n the long and storied history of the Marine

Corps, its contributions to the Union effort

during the Civil War have often been relegated to a mere footnote. An aged officer

corps on the defensive against both attacks

in Congress and the whims of senior naval authorities,

chronic manpower shortages, and its traditional duties all

contributed to limiting the Corps’ role. Bad luck and the

bookend humiliations at Bull Run in 1861(also known in

the South as First Manassas) and at Fort Fisher in 1865 on

the North Carolina coast not only overshadowed the service of Marine battalions but also many instances of individual courage. 

The Fort Fisher campaign, which spanned from December 1864 to January 1865, consisted of two separate

battles in which Marines from both sides took part. The

engagements marked the final large-scale amphibious operations of the war. While today many would naturally associate Marines and amphibious warfare, the Civil War

was a time of ill-defined roles in which the U.S. Army took

the lead in joint operations with the U.S. Navy. 

Fort Fisher, long a thorn in the side of the Union, remained in the closing days of the war as a last hope for a

dying Confederacy to prolong the conflict long enough for

a political settlement. After years of disagreement over

timing and resources, the U.S. Army and Navy finally

agreed on the need for a joint—“combined” as it was

known at the time—operation against the fort. For

Marines on board ships of the U.S. fleet, bombarding the

fort showcased their individual courage and skill manning

large-caliber deck guns as they engaged in a deadly duel

with Confederate batteries inside the fort. Ultimately, a

combination of interservice rivalry, poor planning, and

ego doomed the first attempt to take the fort. 

In reaction to the fiasco, the Union Army swiftly dismissed its landing force commander to quell friction with

the U.S Navy. With personality conflicts largely resolved,

the second attack on Fort Fisher succeeded despite lingering interservice rivalry. To prevent the Army from gaining all the glory, the fleet commander sent a naval brigade

ashore to take part in the final assault on the fort. Some

400 Marines who landed to support the attack found

themselves assigned a difficult mission without benefit of

adequate planning, coordination, or training. 

On a sandy beach facing veteran Confederate infantry

and the South’s most formidable fort, the Marines and

their naval brethren paid dearly for a flawed system, which

on the whole produced a generation of naval officers

largely ignorant of operations ashore. In the wake of the

embarrassing retreat of the naval brigade, the Marines

made a convenient scapegoat for the costly assault. The

bloody debacle also soured some naval officers on the idea

of contested amphibious landings and even in later years

the value of Marines on board ship.

“Malakoff of the South”

On 24 December 1864, a Confederate Marine sentry at

Fort Fisher spotted Union Rear Admiral David Dixon

Porter’s North Atlantic Blockading Squadron as it formed

for battle off the North Carolina coast. Seventy miles away

in Beaufort, North Carolina, 6,500 Union soldiers commanded by Major General Benjamin F. Butler made final

preparations to join Porter in an attack on the Confederacy’s largest coastal fort. Comparing Fort Fisher to the formidable stone tower fort used by Russia in the Crimean

War in the defense of Sevastopol, observers dubbed it the

“Malakoff of the South.”1 Some also likened it to the British

stronghold of Gibraltar. Its official name honored Charles

F. Fisher, colonel of the 6th North Carolina Infantry killed

at the First Battle of Bull Run.

The fort dominated the entrances to the South’s last remaining and most militarily important port at Wilmington, North Carolina. Since 1861, Union ships trying to

impede the flow of foreign war materials reaching Wilmington watched the fort grow. Initially, it consisted of only

a few disjointed and unimpressive works. However, the vision and tireless efforts of Confederate Colonel William

Lamb convinced Confederates to build a fort of such proportions that no blockader dared challenge its guns for

more than two years. 

The importance of blockade running from Wilmington to Confederate military operations increased as the

slow death grip of encroaching Union might exerted itself

on every front. President Abraham Lincoln’s reelection in

November 1864 dampened any hopes in the Confederacy

Fort Fisher

December 1864–January 1865 

by Major David W. Kummer

On The Cover: The Capture of Fort Fisher by Kurz & Allison,

is a fanciful rendering of the second assault on the fort circa

1890. Library of Congress

At Left: Vintage map, circa 1883.

Adapted from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War
2 The Battle of Fort Fisher

of a favorable political settlement. The Confederate transMississippi region with its vast cattle herds and cotton sat

in isolated irrelevance under naval blockade and Union

control of the Mississippi River. Major General William T.

Sherman’s army continued to torch its way through Georgia en route to the sea. In Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley,

Major General Philip H. Sheridan’s hard-riding troopers

routed rebels at Cedar Creek and turned the Confederate

breadbasket into a scorched wasteland. However, General

Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia continued to

stubbornly resist, subsisting largely on foreign supplies

smuggled through the blockade at Wilmington. 

By 1864, Wilmington—protected by Lamb’s fort—was

both an economic and military thorn in the side of the

Union. Confederate commerce raiders that preyed on

Northern shipping and blockade runners loaded with cotton both steamed out of Wilmington under the protection

of Fort Fisher’s guns. The city’s railroad depot received

Confederate cotton and shipped supplies to Lee’s thinned

but unbowed ranks besieged at Petersburg, Virginia. After

repeated attempts to break the railroads supplying Confederates failed, General Ulysses S. Grant decided to capture Fort Fisher and cut off Lee’s line of communications

at its source.2 The Fort Fisher campaign involved two separate attempts to take the bastion in December 1864 and

January 1865. For Marines, whether Union or Confederate, the campaign placed them in key roles during the last

large-scale amphibious operation of the war. 

Before secession, the largely agrarian South shunned

the financial and infrastructure investments required to

wage war on a continental scale. The daunting task of developing and managing the Confederate military-industrial complex from scratch fell on Brigadier General Josiah

Gorgas. Even by 1864, however, for all of Gorgas’s success,

the South’s industrial output could not meet all the demands placed on it by the army. To make up for shortages,

the Confederate government relied on blockade running

to trade cotton and tobacco for key war materials and

weapons.3

General Winfield Scott, the aged architect of the American victory in the Mexican–American War, proposed a

strategy—later called the Anaconda Plan—to coerce rebellious states back into the Union by blockading Southern ports and isolating the western Confederate states by

controlling the Mississippi River. Following the first shots

on Fort Sumter, South Carolina, President Lincoln instituted a blockade of Southern ports. Confederates seized

Federal installations throughout the South, then began to

build and arm coastal forts, such as Fort Fisher, with the

spoils. At first, Lincoln’s proclamation made little impact

as the Union Navy had only 54 seaworthy vessels, and

blockade runners enjoyed a high success ratio. The vast

Confederate coastline in close proximity to the foreign

neutral ports of Mexico, Cuba, and the West Indies proved

difficult to blockade. In response, the Union Navy expanded to more than 600 ships and developed more effective tactics to stem Southern trade and commerce

raiding.4 Over time, blockade runners saw their success

North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources
rate of evading the blockade incrementally reduced from

9-to-1 in 1861 to a 1-to-1 ratio by 1865.

5

Even with increasing losses, the European demand for

cotton, Union trade policy, and the South’s lack of key materials drove a lucrative trade between Confederates in

Wilmington and foreign blockade speculators.

6 The logistical strain of feeding large armies forced Confederate authorities in the Deep South to implore planters to shift

from cotton production to staple crops.

7 The Union capture of New Orleans in April 1862, along with the shift in

agrarian production, combined to create a relative scarcity

of cotton in ports along the Gulf of Mexico. Consequently,

ports such as Wilmington located closer to Bermuda and

Nassau took on added importance for British firms running the blockade.8

The construction of Fort Fisher coincided with Wilmington’s rise as the South’s chief blockade-running port.

Generally, Confederates tried to disperse key war industries into the relative safety of interior portions of the

South. The Confederate Ordnance Department, however,

found it convenient to centralize all official government

freight going through the blockade.

9 Wilmington’s coastal

geography proved to be ideal for trading through the

blockade. The city’s location 27 miles upstream and six miles inland on the east bank of the Cape Fear River protected it from direct naval bombardment but still provided

access to the Atlantic. Confederates built Fort Fisher on a

narrow peninsula at the river’s entrance formed by the east

bank of the Cape Fear River and the Atlantic Ocean. The

peninsula, originally named Federal Point, was renamed

Confederate Point during the war.10

Smith’s Island, an alluvial delta, divided the entrance to

the Cape Fear River creating two approaches for vessels to

run the Union gauntlet. For Federal ships on patrol off

Wilmington, the two Smith Island inlets complicated their

task and forced them to split into two patrol squadrons.11

Fort Caswell guarded the old channel on the western side

of Smith Island. However, its approach remained perilous

for ships because of ever-shifting shoals created by the turbulent mixture of tides and river currents. In 1761, a hurricane formed New Inlet on Smith Island’s north shoreline,

which sat opposite Federal Point. The New Inlet dominated by Fort Fisher enjoyed a “more stable bar” that shallow draft blockade runners and Confederate commerce

raiders could more readily navigate.12

December 1864–January 18653

e Cape Fear Estuaries and the Approaches to Wilmington 

[A] — River Batteries Below Wilmington

[B] — Fort Anderson

[C] — Fort Pender (Johnston), at Smithville

[D] — Defenses at Old Inlet

[E] — Fort Fisher and Battery Buchanan, at New Inlet

North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources
4 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Confederate efforts to fortify the peninsula overlooking New Inlet evolved over the course of the war. Under

the direction Major Charles P. Bolles, several small batteries were first erected on Federal Point. For almost a year,

the defenders sporadically added to Bolles’s emplacements. Fort Fisher’s palmetto log and sandbag defenses

eventually mounted 17 guns by the time Colonel William

Lamb took command in July 1862. Lamb, whose name became synonymous with the fort’s construction, joined the

Confederate army at age 26 after a brief career as a lawyer

and newspaper editor.13 Although he had no practical

training as an engineer, Lamb learned military tactics at

the Rappahannock Military Academy before going on to

earn a law degree from the College of William & Mary.14

Lamb’s first command as captain of the Woodis Rifles,

a militia company from Norfolk,Virginia, not only exposed him to combat but sent him on the road to becoming a self-taught engineer. In May 1861, Lamb’s superiors

issued the company two 10-pounder Parrott rifles and detailed the men to help protect battery construction on

Sewells Point near Norfolk. 

As the Lincoln administration tried to enforce a blockade along the Confederate coast, it hastily bought and converted civilian ships for military use. The commander of

the newly acquired Union gunboat USS Monticello detailed to blockade the mouths of the James and Elizabeth

Rivers at the southern end of Chesapeake Bay, received reports of the Confederate battery. Captain Henry Eagle’s

gunboat steamed toward the rebel battery late in the day

on 19 May 1861. The converted merchant steamer just

leased from a civilian company only a month before now

mounted a single 10-inch Dahlgren pivot gun forward and

two 32-pounder guns aft. Captain Peyton H. Colquitt of

Georgia commanded the overall defense of the battery

ashore and ordered a detachment of artillerists to crew

three recently mounted 32-pounder smoothbore guns. He

then ordered Lamb’s men to make their two rifled guns

ready to fire on the Union vessel as well. At 1730, a shot

from the Monticello whizzed over the Confederate battery.

As the Southerners prepared to return fire, they realized

they had neither a Confederate nor Virginia flag to fly over

the battery. As a stopgap measure, they raised Captain

Colquitt’s Georgia state flag above the earthworks in defiance.15

At a half-mile distance, Lamb’s men opened fire on the

ship. An hour-long artillery duel ensued between Confederates ashore and the heavy guns on board the Monticello.

Confederate infantry peppered the ship with bullets, and

Lamb’s artillerists hulled the gunboat five times, but the

small diameter of the shot posed no real danger to the ship

save a lucky hit on its boilers. Ashore, the large-caliber naval

guns did some damage as two of the big shells scored hits

within the fort, but overall, the thick earthen parapet

thrown up around the battery largely protected both men

and guns alike. After expending 114 rounds of shot and

shell at the fort, the Monticello retired, which left both sides

claiming the victory. As fate would have it, Lamb’s duel with

the Monticello renewed almost four years later at Fort

Fisher. Though both sides claimed victory after the initial

action in 1861, without doubt the artillery duel sparked

Lamb’s interest in engineering and fortifications and put

him on the path to build the Confederate Gibraltar.16

Southern authorities assigned Brigadier General Joseph

R. Anderson, owner of the Confederacy’s largest foundry

at Richmond’s Tredegar Ironworks, to command defenses

in the District of Wilmington. Anderson, a West Point

graduate and successful military and civil engineer, added

Captain Lamb to his staff. While accompanying Anderson

to Charleston, Lamb obtained a complete military history

of the Crimean War which included details of the Malakoff

tower. It was part of a massive earthen fortification that defended Sevastopol on the Black Sea and frustrated efforts

of the combined British and French fleets. Lamb went on to

build fortifications based on the Crimean model with his

own refinements and modifications.17

In May 1862, Anderson placed Lamb in charge of Fort

Saint Philip—later renamed Fort Anderson—built by Confederates atop the ruins of old Saint Philip’s Church.18 The

fort sat on the west bank of the Cape Fear River, 15 miles

below Wilmington, and guarded both river and land approaches to town.

19 Lamb determined to strengthen existing works using lessons he gleaned from his studies of the

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War

Colonel William Lamb, a self-taught engineer, adapted Crimean

War fortification designs to build mammoth earthworks to defend

Wilmington. 
Crimea. In the process, he developed

his trademark inverted “L-shaped” fort,

which he later used at Fort Fisher. Fort

Saint Philip, like Fort Fisher, featured

“heavy earthen traverses separating

gun chambers so that, in the event of

attack, each gun chamber could become a self-contained fort.”20

Lamb’s industrious work and aptitude for fortification evidently impressed his superiors. On 4 July 1862,

Major General Samuel G. French, the

new district commander, ordered

Lamb to take command of Fort Fisher.

Lamb’s initial inspection found several

batteries of uneven quality. The fort itself was “small” and partially built with

“perishable sandbags.” He expressed his

disappointment with the fort and other

modest works already built on Federal

Point; he believed, “one of the Federal

frigates could have cleaned it out with a

couple of broadsides.”21 Lamb chose to

rebuild the fort and improve its existing batteries for the express purpose of “resisting the fire of a fleet.”22 Having experienced the effects of heavy naval guns firsthand, his

plans took on a mammoth scale. He lobbied French to build

the new Fort Fisher on a “magnitude that it could withstand

the heaviest fire of any guns in the American Navy.” French

did not concur with Lamb’s plans for elevated batteries or

the ambitious scale of the works, but he relented and gave

the newly promoted major permission to commence

work.23

For several years, the Union devised a number of plans

for an expedition against Wilmington, but U.S. Army–Navy

relations and competing priorities thwarted them. As the

principal port for running the Union blockade and Confederate commerce raiding, Wilmington was both financially and militarily vital. It housed one of the few

Confederate banks of deposit and also a huge governmentowned cotton press capable of binding 500 bales a day,

along with associated warehouses and platforms to store

and load bales. Finding sufficient railroad rolling stock to

transport freight in and out of town, however, remained a

troubling nuisance to Confederate agents managing blockade activities in Wilmington.24

Despite Union efforts to blockade the port, commerce

raiders and blockade runners defiantly continued to operate under the protective guns of Fort Fisher. New York merchants and insurers pressured Lincoln’s administration to

deal with commerce raiders like the CSS Tallahassee and

CSS Chickamauga, which sailed from Wilmington.25 Late

in the war, the city evolved into the sole point of entry for

foreign medical and ordnance supplies reaching Lee’s army.

During 1863–64, Confederate agents imported more than

2,600 medicinal crates, 4,300 tons of meat, 500,000 pairs of

shoes, 300,000 blankets, 330,000 stands of arms, 960 tons of

saltpeter, and 750 tons of lead to manufacture ammunition.26

December 1864–January 1865 5

Naval History and Heritage Command

Confederates converted English-built steamers from blockade runners to commerce

raiders. During the Fort Fisher Campaign, Confederate Marines and sailors from the

CSS Chickamauga manned naval guns inside the fort. 

Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s military career owed itself to

prewar political clout, which he perpetuated with a combination of

shrewdly timed media manipulation and political endorsements. 

Library of Congress 
Tactical Dilemma 

By capturing Fort Fisher, Grant hoped to starve the

Confederates into either evacuating Richmond or abandoning their Petersburg trenches to face his army headon. Grant wanted Fort Fisher reduced in early October

1864; however, delays resulted from continued fighting

around Petersburg, the 1864 presidential election, and

Lee’s rumored reinforcement of Wilmington. The Navy in

the meantime energetically began to plan and marshal

ships at Hampton Roads to make the assault. Administrative and logistic responsibility for the Fort Fisher campaign fell to the Department of Virginia and North

Carolina commanded by Major General Benjamin F. Butler. Grant, however, never planned to send him to command the campaign given his checkered past. Butler,

seemingly oblivious to Grant’s intention to keep him out of

the field, began to make a plan of his own to take the fort.27

Butler exemplified the term “political general.” The outbreak of the Civil War provided a means for men aspiring

to wealth and high political office, and he used his military

office for both. At the 1860 Democratic Convention, Butler’s efforts to enhance his political clout backfired when

he threw his support behind Senator Jefferson Davis of

Mississippi, whom he thought to be a strong Unionist. Despite this error in judgment, however, Butler’s title as

brigadier of the Massachusetts state militia gave him a

means to regain political relevancy. Always a cagey lawyer,

he possessed good organizational skills and excelled at political wrangling and calculated drama to bolster his image

in the press. However, he possessed no formal military

training or field experience.28

Butler kept his political aspirations at the forefront, but

his bumbling field command and independent proclamations of policy often made him a liability for the Lincoln

administration.29 Besides losing one of

the first land engagements of the war,

his wartime conduct not only threatened his political goals but also earned

him several infamous nicknames. As

the military governor of New Orleans,

“Beast Butler” not only infuriated

Southerners but also foreign powers by

insulting the ladies of New Orleans

and interfering with foreign diplomats.

Working in conjunction with his

brother, he displayed a propensity for

scandal and looting. When he allegedly stole silver spoons from his

New Orleans headquarters, local residents dubbed him “Spoons Butler.” 

By 1864, Butler’s political clout

landed him command of the Army of

the James near Richmond. Infamously,

his abortive offensives on the James River Bermuda Hundred Peninsula only managed to isolate his army behind

entrenchments across the neck of the peninsula despite

facing a numerically inferior force. With Lincoln’s reelection in doubt, “Bottled-up” Butler’s series of military failures frustrated General-in-Chief Grant. Despite Butler’s

demonstrated military incompetence, Grant remarked

that sometimes military priorities ran second to the political concerns with “provok[ing] the hostility of so important a personage.”30

While Butler planned the first attack on Fort Fisher,

Colonel Lamb continued improving the bastion into the

largest coastal fortification in the Confederacy. The selftaught engineer put the men of his 36th North Carolina

Regiment to work and augmented them with more than

500 slaves and freedmen to speed construction.31 The day

after Lamb took command of Fort Fisher, he spotted a

blockader anchored only two miles from the fort and observed that his working parties were well within the range

of the ship’s guns. Upon investigation, he found that blockaders routinely fired harassing salvos into the fort, which

interrupted construction efforts. Lamb changed the existing standing orders, which directed the batteries not to fire

first, and then directed a nearby gun to open fire. The surprised vessel hurriedly got out of range, and for the next

two years, work continued unmolested by enemy fire.32

Over a six-month period in 1863, Mound Battery, the

fort’s most recognizable feature, took shape on the extreme

right of its seaward facing batteries. Lamb employed two

steam engines on elevated tracks to haul earth and create

the nearly 50-foot-high mound. By the fall of 1864, Lamb’s

plans evolved into a huge inverted L-shaped fortress with

two sides. The land face, 500 yards wide, sat across the

neck of Federal Point. The sea face extended from the

6 The Battle of Fort Fisher

U.S. Army Military History Institute

Battery Lamb, also known as the Mound Battery, served as both a lighthouse at night,

which guided Confederate blockade runners, and an imposing battery that kept Union

ships at bay. 
Northeast Bastion at the apex of the fort in a southwesterly

direction along the beach for almost 1,300 yards. By 1864,

the fort mounted 44 large-caliber coastal guns, including

the 170-pounder Blakely and 150-pounder Armstrong rifled guns imported from England.33

In November 1862, new District of the Cape Fear commander, Major General William H. C. Whiting, a trained

engineer, worried that Wilmington’s geography hampered

an effective defense.34 Upon assuming command, he set

about fortifying the Cape Fear River and its land approaches to support Fort Fisher. He strengthened forts

guarding the old inlet and mentored Lamb. He also worried that an amphibious landing force north of the fort

might bypass defenses, leaving Wilmington vulnerable

without supporting infantry.35

Whiting’s personality, however, blotted his career. He

managed to alienate himself from many Confederate leaders, including President Jefferson Davis. Reportedly, he

spread rumors about General Braxton Bragg who was not

only Davis’s personal friend, but also one of his military

advisors. The impending Union threat against Wilmington, rumors about Whiting’s sobriety, and existing personal grudges led Davis to send Bragg to Wilmington in

October 1864 to command the district. Bragg, however,

carried his own baggage. He was not only prone to alienating locals, but his checkered military record also concerned many in the state.36 Given his controversial past,

Lamb doubted Bragg’s ability to command the defense.

Whiting, now Bragg’s deputy, and Lamb redoubled their

efforts amid swirling rumors of an impending attack.37

The rumors proved true. Grant decided to seize the fort

in a combined assault with the newly assigned North Atlantic Blockading Squadron commander, Rear Admiral

David Dixon Porter. Butler was well aware of Wilmington’s significance and in fact had planned several attempts

in the year prior hoping to cash in on a big victory.38 Until

the presidential election, Grant could not remove Butler

from command, but he could try to isolate him at headquarters by assigning field leadership to another. Grant

chose Butler’s subordinate from the New Orleans campaign, Major General Godfrey Weitzel, to command the

landing force composed of men from Butler’s army.39

The assault on Wilmington threatened to snatch Butler’s last chance to restore his political fortunes. However,

the upcoming election placed Butler in position to regain

Lincoln’s confidence thanks to his political connections

and timely endorsement of the president’s campaign in

circulars and the Northern press.40 Though Weitzel commanded the landing force, Butler commanded the Department of Southeastern Virginia and North Carolina.

To Grant’s consternation, Butler, ever the shrewd lawyer,

determined that as the department commander, he could

technically take the field with overall operational command, leaving the tactical employment of troops to

Weitzel.41

The scientific and industrial developments over the

previous half century created a dilemma for Butler and his

staff as they planned to take Fort Fisher. Weapons development had outpaced that of tactics. Butler’s own command experience around Petersburg made him well aware

of the tactical difficulties breaching Confederate fortifications. Weitzel brought recent experience assaulting similar coastal forts, like Fort Wagner, outside Charleston. In

early September, Butler learned that Grant intended to attack Fort Fisher. At Grant’s suggestion, he tasked Weitzel

to conduct a clandestine reconnaissance of the fort. Given

December 1864–January 1865 7

Interior view of Fort Fisher’s first three traverses along the land face. 

Library of Congress
8 The Battle of Fort Fisher

their experience and recent intelligence, the fortification

presented a daunting task that required a creative solution. 

Fort Fisher’s land face, which straddled the neck of Federal Point, began about 30 yards from the river and included a half bastion created from the old Shepherd’s

Battery. On the opposite end, facing the ocean, the land

face was a full bastion called the Northeast Bastion. Between these two flanking bastions, the land face’s parapet

rose out of the sandy soil 20 feet at a 45-degree angle.

Lamb designed the rampart to absorb the impact of “the

heaviest artillery fire.” It was 25 feet thick, planted with sea

grass to prevent erosion. The gun chambers were almost

six feet high, with each gun “mounted in barbette on

Columbiad carriages.” Lamb considered guns built in casement with palmetto logs and sandbags created only the

“delusion” of safety. In practice, they only served to “snare”

incoming projectiles, whereas earthworks absorbed the

impact.42 Ideally, Lamb preferred iron backed by timber,

but railroad iron was scarce. Instead, he had harnessed

sand, which was the one readily available material with

which to build the fort.43

Between the guns ran massive sand traverses. They rose

12 feet above the parapet and extended back almost 30 feet

to prevent enfilade fire effects. Each traverse also served as

a magazine and bomb-proof shelter for the gun crews. Despite the land face’s imposing features, 20 heavy guns and

electrically detonated land mines or torpedoes, no moat

protected it from an infantry assault. The sandy soil and a

lack of materials prevented its construction. As a stopgap

measure, the Confederates erected a wooden palisade fitted with ports to allow musket fire, and to bolster the defense, also added three mortars. Two 24-pounder

Coehorn mortars were mounted in the fifth and sixth land

face traverses and a single 8-inch siege mortar behind the

land face. At the center of the land face, Confederates constructed a sally port and demi-lune—a small elevated redoubt—armed with 12-pounder field artillery. Rushing

from the sally port, Lamb planned for Fort Fisher’s defenders to mass behind the palisade backed by field artillery to repel an infantry assault.44

The sea face from the Northeast Bastion to Mound Battery extended almost three-fourths of a mile down the

beach. For 100 yards, the sea face mimicked construction

of the land face in its enormity. Lamb converted an old

palmetto log and sandbag casement battery known as Battery Meade into a fortified hospital bunker. He also

adapted what was known as the “Pulpit,” located near the

hospital, into his combat command center because of its

elevation and relative central position. Beyond the Pulpit,

Lamb erected a series of batteries along the sea face with

heavy but shorter traverses and lighter intervening parapets to conceal movement and provide cover within the

fort. Mound Battery, at the southern end of the sea face,

consisted of two large seacoast guns atop Lamb’s towering

mound to provide plunging fire into the New Inlet channel. Between the Pulpit and Mound Batteries, Lamb built

the aptly named Armstrong Battery—also known as Purdie Battery—to mount the fort’s huge 150-pounder Armstrong rifle. He also placed a telegraph station between the

Armstrong and Mound Batteries to communicate with

Wilmington and coordinate defense of the peninsula.45

Confederates protected behind Lamb’s massive earthworks and armed with heavy cannon and rifled muskets

seemed invulnerable to standard tactics. The tactical problem presented by Fort Fisher caused Butler to look toward

science to “reap the glory denied him in Virginia.”46

Throughout much of 1864, Confederate armies fought the

Union to a stalemate. Union officers, Butler included, resorted to imaginative and sometimes odd solutions to try

and break the impasse. In Virginia, Butler proposed floating a napalm-like solution across the James River against

entrenched defenders.47 While Grant for the most part

supported these novel ideas, which often proved tactically

feasible but impractical in execution for large bodies of

men, they also sometimes proved costly to him in the

court of public opinion.* But it was Butler’s own experience supporting the Battle of the Crater, digging the Dutch

Gap Canal, and accounts of a powerful powder barge ex-

* During the Overland Campaign of 1864, Grant was dubbed “Butcher Grant”

by northern papers aer a series of costly battles. Formidable earthworks and

trench warfare presaging World War I characterized much of the campaign to

take Richmond, forcing Union leaders to develop alternative tactics to overcome

powerful Confederate defenses. e first of several unusual ideas Grant supported was Colonel Emory Upton’s plan to use a dense column to attack the

Confederate salient at Spotsylvania Courthouse. Once the armies settled into a

siege around Petersburg, Grant approved plans brought up the chain of command by a regiment of former Pennsylvania coal miners to dig and explode a

mine beneath Confederate lines. is became known as the Battle of the Crater.

Butler himself convinced Grant to dig the Dutch Gap Canal as a way to bypass

Confederate river batteries and ascend the James River toward Richmond.

Library of Congress 

Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter was commander of the North

Atlantic Blockading Squadron.
December 1864–January 1865 9

Butler’s relations with the Navy began on a much

brighter note. In 1860, as war clouds loomed on

the horizon, the Navy detailed the USS Constitution to be the school ship used at the U.S. Naval

Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. The aging frigate,

known to generations as “Old Ironsides,” served as a

floating dormitory and classroom for the most junior

midshipmen at its mooring in the Severn River.48 By

April 1861, the country ripped itself apart and pro-secessionist riots in nearby Baltimore prevented Union

troops, including Butler’s newly raised Massachusetts

regiment, from reaching the capital. 

The Naval Academy continued to operate, although

under a cloud, as Confederate cavalry drilled in view of

its grounds and others threatened to shell and seize the

Constitution. Amid all the threats and rumors, news

arrived of a supposed waterborne expedition to capture the venerable vessel. In response, the academy

staff prepared to defend its grounds and the ship, but

she proved to be too cumbersome to maneuver or put

to sea from the shallow waters of the Severn. As a result, officers instructed midshipman as they gamely

transformed it into a floating battery. Unknown to the

sailors, Butler, upon hearing the news of riots in Baltimore, commandeered the steamer Maryland, boarded

his regiment, and made for Annapolis, which boasted

a direct rail connection to Washington, DC.49

On 21 April 1861, Old Ironsides made ready for action at the approach of an unidentified steamer. The

teenage midshipmen nervously manned their stations

waiting for the signal to fire on the vessel. On board

the Maryland, Butler and other Army officers unfamiliar with naval protocol did not respond to hailing

calls. After a few tense moments for the Constitution’s

youngsters, the gun crews stood down when the mystery ship finally replied. Unknown to Butler, who was

ignorant of most military subjects, he came just seconds from a short and inglorious end to his military

career at the hands of midshipmen manning four 32-

pounders aimed at the transport. After landing, Butler’s regiment, made up of former New England

fishermen, worked to lighten the old ship to ensure its

escape from Confederate plots.50

In the fall of 1861, weather and poor timing intervened to elevate David Dixon Porter in the minds of

his superiors and, for the most part, ended dedicated

e bombardment of Fort Jackson is depicted in a period etching. 

U.S. Army Military History Institute

BUTLER, PORTER, AND FORT JACKSON
10 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Marine landing battalion operations. The results not

only had implications for Union commanders at Fort

Fisher, but also the Marines involved in the campaign.

Following the Union defeat at the First Battle of Bull

Run, Captain Samuel F. DuPont, commander of the

South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, requested a Marine battalion to conduct landing operations. Major

John G. Reynolds’s unit, recently bloodied at Bull Run,

trained and reequipped to provide DuPont with that

dedicated landing force. DuPont wanted to capture the

deepwater port at Port Royal, South Carolina, to allow

the fleet to press the blockade of Southern ports

throughout the year. 

Initially, DuPont planned to capture the two forts

guarding the harbor in a combined operation landing

both Union infantry under Brigadier Thomas W. Sherman and Reynolds’s Marine battalion. En route to Port

Royal, however, a storm ripped into his fleet of more

than 70 ships. The storm scattered the fleet and drove

Army transports aground. In addition, the Army

forces lost most of their artillery and ammunition.

Reynolds’s Marines fared no better when their sidewheel transport USS Governor foundered off the coast

of South Carolina. After manning bilge pumps for two

days, the Marines evacuated with most of their equipment onto the sloop USS Sabine. 

The disastrous news forced Dupont to attack Forts

Walker and Beauregard using only his wooden fleet.

Given popular thinking of both engineers and naval

officers at that time, such a choice offered only the

prospect of a Pyrrhic victory. But, contrary to accepted

wisdom, DuPont’s attack and capture of Port Royal

proved that a wooden fleet could not only pass under

a gauntlet of heavy coastal fortifications, but also mete

out severe punishment and survive the ordeal. For the

Marine Corps, the ill-timed storm deprived it of an opportunity to showcase the ability of a properly trained

and drilled landing battalion as opposed to hastily assembled formations like those used later at Fort Fisher,

and which generally marked battalion landing operations for most of the war. After a few months of smallscale operations, the drain of maintaining Reynolds’s

battalion forced DuPont to transfer the unit back to its

barracks where it was promptly disbanded.51 Meanwhile, news of Port Royal’s fall inspired Porter, fresh

from blockade duty in the Gulf of Mexico. He traveled

to Washington and lobbied the Navy secretary Gideon

Welles to capture New Orleans rather than try the impossible task of blockading it. He also advised Secretary Welles to employ a squadron of mortar schooners

to enable the fleet to pass the strong fortifications at

Forts Jackson and Saint Philip on the Mississippi River.

Welles liked the plan and even briefed it to President

Lincoln. The president advised they should get Army

approval from Major General George B. McClellan.52

McClellan’s blessing of the plan set the stage for the

bad blood that ensued between Butler and Porter at

Fort Fisher; however, a year later, the Army proposed

sending Butler’s troops to aid the naval efforts to seize

New Orleans. Butler’s early successes led to command

at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, but his presence complicated McClellan’s own aspirations and operational

plans. The New Orleans expedition gave McClellan an

opportunity to send his fellow Democrat down South

and out the way where Butler could not interfere with

the operations of the Army of the Potomac. In April

1862, the Navy under new Flag Officer David Glasgow

Farragut and Butler’s men, who recently occupied Ship

Island, Mississippi, set their sights on the Crescent

City.53

After he sold his idea to Secretary Welles, Porter

gathered a squadron of 21 schooners and five support

vessels. In the meantime, he directed the casting of almost two dozen 13-inch siege mortars and thousands

of shells at foundries in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Porter saw the mortars installed on board ship and

sailed to meet the rest Farragut’s fleet in mid-February. By late March, Porter was busily employed helping

to tow the larger ships in Farragut’s fleet over the sand

bars and into the river channel. By early April, he

towed his schooners against the current upstream to a

point below the rebel forts. From there, Porter’s “Bummers” bombarded Fort Jackson for six days, helping

Farragut’s fleet to run past the fort on 24 April 1862

and then capture the city. Soon after, both forts, bypassed by Farragut, surrendered to Porter, who remained at anchor below them. 

On 26 April, Captain John L. Broome and 200

Marines secured the New Orleans Customs House and

city hall. Butler’s troops arrived several days later to

garrison the forts and city. Shortly afterward, Butler

usurped credit in newspapers and dismissed Porter’s

mortar flotilla even though his troops were never engaged in the battle. Butler’s stunt enraged Porter, and

two years later, he pressed Grant to avoid working with

Butler before the first attempt to take Fort Fisher.54

Porter’s lingering anger toward Butler belied the fact

that he wasn’t the only official to ruffle feathers by

usurping credit. Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Fox both noted after the war that Porter inflated

his own accomplishments at New Orleans to build his

reputation to the detriment of his subordinates.55 
plosion in Erith, England, that convinced him that explosives might work against Fort Fisher.56

“A Cheap Experiment

in Pyrotechnics”

Butler’s plan required more than 200 tons of unusable

black powder loaded in the hold of a ship converted to

look like a Confederate blockade runner.57 The Navy

would tow the ship “within four or five hundred yards of

Fort Fisher.” He believed detonation of the powder would

render the garrison “paralyzed” and “by a prompt landing

of men, seizure of the fort.”58 After he briefed his naval

counterpart on the plan, Porter described Butler’s excitement as “something like a hen that has laid an egg.” According to Porter, he liked the idea, despite Butler’s odd

and secretive behavior, because it could potentially “simplify” seizure of the fort and would not involve “Congress

or interference of the Committee on the Conduct of the

War.”59 However, one cannot help but wonder if the admiral’s own similar proposal some two decades earlier also

influenced his consent to the plan.*

Butler also pitched his plan to high-ranking members

of Lincoln’s cabinet, and even the president himself. But

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles did not share Porter’s

initial enthusiasm, and he convened a study to determine

the feasibility of the project. Army and Navy ordnance and

engineering experts scoffed at the plan, almost killing it.

Butler’s close friend, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox, liked the plan and became one of its chief

proponents. Fox in his capacity with panel oversight,

threw out the conclusions, reconvened the board, and coerced members to recommend Butler’s plan. With blessings of the experts fresh in hand, Fox got both Secretary of

War Edwin M. Stanton and Welles on board with the

plan.60 Grant for his part only wanted the oft-delayed expedition to begin. While doubtful of Butler’s assertions, he

went along with the scheme, seeing “no serious harm

could come of the experiment.”61

While historian Shelby Foote termed the Army-Navy

combined amphibious force as an “unholy combination,”62

the Wilmington strike force could be better termed an untenable triumvirate. Butler and Porter carried a past of bad

relations from the New Orleans campaign. Grant placed

Weitzel in command of the landing force to limit Butler’s

influence in the field and maintain harmonious relations

with the Navy. However, Butler’s legal wrangling and subversion of Grant’s orders to Weitzel muddied the attempt.63

As a result of Butler’s salesmanship, the powder boat became the expedition’s central planning point, chief hope

for success, and critical point of failure.64 Further, a lack of

communication not only resulted in increased distrust between Porter and Butler, but also additional delays that

worsening winter weather only exacerbated.65

An impatient Grant ordered Butler to assemble the

6,500-man strike force and transports while Porter’s fleet

prepared to sail. The landing force comprised two divisions taken from Butler’s XXIV and XXV Corps commanded by Brigadier Generals Adelbert Ames and

Charles J. Paine. Paine’s division consisted of two brigades

of U.S. Colored Troops, as they were known at the time.

Meanwhile, Confederates weakened Wilmington’s defenses by moving troops to head off Sherman’s campaign

in Georgia. Grant sensed an opportunity and wanted

Weitzel’s force ready to embark the moment Porter’s

squadron weighed anchor. 

Almost three months had passed since Grant decided to

attack Wilmington, and Butler’s powder ship added another lengthy delay. In late November, with the explosive

plan approved, outfitting a suitable ship fell to the Navy.

By the first week of December, the expendable steamer

Louisiana, which had seen duty as a sometime patrol and

mail ship along the North Carolina coast, was selected.

The Navy towed the vessel, only recently salvaged after it

accidently sank, to Hampton Roads.66 Along with Ordnance Bureau engineers, they retrofitted the ship to resemble a blockade runner and loaded the condemned

powder from Army and Navy stores.67

December 1864–January 1865 11

Naval History and Heritage Command

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox, Butler’s personal

friend, used his influence to get final approval of Butler’s scheme. 

* Like many other Civil War leaders, Porter’s experiences in Mexico apparently

colored his later decisions. For Porter those included support of the powder ship

and concocting the naval brigade. During the Mexican-American War, Porter

proposed his own scheme to blow up the Mexican fortress San Juan de Ulloa

which defended Veracruz. Superiors, however, dismissed Porter’s impractical

plan along with those put forward by other officers.
Over time, Porter grew suspicious of Butler’s motives

and planned to ensure he did not again usurp credit from

the Navy. He also worried that winter storms would derail

the expedition while they waited for the powder ship and

Butler to release troops for the expedition.68 By 4 December 1864, Grant ordered the expedition to sail “with or

without [Butler’s] powder boat.”69 Two days later, as the

ship neared completion, Butler issued written orders to

Weitzel of a organizational nature only and omitted any

operational goals. After seeing Weitzel’s orders, Grant issued written orders to Butler, intended for—but never received by—Weitzel, which spelled out the aims of the

expedition.70 First, Grant wanted Weitzel to land and entrench across Federal Point to isolate Fort Fisher, then seize

it by assault and naval bombardment, and, if feasible, capture Wilmington in conjunction with the Navy. Grant sent

a telegram to Butler noting that the plan provided too few

entrenching tools. Butler increased the number of tools

but, as his actions later demonstrated, failed to grasp

Grant’s intent for their use.71 On 8 December, Weitzel, with

Butler’s approval, finally embarked troops onto waiting

transports. 

The all-important Louisiana, however, was not ready

and neither were Porter’s ships. On 10 December, the foul

weather Porter earlier feared made it impossible for transports assembled off Fortress Monroe to sail. The weather

abated two days later, but Porter then needed to replenish

his ironclads at Beaufort, North Carolina. Butler agreed to

a 36-hour delay and, with rations already running low on

board his transports, also planned to replenish at Beaufort.

On 13 December, Butler ordered his transports to steam

up the Potomac River until dark to misdirect Confederate

spies he believed watched their movements. Porter’s ships

already sailed toward Beaufort by the time Butler’s transports returned to Hampton Roads the next morning. Butler’s last-minute concern for secrecy not only confused his

own troops as to their objective but also the Navy.72

Porter was not privy to Butler’s deception plan and

thought the Army transports were already en route to the

rendezvous off Beaufort. Butler, for whatever reason, believed the rendezvous point to be 25 miles offshore from

Fort Fisher. His transports assembled north of Wilmington off Masonboro Inlet late on 15 December. The next

day, he moved a portion of his ships to the supposed offshore rendezvous point, but to his surprise, Porter’s flotilla

was not on station. Instead, he found only few large ships

from Porter’s 60-ship squadron. For three days, the transports idled, waiting for Porter’s arrival. Butler for his part

sent a ship in close to the fort with Weitzel and division

commander Ames on consecutive days to conduct reconnaissance of New Inlet and the fort.73

Finally on 19 December, the rest of Porter’s ships, accompanied by the ironclads and the Louisiana, came into

view—along with another winter storm. Porter blamed his

tardiness on bad weather and difficulties with the powder

ship, but he suggested moving up the timetable on the

Louisiana. Butler viewed Porter’s suggestion as an attempt

by the Navy to take credit if the powder ship worked since

it was not possible to land troops in rough seas. In the end,

Butler’s staff convinced Porter to rescind his order to ex12 The Battle of Fort Fisher

ese drawings of Butler’s “Powdership,” the former USS Louisiana, were used in a congressional hearing. 

U.S. Congress: Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War 
December 1864–January 1865 13

Unlike its famed namesake predecessor, the USS

New Ironsides actually boasted sides consisting

of 41

⁄2-inch iron plate backed by 14 inches of

white oak planking. The armor sloped outward toward

the waterline and included a protective armored belt,

which extended below the waterline. Shipbuilder

Charles Cramp originally designed the ship to mount

a battery of 16 8-inch guns, but during the government

bidding phase, the design changed to substitute more

powerful 9-inch guns. During construction, its armament grew even more powerful as the Navy outfitted

the ship’s gun deck with two 150-pounder Parrott rifles

and an impressive battery of 14 11-inch smoothbore

Dahlgren guns, considered to be best for fighting Confederate ironclads because of their rate of fire. Above

the gun deck, the ship’s spar deck was outfitted with

two 50-pounder Dahlgren rifles. The Navy added a

large iron ram to its prow during construction to complete the ship’s offensive capabilities.74

During its short career, the ship absorbed more

punishment from Confederate guns than any other

ship in the Navy.75 The ironclad’s final major action involved leading the bombardments against Fort Fisher.

During the battle, 48 Marines made up its Marine

Guard commanded by First Lieutenant Richard Collum, who later wrote the first official history of the Marine Corps.76 After the war, the ship went into port in

Philadelphia, where on 15 December 1866, during the

first watch, an unattended stove on board ship finished

what countless Confederate rounds could not. Newspapers cited the ship’s inglorious end as post-war haste

to cut spending that left the ironclad without a Marine

Guard. The fire below decks, which quickly spread,

was blamed on lazy contract watchmen. When hastily

organized and inadequately equipped attempts to control the fire failed, port authorities towed the ship from

its berth to nearby shallows where she burned to the

waterline and sank.77

USS NEW IRONSIDES

USS New Ironsides was depicted as she appeared in 1863 by R. G. Skerrett.

Naval History and Heritage Command
14 The Battle of Fort Fisher

plode the Louisiana.

78 Unable to launch his attack, the next

day, Porter formed ships into line-of-battle to conduct rehearsals. The practice runs, however, according to both

Butler and Confederate accounts, alerted the defenders in

Fort Fisher to the Union presence.79 The Navy suggested

Butler return to Beaufort to avoid the harsh weather and

replenish the transports. Soon after, Butler’s troop ships

steamed north for Beaufort. The weather broke on 22 December, but the bulk of the transports remained in port to

replenish stocks.80

For all of Butler’s last-minute secrecy as to the real objective of the expedition, by Christmas Eve, the element of

surprise was lost. While the general vainly tried to keep the

aim of the expedition secret by cutting off mail service to

Porter’s fleet, newspapers began leaking the plan soon after

the ships departed Virginia.81 The news gave Confederates

cause to bolster Lamb’s garrison previously stripped of five

companies of artillerists to meet Sherman’s advance. By the

time Union ships appeared on the horizon on 20 December, Lamb’s garrison only mustered about half its intended

strength. Lee detached Major General Robert F. Hoke’s division of 6,000 North Carolinians to bolster the defense,

but their timely arrival remained doubtful. Confederate

Commodore Robert F. Pinckney doubted Lamb’s men

could stand up to a naval bombardment. Lamb rebuffed

Pinckney’s assertion and remained confident about defending the fort.82

The storms that forced Butler’s transports back toward

Beaufort provided time to strengthen Lamb’s garrison and

move supporting infantry from Virginia. In response to

the crisis, North Carolina Governor Zebulon B. Vance sent

what state troops he could muster, including 16- and 17-

year-old boys of the North Carolina Junior Reserves. Led

by their cadre officers, the young reservists took up entrenched positions on the Sugar Loaf, a piece of high

ground five miles north of the fort, which covered the

Wilmington Road.83 During the fall of 1864, Whiting advised Lamb to build an entrenched camp for supporting

infantry on Sugar Loaf. From that location, Whiting

planned to coordinate with Lamb to support the fort and

hopefully repulse landings on the nearby beaches.84 On 22

December, the first of Hoke’s brigades arrived in Wilmington and proceeded to the position. On the 23d, state

reinforcements sent by Governor Vance continued to

trickle in. Company-sized units from the 10th North Carolina Regiment, 13th North Carolina Battery, and 7th Battery of Junior Reserves arrived and brought the fort’s

garrison to almost 900 men.85

Reinforcements also came from the Confederate naval

units in Wilmington. The presence of the commerce

raider Chickamauga in port and ongoing conversion of the

Tallahassee back to blockade running left their naval contingents available for duty.86 Confederate authorities in

Wilmington ordered their crews to augment the naval garrison which manned Battery Buchanan. Confederate

Marines from the Wilmington Naval Station commanded

by Captain Alfred C. Van Benthuysen, along with some 32

sailors, boarded the transport Yadkin and steamed toward

the fort. Lamb ordered the Marines and sailors under

Confederate Navy Lieutenant Francis M. Roby of the

Chickamauga to serve two salvaged naval guns inside the

fort. Roby’s detachment found its post manning two 7-

inch Brooke rifled guns along the sea face in the partially

completed Columbiad Battery.87

Things Get Under Weigh

After months of preparation, both sides knew waiting

had come to an end. Inside the fort, morale was high.

Lamb’s men sang campfire tunes and played instruments

and games “with as much zest as if a more serious game

were not impending.”88 Butler’s seasick soldiers were ready

to get off the ships as they bobbed about stuck below decks

some 90 miles away in Beaufort. Admiral Porter, who worried about weather and the powder ship, became restless.

Officers of the few transports that did arrive on 23 December informed him that Butler expected to assemble his

landing force the following night and be ready to attack

on Christmas Day. Porter decided to send the Louisiana

and then launch a sustained bombardment. With luck, the

stunned garrison would fall to a naval landing force before Butler returned.89 To the disappointment of Lieutenant Commander William B. Cushing, captain of

flagship USS Malvern, Porter chose Commander Alexander C. Rhind instead of Cushing to command volunteers

who would steam Louisiana in close to the fort and set off

its explosives. During first watch on the night of 23 December, the USS Wilderness towed Louisiana toward its

appointed destiny. Porter ordered the rest of his ships to be

prepared to go into action on Christmas Eve.90

On board the powder ship, Rhind and the volunteers

prepared fuses and timing devices to set off the 215 tons of

powder stored below.91 Two weeks earlier when the fleet

put into port at Beaufort, Rhind not only loaded another

30 tons of powder on board the ship, but discovered that

the engineers had laid the fuse system improperly. Rhind

also considered the clocks intended to set off a simultaneous explosion inadequate for such a sensitive task. Evidently, the ordnance engineers did not anticipate the

motion of a ship at sea and used ordinary clocks. Rhind

modified the clocks and repaired the fuse train to try and

get a simultaneous explosion. Admiral Porter, however,

distrusted the complex timing system and ordered Rhind

to add a pile of combustibles in the aft cabin of the ship.

The last man on board would ignite the “cord of pine

knots” and evacuate, leaving nothing to chance in case the

clockwork mechanism malfunctioned.92
After the tug Wilderness released the ship, Rhind and

his men steamed toward the fort in the early morning

hours of 24 December. In addition to using Confederate

lantern signals, they also planned to use signals from the

support ship Kansas to estimate their position.93 For blockade runners, the “big hill”—Lamb’s Mound Battery—provided the initial point to reckon final navigation into New

Inlet, and at night, it served as a lighthouse. Each blockade

runner carried a Confederate signalman who by means of

coded lantern signals alerted Fort Fisher. The fort’s lookouts then placed range lights atop Mound Battery and on

the beach. By closely following the signals, the ship’s pilot

determined where to cross the bar into the New Inlet

channel.94 When Union ships spotted these signals, they,

too, used lanterns to coordinate the chase and fire on the

evading ship.95 Fort Fisher’s guns, however, often provided

the final margin of safety to keep blockaders at a distance.96

Unexpectedly, the Louisiana spotted an unknown

blockade runner, which turned out to be the Little Hattie,

in the darkness. The Little Hattie’s captain expected another blockade runner and confused the powder boat for

it. Taking advantage of the situation, Rhind followed Little Hattie toward the fort. However, the swift Confederate

steamer easily outpaced Rhind’s bloated and clumsy floating bomb. Little Hattie passed into the channel and made

for the wharf near Battery Buchanan. The vessel’s captain

thought he had been followed and wished to see Colonel

Lamb. Inside the fort, the blockade runner’s master reported to Lamb what he knew of the Union fleet. As the

two were about to part, a sentry alerted the post that a ship

was on fire off the fort. The captain thought it might be

the runner Agnes Fry, which was due in from Nassau. Others thought it to be a Union blockader scuttled to avoid

capture. Lamb issued orders not to fire on approaching

ships and retired for the night.98

December 1864–January 1865 15

ARMSTRONG GUN

The famous Armstrong gun captured at Fort

Fisher was one of two identical weapons imported from English manufacturer Sir William

Armstrong & Co. The colossal gun tube with its signature reinforcing iron bands weighed almost 16,000

pounds and fired a nearly 150-pound projectile. Confederates mounted one of the Armstrongs in Fort

Fisher and its twin in nearby Fort Caswell. The massive

rifled gun was originally mounted on a mahogany carriage along the sea face. Fort Fisher’s garrison treated

the monster weapon as their mascot and meticulously

maintained the gun and its richly grained carriage. 

The Armstrong was a sophisticated weapon that

used what was known as the “shunt” system of rifling

the gun barrel, which allowed easy loading for the

crew. Rows of copper studs along the body of the shell

e Confederates’ prized Armstrong gun, shown here as captured, is currently on display at the U.S. Military Academy at

West Point, NY. 

U.S. Army Military History Institute

Atlanta History Center

A 150-Pounder Armstrong shunt system shell recovered from

Fort Fisher, NC. e shell had no fuse. Instead, it relied on

heat and friction generated by impact against a target to ignite the internal powder charge.

grabbed grooves in the barrel to impart twist as the

shell moved down the bore of the gun. Lamb’s Armstrong gun could fire two types of rounds, a shell that

relied on friction and heat to detonate, and an armorpiercing bolt for short-range engagements against

heavily armored ironclad warships. 

After the war, both guns were removed and taken

to the service academies as war trophies. The Fort

Fisher gun resides at the U.S. Military Academy at

West Point, New York. The Navy removed the other

gun captured at Fort Caswell to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. That gun has since disappeared. It is believed that, somewhat ironically, the

massive eight-ton gun went on to serve the Union it

once fought against when it was melted for scrap during World War II.97
16 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Activity on board the Louisiana

kept at a frantic pace as the crew tried

to get the ship in close to shore.

Rhind’s navigator triangulated its position and distance from shore using

the support vessel Kansas’s lantern

signals and those of Mound Battery. In

the rough weather, however, Rhind’s

crew incorrectly estimated that the

ship lay just 300 yards off the beach instead of its actual position of 600

yards. They then set anchor, lit fuses,

combustibles, and prepared to evacuate the floating bomb. The tug Wilderness steamed nearby to recover Rhind

and his men. Hurriedly, the men

abandoned the ship and rowed to

safety as the flames took over the

doomed vessel. Fearing the explosion,

Union ships remained at a safe distance 12 miles offshore and awaited

the blast, which was to signal the start

of the battle. Finally at 0150, the powder ship exploded.99

Colonel Lamb, who used the old lighthouse keeper’s

home as his quarters, felt the concussion and rattle of an

explosion. He thought it sounded like a 10-inch

Columbiad shell going off, while sentries thought the powder boat to be a blockader run aground whose crew set it

on fire to avoid capture.100 Contrary to Butler’s expectations, instead of simultaneously exploding, the powder

only partially exploded, probably due to a combination of

malfunctioning time mechanisms, fuses, and the fire set by

Rhind’s men. The result was “a cheap experiment in pyrotechnics” as burning powder created a large curtain of

fire that shot into the air like a huge Roman candle. Instead

of massive devastation and a dazed garrison, Porter discovered that the powder ship only succeeded in waking

Confederates for the upcoming battle.101

Butler learned the next morning that Porter had sent in

the Louisiana. Unaware that the ship only succeeded in

momentarily burning away the darkness as it fizzled out, he

hurriedly ordered his transports back toward Fort Fisher

to keep the Navy from usurping all the glory. Despite

Porter’s professed confidence in Butler’s scheme, he hedged

his bets and published a conventional support plan for the

Army landings. He circulated his General Order 70, which

outlined the organization, tasks, and fire support assignments for each of three lines of battle and line of reserves

that made up the squadron. The admiral also issued special

orders to coordinate gunfire by compass if smoke obscured

the fort and the use of marker buoys to prevent his larger

ships from running aground in front of the fort.102

On 24 December, just after daybreak, the ships steamed

toward the fort. Around noon, Confederate Marine Private Authur Muldoon, standing watch in Lamb’s combat

headquarters atop the Pulpit Battery, spotted a line of ironclads about a mile distant. The imposing ships anchored

National Archives and Records Administration

e crew of a IX-inch Dahlgren gun drill on board a gunboat, most likely the USS Miami,

in 1864. Because of personnel shortages, ship captains oen assigned Marines to crew a

deck gun led by a Marine officer or noncommissioned officer. 

Colonel John Harris was the sixth Commandant of the Marine

Corps. U.S. Marine Corps History Division
close to the beach off the apex of the fort.107 The gray-clad

artillerists manned their guns and waited for Lamb’s signal

to fire. Meanwhile, the wooden ships of the Union

squadron formed their lines of battle approximately 1,300

yards away from the fort to create a gigantic arc surrounding the fort. Out of range at 1.5 miles, Porter’s line of

reserve ships organized into four divisions. His flagship,

the Malvern, a captured sidewheel blockade runner, was

both fast and maneuverable. He positioned himself close

to the middle of the arc where he could coordinate fires

and communicate with his squadron.108

The USS New Ironsides, the Navy’s first ironclad not

limited to coastal duty, led the flotilla of five ironclad vessels spotted by Confederate lookouts. She formed the reference point and base of fire in Porter’s bombardment plan

against Fort Fisher’s land face. Including the ironclad ships,

the squadron’s combined firepower boasted a total of 63

vessels with 590 guns.109 In comparison, the fort mounted

only 44 guns. The fleet’s combined broadside fired 22 tons

of metal at the Confederates with every salvo. The magazines of just two of Porter’s powerful frigates stored more

ammunition than Lamb had available in the entire fort—

3,600 shells. Fort Fisher’s variety of large guns only added

to the acute ammunition shortage and prevented a high

rate of fire. The finely machined Armstrong rifle had only

12 usable shells. Because of the shortage, Lamb ordered

every gun to fire only once every 30 minutes. If a ship tried

to cross over the sand bar and make a run for the New Inlet

channel, however, every gun had permission to fire as fast

as possible.110

Just before 1300 on 24 December, the New Ironsides

broke the calm, which prevailed on a “perfect winter day.”

One of its starboard 11-inch guns belched flame, hurtling

its monstrous shell toward the Confederate flag atop the

ramparts. Lamb ordered a nearby 10-inch gun to return

fire, hoping to ricochet a shot off the water and through

the hull of the Susquehanna. Lamb’s gunners took careful

aim and pulled the lanyard, which sent the shell skipping

off the water like a huge bowling ball. The shot struck and

put a hole through the ship’s smokestack but failed to

puncture the hull. Porter’s fleet answered the Confederate

gun with its own thundering salvos. Lamb’s guns replied

and sent massive shells skipping wildly across the otherwise calm waters.111

The unfinished traverses in the Columbiad battery exposed Lieutenant Roby’s detachment of Confederate

Marines and sailors to the Union broadsides. Besides exposure to Union fire, Roby worried about overheating the

Brooke rifles. To limit the detachment’s exposure and prevent overheating, Roby ordered the men to seek cover and

December 1864–January 1865 17

The outbreak of the Civil War caught not only

the hastily assembled Union Army but also the

Marines off guard after the First Battle of Bull

Run. The rapid expansion of the Navy to enforce the

Anaconda Plan also placed additional burdens on the

Corps. In response, Congress nearly doubled its size

to almost 100 officers and 3,700 enlisted men; however, its relative size decreased when compared to the

Navy. As the Navy expanded to 50,000 men, the

Corps’ relative strength dwindled from 20 percent

down to a mere 7 percent. Senior naval officers repeatedly asked for more Marines and often patrolled

the waters without Marine Guards on board.103

In addition, Marine recruiters fought against a

stacked recruit bounty system at the state level. Relatively generous recruiting bonuses offered by local

state militia and Federal recruiters coupled with long

four-year enlistments offered by the Marines hamstrung the Corps’ own recruiting efforts. For much of

the war, Navy and Marine recruits did not count

against a state’s draft quota. The conscription acts of

1862 and 1863 generally rewarded politically appointed officers, such as Butler, who could recruit and

raise a regiment for the Army. By early 1864, Congress took action to correct the situation. Local bounties in New York and Philadelphia, along with Federal money, induced recruits to join the Marine

Corps. The Battle of Gettysburg and Grant’s 1864

Overland Campaign, along with their correspondingly high casualty rate compared to that of the Marine Corps, also convinced many that they stood a

better chance of survival as a Marine.104

However, some in Congress, including Iowa Senator James W. Grimes, felt that the Army should absorb the Marines into a new regiment. In addition to

congressional efforts to abolish the Marine Corps,

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Fox viewed Marines

as “clumsy” and favored transferring them to the

Army as part of a naval efficiency program.105 Colonel

John Harris, Commandant of the Marine Corps,

along with Marine Quartermaster Major William B.

Slack, successfully fought off attempts by soliciting

input from Rear Admirals Farragut, DuPont, and

Porter along with other influential naval officers.

Armed with these forceful endorsements, Harris published and forwarded the book Letters from Naval Officers in Reference to the United States Marine Corps

to Secretary of the Navy Welles. In the end, the letter

book influenced Congress to table the effort until

after the war.106

U.S. MARINE RECRUITING
only emerge every 15 minutes to fire. The rebel Marines

and sailors cheered when their shots scored hits that splintered the hulls of wooden ships opposite the battery. Union

ships responded, sending numerous shells overhead. Not

every one exploded as intended, however. Some hit the

sand behind the battery, then exploded, causing the rebels

to dart for cover.112 The Confederate Navy had retained the

grog ration, which its Northern counterpart discontinued

in 1862 under pressure from temperance societies.113 Seeing his men tire, Lieutenant Roby issued a ration—a mixture of equals parts water and rum—to maintain the men’s

strength. Just then a Union shell exploded, sending shrapnel that shattered the jug of grog and thereby “delivered a

highly-condensed temperance lecture.”114

Though Confederate return fire paled in comparison to

the volume aimed at the fort, some shells struck home

among the fleet. Their guns hulled the USS Osceola amidships. The sidewheel gunboat limped away from the battle

almost sinking before support vessels put it under tow.

Porter’s wooden ships tried to mitigate damage to critical

areas with provisional armor. They lowered heavy chain

curtains over the sides and stacked sandbags to protect the

ship’s boilers and other crucial areas. These efforts, however, were not always successful as one Confederate 7-inch

shell punctured the sidewheel gunboat USS Mackinaw’s

boiler, scalding 10 of its crew, including three Marines.115

Though scoring hits, the fort’s garrison wanted to concentrate fire on a single vessel to register a victory, but Lamb

forced the artillerists to conserve their limited ammunition supply. As a result, the fort only fired 672 shells the

first day compared to approximately 10,000 by the Union.

The paucity of Confederate firing also led Union leaders to

think their bombardment had silenced the Confederate

batteries.116

Plenty of Blame

The needs of the war placed the

U.S. Marine Corps in a position to

strengthen its ties with the Navy.

Wartime recruiting difficulties

strained the Corps’ ability to meet its

shipboard roles. Both services had

trouble recruiting, and as a result,

many ships went to sea without

Marines, or only the equivalent of a

modern squad on board, called a Sergeants Guard. Of almost 70 ships at

Fort Fisher, only 24 in Porter’s

squadron posted Marines on board.117

In reaction to the Navys own continued manpower struggles, ship captains increasingly assigned Marines to

man deck guns. By early 1864, the

Marine Corps Commandant, Colonel

John Harris, supported ships’ captains by assigning

Marines to naval gun crews. He wanted the Navy to accept Marines as “full partners” as a means to deflect efforts to absorb the Corps into the Army. As a result, the

use of Marine gun crews on board ship evolved during the

war into standard practice.118

Shipboard Marines, such as Sergeant Miles M. Oviatt

from Olean, New York, manned powerful naval guns

mounted on the weather deck. Noncommissioned officers

like him captained a gun crew of almost two dozen

Marines who served the ship’s pivot guns. Oviatt was part

of the Marine Guard commanded by Captain George P.

Houston on board the screw sloop-of-war USS Brooklyn.

Captain Charles Heywood, a future Commandant, enlisted Oviatt on 19 August 1862. Two years later, Oviatt

became one of seven Marines awarded the Medal of

Honor for actions during the Battle of Mobile Bay. The importance and acceptance of the Marine Corps’ new shipboard artillerist role is attested to by the fact that more

than half of the 17 Medals of Honor awarded to Marines

during the war went to those manning the Navy’s great

guns.119

Marines like Oviatt not only manned naval guns, including the 100-pounder Parrott or Dahlgren rifles, on

board ship, but also retained their traditional role as “infantry soldiers trained for service afloat. Their discipline,

equipment, character, and esprit de corps being that of a

soldier . . . [gave] to a ship-of-war its military character.”

They guarded the ship’s magazine and prisoners, and

maintained order and discipline. In addition, they served

as part of the crew standing regular watches, and manned

ropes.120 They also retained their traditional role as sharpshooters. Marines “were efficient with their muskets, and

. . . when ordered to fill vacancies at the guns, did it well.”121

18 The Battle of Fort Fisher

University of Michigan Library

e Christmas Eve 1864 bursting of the 100-pound Parrott rifle on board the USS Juniata was depicted in the 21 January 1865 issue of Harper’s Weekly.
Sergeant Richard Binder, captain of a Marine gun crew

in the USS Ticonderoga, fought the 100-pounder Parrott

rifle, which, unlike smooth-bore guns, had internal

grooves that gave the weapon greater range and accuracy.

The Parrotts were relatively simple in design for mass

manufacturing, consisting basically of two parts—a heavy

cast-iron tube with a reinforcing band of wrought iron

around the breech.122 Parrott rifles, however, especially

larger ones, proved prone to catastrophic failure just ahead

of the breech band. Repeated firing of the guns in combat

often ended with deadly results when barrels burst unexpectedly. During the first attack on Fort Fisher, five 100-

pounder Parrots, including one on board the Ticonderoga,

burst, killing or wounding 45 Marines and sailors.123

Porter published a detailed plan to bombard the fort,

which included the expected position of each ship to engage all of the Confederate batteries and prevent Lamb’s

artillerists from concentrating fire on any one vessel.124

Implementing the plan proved difficult on 24 December as

ships mistakenly anchored away from their assigned positions. In addition to Confederate fire, ships also had to

contend with changing tides that impacted the accuracy

of the Union guns. The shifting tides frustrated naval

crews but, as Oviatt observed, it was the misalignment of

the fleet that caused the smaller ships to miss their targets.125 The calm winds also hampered effective engagement as smoke lingered around the guns rather than

dissipating. These artificial clouds masked Confederate

batteries from naval gunners afloat and prevented Lamb’s

gun crews ashore from adjusting fire as the impressive

sight of Porter’s squadron disappeared into the haze.126 As

a result, the Confederate batteries did little damage to

Porter’s ships as the majority of the “reb’s firing . . . fell

short or went over.”127 

Above the smoke-blurred landscape, the Confederate

banner defiantly waved high atop Mound Battery. Union

gun crews throughout the squadron vied for the honor of

shooting away the Confederate flag. Though well intentioned, many shots went high and missed the fort entirely.

Lamb realized what the Union gunners were doing and

moved a company battle flag to an area, which would not

harm his garrison or their guns. Eventually, the flag was

shot away and landed outside the parapet on the land face. 

With the coming of night, the Navy ceased its bombardment.128 Since Porter began the attack without coordination from the Army, few of Butler’s transports arrived

before nightfall. Without a landing to support, the Navy

withdrew and awaited the ships from Beaufort. In defiance, Lamb fired the last shot of the day to assure the

Union fleet it had not silenced the fort. Despite the smoke

and fires observed in the fort from on board ship, Lamb’s

defenses remained largely intact. The fort lost only its outbuildings, sustained damage to three gun carriages, and

suffered 23 wounded. Despite Union assertions that the

superb naval gunnery silenced the fort, Lamb felt “never

since the invention of gunpowder, was there so much

harmlessly expended.”129

At 0600 on Christmas Day, Weitzel and some of Butler’s staff went on board the flagship Malvern to coordinate the landings and fire support against Confederates

manning artillery batteries above the fort.130 Porter wanted

to follow up on what he thought had been an effective

bombardment the previous day. However, the bad feelings

between Butler and Porter continued to manifest. Porter

mistook Lamb’s ammunition conservation for effective

gunnery that, according to Porter, rendered the fort open

to seizure. As a result, he blamed Butler for not being

ready to assault on 24 December. In a communiqué to Secretary Welles, Porter coolly reported that the fort was silenced on the 24th, but that there were no troops to “take

possession,” as he expected a shell-shocked garrison to

give up at the first sight of Butler’s troops. Weitzel, still expecting a determined stand against the landing and any

assault on the fort, argued against Porter’s view.131

Porter signaled to the squadron and by 0930 the entire

fleet steamed toward Fort Fisher, in the words of Lieutenant J. Gillespie Cochrane on board the sidewheel USS

Alabama, to “exchange Christmas presents with the

‘rebs.’”132 Shortly before 1100, Union guns renewed the

cannonade and shells once again rained down on the Confederate fort. During the morning meeting with Weitzel,

Porter detailed 17 ships to cover the landing beach three

miles north of the fort. He also provided launches and

crew to land Butler’s troops. However, confusion reigned

in Butler’s staff planning. Weitzel and Butler were certain

that Porter sabotaged the landing by exploding the powder

boat early, and as a result, they were sure to face heavy resistance. Butler favored abandoning the landings, but

Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock, sent as an observer by Grant,

urged the men to conduct a reconnaissance landing.133

Porter tasked Captain Oliver S. Glisson to coordinate

naval gunfire for Butler’s landing. Butler dumbfounded

Glisson with the revelation that the Army only intended to

land 500 men despite the good weather and ammunition

constraints within the fleet. The USS Santiago De Cuba

and Brooklyn began preparatory fires on the landing

beaches two miles north of Fort Fisher. They focused on

Battery Anderson, a one-gun emplacement, manned by a

company from the 42d North Carolina of Hoke’s Division,

to help oppose the landing. By early afternoon, landing

craft were going ashore and Porter once again wondered

why no massive assault was made on the fort while its defenders took refuge in their bombproofs.134

Further reinforcement of Porter’s opinions came from

the landing beach when bluejackets took the first prisoners of the campaign. While part of Weitzel’s landing force

December 1864–January 1865 19
approached Battery Anderson from its landing beach, officers on board the captured blockade runner USS Britannia spied a white flag above the earthworks. The ships

ceased fire, and four of them launched surf boats to accept

the surrender. The vessels rowed quickly toward the beach,

each vying to get there first. Then the infantry ashore saw

the boats approaching to snatch their prize away. A new

race ensued between the Army ashore and the sailors

afloat. Britannia’s launch beached first and, as Porter predicted the day before, 70 shell-shocked veterans from the

42d North Carolina surrendered almost on cue to a lone

ensign. The dejected-looking New York infantrymen arrived too late to capture their prize, which left the out-ofbreath soldiers to watch as triumphant sailors took charge

of the prisoners.135

This encouraging news from the beach and seemingly

effective fire against the fort made Porter think about an

attempt on Wilmington itself by running past the fort.

However, he needed accurate information on the depth of

the bar and buoys to mark the channel before such a

foray.136 Ironically, Union efforts to chart the course into

New Inlet inadvertently disabled more guns than all the

Union cannon aimed at the sea face on Christmas Day.

Lieutenant Commander William B. Cushing took soundings of the bar into the New Inlet channel while “[r]ound

shot, shell and shrapnel ploughed around” his surf boats.

Confederate Marines and sailors in Columbiad Battery

overlooking New Inlet fired so fast that Cushing was

forced to bail the water “thrown into the boat” by so many

near misses.137 Colonel Lamb gave Roby’s naval detachment “discretion to fire upon vessels which approached

the bar.” Lamb worried that the Union would make an attempt to run the bar and take the fort from behind.138

Lamb knew that the tactics used at New Orleans and

Mobile had been to run past defenses. He had planned

Fort Fisher to defeat any similar attempt to run into New

Inlet. Besides the fort’s impressive fortifications, electrically detonated floating torpedoes (mines) blocked the

channel. The Confederate Navy planned to play a key role

defending the entrance to the river. It had built several

heavily armored ironclads to bolster river defenses. Two

active ships, however, fell victim to the waters of the Cape

Fear River in one way or another. After engaging Union

blockaders in the spring of 1864, the CSS Raleigh ran

aground and broke up under the immense weight of its

armor. The less well built CSS North Carolina sank at its

berthing in September 1864 after woodworms riddled the

hull below the waterline. A new ironclad was being con20 The Battle of Fort Fisher

is view, taken by Timothy O’Sullivan in February 1865, looks east toward the Northeast Bastion in the background. e weapon in

the foreground (with most likely the photographer) is a banded and rifled 32-pounder. Heavy artillery on both sides was prone to catastrophic failure due to casting flaws or overheating. Library of Congress
structed, but the Wilmington remained in dry dock

months away from completion. Despite naval plans, the

loss of the ironclads meant only the Confederate cruiser

Chickamauga patrolled upriver beyond the fort.139

Lamb focused his defensive plans toward the most

likely avenues of approach by building extensive earthworks across Federal Point and facing the New Inlet. He

ran out of time, however, in securing the rear of the fort.

As a result, only a line of rifle pits extended across the back

of the fortification. From Mound Battery to the end of

Federal Point, the sand rose only some three feet above sea

level, and storms frequently submerged the area.140 A Confederate naval detachment of approximately 150 sailors

and 25 Marines manned Battery Buchanan.141 The small

enclosed redoubt, located at the extreme tip of Federal

Point, mounted several large guns that covered New Inlet.

In addition, Lamb intended the small but powerful redoubt to secure the nearby wharf on the Cape Fear River

for arriving reinforcements or to cover a hasty withdrawal

from the main fort.142

Confederate Marines and sailors in the Columbiad Battery did their part to “promptly driv[e] out” ships which

approached the channel. Like their Union counterparts on

board ship, Confederate Marines suffered casualties when

their cannon suddenly exploded. Amid the din of battle,

they tried to prevent their 7-inch Brooke rifles from overheating. Despite these efforts, one gun exploded, followed

90 minutes later by the other, which disabled both guns

and wounded some of crew. Contrary to Porter’s claims,

and even with all of the firepower directed against Lamb’s

fort, the only guns disabled on Christmas Day came from

overheating, not Union fire.143

At the opposite end of the fort, Wietzel’s skirmishers

cautiously ventured off the landing beaches. The 500-man

force moved south under the cover of the naval bombardment and reached a point only 75 yards from Fort Fisher’s

palisade. At 1500, Weitzel, accompanied by Colonel Cyrus

B. Comstock, went ashore to evaluate the situation. In a

forward line of rifle pits, they met brigade commander

Brigadier General Newton M. Curtis. To Weitzel’s disappointment, he found few of the heavy guns disabled. Curtis urged that 2,000 men waiting for orders on the landing

beach be brought forward immediately. He advised

Weitzel to attack the fort on its flank near the river. Weitzel

then left Curtis’s troops to brief Butler on the situation on

board the Army command vessel Ben De Ford.

144 Curtis’s

assessment encouraged division commander Ames, who

began to prepare his division for the order to assault he

was sure would come.145

General Whiting, on scene as an advisor, and Lamb,

along with a nervous garrison, waited out Porter’s barrage

in Fort Fisher’s traverse bunkers as almost 130 shells per

minute crashed around them. Just after 1700, Lamb signaled Battery Buchanan to reinforce his position and soon

two-thirds of the garrison’s Marines and sailors sprinted

toward the fort.146 Suddenly at 1730, the shelling stopped,

and the Confederates fully expected a violent Union

charge at any moment. Lamb rushed 800 hastily assembled Confederate defenders out of the sally port toward

the wooden palisade. Just behind the wooden spikes, they

manned 12-pounder field guns and formed a line of battle to receive the Union assault. Curtis’s men lay less than

100 yards from the palisade as Lamb steadied the shaky

school boys sent to him by Governor Vance. When the

Union charge came, he planned to break up the formation

with deadly canister rounds at close range, then explode

the minefield behind them to demoralize the survivors.

But the attack never materialized, and skirmishing between the two forces slackened in the approaching darkness.147

Unknown to Lamb, prior experience at Fort Wagner,

South Carolina, weighed on Weitzel as he surveyed the

imposing defenses along the fort’s land face during the afternoon.148 He found the guns intact, and prisoners confirmed that Hoke’s division occupied high ground in his

rear. Weitzel briefed Butler that he could not take the fort.

Butler blamed the Navy for the powder-boat fiasco and

failure to knock out Lamb’s heavy guns. Ignoring Grant’s

explicit instructions to entrench and secure a beachhead,

Butler ordered a general withdrawal. Officers both ashore

and afloat were stunned. Curtis’s men fell back amid conflicting orders to advance then retreat while Confederate

musket and canister fire peppered their positions. Curtis

complied with orders to retire, and by 2030 the entire

landing force returned to the beach. Porter fully expected

an assault on the fort after the Navy ceased firing. In disbelief, he watched launches evacuate the Army off the

landing beach and onto waiting transports. By early

evening, the weather changed for the worse, leaving Curtis’s brigade and its prisoners stranded on the beach and

under fire from Hoke’s skirmishers. Porter ordered gunboats to close in and support the soaked, hungry, and

stranded men.149

Butler considered the Fort Fisher expedition finished

and abruptly left for Virginia even though 700 men still

shivered on the beach waiting to be evacuated. After 24

hours, the weather improved, and the remaining troops

embarked. By 27 December, the fleet disappeared over the

horizon as fast as it appeared a week earlier. Leaders on

both sides were incredulous about the expedition and

blamed the outcome on poor generalship. Though the

guns fell silent, both Butler and Porter wasted no time firing off a series of dispatches blaming the other. Porter immediately sent reports praising the Navy and criticizing

Butler, which newspapers printed just five days after the

battle.150

December 1864–January 1865 21
22 The Battle of Fort Fisher

The reports overstated the effects of the powder ship

and the naval bombardment and ignored the fact that two

days of heavy naval bombardment failed to achieve any

significant damage against the fort, its guns, or garrison.151

Porter lobbied Secretary Welles to renew the campaign

with someone other than Butler, surmising that a coordinated attack on the fort would succeed.152 Confederates

cheered news of Butler’s repulse, but Lamb blamed Bragg

for failing to support the fort and launch an attack to capture the troops Butler left stranded on the beach.153

During the battle and in immediate after-action reports, both Butler and Porter relied on Curtis’s reconnaissance but interpreted the information in different ways.

Porter took reports from ashore at face value when they

seemed to confirm his own views. Butler’s anger over the

powder ship debacle skewed his opinion toward caution.

One thing both men had in common was they co-opted

the information to assail each other in the press after the

fact rather than use it to direct the campaign at the time.154

Butler’s rash decision to abandon the landings meant

he overlooked important information. In Curtis’s after-action report, he credited the 142d New York Infantry with

entering the fort and capturing the garrison flag.155 In reality, it was just a company battle flag, the very same flag

Lamb posted to draw Union fire.156 Under the cover of

naval fire, Curtis’s brigade advanced along the river to the

western edge of the land face. They took cover in an abandoned advanced redoubt. Lieutenant William H. Walling

of the 142d saw Lamb’s target flag shot away and fall onto

Fort Fisher’s parapet. Walling and several men advanced

through a hole in the palisade. Walling then secured the

flag and was later awarded the Medal of Honor.157

While much was made of recovering the flag, the young

lieutenant and several of his men did make an important—but largely overlooked—discovery at the time.

When both Walling and Sergeant John W. White peered

over the parapet, they found that Fort Fisher only had two

complete sides instead of four.158 Both Weitzel and Butler

assumed from observations, deserter interviews, and

Weitzel’s reconnaissance that the fort was a “square bastioned work.”159

Unknown to Butler was Lamb’s main concern that the

rear of the fort would be exposed by “a thousand sailors

and Marines” landing between Mound Battery and Battery Buchanan. Union troops would have faced “little opposition at that time [had they] attacked us in the rear.”160

Confederate Marine Corporal Thomas Lawley deserted to

Union lines from Battery Buchanan and confirmed Lamb’s

fear of a landing near Mound Battery. Confederates saw

crews taking soundings near the bar, and Lamb later

added a 24-pounder gun and an advanced redoubt near

Battery Buchanan to help secure the rear of the fort.161

Both Butler and Weitzel overlooked the new information

in their haste to abandon the beaches. Comstock, a special staff officer sent by Grant, did notice and forwarded

the intelligence reports back to Grant. Grant commented

on Butler’s after-action report and criticized him for abandoning the landings before reconciling all the intelligence

gathered by Curtis’s brigade.162

Initially, however, Grant reserved judgment and took

Butler’s side as Porter jumped out front in the press criticizing the Army. Comstock blamed Porter more so than

Butler for difficulties coordinating the attack. For a few

days, Butler’s command of the department seemed secure;

however, new information arrived at Grant’s headquarters.

Not only did the Navy criticize Butler, but reports from

Army officers critical of Butler convinced Grant to make

a change. Butler also lost support in the political realm as

the halls of Congress aligned against him. Political enemies called for investigations and a court-martial. Presidential politics no longer tied Grant’s hands, and in early

January, he ordered Weitzel sent on 30 days leave, and by

8 January, a courier delivered official notice that relieved

Butler of command.163

The Second Assault

on Fort Fisher

Porter anticipated a second attempt on the fort and kept

his squadron together off Beaufort. Secretary Welles

telegraphed Grant to inform him that the Navy stood

Library of Congress

Major General Alfred H. Terry commanded Union infantry during the second attack on Fort Fisher. 
ready to support another expedition and maintained a

squadron near Fort Fisher to prevent Confederates from

building new works. The message also informed Grant

that the Navy could sail closer to the shore than first

thought to protect the landing beach from Hoke’s brigades

and cover the assault.164 When Grant came around to the

Navy’s view of the events, he quickly decided to send the

same men back to Fort Fisher, but with a different commander. 

This time Grant sent Major General Alfred H. Terry in

command along with an additional brigade, bringing the

total to nearly 9,500 men for the assault. He also placed one

division from Major General Philip H. Sheridan’s corps on

standby to assist Terry if the situation required. Grant’s

friend and most trusted lieutenant, Major General William

T. Sherman, offered to take Wilmington in reverse by

marching from South Carolina. Initially, Grant only sought

to prevent Lee’s army from drawing foreign supplies from

the port, but Sherman’s advance into the Carolinas now

provided him with another reason to send a second expedition to capture not only the fort, but also Wilmington to

assist Sherman.165

While Grant agreed to the second combined effort with

Porter, it is interesting that he chose another general from

the volunteer ranks rather than a West Point graduate.

Like Butler, Terry was a lawyer in civilian life. The comparisons stopped there, however. Their characters and personalities were diametrically opposite and, unlike Butler,

Terry displayed competence as a field commander. Porter

initially doubted Grant’s decision, especially when he discovered that Terry was one of Butler’s subordinates. However, he soon changed his mind when they met.166

Secrecy, or a lack of it, hampered the first thrust toward

Wilmington. Furthermore, Butler’s belated and confusing

attempt at secrecy only served to further strain relations

with the Navy. However, it was the loose talk and newspaper leaks that kept Confederate spies well informed of

Union intentions. Grant was determined to maintain operational secrecy for the second expedition. Aiding Sherman’s northward thrust from Savannah provided a

plausible excuse for keeping Porter’s sizable flotilla on station in Beaufort, North Carolina, while at the same time

embarking Union troops from Fortress Monroe, Virginia.

To both keep Confederates guessing and maintain the secrecy that was so lacking in December, Grant sent Terry

and his men to sea under sealed orders. 

The second expedition wasted no time, as Terry’s men

steamed to meet Porter’s fleet on 4 January 1865. Four days

later, the fleet of transports arrived off Beaufort Harbor in

North Carolina. Terry, unsure of his Navy counterpart

based on reports from Butler, went ashore to meet Porter

for the first time. Porter also felt uneasy after the December fiasco. The two leaders, however, established a mutual

understanding and got to work planning the assault. In

that initial meeting, Terry and Porter agreed to the basic

outline of the operation: land, entrench, then make a coordinated attack.167

Since December, Porter had advanced the idea of a

naval landing force to his superiors. During the first bombardment, Lamb’s ammunition conservation plan and the

reports from Curtis’s brigade convinced him that the Navy

should get credit when the fort fell to the guns of the

fleet.168 Privately, Porter wished to take the fort himself

using only sailors, but he realized that many of them were

raw recruits and had “no knowledge of musket or drill.”

He also knew that undertaking the expedition without the

Army could be disastrous since the sailors could not tolerate the demoralizing effect of massed fire from regular

December 1864–January 1865 23

Atlanta History Center

A Confederate hand grenade. 

A Confederate torpedo or land mine was an altered shell with either a waterproof percussion fuse or an electrically detonated fuse

like those at Fort Fisher. 

Atlanta History Center
24 The Battle of Fort Fisher

troops.169 In the spirit of renewed cooperation, Terry accepted Porter’s plan to land a force of Marines and sailors

from the squadron. 

Porter secretly worried that his raw, untrained bluejackets would wilt under the massed volley fire of Confederate infantry; regardless, determined not to let the

Army take all the credit, he published General Order 81.

His idea harkened back to his Mexican War experiences

when Commodore Matthew C. Perry used a similar assemblage of Marines and sailors to force passage upstream

and capture the Mexican town of Tabasco.170 Porter’s plan

envisioned an organization of 2,000 men from the fleet to

create a naval brigade. He directed the Marines to form at

the rear of the brigade to cover the advancing sailors with

musket and carbine fire. He then detailed how sailors

armed with revolvers and “well sharpened” cutlasses

would “board” the sea face of Fort

Fisher in a “seaman-like way.” Despite

private concerns, he boldly predicted

that the naval brigade would “carry the

day.”171

In the wake of the first Fort Fisher

fiasco, Porter revised the naval bombardment plan. One of the lessons

gleaned from the first attack involved

getting the powerful ironclad New

Ironsides into correct position to serve

as a reference for the remaining vessels. Previously, the massive ship

missed its assigned position, a mistake

that rippled throughout the squadron

as each vessel in turn anchored out of

position. For the upcoming advance,

Porter clarified instructions and assigned ships into three lines of battle.

He encouraged his captains to get

closer than they attempted in December and attempted to ensure this by

moving each line of battle a quartermile closer to Fort Fisher on the revised plan of attack distributed to the

squadron.172

Following Terry and Porter’s planning session on 8 January, a winter

storm delayed the expedition for several days. The heavy seas also complicated Porter’s efforts to replenish ships

with coal and more than 15,000 additional shells. Ships damaged in the

first attack were hurriedly repaired to

sail with the fleet. Undaunted by logistical difficulties, Terry and Porter

issued orders to coordinate landing

the infantry and suppress Confederate

defenses. On 12 January, the combined fleet steamed toward Fort

Fisher. Unlike Butler’s landings, Terry

and Porter wasted no time getting the

Army ashore. At dawn on 13 January,

the ironclads anchored off Fort

Fisher’s land face and began to pumNorth Carolina Department of Cultural Resources
mel its earthworks. The remainder of

the fleet and the Army transports

moved in close to the landing beach

three miles to the north to provide

covering fire and offload men and

supplies. By a little after 1400, Terry’s

men had assembled on shore and

begun to dig in across the width of

Federal Point.173

Since Butler’s attack, Lamb had kept

his garrison employed on fatigue duty

remounting disabled guns, resupplying the magazines, and building new

barracks for the men. He removed

buoys marking mines in the New Inlet

channel and requested reinforcements. Also on Lamb’s wish list were

hand grenades to fight off an infantry

assault and submerged mines to prevent the otherwise invulnerable ironclads from anchoring close enough to

support the landings. In addition,

Lamb requested another 500 slaves to

augment the 200 “feeble and worn

out” laborers he had feverishly overworked making emergency repairs to

the fort. He lobbied General Whiting’s

chief-of-staff (and brother-in-law),

Major James H. Hill, to urge the general to send the labor along with heavy

timber to add four guns around

Mound Battery. Lamb noted that

while his defenses stood ready to repel

the Union fleet, added labor would

allow him to mend palisades and traverses along the land face and “make

[Porter] leave some of his vessels behind.”174 However, few of Lamb’s logistical requests were filled by the

hard-pressed Southern ordnance bureau. When Porter’s fleet reappeared

off Wilmington, Bragg sent some 700

men to bolster Lamb’s garrison. With

these, it numbered around 1,500 men

but was still vastly outnumbered by

the Union task force. Lamb’s concern

grew with the realization that Bragg

seemed content to sit in a passive defense posture while

Union troops dug in unmolested by Hoke’s division.175

As in December, the New Ironsides formed the backbone of Porter’s fire- support plan. Just as before, the entire squadron formation depended on the first vessel

dropping anchor in the correct spot. The plan required the

massive ironclad to anchor roughly one-half mile off Fort

Fisher’s Northeast Bastion. Four smaller Monitor-type

ironclads anchored in turn would provide direct fire close

into the shore but out of the Ironsides’ line of fire. The remaining battle lines formed in succession with a fourth

line of reserves organized into four divisions out of range

December 1864–January 1865 25

North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources
of Confederate guns. The resulting

semicircular formation of ships enabled Porter to concentrate fire to

both support the landings and counter

the fort’s seaward batteries.176

After the Army completed its landing on 13 January, Porter signaled the

remaining ships to anchor in line-ofbattle to bombard the fort. This time

he placed the Brooklyn at the head of

the first line. The Marine gun crews

fought their guns and exchanged fire

with Confederate batteries inside the

fort. Following the earlier Parrott rifle

explosions and Congressional inquiries, Porter’s squadron understandably hesitated to use the

100-pounder guns. Porter tried to

minimize the danger and ordered that

guns, like Sergeant Oviatt’s, be fired if

“at all” with a reduced charge of powder and different fuse.177 Although

Oviatt recorded the accidents in his

diary, he did not seem fearful of another explosion. When the squadron

renewed the attack on Fort Fisher, action on 14 January left the ship critically low on shells. The next day, shortly after dawn, the

Brooklyn left to replenish its magazine, but by noon arrived back on station. Despite the danger of another accident, Oviatt recorded that in three hours, the ship fired all

but 30 of the 800 shells taken on board in the morning.178

Once his troops dried out from sloshing ashore and replenished their soaked ammunition, Terry established defensible positions two miles north of the fort across the

neck of Federal Point. Unlike Butler, Terry intended to

stay. He came ashore prepared with more than 300,000

rounds of ammunition and a “pyramid of hardtack,” along

with the intention to use the extra entrenching tools Grant

told Butler to bring the first time. Union soldiers put them

to good use and worked throughout the night digging

trenches into the soft Carolina sand to secure the Union

rear against Hoke’s division.179

Meanwhile, Bragg apparently drew the wrong conclusions from Butler’s abortive campaign the previous December. Bragg incorrectly believed that the December

attack demonstrated the superiority of fortified coastal

batteries over naval weaponry. Congratulations poured

into Bragg’s Wilmington headquarters, which only further

lulled him into a false sense of security. Unbelievably, and

despite numerous Union naval victories to the contrary by

the likes of DuPont, Farragut, and Rear Admiral Louis M.

Goldsborough, Bragg boldly held onto this belief even as

Terry’s men dug in across Federal

Point.180

This flawed point of view led Bragg

and Hoke to continue to passively occupy the Sugarloaf high ground, fourand-a-half miles north of the fort,

concerned that Terry intended to bypass Fort Fisher and attack Wilmington directly.181 They seemingly failed

to grasp Grant’s assessment of the situation, which noted that just by entrenching to isolate Fort Fisher, Union

forces effectively closed Wilmington.182 Grant and Lee both took the

view that if the fort fell, then so would

Wilmington. Bragg suffered from not

only poor situational awareness, but

also doubted Hoke’s men. By the time

Bragg and Hoke personally rode forward to assess the situation on the

morning of 14 January, they found

that Terry’s troops had already created

strong defenses, which Bragg deemed

too powerful to overcome. For this, he

laid the blame “squarely on Hoke’s

shoulders.”183

Terry’s troops crept ever closer to

the still-imposing fort. The Confederate cruiser Chickamauga, on patrol in the Cape Fear River, spotted Union

troops advancing toward the fort amidst the undergrowth

of the river bank. The cruiser shelled the blue-clad soldiers, even taking General Terry himself under fire as he

conducted a reconnaissance of the fort. Meanwhile, Curtis’s brigade worked throughout the day and dug successive lines of rifle pits and trenches to within musket shot

of the fort. Undeterred by the ever increasing menace outside the walls and Bragg’s empty promises of support,

Lamb boldly planned a night attack. After sunset, he

hoped to dislodge Terry’s men and take advantage of the

Southerners’ knowledge of the terrain in the darkness to

avoid the powerful naval artillery anchored just offshore.

He telegraphed Bragg to request support in a simultaneous

night attack and waited impatiently. Waiting turned to disgust as the time passed without Bragg sending so much as

an acknowledgment while the fort’s garrison vainly stood

ready to charge. Sometime during the night, Bragg belatedly tried to bolster Lamb’s garrison with a South Carolina

brigade commanded by Brigadier General Johnson Hagood. However, only 480 of more than 1,200 men assigned

ever arrived as transports broke down or were forced to

retire by Union fire.184

Porter’s fleet continuously punished the fort, forcing

Lamb’s men to seek cover and leaving them unable to ef26 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Library of Congress

General Braxton Bragg was directed by

Confederate President Jefferson Davis to

command the defense of Wilmington in

the fall of 1864; however, his subsequent

lack of action to defend Fort Fisher confused and angered his subordinates. 
fectively fight back, repair damage, or rest. During the day,

Porter’s fleet concentrated its fire on the fort to cover

Terry’s men; at night, the ironclads remained at anchor

and rotated duty firing volleys into the fort. The increasingly violent metal storm aimed at the fort’s landward face

ripped into portions of the nine-foot-high palisade, flung

guns from their carriages, and cut wires to the torpedo

field. The unrelenting punishment from the fleet not only

began to break Confederate spirits but also bodies as casualties mounted into the hundreds within the fort.185

Marine gun captains Sergeant Richard Binder and Orderly Sergeant Isaac N. Fry manned their 100-pounder Parrot rifles at the forward and aft batteries in the Ticonderoga.

During the preassault bombardment, they directed devastating fire upon the fort despite accurate return fire from

Confederate shore batteries. During the battle, both “maintained a well-placed fire upon the batteries on shore.” For

their “skill and courage[ous]” actions during the three-day

bombardment, both were awarded the Medal of Honor.186

While Marines demonstrated proficiency at the great

guns, accuracy did not initially equate to efficiency. Following the first assault on Fort Fisher, official Union reports celebrated and Confederates later mocked members

of Weitzel’s landing force. Porter’s official report initially

praised the landing force, which captured a small Confederate flag knocked down by his shipboard artillerists.187

In hindsight, Porter used the flag as a lesson for his gun

crews before the next assault on Fort Fisher. He lectured

the Navy and Marine gun crews about the “great many

shells . . . thrown away firing at the flag staff.” He correctly

surmised that Confederates placed their flags as decoys to

draw fire away from the fort’s guns. Instead, he urged gun

crew captains to “pick out the guns.”188 Further, he warned

his gunners about inaccurate fire, stating that when “firing

against earthworks . . . the shell burst in the air is thrown

away.” To gain maximum effect, Porter directed gun crews

to aim for the earthen parapets in order to lodge the explosive shells into the structure before they exploded.189

During the second bombardment of the fort, this change

in tactics proved devastating to Confederate guns intended to spoil an infantry assault along the fort’s land

face. Save for one heavy gun, partially defiladed by the

Northeast Bastion, naval gunfire suppressed Confederate

gun crews and systematically disabled the carriages of the

other 19 heavy guns sighted toward the landing force.190

In stark contrast to the December attack, Porter wrote

both General Grant and Secretary Welles to report the

harmonious joint relations between Terry and himself

after the first day’s bombardment and successful landing.

Supporting Terry’s landing force did not mean, however,

that Porter relented on sending the naval brigade ashore

for the upcoming assault. Late on 14 January, General

December 1864–January 1865 27

Library of Congress

Another O’Sullivan view, this shows the outside land face of Fort Fisher taken from the second gun chamber of Shepherd’s Battery on

the Western Salient. It looks southeast toward the Northeast Bastion in the far distance. Visible at le is the palisade and, in the center, the main sally port. e dismounted gun is an 8-inch Columbiad.
Terry and Colonel Comstock returned from a personal reconnaissance of the fort’s land face. They briefed Porter

that conditions were favorable for an assault the next day

and that naval artillery had succeeded in knocking out the

guns Weitzel found intact the previous December. Porter

and Terry then agreed on a set of conditions to coordinate

the assault. Terry asserted that the attack should commence late in the afternoon to allow naval artillery to further weaken the defenses but still allow enough daylight to

get inside the fort. Porter insisted that his naval brigade

share in the glory and assault along the beach toward the

Northeast Bastion. Both men agreed to the other’s condition, wary of warnings from superiors and public opinion

should they fail to work together.191 

The one major detail they failed to coordinate revolved

around the time of the attack. Both men agreed that

Terry’s force would initiate the attack and signal the fleet.

Immediately, the ships would shift fire and the naval

brigade would launch its attack. However, both men left

the meeting believing the ground assault scheduled for 15

January began at a different time. Porter thought the assault would begin at 1400, while Terry planned to advance

an hour later. The misunderstanding resulted in grave

consequences for hundreds of Marines and sailors waiting to take part in Porter’s grand adventure ashore.192

Porter’s interservice rivalry with the Army only reinforced romantic notions of bluejackets seizing glory atop

Fort Fisher’s ramparts. The naval brigade captivated Porter

like the powder ship enamored Butler during the first attack. Porter issued his order to the man chosen to lead the

brigade, Lieutenant Commander Kidder R. Breese, as if

Fort Fisher were nothing more than an enemy vessel to be

taken at sea. Although Porter rehearsed getting the

squadron into line-of-battle, even going so far as to alert

Confederates to their presence, he made no such investment in the landing party. Senior division officer Lieutenant Commander Thomas O. Selfridge of the USS

Huron later lamented Porter’s tactical error. He said, “expecting a body of sailors, collected hastily from different

ships, unknown to each other, armed with swords and pistols, to stand against veteran soldiers armed with rifle and

bayonets” amounted to a tragic and “fatal” mistake.193

According to the plan, when the sailors “boarded” the

land face, Porter intended the Marines to retain their traditional role as sharpshooters. He envisioned Marines following in the rear of the brigade to cover the assault and

then snipe Confederates inside the fort from atop the ramparts. He worried, however, that Confederates would turn

guns from Mound Battery against the attacking Union

troops inside the fort. To counter the predicament, Porter

ordered “every three men” to “seize a prisoner, pitch him

over the walls, and get behind the fort for protection.”194

Early on the morning of 15 January, Porter and Terry

held one last conference to coordinate the attack. At 1000,

Porter issued landing orders to the squadron. The naval

brigade’s boats began to land outside of small-arms range

covered by the guns of the ironclads. Meanwhile, Lamb

frantically tried to persuade Bragg to attack before the

fort’s defenses collapsed under the weight of the combined

Union force. General Whiting, who arrived at the fort several days earlier to assist Lamb, coolly noted, “Lamb, my

boy I have come to share your fate. You and your garrison

are to be sacrificed.”195

By noon, surf boats landed 35 detachments from

throughout the squadron. On board the flagship Malvern,

Lieutenant Commander Cushing, along with 40 other volunteers, including Admiral Porter’s 19-year-old son, joined

the landing party, not realizing that the attack “was sheer,

murderous madness.”196 Carlisle P. Porter had resigned his

commission as an acting midshipman a year earlier and now

served as his father’s secretary. He shared the carefree attitude of many on board ship and joined the “lark” ashore.

Breese detailed young Porter to act as one of his runners to

carry orders during the attack.197

Near the beach, the growing mass of men milled about

leaderless. Each of the various shore parties remained under

the immediate command of its officers; however, no one

knew exactly who held overall command of the brigade.

Breese, Porter’s fleet captain, left the beach in search of General Terry to try and coordinate the attack. In his absence,

men huddled together on the beach “like a flock of sheep.”

Confederates in the fort began to take notice and soon began

28 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Brigadier General Jacob Zeilin was the seventh Commandant of

the Marine Corps. 

U.S. Marine Corps History Divison
December 1864–January 1865 29

I

n 1782, George Washington created the Badge of

Military Merit, known more popularly today as

the Purple Heart.198 After the Revolution, Washington’s award—but not its precedent—fell out of use.

Prior to the Civil War, a presidential “Certificate of

Merit” and the brevet rank system provided the

means to recognize gallant actions. The outbreak of

the Civil War renewed the call to recognize military

valor in defending the Union. However, General

Winfield Scott fought against a new medal. 

In late 1861, Scott’s retirement and McClellan’s ascension to General-In-Chief reinvigorated proponents of a new medal. Iowa Senator James W. Grimes

introduced a bill to recognize enlisted Marines and

sailors for gallantry and seamanship during the war.

The Medal of Honor was approved by Congress, and

President Lincoln signed the bill on 21 December

1861. A few months later, the government also approved a version of the Medal of Honor for the

Army.199

Of more than 1,500 Medals of Honor awarded for

action in the Civil War, only a few Marines received

the nation’s highest honor. The number of awards is

not surprising considering the small size and largely

shipboard role of Marines in the war. The Fort Fisher

campaign, however, placed Marines in a significant

role both supporting the landings and taking part in

the assaults, which ultimately brought about capitulation of the fort. Of the 17 Medals of Honor awarded

to Marines during the war, more than a third were a

result of the attacks on Fort Fisher. Six Marines, four

ashore and two on board ship, received the Medal for

their actions during the campaign. At the time, Marine officers were ineligible for the award; however,

five were breveted for gallantry during the Naval

Brigade’s assault.200

Medal of Honor presented to Corporal Andrew J. Tomlin and the inscription on its reverse. 

Gen Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center

THE MEDAL OF HONOR

to shell the gaggle of men. Lieutenant Commander James

Parker, the USS Minnesota’s executive officer, was the senior

officer ashore. Confederate fire convinced him to organize

the sailors and gain some control over the chaotic situation.201

Parker assembled the 1,600 sailors into a column of three

lines organized around the naval squadron’s divisions. The

squadron’s senior division officers each commanded one of

the lines. Soon, however, Breese, along with his two aides,

one of whom bore Admiral Porter’s flag, returned to the

beach. Parker relinquished command of the formation upon

learning that Porter intended Breese to lead the attack.

Breese kept Parker’s organizational structure and added the

hastily assembled Marine battalion to the brigade formation.202

In the first line, Marine Captain Lucien LeCompte

Dawson commanded the 400 Marines. Lieutenant Commander Charles H. Cushman commanded the second
line, Lieutenant Commander James Parker the third, and

Lieutenant Commander Thomas O. Selfridge commanded

the fourth. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Samuel W. Preston’s detachment of sailors moved forward to dig rifle pits, covered by a detachment of Marines led by Second Lieutenant

Louis E. Fagan.203

While most Marine Corps officers hailed from the

Northeast, Dawson was born in 1836 at Natchez, Mississippi, and grew up in Texas. His family later settled in

Arkansas, but his father, a former Army officer and Indian

agent, ran to Texas to avoid an 1844 murder charge. In

1859, Dawson accepted a commission as a second lieutenant under an appointment from Texas. By 1865, he

commanded the Marine Guard on board the frigate USS

Colorado.

204

The Marine battalion suffered from some of the same

organizational problems as the naval contingent. Some 20

detachments of Marines, ranging in size from a dozen to

almost 50, milled about on the landing beach waiting for

orders. Captain George Butler, the senior Marine ashore,

sent Lieutenant Fagan’s detachment forward to cover the

advance party digging trenches. However, he did not try to

organize the battalion. Captain Dawson, as battalion commander, had to brief Admiral Porter on board the flagship,

delaying his arrival on the beach. When Dawson finally

came ashore, he found that Captain Butler had done nothing to organize the Marines. Hurriedly, he grouped the

disparate detachments into four companies. Officers

hastily organized the men with little time to establish company much less a platoon command structure.205

Early in the war, both the Navy and Marine Corps saw

advantages in maintaining a dedicated battalion organization for landings. In 1862, they disbanded the organization as it proved to be a burden on supply. Later in the war,

mixed naval battalions such as Porter’s took part in landings; however, they generally lacked unit cohesion and the

logistical support to pose a serious threat to determined

Confederate resistance.206 In the summer of 1863, thenMajor Jacob Zeilin, who by 1865 became the Commandant, wrote then-Commandant Harris of the difficulty

assembling a Marine battalion from ships of the fleet. Almost foreshadowing Dawson’s difficulties at Fort Fisher,

Zeilin wrote: 

The Marine Corps is accustomed to act in small detachments on board ship and ashore, and opportunities rarely offer to have more than one company

together, and therefore when several detachments

are united, it is absolutely necessary that they should

have time to become organized and drilled as a battalion and to know their officers and their duties on

a larger scale. . . . [I]t would be very dangerous to attempt any hazardous operation requiring coolness

and promptness on their part; and no duty which

they could be called upon to perform requires such

perfect discipline and drill as landing under fire.207

Adding to the chaotic situation, Breese’s inability to establish contact with the Army after getting ashore further

confused his timeline to synchronize his attack with that

of Terry’s men. In addition to problems with organization

and based on Porter’s orders, Breese thought Terry intended to attack momentarily. Around 1300, Breese, unsure how to coordinate the naval brigade’s advance, sent a

runner, Navy Lieutenant Benjamin H. Porter, recently

paroled from a Confederate prison, to make contact with

Terry. Thinking the Army was about to attack, Breese ordered Dawson to hasten his companies into formation so

that the entire column would not fall behind the agreed

time line. Dawson hurriedly rushed the Marine battalion

to the front of the naval column with 25 skirmishers in the

lead.208

While the Marines tried to organize themselves, Breese

added to their confusion. He mistakenly thought that on

a signal at 1400, the two forces would launch a simultaneous attack on either flank of the land face. Ships supporting the attack would shift fire toward the interior of the

fort. Next, Dawson’s Marines, armed with rifled muskets

and a variety of naval carbines, would occupy a forward

line of rifle pits to cover the assault and snipe Confederates

atop the parapet. Breese planned for the naval brigade’s

1,600 sailors, armed with cutlasses and revolvers, to ad30 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War

Lieutenant Commander Kidder R. Breese. 
December 1864–January 1865 31

vance on a line perpendicular to the beach and then storm

the formidable Northeast Bastion. Meanwhile, Terry’s men

intended to attack the other flank along the Cape Fear

River.209

Trying to maintain the faulty timeline, the brigade

marched at the double-quick toward Fort Fisher on line,

then halted about a mile away. Breese ordered Dawson to

occupy the line of rifle pits dug by Preston’s advanced

party, about 600 yards from the fort. He directed Dawson

to move forward into a second line of rifle pits nearer the

fort when they were completed. Breese then planned for

the naval assault column to rush the fort while Dawson’s

Marines provided cover for the assault or a retreat should

they be repulsed. Following Porter’s plan, after Breese’s

men gained the parapet, Dawson’s Marines were to follow

and occupy the top of the traverses to snipe the enemy

within the fort.210

Around 1400, Breese formed the brigade again and

marched the men in a column down the beach to within

a half-mile of Fort Fisher. Dawson took the Marines to the

line of rifle pits 600 yards from the fort and waited for the

advance party to complete the support-by-fire position

nearest the fort. Soon after, a messenger countermanded

Breese’s previous instructions. The new orders directed

Dawson to shift the Marines forward 150 yards and to the

extreme left flank to a line of dunes close to the apex of

the Northeast Bastion, which provided “splendid cover.”

Dawson challenged the messenger to ensure he understood the new orders, and soon the Marines lay prone on

the beach as Breese’s sailors advanced and took cover

alongside the Marines.211

The Marines were not the only ones questioning

Breese’s tactics. On the other flank, the Army methodically moved its brigades forward under the cover of the

low ground and scrub along the river and Wilmington

Road. Breese’s runner, Lieutenant Porter, approached General Curtis to try and coordinate the attack. Curtis and

other Army officers were “appalled” at the naval brigade’s

lack of organization and drill. Curtis then lectured the

young naval officer on Breese’s impending tactical error.

According to Curtis, the naval brigade’s formation was

both too narrow in its frontage and too long. As shaped,

Breese’s formation subjected the naval brigade to flank fire

and too little mass or firepower at the breach point. Curtis later recalled, “if you go forward as you are, you will be

fearfully punished, and the only good you will do us will

be to receive the fire which otherwise would come to our

lines.” Disregarding the general’s lesson, Lieutenant Porter

boldly predicted the naval brigade would carry the day

and made his way back to Breese. As fate would have it,

Lieutenant Porter learned that Curtis’s lesson held truth

and fell leading his men during the charge toward the

fort.212

During the day, Lieutenant Preston’s detachment of sappers steadily worked its way forward preparing rifle pits

for the Marine battalion. Second Lieutenant Fagan’s

Marines, assigned to protect the sailors as they dug, found

themselves too far from the fort to hamper Confederate

artillerists aiming for the detachment. The Marines dug

with their bayonets or bare hands, then took cover to wait

for the Navy to complete the second line of trenches.

While Dawson’s battalion impatiently waited on the beach,

the second trench line dug by sappers

filled with soldiers and Marines less

than 200 yards from the fort. But the

Marines were not able to get into position without taking casualties.213

Both Marines and sailors found the

sandy, barren plain to be too hotly

contested with Confederate fire to

march in a standard formation. Fagan

deployed his Marines as skirmishers

to avoid bunching the men into an

easy target for rebel artillery. They

moved forward in bounds, waiting for

canister shot to pass overhead before

leaping to their feet and advancing a

few yards at a time. As they got closer

to the front, Confederates opened on

Fagan’s detachment with two 12-

pounder Napoleons. Several of the

Marines were wounded by the shower

of fragments. Despite incessant Confederate fire, Corporal Andrew J.

is illustration, published in 1907, depicts the scene described by Marine Sergeant

Richard Binder of the advance of the Navy sharpshooters’ unit under Lieutenant

Williams—including Binder and other Marines from the USS Ticonderoga—during the

sailors’ and Marines’ 15 January 1865 assault on Fort Fisher.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 
32 The Battle of Fort Fisher

The Drum and Fife Corps as an organization

was separate from the Marine Band, which

was a ceremonial unit. Musicians who accompanied Marines on board ship consisted of a fifer and

a drummer. Musicians as young as eight years old

enlisted in the Marine Corps under a musical apprenticeship. Music boys, as they were known, attended the music school at the Marine Barracks in

Washington under the tutelage of Drum Major John

Roach. After a period of up to a year, the young musicians transferred to other Marine barracks or on

board ship. Being a musician, however, did not usually equate to crossing over into the Marine Band.214

Roach was the exception. He graduated as a music

boy in 1827, and like most of his peers, completed a

seven-year indenture and gained a discharge at age

21. Some music boys reenlisted back and forth between the line and musical ranks. Roach first reenlisted as a fifer then transferred to the line. He rose to

the rank of sergeant before returning to music. By

1859, he had become the drum major of the Marine

Band and master of the music school.215

Musicians on board ship called Marines to guard

and general quarters as well as sound reveille,

muster, mess, liberty, retreat, and colors. They further helped keep their fellow Marines sharp by playing tunes during drill. As Marine Private Charles

Brother recalled, “Quarters . . . a short drill afterwards, double quick to ‘Pop goes the weasel.’”216

While the band only faced the pointed barbs of

members of the Washington press, the drum and fife

corps faced actual danger in combat. From the first

battle at Bull Run, musicians accompanied Marines

into combat. Despite sharing many of the dangers of

their line counterparts, no Marine musician ever lost

his life in combat.217

MARINE MUSICIANS

Musicians (far le) on board the mortar schooner USS C. P. Williams pose near the mortar “Ole Abe” off the coast of Hilton

Head, SC, in 1862. 

U.S. Army Military History Institute
Tomlin hoisted one of the wounded

Marines over his shoulder and carried

him to a covered position. Acting on

Fagan’s orders, other Marines unleashed a well-aimed volley of fire on

the artillery crews, forcing them to

temporarily abandon the guns. Later,

Tomlin’s act of courage was recognized with the award of the Medal of

Honor.218

Earlier in the day, First Lieutenant

Charles F. Williams, commanding

Ticonderoga’s Marine Guard, which

included Sergeants Binder and Fry

along with three other noncommissioned officers and 20 privates, went

ashore. As the naval brigade formed,

a call went out for volunteers to act as

sharpshooters to cover sappers digging trenches. When no one volunteered, Lieutenant Williams stepped

forward to volunteer his entire detachment.219 Though relatively few in

number, the detachment carried the

Spencer repeating rifle, which amplified their relative firepower over anyone carrying the standard .58-caliber

rifle musket. Confederate fire forced

the detachment to crawl most of the

way to their posts near the fort.

Williams assigned a squad to man the

rifle pits and took the rest of the

troops to some nearby sand dunes

close to the apex of the Northeast Bastion.220 Confederates in the fort spotted the bluejackets massing on the

beach, and Lamb ordered the single

remaining gun on the land face, along

with the Mound Battery guns, to engage the naval brigade.221 Williams’s

Marines answered with their Spencer

rifles, sending a torrent of lead on the

rebel artillerists.222

Confederate Marine Second Lieutenant Henry M. Doak commanded

an 8-inch mortar behind the land face. Lamb had originally placed him in command of three large coastal defense guns, but three days of constant naval bombardment

put all of them out of action. Sporadic sniper fire from

Marines and soldiers in nearby rifle pits pinned down the

crews of Lamb’s remaining artillery. With most of the cannon disabled along the parapet, Doak took command of

the mortar and engaged Union snipers in rifle pits near

the land face. Just as his mortar bracketed the rifle pits,

Commodore William Radford on board the New Ironsides

spotted Doak’s position and directed the ironclad’s gunners to target it. Soon a shell landed near the mortar, decimating the crew and wounding Doak.223

The wounded lieutenant’s fight, however, did not end at

Fort Fisher. When the fort fell, he along with other

wounded Confederates were captured and sent to Fortress

December 1864–January 1865 33

North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources
34 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Monroe, Virginia. By February, Union officials exchanged

him for a Union prisoner, and he soon transferred to the

Confederate hospital in Richmond. Doak had enlisted in

a Tennessee infantry regiment in 1861 and seen action at

Shiloh. In late 1862, he gained appointment into the Confederate Marine Corps and saw duty at Drewry’s Bluff and

other East Coast naval stations. By 1864, he was in Wilmington and for a time commanded the Marine Guard on

board the CSS Tallahassee. By April 1865, his timely release and quick recovery in Richmond allowed him to join

Lee’s army when Confederates evacuated the capital. Doak

surrendered along with the remainder of the army at Appomattox.224

With Confederate mortar fire curbed, the Marines succeeded in suppressing the rebels along the land face; however, the Spencer rifles’ rate of fire could not be sustained

without a resupply of cartridges. As the Marines ran out

of ammunition, their enemy attempted to take some

measure of revenge. Renewed artillery fire forced isolated

Marine snipers to improve their shallow trenches to ride

out the metal storm. Fast firing Marines, including Sergeant Binder, were not only forced to remain at the bottom of their trenches until sunset but were also powerless

to cover the naval brigade’s attack.225

While the naval brigade waited for the signal to assault,

Dawson’s Marines were sheltering with the sailors in a

semi-exposed position. The crest of the beach offered

some cover from direct fire as Confederate rifles cracked

in the distance and bullets whizzed through the air. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Benjamin H. Porter brought back news

that the Army intended to assault at 1500. The land face’s

sole surviving cannon roared to life, firing at the sailors.

From the redoubt near the center sally port, 12-pounder

Napoleons fired shells filled with deadly case shot. The

ironclads answered the Confederate guns and sent shells

screaming overhead, which sometimes burst early and

showered Breese’s command with iron shrapnel. For more

than 30 minutes, men crowded along

the narrow beach trying to seek shelter. The rapidly changing orders and

ensuing chaos on the beach left Dawson confused as to his mission while

the Marine battalion became hopelessly mingled into the body of

sailors.226

One of the Marines seeking shelter

on the beach was musician Alexander

J. McDonald. While musicians faced

danger in combat on board ship, they

did not normally exchange their instruments for muskets to join landing

parties. McDonald was one of two

musicians assigned to the USS Vanderbilt’s Marine Guard. He had seen action in the Mexican

War and entered the hallowed Halls of Montezuma recalled today in the Marines’ Hymn when in 1847 he took

part in the charge on Chapultepec Castle. During the Fort

Fisher attack, he was one of four of Vanderbilt’s Marines

wounded by Confederate fire. Though Marine musicians

often faced danger in combat on land and sea, MacDonald’s wound is notable for being the only combat casualty

suffered by Marine musicians during the war.227

Finally at 1525, lookouts on board Porter’s flagship observed the Army signal flags. The ship sounded its steam

whistle, which resonated to the beach as the entire

squadron repeated the signal to shift fire away from the

land face. Knowing they were to attack after the Army

launched its assault, Breese took movements by some soldiers as Terry’s assault. Suddenly, Dawson’s command and

the rest of the naval brigade heard the order to charge. In

stark contrast to the Army, which Terry ordered to charge

in silence, the sailors raced forward with a cheer in a loose

column. The Marines, heavily weighed down with 40

rounds of ammunition and rifles, tried in vain to catch up

to the lead element of the naval column in the soft sand.

To Dawson it appeared that Breese abandoned the earlier

plan for Marines to occupy rifle pits to cover the advance.

Now, he and the Marine battalion found themselves advancing under fire without clear orders. Dawson quickly

determined to continue moving his men toward the palisade, which provided the only piece of cover in view.

Breese’s order to charge over the final 600 yards rather

than quickstep under covering fire of the Marines not

only caught Dawson’s heavily burdened command off

guard, but also strung out the entire naval brigade down

the beach.228

The Army originally intended to assault Fort Fisher in

a dense column of fours, but Brigadier Newton M. Curtis

convinced General Terry to shift to a two-deep line formation out of concern for casualties.229 In theory, an atBattles and Leaders of the Civil War 

is depiction of the assault of the naval column on Fort Fisher's Northeast Bastion was

first published in 1884.
December 1864–January 1865 35

tack by a dense column along a narrow front mimicked

the highly successful tactic used to breach the formidable

Confederate lines at Spotsylvania Courthouse in May

1864. Instead of assaulting in a two-deep line formation

over an extended front, regiments formed up into a dense

column and charged—without pausing to fire—with bayonets fixed. Grant thought so highly of the novel idea that

he adapted it in scale up to a corps tactic. Although apparently accidental, Breese’s column potentially produced

a similar shock effect with 1,600 sailors brandishing cutlasses at close quarters. In addition, they carried revolvers,

which offered more available firepower at close range than

single-shot muzzle-loading rifles. 

Regardless, effective employment of the tactic required

the column to maintain its integrity to overwhelm defenders at the point of the breach. However, Breese’s column, as General Curtis observed, instead of remaining in

a compact formation, elongated down the length of the

beach. Soft sand, the long distance to be covered, and intense Confederate fire separated the lead elements from

the rear. In addition, Breese never ordered Dawson’s

Marines, originally intended to provide covering fire for

the advance, to occupy the line of rifle pits dug by Lieutenant Preston’s party. When the sailors reached the palisade, they had neither covering fire nor enough men to

launch an effective assault and were forced to wait on the

e Naval Brigade failed to account for the palisade fronting the Northeast Bastion, shown a month aer the fort fell. 

U.S. Army Military History Institute

Library of Congress

e palisade fronting the Confederate works at Fort Fisher's land face, shown in February 1865, concerned General Terry. 
36 The Battle of Fort Fisher

rear elements of the brigade. Meanwhile, Dawson’s heavily burdened

Marines trudged through the deep

sand at the double quick trying to gain

ground and reach the palisade before

the assault took place.230

According to Porter’s landing orders, he directed the naval column to

keep its flags furled until they gained

the top of the parapet. However, the

divisions of the brigade neglected that

part of the order and charged down

the beach with flags flying. The spectacle and elongated nature of the column caused Confederates to hastily

divide forces to repel the impending

assault. Lamb split his available defenders.231 He placed 500 on the parapet to face Breese, then ordered

Hagood’s men to the opposite flank

near Shepherd’s Battery. The South

Carolinians refused to leave the shel-

e Naval brigade attempts to break through the wooden palisade in their ill-fated assault. e c.1887 print of a painting by J. O.

Davidson erroneously depicts the famous 150-pounder Armstrong rifle as being part of the armament of the Northeast Bastion. Library of Congress

Naval History and Heritage Command

An undated watercolor by eyewitness Ensign John W. Grattan, of Rear Admiral David

Dixon Porter's staff, depicts the storming of the fort, as the bombarding fleet stands offshore. e sidewheel steamer in the center flying signal flags is Porter's flagship, the USS

Malvern. e USS New Ironsides is at right with three monitors. 
ter of the bombproofs, which left only 250 men to oppose

the Army’s assault on the western end of the land face.*

The palisade caused another tactical problem. On 14

January, Terry worried that it might hamper the Army’s

assault and pressed Porter to focus on its destruction. Near

the Northeast Bastion, the palisade paralleled the land face

and passed in front of the bastion toward the surf. On the

other flank, Terry’s troops, as a precaution, in addition to

axes brought black powder demolition charges to blast

through the palisade but found naval gunfire had done its

work.233 Breese made no such plans and found the log wall

mostly intact. Instead of passing over or through the palisade to attack frontally, the obstacle forced attackers to either flank around it near the surf or go through small gaps

created by naval artillery. 

When Porter’s call for volunteers to go ashore went out to

the fleet, sailors flocked to join the landing party. The opportunity seemed to be an ideal chance at glory for men convinced the task would be an easy one based on the previous

attempt in December. The sailors heartily raised the cheer

when Breese gave the order to charge. Undeterred by intensifying rebel fire, the naval brigade raced across 600 yards of

barren sandy beach into the teeth of Lamb’s defenses. 

As they closed on the fort, the head of the column

lurched to a halt when Lamb’s forces unleashed a blistering

volley of cannon and rifle fire. Confederate bullets drove

the head of the column away from the beach. At the same

time, the torrent of lead also broke the forward momentum

of the rear of the formation, forcing most of the brigade to

seek cover at the edge of the surf about 100 yards short of

the log palisade. Though heavily weighed down, about half

of the Marine battalion caught up to the head of the column. They took shelter near several small sand hills less

than 100 yards from the fort. Captain Dawson, mindful of

his orders to provide cover fire, directed the Marines to

open fire on the parapets. The remaining sailors followed

the admiral’s flag toward a small angle in the palisade,

which offered cover from the riflemen high above on the

fort’s ramparts. Out of breath and desperate to seek cover,

they halted along the palisade, only to end up being “packed

like sheep in a pen.” A few tried to assault around the palisade, but the detour further dispersed the already stretched

column as it snaked its way around the wooden obstacle.234

Lieutenant Commander James Parker, commanding

the naval brigade’s third line, went ashore with one of the

larger landing parties consisting of 241 men from the Minnesota. This group included Captain George Butler and 50

Marines. Parker and many of the landing party reached

the palisade along with Captain Butler and a few Marines.

The officers sensed an impending slaughter if they remained much longer packed in against the wooden barriDecember 1864–January 1865 37

Robley Dunglison Evans was born in Floyd

County, Virginia, on 18 August 1846 and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1864. He

received a commission as an acting ensign and served

on board the sidewheel steam frigate USS Powhatan

during the rest of the Civil War. “Fighting Bob,” as he

was known later in life, distinguished himself during

the second assault on Fort Fisher, where he received

several serious wounds that caused life-long trouble.

He reportedly threatened to shoot a battlefield surgeon

who attempted to remove his wounded leg. His injuries

led to a brief retirement, but he returned to active duty

in 1867. Evans’s opinion of amphibious operations

changed following Fort Fisher, and he along with other

naval officers blamed Marines for the failure.

During the late 1860s, Evans served on board the

USS Piscataqua, flagship of the Asiatic Fleet. He was

promoted to lieutenant commander, then assigned

shore duty at the Washington Navy Yard and the Naval

Academy. He returned to sea with the European

Squadron, and by the early 1890s, he commanded the

gunboat USS Yorktown in the Pacific Squadron. In

1893, Evans was promoted to captain and the next year

commanded the new battleship USS Indiana (BB 1).

Ironically, Evans, whose life was saved by a Marine,

joined other naval reformers who wanted to remove all

Marines from the battleships. Initially, he even refused

to accept the Marine

Guard on board ship

until the Secretary of

the Navy forced him

to take them. Before

retiring in the first

decade of the new

century, Evans went

on to command battleship USS Iowa (BB

4) in the Battle of Santiago, and nearly a

decade later led the

Great White Fleet on

the first leg of its historic round-the-world

cruise.232

ROBLEY DUNGLISON EVANS

Lieutenant Commander Robley D.

Evans, photographed in 1870. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

* ere is some contention over the effect of the naval brigade’s attack. Aer the

fact, naval officers tried to salvage some pride by claiming they made Terry’s assault possible by drawing Confederate attention and defenders away from the

western flank. Some authors, including Rod Gragg, accept the Navy’s version.

Others, such as University of North Carolina Wilmington historian Chris E. Fonvielle Jr., put more stock in Hagood’s men failing to respond to Lamb’s orders.
38 The Battle of Fort Fisher

cade. Parker attempted to regain the initiative while Breese

tried to rally almost 1,000 sailors taking cover on the

beach. Determined to charge through a hole in the palisade, he sounded the attack and entered the breach, followed by 60 sailors and a few Marines.

Confederate infantry waited atop the parapet on the

other side of the log wall. Under a withering hail of lead,

Parker’s charge made its way up the steep sand embankment. The small band clung to their

foothold as men took multiple hits

from point-blank rifle fire. But they

numbered too few to push back the

massed defenders. The charge crumbled, and wounded men played dead,

hoping Confederate marksmen would

target others. In addition to Captain

Butler, Parker’s after-action report singled out Corporal John Rannahan and

Privates John Shivers and Henry

Thompson as the only Marines who

charged through the palisade breach.

All three received the Medal of Honor

for their actions.235

Only five men made it near the top

of the parapet. One was Lieutenant,

later Rear Admiral, Robley D. Evans.

Shot once through the leg, Evans continued on only to be hit again, this

time taking a .58-caliber bullet

through the right knee, felling him.

The same rebel fired at him again, this

time hitting Evans in the foot, taking

off part of a toe. Bleeding profusely, he

pulled his pistol and shot the rebel in

the neck. The mortally wounded Confederate rolled down the embankment

and came to rest near Evans. Meanwhile, the remaining bluejackets

hastily retreated to seek cover on the

other side of the wall.236

Marines tried vainly to disperse

their tormentors as officers attempted

to find a way to get their men out of

the “slaughter pen.” Volley musket fire

tore into the ranks as some tried to assault around the palisade, only to be

cut off from their comrades and summarily cut down in a hail of gunfire on

the other side of the palisade. Others

tried to squeeze through damaged sections of the log wall, only to meet a

similar fate.237 Marine Private Henry

Wasmuth saw Lieutenant Evans lying

wounded near the parapet as Confederates made catcalls

daring anyone to come back through the palisade. Defiantly, Wasmuth charged through the gap, grabbed Evans,

and dragged him out of the line of fire. However, the huge

shells of the New Ironsides began crashing all around, forcing Wasmuth to again brave Confederate fire to get Evans

into the defilade of a shell crater. Evans warned Wasmuth

to take cover, but he arrogantly dismissed Confederate riNorth Carolina Department of Cultural Resources
flemen saying, “the bullet has not been made that will kill

me.” Shortly after, Evans watched helplessly as Wasmuth

bled to death from a gunshot wound to the neck.238

Confederates rained fire onto the mass of Marines and

sailors huddled less than 100 yards distant. Breese and the

other officers continued to rally the men and press them

toward making an assault on the parapet. After repeated

attempts failed, the rear of the formation gave way. A general panic ensued that carried away most of Breese’s

brigade along with many of Dawson’s Marines. Only a relatively small group of sailors and Marines remained huddled with their officers under the shelter of the palisade.239

By 1600, the Navy/Marine assault was all over. Almost

300 of the naval brigade lay dead or wounded on the sandy

beach. However, on the other flank, Breese’s “diversion”

gave Terry the break he needed to gain a foothold within

the fort. The naval assault forced Lamb to divide his forces.

As a result, he mistakenly left only about 250 rebels to face

the Union onslaught of more than 3,500 veteran infantry

concealed in the low-ground undergrowth along the Cape

Fear River. The Army tried to navigate over the swampy

terrain then race around the flank of the first traverse but

instead found a hostile reception of close-range cannon

and rifle fire.

On Terry’s left, brigades charged toward the fort as

Confederates desperately tried to detonate Lamb’s torpedo-laden killing field. However, days of naval bombardment had cut the wires that operated the electrical

detonators. In a few terrifying moments, the brigades

passed the remains of the palisade and reached the base

of the parapet. While Lamb and Whiting led the defense

of the Northeast Bastion, Major James Reilly, commanding a detachment of the 1st Regiment North Carolina Artillery, took over defense on the Confederate left. Instead

of massing his riflemen atop the parapet where they could fire down on

Federals trying to ascend the steep

slope, Reilly placed them in the planklined gun chambers. While the move

shielded his men from enemy fire, it

also prevented them from firing into

Federals massing at the rampart’s

base. This tactical error allowed

Terry’s men to ascend the steep slope

with relatively little hostile fire compared to that faced by the naval

brigade on the Northeast Bastion.

Reilly’s defenders quickly found themselves outnumbered and engaged in a

close-up fight as more and more

Union troops climbed the wall.240 

Meanwhile, Dawson tried to regroup his remaining Marines. He

began an orderly withdrawal by leading them back to the

cover of the beach. There he directed them to return fire

as he withdrew his command by squads. Lieutenant Commander Cushing, who had survived the onslaught at the

Northeast Bastion, began to rally sailors and Marines who

had retreated down the beach.241 The withdrawal of the

Marines left a few of Lieutenant Fagan’s party still in the

forward trenches near the Army brigades. When Terry’s

attack began, these seven Marines—one sergeant and six

privates—joined the attack to take the traverses along the

land face.242

On the opposite flank, Brigadier General Curtis personally led his men up the steep slope and urged them forward to engage Reilly’s defenders. Savage fighting, which

took a toll on both sides, ensued over Shepherd’s Battery

half-bastion and entrance gate on the Confederates’ extreme left. Despite vastly outnumbering the fort’s garrison, Curtis’s brigade begin to stall in the face of stiff

resistance. Terry quickly sent 20-year-old Colonel Galusha

Pennypacker, who would become the nation’s youngest

general officer following the battle, and his 2d Brigade into

the fray. Accompanied by division commander General

Adelbert Ames, the rush of fresh troops overran outnumbered Confederates along what was known as the “Bloody

Gate.” Curtis’s men steadily expanded their foothold in the

fort and held on for more reserves to exploit their success.243 

The fight at the Northeast Bastion obscured the fact

that the Army was making its own attack. Initially, Lamb

and Whiting were ignorant to the fact that Union troops

had entered the fort. As reports filtered in of a massive assault on the left, Lamb directed the Mound Battery to engage Terry’s troops. Within a quarter hour of sending

Pennypacker’s brigade, Terry launched Ames’s 3d Brigade,

December 1864–January 1865 39

History of the Confederate States Navy

During the first battle of Fort Fisher, the large flag atop Lamb’s 50-foot-high Mound Battery drew the fire of Porter’s fleet. During the second battle, Colonel Lamb turned the

battery’s guns upon both Porter’s naval brigade and attacking Union infantry. 
led by Colonel Louis Bell toward the fort. However, a Confederate sharpshooter dropped Bell with a mortal wound

before he reached the bastion. The brigade charged forward inside Fort Fisher and onto its parade ground

through the recently captured Bloody Gate. After Bell

went down, General Ames took charge of the brigade and

ordered it to assault toward the Northeast Bastion. Seeing

the rear of the fort in jeopardy, Confederate Marines and

sailors in Battery Buchanan fired into the blue-clad

columns, striking both friend and foe alike.244

The repulse of Breese’s column allowed Lamb and Whiting to shift

forces to meet the new attack on the

other flank. By 1600, 3,500 Union infantry were fighting desperately

against outnumbered but tenacious

Confederates. General Whiting led reinforcements to counterattack Union

troops who had already captured the

first three traverses and gun chambers.

Whiting’s strike force, including some

of Captain Van Benthuysen’s Marines,

met Curtis’s men atop the fourth traverse. In the melee that followed, both

North and South fought point blank in

hand-to-hand combat trying to wrest

control from each other. Whiting’s

timely arrival worked, sending Union

troops reeling back to the third traverse. Both sides took brief respites in

the gun chambers separated by the

huge traverse, gathering strength and

nerve to charge again. And once more,

men charged up opposite sides of the

traverse and, once again, Southerners

pushed the Federals back. Shortly after,

Whiting led another savage charge up

the third traverse. However, the general soon fell while trying to wrest a

flag from a Union flag bearer atop the

wall. The wounded general urged his

men on before being taken back to the

hospital bombproof below the Pulpit.245

Realizing that Bragg had no intention of relieving the fort, Lamb hurried

along the sea face to hastily scrape together another counterattack force. He

directed three guns in the Columbiad

Battery to turn their fire on the advancing Union troops. Shortly after,

Lamb returned to the land face with

about 100 volunteers. Southern artillery poured on the parade ground and stopped the

Union advance in its tracks. Along the land face, fighting

was also at a stand-off following the loss of Whiting. However, Lamb still believed he could push the Union troops

out with one more attack. He formed his men in line of

battle and prepared them to make one last desperate charge

to save the fort.246

Resumption of the naval bombardment and the sight of

Union troops entrenching across the parade ground forced

Lamb to launch his counterattack. The men formed, bay40 The Battle of Fort Fisher

North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources

e Confederate Retreat 
December 1864–January 1865 41

onets fixed, ready to follow their

leader. Just as Lamb gave the order to

move forward, a Union bullet

slammed into the young colonel. He

fell with a broken hip and was soon

whisked toward the hospital

bombproof to join Whiting. With the

loss of their leader, the rebel charge

dissipated as men sought cover. By

1630, while the two commanders lay

wounded in the rapidly filling hospital,

Lamb reluctantly called for his subordinate and turned over command of

the defense to Major Reilly.247

Tough fighting along the land face

traverses wore down attacker and defender alike. However, the sheer

weight of numbers and Terry’s request

to resume the naval bombardment

caused the outnumbered defenders to

grudgingly give ground. Despite the

ingenious concept of Lamb’s defensive

fortifications, their design at times

worked in favor of the attacker. The

imposing height of each traverse not

only created a series of successive

small forts for defenders but also an

impromptu blast wall that assaulting

Union soldiers used.248

Prior to the assault, Terry sent an

Army signal officer on board Porter’s

flagship to act as a staff liaison to coordinate shifting naval fires. Once

Terry’s regiments gained a foothold in

the fort, they were able to take advantage of the height and width of the

land face traverses to seek cover while

the Navy blasted away at the next traverse. When fire shifted, Union troops

assaulted over the top into a mass of

stunned Confederates waiting in the

next gun chamber. While Porter’s gun

crews undoubtedly had improved

their accuracy since December, some

shells still fell short. The bursting projectiles showered remnants of the

naval brigade with hot fragments as they sheltered near

the palisade. Enough shells missed their target to force

some in the brigade to prefer surrender in lieu of remaining exposed to the incessant shelling.249 

As the sun sank low in the sky, inside the fort, the tide

of battle began to turn against the defenders. Lieutenant

Evans still lay wounded in a shell crater along the beach,

but each successive wave of the rising tide lapped more

water into the crater. Fearful of drowning, he called to a

nearby Marine protected by a small dune. The Marine initially refused to aid the wounded officer because of intense

Confederate fire. Fighting Bob, however, aimed his pistol

at the Marine, who quickly changed his mind and dragged

Evans to a covered position. His encounters with Marines

North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources

e Surrender of Fort Fisher 
were not yet over. Naval gunfire once again began to

scream overhead, which to Evans’s surprise caused the

ground beneath him to move. He soon found that he lay

atop a Marine completely buried under the sand. The Marine was probably one of Lieutenant Williams’s fast-firing

Spencer sharpshooters now out of ammunition and waiting for the sun to set. With each incoming salvo, the Marine cringed, causing Evans painful twinges in his

wounded legs. Despite promises to remain still, the Marine continued to move underneath the lieutenant with

each shell. Evans, now irritated, “tapped him between the

eyes with the butt of [his] revolver.” The Marine quieted

down and remained still until darkness fell.250

By 1800, shadows covered much of the beach. Breese’s

small party began to run from the cover of the palisade in

groups of twos and threes. Suddenly, Confederate rifles

again targeted the beach, kicking up the sand behind

sailors running toward safety. Casualties mounted and

forced the remainder to wait until darkness prevented

Confederates from observing their withdrawal. Far down

the beach, the remnants of the naval brigade reformed its

shattered ranks and moved the wounded to makeshift

field hospitals. Captain Dawson assembled almost 200

Marines while Lieutenant Commanders Cushing and

Cushman rallied the sailors. Inside the fort, a third counterattack led by Major Reilly forced Federals back, but then

stalled. Division commander General Ames wanted to dig

in for the night, while General Curtis disagreed and

pleaded for more reinforcements. Their argument ended

when a jagged piece of shrapnel ripped out Curtis’s left

eye.251

The still-shocked remnants of Breese’s command reported to General Terry’s field headquarters for orders.

Their arrival helped Terry make a timely decision between

Ames’s insistence on digging in or Colonel Comstock,

who shared Curtis’s opinion that fresh reserves could take

the fort. Terry decided to send in the new troops from

Abbot’s brigade recently vacated from their fortifications

facing Sugarloaf. In the reserves’ place, Marines and sailors

filed into sandy rifle pits to face Hoke’s division, which

continued to menace the rear of Terry’s command. By

1900, Abbott’s brigade, reinforced by the 27th Regiment

of U.S. Colored Troops, prepared to launch what became

the final assault to capture the fort.252

At almost 2100, Abbott’s men began the attack on the

eighth and ninth traverses along the land face. Soon the

combination of fresh troops and firepower from Abbott’s

Spencer-wielding sharpshooters overwhelmed the last defenders at the Northeast Bastion. On board ship, Admiral

Porter ceased bombardment, fearing further casualties

from the naval guns. Reilly’s men ran low on ammunition,

and he decided to evacuate what remained of the garrison. In Battery Buchanan, Lieutenant Robert T. Chapman

sensed the end and began drinking along with his men.

Major William Saunders arrived at the battery to telegraph

authorities of the fort’s fate. At that prompting, Saunders,

Chapman, and the remaining sailors spiked the guns,

abandoned the battery, and took all the remaining

launches.253

While Major Reilly organized the withdrawal toward

Battery Buchanan, Captain Van Benthuysen gathered the

slightly wounded into litter-bearing teams to evacuate

Whiting, Lamb, and other officers wounded too badly to

walk. The remaining defenders covered their escape toward the wharf along the river. However, the tired Confederates found the battery abandoned and all the boats

taken.254 Just then a single rowboat appeared out of the

darkness with Brigadier General Alfred H. Colquitt,

whom Bragg had sent to command the defense of the fort.

Any pretensions of command evaporated with the approach of Union infantry. Colquitt refused to evacuate

Whiting, and the presumptive commander bid a hasty retreat into the night, leaving Lamb and his men to face

Terry’s pursuing brigades.255 

Isolated and without the guns and garrison of Battery

Buchanan to make a last stand, Reilly, Van Benthuysen,

and Whiting’s chief of staff went out to offer the fort’s surrender. The men waited in the moonlight as Union skirmishers approached across the barren stretch of sand.

Major Reilly offered his sword to Captain E. Lewis Moore

of the 7th Connecticut, while Lamb and Whiting waited

on their stretchers to officially surrender to General Terry.

By 2200, the battle was over. A cheer up went throughout

the fort, which reached the ears of sailors on board ships.

Marines and sailors echoed the cheer as their ships sent

up a great cascade of rockets to celebrate the victory.256

Terry’s division commander, General Ames, detached

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M. Zent of the 13th Regiment

Indiana Volunteers to post sentries on all the fort’s remaining magazines and traverse bunkers. Zent inspected

the fort and posted 31 sentries to guard the bunkers, but

in the darkness neglected to post a guard on the large

man-made mound directly behind the Northeast Bastion.

Regardless of sentries, soldiers, sailors, and some Marines

carried on the celebration late into the night inside the

fort. They rummaged through the recently abandoned

bombproofs and magazines seeking souvenirs and a place

to sleep. Men, both Union and their Confederate prisoners, crowded into the dimly lit bunkers while others

camped in and around the fort’s main magazine.257 Men

from the 169th New York Regiment stretched out on the

“luxuriant turf ” crowning the magazine, which still held

more than six tons of gunpowder.258

Squads of Marines patrolled the fort, gathered abandoned weapons, stacked the dead, and guarded prisoners

while others took the opportunity to scavenge for sou42 The Battle of Fort Fisher
venirs. Several sailors and Marines began to drink liquor

found in the Confederate hospital bunker below the Pulpit

Battery. They staggered from one traverse to the next going

through abandoned Confederate equipment, randomly

discharging firearms while lighting their way with openflame lanterns. At 0715 on 16 January, several Marines

were noticed going into the fort’s main magazine.259 Just 15

minutes later, Federal Point reverberated with a thunderous explosion that a sent a torrent of debris and bodies skyward as tons of black powder in the magazine exploded.

Among the 200 Union and Confederate soldiers killed

were three Marines. The discovery, however, of a wire leading toward the river sparked rumors that a booby-trapped

mine exploded the magazine. In the end, General Terry’s

court of inquiry placed more emphasis on drunk and careless Union troops than on Confederates.260

Officially, Union losses from all services totaled almost

1,000 while Confederate losses were almost double that figure when counting killed and captured. Dawn on 16 January revealed a hellish landscape. The wreckage of war

littered the beach, parapets, and bombproofs within the

fort. Bodies lay where they fell, already beginning to stiffen

in odd contortions. Sailors from the fleet came ashore to

survey the scene and search for their dead. When the recovery party found the bodies of Lieutenants Preston and

Porter, they noted how serene Porter looked but that Preston’s face bore the look of anguish.261

Sailors, and presumably Marines also, unaccustomed to

daily exposure to death, sat in shocked disbelief at the soldiers’ callous treatment of the dead. To their distress, they

found bodies stripped lying naked on the beach, their possessions taken not by desperate Confederate scavengers but

by morbid Union souvenir seekers. Exhausted men within

the fort slept in the traverse bunkers and awoke to find

themselves curled up next to dead men. Terry’s men, hardened by months in the front lines around Petersburg,

looked upon the ghastly sight as commonplace. Some proceeded to stack the dead into makeshift tables on which to

play cards or eat their rations. Others built their cooking

fires and walked among the human wreckage making

jokes. Ironically, Porter saw the gruesome effect of the

magazine explosion as actually vindicating both Butler’s

assertion and Porter’s support for the powder ship

scheme.262

After the Battle

Following the successful capture of Fort Fisher, Lieutenant Commander Breese and Admiral Porter both blamed

Marines for the failure of the naval assault. While it is true

that the Marine Corps efforts to reform training standards

had lagged, Captain Dawson and his Marines were capable

and trained to do the task laid out in Porter and Breese’s

plan. However, as both Commandant Zeilin laid out in 1863

and Captain Dawson described in his 1865 after-action report, naval officers unrealistically expected disparate groups

of men, whether Navy or Marine, to assemble as a cohesive

unit on short notice and complete difficult missions without

prior rehearsals or coordination while under enemy fire.

Both Admiral Porter and his fleet captain Breese were products of a Navy that placed little value or emphasis on its officers developing professional skills to employ the naval

brigade effectively. 

In the aftermath, only a handful of the 100 or so Confederate Marines escaped Fort Fisher. More than 60 became

prisoners, while the remainder fell in the savage fighting

along the land face traverses. With Fort Fisher in Union

hands, the only Confederate Marine post of significance remained at Drewry’s Bluff, Virginia, guarding the James River

approach to Richmond. However, the Confederate Marine

Corps, like the Confederacy, only had weeks to live. In early

April 1865, Grant’s Army finally forced Lee to evacuate the

rebel capital, and a few Confederate Marines from Fort

Fisher, including Lieutenant Doak, found themselves in

Richmond to take part in the final death throes of the Confederacy. 

The Marine battalion, on the other hand, although on the

winning side, made a convenient scapegoat. Not only did

many at Fort Fisher blame drunken Marines for the explosion of the magazine, but both Porter and Breese criticized

the Marine battalion for its combat performance despite

many individual acts of courage. Admiral Porter tried to

convince senior Marines that he in fact supported them,

“though the Marines did not do their duty.”263

The war soon came to a close, and Marines once again

found themselves under attack, this time from some in Congress. The Marines, with strong backing of senior naval officers, successfully fought off plans to disband the Corps and

even saw Commandant Zeilin promoted. But assigning

blame for the failure of the naval brigade only added to the

overall narrative of perceived Marine Corps failure during

the entire war.264

Contributing Factors to the Repulse of the

Naval Brigade

For most of first half of the nineteenthth century, naval

officers in general lacked training on infantry tactics and

drill despite the fact that they often led landing parties. Any

training was, according to Midshipman Hubbard T. Minor,

“sporadic and haphazard at best.”265 During the Jacksonian

period, the “Old Navy” distrusted a professional officer

corps as being too British.266 As a result, a midshipman often

first entered service as little more than a captain’s errand boy

and training came on the job. Formal instruction relied on

the officers on board ship, who often lacked enthusiasm to

teach midshipmen reading, mathematics, and gunnery,

much less on how to be a gentleman. Between 1807 and

December 1864–January 1865 43
1825, some reformers pushed for formalized training. As a

result, naval schools began to appear at the Navy yards along

the mid-Atlantic. Appointment standards, however, remained lax as the Navy did not even require basic literacy or

a general knowledge of mathematics and geography until

1831. That is not to say the system did not produce. But it

was geared toward making naval officers, not soldiers.267

Like Marine Corps officer appointments, they had little to

do with merit and everything to do with politics and influence.268

Naval Culture in Transition Examples

from the Battle

At the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York,

superintendant Sylvanus Thayer first established a military

curriculum standard based on science and engineering

rather than the standard classical education. The birth of the

steam Navy in 1839 led reform-minded officers and traditionalists alike to establish a school for Navy officer training

based on engineering. In 1842, a new school opened outside Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and operated for three

years until the Navy disbanded it. In the fall of 1845, the

Naval School—reorganized and renamed in 1850 as the

Naval Academy—opened on the grounds of old Fort Severn at Annapolis, Maryland.269

Naturally, the service academies focused in their sphere.

At West Point, Dennis Hart Mahan, author of A Treatise on

Field Fortification, instructed the men, who later led the

armies during the Civil War, on tactics and strategy.270 Reformist naval officers wrote authoritative works on oceanography and naval ordnance and later, at Annapolis, professors

modeled much of their curriculum after West Point. Those

first and subsequent classes, however, were heavily tilted toward mathematics, navigation, and gunnery rather than infantry drill. Professor Henry H. Lockwood, later a Union

brigadier at Gettysburg, first instructed the midshipmen on

infantry tactics and drill in 1848, only to be burned in effigy and disobeyed by midshipmen.271

Professor Mahan’s son, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who became a famous naval strategist in his own right, attended the

Naval Academy in the early 1850s. He thought Lockwood,

who suffered from a stutter, while well intentioned, only

prompted ridicule and a sense of light-hearted misbehavior

among the young men. Most drills involved seamanship or

naval gunnery and carried a strict sense of professionalism

for the students. Lockwood’s course on military tactics,

however, only served to further a sense of ridicule for most

things that involved “soldiering.”272 The midshipmen generally disliked Marines and regarded drill as too military and

for landlubbers. Following reforms of the early 1850s, however, all classes of midshipmen received a standardized regimen that included drill and infantry tactics. Even so, the

relative importance of infantry tactics in the curriculum

paled in comparison to learning most subjects save history

and geography, which also ranked near the bottom.273

At Fort Fisher, the Navy’s attitudes toward officer education and infantry drill not only reflected generational differences in the officers, but also impacted the outcome of

the naval brigade’s assault. Admiral Porter entered the officer corps in the Old Navy. Lieutenant Commander Breese,

on the other hand, represented a generation in transition

from the ideas of the “old salts” to those espoused by reformminded juniors. Lieutenant Benjamin H. Porter represented

efforts by the Navy to educate and create a professional officer corps. None of these officers, however, received the full

benefit of infantry training and drill so despised by Lieutenant Porter when addressing General Curtis prior to the

naval brigade’s assault. 

Admiral Porter

Admiral Porter’s career followed the traditional path of

the Old Navy, having begun in 1827 at the age of 14. His father, Commodore David Porter, first won fame commanding the USS Essex in the War of 1812. During the John

Quincy Adams administration, however, Commodore

Porter was forced to leave the Navy and traveled to Mexico

to offer his services. He volunteered to command the Mexican Navy and he, along with several relatives, accepted

commissions in the service. Commodore Porter also appointed his son a midshipman in the Mexican Navy under

the elder Porter’s cousin, Captain David H. Porter. After two

years, then 16-year-old David Dixon Porter gained an appointment as a midshipman in the U.S. Navy. During the

brief Mexican naval stint, he had learned how to handle and

fight a ship. Porter never took part in formal infantry tactics

or drill as part of any organized training program. The little

firsthand infantry experience he gained came during the

Mexican-American War. Like many other Civil War leaders, those experiences in Mexico apparently impacted his

later decisions. For him, those included support of Butler’s

powder ship and concocting the naval brigade.274

Before joining Commodore David Conner’s Home

Squadron in early 1847, David Dixon Porter remained stuck

in a New Orleans recruiting post. American forces under

General Winfield Scott marshaled and were preparing to

make a landing at Veracruz, Mexico. Porter proposed a plan

to blow up the fortress San Juan de Ulloa, which guarded

the port of Veracruz, in hopes of gaining a transfer. Having

spent time inside the fort as a young boy when his father

was commander in chief of the Mexican Navy, Porter was

well acquainted with its layout. He volunteered to lead the

attack in which the ramparts of the fort would be blasted by

100-pound casks of black powder planted beneath walls at

the water’s edge. Superiors, however, dismissed his plan as

both risky and unrealistic.275 Almost 20 years later, Porter

remained convinced of the potential of his plan and backed

44 The Battle of Fort Fisher
Butler’s powder ship idea, even going so far as to try and

usurp the entire scheme. The tragic explosion of Fort

Fisher’s magazine only reinforced Porter’s opinion about the

effectiveness of explosives against fortifications first adopted

as an aspiring lieutenant during the Mexican War. 

Porter’s insistent Mexican War correspondence landed

him the transfer he sought. He arrived off the Mexican coast

in late February 1847 assigned to the USS Spitfire. The

schooner was captained by Commander Josiah Tattnall,

who would later resign his commission to join Confederate

service. Of more importance to his Civil War operations,

Porter witnessed General Winfield Scott’s amphibious landings and the success of combined operations during the 20-

day siege at Veracruz. In April, he took part in the naval

attack and observed the contested landing and capture of

the Mexican coastal town of Tuxpan.276

In June, Porter witnessed and took part in Commodore

Matthew C. Perry’s attack and occupation of Tabasco. During the ascent up the Tobasco River (present-day Grijalva

River), Perry’s force encountered three lightly manned forts.

The small squadron disabled two of the gun emplacements

and seized the third by force. Perry landed a naval brigade

of 1,200 men with 10 six-pounder cannon to overrun the

Mexicans and allow his gunboats to pass. The naval brigade

fell behind the gunboats, which continued to press up river.

Near Tabasco, Porter gained his only meaningful firsthand

experience fighting ashore at Tamultec and Chiflon. Just

below the town lay Fort Iturbide, mounting seven guns with

a sizable garrison of several hundred. The gunboats opened

fire on the works while a small landing party went ashore. At

the head of the 70-man party, Porter led a charge up hill that

boarded and captured the fort while taking 11 casualties.277

This experience, along with personal ambition and service rivalry, evidently blinded Porter to the faults in his own

plan for the naval brigade at Fort Fisher. Despite private

worries about his bluejackets being poorly drilled on infantry tactics, he made no effort to train the men before the

assault. Without doubt, Porter’s plans and execution of the

naval bombardment and support of both Army landings evidence his expertise at naval warfare. Sadly, Fort Fisher’s

Confederate defenders exposed Porter’s faulty assumptions

about both the demoralizing effect of naval gunfire on professional infantry and his own fitness to plan and coordinate the naval brigade’s ground assault. 

Other Examples

Breese, on the other hand, gained appointment in late

1846 to the Naval School but immediately left to serve in the

Mexican–American War. Four years later, he returned to

complete about eight months of training in order to satisfy

the lieutenancy boards. After the Naval Academy’s reforms

of 1850 and 1851, Breese fell into a transitional and lessthan-ideal academic plan rather than the four-year one espoused by Professor Lockwood and others at the academy.

Under the four-year curriculum, Breese would have taken

infantry tactics in his third year. However, even then, drill

only represented 2.5 percent of the studies, and the academy did not even receive muskets until 1852.278

Upon his return to the academy, Breese was totally unprepared to lead any of Lockwood’s shore drills normally assigned to upper classmen. He and other “sea lieutenants”

who returned after years on board ship opted to lead exercises involving the light artillery pieces. Although the guns

were small by comparison, both midshipman and fleet returnees took the drills seriously as they approximated the

skills required to man the great guns on board ship. On the

other hand, Breese and his peers only served to further promote the “resultant disrespect” for both Professor Lockwood

and his drills among the underclassmen.279

Lieutenant Benjamin Porter, arrived at the academy in

1859 under the four-year plan, but the looming Civil War

forced the Union to call Porter and most of his class to active service in May 1861. Undoubtedly, he benefitted from

the 1851 academic and disciplinary reforms, but as a member of the second class, he received only the rudiments of

tactical training. He still displayed the same dismissive attitude toward infantry drill and tactics that his predecessors

did when Professor Lockwood first introduced the subject

in 1848.280

Captain Dawson also suffered from prewar attitudes toward professionalism in the officer ranks. At the outbreak of

the war, there were no Marine Corps officers who graduated from either West Point or the Naval Academy despite

Commandant Archibald Henderson’s attempts at Marine officer appointment reforms. For officers at a barracks or in

the fleet, little reason existed to change because of the generally limited role for Marines at sea and ashore. Henderson’s attempted reforms proved to be too late to be

implemented before the war.281

Additionally, the cadre of Marine Corps officers was

aged. Mexican War veterans made up the few field grade officers who put more interest in trifling court-martials

against one another than reforms. Even company grade officers averaged more than 25 years of service. A Marine

Corps officer stood an equal chance of retiring or dying in

office. Unlike Dawson, officers generally came from eastern

states and had influential families with ties to politics or the

naval services. The secession crisis hit the Marine Corps

hard and it lost 20 officers—almost one-third of its ranks.

Marine Corps professionalism suffered as a result of antebellum political appointments and the uneven quality of the

remaining officers, which created a leadership vacuum.

Many of the Corps’ promising younger officers went South,

while the old field grades remained largely focused on administration rather than field duty.282

The dearth of leaders prompted Congress and the Navy

December 1864–January 1865 45
46 The Battle of Fort Fisher

to respond by authorizing 38 new lieutenants. However, the

appointments remained very political, with many going to

the sons of high-ranking Army and Navy officers. Even so,

naval officers recognized that the Marines were uniquely

trained to conduct operations suited to the infantry. Unfortunately for the naval brigade at Fort Fisher, the Marines

who were most qualified to lead, plan, and coordinate the attack ashore were relegated to a supporting role due to institutional tradition and common doctrinal views held by

naval and Marine officers alike.283

A Marine Corps Stuck in the Past

After four long years of war, the Navy held the victory at

Fort Fisher as equivalent to Appomattox for the Army.284

The old cliché that history is written by the victors also applied to policy after the war. Soon after the guns fell silent,

much of the 600-ship Navy that had been amassed to defeat the Confederate nation demobilized, while many of

the remaining vessels rusted and rotted away in naval

yards. At the same time, large seagoing warships reverted

back to the Navy’s prewar role of protecting shipping routes

and serving abroad for extended patrols. The scarcity of

ships compared to the glut of naval officers to serve them

caused a power struggle between older naval officers and

those of the new generation. Men of the Old Navy, represented by Porter, won the battle. Marines, such as Zeilin,

who shared the same traditional views, ensured Marine

Corps survival in its traditional role reminiscent of the War

of 1812.285

The debacle at the First Battle of Bull Run served only to

reinforce prewar attitudes that consolidated around traditional roles supporting the Navy. As a result, the Marine

Corps remained resistant to change.286 Marine Commandants, including Henderson, Harris, and Zeilin, narrowly

focused on survival of the Corps against the efforts of Congress and Secretary Fox to disband it. They failed to grasp

larger concepts for Marine employment as a standing amphibious brigade, which required a large expansion.287

While bad luck and timing also played a part, Major General George B. McClellan’s ascension to General-In-Chief

in late 1861 put the Army in position to embrace what

could have been a Marine Corps role. 

McClellan took lessons from observing the Crimean

War and being a railroad executive and put them into action as part of a grand strategy. After the Union defeat at

the First Battle of Bull Run, rebel forces dug in and blockaded the upper Potomac River in northern Virginia. McClellan reorganized and retrained the Army, but

Confederates in northern Virginia remained close enough

to threaten the nation’s capital. In response, McClellan devised a campaign strategy to shift the fortunes of war back

toward the Union. His plan involved amphibious landings

to turn Confederates out of their prepared defenses to

avoid bloody frontal assaults while making his own attack

on the Confederate capital in nearby Richmond, Virginia.288

With the Marine Corps focused inward and given its

comparatively small size, the Army began to develop its own

“Marine” units, partially to execute McClellan’s plan. The

first of these was the 1st Regiment New York Marine Artillery, a volunteer unit raised by Colonel William A.

Howard. He recruited and organized the regiment in New

York City for service on gunboats, with an eye toward mimicking Royal Marine artillery. The unit was short lived; it

took part in Burnside’s 1862 amphibious campaign before

being disbanded in 1863.289

Another notable “Marine” unit organized by the Army

was Graham’s Naval Brigade, also a brainchild of Colonel

Howard. Command went to former midshipman Charles

K. Graham who joined the Army and rose to rank of

brigadier of volunteers. The unit served primarily in Butler’s Department of Virginia. The commander of the South

Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Rear Admiral John A.

Dahlgren, on the other hand, collaborated with Major

General John G. Foster to create Hatch’s Coastal Division

to make amphibious raids along coastal Georgia and

South Carolina. Dahlgren in fact dedicated a naval brigade

of 500 Marines and sailors led by Commander George H.

Preble to the effort.290

Along the Mississippi River, the chronic shortage of

Marines and continued partisan attacks on shipping led

the Army to create the Mississippi Marine Brigade at the

behest of Admiral David Dixon Porter. They saw duty patrolling Western waters on board armed transports, which

interdicted Confederate cavalry and guerrillas operating

along the river. The unit, however, fell under a cloud of

suspicion because of naval prize regulations. Porter and

other officers were implicated in illegal cotton trading.

Eventually, the unit’s checkered record and spurious dealings led to its disbandment after the Red River Campaign.291

Doctrinal Blinders

Regardless of the units involved, the Union war effort

along the Southern coast and vast inland waterways created an opportunity that few leaders within the Marine

Corps seemed to grasp at the time. At Fort Fisher, Marines

performed admirably as individuals, but conducting battalion-sized operations on short notice proved once again

to be a disaster. Certainly, a lack of vision and institutional

inertia along with a dose of bad luck hampered Marine

success throughout the war.292 But the Navy’s belated efforts to develop a professional officer corps did little to

correct the deficiencies in planning, coordinating, and executing operations ashore like the naval brigade’s attack at

Fort Fisher. Though Porter’s naval brigade suffered a tac-
tical defeat, the operation overall marked a significant improvement over the first attempt to seize the fort. 

Unlike today, amphibious operations in the Civil War

lacked a single overarching doctrine to clearly delineate roles

during each phase. Success or failure potentially devolved

down to personalities of the commanders and their willingness to cooperate as evidenced by the schemes and suspicions exhibited by both Butler and Porter during the first

attack. The second attack demonstrated the effectiveness of

amphibious warfare when both parties were of one mind to

cooperate toward a single purpose.293 Interestingly, as much

as Terry and Porter cooperated and coordinated their efforts

to ensure success of the overall plan, internally, Porter’s naval

brigade still suffered from many of the problems that

plagued the first attack. 

As envisioned by Porter, the naval brigade operated external to Terry’s force and coordination existed only in broad

terms. However, circumstances intervened and after its

bloody repulse, the naval brigade reported to General Terry.

Terry picketed the sailors and Marines along his northern

line of entrenchments to watch for attacks by Hoke’s division on Sugar Loaf. This decision released hundreds of fresh

soldiers to exploit gains within the fort. But Terry’s action

was a tactical contingency, which Porter never mentioned

or apparently even contemplated in his landing orders to

Breese. 

Ideally, the brigade would have operated ashore under

the direct orders of the Army much like Preble’s naval

brigade formed by South Atlantic Blockading Squadron

commander Rear Admiral Dahlgren.* Only a month before

Fort Fisher, Commander Preble’s command went into action as part of a combined force against the railroads near

Savannah, Georgia. Prior to landing his brigade, Dahlgren

drafted written orders directing Preble to not only cooperate, but also report to the senior Army officer ashore for

both tactical employment and some logistical support.294 In

addition to a firm delineation of roles ashore, Dahlgren ensured Preble’s command was both properly drilled and organized to operate effectively as part of a combined force.295

At Fort Fisher, Porter’s brigade struggled to cooperate and

synchronize its actions ashore with those of Terry’s command. It had little in the way of direct contact save runners,

like Lieutenant Benjamin Porter, who dismissed sound tactical advice.

The second attack on the fort has been held up as a model

of Army-Navy cooperation from landing troops, to battlefield communication and supporting fires.296 Much of that

credit lay with General Terry for having both staffs plan in

detail. He ensured good communications to support the attack with naval gunfire by sending signal corps officers on

board Porter’s flagship to relay signals from the beach. Internally, Porter’s brigade had no such luxury in the way of

detailed staff planning, communication, or coordination of

supporting fires. The same lack of planning and communication that bred mistrust and the eventual failure of Butler’s

attack doomed the assault by Marines and sailors of the fleet

against the Northeast Bastion. 

Today, the tides and time have eroded away much of

Fort Fisher. Along the land face, only the first few traverses rise above the surrounding marshy terrain. Visitors

can still view the remains of Battery Buchannan and several of the land face traverses; however, the greater part of

the fort, including the Northeast Bastion, no longer exists.

Perhaps fittingly, the scene of the valiant but ill-conceived

attack by soldiers of the sea has long since been reclaimed

by the Atlantic Ocean. 

December 1864–January 1865 47

* Dahlgren is best known for his contributions to naval gunnery and ordnance

development. In 1861, he also co-wrote a textbook for the Naval Academy—Instruction for Naval Light Artillery: Afloat and Ashore. It focused on drill and employment of the naval howitzers that he helped develop. Preble’s naval brigade

was apparently organized and drilled along the lines of this manual, which may

help explain its relatively smooth integration with the Army. 

December 1864–January 1865 49

1 “Report of Rear-Admiral Porter,” 17 January 1865, in Official

Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the

Rebellion, Series I, vol. 11 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 440 (hereafter cited as ORN); William Lamb,

“Defence of Fort Fisher, North Carolina,” Papers of the Military

Historical Society of Massachusetts, Operations on the Atlantic

Coast 1861–1865, Virginia 1862, 1864 Vicksburg, vol. IX (Boston:

Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, 1912), 350 (hereafter cited as Lamb, “Defence”).

2 Bruce Catton, Grant Takes Command (New York: Little, Brown

& Co., 1969), 386 (hereafter cited as Catton, Grant). 3 Frank E. Vandiver, Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and

Confederate Ordnance (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952),

57, 59, 62, 100–101, 159, 197–98 (hereafter cited as Vandiver,

Ploughshares). 4 Robert M. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the

North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War

(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 146–47

5 Vandiver, Ploughshares, 103–4. 6 Ibid., 84, 100–101. 

7 Arthur W. Bergeron Jr. Confederate Mobile (Jackson: University

of Mississippi Press, 1991), 15.

8 Thomas E. Taylor, Running the Blockade, 2d ed. (London: John

Murray, 1896), 25, 69, 85 (hereafter cited as Taylor, Running the

Blockade). 9 Vandiver, Ploughshares, 100–104. 10 Charles M. Robinson III, Hurricane of Fire: The Union Assault

on Fort Fisher (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 30–

31 (hereafter cited as Robinson, Hurricane). 11 Taylor, Running the Blockade, 44–46, 64–65. 12 Robinson, Hurricane, 27, 30. 13 Ibid., 30–31.

14 Theta Delta Chi, “William Lamb,” The Shield, 27, no. 3 (September 1901), 243 (hereafter cited as Theta Delta Chi, “William

Lamb”). 

15 Ibid., 245–46; “William Aspinall to Gideon Welles,” 24 April

1861, ORN, Series I, 4:327–28; “Report of Captain Eagle,” 19

May 1861, ORN, Series I, 4:644–45; “Report of Commandant

Naval Yard,” 30 May 1861, ORN, Series I, 4:645–46; “Colquitt to

Gwynn,” 19 May 1861, ORN, Series I, 4:648. 16 “Report of Captain Eagle,” 19 May 1861, ORN, Series I, 4:644–

45; “Report of Commandant Naval Yard,” 30 May 1861, ORN,

Series I, 4:645–46, “Gwynn to Lee,” 20 May 1861, ORN, Series I,

4:647; “Colquitt to Gwynn,” 19 May 1861, ORN, Series I, 4:648;

Theta Delta Chi, “William Lamb,” 245–46.

17 Theta Delta Chi, “William Lamb,” 245–46.

18 Robinson, Hurricane, 31. 19 Chris E. Fonvielle Jr., Fort Anderson: Battle for Wilmington

(Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing Co., 1999), 1, 4. 

20 Robinson, Hurricane, 31. 21 Lamb, “Defence,” 349–50. 

22 Robinson, Hurricane, 33. 23 Lamb, “Defence,” 350.

24 Vandiver, Ploughshares, 101, 103–4; Edward G. Longacre,

Army of Amateurs: General Benjamin F. Butler and the Army of

the James, 1863–1865 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books,

1997), 232 (hereafter cited as Longacre, Amateurs). 25 “The Pirate Tallahassee,” New York Times, 16 August 1864, accessed 2 November 2010, http://www.nytimes .com/1864/08/16

/news/pirate-tallahassee-further-depredations-our-commercesteamer-susquehanna-track.html?scp=2&sq=the%20pirate%20tallahassee&st=cse; and “Depredations of the Olustee,”

New York Times, 5 November 1864, accessed 2 November 2010,

http://www.nytimes .com/1864/11/05/news/depredations-olustee-three-vessels-burned-off-coast-arrival-crews-this-port

.html?scp=1&sq=Depredations%20of%20the%20Olustee

&st=cse; “Letter from Prominent Officials of New York Insurance Companies to Secretary of the Navy,” 29 May 1863, ORN,

Series I, 2:233.

26 Vandiver, Ploughshares, 103–4; Longacre, Amateurs, 232. 27 Longacre, Amateurs, 236–37. 28 Chester G. Hearn, When the Devil Came Down to Dixie: Ben

Butler in New Orleans (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University

Press, 1997), 20–25 (hereafter cited as Hearn, Devil). 29 Ibid., 32, 38, 148, 159.

30 Adam Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, From April,

1861, to April, 1865, vol. 2 (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), 246,

quoted in Catton, Grant, 256.

31 Robinson, Hurricane, 33; Lamb, “Defence,” 358. 32 Lamb, “Defence,” 351.

33 Chris E. Fonvielle Jr., The Wilmington Campaign: Last Rays of

Departing Hope (Mechanicsville, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001),

43–44 (hereafter cited as Fonvielle, Wilmington). 34 Robinson, Hurricane, 30–31. 35 Ibid., Hurricane, 30, 35. 36 Judith L. Hallock, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat, vol.

2. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991), 220–23.

37 Lamb, “Defence,” 357–58.

38 Longacre, Amateurs, 236. 39 Ibid., 236–37.

40 Ibid., 236–38.

41 Catton, Grant, 332–33. 42 Lamb, “Defence,” 352.

43 Robinson, Hurricane, 35. 44 Lamb, “Defence,” 351–53.

45 Ibid.; Robinson, Hurricane, 65–66. 46 Longacre, Amateurs, 237. 47 David Dixon Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War

(New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1885), 268 (hereafter cited as

Porter, Anecdotes). 48 “Report of Bvt Major Peter S. Michie,” in The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and

Confederate Armies, Series I, vol. 42, pt. 1 (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, 1893), 657–58 (hereafter cited as

ORA); Benjamin F. Butler, Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major General Benjamin F. Butler: Butler’s Book

(Boston: A. M. Thayer & Co., 1892), 721, 749–50, 775 (hereafter

cited as Butler, Autobiography); “Dutch Gap Canal,” Harpers

NOTES
50 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Weekly, 21 January 1865, accessed 25 May 2011,

http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/h/harpersweekly/harpersweeklyidx?coll=harpersweekly;type=HTML;rgn=DIV1;id=;byte=4980

68.

49 Robinson, Hurricane, 104. 50 Butler, Autobiography, 775. 51 Porter, Anecdotes, 269. 52 Longacre, Amateurs, 245. 53 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant (New York:

C. L. Webster & Co., 1885), 390. 

54 Shelby Foote, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 230. 55 Porter, Anecdotes, 262; Longacre, Amateurs, 236, 247. 56 Catton, Grant, 401–2. 57 Longacre, Amateurs, 248–50. 58 Chester G. Hearn, Admiral David Dixon Porter: The Civil War

Years (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 68, 72 (hereafter cited as Hearn, Porter); Alan R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The

History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: The Free

Press, 1991), 96 (hereafter cited as Millet, Semper Fidelis). 59 Hearn, Porter, 70–71. 60 Robley D. Evans, A Sailor’s Log: Recollections of Forty Years of

Naval Life (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1901), 36 (hereafter

cited as Evans, A Sailors Log). 61 Ibid., 40; Charles Todorich, The Spirited Years: A History of the

Antebellum Naval Academy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute

Press, 1984), 192–93 (hereafter cited as Todorich, Spirited). 62 Evans, A Sailor’s Log, 40–41. 63 Hearn, Devil, 42. 64 Hearn, Porter, 74, 78, 116–17; Porter, Anecdotes, 262. 65 Charles D. Gibson and E. Kay Gibson, Assault and Logistics:

Union Army Coastal and River Operations, 1861–1866 (Camden,

ME: Ensign Press, 1995), 364–65 (hereafter cited as Gibson, Assault and Logistics). 66 Longacre, Amateurs, 246. 67 Porter, Anecdotes, 270-271; Butler, Autobiography, 780; Lt J.

Gillespie Cochrane, “Fort Fisher Notebook,” Henry Clay

Cochrane Papers, box 27, series 5 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps

Research Center), 4 (hereafter cited as Cochrane, “Fort Fisher

Notebook”).

68 Longacre, Amateurs, 246–47; Porter, Anecdotes, 263, 267 69 “Grant to Butler,” 4 Dec 1864, ORA, Series I, vol. 42, pt. 1, 971.

70 Robinson, Hurricane, 110. 71 “Grant to Butler,” 4 Dec 1864, ORA, Series I, vol. 42, pt. 1, 972–

73.

72 Butler, Autobiography, 785–86; Longacre, Amateurs, 247–48. 73 Longacre, Amateurs, 249. 74 Cramp Shipbuilding Company, Cramp’s Shipyard Founded by

William Cramp, 1830 (Philadelphia: The William Cramp & Sons

Ship and Engine Building Company, 1902), 27–29; and William

H. Roberts, USS New Ironsides in the Civil War (Annapolis, MD:

Naval Institute Press, 1999), xi, 2–16 (hereafter cited as Roberts,

USS New Ironsides). 75 Roberts, USS New Ironsides, 2. 76 United States Marine Corps, “Muster Roll of the USS Ironsides,

Jan 1865,” Muster Rolls of the US Marine Corps, 1798–1892, Jan

1865–Feb 1865, Microfilm roll T1118 (Quantico, VA: USMC

History Division).

77 M. Almy Aldrich and Richard S. Collum, History of the United

States Marine Corps (Boston: H. L. Shepard & Co., 1875), 20;

Roberts, USS New Ironsides, 1–2. 78 Longacre, Amateurs, 250. 79 Butler, Autobiography, 788; Lamb, “Defence,” 358–59. 80 “Report of Rear Admiral Porter,” 31 December 1864, ORN,

Series I, 11:266; Longacre, Amateurs, 250–51; Butler, Autobiography, 788. 81 Cochrane, “Fort Fisher Notebook,” 10; Longacre, Amateurs,

250.

82 Lamb, “Defence,” 358–59.

83 “Whiting to Butler,” 22 February 1865, ORA, Series I, vol. 42,

pt. 1, 978–80.

84 Weekly Messenger, 22 June 1893 (Wilmington, NC) quoted in

“The Battles of Fort Fisher,” The Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. 21, Robert Alonzo Brock, ed. (Richmond, VA: The

Southern Historical Society, 1893), 266.

85 “Whiting to Butler,” 22 February 1865, ORA, Series I, vol. 42,

pt. 1, 978–80.

86 Ibid.; Robinson, Hurricane, 117. 87 Robinson, Hurricane, 116–17; David M. Sullivan, The United

States Marine Corps in the Civil War: The Final Year, (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2000), 117–18 (hereafter cited as

Sullivan, The Final Year). 88 Lamb, “Defence,” 359.

89 Robinson, Hurricane, 118. 90 William Barker Cushing and Alden R. Carter, The Sea Eagle:

The Civil War Memoir of Lt. Cdr. William B. Cushing (Lanham,

MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 61 (hereafter cited

as Cushing, Sea Eagle); Robinson Hurricane, 118–19. 91 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 121. 92 Robinson, Hurricane, 111–12. 93 Robinson, Hurricane, 118. 94 Thomas E.Taylor, Running the Blockade, 2d ed. (London: John

Murray, 1896), 53 (hereafter cited as Taylor, Blockade). 95 Robinson, Hurricane, 66. 96 Taylor, Blockade, 54. 97 Philip Katcher and Tony Bryan, American Civil War Artillery

2, 1861–65 Heavy Artillery (Oxford, UK: Osprey Military, 2001),

23 (hereafter cited as Katcher, Artillery); Robert C. Black, “The

Railroads of Georgia in the Confederate War Effort,” The Journal of Southern History 13, no. 4 (November 1947):511–34, “8

inch (150-pounder) Armstrong Gun,” accessed 21 April 2011,

http://www.hmdb .org/Marker.asp ?Marker=22310. 

98 Robinson, Hurricane, 119; Lamb, “Defence,” 360. 99 Robinson, Hurricane, 119–20. 100 Lamb, “Defence,” 361. 101 Porter, Anecdotes, 272. 102 “Special Orders No. 2 of Rear-Admiral Porter,” 19 December

1864, ORN, Series I, 11:247; “Special Orders No. 3 of Rear-Admiral Porter,” 19 December 1864, ORN, Series I, 11:248. 

103 Sullivan, The Final Year, 10. 104 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 92–93. 105 “Fox to Parker,” 11 May 1864, ORN, Series I, 5:420; Sullivan,

The Final Year, 5–10. 106 Sullivan, The Final Year, 6. 107 Sullivan, The Final Year, 118. 108 Robinson, Hurricane, 121–23.
109 Cochrane, “Fort Fisher Notebook.” 110 Lamb, “Defence,” 362–64. 111 Lamb, “Defence,” 363–64. 112 Robinson, Hurricane, 125, 128; Thomas J. Scharf, History of

the Confederate States Navy from its Organization to the Surrender of its Last Vessel (New York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887), 424

(hereafter cited as Scharf, Confederate States Navy). 113 Todorich, Spirited, 10. 114 Scharf, Confederate States Navy, 424. 115 Sullivan, The Final Year, 119. 116 Lamb, “Defence,” 363–64, 366. 117 Sullivan, The Final Year, 114; Millet, Semper Fidelis, 92–100. 118 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 92–100. 119 Sullivan, The Final Year, 114; Miles M. Oviatt and Mary P.

Livingston, A Civil War Marine at Sea: The Diary of Medal of

Honor Recipient Miles M. Oviatt (Shippensburg, PA: White

Mane Publishing Co., 1998), xvi, 135 (hereafter cited as Oviatt,

Civil War Marine). 120 U.S. Congress, House, “Report No. 22: Marine Corps,” The

Reports of the Committees of the House of Representatives, Made

During the Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1866–67, vol.

3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1867), 1.

121 “Report of Commander Rodgers, USS Galena,” 26 May 1862,

ORN, Series I, 7:367–68.

122 Katcher, Artillery, 13–14. 123 “Commodore J. S. Missroon, Chief of Rifled Ordnance Board

to House of Representatives,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I,

11:359–60. 

124 Cochrane, “Fort Fisher Notebook,” 4. 125 Oviatt, Civil War Marine, 128–29. 126 Lamb, “Defence,” 363. 127 Oviatt, Civil War Marine, 129. 128 Lamb, “Defence,” 363–64. 129 Ibid., 363–64, 368. 130 Butler, Autobiography, 791. 131 Hearn, Porter, 281–82. 132 Cochrane, “Fort Fisher Notebook,” 5. 133 Hearn, Porter, 283. 134 Ibid., 285–86. 135 Rod Gragg, Confederate Goliath: The Battle of Fort Fisher

(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 82 (hereafter cited as Gragg, Goliath). 136 Hearn, Porter, 286. 137 Cushing, Sea Eagle, 61. 138 Lamb, “Defence,” 363–64. 139 Ibid., 352–53, 364; Scharf, Confederate States Navy, 415, 422. 140 Lamb, “Defence,” 353, 365. 141 Robinson, Hurricane, 116. 142 Lamb, “Defence,” 353. 143 Ibid., 365–66. 144 Hearn, Porter, 286–87. 145 Longacre, Amateurs, 255. 146 Scharf, Confederate States Navy, 421. 147 Lamb, “Defence,” 367–68. 148 Robinson, Hurricane, 134. 149 Hearn, Porter, 286–88. 150 “Grant to Stanton,” 7 January 1865, ORA, Series I, vol. 42, pt.

2, 966.

151 “Whiting to Butler,” 22 February 1865, ORA, Series I, vol. 42,

pt. 1, 979–80.

152 “Admiral Porter After Action Report,” 29 December 1864,

ORN, Series I, 11:264. 153 Lamb, “Defence,” 369. 154 “Admiral Porter After Action Report,” 29 December 1864,

ORN, Series I, 11:264; “Butler After Action Report,” 27 December 1864, ORA, Series I, vol. 42, pt. 1, 965.

155 “General Curtis After Action Report,” 28 December 1864,

ORA, Series I, vol. 42, pt. 1, 983.

156 Lamb, “Defence,” 364, 370. 157 Beyer, Walter F., and Oscar F. Keydel. Deeds of Valor: How

America’s Heroes Won the Medal of Honor, vol. 1 (Detroit: Perrien-Keydel Co., 1901), 470–71.

158 “Comstock to Rawlins,” 17 January 1865, ORA, Series I, vol.

42, pt. 1, 976–77. 

159 “Report of General Butler,” 3 January 1865, ORA, Series I, vol.

42, pt. 1, 986; “Report of General Weitzel,” 31 December 1864,

ORA, Series I, vol. 42, pt. 1, 986.

160 Lamb, “Defence,” 368. 161 “Porter to Welles,” 7 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:287;

Lamb, “Defence,” 353. 162 “Grant endorsement of Butler’s report,” 2 February 1865,

ORA, Series I, vol. 42, pt. 1, 977.

163 Longacre, Amateurs, 256–57. 164 “Welles to Grant,” 29 December 1864, ORA, Series I, vol. 42,

pt. 3, 1091.

165 “Grant After Action Report,” 22 July 1865, ORA, Series I, vol.

46, pt. 1, 43; Gragg, Goliath, 106–7; Fonvielle, Wilmington , 619. 166 “Grant After Action Report,” 22 July 1865, ORA, Series I, vol.

46, pt. 1, 43; Gragg, Goliath, 106–7. 167 Longacre, Amateurs, 260–62. 168 “Porter After Action Report,” 27 December 1864, ORN, Series I, 11:262. 

169 “Porter to Welles,” 29 December 1864, ORN, Series I, 11:264. 170 James R. Soley, Admiral Porter (New York: D. Appleton & Co.,

1903), 70–73.

171 “General Orders 81,” 4 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:427. 172 “General Orders No. 70,” 10 December 1864, ORN, Series I,

11:244–47; and “General Orders No. 78,” 2 January 1865, ORN,

Series I, 11:425–28; Oviatt, Civil War Marine, 128. 173 “Report of Admiral Porter,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I,

11:436–38.

174 “Lamb to Hill,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:505; Lamb,

“Defence,” 370. 

175 Lamb, “Defence,” 370–71. 176 “General Orders No. 70,” 10 December 1864”, ORN, Series I,

11:244–47; and “General Orders No. 78,” 2 January 1865, ORN,

Series I, 11:425–28. 

177 “Commodore J. S. Missroon, Chief of Rifled Ordnance Board

to House of Representatives,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I,

11:359–60; and “General Orders No. 78,” 2 January 1865, ORN,

Series I, 11:426.

178 Oviatt, Civil War Marine, 129, 132. 179 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 219–20; “Report of Major General Alfred Terry,” 25 January 1865 ORA, Series I, vol. 46, pt. 1, 396. 180 Judith L. Hallock, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat, vol.

II (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991), 231.

December 1864–January 1865 51
52 The Battle of Fort Fisher

181 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 223. 182 “Grant to Butler,” 6 December 1864, ORA, Series I, vol. 42,

pt. 1, 971–72.

183 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 224. 184 Ibid., 232–35. 185 Ibid., 227. 186 United States Marine Corps, Reference Information Pamphlet

U.S. Marine Corps Medal Of Honor Recipients (Washington, DC:

United States Marine Corps, 1974), 1.

187 “Report of Rear-Admiral Porter,” 27 December 1864, ORN,

Series I, 11:262; and William Lamb, “The Battles of Fort Fisher,

NC,” Camp Fires of the Confederacy, Ben Labree, ed. (Louisville,

KY: Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 1898), 428; and “Special

Order No. 8,” 3 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:427. 

188 “Special Order No. 8,” 3 January 1865, ORN, Series1, 11:427;

and Lamb, “Defence,” 364. 

189 “General Orders No. 78,” 2 January 1865, ORN, Series I,

11:426.

190 “Report of Rear-Admiral Porter,” 17 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:439; and Lamb, “Defence,” 351, 362, 373. 

191 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 230–31. 192 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 231; “Report of Major General Alfred

Terry,” 26 January 1865, ORA, Series I, vol. 46, pt. 1, 397; “Report

of Admiral Porter,” 17 January 1865, ORN, Series II, 11:439.

193 Thomas O. Selfridge, “The Navy at Fort Fisher,” Battles and

Leaders of the Civil War: Being for the Most Part Contributions by

Union and Confederate Officers, vol. 4, Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds. (New York: Century Co.,

1888), 660 (hereafter cited as Selfridge, “Navy at Fort Fisher”).

194 “Landing Orders,” 15 January 1865, ORN, Series1, 11:429–

30.

195 William Lamb, “The Defense of Fort Fisher,” Battles and

Leaders of the Civil War: Being for the Most Part Contributions by

Union and Confederate Officers, vol. 4, Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds. (New York: Century Co.,

1888), 647.

196 George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey: Admiral of

the Navy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), 135. 197 Selfridge, “Navy at Fort Fisher,” 659. 198 George Washington, “General Orders,” 7 August 1782, The

Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript

Sources, 1745–1799, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., Library of Congress, accessed 26 October 2010, http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r ?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw240544)).

199 David Stephen Heidler, Jeanne T. Heidler, and David J. Coles.

Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and

Military History (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2000), 1302

(hereafter cited as Heidler, Encyclopedia). 200 Sullivan, The Final Year, 179; Heidler, Encyclopedia, 1302. 201 Daniel Ammen, The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast

(New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 232. 

202 Ibid., 233. 203 Selfridge, “Navy at Fort Fisher,” 659; “Report of LCDR

Breese,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:446, 448.

204 James Henry Gardner, “The Lost Captain—J. L. Dawson of

Old Fort Gibson,” Chronicles of Oklahoma, vol. 21, no. 3 (September 1943), 225; Lewis R. Hamersly, The Records of Living Officers of the U.S. Navy & Marine Corps: Compiled from Official

Sources (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1878), 382. 205 “Report of LCDR Breese,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I,

11:446; “Report of Captain Dawson,” 15 February 1865, ORN,

Series I, 11:576; Sullivan, The Final Year, 141. 206 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 96, 98. 207 “Zeilin to Harris,” 13 August 1863, ORN, Series I, 14:439–40. 208 “Report of LCDR Breese,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I,

11:446; “Report of Captain Dawson,” 15 February 1865, ORN,

Series I, 11:576.

209 “Report of Rear-Admiral Porter,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:439; “Report of LCDR Breese,” 16 January 1865, ORN,

Series I, 11:446; “Report of Captain Dawson,” 15 February 1865,

ORN, Series I, 1:576. 210 “Report of Captain Dawson,” 15 February 1865, ORN, Series

I, 11:576.

211 Ibid.; Fonvielle, Wilmington, 240. 212 Sullivan, The Final Year, 135; and N. Martin Curtis, “The

Capture of Fort Fisher,” Civil War Papers Read Before the Commandery of the State of Massachusetts, Military Order of the

Loyal Legion of the United States, 2 vols. (Boston, 1900): 311–12. 

213 Ibid., 138. 214 Ibid., 310–11. 215 Ibid., 314–15. 216 Ibid, 316; and United States, Naval History Division, “ The

Journal of Private Charles Brother, USMC,” Civil War Naval

Chronology, 1861-1865 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971): VI–57.

217 Ibid., 316, 321–22. 218 Sullivan, The Final Year, 138. 219 Walter F. Beyer and Oscar F. Keydel, Deeds of Valor: How

America’s Heroes Won the Medal of Honor, vol. 2 (Detroit: Perrien-Keydel Co., 1901), 84–85. 220 Sullivan, The Final Year, 139. 221 Lamb, “Defence,” 373. 222 Sullivan, The Final Year, 141. 223 Ralph W. Donnelly, The Confederate States Marine Corps: The

Rebel Leathernecks (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing

Co., 1989), 118–19; “Report of Commodore Radford,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:461.

224 Ralph W. Donnelly, Biographical Sketches of the Commissioned

Officers of the Confederate States Marine Corps (Alexandria, VA:

Ralph W. Donnelly, 1973), 9–10. 225 Sullivan, The Final Year, 141. 226 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 241; “Report of Acting Ensign

Williams,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:474; “Report of

Captain Dawson,” 15 February 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:578.

227 Sullivan, The Final Year, 116; David M. Sullivan, The United

States Marine Corps in the Civil War: The Second Year, (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co., 1997), 322 (hereafter

cited as Sullivan, The Second Year). 228 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 261; “Report of Maj General Alfred

Terry,” 25 January 1865, ORA, Series I, vol. 46, pt. 1, 398; “Report

of Lieutenant Commander Parker,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:495–98; “Report of Captain Dawson,” 15 February

1865, ORN, Series I, 11:576, 578.

229 Selfridge, “Navy at Fort Fisher,” 659; Sullivan, The Final Year,

135; “Report of Acting Ensign Williams,” 16 January 1865, ORN,

Series I, 11:474; “Report of Captain Dawson,” 15 February 1865,

ORN, Series I, 11:577.
230 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 242; and N. Martin Curtis, “The Capture of Fort Fisher,” Civil War Papers Read Before the Commandery of the State of Massachusetts, Military Order of the

Loyal Legion of the United States, 2 vols. (Boston, 1900): 310–11. 

231 Selfridge, “Navy at Fort Fisher,” 659–60. 232 “Report of Maj General Alfred Terry,” 25 January 1865, ORA,

Series I, vol. 46, pt. 1, 398.

233 Robert Debs Heinl Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States

Marine Corps, 1775–1962, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co., 1991), 103; United States Naval Historical

Center, “Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans (1846–1912)” (Washington, DC: Naval History and Heritage Command), accessed

25 April 2011, http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-e/rd-evans.htm.

234 Selfridge, “The Navy at Fort Fisher,” 659–60; Sullivan, The

Final Year, 150.

235 “Report of LCDR James Parker,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:495–97; Sullivan, The Final Year, 152. 236 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 254–55; and Evans, A Sailors Log , 91. 237 “Report of LCDR Breese,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I,

11:446; Selfridge, “Navy at Fort Fisher,” 660.

238 Sullivan, The Final Year, 155; and Evans, A Sailors Log, 92. 239 “Report of LCDR Breese,” 16 January 1865, ORN, Series I,

11:446; Selfridge, “Navy at Fort Fisher,” 660.

240 Lamb, “Defence,” 375; Fonvielle, Wilmington, 264–65. 241 Robinson, Hurricane, 172, 178. 242 “Report of Lieutenant Fagan to Colonel Zeilin,” 19 January

1865, ORN, Series I, 11:584.

243 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 266–72. 244 Ibid., 272, 274, 282. 245 Ibid., 276, 280–81; Sullivan, The Final Year, 162. 246 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 282–83. 247 Ibid., 284–85. 248 Robinson, Hurricane, 177. 249 Ibid. 250 Evans, A Sailor’s Log, 93–94. 251 Robinson, Hurricane, 177–79. 252 Ibid., 179; Fonvielle, Wilmington, 289. 253 Robinson, Hurricane, 179–80; Fonvielle, Wilmington, 293. 254 Sullivan, The Final Year, 162. 255 Robinson, Hurricane, 180. 256 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 295–96. 257 Robinson, Hurricane, 183–84; “The Explosion at Fort Fisher;

Finding of the Court of Inquiry,” New York Times, 16 February

1865, New York Times Online Archive, accessed 21 March 2011,

http://www.nytimes.com/1865 /02/16/news/the-explosion-atfort-fisher-finding-of-the-court-of-inquiry.html?scp=

1&sq=The%20Explosion%20at%20Fort%20Fisher;%20Finding%20of%20the%20Court%20of%20Inquiry&st=cse. 

258 Lamb, “Defence,” 383. 259 Robinson, Hurricane, 183–84; Fonvielle, Wilmington, 306. 260 Lamb, “Defence,” 383; “The Explosion at Fort Fisher; Finding

of the Court of Inquiry,” New York Times, 16 February 1865, New

York Times Online Archive, accessed 21 March 2011,

http://www.nytimes.com/1865/02/16 /news/the-explosion-atfort-fisher-finding-of-the-court-of-inquiry.html?scp=1&sq=

The%20Explosion%20at%20Fort%20Fisher;%20Finding%20of

%20the%20Court%20of%20Inquiry&st=cse.

261 Robinson, Hurricane, 184. 262 Fonvielle, Wilmington, 303. Michael J. Bennett, Union Jacks:

Yankee Sailors in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North

Carolina Press, 2004), 204. Porter, Anecdotes, 272. 263 “Porter to Reynolds,” 30 January 1865, ORN, Series I, 11:585. 264 Sullivan, The Final Year, 258–60. 265 Hubbard T. Minor and R. Thomas Campbell, Confederate

Naval Cadet: The Diary and Letters of Midshipman Hubbard T.

Minor, with a History of the Confederate Naval Academy (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2007), 16 (hereafter cited as Minor,

Confederate Naval Cadet). 266 Todorich, Spirited, 8. 267 Minor, Confederate Naval Cadet, 16. 268 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 88. 269 Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West

Point (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 88, 97 (hereafter cited as Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country); Minor, Confederate Naval Cadet, 18. 270 Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, 100. 271 Todorich, Spirited, 9, 17, 58–60, table 4-1. 272 Alfred T. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, Recollections of Naval

Life (New York: Harper, 1907), 60–61, 63. 273 Todorich, Spirited, 9, 17, 58–60, table 4-1. 274 H. C. Gauss, “Soley’s Life of Admiral David D. Porter,” The

United Service: A Monthly Review of Military and Naval Affairs

vol. 5, no. 2, 3d ed., L. R. Hamersly Jr., ed. (New York: L. R.

Hamersly Jr., 1904), 138–40 (hereafter cited as Gauss, Life of Admiral Porter). 275 James R. Soley, Admiral Porter (New York: D. Appleton & Co.,

1903), 59–60 (hereafter cited as Soley, Porter); Justin H. Smith,

The War with Mexico, vol. 2 (New York: McMillan Company,

1919), 444n20.

276 Soley, Porter, 65–71. 277 Ibid., 73–75; Gauss, Life of Admiral Porter, 140–41; Justin H.

Smith, The War with Mexico, vol. 2 (New York: McMillan Company, 1919), 202–4, 444n20, 444n24, 445–46. 

278 Lewis R. Hamersly, ed., The Records of Living Officers of the

U.S. Navy & Marine Corps: Compiled from Official Sources

(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1878), 118–19; Todorich, Spirited, 79,

84.

279 Alfred T. Mahan, From Sail to Steam Recollections of Naval

Life (New York: Harper, 1907), 61. 280 Sullivan, The Final Year, 135; Park Benjamin, The United

States Naval Academy, Being the Yarn of the American Midshipman (Naval Cadet) ( New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900), 236. 281 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 84–87. 282 Ibid., 87, 92. 283 Ibid., 92. 284 George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey: Admiral of

the Navy (New York: Scribner, 1913), 137. 285 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 100–103; Sullivan, The Final Year, 18. 286 Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., “Among the Last to Run,” Naval History, 17, no. 5 (October 2003), 30. 287 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 91–92; Sullivan, The Final Year, 3–6,

10, 18.

288 Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 30–40; “McClellan to

Burnside,” 7 January 1862, ORN, Series I, 6:507–8.

December 1864–January 1865 53
54 The Battle of Fort Fisher

289 Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion (Des Moines, IA: The Dyer Publishing Co., 1908), 1388;

State of New York, A Record of the Commissioned Officers, NonCommissioned Officers, and Privates, of the Regiments Which

Were Organized in the State of New York and Called into the Service of the United States to Assist in Suppressing the Rebellion,

Caused by the Secession of Some of the Southern States from the

Union, A.D. 1861, As Taken from the Muster-in Rolls on File in

the Adjutant-General’s Office, S.N.Y, vol. 8 (Albany, NY: Weed,

Parsons, and Company, Printers, 1868), 474. 

290 Gibson, Assault and Logistics, 413–14, 439–40. 291 Ibid., 300–334. 292 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 91–92; Arthur G. Sharp, “Reynold’s Regrets,” Civil War Times Illustrated 26, no. 8 (December 1977),

33.

293 Gary J. Ohls, “Fort Fisher: Amphibious Victory in the American Civil War,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 4 (Autumn

2006), 89–90. 

294 “Dahlgren to Preble,” 28 November 1864, ORN, Series I,

16:69; “Hatch to Preble,” 29 November 1864, ORN, Series I,

16:71; “Hatch to Preble,” 30 November 1864, ORN, Series I,

16:72; “Report of Commander Preble to Brigadier General

Hatch,” 4 December 1864, ORN, Series I, 16:76–78; “Report of

Brigadier General John P. Hatch,” December 1864, ORN, Series

I, 44:421–25.

295 “General Instructions of Rear Admiral Dahlgren Regarding

Organization of the Naval Force,” 26 November 1864, ORN, Series I, 16:67–68; Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren, Memoir of John A.

Dahlgren, Rear-Admiral United States Navy (Boston: J. R. Osgood and Co., 1882), 478.

296 Gary J. Ohls, “Fort Fisher: Amphibious Victory in the American Civil War,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 4 (Autumn

2006), 91–93. 
Unpublished Materials

Ingalls, David M. “Francis Scala: Leader of the Marine Band from

1855 to 1871.” Master’s thesis, Catholic University of America,

1957. 

An early work discussing influential Marine Band leader

Francis Scala who served in that capacity during the Civil

War. 

Krivdo, Michael E. “Marines in Gray: The Birth, Life and Death

of the Confederate States Marine Corps.” Master’s thesis, Texas

A&M University, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETDTAMU-1132. 

The author argues political realities and Civil War expediencies allowed the Confederate States Marine Corps

(CSMC) to expand into roles and actually outpace its

Northern counterpart in some respects despite its minute

size and short lifespan. 

LeClair, Paul Joseph. “The Francis Scala Collection: Music in

Washington, DC at the time of the Civil War.” PhD diss., Catholic

University of America, 1973.

Discusses the Marine Band and its leader Francis Scala

during the Civil War. 

Pacious, Daniel M. “Seawolves of the Confederacy: The Origin,

Development, and Operations of the Confederate States Marine

Corps.” Master’s thesis, Southwest Texas State University, 1993. 

Ryan, Jeffrey T. “From Bull Run to Fort Fisher: Marine Battalions in the Civil War.” Master’s thesis, Temple University, 1991. 

________. “On Land and Sea: The United States Marine Corps

in the Civil War.” PhD diss., Temple University, 1997.

Two studies that provide a well-documented bibliography

to begin research on Marine Corps Civil War participation. 

Scala, Francis Maria. Francis Maria Scala Collection, 1820–1915.

Music Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Collection of Marine Band leader Scala who served from

1855–71. Primarily consists of manuscript and printed

music composed by Scala for band concerts, military formations, and White House functions. In addition, the collection includes photographs, clippings, programs, and

some correspondence.

Shoemaker, Judge Ferris. Judge Ferris Shoemaker Papers, 1861–

1866. Kroch Library, Division of Rare & Manuscript Collections,

Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

Correspondence and diaries relating to Shoemaker’s service in the Marine Corps while attached to the USS Saranac

on the Pacific Station during the Civil War. 

United States. Department of the Navy. Records of the United

States Marine Corps. Record Group 127. National Archives

Building, Washington, DC.

Researchers have found records group subgroup 127.2

“Records of the Office of the Commandant, 1798–1978”

contains important correspondence not published in the

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies. Particularly, the “Letters sent” and “Letters received” subgroups proved valuable. 

________. Marine Corps. Historical Reference Branch Subject

File. History Division. United States Marine Corps, Quantico,

VA.

The Historical Reference Branch maintains subject files

that encompass a mixture of primary and secondary

sources on the Civil War. A good starting point for inquiries into Marine activities during the Civil War and individual Marine officers’ biographical data.

Published Materials

Primary Sources

Beyer, Walter F., and Oscar F. Keydel. Deeds of Valor: How America’s Heroes Won the Medal of Honor. 2 vols. Detroit: PerrienKeydel Co., 1901. 

A compilation of various first-hand accounts of acts by

soldiers, sailors, and Marines during the Civil War, which

led to receipt of the Medal Of Honor. Volume two describes the accounts of Medal of Honor recipients Sgts

John F. Mackie and Richard Binder for actions at Drewry’s

Bluff and Fort Fisher respectively. 

Burton, Amos. A Journal of the Cruise of the U.S. Ship Susquehanna: During the Years 1860, 1861, 1862 and 1863. New York:

Edward O. Jenkins, 1863. Special Collections, Pace Library, University of West Florida, Pensacola.

A Marine private’s chronological record of service on

board the USS Susquehanna from her commissioning, 17

August 1860, until 5 May 1863; includes an undated roster of the ship’s personnel. While there are nuggets of useful information, Burton’s “journal” reads more like a Jane

Austin novel leaving the researcher to wade through an

excess of superfluous text. 

Church, Frank L., James Pickett Jones, and Edward F. Keuchel.

Civil War Marine: A Diary of the Red River Expedition, 1864.

Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1975. 

The Civil War journal of Marine Lt Frank L. Church who

commanded the Marine Guard on board Admiral Porter’s

flagship Black Hawk during the abortive 1864 Red River

Campaign. 

December 1864–January 1865 55

APPENDIX

Sources for Further Reading on Marines During the Civil War
56 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Fredd, John P. “Civil War Blockade.” Recruiters’ Bulletin 2, no. 5

(March 1916):12.

________. “Life on the Blockade.” Recruiters’ Bulletin 2, no. 1

(November 1915):1–2. 

A biographical sketch of Fredd is included. Also published

in Marines Magazine 1 no. 1 (Dec 1915):9–11.

________. “More about the Uniform of 1859.” Recruiters’ Bulletin 4 no. 3 (January 1918):12.

Marine veteran’s description of wartime service and of the

uniform he wore during the Civil War. More recent scholarship cast doubts on the authenticity of Fredd’s claims to

have been a Marine during the Civil War. See: Church,

Jones, and Keuchel. Civil War Marine: A Diary of the Red

River Expedition, 1864.

Graves, Henry Lea, and Richard Barksdale Harwell. A Confederate Marine: A Sketch of Henry Lea Graves with Excerpts from

the Graves Family Correspondence, 1861–1865. Tuscaloosa, AL:

Confederate Pub. Co., 1963. 

One of the few accounts of a Confederate Marine officer,

consisting of a series of letters detailing camp life, events

in Savannah written by Graves as he served at Naval Station Savannah. 

Gusley, Henry O., and Edward T. Cotham. The Southern Journey

of a Civil War Marine: The Illustrated Note-Book of Henry O.

Gusley. Clifton and Shirley Caldwell Texas Heritage Series, no.

10. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006. 

The journal of Marine Private Henry O. Gusley. He took

part in naval skirmishes along the Mississippi River and

also saw duty in the West Gulf Blockading Squadron from

Pensacola, Florida, to Texas. Gusley fell prisoner after the

Confederate victory at Sabine Pass and spent time as a

prisoner-of-war in Texas and Louisianna prisons. 

Hamersly, Lewis R. The Records of Living Officers of the U.S.

Navy & Marine Corps: Compiled from Official Sources. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1878.

Official period naval publication giving many organizational related details and service-related data on both

Navy and Marine Corps officers. Useful for the researcher

to provide service record data, previous assignments, and

brevet awards during the Civil War.

Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, eds.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Being for the Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers, Vol. 4. New York:

Century Co., 1888. 

One volume in a series, which features articles about various Civil War battles written by the commanders. Although the accounts were written well after the fact, the

editors provided the reader with information from both

sides. Where details or opinions differ, the editors integrate dissenting opinions or observations from the opposing commander in the footnotes, which is unique and

useful. Several articles describe battles in which a Marine

battalion participated including ill-fated attacks on Forts

Sumter and Fisher. The Fort Fisher articles by Union and

Confederate leaders in the battle shift blame away from

the Marine Corps and onto Admiral Porter. 

Mackie, John F. “The Destruction of Norfolk Navy Yard, April

21, 1861.” Home and Country/incorporating the Grand Army Review 4, Nos. 9–12 (March–May 1889):1011–12; 1041, 1057–58;

1062–63.

Brief account by Civil War Medal of Honor recipient of

the Marines’ part in the botched attempts to raze the

Gosport Naval Yard, which provided occupying Confederates with more than 1,000 naval guns and the tools to

build the ironclad CSS Virginia. 

Oviatt, Miles M., and Mary P. Livingston. A Civil War Marine at

Sea: The Diary of Medal of Honor Recipient Miles M. Oviatt.

Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co., 1998.

The diary of Sgt Miles M. Oviatt who, after the Battle of

Mobile Bay, received one of only 17 Medals of Honor

awarded to Marines during the Civil War. His diary

chronicles life on board ship patrolling the Atlantic trade

routes for Confederate privateers, gun crew assignments,

and the Union attacks on Fort Fisher. 

Peet, Frederick Tomlinson. Civil War Letters and Documents of

Frederick Tomlinson Peet: With the Seventh New York Regiment.

With First Berdan’s Sharp-Shooters. Prisoner to the Confederates.

In the United States Marine Corps. Newport, R.I.: Privately

printed, 1917. 

________. Personal Experiences in the Civil War: . . . in the

United States Marine Corps. New York, 1905. 

Peet reminisces about life in the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. He provides some details of events surrounding the Union landings on Folly Island, SC. It also

mentions the capture of Charleston’s outlying Confederate

defenses including Fort Wagner, however, the account

lacks much in the way of personal details.

United States Congress. House. The Reports of the Committees of

the House of Representatives, Made During the Second Session,

Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1866–67. Washington DC: Government

Printing Office, 1867.

Following the Civil War, an effort was made to merge the

Marine Corps into the Army. Report 22 includes the testimony of many well-known naval officers attesting to the

nature of Marine Corps service during the war. It also describes the roles of the Marine Corps and its value to fighting ships of the Navy.

________. Senate. The Reports of Committees of the Senate of the

United States for the Second Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress, 1861–62. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,

1862. 

Report 37 details the evacuation and destruction of naval

yards at Pensacola and Norfolk. Marines, especially at Norfolk, took part in the botched attempt to destroy the yard. 
________. Senate. The Reports of Committees of the Senate of the

United States for the Third Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress.

4 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1863.

Part II contains Senate Report 108 detailing testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. This

dealt with the Union disaster at the Battle of Bull Run in

July 1861. Col John Harris lamented in correspondence

after the battle that for the first time Marines turned their

backs to the enemy, inadvertently starting a 150-year narrative of Marine failure during the Civil War. Testimony

from key officers include brigade commander Col Andrew Porter, and artillery officers Maj William F. Barry

and Capts James B. Ricketts and Charles Griffin, whose

batteries Marines were assigned to protect. Testimony not

only does not blame Maj John G. Reynolds’s Marine battalion, but in some cases vindicates Marine conduct during the battle. 

United States. Department of the Navy. Regulations for the Government of the United States Navy, 1865. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1865.

The researcher will find articles that relate to Marines especially while embarked at sea useful to understanding

the relative autonomy of a Marine Guard commanding officer and how the guard functioned at sea.

________. Marine Corps. Regulations for the Uniform and Dress

of the Marine Corps of the United States, 1859. Philadelphia:

Charles De Silver, 1859. 

Official description and specifications for the Marine uniform of the Civil War era, accompanied by color illustrations and line drawings.

________. Naval History Division. “The Journal of Private

Charles Brother, USMC.” Civil War Naval Chronology, 1861–

1865. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1971. Appendix IV, VI47–VI84.

An excellent personal narrative with explanatory notes of

enlisted Marine life on board ship in the West Gulf

Blockading Squadron. Besides listing many details of life

at sea, and shipboard duties, Brother also describes action

during the Battle of Mobile Bay. 

________. Office of Naval Records and Library. Official Records

of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.

Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1894–1922. 

Well-known reference for official naval after-action reports and correspondence regarding the blockade, landing

parties, and battles involving Marines. 

________. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate

Armies. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–

1901.

Official Army after-action reports and correspondence regarding combined operations or what would today be termed

joint operations with the naval services during the war. 

United States and John Harris. Letters from Naval Officers in Reference to the United States Marine Corps. Washington, DC: F.

Taylor, 1864. 

A series of letters published in book form that circulated

in the Senate, written by high ranking Civil War naval officers in response to a request from Commandant Harris

and Major W. B. Slack, Marine Quartermaster, to defeat

an effort in Congress to disband the Marine Corps or fold

it into the Army. 

Welles, Gideon, and Edgar Thaddeus Welles. Diary of Gideon

Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson. 3 vols.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911.

The period diary of Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy. It

helps provide some insight into administration views relating to the Marine Corps including the press flap over

band leader Scala’s musical choices, recruiting, enlistment

bounties, and wartime bickering between senior Marine

officers. 

Secondary Sources

Aldrich, M. Almy. History of the United States Marine Corps.

Boston: Henry L. Shepherd and Co., 1875.

In Marine Corps historiography, Aldrich’s work is one of

the first attempts to detail the service’s history from its beginnings up to and immediately following the Civil War.

It relies heavily on extracts of official reports. Major

Richard Collum provided most of the official documents

and reports. 

Bennett, Michael J. Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War.

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

Bennett’s social history details the lives, backgrounds, and

motivations of Union sailors—bluejackets—during the

war. While the book does not discuss Marines, it does provide insight into areas of overlap between the naval services particularly in recruiting practices and

socio-economic backgrounds. Many of the Marine

Guards’ shipboard duties revolved around maintaining

order and discipline among the crew. This book is helpful

for understanding that task. Another interesting section

discusses the relative isolation of sailors—and presumably

Marines—on board ship from the horrors of war seen by

Army units. 

Clark, George B., ed. United States Marine Corps Medal of Honor

Recipients: A Comprehensive Registry, Including U.S. Navy Medical Personnel Honored for Serving Marines in Combat. Jefferson,

NC: McFarland, 2005. 

A compilation of all Marine Corps Medal of Honor recipients, including medals from the Civil War, with citations.

Coletta, Paolo Enrico. An Annotated Bibliography of U.S. Marine

Corps History. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986. 

Organized by time period, the section covering the Civil

War largely reprints O’Quinlivan’s work.

December 1864–January 1865 57
58 The Battle of Fort Fisher

Collum, Richard S. History of the United States Marine Corps.

Philadelphia: L. R. Hamersly & Co., 1890. 

Another early history by Maj Collum who provided most

of the documentation for Aldrich’s work. Collum participated in the Civil War, however, his history and description of events almost duplicate Aldrich. While the book

is useful, it was written in a detached style leaving out the

personal observation of events that diaries and the like

bring out.

Cureton, Charles H., and David M. Sullivan. The Civil War Uniforms of the United States Marine Corps: The Regulations of 1859.

San Jose, CA: R. James Bender Publishing, 2009. 

A recent publication illustrating the 1859 uniform regulations used by Marines during the Civil War. The book

also adds newly published period photographs and discusses the European influences and in some cases break

from traditional influences that made the 1859 rendition

of the uniform unique to the Marine Corps. 

Donnelly, Ralph W. The Confederate States Marine Corps: The

Rebel Leathernecks. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing

Co., 1989. 

One of the few authoritative studies of the Confederate

Marine Corps.

________. Service Records of Confederate Enlisted Marines.

Washington, NC: Donnelly, 1979. 

One of the few works for researchers looking at CSMC enlisted records. It is almost entirely produced from rosters

and provides general enlistment data on Confederate enlisted Marines. 

Donnelly, Ralph W., and David M. Sullivan. Biographical

Sketches of the Commissioned Officers of the Confederate States

Marine Corps. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001. 

Brief accounts on the biographical and military career aspects of Confederate Marine officers.

Dudley, William S. Going South: U.S. Navy Officer Resignations

& Dismissals on the Eve of the Civil War. Washington, DC: Naval

Historical Foundation, 1981.

A scholarly informational pamphlet covering the Secession

Crisis as it applied to naval resignations. The appendices

provide a table of Marine officer resignations and appointments into Confederate service. 

Field, Ron. American Civil War Marines 1861–65. Oxford, UK:

Osprey, 2004. 

A general reference for Marine uniforms for both North

and South with many illustrations. 

Fonvielle Jr., Chris E. The Wilmington Campaign: Last Rays of

Departing Hope. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001.

An excellent and exhaustive account of the entire Wilmington campaign in which Marines from both sides played

roles in the battle outside of their normal shipboard duties. 

Gardner, Donald Ray. The Confederate Corps of Marines. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2007. 

A revised version of Gen Gardner’s 1973 master’s thesis.

The account largely relates CSMC service at Drewry’s

Bluff and describes uniforms and accoutrements.

Heinl Jr., Robert Debs. Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962. Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation

Publishing Co. of America, 1991.

A general history written by Col Heinl probably best

known by Marines for his work Victory at High Tide: The

Inchon-Seoul Campaign. The original completed just before the Vietnam War details Marine Corps service during

the Civil War as part of a comprehensive history up

through the late 1950s. Heinl’s brief take on the Civil War

focused on Marine Corps organizational and institutional

limitations. 

Lewis, Charles Lee. Famous American Marines, An Account of

the Corps: the Exploits of Officers and Men on Land, by Air and

Sea, from the Decks of the Bonhomme Richard to the Summit of

Mount Suribachi. Boston: Page, 1950. 

Provides biographical sketches of important Marines including Commandant Charles Heywood’s service as a

company grade officer during the Civil War.

Lynch, Barbara A., and John E. Vajda. United States Naval History: A Bibliography. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center,

Department of the Navy, 1993. 

A relatively recent bibliography of naval history. The work

breaks down topically so the researcher can quickly reference the Civil War and biography sections.

McAulay, John D. Civil War Small Arms of the U.S. Navy and

Marine Corps. Lincoln, RI: Andrew Mowbray Publishers, 1999. 

Description of general and specialized naval versions of

weapons and shipboard ordnance records used by the sea

services. 

McClellan, Edwin N. History of the U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1925. 

A post–World War I history of the Marine Corps at a time

when the State Department used the service as an intervention force around the world and when it was developing small war tactics. Two-volume document circulated

only in mimeograph form, never published.

Metcalf, Clyde H. A History of the United States Marine Corps.

New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939.

A general history written before World War II shaped

modern views of the Marines Corps. Metcalf follows up

on Collum’s earlier work to produce a general history that

carries the Corps into the first quarter of the 20th century. 

Miller, William M. and John H. Johnstone. A Chronology of the

United States Marine Corps, 1775–1934. Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1970.
Brief chronological entries on Marine activities and operations, Marine Civil War operations listed in section III.

Millet, Alan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States

Marine Corps. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

The authoritative Marine Corps history from its beginnings to the late–20th century. More scholarly in both

style and substance than previous works; a good starting

point for the Civil War period researcher interested in Marine contributions. 

Millett, Allan R., and Jack Shulimson, eds. Commandants of the

Marine Corps. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004. 

Essays discussing the period of service for the Commandants of the Marine Corps. Useful to research aspects of

the three Civil War–era Commandants. However, the essays do not discuss the Civil War experience of post-war

commandants. 

Moskin, J. Robert. The Story of the U.S. Marine Corps. New York:

Paddington Press, 1979. 

Another general history along the lines of Simmons.

Nalty, Bernard C. The United States Marines at Harper’s Ferry

and in the Civil War. Marine Corps historical reference pamphlet. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1983. 

An official Marine Corps publication reprinted from a series of informational pamphlets originally published

around the centennial of the Civil War. The Harpers Ferry

section is useful for the researcher; however, the subsequent coverage of the Civil War is useful as general reference only. 

O’Quinlivan, Michael, and Rowland P. Gill. An Annotated Bibliography of the United States Marines in the Civil War. Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, U.S. Marine Corps,

1968. 

The bibliography lists many early articles and works,

which are largely superseded by subsequent publications.

Parker, William D. A Concise History of the United States Marine

Corps: 1775–1969. Washington, DC: Historical Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1970. 

An official Marine Corps publication which outlines the

Civil War services of the Marine Corps as part of the general history. 

Rankin, Robert H. Uniforms of the Sea Services: a Pictorial History. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962. 

A description of uniforms worn by U. S. Marines during

the Civil War produced during the Civil War centennial.

Ressler, D. Michael. Historical Perspective on the President’s Own

U.S. Marine Band: 200th Anniversary. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1998. 

A well-researched general history of the U.S. Marine

Band. Particularly useful are the portions dealing with

band leader Francis Scala who directed the band from

1855–71. Scala oversaw the evolution of the band, modernizing both its instruments and increasing its musical

catalog. The pamphlet also discusses the band’s role at the

Lincoln White House and Gettysburg dedication ceremony. The pamphlet is not documented, however, it appears the author relied heavily on author O’Sullivan’s work

and Marine Band Library and Archives holdings. 

Robinson, Charles M. Hurricane of Fire: The Union Assault on

Fort Fisher. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 

A scholarly account of the campaign to take Fort Fisher

including coverage of Confederate Marine activities before and during the battles.

Simmons, Edwin H. The United States Marines: A History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

The fourth edition of Gen Simmons work. Provides a

good starting point for themes in Marine-specific Civil

War research, however, the footnotes and bibliography of

a more scholarly work are noticeably absent. 

Simmons, Edwin H., and J. Robert Moskin, eds. The Marines.

New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2004. 

A series of short essays chronicling the Marine experience

from the Corps founding to the current era.

Sullivan, David M. The United States Marine Corps in the Civil

War: The First Year. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing

Company, 1997. 

________. The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War: The

Second Year. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Company, 1997. 

________. The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War: The

Third Year. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Company, 1998. 

________. The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War: The

Final Year. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2000.

Sullivan’s four-volume series provides the most complete

account of the Marine Corps during the Civil War despite

its small size and relatively limited role. Sullivan brings

much in the way of primary materials including new

sources and unpublished diaries. This revisionist work

challenges commonly held themes in the Marine Corps’

historic narrative. 

United States Naval History Division. Civil War Naval Chronology, 1861–1865. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,

1971.

A reprint and consolidation of a previously multi-volume

work pertaining to naval aspects of the war. Appendix IV

contains the wartime journal of Private Charles Brother.

Articles

Alexander, Joseph H. “Civil War Marines: Four Frustrating

Years, Part I.” Leatherneck 90, no. 11 (November 2007):66–71.

December 1864–January 1865 59
60 The Battle of Fort Fisher

________. “Civil War Marines: Four Frustrating Years, Part II.”

Leatherneck 90, no. 12 (December 2007):16–20.

Colonel Alexander presents a brief outline of all of the

themes and major operations involving Marines during

the war and provides a synopsis of lessons that should

have been gleaned by Marine leadership after the war for

the contemporary reader. 

Asprey, Robert B. “The Assault on Fort Fisher” MarineCorps

Gazette 49, no. 11 (November 1965):30–31.

A short account of the Christmas Day 1864 joint Federal

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps amphibious assault on a

major Confederate stronghold on the North Carolina

coast. 

Bailey, Anne J. “The Mississippi Marine Brigade: Fighting Rebel

Guerillas on Western Waters.” Military History of the Southwest

22, no. 1 (Spring 1992):31–42.

Discusses one of several U.S. Army “marine” units which

fought the war as part of combined Army-Navy operations. Useful to describe how the Army took over what

later developed into a central Marine Corps capability and

mission in the 20th century. 

Bearss, Edwin C. “Civil War Operations in and around Pensacola.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 36, no. 2 (October

1957):125–65. 

________. “Civil War Operations in and around Pensacola Part

II.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 39, no. 3 (January

1961):231–55. 

________. “Civil War Operations in and around Pensacola Part

III.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 39, no. 4 (April 1961):330–

53.

The renowned author, Marine, and former National Park

Service chief historian wrote one of the first modern Civil

War histories of Pensacola. Marines figured prominently

during the Secession Crisis and reinforcement of Fort

Pickens. The series of articles also mentions Confederate

Marines in Bragg’s Army of Pensacola and early landings

by Marines near Biloxi. 

Cassidy, John F. “Field Service in the Civil War: Squadron

Marines in Combined Operations.” Marine Corps Gazette 1, no.

3 (Sept 1916):290–97.

Contains a report of operations by lstLt George G. Stoddard, USMC, commander of the Marine battalion in the

Broad River expedition, November 1864–January 1865.

Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. “Civil War Deterrent: Defenses of

Washington.” Military Affairs 29, no. 4 (Winter 1965–66):164–

78. 

________. “Defending Washington during the Civil War.”

Records of the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, DC

71/72 (1971-1972):314–37. 

Both articles discuss the relative inadequacy of the 19thcentury peacetime national defense posture to secure the

capital. During the Civil War, Marines figured into the

equation early on as they represented the only available

regular troops. 

“Confederate Commandoes.” Marine Corps Gazette 30, no. 12

(December 1946):iv.

Brief description of CSMC boarding the USS Underwriter

at New Bern, NC. 

Dawson, Joseph G. “With Fidelity and Effectiveness: Archibald

Henderson’s Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.” The Journal of Military History 62, no. 4 (October 1998):727–53.

A useful article which describes Henderson’s attempts to

reform, modernize, and expand Marine Corps roles on

the eve of the Civil War. 

Donnelly, Ralph W. “Battle Honors and Services of Confederate

Marines.” Military Affairs 23, no. 1 (Spring 1959):37–40.

Chronology of CSMC actions and ship detachments.

________. “The Confederate Marines at Drewry’s Bluff.” Virginia Cavalcade 16, no. 2 (Autumn 1966):42–47.

Account of CSMC training and actions at their principle

camp located at Drewry’s Bluff.

________. “A Confederate Navy Forlorn Hope.” Military Affairs

28, no. 2 (Summer 1964):73–78.

An account of one of the last Confederate attempts to clear

the James River of Federal control using a task force of

CSA, CSN, and CSMC personnel under the direction of Lt

Read, CSN.

________. “Federal Batteries on the Henry House Hill, Bull Run,

1861.” Military Affairs 21, no. 4 (Winter 1957):188–92.

A revisionist article, which reinterprets the key action at

Bull Run when the 33d Virginia cut down Griffin’s Battery. Donnelly blames the defeat not on a loss of men but

of horses. The historic narrative often blamed Marines for

failing to support the battery instead of McDowell’s chief

of artillery for mistaking blue-clad Confederates for supporting infantry who subsequently leveled devastating

volley fire on the battery. 

________. “Uniforms and Equipment of Confederate Marines.”

Military Collector & Historian 9, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 1–7.

Describes CSMC uniforms and equipment.

Gould, James Warren. “The Civil War in the Far East (U.S. Civil

War in Asiatic waters).” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 88, no.

9 (September 1962):160–63.

Hayes, John D. “The Marine Corps in the American Civil War.”

Shipmate 23, no. 11 (November 1960):2–4.

A concise account of institutional and doctrinal limitations,

which influenced Marine employment during the Civil War. 

King, Joseph E. “The Fort Fisher Campaigns, 1864–1865.” U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings 77, no. 8 (August 1951):842–55.
General account focusing on the “naval brigade.”

Krivdo, Micheal E. “Confederate Marine Corps Recruiting in

New Orleans and Marine Activities in the First Year of the Civil

War.” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical

Association 48, no. 4 (Fall 2007):441–66. 

The article focuses on early CSMC activities in New Orleans. After the Crescent City fell to the Union Navy, Mobile, Alabama, became the center of Confederate Marine

activity on the Gulf Coast.

Long, Richard A. “Send Me Thirty Marines . . .” Leatherneck 44,

no. 4 (April 1961):16–21, 72; no. 5 (May 1961):47–53.

Chronology of Marine operations during the Civil War. 

Lonn, Ella. “The Extent and Importance of Federal Naval Raids

on Salt-making in Florida, 1862-1865.” Florida Historical Society

Quarterly 10, no. 4 (July 1932):167–84.

An excellent article, though mainly drawn from the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, describing the importance of salt-making along the panhandle of

Florida. The author describes the process, its importance

to the Confederate cause, and early Union efforts to stamp

out the large salt works that sprang up along the many inland salt marshes and estuaries. While the article focuses

on naval riverine operations, it is illustrative of the small

scale–type landings where Marines operated most effectively due to the prevailing views of organization and employment rather than in large-scale battalion operations.

Magruder III, John H. “Sergeant’s Sword, a Symbol Sheathed in

Honor.” Marine Corps Gazette 38, no. 11 (November 1954):33–

35. 

Description of the sword, Model 1850, assigned to Marine

noncommissioned officers since 1875 but worn by Marine commissioned officers during the Civil War.

________. “The Wreck of the Governor.” Leatherneck 38, no. 11

(Nov 1955):74–77. 

The foundering on 2 November 1862 of a vessel carrying

a battalion of Marines intended to participate in the Port

Royal operation.

McClellan, Edwin N. “The Capture of Fort Fisher.” Marine Corps

Gazette 5, no. 1 (March 1920):59–80. 

________. “The Capture of New Orleans.” Marine Corps Gazette

5, no. 4 (December 1920):360–69. 

Inter-war period articles written about joint operations,

which focus on amphibious aspects of the Civil War at a

time when the Marine Corps was beginning to expand its

educational institutions to both develop the traditions and

professional knowledge base among Marines. 

McKenzie Jr., Kenneth F. “Among the Last to Run.” Naval History

17, no. 5 (October 2003):24–30.

The author recounts the debacle at Bull Run which falls

in with the well-trod narrative that lumps the Marine battalion in with every volunteer regiment that fled as compared to the other regular battalion, which stood and retained its equipment. While differing from revisionist

author Sullivan, McKenzie’s purpose in relating the battle

is to demonstrate how the “Corps’ old guard” did not actively support large land operations with the Army and

used the “Great Skedaddle” to consolidate their grip and

cling to traditional roles rather than seizing the opportunity to expand into the amphibious warfare role, which is

today synonymous with the Marine Corps. 

Nalty, Bernard. “An Escort for Lincoln.” Leatherneck 44, no. 2

(February 1961):78–79, 83.

Brief account of 2dLt Henry C. Cochrane, USMC, in the

honor guard for the president at Gettysburg, July 1863,

with commentary on Cochrane’s personality and later career.

________. “Blue and Gray.” Leatherneck 43, no. 11 (November

1960):54–57.

Briefly describes operations in which both Union and

Confederate Marines took part.

Ohls, Gary J. “Fort Fisher: Amphibious Victory in the American Civil War.” Naval War College Review 59, no. 4 (Autumn

2006):81–99.

A scholarly, well-documented article on the capture of

Fort Fisher. 

Rentfrow, Frank H. “An Incident at Fort Fisher.” Leatherneck 21,

no. 11 (November 1938):10–11.

Recalls the actions of Pvt Henry Wasmuth to save Lt (and

later RAdm) Robley D. Evans after the failed assault on

the Northeast Bastion. 

________. “On to Richmond.” Leatherneck 22, no. 1 (January

1939):10–11.

Marines on board the USS Galena including Sgt John

Mackie during the attack on Drewry’s Bluff. 

________. “We Fight Our Countries Battles.” Leatherneck 13,

no. 2 (February 1930):4–5. 

Short narrative of the two battles of Fort Fisher.

Sharp, Arthur G. “Reynold’s Regrets.” Civil War Times Illustrated

26, no. 8 (December 1977):22–33.

An article detailing the Civil War career of the Corps’ only

senior officer to take field command. While most of the

senior officers at the start of the war contented themselves

to remain in comfortable commands at the various Marine barracks in New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere,

Col Reynolds took field command of a Marine battalion

only to see opportunities slip away because of bad luck at

Bull Run and for the Port Royal expedition on board the

steamer Governor. 

Simmons, Edwin H. “The Federals and Fort Fisher, Part I.” Marine Corps Gazette 35, no. 1 (January 1951):52–59.

December 1864–January 1865 61
62 The Battle of Fort Fisher

A short account of the first battle of Fort Fisher in December 1864.

________. “The Federals and Fort Fisher, Part II.” Marine Corps

Gazette 35, no. 2 (February 1951):47–54.

A short account of the second battle of Fort Fisher and

Porter’s naval brigade along with a brief defense of the

Marines who Porter and Breese later blamed for the failed

assault.

________. “Fort Fisher: Amphibious Finale to the Civil War.”

Fortitudine 16, no. 1 (Summer 1986):3–8.

A brief recap of events surrounding the capture of Fort

Fisher.

Sullivan, David M. “Baptism By Fire.” Pensacola Historical Illustrated 1, no. 2 (1984):8–14.

Describes activities of Confederate Marines along the Gulf

coast and under Bragg at Pensacola early in the war. 

________. “The Confederate States Marine Corps.” The Southern Partisan Magazine 4, no. 2 (Spring 1984):42–47.

________. “The Confederate States Marine Corps in Georgia,

1861–1865.” The Atlanta Historical Journal 29, no. 4 (Winter

1985–86):75–94.

Scholarly article describing Confederate Marines involvement at Savannah.

________. “The Confederate States Marine Corps in South Carolina, 1861–1865.” The South Carolina Historical Magazine 86,

no. 2 (April 1985):113–27. 

An article, which highlights the contributions of Confederate marines to the Southern war effort in Charleston. 

________. “A Few Good Men.” Confederate Veteran 33, no. 2

(March 1985):14–20.

Article describing Confederate Marine activities during

the entire war.

________. “The Few, the Forgotten: The Confederate States Marine Corps.” Military Images (November–December 1981):16–

21.

________. “John Albert Pearson Jr.: Arkansas Soldier and Confederate Marine.” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 45, no. 3

(Autumn 1986):250–60. 

________. “The Marine Battalion at the Battle of Bull Run:

Emending the Record.” Leatherneck (February 2002):42–49.

A revisionist article, which hones in on the successes of

the Marine battalion vice the failures which its commander, Maj Reynolds, and the Commandant Col Harris

focused on in after-action reports. Contrary to popular

culture and myth about Marine Corps traditions,

Reynolds’ report formed the cornerstone of an almost

140-year narrative detailing Marine failures during the

battle and over the course of the war. Sullivan argues that

despite the fact that the vast majority of the Marines present only had days of military experience, the battalion carried itself with honor. His article details how the battalion

not only rallied on several occasions to take part in counterattacks, but in fact penetrated the Confederate line further than any other Federal unit. Finally, he argues that

Reynolds’ battalion maintained its integrity and discipline

well after many other units crumbled until Confederate

artillery rained down on the mass of troops trying to withdraw across Cub Run.

________. “Rebel Marines.” America’s Civil War (March

1991):14–20, 60.

A general article describing the Confederate Marine contributions to the Southern war effort.

Thacker, Joel D. “Highlights of U. S. Marine Corps Activities in

the District of Columbia.” Records of the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, DC. 51/52 (1951–52):78–86.

An article describing the history of the Marine Corps in

and around Washington since the founding of the District

of Columbia. 

Walker, J. B. “Here’s a Chance for the Marines!” Leatherneck 84,

no. 2 (February 2001):38–41.

A brief description of the Federal attempt to pass the Confederate defenses at Drewry’s Bluff, VA, where Cpl John

F. Mackie became the first Marine to earn the Medal of

Honor. 

Walker, Robert M. “Marines in Gray: The Forgotten Service of

Confederacy.” Civil War Times 2, no. 5 (August-September

1960):16–17.

The bombardment and capture of Fort Fisher, 15 January 1865.

Library of Congress