United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security,

International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on

Government Reform and Oversight, House of

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10 a.m. EST

Tuesday,

October 28, 1997

COMBATING TERRORISM

Efforts to Protect U.S.

Forces in Turkey and the

Middle East

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military

Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and

International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Department

of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to protect overseas forces from terrorist attacks.

As the Subcommittee requested, we will focus our discussion on Turkey

and the Middle East. In July we issued a report1

 on DOD’s antiterrorism2

efforts based, in large part, on our visits to the five geographic combatant

commands and to selected overseas sites where U.S. forces are stationed.

Most of the sites we visited were in countries that DOD considered high

threat. Among the countries we visited during March and April 1997 were

Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. My testimony today is based

on the results of those visits and related work we conducted at the Joint

Staff, the military services, and other DOD components during the course of

our review. We have also provided the Subcommittee with a classified

statement that expands upon the information in this statement.

We would like to provide a brief overview and then go back and provide

more information about the following three issues: (1) the environment

U.S. forces overseas are facing, including the terrorist threat and the

relationship with the host nation governments; (2) the measures DOD has

taken to enhance the security of personnel in the countries we visited; and

(3) DOD initiatives to improve its overall force protection program.

Overview Senior military commanders and defense officials we met with emphasized

that they can reduce, but not eliminate, vulnerabilities and that further

terrorist attacks against U.S. forces should be expected. They observed

that efforts to defend against the terrorist threat are complicated by a

number of factors, including the ability of terrorists to decide where and

when to attack and to choose from a wide selection of targets. Moreover,

DOD relies heavily on the host nations for many of its security needs.

Because of this reliance, efforts to reduce vulnerabilities often require

extensive host nation support. In addition, many DOD personnel overseas

1

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, 

July 21, 1997). In addition, we issued a separate report entitled, Combating Terrorism: Federal

Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997), on

national counterterrorism policy and strategy; the roles, responsibilities, programs, and activities of

federal agencies under this policy; and the mechanisms for coordinating interagency efforts.

2

For the purposes of this testimony, we use DOD’s term “antiterrorism” to refer to defensive measures

used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. Counterterrorism, in

contrast, refers to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Antiterrorism

and counterterrorism are elements of a broader concept known as combating terrorism. In turn,

combating terrorism is part of a much broader concept known as force protection. Other elements of

force protection are physical security, operations security, protective services, and law enforcement

operations.

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
may not be protected adequately because it is unclear who is responsible

for their security.

During our March and April visits, we found that deployed U.S. forces

were better protected from terrorist attacks like the one that occurred last

year at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia than they were prior to that

terrorist incident. Security improvements were most evident where the

risk of terrorism was greatest, such as in the Middle East and Turkey. DOD

placed less emphasis on addressing vulnerabilities in countries considered

a lower terrorist threat. However, DOD officials said that even in high-threat

countries vulnerabilities exist and that new vulnerabilities could emerge as

terrorist tactics respond to the measures DOD has taken.

In addition to the improvements made at individual sites, DOD initiated a

number of changes aimed at enhancing its overall antiterrorism program.

However, we found these initiatives did not represent a comprehensive

and consistent DOD approach to antiterrorism. We made a number of

recommendations for improving the situation. DOD concurred with all of

our recommendations except for the one calling for prescriptive DOD-wide

physical security standards. DOD believes that commanders, who are

responsible for force protection, need flexibility and should not be told

how to provide physical security for their personnel. However, the

commanders we spoke with believe that such standards would help them

carry out this responsibility as well as provide an objective basis for

determining whether antiterrorism measures are sufficient.

With this overview, let me talk about the security environment for U.S.

forces overseas.

Security Environment

Facing U.S. Forces

Overseas

DOD faces a number of obstacles in defending against future terrorist

attacks. First, DOD has a large presence in many countries around the

world, offering a plethora of potential targets. Second, predictive

intelligence on terrorist attacks is difficult to obtain. Commanders,

therefore, may not be in a position to prevent an attack from occurring;

they can only prepare to minimize the consequences from an attack. Third,

DOD installations are often located on host nation installations and as a

result there are limitations on the security measures DOD can undertake.

Political and cultural considerations outside the control of local

commanders also influence decisions that affect security. During our

visits, military officials told us that the question is not whether additional

terrorist attacks will occur, but when, where, and how. They emphasized

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
that vulnerabilities to attacks can be reduced, but a zero defects approach

to fighting terrorism is not possible.

According to DOD officials, terrorism is a pervasive phenomenon, whose

specific threats are difficult to predict. It is worldwide in scope, with some

terrorist organizations state supported and some only loosely affiliated, in

support of multiple causes. It is a transnational phenomenon, acting across

geographic and political boundaries. Areas considered safe and benign one

day, such as Saudi Arabia prior to the bombings, can quickly become high

threat the next. Terrorists’ tactics have not been to challenge U.S. military

power directly, but to weaken U.S. resolve through isolated attacks with

high publicity value.

DOD designates the terrorist threat level faced by personnel in each

country. A five-step scale is used to describe the severity of threat. These

steps, from highest to lowest, are critical, high, medium, low, and

negligible. Threat levels may be raised or lowered on the basis of new

information or analysis. As of October 1, 1997, DOD had designated 

14 countries as having a high threat level. The list included Egypt, Jordan,

Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Greece, and Turkey.3

 No countries were

assessed as having a critical terrorist threat.

According to a report issued by the Secretary of Defense following the

Khobar Towers bombing, U.S. forces are constantly exposed to the

terrorist threat because executing the national security strategy requires

their physical presence in many nations. U.S. commanders in the past have

agreed to operate out of facilities and locations that now present serious

security challenges in today’s terrorist environment. The Khobar Towers

complex, for example, was paid for by the Saudis and convenient to U.S.

military work areas but was difficult to defend. In most of the countries we

visited, we found that many U.S. forces were located in urban areas,

closely surrounded by easily accessible buildings or roads.

Terrorists can alter their mode of attack. For instance, some commanders

in the Middle East are concerned that terrorists will switch to weapons

that can be fired over perimeter defenses from hidden locations. One U.S.

commander was concerned that terrorists could fire weapons from

different sectors of the surrounding city. Such attacks are difficult to

defend against because these weapons can be set up, fired, and moved in a

very short period of time.

3

The others were Algeria, Bosnia, Colombia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Peru, and Rwanda.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
In many cases, overseas U.S. forces work at facilities that are owned by

the host nation, and the host nation is responsible for their security. As a

result, DOD relies on the host nation for important security functions, such

as controlling entry onto bases. U.S. commanders in some cases are

prevented from taking actions that would make their forces more secure.

U.S. forces in the countries we visited are usually prevented from

patrolling outside the fencing of their own perimeter. At one location we

visited, entry to the base is controlled by host nation security forces with

no U.S. military role. The U.S. military does not have its own perimeter

within this base and may not approach the base perimeter without escort

from host nation personnel. U.S. security officials at this base said because

the base perimeter is easily penetrated, they believe themselves to be more

vulnerable to small suitcase sized bombs than to truck bombs. Although

the responsibility for ensuring force protection for most DOD personnel has

been assigned to the geographic combatant commanders, a large group of

DOD personnel deployed abroad do not fall under the authority of these

commanders. Some of these personnel, such as those assigned to the

Defense Attache Office and Marine embassy guards, fall under the

authority of a chief of mission,4

 who is responsible for their security.

Others, however, while legally the responsibility of a chief of mission, fall

into a gray area between the force protection responsibility of the chief of

mission and the geographic combatant commander. Many of these

personnel were receiving little or no security support from the embassy.

Such support can include security guards, physical security assessments of

housing and work places, and threat information.

In Turkey, for example, the U.S. embassy and local U.S. military

representatives identified about 1,500 people whose security falls into this

gray area. These include several hundred assigned to the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as others assigned to the Office of

Defense Cooperation, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, the

Army Corps of Engineers, and Military Traffic Management Command.

Embassy officials in Turkey said that antiterrorism responsibility for these

people must be clarified. Either DOD must take responsibility for these

people, they said, or the embassy must have explicit authority over them

to enforce the State Department’s security regulations. The officials added

that State will need a concomitant increase in resources to carry out any

added responsibilities.

4

The chief of mission, with the title of Ambassador, Minister, or Charge D’Affaires, is the head of each

U.S. diplomatic mission. These officers are responsible for all components of the mission within a

country, including consular posts.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
Following the bombing in Saudi Arabia, DOD and State signed a

memorandum of understanding clarifying security responsibilities for all

DOD personnel in the region. In our July report, we recommended that the

Secretary of Defense take the necessary steps to expedite approval of a

similar memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of State that

would clarify the antiterrorism responsibilities for all DOD personnel

stationed overseas who do not fall under the command of a geographic

combatant commander. DOD concurred with this recommendation.

Protection of Many

U.S. Forces Has

Improved, but

Vulnerabilities Remain

During our review, we found the U.S. Central Command and its service

component commands had taken a number of steps to improve the

protection of U.S. forces from terrorist attacks. The U.S. Central

Command’s area of responsibility includes the Middle East, the region

with the most high-threat countries. The special emphasis at U.S. Central

Command was not unexpected given that its forces were the most recent

targets of terrorist attacks. Among the actions taken, the command had

• determined the range of specific terrorist threats it needed to counteract

in its area of responsibility, including a 20,000-pound truck bomb—the

estimated approximate size of the bomb that struck Khobar Towers;

• devised threat-based standards, such as stand-off,5 to guide the design and

construction of new facilities and modifications to existing structures;

• established an office that coordinates antiterrorist activities in the region

and reports directly to the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central

Command; and

• identified a need for and filled hundreds of additional security positions.

During our visits to overseas bases, we found that significant efforts had

been taken in Turkey and the Middle East to increase the protection of

U.S. forces from vehicle bombs. In these countries, sites had been fortified

in various ways for protection against a possible terrorist attack,

particularly against a truck bomb like the one that struck Khobar Towers.

Commanders were attempting to extend the stand-off distance around

their facilities. Where sufficient stand-off was not available, they were

using other measures, such as concrete barriers, to mitigate against the

impact of a truck bomb.

Saudi Arabia had seen the most profound changes, as thousands of DOD

personnel were moved to remote facilities in the desert and restricted

5

According to DOD officials, “stand-off” is the distance between the base facilities and uncontrolled

public and private land.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
from leaving base throughout their entire tour. Most military dependents

were returned to the United States to reduce exposure to the terrorist

threat. Many dependents also were being withdrawn from Kuwait and

Bahrain. In Turkey, an off-base apartment building dedicated solely to U.S.

military personnel was closed because it was considered too vulnerable to

a truck bomb attack. The personnel living in this building were relocated

to on-base housing or dispersed to other off-base housing facilities. The

base also had installed concrete barriers to make on-base residential areas

and headquarters buildings less vulnerable and had begun to repair holes

in the perimeter fence.

Despite these improvements, commanders and security officials

acknowledged that vulnerabilities remained. We discuss these

vulnerabilities in our classified statement.

Some U.S. officials expressed concern that efforts to isolate and fortify

DOD facilities could have the effect of making other targets more

vulnerable. For instance, terrorists could decide to target small military

offices or vehicles outside the main installations. Moreover, they could

target housing areas because in Turkey and some Middle East countries,

many U.S. military personnel were living in off-base housing complexes or

in individual quarters dispersed among the civilian population.

DOD Has Taken Steps

to Improve the

Antiterrorism

Program

At the time of our review, DOD had initiated a number of changes in its

overall antiterrorism program in response to the Khobar Towers bombing.

Some of the major initiatives were as follows:

• The Secretary of Defense assigned the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to

be his principal advisor on antiterrorism. To support this added

responsibility, the Chairman created a new office in the Joint Staff—the

Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism.

• The Secretary of Defense directed that the five geographic combatant

commanders take on increased antiterrorism responsibilities. Prior to this,

the combatant commanders did not have explicit responsibility for

ensuring the force protection of all DOD activities in their area of

responsibility.

• Under the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense

Special Weapons Agency began to conduct vulnerability assessments at

installations. The assessments, which supplement those done by other DOD

components, are intended to help commanders understand their

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and to give them options for enhancing

security and mitigating weapon effects.

• DOD mandated more robust antiterrorism training for personnel deploying

to medium- and high-threat countries. The training is intended to increase

awareness of the threat and provide information on individual protective

measures. Additional training is to be provided to (1) personnel designated

as unit antiterrorism instructors and advisors, (2) officers attending

pre-command courses, and (3) executive-level officials with antiterrorism

responsibilities.

• The Secretary of Defense established a centrally controlled fund to

support emergency high-priority antiterrorism requirements not funded by

the services. The fund is managed by the Joint Staff. In fiscal year 1998,

DOD requested $15 million for this fund.

• The services also had planned or instituted changes in their approach to

antiterrorism. Most notably, the Air Force created a Force Protection

Group that would be among the first to deploy in a contingency and would

be responsible for establishing the security infrastructure at the

deployment site.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, our work raised concerns that DOD’s

initiatives were falling short of establishing a comprehensive and

consistent approach to antiterrorism. This was the vision set forth by the

Downing Assessment Task Force, appointed by the former Secretary of

Defense to investigate the Khobar Towers bombing and make

recommendations on how to prevent or minimize the damage of future

attacks. The Secretary on the whole concurred with the task force’s

report. The report identified key principles for managing and improving

the antiterrorism program, and we used these principles as the primary

criteria for our review.

The Downing task force found, and our review confirmed, that

commanders at all levels lacked definitive guidance on implementing an

antiterrorism program. Such guidance—in the form of prescriptive,

measurable standards—is one of the tools commanders need to fulfill their

responsibilities for protecting the force. In the absence of definitive

guidance, commanders lack an objective basis for determining whether

their antiterrorism measures are sufficient. They must rely instead on their

own knowledge and experience and that of their staff. I should note here

that U.S. Central Command was much further along than the other

combatant commands or DOD as a whole in providing definitive guidance

to commanders in its area of responsibility.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
In our July report, we made a number of recommendations to the

Secretary of Defense. Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary

direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop the following

common standards and procedures:

• standardized vulnerability assessments to ensure a consistent level of

quality and to provide a capability to compare the results from different

sites,

• DOD-wide physical security standards that are measurable yet provide a

means for deviations when required by local circumstances, and

• procedures to maintain greater consistency among commands in their

implementation of threat condition security measures.

DOD concurred with two of our recommendations but did not agree on the

need for DOD-wide physical security standards

Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that in its investigation of the Khobar

Towers bombing, the Downing task force found that DOD had not

established physical security standards, including standards governing the

design and construction of new buildings or the modifications of existing

structures against the terrorist threat. The Downing task force

recommended that DOD adopt prescriptive physical security standards. We

found that DOD had not implemented this recommendation and had no

plans to do so.

The Downing task force held up the State Department’s physical security

standards as an example for DOD to follow in developing its own standards.

The task force characterized State’s standards as detailed and descriptive.

Most importantly, the task force said that State had adopted the standards

as requirements, not as guidance. State’s standards, developed in

coordination with the Overseas Security Policy Board, apply to all U.S.

missions abroad under the authority of a chief of mission. The standards

were created primarily for U.S. diplomatic offices and residential facilities.

They are based on the assessed threat level in the country, with the result

that facilities in higher threat countries must meet more stringent

requirements. For high-threat areas, the standards address such physical

security concerns as the height of perimeter walls, entry control, stand-off

distance, and the location of parking areas.

Currently, DOD requires its components to deploy a physical security

system to protect defense resources. But, unlike State’s regulations, DOD’s

regulations do not establish physical security standards that define what is

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
acceptable or unacceptable. After the Khobar Towers bombing, DOD

developed combating terrorism program standards,6 but these do not

provide detailed and descriptive requirements. The new DOD standards,

rather, are intended as a baseline for developing specific standards. For

instance, one program standard states,

“Commanders at all levels shall develop and implement a physical security plan, as part of

the [antiterrorism/force protection] program, that incorporates facilities, equipment,

trained personnel, and procedures into a comprehensive effort designed to provide

maximum antiterrorism protection to personnel and assets.”

More specific guidance to implement these performance standards is

provided in a DOD handbook, but the handbook guidance is advisory only.7

DOD officials told us they had no plans to issue DOD-wide physical security

standards. They believe that the variability in threat and vulnerabilities

among geographic areas and individual sites precludes such standards.

However, we noted that diplomatic missions also face different threats

and vulnerabilities yet are required to meet State’s physical security

standards. The DOD officials also said commanders responsible for

antiterrorism may establish specific standards if they choose. Of the five

geographic combatant commands, only U.S. Central Command had

developed prescriptive design standards. Central Command officials said

that since DOD declined to issue standards for protecting facilities against a

bomb blast, they developed their own. Officials at the other geographic

combatant commands had various opinions regarding the need for

DOD-wide physical security standards. For instance, U.S. European

Command officials stated that DOD should establish minimum physical

security standards for each threat level and then require the services to

publish more specific guidance. Such an approach would allow for

differences among the services. U.S. Pacific Command officials believe

that measurable DOD-wide physical security standards are a good idea if

they provide flexibility to allow for variability in the threat and local

circumstances. U.S. Navy Europe stated that there is a need for a DOD-wide

standard that is tough enough to force all activities to a minimum level of

compliance but flexible enough to allow an activity to adjust for

impediments that might prevent them from complying with the

requirements. In its official comments on our report, DOD stated that

commanders should not be told how to accomplish the task of providing

6

The standards were issued in July 1997.

7

DOD 0-2000.12H, “Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political

Turbulence” (Feb. 1993).

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
physical security for their personnel. DOD believes that its new program

standards, supplemented by existing physical security guidance, will be

sufficient to assist commanders. DOD also stated that it would be a mistake

to have a central office in Washington, D.C., issue standards because such

an office could not react quickly enough to changes in terrorists tactics.

Furthermore, DOD stated that establishing standards would require a

bureaucratic waiver process for facilities that do not meet the standards.

We continue to believe that common DOD standards would aid

commanders by providing them with a more objective basis for

determining whether their forces are adequately protected from terrorist

threats. Many of the commanders and antiterrorism officials we spoke

with specifically noted the need for, and the importance of, DOD-wide

standards.

We agree with DOD that any physical security standards must be flexible to

accommodate unique security situations and recognized this need for

flexibility in our recommendation. The common DOD standards could be

supplemented as warranted by the geographic combatant commands and

their service component commands. Similarly, if a waiver process is

required, it could be implemented by these commands rather than by a

central office in Washington, D.C. Moreover, in our view and in the view of

several commanders we spoke with, a waiver process is likely to add a

measure of accountability to the program and assures that senior-level

officials are aware of potential problems.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We would be

pleased to answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee

may have.

(703224) Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44 Combating Terrorism
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