* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-60802 

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHARON DEMETRESS HOOPER,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:97-CR-28-1-LS

- - - - - - - - - -

October 23, 1998

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sharon Demetress Hooper appeals her conviction of

trafficking in and using unauthorized access devices from

February 1996 until December 1996, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1029(a)(2). Hooper submitted fraudulent applications to

acquire and resell cellular telephones and cellular telephone

service provided by Century Cellunet.

Hooper argues that the district court erred in denying her

motion in limine to exclude evidence that prior to the charged

offense, she had obtained two cellular telephone service 
No. 97-60802 

-2-

contracts for her own use by submitting fraudulent applications. 

It is not clear whether Hooper properly preserved the issue

raised on appeal in her motion in limine. The record does not

contain a copy of Hooper’s motion in limine. Although the

transcript indicates that a motion in limine was presented in

open court and discussed at trial, the record is vague as to the

specifications of the motion. Hooper failed to provide record

cites in her brief showing that she objected when the evidence

was introduced at trial. See Moore v. FDIC, 993 F.2d 106, 107

(5th Cir. 1993); Wilson v. Waggener, 837 F.2d 220, 222 (5th Cir.

1988). Regardless whether the issue was properly preserved or

briefed, Hooper’s argument is without merit.

Although the district court did not determine whether the

evidence was intrinsic or extrinsic, it not abuse its discretion

in admitting the evidence. Even if the evidence were considered

extrinsic, evidence that Hooper fraudulently obtained cellular

phones and service in the past is admissible under Fed. R. Evid.

404(b) to establish knowledge and intent. See United States v.

Leal, 74 F.3d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 1996)(extrinsic evidence that

defendant engaged in similar crimes can be relevant to

establishing her knowledge or intent to commit the crime

charged). 

The probative value of the evidence is not substantially

outweighed by undue prejudice. Hooper’s acts were similar to

those for which she was charged and occurred close in time to the

charged offense. The Government’s other evidence sheds little

light on Hooper's intent; thus, the probative value of the
No. 97-60802 

-3-

extrinsic offense is great. United States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d

342, 346 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 615 (1997).

Hooper also argues that the district court erred in denying

her motion for a judgment of acquittal challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence establishing her intent to defraud. 

Hooper’s codefendant testified that the applications for

telephones and service were completed with false information,

that he was directed to forge signatures on the applications, and

that he and Hooper resold the cellular telephones. A handwriting

expert testified that Hooper filled out a large number of the

applications herself and that she probably signed the customer’s

signatures on a number of the applications. A Century Cellunet

representative also testified that numerous charges were incurred

on the contracts Hooper sold but the customers could never be

located. Hooper admitted that she had previously obtained

cellular phones and service for her personal using by submitting

fraudulent applications. Based on this evidence, a rational

trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Hooper had intent to defraud. See United States v. Resio-Trejo,

45 F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 1995). 

AFFIRMED.