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NEWS FROM THE

FRONT

August 2018

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Insights from

Brig. Gen. S. Clinton Hinote, USAF

Deputy Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq

Colonel Robert J. Blaesing

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

Military Analyst (forward), Kuwait

Security Cooperation in Iraq
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News from the Front:

Insights from

Brig. Gen. S. Clinton Hinote, USAF

Deputy Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq

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Brigadier General S. Clinton Hinote, USAF 

Forward 

The purpose of this document is to share insights into the consolidation of gains, 

specifically the execution of security cooperation and assistance activities, as we defeat 

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq. This document summarizes the key 

points from: (1) an End of Tour interview with Brigadier General (BG) S. Clinton Hinote, 

USAF, Deputy Chief for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (U.S. Department of 

Defense (DOD) and U.S. State Department) (OSC-I) from Feb 2017 to Feb 2018. The 

interview, conducted at the conclusion of his tour, contained a few focus areas that 

capture best practices and lessons learned during his tenure as the Deputy Chief for the 

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and (2) BG Hinote’s white paper entitled “Iraq What 

Now? Consolidating Coalition Gains with Smart, Limited Investments.” 

The End of Tour interview questions focused on the following but were not limited to: 

 White paper entitled “Iraq What Now? Consolidating Coalition Gains with

 Smart, Limited Investments”. 

 Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I).

 Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).

 Training.

 Synchronization.

Front Cover: The first shipment of M1A1 Abrams tanks arrived August 7, 2010 at the port of Umm 

Qasr, Iraq. This initial delivery of 11 was the first of 140 systems that were delivered throughout the 

following year as part of a foreign military sales agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi governments. 

(Photo Credit: DVIDS, United States Forces – Iraq, Deputy Commanding General (Advising and 

Training) 08.07.2010)
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Iraq: What Now? Consolidating Coalition Gains with Smart, Limited Investments 

(White Paper Executive Summary) 

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is no longer able to hold territory inside Iraq, 

so many are asking, “What now?” This paper explains why the Coalition should stay 

engaged in Iraq and identifies a realistic approach that sets priorities and pursues 

objectives that are limited and achievable in a post-caliphate consolidation phase called 

“Operation Reliable Partnership.” If productive, this approach can be continued.

Military success against ISIS has provided the Coalition an opportunity to consolidate 

gains and invest in Iraq’s future, avoiding the mistakes of 2011 and the crisis of 2014. 

It’s clear, however, that the Coalition cannot do everything for Iraq. Iraqis must solve 

most of Iraq’s most intractable problems. In the post-caliphate environment, it is in the 

Coalition nations’ interest to help establish an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and 

independent. This is to the extent that it can counter a continuing threat from both the 

Sunni and Shia extremists. It must also address the root causes of extremism within its 

population and diminish the extremists’ ability to use Iraq to conduct external attacks. In 

Iraq, sectarianism and corruption combine to create dysfunction, harming the legitimacy 

of the government. A symptom of this dysfunction is the rise of extremist groups that 

employ violence and intimidation in a struggle for power and resources. Extremism, 

therefore, leads to the most dangerous and most likely security threat in Iraq: a wellresourced terrorist network with access to sanctuary, coupled with an irregular militia 

capable of employing sophisticated weapons. These groups could challenge both the 

legitimacy and viability of the Iraqi government and conduct external attacks around the 

world. 

Stated simply, the Coalition cannot solve sectarianism and corruption in Iraq. It can, 

however, build the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to counter terrorist networks and militias. 

If ISF establish legitimate security against this threat, it gives the Iraqi government time 

and space to address the root causes of sectarianism and corruption, slowly robbing 

extremism of its sources of power. 

As it helps to build ISF ability to counter terrorist networks and militias, the Coalition 

should prioritize increasing Iraq’s capacity to meet four critical requirements that will 

form the backbone of Iraq’s layered security approach:

1. Counterterrorism: Conducting operations to disrupt terrorist networks/militias

and deny sanctuary throughout Iraq. 

2. Policing: The establishment of a legitimate, community-based police force that

is able to contain insurgency activities at an acceptable level. 

3. Border Control: Reestablishing control of the Iraq-Syria border region to deny

freedom of movement in and out of sanctuary in Syria and prevent access to resources 

stockpiled there. 
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4. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Protecting key facilities, population centers,

and network nodes from “spectacular” attacks that would that would fracture the 

government, damage the economy, and provoke spiraling sectarian violence. 

As the Coalition focuses on these requirements, it must also work with Iraqi leaders to 

encourage them to make the difficult choices necessary for Security Sector Reform 

(SSR). Iraq’s security institutions require reform, or they will fade under pressure once 

again. All of the Coalition’s long-term interests in Iraq will be affected by the success or 

failure of the current SSR strategy approved by the Prime Minister. There is one area in 

SSR where the Coalition can help the Iraqis the most: establishing roles and 

responsibilities for individual components of the ISF. 

To help each component fulfill its role as determined through SSR, the Coalition will 

execute Operation Reliable Partnership, the consolidation phase of the campaign to 

defeat ISIS. During this phase, the Coalition will apply its resources and manpower to 

six functional efforts: security policy, security operations, training, sustainment, 

intelligence, and counter terrorism. Through Operation Reliable Partnership, the 

Coalition is committed to creating time and space for the Government of Iraq to 

establish legitimacy and meet the needs of its people. This paper presents leading 

indicators that can help Coalition nations assess positive and negative trends over the 

coming years. 

As ISIS recedes as a threat to the central government, the struggle for power and 

resources will be fierce in the post-caliphate context. The outcome is far from clear. The 

approach outlined in this paper applies limited marginal investments by the Coalition to 

give Iraq a chance to be sovereign, stable, and independent. The Coalition cannot do 

more, but it should not do less. This opportunity may not come again. 

Key Takeaways 

Persons new to the Security Cooperation (SC) field might be overwhelmed with new 

terms, funding authorities, and understanding how SC fits into the larger picture. CALL 

has published previous 

handbooks on topics 

ranging from Theater 

Security Cooperation to

Defense Institution 

Building. 

CALL Publications of Interest

 18-08 Defense Institution Building, Jan 2018

 17-03 Theater Security Cooperation, The Military

 Engagement Team Handbook

 14-14 Army Security Cooperation Newsletter

 News From the Front, Ministerial Advisors, Aug 17
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Security Cooperation

Field Manual (FM) 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, defines SC as all of the 

Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build 

defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests and develop allied 

and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. To

provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (Joint 

Publication [JP] 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense). SC includes all security assistance 

programs administered by DOD that build defense and security relationships that 

promote specific U.S. security interests. Security assistance programs include all 

international armament cooperation activities and other security assistance activities. 

Funding 

Understanding funding sources for SC can be complex and requires expertise. Staff 

officers who operate outside the G-8 realm typically have little experience with funding 

authorities. An understanding of the differences between Title 10 SC and Title 22 

security assistance funding and authorities is critical. In the most simplistic terms, if the 

Department of State (DOS) funds it, it is going to be Title 22 funding, as opposed to 

funding by DOD, which is Title 10. OSC-I operations and funding can be easily 

miscommunicated or misstated. This article will not go into the nuances of the above, 

but it is important to realize that OSC-I, while in its present form, is nested with the U.S. 

Embassy and answers to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; it operates in a Title 22 

environment. At the same time, much of its current funding is from DOD and will 

eventually come from DOS.

Training 

Training for positions in SC can be challenging in today’s high optempo environment. 

OSC-I, due to a number of reasons, faces the challenge of not always having personnel 

that have appropriate training. If time permits, there are classes available that will assist 

the majority of personnel before they arrive. The task then becomes identifying 

personnel who will fill key billets in a timely manner that will allow them to take 

necessary courses before their arrival to theater. 

Synchronization 

The key to a successful mission in a crowded environment is teamwork, a plan, and 

more importantly a shared vision. OSC-I personnel face a big task with an active military 

operation occurring while they are completing their mission. Having a defined plan, in 

this case a paper titled Iraq, What Now?, allows them to have a shared vision with 

multiple interests. In addition, it keeps all parties working towards the same goal. 
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Brigadier General (BG) S. Clinton Hinote, USAF 

Deputy Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I)

Summarized Interview

The OSC-I mission, its interaction with CJTF-OIR and the coalition, 

the recent Iraq history, and how it all fits into the big picture 

BG Hinote: Major General (MG) Felix Gedney, United Kingdom (UK), the Deputy 

Commander of Strategy and Support, CJTF-OIR, gathered quite a few of the one stars 

together and talked about the future of engagement in Iraq. The mixture included 

American, Australian, Canadian, and French BGs. We were talking through what is 

important right now. One of the things we decided that was quite important was being 

able to tell the story about “What now?” This was the genesis of the white paper 

idea. The caliphate in Iraq is no more; they don’t control territory. “What now? What do 

you do now?” It is not that we never had a plan, we did. People were ready for an 

answer; they are ready to discuss this because it is time to move on. Many of the 

coalition nations, although publicly saying we are through the defeat of Da’esh and we 

are solid in support of the coalition; are privately having individual conversations with 

what their commitment to Iraq ought to look like going forward. They need a plan, they 

need to balance shortfalls and dedicate resources and there are always too many 

requirements and not enough resources to meet those requirements. After 30 minutes 

of discussion, we needed to articulate what it is that the coalition can and should 

accomplish in Iraq. Of course, OSC-I is not part of the Coalition Joint Task Force, but 

we have been included in many different things. I attribute that to great leadership on 

the part of Lieutenant General (LTG) Paul E. Funk II, Commanding General, CJTF-OIR

and his subordinate commanders. They understand that OSC-I has a long-term view of 

Iraq and should; if we don’t were not adding value to the situation. 

The white paper we created was a collaborative effort; everybody on the Joint Task 

Force (JTF) including the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command 

(CJFLCC), the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF), as well as folks around 

the green zone as far as bilateral relationships, between - UK and Iraq, - Australians 

and Iraq, and others. Certainly, the staff of CJTF and OSC-I, all worked this together. 

The decision to publicly talk about the ideas that are in the paper, it was an effort to 

explain to everyone, including our coalition partners, what the plan was going forward, 

what are the things we could do. There wasn’t an appetite for unlimited commitment, but 

it was there for, “tell us what is good enough.” A large part of the paper’s theme is 

attempting to articulate, “This is good enough for the coalition involvement in Iraq going 

OSC-I has a long-term view of Iraq and should; if we don’t, were not adding value 

to the situation.
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forward.” It does not have to be 100,000 troops on the ground assuming security for 

cities and things like that; nobody has the appetite for that. However, a training/advisory 

mission that has a long-term focus, prioritized on the things they must do now, and what 

they must do going forward – that is what the paper is about. 

OSC-I is the long term. What about the next two years? 

Events are unfolding quickly in Iraq and in the adjoining countries. Many of the events 

that are happening such as the election results being influenced from outside parties 

and cannot be forecasted or controlled, that is to be expected. A good SC plan should 

always be well planned, with known objectives that look at long-term stability. 

BG Hinote: Most people will tell you there are two years remaining for CJTF but there 

is no specific mandate for how long this thing will last. There is a decision point after the 

upcoming election and the formation of the government and we’ll take a look at that 

during that time. However, if you don’t know where you want to go over the next 2-5 

year period, it’s really hard to understand what the next steps should be as we transition 

into Reliable Partnership. 

The white paper’s purpose is to be the overall vision for the U.S. involvement in Iraq on 

the security front. It’s not politics, not economics, but focuses on security. OSC-I has a 

long-term view of Iraq and should; if we don’t we're not adding value to the situation

again 

Preparation for the OSC-I mission 

BG Hinote: The longest we (U.S.) have anybody in OSC-I is a year, the shortest is 4 to 

6 months, and our assistant Staff Judge Advocate rotates every two months. Continuity 

is a very difficult challenge here. Then, you add in the fact that all of us here are 

amateurs at SC. I have had a one-week executive course at the Security Cooperation 

Agency... it’s great but it’s too much information in too little time. “I came over here and 

I was thrown into the fire; that’s how I learned.” That may work but we are constantly 

relearning the same things. For example, having served in Korea, at Kunsan Air Base, 

Spotlight on the importance of Security Cooperation 

Thank God OSC-I was here in 2014. ...OSC-I gave the Iraqis that capability 

because they had a consistent relationship. They were still in the relationship 

business with the Iraqi Army even when we were gone from 2011-2014. They 

were here. The Office of Security Cooperation was the interface between the U.S. 

and Iraqi militaries. Fortunately, they had some relationships that we were allowed 

to take-in and take-on and help grow. (LTG Paul E. Funk II, Commanding General, 

CJTF-OIR SEP 2017 to SEP 2018)
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that is 100% manned by one-year remote tours, we used to talk about how we have 

been in Korea for 50 years but it’s really that we’ve been in Korea for 50 one-year tours! 

One continues to learn and you would like to think that you build on previous people’s 

work, in some cases, you do, but a lot of that continuity is lost because of the length of 

the tour. There is a lot of SC out there but it doesn’t come to OSC-I for some reason. I 

don’t know the answer. We staff OSC-I with amateurs. Except with the possible 

exception of one or two of our people who just got here, everybody is new to the SC

world. 

Training that is currently out there for SC planning 

The Army and the DOD know that the GCCs would benefit from individuals well versed 

in SC. While foreign area officers (FAOs), regionally focused experts in political-military 

with language proficiency, would be considered ideal candidates for SC positions, SC 

does not always require that level of experience. Given the limited number of FAOs 

available versus the number of SC individuals needed, the Army has tasked the 

Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS) to conduct educational 

courses designed to improve the knowledge and enhance the skills of a wide audience 

in the field of SC. 

Courses range from a short three-day course in SC Management that provides an 

orientation-level understanding of SC to more detailed courses in the U.S. Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) program in support of the partners nation’s defense that can be as 

long as 15 days. 

Courses are also available for Senior Executives (O7 or equivalent) to gain a better 

understanding of the overall United States Government (USG) security 

cooperation/security assistance purpose, policies, management structure, and 

execution processes. More detailed courses are also available in SC Management that 

are designed to meet the educational requirements of U.S. security cooperation 

organization (SCO) personnel and geographic combatant command staff personnel 

directly supporting SCOs and can range in length from one to five weeks. 

Training for OSC missions can be difficult to obtain if it is not planned for several 

months out. The OSC-I mission experiences many of the same training obstacles that 

are experienced by personnel going to the Afghanistan Theater. These obstacles range 

from having personnel minimally experienced in dealing with foreign personnel and 

customs to having personnel arrive in theater with no training whatsoever. Though not 

the norm, in rare instances, positions are filled when personnel arrive in theater. 

While last minute fills and taskings are to be expected in the Services, they do degrade 

the mission. Having a focused career field or a skill qualifier would go a long way in 

professionalizing the SC field. 
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BG Hinote: Our J8 lead is Ministry of Defense Advisor (MODA) trained. We are hoping 

to bring over a training team from Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to 

train us on a few topics soon. Most people here will be rotating out this summer though. 

It’s good training; I’d rather we all had it than not, but it’s hard to see how continuity 

comes from that. 

Are you really going to man a place like this with two-year people? You are probably not 

and it’s not recommended; it’s too long away from home and family. At the same time, 

the mission suffers. There is a lot of on the job training for us since we don’t have deep 

backgrounds. In almost every case, we are taking people who are generalists and we’re 

trying to make them look like someone who is a specialist in a few programs that they 

can manage while they are here and also manage the relations with the Iraqis within 

those programs. 

Addressing these training challenges 

BG Hinote: In the new National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), LTG Charles 

Hooper, Chief, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, has been told to create a SC

career field. It is hoped that one of the reasons why that was put in the NDAA was to 

create a career field that provides expertise to places like OSC-I. People will come here 

and understand the challenges: they have worked with foreign military sales, they know 

the computer programs, and they understand some of the pitfalls that could/will happen. 

I think that’s one of the main things – there are just standard friction points in any of 

these programs. You can anticipate them if you have the experience and 

understanding; our people don’t have that experience so they walk right into the friction 

point. They have to figure out how to manage it and at times, it ends up being 

untenable. 

Security Cooperation Program in Iraq requires significant Support 

Having a sustainable program is an important part of a good Security Cooperation 

Program. When Iraq first made purchases in the 2008 period, oil prices were still high 

and there was a strong belief that Iraq could sustain the program they were purchasing. 

With the subsequent drop in oil revenue, that is no longer the case.

BG Hinote: We’ve made some significant mistakes in SC with Iraq since we withdrew in 

2011. One of the things that clearly was a mistake was overselling equipment that has 

to be maintained through contracted logistic support. Their (Iraqis) force structure is 

non-sustainable in the long term yet there was never (at least if there was it was never 

handed off to us) a plan for weaning them off very expensive contracted logistic support. 

It was just assumed that they could pay for it – well they can’t. Reconstruction dollars 

are more strategically important than keeping some of these expensive weapons 
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programs running. They just don’t have the budget for it. You could say that no one 

anticipated oil prices dropping the way that they did, that’s true, but we are in a situation 

now where there was never a branch plan on how to taper down the contracted logistic 

support. 

The likely outcome right now

For example, they need so many dollars per year, 

in the out years to keep the F-16 program going. 

So what happens the first year they can’t pay it? 

We demobilize Lockheed who is fixing the F16s 

and we demobilize SallyPort that has the Base 

Operation Support contract and so on. It goes 

from very high level of support, everything going

well – they’re flying, their fixing, they’re fine – to

nothing. What do you think happens at that point?

They park their aircraft and the aircraft lose their 

value. After a year of not flying and being out in 

the desert, you will never be able to resell those 

aircraft; no one will want them. The program has 

now failed. We have to figure out a way draw the 

program down so that the Iraqis realize that they 

have to learn how to do flight line maintenance; 

how to refuel the aircraft; or how to run the 

airfield. They’re not doing any of those things right 

now. It’s the biggest example money wise, but you could replicate that scenario across

many of these weapon systems. 

Someone made the decision to sell these things, the F-16s. They had to know what 

level of support was required because they had to put that into the contracts. It was 

never handed off to us (OSC-I) as to what that plan was. What I got from my successor 

was, “This is a problem. You’re going to have to worry about this.” However, there was 

no plan on getting out of there. This is a byproduct of the mature nature of OSC-I. It’s 

been a year and I’m fluent in it, trying to influence Washington D.C., the implementing 

agencies back in the States - and trying to influence the Iraqis. Nevertheless, I will go, 

my successor will come in, I’ll have a five-day hand off with him, and we’ll see where 

he goes with it. 

Snapshot of the F-16 Program

-18 of 35 have been delivered to

Balad Air Force Base. Total package 

$7.8 billion

-Annual Maintenance Contract with

SallyPort (Balad Air Force Base 

Operations) not to exceed $400

million.

F-16 ~$350M/yr
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How does OSC-I utilize the Defense Attaché Office?

BG Hinote: We do for the things that they 

are experienced and good at but there are 

very few if any people in the current Defense 

Attaché Office who have SC backgrounds. 

They have attaché backgrounds, and they 

have attaché training and they are fantastic at 

those tasks but not necessarily in the 

cooperation tasks or in the things we need to 

be able to do to manage things like Foreign 

Military sales or military financing. 

OSC-I is Title 10 funded, how does 

this affect the way you work in a 

Title 22 environment?

BG Hinote: We are a Title 22 organization. 

Someone was saying the other day, “When 

are you going to make the switch from Title 

10 to Title 22?” I will tell you, we are clearly a 

Title 22 organization with a little bit of Title 10 

responsibility thrown in there. Some funding 

comes from Title 10, which is not 

inconsequential, it’s Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) funding, and we use that to 

be able to do our jobs. If that funding went 

away, we’d have to do less. That being said, the focus of what we do is clearly Title 22 

stuff, run by the State Department, administered by us. We know that and understand 

that. The Attaché office is responsible for different things than we are. The Attaché

office clearly wants there to be a Senior Defense Official (SDO) / Defense Attaché 

(DATT) that is over everything. It would be better for the synergy between the offices. 

The ambassador would like that too. We put up a request to designate the Chief of 

OSC-I as the senior defense official and the Defense Attaché as well. We’ll see if that 

gets approved; it’ll be a long process if it does. 

What are Senior Defense Officials 

(SDO) / Defense Attachés (DATT)? 

It is the principal DOD official in a U.S. 

embassy, as designated by the Secretary 

of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the Chief 

of Mission's principal military advisor on 

defense and national security issues, the 

senior diplomatically accredited DOD 

military officer assigned to a diplomatic 

mission, and the single point of contact for 

all DOD matters involving the embassy or 

DOD elements assigned to or working from 

the embassy. The SDO or DATT is 

considered the dual-hatted chief of both the 

security cooperation organization (SCO) 

and defense attaché office (DAO) in the 

embassy. This position was established by 

DODD 5105.75, Department of Defense 

Operations at U.S. Embassies, December 

21, 2007. The same document gives 

coordinating authority (see glossary 

definition) to the SDO or DATT for ensuring 

that all DOD elements in a country are 

working in consonance with each other and 

under the guidance of the Chief of Mission. 

The SDO or DATT program replaces the 

now defunct U.S. Defense Representative 

(USDR) model.
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Synchronization: Keeping OSC-I, CJTF-OIR and coalition forces on 

the same page

According to Colonel Robert Davis, USAF, Director, Security Assistance, Office of 

Security Cooperation-Iraq, the coordination between OSC-I and CJTF isn’t built into 

either organization’s structure. The organizations don’t report to the same boss. The 

CJTF holds a weekly synchronization meeting that includes OSC-I. There is a 

realization that there needs to be unity of effort; there needs to be a synchronized effort 

because things that both organizations do will affect each other’s mission. If there 

wasn’t a willingness to coordinate and synchronize then the forcing function to make 

that happen would be very high up the chain of command.

BG Hinote: The way that the U.S. does foreign engagement is challenging. I can think 

of at least seven semi-autonomous headquarters of military here. When I say 

headquarters, I also mean units that are 

semi-autonomous - doing their own thing. If 

it weren’t for the senior leadership we could 

easily all get off the grid. In my humble 

opinion, we’re pretty well aligned with all of 

those but it takes a tremendous amount of 

relationship building, and that’s just with the 

military. Let’s start talking about Treasury, 

State, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

When you start talking about how the U.S.

engages with others, it’s not at all clear who 

is running the engagement, of course 

everyone will say the Chief of Mission is the 

President’s representative inside of the 

country. Totally agree, but that does not necessarily reflect all of the detail that has to 

happen in order for our engagements to line up and all pursue the same overall 

objectives. 

We need more interagency alignment underneath an agreed upon construct, whatever 

that construct would be and look like. That would be a big, big reform effort on our part. 

We talk about Security Sector reform for others, but security sector reform that we need 

is being able to bring the interagency together at a level that’s different than the National 

Security Council. It works here to the degree of good relationships and good trust being 

built across people who are trying to help each other out. But there’s no reason why it 

has to work; it works because people are doing the right thing. 

On Interaction with OSC-I

...I think that the Iraqis now have an 

opportunity to start making some 

choices, the relationship with CJFLCC 

[CJTF] and OSC-I will become tighter. 

It will have to become tighter; we will 

now be focused on moving the Iraqis 

through a training cycle that gets them 

to operate on their own. (MG Robert 

“Pat” White, Commanding General, 

Combined Joint Force Land Component 

Command-OIR, Mar 2017 to Mar 2018).