COUNTERNARCOTICS 

ASSISTANCE 

U.S. Agencies Have 

Allotted Billions in 

Andean Countries, but 

DOD Should Improve 

Its Reporting of 

Results 

Report to the Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere, Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, House of 

Representatives 

July 2012 

GAO-12-824 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-12-824, a report to the 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 

Representatives 

June 2012 

COUNTERNARCOTICS ASSISTANCE 

U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean 

Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of 

Results 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Hundreds of metric tons of cocaine 

flow annually from South America to 

the United States, threatening the 

security and well-being of U.S. citizens. 

South American cocaine production 

and trafficking is centered in the five 

countries in the Andean region. State, 

USAID, DOD, and DEA provide 

counternarcotics assistance to stem 

production and trafficking of narcotics 

in these countries. ONDCP oversees 

and coordinates this assistance. 

In this report, GAO (1) describes the 

U.S. strategic approaches to counternarcotics assistance in the Andean 

countries; (2) identifies amounts 

allotted for such assistance by State, 

USAID, DOD, and DEA in fiscal years 

2006 through 2011; and (3) reviews 

the agencies’ reporting on their 

performance. GAO reviewed agency 

and U.S. strategy documents, 

analyzed available agency data, and 

interviewed agency officials. 

What GAO Recommends 

The Secretary of Defense should 

ensure that DOD submits performance 

summary reports to ONDCP including 

the Inspector General’s attestation that 

the reported information is reliable to 

facilitate good management and 

oversight. DOD concurred with this 

recommendation. 

What GAO Found 

No single U.S. counternarcotics strategy exists for the Andean region. In each 

country—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—the U.S. embassy’s 

mission strategic resource plan, developed in consultation with the country’s 

government, guides counternarcotics assistance provided by U.S. agencies. 

Department of State (State) officials told GAO that these plans incorporate highlevel guidance from the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) annual 

National Drug Control Strategy. 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, estimated allotments for counternarcotics 

assistance to the Andean countries by U.S. agencies—State, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—totaled about $5.2 billion. Total 

allotments declined for each country during this time period. 

Total Estimated U.S. Allotments for Counternarcotics Support in Andean Countries, Fiscal 

Years 2006-2011 

Note: Allotments do not sum to total because of rounding. 

State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding most annual targets for 

key measures of their counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries since 

2007. For instance, State reported assisting in the eradication of illicit crops, 

USAID reported promoting alternative development, and DEA reported disrupting 

drug trafficking organizations. In addition, State, USAID, and DEA complied with 

an ONDCP requirement that each agency’s Inspector General (IG) attest to the 

reliability of annual performance summary reports before submitting the reports 

to ONDCP. DOD reported tracking several performance measures, but DOD’s IG 

was unable to attest to the reliability of DOD’s reporting to ONDCP. As a result, 

ONDCP lacks assurance of the accuracy of information it receives from DOD and 

in turn reports to Congress. 

View GAO-12-824. For more information, 

contact Charles Michael Johnson Jr. at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Letter 1 

Background 3

Mission Plans Describe Strategic Approaches for U.S. 

Counternarcotics Assistance to Andean Countries 7

U.S. Agencies Allotted Billions to Andean Countries for 

Counternarcotics Assistance in Fiscal Years 2006-2011 10

State, USAID, and DEA Reported Meeting or Exceeding Many 

Targets, but DOD’s Reporting Has Been Unreliable 15

Conclusions 20

Recommendation for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and our Evaluation 21

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix II Agency Allotments and Program Goals for Counternarcotics 

Assistance 27

Appendix III U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Andean Countries 36

Appendix IV Western Hemisphere Initiatives to Combat Narcotics Trafficking and 

Related Crimes 40

Appendix V Sources of Funding for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in the 

Andean Region 41

Appendix VI Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 42

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Defense 44

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45

Figures

Figure 1: Countries in the Andean Region 4

Figure 2: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Andean Countries, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 11

Figure 3: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Andean Countries, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 12

Figure 4: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Andean Countries, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 14

Figure 5: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Bolivia, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 27

Figure 6: Hectares of Illicit Crops Eradicated in Bolivia, Fiscal 

Years 2006-2010 28

Figure 7: Hectares of Alternative Crops Cultivated in Bolivia, Fiscal 

Years 2006-2010 28

Figure 8: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Colombia, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 29

Figure 9: Hectares of Illicit Crops Eradicated in Colombia, Fiscal 

Years 2006-2010 30

Figure 10: Hectares of Alternative Crops Cultivated in Colombia, 

Fiscal Years 2006-2010 30

Figure 11: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Ecuador, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 31

Figure 12: Kilos of Narcotics Seized in Ecuador, Fiscal Years 2006-

2010 32

Figure 13: Hectares of Alternative Crops Cultivated in Ecuador, 

Fiscal Years 2006-2010 32

Figure 14: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Peru, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 33

Figure 15: Hectares of Illicit Crops Eradicated in Peru, Fiscal Years 

2006-2010 34

Figure 16: Hectares of Alternative Crops Cultivated in Peru, Fiscal 

Years 2006-2010 34

Figure 17: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Venezuela, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 35

Figure 18: Disrupted Priority Target Organizations (PTOs), Fiscal 

Years 2006-2011 39

Figure 19: Dismantled Priority Target Organizations (PTOs), Fiscal 

Years 2006-2011 39
Page iii GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Abbreviations 

ACI Andean Counterdrug Initiative 

ACP Andean Counterdrug Program 

CARSI Central American Security Regional Initiative 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

CBSI Caribbean Basin Security Initiative 

CNP Colombian National Police 

CSDI Colombian Strategic Development Initiative 

CTA Central Transfer Account for Counternarcotics 

DA Development Assistance 

DASD-CN> Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Counternarcotics and Global Threats 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

ESF Economic Support Fund 

FACTS Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System 

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FMF Foreign Military Financing 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program 

IG inspector general 

IMET International Military Education and Training 

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

MSRP mission strategic resource plan 

NADR Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and 

Related Programs 

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy 

PTO priority target organization 

SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit 

State/INL State Department Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USCG U.S. Coast Guard 
Page iv GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

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Page 1 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 10, 2012 

The Honorable Connie Mack, IV 

Chairman 

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The United States provides assistance to several countries in the Andean 

region of South America—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 

Venezuela—to help curb the supply of illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, 

entering the United States. According to U.S. government estimates, most 

of the cocaine entering the United States is produced in Colombia, while 

Peru and Bolivia are also significant producers of coca, the plant used in 

cocaine production. Ecuador and Venezuela serve mainly as transit routes 

for criminal drug trafficking organizations transporting drugs into the United 

States and other parts of the world from neighboring countries. 

Several U.S. agencies—the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense 

(DOD), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—are primarily 

involved in planning and executing counternarcotics assistance in the 

Andean countries, in collaboration with authorities in each country.1

 The 

agencies’ assistance supports, among other things, the disruption of 

cocaine processing and trafficking and coca cultivation and the promotion 

of alternative livelihoods for coca farmers. The Office of National Drug 

Control Policy (ONDCP) coordinates and oversees these efforts to reduce 

the availability or use of drugs in the United States and abroad and 

reports on these efforts to Congress.2

 

1

In this report, “counternarcotics assistance” refers to funds provided in support of 

interdiction, eradication, alternative development, and counternarcotics-related military 

and law enforcement training and equipment. See appendix I and appendix V for more 

information on funding sources included. 

2

See Pub. L. 105-277, Div. C, Title VII, §704(b)(3), (14), 21 USC 1703(b)(3), (14). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

In response to your request concerning the impact of the production and 

trafficking of illicit drugs from the Andean region on the United States, we 

undertook a review of U.S. counternarcotics assistance in the region. This 

report 

(1) describes the U.S. strategic approaches to counternarcotics 

assistance in the five Andean countries; 

(2) identifies amounts allotted for this assistance by State, USAID, DOD, 

and DEA in fiscal years 2006 through 2011; and 

(3) reviews State, USAID, DOD, and DEA reporting on their 

performance of counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed U.S. strategy documents 

related to counternarcotics assistance and analyzed State, USAID, DOD, 

and DEA budget and financial data. We also reviewed available agency 

performance data and related documentation, including annual ONDCP 

reports. To help assess the reliability of the financial and performance 

data we received, we incorporated questions about the reliability of the 

agencies’ data and information systems, conducted internal reliability 

checks, and followed up as necessary with agency staff. We determined 

that the data used in our report were sufficiently reliable for our purpose 

of presenting estimated allotments of funding for counternarcotics 

assistance. We also interviewed relevant officials from each agency to 

corroborate information provided in agency documentation and discuss 

each agency’s management of counternarcotics assistance in the Andean 

region. (See app. I for a more detailed description of our scope and 

methodology.) We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 to 

July 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

The five countries in the Andean region—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 

Peru, and Venezuela—represent primary sources of or transit routes for 

cocaine entering the United States. 

 Bolivia. Bolivia is the world’s third largest producer of cocaine as well 

as a transit zone for cocaine products from Peru, primarily to 

neighboring countries in South America and to Europe. Although 

cocaine production is illegal in Bolivia, coca farming is permitted in 

some parts of the country. 

 Colombia. Colombia, within 3 hours flying time from Florida, 

produces 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States and 

much of the heroin in the eastern United States. Several terrorist 

organizations in Colombia, which commit wide-scale violence and 

human rights abuses, engage in drug trafficking as a source of 

income. 

 Ecuador. Ecuador is a major transit route for cocaine produced 

primarily in neighboring Colombia and Peru. Since it uses the U.S. 

dollar as its currency, Ecuador is also an attractive venue for money 

laundering by individuals and organizations engaged in criminal 

activities. 

 Peru. Peru is the world’s second largest producer of cocaine.3 Drug 

trafficking also generates a significant amount of money laundering in 

Peru. 

 Venezuela. Venezuela is one of the major drug transit countries in the 

Western Hemisphere. Cocaine produced in Colombia is trafficked 

through Venezuela; transported to locations in the Caribbean, Mexico, 

or Central America; and then subsequently brought to the United 

States and other locations. 

The map in figure 1 shows the locations of the five Andean countries. 

 

3

According to ONDCP, as of 2010, Peru was the world’s largest producer of potentially 

pure cocaine. 

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Figure 1: Countries in the Andean Region 

Several U.S. departments and agencies are involved in planning and 

executing counternarcotics assistance in the Andean countries.4

 

4

State, USAID, DOD, and DEA provide funding for counternarcotics assistance in the 

Andean region. Other agencies and programs—such as the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Justice’s 

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program—manage 

counternarcotics-related training efforts in the region using funding transferred from State 

or DOD. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) collaborates with DEA in 

Colombia through an agreement known as Resolution 6, whereby FBI agents posted in 

DEA’s office in Colombia jointly conduct investigations of multijurisdictional and 

international drug-trafficking activities. Because the Resolution 6 program is primarily 

intended to pursue evidence for domestic U.S. court cases, rather than to provide 

counternarcotics assistance to Colombia, we have excluded this program from the scope 

of our review. 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

 State. State manages and funds eradication, interdiction, and law 

enforcement assistance, including programs implemented by a variety 

of other U.S. agencies. State also funds security assistance programs 

generally implemented by DOD, including Foreign Military Financing 

and International Military Education and Training programs, which are 

intended to strengthen the overall capacity of foreign forces to 

address security threats such as the narcotics trade. In addition to 

these activities, State provides limited funding to the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) to implement counternarcotics assistance 

in the Andean region. DHS components that implement this 

assistance include Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG).5

 State also provides funding for the Department of 

Justice’s (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative Training and 

Assistance Program (ICITAP), which supports prosecution of 

members of paramilitary groups in Colombia. 

 USAID. USAID supports the U.S. counternarcotics effort through its 

rule-of-law and alternative development programs in several of the 

Andean countries. 

 DOD. DOD, primarily through its Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats 

(DASD-CN>), provides oversight and funds for counternarcotics 

activities in the Andean region. 

 DEA. DEA works, primarily through its Sensitive Investigative Unit 

(SIU) program, to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations 

that are active in the Andean region. DEA maintains SIU programs in 

three of the five Andean countries. 

For more information about each agency’s counternarcotics assistance in 

the Andean countries, see appendixes II and III. 

 

5

According to DHS officials, CBP implements counterdrug port security programs in 

Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. ICE provides financial investigation training in Bolivia, 

Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru to disrupt the ability of transnational narcotics trafficking 

organizations to operate effectively. USCG provides training to the Colombian Navy and 

collaborates with Colombia, Ecuador and Peru for maritime drug interdiction operations. 

DHS reported that its components also receive funding from DOD, the U.S. Treasury, and 

the Organization of American States for counternarcotics activities in the region. 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

ONDCP produces the National Drug Control Strategy, which outlines the 

administration’s initiatives to reduce illicit drug use, manufacturing and 

trafficking, drug-related crime and violence, and drug-related health 

consequences. ONDCP is also responsible for evaluating, coordinating, 

and overseeing U.S. agencies’ counternarcotics activities. In December 

2006, Congress directed ONDCP to produce an annual report describing 

the national drug control performance measurement system and 

identifying the efforts of agencies carrying out activities under the National 

Drug Control Program. In May 2007, ONDCP issued guidance requiring 

these agencies to submit annual performance summary reports to the 

ONDCP Director.6

 According to the guidance, these reports must 

describe, among other things, performance measures used by the agency 

to assess its counternarcotics activities; the prior year’s performance 

targets and results; current fiscal year performance targets and 

methodology used to establish those targets; and procedures used to 

ensure that performance data are accurate, complete, and unbiased. 

Prior to submitting these reports to ONDCP, agencies must provide the 

reports to their Inspector General (IG) for attestation to the reliability of 

each assertion made in the report. 

As part of its counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere, the 

United States has launched several regional initiatives outside the 

Andean region—the Mérida Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security 

Initiative (CBSI), and the Central American Regional Security Initiative 

(CARSI)—to combat rising drug-related crime in Mexico, the Caribbean, 

and Central America. See appendix IV for additional information about 

these regional initiatives. 

 

6

ONDCP, ONDCP Circular: Drug Control Accounting (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2007). 

Section 7 of the circular contains the requirements of a performance summary report. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Although no single comprehensive U.S. counternarcotics strategy exists 

for the Andean region, mission strategic resource plans (MSRPs) for each 

of the countries in the region delineate the strategic approaches guiding 

U.S. counternarcotics assistance. According to State officials, the MSRPs 

incorporate high-level guidance from ONDCP’s annual National Drug 

Control Strategy, which also includes specific policy guidance for the 

Western Hemisphere. This strategy presents a broad framework for 

reducing illicit drug use and its harmful effects on the United States. 

Included in the strategy is a chapter on international partnerships focused 

on reducing the supply of illicit drugs in the United States via U.S. 

cooperative efforts, such as those with Colombia and Peru, the CBSI 

countries, and the CARSI countries, and initiatives to combat trafficking 

through transit countries such as Ecuador. 

The MSRPs for the Andean countries, developed by interagency teams at 

U.S. embassies in consultation with host country governments, 

summarize conditions in each country, specify U.S. foreign assistance 

goals, and describe in general terms the assistance planned to further 

those goals.7

 Following are highlights of the strategic approaches 

described in MSRPs developed for each of the Andean countries in fiscal 

years 2007 through 2011. 

The MSRPs for Bolivia address counternarcotics assistance as one of the 

U.S. mission’s highest priorities. The MSRPs generally focus on 

developing the government of Bolivia’s capacity to interdict cocaine and 

precursor chemicals, supporting multilateral cooperation, assisting the 

government of Bolivia with demand reduction policies, and supporting 

alternative development programs. Similarly, as part of U.S. public 

diplomacy efforts to support understanding of U.S. policies, the MSRPs 

call for U.S. support of drug-awareness programs to communicate the 

damage done to Bolivian society caused by excess coca production, drug 

trafficking and consumption, and the benefits of alternative development. 

The MSRPs reflect a difficult bilateral relationship between the United 

States and Bolivia, which has adversely affected counternarcotics 

operations in that country. Bilateral ties were greatly strained in 2008, 

 

7

The MSRPs typically contain several elements: a Chief of Mission statement, a summary 

of the last fiscal year’s performance results, goal papers describing each of the mission’s 

strategic goals, and summaries of State operations and foreign assistance provided. 

Mission Plans 

Describe Strategic 

Approaches for U.S. 

Counternarcotics 

Assistance to Andean 

Countries 

Bolivia 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

when coca growers expelled USAID from the Chapare region in June, 

followed by the Bolivian president’s declaring the U.S. Ambassador 

persona non grata in September and expelling DEA in November of that 

year.8

 Although U.S. counternarcotics assistance in Bolivia has continued, 

State officials report that resources for interdiction have declined in the 

years since DEA’s departure. 

The MSRPs for Colombia characterize counternarcotics efforts as the 

cornerstone of the U.S. bilateral relationship with that country. The U.S. 

counternarcotics strategy in Colombia has focused on aerial eradication, 

alternative development, interdiction, counterterrorism, and 

demobilization of combatants. The MSRPs report a successful 

partnership with Colombia over a number of years, with Colombian 

authorities increasingly assuming responsibility for funding and sustaining 

counternarcotics programs. The MSRPs also note that Colombia has 

emerged as a provider of counternarcotics assistance to other countries 

in the region. 

Beginning in 2009, the MSRPs reflect the launch of the Colombian 

Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI). CSDI supports the government 

of Colombia’s National Territorial Consolidation Plan that aims to expand 

state presence in four priority geographic zones previously dominated by 

illegal armed groups. Many municipalities in the target areas suffer from 

weak local institutions, lack of civilian authority, limited police capabilities, 

and an ineffective or absent justice system, which undermine the rule of 

law and perpetuate a vicious cycle of drug trafficking and violence. CSDI 

supports the government of Colombia’s efforts by providing economic 

opportunities once security and basic public services are established. 

Through CSDI, the U.S. strategy intends to support the transfer of 

security responsibilities from the Colombian military to the police. The 

U.S. strategy also seeks to sharply curtail illicit crop cultivation and 

cocaine production in priority conflict zones, thereby removing a vital 

source of funding for illegal armed groups. 

 

8

Since the Ambassador’s expulsion from Bolivia, the embassy has been overseen by a 

Charge-d’Affaires. 

Colombia 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

The MSRPs for Ecuador describe a strategic approach that, owing to 

Ecuador’s role as a transit country for illicit drugs, has focused on 

improving security along the northern border with Colombia and other key 

transport choke points. The MSRPs generally reflect U.S. support in the 

form of technical and advisory assistance, as well as equipment and 

training for the Ecuadorian military and police forces to improve detection 

and interdiction of drug trafficking. The MSRPs also note efforts to 

provide licit employment opportunities for populations in regions 

vulnerable to penetration by drug traffickers, as well as advocacy of 

tougher penalties for money laundering. Until 2009, a key element of the 

U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Ecuador and the Andean Region was 

the Forward Operating Location at the Ecuadorian Air Force base at 

Manta.9

 This facility allowed detection, monitoring, and tracking of drug 

trafficking activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. According to agency 

officials, since 2009 U.S. monitoring of drug trafficking has been moved to 

other locations in the region. For example, detection and monitoring are 

now primarily focused on areas of arrival in Central America rather than 

areas of departure in South America. 

The MSRPs for Peru note a number of factors affecting the strategy for 

counternarcotics assistance. Foremost among these factors is the crossborder nature of drug trafficking throughout the Andean region, where 

successes in Colombia, for example, increase pressures on Peru. In 

addition, these documents highlight the lack of a Peruvian government 

presence in the principal areas of the country where coca production and 

trafficking takes place, which has allowed narcotics traffickers to move in 

to fill the vacuum. 

Under the strategic goal of combating terrorism, the United States has 

supported the government of Peru’s efforts against domestic terrorists, 

who fund their operations and recruitment through drug production and 

trafficking. U.S. assistance also has targeted efforts to bring greater 

government control to border areas where Colombian terrorist 

organizations have obtained a foothold. The most recent MSRPs identify 

Mexican and Colombian drug cartels among the entities that benefit from 

drug trafficking in Peru. Funding support for the Peruvian government’s 

drug strategy is designated a priority. The Peruvian strategy focuses on 

 

9

In July 2009, the lease for U.S. use of the Manta air base expired and was not renewed. 

Ecuador 

Peru 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

preventing and reducing consumption, disrupting production and 

trafficking, and promoting alternative development, including helping 

farmers grow licit, rather than illicit, crops. According to the MSRPs, the 

eradication program combined with sustained alternative development 

supported by USAID over the last several years has reduced coca 

cultivation to nearly insignificant levels in San Martin department, once 

one of the key coca growing areas of the world, and replaced it with licit, 

high-value crops such as cacao, coffee, and oil palm. The U.S. strategy 

seeks to replicate that model in other areas of Peru and to encourage 

Peruvian authorities to assume greater responsibility for sustaining 

counternarcotics programs. The MSRPs also reflect concerns over the 

role that efforts to combat drug trafficking play in stemming other illicit 

activities, such as money laundering, illegal logging, and trafficking in 

wildlife. 

The MSRPs for Venezuela reflect continuing concern over increased 

trafficking of cocaine from neighboring Colombia, which apparently has 

led to rising cocaine consumption in Venezuela. The MSRPs note that the 

U.S. counternarcotics strategy for that country is constrained by the 

Venezuelan government’s antagonism toward the United States. The 

U.S. strategy has therefore aimed primarily at reducing demand for 

cocaine, primarily through cooperation with local and regional law 

enforcement. 

State, USAID, DOD, and DEA allotted a combined estimated total of 

nearly $5.2 billion in counternarcotics assistance to Andean countries in 

fiscal years 2006-2011. Of this amount, about $366 million (7 percent) 

was allotted for Bolivia; $3.92 billion (76 percent) for Colombia; $233 

million (5 percent) for Ecuador; $659 million (13 percent) for Peru; and $7 

million (less than 1 percent) for Venezuela (see fig. 2). 

Venezuela 

U.S. Agencies Allotted 

Billions to Andean 

Countries for 

Counternarcotics 

Assistance in Fiscal 

Years 2006-2011 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Figure 2: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in 

Andean Countries, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 

Note: Percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding. Amounts have been rounded to the 

nearest million. The primary funding sources used for counternarcotics support in Andean countries 

include the following foreign assistance accounts: Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP); 

Development Assistance (DA); Economic Support Fund (ESF); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); 

International Military Education and Training (IMET); International Narcotics Control and Law 

Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 

(NADR). According to State, the FMF, IMET, and NADR accounts contribute to counternarcotics 

efforts, but are also used for broader activities. In addition, DOD receives an annual appropriation for 

counternarcotics activities and uses some of these funds to support operations in the Andean region, 

and; DOD also provided an allotment from the Section 1207 Assistance program. DEA supports its 

Sensitive Investigative Unit program from its annual appropriation. See appendix V for details on 

sources of funding included in our analysis. 

Total estimated allotments for counternarcotics assistance programs in 

the Andean countries declined overall by about 51 percent from fiscal 

year 2006 to fiscal year 2011. Allotments for Bolivia declined by about 

$103 million (87 percent); for Colombia, by $377 million (45 percent); for 

Ecuador, by $32 million (59 percent); for Peru, by $87 million (52 

percent); and for Venezuela, by $2 million (88 percent). In fiscal year 

2008, allotments for counternarcotics assistance programs declined in all 

Andean countries. (See fig. 3.) 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Figure 3: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in 

Andean Countries, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 

Note: Amounts have been rounded to the nearest million and thus may not sum totals shown. 

Amounts of less than $1 million were rounded to nearest 2 decimal places. The primary funding 

sources used for counternarcotics support in Andean countries include the following foreign 

assistance accounts: Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP); Development Assistance (DA); Economic 

Support Fund (ESF); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); International Military Education and Training 

(IMET); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). According to State, the FMF, IMET, and NADR 

accounts contribute to counternarcotics efforts but are also used for broader activities. In addition, 

DOD receives an annual appropriation for counternarcotics activities and uses some of these funds to 

support operations in the Andean region; DOD also provided an allotment from the Section 1207 

Assistance program. DEA supports its Sensitive Investigative Unit program from its annual 

appropriation. See appendix V for details on sources of funding included in our analysis. 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Of the agencies’ combined estimated assistance in fiscal years 2006 

through 2011, State provided about $3 billion (60 percent), USAID 

provided $1 billion (21 percent), DOD provided $956 million (19 percent), 

and DEA provided $25 million (less than 1 percent). As figure 4 shows, 

each agency’s allotments decreased during this time period. State’s 

allotments for counternarcotics assistance declined the most, dropping by 

about 60 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011. According to 

agency officials, this decline in funding for counternarcotics assistance 

could be attributed to factors such as the ongoing nationalization of U.S. 

counternarcotics programs and assets in Colombia as well as a general 

reduction in available resources across the federal government in recent 

fiscal years.10

 

10 “Nationalization” refers to the transfer of operations and funding responsibilities for U.S.-

supported programs to the host country governments. 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Figure 4: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in 

Andean Countries, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 

Note: Amounts have been rounded to the nearest million and thus may not sum to totals shown. The 

primary funding sources used for counternarcotics support in Andean countries include the following 

foreign assistance accounts: Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP); Development Assistance (DA); 

Economic Support Fund (ESF); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); International Military Education and 

Training (IMET); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation, 

Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). According to State, the FMF, IMET, and 

NADR accounts contribute to counternarcotics efforts, but are also used for broader activities. In 

addition, DOD receives an annual appropriation for counternarcotics activities and uses some of 

these funds to support operations in the Andean region; DOD also provided an allotment from the 

Section 1207 Assistance program. DEA supports its Sensitive Investigative Unit program from its 

annual appropriation. See appendix V for detail on sources of funding included in our analysis. DEA 

amounts are not visible due to the scale of the chart. 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding most of their 

annual targets related to key counternarcotics performance measures in 

the Andean countries, and each complied with the ONDCP requirement 

that each agency obtain its IG’s attestation to the reliability of the 

agency’s performance summary reports before submitting the reports to 

ONDCP.11 DOD also reported tracking counternarcotics performance 

measures, but we could not confirm the reliability of its performance data. 

Moreover, DOD did not comply with ONDCP’s requirement that the IG 

attest to the reliability of reported data. 

State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding many 

performance targets related to key measures since 2007, when ONDCP 

called for these targets to be set.12 Performance measures are important 

in helping managers assess progress toward goals and promoting 

accountability by communicating agency performance to Congress and 

the public. In addition, in compliance with ONDCP’s 2007 requirement, 

each agency submitted IG attestations to the reliability of the data 

reported. 

State reported meeting or exceeding more than half of its annual targets 

for two key measures of its counternarcotics activities: (1) hectares of 

illicit crops eradicated and (2) kilos of narcotics seized.13 State reported 

meeting or exceeding a total of 16 of 28 annual targets related to these 

measures. State reported assisting in the eradication of about 915,000 

hectares of illicit crops in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in fiscal years 2006 

through 2010, meeting or exceeding its annual targets in those countries 

about half the time in the 4 years for which data are available.14 State also 

reported assisting in the seizure of approximately 2,300,000 kilos of 

 

11ONDCP, ONDCP Circular: Drug Control Accounting (Washington, D.C.: 2007). 

12In fiscal year 2007, State’s Bureau of Foreign Affairs began reporting State’s and 

USAID’s performance targets, and DEA began reporting its performance targets. Prior to 

this year, the agencies reported results but not targets. 

13Although State has several counternarcotics performance measures, the two key 

measures that State reports to the ONDCP for the Andean countries are hectares of coca 

eradicated and kilos of narcotics seized. 

14State reported assisting the Bolivian government in eradicating 32,462 hectares of illicit 

crops in 2006 through 2010. State’s results for fiscal year 2011 have not yet been 

finalized. 

State, USAID, and 

DEA Reported 

Meeting or Exceeding 

Many Targets, but 

DOD’s Reporting Has 

Been Unreliable 

State, USAID, and DEA 

Reported Meeting or 

Exceeding Targets for Key 

Measures 

State Department 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

narcotics in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in fiscal years 2006 

through 2010, meeting or exceeding more than half of its annual 

interdiction targets in the four years for which data are available.15 State is 

currently revising its performance measurements. Officials told us that 

they are making efforts to develop more performance measures that do 

not focus on eradication, because eradication is not the sole factor 

influencing cultivation levels. State is also making efforts to develop 

metrics that demonstrate progress toward turning over control of 

counternarcotics programs to partner countries. (See app. II and app. III 

for further details of State’s counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean 

countries.) State’s IG attested to the reliability of the department’s 

reporting of performance results for fiscal years 2007 through 2010, in 

accordance with ONDCP’s requirement. 

In January 2010, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs [State/INL] issued guidelines for program monitoring 

and evaluation. These guidelines were intended to help program 

managers determine whether projects are achieving their goals and 

adjust projects as necessary; plan effective programs; report program 

results to key stakeholders and oversight entities; justify resource 

requests; promote necessary changes in partner support, and contribute 

to constructive policy dialogue within the U.S. government and 

internationally. Departmentwide program evaluation guidance followed in 

November 2010, when State announced its first-ever evaluation policy for 

improving program management. 

USAID reported generally exceeding annual targets related to two key 

measures for its counternarcotics efforts in the Andean countries: (1) 

hectares of land devoted to cultivating licit crops in areas receiving USAID 

assistance and (2) number of jobs created by alternative development 

projects each year.16 USAID reported exceeding a total of 26 of 32 annual 

targets related to these measures. According to USAID data, 804,314 

 

15In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, State reported assisting with the seizure of approximately 

550,000 kilos of narcotics in Bolivia but reported no interdiction assistance after fiscal year 

2008. 

16These two measures are the key performance measures that USAID reports to ONDCP 

for the Andean countries. USAID monitors a range of additional metrics that vary by 

country, such as sales of licit farm and non-farm products, number of families benefited by 

alternative development, and number of municipalities strengthened by U.S. government 

programs. 

USAID 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

hectares were devoted to alternative crops and 761,031 full-time jobs 

were created in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in fiscal years 2006 

through 2010.17 (See app. II and app. III for further details of USAID’s 

counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean countries.) In accordance 

with ONDCP’s 2007 requirement, USAID’s IG attested to the reliability of 

the agency’s reporting of performance results for fiscal years 2007 

through 2010. 

USAID conducts evaluations of its counternarcotics and development 

programs in the Andean countries. These evaluations provide historical 

and regional context for USAID projects, detailed descriptions of program 

activities and results, findings, conclusions, recommendations, and 

lessons learned. Some of the achievements reported in these evaluations 

include the following: 

 USAID’s alternative development program has met and surpassed 

annual targets for voluntary eradication of illicit crops in Peru. 

 USAID contributed to Plan Colombia, which reduced opium poppy 

cultivation by 50 percent and improved security by suppressing 

illegally armed groups. 

 USAID’s activities in Bolivia have contributed to improved poverty 

indicators, and hectares of principal alternative crops—such as 

bananas and citrus—have increased more than coca. 

DEA reported generally exceeding regional targets related to two key 

performance measures for its international counternarcotics efforts:(1) 

number of drug trafficking organizations, or priority target organizations 

(PTO), disrupted and (2) number of PTOs dismantled.18 DEA reported 

 

17USAID reported supporting the cultivation of 39,834 hectares of alternative crops and 

the creation of 22,386 jobs in Bolivia in fiscal years 2006 through 2010. USAID’s results 

for fiscal year 2011 have not yet been finalized. 

18DEA defines PTOs as drug trafficking organizations with an identified hierarchy engaged 

in the highest levels of drug trafficking or drug money laundering operations, having a 

significant international, national, regional, or local impact upon drug availability. DEA 

defines disrupting as significantly interfering with the normal and effective operation of a 

targeted organization, as indicated by changes in, for example, organizational leadership, 

trafficking patterns, and drug production methods. DEA defines dismantling as destroying 

the organization’s leadership, financial base, and supply network such that the 

organization is incapable of operating or reconstructing itself. 

DEA 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

meeting or exceeding 8 of 10 annual targets related to these measures. 

DEA reported disrupting 73 PTOs and dismantling 144 in Colombia, 

Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 through 2011,19

meeting or exceeding its regional targets for every year except 2007 and 

2011.20 (See app. II and app. III for country-level details on the results of 

DEA’s counternarcotics activities in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 

Venezuela.) DOJ’s IG attested to the reliability of DEA’s reporting of its 

performance results for 2007 through 2010, in accordance with ONDCP’s 

requirement. 

DOD reported a number of performance measures for its 

counternarcotics efforts in the Andean countries in fiscal years 2007 

through 2011, such as training and military support. However, we could 

not confirm the reliability of the counternarcotics performance data DOD 

reported during these years. DOD is working to improve its 

counternarcotics performance measurement system, but DOD officials 

have reported challenges in measuring the performance of its 

counternarcotics activities, such as difficulty in creating performance 

measures that assess program outcomes, as well as dependence on host 

nations and third parties for the collection and reporting of data related to 

these results. 

DOD’s efforts to develop counternarcotics performance measures are 

long-standing. We reported in 1999 that DOD had taken initial steps to 

develop better counternarcotics performance measures.21 In a 

subsequent review, we found that DOD did not have an effective 

performance measurement system to track the progress of its 

 

19According to DEA, although all formal counterdrug investigations between DEA and the 

government of Venezuela were discontinued in 2005, the agency has continued to disrupt 

and dismantle Venezuelan PTOs through efforts in other countries. DEA reported that no 

data for its activities in Bolivia were available because its Bolivia offices were closed by 

January 2009. 

20DEA measures its performance in each country but sets performance targets at the 

regional level rather than the country level. 

21See GAO, Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply 

Have Declined, GAO/NSIAD-00-9 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 1999). 

DOD Reported Various 

Performance Measures, 

but Its Reporting Has Not 

Been Reliable 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

counternarcotics activities.22 ONDCP also reported holding, since 2006, 

numerous consultations with DOD regarding the department’s 

development of a performance measurement system for its 

counternarcotics efforts. In 2010 we recommended that (1) DOD review 

the department’s performance measures for counternarcotics activities 

and revise the measures, as appropriate, to include the key attributes of 

successful performance measures that we had previously identified and 

(2) apply practices that we had identified to facilitate the use of 

performance data.23 In response to these recommendations, DOD issued 

standard operating procedures for the development and documentation of 

counternarcotics performance metrics.24 This guidance outlines 

procedures for selecting and evaluating counternarcotics performance 

measures, setting performance targets, and assessing the reliability and 

limitations of performance data with the purpose of using this information 

to provide oversight and guide management decisions about the 

allotment of counternarcotics resources. According to ONDCP, as a result 

of this standard operating procedure, DOD revised its performance 

measurement system in fiscal year 2011 to improve the system’s quality 

and usefulness. According to DOD officials, the department is currently 

developing its counternarcotics performance measures and plans to 

transition to a web-based system for reporting its performance metrics by 

fiscal year 2013. 

DOD did not submit IG statements attesting to the reliability of the 

department’s performance data as required by ONDCP. DOD IG cited a 

number of reasons for not attesting to the reliability of DOD’s performance 

data. For example, according to the IG, DOD’s performance reports for 

fiscal years 2007 through 2009 did not meet ONDCP requirements that 

the reports clearly describe the meaning and relevance of performance 

measures and explain why any targets were not met. In addition, 

according to information we obtained during a 2010 interview with the IG, 

DOD’s 2008 performance report did not include 4 consecutive years of 

data required for tracking improvements. Further, targets for several 

 

22GAO, Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement System to 

Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotics Activities, GAO-10-835 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 21, 2010). 

23GAO-10-835. 

24DOD, Counternarcotics and Global Threats Performance Metrics System Standard 

Operating Procedures (Washington, D.C.: 2012). 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

performance measures in the 2008 report appeared to have been set 

after the actual results for these measures were determined, therefore 

throwing the reliability of all the data into question. DOD IG saw no 

changes in DOD’s 2009 performance report and therefore decided not to 

dedicate resources to conducting a review for the 2009 report. ONDCP 

confirmed that DOD again failed to comply with the IG review requirement 

in fiscal year 2010. In June 2012, DOD IG stated that it was unable to 

attest to the reliability of DOD’s fiscal year 2011 performance report. 

Given the strategic importance of reducing drug production and trafficking 

in the Andean countries—the source of more than 95 percent of the 

cocaine seized in the United States and much of the heroin available east 

of the Mississippi River—accurate and reliable information on the results 

of this assistance is essential. State, USAID, and DEA have reported the 

required information, with attestations of its reliability, regarding the 

combined $4 billion in assistance that they provided in fiscal years 2006 

through 2011. However, lacking attestations by DOD’s IG, ONDCP has 

minimal assurance of the reliability of DOD’s reporting on its estimated 

$956 million in counternarcotics assistance in those years. Without 

reliable information, ONDCP may be limited in its ability to carry out its 

responsibility for coordinating and overseeing implementation of the 

policies, goals, objectives, and priorities established by the national drug 

control program and to report accurately to Congress on counternarcotics 

assistance provided by agencies under ONDCP’s purview. Moreover, 

without reliable information, Congress and other decision makers, 

including ONDCP, may lack information that is essential to assessing 

progress toward the U.S. goal of curtailing illicit drug consumption in 

America, making decisions on the allocation of resources, and conducting 

effective oversight. 

To strengthen ONDCP’s ability to coordinate, oversee, and report to 

Congress on U.S. counternarcotics assistance in the Andean countries, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that DOD complies 

with the ONDCP requirement to submit to ONDCP performance summary 

reports that are accompanied by IG attestations of the reliability of the 

information reported. 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, DOD, DEA, and 

ONDCP. State, DOD, DEA, ONDCP, and DHS provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. USAID and DOD also 

provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes VI and 

VII, respectively. In its written comments, DOD stated that it concurred 

with our recommendation. 

As discussed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of State, the 

USAID Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, 

and the Director of National Drug Control Policy. In addition, the report 

will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 

Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

Agency Comments 

and our Evaluation 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

To identify U.S. agencies that provided counternarcotics assistance in the 

Andean region during fiscal years 2006 through 2011, we reviewed past 

GAO reports and relevant legislation. To identify counternarcotics 

assistance activities, we reviewed funding amounts reported to us by 

agencies, congressional budget submissions, agency annual reports, and 

other program documents. We also interviewed officials from the 

Department of State (State), the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA).

To describe the U.S. strategic approaches to counternarcotics assistance 

in the five Andean countries, we examined multiple U.S. government 

documents and interviewed U.S. government officials. Specifically, we 

obtained and analyzed State’s mission and bureau performance plans to 

understand U.S. foreign policy and security goals and priorities and the 

executive branch’s approach to formulating those goals. We also 

obtained State’s and USAID’s joint strategic 5-year plan, DOD’s 

Counternarcotics and Global Threats strategy, and DEA’s agency 

strategic plan. We interviewed officials from State, USAID, DOD, and 

DEA in Washington, D.C., who are responsible for administering and 

implementing the assistance programs to the five Andean countries. We 

reviewed department and agency planning, reporting, and budgeting 

documents and obtained and reviewed the various strategy documents 

produced by the United States that are the basis for overall drug control

efforts, such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) 

annual National Drug Control Strategy and the U.S. embassy’s mission 

strategic resource plans for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

We defined “counternarcotics assistance” as all funding provided primarily 

for the purpose of eradicating drug crop cultivation, interdicting trafficked 

narcotics, supporting alternative livelihoods and alternative crop 

cultivation, or training and equipping military and law enforcement for 

counternarcotics operations. In addition, we included small amounts of 

funding for assistance efforts in the region intended to support U.S. 

counternarcotics goals in the region, such as legal sector reform and drug 

demand reduction programs in Andean countries. The funding information 

presented in this report is based on allotment data. We used GAO’s 

definition of “allotment” as funds authorized by the head of an agency to 

be used for obligations. Each agency provided their funding amounts 

using internal, agency-specific budget terminology. This terminology 

varied among agencies; for example, some agencies referred to their 

funding amounts as ‘budget levels’ where other agencies referred to their 

funding amounts as ‘allocations.’ We discussed our definition of the term 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 23 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

“allotment” with cognizant officials at each agency. At each agency, those 

officials stated that the funding amounts they provided could be 

characterized using our definition of allotment and thus could be 

presented in this report as funds available for obligation in support of 

counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean countries.

To identify the amounts of U.S. government funding allotted for 

counternarcotics, we requested funding data for counternarcotics 

assistance in the Andean region for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We 

also interviewed cognizant agency officials and examined past GAO 

reports and congressional budget submissions, including State’s Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) 

program and budget guides for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. In 

addition, we obtained technical comments from DHS to confirm that all 

DHS counternarcotics efforts in the region are implemented using funds 

from other U.S. agencies and international organizations. We collected 

data for fiscal years 2006 through fiscal year 2011 to show trends in 

counternarcotics assistance funding in the region. Each agency provided 

funding data organized by country (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 

Venezuela) and by fiscal year (2006-2011). Based on our review of the 

data and discussions with agency officials, we determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for a broad estimate of U.S. government 

counternarcotics program allotments the Andean region, and to provide 

an indication of general trends over time as well as differences in funding 

provided by country and agency.

The agencies took different steps and queried different systems to 

provide the funding data we requested.

• State. Officials from State’s Office of the Director of Foreign 

Assistance provided data from the Foreign Assistance Coordination 

and Tracking System (FACTS) database, which houses funding data 

on U.S. foreign assistance programs.1

 

1

FACTS is used to collect foreign assistance planning and reporting data, including plans 

for implementing current-year appropriated budgets and performance planning and 

reporting data.

The FACTS funding data 

included amounts from fiscal year 2006 through 2011 from the 

following foreign assistance accounts: Andean Counterdrug Initiative 

(ACI); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); International Military 

Education and Training (IMET); International Narcotics Control and 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 24 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, 

Demining and Related Programs (NADR). We requested the funding 

amounts for these accounts after determining, through discussions 

with State officials, that these accounts were the most relevant to our 

scope. In addition, we requested specific amounts allotted for security 

sector reform and combating transnational crime in the region from 

the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) 

accounts. In addition, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement (INL) provided records on appropriations, 

allotments, obligations, expenditures, and other budget categories. 

We used these records to provide data on funding allotted for 

assistance in Ecuador through DOD’s Section 1207 Assistance 

program; we did not obtain any additional data on 1207 program 

funding in the region.

• USAID. USAID’s Office of Latin America and the Caribbean consulted 

internal records and submitted a spreadsheet that combined (1) 

amounts of ACI assistance provided in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, 

which were not included in the State/F data and (2) data pulled by a 

query of the FACTS database to provide amounts allotted for 

counternarcotics assistance through the DA and ESF accounts for 

fiscal years 2008 through 2011.

• DOD. DOD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD-CN>) provided a 

document with funding data from the CTA for Counternarcotics. 

DASD-CN> provides oversight of CTA funding through a Webbased database. DASD-CN> compiled funding data from this 

database— which tracks funds by project code— and then asked 

knowledgeable officials to provide estimated amounts of funds used in 

support of each Andean country.

• DEA. DEA reviewed interagency agreement documents with State to 

obtain data on allotments for DEA’s SIU program. DEA provided a 

spreadsheet with detail from those agreements on funding provided in 

support of the program.

We combined the funding data provided by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA 

to obtain total estimated U.S. government funds allotted. These amounts 

are estimates because, according to agency officials, funding databases 

may have imperfect or incomplete information, and some agencies relied 

on manual estimates or manual review of agency documentation rather 

than a central data management system to provide funding information.

Because State’s FACTS database was in the process of being created 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

and launched in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, some data may be missing 

for those years. In addition, State officials told us that although assistance 

provided through the FMF and IMET accounts is often used for 

counternarcotics purposes, the main intent of these accounts is to provide 

assistance to partner nation militaries. Some of the FMF and IMET 

assistance included in this report may not have provided direct support to 

counternarcotics efforts of Andean countries. In addition, State/INL’s 

records on the allotments for the 1207 program may not be complete, 

because the program was originally managed by DOD; authority for the 

1207 program expired on September 30, 2010. According to State, 

because State does not maintain separate records for the uses of funds 

in the ACI account, State was not able to provide complete data specific 

to this account. According to USAID, USAID’s Office for Latin America 

and the Caribbean relied on internal records that had been maintained by 

the staff since 2006 to provide GAO with data on ACI funding amounts 

allotted by USAID in each country for counternarcotics programs.

Similarly, DOD provided manual estimates of amounts by country, 

because according to DOD, the department tracks CTA funding by project 

code—which indicates the general purpose of the funding—rather than by 

country. According to DOD, there is no standard procedure for estimating 

these amounts by country. Unlike funding data provided by other 

agencies, DEA amounts were obtained by a manual review of agency 

documentation, not pulled by query from a data management system, 

according to DEA officials.

To assess State, USAID, DOD, and DEA reporting on their performance 

of counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries, we reviewed 

agency planning and reporting documents related to counternarcotics 

performance measures and targets. We also met with State, USAID, 

DOD, and DOJ officials to identify the most significant performance 

measures for their counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries. For 

the focus of our review, we selected two key measures for each agency 

that were identified by agency officials as significant indicators of the 

results of their counternarcotics activities, included in the agencies’ 

annual performance reports to ONDCP, and consistently reported to 

ONDCP over the past 5 years for all Andean countries. We assessed the 

reliability of agency performance data for these key measures by 

interviewing cognizant agency officials about the methods used to gather 

and verify this data. We also reviewed related documents, such as 

independent data quality assessments and statements from agency 

Inspector Generals (IG) attesting to the reliability of agency performance 

data. We found limitations with some of the performance data for these 

key measures, including (1) lack of available State and USAID data in 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 26 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Venezuela, and of DEA data in Bolivia, due to limited U.S. presence in 

these countries; (2) reliance on partner nations and third parties for 

collection and reporting of certain performance data; and (3) lack of IG 

authentication of DOD’s reported performance data. We used these data 

to describe each agency’s counternarcotics performance measures and 

the results related to these measures, as reported by the agencies, in 

relation to their counternarcotics performance targets. With the exception 

of DOD’s performance data, we determined that the performance data 

provided by the agencies were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 through July 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our work objectives.
Page 27 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Figure 5: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in 

Bolivia, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 

Bolivia: 

Counternarcotics Assistance 

Department of State (State) 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

State allotted about $237 million for 

counternarcotics assistance in Bolivia, 

despite the deterioration of diplomatic 

relations (see fig. 5). This assistance 

supported manual eradication efforts 

and an aviation program. The 

program’s aircraft are used to provide 

transportation for manual eradication 

teams and interdiction operations. 

State also supports eradication and 

interdiction in Bolivia through logistics 

support to law enforcement. 

Since fiscal year 2006, State has 

reported assisting the Bolivian 

government in eradicating 32,462 

hectares of illicit crops (see fig. 6). 

State began setting annual 

eradication targets for Bolivia in 2007 

but first met its target in 2010. State 

reported assisting the government of 

Bolivia in seizing 550,024 kilos of 

narcotics in 2006 and 2007. 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

USAID allotted about $118 million for 

alternative development assistance 

to Bolivia (see fig. 5). Alternative 

development assistance provides 

opportunities for farmers to transition 

from coca production to other viable 

products. USAID provides support to 

farmers who are vulnerable to 

entering into the coca economy. 

USAID also partners with Bolivian 

government agencies to address 

infrastructure needs. 

Since fiscal year 2006, USAID has 

reported supporting the cultivation of 

39,834 hectares of alternative crops 

in Bolivia, exceeding annual targets in 

2007 and 2010 (see fig. 7). USAID 

reported that its alternative 

development activities created 22,386 

jobs, exceeding USAID’s annual 

targets every year except 2007. 

Appendix II: Agency Allotments and Program 

Goals for Counternarcotics Assistance 

Bolivia 
Page 28 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Figure 6: Hectares of Illicit Crops Eradicated in Bolivia, Fiscal Years 2006-2010

Figure 7: Hectares of Alternative Crops Cultivated in Bolivia, Fiscal Years 2006-

2010

Bolivia: 

Counternarcotics Assistance

Department of Defense (DOD)

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

DOD allotted about $9 million for 

counternarcotics-related security 

assistance in Bolivia (see fig. 5). 

Most funding has supported training 

for individuals who are sent to 

receive instruction at U.S. military 

service schools. This has included 

training in counterdrug operations 

and equipment maintenance, as well 

as officer professional development. 

Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA)

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

DEA allotted about $2 million to 

support the Sensitive Investigative 

Unit (SIU) program in Bolivia, which 

maintained a team of vetted 

counterdrug investigative and 

intelligence experts (see fig. 5). In 

November 2008, the SIU program 

ended and DEA staff were expelled 

from the country on the order of 

President Morales. 

DEA performance data for Bolivia 

are not available.
Page 29 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Colombia 

Figure 8: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in 

Colombia, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 

Colombia: 

Counternarcotics Assistance

State 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

State allotted about $2.4 billion for 

counternarcotics assistance in 

Colombia (see fig. 8). This 

assistance supported aerial and 

manual coca eradication, including 

aviation support. State maintains a 

fleet of fixed-wing aircraft that are 

used for aerial eradication. State 

also maintains rotary-wing aircraft 

that provide security for manual 

eradication teams and support 

interdiction missions. In addition, 

State provides support to an elite 

interdiction force within the 

Colombian National Police (CNP) 

and supports police in rural areas 

Since fiscal year 2006, State has 

reported assisting the government of 

Colombia in eradicating 832,395 

hectares of illicit crops and seizing 

1,649,561 kilos of narcotics, 

exceeding half of its annual 

eradication targets and all of its 

interdiction targets in Colombia since 

2007 (see fig. 9). 

USAID 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

USAID allotted about $718 million for 

alternative development and local 

government support programs (see 

fig. 8). These programs were 

intended to strengthen linkages 

among governmental institutions, 

markets, and local producers and to 

strengthen the government’s 

legitimacy in target areas (see map). 

Since fiscal year 2006, USAID has 

reported supporting the cultivation of 

502,645 hectares of alternative crops 

in formerly coca growing areas of 

Colombia, exceeding its annual 

targets every year except 2007 (see 

fig. 10). USAID also reported that its 

alternative development activities 

created 584,803 jobs in Colombia, 

exceeding annual targets every year 

except 2007. 

Appendix II: Agency Allotments and Program 

Goals for Counternarcotics Assistance 

Colombia 
Page 30 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Each U.S. agency involved in CSDI has a designated area of 

responsibility. State focuses on eradication, USAID focuses on land 

reform and restitution, and DOD focuses on anti-insurgency support. 

DEA’s SIU program is not part of CSDI but provides training and 

equipment to a vetted unit within the Colombian National Police (CNP). 

State, USAID, DOD, and DEA coordinate counternarcotics efforts in 

country.

Some counternarcotics programs and assets are being transferred to 

Colombian control. For example, State’s Plan Colombia Helicopter 

Program, initiated in 2002, provides rotary-wing aircraft to develop 

Colombian Army aviation. State officials estimated that the last aircraft 

provided by the program would be transferred to the government of 

Colombia by the end of 2012. Similarly, State’s Colombian National 

Police Aviation program has nationalized the cost of fuel to the CNP and 

plans for the nationalization of rotary-wing aircraft in 2012. The CNP also 

plans to assume financial responsibility for the purchase, transport, and 

mixing of glyphosate, the chemical used in aerial eradication, in 2011 and 

2012.

Figure 9: Hectares of Illicit Crops Eradicated in Colombia, Fiscal Years 2006-2010 

Figure 10: Hectares of Alternative Crops Cultivated in Colombia, Fiscal Years 2006-

2010

Colombia: 

Counternarcotics Assistance

DOD

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

DOD allotted about $752 million for 

counternarcotics-related security 

assistance in Colombia (see fig. 8). 

DOD has provided training and 

equipment for the Regional 

Helicopter Training Center and pilot 

training program in Melgar. DOD has 

also provided rotary-wing aircraft 

support to the Colombian Joint Task 

Force-Omega, which is the main 

Colombian task force charged with 

confronting the Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia (known by its 

Spanish acronym, FARC). DOD 

counternarcotics funds have also 

developed maritime interdiction 

capacity through the purchase of 

boats and construction of related 

infrastructure in Santa Marta, 

Cartagena and other locations.

DOD reported training helicopter 

pilots and mechanics in Colombia 

and supporting the government in 

maintaining the operational 

readiness of its air assault division.

DEA

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

DEA allotted about $15 million to 

support the Sensitive Investigative 

Unit (SIU) program in Colombia (see 

fig. 8). The program maintains a 

team of vetted counterdrug 

investigative and intelligence experts 

in the national police. 

Since fiscal year 2006, DEA has 

reported disrupting 31 priority target 

organizations in Colombia and 

dismantling 121.
Page 31 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Figure 11: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in 

Ecuador, Fiscal Years 2006-2011

Ecuador: 

Counternarcotics Assistance 

State 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

State allotted about $64 million for 

counternarcotics assistance (see fig. 

11). This assistance focused on 

improving the institutional 

capabilities of Ecuador’s police and 

military to combat narcotics 

trafficking and money laundering. In 

addition, State provided port security 

assistance. 

Since fiscal year 2006, State has 

reported assisting the government of 

Ecuador in seizing 45,897 kilos of 

narcotics (see fig. 12). Actual 

seizures exceeded State’s annual 

target only in 2009.

USAID

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

USAID allotted about $45 million for 

alternative development assistance 

in Ecuador (see fig. 11). This 

assistance, focused in part on 

Ecuador’s border areas (see map), 

has included water and sanitation 

infrastructure improvements as well 

as technical assistance, training, and 

small grants to stimulate agricultural 

investment. 

Since fiscal year 2006, USAID has 

reported supporting the cultivation of 

81,682 hectares of alternative crops 

in formerly coca growing areas of 

Ecuador, exceeding its annual 

targets for Ecuador every year since 

2007 (see fig. 13). According to 

USAID, alternative development 

activities have created 55,304 jobs in 

Ecuador, exceeding USAID’s annual 

targets in 2007 through 2010, the 

years for which data were available.

Appendix II: Agency Allotments and Program 

Goals for Counternarcotics Assistance

Ecuador 
Page 32 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Figure 12: Kilos of Narcotics Seized in Ecuador, Fiscal Years 2006-2010

Figure 13: Hectares of Alternative Crops Cultivated in Ecuador, Fiscal Years 2006-

2010

Ecuador: 

Counternarcotics Assistance

DOD

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

DOD allotted about $121 million for 

counternarcotics-related security 

assistance in Ecuador (see fig. 11). 

DOD has focused on providing 

military training and equipment to 

enhance interdiction capacity, 

particularly along the northern border 

with Colombia. 

DOD reported supporting Ecuador in 

maintaining the operational 

readiness of its tactical vehicles and 

river boats. 

DEA

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

DEA allotted about $2 million to 

support the Sensitive Investigative 

Unit (SIU) program in Ecuador,

which maintains a team of vetted 

counterdrug investigative and 

intelligence experts in Ecuador (see 

fig. 11). 

Since 2006, DEA reported disrupting 

15 priority target organizations in 

Ecuador and dismantling 10.
Page 33 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Appendix II: Agency Allotments and Program 

Goals for Counternarcotics Assistance 

Peru 

Figure 14: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in 

Peru, Fiscal Years 2006-2011

Peru: 

Counternarcotics Assistance

State 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

State allotted about $379 million for 

counternarcotics assistance in Peru 

(see fig. 14). This assistance 

included coca eradication, 

interdiction support. In addition, 

State provided aviation support, 

maintaining a fleet of State-owned 

helicopters for interdiction and 

eradication missions. 

Since fiscal year 2006, State has 

reported assisting in eradicating 

50,387 hectares of illicit crops in 

Peru, exceeding its annual 

eradication targets in Peru in 2008 

through 2010 (see fig. 15). Although 

State assisted the government of 

Peru in seizing 82,311 kilos of 

narcotics since 2006, annual 

narcotics seizures in Peru have 

remained below State’s interdiction 

targets every year since 2007. 

USAID

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

USAID allotted about $203 million for 

alternative development in Peru (see 

fig. 14). USAID’s alternative 

development program provides 

assistance to help coca-producing 

communities transition to cultivating 

licit crops. Licit crops fostered by 

USAID programs include cacao, 

palm oil, and coffee. 

Since fiscal year 2006, USAID has 

reported supporting the cultivation of 

180,153 hectares of alternative crops 

in formerly coca growing areas of 

Peru, exceeding its annual 

alternative-development targets for 

Peru in 2007, 2008, and 2010 (see 

fig. 16). USAID also reported that its

alternative development activities 

created 98,538 jobs in Peru, 

exceeding its annual targets every 

year, according to USAID.
Page 34 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Figure 15: Hectares of Illicit Crops Eradicated in Peru, Fiscal Years 2006-2010

Figure 16: Hectares of Alternative Crops Cultivated in Peru, Fiscal Years 2006-2010

Peru: 

Counternarcotics Assistance

DOD

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

DOD allotted about $71 million for 

counternarcotics-related security 

assistance in Peru (see fig. 14). 

DOD has supported maritime drug 

interdiction efforts of the Peruvian 

coast guard, and has provided 

equipment and training to Peru’s 

special forces to enhance their ability 

to combat narcoterrorism along 

rivers in illicit coca growing regions. 

DEA

In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

DOJ allotted about $6 million to 

support DEA’s Sensitive 

Investigative Unit program in Peru 

(see fig. 14). DEA maintains a team 

of vetted counterdrug investigative 

and intelligence experts in the 

Peruvian national police. During this 

time period, DEA reported disrupting 

19 priority target organizations in 

Peru and dismantling 11.
Page 35 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Figure 17: Total Estimated Allotments for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance in 

Venezuela, Fiscal Years 2006-2011

Venezuela: 

Counternarcotics Assistance

State 

State allotted about $4 million for 

counternarcotics and related security 

assistance in Venezuela in fiscal 

years 2006 through 2011 (see fig. 

17). This assistance has provided 

port security measures and law 

enforcement training. 

USAID

USAID did not provide 

counternarcotics assistance to 

Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 

through 2011. 

DOD

DOD allotted about $3 million for 

counternarcotics and related security 

assistance in Venezuela in fiscal 

years 2006 through 2011 (see fig. 

17). Through 2009, this assistance 

was used in part to provide tactically 

actionable intelligence to both US 

and select Venezuelan law 

enforcement agencies. 

DEA

DEA did not maintain a Sensitive 

Investigative Unit in Venezuela in 

fiscal years 2006 through 2011. 

However, during this time period, the 

agency reported disrupting eight, 

and dismantling two, Venezuelan 

priority target organizations through 

efforts in other countries.

Appendix II: Agency Allotments and Program 

Goals for Counternarcotics Assistance

Venezuela 
Page 36 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Bolivia 

State supports manual eradication efforts in Bolivia by providing training 

and equipment to military and police and through aviation programs that 

provide aircraft with related training and maintenance to support 

transportation and logistics.1

 State also makes aviation assets available 

for interdiction purposes, transporting manual eradication teams, 

supplies, and equipment to otherwise inaccessible regions of the country. 

Colombia

State supports aerial and manual eradication in Colombia and provides 

assistance to enhance the country’s interdiction capacity. State supports 

aerial eradication primarily by hiring a private U.S. contractor to aerially 

spread herbicide over areas of coca cultivation. State supports manual 

eradication, planned by the Colombian government, by providing 

protective equipment for manual eradicators. State has also provided 

helicopters and related training and equipment to both the Colombian 

Army and the Colombian National Police to enhance the eradication and 

interdiction capabilities of those institutions.2

 

Ecuador

Because Ecuador is a major transit route for narcotics passing from 

Colombia and Peru to the United States, State’s counternarcotics 

assistance in Ecuador focuses on interdiction efforts and law enforcement 

training. State supports programs to improve the institutional capabilities of 

Ecuador’s military, police, and judicial sectors to combat narcotics 

trafficking, money laundering, and other transnational crimes. 

Peru

 

1 Bolivia does not allow aerial eradication. 2

 These State efforts include the Plan Colombia Helicopter Program and the Colombian 

National Police Aviation Program. 

3

 Peru does not allow aerial eradication. 

U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance Activities

Funding allotted by State, USAID, 

DOD, and DEA in the Andean 

countries primarily supported, 

respectively, eradication and 

interdiction, alternative development, 

military assistance, and law 

enforcement capacity building in 

Andean countries in fiscal years 

2006 through 2011. 

State Department: Eradication 

and Interdiction 

State leads drug crop eradication 

efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru 

and supports law enforcement in 

each of these countries with training 

and equipment to enhance drug 

interdiction capacity. State’s primary 

effort in Ecuador supports training 

and equipment for Ecuador’s 

counternarcotics police. State 

provided limited assistance In 

Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 

through 2011. However, State has 

used recently reprogrammed funds 

for administrative costs associated 

with closing its counternarcotics 

programs in Venezuela. 

Appendix III: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in 

Andean Countries 

Department of State 
Page 37 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Bolivia 

USAID works with the government of Bolivia to diversify the economies of 

coca-growing regions, strengthen productive capacities, improve access to 

essential social services, and improve rural road infrastructure. USAID’s 

alternative development program provides opportunities for farmers to 

transition from production of coca to other viable productive activities. 

Colombia 

In Colombia, USAID’s primary focus is supporting the stabilization efforts of 

the Colombian government to establish and reinforce the government’s 

credibility and legitimacy in regions where illegal armed narcotics-trafficking 

organizations are active. At the U.S. embassy in Bogotá, USAID leads CSDI, 

which coordinates U.S. programs in Colombia to support the Colombian 

government in establishing control over high-priority areas of the country that 

have been affected by drug-related conflict. This effort includes providing 

support to improve the management of Colombian institutions, such as the 

land-titling system.43

Ecuador

 

In Ecuador, USAID’s counternarcotics effort includes a local business 

development program to generate licit employment and increase income for 

families along Ecuador’s northern and southern borders by supporting a 

market-driven expansion of private enterprises linked to rural producer 

groups and associations. Through local business development projects, 

USAID provides technical assistance, training, and small grants to stimulate 

investment in agribusinesses that are linked to both small producers and 

larger markets. 

Peru

USAID supports efforts to help communities to transition from growing coca 

to cultivating licit crops. According to USAID, approximately 1 to 3 months 

after eradication of illicit crops in an area, communities are offered the 

opportunity to sign agreements with the government of Peru, in which the 

communities commit to remaining coca free. USAID and DEVIDA, the 

Peruvian drug control agency, commit to support the coca-free communities 

with a package of assistance tailored to each community’s priorities and 

needs. This assistance includes planting new crops, increasing farmers’ 

access to financial services, and strengthening producer associations and 

cooperatives to facilitate access to local and international markets.

 

4 USAID supports land titling as a way to consolidate government control over areas 

previously controlled by drug trafficking groups, enhance security, and promote 

investment.

U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance Activities 

The funding allotted by State, 

USAID, DOD, and DEA in the 

Andean countries primarily 

supported, respectively, eradication 

and interdiction, alternative 

development, military assistance, 

and law enforcement capacity 

building in Andean countries in fiscal 

years 2006 through 2011. 

USAID: Alternative 

Development 

USAID focuses on alternative 

development in Bolivia, Ecuador, 

and Peru and leads stabilization and 

alternative development programs in 

Colombia. Alternative development 

programs provide assistance to 

individuals and communities to 

facilitate the transition away from 

drug crop cultivation as a source of 

income. CSDI, the stabilization 

program in Colombia, supports the 

counternarcotics efforts of the 

government of that country. USAID 

reported that it did not provide 

assistance in Venezuela in fiscal 

years 2006 to 2011.

Appendix III: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in 

Andean Countries

U.S. Agency for International Development
Page 38 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Bolivia 

DOD reported providing minimal counternarcotics-related military 

support to members of the Bolivian armed forces since 2006. Generally, 

this support has been provided as training for selected members of the 

armed forces who receive instruction at U.S. military service schools.

Colombia

DOD counternarcotics funding in Colombia supports development of 

military air, maritime, river-based, and ground capabilities. For example, 

DOD provides funding for the Regional Helicopter Training Center pilot 

training program in Melgar, which has provided helicopter pilot training to 

counternarcotics forces throughout Latin America. DOD has also supported 

the helicopter capability of the Colombian Joint Task Force – Omega, 

responsible for countering the FARC. Similarly, DOD has purchased and 

funded the maintenance infrastructure necessary for boats used in the 

Colombian military’s maritime interdiction operations. 

Ecuador

DOD counternarcotics funding supports the Ecuadorian military in their 

operations against transnational criminal organizations, principally in the 

country’s northern border region with Colombia. DOD funding provides 

spare parts and tools to support a fleet of tactical vehicles used in 

operations to destroy narcotics processing locations. DOD also provides 

support for efforts to improve river-based patrol capabilities in the same 

northern border region. 

Peru

The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group focuses DOD

counternarcotics support in the interior of Peru and along the northern 

coast. In the interior, DOD has provided communications and surveillance 

equipment to improve Peruvian forces’ ability to deploy for counternarcotics 

patrols. DOD’s assistance in these regions is intended to enhance the 

Peruvian military capacity to conduct operations against criminal and 

terrorist organizations in the region. Along the coast, DOD provides fuel, 

information sharing, training, and equipment to enhance detection and 

monitoring capabilities in Peru’s coastal areas. 

Venezuela

DOD reported providing limited counternarcotics support to Venezuela 

since 2006. Until 2009, this support included a tactical analysis team that 

provided actionable intelligence to both U.S. and select Venezuelan law 

enforcement agencies. Since 2009, DOD resources in the area have been 

used primarily in support of U.S. law enforcement.

U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance Activities 

The funding allotted by State, 

USAID, DOD, and DEA in the 

Andean countries primarily 

supported, respectively, eradication 

and interdiction, alternative 

development, military assistance, 

and law enforcement capacity 

building in Andean countries in fiscal 

years 2006 through 2011.

DOD: Military Support and 

Training 

DOD leads counternarcotics-related 

military support and training 

programs in all countries in the 

region. DOD reported minimal 

engagement with the armed forces 

of Bolivia. In Colombia and Peru, 

DOD provides support to fight armed 

groups that engage in narcotics 

production and trafficking in these 

countries. In Ecuador, DOD works 

jointly with the military to counter 

transnational criminal organizations 

operating in the Ecuador-Colombia 

border region. DOD reported minimal 

engagement with the armed forces 

of Venezuela.

Appendix III: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in 

Andean Countries

Department of Defense
Page 39 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Figures 18 and 19 show DEA’s targets for disrupting and dismantling priority 

target organizations (PTOs) as well as the actual numbers of PTOs 

disrupted and dismantled in the Andean region from fiscal year 2006 through 

2011.

Figure 18: Disrupted Priority Target Organizations (PTOs), Fiscal Years 2006-2011

Figure 19: Dismantled Priority Target Organizations (PTOs), Fiscal Years 2006-2011

U.S. Counternarcotics 

Assistance Activities

The funding allotted by State, 

USAID, DOD, and DEA in the 

Andean countries primarily 

supported, respectively, eradication 

and interdiction, alternative 

development, military assistance, 

and law enforcement capacity 

building in Andean countries in fiscal 

years 2006 through 2011. 

DEA: Sensitive Investigative 

Unit (SIU) Program

The SIU program, an international 

drug enforcement initiative managed 

by DEA, is currently active in three 

countries of the Andean region—

Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. SIU 

members work with the relevant DEA 

country office to disrupt and 

dismantle drug-trafficking 

organizations. DEA operated the SIU 

program in Bolivia through 2008 but 

ended the program after DEA was 

expelled from the country by a 

declaration of President Morales. 

DEA has had no formal relationship 

with Venezuela since 2005. 

Appendix III: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in 

Andean Countries

Drug Enforcement Administration
Page 40 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

State reported that since 2008, it has allocated more than $1.6 billion for 

the Merida Initiative in law enforcement support for Mexico. The Merida 

Initiative guides U.S.-Mexico collaboration against violent drug trafficking 

organizations. The initiative aims to increase Mexican counter-drug 

capacity and to institutionalize the partnership focused on four goals or 

pillars: (1) disrupt organized criminal groups, (2) strengthen law 

enforcement and judicial institutions, (3) advance global competitiveness 

while providing for security along the U.S.-Mexico border, and (4) build 

strong and resilient communities. 

CBSI is an initiative focused on citizen safety that brings all member 

countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican 

Republic together to collaborate on regional security with the United 

States as a partner. To date, Congress has appropriated $203 million to 

CBSI. CBSI aims to strengthen Caribbean partner nations’ capabilities, 

including maritime security, law enforcement, information sharing, border 

and migration control, transnational crime, and criminal justice. 

CARSI seeks to address the corrosive impact of narcotics and weapons 

trafficking, gangs, and organized crime that exist in many Central 

American countries. Congress has appropriated $491 million for CARSI 

to integrate U.S. security efforts from Guatemala to Panama. The pillars 

of CARSI include (1) fostering streets free of violence and crime; (2) 

disrupting the movement of criminals and contraband; (3) supporting 

strong and accountable governments willing to combat the drug threats 

with trained and resourced law enforcement; and (4) building state 

presence in communities at risk. 

Beginning in 2009, U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia has 

focused on supporting the Colombian government’s National 

Consolidation Plan through CSDI. The plan represents the centerpiece of 

Colombian regional development and reform programs by responding to 

issues of rural poverty, violence, human rights, the needs of vulnerable 

groups, and the country’s internally displaced population. CSDI provides 

integrated support for civilian institution-building, rule of law, and 

alternative development programs coupled with security and 

counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The initiative is intended to support 

the Colombian government’s goal of establishing and building state 

presence in areas contested by terrorist groups linked to narcotics 

trafficking, thereby integrating these priority regions into the country’s 

broader political, economic, social, and institutional fabric. 

Coordinator of Citizens 

Security Initiatives in the 

Western Hemisphere

State describes the Coordinator for 

Citizens Security Initiatives in the 

Western Hemisphere as being 

responsible for coordination of four 

initiatives: the Merida Initiative, the 

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative 

(CBSI), the Central American 

Security Initiative (CARSI), and the 

Colombian Strategic Development 

Initiative (CSDI). 

According to State, the Coordinator 

presides over a series of interagency 

executive committee meetings 

focused on counternarcotics efforts 

in the Hemisphere, including the four 

initiatives, as well as programs and 

activities in the Andean countries 

(see map.) The Coordinator has no 

dedicated staff or budget. Although 

the coordination meetings may result 

in adjustments in the implementation 

of programs, they do not determine 

policy, which is the purview of the 

National Security Council. 

The National Drug Control Strategy 

includes information on the 

coordination of the regional initiatives 

as well as efforts in Colombia. 

Appendix IV: Western Hemisphere Initiatives 

to Combat Narcotics Trafficking and Related 

Crimes
Page 41 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics

Appendix V: Sources of Funding for U.S. 

Counternarcotics Assistance in the Andean 

Region

Agency Funding source Primary uses

Andean region 

allotments, 

FY2006-2011

State Economic Support Fund 

(ESF) 

Used for stabilization 

operations and security 

sector reform in Colombia

$55 million 

Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF) 

Facilitates the acquisition of 

U.S. defense equipment by 

partner nations

$391 million 

International Military 

Education and Training 

(IMET) 

Provides professional 

training to partner nations’ 

militaries

$14 million 

Andean Counterdrug 

Program (ACP) 

International Narcotics 

Control and Law 

Enforcement (INCLE)

Supports eradication, 

interdiction, and partner 

nation law enforcement 

training

$2,625 million

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 

Related Programs (NADR)

Provides anti-terrorism 

training to partner nation 

law enforcement

$30 million 

USAID Andean Counterdrug 

Program (ACP)

Development Assistance 

(DA) 

Economic Support Fund 

(ESF) 

Provide technical and 

infrastructure assistance to 

support cultivation of licit 

crops; also used for 

strengthening government 

capacity in post-conflict 

areas of Colombia

$1,085 million 

DOD Central Transfer Account 

(CTA) for Counternarcotics

Section 1207 Assistance

Support training and 

equipment for 

counternarcotics and 

security assistance 

purposes

$956 million 

DEA Annual agency 

appropriation

Sensitive Investigative Unit 

(SIU) 

Supports equipment and 

salary bonos for SIU 

members

$25 million 

Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, DOD, and DEA data.

Notes: 

Totals have been rounded to the nearest million. 

Licit crops supported in the Andean region include cacao, coffee, and oil palm. 

Counternarcotics Assistance 

in the Andean Region 

U.S. agencies use a variety of 

funding sources to provide 

counternarcotics support to countries 

in the Andean region.

State Department 

State’s primary funding sources for 

counternarcotics assistance in the 

Andean region include the ESF, 

FMF, IMET, INCLE, and NADR 

foreign assistance accounts. State 

also allotted about $600,000 from 

the DA account for counternarcotics 

assistance to combat transnational 

crime in Ecuador in fiscal years 2009 

and 2010. 

USAID 

USAID’s primary funding sources for 

counternarcotics assistance in the 

Andean region included the DA, 

ESF, and ACP accounts. 

Department of Defense 

DOD’s primary funding source for 

counternarcotics assistance in the 

Andean region is the Central 

Transfer Account for 

counternarcotics. DOD also allotted 

funds for stability assistance in 

Ecuador in fiscal year 2010 through 

the Section 1207 Assistance 

program. 

Drug Enforcement 

Administration 

DEA’s primary funding source for 

counternarcotics assistance in the 

Andean region is annual agency 

appropriations used to support the 

Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) 

program.
Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 42 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. 

Agency for International Development
Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 43 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 44 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 45 GAO-12-824 Andean Counternarcotics 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Juan Gobel (Assistant Director), Claude Adrien, Joshua Akery, 

Martin de Alteriis, Bruce Kutnick, Reid Lowe, and Cristina Ruggiero. 

Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, and Jena Sinkfield provided technical 

support.

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(320835)
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