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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

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Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation.
Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER:

DOES FORWARD PRESENCE STILL MATTER?

THE CASE OF THE ARMY IN EUROPE

John R. Deni

October 2012

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them 

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Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
ii

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The author wishes to thank Dr. Andrew T. Wolff and Dr. 

Stephen J. Blank for their extraordinarily helpful comments on a 

draft of this manuscript, and Mr. Jeff Hall and Ms. Jenny Silkett 

for their research assistance. Nevertheless, any errors of omission, fact, or interpretation remain the author’s alone.

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ISBN 1-58487-548-8
iii

FOREWORD

In January 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 

announced that the United States would reduce the 

number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Europe. 

In conjunction with this decision, the administration 

also announced plans to increase the U.S. military 

presence in Europe in other ways—by establishing 

an aviation detachment in Poland; locating missile 

defense assets in Romania, Poland, and Turkey; and 

deploying Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships to 

Spain. However, it was the announcement regarding 

American land forces in Europe that captured media, 

popular, and scholarly attention, prompting many to 

ask whether the United States was turning its back on 

Europe as it pivoted to Asia and whether the Europeans had the wherewithal to defend themselves. This in 

turn led to more fundamental questions as to whether 

forward-based U.S. land forces were necessary at all.

In this monograph, Dr. John R. Deni explores 

the utility of forward presence in Europe, placing 

the recent decisions—and, in particular, the arguments against forward presence—in the context of a 

decades-long tradition on the part of many political 

leaders, scholars, and others to mistakenly tie the 

forward-basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense 

burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence 

still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and 

achieving U.S. objectives, Dr. Deni bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his 

analysis in political science theory while illuminating 

how forward-basing yields direct, tangible benefits in 

terms of military operational interoperability. Moreover, Dr. Deni’s monograph forms a critical datapoint 
in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American Landpower, particular in this age of austerity. For 

all of these reasons, the Strategic Studies Institute is 

pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to 

the national security debate on the future of the U.S. 

Army and the manner in which it can best serve the 

nation today and in the future.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOHN R. DENI is currently a research professor of 

Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Security Studies for the Strategic Studies 

Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Previously, 

he was a political advisor for senior U.S. military 

commanders in Europe for 8 years. Prior to that, he 

spent 2 years as a strategic planner specializing in the 

military-to-military relationship between the United 

States and its European allies. While working for the 

U.S. military in Europe, Dr. Deni was also an adjunct 

lecturer at Heidelberg University’s Institute for Political Science. There, he taught graduate and undergraduate courses on U.S. foreign and security policy, 

NATO, European security, and alliance theory and 

practice. Before working in Germany, he spent 7 years 

in Washington, DC, as a consultant specializing in national security issues for the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, and State. Most recently, Dr. Deni has 

authored the book, Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, as well 

as several journal articles. He has published op-eds in 

major newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and 

the Baltimore Sun, and he has spoken at conferences 

and symposia throughout Europe and North America. Dr. Deni completed his undergraduate degree in 

history and international relations at the College of 

William & Mary, holds a Master of Arts degree in U.S. 

foreign policy from American University in Washington, DC, and a Ph.D. in international affairs from 

George Washington University. 

vii

SUMMARY

For at least 50 years, many American politicians, 

scholars, analysts, and observers of European affairs 

have complained about perceived inequitable burdensharing in the transatlantic alliance. If only the United 

States would withdraw its military forces from Europe, so they reasoned, then the European allies would 

pick up the slack and start paying more for their own 

defense. The decision to station U.S. forces in Europe 

during peacetime was in substance and style a major 

commitment to European defense, matched to a limited degree by parallel British forward-stationing on 

the continent as well as West German rearmament, 

for example. By the Vietnam era though, as American 

commitments in Southeast Asia grew significantly, in 

part at the expense of commitments in Europe, many 

in the United States became critical of Europe’s perceived unwillingness to shoulder more of the defense 

burden in Europe. Since then, similar burden-sharing 

complaints have been lodged against America’s closest 

allies, with most arguing that the United States ought 

to use the withdrawal of its forward-based forces as a 

political tool to compel greater defense spending on 

the part of European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members.

In fact, since the end of the Cold War, the American 

military presence in Europe has dramatically downsized, from a high point of over a quarter-million Soldiers down to roughly 42,000 today. Ironically though, 

European defense spending has actually fallen for the 

most part during the same period. Why? Leading political science theories such as institutionalism, neorealism, and collective goods theory all offer potential 

explanations. However, these are flawed tools, since 

the available data contradict the expectations of insti-
tutionalism, and since both neorealism and collective 

goods theory assume that the purpose of U.S. forces 

in Europe today is to act as a deterrent force against a 

conventional military adversary such as Russia. 

In fact, the primary purpose of U.S. forces in Europe today is to build interoperability and military 

capability within and among America’s most capable 

and most likely future coalition partners through security cooperation activities like exercises and training events. This shift in purpose means that U.S. force 

presence in Europe is no longer—if indeed it ever 

was—a useful tool in extracting a greater commitment 

to increased defense spending on the part of America’s 

European allies. Nonetheless, through security cooperation, America’s forward-based military forces in 

Europe play a critical role today in shaping the capabilities of allied military forces. Given the necessity of 

capable, interoperable coalition partners for the future 

security threats Washington most expects to encounter, the role of America’s forward military presence in 

Europe remains as vital as it was at the dawn of the 

Cold War, but for different reasons. Unfortunately, 

continuing calls to withdraw even more U.S. forces 

from Europe threaten to undermine Washington’s 

ability to develop and maintain capable, interoperable 

coalition partners.

viii
1

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER:

DOES FORWARD PRESENCE STILL MATTER?

THE CASE OF THE ARMY IN EUROPE

Introduction.

Many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

skeptics, critics of Europe, and American politicians 

from across the political spectrum have long called 

for a wholesale removal of U.S. forces from Europe. 

Arguments in favor of pulling forward-based American service members back to the United States include 

perceived easier and cheaper deployment to global 

hot spots, thanks to advancements in power projection.1

 Others claim that European environmental or 

other regulations restrict U.S. training or that ranges 

and maneuver areas in the United States are simply 

“better” than those available in Germany or elsewhere 

in Europe.2 However, the argument that has been relied upon most frequently by the many analysts and 

politicians who have called for rebasing over the last 

several decades is that removing U.S. forces from Europe in particular would spur European NATO allies 

to spend more on their own defense and therefore 

correct the perceived imbalance in collective defense 

burden-sharing.3

Calls to address the perceived lack of burden-sharing through a rebasing of U.S. forces forward-based 

in Europe, especially Army forces, which have comprised the greatest proportion of troops there, certainly have been made since the end of the Cold War. Such 

appeals have only intensified as the U.S. Department 

of Defense (DoD) seeks to tighten its belt as a result of 

the debt-reduction efforts that have engulfed Wash-
2

ington in the last few years. Perhaps not coincidentally, the American military presence in Europe, and in 

particular the Army, has slowly but steadily decreased 

over the last 2 decades. From a high point of over a 

quarter-million Soldiers in Europe at the height of the 

Cold War, the U.S. Army has drawn down to roughly 

42,000 Soldiers today. Plans announced in early-2012 

call for further cuts between now and 2014, when two 

of the four remaining U.S. brigade combat teams in 

Europe will inactivate, bringing the total down to 

roughly 29,000 Soldiers.4

However, while the United States has, in fact, reduced its forward military presence in Europe over 

the last 20 years, defense spending on the part of 

America’s allies in Europe has been steadily decreasing over time and certainly since the end of the Cold 

War. This trend has only become magnified in the last 

3 years as European governments have sought to deal 

with the most serious economic downturn in decades, 

since a significant part of the European government 

response has included dramatic cuts to defense budgets and force structure. Therefore, contrary to the 

expectations of those who argued that the NATO allies would contribute more to collective defense if the 

United States simply reduced its military presence in 

Europe, European contributions to collective defense, 

at least by some of the most commonly accepted measures, have instead dropped.

Borrowing from academia—specifically, by relying on political scientists—can help to explain this 

seeming paradox better. The most obvious political 

science theoretical tools for explaining why European 

defense budgets have gone down while U.S. forward 

military presence in Europe has fallen over the last 

20 years—institutionalism, neorealism, and collec-
3

tive goods theory—are largely inadequate, either because the available data contradict their expectations 

or because they are based on inaccurate assumptions 

regarding the purpose of U.S. troops in Europe. This 

monograph will examine the case of the U.S. Army in 

Europe as a means of determining whether forward 

presence still has any value today as American land 

forces face fundamental questions regarding their future role and missions. In doing so, the monograph 

will show that, although the rationale for a U.S. military presence in Europe has changed significantly 

from territorial defense to allied interoperability, the 

presence of American forces in Europe is no less vital 

to American security today than it was 60 years ago, 

when President Harry S. Truman ordered U.S. troops 

to return to Europe in the largest peacetime deployment of military forces in American history. 

Bring the Boys Home.

During the Cold War, there was a broad political 

consensus in the executive branch of the U.S. Government—through both Democratic and Republican administrations—regarding the importance of forward 

military presence in Europe. That consensus was 

based upon the need to protect and defend America’s 

closest allies—those of NATO—from Soviet political 

intimidation and to deter the Soviets from attempting 

to overrun Western Europe quickly through a military 

assault. The result was that, with some variation, between 200,000 and 300,000 U.S. troops—the vast majority of whom were U.S. Army Soldiers—were based 

in Europe at any given time. 

The political consensus within the executive branch 

on the importance of forward presence was certainly 
4

not always reflected by the legislative branch. As far 

back as the early-1960s, some in Congress—most notably U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield, a Democrat from 

Montana—expressed opposition to the U.S. presence 

in Europe. The reasons for such opposition varied, but 

important among them was congressional frustration 

with European defense spending levels, which many 

viewed as insufficient.5

Such a perspective—that the Europeans should 

step up their defense spending and their contributions 

to collective defense if America was to maintain forces 

in Europe—was not altogether novel in the 1960s. 

Indeed, when President Truman first announced in 

September 1950 the stationing of significant numbers 

of U.S. Soldiers in Europe following the immediate 

post-World War II drawdown, he noted his assumption that the Allies would also make a corresponding 

commitment: 

A basic element in the implementation of this decision 

is the degree to which our friends match our actions 

in this regard. Firm programs for the development of 

their forces will be expected to keep full step with the 

dispatch of additional United States forces to Europe. 

Our plans are based on the sincere expectation that our 

efforts will be met with similar action on their part.6

The rearming of Germany in 1955 helped to assure 

most in both the executive branch and the legislative 

branch in Washington that the Europeans were indeed capable of increasing their commitment to the 

common defense and willing to do so. However, as 

American involvement in Vietnam deepened in the 

early-1960s—with little assistance from the European 

allies—resentment within the Congress began to manifest itself in terms of calls to return U.S. Soldiers from 

Europe to America.7
5

Beginning in 1963 and continuing until the 1970s, 

Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a series of resolutions and amendments designed to reduce the U.S. 

military presence in Europe unless the allies increased 

their defense expenditures. While his efforts in the 

1960s consisted primarily of “sense of the Senate” 

resolutions, which do not carry the force of law since 

they are not passed by the House nor signed by the 

President, subsequent resolutions in the 1970s were far 

more pointed. In 1971, Mansfield offered an amendment to a bill extending the U.S. Selective Service Act, 

a must-pass piece of legislation that authorized U.S. 

military conscription and was hence crucial for generating the manpower necessary to fight the Vietnam 

War while maintaining U.S. commitments to other allies around the world. Mansfield’s amendment would 

have forced a 50 percent cut in U.S. troop strength in 

Europe. The amendment failed by a vote of 61 to 36, 

but only after the Richard Nixon administration had 

engaged in a significant lobbying effort against it.8

Concerns over perceived inequitable burden-sharing did not end with the Vietnam War. A decade later, 

Senator Sam Nunn, a Georgia Democrat, and Senator 

William Roth, a Delaware Republican, sought again 

to tie U.S. military presence in Europe to higher allied 

defense spending. In this instance, Senators Nunn and 

Roth sought to attach an amendment to a must-pass 

piece of legislation—the annual Defense Department 

spending bill. The amendment would have mandated 

a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe unless the European allies met the agreed-upon 3 percent annual increase in real defense expenditures and 

took other steps to increase their military capabilities. 

The amendment was ultimately defeated by a vote of 

55-41, but it was particularly noteworthy that one of 
6

the co-sponsors was Senator Nunn. During his days in 

the Senate and since then—and in contrast to the antiwar Mansfield—Nunn was known as a defense hawk, 

a strong proponent of NATO, and an internationalist. To have such a person as co-sponsor signaled the 

extent of U.S. frustration with perceived inequities in 

burden-sharing and the willingness to use U.S. troop 

strength in Europe coercively to spur greater allied 

defense spending.9

As the Cold War ended, a broad-based bipartisan 

consensus emerged in favor of cashing in on the socalled “peace dividend,” chiefly by reducing troop 

presence in Europe but also by cutting defense spending more broadly.10 The DoD and the executive branch 

generally favored a slow pace for any withdrawal of 

U.S. forces from Europe, largely because of what was 

perceived as continuing uncertainty in Eastern Europe 

as the Soviet Union gave way to 11 successor states, 

four of which retained nuclear weapons or related 

delivery systems on their territory, and as Russia, 

the largest and most powerful of the successor states, 

seemed less than completely stable politically. However, as Moscow showed an increased willingness to 

negotiate deep, mutual reductions in conventional 

forces based in Europe, the threat-based rationale for 

keeping U.S. forces in Europe crumbled, and with 

it, DoD’s willingness to stand in the way of a drawdown. As then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 

noted in explaining the transfer of forces from Europe 

to the Persian Gulf as part of the Operation DESERT 

SHIELD buildup, “Clearly, our ability to move forces 

out of Europe to support Desert Shield is a direct result of the fact that the threat level in Europe is down. 

. . . [Because of the overwhelming changes in Eastern 

Europe in the past year,] there is no military risk.”11
7

On Capitol Hill, the reaction to the move to draw 

down forces as the Cold War ended was positive, as 

both sides of the political aisle sought to redirect the 

funds spent on defending Europe to their other political priorities.12 Indeed, many clamored for even deeper cuts in the U.S. presence in Europe, arguing that the 

United States had no business subsidizing the defense 

of relatively wealthy European allies.13

More recently, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, a 

Republican from Texas, has made similar arguments, 

although her motivations are perhaps somewhat complex. Her state plays host to some of the largest military installations in America, and she has expressed 

an abiding interest in expanding them to house even 

more U.S. military units.14 Nonetheless, she has cited 

lack of allied commitment in Afghanistan as a key 

rationale for reducing the U.S. military presence in 

Europe.15 Similarly, Representative Mike Coffman, a 

Republican from Colorado, has tied the U.S. military 

presence in Europe with his interest in seeing America’s European allies spend more on defense, arguing 

that the United States should reduce its presence in 

Europe as a means of eliminating an imbalance in 

burden-sharing.16

Still others in the U.S. Congress have expressed 

similar sentiments on burden-sharing and the corresponding need to reduce America’s military presence 

in Europe as a means of encouraging the Europeans to 

do more in their own defense. Representative Barney 

Frank, a Democrat from Massachusetts, has argued for 

some time that, given the demise of the Soviet threat, 

the United States should have long ago withdrawn its 

forces from Europe:

I think the time has come to reexamine NATO. NATO 

was a brilliant move by Harry Truman in 1949, because 

you had devastated nations in western and central 
8

Europe and a brutal, aggressive dictatorship under 

Stalin, and only American military force could stop 

him. Two of those things are no longer the case. We no 

longer have devastated, poor western and central European nations. We no longer have a brutal, militant, 

and aggressive dictatorship in the Soviet Union. The 

only thing that hasn’t changed is America is still there 

defending them, except there’s now no reason for it.17

In 2010, Frank joined Representative Walter B. Jones 

of North Carolina, Representative Ron Paul of Texas, 

and Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon in establishing the 

Sustainable Defense Task Force (SDTF)—comprised of 

defense and foreign affairs experts from several think 

tanks and academia—which was charged with developing possible defense budget contributions to deficitreduction efforts.18 The SDTF report, released in June 

2010, proposed capping U.S. total military strength in 

Europe—that is, not just Army but all the services—

at 35,000, largely on the basis of their contention that 

there is no longer a need for a high-readiness deterrence force in Europe and that the United States can in 

any case quickly redeploy military assets to Europe in 

the event of hostilities there: “Our friends in Asia and 

Europe can now defend themselves.”19

Frank and Paul sought to promote the findings of 

the SDTF as a means of advancing deficit-reduction 

efforts underway in Washington over the last year. In 

October 2010, they led the drafting of a letter to the 

National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and 

Reform, otherwise known as the President’s debt commission. Fifty-five other Members of Congress joined 

them in writing: 

Years after the Soviet threat has disappeared, we continue to provide European and Asian nations with 
9

military protection through...the troops stationed in 

our overseas military bases. Given the relative wealth 

of these countries, we should examine the extent of 

this burden that we continue to shoulder on our own 

dime.20

In sum, over at least the last half-century, many 

members of the U.S. Congress from both sides of the 

political aisle—as well as some policy analysts who 

have recently addressed this subject—have called for 

cuts, sometimes dramatic, in the U.S. military forces 

forward-based in Europe. These calls have typically 

been based, in part if not wholly, on the sense that 

burdens have not been shared equally by the European allies, and that through cuts in the American commitment to its forward-based presence in Europe, the 

United States can spur increased defense spending on 

the part of the Europeans and greater allied contributions to the collective defense.

By the Numbers: America’s Presence in Europe.

Interestingly, an examination of U.S. Army force 

structure levels in Europe appears to indicate that the 

executive branch has heeded the concerns of some 

members of Congress. As noted above, immediately 

after the end of the Cold War, the United States began 

to reduce significantly its military presence in Europe. 

In some cases, U.S. military units that were deployed 

from their home stations in Europe to Operations 

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in Kuwait and 

Iraq in 1990 and 1991 were redeployed straight back 

to the United States following the war’s conclusion. 

As seen in Figure 1, the U.S. Army presence in Europe 

declined precipitously following the end of the Cold 

War, from roughly a quarter-million Soldiers in 1988-

89 to about 55,000 by 2001.
10

Figure 1. U.S. Army Presence in Europe, 1946-2009.21

In 2001, the incoming administration of George W. 

Bush began an intense re-examination of the U.S. overseas force posture both in Europe and in Asia. Led by 

the DoD and its new Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, the 

Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study (IGPBS) 

was designed to assess the size, location, types, and 

capabilities of U.S. forward military forces. 

The IGPBS had roots in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). The QDR is a periodic review of U.S. defense doctrine and strategic planning, 

which was mandated by Congress following the end 

of the Cold War. The 2001 QDR recognized the importance of forward presence as “one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and 

friends,” but it also noted that the concentration of 

forward-based forces in Western Europe and Northeast Asia was “inadequate for the new strategic environment.”22

So in 2004, President George W. Bush promulgated 

the IGPBS, through which he recommended cutting 

U.S. Army combat forces in Europe substantially. Ultimately, and in combination with the 2005 Base Re-
11

alignment and Closure (BRAC) process, the plan for 

rebasing in Europe would aim to take the U.S. force 

structure from two division headquarters with four 

brigade combat teams down to no division headquarters and two brigade combat teams. American force 

structure overseas was still necessary, according to 

the report, to project military power in crises, ensure 

U.S. military access to critical regions and lines of communication, “strengthen U.S. diplomacy and foreign 

policy,” demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security 

of its friends and allies, and demonstrate to any potential challengers U.S. resolve to deter aggression.23 In 

announcing the plan, President Bush noted:

Although we’ll still have a significant presence overseas, under the plan I’m announcing today, over the 

next 10 years, we will bring home about 60,000 to 

70,000 uniformed personnel and about 100,000 family 

members and civilian employees.24

The drawdown initiated in 2004 and later reaffirmed in the 2006 QDR moved forward slowly, 

largely because of the wartime rotations to Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Specifically, the operational demands of 

generating forces for two simultaneous wars preempted the plan to move Soldiers and their families back to 

the continental United States. Another reason for slow 

implementation, though, was the fact that both Admiral James Stavridis and General John Craddock—the 

current NATO commander and his immediate predecessor—as well as the senior Army commander in 

Europe at the time, General David McKiernan, argued 

against a quick, dramatic drawdown, in part because 

they believed it would have a negative effect on U.S. 

leadership of and influence within NATO.25
12

In response to these concerns—as well as a lack 

of facilities and quarters in the United States for the 

returning troops—the Bush administration decided to 

delay the return of two brigade combat teams in late2007.26 Instead of returning in the 2010-11 timeframe, 

the brigades would return in 2012-13. This delay essentially punted to the next administration a decision 

on the final disposition of U.S. forces in Europe. 

The Barack Obama administration addressed force 

presence in Europe through the 2010 QDR, declaring 

initially that it would maintain existing U.S. Army 

force levels on the continent of Europe. Specifically, 

the 2010 QDR stated that, “the United States will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps 

headquarters forward-stationed on the continent” 

of Europe.27 The adjustment from the Bush administration’s original plan of returning two brigades appeared to be based on several arguments: deterring 

political intimidation of U.S. allies and partners in 

Europe; displaying U.S. commitment to NATO allies; 

promoting stability in the Balkans, the Baltic region, 

and the Black Sea region; and training and exercising 

with key NATO allies.28 This decision, though, was 

made pending a review of the new NATO Strategic 

Concept—slated for release later that year at the Lisbon summit—and an accompanying U.S. review of its 

forward posture.

Following NATO’s approval of its new Strategic 

Concept in November 2010, and after its own strategic 

posture review, the Obama administration announced 

in April 2011 that it would reverse its reversal—that 

is, it would not follow in the tentative path laid out 

by the 2010 QDR to leave four brigade combat teams 

in Europe but would instead leave only three.29 This 

decision—based apparently on budgetary considerations but also on the argument that the troops were 
13

no longer needed for Europe’s defense—would result 

in a U.S. Army presence of roughly 37,000 in Europe 

by 2015, when one of the brigade combat teams would 

return from Germany.30

Not even a year later, in February 2012, the Obama 

administration again changed course, declaring that 

it would indeed cut two brigade combat teams from 

America’s forward-based force structure in Europe, as 

well as the Germany-based U.S. V Corps headquarters 

and a further 2500 troops from within combat support 

and combat service support units.31 Given DoD’s intent to reduce the overall size of the U.S. Army over 

the next several years, current plans call for all of 

these forces to be eliminated from the force structure 

as a means of cutting the defense budget, not simply 

relocated to the United States. In any case, the latest 

announcement continued the trend of a significantly 

reduced American military presence in Europe following the end of the Cold War.

European Defense Budget Cuts.

For the last 50 years or more, advocates for cutting the American military presence in Europe, particularly those in the U.S. Congress but also including analysts elsewhere, have consistently based their 

argument on the notion that such reductions would 

spur the European allies to spend more on their own 

defense. Cutting the U.S. presence in Europe was 

therefore deemed necessary to correct the perceived 

imbalance in transatlantic burden-sharing. Over the 

last 20 years, the U.S. presence in Europe—particularly the presence of U.S. Army forces, which have 

always been the most numerous of the four military 

services in Europe—has been significantly reduced. 
14

In response, and somewhat paradoxically, if one subscribes to the logic of the aforementioned critics of 

forward presence, defense spending on the part of the 

European allies has, for the most part, actually gone 

down instead of up.

One of the most common measures of comparative burden-sharing among the NATO countries is the 

level of annual defense expenditure as a percentage of 

gross domestic product (GDP) in constant terms. This 

measure is very useful, because it keeps prices constant, it is based on data that NATO reports annually, 

and it permits relative comparison in a way that other 

measures do not. Figure 2 portrays the available data 

for select European NATO member states from 1990 

until 2011. In all cases, the trend is quite clear since the 

end of the Cold War—that is, defense expenditures as 

a percentage of GDP have declined among European 

NATO member states. In most cases, the percentage 

has dropped below the politically agreed-upon goal 

for European member states of 2 percent of GDP.

Figure 2. Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of 

GDP, in Constant Prices.32
15

However, using this measure of comparison is not 

without its shortcomings. For example, if one were 

to rely solely on defense spending as a percentage 

of GDP as an indicator of burden-sharing, one might 

conclude that Denmark was not carrying its fair share 

of the common defense burden, since it spends only 

the equivalent of 1.4 percent of its GDP on defense. 

Such an analysis, though, would overlook the fact that 

the Danes have been among only a handful of allies 

to contribute interoperable special forces to combat 

operations in Afghanistan, that the Danes were one 

of four European NATO allies to contribute interoperable fighter-bomber aircraft to operations against the 

Taliban and for the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF), that the Danish battlegroup in ISAF operates in Helmand in the more dangerous southern 

part of Afghanistan, and that Denmark has the second 

highest per capita casualty rate of ISAF contributors.33

Clearly, the Danes have taken on a greater burden and 

a greater share of the military and political risks than 

their 1.4 percent of GDP would indicate.

Conversely, on the other end of the spectrum, one 

might conclude that Greece made a more than fair contribution to alliance security when it spent the equivalent of 3.1 percent of its GDP on defense in 2009, 2.6 

percent in 2010, and 2.1 percent in 2011. Admittedly, 

this was a downward trend, but still the highest of 

any European NATO member in 2009 and the second 

highest—after only the United Kingdom (UK)—in 

2010 and 2011. Greece's contribution was well above 

the European averages for those years of 1.8, 1.7, and 

1.6 percent, respectively, and certainly above the politically agreed-upon level of 2 percent for each of the 

European allies. 

However, if one were to examine what Greece actually purchased with its defense funds, one might 
16

conclude quite the opposite, given that 56 percent of 

Greece’s defense budget in 2009, 65 percent in 2010, 

and 74 percent in 2011 was used to pay for personnel 

costs. Additionally, the Greek military has only 245 

troops deployed to Kosovo as part of KFOR and only 

162 troops deployed to ISAF at the Kabul International Airport—relatively low numbers for a country with 

a military of 124,000 troops.34

To get a more complete picture of burden-sharing, 

it is helpful to examine defense spending per capita 

in constant prices. This measure also allows for a 

comparative examination of defense spending in real 

terms—in this case, in 2000 prices. Figure 3 shows 

that over the last 20 years, the trends in European defense spending have been mostly downward. At best, 

some trend lines appear somewhat flat. It should also 

be noted that the 2011 data consist of estimates—actual expenditures are likely to be lower. In any case, 

there is no evidence of a significant increase in defense spending over the 2 decades since the end of the 

Cold War. 

Figure 3. Defense Spending Per Capita,

in Constant Prices.35
17

In sum, as the American military presence in Europe has decreased, European defense spending has 

fallen—precisely the opposite of what opponents of 

forward presence had expected. As American politicians and others have long argued, a reduced American presence in Europe should have resulted in an 

increase in burden-sharing. However, at least as measured by defense spending as a percentage of GDP 

and by per capita defense spending—two of the most 

common, most useful measures of burden-sharing —it 

seems clear that the slow but steady drawdown of U.S. 

forces on the continent has evidently not persuaded 

or compelled European governments to increase the 

amount of money they devote to defense or fix perceived inequities in burden-sharing. 

Potential Explanations: Institutionalism, 

Neorealism, and Collective Goods Theory.

A consistent drawdown in the U.S. forward presence in Europe over the last 2 decades has not resulted 

in a corresponding increase in European defense expenditures or amelioration of unequal burden-sharing as many in America evidently expected. Political 

science theory offers some tools for explaining why 

America’s European allies have not increased their 

defense expenditures, and hence their share of the collective defense burden, as the United States has drawn 

down its forces in Europe. Three of these are most applicable for explaining this seeming paradox—international institutionalism, or regime theory; neorealism; and, collective goods theory.36

First, an international institutionalist, or regime, 

theory perspective might focus on the role of norms 
18

among the alliance members, and the expression of 

those norms in the form of varying defense expenditures relative to the number of U.S. combat troops 

forward-based in Europe. One leading theorist has 

defined international institutions as a persistent and 

connected set of rules, both formal and informal, that 

prescribe roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations for behavior.37 In one example of how this might 

apply to NATO, John Duffield relied on international 

regime theory in arguing that NATO’s conventional 

force levels in Germany and the Benelux countries 

were remarkably stable over the course of the Cold 

War, despite changing Soviet threat levels during the 

same period.38

In this way, Duffield used international institutionalism to explain how norms of behavior among 

the alliance members had a constraining effect, resulting in consistent behavior (in terms of troop levels) in 

the face of changes in the distribution of power and 

resources (in terms of the perceived or actual Soviet 

threat). Placed in the post-Cold War context, perhaps 

a consensus among Alliance members led to a change 

in the norms of behavior, resulting in agreement on 

reduced European defense burden-sharing, while the 

United States simultaneously drew down its forwardbased forces. 

Initially, the facts might appear to support this 

interpretation. In 1990, recognizing the changing security picture in Europe, alliance members agreed to 

cut the defense spending target from the equivalent 

of 3 percent of GDP to the equivalent of 2 percent for 

European members of NATO. However, most members did not conform to this new “regime,” and instead went far beyond it in terms of cuts, unilaterally 

implementing deep defense reductions without re-
19

gard to Alliance-wide strategy or norms of expected 

behavior.39 Indeed, in the immediate post-Cold War 

period, the Alliance as a whole struggled to remain 

collectively ahead of dramatic defense cuts then occurring in allied capitals, where the expected norms of 

behavior—in terms of defense burden-sharing—were 

seemingly flouted. 

Next, structural realism might provide a potential 

explanation to the apparent paradox outlined above. 

Structural realists, otherwise known as neorealists, 

posit that the structure of the international system—

one in which anarchy reigns—causes states to pursue 

power. It is this pursuit of power that best explains 

the relations between states. One strain of neorealism, 

known as defensive realism, is best represented by the 

work of Kenneth Waltz. In his Theory of International 

Politics, Waltz argued that states pursue power as a 

means to achieve security, placing special emphasis 

on the role of external balancing behavior.40 Another 

major neorealist scholar, Stephen Walt, added significant richness to our understanding of the reason states 

form alliances by noting that most often states seek to 

balance against threats, not simply against power.41

A second strain of neorealism, known as offensive neorealism and best represented by scholar John 

Mearsheimer, posits that states are actually quite aggressive in their search for power and hence security, 

because they can never be certain of a competitor’s intentions. Therefore, a state must never end its quest for 

power and security, including by relying on alliances 

if and when necessary, lest it lose sovereignty at the 

hands of another state.42 Still another strain—labeled 

neoclassical realism and best represented by Christopher Layne—holds that neorealist theory is actually 

too parsimonious and that unit-level, or domestic, factors must be taken into consideration.43
20

Applying some of the broad tenets outlined above 

to the context of the post-Cold War period, one can 

arrive at a general neorealist interpretation. As the 

Soviet threat evaporated, neorealists might argue, so 

too did the salience of NATO—the Alliance was not as 

important to its member states because they no longer 

faced an existential threat for which NATO was absolutely vital. More specifically, it has become obvious 

that absent the Soviet threat, neither the Europeans 

nor their American allies desired to pay for what they 

saw as an unnecessary level of defense expenditures 

(for Europeans) or military deployments overseas (for 

Americans). Neither side is interested in carrying any 

more of a defense burden than necessary to address 

the threats in the international system; hence, the Europeans cut their defense budgets while the Americans simultaneously reduced their military presence in 

Europe. To some degree, the evidence supports such 

an interpretation. However, as will be shown below, 

a critical assumption necessary to rely upon neorealism as an explanatory tool in this situation is without 

basis.

Finally, the sharing of defense burdens in the context of alliances has often been considered by scholars 

as part of the larger academic field of collective goods 

theory, which offers a second potential explanatory 

tool in addition to neorealism. Collective goods theory 

is actually a subfield of the study of economics and 

public policy, and examples include early works like 

“An Economic Review of Alliances,” by Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, as well as more recent 

studies such as Wallace Thies's Friendly Rivals.

44

These studies rely on economic models of behavior that emphasize the challenges of free riders within 

an alliance who limit their own contributions to the 
21

provision of the “public good”—in this case, defense 

against the Soviet Union—and instead rely upon their 

allies for defense or security. Earlier formulations of 

this school of thought placed emphasis on achieving 

an elegant, parsimonious theory at the expense of often necessary actor-specific detail, resulting in theoretical tools that often were not of great use beyond 

the very generic. To provide a more useful set of tools, 

theorists of alliance burden-sharing have sought to 

incorporate more refinements from real-world cases. 

The result is that there exists a rich array of literature 

on burden-sharing, which goes beyond the parsimonious free-rider construct originally developed by 

Mancur Olson nearly 5 decades ago.45

One of the most important developments in the 

literature was the recognition that some of the goods 

provided by states for alliance use are not entirely 

pure public goods and that instead they may be 

private goods, or they may be so-called impure, or 

mixed, public goods. Theoretical refinements such as 

this helped to explain and describe what is commonly 

seen in the empirical world—that the factors motivating states to contribute (or not) to collective defense 

are often far more complicated than relatively simple 

calculations of threat, as neorealists would have us 

believe, and instead consist of sometimes complex political, bureaucratic, and/or organizational factors. 

Applied to the context of the post-Cold War period, 

a collective goods theorist might point out that European governments have simply continued to free-ride 

on Washington’s provision of security, particularly 

during a period in which European publics expected 

and demanded a so-called “peace dividend” after the 

end of the Cold War, and as many members of NATO 

turned their attention—and their treasuries—toward 
22

broadening and deepening the European Union (EU). 

Meanwhile, the United States took the first steps toward a gradual rebalancing of its strategic orientation 

toward Asia, as the American public demanded its 

own peace dividend and homeland security took on 

greater importance. In short, for an array of potential 

reasons, including but certainly not limited to the demise of the Soviet threat, both the United States and 

its European allies have been in a race to the bottom 

when it comes to the common defense in Europe, each 

hoping to shift the burden of common defense to the 

other.

Even with the refinements offered by the most recent incarnations of collective goods theory, utilizing 

it—or, for that matter, the less nuanced neorealism—

in a post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), environment to 

explain why European defense spending has not risen 

in the face of the reduced U.S. military presence in 

Europe assumes that the purpose of American forward presence is for collective defense. In part, this 

is true—America’s Baltic and Polish allies view a U.S. 

military presence in Europe as vital to deterrence visà-vis Russia.46 Twenty years of post-Cold War peace 

in Europe cannot so easily lighten the weight of their 

historical experience at the hands of Moscow. To such 

allies, the American military presence in Europe represents a tripwire, one that would compel deeper U.S. 

involvement if Russia engaged in hostilities. Doubtlessly other allies—perhaps Norway and Turkey, for 

instance—subscribe to a somewhat similar view, but 

such perceptions are generally concentrated among a 

small handful of allies in Eastern Europe.

However, the American military presence in Europe today is about far more than deterrence. Indeed, 

the primary purpose of the American military presence 
23

in Europe today is to maintain interoperability with 

existing capable allies, build partner capacity among 

newer, less capable allies and partners, and ensure 

operational access for operations beyond Europe. This 

shift in purpose means that the U.S. force presence in 

Europe is no longer—if indeed it ever was—a useful 

tool in extracting greater commitment to increased 

defense spending on the part of the European allies. 

Nonetheless, through security cooperation, America’s 

forward-based military forces in Europe play a critical 

role today in shaping the capabilities of allied military 

forces. 

The Purpose of U.S. Presence in Europe.

Many of those described earlier as critics of forward presence assume, if only implicitly, that the primary purpose of U.S. forces in Europe is to keep the 

Russians out of Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw. Even some 

political science scholars and analysts have continued, 

in the post-Cold War world, to subscribe to the notion 

that the U.S. presence is focused almost entirely on mitigating security threats in Europe. Professor Andrew 

Bacevich of Boston University clearly implied that 

U.S. forces had no further reason to stay in Europe after the Soviet Union’s demise, when he criticized what 

he perceived as a policy of “permanent presence” and 

wrote that, “A decade after the end of the Cold War 

rendered Europe whole, the United States maintained 

a garrison of 100,000 troops there.”47 Robert J. Art of 

Brandeis University sees the purpose of the U.S. presence in Europe as directed not against any threat from 

the east but rather from the center: “In Western Europe, that [U.S. military] presence assures Germany’s 

neighbors that it will not return to its ugly past.”48
24

Kenneth Waltz of the University of California, Berkeley, argued that the purpose of the continued U.S. 

military presence in Europe, “where no military threat 

is in sight,” was not directed at any single adversary 

but rather to keep a new balance of power inimical to 

American interests from rising.49

Elsewhere, John Bolton, a senior fellow at the 

American Enterprise Institute and a former official in 

the administrations of George H. W. Bush and George 

W. Bush, has written, “If the EU were really capable 

of a united security policy . . . it would undermine 

the sole remaining argument for an American military presence in Europe, which is that the Europeans 

cannot handle these critical [security] questions themselves.”50 Similarly, Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee and a leading 

advocate in Germany for close transatlantic ties, has 

argued that, “without the United States in Europe, 

there is neither security nor stability in Europe itself. 

For quite a time to come, Europe cannot do without 

the American presence.”51

Others have also tied the American military presence overseas with threats to Europe, suggesting that 

withdrawing half of all U.S. troops on the continent 

would be a good first step toward a necessary reassessment of the American commitment to Europe’s 

defense, or that the EU would need to fill the gap 

created by an American withdrawal in order to keep 

Russia from filling the security void on the continent.52

Indeed, some have argued that the recently released 

DoD defense strategic guidance appears to rest on the 

logic that since there are no major threats to European 

security—beyond Iranian missiles, which the new 

NATO missile defense system will guard against—the 

United States can further draw down its Army forces 

in Europe.53
25

In fact, over the last 20 years, the U.S. military presence in Europe has gradually but decisively become 

de-linked from its Cold War-based foundations. Correspondingly, the logic of neorealism and the imperative to share more equitably the burdens associated 

with the provision of a collective good (specifically, 

the defense of Europe) no longer apply in the same 

way that they did 2 decades ago. Today, defending alliance territory and deterring potential aggression toward the same are two of several purposes of the U.S. 

presence in Europe—and they are arguably not even 

the most important, given the lack of serious threats to 

allied territory in Europe. 

Explicit expressions of the changing purpose of 

U.S. forces in Europe have appeared in an array of 

official policy pronouncements and publications. For 

example, the 2006 QDR identified four purposes for 

forward presence, regardless of the geographic region 

those forward-based forces are located in: (1) to interact with allies; (2) to build partner capability; (3) to 

conduct long-duration counterinsurgency operations; 

and, (4) to deter aggressors.54

The 2010 QDR took a slightly more detailed view 

in addressing five specific reasons for maintaining 

U.S. military forces in Europe:

1. To deter the political intimidation of allies and 

partners;

2. To promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, 

Caucasus, and Black Sea regions; 

3. To demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO 

allies;

4. To facilitate multilateral operations in support of 

mutual security interests both inside and outside the 

continent; and, 

5. To build trust and goodwill among host 

nations.55
26

Shortly after the 2010 QDR was published, the 

commander of the U.S. European Command, Admiral James Stavridis, appeared before the House 

Armed Services Committee and explained that there 

were five reasons to maintain a robust U.S. forward 

military presence in Europe. In addition to reassuring allies and deterring potential aggressors, Stavridis 

cited logistics—the “capability to move rapidly globally,” training—a tool for building partner capacity 

and maintaining interoperability, and leadership—for 

maintaining a role as first among equals in NATO.56

Even to the armchair strategist, it would seem 

obvious that Russia, despite massive oil revenues at 

its disposal and a growing tendency toward authoritarianism, has failed to materialize into the kind of 

threat—in terms of either intentions or capabilities—

that many had thought possible or even likely. The 

August 2008 Georgia-Russia Crisis notwithstanding, 

and with the previously noted exceptions of policymakers in Warsaw or the Baltic states, few in the West 

really see Russia as a security threat in a classic stateon-state context. American policymakers have long 

recognized that threats to U.S. security in the decades 

to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength. For example, the 2002 

National Security Strategy (NSS) noted that, “America 

is now threatened less by conquering states than we 

are by failing ones.”57 Indeed, with regard to Russia, 

the 2001 QDR explicitly noted that it, “does not pose 

a large-scale conventional military threat to NATO.”58

The 2006 QDR made almost the exact same point: 

“Russia . . . is unlikely to pose a military threat to the 

United States or its allies on the same scale or intensity as the Soviet Union during the Cold War.”59 More 

recently, the January 2012 defense strategic guidance 
27

emphasized violent extremism as well as instability 

and inaccessibility of the global commons brought 

about by weak governments as primary threats to U.S. 

security in the coming years, noting that the United 

States would continue to build a closer relationship 

with Russia.60

Today, America’s European military presence has 

as its most important function the maintenance of interoperability with Washington’s most capable allies 

and the development of basic military capabilities 

within the newest U.S. allies and partners. The reason 

for this is relatively straightforward—Washington believes it will need highly capable allies to address the 

expected future security challenges, characterized by 

hybrid warfare, protection of access to the global commons, and mitigating the threats posed by failed or 

failing states.61

According to the Obama administration’s 2010 

NSS, the United States relies upon its European allies 

as its most likely, most capable coalition warfare partners for future military operations:

Our relationship with our European allies remains the 

cornerstone for U.S. engagement with the world, and 

a catalyst for international action. . . . We are committed 

to ensuring that NATO is able to address the full range of 

21st century challenges, while serving as a foundation 

of European security.62

The 2010 QDR further clarifies the importance of 

interoperable allies when it comes to the ways America 

would prefer to wield force in the future: “Whenever 

possible, the United States will use force in an internationally sanctioned coalition with allies, international 

and regional organizations, and like-minded nations. 

. . . We have an enduring need to build future coalitions.”63
28

If we extrapolate from the expected threat environment, the implications for force structure are fairly 

clear and provide a basic description of the kinds of 

allies and partners America wants to cultivate for the 

future. The military forces of Washington’s coalition 

partners must be capable of rapid adaptation and innovative thinking so as to handle the complexity of 

the hybrid threat environment; of power projection in 

order to secure the commons; and of full spectrum operations so as to operate effectively and often simultaneously across high-intensity combat, peacekeeping 

operations, and humanitarian relief missions.

America’s most innovative and adaptive allies, 

those at least somewhat capable of sustaining forces 

across time and distance and those that are full spectrum or nearly so, are primarily found in Europe. 

However, capable allies are not of much use unless 

they are also interoperable. The DoD employs a variety of efforts, including exercises, training, and common acquisition programs as the primary means of 

building and maintaining interoperability. Although 

the entire U.S. Armed Forces have responsibility for 

conducting these kinds of activities in coordination 

with or occasionally under the direction of the Department of State, those forces based overseas bear most, 

if not all, of the burden for implementing this element 

of U.S. national security strategy. Multi- or bilateral 

acquisition efforts lead to commonality in equipment, 

while combined training and combined exercises 

provide military forces with the opportunity to learn 

common tactics, techniques, and procedures and to 

practice how they would fight and operate together in 

actual combat. 

To practitioners familiar with the composition of 

the U.S. force structure in Europe, the shift in purpose 
29

for American forces based in Europe has been obvious.64 The numbers alone tell the story of a dramatically less powerful—and hence, at least somewhat less 

capable, and even less full-spectrum—U.S. military 

force in Europe, designed not to take on Russia’s land 

forces, but rather to support American national security in other ways. During much of the Cold War, 

the United States maintained two entire divisions of 

armored forces, each comprised of roughly 300 tanks, 

which were deemed essential to help defend the Allies 

against the vastly superior number of Soviet tanks arrayed on the other side of the Iron Curtain.65 However, 

since the early-1990s, the United States has gradually 

removed all but two of its armored brigades from Europe, each of which currently consists of less than 100 

tanks, but both of which are slated to be inactivated 

by the end of 2013. Similarly, forward-based U.S. 

fixed- and rotary-wing anti-armor assets have been 

or are slated to be dramatically downsized across 

the American footprint in Europe. The U.S. Air Force 

has announced plans to remove the last of the A-10 

Warthog aircraft from Germany over the next couple 

of years, after similar units based in England were 

eliminated in the 1990s.66 Meanwhile, the number of 

tank-killing AH-64 Apache attack helicopters has been 

cut significantly from over 200 in the 1980s to less than 

50 today.67

To be fair, U.S. forces in Europe during the Cold 

War were never equal to those of the Soviet Union. 

Indeed, forward-based American military forces in 

Europe functioned not only to defend U.S. Allies but 

also to act as a tripwire of sorts, should Moscow and 

its Warsaw Pact allies initiate an attack against Western Europe. In such a scenario, while American forces 

based in Europe may not have halted completely a 
30

Soviet thrust into West Germany, their engagement in 

combat by Pact forces would have compelled greater 

American involvement in Europe’s defense, aimed ultimately at ejecting the invading forces. 

While it is certainly true that European-based 

U.S. forces were never quantitatively equivalent to 

their Soviet counterparts during the Cold War, it is 

equally clear that, as U.S. force levels and force structure have changed over the last 2 decades, so too 

has the combat focus of American forces in Europe. 

During the 1990s, American Army forces in Europe 

had primary responsibility for peace-support operations in the Balkans, while U.S. Air Forces in Europe 

enforced the no-fly zones over Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Iraq. As part of the global American force pool, from 

which combat rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan were 

resourced, U.S. forces in Europe focused during the 

2000s on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; Operation IRAQI FREEDOM; its successor, Operation NEW 

DAWN; and, ISAF. As a result, at least one-third of all 

U.S. forces based in Europe were deployed annually 

to conduct counterinsurgency and peace-support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.68 This reflected the 

reality that the U.S. Army in Europe had, over the 2 

decades since the end of the Cold War, evolved from 

a large, conventional force with a defensive mission 

focused on Article 5, to a smaller, more expeditionary 

force designed and trained to deploy from Europe to 

crisis locations elsewhere.69

The noncombat activities conducted by U.S. forces 

in Europe also reflected the change in purpose. As a 

result of current operations in the 2000s, U.S. forces 

in Europe focused much of their training and exercise 

efforts during that decade on peace-support missions, 

necessarily devoting less funding and fewer man-
31

hours to training and exercising Article 5 full-spectrum operations. The U.S. development of so-called 

forward-operating bases in Romania and Bulgaria 

during the 2000s was emblematic of this shift in mission focus from conventional defense against Moscow 

to security cooperation with allies and partners.70 To 

be sure, U.S. forces continued to support NATO exercises, including Article 5 exercises, but the majority 

of U.S.-led exercises and training events over the last 

decade have been aimed at preparing American and 

allied forces for stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—so-called Mission Rehearsal Exercises and 

related events.71

Clearly, America’s forward-based forces in Europe 

have several functions, such as those cited by Admiral Stavridis above—assuring allies of the American 

commitment to European security, deterring potential aggression, providing logistical support for U.S. 

and allied military operations on three continents, 

embodying American leadership of NATO, building 

partner capacity for regional security and internal stability, and maintaining interoperability with key allies 

and partners. Nevertheless, it is the last of these that is 

most vital today from Washington’s perspective when 

it comes to the reasons forward-based U.S. forces are 

worth the expense and effort, since the other missions 

could conceivably be accomplished almost as well, and 

perhaps more cheaply, by forces based in the United 

States that are then rotated to Europe periodically or 

on a contingency basis, as crises manifest themselves. 

However, the sort of interoperability necessary to 

operate side-by-side in combat does not simply happen when coalition soldiers land on a beach or seize 

an airfield, or as the result of episodic engagement—it 

is the result of significant and consistent effort and resources. In Europe, still home to Washington’s most 
32

capable, most likely future coalition partners despite 

recent defense restructuring across the continent, 

America’s forward-based military forces provide the 

bulk of the manpower necessary to achieve the interoperability required in operations such as ISAF, 

where 90 percent of the non-U.S. forces come from 

Europe. Today, the most important mission for U.S. 

military forces based in Europe—aside from maintaining trained and ready forces prepared for deployment 

anywhere—is the implementation of security cooperation activities to maintain interoperability, as well as 

to build coalition partner capability and secure lines 

of communication and logistical support throughout 

Europe to regions and theaters beyond.

Nonetheless, many continue to call for even 

deeper cuts to the U.S. presence in Europe than those 

planned by the Obama administration. For instance, 

during floor debate on the House’s version of the 

2013 National Defense Authorization Act, Representative Mike Coffman (R-CO) offered an amendment 

authorizing and requesting that the President remove 

all U.S. Army brigade combat teams from Europe, 

arguing that this was justified because of decreased 

defense spending among European NATO allies.72

Another member of the House, Representative Jared 

Polis (D-CO), claimed that continued forward-basing 

amounted to “subsidizing” the defense of America’s 

European allies.73 Such efforts to cut further what is already a very limited forward presence are particularly 

risky, because they threaten to undermine America’s 

ability to develop and maintain capable, interoperable coalition partners across the range of military 

operations. If the United States desires that its future 

leaders, when faced with a security challenge, have a 

full range of military options to consider—including 

the option of engaging in a multinational, coalition 
33

military operation—then the investments necessary 

to achieve that objective must be made and preserved 

today, in the form of the forward U.S. military presence in Europe.

Conclusion.

The American military presence in Europe today 

plays a vital role in U.S. and allied national security. Certainly, the Baltic states and Poland view that 

presence, regardless of its size, as critical to their defense—after all, there is no prescribed minimum force 

structure for the “tripwire” they seek in the form of 

an American presence on the continent. Nonetheless, 

the focus of the American military role is not deterrence of Russia or other traditional conventional military threats. Instead, the most important mission of 

forward-based forces in Europe is that of maintaining 

interoperability with America’s most capable allies 

and building up capacity within America’s newest allies and partners. This is driven by the requirement 

to prepare for future security threats by building and 

maintaining capable, interoperable coalition partners. 

This goal is accomplished through security cooperation activities such as exercises and training events 

in which U.S. forces work side-by-side with foreign 

counterparts who may someday be called to fight next 

to American forces. The purpose of security cooperation is to provide U.S. and allied forces with the opportunity to “train as they would fight,” as the military say.

This relatively new mission for U.S. forces in Europe 

has developed in an evolutionary way, as Washington 

has come to see the growing importance of interoperable allies at the brigade, battalion, and company level 

over the last 20 years. Many U.S. politicians, analysts, 
34

and observers had long expected the Europeans to 

increase their share of the defense burden, at least as 

measured by defense expenditures, if and when the 

United States began withdrawing troops from Europe. However, as U.S. troop strength in Europe has 

fallen steadily since the end of the Cold War, European defense spending has also fallen. This seemingly 

paradoxical development cannot be explained by using the most obvious theoretical tools—institutionalism, neorealism, and collective goods theory—since it 

is clear that alliance members flouted the post-Cold 

War norms that the “institution” (NATO) put in place 

to guide defense spending, and since both neorealism 

and collective goods theory assume that the purpose 

of the U.S. presence is collective defense of allied territory. 

In fact, there has been an evolutionary change in 

the purpose of the U.S. military presence in Europe, 

dramatically reducing the utility of that forward-based 

force as a means of extracting greater defense spending from the European allies. Instead of countering a 

conventional military attack on NATO territory—particularly from Russia—American military forces have 

come to focus on security cooperation as their primary 

reason for remaining forward-based in Europe. Given 

the necessity of capable, interoperable coalition partners for the future security threats Washington most 

expects to encounter—and the downsizing of military 

force structure occurring across the Alliance—the role 

of America’s forward military presence in Europe remains as vital as it was at the dawn of the Cold War, 

but for very different reasons. Unfortunately though, 

threatening to reduce or actually reducing that presence further is no longer useful—if indeed it ever 

was—as a means of extracting greater defense commitments or expenditures from European allies.
35

ENDNOTES

1. “Tester urges Defense Secretary to consider closing Cold 

War-era bases overseas,” press release from the Office of Senator Jon Tester, May 19, 2011, available from tester.senate.gov/Newsroom/pr_051911_overseasbases.cfm. See also Raymond DuBois and 

David Vine, “Bipartisan Strategy Takes Shape To Close Overseas U.S. Bases,” Defense News, January 29, 2012. “And we could 

achieve these savings at a time when technological advances and 

prepositioned equipment allow us to deploy troops almost anywhere nearly as quickly and more reliably from Fort Bragg as 

from Ramstein Air Base in Germany, as a Bush administration 

study found.”

2. Chris Roberts, “Texas Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison Wants 

Brigade Relocated to Fort Bliss,” El Paso Times, July 11, 2011.

3. For the most recent incarnations, see for example, Chris 

Preble, “Why Does U.S. Pay to Protect Prosperous Allies?” CNN 

Opinion, February 3, 2012, available from www.cnn.com/2012/02/03/

opinion/preble-military-budget/index.html; and “Letter to Joint Committee on Overseas Bases,” signed by Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), Jon Tester (D-MT), Tom Coburn (R-OK), Mark Begich 

(D-AK), Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), and Ron Wyden (D-OR), October 18, 2011, available from tester.senate.gov/Legislation/upload/

Letter-to-joint-committee-on-overseas-bases.pdf. Preble argues, “As 

many as 70,000 [U.S. troops] are likely to remain [in Europe]. . . .

These troops serve to reassure our allies of our commitment to 

defend them. It is working as designed: Other countries do not 

spend enough to satisfy their defense needs,” while the authors of 

the letter write, “We support our NATO allies but believe the . . . 

strategy will continue to promote an over reliance by our NATO 

partners on the U.S. taxpayers who disproportionately foot the 

bill for defense spending.”

4. John Vandiver, “Pentagon Lays Out Significant Cuts to U.S. 

Forces in Europe,” Stars and Stripes, February 16, 2012.

5. Other key reasons many in the U.S. Senate agreed with 

Mansfield included a general displeasure with the lack of Euro-
36

pean support for U.S. efforts in Vietnam and the general drain 

on the U.S. treasury of maintaining forces in Europe during 

peacetime. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: 

The Evolution of an Alliance, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004, p. 53.

6. Public Papers of President Harry S. Truman, 1945-53, 

“Statement by the President Upon Approving an Increase in U.S. 

Forces in Western Europe,” September 9, 1950, available from 

trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/.

7. Phil Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe, New 

York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, pp. 129-38.

8. Ibid., pp. 174-192. Wrote Williams, “. . . the personal lobbying of senators was probably the most significant of the Administration’s activities. The campaign was both intensive and 

extensive.”

9. Phil Williams, “American Troops in Europe: A New Great 

Debate?” The World Today, London, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 12, December 1987, p. 217.

10. David Rosenbaum, “Peace Dividend: A Dream for Every 

Dollar,” The New York Times, February 18, 1990. 

11. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney speaking at a news 

conference, as cited in David Lauter, “Bush’s ‘Peace Dividend’—

Huge Troops Shift Shows New Realities After The Cold War,” The 

Los Angeles Times, November 9, 1990.

12. Patrick Tyler, “More Defense Cuts Needed, Senator Says; 

Budget ‘Off the Mark,’ Sasser Tells Cheney,” The Washington Post, 

February 6, 1990, p. A10.

13. Marc Fisher, “Europeans Told of U.S. Isolationism; Congressmen Signal Slipping Commitment to Atlantic Alliance,” The 

Washington Post, February 10, 1992, p. A1; John Lancaster, “Top 

Generals Support 150,000 U.S. Troops in Europe as Hedge,” The 

Washington Post, March 4, 1992, p. A20.

14. Kay Bailey Hutchison, “Build Bases in America,” 

Politico, July 13, 2010, available from www.politico.com/news/

stories/0710/39625.html.
37

15. U.S. Senate Hearing, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 

Agencies, on the Proposed Fiscal 2012 Appropriations for the U.S. 

Army and U.S. Air Force, April 14, 2011.

16. U.S. House of Representatives Hearing, House Armed 

Services Committee, on the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from U.S. European Command and 

U.S. Africa Command, February 29, 2012.

17. Barney Frank, Interview with MSNBC television, 

April 26, 2011.

18. Membership of the SDTF is available from www.comw.org/

pda/1006SDTF.html.

19. “Debt, Deficits, and Defense: A Way Forward,” Report of 

the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, available from 

www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1006SDTFreport.pdf.

20. Barney Frank, Ron Paul et al., Letter to the National 

Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, October 13, 2010, 

available from www.house.gov/frank/docs/2010/fiscalcommission

defenseletter.pdf.

21. Data taken from Hubert Zimmermann, “The Improbable 

Permanence of a Commitment: America’s Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 11, 

No. 1, Winter 2009, and the website of the U.S. Army Europe, 

www.eur.army.mil.

22. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 

Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

September 30, 2001.

23. Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Strengthening 

U.S. Global Defense Posture, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, September 2004.

24. President George W. Bush, Speech to the Veterans of Foreign 

Wars Convention, August 16, 2004.
38

25. U.S. House of Representatives Hearing, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, 

and Related Agencies, on The Fiscal 2009 Budget for the European 

Command, April 10, 2008; also, U.S. House of Representatives 

Hearing, House Armed Services Committee, on President Obama’s 

Fiscal 2011 Budget Requests for the European Command, Africa 

Command and Joint Forces Command, March 10, 2010.

26. Thom Shanker, “Gates Halts Cut in Army Force in Europe,” The New York Times, November 21, 2007; “United States,” 

Jane’s World Armies, April 27, 2012.

27. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 

Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2010, p. 65.

28. Seth Robson and Sandra Jontz, “Four Combat Brigades to 

Stay in Europe,” Stars and Stripes, February 3, 2010.

29. Department of Defense, News Release: DOD Announces U.S. 

Force Posture Revision in Europe, No. 287-11, April 8, 2011, available from www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14397.

30. Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Army to Transfer Just One Brigade 

from Germany to States,” Stars and Stripes, April 9, 2011. 

31. Department of Defense, Media Background Briefing on U.S. 

Force Posture in Europe Going Forward, February 16, 2012, available 

from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4981.

32. Data portrayed in this figure came from a series of annual NATO press releases on fiscal and economic data from 1990 

to 2011.

33. Figures taken from Department of Defense, “Report on 

Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,” July 2003, available from www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a435848.pdf; and from 

Jim Garamone, “Commander Discusses NATO Contributions in 

Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Service, May 17, 2010.

34. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” Press Release, April 13, 
39

2012; NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” Press Release, March 10, 

2011; NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) Placement, June 4, 2011, available from www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf; and “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key 

Facts and Figures,” June 6, 2011, available from www.isaf.nato.int/

images/stories/File/Placemats/Revised 6 June 2011 Placemat (Full).pdf. 

35. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial and 

Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” Press Release, 

April 13, 2012.

36. These three theoretical tools were chosen for their obvious 

and strong applicability to the puzzle in question—namely, why 

European members of NATO have not increased their share of 

the defense burden, as seen through some of the most commonly 

accepted measures, in the face of reduced American military presence in Europe, as many have long expected. Other theoretical 

models may be useful for explaining specifically the continued 

presence of U.S. troops in Europe or the post-Cold War existence 

of NATO, but such subjects are not the focus of the puzzle as described at the outset of the monograph.

37. Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4, Autumn 1990, p. 732.

38. John Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliance 

Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 4, Autumn 1992, pp. 819-855.

39. “Targets for Defense Spending May be Scrapped by 

NATO,” from the Reuters wire service, as printed in The Toronto 

Star, May 18, 1990, p. A5. During the Cold War, few allies met the 

3 percent threshold. John R. Deni, Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, Burlington, VT: 

Ashgate, 2007, p. 35.

40. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, 

MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

41. Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 1987.
40

42. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 

New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.

43. Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand 

Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 

Press, 2006. See also Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and 

Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 

1998, pp. 144-172; as well as Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand 

Strategy Formation,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, 

January 2010, pp. 117-143.

44. Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic 

Review of Alliances,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 

48, No. 3, August 1966, pp. 266-279; Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO, Armonk, NY: M.E. 

Sharpe, Inc., 2003.

45. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. For examples of the array of 

literature on burden-sharing that followed, see Wallace J. Thies, 

“Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 1987, pp. 298-332; John A. Conybeare and Todd Sandler, “The Triple Entente and the Triple 

Alliance 1880-1914: A Collective Goods Approach,” The American 

Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, December 1990, pp. 1197-

1206; Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley, “On the Economic Theory of 

Alliances,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1975, 

pp. 330-348; and John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, “The Theory 

of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, June 1994, 

pp. 373-396.

46. See for example, John Vandiver, “U.S. Embassy Cables: 

Poles Want a Larger U.S. Military Presence in Country,” Stars 

and Stripes, December 7, 2010; Tadeusz Pieciukiewicz, “Security 

in Central and Eastern Europe: A View From Warsaw,” Parameters, Vol. XXVI, Winter 1996-97, pp. 122-135; Laura Chappell, 

“Poland in Transition: Implications for European Security and 

Defence Policy,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 31, No. 2, August 2010, pp. 225-248; Estonian Ministry of Defence, National 

Security Concept of Estonia, May 12, 2010, available from www.kmin.

ee/files/kmin/img/files/National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf.
41

47. Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities 

and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 2002, p. 127.

48. Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter 

1998-99, p. 92.

49. Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 

International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, p. 36.

50. John Bolton, “The Next President and NATO,” The 

Washington Times, July 21, 1999.

51. Klaus Naumann, “Staying In Europe: A Vital American 

Interest,” in Lloyd Matthews, ed., The Future Of The American Military Presence In Europe, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, May 2000.

52. Ted Galen Carpenter and Marin Tupy, “U.S. Defense 

Spending Subsidizes European Free-Riding Welfare States,” 

July 12, 2010, available from dailycaller.com/2010/07/12/u-sdefense-spending-subsidizes-european-free-riding-welfare-states/; and 

Heather Horn, “Why Europe Should Be Glad its U.S. Troops Are 

Leaving,” The Atlantic, January 23, 2012, available from www.

theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/why-europe-should-beglad-its-us-troops-are-leaving/251768/.

53. “The Downgrading of Europe,” The Economist, January 14, 

2012, available from www.economist.com/node/21542789.

54. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 6, 

2006, p. 38.

55. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 

2010, p. 65.

56. U.S. House of Representatives Hearing, House Armed 

Services Committee, on President Obama’s Fiscal 2011 Budget Requests for the European Command, Africa Command, and Joint 

Forces Command, March 10, 2010.
42

57. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, September 2002, p. 1. See also Department of Defense, 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2010, p. 73.

58. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 30, 

2001, p. 4.

59. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 6, 

2006, pp. 28-29.

60. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2012. This defense strategic guidance mentions Russia only once, in the context noted above.

61. See Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 

2010, pp. 8-10, 74. Hybrid warfare, “may involve state adversaries 

that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy 

forces to coerce and intimidate, or nonstate actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated 

with states.” The global commons can be defined as international 

space that connects states such as sea lanes or airspace or even 

outer space. The threat from failed or failing states is particularly 

so among poor, nuclear-armed countries or those that may be 

catalysts for radicalism or extremism.

62. The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010, pp. 41-42. Emphasis added.

63. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 

2010, pp. 10, 74. Emphasis added.

64. For example, General Bantz Craddock, Commander of U.S. 

European Command, testified before the U.S. Senate that the first 

theater objective of American forces based in Europe was to be ex-
43

peditionary and ready for “global deployment,” while the second 

objective was to promote NATO’s ability to conduct out-of-area 

operations. Statement of General Bantz Craddock Before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, March 24, 2009, available from armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Craddock%03-24-09.pdf.

65. Armored divisions also included infantry units; similarly, infantry divisions include some tanks, but only about half 

as many as an armored division. Since the development of tanks 

many decades ago, the precise number in a U.S. armored division 

has varied over time.

66. Jill Laster, “Spandahlem A-10 Squadron to Shut 

Down,” Air Force Times, February 16, 2012, available from www.

airforcetimes.com/news/2012/02/air-force-europe-cuts-a10-021612w/. 

67. Email correspondence with an expert in Army force structure in Europe, May 1, 2012.

68. During these deployments, neither the United States nor 

its NATO allies sought to augment the lost U.S. force structure in 

Europe—no ally clamored for additional forces in Europe, as a 

means of deterring aggression on the continent.

69. Carter Ham, “USAREUR: Building Partner Capacity for 

the Future,” ARMY Magazine, October 2009, p. 118.

70. Ibid., p. 119.

71. Interview with a senior U.S. field grade officer based in 

Europe, June 7, 2011. See also testimony of Admiral James G. 

Stavridis, Commander, United States European Command, 

March 9, 2010, available from www.armed-services.senate.gov/

testimony.cfm?wit_id=8889&id=4361.

72. U.S. Congress, Congressional Record - House, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 17, 2012, p. H3082.

73. Ibid.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. John R. Deni

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil