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i 

73–430 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–104] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

DOUG ROACH, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, February 28, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force .................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, February 28, 2012 ................................................................................... 53 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force ............................................ 3 

Schwartz, Gen Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ......................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Donley, Hon. Michael B., joint with Gen Norton A. Schwartz ..................... 60 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 57 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 95 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 111 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 120 

Mr. Courtney ..................................................................................................... 118 

Mr. Critz ............................................................................................................ 122 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 101 

Mr. Griffin ......................................................................................................... 137 

Dr. Heck ............................................................................................................ 127 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 121 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 126 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 102 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 119 

Mr. McIntyre ..................................................................................................... 100 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 101 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 153 

Mr. Runyan ....................................................................................................... 133 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 125 

Mr. Schilling ..................................................................................................... 131 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 135 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 120 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 103 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 121 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 28, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us 

today as we consider the President’s fiscal year 2013 Budget Request for the Department of the Air Force. 

Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, it is good to have you back 

again before the committee today, at least for us. I hope you enjoy 

your time here. 

We are fortunate to have experienced leadership on our Air Force 

in this challenging period. We appreciate all that you do and we 

are truly grateful to have leaders like you in service to our Nation. 

When you took your respective positions, you probably didn’t fully 

appreciate the leadership challenges that you would confront. 

The Air Force has been engaged in combat operations supporting 

the Joint Forces for the past 20 years, beginning with the Gulf war 

in 1991 and continuing thereafter through enforcement of the Iraq 

no-fly zones; combat operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the related logistics support missions; and worldwide humanitarian support missions. And of course the Air Force has continued 

the 24/7, 365-day-a-year nuclear-deterrence mission. 

Everyone should fully understand that our vital interests have 

not changed since last year. The threats to those interests have not 

decreased, and they are not likely to diminish over the next 5 

years. What has changed is that the President directed at least 

$400 billion in cuts to our military, which were reflected in the 

Budget Control Act. 

Despite the suggestion by some that the strategy evolved independent of the President’s fiscal guidance, each of the military 

services is making force-structure and equipment-modernization 

recommendations to Congress based purely on the budget and not 

based on the world security environment. 

For example, there are 54 aircrafts in the Air Force budget request. If procurement continues at this rate, and assuming an air-
2 

craft lifespan of 25 years, the resulting force structure is 1,350 aircraft; one-quarter the size of the current force. I do not believe 

1,350 total Air Force aircraft—bombers, fighters, airlifts, searchand-rescue, rotorcraft, and trainers—is in the national security interest of this country. And this is without the potential of sequestration. 

Furthermore, the budget request does little to mitigate the consequences of aging force structure resulting from the procurement 

holiday of the 1990s. Operation and Maintenance accounts are not 

increasing to sustain and extend these aging platforms. Other 

budget-driven choices include the requested increase in TRICARE 

fees for retirees. Congress addressed this issue at length last year 

and enacted what I considered a reasonable approach for managing 

cost. 

The Department’s proposal would increase the fees by 96 percent 

to 345 percent over a 5-year period which, in my opinion, is unreasonable. With that said, I am pleased to see the priorities for strategic airlift, a new bomber, and an airborne tanker have been preserved. As well, the Air Force has deliberately elected to ensure the 

percentage of the Air Force’s combat and mobility forces that are 

on Active Duty will increase after the implementation of the force 

structure changes. 

This is appropriate from a risk perspective, but I believe it is important for the Air Force leadership to continue this public discussion to better ensure that Guard and Reserve personnel fully accept that they have received and will receive equitable and fair 

treatment in this transition process. 

Thank you very much again for being here. Representative 

Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank Secretary Donley and General Schwartz for being, 

once again, before this committee, and for their great leadership of 

the Air Force and their service to our country. It is terrific to have 

such able people in charge of such an important task. We appreciate you being here. 

The Air Force has been critical to all of our missions in the recent past—in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, as the chairman 

mentioned—and also, you know, providing critical lift capacity for 

humanitarian response in Haiti and Japan and many other places. 

The strength of our Air Force is one of the great strengths of our 

national security and the strengths of our entire Nation, and we do 

appreciate that leadership. 

This is a very challenging time, as the chairman mentioned. The 

needs are still great. We are still fighting in Afghanistan. We still 

face threats on a number of fronts and needs globally. At the same 

time, the budget picture is not good. We are running a significant 

deficit and we have challenges to figure out how to make that work 

within the budget. We have had that debate, and I am sure we will 
3 

continue to have the debate on the committee about whether or not 

strategy or budget should drive what we do in the national-security 

realm; and of course my position is both. 

We are always, no matter what you are doing, constrained by the 

budget to a certain extent. And we would not pretend that nobody 

thought for a second about the budget when putting together the 

strategy. But I do think that the gentlemen before us and everyone 

over at the Pentagon and the White House did put together a strategy looking at our national security needs first to figure out what 

needs to be met, and then figuring out how to match that strategy 

to the budget constraints that we have. And I want to compliment 

both of these gentlemen for doing a great job of that—for, I think, 

realistically looking at our choices going forward. 

I mean, the bottom line is, over the course of the last 10 years 

in the Air Force and elsewhere, we have started more projects than 

we could ever possibly have the money to finish; in part, because 

some of them have wound up costing far more than we thought 

they would. But that forces difficult choices, frankly, almost no 

matter the budget environment. I think those choices have been 

made wisely in the Air Force budget that has been put forth. And 

we have a good strategy and I think we have a budget to match 

it, but there will be challenges. 

And I think this hearing is a perfectly appropriate form to have 

the gentlemen before us explain how they met some of those challenges; how they see some of the tougher aspects of it coming to 

pass over the course in the next several years. And I look forward 

to their comments. And, again, I thank them for their leadership 

in very, very difficult times. I look forward to the testimony, and 

I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

Secretary DONLEY. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Smith and Members of the committee. 

It is a pleasure to be here representing more than 690,000 Active 

Duty Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen. I am also honored to be 

here today with my teammate, who is now the dean of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and one of our Nation’s finest public servants, General ‘‘Norty’’ Schwartz. 

For fiscal year 2013, the United States Air Force requests $110.1 

billion in our baseline budget and $11.5 billion in the Overseas 

Contingency Operation supplemental appropriation to support our 

work. 

This budget request represents the culmination of many hard decisions taken to align our fiscal year 2013 budget submission with 

the new strategic guidance, and with the cuts required by the 

Budget Control Act over the next 10 years. Finding the proper balance between force structure, readiness, and modernization is our 

guiding principle. In short, we determine that the Air Force’s best 
4 

course of action is to trade size for quality. We will become smaller 

in order to protect a high-quality and ready force; one that will continue to modernize and grow more capable in the future. 

The capabilities resident in the Air Force mission set are fundamental to the priorities outlined in the new strategic guidance. And 

in assessing how to adjust the Air Force programs and budgets in 

the future, we have taken care to protect the distinctive capabilities our Air Force brings to the table: Control of airspace and 

cyberspace, global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 

rapid global mobility, and global strike; all enabled by effective 

command and control. 

The Air Force and our joint interagency and coalition teammates 

and partners rely on these capabilities. And though we will be 

smaller, we intend to be a superb force at any size, maintaining the 

agility and the flexibility that is inherent in our air-power capabilities, and ready to engage a full range of contingencies and threats. 

This budget protects the Air Force’s top priorities. We protect the 

size of the bomber force. We are ramping up our remotely piloted 

aircraft force to a goal of 65 combat air patrols, with the ability to 

surge to 85 CAPS [combat air patrols]. 

We protect our Special Operations Forces’ capabilities; largely 

protect space programs and our cyber capabilities. But as we get 

smaller, it is not possible to protect everything. Our proposed force 

structure changes include the reduction of 286 aircraft over the Future Years Defense Plan, including 123 fighters, 133 mobility aircraft, and 30 ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 

platforms. Many of these changes correspond to adjustments in the 

overall size of the Armed Forces, especially the Army and the Marine Corps ground forces, which is the case for the proposed reduction in A–10s [Thunderbolt II close air support jets]. 

Our smaller force structure has also led us to favor divesting 

smaller niche fleets such as the C–27J [Spartan medium-sized 

airlifter], and emphasizing multirole capabilities that will provide 

operational flexibility across the spectrum of conflict, demonstrated 

by our C–130s [Hercules strategic airlifters] and by our choices in 

fighter-force structure, which include a smaller A–10 fleet and 

plans for F–16 [Fighting Falcon multirole jet fighter] service-life extension. We also emphasize common configurations which can be 

seen in the adjustments to the C–5 [Galaxy heavy intercontinentalrange strategic airlifter] force structure and the C–17 [Globemaster 

III strategic airlifter] mobility fleets; and in ongoing efforts to seek 

common configuration within the F–22 [Raptor fifth-generation 

stealth fighter jet] and F–15C [Eagle tactical fighter jet] fleets. 

Because force structure changes have a ripple effect on manpower, our budget proposals call for a reduction of 9,900 Air Force 

military personnel. By component, this amounts to reductions of 

3,900 in Active Duty; 5,100 in Air National Guard; and 900 Air Reserve personnel. And the Chief and I are joined today by the Chief 

of the Air Force Reserve, Charlie Stenner, and the Director of the 

Air National Guard, Lieutenant General Bud Wyatt. 

Fighter mobility and other force-structure changes have been 

strategy-driven, based on changed requirements. And consistent 

with that strategy, especially where Air National Guard units are 

affected, we have proposed to remission units where feasible. 
5 

We have carefully balanced our Active and Reserve Component 

changes to make sure that we can meet the demanding operational 

tempos, including both surge and rotational requirements that are 

part of the current and projected strategic environment. As our 

force gets smaller, all of our components gets smaller together, and 

will become even more closely integrated. 

We remain fully committed to our total force capability, and have 

proposed several initiatives to strengthen integration of effort, including increasing the number of Active Reserve Component associations from 100 to 115. 

Our intention is to protect readiness at any force level; because 

if we are going to be smaller, we have to be prepared. To that end, 

we put funds in critical areas such as flying hours and weapon system sustainment. 

We also support the Air National Guard readiness reset, which 

balances manpower across the States from lower-demand units to 

new high-demand intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

missions, and increases readiness in 39 units. We are committed to 

ensuring that our military forces do not go hollow. And readiness 

bears close watching as we move forward. 

Modernization is our most significant concern, especially as our 

fleets age and new technologies drive new investment needs. In 

this year’s budget proposal, we slow modernizations as we protect 

programs that are critical to future capabilities. We also restructure or terminate some major programs to protect key priorities. 

Protected modernization priorities include the long-range strike 

bomber, the KC–46 refueling tanker; and key space programs such 

as the space-based infrared and advanced extremely high-frequency 

satellites; and follow-on global-positioning-system work; and advanced ISR. 

We remain fully committed to the F–35 [Lightning II fifth-generation stealth fighter] Joint Strike Fighter, which is the future of 

the fighter force. But we reduced the rate of procurement for a few 

years because, in our judgment, Lockheed Martin is not ready to 

ramp up to full-rate production. Due to recent delays in the F–35 

program, we have also proposed to proceed with an F–16 servicelife-extension program. 

Among the programs slated for termination are the Global Hawk 

RQ4 [surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle] Block 30 Aircraft because, among other reasons, we could not justify the cost to improve the Block 30 sensors to achieve capability that already exists 

in the U–2 [‘‘Dragon Lady’’ high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft]. 

We also terminated the Defense Weather Satellite System, a termination initiated by Congress, but one that we can accept for now 

because the program is early to need. 

As noted earlier, we decided to divest the C–27J, but we have a 

good alternative to this aircraft with the multirole C–130, which 

has demonstrated its ability to provide the direct support mission 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. And we remain committed to providing 

this support to the Army. In other cases, we eliminated programs 

that were judged to be nonessential in the current budget environment such as the light mobility aircraft and the light attack and 

armed reconnaissance aircraft. 
6 

Through a more disciplined use of resources, our Air Force continues to ring savings out of overhead; to squeeze discretionary 

spending; and find more efficient ways of doing business. In fiscal 

year 2012, we committed to $33.3 billion in efficiencies across the 

FYDP. In this year’s budget, we have identified about $3.4 billion 

in additional efficiencies and another $3.2 billion in programmatic 

adjustments to add on top of that $33.3 billion. 

In keeping with our enduring obligation to take care of our people, we will keep faith with airmen and their families. Doing right 

by our service members is key to our ability to recruit and retain 

a high-quality force. 

Nevertheless, the impact of increasing personnel costs continues 

to be a serious concern. Therefore, we support the military-compensation program reforms in the President’s Budget which include 

a modest pay raise, proposals to control health-care costs and calls 

for a commission to recommend reforms in retired pay. We must 

continue to seek and develop reforms to ensure the long-term sustainability of the benefits our men and women in uniform have 

earned. 

Identifying $487 billion in defense cuts to comply with the current requirements of the Budget Control Act has been difficult. Our 

Air Force will get smaller, but we are confident that we can build 

and sustain a quality force that is ready for the contingencies 

ahead, and that will improve in capability over time. However, further cuts through sequestration or other means will put at risk our 

ability to execute the new strategy. 

To get this far, we have made tough decisions to align structure 

and balance our forces in a way that can meet the new strategic 

guidance. If substantially more reductions are imposed on DOD 

[Department of Defense], we will have to revisit the new strategy. 

We cannot afford the risk of a hollow force. 

Mr. Chairman, General Schwartz and I feel deeply that our leadership team has inherited the finest Air Force in the world. It is 

our obligation to keep it that way so that our joint and coalition 

partners know they can count on the United States Air Force to deliver the capabilities that we need to meet the security challenges 

ahead, and so that our future airmen remained confident as we are 

today that they are serving in the world’s finest Air Force. That is 

our obligation going forward, and we are going to meet it. 

We remain grateful for the continued support and service of this 

committee and we look forward to discussing our proposed budget. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Donley and General 

Schwartz can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF OF STAFF, 

U.S. AIR FORCE 

General SCHWARTZ. Thank you Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman, 

Congressman Smith, and Members of the committee. 

I am privileged to be here today with Secretary Donley, representing the men and women of the United States Air Force. 
7 

When we appeared before you last year to discuss our budget request, America’s airmen were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan 

alongside their joint and coalition teammates. Little did anyone 

know at that time that we were on the verge of surging into two 

additional theaters of operation ranging more than 5,500 miles 

apart; engaging in operations spanning the entire spectrum of activities. 

But when multiple disasters struck in Japan on March 11th, and 

when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 

6 days later, the men and women of the United States Air Force 

and the Armed Forces were ready to respond; and respond they 

did. 

The ability to address the concurrent surge requirements while 

we remained fully engaged on two fronts in the United States Central Command area of responsibility was most assuredly not trivial. 

Such a capability and the capacity to address potential similar scenarios remains important to our success in the future security environment. 

But in light of our fiscal circumstances both presently and for the 

foreseeable future, helping to ensure America’s success in these 

and other contingencies requires carefully tailored preparedness of 

our Air Force and the Armed Forces. 

The budget request we have forwarded to you, fully appreciating 

the Department’s role in helping to stabilize the Nation’s extraordinary fiscal condition, supports our airmen in our continuing efforts to structure the Force for maximum versatility with minimum 

risk across the range of operations. 

So using our very own version of March Madness last year, as 

an example, this spectrum includes humanitarian relief operations 

in places like Japan, where more than 13,000 personnel were called 

to action to increase much needed airfield capacity; to conduct 

search-and-rescue operations; to provide airborne wide-angle views 

of the devastation for overall situation awareness; and to provide 

rapid and tailored airlift capability delivering some 5 million 

pounds of cargo. The operational continuum also includes airpowerintensive combat operations such as Libya, where airmen surged to 

contribute more than 65 percent of all coalition sorties; notably, 99 

percent of the lift, 79 percent of the in-flight refueling, 50 percent 

of the airborne reconnaissance, and 40 percent of the strike missions. 

And our Nation’s full spectrum requirements that rely on Air 

Force capabilities include everything else from counterinsurgency 

to counterterrorism; to our regular operations; to safe and reliable 

operation and maintenance and security of two of the Nation’s 

three legs of the strategic deterrent. 

In all of these mission areas, our airmen are committed to the 

task of leveraging air-and-space power with all of its inherent 

versatility, tailor-ability and rapidity. Ultimately, Air Force capabilities present to the President and the national leadership a 

range of strategic options to meet priorities of the new defense 

strategic guidance such as projecting power in anti-access and 

area-denial environments; preventing the spread of weapons of 

mass destruction; conducting space and cyber operations; and 

maintaining the preponderance of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 
8 

The wide array of Air Force capabilities which will remain vital 

to our Nation’s diplomatic, economic, and military interests fall into 

four general categories—air and-space control; global intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance; rapid global mobility; and global 

strike. 

As part of the defense strategic guidance, we are structuring our 

force to be more agile and responsive even as we accept some risk 

with the smaller force. 

While still maintaining quality, we will divest nearly 230 fighter, 

mobility, and ISR aircraft in fiscal 2013 toward a total of 286 aircraft retirements over the program period. We project that these 

targeted divestitures will save some $8.7 billion. 

And when applied to our modernization strategy, as Secretary 

Donley discussed, as well as to all important operations and maintenance sustainment accounts, our guiding principles in these careful and responsible reductions were to favor multirole systems over 

those with more niche capabilities so that we could maximize 

versatility; and to retire entire aircraft types where possible, that 

we could potentially eliminate the entire support infrastructure, 

thereby, achieving greater efficiency. 

But where retirement of entire fleets was not feasible, we evaluated options for eliminating aircraft that were the least capable or 

the most expensive to operate. 

For the assets that we will retain—that is 54 combat-coded fighter squadrons, 275 airlifters, 453 tankers, and a robust mix of remotely piloted, U–2, E–3 [Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft], EA, and other ISR systems—we are emphasizing common configurations for fewer support-andsustainment requirements. And therefore, we would be positioned 

to achieve greater efficiency in delivering the core capabilities I addressed earlier. 

The defense strategic guidance articulates our plan to execute a 

$487 billion defense-spending reduction over 10 years. And although we have no illusion—no illusion at all—about the road 

ahead being easy, we have confidence in our ability to manage this 

tight fiscal circumstance. 

I must echo, however, Secretary Donley’s concern that across-theboard cuts driven by sequestration would dramatically change the 

complexion of our thoroughly deliberated defense strategy. 

We would effectively be sent back to the drawing board because 

indiscriminate salami-slicing of the budget would nullify the carefully considered and responsible reductions that preserve our readiness, our effectiveness; notwithstanding the fiscal constraints in a 

smaller force. 

The comprehensive nature of our fiscal year 2013 budget request 

includes a holistic interstate approach to Air National Guard and 

Air Force Reserve force structure. From both an operational-effectiveness and fiscal-responsibility perspective, we prefer this strategy over a more piecemeal State-by-State approach. 

Our proposed efforts will correct several manpower disconnects, 

rebalance forces, and improve sortie generation and aircraft utilization rates, thereby improving the total forces’ readiness and responsiveness across the spectrum of operation. 
9 

It allows us to better resource our high-priority requirements 

such as ISR; distributed and mission training; and domestic and 

homeland defense operations. 

On our manpower side, our program total-force realignment on 

the order of 10,000 Active Guard and Reserve airmen will bring the 

total force end strength down to 501,000 by the end of fiscal year 

2013. And we hold no illusions that these personnel reductions affecting all 54 States and U.S. territories will be easy. Taken comprehensively, however, this recalibration will robust nearly 40 

units across the Air National Guard and, thus, enhance overall 

total force readiness. 

Clearly, the Air Force’s vitality and effectiveness is dependent on 

the strength of the total force, and therefore the leadership of both 

the Active and the Reserve Components work closely together in all 

deliberations and decisions affecting the total force. 

Understandably, we did not always achieve to total unanimity, 

but we most certainly were unified and we remain unified in the 

common goal of ensuring total force vitality and viability. And together we remain committed to fulfilling the requirements of the 

defense strategic guidance as one Air Force. 

Mr. Chairman and committee Members, the Air Force remains 

committed to the providing of global vigilance, reach, and power for 

Americans’ needs today, and for her aspirations and challenges 

that we know the Nation will face tomorrow. 

Every single day, our airmen, Active Guard, and Reserve proudly 

serve on behalf of the American people as trusted stewards of the 

Nation’s resources and stalwart defenders of her security. 

Finally, please allow me to make one comment concerning military compensation. I appeal to the committee to carefully consider 

those initiatives in our budget proposal that begin to tackle the escalating personnel costs of compensation, health care, and retirement. Among all the other challenges facing us, the reality of fewer 

members of the Armed Forces—costing increasingly more to recruit, train, and retain for promising careers—is the monumental 

defense issue of our time. 

Our inability to address this issue properly will place other areas 

of the budget, including force structure and modernization, under 

yet more pressure, forcing out needed military capability at the 

time when we are already right-sized for the likely missions ahead. 

Thank you again, sir, for your continued support of the United 

States Air Force and for the committee’s support of our airmen and 

their families. We look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Schwartz and Secretary 

Donley can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Schwartz, in this budget, the Air Force made the choice 

to cut older platforms in favor of newer modernized platforms. For 

example, you sustained the F–35 and the old and retired older F– 

16s and A–10s. Similarly, you retire all the C–5As and the C– 

130Hs. 

While I would prefer we didn’t retire so much force structure, I 

understand that given the choice between old and new, the Air 

Force went for the most modernized advanced program. One of two 
10 

notable exceptions is the decision to cut the Global Hawk Block 30 

and extend the use of U–2s. 

Please explain why, in this case, the Air Force chose to retain a 

plane that was flown by the grandparents of today’s U–2 pilots, especially given that 8 months ago, the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics certified to Congress that 

the continuation of the Global Hawk program was essential to national security; and that there are no alternatives to provide acceptable capability at less cost. 

At that time, we were told that the U–2 aircraft cost $220 million 

per year more than the Global Hawk Block 30 to operate. Isn’t this 

a short-sighted decision that favors near-term savings over longterm capability and cost? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, the Block 30 decision was 

made on two bases—one, that the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reduced the demand signal for high-altitude surveillance. 

I can’t go in the explicit detail here. I would be happy to do so in 

another manner. That was one factor. 

The second factor was a realization that the operating cost of the 

two systems was, at best, to push; in the neighborhood of $32,000 

per flying hour—U–2 versus Global Hawk Block 30. 

The third factor was the realization that the sensor capability on 

the U–2—particularly for EO [electro-optical], IR [infrared] and, to 

some degree, also on the signal side—was better, and required improvements in the Global Hawk system that were yet not funded. 

And I acknowledge the Nunn-McCurdy certification which occurred last year, but I would only remind that that occurred prior 

to the Budget Control Act and its implications in terms of resources 

for our Air Force. 

So, our choice was—it is true the U–2 has been flying a long 

time, the U–2 is not the senior plane that our grandfathers flew. 

It has been improved and modified and continues to be modified as 

we speak. And it was our judgment that—given the demand signal, 

the sensor capability, and the relative modest, if any, cost differential—that sustaining the U–2 was a better bet. 

I would conclude by saying, sir, that we are not giving up on 

Global Hawk by any means. Block 20 will continue to perform the 

communications mission. Block 40 will continue to perform the 

ground moving-target-indicator mission. And that is, under these 

circumstances, the best package we could offer our joint teammates. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Also, General Schwartz, you talked a little bit at the conclusion 

of the—for the compensation to the Force—I have one other question on that. 

The Department’s proposal to increase the TRICARE prime enrollment fee is a tiered approach based on an individual’s retired 

pay. The health-care benefit for retired Federal employees is not 

based on an individual’s retirement pay. 

So in essence, the President would pay the same for Federal retirement health care as the lowest level Federal employee. Why, 

then, should the military retirement health care benefits be means 

tested? 
11 

General SCHWARTZ. It was a recognition, Mr. Chairman, that 

there were those among our alumni who were less able to accommodate the increases in the fees than others. And so, this simply 

was, in my view—was a recognition of reality in that enlisted retirees were certainly not as capable of absorbing these costs as retired 

flag officers. And it was simply done on that basis in an attempt 

to be as fair as possible. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you probably did the right thing, and the rest 

of the Federal employees should probably follow suit? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I am not in the position to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. 

General SCHWARTZ [continuing]. To make policy here. 

But I can tell you that I am comfortable with what we decided 

to do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ask about the F–35—it is still a little bit uncertain exactly where 

that program is going exactly. Over the course of the next 4 or 5 

years, what are you counting on from the F–35? How many planes? 

What is the cost point that is going to become problematic? And 

how confident are you that those planes can be delivered at this 

point on whatever the current schedule is? And I say that, because, 

as you know, every year it seems like we have to readjust that 

schedule based on delays; increases in cost. 

As of right now, what are you counting on in terms of the number of planes? What are the cost points? And then how confident 

are you that this schedule is actually going to hold up? 

Secretary DONLEY. Mr. Smith, we are currently working through 

the concurrency in the program that I think the committee is 

aware of, where the development program is not yet complete. And 

we have started production and we are weighing carefully, year to 

year, the progress of the program to make sure that we do not 

ramp up production too quickly, and that we worked out all the 

kinks in the program. And there is a list of issues that the Joint 

Program Office and the Air Force and the Navy are watching and 

managing together, going forward. 

We have worked hard with Lockheed Martin to reach conclusion 

on the low-rate initial production of LRIP–4 contracts last year. We 

are in negotiations with them now on Lot 5, and we think that 

work needs to continue and to come to closure soon. 

Mr. SMITH. And it is interesting. As you talked about, you know, 

we don’t want to produce them until they are actually ready, but 

we kind of are, as we have gone through a series of lots. 

But within those productions lots, we are still not at the point 

where we are like, ‘‘Okay, it is good. We are building a plane that 

we know is going to be ready to go.’’ We are still saying, ‘‘Okay, 

we are working out concurrency. We are working out these different things.’’ And it is not at all clear at this point when that is 

going to be worked out. We are hoping at certain points that it will 

be worked out, but it is not locked in by any stretched imagination. 

Is that correct? 

Secretary DONLEY. It is becoming more locked in. The Joint Program Office—— 
12 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary DONLEY [continuing]. Just completed a baseline review 

really capturing the last 2 years—— 

Mr. SMITH. Not to be overly philosophical, but you are locked in 

or you are not. There is no such thing as more locked in. So, we 

are still—— 

Secretary DONLEY. The Joint Program just finished preparing a 

new program baseline based on the changes over the last 2 years; 

the cumulative adjustments to set the way forward for the program. 

So Admiral Venlet, I think, has a good handle on how to push 

the program forward. The program of record for us has not 

changed. It is 1,763 of the A-models for the United States Air 

Force. That is obviously taking a little bit longer than we would 

like, so production is being pushed out a bit. But we remain fully 

committed to this aircraft going forward. 

Mr. SMITH. And what is the per-unit cost estimate at this point? 

Secretary DONLEY. This is still to be negotiated. The early lots 

tend to cost more than the others. So let me give to you some numbers for the record which reflect—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 95.] 

Secretary DONLEY [continuing]. Sort of where we are today. 

But we have ongoing negotiations with Lockheed on this. And I 

will say that the Joint Program Office and the Air Force and the 

Navy are working together to get the best deal for the taxpayer; 

to push this program forward, but at an affordable cost that represents continuing progress down the price curve, as we should expect in this program. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. 

And just one quick question on the Guard and Reserve—there 

are concerns and been expressed by a number of adjutant generals 

about—I guess it is 5,100 Guard airmen that are being cut, and 

then a fair number of planes are being cut from the Reserve and 

Guard components. They are concerned about the impact of that. 

What is your response as to why you made the decisions that you 

made? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, a few points here. 

First, the adjustments in the aircraft were driven by the changes 

in strategy that we referred to in our opening statements. So the 

Department’s assessment was that the Air Force could take additional risk in fighter force structure. We just went through some 

significant changes in fighter force structure a couple of years ago, 

where most of those reductions took place in the F–16 fleet and in 

the F–15C fleet; so we just went through some significant adjustments there. 

As we look at the strategy changes and the sizing of the fighter 

force going forward, it was determined that we could take additional risk in the A–10 fleet. We will still have in excess of 300 A– 

10s in our inventory. But going forward, it looked like we could 

take additional risk in that area. 

On the C–130 side—on the mobility, for example—the prior Mobility Capability Requirement Study, MCRS—before we even got in 
13 

to the strategic review—had told us that we had excess tactical-lift 

capabilities in excess to requirements. So we felt like we could take 

additional risk in the size of the C–130 fleet going forward. 

So, again, these are the force structure adjustments and strategic 

adjustments that started the force structure changes. 

Then, the issue was how to mix the Active Duty and the Guard 

capabilities most effectively to meet the requirements of the strategy, but also provide for surge and provide for rotational capabilities at the same time—make sure the Force is robust. 

So this is why, while we are getting smaller, we are focused on 

making sure that the Active Guard and Reserve are more integrated going forward. And I would defer to the chief for some additional comments. 

General SCHWARTZ. I would only make one additional comment 

in that it is important from a force-management point of view to 

understand what the likely tempo is of the respective forces. 

For the Active, the goal was set at not less than one to two—that 

is a deploy-to-dwell ratio of 6 months deployed, for example, 1 year 

home; and a tempo of not less than 1 to 4, ideally 1 to 5, for the 

National Guard and Reserve components. 

And the reason for that is so that we do not overuse any of the 

components, with the downside of forcing folks either to leave the 

Active Duty; or because of the multiple demands on the Guard and 

Reserve, including their employment in the private sector, to leave 

the Guard and Reserve. 

So this was fundamentally in a smaller Air Force, recognizing 

the activity level that is anticipated to have the right mix that allowed us to manage the tempo at levels which were sustainable for 

the future. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your service. 

General Schwartz, in February of 2008, the Air Force certified to 

Congress in a letter—and I want to quote from that letter, sir— 

‘‘Time-sensitive mission-critical resupply is crucial to our success as 

war fighters. We also believe there are mission steps that may support additional procurement of the C–27, such as building international partnerships around the common airframe; National 

Guard support of Federal Emergency Management Agency regions; 

delivery of Special Operations Forces teams, and others small unit 

maneuvers; more efficient movement of small payloads in theater; 

taking convoys off the road; precision air-drop of bundles and joint 

precision air-drop systems operations; and recapitalization of operational support aircraft inventories.’’ 

This is the direct quote from that letter of February of 2008. Fifteen months later, you were in front of this committee—and let me 

quote from your testimony there—‘‘Our programs reflect their commitment to pursuing joint multimission solutions such as the procurement of eight C–27Js in the fiscal year 2010.’’ 

These appear to be in direct conflict to your written testimony, 

where you say that the Air Force is divesting the C–27 aircraft in 
14 

favor of the multirole C–130 because you consider the C–27J a 

niche capability. 

Again, this seems to be in direct contrast to these two previous 

quotes. Why, sir, do you believe 3 years later that this C–27J is no 

longer a multimission capable aircraft? Has there been any formal 

Air Force testing or analysis conducted that proves the C–27 is no 

longer a multimission aircraft? 

General SCHWARTZ. It is a multimission aircraft. We don’t dispute that, Congressman Bartlett. 

But what I would say—the significant thing that has changed 

since both 2008 to 2010 testimony is $487 billion. I mean that is 

a factor in our approach to how to address the force structure. 

When we looked at the C–27, sir, as attractive at was, there was 

a personal commitment from me to George Casey in the 2010 timeframe to perform that mission for the Army. 

We looked at a couple things—life-cycle costs, for example. The 

C–27 life-cycle cost over 25 years is $308 million an aircraft. For 

the C–130J, it is $213 million per aircraft. For the C–130H, it is 

$185 million per aircraft. So there was a cost differential; sometimes it is worth it. But in this fiscal environment it certainly 

caught our attention. 

Additionally, we had demonstrated our capacity, both in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, to provide the time-critical support mission for the 

maneuver units with the C–130 platform. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Excuse me, I am led to understand that because 

we do not have enough C–27Js that we are—and I am quoting your 

people—‘‘flying the blades off the 47 [CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter],’’ and using the 130, which is more expensive and cannot 

be used on short air strips. 

The C–27 procurement costs us less than the C–130. It has only 

two engines as compared to four. It is one-half the size of a 130. 

The hourly cost is $3,000 less than the 130 and $5,000 less per 

hour than the helicopter. 

The parts and avionics of the C–27 are 35 percent to 40 percent 

in common with the C–130. They should be. The engines are identical, as I understand. Yet, the Air Force claims that the C–27 is 

more expensive to own and operate than the C–130. 

Given these facts, can you please explain to me how the Air 

Force determined that operating a C–27 is more expensive than the 

130 and the 47? 

General SCHWARTZ. I didn’t talk about the 47. I did talk about 

the 130. And it has to do with the basing arrangement; it has to 

do with the contract logistic support, rather than organic 

sustainment. There are a number of factors that affect life-cycle 

costs, sir, but I would just—allow me to make this point—that 

there is not a single airfield in Afghanistan today that the C–27 

is using that the C–130 cannot. That is a reality on the ground 

today. 

Mr. BARTLETT. My time has expired. I thank you very much. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks Mr. Chairman. 
15 

Several questions—I didn’t note it in your testimony—in the past 

couple of years we have had discussions here with you all about 

electronic warfare; and, in particular, some of that platforms we 

have for use for the Air Force’s electronic warfare capability, including the information operations like Compass Call and so on. 

But I didn’t note anything in your testimony specific to EW [electronic warfare], and I was wondering if you could enlighten us to 

the investment the Air Force has been able to make despite the 

budget constraints you are under. 

General SCHWARTZ. Certainly the Compass Call—we will sustain 

the Compass Call mission and continue to expand its repertoire 

with the onboard equipment and so on and so forth. 

We are equipping some of the remotely piloted aircraft with EW 

capabilities as well, and we are—in the intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance area, this is mapping adversary signals and so 

on and so forth; there is certainly a concerted effort in that domain. 

So the other area which is not as obvious is part of our—for example, our service-life extension proposal on the F–16 introduces 

an electronically scanned array radar, an AESA [active electronically scanned array]. That in itself is an EW capability, both offensively and defensively. So there are traditional investments in the 

traditional platforms, but there are also efforts under way in less 

visible ways like the AESA radars, which will magnify our EW confidence. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Secretary, is that good enough? Yes, okay. 

With regards to anything you are doing on EW jointly with either Navy or Army or Marine Corps—can you discuss that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sure. And this is something, sir, that is a 

part of the air-sea battle collaboration between the Navy and the 

Air Force. There are electronic-warfare potential capabilities out 

there that concern us greatly. And we are collaborating with the 

Navy in order to introduce countermeasures; to introduce resilience 

into our respective systems to make sure, for example, that our 

data links are robust enough so that we can assist one another— 

mutually support one another—when, say, one aircraft is being 

jammed, but we can link with another aircraft of the other service 

to still engage a target. 

These are the kinds of things that I think hold great promise for 

us in making better use of the assets we possess. 

Mr. LARSEN. And as this is the budget-posture hearing, then are 

these activities reflected in the budget? 

General SCHWARTZ. They certainly are, and they will be more 

visible over time. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. And I gather from your answer there may be 

room for a bigger discussion in a different setting as well? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would be happy to do that, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay, good. 

In your testimony, with regards to the nuclear deterrent—sorry, 

page 20 or so—yes, nuclear-deterrence operations—can you talk a 

little bit about the Air Force’s investment in the two legs of the 

triad that you have is—obviously, I am on the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee—several of us are, certainly, and we will probably 

look into this further. But if you could give us an introduction of 

what we might be looking into on the subcommittee? 
16 

Secretary DONLEY. Sure. Sure. 

Just quickly, an overview—nuclear-deterrent operations make up 

about 6 percent of our overall Air Force budget. We made no major 

force structure adjustments in this area, pending presidential decisions on how to structure the nuclear triad going forward. Broadly 

speaking, there are funds in the budget to support the beginning 

of START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] implementation. 

In the START regime and in the current force structure, we have 

what are referred to as phantom capabilities that count against us 

but, are purely not operational. I refer here to Peacekeeper [LGM118A missile] silos, which are still in existence but have not been 

dismantled, but have no missiles in them; and bombers that have 

been retired for several years and are no longer capable but still 

count in the totals. So we are making the investments to start dismantling the phantom capabilities that are present in the force 

structure. And we are working on other measures that would lead 

in to the START implantation work ahead of us. 

The existing decisions, as they stand are that we would plan on 

no more than 420 ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and 

up to 420 ICBMs, up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers. So these are 

decisions that the President has in front of him about how to shape 

the nuclear posture going forward. And we will wait for those decisions before taking next steps. 

Just two additional points quickly—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

Secretary DONLEY. Our immediate goal for the ICBM force is to 

get the Minuteman [LGM-30 ICBM] to 2030, and so we have the 

resources in there to support that. And I would remind the committee that the long-range strike bomber, while it is intended to be 

nuclear-capable, is a factor in considering the nuclear-deterrent 

force structure. But we are building this bomber for conventional 

operations over 20 or 30 years. Where our bomber capabilities have 

been used is on the conventional side. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes good. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you both for being here. 

Mr. Conaway and I both share a concern about a particular issue 

and I will yield to him to ask you about that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well thanks for your time, Mr. Thornberry. In the 

force-restructure plan, you are moving C–130s from Dallas/Fort 

Worth to Montana; you are moving F–15s from Montana to California; and then you are moving something called the MC–12 [Liberty ISR turboprop aircraft] I guess a twin-engine ISR platform to 

Fort Worth. 

Moving aircraft is very simple. But these are Guard assets and 

the Guard complement that they currently fly—the C–130s—maintain them, evaluate them and train the pilots, all that kind of 

stuff—they are not moving to Montana. 

And I suspect that the F–16 protection team in Montana is not 

going to move to California. You got MIL–CON [military construction] considerations in all these places. Given the overall cuts of 

the budget, can you walk us through the business plan for why this 

makes sense? 
17 

Because, while it may seem parochial because Mike and I are 

from Texas, it is not; I have going to answer questions back home 

to folks who are looking at tough decisions. And moving things for 

the sake of moving thing doesn’t make a lot of sense at this stage. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it goes something like this—that F–15s 

are a air-sovereignty mission in the Air National Guard. And they 

are better utilized on the West Coast than they are in the north 

central part of the United States. That is why the F–15s are moving to Fresno, because that is an established air-sovereignty location for North America—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. And how long have the F–15s been in Montana 

that we are making the exchange for? I mean this is a new air-sovereignty issue for the F–15s? 

General SCHWARTZ. Remember we are taking out 200 fighter aircraft in the Fiscal 2013 program and so—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Let us focus on the C–130s because—— 

General SCHWARTZ. Okay. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. As I understand it, they are the only 

C–130s available to Governors on the Gulf Coast that are Governor-to-Governor as opposed to going to the Pentagon to get those. 

Can you walk us through why we are moving C–130s to Montana? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think that the fundamental reason is because there are other multitudes of other C–130s in the region that 

you are well aware of, regardless of their component affiliation. 

And there was a requirement—there has been a need for lift in the 

central northwestern part of the States—FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] Region 10, specifically. 

The logic here was to try to position lift capabilities—again, total 

force lift capabilities—in a way that that could posture for potential 

natural disasters and the like. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And those considerations overweigh the financial 

circumstances—the millions of dollars in training, the pilots that 

current fly for commercial carriers in Dallas, Fort Worth, who fly 

the C–130s, you got—— 

General SCHWARTZ. And they will fly MC–12s which is an enduring mission for our Air Force, as far as the eye can see, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. But I am more interested in what the C–130s do 

for our National Guard and their ability to respond to fires in 

Texas and hurricanes throughout the region. It is a 2.5-hour flight 

from Montana to Texas and a 2.5-hour back flight. 

General SCHWARTZ. And Abilene has 28 C–130s. 

Mr. CONAWAY. But those belong to you, and they are not controlled by the National Guard. And I got to believe, unless you can 

show differently, that a Governor-to-Governor response time is 

quicker than a Governor-to-Pentagon-and-back-to-the-Governor— 

whatever. 

General SCHWARTZ. And the Governor of Arkansas and the Governor of Mississippi, I am sure, will happily support the needs of 

the Governor of Texas, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. You have got C–130s that belong to the Guard in 

Arkansas, and where else did you say? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mississippi. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Mississippi. 
18 

All right; well, I stand corrected, as I was told that these are the 

only ones available in the Gulf Coast. 

It is troubling. And again it looks like it is parochial, but it is 

not, and—— 

General SCHWARTZ. No, I take your point, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. 

And I do yield back. 

Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. General, let me ask you briefly one other 

thing—you all delayed the follow-on to the T–38 [Talon twin-engine 

supersonic jet trainer] trainer a year. There are some questions to 

how serious you are about bringing that trainer on. It is not just 

us. It is our European allies who jointly train. How big a deal is 

that for you all? 

General SCHWARTZ. There is just no space, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. But next year? 

General SCHWARTZ. I can’t promise you. I mean this is an issue 

of resources. And, you know, we need a new trainer. As you are 

well aware, the T–38 is older than I am, almost. And we need a 

new trainer. But the bottom line is that we simply did not have 

space to pursue that in the current budget environment. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

both witnesses. 

General, just to go back to the C–27 issue, the—it is my understanding that the decision to end this program is not simply to 

truncate it, but to actually take these brand-new planes and send 

them to ‘‘the boneyard’’—I think was the term that was used in the 

description of the budget earlier. 

These are planes that are bought and paid for. Can you explain 

how that is a good business plan? Because, frankly, it feels like a 

‘‘60 Minutes’’ moment in terms of the taxpayer. And again, first of 

all, is that correct? And number two, just explain how that works. 

General SCHWARTZ. There are multiple options which haven’t 

played out. Yes, they certainly could go into what we call flyable 

storage. It happened out in Arizona. 

They could also become foreign military sales vehicles to other 

air forces. And there are other air forces interested in the platforms. So I mean there are a couple of options which, again, 

haven’t played out. And certainly that would happen in the next 

number of months. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, I think for some of us that is an 

issue we kind of need to understand a little better. I mean it is my 

understanding the producer is not too thrilled about the idea of us 

turning around and sort of flipping the planes for resale. And, 

frankly that is pretty understandable. 

Secretary DONLEY. Maybe. But I mean we have a mandate from 

you to—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Understood. 

Secretary DONLEY [continuing]. Get smaller; and we are. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Again, but so when the F–22 production line 

came to an end, I mean we truncated the program. And that, 
19 

frankly, for some of us it was a bitter pill; but nonetheless—I mean 

those planes are still being used. And that is sort of a thing that 

I think we are struggling to understand is why perfectly brand-new 

planes are not being sort of at least used. 

And again, I am sure that is something that the budget folks can 

walk us through. 

For Guard and Reserves who have been given sort of an alternative for the—is it the 12–MC—or the MC–12 rather, excuse me— 

Mr. Secretary, you indicated that the adjustments to Guard and 

Reserves aircraft is being driven by strategy. 

Again, those planes are, in my understanding—are used for intelligence and reconnaissance given the fact that, you know, the strategy horizon is that we are sort of going to be leaving Afghanistan 

sometime in the future. 

I am just trying to visualize, for Guard units who are being told, 

‘‘This is your new assignment’’—what is the strategy that will 

make that a firm commitment? I mean this has been an issue. I 

don’t have to tell you that, you know, Guard units are kind of feeling like, you know, their head is spinning in terms of trying to keep 

up with what their mission is. 

Secretary DONLEY. This is a fair point. And we struggle as well 

with rapid changes in force structure; the rapid changes in the fiscal environment that have caused us to have to take decisions, revisit decisions and continue to adjust. 

This is a challenging part of the environment in which we live. 

I would say when the MC–12 came into the inventory, we gave serious consideration to putting it in the Guard and Reserve from the 

beginning. It does have a counterdrug kind of capability that is 

well beyond the existing capabilities of the RC–26 [Metroliner twin 

turboprop aircraft], which has been used in that capacity across the 

southern tier of the U.S. to support Guard and counterdrug activities. So it does represent an increase in those capabilities. 

But when we brought the MC–12 into the Force, the Guard did 

not have the manpower to support and to generate quickly the required capability to operate that down range. 

You should be aware—I think already are—the MC–12s are not 

in the United States. They went straight from the factory into the 

theater, and that is where they are operating today. But as we look 

forward, we think this is a more sustainable mission for the Guard 

as the op tempo adjusts a little bit. And I believe that the Air National Guard looked at the locations of the MC–12 along the southern tier mainly as a good fit. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, certainly we want to work with you 

in terms of trying to, you know, find missions. It is critical, obviously, to keep that capability which you talked about earlier. But 

obviously there is going to be questions and look forward to working with you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary and General—thank you for your service to 

our country. I only have 5 minutes so I have got to be kind of concise and I just want to say at the outset that I am going to ask 
20 

you to forgive me for not swimming in the same sea of accolades 

that some of my colleagues are comfortable in doing. 

But when I first came into office, the way we would have these 

hearings—we would spend a lot of time bragging about you; you 

would spend a lot of time bragging about us. And we never really 

asked the tough questions necessary to defend this country. And I 

vowed never to do that again. 

Mr. Secretary, you said that your decisions are strategy-driven. 

And, General, you have said that—it is in your written statement—that the strategy was driven by security changes. You don’t 

mention in there that it was also driven by $427 billion of cuts. So 

I want to focus on those security changes. 

When I first came into office, I had this report that the RAND 

Corporation did that said if we were involved in a conflict between 

China and Taiwan, the United States Air Force would easily defeat 

the Chinese in that particular situation. 

Since you have been in the position that you are in, you have 

canceled the F–22. You have retired 235 F–15s and F–16 fighters. 

You are now proposing retiring another 123 combat aircraft. You 

put all our eggs in the F–35 platform, which I think everybody acknowledges is smaller, slower; less lethal than the F–22. 

And now I see a new study that has come out by the RAND Corporation that takes a totally different tack. It says that we would 

lose in that conflict between China and Taiwan. 

Now, I don’t have time in the 5 minutes I have to get into the 

specifics of those studies. But my question for you is: Do you have 

any other studies that you can present to this committee that we 

can review, that would refute the conclusion that the RAND Corporation had in this study? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I would have to take a look at 

that study. I will certainly—— 

Mr. FORBES. You have not seen the study by RAND Corporation? 

General SCHWARTZ. I am not sure. I can’t see it from this distance. I certainly will—— 

Mr. FORBES. Are you familiar with any study that RAND Corporation did, as big as this one was, that said that we would lose 

in that conflict? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I don’t know what the assumptions are in that study. I don’t know what the premises were. 

You need to allow me to exercise that professional judgment. 

Mr. FORBES. And I will, General. I just want you say for the 

record today that you are not aware of this RAND study and you 

haven’t reviewed the study. Is that correct? 

General SCHWARTZ. What I am saying is I have not seen that— 

what is the title of the study, Congressman? 

Mr. FORBES. ‘‘Question of Balance, Political Context and Military 

Aspects of the China and Taiwan Dispute’’ by the RAND Corporation. 

General SCHWARTZ. I have not seen that study. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. It is a big one. 

I would suggest the Air Force look at it. Second thing I would 

say is if that conclusion in that study was correct, would that be 

an acceptable risk for the Air Force to have? 

I am not saying it is. I am saying if it would be? 
21 

General SCHWARTZ. If the conclusion is correct, I would say that 

would be, decidedly, a concern for all of the entire Armed Forces. 

Mr. FORBES. Let me come back to the F–22 decision that you 

made. 

When you did that, you and the Secretary wrote this at op-ed 

piece saying that we should have 183 F–22s. Prior to that decision, 

according to the Congressional Research Service, not me, there 

were 30 air-campaign studies that said you were wrong. 

Did you review a single study that said that you were correct, 

and that we should reduce the F–22s down to only 183? And the 

reason I say it—because right when you did it, the commander of 

the Air Combat Command said that there were no such studies out 

there at all. Did you review any of those? And can you just present 

them to the committee for us to review? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would be happy to do that. 

Mr. FORBES. Were there any—— 

General SCHWARTZ. There was. And the Department and Congress chose otherwise in the end. 

Mr. FORBES. So General Corley was incorrect when he said there 

were no studies out there that justified that? 

General SCHWARTZ. The study that I refer to talked about more 

than 187 aircraft. 

Mr. FORBES. If you would, present that to us. 

Can you tell us now, General, what is the current strike-fighter 

shortfall that the United States Air Force has? 

General SCHWARTZ. Given the new strategy, we have sufficient 

aircraft to deal with the threats that are outlined in the forcesizing construct at moderate risk. 

Mr. FORBES. And, General, was that strategy, according to your 

testimony today, driven completely by security changes or was it 

driven by the 427—— 

General SCHWARTZ. Of course it was driven by both, but—— 

Mr. FORBES. And—— 

General SCHWARTZ. The recognition was that we were out of 

Iraq, that we were going to diminish our presence in Afghanistan—— 

Mr. FORBES. General, my time is running out. 

Can you tell us if you can distinguish between the part of the 

strategy that was driven by the cuts, and the part by the security 

changes? 

General SCHWARTZ. Clearly, it is a combination of both. But I 

would submit to you, sir, that the F–35, the long-range strike 

bomber, and the new tanker—those programs are sustained by the 

new strategy and not diminished by it. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I want to thank both of you for being here today as well. Thank 

you for your service. And, of course, as I have discussed with both 

of you, I remain, I guess, deeply concerned about the proposal to 

retire the Iowa National Guard’s 132nd Fighter Wing’s F–16s, as 
22 

well as the broader budget decisions affecting the Air National 

Guard. I know this issue is brought up by Ranking Member Smith 

earlier as well. 

Roughly 130 airmen from the 132nd are currently deployed to Afghanistan or elsewhere across the globe. They have proven time 

and again that they are one of the most-experienced, best-performing fighter wings in the Air Force; maintaining a very high degree of readiness for some of the lowest personnel, maintenance, 

and flying costs of all F–16 units. As you know, in other words, this 

is a very, very effective unit by any measure. 

And while I am still baffled by the proposal to retire the 132nd 

F–16s, I am deeply concerned about the budget proposals affecting 

the entire Air National Guard as well, which would bear—my understanding is—59 percent of the total aircraft cuts, and see most 

of their personnel reductions occur in fiscal year 2013, if I am not 

mistaken; which provides little leeway to reserve course from a 

strategy that is stated to be meant to be irreversible. 

Given that the Air National Guard also plays a critical homeland-security role for our States and our country at lower basing 

personnel and life-cycle costs to the taxpayers, I have a couple of 

questions related to these issues. 

In your joint testimony, you state that the right mix of Active 

Duty and Reserve Components must be maintained. And I think 

we can all agree that that is the case. How did you determine the 

appropriate mix, what the appropriate mix would be, and what 

were the factors such as experience and personnel and operational 

cost that were taken into account? Could you be specific about the 

factors and the mix? 

Secretary DONLEY. I go back to the rationale that we provided in 

the opening statement. And I think we have been clear about it. 

The issue here was where we could take risk in the force structure. 

And the DOD and Air Force decision collectively was that we could 

take additional risk in the fighter force structure. 

We have already taken significant reductions in the F–16 force, 

but the assessment was we could take an additional squadron this 

time around. 

The unit at Des Moines, while it continues to perform very, very 

well—there is no question about the competency and the capability 

of this unit—the aircraft are a little bit older and less capable than 

some others. And they are not participating in the Air Sovereignty 

Alert mission. This has not been a mission that has been assigned 

or associated with Des Moines for the North American Air Defense 

Command. So those were the factors that went into this particular 

decision. 

The issue on the Active Reserve Component balance, I think the 

chief has been very clear on. This is not just about the cost to operate the unit. This is how the unit fits into the force structure, and 

how that force structure not only meets the demands of the strategy, but our ability to surge and then sustain combat operations 

going forward. And we have tried to strike the right balance. 

Our Air Force is now small enough; small enough that we have 

to go forward as one Air Force together and become more integrated going forward. As we get smaller, the requirements for read-
23 

iness and immediate capability go up here. So these were the decisions that factored into the Active arc balance. 

And, again, it is not—as you suggested, we understand the perception the reductions are disproportionate on the Air Guard. Certainly, that is the way the numbers fall in fiscal year 2013. 

But this is a multiyear look backwards and forwards in terms of 

how we are going to structure our Air Force going forward. And we 

need the right balance of Active Duty and Reserve Components, so 

we don’t break these components—— 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Yes. 

Just one quick historical question—because we mentioned certainly we have got to be able to deploy folks fairly quickly. Accessibility is an issue. I think it is an issue that the Guard—it has been 

raised as a concern. And I just have one question about that. Over 

the last 10 years, have there been any instances where the Air 

Guard has not been able to fulfill request for deployment? 

General SCHWARTZ. There have been no occasions where we did 

not—if we resorted to mobilization—where the guard was not 

available. And there were very few cases when we ride on volunteer status of the guardsmen. 

I would just say, sir, that the Guard and the Reserve are an essential part of our family. And we respect what they do. And in the 

case of your unit, sir, they are going to go transition into a remotely piloted aircraft mission that clearly is for the ages. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you. Thanks to both of you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To both gentlemen—I would like to know—Secretary Panetta recently talked about the call for maybe two more rounds of BRAC 

[base closure and realignment]. I would like to go back to our last 

round of BRAC, if I might—and just ask: Do each of you think that 

BRAC of 2005—the recommendations in that document—carry the 

force of law? 

Secretary DONLEY. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. And I think it was section 2703 of the 2012 NDAA 

[National Defense Authorization Act] requires that you complete all 

the closures and realignments recommended by the 2005 BRAC 

Commission as expeditiously as possible. So you are finished now 

with all of the BRAC recommendations and requirements? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, we believe we have complied with the law 

at Eglin. 

Mr. MILLER. So a comment by General Hoffman last week at the 

AFA [Air Force Association] Convention that, ‘‘BRAC 2005 has expired, it is irrelevant,’’ and that, ‘‘people just need to get over it,’’ 

is a correct statement? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I was there. That is not what 

he said. 

Mr. MILLER. What did he say, General? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Miller, what he said was that 

BRAC 2005 was complete, and that what we propose now with respect specifically to the Air Armament Center and the mission at 
24 

Eglin is something to address today, in today’s context, and not relative to something which, in our view, is a completed project. 

Mr. MILLER. So the Recommendation 185 to create an integrated 

weapons-and-armament, research development and acquisition, 

test-and-evaluation center at Eglin has been done? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would argue that it has, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. Not co-location—integration at Eglin? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would argue that it has. 

Mr. MILLER. How does disestablishing the Air Armament Center 

support your compliance with the BRAC law? 

General SCHWARTZ. We are not disestablishing the Air Armament Center, sir. Nothing is migrating from Eglin with respect to 

the proposal for AFMC [Air Force Materiel Command] reorganization—nothing. The one major change that is involved is collapsing 

the two wings which exist at Eglin into one, which is fundamentally an efficiency move. 

So the 96th wing and the test wing will become one organization. 

And the overhead that is associated with the two will be thinned 

out. That is the major element of the changes that we proposed 

here. 

I acknowledge forthrightly that we are talking about establishing 

a brigadier rather than a two-star in this instance. We have had 

pressure, as you are aware, to reduce 39 flag officers in the Air 

Force—no doubt more in the future. 

But, again, the bottom line is we are not migrating a thing away 

from Eglin. We simply are collapsing overhead. 

Mr. MILLER. And it is not your intent in the future to move forward with moving things away from Eglin? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would say it is not our intent to do that, 

Congressman Miller. I can’t presuppose the future; but there is no 

secret effort, no clandestine effort here, to change the chemistry. 

What we had to do was we—the Air Force had a target of 16,000 

civilian spaces to reduce. And so one of the ways that we approached that problem was in the Air Force Materiel Command reorganization—was to go from 12 direct reports to Don Hoffman to 

5, and to reduce the overhead throughout the command. That overhead involved more than 1,000 civilian spaces. This was a mandate 

we had to accomplish. And this is one of the ways we achieved that 

end. 

Mr. MILLER. General, you were sent a letter from the Ranking 

Member Bordallo and Chairman Forbes of the Readiness Subcommittee expressing their opinion that changes materially impacting BRAC decisions should be made only within the BRAC process. 

With that in mind—and I don’t believe they received a response—do you intend to continue the disestablishment of the Air 

Armament Center? 

General SCHWARTZ. We do not intend to disestablish the Air Armament Center. What we are doing is renaming it the Air Armament Complex, and it will remain in its current state, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
25 

Good morning, gentlemen. I commend the diligence with which 

you have prepared your fiscal year 2013 budget, shaped as it was 

by the Defense Department’s strategic guidance, and the initial 

round of cuts required by the Budget Control Act; cuts which I recognize as necessary. 

However, it is important that we work together to make sure 

that these cuts are made to programs and installations in a manner that minimizes risk to our national security and future readiness. 

My district borders Hanscom Air Force Base, a facility which can 

uniquely leverage local assets such as the numerous defense firms 

and exceptional universities nearby, including MIT’s [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Labs, which is located onsite 

to research and develop cutting-edge capabilities. It is an ideal site 

for cybersecurity R&D [Research and Development], an area in 

which the Department seeks to increase spending while so many 

cuts are being made elsewhere. 

We have incredible capability and value-added technology that 

we should be growing at Hanscom, because technology is even more 

important in a smaller military, which is what the strategic guidance in the budget envisions. However, a February 21 article in the 

Boston Globe revealed that internal Air Force documents showed 

that Hanscom was sustained a double hit—a loss of 380 Government positions and a 74-percent decrease in funding for contract of 

services over the next 4 years. 

My office, along with Representative Markey and Representative 

Tierney’s offices, have jointly requested a briefing to learn more 

about these cuts, and we look forward to it. 

But as you are both here, could I ask: Given that greater Boston 

has an extraordinarily skilled workforce—one of the best in the 

world—and that we are in a world that needs less boots and planes 

and more intelligence in cyber, why isn’t Hanscom growing? 

Secretary DONLEY. As the chief articulated, Hanscom has been— 

it remains an important center force—the Electronic Security Complex there is extremely important. But I would say that it has 

faced the results of the AFMC restructure and the requirement for 

us to take down 16,000 civilian spaces across the Air Force, which 

we have been working through over the last year or so. 

And we also recognize that Hanscom has been hit by programmatic impacts in areas where programs have been restructured or canceled. So we have been working through, with General 

Davis—a broader assessment of the capabilities at Hanscom and of 

the surrounding community; the impact of the program reductions 

that are coming there; to understand how we can best fit the workforce with the available work going forward, and build a plan for 

how to take that forward. 

So General Davis has had this mandate from the chief and I 

since he arrived last year. 

Ms. TSONGAS. General Schwartz, would you like to add anything? 

General SCHWARTZ. And we heard earlier a question regarding 

electronic warfare, command and control, software, enterprise resource, planning systems—all these very important kinds of capabilities are the expertise that resides within C.R. Davis’ organization. And that is not going to change. 
26 

But I would just reiterate that we are getting smaller. And so 

those reductions will be reflected at Hanscom, as they are at the 

other locations that have been addressed here. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, as we wrestle with this, I know the Hanscom 

community wants to work with you. Is there anything that it 

should do in particular to expand its mission; to help the Air Force 

be successful in these challenging times? Is there anything you 

would suggest? 

Secretary DONLEY. I think the same thing we would require, 

ma’am, from any of our acquisition enterprises—and that is to 

produce on cost, on time, and to have successful programs; not ones 

that are subject to termination or restructure. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for your service. But I am very, very concerned 

about the reductions in the personnel of our military—other reductions—at the time of war. And I have just gotten back from visiting 

in Pakistan, and how horrible it was. There was an attack on a bus 

station; the next day, an attack on a police station. Today I read 

where a convoy of buses were stopped and persons associated with 

the Taliban took out certain persons and assassinated them right 

there, 16 people. 

This is incredible—an ally so important as ours—a nuclear 

power—and we have just got to be prepared. And I am very, very 

concerned. 

General Schwartz, the Air Force has made headlines recently 

with the involuntary separation of 157 majors, and selective early 

retirement boards selecting 106 colonels for early retirement. You 

have indicated—and I am concerned, too—about leading to a hollow force. 

To what extent does the Air Force intend to use the Temporary 

Early Retirement Authority in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act? 

General SCHWARTZ. We will use it very, very selectively; very 

surgically only. This will not be broadly applied at all. In fact, we 

did not anticipate, sir, the use of involuntary measures in 2013. We 

will wrap up the difficult work we have done to try to reduce our 

over-strength through 2012. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, that is reassuring because the experienced 

people we have—it is just crucial of what we are facing. 

Mr. Secretary, according to the Washington Free Beacon today, 

the Administration’s proposal of defense budget cuts for military 

families and retirees to pay more for the health care, while leaving 

unionized civilian defense workers’ benefits untouched. Why is 

there a disparity in treatment between civilian and uniformed personnel? 

Secretary DONLEY. I think, as the chief indicated, when the Department looked at the rising personnel costs facing us—and in 

particular the rising cost of health care, we determined that we 

needed to slow that growth, and that the best way to do this was 

to propose increases in premiums for working-age retirees. 
27 

And as we looked at options in front of us for how that might 

be done, the sense was that we should scale those premiums to 

match the resources available to our retirees—— 

Mr. WILSON. Well—— 

Secretary DONLEY. Our staff sergeants versus retired flag officers, for example. 

Mr. WILSON. But why would that only be applied to uniformed 

personnel and not civilian employees? 

Secretary DONLEY. Yes. We did not address the civilian healthcare systems that exist across the Federal Government. We did not 

have a mandate to address that. That was not part of our discussions or deliberations in the Department. Our focus was on the 

military piece of this. 

Mr. WILSON. That strikes me as tragic for retention and recruiting. 

And Mr. Secretary, this has already been brought up about the 

Global Hawk system, but the Deputy Secretary had certified earlier, just a couple of months ago, that it was essential to national 

security; additionally, that the Global Hawk is $220 million cheaper per year to operate than U–2. And now it is being terminated— 

the Block 30. How can we understand that an asset critical to national security and costs less than an alternative be terminated? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, we got a lot of careful attention in the 

Department, recognizing that we have been in the middle of procurement and these are relatively new capabilities being fielded. 

When the Department came back to Congress on the NunnMcCurdy certification previously on Global Hawk Block 30, the 

question was, ‘‘What would it take to operate any other capability 

at the Global Hawk level of capability?’’ That is, the U–2 was compared to the Global Hawk capability. 

We understood and we still understand that the Global Hawk offers persistence that the U–2 does not have, so—but that was the 

measure in the Nunn-McCurdy—is measuring the U–2 against the 

persistence of the Global Hawk, and the cost variable between the 

two. 

Mr. WILSON. And—— 

Secretary DONLEY. Subsequent to that, the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council adjusted the requirements for high-altitude ISR. 

And they took a broader look at ISR capabilities across the Department, not just one or two programs—determined that those requirements could be adjusted. 

After they adjusted those requirements, we then went back and 

looked at the existing fleets and capabilities, and we said, ‘‘Can we 

live with the U–2 capability that we have, because the U–2 will be 

good through 2040, basically?’’ 

Mr. WILSON. And finally, you referenced ‘‘through 2040’’—could 

you provide us information on what the cost would be to upgrade 

and support the U–2s through 2025? Thank you. 

Secretary DONLEY. We can do that, sir. And the main message 

here is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is up. 

Could you do that for the record please? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sure, we can. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Critz. 
28 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, thank you for your service to the country. 

My first question is more of a statement or a request. The recent 

Air Force structure change has announced the closing of an Air Reserve station in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania outside of the BRAC 

process. This base serves 1,400 Active Reserve and Guard units of 

both the Air Force and the Navy. The base just completed an $8.1 

million housing project and is set to break ground on a $13.8 million joint Reserve center. 

Now, to give you some perspective of the efficiencies at this base, 

the Air Force leases 100 acres at this base. It includes access to 

four runways, an FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] control 

tower, medical and crash-fire response and zero-cost airfield maintenance, including snow removal and capital improvements for 

$20,000 a year. 

It is also worth pointing out that the Pittsburgh region has significant success with recruiting, and that the 911th Airlift Wing is 

one of the highest manned units in the Air Force Reserve command. This being said, I can’t understand why the Air Force would 

make the decision to close this Air Reserve station. 

If this is truly an issue with retiring C–130s, then let us bring 

in new C–130s to this very efficient and very effective wing so that 

this cost-effective base can continue to serve both the Air Force and 

the Pittsburgh community. 

Mr. Secretary General, I would like to see the cost analysis of the 

911th Airlift Wing compared to others throughout the Air Force 

and the justification for closing this base. 

My first question concerns the reduction of 65 C–130 tactical 

airlifters, getting us to a total fleet projection of 318. And I am 

going to go through some notes here so that you know where I am 

coming from. 

Mobility Airlift Aircraft Program has previously discussed the 

budget request for fiscal year of 2013—plans to divest intertheater 

and intratheater force structure in support of the new defense 

strategy. Air Force officials state that Case 3 of the Mobility Capability and Requirement Study 2016, MCRS–16, was the analytical 

underpinning for the new mobility force structure associated with 

the 2012 defense strategy. 

Air Force minimum C–130 force structure has concluded MCRS– 

16 was to go no lower than 335 C–130s under the QDR 2010. However, MCRS–16 also did not take into account United States Code 

title 32 Air National Guard or Army Guard airlift missions that 

would be required to support State Governor mobilization missions. 

MCRS–16 also did not analyze the Army’s time-sensitive mission-critical mission, and noted that additional C–130s beyond the 

planned program of record of 335 aircraft and 38 C–27J aircraft 

may be required. Note, time-sensitive mission-critical missions 

noted that additional may be required to supplement C–27s to support the mission. 

Part of my concern is that the Army is going down to 490,000, 

approximately, members. Pre-9/11, we were at about 480,000 and 

we had 530 C–130s. 
29 

Now, General Dempsey, when he was in here, sort of referenced 

that, ‘‘Lessons learned mean we need less.’’ But the MCRS–16 says 

otherwise. So can you elaborate on how we are going from 530 for 

480,000 to 318 for 490,000; and how that works—either for the 

General or for you, Secretary Donley? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, the MCRS put the floor at 

335. Our analysis indicates that 275 is sufficient to support the 

intratheater requirements. And the excess has to do with the timesensitive, mission-critical mission that you referred to, for a total 

of 318. 

It is also important to appreciate the fact that we were talking 

about C–130H models at one point in time, and now we are talking 

about a force that is currently about a third Js and, over time, will 

become more and more dominated by the J version, which is a 

more capable platform. 

There is a mix of analysis. MCRS is one piece of that, certainly. 

Our own that we have—that 318 C–130s is the minimum number 

in order to perform the strategy that we have been given, and its 

inherent force-sizing construct, which no longer supports a longterm—I am missing the word—stability—yes, sir, a long-term stability operation, which the former QDR strategy did include. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Your time expired. 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Schwartz, a little over a week ago, there was a memo 

from NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] outlining a reduction of two ACA [Aerospace Control Alert]—formerly 

ASA [Air Sovereignty Alert]—sites; one in Duluth, Minnesota and 

the other in Langley, Virginia. The justification was said to be 

based on a year-long comprehensive risk analysis completed by 

NORAD in deliberation with the United States Air Force. 

There was a GAO [Government Accountability Office] report in 

2009 that gave specific recommendations for, among other things, 

conducting routine risk assessments of ACA operations. However, 

in a follow-up memo in 2009—a study released just last month— 

the GAO stated, and I am quoting, ‘‘Although NORAD has not conducted routine risk assessments, it took steps toward implementing 

our 2009 recommendation by developing a computer model to 

evaluate current ASA basing locations. 

However, we found that the model had certain limitations that 

limit its ability to provide NORAD commanders, DOD decision 

makers, and Congress risk-based information.’’ 

And additionally, GAO report notes that, ‘‘In 2009, NORAD analyzed its ASA basing strategy to identify whether it could chance 

the number and location of ASA sites without affecting its ability 

to defend the homeland from an aviation-related attack. However, 

the analysis did not identify potential cost savings that could result 

from eliminating a given number of sites.’’ 

So General, can you explain what risk assessment and potential 

cost-saving conclusions you are using to justify your decision, since 

the GAO could not identify any? And it would be appreciated if you 

could provide the committee with any copies. 
30 

General SCHWARTZ. Be happy to give you what our part of this 

was. But I think that is a question better directed at General 

Jacoby, who performed that analysis as NORTHCOM [Northern 

Command]–NORAD, and came to the conclusion that—and justified this through the program process in the Pentagon—that we 

could reduce the alert sites. 

I acted, we acted, the Air Force acted on that basis; that there 

was proposal made by the relevant combatant commander to reduce the number of alert sites, and that there are benefits associated with that. And we would be happy to provide that to you, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. So if I am understanding this right, you 

will attempt to determine if there are studies you can provide to 

us that justify this and give us an analysis? 

General SCHWARTZ. I will certainly ask Chuck Jacoby to make 

available his analysis, on which we acted in good faith. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, do we have a mechanism to, in 

an appropriate amount of time, follow up to see if the General can 

comply with our request of the committee? 

Do we have a mechanism to do that? I am a little concerned with 

just the timeline getting stretched out and months and months go 

by, and then somehow we just don’t hear anything back. 

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask when we can expect those answers? 

General SCHWARTZ. How about the end of March? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for joining us here today. 

I have heard many cries about the cuts proposed to sacred cows 

that are made in our backyards. I have heard others claiming that 

this 1-percent reduction in the Pentagon’s base budget from 2012 

to 2013 could mean the difference between the world’s greatest 

military and a hollowed out force. And I frankly just don’t see how 

that would happen with a 1 percent cut. 

But now, General, some of us on this panel have a poor understanding of how military planning is carried out. For our benefit, 

could you explain to us how and why strategic considerations must 

merge with a pragmatic assessment of available resources as the 

Department develops its budget proposals in any given year? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, it starts with what is required: What do we want the Armed Forces of the United States 

to do, and where? And what are the relative priorities in terms of 

the likely missions that we are going to be assigned? 

That was the genesis and the motivation for the strategic review 

which the Department undertook over a period of many months to 

provide the backdrop for the program review which followed. 

The bottom line, sir, is that—and the Secretary of Defense, sir, 

was determined not to make this a bookkeeping exercise. And I 

think we avoided that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But you have to look at what Congress has mandated that you do within a certain amount of funding. You must 

take that into consideration, isn’t that correct? 
31 

General SCHWARTZ. It certainly influenced the program decision 

process. But it was independent of the strategic formulation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand. 

Mr. Secretary, can you remind this committee that it was the Republican-controlled House that forced passage of the Budget Control Act which mandated the caps on defense spending; and those 

cuts are reflected in this proposal. 

Secretary DONLEY. Well, Congressman, certainly the Budget 

Control Act represented the work of the House and the Senate together in crafting a compromised bill, which was acceptable to the 

President, which was signed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

Now, General, we have got a penetrating-bomber capability from 

the B–2s [Spirit stealth strategic bombers] for several more decades. And we have got cruise missiles. We have got unmanned 

stealth strike aircraft. And we are developing a prompt global 

strike capability. Why in the world do we need a next-generation 

bomber? 

General SCHWARTZ. There are 20 B–2s. They are great platforms, 

but they are 20 years old now. And the technology on which they 

were designed, with respect to signature management and so on— 

the stealth capabilities is 1980s vintage. 

And the reality is that the B–2, over time, will become less survivable in contested air space. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask this question. You have said that 

the next-generation bomber won’t be an ‘‘exquisite’’ aircraft in 

order to keep costs under control. 

Can you tell us how much is too much to pay for this next-generation bomber? 

General SCHWARTZ. We have a rough target of about $550 million per aircraft flyaway. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

I have got time to yield back, Mr. Chairman. So I will do so. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General—both of you in your statements indicated 

the importance of our global ISR assets and the increasing reliance 

upon those assets. 

Remotely piloted aircraft remain, and are increasing their role as 

part of that infrastructure. There is an effort by Congress, of which 

I have been a part, to see ways in which remotely piloted aircraft 

could be integrated into our domestic air space for the issues of 

testing, training, and pursuing additional capabilities. 

In the FAA Reauthorization Bill, there is the establishment of six 

test ranges. We also put language in the National Defense Authorization Act last year that calls for a report on the ways in which 

the FAA and DOD were working together on this issue; and also 

how support language—encouraging the FAA and the DOD to work 

together. Recognizing the FAA, of course, has jurisdiction in this 

area, AFRL [Air Force Research Laboratory] and NASA [National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration] are working with the FAA 

on trying to resolve the conflicts that may be inherent in remotely 

pilot aircraft being in domestic air space. 
32 

As we look to formulate this National Defense Authorization Act 

this year, gentlemen, what do you believe might be helpful in assisting the AFRL efforts in working with the FAA to incorporate 

them into our domestic air space? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I think that the key thing 

here is to increase confidence on the part of civil airspace control 

authorities that remotely piloted aircraft are predictable. That is 

the key thing—that if an anomaly occurs—that we know how the 

machine will respond. And that is the key technology, in my view, 

and certainly something that AFRL has a place in fielding, ultimately; but being able to assure the civil airspace authorities that 

the remotely piloted aircraft—if we lose link, if there is an anomaly 

on the weapon system—will react in a predictable manner is the 

coin of the realm here. 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I would simply add that this is a very important issue to our Air Force going forward. We have had several 

interactions with AFA—really, it has been on a continuing basis 

the last several years. We have Air Force personnel in the FAA 

headquarters helping work through these issues relative to the development to the National Airspace system; and how to make sure 

unmanned systems are part of that and an accepted part of the 

normal way of doing business going forward. 

Mr. TURNER. So I also have a question concerning the Air Force 

Institute of Technology that I am going to submit and request your 

statements for the record, hoping of course to have your strong support for AFIT [Air Force Institute of Technology]. 

Last year, in the National Defense Authorization Act, I inserted 

a language that allowed for students to enroll on a space-available 

basis. The Air Force has not taken advantage of that. We hope that 

in your written answers that we will have your commitment to 

that. 

As you know, I am also chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. And as you are aware, the President established a modernization plan in the 1251 Plan in the 2010 NPR [Nuclear Posture 

Review]. The fiscal year 2013 budget, after the new START Treaty 

was ratified—we see that the President is backing off those plans. 

Let us review that list. 

The B61 gravity bomber is 2 years delayed. The associated tail 

kit is late, and we understand that certain high-accuracy options 

are not being looked at. The W78 warhead is being pushed back, 

and a certain modernization options have been arbitrarily taken off 

the table. The new bomber won’t be certified at the outset. And the 

new cruise missile is late at least 2 years. And the plan for modernization of the Minuteman III appears to be lacking commitment. 

So my question, gentlemen, is: Can you assure us that the Air 

Force has an ironclad, no-caveat commitment to field a new ICBM, 

to field a new nuclear-capable bomber and cruise missile; and will 

this commitment change result in the Administration’s many EPR, 

which the Administration is not sharing with Congress as it is formulating? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, let me assure you that these issues have 

the most senior attention in the Department. The Nuclear Weapons 

Council has been meeting on these issues over the last month, a 
33 

month and a half—on an extended basis, again, for many months 

now, but we are—— 

Mr. TURNER. Does it surprise you that Congress has not had any 

of this information shared with them, regardless of the fact that we 

have repeatedly asked? 

Secretary DONLEY. You are about to get a communication from 

the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy—joint communication on the subject. 

I won’t address what is in that letter at this point, but that communication is being prepared. 

I will say that the B61 LEP [Lifetime Extension Program] program is important to the United States Air Force and the work on 

the W78 as well. These are priority issues for our Air Force, among 

others. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

It is my intention after the next question period to call a 5- 

minute recess for the committee. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Secretary, one of the most intriguing things that I have 

learned—and as you know I am a freshman coming in—is the fact 

that in the building of F–35, we actually have nine allies who are 

participating with us in that construction and technology. And, you 

know, I had never even envisioned that we would be doing something like that. 

Having said that—on page six of your report to us, you talk 

about the budget—‘‘seeking to leverage strong relationships with 

allies and partners including the development of new partners’’— 

so this seems to tell me that the Air Force of the future may not 

be as we envision it. 

So can you first tell me what is meant by the ‘‘leveraging of the 

strong relationships?’’ And in addition to that, how is that going to, 

then, affect what we may look at the Air Force into the future? 

Secretary DONLEY. Ma’am, just a couple of thoughts to leave with 

you on this model here—our thinking for this is the F–16 program, 

which has been a very successful multinational program since the 

early to mid-1970s. Much of that program was put together after 

the United States had made a decision to build the F–16; and the 

international partners came in after. 

So there are many, many nations that fly the F–16. This provides for interoperability in operations. It provides for more efficient logistics and worldwide access to logistics as we collaborate 

with partners on availability in the supply chain and such. 

And I think from an operational—I will let the chief speak to the 

operational point. But on the F–35 program, we are doing that 

work upfront. So the partners are more involved earlier and they 

are participating in the development as well. So we are sharing the 

cost in that work. 

General SCHWARTZ. I would only to add, ma’am, that when we 

do programs like this, it establishes a relationship that lasts decades. In the case of the F–16, it will be 40 years with the allies 

who have flown the F–16. Same thing is true with the F–15, C– 

130J, or you know—the C–130 is the same thing. 
34 

Establishing these relationships, these professional relationships, 

with counterpart air forces is important to us for both professional 

reasons; for our ability to influence others’ thinking; for the potential of gaining access in areas where the military and military relationship can be beneficial. All of these things revolve around common equipment. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. I understand what was unique about the F–35 

is that we were doing it right upfront as we were developing it. Because you hear people like, for example, Representatives of Taiwan 

coming in saying, ‘‘We want you to sell us the F–16,’’ or whatever 

it is that they are looking for, versus now that you have it upfront 

with F–35, I assume that, in the development of that relationship— 

military relationship—we have already defined who will, then, buy 

or, who will have access to the jet, with whatever kinds of components in it—because I can’t imagine we are sharing everything. 

But I guess the long-term effect is this our way of holding our 

allies close? And then, if we are going to ever unfortunately enter 

another theater, we would be able to rely on them because of this 

relationship? Is this the way we are playing well together, so to 

speak? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think clearly there is a process within the 

Government to make decisions about what to export, who to partner with, and so on and so forth. And there is certainly congressional involvement in that process. 

But a key thing here is that, yes, it is certainly my experience, 

over many years, that the relationships that we have created— 

when I was a captain, I—there are still people serving in other air 

forces—they all have a gray hair now, but these kinds of things are 

profoundly important. And they do influence the thinking we— 

when we can offer the best military advice of our civilian masters. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. And I am running out of time, but do you foresee that what we are aiming towards is some sort of a global military? When I say ‘‘global’’—is that we are not going to have such 

defined lines between countries? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, I think sovereignty will always be 

primary. I mean, national interest is national interest. But to the 

extent that one can collaborate for positive outcomes, I think it 

makes sense. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess for 5 minutes 

and when we return, Mr. Lamborn will have the next round of 

questions. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Lamborn? 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, both, for your work and your service. 

And on page 20 of the Posture Statement, under ‘‘Nuclear Deterrence Operations,’’ the somewhat inconsistent information is found 

that you are looking for $20.1 million to fund treaty preparatory 

actions and other additional actions necessary to accomplish treatyrequired reductions by 2018. Specifically what is it that you are 

wanting to do with that $20 million? 
35 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is a couple things. 

The Secretary addressed this earlier. Some of that is eliminating 

the missile silos and the bombers that are out at Davis-Monthan 

that are still counters against treaty limits but haven’t been dismantled in a way that it takes them off the books. That is what 

part of the cost is for. 

Some of the additional cost is associated with the design effort 

that is required to convert nuclear-capable B–52s [Stratofortress 

strategic bombers] to conventional-only B–52s. That design effort is 

necessary. As you know, the 1251 report said up to 60 airplanes. 

We have 76. So there is at least 16 birds that need to be converted 

and—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Under New START? 

General SCHWARTZ. Under New START. That is correct. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And I have problems with New START. It was 

passed by a lame duck Senate; the same lame duck session that 

repealed ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’’ 

And so I just am concerned about the other things that are going 

on that might be unilateral actions by this Administration. Is there 

any activity that either of you are aware of to de-MIRV [multiple 

independently targetable reentry vehicle]—to take from multiple 

warheads or ICBMs and convert them to single-warhead status? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think I would prefer to talk with you about 

this in a classified forum. But it should be no surprise that our intent, expressed over many years, was to move away from MIRV 

ICBMs towards single-warhead ICBMs. And that is unrelated, 

frankly, to START limitations. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Donley, were you going to add something on that? 

Secretary DONLEY. I just was going to mention that that was a 

result of the Nuclear Posture Review. And it was not a treaty compliance issue. This was a U.S. Government choice to do that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And we are talking about the new-generation 

bomber, but isn’t that decades away? 

General SCHWARTZ. We anticipate having platform at least for 

test in the mid-2020s. So it is a decade away. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And it is not even on the drawing board yet. 

General SCHWARTZ. Well—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Sometimes you say something is just on the—this 

isn’t even on the drawing board. 

General SCHWARTZ. The program is now under way, sir. And, 

again, the target is the mid-2020s; 80 to 100 total aircraft inventory. And, very importantly, we intend to manage this very carefully, and with discipline. We are not going to repeat the B–2 experience with long-range strike bomber. 

Mr. LAMBORN. What do you mean? Could you clarify what you 

meant by that? 

General SCHWARTZ. The B–2 requirement set moved around over 

a period of time. And as a result, in some respects, we overdesigned 

the airplane. And that is why it was $1.5 billion-plus per copy. 

And, of course, we only acquired 21, as well—another issue. 

And so the mandate that we have from the Department is that 

we are going to produce a machine where we are disciplined on its 

requirements—that it will have an opportunity to grow over time. 
36 

But it is not going to be the end-all, be-all the first time it flies. 

And we are going to do this in a way that allows us to purchase 

the aircraft in sufficient numbers, again, to succeed the B–52s; the 

B–1s [Lancer strategic bombers]. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

Changing subject entirely in my last 45 seconds here—the President’s budget request has zeroed out the Operationally Responsive 

Space Mission. And with the modular space vehicles, in particular, 

I guess that that is included. But isn’t that meeting a need that 

we absolutely have to have—and so we are zeroing it out? 

General SCHWARTZ. So the Department remains committed to the 

Operationally Responsive Space concept, sir. But as we looked at 

affordability and other ways to do this, we determined this year 

that the best approach was really to build in resiliency in the existing constellations of satellites across each mission area, and not to 

rely on a single program office to try to provide that capability from 

a single program. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you both. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hochul. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary and General, I appreciate your service to our 

country and, certainly, the challenge that you have before us. 

In your opening statement, Mr. Secretary, you talked about the 

fact that in some cases you provided new missions to guard units 

whenever possible. And I believe that 14 of 24 will receive new missions. 

Can you tell me what the analysis that went into the decision as 

to which locations receive new missions, and help me understand 

the thought process? 

Secretary DONLEY. The considerations that the Air National 

Guard went through in making these decisions involved making 

sure that there was a flying operation in each State, to the extent 

that we could do that; and also, judging across individual locations 

whether or not there were other Guard or Reserve units on station 

or very close by. 

So we have a number of States that have multiple Guard and 

Reserve and flying missions. New York is one of those. And at Niagara, in particular, while the Guard unit there was proposed to 

be taken down, the Reserve unit at that same location remains intact. 

So this was a reason why Niagara was not prioritized higher for 

a re-missioned unit, if you will—coming in behind the Guard unit. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Do you also take into consideration geographic location and the fact that the Niagara Falls Air Reserve station is 

on the border with Canada, protecting hydroelectric power plants 

as well, and four bridge crossings? 

I mean I know that some geographic locations and all the cities 

in the center of this country have received two new missions. And 

I am just asking whether you look at our strategic location on the 

border with a foreign country like Canada, which has different— 

you know, we have relationship with them. And I just wanted to 

know whether or not that, you know, any priority in your mind 

should be given to a location on the border with Canada. 
37 

Secretary DONLEY. As we look at adjustments across all the 50 

States here, there remains significant C–130 capability in New 

York. And we think the reductions here, while they are painful at 

the unit level, and certainly the manpower associated with it, the 

reductions in the number of aircraft are relatively marginal. 

Ms. HOCHUL. And certainly, that being said, I—if the aircraft 

need to go to a different function elsewhere or removed completely, 

that is understandable. 

But what I am asking, again, as a consideration—since the decision is not final—that a new mission be given to this, given that, 

number one, the strategic location; but also, the investment the Air 

Force has already made into this facility. And that is why I want 

to make sure that our taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely; that 

if you have already put money in here since 2005, why not continue, instead of pulling out one of the two operations and, you 

know, just ceasing that? 

So as a watchdog of our taxpayer dollars, as you are as well, that 

is something I am asking, as you undertake your reconsideration 

of the Niagara Falls Air Station Guard mission—we will take another mission. It doesn’t have to be the C–130s. We will take another mission. And again, location and investments that have already made is something I would ask you to consider. 

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary Donley and thank you, General Schwartz 

for being here. You know, I never want to miss an opportunity to 

thank people such as yourself—General Schwartz—on behalf of my 

3-year-olds for your lifetime dedication to the cause of freedom. You 

all are the most noble figures in our society. 

Most of my questions have been asked. So I am going to ask one 

that is going to be a little longer, if you will indulge me. It is an 

energy-related question. And I find very little discussion in the 

hearing materials about energy, apart from some references in the 

‘‘HASC Memorandum on Energy Horizons Papers,’’ it is titled. It 

outlines the Air Force plans to increase energy supply by reduced 

demand; and change the culture to meet mission requirements. 

And then there is some general discussion about green and renewable energy initiatives in the Air Force that it intends to implement over the next few years. 

My question is more about an immediate energy challenge in my 

mind. A lot of the studies, as you know—we have had several 

major ones now—show our civilian power grid is critically vulnerable to both natural and man-made electromagnetic pulse. Furthermore, the reports show that domestic military instillations received 

99 percent of their electricity needs from the civilian power grid. 

And when I look in your summary for what the Air Force is 

doing to eliminate or to mitigate or to really fully understand those 

vulnerabilities to our electric-power supply coming from the civilian 

government, I really—I am not finding anything, now, that may be 

there. And it is not a rhetorical question. 

So if I am missing something, you know, I—it is hard for me to 

see that—in the green initiatives—the real effort in that direction. 
38 

And so I guess my question is along the lines—has the Air Force 

considered the magnitude in the immediacy of what is potentially 

a catastrophic danger to the nation if our civilian power grid were 

to go down for an extended period of time, you know, as a result 

of natural or man-made EMP [electromagnetic pulse]. 

Bottom line, does the Air Force feel like they have a strong handle on this? And have they considered the magnitude of the challenges it would face in trying to carry out its mission in such an 

environment if we did have a major catastrophic power-grid failure? And what are the plans here to deal with this issue? 

And I will start with you, Secretary Donley; and then General 

Schwartz. 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, we would be happy to fill in the record 

on your specific question regarding EMP, which is a significant 

one. But I would offer—and as we fill in this discussion for you— 

that many of our initiatives on alternative forms of—solar, wind, 

other renewable projects—are focused on the local instillation capabilities. So they are generating capabilities sometimes upwards of 

20 percent, 23 percent, 25 percent of local power needs—generated 

on the base. 

So in some cases we are trying to get to—we are at the Air Force 

Academy, trying to get to 100 percent as a test effort, if you will. 

So there is a connection between our application of renewable-energy sources at local bases and a reduction in our dependency on 

the local grid. But it is true that we still get most of our power 

from local grids. 

General SCHWARTZ. I would only add, Congressman, that we do 

have a process of evaluating such vulnerabilities. And there are 

about 900 of these vulnerabilities currently in our database, 62 of 

which are considered significant enough that it would affect at a 

strategic level of military mission. And 22 of those 62 are considered national-level vulnerabilities. 

So again, we have this process to assess—to identify these 

vulnerabilities. And as the Secretary suggested, certainly we have 

backup power for key functions on our installations; primarily hydrocarbon-driven, obviously. But we are working hard on the renewables, as the Secretary said. And Nellis Air Force base is a 

case-in-point, where obviously solar is abundant. And it powers just 

under 25 percent of the daily requirement. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, given the magnitude of that 

kind of a possibility, I still guess I am not hearing what seemed— 

I mean I don’t even know if EMP is one of those 22 national categories. But I am hoping that we can have further discussion about 

this because if Iran or someone like that should gain nuclear capability, then the equation is changed dramatically. 

Thank you. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to Mr. Secretary and General. I too would like to 

add my thanks to you for the sacrifices you have made through a 

lifetime career protecting us. 
39 

General, you had said earlier when we were discussing the F– 

16s that the relationships that have developed with many of our 

allies have lasted a generation and have been very constructive to 

us. I noted that with the F–35, there have been reports to suggest 

that Australia—that originally was going to purchase 12—is now 

rethinking that. So are Turkey and Italy. And I am wondering, 

with the F–16 experience as a backdrop, what does that tell us 

about, one, relationship-building, but, two, whether there is really 

confidence in the F–35 around the world? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, I think this is less a question of confidence than it is an issue of the economic circumstances that many 

nations find themselves in right now. And it is affecting us too, obviously, with the Budget Control Act. I think that it should not be 

a surprise that Canada, Australia, Italy, others, you know, are 

watching their checkbooks. 

And so the fact that military programs in general are getting additional scrutiny shouldn’t—you know, is not that much of a surprise. 

It should not be read as a diminished commitment to pursuing 

this capability over the longer term. I know personally—you know, 

I interact with my counterparts routinely—Canada, Australia, 

Italy, Turkey, each on the military-to-military basis—are committed to moving to the generation-five level of capability as soon 

as their economic circumstances permit. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. 

Just this morning, the Government Accounting Office just released a report. It is its ‘‘Annual Report on Opportunities to Reduce 

Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, and Achieve Savings.’’ 

The very first two areas that they focus on deal with the military 

and, in particular, electronic warfare; and they point that the Navy 

and the Air Force have been in discussions historically to try and 

reduce the duplication; try and find ways to acquire much of this 

equipment jointly so the costs can be reduced. And, yet, not much 

has happened. Can you give us an update on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. I guess I would dispute that assessment. We 

walked away from the EF–111 [Raven electronic warfare aircraft] 

aircraft, which was our dedicated jammer platform, in favor of 

what, at the time, was the EA–6 [Prowler electronic warfare aircraft] capability in the United States Navy. 

And we have been dependent on EA–6 capability for some period 

of years. I think the key thing here is that certainly there is a renewed effort on the part of the Navy and the Air Force; not just 

in electronic warfare, but in other areas. Global Hawk and BAMS 

[Broad Area Maritime Surveillance] is a case in point, ma’am, 

where we are using a common system. There is a different sensor 

because their mission is maritime and ours is over land. But fundamentally it is the same platform and we are pursuing it together. 

Ms. SPEIER. They specifically reference the services M–A–L–Dhyphen-J—MALD–J, Increment II, and Airborne Electronic Attack 

Expendable Initiatives to determine if these activities should be 

merged. 

General SCHWARTZ. Well, in fact, we terminated Increment II in 

the 2013 program in our proposals. So it is no longer in play. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. 
40 

And then, with my 40 seconds remaining—also reference the unmanned-aircraft systems and pointed that since 2008, in an effort 

to save money, there have been requests made to see if there could 

be joint efforts there. 

According to a DOD-sponsored study in 2010, the Department 

could have saved almost $1.2 billion had the Air Force acquired the 

same sensor as the Army. Would you like to comment on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, I would have to see the specific reference and what sensor they were referring to. I would be happy 

to do that for the record. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you gentlemen for being here today; and thank you 

for your service. My first question is for General Schwartz. 

General, week before last, Secretary of Defense Panetta visited 

Barksdale Air Force Base, which is in my district. 

And while I couldn’t be there—we were here voting—my understanding is that he laid out a very positive plan for moving forward 

with our bomber platform. And, in fact, I met with Global Strike 

Command and the 8th Air Force this past Friday. And it looks 

like—that nearly $300 million requested in fiscal year 2013 and 

$6.3 billion is programmed through fiscal year 2017. So it looks like 

the commitment is real; that the long-range strike bomber is really 

beginning to come together; and so as it should. 

Now, picking up on some of the questions you have already answered, we understand it will probably be beyond the decade before 

they will actually roll out and be operational. We also know that 

there will probably be at an estimated cost of $550 million each 

and numbers as high as 100. That is all good to know. And, I will 

give you a personal experience. 

About 6 months ago, I actually flew inside of a B–52. And it was 

a very interesting experience. Number one, it is a giant airplane 

but it is very cramped on the inside. It is sort of like being inside 

a cave or inside of a mine or perhaps a submarine. So it is jammed 

with a lot of stuff. And what is interesting—it has all of the old 

1950s vintage dials and gauges and tubes—actually tubes—still in 

operation. 

Well, I am seriously concerned that the budget bans a number 

of vital modernization programs that will fill in the gap between 

now and when these new bombers roll out; and that is legacy radar 

of the 1960s, which they can’t even turn it off because they are 

afraid they can’t get it back on. And that can seriously hamper our 

readiness, bringing us down to maybe a 37-percent mission-success 

probability; and also, the EHF [Extremely High Frequency] FAB– 

T [Family of Advanced Beyond-Line-of-Sight Terminals] program 

which, as you know, is a communication with satellites, receiving 

orders for nuclear deployment and missions. 

So my question—and as I understand it, both of these have been 

completely zeroed out—if you could respond to that please? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sure. 
41 

With respect to FAB–T—really, that was a priority decision. And 

by the way, FAB–T is a terminal to allow communications with the 

new advanced, extremely high-frequency satellites’ protected communications architecture. 

The priority was to do ground terminals and command-and-control requirements first. And it had been deferred for the B–52 because the B–52 has a reliable proven LF [Low Frequency], VLF 

[Very Low Frequency] command-and-control capability—low-frequency, very-low-frequency capability—on the platform as it 

stands. 

So I think was an appropriate prioritization, sir, to go with the 

command-and-control platforms first, both air and ground, and 

then to rely on the existing capability for the time being in the B– 

52. 

With respect to the radar, we looked at that carefully. I believe 

it is the APQ–166—is the designation for the radar in the B–52. 

And the cost of the new radar relative to what we saw as a renovation—in other words, maintaining the 166, but perhaps going solid 

state in some of its subcomponents—was a wiser path than putting 

a brand-new, probably, electronically scanned radar on the B–52. 

So bottom line is these are choices based on priority and available resources. And they were carefully considered. And that is 

kind of where we stand. They have not been eliminated in the context you mentioned. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. 

To follow up then, the radar, there is sort of a semi-modernization or a—parts or components—and the FAB–T, you are really 

looking at other capabilities that can get around that reliably. 

Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, I want to thank you 

very much for appearing before the committee today, and for your 

testimony; of course, most especially for your service to our Nation. 

As a ranking member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, I 

have long maintained, as you probably know, a strong interest in 

mitigating vulnerabilities in cyberspace. In particular, I have long 

been concerned about the potential of what a cyberattack in our 

electric grid—and its impact on our ability to conduct military operations. 

In the past hearings before the committee, of course, I have been 

pleased with the Air Force’s engagement on this issue. I did have 

a question, Secretary Donley, on what progress the Air Force has 

made in evaluating threats to our bases that rely on civilian power 

sources and how the Air Force has strengthened its plans for alternative energy sources. 

I think you probably answered a lot of that question when Mr. 

Franks asked his question. If there is anything else you want to 

add, feel free. 

But I will go to the next one, which is—I also continue to be concerned about the overall strength and size of our nation’s cybersecurity workforce. So in that point, perhaps, if you both could comment—what is the Air Force doing to recruit and train airmen with 
42 

cyberskills? And what is it doing to encourage them to stay in uniform? 

In particular, then, the next question—this one, perhaps, is more 

directed at General Schwartz. General, I recently visited 24th Air 

Force at Lackland Air Force Base, and was very impressed with 

General Vautrinot and the work that her team is doing there with 

its operations. We have clearly made great strides in our ability to 

impact the cyber domain. But, as I am sure you would agree, we 

really have to continue to innovate and transform in order to maintain and expand that ability. 

In your view, what must the Air Force do next in order to ensure 

the ability of its networks to support the full spectrum of operations? 

Perhaps, Secretary Donley, if we could start with you; and then 

we will go to General Schwartz? 

Secretary DONLEY. Well, just a couple of general points here. 

This is a key capability for us and for the joint force moving forward. No question about it. It is an emerging threat. It is actually 

with us today. 

The first order of business for the Air Force was to establish our 

component 24th Air Force to do this work, and to give control of 

what we referred to as Air Force—AFNetOps—Air Force Network 

Operations—across all our bases so that we view this as an entire 

enterprise together; and especially to work through the 

cyberdefense issues that are immediately in front of us; also to 

build the forensic capability that will allow us to move from just 

defensive operations to more of a dynamic defense environment; 

and also to develop the offensive tools that our commanders will 

need going forward. So this is the general evolution of our cyber 

capability. 

The airmen that we recruit for this work are outstanding. They 

perform not just Air Force work but also joint work. They are in 

high demand in the Defense—at the Defense Department level for 

the work that they do. And we also have Guard and Reserve units 

that are contributing here based on regional expertise from the 

Northwest and also from the San Francisco Bay Area; Northern 

California area—so a very important capability for us. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I think the major thing we need to do 

is to recognize that this is not an administrative activity, if it ever 

was. It is to change mindset that this is about operations. This is 

a recognition that these are operators, not network controllers or 

managers, but operators. 

And I know Sue Vautrinot, I am sure, explained that to you. It 

is a culture issue that will take a bit longer to inculcate throughout 

our Air Force. But this is a military capability, and it needs to be 

employed and cultivated and so on, along those lines. 

Our recruiting and retention has generally been good in part, no 

doubt, over the last couple of years, because of the economy—has 

been suffering some. But, again, there are exciting things that we 

do that I would argue that IT [Information Technology]-competent 

people in the private sector don’t get to do. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you gentlemen. I appreciate the work you 

are doing. 

Chairman, I yield back. 
43 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to go back to the more specific discussion on the Global 

Hawk, if I could, and some of the things that you have already said 

in your testimony—just to clear up. I am an Army guy, so I apologize for any confusion I may have. But I think, General, you talked 

about the B–52 being 20 years old, you know. We know the U–2 

is at least that old. 

And then I think that you said at the beginning of your testimony that the decision was made to discontinue the Block 30 part 

of the Global Hawk because of—the U–2 cost versus the Global 

Hawk was essentially a push. Correct me if I am wrong on that. 

I guess my question—what I want to start my question off is— 

I have seen the Global Hawk up close. It was very impressive. You 

know, it makes you feel proud to be an American that this is the 

kind of stuff that we are putting out. Nothing against the U–2, but 

when you talk about antiquated systems versus what we have got 

to show the world in the future, it was just impressive. 

And so I guess if we are worried about the age of the B–52, and 

the cost of the Global Hawk and the U–2 was essentially a push, 

why don’t we err—or why don’t we decide for the future that the 

capability that we are going to use is something that—I assume 

that where we are going in this kind of surveillance in the future 

would be unmanned aircraft like the Global Hawk, someday in the 

future. So why wouldn’t we err on the side of starting to use that 

now, especially if we have already built some of these things? 

General SCHWARTZ. If resources were not an issue or were less 

an issue, we might well make a strategic decision to do something 

on those lines; but we did not have that option. 

Just to put it in context—so you have a sense—keeping the U– 

2 vs. terminating Block 30 yielded $2.5 billion in savings in the 

program period; not trivial. So, you know, if there were $2.5 billion, 

you know, more in our top line, I am not sure how we would use 

it. 

Mr. ROONEY. Right. 

General SCHWARTZ. I just want to give you that sense that we 

recognize that. And remotely piloted aircraft are growing in our inventory and will continue to grow. And we will have a foothold 

with Global Hawk. And the Department of Defense will have a 

broader one, including the Navy. This was a choice that we had an 

asset that could do the mission as it is currently specified, and 

could do it overall at much less cost. 

Mr. ROONEY. I just want to—for the sake of presenting this letter 

that I have from my colleague from Florida, Mr. Young, from Secretary Ashton Carter, which highlights—and this is just 6 months 

ago. ‘‘The continuation of the program is essential to national security and there are no alternatives to the program which will provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at 

less cost.’’ 

There is also language in here that talks about how, because of 

the need for a U–2 not being able to fly continuously and that a 

Global Hawk could, it—the cost for U–2 would actually be $220 

million more per year. 
44 

I understand that those numbers, you know, aren’t matching up 

now. But 6 months ago—what I look at when you say ‘‘We have 

spent’’ or ‘‘We have appropriated $4 billion for you to make,’’ or ‘‘for 

us to be able to purchase,’’ I think, ‘‘21 of these Global Hawks. We 

have got 14 built.’’ 

When I have to talk to my constituents and the taxpayers, and 

I say, ‘‘Yes, we have got these really cool surveillance Global 

Hawks that are going to take the place of this 50-year-old plane. 

We have got 14 of them made, but now we have made the decision 

to just park them in the garage somewhere’’—you see, it is hard 

for me to be able to explain that to—especially in this kind of age. 

So, I mean, I guess what I am asking you is: What do I tell them, 

you know, when we talk about how we are going to park this vehicle in a garage for God knows how long? 

General SCHWARTZ. We will put the platforms into recoverable 

storage. 

So we are not talking about breaking the birds up. We want to 

be able to have access to them. And as circumstances change, you 

know, perhaps there will be a time when they come back out of 

storage. But right now—right now, we strongly recommend the U– 

2 solution set given all the demands that we face. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And for Secretary Donley and General Schwartz—I am impressed by your ability to stay with this. I want to thank you for 

your answers; the forthcoming way in which you have dealt with 

the multitude of questions here. 

I was going to ask you about the Global Hawk, but that has been 

covered at least by five of us. And I will let it go at that. And I 

thank you for a private discussion that you gave me earlier. 

My question is going to go on the mobility side. Obviously, it is 

extremely important element in the future of war planning and the 

direction we are going. You are downsizing some elements of it. 

Could you just give us a quick overview on the downsizing and 

then see where it takes us? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

We are going from—on the intratheater lift side from somewhere—well, down to 318 aircraft; C–130 class aircraft. And we 

were at about 390 to start. So 65 birds come out, 39 of which can 

retire in 2013—on the big-airplane life side, we will reduce 27 C– 

5As. And that will keep 275 total big airplanes—that is 223 C–17s 

and 52 C–5Ms. That is the re-engined version of the C–5, a very 

efficient—a good lifter; so that is the basic approach on the lift 

side. 

I would just say that the analysis that was done based on the 

new strategy suggested that we needed—one of the metrics we use 

is called ‘‘million-ton miles per day’’—that the former mobility-capability requirements studies specified a minimum of 32.7 millionton miles per day. The analysis we have based on the new strategy 

and the reduced force size, and the other components of the Department of Defense is 29.4 million-ton miles. And our actual capacity is somewhere around 30.5. So there is a little bit of excess 

there. It is okay to have a little management reserve here, in my 
45 

view. And so we think that, again, 275 and 318 is the right combination. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are you going to continue to upgrade the C– 

5As? 

General SCHWARTZ. The remaining C–5As will go out of the inventory before there is an opportunity to modify them. So there 

will be 52 total C–5s, all of which will be the re-engined version 

of the C–5M. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And how many do you have to day on the C– 

5s? 

General SCHWARTZ. There are 89 total C–5s and—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Reducing 27. 

General SCHWARTZ. And reduce it by 27. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Have you decided where they are going to be deployed, the remaining? 

General SCHWARTZ. I don’t think we have decided that specifically. I would indicate, however, that the units that were donors on 

the C–5As, as reflected in the program, either are going to get C– 

5Ms or, in one case, get Active Duty C–17s. It is a Guard unit. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You know I would have the preference as to 

where you would locate those. 

On the tankers—you are retiring some tankers and looking forward to the new tanker coming in. Is this a transition process that 

is under way? 

Secretary DONLEY. Well, the tanker program does not deliver an 

initial operational per-squadron-level capability until about 2017. 

So we will, this year, go through the process of establishing the requirements for basing, and then make decisions at the end of this 

calendar year on the first two bases for initial bed-down of the 

tanker. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We do like the West Coast. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Griffin. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I have got several questions here, so I want to try to 

move quickly. First and foremost, I saw that—and this is for Secretary Donley—I saw that there has been a reversal with regard 

to the LAS [Light Air Support] contract involving Hawker 

Beechcraft. I have got the statement you put out today, Mr. Secretary. Is there anything you would want to add to that? 

Secretary DONLEY. No, certainly, the situation is that as we went 

to make a court filing on this issue, we found—the service acquisition executive and support staff found that the documentation for 

this source selection was not what it needed to be. 

And, certainly, we are disappointed that that has been the case, 

and that we have fallen short here. But we need to go back and 

take corrective action. We are in the process of doing that. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay—another quick question on that issue. It was 

brought to my attention that there was a change or a lowering in 

the pilot-safety standards with regard to ejection in this contract. 

Are you familiar with that? Do you know if there was lowering of 

safety standards so that the Super Tucano would be compliant? 

Secretary DONLEY. I am not familiar with those details. 
46 

Mr. GRIFFIN. General, are you familiar with that at all? 

General SCHWARTZ. I am not. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay. 

We may submit that in writing for more detail. 

With regard to the A–10s that are outside of my district, I am 

going to ask a question here to try to assist my colleague who had 

the A–10s in his district in Fort Smith. 

My understanding is that the BRAC report cited the airspace 

around the airfield in Fort Smith, a low-level route, as to why Fort 

Smith was an ideal location for the A–10. 

Now the A–10s are being moved. Was there something in the 

current basing commission report that contradicted the BRAC findings? Can you give me any insight as to why the A–10s might be 

moved from there? 

Secretary DONLEY. The A–10s are not moving. The A–10s are 

being retired out of the fleet. So it really doesn’t affect BRAC-related issues that—— 

Mr. GRIFFIN. So we will have no A–10s left at all? 

Secretary DONLEY. No. The Air Force will still have about 248 A– 

10s in the inventory. But we have made a decision at a corporate 

and strategic level that we could take additional risk in the fighter 

force structure. And that inside the fighter force structure, the best 

place to take that was probably in the size of the A–10 fleet. So 

that was the basis for the decision. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Right, but—— 

Secretary DONLEY. And I think in this case, as has been applied 

in other locations where it was feasible—we have a mission to 

backfill at this location with an RPA [remotely piloted aircraft]—— 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Right—with the unmanned. 

Secretary DONLEY. Right. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. But you said they are completely retired. But then 

you said, ‘‘But we are keeping A–10s.’’ 

I think the question here is if you are going to keep them anywhere—BRAC indicated that this was a type of place you would 

want to keep them. But if you—I have only got like 50 seconds, but 

if you have anything else to add on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Again, sir, one of the imperatives for us was 

to try to retain a flying mission in each State; a Guard mission. 

And in this case, of course, there is a substantial presence in the 

Little Rock area, with the National Guard. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Sure. Sure. 

Let me move on to the next question. This is regarding AMP 

[Avionics Modernization Program] vs. AMP light—some call it AMP 

light. I met with the pilots out at the Little Rock Air Force Base 

last week. 

Can you talk about—when you were comparing AMP to what 

some have called AMP light, were you considering the cost of supporting that navigator position for the AMP light, which you 

wouldn’t have to do with the AMP? If you could—I don’t if the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. If you will answer for the record? 

And we are going to—we will have a briefing on—classified briefing on that. 
47 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to thank both the Secretary and the General 

for your service, and for being here today. When we have less than 

20 percent to 22 percent of the people serving as Members of Congress with any previous military experiences, it is always great to 

hear from those who have served and are serving, and representing 

hundreds of thousands of our men and women in uniform—to be 

able to come share your experience, your insight, and expertise 

with us. 

It is definitely a tough time for our military, and it is pretty 

tough for you all having to propose and make these tough forcestructure decisions. I definitely don’t envy you. But at the same 

time we have a lot of questions, you know, the C–130J and the C– 

27J, we have talked about it. So, Mr. Secretary, thank you for 

briefing the Mississippi delegation on those two projects. And we 

are going to be talking about it probably for a long time as we 

move ahead. 

So my first question really involves the C–130J. And if you don’t 

mind, I will read my question. I do want to know how the decisions 

were made to move the airplanes within the Air Force. 

My staff and I have been looking at this for quite some time now, 

and still fail to see any military benefit or cost benefit to some of 

these moves. In fact, some of the numbers we are looking at seem 

like it is going to cost into the millions in new construction, training and other incidentals and collateral costs just to move these 

aircraft a couple hundred miles from their current location. 

Can you tell me what kinds of calculations were used when making these decisions? And were some of these—that would be my 

first question—the calculations used in making these decisions. 

General SCHWARTZ. It had to do with what demands were there 

for both Federal and State missions. It had to do with what backfill 

opportunities did we have, even as we were getting smaller. And 

it had to do with the ability of the local community to recruit and 

provide the expertise for a new mission, if that was, in fact, going 

to materialize. And so those are three of the thought processes involved in deciding, again, how to allocate scarcity; how to allocate 

the reduction of 286 aircraft in total, and so on. 

Secretary DONLEY. I would just add that it is complex work to 

do this across 50 States. And we have been working with and supportive of the Air Guard as General Wyatt and his staff work 

through these issues on how best to balance capabilities across the 

50 States in these different disciplines—C–130s, ISR capabilities, 

et cetera. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Right. 

I mean I have four pages of reasons why we think the C–130J 

should stay where they are at, and why it is possibly a bad decision 

to move them, again, just a couple of hundred miles—infrastructure improvements; the amount of money that this congress or 

prior congresses in the administrations have invested in Keesler for 

the C–130Js, especially post-Katrina—brand new hangars, the 

wreckers, the accomplishments, the squadrons just received from 

completing missions in Afghanistan, and so forth and so on. 
48 

The fact that we have great training areas—very, very limited 

interference from civilian population. We have, you know, Camp 

Shelby to the North, Stennis Space Center to the West—just hundred—and then, of course, we have the entire expense of the Gulf 

of Mexico as un-encroached training areas for the Air Force. And 

so I mean, I do have some valid concerns. 

I guess if we continue to propose these, what is the next step? 

I mean if we can—I mean, in concrete? It is done? It has been 

penned in blood? This is a covenant going forward? Can we have 

an opportunity to explain as we are here today that can possibly 

change your mind that this is not in the best interest of our national security or our force structure? 

Secretary DONLEY. Well, the force structure proposals we made 

are part of the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget—many moving 

parts. And, you know, we are happy to answer questions and support, you know, further discussion. But it is really up to Congress 

now to—— 

Mr. PALAZZO. I am out of time. Thank you very much. 

Secretary DONLEY [continuing]. Take the next steps. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I want to thank 

you for being here. And more importantly, as a Member of Congress, I want to thank you for standing up for the Air Force. 

When the Secretary of the Army and their respective commanders were here, I didn’t really get the sense that they were 

standing up for their divisions. 

And talking about—using the terms, if you will, that you have 

used—you know, we have talked about—you have talked about additional risk that comes from the force structure changes. 

And, General, you used the word ‘‘indiscriminant salami-slicing.’’ 

I think that is an accurate word for what has been done to the 

military. And, quite honestly, it leaves Americans at risk. 

And as a Member of Congress, what we need is the two of you 

and your colleagues standing up and saying that, you know, it is 

not just the magnitude of the cuts, it is the pace of the cuts and 

it is the mandate of how the cuts are done that is putting the security of Americans at risk. 

So I hope you will continue that. We have to undo the sequestration. I am interested in your suggestions with regard to that. 

In dealing with the force structure changes that you have proposed to us—as you know, I represent Robins Air Force Base. And 

obviously, the depots are extremely important to us. And I would 

like, if you will, just speak to the potential loss of a qualified workforce and how much greater that loss may be because of the pace 

at which the cuts have to be made. 

Secretary DONLEY. Well, certainly, sir, we value all three depots. 

And our intent is to move forward with the three-depot strategy. 

We think it would be very costly and a complex operation to consider changing that. And I think there would be a penalty paid in 

trying to move or recreate the workforces that have built up 

around these three depots. 
49 

I would offer that the workload at these locations does ebb and 

flow. And this is what our working capital fund is intended to address. So employment does not always stay level; it goes up and 

down with the aircraft that are being inducted and worked on and 

then depart. So the workload issues will continue with us going forward, but our intent is to stick with the three-depot approach. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you so much. 

You have got a wonderful gentleman in Warner Robins right 

now, and General McMahon, that is going to be retiring. And he 

has done an excellent job of maximizing the performance of that 

base; a lot of great men and women out there supporting the 

warfighter. 

But we also have the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System] unit there. Certainly, there is the ability to expand their intelligence capabilities. I hope that is something that 

you will continue to pursue. 

And gentlemen, I want to help you solve this problem. I want 

suggestions on how we are going to do the sequestration and find 

a better national security for Americans. 

With that, Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining balance of my 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Platts. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz, certainly I want to 

echo my colleagues in expressing our gratitude for both of your 

great service to our nation and the important work that you are 

doing, and the challenges with the budget restraints that you are 

working under. 

Before I ask or comment specifically on a force structure issue, 

Mr. Secretary, could you kind of give me an update? I have had a 

lot of inquiries in my district, as I know Members across the country have, about the Dover mortuary issue and with the most recent 

report. And I apologize. I am in a markup in another hearing. If 

this was asked earlier, I apologize—but with the Special Counsel’s 

findings and the report being issued, and the repercussions that 

were suffered by those who sought to do the right thing, where we 

stand and both from a disciplinary standpoint and going forward 

in the best way possible? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I will just give you a quick overview. 

General Abizaid completed his work this week; briefed that out to 

the Secretary of Defense. The chief and I were there yesterday. 

And we will have some more to say about that today. But we do 

support the results of the Abizaid panel and are embracing their 

recommendations. And we intend to move out on those. I will speak 

to those later. 

Mr. PLATTS. Okay. 

Secretary DONLEY. We did receive, at the end of January, a report from the Office of Special Counsel concerning reprisals against 

the whistle blowers in the original—during the original investigation of this. And the OSC [Office of Special Counsel] report concluded that, indeed, reprisals had taken place and this raised a 

new requirement for us to consider the need for additional disciplinary action against those involved in that work. And I assigned 
50 

that to a two-star general who has undertaken that work. And I 

expect him to report out in sort of mid-March—around the 19th of 

March is what we are forecasting at this point. 

Mr. PLATTS. I appreciate those continued efforts in this issue and 

the importance of—that we properly honor the fallen, and properly 

hold accountable those who sought to punish those who are doing 

the right thing. 

I am the—have been, for 8 years, working on strengthening our 

whistleblower-protection laws so that Federal employees who see 

wrong can come forward and know they are not going to be punished for doing the right thing as, unfortunately, happened in this 

case. So staying focused on that is, I think, very important. 

A follow up on that issue—and I know there is, I guess, not great 

certainty about the partial remains that were then incinerated in 

landfills of some of our fallen heroes—is there any consideration— 

and this is a specific question from one of my constituents—a veteran himself who lost a brother in combat years back—not related 

to this current situation, but where the legs of the fallen were not 

recovered with the body and buried appropriately. 

His question was, ‘‘If we know that a lot of these remains were 

landfilled, is there any current review of how to properly honor 

those remains with a memorial marker or something, because we 

have the remains of fallen that apparently are in a landfill, not 

properly acknowledged? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I am not sure it is possible for the Department of Defense to go back and reconstruct the history for 

every single case prior—where this practice was in place. Certainly 

we are in a better place today. And certainly we apologize for any 

additional grief or concern caused to the families as a result of this 

prior practice. It changed in 2008. 

And the Abizaid panel actually has additional ideas for us to consider going forward that we might consider for how best to honor 

the disassociated remains of the fallen that are subsequently— 

come in after the remains are processed through Dover. 

So we will continue to work this issue going forward and make 

sure that we honor our fallen and treat them with the respect that 

they deserve. 

Mr. PLATTS. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. 

And any way that we are able to honor the fallen that we do so 

especially going forward, but even if there is a way in retrospect. 

And just a final comment—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We are into the vote. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Roby. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as you can see, there 

are several of us that have been running back and forth. So I 

apologize for my absence. 

But I do appreciate General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, you 

being here today. And all of my concerns today, although there are 

many concerns—but if I could focus in a little bit on the Air National Guard and the decisionmaking process—I know you touched 

on some—the C–130s. But I really would like an opportunity, 
51 

mainly for the benefit of those back in Alabama, for you to expand 

upon the Air National Guard’s ability. 

I know that the Air Force has said that they were a full partner 

in these cuts, but could you just kind of paint a picture for what 

that looked like? Did they have a vote? To what extent was their 

input taken? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would describe it as—and again, you know, 

the two gentlemen behind us certainly were there throughout. And 

their voices were heard. They were not timid. 

You know, discussions unfolded and we debated. And ultimately, 

the Secretary decides. I mean that is the way it unfolds. As I have 

suggested in another forum—I mean it is not to say that everyone 

agrees with the outcome necessarily. But it is also incorrect to contend that their interests were not represented. That is not the case. 

Mrs. ROBY. That is the message that we want to make sure we 

get back to home, Secretary. 

Secretary DONLEY. Just an additional point—and I think the 

chief and General Stenner and General Wyatt articulated that view 

jointly together. 

And as we went through the decision process—you are aware of 

the mitigating efforts that we made to remission units, even moving some capability from the Active to the Reserve Components. 

And the Guard and Reserve helped work through all those decisions about what units and where, and how to make the adjustments. 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. 

So the Air Force justified the reduction for the Air National 

Guard. Is that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past when 

the Air National Guard has grown. And if you could, just talk 

about that. Is that true? 

Secretary DONLEY. It is part of the context, but that wasn’t the 

motivation. 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. 

Secretary DONLEY. It wasn’t the case of what is their turn; not 

at all. What this really was, was a recognition that we had a new 

strategy in force-sizing construct first and a recognition that the 

Air Force as a whole was getting to a size where we had to have 

access in utility out of every asset. 

Mrs. ROBY. Right. 

Secretary DONLEY. And that suggested, again, having that utility 

in a way, though, that wouldn’t destroy the fabric of the units either on the Active Duty side with expected tempo for full time, or 

on the Guard and Reserve side where there is a lesser expectation 

of personal availability because of structure of those organizations. 

And so the bottom line is that we worried about tempo and making sure that the mix would accommodate both the surge and the 

rotational requirements that we foresee in the future. And again, 

exactly how we did that, others might differ, but you have the proposal before you. 

Secretary DONLEY. And as we go forward, the Air National 

Guard, with our support, is going forward with a multiyear effort 

to increase the readiness of the Guard. 

We are all going to have to be focused on that going forward together, as we get smaller. So readiness is more important. The 
52 

Guard is working on that. And we support them in that effort. And 

we are increasing the number of associations between the Active 

and the Reserve Components from 100 to 115, with maybe more 

coming. 

So this reflects a closer integration of effort to get the most combat capability out of all of our units going forward. 

Mrs. ROBY. Well, thank very so much. I have other question and 

I will submit them to the record because my time is about to expire. 

But thank you so much. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The lady yields back. Thank you very much. 

Thank you General, Secretary, for being here today; for all the 

work that you have done to get to this point in the process. You 

can see with all the questions there is lots of angst over these cuts. 

And I think only one or two mentions of sequestration, which will 

be that much worse on top of it. 

So that is something that I think we really need to address and 

focus on. And we will be doing that. 

We have started the vote. 

Thank you all. 

With that, we will conclude our hearing here today. 

[Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

(57) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force 

February 28, 2012 

The Air Force has been engaged in combat operations supporting 

the joint forces for the past 20 years, beginning with the Gulf War 

in 1991 and continuing thereafter, through enforcement of the Iraq 

no-fly zones, combat operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the related logistics support missions, and worldwide humanitarian support missions. And of course the Air Force has continued 

the 24/7, 365-day-a-year nuclear-deterrence mission. 

Everyone should fully understand that our vital interests have 

not changed since last year. The threats to those interests have not 

decreased and are not likely to diminish over the next 5 years. 

What has changed is that the President directed at least $400 billion in cuts to our military, which were reflected in the Budget 

Control Act. 

Despite the suggestion by some that the strategy evolved independent of the President’s fiscal guidance, each of the military 

services is making force structure and equipment modernization 

recommendations to Congress based purely on the budget and not 

based on the world security environment. 

For example, there are 54 aircraft in the budget request. If procurement continues at this rate, and assuming an aircraft lifespan 

of 25 years, the resulting force structure is 1350 aircraft, one quarter the size of the current force. I do not believe 1350 total Air 

Force aircraft—bombers, fighters, airlift, search and rescue, rotorcraft, and trainers—is in the national security interests of this 

country. And this is without the potential of sequestration. Furthermore, the budget request does little to mitigate the consequences of aging force structure, resulting from the ‘‘procurement 

holiday’’ of the 1990s. Operation and Maintenance accounts are not 

increasing to sustain and extend these aging platforms. 

Other budget-driven choices include the requested increase in 

TRICARE fees for retirees. Congress addressed this issue at length 

last year and enacted what I consider a reasonable approach for 

managing costs. The Department’s proposal would increase the fees 

by 96 percent to 345 percent over a 5-year period which, in my 

opinion, is unreasonable. 

With that said, I am pleased to see that priorities for strategic 

airlift, a new bomber and an airborne tanker have been preserved. 
58 

As well, the Air Force has deliberately elected to ensure the percentage of the Air Force’s combat and mobility forces that are Active Duty will increase after the implementation of the force structure changes. This is appropriate from a risk perspective. But I believe it is important for the Air Force leadership to continue its 

public discussion to better ensure that Guard and Reserve personnel fully accept that they have received and will receive equitable and fair treatment in this transition process. 
59 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force 

February 28, 2012 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I want 

to also thank the witnesses, Secretary of the Air Force, Michael 

Donley, and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, for 

appearing here today and for their dedicated service to our country. 

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed 

focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, which will 

likely result in an enhanced role for the Air Force in our national 

defense. 

Over the last 10 years, the Air Force has contributed greatly to 

the recently concluded war in Iraq and the ongoing war in Afghanistan. The contributions of Air Force personnel who have provided 

air support, transport, reconnaissance, and other key functions 

have been invaluable. Going forward, under the new strategic guidance, the Air Force will continue to carry out those missions, although the relative balance between and the geographic area of 

focus may change. The budget put forth 2 weeks ago will enable 

the Air Force to continue to be the greatest air power in the world. 

I have consistently said that we can rationally evaluate our national security strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current 

set of missions we ask the military to undertake and come up with 

a strategy that enhances national security by spending taxpayer 

dollars more wisely and effectively. I believe this budget supports 

that goal as well. 

Overall, the defense budget is also fully consistent with the funding levels set by the Budget Control Act passed by Congress. Although I did not support this act, many members of the House 

Armed Services Committee did, Congress passed it, and the Department of Defense has submitted a budget that complies with the 

congressionally mandated funding levels. 

Over the last few years, with the strong support of the Air Force, 

our military has put together a significant string of foreign policy 

successes, including the death of bin Laden, Anwar Al-Awlaki, the 

elimination of much of Al Qaeda’s leadership, the end of the war 

in Iraq, and supporting the uprising in Libya. The budget lays out 

a strategy that will enable the United States to build on those successes and confront the threats of today as well as in the future. 

I want to thank the witnesses again and I look forward to hearing their testimony. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

(95) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Secretary DONLEY. Based on the December 2011 F–35 Selected Acquisition Report 

(SAR) to Congress, the unit recurring flyaway cost numbers for the aircraft we are 

procuring in FY13 are: $123.2 million for the F–35A conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant; $155.0 million for the F–35B short take-off and vertical landing 

(STOVL) variant; and $131.7 million for the F–35C carrier (CV) variant. These unit 

cost numbers account for the ‘‘must fix’’ concurrency changes (captured in the engineering change order line) but do not account for block upgrades. [See page 12.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

(99) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. I am pleased to see the Department has continued funding in FY 

13 for the T–X Advanced Jet Trainer Replacement Program. Replacing the aging T– 

38s with a new trainer suitable to train pilots for 4th and 5th generation fighters 

such as F–22 and F–35 is critical to readiness. The contract award for this program 

slipped a year in the budget from FY 15 to FY 16. Is replacement of the current 

Air Force trainer an important component of USAF readiness and training? Is the 

Air Force committed to moving forward with the T–X program with procurement 

funding in FY 16? 

General SCHWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. What is the Air Force’s plan in the FY13–17 FYDP to address the 

aging 707 and C–135 fleet of C2ISR aircraft? Given the historical precedent that acquisition programs take many years and that the E–8 JSTARS may only continue 

operations until about 2025, is there a plan to start to address this issue? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force continues to sustain/modernize the 707 and C– 

135 fleet of C2ISR aircraft. All platforms are considered viable through the 2035– 

2040 timeframe. Airborne Warning and Control system (AWACS) Prime Mission 

Equipment Diminishing Manufacturing Source (DMS) and Avionics DMS cockpit 

issues are being addressed through the Block 40/45 and DRAGON programs. The 

upgrades will ensure AWACS remains compliant with military, civil, and international flight certifications and flight safety standards. 

Air Combat Command’s recently completed Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/ 

Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and Joint STARS Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) evaluated materiel solutions to fulfill future overall SAR/MTI requirements. JSTARS Prime Mission Equipment DMS and Avionics DMS cockpit 

issues will be addressed based on the approved way-ahead of the AoA. Based on the 

data from the E–8C Fleet Viability Board the E–8C is viable until 2035. 

Mr. SMITH. How does the Air Force plan to provide continued support to the Army 

in SAR/GMTI/DMTI mission area? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to providing continued support to 

the Army to fulfill the ever growing demand for SAR/GMTI/DMTI data. The Air 

Force continues to sustain and modernize, as required, the E–8C Joint Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), fielding Global Hawk Block 40 with MultiPlatform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP–RTIP) with Initial Operational 

Capability 4th quarter FY14, and fielding Dismount Detection Radar (DDR) on the 

MQ–9 in late FY14 to early FY15. 

Mr. SMITH. Assuming the retirement of the E–8 JSTARS in 2025, what is the Air 

Force doing to ensure that future ground surveillance radar capability will be available to the ground forces and intelligence community after that date? 

General SCHWARTZ. Based on the data from the E–8C Fleet Viability Board the 

E–8C is viable until 2035. The Air Force continues to sustain the E–8C with necessary Prime Mission Equipment Diminishing Manufacturing Source (DMS) and 

Avionics DMS cockpit upgrades work to ensure the E–8C remains compliant with 

military, civil, and international flight certifications and flight safety standards. Air 

Combat Command’s recently completed Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/Moving 

Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) evaluated materiel solutions to fulfill 

future overall SAR/MTI requirements. 

Mr. SMITH. As part of the ongoing analysis of alternatives, has the Air Force done 

a complete cost analysis of all of its alternatives? When will Congress see the result 

of this analysis? 

General SCHWARTZ. Air Combat Command presented the final results of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council 

(AFROC) for validation on 30 November 2011. Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

approved the AoA’s release on 25 Jan 12 to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). OSD/CAPE is currently 
100 

reviewing the final report for sufficiency. A complete cost analysis was accomplished 

on the 10 AFROC validated alternatives during the AoA. 

Air Force senior leadership has not made a decision on when the data will be released. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE 

Mr. MCINTYRE. The fiscal year 2012 NDAA requires the Air Force to maintain a 

combat-coded B–1 fleet of 36 aircraft during fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Does the 

budget request for FY 2013 include funding to comply with this legislative directive? 

General SCHWARTZ. The fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) requires the Air Force to maintain not less than 36 B–1 aircraft as combatcoded in a common capability configuration. The Air Force will comply with this requirement by performing the necessary maintenance actions to keep a minimum of 

36 combat-coded aircraft flyable and mission capable at their respective Main Operating Bases. However, since the FY12 NDAA did not provide additional funding for 

the continued operation of the three combat-coded aircraft planned for retirement, 

the Air Force prioritized the programmed reinvestment of the expected savings in 

both the B–1 program and other department priorities over the restoral of Operation 

& Maintenance funding for flying hours in the FY13 President’s Budget request. To 

this end, three combat-coded aircraft will be withheld from daily operations until 

their planned retirement dates as permitted by the FY12 NDAA, but these aircraft 

will remain available to support Combatant Commander requirements during the 

phased retirement period. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. With the decision to delay procurement of 179 F–35s in the FYDP, 

what steps is the Air Force taking to prevent fighter inventory shortfalls in the midto long-term? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is modernizing and extending F–16 Block 40– 

52 service life via the Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite (CAPES) and 

Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP). The programs are planned for 350 aircraft, 

yet still only programmed for 300 within the Future Years Defense Plan. Both programs are scalable and able to grow to 650 aircraft if needed. Additionally, the Air 

Force continues to modernize F–15 C/D/Es with system upgrades to include Active 

Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS), Eagle Passive Attack Sensor System (EPASS), Infrared 

Search and Track (IRST), Advanced Display Core Processor (ADCP) –II, and Beyond 

Line of Sight (BLOS) radios. Additionally, F–22A modernization remains on track 

and includes Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) mapping, Small Diameter Bomb 

(SDB), Electronic Protection, Combat ID, AIM–9X, AIM–120D, Link-16 upgrades, 

and Geo-location capability. Finally, the Air Force remains committed to the F–35 

and procurement of 1,763 Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) variants. The 

decision to delay procurement was an effort to minimize concurrency costs and 

maximize combat capability when the aircraft moves into full rate production in 

2019. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. The committee has been informed that the recent F–22 scientific 

advisory board did not determine a root cause of the recent hypoxia incidents. What 

action is the Air Force taking to address the risk of future hypoxia events with the 

F–22? 

General SCHWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. MCINTYRE. The Navy has a plan to continue low-rate production of the D5 

ballistic missile to keep the industrial base healthy. The Air Force does not appear 

to have a similar program for the Minuteman III ICBMs. Why not? What are the 

risks to the ICBM industrial base? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force recognizes the importance of maintaining the 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) industrial base and has programs in place 

to ensure the Minuteman III remains viable through 2030 and to support any follow-on ground based strategic deterrent system. The research and development portion of the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) industrial base, exercised as part of ICBM 

Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), matures SRM technologies for insertion into any future propulsion modernization program. The Air Force PAP program exercises design and systems engineering skills 

critical to maintaining a healthy SRM industrial base. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Just last year the Global Hawk Block 30 program was certified 

as ‘‘essential’’ to national security, yet the FY 2013 budget request proposes 

mothballing all of the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft. How can you explain such a 

dramatic change in the Air Force’s position on this program? 

General SCHWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
101 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. I am pleased to see the Department has continued funding in FY 

13 for the T–X Advanced Jet Trainer Replacement Program. Replacing the aging T– 

38s with a new trainer suitable to train pilots for 4th and 5th generation fighters 

such as F–22 and F–35 is critical to readiness. The contract award for this program 

slipped a year in the budget from FY 13 to FY 14. Is replacement of the current 

Air Force trainer an important component of USAF readiness and training? Is the 

Air Force committed to moving forward with the T–X program with procurement 

funding in FY 14? 

Secretary DONLEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Submitted on behalf of Congresswoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers: In 

the FY13 proposed budget, the Air Force is proposing to purchase only 54 aircraft. 

How is the Air Force planning to recapitalize its aging fleet? 

Secretary DONLEY. While the Air Force continues to advocate for strong investment in recapitalizing our aging fleet, modernizing the Air Force during a period 

of budget decline is a significant challenge. In order to address this challenge, we 

are slowing the pace and scope of modernization while protecting programs critical 

to future warfighter needs. Focused investment in high priority programs such as 

the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, Long Range Strike Bomber, and KC–46A refueling 

tanker is critical to the Department’s overall strategy. Simultaneously, investment 

in service life extensions for legacy aircraft is necessary to sustain the capacity necessary to meet the new Defense Strategic Guidance. The Air Force objective is to 

mitigate risk by addressing recapitalization concerns as aggressively as possible 

within fiscal constraints, while ensuring our existing force structure remains ready, 

capable, and relevant in the near-term. As budget pressures ease in future years, 

the Air Force will be postured to resume a more expansive recapitalization effort. 

Mr. FORBES. Submitted on behalf of Congresswoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers: 

Funding for the KC–46A Refueling Tanker is largely preserved in the FY2013 Budget. Should sequestration go into effect this year, will the KC–46A tanker remain an 

Air Force priority? What would be the effect of sequestration upon the KC–46A 

tanker program? 

Secretary DONLEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. What is the Air Force’s definition of a ‘‘Center,’’ as the term is used 

by Air Force Materiel Command to describe commands such as the Electronic Systems Center, the Air Armament Center, and the Flight Test Center? What functions 

must be present for a location to be designated a ‘‘Center’’? Is strategic planning 

an essential part of a Center? 

Secretary DONLEY. Within the Air Force, a ‘‘Center’’ is a named unit that performs a specialized mission. A primary characteristic of a Center is that it performs 

most of its mission within a large complex at one location and usually has only a 

few subordinate units. There are a number of centers across the Air Force. Other 

commands outside of Air Force Materiel Command use the term ‘‘Center’’ such as 

the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center which is a Direct Reporting 

Unit to Headquarters United States Air Force. Aside from the characteristics mentioned above, there are no standard functions that must be present for an organization to be designated a ‘‘Center’’. Additionally, since a ‘‘Center’’ is a unit that may 

have functions at multiple locations, it is the organization (and not the location) 

that is designated a ‘‘Center.’’ Strategic planning is not a mandated ‘‘Center’’ function, but by the nature of their functions, most ‘‘Centers’’ do support strategic planning, either at the Major Command or Headquarters Air Force level. 

Mr. MILLER. What is the Air Force’s definition of a ‘‘Center,’’ as the term is used 

by Air Force Materiel Command to describe commands such as the Electronic Systems Center, the Air Armament Center, and the Flight Test Center? What functions 

must be present for a location to be designated a ‘‘Center’’? Is strategic planning 

an essential part of a Center? 

General SCHWARTZ. Within the Air Force, a ‘‘Center’’ is a named unit that performs a specialized mission. A primary characteristic of a Center is that it performs 

most of its mission within a large complex at one location and usually has only a 

few subordinate units. There are a number of centers across the Air Force. Other 

commands outside of Air Force Materiel Command use the term ‘‘Center’’ such as 

the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center which is a Direct Reporting 

Unit to Headquarters United States Air Force. Aside from the characteristics mentioned above, there are no standard functions that must be present for an organiza-
102 

tion to be designated a ‘‘Center’’. Additionally, since a ‘‘Center’’ is a unit that may 

have functions at multiple locations, it is the organization (and not the location) 

that is designated a ‘‘Center.’’ Strategic planning is not a mandated ‘‘Center’’ function, but by the nature of their functions, most ‘‘Centers’’ do support strategic planning, either at the Major Command or Headquarters Air Force level. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary Donley, what progress has the Air Force made in evaluating threats to our bases that rely on civilian power sources, and how has the Air 

Force strengthened its plans for alternative energy sources? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force’s dependency on the commercial power grid represents a critical asymmetric vulnerability that must be mitigated through partnerships with industry, state and local governments. The Air Force conducts Critical 

Asset Risk Assessments (CARAs) to identify key critical assets and supporting infrastructure. Identification of critical assets focuses within installation boundaries, and 

extends to the first critical infrastructure nodes outside perimeters. The Air Force 

has identified over 900 critical assets, and 62 of those are Tier 1 assets, where loss 

or degradation of energy would impact strategic-level missions. Of the 62 Tier 1 assets, 22 of them are Defense Critical Assets (DCA); the loss of a DCA would result 

in mission failure for the entire Department of Defense (DOD) capability. 

To date, the Air Force has completed 30 CARAs (12 in FY11). In FY12, there are 

nine CARAs scheduled. The Air Force expects to complete CARAs for all Tier 1 assets by the end of FY13. Eight CARAs have been conducted on DCAs and two more 

are scheduled for FY12. The Air Force is also a member of the DOD’s Energy Grid 

Security Executive Council, which exists to discuss grid concerns across the Services. 

The Air Force uses the CARA report as a starting point to work with the owning 

organizations to develop risk response plan that identifies discrete courses of action 

to address identified risks. CARA reports are provided to Commanders, Major Commands (MAJCOM), Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Secutity Affairs 

(ASD(HD&ASA)), Headquarters Air Force functional stakeholders, and the Air 

Force Directorate for Air Operations, to inform Commanders’ decisions on how to 

apply limited resources, and provide visibility to asset owners and mission owners 

of those issues affecting their roles and responsibilities. Decisions on responses to 

identified risks can be made at various levels of the organization. Such decisions 

may be to remediate, mitigate, or following a comprehensive review by leadership 

and evaluation within the corporate process, to accept risk. 

The Air Force also prepares Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM) Plans for 

a select subgroup of critical assets. Of the 17 course of action (COA) recommendations developed thus far in the seven CARM Plans submitted to ASD(HD&ASA), 3 

have been funded at a total Operations and Maintenance cost of $250,000, and the 

corresponding vulnerability to the respective critical assets remediated. Remediation 

is currently in progress for two additional COAs, at a total cost of $6.65 million. 

COA examples include installing power generators to provide electricity to a critical asset in the event of a power failure or developing a continuity of operations 

plan. Projects addressing risks identified in CARA reports can receive higher 

weighting factors during Air Force budgeting process. Additionally, a further six 

CARM Plans are currently in development. 

The ability of the Air Force to ensure continuity of operations is dependent upon 

not only the delivery of reliable and uninterrupted energy supplies in the necessary 

quantities, but also on the adaptability of mission platforms to operate on diversified 

energy sources, such as biofuels or synthetic fuels. To assure its energy supply, the 

Air Force has two very ambitious goals in place—to certify aircraft to use alternative aviation fuels and to develop on-base source of renewable energy. The Air 

Force is certifying its fleet on several alternative aviation fuels to ensure our aircraft could fly on commercially available fuels by 2016. Those alternative fuels will 

need to be drop-in fuels that are cost competitive with traditional petroleum-based 

jet fuels, and meet our environmental and technical specifications. For the second 

goal, the Air Force is focused on developing on-site sources of renewable energy, particularly those sources that can insulate the Air Force from grid failure or other 

supply disruptions, and plans to achieve 1,000 megawatts of on-site capacity by 

2016. This will largely be accomplished through third-party investments and at 

those installations where renewable energy is mission compatible. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I continue to be concerned about the overall strength and size of 

the nation’s cybersecurity workforce. What is the Air Force doing to recruit and 
103 

train airmen with cyberskill and what is it doing to encourage them to stay in uniform? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force, in order to improve the identification of future 

enlisted and officer cyberspace operators during the recruitment process, partnered 

with Navy and the Army in the development of a cyber test that could be used as 

a supplement to the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. At this time, the 

test has been used at selected military entrance processing stations as part of a pilot 

program to test enlisted recruits’ cyberspace aptitude. However, the results have not 

yet been used in the selection of a recruit’s Air Force Specialty Code. Additional 

work needs to be completed to ensure test results identify cyberspace aptitude 

versus simply identifying current skill level and knowledge. The United States Air 

Force Academy and Air Force Reserve Officer Program have also created three 

cyberspace emphasis pre-accessions programs for officers. These programs have an 

annual throughput of 330 future cyberspace officers. Additionally, over the last two 

years, the Air Force has implemented 10 separate training programs that have an 

annual throughput of over 2,600 cyberspace operators. Finally, in regards to the retention of our cyberspace enlisted career fields, as of October 2011, 5 Air Force Specialty Codes have varying levels of retention bonuses, which are used to encourage 

re-enlistment. Currently, no incentive programs are used to retain the officer and 

civilian cyberspace populations. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Schwartz, I recently visited 24th Air Force at Lackland 

Air Force Base and was very impressed with its operations. We have clearly made 

great strides in our ability to impact the cyber domain, but as I am sure you agree, 

we must continue to innovate and transform in order to maintain and expand that 

ability. In your view, what must the Air Force do next in order to ensure the ability 

of its networks to support Full Spectrum Operations? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force contributes to the Joint force by developing, integrating, and operating cyberspace capabilities in three mission areas: support, defense, and offense. Future capabilities will enable effects across the full spectrum 

of operations. 

 The Air Force Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master Plan specifies nine 

capabilities that require programmatic actions to evolve the force from its current capability state: Passive Defense, Defensive Counter Cyberspace, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance & Situational Awareness, Persistent 

Network Operations, Data Confidentiality & Integrity Systems, Cyberspace Air 

Operations Center, Offensive Counter Cyberspace for Global Reach and Access, 

Contingency Extension, and Influence Operations. 

 A shift in mindsets from support to operations will foster greater concentration 

of effort. Air Force members will understand their contributions to the joint 

fight. The shift in mindset will engender greater operational integration across 

all warfighting domains. 

 Attaining the Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master Plan’s specified capabilities and shifting from a support to operational mindset sets the conditions 

for attaining partnership capabilities. Partnerships with other governmental 

agencies, industry, allies, and partners, will enhance mission effectiveness. The 

ability to integrate and leverage partnerships will underpin force projection in 

all domains. The Air Force will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively and enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical cyber capabilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The President established a modernization plan in the 1251 plan 

and the 2010 NPR. The FY13 budget, after the New START treaty was ratified, is 

backing off those plans. Let me review the list, the B61 gravity bomb is 2 years delayed; the associated tail kit is late, and we understand that certain high-accuracy 

options are not being looked at; the W78 warhead is being pushed back, and certain 

modernization options have been arbitrarily taken off the table; the new bomber, 

won’t be nuclear-certified at the outset, and new cruise missile are late by at least 

2 years; and the plan for the modernization of the Minute Man III appears to be 

lacking commitment. Further we hear all of these programs are dependent on the 

President’s review—the so-called mini-NPR—about which this Committee has been 

completely shut out by the White House. 

1) Can you assure us that the Air Force has an iron-clad, no-caveat, commitment 

to field a new ICBM, to field a new nuclear-capable bomber and cruise missile? Will 

this commitment change as a result of the Administration’s mini-NPR? 
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2) Why would the plan to implement the New START treaty, which was ratified 

in 2010, depend on the President’s mini-NPR which is being conducted in complete 

secrecy from the Congress? 

3) Secretary Panetta promised to assist this committee in oversight of the nuclear 

war plan, in fact promising read-ins last December, but nothing has happened since 

then. What accesses do you have to the so-called 8010 plan? How many Air Force 

personnel have access to that plan? Tens? Hundreds? More? 

a. Does it surprise you that the Department is denying any access to that plan 

to the Congress? Understand that we’re told that the Administration may be considering 80% reductions in the nuclear force, and no one in Congress has been allowed 

to see the plan. 

Secretary DONLEY. The President’s fiscal year 2013 (FY13) Budget reflects the Air 

Force’s continued commitment to invest in the enduring and compelling attributes 

the Nation needs for a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force. The Air 

Force fully funded and is conducting the materiel solution analysis to identify the 

options for both a follow-on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system and a cruise 

missile to follow the Air Launch Cruise Missile. Reports are expected to be completed in FY14. A nuclear-capable Long Range Strike Bomber is also funded in the 

Presidents FY13 budget. The Administration’s post-Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 

analysis has not altered these commitments. 

Air Force plans to implement New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are 

not dependent on current Post-NPR analysis efforts underway. As stated in the 

2010 NPR, the Administration is conducting follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the levels in New START. Although a final New 

START force structure decision has not been made, the Air Force has fully funded 

NST implementation actions to achieve the baseline force structure as outlined in 

the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1251 Report: 240 deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles on 14 strategic nuclear submarines, up to 420 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and up to 60 deployed nuclear-capable 

heavy bombers. 

As a Service component to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) responsible for providing assets and capabilities required for execution, several echelons of the Air Force have access to Operational Plan 8010. Since this is a 

USSTRATCOM plan, the Air Force defers to USSTRATCOM and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense regarding your concerns in this question. 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to strengthen 

our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and use of remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where these systems can be freely tested. With the military 

operations overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate remotely 

piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). Working with the 

FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading the charge 

within the Air Force in developing the future technology for the safe operation of 

RPAs in the national airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps 

are needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research capabilities of 

AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and 

NASA as a goal to shorten the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is working both airborne (long term) and ground 

based (near term) sense and avoid programs to integrate remotely piloted aircraft 

(RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). We have been working technology 

development in this area for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to 

acquisition over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to complete our 

ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and complete certification 

of the system approximately 18 months later. Once certification is complete, this 

system will enable more routine access to portions of the NAS and enhance our 

readiness. Equally important, we are developing the required Department of Defense certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA’s) Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

airspace integration and test site mandate in both the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and Modernization Act is a significant step forward to both expand technology and establish performance standards needed for full 

RPA integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further serve 

to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally. The Air Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Air Force 
105 

Research Laboratory is vital to effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA 

integration into the National Airspace System. 

Mr. TURNER. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the primary postsecondary education institution for the Air Force and it has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget 

environment, I am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in 

the future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of short-term 

needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains committed to offering future 

leaders the kind of advanced technical degrees that AFIT provides? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced 

technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). 

Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper 

educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental 

equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers 

with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve 

this objective. 

AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the 

critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the 

students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the 

DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible 

to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain 

maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT. 

Mr. TURNER. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act included an 

amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 

to enroll up to 125 civilians on a space-available basis. This is similar to authority 

granted other defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this 

new policy will be implemented and have been told ‘‘soon.’’ We are now working on 

the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate implementing the provision and what is causing the delay? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Title 10 language clearly requires permission by Secretary 

of the Air Force to admit defense industry employees as students. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed the strategy and policy needed to manage this new student base and has coordinated the draft language with senior Air 

Force leadership, including our legal staff. A staff package implementing this program is currently in coordination for Secretary of the Air Force signature. The implementation guidance gives AFIT permission to proceed and delegates authority for 

annual reviews to the AFIT Commandant. We do not anticipate any further delays 

and expect to enroll defense industry employees in our September 2012 class. 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to strengthen 

our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and use of remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where these systems can be freely tested. With the military 

operations overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate remotely 

piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). Working with the 

FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading the charge 

within the Air Force in developing the future technology for the safe operation of 

RPAs in the national airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps 

are needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research capabilities of 

AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and 

NASA as a goal to shorten the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is working both airborne (long term) and ground 

based (near term) sense and avoid programs to integrate remotely piloted aircraft 

(RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). We have been working technology 

development in this area for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to 

acquisition over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to complete our 

ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and complete certification 

of the system approximately 18 months later. Once certification is complete, this 

system will enable more routine access to portions of the NAS and enhance our 

readiness. Equally important, we are developing the required Department of Defense certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA’s) Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
106 

airspace integration and test site mandate in both the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and Modernization Act is a significant step forward to both expand technology and establish performance standards needed for full 

RPA integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further serve 

to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally. The Air Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Air Force 

Research Laboratory is vital to effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA 

integration into the National Airspace System. 

Mr. TURNER. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the primary postsecondary education institution for the Air Force and it has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget 

environment, I am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in 

the future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of short-term 

needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains committed to offering future 

leaders the kind of advanced technical degrees that AFIT provides? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced 

technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). 

Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper 

educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental 

equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers 

with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve 

this objective. 

AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the 

critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the 

students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the 

DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible 

to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain 

maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT. 

Mr. TURNER. The President established a modernization plan in the 1251 plan 

and the 2010 NPR. The FY13 budget, after the New START treaty was ratified, is 

backing off those plans. Let me review the list, the B61 gravity bomb is 2 years delayed; the associated tail kit is late, and we understand that certain high-accuracy 

options are not being looked at; the W78 warhead is being pushed back, and certain 

modernization options have been arbitrarily taken off the table; the new bomber, 

won’t be nuclear-certified at the outset, and new cruise missile are late by at least 

2 years; and the plan for the modernization of the Minute Man III appears to be 

lacking commitment. Further we hear all of these programs are dependent on the 

President’s review—the so-called mini-NPR—about which this Committee has been 

completely shut out by the White House. 

1) Can you assure us that the Air Force has an iron-clad, no-caveat, commitment 

to field a new ICBM, to field a new nuclear-capable bomber and cruise missile? Will 

this commitment change as a result of the Administration’s mini-NPR? 

2) Why would the plan to implement the New START treaty, which was ratified 

in 2010, depend on the President’s mini-NPR which is being conducted in complete 

secrecy from the Congress? 

3) Secretary Panetta promised to assist this committee in oversight of the nuclear 

war plan, in fact promising read-ins last December, but nothing has happened since 

then. What accesses do you have to the so-called 8010 plan? How many Air Force 

personnel have access to that plan? Tens? Hundreds? More? 

a. Does it surprise you that the Department is denying any access to that plan 

to the Congress? Understand that we’re told that the Administration may be considering 80% reductions in the nuclear force, and no one in Congress has been allowed 

to see the plan. 

General SCHWARTZ. The President’s fiscal year 2013 (FY13) Budget reflects the 

Air Force’s continued commitment to invest in the enduring and compelling attributes the Nation needs for a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force. 

The Air Force fully funded and is conducting the materiel solution analysis to identify the options for both a follow-on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system and a 

cruise missile to follow the Air Launch Cruise Missile. Reports are expected to be 

completed in FY14. A nuclear-capable Long Range Strike Bomber is also funded in 
107 

the Presidents FY13 budget. The Administration’s post-Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR) analysis has not altered these commitments. 

Air Force plans to implement New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are 

not dependent on current Post-NPR analysis efforts underway. As stated in the 

2010 NPR, the Administration is conducting follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the levels in New START. Although a final New 

START force structure decision has not been made, the Air Force has fully funded 

NST implementation actions to achieve the baseline force structure as outlined in 

the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1251 Report: 240 deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles on 14 strategic nuclear submarines, up to 420 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and up to 60 deployed nuclear-capable 

heavy bombers. 

As a Service component to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) responsible for providing assets and capabilities required for execution, several echelons of the Air Force have access to Operational Plan 8010. Since this is a 

USSTRATCOM plan, the Air Force defers to USSTRATCOM and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense regarding your concerns in this question. 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to strengthen 

our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and use of remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where these systems can be freely tested. With the military 

operations overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate remotely 

piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). Working with the 

FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading the charge 

within the Air Force in developing the future technology for the safe operation of 

RPAs in the national airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps 

are needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research capabilities of 

AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and 

NASA as a goal to shorten the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is working both airborne (long term) and 

ground based (near term) sense and avoid programs to integrate remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). We have been working 

technology development in this area for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to acquisition over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to 

complete our ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and complete 

certification of the system approximately 18 months later. Once certification is complete, this system will enable more routine access to portions of the NAS and enhance our readiness. Equally important, we are developing the required Department 

of Defense certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional 

authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA’s) Unmanned Aircraft Systems airspace integration and test site mandate in both the 2011 National Defense 

Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and Modernization Act is a significant step 

forward to both expand technology and establish performance standards needed for 

full RPA integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further 

serve to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally. The Air 

Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 

Air Force Research Laboratory is vital to effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA integration into the National Airspace System. 

Mr. TURNER. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the primary postsecondary education institution for the Air Force and it has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget 

environment, I am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in 

the future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of short-term 

needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains committed to offering future 

leaders the kind of advanced technical degrees that AFIT provides? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced 

technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). 

Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper 

educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental 

equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers 

with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines; AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve 

this objective. 
108 

AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the 

critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the 

students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the 

DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible 

to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain 

maximum benefits. Policies are in places that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT. 

Mr. TURNER. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act included an 

amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 

to enroll up to 125 civilians on a space-available basis. This is similar to authority 

granted other defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this 

new policy will be implemented and have been told ‘‘soon.’’ We are now working on 

the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate implementing the provision and what is causing the delay? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced 

technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). 

Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper 

educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental 

equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers 

with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines; AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve 

this objective. 

AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the 

critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the 

students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the 

DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible 

to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain 

maximum benefits. Policies are in places that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT. 

Mr. TURNER. As an estimate, how much of the development and procurement 

costs associated with the long range strike bomber can be associated with making 

it nuclear-capable and nuclear-certified? What percentage of the total development 

and procurement costs is this? Does the Air Force plan to buy additional aircraft 

for the nuclear mission, or would the same number of aircraft be procured if the 

bomber were only for conventional missions? 

General SCHWARTZ. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Long Range 

Strike Bomber program was started in Fiscal Year 2012. The Air Force recently 

began the process of building detailed cost estimates for the development, procurement, and sustainment of the Long Range Strike Bomber. We are working closely 

with the nuclear centers of excellence to understand the stringent nuclear design 

and certification requirements to inform these cost estimates. Upon completion, we 

will fully disclose the requested information within appropriate channels. 

The Air Force plans to field 80–100 nuclear-capable Long Range Strike Bombers 

beginning in the mid-2020s by leveraging mature technologies and making capability tradeoffs to hold down procurement costs. The $550 million average procurement unit cost (Base Year 2010) includes sufficient funding to make the bombers 

survivable in a nuclear environment and capable of nuclear weapons employment. 

The Long Range Strike Bomber will be certified for nuclear operations in time to 

meet USSTRATCOM’s nuclear force structure requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. The Navy has a continuous low-rate production program for D5 ballistic missiles to keep the industrial base healthy and responsive. The Air Force 

does not have a similar program for Minuteman III ICBMs—why not? What are the 

risks of this approach? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force recognizes the importance of maintaining the 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) industrial base and has programs in place 

to ensure the Minuteman III remains viable through 2030 and to support any follow-on ground based strategic deterrent system. The research and development portion of the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) industrial base, exercised as part of ICBM 

Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), matures SRM technologies for insertion into any future propulsion modernization program. The Air Force PAP program exercises design and systems engineering skills 

critical to maintaining a healthy SRM industrial base. 

Mr. TURNER. Does the FY12 request include funds to make the F–35 Joint Strike 

Fighter dual-capable (to carry nuclear payloads)? When is the F–35 expected to be 

fully nuclear-capable and nuclear-certified? Have the estimated costs for this nu-
109 

clear-capable retrofit increased, and if so, is that a lesson for the new bomber (i.e., 

to make it nuclear-capable from the outset)? 

General SCHWARTZ. The JSF Operational Requirement Document (ORD) directed 

the F–35 program to incorporate Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) capability in the first 

post-System Development and Demonstration (SDD) block upgrade, Block 4, currently projected to field in the 2021 timeframe. The Air Force fully supports our 

commitment to our NATO partners to provide forward deployed DCA capable fighters in European Command (EUCOM), and is reviewing available options to maintain DCA requirements in the European theatre by other means until nuclear capable F–35As are ready to assume the mission. 

In the President’s Budget 2013, the Air Force chose to defer further dual capable 

aircraft (DCA) funding. The Air Force made this decision based on several factors: 

1) Uncertainty in the F–35 Block 4 delivery timeline and associated candidate list 

due to congressional marks on F–35 Follow-on Development funding and F–35 SDD 

re-plan activities 

2) Uncertainty in the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) approach and timeline; 

the B61 LEP is a joint DOD/DoE effort that will provide a digital nuclear weapon 

capability that can be integrated on the F–35A 

3) The ability to mitigate delays in F–35A DCA capability through Service Life 

Extension Programs (SLEP) for legacy aircraft 

The Air Force fully supports the commitment to provide forward deployed DCA 

capable fighters and is reassessing DCA need dates and development timelines. To 

mitigate potential future hardware changes and retrofit costs, DCA basic provisions, 

to include power, wiring, cooling, and weapons bay volume, were accounted for in 

the current F–35A design. Should the Department of Defense decide to fund for F– 

35A DCA integration in PB 14, funding will total $309M across the Future Years 

Defense Plan. Including fiscal year 2012 funding and additional funding in fiscal 

year 2019+, the total DCA cost is still anticipated to be $339M. 

Mr. TURNER. Please describe the Air Force’s plans for a follow-on to the nuclearcapable Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). When is such a capability needed and 

what is the anticipated total quantity and cost needed? Why has the program been 

delayed? 

General SCHWARTZ. Long Range Standoff (LRSO) is the Air Force’s plan for the 

follow-on to the nuclear-capable Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The need 

date is based on survivability of the ALCM, to mitigate risk to this validated capability requirement. The Air Force is currently executing an Analysis of Alternatives 

(AoA) to determine the best materiel solution to meet the future need in a quantity 

required by the combatant commanders. Affordability is one factor to be assessed 

during the AoA. Potential options under analysis range from modification of existing 

inventory to new weapon system development. Once the AoA is complete, the Air 

Force will be able to determine options that best provide our Nation a safe, secure 

and effective nuclear deterrent in the 21st Century. 

The Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) AoA, which began in August 2011, continues 

and is scheduled to be completed in early fiscal year 2013 (FY13). The LRSO program was delayed until FY15. This delay was driven by necessary adjustments 

within the current fiscally-constrained environment. 

Mr. TURNER. The Air Force plans to spend $80 million in FY13 on development 

of the tail kit for the B61–12, the life-extended nuclear gravity bomb. The National 

Nuclear Security Administration has delayed production of the first B61–12 by 2 

years, to FY2019. How does this affect the Air Force’s plans for the tail kit? Is the 

Air Force comfortable with National Nuclear Security Administration’s decision to 

delay the B61–12 by 2 years? What risks are there in this delay? Is there any more 

room for schedule slippage, or have we taken all of the flexibility out of the schedule? Please provide a classified response detailing the technical requirements for the 

new tail kit as compared to the technical requirements of the current B61; how will 

the CEPs of the B61 mods differ? 

General SCHWARTZ. The new schedule for the first production unit was incorporated into the B61–12 Tailkit Assembly (TKA) Service Cost Position/Independent 

Cost Estimate and is reflected in the FY13 President’s Budget. The tail kit development schedule was extended so it remains in synch with the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) schedule. 

The Air Force is comfortable with NNSA’s decision to delay the B61–12 by two 

years. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DoE) conducted an integrated schedule review to ensure both efforts remain synchronized. 

This delay adds schedule risk to the program, as legacy B61s continue to age and 

must be replaced. As a result, flexibility has been removed. Mitigation efforts have 

already been implemented to extend the life of legacy B61s so that the B61–12 can 
110 

be fielded before they retire. Further life extensions of the legacy stockpile may be 

possible, but they would likely be very expensive and difficult to execute. 

A classified response will be forwarded separately detailing the technical requirements for the new tail kit as compared to the technical requirements of the current 

B61. 

Mr. TURNER. Will the next-generation bomber be built to meet nuclear-hardening 

requirements? Will nuclear certification of the next-generation bombers be delayed 

after initial operational capability is achieved—if so, when would nuclear certification be expected? What are the costs and risks for delaying certification of a nuclear-capable bomber? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, the Long Range Strike Bomber will meet nuclear-hardening requirements in accordance with current military standards. 

Currently, nuclear certification is planned after the Long Range Strike Bomber 

has met initial operational capability. The Long Range Strike Bomber will achieve 

nuclear certification in time to meet United States Strategic Command’s 

(USSTRATCOM) nuclear force structure requirements. USSTRATCOM is integrally 

involved with the Air Force in this process to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent 

force will remain credible and effective. 

Delaying nuclear certification until after conventional certification reduces the 

costs and risks to the Long Range Strike Bomber program because it minimizes concurrency during baseline program integration and test activities. It also ensures sufficient, production representative test assets are available for a dedicated nuclear 

certification effort. 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to strengthen 

our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and use of remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where these systems can be freely tested. With the military 

operations overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate remotely 

piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). Working with the 

FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading the charge 

within the Air Force in developing the future technology for the safe operation of 

RPAs in the national airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps 

are needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research capabilities of 

AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and 

NASA as a goal to shorten the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is working both airborne (long term) and 

ground based (near term) sense and avoid programs to integrate remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). We have been working 

technology development in this area for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to acquisition over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to 

complete our ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and complete 

certification of the system approximately 18 months later. Once certification is complete, this system will enable more routine access to portions of the NAS and enhance our readiness. Equally important, we are developing the required Department 

of Defense certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional 

authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA’s) Unmanned Aircraft Systems airspace integration and test site mandate in both the 2011 National Defense 

Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and Modernization Act is a significant step 

forward to both expand technology and establish performance standards needed for 

full RPA integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further 

serve to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally. The Air 

Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 

Air Force Research Laboratory is vital to effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA integration into the National Airspace System. 

Mr. TURNER. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the primary postsecondary education institution for the Air Force and it has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget 

environment, I am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in 

the future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of short-term 

needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains committed to offering future 

leaders the kind of advanced technical degrees that AFIT provides? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced 

technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). 

Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper 
111 

educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental 

equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers 

with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve 

this objective. 

AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the 

critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the 

students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the 

DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible 

to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain 

maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT. 

Mr. TURNER. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act included an 

amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 

to enroll up to 125 civilians on a space-available basis. This is similar to authority 

granted other defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this 

new policy will be implemented and have been told ‘‘soon.’’ We are now working on 

the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate implementing the provision and what is causing the delay? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Title 10 language clearly requires permission by Secretary of the Air Force to admit defense industry employees as students. The Air 

Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed the strategy and policy needed 

to manage this new student base and has coordinated the draft language with senior Air Force leadership, including our legal staff. A staff package implementing this 

program is currently in coordination for Secretary of the Air Force signature. The 

implementation guidance gives AFIT permission to proceed and delegates authority 

for annual reviews to the AFIT Commandant. We do not anticipate any further 

delays and expect to enroll defense industry employees in our September 2012 class. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. Will the divesture of the C–27J have a logistical impact on the 

supply chain in theater and if so, what will the impact be? 

Secretary DONLEY. No, divestiture of the C–27J will not impact the supply chain 

in-theater as the C–130 has sufficient airlift capability and capacity. The Air Force 

remains committed to providing this support to the Army. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Could either of you explain in more detail why you proposed a 

larger cut in Air Guard & Reserve forces, than you did in Active Duty forces? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force FY13 Budget Request achieves $8.7 billion in 

savings across the Active and Reserve Components by retiring over 200 aircraft in 

FY13 and nearly 300 aircraft over the FYDP, consistent with the new strategic 

guidance. Our programmed force reductions are wide ranging and affect over 60 installations. Without the Total Force re-missioning actions our plan would have significantly affected 24 units and left eight installations without an Air Force presence. After specific efforts to reallocate Air Force missions to locations affected by 

force structure reductions, we were able to preserve 14 squadron level units and 

leave only one installation without an operational mission. With the re-missioning, 

the plan would have direct impact in 33 states, but in order to support Total Force 

re-missioning, the manpower realignment plan built by the Reserve Components ultimately will affect additional units in all 54 states and territories. 

Our analysis of requirements driven by the new strategy shaped all of our decisions. Air Force force sizing analysis answered two complementary questions: what 

is the maximum, or surge, requirement posed by the force sizing model of the new 

strategy; and what is the steady state, or post-surge, requirement for deployed rotational forces? Because the new guidance requires the Joint Force to be capable of 

fighting one large scale, combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to 

also deny a second adversary, and deemphasized large-scale, prolonged stability operations, our FY13 budget request accepts risk by retiring fighter, mobility, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft excess to the surge requirements of the new force sizing construct. Although the U.S. has removed all 

combat forces from Iraq and the new strategic guidance reduces the steady state requirement for ground forces, we expect Air Force steady state rotational requirements to remain nearly constant, or perhaps increase, under the new strategy. This 

continuing rotational post-surge requirement is a key factor in determining the required mix between Active and Reserve Component forces due to differences in sus-
112 

tainable deployment rates and operations tempo. Where possible, we attempted to 

retire all aircraft of a specific type, allowing us to also divest the unique training 

and logistic support structure for that aircraft. Where that was not possible, we 

worked to retire the oldest aircraft first, and redistributed aircraft into effective and 

economical units, eliminating other units when that was most efficient. Where we 

retained older aircraft, we are taking steps to ensure they will remain viable into 

the future. 

Ms. BORDALLO. One of the cut programs is the CONECT program. It provides 

much-needed digital communication and mission retasking capability for our 

warfighters, which is essential for B–52 missions, especially with the added emphasis on the Pacific theater. With this program successfully finishing flight test, why 

would the Air Force cut the production funding, and leave our crews with a temporary laptop solution that doesn’t satisfy the CONECT operational requirements? 

Secretary DONLEY. Based on competing budget priorities, the Air Force restructured Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) to address the sustainability issues within the program and the replacement of legacy displays. The 

restructured program also funds conversion of the temporary Evolutionary Datalink 

(EDL) system into a permanent modification, which provides a viable (although less 

robust) communication capability for the B–52. This decision was made as part of 

a balanced investment strategy for the Air Force Nuclear Deterrence portfolio. At 

the time the decision was made, CONECT had not completed the flight test program, and the program faced significant cost, schedule, and performance issues. The 

completion of MS C certification later this year provides the Air Force an option to 

re-examine the CONECT program in future budget cycles. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Another program proposed to be completely terminated is the replacement of the B–52 radar. The reliability of the current radar, which will continue to degrade, results in ever-increasing cost and unacceptable impact to the 

probability of success of long missions. With the nuclear and conventional importance of the B–52, how do we maintain a much-needed capability without a radar 

replacement program? 

Secretary DONLEY. To meet higher priorities, the Air Force has elected to maintain the current B–52 APQ–166 radar versus investing in a replacement radar with 

higher near-term costs. Analysis indicates that the current B–52 radar system is 

sustainable through the B–52’s service life (2040). Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR–ALC) will pursue reverse engineering/sustainment initiatives to address 

radar reliability and availability to meet B–52 mission requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. You prepared a statement that read ‘‘The Air Force will meet its 

OSD-directed civilian end strength target for FY12.’’ How do you reconcile that 

statement and direction with the requirements of sections 129 and 129a of title 10 

that prohibit management to a civilian personnel constraint such as end-strength? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force does not manage its civilian workforce by any 

constraint or limitation in terms of man-years, end-strength, fulltime equivalent positions, or maximum number of employees. Based on fiscal constraints, OSD-directed civilian workforce targets for FY12; and these targets were achieved through 

strategic reviews to improve business operations, streamline administrative functions, and eliminate low-priority/overhead functions and expenses. As such, the Air 

Force has followed section 129 of title 10 with regard to execution of civilian personnel management. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In your prepared statement, you addressed ‘‘congressionally mandated military end strength’’ and ‘‘OSD-directed civilian end strength’’—what kind 

of limitations or levels have been placed, or have you imposed, on your contract support workforce? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force’s ‘‘sourcing’’ of functions and work between military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable 

laws and statute. The Air Force remains committed to meeting its statutory obligations to annually review missions, functions, and workforce composition, including 

reliance on contracted services, and to ensure the workforce is appropriately balanced and aligned to our most critical priorities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In your prepared statement, the Air Force wrote that ‘‘We continue to put downward pressure on service support contract spending and are committing to an additional $200 million reduction in FY13 and $1 billion across the 

FYDP.’’ Considering that in the fiscal year 2010 inventory of contracts for service 

the Air Force reported more than $24 billion in obligations—for a single year—on 

contracted services, this downward pressure is laughable. Why are the reductions 

so small? 

Secretary DONLEY. The inventory of contract services (ICS) is a much broader set 

of service contracts than what was referred to in testimony as ‘‘service support con-
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tractors’’. While the Air Force submitted $24.8 billion in our Fiscal Year 2010 ICS, 

that amount captured all Air Force-funded service contracts that perform critical 

missions across every functional domain across the Air Force. These include service 

and maintenance of our aircraft, base operations, and supply chain management. 

The ‘‘service support contractors’’ definition is stated in the Secretary of Defense’s 

memo, ‘‘Reducing Reliance on DOD Service Support Contracts,’’ dated September 24, 

2010, which directed a 30 percent reduction from the FY10 levels by FY13 (10 percent per year). The definition of support contracts/contractor is ‘‘any contracted personnel who provide support as staff augmentation for Government employees; i.e., 

personnel who are subject to the direction of a Government official and function as 

a staff/action officer.’’ 

The additional $200 million savings in FY13 and a total of $1 billion across the 

FYDP is over and above our past service support contractor reductions. Our intent 

in additional reductions was to target headquarters staff augmentation contract 

support to a more manageable level as this is an area that has grown tremendously 

since 2001. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How do these reductions of less than 1% over the FYDP compare 

to the fiscal and manpower reductions associated with the mandated civilian workforce levels? 

Secretary DONLEY. The true service support contractor reduction (staff augmenta- tion dollars) is approximately 62 percent ($390M from a $634M baseline) which is 

drastically higher than our programmed civilian reduction of approximately 8 percent (16K positions from a 199K baseline). 

Ms. BORDALLO. You also stated that ‘‘These efforts are consistent with . . . OMB 

guidance to reduce contract spending by 15 percent by the end of FY12 from an 

FY10 baseline.’’ That would mean that you should reduce by $3.6B annually from 

the $24B in FY10, as opposed to the $200M you stated. This is an exponentially 

large discrepancy and I am requesting further explanation and justification of your 

statement, and the small reductions planned in the Air Force in contracted services. 

Secretary DONLEY. Again, there is a definitional issue that must be clarified in 

answering this question. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance 

has its prime focus to reduce contract spending on management support services 

which is quantified by 12 separate product service codes in such areas as automated 

information systems development and services; system engineering; intelligence 

services; personal services; and acquisition/contract support. The Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS–NG) captures approximately $5.6B 

management support services funded by the Air Force in FY10. The OMB mandated 

15 percent reduction equates to approximately $843M. Currently, the Air Force is 

ahead of schedule based on a FPDS–NG current FY12 obligations of approximately 

$1.7B through the end of month February. 

Ms. BORDALLO. You stated that you had a target of 16,000 civilian spaces to reduce. Can you please provide a list of those 16,000 based on the Air Force’s FAIR 

Act inventory, including the location, functions performed, and manpower mix criteria associated with each? Can you estimate the cost savings associated with each? 

Can you assure the Committee that the workload associated with any one of these 

16,000 reductions was not absorbed by contract as you executed the AFMC reorganization and reduced overhead? Where did this target of 16,000 civilian space reductions come from, and was that target based on a workforce analysis considering mission risk and cost, or did the Air Force essentially have to reverse engineer it and 

associated workload/organizational structures to achieve that number? 

Secretary DONLEY. 1) The Air Force does not have a specific list of the civilian 

positions based on the Air Force’s Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act 

inventory because a large portion of the reductions were tied to planned growth; 

thus, these ‘‘positions’’ were not captured by any previous or existing FAIR Act inventory. 

2) These changes in programmed growth resulted in an approximate total savings 

of $1.6 billion through Fiscal Year 2012. 

3) The workload associated with the reductions was not absorbed by contract because in addition to the civilian funding reductions, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense also strove to achieve savings by reducing the number of service support 

contractors. The AFMC reorganization and other Air Force consolidation efforts 

were a means to achieve savings in both civilian and contractor funds; the AFMC 

reorganization resulted in a workforce reduction. 

4) The target reductions were based on workforce analysis considering mission 

risk, readiness and cost. The Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defensewide efficiency measures to reduce overhead and eliminate redundancies while reducing the associated funding. To meet the guidance issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force conducted a comprehensive strategic review to 
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streamline operations and consolidate overhead while preserving or growing the 

most critical mission areas. The Air Force maintained some growth in areas like acquisition, nuclear enterprise, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 

while streamlining headquarters and support functions. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Given the civilian personnel constraints first reflected in last 

year’s budget and continued in the FY13 submission, can you certify in full accordance with 10 USC sections 129 and section 129a? Your certification was due on 1 

February. When can the committee expect it? 

Secretary DONLEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. How does the Department of Air Force’s budget request for FY13 

reconcile with legislative language set forth in Division A, Section 8012 of Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112–74) which states that ‘‘ . . . during fiscal 

year 2012, the civilian personnel of the Department of Defense may not be managed 

on the basis of any end-strength, and the management of such personnel during 

that fiscal year shall not be subject to any constraint or limitation (known as an 

end-strength)’’, and more specifically, that the fiscal year 2013 budget request be 

prepared and submitted to the Congress as if this provision were effective with regard to fiscal year 2013? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force does not manage its civilian workforce by any 

constraint or limitation in terms of man-years, end-strength, fulltime equivalent positions, or maximum number of employees. Based on fiscal constraints, the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense-directed civilian workforce budgetary targets for fiscal 

year 2012 achieved through strategic reviews to improve business operations, 

streamline administrative functions, and eliminate low-priority/overhead functions 

and expenses. For the fiscal year 2013 (FY13) budget request, the Air Force determined the best workforce mix based on the most-efficient and cost-effective means 

to perform the Air Force mission. The FY13 budget request also accounted for budget constraints while at the same time returning a flexible, agile, and ready workforce. 

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and 

rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In 

your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the Air Force FY13 budget request 

reflect an appropriately balanced workforce across all major capabilities, functional 

areas, and requirements? 

Secretary DONLEY. The fiscal year 2013 (FY13) budget request reflects an appropriately balanced workforce that meets required budget reductions that preserves 

readiness while avoiding a hollow force. The Air Force’s ‘‘sourcing’’ of functions and 

work between military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with 

workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as 

well as applicable laws and statute. The FY13 budget request reflects our best judgment today and represents a carefully coordinated approach based on the Department of Defense’s strategy and policy that balances operational needs and fiscal reality. The Air Force remains committed to meeting its statutory obligations to annually review missions, functions, and workforce composition, including reliance on 

contracted services, and to ensure the workforce is appropriately balanced and 

aligned to our most critical priorities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department’s budget request overview included discussion of 

improved buying power and how acquisitions are managed. To what extent is the 

Department of Air Force using its Inventory of Contracts for Services to make such 

improvements and influence how it manages the Air Force Total Force? 

Secretary DONLEY. This is currently one of many tools available internal to the 

Air Force to help manage our total force. Although we have fully complied with Department of Defense Guidance each year, there is room to improve the Air Force’s 

use of this inventory of contract services. To this end, we are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other Services in order to determine the 

best way to document and use our annual Inventory of Contracts for Services as 

required by Title 10, Section 2330a, Procurement of Services. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Did the Department of Air Force seek relief from DOD-mandated 

civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively 

performed by civilians? 

Secretary DONLEY. As part of our fiscal year 2013 (FY13) President’s Budget submission, the Air Force did not seek relief from Department of Defense (DOD) mandated civilian personnel levels. Our overall strategic review of all civilian resource 

allowed the Air Force to retain civilian end strength to satisfy our most critical 

insourcing initiatives. While the Air Force uses civilian end strength as a target for 

management, there are mechanisms in place to permit exceptions to the target, if 

justified, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approval. In order to 
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pursue any further/new insourcing initiatives, the Air Force would plan on requesting OSD approve the corresponding civilian end strength increase as allowable 

growth given it drives efficiencies or is a result of converting inherently governmental workload to in-house DOD civilians. The Air Force is committed to ensuring 

no inherently governmental functions are outsourced or otherwise contracted. 

Ms. BORDALLO. If relief was not sought, does that mean that the Department of 

Air Force is comfortable that all contracted services currently procured by the Department are the most cost-effective source of labor and minimize risk? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force’s ‘‘sourcing’’ of functions and work between military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable 

laws and statute. The fiscal year 2013 budget request reflects our best judgment 

today and represents a carefully coordinated approach based on the Department of 

Defense’s strategy and policy that balances operational needs and fiscal reality. The 

Air Force remains committed to meeting its statutory obligations to annually review 

missions, functions, and workforce composition, including reliance on contracted 

services, and to ensure the workforce is appropriately balanced and aligned to our 

most critical priorities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What assurances can you give me that as civilian reductions or 

hiring freezes are occurring across Air Force installations work is not shifting illegally to contract performance? 

Secretary DONLEY. We are tracking, on a monthly basis, our use of support contractors performing knowledge based services, service support contractors, management support services, and advisory studies to ensure that we achieve already 

planned/programmed reductions. These actions, coupled with the current monthly 

tracking of the financial obligations of contract usage, facilitate prevention of inappropriate migration of workload from organic to contract support. In addition, we 

worked closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness (USD (P&R)) who developed a memo dated 1 Dec 2011 Prohibition on 

Converting Certain Functions to Contract Performance. The basic intent of this 

memo was to inform leadership at all levels and to reiterate the need to be cognizant of not converting work performed by organic personnel to contract performance. Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within the Air Force to ensure the 

workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact 

ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or 

military personnel? 

Secretary DONLEY. The main process is the Air Force’s planning, programming, 

and budget execution process. The Air Force conducted a comprehensive strategic 

review to increase efficiency, reduce overhead, and eliminate redundancy while preserving or growing the most critical mission areas in our civilian workforce. This 

force mix determination will be reviewed annually as we submit our president’s 

budget submission to ensure that we maintain the most-efficient and cost-effective 

means to perform the Air Force mission, taking into account current budget realities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the ‘‘exceptions’’ to 

the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates’ mandated. Please provide a detailed list 

of all exceptions the Department of Air Force has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions across that were requested but 

not approved, and the justification for such. 

Secretary DONLEY. The Office of the Secretary of Defense allowed limited Service 

growth for certain requirements. The exceptions include: portions of Combat Commander requirements, joint basing requirements and acquisition workforce requirements. The warfighter requirements were linked to Joint Staff-approved changes at 

Combatant Commands where the Air Force is the executive agent. Allowances were 

provided for Joint basing growth to ensure equivalency across all Services as a result of the transfer of responsibilities, and the associated manpower, from other 

Services. Acquisition workforce growth was allowed due to the Department’s focus 

on strengthening and growing our in-house acquisition workforce. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent have the existing data sets available to Air Force 

planners, specifically the annual inventory of inherently governmental and commercial activities, contributed to the functional streamlining, organizational realignments, workforce shaping decisions, and civilian personnel reductions reflected in 

last year’s efficiencies initiative and continued in this year’s budget? 

Secretary DONLEY. The efficiencies initiatives began under Secretary Gates, and 

continued in this year’s budget, were implemented based on guidance to conduct organizational assessments and mission/function prioritization. This guidance required the Air Force to: baseline our organizations; assess and prioritize missions; 
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eliminate duplication; ensure workload distribution; and submit recommendations 

for organization restructuring and reallocation of manpower, including workforce reductions. 

While the guidance did not specifically require the Department of Defense components to use their annual inventory of inherently governmental and commercial activities, it is one of many data sets and workload quantification sources that the Air 

Force utilizes during the planning, programming, and budget execution process. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In achieving the right mix for the Total Force, how does the Department of Air Force use the annual inventory of inherently governmental and 

commercial activities, and associated manpower mix determinations, to identify the 

civilian workforce reductions reflected in the past two budgets? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force conducted a comprehensive strategic manpower 

review to size civilian workload contained in our past two budgets with the goal to 

increase efficiency, reduce overhead, and eliminate redundancy while preserving or 

growing the most critical mission areas—not necessarily the Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activities (IGCA) review. However, the Air Force continually refines our Total Force skill mix to include civil servants and contractors, to 

determine the most appropriate, efficient, and cost-effective means of performing Air 

Force missions. As outlined in Department of Defense Instruction, 1100.22, ‘‘Policy 

and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix’’, as well as Federal Acquisition Regulations 7.5, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 207.5, and Air Force Instruction, 38–204, Programming United States Air Force USAF Manpower, the Air Force 

adheres to the overarching guidance regarding workforce mix determination. Also, 

the Air Force annually performs a comprehensive annual IGCA review to ensure it 

has the proper work force mix. This review categorizes all organically performed 

work as either an inherently governmental function (which must be performed by 

organic personnel) or a commercial activity (could be performed by organic or contractor support). 

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across the Department of Air 

Force, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions? 

Secretary DONLEY. The annual Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activity 

review is not currently utilized to track eliminated or divested functions, but rather, 

identifies current positions that are either inherently governmental or a commercial 

activity in nature. As efficiencies are realized, government positions identified with 

performing those functions are removed from unit manning documents. Contractor 

reductions associated with efficiencies are tracked via a combination of financial 

commitments and organization surveys. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I’d like to ask you questions I posed to the service vice chiefs during an October hearing. Why would Congress consider any potential changes to recruiting and retention incentives such as military retirement and health care or reductions to essential training accounts when the military departments can’t identify 

the cost of what they pay for contracted services? So what is your military department doing to reduce contracted services and work requirements instead of just reducing dollars? If you are only reducing dollars then you are likely setting up conditions to default to contractors in light of the current civilian personnel constraints. 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force knows the dollars obligated/programmed for 

contracted services and continues toward implementing a contractor manpower data 

collection system, similar to the system the Army has developed, to manage the contractor full time equivalents providing these services. The Air Force is using the 

planning, programming, and budget execution process to ensure workload reductions remain consistent with the contract dollar reduction. This force mix determination is reviewed annually during the president’s budget submission process to 

ensure the Air Force maintains the most efficient and cost-effective means to perform the Air Force mission taking into account the current budget realities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. When the Air Force says they are going to divest the block 30 inventory, does that mean that they are going to cut their losses with just the block 

30’s that haven’t hit the production or will you be mothballing all block 30’s in the 

inventory? How will this affect Guam’s strike/ISR capabilities? 

General SCHWARTZ. Fourteen Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft have been delivered 

to the Air Force and an additional four are in production. Pending congressional direction and consistent with appropriate statutes and regulations, the Air Force will 

gauge interest for the transfer of these eighteen aircraft to qualified entities, both 

internal and external to the Department of Defense (DOD), who express an interest. 

The Air Force does not plan to spend fiscal year 2012 funding for the remaining 

three Block 30 aircraft at this time. 
117 

In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that high-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance force structure could be reduced. The Air 

Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was 

sufficient to meet these reduced requirements. There will be no impact to 

warfighting capability, and peacetime support will be managed by the current Global Force Management Process. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Have you worked with the Army to come up with a plan to compensate or fill the gap for the loss of the C–27J platform and if so, what is it? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force and Army signed a Direct Support Memorandum of Understanding on 27 January 2012. Divesting the C–27J fleet does not 

create a capability gap as the Air Force continues to maintain the more capable and 

cost effective C–130. The Air Force remains fully committed to support time-sensitive, mission-critical direct support airlift to the Army and will continue to provide 

direct airlift support to the U.S. Army with the fleet of 318 C–130s. Currently, C– 

130s are providing daily direct support airlift in the Central Command area of responsibility. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Could either of you explain in more detail why you proposed a 

larger cut in Air Guard & Reserve forces, than you did in Active Duty forces? Will 

this impact the Air Forces deployment ops tempo and if so, how? 

General SCHWARTZ. The new Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic Guidance 

‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense’’ directs the 

services to build a force that will be smaller and leaner, flexible, ready and technologically advanced. To deliver the capabilities required by this strategy, and remain 

within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all service core 

functions. While remaining consistent with the new strategy, the Air Force FY13 

Budget submission achieves $8.7 billion in savings across the Active and Reserve 

Components by retiring over 200 aircraft in FY13 and 286 aircraft over the Future 

Years Defense Plan. Our programmed force reductions are wide-ranging and affect 

over 60 installations. 

This was an integrated, Total Force effort—Active Duty, Reserve and National 

Guard—working together to achieve our end state of a ready and sustainable force 

that can meet our surge and rotational requirements. My directive to the Air Force 

was to realign our forces to better meet this new strategic guidance using the following four principles: ensure the Total Force can fulfill surge requirements; maintain a balance between components that allows us to fulfill continuing rotational requirements at sustainable rates; retain the recruiting, training and operational seasoning base required to sustain the Total Force’s needs into the future; and ensure 

the Reserve Component remains relevant and engaged in both enduring and evolving missions. 

To meet this end, the Air National Guard (ANG) developed five Capstone Principles to help guide this transition: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG 

equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular 

Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states. Similarly, our Reserve Component used the following four principles: ensure aircraft reductions do not negatively impact operational support to 

Combatant Commands; ensure force structure movements do not create any new Air 

Force bills; ensure risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected 

increases in mission capability rates; and, consider locations that continue to have 

an Air Force mission due to the presence of another Air Force Component. This 

Total Force approach allowed us to maintain the right Active/Air Guard/Reserve 

mix, which will allow us to meet our operational demands with a leaner force while 

taking care of our Airmen. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In reviewing the President’s proposed FY13 budget it appears 

many critical B–52 programs were cut. As the backbone of the Air Force’s nuclear 

and conventional bomber fleet, what is the Air Force’s plan to maintain a reliable 

and viable B–52 with such drastic cuts? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force continues to ensure the B–52 stays relevant 

throughout its service life (2040) by focusing on bomber sustainment and addressing 

diminishing manufacturing source (DMS) issues in the fiscal year 2013 President’s 

Budget. Efforts such as the development of replacement visual displays in the restructured Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) program and 

modernization of the anti-skid braking system address existing supportability 

issues. Multiple smaller efforts continue to add B–52 capability including Military 

Standard 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade (1760 IWBU) and Mode S/5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). Funding totals include $202M for research, development, test and evaluation and $250M for procurement across the Future Years De-
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fense Plan. The B–52 remains the backbone of the USAF manned strategic bomber 

force; we are actively supporting the continued bomber presence in Guam and maintaining a high state of nuclear mission readiness. 

Ms. BORDALLO. One of the cut programs is the CONECT program. It provides 

much-needed digital communication and mission retasking capability for our 

warfighters, which is essential for B–52 missions, especially with the added emphasis on the Pacific theater. With this program successfully finishing flight test, why 

would the Air Force cut the production funding, and leave our crews with a temporary laptop solution that doesn’t satisfy the CONECT operational requirements? 

General SCHWARTZ. Based on competing budget priorities, the Air Force restructured Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) to address the sustainability issues within the program and the replacement of legacy displays. The 

restructured program also funds conversion of the temporary Evolutionary Datalink 

(EDL) system into a permanent modification, which provides a viable (although less 

robust) communication capability for the B–52. This decision was made as part of 

a balanced investment strategy for the Air Force Nuclear Deterrence portfolio. At 

the time the decision was made, CONECT had not completed the flight test program, and the program faced significant cost, schedule, and performance issues. The 

completion of MS C certification later this year provides the Air Force an option to 

re-examine the CONECT program in future budget cycles. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Another program proposed to be completely terminated is the replacement of the B–52 radar. The reliability of the current radar, which will continue to degrade, results in ever-increasing cost and unacceptable impact to the 

probability of success of long missions. With the nuclear and conventional importance of the B–52, how do we maintain a much-needed capability without a radar 

replacement program? 

General SCHWARTZ. To meet higher priorities, the Air Force has elected to maintain the current B–52 APQ–166 radar versus investing in a replacement radar with 

higher near-term costs. Analysis indicates that the current B–52 radar system is 

sustainable through the B–52’s service life (2040). Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR–ALC) will pursue reverse engineering/sustainment initiatives to address 

radar reliability and availability to meet B–52 mission requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In October when General Breedlove testified to this committee, I 

asked him about the statutorily required inventory of contracts for services. His response was that there the Air Force as in an ongoing review that was ‘‘looking at 

everything we do contractually’’ and particularly ‘‘What is inherently governmental 

and what should we be retaining as a blue suit requirement versus those things 

that we contract for . . . ’’ and ‘‘how does that relate to those jobs that typically our 

civilians also do, civilians who are a part of our Air Force.’’ Can you please share 

the results of that review and what the end-result has been in terms of realignment 

of work? Please provide a list identifying services that have since been cut or reduced, and instances where contracted work has been reassigned to Airmen or Air 

Force civilians. 

General SCHWARTZ. The review to which General Breedlove was referring was the 

inventory of contract services review requirements, defined in Title 10, Section 

2330a, Procurement of Services. The end result is that we preliminarily identified 

approximately 400 contractor full-time equivalents who may be performing inherently governmental functions out of our full inventory of 143,184 contractor full-time 

equivalents. This work spans the 91 instances reflected in government Accountability Office (GAO) Report Number GAO–12–357, Defense Acquisitions—Further 

Actions Needed to Improve Accountability for the Department of Defense’s Inventory of Contracted Services. This includes a variety of acquisition and professional 

services, primarily technical functions, such as accounting, quality control, management support services, engineering and technical, financial, program management, 

and other professional services. We are still working on our final assessment and 

disposition. For those functions determined to be inherently governmental, remedial 

actions may range from divestiture of the service, restructuring the contract, or 

insourcing the function. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY 

Mr. COURTNEY. Please describe the anticipated mission and use of the MC–12 

once transferred to the Air National Guard. Do you see this mission as a long-term, 

enduring mission for those units receiving this platform? Is the USAF committed 

to the MC–12 program through the FYDP, to include all necessary manpower and 

platform funding requirements? 
119 

Secretary DONLEY. Once transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG), the MC– 

12W could provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, homeland defense, and border patrol missions, as well as continue to support deployed ISR operations. Once 

they reach Full Operational Capability (FOC), the ANG will sustain two ‘‘steady 

state’’ Combat Air Patrols (CAP), with the ability to surge to six total CAPs. In addition, the Air Force will create an active duty associate unit to augment MC–12W 

operations which will maintain long-term active duty Air Force expertise/presence 

in MC–12W operations/capabilities. The active unit will augment the ANG’s steady 

state CAPs and have the capability to surge to four CAPs if required for a total of 

ten Total Force MC–12W CAPs. The MC–12W is an enduring Air Force capability 

that will stay with us beyond the conclusion of the current engagements. The Air 

Force has programmed all necessary funds and manpower through the FYDP. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Please describe the anticipated mission and use of the MC–12 

once transferred to the Air National Guard. Do you see this mission as a long-term, 

enduring mission for those units receiving this platform? Is the USAF committed 

to the MC–12 program through the FYDP, to include all necessary manpower and 

platform funding requirements? 

General SCHWARTZ. Once transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG), the MC– 

12W could provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, homeland defense, and border patrol missions, as well as continue to support deployed ISR operations. Once 

they reach Full Operational Capability (FOC), the ANG will sustain two ‘‘steady 

state’’ Combat Air Patrols (CAP), with the ability to surge to six total CAPs. In addition, the Air Force will create an active duty associate unit to augment MC–12W 

operations which will maintain long-term active duty Air Force expertise/presence 

in MC–12W operations/capabilities. The active unit will augment the ANG’s steady 

state CAPs and have the capability to surge to four CAPs if required for a total of 

ten Total Force MC–12W CAPs. The MC–12W is an enduring Air Force capability 

that will stay with us beyond the conclusion of the current engagements. The Air 

Force has programmed all necessary funds and manpower through the FYDP. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is an important initiative 

intended to build capabilities and partnerships between the U.S. military and our 

allies where our shared interest in defeating insurgency and other threats are advanced through the operation of aircraft familiar to the U.S. military and well suited to the relevant missions. Is it the Air Force’s intention that the LAS aircraft comply with U.S. weapons, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military personnel and partners to work seamlessly? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Afghan LAS aircraft will comply with U.S. weapon, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military personnel and partners 

to work seamlessly. That said, the LAS aircraft program will also adhere to U.S. 

export policy governing military equipment transfers to Afghanistan. Accordingly, 

the LAS aircraft communications and weapons capabilities will be configured to the 

envisioned future Afghan Air Force (AAF), but not necessarily state-of-the-art U.S. 

Air Force capability. U.S. Air Force and NATO military personnel will train and advise the AAF on maintaining and employing the LAS aircraft. The aircraft will employ U.S. and NATO-standard weaponry, interface with friendly forces via common 

communications equipment and follow U.S. design standards to ensure safety and 

maintainability. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is an important initiative 

intended to build capabilities and partnerships between the U.S. military and our 

allies where our shared interest in defeating insurgency and other threats are advanced through the operation of aircraft familiar to the U.S. military and well suited to the relevant missions. Is it the Air Force’s intention that the LAS aircraft comply with U.S. weapons, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military personnel and partners to work seamlessly? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Afghan LAS aircraft will comply with U.S. weapon, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military personnel and partners 

to work seamlessly. That said, the LAS aircraft program will also adhere to U.S. 

export policy governing military equipment transfers to Afghanistan. Accordingly, 

the LAS aircraft communications and weapons capabilities will be configured to the 

envisioned future Afghan Air Force (AAF), but not necessarily state-of-the-art U.S. 

Air Force capability. U.S. Air Force and NATO military personnel will train and advise the AAF on maintaining and employing the LAS aircraft. The aircraft will employ U.S. and NATO-standard weaponry, interface with friendly forces via common 
120 

communications equipment and follow U.S. design standards to ensure safety and 

maintainability. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. The current FMS LAS requirement is 20 aircraft for Afghanistan. 

Over the course of the next 10 to 15 years, do you anticipate the LAS program expanding to other countries beyond Afghanistan and if so, will the contract made 

with Afghanistan serve as any type of ‘‘program of record’’ for future foreign military 

sales? Is there a requirement within the FMS LAS program to Afghanistan that 

U.S. forces will partner with Afghanistan to train and mentor them on the system? 

If so, should the LAS platform be familiar to U.S. forces to facilitate this training? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is funded by Afghan Security Forces Funds and provides a light attack capability specifically for Afghanistan. This program is specifically for Afghanistan and no plan currently exists to 

extend the platform beyond Afghanistan. However, it could be used as a model for 

future light attack foreign military sales. There is a requirement within the Afghan 

LAS program for U.S. forces to partner with the Afghan Air Force to train and advise them on the system. Although there are advantages to U.S. forces being familiar with the LAS platform, this is not an absolute requirement. The USAF will leverage experienced USAF instructor pilots, maintainers and logisticians capable of 

quickly learning the LAS system and then training and advising their Afghan counterparts. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the Air Force justification for not acquiring the technical 

data rights to the F117 engine? Does the Air Force have a plan to acquire such data 

rights? 

Secretary DONLEY. Under the procurement and sustainment contracts, the Air 

Force has never purchased data rights for the F117 engine because: (1) under the 

C–17 contract, Boeing acquired the engines from Pratt & Whitney (P&W) as a commercial item; and (2) under the Air Force contract to acquire engines, the Air Force 

used a commercial contract. P&W paid for the development of these engines. Also, 

the C–17 sustainment program included Contractor Logistics Support for life; therefore, there was no need to acquire data rights. Since then, the Air Force has decided 

to break out the engine technical overhaul, supply chain management and systems 

engineering from the C–17 support. As a result, the Air Force is currently working 

two separate contract actions to acquire licensed use of P&W’s technical manual, 

and to acquire the data rights for the System Engineering and Supply Chain Management processes for the F117 engine. In December 2011, P&W agreed to a General Terms Agreement release of their technical manual for basic F117 repairs, and 

the Air Force will further pursue Government Purpose Rights on historical supply 

chain management and systems engineering to enhance future competition. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. During our review of the FY11 Omnibus reprogramming, it came 

to light that funds to support the operations in Libya would be funded internally. 

The total realignment from within Operation & Maintenance, Air Force was estimated at over $400 million. What was the final realignment in FY11, and with realignments of this magnitude, what mission requirements were not supported due 

to this internal support of the Libyan operation? 

Secretary DONLEY. The final FY11 Operation & Maintenance (O&M), Air Force 

costs in support of operations in Libya were $408 million (both flying hours and 

non-flying hours). In addition, O&M, Air Force had to reimburse the Air National 

Guard O&M $99 million for flying hours flown in support of Title 10 missions. 

The flying hours were sourced from the Air Force’s baseline flying hour program. 

Instead of the hours being flown at home station, they were flown in support of 

Libya. The pilots still received some level of training therefore there was no loss to 

the flying hour training program. The remainder of the support funding supported 

transportation, travel, base support, communication and global lift and sustainment. 

To fully support Libyan operations, funding was sourced from the Airlift Readiness 

Account and lower priority base operating requirements. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The MCRS–16 study recommends using C–17s for intratheater airlift but several senior mobility leaders in the past have been concerned that we are 

overusing the 30-year/30,000-hour life expectancy of that airframe too quickly. Can 

you tell me what the average age and number of hours our C–17 fleet currently has 

on it? 
121 

General SCHWARTZ. As of 29 February 2012, the average age of the C–17 fleet was 

8.9 years and the average number of hours per aircraft was 10,104. 

Mr. CONAWAY. During our review of the FY11 Omnibus reprogramming, it came 

to light that funds to support the operations in Libya would be funded internally. 

The total realignment from within Operation & Maintenance, Air Force was estimated at over $400 million. What was the final realignment in FY11, and with realignments of this magnitude, what mission requirements were not supported due 

to this internal support of the Libyan operation? 

General SCHWARTZ. The final FY11 Operation & Maintenance (O&M), Air Force costs in support of operations in Libya were $408 million (both flying hours and 

non-flying hours). In addition, O&M, Air Force had to reimburse the Air National 

Guard O&M $99 million for flying hours flown in support of Title 10 missions. 

The flying hours were sourced from the Air Force’s baseline flying hour program. 

Instead of the hours being flown at home station, they were flown in support of 

Libya. The pilots still received some level of training therefore there was no loss to 

the flying hour training program. The remainder of the support funding supported 

transportation, travel, base support, communication and global lift and sustainment. 

To fully support Libyan operations, funding was sourced from the Airlift Readiness 

Account and lower priority base operating requirements. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Schwartz: With the reduction in strategic lift assets for the 

Air Force and the previous reduction in the prepositioned stocks of the Army and 

the Marine Corps, what missions will be eliminated to meet the equipment availability? How will the Administration be able to accomplish all combatant commander theater plans with reduced strategic lift capabilities? 

General SCHWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. I understand that only about 15% of Air Force’s engine sustainment 

contracts are competed. What is your estimate of the savings that could be achieved 

from more effective use of competition in this area? 

Secretary DONLEY. The United States Air Force is committed to competition in the 

propulsion enterprise to achieve the best value for our warfighter while preserving 

system safety. Typically, life-cycle sustainment decisions regarding data rights made 

in the early phases of a propulsion system’s acquisition significantly impact the pace 

and degree of competition for an engine during the sustainment phase. 

Today, the Air Force leverages competition at three different levels of an engine 

during sustainment: 

1. At the weapon system/whole engine level, the Air Force attempts to gain sufficient access (e.g., via licensing) to sustainment data in order to facilitate competition 

of engine overhaul and supply chain management. As an example, the Air Force secured the necessary sustainment data to compete the sustainment, to include overhaul and supply chain management, of the F103 engine (KC–10 aircraft). 

2. At the component repair/replace decision point, the Air Force leverages the use 

of component repairs to the maximum extent practicable. Components can often be 

repaired more economically than replaced with new components, and a repair capability provides the Air Force with an additional source of supply. For example, the 

Air Force introduced a repair for an air seal in the F100 engine (F–15/F–16 aircraft) 

reducing the need for new air seal replacement by 90 percent. 

3. At the individual part level, the Air Force is engaged in several initiatives to 

create alternative sources. These initiatives include expanding the base of new manufacturers beyond the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and evaluating 

potential sources for repaired and used parts. To expand to new manufacturers, the 

Air Force encourages industry to submit Source Approval Requests (SARs) to obtain 

certification to compete as alternative sources. The SAR process is designed to balance safety with competition and cost improvement objectives. Evaluating sources 

for repaired and used parts, the Air Force recently competed new, OEM parts 

against used parts with exceptional results. The Air Force achieved a $36M savings 

(projected cost of $43M, versus contract cost of $7M) by leveraging a source of used 

fan blades for the F108 (KC–135 engine). The Air Force continues to expand this 

type of individual part competition and the pool of alternative sources. 

Mr. HUNTER. The Air Force awarded an $11.75 billion sole source maintenance 

contract for continuing the C–17 Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) using the justification and approval rationale from 2009 without change. 
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What actions do you intend to take with regard to this issue to ensure competition 

in sustainment of weapon systems? 

What are you doing to increase opportunities for competition, particularly at the 

subsystem and component level where broad commercial capabilities often exist? 

Secretary DONLEY. On November 29, 2009, the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive approved a justification and approval document that permitted the award 

of a sole source contract to the Boeing Company to provide Performance Based Logistics (PBL) for the C–17 weapon system. The Air Force entered into this contract 

with the Boeing Company on October 1, 2011. 

The structure of the contract allows the program office to evaluate Boeing support 

on a monthly basis as well as develop alternative sustainment strategies should the 

contractor not produce desired outcomes at committed-to costs. While not a traditional form of competition, the option to move work from Boeing to the Government 

has proven to be a successful incentive and form of competition for the C–17 program. 

The C–17 Program Office is pursuing further competition for sustainment of the 

F117 engine. The Program Office is planning a competitive award for Performance 

Based Service Arrangement (PBSA) for overhaul of F117–PW–100 (C–17) engines, 

to include F117 depot Supply Chain Management (SCM). This competitive acquisition strategy should yield F117 engine sustainment at reduced costs, while sustaining F117 performance outcomes. 

To increase competition at the weapon system subsystem and component level, 

Air Force Instruction 63–101 (October 2011) mandates that all source of repair analysis (SORA) determinations be conducted at the System/Subsystem level. In the C– 

17 PBL program, all depot maintenance is placed on contract to Boeing, the product 

support integrator (PSI) responsible for performance outcomes. The PSI contracts 

with either Government depots or other product support providers, for repairs in 

support of the weapon system. Boeing and the technical repair centers negotiate repair quantities quarterly, based on the repair center capacity and best value to the 

Government. For example, two viable sources of C–17 airframe depot repair are 

maintained, fostering competition, supporting required C–17 maintenance and modification throughput, reducing program costs and depot schedule risk. 

Mr. HUNTER. As the Air Force moves to transition engines such as the F119, 

F117, F135 into Tinker Air Logistics Center, what is being done to ensure competition and to reduce organizational conflict of interest in the supply chain relating to 

the servicing of systems, subsystems, and components? 

General SCHWARTZ. The F119 has transitioned to organic depot maintenance 

under a partnership arrangement with Pratt & Whitney. However, the supply chain 

management (SCM) responsibilities for the F119 engine remains with the contractor. The Air Force made the decision to keep SCM responsibilities for the F– 

22 airframe and engine with their respective contractors for another five years 

based on the Jan 10 F–22 Product Support Strategy Business Case Analysis to reduce risk to the government by allowing the F–22 weapon system to fully mature. 

The F–22 Program Manager will revisit the BCA decision in five years to determine 

if SCM responsibilities should be transitioned to organic execution. 

The United States Air Force (USAF) approach to increasing competition for the 

F117 engine is to secure access to the overhaul and component repair manuals as 

well as other technical data. Access to these manuals and data will allow the Air 

Force to compete touch labor and supply chain management. In addition, because 

the F117 is a commercial derivative engine, the USAF is working to approve NonOriginal Equipment Manufacturer parts and repairs by using the Source Approval 

Process (SAR) detailed in AFMCI 23–113. The USAF will implement this strategy 

over a two year transition period to ensure all potential offerors are provided an opportunity to compete. This process injects competition at the engine and component 

levels for parts and repairs. The strategy is designed to balance operational risk and 

cost savings while providing support at the best competitive cost. 

The F135 engine is still in acquisition and details of the sustainment strategy are 

still being finalized. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ 

Mr. CRITZ. The recent Air Force structure changes announced the closing of an 

Air Reserve station in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, outside of the BRAC process. This 

base serves 1,400 Active, Reserve and Guard units of both the Air Force and the 

Navy. The base just completed an $8.1 million housing project and is set to break 

ground on a $13.8 million joint Reserve center. The Air Force leases a hundred 

acres at this base. It includes access to four runways, an FAA control tower, medical 
123 

and crash fire response and zero-cost airfield maintenance, including snow removal 

and capital improvements for $20,000 a year. The Pittsburgh region has significant 

success with recruiting and that the 911th Airlift Wing is one of the highest manned 

units in the Air Force Reserve Command. This being said, I can’t understand why 

the Air Force would make the decision to close this Air Reserve station. If this is 

truly an issue with retiring C–130s, then let’s bring in new C–130s to this very efficient and very effective wing so that this cost-effective base can continue to serve 

both the Air Force and the Pittsburgh community. Can you provide, for congressional review, the cost analysis of the 911th Airlift Wing compared to others 

throughout the Air Force that was used as the justification for closing this base? 

Secretary DONLEY. While cost savings are part of the decision-making process, the 

most important factor is the Air Force’s ability to provide the capabilities required 

by the new Defense Strategic Guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.’’ This new strategy directs the services to build a 

leaner, more flexible, and technologically advanced force. We made these decisions 

after careful analysis. As we assessed intra-theater airlift using scenarios consistent 

with the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air 

Force studies determined excess capacity exists in the Air Force fleet. The reduced 

intra-theater airlift requirement permitted retirement of 65 C–130H aircraft. The 

C–130s proposed for retirement are among the oldest in the USAF fleet and would 

require costly modifications and modernization efforts to keep the aircraft viable. 

Twenty-seven bases worldwide have C–130s assigned; of the 27 bases, either force 

structure reductions or aircraft transfers affected 18 of them. Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station has seven C–130H2 aircraft assigned to the 911th Airlift Wing. The 

FY13 President Budget submission retires all seven C–130H2s in FY13, resulting 

in a savings of $41 million across the Future Years Defense Plan and avoidance of 

approximately $77 million in modernization costs. 

With the reduction of the C–130H2s, Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station becomes excess to Air Force needs. Since the number of full time civilians assigned to the installations below the BRAC threshold defined by 10 USC § 2687(a)(1), I have recommended the base for closure. It is currently the only Air Force Reserve installation that meets these criteria, and as such, presents an opportunity to preserve national resources. After installation shutdown actions are complete, we expect an annual installation savings of approximately $25 million for the Air Force. In addition, 

manpower savings associated with the C–130 divestment will result in approximately $16 million savings the first year, and $32 million annual savings after that. 

Other factors we considered in the decision are that Air Force Reserve bases at 

Youngstown and Niagara are both within reasonable commuting distance from 

Pittsburgh. As a result, those bases may be able to support continued military service for those members of the 911th Airlift Wing who wish to remain serving but are 

unable to relocate to more distant Air Force Reserve 

Mr. CRITZ. Regarding the reduction of 65 C–130 tactical airlifters getting us to 

a total fleet projection of 318: The Air Force planned in the fiscal year 2012 budget 

to eventually modernize and upgrade 383 C–130’s and procure 38 C–27J’s to support intratheater, homeland defense, stead-state rotational, building partnership capacity, and Army time-sensitive/mission-critical airlift requirements. The Air Force’s 

minimum C–130 force structure, as concluded in the Mobility Capability and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16), was to go no lower than 335 C–130s under the 

QDR 2010 defense strategy. The budget request for fiscal year 2013 plans to divest 

intertheater (strategic) and intratheater (tactical) force structure in support of the 

new defense strategy. Air Force officials have stated that ‘‘Case 3’’ of the MCRS– 

16 was the analytical underpinning for new mobility force structure associated with 

the new 2012 defense strategy. As stated above, Air Force minimum C–130 force 

structure as concluded in MCRS–16 was to go no lower than 335 C–130s. However, 

MCRS–16 did not take into account United States Code Title 32 Air National Guard 

or Army Guard airlift missions that would be required to support State Governor 

mobilization missions nor did it account for the Army’s time-sensitive/mission-critical mission and noted that additional C–130s beyond the planned program of record 

of 335 aircraft and 38 C–27J aircraft may be required. Additionally, pre-9/11 the 

Army was around 480,000 strong with 530 C–130s, and now we are drawing down 

to similar force levels, 490,000, with only 318 C–130s planned. How will 318 C–130s 

support a force of 490,000 when pre-9/11 historical lift capacity indicates otherwise, 

and MCRS–16 Case 3 states that 335 C–130s PLUS 38 C–27Js is also not enough 

to execute Title 32 and Army time-sensitive missions? Is the Air Force’s plan to reduce or restrict Title 32 and other Army requirements? 

Secretary DONLEY. The 2013 Presidential Budget Request reduced the C–130 fleet 

size to 318 aircraft to meet the requirement that was outlined in the new strategy 

presented by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The fleet is sized to fulfill 
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intra-theater (270 aircraft) and Direct Support Mission (48 aircraft). The new strategy reduces the requirements as forces are no longer sized to meet two near-simultaneous large scale campaigns. The MCRS–16 had previously influenced sizing with 

Case 1 (335 C–130s) and Case 3 (270 C–130s). However, Case 1 was based on two 

near-simultaneous large-scale campaigns and, per the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is no longer a valid force-sizing scenario under the new strategy. Case 3, on 

the other hand, is consistent with the new strategy. Although the MCRS scenarios 

did not examine the Direct Support Mission, Case 3 did include airlift to support 

two domestic missions, a major regional disaster, and a Homeland Defense event 

to inform its 270 intra-theater aircraft requirements. 

Mr. CRITZ. Part of my concern is that we are actually adding duties to the Air 

Force’s C–130s, because they are going to be doing the C–27J lift as well. Just as 

a sort of general idea, I look at the C–27J, it was going to be sort of the pick-up 

truck and the C–130 might be more like a tractor trailer truck. I’m just curious if 

the C–130 is going to be able to get into the same airports as the C–27, and is it 

really a cost savings or are we going to start saying well we can’t get into these 

places so we’re going to up the tempo for the Chinooks to do what the C–130s can’t 

do. My question is, long-term—this is a short-term savings—is it also a long-term 

savings? Have we looked at the 20–30 year life cycle of these aircraft? 

Secretary DONLEY. According to the RAND USAF Intra-Theater Airlift Fleet Mix 

Analysis, Oct 2010; during sea-level/standard day conditions, the C–27J and C–130J 

require 2000 ft/2200 ft runway respectively. However, under high pressure altitude/ 

high temperature conditions which are representative of the majority of current operations in Afghanistan, the C–130J only requires 2600 feet while the C–27J requires 2700 feet with approximately 43% less payload. Further analysis of take off 

capability for the C–27J, C–130J, and C–130H reveals very similar short-field take 

off characteristics, with relatively miniscule differences in take off capability. The 

C–27J is a niche capability providing access to airfields that are 1700 feet or less 

in length. While this capability is not without value, current operations in deployed 

locations show that there are no airfields being used by the C–27J that cannot be 

accessed by the C–130J. 

In regard to long-term savings, there are substantial long-term savings associated 

with the divestiture of the C–27J. The 25-year life-cycle cost of the aircraft is $308M 

based on the May, 2011 Service Cost Position. Overall long-term cost avoidance for 

divesting the previously programmed fleet of 38 aircraft is $11.7B. 

Mr. CRITZ. What are the Air Force’s plans for the 21 C–27s already procured? 

Secretary DONLEY. The final disposition determination of the C–27J fleet will not 

be made until the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act is signed into law. The 

full range of disposition options is being considered. 

Mr. CRITZ. The Air Force’s decision to delay orders for 179 F–35s over the next 

five years will likely have an impact on overall program cost, and the cost-per-aircraft. This will affect our international partners as well as our own bottom line. In 

your budget analysis, what cost increases were assumed for the purchase delays? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Department of Defense made a decision reflected in the 

President’s Budget 2013 (PB13) budget request to delay the order of 179 F–35s (all 

three variants). The Air Force share of this delay includes a reduced procurement 

of 98 conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017. When a decision is made to delay procurement of aircraft, there are 

two primary effects on unit recurring flyaway cost. First, the contractor will not be 

as far down the learning curve in procurement and so average costs of the smaller 

quantity procured will be higher. Second, fixed contractor costs will be spread over 

fewer quantities. The increase in CTOL (F–35A) Unit Recurring Flyaway cost between PB12 and PB13 are shown below. 

CTOL URF 

Buy Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

FY12 (SAR 10) $112.1 $96.7 $91.2 $80.6 $84.8 

FY13 (SAR 11) $123.2 $122.0 $107.7 $93.4 $91.4 

URF Increase ($) $11.1 $25.3 $16.5 $12.8 $6.6 

URF Increase (%) 9.9% 26.2% 18.1% 15.9% 7.8% 
125 

Despite this projected increase in unit cost, the Air Force felt it a prudent choice 

to delay these quantities so as to reduce the risk of concurrent development and procurement. Since flight testing is not scheduled to be complete until fiscal year 2017, 

there is risk that planes procured now may require expensive retrofits later. The 

Air Force felt reducing this risk of concurrency outweighs any short-term increases 

in unit cost driven by the delay in procurement quantities within the Future Years 

Defense Plan. In addition, these delays allow the aircraft prime contractor time to 

stabilize production, decrease scrap and rework, and work through final finishes/ 

flight line issues. 

Mr. CRITZ. In an interview with Defense News 27 February, DOD Comptroller 

Robert Hale, in response to a question regarding the cancelling of the C–27J program, stated that ‘‘In the case of the C–27, we have enough C–130s to do most of 

that mission.’’ What percentage of the mission will C–130s not be able to cover, and 

what asset(s) will cover the remainder of that mission? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is postured to fully meet the Direct Support airlift mission requirements. C–27J was developed and procured to provide direct support airlift to Army urgent needs in difficult environments such as Afghanistan 

where we thought the C–130 might not be able to operate effectively. However, in 

practice, we did not experience the anticipated airfield constraints for C–130 operations in Afghanistan; furthermore, we expect these constraints to be marginal in 

future scenarios. The Air Force has analyzed scenarios consistent with the new 

strategy and determined a range of 22–50 aircraft would meet direct support airlift 

requirements. The 2013 Presidential Budget Request reduced the C–130 fleet size 

to 318 aircraft to meet the requirements of the new strategy. The fleet is sized to 

fulfill intra-theater airlift (270 aircraft) and the Direct Support airlift mission (48 

aircraft). 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What contracting structure will the Air Force pursue regarding its EELV procurement? Has Air Force determined a quantity or duration 

for the next EELV acquisition, starting in FY13? If so, what types of ‘‘off-ramps’’ 

are you considering to the block buy, if/when a New Entrant is qualified? 

Secretary DONLEY. The contracting structure is two-fold: release a Request for 

Proposal (RFP) that will properly inform a government decision on the quantity and 

length of the first block buy; and then award a contract based on analysis of the 

most advantageous approach to the government. The Air Force has not determined 

a final quantity or duration for the contract starting in fiscal year 2013. The Air 

Force believes it is essential to have more fidelity in the Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle (EELV) pricing strategy before making a long term contractual 

agreement. In order to validate the most advantageous production rate and commitment period, and to use maximum leverage in negotiations, the Government will require the contractor to propose a range of fixed prices for various rate and commitment options. The Government decision on the specific contractual commitment will 

be balanced among price, operational requirements, budget realities (including all 

fiscal law constraints), and potential for competition. Requirements above the commitment will be met through a full-and-open competition among all certified providers. While United Launch Alliance (ULA) is currently the only responsible source 

certified to launch EELV class payloads, research indicates there are potential New 

Entrants; however, the earliest timeframe to meet all EELV-class launch requirements appears to be fiscal year 2016–2017. 

To facilitate the certification of potential New Entrants, the Air Force has identified two opportunities that providers may bid on—the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) mission, targeted for launch in late fiscal year 2014, and the Space 

Test Program (STP) mission, targeted for launch in late fiscal year 2015. These 

EELV-class missions have a higher risk tolerance and will provide an opportunity 

for potential New Entrants to prove their capability for certification. When the 

Phase I Block Buy expires, assuming New Entrants are certified, we will have a 

full and open competition for launch services for the second Block Buy. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Currently the Air Force has 39 rocket booster cores purchased from ULA for 35 missions that have not yet launched, some purchased back 

in 1998. Given this substantial backlog of orders, why haven’t prices come down already? Indeed, why have they continued to increase by more than 50 percent? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force currently has 16 rocket booster cores on order 

to support 16 mission launches. For all National Security Space partners (National 

Reconnaissance Office, Navy, Air Force, and Australia) combined there are 32 rocket 

booster cores for 28 mission launches on order; 17 of these are currently in the pro-
126 

duction flow to be launched in fiscal year 2012 and 2013. Another 9 cores are projected to be launched in fiscal year 2014, while the remaining five are projected to 

fly out by fiscal year 2016, exhausting the backlog. The backlog does not affect the 

current vehicle pricing as the program’s initial inventory of components and smaller 

follow-on lot quantity buys are being depleted. Additionally, production breaks, production rework, subsequent recertification, annual inflation and a reduced supplier 

business base have driven higher unit costs, particularly from propulsion system 

suppliers. As a result of these factors, United Launch Alliance’s costs to build the 

launch vehicle have increased. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership Cost 

data for U–2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per operational hour 

(that is, the cost per hour executing missions) for Global Hawk is lower than U– 

2. This seems to be a much more relevant number than cost per flying hour. How 

does this square with your claim that Global Hawk operating costs are higher? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Global Hawk Block 30 has not matured to the point where 

a true apples-to-apples cost comparison of operational costs is possible. Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis during the FY13 budget review using 

the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database where Global Hawk and U– 

2 operating and support costs were compared using the operational cost per flying 

hour (CPFH) metric. This metric reflects costs associated with the sum total of a 

platform’s flying hours including training hours and the flying hours associated with 

mission execution. The AFTOC figures for FY11 show the U–2 had $32K per hour 

and the RQ–4 also had $32K per hour. The Air Force did not begin flying the RQ– 

4 Block 30 until March 2011, so there is only six months of representative flying 

hour information in the database. Also, the Air Force did not fly the RQ–4 Block 

30 with the SIGINT sensor in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying this payload 

in April 2012 and once operational, we expect the Global Hawk CPFH to increase 

relative to those of the U–2. Given these flying hour cost considerations, and the 

large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 

program and save a net of $2.5B. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The Department based its Global Hawk Block 30 divestment 

decision on it being more expensive to operate than the U–2. Can you explain how 

the Department determined these costs? 

Secretary DONLEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. JOHNSON. Secretary Donley: How long will the A–10 aircraft remaining in 

service under your budget proposal stay in the fleet? 

Secretary DONLEY. Under our current plans, the A–10 will remain in the Air 

Force inventory through 2035. At that time, the average age of remaining A–10s 

in the fleet will be approximately 53 years old. 

Mr. JOHNSON. General Schwartz: Even after the B–2 is not adequately survivable 

in the least permissive air defense environments, the U.S. Armed Forces will have 

the F–35, the F–22, cruise missiles, prompt global strike capability, and long-range 

stealthy unmanned strike aircraft. To complement this set of impressive strike systems, what unique capabilities will a manned ‘‘next-generation’’ bomber provide? 

Please specify those unique capabilities the bomber would provide such that its role 

is not redundant given the other systems at the disposal of the Armed Forces. 

General SCHWARTZ. The Long Range Strike Bomber’s unique capabilities include 

long range, significant payload capacity, operational flexibility, and survivability in 

anti-access environments. 

The Long Range Strike Bomber will provide the President with the option to hold 

any target at risk at any point on the globe. Its long range, large payload, and survivability will provide operational flexibility and necessary capacity to satisfy Joint 

commander needs across the range of military operations. Fighters provide great 

value in shorter range engagements, but offer limited capability and capacity to 

service targets deep within enemy territory, especially if theater basing is constrained or unavailable. 

The Long Range Strike Bomber will employ a broad mix of standoff and direct 

attack munitions to provide effects within hours across the spectrum of conflict, 

from deterrence to raids to campaigns. While standoff weapons provide an essential 

capability to prosecute targets in dense anti-access environments, their significant 

expense and limited quantity constrain their capacity to address an extensive target 

set. Further, standoff weapons are less effective against mobile targets due to the 

fleeting nature of the targets coupled with the finite speed of the weapons. A surviv-
127 

able bomber fleet is necessary to penetrate enemy air defenses and deliver the volume of munitions required to address the potential target set. 

In addition, bombers remain a key element of our nuclear deterrence capability 

and are the only systems that can be surged, relocated, and recalled. The Long 

Range Strike Bomber will be designed from the outset to be capable of nuclear 

weapons employment and certified for nuclear operations in time to meet United 

States Strategic Command’s nuclear force structure requirements. 

Despite upgrades, our aging bomber inventories are increasingly at risk to modern 

air defenses and are becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain and 

modernize. The Air Force plans to field 80–100 Long Range Strike Bombers beginning in the mid-2020s to ensure they are available before the current aging bomber 

fleet begins to go out of service. 

Mr. JOHNSON. General: We’re retiring A–10s, unmanned systems provide useful 

air-to-ground capabilities but are controlled from thousands of miles away, and the 

F–35 can’t fully replicate the close air support capabilities of the A–10. In future 

land warfare scenarios, how are we going to provide close air support to troops in 

combat? 

General SCHWARTZ. The remaining A–10, F–16, MQ–9, MQ–1, F–15E, B–1, & B– 

52 aircraft force structure will meet the requirements for air-to-ground and Close 

Air Support capability. This aircraft force structure is based on conducting one 

large-scale combined-arms campaign in a single region while simultaneously denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, an opportunistic aggressor 

in a second region. Multi-role platforms were preferred over the A–10 due to providing greater utility across the range of potential missions for which the Air Force 

is directed to prepare. 

Mr. JOHNSON. General: Does the F–35 fully replicate the close air support capabilities of the A–10? 

General SCHWARTZ. When test and development is complete and the USAF has 

sufficient capability and capacity of Joint Strike Fighters to begin replacing our legacy fleet, the F–35 will have the appropriate capabilities to safely and effectively 

conduct the close air support (CAS) mission, similar to our F–16 and F–15E fleets. 

While not optimized for CAS like the A–10, the F–35 will be able to conduct this 

mission and survive in the higher threat scenarios we expect to face in the future. 

Although the F–35 will eventually replace the A–10, the USAF is planning to keep 

A–10s in our fleet to provide CAS for ground forces until at least the 2030s. Replacement of the single-mission focused A–10 with the multi-role F–35 provides the 

USAF and the Department of Defense a more affordable solution to retire and replace our aging legacy fleet while ensuring our ability to meet National Military 

Strategy requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. HECK 

Dr. HECK. The F–35 provides a significant challenge to the Nevada Test and 

Training Range (NTTR). The F–35 has new unique capabilites in the way that it 

detects and engages ground threats (Surface to Air Missile Systems, Aquisition Radars, etc.) F–35 targets are not only detected via radio signals and infared signatures, but also proper visual signatures. At this time, the NTTR does not have 

ground target systems that can provide all three parameters to the F–35s being 

trained at the NTTR. 

1) Does the Air Force see this as a challenge in supporting current and future 

F–35 training within the existing NTTR infrastructure? 

2) How does the Air Force intend on employing the existing NTTR capability in 

support of that training? 

3) If there are identified shortfalls in support of F–35 training, what are they, 

what are the capabilities required to alleviate them, and what are the associated 

costs and priorities for each needed capability? 

4) If capabilites are needed, when do they need to be in place to support propper 

F–35 training? 

5) What are the current personnel authorization changes at Nellis AFB or the 

NTTR resulting from the current F–35 program in FY13 budget and are they quantified at this time? 

Secretary DONLEY. The unique capabilities of the F–35 do create challenges for 

the Air Force in providing support for future training at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). However, these challenges are being addressed and will be met 

through various avenues of approach. The Air Force is in the process of investigating and acquiring threat emitters that will be used to meet the requirements 

of the F–35. Additionally, many of the challenges posed by the F–35 will be met by 
128 

creating a training environment that is not only composed of traditional threats and 

threat emitters, but will synthesize virtual threats creating a combined Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) training environment. This composition will allow the 

NTTR and other ranges supporting the F–35 to provide necessary training. 

The NTTR will employ its existing capabilities, along with those in the acquisition 

process, to provide the ‘‘live’’ portion of the LVC concept. To meet the unique sensor 

requirements of the F–35, the NTTR is developing a CONOPs for a dry ‘‘sensor fusion’’ range that will consist of realistic targets/decoys. Additionally, the NTTR is 

investigating the use of assets currently located at other ranges to increase its capabilities. The NTTR is working with Pacific Air Forces to examine the option of entering into a phased ‘‘threat’’ sharing agreement that will provide additional threat 

density and realistic threat emitters to meet the F–35 training requirements. The 

first phase will only include one threat emitter. While the NTTR currently provides 

the best training for F–22 and 5th gen aircraft and has the best target sets available, these target sets alone are not sufficient to provide realistic training when 

multiple sensors (EO, visual, Radar) are fused into a single picture. (These limitations also exist within current 4th generation training.) Current emitters are also 

insufficient to provide adequate density to fully replicate threat environments. To 

meet these shortfalls Air Combat Command (ACC) is procuring more threat 

emitters for NTTR; however it is impractical to procure enough emitters to fully represent threats anticipated in current operational plans. ACC intends to use LVC 

training to overcome these shortfalls by providing sufficient threat density and realistic training to ‘stress’ pilots. New targets need to be in-place by 1 August 2014 

when the first F–35s are scheduled to arrive at the Air Force Weapons School. 

There are no personnel authorization changes at the NTTR resulting from the current F–35 program in the FY13 budget. 

Dr. HECK. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop: 

1) Secretary Donnelly, in FY2013, the Air Force has requested $135.4 million in 

RDT&E funds in the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile—Engineering and Manufacturing Development funding line (PE 0604851F). Air Force budget justification documents cite a sub-element request of $8.0 million for a new start Solid Rocket Motor 

Modernization program. Specifically, related justification documents state that the 

Air Force plans to use these funds to: 

‘‘Accomplish studies to investigate the application of new technologies in the Minuteman III booster stack. Evaluate current Minuteman III solid rocket motor requirements and update as required based on legacy system issues and availability 

of mature technology that will reduce total ownership costs. Prepare for release of 

requests for proposals.’’ 

What ‘‘new technologies’’ do you foresee being investigated during these studies? 

Budget documents show no funds requested in the out-years for this effort. With no 

follow-on funding requested, how will any of these technologies be fully developed? 

Secretary DONLEY. New technology candidates for insertion into a possible solid 

rocket motor program include components the Air Force has developed within the 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program (PAP). Included in these are advanced propellants, igniters, composite case materials, case insulation, thrust vector actuators, and nozzles. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force will analyze the maturity level of available 

technologies and identify the most promising candidates. 

ICBM Dem/Val matures technology to a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 and 

then makes it available for use within a program where it can be fully developed 

and integrated into a production effort. The candidates identified in fiscal year 2013 

will be assessed for use in a future Minuteman III Solid Rocket Motor Modernization program as well as in any ICBM follow-on program considered in the Ground 

Based Strategic Deterrence (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives, which is funded in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014. 

Dr. HECK. The F–35 provides a significant challenge to the Nevada Test and 

Training Range (NTTR). The F–35 has new unique capabilites in the way that it 

detects and engages ground threats (Surface to Air Missile Systems, Aquisition Radars, etc.) F–35 targets are not only detected via radio signals and infared signatures, but also proper visual signatures. At this time, the NTTR does not have 

ground target systems that can provide all three parameters to the F–35s being 

trained at the NTTR. 

1) Does the Air Force see this as a challenge in supporting current and future 

F–35 training within the existing NTTR infrastructure? 

2) How does the Air Force intend on employing the existing NTTR capability in 

support of that training? 
129 

3) If there are identified shortfalls in support of F–35 training, what are they, 

what are the capabilities required to alleviate them, and what are the associated 

costs and priorities for each needed capability? 

4) If capabilites are needed, when do they need to be in place to support propper 

F–35 training? 

5) What are the current personnel authorization changes at Nellis AFB or the 

NTTR resulting from the current F–35 program in FY13 budget and are they quantified at this time? 

General SCHWARTZ. The unique capabilities of the F–35 do create challenges for 

the Air Force in providing support for future training at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). However, these challenges are being addressed and will be met 

through various avenues of approach. The Air Force is in the process of investigating and acquiring threat emitters that will be used to meet the requirements 

of the F–35. Additionally, many of the challenges posed by the F–35 will be met by 

creating a training environment that is not only composed of traditional threats and 

threat emitters, but will synthesize virtual threats creating a combined Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) training environment. This composition will allow the 

NTTR and other ranges supporting the F–35 to provide necessary training. 

The NTTR will employ its existing capabilities, along with those in the acquisition 

process, to provide the ‘‘live’’ portion of the LVC concept. To meet the unique sensor 

requirements of the F–35, the NTTR is developing a CONOPs for a dry ‘‘sensor fusion’’ range that will consist of realistic targets/decoys. Additionally, the NTTR is 

investigating the use of assets currently located at other ranges to increase its capabilities. The NTTR is working with Pacific Air Forces to examine the option of entering into a phased ‘‘threat’’ sharing agreement that will provide additional threat 

density and realistic threat emitters to meet the F–35 training requirements. The 

first phase will only include one threat emitter. While the NTTR currently provides 

the best training for F–22 and 5th gen aircraft and has the best target sets available, these target sets alone are not sufficient to provide realistic training when 

multiple sensors (EO, visual, Radar) are fused into a single picture. (These limitations also exist within current 4th generation training.) Current emitters are also 

insufficient to provide adequate density to fully replicate threat environments. To 

meet these shortfalls Air Combat Command (ACC) is procuring more threat 

emitters for NTTR; however it is impractical to procure enough emitters to fully represent threats anticipated in current operational plans. ACC intends to use LVC 

training to overcome these shortfalls by providing sufficient threat density and realistic training to ‘stress’ pilots. New targets need to be in-place by 1 August 2014 

when the first F–35s are scheduled to arrive at the Air Force Weapons School. 

There are no personnel authorization changes at the NTTR resulting from the current F–35 program in the FY13 budget. 

Dr. HECK. The Air Force recently announced that it is setting aside the award 

for the Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft program. In subsequent press statements, 

Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz called the issue ‘‘embarrassing’’ and cited poor documentation processes as the reason for delaying this important capability to help 

transition U.S. force out of Afghanistan. Was the issue in fact a matter of documentation or rather of specific decision process substance? What is the Air Force’s 

specific plan moving forward? Will the service continue to use the same solicitation 

or delay this time-sensitive program with another RFP? What is the new timeline 

for contract award? 

General SCHWARTZ. After the Air Force announced that it is setting aside the 

award for the Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft program, on February 27, 2012, the 

Air Force Materiel Command Commander initiated a commander directed investigation (CDI). The CDI into the LAS procurement confirmed that inconsistencies in 

level of documentation, failure to fully adhere to Source Selection processes outline 

in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and supplements and source selection 

team inexperience contributed to the need to restart the LAS source selection. As 

a result, a new source selection team was established and an amended RFP was 

released to both offerors on May 4, 2012. The amended RFP did not include any 

changes to requirements but more clearly defined the evaluation criteria and decision-making process. Air Force officials met individually with both original offerors, 

SNC and HBDC, to review the amended RFP changes line-by-line on April 17, 2012. 

Both offerors submitted comments on the draft amended RFP, which were individually addressed prior to release of the amended RFP. While the decision process will 

be event-driven, the Air Force targets a source selection decision in early calendar 

year 2013. This would allow first aircraft delivery to Afghanistan in third quarter 

2014. 

Dr. HECK. With respect to a recompetition of the LAS program, since the RFP was 

for a nondevelopmental solution, will new or readmitted competitors be allowed to 
130 

introduce new information, such as product developments or improvements that 

were accomplished after the deadlines for original RFP submissions? Will the Air 

Force maintain the mission-based performance requirements from the original competition, or lower the requirements to allow additional competitors? Will offerings 

that have not previously been produced in the United States be barred from the future competition? If so, please explain why. Additionally, please explain fully why 

Hawker Beechcraft was found technicially insufficient and therefore excluded from 

the competitive range during the original LAS competition. 

General SCHWARTZ. Consistent with the corrective action accepted by the Court 

of Federal Claims, the Air Force decided to issue an amendment to the LAS request 

for proposal (RFP) to current offerors. The amended RFP did not include any 

changes to requirements but more clearly defined the evaluation criteria and decision-making process. Because offerors may submit entirely new proposals in response to this amended RFP, either offeror could conceivably submit new information. 

Offerings that have not previously been produced in the United States are not 

barred from the LAS competition. LAS offerors with proposals that meet the requirements and other terms and conditions of the request for proposal will be considered for award. Specifically, the RFP incorporates provisions required by the Buy 

American Act and the Balance of Payments Program. Each offeror will be required 

to certify whether it will provide domestic end products, qualifying country end 

products, or other foreign end products. The Buy American Act and Balance of Payments Program clause (DFARS 252.225–7001) incorporated in the solicitation defines a domestic end product, in part, as an end product manufactured in the United 

States ‘‘if the cost of its qualifying country components and its components that are 

mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the 

cost of all its components.’’ The evaluated price would be adjusted, if and as required by DFARS 225, for an offeror who proposes a foreign end product. The 

Source Selection Authority will consider the adjusted evaluated price in the bestvalue award decision. 

The results of the evaluation of HBDC’s proposal are considered to be source selection and proprietary information and only releasable by HBDC. 

Dr. HECK. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop: 

The Senate version of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act included 

report language stating: ‘‘. . . the Air Force may use up to $12.0 million of the funds available for the solid 

rocket motor warm line for consolidation purposes. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to inform the committee no later than December 1, 2011, 

of its decision and the funding needed to carry out such decision.’’ 

What decision has been made concerning this ‘‘consolidation’’? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line program will close out in 

fiscal year 2012 and will document, disassemble, clean and store the government 

furnished equipment used during the Warm Line program. Before the Air Force 

puts its equipment in long term storage, we will use up to $10M of fiscal year 2012 

Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line closeout funds to perform a Solid Rocket Motor 

Smart Transition. The Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line Smart Transition activity will 

transfer and install Stage 1 equipment at the ATK Bacchus facility. After washing 

out and recasting a Stage 1 motor, we will static fire the motor, document the result, then disassemble, clean, and store all equipment. Through this testing and documentation, the Air Force will establish the procedures necessary to quickly install 

the equipment at a consolidated production facility in the future. This ensures the 

Air Force retains the capability to re-pour the current motors while helping to sustain the industrial base through consolidation of excess infrastructure. This consolidation also allows the contractor to manufacture a variety of solid rocket motors 

more efficiently, thereby reducing contractor overhead and providing an overall cost 

savings to the government. The Air Force’s decision to implement this smart transition is consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Solid Rocket Motor 

Interagency Task Force recommendation to right-size solid rocket motor contractor 

production facilities. 

Dr. HECK. Submitted on behalf on Representative Rob Bishop: 

In FY2013, the Air Force has requested $71.2 million in RDT&E funds in the 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile—Demonstration/Validation funding line (PE 

0603851F). Air Force budget justification documents cite a sub-element request of 

$45.0 million for the ICBM Propulsion Applications Program, a program otherwise 

known as ‘‘PAP.’’ Related justification documents state that the Air Force plans to 

use some PAP funds to ‘‘continue LCS [Large Class Stage] motor development.’’ In 

fact, I understand that as much as 25% of FY2012 funds are being used to integrate 

Minuteman LCS stages into a demonstration launch vehicle, a task in the past left 
131 

for industry, even as there are no funds for LCS flight tests.’’ Please tell me why 

these funds are not better spent on the continued development of MCS [Medium 

Class Stage] motors, where there appear to be sufficient funds for flight tests? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Demonstration/ 

Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program (PAP) is transitioning technology development efforts from Large Class Stage (LCS) to Medium Class Stage 

(MCS) in fiscal year 2013. Technologies demonstrated under LCS, (e.g.) domestic 

fiber case qualifications and thrust vector control development, as well as early integration work will help reduce MCS motor development risk. There is no plan to 

flight test the integrated LCS booster in the PAP program, but exercising the systems engineering expertise required to do the integration work has value for continued MCS development. 

Dr. HECK. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop: 

This Administration has repeatedly stated that they wish to reduce negative environmental impacts made by Department of Defense programs and activities. At the 

same time, the Air Force continues to demilitarize its excess rocket motors, specifically Minuteman stages 1 and 2, through open burning. I understand industry has 

developed an alternative method, where propellant is washed out, and then key ingredients—such as ammonium perchlorate—are recovered. While this process may 

be slightly more expensive, since it eliminates introduction of pollutants to the atmosphere, is the Air Force considering moving in this direction? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force’s Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP) is responsible for storage, aging surveillance, and demilitarization of many excess and 

decommissioned motor assets, primarily Minuteman and Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) motors. The decision to dispose of excess solid rocket 

motors via burning or chemical wash-out is subject to many considerations, to include motor type, environmental regulations, existing Depot 50/50 law, weather, facility capacity, contract availability, and costs. While the Air Force Comprehensive 

Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment (AFCANS) 2 Report resulted in the addition of 

$11 million over fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 for motor destruction (which 

is being used to dispose of approximately 150 motors, including at least 15 Minuteman 1st Stage motors by the washout method) most years have no funding available 

for motor destruction. Without AFCANS funds, the near-total of RSLP funds are 

utilized to store excess motor assets and complete safety-of-storage aging surveillance. The Air Force will continue to apply its current decision-making processes for 

motor destruction, to include adherence to existing laws and environmental regulations, when demilitarization funding is available. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING 

Mr. SCHILLING. What is the Air Force doing to increase competition opportunities 

and therefore cut down on costs for DOD on all levels of the industrial base—from 

subsystem and component levels to major platforms? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force continually looks to find places, both large and 

small, where we can leverage competition and reduce costs. The Air Force is working to understand the interrelated supply chains that support our programs at all 

levels of the industrial base. As we increase supply chain visibility we will be able 

to identify risk. It will also allow the Air Force to identify opportunities to evaluate 

for cost effective breakouts, as well as the potential to move competition to lower, 

more competitive tiers in the supply chain. 

The Air Force is also taking a comprehensive approach that looks at both our legacy platforms and our new platforms in terms of data rights and ownership. Where 

our legacy platforms did not include full ownership of data rights, thus limiting 

competition, the Air Force has initiated a business case analysis to determine which 

data rights are required to organically sustain our legacy major weapons systems. 

We then look at ways to pursue attaining the rights for that data and the trade 

off of attaining the rights versus the cost to do so. Where new platforms are established, the Air Force is taking a proactive planning approach by determining what 

type of data rights are required for both acquisition and sustainment. This approach 

will lend itself to greater competition and cost savings at various milestones through 

the acquisition and sustainment life cycles. 

Mr. SCHILLING. How does the Air Force intend to ensure that small and medium 

sized business are able to compete for contracts? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force recently released the ‘‘Small Business Improvement Plan’’ which has several recommendations. The first four are adopted from the 

plan: 
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a) More standardization of North American Industrial Classification System 

(NAICS) Code (dollar and size standards). Contracting officers too often assign two 

or more NAICS codes to the same or very similar types of acquisitions resulting in 

lost opportunities for small businesses that have grown out of the small business 

category when a larger more appropriate NAIC S size standard could have been applied. Where flexibility in application of NAICS codes exists, Air Force leadership 

will provide guidance for the uniform selection of NAICS codes that maximizes practicable opportunity for small business prime contract participation. 

b) Use of a Bundling and Consolidation ‘‘early warning report’’ to alert key stakeholders as early as possible and to ensure that the Air Force provides maximum 

practicable opportunity for small business participation 

c) Encourage teaming by small businesses with firms other than small (there is 

no such term as ‘‘medium’’ size in federal contracting) in order to compete for larger 

dollar contracts Solicitations should contain language that encourages teaming arrangements and/or joint ventures to counter the tendency to issue larger, sometimes 

bundled or consolidated contracts 

d) Improve the quality and availability of acquisition procurement forecasting information available to small businesses. This would allow small businesses more 

time to plan for responding to upcoming acquisitions, to more fully consider teaming 

arrangements and to produce a higher quality Request for Proposal 

e) Identify and standardize market research processes to maximize small business 

opportunities in Air Force services contracts. After processes are developed, provide 

training to our small business specialists who, in turn, can train the acquisition 

community 

f) Require that the small business specialist fully participate in all early acquisition planning meetings and review all documentation. These include review of ‘‘requirement approval documents’’ (RADs). This provides more planning time to fashion successful small business set-aside strategies 

Mr. SCHILLING. How do the Air Force’s views on best practices compare to the 

commercial sector’s best practices? 

The above QFR was rephrased by the committee POC and/or Military Legislative 

Fellow Derek R. Noel, as of 04/09/2012: QFR: The commercial aircraft industry has 

embraced FAA-approved components and repairs for the PW2000 engine, but the 

Air Force has still not found these practices acceptable for F117 repair contracts. 

If the commercial industry is finding considerable success in using FAA-approved 

components and repairs, why is the Air Force not considering the same practice for 

the F117 engine? 

Secretary DONLEY. In December, Pratt and Whitney (P&W) agreed to share their 

repair and overhaul manuals, which was a major step to enable proper overhaul and 

supply chain competition. With access to the repair manuals, the Air Force proposes 

a F117 competitive contract which aligns F117 supply chain with industry best 

practice. 

The P&W manuals allowed the Air Force to enhance the competitive playing field 

by building on PW2000 commercial approaches, and allow the Air Force to more 

rapidly reduce the F117’s reliance on the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 

in parts repair and new parts source approval process. Because the Air Force flies 

its engines in six profiles for which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will 

not certify the F117 engine, we cannot rely on FAA certified parts manufacturer approval (PMA) parts. Instead, we have elected to mimic the Delta Airline engine repair approach we learned of during further market research. More specifically, like 

Delta, we will rely on P&W as the OEM for as much as 95 percent of the new engine parts in the near term and rather than continually buying new parts, the commercial data P&W made available allows us to repair the parts rather than replace 

them. We expect this strategy to deliver significant savings over exclusive parts replacement, which we believe has been P&W’s technique. 

Additionally, to seek new part cost savings through our Source Approval Request 

(SAR) process, similar to those we believe are achieved by United/Chromalloy 

(through the FAA’s PMA process), the P&W data will allow the Air Force to procure 

and use non-OEM parts. This will separate us from an exclusive relationship with 

P&W for OEM parts. However, to immediately and unconditionally accept FAA certified PMA parts for the F117 engine puts our crews and aircraft at operational 

safety risk. Without validation that the parts can perform to our military mission, 

the Air Force cannot accept the risk. Once PMA parts are validated and found to 

be safe, suitable and cost effective they will be used for the military application. 

The competitive approach the Air Force has proposed puts us on an ownership 

track that keeps our crews safe, will deliver near-term and long-term savings in repaired part costs, and promises more savings to come via the source approval process for new non-OEM parts. 
133 

Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated that cutting squadrons was painful, but necessary. What assessments were made when deciding that the Air Force should cut 

these squadrons? Would other efficiencies have been able to cover the costs of keeping some of these important squadrons? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force formed a General Officer-led team of Active 

Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined force structure changes at 

various locations. Each course of action was assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location 

(e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or 

disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Before backfill missions were identified, 24 squadron-level units were in jeopardy of 

being eliminated and eight installations would have been left without an operational 

Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units 

were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission. 

The new Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic Guidance ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense’’ directs the services to build a 

force that will be smaller and leaner, flexible, ready and technologically advanced. 

As such, the Air Force was able to make force structure reductions, with acceptable 

risk, to provide the capabilities required by the new DOD Strategic Guidance. The 

Air Force identified $33 billion in efficiencies in the FY12 President’s Budget (PB), 

which the Air Force was able to realign from tail to tooth, and an additional $6 billion in efficiencies in the FY13 PB. Additional efficiencies would come at the expense of other programs and possibly prevent the Air Force from meeting the capability required in the new DOD Strategic Guidance. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated the importance of the Air Force’s work on cyberspace security issues for some time and have now reiterated that point and noted 

that it is vital for our networked force. You also mentioned that our adversaries are 

realizing the benefits of doing so as well. How do you see the Air Force’s role in 

addressing this force structure change in current and future adversaries? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master 

Plan, submitted by the Air Force Core Function Lead Integrator for Cyberspace Superiority (AFSPC/CC), specifies nine capabilities that require programmatic actions 

to evolve the force from its current capability state: Passive Defense, Defensive 

Counter Cyberspace, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Situational 

Awareness, Persistent Network Operations, Data Confidentiality & Integrity Systems, Cyberspace Air Operations Center, Offensive Counter Cyberspace for Global 

Reach and Access, Contingency Extension, and Influence Operations. The ability to 

integrate and leverage these capabilities will underpin force projection in all domains while serving to deny adversaries operational and informational advantages. 

The Air Force will meet this challenge by dedicating funding to ensure its ability 

to operate effectively and enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical cyber 

capabilities. Cyberspace capabilities will assure freedom of action to conduct operations at times of our choosing by safeguarding cyberspace systems and negating 

adversary cyberspace capabilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN 

Mr. RUNYAN. How much do you anticipate saving if you retire the C–5s, C–130s, 

and the six fighter squadrons? 

General SCHWARTZ. Based on the retirements of 27 C–5As, 65 C–130s, and 123 

A–10s and F–16s, the Air Force projects to save approximately $458 million in FY13 

and $4.1 billion over the Future Years Defense Program. 

Mr. RUNYAN. What would be the economic effect on the Air Force if you put all 

those aircraft (C–5s, C–130s, and the six fighter squadrons) you plan to retire into 

the Reserve and Guard instead of retiring them? 

General SCHWARTZ. Retaining C–5A and C–130H aircraft retired in the FY13 

President’s Budget (PB) would provide excess strategic and theater airlift capacity 

at the expense of other programs vital to national defense. Replacing the aircraft 

in the Guard and Reserve would result in the requirement to restore over $2.97 billion in operations, maintenance, and personnel funds. This amount does not include 

additional costs associated with modification programs or the cost to address obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing source issues unique to the C–5A and C– 

130H fleets. Placing those aircraft back in the Reserve and Guard would require the 

Air Force to divert funds from other critical programs. The FY13 PB divested five 

Air Reserve Component (ARC) fighter squadrons and one Active component fighter 
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squadron. The economic effect of restoring five ARC squadrons to the FY12 PB level 

is an unfunded cost of $207 million in FY14 and $1,414 billion over the next five 

years in both manpower and operations & maintenance costs. Notionally moving the 

sixth combat coded squadron from the Active Component to the ARC generates an 

unfunded cost of $38M in FY14 and $265M over the next five years in both manpower and operations & maintenance costs. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Can you retire less aircraft if you put more of them in the National 

Guard and Reserve? Could you not have more aircraft available if you made the 

ratio of Active to Reserve Component flying squadrons 1:3? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force does not intend to change the planned active 

and reserve component mix. Force structure adjustments have been and will continue to be supported by Force Composition Analyses of weapon system and career 

field communities, which use models developed by SAF/FM’s Center of Expertise 

(COE) to present cost and benefit information for several Active and Reserve Component mixes produced by combinations of stand-alone units and Total Force Integration Associations. The Air Force will continue to leverage the Total Force’s Regular Air Force (RegAF), Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve components to maintain the same high capabilities and standards across the components 

while meeting our many and varied commitments. Maintaining the appropriate mix 

of forces between the Active and Reserve Components is critical to sustaining Air 

Force capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate rotational demands with a smaller overall force. In 1990, the Reserve Component represented 

25 percent of Total Force end strength; today that percentage is 35 percent. The 

proper ratio between Components must be achieved to maintain acceptable operations tempo levels within each Component, and to preserve the ability of a smaller 

Air Force to meet continued overseas presence demands and the rapid deployment 

and rotational force requirements of the strategic guidance. After the proposed force 

reductions and mitigations of FY13, Reserve Component end strength will make up 

33 percent of Total Force military personnel, a reduction of two percent from the 

FY12 numbers. Within the Combat Air Forces (CAF), the Reserve Component will 

have 38 percent of total aircraft which is only four percent lower than FY12. For 

the Mobility Air Forces (MAF), the Reserve Component shares shift from 51 percent 

to 46 percent. In order to maintain and enhance combat capability, the Air Force 

intends to grow the number of Total Force Integration Associations from 100 to 115. 

This will enable the seasoning of our RegAF personnel while improving the combat 

capacity of our Reserve Component. The FY13 Active and Reserve Component mix 

is the appropriate mix to maintain the Air Force’s combat capability. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Do you think that keeping a smaller Active force and greatly increasing the Reserve Component forces will decrease your combat capability? Why 

or why not? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force does not intend to change the planned active 

and reserve component mix. Force structure adjustments have been and will continue to be supported by Force Composition Analyses of weapon system and career 

field communities, which use models developed by SAF/FM’s Center of Expertise 

(COE) to present cost and benefit information for several Active and Reserve Component mixes produced by combinations of stand-alone units and Total Force Integration Associations. The Air Force will continue to leverage the Total Force’s Regular Air Force (RegAF), Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve components to maintain the same high capabilities and standards across the components 

while meeting our many and varied commitments. Maintaining the appropriate mix 

of forces between the Active and Reserve Components is critical to sustaining Air 

Force capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate rotational demands with a smaller overall force. In 1990, the Reserve Component represented 

25 percent of Total Force end strength; today that percentage is 35 percent. The 

proper ratio between Components must be achieved to maintain acceptable operations tempo levels within each Component, and to preserve the ability of a smaller 

Air Force to meet continued overseas presence demands and the rapid deployment 

and rotational force requirements of the strategic guidance. After the proposed force 

reductions and mitigations of FY13, Reserve Component end strength will make up 

33 percent of Total Force military personnel, a reduction of two percent from the 

FY12 numbers. Within the Combat Air Forces (CAF), the Reserve Component will 

have 38 percent of total aircraft which is only four percent lower than FY12. For 

the Mobility Air Forces (MAF), the Reserve Component shares shift from 51 percent 

to 46 percent. In order to maintain and enhance combat capability, the Air Force 

intends to grow the number of Total Force Integration Associations from 100 to 115. 

This will enable the seasoning of our RegAF personnel while improving the combat 

capacity of our Reserve Component. The FY13 Active and Reserve Component mix 

is the appropriate mix to maintain the Air Force’s combat capability. 
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Mr. RUNYAN. What missions can you put into the Reserve Component forces 

where you can perform them at lower cost? ICBM? Pilot training? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is rebalancing the Total Force to match capability and capacity requirements of the new Defense Strategy. The Air Force, in full 

collaboration with Reserve Component (RC) leadership, will make decisions placing 

mission capabilities in the Guard/Reserve to achieve an appropriate mix in order to 

sustain the Air Force’s ability to provide forward presence, rapid crisis response, 

and high rotational demands. Examples of these missions include remotely piloted 

aircraft operations, MC–12W, and intelligence. 

Decisions on the placement of capabilities into RC forces were based upon mission 

requirements and included analysis of the costs involved. RC value is enhanced by 

a part-time model and the continuum-of-service construct whereby their participation in all mission sets is valuable, but more cost effective in missions that do not 

require full-time participation to meet daily requirements, such as pilot training. 

The RC is already a full partner in the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise and is fully 

integrated in six of the thirteen core nuclear career fields. The Air Force is currently 

evaluating several additional mission areas where greater RC participation would 

benefit the Air Force through increased continuity and retention of critical nuclear 

expertise. RC Security Forces currently support of the Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missille (ICBM) mission at Minot AFB and the Air Force continues to assess other 

areas of the ICBM mission that may be compatible with RC participation. 

The Air Force will continue to analyze the best mix of forces and capabilities between the Active and RC forces balancing costs and mission requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you describe the relationship between the U.S. Air Force 

and the Republic of China Air Force? What impact does the ban on U.S. general 

officers visiting Taiwan have on enhancing and building upon this relationship? 

General SCHWARTZ. The United States Air Force (USAF) and Taiwan Air Force 

relationship is strong. Our current Air Force leadership has developed enduring relationships with their Taiwan Air Force counterparts through annual meetings here 

in Washington. The USAF works closely with our Taiwan counterparts to provide 

the services they need to transform their force into one that will continue to deter 

aggression from the People’s Republic of China. Last September the Administration 

announced a $5.85B sale to Taiwan that included retrofitting their F–16 A/Bs. This 

retrofit will significantly increase the war-fighting capability of Taiwan’s Air Force. 

What impact does the ban on U.S. general officers visiting Taiwan have on enhancing and building upon this relationship? 

The ban has had minimal impact to the USAF–Taiwan Air Force relationship, due 

to the strong relationships built through engagement here in Washington. In addition, consistent with our longstanding policy, we will continue the practice of sending USAF Senior Executive Service (SES) leaders and retired flag officers to Taiwan 

to assist in improving their defense capabilities. Most recently, Ms. Grant (SAF/IA) 

and Mr. Wert (ESC) visited Taiwan and provided security cooperation on F–16 A/ 

B retrofit program and the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP). Retired flag officer 

visitors have included Admiral (ret) Blair, Admiral (ret) Natter, Lieutenant General 

(ret) Gregson, and Lieutenant General (ret) Leaf. They have all spent weeks in Taiwan sharing their decades of experience and mentoring senior Taiwan flag officers 

on how to improve Taiwan’s defenses, culminating in the annual Han Kuang exercise. We will continue to send these highly-qualified Air Force leaders to preserve 

our strong ties and help ensure Taiwan maintains a robust self-defense capability. 

Mr. SCOTT. When do you expect to complete the JSTARS Analysis of Alternatives 

(AoA) study? 

General SCHWARTZ. Air Combat Command (ACC) presented the results of the Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 

to the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC) for validation on 30 November 2011. Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the AoA’s release on 25 

Jan 12 to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). OSD/CAPE is currently reviewing the final report for sufficiency. 

Mr. SCOTT. DOD’s new strategic guidance calls for cooperative partnerships to bolster common interests around the world. What are some examples of the kinds of 

innovative partnerships that the U.S. Air Force can assist in developing? 

General SCHWARTZ. Developing mutually beneficial partnerships with militaries 

around the world enables interoperability, integration and interdependence between 
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Coalition forces while providing our partner nations the capability and capacity to 

resolve their own national security challenges. Through these relationships, we are 

able to develop innovative partnerships such as the Wideband Global SATCOM, C– 

17 Heavy Airlift Wing at Papa Air Base Hungary, the deployment of UAE F–16s 

in support of operation ODYSSEY DAWN, the U.S. and U.K. RC–135V/W RIVET 

JOINT (RJ) weapon system, and the C–130J multi-national cooperative upgrade 

program. 

The Wideband Global SATCOM satellite system, with the first satellite launched 

in 2007, will reach full operational capability with 5 operational satellites in FY13. 

WGS increased our communications capacity more than ten times over the existing 

legacy system. As a result of a partnership with Australia, a 6th satellite is in production, which will increase U.S. overall capabilities at zero additional U.S. cost, yet 

enable Australia to realize 100% of their global SATCOM requirements. In January 

of this year, the U.S. signed another cooperative agreement with 5 new partners for 

a 9th satellite, increasing capacity for the U.S. and our international partners. 

A Heavy Airlift Wing activated on 27 July 2009 at Papa Air Base Hungary, the 

result of a cooperative-agreement among 12 NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) 

nations. The wing’s, mission is to provide strategic airlift to the consortium’s members in support of national, NATO, European Union and United Nations humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. Through a consortium, economies of 

scale provide a capability for numerous nations that did not have the resources to 

realize an airlift capability on their own. Additionally, missions this wing executes 

are sorties the USAF does not have to fly, potentially saving the USAF upwards 

of $200M/yr. In August, 2009, the wing began delivering supplies to the Swedish 

ISAF contingent in Afghanistan. A C–17 from the wing delivered construction material to Haiti, seven days after the devastating earthquake. Last fall, a multinational 

crew supported the U.S. Army’s hundred and seventy-third airborne Brigade Combat Team jump-week with multiple airdrop training sorties. 

The United Arab Emirates demonstrated their capability to carry out integrated 

coalition combat air operations in support of a NATO-led humanitarian mission 

when they flew their Block 60 F–16s in Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Their participation was made possible due to the strong relationship the USAF cultivated through multiple personnel exchanges, direct commercial sale of F–16s, foreign military sales cases for maintenance, equipment, parts, 

training and logistical support, pilot training from the Air National Guard’s 162nd 

Fighter Wing, participation in RED FLAG and GREEN FLAG exercises, and training at the Gulf Air Warfare Center. 

The RC–135V/W RIVET JOINT (RJ) weapon system merges the respective U.S. 

and U.K. RIVET JOINT fleets into a single, cooperative program for upgrade and 

sustainment (RIVET JOINT Sustainment and Follow-on Development MOU) of RJ 

aircraft and mission systems, and provides cooperative training for the initial cadre 

of operations and support personnel. This initiative allows for the U.S./U.K. to jointly train, operate and base a combined RJ fleet, increasing ISR capability 20 percent, 

saving the USAF $841M in follow-on and sustainment costs, and enabling economies of scale in training, maintenance, and personnel. 

The C–130J Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was established between the 

U.S. and 6 member nations as a vehicle for cooperative C–130J projects enabling 

common requirement studies, block upgrades, and capability updates for continued 

flight. Project Arrangements (PAs) pursuant to the MOU concluded under the MOU 

have totaled over $667M, and leveraged $376M in participant investment. 

Mr. SCOTT. How does JSTARS operations provide a test bed for the networked future of air warfare? 

General SCHWARTZ. Through the use of a dedicated test aircraft, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) program has delivered capability to inform the networked future of air warfare. JSTARS’ robust onboard Line of Sight 

(LOS)/Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) data links and Battle Management Command 

& Control (BMC2) mission aircrew employed on JSTARS provide ample network capability to develop improved network capabilities. JSTARS are able to digitally commit fighters to targets in air to ground engagements within an electronically contested environment without ever speaking on the radio. Moreover the majority of 

all Command/Control taskings now occur in chat room environments vice traditional 

radio voice methods. In 2010 JSTARS demonstrated the ability of an Intelligence, 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance platform to provide terminal guidance of net enabled weapons (NEWs) such as the Joint Surface Warfare (JSuW) to an intended 

target from increased stand-off ranges. In 2011 JSTARS tested and fielded a Quick 

Reaction Capability (QRC) to improve the Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) reach back. 

Near-real-time aircraft collection data was provided via Satellite to any Secret Internet protocol Router network (SIPRnet) subscriber to an expanded audience including 
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the Air and Space Operations Center. The capability reduced Air Operations Center 

leadership decision making timelines tremendously informing Rules of Engagement 

(ROE). 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN 

Mr. GRIFFIN. C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP): According to the 

President’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, the Administration plans to cancel 

the AMP and replace the AMP with a less ambitious, less costly program, commonly 

referred to as ‘‘AMP Lite,’’ for modernization of the C–130 fleet, including 184 C– 

130 aircraft. According to General Schwartz, these upgrades would likely be similar 

to those used on the KC–10 refueling aircraft and would keep the navigators in our 

C–130s. 

When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force consider the cost of 

retaining the navigator position over the life cycle of the legacy C–130 fleet? If so, 

what is the cost? What were other criteria for considering the cost of AMP Lite? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force did consider the cost of retaining the navigator. 

As reported in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), eliminating 

the navigator position results in a mission personnel cost savings of $482 million 

(Base-Year 2010 dollars) over 15 years for the 221 C–130 Avionics Modernization 

Program (AMP) aircraft fleet. This equates to a cost savings of $694 million in 

Then-Year dollars (i.e., dollars that are reflected in the budget). 

Other criteria weighed when considering the cost of the C–130 Communication, 

Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program vice C–130 

AMP, were that the C–130 CNS/ATM program has 40 percent fewer requirements, 

to include retaining the navigator (which drove less avionics integration), and not 

driving commonality across the legacy C–130H fleet. 

Although the fiscal year 2013 President’s Budget reflects funding for 176 aircraft, 

the Air Force plans to modernize all 184 aircraft legacy C–130H combat delivery 

fleet in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM 

solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC–10, KC–135), and an awareness 

of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations’ C–130 aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. The President’s FY13 budget proposed to terminate the C–130 AMP 

and claims this will save $2.2 billion. However, it is my understanding that the $2.2 

billion in savings does not include the cost of a new program start, current contract 

termination costs or the life-cycle savings that AMP will provide. 

How much will the new start effort truly save after considering the termination 

liability, and other life-cycle cost savings are removed from the solution? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), fiscal year 2013–2017, 

investment cost savings from terminating C–130 Avionics Modernization Program 

(AMP) and initiating the ‘‘Optimize Legacy C–130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)’’ program is $2.3 billion. Additionally, 

when adding the ‘‘To Complete’’ cost of AMP in the fiscal year 2012 President’s 

Budget (PB) and comparing to what the Air Force has funded in the fiscal year 2013 

PB for CNS/ATM including its ‘‘To Complete’’ cost, the Air Force identified a total 

investment cost savings of $3.5 billion. 

By going with the new Optimize Legacy C–130 CNS/ATM, which retains the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we would lose the mission 

personnel ‘‘cost savings’’ of $482 million in base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 

C–130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP. This additional cost of retaining the navigator reduces the program savings referenced in the 

above paragraph. 

Furthermore, the 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) identified that there 

were no other life-cycle costs savings by continuing with AMP. AMP was a program 

intended as a force enhancement, not an efficiency. 

The termination liability for C–130 AMP is $5.1 million, and has been factored 

into the cost savings referenced above. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission’s final report 

to the President cited airspace, low level routes, and auxiliary airfields and nearby 

Fort Chaffee as reasons why ‘‘Fort Smith is an ideal location for the A–10.’’ Since 

the report was released, the unit has significantly modernized its facilities, greatly 

expanded its existing world-class airspace, become a leader in data link operations, 

and solidified training relationships with attack controllers special forces. 

What did the current Basing Commission find to contradict the BRAC commission’s findings and suggest the transition from the A–10 to a remotely piloted air-
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craft mission at Fort Smith? Is the Air Force moving the A–10s at Fort Smith to 

other guard units to replace aging A–10s? 

Secretary DONLEY. The reduction of A–10 aircraft is driven by the need to reduce 

excess force structure as identified in the new Defense Strategy and was not driven 

by a basing study. In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air 

Force considered the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by (the Adjutant Generals (TAGs)) of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort 

Smith, AR, as one of three (ANG) A–10 unit closures because the base, along with 

those in Michigan, have other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A–10 

units selected for divestment. Final disposition of the individual tail numbers is determined during fleet management reviews and some aircraft may be realigned to 

other units to replace older A–10 aircraft. Our intent is to keep the remaining A– 

10 fleet in the best possible health. 

Additionally, the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted 

Aircraft as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas’ Razorback 

Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area 

(MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive 

location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint training. The divestiture of the A– 

10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and 

take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate joint training. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I am concerned that the Air Force’s acquisition strategy for the LAS 

was flawed, for example, for LAS, the Air Force lowered modern pilot safety standards for accommodating women pilots in ejection seat aircraft. The choice for the 

LAS contract, the Brazilian Super Tucano doesn’t even meet these lowered safety 

standards. 

Why did the Air Force roll back the clock on LAS aircraft safety requirements 

that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft, instead of using the modern, 

and congressionally mandated pilot size accommodation requirements used for your 

T–6, F–35, and T–38 modernization programs? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety standards for the light 

air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a security assistance effort for Afghanistan, NATO Air Training Command—Afghanistan (NATC–A) defined the ejection 

seat and pilot accommodation requirements based on expected seating height range 

for potential Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected 

for the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation standards. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY–12, the Senate 

Armed Services Committee commends the Air Force for ‘‘its commitment to developing and maintaining a transparent, repeatable, and effective strategic basing 

process.’’ They went on to say the Air Force has developed a process that consists, 

in part, of establishing basing criteria, developing a preliminary list of candidate 

bases based upon those criteria, and selecting final bases following a detailed evaluation of a smaller group of installations (Senate Bill 1253). Removal of aircraft is 

a basing decision and will affect future basing actions. Is there an A–10 basing 

study? If not, what criteria did you use to determine basing? Can I see the scores? 

If there was not a study, then explain how you compared options? 

Secretary DONLEY. The reduction of A–10 aircraft is driven by the need to reduce 

excess force structure as identified in the new Defense Strategy and was not driven 

by a basing study. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that U.S. Forces will 

no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Analysis 

based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability within each scenario. As a result, A–10 retirements 

were selected in lieu of other combat aircraft and the Air Force made the difficult 

choice to retire five A–10 squadrons comprised of 102 A–10 aircraft. Previous reductions in fighter force structure shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve component forces, and Air Force decisions in the FY13 President’s Budget request rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable force structure over the long term. In 

conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the 

Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs) of 

maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force 

chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A–10 unit closures because the State, along with those in Michigan, has other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A–10 units selected for divestment. Additionally, the 

proximity of Arkansas’ Razorback Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and 

Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, 

make Fort Smith a very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint 

training. The divestiture of the A–10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to as-
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sign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate 

joint training. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the fall of 2008, Secretary of the Air Force Michael 

Donley and the Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz sought to redefine how 

the Air Force expects to make basing decisions. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force for Installations Kathleen Ferguson said ‘‘We created a process that 

was deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities.’’ 

(Official Air Force Web site) Did the Air Force follow their established procedures 

for A–10 basing decisions, and was the process deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force basing process is a great tool to determine the 

optimal location for assigning assets; however, the Air Force’s goal was to reduce 

force structure based on the new Defense Strategy. The Air Force formed a General 

Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined 

force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action was assessed 

using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, 

Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is 

suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24 squadron-level 

units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations would have been 

left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY–12, 

the Senate Armed Services Committee stated: ‘‘Given the high cost of operating aircraft and the fact that these flying operation costs are recurring, the committee believes these costs warrant examination in the strategic basing process. These flying 

operation costs include, at a minimum, the costs associated with the additional flying time resulting from a candidate base’s relative distance to (1) operational training areas for fighters and training aircraft, (2) operational refueling tracks for tankers, and (3) critical logistic centers for strategic and tactical airlift aircraft. The 

188th Fighter Wing’s distance to their operational training areas is the closest in 

the Air National Guard which significantly minimizes its operations costs. The committee directed, ‘‘no later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force to review and report on the role that the efficiency of flying 

operation costs should play in the strategic basing process and any steps that it 

plans to take to capture these costs in evaluating candidate bases in that process.’’ 

Was the Armed Services Committee’s guidance to consider distance to the operational training areas followed in the A–10 basing process? If so, what weight was 

given to the significant taxpayer savings due to reduced transit time to the 188th’s 

training areas? 

Secretary DONLEY. When determining A–10 divestitures, Air Force assessed various criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve 

Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for 

a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The 

team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership, and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Arkansas’ Razorback Range and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA) make Fort Smith a 

very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft joint training, providing an enduring mission capability to Fort Smith while facilitating training with our joint 

warfighters. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: The Commander of United States Special Operations 

Command Admiral Eric Olson testified to Congress in March 2011: ‘‘The shortage 

of readily available, local ranges currently hampers special operations forces’ ability 

to meet deployment training timelines and causes our operators to ‘travel to train,’ 

further increasing their already excessive time away from home.’’ Additionally Vice 

Admiral William McRaven (current Special Operations Commander) testified in his 

confirmation hearing June 28, 2011, that ‘‘high operational tempo has impacted 

readiness.’’ He went on to say among the areas effecting the high operations tempo 

was the ‘‘lack of fixed wing aircraft for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint 

Tactical Air Controllers.’’ (SOF Background and Issues for Congress) The 188th 

Fighter Wing is a leader in Special Forces integration with an extensive history of 

SOF integration (All Services), the unique ability to conduct face-to-face briefs/debriefs, and an on-site Special Forces unit (SEALs). Without tactical fighters at Fort 

Smith, SOF training quality would significantly decrease. In addition, SOF operations tempo would increase since forces would have more ‘‘travel to train’’ require-
140 

ments. Were the Special Operations Forces training needs and their operations 

tempo considered in the A–10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the significant joint force multiplier capabilities of the 188th Fighter Wing? 

Secretary DONLEY. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability 

to execute strategic guidance. Analysis based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and 

a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability to successfully prosecute each scenario. The Air Force provides full spectrum support to all 

joint warfighters. Special operations forces training involves a variety of weapon 

systems, and the Air Force will continue to provide required support while accounting for the divestiture of A–10s from Fort Smith. The Air Force will continue to provide the necessary training capability required by special operations forces. United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is aware of the divestiture of A– 

10s at Fort Smith and has not expressed any concerns with operational training impacts. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the 2010 QDR and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY–12, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended the services produce formal Memoranda of Agreements (MOA) between general purpose 

forces and special operations forces. A recent report required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 stated the requirement to ‘‘codify support through 

formal agreements, and eventually get SOF units and their general purpose forces 

counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle.’’ The 188FW has 

numerous formal MOA’s in coordination with SOF and effectively trains with special 

operations throughout their deployment cycle. Does closing the 188FW and losing 

their unique SOF training relationship, support the special operations forces in accordance with the Senate Armed Services direction? 

Secretary DONLEY. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability 

to execute strategic guidance. The Air Force provides full spectrum support to all 

joint warfighters. Special operations forces training involves a variety of weapon 

systems, and the Air Force will continue to provide required support while accounting for the divestiture of A–10s from Fort Smith. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On October 5, 2009, the President signed Executive 

Order (EO) 13514, which set sustainability goals for federal agencies to make improvements in their environmental, energy, and economic performance. He went on 

to say ‘‘The Defense Department must take a hard look at every aspect of how it 

is organized, staffed, and operated—indeed, every aspect of how it does business.’’ 

The 188th Fighter Wing is a leader in renewable energy, energy conversation, and 

has among the lowest energy costs in the Air National Guard. When making basing 

decisions did the Air Force consider energy costs and sustainability? If so, what 

weight was given to the significant energy cost savings of the 188th Fighter Wing? 

Secretary DONLEY. The impact of energy on basing decisions can be important. 

However, the changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing decision but a 

force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was 

made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guard’s (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ‘‘allocate at least one 

flying unit with ANG equipment to each state,’’ when deciding which A–10 bases 

would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A–10 units, two have no other flying 

unit and so reductions came from the three states, including Arkansas, that have 

other flying units. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On May 8, 2010, the Secretary of Defense gave a 

speech at the Eisenhower Library, in which he announced his intention of reforming 

the business operations of the Pentagon in an effort to root out duplication, waste, 

and excess spending. The Secretary stated: ‘‘The Defense Department must take a 

hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operated—indeed, 

every aspect of how it does business. In each instance we must ask: First, is this 

respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal duress? And 

second, is this activity or arrangement the best use of limited dollars, given the 

pressing needs to take care of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in 

the capabilities necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?’’ 

Additionally, in January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released the Defense 

Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing the budget, the DOD 

first turned to where DOD could reduce among other things operations expenses 

across the defense enterprise. Flight hour costs represent a significant proportion 

of fighter training expenses. Flight time spent transiting to/from the training areas 

is waste of taxpayer resources. The 188th Fighter Wing has the closest airspace 

therefore, it also has the lowest flight hour cost per training event. Were operational 
141 

costs considered in the A–10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the significant cost savings provided by the 188th Fighter Wing? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active 

Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include 

manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in 

the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., 

MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was 

not weighted. The team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership 

and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released 

the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing the budget the DOD first turned to where DOD could reduce among other things personnel 

costs across the defense enterprise. Fort Smith, (compared to all current A–10 bases 

and all air-to-ground Air National Guard fighter units) has the lowest combined 

health, housing and utility costs. Were personnel costs included when A–10 basing 

decisions were made? If so, what weight was given to the significant personnel cost 

savings at the 188th Fighter Wing? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active 

Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include 

manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in 

the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., 

MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part of the Air Force’s formal strategic basing process, the 

specific personnel cost criteria was not weighted. The advantages of the relatively 

low cost of living found near Fort Smith, AR will continue to benefit the members 

of the unit who will perform the new MQ–1/9 Remote Split Operations mission. The 

team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On Oct. 25, 2010, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Admiral Michael Mullen responding to a letter on JTAC training said ‘‘I share his 

concern regarding the increased demand signal for JTAC’s and the stress it exerts 

on the current production capacities.’’ On November 16, 2010, General Raymond 

Odierno, the Commander of United States Joint Forces Command, wrote Admiral 

Mullen to express concerns he had over JTAC tasking and training. He said ‘‘The 

increased demand has resulted in a more than 100 percent increase in schoolhouse 

throughput with a corresponding increase in the number of required support sorties.’’ Since the 188th’s primary mission is Close Air Support almost every training 

sortie is in support of ground forces. With unmatched airspace proximity, volume, 

and availability, the 188th produces the most JTAC training per flight hour in the 

entire Air Force. When making fighter basing decisions, did the Air Force consider 

JTAC training requirements? If so, what weight was given to the significant JTAC 

training production of the 188th Fighter Wing? 

Secretary DONLEY. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense,’’ directs the 

Services to build a force that will be smaller, leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the Air Force is reducing its size to support one 

large-scale combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second 

adversary. With the divestiture of Fort Smith’s A–10s, the Air Force will maintain 

sufficient capacity to produce and train Joint terminal Attack Controller to support 

the new Defense Strategy. 

The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how 

well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and 

range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not 

part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not weighted. The 

team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: Quality attack controller training has long been a problem for the DOD. A Due to airspace and asset limitations at other locations throughout the country the quality of attack controller sometimes suffers. The 188th Fighter 

Wing with it’s unique capability to face-to-face brief/debrief, diverse training environment, regional training partners, and incorporation of leading edge technology 

provides the best training for the services JTAC’s, When making fighter basing decisions did the Air Force consider the quality of JTAC training? If so, what weight 

was given to the second-to-none JTAC training VALUE at the 188th Fighter Wing? 
142 

Secretary DONLEY. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense,’’ directs the 

Services to build a force that will be smaller, leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the Air Force is reducing its size to support one 

large-scale combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second 

adversary. With the divestiture of Fort Smith’s A–10s, the Air Force will maintain 

sufficient capacity to produce and train JTACs to support the new Defense Strategy. 

The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how 

well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and 

range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not 

part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not weighted. The 

team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the 

Air Force. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did the Air Force consider innovation and joint network capabilities 

when developing the A–10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the leading 

edge initiatives of the 188th Fighter Wing? 

Secretary DONLEY. The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing are not a 

basing decision but a force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guard’s (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ‘‘allocate at least one flying unit with ANG equipment to each state,’’ when 

deciding which A–10 bases would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A–10 

units, two have no other flying unit and so reductions came from the three states, 

including Arkansas, that have other flying units. Additionally, our General Officer 

led review considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location 

of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range 

and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part 

of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria were not weighted. The team’s 

recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved. 

The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing decision but a 

force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was 

made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guard’s (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ‘‘allocate at least one 

flying unit with ANG equipment to each state,’’ when deciding which A–10 bases 

would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A–10 units, two have no other flying 

unit and so reductions came from the three states, including Arkansas, that have 

other flying units. Additionally, our General Officer led review considered a variety 

of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve 

Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for 

a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since 

these were force structure reductions and not part of the strategic basing process, 

the specific criteria was not weighted. The team’s recommendations were reviewed 

by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Was F–35 basing considered in the A–10 basing study? If so, how 

did bases that scored lower in the study keep their manned fighter aircraft? 

Secretary DONLEY. F–35 basing was not considered when making force structure 

reduction or backfill mission decisions that take effect in FY13 and FY14. Given current F–35 production estimates, the next set of F–35 basing decisions will include 

domestic and overseas bases and will not be required prior to FY17. The Air Force 

formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts 

that determined force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action 

was assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of 

the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and 

airspace availability). The team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force 

leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force 

and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24 

squadron-level units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations 

would have been left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Was the capability to support Total Force Initiatives considered in 

the A–10 basing decisions? If so what weight was given to Fort Smith’s efficiencies 

and unique strengths? 
143 

Secretary DONLEY. The new Defense Strategic Guidance drove a holistic interstate approach to Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve force structure. The 

Air Force’s proposed efforts will correct several manpower disconnects, rebalance 

forces, and improve sortie generation and aircraft utilization rates across the Total 

Force. This combination is intended to improve the Total Force’s readiness and responsiveness across the spectrum of operations. From both an operational effectiveness and fiscal responsibility perspective, this strategy was preferred over a more 

piecemeal state-by-state approach. 

In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered 

the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs) 

of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air 

Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A–10 

unit closures because the base, along with those in Michigan, have other manned 

ANG flying units in addition to the A–10 units selected for divestment. Additionally, 

the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 

as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas’ Razorback Range 

(less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive location 

for RPA joint training. The divestiture of the A–10s affords an opportunity for the 

Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate joint training. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Questions regarding AMP 

Why are you now choosing to end a program that is over 98% complete with development activities and with very little risk going forward? 

With a reasonable learning curve, what is a cost of the current AMP system fully 

installed? What would the cost be for the alternative system? 

Could you explain the numbers that have been floating around in the press on the cost of the current program? My understanding is we’ve invested about $2.1B 

and should have around $2.5B to go. However, it appears the USAF is using a $6.2B 

total program cost, leaving over $4.1B yet to be spent. With less than 200 aircraft 

to be modified and using $8M a copy, we should be able to finish the program for 

around $2B. 

Has there been any analysis of the long-term cost savings the current AMP solution provides versus the new start for just a CNS/ATM capability that is proposed 

for FY 13? 

So that the taxpayer’s money invested in the program and research is not lost, 

have you considered restructuring the current program to work within your new 

funding profile and avoid the cost and inherent risks of a new start effort? 

Can the current program be scaled down and still retain its certification? If so, 

have you thought about doing that instead of starting all over again? 

Secretary DONLEY. Due to budget constraints, the fiscal year 2013 President’s 

Budget (PB) terminated the C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). 

As reflected in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the C–130 

AMP per aircraft estimate is $19 million. The fiscal year 2012 PB per aircraft cost 

of ‘‘Optimize Legacy C–130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic 

Management (CNS/ATM)’’ program is $3.7 million. 

A total of $1.8 billion has been spent to date on C–130 AMP. A breakdown by 

phase follows: RDT&E: $1.7 billion Procurement: $0.1 billion 

Total cost of the 221 C–130 AMP aircraft fleet is $6.3 billion: The latest cost estimate is from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation’s (CAPE) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) dated 23 March 2010; 

it reflects total cost of $6.3 billion (Then-Year dollars): RDT&E: $1.8 billion Procurement: $4.5 billion 

A specific comparative analysis of the long-term cost savings the current C–130 

AMP solution provides versus the new C–130 CNS/ATM program was not accomplished. Compliance with looming CNS/ATM mandates was the primary reason behind the C–130 AMP program, and remains the primary reason for the planned C– 

130 CNS/ATM program. The Air Force plans to modernize the 184 aircraft legacy 

C–130 combat delivery fleet in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC–10, 

KC–135), and an awareness of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations’ C–130 

aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available. 

The C–130 CNS/ATM program will provide the capabilities related to global access and global engagement that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 

determined are essential to national security. 

The primary differences between the C–130 AMP and the C–130 CNS/ATM program are: The new program retains the navigator position, thereby requiring much 

less avionics integration than C–130 AMP, the new program does not standardize 
144 

the aircraft cockpit across the C–130H fleet, and there is more than a 40 percent 

reduction in requirements when compared to C–130 AMP. These changes were too 

large to restructure the C–130 AMP program or to simply scale it down. The goal 

is for an open and transparent defense industry competition, with C–130 CNS/ATM 

program contract award in fiscal year 2014. This is required to ensure the legacy 

C–130H combat delivery fleet meets the Federal Aviation Administration’s air traffic management 1 January 2020 mandate. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Today, the Air Force advised the Department of Justice that it will 

take corrective action on the Afghanistan Light Air Support Contract and will set 

aside the contract award to Sierra Nevada effective March 2, 2012. 

What does this announcement mean for the LAS contract award and is the AF 

planning on reopening the competition for the LAS contract? 

Secretary DONLEY. On February 28, 2012, the Air Force initiated review of appropriate corrective action in response to litigation and dissatisfaction with source selection documentation. At a minimum, the Air Force corrective action would: 

1) Set aside (terminate) the award to Sierra Nevada Corporation (‘‘SNC’’), 2) Reinstate Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company, LLC (‘‘HBDC’’) to the competitive range 

under the procurement, 3) Accept new proposals from the parties, based upon the 

existing solicitation in its original form, or as amended, 4) Conduct meaningful discussions with the parties, and 5) Reevaluate proposals in accordance with the terms 

of the solicitation; or 6) Reserve the right to conduct a whole new competition 

Concurrently, the Air Force Materiel Command initiated a Commander Directed 

Investigation (CDI) into the Light Air Support (LAS) procurement. After studying 

the circumstances prompting the corrective action and facts from the subsequent 

CDI, the Air Force decided to issue an amendment to the LAS Request for Proposal 

(RFP) to both offerors. Air Force officials met with both original offerors, SNC and 

HBDC, individually to review the amended RFP changes line-by-line on April 17, 

2012. Both will have time to submit comments on the draft RFP amendment, after 

which the Air Force expects to release the final amended RFP on approximately 

April 30, 2012. While the decision process will be event-driven, the Air Force targets 

a source selection decision in early calendar year 2013. This would allow first aircraft delivery to Afghanistan in third quarter 2014. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Why did the USAF roll back the clock on LAS aircraft safety requirements that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft instead of using the 

modern, and congressionally mandated pilot size accommodation requirements used 

for your T–6, F–35, and T–38 modernization programs? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety standards for the light 

air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a security assistance effort for Afghanistan, NATO Air Training Command—Afghanistan (NATC–A) defined the ejection 

seat and pilot accommodation requirements based on expected seating height range 

for potential Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected 

for the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation standards. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Why did the USAF ignore inputs from industry that pointed out that 

the LAS solicitation was using outdated pilot size accommodation requirements and 

instead should be using the state of the art safety standards established for the 

JPATS, JSF, and T–38 modernization programs? 

Secretary DONLEY. Since light air support (LAS) is a security assistance effort for 

Afghanistan, NATO Air Training Command—Afghanistan (NATC–A) defined the 

ejection seat and pilot accommodation requirements based on expected seating 

height range for potential Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected for the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation standards. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP): According to the 

President’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, the Administration plans to cancel 

the AMP and replace the AMP with a less ambitious, less costly program, commonly 

referred to as ‘‘AMP Lite,’’ for modernization of the C–130 fleet, including 184 C– 

130 aircraft. According to General Schwartz, these upgrades would likely be similar 

to those used on the KC–10 refueling aircraft and would keep the navigators in our 

C–130s. 

When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force consider the cost of 

retaining the navigator position over the life cycle of the legacy C–130 fleet? If so, 

what is the cost? What were other criteria for considering the cost of AMP Lite? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force did consider the cost of retaining the navigator. 

As reported in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), eliminating 

the navigator position results in a mission personnel cost savings of $482 million 

(Base-Year 2010 dollars) over 15 years for the 221 C–130 Avionics Modernization 
145 

Program (AMP) aircraft fleet. This equates to a cost savings of $694 million in 

Then-Year dollars (i.e., dollars that are reflected in the budget). 

Other criteria weighed when considering the cost of the C–130 Communication, 

Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program vice C–130 

AMP, were that the C–130 CNS/ATM program has 40 percent fewer requirements, 

to include retaining the navigator (which drove less avionics integration), and not 

driving commonality across the legacy C–130H fleet. 

Although the fiscal year 2013 President’s Budget reflects funding for 176 aircraft, 

the Air Force plans to modernize all 184 aircraft legacy C–130H combat delivery 

fleet in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM 

solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC–10, KC–135), and an awareness 

of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations’ C–130 aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. The President’s FY13 budget proposed to terminate the C–130 AMP 

and claims this will save $2.2 billion. However, it is my understanding that the $2.2 

billion in savings does not include the cost of a new program start, current contract 

termination costs or the life-cycle savings that AMP will provide. 

How much will the new start effort truly save after considering the termination 

liability, and other life-cycle cost savings are removed from the solution? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), fiscal year 2013–2017, 

investment cost savings from terminating C–130 Avionics Modernization Program 

(AMP) and initiating the ‘‘Optimize Legacy C–130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)’’ program is $2.3 billion. Additionally, 

when adding the ‘‘To Complete’’ cost of AMP in the fiscal year 2012 President’s 

Budget (PB) and comparing to what the Air Force has funded in the fiscal year 2013 

PB for CNS/ATM including its ‘‘To Complete’’ cost, the Air Force identified a total 

investment cost savings of $3.5 billion. 

By going with the new Optimize Legacy C–130 CNS/ATM, which retains the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we would lose the mission 

personnel ‘‘cost savings’’ of $482 million in base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 

C–130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP. This additional cost of retaining the navigator reduces the program savings referenced in the 

above paragraph. 

Furthermore, the 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) identified that there 

were no other life-cycle costs savings by continuing with AMP. AMP was a program 

intended as a force enhancement, not an efficiency. 

The termination liability for C–130 AMP is $5.1 million, and has been factored 

into the cost savings referenced above. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission’s final report 

to the President cited airspace, low level routes, and auxiliary airfields and nearby 

Fort Chaffee as reasons why ‘‘Fort Smith is an ideal location for the A–10.’’ Since 

the report was released, the unit has significantly modernized its facilities, greatly 

expanded its existing world-class airspace, become a leader in data link operations, 

and solidified training relationships with attack controllers special forces. 

What did the current Basing Commission find to contradict the BRAC commission’s findings and suggest the transition from the A–10 to a remotely piloted aircraft mission at Fort Smith? Is the Air Force moving the A–10s at Fort Smith to 

other guard units to replace aging A–10s? 

General SCHWARTZ. The reduction of A–10 aircraft is driven by the need to reduce 

excess force structure as identified in the new Defense Strategy and was not driven 

by a basing study. In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air 

Force considered the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by (the Adjutant Generals (TAGs)) of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort 

Smith, AR, as one of three (ANG) A–10 unit closures because the base, along with 

those in Michigan, have other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A–10 

units selected for divestment. Final disposition of the individual tail numbers is determined during fleet management reviews and some aircraft may be realigned to 

other units to replace older A–10 aircraft. Our intent is to keep the remaining A– 

10 fleet in the best possible health. 

Additionally, the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted 

Aircraft as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas’ Razorback 

Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area 

(MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive 

location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint training. The divestiture of the A– 

10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and 

take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate joint training. 
146 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I am concerned that the Air Force’s acquisition strategy for the LAS 

was flawed, for example, for LAS, the Air Force lowered modern pilot safety standards for accommodating women pilots in ejection seat aircraft. The choice for the 

LAS contract, the Brazilian Super Tucano doesn’t even meet these lowered safety 

standards. 

Why did the Air Force roll back the clock on LAS aircraft safety requirements 

that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft, instead of using the modern, 

and congressionally mandated pilot size accommodation requirements used for your 

T–6, F–35, and T–38 modernization programs? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety standards for the 

light air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a security assistance effort for 

Afghanistan, NATO Air Training Command—Afghanistan (NATC–A) defined the 

ejection seat and pilot accommodation requirements based on expected seating 

height range for potential Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected for the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation standards. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY–12, the Senate 

Armed Services Committee commends the Air Force for ‘‘its commitment to developing and maintaining a transparent, repeatable, and effective strategic basing 

process’’. They went on to say the Air Force has developed a process that consists, 

in part, of establishing basing criteria, developing a preliminary list of candidate 

bases based upon those criteria, and selecting final bases following a detailed evaluation of a smaller group of installations’’ (Senate Bill 1253) Removal of aircraft is 

a basing decision and will affect future basing actions. Is there an A–10 basing 

study? If not, what criteria did you use to determine basing? Can I see the scores? 

If there was not a study, then explain how you compared options? 

General SCHWARTZ. The reduction of A–10 aircraft is driven by the need to reduce 

excess force structure as identified in the new Defense Strategy and was not driven 

by a basing study. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that U.S. Forces will 

no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Analysis 

based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability within each scenario. As a result, A–10 retirements 

were selected in lieu of other combat aircraft and the Air Force made the difficult 

choice to retire five A–10 squadrons comprised of 102 A–10 aircraft. Previous reductions in fighter force structure shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve component forces, and Air Force decisions in the FY13 President’s Budget request rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable force structure over the long term. In 

conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the 

Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs) of 

maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force 

chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A–10 unit closures because the State, along with those in Michigan, has other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A–10 units selected for divestment. Additionally, the 

proximity of Arkansas’ Razorback Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and 

Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, 

make Fort Smith a very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint 

training. The divestiture of the A–10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate 

joint training. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the fall of 2008, Secretary of the Air Force Michael 

Donley and the Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz sought to redefine how 

the Air Force expects to make basing decisions. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force for Installations Kathleen Ferguson said ‘‘We created a process that 

was deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities.’’ 

(Official Air Force Web site) Did the Air Force follow their established procedures 

for A–10 basing decisions, and was the process deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force basing process is a great tool to determine the 

optimal location for assigning assets; however, the Air Force’s goal was to reduce 

force structure based on the new Defense Strategy. The Air Force formed a General 

Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined 

force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action was assessed 

using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, 

Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is 

suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of 
147 

Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24 squadron-level 

units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations would have been 

left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY–12, 

the Senate Armed Services Committee stated: ‘‘Given the high cost of operating aircraft and the fact that these flying operation costs are recurring, the committee believes these costs warrant examination in the strategic basing process. These flying 

operation costs include, at a minimum, the costs associated with the additional flying time resulting from a candidate base’s relative distance to (1) operational training areas for fighters and training aircraft, (2) operational refueling tracks for tankers, and (3) critical logistic centers for strategic and tactical airlift aircraft. The 

188th Fighter Wing’s distance to their operational training areas is the closest in 

the Air National Guard which significantly minimizes its operations costs. The committee directed, ‘‘no later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force to review and report on the role that the efficiency of flying 

operation costs should play in the strategic basing process and any steps that it 

plans to take to capture these costs in evaluating candidate bases in that process.’’ 

Was the Armed Services Committee’s guidance to consider distance to the operational training areas followed in the A–10 basing process? If so, what weight was 

given to the significant taxpayer savings due to reduced transit time to the 188th’s 

training areas? 

General SCHWARTZ. When determining A–10 divestitures, Air Force assessed various criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve 

Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for 

a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The 

team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership, and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Arkansas’ Razorback Range and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA) make Fort Smith a 

very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft joint training, providing an enduring mission capability to Fort Smith while facilitating training with our joint 

warfighters. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: The Commander of United States Special Operations 

Command Admiral Eric Olson testified to Congress in March 2011: ‘‘The shortage 

of readily available, local ranges currently hampers special operations forces’ ability 

to meet deployment training timelines and causes our operators to ‘travel to train,’ 

further increasing their already excessive time away from home.’’ Additionally Vice 

Admiral William McRaven (current Special Operations Commander) testified in his 

confirmation hearing June 28, 2011 that ‘‘high operational tempo has impacted 

readiness.’’ He went on to say among the areas effecting the high operations tempo 

was the ‘‘lack of fixed wing aircraft for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint 

Tactical Air Controllers.’’ (SOF Background and Issues for Congress) The 188th 

Fighter Wing is a leader in Special Forces integration with an extensive history of 

SOF integration (All Services), the unique ability to conduct face-to-face briefs/debriefs, and an on-site Special Forces unit (SEALs). Without tactical fighters at Fort 

Smith, SOF training quality would significantly decrease. In addition, SOF operations tempo would increase since forces would have more ‘‘travel to train’’ requirements. Were the Special Operations Forces training needs and their operations 

tempo considered in the A–10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the significant joint force multiplier capabilities of the 188th Fighter Wing? 

General SCHWARTZ. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability 

to execute strategic guidance. Analysis based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and 

a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability to successfully prosecute each scenario. The Air Force provides full spectrum support to all 

joint warfighters. Special operations forces training involves a variety of weapon 

systems, and the Air Force will continue to provide required support while accounting for the divestiture of A–10s from Fort Smith. The Air Force will continue to provide the necessary training capability required by special operations forces. United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is aware of the divestiture of A– 

10s at Fort Smith and has not expressed any concerns with operational training impacts. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the 2010 QDR and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY–12, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended the services produce formal Memoranda of Agreements (MOA) between general purpose 

forces and special operations forces. A recent report required by the National De-
148 

fense Authorization Act of 2010 stated the requirement to ‘‘codify support through 

formal agreements, and eventually get SOF units and their general purpose forces 

counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle.’’ The 188FW has 

numerous formal MOA’s in coordination with SOF and effectively trains with special 

operations throughout their deployment cycle. Does closing the 188FW and losing 

their unique SOF training relationship, support the special operations forces in accordance with the Senate Armed Services direction? 

General SCHWARTZ. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability 

to execute strategic guidance. The Air Force provides full spectrum support to all 

joint warfighters. Special operations forces training involves a variety of weapon 

systems, and the Air Force will continue to provide required support while accounting for the divestiture of A–10s from Fort Smith. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On October 5, 2009, the President signed Executive 

Order (EO) 13514, which set sustainability goals for federal agencies to make improvements in their environmental, energy, and economic performance. He went on 

to say ‘‘The Defense Department must take a hard look at every aspect of how it 

is organized, staffed, and operated—indeed, every aspect of how it does business.’’ 

The 188th Fighter Wing is a leader in renewable energy, energy conversation, and 

has among the lowest energy costs in the Air National Guard. When making basing 

decisions did the Air Force consider energy costs and sustainability? If so, what 

weight was given to the significant energy cost savings of the 188th Fighter Wing? 

General SCHWARTZ. The impact of energy on basing decisions can be important. 

However, the changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing decision but a 

force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was 

made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guard’s (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ‘‘allocate at least one 

flying unit with ANG equipment to each state,’’ when deciding which A–10 bases 

would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A–10 units, two have no other flying 

unit and so reductions came from the three states, including Arkansas, that have 

other flying units. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On May 8, 2010, the Secretary of Defense gave a 

speech at the Eisenhower Library, in which he announced his intention of reforming 

the business operations of the Pentagon in an effort to root out duplication, waste, 

and excess spending. The Secretary stated: ‘‘The Defense Department must take a 

hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operated—indeed, 

every aspect of how it does business. In each instance we must ask: First, is this 

respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal duress? And 

second, is this activity or arrangement the best use of limited dollars, given the 

pressing needs to take care of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in 

the capabilities necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?’’ 

Additionally, in January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released the Defense 

Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing the budget, the DOD 

first turned to where DOD could reduce among other things operations expenses 

across the defense enterprise. Flight hour costs represent a significant proportion 

of fighter training expenses. Flight time spent transiting to/from the training areas 

is waste of taxpayer resources. The 188th Fighter Wing has the closest airspace 

therefore, it also has the lowest flight hour cost per training event. Were operational 

costs considered in the A–10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the significant cost savings provided by the 188th Fighter Wing? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active 

Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include 

manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in 

the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., 

MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was 

not weighted. The team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership 

and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released 

the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing the budget the DOD first turned to where DOD could reduce among other things personnel 

costs across the defense enterprise. Fort Smith, (compared to all current A–10 bases 

and all air-to-ground Air National Guard fighter units) has the lowest combined 

health, housing and utility costs. Were personnel costs included when A–10 basing 

decisions were made? If so, what weight was given to the significant personnel cost 

savings at the 188th Fighter Wing? 
149 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active 

Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include 

manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in 

the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., 

MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part of the Air Force’s formal strategic basing process, the 

specific personnel cost criteria was not weighted. The advantages of the relatively 

low cost of living found near Fort Smith, AR will continue to benefit the members 

of the unit who will perform the new MQ–1/9 Remote Split Operations mission. The 

team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On Oct. 25, 2010, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Admiral Michael Mullen responding to a letter on JTAC training said ‘‘I share his 

concern regarding the increased demand signal for JTAC’s and the stress it exerts 

on the current production capacities’’ On November 16, 2010, General Raymond 

Odierno the Commander of United States Joint Forces Command wrote Admiral 

Mullen to express concerns he had over JTAC tasking and training. He said ‘‘The 

increased demand has resulted in a more than 100 percent increase in schoolhouse 

throughput with a corresponding increase in the number of required support sorties.’’ Since the 188th’s primary mission is Close Air Support almost every training 

sortie is in support of ground forces. With unmatched airspace proximity, volume, 

and availability, the 188th produces the most JTAC training per flight hour in the 

entire Air Force. When making fighter basing decisions, did the Air Force consider 

JTAC training requirements? If so, what weight was given to the significant JTAC 

training production of the 188th Fighter Wing? 

General SCHWARTZ. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense,’’ directs the 

Services to build a force that will be smaller, leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the Air Force is reducing its size to support one 

large-scale combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second 

adversary. With the divestiture of Fort Smith’s A–10s, the Air Force will maintain 

sufficient capacity to produce and train Joint terminal Attack Controller to support 

the new Defense Strategy. 

The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how 

well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and 

range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not 

part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not weighted. The 

team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: Quality attack controller training has long been a problem for the DOD. A Due to airspace and asset limitations at other locations throughout the country the quality of attack controller sometimes suffers. The 188th Fighter 

Wing with it’s unique capability to face-to-face brief/debrief, diverse training environment, regional training partners, and incorporation of leading edge technology 

provides the best training for the services JTAC’s, When making fighter basing decisions did the Air Force consider the quality of JTAC training? If so, what weight 

was given to the second-to-none JTAC training VALUE at the 188th Fighter Wing? 

General SCHWARTZ. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense,’’ directs the 

Services to build a force that will be smaller, leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the Air Force is reducing its size to support one 

large-scale combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second 

adversary. With the divestiture of Fort Smith’s A–10s, the Air Force will maintain 

sufficient capacity to produce and train JTACs to support the new Defense Strategy. 

The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how 

well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and 

range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not 

part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not weighted. The 

team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the 

Air Force. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did the Air Force consider innovation and joint network capabilities 

when developing the A–10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the leading 

edge initiatives of the 188th Fighter Wing? 
150 

General SCHWARTZ. The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing are not a 

basing decision but a force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guard’s (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ‘‘allocate at least one flying unit with ANG equipment to each state,’’ when 

deciding which A–10 bases would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A–10 

units, two have no other flying unit and so reductions came from the three states, 

including Arkansas, that have other flying units. Additionally, our General Officer 

led review considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location 

of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range 

and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part 

of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria were not weighted. The team’s 

recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved. 

The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing decision but a 

force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was 

made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guard’s (ANG) first Capstone Principle, ‘‘allocate at least one 

flying unit with ANG equipment to each state,’’ when deciding which A–10 bases 

would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A–10 units, two have no other flying 

unit and so reductions came from the three states, including Arkansas, that have 

other flying units. Additionally, our General Officer led review considered a variety 

of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve 

Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for 

a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since 

these were force structure reductions and not part of the strategic basing process, 

the specific criteria was not weighted. The team’s recommendations were reviewed 

by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Was F–35 basing considered in the A–10 basing study? If so, how 

did bases that scored lower in the study keep their manned fighter aircraft? 

General SCHWARTZ. F–35 basing was not considered when making force structure 

reduction or backfill mission decisions that take effect in FY13 and FY14. Given current F–35 production estimates, the next set of F–35 basing decisions will include 

domestic and overseas bases and will not be required prior to FY17. The Air Force 

formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts 

that determined force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action 

was assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of 

the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and 

airspace availability). The team’s recommendations were reviewed by Air Force 

leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force 

and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24 

squadron-level units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations 

would have been left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Was the capability to support Total Force Initiatives considered in 

the A–10 basing decisions? If so what weight was given to Fort Smith’s efficiencies 

and unique strengths? 

General SCHWARTZ. The new Defense Strategic Guidance drove a holistic interstate approach to Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve force structure. The 

Air Force’s proposed efforts will correct several manpower disconnects, rebalance 

forces, and improve sortie generation and aircraft utilization rates across the Total 

Force. This combination is intended to improve the Total Force’s readiness and responsiveness across the spectrum of operations. From both an operational effectiveness and fiscal responsibility perspective, this strategy was preferred over a more 

piecemeal state-by-state approach. 

In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered 

the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs) 

of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air 

Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A–10 

unit closures because the base, along with those in Michigan, have other manned 

ANG flying units in addition to the A–10 units selected for divestment. Additionally, 

the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 

as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas’ Razorback Range 

(less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive location 

for RPA joint training. The divestiture of the A–10s affords an opportunity for the 
151 

Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate joint training. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Why are you now choosing to end a program that is over 98% complete with development activities and with very little risk going forward? 

With a reasonable learning curve, what is a cost of the current AMP system fully 

installed? What would the cost be for the alternative system? 

Could you explain the numbers that have been floating around in the press on the cost of the current program? My understanding is we’ve invested about $2.1B 

and should have around $2.5B to go. However, it appears the USAF is using a $6.2B 

total program cost, leaving over $4.1B yet to be spent. With less than 200 aircraft 

to be modified and using $8M a copy, we should be able to finish the program for 

around $2B. 

Has there been any analysis of the long-term cost savings the current AMP solution provides versus the new start for just a CNS/ATM capability that is proposed 

for FY 13? 

So that the taxpayer’s money invested in the program and research is not lost, 

have you considered restructuring the current program to work within your new 

funding profile and avoid the cost and inherent risks of a new start effort? 

Can the current program be scaled down and still retain its certification? If so, 

have you thought about doing that instead of starting all over again? 

General SCHWARTZ. Due to budget constraints, the fiscal year 2013 President’s 

Budget (PB) terminated the C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). 

As reflected in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the C–130 AMP per aircraft estimate is $19 million. The fiscal year 2012 PB per aircraft cost 

of ‘‘Optimize Legacy C–130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic 

Management (CNS/ATM)’’ program is $3.7 million. A total of $1.8 billion has been spent to date on C–130 AMP. A breakdown by phase follows: RDT&E: $1.7 billion Procurement: $0.1 billion Total cost of the 221 C–130 AMP aircraft fleet is $6.3 billion: The latest cost estimate is from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation’s (CAPE) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) dated 23 March 2010; 

it reflects total cost of $6.3 billion (Then-Year dollars): RDT&E: $1.8 billion Procurement: $4.5 billion 

A specific comparative analysis of the long-term cost savings the current C–130 

AMP solution provides versus the new C–130 CNS/ATM program was not accomplished. Compliance with looming CNS/ATM mandates was the primary reason behind the C–130 AMP program, and remains the primary reason for the planned C– 

130 CNS/ATM program. The Air Force plans to modernize the 184 aircraft legacy 

C–130 combat delivery fleet in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC–10, 

KC–135), and an awareness of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations’ C–130 

aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available. 

The C–130 CNS/ATM program will provide the capabilities related to global access and global engagement that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 

determined are essential to national security. 

The primary differences between the C–130 AMP and the C–130 CNS/ATM program are: The new program retains the navigator position, thereby requiring much 

less avionics integration than C–130 AMP, the new program does not standardize 

the aircraft cockpit across the C–130H fleet, and there is more than a 40 percent 

reduction in requirements when compared to C–130 AMP. These changes were too 

large to restructure the C–130 AMP program or to simply scale it down. The goal 

is for an open and transparent defense industry competition, with C–130 CNS/ATM 

program contract award in fiscal year 2014. This is required to ensure the legacy 

C–130H combat delivery fleet meets the Federal Aviation Administration’s air traffic management 1 January 2020 mandate. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. The Air Force has stated that you were a full partner in the decisions to cut force structure and manpower from the Air National Guard in the budget process. Does this mean that you had a vote in the decisions? How did you vote 

on the decision to cut three (3) A–10 squadrons from the Air National Guard? 65 

x C–130s? F–16s? Did you offer alternate solutions? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air National Guard (ANG) was a participant in the budget discussions during the decision-making process. Neither ANG, Air Force Reserve 

Command (AFRC) or Active Duty Major Command (MAJCOM) leadership took part 

in a ‘‘vote’’ on the final force structure decisions. The Secretary of the Air Force, 

with the Chief of Staff’s best military input, made the call on determining which 

planes would be cut from the Guard component. ANG leadership did provide inputs 

on which squadrons to stand down based on the five ANG Captsone Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concur-
152 

rently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG 

people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-use capabilities 

(Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states. 

Following release of the President’s fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget proposal, the 

Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest 

changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered 

two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided 

to the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results 

of the DOD’s assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13 

budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Do you think we can leverage the cost savings in the ANG to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally sensible way for FY13 compared to what was 

released earlier this week in the President’s Budget Request? Can your staff prepare 

some alternate options for the Congress to consider that the Air Force may not have 

been willing to look at? 

General SCHWARTZ. Following release of the President’s FY13 budget proposal, the 

Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest 

changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered 

two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided 

to the Air Force and the Department of Defense through the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results of the Department of Defense’s assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed 

FY13 budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. The Air Force’s justification for reducing the Air National Guard is 

that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past when the Air National Guard 

has grown? Is this true? Do you believe that it was the right decision to reduce the 

Active Air Force rather than gutting the ANG in the past? Has anything changed 

that would change our way of doing business since those reductions were made? 

General SCHWARTZ. It’s not correct to say the Air Force is reducing the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty force. To meet the 

requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle 

was balance. To retain critical core capabilities and maintain our ability to rapidly 

respond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, the Air Force balanced risk to force structure and modernization. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did the AF consider Homeland Security capacity in their reductions? 

Do you think the AF places the same interest or emphasis on homeland missions 

as it does overseas missions? What happened with the C–27J? Was it a good aircraft 

for the Homeland Security mission? How is it doing in Afghanistan? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force conducted detailed analysis of wartime and disaster response (Homeland Defense) scenarios consistent with the new the Department of Defense strategic guidance and validated a reduced airlift requirement, 

leaving the Air Force with excess airlift capacity. As a result the Air Force was able 

to reduce the C–130 fleet by 65 aircraft and divest the C–27J fleet. The Air Force 

is exploring options on the disposition of the C–27J fleet. While the C–27J can perform the Homeland Security mission, the C–130 is a more cost effective and capable 

aircraft. In support the Homeland Security mission, the Air Force meets mission requirements/taskings through the Global Force Management process that prioritizes 

all combatant commanders’ (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements. 

Feedback from CENTCOM indicates the C–130 has generally outperformed the C– 

27J providing intra-theater airlift support in Afghanistan. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. It appears the AF is changing the force mix out of its concern for 

readiness and to avoid asking too much of the air reserve components (ARC). How 

is your retention? Are you maxed out in the ANG and need the AF to reduce your 

operational load? Or do you have the capacity to do more in some of your missions? 

Where are you near capacity? 

General SCHWARTZ. Retention in the Air Force is at a 17 year record high. Although we’ve had to implement Force Management programs to ensure we remain 

within authorized end strength, we also continue to invest in retention programs for 

certain critical career fields to guarantee we maintain the right balance of skills and 

experience. 

The FY13 Presidents Budget proposal outlined a total force mix to meet the requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy. The Air Force retains critical core 

capabilities and maintains its ability to meet the operational load. Balancing the 

right mix of Active Duty, Guard and Reserve components allows us to rapidly re-
153 

spond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, while balancing risk 

to force structure and modernization. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. The experience levels in the ANG are well known, and are a major 

factor in how you can fly older aircraft less often and thus extend their service life 

and save money. Will the same hold true for RPA and MC–12? What can we expect 

regarding these missions? Are they good ANG missions, and can we count on having 

them longer than the plan to retire the A–10s? Did the MC–12s and RPA missions 

come to you at your request? Were these missions part of a long term strategy to 

equip the ANG? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, the ability of the Air National Guard (ANG) to establish 

and maintain superior experience levels, regardless of the particular platform, is 

well known. History tells us that there is no reason to believe that would be any 

different in the Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and MC–12 and in fact, the ANG 

currently has the highest experience levels in RPAs. 

As part of the plan to meet the increased RPA taskings to the Air Force from the 

SecDef, Air Combat Command (ACC) has asked the ANG to operate 11 steady state 

Combat Air Patrols (CAP) indefinitely. The fiscal year (FY13) budget proposal takes 

this into account and converts an additional four units from former missions to 

RPAs in order for the ANG to meet this requirement. As an end state, there will 

be a total of 11 ANG RPA units operating 11 steady state CAPs with the ability 

to mobilize more. 

The RPA mission is excellent for the ANG for several reasons. First, ANG Airmen 

are able to augment active duty forces in a wartime tasking while ‘‘deployed in 

place.’’ This means these Guard Airmen are able to maintain relevancy in the fight, 

but are able to be with their families at the end of the duty day; traditional guardsmen are able to maintain their important roles in business and community life. Second, ANG RPA units are part of that traditional rheostat of reserve forces that continue to be called upon when demand increases and then can go back to civilian life 

when not needed. Case in point, the ANG has been asked and is continuing to fly 

five surge CAPs while ACC reconstitutes its active duty RPA force. Finally, RPAs 

could be an invaluable asset to State Governors and Department of Homeland Security in both the DomOps and Defense Support to Civil Authorities role for events 

such as natural disasters or Incident Awareness and Assessment. 

The transition of RPAs and the MC–12s to the ANG may extend the service life 

of the aircraft based on predicted reduced operational use after the Afghanistan 

drawdown. The MC–12 provides a replacement for the retiring RC–26, preserving 

ANG aviation capabilities and experience. The addition of the MC–12 mission also 

mitigates some mission losses sustained by the ANG in the FY13 President’s budget. The reliance on the Guard for these important missions is, indeed, an important 

part of our long term strategy to equip the ANG to continue its important national 

role into the foreseeable future. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. If approved, this new plan will once again require many units to 

convert to new missions and require retraining of hundreds of airmen. How much 

do these conversions cost? Were there options to save this expense on our people 

and to avoid losing all the experience the ANG possesses? 

General SCHWARTZ. The conversion costs will vary between units and missions. 

Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion costs. When exploring 

options we were guided by the Air National Guard (ANG)-developed five Capstone 

Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build 

dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states. 

Following release of the President’s fiscal year (FY13) budget proposal, the Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest 

changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered 

two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided 

to the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results 

of the DOD’s assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13 

budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. I understand that the Air Force decision to cut the C–130s was based 

on removing the older aircraft from the fleet that require costly modification and 

modernization efforts to remain viable. However, some of these older aircrafts have 
154 

not put on as many flight hours than others and are only portionally through their 

life cycle. Was this at all considered than just arbitrarily retiring the older aircrafts? 

Secretary DONLEY. Yes, this was one of multiple factors considered when deciding 

which aircraft to retire. While the relative age of each model was the primary factor 

for consideration, existing and required modifications and creating fleet commonality were also considered. 

Mrs. ROBY. In regard to the C–130s being retired, how was the decision made in 

which squadrons to retire rather than any consideration made to the actual performance and role of the squadrons than just that the older C–130s were at those 

locations? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force found very little variance in squadron performance and roles when it looked at C–130 force structure reductions. The Air Force 

used two primary means to determine the optimum way to reduce intra-theater 

force structure while retaining needed capacity and capability. Using scenarios consistent with Defense Strategic Guidance, the Air Force determined that excess capacity exists in the Air Force intra-theater airlift fleet. A reduced intra-theater airlift requirement enabled the retirement of 65 C–130H aircraft. To not only meet 

surge requirements, but also to meet a 62-aircraft post-surge and steady-state requirement with a reduced total fleet size, adjustments to the Active Duty (AD)/Air 

Reserve Component (ARC) mix were necessary. The previous AD/ARC mix of 33%/ 

67% was problematic during post-surge and steady-state operations with excessive 

AD deploy-to-dwell rates. Therefore, 65 aircraft were removed from the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve changing the AD/ARC mix to 41%/59% which more 

closely aligns with other Air Force force structure. 

Mrs. ROBY. Was there a consideration given to moving the C–130s to any of these 

squadrons due to their mission and location rather than retiring those units with 

the oldest aircraft? 

Secretary DONLEY. Yes, besides retiring 65 older C–130H aircraft, the Air Force 

realigned a substantial portion of its C–130 fleet to ensure fleet commonality at individual units, effectively streamlining operations and maintenance. In some cases, 

units gained newer C–130H models or C–130J aircraft. Besides realignment, the Air 

Force in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, considered State-by-State 

capability and in multiple cases employed mission mitigating options to avoid divesting entire units. 

Mrs. ROBY. Do you believe that we can leverage the cost savings in the Air National Guard to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally sensible way for Fiscal Year 

2013 compared to what was released earlier this week in the President’s Budget Request? 

Secretary DONLEY. The proposed FY13 President’s Budget provides the most cost 

effective force structure to meet the new U.S. defense strategy. Out of this assessment, the Department of Defense developed a strategy that transitions our defense 

enterprise from an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department’s 

efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of 

deficit reduction by reducing defense spending. The resulting strategic guidance provided a set of precepts to guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force 

over subsequent budget cycles. 

Mrs. ROBY. The Air Force’s justification for reducing the Air National Guard is 

that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past when the Air National Guard 

has grown. Is this true and has anything changed that would change our way of 

doing business since those reductions were made? 

Secretary DONLEY. It’s not correct to say the Air Force is reducing the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty force. To meet the 

requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle 

was balance. The Air Force retains critical core capabilities and maintains its ability 

to rapidly respond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, while 

balancing risk to force structure and modernization. 

Mrs. ROBY. Does the Air Force places the same interest or emphasis on homeland 

missions as it does overseas missions when it comes to the Air National Guard and 

was homeland security capacity consider with reductions? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force recognizes that the first responsibility of U.S. 

forces is to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors. 

When directed by the President or approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Air 

Force conducts defense support of civil authorities and assists at all levels in preventing, protecting against, mitigating the effects of, and responding to man-made 

or natural disasters. To fully analyze the effects of impending reductions, the Air 
155 

Force conducted detailed analysis of wartime and disaster response scenarios consistent with the new Department of Defense strategic guidance. In support of the 

Homeland Security mission, the Air Force continues to meet mission requirements/ 

taskings through the Global Force Management process that prioritizes all combatant commanders (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements. 

Mrs. ROBY. If approved, this new plan will once again require many units to convert to new missions. Were there options to save this expense on our people and 

to avoid losing all the experience the Air National Guard possesses? 

Secretary DONLEY. The conversion costs will vary between units and missions. 

Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion costs. When exploring 

options we were guided by the Air National Guard (ANG)-developed five Capstone 

Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build 

dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states. 

Following release of the President’s fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget proposal, the 

Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest 

changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered 

two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided 

to the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results 

of the DOD’s assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13 

budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks. 

Mrs. ROBY. I understand that the Air Force decision to cut the C–130s was based 

on removing the older aircraft from the fleet that require costly modification and 

modernization efforts to remain viable. However, some of these older aircrafts have 

not put on as many flight hours than others and are only portionally through their 

life cycle. Was this at all considered than just arbitrarily retiring the older aircrafts? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, this was one of multiple factors considered when deciding 

which aircraft to retire. While the relative age of each model was the primary factor 

for consideration, existing and required modifications and creating fleet commonality were also considered. 

Mrs. ROBY. In regard to the C–130s being retired, how was the decision made in 

which squadrons to retire rather than any consideration made to the actual performance and role of the squadrons than just that the older C–130s were at those 

locations? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force found very little variance in squadron performance and roles when it looked at C–130 force structure reductions. The Air Force 

used two primary means to determine the optimum way to reduce intra-theater 

force structure while retaining needed capacity and capability. Using scenarios consistent with Defense Strategic Guidance, the Air Force determined that excess capacity exists in the Air Force intra-theater airlift fleet. A reduced intra-theater airlift requirement enabled the retirement of 65 C–130H aircraft. To not only meet 

surge requirements, but also to meet a 62-aircraft post-surge and steady-state requirement with a reduced total fleet size, adjustments to the Active Duty (AD)/Air 

Reserve Component (ARC) mix were necessary. The previous AD/ARC mix of 33%/ 

67% was problematic during post-surge and steady-state operations with excessive 

AD deploy-to-dwell rates. Therefore, 65 aircraft were removed from the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve changing the AD/ARC mix to 41%/59% which more 

closely aligns with other Air Force force structure. 

Mrs. ROBY. Was there a consideration given to moving the C–130s to any of these 

squadrons due to their mission and location rather than retiring those units with 

the oldest aircraft? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, besides retiring 65 older C–130H aircraft, the Air Force 

realigned a substantial portion of its C–130 fleet to ensure fleet commonality at individual units, effectively streamlining operations and maintenance. In some cases, 

units gained newer C–130H models or C–130J aircraft. Besides realignment, the Air 

Force in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, considered State-by-State 

capability and in multiple cases employed mission mitigating options to avoid divesting entire units. 

Mrs. ROBY. Do you believe that we can leverage the cost savings in the Air National Guard to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally sensible way for Fiscal Year 

2013 compared to what was released earlier this week in the President’s Budget Request? 

General SCHWARTZ. The proposed FY13 President’s Budget provides the most cost 

effective force structure to meet the new U.S. defense strategy. Out of this assessment, the Department of Defense developed a strategy that transitions our defense 
156 

enterprise from an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department’s 

efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of 

deficit reduction by reducing defense spending. The resulting strategic guidance provided a set of precepts to guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force 

over subsequent budget cycles. 

Mrs. ROBY. The Air Force’s justification for reducing the Air National Guard is 

that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past when the Air National Guard 

has grown. Is this true and has anything changed that would change our way of 

doing business since those reductions were made? 

General SCHWARTZ. It’s not correct to say the Air Force is reducing the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty force. To meet the 

requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle 

was balance. The Air Force retains critical core capabilities and maintains its ability 

to rapidly respond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, while 

balancing risk to force structure and modernization. 

Mrs. ROBY. Does the Air Force places the same interest or emphasis on homeland 

missions as it does overseas missions when it comes to the Air National Guard and 

was homeland security capacity consider with reductions? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force recognizes that the first responsibility of U.S. 

forces is to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors. 

When directed by the President or approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Air 

Force conducts defense support of civil authorities and assists at all levels in preventing, protecting against, mitigating the effects of, and responding to man-made 

or natural disasters. To fully analyze the effects of impending reductions, the Air 

Force conducted detailed analysis of wartime and disaster response scenarios consistent with the new Department of Defense strategic guidance. In support of the 

Homeland Security mission, the Air Force continues to meet mission requirements/ 

taskings through the Global Force Management process that prioritizes all combatant commanders (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements. 

Mrs. ROBY. If approved, this new plan will once again require many units to convert to new missions. Were there options to save this expense on our people and 

to avoid losing all the experience the Air National Guard possesses? 

General SCHWARTZ. The conversion costs will vary between units and missions. 

Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion costs. When exploring 

options we were guided by the Air National Guard (ANG)-developed five Capstone 

Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build 

dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states. 

Following release of the President’s fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget proposal, the 

Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest 

changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered 

two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided 

to the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results 

of the DOD’s assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13 

budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks. 

Æ