations’ worth of missions, 

there is always a flow of inbound and outbound 

aircraft.

Upon receipt of the Theater Provided Equipment 

(TPE), the 35th CAB identified that the TPD was not 

loaded into the Ground Combat Support System –

Army. This caused secondary effects of not being 

able to order new parts for non-mission capable

equipment. In order to overcome this deficit the 35th

committed resources to input the TPE into the system

and restore functionality of the equipment back to a 

fully mission capable status.

The 35th CAB Maintenance Test Pilots (MTP) were 

dispersed to the point of being one deep at remote 

locations. This created the potential to have a critical 

gap at a given location without the depth to maintain 

continuity should a contingency arise. To get the 

aircraft certified to fly missions, the 35th had to play a 

bit of a shell game to move MTPs around on a couple 

occasions. 

Similarly, the dynamics of the Central Command OE

is such that one company of Apaches and four 

Chinooks were sent to Afghanistan. With the 

dispersal of aircraft, so too are maintenance soldiers. 

Losing assets to another theater and being dispersed 

as they are for OIR constrains the 35th’s flexibility to 

respond to major unforeseen events.

Team building was not only limited to the U.S. 

soldiers from fifteen different states. There were 

social events among the Spanish, Italians, and 

Americans and fortunately everyone had an 

intellectual curiosity about each other, said COL

Hausman. Warfare characterized by international 

coalitions requires everyone, but especially among 

pilots who fly together in austere conditions, to 

establish rapport and build a team that is well in tune 

with each other. 

Additional insights:

 A flight physical does not satisfy the deployment 

medical screen criteria.

 The brigade trained on the Command Post of the 

Future (CPOF), but CPOF is not used in theater.

 There are inconsistencies in medical screening 

and what one doctor considers a no-go, another 

doctor may call a go.

 Get someone trained to be a Foreign Disclosure 

Officer. There are 74 nations in the OIR coalition 

and disseminating releasable information is 

critical to a shared understanding of the OE.

The changing OE in OIR may cause more challenges 

for the aviation brigade in Iraq. Even the force 

structure in Kuwait is likely to change. Leadership 

and cognitive agility to solve problems is what 

ultimately carried the 35th CAB across the finish line 

and it is those traits the next CAB will rely upon to 

execute a dangerous mission in a manner that differs 

slightly from standard procedure.

Missouri Assistant Adjutant General Visits Middle East (Photo by Capt. 

Aaron Shaffer)