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76–168 2012

ECONOMIC MODELS AVAILABLE TO THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION FOR 

ANALYZING TAX REFORM PROPOSALS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 

Serial No. 112–116 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means 

( 


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COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan, Chairman 

WALLY HERGER, California 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

PETER J. ROSKAM, Illinois 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

TOM PRICE, Georgia 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

LYNN JENKINS, Kansas 

ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

RICK BERG, North Dakota 

DIANE BLACK, Tennessee 

TOM REED, New York 

SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan 

CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York 

FORTNEY PETE STARK, California 

JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington 

JOHN LEWIS, Georgia 

RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

RON KIND, Wisconsin 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

Jon Traub, Staff Director 

Janice Mays, Minority Staff Director 

Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public hearing records 

of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published in electronic form. The printed 

hearing record remains the official version. Because electronic submissions are used to 

prepare both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process of converting 

between various electronic formats may introduce unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the current publication process and should diminish as the process 

is further refined. 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Advisory of September 21, 2011, announcing the hearing ................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation ..................... 6 

Douglas Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action Forum ................................... 32 

John L. Buckley, Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center ......... 41 

William W. Beach, Director, Center for Data Analysis, the Heritage Foundation ........................................................................................................................ 48

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Center for Fiscal Equity, statement ....................................................................... 112 

Grover L. Porter, statement .................................................................................... 122 

National Small Business Association, statement .................................................. 123 


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ECONOMIC MODELS AVAILABLE TO THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION FOR 

ANALYZING TAX REFORM PROPOSALS 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in Room 

1100, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

[The advisory announcing the hearing follows:] 


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ADVISORY 

FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

Wednesday, September 21, 2011 

Chairman Camp Announces Hearing on 

Economic Models Available to the 

Joint Committee on Taxation for 

Analyzing Tax Reform Proposals 

Congressman Dave Camp (R–MI), Chairman of the Committee on Ways and 

Means, today announced that the Committee will hold a hearing to review and examine the variety of economic models used by the Joint Committee on Taxation 

(JCT) to analyze and score tax reform legislation. In particular, the Committee will 

review the tools available to the JCT that would enable it to measure the effect of 

proposals on economic growth and job creation as well as the effect on revenue levels. The Committee last reviewed this topic at a hearing in 2002, so this hearing 

will not only examine changes in economic thinking and the Joint Committee’s capabilities since then, but also review the extent to which the current economic climate 

poses new challenges to this analysis. The hearing will take place on Wednesday, September 21, 2011, in Room 1100 of the Longworth House Office 

Building, beginning at 10:00 a.m. 

In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, oral testimony at this 

hearing will be from invited witnesses only. However, any individual or organization 

not scheduled for an oral appearance may submit a written statement for consideration by the Committee and for inclusion in the printed record of the hearing. A 

list of invited witnesses will follow. 

BACKGROUND: 

JCT serves a critical role in the legislative process by providing expert and impartial analysis of the potential effect of proposals to change U.S. tax policy. Under current practice, the analytical methods used by JCT do not take into account the potential effects of statutory tax changes on economic growth. For most of the proposals analyzed by JCT, this practice is appropriate because the proposed changes 

would not be large enough to have a material impact on an economy as large as 

that of the United States. However, JCT has worked to develop the capacity to conduct macroeconomic modeling of significant changes to U.S. tax policy. Comprehensive tax reform by its very nature constitutes a significant change in U.S. tax policy 

and has the potential to significantly boost economic growth and job creation. The 

hearing will review the current status and capabilities of JCT’s macroeconomic analysis and how it can be used to measure accurately the impact of comprehensive reform on economic growth and job creation. 

In announcing this hearing, Chairman Camp said, ‘‘A wide array of economists 

and business leaders have testified before the Ways and Means Committee 

that comprehensive tax reform that lowers rates by broadening the tax 

base will promote economic growth and job creation. This hearing will examine the importance of ensuring that Congress can accurately measure 

the broad economic impact of comprehensive tax reform.’’ 

FOCUS OF THE HEARING: 

The hearing will review JCT’s revenue estimating methodologies and its ability 

to analyze the impact on economic growth and job creation of comprehensive tax reform proposals. 


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DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: 

Please Note: Any person(s) and/or organization(s) wishing to submit written comments for the hearing record must follow the appropriate link on the hearing page 

of the Committee website and complete the informational forms. From the Committee homepage, http://waysandmeans.house.gov, select ‘‘Hearings.’’ Select the hearing for which you would like to submit, and click on the link entitled, ‘‘Click here 

to provide a submission for the record.’’ Once you have followed the online instructions, submit all requested information. ATTACH your submission as a Word document, in compliance with the formatting requirements listed below, by the close 

of business on Wednesday, October 5, 2011. Finally, please note that due to 

the change in House mail policy, the U.S. Capitol Police will refuse sealed-package 

deliveries to all House Office Buildings. For questions, or if you encounter technical 

problems, please call (202) 225–3625 or (202) 225–2610. 

FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS: 

The Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing record. As always, submissions will be included in the record according to the discretion of the Committee. 

The Committee will not alter the content of your submission, but we reserve the right to format 

it according to our guidelines. Any submission provided to the Committee by a witness, any supplementary materials submitted for the printed record, and any written comments in response 

to a request for written comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any submission 

or supplementary item not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed, but will be 

maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the Committee. 

1. All submissions and supplementary materials must be provided in Word or WordPerfect 

format and MUST NOT exceed a total of 10 pages, including attachments. Witnesses and submitters are advised that the Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official 

hearing record. 

2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not be accepted for printing. 

Instead, exhibit material should be referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material 

not meeting these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use 

by the Committee. 

3. All submissions must include a list of all clients, persons, and/or organizations on whose 

behalf the witness appears. A supplemental sheet must accompany each submission listing the 

name, company, address, telephone, and fax numbers of each witness. 

Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on the World 

Wide Web at http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov. 

The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. 

If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202–225–1721 or 202–226– 

3411 TTD/TTY in advance of the event (four business days notice is requested). 

Questions with regard to special accommodation needs in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats) may be directed to the Committee as noted above. 

f 

Chairman CAMP. Good morning. Thank you for joining us for 

the latest in our continued series of hearings on comprehensive tax 

reform. 

Over the last several months, as we discussed the various facets 

and complexities associated with comprehensive tax reform, a wide 

array of economists and business leaders have testified before this 

Committee that comprehensive tax reform that lowers rates by 

broadening the tax base will promote economic health and job creation. But how much growth and how many jobs is what the American people want to know. Frankly, it is what I want to know, and 

I think most Members of Congress want to know as well. 

Before we can even determine if a tax reform package is worthy 

of consideration, let alone be called a success, it is critical to understand the true impact it will have on economic growth, Federal revenues, and, most importantly, job creation; and that brings us to 


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the focus of the hearing today, both the capabilities and limitations 

of the Joint Committee on Taxation in estimating and analyzing 

comprehensive tax reform plans. 

JCT serves a critical role in the legislative process by providing 

expert and impartial analysis of potential revenue effects of proposals to change U.S. tax policy. However, under current practice, 

the analytical methods used by JCT do not typically take into account the potential effects of statutory tax changes on economic 

growth. 

For most of the proposals analyzed by JCT, this practice is appropriate, because the proposed changes would not be large enough 

to have a material impact on an economy as large as that of the 

United States. However, comprehensive tax reform, by its very nature, constitutes a significant change in U.S. tax policy and has the 

potential to significantly boost economic growth and job creation. 

JCT has developed a suite of macroeconomic models that can be 

used to estimate the impact of tax policy changes on economic 

growth. Today’s hearing will help us better understand which policies and decisions are most relevant to promoting economic growth. 

As our economy continues to struggle, this additional analysis and 

research will serve an important role in helping this Committee 

make the hard decisions that are necessary to craft comprehensive 

tax reform. 

It is my hope that today’s discussion will help to highlight how 

the work being done by the Joint Tax Committee will help us plan 

and develop solutions that create a Tax Code that works better for 

employers and families, instead of one that for far too long has 

worked against them. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I yield to Ranking Member Levin for his opening statement. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to all of you. 

This is a hearing on, and I quote, ‘‘The economic models available 

to the Joint Committee on Taxation for analyzing tax reform proposals.’’ 

Let me first say that I hope that neither this hearing nor anything said here today is construed as a criticism of the Joint Committee, its work, or its staff. The dedicated team of economists, 

lawyers, and other professionals of the Joint Committee produce 

some of the very best economic analysis in the country and do so 

not in an academic or think-tank environment, but under the pressures and at the pace of the legislative process. This Committee 

could not function without them. I thank you, Mr. Barthold, and 

all your colleagues for your service. 

The debate over so-called dynamic scoring has been going on for 

years. During the Bush administration, the Republican majority 

and leadership—and we remember their statements very well—and 

Ways and Means Members on the then-majority side argued that 

the Bush tax cuts would pay for themselves and create millions of 

jobs. Whether guided by this notion of so-called dynamic scoring or 

by none, the majority ruling this Committee never paid for anything. At the end of the Bush administration, we had a $1.5 deficit 

and an economy that was losing 700,000 jobs a month. There were 

other factors, but there was nothing dynamic about the fiscal irresponsibility of the then Republican majority. 


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After reviewing today’s testimony and grappling with all of its 

complexities, I urge that we not become embroiled in a theoretical 

debate at this particularly challenging time for our Nation’s economy for two reasons. 

First, in addition to there being no evidence that tax cuts pay for 

themselves—quite the contrary—even most who sound some positive notes about so-called dynamic scoring acknowledge problems 

that make such an approach unworkable as we confront today’s 

challenges. The reality is that there is simply no consensus in the 

economics profession about how businesses and individuals will respond to changes in policy, how foresighted they are in their decisionmaking, or on a host of other questions that would have to be 

answered to conduct a so-called dynamic analysis of tax legislation. 

Second, and most vitally, there is a crisis before us right now, before the Nation, and before the Committee; economic growth and 

jobs. The Committee, our Committee should be focused on jobs. The 

14 million Americans who are looking for work need less theoretical discussion of estimating methodology and more practical action on job creation. One estimate, that of Mark Zandi, is that the 

President’s proposed American Jobs Act would add 2 percentage 

points to GDP growth next year and 1.9 million jobs and cut the 

unemployment rate by a percentage point. 

The Committee Democrats have asked the chairman—you, Mr. 

Chairman—to hold hearings on the President’s American Jobs Act. 

We have not received an answer, and we renew that request today. 

The President’s proposal would jump-start our economy and create jobs for American workers. It would put more money in workers’ pockets through a temporary payroll tax cut, saving the average family $1,500 a year. It would also keep over 6 million workers 

from losing their unemployment benefits when they continue 

searching for work and provide new employers incentives to help 

get them hired. 

These proposals—these jobs and tax proposals are in the jurisdiction of this proud Committee. It is our responsibility to consider 

them, and I hope this Committee will meet that responsibility here 

and now. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CAMP. Thank you, Mr. Levin. 

And, without objection, any other Member who wishes to have an 

opening statement included in the formal hearing record may submit one in writing. 

We are fortunate to have a panel of witnesses this morning with 

a wealth of experience. Let me briefly introduce them. 

First, I would like to welcome Tom Barthold, the chief of staff for 

the Joint Committee on Taxation. We thank you and your staff for 

your work and your efforts in preparing for today’s hearing, and we 

look forward to your presentation. 

Second, we will hear from Doug Holtz-Eakin, who is currently 

serving as president of the American Action Forum. Mr. HoltzEakin formerly served as chief economist of the President’s Council 

of Economic Advisors and later as director for the Congressional 

Budget Office. 

And, third, we will hear from John Buckley, who is well-known 

to this Committee, who is a visiting professor at the Georgetown 


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University Law Center. Mr. Buckley formerly served on the staffs 

of both the Committee on Ways and Means and the Joint Committee on Taxation. 

And, finally, we will hear from William Beach, the director of the 

Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis. Mr. Beach has 

been instrumental in developing the economic modeling capacity at 

the Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you all again for being with us today. The Committee has 

received each of your written statements, and they will be made 

part of the formal hearing record. 

Mr. Barthold you will be recognized for 10 minutes in order to 

adequately explain JCT’s current modeling practices. Our other 

three witnesses will be given the customary 5 minutes to summarize their written testimony. 

Mr. Barthold, you are recognized for 10 minutes. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. BARTHOLD, CHIEF OF STAFF, 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Thank you very much, Chairman Camp and 

Mr. Levin. It is always a pleasure to be before this Committee. 

Today, I will be describing for you the economic modeling that 

the Joint Committee staff uses to estimate the effects of Federal 

revenues from changes in tax policy as well as to provide supplemental economic information for the Members’ consideration. 

To make it clear I think perhaps the place to start is to ask the 

simple question of what is a revenue estimate. A revenue estimate 

is an estimate of the change in projected Federal baseline receipts 

that would result from a change in law. 

Now the reference point for a revenue estimate prepared by the 

Joint Committee staff is the Congressional Budget Office’s 10-year 

projection of Federal receipts, which is referred to as the receipts 

baseline. The receipts baseline assumes that present law remains 

unchanged during the 10-year period and thus asks what receipts 

will accrue to the Federal Treasury over the next 10-year period 

absent any statutory changes. 

A common misunderstanding that arises when we report revenue 

estimates to policymakers is that we are sometimes presenting a 

receipts forecast. Generally, when the economy is growing, the Congressional Budget Office forecasts that baseline receipts are growing. So when the Joint Committee staff reports a revenue estimate 

with a negative in front of it that does not mean that the Joint 

Committee staff is predicting that receipts will fall, but rather that 

baseline receipts will generally grow more slowly if the proposal is 

enacted than they are projected to grow under present law in the 

baseline receipts forecast. 

Just to emphasize this point, I would like to refer back to some 

work we did a number of years ago. Congress passed the Jobs and 

Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, known by its clever 

acronym of JGTRRA. In figure 1 before you and on the screen, the 

red bars show CBO’s January 2003, forecast of receipts. The Joint 

Committee staff estimated that the JGTRRA provisions, at least in 

the first couple of years, would have negative revenue effects. Now 

that did not mean that receipts would fall. On the figure, when we 

add the negative revenue effects to the CBO receipts, we get the 


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green bars, which is the combination of baseline receipts plus 

change in those receipts as estimated by the Joint Committee staff. 

The one thing I want to emphasize is that, while lower, the green 

bars are still growing from year to year. So it was not a projection 

that receipts would fall. They would continue to grow but at a 

lower rate. And just to emphasize that point, the blue bars on the 

figure show the actual Federal receipts for those years. So, actually, in aggregate, our estimates did quite well that year. But the 

point I would like to make here is that the negative revenue estimate was still consistent with receipts growing overtime. 

Another frequently expressed misconception about our conventional revenue estimating methodology is the notion that the Joint 

Committee staff assumes that taxpayers will not change their behavior in any way in response to tax policy changes. It is true that 

one of the conventions that is followed by the staff is that we hold 

fixed a forecast of aggregate economic activity. However, within 

that, the Joint Committee estimates are never static in the sense 

that our estimates always take into account a number of likely behavioral responses by taxpayers, such as shifts in the timing of 

transactions, changes in the form of income recognition, shifts between taxable and non-taxable income or more highly taxed to 

more lightly taxed income, shifts between business sectors in terms 

of investment and the site of economic activity, changes in consumption behavior, tax planning, and avoidance activities. 

Beyond raising funds for the Federal Government, Members 

often intend that their proposed tax policy changes alter microeconomic behavior or the future growth prospect of the economy. 

Our conventional analysis generally addresses only the microeconomic behavior and does not account for possible changes in the 

underlying Congressional Budget Office macroeconomic assumptions. 

Since 2003 and the implementation of House Rule 13, for any 

legislation that has been reported by the Ways and Means Committee, the Joint Committee staff has prepared a macroeconomic 

analysis. To undertake this analysis, the Joint Committee staff has 

used several different models to simulate macroeconomic effects in 

order to reflect the sensitivity to different assumptions and to emphasize different aspects of the macroeconomy. 

The Joint Committee macroeconomic models that we currently 

use are the Joint Committee macroeconomic equilibrium growth 

model, which we cleverly call MEG, an overlapping generations 

model, and a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium growth model 

with infinitely lived agents. 

I will highlight briefly the MEG model and the OLG model just 

to provide some distinctions in terms of the types of assumptions 

that underlie these models, and then I will try and present an example of how we use these models to provide information to the 

Members of Congress. 

In the MEG model, the availability of labor and capital determines total national output. Prices adjust so that demand equals 

supply in the long run, but in the short run resources may be temporarily underemployed, or overemployed as people in businesses 

adjust to outside changes in the economy. 


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One important feature of the MEG model is that household consumption is determined by what is referred to in economics as the 

life-cycle theory. Labor supply respond to changes in after-tax 

wages are separately modeled for four different groups of taxpayers 

that vary by income and type of worker. Household saving and consumption respond to the after-tax return to saving and to after-tax 

income. Business production and the production of housing are 

modeled in separate sectors with business investment responding 

to changes in what economists refer to as the user cost of capital. 

The MEG model is an open economy model. There are cross-border 

capital flows and changes in net exports that can affect the domestic economic outcomes. Another important feature in the MEG 

model is individuals are myopic. They do not anticipate changes in 

the economy or in government policy. 

By some contrast, the overlapping generations model assumes 

that prices adjust to any change in economic conditions so that supply always equals demand, period by period, and resources are 

fully utilized after accounting for adjustment costs that may occur 

as investment changes. There is no explicit modeling of international trading goods and services, but international capital flows 

are modeled through interest rate adjustments. 

Economic decisions are modeled separately for 55 different cohorts. There are separate production sectors for business and housing. Again, there are labor supply responses, saving consumption 

responses, and responses of investment to the user cost of capital. 

And the OLG model, unlike the MEG model, is a perfect foresight 

model. The individuals in the model figure out what is going on. 

Now how do we use these models? We take the detailed information that we produce in our conventional revenue estimates about 

how taxes affect individual taxpayers, individual businesses, and 

investments decisions, and we use those as inputs into the macroeconomic models. 

To try and give an example, in December of this past year, the 

Congress passed the Tax Relief Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010; and table 1 in your handout and this figure on the board shows you our conventional revenue estimate. It produced, by our conventional estimates, substantial revenue losses in the first couple years, followed by very modest revenue increases. The revenue increases were—again, projected relative to baseline receipts. They are a consequence of substantial timing changes that result from the expensing provisions 

for capital cost recovery, which were enacted as part of that legislation. 

Now concurrent with our conventional analysis, the Joint Committee staff undertook a macroeconomic analysis of the legislation 

using the MEG model and allowing varying different assumptions 

about how the Federal Reserve would respond. Would they aggressively fight future inflation or not? We also varied consumer and 

business responses to the tax changes in terms of labor supply response and investment response. 

I am going to try and briefly talk about these results to give you 

an idea of the type of information that is added by our macroeconomic analysis. 


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What figure 2 shows is that the Joint Committee staff estimated 

under what we call our neutral Federal Reserve policy response 

measure—that the size of the economy as measured by GDP would 

increase by 0.6, to 1.7 percent during the extension period, primarily because of the extra demand that would be generated by the 

tax cuts. 

The staff also estimated that lower marginal tax rates on labor 

and on income from capital would provide an incentive for temporarily increased supplies of labor and accelerated investment. However, these effects are expected to be reversed by the end of the 

budget period as the tax decreases expire and increased borrowing 

by the Federal Government crowds out some of the private investment. So that in the latter part of the period—you can see on the 

far right the negative bars—GDP would decrease by two-tenths to 

five-tenths percent relative to present law. 

The second set of bars that I just flipped up shows an alternative 

Federal Reserve policy response, and it is important in analyzing 

macroeconomics to think about what else is going on and how the 

Federal Reserve monetary policy might affect outcomes. 

Now the December legislation was not deficit neutral. To highlight how tax policy changes might have macroeconomic effects, the 

Joint Committee staff simulated the same policy but assuming that 

government transfer payments would be reduced by the amount of 

reduction in the revenues. We simulated two different timeframes 

for this, either reducing government transfer payments year by 

year so the revenue and spending changes were in balance every 

year, on attentively reducing the transfer payments in the second 

half of the period so that revenue and spending changes were in 

balance over the 10-year period. 

My written testimony before you today has the details of that. 

What I will highlight here in my closing minute, where I have gone 

into overtime, is the revenue consequences that one might see from 

this. Because, remember, the key in macroeconomic analysis is, if 

the economy grows, there is a bigger taxable base, and so you 

might expect that there could be some additional revenue. 

The first set of charts shows under one set of assumptions just 

our conventional estimates of the December bill, the second shows 

what happens when we layer on the macroeconomic effects of that 

bill, and the third shows projections for when we consider that it 

could have been done in a deficit neutral fashion and, again, depending upon the Fed response. 

My colleagues and I always strive to update our models with the 

most recent possible data, looking at economic research. For example, we are currently exploring adding a more detailed international trade sector to the OLG model and additional business investment sectors to the MEG model. We always try to provide the 

Members with the best information we can. 

I appreciate this opportunity to try and give you a very brief 

walk-through of some of the work and modeling that we do, and 

I look forward to answering the Committee’s questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barthold follows:] 


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Chairman CAMP. Thank you very much, Mr. Barthold. 

Mr. Holtz-Eakin, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS HOLTZ–EAKIN, PRESIDENT, 

AMERICAN ACTION FORUM 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Thank you, Chairman Camp, Ranking 

Member Levin, and Members of the Committee for the chance to 

be here today. You have my written testimony, and I look forward 

to the questions. I will be brief in my opening remarks. 

I think there are three major points to be made. The first is that 

dynamic scoring is good science, and that is simply the case because the Committee should be interested in all of the responses 

in the economy to changes in tax policy, including the overall level 

of economic growth, and to exclude that arbitrarily is not good 

science. So the principles of dynamic scoring really should not be 

in debate. 

The second point I would like to make is that the Committee 

needs to make some decisions in order for dynamic scoring to become operational and to achieve one of the chief objectives of scoring which is to be able to rank proposals in a consistent fashion, 

and I think that is where some very tough but not insurmountable 

decisions would have to be made. 

In particular, I have considerable sympathy to the difficulties 

that Tom Barthold and his staff would have in executing this on 

a regular basis. So the Committee would have to include in its 

process enough time to do this analysis on a regular basis. There 

is no way around that. 

Next is the Committee would have to decide on a single approach. You have seen three alternative macroeconomic approaches 

to doing the modeling. In order to get consistent ranking proposals, 

you are going to have to settle on a single approach so that when 

you look at two different tax reforms you can compare them in a 

consistent fashion. That would require settling at least on a yearby-year basis some of the tough questions about how forward looking people are and the degree to which you are going to recognize 

the business responses. 

I think that is especially important in the debate over tax reform. There is no question that, at the moment, we would benefit 

from pro-growth tax reform where we were providing better incentives for the accumulation of human capital, technological skills, 

and fiscal capital. But it is also the case that we have woefully underutilized labor and capital resources in the economy right now. 

And to adopt good policies that both bring us back to full employment and raise the capacity at full employment to grow more rapidly I think is the objective. You are going to have to get both into 

the analysis in one way or another, and deciding the rules for doing 

that is crucial. 

Third point in this regard is this issue of other policies that are 

going on in the economy. You will have to simply decide two important rules of thumb by which the Committee will operate. One 

would be what will you assume on a regular basis about the Federal Reserve so that each and every tax reform is accompanied by 

a comparable Federal Reserve response and you can get the ranking of them correct? The second, and I think the harder one, will 


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be deciding how you will provide for budgetary offsets when a tax 

reform loses money or gains money at certain points in time. 

At the moment, we have two difficulties in this modeling. I want 

to emphasize this. The first is actually quite remarkable, and that 

is for some of these models, particularly for ones where there is tremendous foresight, those models simply cannot be calculated, 

meaning the computer algorithms will not run if the Federal Government’s budget is on an unsustainable trajectory. 

Our Federal budget is on an unsustainable trajectory. So in order 

to actually do the analysis you have to make some assumption 

about how to get the debt stabilized relative to GDP, and that is 

even before you can do the analysis of the tax reform. 

The second piece is that when you do the tax reform analysis you 

have to have a regular and predictable offset for any budgetary 

gains or losses. Will it be spending cuts? Will it be tax increases 

out further in the future? The economy will react very differently 

depending upon how you do it. You have to decide upon a set of 

procedures which may seem arbitrary but which allow you to do 

the business on a regular fashion. 

So the short message is that there will be a whole series of 

things that the Committee will have to decide in order to make this 

operational. They may be better or worse from a predictive point 

of view. I want to emphasize what Tom said about the difference 

between the forecast and the scoring. They may be better or worse 

from the prediction point of view, but they will allow you to rank 

things. 

I will close with simply the reminder that this will not be a panacea. You will not find yourself dramatically changing the Federal 

budgetary outlook over especially the first 5 years on the basis of 

dynamic scoring. You will, however, probably adopt better tax policies from the perspective of jobs and growth. I think that should 

be the focus of the Committee’s deliberations. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holtz-Eakin follows:] 


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Chairman CAMP. Thank you very much, Mr. Holtz-Eakin. 

Mr. Buckley, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN L. BUCKLEY, VISITING PROFESSOR, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Levin, for the 

opportunity to speak to you today. 

I will echo Mr. Levin’s remarks about the amount of work and 

the skill that has been brought to this task by the Joint Committee 

staff. However, they, like every other economist, are faced with the 

fact that it is virtually impossible to model—for any economic 

model to accurately reflect our complex economy with global flows 

of capital goods and services. Therefore, these models, by necessity, 

use simplifying assumptions, and those simplifying assumptions 

often bear little relationship to reality. 

They are also, as both Tom and Doug pointed out, very dependent on assumptions of what other governmental agencies will do, 

including both the Federal Reserve and foreign governments, how 

will they respond to the tax policy. 

The impact on important sectors like health care, housing, or 

manufacturing are not measured by these models or measured only 

in very partial ways. Tax reform could easily remove long-standing 

tax benefits for these important sectors with consequences that this 

Committee needs to understand. The models do not provide that insight at this time. 

I would suggest before this Committee places a greater importance on these models, this macroeconomic analysis, there are important questions for which they should seek answers. 

The Reagan tax cut in 1981 promised large economic benefits because of its rate reductions. Why did a study by Martin Feldstein 

on the impact of the 1981 Tax Act conclude that it had no net impact on economic activity? 

The 1986 Tax Reform Act is very similar in structure to what 

people are talking about today, rate reductions coupled with a 

broadening of the tax base. Under standard economic theory, you 

would have seen a labor response and a capital response. Yet a 

study conducted by the University of Michigan found no measurable impacts on the real-world factors that economists care about. 

In 1993, opponents of the Clinton tax increases could rightfully 

say that virtually every economic model in the country projected 

that that Act would reduce economic growth and reduce jobs. The 

response in the economy was totally different. The economic projections that accompanied the 2001, the 2003, and for that matter the 

2009 tax reductions have not been reflected in the real world. The 

job growth and economic growth following those Acts was far less 

than what was predicted. I would suggest the Committee needs to 

explore why those projections were wrong before they place greater 

impact on this analysis. 

I also agree in many respects with what Doug has said. The 

question to me is whether you use these models for analysis or 

scoring. They can provide important insights in designing tax policy, and you can fix the assumptions so all tax policies are judged 

the same. But the real question is whether they will be used for 


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scoring of {budget estimates}, and that is where I think there is 

real risk of doing damage. 

These are very uncertain economic projections, even the best of 

the models. If you base your budget estimates on these models and 

those budget estimates do not have credibility in the financial markets, you risk serious adverse consequences. The models have to be 

both understandable and credible to the financial markets before 

they can be used in making budget estimates or I think you risk 

great harm. They also have to be based on assumptions that the 

financial markets find credible, and many of the assumptions today 

do not reflect our economy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Buckley follows:] 


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Chairman CAMP. Thank you, Mr. Buckley. 

Mr. Beach, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. BEACH, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR 

DATA ANALYSIS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. BEACH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman 

Levin. 

It is difficult to find economists who would argue that the Federal Government’s tax and spending policies just make absolutely 

no difference to U.S. economic performance. In this age of massive 

and growing Federal debt, it is even more difficult to find a politically engaged citizen who fails to see the connection between Federal fiscal policy and economic performance. Indeed, all across the 

political spectrum and throughout the leading schools of economic 

thought a broad consensus exists that what governments do with 

tax dollars and their outlays as well and how they raise revenues 

matters in the larger dynamic economic world. 

Thus, it is crucial that economic models that organize complex 

theory and data be available and used by policymakers to chart the 

most beneficial course for the country, given the policy options 

available to us. I agree very much analysis is hugely important. 

Some observers, however, would warn policymakers away from the 

use of economic models entirely, even to analyze the likely outcomes of policy change. But the usefulness of the policy tools far 

outweighs the known disadvantages. Indeed, the absence of dynamic economic analysis in major policy debate should be enough 

to stop such a debate until it is informed by such analysis. 

Today’s economic policy models carefully sort through the fundamental requirement that behavioral changes be prominent drivers 

of economic estimates. Likewise, today’s complex and nuanced models nevertheless perform with the speed that policymakers require. 

It is in fact unacceptable to deliver estimates of how policy change 

will likely affect economic activity after the policy change has been 

adopted. 

To be frank, there is also the view that dynamic scoring and 

analysis—and those are two different processes—is a part of the 

legislative process advanced by advocates only of tax reductions 

and limited government. This misimpression has done much to 

keep this useful tool out of the policymakers’ hands. Let me illustrate. 

Heritage used a model of the U.S. economy in 2007 to estimate 

the economic effects of the tax bill advanced by then-Chairman 

Charles Rangel—Congressman Rangel, who is before us today— 

when he chaired the Ways and Means Committee. Chairman Rangel’s reduction of the corporate income tax rate from 35 to 33 percent in fact drew Heritage’s praise, and our model indicated that 

this rate reduction alone would support the creation of as many as 

220,000 jobs. Other provisions of Chairman Rangel’s plan, however, 

we thought neutralized that very good effect. 

It may surprise some on this Committee to learn that Heritage’s 

Center for Data Analysis has published the only dynamic analysis 

and score of the justly famous tax reform proposal of Senators Ron 

Wyden and Dan Coats, which previously that bill was cosponsored, 

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makers that this bipartisan reform effort could potentially mean 

that the Federal deficit would be $61 billion lower per year; the 

Nation’s debt-to-GDP ratio would be 3.9 percentage points lower in 

2020; there would be 2.3 million more jobs created on average in 

each of the years in which the tax reform had full effect. 

No one knows, of course, what policymakers will do, even when 

they possess the very best analytical tools. This we do know, however: The standard conventional or static tax models used today by 

the official revenue estimators at the Joint Committee in the absence of their dynamic analysis could produce highly inaccurate 

revenue estimates and estimates of economic effects. It is this 

record of inaccuracy and, thus, of bad policy advice that has fueled 

the interest in dynamic analysis over the past 20 years in which 

I have been working on this issue. 

In the real world, we know that businesses and consumers will 

respond to both tax cuts and tax hikes, and they will do so in fairly 

predictable fashions. Tax cuts often, but not always, spur investment, which spurs hiring and increases payroll taxes; and they 

lead to a positive feedback effect for government treasuries. Yet it 

is exactly this kind of feedback effect that static analysis misses. 

Advocates of dynamic scoring must be careful not to oversell its 

capabilities or benefits. There are legitimate disagreements about 

which economic model best captures the economic effects of tax policy changes. Even so, we get better, more transparent government 

by encouraging the introduction of more economics into the evaluation of tax policy choices and the occasional use of dynamic scoring 

models to advise policymakers on really big tax bills. Better government and better tax policy is, I believe, a winning combination 

of benefits that assures the widespread adoption of dynamic analysis in the process of creating tax policy. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beach follows:] 


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Chairman CAMP. Thank you very much. 

Thank you all for your testimony. 

Mr. Holtz-Eakin, the Committee has heard from a number of witnesses this year that comprehensive tax reform that broadens the 

base and lowers rates will help spur economic growth and job creation. Can you walk us through the economics of why this is the 

case and how that might manifest itself in economic models that 

analyze any proposal. And what is it about that type of reform that 

would promote growth? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Economies grow in two ways. The first is by 

increasing their capacity to produce; and that comes from giving up 

something in the present and investing in either physical capital, 

factories, equipment; skills and human capital, better, more productive workers; or new technologies and a higher level of innovation. 

The tax system influences that in deep and fundamental ways 

because individuals have to give up something now for a return in 

the future, and taxes affect those returns. As a result, a tax system 

that is fundamentally reformed to lower marginal tax rates and 

take less of that return will incentivize people to undertake those 

activities. If it is a reform that is durable and predictable, it will 

also give them greater confidence in those future returns and, by 

removing that uncertainty, incentivize activities. So it is not really 

complicated. It is at the core of the nature of economic growth. 

It is also true at the moment that the economy can grow by utilizing the existing resources. We have millions of workers out of 

work, we have lots of factories not in use, and if we were to undertake fundamental tax reform right now we could spur immediate 

activity on top of these long-run impacts. 

I think, for example, a corporate rate cut would right now change 

the valuation of our existing capital. So we would see equity values 

go up. That would make household balance sheets better. They 

would spend more. It would change the incentives for business to 

invest right now and thus lead to the kinds of feedbacks on to hiring and payroll taxes that Bill Beach mentioned. It would also 

change international location decisions, which happen quickly, 

where you could get capital flows into the economy. 

So, in both ways, fundamental tax reform can spur immediate 

growth and long-run growth. 

Chairman CAMP. Thank you. 

Both for you and Mr. Barthold, as Mr. Holtz-Eakin just said in 

sort of response to this question, I understand a dynamic analysis 

would analyze the impact that reform could have on the supply of 

labor and capital. As he mentioned, idle factories, workers out of 

work. So, given our current economic conditions, with high unemployment and large amounts of capital sitting on the sidelines, do 

you think the benefits of reform could be even larger than historical assumptions? Or, put another way, do the current group of economic models sufficiently recognize the excess capacity that I have 

just mentioned? 

And if each of you would like to respond or, Mr. Barthold, if you 

would like to go first. 

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gate supply. Generally, people tend to think of the aggregate demand effect as more of a short-term effect. The point that you were 

just raising, Mr. Chairman, with the excess capacity means if there 

were an increase in demand then we could put resources to work 

even without expanding the economy’s future capacity. 

In terms of models and what they show, actually, our MEG 

model is structured to attempt to analyze what economists would 

generally think of as disequilibrium outcomes. In other words, our 

current relatively high unemployment can be reflected in short periods of time in our MEG model while over the long run it provides 

more equilibrium outcomes. Is that model perfect? No. 

Another factor that I think your question also raised is are we 

reflecting the range of outcomes you could see. One thing that I 

tried to emphasize a little bit was the difference between—and 

Doug mentioned this, also—the difference in Fed responses. You 

would expect with current high unemployment that the Fed would 

be more neutral and would let the aggregate demand incentives, 

the improved cash flow aspects of the tax reduction, for example, 

flow through to consumers without trying to fight inflation by raising interest rates in the short term, with interest rates being increased. So that would provide some short-run and some of the 

longer-run crowding-out effects. 

As whether there are facets that the models try to capture perfectly and across all sectors obviously, I have to say the answer to 

that is no and we are still working on it. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. So I think the key for this Committee is 

that if you were to go forward with an approach that encompassed, 

as the MEG model does, both the near-term business cycle impacts 

and the longer-term supply side growth you could do that in a way 

that was rigorously comparable both over time and at any point in 

time across proposals. You would always be starting from a baseline. 

That baseline at the moment reveals enormous unemployment— 

we are starting from a very low level of economic activity—and, as 

a result, could show quite potentially large business cycle gains. At 

other points in time, the baseline perhaps right at full employment, 

the same modeling approach would not give you any business cycle 

gains because you are already at full employment. It would only 

have the supply side approaches. 

So I don’t think there is any disqualifying problem with having 

that kind of approach. The baseline would capture the starting 

point and the degree to which you could get the near-term gains. 

In the same way, having a consistent rule for how the Fed reacts, 

the Fed is unlikely with large amounts of unemployment to be raising rates at a rapid rate, and a rule for how the Fed behaves would 

capture that. So I don’t see any overwhelming obstacle to instituting a set of procedures that were consistent at any point in time 

and captured what is going on in the economy over time. 

Chairman CAMP. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Levin is recognized. 

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to state clearly why I think 

this hearing is perplexing and potentially counterproductive. We 

need analysis. We also have a crisis facing this country and its 

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sented by the President of the United States relating to economic 

growth and jobs. Most of those proposals are in the jurisdiction of 

this Committee. We should have an analysis of those. We should 

have hearings on those. 

We have one analysis—I don’t know if you call it dynamic, but 

let it not misshape what the challenge is before us. So one analysis, 

as I mentioned in my opening statement, Mark Zandi’s, is that the 

President’s Jobs Act would add 2 percentage points to GDP growth 

next year and 1.9 million jobs. 

Mr. Holtz-Eakin, you say in your testimony we should not overestimate, that we should have little reason to believe tax cuts, even 

the best, will pay for themselves, and that over 10 years, no matter 

what scoring, it is unlikely that there will be a major impact, whatever model you use. And here we have a jobs crisis, and we need 

to hold hearings on that. 

So, look, I remember the fight over the proposal in 1993. There 

was some macroanalysis that said, as mentioned here in the testimony, it would lose jobs, et cetera. It would ruin the economy. And 

it helped lead to a major series of years characterized by economic 

growth and jobs. So that is why it is perplexing. 

So let me just ask Mr. Buckley a question, if I might, because 

the chairman asked about tax reform. Lowering the rate and widening the base theoretically has something going for it. But you 

have to discuss what it takes to do that. You have to discuss that. 

I took economics 101 at Columbia. My professor later won a Nobel 

prize for economics. I don’t think that helped me very much. I 

tried. 

So I want to ask you, Mr. Buckley, if as part of widening the 

base and lowering the rate, you eliminate all of the deduction for 

mortgage interest, the deduction for State and local income tax, if 

you include in income the cost of employer-provided health care, if 

you eliminate the charitable deduction and the exclusion of interest 

paid on State and local bonds, if all those are eliminated, what is 

the analysis? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. Levin—— 

Mr. LEVIN. Macro or micro? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. However you do it, I do believe that the details 

of a tax reform matter dramatically. The economists who claim 

there are large economic efficiency benefits from tax reform are 

modeling a specific proposal. Essentially, their vision of what 

should be an ideal tax system, probably not a vision that this Committee would adopt. They cannot analyze tax reform without a specific proposal. This Committee cannot, either. Some types of tax reform could result in a net tax increase on U.S. manufacturing by 

repealing large benefits for the manufacturing sector. 

Mr. LEVIN. Is it your proposal today to pay for—— 

Mr. BUCKLEY. For the rate reduction. 

Mr. LEVIN. By eliminating the remaining money in 136, which 

I think is mindless. 

Chairman CAMP. It does not eliminate the remaining money in 

136. There is a reduction in the 136 dollars. It does not eliminate. 

Mr. LEVIN. The remaining money. 

Chairman CAMP. It is a big distinction. It is 1.5. I think there 

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Mr. LEVIN. But that is all spoken for. That is all spoken for. If 

you look at what is in the hopper now, it eliminates what isn’t spoken for. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. That is what I think—the one thing the models 

do not do very well is analyze the impact on sectors. If you repeal 

current law benefits for owner-occupied housing, I believe you will 

see a reduction in home prices. I believe that those benefits are 

capitalized in the current value of our homes. 

Now that may be desirable economic policy, but you need to 

know what impact that would have on the economy and whether 

you can mitigate those effects through transition rules. Until you 

have those details—and that is really what this debate is lacking, 

is a detailed proposal—you do not know what the consequences of 

the tax reform will be. 

Chairman CAMP. All right, thank you. 

Mr. Herger is recognized. 

Mr. HERGER. Thank you, Chairman Camp. 

I would like to ask Mr. Barthold about how the scoring process 

considers administrative and compliance costs. In 2006, Congress 

passed a 3 percent withholding tax on government agencies’ payments for goods and services. Joint tax scored this provision as 

raising Federal revenues by $7 billion. Subsequently, however, the 

Department of Defense released a study finding that, for DoD 

alone, the cost to implement this new tax would be over $17 billion. 

This means the government would be spending far more to collect 

this tax than it raises in revenue. 

Another independent study estimated that the cost of businesses to comply with this withholding requirement could be over $40 billion. In general, the high cost of tax compliance means less money 

is available for small business to invest in job creation, and many 

of us are hopeful that simplifying the Tax Code would reduce this 

burden and thus spur economic growth. 

Mr. Barthold, does the current scoring process incorporate the 

cost to the IRS and other Federal agencies to administer specific 

tax provisions? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Thank you, Mr. Herger. 

What we are estimating for the Committee Members are the receipts’ effect to the IRS. We try to bring into the process at the 

staff level issues of what it will take for different agencies or different taxpayers to comply. But the estimates themselves do not include direct estimates of compliance costs except to the effect that 

compliance and complexity affect taxpayer behavior. 

If I could—I know I am on your time, but if I could make one 

note about the $7 billion estimate that was done for the 3 percent 

withholding at the time that TIPRA was enacted, I think it is important for the Members to recognize that estimate has two components. Because it is a withholding provision, it has the effect of accelerating tax payments within the fiscal budget period. And that 

was the bulk of the $7 billion estimate, was an acceleration of payments into the Treasury. 

There was a second component which was smaller, but not insignificant, of ongoing compliance gains. Because as I know the Committee was aware because they had heard testimony, there was 

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terms of paying their legally due income and payroll tax liabilities, 

and that is what had motivated the enactment of that proposal. 

I hope that addresses your question, Mr. Herger. 

Mr. HERGER. Well, Mr. Barthold, it would seem to me again 

where just one department, the Department of Defense, estimated 

that its costs would be more than double the revenues coming in, 

it would seem that we are getting an incomplete picture of how tax 

changes affect a budget. And if tax policy creates new administrative costs for the government, then we have to either increase total 

appropriations or agencies have to sacrifice other priorities. Conversely, if tax reform reduces administrative costs, that should generate savings in the discretionary budget. 

Mr. Holtz-Eakin, from your experience at CBO, do you have any 

thoughts on this topic? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I am certainly not familiar with the specifics of that proposal. I do know that when CBO undertakes to 

score proposals it has to make some judgement about the likely implementation of the rulemaking, the time it will take for that rulemaking, and, as a result, when the Federal budget is affected. And 

it also has to make some judgment about overall discretionary 

funds that will be necessary to implement it. So I think this is part 

and parcel of doing estimates—impacts on the Federal budget. 

Mr. HERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CAMP. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson is recognized. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am asking that—Mr. Barthold, I want to ask you about the revenue impact analysis for the 2003 tax cuts and in particular the 

capital gains tax cut. I am sure you’re familiar with the July 24th 

Wall Street Journal edition on tax oracles. This is it. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to get this introduced into the record, 

if I could. 

Chairman CAMP. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

The editorial points out there was a surge in tax revenue following the 2003 tax cuts. The surge simply was missed by the 

budget scorekeepers. In particular, with respect to the capital gains 

tax cut, the Wall Street Journal points out the behavioral model 

that Mr. Barthold celebrates predicted that the capital gains cuts 

would cost the government just under $10 billion from 2003 to 

2007 when the actual capital gains revenues over 5 years were 

$221 billion higher than JCT predicted. 

Mr. Chairman, I think I would like to ask Mr. Barthold, why was 

the analysis so wrong with respect to the revenue impact of the 

capital gains tax cut? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. As our staff pointed 

out in some of the background material that we prepared in our 

overview, we tried to account for taxpayer behavioral responses, including capital gains realizations. Because it is entirely discretionary, it is a very difficult area. In the document that we published in advance of this hearing, JCX 46–11, we noted in particular that compared to baseline projections of capital gains and 

a simple static sort of analysis of saying if you change the rate of 

tax on those gains, what would happen to receipts, that our modeling at the time of 2003 had over 70 percent of the static effect 

offset by behavioral change. So we had a substantial behavioral 

component to that particular estimate. 

The Wall Street Journal’s discussion I think makes some—without knowing completely what they are trying to compare—I think 

they have some confusion in what they take as the baseline projections for capital gains as opposed to overall receipts. In part of this 

particular editorial and the editorial that they had prior to this editorial, they seem to display some confusion about the point I made 

earlier regarding whether our estimates are about receipts or a 

change from the baseline of receipts. 

But that said, as I noted in my testimony, we always strive to 

try to update and present to the Committee information based on 

the best estimates possible. Because of the importance of the capital gains in the tax policy debate, it is one area that we are reviewing. We have a research project underway right now. In fact, 

we have just submitted to a small professional conference of academic economists a proposal to present some preliminary results 

from this research that we would use to change our modeling. 

So all I can say is we do our best overall on—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I recognize it is not a simple thing. But in 

light of the revenue figures, do you not believe that cutting the capital gains tax rate, as Congress did in 2003, can have a positive 

macroeconomic impact? In other words, do you not believe a tax cut 

such as the 2003 capital gains tax cut can lead to greater investment, job growth, and perhaps higher tax revenues? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Mr. Johnson, on that point you actually enter 

sort of a different realm about what is the macroeconomic transmission mechanism of particular policy changes. Reducing the tax 

on capital gains increases after-tax returns to individuals’ savings, 

particularly in the form of equity investment. The way we would 

analyze that is that is one component of how people save. Other 

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stocks that accrue more gains; do we alter portfolios that have less 

debt, more equity? That all goes into the type of analysis that I 

tried to present to you briefly this morning. 

So by increasing the after-tax return to savings, there should be 

some positive effects on savings. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CAMP. Mr. Rangel is recognized. 

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this enlightening hearing that we are having. I gather from the Joint 

Committee that the purpose that this panel is here is to share with 

us the resources that you have available to us as tax writers, if and 

when we move forward with tax reform. And my question to you: 

Does anyone here have any reason to believe that we will be using 

this information in order to reform the tax system? 

I guess not. 

Mr. BEACH. The answer is yes. 

Mr. RANGEL. Then could you share with me what allows you to 

believe that this Congress will be reforming the tax system? What 

have you heard; what indications? Because I have been on this 

Committee longer than anyone else and I received no signal that 

my Committee will be moving into tax reform in this session. Because, as you pointed out, I have been a strong advocate of tax reform, I think it increases revenue. It is fair. It is more equitable. 

So share it with me, Mr. Beach. 

Mr. BEACH. I don’t know what the Committee will do, obviously. 

I am not sitting where you are sitting. And I hope that you do tax 

reform, and do it very soon, and you follow some of the principles 

that you laid out when you were chairman of this Committee. 

I will tell you that as a long-time person whose group helps 

Members of Congress shape their bills and does some analysis of 

their bills to help them understand better, I am getting a lot of 

business. I think as a market indication, there is a strong interest 

among Members of this Committee and Members outside of this 

Committee in reforming the taxes. But I think also a lot of Members understand that there is a dance that has to be held here. And 

one partner is tax reform and the other partner is overall fiscal reform. And it is the difficulty of finding how you in fact dance with 

those two partners. 

Mr. RANGEL. What you are saying, Mr. Beach, is that it is a 

complex and sensitive subject politically. I don’t see how you think 

we can overcome that problem this year. And I know you are not 

talking about having this Committee move into a tax reform mode 

next year. 

I guess my real question to you, based on your experience, when 

the President has a tax proposal of any kind, as he recently reported, you don’t believe that you can really be for or against it 

until the Committee of jurisdiction reviews it and has hearings on 

it. Would you agree with that statement? 

Mr. BEACH. That is a matter for the Committee to take up. I 

know there is tremendous interest in this outside. 

Mr. RANGEL. You pay taxes. You are going to be affected by 

what happens here. Now, you have a 12-Member Committee. You 

know what the Ways and Means and the Finance Committee’s responsibility is. You know about deadlines that we have. I hope you 


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are not suggesting that you think that we can do tax reform between now within the deadlines that the Congress has. Is that 

what you are telling me? 

Mr. BEACH. You shouldn’t do it. If you are not started right 

now—you should take your time to do tax reform. 

Mr. RANGEL. That means that you agree with me. You don’t 

think it is the right thing to do to start tax reform now, with all 

of the congressional restrictions that we have on timetable. 

Mr. BEACH. You have already started tax reform. There are so 

many discussions going on. But this Committee and the Congress 

has a duty which is even greater than that, and that is to plot a 

course through the most difficult financial challenge that this country has faced perhaps in the last 100 years. And tax reform is part 

of that. But also major changes to our spending priorities is part 

of that as well. 

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I assume that means that you don’t expect us to do tax reform 

this session. 

Chairman CAMP. All right. Mr. Tiberi is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barthold, I want to 

follow up on the line of questioning from Mr. Levin regarding the 

President’s Jobs Act and how you model that Jobs Act. 

Let me give you a real-life example and tell me how your process 

applies to this. I had a discussion Monday with a constituent who 

is part of a family-owned business. They are an S Corp. He and his 

wife were looking at making an investment decision, and they were 

down the road of making this decision. The President’s proposal 

has an impact on that investment decision, and thus he and his 

wife now have put a hold on that investment decision and—an investment decision that theoretically would create jobs and opportunity. And so based upon the President’s proposal, that is stopped. 

And it is going to stop for maybe forever, based upon the President’s proposal and what happens to it. 

How do you and your folks at Joint Tax figure that out and apply 

it to real life? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Mr. Tiberi, you raised a really important issue 

in economic modeling, and that is how to account for individuals’ 

or businesses’ expectations. As you have described your constituents, they apparently feel pretty strongly about the uncertainty 

that is created by introduced legislation. We try to account for, as 

I noted, taxpayer behavior in all the estimates that we do. What 

is particularly difficult, I think, in what you proposed is what does 

that do to the baseline? We make these estimates relative to baseline receipts. And the baseline receipts projections aren’t assuming 

that there is any change in law. So our baseline receipts projections 

assume that a lot of investments would have gone on as projected 

under the macroeconomic projections of the Congressional Budget 

Office. 

The situation you posed is you think that legislative uncertainty 

may change the course or timing of those investments. Now, when 

that gets picked up is when the Congressional Budget Office redoes 

its macroeconomic forecast. If they redo the macroeconomic forecast, that will then be reflected in what we think about the course 


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of the economy, the course of receipts from business income. But 

as you posited this particular situation, that is sort of missed in the 

economic modeling right now because your constituents had something they were thinking of doing in, let’s say, the next 6 months, 

and now they are not because of legislative uncertainty. 

We have recently had a revision in the CBO macro forecast. We 

are not picking up in anything that we are doing on Capitol Hill, 

in our modeling, really, that reflects that kind of uncertainty and 

changed decision because of current legislative uncertainty. 

Mr. TIBERI. Since CBO is mentioned, Mr. Holtz Eakin, can you 

comment from your perspective when you sat at CBO? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I would concur that incorporating explicitly 

policy uncertainty is one of the real weak points of the current 

state of economic science. In that regard, if I could, I think it is important to distinguish between scoring and forecasting. Think 

about football. For reasons that I don’t know, if you get a touchdown, you get six points. If you kick the extra point, you get one. 

If you run or throw it across, you get two. I have no idea why. Because those scoring rules allow you to compare two teams, they 

allow you to compare games across the country and over time. 

And that is what you want out of good rules to evaluation legislation. You want to be able to score them consistently. You would 

also like to be right. But the Committee operates in areas where, 

quite frankly, often it is impossible to be sure you are right. We 

passed the Medicare Modernization Act when I was at CBO. There 

had never before been a product which was insurance for the cost 

of outpatient prescription drugs offered by the Federal Government. We developed scoring rules so that there are more and less 

expensive ones. We had no idea if we were right. It turned out we 

were way too high. Probably 30, 40 percent too high. Over time 

now, I think scores of prescription drug estimates will get better. 

I think the same will be true for the Joint Committee. If you go 

down this route, you will bring into the scoring additional information—growth consequences—and they won’t be right the first time. 

But they will get better and better. And at every point in time, you 

will be playing fair across the proposals. That is the key. 

Mr. TIBERI. My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CAMP. Mr. Davis is recognized. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to continue 

in that line of questioning, Mr. Eakin. 

In your testimony you suggested coming up with a new single approach to estimating that provides uniformity of scoring while taking aspects of both static and dynamic scoring into account. How 

does the current regime produce scoring estimates that result in 

qualitative differences, in your opinion? 

Following on that, how do you think a new system would treat, 

comparatively, a reduction in marginal rates versus, say, the credit 

from State and local sales taxes? I am not looking so much for a 

specific answer on the second, but trying to get to a more realistic 

aspect. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I think that it is important if you are worried about economic growth, particularly over the long term, longer 

horizons. You want to have a system that reflects the fact that 

there is a big difference between a revenue-neutral tax reform that 


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cuts marginal rates, broadens the base, and one that might, say, 

jack rates up on every taxpayer in America and then provide a refundable credit to exactly the same people. It would be revenue 

neutral. Some people might take that cash and spend it. It might 

look like a good idea in the near term. But over the long term, 

those are terrible incentives for labor and capital and growth. And 

you want the process to reflect those incentives. Static models will 

not capture the longer-term index. 

Mr. DAVIS. Anybody else like to comment on that? Mr. Buckley. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. The only thing I would say is, there is a sharp 

difference between analysis and scoring. I think a lot of these models may be useful in analyzing different proposals and the comparative benefits. When you are doing that, the Committee can 

specify assumptions that they want the Joint Committee to follow. 

I don’t think you can do that for the actual scoring of the legislation. Do exactly what Doug has suggested. Put the assumptions in 

there and you can compare different proposals across the board. 

But if you use that for determining the budget score, what you reflect as the budget cost of the bill, the perception of political interference, if this Committee sets the assumptions—and somebody 

has to do that—those estimates then have no credibility. And I 

think you run a real risk in the financial markets if you use that 

type of estimate in determining the ultimate cost of the bill. 

I think that is the real question here for the Committee. Analysis 

is fine and good. You want more information. But you should be 

very careful before you take that final step and say that the actual 

official score of the legislation is determined with regard to these 

models and with regard to the assumptions that the Committee 

specifies. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Eakin, you wanted to add an additional point. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I think this is the right discussion. I think 

I come down at a different place. Point number one is that I see 

no qualitative difference between the kinds of uncertainty that surround these growth effects and the different models that capture 

them and the kinds of uncertainty that surround the conventional 

micro uncertainty around a lot of scores. We did scores for terrorism risk insurance. I hope we never find out how accurate they 

are. There are fundamental questions of uncertainty that pervade 

the scoring process. There is nothing new about that here. 

I also come down on a different place on the financial markets. 

They use these models every day in order to evaluate exactly what 

you are doing. So I don’t think they are going to be at all phased 

by the fact that you use them to make your decisions better. They 

are using them right now. 

The third thing I would say is there will be some arbitrary decisions. And the goal to make them appear to be done in an evenhanded, nonpolitical fashion is an important one. Transparency 

would do a lot to solve that. 

So I think there is a route forward. 

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Beach. 

Mr. BEACH. There is one thing I would want to remind the 

Committee, is that when they take a score of an important bill 

from the good people at the Joint Committee on Taxation, it is not 


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based on an economic model. Be under no misimpression. You have 

used an economic model to get to that score. What you are assuming is the economy does not have an effect. So any way, shape, or 

form, when your scores come in there is an economic set of assumptions behind that. 

What we are saying on this panel—I think we are all agreed— 

is that you need to have the best information, the best advice possible to plot that good course to a better economy. And that is why 

dynamic analysis is so crucial and it should be part of the routine 

pieces of information that come to this Committee. 

So when you get a static score, the assumption is the economy 

is not working there. There might be microeconomic behavioral assumptions built in, but the general economy is not responding. 

That is the assumption made by the static score. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman CAMP. Mr. McDermott is recognized. 

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I 

have spent 40 years sitting in Ways and Means Committee, 17 

years in the State legislature, and 23 years here. And these mindnumbing discussions always remind me of Henry Jackson, our Senator, who once said what he was looking for was a one-armed economist so he wouldn’t hear any more of this ‘‘on the one hand this’’ 

and ‘‘on the other hand that.’’ 

And in the State of Washington I hired a guy in 1979, after we 

lost our bond rating and whatnot, to do our revenue estimates, because we always had a fight between the Governor’s office and the 

legislature as to what the revenue was going to be. We finally said, 

let’s get one guy and he would give us a high, a medium, and a 

low, and then we would pick one, and the Governor had to live 

with it and we had to live with it. 

Now, up here we keep playing this game of OMB and CBO and 

the Joint Committee on Tax and everybody else. It is all for political reasons. Groucho Marx probably said it best when he said, 

‘‘When you go into politics, the first thing you have to learn to do 

is to have a straight face.’’ And we sit here and have these soberfaced discussions. But we know that we are never going to get a 

balanced budget because one group is going to say, if we do this, 

if we cut taxes, the revenue will go up. And another group will say, 

no, if you cut taxes, the revenue will go down. And we never agree 

on the baseline. And we fight. And we are going to come to a showdown here on the weekend, because people say we are in so much 

debt that we can’t—what can we do? Well, it depends. 

But we don’t have one definition of being in debt because we 

don’t talk about the investment in infrastructure. We don’t talk 

about a lot of things in some kind of unified system. 

My belief is that these discussions—the majority will decide what 

they think the estimate is. I think this hearing is probably about 

let’s use some dynamic scoring so we can make things look better 

going into some kind of a tax reform discussion. 

I read, Mr. Buckley, your statement that if we accept some of 

these assumptions, we may have a negative effect on the market. 

Could you expand on that? We are sitting here today with the Republican leadership saying that we don’t want Bernanke fiddling 


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with the interest rates because it is going to—they don’t want 

things to get better, that is pretty clear. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Let me slightly respond to what Doug said. Businesses do use macroeconomic models in making business decisions. 

And that is exactly what I think this Committee should do. That 

is perfectly appropriate. But when they report to their shareholders, they record the cost without reduction for the potential 

gains that may result from the investment. If any business reflected in its current statements the prospective but uncertain benefits from its current investments, it would probably violate every 

securities law. 

So to say that business used these assumptions, that is correct, 

they do, in making business decisions. They do not use these assumptions when they report to shareholders. If the profits from the 

investment actually are realized, the business takes those profits 

and they will count in the year which they are realized. If you score 

using these estimates, you are saying that the Federal Government 

will take into account uncertain benefits before they are realized. 

I think that is pretty dangerous. I think it is dangerous as far as 

the acceptance of the market for cost assumptions. 

Mr. MCDERMOTT. What difference would it make to the market 

if you started taking those—— 

Mr. BUCKLEY. If the markets suggested that you could pass big 

tax reductions and pretend that they had no cost because of uncertain projections of future macroeconomic benefits, they would not 

respect those decisions. There is a point where you need credibility 

in your budget assumptions. Those budget assumptions have credibility now because they are consistent with the cost accounting 

standards that businesses have to follow in their everyday life. 

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Can we have that as long as we have OMB 

and CBO fighting? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. But they are not making assumptions about the 

wisdom of the change in law. They are making microeconomic decisions about the effects on revenues. 

Chairman CAMP. The time is expired. Mr. Buchanan is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I also want to thank all of our witnesses today. 

Mr. Eakin, I was curious. I want to talk about taxes and small 

business in a minute, but I was very interested to read your comment the other day on the Federal Reserve. I believe we need to 

audit the Fed. I have talked to a lot of people in Florida who are 

concerned about the Fed and their active involvement. What are 

your thoughts on whether the Fed should be more active or less active in terms of our policies? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I have no idea what I said. I talk too much, 

evidently. 

Mr. BUCHANAN. I heard your comments. I think it was along 

the lines that the Fed was too active. I just hear that comment a 

lot. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I don’t think—there are multiple discussions about the Fed. Number one, I do not believe that there is 

much the Fed can do to enhance near-term economic growth at this 

point in time, and that doing nothing is essentially the right nearVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:17 Oct 15, 2012 Jkt 076168 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\76168.XXX 76168

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term situation in my view. They still have capacity to help us if, 

God forbid, European financial shocks or something get transmitted to the U.S. They can step in and help us on the downside. 

And I believe that I would prefer to have the Congress of the 

United States do appropriate oversight in hearing settings and 

make sure that the books are square. But I do not want the Congress of the United States running U.S. monetary policy. I have 

seen how the Congress produced fiscal policy, and I am not overwhelmed. 

Mr. BUCHANAN. The other thing I wanted to get on is small 

business. I know we all believe it is the backbone of our economy. 

It creates 70 percent of the jobs. And I see it in our communities 

that are concerned about taxes and where that is going. There is 

also the lack of credit out there. 

Mr. Barthold, in terms of your modeling, what have you taken 

into account in terms of pass-through entities? How do you look at 

that in terms of your modeling? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Pass-through entities are part of our conventional modeling. And to the extent that the conventional modeling 

feeds into the macroeconomic analysis that we provide from time 

to time, pass-throughs are included. On the macro side, as I noted 

in the testimony and overview document, we don’t divide the business sector into small businesses, medium businesses, and large 

businesses. We use a much more crude aggregation. Most of the 

time we are looking just at business investment and investment in 

housing. 

But in our conventional modeling, as I know you know from some 

material that we went through earlier in the year, we have a substantial amount of background data on the types and numbers and 

distribution of different entities—sole proprietorships, S Corporations, partnerships—by industry. And we use that data to analyze 

all the different proposals that Members such as yourself bring to 

us. 

Mr. BUCHANAN. A lot gets thrown around. I have been in business for myself for 30 years and been active with a lot of small 

businesses. I am concerned because a lot of times it gets thrown 

around about the idea that only 2 percent of small businesses are 

affected by the tax increases. But yet when you look at the income 

of these pass-through entities, 50 percent of the income is impacted. 

And when you look at the environment, especially in Florida, but 

I am sure other States, where you have a lack of credit, the growth 

and whatever success I had because I had strong banks that were 

able to back cheap capital, but when you take into account a lot 

of pass-through entities looking at their taxes are going to go up, 

along with a lack of capital, then we try to figure out why we don’t 

have the job creation. That is what I am getting feedback on every 

day back in Florida. Do you have any thoughts about that? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. I think the issue that you are raising is very 

similar to the issue that Mr. Tiberi raised earlier, and that is; to 

what extent does current legislative uncertainty affect current business decisions, and then how is that reflected in the modeling? I 

noted that short-term uncertainty that is not picked up in the periVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:12 Oct 11, 2012 Jkt 076168 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\76168.XXX 76168

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odic updates of baseline projections of investment, macroeconomic 

activity, on business income, is missed in the process. 

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Beach, do you have anything you want to 

add to that? 

Mr. BEACH. It is very important to do the pass-through entities 

correctly. In models that we use, we take a lot of time to take a 

look at which ones are most likely to be benefited by drops in capital cost because of the capital-intensive nature of some of those 

pass-throughs, labor costs, because of that, and so forth. You need 

to have very detailed information. 

Fortunately, I can tell you that the Joint Committee does a 

pretty good job of sorting through that. I will also tell you that I 

think the Joint Committee would benefit tremendously by having 

more active participation of advisory panels, outside groups, that 

would come in and not oversee their work, but be at a place where 

they could try out new ideas and get suggestions. There are a lot 

of people in this town and around the country that are handling 

questions just like you have asked that are outside the Joint Committee. 

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Beach. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CAMP. Mr. Smith is recognized. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the experts on the panel here today. I certainly want to be sensitive to 

the fact that there are a lot of moving parts in the economy. And 

I think I hear you saying that it is hard to predict everything. I 

am certainly sensitive to that. We are forced to—and I think it is 

healthy—to look even beyond the 10-year window. 

Mr. Holtz-Eakin, do you think that we could use dynamic analysis perhaps to even look beyond the 10-year window? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I think it would be incredibly desirable to 

do that. You certainly want to always use all the information you 

can about the long-run consequences of both the tax and the spending policies of the government, there is no question. We have enormous long-run problems that the 10-year window doesn’t capture 

right now. The only real issue is the degree to which you bring 

those into the formal scoring process. And that is the place where 

the Holtz-Eakin-Buckley feud shall continue. 

Can I respond to what he said? I think what he said is wrong. 

Can I respond? 

Under current procedures, the CBO and the OMB will put out 

a baseline projection in January. And those will be budget projections for the U.S. This Committee could then, in the middle of the 

year, pass a tax reform, under current procedures. When the next 

January came around, CBO and OMB would have to create new 

budget projections and they would have to look at the new current 

law and decide whether that tax reform helped growth or didn’t. 

All we are talking about is whether during the year you actually 

use that information to decide among tax reforms. It is not going 

to change the integrity of the budget projections. The financial 

markets are not even going to notice. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. If I could have an opportunity. I am sorry; on 

your time, too. 


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You are right, you keep doing changes in estimates. There is no 

way that the CBO estimate next year is going to be dramatically 

different by reason of a tax reform enacted this year. I don’t think 

it is going to change the projections all that much. The real question is how you score it. If you score it in a way that hides the 

budget cost, I think you run into trouble. And particularly if you 

score it under assumptions that this Committee selects—and that 

is what Doug says you have to do—then I think you have real problems. 

I think it is different if CBO has a new baseline. I think it is a 

quite different thing from this Committee saying we shall assume 

that the Federal Reserve is going to accommodate this in this way; 

we shall assume this and we shall assume that. And therefore you 

would determine the score by the actions of this Committee. That 

is a political judgment that I think you are perfectly appropriate 

to make. I don’t think it should affect the budget score. 

Mr. SMITH. Pardon me while I shift gears a little bit. I know 

that tax policy does have consequences in the economy. And I know 

that different States have different tax policies among themselves. 

And so I have seen where tax policy affects behavior. I think we 

can all agree on that to a certain point. 

Take, for example, section 1031 exchange policies that oftentimes 

encourage some behavior that impacts market values. And then a 

high property tax State like Nebraska sets property taxes according 

to market value, and all of a sudden tax policy can effectively influence and affect local tax policy—even the most local of taxes, being 

property tax. Is that taken into account in an analysis of any form 

right now? 

Mr. Barthold. 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Yes, Mr. Smith. There are a couple different 

avenues in which some of the State and local effects are taken into 

account. What we don’t do is we don’t project that there will be a 

change in the budgetary receipts in the State of Nebraska or in the 

State of Missouri. But we do as part of our individual modeling, for 

example, assign individuals to States. We have upgraded from time 

to time—in fact, just this last year, we added a State tax calculator—so that when we look at behavioral effects, we will be able 

to take into account the combined marginal tax rates of the Federal 

and State level. We also use that State tax calculator to look at 

possible itemized deductions for real estate property taxes and 

State and local income and/or sales taxes. 

So we do try to account for some of the interaction that is in the 

Federal system. But it doesn’t go down to projecting budgetary outcomes for specific States. 

Mr. SMITH. And then how that might come back around and affect tax. 

Chairman CAMP. The time has expired. Mr. Neal is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding this hearing. I 

often think that this is a part of congressional life that the public 

does not get to see, where there really is an exchange, and you listen to people who do this every day and there is good give-andtake, and the people that are at the witness table are not only seaVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:12 Oct 11, 2012 Jkt 076168 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\76168.XXX 76168

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soned but, just as importantly, I think, pretty honest about the 

arithmetic that is put in front of them. I appreciate it very much. 

I tortured Mr. Holtz-Eakin over the year with this question. And 

I see no reason that I should leave him alone today, on that basis. 

He knows where I am going with this. He already knows the answer and I know the answer to the question that I am going to 

raise with him. But I appreciated his candor. 

I was driving along one night listening to a lengthy NPR piece, 

and Mr. Holtz-Eakin was the subject of the interview. I thought the 

candor he expressed on the campaign trail was very helpful to the 

dialogue as well. 

Do you think tax cuts pay for themselves? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. On average, no. 

Mr. NEAL. Thank you. Now I am going to come back to you for 

a second here, because I also want to question Mr. Buckley for a 

moment here. 

You were around during the Tax Reform Act of 1986. How do you 

realistically think that we can get to that 25 percent rate that is 

being shopped by many in this town at the moment? 

I want to give Mr. Holtz-Eakin a chance to speak to that as well. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Unless you are willing to sustain a large net tax 

reduction—and that is clearly a question here—I doubt that you 

can get to 25 percent if you follow your normal practice of providing transition relief for people who have made investment decisions based on current law. For example, you can raise a lot of 

money by repealing the mortgage interest deduction. However, if 

you decide it is unfair to raise that—repeal that deduction for people with existing mortgages, the amount of money you raise disappears rapidly. 

A lot of the numbers that are being used for tax reform debates 

so far are not revenue estimates. They are static tax expenditure 

estimates. If we are talking about purely static, tax expenditures 

estimates are static. So a lot of the estimates that people are using 

are static estimates. It will be estimated with behavioral responses; 

not macroeconomic responses, but behavioral responses. 

So I think it is very difficult to do, without being pretty rough, 

and not properly taking into account the investment decisions that 

people have made based on current law. 

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I think qualitatively the key is that the Tax 

Code now subsidizes to a tremendous extent consumption items. 

The mortgage interest deduction is the consumption of debt to finance owner-occupied housing. The employer-sponsored insurance 

exclusion is the subsidization of the consumption of insurance and 

health products that it pays for. If you go through the list, by and 

large what we do with the Tax Code are things that subsidize what 

is the opposite to growth policy. It is consume now, forget about the 

future. So if you want to get rates down and you are serious about 

growth effects, you have to reform the Tax Code to reward saving 

and investment and to stop subsidizing consumption. And that is 

the only way you will get rates down. That points to the reason 

why it is very often the case that tax cuts don’t pay for themselves 

and that analyses of tax policies don’t show big growth effects, is 


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because often it is not very good growth policy. Because a lot of tax 

policy simply is not. 

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Barthold, he just teed-up the question that I 

want to raise with you. Mr. Beach disagrees with the economic 

models you use as it relates to static estimates. Would you like to 

expound upon the testimony you offered based upon the models 

that you have offered today? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Well, I just wanted to take issue with the word 

‘‘static,’’ as I noted in my testimony and we noted in our background material, and as came up in the discussion of capital gains 

tax policy changes. We incorporate at the microeconomic level a 

substantial amount of behavioral response. We try to account for 

compliance behavior, portfolio changes, shifts between investment 

sectors, all in response to tax proposals that the Members offer to 

us for economic analysis. 

What we pointed out some today is that in macroeconomic work 

that we have tried to do for the Committee, we are presenting further economic analysis on how some policies might have broad effects on the economy in terms of labor supply and capital investment, how they could matter to future economic growth. 

Chairman CAMP. Thank you. Mr. Schock is recognized. 

Mr. SCHOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like 

your permission to submit questions in writing to these panelists 

so that they can respond in writing if I run out of time. 

Chairman CAMP. Without objection. 

Mr. SCHOCK. First, Mr. Holtz-Eakin, your response to tax cuts 

don’t pay for themselves. I am curious, by my friends on the other 

side who keep pointing this out, I am wondering whether or not 

government spending to spur economic growth pays for itself. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Not in my view, no. 

Mr. SCHOCK. So when you said earlier that oftentimes cutting 

taxes is not an effective way of spurring economic growth, obviously we have tried to spend a lot of money here in Washington, 

D.C. to spur economic growth. Which of those two paths do you 

think is a better one to spur economic growth, if you can; and if 

not one of those two paths is better, is there a third that we are 

not seeing? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I think if you look at long-run growth, ignoring business cycles, unquestionably the preferred package, progrowth tax reform, has the bigger impacts. I have little doubt about 

that. The debate over what happens in the short run—throw 

money at the economy, get Keynesian effects; cut taxes, get 

Keynesian effects—I think both have proven to be relatively inefficient and not something that we ought to get too high hopes of. 

I guess the biggest thing is have a discussion where how you cut 

taxes matters, not just do you cut taxes. How you spend money 

matters, not just do you spend money. There is a big difference between providing high-quality infrastructure over the long term and 

passing out cash benefits to American citizens. 

Mr. SCHOCK. Do you think that infrastructure spending matters if it is more long term and sustained? For example, a highway 

bill over 6 years versus a 1- or 2-year stimulus bill? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I have little faith in so-called infrastructure 

stimulus spending. This for decades has been a phantom that ConVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:17 Oct 15, 2012 Jkt 076168 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\76168.XXX 76168

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gresses have tasted. It never arrives in time. It is often spent on 

bad projects. It is not good policy. There is no question that we 

need better infrastructure programs where we spend the money 

wisely. And I recommend to you a private sector commission report 

that I can get to you on reforming transportation infrastructure 

programs. 

Mr. SCHOCK. I would like that. Thank you. 

Mr. Barthold, we had a panel of company CEOs and CFOs before 

us on the issue of tax reform and I specifically asked them—many 

of them received different types of credits, deductions in our current Tax Code—whether or not, in fact, eliminating all those tax 

deductions and going to a straight, for example, 25 percent rate 

would be better for them. They unequivocally—all of them said yes. 

I then asked them whether or not, in fact, their business models 

would stay static or whether or not they would in fact invest more 

money in the United States. Most of these were multinational companies. Again, went down the line, Republican and Democrat witnesses alike, all uniformly said they would in fact invest more in 

the United States if we got rid of deductions and could get the rate 

close to 25 percent. 

That leads me to ask you specifically a question. And I will put 

it in writing so you can respond in writing, but maybe you can take 

a jab at it with the time that you have: 

First, whether the Joint Committee revenue estimating methodology would assume one or more of the following: First, that U.S. 

multinationals would increase the amount of their U.S. domestic 

investing by investing capital inside the U.S. that, under current 

law, would have been invested outside the U.S. 

Second, that the amount of foreign investment inside the U.S. 

would increase above what is expected under current law. 

Third, that less earnings stripping would occur with respect to 

foreign investment in the U.S. than occurs under current law. 

And fourth, would U.S. companies engage in less income shifting 

than occurs under current law? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Well, I think I can give at least a short answer 

on that and I will be happy to give you a more detailed response 

in writing. 

You asked really about both sides of U.S. domestic investment in 

response to a corporate rate. First of all, we think, off course, it depends on what other tax policy changes are made. But if we are 

just saying lower corporate rate, that gives incentives for corporations to expand their business activities in the United States. So, 

yes, part of our modeling would show—particularly if we are talking about macroeconomic effects—we would show that U.S. investment by U.S.-based multinationals should increase. 

Similarly, it does make any investment by anyone in the United 

States more attractive. So we should expect also that the incentives 

would be for foreign-based multinational corporations also to expand their business activities in the United States. 

You asked about two aspects of income shifting for inbound investment by foreign persons. There is some evidence—it is mixed— 

of what is called earnings stripping. That is because of the ability 

to deduct at a relatively high statutory tax rate against the U.S. 


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base and report that income abroad with a lower statutory tax rate. 

Again, the incentive would be for less earnings stripping. 

On the flip side, for outbound investment or activities to try to 

locate U.S. multinational income abroad rather than in the United 

States, the incentive would also be to retain more of that income 

in the United States. 

Chairman CAMP. Thank you. Mr. Becerra is recognized. 

Mr. BECERRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

Mr. Barthold, from what I can gather, trying to work through all 

the economic-speak, this is like trying to ride a bucking bronco 

when you are trying to come up with a good score. In the modeling 

that is done and that has been traditionally done, have you all developed a sense of the variables that you can include in this equation to give you your score that you have the most confidence in 

helping you come out with a result that reflects reality? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Mr. Becerra, the interesting question that you 

raise, it is really about the level of uncertainty that there would 

be to different aspects of our modeling—different aspects in proposals that Members might create for us to think about. As Doug 

had mentioned before, there are some areas that are well known 

and well tried and relatively well understood. There are other 

areas also where there is lots of good data and the outcomes seem 

quite clear. And then there are some where we are really in very 

much the realm of the brand new and the unknown. 

As an example of something that is well known, well understood, 

good data, one policy that has been changed from time to time by 

this Committee has been to adjust the value of the standard deduction and the personal exemption. We feel really, really good about 

our estimates on that; one, because there are not huge behavioral 

responses from those sorts of changes. The numbers are quite clear. 

It is a well-understood area, with lots of good data. 

Mr. BECERRA. So have you a higher degree of confidence with 

some of the variables that you have in this equation than others? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. That is definitely the case. 

Mr. BECERRA. I assume as we move forward, the more data you 

collect, the greater your ability to know if you feel confident about 

tweaking a particular variable or adding or subtracting a variable. 

Mr. BARTHOLD. I will just leave it as that is so. 

Mr. BECERRA. To the degree that economics is a science and to 

the degree that your modeling and CBO’s modeling to come up 

with a score, an assessment, can be characterized as a science, we 

are essentially making some very good educated guesses about 

what we think the very fluid and dynamic economy will do if we 

tweak it here or there, based on a policy change in law. 

Mr. BARTHOLD. To the extent that estimates are guesses, what 

you say is correct. Our models are empirically-based models. So 

where there is better data, where there has been more testing of 

the data, more similar sorts of policy changes in the past, we have 

better confidence about the estimates that we make for those policies than when we are starting with something brand new and 

where there is limited data. 


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Mr. BECERRA. Let’s put aside for a moment this unresolved 

question of whether tax changes can produce measurable macroeconomic effects. 

Mr. Buckley, let me ask you a question. Is there a constant relationship between GDP growth and jobs? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. You probably are asking the wrong person on 

the panel. My guess is there is; that the greater economic growth, 

the greater job growth, since labor is such a large part of our economy. 

Mr. BECERRA. And, Tom, maybe that should have been directed 

first to you, and then let me go back to Mr. Buckley, because I 

wanted to ask Mr. Buckley a question. But to the degree you think 

there is an answer, is there a constant relationship between GDP 

growth and jobs? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. There is a positive relationship. If you mean constant, if I could say for every $50,000 increase in GDP, that 

that represents half of a job or one job, there is going to be variability because it depends on what sector is growing and what sector 

is producing the GDP. But as a general matter, real economic 

growth means greater job opportunities. In particular, it means 

greater income for individuals. 

Mr. BECERRA. And different economic growth policies could 

have different job consequences. 

Mr. BARTHOLD. That is certainly the case. 

Mr. BECERRA. So, Mr. Buckley, looking at it from the other end, 

would a budget score in and of itself tell policymakers about the 

loss of jobs? 

Chairman CAMP. I am afraid time is expired, Mr. Buckley. If 

you want to respond in writing, that would be fine. 

[Information not provided.] 

Chairman CAMP. Ms. Jenkins is recognized. 

Ms. JENKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 

being here. 

I would like to follow up where Congressman Schock left off on 

the international front, maybe for each of you to comment, because 

we all know the U.S. economy is a whole lot more global today and 

many experts tell us that our Tax Code hasn’t kept pace with the 

globalization. And one option would be to move American companies toward a more territorial style tax system. 

So, a couple of questions. If we would make that change, are the 

models available and capable of accurately estimating the impact 

of this change on economic growth and investment decisions? If 

not, do they need to be updated to estimate the impact on the economy of bringing our international rules more in line with that of 

the rest of the world? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Thank you, Ms. Jenkins. Within our conventional estimates I had noted in my testimony that we use a fixed 

GNP as opposed to GDP as the baseline assumption, GNP being 

the measure of income which can be earned by U.S. people either 

abroad or in the United States. So within our conventional estimates we model some cross-border investment flows of U.S. taxpayers. 

Now, what we don’t do in the conventional estimates is then incorporate possible effects from those flows on domestic productivity 


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and ultimately domestic employment and second-round macroeconomic income growth. I pointed out in my testimony that our 

MEG model actually does incorporate cross-border flows from foreign and U.S. investors, and that as investment flows, that has effects on productivity, and ultimately increased employment. The 

MEG model assumes that domestic and foreign investment responds to after-tax returns. So in assessing a proposal that might 

involve territorial concepts—more territorial concepts as opposed to 

worldwide concepts, that would be part of how we analyze that for 

macroeconomic purposes. 

Some things that are not in our modeling, one feature that would 

be important ultimately, is if the United States does something, 

what does the rest of the world do? We do not model what the rest 

of the world does. That is a hard one to guess in any event. 

And I should note that—one of the work projects that I noted is 

we are trying to upgrade our overlapping generations model, which 

gives some alternative sensitivity for Members. We are trying to 

upgrade that to more explicitly model cross-border flows. Right now 

the cross-border features are only reflected in net interest rate 

changes. 

Ms. JENKINS. Okay. Thank you. 

Any thoughts, comments? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I would defer to Mr. Beach, who actually 

has a model, and ask how he does it. 

Mr. BEACH. Congresswoman, thanks for that question. I would 

refer you and the Members of the Committee to the analysis that 

we did of the Wyden-Gregg/Coats bill, where a much lower corporate rate was introduced, down to 25 percent. We had territoriality. We had major economic effects coming from the rest of the 

world. You can look at that. I am very impressed. I was part of the 

team that helped build the MEG model. The MEG model has great 

capabilities for doing these things. The research program you just 

heard of was very good. 

With respect to how we handle the rest of the world, when our 

tax rate goes down, as you well know, the rest of the world tries 

to follow. And we use Ray Fair’s model out of Yale University, 

which is available at no cost on the Internet. It is a very fine 

model. And it has a well-articulated set of 57 countries that interact with whatever policy changes you introduce. 

Ms. JENKINS. Thank you all. I yield back. 

Chairman CAMP. Thank you. Mr. Paulsen is recognized. 

Mr. PAULSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just start out, because several of you have commented or 

made comments regarding how the economic models handle budget 

deficits and how that debt is a very important factor in determining or understanding the model’s result. If the Committee really wants to get an accurate picture, an accurate understanding of 

the potential benefits of tax reform, as accurate a picture as possible, how do you recommend that we address this issue overall? 

Mr. Barthold. 

Mr. BARTHOLD. I think that is probably more of a question for 

my colleagues on the panel. Our modeling does reflect the fact that 

increased budget deficits can crowd out private capital formation. 

But how to address the policy issues are the Members’ call. 


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Mr. PAULSEN. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Mechanically, what I would do is isolate the 

impact of current tax policy versus the reform policy. And to do 

that, first go to the spending side and at least in a computer, if not 

in the real world, fix Social Security, fix Medicare, fix Medicaid. Do 

the big transfer programs on the spending side that are the budget 

problem, so that over the long term the debt to GDP ratio is stabilized, not exploding. Now you have a stable spending policy, and 

enact a tax reform and look at the difference between those two 

scenarios. That is the benefits of tax reform, isolated. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I would slightly disagree. We have increasing 

debt not just simply because of the spending side. We have one of 

the lowest tax burdens of any developed country in the world. Our 

taxes now are approximately 15 percent of GDP—our Federal 

taxes—which are really very low, historically. It is hard to run a 

government with a large defense budget and other needs like that 

with a revenue base that low. Sustained deficits do affect, I believe, 

long-term economic growth. And they have to be handled. I do 

think you can’t get there only on the spending side. You have to 

adjust revenues as well. 

Mr. BEACH. The first thing I would do is avail yourself of the 

good work that the CBO and Congressional Research Service is 

saying in illustrating how crowding out works. Crowding out is 

kind of a ham-fisted approach to understanding the deficit, because 

ultimately it is the composition of the deficit and the drivers that 

you need to understand best. Many of you probably sit on the Subcommittee dealing with health care, and of course health care is 

driving so much of this deficit. So ask for analysis that decomposes 

the drivers of the deficit. And then as we reform those drivers, you 

will see that that has a positive effect on the economy through 

prices and through competition and through the better allocation of 

resources, particularly capital resources. 

And in our modeling—and I would be happy to share this with 

you—we have done that kind of work, got in, looked at the 

compositional things, reformed those; and then from the spending 

side, absent a tax change, we see greater efficiencies in the economy just because resources are better used. 

Mr. PAULSEN. I think one thing that is very interesting is I 

talked to several corporations—and this has not been in testimony 

here—but how do you use your own projections for your own company and allocation of capital? And a good number of them use dynamic scoring or macroeconomic policy as well themselves as they 

look to moving forward. 

Let me just ask this, Mr. Beach. I will just start with you. When 

choosing between different tax reform options—we kind of laid into 

this a little bit—which types of policies are going to be the most 

effective or the most likely to produce the dynamic long-term 

growth that everyone is sort of looking for or hungering for or 

wanting right now? Are they the policies that kind of give the oneterm benefit for a jump start, or is it more the policies that provide 

the long-term sustainable low tax rates, rates for taxpayers for a 

long time? 

Mr. BEACH. Well, as fiduciaries of the revenues of the fiscal situation of the United States, you are going to want to look at the 


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long term. And that also is the right answer for the economy as 

well. So keeping tax rates low, low relative to other countries, making sure that you are raising enough revenue for your needed services or government, that is the basic thing, make sure there are as 

little as possible expenditures, subsidies, going through the Tax 

Code. That is better done on the spending side. And then that just 

releases the private sector to lead the economy to higher levels of 

growth. 

Mr. PAULSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Chairman CAMP. Thank you. Mr. Stark is recognized. 

Mr. STARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your patience. 

We will hear from our colleagues across the aisle that cutting 

taxes and cutting spending and shrinking the role of government 

leads to growth. I guess that leads to the conclusion that our 

economy would be better off if we eliminated all regulation, and 

the safety nets, and the military, and sort of end up looking like 

Somalia. 

But assuming that we won’t go that far, I wonder, Mr. Buckley, 

if you could tell me—and I am somewhat confused by this issue of 

dynamic analysis and static analysis. If the Republicans were successful in following their plan to eliminate Social Security and 

eliminate Medicare, what would be the difference if you scored that 

dynamically or statically? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, if you eliminated those programs, you 

would see large nominal reductions in spending. 

Mr. STARK. Nominal. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Nominal. I would guess that dislocations would 

be so severe that you would see real economic effects that would 

be negative. Medicare is a large part of the health care sector in 

the economy. Social Security is the primary income support for the 

elderly. Eliminating those two things, which I am fairly confident 

nobody is talking about—— 

Mr. STARK. Oh, yes, they are. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, let me put it this way. I would hope no one 

is talking about it, because it would have very serious consequences, put the economy and the safety net back to pre-Depression times where things were not as good as they are today. 

Mr. STARK. Wouldn’t make a difference if you scored that dynamically or statically, we would still be in deep trouble? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. This is where I don’t think the models are very 

good—they would probably treat that as positive because it removes these government distortions from the economy. It would 

create really serious economic consequences. I mean, homelessness 

and hunger are pretty stark economic incentives. I am not so certain if you follow some of these models you wouldn’t get a projection of a positive impact here. And that is why I think so many of 

these models are just at their base wrong, and they have not 

proved to be very accurate. 

Mr. STARK. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CAMP. All right. Mr. Marchant is recognized. 

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So far we have heard from you how macroeconomic models have 

seen some limited use by the Joint Committee on Taxation and 


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CBO. I am interested in hearing from you about the extent to 

which other Federal Government agencies, or even other governments such as the States, have used dynamic models to evaluate 

policy options. 

Mr. Holtz-Eakin and Mr. Beach, how have they overcome some 

of the concerns that we have heard about today about dynamic 

scoring? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Well, I know from personal experience that 

the U.S. Treasury and the White House Council of Economic Advisors have at times used these kinds of modeling efforts to understand the impacts of policies and ultimately the budgetary impacts. 

Some of those are in the public domain and you could look at them. 

When I was at Syracuse University, I was on the Tax Study 

Commission for the State of New York, and I was on the Ways and 

Means Advisory Board for revenue forecasting purposes. And we 

regularly used models of this sort which at the State level included 

a fairly serious scrub of cross-State influences; could New York 

State influence what was then largely the outbound exodus of businesses, slow it down? And also these tough issues on capital gains 

and bonuses, because an enormous part of the New York State revenue was driven by the taxation of Wall Street incomes. 

So I think there is a wealth of experience. I couldn’t pretend to 

summarize all the other States, but this is not new territory. There 

are places that have undertaken to do this both for purposes of accuracy and because their revenue streams sort of demand that they 

understand it better. 

Mr. MARCHANT. Mr. Beach. 

Mr. BEACH. Yes, it is the case that macroeconomic models play 

a prominent role in many of the Federal agencies as matter of their 

routine work. For example, the Energy Department, through the 

Energy Information Agency, on a quarterly basis runs the global 

insight macroeconomic model, which is the big one, that is the one 

Heritage uses and the one most of the Fortune 500 companies use 

to develop their quarterly forecast of energy use in this country, 

and also it is important for the budgeting of the Energy Department and a lot of the programs that you run through the Tax Code. 

The Treasury does that. Doug has mentioned it. 

I also mention the CBO, under Doug Holtz-Eakin, has vastly increased the number of models which were used. They use eight, 

nine models right now, and that is wonderful. 

The Agriculture Department is famous for its use of macro modeling and has been using those models now for almost 30 years to 

look at ag programs at the local level. 

I wrote an article not too long ago in which I called every State 

in the country to find out what their modeling practices were, and 

found 11 States—the big ones, California, New York, and others— 

using macroeconomic models to advise the legislature on spending 

programs and on tax policy changes. And in the case of about half 

of those States required when doing the revenue estimate—I was 

chief economist for the Sprint Corporation, and I would like to 

echo, just to say we used macroeconomic models all the time to look 

at the various ways in which public policy would affect our company. And we were a large enough company that sometimes we 

would actually affect the outcomes for certain parts of the economy. 


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So it is in widespread use. I tell you, I will say this in just a second or two, I have been working, giving dynamic modeling up here 

at the Federal level for a long time, and you folks are moving way 

closer to the goal than you may even sense. Since it is now in such 

widespread use, we need to get the Joint Committee actively engaged in it to the extent that these other agencies are as well. 

Mr. MARCHANT. I have one more question to Mr. Barthold. Are 

there studies that the Joint Committee on Taxation have on hand 

that show what effect a consumption tax versus an income tax 

would have on the gross domestic product? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. In the mid-1990s we started doing some macroeconomic analysis and studying how to incorporate our detailed 

conventional modeling, the results of that that I described, into 

larger macroeconomics models. The first part of that was to look 

at broad tax reform of replacing income taxes with consumption 

taxes. 

So one place to look is on our Web site. There are the results of 

the symposium that we held with a number of outside modelers 

who looked precisely as replacing income tax with a consumption 

tax. But more generally, there are a large number of academics 

who have published work on that subject. 

Chairman CAMP. Mr. Berg is recognized. 

Mr. BERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really enjoy this hearing. And in North Dakota, we have dynamic analysis but we call 

it something different in our tax policy; we call it common sense. 

We have lowered our income tax, our corporate income tax and 

property tax this last year. Some of those, it is the third time we 

have lowered them in the last 10 years. We have seen the exact 

reality of that. We have a little over 3 percent unemployment rate, 

we have a substantial amount of our State’s budget in cash, we are 

short on workers, we have a lot of jobs that are unfilled. 

When I was back home on Sunday, there were eight pages in our 

local newspaper of employers looking for employees. So again, I 

just think when we talk about the dynamic analysis, the more information that we can have, I mean just the better decisions it will 

make. 

So as I was sitting here I was thinking, looking back—maybe 

this was for the Joint Tax, Mr. Barthold—were there some periods 

in the last 20 years that we just looked at tax policy totally statically, and even though we knew it would have different effects we 

didn’t put that into the scoring? Is there a thing we can look at, 

again in the past, that says if we used dynamic modeling we would 

have been much more accurate than we were? Any examples that 

stand out? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Let me try and answer that in a slightly different direction, Mr. Berg. I hope this is responsive. We reevaluate 

estimates in our models all the time in the course of upgrading to 

try to improve the information that we provide to the Members. 

And so as the models incorporate empirically-based outcomes from 

the 1990s, we use that as information for how we analyze things 

now—recognizing that the 1990s were a different time from now. 

But in terms of looking at a behavioral response by taxpayers, looking at shifting of investments across sectors and responsiveness by 

businesses, that is important data for us. 


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If you are asking are there important big estimates that we got 

wrong, I am sure there are. But I would like to think about them 

and maybe respond at another time. I don’t want to admit to any, 

offhand in a public hearing, if that is fair. 

Mr. BERG. That is very fair. In fact, we may follow up on that 

in writing. 

Mr. BARTHOLD. I would be happy to, Mr. Berg. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Briefly, I think there are some lessons, and 

I want to first of all emphasize there has never been static analysis, not at the Joint Committee, not at the CBO. The question is 

whether you take macrogrowth effects into account or not. There 

are all sorts of behavioral responses that are modeled. 

In 2003 when I was at CBO, we did an analysis of the President’s budget proposals, a comprehensive macroeconomic impact, 

and that included the 2003 tax cuts, the JGTRRA that came up 

earlier, and it also included the Medicare Modernization Act, $400 

billion of subsidized consumption. And when we did the analysis, 

what we saw was overall modest impacts of both those things. 

My conclusion was that if you undertake a radical policy of subsidized consumption, it offsets the beneficial growth effects of tax 

policy, and that is the lesson. Everyone else’s conclusion was I did 

the analysis wrong. 

The point of this is that we would have been wrong if we just 

looked at the tax cuts in isolation, because other policy negated the 

impact. That happens a lot with the Joint Committee. There is a 

lot going on out there. It is not just macroeconomic uncertainty in 

other countries. There are also other policies that go on that impact 

ultimately receipts. And getting it wrong isn’t really the metric of 

whether the analysis was done right. There is a lot going on that 

makes these estimates uncertain. 

Mr. BERG. Thank you. As long as you are all here, one last question I had is on the capital gains tax. It seems like that is getting 

a lot of press today at 15 percent. Just quickly: Will increasing that 

capital gains tax—again, it is on capital that already in my opinion 

has been taxed once—is there any model that would show that 

would encourage growth if that number goes up? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Well, Mr. Berg, I think we touched upon this 

a little bit before. As you know, under the baseline, the maximum 

rate on capital gains will increase to 20 percent after 2012. That 

is already accounted for in terms of baseline receipts. 

Your question about growth is what is the overall effect of taxing 

the return to saving and of the increased rate on capital gains and 

changes in tax rate on dividends, other—the ordinary tax rates on 

interest income all go into our modeling when we do macroanalysis 

of what would be the effect on the macroeconomy. 

Mr. BERG. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CAMP. Mr. Pascrell is recognized. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our distinguished panelists. I am very, very hesitant to listen to people who 

were part of waltzing us through the last 10 years of economic 

issues. Mort Kondracke, certainly no liberal by any extent, said in 

discussing the tax cuts in February 2003, after the tax cut in 2001, 

that this is a wild ride Mr. Bush has set in motion. When it is over, 

we will know a lot, a lot about economics. We will either be a lot 


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richer as a country, or in disastrous shape. The credit or blame will 

belong to the President. Now that is what he said in 2003. 

Followed by what Mr. Tom DeLay said: The jobs and growth 

package will not only grow the national economy—whatever models 

we are talking about, Mr. Chairman—but through that growth, it 

will help us support and fund the war on terror and other priorities 

for years to come. The American people understand the relationship between the war on terror and economic recovery, et cetera, 

et cetera. And here we are. 

Now in the last 18 months, we have seen the addition of about 

2.2, 2.4 million private jobs that have been added to the economy. 

Yet we go back over the 8 years, and this is not pointing blame, 

because both parties—neither party is privy to virtue on the subject of where we are economically. So please know where I am coming from. 

It seems to me we need a more eclectic view when we talk about 

models, that no one model suits this, particularly because of what 

you said, Mr. Eakin, there are other factors involved. You cannot 

just cut taxes and think jobs are going to be created. That certainly 

did not happen in the 2001 and 2003 tax cut, until 2005 when we 

had a little bit more private sector jobs. There are a lot of factors 

involved. 

So people who say all we need to do is cut taxes or all you need 

to do is cut social programs and we will have Nirvana, that is certainly no model that we could adhere to at this particular point. 

I don’t think anybody on the panel would support that. 

So these are a lot more complex than we think, and you folks 

have been pointing that out very nicely. 

I have a question for you, Mr. Eakin, and then I would like to 

turn to Mr. Buckley on the same question. In your opinion, how 

does a statutory rate influence—because we have been talking a lot 

about this—influence a company’s decision to create jobs versus an 

effective tax rate? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Well, certainly companies are going to operate on effective marginal tax rates at the margin. They are going 

to look at the overall consequences of the Tax Code for their net 

gain from adding a worker. That is the key. Statutory will be embedded in there, but it might not summarize it entirely. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Will they think of other things besides the tax 

rate that would go into their decision in determining how they 

would grow, how they would hire people, how they would not hire 

people? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Certainly. As this Committee is well aware, 

the Tax Code is an exceedingly complex animal with statutory 

rates, all sorts of deviations from the base—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Beach. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Deductions, depreciation, the whole thing. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. Mr. Beach. 

Mr. BEACH. Yes. The marginal tax rate is one of a spectrum of 

issues which go into determining the hurdle rate. Every chief financial officer has a hurdle rate in place in their mind, the Committee does as well, for making an investment. So you have a lot 

of things that go into that. 


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I will point out that the marginal tax rate, the effective marginal 

tax rate is one of the major ones because it varies, it goes up and 

down and it is very large. So doing that is important. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Buckley. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I believe it is the effective corporate tax rate 

that is important. Our statutory rates are relatively high compared 

to other countries. Our effective tax rates are not, because we provide more generous depreciation benefits. 

Mr. PASCRELL. It has to be part of the discussion. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. That is correct. That is one of the real questions 

on tax reform. If you do eliminate accelerated depreciation, you do 

kind of shift the tax burden onto those sectors that rely on that for 

their major incentive. 

Mr. PASCRELL. That is absolutely true. 

Chairman CAMP. Mr. Reed is recognized. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Is that it? 

Chairman CAMP. Time is expired, yes. Mr. Reed. 

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I enjoyed the testimony 

today. It is very enlightening trying to get an understanding, not 

being familiar with the world that you live in in macroeconomic 

forecasting. 

From a historical point of view in judging it from forecast and 

then as a result of actual numbers that were produced, is there any 

one model that stands out as one that has been very—more accurate than other ones? If anyone would care to—you have a slew of 

them here in your testimony as different models. Is there one that 

stands out amongst you as scholars in this area? 

Mr. BEACH. Let me take a quick stab at that, because the field 

of models that are commercially provided is a good field to look at. 

After all, the Fortune 500 companies are kind of picky, they want 

to make sure the models they pick are the ones that are the most 

accurate and have been over the course of time. 

And without doing an advertisement for my company, I very 

much like the global insight model. It is a combination of all of the 

old models put back together into one. It is the one that is sitting 

out there in almost everybody’s portfolio of models. And then I 

must say, then you must go on to develop the models that are best 

suited for your companies, a standard off-the-shelf one. That is why 

the MEG model was such a breakthrough for the Joint Committee 

on Taxation because it is a great model. John Diamond’s overlapping generations model that you heard about today—you haven’t 

heard John’s name, but it is in widespread use throughout this 

town. It is getting a lot of attention and a lot of auditing. That is 

another one that is rising to the top as one of the best models. It 

isn’t rocket science to pick these models. There are only a few out 

there that are any good. 

Mr. REED. Okay. Mr. Barthold, anything you want to add to 

that from your opinion? 

Mr. BARTHOLD. I just wanted to make one point. The Joint 

Committee staff does not make macroeconomic forecasts per se. We 

do modeling to provide information to the Members about possible outcomes from the policies that they are exploring. I wouldn’t 

really be in a good position to endorse private sector enterprises. 


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Mr. BEACH. One other thing, Mr. Reed. I forgot to mention this. 

The macroeconomic advisor’s model out of Saint Louis is also an 

extraordinarily good model, and it was that model that was the 

basis for the MEG model. So you already have a well-respected 

commercial model. It is not identical to MEG by any means, but 

it is kind of the architecture. 

Mr. REED. A good source, okay. 

And then other countries that are dealing with these issues and 

trying to forecast out their tax policy implications, is there any one 

country we could look to in our office as kind of a benchmark to 

identify and maybe learn something from what they do differently 

from what we do? 

Mr. Beach. 

Mr. BEACH. Good science is being done by the OECD more and 

more. You can go down the block to the World Bank and they are 

making significant advances in here. A lot of countries have very 

poor practices actually with respect to modeling. And so there 

aren’t a lot that you can look to. The Germans have done a decent 

job, but I would look rather to the international organizations and 

to practices of the States that we have mentioned here today. 

Mr. REED. That we talked about earlier. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I don’t have anything further. 

Chairman CAMP. Thank you. Dr. Boustany is recognized. 

Mr. BOUSTANY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to explore the limitations of models using a specific example. Over the 

past 3 years and now in the President’s current proposal, he has 

repeal of certain expensing measures for oil and gas companies 

that would hit predominantly independent companies, smaller companies, not the integrated, large ExxonMobils or Chevrons or those 

types of companies. 

The most prominent of these is the repeal of the intangible drilling costs. And again, these are measures in a capital-intensive endeavor where you can expense where the return—if you get a return, it is on the back end. And in talking to a lot of companies 

they are telling me that if these things are repealed, we will end 

up seeing a lot less of this type of activity by these companies. Consistently, the scoring of these measures as a package yields about 

45 billion in revenue. 

I want to question that figure based on the modeling, and here 

is why. If you reduce independent companies’ production of oil and 

gas, you are going to—it seems to me you are actually going to lead 

to a decrease—well, certainly a decrease in activity and decrease 

in revenue emanating from it. 

And so I guess my question is: How did that $45 billion come 

into—how was it derived? Were certain behavioral considerations 

taken into effect based on interviews or discussion from what 

would really happen here? And was there a consideration that we 

now have a delinkage between the price of oil and the price of natural gas in this country—well globally, for that matter, but predominantly in this country because it is more pronounced here 

than it is globally? 

Given the natural gas production, 97 percent of it is done domestically. It is done by small, independent companies. I have heard 

anecdotal information that suggested a company that might drill 


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15 wells perhaps would only drill two, or one, if the expensing provisions were repealed. So I want to explore some of these aspects 

and how they fit into the limitations that these models predict. 

Mr. Barthold, if you would start. 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Thank you, Mr. Boustany. The question that 

rises is obviously an important one to that particular sector of the 

economy. The oil and gas industry is a big component of the economy, and that is the main factor behind the scale of the estimate 

that we produced. 

But as I noted in my testimony we assume—we take into account—I shouldn’t say we assume—we take into account that if we 

change the tax treatment of one sector, that there will be less economic activity in that sector. Now that economic activity, though, 

isn’t necessarily lost to the economy as a whole. 

Now, unfortunately, I assume there are some of your constituents that you have talked to, the independent drillers of gas, they 

would go out and seek their funding from Doug Holtz-Eakin or 

John Buckley. And a Doug and a John would look and say, ‘‘Gee, 

because of this tax change, the returns don’t look so good; I don’t 

want to finance your gas venture.’’ They may turn to the film industry or they may turn to the micro-processor industry and invest 

their funds there. 

So the investment isn’t necessarily a loss to the economy. And 

our conventional modeling always tries to account for some shifting 

across sectors. So the model, yes, does recognize there will be less 

investment in oil and gas. We have done work to recognize the 

point that you made that oil and gas are different. They are different in international trade, and that can be an important factor 

in terms of displacement of domestic activity, and for foreign activity, the ability or inability to transport gas across the ocean. It is 

growing, but it is much more limited than the oil industry. All 

those factors we do try and take into account, sir. 

Mr. BOUSTANY. Thank you. Mr. Holtz-Eakin would you like to 

comment, or Mr. Beach? 

Mr. BEACH. I would add one thing, and that is even though it 

is true that investment dollars may flow to another sector and thus 

benefit that sector, there are sectors of the economy, once you degrade the capital structure, that are very difficult to rebuild. The 

transmission system, the production system, and the refining system associated with natural gas and petroleum must be continuously revitalized in order to keep them at their highest level of productivity and return. 

So changes in tax policy that you make for an industry must be 

taken with great care to think about the long-term consequences of 

that act. For example, in a model of the economy, we would have 

to treat it that way. 

Mr. BOUSTANY. Thank you. 

Chairman CAMP. Ms. Black is recognized. 

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, panel, 

for being here today with this really complicated issue. 

I want to return to the issue of the corporate taxes and ask if 

there are any models out there that assume the burden of the corporate tax where they assume in the economy? Did they assume it 


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on the company, the shareholder, or the consumer? And does this 

impact the model’s results? Each one of you address that, please. 

Mr. BARTHOLD. Ms. Black, that is another important question. 

The most basic answer is we always assume that taxes are borne 

by individuals. The question you are asking is what is the incidence of the corporate tax or, more generally, what is the incidence 

of all the taxes that we have on capital? In the case of the corporate tax, is it borne by domestic shareholders, is it borne by domestic labor or a combination of the two? 

Economics literature is divided on this. There has been change 

through time. The ability of capital to flow across borders leads a 

number of people to conclude that there can be substantial shifting 

onto labor. There is not uniform consensus on that. The corporate 

tax affects the after-tax rate of return ultimately to investors. That 

is a factor that goes into our modeling, and our modeling is ultimately about individuals. 

Mrs. BLACK. Others want to address that? 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I simply want to concur with what Mr. 

Barthold just said. This is how the economics professional handles 

this. There has been evolution over time in their perception of who 

ultimately bears the burden of this tax, with it shifting more and 

more toward labor as opposed to owners of domestic capital. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I would say there is a sharp distinction between 

the corporate executives and economic models as to who bears the 

incidence of the tax. The executives believe that they and their 

shareholder bear the burden. So there is a difference of opinion 

here between the more technical economic analysis where it may 

be assumed to be borne by different factors, and what I have seen, 

just from the basic reaction of the corporate executives, where they 

are quite confident it is borne by their shareholders. 

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Holtz-Eakin. 

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. I think there is unanimity that corporations respond to the corporate tax. I mean, they will rearrange 

their financial policies and they will alter their capital investment 

decisions. They will change the location of expansions. All of 

that is part of the transmission mechanism by which the tax gets 

shifted somewhere in the economy. And if they turn out to be less 

productive and less able to pay high wages, labor ends up bearing 

that burden. That is the mechanism. 

Mr. BEACH. Well, the corporate tax is borne by labor. That is 

the way we handle it in our model. That is the bearing of the tax. 

It goes to an individual. The effect of the tax, of course, is widespread. So depending upon the corporate strategies that are 

changed by the change in your tax policy here, you can see wages, 

standard of living for a lot of people who are affected in the private 

sector, the revenues of State and local governments. So it permeates throughout the whole economy. There are the effects and 

then there is the economically, theoretically-driven notion of bearing. 

So for your deliberations I would always think about the taxes 

borne by labor and the taxes borne by capital, and then think 

about the corporate tax and which of those does it really affect 

most? In our view, it mostly affects the amount and the compensation of labor. 


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Mrs. BLACK. Well, it seems ultimately it will be borne by individuals as they purchase the product or the service, but that is not 

really considered in the model. So in the model, is it? 

Mr. BEACH. Yes, it is. It is like the discussion we had about 

eliminating Social Security. If we reduce the Social Security in the 

models that I use, there would be a definite effect in the reduction 

in transfers to individuals. And so consumption expenditures would 

fall, and you would see a change in relative prices, and we would 

all have an effect. So nothing happens in isolation inside these 

models at all. 

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman CAMP. Well, thank you. And I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony and time today. And with that, this 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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