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CAMBODIA’S SMALL DEBT:

WHEN WILL THE U.S. FORGIVE?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND 

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 30, 2010

Serial No. 111–128

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Mr. Joseph Y. Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................... 9

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and 

the Global Environment: Prepared statement ................................................... 6

Mr. Joseph Y. Yun: Prepared statement ............................................................... 12

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 34

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 35

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega: Material submitted for the record ...... 36

(1)

CAMBODIA’S SMALL DEBT: WHEN WILL THE 

U.S. FORGIVE? 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC

AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The subcommittee will come to order. 

This is a hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, 

the Pacific and the Global Environment. The specific topic for discussion this afternoon is ‘‘Cambodia’s Small Debt: When Will the 

United States Forgive This Debt?’’

I am going to begin the hearing by giving my opening statement. 

I do want to say, Mr. Secretary, I deeply appreciate your taking 

the time to come again and make this appearance before the subcommittee. I want to say that this town is practically a ghost town 

ever since we took the last vote last night at about 1 or 2 in the 

morning, and everybody is out trying to get re-elected. I thought 

we were going to still be in session next week, but things change, 

and this is where we are now. 

Between 1972 and 1975, Cambodia incurred a $276 million debt 

to the United States through the provision of agricultural commodities. General Lon Nol incurred this debt to support his chaotic and 

dictatorial regime, which seized power through a coup, making his 

an illegitimate government in the eyes of many of today’s Cambodians. Lon Nol did nothing to address this debt. 

The Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975. This regime also failed 

to service the loan. In addition, it killed or starved at least 20 percent of Cambodians, some 7 million people, and neglected infrastructure and factories and reverted to ancient agricultural techniques, all of which decimated the Cambodian economy and any 

ability to repay the debt. Vietnam occupied Cambodia for 10 years 

after the Khmer Rouge lost control, and they also ignored the debt. 

Consequently, Cambodia now owes the United States $444.4 million, including interest, as of December of last year. 

I want to give a little sense of perspective concerning the history 

of U.S.-Cambodia relations because I think it is important for the 

record that this be noted. At the height of the Vietnam War, Cambodia was very much a part of our overall military and strategic 

interests, and some highly questionable decisions were made by ofVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:29 Dec 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\APGE\093010\61519 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ficials of the Nixon administration, including President Nixon himself. 

Part of the U.S. frustration in dealing with Cambodia was due 

to Prince Sihanouk. As ruler in Cambodia, he maintained a position of neutrality on the war in Vietnam, yet, at the same time, 

was unable to prevent North Vietnamese military forces from setting up sanctuaries or strongholds along the border between Cambodia and Vietnam. Prince Sihanouk’s government was later overthrown by General Lon Nol, supposedly with the assistance of the 

United States, although this has never been proven to be true. 

Against the advice of his Secretary of Defense Laird and Secretary of State Rogers, President Nixon accepted the recommendations of his military commanders by sending military forces into 

Cambodia to destroy those North Vietnamese sanctuaries along the 

Cambodian-Vietnam borders, raising the specter of expanding the 

war in Vietnam despite an established policy of supposedly winding 

down the overseas U.S. military presence in Vietnam. 

It is believed that the U.S. military action going into Vietnam 

contributed to one of the greatest tragedies of recent history. The 

American invasion of North Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia unleashed thousands of tons of bombs on Cambodia. It also caused 

North Vietnam to conduct large-scale operations in support of the 

Khmer Rouge, who were fighting against Lon Nol’s government, 

which was supposedly supported by the United States. 

I quote from George Herring’s book, ‘‘America’s Longest War: The 

Ultimate Tragedy’’:

‘‘From beginning to end, the Nixon administration viewed its 

new ally, General Lon Nol, as little more than a pawn to be 

used to help salvage the U.S. position in Vietnam, showing little regard for Cambodia and its people.’’

It should also be noted that President Nixon’s decision to invade 

Cambodia caused serious repercussions even within the United 

States. College student demonstrations erupted all over the country, and some might have said this was Nixon’s worst nightmare. 

One demonstration in particular resulted in four students shot 

dead by the U.S. National Guard at Kent State University in Ohio. 

Two students were also shot dead at Jackson State University in 

Mississippi. 

Some 100,000 more demonstrators showed up in our Nation’s 

capital to demonstrate against the President’s decision to invade 

Cambodia. Students at some 350 college and university campuses 

went on strike, and more than 500 colleges and universities were 

closed to prevent more violence. So this little insight in terms of 

the history was not very pleasant in terms of U.S. involvement, not 

only in Vietnam but what we did to the people of Cambodia. 

Cambodia has asked the United States to forgive its debt or use 

a portion of the payment toward U.S. assistance programs, which 

include health care, economic competitiveness, civil society and 

land mine removal—especially land mine removal, Mr. Secretary. 

However, the U.S. Treasury and Department of State have showed 

remarkable inflexibility and simply a lack of any cooperation on 

this issue. 

3

Why does the United States insist on squeezing this little, least- developed country out of $444.4 million? Why is debt forgiveness 

not an option? Why do we not consider recycling the debt payments 

for environmental conservation efforts or swapping the debt for a 

much-needed educational exchange fund similar to the Vietnam 

education exchange fund created by Congress 10 years ago? 

This is the second in a series of hearings I have held in my capacity as chairman of the subcommittee on Cambodia’s debt. During the last hearing, held in February, 2 years ago, the U.S. State 

Department testified that debt forgiveness or recycling for Cambodia would set a pattern of forgiveness for other nations indebted 

to the United States. In my opinion, Mr. Secretary, this is absolutely ludicrous and without justification. 

We should note that a precedent has already been established. Six years ago, the United States forgave $4.1 billion of Iraqi debt 

accumulated under Saddam Hussein’s leadership so as not to cripple the new government. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s debt of $24 million 

was forgiven in 1999, and Yugoslavia’s $538.4 million debt was forgiven in 2002. 

But we must also consider the impact of U.S. activities in Cambodia during the Vietnam War era. From 1969 to 1973, the U.S. 

staged large-scale bombing campaigns in parts of Cambodia, which 

still prevent the use of a vast majority of rich farmlands in this 

country, Mr. Secretary. In certain regions it has restricted agricultural development because many of these bombs that were dropped 

never detonated and has caused a serious hazard, not only to the 

citizens and to the people of Cambodia and just simply because the 

ordnance is still there and it is a real, real serious situation. 

The legacy of losses inflicted by the Khmer Rouge also continues today. The average Cambodian earns a mere $5.50 a day, an 

amount comparable to Mauritania, Cameroon and several other 

countries classified by the International Monetary Fund as highlyindebted poor countries worthy of debt reduction. But far worse living standards face 30 percent of Cambodians, who live on less than 

60 cents per day, according to the 2009 United Nations Development Program report. 

Given Cambodia’s status as a least-developed country and acknowledging that the Khmer Rouge’s brutal genocide continues to 

afflict the country today economically, other nations and organizations have shown considerably more flexibility in addressing Cambodia’s debt. 

For example, Hungary forgave Cambodia’s debt of $216 million 

in 2009. Russia forgave approximately $1 billion of Cambodian debt 

in 2008. In 1995, Japan forgave all claims against Cambodia incurred before 1975, which totaled $270 million. Additionally, the 

International Monetary Fund granted Cambodia $82 million in 

debt relief 5 years ago, acknowledging that Cambodia needed the 

funding to reach its Millennium Development Goals. 

Should the United States fail to forgive or recycle Cambodia’s 

debt, Cambodia may turn to other countries for financial assistance. Already, China has forgiven at least $60 million of debt and 

extended loans to Cambodia for infrastructure and historical preservation. Such Chinese assistance often comes without conditions 

for political, economic or environmental reform, thereby weakening 

4

the position of the United States and other democracies to influence Cambodia’s leaders. 

Greater engagement with Cambodia could help the United States 

achieve our foreign policy goals in the region and counter adverse 

influences. Requiring payment of a debt incurred by an illegitimate 

government more than 30 years ago, without consideration of Cambodia’s historical trauma, runs counter to the need for greater engagement, in my humble opinion, Mr. Secretary. This is why I ask 

the Department of State and Treasury to end their opposition to 

Cambodian debt forgiveness and support our efforts to give this 

country a brighter economic future. 

The Department of Treasury could begin by taking this issue seriously enough to send a witness to testify before this subcommittee. Two years ago, and again for this hearing, the U.S. 

Treasury Department refused to send a witness, which, in and of 

itself, speaks volumes about the lack of commitment for advancing 

American interests in Southeast Asia. 

Finally, for the record, I want to express my opposition to a bill 

that was introduced earlier this year, H.R. 5439, the Cambodian 

Trade Act of 2010, which would prevent any forgiveness of Cambodia’s debt currently owed to the United States and would ensure 

that no textiles or apparel produced in Cambodia would be given 

duty-free treatment within the United States. 

My two colleagues who introduced this piece of legislation are 

very dear to my heart, and we constantly work together on many 

issues. My good friend from California, Congressman Rohrabacher, 

and my good friend from Massachusetts, Congressman Delahunt, 

who is retiring this year, unfortunately, are certainly champions 

and senior members of this committee when it comes to human 

rights. 

While I have the utmost respect for my two colleagues who introduced the bill, unfortunately, there was never any consultation 

with me or members of this subcommittee. And I am deeply concerned that a trade bill like this was introduced in response to 

Cambodia’s deportation of 20 Uighurs who entered Cambodia illegally from China. I do want to note for the record that I do oppose 

the provisions this bill. 

Prior to the introduction of this bill, I was in Cambodia and met 

with Prime Minister Hun Sen, Deputy Prime Minister Hor 

Namhong, and the Minister of Finance Cham Prasidh, at which 

time we discussed the deportation of Uighurs who were returned 

to China in December of last year. The Government of Cambodia 

provided me with the following account of events which transpired, 

affecting the status of these Uighurs. 

Three groups, with a total of 22 Uighurs, illegally entered Cambodia in June, October, and November of last year. But the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees failed to determine their 

status and failed to provide the Government of Cambodia with any 

information relating to the Uighurs’ entry in November of last 

year. Two Uighurs fled the headquarters without reporting to the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Consequently, 20 Uighurs were returned in December because they 

had entered Cambodia illegally. 

5

The Government of Cambodia has firmly stated that it adheres 

to the principles of the rule of law and respects the International 

Convention on Refugees. The Royal Government of Cambodia also 

believes, and correctly so, in my opinion, that the United Nations’ 

High Commissioner for Refugees should do its part by acting in accordance with its mandate to coordinate the protection of refugees 

in a transparent and expeditious manner. 

While I fully support the rights of international refugees and the 

mission of UNHCR, the Uighurs are a minority population residing 

in China, not Cambodia. Therefore, if the intent of the bill is to 

champion the cause of the Uighurs, it should not offer up a superficial fix which pits Cambodia against China in a match-up that 

should be, actually, between the United States and China. Simply 

put, the bill should not use trade or debt as a means to address 

the repatriation of Uighurs. 

I remain firm in my position that the United States should forgive or recycle Cambodia’s debt, given that there is historical precedent for both options. And I commend Cambodia’s ambassador to 

the United States, his Excellency Hem Hang, for tirelessly working 

on behalf of the Royal Kingdom of Cambodia to bring these serious 

matters to the attention of the U.S. Congress. 

The Kingdom of Cambodia’s statement regarding the pre-1975 

loans will be made part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. At this time, I recognize our leading witness 

and only witness willing to come and testify before this subcommittee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Joseph Yun. 

Mr. Yun is currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State 

Department responsible for relations with Southeast Asia and 

ASEAN affairs. He previously held the position of Director of the 

Office of Maritime Southeast Asia at the Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs within the Department of State. He served also as 

a senior counselor in our U.S. Embassy in Korea and in other overseas posts, including Thailand, France, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. 

He has been a career member of the Foreign Service since 1985. 

He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the 

University of Wales. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to sincerely thank you for taking the time 

from your busy schedule to again appear before the subcommittee 

for your testimony concerning the issue of Cambodia’s debt forgiveness. 

Without objection, your statement will be made a part of the 

record. If you have any miscellaneous materials or documents that 

you would like to submit to be made part of the record, you are 

welcome to do so. 

So, Mr. Secretary, please, I would like to hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. YUN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here today 

to testify about Cambodia’s outstanding bilateral debt to the 

United States. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like 

to make a few brief remarks on this topic and submit a more detailed written response for the Record. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Without objection. 

Mr. YUN. U.S.-Cambodia relations have continued to improve 

over the past few years. The tempo of interaction has quickened, 

and there has been both a broadening and a deepening of positive 

engagement in a number of areas. In order for Cambodia to realize 

its full democratic and economic potential, we continue to ask Cambodia to make progress on issues related to human rights and rule 

of law. 

A satisfactory resolution of Cambodian debt to the United States 

can help accelerate development of this improving and growing bilateral relationship. Such a move would also enhance Cambodia’s 

own economic development by improving its creditworthiness and 

better access to international capital markets. 

Cambodia’s debt to the United States stems from shipment of 

U.S. agricultural commodities to Cambodia in the 1970s during the 

turbulent Lon Nol era financed with low-interest rate loans from 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Cambodia fell to the Khmer 

Rouge in 1975, which ceased servicing this debt. By the end of 

2009, Cambodia’s debt to the United States totaled approximately 

$445 million, including arrears and late interest. About $405 million of that amount was in arrears, and it’s due and payable immediately. 

10

Debt relief can be an important means of achieving U.S. goals of 

promoting economic growth, well-functioning markets, and economic reform of our foreign partners. Long-standing U.S. policy on 

debt relief and restructuring is to coordinate internationally, primarily through the Paris Club group of official creditors. In 1995, 

the Paris Club and Cambodia reached an agreement to restructure 

Cambodia’s debt on the so-called Naples terms, at that time the 

most generous treatment in the Paris Club’s project. 

Cambodia eventually signed debt agreements with France, Germany, Italy, and Japan to implement the 1995 Paris Club agreement and began repaying those countries accordingly. However, the 

United States and Cambodia never concluded a bilateral implementing agreement, in part because the Cambodian Government 

refused to accept responsibility for debts incurred by the Lon Nol 

regime and in part because of a disagreement at the time over the 

amount of debt actually owed. 

U.S.-Cambodian debt negotiations resumed over the 2001 to 2005 

period. The U.S. ultimately offered concessions of nearly $100 million, and the Treasury affirmed that, for legal and policy reasons, 

this was the final best offer the U.S. could make. 

In February, 2006, the Cambodian Minister of Finance indicated 

that Cambodia agreed with the United States that the amount of 

principal it owed was $162 million. He also agreed to move forward 

in drafting a bilateral agreement implementing the 1995 Paris 

Club agreement. Based on this understanding, the United States 

drafted a bilateral agreement that retroactively implemented the 

1995 Paris Club agreement, including USDA’s concessions, and 

presented it to the Cambodia Government in the summer of 2006. 

Nevertheless, to date, the Cambodian Government has been unwilling to sign the draft bilateral agreement and now seeks additional concessions. Cambodia is seeking a low interest rate. However, long-standing U.S. debt policy is to retain the same interest 

rate of the original loans in any rescheduling of those loans. Offering a lower interest rate would be an unauthorized form of debt reduction. 

Another concession requested by the Cambodian Government in 

the past has been debt for assistance swaps. The only general debt 

swap program that the United States currently offers is through 

the Tropical Forest Conservation Act for which Cambodia is not eligible because of its arrears. Cambodia, however, has focused on the 

swap arrangement that the United States established with Vietnam in 2000 and is seeking a similar program. 

In 1993, Paris Club creditors provided Vietnam debt rescheduling terms similar to those of Cambodia’s in 1995. Vietnam signed 

a bilateral agreement with the United States in 1997 and resumed 

making scheduled payments and was in good financial standing 

when Congress created the Vietnam Education Foundation several 

years later. This program, authorized by law, directs about 40 percent of Vietnam’s total debt payments to the foundation for joint 

education initiatives. There are no special programs authorized for 

Cambodia, however, and existing programs are not available so 

long as Cambodia is not making scheduled payments. An individual debt program, therefore, is not a possibility. 

11

The administration is concerned that creating a special statutory 

debt with option program for a country that is accumulating large 

arrears, despite payment capacity, sets a poor precedent for other 

countries in similar circumstances and sends the wrong message 

about prudent debt management. 

In Cambodia’s case, I would note that Cambodia has accumulated arrears to the United States while paying other creditors on 

time. The administration has, therefore, urged the Cambodian Government to sign the bilateral agreement and reestablish a track 

record of timely repayments under that agreement. We have communicated to the Cambodian Government that if it makes scheduled payments for at least 1 year the U.S. Government would signal to the IMF that efforts are under way to resolve the country’s 

official arrears. Should Cambodia then obtain an IMF program, end 

the future Paris Club treatment, this action could pave the way for 

generous rescheduling of accumulated arrears on debts owed to the 

United States. 

We have also informed the Cambodians that we would work with 

Congress to explore the possibility of enhancing mutually beneficial 

U.S. development assistance projects Unfortunately, the Cambodia 

Government thus far has not responded to this overture and continues to accumulate arrears on debts owed to the United States. 

In sum, the administration is very much of the view that Cambodia should resolve U.S. debt claims by concluding a bilateral 

agreement implementing the 1995 Paris Club agreement. This 

would eliminate this long-standing issue in the overall context of 

otherwise very much improving bilateral relations. We also believe 

that an agreement to address the U.S. bilateral debt issue would 

also enhance Cambodia’s creditworthiness and Cambodia’s ability 

to access international capital markets. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you 

today and I welcome any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yun follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate your 

statement and your testimony. I would like to have a little dialogue 

in that respect in terms of some of the issues that have been raised 

on this question. 

Can you explain what exactly the procedure the United States 

currently has for granting debt forgiveness to countries that owe 

money to the United States? Is it in statute, or does the administration have discretion, or is it a given policy of the Treasury as 

well as the State Department? I would like to know. 

Mr. YUN. Mr. Chairman, as you can appreciate, that issue is a 

very implicated issue, so I will try my best to explain what the U.S. 

policy is, with the provision that you do understand I am a diplomat. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I will note that for the record, sir, you are 

going to give a very diplomatic response to the question. I thank 

you. 

Mr. YUN. First of all, let me say your remarks earlier on about 

the economic position Cambodia finds itself in and the historical remarks you made are very persuasive. However, it is not U.S. policy 

at this point to forgive Cambodia’s debt, and let me explain that 

point. 


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In that situation you do have creditor and a debtor. In our case, 

U.S. is the creditor. U.S. interest is very much in protecting the 

creditor interest, and so in any situation we understand why countries get into debt difficulty, and so there is a general procedure. 

Once a sovereign country is in a debt difficulty, what do we do 

about it? 

Number one, the first step generally is that sovereign country 

must show that it is in debt difficulty. How do they show it? Typically they enter into an IMF program. Essentially, what the IMF 

does is go through the country’s books, including its ability to finance, including how much money it has in reserve. And so they 

are the bookkeeper, or I guess you could say almost like a bankruptcy court internationally. 

So with the IMF help, usually the creditors, there are two types 

of international creditors, sovereign creditor or we call it official 

creditor. They will reschedule their debts in Paris Club. Private 

side, mostly bank side, will reschedule their debt at the London 

Club. 

In Cambodia’s case, in 1995, as I mentioned, we had a Paris Club 

arrangement; and by perchance I happened to be there at that 

time. I was working for the U.S. Embassy in Paris, and I attended 

that debt rescheduling. And it is a negotiation process with IMF 

acting as the official data keeper saying how much debt relief they 

would need. 

So at that time all the countries went through their debt and 

reached an agreement, what we characterize as Naples terms. And 

so we reached an agreement and each country from there on went 

back to their countries and negotiate the terms of Paris Club agreement and how each country would implement. And, as I mentioned 

to you, Cambodia reached that agreement with many countries and 

thereafter started paying them. With the U.S., we never got to 

that, and that’s the bilateral agreement that is in question. 

And so our policy is we do have a bilateral agreement that is outstanding, that implements the Paris Club. Now, the debtor country 

should sign the bilateral agreement so their debt relations with us 

is normalized. So the U.S. policy very much is to reschedule debt, 

forgive debts, debt reduction or anything, do it under the auspices 

of the Paris Club. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In terms of the IMF’s involvement, as you 

had mentioned, pursuant to the Paris agreement that was made in 

1995, how much influence does the United States have in the operations of the IMF? Don’t we have about somewhere between 25–

30 percent of the assets, votes, and influence within the IMF? Does 

the United States have that much influence in the process? 

Mr. YUN. Again, Mr. Chairman, I regret very much, like you, my 

Treasury colleague not being here. So let me try as best I can——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, I just want to say that you are more 

senior than the Treasury Department anyway. I have always held 

the belief that the Secretary of State is the most senior member of 

the President’s cabinet. In that sense, as far as I am concerned, the 

Treasury is second to the State Department, as far as formulating 

policies by the President. Now, correct me if I am wrong on that. 

Mr. YUN. Thank you for your confidence. 

23

On the IMF issue, we do, I believe, have about 19–20 percent of 

contribution, and that contribution is reflected in our voting size. 

So, of course, when a country goes there for a program, the U.S. 

reveals that program is very much a factor. I would agree with you. 

But I think in these cases what IMF does, the IMF program is essentially to put the house in order. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. Can you 

tell me how we were able to forgive Iraq’s debt for some $4.1 billion 

6 years ago? I assume that they went to the Paris Club, they went 

to the IMF, the same procedures. Somehow we were able, through 

the goodness of our hearts, to say, Iraq, we forgive you for $4.1 billion. 

That is not a pittance. That is a lot of money that we forgave and 

apparently Iraq qualified for this debt forgiveness? 

Mr. YUN. In Iraq’s case, they did go through IMF, and it was rescheduled at IMF. What has happened between 1995 and 10 years 

down the road is that terms change and the amount of debt forgiveness a nation can do change. So after Naples terms that Cambodia was beneficiary of, we had other, more generous terms. I 

mean, at that time, in 1995, the Naples terms were the most generous. 

And, also, we are going to have, throughout debt history, special 

cases. I believe Iraq was one of them; and there were special cases 

also for Poland, Egypt, countries that underwent significant transformation. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, I know 

what you mean. Iraq was a very special case. Given the fact that 

we have spent almost $1 trillion in fighting this war in Iraq, not 

only for the loss of lives and 2 million Iraqi people that died as a 

result or displaced, as you said, there are special cases given to 

each country, I grant that. That is an important consideration. 

So it now comes down to our basic foreign policy and political 

consideration. We bombed the hell out of Cambodia when we invaded Cambodia. This was one of President Nixon’s defining moments, a legacy of his administration, when we sent military forces 

into Cambodia, supposedly to go after North Vietnamese forces, 

which was true. They had sanctuaries. The North Vietnamese had 

strongholds along the Vietnam-Cambodian borders, and with some 

justification. I can understand that. But what I am really troubled 

by all of this is that Cambodia is considered a least-developed country by the United Nations. How many countries are in the LDC 

classification within the United Nations? 

Mr. YUN. I would say quite a few. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you submit that for the record? I believe there are about 50 LDCs——

Mr. YUN. Yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA [continuing]. Within the United Nations of 

190-some countries that make up the United Nations. 

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DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

Currently, the United Nations classifies forty nine countries as Least Developed 

Countries (LDCs). Cambodia is classified as an LDC.

24

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I just wanted to pry into this issue a little 

more. Some of our policymakers, including me, ask, why can’t we 

recycle? What is wrong with recycling the debt process? I think 

there seems to be not so much the money here but it is the principle. 

Somehow, somebody seems to be so annoyed by Cambodia. Whatever it was historically. I can talk to you about the killing fields. 

I have been there. It is one of the saddest legacies of modern history—the genocide that was committed against the Cambodians. 

And by implication we were very much a part of what happened 

in that country. Really, really a sad history. I consider our involvement in Cambodia as very special in that it cost so many lives. 

Some 20 percent of the country’s population was decimated through 

genocide. 

And this was because we wanted to continue the Vietnamization 

process. President Nixon had tried very hard to get us out of Vietnam. And, as you know, instead of getting out of Vietnam, we 

ended up invading Cambodia—Nixon’s private war, as some have 

said. 

So I don’t see where the comparison could be said that Cambodia 

is not special enough, in the same way that we were able to forgive 

Iraq’s debt of some $4.1 billion and Yugoslavia’s debt incurred 

under Marshal Tito. He was no democratic person. 

I mean, during the time of Yugoslavia’s problems, we forgave Yugoslavia’s debt of $538 million. So I just want to say by comparison Yugoslavia and Iraq do not come to the same status as Cambodia with the problems and the complications and the difficulties 

that our country faced when dealing with these people. 

I don’t mean to suggest you are just throwing out numbers and 

figures, but I want to say that these are people. I just wonder, is 

there an existing policy that we have toward Cambodia that continues to allow or to say that our standing policy is that they must 

pay their debt because we don’t want to set a precedent? The problem is that we have already set precedents. We have already forgiven debts of several countries. 

As you said, it is complicated. There are exceptions. There are 

special cases. I happen to believe that Cambodia is a special case, 

and we ought to give due consideration to them for what we did 

to these people, their lands, and the misery is still there. 

We have not even cleaned up the mess that we created in Cambodia from the hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs that we 

dropped on its people. A lot of innocent people died as a result. 

Mr. YUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would say that the overriding factor on debt issues is the capacity to pay. And if you look where Iraq was, where countries like 

Egypt were, where they went when they had a debt program, they 

could not sustain the amount of debt they had, which was why debt 

reduction was possible for those countries. 

In the case of Cambodia, admittedly, they are a least developed 

country among them, but their capacity to pay is there in terms of 

foreign exchange earnings. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I didn’t mean to interrupt you, and I appreciate that term, that they have the ‘‘capacity to pay.’’ So then it 

raises the question of principle. The principle is that it was an illeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:29 Dec 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\APGE\093010\61519 HFA PsN: SHIRL
25

gitimate government that caused the debt to be incurred during 

General Nol’s military takeover against Prince Sihanouk’s government. 

Now was that a legitimate government that we supported? There 

are still a lot of questions raised right now whether our intelligence 

agencies had anything to do with overtaking Prince Sihanouk’s 

government when General Lon Nol became the new dictator, if you 

will. And, of course, later on, a civil war broke out between the 

Khmer Rouge and Lon Nol, who was kicked out. 

So this is another gray area. To say that, on the one hand, they 

might have the capacity to pay, but then, as a matter of principle 

they say, Why should I pay when it wasn’t us that were there? I 

mean, why is it that we are being targeted as the government to 

pay for these debts? 

We could have said the same thing about Tito’s government and 

his reign in Yugoslavia. The succeeding government of Yugoslavia, 

whatever existed then, should have been responsible. In the same 

way, in Iraq—the government was legitimate even though it was 

controlled by a dictator. How do we say that a government’s legitimacy comes from the fact of whether you are a dictator or whether 

you are ruled by a dictator? 

Mr. YUN. Mr. Chairman, in regard to that issue of what happens 

to the debt as it gets passed from one government to another, it 

is the policy of the U.S. Government and is standard international 

practice that whoever takes over the government assumes responsibility for all previous government. There is a class of debt called 

ODS debt, but that is very narrowly defined. 

In the case of Cambodia, these were agriculture, PA 480 debt, 

mostly for foodstuffs. I think it would be another thing if, say, Lon 

Nol bought tanks with them and started, you know, fighting or, 

you know, forces that were, say, loyal to Prince Sihanouk at the 

time and so on. So it is very hard to classify agriculture commodities in that class of ODS debt. 

Secondly, even in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, they have assumed their previous debt. You are right. A lot of them, you are 

right, were forgiven, but there are some debt they have assumed. 

I don’t think it was 100 percent forgiveness. I will get the data for 

you——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please. 

Mr. YUN [continuing]. How much they were forgiven. 

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WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

Afghanistan qualified for treatment as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) 

according to the eligibility requirements established by Congress in the Enhanced 

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (Title V of Appendix E of H.R. 3425, as 

enacted into law by Section 1000(a)(5) of P.L. No. 106–113) and we signed the bilateral agreement with Afghanistan authorities in July, 2010. Congress authorized 

funds for the forgiveness of 100 percent of Iraqi debt in section 135 of the Continuing Resolution (P.L. 108–309)(CR), enacted into law by Section 569 of the FY 

2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, H.R. 4818, as passed by the House of 

Representatives on July 15, 2004. U.S. government forgiveness of both Afghanistan’s and Iraq’s official debt was coordinated through the Paris Club of creditor nations which requires, as a condition on such forgiveness, that the debtor nation have 

an IMF program. Cambodia does not have an IMF program.

26

Mr. YUN. So that policy is very much based on capacity to pay, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I make an observation that one of the things 

that really riles me up is all the resources and the amount of 

money that we spent in the war in Iraq. And, all of a sudden, overnight, after spending almost $1 trillion and causing the suffering 

that we have caused the people of Iraq, and then when the new 

government came up it says they are going to have a bidding process for oil companies that could come and help extract the oil so 

that they could start, go back to prosperity and all of that. 

So 30 major oil companies conducted their bidding, and guess 

what country won the oil contract? The People’s Republic of China, 

which didn’t lift a finger, not even an ounce in terms of having it 

any way associated with all the resources and the sufferings and 

the commitments that we made. China ended up tapping into the 

resources of the oil that, I thought, as a matter of policy, was why 

we had to go to Iraq to make sure to secure the oil supply, that 

we don’t lose that. 

Well, after the bidding, as we like to do free enterprise market 

system and letting the markets control, China ended up getting the 

oil contracts. So that was a special condition, to say the least. 

Here is just a question for you, Mr. Secretary. Is there a strategic 

argument for offering Cambodia debt relief? Many have argued 

that economic dependence has made Cambodia one of China’s 

strongest allies in Southeast Asia. Do you agree, and would debt 

relief from the United States change this dynamic? 

Mr. YUN. Mr. Chairman, I believe debt relief should be offered 

in the context of our debt policy. So in that sense we did make 

progress in 2006. We did come to terms on the actual amounts 

owed. So, right now, I think the way forward is for us in Cambodia 

to at least come to terms on the bilateral agreement so that Cambodia is current for, say, 1 year or so, which we have asked them. 

After 1 year, we can review the situation, but it is very hard to 

commit to up-front debt forgiveness, debt reduction, debt swap. 

I mean, that really isn’t the domain of Congress. If you allow 

us—if you allow us to do that, because what it means is that our 

budget, the U.S. Government budget, has to reflect that. If you 

allow us that, sure. I mean, we can do it. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I remember a couple of years ago there was 

a newspaper article that said we had forgiven Jordan $500 million 

in debt, just like that. And Jordan isn’t exactly a least-developed 

country, may I add. So, here again, I guess one word that comes 

to mind is contradiction. I am a little puzzled when you mention 

there have to be special circumstances to forgive debt. 

I would deeply appreciate if you could submit for the record what 

exactly is both the State Department policy as well as that of the 

Treasury Department, since they are not here, to outline exactly 

what process and what specifics these countries have to follow in 

order to qualify for debt forgiveness. Because, as you said, it is 

complicated. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

The fundamental principle underlying debt forgiveness is that debts owed to the 

United States are assets of the United States and that federal officials generally 

lack authority to dispose of such assets without both: (1) statutory authority from 

Congress; and (2) a corresponding appropriation to pay the ‘‘subsidy cost’’ of the debt 

forgiveness under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. § 661, et seq.). 

Further, any additional conditions on that forgiveness included by Congress in the 

authorizing statute(s) must also be satisfied. When debt is forgiven, the Federal 

Credit Reform Act of 1990, 2 U.S.C. § 661, et seq., requires that Congress have appropriated sufficient funds to the Treasury Department’s Debt Restructuring Account to pay the ‘‘subsidy cost’’ of the forgiveness on the government’s books. Foreign government debt is maintained on the account books of the United States Government as an asset. Changes to loan contracts, including debt forgiveness, are considered modifications to the original loan agreements under the Federal Credit Reform Act and require an appropriation amount to pay the value of that modification. 

Essentially, this is double entry bookkeeping with the ‘‘subsidy cost’’ of the debt forgiveness offset by an appropriation enacted by Congress to pay the cost of the forgiveness. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has issued detailed rules 

on how this amount is ‘‘scored’’ for budgetary purposes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Secondly, there are special circumstances. 

Thirdly, I am totally puzzled as to what are these exceptions or 

special cases that makes Cambodia different from these other countries that I have just shared with you where we have forgiven debt. 

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WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

Cambodia’s situation is different from other countries that have been given debt 

relief in a number of important ways. For example, whereas Cambodia has paid 

other creditors on time or early, it has made no attempt to pay the United States 

despite there being a Paris Club agreement. Also, Cambodia is the only country that 

has refused to pay the United States on the grounds that the debt is ‘‘odious.’’ We 

do not agree with the Cambodian view that this debt is ‘‘odious’’ or that Cambodia 

is relieved of payment obligations. Finally, every country that has had debt forgiven 

by the United States has had an IMF program. Cambodia is requesting debt forgiveness even though it does not have an IMF program.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Could I ask if you could do that for the 

record? So at least, assuming I get re-elected in November, you will 

see my ugly face again. And I don’t know if we are going to take 

a majority of the House, but I assure you we are going to revisit 

this issue again, maybe by introducing a bill that will reflect the 

concerns of my colleagues here and me. 

I fully understand the standard policy. We don’t want to set a 

precedent. But when I look at the number of countries that have 

had their debts forgiven, that is where I raise more questions and 

say, Well, we have a standing policy, but there are exceptions to 

the rule. 

If you could, Mr. Secretary, if you could submit for the record all 

the countries for which we have forgiven their debts. It would also 

be helpful to explain what gave rise to our justification in forgiving 

those countries of their debts. I think that would really help the 

record. 

Mr. YUN. We will do that, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

Attached please find Table A5 from Treasury’s Foreign Credit Reporting System’s 

Salmon Book, which lists U.S. bilateral debt reductions from FY 1990 through FY 

2009 and the statutory authorities under which those debts were forgiven. Since the 

table was published, Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) agreements with 

Peru (2008—$25.1 million) and Brazil (2010—$20.8 million) have been finalized.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All right. I really thank you. 

I think I have already asked a question, and you have already 

raised the conditions that Cambodia has to come up with in order 

for them to properly pay their debts. Whatever documentation or 

things that relate to that, I would appreciate if you could submit 

that for the record, and maybe even the terms of the Paris Agreement, do that as well. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

The 1995 Paris Club Agreed Minute is attached along with the draft of a proposed 

bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Cambodia, which was never signed. Also 

attached is a copy of the February 2010 letter from Under Secretary of State 

Hormats to Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister Hor Namhong, which offers a generous rescheduling of arrears, provided that certain basic conditions are met. We 

have not received a reply to this letter.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What about the suggestion by some of our 

policymakers—including myself—about the recycling of this debt 

forgiveness? Is that a poor option? Has it been done in other countries about recycling resources? 

Mr. YUN. It has been done quite a bit, sir, I would say. There 

is, as I said, one program in the U.S. Government called Tropical 

Forest Conservation Act. And essentially what that program does 

is payment is made in local currency, and that money goes toward 

protecting forests. And we have done it in several countries. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I didn’t mean to interrupt you, but I think 

there is one standing issue that has been brought to my attention, 

that some of the richest cultural, historical sites—I don’t know if 

it is an ancient city or ruins—that sit right on the border between 

Thailand and Cambodia. It has been suggested by some of the 

NGOs and other organizations that some kind of funding process 

could be brought about so that these countries, rather than fighting 

over their borders in this very historic area between Cambodia and 

Thailand, that maybe some kind of an international cultural heritage, some type of thing that would be beneficial to visitors, tourists 

coming from—whether you are from Cambodia or from Thailand, 

certainly as a means of giving a greater economic boost for the 

tourism industry of both of these countries. I have been informed 

that—this was one suggestion that was offered, that maybe the recycling of the debt could be done in that format. But what is your 

best sense about recycling as another option to consider in dealing 

with Cambodia’s debts? 

Mr. YUN. I think recycling, or debt swaps as we call it, is certainly something that could complement our debt program with 

them. 

However, one real difficulty currently doing something like recycling is that Cambodia is in arrears in the sense that they have 

29

stopped paying us. And so, as in any creditor/debtor relation, when 

a debtor stops paying you, the creditor is not going to say let’s 

think about these creative options. I mean, those options only come 

as we negotiate and normalize debt relations. So I would say, Mr. 

Chairman, certainly those are great ideas and we should and we 

will explore them, but please understand they can only be done as 

debt relations become normal. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So, in other words, you are making a precondition. Before you may consider recycling, you have to start paying up your debts to kind of show that in good faith you are sincere 

in your efforts to try and pay your debts. Am I sensing this is our 

policy on recycling? 

Mr. YUN. That is very much it. Our U.S. Government is a tough 

creditor, sir. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, $4.1 billion, that is a pretty sizeable 

debt forgiven for Iraq, which has a huge amount of oil. I think 

number two or three largest oil reserves in the world. 

So what does Cambodia have to depend upon? Not very much. 

The textile industry is really the only thing that is really putting 

this poor country on the strings of trying to get economic billing. 

And when you compete against the largest textile industry, like 

China or Bangladesh or India or other countries, you are living in 

a real tough market situation there where these 14 million people 

in Cambodia are struggling to make ends meet and survive. 

So basically you are saying that the basic policy on the recycle 

issue is that we do have this precondition that you have to start 

paying your debt before we talk about recycling. Is that basically 

the administration’s position on this? 

Mr. YUN. I would say in order for us to discuss issues like that, 

Cambodia really should come to terms—and Cambodia and us, it 

is negotiations—should come to terms on what to do about arrears 

and what to do about payments coming due. Once we can come to 

terms on those, I am pretty sure we can discuss some of the options 

you have outlined. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So it isn’t a question of whether the government was illegitimate. It is a question of whether you are a dictator or whatever it is, you are responsible for the debts that incurred in that given period, obviously. Because this is what happened historically with Cambodia and why we are slapping this 

$400 million debt because of something that General Lon Nol did 

in receiving these agricultural commodities. 

Is this also one reason why our assistance in ordnance, trying to 

clean up the mess that we created, the bombings in Cambodia, is 

this also one of the reasons why we are not forthcoming in helping 

Cambodia get rid of the mess that we created, because they haven’t 

repaid their debt? 

Mr. YUN. We are in a kind of, I would say, contradictory situation. We do give assistance. Our USAID programs in Cambodia are 

in the region of $60 million or so. And we do that every year. There 

is a substantial USAID program in terms of health, public health 

programs, HIV/AIDS programs. We also have education exchanges 

and some fellowships there. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you submit for the record total U.S. assistance programs——

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Mr. YUN. Yes, happy to do so. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA [continuing]. Loans and stuff that are currently given to Cambodia every year. 

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DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

In Fiscal Year 2010, the United States provided $72.6 million dollars in assistance 

to Cambodia. That amount includes development assistance, economic support, military financing, health, education, and non-proliferation and anti-terror programs.

Mr. YUN. So for a lot of people looking at this situation, it would 

seem ironic that we are insisting on debt payments while we are 

giving assistance. But these are two, we believe, separate issues. 

Matters of debt follow their own policy issue. Matters of assistance—and I think it is correct that we do that. We cannot withhold 

assistance because of some disputes over what is owed and what 

is not owed. That will take time coming to terms, and we are coming to that. 

So in terms of assistance on unexploded ordnance and so on, we 

continue to give them. We have programs both in Cambodia, Laos, 

and Vietnam—we call it UXO programs. And we work with NGOs 

on cluster bombs, especially in Laos and Cambodia. And we also 

work somewhat on education programs so that people are, I would 

say, watchful of these UXOs. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I appreciate you mentioning the situation in 

Laos. I visited Laos recently. We dropped 2 million pounds of 

bombs, probably the most bombed country per capita in the world. 

What we did in that country, both Laos and Cambodia, as a result 

of that a lot of unexploded ordnance remains in the farmlands and 

all over. Approximately 300 people—mostly children and women, 

because they look for scrap metal—end up getting into a lot of 

these bombs that were unexploded and ended up getting blown up 

themselves. And so for the Unexploded Ordnance Program that is 

currently being carried out right now, for example, in Laos, we contribute only $3 million a year to do this. And I will say, Mr. Secretary, I sincerely hope the administration is going to change the 

policy of giving a little more than the measly $3 million to clean 

up the mess that we created both in Laos as well as Cambodia, especially for all of that. It is still there. 

I am not going to get into the cluster bomb situation. I don’t 

know if many Americans know what a cluster bomb is. Although 

I have seen a bombie—they are called little bombies—these cluster 

bombs are dropped from planes and in midair would explode, putting out 50, 100 bombs like little grenades. I mean, it is amazing 

how man can invent machines and things on how to kill in a more 

perfect way, but probably put it in other terms, the worst way in 

killing other human beings, and we did this to the Cambodians. A 

lot of innocent people died as a result of these cluster bombs that 

we dropped on them. But worst is that thousands or millions of 

these bombies are all over the country, and because they haven’t 

exploded, children get—I think 300 people get killed a year because 

of what we have left that we never cleaned up, the situation that 

we did there. 

31

So I hope in some way that, as much as we are giving assistance, that we can give a lot more than $3 million a year to clean up the 

unexploded ordnance that we have left both in Cambodia as well 

as in Laos. 

Mr. Secretary, I know I have retained you for quite a long time 

here, and I don’t want to hold you any further. 

As I understand it, you mentioned earlier that debt forgiveness 

is an entirely different issue from the current U.S. assistance programs for Laos. What is your best estimate as to the total amount 

of money that we provide in assistance programs, Mr. Secretary, to 

Cambodia? 

Mr. YUN. We will get the exact figure for you. By my recollection, it is about $60 million a year. 

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WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

In Fiscal Year 2010, the United States provided $72.6 million dollars in assistance 

to Cambodia. That includes development assistance, economic support, military financing, health, education, and non-proliferation and anti-terror programs.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Could you also provide for the record total 

exports, imports of products? 

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DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

In 2009 total trade with Cambodia was approximately $2 billion. Total exports to 

Cambodia amounted to $127 million, and total imports from Cambodia equaled $1.9 

billion. U.S. exports to Cambodia include motor vehicles, textile fibers, waste, professional and scientific instruments, and vegetables and fruit. Cambodian imports 

to the United States include apparel, textile yarn and fabric, footwear, miscellaneous manufactured goods, and fish.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Does the United States have any trade, any 

export relations, import/export ties with Cambodia? 

Mr. YUN. We have very good export-import relations. As you 

mentioned, textile trade—of course, textile exports from Cambodia 

is a very big source of U.S. imports of textiles. There is substantial 

U.S. investment there, especially in the mineral sector and the oil 

and gas side. And I would say the economic relations is really improving, as is the Cambodian economic situation in general. They 

are very hardworking people, and they are doing quite well. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your 

participation in this dialogue. I sincerely hope that one day both 

of us will travel to Cambodia and meet with officials of that government and find a solution to the current problem with this debt 

issue that we have discussed this afternoon. 

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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