COMMANDANT

COL Bryan G. Watson 

563-6192

<bryan.watson@us.army.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

COL Robert A. Tipton

563-6192

<robert.tipton@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

Mr. James R. Rowan

563-4363

<james.rowan@us.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

CW5 Robert K. Lamphear

563-4088

<robert.lamphear@us.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

CSM Robert J. Wells

563-8060

<bobby.wells@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR

COL Jose Cepeda 

563-8045

<jose.cepeda.deaner@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG

LTC Steven K. Knutzen 

563-8046

<steven.knutzen@us.army.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF

LTC Scott C. Johnson

563-7116

<scott.johnson@us.army.mil>

COMMANDER, 1st ENGINEER BRIGADE

COL Tommy R. Mize 

596-0224, DSN 581-0224

<tommy.mize@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

COL Jerry C. Meyer

563-4093

<jerry.meyer@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION

Mr. Robert F. Danner

329-1942

<robert.f.danner@us.army.mil>

COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS CENTER

COL David Theisen 

563-8142

<david-theisen@us.army.mil>

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER

Mr. Angel Belen, Deputy Manager

563-6199

<angel.belen@us.army.mil>

ENGINEER DOCTRINE, MANSCEN DOT

Mr. Douglas Merrill

563-0003

<douglas.merrill@us.army.mil>

MANEUVER SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

LTC Stephen A. Danner

563-6282

<stephen.danner@us.army.mil>

MANEUVER SUPPORT MATERIEL

LTC Steven T. Wall

563-5055

<steven.wall@us.army.mil>

Engineer (ISSN 0046-1989) is prepared three times a 

year by the United States Army Engineer School and the 

MANSCEN Directorate of Training, 464 MANSCEN Loop, 

Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926. 

Periodicals postage is paid at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and additional mailing offices.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to MANSCEN 

Directorate of Training, ATTN: ATZT-TDS-BS (Engineer), 

464 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri 65473-8926.

CORRESPONDENCE, letters to the editor, manuscripts, photographs, official unit requests to receive copies, and unit address changes should be sent to Engineer

at the preceding address. Telephone: (573) 563-4104, 

DSN 676-4104; e-mail address: <leon.engineer@conus.

army.mil>; Internet home page: <http://www.wood.army.

mil/engrmag/default.htm>.

DISCLAIMER: Engineer presents professional information designed to keep U.S. military and civilian engineers 

informed of current and emerging developments within 

their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their 

professional development. Views expressed are those of 

the authors and not those of the Department of Defense 

or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede 

information in other U.S. Army publications. Use of news 

items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy nor 

product endorsement. Engineer reserves the right to edit 

material submitted for publication.

CONTENT is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit is given to Engineer and the author.

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION is targeted to all engineer 

and engineer-related units.

PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS are available for $19.00 

($26.60 foreign) per year by contacting the Superintendent 

of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 

15250-7954.

ADDRESS CHANGES for personal subscriptions 

should be sent to the Superintendent of Documents, 

ATTN: Mail List Branch, Mail Stop SSOM, Washington, 

D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

0907801

JOYCE E. MORROW

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

United States Army Engineer School

573-563-8080 / DSN 676-8080
E R

DEPARTMENTS

Inside Front Cover -

Engineer School Points of Contact

02 Clear the Way

By Commandant 

Colonel Robert A. Tipton

 3 Clear the Way

By Commandant 

Colonel Bryan G. Watson

04 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major 

Robert J. Wells

05 Show the Way

By Chief Warrant Officer Five

Robert K. Lamphear

45 Dedication

76 The Engineer Writer’s Guide

Front Cover: ENFORCE 2009

Back Cover: Year of the NCO

Designed by Jennifer Morgan

MANAGING EDITOR

Shirley Bridges

EDITOR

Rick Brunk

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Cheryl Green 

Susan Stevens

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer Morgan

COMMANDANT

Colonel Bryan G. Watson

FEATURES

06 Moving Out With Great Engineers

By Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp

07 Lay Hold! Heave! Building Speed: Excitement and Satisfaction in Pushing 

the BGE Flywheel 

Compiled by Colonel Jerry C. Meyer 

13 A Quick Look Across the DOTMLPF Domains 

 By Colonel James R. Rowan (Retired)

17 BGE Accomplishments: Training and Education Work Group

 By Dr. Troy Messer

20 Officer Professional Development in a BGE World

By Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Johnson

22 Show Me the Building Great Engineers Money

 By Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Johnson

24 Engineer Officer Education Transformation

 By Command Sergeant Major Thomas H. Chambers (Retired)

26 JEOC: Joint Engineer Operations Course

By Mrs. Rachel M. King (formerly Rachel M. Walkenbach) and Mr. Dwayne E. Boeres

28 Advanced Route Clearance Courses: Getting There...

 By Major Carl Coats and Mr. Larry D. Jackson

31 IED Defeat Gated Training Strategy: A Holistic Approach to Preparing Units 

and Soldiers for Combat

 By Colonel Kenneth J. Crawford

38 Operation Lionclaw: Building Iraqi Route Clearance Capability Through 

Active Partnership

 By Captain Andrew P. Sanders, Major Marvin L. Griffin, and First Lieutenant 

Eric R. Gentzel

42 The 766th Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell Leads the Way Into Afghanistan

 By First Lieutenant Matthew D. Brady

46 Geospatial Engineering: Combat Development Update

 By Mr. Kenneth Bergman

48 The 3 Cs of Leadership

 By Major Brian S. Smith

50 Appearing Larger Than We Are: The Story of the 1st Brigade Special Troops 

Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division

 By Lieutenant Colonel Frederic A. Drummond and Major James H. Schreiner

55 Lessons Learned From the Front—Operation Enduring Freedom

By Lieutenant Colonel Ronald E. Zimmerman, Captain Caitlin M. Dempsey, and 

First Lieutenant Haley E. Whitfield

60 Engineer Doctrine Update

 By Lieutenant Colonel Hank Thomsen

Volume 39 PB 5-09-1 Headquarters, Department of the Army January-April 2009

NGINEE

UNITED STATES ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

MANSCEN 

DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING 

PUBLICATIONS BRANCH

January-April 2009 Engineer 1

72 Getting the Right Answers

By First Lieutenant Kelly Lanternier0

73 Waste-to-Energy Systems

 By Mrs. Rebecca C. Wingfield

77 The Essayons Button

By Dr. Larry D. Roberts

63 Continual Assessment and Revision of SOPs

 By First Lieutenant Michael P. Carvelli

65 The Bridge at Remagen

 By Captain Michael J. Halloran

70 Studies Define Solid Waste Stream at Base Camps

By Mr. Gary Gerdes
2 Engineer January-April 2009

-

By Colonel Robert A. Tipton

Commandant, United States Army Engineer School

Clear The Way 

As we once again transition leadership at the Engineer School and come 

together for the annual ENFORCE 

conference, I thought it appropriate to provide 

a regimental perspective on the current operational and strategic environment, as we are at a 

time that offers great challenge—but also great 

opportunity.

We all know that our Army and Regiment 

have changed dramatically over the past decade, 

but from an enduring perspective, this past year 

may be the most significant. With the February 

2008 publishing of FM 3.0, Operations, our 

Army’s capstone doctrine, stability operations 

are now equally as important as offensive 

and defensive operations. For years, tasks 

associated with “nation building” were to be avoided because we 

were designed and equipped for high-intensity operations and would 

only do those other tasks when we had to. From our experiences 

over the past decade, we know that stability operations require 

new capabilities and new tactical and technical competencies for 

engineer Soldiers. Prior to this new doctrine, most engineer Soldiers 

and leaders were not required to have a high level of technical skills. 

The Engineer Regiment has been at the tip of the spear in terms of 

transformation and in prosecuting full spectrum operations in two 

separate theaters, and we should be proud of how well we have done 

on both fronts under an operational design that never expected us 

to conduct the myriad of tasks associated with stability operations. 

However, experience over the past 5 years illustrates that stability 

operations need military engineer capabilities and skills that were 

not previously required, and it is important that we articulate to 

Army leadership how important it is to support our Regiment’s efforts to continue to adapt to this new reality. I believe we have done 

a relatively good job of identifying how we must change and are 

working many initiatives to develop the Engineer Regiment we need 

now and for the foreseeable future. Central to this is the Building 

Great Engineers campaign, which we will again focus on during this 

year’s ENFORCE. However, to be successful in these endeavors, we 

must collectively educate the Army at large on these new realities, 

and to do this, we must educate our own Regiment. To this end, I 

ask each of you to work the following three strategic messages into 

your conversations, writings, and briefings whenever possible:

Strategic Message #1: FM 3-0 places stability and civil support 

operations on equal par with offensive and defensive operations. 

These operations require new and significantly higher engineer 

technical capabilities than under previous Army doctrine, and the 

Army must adapt its engineer force within the context of this new 

doctrine. 

Strategic Message #2: The current Army and engineer leader 

development and personnel management system is not optimized 

to create engineer leaders with the technical 

and tactical engineering skills needed for 

full spectrum operations. The Army needs 

to recognize this and support the Engineer 

Regiment’s actions to build great engineers in 

order to provide the higher degree of technical 

capabilities our force needs, even at a time when 

the United States as a nation is producing fewer 

engineers. 

We are focused on the personnel domain, 

which has historically compensated for shortcomings in other domains. We will never have 

the exact doctrine, organization, or materiel that 

we need, so it is up to our Soldiers and leaders 

to adapt and develop solutions on the battlefield 

that will achieve victory. We recognize that 

our challenges do not reside entirely in the personnel domain. The 

modular force has not been fully fielded, and we must have the 

tactical patience to grow the complete force before we make radical 

judgments on its effectiveness. We must remind ourselves that the 

modular engineer force provides much more balanced engineer 

capabilities for the force at large (combat, general, geospatial), and 

there is universal recognition that the new modular engineer battalion 

headquarters is much more capable than were the legacy engineer 

battalions. The primary shortfall that has become clear is engineer 

command and control (C2)—specifically within the brigade combat 

team (BCT). To leverage the engineer force pool, the BCT needs 

a more robust engineer C2 solution. To this end, I offer the final 

strategic message for your use as you engage our Army leaders:

Strategic Message #3: The Army’s modular BCTs will need 

augmentation from the engineer force pool for virtually every mission 

assigned, because there is not enough engineer capability within the 

Army to provide each BCT with the organic engineer support it will 

need for full spectrum operations. These high-demand engineer 

capabilities must be carefully managed and seamlessly moved 

within and between BCTs throughout any campaign. In many cases, 

the engineer augmentation will be large enough to allocate up to an 

engineer battalion to the BCT to provide C2 of these units. Short of 

having the organic engineer capability needed, BCTs must be trained 

on how to leverage and integrate engineer capabilities from the force 

pool to meet this gap and must have a capable and robust organic 

engineer staff to enable efficient engineer integration. 

It has been a great privilege to serve as your Commandant during 

the past 6 months. The Army has made an outstanding choice in the 

selection of our new Commandant, COL Bryan Watson, who comes 

to us with the right experience and is the perfect leader to take our 

Regiment forward. I will continue to serve the Regiment and the 

new Commandant as the Assistant Commandant and look forward 

to seeing you at ENFORCE. Remember that we are in a period of 

tremendous opportunity for the Regiment! Essayons! 
By Colonel Bryan G. Watson

Commandant, United States Army Engineer School

Clear The Way 

Stepping into the job as the Commandant 

of the Engineer School and Regiment 

is an incredible honor...daunting when 

I look at the character, vision, toughness, and 

accomplishments of the previous Commandants, 

from Colonel Jonathan Williams in 1802 to 

Colonel Bob Tipton today—all magnificent 

leaders. So, you wonder, how did that happen 

to Watson? Well, I’m very clear about how I 

got to these crossroads. It was the Soldiers, 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers 

that I’ve had the incredible privilege of serving 

alongside that got me here. THEIR dedication, 

THEIR sense of mission, THEIR personal 

sacrifice, and THEIR willingness to serve...made 

the difference. As I step into the position as the 

next Commandant, know that it was your hard 

work—your coaching—that prepared me for this job. I’m eternally 

grateful and look forward to living up to your expectations with 

the same sense of service. My wife Kris and I are elated about 

returning to our Home of Engineers and serving this tremendous 

regimental family to our utmost...a family we have come to love 

as our own. 

Recently, during a meeting with senior engineer leaders from 

across the Regiment, our Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General 

Van Antwerp, made the comment that these are historic times for our 

world, our Nation, our Army...and our Regiment. I had to ponder that 

for a moment. When I think of the challenges we faced in these past 

years of conflict and the accomplishments of engineers in the fight, 

they are beyond historic. The pace of operations at the unit level as 

we reorganize, field new capabilities, restation, prepare to deploy, 

conduct full spectrum operations in multiple theaters, and reset to 

redeploy is...well...unprecedented. The responsibilities borne by 

young engineer leaders in our small units are without parallel in my 

career...beyond our imagination only 10 years ago. Yet, they meet 

the challenge with splendor. Our adaptation of doctrine and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTP) and the rapid fielding of new 

equipment to meet our dynamic needs in combat is extraordinary 

by every measure. Finally, the steely resolve of our Soldiers to see 

“the Long War” through to victory...to repeatedly deploy-redeploydeploy...to get back out on point to clear and build the way! Frankly, 

it leaves me in absolute awe of today’s engineers.

Yes, this is a historic time for our Regiment, replete with historic 

challenges overcome by historic acts by historic-caliber engineer 

Soldiers and Leaders in historic service to their nation. But don’t let 

your focus on our recent challenges and accomplishments obscure 

what should be paramount. It is the historic opportunity we have to 

shape our Regiment for the generations of engineers still to join our 

ranks that makes these critical times. Our responsibility is to harness 

today’s historic experience and use it to forge our future. We must 

make today’s history matter so we can continue 

to answer the call of our Army and our Nation 

with the engineer service it has come to expect.

The question at hand is, Where should we 

focus our collective efforts into prudent actions 

that will guarantee our Engineer Regiment’s 

legacy of service to the Army and Nation into 

the future? In my view, there are seven key 

strategic tasks that must guide us as we navigate 

the uncertain waters that lie ahead—in priority:

Breed the Army’s best leaders by instilling passion for the traditions of engineer service among all ranks and inspiring them to be part of something 

bigger than self...without passion, this is 

just a job.

Be clear in our purpose: We exist to provide the 

full spectrum of engineer capabilities needed to assure 

the movement, maneuver, protection, and freedom of 

action of the force from theater to tactical-level operations. It drives everything we do; it must guide our 

priorities.

Build Great Engineers through lifelong development opportunities for officers and noncommissioned officers to ensure

that our formations have the technical skills, operational savvy, 

and physical/mental stamina to continue our heritage of expert 

service to the Nation in battle or peace.

Constantly improve the Regiment’s stance at the line of 

scrimmage so we can rapidly respond to the commander’s 

audible with the full spectrum of engineer capabilities...and be 

ready for tomorrow’s battle.

Extend our view of the engineer team beyond our regimental 

formations in all components, to include our sister Services 

and industry partners; learn to leverage and complement their 

capabilities.

Take immense pride in our Regiment, never forgetting our 

purpose to support the force first...serving as engineers with 

the heart of a sapper!

In my estimate, these strategic key tasks are imperatives for the 

future. Some we do extremely well now, while others represent recent 

initiatives already underway. We must sustain those efforts! But the 

list also describes new territory that I believe is vitally important to 

ensure that we provide commanders with the engineer force they 

require in future conflicts. They must guide our way ahead and the 

tough decisions we will face. Overall, they support my personal 

vision for our Engineer Regiment:

■

■

■

■

■

■

January-April 2009 Engineer 3

(continued on page 62)
-

4 Engineer January-April 2009

Lead The Way 

By Command Sergeant Major Robert J. Wells

United States Army Engineer School

As you know, the Army has announced 

that this year is “The Year of the NCO,” 

and I’d like to address the Sergeants 

in our formation. This article is devoted to 

those great NCOs who taught me how to be a 

good Soldier and Sergeant and a decent human 

being. 

What I’ve learned from my Sergeants has had 

a lasting impression. Without my knowing it, 

they’ve dictated the way I train and care for my 

own Soldiers and their Families. Being an NCO 

is harder today than it was 10 years ago. A 12- 

or 15-month deployment leaves you exhausted, 

physically and mentally. Period. No matter 

how you slice it, this stuff is hard. The stress of 

combat, accomplishing the mission, and taking 

care of Soldiers made me realize that there’s a 

lot of hard work that needs to happen back in garrison to minimize 

the number of Soldiers wounded in combat. I know the enemy has a 

say in every engagement, but it’s the way my NCOs reacted during 

those engagements that’s carried the day for our unit. And to build 

a great team, it takes some hard thinking, detailed planning, and 

solid execution once we start training at R+91. 

My NCOs have taught me the value of acting on those hard 

lessons learned from the last deployment and from our brothers 

and sisters who are deployed now. I don’t have all the answers, but 

there’s a bunch of NCOs in my company who can help me figure 

this stuff out. 

My Sergeant told me that he can’t give me his full, undivided 

attention back in the rear like he did when we were deployed. He 

has a family that hasn’t seen him these past 15 months, and they’d 

like to get to know their father. That doesn’t mean he’s going to 

completely ignore me, but it does mean that I have to behave myself, 

especially when my Sergeant’s not around. He told me I should act 

like a decent human being. I had no idea what he was talking about, 

and I asked for clarification. So he sat the entire team down and gave 

us his philosophy on decency.

He said, “There are usually three things that get Soldiers in 

trouble—money, women, and compulsive behavior.”

“Money is a powerful aphrodisiac, and right now your pocket is 

burning to spend as much of it as possible, but you’ve got to have 

patience. Remember how we took down that IED cell a few months 

back? It took us about 3 months to do it, but it was worth the effort. 

We took our time, gathered the intel, developed a plan, and executed 

it with no collateral damage. Everyone was happy, except the bad 

guys. Same goes for money. You’ve got this strong urge to go out 

and shoot (spend) anything that moves, but in the end you’ll just 

create a lot of collateral damage, a debt you can’t manage on your 

now-taxable private’s pay, and everyone’s gonna 

be mad at you, except the bad guys.”

“Formal courtesy between a man and a 

woman is more important than it is between 

strangers. Never embarrass or tease your girlfriend in front of your buddies or in private. 

When you’re out on the town, your first meeting 

engagement should be just like we do key 

leader engagements in-theater. Slow is smooth, 

and smooth is fast. Do your homework, get 

to know your subject, and slowly develop a 

good relationship based on honesty and trust. 

We don’t take advantage of the Sheik’s good 

nature and start putting our own plan into action 

without his consent. Same goes for a woman. 

You may think she’s flirting with you, but really 

she’s just being nice and conducting her own 

recon. You’ll know you’re doing things right if the happiness of your 

wife or girlfriend is essential to your own happiness. One last thing, 

you are never authorized to push around or hit a woman. No matter 

what she says or how drunk or how stupid you get. You can expect 

the full attention of the entire chain of command, from team leader 

to battalion commander, if you do.”

“Being compulsive means that you’re obsessed about one 

particular thing, and you just take it too far. Being a ‘Barracks Rat,’ 

sitting in front of a TV playing video games all weekend is one 

example. Drinking alcohol to excess is another example. Watching 

civilians on MTV or the Internet, going to the mall and outfitting 

your entire wardrobe with clothes that look more like costumes 

than anything else is another. Putting large plugs in your ears so it 

looks like you’ve got two little butts growing out of your earlobes...

tattoos...piercings...and the list goes on and on. The object is to 

not lose your perspective. Just because you’re in a combat zone 

doesn’t mean that stuff like hygiene, courtesy to officers, uniform 

standards, maintenance, awards, reports, and ceremonies stop until 

we redeploy, now does it? It’s the reason we don’t keep you on the 

same equipment for the entire rotation. You’ll reach tracer burnout, 

and it could get you or someone else hurt. Same theory applies back 

in the rear. You’ve got to have a wide variety of interests and spread 

your time out for your Family, your battle buddies, and your duties as 

a Soldier so you don’t burn out on us. You are expected to maintain 

our standards of uniform, punctuality, weapons, equipment, and 

good behavior no matter where you are.” 

Thank you, Sergeant Barajas, lesson learned. I continue to be 

amazed by what our Sergeants are required to do—in combat and 

in garrison. It’s our duty to ensure that they not only have all the 

tools in their kit bag to be a successful Sergeant but also to help 

them sort out their kit bag and train them on how to best use those 

tools. 
January-April 2009

Chief Warrant Officer Five Robert K. Lamphear

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer 

Show The Way 

As the third Regimental Chief Warrant 

Officer (RCWO), I am thrilled to join 

the Engineer School Commandant 

and the Regimental Command Sergeant Major 

in communicating with our great Regiment’s 

Soldiers through the Engineer Professional 

Bulletin. What a great opportunity to inform and 

educate our engineer force about regimental and 

Army warrant officer issues. I’ll use this venue 

to keep you updated on all things warrant officer 

in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 

and facilities – the DOTMLPF domains. 

The RCWO position was established as 

a result of the recommendation of the Chief 

of Staff, Army-chartered Army Training and 

Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Phase III – Warrant Officer 

Study, published on 18 July 2002. The panel met to examine and 

make recommendations on the training and leader development of 

the Army’s Warrant Officer Corps. The panel made 63 recommendations, grouped into four major categories: Army Culture, Training 

and Education, Manning, and Professional Development. One recommendation was to establish and resource a Chief Warrant Officer 

of the Branch position at proponent centers and schools where they 

did not currently exist. The RCWO’s primary duties are as follows:

Serve as the principal advisor to the Commandant on all matters pertaining to engineer warrant officers.

Serve as a voting member of the Vice Chief of Staff, 

Army-chartered Senior Warrant Officer Advisory Council 

(SWOAC). The council provides Department of the Army 

(DA)-level integration and synchronization and advice to the 

Army leadership for career field-related issues. 

Act as the single regimental point of contact for engineer 

warrant officer issues and primary advocate/liaison for engineer warrant officer training/leader development issues.

Assess, monitor, and solve problems related to training, professional development, morale, recruiting, retention, and readiness.

Manage the engineer warrant officer recruiting program­;

evaluate accession packets for the Active Army, Army National 

Guard (ARNG), and United States Army Reserve (USAR).

Develop and write the Regiment’s position for warrant officer accessions, training, and professional development issues.

The Regiment has two warrant officer areas of concentration (AOCs)—utilities operation and maintenance technician 

(210A) and geospatial information technician (215D). With modularity nearly tripling the number of 210A positions and FM 3-0, 

■

■

■

■

■

■

Operations, placing stability and civil support 

operations on equal par with offensive and 

defensive operations, the 210A will play an 

increasingly important role in providing construction expertise and support to the Regiment, 

Army, and nation. The 210A can now be found 

in vertical construction platoons, survey and design detachments, prime power platoons, engineer brigades, maneuver enhancement brigades, 

combat support hospitals, division and corps 

headquarters, and the White House.

The 215Ds play a vital role in coordinating and supervising the collection, production, 

analysis, interpretation, and processing of geospatial information for the combatant commander. The Force Development Update (FDU) 

to add geospatial warrant officers to all brigade 

combat teams (BCTs), if approved, will nearly double the number 

of 215D positions within the Regiment. The 215Ds can be found in 

BCTs, division and corps geospatial teams, topographic companies, 

geospatial planning cells, and joint (COCOM) assignments. The 

growth in engineer warrant officers has created a great opportunity 

for noncommissioned officers to apply for the warrant officer program. Calendar year 2008 was the Regiment’s best recruiting year 

ever as we approved and/or accessed 75 Active Army, ARNG, and 

USAR Soldiers to be engineer warrant officers. For information on 

becoming an engineer warrant officer, log onto the Army recruiting 

website at <http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant >.

The growth in engineer warrant officers is also changing how we 

train both our 210As and 215Ds. The Engineer School’s Department 

of Training and Leader Development is in the midst of a comprehensive analysis of the 210A Basic Course which, when completed, will 

significantly improve the quality and breadth of technical training. 

The 215D Basic Course has already expanded to meet the changing 

requirements of the Army’s geospatial community. I will detail the 

Warrant Officer Education System in the next issue of the Engineer 

Professional Bulletin.

This year’s ENFORCE will feature the first Council of Engineer 

Warrant Officers and recognition of the Warrant Officers of the Year 

for the USAR and Active Army. The Council format will provide for 

a comprehensive warrant officer update for attendees and allow them 

to participate in the discussion of issues that will affect engineer 

warrant officers. Come join us!

In closing, this IS the best time in our Regiment’s history to be an 

engineer warrant officer. As your RCWO, I will strive to keep you 

informed through this publication and other avenues as appropriate. 

For those of you in harm’s way, stay safe and continue to do the fantastic work that is keeping this country safe. Essayons!

Engineer 5
6 Engineer January-April 2009

Our historic workload both here and abroad—plus the 

addition of “The American Recovery and Investment 

Act (Stimulus)”—focuses us on having Great Engineers with the requisite competencies to “get ‘er done.” Our 

Soldiers and Civilians are working in 33 countries providing 

full spectrum engineering services—from sapper and construction engineering in combat to water resource planning 

and construction on our river systems to geospatial engineering to disaster recovery and reconstruction. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike 

Mullen, has recognized the need for developing and growing 

great leaders and engineers. He demonstrated this requirement 

when he published his new doctrinal guidance on how our 

future force must function and the capabilities it needs to 

possess.

Our engineers must be able to serve an array of customers in a diverse set of circumstances, from partnering 

with local tribal leaders to designing a sluice gate on a levee 

to building a bridge across a river in Iraq. Our engineer force 

must be able to synchronize individual talents and overall 

effects in order to offer a full suite of engineering skills. It 

will take Great Engineers to accomplish these important 

missions. 

As Admiral Mullen states, “Leaders down to the lowest 

levels must be comfortable acting on their own authority based 

on an understanding of the larger situation and an appreciation 

for the broader implications of their actions...” That puts a 

premium on competency!

We have a significant mission ahead. What a great time to 

be an ENGINEER!

Lieutenant General Van Antwerp is the 52d Chief of Engineers and Commander of the United States Army Corps of 

Engineers.

Bassett Army Community Hospital in Fort Wainwright, Alaska, is a modern $215 million medical facility built by 

the Corps’s Alaska District. This 259,500-square-foot medical building replaced a hospital built before Alaska became 

a state. The construction and modernization of quality-of-life facilities such as this represent the many engineering 

services that our Nation, our Soldiers, and their Families depend on each day.

By Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp
January-April 2009 Engineer 7

Compiled by Colonel Jerry C. Meyer from information provided by past and present members of the Building Great 

Engineers (BGE) Council of Colonels: Colonel William H. 

Haight, Colonel Timothy O’Rourke, Colonel James Wong, 

Colonel Janice Dombi, Mr. Steven H. Tupper, Colonel Robert A. Tipton, Colonel Jose Cepeda, Colonel Andrew Phillips, 

and Dr. Robert Wolff

“. . . why does the Flywheel Effect work? Because more 

than anything else, real people . . . want to be part of a winning team. They want to contribute to producing real results. 

They want to feel the excitement and the satisfaction of being part of something that just flat-out works. When people 

begin to feel the magic of momentum—when they begin to 

see tangible results and can feel the flywheel start to build 

speed—that’s when they line up, throw their shoulders to the 

wheel, and push.”—Jim C. Collins1 

Background

Seeking to reverse quantifiable degradation to engineer leader technical and tactical competency, the Fort Leonard Wood portion of ENFORCE 2008 built on the 

foundation of six Engineer Leader Technical Competency 

(ELTC) work groups:

Future Roles, Missions, Delivery Methods

Accessions

■

■

Training and Education

Employment

Retention

Strategic Communications

Less than 60 days later, the result was a Chief of Engineersapproved Building Great Engineers Campaign Plan with 

nearly 40 initiatives. For those with Army Knowledge Online 

(AKO) access, that plan can be read on the Engineer School 

Knowledge Network (ESKN).

Seven months later (as of this 1 March writing), what has 

become of the efforts of those who have remained engaged 

and put shoulder to the flywheel? Too often “good ideas” languish and die from lack of follow-up and effort. Did we really begin doing what we said we were going to do? Is the 

flywheel turning? The intent of this article is to inform the 

Engineer Regiment on the current status of many BGE actions 

initiated by the plan and the way ahead in increasing engineer 

leader technical and tactical competency for full spectrum 

operations in an era of persistent conflict. 

“Don’t wait until everything is just right. It will never be 

perfect. There will always be challenges, obstacles and less 

than perfect conditions. So what. Get started now. With each 

step you take, you will grow stronger and stronger, more and 

more skilled, more and more self-confident, and more and 

more successful.”—Mark Victor Hansen

■

■

■

■
8 Engineer January-April 2009

First, a salute to the leaders who provided great value and 

now have moved on to other duties! These include Major 

General Gregg F. Martin, Colonel William H. Haight, Colonel 

Everett McDaniel, and Colonel James Wong. The power of 

these leaders’ mighty shoulders overcame the inertia of rest 

on our great wheel!

Next, there are signature accomplishments on each 

spoke. For the Futures work group, the force structure in 

corps and division staffs is being addressed to improve engineer expertise, and we now see the return of military personnel to public works in the foreseeable future. Accessions

has stirred up a significant review of how the Army runs 

the business of bringing in new lieutenants and leveraging 

their academic backgrounds. Training and Education has 

pushed a suite of teaching and curriculum improvements 

inside the United States Army Engineer School. Employment has redrafted the description of an engineer’s career 

in Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 600-3, 

Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, thus setting a modern paradigm for a new 

generation of sappers, builders, and geospatial engineers. 

Retention is on the verge of reimbursement of Professional 

Engineer (PE) exams and preparation fees. Strategic Communications has developed DA-level marketing materials 

that are making a difference. 

Finally, you are invited to review the following detailed 

summaries and to attend the work sessions at ENFORCE 

2009 that will push this critical work forward.

Future Roles, Missions, Delivery Methods

Work group leadership has been passed to Colonel 

Timothy O’Rourke and Lieutenant Colonel Vernie Reichling, Office of the Chief of Engineers–

Pentagon (OCE–P). The work group founder, Colonel William H. Haight, has moved to the Joint Staff and still remains

engaged.

Progress

Engineer Staff Structure in the Brigade Combat Team, 

Division, Corps, and Army Service Component Command.

To date, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) has approved 

the force structure for the corps and division staffs; there were 

no significant changes for engineers. The Army is conducting a holistic review of the brigade combat team (BCT) structures. Currently, one 215D/W2 is an addition, and there is a 

reduction of one 21B/03 in the heavy brigade combat team 

(HBCT)/infantry brigade combat team (IBCT).

Gaining Support in the Joint Operational Engineer 

Board for Capacity Development. The new capstone concepts for joint operations, the joint operational environment, 

and the joint operational concepts include capacity development. The Joint Engineer Capabilities-Based Assessment will 

address the needs of capacity development across the engineer 

components of the Services.

Coordination With Other Centers/Branches to Better Synchronize Shared Missions With the Intent to Eliminate Redundancy/Increase Synergy. Efforts have largely centered on stability 

operations. The Base Camp Integrative Capability Development 

Team continues to move toward a capabilities-based assessment, and recently the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 

Management (ACSIM) presented a concept to the VCSA on expeditionary base camps; however, it falls short of addressing the 

strategic issue of defining policy for expeditionary basing. Additionally, we are engaging with the United States Army Civil 

Affairs and Psychological Operations Command on developing 

doctrinal concepts for engineer support to their operations with 

a goal of formalizing this relationship for the Regiment.

Development of a Force Design Update for a StrategicLevel Engineer Brigade. This is on hold due to the Army 

being overstructured. It is unlikely that this structure will be 

addressed until after the release of the new administration’s 

National Defense Strategy. The Engineer School is determining the feasibility of this requirement.

Return of the Director of Public Works (DPW). The Installation Management Command (IMCOM) initiative and support for this is pending approval in Total Army Analysis (TAA) 

for FY2010-2015, but it is an unresourced requirement. These 

positions will have to be readdressed in TAA for FY2012-

2017. Additionally, the engineer chapter in DA Pam 600-3 was 

submitted reflecting the BGE concepts and career paths.

Way Ahead

The United States Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) continues to provide input to the BCT holistic review. 

Members of the Futures work group will continue to define 

capacity development as a task in the Joint Capabilities-Based 

Analysis and Engineer Brigade Headquarters DOTMLPF 

Study. We will continue to engage the United States Special 

Operations Command on civil affairs doctrine and engineer 

support. The Engineer School will work on determining feasibility of developing a Force Design Update for the strategic 

engineer brigade. We will continue to readdress resourcing 

DPW requirements in TAA 12-17, per the above update.

“You don’t make progress by standing on the sidelines, 

whimpering and complaining. You make progress by implementing ideas.”— Shirley Hufsteddler

Accessions

Colonel Janice Dombi, who recently assumed command of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) South Pacific Division, heads this work 

group, which was previously chaired by Colonel Everett

McDaniel and Colonel James Wong.

Progress

Access More Degreed Engineers. Results from attempting to access more degreed engineers into the branch are in. 

Despite a concerted effort at Warrior Forge, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) branch selection resulted in only
January-April 2009 Engineer 9

29 percent of officers with engineering degrees being accessed into the Engineer Branch. This is down from 35 percent 

degreed engineers with the class of 2008, in which little effort was expended to recruit degreed engineers into the branch. 

Twenty-nine cadets with engineering majors had engineer as 

their first branch preference, yet did not receive the Engineer 

Branch. Popularity of the branch went from 7th to 5th, mostly 

on the 50 percent rise of nonengineers who wanted the branch 

as their first choice. Among degreed engineers, first choice selection rose by about 10 percent. Had it been specified by Army 

regulation (AR), the branch could have had 30 to 40 percent 

more accessed officers with engineering degrees. One-third of 

those who branched engineer had a degree in political science, 

criminal justice, history, international relations, or psychology. 

As a result of these findings, United States Army Cadet Command is now willing to explore branching degreed engineers to 

lessen the effect of the order of merit listing in the process (not 

only for engineer, but also other degrees/branches).

For the combined classes of 2009 that were accessed from 

the United States Military Academy (USMA) and ROTC, 41 

percent had engineering degrees (USMA had about 58 percent 

degreed engineers in the class of 2009, while having well over 

60 percent from the class of 2008). If all degreed engineers who 

selected the Engineer Branch as first choice had been allowed 

to branch engineers, almost 53 percent of the total USMA and 

ROTC class would have had engineering degrees.

Officer Candidate School (OCS) classes with an engineer 

captain leader appear to have higher selection rates for the 

branch. In 2009, 50 percent of engineer degreed Soldiers

selected the Engineer Branch. 

Professors of Military Science at Engineer-Centric 

ROTC Schools. The United States Accessions Command held 

a summit to talk to Professors of Military Science (PMSs) at

engineer-centric ROTC schools to promote engineering. 

There appears to be a correlation between the branch of the 

overseeing PMS at the college and branches chosen by the 

ROTC cadets (“be like me” syndrome). Colonel Dombi has 

requested feedback from this summit.

Way Ahead

Changing AR 600-3, The Army Personnel Proponent System, will have significant impact on determining the number of engineer-degreed cadets branching engineer. Colonel

Dombi will lead a breakout group during ENFORCE on 

broadening an “adopt an engineer” program.

“The great thing in the world is not so much where 

we stand, as in what direction we are moving.”— Oliver 

Wendell Holmes

Training and Education

Colonel Jerry Meyer, Engineer School Director of 

Training and Leader Development, and Mr. Steven 

Tupper, Missouri University of Science and Technology (Missouri S&T), continue to head this work group.

Progress

The Training and Education work group has made solid 

progress, albeit mostly internal to the Engineer School, for 

changing courses and improving instruction.

Improving Engineer School Instructors. In consonance 

with improving Engineer School instructors, the School has 

implemented a mandatory interview process in addition to the 

formalized instructor criteria provided to Human Resources 

Command (HRC) several months ago. Approximately eight 

Engineer School instructors are participating in the USMA 

Master Teacher Certification Program, after a visit by Dr. 

Mark Evans from West Point’s Center for Teaching Excellence. Instructors are already halfway through their first year 

of the program, learning to be better in their primary mission. 

Several instructors also completed a speed-reading course for 

college credit via the University of Central Missouri.

Maximizing Learning Effectiveness Within the Existing 

Training Infrastructure. The Engineer Basic Officer Leader 

Course (BOLC) has been aligned with FM 3.0, Operations. 

In response to overseas unit requests, more than 300 officers, 

warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) have 

received 20 hours of contracting officer’s representative (COR) 

training via Defense Acquisition University online training. 

Environmental officer certification is now being requested as 

course growth for BOLC, Engineer Captains Career Course 

(ECCC), and 210A Warrant Officer Course. The Society of 

American Military Engineers (SAME) and the University 

of North Dakota are in the process of signing an agreement 

giving Soldiers an opportunity to earn an ABET (formerly 

Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology)-

accredited bachelor of science degree in engineering online 

(some lab time required). (See the Strategic Communications 

work group’s progress on page 12.) In February 2009, the Engineer School Department of Instruction invited the International Committee of the Red Cross to speak to the ECCC. The 

ECCC partnered with academia (Missouri S&T), SAME, and 

the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) 

to conduct Structural Assessment Visual Evaluation (SAVE) 

training, not only to make officers available for state disaster 

assistance during their student time but also to hone wartime 

damage assessment skills. Media training, in partnership with 

journalism students from the renowned University of Missouri (Columbia) School of Journalism, was so successful that 

it is being developed for use across the United States Army 

Military Police School and the United States Army Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) School. Captains are taught principles of dealing with the media and are 

videotaped in scenario-driven interviews for peer analysis.

Improvements in Engineer School Methods of Instruction. Testing out/validation of instruction continues to be developed. Experimentation to test out student officers and offer more advanced substitute courses has revealed a student 

reluctance to attempt validation and a need to formalize and 

grow alternative subjects, should students “validate” normal course offerings. Additionally, Dr. Brock Barry, Purdue 
10 Engineer January-April 2009

University, and soon-to-be USMA civil engineering professor, spent a few days at the Engineer School, made recommendations for classroom improvement, and began forging a 

closer relationship for a USMA–Engineer School partnership. 

Captain–lieutenant mentorship/integration began where feasible between ECCC and BOLC students. For example, students who are lieutenants must receive a company operations 

order (OPORD) given by a captain who is being graded by a 

senior evaluator, and lieutenants must subsequently write a 

platoon OPORD for evaluation. Additional hands-on activities and integration across the BOLC–ECCC–NCO–warrant 

officer courses have occurred via tactical exercises without 

troops (TEWTs).

Technology in the Classroom. Use of technology in the 

classroom continues to progress. DARWARS Ambush! route 

clearance simulation training within BOLC and the Advanced 

Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) collaboration 

has been very useful and continues to expand and improve. The 

“Think Like a Commander” United States Army Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) leadership simulation was 

not as useful as hoped. “Turnitin®” is being used to assist students with writing assignment documentation and as a bulwark 

against occasional plagiarism. Tablet personal computers (PCs) 

have been purchased for one ECCC small group, and the second pilot of use of the Tablet PC and e-books is underway. The 

first pilot experienced organizational and technical challenges.

Piloting has been completed and a purchase of Classroom Response Systems (CRS) is underway for BOLC. CRS is a software environment for developing and administering questions 

via PowerPoint®. Students input their answers using wireless 

devices, and a receiver connected to the instructor’s computer 

tabulates the results for immediate feedback that is visible to 

all. Although uses of the system are numerous, this system 

particularly enhances interactive, student-centered learning 

by real-time compilation of student responses to checks on 

learning via wireless technology. Feedback to students and instructors allows for more efficient and effective learning. 

Warrant Officer 210A Course. This course has been redesigned, with much more emphasis on technical competency 

and certification. Course growth from 12 to 26 weeks is now 

being worked through the TRADOC course development

process.

Civilian Education Options. The civilian education options for the Regiment are still largely the cooperative degree 

program with Missouri S&T. The ECCC Reserve Component students now have an avenue to achieve an engineering 

master’s degree, and a follow-on doctoral program has been 

publicized by Missouri S&T. A series of new, online ABETaccredited engineering degrees via the University of North 

Dakota is explained in the Strategic Communications work 

group progress.

Way Ahead

Most of the effort during the past several months has been 

internal to the Engineer School. External partnership needs 

to be reinvigorated. This emphasis will include multi-Service 

and joint training, officer exchanges, and concepts like the 

Joint Engineer Training Center of Excellence. Partnership 

with the USACE courses and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) educational opportunities are needed. Since the various Service chief engineers are 

scheduled to speak at ENFORCE 2009, rejuvenation of these 

partnerships is a goal.

A memorandum formalizing Engineer School participation in the USMA Master Teacher Certification Program 

will be written. The Engineer School Directorate of Training 

and Leader Development will investigate establishment of a 

funded graduate degree program with follow-on assignment 

to the School. It will also develop an instructor recruitment 

program from higher-performing ECCC graduates. The Engineer School is also exploring the possibility for general officer 

(Engineer School Commandant) senior rating of School officer instructors. Increased leveraging of TRADOC’s Learning Services Division video teleconference training will also 

improve instructor competence.

The Engineer School Department of Instruction should 

soon complete planning for and execution of the Captains Career Course common-core redesign, as mandated by the new 

TRADOC Commanding General. How or if this initiative 

supports BGE is yet to be determined.

The ability of students to get an ABET-accredited engineering bachelor of science degree from SAME-brokered partnership with University of North Dakota will require Regimentwide promotion.

Impacts and implementation of a new Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System (NCOES) will be determined over 

the course of the next several months.

“Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable. . . 

Every step toward the goal . . . requires sacrifice, suffering, 

and struggle; the tireless exertions and passionate concern 

of dedicated individuals.” — Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Employment

Colonel Jose Cepeda, Engineer School Deputy Assistant Commandant for the Reserve Component, assumed leadership of the Employment work group 

when Colonel Robert Tipton assumed the duties of Engineer 

School Commandant late last fall.

Progress

“Green Pages” is a personnel tool designed to display an 

individual’s talents, experience, and most desired assignments 

beyond current capabilities. Rather than contracting this initiative, AKO has begun improving the “My Profile” section, 

which will become the foundation of the Green Pages. Supplied with this additional data, HRC will be better informed in 

selecting the most qualified individuals for available positions 

or for consultation or reachback support.
January-April 2009 Engineer 11

DA Pam 600-3. The Engineer School submitted a final draft 

of DA Pam 600-3, Chapter 14, Engineer Branch career paths, 

near the end of December 2008. The new manual, which is to 

be published in the spring/summer of 2009, is out for DA-level 

staffing. The rewrite reflects a theme of continuous education and 

broadening both inside and outside of positions within the Engineer Branch. The objective is to promote the pursuit of education 

and certification throughout an officer’s career and identify both 

key and developmental positions for each rank that broaden an 

officer’s knowledge of all facets of engineer operations, to include geospatial, USACE, facilities, combat, construction, and 

maneuver support. When combined with a quality senior mentorship and training program, this manual will provide a road 

map to producing high-quality engineer officers for our Regiment. A special team will be formed to analyze at least three 

courses of action, study potential impact on the Regiment, and 

make recommendations at ENFORCE 2009.

 Way Ahead

Further definition, scope, and boundaries are needed for 

Green Pages, as well as talent-matching rules. A pilot program 

of its use will follow. There will be continued collaboration 

among the Engineer School, DA G1, G6, AKO, and HRC.

A major breakout group session for ENFORCE will address engineer military occupational specialty (MOS) and 

skill identifier (SI) considerations, as well as professional 

requirements and certifications. This ENFORCE breakout 

group will be led by Lieutenant Colonel Keith Dupont. The 

issue is whether to create two or more specialized officer area 

of concentration (AOC) codes within the Engineer Branch 

and manage our officers according to the AOCs. While the 

current DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification 

and Structure, lists 21A, 21B, and 21D as separate and distinct 

AOCs, DA Pam 600-3 doesn’t address the differences, and 

Engineer Branch and the Army aren’t really managing our officer population by separate AOCs. This will be a major focus 

topic for this year’s Building Great Engineers II ENFORCE 

Conference. The courses of action (COAs) are as follows:

COA 1: Develop Additional Areas of Concentration.

AOCs create “minibranches” within the Engineer Branch.

Officers will be accessed into each AOC based on their

educational background and experience, instead of requiring that all officers fulfill all duty positions. By being

grouped into concentrations, officers will experience

similar positions during their career. This will incrementally develop officers’ abilities and ensure that those competencies are not lost by misaligned position requirements

and personnel capabilities.

COA 2: Develop Skill Identifiers. SIs identify duty

positions that require individuals with specific skills.

Officers are not required to fill a position with which they 

share a skill code; however, personnel managers are able

to quickly identify qualified personnel for specialized

positions during the assignment process. Because SIs are

coded in the modified table of organization and equipment

■

■

(MTOE), the training that individuals need to fill those

positions is funded by DA. 

COA 3: Increase the Number of Project Development 

Skill Identifiers. Project development skill identifiers

(PDSIs) are codes given to personnel based on specific 

experiences or training they have received. PDSIs allow

assignment officers to quickly identify personnel with

specific backgrounds. Because PDSIs are not coded in

the MTOE, there is no forcing function to provide training; 

however, they allow the branch to better employ officers 

with specific skills and experiences.

There is a need to continue studying existing HRC policies 

and practices and identify which must be changed.

Another employment-related breakout group at ENFORCE 2009 will determine how to best get engineers 

into short-term USACE/DPW positions and establish a 

“partnership program” to link USACE/DPW with field 

units. This breakout session will be led by Colonel Janice 

Dombi.

The Regimental Command Sergeant Major will be working BGE issues in support of NCOs. 

“Progress always involves risk; you can’t steal second 

base and keep your foot on first base.”—Frederick Wilcox

Retention

Colonel Andrew Phillips, the United Kingdom MANSCEN Liaison, continues to lead the Retention work group of BGE.

Progress

Reimbursement of Fees. The reimbursement of fees 

associated with PE license renewal and for gaining a PE

license for the first time, regardless of the current position 

held by the applicant, was investigated. A proposal to gain 

authorized delegation for USACE/Engineer School to fund 

this initiative has been submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and a decision is expected soon. 

If successful, a policy letter will be issued. In parallel, details of other potential sources of funding for PE licensing

(such as tuition assistance and the GI Bill) will be publicized

Regimentwide as part of the strategic communications 

plan.

Branch Mentorship. Branch mentorship for junior engineer officers employed outside an engineer chain of command is a complex issue that will be examined in more detail 

by a breakout group at ENFORCE 2009.

Transportability Between the Regular Army and Reserve 

Component. The issue of transportability between these components in order to improve retention is an issue that is being 

examined Armywide by Headquarters, DA, and progress is 

being monitored to identify any targets of opportunity for the 

Engineer Branch.

■
Way Ahead

A plan for leading an ENFORCE 2009 breakout group on 

branch mentorship for junior engineer officers employed outside an engineer chain of command has been drafted. If this is 

an area of interest to you, plan to join the breakout session.

We continue to monitor progress of the Continuum of Service Opportunity initiative to remain abreast of progress and 

identify targets of opportunity for the Engineer Branch.

“He who cannot change the very fabric of his thought 

will never be able to change reality, and will never, therefore, make any progress.” — Anwar Sadat

Strategic Communications

Dr. Robert Wolff, Executive Director, Society of 

American Military Engineers (SAME), is the work 

group lead.

Progress

Marketing Brochure. An Army Engineer Regiment (AER) 

marketing brochure was printed and distributed via United 

States Army Cadet Command and USACE districts. It has 

since been revised to correct some missing units. A brochure 

is being reprinted for wider distribution.

AKO/Engineer School Websites. An AER briefing, posters, and frequently asked questions (FAQs) were provided on 

AKO and Engineer School websites.

Visit Engineering Schools/ROTC Units. USACE implemented an initiative to visit engineering schools and ROTC 

units to market AER.

DA-Level Marketing Opportunities. The work group

obtained a DA point of contact for the McCann Erickson contract and intends to follow up to ascertain DA-level 

marketing opportunities.

Online Engineering Degrees. SAME negotiated with the 

University of North Dakota (UND) regarding online engineering degrees. When the memorandum of agreement is signed 

and implemented, UND will offer undergraduate ABETaccredited online degrees in chemical, civil, mechanical, and 

electrical engineering. UND will possibly add petroleum engineering in the near future. These degrees require at least 

125 (semester) credits to be obtained in an estimated six-year 

period, predicated on an individual taking two courses per 

semester. The completion time will be shorter if an individual 

is awarded credits for experience in an engineering field or 

has undergraduate credits that can be transferred to the UND 

degree program. The only resident requirement is for approximately five weeks of laboratories at UND (the number 

of weeks/visits to UND may differ depending on labs that 

students have already taken at another college/university) or 

other location sponsored by SAME and approved by UND. 

UND assists in the arrangement of inexpensive housing for 

students while they are attending these resident programs. 

It is anticipated that most of the cost will fall under current

tuition assistance available to military personnel.

Way Ahead

The work group will continue to support the communications needs of the Building Great Engineers Campaign Plan 

and other BGE work groups. Signing and implementation 

of the SAME–UND memorandum of agreement is expected 

very soon. The work group will continue to update and improve the package of documents that is now on the Engineer 

School public website for use in talking to high school and 

college students about the opportunities for a career (military 

and civilian) in the Engineer Regiment.

We need to develop a concept and cost estimate for an

8- to 10-minute video that can describe the elements of the AER 

for use in recruiting and upload it to the regimental websites 

and YouTube. Social networking is next among our targets.

In the near future, we intend to identify points of contact 

who can best represent the career opportunities in the United States Army Reserves, Army National Guard, USACE, 

and IMCOM for officers leaving active duty early in their

careers. 

Conclusion

With measurable progress across all BGE work 

groups, major progress occurred with SAME’s establishment of online ABET-accredited engineering degrees via the University of North Dakota; rewrite of DA 

Pam 600-3, Chapter 14, Engineer Branch career paths; initial 

decisions and development of Green Pages via AKO; numerous Engineer School internal training and education initiatives; and development of strategic communications media 

for use by all members of the Regiment.

Five BGE breakout work groups have been identified for 

ENFORCE 2009. Most profound will be the work regarding 

which course of action to pursue in commissioned officer professional development and career management (generalization versus specialization). This is a significant milestone and 

will guide future progress for many initiatives across several 

BGE work groups.

Several unsung heroes of the Engineer Regiment, unmentioned here, have shouldered the load in making the first push 

of the flywheel. They have experienced the excitement and 

satisfaction of making a lasting, positive, significant difference for the Regiment.

“It behooves every man to remember that the work of 

the critic is of altogether secondary importance and that, 

in the end, progress is accomplished by the man who does 

things.”—Theodore Roosevelt 

Where’s your shoulder? Lay hold! Heave!

Endnote

1 Jim C. Collins, Good to Great, Harper Business, New 

York, 2001. 

12 Engineer January-April 2009
January-April 2009 Engineer 13

There are several actions ongoing at the United States 

Army Engineer School and the United States Army 

Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) directorates 

at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Although there are too many 

to discuss in a single article, this one will identify one or two 

areas in each of the key domains—doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF). If you haven’t already done so, it’s 

probably best to go back to the two “Clear the Way” articles at 

the front of this bulletin. Colonel Tipton’s column highlights 

the strategic messages for the Regiment and Colonel Watson’s 

column provides the commandant’s vision and philosophy. 

Reading these two short articles first is necessary to put the 

DOTMLPF actions in the right perspective.

Doctrine

Our keystone field manual (FM) 3-34, Engineer Operations, has been approved and will be online shortly at the Reimer Digital Library. All engineer leaders should 

read the manual and understand how the Regiment is designed 

to operate within the modular force. FM 3-34.22, Engineer 

Operations–Brigade Combat Team and Below, can be accessed 

and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital 

Library at <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>. Also due out soon is 

our other new organizational manual, FM 3-34.23, Engineer 

Operations–Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team. Both of 

these manuals have had all the necessary reviews completed 

and have been staffed extensively and validated through a Fort 

Leavenworth-sponsored Combined Arms Assessment Team 

(CAAT) visit to Iraq this year. FM 3-34.230, Topographic Operations, is being replaced by FM 3-34.600, Geospatial Engineering, and the initial draft has been delivered to the Engineer 

School. We will be soliciting your comments on this draft manual. There are also two new MANSCEN doctrinal publications 

that you should become familiar with—FM 3-90.31, Maneuver 

Enhancement Brigade (MEB) Operations, and FM 3-10, Protection. The MEB Operations manual can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library at 

<http://www.adtdl.army.mil>; the Protection manual is in draft 

form and can be obtained by contacting Lieutenant Colonel 

Hank Thomsen at <leon.mdottddengdoc@conus.army.mil>. 

Organization

Getting the right engineer command and control (C2) 

into the structure is crucial and remains the top 

organizational priority. We work this every day and 

know how important it is. We also know that we don’t have 

it exactly right yet, but thanks to you, we have continued to 

provide excellent support to commanders with whatever 

structure is in place. While all C2 is important, we believe 

that our most critical nodes, given the current organizational 

structure, are the brigade combat team (BCT) engineer and the 

functional engineer brigade headquarters. Colonel Tipton has 

already discussed the challenges in the BCT. Above the BCT 

level, we must fully define the roles and responsibilities of the 

functional engineer brigade and deconflict those roles with the 

MEB. We are working on a study with the Office of the Chief 

of Engineers–Pentagon (OCE–P) and the United States Army 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC)–Leavenworth to formally document the roles and 

responsibilities of the engineer brigade. 

The modular engineer force and the force pool are quickly 

coming on line. We went to a modular force on purpose. Since 

there aren’t enough engineer units to embed all the required 

engineer structure into 76 BCTs across the Army, we must 

have our units in a force pool so they can be task-organized 

when required. We worked hard to make most of our modular 

By Colonel James R. Rowan (Retired)

Publication of our capstone manual, FM 3-34, 

is imminent and will align our doctrine with 

FM 3-0, Full Spectrum Operations.
14 Engineer January-April 2009

forces very focused in their mission. We’ve heard comments 

from the field that people want more multifunctional modules. 

We are studying this, but would ask for the time being that we 

let the modular force get fielded first, and that we don’t make 

radical changes until we’ve had the chance to fully understand 

and assess the force across the full spectrum of operations—

not just stability operations—that we have designed. 

The Army has worked very hard to field the clearance 

companies. The challenge has been that almost all the clearance equipment has gone directly into the combat theaters to 

support operational needs statements. While this has delayed 

standing up the organizations, it has provided a needed capability in-theater, and we have learned a lot of valuable lessons 

with regard to route and area clearance. Based on our experience and comments from the field, we will adjust the clearance company structure in the near future.

We are standing up forward engineer support team– 

advanced (FEST–A) and forward engineer support team–

main (FEST–M) organizations across the Regiment. These 

are critical links to the United States Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) Field Force Engineer program and provide a tremendous technical capability to our formations. These teams 

have been outstanding in both War on Terrorism and civil support missions, and it’s a great accomplishment that they will 

now be formally recognized as part of our engineer structure 

and resourced with personnel and equipment.

We have recently gained support from TRADOC to have 

a geospatial warrant officer (215D) added to the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) and the infantry brigade combat 

team (IBCT), as well as the armored cavalry regiment (ACR). 

Previously, this only existed in the Stryker brigades, but due 

to the outstanding performance of these terrain experts, the 

Army has realized that we need this capability across the 

force. If this is approved by the Army, it will take a couple of 

years for us to grow enough 215Ds to fill all of these positions, 

but this is a big win for the Army. 

Although it isn’t final yet, 

we are optimistic that we will 

see engineers added into the 

future combat systems (FCS) 

brigade formation. Many of 

the traditional engineering 

problems were assumed away 

in hope of breakthrough technologies, but the reality of the 

FCS capabilities will require 

engineers to be organic to the 

future brigade combat team 

(FBCT). We have proposed a 

structure similar to the engineer formations in the HBCT, 

but with the addition of a gapcrossing capability that the 

HBCT does not have. Again, 

this is predecisional, but we 

are fully engaged in this effort and the engineering requirements are being addressed at the highest levels of the Army. 

(POC: Lieutenant Colonel Steve Danner at <Stephen.Danner@

us.army.mil>) 

Training

Under the new TRADOC Center of Excellence model, 

the Engineer School is postured to focus on training and leader development. We have processes to 

continually review all of our institutional courses to ensure 

that they are relevant and current. Based on FM 3.0 and feedback from the field, there are numerous topics we’d like to 

add to courses. The constraint is that TRADOC has mandated 

zero growth in course lengths while simultaneously adding 

more Army-directed training. We have been successful in 

gaining approval to run some pilot topics that will add 3 to 

5 days to officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer (NCO) courses. Key topics that have been or will be 

added to courses include contracting officer’s representative 

(COR), more in-depth project management, and joint engineer operations. Recent efforts to move toward less classroom 

lecture and more hands-on instruction include increased use 

of tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) and introduction of interactive simulations, such as DARWARS Ambush! 

(route clearance simulation); Think Like a Commander and 

Gator 6 (leadership simulations); and planned trial use of virtual training to include the “Virtual Route Clearance Trainer” 

and improvised explosive device defeat (IEDD) training via 

Dismounted Soldier. Additionally, more integrated training 

among captain and lieutenant courses and lieutenant and NCO 

courses is occurring. Slowly, the Engineer School is offering 

the ability of students to “test out” of selected training within 

courses in exchange for additional training and education in 

other pertinent subjects or deeper training and education within the validated curriculum. 

The Engineer School’s Directorate of Training and Leader 

Development continues to struggle in proper military manning 

Smith Hall, home of the Counter Explosive Hazards Center
January-April 2009 Engineer 15

of instructor and training developer positions. We do need 

help from our brigade commanders and command sergeants 

major to identify the best candidates to serve as our smallgroup leaders to teach and develop our leaders of tomorrow. 

The commandant is reviewing officer record briefs (ORBs) 

of potential small-group instructors for assignment to the Engineer School for spring/summer 2010. If you have a strong 

company commander with downrange experience projected 

to come out of command next spring/summer, please talk to 

that person and send me his or her name. These officers will 

be personally managed by the commandant and will be well 

taken care of. More important, this small group of officers will 

have a profound effect on the quality of our future Regiment. 

TRADOC is currently considering some major changes to 

the Captains Career Course. One of the goals is to increase 

and enhance the common training that all captains receive. 

Our concern is obviously that we cannot afford to reduce the 

branch-specific training and the technical engineering aspects 

of the curriculum as we implement the Building Great Engineers (BGE) Campaign Plan. (POC: Colonel Jerry Meyer at 

<Jerry.Meyer@us.army.mil>)

Probably our most relevant and cutting-edge ongoing 

training is at the Counter Explosive Hazards Center (CEHC). 

So far, we’ve trained more than 2,000 U.S. Soldiers, Marines, and coalition forces this year in the following courses: 

Route Reconnaissance and Clearance Operations–Operator, 

Leader, Sapper, and Maintainer; Counter Explosive Hazards– 

Planner; Intermediate Search Operations; Area Clearance; 

and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat–Train the Trainer. 

The outstanding job the CEHC team is doing was validated 

during the CAAT visit to Iraq in September and by the number 

of Soldiers who provided positive comments on the training 

and the equipment. CEHC continuously adapts the training 

it provides, and the training programs now focus on training 

teams rather than individual training. We are incorporating 

many search techniques into the training as well. Engineers 

across the Regiment should take great pride in the work they 

are doing to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and 

the work CEHC is doing to advance this effort. Over the past 

year, the international community has recognized that our 

U.S. engineers and the CEHC comprise the single most qualified organization to train Soldiers and leaders on route clearance operations. International military engineers are eager 

to receive this highly coveted training. Within the past few 

months, we trained engineers from Canada, Turkey, and Korea, as well as having an exchange with the Ukraine. Over the 

next few months, we will be training engineers from France, 

the United Kingdom, and Germany and will hold an exchange 

with the Dutch and Israelis. The CEHC has truly become a 

center with unique expertise found nowhere else in the world 

right now. We are currently updating the CEHC concept plan 

to institutionalize this training in TRADOC. (POC: Colonel 

Dave Theisen at <David-Theisen@us.army.mil>)

Materiel

Our materiel acquisitions and fieldings are getting the 

right equipment to our next deploying units and to 

the units in-theater to meet mission requirements. We 

continue to have challenges to field continental United States 

(CONUS) units the equipment and training assets they need 

prior to deployments. The acquisition community is working 

hard to meet these needs. The training base has acquired mini 

construction equipment to augment the fleet of hydraulic excavators (HYEX) and dozers, because the full-size equipment 

is needed for missions elsewhere. The first suite of 30 HYEX 

computer simulators has been installed at Fort Leonard Wood, 

with dozers, motor graders, scrapers, and loaders to follow. 

Our materiel team is tracking more than 100 systems, 

and the current commandant’s top 10 priority systems are as

MANSCEN will recommend to the VCSA that all military working dog handlers be placed in a single MOS.
16 Engineer January-April 2009

follows: Joint Assault Bridge (JAB), High-Mobility Engineer Excavator (HMEE), Medium Mine-Protected Vehicle 

(MMPV), Mine-Protected Clearance Vehicle (MPCV),

Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detector (VMMD), Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS), 2.5 cubic yard Loader, Special Construction Equipment, 4-5 cubic yard Loader, and the 

Ribbon Bridge Transporter. The review cycle for updating our 

“1 to n” lists will take place later this spring. (POC: Lieutenant Colonel Steven Wall at <Steven.Wall@us.army.mil>).

Leadership and Education

Our highest priority in the leadership area remains 

improving the tactical and technical skills of our officers, warrant officers, and NCOs. We’ve worked 

this hard for the past year and have made real progress on the 

Building Great Engineers Campaign Plan. I’m really pleased 

at the way we have been able to partner with the field and 

with the Society of American Military Engineers (SAME) to 

advance this critical program. Progress toward Building Great 

Engineers includes advancements in the following working 

group areas: Future Roles, Missions, and Methods of Delivery; 

Accessions; Training and Education; Employment; Retention; 

and Strategic Communications. Thanks to all the people in 

the field and thanks to SAME for leading and participating in 

these work groups. 

Be watching for changes in both officer and NCO education in the very near future. TRADOC is looking at a Captains Career Course redesign and really focusing on the common core tasks that all captains need to be trained on. Our 

challenge will be to ensure that we maintain or improve the 

amount of branch-specific technical training that our captains 

receive. The Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES) will also transform. NCOs will attend an Advanced 

Leader’s Course and a Senior Leader’s Course. These courses will basically cover the topics that are now taught in the 

Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC), the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), and the 

First Sergeant’s Course. (POC: 

Colonel Jerry Meyer at <Jerry.

Meyer@us.army.mil>)

Personnel

As most of you know, we 

have consolidated the 

military occupational 

specialties (MOSs) 21J, 21F, and 

21E into MOS 21E (commonly 

known as “Super Echo”). Training for this MOS is underway 

and going very well. 

We are also working on an 

overarching strategy for our military working dog handlers. We 

are working with MANSCEN, the United States Army Military Police School, and the United States Air Force (the executive agent for military working dogs) and have proposed 

a comprehensive solution to consolidate all dog handlers into 

a single MOS called 31K. This recommendation is just one of 

several that were the result of a Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 

(VCSA)-directed review of military working dogs. With a 

dedicated MOS, Soldiers will be able to serve as dog handlers 

throughout their career (rather than just for an assignment) and 

in a career in which they will handle several different types of 

military working dogs. New organizations and new equipment 

are also part of the study recommendations. There are many 

advantages to this, but some of our Soldiers are concerned that 

they might have to become military police if they want to continue to work with dogs. It’s too soon to know all the answers, 

but the plan is that engineers would not be moved out of an 

engineer MOS unless they requested to do so. Also, any solution will not change the relationship of engineers to mine dogs 

or special search dogs; these capabilities will remain available 

to the Regiment. Once we have an Army-approved decision, 

we will share the full details of this with the field.

The Engineer Personnel Proponency Office (EPPO) has 

been working with the geospatial, Department of the Army, 

and intelligence communities to have all 21Y (geospatial

engineer) positions coded for Top Secret clearance. If you 

have 21Ys in your units, go ahead and submit them for Top 

Secret clearances now.

We just recently staffed the update of Department of the 

Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional 

Development and Career Management, and the redefining of 

critical jobs for our engineer leaders. The old term of branch 

qualification has been replaced by the terms key and key 

development jobs. The new pamphlet also introduces the new 

term of developmental or broadening assignments, which 

will carry added emphasis and importance to our officer and 

Medium Mine-Protected Vehicle (MMPV)

(Continued on page 19)
January-April 2009 Engineer 17

The United States Army Engineer School, Directorate 

of Training and Leader Development (DOTLD) and 

Department of Instruction (DOI) are leaning hard into 

the flywheel. Here at the School, the DOTLD team is employing and empowering the right people to develop and deliver 

Building Great Engineers (BGE) initiatives. Recent actions 

include expanding the engineering body of knowledge with 

academia and partners using joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) training events; integrating 

gaming and technology into the classroom; and expanding 

leader development and education (LDE) initiatives that include degree program opportunities and joint engineer training partnerships with other Services. 

Body of Knowledge

DOI invited Dr. Brock Barry, who will soon be a faculty member of the United States Military Academy (USMA) and Professor in the Department of Mechanical and Civil Engineering, to the Engineer School in 

February 2009 for an in-depth orientation of the engineer 

enlisted training program. The briefings highlighted vertical, 

horizontal, general, and combat engineering at Brown Hall 

and the Million Dollar Hole training sites. Dr. Barry’s expertise in engineering education was turned toward assessing 

engineer officer education, covering the Basic Officer Leader 

Course (BOLC) III, the 210A Warrant Officer Basic Course 

(WOBC), and the Engineer Captains Career Course (ECCC). 

On the surface, this may not seem to have a high payoff for 

training and education, but when you consider that Dr. Barry 

is one of the country’s first doctors of philosophy in engineering education, this takes on a whole new meaning. He 

will serve as a direct link between USMA and the Engineer 

School in improving the cradle-to-grave education lifecycle 

of engineers. DOTLD is participating with USMA’s Master 

Teacher Certification program and looking for opportunities 

to partner with the USMA Engineering Department, starting 

with Dr. Barry speaking at the 2009 ENFORCE training and 

education workshop.

JIIM Training Events

We are seeking every opportunity to expand engineer officer curriculums into the JIIM context. Guest speakers from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID), and State Emergency 

Management Agency provide program overviews to ECCC 

students in their general engineering module. And recently, 

selected ECCC small group instructors (SGIs) and ECCC students were given the opportunity to attend the Joint Engineer 

Operations Course (JEOC).

Mr. Andrew Bell, military delegate of the ICRC, visited 

Fort Leonard Wood to address the 01-09 ECCC class on 

By Dr. Troy Messer
18 Engineer January-April 2009

24 February 2009. The subject was the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in conflict zones. He placed the ICRC 

in context with the thousands of other NGOs operating worldwide and further defined the mission, objectives, and activities 

in current conflict locations (such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 

Horn of Africa). His defining the role of ICRC, the American 

Red Cross, and Red Crescent Societies engendered a high level 

of interest and interaction from the students. 

The ECCC hosted Structural Assessment Visual Evaluation 

(SAVE) training on 12 February 2009 to increase technical 

competency and partner with academia (Missouri University 

of Science and Technology) and federal, state, and local governments. The training, sponsored by the Fort Leonard Wood 

Chapter, Society of American Military Engineers (SAME), 

brought the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency 

(SEMA) SAVE coalition to Fort Leonard Wood. The training taught 64 ECCC students, 2 ECCC cadre, a Directorate of 

Contracting employee from Fort Leonard Wood, and 6 state 

and local emergency management personnel in preparation 

for assessing building structures affected by earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, or natural disasters that cause structural damages for both domestic and theater applications. The student 

comments were best reflected in this one comment: “It was an 

awesome experience, and I can speak for many of my peers 

when I say that the information we’ve drawn from just this 

one event will pay huge dividends in our future deployments. 

The application to our work in Iraq and Afghanistan is obvious. Thanks so much!” All students were offered the opportunity to obtain certification along with their completion-oftraining certificate.

DOI is integrating as many curriculum advances as it can. 

Some of the advances include sending ECCC students and 

SGIs to JEOC and piloting contracting officer’s representative 

(COR) training and environmental training and education. Two 

ECCC SGIs and three students will have the opportunity to attend the JEOC hosted at Fort Leonard Wood on 13 – 17 April 

2009. The JEOC is just one training opportunity that ECCC 

and BOLC students can take advantage of if they test out of 

certain modules in general engineering and basic demolitions. 

The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC); Human Resources Command (HRC); and the 

Department of the Army Operations and Plans (G3), Civil Affairs (G5), and Information Operations Staff Officer (G7) approved DOI to pilot three days of COR training for the ECCC, 

Engineer BOLC, WOBC, 21H Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) and Advanced Noncommissioned 

Officer Course (ANCOC), and 21N BNCOC and ANCOC. 

The 20 hours include the minimum essential training requirement to become a COR according to the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) and TRADOC Regulation 5-14, Acquisition Management and Oversight, dated January 2009. DOI 

has trained a total of 328 students since June 2008 (86 BOLC, 

35 WOBC, 204 ECCC, 57 21H BNCOC and ANCOC, and 11 

21N ANCOC students) in the following subject areas (located 

at <http://www.atrrs.army.mil/channels/aitas>):

CLC 106 – Contracting Officer Representative With a

Mission Focus (minimum 8-hour requirement)

CLC 011 – Contracting for the Rest of Us 

CLM 024 – Contracting Overview 

CLM 003 – Ethics Training for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics (AT&L) Workforce

DOI and the Directorate of Environmental Integration 

(DEI), in response to surveys of 125 ECCC students and field 

commander comments, assessed environmental compliance 

in the curriculums. As a result of the assessment, DOI and DEI 

are partnering to gain approval for a pilot, three days of environmental training and education for the Engineer BOLC and 

four days for the ECCC and WOBC. In order for U.S. troops 

to be out of Iraq by 2012, Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) 

C7 (senior staff engineer in Iraq) indicates this training gap 

must be addressed. Current environmental understanding 

needed to support the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) 

process is inadequate. The pilots will address training and 

education in designing, building, and maintaining solid waste 

and wastewater systems and conducting environmental baseline surveys.

Gaming and Technology

Gaming and technology in the classroom are becoming the new enablers to overcome instructor personnel shortages and the constraint to grow engineer 

courses. DOI has implemented several new technology initiatives in the following BOLC areas: 

General Engineering Division – Use of the Turning Point 

Classroom Response System (CRS)

Combat Engineering Division – DARWARS Ambush!

and Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2)TM Route Clearance

Gaming Software

Officer Training Development Division (OTDD) – 

Implementing Gameshow Pro for classroom learning

DOTLD is also seeking funding for laptop computers in 

the classroom. The integration of these technologies will create challenging student-centered learning and collaboration. 

Current technology trends in civilian and military academia, 

such as USMA, Fort Knox Armor School Maneuver Captains 

Career Course, Armor BOLC, and Virginia Technical College 

of Engineering have all adopted the same or equal classroom 

technologies (to include laptops) as learning multipliers, a 

best practice by any standard.

Degree Program Opportunities

Currently the Engineer School participates with several 

universities with branches at Fort Leonard Wood to 

provide cooperative credit, master’s degree programs 

such as engineering management, civil engineering, geological engineering, and public and business administration.

■

■

■

■

■

■

■
January-April 2009 Engineer 19

From 1995 until the present, 427 students have graduated with 

a degree in engineering management, 319 in civil engineering, and 189 in geological engineering. Currently, 15 students 

are enrolled in a degree program in engineering management, 

1 in civil engineering, and 29 in geological engineering. While 

the opportunity is now only provided to ECCC graduates, Engineer School cadre and the Fort Leonard Wood Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Academy are forming an exploration 

committee to conduct a limited pilot of this program with 

NCOs and junior officers (BOLC, WOES, 21B BNCOC and 

ANCOC, 21H BNCOC and ANCOC, and 21N BNCOC and 

ANCOC graduates).

Joint Engineer Training Partnerships

DOI is actively collaborating with the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) to conduct a pilot exchange of program material and course seats. It has been discussed as an initial way ahead that two to five ECCC students 

each quarter could attend AFIT’s WMGT 585, Contingency 

Engineer Command Course, depending on AFIT course fill, 

and continue to discuss the possibility of seats in WMGT 570, 

Civil Engineer Superintendent Course, and WMGT 436, Operations Course, in order to gain a joint context between the two 

Service engineer schools. Additionally, DOI would provide 

Army engineer lesson(s) at a 101 level to various AFIT leader 

courses focusing on types of operations orders, fragmentary 

orders, and warning orders; mobility; countermobility; assured 

mobility; and counterinsurgency. This partnership would allow 

AFIT to attend video teleconferences (VTCs) to gain awareness of current Army engineer theater operation events through 

monthly and quarterly secure VTCs, such as Multinational Coalition Forces–Iraq, Fusion Cell, Worldwide Engineer VTC, 

and the Engineer Training Support Network (ETSN). 

Summary

DOI, in support of the Building Great Engineers Campaign Plan, is making deliberate and positive progress. We continue to engage in new initiatives such 

as the body of knowledge, technology in the classrooms, and 

JIIM partnerships. We encourage positive and negative constructive feedback from the field so that we can gauge our true 

progress. 

Dr. Messer is the technical director of the Department of 

Instruction, Directorate of Training and Leader Development, 

United States Army Engineer School. He retired from the 

Army in May 2001 as a sergeant first class after serving four 

stateside tours, three overseas tours, and one combat tour in 

Panama during Operation Just Cause. He is an Army Civilian 

Education System advance graduate.

warrant officer career tracks. The Regiment is now at a crossroads, and we need to decide whether to manage officers with 

a single career track as we do now or go back to some kind of 

multiple tracking system like the 21A, B, and D series we had 

several years ago. We will develop courses of action at the Engineer School and rely on feedback from the field in order to 

get this important decision right. (POCs: Lieutenant Colonel 

Keith Dupont at <keith.dupont@us.army.mil> and Colonel 

Joe Cepeda at <Jose.Cepeda@us.army.mil>)

Facilities

We are working a number of local issues here at the 

Engineer School (such as the Prime Power School 

move to Fort Leonard Wood and new facilities for 

training the JAB and the assault breacher vehicle (ABV), but 

most of these will be invisible to the field. The real emphasis 

here over the next few years will be getting our units aligned 

for training. The United States Army Forces Command 

(FORSCOM) engineers are managing this for the Army, but 

the ultimate goal is to get our units colocated with maneuver 

units whenever the opportunity exists. Also, in May-June of 

this year, the Engineer School headquarters will move into 

improved office space on the first floor and will have a dedicated Engineer School entrance.

Another aspect of facilities that I will highlight is the Basecamp Integrated Capabilities Development Team (ICDT) that 

is being conducted at the MANSCEN level. While we have 

a lot of experience and expertise on basecamps, there is still 

no overarching doctrine that covers construction, operation, 

and closing of basecamps. MANSCEN is working to gain this 

proponency and the resources required to execute this mission for the Army. (POC: Mr. Steve Orth at <Steven.Orth@

us.army.mil>)

Summary

As you can see from these highlights, this is an exciting time for the Regiment, and we have numerous actions underway that will shape the branch for many 

years to come. Feedback from the field is always appreciated. 

Please feel free to contact me or any of the points of contact 

previously listed if you are interested in knowing more details on these actions or if you have ideas to submit. Thanks 

in advance for your comments and thanks to the entire Regiment for the outstanding jobs that are being executed every 

day across the full spectrum of operations.

Colonel Rowan (Retired) is the Deputy Assistant Commandant, 

United States Army Engineer School. Previously, he served as 

the Assistant Technical Director for Military Engineering at 

the United States Army Engineer Research and Development 

Center (ERDC), Vicksburg, Mississippi. Other key duty positions 

include Commander, ERDC; Commander, 1st Engineer Brigade; 

Commander, 54th Engineer Battalion; and Commander, 16th 

Engineer Battalion. He has served in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

both as a military officer and a civilian. 

(“DOTMLPF,” continued from page 16)
20 Engineer January-April 2009

Over the last three to four years, our Engineer Regiment’s force structure reemerged in the form of the Future Engineer Force. This engineer force included 

a much larger ratio of combat capability to construction or 

technical capability than it did in the recent past. These units 

need leaders and Soldiers with more technical engineering 

skills and abilities, and the need for these skills and abilities 

goes beyond the more technically oriented units.

With the February 2008 revision of Field Manual (FM) 

3.0, Operations—and through personal experience, officially 

published lessons learned, and feedback from peers and superiors—there is a consensus that United States Army engineers 

at every level, from brigade combat team (BCT) platoon leaders to staff officers, need to improve their general engineering 

technical skills to better support full spectrum operations. In a 

nutshell, this is the central theme of the Building Great Engineers (BGE) Campaign Plan. 

How We Got Here

Whether they admit it or not, over the years many 

of our fellow engineer officers have had a maneuver fetish, real or impressed upon them by the 

maneuver-centric environment in which they found themselves. The focus on maneuver shaped the Engineer Regiment’s doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership 

and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) decisions 

and focus over the 15 to 20 years before 11 September 2001. 

The maneuver mentality was in direct response to the Army’s 

focus on training for direct combat versus a more holistic approach to warfare that emerged with the version of FM 3.0 

published in June 2001. 

The direct combat focus enabled and enhanced the Army’s 

ability to synchronize combat operations, which in turn facilitated successful (albeit limited) operations that culminated in 

the initial operational success in Iraq. Operation Desert Storm 

fits into this context due to the limited time frame and objectives of that action. Force-on-force operations during rotations 

at the United States Army combat training centers were the 

culminating point of combined arms training for BCTs. 

Similarly, direct engagement-focused computer simulation 

exercises at the division and corps levels almost never transitioned beyond the fight and barely touched on the next phase. 

In reality, the brigade, division, and corps exercises rarely incorporated the detailed planning and execution requirements 

of large-unit deployments and sustainment, or the enormous 

tasks associated with building the infrastructure that supports 

our forces. These exercises did little to prepare the Army for 

the realities of repairing a defeated nation—helping to provide 

essential services, security, economic recovery, or capacitybuilding. 

To maintain relevance in a direct combat-centric environment, engineers focused on the mission at hand—combined 

arms offensive and defensive operations. Critical training on 

general engineer skills and competency requirements were 

stripped away from all but construction units, and the construction units on active duty were reduced in number and size. The 

harsh reality was that these types of units just weren’t relevant 

to the majority of the training being conducted by BCTs, divisions, and corps. 

The importance of general engineering missions and unique 

contributions failed to fully register with the decision makers developing the Army’s future force structure. Engineer 

force structure continued to pay bills for a more maneuvercentric Army with the initial transformation to a more 

modular force. 

The Stryker BCT, in the form of the interim BCT in 2000 

and the initial modular BCT-centric designs that emerged in 

2003 and 2004, did not appear to recognize the unique contributions of the Engineer Regiment. The experiences of 

Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom 

validated the need for a more robust engineer force and a renewed requirement for general engineering skills to support 

the Army. 

The latest revision of FM 3.0 validates these requirements 

and suggests a requirement for additional modifications to the 

force structure that will enable the Engineer Regiment to support offensive, defensive, and stability operations or civil support operations equally. 

Skills Engineer Leaders Need

While the brief history lesson above is instructive 

on how the Engineer Regiment was formed, developed, and transformed—and is in the process 

of transforming again—the Army requires engineer leaders 

who are able to operate effectively within the engineer force 

and across the full spectrum of operations. In addition to 

well-honed tactical skills and acumen, engineers need unique 

engineer-specific skills to enable the overall success of the

operations. The listed tasks and skills are not inclusive, nor are 

they limited to a single area of full spectrum operations. 

Offensive and Defensive Operations

Analyze and/or shape terrain to maximize the effects of 

direct and indirect fires in support of a maneuver force or

to protect a designated area.

■

Officer Professional Development in a BGE World

Officer Professional Development in a BGE World

By Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Johnson
January-April 2009 Engineer 21

Analyze, plan, resource, build, maintain, and/or provide 

lanes in impediments to movement, to include lines of 

communication through natural and man-made terrain 

that enable movement in support of operations across the 

full spectrum of operations.

Know and understand maneuver doctrine and how 

engineers support offensive and defensive missions 

in urban and restricted terrain.

Know and understand Army and enemy mobility/ 

countermobility systems and capabilities and how to 

maximize their employment or counter their strengths. 

Know and understand the integration of fires, construction of survivability positions and the synchronization 

of effects.

Know and understand how to enhance mobility by 

synchronizing effects and/or providing a means to 

assured mobility in any environment.

Know, understand, and be able to execute bridge/gap 

reconnaissance and develop standard and nonstandard 

gap crossing and solutions.

Stability Operations or Civil Support Operations 

Design, resource, and build (or have built) force projection

structures and life support areas to support our own forces in 

an austere environment (stability operations or civil support operations).

Identify, design, resource, and build (or have built) projects

that promote economic development and/or restore essential services in a permissive and semipermissive 

environment.

Know and understand Army combatant command and 

Department of Defense standards and planning factors 

for force protection and life support requirements.

Know and understand how to develop statements of 

requirements (SOR), statements of work (SOW), and 

bills of material (BOM) and how to submit projects for

contracting, funding, and resourcing. 

Know and understand the quality assurance (QA)/ 

quality control (QC) process for construction and other 

engineer-related projects and how to perform as the

contracting officer’s representative (COR).

Have a basic knowledge of essential services and how 

the systems function and interact. 

A strong working knowledge of the stability operations and civil support operations skills listed above is 

a good basis for the emerging mission of capacitybuilding with civil authorities and local military forces. 

Engineer officers must know how to effectively use

translators and interpreters, have a basic understanding 

of the local culture, and know how to engage the media.

■

□

□

□

□

□

■

■

□

□

□

□

Developing, Training, and Enhancing Skills

The tasks and skills listed above provide a framework for 

developing a personal and professional education program to 

supplement both a junior officer’s college education and the 

United States Army Engineer School Professional Military 

Education (PME) program. While the content of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) III and Captains Career Course 

(CCC) PME is evolving to meet the demands of the field, the 

Engineer School has not evolved as an institution to the point 

where it can produce fully functional engineers capable of 

executing the wide variety of missions expected of our Engineer Regiment. However, the School continues to adapt. It 

recently added COR training and just completed its first pilot 

of Structural Assessment Visual Evaluation (SAVE) training 

on 12 February 2009.

Now more than ever, a well-thought-out officer professional development (OPD) program and an individual professional development program can significantly enhance the overall 

professionalism within the Engineer Regiment. Tuition assistance and the ability to coordinate/request training by contractors or through civilian institutions provide a wide range of 

potential training opportunities on technical topics. 

Additional resources and ideas for engineer skills training, 

although not inclusive, include the following:

Partnering With Installations

Installation Department of Public Works (DPW) troop 

construction programs were a major venue for project development and execution for many of our construction engineers. These projects can provide opportunities to train

both horizontal and vertical skills, estimating, and QA/QC 

procedures. 

Most DPWs own and operate the essential services—such 

as sewer, water, power transmission, gas, and fiber

optics—of the installation. With coordination, these systems can become training venues for engineer leaders, 

either through OPD or on-the-job training (OJT). 

DPWs execute or have oversight over many projects that 

fall short of the military construction, Army (MCA) 

threshold. These project sites make great venues for construction OPDs, site visits, and concepts/construction 

techniques teaching opportunities. 

If additional time is available, units could create internstyle relationships with DPWs that would provide OJT 

for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in

fields ranging from environmental engineering to civil engineering and from project management to project development (SOR, SOW, and BOM) in support of the range 

development process or other requirements.

Partnering With Local Governments and Government 

Agencies 

City, town, and county governments provide services to 

their citizens and provide a great venue for OPDs on basic 

■

■

■

■

■

(Continued on page 23)
There are several venues engineer Soldiers can take to 

obtain certifications and licenses and to get technicalrelated training. Funding is available now through the 

tuition assistance (TA) program and through the GI Bill. Units 

cannot use operations and maintenance funds for individual 

training and certification, but those funds can be used to 

pay for mission- or contingency-related technical training

for Soldiers. 

Programs

There are three programs—Army COOL (Credentialing 

Opportunities On-Line), DANTES (Defense Activity 

for Nontraditional Education Support), and AVOTEC 

(Army Vocational/Technical) Pilot Program—that provide information, training that leads to certification, and/or testing for 

Soldiers using TA and/or the GI Bill. The licenses available 

through these programs include engineer, construction, and 

technical certifications and licenses. Two of the three programs 

can be used to fund the Professional Engineer (PE) license 

exam.

Army COOL (<www.cool.army.mil/>) provides information and some training resources that can lead to technical 

credentials. This site focuses on enlisted Soldiers and directly 

ties unique credentials to specific military occupational 

specialties (MOSs). Many of these are relevant to engineer 

commissioned and warrant officers. For example, the 21Z 

MOS (combat engineer senior sergeant) links to the Certified 

Associate in Project Management (CAPM) and the Project 

Management Professional (PMP) credentials. Army COOL 

also points to training and funding sources such as TA,

22 Engineer January-April 2009

By Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Johnson

Show Me the 

Building Great

Engineers Money

eArmy U, and the GI Bill. PMP training and testing are available online now through eArmyU.

DANTES (<http://www.dantes.doded.mil/Dantes_web/

certification/Calendar.htm>) is a Department of Defense 

(DOD) program that lists multiple credentialing organizations 

and licenses that can be tested for, or administered through, 

Army and other Service education centers. Test costs may 

be covered by TA or the GI Bill and include certificates in 

building construction, construction materials testing, geotechnical, land management/water control, transportation, and 

underground utilities construction by the National Institute 

for Certification Engineering Technology. The Certified 

Professional Constructor certificate is from the American 

Institute of Constructors. 

AVOTEC (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/education/ 

index.html>) is a 2009 Army pilot program funded via 

TA for credential-producing programs and license and 

certification examinations. The pilot ends in September 

2009, and according to the website, Soldiers must be enrolled 

in a credential-producing program before that cutoff date. 

AVOTEC offers online and traditional education programs on 

a state-by-state basis. Right now there is an online program 

that leads to certification as a professional home inspector. 

Traditional certification and licensing programs offered by a 

local or state institution must be registered with AVOTEC for 

Soldiers to receive funding. There is an opportunity for each 

Army Vocational/Technical 

(AVOTEC) Pilot Program
January-April 2009 Engineer 23

installation to develop credential-producing relationships 

with local vocational institutes, community colleges, and other 

continuing education programs. Additionally, Soldiers can 

use the AVOTEC system to pay for certification and license 

examinations by accredited organizations.

TA is available for lifelong learning and continuing education courses in technical-related fields for all Soldiers. 

The GI Bill will pay for certification and licensing fees and 

renewals and approved courses leading to the same. Soldiers 

must be eligible to receive GI Bill benefits. The good news 

for non-prior service officers is that the GI Bill that kicks off 

in August 2009 is open to all Soldiers. According to the latest 

information from the United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs website, the new GI Bill will pay for one certification test. 

Another venue for technical-related training can be 

pursued via a unit’s operations and maintenance funds. These 

funds can be used to send Soldiers to approved courses such 

as the United States Army Corps of Engineers ProponentSponsored Engineer Corps Training (PROSPECT) program. 

Unit commanders can also establish Soldier technical skills 

training courses according to Army Regulation 350-1, 

Army Training and Leader Development, through the Army 

Education Center via a contractor, although Department of 

the Army approval may be required if a contractor is used. 

This type of training could be developed to contribute to 

the overall body of knowledge required to successfully pass 

a technical certification or license exam. This technical 

training could also be tailored as required for contingency 

missions. 

Summary

While the programs and resources described above 

aren’t comprehensive or well-known, they provide 

a funding source and venue for both technical 

training and certification for a large proportion of engineer 

Soldiers. As leaders, we need to know and understand these 

programs and encourage Soldiers to take advantage of them. 

Certification, licensing, and the associated training will 

significantly improve our overall technical competence and 

capabilities. 

Lieutenant Colonel Johnson is the United States Army 

Engineer School Chief of Staff. He commanded the 1-3 

Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 

3d Infantry Division, from 20 June 2006 to 17 June 2008.

services, essential services, emergency services, goverment processes, and a variety of construction projects.

The local United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

district can provide venues for OPDs and MCA/civilian

project site visits and intern-style arrangements. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States 

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 

American Red Cross, and other agencies and activities

may also provide unique opportunities and perspectives 

on essential services and other technical engineering issues.

Nongovernmental Agencies

Habitat for Humanity and other charitable organizations

routinely have ongoing construction projects where junior

leaders can volunteer and obtain direct construction 

experience.

USACE Proponent-Sponsored Engineer Corps Training 

(PROSPECT) Program

In addition to partnering with USACE, technical training is available through the USACE PROSPECT Program.

Course offerings can be found in the “Purple Book” catalog at <http://pdsc.usace.army.mil/ >. 

The Internet also provides an abundance of information on how power generation, water purification, water

■

■

■

■

■

(“Professional Development,” continued from page 21) treatment, road design, QA/QC procedures, and basic

horizontal and vertical skills can be brought to bear for 

OPD or even officer physical training events, to include 

scavenger hunts, junior officer-led OPDs, and questionand-answer sessions during all-hands events.

Conclusion

The technical training resources and opportunities available to units and individuals are vast. Time, of course, is always an issue, but our Soldiers must balance time 

available, time between deployments, and family time. It’s a 

challenge, but being able to successfully employ our engineer 

organizations is also a challenge. Instilling the Building Great 

Engineers ethos for learning our profession is fundamental to 

our success as engineers. 

Leaders throughout the Engineer Regiment must ensure 

that there is a culture of lifelong learning within our officer 

and NCO corps that promotes technical as well as tactical 

proficiency. Fostering a climate that encourages and promotes 

individual technical and construction-related excellence and 

discussion is central to developing the adaptive, innovative, 

and technically competent culture the BGE Campaign Plan 

envisions. 

Lieutenant Colonel Johnson is the United States Army Engineer School Chief of Staff. He commanded the 1-3 Brigade 

Special Troops Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, from 20 June 2006 to 17 June 2008.
By Command Sergeant Major Thomas H. Chambers (Retired)

24 Engineer January-April 2009

The Engineer Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) III 

has recently undergone several changes, so many officers in the field may be unaware of the specific types 

of skills and the actual depth of knowledge that graduates of 

the BOLC III program of instruction possess. This article outlines these changes as well as other proposed changes to the 

courses.

Why Change?

Anumber of factors have led to a change of the Engineer BOLC III program of instruction, to include 

the rewrite of Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Operations; the 

emergence of the Building Great Engineers Campaign Plan; 

lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan; and the need to remain relevant. In particular, the increase in technical skills required and the difficulties faced in the contemporary operating 

environment (COE) need to be incorporated into the course.

During a course review, the BOLC III team recommended 

changes that field commanders have requested, such as the 

following: 

Contracting 

DARWARS*

Supply Management 

Unit Maintenance Management

Environmental Integration

Project Management

Theater Construction Management System (TCMS)

*DARWARS Ambush! is a personal computer-based 

simulation that provides a flexible training environment for 

Soldiers to learn important lessons regarding both mounted 

and dismounted operations in conflict zones such as Iraq and 

Afghanistan.

Important Changes

Changes in the course’s subject material include greater 

emphasis on project management, contracting, TCMS, 

urban operations, counterinsurgency, information operations, and cultural awareness. General engineering instruction focuses on base camp design, project management, contracting, force protection, infrastructure reconnaissance, and 

field force engineering. The use of war games and simulation 

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

has increased, and students fight a battle on a combat simulation program and conduct simulated reconnaissance using the 

RG-31, Husky, and Buffalo simulators.

The recent changes in the course address the gaps in technical skills proficiency. Each leader will receive training on unit 

supply and unit maintenance operations required of platoon 

leaders. We have also incorporated aspects of the COE into 

every scenario, and students encounter a few of the most difficult realities faced daily in operations. Lessons learned from 

combat are rapidly included in training to ensure the relevance 

and currency of the subject matter.

In addition, the United States Army Engineer School has 

implemented a program to require BOLC III leaders to complete a 24-hour block of prerequisite training in response to 

comments and suggestions from units deployed to theater. The 

training program will require students to register and complete 

the following Defense Acquisition University (DAU) online 

training:

CLC 106 – Contracting Officer Representative With a 

Mission Focus

CLC 011 – Contracting for the Rest of Us 

CLM 024 – Contracting Overview 

CLM 003 – Ethics Training for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics (AT&L) Workforce

Each module is assigned an outcome that emphasizes the 

desired end state and provides instructional intent such as the 

following:

Leadership Fundamentals. Desired outcome: Students 

will demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of critical 

engineer training, leader functions, and administrative requirements of a successful platoon leader at the company level. 

Doctrine Foundations. Desired outcome: Students will 

demonstrate a thorough knowledge of engineer doctrine at the 

company level, including intellectual tools that Army leaders 

use to solve military problems. Students will also demonstrate 

a comprehensive understanding of tactics and procedures of 

the various primary tasks associated with the elements of 

FM 3-0 full spectrum operations.

Defensive Operations. Desired outcome: Students will 

demonstrate the ability to employ defensive operations at the 

company level according to FM 3-0 by integrating a thorough understanding of direct-fire planning, landmine warfare,

■

■

■

■

Engineer Officer Education 

Transformation
January-April 2009 Engineer 25

engagement area development, obstacle planning, and defensive planning to defeat an enemy attack, gain time,

economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for

offensive or stability operations.

Offensive Operations. Desired outcome: Students will 

demonstrate the ability to employ offensive operations at 

the company level by integrating a thorough understanding of demolitions, breaching, and offensive planning in 

order to capture the essence of the offensive in engineering

operations.

General Engineering Operations. Desired outcome: 

Students will demonstrate the ability to conduct general engineering operations at the company level according to FM 3-0 

by demonstrating a thorough understanding of civil support, 

restoring essential services, and protecting infrastructure and 

property according to FM 3-0 by identifying critical aspects 

of horizontal construction, vertical construction, and bridging

operations.

Stability Operations. Desired outcome: Students will

demonstrate the ability to employ engineer stability operations at the company level according to FM 3-0 by demonstrating a thorough understanding of counterinsurgency fundamentals and principles, stability operations, COE threats, 

explosive hazard recognition and management, improvised 

explosive device (IED) fundamentals, clearance operations,

route clearance planning, civil-military operations, negotiations, and search operations.

Field Training Exercise (FTX). Desired outcome: Students will demonstrate the ability to successfully conduct 

real-time engineer missions at the company level according to

FM 3-0 as platoon leaders in a field environment by integrating and reinforcing instruction with tactical mission sets.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article is to keep field commanders 

informed of the depth and breadth of knowledge that 

BOLC III graduates possess upon completion of the 

course. The BOLC III team is working to incorporate many 

of the suggestions received from the field into the BOLC III 

program of instruction. Suggestions, lessons learned, and 

feedback from the field are welcome to ensure that we are 

providing the Engineer Regiment with the best possible young 

leaders. Contact the course manager at DSN 581-1310 or by 

e-mail at <thomas.chambers1@us.army.mil>.

Command Sergeant Major Chambers (Retired) is the 

Engineer BOLC III Course Manager at Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri.

Engineer BOLC III Schedule (In Weeks)
26 Engineer January-April 2009

The joint engineer community continues to be the tip 

of the spear for engineering initiatives, and one of its 

greatest success stories is the Joint Engineer Operations Course (JEOC). This joint engineer opportunity prepares 

joint staff personnel to respond quickly and adapt effectively 

to the changing strategic environment. The JEOC is designed 

to ground students in the responsibilities of a staff officer assigned to the joint engineer staff section of a joint task force 

(JTF). The major focus of the course is to introduce students 

to joint doctrine, planning, and operations (specifically engineer operations), and the type of engineer staff positions and 

associated products engineers are required to develop. Educating and preparing our mid- to senior-level officers, warrant officers, and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 

for operational assignments in the joint environment, the 

JEOC operates on the prevailing principle that no engineer 

should perform a task without first having been educated and 

trained. This course—which was developed by engineers for 

engineers—brings together engineers (varying in ranks from 

E-6/7 to 0-6) from all five Services, government civilians, selected multinationals, and contractors to better prepare engineer operational planners to serve within joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environments. 

Not only will engineers use what they learn in the current 

operational environment, but they will also use it for future 

applications to meet the challenges faced by engineer forces 

of the 21st century. The need for the JEOC is based on guidance from the National Military Strategy, the Quadrennial 

Defense Review, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, as well as other 

sources. The joint engineer community has set its sights on 

developing engineers who are better prepared and who can 

engage and influence engineering factors within the JTF and 

its combatant commands’ areas of responsibility (AORs).

Course Description

The JEOC is a blended course consisting of both a distributed learning (dL) Phase and a Resident Phase designed for selected engineer officers, senior NCOs, 

warrant officers, and government civilians who may serve on 

a joint staff. 

Distributed Learning Phase

The JEOC dL Phase is open to all engineers for selfdevelopment in JTF engineer operations. Designed to be about 

48 hours, this no-obligation, self-paced, self-development 

course consists of current information in support of joint 

engineer operations. From across the Services, engineers from

combatant commands, government agencies, and contractors 

have participated in the development of this course and its 

resources. Students may elect to complete the JEOC dL Phase 

only, but the interaction and collaboration with students of 

other Services at the Resident Phase greatly contribute to the

success of JEOC. 

The dL Phase consists of eight modules with associated 

lessons that introduce the student to the following:

Formulating and Integrating United States National 

Security Strategy

Joint Operational Planning

Joint Engineer Service Capabilities: United States Army,

United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, United

States Air Force, United States Coast Guard

JTF Engineer Staff Operations and Planning

Theater Engineer Operations and Base Camp Planning

Joint Engineer Considerations and Relations with JIIM

■

■

■

■

■

■

By Mrs. Rachel M. King (formerly Rachel M. Walkenbach) and Mr. Dwayne E. Boeres

JEOC Dates and Locations

FY 2009 & FY 2010 (Tentative)

The Joint Engineer Operations Course now rotates to 

four locations each year, providing a course offering at the 

United States Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri; Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright 

Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Civil Engineer Corps 

Officers School (CECOS), Port Hueneme, California; and 

the Marine Corps University, Headquarters (HQ) Marine 

Corps, Quantico, Virginia.

3-7 August 2009

26-30 July 2010

Civil Engineer Corps Officer 

School 

Port Hueneme, California

5-9 October 2009

(TBD) October 2010

HQ, United States Marine 

Corps

Marine Corps University

Quantico, Virginia

13-17 April 2009

12-16 April 2010

Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri

United States Army 

Engineer School

15-19 June 2009

May 31-4 June 2010

Air Force Institute of 

Technology 

Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio
January-April 2009 Engineer 27

Theater Environmental Considerations

Resident Phase Preparation Module

Although there is no obligation for completing the dL 

Phase after enrollment, a dL course certificate (good for 

one year after completion) is a prerequisite for attending 

the Resident Phase. An Army Knowledge Online (AKO) or 

Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) account is required for

enrollment. 

The dL course enrollment is conducted through e-mail 

contact with the JEOC Service representatives. (See information at the end of this article.) The Service representative 

will direct you to the course administrator. For enrollment, 

you will need to request sponsorship for an AKO account or 

provide your AKO username information at the time of your 

request. The administrator will process your enrollment and 

provide information for access to the JEOC Blackboard site. 

The dL course is gated and graded and provides a completion 

certificate (Resident Phase requirement only). The JEOC is 

not yet an Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) integrated course, but course officials are in the 

process of obtaining United States Joint Forces Command 

joint certification. 

Resident Phase

The JEOC Resident Phase primarily consists of facilitatorled small-group discussions and associated practical exercises 

(PEs). Integrated throughout the course agenda are thirteen 

JTF engineer seminar discussions via video teleconference 

(VTC), guest speaker or panel discussions, and social networking activities with guests from specialized engineering 

fields. The thirteen seminars are aligned with PEs built around 

likely JTF scenarios. Students must demonstrate their knowledge and ability to apply joint Service engineer capabilities, 

common functions, and responsibilities of a JTF engineer staff 

officer or NCO in a simulated JTF engineer staff environment 

to develop a joint engineer solution. The small-group discussion topics and PEs are as follows: 

Service Engineer Capabilities

Engineer Support Plan

JTF Assignments, Functions, and Roles

Horizontal Staff Integration

Engineer Functions

Facilities Engineering and General Engineering

Outside-the-Wire JIIM Considerations

Resident Phase seminar briefing and discussion topics are 

as follows:

Combatant Command Engineer–AOR Briefing

Theater JTF Engineer Perspectives and Lessons Learned

Coalition Engineer Panel (A, B, C Countries)

JTF Engineer Observations and the Effects-Based 

Approach to Operations

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

Senior Engineer (Joint Staff J4) Theater and Joint Engineer Considerations

Sourcing and the Request-for-Forces (RFF) Process

Base Development and Planning

Environmental Considerations for the JTF Engineer

Senior Engineer Brief (Service Engineer Chief)

Engineer Support to JIIM Operations

Contractors on the Battlefield Panel Seminar and Dinner

Defense Support to Civil Authorities (United States Northern Command)

Enrollment in the Resident Phase of JEOC requires completion of the dL Phase of the course and a contact request 

to the Service representative or to the course administrator. 

Requests for Resident Phase attendance should be made 120 

days in advance. Because course quotas fill quickly, consider enrollment as early as possible; seats can be held up to a 

year in advance. Each course offering supports 60 students. 

Top priority goes to personnel assigned to a JTF, combatant 

command, or component command. Second priority goes to 

personnel with a high probability of being assigned to a joint 

billet. Third priority is for other personnel who would benefit 

from attending JEOC. 

Summary

The JEOC is a Joint Staff J4 initiative directed through 

the Joint Operational Engineer Board (JOEB), and the 

course and the course management team are hosted 

by the United States Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri. The joint engineer community is working to 

finalize the JEOC as a joint, permanently funded and established functional course by FY2010. This course has graduated 324 engineers from all five Services who are now better 

prepared for the evolution of the joint warfighter. 

Engineer staffs and planners are encouraged to enroll in the 

Joint Engineer Operations Course! This course provides sufficient grounding for students to understand the responsibilities 

of a staff officer assigned to the joint engineer staff section of 

a JTF. The major focus of the course is to introduce students to 

joint doctrine, planning and operations (specifically engineer 

operations), and the types of engineer staff positions and associated products engineers are required to develop. For information pertaining to enrollment, contact the course administrator, Mr. Dwayne Boeres, at the Engineer School’s Directorate 

of Training and Leader Development. He can be reached at 

<dwayne.boeres@us.army.mil> or (573) 563-7065.

Mrs. King is the JEOC Course Manager. She is a former 

Army officer and has worked the development and execution 

of the JEOC for five years. She is a contractor with C2 Technologies, Inc. 

Mr. Boeres is the JEOC Course Administrator. He retired 

from the Army Engineer Corps in 2006 and has served on the 

JEOC team for three years.

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■
28 Engineer January-April 2009

I

s the training at the Counter Explosive Hazards Center 

(CEHC), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, individual or 

collective training? Is it doctrine? Or is it tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)? These are questions repeatedly 

asked about the courses taught at the CEHC. Very much like 

the battlefields that our Soldiers fight on in the 21st century, the 

answer is not simple. That is even more true for a center that 

attempts to teach relevant contingency training that accurately 

reflects the contemporary operating environment 

(COE). This article will explain the current suite 

of route clearance courses taught by the CEHC 

and highlight some of the future initiatives that 

are in the pipeline.

Suite of Courses

Route clearance is a mounted operation 

carried out by Soldiers in a variety 

of heavily armored vehicles. Its main 

purpose is to patrol designated routes to give the 

area commander a high level of assurance that the 

route is safe for civilian and military vehicular 

traffic. On today’s battlefield, this translates to 

finding and clearing the route of obstacles—

including improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—

to enable assured mobility.

The Operator, Leader, and Sapper Courses 

form the suite of route clearance courses taught 

at the CEHC. Initially, these were taught as 

individual courses, with the onus on home 

stations and the collective training centers to carry out 

collective training and bring together the various capabilities. 

However, with a higher operational tempo and reduced dwell 

times, there isn’t time for commanders to follow the traditional 

cycle of training individually, then collectively, at platoon, 

company, and battalion levels. This caused the CEHC to 

examine its courses and make changes to assist commanders 

in the predeployment training of their Soldiers.

By Major Carl Coats and Mr. Larry D. Jackson

Advanced Route 

Clearance Courses:

Getting There

A Soldier prepares an explosive charge to place on a robot to blow an 

IED in place.
January-April 2009 Engineer 29

Analysis of information from both current operational 

theaters and a series of interviews with deployed and 

redeploying units revealed that the members of route 

clearance patrols, although individually well-trained, 

sometimes struggled to receive an appropriate amount of 

home station and collective training. This resulted in Soldiers 

who were competent in their own responsibilities, but 

struggled to understand the capabilities of the other members 

of the patrol. The decision was made to combine the three 

courses to allow cross-pollination of training. This combined 

training approach to route clearance is not collective training, 

but an introduction to the host of capabilities present at the 

patrol level. This is advantageous for the Soldiers, since they 

are introduced at an early stage to the capabilities of their 

battle buddies. It is crucial for commanders, since they get 

an opportunity to plan a route clearance patrol, issue orders, 

and “deploy” their Soldiers to carry out a mission as a

formed team.

Operator Course. This training is aimed at Soldiers in 

ranks from privates to sergeants and focuses on detecting, 

investigating, marking, reporting, and neutralizing explosive 

hazards using the Buffalo, Husky, and RG-31 Charger mineresistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. In order to gain 

an in-depth knowledge of how to operate and drive the Husky 

simultaneously, the Husky students are separated during the 

first week. The remaining students focus on the other two 

vehicles, learning to drive and operate the equipment to the 

required standard.

Leader Course. This training is aimed at Soldiers in the 

rank of sergeant first class to first lieutenant. It focuses on the 

planning and command and control (C2) of a patrol. Students 

Advance Route Clearance Team

Training the Force

Legend:

R2C2 - Route reconnaissance and clearance operations course
30 Engineer January-April 2009

learn to conduct a threat assessment of the battlefield; missionplanning, orders and rehearsals; and execution of realistic 

missions. 

Sapper Course. This course includes Soldiers in the ranks 

of specialist to first lieutenant. Students learn to operate the 

TALON® robot, allowing them to identify explosive hazards 

and understand the threat they pose. Their training then 

guides them through a series of questions that allows them to 

assess whether or not they can neutralize the hazard without 

requesting assistance. 

Each of the three courses lasts 80 hours over a two-week 

residential period at Fort Leonard Wood. During the first 

week, the three courses run simultaneously, but with a degree 

of separation. This allows students to concentrate on their 

particular responsibilities and become proficient in their own 

disciplines. The second week brings together the operators and 

leaders to allow commanders to plan and execute a mission 

with their own Soldiers. The Virtual Training Suite is also 

introduced during this period to let commanders and leaders 

practice their own platoon-level TTP and C2. The ability to 

rerun missions in the virtual environment gives commanders 

the opportunity to mission-rehearse their Soldiers until they 

all understand what to do in different circumstances. During 

this phase, Soldiers conduct “real” missions on the equipment, 

giving them an opportunity to hone their personal operator 

and driver skills, while simultaneously giving commanders a 

chance to plan and execute a mission with the Soldiers they 

will deploy with. The Sappers are then introduced, giving the 

route clearance patrol the ability to deal with explosive hazards 

with the vehicles and remotely, from a standoff distance, 

using robots. 

Possible Future Improvements

Combining these three courses allows commanders 

to improve predeployment training by giving their 

platoons an opportunity to practice individual and 

platoon-level skills in the training environment. The COE 

is ever-changing, with the enemy adapting daily to our TTP. 

Likewise, the CEHC has also adapted to attempt to close the 

gap between our training and the actions of our enemies. As 

such, the new training will not remain static. Plans are in 

the pipeline to introduce dog handlers to the courses to give 

commanders that extra ability to confirm or deny the presence 

of an explosive hazard. 

The need for an evidence collection capability to “fight 

the network” has also been highlighted, and the feasibility 

of introducing this to one of the courses is under study. The 

development of commanders and leaders cannot be ignored 

either. Today’s battlefield requires adaptive thinkers who are 

not merely trained in TTP, but who are educated. Commanders 

and leaders are required who think like the enemy, who remain 

unpredictable and who constantly change how they reflect the 

COE. These are all future aspirations to maintain constant 

upgrading so that courses at the CEHC remain relevant to our 

operational theaters. 

Major Coats was commissioned into the Royal Engineers 

from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1999. He 

commanded at Troop level in Northern Ireland and England 

before taking up the post of Regimental Intelligence Officer 

and subsequently a Squadron Second-in-Command post in 

Germany. Following two tours of Iraq, he was promoted to 

Major, attended the Intermediate Command and Staff College, 

then took up the post of Chief Future Plans at the Counter 

Explosive Hazards Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Mr. Jackson enlisted in the Georgia National Guard 

as a combat engineer in 1975. After completing his basic 

and advanced individual training at Fort Leonard Wood, 

he enlisted in the Regular Army. Over a 30-year career, he 

served in leadership positions ranging from team leader to 

command sergeant major. He now serves as Chief, Training 

Support Division at the Counter Explosive Hazards Center.

A Husky (front) 

and an RG-31 

set off on a route 

clearance patrol.
January-April 2009 Engineer 31

Warfighters and leaders across the United States 

Army often face the same challenge as they create 

and execute their directed mission-essential task 

list (DMETL) training. Once they receive orders for deployment, their interests quickly adjust to their future operating 

environment and the threats therein. The most common and 

lethal threat experienced on today’s battlefield is the improvised explosive device (IED). 

Of the 4,865 fallen warriors in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

and Operation Enduring Freedom,1

 3,8302 are a result of 

hostile action, and 2,350—or 61.4 percent—are the direct 

result of an IED.3 Thousands more have been wounded by 

the devices. These deadly IEDs consist of various types and 

configurations of explosives, munitions, triggers, and arming 

and firing methods. However, there is one constant element—

it took an enemy to design, finance, manufacture, transport, 

emplace, arm, and (sometimes) detonate an extremely lethal 

device against our fellow warriors. The purpose of this article 

is to furnish leaders and resource providers with a holistic and 

practical approach to prepare and train Soldiers and units for 

combat. Specifically, it is meant to provide a methodical approach along the three lines of operation laid out by the Joint 

IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO),4

 which calls for—

Defeating the device.

Attacking the network.

Training the force.

■

■

■

By Colonel Kenneth J. Crawford

IED defeat skills are important for Soldiers whether 

mounted or on foot.

Photo by Sergeant First Class Kap Kim
32 Engineer January-April 2009

Figure 1

Spheres of IEDD Enablers and Connectivity

Legend:

BCT - brigade combat team 

CTE - culminating training event 

MTT - military training team 

O/C - observer/controller 

TADSS - training aids, devices, 

simulators, and simulations 

TSP - training support package

The readily available and supporting Joint Center of Excellence at Fort Irwin, California, supports training warfighters 

by “validating and propagating IED defeat (IEDD) tactics, 

using [tactics,] techniques and procedures (TTP) and lessons 

learned from theater.”5 The primary outlet for this expertise is 

found in our combat training centers (CTCs), which provide 

units with a wealth of experience and resources in a hyperrealistic training environment. The challenge is providing this 

quality of training experience across the Army for all deploying forces at home and mobilization stations for all Regular 

Army and Reserve Component forces. 

Providing Quality Training

Asystematic approach to providing Soldiers and units 

with the quality of training they deserve is to harness the resources of our installations—facilities; 

ranges; training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations 

[TADSS]—and the expertise of specific organizations such 

as JIED-DO, the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), the 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command’s 

IEDD Integrated Capabilities Development Team, and Forces 

Command’s IEDD Integration Cells. These are used in a gated training strategy (GTS) similar to the one used to conduct 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle and tank gunnery tables. (See Figure 1 for the interrelated resource providers for home station 

training.) The solution isn’t simple and will require vigilance 

to maintain relevance as our tactical environments and enemy TTP change. Every unit leader’s intent is to develop and 

resource the training that will best prepare their Soldiers for 

what they may experience downrange. Rather than complicating resource requirements, the IEDD community must enable 

the chain of command, which has the ultimate responsibility 

(inherent within senior commanders’ training and readiness 

authority [TRA]) for preparing Soldiers and units for deployment. The cascading complexity of efficiently coordinating 

the resources for a senior commander requires a dedicated 

and focused effort to provide support to all units training at 

home station. Essentially, this is commanders’ business and 

commanders must have the ability to use resources to meet 

their common challenge, which is the absence of a standard, 

relevant, and current approach to training IEDD at the individual through collective levels.

Structuring and Planning the GTS

Structuring a way to overcome this challenge through 

live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) training to produce 

a CTC-like experience at home station lets leaders and 

units hone their skills, battle drills, and TTP before certification and deployment. In essence, the leaders and units will arrive at the CTC or their deployed destination with heightened 

levels of competency and ability. The GTS is not a catchall approach for training on all predeployment tasks, but focuses on 

IEDD and its supporting or interrelated tactical tasks. Given 

the high probability that IEDs will remain a weapon of choice 

for our enemies in future conflicts, our IEDD training must be 

adaptive, structured, and holistic. 

Soldiers are at risk of encountering IEDs while deployed, and 

their probability of encountering them depends on their unique 

operational environment. To effectively synchronize our IEDD 

GTS, we must prioritize the competing demands for resources 

and dovetail the hierarchy of training requirements with the 

training tasks in the four categories articulated in FORSCOM’s 

Southwest Asia (SWA) Training Guidance6

 in November 

2008—(see Figure 2, page 33). The GTS focuses the specific 

individual, leader, and collective IEDD training tasks (outlined 

in red boxes in Figure 2), builds upon each training experience, 

Multiple organizations across the 

Army and Joint communities enable 

quality training through resources, 

opportunities, capabilities, expertise, 

program development, and systems. 

Each of them focuses on providing 

units and Soldiers the expertise, 

skills, and knowledge to accomplish 

their missions in combat.
January-April 2009 Engineer 33Figure 2 Legend: BCT - brigade combat team CA - civil affairs CSH - combat support hospital DA - Department of the Army Det Ops- detainee operations GTMO - Guantanamo Bay HOA - Horn of Africa MTBI - mild traumatic brain injury OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom OIF - Operation Iraqi Freedom OPSEC - operations security PCC - precombat check PCI - precombat inspection PSYOP - psychological operations PTSD - post-traumatic stress disorder ROE - rules of engagement SAEDA - subversion and espionage directed against the Army SECFOR - security force UXO - unexploded ordnance Required Tasks by Deployment Category
34 Engineer January-April 2009

and culminates in the unit’s ability to systematically defeat the 

device and attack the network. 

The construct of the IEDD GTS takes into account the following considerations:

It must be scalable to meet the desired training objectives from platoon to brigade level. The strategy must 

have the ability to be tailored to a unit’s mission and experience level. Commanders must tailor the concept to fit 

current unit training levels, especially for a combatexperienced force; the start point for training may not always be the “crawl” stage. As units head into the next 

higher level’s training event, they must prepare accordingly. As units prepare for major combat operations gunnery, a crew is expected to execute specific tasks before 

operating as part of a section or platoon; platoons must 

master specific tasks before executing company-level operations; and companies and battalions must be able to 

effectively maneuver and mass firepower to support battalion- and brigade-level operations. The nesting of IEDD 

GTS is similar with the underlying objectives of defeating the device and maneuvering on and attacking 

the network.

The training, enemy and friendly TTP, available TADSS, 

terrain and environment, and systems employed must be 

relevant and current. We should train with the same systems and platforms Soldiers will operate downrange to 

reduce the initial risks associated with learning while being engaged. It is absolutely necessary to field our platforms and systems first to those in the fight. To train effectively on similar systems, we can create surrogates and 

mock-ups to achieve the desired effects until we field the 

actual systems at our home stations.

■

■

We must ensure that our doctrine and knowledge management remain relevant, current, dynamic, and adaptive 

to the changing threat abroad. JIEDDO provides outstanding references and resources for LVC training applications 

through the Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange 

(KnIFE). The primary purpose of KnIFE is “to exchange 

information, consolidate best practices, and respond to 

requests for information (RFIs) related to the asymmetric 

application of ... (TTP) by both enemy and friendly 

forces.”7 The KnIFE website provides leaders and units 

with a wealth of information to enable quality training. 

Keeping our doctrine current is a significant challenge. Our 

existing doctrine is a reference that we must expand into 

our digital knowledge management databases to allow the 

Army to remain current until the release of the next printed 

revision. The constantly changing conditions and operating environments mandate a requirement to have both a 

baseline printed reference and an individual, dynamic 

online database of information to maintain relevance for 

the warfighter’s training.

We must provide and resource the most realistic training 

for our Soldiers to immerse them in the environment they’ll 

operate in abroad. The structures, civilians, smells, and sounds 

experienced by individual Soldiers and units serve to help “inoculate” and prepare them to instinctively respond to conditions they might encounter while deployed.

IEDD “Gunnery”

The IEDD GTS is a holistic approach to training everything from individual Soldiers to brigade-size units to defeat the device and attack the network. The overarching intent is to ensure that units understand and can effectively analyze the complexity of the IEDD fight. The IEDD 

GTS provides this by creating gates 

where individuals and units must 

successfully accomplish specific 

training objectives to standard before moving to the next higher and 

more complex gate. The structure 

of the IEDD GTS includes tables 

similar to Bradley Fighting Vehicle and tank gunnery tables and is 

focused on specific unit levels (see 

Figure 3, page 35).

Gate 1 establishes a baseline to 

ensure that every individual, crew, 

and squad can successfully execute 

the common individual and leader 

training tasks. It also guarantees 

that they possess a common frame 

of reference based on FORSCOM 

training guidance, doctrine, unit 

standing operating procedures 

(SOPs), and current enemy and 

friendly TTP. KnIFE’s training 

■

The environments where IEDs are encountered range from rural to inner-city 

slums. Knowing local residents is just as important as knowing TTP and Army 

systems.

Photo by Sergeant First Class Kap Kim
January-April 2009 Engineer 35 IEDD Gated Training Strategy Concept (Live-Virtual-Constructive) Figure 3 Legend: BN - battalion CIT - capabilities integration team CO - company CP - command post EOD - explosive ordnance disposal EW - electronic warfare EWO - electronic warfare officer LTA - local training area MTT - military training teams RVS - reconfigurable vehicle simulator VBSVBSII - Virtual Battle Simulation/Virtual Battle Simulation II
resources can enhance unit capabilities when Soldiers attend 

courses, participate in distance learning, or apply the training support packages available for download. Similar to the 

gunnery skills tests, commanders certify that individuals and 

crews are ready to begin the LVC training tables outlined in 

the IEDD GTS before allowing crews to move into Table I 

(Crew Skills Virtual Training).

Table I

Table I includes Gate 2 and Gate 3, which build on previously gained experiences and knowledge. Unit training is 

applied and refined through virtual training with simulators 

and simulations to validate the TTP units will adopt in their 

SOPs for tactical operations. The focus of Table I is to ensure 

that crews can effectively perform individual and leader tasks 

in virtual terrain, provide proper contact reports, and successfully execute crew battle drills, such as rollover drills using 

the high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) 

egress assistance trainer (HEAT). Gate 2 is executed in generic virtual terrain and includes graduated skill levels. Once 

crews successfully meet the standards of performance, they 

pass into the second half of Table I (Gate 3), which provides 

a more complex and realistic training experience for the crew 

and unit. The simulated terrain replicates actual terrain they 

will encounter in Tables II to V. At this point, the scenario 

provides a comprehensive experience from the individual 

crew up to the battalion and brigade commander and staff 

levels. This takes advantage of the way units manage, report, 

synthesize, and analyze reports and information for future decisions and action. Every report from Table I to VI (collective 

proficiency) is meaningful, eventually leading to the ultimate 

objective of successfully “attacking the network” and ensuring a holistic training experience.

Tables II to V

Platoons normally serve as the lowest level called on to 

execute patrols in a combat environment. Thus, Tables II to 

V build to platoon-level proficiency in live scenarios with 

a crawl-walk-run approach. Crews, sections, and platoons 

execute their mission and focus on their ability to operate in 

a combat environment, defeat the effects of IEDs, and submit 

effective reports as staffs analyze the reports and build actionable intelligence for direct action. Platoon leaders execute 

one or more missions, similar to what they could experience 

while deployed. Missions might include—

Mounted or dismounted navigation.

Tactical questioning.

Reaction to contact.

Establishment of traffic control points.

Crowd control.

Detainee operations.

Other tasks, depending on training objectives selected 

from FORSCOM training guidance.

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

36 Engineer January-April 2009

“We must provide and resource the most 

realistic training for our Soldiers to 

immerse them in the environment they’ll 

operate in abroad ... and prepare them to 

instinctively respond to conditions they 

might encounter while deployed.”

As the sun sets over Baghdad, a Buffalo crewmember prepares for a night mission.

Photo by Colonel Kenneth J. Crawford
The crews, sections, and platoons encounter a hyperrealistic environment while responding to civilian role-players, enemy elements, urban structures, and other battlefield effects 

that replicate indirect and direct fire, IEDs, and homemade 

explosives. Once platoons meet the training standards of 

Table V (Gate 4) and the battalion or brigade establishes the 

IED network hierarchy and probable locations, the company 

gets orders to prepare to execute lethal operations. Since operations may be led by U.S., combined, or host nation forces, 

additional complexities and considerations may be included, 

based on the theater of operations, the established rules of 

engagement, or the status of forces agreement.

Table VI

Table VI (Gate 5 and Gate 6) focuses on companylevel planning, rehearsals, operations, and mission execution. 

Once all the platoons of a company successfully pass through 

Gate 4, the company receives its mission and begins troopleading procedures on their forward operating base. On order, 

the company executes a direct-action mission to destroy or 

defeat the network by a raid, a cordon-and-search operation, 

or destruction. Depending on the available training terrain, 

Table VI could culminate in a combined arms live-fire exercise (LFX) on a multipurpose range complex where battalion 

and brigades can integrate combat multiplier resources, such 

as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs), precision fires, 

or attack aviation.

As units approach their deployment date and ship their 

equipment, the availability and application of simulations helps 

them sustain their skill sets and capabilities. Gate 7 focuses on 

sustaining these skills and enables the training of Soldiers who 

arrive after a unit has finished its CTC rotation and shipped its 

equipment (normally 60 days before the unit’s scheduled latest arrival date). These same Soldiers reap the benefits of the 

unit’s training and quickly learn “what right looks like” as they 

study their unit’s TTP and SOPs before deployment.

Figure 3 lays out the IEDD GTS as it is being developed at 

Fort Hood, Texas. The intent is for all units to have access to 

world-class home-station IEDD training facilities that enable 

them to successfully accomplish the desired DMETL tasks 

and deploy with validated TTP and SOPs. Due to shortened 

dwell times and the fact that not every type of unit can deploy 

to a CTC, these resources and training strategy enable units 

to attain readiness more quickly at their home stations. Additionally, this training can be integrated as part of a battalion 

or brigade combat team’s gunnery scheme of maneuver with 

minimal effort and resource overhead. The commonality of 

training tasks and threat allows the Army to adopt the IEDD 

GTS concept and apply it across every installation for Regular Army and Reserve Component training.

The Desired Effect

The IEDD GTS allows units to build on realistic training scenarios to “defeat the device” as they execute missions and provide reports to battalion and brigade 

tactical operation centers in virtual and live environments. 

Staffs synthesize the information gained from the reports into 

actionable intelligence and build target decks, as well as develop and direct missions, and commanders decide how and 

when to “attack the network” as they will during deployment. 

The outcome—or desired training effect—is a unit that is 

fully trained to operate, adapt, and decisively act in an extremely lethal environment with positive results. Units will 

deploy well-trained, able to defeat the device, and able to 

successfully attack the network.

Colonel Crawford is the Assistant Chief of Staff G5 (Plans, 

Exercises, and Training) at III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. Earlier assignments include combat tours during Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Continue Hope 

in Somalia, and two deployments during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. He is a selectee for the Senior Service College as a 

Fellow at the University of Texas Institute of Advanced Technology. He holds a master’s in engineering management from 

the University of Missouri–Rolla (now Missouri University of 

Science and Technology).

Endnotes

1 Madonna Lebling, Magda Jean-Louis and Rena Kirsch, 

“Faces of the Fallen,” Washington Post, <http://projects.

washingtonpost.com/fallen/about/>, accessed on 21 February 2009.

2 “Global War on Terrorism, Casualties by Military Service Component—Active, Guard and Reserve,” October 7, 

2001 through February 14, 2009, Defense Manpower Data 

Center–Data, Analysis and Programs Division, <http:// 

siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/gwot_component.pdf>, accessed on 21 February 2009.

3 “Global War on Terrorism, by Reason,” October 7, 

2001 through January 31, 2009, Defense Manpower Data 

Center–Data, Analysis and Programs Division, <http:// 

siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/gwot_reason. 

pdf>, accessed on 21 February 2009. 

4 Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO), “Train the Force,” <https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/

CIEDTRAINING/CIEDTRAINHOME.ASPX>, accessed 21 

February 2009. 

5 JIEDDO, “Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE),” <https://

www.jieddo.dod.mil/CIEDTRAINING/CIEDTRAINHOME.

ASPX>, accessed 21 February 2009.

6 FORSCOM Training Guidance for Follow-on Forces 

Deploying ISO Southwest Asia (SWA), updated 11 February 

2009.

7 Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange mission 

statement, “The KnIFE Mission,” <https://knife.jfcom.mil/

Pages/KnIFEPublic.aspx>, accessed on 22 February 2009.

January-April 2009 Engineer 37
38 Engineer January-April 2009

During the past several months, U.S. and coalition 

forces have become increasingly focused on transition. Over time, as U.S. forces draw down in Iraq, 

the Iraqi Army (IA) will be required to expand its capabilities. 

For example, the No. 1 threat to both coalition and Iraqi forces 

continues to be the improvised explosive device (IED), which 

makes route clearance teams (RCTs) necessary. Since the current Iraqi Army modified table of organization and equipment 

(MTOE) only authorizes one engineer company for each division, and since a division’s operational environment typically 

covers 5,000 square kilometers in southern Iraq, more Iraqi 

RCTs will be needed to meet the threat. 

Recognizing the capability gap within the Iraqi formation, 

the 4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), 3d Infantry Division—along with Echo Company, 3-7 Infantry, and 

the 760th Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Company— 

developed Operation Lionclaw to build Iraqi route clearance 

capability in the 8th Iraqi Army Division by transforming 

Iraqi infantry platoons into RCTs at the brigade level. The 

operation was named after the symbol of the Babil Province, 

the Lion of Babylon, and Iron Claw, the name of many U.S. 

RCTs. Operation Lionclaw consisted of four critical pieces: 

manning, equipping, training, and partnering. It would be necessary to successfully complete each of these parts to reach 

the ultimate goal of independent Iraqi route clearance operations coordinated by the Iraqi brigade.

Manning

The mobility support gap in the Iraqi Army became 

evident after conducting operations for six months, but 

we knew we could not build their capability without 

buy-in from our Iraqi partners. The 4-3 BSTB leader engagement team, in conjunction with the 31st Iraqi Army military 

transition team, led the discussion with the commander of the 

31st Iraqi Army Brigade, who saw the importance of bringing route clearance capability to his brigade and assigned a 

platoon of Iraqi infantry forces from 2d Battalion, 31st Iraqi 

Army Brigade, to take the lead in Operation Lionclaw. Three 

more platoons followed—one each from the 1st, 3d, and 4th 

Battalions—and were to be handpicked by the battalion commanders of each respective battalion for this critical mission.

Equipping

Another key issue was determining the right equipment set for the Iraqi forces. The standard Iraqi Army route clearance vehicle is the Badger, a version of 

the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) Cougar. With 

only four of these vehicles available for each Iraqi division, 

we were forced to develop alternatives. An American route 

clearance patrol includes a detection element, an interrogation 

element, and a security element. In a U.S. patrol, the detection 

element includes the Husky mine detection vehicle and the 

RG-31 MK III with self-protection adaptive roller kit (SPARK). 

By Captain Andrew P. Sanders, Major Marvin L. Griffin, 

and First Lieutenant Eric R. Gentzel
January-April 2009 Engineer 39

The Buffalo mine-protected clearance vehicle conducts interrogation, and the RG-31—or MRAPtype vehicles—provide security (see Figure 1). 

For the Iraqi Army, we would have to improvise. 

The initial plan was to use the Polish-built DZIK 

armored car as the platform for both the detection 

and interrogation by mounting a blower for detection and a ferret arm for interrogation. We would 

round out the patrol with an RG-31 with SPARK 

for detection and an Iraqi M1114 for security. 

After an initial engineering and mechanical 

assessment, we determined that the DZIK would 

work to mount the blower, and we would mount 

the ferret arm on the mine roller mount, which 

our maintenance team designed and fabricated. 

Once the fabrication was complete, our initial 

equipment set was complete. The set included 

the RG-31 with SPARK, RG-31 with ferret arm, 

and the DZIK or M1114. We were now ready to 

train the Iraqi Army.

Training

The Lionclaw Academy at Forward Operating Base (FOB) 

Kalsu served as a 14-day cornerstone training event for the 

program, where Iraqi forces were trained on critical tasks 

that would allow them to operate with their U.S. counterparts. A 

U.S. route clearance platoon leader, enlisted squad leaders, and 

EOD Soldiers served as cadre. The first week consisted mostly of 

classroom instruction, in which the students were trained in areas 

of vehicle maintenance, vehicle recovery, patrolling, and mission 

briefings. An average day consisted of a classroom portion in 

the morning, followed by practical exercises in the afternoon. 

During the second week of training, the students conducted “mock 

patrols” on a situational training 

exercise (STX) lane on the FOB. 

With help from the EOD Soldiers, 

the cadre set up inert IEDs and initiation systems common to our operating environment. The students 

drove the vehicles and operated the 

equipment themselves, looking for 

the suspected IEDs. This phase applied the crawl-walk-run method, 

with coalition forces assisting in 

the beginning, and ended with the 

Iraqi platoon conducting a certification STX patrol. Language was a 

challenge to the training, but with 

numerous translators assisting, it 

became easier each day. In addition, the cadre improved their Arabic language skills, enabling them 

to interact more comfortably with 

the students. 

Partnering

After the first Lionclaw platoon completed the initial

14-day training, we were ready to begin the partnership. Prior to Operation Lionclaw, other coalition units 

had conducted route clearance training with Iraqis in Baghdad 

and elsewhere. We took it a step further, including an aggressive partnership program with U.S. route clearance platoons. 

We were able to draw on other units’ experience and programs 

of instruction as we developed the Lionclaw Academy, but 

partnership was uncharted territory. The first part of the partnership cycle had the U.S. platoon in the lead and included a 

leadership ride-along, rehearsals, and integrated patrols with 

Figure 1

U.S. Route Clearance Team Formation

Iraqi Route Clearance Team Formation

Iraqi Soldiers conduct a mock patrol in an RG-31 MK III with SPARK.
out with lower threat areas along multilane roads 

to allow the Iraqi Army to continue learning in a 

live environment. On these patrols, the Iraqi element conducted interrogation of suspected IEDs 

and served as part of the cordon during interrogation. After each mission, we conducted a combined AAR to glean the lessons for the day’s operation and fine-tune command and control of the 

formation. After a week of combined patrolling by 

section, the conditions were set for the Iraqi Army 

to take the lead in partnership.

Iraqi-led patrolling began with rehearsals to refine TTPs and adjust the patrol to the new formation with the Iraqi platoon in the lead. With their 

proficiency proven in previous combined patrols, 

only one day of rehearsals was necessary. After final refinements and communications were set up, the patrols 

were ready to execute. As before, the patrols started off on 

a multilane highway with limited traffic, which allowed the 

Iraqis to navigate easily and focus more on the basics of route 

40 Engineer January-April 2009

the U.S. platoon (see Figure 2). The second part of the partnership cycle put the Iraqi Army in the lead and included rehearsals and combined patrols with the Iraqi platoon in the lead (see 

Figure 3). One of the U.S. route clearance platoons was designated the “partnership platoon” so that the operations were consistent and the platoon leadership could develop the personal relationship that 

is so critical to success in the Arab culture. The 

partnership expanded to include all platoons in 

the company as additional Iraqi platoons completed the Lionclaw Academy. 

On the first day of the partnership, the Iraqi 

platoon leader and platoon sergeant conducted 

a ride-along with the U.S. platoon leader and 

platoon sergeant in a standard route clearance 

patrol. After the ride-along, we began work with 

the rest of the platoon. Some initial challenges 

were developing command and control tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTP) and combined battle drills. To meet these challenges, 

we broke the platoon into two sections, with 

each section conducting two days of instruction 

on battle drills and mounted rehearsals on the 

FOB. During the rehearsal days, the U.S. and 

Iraqi Army chains of command worked out the 

details of communications between the vehicles. 

Battle drills trained and rehearsed included IED 

found, IED interrogation, IED detonation, medical evacuation, and vehicle recovery. Iraqi forces were integrated into the security plan and all 

aspects of the battle drills. 

After the rehearsals were completed on 

the FOB, the combined patrol was certified to 

conduct operations off the FOB. Each section 

conducted three days of combined patrols. The 

daily schedule included a combined intelligence 

update, rock drills, patrol briefing, the actual

patrol, an after-action review (AAR), and lunch 

with the U.S. platoon at the mess hall. We started 

Figure 2

Partnership: U.S. in Lead

Partnership: Iraqi Army in Lead

Figure 3

Iraqi Soldiers train on critical maintenance tasks.
clearance rather than being concerned with civilian traffic in built-up areas. The Iraqi platoon 

leader was partnered with the U.S. platoon leader and rode in his vehicle. From here, the Iraqi 

platoon leader was able to both command and 

control his formation and coordinate with the 

U.S. patrol via the interpreter over the vehicle’s 

internal AN/VIC-3 communications system. 

The Iraqi patrol’s frequency was loaded on the 

second radio set, so the Iraqi platoon leader was 

able to use the AN/VIC-3 for both internal and 

external communications. This setup streamlined command and control of the patrol and 

allowed direct contact between the two patrol 

leaders. 

The platoons conducted five days of combined 

patrols with the Iraqi Army in the lead. These 

patrols progressed from relatively simple routes on a multilane 

highway to more difficult terrain. The “capstone” patrol was 

an Iraqi-led patrol through the congested towns of Haswah and 

Iskandariyah. The Iraqi Army’s navigation and command and 

control skills were put to the test as they maneuvered through 

the challenging urban terrain. 

Conclusion

Operation Lionclaw has been successful in building 

Iraqi Army capability, enabling combined operations 

and building the relationship between the Iraqi and 

the U.S. Armies. However, the Iraqi platoons cannot conduct 

independent operations until they are properly equipped. The 

ultimate goal for equipping would be one RG-31 MK III with 

the ferret arm, one with the SPARK, and one Iraqi DZIK or 

M1114 as a security vehicle (see Figure 4). The current challenge is that the RG-31 MK IIIs are still U.S. Army property 

and cannot be transferred to the Iraqi Army for independent 

January-April 2009 Engineer 41

use. Until the equipment can be transferred, or the Iraqi Ministry of Defense buys more sets of route clearance equipment, 

route clearance at the Iraqi Army battalion and brigade levels 

will be limited to combined patrols with U.S. platoons. 

Captain Sanders is the commander of Echo Company, 

3-7 Infantry, deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Previous assignments include sapper platoon leader, construction support platoon leader, and company executive officer with 

the 14th Engineer Battalion; assistant training and operations 

officer (S3) for reconstruction and assistant S3 plans with the 4th 

BSTB, 3d Infantry Division. He holds a bachelor’s in civil engineering from the United States Military Academy and is an intern 

engineer in the state of New York. He is a graduate of the Sapper 

Leader Course and Airborne School. 

Major Griffin is the executive officer of the 4th BSTB, 3d Infantry Division. Previous assignments include platoon leader, 

company executive officer, and assistant S3 with the 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); assistant 

S3 and company commander with the 40th Engineer 

Battalion, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division; and instructor/assistant professor in the Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering at the 

United States Military Academy. He holds a bachelor’s 

from the United States Military Academy and a master’s 

in civil engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology and is a licensed professional engineer in the state 

of Missouri. He is a graduate of the Engineer Officer 

Advanced Course; Combined Arms Services and Staff 

School; Command and General Staff College; and Airborne, Air Assault, and Ranger Schools.

First Lieutenant Gentzel is the lead advisor/officer 

in charge for the Lionclaw Academy and is the support 

platoon leader in HHC, 4-3 BSTB, conducting EOD 

security missions in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As platoon leader for E/3-7 Infantry Battalion, he 

conducted route clearance operations in and around 

the Babil Province of Iraq from November 2007 to May 

2008. Commissioned from the Officer Candidate School 

at Fort Benning, Georgia, he holds a bachelor’s in telecommunications management from Ohio University. 

Figure 4

Iraqi Army Independent Operations

U.S. Soldiers lead a combined patrol brief.
42 Engineer January-April 2009

On today’s resource-constrained, high-turnover, asymmetric battlefield, assessing the threats and developing appropriate courses of action can present leaders 

with complex choices requiring analysis of second- and thirdorder effects. In a legacy battlefield like that in Afghanistan, 

threat analysis can become complicated due to the presence 

of explosive hazard remnants from decades of conflict. To 

synchronize the combat power and resources dedicated to 

reducing those hazards, a common operating picture is needed. 

The explosive hazards coordination cell (EHCC) helps develop 

the common operating picture and provides informational or 

situational understanding on explosive hazards to coalition 

forces to minimize coalition and civilian casualties. 

New Type of Engineer Organization

The first EHCC to be deployed to Afghanistan in support 

of Operation Enduring Freedom was the 766th EHCC, 

Illinois Army National Guard. Its mission was to 

provide situational awareness on explosive hazards to coalition 

The 766th 

Explosive Hazards 

Coordination Cell 

Leads the Way 

Into Afghanistan

By First Lieutenant Matthew D. Brady

 Terrain such as this narrow pass in Afghanistan can limit the mobility of route clearance packages.
January-April 2009 Engineer 43

forces, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 

and nongovernmental organizations to support stability 

operations in Afghanistan. The cell’s Soldiers provided trend 

and pattern analysis, focusing on elements directly involved 

in the removal or reduction of explosive hazards. In addition, 

they observed, collected, wrote, published, and distributed 

route clearance information. 

The EHCC is a new type of engineer organization that 

was first employed during Operation Iraqi Freedom. At 

its beginning in spring 2003, the EHCC was known as the 

Mine and Explosive Ordnance Information Coordination Cell 

(MEOICC). In its early days, it merged portions of a Mine 

Information Coordination Cell (MICC)—which tracked 

explosive hazards to coordinate safe military movement 

in mined areas and supported force protection through 

hazard awareness training—and a National Mine Action 

Authority (NMAA), which coordinates Mine Action Center 

(MAC) operations in regions where humanitarian demining 

operations are active. Since fall 2005, the organization has 

been known as the EHCC, and to date there have been four 

so-named rotations through Iraq. The EHCC in Afghanistan 

was first employed in spring 2008. In the past, EHCCs had 

been formed from elements of engineer battalion headquarters 

support companies. Doctrinal EHCCs began to be stood up in 

2008 and will continue into 2011.

766th EHCC Partners

The 766th EHCC partnered with many organizations 

during its mission in Afghanistan. As an organic part 

of Combined Task Force (CTF) Castle, the EHCC 

supported Task Force (TF) Workhorse (Route Clearance) 

and TF Hammer (Construction) by providing them with 

explosive hazards awareness. Along with components of 

CTF Castle, the EHCC collaborated with the Combined 

Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE); BuckEye, 

an airborne high-resolution geospatial collection system; 

Joint Task Force (JTF) Paladin, the counter improvised 

explosive device (C-IED) task force for Afghanistan; the 

MAC; and the Counter Explosive Hazards Center (CEHC) 

at the United States Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri. 

Many roads in Afghanistan are simply cut into the side of a mountain and may not bear the weight of heavy route 

clearance vehicles.
January-April 2009 44 Engineer

TF Workhorse

Everything the EHCC produced was primarily focused 

on supporting TF Workhorse, which had the route 

clearance mission for Regional Command–East and 

portions of Regional Command–South. TF Workhorse led 

the way on route clearance operations all across Regional 

Command–East and proved to be a dominant player in the 

IED fight, involved in more than one-third of all IED events 

in its area. It excelled in adapting quickly to the ever-changing 

threat presented by the IED fight. Not only did the Soldiers 

incorporate the new technologies that were constantly offered 

to them, they came up with innovative ways to push their 

equipment to the limit—and sometimes beyond the original 

design concept. 

Combined Information Data Network 

Exchange

The EHCC collaborated with CIDNE to improve the 

quality of reporting and helped to educate people on the 

importance of timely, accurate reporting. CIDNE is the 

database of record and provides users with the tools to support 

the diverse and complex processes contributing to the mission 

of coalition forces. It provides an information bridge between 

various communities which, while working the same problem 

sets from different perspectives, might not otherwise be able 

to share data. The Web-enabled Temporal Analysis System 

(WebTAS) is a flexible suite of generic analytical tools that 

allows organizations to quickly fuse, visualize, and interpret 

disparate sources of information, including databases, data 

streams, and other structured information. WebTAS is designed 

to help users uncover trends, patterns, and relationships in their 

data by providing a number of visualization options. Using 

WebTAS to mine the CIDNE database, the EHCC was able to 

obtain real-time data on explosive hazard events throughout 

the theater. This enabled them to create accurate and up-todate explosive hazard overlays for analysis at both the tactical 

and operational levels. 

BuckEye System Imagery

The EHCC worked with the BuckEye System to 

provide high-resolution geospatial data coupled with 

explosive hazard activity overlays so that Soldiers at 

the tactical level could have better situational awareness of 

explosive hazard activity in their area of operations. In 2006, 

the BuckEye System was deployed to Afghanistan to conduct 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in 

support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The BuckEye 

System’s digital color camera was combined with sensor 

data to collect high-resolution, high-accuracy elevation data. 

The EHCC used ArcGIS,TM a geospatial analysis program, to 

fuse the imagery and elevation data, pulled from the CIDNE 

database using WebTAS, to create a tailored operational 

picture. This was then used to create Portable Document 

Format (PDF) files that were small enough to be distributed in 

locations with limited or restricted bandwidth.

JTF Paladin Liaison Officer

The EHCC embedded a liaison officer with JTF Paladin

to facilitate communications among EHCC, CTF

Castle, TF Workhorse, Combined Joint Task Force 101, 

and ISAF soldiers employed in the C-IED fight. The liaison 

officer brought extensive knowledge of route clearance operations and the ability to navigate through both the CTF Castle

and JTF Paladin organizations. This let the liaison officer

distribute critical information to U.S. and coalition forces.

He established an enhanced working relationship between

TF Workhorse, the EHCC, and the JTF Paladin operations research/systems analysis section, science and 

technology advisors, C-IED Operations Integration Center, 

and Asymmetric Warfare Group. He also assisted the United 

States Army Materiel Command by helping coordinate the 

distribution of several C-IED technologies and initiatives. 

The liaison officer was able to engage members of ISAF 

from Regional Commands–East, –West, –North, –South, and 

–Capital to educate and inform them on what route clearance 

equipment is in operation by U.S. forces and how the ISAF 

can use this equipment to perform route clearance missions in 

their respective areas of operations. Polish, Italian, German, 

British, Canadian, and French soldiers were all aided by the 

liaison officer’s knowledge of route clearance equipment and 

operations. 

Mine Action Center

The EHCC worked with the MAC to coordinate minefield activity near coalition forces. The MAC for 

Afghanistan coordinates mine action activities in the 

country and operates under the auspices of the Relief, Recovery 

and Reconstruction Pillar of the United Nations Assistance 

Mission to Afghanistan. It is a program of the United Nations 

Mine Action Service, implemented by the United Nations 

Office for Project Services. Members of the EHCC staff were 

also integrated into the MAC itself. They provided geospatial 

map-making support to document the location of mine areas all 

across Afghanistan. They also participated in the supervision 

and quality assurance of the humanitarian demining efforts 

throughout the Afghanistan theater of operations.

Counter Explosive Hazards Center

The CEHC is the primary training source that the EHCCs 

use to track and analyze explosive hazards. The CEHC 

mission is to preserve the fighting force by—

“...assessing the threats and developing 

appropriate courses of action can 

present leaders with complex choices...”
January-April 2009 Engineer 45

Providing explosive hazard training to deploying forces.

Helping to identify and field viable countermeasures

solutions and technologies.

Developing the intellectual and situational superiority of

combat units.

The Center provides predeployment training to all units 

assigned the EHCC mission. During its deployment, the 

766th EHCC maintained contact with the CEHC and worked 

with it to continue to refine doctrinal concepts for both route 

clearance operations and the EHCC itself. 

Mobile Observation Team

The EHCC also employed a mobile observation team 

(MOT), which conducted ride-along missions with 

the route clearance packages (RCPs) as specialized 

observers to collect and document the best practices being 

used by RCPs and to help distribute those tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (TTP) across the theater. As the team members 

moved from one area to another, they brought with them 

experiences gathered from route clearance missions with 

other RCPs. This mobility gave them a broader perspective 

on the C-IED fight than the typical RCP would have. In turn, 

this allowed the team members to recognize IED threats as 

they migrated into the areas of operation of different RCPs. 

As these threats spread across the theater, they could appear to 

be new techniques when encountered by an RCP for the first 

time, though the technique could be common in other parts 

of the theater. When the team members passed through, they 

helped RCPs counter the new threat by relaying experiences 

gathered from conducting missions with other units that had 

encountered the threat before. This allowed RCPs to discover 

how neighboring units were operating and learn from their 

collective experiences. Ultimately, this led TF Workhorse to 

■

■

■

create a strike after-action review to cross-level TTP after 

each significant activity.

Route Clearance Handbook 

The MOT spent most of its time learning from TF 

Workhorse and bringing those route clearance 

concepts back to the EHCC for greater distribution. 

The team’s mission culminated in the publication of a route 

clearance handbook, specific to Operation Enduring Freedom, 

documenting the successes of TF Workhorse and other RCPs 

operating in-theater. With the help of the Center for Army 

Lessons Learned, the EHCC will publish this handbook for 

widest distribution. 

First Lieutenant Brady is scheduled to take command of the 

631st Engineer Support Company, 766th Engineer Battalion. 

Previously an enlisted Soldier, he has served more than 6 years 

in the Army National Guard. He is a graduate of the Engineer 

Officer Basic Course and holds a bachelor’s in civil engineering 

and a master’s in structural engineering from the University of 

Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He also holds a professional 

engineering license. 

Note. The 766th EHCC was formed out of the Headquarters 

Support Company, 766th Engineer Battalion, Illinois Army 

National Guard. The EHCC worked closely with the route 

clearance battalion from TF Workhorse, which was formed 

from components of the 201st and 206th Engineer Battalions, 

Kentucky Army National Guard, and the 927th Sapper 

Company, Louisiana Army National Guard. TF Hammer 

was formed out of the 62d Engineer Battalion, United States 

Army, Fort Hood, Texas. The EHCC, TF Workhorse, and TF 

Hammer operated under the command of the Engineer Brigade, 

CTF Castle, which was formed out of the Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 420th Engineer Brigade, United 

States Army Reserve. 

Dedication

The following members of the Engineer Regiment have been lost in the War on Terrorism since the last issue of Engineer.

We dedicate this issue to them.

Connelly, Corporal Brian M. 40th Engineer Battalion, 2d Brigade Combat Team Baumholder, Germany

Cotting, Private First Class Grant A. 5th Engineer Battalion, 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 

Diamond, Staff Sergeant Sean D. 14th Engineer Battalion, 555th Engineer Brigade Fort Lewis, Washington

Sam, Staff Sergeant Solomon T. 84th Engineer Battalion, 130th Engineer Brigade Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

Savage, Sergeant John J. 94th Engineer Battalion, 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Turner, Private First Class Ricky L. 3d Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 3d Brigade Combat Team Fort Bragg, North Carolina
46 Engineer January-April 2009

This article provides an update on emerging changes 

in geospatial engineering and battle command that 

better enable current and future warfighters in situational understanding and decisionmaking. To this end, the 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager–Geospatial (TCM–Geospatial) 

completed the Army Geospatial Enterprise functional solutions analysis (FSA) in August 2007. Since then, the TCM–

Geospatial and the United States Army Maneuver Support 

Center (MANSCEN), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, have 

been working with the Army Staff and the United States 

Army Geospatial Center (AGC) (formerly the Topographic 

Engineering Center) to implement recommended solutions. 

The geospatial enterprise FSA addresses a number of initiatives, one of which deals with organizational changes at the 

Department of the Army (DA) level to achieve governance 

across the Army. While the Chief of Engineers continues to 

serve as the Topographer of the Army, the Director of the 

AGC has been designated as the Deputy Topographer of the 

Army and the Army’s Geospatial Information Officer (GIO). 

Mr. Robert Burkhardt, as the AGC Director and GIO, reports 

directly to the Chief of Engineers on geospatial matters. Mr. 

Burkhardt has initiated policies to standardize the use of geospatial capabilities in battle command systems. The Geospatial Acquisition Support Directorate (GASD) is a new organization established under the AGC that works across programs 

of record to establish interoperable geospatial software tools 

and products based on common standards and interfaces. A 

new Geospatial Governance Board was established at DA to 

provide oversight and guidance at the general officer level.

To support these top-level changes, the geospatial engineers 

are working at all echelons to establish a new concept called 

the Army Geospatial Enterprise (AGE),1

 where all Soldiers in 

the field can use various geospatial products and discover and 

enter geospatial data in an enterprise (distributed) environment. 

The AGE concept embodies the Army tenet that “every Soldier 

is a sensor.” Soldiers on the ground provide the most accurate input on conditions that update the map foundation for the 

common operating picture (COP). Geospatial engineer teams 

will increasingly serve as clearinghouses for data flowing from 

convoys or patrols, helicopter pilots returning from missions, 

Soldiers with handheld devices, and other field sources.

The AGE is technically feasible in commercial software, 

but it has not yet been implemented across systems in the 

field. Geospatial data handling and management in battle

command is currently a disjointed collection of processes 

and products resulting in multiple pictures with no unified 

COP.2 This can be overcome by integrating standardized 

geographic information system (GIS) technologies across 

the Army’s battle command systems. A GIS uses digital automated tools to manage, edit, and enhance geospatial information to support decisionmaking processes. A GIS can be 

used to represent the foundational geospatial layers depicted 

in Figure 1, page 47. Situational awareness information is 

depicted in the top layer of the figure, in conjunction with the 

geospatial foundation.

There is increasing recognition of the need for current, accurate GIS capabilities that form the foundation of the COP. 

This need is being met by organizational and technological 

changes that will accelerate the insertion of integrated solutions across all Army functional areas. These changes will ensure that our Soldiers receive enhanced geospatial capabilities 

in their battle command systems. 

Under the GIO’s direction, the GASD is leading efforts to 

standardize formats and types of geospatial products that are 

used in battle command systems. GIS standardization includes 

the establishment of an Army Geospatial Data Model. The 

GASD has already established an initial version of a geospatial 

data model that closely aligns with the National Geospatial– 

Intelligence Agency (NGA), as well as geospatial standards 

used by international and commercial communities. Modeling 

and simulation concepts are also being integrated into the Army 

Geospatial Data Model. Ongoing model development will lead 

to a common and interchangeable COP foundation that is built 

on data models and standards compatible within the Department of Defense (DOD) and with coalition partners. 

GASD continues to promote the use of Commercial Joint 

Mapping Toolkit, where appropriate, across battle command and acquisition community programs of record. NGA 

oversees the development of the toolkit, including terrainreasoning software that the AGC has developed. Warfighters 

have used sand tables for decades to analyze terrain and convey knowledge to others. Today’s systems go several steps 

further by using tools that automate the modified combined 

obstacle overlay (MCOO). Emerging capabilities from the 

Battlespace Terrain Reasoning and Awareness program, led by 

the AGC, will enable Soldiers to use dynamic MCOO-related 

applications embedded in battle command systems to provide 

By Mr. Kenneth Bergman

Geospatial Engineering:

Combat Development Update
January-April 2009 Engineer 47

route analysis, line-of-sight analysis, and many other tools. 

Soldiers at the last tactical mile will be able to tap into terrainreasoning capabilities at the platform level.

While all of these changes are taking place in battle 

command system development, the systems used by the 

geospatial engineer teams are changing as well. Geospatial engineers have used the Digital Topographic Support 

System (DTSS) for many years to support the military 

decisionmaking process. DTSS is migrating as the geospatial 

component of the Distributed Common Ground Station–Army 

to support integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Figure 2 shows the various ways the geospatial engineer teams support battle command.3 

Knowledge and understanding of geospatial capabilities 

are essential to providing our forces with the information 

advantages they need, especially in complex and urban terrain. 

Figure 2

Figure 1

 Geospatial Layers Depicted by GIS

Geospatial Engineer Support to Battle Command

(Continued on page 49)
48 Engineer January-April 2009

I

n the military today, especially the Army, there is no skill 

more desirable for success than good leadership. The price 

paid for bad leadership or lack of leadership, tragically, 

is the ultimate sacrifice of Soldiers’ lives. Good leaders do 

not magically appear; they are developed, or “grown from 

within.” According to doctrine, “An Army leader is anyone 

who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility 

inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational 

goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside 

the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and 

shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.”1

Leadership Attributes

The characteristics I look for in good leaders are 

the 3 Cs: competence, confidence, and compassion.

I learned these three attributes from former supervisors 

and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in different forms and 

manners, but they all conveyed the same message. I viewed 

these attributes as necessary not only for good leaders but for 

followers as well, and adherence to them has contributed to 

many successes in my career on different levels.

Competence

First and foremost, good leaders need to be competent in 

their field. One does not need to know everything about one’s 

field but must have breadth in knowledge and experience to 

receive a mission, analyze it, ask for guidance, recommend 

courses of actions, delegate tasks, and supervise as needed. 

All this is done with some level of assistance from one’s 

peers, subordinates, and/or supervisors. For example, 

competent Army engineers must know the following: combat 

engineering (demolitions, mines, force protection, field craft, 

and explosives); combat construction (road, structure, or 

facility construction); military pipeline operations (storage and 

transport systems); facilities development and management 

(utilities and structures); power generation (military and 

civilian systems); dive operations (reconnaissance, salvage 

and recovery, destruction and demolitions, and construction 

operations); military bridging (tactical and nontactical); 

topographic and geospatial operations; and United States 

Army Corps of Engineers operations (military and civilian 

projects/activities). 

Engineer officers will be not be expert in all of these areas, 

but they should have a general knowledge of these systems, 

how they work and support others, and whom to resource or 

leverage to get desired information and complete an assigned 

mission or task. When engineers join a unit, leaders and peers 

assume that they are technically adept and ready to advise or 

recommend engineer courses of actions. Many engineer officers 

have technical backgrounds while others just have technical 

training, whether professional or personal. Good engineer 

officers continue to develop professionally (and train) and seek 

mentorship to ensure that they are true combat multipliers. 

Leadership is not only on the battlefield or in direct conflict but 

also off the battlefield, such as Lieutenant General Russel L. 

Honore’s actions and command during Hurricane Katrina, or 

General David H. Petraeus’ expressed importance of transition 

teams to assist in our nation’s efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Confidence

Second, leaders must be confident in action and in word. 

This contagious confidence influences an ideology in which 

orders are delegated, not questioned, and followed specifically 

to include whatever guidance is given. One’s subordinates or 

peers will be encouraged to “buy in” to that guidance and 

exhibit their own initiative when confidence is modeled by 

a leader. Confidence is a physical aspect illustrated by direct 

presentation: how one dresses, speaks, or interacts with 

others, professionally and personally. Good leaders know the 

difference between confidence and overconfidence (cockiness) 

and where to the draw the line; each of these two levels of 

confidence has a place in leadership.

By Major Brian S. Smith
January-April 2009 Engineer 49

Compassion

Finally, leaders must have compassion and respect for

co-workers—and especially subordinates. At times, compassion requires leaders to have physical, mental, and spiritual 

courage. Such courage is what inspires others willingly to 

go the extra mile, to give 110 percent or, if necessary, to lay 

down their lives for a buddy. Good leaders should praise and 

reward members of the organization as well as counsel and 

punish; with punishment, good leaders look at all matters of 

mitigation and decide an outcome (and live with it). Leaders 

must recognize the dynamics of the organization and teambuild to bring others on to their philosophy. The downside 

to compassion is that at times it can be abused; additionally, 

some people view compassion as a character weakness. If 

leaders are compassionate as well as competent and confident, 

compassion will be seen as strength.

Summary

Our Soldiers, their Families, and our leaders deserve 

our competence, confidence, and compassion. It is 

these ideals which inspire that private, that NCO, or 

that lieutenant to get up day after day in combat and say, “Let’s 

go!” When Family members see those qualities in good leaders, 

they will have faith that their loved ones are in good hands and 

confidence that they will return home safely. Leadership is the 

number one business of all Army officers, next to management 

of resources and personnel, and leaders should strive to be 

impact players or combat multipliers wherever the assignment 

is to do their country’s bidding. Leaders at all levels should 

continue to “fill their lamps with oil” to further develop 

leadership and critical thinking skills. No matter where our 

boots take us, we owe it to our subordinates to be competent, 

confident, and compassionate!

Major Smith is attending the Intermediate Level Education 

Course at the Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. Previously, he was the Assistant 

Brigade Operations Officer in the 189th Infantry Brigade, 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and served as commander of a 

mechanized engineer company in the 2d Engineer Battalion 

and also a Bradley Fighting Vehicle Company in the 

2-9 Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, South Korea. 

He is a graduate of the Engineer Captains Career Course 

and holds a bachelor’s in mechanical engineering from the 

United States Military Academy, a master’s in engineering 

management from the University of Missouri-Rolla (now 

Missouri University of Science and Technology), and is 

pursuing a master’s in business administration at Benedictine 

College in Atchison, Kansas.

Endnote

1 Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership, 12 October 2006, 

paragraph 1-2.

After eight years of engagement in the War on Terrorism, we 

currently have unprecedented levels of detailed geospatial 

data, but many Soldiers are simply unaware of these capabilities. As we continue to advance the geospatial capabilities 

used in battle command, it is essential that Soldiers receive the 

training they need to understand the operational environment. 

Training all Army leaders is critical in properly equipping our 

Soldiers for deployments. MANSCEN is conducting a training needs assessment to produce an overall training strategy 

to adjust professional military education so all Soldiers can 

better leverage geospatial capabilities. Decisions regarding 

geospatial engineering combat development will continue to 

have a significant impact on the Army, DOD, and coalition 

partners. These geospatial initiatives are changing the way we 

operate in the Engineer Regiment and across all Army functional areas. As we advance the state of the art in geospatial 

engineering, we maximize the informational advantage for all 

warfighters in successful mission execution.

Mr. Bergman is a member of the Corps of Engineers 

Army Geospatial Center (AGC). He is assigned to Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri, to provide direct support to TCM– 

Geospatial. A former United States Marine, he is a Naval 

Academy graduate and holds a master’s in systems engineering from George Mason University.

Endnotes

1

The Army Geospatial Enterprise (AGE) comprises the 

people, organizations, and technology involved in acquiring 

and managing geospatial data that affects all Army missions. 

Army battle command, consisting of operations, intelligence, 

mission rehearsal, and training capabilities, all depend on 

achieving an AGE. At its core, the AGE is a distributed database and supporting infrastructure that is based on a common 

suite of interoperable software. The AGE allows geospatial 

data to be collected, stored, fused, analyzed, and disseminated 

horizontally and vertically (from peer-to-peer and from echelon to echelon, down to the individual Soldier.

2

Major David P. Burris, “White Paper on Geospatial Support to Battle Command,” TCM–Geospatial, Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 9 January 2008.

3

Figure from <http://www.tec.army.mil/ctis/software 

/geospatial_services/index.html>.

(“Geospatial Engineering,” continued from page 47)
50 Engineer January-April 2009

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (from June 2007 through 

July 2008), the 1st Brigade Special Troops Battalion 

(BSTB), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division, deployed to Contingency Operating Base Adder in Dhi Qar Province of southern Iraq. Initially charged with 

the theater security and security forces mission for Dhi Qar, al 

Muthanna, and Diwaniyah Provinces, the battalion conducted 

a successful in-stride transition to an operational overwatch 

mission in the provincial Iraqi-controlled province of al Muthanna and assistance in Dhi Qar. The 1st BSTB was charged 

with a mission set that tested the limits of the organization. 

The counterinsurgency (COIN) fight in the Shia-dominated, 

Iranian-influenced south presented difficult and unique challenges, and it led to a comment about “appearing larger than 

you are” by General David Petraeus, Multinational Force–Iraq 

(MNF–I) commander, on a visit to one combat outpost. This is 

exactly what the battalion was tasked to achieve and exactly 

what it accomplished. The 1st BSTB was the right unit, with 

the right capabilities, at the right time to fight counterinsurgent 

and criminal elements in a nontraditional BSTB role. Through 

the use of a dynamic task-organization leveraging additional 

BCT assets, a well-defined campaign design with a stringent 

targeting system to adjust it, detailed interagency coordination enabling, and creative small-unit leadership, the BSTB’s 

capabilities are well suited for COIN operations. 

Traditional BSTB Tasks

Before describing how the 1st BSTB achieved success, 

it is important to understand more traditional BSTB 

tasks and current tactics, techniques, and procedures 

that have evolved during the War on Terrorism.The doctrinal 

mission statement of the BSTB highlights rear area security as 

one of the main tasks the organization was designed to accomplish. This responsibility is where the BSTB is more limited 

in nature due to the lack of depth in the organization. Traditionally, the BSTB has been employed to provide intelligence 

and signal enablers for the BCT, limited civil-military operations (CMO) command and control (C2) oversight, military 

training teams, route clearance operations, some base defense 

operations (with significant augmentation), detainee operations, and BCT C2 support and security with the headquarters/

BCT company. Many of these tasks are stovepiped toward 

addressing specific BCT-level requirements that a BCT commander may not have the organizational energy to focus on 

specifically and are rarely used in close coordination with

each other. 

Often, BSTBs are used as force provider units to augment 

BCT operations or other task force-sized elements handling 

very specific tasks. Rarely is a BSTB headquarters charged 

with planning, synchronizing, resourcing, and executing multiple items from the BCT mission-essential task list (METL) 

in a BCT’s area of operations. The 1st BSTB validated the 

By Lieutenant Colonel Frederic A. Drummond and Major James H. Schreiner

“Through the use of a dynamic 

task-organization leveraging 

additional BCT assets ... the 

BSTB’s capabilities are well 

suited for COIN operations.”
January-April 2009 Engineer 51

idea that the fusion of its unique capabilities into small units under a company C2 

system—with the battalion providing the 

framework for that unity of effort—is 

ideal for the mission. This unique fusion 

provided a new way to “appear larger than 

we are” with some BCT enablers helping 

to build capabilities that lacked depth. The 

combination of such capabilities validates 

the theory described in the July-September 

2006 issue of Engineer by then Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Magness, then an 

Army War College Fellow at the University of Texas, that 1+1+1>3 in a complex 

COIN fight.1

 With the right balance and 

clear vision, the BSTB has ideal capabilities and diverse military skills to apply to 

COIN operations in a BCT mission set.

The support behind the argument is generally found within the statistics over the 

1st BSTB’s 14-month combat tour. Three 

primary mission-essential tasks were assigned to the battalion:

Secure freedom of movement along Main Supply Route

(MSR) Tampa

Provide operational overwatch to al Muthanna Province

Conduct CMO for the BCT

The results for the 1st BSTB’s combat actions from June 

2007 through July 2008 argue that, while not a completely 

causal relationship, the skill sets of a BSTB can be very effective within a sound COIN strategy. The downturn in enemy 

operations (see Figure 1) was a result of all the teams operating in southern Iraq—to include other defense agencies, civil 

affairs teams, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), and 

other government agencies (OGAs)—but the battalion was a 

key enabler and catalyst for significant atmospheric changes 

in the tribal areas that had been previously untouched by coalition forces. This persistent engagement with the locals and 

assistance from provisional government officials aided in the 

tremendous success achieved by all forces listed above.

Dynamic Task Organization

On arrival in June 2007, the BSTB was assigned to 

secure five radio relay points along MSR Tampa 

and to disrupt improvised explosive device (IED) 

cells along the MSRs. An offensive mind-set, and some creative repositioning of critical enablers from the brigade and 

battalion, turned these five relay points into three legacy 

combat outposts (COPs) through the use of improved communications systems; mortar teams; and human intelligence 

(HUMINT) collection, signal, and intelligence capabilities. The remaining COPs were task-organized with a similar capability due to threats, but could easily be modified 

to address surges in explosively formed projectiles (EFP) 

■

■

■

activity, PRT efforts, and basic engagement needs as the mission set was modified. At COP 4 in Diwaniyah Province and 

COP 9 in Dhi Qar Province, the threat was almost exclusively 

from EFPs, complex attacks, and indirect fires (IDFs). At COP 

6 in al Muthanna Province, the threat was mostly from criminals acting against Iraqi commerce, using MSR Tampa as the 

most expedient route from Basra to Baghdad. The task organization in Figure 2, page 52, became the essential team that 

staffed the COPs throughout the 14-month rotation. Guidance 

from the MNF–I commander was to “live among the people. 

You cannot commute to this fight. Position ... combat outposts ... in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living 

among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.”2

 The 1st BSTB provided a solid mix of 

capabilities when augmented by a few additional BCT assets and epitomized the General Petraeus strategy of forward 

engagement.

Fundamental to the success of each COP was the diverse 

mixture of military occupational specialties and multiple 

branch-specific officers. The COPs, with fewer than 100 Soldiers each, could deal with installation defense, installation 

support, route security, CMO, and security force partnerships. 

Deliberate route clearance along 250 kilometers of road led 

to the reduction of Tier 1 IED hot spots from eight in June 

2007 to zero in March 2008. This allowed a distinct move 

to hold-and-build operations along that same stretch of road 

while maintaining flexibility for the commander to surge security forces back. 

Combat engineers and military police focused efforts 

on security and partnership with Iraqi army, police special 

units, and Iraqi Highway Police (IHP), while CMO patrols 

engaged the populations, enabling PRTs and other agencies 

Figure 1. Trend Lines of Enemy Activity (EFP/IDF/Complex Attacks) on 

Coalition versus CMO Engagements/Partnerships and Capable ISF 

Application

1 ISF unit = 1- HP police officers (total # on duty)

Dhi Qar Province
52 Engineer January-April 2009

to build capacity and infrastructure. Together, these efforts 

created space, or freedom of movement, for all engagements. 

HUMINT collection team (HCT) operations from COPs 

4 and 9 would be integrated into all security and CMO 

patrols, thus filling information voids in the three provinces. 

That in turn led to increased freedom of movement and multiple target packages to be handed off to maneuver forces. The 

diverse set of capabilities brought to bear set conditions for an 

ever-increasing sphere of influence for the BCT in the three 

provinces. In essence, it set conditions for the transition from 

telecommunications and theater security to an effective operational overwatch mission and created space for the BCT to 

expand its reach and support Iraqi army operations in Basra 

and Amarrah with great success during April and May 2008.

Campaign Design and Targeting

The dynamic task organization is only good if all the 

unit efforts are working toward one common goal. Understanding the dynamics of the COIN fight, and the 

propensity for battalion milestones to change in achieving that 

goal, forced an extremely defined, yet adaptive, process to be 

created. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, has dedicated a complete chapter to the development of 

rigid processes that increase unit flexibility. “The campaign 

design must therefore guide and empower subordinate leaders to conduct the coordination, cooperation, and innovation 

required to achieve the campaign purpose in a manner best 

suited to local conditions.”3 In operations across three provinces, fighting three distinct sets of enemy influence and 

actions, the need for relevant systems was instrumental to any 

success the battalion would have.

The operational design enabled the battalion to keep its focus clearly within a security logical line of operations (LLO) 

with focus on the COPs and freedom of movement along the 

main and alternate supply routes. Flanking efforts included the 

operational overwatch of the al Muthanna Province and a separate LLO for the engagements with three separate PRTs. This 

road map for the battalion was nested within the BCT targeting 

cycle and allowed the battalion to adopt a one-week targeting 

and synchronization cycle that was adaptive and responsive 

enough to stay even with, or ahead of, the daily change in atmospherics. Reactions to EFP Tier 1 sight evolution; security 

and reconstruction changes in dynamics; a changing political landscape at provincial, tribal, and district levels; and the 

BCT focus on operational-level and some strategic-level planning was possible through this system. A simple fragmentary 

order (FRAGO) with a synchronization and execution matrix enabled resourcing to support operations along the 250- 

kilometer stretch of MSR. This FRAGO also included the 

overwatch portion of the battalion’s mission.

The culmination of the process included a weekly briefing 

to the battalion commander that included the following:

Intelligence summary with more detail than the normal 

battalion operations and intelligence briefings

Battalion milestone review with measure-of-effectiveness 

trends from the previous week

Breakdown of the high-payoff target list with actionable 

efforts toward achieving those 

milestones 

New milestones were nominated 

in this meeting, and the high-payoff 

targets would be rendered active or 

passive for the upcoming week. Battalion planning priorities of work 

would be locked in by the commander and focus the staff for two weeks 

out. The end-state was an order that 

provided course corrections to the 

campaign plan and added maximum 

flexibility for the COP commanders 

to engage in security, partnership 

with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and 

reconstruction efforts. The systems 

allowed the commander to exercise 

effective battle command. In particular, the battalion could see the 

enemy and adapt quickly to understand the dynamics governing the 

environment.

“Understanding tribal loyalties, 

political motivations, and family 

relationships is essential to defeating the enemy we faced, a task more 

■

■

■

Figure 2. Task Organization

Engineer, Signal, and HHC 

(60-100 paratroopers each)

Intel Company picked up HHC 

responsibilities at the Contingency 

Operating Base
January-April 2009 Engineer 53

akin to breaking up a Mafia crime ring than dismantling a conventional enemy battalion or brigade.”4

 The system created an 

environment within the battalion that allowed the creation of 

a “human terrain map,” helping to feed the targeting process 

and answer battalion and brigade commanders’ critical intelligence requirements. The process enabled the COIN fight focus, and the unique characteristics of the BSTB created the 

capability to address a wide array of challenges, with these 

systems providing the rudder for all operations. 

In total, the battalion staff required external assets to implement this system, much like the COPs needed augmentation 

in mortar crew and HCT operators. The need for a full-time 

fire support/targeting officer, a signal officer, and a CMO officer were just three fills that were external tasking, but critical 

to mission accomplishment. Systems in a BSTB can make the 

battalion a large force multiplier to the BCT, but key augmentations must be addressed from a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) change initiative. Further review of these critical capabilities must accompany unit status 

reporting and drive the study of MTOE revision for the unit 

to be a more independent and self-sufficient enabler in both 

lethal and nonlethal operations in support of a BCT. 

While there are some areas where help is needed, the 

diverse BSTB staff capabilities create an extremely positive 

learning atmosphere. For example, within the operations and 

training section alone, an engineer officer in charge led a team 

of two infantry captains, two military intelligence captains, a 

logistics captain, and a fire support officer. Making all orders 

and targeting operational for four different types of companies 

with 67 different military occupational specialties with different METL sets of core competencies was extremely complex. 

Leaders in a BSTB must learn each other’s skill sets so that 

the companies can be properly planned for, resourced, and 

led in training and operations. The rigid campaign design and 

targeting process provide the framework to ensure that a common language is understood and that the diverse nature of the 

organization can be overcome when working outside of the 

core mission sets.

Interagency Engagement and Engaged 

Leadership

The systems in place in the 1st BSTB enabled quick 

recognition that a plan was on or off course. Commanders at the battalion and company levels—and 

their understanding of the nested commander’s intent— 

allowed for maximum creativity in developing the “how” to 

achieve milestones (see Figure 3). Subsequently, the strong 

relationships with the Department of State (DOS) and other 

Figure 3. Battalion Milestones and Logical Lines of Operations

Devil Strike Enduring Key Tasks, Objectives, and Milestones

Logical Lines of Operations (Arrows)
54 Engineer January-April 2009

governmental agencies allowed “spheres of influence” to expand rapidly. FM 3-24 has dedicated an entire chapter to leadership, which must be creative and accountable. 

“Senior commanders are responsible for maintaining the 

‘moral high ground’ in all deeds and words of their units.”5

The battalion leadership understood that while the COIN fight 

is extremely decentralized in nature, each commissioned and 

noncommissioned officer must be grounded in the commander’s intent and prepared to enforce legal and ethical behavior 

while implementing creative solutions to win influence over 

the population or deny influence to the enemy. In many instances, this meant high densities of leadership with few Soldiers to conduct key leader engagements. 

One prime example of battalion imagination was the creation of a joint security site (JSS)/mission support site (MSS) at 

COP 6 in al Muthanna Province (see Figure 4). This combined 

effort between the PRT, the Civil Police Authority Training 

Team, and coalition forces occurred from battalion through 

platoon levels. The 1st BSTB provided security for the C2 

site, freedom of movement for the PRT throughout the province, and leverage with partners in the ISF and government 

to begin advanced training of special police and Iraqi army 

units from the site. It offered a JSS for intelligence sharing and 

partnership development between key players in the province, 

encompassing governance at the tribal and provincial levels, 

and security elements. This initiative was not a specified task, 

yet it became a beacon for other provinces, Iraqi government 

officials, and U.S. congressional staffers who became interested in studying because the site leveraged the capabilities 

of Department of Defense (DOD), DOS, and other agencies 

in appearing larger than we were. This one example was 

developed over time by the PRT team chief with 

the battalion and COP 6 commander and staff. 

Another example of creative leadership emanated from the military police leaders at 

COP 6 and COP 9, who developed training 

plans with the IHP, the most under-resourced 

security forces in the ISF. Weekly classroom, 

range, and on-the-job training enabled the building of bonds between the units and helped deter more than 15 EFP detonations and traffic

accidents.

Two examples of the BSTB’s unique capabilities that would be missing in maneuver units were 

the engineer and CMO leaders closely working with 

the PRTs and military police Soldiers who were 

experts at traffic checkpoint operations. Given the 

COIN threats of small EFP and indirect-fire cells, 

and the limited-sized threat to the units, the BSTB 

brought the ideal capabilities to apply to the problem set. Couple this with an imagination that can 

expand and build new concepts in the interagency 

and multinational reality, and the unit can thrive. 

Many of the integration concepts for the JSS/MSS 

are now being studied in new DOS structures for 

teaching at combat training centers and in the Officer Educational System. An interagency team is currently working to 

develop such a structure and will become the hub for all PRT 

lessons learned at DOS and DOD training centers.

One area that will have to be closely developed is the DOS 

mind-set that an aggressive approach in engagement is needed 

at provincial, tribal, and district levels simultaneously. This is 

perhaps one area where a battalion can only cover so much 

ground due to lack of subject matter experts. The willingness 

to use those experts and reach out to the provinces plays a key 

part in the hold-and-build portions of a COIN fight. Even with 

a mixture of engineers, military police, and CMO personnel, 

a BSTB still is heavily reliant on DOS experts. Understanding COIN strategy is not a responsibility of DOD alone. Interagency engagement is only as good as the understanding of 

leaders in both organizations of COIN doctrine.

Summary

Despite many challenges, the 1st BSTB proved that 

it could be an extreme force multiplier in the COIN 

fight when left to fight as an organic battalion with 

key enablers from the BCT. In 14 months, it took roads most 

susceptible to EFP and complex attacks and reduced the frequency of attacks by as much as 90 percent in most areas and 

eradicated them completely in others. Augmented with a robust CMO and ISF partnership strategy, systems to keep the 

battalion leadership on course, and the inclusion of OGAs, 

the battalion enjoyed extreme success. One of the key themes 

of the battalion was to “extend a hand in partnership, but always remain vigilant of the threat.” Learning to adapt to the 

Joint Security and Mission Support Site

Figure 4. An Example of a JSS/MSS

(Continued on page 64)
January-April 2009 Engineer 55

On 10 May 2008, the 62d Engineer Battalion (Combat) 

(Heavy) assumed responsibility from the 864th 

Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy) at Forward 

Operating Base Sharana in Afghanistan. In preparation for 

this, our home station training at Fort Hood, Texas, focused 

on four priorities:

Building roads, operating bases, and force protection in 

support of maneuver forces

Developing strong leaders who inspire their Soldiers with 

the will and skill to win in combat

Training Soldiers on basic combat and engineer-skill tasks

Developing strong Family Readiness Groups (FRGs) and 

rear detachments

We capitalized on unique training opportunities to develop 

junior leaders at Fort Hood during our predeployment training. 

Our training built cohesive teams with Soldiers who shared a 

common bond, grounded in Warrior Skills. Finally, we built 

strong FRGs and rear detachments to take care of each other. 

Eight months into our deployment, our experiences continue 

to teach and challenge us. This article is an effort to share 

the experiences of our preparations for deployment and the 

personnel, logistical, and tactical challenges we have faced. 

Warrior Skills as a Command Training Base

Key to our force protection success is engaged leadership and Warrior Skills training as a prerequisite to our home station mission-essential task list (METL) 

(construction) training. At Fort Hood, we used a battalion “gate 

■

■

■

■

strategy” as a control mechanism in developing trained and 

sustainable companies and platoons. We focused on ensuring 

that all Soldiers possessed the individual skills necessary to 

accomplish their combat portion of the mission, thus surviving 

in a combat environment. We focused on achieving superior 

skills with weapons and marksmanship, reflexive fire, first 

aid, communication, navigation, and physical training. We 

reinforced basics such as land navigation, map reading, combat 

vehicle identification, proper operation of assigned equipment, 

and the effects of personal and crew-served weapons. We 

aggressively trained on convoy procedures, escalation of 

force, and counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) 

drills. We used lessons from the battalion’s last Operation 

Iraqi Freedom deployment, our Army’s current doctrine, and 

keys tasks from the unit being relieved in place—to include 

training on composite risk management—to shape training 

management at all levels within our battalion.

 We found that protection—force protection, safety, fratricide avoidance, and field discipline—of Soldiers and their 

equipment requires engaged leadership. “Checking the 

block” by having platoon and company leadership complete 

composite risk management website classes is not sufficient. 

Every activity, action, and engagement must be assessed for 

risk. Leaders must be on the ground looking for negative 

trends and ensuring that risk mitigation factors are properly 

implemented. Supervisors who assist in unloading a truck are 

no longer supervising and thus have opened up the task for 

a mishap. Our underlying principle for protection is engaged 

leadership and a steadfast enforcement of standards and 

discipline, regardless of the task or location.

By Lieutenant Colonel Ronald E. Zimmerman, Captain Caitlin M. Dempsey, and First Lieutenant Haley E. Whitfield

Lessons Learned From the Front—

Operation Enduring Freedom
56 Engineer January-April 2009

 Effects on Officer Development

Officer promotions come earlier than in the past. 

Second lieutenants are promoted to first lieutenant in 

18 months and are then promoted to captain 16 to 20 

months later. With time spent attending the basic officer leader 

course (BOLC), and many officers attending schools such as 

Airborne, Ranger, and Sapper after BOLC, second lieutenants 

may be in a unit for only 6 to 8 months before pinning on 

first lieutenant bars. At that point, young officers are getting 

ready to move to either a company executive officer position 

or a headquarters staff position. This means that many of 

today’s officers have very little time to learn and grow as 

platoon leaders. Because growth comes from institutional 

knowledge and experience, many of our young officers lack 

the cumulative advantage and practical intelligence associated 

with years of experience. The growth of young officers 

requires practical learning engagements that come from 12 

to 18 months as a platoon leader. If officers had additional 

platoon leader time before promotion to captain, they would 

learn more of the basics needed to build on throughout the rest 

of their careers. This also affects the ability of a commander to 

send a promotable first lieutenant to the career course. Often, 

that lieutenant may not have experienced various jobs within 

the battalion before moving on. 

The opposite side of that argument is that young officers 

frequently complete their platoon leader time in combat. To 

use the “drinking from a fire hose” analogy, today’s platoon 

leaders are learning more in a shorter amount of time because 

of current wartime situations. A young lieutenant learns more 

quickly by leading Soldiers in combat than by just training 

with them at home station, although sometimes the lesson is 

a shortcut rather than the standard. Thus, our model of officer 

growth should account for combat experience, maturity, and 

career desires. We should focus on quality of leadership and 

practical experience, versus time in a leadership position.1

Out-of-Cycle Deployments

Out-of-cycle deployments under the auspice of 

modularity are negatively affecting our flexibility 

in officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

development. The battalion has five companies deployed to 

Afghanistan and one to Iraq. However, there are only three 

companies the battalion commander has flexibility in moving 

officers and NCOs through. Transfers within the battalion are 

impossible with the company in Iraq. One of the companies 

deployed to Afghanistan three months ahead of the rest of the 

battalion and has a home station at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, rather 

than Fort Hood. As a result, officers and NCOs can only be 

moved in or out of that company for short periods and must 

return to their original company for redeployment. Another 

company, although based at Fort Hood with the majority of 

the battalion, deployed two months ahead of the battalion. Its 

officers and NCOs also can be moved for only short amounts 

of time because they have to redeploy with their original 

company. 

These restrictions limit the transfers the battalion commander can order within the battalion to move captains and 

promotable first lieutenants. More important, out-of-cycle 

deployments and modularity can inhibit officer growth in 

connection with early promotion cycles. Planners at the United 

States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)-level must pay 

close attention to out-of-cycle deployments. Just because we 

can deploy engineer companies outside their parent battalion 

headquarters does not necessarily mean we should. 

Demand for Sustainment Engineers

in Stability Operations

Counterinsurgencies and stability operations like the 

current War on Terrorism are taxing on engineer 

units. In high-intensity conflicts, the infantry, 

armor, and other combat units bear much more of the brunt 

of responsibility. A combat heavy engineer battalion’s role 

is inversely proportional to the intensity of the conflict. 

In counterinsurgency operations, engineers—and more 

specifically, construction engineers—bear a greater amount 

of responsibility. As the United States expands to remote 

areas of Afghanistan for security purposes and helps build 

infrastructure there, construction engineers are either doing 

the construction or executing quality assurance and quality 

control of local national construction. Construction engineers 

in most cases are either building new forward operating bases 

(FOBs) or expanding existing FOBs well before the arrival of 

maneuver forces. We have found that it takes nearly two-andone-half months to build a battalion task force-level operating 

base. Before a maneuver unit sends a squad of Soldiers to a 

tiny outpost for weeks at a time, engineers are sent there to 

build up the observation post and make it as livable as possible 

for the maneuver Soldiers. Naturally, security is provided by 

maneuver forces. Engineers are in such high demand during 

stability operations that it makes it even more difficult for 

an engineer commander to release any veteran officers or 

NCOs. 

The high demand for engineer units during this everchanging counterinsurgency fight also results in more 

frequent deployment cycles for the engineers. During home 

station predeployment training, deploying unit commanders 

are reluctant to transition unit-level leadership as teams are 

forming. There is little time for retraining new team, platoon, 

company, or staff leadership. Commanders become even 

more unwilling to release officers and NCOs in exchange 

for untrained new additions to the battalion. However, if the 

officers and NCOs are going to continue their development, 

they need to move on to Army schools. Commanders must 

accept that they might not have a full year of training with a 

group of officers and NCOs and then deploy for 12 months 

with that same group of Soldiers. More important, the United 

States Army Human Resources Command (HRC) must fill 

units on a steady cycle versus once per year. Yearly dumps of 

second lieutenants straight out of the basic course, compared 

to a steady flow of replacements, lead to massive changes. 
January-April 2009 Engineer 57

Officer replacements and school slots must be aligned with 

redeployment of units. The increased need for engineers has 

created out-of-cycle deployments for engineer companies that 

negatively affect officer development. 

Legacy Battalion in Dispersed Operations

Legacy combat heavy engineer battalions are not 

designed for dispersed operations. Until recently, the 

62d Engineer Battalion was the only construction 

battalion in-theater during expansions in Regional 

Command–East (RC–E) and Regional Command–South 

(RC–S). The battalion is a legacy modified table of organization 

and equipment (MTOE) engineer battalion operating as a 

transformed modular unit dispersed across a wide area. Our 

staff is not nearly as robust as a transformed battalion staff. 

Controlling the expansion of multiple battalion- and brigadelevel operating bases, while simultaneously controlling 

upgrades of existing operating bases, greatly stretched our 

doctrinal command and control (C2) capabilities. We now 

have four C2 nodes to support expansion and sustainment 

construction at—

FOB Sharana, the battalion tactical operations center 

(TOC).

Bagram Air Base, the battalion administration/logistics 

operations center.

FOB Shank, where RC–E is being expanded to support the 

arrival of a brigade combat team (BCT).

Kandahar, in support of RC–S/Task Force 2-2 Infantry 

expansion, which will soon move north to FOB 

Wolverine. 

Each of these command nodes requires additional personnel and equipment above MTOE authorization. To maintain 

an aggressive maintenance posture, the battalion uses four 

different supply/support activity locations. Soldiers fly out 

■

■

■

■

of Kandahar and Bagram for 

rest and recuperation leave 

and redeployment because of 

our dispersion. Liaison officer teams are located at 

each Class IV construction 

material site to maintain 

visibility of inventories and 

the status of material being 

pushed from the Class IV 

yard to the construction site. 

The battalion purchased 20 

satellite telephones and minutes for improved C2 and 

for Soldier morale, given the 

units’ remote locations. In 

the end, our MTOE relevant to 

C2 does not fit the current 

dispersed construction fight. 

However, thanks to nontraditional methods, we maintain construction efforts in spite 

of the increasing construction requirements. 

Class IV Management

Acquisition and battle-tracking of Class IV construction 

material and the lack of host nation trucking reliability 

are unique challenges within Afghanistan. Contractorrun Class IV yards control construction material. There are five 

supply yards in-country responsible for filling and shipping 

our construction material. While each Class IV yard performs 

the same function, they do not all provide requesting units 

the same information necessary to acquire and track a bill of 

material (BOM) in the most efficient manner possible. Class 

IV yards are responsible for loading and shipping material to 

each project site. However, they do not accurately keep track 

of the material they ship to each site, and each yard has a 

different standard for reporting what it has shipped. Members 

of the logistical community work hard at maintaining their 

Class IV yards. However, they do not understand construction 

well enough to realize how important Class IV management 

is to engineers or how management of construction material 

must be treated differently from other classes of supply. 

As mitigation, we recently created liasion officer teams at 

Class IV yards to provide visibility on inventory and jobsite 

shipment amounts. However, 3- to 4-week project delays are 

common due to operational impacts and bad weather. There 

are no Army truck companies in-theater, which means that all 

construction materials travel by host nation trucks. Delayed 

delivery resulted in wasted time, material, and money. Education about project management and vulnerability identification of tactical risks remains paramount for officers, given 

the fluid construction environment. Company commanders 

identify project vulnerabilities, mitigation, and decision points 

(complete with priority intelligence requirements, friendly 

force information requirements, and essential elements of 

Standard Guard Tower Construction
58 Engineer January-April 2009

friendly information, given insurgent attacks associated with 

movement of Class IV materials and equipment). 

Finally, engineers should simply take on and resource the 

task of Class IV management, similar to the standard in which 

we associate our actions with the BCT support battalion for 

Class IV/V supply points and mine dumps. Our plugs into the 

sustainment brigades would then be mission-essential tasks 

for battalion and brigade headquarters. 

Standard Building Designs

Standard building designs have greatly increased efficiency in project management, construction, and acquisition of Class IV construction material. At the 

time of the battalion’s arrival, different designs for similar 

buildings were used at each construction site. Three months 

into the deployment, a massive effort began to expand existing operating bases to receive additional maneuver forces 

repositioning to Afghanistan. Joint Facilities Utilization 

Board (JFUB) packets with incomplete designs were rapidly 

completed in order to jump-start the construction process. 

However, the lack of detailed plans resulted in project 

delays caused by inaccurate material ordering and frustrated 

movement of high-priority Class IV materials. To mitigate 

these issues, the battalion developed standard building 

designs for guard towers, semipermanent wooden “B-huts,” 

Southeast Asia hut TOCs, helicopter landing zones (HLZs), 

and company-level contingency operating posts (COPs). 

Each design focused on available lumber versus off-the-shelf 

dimensional lumber. For example, the guard tower design 

called for 21-foot lengths of 8-inch by 8-inch lumber, but 

the best we could get in Afghanistan was 16-foot lengths. To 

gain the same load strength as 8-inch by 8-inch columns, we 

spliced and laminated five 16-foot lengths of 2-inch by 8-inch 

lumber, using designated nail and bolt patterns. 

We implemented battalion standard designs based on 

subject matter expert and company-level experience. Building 

guard towers, B-huts, and TOCs were one company’s strong 

point, while another company became known as our “cash 

cow” because of its ability to quickly build company-level 

COPs. Yet another company built most of the “hard huts,” 

(B-huts with indirect-fire protection) in RC–E. Our horizontal 

assets built most of the HLZs and fuel farms, so their expertise 

became the battalion benchmark. Overall, standard designs 

increased our productivity in ordering BOMs and improved 

jobsite quality control and quality assurance. Standard designs 

greatly aided in construction rehearsal before beginning a 

project since squad leaders could determine their work effort 

and team taskings. 

Moving a Combat Heavy Engineer

Line Company

Traversing the battlefield provided many challenges to 

a combat heavy engineer line company that maneuver 

forces do not face. Frequently, mission dictates the 

movement of a single construction company, or even platoon, 

more than 300 kilometers with heavy engineer equipment. By 

MTOE, one engineer company consists of five M916 tractors 

with M870 trailers. A routine FOB construction mission 

typically requires 10-15 pieces of heavy engineer equipment, 

to include bulldozers, hydraulic excavators, bucket loaders, 

rollers, graders, and scrapers that weigh up to 76,000 pounds. 

Due to their limited number of organic transportation assets, 

engineer units are forced to rely on the support of host 

nation trucking, which could cause project delays, increased 

maneuver time between construction sites, and increased 

threat to Soldiers. To mitigate the obvious risks, units are 

forced to integrate the local national trucks into their convoys 

to ensure the security and timely arrival of their equipment 

and materials. If a request were submitted for ten 40-foot, 

flatbed local national trucks, only six would show up on 

the specified date with adequate specifications. Many local 

nationals overestimate the quality of their personally owned 

trucks. It is not uncommon to destroy the axle of a local 

national truck or turn a truck on its side during the process 

of loading a scraper or bulldozer in preparation for movement 

to the next construction site. The local national trucks are 

not equipped to support the weight of up-armored engineer 

equipment. 

Adding local national trucks to a ground assault convoy 

greatly reduces the average speed and greatly increases 

the probability that the convoy will need assistance. 

Whether it is a flat tire, inadequate fluids, engine failure, 

or the mere inability to transport the assigned load, the host 

construction-maneuvering unit is forced to assist or recover 

the deadlined local national truck. This can force a convoy 

to stop in the middle of hostile terrain to provide support 

to the local national to ensure the safe arrival of the unit’s 

equipment. Forcing a combat heavy engineer unit to stop 

and dismount adds a significant level of threat to an already 

dangerous mission of traveling across the battlefield. Heavy 

construction engineer units are not equipped to precisely 

maneuver, effectively engage, and actively pursue the 

enemy, characteristics that are commonly found in light 

maneuver units. Uncoiling a heavy construction engineer 

unit takes a great deal of time and precision that higherechelon command units may not take into account during 

their planning process. 

“Key to our force protection 

success is engaged leadership 

and Warrior Skills training as a 

prerequisite to our home station 

mission-essential task list (METL) 

(construction) training.”
January-April 2009 Engineer 59

Conclusion

Maintaining focus on the mission is essential, regardless of the time remaining in our deployment. Our challenge is not to lose focus or become complacent 

in enforcing standards and discipline. Each construction task 

is another opportunity to increase work efficiency, sustain 

our Warrior Spirit, and maintain our position as builders of 

choice. Communication remains paramount as we continue to 

find every opportunity to mentor and develop the battalion’s 

Soldiers and leaders. Moreover, given the battalion’s dispersed 

environment and limited communication, each command visit 

is a detailed leader engagement that targets young leaders. We 

must communicate that deployment relief is in sight. More 

important, we must communicate that senior Army leadership 

is addressing improvements in schooling, assignments, and 

dwell time. Our Soldiers and leaders deserve honest dialogue 

on how no other organization in the world could sustain what 

our Army has completed over the last decade. 

Lieutenant Colonel Zimmerman is Commander, 62d Engineer 

Battalion, now deployed to Afghanistan. Prior assignments include chief of plans for the 4th Infantry Division’s initial assault 

into Iraq; operations officer for the 299th Engineer Battalion; 

operations officer for 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry 

Division; and chief of plans for the 4th Infantry Division’s second 

Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment. He holds a bachelor’s in 

civil engineering–structures from the University of WisconsinPlatteville, a master’s in engineering management from the 

University of Missouri–Rolla (now Missouri University of Science 

and Technology), and a master’s in airpower art and science from 

the School for Advanced Airpower Studies.

Captain Dempsey is the assistant operations officer and engineer Class IV manager with the 62d Engineer Battalion. Prior 

assignments include company executive officer and horizontal 

platoon leader. She holds a bachelor’s in elementary education 

from Wake Forest University.

First Lieutenant Whitfield is the 62d Engineer Battalion 

assistant operations officer and battle captain. Previous assignments include vertical platoon leader and executive officer. 

She holds a bachelor’s in engineering management from the 

United States Military Academy.

Endnote

1 The retention of officers and NCOs is likely affected 

by the strain in the United States Army between mission 

accomplishment and officer development. The operational 

tempo in today’s Army has caused a backlog of officers and 

NCOs in many units. Units are reluctant to release officers 

or NCOs because they have been trained for the upcoming 

deployments. Commanders, understandably, do not want to lose 

that training by releasing the veterans and deploying with new 

officers and NCOs. This is causing a long-range deterioration 

of both the officer corps and the NCO corps. Three factors are 

probable reasons that units do not release officers and NCOs in 

a timely manner that would benefit their careers. These factors, 

which are specifically focused on engineer units, are—

Early promotion of young officers.

Heavy use of engineers during counterinsurgency fights.

Modularity or out-of-cycle deployment of engineer companies without their parent battalion headquarters. 

I contend that we must understand from their viewpoint 

the challenges our junior leaders are experiencing within 

the United States Army. Accelerated timelines for officer 

promotions, high demand on engineer units for deployment 

purposes, and the structure of engineer units are, to some 

degree, causing friction with our young officers. We must 

communicate with our company-grade officers the same way 

we do with our young Soldiers. Senior leaders must understand 

the difference in generational perceptions between themselves 

and their junior officers and NCOs.

It is important for senior leaders to understand that our 

“Generation Y” leaders (those born after 1978) grew up in 

a climate of uncertainty, in which their adolescent years may 

have included the experience of parents divorcing and job 

loss. Members of Generation Y worry about their financial 

future, especially with today’s market meltdown. As a result, 

they are less inclined to be loyal to—or feel a connection 

with—their work place. They expect instant gratification 

because they have faster access to information, thanks to 

technology. They prefer challenges to their abilities and thus 

career advancement. When we put into context the perceptions 

about Generation Y, such as the desire for instant gratification, 

preference for a casual environment (not to be confused with 

lack of professionalism), feeling of entitlement to job benefits 

they’ve not yet earned, and comfort with technology, we see 

four basic challenges from their viewpoint:

Twelve- to fifteen-month deployments with minimal 

dwell time translates to minimal time with family when 

not deployed.

Officers are stuck in the same unit too long when they 

deploy twice over the course of four to five years. (This

may be a double-edged sword in that some young officers

are probably interested in having multiple changes of 

station, as opposed to those with families, who probably 

wish for longer assignments to reduce the number of 

moves.)

The Army system of formal training is not intellectually 

stimulating enough, considering their usual level of 

education.

There is too much micromanagement, which does not empower company-grade leaders.

Taken in context, this list becomes a tool to gain a better 

understanding of the strain between mission accomplishment 

and officer development in order to reach a balance between 

operational deployments and officer retention. (California 

State University, Fullerton, “The Gen Y Perceptions Study,” 

<http:// www.spectrumknowledge.com/signatureprograms/

index.html>, 2008.)

■

■

■

■

■

■

■
60 Engineer January-April 2009

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description 

(and Current Status)

Publications Currently Under Revision

FM 3-34 Engineer Operations Jan 04

FM 3-34.22 

(FM 3-34.221) 

(FM 5-71-2)

(FM 5-71-3)

(FM 5-7-30)

Engineer Operations – 

Brigade Combat Team 

and Below

Pending 

(Jan 05) 

(Jun 96) 

(Oct 95) 

(Dec 94)

This is the engineer keystone manual. It encompasses all engineer 

doctrine; integrates the three engineer functions of combat, general, and 

geospatial engineering; and addresses engineer operations across the 

entire spectrum of operations.

Status: The estimated date for posting to Army Knowledge Online (AKO) 

is 3d Quarter FY09.

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center 

Training and Doctrine Development Department 

Doctrine Division, Engineer Branch

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update

FM 3-90.11 

(FM 3-34.2)

Combined Arms Mobility 

Operations

Aug 00

Combat Engineering

This is a new manual that will encompass engineer operations in support 

of all engineer operations above the BCTs (division, corps, and theater). 

The intent is to consolidate and revise three engineer FMs that provide 

doctrinal guidance for the entire spectrum of engineer operations 

supporting echelons above the BCT level. This manual will supersede 

FM 5-71-100, FM 5-100-15 and FM 5-116.

Status: Comments closed on final draft; estimated publishing date is

4th Quarter FY09

FM 3-34.23 

(FM 5-116)

(FM 5-100-15)

(FM 5-71-100)

Engineer Operations –

Echelons Above Brigade 

Combat Team

Pending

(Feb 99)

(Jun 95)

(Apr 93)

This is a full revision, to include renaming and renumbering of FM 3-34.2, 

Combined Arms Breaching Operations. Changes in the force structure 

have required adjustment of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) 

associated with breaching and clearance operations.

Status: On hold for release of FM 3-90, Tactics

FM 3-90.13 

(FM 5-102) 

(FM 90-7)

Combined Arms Obstacle 

Integration

Sept 94 

Mar 85

This revised manual will contain the basic fundamentals associated 

with countermobility operations and will incorporate aspects of the 

contemporary operating environment (COE).

Status: On hold for release of FM 3-90, Tactics.

This new manual will encompass engineer operations in support of 

brigade combat teams (BCTs) (heavy, infantry, and Stryker–the armored 

cavalry regiment) and their primary subordinate units (infantry battalion, 

Stryker battalion, combined arms battalion, and reconnaissance 

squadron). This manual will supersede FM 3-34.221, FM 5-7-30, FM 

5-71-2, and FM 5-71-3. 

Status: Published February 2009.

FM 3-34.300 

(FM 5-103)

Survivability Jun 85 This manual provides survivability information needed by commanders 

and staff at the tactical level. It includes guidance on integrating survivability into planning and order production and creation of the engineer 

running estimate. It provides examples of a survivability capabilities card, 

matrix, and timeline to assist with the planning, revision, and conduct of 

specific survivability tasks.

Status: On hold for release of FM 3-10, Protection.

Organizational Manuals
January-April 2009 Engineer 61

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description 

(and Current Status)

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center 

Training and Doctrine Development Department 

Doctrine Division, Engineer Branch

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update

FM 3-34.400 

(FM 5-104)

General Engineering Nov 86 This manual describes the operational environment (OE) and how to 

apply and integrate general engineering principles in support of full 

spectrum operations. It focuses on the establishment and maintenance 

of lines of communications and engineer support to sustainment 

operations throughout the area of operation. Although not designated 

as a multi-Service publication, it is intended to inform all Service 

components of the types of general engineering tasks, planning 

considerations, variety of units available to perform them, and the 

capabilities of Army engineers to accomplish them. 

Status: Published December 2008.

General Engineering

FM 3-34.410

Volumes I & II 

(FM 5-430-00-1 

& 5-430-00-2)

Design of Theater of 

Operations Roads, Airfields, 

and Helipads

Aug 94; 

Sep 94

This manual will serve as a reference for engineer planners in support of 

joint and theater operations in the design of roads, airfields, and helipads. 

This manual is currently dual-designated with the Air Force. The Navy 

plans to adopt it as well. 

Status: Adjudicating comments on the final draft.

FM 3-34.451

(FM 5-472)

Materials Testing Dec 92 This manual will provide technical information for obtaining samples 

and performing engineering tests and calculations on soils, bituminous 

paving mixtures, and concrete. For use in military construction. The 

test procedures and terminology will conform to the latest methods 

and specifications of the American Society for Testing and Materials 

(ASTM), the American Concrete Institute (ACI), and the Portland Cement 

Association (PCA), with alternate field testing methods and sampling 

techniques when complete lab facilities are unavailable or impractical to 

use.

Status: Adjudicating comments on the final draft.

FM 3-34.465 

(FM 3-34.465 

& FM 3-34.468)

Quarry Operations Mar 05; 

Dec 03 

(Apr 94)

This manual outlines the methods and procedures used in the exploration 

for and operation of pits and quarries. It provides information on 

equipment required for operating pits and quarries and for supplying 

crushed mineral products, but does not cover the operation of the stated 

types of equipment. This collaborative effort with the Navy includes the 

newest technologies and current practices.

Status: Preparing the final draft for staffing to the force.

This manual is a guide for planning, designing, and drilling wells. It 

focuses on techniques and procedures for installing wells and includes 

expedient methods for digging shallow water wells, such as handdug wells. This collaborative effort with the Navy includes the newest 

technologies, current practices, and revised formulas.

Status: The estimated date for posting to Army Knowledge Online (AKO) 

is 3d Quarter FY09.

FM 3-34.469 

(FM 5-484)

Multi-Service Well Drilling 

Operations

Mar 94
62 Engineer January-April 2009

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description 

(and Current Status)

General Engineering (continued)

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center 

Training and Doctrine Development Department 

Doctrine Division, Engineer Branch

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update

FM 3-34.485 

(FM 5-415)

Firefighting Operations Feb 99 This manual gives directions on deploying and using engineer firefighting 

teams. These teams provide fire prevention/protection, aircraft crash/

rescue, natural cover, and hazardous material (HAZMAT) (incident) 

responses within a theater of operations (TO). This is a parallel effort with 

the revision of the firefighting Army regulation (AR) to bring both policy 

and doctrine current with required certifications, newest technologies, and 

current practices.

Status: Initiating the program directive and developing the initial draft.

FM 3-34.500 

(FM 3-100.4)

Environmental Considerations 

in Military Operations

Jun 00 This manual provides environmental protection procedures during all 

types of operations. It states the purposes of military environmental 

protection, a description of legal requirements, and a summary of current 

military programs. It also describes how to apply risk management 

methods to identify actions that may harm the environment and 

appropriate steps to prevent or mitigate damage.

Status: The estimated date for posting to Army Knowledge Online (AKO) 

is 3d Quarter FY09.

Geospatial Engineering

FM 3-34.600 

(FM 3-34-230)

Geospatial Operations 3 Aug 00 This full revision of FM 3-34.230, Geospatial Operations, will incorporate 

changes as a result of FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, and FM 3-0, 

Operations. Geospatial engineering consists of those engineer 

capabilities and activities that contribute to a clear understanding of the 

physical environment by providing geospatial information and service to 

commanders and staffs.

Status: Developing the final draft.

NOTE: Current engineer publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library 

at <http://www.adtdl.army.mil> or the MSKN website at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/500629>. The manuals discussed in 

this article are currently under development. Drafts may be obtained during the staffing process or by contacting the engineer doctrine branch at: Commercial 573-563-0003, DSN 676-0003, or <douglas.merrill@us.army.mil>. The development status 

of these manuals was current as of 10 February 2009.

A Regimental Family of the world’s finest military engineers 

who lead to serve others and answer the call to solve the 

commander’s toughest problems. A Regiment organized 

into highly flexible, tailorable, and adaptive units capable 

of supporting anyone, anywhere, with the right engineer 

capability. A Regiment filled with Soldiers inspiring each 

other to go beyond “Let Us Try” and achieve “Well done, 

engineer!”

Is this vision of the Engineer Regiment and supporting key 

strategic tasks carved in stone? No, this is the mark I’ve personally 

set on the wall—my estimate of the way forward. I urge you to make 

your own assessment and come to ENFORCE prepared to be an 

active participant in the professional debate that will confirm this 

vision and chart our future. I only ask one thing...come prepared 

to take your historic experience and help shape the legacy we will 

pass on to our young engineers who will clear and build the way 

for our Army in the future. 

(“Clear the Way,” continued from page 3)
January-April 2009 Engineer 63

Current deployments to Operation Enduring Freedom 

and Operation Iraqi Freedom are forcing light, airborne, and mechanized units to operate as if they 

were motorized. The prevalence of high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and the new mineresistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles have been the 

main facilitator of this change. 

Platoon- and company-level leaders are the primary personnel responsible for recognizing and adapting to the continual 

changes occurring on the battlefield. Company commanders, 

platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants should be the driving 

force of continual assessment, rehearsal, training/ execution, 

and refinement of standing operating procedures (SOPs). Input from Soldiers filling all positions within a unit should be 

included as part of the continual assessment process. A patrol 

leader cannot fill all roles and relies on the information provided by gunners, drivers, dismounts, and others to improve 

all the areas included in the SOP.

After a deployment, the following areas of the SOP and 

unit training have undergone constant revision: 

Operations

Maintenance/recovery

Communications

Medical needs

Interpreters

Operations

M.ission Briefs. Also known as “convoy briefs” or 

“patrol briefs,” mission briefs should always be 

modeled after the five-paragraph operations order 

format. Signal plans, frequencies, priorities of medical support, and locations of key leaders typically do not change. 

Continual reviews of the SOPs are verbal precombat checks 

that the patrol leader gives during the brief. Add or delete what 

is relevant and applicable each time a mission brief is given.

Clearing Techniques. Integrate all host nation security 

forces to improve security and provide the direct link with 

locals. Always adjust to enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Consider the enemy’s tactics, as they are always 

evolving, and adjust unit TTP accordingly. 

Load Plans. These should be detailed enough to cover all 

mission-essential equipment, but not be so micromanaged that 

they detract from operator preference. Dictate where medical equipment, sensitive items, ammunition, and maintenance 

■

■

■

■

■

parts belong in each type of vehicle to ensure that Soldiers can 

quickly move to a vehicle and resupply as needed. 

Maintenance/Recovery

Linkup. Develop SOPs and linkup procedures to integrate recovery assets or other units that assist with recovery. Define the roles of each element/leader—

security, recovery, liaison—before the operation is conducted. 

Equipment. Redundancy of recovery equipment such as 

tow straps, sling legs, and tow bars within the patrol are very 

necessary. For example, tow straps tend to break after just a 

single use. With the increase in weight and protection of vehicles, it is necessary to adapt recovery and operating equipment 

to achieve effective results in-sector. Spare recovery equipment is a must for all units.

Training. Practice recovery techniques across all vehicles 

within a patrol. Understanding the capabilities of recovery 

equipment can give leaders an increased ability to call for 

dedicated recovery assets while on a mission. This increases 

the unit’s self-recovery ability and reduces the time that a unit 

is exposed with broken equipment.

Communications

Succession of Signal. Model communications after the 

primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plan. 

Just like the succession of command, this gives each 

leader an immediate list when systems become unusable or 

unreliable.

Alternate Means. Each type of communication offers distinct advantages and disadvantages to the user. Leaders may 

be exposed to situations when one type of communication is 

ineffective and will need to immediately transfer to another 

type. Continual training and communication exercises are 

beneficial to units at all levels.

Medical Needs

T .raining. Preparing Soldiers for the need to provide 

lifesaving medical assistance will boost their confidence and improve their competence.

Monthly scenario-based training. Complacency becomes more prevalent the longer a unit is deployed, and leaders must continue training to fight

it. Keeping training both realistic and difficult ensures that each Soldier is prepared throughout the

deployment.

■

By First Lieutenant Michael P. Carvelli

Continual Assessment 

and Revision of SOPs
64 Engineer January-April 2009

Intravenous (IV) stick practice. Practice giving IV injections under red light, while using night vision goggles, 

and while both patient and responder are wearing complete personal protective equipment. This will increase 

the lifesaving abilities of the Soldiers and give them

confidence when injuries actually occur.

Limited visibility practice. Perform all medical tasks 

under conditions of good and limited visibility to increase 

competence.

Combat Lifesavers (CLS). All personnel should be CLSqualified. This is enforced very well within company-level 

units, but CLS certification should not end once the deployment 

begins. Plan and resource monthly or quarterly refreshers.

Standardization. The setup and location of all medical 

equipment should be standardized across a patrol. This includes the standardization of all individual first aid kits and 

CLS bags. The ability to quickly identify the location of medical equipment ensures effective and timely treatment. 

Interpreters

Medical. Ensure that interpreters are CLS-qualified. 

Since interpreters are a combat multiplier, basic 

medical training will be extremely useful when 

needed.

Alternate Roles. Define the interpreter’s role for each 

battle drill. For each drill, provide a task and purpose, such 

as “respond to a vehicle rollover” or “react to contact.” The 

interpreter should have a designated place and activity that 

assists the unit with accountability during combat.

Quick Brief. Speak with the interpreter shortly before attending a meeting or speaking to a group of people to ensure 

that the interpreter understands your message clearly. This 

will clarify most of the speech. Also, the interpreter represents 

the speaker and should understand that voice inflection and 

emphasis are required across the language boundary.

Summary

Continual after-action reviews of missions and training will further refine any SOP that a unit uses. Input 

from gunners, drivers, truck commanders, medics, 

and others will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the 

unit and give each Soldier more motivation to speak in support of change. This ensures that all activities are streamlined 

and that each Soldier can improve the existing SOPs for future 

operations.

First Lieutenant Carvelli is the battalion engineer for the 

3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. He has served as a task 

force engineer and sapper platoon leader with the 173d Special 

Troops Battalion. He holds a bachelor’s in civil engineering 

technology from the Rochester Institute of Technology and 

has completed the Fundamentals of Engineering Exam in 

Pennsylvania.

.

■

■

challenges and threats was a daily fight, but accomplished to

a high standard. It is possible for a BSTB to operate successfully as a multifunctional battalion. It is about appearing larger than we are as a coalition and will continue to be as long as 

we are asked to fight and win the nation’s wars.

Lieutenant Colonel Drummond is the Director of Operations, Task Force Bragg, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. Previous assignments include Commander, 

1st Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat 

Team, 82d Airborne Division; USCENTCOM ground operations officer and J3 executive officer; Combined Task Force 

82 Senior Engineer, Operation Enduring Freedom; 307th 

Engineer Battalion executive and operations officer; and

observer-controller (Scorpion and Sidewinder Teams) 

at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. 

He holds a bachelor’s in industrial management from 

the University of Nebraska–Kearney and a master’s in 

business administration through Embry–Riddle University. He can be contacted at <frederic.drummond@us. 

army.mil>

Major Schreiner is an engineer officer serving as the 1st 

BSTB’s executive officer. He was previously a battalion operations officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He served 

as a company commander in Operation Iraqi Freedom and 

as a strategic reconstruction officer to Combined Forces 

Command–Afghanistan Engineer Directorate in 2005. He 

holds a master’s in engineering management from the University of Colorado and is a certified project management

professional. He can be contacted at <james.schreiner@us. 

army.mil>.

Endnotes

1 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Magness, “Brigade Special Troops Battalions, Part I: All the Way In,” Engineer, JulySeptember 2006, p. 47.

2 General David H. Petraeus, “Multinational Force–Iraq 

Commander’s COIN Guidance,” Military Review, 21 June 

2008, p. 1.

3 Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, 

December 2006, p. 4-6.

4

 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam, University 

of Chicago Press; Chicago, Illinois, 2005, p. 13.

5 FM 3-24, p. 7-2.

This article is reprinted from the Maneuver Support 

Magazine, Winter 2009.

(“Appearing Larger,” continued from page 54)
January-April 2009 Engineer 65

After successfully breaking through the defenses at the 

border of Germany early in 1945, the Allied forces 

had one obstacle—the Rhine River—denying them 

access to the heart of Nazi territory. At each Allied advance, 

the Germans destroyed the bridges spanning the river. The 

Ludendorff Bridge in Remagen was often overlooked due to 

its location 40 miles from the front lines. Thus, it was one of 

the few bridges still standing on 7 March 1945. 

Remagen is located between Cologne and Koblenz. The 

Ludendorff Bridge stretched from the city of Remagen on the 

western bank to a 600-foot hill, known as the Erpeler Ley, on 

the eastern bank. The first American force to arrive at the bridge 

was a task force from the 9th Armored Division, commanded 

by Major General John W. Leonard. The task force consisted 

of the 14th Tank Battalion (minus Delta Company), the 27th 

Armored Infantry Battalion, and one platoon of C Troop, 85th 

Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion.1

 Major Hans Scheller 

commanded the German forces defending Remagen and the 

Ludendorff Bridge. These forces included a bridge security 

company of 36 men led by Captain Willi Bratge, an engineer 

company of about 120 men led by Captain Karl Friesenhahn, 

180 Hitlerjugend, an antiaircraft unit of 200 men, 20 men 

from a Luftwaffe rocket battery, 120 Eastern “volunteers,” 

and roughly 500 civilian Volksturm. In all, the German forces 

amounted to roughly 1,000 men.2

Key Factors of the Battle

On 7 March 1945, Soldiers from the 9th Armored 

Division task force arrived at Remagen and captured 

the Ludendorff Bridge. The American forces won the 

battle by massing the effects of fire, rapidly conducting the 

operation, and taking the initiative. While the Germans did 

mass the effects of their flak guns and other available assets 

on the American tanks, they did not have enough firepower 

to overcome the American forces. Since the Germans did not 

integrate the effects of their fires with well-planned defensive 

positions, the Americans were able to reach the western banks 

of the Rhine River. This enabled the Americans to mass their 

own fires against the German units on the eastern bank. The 

Germans, fearing retaliation from superiors for failure to 

“We were across the Rhine, on a permanent bridge; the traditional defensive barrier to the heart of Germany was pierced. 

The final defeat of the enemy, which we had long calculated would be accomplished in the spring and summer campaign of 

1945, was suddenly, now, just around the corner.”

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

By Captain Michael J. Halloran
66 Engineer January-April 2009

follow orders, took no initiative 

to improve their situation. 

However, had they emplaced 

explosives in different locations, 

the bridge may have collapsed. 

The American forces took the 

initiative from the start of the 

operation because intelligence 

had suggested that the bridge 

would be collapsed by the 

time they arrived at Remagen. 

The capture of the Ludendorff 

Bridge led to the passage of 

thousands of Allied forces into 

the center of Germany and 

aided in the ultimate defeat of 

Nazi Germany.

Minimal German Resistance

The first key factor in this 

battle—the minimal German 

resistance in Remagen— 

allowed a fast push by the 

American forces to the Ludendorff Bridge. The German 

failure was caused primarily by the lack of rear-allocated 

forces and reliance on the Volksturm. The Germans allocated 

most of their forces to the front lines, thinking that the Allied 

forces would never reach the Rhine River, 40 miles behind 

the German defensive positions. This left minimal troops to 

reinforce their rear.

The bridge commander in Remagen, Captain Willi Bratge, 

had to rely on the Volksturm for the bulk of his forces. All over 

Germany, Volksturm troops were conscripted and committed 

close to their homes in the hope that they would fight to defend 

their homes and localities. These forces discovered that every 

time they showed resistance, the American forces methodically 

demolished every structure that could house defenders. It did 

not take long to discover that a quick surrender spared their 

lives, homes, and property.3

The German soldiers in the bridge security company were 

attached from a convalescent unit, where they were recovering 

from wounds. Most of them were still wearing bandages. 

During one of several air raids on the city of Remagen, the 

ferries used to transport workers and civilians from one side 

of the Rhine to the other were destroyed. In addition, German 

policy refused to allow planning for rear area defense in depth. 

All of the above, each of which had a profound effect on the 

outcome of the battle, help explain the minimal resistance 

provided by the German forces.

When the American Soldiers of the 9th Armored Division 

arrived at Remagen, they came upon almost no hindrance 

between the city’s entrance and the Ludendorff Bridge. Due 

to the low morale of the Volksturm, the obstacles they had 

built were too weak to block tanks, the roadblocks they had 

emplaced allowed ample room for vehicles to pass, and some 

obstacles had been emplaced in open terrain.4

 Because most 

of Captain Bratge’s forces consisted of the Volksturm, he 

had counted on them to provide the greatest defense in the 

city. However, the Volksturm had deserted and most of the 

main German force was located at the eastern side of the 

bridgehead. In addition, the members of the bridge security 

company were virtually useless in combat. Once troops from 

the convalescent unit became strong enough, they were sent 

back to rejoin combat units, and few replacements were sent.

The destruction of the ferries forced large amounts of 

civilian traffic across the Ludendorff Bridge. The German 

troops securing it had to check passes and keep people 

moving. This took away from the time the troops had to 

prepare defenses and demolitions. German policy allowed for 

few prepared defenses; little time to emplace; and no antitank 

ditches or mines, barbed wire, or trenches on the way to the 

Rhine. This allowed the 9th Armored Division to arrive at the 

bridge rapidly with few casualties, and German resistance at 

the bridge soon found it was not strong enough to withstand 

this unweakened American force.

Lessons Learned. Several lessons can be drawn from this 

key event. Due to Hitler’s prohibition of defense in depth 

and the failure of the Volksturm, the German forces had no 

defensive plan in Remagen. By the time the Americans arrived 

there, the Germans had neither time to emplace an effective 

defense nor enough troops to defend the city. If obstacles or 

defensive positions had been emplaced, the Germans could 

have delayed the Americans’ speed crossing the Ludendorff 

Bridge. The first company to cross the bridge consisted of 

dismounted infantry, and with machine guns mounted in 

the buildings, the Germans could have easily reduced these 

Soldiers. Tank ditches dug around the city and antitank mines 

emplaced along the routes to Remagen could have prevented 

Company A, 14th Tank Battalion—under the command 

The daylong fight for the Ludendorff Bridge across the Rhine was intense. The bridge 

was weakened during the fighting and eventually collapsed. By then, a firm American 

bridgehead had already been established.
January-April 2009 Engineer 67

of First Lieutenant Karl Timmermann—from reaching the 

western banks of the Rhine. In turn, these tanks would have 

been delayed in decisively engaging the German flak guns 

on the eastern banks. Preparing a proper defense would have 

significantly diminished U.S. capabilities and assets available 

to attack the bridge. In addition, the delay could have given 

the German forces adequate time to mount a counterattack. 

Doctrinal Guidance. The lessons learned from this key 

event are covered in United States Army doctrine. Field 

Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics,

5

 states that the defender does not 

wait passively to be attacked but aggressively seeks ways to 

weaken attacking forces before the initiation of close combat. 

The German forces at Remagen waited on the eastern banks of 

the Rhine River while the 9th Armored Division approached. 

They did nothing to weaken the American forces before they 

reached the bridgehead. FM 3-90 also states that a defense is 

more effective when there is adequate time to thoroughly plan 

and prepare defensive positions. Between the overcrowded 

traffic on the bridge and the official prohibition of defense in 

depth, the Germans forces at Remagen had no time to emplace 

a thorough defense.

Failed German Demolition Attempt

The failed attempt by the Germans to destroy the bridge 

with preemplaced explosives presents the second key factor in 

the successful U.S. operation. This failure was caused by many 

factors. During World War I, the French Army had occupied 

the Remagen area. While in charge of the Ludendorff Bridge, 

they discovered that each stone pier supporting the bridge 

contained two large demolition chambers that could be packed 

with explosives for easy destruction in case of an enemy 

attack. The French filled these chambers with cement.6

Weeks before the U.S. attack at Ludendorff Bridge, another 

German bridge had been inadvertently destroyed when an 

Allied bomb set off pre-positioned demolitions. Orders 

went out that all demolition material was to be removed and 

replaced on bridges only when an Allied army attack was 

imminent. Also, those responsible for losing a bridge to the 

enemy or for blowing up a bridge too soon faced a possible 

death sentence. Finally, Captain Friesenhahn ordered 600 

kilograms of explosives, the amount determined necessary to 

destroy the bridge, but only received 300 kilograms. The type 

of explosives he received was an industrial explosive, which 

was less powerful than the regular military grade.7 

The effects of these causes provide insight on how the 

bridge was taken. When the Germans began plans to demolish 

the bridge in case of attack, they discovered that the only 

way to remove the cement from the wells in the piers was to 

remove the main supports of the bridge, which could collapse 

the entire bridge.8 Second, Hitler’s order not to emplace 

explosives until an attack was imminent had a psychological 

effect on the engineers guarding the bridge. If any of the 

engineers armed the explosives too soon, they could suffer 

the death penalty. Third, the explosives on the Ludendorff 

Bridge were not detonated until the U.S. tanks were on the 

U.S. Soldiers examine damages to the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, March 1945.
68 Engineer January-April 2009

western banks of the river, giving no time to adjust to the 

failed attempt. Last, due to the shortage of explosives and 

their low quality, the explosion inflicted minimal damage on 

the bridge. A main member of the bridge was damaged and a 

30-foot hole was blown in the structure, but the bridge itself 

remained standing. 

Lessons Learned. This key event presents a number of 

lessons. Although the engineers were not provided with the 

correct amount or type of explosives to blow the bridge, they 

failed to improvise with the supplies they had. If their limited 

amount of explosives had been placed in more effective 

positions to yield a larger explosion in one specific part of 

the bridge, they might still have collapsed the bridge or at 

least caused major damage. Instead, the Germans attempted 

to complete the previous plan with half the amount of 

explosives required. Furthermore, they failed to properly 

allocate supplies, insisting on sending large amounts to the 

front lines, which incapacitated the rear defenses. Once the 

German forces realized the Americans were encroaching on 

the Rhine River, they failed to respond in a timely manner or 

adapt to the changing situation by allocating supplies to the 

Rhine River bridges. 

Doctrinal Guidance. The lessons learned from this event are 

also covered in U.S. doctrine. FM 3-34, Engineer Operations,

states that responsiveness is “providing the right support in 

the right place at the right time.”9 It includes the ability to 

anticipate operational requirements and involves identifying, 

accumulating, and maintaining the minimum assets and 

capabilities to meet the support requirements. Flexibility is the 

capability to adapt logistical availability based on changing 

situations, missions, and concepts of the operation. Flexibility 

may also include improvisation, which is the ability to make, 

invent, or arrange what is needed from what is on hand. The 

Germans failed in all three aspects by neglecting to allocate 

necessary supplies at the right time. In turn, the engineers did 

not receive the right amount or type of explosives. 

Communications Failures

The third key factor in the success of the American forces 

was caused by the limited communications in Remagen. 

The means of communication and transportation available 

to the German troops at Remagen were very meager. Until 

the beginning of March, neither Captain Bratge nor Captain 

Friesenhahn had a vehicle. The radio and telephone apparatus 

available to the Remagen commanders, although serviceable 

in normal times, was inadequate for an emergency. One 

telephone line connected the bridge to the regular German 

army line running between Bonn and Koblenz, and another 

line was connected by a civilian adapter to military district 

headquarters in Wiesbaden. Frequent bombings disrupted 

the lines for long periods, but even when undamaged, they 

were so busy it usually took a full day to complete a telephone 

call. For contact with the attached units in Remagen, Captain 

Bratge had to depend on the civilian telephone system, which 

was fairly reliable in normal times. However, electricity was 

needed to operate the line and could not always be obtained 

during combat. Also, the line had a tendency to go dead 

Present-day Remagen Bridgehead
January-April 2009 Engineer 69

suddenly when jarred by explosions, and it remained dead for 

weeks after a large bombing attack.10

The limited means of communication had multiple effects. 

When First Lieutenant Timmerman’s few men on the east 

bank were most vulnerable, Major Scheller, the German 

commander, left the battle to find reinforcements, leaving 

Captain Bratge to conduct a counterattack. The ineffective 

communication systems at Remagen made it nearly impossible 

to contact any units outside of the defenders’ immediate 

area. Without adequate transportation, the fastest means of 

contact was by bicycle. Major Scheller did not arrive at the 

67th Corps Headquarters until 10 March. The possibility of 

German forces conducting an effective counterattack on the 

9th Armored Division was nonexistent. 

Lessons Learned. The main lesson offered in this event is 

the importance of communication on the outcome of a 

battle. The inability of the German forces to contact higher 

headquarters or any of the surrounding units made it impossible to conduct an effective counterattack. The minimal 

forces on the eastern banks were not strong enough to defeat 

the U.S. attackers. When the Soldiers of Company A, 27th 

Armored Infantry Battalion, arrived on the eastern banks of 

the river, they had been beaten down by constant fire from the 

German flak guns and snipers, and the unit was at its weakest 

point. If the German higher headquarters had prioritized communications and transportation assets at Remagen, Major 

Scheller would have been able to reach them and surrounding 

German units with enough time to prepare for a counterattack. 

Destroying Company A would have prevented the American 

forces from gaining a foothold on the eastern banks and taking 

the heights of Erpeler Ley. With American forces stuck on the 

western side of the river, the Germans would have had time 

for reinforcements to arrive.

Doctrinal Guidance. U.S. doctrine portrays the importance 

of an effective counterattack. FM 3-90,11 states that the 

commander directs a counterattack to defeat or destroy enemy 

forces, exploit an enemy weakness, or to regain control of 

terrain and facilities after an enemy success. The commander 

plans and conducts a counterattack to attack the enemy when 

and where he is most vulnerable, while he is attempting to 

overcome friendly defensive positions. In every way, the 

situation was right for the Germans to conduct a successful 

counterattack on Company A. If the Germans’ communications 

had been more effective—so they could have contacted another 

unit to reinforce them—they probably would have destroyed 

the American forces on the eastern banks and gained the time 

to receive the necessary reinforcements.

Summary

American forces captured the Ludendorff Bridge by 

an effective use of massing the effects of fire, rapidly 

conducting the operation, and taking the initiative. The 

German forces at Remagen relied heavily on the Volksturm, 

an untrained civilian force, leaving an ineffective defense 

within the city and limited firepower arrayed against the 

9th Armored Division units. The highly trained American 

forces, upon reaching the banks of the Rhine River, integrated 

the fires of their tank companies in multiple positions and 

engaged the German forces on the east banks with massed 

firepower. This allowed Company A, 27th Armored Infantry 

Battalion, to successfully cross the bridge and secure the 

bridgehead. The German forces were often slow to adapt 

to changes and often failed to effectively react. From their 

positions atop Erpeler Ley, the Germans could see the 

approach of the American forces, allowing ample time to blow 

the bridge or even retest the explosives. Seeing the size of the 

American force and knowing their composition, the Germans 

knew they were outnumbered and should have attempted 

communication with nearby units much sooner. The American 

forces moved rapidly from the start of the operation, adapting 

to change with little or no pause. When the 9th Armored 

Division Soldiers were given the mission to cross the Rhine 

River, they did not know that the Ludendorff Bridge was still 

standing. The American forces adapted to the situation and 

took the initiative to conduct a bridge-crossing operation 

within hours of discovering the still-standing bridge. 

Captain Halloran is the operations and training officer of 

the 169th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. 

Previous assignments include platoon leader with Bravo 

Company, 9th Engineer Battalion, in Schweinfurt, Germany, 

with which he deployed to East Baghdad as part of Task 

Force 1-26 Infantry. He holds a bachelor’s in biology from 

John Carroll University in University Heights, Ohio, and 

is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Basic Course, the 

Safety Officer Course, the Unit Movement Officer Course, 

the Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agent Course, and the 

Engineer Captains Career Course.

Endnotes

1 M. Oyloe, C. Donnell, R. Gilmore, W. Hagan, R. Hardie, 

“Remagen Bridgehead, Offensive, Hasty Assault, River 

Crossing,” United States Army Combat Studies Institute 

Battlebook 16A, Army Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1996.

2 Hechler, Ken, The Bridge at Remagen, Pictorial Histories 

Publishing Company, Incorporated, Missoula, Montana, 

2001.

3

 Ibid., p. 40. 

4

 Ibid., p. 41.

5

 FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001.

6

 Hechler, p. 58.

7

 Oyloe, Donnell, Gilmore, Hagan, Hardie, p. 45. 

8 Hechler, p. 58.

9 FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, 2 January 2004.

10 Hechler, p. 43.

11 FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001.
70 Engineer January-April 2009

Base camp planning typically does not include a strategy for long-term management of nonhazardous solid waste, because this issue has low priority compared to 

other operational concerns. However, for camps that endure 

and evolve toward semipermanent status, solid waste quickly becomes a very large problem. Ideally, longer-term plans 

would put equipment and services in place when needed to 

handle the waste produced.

Solid Waste Studies

Before planners can identify ways to manage solid 

waste at base camps, they need to know the types and 

amounts of waste to be expected. Two studies completed by the United States Army Engineer Research and 

Development Center (ERDC) characterize, for the first time, 

the makeup of solid waste generated at military base camps. 

The findings are published in two ERDC technical reports 

and summarized in a public works technical bulletin (PWTB) 

issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers.1

ERDC’s Construction Engineering Research Laboratory 

(CERL) conducted the studies at two base camps in the Balkans. The sites included Camp A, which in 2003 had recently 

transitioned from contingency operations (CONOPS), and 

Camp B, which in 2006 had matured to semipermanent infrastructure capable of sustaining long-term missions. The research covered only nonhazardous solid waste such as plastic, 

light metal, paper and cardboard, scrap wood, sewage sludge, 

ashes, and miscellaneous trash.

Solid Waste Types

Results showed that the types of solid waste produced 

at the two camps were roughly similar. However, the 

amounts of specific waste types differed greatly. For 

example, much more plastic trash was found at the transitioning CONOPS site, Camp A, than at the more established 

Camp B. This was probably due to gradual replacement of 

single-serving bottled water with central distribution points 

for purified water at the older camp. The table on page 71 

summarizes the waste produced at each camp. (Sites are not 

identified for operational security reasons.)

Plastic. The number of plastic bottles significantly decreased from 2003 at Camp A to 2006 at Camp B. This is 

likely due to efforts in the Balkan camps to provide bulk 

drinking water supplies to replace bottled water. However, the 

generation of “other plastic” significantly increased, possibly

due to increased post exchange (PX) services on the base 

camps, which created an 

increase in disposal of plastic 

packaging.

Light Metal. The light 

metal increased in 2006 at 

Camp B, perhaps because of 

an increase in the disposal 

of metal cans by the dining 

facility, where fewer meals, 

ready-to-eat, were issued, 

and more canned drinks became available at the PX.

Paper and Cardboard.

The amount of paper and 

cardboard generated per person almost tripled from the 

2003 Camp A sorting to the 

2006 Camp B sorting. The 

greatest increases were in paper. This may be due in part 

to a fully stocked PX and 

Studies Define Solid Waste 

Stream at Base Camps

By Mr. Gary Gerdes

To characterize the waste stream at both base camps, garbage was first sorted by 

category. 

Photograph courtesy U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center
January-April 2009 Engineer 71

disposal of packaging. A high moisture content undoubtedly 

contributed to the high generation rate as well.

Scrap Wood. The amount of scrap wood showed a decrease of 75 percent in 2006 at Camp B compared to 2003 at 

Camp A, which might be attributed to two factors: Camp A in 

2003 may have had more construction activities that created 

a large amount of construction debris; and it may have been 

more dependent on goods shipped from the United States, as 

opposed to the local economy, where goods were not palletized and arrived in smaller trucks.

Sewage Sludge. The huge increase in sludge generation 

cannot be explained. The sewage sludge reported in the 2003 

Camp A survey was reported as dried solids. The moisture 

content of the sludge reported in the 2006 Camp B survey 

was not known, but was probably somewhat dry according 

to pictures in the report. It is possible that at the 2006 survey 

site, sewage sludge was collected from other base camps for 

disposal at the composting facility, thus raising the apparent 

generation rate.

Ashes. The results of the 2003 Camp A survey were based 

on the waste before incineration, because all wastes at Camp 

A were incinerated. The camp where the 2006 Camp B survey 

was done used an incinerator to dispose of items for security 

reasons, such as uniforms and documents. Since these items 

were always incinerated to ash, the ash was considered to be a 

component of generated waste. The materials that were incinerated were not included in other component fractions.

Miscellaneous. This category was significantly higher in 

the 2006 Camp B survey. Descriptions of the waste being 

sorted indicated that it was much wetter in 2006 than in 2003 

at Camp A, making it more difficult to sort. It is also possible 

that the workers in 2003 were much more diligent at pulling 

apart compressed waste.

Conclusion

By understanding the types of solid waste produced under different circumstances, military base camp planners will be better able to develop strategies for its 

disposal. This information will enable proactive efforts to procure equipment and services to handle the waste in a timely 

fashion and ensure sustainable base camp operations.

Mr. Gerdes is a researcher at ERDC–CERL. During his 

35 years at CERL, he has conducted studies in the areas of 

solid waste processing and management; oil-water separator 

design and management; and tactical vehicle washing. He 

holds a bachelor’s from the University of Illinois and a master’s from the University of Missouri. He can be reached at 

(217) 373-5831 or <gary.l.gerdes@usace.army.mil>.

Endnote

1 Public Works Technical Bulletin 200-1-51, “Solid Waste 

Generation Rates at Army Base Camps,” 1 April 2008, <http://

www.wbdg.org/ccb/ARMYCOE/PWTB/pwtb_200_1_51.pdf>.

References

Gerdes, G.L., and A.L. Jantzer, United States Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC)/ Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL) Technical Report (TR)-06-24, “Base Camp Solid Waste Characterization 

Study,” Champaign, Illinois, 2006.

Jantzer, A.L., and G.L. Gerdes, ERDC/CERL TR-05-34, 

“Base Camp Utility Technology Matrix,” Champaign, Illinois, 2005. 

Results of Characterization Studies

Component

Plastic bottles

Other plastic

Aluminum

Light metal

Cardboard (and paper)

Other paper

Food and vegetation waste

Textiles

Glass

Rubber

Polystyrene

Scrap wood

Sewage sludge

Ashes

Miscellaneous

Total

2006 Data (Camp B) 2003 Data (Camp A)

lb/person/yr Percent lb/person/yr Percent

196

502

46

202

529

974

609

95

37

4

21

1076

688

811

838

6627

3.0

7.6

0.7

3.0

8.0

14.7

9.2

1.4

0.6

0.1

0.3

16.2

10.4

12.2

12.6

100.0

295

143

10

11

349

179

418

25

40

4

9

4151

70

52

5756

5.1

2.5

0.2

0.2

6.1

3.1

7.3

0.4

0.7

0.1

0.2

72.1

1.2

0.0

0.9

100.0
72 Engineer January-April 2009

I

n the current operating environment in Iraq, it is more important than ever to have all of the 

right answers. But what do you do 

if you are an engineer officer who is 

uncertain of the correct answer in a 

particular situation? The solution is 

easy—use the engineer “reachback” 

capability. The reachback capability is 

nothing new. The United States Army 

Engineer Research and Development 

Center (ERDC) has been using it for 

years, but unfortunately, awareness of 

this great resource is either unknown 

or unused by most engineers. Just recently, the 561st Engineer Company 

“Warriors” in Iraq learned just how 

valuable that resource is.

The reachback capability provides 

engineers in remote locations access 

to unique subject matter experts. 

This system connects the engineers 

with questions to the engineers with 

answers. ERDC employs highly educated, well-qualified professionals with diverse engineering 

degrees to help tackle any problem, and they are available to 

Soldiers on the ground 24 hours a day.

Engineers from the 561st were assigned the mission of 

constructing an unimproved road to provide freedom of maneuver to an armor task force near the Iranian border. Along 

the route was an unclassified bridge with no known load classification capacity. Field manuals only account for maximum 

load capacities (MLC) up to certain limits and knowing the 

exact MLC of the bridge became extremely important to the 

maneuver units on the ground, which have various pieces of 

heavy equipment of many different weights. 

The professionals at the United States Army Maneuver 

Support Center (MANSCEN), at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, were quick to jump aboard to help when the 561st contacted them via e-mail. The 561st engineers provided MANSCEN with all of the known dimensions and data. In addition, 

the 561st engineers were able to communicate on-site using a 

device called the TeleEngineering Toolkit, enabling the engineers at MANSCEN to “see” the problem. 

Essentially, the TeleEngineering Toolkit is a video teleconferencing unit hooked up to a laptop computer and a mobile 

phone. With a precoordinated linkup time, the system lets 

both parties communicate in real time. After compiling all the 

necessary information, a team of stateside bridge engineers 

was busy writing down formulas and going over equations, 

ultimately concluding that the bridge was not safe for tracked 

vehicles weighing more than 82 tons.

Engineer reachback is not limited to bridge classification. 

It can be used in almost any situation where engineers have 

limited resources to solve complex problems. The subject 

matter experts at MANSCEN are equipped with engineering 

expertise ranging from the history of a specific watershed to 

building designs to soil stabilization methods. One of the most 

important lessons learned by the deployed Soldiers of the 

561st Engineer Company—do not hesitate to refer problems 

to the qualified engineers at MANSCEN. 

First Lieutenant Lanternier is the executive officer of the 

561st Engineer Company (Horizontal), 84th Engineer Battalion, deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Previously she was a platoon leader with the 643d Engineer 

Company (Vertical), 84th Engineer Battalion, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and platoon leader for the 561st Engineer 

Company. She holds a bachelor’s in civil engineering from 

the United States Military Academy. In 2007, she passed 

the fundamental engineering exam and is now an engineer 

in training.

By First Lieutenant Kelly Lanternier

Getting the Right Answers

With a clear view of the bridge in the background, the MANSCEN engineers can see 

the problem and receive valuable feedback from the engineers on the ground.

Photo by Specialist Josiah E. Johnson
January-April 2009 Engineer 73

By Mrs. Rebecca C. Wingfield

Waste-to-Energy Systems

One of our newest resources is common, everyday 

trash. “Basic” science tells us that all objects have 

energy, whether they are trash, scraps, or treasure. 

Therefore, with the energy situation we are in, many have 

begun—or already had been—looking at our newest resource 

for energy. After all, a British thermal unit (BTU) of trash is 

the same as a BTU of petroleum. This idea has the potential 

to make companies a lot of money if they can solve some of 

the problems associated with turning waste (trash) into clean 

energy.

Clean energy is the crux of the problem. In former times 

when it was common, open burning of trash was smelly, dirty, 

and not very efficient. The Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) was created in 1970 with a mandate to clean up and 

protect the environment, so open trash burning in dumps in 

the United States became a thing of the past.

“. . . [President Nixon] and Congress worked together to 

establish the...EPA...in response to the growing public demand 

for cleaner water, air, and land. Prior to the establishment of 

the EPA, the federal government was not structured to make a 

coordinated attack on the pollutants that harm human health 

and degrade the environment. The EPA was assigned the 

daunting task of repairing the damage already done to the 

natural environment and to establish new criteria to guide 

Americans in making a cleaner environment a reality.”1

The next phase was to burn 

trash in special incinerators to 

produce heat energy, which 

was done on several college 

campuses and some military 

installations. Many of these 

incinerators shut down in 

the 1980s due to tougher air 

pollution regulations. Now, 

we are considering using 

municipal solid waste (MSW) 

(trash) to produce energy 

(electricity) for cities and 

elsewhere. 

Systems Under 

Development

Technology is advancing, and several 

types of systems for 

producing energy are being 

tested:

Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery

Last summer in Iraq, a system was tested called “Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery” or TGER (pronounced 

“Teeger”). 

“TGER is small enough to fit into a CONEX [military 

shipping] container, but . . . [powers] a standard 60-kilowatt 

generator. TGER works by turning the solid [mixed waste] 

trash into fuel pellets which are fed into a down-draft gasifier. 

The gasifier [another word for a pyrolysis system] then 

heats the pellets, and breaks them down into a synthetic gas 

[syngas] composed of simple hydrocarbons that resembles 

low-grade propane. TGER processes the liquid and food waste 

into a hydrous ethanol, which is blended with the syngas to

create usable energy. It takes TGER six hours to fully 

power up, during which time the amount of diesel fed

into the machine slowly drops, until the generator is powered by less than one gallon of fuel per hour, as compared to 

five per hour without TGER.”2

TGER’s fuel is a mixed waste stream of sorted MSW of 

papers, plastics, and food-slop garbage. TGER, as it was

tested, does not process glass, metals, or hazardous 

waste streams like medical wastes. This waste must still be 

processed some other way, but TGER is a step in the right 

direction. 

Swearing in of the first Environmental Protection Agency administrator in 1970.
74 Engineer January-April 2009

Biotechnologies

The Army has seen the opportunity to use biotechnologies 

to solve real problems to provide energy to power generators, 

and so forth, which provide about half of all the energy used 

at most forward operating bases (FOBs).3

 A new biorefinery 

from the United States Army Research, Development and 

Engineering Command (RDECOM) could cut down on the 

need for some of the fuel convoys during deployments. “The 

two 4-ton machines were designed to fit into standard ISO 

[International Organization for Standardization] containers, 

bringing the technology down to a size that is easily transportable.”4

 According to RDECOM, the technology itself 

is not new: 

“What’s new about it is the way we put together two 

different technologies to have a hybrid. First, all the garbage 

is fed into a chute . . . ground . . . pelletized and gasified. . .

Advanced fermentation is used for the food slop and field 

rations, which get converted into hydrous ethanol. We take 

those two streams and we blend them, and it gets aspirated 

into a standard Army generator set . . . a TGER unit can 

handle about a ton of garbage a day,” creating a potentially 

significant alternative fuel source for the military. “So if we 

can keep some of the convoys off the roads . . . drastically cut 

down on fuel use, it’s a good thing all around. The only other 

byproducts from the TGERs are ash . . . a benign soil additive, 

and water . . . Once the TGER is ready for prime time, there’s 

likely to be plenty of need for the units, and not just in the 

Army. The potential for their use at something like a postKatrina event is huge, because there was plenty of garbage, 

plenty of trash, but no power. [Other uses for them could be] 

. . . at campsites, at hospitals, at schools,” or wherever there 

are people creating masses of trash.5 

Pyrolytic Gasification

Pyrolytic gasification is not a new term. “The principles 

were first brought forth in 1958 at Bell Laboratories within 

the United States. . . . Thereafter, a number of universities 

and organizations around the world started R&D [research 

and development] programs. The word pyrolysis, meaning 

chemical change brought about by heat,is widely used— even 

by incineration technologies, which have tried to escape their 

roots in oxidation and combustion because of the problems 

prevalent with both. Gasification is . . . the chemical reaction 

and molecular breakdown or degradation of materials.

The first pyrolytic gasification systems were brick ovens 

that used indirect heat/low oxygen.... Waste was placed into 

the unit, the unit was sealed, and heat applied. After the 

process of degradation was completed, the oven was opened 

and emptied to make room for the next batch. Therefore, these 

systems were known as batch-by-batch systems. This format 

was first introduced commercially in the early 1970s.”6

Across the pond, the Royal Navy is using technology to 

produce energy from waste with pyrolysis technology from 

QinetiQ.® “As landfill sites become increasingly overloaded 

and refuse disposal an escalating problem, engineers have 

perfected a technology that not only breaks down waste to 

just a fifth of its previous volume, but generates energy at the 

same time.”7

In this technique of burning waste without oxygen, 

“. . .pyrolysis as a method of waste disposal provides a host 

of potential benefits. Unprocessed waste can be treated in 

a burner to reduce its mass by 80 percent. The end product 

is an inert ash, which itself is useful and can be bonded to 

form the lightweight blocks used for building internal walls. 

Additionally, pyrolysis has the potential to generate ‘green’ 

HMS Ocean received a pyrolysis unit in 2008.
January-April 2009 Engineer 75

energy as a byproduct. Pyrolysis yields an 80 percent heat 

output: if you put 100 kilowatts of energy into the process, it 

produces 80 kilowatts of heat energy. This heat can be used to 

power a steam turbine to generate electricity.”8

Although this process affords the benefits of cutting down 

numbers of personnel and saving valuable space, “the pyrolysis 

system has not been without considerable engineering 

challenges, however. The system is shaped like a tube, into 

which the waste is inserted at one end. A screwlike device then 

pushes waste along the tube at enormous pressure. As the waste 

passes through, it is heated—without oxygen—to between 800 

and 1,100 degrees celsius (C). By the time it reaches the end 

of the tube, it has been reduced to a grey ash, which can be 

emptied out. The heat energy by-product of the process is fed 

back into the system and is used to drive the device so that, 

once started, it effectively becomes a self-driving process. The 

ship-based burners are designed to handle 2.8 tons of waste 

per day—roughly the amount of waste produced by the ship’s 

complement.”9 

Modular and Containerized Technologies

Several research and development systems have been 

developed that integrate technologies into modular and 

containerized systems. These systems usually consist of a 

solid waste management system, a water purification system,

a power generation system, and/or living units. One of the 

requirements of a modern military force is that it be modular 

and scalable, which this system is. Approximately 20 ISO 

containers can carry one system that provides virtual selfsufficiency for a community of 500 people in drinking water 

and waste management. The plant, which is capable of dealing 

with about 2 tons of mixed solid waste per day, will destroy 

wood, paper card, food, plastics, and sanitary, clinical, and oil 

waste and satisfies 

the emission requirements of the 

European Union. 

This system is 

supplemented by 

harvesting water 

from the air and 

from the diesel 

generator exhaust 

gas stream. When 

burned, diesel fuel 

generates a useful 

amount of water 

vapor. The exhaust 

gas stream from the 

diesel generator is 

processed to remove 

the entire water 

content, which is 

then sent to the 

liquid waste plant 

for purification. As 

newer technology becomes available, other containers could 

easily be integrated into the system. 

Waste Streams

“A wide variety of waste streams can be used for power 

production . . . The moisture content in sewage sludge and 

other toxic liquids or waste materials having high oxygen 

content will be dehydrated prior to system introduction. 

A material recovery facility—sometimes referred to as a 

municipal recycling facility (MRF)—for front-end material 

handling will be waste-stream specific in design. Liquids 

will be conveyed by a cavitation pump, whereas solids are 

generally transported by a conveyor system. 

Transportable electrical power that is generated by the 

process is in the region of 3.8 kilowatt-hours per 7000± BTUs, 

which is the average value per pound produced by MSW—one 

of the lowest in calorific value. Higher BTU values of 14,000+ 

per pound in materials such as rubber or plastics will produce 

8+ megawatt-hours. Incineration systems are typically 50 

percent efficient, but with [most pyrolysis systems], 75 to 90 

percent of the BTU value (depending on the waste stream) is 

available as an energy source.”10

Summary

Waste-to-energy is a way to use MSW and other 

waste streams to produce electricity for use in 

cities and elsewhere. For the military to use 

this technology, it must be scalable and modular. Current 

research in systems such as TGER, biotechnologies, pyrolytic 

gasification, and modular and containerized technologies is 

yielding more economical and environmentally protective 

solutions for clean energy. Waste-to-energy systems are the 

Contractors install the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery (TGER) in Iraq.
76 Engineer January-April 2009

wave of the future for many reasons, but mostly because they 

are the smart and right thing to do.

Mrs. Wingfield is a civil engineer working for the United 

States Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri, in the Directorate of Environmental Integration. 

She previously spent 13 months with for the United States 

Army Corps of Engineers as a project engineer stationed 

in Basra, Iraq, and at Contingency Operations Base Adder 

near Nasiriyah, Iraq. She has also worked at Fort McClellan, 

Alabama; for the Department of Defense Dependent Schools

in the Federal Republic of Germany; and for the state of 

Illinois. She holds a bachelor’s in civil engineering from 

the University of Missouri-Rolla (now Missouri University 

of Science and Technology). In January 2009, she was 

awarded LEED-AP accreditation (Leadership in Energy and 

Environmental Design—Accredited Professionals) by the 

United States Green Building Council (ISGBC), of which the 

United States Army is one of the leading members.

Acknowledgment

Special thanks go to Dr. James Valdes, scientific advisor for 

biotechnology at the Army’s Edgewood Chemical Biological 

Center, United States Army Research, Development and 

Engineering Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 

for his considerable input to the Ehrlich and Kyzer articles. 

Endnotes

1 “Our History,” About EPA website, <http://www.epa.gov/

epahome/aboutepa.htm>, accessed 30 January 2009.

2 Lindy Kyzer, “Army Turning Trash into Energy in Iraq,”

Army Times, 19 June 2008, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/

06/19/10194-army-turning-trash-into-energy-in-iraq/>, accessed 

30 January 2009.

3 Ibid.

4 David Ehrlich, “Tactical Biorefineries go to Iraq.” Cleantech 

Group LLC, 29 April 2009, <http://cleantech.com/news/print/

2774/>, accessed 30 January 09.

5 Ibid.

 6 Balboa Pacific Corporation, “History of Pyrolysis,” 26 June 

2007, <http://balboa-pacific.com/balboa_sitemap.htm>, and web 

site <http://www.balboa-pacific.com/Papers/HistoryOfPyrolysis.

pdf>, accessed 30 January 2009.

7 G. A. Chadwick, “Ship-shape way of generating power,” 

The Independent, p. Environment, 31 May 2008. <http://www.

independent.co.uk/environment/a-shipshape-way-of-generatingpower-839890.html >, accessed 30 January 2009.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Balboa Pacific Corporation, “Waste to Energy,” 27 June 

2007, <http://balboa-pacific.com/WasteToEnergy/>, and website 

<http://balboa-pacific.com/WasteToEnergy/WasteToEnergy.pdf>,

accessed 30 January 2009.

Engineer is a professional-development bulletin designed 

to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas 

within the Army engineer community. We include articles by 

and about officers, enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, 

doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other 

areas of general interest to engineers. Articles may share 

good ideas and lessons learned or explore better ways of 

doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations 

not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text 

length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight doublespaced pages). Shorter after-action-type articles and reviews 

of books on engineer topics are also welcome.

Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that 

illustrate information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them 

as a separate file. Do not embed photos in PowerPoint®. If 

illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid excessive use of color 

and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower 

than 200 dpi. Images copied from a website must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content 

of the article. Also include a short biography, including your 

full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past 

assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; and a fax number and commercial daytime telephone 

number.

Articles submitted to Engineer must be accompanied by a 

written release by the author’s unit or activity security manager 

prior to publication. All information contained in the article must 

be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. 

Engineer is distributed to military units worldwide and is also 

available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, 

it is readily accessible to non-government or foreign individuals 

and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. They are accepted for publication only after thorough 

review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we 

will notify you. Therefore it is important to keep us informed of 

changes in your e-mail address and telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and 

structural changes as well as editing for style.

Send submissions by e-mail to <leon.engineer@conus.

army.mil> or on a 3 1/2-inch disk or CD in Microsoft Word, 

along with a double-spaced copy of the manuscript, to: Managing Editor, Engineer Professional Bulletin, 464 MANSCEN 

Loop, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926.

Note: Please indicate if your manuscript is being considered for publication elsewhere. Due to the limited space per 

issue, we usually do not print articles that have been accepted 

for publication by other Army professional bulletins.

The Engineer Writer’s Guide
January-April 2009 Engineer 77

As with many aspects of military history, 

the origins and originators of 

military customs, emblems, and 

insignia are lost to the mist of the past. 

This is certainly the case with the 

distinctive button worn by engineer 

officers—the Essayons Button. 

Evidence does suggest that it is 

the oldest uniform element or 

emblem unique to the Corps of 

Engineers.

The history of the Essayons 

Button can be traced to the earliest 

days of the Corps of Engineers. As 

early as the American Revolution, 

there was an effort to distinguish the 

uniforms of the engineers from those 

of the rest of the Army. However, during 

the Revolution, officers wore buttons either 

identifying them with their states, if they were militia, 

or with “USA,” if they were with the regular Continental 

Army. 

In 1794, Congress authorized a regiment of artillerists 

and engineers that took station at West Point, New York. In 

time, the officers of this regiment wore a button with an eagle 

standing on a field piece. Later, the eagle disappeared and the 

inscription USA&E, for U.S. artillerists and engineers, was 

placed on the button. In 1802, the artillery and engineers were 

separated, forming their own independent corps. Once again, 

efforts were initiated to create something that could distinguish 

engineer officers from those of other branches or arms.

Sometime between 1802 and 1814, the design for the 

Essayons Button was developed. At that time, the Corps’s 

primary mission was the construction of coastal fortifications. 

The first Commandant of the United States Military Academy, 

and Chief Engineer, Major Jonathan Williams, was given 

the freedom to develop uniform items for the Corps and the 

cadets at West Point. A map of the coastal fortifications at 

Charleston, South Carolina, drawn in 1806, shows an eagle 

with a scroll in its beak with the word “Essayons”—the first 

time that this French word, meaning “we will try,” is found 

on a formal document produced by the Corps. A map made of 

the defenses of New York Harbor the following year also had 

an eagle and the word “Essayons.” In addition, it had a water 

bastion, and rays depicting the rising sun. Therefore, by 1807, 

all of the elements of the Essayons Button had been adopted 

and used by officers of the Corps.

The earliest reference to the Essayons Button 

is found in an account written by General 

George D. Ramsey. Recalling his days 

as a cadet in 1814, he noted that “...

Captain Partridge was never known 

to be without uniform... His was 

that of the Corps of Engineers, 

with the embroidered collar 

and cuffs and the Essayons 

Button....”1

 Clearly, Major 

Williams and other officers of 

the Corps had arrived at a design 

for a button to distinguish the 

uniform of the engineer officer. 

Influenced by the historic ties with 

French engineers, the leadership of 

the Corps of Engineers had not only 

adopted the French term “Essayons” 

but also had incorporated it into a button 

showing the principal mission of the engineers—

fortification.

In 1840, the War Department officially endorsed the button 

for the Corps of Engineers. General Orders 7, Adjutant General’s Office, dated 18 February 1840, described the button as 

“an eagle holding in his beak a scroll with the word ‘Essayons,’ a bastion with embrasures in the distance, surrounded by

water, and rising sun....”2

 Of interest, the same general order 

also authorized the turreted castle for wear by engineer officers. 

Coincidentally, the Commanding General of the Army at that 

time was Alexander Macomb, a former engineer officer.

The Essayons Button was, therefore, uniquely associated 

with the Corps of Engineers. When the Army adopted a 

standard button for its uniforms in 1902, the Corps already had 

almost a century of identification with the Essayons Button. 

Consequently, the Corps of Engineers was the only branch 

authorized to retain a distinctive button on the uniforms of its 

officers. 

Dr. Roberts is the Director of Historical Programs, United 

States Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Endnotes

1 Raleigh B. Buzzaird, “The Essayons Button,” Insignia 

of the Corps of Engineers, <http://www.sigma4photo.com/

civilwar/insignia-hist.pdf>, accessed 17 February 2009.

2 “Insignia of the Corps,” http://140.194.76.129/publications 

//misc/un16/c-2.pdf>, accessed 17 February 2009.

By Dr. Larry D. Roberts

The Essayons Button

.