[Cite as Kumpf v. Miami Univ., 2011-Ohio-3860.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

DAVID KUMPF, et al. 

 Plaintiffs 

 V. 

MIAMI UNIVERSITY 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2010-12125-AD 

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiffs, Seth Kumpf, who was visiting a student attending Miami 

University (MU), and his father, David Kumpf, filed this action against defendant 

contending Seth suffered injury on February 21, 2009, as a proximate cause of 

negligence on the part of MU personnel in maintaining a hazardous condition on the 

premises of the Miami campus. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted Seth broke his elbow 

when he slipped and fell on ice on a section of the walkway outside of Emerson Hall on 

defendant’s premises. Plaintiffs submitted photographs depicting the sidewalk area 

where Seth slipped and fell. After reviewing the photographs, the trier of fact finds the 

site depicted a long span of sidewalk area with a highly visible natural accumulation of 

snow and ice remaining on the middle portion of the length of sidewalk leading up to a 

brick building. In their complaint, plaintiffs requested damages in the amount of 

$675.19, the cost of medical treatment expenses plaintiff David Kumpf incurred as a 

result of the slip and fall injury that occurred on February 21, 2009, at approximately 

7:00 p.m. The $25.00 filing fee was paid. 
{¶ 2} Defendant contested this matter arguing “the presence of ice or slush was 

an open and obvious danger which reasonably should have been seen by the plaintiff 

Seth Kumpf to allow him to take appropriate measures to protect himself.” Defendant 

implied it had no duty to protect plaintiffs from dangers associated with the natural 

accumulation of ice and snow. 

{¶ 3} To establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must show the 

existence of a duty, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach. 

Texler v. D.O. Summers Cleaners & Shirt Laundry Co., 81 Ohio St. 3d 677, 680, 1998-

Ohio-602, 693 N.E. 2d 271. Generally, in the area of premises liability, the status of a 

person who enters upon the land of another determines the scope of the duty the 

premises owner owes the entrant. Shump v. First Continental-Robinwood Assoc., 71 

Ohio St. 3d 414, 417, 1994-Ohio-427, 644 N.E. 2d 291. Under the facts of the instant 

claim, Seth’s status was that of an invitee. See Baldauf v. Kent State Univ. (1998), 49 

Ohio App. 3d 46, 550 N.E. 2d 517; Shimer v. Bowling Green State Univ. (1999), 96 

Ohio Misc. 2d 12, 16, 708 N.E. 2d 305. 

{¶ 4} “[T]he possessor of premises owes a duty to an invitee to exercise ordinary 

or reasonable care for his or her safety and protection. This duty includes maintaining 

the premises in a reasonably safe condition and warning an invitee of latent or 

concealed defects of which the possessor has or should have knowledge.” Baldauf, at 

47, 48 citing Scheibel v. Lipton (1985), 156 Ohio St. 308, 46 O.O. 177, 102 N.E. 2d 453. 

“However, it is also well-established that balanced against this duty, the owner of 

premises is not to be held as an insurer against all forms of risk.” Baldauf, at 48, citing 

S.S. Kresge Co. v. Fader (1927), 116 Ohio St. 718, 158 N.E. 174. Although the owner 

of premises generally owes a duty of ordinary care “the liability of an owner or occupant 

to an invitee for negligence in failing to render the premises reasonably safe for the 

invitee, or in failing to warn him of dangers thereon, must be predicated upon a superior 

knowledge concerning the dangers of the premises to persons going thereon.” 38 

American Jurisprudence, 757, Negligence, Section 97, as cited in Debie v. Cochran 

Pharmacy Berwick, Inc. (1967), 11 Ohio St. 2d 38, 40, 40 O.O. 2d 52, 227 N.E. 2d 603. 

{¶ 5} There is no duty on the part of a premises owner to warn or protect an 

invitee of a hazardous condition, where the condition is so obvious and apparent that 

the invitee should reasonably be expected to discover the danger and protect himself 
from it. Parsons v. Larson Co. (1989), 57 Ohio App. 3d 49, 566 N.E. 2d 698; Blair v. 

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (1989), 61 Ohio Misc. 2d 649, 582 

N.E. 2d 673. This rationale is based on principles that an open and obvious danger is 

itself a warning and the premises owner may expect persons entering the premises to 

notice the danger and take precautions to protect themselves from such dangers. 

Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co. (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 642, 1992-Ohio-42, 597 N.E. 2d 

504. The open and obvious doctrine is determinative of the threshold issue, the 

landowner’s duty. Armstrong v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2003-Ohio2573, at ¶13. If an alleged hazard is open and obvious, whether plaintiff can prove the 

elements of negligence other than duty is superfluous. Horner v. Jiffy Lube Internatl., 

Inc., Franklin App. No. 01AP-1054, 2002-Ohio-2880, at ¶17. 

{¶ 6} Furthermore, a landowner ordinarily owes no duty to an invitee, such as 

plaintiff, to remove accumulations of ice and snow on the premises or to warn the 

invitees of dangers associated with these natural accumulations. See Brinkman v. 

Ross, 68 Ohio St. 3d 82, 1993-Ohio-72, 623 N.E. 2d 1175. Everyone is assumed to 

appreciate the risks presented by such snow and ice accumulations and consequently, 

everyone is expected to bear responsibility for protecting himself from such risks 

presented by natural accumulations of ice and snow. Brinkman. 

{¶ 7} “In a climate where the winter brings frequently recurring storms of snow 

and rain and sudden and extreme changes in temperature, these dangerous conditions 

appear with a frequency and suddenness which defy prevention and, usually, 

correction. Ordinarily they would disappear before correction would be practicable . . . 

To hold that a liability results from these actions of the elements would be the 

affirmance of a duty which it would often be impossibile, and ordinarily impracticable . . . 

to perform.” Norwalk v. Tuttle (1906), 73 Ohio St. 242, 245, 76 N.E. 617, as quoted in 

Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St. 2d 45, 42 O.O. 2d 96, 233 N.E. 2d 589. 

{¶ 8} In his response, David Kumpf argues the area was dark and poorly-lighted 

such that the danger was not open and obvious. Nonetheless, the court finds that 

"‘[d]arkness' is always a warning of danger, and for one's own protection it may not be 

disregarded." Jeswald v. Hutt (1968), 15 Ohio St. 2d 224, 44 O.O. 2d 196, 239 N.E. 2d 

37, at paragraph three of the syllabus. Indeed, the darkness Seth encountered 

increased rather than reduced the degree of care he should have exercised for his own 
safety. In the present claim, plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence to 

establish the icy sidewalk condition was not open, obvious, and readily discernible. 

Consequently, plaintiffs cannot recover damages from defendant based on any failure 

to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim is denied. 
Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us 

DAVID KUMPF, et al. 

 Plaintiffs 

 v. 

MIAMI UNIVERSITY 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2010-12125-AD 

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert 

ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION

 Having considered all the evidence in the claim file and, for the reasons set forth 

in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor 

of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiffs. 

 

 ________________________________ 

 DANIEL R. BORCHERT 

 Deputy Clerk 

Entry cc: 

David Kumpf Paul S. Allen 

Seth Kumpf Miami University 

6626 Forestwood Street N.W. Roudebush Hall Room 14 

Canton, Ohio 44718 Oxford, Ohio 45056 

SJM/laa 

3/30 

Filed 4/21/11 

Sent to S.C. reporter 8/5/11