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NEWS FROM THE FRONT

 JUNE 2019

Building Partnership Capacity 

through Train, Advise, and Assist 

Insights from BG Scott Jackson

Commander, 1SFAB and Task Force SE

14NOV18 Interview with CALL and Military Historian

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News from the Front:

Building Partnership Capacity through Train, Advise, and Assist: Insights 

from BG Scott Jackson

Edited by COL Robert Blaesing

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UInsights from BG Scott Jackson, Commander, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade 

Afghan soldiers listen to a map reading class taught by an advisor non-commissioned 

Officer (NCO) with 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, 18 SEP 18. (Photo Credit: 

Sean Kimmons)
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UForward

The 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (1SFAB) deployed in support of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RS) and Operation 

FREEDOM’s SENTINEL (OFS) from February to November 2018. The 1SFAB supported RSM 

and OFS with the Army’s first unit dedicated to training, advising, assisting, accompanying and 

enabling (A3E) conventional foreign security force partners. 

The 1SFAB had a positive impact on NATO and U.S. strategic 

initiatives in Afghanistan by advising Afghan National Defense and 

Security Forces (ANDSF) at tactical levels of command that had not 

been consistently and directly advised since 2015. 1SFAB regularly 

advised kandaks, brigades, corps headquarters, regional military 

training centers, and the Capital Division responsible for securing Kabul.

1SFAB’s six battalions advised Afghan partners in every Afghan National Army (ANA) 

corps and each of RSM’s regional Train, Advise and Assist Commands (TAACs). The brigade 

also advised Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) units.

UKey Insights

Know what training you must complete and what training you would do given more time.

Keep Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) teams together. Do not break teams into 

smaller pieces.

Keep SFAB Brigade headquarters (HQ) as a functional headquarters located at either 

RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RS) or Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS-Ops) level.

All SFAB members, to include support personnel, should attend advisory training, as 

they might be called upon to be trainers.

Linguists should be added to the teams while they train.

Measuring success takes time, but having continuity between all SFABs will be a marked 

improvement over previous training. After action reports (AARs), lessons learned (LLs), 

and best management practices (BMPs) are recorded for all to access.

Persistent advising makes a difference.

The brigade level is the “sweet spot” for tactical advising.

The kandak level is where there are institutional effects.

Insights from BG Scott Jackson, Commander, 1SFAB

Afghanistan/US Crosswalk

Kandak = Battalion

 Tolay = Company
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Conducted November 14, 2018 at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan

Brigadier General (BG) Scott Allen Jackson is the first 

Commaner of 1SFAB at Fort Benning, Georgia. He 

assumed command in March 2017 and deployed to 

Afghanistan in March 2018. The 1SFAB rotated out of 

Afghanistan in November 2018. Throughout his career, 

BG Jackson has served in leadership and staff positions,

from infantry platoon leader to First Cavalry Division 

G3, at duty stations throughout the United States, Korea, 

and Iraq. His previous command of the 2nd Armored 

Brigade Combat Team, was from July 2013 to January

2015. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College and the School of Advanced 

Military Studies, where he researched and analyzed 

command and control relationships between 

conventional and special operations forces in combat, as 

seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. BG Jackson has deployed to Iraq three times, for a cumulative 41 

months. 

UPREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

The SFAB concept was created to be a dedicated formation to accomplish the Train, Advise and 

Assist (TAA) mission that had been going on since 2014, at the start of Operation RESOLUTE

SUPPORT. At that time, the training was delivered via Security Force Assistance Teams,

(SFATs) which were generally composed of 10 to 15 personnel. Given the initial success of the 

SFAT missions, the SFAB concept was born. The Army plan is to have six SFABs total, and to 

have them constantly rotate in and out of theater with continuous back to back coverage. When it 

was time to create the first SFAB, also known as 1SFAB, senior Army leaders held an informal 

board and did a scrub of recent brigade commanders who were available. Having just completed 

a successful brigade command, BG Scott Jackson (then Colonel), was chosen to be the 1SFAB 

Commander in March 2017. 

By the time BG Jackson arrived at Fort Benning in early May, the belief was that there would be 

roughly 15 months to put the brigade together, train on a multitude of subjects, complete

collective training, and then validate at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, 

Louisiana. Since time was the limiting factor, forming the initial brigade staff and creating the 

initial training calendar had to occur up front. The priority was on Core Advisor Level training,

and also individual competency across the brigade. As part of the Core Advisor Level training, 

everyone was required to complete the Military Advising Training Academy (MATA) and 

medical training. Also on-line was a 16-week language course for all primary advisors, in 

addition to a three week Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) course for everyone. 
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After developing what training they wanted to complete, the deployment date for the 1SFAB was 

moved up six months, and the training calendar had to be adjusted. Much of the language course 

was sacrificed, and SERE training was shortened to one week. Training in communications, 

language, and culture still happened, just not to the degree originally planned. Everyone still 

went to the advisor’s academy and did medical training. The collective training was shortened to 

about four weeks of home station collective training, focusing primarily on tactical movement, 

team building, and live fire certification. 

Due to the unique nature of the SFAB structure, and this being JRTC’s first experience 

validating an SFAB, only a single battalion went to JRTC for the first rotation in December of 

2017. According to BG Jackson, that battalion was a “proof of principle” rotation so that JRTC 

would know what to expect when the full SFAB came through the following month. When the 

SFAB returned, the JRTC staff was ready, and 1SFAB completed a full training rotation. The 

brigade validated and deployed approximately three weeks later.

UDEPLOYMENT

The SFAB was designed to be a force provider and not an operational headquarters. The SFAB 

commander provided battalions and teams to all the TAACs. While the SFAB brigade 

headquarters was designed to provide leadership to the subordinate battalion commanders, BG 

Jackson kept a hands off approach to managing his subordinate commanders. According to BG 

Jackson, “...you have to acknowledge that you have second-time battalion commanders, branch 

qualified field grade officers, and 

experienced company commanders as 

your team leaders.” For BG Jackson, 

it was easier to manage by exception.

As a force provider, the SFAB was

built in a certain way for TAA 

missions. The battalions can be 

broken down into teams that can be 

split into smaller units, but only to a 

certain point. Army senior leaders, in 

addition to doctrine, informed BG 

Jackson of two important commands 

that must be followed. Number one is 

to not break up the teams, and number 

two is to never overextend your risk 

factors.

Assuming TAAC Command

“My recommendation for 2SFAB and all follow 

on SFABs deployed to Afghanistan is for the 

SFAB brigade headquarters to be pulled out of 

any regional location. This will make it more of 

a functional headquarters. Working at the 

DCOS-Ops level, or Resolute Support level,

would provide the functional headquarters that 

can provide recommendations on the best 

utilization of SFAB teams across the CJOA-A.” 

BG Scott Jackson, Cdr. 1SFAB, interview 14 November 2018
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The SFAB units train as teams and that is 

how they should be employed. Leadership 

has to acknowledge the fact that the SFAB 

works best when it is kept together. 

Keeping the units intact occurs at every 

single level of command from the team, and 

the units must stay together from battalion 

level all the way to the brigade headquarters 

level. When the 1SFAB battalion 

commanders followed these commands, 

they were able do their training and 

command their units. That trust allowed the 

1SFAB commander to look at the larger 

perspectives, such as strategic messaging 

and organizational design in order to help 

the Army shape 2SFAB, as well as the 

overall messaging of the SFAB. 

For the 1SFAB’s deployment, an extra challenge was encountered. In addition to being the 

higher headquarters for all six SFAB battalions, the 1SFAB headquarters was employed as the 

“mission command” for Task Force Southeast (TF SE). In essence, the 1SFAB fulfilled three 

functions in Afghanistan: 1) It was the overall higher headquarters for all six 1SFAB battalions.

2) It was the mission command for TF SE, which means it did all TF SE operations. 3) It was the 

advising platform for 203rd ANA Corps.

TF command had its ups and downs. The downside of being TF SE command is that it limited 

the availability for the brigade staff to interact with battalion staff. Although it kept the staff 

busy, it did not maximize all that they were capable of. Another downside of taking on command 

is that there was considerably less time to visit the battalion commands and engage with the 

troops. In the course of nine months, BG Jackson was only able to visit TF South and TF East a 

limited number of times.

The upside to being assigned as TF SE 

command was that the SFAB had the 

ability to maximize corps-level 

advising. The standard TAAC corps 

advising team is about 17-20 people,

when you look at TAAC South or 

TAAC East. 1SFAB had 44 Soldiers 

committed to the 203rd Corps. There 

were eight logisticians focused on 

corps logistics, and five medical 

officers focused on the corps medical 

SFAB Workload

“No, I was never concerned about that 

[the workload] but I knew my staff was 

extremely busy. The SFAB Soldiers who 

were hired for this mission were well 

chosen, screened, and prepared and they 

all rose up to the challenge. I would even 

say that they were ‘work horses’.... The 

reason is simple, these officers are A+, 

rock solid officers and I really didn’t have 

a concern about that issue.”

BG Scott Jackson, Cdr. 1SFAB, interview 14 November 

2018

Brig. Gen. Scott Jackson shares a laugh with the 

Afghan National Army 203rd Corps Commander, 

before a battle update briefing Sept. 18, 2018. (Photo 

Credit: Sean Kimmons)
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functions, to include running the corps hospital, and overseeing corps medical evacuation and 

resupply operations. There were also explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians and 

Engineer route clearance advisors. The SFAB had depth at the corps staff that allowed it to do 

training in certain areas that other battalion staffs did not have the capacity to do.

UInserting the SFAB Force Structure into the TAACs

There was no SFAB advising platform below the corps level when the 1SFAB arrived in theater. 

No brigade or battalion/kandak level advising existed. All that existed was the concept of the 

Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) advising at the corps level. The arrival of the 1SFAB changed 

everything.

The Brigade Advisory Teams (BATs) 

primarily advise at the brigade level, though,

dependent upon the mission, some staff advise 

at higher levels to include division and 

Ministerial level. The BAT also provides 

mission command for 12 subordinate Company 

Advisory Teams (CATs) (advisory teams at the 

battalion/kandak and company/tolay level). 

These maneuver CATs advise tactical level 

operations and conduct the training and 

assistance for combined arms maneuver.

Upon arrival to the TAACs, there was not an 

established role for the SFAB. The SFAB 

brigade commander’s first task was to get his

team into the different TAACs, and get 

environmentally and organizationally 

acclimated; and develop trust not only with 

their ANA partners, but also with their U.S.

higher headquarters in each respective TAAC.

Developing trust was a challenge due to the 

fact that very few people in theater knew much about the SFAB or their capabilities. According 

to BG Jackson, several TAAC Commanders were surprised to learn all that the SFAB could 

accomplish. Developing this trust with their ANA partners and their U.S. higher headquarters did

not happen overnight. It took time for both to understand the full capability of the SFAB.

Leadership

“Every one of the SFAB missions in 

each of the TAACs was different. That 

was another reason why I had to step 

back with a hands-off approach 

because of the diversity of missions for 

my six battalion commanders in 

Afghanistan. Even if I had operational 

control of my battalion commanders 

and I was able to direct the advising 

mission in each TAAC, it’s so different 

for each one that, unless I was on the 

ground, I really wouldn’t know what 

the requirements are. You really just 

have to trust your subordinates and let 

them command their units.”

 

BG Scott Jackson, Cdr. 1SFAB, interview 14 

November 2018
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UMeasuring Training Success

1SFAB TAACs and battalion missions were all 

different. Therefore, the ability to establish a 

common set of metrics to measure training 

effectiveness was challenging. To a certain 

extent, it is possible to measure the ANA 

partner’s performance. The 1SFAB only affects

one portion of the ultimate goal of ANSDF 

independence, and that is to make the ANA 

partner units better. So the actual question is 

“Did the 1SFAB make their ANA partner units 

better?” Performance can be measured by 

employments of A29 light attack planes,

MD530 light helicopters, logistics, and selfsustainability through logistics systems. Also, 

implementations of command and control 

systems help assess the ANA partner unit’s 

performance. In the end, the 1SFAB used a 

number of different metrics.

BG Jackson mentioned a few unique ways the 

1SFAB measured success. One method was by 

helping their partners with problem solving. If 

the ANA partner units cannot get something 

done through their channels, the SFAB advisors 

would work through their channels to get results 

so that each unit was working the problem 

multiple ways. This methodology worked well 

during typical paperwork issues. The SFAB 

advisors knew where the paperwork was going 

and where it was stopped, and they were able to 

teach their partner.

Another unique method of problem solving is 

seen in the example of some ANA soldiers that 

manned multiple check points for their forward 

operating base (FOB). The soldiers believed that 

all of the Taliban had night vision devices, and 

that the Taliban could easily overrun and kill 

them at night. They insisted that they needed

night vision devices as well. An SFAB advisor

explained to them that they did not need night 

vision devices, and told them all they needed 

was a strong flashlight. He then showed 

Opportunistic Training and 

Measurements of Performance

“...one of the things the ANA partner 

units struggled with was their 

reluctance to use maps. If you were to 

ask them to show you where all their 

checkpoints were located, they would 

pull out books, but not a map. They 

were really reluctant to put these on 

the map, despite being told how much 

easier it would be for them. Over the 

course of a couple of months, the 

SFAB Geo-Spatial Engineer Soldiers, 

who were originally not tasked as 

SFAB advisors, but were designed to 

be mission support to the 1SFAB,

came up with a solution.

These Soldiers went to the ANA 

partner units and taught them how to 

use Google Earth, because they had 

computers and internet access. They 

taught them how to put all the check 

points into Google Earth, and taught 

them how to embed data like check 

point numbers and commander 

names. This was important because if 

a checkpoint was under attack, they 

could go into Google Earth and pull 

up all the contact information. This 

also helped the ANA partner units to 

develop a common operating picture 

(COP), and this was one of our main 

efforts at the Corps level.”

BG Scott Jackson, Cdr. 1SFAB, interview 14 

November 2018
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everyone his pocket flashlight. Because the SFAB was spending the night there, they conducted 

a class on how to defeat the night vision devices. For the purposes of the class, all the ANA 

partners were given night vision devices and they put them on, just as they believed the Taliban 

would. He asked if they all could see him and they all said they could. An SFAB advisor then

takes out his flashlight and shines it at them and temporarily blinds them while they wore the 

night vision device. He asked them if they could see and, as expected, they said they could not. 

An SFAB advisor used the practical class to show the ANA soldiers how light can defeat night 

vision devices. He explained how mortars and illumination rounds could be used to effectively 

counter the belief that the Taliban “owned the night.” This was followed by a practical exercise,

where he then taught them how to shoot with illumination rounds to counter any benefit of night 

vision googles. 

The teaching of these simple tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) not only made a 

difference on the battlefield, but also changed their perspective regarding the enemy to the point 

that they were no longer afraid to fight at night; this was a training success. An SFAB advisor

took it a step further, and also taught them how to put light sets on their FOBs, which faced out 

and not inward. This was another way that made all the difference, and ANA partner soldiers 

stopped abandoning their check points up in the 1st Kandak area. Their partners learned these 

TTP and their performance as a unit was markedly improved.

Training success was not just limited to the ANA partners, but also to the SFAB soldiers 

themselves. When the geo-spatial soldiers (Warrant and a Staff Sergeant) taught several of the 

ANA units to use Google Earth, the SFAB learned a valuable lesson. Though the two soldiers 

were not assigned as original SFAB advisors, they did go through all the pre-deployment training 

that the SFAB advisors had done. Their jobs, by organizational design, were to support the 

SFAB brigade. The main lesson the SFAB learned was that “Everybody in the SFAB has the 

potential to be an advisor.” This message has been relayed back to the 2SFAB, so that they can 

leverage their full complement of soldiers.

Advisors with the 1st Security 

Force Assistance Brigade's 3rd 

Squadron, speak with their 

Afghan National Army 

counterparts during a routine 

fly-to-advise mission at Forward 

Operating Base Altimur, 

Afghanistan, Sept. 19, 2018. 

(Photo Credit: Sean Kimmons)
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USFAB CONTINUITY

One of the main drivers in establishing the SFAB program is to maintain consistency between 

rotations that did not always occur between Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs) in years 

past. The 1SFAB is utilizing lessons learned from prior SFAT teams, and the whole Relief in 

Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) process in general. Many positive recommendations

came out of the AR 15-6 investigation from the Niger ambush, and the 1SFAB has implemented 

many of them. The 1SFAB conducted video teleconferencing (VTC) every Wednesday night 

with all SFAB battalion commanders, and discussed operations, lessons learned, observations,

and concerns. Starting in May or June of 2018, when 2SFAB got their feet on the ground and 

began their training, they were immediately incorporated into the 1SFAB’s weekly VTCs. And 

in a leaning forward position, the 3SFAB is currently incorporated into the VTCs with 2SFAB. 

It has now become the SFAB “community of practice” VTC. While all the 1SFAB battalion 

commanders are discussing how “this kandak advising team is doing this; or the concerns we’re 

having here with operations; or this is the dilemma”, the 2SFAB and 3SFAB are getting all this 

information.

Another way that the 1SFAB is sharing 

knowledge with future SFABs is through the 

After Action Review (AAR) process. After 

every single “fly to advise” mission, or 

significant operation, the battalion 

commanders are required to conduct a written 

narrative AAR. There are no slides, and it 

must be an English narrative. The narratives 

must address the following: 1) What was the 

purpose of the operation, and to some extent 

what took place. 2) What was the Afghanistan 

plan from our ANA partners? Then, based on 

the Afghanistan plan, what was the advisor’s 

analysis of the Afghan plan? 

The 1SFAB has over 125 written narrative 

AARs in a repository. BG Jackson’s vision 

was to find a secure Facebook-like page where 

the 1SFAB could put AARs and other relevant 

files, and follow-on SFABs could have ready 

access. They selected “I-Space” since the 

forum contains community pages where they 

are able to post blogs, discuss questions, and 

post all of their AAR products. 

Continuity through AARs

“Every one of these operations is tied 

to an Afghan unit. The idea is that you 

can take that AAR tied to 1st Kandak, 

1st BDE, 203rd Corps and, if you’re 

with a follow-on SFAB, you can then 

go back to this AAR and fill in the 

learning gap. For example, you can 

search on 9 April 2018, pull up the 

report on 1st Kandak, 1st BDE, 203rd

Corps, and you can read all these AARs

up and get a running tally on where 

they’ve come from and what our 

advisory focus has been. The scope of 

the operation, observations, and the 

TAA plan are now all written down. 

Follow-on advisors can discover why 

we went out there, what were the 

objectives, what we observed, and how 

the Afghans did.”

BG Scott Jackson, Cdr. 1SFAB, interview 14 

November 2018
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The 1SFAB also shared lessons learned with JRTC for when the 2SFAB went through for 

validation. The 1SFAB sent battalion command teams, a portion of the brigade staff, and one 

senior leader from each team to JRTC to be mentors and subject matter experts. With the 1SFAB 

Commaner as the lead, they built a battalion-level advising team to cover down on all six 

battalions on 2SFAB. The battalion level advising team assisted the JRTC Observer/ControllerTrainers (OC-Ts) with training and validating the 2SFAB.

The final piece of the SFAB continuity puzzle was the in-country RIP/TOA. Simultaneous to the 

2SFAB deployment, the 1SFAB sent the command group, and a leader per team or battalion,

back to Afghanistan to complete a proper left-seat/right-seat hand off. Between the VTCs, the 

written AARs, and JRTC validation, the 1SFAB ensured that the ANA partners have a good 

hand off to the next SFAB. 

The long term goal is to have SFABs RIP “heel to toe.” While the 2SFAB will still be required to 

send some leaders back from Afghanistan to JRTC to train up 3SFAB, it should not have to be as 

intense as the previous rotation. With each additional deployment and rotation, JRTC staff will 

be gaining more experience. 

U1SFAB Lessons LearnedU

Continuity is an important factor to achieve continual improvement. Just as critical as ensuring 

continuity between SFAB units, is recording lessons learned and making sure successive units 

have access to them. The 1SFAB had roughly a year at home station before coming to 

Afghanistan for nine months. While many of the LLs and BMPs are in the records that they 

shared with 2SFAB, there are “larger” lessons learned that affected the way they operated or 

intend to operate in the future. Three main lessons at the top of the list include: persistent 

advising is important; institutional changes happen at the kandak level; and linguists should be 

added to the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

BG Scott Jackson, left center, 

attends an Afghan-led battle update 

briefing Sept. 18, 2018. BG Jackson 

and other advisors in his brigade 

often attend the briefings near his 

command headquarters at Advising 

Platform Lightning to offer their 

insight to counterparts. (Photo 

Credit: Sean Kimmons)
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The 1SFAB realized early that periodic 

touchpoints worked well for sustainment of 

skills. In order to have improvement though, 

the training team needs to be there every day 

and conduct “persistent advising.” At times it 

can be challenging to be out there every day 

with a unit, so that is why it is important for 

SFAB teams to look for creative ways to 

change the battlefield geometry or resourcing 

to create those “persistent advising” 

opportunities when needed.

The SFAB advised at multiple levels, to 

include the corps, brigade, and the kandak 

level. To achieve tactical effects, being 

plugged in and advising at the Afghanistan 

brigade level is the place to operate. 

According to BG Jackson, the brigade-level 

advising is the “sweet spot” for tactical 

effects. This is true in the Afghanistan Army 

because their brigades are the last level at 

which true decision makers exist. The level of 

operations at the kandak are so small that it 

really comes down to the Afghanistan brigade 

commanders, who really make decisions on 

the battlefield. The kandak level is where the 

“institutional” development is really taking 

place. BG Jackson believes that the 

Afghanistan older generation brigade 

leadership, by and large, is still tied to the old 

Afghanistan culture, and it is difficult to 

change things at the brigade level. The kandak 

level is a younger generation. Several kandaks 

are led by Afghanistan majors who are in their 

late 20s or early 30s, which is not too far off 

from where the SFAB captains and majors are 

in age. These Soldiers can talk “peer-to-peer,” 

not by rank but by generation. The more that 

the younger Afghan generation is exposed to 

how the SFAB and U.S. forces do business, 

the faster and more efficiently we’ll be at 

improving the Afghan military culture. 

Institutional Change starts at the 

Kandak

“Very early in our deployment, we 

were sitting in the corps headquarters 

building one night and the President of 

Afghanistan was visiting. It’s 0200 and 

I’m talking with a couple of U.S.

Soldiers with the rank of PV2, who 

were my Guardian Angels. and this 

Afghan captain was looking at me 

intensely. We were laughing and having 

a good time, and the Afghan captain 

continued to stare until I asked my 

interpreter to ask him if something was 

the matter. The Afghanistan captain 

asked the interpreter my rank and duty 

position, and he was told that I was a 

colonel and the SFAB brigade 

commander. His response was that this 

interaction with junior Soldiers by a 

colonel would never happen in the 

Afghan Army. He said that brigade 

commanders don’t talk to privates in 

the Afghan Army, and they rarely talk 

to him as a captain. 

This point hit home to me that the more 

we can engage the young officers and 

non-commissioned officers in the 

Afghan Army, the better effect we’ll 

have on the “institution” development 

across Afghanistan....you have to start 

at the kandak level. Just like in our 

Army, we identify and develop leaders 

and things like that, but you cannot do 

that if you don’t have the presence 

down there to see those guys.”

BG Scott Jackson, Cdr. 1SFAB, interview 14 

November 2018
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BG Jackson believes that advising at the kandak level is important because the relationship that 

develops can actually be more secure than advising at the brigade or corps level. If a leader

advises at the kandak level, they know everyone in the kandak.

 

One of the keys to important training is having qualified linguists. There were eleven 09L 

(Linguist Interpreters) attached to the SFAB for this mission. They were both Dari and Pashtu 

speaking linguists, and according to BG Jackson they were an “absolute game changer.” His 

assigned linguist was an U.S. Army Specialist originally from Afghanistan. Like the brigade 

commander, all of the SFAB battalion commanders also had 09L linguists with them at all times. 

Having an Army linguist with the SFAB commanders gives the mission instant credibility and 

instant trust with the ANA partner units. 

 

The 09L Soldiers are flexible and understand mission requirements and the needs of the Army 

advising mission. The 09L Army linguists tend to be more flexible than their civilian 

counterparts, and are essential to the SFAB mission. Based on the tremendous value of the 09L 

linguists during the 1SFAB deployment in Afghanistan, BG Jackson recommended that they be 

built into the SFAB MTOE for future deployments. Currently, they are not part of the SFAB 

MTOE, and are attached for this deployment. 

 

If the MTOE cannot be adjusted to include the linguists, BG Jackson recommends that future 

SFAB units receive their 09L linguists early on in their pre-deployment training. The benefit to 

having them early is that it gives the deploying unit the ability to incorporate them into their 

advisory training program. In addition, the linguists can participate in the language sustainment 

training which is part of the pre-deployment training, and provide cultural advising to the SFAB 

advisors. Being incorporated earlier allows them to be with the unit and helps them become an 

integral part of the SFAB team from the start. 

BG Scott Jackson with linguist, 

advises a role player acting as a 

commander in the Afghan National 

Army during a key leader engagement 

held Jan. 15, 2018, during the monthlong 1st SFAB training rotation at the 

Joint Readiness Training Center in 

Fort Polk, La. The engagement was 

held to prepare the 1SFAB leadership 

for their upcoming deployment to 

provide training and advising 

assistance to Afghan National Security 

Forces. (Photo Credit: SPC Noelle E. 

Wiehe, 50th Public Affairs 

Detachment)
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The Army linguists give instant credibility because they are part of the SFAB and are associated 

with the advisors. While the partners see them as U.S. Soldiers, many of them are native born 

and this gives the SFAB advisors a greater understanding of the Afghanistan culture and 

heritage. The 09L is definitely a force multiplier. 

 

UInsider Threat

The insider threat is alive and well in Afghanistan. While the overall number of insider threats 

has gone down over the past few years, so has the coalition force’s number of interactions with 

the Afghans. While not all incidents happen during training engagements with Afghan partners, 

SFAB members have to constantly be aware when there are new partner members, or when there 

are outside visitors to their training.

As stated earlier, trust was an important component of the training. The SFAB commanders on 

the ground know their training environments and variables the best. Overly restrictive force 

protection (FP) policy can take away the judgment of the commanders, and potentially put them 

in a worse place by being overly cautious. According to BG Jackson, you have got to trust your 

Commanders to make the right call.

The “Afghan Blanket” an Insider Threat Vignette

“There were times at Ghazni I was downtown with the ANA Corps commander, and he said to 

me that we should go and see the governor. It’s a 150 meter walk inside the compound and 

Afghan generals never wear body armor. I had a choice to make, I could go next door and get 

my personal protective equipment (PPE), or I could just walk with him without my PPE. I 

made the decision to go with the ANA Corps commander without PPE, but ensured all my 

Soldiers who accompanied me remained in full PPE.”

“I use the term that I “wrapped myself in an Afghan blanket,” and was literally side by side 

with him so that I was almost touching him with my shoulder as we walked. I later used the 

term “Velcro to Velcro” as we walked closely side by side. Bottom line is that we need to trust 

the judgment of the SFAB commanders to make PPE calls when interacting with their ANA 

partners. You need the freedom to adjust your TTPs, and it made a difference. In fact, the 

ANA Corps commander stated to me “now you look like an Afghan general.” From there on 

out, our relationship was solid. I did the tactical actions on the ground to mitigate the risk and 

chose not to wear my PPE in this situation.” 

BG Scott Jackson, Cdr. 1SFAB, interview 14 November 2018
Approved for Public Release

Distribution Unlimited

USFAB Gap and the Arizona National Guard (1/158)

As it stands now, there is an approximate four month gap between the 1SFAB’s departure and 

the 2SFAB’s arrival. There will be no gap between 2SFAB and 3SFAB as they rotate in and out 

of Afghanistan. The plan is for the gaps between SFABs to disappear. The hope is that when the 

2SFAB arrives in theater, the Army will be able to generate a SFAB brigade to maintain “heel to 

toe” rotations from here on out.

Since the 2SFAB had a late start in standing up and a limited time to train, and the Arizona Army 

National Guard (AZARNG) was originally planning to be in theater during the winter months 

(normally the nonfighting season), it was decided that they could potentially fill the gap between 

the 1SFAB and 2SFAB.

According to BG Jackson, the mission of the 1/158 AZARNG was to “keep the fires warm” at 

the Regional Training Centers. Their mission set was specially scoped to keep them focused on 

maintaining critical relationships and functions, but not to conduct expeditionary advising at the 

kandak level. The AZARNG was not resourced or equipped to conduct the SFAB mission. While 

it is true that their rank structure and experiences were different from the SFAB, the 1/158 

AZARNG was fully capable of maintaining the critical relationships and functions until the 

arrival of the 2SFAB in March 2019.