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76–586 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 110–1183 

OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION (TSA): EXAMINING THE TSA’S 

EFFORTS AND PROGRESS ON H.R. 1, IMPLEMENTING 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION 

ACT OF 2007 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 16, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

PAUL NAGLE, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on October 16, 2007 .......................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Dorgan ................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................ 35 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 40 

Statement of Senator Lott ...................................................................................... 48 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Statement of Senator McCaskill ............................................................................. 32 

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 41 

Statement of Senator Smith ................................................................................... 2 

Statement of Senator Snowe ................................................................................... 33 

Statement of Senator Stevens ................................................................................ 43 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 37 

WITNESSES

Berrick, Cathleen A., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) .......................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

Hawley, Hon. Edmund S. ‘‘Kip’’, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security 

Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................. 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX

Letter, dated October 26, 2007, from Marshall S. Filler, Managing Director 

and General Counsel, Aeronautical Repair Station Association to Hon. 

Daniel K. Inouye and Hon. Ted Stevens ............................................................ 51 

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Edmund S. ‘‘Kip’’ Hawley 

by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 53 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 60 

Hon. Trent Lott ................................................................................................. 64 

Hon. Ted Stevens .............................................................................................. 60 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA): 

EXAMINING THE TSA’S EFFORTS AND 

PROGRESS ON H.R. 1, IMPLEMENTING 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 

COMMISSION ACT OF 2007 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, 

presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA 

Senator DORGAN. I call the hearing to order this morning. Senator Inouye is unable to be with us. Senator Stevens will be here 

in about 10 minutes. I’m Senator Dorgan. I’m joined by Senator 

Smith, from Oregon. We will begin the hearing. 

We very much appreciate the witnesses being present. This is a 

full committee hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee, an 

oversight hearing on the Transportation Security Administration, 

examining TSA’s efforts and progress on H.R. 1, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 

We have with us today the Honorable Edmund ‘‘Kip’’ Hawley, Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security, and Ms. Cathleen 

Berrick, the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues in 

the GAO. We appreciate your attendance and your work, and we 

will proceed by asking Mr. Hawley to present testimony, and then 

we will hear from the GAO. 

Let me ask whether we have any members that wish to make 

any brief opening comments. I will put Senator Stevens’ statement 

in the record. Otherwise, we’ll go to the witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

The 9/11 bill included a number of significant transportation security provisions 

in the surface sector modes as well as in aviation, which has been TSA’s primary 

area of focus. 

Anchorage International Airport continues to be the number one cargo airport in 

the U.S. based on cargo landed weight and the third largest by cargo landed weight 

worldwide. In addition to our all cargo operations, the airport is also a major transVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
2 

fer point for passenger air cargo. The improved screening of passenger air cargo will 

provide a higher level of safety and security to my constituents. 

However, Alaska’s economy will be severely impacted if the cargo screening provision in the 9/11 bill is not instituted in a manner that safeguards the flow of commerce. 

I encourage TSA to work diligently and quickly to attain 100 percent screening 

of air cargo, within the bicameral agreed-upon benchmarks that were set within the 

9/11 bill. 

It is essential TSA maximize the screening of cargo on commercial personal aircraft without causing negative repercussions on the flow of commerce. 

Senator SMITH. I have one, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Smith? 

STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator SMITH. I want to thank our witnesses for being here. It’s 

been more than 6 years since the horrific morning of 9/11. On that 

day, we all woke up to the fact that there are people in the world 

who want to do us harm. While we have made notable progress in 

the last 6 years toward securing our transportation systems, there 

is still a great deal of work, obviously, to be done. 

Recently, the GAO released a report detailing the progress of the 

Department of Homeland Security in implementing its mission and 

management responsibilities. The report found, among other 

things, that, in the area of aviation and surface transportation security, moderate progress has been made, while there has been 

substantial progress in securing the maritime environment. The 9/ 

11 Commission bill, that was signed into law this past summer, 

and the SAFE Port Act, that was enacted last year, contained a 

number of mandates aimed at further strengthening the security of 

our transportation system. 

I look forward to hearing from our administrator, Assistant Secretary Hawley, on his plans for implementing the portions of the 

9/11 Commission bill and the SAFE Port Act that fall to his agency 

to carry out. I also look forward to hearing his plans to address 

some of the issues raised by GAO in its progress report. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Smith, thank you very much. 

Let me just make a point on behalf of our Chairman and other 

Members as well that there’s an urgency to this issue. Transportation security is very, very important. We know from our last published National Intelligence Estimate, the leadership of al Qaeda 

continues to plot additional attacks against our homeland. In fact, 

the NIE says the most significant threat to our country is al Qaeda 

and its leadership. They are reconstituted, they are recreating terrorist camps and plotting attacks against our homeland. 

It seems to me the obligation for all of us is not to try to figure 

out how to respond to attacks, but, rather, how to prevent attacks, 

and that’s why there’s an urgency about this issue of transportation security. We have passed a number of pieces of legislation, 

as my colleague, Senator Smith, indicated. There is, uneven 

progress on some of these issues. In some cases, the money has 

been spent with not as much progress as we would hope; in other 

cases, there has been some significant strengthening and progress 

in these issues of transportation security. 

3 

So, your willingness to come, Secretary Hawley, and describe 

from your perspective what has happened is something we welcome. And, Ms. Berrick, we appreciate, as always, the work of the 

Government Accountability Office, and we are anxious to receive 

your testimony, as well. 

So, with that, Secretary Hawley, why don’t you proceed. Your entire statement will be made a part of the permanent record, and 

you may summarize. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you, Chairman Dorgan. Good morning, Senator Smith, Senator McCaskill. I am pleased to be here this morning to talk about TSA’s efforts to implement provisions under the 

new law implementing recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act of 2007. I’m also pleased to join Cathy Berrick, of the GAO, on 

the panel this morning. 

First, I’d like to thank this Committee for its continued support 

for TSA’s mission and for your leadership in writing the 9/11 implementation bill. I particularly appreciate this Committee’s detailed 

understanding of TSA’s operational needs and the Committee’s 

focus on practical solutions to complex problems. 

The challenges of implementing all the provisions of the 9/11 Act 

are formidable, but TSA is committed to achieve the objectives of 

this Committee, the Congress, and the 9/11 Commission. With all 

that we have to do, as Senator Dorgan said in his introductory remarks, we must keep our focus on the highest-priority items, priorities informed and driven by the current threat information. 

Since last June, we have witnessed disrupted attacks in London, 

Denmark, and Germany, as well as a completed attack on Glasgow’s airport in Scotland. There is no reason to think that we are 

exempt from that kind of attack planning. The National Intelligence Estimate, as Senator Dorgan mentioned, indicates that, 

over the next 3 years, the threat will continue, with terrorists attempting transportation sector attacks on a grand scale. We know 

their focus is on using items easily available in grocery- and hardware-store shelves. That means we cannot rely on a checklist mentality, searching bags for a static list of specific prohibited objects 

or becoming stuck in a predictable, and therefore vulnerable, routine. We must use security measures that are unpredictable, agile, 

and adaptable, that put us one step ahead of evolving threats. 

As I’ve said in previous meetings with this committee, TSA has 

added layers of security and additional technology to our airport 

operations. We have continued to provide more training and realthreat testing to our front-line officers. Federal air marshals move 

invisibly to protect Americans wherever they fly around the globe. 

And VIPR teams deploy every week, including this one, somewhere 

in the United States, to support State and local security efforts everywhere in transportation. That is our focus every day. It is on 

that base of daily operations that we address the new requirements 

from the 9/11 legislation. 

In prior hearings, we’ve discussed TWIC and Secure Flight. We 

have discussed the challenges and opportunities of both programs. 

4 

After a great deal of work to strengthen the foundations and build 

privacy protections into both programs, I am pleased to report that 

TWIC and Secure Flight are back on track and moving forward. 

When I appeared before this committee in April, I said the TWIC 

card was on its way. Today, TWIC is up and running. Over the 

next 5 years, approximately a million individuals will use a TWIC 

card, interoperable at 3,200 facilities and 10,000 vessels. Enrollments for TWIC are underway, as we speak, in Delaware this 

morning. Already, we’ve had more than 1,000 pre-enrollments online, and the pace will accelerate across the ports through the end 

of calendar year 2007 and continue at full speed through 2008. 

When I spoke to you last January, we had a very direct conversation about Secure Flight. I promised that we would complete the 

rebaselining of the program, build in privacy protections, and publish the rule. We have done those things, and we are ready to go. 

The rule for Secure Flight has been published, and, after a public 

hearing in September that was available live on the Internet, the 

comment period is open now. It closes next week, and we expect 

to get the final rule out in spring of 2008. 

Should the Congress choose to fully fund the program in Fiscal 

Year 2008, we can begin testing in 2008. 

I am mindful that, despite the progress that TSA has made 

across the board, that there is still much to do, and I look forward 

to our work together to further strengthen security throughout our 

transportation network. Thank you for the opportunity to appear. 

I would be happy to answer questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY

Good morning, Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, and distinguished 

Members of the Committee. I am pleased to speak with you this morning to discuss 

the state of transportation security and the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to begin implementation of the important bill that you just 

passed—the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 

Pub. L. 110–53, (9/11 Act). 

First, I would like to thank this Committee for the continued support you have 

given TSA since its inception and to the Committee staff for its professionalism and 

the hard work and cooperative spirit they displayed in working with the Department of Homeland Security (Department) and TSA to finalize the provisions of the 

9/11 Act. 

TSA appreciates that the 9/11 Act includes many provisions which we sought as 

tools to provide better transportation security to the United States. In particular, 

we are pleased that based on this Committee’s leadership, the 9/11 Act gives us the 

flexibility to craft a robust air cargo security system that will provide security and 

an unimpeded flow of commerce. We also appreciate that the 9/11 Act recognizes 

and supports the expansive training that we are providing to our Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce to move our security outward from the static checkpoint. We very much needed authority to establish an administrative process for 

civil enforcement of surface transportation regulations and orders and you gave us 

that authority. Additionally, you emphatically recognized the importance of our integrated Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams (VIPR), which provide a 

mobile surge of TSA resources in all modes of transportation. 

It is also important to understand the challenge that the 9/11 Act places on TSA 

and our resources. Fully half of the many tasks required of the Department by the 

9/11 Act fall on TSA’s shoulders. They affect all aspects of transportation security, 

including strategic planning, aviation security, rail security, security of public transit facilities, pipelines, over-the-road buses, and trucking security. TSA has a big 

5 

task in continuing the implementation of the 9/11 Act and in working with the 

many stakeholders in the transportation sector to assure the level of security that 

Congress and the 9/11 Commission envisioned. TSA will now need to integrate the 

many mandates in the 9/11 Act into our current priorities and resources to enable 

key initiatives to progress without delay while not losing focus on our threat-based 

operations. 

The current restriction on funding presents an immediate challenge for TSA’s efforts to implement certain requirements of the 9/11 Act. As you know, we are operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR). The CR presents additional financial 

challenges to TSA as we are limited in our spending to a prescribed formula based 

on our Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 appropriations, and we are prohibited from initiating 

new programs or projects that were not funded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. Placed in 

the context of implementing the 9/11 Act, this situation creates particularly difficult 

challenges. 

Additionally, many of the rulemaking requirements mandated in the 9/11 Act do 

not adequately recognize the obligations that TSA must give the many stakeholders 

affected by proposed regulations and the general public an opportunity to be heard 

throughout the development process. These requirements are time consuming but 

are time well spent to assure that our regulations achieve their objective in a way 

that is transparent to stakeholders and the public and does not adversely affect 

travel and commerce. 

TSA is actively working to implement the 9/11 Act and we are assessing what resources are needed to continue the implementation. We are working with our partners in the Department and other Federal agencies toward those goals that require 

close cooperation to implement inter-Departmental and inter-agency requirements. 

Ongoing Threat 

Before I discuss in greater detail the current and future efforts of TSA to secure 

our Nation’s transportation systems and fulfill the requirements of the 9/11 Act, I 

believe it is important for me to explain the context in which TSA operates and the 

direction TSA is going to anticipate threats to transportation. 

The effort to ensure the security of the transportation system remains as important now as it ever has been in the past 6 years. The National Intelligence Estimate 

on threats to the U.S. Homeland issued in July 2007 confirmed publicly that the 

terrorist threat is real. This threat is persistent and evolving. Terrorists maintain 

an undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and show a continued effort to 

adapt and improve their capabilities. They are innovative in overcoming security obstacles. They are training to use improvised explosive devices (IED). Terror groups 

continue to focus on prominent infrastructure targets with the goal of producing 

mass casualties. We know they are working to defeat us, and we must remain vigilant. 

Keeping Ahead of Terrorists 

TSA’s security strategy is based on flexible, mobile, and unpredictable methods. 

To counter the evolving threat and adaptive capabilities of terrorists, we are staying 

ahead by rethinking the entire screening process and changing the legacy systems 

that originated in the 1970s. We are going on the offense to address current threats. 

We are being proactive in an effort to stay ahead of the threats. We, therefore, rely 

heavily upon intelligence. 

Intelligence and information sharing are at the core of our overall transportation 

security strategy. Building on the efforts of our partners in the Intelligence Community (IC), we use intelligence and analysis to prioritize our security activities. We 

begin each day with briefings on the latest intelligence from the IC, and that information drives our decisionmaking process both operationally and strategically. In 

addition, we share intelligence as appropriate with our front-line employees and 

stakeholders, enabling them to make informed security decisions. 

Sharing intelligence information with our stakeholders in surface transportation 

is especially important as they are primarily responsible for providing the direct 

staff and resources to secure their respective transportation systems. Providing intelligence to these stakeholders enables us to partner with them through our security grant programs to apply resources in the most effective way possible. 

We recognize that we cannot protect every person or all property against every 

possible threat to the system. Given the nature of the threats to aviation, we must 

manage risk consistent with what we understand of the threats, vulnerabilities, and 

consequences. We will prioritize our resources to protect against the high-threat, 

high-consequence events. 

6 

Aviation Security 

The discussion of aviation security almost always starts at the familiar TSA security checkpoint. For the two million travelers a day who fly, that is TSA to them. 

However, TSA looks at the checkpoint as but a piece—an important piece—of a 

much larger picture. Therefore, before discussing checkpoint issues, I would like to 

point out that TSA looks at the entire transportation network in evaluating risk, 

including threat information. A large part of TSA’s work involves working closely 

on a daily basis with the intelligence and law enforcement communities and our 

global partners to try to stay ahead of the current threat. 

We have to be strong at the checkpoint, but also many other places—including 

the back, front, and sides of the airport. Risk-based security means that we take 

the whole picture into account and implement selective and unpredictable security 

measures. We must first deny the terrorist a stationary target where a planner can 

take the time to map an attack with high odds of success. Nothing can be uncovered, but likewise, we cannot fool ourselves into thinking that fixed, robust security 

is impenetrable. Our security needs to play offense, not just defense. 

TSA is focusing beyond the physical checkpoint—to push our borders out, so to 

speak—to look more at people and to identify those with hostile intent or those conducting surveillance even if they are not carrying a prohibited item. By spreading 

our layers of security throughout the airport environment and elsewhere, we have 

multiple opportunities to detect terrorists and leverage the capabilities of our workforce, our partners, and our technology. 

Travel Document Checking 

We are placing specially trained TSOs at the front of the checkpoint to review 

travel documents to find fraudulent identification (IDs) and also to look at behavior. 

The 9/11 Commission recognized that travel documents are akin to weapons for terrorists. We will make it harder for dangerous people to use fraudulent documents 

and IDs by raising the standard of inspection and providing additional equipment 

for our TSOs to perform this function. We ask this Committee to fully support the 

President’s budget for this program so that TSA can make a seamless transition 

from the airlines and continue the program with as little disruption as possible to 

the flow of passenger screening. 

Behavior Observation 

We continue to expand the Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques 

(SPOT) program, which utilizes non-intrusive behavior observation and analysis 

techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. Individuals exhibiting specific observable behaviors may be referred for additional screening at the checkpoint 

that may include handwanding, pat down, or physical inspection of their carry-on 

baggage. SPOT adds an element of unpredictability to the security screening process 

that is easy for passengers to navigate but difficult for terrorists to manipulate. It 

serves as an important additional layer of security in the airport environment, requires no additional specialized screening equipment, can easily be deployed to 

other modes of transportation, and presents yet one more challenge for terrorists attempting to defeat our security system. The SPOT program has already added great 

value to our overall security system. For example, a Behavior Detection Officer recently identified an individual at a ticket counter carrying a loaded gun and more 

than 30 rounds of ammunition. 

Aviation Direct Access Screening Program 

We continue to expand the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program—deploying 

TSOs and Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) to locations throughout airports 

to screen airport employees, their accessible property, and vehicles entering a direct 

access point to secured areas of airports. The random screening at unexpected locations is a valuable measure to increase the protection on the ‘‘back side’’ of airports. 

This random and unpredictable screening allows airport workers to perform their 

duties with minimal interruptions and keeps the aviation industry operating. TSA’s 

approach is both practical and effective. Requiring 100 percent screening of all airport workers, even in a pilot program, is contrary to this philosophy; it unnecessarily diverts resources from higher risk operations without providing the improvements in security that we need. We would like to continue to work with the Committee to craft a pilot program that will test varying methods of improving an airport worker screening program that will offer better security. 

This strategy of active, nimble, flexible security depends on the quality of the people involved. TSA has had a major focus on improving security by improving the 

capabilities of its people. Better recruiting and hiring, better training, better incentive systems, career progression opportunity, more involvement in decisions effectVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
7 

ing the workforce, and more recognition of the critical role played by our people— 

these efforts all have a positive effect on the security result TSA delivers. The success of all these programs in increasing the layers of security would not be possible 

without the incredible effort, professionalism, and dedication shown by TSA’s workforce. Our highly trained and highly motivated workforce—TSOs, TSIs, Federal Air 

Marshals (FAMs), and other professionals—have proven to be a nimble, adaptable 

workforce that can quickly adjust to counter an emerging terrorist threat. In August 

of 2006, TSOs employed new standard operating procedures within hours to deal 

with the threat identified as part of the United Kingdom (UK) plot to blow up commercial aircraft with liquid explosives. TSA has rapidly deployed FAMs to international destinations to support its mission coverage based on new threats. We are 

constantly reviewing and adjusting our procedures and strategies to ensure our personnel are ahead of the next threat. TSA’s workforce has met every challenge in the 

past 5 years and I am confident they will continue to do so. 

Workforce Safety 

Maintaining a healthy, able-bodied workforce is also critical to TSA’s mission. We 

improved workplace safety through a series of aggressive initiatives, including nurse 

case managers, Optimization and Safety Teams, automated injury claims filing process, involvement of the National Advisory Council in planning and implementing 

the Safety Week Campaign and other aspects of the Safety Program, deployment 

of contract safety specialists to support TSA field operations, and speedy investigations to correct safety problems. Through these programs, TSA has reduced the rate 

for employees losing time from duty due to injury by almost half from 11.56 per 100 

employees in FY 2005 to 6.75 for the 3rd quarter of FY 2007. 

New Technology 

We are also adding significant new technology. A lesson from 9/11 is that we must 

be proactive—we must anticipate threats that continue to grow in sophistication and 

complexity. This effort includes leveraging the skills of our TSOs with new technology. This next generation of technology will assist our TSOs in separating friend 

from foe, increasing efficiency, and helping minimize the impact to travelers and 

businesses: 

• Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray. We will begin deploying AT X-ray equipment 

for carry-on baggage. It provides TSOs with a better capability to identify and 

detect threats through improved imagery and analysis tools. 

• Checkpoint Automated Carry-On Explosives Detection Systems (Auto-EDS). We 

are exploring Auto-EDS for inspecting carry-on items. Auto-EDS may provide 

additional detection and automation opportunities. 

• Whole Body Imagers. We are pilot testing whole body imagers, such as the 

backscatter and millimeter wave technologies, to quickly and safely screen passengers for prohibited items without the need for physical contact on a voluntary basis. 

• Cast and Prosthesis Scanner. We are testing new cast and prosthesis scanners 

to provide a safe, dignified, and non-invasive way to identify potential threats 

and clear passengers wearing casts, braces, and prosthetic devices. 

• Bottled Liquids Scanners. We have begun deploying liquids scanning devices at 

checkpoints, and are now using a hand-held liquids scanner for non-checkpoint 

screening locations. 

• New Explosives Detection Systems. We are evaluating several new products that 

will greatly increase the speed of handling and screening checked baggage, particularly when integrated into an airport’s baggage handling system, while reducing the size of the footprint of the baggage screening location. 

Improving Security By Improving the Security Experience 

Despite the critical need for enhanced security measures, such as the requirement 

to remove all shoes and the restrictions on liquids, gels, and aerosols, we know we 

need to improve the checkpoint screening process so it is less stressful for the traveling public. 

Working with our stakeholders, we are pursuing programs and processes that improve the security screening process. We are moving from the legacy approach of 

simply looking for weapons to a more fluid process focused on the goals of: (1) improving detection of explosives; and (2) developing the capability to evaluate travel 

documents as well as detect hostile intent or possible surveillance. 

8 

Looking Ahead in Aviation Security 

Screening of Air Cargo 

As you know, the 9/11 Act requires the establishment of a system for industry 

to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft within 3 years. As 

we proceed toward enabling industry to meet the cargo screening requirements, TSA 

will stress effective security management of the air cargo supply chain. This process 

will require substantial collaboration with stakeholders, specifically, U.S.-based 

shippers, freight forwarders, and passenger air carriers. This Committee was a leader in including key language in the bill that authorizes TSA to develop and implement a program that will enable shippers to screen cargo early in the supply chain 

using currently approved screening methods and meeting additional stringent facility and personnel security standards. This is a critical element in enabling the improved security for air cargo on passenger aircraft that Congress requires. I am 

grateful to the Committee for its recognition that better screening occurs when shipments are screened and secured at various points along the supply chain. Waiting 

until the freight is dropped at the airport, often in large pallets, to begin screening 

would result in less effective screening as well as defeat the whole purpose of the 

air cargo system that strives to provide expeditious delivery of goods from origin to 

destination. We are working closely with all stakeholders within the air cargo supply chain and our initial feedback has been very positive. The stakeholders clearly 

recognize the need to achieve our country’s heightened security requirements while 

continuing the free flow of commerce upon which our economy relies. TSA will build 

upon our established programs: air cargo security regulations; Security Directives; 

the Known Shipper Management System; and increased use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams and Transportation Security Inspectors for Cargo. 

In addition, the $80 million dollars appropriated to TSA this year for air cargo 

security as part of the FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (Pub. 

L. 110–28) will contribute to our increased efforts through the hiring of at least 150 

additional cargo inspectors and expansion of the National Explosives Detection Canine Program by no fewer than 170 teams. 

Secure Flight 

TSA has taken a significant step toward implementing the recommendation of the 

9/11 Commission and the requirement of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to enhance the vetting of aviation passengers against terrorist 

watch lists. On August 23, 2007, TSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) proposing implementation of the Secure Flight program. Secure Flight, if 

implemented as proposed, will bring the process of comparing passenger names 

against the watch list, now performed by aircraft operators, into the government, 

and will align domestic and international passenger pre-screening. By establishing 

a more consistent and effective watch list matching process, TSA will strengthen a 

key layer of security and enhance its ability to stop terrorists before they get to the 

passenger screening checkpoint. The program is designed to better focus enhanced 

passenger screening efforts on individuals likely to pose a threat to civil aviation, 

and to facilitate the secure and efficient travel of the vast majority of the traveling 

public by distinguishing them from individuals on the watch list. 

We have taken the time to build the Secure Flight program right, and we believe 

that the NPRM and associated Privacy Act System of Records Notice and Privacy 

Impact Assessment demonstrate that TSA has built a program with the operational 

requirements necessary to enhance aviation security while protecting the privacy 

and civil liberties of the traveling public. The Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

(DHS TRIP) is available for passengers who feel they have been improperly delayed 

or prohibited from boarding an aircraft. 

Over the next few months, TSA intends to begin a testing period using data from 

aircraft operators that volunteer to participate. During testing, air carriers will continue conducting watch list checks for domestic flights, and TSA will compare the 

results of its watch list matching with air carrier results to ensure the validity of 

the Secure Flight system. 

It is therefore extremely critical that Congress provide the necessary funding for 

Secure Flight requested by the President in the FY 2008 budget. Without the necessary funding, the program will have to scale back benchmark testing with airlines, Secure Flight system to airline system testing, parallel operations with airlines, and the stand up of the Secure Flight Service Center or Secure Flight Operations Center. In short, the program would have a system with no ability to connect, 

communicate, or test with airlines for the purposes of implementation. Important 

contract awards would be postponed. From a schedule perspective, rollout of the Secure Flight program would be severely delayed. An immediate concern is the signifiVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
9 

cant budget constraint imposed on the Secure Flight program due to the enactment 

of the current CR. The restrictions on funding under the CR will inhibit TSA’s ability to implement this critical program to improve aviation security and fulfill a key 

recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Now that we have demonstrated major 

progress on the Secure Flight program through the issuance of the NPRM and associated privacy documents, we need your support to fund this vital program. 

General Aviation 

TSA is working closely with the general aviation (GA) community to develop reasonable, feasible, and effective security for GA operations while ensuring that these 

measures support continued operations and increased growth of the industry. 

TSA is also working with aircraft operators and Fixed Base Operators directly to 

develop voluntary programs of verifying the identification of passengers on board 

aircraft and maintaining facility security in and around GA aircraft. 

TSA is working closely with our interagency partners to improve GA security. The 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently issued a NPRM that will require GA operators to submit comprehensive manifest data about passengers, crew, 

and flight information electronically to CBP, as part of its Electronic Advance Passenger Information System (e-APIS), at least 60 minutes before the aircraft departs 

for the United States. 

Currently, we only receive very basic information from GA aircraft coming into 

the United States, such as who is and is not a U.S. citizen. That is not enough. Having this information an hour before departure will give CBP inspectors more time 

to fully pre-screen travelers and crews and take necessary actions to resolve threats. 

Surface Transportation Security 

As the security framework for transportation continues to grow, TSA is moving 

to apply many of the same tools to protect all modes of transportation. TSA is building information sharing networks in surface transportation. We work closely with 

stakeholders in these industries, putting an emphasis on sharing intelligence, capacity, and technology with that of other law enforcement, intelligence or other agencies at every level of government. 

When I appeared before this Committee in January, I explained TSA’s comprehensive strategy that we are applying across all transportation networks, regardless of mode. Today, I want to focus on the last two elements of our strategy: closing 

gaps; and developing enhanced security systems. 

Program Improvements 

Freight Rail. Secretary Chertoff established the priority goal of achieving a 50 

percent drop in the objectively measured risk posed by rail cars carrying toxic inhalation hazards (TIH) by the end of 2008. To achieve this goal, TSA is implementing 

a multi-layered security strategy which includes regulatory development, cooperative agreements, and comprehensive risk-based programs. 

On December 21, 2006, TSA published a proposed rule (NPRM) to strengthen the 

security of the Nation’s freight rail systems in high threat urban areas (HTUA). The 

NPRM addressed shippers, carriers, and receivers of TIHs and other security-sensitive materials by rail. Proposed requirements include railcar location reporting 

within a specific time period and the establishment of a secure chain of custody in 

and through HTUAs. TSA also proposed requirements for designating rail security 

coordinators and suspicious incident reporting by rail mass transit, passenger rail, 

and all freight rail carriers. We intend to publish this final rule by the end of the 

year. 

Prior to publishing the NPRM, TSA separately reached an agreement with the 

rail carrier industry to reduce the standstill time of unattended TIH cars in HTUAs 

beginning in early 2007. To support this effort, TSA is developing a comprehensive 

database to identify highest priority risk reduction opportunities. Additionally, 

working in conjunction with TSA, the Nation’s rail carriers are developing site-specific security plans focused on reducing the risk of TIH cars in HTUAs. 

In addition to reducing the risks to TIH in freight rail transportation, TSA is 

working with rail carriers to raise the baseline in security training. TSA is developing a training video that addresses inspection of TIH rail cars, emphasizing the 

recognition of IEDs, as well as general security awareness for rail employees. The 

video will be available by the end of the year. 

Passenger Transit Programs and Grants. TSA, in partnership with the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Transit Administration, leverages 

the Transit Security Grant Program funds to focus on reducing risk and increasing 

security capabilities in State and local transit systems with the most risk. We are 

continuing research to expand our understanding of the vulnerabilities and the consequences of terrorist attacks on our critical infrastructure, applying the results as 

10 

they are developed in immediate and phased mitigation strategies. We have 

partnered with the National Laboratories and affected passenger transit systems to 

complete assessments of the Nation’s 29 underwater transit tunnels and produce 

priorities for risk mitigation. From the information gained, TSA developed action 

items intended to elevate security, harden targets, and mitigate risk using available 

resources and investment of grant funds. 

A recent change to the Transit Security Grant Program supports the ability of 

high-risk systems to field dedicated anti-terrorism teams through cooperative funding of operational packages. This initiative provides funding for the training and operations of teams specifically deployed to engage in visible and covert activities to 

detect, disrupt, and deter terrorist activities. 

TSA trains and certifies explosives detection canine teams to provide a mobile and 

flexible deterrence and detection capability to passenger transit systems. Since late 

2005, TSA’s National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program has partnered with 

passenger transit systems to deploy some 60 explosives detection canine teams to 

14 major transit systems using a risk-based application of resources. More than 50 

of these teams are currently in place, with the remaining force projected for training, certification, and deployment in the coming months. 

The Department has awarded roughly $18 billion to State and local governments 

for programs and equipment that help to manage risk. In passenger transit, the 

Transit Security Grant Program, which funded $275 million in FY 2007, is the centerpiece of the Department’s interagency strategy to close gaps in operator security 

status and baseline standards. The Department allocates those grants to enhance 

capabilities in areas of weakness identified in the system security assessments 

under the BASE program, with particular emphasis on elevating security posture 

in six fundamental areas underpinning the broader transit security strategy. These 

priority areas are protection of underwater and underground infrastructure; protection of other high consequence systems and assets; expanded random, unpredictable 

security activities for deterrent and disruptive effect against terrorist planning and 

reconnaissance; security training of frontline employees; drills and exercises; and 

public outreach and awareness. Cooperative efforts through the Regional Transit Security Working Groups in higher risk areas secure agreement on risk-based priorities and security enhancement solutions advanced by targeted application of grant 

funds. Amtrak participates in these regional meetings. Additionally, TSA engages 

directly with Amtrak to reach agreement on risk-based priorities and the most effective use of grant funds for risk mitigation and security enhancement. 

An area security assessment indicated a need for a more focused effort on security 

training for transit agency employees. Although an extensive Federal security training program has been implemented since 9/11—including 17 security courses, more 

than 500 course presentations, and more than 78,000 transit employees trained— 

the assessment results indicate wide variations in the quality of transit agencies’ 

security training programs and an inadequate level of refresher or follow-on training. Well-trained employees are a security force multiplier for security efforts implemented by transit agencies. To close the gap identified in the assessments, TSA produced a Mass Transit Security Training Program that assists agencies in developing 

and implementing more consistent training programs. The program aligns substantive training areas with specific types of employees, which in turn guides the 

development and execution of training programs. To support actual delivery of training courses, the Transit Security Grant Program offers a streamlined application 

process to fund the instruction and overtime costs incurred by substitutions for employees in training. This initiative significantly expands the volume and quality of 

training for transit employees during 2007. TSA anticipates maintaining this commitment in future years, as resources allow. 

The collective effort in passenger transit security aims to build security force multipliers in the rail and bus systems—the capabilities of law enforcement and frontline employees and the awareness of the traveling public—and to maximize regional 

collaboration for the employment of the full range of available resources in random, 

unpredictable applications for a deterrent effect. 

Highway. TSA is working on a number of strategies to close gaps in performance. 

We are currently considering a number of voluntary incentive programs and regulatory options. Prior to the enactment of the 9/11 Act, TSA was developing many 

programs and initiatives in collaboration with industry within the context of implementing the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TSSP), Highway and Motor Carrier Modal Annex. 

These programs and initiatives include the following: 

Training: The School Transportation Security Awareness Program, Hazardous 

Materials (HAZMAT) Motor Carrier Security Self-Assessment Program, Federal 

11 

Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) training course for commercial 

motor vehicle (CMV) enforcement officers and security specialists, and Operation Secure Transport Training Program for the over-the-road bus industry 

were developed. 

Standards/Guidelines: Security Standards are currently being developed in collaboration with industry for the HAZMAT Motor Carrier industry, the School 

Transportation Industry, the over-the-road bus industry, and the Highway Infrastructure sector. 

Information Sharing: The Highway and Motor Carrier sector Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) have been developed and are actively meeting on a regular basis. In addition, the Homeland 

Security Information Network Highway portal, TSA Highway & Motor Carrier 

(HMC) Webpage, internal TSA Highway and Motor monthly newsletter for field 

personnel, and inclusion of security notes in industry trade periodicals have 

been developed. The Highway and Motor Carrier Industry Information and 

Analysis Center and Highway Watch programs are active and continually processing reports from highway operators and sharing information between industry and TSA. 

Domain Awareness: Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) are conducted with organizations engaged in transportation by motor vehicle, as well as those that 

maintain or operate key physical assets within the highway transportation community, with a current focus on the transportation of HAZMAT transported by 

motor carriers. TSA is developing a pilot project for testing the feasibility of 

tracking trucks carrying HAZMAT. This practice will allow not only the continual tracking of truck locations, but also hazardous load types in all 50 states. 

The pilot includes the development of a set of protocols capable of interfacing 

with existing truck tracking systems, State and local government intelligence 

operations centers, and Federal law enforcement agencies, as well as first responders. The Integrated Intermodal Information System-Domestic Feasibility 

Study focused on the transportation of Extremely Hazardous Materials throughout the domestic transportation system. 

Plans and Exercises: The Highway and Motor Carrier GCC collaborated with 

the HMC SCC to create the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Modal 

Annex to the Transportation System Sector-Specific Plan. This document describes how the goals and objectives of the transportation sector will be 

achieved to protect the highway transportation system. 

Risk Management and Grants: The Highway Watch Program® is a TSA grant 

initiative that is administered by the American Trucking Associations with an 

enrollment of nearly 500,000 driving professionals to observe, assess, and report 

incidents to the appropriate authorities that are potential terrorist activities, accidents, disabled vehicles, hazardous road conditions, or other highway incidents. In January 2006, TSA initiated a CSR pilot program with the State of 

Missouri Department of Transportation Motor Carriers Services Division 

(MoDOT). 44 MoDOT officers were trained to conduct over 2,700 CSRs during 

their safety audits on trucking companies and their equipment within Missouri. 

The HAZMAT Motor Carrier Security Self-Assessment Training program focuses on transportation security regulations and specific terrorist and criminal 

threats to the HAZMAT motor carrier industry. It conducts security assessments, produces security action items, and reports procedures for security related incidents. The HMC office is supporting the Intercity Bus Security Grant 

Program in assessing which over-the-road motorcoaches qualify for grants and 

how the grant funding can be used to enhance motorcoach security. Additionally, in partnership with the motorcoach industry, we developed training entitled ‘‘Operation Secure Transport’’, which is specifically geared toward passenger motor carrier operators. 

Pipeline. TSA initiated a number of programs to assist pipeline companies in their 

efforts to secure these vital systems. For example, through the CSR Program, we 

compiled the best security practices observed throughout the industry and established that pipeline companies adopt a minimum of 70 percent of TSA pipeline security guidelines. 

TSA partnered with our counterparts in Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) to 

hold an International Pipeline Security Forum. This event provided an opportunity 

for pipeline companies, industry associations, and government representatives to exchange security information and best practices. We continue to work with NRCan 

on cross border pipeline assessments in accordance with the Security and Prosperity 

Partnership agreement. 

12 

Identifying a shortfall in security awareness training through the CSR results, 

TSA developed a compact disc-based training program. Over 300 U.S. pipeline companies, representing approximately 61,000 industry employees, have requested the 

CD and accompanying brochure. 

Enhanced Systems of Security 

The final part of our strategy is to enhance the systems of security. As we take 

actions to close gaps, we also need to improve security technology and practices that 

apply to multiple modes of transportation. 

Over this past summer we began to more broadly deploy VIPR teams in aviation 

and surface transportation facilities. Comprised of TSOs, TSIs, and FAMs, VIPR 

teams collaborate with local law enforcement agencies to intensify the visible presence of security personnel at various points throughout the transportation system. 

More than 100 VIPR deployments have been conducted at key commuter and regional passenger rail facilities, Amtrak stations, ferries, and airports. VIPR teams 

have proven that TSA and our stakeholders can greatly improve security by altering 

and enhancing security measures at transportation facilities. 

The Department is developing a number of screening techniques and technologies 

which may be implemented or deployed quickly to systems facing a specific threat, 

or in support of major events such as National Special Security Events. Pilot programs to test these technologies are already underway in several major American 

cities. 

Mitigation of risk to underwater and underground infrastructure is a top priority 

of the joint Department Science and Technology Directorate and TSA research and 

development effort. Collaborative efforts with particular systems as operational test 

beds advance development of anomaly detection and explosives trace detection; 

smart video surveillance; and integrated prevention and response actions by security and law enforcement personnel. As one example, through the Rail Security 

Pilot, the Department field tested the effectiveness of explosives detection techniques and imaging technologies in partnership with the Port Authority of New 

York and New Jersey. 

Finally, we maintain mobile security equipment, which can fit into two standard 

size shipping containers, for rapid deployment for use in screening and detection at 

any major system in the country, should the need arise. 

In addition to technologies that may apply primarily to passenger modes, TSA is 

working closely with a number of parties to develop advanced railcar tracking systems with geofenced event-notification capabilities. TSA is also cooperating in efforts 

to develop next generation hazardous materials rail cars designed to better withstand terrorist attacks and operating accidents. 

TSA is working with selected hazardous material carriers to test truck tracking 

and control technologies. We are also in the early stages of security technology applications to the pipeline industry. Two specific areas TSA is involved in are blast 

mitigation and unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles. 

In addition to our progress toward implementing the requirements of the 9/11 Act, 

I am pleased to report to this Committee the success of another milestone for TSA 

and the Department. Today, port workers, longshoremen, truckers, and others at 

the port of Wilmington, Delaware became the first workers in the Nation to begin 

enrollment in the DHS Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. This program will ensure that any individual with unescorted access to secure 

areas of port facilities and vessels received a thorough background check and is not 

a security threat. TWIC will be one of the world’s most advanced, interoperable biometric credentialing programs and is powered by state-of-the-art technologies. I 

would like to thank our partners, the U.S. Coast Guard, and maritime stakeholders 

for their valuable input, for making the launching of the TWIC program a reality. 

Conclusion 

Although the threats and challenges to the security of transportation systems are 

numerous, so are the solutions and efforts of TSA to continue to successfully carry 

out our mission. We will continue to use our personnel, information, and technology 

in innovative ways to stay ahead of the evolving threats and facilitate passenger 

travel and the flow of commerce. 

Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, thank you again for the opportunity 

to testify today. I am happy to respond to the Committee’s questions. 

Senator DORGAN. We’re going to ask Ms. Berrick to present her 

testimony from the Government Accountability Office, at which 

point we will be able to ask questions of both witnesses. 

13 

Ms. Berrick, thank you very much for being here, and you may 

proceed. 

STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you, Senator Dorgan, Vice Chairman Stevens, and Members of the Committee, for inviting me here to discuss GAO’s work assessing TSA’s progress in securing the transportation network. 

In August 2007, shortly after the Department of Homeland Security’s 4-year anniversary, we reported on DHS’s progress in satisfying its key mission and management functions, including securing aviation and surface modes of transportation. We based our assessment on over 400 reports and testimonies we’ve completed, assessing DHS’s operations, and, by determining whether DHS generally achieved or generally did not achieve key performance expectations set out for them by Congress, the Administration, and the 

Department itself. 

Overall, we reported that TSA has made moderate progress in 

securing transportation systems. With respect to commercial aviation, we found that TSA generally achieved about 70 percent of the 

24 performance expectations established for them. For example, 

TSA has made significant progress in hiring, deploying, training, 

and measuring the performance of its aviation security workforce. 

These efforts include the development of robust training programs 

for TSO’s, including enhanced explosives detection training and 

standards for determining appropriate TSO staffing levels at airports. TSA also made significant progress in balancing security and 

efficiency in its checkpoint screening procedures and in deploying 

checked baggage screening equipment. However, we found that 

DHS and TSA have made less progress in securing airport perimeters and access to restricted areas, deploying technologies to detect explosives at checkpoints and to screen air cargo, and fielding 

a system to prescreen airline passengers against terrorist watch 

lists for domestic flights, although progress is being made in all of 

these areas. 

One of the most critical areas in which limited progress has been 

made is in the deployment of technologies at airport checkpoints to 

detect explosives on passengers and in their carry-on bags. Although DHS is developing and testing these technologies today, the 

Department reported that the extensive deployment of new technologies at the checkpoint will not be realized for another 2 years. 

Regarding the security of surface modes of transportation, we reported that TSA generally achieved about 60 percent of the performance expectations established for them, or three of five expectations, but their efforts, especially related to commercial vehicles 

and highway infrastructure, are still relatively in the early stages. 

In terms of progress, DHS and TSA have developed an approach 

for securing surface transportation modes through a strategy, have 

conducted risk assessments of related assets, and they have administered grant programs; however, TSA has not determined whether 

it will issue standards for securing all surface transportation 

14 

modes, and is still defining what its regulatory and oversight role 

will be for these modes. 

We also found that, although TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections of some systems, inspectors’ roles 

and missions have not yet been fully defined. 

We also reported that a variety of cross-cutting issues have affected DHS’s and TSA’s efforts in implementing its mission and 

management functions. These include developing results-oriented 

goals and measures to assess performance, developing and integrating a risk-based approach to guide investment decisions, and 

establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing information and coordinating with stakeholders. It will be important 

for the entire Department to continue to address these issues as it 

moves forward. 

In closing, TSA has made considerable progress in securing the 

transportation network, especially related to commercial aviation, 

and its efforts should be commended. However, the agency still has 

work to do in some key areas, most especially related to the deployment of technologies to screen for explosives at checkpoints and in 

air cargo and more fully defining its regulatory role in security for 

surface transportation modes. 

We are currently reviewing many of these key areas, and will 

continue to report to this committee and others on the results of 

our work. 

This concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY

AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress and challenges in securing our Nation’s transportation systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 

originally established as an agency within the Department of Transportation in 

2001 but now a component within DHS, is charged with securing the transportation 

network while also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. TSA has 

primary responsibility for security in all modes of transportation and since its inception has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure 

commercial aviation and surface modes of transportation, including passenger and 

freight rail, mass transit, highways, commercial vehicles, and pipelines. Other DHS 

components, Federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector 

also play a role in transportation security. For example, with respect to commercial 

aviation, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening—in general, the matching of passenger information 

against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft’s departure—for international flights 

operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound air cargo upon 

its arrival in the United States. In addition, responsibility for securing rail and 

other surface modes of transportation is shared among Federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. 

My testimony today will focus on: (1) the progress TSA, and other DHS components have made in securing the Nation’s aviation and surface transportation systems, and (2) challenges which have impeded DHS’s (and, as they relate to transportation security, TSA) efforts to implement its mission and management functions. 

My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the security of the Nation’s aviation and surface transportation systems, including an August 2007 report that highlights the progress DHS has made in implementing its 

mission and management functions.1 In this report, we reviewed the extent to which 

DHS has taken actions to achieve performance expectations in each of its mission 

and management areas that we identified from legislation, Homeland Security PresVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
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idential Directives, and DHS strategic planning documents. Based primarily on our 

past work, we made a determination regarding whether DHS generally achieved or 

generally did not achieve the key elements of each performance expectation. An assessment of ‘‘generally achieved’’ indicates that DHS has taken sufficient actions to 

satisfy most elements of the expectation; however, an assessment of ‘‘generally 

achieved’’ does not signify that no further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, an assessment of ‘‘generally not achieved’’ indicates that DHS has not yet 

taken actions to satisfy most elements of the performance expectation. In determining the department’s overall level of progress in achieving performance expectations in each of its mission and management areas, we concluded whether the department had made limited, modest, moderate, or substantial progress.2 These assessments of progress do not reflect, nor are they intended to reflect, the extent to 

which actions by DHS and its components have made the Nation more secure. We 

conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

Summary 

Within DHS, TSA is the agency with primary responsibility for securing the 

transportation sector and has undertaken a number of initiatives to strengthen the 

security of the Nation’s commercial aviation and surface transportation systems. In 

large part, these efforts have been driven by legislative mandates designed to 

strengthen the security of commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks. In August 2007, we reported that DHS had made moderate 

progress in securing the aviation and surface transportation networks, but that 

more work remains.3 Specifically, of the 24 performance expectations we identified 

for DHS in the area of aviation security, we reported that it has generally achieved 

17 of these expectations and has generally not achieved 7 expectations. With regard 

to the security of surface modes of transportation, we reported that DHS generally 

achieved three performance expectations and has generally not achieved two others. 

DHS, primarily through TSA, has made progress in many areas related to securing commercial aviation and surface modes of transportation, and their efforts 

should be commended. Meeting statutory mandates to screen airline passengers and 

100 percent of checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA 

initially hired and deployed a Federal workforce of over 50,000 passenger and 

checked baggage screeners, and installed equipment at the Nation’s more than 400 

commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using 

explosive detection systems, as mandated by law. TSA has since turned its attention 

to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening—in general, the 

matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft’s 

departure; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the transportation 

security officer (TSO)—formerly known as screener—workforce; strengthening 

screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. In addition to TSA, 

CBP has also taken steps to strengthen passenger prescreening for passengers on 

international flights operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting 

inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States. DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has also taken actions to research and develop aviation security technologies. With regard to surface transportation modes, TSA has taken 

steps to develop a strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and 

freight rail, commercial vehicles, highways, and pipelines; establish security standards for certain transportation modes; and conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly passenger and 

freight rail. TSA also hired and deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of passenger and freight rail systems. DHS also developed and administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes. 

While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the transportation 

network, DHS still faces a number of key challenges that need to be addressed to 

meet expectations set out for them by Congress, the Administration, and the Department itself. For example, regarding commercial aviation, TSA has faced challenges in developing and implementing its passenger prescreening system, known 

as Secure Flight, and has not yet completed development efforts. As planned, this 

program would initially assume from air carriers the responsibility for matching information on airline passengers traveling domestically against terrorists watch lists. 

In addition, while TSA has taken actions to enhance perimeter security at airports, 

these actions may not be sufficient to provide for effective security. TSA has also 

begun efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as 

biometric identification systems. However, TSA has not developed a plan for impleVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
16 

menting such new technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports and 

the commercial airport system as a whole. Further, TSA has not yet deployed checkpoint technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed 

and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. With regard to surface 

transportation security, while TSA has initiated efforts to develop security standards for surface transportation modes, these efforts have been limited to passenger 

and freight rail, and have not addressed commercial vehicle or highway infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels. TSA has yet to provide a rationale or explanation for why standards may not be needed for these modes. Moreover, although 

TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections of some surface transportation systems, inspectors’ roles and missions have not been fully defined. 

A variety of cross-cutting issues have affected DHS’s and, as they relate to transportation security, TSA’s efforts in implementing its mission and management functions. These key issues include agency transformation, strategic planning and results management, risk management, information sharing, and stakeholder coordination. In working toward transforming the department into an effective and efficient organization, DHS and its components have not always been transparent 

which has affected our ability to perform our oversight responsibilities in a timely 

manner. They have also not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts, 

fully developed performance measures, or put into place structures to help ensure 

that they are managing for results. In addition, DHS and its components can more 

fully adopt and apply a risk management approach in implementing its security 

mission and core management functions.4 They could also better share information 

with Federal agencies, state and local governments and private sector entities, and 

more fully coordinate their activities with key stakeholders. 

Background 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in November 2001, 

created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.5

TSA’s aviation security mission includes strengthening the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport areas; hiring and training a screening workforce; 

prescreening passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers, 

baggage, and cargo at the over 400 commercial airports nation-wide, among other 

responsibilities. While TSA has operational responsibility for physically screening 

passengers and their baggage, TSA exercises regulatory, or oversight, responsibility 

for the security of airports and air cargo. Specifically, airports, air carriers, and 

other entities are required to implement security measures in accordance with TSAissued security requirements, against which TSA evaluates their compliance efforts. 

TSA also oversees air carriers’ efforts to prescreen passengers—in general, the 

matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft’s 

departure—and plans to take over operational responsibility for this function with 

the implementation of its Secure Flight program initially for passengers traveling 

domestically. CBP also has responsibility for prescreening airline passengers on 

international flights departing from and bound for the United States,6 while DHS’s 

Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for researching and developing 

technologies to secure the transportation sector. 

TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes with Federal, 

state, and local governments and the private sector. TSA’s security mission includes 

establishing security standards and conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes, including passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and commercial vehicles; and pipelines. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Grant Programs Directorate provides grant funding to surface transportation operators and state and local governments, and in conjunction with certain 

grants the National Protection and Programs Directorate conducts risk assessments 

of surface transportation facilities. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), 

the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA) have responsibilities for establishing standards for passenger rail safety and 

security. In addition, public and private sector transportation operators are responsible for implementing security measures for their systems. For example, the primary responsibility for securing passenger rail systems rests with the passenger rail 

operators. Passenger rail operators, which can be public or private entities, are responsible for administering and managing passenger rail activities and services, including security. 

DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation’s Aviation and Surface Transportation Systems, but More Work Remains 

DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken numerous initiatives 

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tems. In large part, these efforts have been guided by legislative mandates designed 

to strengthen the security of commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001 

terrorist attacks. These efforts have also been affected by events external to the department, including the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to blow up commercial 

aircraft bound from London to the United States, and the 2004 Madrid and 2005 

London train bombings. While progress has been made in many areas with respect 

to securing the transportation network, we found that the department can strengthen its efforts in some key areas outlined by the Congress, the Administration, and 

the department itself. Specifically, regarding commercial aviation, we reported that 

DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations in this area, and has generally not achieved 7 expectations. Regarding the security of surface transportation 

modes, we reported that DHS has generally achieved three performance expectations and has generally not achieved two others. We identified these performance 

expectations through reviews of key legislation, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and DHS strategic planning documents. 

Aviation Security 

Since its inception, TSA has focused much of its efforts on aviation security and 

has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure 

commercial aviation. For example, TSA has undertaken efforts to hire, train and deploy a screening workforce; and screen passengers, baggage, and cargo. Although 

TSA has taken important actions to strengthen aviation security, the agency has 

faced difficulties in implementing an advanced, government-run passenger 

prescreening program for domestic flights, and in developing and implementing 

technology to screen passengers at security checkpoints and cargo placed on aircraft, 

among other areas. As shown in table 1, we identified 24 performance expectations 

for DHS in the area of aviation security, and found that overall, DHS has made 

moderate progress in meeting these expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS 

has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and has generally not achieved 

7 performance expectations. 

Table 1.—Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation Security 

Performance expectation 

Assessment 

Generally 

achieved 

Generally not achieved No assessment made 

Aviation security strategic approach 

Implement a strategic approach for aviation security 

functions ✓ 

Airport perimeter security and access controls 

Establish standards and procedures for effective airport 

perimeter security ✓ 

Establish standards and procedures to effectively control 

access to airport secured areas ✓ 

Establish procedures for implementing biometric 

identifier systems for airport secured areas access control ✓ 

Ensure the screening of airport employees against 

terrorist watch lists ✓ 

Aviation security workforce 

Hire and deploy a federal screening workforce ✓ 

Develop standards for determining aviation security 

staffing at airports ✓ 

Establish standards for training and testing the 

performance of airport screener staff ✓ 

Establish a program and requirements to allow eligible 

airports to use a private screening workforce ✓ 

Train and deploy federal air marshals on high-risk flights ✓ 

Establish standards for training flight and cabin crews ✓ 

Establish a program to allow authorized flight deck 

officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or 

criminal acts ✓ 

Passenger prescreening 

Establish policies and procedures to ensure that 

individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk 

or threat to security are identified and subjected to 

appropriate action ✓ 

18 

Table 1.—Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation Security—Continued 

Performance expectation 

Assessment 

Generally 

achieved 

Generally not 

achieved 

No assessment 

made 

Develop and implement an advanced prescreening system 

to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger information 

to the Selectee List and No Fly List ✓ 

Develop and implement an international passenger 

prescreening process to compare passenger information to 

terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure ✓ 

Checkpoint screening 

Develop and implement processes and procedures for 

physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints ✓ 

Develop and test checkpoint technologies to address 

vulnerabilities ✓ 

Deploy checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities ✓ 

Checked Baggage screening 

Deploy explosive detection systems (EDS) and explosive 

trace detection (ETD) systems to screen checked baggage 

for explosives ✓ 

Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage screening 

equipment at airports ✓ 

Pursue the deployment and use of in-line baggage 

screening equipment at airports ✓ 

Air cargo security 

Develop a plan for air cargo security ✓ 

Develop and implement procedures to screen air cargo ✓ 

Develop and implement technologies to screen air cargo ✓ 

Total 17 7 0 

Source: GAO analysis. 

Aviation Security Strategic Approach. We concluded that DHS has generally 

achieved this performance expectation. In our past work, we reported that TSA 

identified and implemented a wide range of initiatives to strengthen the security of 

key components of the commercial aviation system. These components are interconnected and each is critical to the overall security of commercial aviation.7 8 More 

recently, in March 2007, TSA released its National Strategy on Aviation Security 

and six supporting plans that provided more detailed strategic planning guidance 

in the areas of systems security; operational threat response; systems recovery; domain surveillance; and intelligence integration and domestic and international outreach. According to TSA officials, an Interagency Implementation Working Group 

was established under TSA leadership in January 2007 to initiate implementation 

efforts for the 112 actions outlined in the supporting plans. 

Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. We concluded that DHS has generally achieved one, and has generally not achieved three, of the performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has taken action to ensure the screening of 

airport employees against terrorist watch lists by requiring airport operators to compare applicants’ names against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. However, in June 

2004, we reported that although TSA had begun evaluating commercial airport perimeter and access control security through regulatory compliance inspections, covert testing of selected access procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected 

airports, TSA had not determined how the results of these evaluations could be used 

to make improvements to the Nation’s airport system as a whole. We further reported that although TSA had begun evaluating the controls that limit access into 

secured airport areas, it had not completed actions to ensure that all airport workers in these areas were vetted prior to being hired and trained.9 More recently, in 

March 2007, the DHS Office of Inspector General, based on the results of its access 

control testing at 14 domestic airports across the Nation, made various recommendations to enhance the overall effectiveness of controls that limit access to 

airport secured areas.10 In March through July 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on procedures, plans, and other efforts it had implemented to secure airport perimeters and strengthen access controls, including a description of its 

Aviation Direct Access Screening Program. This program provides for TSOs to randomly screen airport and airline employees and employees’ property and vehicles as 

they enter the secured areas of airports for the presence of explosives, incendiaries, 

weapons, and other items of interest as well as improper airport identification. HowVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
19 

ever, DHS did not provide us with evidence that these actions provide for effective 

airport perimeter security, nor information on how the actions addressed all relevant requirements established by law and in our prior recommendations. 

Regarding procedures for implementing biometric identification systems, we reported that TSA had not developed a plan for implementing new technologies to 

meet the security needs of individual airports and the commercial airport system 

as a whole.11 In December 2004 and September 2006, we reported on the status of 

the development and testing of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 

program (TWIC) 12—DHS’s effort to develop biometric access control systems to 

verify the identity of individuals accessing secure transportation areas. Our 2004 report identified challenges that TSA faced in developing regulations and a comprehensive plan for managing the program, as well as several factors that caused 

TSA to miss initial deadlines for issuing TWIC cards. In our September 2006 report, 

we identified the challenges that TSA encountered during TWIC program testing, 

and several problems related to contract planning and oversight. Specifically, we reported that DHS and industry stakeholders faced difficult challenges in ensuring 

that biometric access control technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment where the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program is 

being initially tested. In October 2007, we testified that TSA had made progress in 

implementing the program and addressing our recommendations regarding contract 

planning and oversight and coordination with stakeholders. For example, TSA reported that it added staff with program and contract management expertise to help 

oversee the contract and developed plans for conducting public outreach and education efforts.13 However, DHS has not yet determined how and when it will implement a biometric identification system for access controls at commercial airports. 

We have initiated ongoing work to further assess DHS’s efforts to establish procedures for implementing biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access 

control. 

Aviation Security Workforce. We concluded that DHS has generally achieved all 

7 performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has hired and deployed 

a Federal screening workforce at over 400 commercial airports nationwide, and has 

developed standards for determining TSO staffing levels at airports. TSA also established numerous programs to train and test the performance of its TSO workforce, 

although we reported that improvements in these efforts can be made. Among other 

efforts, in December 2005, TSA reported completing enhanced explosives detection 

training for over 18,000 TSOs, and increased its use of covert testing to assess 

vulnerabilities of existing screening systems. TSA also established the Screening 

Partnership Program which allows eligible airports to apply to TSA to use a private 

screening workforce. In addition, TSA has trained and deployed Federal air marshals on high-risk flights; established standards for training flight and cabin crews; 

and established a Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and allow 

authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or 

criminal acts. Related to flight and cabin crew training, TSA revised its guidance 

and standards to include additional training elements required by law and to improve the organization and clarity of the training. TSA also increased its efforts to 

measure the performance of its TSO workforce through recertification testing and 

other measures. 

Passenger Prescreening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved one, and 

has not generally achieved two, of the performance expectations in this area. For 

example, TSA established policies and procedures to ensure that individuals known 

to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk or threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate action. Specifically, TSA requires that air carriers check all 

passengers against the Selectee List, which identifies individuals that represent a 

higher than normal security risk and therefore require additional security screening, and the No Fly List, which identifies individuals who are not allowed to fly.14

However, TSA has faced a number of challenges in developing and implementing 

an advanced prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, which will allow TSA to 

take over the matching of passenger information against the No Fly and Selectee 

lists from air carriers, as required by law.15 In 2006, we reported that TSA had not 

conducted critical activities in accordance with best practices for large-scale information technology programs and had not followed a disciplined life cycle approach in 

developing Secure Flight.16 In March 2007, DHS reported that as a result of its rebaselining efforts, more effective government controls were developed to implement 

Secure Flight and that TSA was following a more disciplined development process. 

DHS further reported that it plans to begin parallel operations with the first group 

of domestic air carriers during Fiscal Year 2009 and to take over full responsibility 

for watch list matching in Fiscal Year 2010. We are continuing to assess TSA’s efforts in developing and implementing the Secure Flight program. We have also reVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
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ported that DHS has not yet implemented enhancements to its passenger 

prescreening process for passengers on international flights departing from and 

bound for the United States.17 Although CBP recently issued a final rule that will 

require air carriers to provide passenger information to CBP prior to a flight’s departure so that CBP can compare passenger information to the terrorist watch lists 

before a flight takes off, this requirement is not scheduled to take effect until February 2008. In addition, while DHS plans to align its international and domestic 

passenger prescreening programs under TSA, full implementation of an integrated 

system will not occur for several years. 

Checkpoint Screening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved two, and has 

not generally achieved one, of the performance expectations in this area. For example, we reported that TSA has developed processes and procedures for screening 

passengers at security checkpoints and has worked to balance security needs with 

efficiency and customer service considerations.18 More specifically, in April 2007, we 

reported that modifications to standard operating procedures were proposed based 

on the professional judgment of TSA senior-level officials and program-level staff, 

as well as threat information and the results of covert testing. However, we found 

that TSA’s data collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine 

whether proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. We also reported that DHS and its component agencies have taken 

steps to improve the screening of passengers to address new and emerging threats. 

For example, TSA established two recent initiatives intended to strengthen the passenger checkpoint screening process: (1) the Screening Passenger by Observation 

Technique program, which is a behavior observation and analysis program designed 

to provide TSA with a nonintrusive means of identifying potentially high-risk individuals; and (2) the Travel Document Checker program which replaces current travel document checkers with TSOs who have access to sensitive security information 

on the threats facing the aviation industry and check for fraudulent documents. 

However, we found that while TSA has developed and tested checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities that may be exploited by identified threats such 

as improvised explosive devices, it has not yet effectively deployed such technologies. 

In July 2006, TSA reported that it installed 97 explosives trace portal machines— 

which use puffs of air to dislodge and detect trace amounts of explosives on persons—at 37 airports. However, DHS identified problems with these machines and 

has halted their deployment. TSA is also developing backscatter technology, which 

identifies explosives, plastics and metals, giving them shape and form and allowing 

them to be visually interpreted.19 However, limited progress has been made in fielding this technology at passenger screening checkpoints. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), enacted 

in August 2007, restates and amends a requirement that DHS issue a strategic plan 

for deploying explosive detection equipment at airport checkpoints and requires 

DHS to expedite research and development efforts to protect passenger aircraft from 

explosives devices.20 We are currently reviewing DHS and TSA’s efforts to develop, 

test and deploy airport checkpoint technologies.21

Checked Baggage Screening. We concluded that DHS has generally achieved all 

three performance expectations in this area. Specifically, from November 2001 

through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about 1,600 Explosive Detection 

Systems (EDS) and about 7,200 Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines to screen 

checked baggage for explosives at over 400 commercial airports.22 In response to 

mandates to field the equipment quickly and to account for limitations in airport 

design, TSA generally placed this equipment in a stand-alone mode—usually in airport lobbies—to conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives.23

Based in part on our previous recommendations, TSA later developed a plan to integrate EDS and ETD machines in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. The 

installation of in-line systems can result in considerable savings to TSA through the 

reduction of TSOs needed to operate the equipment, as well as increased security. 

Despite delays in the widespread deployment of in-line systems due to the high upfront capital investment required, TSA is pursuing the installation of these systems 

and is seeking creative financing solutions to fund their deployment. In March 2007, 

DHS reported that it is working with airport and air carrier stakeholders to improve 

checked baggage screening solutions to enhance security and free up lobby space at 

airports. The installation of in-line baggage screening systems continues to be an 

issue of congressional concern. For example, the 9/11 Commission Act reiterates a 

requirement that DHS submit a cost-sharing study along with a plan and schedule 

for implementing provisions of the study, and requires TSA to establish a 

prioritization schedule for airport improvement projects such as the installation of 

in-line baggage screening systems.24

21 

Air Cargo Security. We reported that TSA has generally achieved two, and has 

not generally achieved one, of the performance expectations in this area. Specifically, TSA has developed a strategic plan for domestic air cargo security and has 

taken actions to use risk management principles to guide investment decisions related to air cargo bound for the United States from a foreign country, referred to 

as inbound air cargo, but these actions are not yet complete. For example, TSA 

plans to assess inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets—two crucial elements of a risk-based management approach—but has not yet established a methodology or time-frame for how and when these assessments will be completed.25 TSA 

has also developed and implemented procedures to screen domestic and inbound air 

cargo. We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air carrier and indirect air carrier 

compliance with security requirements. However, we also reported that TSA exempted certain cargo from random inspection because it did not view the exempted 

cargo as posing a significant security risk, although air cargo stakeholders noted 

that such exemptions may create potential security risks and vulnerabilities since 

shippers may know how to package their cargo to avoid inspection.26 In part based 

on a recommendation we made, TSA is evaluating existing exemptions to determine 

whether they pose a security risk, and has removed some exemptions that were previously allowed. The 9/11 Commission Act requires, no later than 3 years after its 

enactment, that DHS have a system in place to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft.27 Although TSA has taken action to develop plans for 

securing air cargo and establishing and implementing procedures to screen air 

cargo, DHS has not yet developed and implemented screening technologies. DHS is 

pursuing multiple technologies to automate the detection of explosives in the types 

and quantities that would cause catastrophic damage to an aircraft in flight. However, TSA acknowledged that full development of these technologies may take 5 to 

7 years. In April 2007, we reported that TSA and DHS’s S&T Directorate were in 

the early stages of evaluating and piloting available aviation security technologies 

to determine their applicability to the domestic air cargo environment. We further 

reported that although TSA anticipates completing its pilot tests by 2008, it has not 

yet established time frames for when it might implement these methods or technologies for the inbound air cargo system.28

Surface Transportation Security 

Although TSA has devoted the vast majority of its resources to securing commercial aviation and to meeting related statutory requirements, it has more recently increased its focus on the security of surface modes of transportation. However, these 

efforts are still largely in the early stages. International events such as the March 

2004 Madrid and July 2005 London train bombings, have, in part, contributed to 

this increased focus. Specifically, TSA and other DHS components have developed 

an approach for securing surface modes of transportation, have taken steps to conduct risk assessments of surface transportation assets; and have administered related grant programs. However, TSA has not issued standards for securing all surface transportation modes, and is still defining what its regulatory role will be. 

Moreover, although TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections of 

some surface transportation systems, inspectors’ roles and missions have not been 

fully defined. As shown in table 2, we identified five performance expectations for 

DHS in the area of surface transportation security and found that, overall, DHS primarily through the efforts of TSA has made moderate progress in meeting these expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved three performance expectations and has generally not achieved two performance expectations. 

22 

Table 2.—Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Surface Transportation Security 

Performance expectation 

Assessment 

Generally 

achieved 

Generally not achieved No assessment made 

Develop and adopt a strategic approach for implementing 

surface transportation security functions ✓ 

Conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments 

of surface transportation assets ✓ 

Issue standards for securing surface transportation modes ✓ 

Conduct compliance inspections for surface transportation 

systems ✓ 

Administer grant programs for surface transportation 

security ✓ 

Total 3 2 0 

Source: GAO analysis. 

Strategic Approach for Implementing Security Functions. We concluded that DHS 

has generally achieved this performance expectation. In May 2007, DHS issued the 

sector-specific plan for transportation systems and supporting annexes for surface 

transportation modes, and reported taking actions to adopt the strategic approach 

outlined by the plan. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan and its supporting modal implementation plans and appendixes establish a strategic approach 

for securing surface transportation modes based on the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and Executive Order 13416, Strengthening Surface Transportation Security. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security 

framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to make effective and appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation decisions. During the course of 

our work assessing freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highway infrastructure security, we identified that TSA has begun to implement some of the security initiatives outlined in the sector-specific plan and supporting modal plans. While DHS 

has issued a strategy for securing all transportation modes, and has demonstrated 

that it has begun to take actions to implement the goals and objectives outlined in 

the strategy, we have not yet analyzed the overall quality of the plan or supporting 

modal annexes, the extent to which efforts outlined in the plan and annexes have 

been implemented, or the effectiveness of identified security initiatives. In addition, 

we recognize that the acceptance of DHS’s approach by Federal, state and local, and 

private sector stakeholders is crucial to its successful implementation. We also have 

not assessed the extent to which the plan and supporting modal annexes were coordinated with or adopted by these stakeholders. We will continue to assess DHS’s 

efforts to implement its strategy for securing surface transportation modes as part 

of our ongoing reviews of mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and highway infrastructure security. 

Threat, Criticality and Vulnerability Assessments. We reported that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation. TSA has taken actions to conduct 

threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, 

particularly for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail, but we have not yet 

reviewed the quality of many of these assessments. TSA uses threat assessments 

and information as part of its surface transportation security efforts. For example, 

TSA has conducted threat assessments of mass transit, passenger rail, and freight 

rail transportation modes. TSA has also conducted assessments of the 

vulnerabilities associated with surface transportation assets, to varying degrees, for 

most surface modes of transportation. For freight rail, for example, we found that 

TSA has conducted vulnerability assessments of High Threat Urban Area rail corridors where toxic inhalation hazard shipments are transported. However, TSA’s 

vulnerability assessment efforts are still ongoing and in some instances, are in the 

early stages, particularly for commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure. With 

regard to criticality assessments, DHS has conducted such assessments for some 

surface transportation modes. For example, TSA has conducted Corporate Security 

Reviews with 38 state Department of Transportation highway programs. In addition, the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of Infrastructure 

Protection conducts highway infrastructure assessments that look at critical highway infrastructure assets. We testified in January 2007 that TSA had reported completing an overall threat assessment for mass transit and passenger and freight rail 

modes, and had conducted criticality assessments of nearly 700 passenger rail stations. In addition, we further reported that the Grant Programs Directorate develVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
23 

oped and implemented a risk assessment tool to help passenger rail operators better 

respond to terrorist attacks and prioritize security measures. We will continue to 

review threat, criticality and vulnerability assessments conducted by TSA and other 

DHS components for surface modes of transportation during our ongoing work assessing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, highway infrastructure, and commercial vehicle security.29

Issuance of Security Standards. We found that DHS has generally not achieved 

this performance expectation. TSA has taken actions to develop and issue security 

standards for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail modes. However, TSA 

did not provide us with evidence of its efforts to develop and issue security standards for all surface transportation modes, or provided a rationale or explanation 

why standards may not be needed for other modes. Specifically, TSA has developed 

and issued security directives, security action items—recommended measures for 

passenger rail and mass transit operators to implement in their security programs 

to improve both security and emergency preparedness, and a proposed rule in December 2006 on passenger and freight rail security requirements.30 In April 2007, 

DHS reported that TSA uses field activities to assess compliance with security directives and implementation of noncompulsory security standards and protective measures with the objective of a broad-based enhancement of passenger rail and rail 

transit security. TSA also reported that in its December 2006 notice of proposed 

rulemaking on new security measures for freight rail carriers, it proposed requirements designed to ensure 100 percent positive handoff of toxic inhalation hazard 

shipments that enter high threat urban areas, as well as security protocols for custody transfers of toxic inhalation hazard rail cars in high-threat urban areas. TSA 

also reported that its High Threat Urban Area rail corridor assessments supported 

the development of the Recommended Security Action Items for the Rail Transportation of Toxic Inhalation Materials issued by DHS and the Department of Transportation in June 2006. 

Compliance Inspections. We concluded that DHS has generally not achieved this 

performance expectation. TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections, particularly in hiring and deploying inspectors, but inspectors’ roles and missions have not yet been fully defined. TSA officials have reported that the agency 

has hired 100 surface transportation inspectors whose stated mission is to, among 

other duties, monitor and enforce compliance with TSA’s rail security directives. 

However, some mass transit and passenger rail operators have expressed confusion 

and concern about the role of TSA inspectors and the potential that these inspections could duplicate other Federal and state rail inspections. In March and April 

2007, with respect to freight rail, TSA reported visiting terminal and railroad yards 

to measure implementation of 7 of 24 DHS recommended security action items for 

the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard materials. Through its Surface Transportation Security Inspection program, TSA reported that its inspectors conduct inspections of key facilities for rail and transit systems to assess transit systems’ implementation of core transit security fundamentals and comprehensive security action items; conduct examinations of stakeholder operations, including compliance 

with security directives; identify security gaps; and develop effective practices. Although TSA has deployed inspectors to conduct compliance inspections and carry 

out other security activities in the mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail 

modes, TSA did not provide us with evidence that it has conducted compliance inspections for other surface transportation modes or information on whether the department believes compliance inspections are needed for other modes. 

The 9/11 Commission Act authorizes funds to be appropriated for TSA to employ 

additional surface transportation inspectors and requires that surface transportation 

inspectors have relevant transportation experience and appropriate security and inspection qualifications.31 The Act also requires DHS to consult periodically with surface transportation entities on the inspectors’ duties, responsibilities, authorities, 

and mission. We will continue to assess TSA’s inspection efforts during our ongoing 

work.32

Grant Programs. We reported that DHS generally achieved this performance expectation. More specifically, DHS has developed and administered grant programs 

for various surface transportation modes. However, some industry stakeholders have 

raised concerns regarding DHS’s current grant process, such as time delays and 

other barriers in the provision of grant funding. We have not yet assessed DHS’s 

provision of grant funding or the extent to which DHS monitors the use of the 

funds. In March 2007, we reported that the DHS Office of Grants and Training, now 

called the Grant Programs Directorate, has used various programs to fund passenger rail security since 2003.33 Through the Urban Area Security Initiative grant 

program, the Grant Programs Directorate has provided grants to urban areas to 

help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to prevent, respond to, 

24 

and recover from acts of terrorism. The Grant Programs Directorate used Fiscal 

Year 2005, 2006, and 2007 appropriations to build on the work under way through 

the Urban Area Security Initiative program, and create and administer new programs focused specifically on transportation security, including the Transit Security 

Grant Program and the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. The 9/ 

11 Commission Act requires DHS to establish grant programs for security improvements in the public transportation, passenger and freight rail, and over-the-road bus 

modes and requires DHS to take certain actions in implementing the grant programs.34 For example, the Act requires that DHS determine the requirements for 

grant recipients and establish the priorities for which grant funding may be used, 

and it requires that DHS and DOT determine the most effective and efficient way 

to distribute grant funds, authorizing DHS to transfer funds to DOT for the purpose 

of disbursement. We will be assessing grants distributed for mass transit and passenger rail as part of our ongoing work.35

Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS’s Efforts in Implementing Its 

Mission and Management Functions 

Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across DHS’s mission and core management functions. These issues have impeded the department’s 

progress since its inception and will continue as DHS moves forward. While it is 

important that DHS continue to work to strengthen each of its mission and core 

management functions, to include transportation security, it is equally important 

that these key issues be addressed from a comprehensive, department-wide perspective to help ensure that the department has the structure and processes in place 

to effectively address the threats and vulnerabilities that face the Nation. These 

issues include: (1) transforming and integrating DHS’s management functions; (2) 

establishing baseline performance goals and measures and engaging in effective 

strategic planning efforts; (3) applying and strengthening a risk management approach for implementing missions and making resource allocation decisions; (4) 

sharing information with key stakeholders; and (5) coordinating and partnering 

with Federal, state and local, and private sector agencies. We have made numerous 

recommendations to DHS and its components to strengthen these efforts, and the 

department has made progress in implementing some of these recommendations. 

DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform into a fully functioning department. We designated DHS’s implementation and transformation as 

high-risk in part because failure to effectively address this challenge could have serious consequences for our security and economy. DHS continues to face challenges 

in key areas including acquisition, financial, human capital, and information technology management. This array of management and programmatic challenges continues to limit DHS’ ability to effectively and efficiently carry out its mission. In addition, transparency plays an important role in helping to ensure effective and efficient transformation efforts. We have reported that DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough so that Congress can be sure it 

is effectively, efficiently, and economically using the billions of dollars in funding it 

receives annually. More specifically, in April 2007, we testified that we have encountered access issues during numerous engagements at DHS, including significant 

delays in obtaining requested documents that have affected our ability to do our 

work in a timely manner.36 The Secretary of DHS and the Under Secretary for Management have stated their desire to work with us to resolve access issues and to 

provide greater transparency. It will be important for DHS and its components to 

become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can 

independently assess its efforts. 

In addition, DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts 

and has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into place structures 

to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. We have identified strategic 

planning as one of the critical success factors for new organizations, and reported 

that DHS as well as TSA and other component efforts in this area have been mixed. 

For example, with regards to TSA’s efforts to secure air cargo, we reported that TSA 

completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threatbased risk management approach to securing the Nation’s domestic air cargo system, and that this plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air cargo security based on risk, cost, and deadlines. However, we reported 

that TSA had not developed a similar strategy for addressing the security of inbound air cargo—cargo transported into the United States from foreign countries, 

including how best to partner with CBP and international air cargo stakeholders. 

In another example, we reported that TSA had not yet developed outcome-based 

performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 

25 

programs, such as the percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as a 

result of TSA’s on-site assistance and recommendations, to identify any aspects of 

these programs that may need attention. We recommended that DHS direct TSA 

and CBP to develop a risk-based strategy, including specific goals and objectives, for 

securing air cargo; 37 and develop outcome-based performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs.38 DHS generally concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 

DHS has also not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission and core management functions. Risk management has been 

widely supported by the President and Congress as an approach for allocating resources to the highest priority homeland security investments, and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security have 

made it a centerpiece of DHS and TSA policy. Several DHS component agencies and 

TSA have worked toward integrating risk-based decisionmaking into their security 

efforts, but we reported that these efforts can be strengthened. For example, TSA 

has incorporated certain risk management principles into securing air cargo, but 

has not completed assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets—two 

crucial elements of a risk-based approach without which TSA may not be able to 

appropriately focus its resources on the most critical security needs. TSA has also 

incorporated risk-based decisionmaking when making modifications to airport checkpoint screening procedures, to include modifying procedures based on intelligence information and vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport checkpoints. However, in April 2007 we reported that TSA’s analyses that supported 

screening procedural changes could be strengthened. For example, TSA officials 

based their decision to revise the prohibited items list to allow passengers to carry 

small scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their review of threat information— 

which indicated that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system— 

so that TSOs could concentrate on higher threat items.39 However, TSA officials did 

not conduct the analysis necessary to help them determine whether this screening 

change would affect TSO’s ability to focus on higher-risk threats.40

We have further reported that opportunities exist to enhance the effectiveness of 

information sharing among Federal agencies, state and local governments, and private sector entities. In August 2003, we reported that efforts to improve intelligence 

and information sharing need to be strengthened, and in 2005, we designated information sharing for homeland security as high-risk.41 In January 2005, we reported 

that the Nation still lacked an implemented set of government-wide policies and 

processes for sharing terrorism-related information, but DHS has issued a strategy 

on how it will put in place the overall framework, policies, and architecture for sharing information with all critical partners—actions that we and others have recommended.42 DHS has taken some steps to implement its information sharing responsibilities. States and localities are also creating their own information ‘‘fusion’’ 

centers, some with DHS support. With respect to transportation security, the importance of information sharing was recently highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Act 

which requires DHS to establish a plan to promote the sharing of transportation security information among DHS and Federal, state and local agencies, tribal governments, and appropriate private entities.43 The Act also requires that DHS provide 

timely threat information to carriers and operators that are preparing and submitting a vulnerability assessment and security plan, including an assessment of the 

most likely methods that could be used by terrorists to exploit weaknesses in their 

security.44

In addition to providing Federal leadership with respect to homeland security, 

DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of key stakeholders, but 

has faced challenges in this regard. To secure the nation, DHS must form effective 

and sustained partnerships between legacy component agencies and a range of other 

entities, including other Federal agencies, state and local governments, the private 

and nonprofit sectors, and international partners. We have reported that successful 

partnering and coordination involves collaborating and consulting with stakeholders 

to develop and agree on goals, strategies, and roles to achieve a common purpose; 

identify resource needs; establish a means to operate across agency boundaries, such 

as compatible procedures, measures, data, and systems; and agree upon and document mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report to the public on the results of 

joint efforts.45 We have found that the appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of government, and with the private 

sector, are evolving and need to be clarified. For example, we reported that opportunities exists for TSA to work with foreign governments and industry to identify best 

practices for securing passenger rail, and air cargo, and recommended that TSA systematically compile and analyze information on practices used abroad to identify 

those that may strengthen the department’s overall security efforts.46 Further, reVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
26 

garding efforts to respond to in-flight security threats, which depending on the nature of the threat could involve more than 15 Federal agencies and agency components, we recommended that DHS and other departments document and share their 

respective coordination and communication strategies and response procedures.47 In 

September 2005, we reported that TSA did not effectively involve private sector 

stakeholders in its decisionmaking process for developing security standards for passenger rail assets.48 We recommended that DHS develop security standards that reflect industry best practices and can be measured, monitored, and enforced by TSA 

rail inspectors and, if appropriate, rail asset owners. DHS agreed with these recommendations. In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act includes provisions designed 

to improve coordination with stakeholders. For example, the Act requires DHS and 

the Department of Transportation to develop an annex to the Memorandum of Understanding between the two departments governing the specific roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments in addressing motor carrier transportation security matters, including the processes the departments will follow to promote communications and efficiency, and avoid duplication of effort.49 The Act also requires DHS 

in consultation with the Department of Transportation to establish a program to 

provide appropriate information that DHS has gathered or developed on the performance, use, and testing of technologies that may be used to enhance surface 

transportation security to surface transportation entities.50

Concluding Observations 

The magnitude of DHS’s and more specifically TSA’s responsibilities in securing 

the Nation’s transportation system is significant, and we commend the department 

on the work it has done and is currently doing to secure this network. Nevertheless, 

given the dominant role that TSA plays in securing the homeland, it is critical that 

its programs and initiatives operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In the 

almost 6 years since its creation, TSA has had to undertake its critical mission 

while also establishing and forming a new agency. At the same time, a variety of 

factors, including threats to and attacks on transportation systems around the 

world, as well as new legislative requirements, have led the agency to reassess its 

priorities and reallocate resources to address key events, and to respond to emerging 

threats. Although TSA has made considerable progress in addressing key aspects of 

commercial aviation security, more work remains in the areas of checkpoint and air 

cargo technology, airport security, and passenger prescreening. Further, although 

TSA has more recently taken actions in a number of areas to help secure surface 

modes of transportation, its efforts are still largely in the early stage, and the nature of its regulatory role, and relationship with transportation operators, is still 

being defined. As DHS, TSA, and other components move forward, it will be important for the department to work to address the challenges that have affected its operations thus far, including developing results-oriented goals and measures to assess 

performance; developing and implementing a risk-based approach to guide resource 

decisions; and establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing information and coordinating with homeland security partners. A well-managed, highperforming department is essential to meeting the significant challenge of securing 

the transportation network. As DHS, TSA, and other components continue to evolve, 

implement their programs, and integrate their functions, we will continue to review 

their progress and performance and provide information to Congress and the public 

on these efforts. 

Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at this time. 

Endnotes 

1GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and 

Management Functions, GAO–07–454 (Washington, D.C.: August 2007); GAO, Department of 

Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, 

GAO–07–1081T (Washington, D.C.: September 2007); and GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO–07–1240T 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2007). 2Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25 percent or less of the identified performance expectations. Modest progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 

more than 25 percent but 50 percent or less of the identified performance expectations. Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 50 percent but 75 percent 

or less of the identified performance expectations. Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions 

to generally achieve more than 75 percent of the identified performance expectations. 3GAO–07–454. 

4 A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk through a series 

of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. 5Pub. L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

27 

6 Currently, air carriers departing the United States are required to transmit passenger manifest information to CBP no later than 15 minutes prior to departure but, for flights bound for 

the United States, air carriers are not required to transmit the information until 15 minutes 

after the flight’s departure (in general, after the aircraft is in flight). See 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 

122.75a. In a final rule published in the Federal Register on August 23, 2007, CBP established 

a requirement for all air carriers to either transmit the passenger manifest information to CBP 

no later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft doors (that is, prior to the flight 

being airborne), or transmit manifest information on an individual basis as each passenger 

checks in for the flight up to but no later than the securing of the aircraft. See 72 Fed. Reg. 

48320 (Aug. 23, 2007). This requirement is to take effect on February 19, 2008. 7For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and 

Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO–06–371T (Washington, D.C.: April 

2006). 8For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration 

Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. 

Airports, but Challenges Remain, GAO–06–597T, (Washington, D.C.: April 2006) and GAO, Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters 

and Access Controls, GAO–04–728 (Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 9GAO–06–597T and GAO–04–728. 

10Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Audit of Access to Airport 

Secured Areas (Unclassified Summary), OIG–07–35 (Washington, D.C.: March 2007). 11GAO–06–597T and GAO–04–728. 12GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, GAO–05–106 (Washington, D.C.: December 2004), and Transportation 

Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential Program, GAO–06–982 (Washington, D.C.: September 2006). 13GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, GAO–05–106 (Washington, D.C.: December 2004), and Transportation 

Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential Program, GAO–06–982 (Washington, D.C.: September 2006). 14 In accordance with TSA-issued security requirements, passengers on the No Fly List are 

denied boarding passes and are not permitted to fly unless cleared by law enforcement officers. 

Similarly, passengers who are on the Selectee List are issued boarding passes, and they and 

their baggage undergo additional security measures. 15See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C). 16GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation Security 

Administration’s Secure Flight Program, GAO–06–864T (Washington, D.C.: June 2006). 17GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO–07–448T (Washington, D.C.: February 2007) and GAO, 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under Way, 

but Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, GAO–07–346 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007). 18For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns 

Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of 

Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO–07–634 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007); GAO, Aviation Security: TSA’s Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive, GAO–07– 

623R (Washington, D.C.: April 2007); GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO–03–1173 (Washington, D.C.: September 2003); and GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO–06–371T (Washington, D.C.: April 2006). 19GAO–06–371T. 20See Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1607, 1610, 121 Stat. 266, 483–85 (2007). 21For more information, see GAO–06–371T. 22 Explosive detection systems (EDS) use specialized X-rays to detect characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage as it moves along a conveyor belt. Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs determine to be 

suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then chemically analyzes the swabs 

to identify any traces of explosive materials. 23For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage 

Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO–06–869 (Washington, D.C.: July 2006), 

GAO–06–371T, and GAO–07–448T. 24See Pub. L. No. 110–88. 1603–04, 121 Stat. at 480–81. 25For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO–06–76, (Washington, D.C.: October 2005) and GAO, Aviation 

Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be 

Strengthened, GAO–07–660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007). 26GAO–06–76. 27See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1602, 121 Stat. at 477–79. This provision defines screening as 

a physical examination or non-intrusive method of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to 

transportation security that includes the use of technology, procedures, personnel, or other 

methods to provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening 

of passenger checked baggage. Methods such as solely performing a review of information about 

the contents of cargo or verifying the identity of a shipper of the cargo, including whether a 

known shipper is registered in TSA’s known shipper database, do not constitute screening under 

this provision. 28GAO–07–660. 

28 

29For more information, see GAO–06–181T; GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal 

Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO–07–225T (Washington, D.C.: 

January 2007); and GAO–06–181T. 30See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006). 31See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1304, 121 Stat. at 393–94. 32For more information, see GAO–07–225T; GAO–06–181T; and GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO–05–851 

(Washington, D.C.: October 2005). 33GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to 

Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts GAO–07–583T (Washington, D.C.: March 2007). 34See Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1406, 1513, 1532, 121 Stat. at 405–08, 433–35, 457–60. 35For more information, see GAO–06–181T and GAO–07–583T. 36GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO Access to Information on Programs and Activities, GAO–07–700T, (Washington, D.C.: April 2007). 37GAO–07–660. 38GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO–07–729 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 11, 2007). 39GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns, GAO–07–634 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007). 40GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to Airline 

Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could 

Be Improved, GAO–07–634 (Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007). 41GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened, 

GAO–03–760. Washington, D.C.: August 2003, and GAO, HIGH-RISK SERIES: An Update 

GAO–05–207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 42GAO–07–454. 43See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1203, 121 Stat. at 383–86. 44See Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1512(d)(2), 1531(d)(2), 121 Stat. at 430, 455. 45GAO–07–660. 46GAO–07–660 and GAO–05–851. 47GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats 

Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, GAO–07–891R (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2007). 48GAO–05–851. 49See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1541, 121 Stat. at 469. 50See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1305, 121 Stat. at 394–95. 

Senator DORGAN. Ms. Berrick, thank you very much. 

Mr. Hawley, let me ask you a couple of questions, first, about the 

Government Accountability Office assessment. One of the things 

they concluded is that the perimeter security at airports is probably not sufficient, and the plans, at this point, may not be sufficient. All of us who go to airports understand the security inside 

the airport terminal. We go through it. We watch it. We experience 

it. But the security with respect to the perimeter of the airport is 

also very, very important. Tell us your assessment of what you are 

doing in that area, and what the progress has been. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir. The—every airport has its own security 

plan that is tailored for their particular circumstances, and that 

does include perimeter security. So, first of all, there is perimeter 

security in place that is inspected by us and owned and operated 

by the airports themselves. So, the commentary in the report was, 

I believe, in part, based on some pilot tests that were done and the 

criticism was, ‘‘Hey, you’ve tested some of this stuff, but it’s not 

widely deployed.’’ And I would agree that more can be done. And 

it is a partnership that we have with the airports. I think, it is— 

it is important, as you noted, the security everybody sees at the 

front of the airport, it really extends to the perimeter and everything inside the perimeter. And I think—I view those as equally 

important, because if we just set up a strong perimeter, and don’t 

have security that operates on the inside against, perhaps, the insider threat, that that’s not a good thing. So, we need to have all 

of that covered, and that is what we’re doing. 

29 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Hawley, let me ask about the issue of an 

award made to BearingPoint in 2004, which you’re familiar with, 

to do a pilot project to provide transportation security credentials 

to 75,000 workers at various ports, airports, train stations, transportation sites. My understanding is that, by mid-2006, some $26 

million had been spent, and there were only 4,000 workers in this 

whole matrix that had cards. Then, in 2007, TSA awarded a $70 

million contract to Lockheed Martin to provide credentials to 

850,000 individuals. Deployment had been expected in March of 

this year, but apparently a botched transfer of data from 

BearingPoint to Lockheed further delayed that. 

I ask this question because I was involved, some while ago, in 

the issue of recruiting for screeners at airports, and we found out 

that the company that did that had actually had recruiting sessions 

at the Waldorf Astoria, in New York, at very expensive ski resorts, 

and so on. And that company, of course, was taken to task for that, 

but I think there was pretty sloppy oversight of that company. Tell 

me about this circumstance, where we provide a contract to 

BearingPoint, didn’t get the performance; now we provide a contract to Lockheed Martin, they couldn’t transfer the data. Tell me 

about what’s happening. And the reason I ask—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well—— 

Senator DORGAN.—the question, is because credentialing people 

at these critical sites—airports, train stations, and so on—is really 

important. You’ve got to know who’s there and who has access. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Right. And the problems you mentioned have been 

solved, and it’s—we refer to is as the TWIC program, Transportation Worker Identification Credential. And it’s rolling out—in 

fact, today is the first day they’re actually physically enrolling 

transportation workers at the Port of Wilmington, Delaware. And 

the issue there at the transition was essentially a technological 

issue of migrating systems so that they would interact with our 

other vetting systems for aviation and the other modes. And 

there—we were concerned that, if there was a problem with that 

integration, it would not only slow down the TWIC part, but would 

hurt the rest of our vetting. So, we took that slowly and carefully, 

but it is now resolved. That’s—that was a lot of the concern that 

everybody had, frankly, this spring. But now Lockheed Martin is 

in place, those issues are behind us, and cards are being issued as 

we speak. 

Senator DORGAN. And you feel there is ample and proper oversight by the agency? 

Mr. HAWLEY. There is. The security measures—and this also is— 

a GAO report was critical of a lot of the pieces behind the TWIC 

program; and those, we did address, have addressed, and I believe 

they are resolved, at this point. 

Senator DORGAN. The GAO report was critical of the oversight 

and management. 

Ms. Berrick, what is your assessment, having looked at all of 

this, with respect to rail security? Has rail security been given 

short shrift? You know, all of us understand what happens when 

you get on an airplane. And we also understand how little of that 

occurs when you try to get on Amtrak or a passenger train. Has 

rail security been given short shrift here? 

30 

Ms. BERRICK. I think, compared to all surface modes of transportation, TSA and DHS have placed more of a focus on passenger rail 

and mass transit, because, based on intelligence information, they 

view that as a risk-based decision, focusing on the area—the areas 

of surface transportation modes where they should be spending 

their time. So, they’ve issued security directives for passenger rail, 

they’ve issued security action items. They’ve hired inspectors to follow up on these requirements and work with rail operators to 

strengthen security. We identified areas where they could do additional work. For example, we reported that inspectors’ roles haven’t 

been fully defined. Rail operators aren’t completely certain whether 

or not the security directives are mandatory or voluntary. There 

can be increased communication between TSA and the rail operators. But we found that they have put more and more focus on it, 

and they’re continuing to do that. 

Senator DORGAN. Ms. Berrick, thank you very much. 

I indicated, at the start, before some members were here, that 

Senator Inouye is not able to be at the hearing, and Senator Stevens will chair in his absence. 

Senator Stevens, did you wish to go in order of arrival? 

Senator STEVENS. Yes. The Senator—— 

Senator DORGAN. All right. 

Senator STEVENS.—was ahead of me. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. Senator Smith, McCaskill, Stevens, 

Snowe, and Klobuchar would be the order of arrival. 

Senator STEVENS. Right, OK. Thanks. 

Senator DORGAN. And I have to be over on the floor of the Senate, so Senator Stevens will recognize those Senators. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Smith? 

Senator STEVENS [presiding]. Senator Smith? 

Thank you. 

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator Stevens—Senator Dorgan, as 

well. 

Mr. Hawley, in my opening statement I referred to the testimony 

of the Government Accountability Office that quotes, ‘‘While TSA 

initiated efforts to develop security standards for surface transportation modes, these efforts have been limited to passenger and 

freight rail, and have not addressed commercial vehicles or highway infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels.’’ How do you respond to that statement? Is that an accurate statement, in your 

view? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, on the highway side, we’ve done—we’ve 

worked with the individual states and the trucking community, basically, and are—have started with the hazardous materials drivers, those who have the hazardous materials endorsement, and we 

do full checks on those people. So, that is in place today, and it 

really is adding layers as we go. I think the bridges and tunnels 

would be a very high priority, and that is something that we work 

on with the states and also other elements of DHS. And the question of exactly what the regulatory scheme is, beyond what we have 

in place for hazardous materials, would be the next step, and we 

are looking at the vetting—basically, watch list checking against 

the CDL holders, those who have commercial driver’s license. We 

31 

also have a ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ program that is good 

for reporting of suspicious incidents. 

Senator SMITH. I understand from your reports, that roughly 

three-quarters of your budget goes toward aviation. That must be 

in response to the threat levels that you hear, or is it for some 

other reason that that’s the preponderance? 

Mr. HAWLEY. It is for another reason. And the reason is that the 

economic model that we use for aviation is—the Federal Government actually does the operation of it; whereas, in the other modes 

it’s done by State and local and private sector. It’s a shared responsibility everywhere, but the bulk of our budget comes from paying 

the officers who work in the airports. 

Senator SMITH. And do you see that shifting, over time, more to 

surface transportation? 

Mr. HAWLEY. No. No. I think that that’s the economic model—— 

Senator SMITH. It’s just a function of the State and Federal responsibilities. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Correct. 

Senator SMITH. OK. I’m curious, in 2004–2005 we saw terrorists 

attack train systems in Madrid and London, England, and I wonder, if we have similar threats, why our focus hasn’t been more on 

the rail system. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, I—the focus is on the rail system more than, 

perhaps, it appears. And you will see that in the transit communities with our pairing with local law enforcement and providing 

them the technology. And we do VIPR teams with them. But, most 

importantly, for both rail and transit rail, is the employee training, 

and we’ve seen a major shift to something that—in working with 

the Congress—what we’ve done is shift the priority of the grant 

money to front-line training, which we think has an immediate application to stop terrorist attacks. And so, that’s on the passenger 

rail side. On the freight rail side, we have an agreement that’s in 

place that’s already reduced the amount of toxic material that is 

standing unattended in high-threat urban areas. And we’re doing 

a regulation now to back that up, but we’ve already seen the improvement. 

Senator SMITH. One final question, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hawley, it’s been interesting to follow TSA since 9/11, and 

the different kinds of technologies employed, and it seems to be 

getting better and better and more efficient all the time. And I’m 

wondering, as you look into the future, what is the best technology 

for providing security to the American people that you see? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The best technology is the human brain, because 

we’re fighting an enemy who, when we put in place something that 

is rigid, will figure a way to go around it. So, we always have to 

have the human element to not allow them—they have unlimited 

time to plan—not allow them the ability to plan a perfect attack. 

But, I think, the technology we’re testing now in Phoenix to detect 

explosives on the body, I think that is—that has been a concern of 

all of ours, and that’s now getting in place; and the privacy aspects 

of that are critical, and looking forward to the public debate as we 

roll that out. 

I think the explosive detection for baggage is moving along pretty 

well, but the main—the big bonus will be when we have stand-off 

32 

explosive detection, to be able to—as people go through a lobby 

area, be able to detect it without forcing them to go through a bottleneck. 

Senator SMITH. Very good. Thank you. 

Senator STEVENS. Senator McCaskill? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hawley, in December of 2001, according to the IG at the Department of Transportation, a senior aircraft technician at a foreign repair station in Singapore was found to be a member of the 

terrorist organization al Qaeda. Based on interviews with the repair station personnel, the IG determined that this technician had 

photographed U.S. aircraft as potential targets for a terrorist attack. That was in December of 2001. That was one of several different facts that the IG revealed in a scathing report concerning 

foreign repair stations and security issues. There are foreign repair 

stations located at a minimum of five countries that have been 

identified by the U.S. State Department as terrorist safe havens. 

Now, as a result of this report, Congress took it very seriously 

and passed a law, and said, in that law, by 2004, you had to promulgate a rule concerning foreign repair stations and the auditing 

and inspection of foreign repair stations for the safety of the flying 

public. By 2000—18 months later, you were supposed to be auditing all these foreign repair stations. 

I have here a draft of the rule that was supposed to be finished 

in 2004. This draft was finished in 2005. And nothing has happened. 

Now, I know, if we determined there was a member of al Qaeda 

that was traveling on one of our airplanes by one of the systems 

we have in place—there would be an outcry. What I can’t figure out 

is why there is no sense of urgency about foreign repair stations, 

especially in light of the fact that we have, now, noncertified foreign repair stations that are doing significant work. And, by the 

way, all of these airplanes have the right to leave these foreign repair stations, some which are in countries we’ve designated as terrorist safe havens, and go directly to an airport and pick up passengers. There’s no requirement they come back to be looked at 

again by people here in the United States or by any of our systems 

here in the United States. I think it is a disaster waiting to happen, and I would like an explanation as to why your agency has 

been unable to promulgate a rule that Congress said had to be 

done by 2004, and this is 2007. 

Mr. HAWLEY. I can speak to what has happened recently. I was 

not with TSA at that time, and I, frankly, don’t have any background into what happened there. I think—I know what’s happening now, which is, in the 9/11 bill, there is a requirement for 

us to put out a rulemaking, and then follow it up in 6 months with 

inspections. And we intend to do that. The regulation is working 

its way through the process, and that will kick out when it goes 

through the review process. And I can’t exactly predict—except 

that it is being worked on. And as far as the current vulnerability, 

that is something that we look at, with what happens in other 

33 

countries and people’s access to the transportation infrastructure, 

including aviation. And, as you know, there are layers that are in 

place, so it is not completely uncovered. It’s part of the layer and 

risk management that we look at. And we take the—clearly, the requirement put forth by the Congress to make this happen, and we 

will make this happen. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, there is a rule that was drafted, and 

a former employee got it to us, and nothing’s happened with it. 

And, I gotta tell ya, as you well know, right now there is no rule 

even requiring background checks. When you’ve got perimeter security issues at many of these foreign repair stations, certified and 

noncertified, I would hate to have happen what could happen, and 

that is, with all the effort and time we’re taking checking everyone’s suitcases and wanding everyone’s knee replacements, that 

we’ve got terrorists working under the hoods of these airplanes in 

foreign countries, and we are basically twiddling our thumbs since 

the Congress mandated this, back in 2003. I just hope that you 

leave this hearing with a sense of urgency about the issue of foreign repair stations. 

I’ve got some other questions about airport screenings I’d like to 

address if we get a chance for another around of questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. I’m sure there will be another 

round, Senator. 

Senator Snowe? 

STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hawley, I’d like to follow up on the issue of commercial airline cargo and what is the status. I noted, in the GAO report, that 

one of the significant failures, at this point, is the inability to develop and implement the technologies necessary. For too long, this 

has—cargo loophole has been insufficiently addressed by the Department, and, despite the ramping-up of efforts with the passage 

of the 9/11 Commission recommendations by this committee last 

year, and by the Congress, clearly this is a major issue and flaw 

in the process. And I would like to hear what you intend to provide 

for an update on this, and why we can’t close the gap. I know we’ve 

got the Known Shipper Program, but, again, that does not require 

extensive screening of the cargo under the Known Shipper Program, similar to what, you know, individuals, you know, have to 

comply with when they’re going through screening at the airports. 

And certainly this provides another gaping hole in our system. 

And, frankly, it’s gone on for far too long. 

Mr. HAWLEY. The report that you mention was a snapshot in 

time, looking backwards over a year ago. And we’ve been—Secretary Chertoff has a very high priority of mine, as well as—I have 

my own priority to do this—to meet those issues. And we’ve done 

exactly that. The—there was a category of freight called ‘‘exempted 

freight,’’ and we’ve gone in and required various security measures 

on that. We’ve added the equivalent of 100 canine teams to focus 

on the cargo that previously had not been inspected. So, that’s— 

that is now happening everywhere. 

34 

At the 250 smallest airports, they get exactly the same screening 

as we give for checked baggage. And the 9/11 bill that we’re talking 

about here puts in place—I—and I would really compliment this 

committee to work with us on practical solutions, a step up from 

where we are, and we intend to meet the requirements under that 

deadline. 

We also have the canine—170 canine teams were put in through 

the recent appropriation supplemental for air cargo. So, we’ve—we 

have been driven on the issue of closing any vulnerabilities that 

may have existed on air cargo, and I think the picture today is significantly different than it was when that report was written—significantly better. 

Senator SNOWE. So, what is the percentage of air cargo that is 

now currently screened? And is it done on the—is it conducted 

under the Known Shipper Program? And is that cargo actually 

screened? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The—I know exactly what you’re asking, and, in 

the new law, it says, explicitly, ‘‘You can’t use the Known Shipper 

Program to meet the requirements that we’re saying.’’ It says, ‘‘You 

get 18 months to get 50 percent, and then, at the end of 3 years, 

you’ve got to be 100 percent, and you can’t count Known Shipper.’’ 

So, it’s very clear on what is required. It defines ‘‘screening,’’ it defines what the system is required to do, the timeline. And I think 

it is workable. And, again, I would thank the Committee for working with us to get something that is workable and we will do it. 

Senator SNOWE. I know the Inspector General report in August 

indicated that there were a dearth of screeners for cargo. So, what 

is the ratio of cargo screeners to airports? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, we don’t assign our officers to the cargo side. 

The—where we do that is with either the law enforcement officer 

paired with a canine, our security inspectors—and we’ve got about 

1,000—and then the airlines themselves have to do screening. 

Senator SNOWE. And so—but what is—so, what’s the actual number, though? I mean, isn’t that something that you ought to be concerned about? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, we use our transportation security officers for 

screening people, and we do have them go in the back of the airport, including cargo, to do checks on the people working there. But 

the actual screening is not done by those officers, it’s done either 

by the canine teams, who are not TSOs, our inspectors, or airline 

personnel. 

Senator SNOWE. Ms. Berrick, can you comment on Mr. Hawley’s 

response to cargo screening? Because this is a critical issue, and a 

major gap in our system that obviously needs to be rectified. And 

what would you—in response to his—the answer with respect to 

the timeline for achieving it? 

Ms. BERRICK. Sure. GAO actually looked at two aspects of air 

cargo. One was cargo domestically transported to the United 

States, and we also looked at cargo from foreign countries coming 

into the United States. One point we made was that, for domestic 

air cargo security, TSA does have a lot of actions underway and are 

moving in the right direction to strengthen cargo security. We had 

a number of recommendations and things they can be doing, more. 

35 

In terms of inbound air cargo coming into the United States, 

that’s much more in the early stages, in terms of both TSA and 

CBP ensuring the security of this cargo. 

But, I think, probably the most important points we made in our 

report was that foreign countries that also secure their cargo were 

using some measures that potentially could be used in the United 

States. For example, some countries have a more robust program 

to verify indirect air carriers, freight forwarders who consolidate 

cargo. And they over—they’re pretty rigorous in their oversight 

over these entities, which isn’t currently happening in the United 

States. Also, some foreign countries have extra security procedures 

at airports where cargo is stored, or they have guards monitoring 

the cargo. People have to be physically screened if they go into the 

facility. Here in the United States, the cargo is on the airport 

grounds, which has its own security program, but it doesn’t have 

that extra layer of security. 

Also, some other countries are using technologies to screen 

cargo—radiation detection monitors. They’re also using large X-ray 

machines to screen a portion of air cargo. And other countries are 

also, similar to TSA, working to increase the amount of cargo that 

they screen. And, in fact, some view the United States—the risk of 

shipping cargo to the United States as higher, so some countries 

actually do additional security screening for cargo that’s bound for 

the United States. 

But I think that the lessons from our report—a good lesson is the 

fact that other countries do have mechanisms in place to strengthen cargo screening, and some of these, potentially, could be considered and may be applied in the United States. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. 

Senator Klobuchar? 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you, Senator. Thank you. 

Five years ago, the 9/11 Commission provided Congress and the 

American people with a clear assessment of the need to reform our 

approaches for security. And I believe that TSA was created in 

2001—is that correct?—has done some good work. But I think of, 

the assessment that you received in 2005, when ten members of 

the 9/11 Commission issued a report card that found that the TSA 

was either failing or providing unsatisfactory progress in a number 

of key areas. And my questions are really to follow up on Senator 

Snowe, first, about the cargo screening, and if you think that the 

100 percent goal is possible to meet. And I want to clear the record 

that you did say we would meet the goals of the 9/11 Commission 

recommendation bill—I think that’s 50 percent of all air cargo carried on commercial airplanes screened within 18 months, all commercial air cargo screened within 3 years. Is that correct? 

Mr. HAWLEY. That is correct. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And so, do you think it’s possible to get to 

100 percent? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. 

36 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. How do we do that? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. And I think Ms. Berrick, in her answer to Senator Snowe, outlined a lot of the tools that we’re going to use. And 

we have followed, very closely, the work with our international 

partners, and some of those programs are, we feel, capable of being 

implemented here, and some of the technology that Ms. Berrick 

mentioned, that we’re not currently using, could be configured to 

use in cargo. So, we are working through that right now, and I— 

this committee was instrumental in making it such that we are, in 

fact, going to be able to do it, and get the real screening that 

doesn’t rely on the so-called Known Shipper Program, that is real 

screening in the way we all know we mean it. And I think the 

other important piece is that—with our international partners— 

that, as we align with them—we are in frequent conversation with 

our partners around the world to have a unified security measure, 

that, as we meet those deadlines, it would be a similar security 

blanket for our trading partners, as well. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. Thank you. 

Ms. Berrick, I had some questions about the GAO report on the 

passenger screening. I know that the GAO found the lack of a 

standardized process for all airlines when they look at cleared lists 

for passengers, and that they’ve contributed to delays—could you 

talk a little bit about that and what those problems are? I know 

the Secure Flight Program can’t become operational until you certify that the TSA has satisfied the requirements. What are the barriers to getting that satisfied and how do we fix this? 

Ms. BERRICK. Sure. In terms of the current process, the 

prescreening of passengers—the way it works is, air carriers match 

passenger information against the terrorist watch list that TSA 

supplies to them to determine if there are any high-risk passengers 

that shouldn’t be allowed on a flight. The problem with the current 

process is that air carriers all do it a little bit differently. Some 

may have really rigorous methods for doing name-matching, others 

may use a manual process. So, theoretically, you could be on one 

flight with one carrier and not be a match, get on the plane with 

no problem; you could be with another carrier, and be a match, because your name sounds similar to someone that’s on the terrorist 

watch list. So, with the development of Secure Flight, if Secure 

Flight operates as intended, it should correct that problem, because 

the government will be taking over the function, they’ll be doing 

the name-matching consistently, they’ll be using a more robust 

methodology to match passenger information. And it also provides 

a security benefit, in that the government won’t have to provide the 

terrorist watch list to the private sector, because right now, again, 

the carriers are receiving this—some carriers contract out with foreign countries, and the foreign countries are actually doing the 

name-matching. So, obviously, there are concerns there. 

Secure Flight, in the past we’ve reported that the reason the program has had problems—again, this is in the past—was that TSA 

wasn’t following a disciplined development process. There is—TSA 

even has procedures on how you go about developing systems like 

this. And, in the need that they felt to implement the program 

quickly, some of those requirements were bypassed. Since that 

time, TSA has stood down and rebaselined their program conVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
37 

sistent with GAO’s recommendations. They’ve taken a lot of positive action to help ensure Secure Flight’s success, including following more disciplined processes, bringing in people with the appropriate skills. 

We’re still looking at Secure Flight. And, in fact, we’re going to 

be reporting, in response to the 9/11 Act, in January of 2008 on 

what our assessment is of TSA’s progress. Right now it’s too early 

for us to conclude whether—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Do you know how long it will take to get 

it certified, and what the timetable is? 

Ms. BERRICK. Well, one of the things we’ve been asked in the 9/ 

11 mandate was to look at TSA’s time-frame for fielding the program to determine whether or not we think it’s reasonable. So, 

that’s one of the things we’ll report in January. We don’t have an 

answer yet on that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Mr. Hawley, do you want to add anything? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I think that’s a good summation. And I think we 

now have got the program in good shape. The rule is out. We’ve 

had the public comment. We’re going to be closing off public comment and writing the final rule, and then the various certifications. 

We’re about a third of the way through from our end, of that work. 

And it will come down to the funding level for FY08 as to exactly 

how fast the program progresses. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Ms. Berrick, back to the issues you raised 

about the privacy concerns. So, the actual names of the people on 

this list are going to foreign governments, or what’s happening? 

Ms. BERRICK. In some cases, under the current process, air carriers who do, again, the matching, they’ll contract out and have a 

contractor do the matching. In some cases, they have done that 

with companies located in foreign countries. So, that has happened. 

The majority of carriers don’t do that, but some have. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Should the Congress take seriously the reports that airlines have supplied DHS with substantial information 

on passengers without their knowing it, some of these privacy concerns that have been raised? 

Ms. BERRICK. We haven’t looked at privacy with respect to the 

current process. We are looking at that as a part of Secure Flight. 

In the past, we have reported that there were some problems, in 

terms of TSA reporting how they’re using passenger data during 

testing of the Secure Flight program. Since that time, in our work 

with TSA, we’ve found that they’ve built in more privacy safeguards into the program—again, that are positive. The recent privacy notice that they’ve implemented has contained information 

that, in fact, GAO recommended. So, we think they’re moving in 

the right direction. But, again, in terms of Secure Flight protecting 

privacy, it’s too early for us, at this point to draw any conclusions, 

but we will be talking about that in our January report. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. 

Senator STEVENS. Senator Thune? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding the hearing. 

38 

And thank you, our panelists, for being here today and providing 

some testimony in what is very valuable input on TSA’s progress 

toward carrying out the important piece of legislation that was 

passed, the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 

We’ve got about 9 billion, I think, passengers each year that use 

mass transit, about a 2 million a day that fly on the airlines, and 

so, obviously, we have a lot of citizens who depend and—upon accessible, affordable, and efficient travel, both for commerce and leisure, and that—the same things that, you know, we’re concerned 

about, in terms of our vulnerability to terrorist attacks, our—those 

things, even though we’ve got safeguards and everything in place, 

continue to be a concern to a lot of people who travel. And, obviously, we want to make—take every precaution, but try and do it 

in a way that provides as much ease and convenience for people 

that are traveling as possible. 

One question I have with regard to that, Mr. Hawley, is, can the 

TSA implement the provisions of the 9/11 Act, while, at the same 

time, making the airline passenger prescreening process more efficient and passenger friendly? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I think that the parts in the 9/11 Commission implementation bill that relate to passenger screening will put us in 

the right direction. In other words, the Secure Flight, the watch list 

matching, those programs, I think, will have an immediate—when 

Secure Flight is up, will have an immediate, positive, enormous effect by eliminating the people who are not on the watch list, who 

are somehow told that they are, or think that they are; and, when 

that issue goes away, I think it will elevate the spirit of the traveling public, as well as protect the security of the list. So, we’ve got 

some technology that we need to roll out, that we have already 

started rolling out for passenger checkpoints, and so, all of those 

things are going to go toward decluttering the checkpoint, calming 

the environment down so it’s not as much of a crush, and that 

gives us better security, it also gives a better experience. 

Senator THUNE. How close are we to using some of the biometric 

identifiers? You talked about technology. How far out is that? And 

are these short-term or long-term objectives for TSA? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The ones I mentioned are short-term, immediateterm, and they’re happening now. 

Senator THUNE. Right. 

Mr. HAWLEY. On the biometrics, it’s—one of the criticisms in the 

GAO report is that we haven’t deployed the biometrics in the airport environment. So, that clearly is the next piece for us. We’ve 

got the—in the port environment, the TWIC card is being—enrollments are going on now, so that is the sophisticated biometric. The 

standards are set, and we’re working with the airport community 

to get the—the difficulty is the interoperable card so that, as required in the 9/11 bill, when we’re talking about flight crews, that 

there be interoperability from airport to airport. So, it’s much easier to do one airport, but a—but it’s much more complicated to have 

the one issued here work at the other. So, that’s the problem that 

we’re working through. But I think you put your finger on it, 

that’s—that is a critical next step in aviation security. 

39 

Senator THUNE. What—how—and what—when you say ‘‘shortterm,’’ what—‘‘long-term time frame,’’ what is the time-frame on 

that, would you say? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The biometrics have been much more difficult to 

implement than any of us expected. And TWIC, as everybody 

knows, has taken longer than any of us would have liked. And it 

come—it is the most sophisticated interoperable biometric system 

in the world. And so, expanding that into the aviation environment 

is not trivial, but I think we’ve solved most of the problems. We 

now have to figure out, ‘‘OK, how do we—how do we actually implement it? And how do we make the back end connect to our 

watch-list-checking in a way that allows us to process it all smoothly?’’ 

Senator THUNE. Is the interoperability that you referred to, and 

being able to integrate this on all the airports around the country, 

the limitation on that, is that a technology limitation or a funding 

limitation? Is it a—is it a matter of not having enough money to 

make that—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. It’s first the—it’s first the technology and the operational integration from the point—it’s not—nothing needs to be invented, but fitting the pieces together is the difficult part, and then 

the money—we’ll have a big debate about the money. But I think 

all of us agree it has to happen, and the airports have been a great 

partner in it, and we’ll work that out. 

Senator THUNE. Thanks. 

Ms. Berrick, some of the critics of the U.S. aviation security policy argue that there has been too much emphasis given to previous 

attack scenarios, and—for example, hijackings, luggage bombs, 

those sorts of things. Do you agree with that assessment? 

Ms. BERRICK. I—— 

Senator THUNE. And why, or why not, I guess is—— 

Ms. BERRICK. Yes. It—well, in most of our work we look at to 

what extent TSA is using threat information—current threat information to drive their decisions. And generally we’re finding that 

they do do that. And, of course, they consider past threats and try 

to mitigate those. They also look forward: What are the current 

threats, and where should we be moving, you know, in the next 5 

to 10 years? So, generally, we’ve seen that they’ve done that. Related to making risk-based decisions, the area where we’ve probably identified they could do more work is related to doing vulnerability assessments on how vulnerable are we against these various 

threats? But they’ve done vulnerability assessments in a lot of different areas. We’ve reported that we think we can—they can 

strengthen their efforts to look at how vulnerable we are. But, pretty consistently, in almost all of our work, we’ve found that TSA has 

incorporated threat information—and, again, not just past threat 

information, but looking forward—to help drive their decisions and 

priorities. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. 

Senator Lautenberg? 

40 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks very much for 

conducting this hearing. We have lots of questions about the inability of—a major government agency unable to meet a deadline. And 

it’s a consistent problem, it seems to me, especially with DHS. I 

know there are lots of loyal, hardworking people there who want 

to get the job done right, they know that it’s an enormous responsibility. But yet, a deadline for dealing with the security of bridges 

and tunnels in New York/New Jersey region. There is an amendment that I authored, the Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security appropriations legislation, and they were supposed to report by 

March 1, 2007. And I ask you, Mr. Hawley, what’s the status of 

that report? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The report is complete, and I believe it is undergoing—it’s a classified report, and it is undergoing clearance. But 

I should also say that anything developed from that report, we’ve 

discussed with the appropriate officials in the appropriate regions, 

so that there—so that we’re not holding back information that 

would allow them to do security improvements. It’s the—it’s basically going through the clearance process. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, this is way past April 2007, in case 

anybody didn’t notice the weather change out there. 

When will TSA, Mr. Hawley, begin enrolling workers at the Port 

of New York and New Jersey in the TWIC program? 

Mr. HAWLEY. It will be soon. I’m trying to figure out how to give 

you an answer without making it one—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Me, too. 

Mr. HAWLEY.—that we can’t meet. I think it’s going to be in the 

next big series. Obviously, that is the—that is the big port community on the East Coast, and there are a couple of the smaller ones 

first to get the system burned in, but it will be in the holiday-season/January time-frame that we’ll begin in the New York region. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. The 10 or 11 test communities or ports— 

that are identified for establishing the clearance mechanism does 

not include—a port like the Port of New York and New Jersey, 

which is one of the largest ports in the country. We’re going to 

smaller ports. And I don’t know how long we have to stand and 

wait. If there is any risk at all with the people who come in, drive 

the trucks, and so forth—now, most of the regular port workers 

have ID cards—but the trucks that come in by the thousands each 

and every day don’t have any checks going on there. And I wonder 

why it is—that it doesn’t require immediate or critical attention to 

a port like the New York/New Jersey Port, which has exposure to 

all kinds of things that we dread thinking about, like the most dangerous 2 miles in the country, identified by the FBI, for a terrorist 

attack. 

Mr. HAWLEY. We’ve spent a lot of time working with the ports 

there, and there’s a lot of security in place. They are right in line 

to get the TWIC program when it rolls out. And, as you know, 

today is the first day we’ve started issuing them, and once we get 

through this—the first couple of rounds, it will—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. How long might that take? 

41 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, I was projecting in the holiday-to-January 

time frame. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Holiday? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Holiday this year. Yes, between now and sometime 

in January. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That we might—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. Begin—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG.—that we might see a rollout in the—— 

Port of New York/New Jersey—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG.—and I want to take a moment to ask Ms. 

Berrick—has your office looked at TSA’s efforts on assessing security of critical infrastructure—bridges and tunnels? 

Ms. BERRICK. We do. We do have ongoing work, looking at TSA’s 

efforts in that area. We’re going to be completing a report, probably 

in the spring of 2008, so it’s ongoing. And we’re finding that TSA 

is doing what they call, ‘‘corporate security reviews,’’ where they’ll 

go out to these bridges and tunnels and assess the state of security, 

work with the states there. Basically, at this point, it’s in the early 

stages. They’re getting an understanding of what’s being done for 

security. There are some technologies that DHS is pursuing related 

to bridges and tunnels, but it’s still relatively in the early stages. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Chairman, we’ve grown accustomed to 

the pace here, and—not to be critical of the witness, but the fact 

is that deadlines made—don’t mean that deadlines are met. Any 

deferrals of the serious problems that we might encounter on the 

bridges and tunnels is something that ought not to be acceptable, 

and it isn’t. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator STEVENS. Senator Rockefeller? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator STEVENS. Sir. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I was going to ask a bunch of questions 

on air cargo, but I understand they’ve already been asked. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Bunch of them have. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. So, that means that if I read the memos 

that come out of this, I’ll know what the answers were. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Or I could ask them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You could ask them again. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I will. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator STEVENS. You know, the famous Simpson statement that 

all the questions have been asked, but not everybody has asked 

them. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I am constantly amazed at the asymmetry between everybody going through all of this trouble, which 

I thoroughly support and was co-conspirator in writing, with their 

handbags and carry-on bags and all the rest of it, and then knowing that, if it’s a 4-ounce something, I can put it in my checked 

42 

suitcase, or if I was a terrorist, if it was a 2-pound bomb, I could 

put it in my suitcase, and just check it. I don’t care how many 

times the question has been asked, I don’t understand that. I don’t 

understand why we aren’t doing more on air cargo. 

Mr. HAWLEY. We are doing more. And we talked a little bit about 

the old report that is now out of date, and some of the things that 

we have done between then and now. I think the critical point is 

that the Committee was instrumental in writing the legislation in 

the 9/11 bill, and I mentioned earlier that we expect to meet the 

deadlines in the bill by the terms written in the bill. We understand what they mean. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Do you have the money? 

Mr. HAWLEY. To start? Yes, we’re launching, and then, when we 

need more money, we’ll tell you. I think, around January we’re 

going to know more, in terms of what the—— 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Is OMB releasing to you the money you 

need to do this? 

Mr. HAWLEY. It isn’t a money issue right now; so, yes. But it’s 

really at the point of program development. We have enough program development money to get it done—to get it rolled out, and 

then we’ll figure out what the costs are. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. See, but that sounds to me—like—what 

you’re really saying is, ‘‘We’ve got good ideas, and we’re starting to 

implement some of those ideas, but we’re not really sure if we’re 

going to have the money.’’ 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, no, no. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. That’s what it sounds like to me. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well—I’m sorry. The—Ms. Berrick mentioned some 

of the experience the international community has in air cargo, and 

that what we’ll be doing is adopting some of those methods at— 

that are compatible with the language of the law, and applying 

those. Some of those do not require congressional appropriations, 

some of them are going to require expenses by other parties in the 

supply chain. I think where the money will come in is when we figure out what kind of technology we can deploy, at airports, that 

can handle the cargo that we’re going to see there, and then we 

have to fight out who pays for that. 

So, we are—— 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. A lot of ‘‘ifs.’’ 

Mr. HAWLEY. We—pardon me? 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. A lot of ‘‘ifs.’’ 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, we pretty much know what we’re doing on the 

program, and it has to be driven down to the operational level of 

exactly the details. So, I think—I mean, I—this is a tough deadline, 

to hit 50 percent in 18 months, and we are accepting that challenge, and we will meet that. And I believe that, in future years— 

i.e., 3 years from now—that the 100 percent will be done, as well. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. OK. Oh, boy. Well, good luck. What about 

general aviation? I’ve done a lot of flying on that, which I pay for, 

when I have to get to West Virginia, because we don’t have a lot 

of flight service. And—once, in my entire life, I—have been through 

a screening device. Once. I forget the airport. And I know that you 

have plans for identification and things of this sort, but I have the 

feeling that, in terms of what people carry on, and the cargo, the 

43 

pilots, the passengers, nobody really has any idea of who they are, 

and, like in everything else, they’re getting a free ride. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Our—we are working on, as I think we’ve discussed, regulations in that area. We’ve done risk assessment in the 

GA community to see what the higher-risk aircraft are, and what 

to do about them. And then—so, I would expect, in the coming 

months, that we’ll come forward with the—a formal program on 

that. We already are working, as you may know, with our international partners on identifying aircraft as they come to the United 

States, and also, with the GA community to, as you mentioned, the 

identity validation of who’s flying the aircraft. And then, the passenger screening comes behind that. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Is it—and, I apologize; it’ll just take 3 

seconds—the—is it not true that if you have the right amount of 

explosives in a King Air, that you could pretty much demolish this 

whole complex? 

Mr. HAWLEY. You know, I think the answer to that is a classified 

answer, but your point is well taken. Certainly, an aircraft of that 

size loaded with explosives would—— 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I’m not talking about even a jet, just a 

King Air. 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, I understand. Yes, I’m—— 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thanks. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Ms. Berrick, we’ve got your report, and you touched on it in your 

opening statement, but could you summarize, what does your agency think about the progress that has been made on the major programs, like TWIC and Secure Flight and cargo security and the 

surface transportation security? Have you judged that, relatively? 

Ms. BERRICK. Well, we have given an overall assessment on 

TSA’s progress in both aviation and surface. In aviation, we concluded, if you look at all the legislative requirements that Congress 

passed, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, DHS’s own 

plans, for aviation we found that TSA met 70 percent of the expectations that were set out for them related to aviation. This doesn’t 

include the recent requirements in the 9/11 Act. In surface transportation security, there were much less requirements set out in 

legislation for TSA. There were only five. And we said that TSA 

met three of the five. So, in terms of progress, much more has been 

done in commercial aviation. 

There’s definitely becoming, and we’re seeing through our work, 

more of a focus on surface modes of transportation. 

Senator STEVENS. How is that related to the payment into the 

system from the transportation mechanisms you reviewed? I mean, 

it seems to me that the bulk of the money is coming from airline 

passengers, and yet, part of that is going into the other systems. 

Is that right? 

Ms. BERRICK. That’s not our—that’s not our understanding. And 

we haven’t looked specifically at how the fees flow in. I know TWIC 

44 

will be a fee-funded program, the program that you mentioned, 

which is another major effort that TSA is—— 

Senator STEVENS. But that’s, again, airlines. 

Ms. BERRICK. I’m sorry? 

Senator STEVENS. That’s, again, an airline program, right? 

Ms. BERRICK. Well, right now it’s being implemented at the 

ports. Eventually, it may be implemented to other transportation 

modes, including aviation. Right now, it’s just being implemented 

at the ports. 

Senator STEVENS. Will it pay for itself? 

Ms. BERRICK. That may be a better question for Mr. Hawley. I 

know there were—— 

Senator STEVENS. Well, let me ask—— 

Ms. BERRICK.—appropriations—— 

Senator STEVENS.—him, then. Are these other systems going to 

pay for themselves? You know, I’m a little provincial. Seventy percent of our travel is by air. And we’re paying, every time we travel. 

I think there are other people, who travel in various modes of 

transportation, that aren’t contributing to this system. Am I 

wrong? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The TWIC cards will be paid for by the people buying them. So, that will be—— 

Senator STEVENS. They’re not paying, now, are they? 

Mr. HAWLEY. We’re just starting the implementation. But I think 

your larger point, the transit drivers pay a significant part of the— 

or transit users—pay a significant part of the cost. It is paid for 

out of the municipality where they exist. So, in an indirect form, 

I guess through taxes and also from the fare box—but I think your 

point certainly, in dollars in aviation, it is a large chunk of money 

that comes to the Federal Government; in transit, it’s dispersed 

throughout—— 

Senator STEVENS. Well, I pay an exit tax, as well as a tax on my 

airline ticket. The rail passengers don’t do that, do they? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I don’t believe they pay a separate tax. 

Senator STEVENS. How are we going to get to the time when we 

balance this program so that the people involved pay for the security that they’re being delivered? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I think that’s a larger societal issue. And—you 

know, that it goes to the economic model of how we pay for security. 

Senator STEVENS. Well, let me get real provincial. In airports like 

ours, why don’t we have a line for the local residents, and other 

lines for nonresidents? I would go into one of these airports, and 

they would say, ‘‘Hi, Ted. Take off your belt and shoes.’’ Now, why 

can’t we get to the point of recognition of local people? 

Mr. HAWLEY. We’re working on making the whole process go 

more smoothly. And—I mentioned, earlier, in terms of spreading it 

out, the identity issue—I guess we’re feeling that, at this point, everybody should have an exposure to some security, although we are 

looking at breaking that up, based on—random. So, in other people—some people get shoes, trace detection; other people may have, 

you know, belts or something else. 

Senator STEVENS. All right. My last question is this. I saw an elderly gentlemen. He was obviously a World War II vet, not very arVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
45 

ticulate; he came through the system, and he set it off. And he was 

having a very difficult time, everyone trying to hold wands over 

him, everything else. He had shrapnel in him. Do we have identifications for those people now, so they don’t have to go through 

that every time they go through that screening? 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, we don’t. However, we do have—we just deployed machinery that will make that automatic, so that the people 

with hips and shrapnel or any other implant, basically, will not 

slow them down, so they won’t trigger secondary alarm when they 

go through. 

Senator STEVENS. How far away is that? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, we have it in Phoenix today, and we’re going 

to put some—probably four out in 2008. 

Senator STEVENS. Well, what do you do with those people, when 

no one really understands it? That gentleman was put into a secure 

room until someone figured out he was a vet with shrapnel in him. 

Mr. HAWLEY. They usually are able to resolve it at the—right 

there are the magnetometer. And if the individual requests secondary screening, of course they’ll take them back. But our officers 

are extremely well prepared for that situation. It happens every 

day. 

Senator STEVENS. Senator? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Back to foreign repair stations, Mr. Hawley, 

the law that was passed in 2003 also mandated that you all begin 

doing auditing of foreign repair stations. How many foreign repair 

stations has TSA audited in the last year? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I don’t believe that we’ve audited any. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And so, you’ve had no inspectors traveling 

to foreign repair stations, even the five countries where there are 

foreign repair stations that have been identified, in April of this 

year, as—terrorist safe havens? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, the FAA, as you know, has responsibility to 

be in there, and—for the certified areas—and I think we discussed, 

in your previous round, that we’re preparing the rule, and we’ll be 

deploying our inspectors within 6 months of the rule. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, the law specifically gives TSA the responsibility to audit for security; FAA just does safety. You specifically have been mandated by Congress to audit for security, and 

you’re saying that has simply not been done. 

Mr. HAWLEY. No—I’m saying we intend to meet the obligation 

under the law, that we have to put out a rule that will give us the 

regulatory authority to do it. And, when the rule is out, then we 

go and inspect. And I think the law—the 9/11 law is very clear, and 

it says, ‘‘We want this rule out quickly’’—we are working on it— 

and, ‘‘Once you get it out, 6 months later you’d better start inspecting,’’ and we will. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know you keep referring to the 9/11 law, 

but I think it’s important that you realize that this law, in fact, 

was a 2003 law. It’s not the 9/11 law. It’s been on the books now 

for 4 years, and the requirements are long past due. This is not 

something that we just passed—and the draft rule has been sitting 

around for a couple of years. So, I hope you work on that. 

Let me move to airport screening. I’ve talked about, a major 

issue, which are these foreign repair stations. This is kind of a 

46 

minor issue, but it’s like I said in another hearing. The face of our 

criminal justice system is our municipal courts—people who get 

traffic tickets, even though our criminal justice system is a labyrinth of people all over the country at various levels doing a myriad of important activities to keep our citizens safe. Our face of 

homeland security is airport screening. That’s where most Americans are getting a sense as to whether or not what we’re doing 

makes sense, and whether or not we are comprehensive and 

proactive in our security measures, rather than reactive and inconsistent. And I think that many of the things that have occurred— 

and I understand that they couldn’t be helped, but the changing of 

what you can take on and what you can’t take on—the example 

that Senator Stevens talked about, about the shrapnel, the knees, 

the hips, all of the things, appear to be, sometimes, nonsensical. 

And the one that more people have mentioned to me than anything 

else, and perhaps it’s because I’m a woman, is mascara. Mascara 

does not have a different consistency than lipstick. You can smear 

either one. Lipstick’s OK, mascara isn’t. And the reason I think 

women have mentioned this to me is that—every other makeup 

product you can get, you can get in a powder form or lipstick, you 

can get it in a tube form, which is OK. Mascara is the only one 

that doesn’t come in a powder form, which means, if someone 

wants to avoid having to check a bag, they have to put mascara 

in the little bag, which means it’s not in their purse. If they’re on 

the airplane, they don’t want to carry the mascara along with the 

shampoo in their purse. And no one can explain to me why mascara is different than lipstick. I haven’t gotten a good explanation. 

So, I figured I’d ask the boss. 

Mr. HAWLEY. OK. If you can—if you dump it out on the table, 

and it retains its form, it’s OK. If you dump it out on the table, 

and it kind of goes like that, then it needs to be in the 3-ounce container, put in your baggie. And what quite a lot of people do every 

day is put whatever it is they want into that baggie, they—and 

carry it on, and have access to it during the flight. So, it’s actually, 

I think, a pretty convenient way of bring it on. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I don’t think you’ve talked to enough 

women. 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, I—well, we’ve—we do. We have a lot of work 

to make these things comfortable for people. The fact of the matter 

is, it’s not nonsensical, and there are people trying to blow up aircraft using liquid explosives. And this is the way that we worked 

with the National Laboratories, the FBI, a lot of testing to determine what is a safe way to allow men and women to bring whatever they want onto the aircraft. What do you do for people who 

need medicines? What do you do for infants? What do you do for 

breast milk? All of those things, we’ve addressed and figured out 

a way that accommodates the security need, which is a very real 

threat, I can assure you, and also the passenger customer-service 

needs so they can travel without necessarily checking a bag. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I quarrel with the notion that you can 

dump mascara out on a table. And I hope the next time we have 

a hearing, that you are as righteously indignant about foreign repair stations and terrorists potentially working under the hood of 

airplanes as you are about the mascara. 

47 

Thank you, Mr. Hawley. 

Senator STEVENS. Senator Lott? 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Oh, I’m sorry, he hasn’t spoken—— 

Senator LOTT. Please go ahead. 

Senator STEVENS. Go ahead. He hasn’t had a first round. That’s 

why I called him. Go ahead. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I defer to Mississippi. 

Senator LOTT. No, please go ahead. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. OK. All right. 

I want to go back to this cargo thing—you said 50 percent will 

be screened within 18 months, and virtually all of it, within 3 

years. I don’t believe that. And you can tell me that it’s in your 

plans. I think you are both faced with a fundamental problem that 

anybody who works for any administration faces. You don’t have 

enough money, you are constrained in what you can say, your testimony this morning was not written by you, free and clear, it was 

vetted by the Office of Management and Budget; therefore, it has 

to agree exactly with what the Bush Administration thinks. The 

Bush Administration puts homeland security as a side issue, relative to some wars that we may be fighting. And I just don’t think 

you can get it done. You’ve got a whole list of things that you’ve 

got to do—you’ve got to submit a strategic plan to Congress, 

timelines, testing, you’ve got a great many things you have to do 

before you start to spread this out to the big airports, much less 

the small ones. And if it isn’t all of them, since I consider Ames, 

Iowa, just as vulnerable as I do New York City. I do. You may not, 

but I do. I don’t see any way that you can get it done, and I don’t 

see what’s wrong with your telling us that—frankly, you don’t 

think you can, and what you really need is a whole lot more money 

and a whole lot more emphasis and a whole lot more pushing from 

the Administration. 

Mr. HAWLEY. That, sir—— 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. You could get fired, but, you’d be telling 

the truth. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, I can tell you the—a year ago, I would not 

have thought that we could do 100 percent screening in 3 years, 

et cetera. Now I do. And the reason I do is because—and I said, 

at the beginning, this committee worked with us to go through the 

provisions of the law that it—was enacted—that is a doable deal, 

and it is something that we could explain over a period of time— 

and I could give you a briefing—and it would show you—and it is 

a layered and shared responsibility that involves the inspection, 

the screening of a variety of methods, and then securing the supply 

chain along the way, so that each step along the way there’s some 

screening that will get to the same commensurate level with passenger—or checked-baggage screening by the time it gets to the 

airport. And it’s a very well-developed program, and a lot of it 

we’ve taken from our European partners, specifically the U.K. So, 

this one—I mean, there’s—you’re right, there are 117, 120 taskings 

in this law for TSA, and we take them all seriously. This one, I personally was involved in the language and understanding what 

could be done, because I understand how tough it is. And we originally had had veto, as you may recall, on this provision, as it was 

earlier in the process, but this was not the subject of a veto threat 

48 

because—and I give this committee tremendous credit, really, for 

sitting down and working through the thorny details of how we actually will do it. So, I’ve—this one, I believe—regardless of what 

anybody else says, this one I personally was involved in, and I believe we are going to meet that. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. OK. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI 

Senator LOTT. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just—I have a couple of 

questions here. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lott follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT, U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

I am pleased that the Commerce Committee is having this hearing to get an update from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on it’s implementation 

schedule of the recently enacted 9/11 bill. I would like to thank both of our distinguished witnesses for being here today. 

I think the work that Mr. Hawley has done at the TSA so far is commendable. 

In the past I have stressed that TSA needs to take a common sense approach to 

security and I think he has done that so far. 

One area that I believe that the Department of Homeland Security and TSA need 

to really focus on is the use of technology to improve the screening process. There 

are many promising technologies that exist, the challenge is to test and deploy them 

expeditiously. I am afraid that in many cases this is just taking too long. Our 

screeners deserve to have the best tool possible to do their jobs. Terrorists are constantly changing their methods and tactics, we need to adjust as well. 

I encourage TSA to continue to look for practical and innovative ways to address 

security concerns that face our transportation systems. Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Senator LOTT. Mr. Hawley, the GAO testimony points out that, 

while TSA has developed the so-called backscatter technology, ‘‘limited progress has been made in fielding this technology at passenger screening checkpoints.’’ And, as you know, I’ve long been an 

advocate of using innovative technology to screen passengers and 

baggage to move the process along and to also be more thorough. 

I understand that the testing has indicated the technology is very 

effective at detecting explosives and weapons that might be concealed on a person. Is that correct? And why are you still experiencing delays fielding the backscatter technology? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The backscatter technology is, as you know, tested 

in prototype, and we are satisfied with its work. We’re going to continue to work with it. But it is—it’s meeting expectation, and I expect that we will continue the deployment. We’ve talked about adding additional cities after Phoenix. I also should point out that 

we’ve—we are deploying a significant amount of new technology at 

the passenger checkpoint for carry-on bags, which is a very significant deployment of technology—— 

Senator LOTT. And you are doing that in pilot areas, aren’t you? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, on the checkpoint technology for the passenger bags, we’ve already done the pilot, and we’ve put out a buy 

to get about 250 of the machines right away. 

Senator LOTT. All right, sir. So, you’re still planning on trying to 

go forward with fielding this technology—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LOTT.—correct? Uh-huh. 

49 

One of the problems, I suspect, is that TSA doesn’t have direct 

control over research and development, but they still have to deploy it. The research and development is done by DHS. You’ve got 

one agency doing the research and development, you’ve got another 

agency that is charged with deploying it. It seems to me like that’s 

the typical Federal Government bureaucratic process. 

Ms. BERRICK. We are actually looking at that, as it relates specifically to checkpoint technologies. And, as you mentioned, Department of Homeland Security, their Science and Technology Office, 

has a role. They manage all research and development. And TSA 

is a major customer of that. 

What we found was, although DHS Science and Technology manages research for all of the components, all of the components are 

involved in the requirements for those programs, so there’ll be 

working groups where TSA would be a part of it and could identify 

to DHS what their requirements are. 

We did see some break-downs, though, in communication and coordination. There’s a Memorandum of Understanding between DHS 

and TSA on how they’re going to work together with technologies. 

And there have been complaints from both sides that that hasn’t 

been fully implemented. So, we’re exploring this further as a part 

of our work, but—we have found that there have been some breakdowns in communication, but we are seeing that TSA is definitely 

very much a part of that process and are communicating with S&T 

in what their requirements are. 

Senator LOTT. I wish you would pursue that, because, again, it 

appears to me that things are better at these airport terminals. I 

still see things that, you know, defy common sense, and I still wonder why it takes so long to employ new technology or new processes. 

For instance, Mr. Hawley, the Registered Traveler plan, that was 

delayed and delayed and delayed and delayed. I guess it’s been implemented. Is it being utilized very much? What’s happening with 

that? 

Mr. HAWLEY. It’s out there, and we’ve got seven operations where 

passengers are going through. And we’ve got—— 

Senator LOTT. ‘‘Seven operations,’’ you mean seven—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. Airports. 

Senator LOTT.—airports? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. And about 48,000 people have signed up. And 

so, it is up. It is not running at full speed, I don’t think. I certainly 

wouldn’t say that, and I don’t think—— 

Senator LOTT. What does it cost a registered traveler to go 

through this process and get whatever it is he or she gets? 

Mr. HAWLEY. It’s about $100, and I think either $28 or $31 of 

that is—goes to the background checking that we do. And the 

promise for Registered Traveler is to get beyond the ‘‘cut to the 

front of the line’’ privilege, which is what it is now. And that’s the 

part that I see as exciting and promising, is additional security deployed will help and be able to speed up the processing for those 

people, and other identification things that will smooth their way 

through the airport. 

We do have a shoe scanner that one of the providers put out 

there, on their own money, which was terrific, and we’re continuing 

50 

to work with them to get it to the point where we can use it so 

the people can keep their shoes on. 

Senator LOTT. That would be very nice. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yup. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LOTT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. I’m going to put the statement I would have 

made, had I been here at the beginning, in the record after Senator 

Dorgan’s comments. 

I do urge that we find a way to deal with some of these issues 

that the Members have spoken about, because we still have some 

legislation that’s got to go by—across the floor, and I would like not 

to get so many amendments to that, these appropriations bills dealing with this subject. So, I’d like to find a chance where we might 

visit with you, Mr. Hawley, and the Chairman, before those bills 

come to the floor. 

Thank you very much, Ms. Berrick. 

This concludes this hearing. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(51) 

1See, ICAO Annex 8, Airworthiness, § 4.2.1(b). 

A P P E N D I X 

AERONAUTICAL REPAIR STATION ASSOCIATION

Alexandria, VA, October 26, 2007 

Hon. DANIEL INOUYE, 

Chairman, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. TED STEVENS, 

Vice Chairman, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

RE: SUBMISSION TO RECORD FOR OCTOBER 16, 2007 HEARING ON

OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) 

Dear Chairman Inouye and Vice-Chairman Stevens: 

We are writing to address issues raised about the use of foreign repair stations 

at the October 16, 2007 hearing on oversight of TSA. In particular, it is important 

that the leadership of the subcommittee understand the following about foreign repair station security: 

• Foreign repair stations are an essential component of the global aviation system. Without them there would be no international travel. 

• Security standards do exist for repair stations based on their location. Such 

standards come from existing TSA regulations and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 

• Pushing TSA to quickly produce rules mandating additional security requirements will reallocate limited oversight resources from areas where the threat 

is greatest. 

• Given the broad scope of the aviation maintenance industry, adequate time is 

needed to review any rules proposed by TSA, and mandates for new repair station security rules by August 2008 are unrealistic given TSA’s current resources. 

While ARSA understands the concern of the Committee that government inaction 

may be putting the public at risk, we wish to underscore the fact that there are 

both safety and security regulations already in place. It is in the best interests of 

the industry to maintain high standards in both of these areas. 

Foreign repair stations are an essential component of the international aviation system. Without them there would be no international travel. 

The Chicago Convention of 1944 and ICAO standards require that the State of 

Registry (i.e., the country in which an aircraft is registered) oversee the maintenance performed on that aircraft and related components, regardless of where the 

work is performed.1 Consequently, a U.S. registered aircraft requiring maintenance 

while outside of the U.S. must have that work performed by an FAA-certificated 

maintenance provider. Similarly, when an aircraft of foreign registry requires maintenance while in the U.S., only a repair station certificated or validated by the relevant National Aviation Authority (NAA) may perform the work. For example, only 

a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)-certificated repair station may perform 

maintenance on an aircraft of French registry within the U.S. 

Prohibiting or otherwise limiting the use of repair stations overseas would make 

international travel impossible, since aircraft need some level of work performed 

when they land at their destination. Furthermore, foreign authorities may choose 

to take retaliatory action against U.S. counterparts for any restrictions put in place. 

Indeed, it seems such action is possible. In a letter dated October 22, 2007 from 

Mark Wilson, Chairman of the EASA Advisory Board, Congress’s proposals regarding the requirement for additional inspections of foreign repair stations and proVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
52 

posed drug and alcohol testing were examined. Chairman Wilson stated, ‘‘Adoption 

of such legislative text would bring to an end any possibility to finalise a balanced, 

reciprocal EU–US Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA) and association 

Maintenance Implementing Procedures (MIPs) . . .’’ 

Given this warning, it is necessary for Congress to closely examine the effect its 

proposals will have not just on the traveling public, but on the global aviation community. 

Security standards do exist for repair stations based on their location. Such standards come from the FAA, existing TSA regulations, and ICAO. 

Domestically, many repair stations located on an airport are required to have 

their personnel undergo criminal background checks under TSA regulations if they 

require unescorted access to the designated airport security identification display 

area (SIDA). Therefore, a repair station employee that performs line maintenance 

for an air carrier would have the same 10-year criminal background check requirement as an airline mechanic. Many repair stations voluntarily implement additional 

security procedures since the quality and safety of their work directly affects their 

business. 

However, many U.S. repair stations are located miles away from airports and perform specialized work on component parts that have been removed from the airplane and sent to them for repair. These facilities are usually small businesses; 

thus, imposing undue security burdens on them would jeopardize an entire sector 

of highly-specialized workers. Our members understand the need for safety and security, since their livelihood depends upon it, and we ask that Congress recognize 

the difference in repair facilities, remembering that our industry shares their same 

goal: maintaining a high level of safety and security. 

Internationally, each country must implement the types of security procedures to 

be followed just as they must do in the safety area. These are based on ICAO standards contained in Annex 17 and thus are very similar to TSA regulations. They include, but are not limited to: 

• A national civil aviation security program with continuous threat monitoring 

and mandatory quality control procedures; 

• Airport security programs for each airport serving international carriers; 

• Air operator security programs; 

• Background checks for persons implementing security control measures and 

persons with unescorted access to restricted security areas; and 

• Periodic ICAO security audits. 

The professionals at the TSA, ICAO and other countries’ security oversight organizations have concluded that resources should be focused where the threat is greatest. Therefore, FAA foreign repair stations working on components and located 

miles away from an airport are not required to implement background checks for 

their employees. However, if they perform line maintenance at an international airport or otherwise require access to the ramp area, foreign repair station employees 

would be subject to similar security requirements to their FAA counterparts, including background checks. 

Neither domestic nor international security requirements are based on whether 

a person works for an airline or a repair station; they are dependent on the degree 

of access the individual has to an aircraft. Further, mandating additional security 

requirements where none are truly needed will reallocate limited oversight resources from areas where the threat is greater. This could have the unintended consequence of reducing the level of security for the traveling public. 

Pushing TSA to quickly produce rules mandating additional security requirements 

will reallocate limited oversight resources from areas where the threat is greater. 

The testimony given by Assistant Secretary Kip Hawley mentioned several of the 

initiatives TSA is working on to increase safety, from highways and rail, to aviation 

and cargo shipments. Threats exist throughout all modes of transportation, and TSA 

must be allowed the opportunity to prioritize its resources to those areas where the 

threat is greatest. During the October 16 hearing, Assistant Secretary Hawley testified that the TSA currently is committed to focusing its resources on ‘‘high priority 

items’’ facing national security interests. 

53 

Given the broad scope of the aviation maintenance industry, adequate time is needed 

to review any rules proposed by TSA, and Congressional mandates for new repair station security rules by August 2008 are unrealistic given TSA’s current 

resources. 

Congress’s recently passed mandate in section 1616 of H.R. 1 (Public Law 110– 

53) severely limits the ability of TSA to conduct an adequate rulemaking. While 

ARSA understands Congress’s concern over the delay, as stated above, TSA must 

be allowed to prioritize its resources and personnel to address the areas with the 

greatest need. As Secretary Hawley stated in his written testimony, 

‘‘. . . many of the rulemaking requirements mandated in the 9/11 Act do not 

adequately recognize the obligations that TSA must give the many stakeholders 

affected by proposed regulations and the general public . . . These requirements are time consuming but are time well spent to assure that our regulations achieve their objective in a way that is transparent to stakeholders and 

the public and does not adversely affect travel and commerce.’’ 

Furthermore, punishing industry for government inaction sets a very dangerous 

precedent. The penalties in section 1616 hurt repair stations and companies who are 

doing their best to comply with existing law, and which do not have the ability or 

influence to force TSA to promulgate these new rules. 

Congress may not have considered the fact that restrictions such as those in section 1616 may adversely affect the trade balance between the U.S. and other countries, specifically the EU. There are only 698 FAA-certificated repair stations outside the U.S.; yet there are approximately 1,200 EASA-certificated repair stations 

and numerous other NAA-certificated repair stations in the U.S. 

Conclusion 

Although ARSA has testified before on this subject, we felt it was important to 

underscore the safety and economic necessity of foreign repair stations. With the 

topic of maintenance overseas gaining more and more visibility with the press, it 

is important to emphasize the facts, and not allow legislation or news coverage to 

be based on fear. 

Furthermore, as the possibility of retaliation by foreign civil aviation authorities 

looms, now is the time for the Senate to look carefully at the effect it is having on 

the international aviation community. 

Should you have any questions or require additional information, do not hesitate 

to contact me. 

Regards, 

MARSHALL S. FILLER, 

Managing Director and General Counsel. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY

Question 1. Can you provide greater detail regarding the efforts the TSA is taking 

to comply with the new requirements in the 9/11 Commission Recommendations 

Law, that specifies that 50 percent of cargo on commercial passenger aircraft must 

be screened in 18 months and 100 percent screening be achieved within 3 years? 

How does the new system compare with current international efforts to screen cargo 

transported on commercial passenger flights? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) approach to air 

cargo security is comprised of multiple programs, which form a layered security approach to include vetting, screening, and risk-based targeting of air cargo to guard 

against potential attack. To comply with the air cargo screening requirements of the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, TSA plans to 

build upon established programs and is in the process of developing a Certified 

Cargo Screener Program. Together, enhancements to existing air cargo screening requirements and the planned Certified Cargo Screener Program will satisfy the requirement that 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft is 

screened to provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for 

the screening of passenger checked baggage. The Certified Cargo Screener Program 

is an entirely new program that TSA is developing whereby indirect air carriers, 

third party logistics entities, and shippers will perform cargo screening functions 

and implement secure supply chain security practices. The Certified Cargo Screener 

Program will be a robust combination of stringent security standards at the facility 

and personnel level. It will require Certified Screeners to implement secure standard operating procedures and utilize chain of custody measures that will establish 

54 

and maintain the security of cargo as it moves throughout the supply chain. All Certified Screeners will be subject to TSA inspection to ensure that they are complying 

with all applicable program requirements. 

TSA’s existing security programs concentrate the responsibility for screening 

cargo to aircraft operators and foreign air carriers, utilizing TSA-approved physical 

and technological screening methods. The Certified Cargo Screener Program will 

similarly require entities that are validated and certified to screen air cargo to use 

TSA-approved physical and technological screening methods. However, a greater 

level of screening can be achieved because screening will be allocated across the air 

cargo supply chain. By spreading the responsibility for screening air cargo to entities other than aircraft operators and air carriers, TSA will be able to meet the legislative mandate that 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft be 

screened to provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for 

the screening of passenger checked baggage. 

TSA has examined and leveraged the United Kingdom’s and Ireland’s Known 

Consignor Programs to provide a solid framework for TSA’s planned Certified Cargo 

Screener Program. These programs require certification of the entity’s supply chain 

security practices and require the entity to implement secure standard operating 

procedures as well as utilize chain of custody measures that will establish and 

maintain the security of cargo as it moves throughout the supply chain. 

Question 2. What efforts does the TSA have underway to develop ‘‘in-line’’ explosive detection systems (EDS) systems at airports that requested support through the 

agency’s Letter of Intent (LOI) process? How long does the TSA expect it will take 

to deploy in-line EDS systems at the airports that require them? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) welcomes the opportunity to make use of the resources provided in the Implementing Recommendations 

of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to continue its efforts to expand the number 

of airports with in-line checked baggage screening solutions at those airports where 

such a system is determined to be the optimal solution. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires TSA to allocate $250 

million each Fiscal Year (2008 through 2028) to support airport improvement 

projects to fulfill Letters of Intent for in-line baggage screening systems. Of the total 

amount, $50 million is to be allocated to projects at small hub and non-hub airports. 

In February 2006, TSA published an Electronic Baggage Screening Program 

(EBSP) Strategic Framework for identifying airports that would benefit from in-line 

systems, and within that framework we have an airport prioritization model (APM) 

to prioritize airports for Federal funding of these checked baggage screening systems. 

Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, in 

February 2007, DHS turned to the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) 

to sponsor a Baggage Screening Investment Study (BSIS). The ASAC, comprised of 

industry stakeholders, outlined a number of financing and cost sharing options that 

could be considered for funding in-line systems. TSA is evaluating each of these options, and others, to identify the most efficient and cost effective methods for deploying these resources to the highest priority airports. 

Because the aviation industry is dynamic and changes to operations are sometimes unpredictable, a spend plan is developed each fiscal year designating the 

projects that will be funded using appropriated funds for the purchase and installation of checked baggage explosives detection systems (EDS). TSA also determines 

where it is appropriate to reimburse airports for eligible costs associated with inline systems that the airports have already built without Federal funding. TSA continues to work with its industry partners and the Administration to effect the most 

economical and effective process available to support construction of these types of 

systems. 

Question 3. When do you expect the TSA to begin testing and implementing the 

Secure Flight program? What do you believe to be the agency’s biggest challenges 

in implementing the Secure Flight program? 

Answer. The following key milestones for the program are based on the President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 budget request, but are subject to change based on the 

impact of the Continuing Resolution (CR) and final FY 2008 funding: 

• Benchmark testing with volunteer aircraft operators—December 2007 

• Parallel testing begins—Third Quarter FY 2008 

• Domestic cutovers begin—Second Quarter FY 2009 

Funding is the biggest challenge for Secure Flight implementation. In FY 2007, 

the program expended $31 million, but the rate used to calculate the CR is based 

on the FY 2007 enacted level of $15 million. This rate leaves the Secure Flight proVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
55 

gram significantly short of funding for the duration of the CR. If the CR extends 

into calendar year 2008, TSA will be forced to take steps that would result in significant delays to the Secure Flight program. Furthermore, funding for the FY 2008 

budget at less than the President’s requested level will delay development and deployment of Secure Flight. The progress the Secure Flight program has made in the 

last year is substantial with strong forward momentum. The future of this important aviation security program and 9/11 Commission recommendation is in jeopardy 

unless the current funding is resolved. 

Stakeholder understanding and commitment are also important to the success of 

the Secure Flight program. It is a highly visible program including diverse stakeholder groups such as the travel industry, passengers, Congress, airlines, and privacy advocacy groups. TSA will continue to reach out to stakeholders to engage 

them in the program and to obtain input. 

Question 4. What actions has DHS taken to establish standards and guidelines 

for developing and implementing the vulnerability assessments and security plans 

for railroad carriers and over-the-road bus operators? 

Answer. 

Freight Railroad 

After September 11, 2001, the freight railroad industry developed and implemented their own corporate security plans. In an ongoing effort to ensure a robust 

level of security planning, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in 2007 

conducted Corporate Security Reviews on all seven of the Class I carriers. These reviews include an assessment of a carrier’s plan, its implementation, and if necessary, TSA recommendations for improvement. TSA’s Corporate Security Review 

(CSR) program is one layer of freight rail security that TSA will use to inform its 

regulatory efforts. 

TSA has begun developing the vulnerability assessment and security plan regulations for freight railroad carriers required under section 1512 of the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. TSA will draw on existing 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and private industry knowledge of security planning including the U.S. Coast Guard and infrastructure protection security 

plan regulations and the Association of American Railroads industry plan in developing its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) required under the Act. 

Mass Transit 

TSA has begun developing the concepts that will produce the required regulation 

of security plans for mass transit and passenger rail systems. We anticipate the conduct of vulnerability assessments will be a component of the required plans. Consultation with the mass transit and passenger rail community—including representatives of systems, law enforcement and security forces, and employee organizations—as well as public safety officials will facilitate the development of requirements that meet the statutory requirements and reflect operational realities. 

Mass transit and passenger rail systems operating in the Nation’s sizable metropolitan areas are among the most thoroughly assessed of all transportation modes. 

Since 9/11, they have undergone security assessments by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the former Office of Grants and Training at DHS (for grant 

funding eligibility), the American Public Transportation Association, private sector 

security consultants (funded by DHS grants), and now under the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program conducted by TSA Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs). 

Through the BASE program, TSA assesses a transit system’s security posture on 

the 17 Security and Emergency Management Action Items. The Actions Items cover 

a range of areas that are foundational to an effective security program, including 

security program management and accountability, security and emergency response 

training, drills and exercises, public awareness, protective measures for Homeland 

Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat levels, physical security, personnel security, and information sharing and security. Particular emphasis is placed on posture 

in the six Transit Security Fundamentals (protection of underground/underwater infrastructure; protection of other high consequence systems and assets; random, unpredictable deterrence; training; exercises; and public awareness). This program is 

dynamic, with regular reviews to ensure assessment tools continue to reflect security realities and priorities. 

TSA completed BASE reviews of 45 of the largest 50 mass transit and passenger 

rail agencies, plus 8 others ranked in the 51–100 range in size, with the goal of completing the largest 100 by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2008. Simultaneous with the 

BASE reviews, TSA engaged each of the top 50 agencies directly during January– 

February 2007 to complete self-assessments on their posture in the Transit Security 

56 

Fundamentals. All 50 agencies completed these self-assessments, showing remarkable candor in their review of their respective agencies’ posture. 

TSA development and implementation of focused security programs and initiatives and resource allocations, notably Transit Security Grant Program funds, for 

security enhancement has directly resulted from these reviews. Specific examples 

include the streamlined security training initiative, authorization of grant funding 

for deployment of dedicated anti-terrorism teams, and cooperative agreements on 

risk-based priorities and targeted mitigation projects through the Regional Transit 

Security Working Groups. 

Highway and Motor Carrier 

Many of TSA’s surface transportation modal divisions have conducted threat, criticality and vulnerability assessments for two to 3 years under the CSR process. The 

process places modal security specialists in stakeholder sites for a thorough overview and analysis of the stakeholder’s security preparedness plans and points of vulnerability. Despite the fact that most surface modes have not yet been subjected to 

TSA regulatory requirements for comprehensive security plans, the Agency has 

made significant progress in identifying security gaps and in recommending appropriate mitigation tools from industry best practices, technology and newly-developed 

policy guidance. The process is especially valuable when it is combined with DHS’s 

intelligence offices and linked to timely and credible threat information. TSA is expanding its CSR system now with the use of DHS field personnel and on-site law 

enforcement agencies to reach the massive stakeholder community. 

TSA is also partnering with the motorcoach industry and is developing a set of 

security action items (SAI) that when implemented will provide critical gap closures 

within the industry. These SAIs are being vetted through the industry and other 

partners. 

Question 5. What progress has TSA made in implementing its surface transportation inspection program? 

Answer. Substantial progress has been made in implementing the TSA Surface 

Transportation Security Inspections Program (STSIP) since its inception in 2005. 

The surface inspectors develop and implement programs and initiatives to improve regional collaboration and coordination to ensure security resources are applied in the most effective manner. For optimal effectiveness, leadership of the 

STSIP at Transportation Security Administration (TSA) headquarters and regional 

levels work in concert with the Office of Security Operations (OSO) Federal Security 

Directors, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and the staffs of Transportation 

Security Network Management (TSNM)-Mass Transit and TSNM-Freight Rail. National priorities set by TSNM lead to customized security products that are developed in coordination with the STSIP and drive the activities of inspectors on the 

national level. The Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs)-Surface act as fact 

finders and Ambassadors for TSA’s security policies and programs in the field. 

The success of this integrated OSO–TSNM approach through the STSIP is demonstrated in the achievements made since the STSIP began operations in earnest 

in the fall of 2005. Highlights include: 

• TSA has advanced a regional engagement strategy for mass transit security by 

networking with transit systems in metropolitan areas to: (1) expand visible, 

random, and unpredictable security activities; (2) facilitate the delivery of security training programs to broader audiences of transit system employees; and 

(3) make security tools available for use in systems; 

• In a coordinated effort involving the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and 

the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), TSA developed several comprehensive security assessment and review programs to determine and elevate the security baseline in passenger rail and mass transit. These programs include the 

Security Analysis and Action Program (SAAP), Security Directive Reviews 

(SDR), and the more recent Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement 

(BASE) program; 

• TSA has completed assessments under the SDR or SAAP programs of multiple 

rail/transit properties; 

• TSA has conducted BASE assessments of 54 transit agencies nationwide, including 45 of the largest 50 transit systems; 

• STSIP Inspectors have conducted more than 1,000 Transit Station Profiles and 

40 rail and mass transit Operations Center Profiles nationwide. These profiles 

provide valuable critical infrastructure data and give the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA an accurate picture of security countermeasures 

57 

that are in place, the location of the transportation asset, and accurate contact 

information on each asset; 

• In a coordinated effort with the FTA, TSA has engaged with the State Safety 

Oversight Agencies (SSOA) to support the conduct of on-site security assessments and audits required for heavy rail (i.e., subway) systems under 49 CFR 

Part 659. The initial effort took place in the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) 

system. The program is expanding dramatically, due in large part to the coordinated Federal effort and engagement with the SSOAs through their biannual 

conferences; 

• TSA has partnered with the FTA, the DHS Offices of Grants and Training and 

Science and Technology, the American Public Transportation Association 

(APTA), and the mass transit industry to develop voluntary security standards 

and recommended practices for both mass transit rail and bus transportation; 

• The STSIP participates in the interagency Mass Transit Security Information 

Sharing Network, a forum comprised of subject matter experts from the Department of Transportation, DHS, TSA, and FTA to streamline Federal information 

gathering and exchange to support timely decision-making and information 

products in threat situations, incident response, and normal operations. TSIsSurface channel and receive information through this process in response to incidents in transit systems in their areas of responsibility as well as during 

international events and regular drills and exercises; 

• TSA has developed a voluntary inspection program of the Nation’s freight railroads using the Toxic Inhalation Hazmat (TIH) Freight Rail Security Action 

Items to elevate the level of security in freight rail yards, storage facilities, and 

rights of way. To date, STSIs have completed over 1,600 field inspections and 

interviewed more than 3,000 front-line railroad employees in 46 high-threat 

urban areas. 

Although TSA has issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making for rail and passenger 

rail, there does not yet exist a regulatory regime for the STSIP. At this stage of its 

development, the STSIP performs voluntary assessments only and is primarily in 

a supportive and facilitative role with the mass transit, passenger rail, and freight 

rail communities. 

Close alignment of the STSIs with TSA strategies ensures an integrated approach 

that has demonstrated success in advancing security programs in surface transportation. Priority taskings for the STSIP align with national risk-based strategies as 

described below: 

• Security Action Item TIH reviews in freight rail through November 2008. 

• BASE reviews of mass transit systems through the completion of the Top 100 

systems. 

• Security Analysis and Action Program vulnerability and risk assessments in 

freight and passenger rail environments with special emphasis on high threat 

urban areas and major passenger rail infrastructure. 

• Building a nationwide rail and mass transit infrastructure profile database. 

• Supporting Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) teams, which 

consist of varying force packages of Federal Air Marshals, TSIs, Transportation 

Security Officers, behavior detection officers, TSA explosives detection canine 

teams, and supporting equipment, that work with local security and law enforcement officials to supplement existing security resources, provide deterrent 

presence and detection capabilities, and introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist planning activities. 

In addition to these primary responsibilities, TSIs-Surface are actively involved in 

a variety of other functions critical to TSA’s surface transportation security efforts. 

These include: 

• Security Incident Response—TSIs are responsible for responding on scene to a 

significant surface transportation security incident or natural disaster in order 

to ensure the timely and accurate communication of information to TSA headquarters and the Freedom Center and effective liaison with passenger rail and 

rail and bus transit systems. 

• Heightened Threat Deployments—TSIs staff stakeholder transportation operations centers or emergency operations centers, as directed, during periods of 

heightened threat in order to provide timely information from the local level to 

TSA headquarters and the Freedom Center and ensure effective liaison with 

passenger rail and rail and bus transit systems. Additionally, TSIs support 

58 

other TSA operations during specific threats (for example, providing support to 

TSA airport operations during an aviation-specific threat). 

• Special Event Support—TSIs provide additional operational and subject matter 

expertise to multiagency task forces during National Special Security Events 

(NSSE) or other high threat events. 

• Stakeholder Outreach—TSIs establish and maintain partnerships among public 

and private transportation stakeholders in order to enhance information sharing capabilities, best practice development, and coordinated response planning. 

• Transportation Security Grant Program (TSGP)—TSIs participate as subject 

matter experts to review grant applications under the DHS TSGP. 

TSIs regularly collaborate with other government and private industry stakeholders on large scale assessments that cross jurisdictions and/or have regional implications. 

TSIs coordinate their activities, when appropriate, with the FRA pursuant to the 

TSA/FRA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (September 2006), which outlines 

roles and responsibilities of inspectors as well as inspection coordination requirements. Additionally, there are MOUs between TSA and the FTA and TSA and the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration that govern coordination 

of mass transit security and hazardous materials transportation security issues, respectively. 

• TSIs accompany FRA safety inspectors on their compliance reviews under 49 

CFR Part 239 (emergency preparedness plans and programs for passenger/commuter rail). 

• TSIs coordinate with other agencies during response to significant security or 

other incidents that impact surface transportation. 

• TSIs regularly participate on regional security roundtables and working groups 

that include Federal, State, and local governments, as well as industry representatives. 

• TSIs collaborate with the SSOAs that have a specific responsibility for security 

oversight of rail fixed guideway systems under 49 CFR Part 659. 

• TSIs regularly participate in local emergency response drills and exercises. 

• TSIs participate on TSA VIPR teams, which consist of varying force packages 

of Federal Air Marshals, TSIs, Transportation Security Officers, Behavior Detection Officers, TSA explosives detection canine teams, and supporting equipment, that work with local security and law enforcement officials to supplement 

existing security resources, provide deterrent presence and detection capabilities, and introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist 

planning activities. 

• TSIs participate on National Transit Security Roundtables, which are twice 

yearly forums that bring together the security chiefs and directors from the top 

50 transit agencies (by passenger volume) in a working seminar to develop effective solutions to security challenges. 

• TSIs participate in PortSTEP exercises, which are intergovernmental, multi-jurisdictional regional exercises executed through the Area Maritime Security 

committees. 

• TSIs represent TSA in the joint initiative of the American Public Transportation Association Standards Development Committee and Federal security 

partners (TSA, FTA, and DHS Standards Executive and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency) to develop operational and technology security standards. 

Question 6. The 9/11 Commission Recommendations Law requires significant levels of cooperation and coordination between the TSA and the DOT in order to enhance security while improving efficiency and the use of Department resources. Can 

you describe the efforts that your agency is taking to strengthen your relationship 

with DOT? Are you getting the cooperation you need from Transportation Secretary 

Mary Peters? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Department of Transportation (DOT) have an 

ongoing, active, and cooperative relationship concerning security matters. Each 

mode maintains a Government Coordinating Council that includes representatives 

from DHS, TSA, DOT, and other appropriate Federal agencies. The tasks from the 

Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 are discussed and, as appropriate, are collaboratively addressed through these councils. In 

addition, DHS, TSA, and DOT jointly evaluated the requirements of the Act, agreed 

to the designations of lead agencies, and identified points of contact. DHS, TSA and 

59 

DOT are also cooperating through other existing committees, councils, and working 

groups to coordinate research and development, cyber security, and threat assessments, HAZMAT regulations, transportation system recovery planning, and aviation 

security operations and planning. 

Question 7. Your testimony suggests that since the budget allocations and homeland security appropriations bill were considered prior to enactment of the 9/11 

Commission Recommendations Law, appropriations equal to the funding authorized 

by it are unlikely. Given that these programs and funding levels were provided 

based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, will the President be requesting additional funding in FY 2008 either through a Supplemental Appropriations request, or a budget amendment? 

Answer. The President has submitted an Amendment to the Fiscal Year (FY) 

2008 Budget Request to address critical security gaps identified in the FY 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. While the Amendment was not specifically formulated 

to address the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

requirements, it does contain funding for two of the mission-critical items identified 

by the Act. The FY 2008 Budget Amendment proposes $20 million in funding for 

10 additional Visible Intermodal Protection and Response teams which will provide 

protection in multiple modes of transportation as well as $10 million to support 92 

additional K–9 teams for multi-modal coverage (46 teams through Cooperative 

agreements and 46 TSA-led teams). 

Question 8. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2006 

consolidated all of the funding for the Department’s research and development functions within the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). In August 2006, you 

signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with S&T which shifted the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) from TSA to S&T. Do you think this consolidation has weakened the TSL’s core mission and made the process for certifying EDS 

for the TSA more inefficient? Please explain why or why not. 

Answer. Shifting the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the Science and Technology Directorate 

(S&T) has not weakened TSL’s core mission. As a customer of the S&T Directorate, 

TSA’s work remains the number one priority of TSL. 

The S&T Directorate is working closely with TSA to ensure that the S&T Directorate is meeting TSA’s priorities and requirements. TSL has accomplished priority 

certifications and qualifications of equipment for TSA, including work with EDS, in 

a timely fashion. 

Question 9. To what extend has the DHS, the TSA and the TSL considered the 

qualification and certification of EDS for use in modes of transportation other than 

aviation? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for certifying and qualifying technology across all modes of transportation. The Science 

and Technology (S&T) Directorate and TSL support TSA and other customers in developing solutions that can fill their technology gaps. These technology gaps are 

identified in a collaborative process where TSA works with S&T and TSL on a continuing and reoccurring basis. 

Question 10. On Wednesday, October 3, 2007, you announced that Honolulu, Hawaii, would begin to enroll seaport personnel for TWIC in mid-November. That time 

has arrived and no one with the TSA nor with the contractor Lockheed Martin can 

provide the most basic operational information such as how many trusted agents are 

hired and trained to enroll workers; how many fixed and mobile enrollment stations 

will be deployed; or what the enrollment facilities’ hours of operation will be. How 

confident are you that this enrollment process will be implemented efficiently, successfully, and on time? 

Answer. The enrollment center in Honolulu opened on November 7, 2007. Lockheed Martin provided Port stakeholders with advance notice of the plans for when 

pre-enrollment and enrollment activities were to begin. There are 4 trusted agents 

staffed at the Honolulu enrollment center, with two fixed and one mobile enrollment 

station. The hours of operation are Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. 

However, Lockheed is currently evaluating changing these hours to 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 

p.m. in order to better accommodate the workforce. 

Question 11. When can we expect to see the deployment schedule for the TWIC 

program at the other 134 enrollment locations? 

Answer. On October 31, 2007, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

released a general schedule for all 147 enrollment locations. TSA and the U.S. Coast 

Guard expanded the original list of 134 to 147 based on stakeholder input. This listing provides monthly or quarterly deployment time-frames. The list is available to 

the public on TSA’s website at www.tsa.gov/twic. As the start of the enrollment peVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:24 Nov 09, 2012 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\76586.TXT JACKIE
60 

riod for each grouping of ports nears, TSA will post a specific enrollment start date 

in the Federal Register. To date, TSA has announced the start of enrollment for 22 

locations in the Federal Register. 

Question 12. How does an employer go about arranging for a trusted agent to enroll employees at its facility? 

Answer. If an employer is interested in arranging for a mobile enrollment center, 

they should contact the Lockheed Martin Operations Manager, Stacy BonnahDeMoss at 703310–9157 or the Field Coordinator to discuss arrangements at the requestor’s facility. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. TED STEVENS TO

HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY

Question. The recently enacted 9/11 Commission recommendations legislation 

(Pub. L. 110–53) provides significant resources and an expanded Letter of Intent 

program to expedite the installation of in-line electronic screening systems for the 

enhanced screening of checked baggage at our Nation’s airports. 

The Committee was clear on its intent that TSA and the Administration should 

fully utilize the 20 year horizon for LOIs. However, the Committee is concerned by 

rumblings that the Administration may be pursuing a limited short-term view of the 

program, which would have detrimental effects on the ability of airports to obtain 

requisite funding from the financial bond markets. 

Is it TSA’s intention to issue multi-year Letters of Intent to airports for in-line 

projects? Can TSA assure the Committee that the Department will issue multi-year 

LOIs for in-line systems in FY 2008, in accordance with the law? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) welcomes the opportunity to make use of the resources provided for in the 9/11 Commission recommendations legislation to continue its efforts to expand the number of airports 

with in-line checked baggage screening solutions, at those airports where such a 

system is determined to be the optimal solution. TSA will continue to work with its 

industry partners and the Administration throughout Fiscal Year 2008 to affect the 

most economical and effective process available to support construction of these 

types of systems. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY

Question 1. When will TSA begin enrolling workers at the Port of New York and 

New Jersey in the TWIC program? What about the Port of Philadelphia/Camden? 

Answer. Enrollments at the Port of New York and New Jersey are currently targeted to begin the week of December 17, 2007. There will be a total of 3 sites. The 

other two will open within a month of the opening of the first site. Enrollment at 

the Port of Philadelphia/Camden is currently targeted to begin the week of December 10, 2007. A second site is targeted for mid-2008. Plans are being finalized for 

these locations and notifications to port stakeholders will begin shortly. 

Question 2. Do you believe our Nation’s rail and vehicle bridges and tunnels are 

sufficiently protected against terrorist attack? Has the Department completed a security assessment of the Nation’s rail and vehicle bridges and tunnels? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considers mitigation 

of risk to underwater transit tunnels as a strategic priority. Protecting this infrastructure requires an integrated approach aligning Federal capabilities with mass 

transit and passenger rail systems that operate in this infrastructure. To harness 

Federal expertise and advance coordinated effort, TSA convened an interagency 

Tunnel Risk Mitigation Working Group in 2006. This interagency effort brings together Subject Matter Experts from a range of relevant fields among Department 

of Homeland Security and Department of Transportation organizational elements to 

identify, assess, and prioritize the risk to mass transit and passenger rail systems 

with underwater tunnels in the United States. This effort also assists transit agencies in planning and implementing protective measures to deter and prevent attacks 

as well as blast mitigation and emergency response strategies in the event of a terrorist attack and/or all hazards incident or event. 

Through regular meetings, this working group has developed mitigation strategies, engaged stakeholders, analyzed and applied the results of risk assessments, 

prepared statements of work for testing and modeling programs, and integrated the 

overall risk mitigation effort for a cohesive, coordinated, and effective approach. The 

initiative has: 

61 

• Identified and assessed risk to all 29 underwater tunnels in the nation; 

• Prioritized tunnel risk mitigation based on risk to drive grant funding to most 

pressing areas; 

• Developed strategies for funding future technology research and development 

aimed at producing novel approaches to this challenging problem; and 

• Produced and disseminated recommended protective measures transit agencies 

may implement to enhance security with available resources or through targeted grant funding. 

These recommended measures derive from the experience gained in Federal security assessments and the ongoing work to identify and prioritize tunnels and develop a strategic plan to mitigate risk. The interagency group is working closely 

with the transit industry to ensure the implementation of protective measures to 

mitigate risk in transit tunnels. TSA security assessments of passenger rail and 

mass transit agencies with tunnel infrastructure include review of protective measures implemented to mitigate risk. 

To advance this concerted effort, the Transit Security Grant Program has made 

projects to protect high risk underwater and underground assets and systems a top 

funding priority. 

Question 3. A report on the security of bridges and tunnels in the New York/New 

Jersey region was due last March. When will you submit this report to Congress? 

Answer. A classified report, as required by the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2007, was delivered to the Chairman and Ranking Members of 

the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the House and Senate Committees 

on Appropriations on October 22, 2007. 

Question 4. Do you know how much funding will be required to better secure our 

Nation’s highest-priority bridges and tunnels, especially high-priority rail tunnels? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recognizes, through 

the assessments it has conducted, that there are operational and structural aspects 

to improving bridge and tunnel security and that each bridge and tunnel requires 

varying approaches to achieve the desired level of security. TSA, State and regional 

authorities, and the owners and operators of the highest priority bridges and tunnels have focused their efforts primarily on operational security solutions that include: establishment of an interagency Tunnel Risk Mitigation Working Group, assessment of vulnerabilities of the Nation’s 29 underwater transit tunnels, development of security recommendations and guidelines, assessment of risk mitigation 

measures employed through the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement 

Program inspections conducted by TSA Surface Transportation Security Inspectors, 

deployments of Visible Intermodal Protection and Response Teams, and increased 

security awareness campaigns. 

As an example, one of the most symbolic of America’s highway bridges has been 

spending approximately $6 million annually just on security. They have invested in 

intruder detection technology and personnel to monitor those devices, perimeter 

fencing, structural hardening, and both full- and part-time emergency response staff 

as well as oversight contracts with local law enforcement units. While improvements 

in technology may help displace personnel costs in the future, the security needs of 

just the Nation’s most critical bridges and tunnels will involve significant costs for 

many years to come. 

The Transit Security Grant Program funds many operational initiatives. In Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2006, $136 million was awarded under the TSGP. About one-third of that 

amount was awarded for operational security improvements in the Nation’s most 

critical tunnels. The FY 2007 awards have not been finalized. 

Structural security improvements require a substantially greater investment. Efforts are underway to determine the requirements for security improvements, and 

ultimately the costs of those improvements, at some of the Nation’s highest priority 

underwater tunnels. Structural options under consideration include the replacement 

of antiquated structures or hardening existing structures to improve their resilience 

to attack. The costs of these initiatives are roughly estimated to be between $100 

million to $500 million per structure for hardening and up to several billion dollars 

per structure for replacement. 

Question 5. When will TSA comply with Section 125 of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 

concerning threat assessments of port truck drivers? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) anticipates completion 

of the threat assessments for port truck drivers by summer 2008. Collection of driver information from all state motor vehicle licensing agencies is underway at this 

time. There is substantial variation in the technological capabilities of the states, 

62 

leading some to respond to TSA’s request earlier than others. Also, as the Transportation Worker Identification Credential is deployed across the country we will enroll 

these drivers and they will go through a much more thorough check than the namebased check, and it will be done perpetually. 

Question 6. Will the President request sufficient levels of security funding for Amtrak’s capital and operating needs in the Department of Homeland Security’s 2009 

budget? Do you anticipate that Amtrak will be required to use funding from sources 

other than DHS grants for these functions? 

Answer: The Department of Homeland Security has been working in conjunction 

with the Department of Transportation and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation to identify and address security needs for Amtrak. Historically, Federal 

grant assistance has been provided to Amtrak through FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate both for capital and operating needs. 

DHS believes that sufficient levels of security funding for Amtrak’s capital and 

operating needs will be included in the President’s Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request, and does not anticipate additional funding requirements from sources other 

than DHS grants. 

Question 7. Since the inception of the agency, how many TSA employees have notified the Office of Special Counsel of agency abuse, fraud, or waste pursuant to 

whistleblower complaint procedures and are still employed by the TSA? How many 

complainants are no longer employed by the TSA? 

Answer. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) does not provide the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) with the names of all complainants or the number 

of employees who have filed complaints pursuant to the whistleblower complaint 

procedures. OSC only notifies TSA when OSC determines that it is appropriate for 

a complaint to proceed to mediation or a full investigation. Throughout Fiscal Years 

2006 and 2007, there were 14 active complaints in OSC’s investigative process. Two 

of these are still open investigations and one has been settled. The remaining 11 

have all been closed by OSC with no further action taken. Three of these 14 individuals are currently TSA employees (one has one of the open investigations, two had 

cases closed with no further action). 

Question 8. What is TSA doing to improve its ability to check passenger carryon bags for explosives? 

Answer. To drive improvement in the screening system nationwide, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made covert assessments very difficult for 

our screening workforce, and we frequently use high-level vulnerability testing to 

identify best practices in explosives detection. We believe that covert testing is a 

powerful tool to identify vulnerabilities in the system, and we are building a culture 

of heightened awareness of threat items at every airport in the country. 

A key to building this culture is the implementation of covert drills involving simulated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for the screening workforce. As part of 

this effort, TSA deployed 5,800 bomb test kits to the field and provided intensive 

onsite training to every Transportation Security Officer (ISO). IED recognition is at 

the forefront of our training objectives, and we have incorporated emerging threats 

such as liquid explosives. Today, TSA conducts 2,500 IED recognition drills a day, 

and we are currently conducting a study to identify an optimal level and frequency 

of drills. 

Further, TSA recognized that a more systematic, nationwide framework to assess 

the effectiveness of the screening process and identify areas to focus our resources 

in training and technology was needed. Therefore, TSA instituted a comprehensive 

program to measure screening performance called the Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP). ASAP is aggressively focused on improving recognition of 

IEDs, and TSA has performed thousands of covert assessments at airports across 

the country in just 6 months. Through ASAP, we are assessing our performance 

every day in every aspect of the screening process. 

Findings from ASAP are reported directly to TSA leadership, and we will use 

these performance metrics to make strategic decisions within the screening environment, from the type of equipment TSA purchases to the type of training TSA delivers to our TSOs. 

In addition, TSOs undergo extensive individual training using the Threat Image 

Projection (TIP) system, which displays fictional threat items within x-ray images 

of actual passenger bags in order to evaluate the ISO’s ability to detect threat items. 

TSO responses are recorded and downloaded monthly for analysis and reporting. 

TIP is a multifunctional system that extends well beyond an evaluation tool. It provides screeners with real-time experience in detecting threats and resolving alarms 

in passenger baggage. It is an immediate feedback and reinforcement system that 

increases screener accuracy. At a higher level, TIP data shows performance trends 

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by airport and nationally and these trends help TSA identify national training 

needs. 

The result of all of these performance assessment efforts is that our TSOs are the 

most tested workforce in the country. TSOs are tested every day, on every shift, at 

every checkpoint in the United States, and we believe that this intensive activity 

will drive the improvements we all desire in our explosives detection capabilities. 

To support our IED training initiatives, the Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO) Program has been instituted at our Nation’s airports. BAOs spend a substantial 

amount of their time providing IED training to TSOs. Their expertise proves invaluable when conducting this training. This program is still in the deployment phase, 

having grown from an initial class of 13 to more than 100 BAOs currently in the 

field. As of October 2007, BAOs have conducted over 12,500 hours of training to approximately 40,000 TSOs. 

In addition to the training and testing of TSOs, we are working hard to deploy 

new explosives detection technology, including backscatter and millimeter wave imaging, automated explosives detection systems, and other technologies that will play 

an important role in TSA’s layered security approach. The deployment of advanced 

technology will be guided by a 5-year strategic plan that has two core goals: (1) improving explosives detection capabilities, and (2) developing the capacity to detect 

hostile intent before and during the screening process. Examples of this technology 

include: 

• Whole Body Imagers. We are field testing whole body imagers, such as the 

backscatter and millimeter wave technologies, to quickly and safely screen passengers for prohibited items without the need for physical contact. Field testing 

is underway at Phoenix, and test sites will be expanded to two other major airports in early 2008. 

• Bottled Liquids Scanners. After recently completing field testing at six major 

airports, we have purchased and are deploying over 200 bottled liquids scanning 

devices at checkpoints, and are now using a hand-held liquids scanner for noncheckpoint screening locations. 

• Hand-Held Explosives Scanners. In the 3rd quarter of the 2007 Fiscal Year, we 

purchased 23 hand-held explosives scanners to supplement the over 50 devices 

now in use. These devices are mobile and can be used for explosives detection 

at non-checkpoint locations. 

• Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray. We have recently completed field testing of 

AT X-ray equipment for carry-on baggage at four airports. This technology will 

provide TSOs with enhanced capability to identify and detect threats through 

improved imagery and analysis tools. We will begin deploying these systems in 

2008. 

• Checkpoint Automated Carry-On Explosives Detection Systems (Auto-EDS). We 

are field testing Auto-EDS for inspecting carry-on items at four additional airports, and we have plans to test these systems’ capabilities to inspect both 

carry-on and checked baggage at smaller airports. Auto-EDS supports enhanced 

threat detection through computed tomography X-ray, 3D imagery and automated explosives and weapons detection. A limited quantity of these systems 

is expected to be deployed in 2008. 

• Cast and Prosthesis Scanner. After completing field testing at three airports, we 

have purchased cast and prosthesis scanners to provide a safe, dignified, and 

non-invasive way to identify potential threats and clear passengers wearing 

casts, braces, and prosthetic devices. Deployment activities for these units are 

expected to begin in 2008. 

We will continue to explore additional technologies to maintain our evolving ability to detect prohibited items at checkpoints. 

An initiative critical to the second core goal is Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT), a program initiated to develop strong behavior observation skills in our TSOs. TSA must not make the mistake of focusing so intently on 

the property individuals carry through checkpoints that we miss indicators that an 

individual could be engaged in criminal and/or terrorist activity. SPOT systematically identifies high-risk passengers exhibiting significant levels of stress, fear, and 

deception associated with criminal intent, allowing our officers to either refer the 

passenger for enhanced screening or to law enforcement. 

Because behavioral screening has a strong record of effectiveness in the prevention of criminal and terrorist activity, TSA has significantly increased the number 

of airports with SPOT to now cover over 75 percent of the traveling public. To date, 

TSA Behavior Detection Officers have made passenger referrals resulting in 391 arrests. The program will be expanded to 155 airports in 2008. 

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A third initiative strengthening security at our checkpoints is the Optimization 

Program. Through this effort, TSA sends optimization teams to airports to observe 

their checkpoints in action and find ways to improve how they operate. The teams 

are made up of experts in screening procedures, staffing models, equipment and 

checkpoint design, and passenger flow, and they improve security by reducing passenger delays and frustration and eliminating structural problems that are obstacles 

to an effective screening process. Recommendations from the optimization team are 

presented to the airport’s Federal Security Director, and every recommendation is 

tracked at TSA headquarters to ensure that airports are provided the assistance 

they need to be successful. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. TRENT LOTT TO

HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY

Question 1. The GAO’s testimony points out that while TSA has developed 

backscatter technology, ‘‘limited progress has been made in fielding this technology 

at passenger screening checkpoints.’’ As you know, I have long been an advocate of 

using innovative technology to screen passengers and baggage. My understating is 

that testing has indicated that this technology is very effective at detecting explosives and weapons that might be concealed on a person, is this correct? Why have 

there been delays in fielding backscatter technology? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently conducting a field operational pilot of whole body imaging technology; which includes 

both backscatter and millimeter wave technology. While laboratory testing has validated detection capabilities of whole body imaging technology, it is crucial to also 

evaluate technology on its operational effectiveness and efficiency prior to procuring 

technology for full deployment. Additionally, TSA, in consultation with the DHS Privacy Office, continues to work closely with the vendors in the development of privacy protection algorithms that will not diminish the effectiveness of the technology. 

TSA is currently conducting the pilot of backscatter and millimeter wave technologies at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport and is expanding it to Los Angeles International Airport and John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. 

A pilot using only millimeter wave technology is planned for the Miami International Airport. TSA anticipates completing the operational pilots by the end of the 

third quarter in Fiscal Year 2008 and will make procurement and deployment decisions based on the results of the pilot. 

Question 2. The 9/11 bill requires that TSA develop a strategic plan for deploying 

explosive detection equipment at airport checkpoints. What is the status of this 

plan? 

Answer. The report to Congress required by the Implementing Recommendations 

of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, entitled ‘‘Aviation Security Report—Development of a Passenger Checkpoint Strategic Plan,’’ dated September 2007, was delivered to Congress, including the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, on October 4, 2007. 

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