IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 86

 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2014

July 3, 2014

JESSICA LYN HOFHINE,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

MIKE DAVID HOFHINE,

Appellee

(Defendant).

No. S-13-0225

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County

The Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant:

John A. Thomas and Ammon E. Francom, John A. Thomas Law Office, Evanston, 

Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:

Farrah L. Spencer, Long, Reimer, Winegar, Beppler, LLP, Park City, Utah; 

Monica J. Vozakis, Long, Reimer, Winegar, Beppler, LLP, Evanston, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE*, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

*Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers 

are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in 

the permanent volume.
1

BURKE, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Appellant, Jessica Lyn Hofhine, challenges the district court’s order denying her 

“Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and Decree of Divorce.” She asserts she is 

entitled to an “income equalization” payment under the terms of the parties’ divorce 

decree. She also contends the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Appellee. 

We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Ms. Hofhine presents the following issues:

1. Whether the district court erred in its interpretation and 

application of the legal documents governing the property 

distribution between Appellant and Appellee, and the 

equalization of their incomes.

2. Whether the district court violated Appellant’s right to due 

process of law when it did not allow any party or witness 

testimony at the hearing on Appellant’s motion to equalize 

income.

3. Whether the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees 

should be reversed.

Mr. Hofhine presents an additional issue:

1. Whether Husband is entitled to attorney’s fees incurred on 

appeal.

FACTS

[¶3] The parties were married in 2001. Ms. Hofhine filed for divorce in September, 

2010. At that time, Mr. Hofhine was the president and sole shareholder of New Tech 

Inspection Service (New Tech), and Ms. Hofhine worked for the company as an office 

manager and bookkeeper. In November, 2010, after Ms. Hofhine submitted a motion for 

temporary spousal support, the district court entered an “Order Setting Current Salaries,” 

which provided that both parties would “continue to be employed by New Tech 

Inspection Service at their current salaries of $5,200.00 gross each per each semi-monthly 

pay period.” The order also stated that “any additional compensation from New Tech 

Inspection Service in the form of draws, or otherwise, shall not be paid to either party 

without the written consent of both parties or by court order.”
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[¶4] In September, 2011, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement. The 

“Stipulation and Agreement” provided that Mr. Hofhine would pay to Ms. Hofhine “a 

total cash settlement for any and all interest in New Tech Inspection Service [in] the sum 

of $375,000.” Paragraph 18 of the Stipulation and Agreement stated that “This 

agreement is intended to be and shall be a full, final and complete property settlement 

between the parties and neither party shall make any property claim against the other 

except as herein provided and set forth.”

[¶5] The Stipulation and Agreement was subsequently incorporated into the Decree of 

Divorce entered by the district court on September 23, 2011. On October 27, the court 

entered a Judgment and Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc to correct a typographical 

error in the original Decree. Paragraph 11ac of the Decree Nunc Pro Tunc provided that 

Ms. Hofhine

shall have as her sole and separate property . . . An amount to 

be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff to equalize the incomes of 

the parties to the date of termination of Plaintiff’s 

employment as set forth above, pursuant to the provisions set 

forth in the Order Setting Current Salaries . . . filed by the 

Court on November 5, 2010 which equalized the salaries of 

both parties.

Ms. Hofhine’s employment with New Tech ended in October, 2011.

[¶6] In May, 2012, Ms. Hofhine filed a “Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and 

Decree of Divorce.” A hearing was held on the motion and during that hearing 

Ms. Hofhine claimed that Mr. Hofhine had withdrawn approximately $182,000.00 from 

the company in the form of dividends, special pay, and draws, and that these withdrawals 

should have been equalized under Paragraph 11ac of the Decree Nunc Pro Tunc. 

Following the hearing, the district court entered an order denying Ms. Hofhine’s motion. 

The court concluded as follows:

4. Paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce clearly and 

unambiguously provided that Plaintiff be paid a total of 

$375,000 as a complete and final cash settlement for any and 

all interests that Plaintiff had in New Tech Inspection 

Services. Therefore, Plaintiff has no claim to any additional 

compensation for any interest Plaintiff now claims to have in 

New Tech Inspection Services.

. . .

7. The Order Setting Salaries required only that the 
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parties’ salaries from New Tech Inspection Services be 

equalized so that both parties received a salary of $10,400.00 

per month, which Plaintiff did not dispute that she received 

until her termination date. The Order Setting Salaries did not 

require that any dividends, special pay, or draws be equalized.

Additionally, the court noted that “as of June 2011, Plaintiff knew of the dividends, 

special pay, and draws she now claims should be equalized but Plaintiff did not ask the 

Court for compensation or equalization of such payments before the Decree of Divorce 

was entered on September 23, 2011.” The court concluded that “because Plaintiff had 

knowledge of the payments that she now argues should have been equalized but failed to 

request such equalization, Plaintiff waived any claim she may have had to such 

equalization when the final Decree of Divorce was entered.” The court also entered an 

order awarding attorney’s fees to Mr. Hofhine, as permitted under the Decree Nunc Pro 

Tunc. Ms. Hofhine filed a timely appeal from the district court’s orders.

DISCUSSION

[¶7] In her first issue, Ms. Hofhine contends the district court erred in concluding that 

she was not entitled to equalization of income under the parties’ divorce decree. She 

asserts that Mr. Hofhine received compensation from New Tech in the form of dividends, 

special pay, and draws for personal use. She claims that this additional compensation 

must be considered income for tax purposes, and should also be considered “income” that 

is subject to the equalization requirement under Paragraph 11ac of the decree. It is 

undisputed that the funds which Ms. Hofhine seeks to have equalized were paid to 

Mr. Hofhine prior to entry of the decree. Mr. Hofhine asserts that only salary was 

required to be equalized and that Ms. Hofhine received all salary required to be paid to 

her pursuant to the decree. 

[¶8] In order to resolve this issue, we must interpret the provisions of the decree, the 

parties’ Stipulation and Agreement, and the Order Setting Current Salaries. We have 

repeatedly held that interpretation of contracts is a question of law, which we review de 

novo. Knight v. TCB Constr. & Design, LLC, 2011 WY 27, ¶ 7, 248 P.3d 178, 181 

(Wyo. 2011).

[¶9] In interpreting a property settlement agreement, we attempt to ascertain the 

parties’ intent by looking to the specific language of the agreement:

As with all contracts, a court reviewing a property 

settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree must 

attempt to ascertain the parties’ intent by first looking to the 

specific wording of the agreement. If the language is clear 

and unambiguous, the court should restrict its review to the 
4

four corners of the document. That is, a court should not 

resort to extrinsic or parol evidence or rules of contract 

construction to avoid or enlarge the clearly expressed intent 

of the parties. It may, however, confirm its understanding of 

otherwise seemingly unambiguous language by reviewing 

evidence which, although extrinsic to the contract, 

complements that language by clarifying the context in which 

the agreement was drawn.

Dowell v. Dowell (In re Dowell), 2012 WY 154, ¶ 18, 290 P.3d 357, 361 (Wyo. 2012)

(citations omitted).

[¶10] Ms. Hofhine’s claim that she is entitled to payments equaling Mr. Hofhine’s 

withdrawals from New Tech is based on the language of Paragraph 11ac of the parties’ 

divorce decree. As noted above, that paragraph provides that Ms. Hofhine

shall have as her sole and separate property . . . An amount to 

be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff to equalize the incomes of 

the parties to the date of termination of Plaintiff’s 

employment as set forth above, pursuant to the provisions set 

forth in the Order Setting Current Salaries . . . filed by the 

Court on November 5, 2010 which equalized the salaries of 

both parties.

Ms. Hofhine asserts that the term “income,” as used in this paragraph, includes all 

payments received by Mr. Hofhine from New Tech including payments received prior to 

entry of the decree. As support for her definition of the term “income,” Ms. Hofhine

relies on our decision in Teeples v. Teeples, 2012 WY 127, ¶ 11, 286 P.3d 134, 136 

(Wyo. 2012), in which we noted that, under Section 301(c)(1) of the United States 

Internal Revenue Code, “If a corporation makes a distribution of property to a 

shareholder with respect to that shareholder’s stock, the portion of the distribution which 

is a dividend must be included in the shareholder’s income as well.” Ms. Hofhine’s 

reliance on our decision in Teeples, however, is misplaced. In Teeples, the appellant 

received a payment from the appellee pursuant to the parties’ Property Settlement 

Agreement. The appellee paid the appellant with funds from an S corporation he 

received in the divorce. The appellant claimed that because she had previously been a 

shareholder in the S corporation, the payment constituted a dividend and impermissibly 

increased her income tax liability. We concluded, however, that under Section 26 

U.S.C.A. § 301(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, the appellant was taxed properly on 

“income” earned by the S corporation. Id., ¶ 11, 286 P.3d at 136. Unlike Teeples,

resolution of the dispute in the present case does not depend on interpretation of the 

Internal Revenue Code. In this case, the parties’ agreement unambiguously equates 

“income” with “salary.”
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[¶11] The term “income” is not defined in the Decree of Divorce, the parties’ Stipulation 

and Agreement, or the Order Setting Current Salaries. The manner in which the term is 

employed in the Decree of Divorce, however, unambiguously indicates that the term is 

intended to be synonymous with the term “salary.” First, we note that Paragraph 11ac 

states that Ms. Hofhine is entitled to an amount equalizing the “incomes” of the parties 

“to the date of termination of Plaintiff’s employment.” The reference to termination of 

Ms. Hofhine’s employment suggests that the equalization of “income” is intended to 

mean equalization of the parties’ salaries. This meaning of “income” is also suggested by 

Paragraph 8 of the decree, which provides that, until Mr. Hofhine satisfied his obligations 

under the terms of the decree, Ms. Hofhine would “continue to work for New Tech 

Inspection Service at her present monthly income.” Further, Paragraph 11ac states that

equalization of income is “pursuant to the provisions set forth in the Order Setting 

Current Salaries.” That order, as indicated by its title, related to the parties’ salaries and 

provided that the parties would “continue to be employed by New Tech Inspection 

Service at their current salaries of $5,200.00 gross each per each semi-monthly pay 

period . . . .” 

[¶12] Ms. Hofhine notes that the Order Setting Current Salaries also states, in Paragraph 

2, that “any additional compensation from New Tech Inspection Service in the form of 

draws, or otherwise, shall not be paid to either party without the written consent of both 

parties or by court order.” Ms. Hofhine suggests that this language indicates that such 

additional compensation is required to be equalized under the divorce decree. We do not 

agree. The plain language of Paragraph 2 contains no requirement that any additional 

compensation be equalized, and there is nothing in the Order that provides for 

equalization of additional compensation as a remedy for violation of the Order. 

Accordingly, pursuant to the Order Setting Current Salaries, which is incorporated into 

the divorce decree by explicit reference in Paragraph 11ac, only the parties’ salaries were 

required to be equalized. The divorce decree confirms this interpretation by stating that 

the Order Setting Current Salaries “equalized the salaries of both parties.”

[¶13] Additionally, under Ms. Hofhine’s interpretation of the term “income,” she would 

be entitled to payments equalizing Mr. Hofhine’s withdrawal of dividends from New 

Tech. The effect of Ms. Hofhine’s interpretation, however, would be directly 

contradictory to the parties’ Stipulation and Agreement, which provides that Mr. Hofhine

would pay to Ms. Hofhine “a total cash settlement for any and all interest in New Tech 

Inspection Service [in] the sum of $375,000.” The Stipulation also states that the 

agreement “is intended to be and shall be a full, final and complete property settlement 

between the parties and neither party shall make any property claim against the other 

except as herein provided and set forth.” These provisions were incorporated into the 

Decree of Divorce. Ms. Hofhine’s claim that she is entitled to additional compensation to 

equalize dividend payments made to Mr. Hofhine would effectively circumvent these 

provisions by allowing her to receive an additional interest in New Tech beyond the 
6

$375,000 paid to her for “any and all interest” in the company. Ms. Hofhine’s claim to 

additional compensation under the decree also contradicts her counsel’s statements in a 

letter to opposing counsel following entry of the original decree. In that letter, which was 

introduced into evidence at the hearing, Ms. Hofhine’s counsel stated that “It appears that 

your client has satisfied all of the requirements of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce so 

that my client can cease working for New Tech Inspection Service at her present monthly 

income . . . .”

[¶14] We conclude that the plain language of the parties’ divorce decree unambiguously 

required only the parties’ monthly salaries from New Tech to be equalized. The district 

court did not err in denying Ms. Hofhine’s request for additional compensation. Because 

we have found that additional payments received by Mr. Hofhine from New Tech were 

not required to be equalized under the decree, we need not determine whether 

Ms. Hofhine waived her claim to equalization of those payments.

[¶15] In her next issue, Ms. Hofhine contends the district court violated her due process 

rights by refusing to permit the parties or witnesses to testify at the hearing on her

motion. She claims that she should have been allowed to testify and “to call witnesses to 

explain the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and the purposes of the 

provisions at issue in the Order Setting Current Salaries, the Stipulation, and the Decree 

Nunc Pro Tunc.” Whether a court’s action has violated a party’s right to due process is a 

question of law which we review de novo. Verheydt v. Verheydt, 2013 WY 25, ¶ 20, 295 

P.3d 1245, 1250 (Wyo. 2013).

[¶16] As we have previously stated, an opportunity for hearing in accordance with due 

process must be “appropriate to the nature of the case.” JKS v. AHF (In re ARF), 2013 

WY 97, ¶ 28, 307 P.3d 852, 858 (Wyo. 2013). “The party claiming an infringement of 

his right to due process has the burden of demonstrating both that he has a protected 

interest and that such interest has been affected in an impermissible way. The question is 

whether there has been a denial of fundamental fairness.” DH v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family 

Servs., 2003 WY 155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003) (citation omitted). In the 

present case, the purpose of the hearing was to determine whether Ms. Hofhine was 

entitled to additional compensation under the parties’ divorce decree, and if so, to 

determine the amount of such additional compensation. At the hearing, both parties were 

allowed to present argument and to introduce and explain exhibits. Ms. Hofhine did not 

object to the procedure, did not seek to introduce any testimony, and did not provide an 

offer of proof indicating the content of any proposed testimony. Additionally, the 

determination as to whether Ms. Hofhine was entitled to additional compensation was a 

purely legal issue. As we have previously discussed, the district court properly 

determined that the agreement was unambiguous. Under the circumstances, admission of 

evidence extrinsic to the parties’ agreement would not have been appropriate. The 

district court did not violate Ms. Hofhine’s due process rights.
7

[¶17] In her third issue, Ms. Hofhine challenges the award of attorney’s fees to 

Mr. Hofhine. A district court’s grant or denial of attorney’s fees is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. Sterrett Props., LLC v. Big-D Signature Corp., 2013 WY 154, ¶ 8, 314 P.3d 

1155, 1157 (Wyo. 2013). Ms. Hofhine concedes that the award of attorney’s fees to the 

prevailing party is authorized under Paragraph 18 of the Decree Nunc Pro Tunc. That 

paragraph provides:

In the event any subsequent action should be commenced by 

either party against the other involving any of the provisions 

which are the subject matter of this proceeding and any future 

orders and decrees filed herein, then the losing party to such 

action as evidenced by an order or judgment against the 

person shall pay all the successful party’s attorney’s fees and 

costs in such action, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

Ms. Hofhine’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in awarding 

attorney’s fees to Mr. Hofhine is contingent on her success in this appeal. According to 

Ms. Hofhine,

A reversal of the district court’s Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law, and Order on Hearing that dismisse[d] 

Wife’s claim to equalize income will mean Husband was not 

the prevailing party below, and therefore is not entitled to 

attorney’s fees pursuant to the Decree Nunc Pro Tunc. In 

other words, if Wife prevails on this appeal, the award of 

attorney’s fees to Husband, as the losing party, would become 

an abuse of discretion that should be reversed by this Court.

As set forth above, the district court properly denied Ms. Hofhine’s Motion for 

Enforcement of Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, we find no basis to 

reverse the award of attorney’s fees. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding attorney’s fees to Mr. Hofhine.

[¶18] Finally, with respect to Mr. Hofhine’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred in this 

appeal, we conclude that he is entitled to those fees under Paragraph 18 of the Decree 

Nunc Pro Tunc. As we have previously noted, “Attorney’s fees are recoverable if 

expressly provided for by statute or contract. Where a contract allows the award of 

attorney’s fees, that includes fees incurred on appeal.” Kinstler v. RTB South Greeley, 

LTD., LLC, 2007 WY 98, ¶ 13, 160 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Wyo. 2007) (citation omitted). We 

will determine the appropriate sum to be awarded after counsel submits proper 

documentation. 

[¶19] Affirmed.