UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL E. LANE,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

EXCHANGE BANK OF KINGSTREE;

BARCLAYS AMERICAN LEASING; TRI

COUNTY TRACTOR; CAROLINA

No. 98-2598

EASTERN-DUKE, INCORPORATED;

NATIONAL BANK OF SOUTH CAROLINA;

SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU INSURANCE

COMPANY; BANK OF GREELEYVILLE;

ROYSTER-CLARK, INCORPORATED; JOHN

DEERE COMPANY,

Defendants,

v.

CAROL G. LANE,

Third Party Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.

C. Weston Houck, Chief District Judge.

(CA-95-2602-4-2)

Submitted: July 20, 1999

Decided: September 20, 1999

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

C. Craig Young, WILLCOX, BUYCK & WILLIAMS, P.A., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States

Attorney, LaVerne H. Manning, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S

OFFICE, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Michael E. Lane appeals from the district court's orders denying

his motion to compel settlement, denying his motion to file an

amended answer, granting summary judgment in favor of the United

States, and denying his motion for reconsideration. Finding no abuse

of discretion by the district court, we affirm these orders.

In 1994, the Farm Service Agency ("FSA") notified Lane that his

loans were in default and had been accelerated. Thereafter, Lane

made several settlement proposals, which were rejected. FSA filed its

foreclosure action in August 1995. In October 1996, Lane moved the

court to compel settlement, asserting that he had engaged in settlement negotiations with the Loan Resolution Task Force and had been

informed that the lowest settlement offer the United States would consider was $305,000. Lane then sought financing to settle the account

with FSA. He contends that the United States subsequently withdrew

its offer. The district court found that no agreement had been reached

between the parties and denied the motion to compel settlement.

Lane then moved for leave to file an amended answer to assert a

counterclaim and several defenses based on the alleged settlement

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contract between the United States and Lane. Finding that amendment

would prejudice the United States and would be futile, the district

court denied the motion for leave to file an amended answer.

The United States then moved for summary judgment. Finding no

genuine issue of material fact, the district court granted summary

judgment for the United States. After the court denied Lane's motion

for reconsideration finding that it was an attempt to relitigate issues

already determined by the court, Lane noted his appeal.

Lane failed to present evidence that an agreement had been reached

by the parties. At best, he has shown that the United States expressed

a willingness to consider an offer at a specified amount, and, after

Lane submitted an offer in that amount, the United States rejected the

offer. Finding no offer and unequivocal acceptance of the offer, see

Gaskins v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 245 S.E.2d 598, 600 (S.C. 1978);

Sossamon v. Littlejohn, 129 S.E.2d 124, 127 (S.C. 1963), the district

court properly denied Lane's motion to compel settlement.

Because his proposed amended answer asserted a counterclaim and

defenses based on his erroneous contention that a settlement agreement had been reached and other defenses which were not sufficiently

alleged, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Lane's motion for leave to amend his answer. See Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Ward Elecs. Serv. Inc. v. First

Commercial Bank, 819 F.2d 496, 497 (4th Cir. 1987) (leave to amend

may be denied based on "prejudice, bad faith, futility, or dilatoriness

associated with the motion.").

Because Lane had his opportunity to be heard by presentation of

motions, memoranda, and affidavits, he has failed to show that the

district court abused its discretion in deciding the motions without

holding hearings. See Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys. Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 1994) (no requirement that

hearing be held prior to entry of summary judgment), cert. denied,

513 U.S. 1191 (1995); see also D.S.C. Local R. 7.08 ("Unless [ ]

ordered [in the discretion of the court], motions shall be determined

without a hearing.").

Lastly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial

of Lane's Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. Lane rested his Rule 59(e)

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motion on the ground that reconsideration of the issue was necessary

to prevent manifest injustice from occurring due to errors of his former counsel. However, negligence by counsel is an insufficient basis

to overturn a judgment. See Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 795

F.2d 601, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1986) (decided under Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)); Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1278 (7th Cir. 1990) (negligence by

counsel does not warrant Rule 60(b) relief). Also, a Rule 59(e) motion

is not proper merely to relitigate matters already determined. See

Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403

(4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S.

Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-742). Because Lane sought in his Rule 59(e)

motion to reargue his position on the motion to compel settlement,

motion to amend answer, and motion for summary judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. See id.

In conclusion, we grant the United States' motion to supplement

the record with letters evidencing the parties' settlement discussions.

We grant the motion to file a supplemental appendix and treat the letters attached to the motion as a supplemental appendix. We also

affirm the district court's orders denying Lane's motion to compel

settlement, denying his motion for leave to file an amended answer,

granting summary judgment for the United States, and denying

Lane's motion for reconsideration. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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