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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

RUSSIA'S HOMEGROWN INSURGENCY: 

JIHAD IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

Stephen J. Blank

Editor

October 2012

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose 

classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives 

in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is 

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ISBN 1-58487-544-5
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword ........................................................................v

1. The Caucasus Emirate Jihadists: 

 The Security and Strategic Implications ...............1

Gordon M. Hahn

2. The North Caucasus in Russia and Russia 

 in the North Caucasus: State Approaches 

 and Political Dynamics in the 

 Turbulent Region ...................................................99

Sergey Markedonov

3. The “Afghanization” of the North 

 Caucasus: Causes and Implications 

 of a Changing Conflict ........................................121

Svante E. Cornell

About the Contributors .............................................155

v

FOREWORD

The United States has had a bitter set of experiences 

with insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations, 

but it is by no means alone in having to confront such 

threats and challenges. Indeed, according to Russian 

President Dmitry Medvedev, the greatest domestic 

threat to Russia’s security is the ongoing insurgency 

in the North Caucasus. This insurgency grew out of 

Russia’s wars in Chechnya and has gone on for several years, with no end in sight. Yet it is hardly known in 

the West and barely covered even by experts. In view 

of this insurgency’s strategic importance and the fact 

that the U.S. military can and must learn for other contemporary wars, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 

felt the need to bring this war to our readers’ attention 

and shed more light upon both sides, the Islamist (and 

nationalist) rebels and Russia, as they wage either an 

insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign.

While the evident and primary cause of this current war is Russian misrule in the North Caucasus in 

the context of the Chechen wars, it also is true that 

Russia is now facing a self-proclaimed fundamentalist, Salafi-oriented, Islamist challenge, that openly 

proclaims its links to al-Qaeda and whose avowed 

aim is the detachment of the North Caucasus from the 

Russian Federation. Therefore, we should have a substantial interest in scrutinizing the course of this war 

both for its real-world strategic implications and for 

the lessons that we can garner by close analysis of it. 

The three papers presented here are by well-known 

experts and were delivered at SSI’s third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on 

September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, Eu-
ropean, and American experts to engage in a regular, 

open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security; this panel realized that ambition, 

as Dr. Hahn is American, Dr. Markedonov is Russian, 

and Dr. Cornell is Swedish. 

SSI believes that such regular international dialogue plays an important role in expanding the repertoire of ideas and potential course of action available 

to Army and other strategic leaders, and we look forward to continuing this process in the future. Bearing 

these objectives in mind and with the goal of informing senior Army and other strategic leaders about contemporary strategic and military developments, SSI 

is pleased to present this monograph to our readers 

for their consideration. We hope that it will stimulate 

further debate, reflection, and learning among our 

readers, as the issues of insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as Islamist-driven terrorism, will not go 

away anytime soon.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vi
1

CHAPTER 1

THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE JIHADISTS:

THE SECURITY AND STRATEGIC 

IMPLICATIONS

Gordon M. Hahn

In 1994, before the outbreak of the first post-Soviet 

Russo-Chechen war, Shamil Basaev, the leading operative of the then self-declared independent Chechen 

Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI), took a group of some 30 

men from his battalion of Abkhaz fighters to Osama 

bin Laden’s al-Qaeda (AQ) training camps in Khost, 

Afghanistan.1

 From this fleeting but nevertheless seminal contact between the ChRI and AQ, an increasingly closer relationship gradually developed between 

Chechen as well as other Caucasus nationalist and 

Sufi Islamic insurgents on the one hand, and AQ and 

the burgeoning global jihadi revolutionary movement 

on the other. After more than a decade of evolution, 

this trend culminated in the full “Salafization” or “takfirization” of the ChRI’s ideology and the jihadization 

of its goals, operations, and tactics.2

 With the dissolution of ChRI by its then President Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov in October 2007 and his creation of the 

Caucasus Emirate (CE) in its place, the Salafization 

and jihadization processes were made official.

We can point to a series of factors that for more 

than a decade drove the radicalization and jihadization of the Chechen/Caucasus mujahedin. These factors include: the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement and ideology realized through the 

Internet and other means; brutal Russian warfighting 

and counterinsurgency methods; the North Cauca-
2

sus’s colonial experience at the hands of the Russians; 

the region’s relatively low standard of living and socioeconomic development; corrupt and ineffective local and Russian governance; and, Caucasus customs 

of blood revenge and martial courage. What is clear 

is that the CE is an explicitly self-identified global 

jihadist organization. Somewhat belatedly in May 

2011, the CE was placed on the U.S. State Department’s 

list of specially designated international terrorist 

organizations.

Still, the overwhelming weight of journalistic, 

analytical, and academic work on the violence in the 

North Caucasus tends to avoid mention of the global 

jihad’s role in the region, the attractiveness of jihadism to a consistent portion of youth across the entire 

umma, or the influence of these factors on the CE’s 

ideology, goals, strategy, and tactics. The focus is 

almost always on factors related to Russian responsibility for the generically named violence: the form 

of siloviki brutality, poor governance, and economic 

dependence and limited investment in the region’s 

development. Given this chapter’s purpose of providing a strategic threat assessment of the current CE insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus and its broader 

regional implications, it will focus on the CE’s theoideology, goals, strategies, tactics, and capacity to deliver violence inside Russia. Given the CE’s new place 

within the global jihadi revolutionary alliance, I will 

also look at the CE’s broader strategic regional and 

global security implications.
3

THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE: THEO-IDEOLOGY, 

GOALS, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONAL 

CAPACITY

The CE’s ideology and goals are now defined entirely by the global jihadi revolutionary movement’s 

Salafi takfirism and jihadism. They have broadened 

exponentially to include not only the internationalist aspirations of the global jihadi revolutionary alliance but also an expanded vision of the CE’s territorial claims. Those claims now extend beyond the 

pan-Caucasus goal of the emirate to all of Russia’s 

Muslim lands, defined so broadly as to encompass all 

of Russia for all intents and purposes. Operationally, 

I discuss the CE’s wide range of tactics, including the 

use of the typically jihadi istishkhad, that is, martyrdom or suicide operations.

The CE’s Salafist Theo-Ideology.

The Salafist theo-ideology made serious inroads 

beginning in the inter-war period and reached critical mass in 2002 when a ChRI shura subordinated the 

ChRI constitution to Shariah law, approved a strategy 

of bringing jihad to the entire North Caucasus, and 

appointed the Islamist-oriented Abdul Khalim Sadulaev as Chairman of both the new ruling Madzhlisul Shura’s Shariah Law Committee and the Shariah 

Court, and designated him successor to ChRI president and former Soviet general Aslan Maskhadov.3

With Umarov’s declaration of the CE in October 2007, 

the monopoly of the Salafist theo-ideology and its violent universal jihadism over the North Caucasus mujahedin was fully secured and institutionalized. The 
4

CE’s ideology is now precisely the same Salafist theoideology as that proselytized by AQ and other groups 

in the global jihadi revolutionary alliance (global jihad) and movement. 

The key elements of this theo-ideology are tawhid, 

takfir, jihad, and martyrdom. These principles have 

been elaborated upon in great detail by three successive CE Shariah Court qadis (judges or magistrates). 

Of the three, it was the CE’s first Shariat Court qadi 

“Seifullah” Anzor Astemirov, who most effectively 

propagated the principles of tawhid and takfir. Astemirov, like many of the CE’s young generation of 

leaders, studied Islam abroad in the late 1990s before turning to Salafism and jihadism. Appointed 

by CE amir Umarov as the CE’s qadi in early 2008, 

Astemirov founded the website, Islamdin.com, which 

incorporated his library of foreign Salafi jihadi texts, 

audiotapes, and videos.4

 By then, Islamdin.com and 

the other CE vilaiyats’ websites carried jihadi literature exclusively, including numerous translations of 

the writings of leading radical Saudi, Egyptian, Iraqi, 

and Pakistani jihadist theologians, ideologists, and 

propagandists, including AQ’s Osama bin Laden and 

Ayman al-Zawahiri;5 the American Yemeni-based AQ 

in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Anwar AlAwlaki; and, tens of others.6

 CE sites now post Russian-language summaries and translations of editions 

of and articles from AQ’s English-language journal Inspire and within days of bin Laden’s death published 

at least 15 articles, announcements, and testimonials.7

Among the most prominent of the foreign jihadi 

theo-ideologists who Astemirov featured on Islamdin.com was the Jordanian Sheikh Abu Muhammad 

Asem al-Maqdisi. According to the United States 

Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center 
5

(CTC) among others, Maqdisi is “the most influential 

living Jihadi Theorist” and “the key contemporary 

ideologue in the Jihadi intellectual universe,” and 

his website Minbar al-Jihad wa’l-Tawhid is “al-Qa`ida’s 

main online library” and “very representative of Jihadi literature.”8

 Astemirov and Maqdisi struck up a 

close student-mentor relationship of correspondence 

and consultations that would cement the CE’s alliance 

with AQ and the global jihadi revolutionary movement. Astemirov translated and generously cited 

Maqdisi’s works. Astemirov’s key video lecture “On 

Tawhid” was based on Maqdisi’s Millat Ibrahim (The 

Religion of Abraham), both becoming staples on CE and 

other jihadi websites.9

 Maqdisi’s website began publishing articles about the CE, which were translated 

into Russian and posted on CE sites.10 Maqdisi endorsed the CE in September 2009 as a fervent global 

jihadi organization, praising Astemirov for his Islamic 

knowledge.11 In September 2010 Maqdisi urged Muslims to support the CE, “so the Emirate becomes the 

door to Eastern Europe.”12 Since then, the CE has entered Europe.

The theological elements of tawhid and takfir are 

encoded in Shariah law on the basis of the Koran and 

Sunna as interpreted by true (and self-selected) Salafi 

leaders. They have profound political, economic, and 

operational implications, since they define jihadists’ 

political ideology and goals and thereby their militarily strategy and tactics.13 Tawid, or strict monotheism, 

requires that Muslims worship only Allah; even worship of, or prayers to the Prophet Mohammed are forbidden. This puts the CE’s ideology within the mainstream of global jihadism but decidedly at odds with 

the North Caucasus’s chief Islamic tendency, Sufism, 

which holds a prominent place for prayer to Sufi saints 
6

and teachers, the creation of shrines at their graves, 

and prayers to the Prophet Mohammed. Tawhidism’s 

call to “raise the word” or “raise the religion of Allah 

above all others” influences every aspect of the jihadi 

theo-ideology and political philosophy. It renders 

all other ideologies and identities—democracy, communism, socialism, nationalism, and class or ethnic 

identity—to be sacrilegious. Its exclusivist focus on 

the Deity’s will for guidance in all matters, presupposes the possibility that this will is made privy to the 

movement’s leaders, opening the way to a totalitarian 

monopoly over thought and power. 

Much as international communism’s party of professional revolutionaries were afforded a vanguard 

role in divining what was best for the proletariat, 

under jihadist theo-ideology the power to interpret 

Allah’s will devolves by default to a small coterie of 

leaders (amirs), theologians (ulema and qadis), and 

ideologists among the mujahedin, regarded as the 

most devout and committed of the umma’s Muslims. 

The special knowledge, faith, and commitment of the 

mujahedin vanguard—the amirs and qadis—justify 

their monopoly on the interpretation of the Koran and 

Sunna. According to Astemirov and other jihadists, 

the amirs, advised by Shariah court qadis, possess dictatorial powers to take unilateral decisions on the most 

important questions, such as that taken by Umarov in 

formation of the CE. The CE amir holds the ultimate 

reins in a circular flow of power, as he appoints the 

amirs and qadis for each of its largest substructures—

the CE vilaiyats (from the Arabic word “welaiyat” for 

provinces or governates). The amir cannot be challenged on any decision unless he is deemed by a qadi 

to have deviated from Shariah law as interpreted by 

the qadi whom he has appointed.14 The qadis’ author-
7

ity to advise and confirm the decisions of the amirs 

gives them great power. CE and some vilaiyat qadis 

have passed death sentences, some of which have 

been carried out.15 Not surprisingly then, Astemirov 

and other jihadi leaders regard democratic institutions and primary allegiance to country or nationality as major deviations from monotheism and thus 

sacrilege, even manifestations of nonbelief. Similarly, 

all other philosophies, allegiances or interests that intervene between the all-knowing amirs and qadis and 

their interpretation of the holy texts are forbidden, 

since they undermine Muslims’ unity in their fight 

against nonbelief and, more to the point, undermine 

their monopoly over interpretation of the Koran and 

Sunna, the foundations of Shariah law. Thus, nationalism is rejected as a legitimate ideological basis and is 

regarded as a manifestation of nonbelief, for it places 

the religion of Islam below ethnicity.16

Among Salafists and jihadists violating the principle of tawhid by worshipping these false gods leads 

to what is the second basic building block of the global 

jihad’s and the CE’s theology, takfirism, a trend informed by an extremely exclusivist definition of what 

constitutes true Islam and a real Muslim. The designation of takfir means the excommunication from the 

Islamic religious community and is reserved for those 

Muslims who are deemed to have violated fundamental tenets of Islam, such as tawhid, in accordance with 

Salafist interpretation. Many takfirists hold that those 

ruled apostates may be subject to the death penalty. 

Given the extremist nature of their monotheism, tawhidists and jihadists have a low threshold in deciding 

who should be designated takfir and subjected to the 

harshest of penalties. For Astemirov and the CE, those 

who help the Russian infidel and those who practice 

Sufism are at risk of takfir denunciation.17
8

The iconoclastic nature of the battle between those 

who observe the supposedly true Salafi version of Islam and those who do not, whether Muslim or infidel, 

leads to the jihadist’s third main principle: a kinetic 

rather than contemplative definition of jihad and an 

offensive rather than defensive global jihadism. Rather than Islam’s traditional emphasis on the greater 

jihad of the inner search for faith in Allah, takfirists 

require that all Muslims support to the best of their 

ability an Islamic war against nonbelievers, whether 

Christian, Jew, Hindu, secularist or any other nonMuslim religion, as well as fallen Muslim apostates; 

otherwise, they themselves can be subject to takfir and 

be deemed targets of the jihad. The implication of takfirism is that the world is divided into two camps: the 

takfiri jihadists and everyone else. The catholic nature 

of this schism combines with the general trend toward 

globalization fostered by technology to push Salafists 

towards a global rather than a local vision of jihad. 

Since neither ethnicity nor state borders can trump the 

principle of raising Islam’s word above all others, the 

jihad cannot be confined to specific regions or targeted attacks; it must be carried out globally. Given the 

maximalist, sacred, and twilight nature of the struggle 

between the abode of Islam and the abode of the infidel in the takfirist jihadis’ vision, the jihadists permit themselves rather extremist methods to maximize 

their capacity to attain the goal. Using Islamic holy 

texts’ frequent praise for martyrdom in battle with the 

infidel during the early centuries of Islam’s expansion 

across the Arabian Peninsula and beyond, jihadists 

routinely proselytize, train, and deploy the ultimate 

form of self-sacrificial martyrdom, (istishkhad)—that 

is, suicide operations. The ability to offer one’s life for 

the jihad is incontrovertible evidence of one’s purity 
9

and closeness to Allah.18 The remainder of this chapter 

demonstrates that all of these jihadi tenets have become part and parcel of the CE’s theo-ideology, behavior and aspirations.

The CE’s Goals and Strategic Vision.

The ChRI’s implicitly expanding pan-Caucasus 

ambitions became explicit and institutionalized in October 2007 with Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov’s declaration of the CE.19 Umarov’s declaration of the CE 

claimed not only domain over the entire North Caucasus from the Caspian to Black Seas, but it also included a declaration of jihad against the United States, 

Great Britain, Israel, and any country fighting Muslims anywhere on the globe.20 The unilateral nature of 

this decision, although prompted and supported by 

both foreign jihadists and many North Caucasus mujahedin as well as by their Islamic texts, demonstrates 

the totalitarian essence of the Salafi takfirism. In order to achieve their local emirate, Umarov divided the 

Caucasus mujahedin into some five vilaiyats loosely 

based along the territorial borders of Russia’s North 

Caucasus republics: the Nokchicho (Chechnya) Vilaiyat (NV), the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV); the Galgaiche 

Vilaiyat (GV) covering Ingushetia and North Ossetiya; 

the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya, and Karachai (OVKBK) covering the republics of KabardinoBalkaria (KBR) and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; and, the 

Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat (NSV) covering Krasnodar and 

Stavropol Krais. Except for the NSV, which has never 

been fully developed, each is headed by an amir with 

similar dictatorial powers. The chief theo-ideological 

figure is the vilaiyat’s shariah court qadi. Qadis sometimes are amirs simultaneously.
10

In a May 2011 interview, Umarov again elaborated 

on the CE’s expansive goals: 

We consider the CE and Russia as a single theater of 

war.

We are not in a hurry. The path has been chosen, we

know our tasks, and we will not turn back, Insha’Allah, 

from this path. Today, the battlefield is not just Chechnya and the Caucasus Emirate, but also the whole [of] 

Russia. The situation is visible to everybody who has 

eyes. The Jihad is spreading, steadily and inevitably, 

everywhere.

I have already mentioned that all those artificial 

borders, administrative divisions, which the Taghut 

drew, mean nothing to us. The days when we wanted 

to secede and dreamed of building a small Chechen 

Kuwait in the Caucasus are over. Now, when you tell 

the young Mujahedeen about these stories, they are 

surprised and want to understand how those plans 

related to the Koran and the Sunnah.

Alhamdulillah! I sometimes think that Allah has 

called these young people to the Jihad, so that we, the 

older generation, could not stray from the right path. 

Now we know that we should not be divided, and 

must unite with our brothers in faith. We must reconquer Astrakhan, Idel-Ural, Siberia—these are indigenous Muslim lands. And then, God willing, we shall 

deal with [the] Moscow District. 21

The evidence of the CE’s adoption of the global 

jihad’s universal goals as its very own is overwhelming. Yet, most analysts and activists appear unaware 

or unwilling to acknowledge the fact.22 Umarov has 

repeatedly associated the CE with the global jihad, 

from his announcement declaring the foundation of 
11

the CE and its jihad against anyone fighting against 

Muslims anywhere across the globe to his most recent 

February 2011 “Appeal to the Muslims of Egypt and 

Tunisia.”23 For example, in October 2010, Umarov addressed the global jihad: 

Today, I want to describe the situation in the world because, even if thousands of kilometers separate us, those 

mujahedin who are carrying out Jihad in Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, Kashmir and many, many other places, they 

are our brothers, and we today (with them) are insisting 

on the laws of Allah on this earth. 

He also noted that the CE mujahedin follow the 

Afghani jihad closely by radio and Internet and that 

the Taliban are “opposed by Christian-Zionist forces 

led by America.” In traditional jihadi fashion, Umarov calls jihadism’s enemies “the army of Iblis” or the 

“army of Satan,” uniting “the Americans, who today 

confess Christian Zionism, and European atheists, 

who do not confess any of the religions.” Iblis fight 

so “there will be no abode for Islam (Dar as-Salam)” 

anywhere on earth.24 A leading ideologist for the CE’s 

Ingush mujahedin of its Galgaiche (Ingushetia) Vilaiyat, Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, laid out in detail the 

connection between the CE’s prospective emirate and 

the grander global caliphate:

In the near future we can assume that after the liberation of the Caucasus, Jihad will begin in Idel-Ural 

and Western Siberia. And, of course we will be obligated to assist with all our strength in the liberation 

of our brothers’ lands from the centuries-long infidel 

yoke and in the establishment there of the laws of the 

Ruler of the Worlds. It is also possible that our help 

will be very much needed in Kazakhstan and Central 

Asia, and Allah has ordered us to render it. And we, 
12

Allah willing, will destroy the laws of the infidel on 

the Central Asian lands in league with the mujahedin of Afghanistan. And it is impossible to forget our 

brothers in the Crimea, which is also land occupied by 

non-believers.25

The CE’s top qadi has put it more explicitly and 

concisely: “We are doing everything possible to build 

the Caliphate and prepare the ground for this to the 

extent of our capabilities.”26

Domestic Strategy.

The CE issues few documents indicating their 

strategy. However, some implicit strategic approaches can be sketched from some of its statements and 

propaganda articles. Essentially, the CE is attempting 

to create a revolutionary situation through the establishment of a credible, alternative claim on the sovereign right to rule in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia. This state-building political strategy 

includes: (1) establishing a judicial system based on 

Shariah courts and qadis; (2) enforcement of Shariah 

law through attacks on owners, workers, and patrons 

of gaming, prostitution, drinking, and alcohol-selling 

establishments; (3) tax collection in the form of the Islamic tithe or zakyat to fund CE military, police, and 

judicial functions; and, (4) a more expanded propaganda strategy focused exclusively on proselytizing 

the Salafist theology and jihadist ideology by multiplying the number of CE-affiliated websites.27 Military 

strategy compliments this political strategy, weakening the infidel state and regime by targeting state 

institutions, officials, and personnel—civilian, police, 

military, and intelligence alike.
13

Creating a credible alternative sovereignty requires not simply weakening local branches of the 

present Russian regime and state but also the federal government in Moscow and its affiliates across 

the federation. Combined with the basic homeland 

strategy focused on creating dual sovereignty in the 

Caucasus, there is an effort to expand operations and 

eventually more state-building efforts across Russia, 

using concentrations of Muslim populations in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and elsewhere as platforms 

from which the network could conceivably expand. 

Thus, CE amir Umarov promised to liberate not just 

Krasnodar Krai—part of its still very virtual Nogai 

Steppe Vilaiyat—but also Astrakhan and the entire 

Volga mega-region, which would include Tatarstan, 

Bashkortostan, and other predominantly Muslim 

Tatar-populated regions in Russia’s Volga and Urals 

Federal Districts.28 Simultaneously, attacks like those 

on the Nevskii Express St. Petersburg-Moscow train 

in November 2009, the Moscow subway system in 

March 2010, and Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport in 

January 2011 serve the purpose of terrorizing the Russian elite and population, creating political disunity, 

and undermining the Russian will to fight for the region’s continued inclusion in the federation. 

Operational Capacity and Tactics.

Although the CE is overlooked by most terrorism 

or jihadism experts, its operational capacity puts the 

North Caucasus a distant third among the world’s 

various jihadi fronts behind the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

(AfPak) theatre of AQ including the Taliban and their 

numerous allies in the region, and Yemen. In recent 

years, jihadi-related violence in the North Caucasus 
14

has outstripped that in Iraq. From late October 2007 

through June 2011, CE mujahedin have carried out 

or been involved in approximately 1,800 attacks and 

violent incidents, with an increase in the number of 

attacks/incidents each full year of the CE’s existence, 

2008-10.29 Those 1,800 attacks have killed approximately 1,300 and wounded 2,100 state agents (civilian officials and military, intelligence, and police officials and personnel) and killed 300 and wounded 

800 civilians, for a total of some 4,500 casualties.30 This 

amounts to nearly two attacks/incidents and more 

than three casualties per day. For comparison, for the 

period 2008-10, there were 1,527 U.S./North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) troops killed and 9,703 

U.S./NATO casualties in Afghanistan.31

Like its allies in the global jihadi revolutionary 

movement, the CE has carried out spectacular and horridly effective attacks, in particular tens of istishkhad 

operations—that is, suicide bombing operations. For 

example, in November 2009, the CE, perhaps its Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs Brigade (RSMB), was behind 

the bombing of the Moscow-St. Petersburg Nevskii Express high speed train, which killed 21 and wounded 

74 civilians. The explosion of the train was followed 

by a second as investigators arrived on the scene that 

slightly wounded several officials. In April 2009 amir 

Umarov announced after the CE’s traditional spring 

planning shura that the CE had revived warlord and 

notorious terrorist Shamil Basaev’s RSMB in 2008, and 

that it had already carried out two operations, including the November 2008 suicide bombing of a bus in 

Vladikavkaz, Ingushetia, that killed 14 and wounded 

43 civilians.32 In June 2009, the notorious ethnic BuryatRussian Muslim convert Aleksandr Tikhomirov, a.k.a. 

Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, masterminded the 
15

suicide bombing that severely wounded and nearly 

killed Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov and 

the August 2009 suicide bombing of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) district headquarters in Nazran 

that killed 24 MVD servicemen and wounded approximately 260 people, including 11 children, on the very 

day that Yevkurov returned to Ingushetia after months 

of hospitalization. Based with the CE’s GV mujahedin 

and RSMB, Buryatskii wrote prolifically about the importance of istishkhad operations and his preparation 

with RSMB suicide bombers.33 The equally notorious 

‘Seifullah Gubdenskii’ Magomedali Vagabov, CE DV 

amir and CE qadi in 2010 until his demise in August 

of that year, organized the double suicide bombing of 

the Moscow Metropolitan subway in March 2010 that 

killed 40 and wounded 101 civilians, including some 

10 traveling foreigners. (Both Buryatskii and Vagabov 

received Islamic education abroad before turning to 

jihad; the former—in Egypt, Yemen and perhaps Saudi Arabia; the latter in Pakistan.) On amir Umarov’s 

orders, the CE’s RSMB prepared and dispatched 20-

year old Ingush Magomed Yevloev from Ingushetia 

to carry out the January 2011 suicide attack in the international terminal of Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport that killed 37 and wounded 180.34 In total, the CE 

has carried out some 36 suicide attacks since CE amir 

Umarov revived the RSMB: 1 in 2008, 16 in 2009, 14 

in 2010, and 5 during the first 6 months of 2011. Istishkhad bombing operations are a distinct symptom 

of the CE’s global jihadist theo-ideology and a symbol of its alliance with the global jihadi revolutionary 

movement.
16

THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE AND THE GLOBAL 

JIHADI REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

The CE’s jihadization of the Chechen and North 

Caucasus insurgency, in particular its alliance with 

the global jihadi revolutionary movement, imparts it 

strategic importance. The process of the Salafization 

of the ChRI’s ranks was a long process and was driven 

by both the external influence of jihadist groups and 

the weak but nevertheless existing Salafist elements 

in the North Caucasus. The connections between AQ 

and the ChRI were common knowledge by the late 

1990s among U.S. Government officials, intelligence 

analysts, and terrorism experts.35 It was well-known 

and well-documented as early as the mid-1990s, for 

example, that the notorious Abu Ibn al-Khattab was 

an AQ operative and fought in the North Caucasus. 

The declassified Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) 

Swift Knight Report documents not just Khattab’s deep 

involvement, but also that of AQ and Osama bin Laden personally with the ChRI in the mid-1990s.36

After the visit by Basaev and his ethnic Circassian 

or Akhaz fighters to Afghanistan, other radical nationalist and Sufi Chechen and Caucasus leaders followed 

with visits to bin Laden. An important but often overlooked DIA document details the results of some of 

those visits occurring in 1997. Thus, “several times in 

1997 in Afghanistan bin Laden met with representatives of Movlady (Movladi) Udugov’s party ‘Islamic 

Way’ (Islamskii Put’) and representatives of Chechen 

and Dagestani Wahhabites from Gudermes, Grozny, 

and Karamakhi.”37 Udugov would become the chief 

ideologist and propagandist for both the ChRI and 

CE for a decade or more. The village of Karamakhi 

would be the locus of one of the self-declared Salafi 
17

Islamic states that popped up intermittently in the late 

1990s and the focal point of Khattab’s, Basaev’s, and 

Bagautdin’s incursions and ultimate full-scale invasion of Dagestan in July and August 1999 that kicked 

off the second post-Soviet Russo-Chechen war. The 

result of this local-global nexus rooted in a common 

theo-ideology, mutual training camps, and overlapping personnel was a gradual but significant spread 

of Salafism and exclusionary takfirism among young 

Muslims across the Caucasus, creating an unprecedented recruitment pool for both the local and global 

jihads.

AQ and the Caucasus Islamic separatists agreed to 

create a jihadist movement and insurgency across Russia with AQ supplying funding, training, and fighters 

towards the goal of attacking Russians and Westerners. AQ money funded the establishment of training 

camps in Chechnya and Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, a 

steady supply of trainers for those camps, and fighters who spread out across Chechnya and the North 

Caucasus bringing the message of Salfism and global 

jihadism to the ChRI insurgents and their still very 

few allies in other North Caucasus regions such as the 

Republic of Dagestan and the Republic of KabardinoBalkaria (KBR).38 The DIA document details AQ’s 

plans for the North Caucasus and Russia’s Muslims: 

[R]adical Islamic (predominantly Sunni) regimes are 

to be established and supported everywhere possible, including Bosnia, Albania, Chechnya, Dagestan, 

the entire North Caucasus ”from sea to sea”, Central 

Asian republics, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, all of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and the 

states of the Persian Gulf. Terrorist activities are to be 

conducted against Americans and Westerners, Israe-
18

lis, Russians (predominantly Cossacks), Serbs, Chinese, Armenians, and disloyal Muslims. . . .

Special attention should be given to the Northern Caucasus, and especially Chechnya since they are regarded as areas unreachable by strikes from the West. The 

intent is to create a newly developed base for training 

terrorists. Amir Khattab and nine other militants of 

Usam Ben (sic) Laden were sent there with passports 

of Arab countries. They work as military instructors in 

Khattab’s three schools; they also work as instructors 

in the army of Chechnya. Two more schools are being 

organized in Ingushetiya and Dagestan.39

“’Volunteers’ from ben Laden’s ‘charity societies’ from 

Pakistan and Afghanistan” went to Chechnya and the 

Northern Caucasus for a “new round of jihad against 

Cossacks and Russia.”40

These AQ-affilitated “charity societies” ensured a 

steady flow of AQ funds, Salafist Wahhabi literature, 

and equipment to the region. The DIA’s Swift Knight 

Report, as well as numerous trial transcripts, document 

the support rendered by the AQ-affiliated Benevolent 

International Foundation (BIF) and Al-Haramain to 

the ChRI or at least its radical wing beginning in the 

early 1990s.41 The U.S. criminal prosecution of BIF 

for supporting terrorist activity reveals much about 

the AQ-BIF-ChRI connection. AQ used BIF for “the 

movement of money to fund its operations” and the 

support of “persons trying to obtain chemical and 

nuclear weapons on behalf of AQ,” and BIF funded 

and supplied the Chechen separatist mujahedin before, during, and after the first Chechen-Russian war 

before Moscow forced BIF to shut down its operations 

in Russia.42 AQ ruling Majlisul Shura member Seif 

al-Islam al-Masry was an officer in BIF’s Grozny of-
19

fice, which moved to Ingushetia in 1998.43 A BIF officer “had direct dealings with representatives of the 

Chechen mujahideen (guerrillas or freedom fighters) 

as well as Hezb i Islami, a military group operating in 

Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.”44 BIF’s work with Hezb 

i Islami in Azerbaijan was likely related to AQ’s corridor to the North Caucasus noted in the DIA document. BIF worked to provide the Chechen mujahedin 

with recruits, doctors, medicine, “money, an X-ray 

machine, and anti-mine boots, among other things.”45

Beginning around 2000, the pro-Khattab and likely 

AQ-backed website, Qoqaz.net (Qoqaz is Arabic for 

Caucasus) sought funders and recruits for the Chechen 

jihad. Qoqaz.net, Qoqaz.co.uk, Webstorage.com/~azzam, 

and Waaqiah.com were created and supported by the 

AQ-affiliated Azzam Publications run by Babar Ahmad, both based in London. Azzam Publications produced numerous video discs featuring the terrorist 

attacks carried out by Khattab and Basaev as well as 

other ChRI operations.46 According to the U.S. indictment of Ahmad, through Azzam he 

provided, through the creation and use of various 

internet websites, email communication, and other 

means, expert advice and assistance, communications equipment, military items, currency, monetary 

instruments, financial services, personnel designed 

to recruit and assist the Chechen Mujahideen and the 

Taliban, and raise funds for violent jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other places.” 

Azzam’s web sites were created for communicating 

with: (1) “members of the Taliban, Chechen Mujahideen, and associated groups;” (2) others “who sought 

to support violent jihad” by providing “material support;” (3) individuals who wished to join these groups, 
20

“solicit donations,” and arrange money transfers; and, 

(4) those who sought to purchase “videotapes depicting violent jihad in Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, 

and other lands of jihad, and the torture and killing 

of captured Russian troops.” Videotapes, including 

those eulogizing dead fighters, were intended to help 

and indeed were used to solicit donations for the jihad 

in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Ahmad also assisted 

terrorists to secure temporary residence in London, 

and to travel to Afghanistan and Chechnya in order to 

participate in jihad. He also assisted terrorists in procuring “camouflage suits; global positioning system 

(GPS) equipment; and, other materials and information.” Ahmad even put Shamil Basaev in touch with 

an individual who had traveled to the United States 

in order to raise money and purchase footwarmers for 

the ChRI fighters.47

Documents found in BIF’s trash revealed that 42 

percent of its budget was spent on Chechnya. During 

a 4-month period in 2000, BIF funneled $685,000 to 

Chechnya in 19 wire bank transfers through the Georgian Relief Association (GRA) in Tbilisi and various 

BIF accounts across the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), according to Citibank records introduced to the court. The GRA was actually a BIF front 

organization and was run by the brother of Chechen 

field commander Chamsoudin Avraligov, who was 

operating in AQ’s training camp in Georgia’s Pankisi 

Gorge.48 Given that BIF was able to function in Russia 

for nearly a decade, claims made by Russian officials 

that AQ sent tens of millions of dollars to the North 

Caucasus mujahedin are plausible. One expert claims 

that AQ has funneled $25 million to the Chechen resistance including a one-time contribution in 2000 of 

$2 million, four Stinger missiles, 700 plastic explosive 
21

packs amounting to over 350 kilograms, remote detonators, and medical supplies.49 Basaev acknowledged 

in a 2004 interview receiving funds from international 

Islamists “on a regular basis,” perhaps understating 

the amount he received that year at some $20 thousand.50 Despite the crackdown on Saudi-sponsored 

and AQ-tied foundations like the BIF and the deaths 

of Khattab in 2003 and Basaev in 2006, both the ChRI 

and then its successor organization the CE continued 

to receive foreign funding from Middle Eastern contributions funneled through foreign and AQ-tied mujahedin through 2010.51

There were two principal figures involved in leading AQ’s work in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: 

Khattab, who turned high-ranking ChRI warlord and 

Prime Minister Shamil Basaev to Salafi global jihadism 

and together with him ran training camps and numerous operations, and Abu Sayif, who headed the Saudi 

BIFs office in Grozny before the second war and ran 

communications and the transport of supplies, fighters, and funding from AQ to the Caucasus. Upon arriving in the Caucasus, Khattab linked up with Shamil 

Basaev, a notorious terrorist in Chechnya, and married 

the sister of Nadir Khachilaev, the leader of the Union 

of the Muslims of Russia (Soyuz musul’man Rossii) and 

an ethnic Lak from Dagestan.52 By so cementing his 

connection to a pan-Russian Islamist organization and 

to Dagestan, Khattab was clearly using a standard AQ 

approach of imbedding into the local social fabric in 

the service of highjacking local Muslim nationalist and 

Islamic movements for the global jihadi movement. 

Excluding Khattab, AQ operative Abu Sayif, who 

worked in the Chechen Foreign Ministry under Movladi Udugov in the inter-war years, played the most 

important role in developing AQ’s presence in Chech-
22

nya and the North Caucasus. Sayif coordinated the 

travel route, which was used to route volunteers and 

drug trafficking, and Sayif and Khattab were the only 

ones permitted to know the real names of the foreign 

volunteers. A travel route from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Chechnya, via Azerbaijan and Turkey, was established. The first group of some 25 “Afghan Arabs” 

arrived in Khattab’s Vedeno camp in June 1998. Some 

were to pass through Tatarstan on their way to Central Asian Republics, where they were supposed to 

create “Wahhabite and Taliban cells, spreading terror 

against U.S., Russian, and other Western officials and 

businessmen.”53 It is now common knowledge that the 

lead perpetrator of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, Mohammed Atta, was on his way to Chechnya 

when he was sent to Germany and later the United 

States. Rohan Gunaratna claims that already by 1995, 

there were some 300 Afghan Arabs fighting in Chechnya against the Russians. They were joined by mujahedin from Bosnia and Azerbaidzhan.54 Thus, there 

were perhaps as many as 500 foreign fighters in the 

North Caucasus on the eve of the Khattab-Basaev-led 

invasion of Dagestan. Indeed, the nexus of Dagestan, 

Karamakhi, bin Laden, and Khattab’s and Basaev’s 

Chechnya training camps draws a straight line from 

AQ in Afghanistan to the second post-Soviet RussoChechen war and the ChRI’s expansion of operations 

across the North Caucasus.

Not only did AQ mujahedin fight in the North 

Caucasus during the ChRI struggle but North Caucasus mujahedin fought on other fronts in the global 

jihad during the same time frame. Two ethnic Kabardins from KBR were among eight ethnic Muslims 

from regions both in the North Caucasus and Volga 

area captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2001 
23

fighting among the Taliban and AQ and sent to the 

Guantanamo Bay prison camp in 2002.55 A brief official CE biography of late Dagestani amir and CE 

qadi Magomed Vagabov (a.k.a. Seifullah Gubdenskii) 

shows that in 2001-02 some members of his Gubden 

Jamaat went to Afghanistan after the rout of the joint 

Chechen-Dagestani-foreign jihadi force that invaded 

Dagestan in August 1999. Among those Gubden Jamaat members who went to Afghanistan was its then 

amir Khabibullah, who became the amir of “a Russian-speaking jamaat of AQ.”56 More recently, some 

members of the DV-tied cell, that was uncovered in 

the Czech Republic and discussed below, were at one 

time based in Germany and underwent training in Afghanistan and Pakistan.57 We also know that the Tatar 

jihadi “Bulgar Jamaat,” made up mostly of ethnic Tatars who made the hijra from Russia and now based 

in Waziristan, Pakistan, has declared jihad against 

Russia and stated that it includes “Dagestanis, Russians, Kabardins” and has carried out operations in 

Afghanistan.58

If one prefers to narrow the issue to Chechens, Bryan Glynn Williams claims that after extensive travel 

across Afghanistan, he was unable to find evidence 

that even one Chechen fighter ever fought there.59 But 

there have been numerous reports of Chechens fighting not just in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq against 

U.S. forces.60 In 2003, Indian police uncovered an AQ 

cell led by a Chechen planning to assassinate Vice 

Admiral V. J. Metzger, commander-in-chief of the 

U.S. Seventh Fleet, forcing the admiral’s trip to India to be cancelled.61 Every officer and junior officer 

with whom I have had the pleasure of speaking has 

claimed that he encountered a Chechen presence in 

both Afghanistan and Iraq. Almost all of these officers 
24

spoke some Russian. It is certainly true that some of 

these testimonials are cases of mistaken identity, taking Russian-speaking Central Asians for Chechens. 

But it simply strains credulity to believe that not a 

single Chechen has fought in Afghanistan, when we 

have seen that Americans, Germans, other Westerners, Central Asians, Tatars, Kabardins, and Dagestanis 

have been there. 

These are a few examples of CE ties to other fronts 

in the global jihad. In the same month that the CE was 

formed (October 2007), the Lebanese government arrested four Russian citizens, including three ethnic 

North Caucasians (one from Dagestan), who were 

charged with belonging to Fatah-el-Islam, fighting 

in northern Lebanon that summer, and carrying out 

terrorist attacks against Lebanese servicemen while 

participating in an armed revolt in the Nahr el-Barid 

Palestinian refugee camp. Along with 16 Palestinians, 

they formed a Fatah cell.62 According to a recent report by Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee, 

a Kabardin, who allegedly was recently fighting in 

Lebanon, returned home and was killed in Nalchik.63

Thus, there have been some, but very few Chechen 

or other North Caucasus mujahedin who have fought 

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other fronts of the global 

jihad. The Chechen and then Caucasus mujahedin’s 

operational connections with, and influence on the 

more central fronts of the global jihad are evident. 

However, these connections are less than robust and 

of limited strategic significance, with the caveat that 

a small number of well-funded and capable terrorists 

can do great damage, as we saw on 9/11. Neither the 

ChRI nor the CE ever declared themselves AQ in the 

Caucasus or North Caucasus. But the close ties that 

developed between the ChRI and AQ beginning in the 
25

inter-war period meant that the ChRI units and camps 

of foreign fighters and their local allies led by Khattab and Basaev became AQ’s de facto, unofficial North 

Caucasus affiliate and a key, if relatively weak, front 

in the global jihad. The AQ-tied foreign fighters, many 

of whom settled down and even married in Chechnya 

and other North Caucasus republics after the second 

war, were in large part responsible for the growing 

influence of jihadist ideologies in the region and fundamentally altered the nature of what began as a secessionist struggle for Chechen independence; this is 

precisely what AQ had counted on when it infiltrated 

the ChRI.

AQ’s intervention and the growing influence of the 

global jihadi revolutionary movement led the radical 

Chechen national separatist movement down a path 

traversed by many such movements across the Muslim world in recent decades. In the Caucasus, especially Dagestan, they mixed with the very limited indigenous history of Salfism and significant contemporary 

flood of young Caucasus Muslims to study abroad in 

the Middle East and South Asia, on the one hand, and 

of Wahhabi and other Salafi teachings from there to 

the Caucasus through the Internet on the other. In the 

18th and certainly by the 19th centuries, Salafism was 

brought in from abroad by Caucasians like Mukhamad Al-Kuduki after travels in Egypt and Yemen introduced him to scholars like Salikh al-Yamani.64 The 

revival of this relatively recent, if thin, Salafi Islamist 

usable past, along with the national myths during the 

perestroika and post-perestroika periods, yielded the 

rehabilitation and of the 19th century imams and religious teachers who led the gazavats against Russian 

rule teachers.65 But the nationalist ideas and cadres 

were gradually displaced by jihadist elements, trans-
26

forming the secular movement into a jihadist one. This 

process was increasingly legitimized and gained momentum as Islamic elements were incorporated into 

the ChRI proto-state and foreign Salafists, Wahabbis, 

and other Islamic extremists continued to infiltrate 

the movement throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 

bringing finances, guerrilla and terrorist training and, 

most importantly, a new jihadist ideo-theological orientation. The Salafist historical myth and related historical figures served as models for some local Salafists, who played key roles in the ChRI’s incomplete 

Islamization even before 2007.66

The combination of AQ and other foreign Salafi intervention, a usable indigenous Salafi historical myth, 

and locals studying Islam abroad influenced a small 

but highly motivated group of Islamist and ultimately 

jihadist leaders across the North Caucasus. Beginning 

in the early 1990s, thousands of Muslims from Russia traveled abroad to receive Islamic education in 

Islamic schools which were experiencing the rise of 

a significant global jihadi revolutionary movement. 

They returned home with Wahhabist and other forms 

of Salafist zeal for jihad and a strong sense of kinship 

with radical Islamists and mujahedin in Afghanistan, 

Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere. Three young, foreigneducated Muslims—”Sefullah” Anzor Astemirov, 

Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii (Aleksandr Tikhomirov), and “Seifullah Gubdenskii” Magomedali 

Vagabov—joined the ChRI’s jihadi wing or later the 

CE and rose quickly up the CE’s ranks, driving its expanding jihad on three main fronts outside Chechnya: 

Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KBR.

In the early 1990s, the foreign-educated Dagestani 

Salafist Ahmad-Kadi Akhtaev taught the first important post-Soviet Dagestani jihadi theo-ideologists, Ma-
27

gomed Tegaev and Bagautdin Magomedov (Kebedov), 

and the two leading ethnic Kabard jihadists, Musa 

Mukozhev and “Seifullah” Anzor Astemirov, both of 

whom studied abroad as well. Astemirov would play 

a key role in the formation of a small cadre of jihadi 

fighters in the KBR, in Umarov’s decision to form the 

CE and jettison the ChRI Chechen nationalist project, 

and in the development of the CE’s relationship with 

Jordanian Sheikh Maqdisi and thus the global jihadi 

revolutionary movement. In the mid-1990s, as one of 

the leading students at a madrassah run by the official 

Muslim Spiritual Administration (DUM) of the KBR, 

Astemirov was one among many sent by the DUM to 

study Islam abroad in an unknown higher education 

religious school in Saudi Arabia.67 This set him and 

many other young Muslims from the KBR on the path 

of Islamism and ultimately jihadism.68 In summer 

2005 Mukozhev and Astemirov met with Basaev, and 

they agreed that they would transform their Islamist 

Jamaat of KBR into the ChRI North Caucasus Front’s 

Kabardino-Balkaria Sector (KBS) on the condition that 

Sadulaev and Basaev saw through to the end the formation of a pan-Caucasus jihadi organization like the 

future CE based on a strict takfirist interpretation of 

Shariah law. In addition to this and his abovementioned role as CE qadi, Astemirov’s organizational efforts as amir of the CE’s OVKBK resulted in its becoming the CE’s second most operationally active vilaiyat 

in 2010, ahead of Chechnya’s NV and Ingushetia’s 

GV.69

Sheikh Buryatskii is representative of an even 

more disturbing transformation which shows that one 

does not need to be a victim of Russian brutality and 

bad governance or the product of the Caucasus traditions of martial violence and blood revenge to join the 
28

Caucasus jihad and that the jihadist theo-ideology is 

by itself a substantial driver of jihadism in the region. 

As his jihadi nom de guerre suggests, Buryatskii was 

part ethnic Buryat, a Mongol and traditionally Buddhist ethnic group, and part ethnic Russian. Born as 

Aleksandr Tikhomirov in 1982, he lived in far away 

Ulan-Ude, the capitol of Russia’s republic of Buryatia. His mother was Russian and Orthodox Christian; 

his father was an ethnic Buryat and Buddhist. 70 Buryatskii studied at a Buddhist datsan, but at age 15 he 

converted to Islam. He moved to Moscow and then to 

Bugurslan, Orenburg where he studied at the Sunni 

madrasah, Rasul Akram. Buryatskii then studied 

Arabic at the Saudi-supported Fajr language center 

in 2002-05 before traveling to Egypt to study Islamic 

theology at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University as well as 

under several authoritative sheikhs in Egypt, Kuwait 

and, according to Russian prosecutors, Saudi Arabia.71

Buryatskii himself reveals what his education in the 

core of an umma plagued by global jihadi revolutionary ideology taught him: 

At one time when I was in Egypt at the lecture of one 

of the scholars, who openly said to us: “Do you really think that you can so simply spread the Allah’s 

religion without the blood of martyrs?! The disciples 

of Allah’s prophet spilt the blood of martyrs on many 

lands, and Islam bloomed on their blood!”72

Running afoul of the Egypt’s secret services, Buryatskii returned to Russia.73 Buryatskii left for the Caucasus jihad in May 2008.74

Assigned by Umarov to the CE’s GV in Ingushetia, 

the fervent Buryatskii became a recruiting draw. In 

2009, Buryatskii was the CE’s main, if fatal, attraction 

and its most effective propagandist and operative, 
29

showing shades of the charisma and ruthlessness for 

which Shamil Basaev became infamous. His articles 

detailing his mentoring of RSMB suicide bombers and 

his video lectures propagandizing jihadism and the 

importance of istshkhad drew new forces to the CE’s 

once relatively quiet Ingush mujahedin. Buryatskii’s 

activity was perhaps the main factor making the CE’s 

GV the most operationally capacious of its vilaiyats in 

2008-09, leading in the number of attacks both years.75

Thus, there is a direct line between Buryatskii’s Islamic conversion and study abroad to the explosion of 

terrorism in Ingushetia during 2008-09. Buryatskii is 

but one of several ethnic Russian and Slavic converts 

to Islam from outside Russia’s Muslim republics who 

have become prominent CE terrorists in recent years, 

including Pavel Kosolapov, Vitalii Razdobudko, Maria Khorsheva, and Viktor Dvorakovskii.76

In contrast to Astemirov and Buryatskii, Vagabov 

was influenced by Pakistani Salafism. After studying 

Islam locally in Dagestan, he began to work with missionaries of the peaceful Pakistan-based international 

Salafist sect Tabligh Jamaat in Dagestan. His native 

Gubden District was declared the Tablighists’ center 

for the call to the Tabligh in Russia. Vagabov then 

traveled in 1994 to Raiwand, Pakistan, the center of 

the Tabligh Jamaat movement, and studied there for 

several months in a madrassah learning the Koran by 

heart and receiving the diploma of a khafiz. Traveling 

on to Karachi, he studied the fundamentals of Shariah 

law apparently both at university and privately with 

sheikhs and became an adherent of Salafism and the 

writings of imam Abul Hasan Al-Ashari, Al-Ibana, 

and Risalyatu ila Aglyu Sagr-Vibabil Abvab. Vagabov 

returned home in 1997, opened the School of Khafiz 

in Gubden to courses on the hadiths, and traveled to 
30

Chechnya where he met with Khattab and underwent 

military training in the AQ-funded camps. He fought 

for the Salafis, who declared an independent Islamic 

state in Karamakhi and two other Dagestani villages 

in 1998, and in the 1999 Khattab-Basaev invasion of 

Dagestan that kicked off the second Chechen war.77 In 

the 2000s, Vagabov rose up the ranks of the ChRI’s 

Dagestani Front and then the CE’s DV. He played a 

lead role in building up the DV’s dominant Central 

Sector, which has made Dagestan the locus of the 

highest number of attacks of any Russian region since 

April 2010. Vagabov also organized the pivotal March 

2010 Moscow subway suicide bombings carried out by 

the respective wives of his predecessor and successor 

as DV amir. In June 2010, Umarov appointed him as 

the DV’s amir, and Astemirov’s successor as the CE’s 

qadi.78 Vagabov’s biography draws a direct line from 

the umma’s global jihadi revolutionary movement and 

radical Pakistani madrassahs, mosques, and universities to the rise of the Dagestani jihad within the overall 

CE and to terrorism in Moscow itself with the Moscow 

subway bombing among others. Although Astemirov, 

Vagabov, and Buryatskii were killed in 2010, by then 

each had left their mark on the CE’s expansion across 

the Caucasus and transformation into a viable jihadist 

project allied with the global jihadi revolutionary alliance inspired by AQ and its takfirist theo-ideology.

As AQ and the global jihadi revolutionary alliance 

have evolved into a more decentralized network of 

jihadi groups, interacting increasingly for theo-ideological sustenance, funding, training, and operational 

planning through the Internet rather than directly, 

the CE integrated into the AQ’s wider network of 

jihadi websites. In this way, it developed relationships with jihadi leaders and philosophers such as 
31

Maqdisi, mentioned earlier, and AQ in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) and Anwar Al-Awlaki. The AQaffiliated website, Ansar al-Mujahideen (www.ansar1.

info/), is used to recruit fighters and raise funds for the 

CE by those involved in the Belgian plot uncovered 

last autumn and is closely linked to AQ. The Ansar 

al-Mujahideen network is typically regarded as a selfstarted jihadi and pro-AQ site that helps propagandize and recruit for the global jihad and AQ.79 Ansar al 

Mujahideen’s English-language forum’s (AMEF) leading personality was “Abu Risaas” Samir Khan until 

mid-2010 when he turned up working with Awlaki in 

AQAP.80 The Virginian Zachary Adam Chasser, alias 

Abu Talhah al-Amriki, in prison for assisting the Somalian AQ affiliate Al-Shabaab, also participated in 

AMEF.81 Ansar al Mujahideen’s German-language sister site is closely associated with the Global Islamic 

Media Front (GIMF), which also has produced several 

operatives arrested for involvement in AQ terrorism 

plots.82 The Taliban has authorized the Ansar al-Mujahideen network as one of three entities that may publish its official statements, and Ansar al-Mujahideen’s 

founder noted “we have brothers from Chechnya and 

Dagestan.”83

In December 2010, Ansar al-Mujahideen announced 

“the Start of a New Campaign in Support of the Caucasus Emirate,” signaling a request for fighters and 

funds for the CE and emphasizing: “We ask Allah to 

make this year a year of constant discord and increasing enmity for the enemies of the Islamic Emirate of 

the Caucasus.” The announcement welcomed emerging signs of jihadism in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, 

asking Allah for “a new generation of scholars” to replace Astemirov, Buryatskii, and AQ operative Omar 

al-Sayif, all mentioned by name.84 Ansar al-Mujahedeen
32

soon partnered with Astemirov’s and the CE OVKBK’s 

Islamdin.com to create a new Russian-language global 

jihadi website (al-ansar.info) no later than July 2010.85

In August, the webmaster of Ansar al-Mujahideen, an 

ethnic Moroccan named Faisal Errai, was arrested in 

Spain. Spanish authorities also reported that the website was already raising money for terrorists in Chechnya and Afghanistan.86 The Russian-language Al-Ansar.info was set up to “highlight news summaries of 

the Jihad on all fronts, both in the Caucasus and in 

all other lands of the fight” and publish old and new 

works of scholars of the “ahli sunny ual’ jama’a.” The 

fact that it contains primarily Russian-language but 

also English-language content suggests, along with 

other factors, that AQAP’s Awlaki may be a driving 

force behind the Ansar al-Mujahideen network of which 

Al-Ansar.info is a part. Thus, Islamdin.com’s announcement of the joint project with the Ansar al-Mujahideen

network extensively quotes Awlaki (who otherwise 

retains a high profile on CE sites) on the value of being a “jihadist of the internet.”87 Islamdin.com posted 

the first part of Awlaki’s Al-Janna the day after this 

announcement, and CE websites continue to post Awlaki’s works.88 With the CE tied into the global jihadi 

revolutionary alliance and once again plugged into 

the AQ-affiliated Internet network, it was just a matter 

of time before it developed a more international role.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

IMPLICATIONS

The CE’s more expansive aspirations and growing ties with the global jihad revolutionary movement 

have been accompanied by closer propaganda and operational ties to jihadists in other regions of Russia, the 
33

former Soviet Union, other fronts in the global jihad 

and, per Maqdisi’s call, even Europe. Moreover, there 

are even broader strategic implications impinging on 

both international and U.S. national security.

To the Volga and Beyond.

Aside from the abovementioned train, subway, 

and airport attacks in and around Moscow, the CE 

is involved in several projects inside Russia far beyond the virtual emirate’s supposed borders. But the 

CE also has plans to expand operations beyond Russia. Already in January 2006, Basaev warned that by 

summer, the ChRI’s combat jamaat network would 

“cross the Volga,” suggesting expansion to Tatarstan, 

Bashkortostan, and likely beyond.89 In June 2006, then 

ChRI amir Umarov issued a decree creating Volga 

and Urals Fronts, hoping to expand operations to 

Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and other ethnic Tatar and 

Bashkir communities across Russia.90 Through 2009 

there was much CE propaganda targeting Tatars and 

Bashkirs but few jihadi deeds. A group called Islamic Jamaat was uncovered in 2007, but there was no 

evidence that it had CE ties.91 Rather, the group may 

have been the predecessor of the allegedly CE-tied 

so-called Oktyabrskii Jamaat uncovered in 2010, both 

of which could have been connected to the so-called 

Uighur-Bulgar Jamaat (UBJ), which may be one and 

the same as the abovementioned Bulgar Jamaat, fighting with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan.92 The UBJ, like the Bulgar Jamaat, is Tatardominated and adheres to the ideology of resettling 

in order to fight the infidel (at-Takfir Val Khidzhra). 

Several alleged operatives from the UBJ were arrested 

in Bashkortostan in August 2008 after a shootout with 
34

Bashkir police in Salavat, Bashkortostan. They went 

on trial in April 2009 for allegedly planning terrorist 

attacks in the republic. According to Bashkir authorities, the UBJ was founded by Bashkiriya native Pavel 

Dorokhov, who underwent training in al-Qaeda and 

Taliban camps.93

More recently, during 2010 and early 2011, several 

arrests of alleged mujahedin with ties to the CE have 

been made and the first apparent jihadi attacks occurred in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Astrakhan.94

This suggests that the CE may indeed be expanding 

operations to these key Muslim communities. In addition, this past winter a group from Tatarstan and/or 

Bashkortostan appealed to Umarov to recognize their 

self-declared Idel-Ural Vilaiyat (IUV) and provide 

financial and other assistance in setting up training 

camps in the southern Ural Mountains and in organizing attacks.95 As of mid-summer 2011, there had been 

no public response by Umarov, though clandestine assistance cannot be ruled out. The UBJ/Bulgar Jamaat 

also could be playing a role in these possible efforts by 

these Tatars and Bashkirs. Bringing Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Astrakhan would help form a bridgehead to Siberia, the Far East, and Central Asia. Gaining a foothold in ethnic Bashkir and especially Tatar 

communities in these regions would vastly expand the 

CE’s pool of potential recruits and geographical reach 

into both Russia and Central Asia, since Tatar communities can be found in almost all of Russia’s provincial 

capitals, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, and 

in Central Asia. Expansion along these lines would 

further tax Russian resources, already burdened by 

massive federal subsidies to the North Caucasus. Although it is unlikely that the CE will achieve substantial progress in expanding to a permanent presence in 
35

the Volga, Urals, or Siberian regions, the ChRI’s and 

CE’s record in expanding operations across the North 

Caucasus argues against complacency. Few expected 

that Ingushetia rather than Chechnya would be the 

center of gravity of the jihadi in 2008 and 2009, or that 

Dagestan and KBR would supersede both Vainakh 

republics in the number of jihadi operations in 2010. 

Even a small IUV enterprise could significantly complicate Moscow’s coordination problems, given some 

creativity and modest resources on the part of the mujahedin.

More disturbing is the threat posed by the CE mujahedin to the 2014 Olympic Games to be held in the 

North Caucasus resort city of Sochi, Krasnodar. The 

area comes under the CE’s NSV, which is responsible 

for Russia’s Krasnodar and Stavropol regions but it 

has not demonstrated much of an existence no less capacity, with a caveat: Recent suicide operations, failed 

and successful, have involved ethnic Russian Islamic 

converts from Stavropol. The advantage that less conspicuous ethnic Russian mujahedin might offer in an 

operation targeting Sochi raises red flags. These same 

ethnic Russian mujahedin’s ties to the most capacious 

of the CE’s vilaiyats, the DV, raise more concerns.96

Not only have the Dagestani mujahedin carried out 

the highest number of operations each month since 

April 2011, but the DV has also led in the number of 

suicide bombings and created its own Riyadus Salikhiin Jamaat (RSJ).97 In August 2010, Dagestani mujahedin issued an explicit promise of “operations in 

Sochi and across Russia and more ‘surprises’ from the 

horror of which you will blacken.”98 The CE’s OVKBK 

mujahedin also might be involved in an attack on the 

Sochi Games. Its field of operations, the republics of 

KBR and lesser so Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (KChR), 
36

are geographically closer to Sochi than is Dagestan.99

In February 2011, the OVKBK carried out a series coordinated attacks against the winter ski resort area 

around Mt. Elbrus. The entire operation resembled 

a training operation for an attack on Sochi, and the 

OVKBK warned it would continue to fight infidel Russian development efforts and international culture in 

the region.100 Thus, CE plans for Sochi could include 

a joint DV-OVKBK operation or separate ones by the 

DV and OVKBK with built-in redundancy, utilizing 

ethnic Russian suicide bombers. The possibility that 

the CE might strike at the Sochi Games, an international target, is strengthened by its active support for 

the global jihadi revolutionary alliance’s goals.

The Eurasian Horizon.

There already are connections between the CE 

and other post-Soviet jihadists. At the most general 

level, mujahedin from Central Asian states, Azerbaijan, and even Georgia, have turned up among the CE 

mujahedin, but the reverse has not been true, putting 

aside the CE’s use of Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge as a rear 

base. The CE has declared not only all Muslim lands 

in Russia, but also the entire Caucasus as its rightful 

domain.101 In the Caucasus writ large, Azerbaijan, bordering and having some ethnic and Islamic overlap 

with Dagestan, the present spearhead of the CE’s activity, is most vulnerable to CE penetration. Its Islamic 

population includes nationalities such as the Lezgins, 

who straddle the Azerbaijani-Dagestan border and are 

an important nationality in Dagestan. As noted above, 

the ChRI, AQ, and its affiliated charity societies used 

Azerbaijan as a transit point for funneling funds, cadres, and weapons to Chechnya in the 1990s. The CE also 
37

seems to be taking note. Recent incursions south by 

likely CE mujahedin into northern Azerbaijan as well 

as jihadist activity in Baku suggest mujahedin could 

threaten this strategically important state.102 Recently, 

the DV added an Azerbaijan Jamaat with unidentified 

locale and goals.103 The CE’s capacious vanguard DV 

puts Umarov within striking range of international 

and U.S. interests in Azerbaijan such as oil company 

headquarters, refineries, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 

pipeline carrying oil to Europe. Clearly, a CE or other 

significant jihadi presence in Azerbaijan would have 

security implications for the entire Transcaucasus and 

the Persian Gulf region.

The bad blood between Moscow and Tbilisi created 

by the 2008 Georgian-Russian 5-day war is beginning 

to influence the situation in the North Caucasus. To 

be sure, there is little evidence of the ethno-nationalist 

mobilizational effect on Russia’s Circassian nationalities that many predicted would be a result of Russia’s 

recognition of the independence of Abkhazia. However, Georgia has been speculating on the situation in 

the region, especially the Circassian genocide issue, 

as the Sochi Olympics approach. It has opened up a 

television and radio company that broadcasts propaganda to the region, waived visa requirements for 

North Caucasus residents, and adopted a parliamentary resolution calling for a boycott of the Sochi Olympics and Russian and international recognition of the 

Russians’ rout and partially forced exile of Circassians 

in the 1860s as a genocide. Some Georgian opposition 

figures and one former U.S. official claim that President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government is providing 

financial and training assistance to the CE.104 Georgia’s policies could radicalize some Circassians and 

thus improve the CE OVKBK’s and NSV’s prospects 

for recruitment.
38

Consistent with the interrelated goals of recreating 

the caliphate and extending the CE through the Volga 

and southern Urals regions as a bridge to Central Asia, 

the CE maintains relations with Central Asian jihadi 

organizations tied to AQ and the Taliban in AfPak 

such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 

and the IMU splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union 

(IJU). Both the IMU and IJU have fighters in Afghanistan, train in Pakistan, and fight in both as well as in 

Central Asia. In a May 2007 statement, IJU amir Ebu 

Yahya Muhammad Fatih stated that the IJU had “also 

been working on our common targets together with 

Caucasian mujahedeens.”105 In March 2011, the IJU’s 

media department, Badr At-Tawhid, sent a 7-minute 

video message to the CE mujahedin from the IJU’s 

amirs in the “land of Horosan,” Afghanistan.106 It 

praised the CE mujahedin for joining the global jihad 

and noted: “In our jamaat, there are many brothers 

who were trained or fought on the lands of the Caucasus Emirate.”107 The CE DV cell uncovered in the Czech 

Republic discussed below could have been training 

with the IJU or IMU. CE websites regularly cover and 

provide at least propaganda support to Central Asia’s 

leading jihadi organizations, including the IMU and 

IJU. Thus, the CE reported extensively on the series of 

suicide, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ambush attacks and skirmishes carried out by the IMU, 

IJU, and/or a possible subunit thereof, the “Jamaat 

‘Ansarullah’ in Tajikistan,” during autumn 2010 in 

Hujand, Sogdo Oblast’ and elsewhere in Tajikistan.108

The CE Ingush GV’s website Hunafa.com, founded by Buryatskii, has shown a special interest in the 

emergence of jihadism in Kazakhstan, carrying propaganda materials from a Kazakhstan jihadi jamaat 

“Ansaru-d-din,” calling Kazakhstan’s Muslims to 
39

jihad and a fatwa issued by Sheikh Abul-Mundhir 

Al-Shinkiti, asserting the Shariah legality of attacking 

police and fighting jihad in Kazkahstan, even though 

the Muslims there are weak and small in number.109

It is unclear whether the CE, GV independently, or 

Absaru-d-din played a role in recent bombings and attacks on police this year.110 The CE’s main website Kavkaz tsentr also reported in March 2011 the bayat to the 

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammad 

Omar Mujahid, the Islamic group taken by a group of 

Kyrgyzstan mujahedin, Jaish Jamaat al-Mahdi (Amirul-Mu’minin), and their call to the Kyrgyz to take up 

jihad.111

Thinking Globally: The CE and Jihad in Europe.

The CE’s rabid anti-infidelism is not new; the ChRI’s 

websites were replete with anti-Western, anti-Semitic, 

and anti-American articulations as far back as 2005.112

The CE’s growing ties with AQ and the global jihadi 

revolutionary alliance produced in 2010 what appears 

to have been the first CE-tied activity in Europe: the 

plot by “Shariah4Belgium” broken up in November 

2010, and the DV-tied Czech cell uncovered in April 

2011. On November 23, 11 suspects tied to the jihadi 

Shariah4Belgium group were arrested in Belgium, the 

Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Morocco, and Saudi 

Arabia on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks in Belgium, recruiting “jihadist candidates” and financing 

the CE. Earlier in 2010, Shariah4Belgium leader Abou 

Imran declared that the White House would “be conquered,” and “Europe will be dominated by Islam.”113

The Belgian-based detainees included six Moroccan 

Belgian citizens detained in Antwerp, three Moroccan 

Belgian citizens arrested in the Netherlands, and two 
40

Chechens apprehended in the German city of Aachen 

near the Belgian border.

114All the suspects held dual 

citizenship and belonged to the Antwerp-based Shariah4Belgium.115 Belgian police said the Shariah4Belgium cell had ties to a local Islamic Center and had 

been under investigation since at least 2009. One of 

the Russian nationals was a 31-year-old “Chechen” arrested in Aachen, Germany, under a European arrest 

warrant issued by Belgium who was suspected of having recruited young people to fight in Chechnya.All 

the detainees, including the two Chechens, were said 

to have been involved in both recruiting and financing for the CE and planning attacks in Belgium.

116 A 

third Chechen supporter of Doku Umarov allegedly 

involved in the Shariah4Belgium plot was arrested on 

December 1 at Vienna’s Schwechat airport on the basis 

of one of nine international arrest warrants issued by 

the Belgian government.117The 32-year old Aslambek 

I., as he was identified by the authorities, was detained 

upon his return from the hajj to Mecca in connection 

with an international plot to attack “a NATO facility 

in Belgium.”118 Aslambek I. reportedly lived in the 

Austrian town of Neunkirchen with this family and 

was planning to bomb a train carrying NATO troops. 

Earlier, he reportedly lost both his hands in a grenade 

attack in Chechnya and had been arrested in Sweden 

for smuggling weapons, was released, and then left 

for Mecca.

119

It remains unclear whether this CE-connected plot 

was part of the reported AQ plan to carry out a series 

of Christmas terrorist attacks in the United States and 

Europe last holiday season..

120Besides the Chechen origins of three members of the Belguim4Shariah cell and 

their assistance to the CE, there was other evidence 

of the plot’s connection simultaneously to the CE, 
41

AQ, and the global jihad. On June 20, the OVKBK’s 

Islamdin.com posted an appeal from Belgian Muslims 

to Maqdisi, underscoring once again the way in which 

the CE’s tie to Maqdisi unites it with the larger global 

jihadi revolution.121 More significantly, the arrested 

Shariah4Belgium suspects were said to have been using the jihadi website Ansar al-Mujahidin in carrying 

out their activity.122As noted above, the CE OVKBK’s 

Islamdin.com co-sponsored with Ansar al-Mujahidin the 

Russian-language forum Al-Ansar.info.

In April 2011, counterterrorism officials in the 

Czech Republic uncovered an international cell in 

Bohemia connected to the CE’s DV. According to the 

chief of the Czech Unit for Combating Organized 

Crime (UOOZ) Robert Slachta, the group included 

one Chechen, two or three Dagestanis, two or three 

Moldovans, and two Bulgarians, who are accused 

variously of weapons possession, document falsification, financing and supplying terrorist organizations, 

specifically the DV’s new members, with weapons 

and explosives.123Documents relating to the Dagestan 

mujahedin in both Arabic and Russian were found 

during the arrests. The apartment of the Chechen 

involved in the Czech cell was reported to have contained significant quantities of arms and ammunition. 

Six of the eight accused were arrested in the Czech 

Republic, with two members still at large in Germany. 

There was also an unidentified ninth member. Profits made from the falsification of passports and other 

documents were sent to Dagestan as were weapons 

and explosives purchased by the cell. None of those 

arrested were suspected of planning terrorist attacks 

in the Czech Republic.124 However, one press report 

claimed that the Bulgarian members of the group were 

involved in planning terrorist attacks in unidentified 
42

other states.125 In June 2011, two more unidentified 

Russian citizens were arrested in Germany engaging 

in the same activity for the DV and perhaps working 

with the abovementioned DV Czech cell.126The CEand DV-tied Czech Republic cell represents global jihadi thinking and suggests the CE and its DV as clear 

and present dangers to the Sochi Games.

On July 5, 2010, French police and security carried 

out a counterterrorism operation arresting five Chechens, three men aged 21 to 36, and two women, in several districts across the city of Le Mans. One of the 

three males was described as an imam and father of 

five. Reportedly, French counterterrorism was tipped 

off by Russian security after they arrested a Chechen 

citizen in Moscow in possession of weapons, explosives, plans for making bombs, and a residence permit issued by France’s Prefecture de la Sarthe. Russian investigators also discovered that the wife of the 

arrested Chechen lives in Le Mans. The three males 

were arraigned on July 9 and charged on suspicion of 

“criminal association in relation with a terrorist enterprise.”127The CE also could be connected directly or 

indirectly to several Chechens arrested individually 

in Europe in recent years; for example Lors Doukaev, 

who was sentenced in May 2011 to 12 years in prison 

for planning an attack on the offices of the newspaper 

Jyllands-Posten, which published the famous 12 caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005.128 In sum, the 

CE and perhaps lone wolf terrorists inspired by it are 

posing a new threat to Europe and the West.
43

Potential Threats to U.S. Interests.

The CE also poses a potential threat to U.S. interests 

and citizens, if not the homeland. It may be significant 

that both the Nevskii Express and Domodedovo Airport attacks targeted transport infrastructure where 

foreigners, in particular Americans, are often present. 

The potential threat to U.S. interests and even personnel is suggested by the Nevskii Express attack. The 

Moscow-St. Petersburg rail route is located within 100 

miles of the northern stretch of the Northern Distribution Route (NDR) supplying U.S. and NATO troops in 

Afghanistan. Beginning in Latvia, it traverses through 

northeast Russia on its way to Central Asia and Afghanistan. If the Shariah4Belgium plot was intended 

to target NATO transport, then a similar project to 

one that would target the NDR has already been on 

the CE-tied jihadists’ agenda. Finally, aside from the 

numerous propaganda attacks on the U.S. extant on 

CE websites, in 2010 two sites taken together thrice 

published the infamous al-Fahd fatwa calling for the 

use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against 

the Americans.129 To be sure, in contrast to the ChRI, 

there is only limited evidence to suggest that CE operatives intend or have attempted to acquire chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear materials.130 However, the CE’s jihadization and the al-Fahd posting 

suggest a theo-ideological orientation that could so 

incline CE operatives to employ such tactics, and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Aleksandr 

Bortnikov’s claim in June 2010 that terrorists continue 

to “attempt to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical components” across the former Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR) underscores the point.131
44

RUSSIAN COUNTER-JIHADISM POLICY

How is Moscow dealing with the CE insurgency 

and its alliance with the global jihad? It must be noted 

that the derision that many in the West devoted to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims that Russia was 

dealing with international terrorism was misplaced. 

Putin was exaggerating his claim but not inventing it 

out of whole cloth, as the discussion above of AQ’s 

ties to those ChRI elements involved in the 1999 invasion of Dagestan clearly shows. There is probably 

some truth to the assumption that Putin’s claim was 

intended to serve as a justification for Russia’s heavyhanded tactics in dealing with the ChRI and CE. Russian military, police, and special security forces have 

committed and, to a much lesser degree, continue to 

commit atrocities. However, the last few years have 

seen a considerable shift in the Russian strategy and 

tactics to include more elements of soft power in its 

overlapping counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, 

including attempts to combat jihadism theo-ideologically and through greater investment in the socioeconomic development of the North Caucasus.

Federal Policy.

Already during Putin’s second term, there was a 

shift to include nonmilitary means: (1) better intelligence gathering and dissemination and better interoperational coordination among the siloviki with the 

creation of federal and regional anti-terrorism committees for searching out and destroying CE amirs 

and operatives; (2) the removal from office of the oldest, longest-serving, and most odious of the North 

Caucasus republics’ presidents, with the exception of 
45

Chechenya’s Ramzan Kadyrov and Ingushetia’s Murat Zyazikov; and, (3) “draining the pond” of mujahedin through a fourth amnesty in 2006 which brought 

in 600 mujahedin from the forest.132 Russian security 

and local police forces have become quite efficient at 

eliminating top CE leaders, with the exception of CE 

amir Umarov.133 On June 9, 2009, the FSB managed for 

the first time to capture rather than kill a major CE 

amir, the CE’s military amir, and the CE GV’s amir and 

vali “Magas” Ali Taziyev (a.k.a. Akhmed Yevloyev). 

His capture likely led to actionable intelligence that 

has facilitated many of the increasing number of CE 

amirs killed since then. Also during his second term, 

Putin undertook a massive reconstruction effort for 

Chechnya, which after years of slow progress finally 

achieved considerable results. Groznyi has been almost completely rebuilt, and Chechnya’s second city, 

Gudermes, is also making progress. The reconstruction efforts provided some employment for Chechen 

youth, but unemployment remains high, and Kadyrov 

has been criticized for funneling work to his Benoi and 

political clans. Putin-era anti-extremism laws remain 

in force and far too broad, allowing Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and FSB operatives to apply them 

occasionally against journalists, moderate Muslims, 

and certain Islamic texts.

Under the Medvdev presidency, Russia has moved 

further in complimenting hard power with a robust 

soft power component in attempting to tackle jihadism in the Caucasus. In his first annual presidential 

address to Russia’s Federal Assembly in November 

2009, President Dmitry Medvedev called the North 

Caucasus Russia’s “most serious domestic political 

problem” and announced a federal program to invest 

800 billion rubles in Ingushetia, which since the sum-
46

mer of 2007 had been the center of gravity of the jihad, 

with the largest number of CE attacks of any North 

Caucasus region.134 Medvedev also fired the extremely 

unpopular, incompetent, and violence-prone Ingushetiyan president Murat Zyazikov, who, largely on 

the strength of his FSB career, had been ensconced in 

power by Putin through a series of electoral manipulations. Under Zyazikov, Ingushetia saw abductions 

skyrocket, with many suspecting Zyazikov’s cousin, 

who headed the security forces, of organizing the abductions. The final straw for Zyazikov came when Ingushetia’s top opposition leader Magomed Yevloyev 

was shot while in the custody of the Ingushetia’s MVD 

chief, after arguing with Zyazikov on a plane flight 

in August 2008. Zyazikov’s removal and the security 

forces’ killing of Buryatskii and GV amir Taziyev were 

followed since March 2010 by a fall both in attacks by 

the CE and abductions in the republic. Medvedev’s 

federal assistance program for Ingushetia has made it 

since 2009 the most highly subsidized region in Russia, with 91 percent of the republic’s budget being 

federally funded. From 2008 to 2010, expenditures increased for sectors crucial to socioeconomic development and jobs: by 282 percent for housing, 110 percent 

for economic development, 103 percent for education, 

with slightly lower increases for state agency expenditures, culture, health, and sport.135

Medvedev also moved to increase, better target, 

and ensure proper use of funding for the North Caucasus as a whole by creating the North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO) and appointing as its presidential 

envoy and as federal government deputy premier, 

the former businessman and Krasoyarsk Governor 

Aleksandr Khloponin. It is planned to fold the federal 

targeted programs for the North Caucasus, Chechnya, 
47

and Ingushetia into a single program, with one-third 

of the unified program designated for the most jihadplagued republic, Dagestan.136 Medvedev’s June 2011 

proposal to decentralize aspects of government to the 

regions and municipalities appears to be dictated in 

part by the situation in the North Caucasus, as SKFO 

envoy Khloponin has been assigned to draft the details 

for the decentralization of interbudgetary relations 

along with his fellow vice premier Dmitrii Kozak.137

Since 2008, federal expenditures have increased in all 

the SKFO’s regions, except for Chechnya. This has led 

to some modest economic growth for the SKFO as a 

whole, with some republics’ economic growth outpacing the federal average. However, unemployment remains high, especially youth unemployment.138

In line with Medvedev’s overall liberalization 

policies and his turn to more use of soft power in the 

North Caucasus, Prime Minister Putin announced a 

radical departure in Kremlin policy in the Caucasus, 

unveiling an ambitious economic development program for the region that was long overdue. He also 

called for the North Caucasus governments to open 

up in order to attract private investment, to pay more 

attention to the views of human rights activists, to encourage the development of civil society, and to air 

more federal broadcasts offering “objective and honest stories about life in the North Caucasus” and not an 

“artificially” drawn “soft and pleasing picture.” The 

new development strategy detailed in Putin’s speech 

is to integrate the North Caucasus into the Russian 

and global economies and to create 400,000 new jobs 

in the region by 2020 by: (1) plugging the region into 

the international North-South transit corridor linking 

Russia and Europe with Central Asian and Gulf states; 

(2) organizing several major public works and con-
48

struction projects toward that end, to include building 

a major oil refinery in Chechnya’s capital; (3) creating a modern tourism industry including a system of 

ski and other recreational resorts; and, (4) increasing 

North Caucasians’ access to university education.139

Specifically, these goals are to be achieved by 

building a network of highways, renovating airports, 

and developing energy projects and recreation resort 

areas across the region. The construction and resulting 

resort-related businesses will help solve the region’s 

unemployment problem. The government is already 

constructing highways around and between cities 

such as Mozdok in Republic of Ingushetia, Nalchik 

(the capital of the KBR), and Stavropol (capital of Stavropol Krai or Territory). A highway is being designed 

for Chechnya’s second largest city, Gudermes, and another for Beslan, North Ossetia, will be commissioned 

by 2015. Another approximately 150-kilometer highway will link Cherkassk with Sukhum, the capital of 

Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia, through 

a six-kilometer tunnel to be constructed through 

the mountains. The airports in Magas (Ingushetia), 

Beslan, and Stavropol’s Shpakovskoye and Mineralny Vody airports will be modernized. In the field of 

energy, he announced new hydroelectricity projects 

for the mountainous region and the construction of 

a Rosneft oil refinery in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, 

to be commissioned in 2014. The total sum of investments for these anticipated economic projects will be 

3.4 trillion rubles, according to Putin. The government 

is ready to cover risk for private investors guaranteeing up to 70 percent of project costs. The government 

will choose investors and distribute money through 

a new North Caucasian branch of Russia’s Development Bank. This year, three federal programs—one 
49

for the entire region and one each for Chechnya and 

Ingushetia—will invest 20 billion rubles (some $700 

million) in social and economic development projects 

in the North Caucasus. Putin also announced plans 

to develop the education infrastructure in the North 

Caucasus. A new proposal is to require that Russia’s 

leading universities admit 1,300 students from North 

Caucasian republics annually. A project to build one 

of the eight federal universities in the North Caucasian District was announced in January.140

Putin also proposed “alpine skiing, ethnographic, 

or family” tourism. Specifically, he proposed creating 

a network of ski resorts across the region stretching 

from the Caspian to Black Seas building on the Elbrus 

ski resort in KBR. Mt. Elbrus is the highest mountain in 

Europe. This resort area was targeted by the OVKBK in 

February 2011, which issued an explicit statement that 

it would fight to prevent any resort development and 

keep out Russian and foreign infidel influence.141 The 

planned tourism cluster will include resorts in Dagestan, North Ossetia, KBR, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and 

Adygeya. The resorts should accommodate 100,000 

tourists and create 160,000 jobs. Putin also announced 

plans to upgrade the Mineralnyi Vody hot springs 

and spa resort in Stavropol into a “hi-tech resort” and 

the nucleus of the healthcare and tourism industries of 

the region. He promised eight billion rubles in investments to kick start the tourism industry component 

of the development strategy.142 At the June 2011 St. 

Petersburg International Economic Forum, Medvedev 

endorsed Khloponin’s additional proposal to attract 

foreign direct investment of some 300 billion rubles 

on the basis of a 60 billion rubles initial investment to 

lay down infrastructure in the first 4 years followed 

by 240 billion rubles in tax breaks and investment.143
50

Credit Suisse and the United Arab Republic’s (UAR) 

Abu Dhabi Investment Company (Invest AD) have already declared their readiness to invest in the project. 

Included among these plans is the KBR’s 2008 plan for 

five major investment projects that would be able to 

entertain 25,000 visitors at any one time and provide 

20,000 jobs. In 2009 the South Korean company Hanok and Russia’s Olimp agreed to invest 600 million 

euros in Elbrus to build 300 kilometers of trails, eight 

lifts totaling 100 kilometers, a skating rink, hotel, and 

sports complexes.144 Following a joint statement on development of the North Caucasus by President Medvedev and French leader Nicolas Sarkozy during the 

G8 summit in Deauville, France’s Caisse des Depots et 

Consignations holding company signed an investment 

agreement at the June 2011 St. Petersburg Economic 

Forum.145

Local Policy.

Each Muslim republic where the CE has a permanent network—Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and 

the KBR—has its own style and counterinsurgency 

and counterterrorism (anti-jihadism) policies. Under 

Ramzan Kadyrov’s brutal rule, Chechnya maintains 

the harshest regime, while Ingushetia and the KBR 

have taken a softer line with the arrival of new presidents, and Dagestan falls in the middle between Ramzan Kadyrov’s harsh rule and the more conciliatory 

line in Ingushetia and the KBR. Kadyrov has made 

some gains in reducing insurgent and terrorist activity in Chechnya, which by 2010 was the least active 

of the CE’s four main vilaiyats in terms of the number of jihadi attacks and related casualties. This result 

has been achieved through a mixture of the carrot and 
51

the stick, with a clear emphasis on the latter but with 

far less violence than that inflicted by the mujahedin. 

Localized counterterrorist operations are carried out 

ruthlessly, on occasion with casualties among civilians 

or innocent family members of mujahedin. Abductions, though fewer and sometimes driven by blood 

revenge rather than jihad-related problems, continue 

at a somewhat lower level in several of the Caucasus 

republics. Kadyrov’s policy towards the families of 

mujahedin differs significantly from that of his North 

Caucasus counterparts. The families of known or suspected mujahedin are often harassed, detained, and 

beaten, and their homes are occasionally demolished. 

Such policies negate any progress Kadyrov has made 

in the battle for “hearts and minds” by attempting to 

co-opt the banner of Islam claimed by the CE. This cooptation effort has been built around the construction 

of Europe’s largest mosque and an Islamic university 

and moderately enforcing some Islamic holidays and 

customs, including restrictions on female dress. At the 

same time, Kadyrov, like his Caucasus counterparts, 

has supported the traditional Sufi clerics under theoideological and physical attack from the takfirist mujahedin, and he has tried to enlist clerics in efforts to 

counter the CE’s increasingly sophisticated and effective propaganda.

Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov has 

employed a very different policy—the most liberal 

policy of any North Caucasus leader—initiating a sea 

change from Zyazikov’s brutal regime and showing 

enormous courage in the process. Upon assuming 

office in 2008, he reached out to the nationalist and 

democratic opposition, offering them positions in his 

government, and created an advisory body of societal 

and opposition organizations. Yevkurov also moved 
52

aggressively to talk young Muslims out of joining the 

jihad and into leaving it, working with families, councils of village elders, and teip or clan councils.146 According to Yevkurov, 16 mujahedin were convinced 

to turn themselves in during 2009 and 36 in 2010, and 

there were only 15 mujahedin active in the republic by 

early 2010.147 In some cases, the courts applied no punishment to those who surrendered, and many were 

provided work or education.148

Yevkurov was targeted by Buryatskii in a car 

bomb assassination attempt in June 2009 that left the 

Ingush President severely wounded. Nevertheless, after rehabilitation, Yevkurov returned to work within 

2 months, publicly forgave his attackers, and continued to work with families of mujahedin to convince 

them to leave the jihad. In February 2010, Yevkurov 

reiterated the cornerstone of his anti-jihadism policy 

of “showing good will towards those who have deviated from the law” and even offered mujahedin an 

amnesty of sorts, promising that if mujahedin turned 

themselves in, they would receive soft sentences and 

would be eased back into society: 

Today a unique opportunity has been created, and a 

chance to become a fully engaged citizen of society included in the process of the economic rebirth of our 

Ingushetia, applying your strength and knowledge in 

creative places of work and showing yourselves favorably in any of the spheres of social and public political 

life, is still being preserved for each of you [mujahedin].149

Two days after Buryatskii’s demise in March 2010, 

Yevkurov met with the relatives of those who had 

sheltered Buryatskii and the other mujahedin who 

were planning a major terrorist attack in Ingushetia. 
53

Yevkurov told these families and, by extension, all 

Ingushetia’s families, that they should know who is 

coming into their homes. He added that the authorities would continue his policy of trying to persuade 

mujahedin to abandon jihad, but that the security infrastructure would go into action for those who could 

not be persuaded.150 Similarly, Yevkurov has led in 

reducing violent outcomes of the notoriously violent 

Caucasus tradition of blood feuds that contribute to 

both jihadi and non-jihadi violence in the region. In 

a 2-year period, the Ingush authorities reconciled 150 

families, according to Yevkurov, in part by raising the 

ransom for resolving them from 100 thousand rubles 

to one million rubles.151

Compared to his colleagues in the North Caucasus, 

which is plagued more by corruption than any other 

region, Yevkurov has carried out the most aggressive 

anti-corruption campaign. Greater social expenditures 

and economic investment plus Yevkurov’s struggle 

against corruption and clean bookkeeping is improving the situation, but slowly. Yevkurov policies have 

allowed Ingushetia to double its revenues from 810 

million rubles in 2008 to 1.744 billion rubles in 2010!152

This is not to say that Yevkurov has ignored the stick. 

In early January, rumors claimed that Yevkurov had 

requested 20 units of additional military intelligence 

(GRU) forces for the republic.153 However, whereas 

Kadyrov has overemphasized the “stick” of hard 

power, Yevkurov has heavily favored the “carrot” of 

soft power. Yevkurov’s policies have corresponded 

with a significant decline in the number of attacks in 

Ingushetia, according to my own estimates, from some 

138 in 2008 and 175 in 2009, to only 99 in 2010 and approximately 40 in the first 6 months of 2011.154 However, it remains unclear whether Yevkurov’s policies 
54

are responsible for the decline, factoring in the killing 

of Buryatskii and the capture of CE military amir and 

GV amir “Magas” Ali Taziyev.

Since Putin’s removal of the ailing Valerii Kokov 

(the KBR’s ancient Soviet-era communist party first 

secretary) from the KBR presidency in 2005, the republic has adopted policies closer to Yevkurov’s. Like Zyazikov, Kokov had been harshly criticized by official 

Islamic clergy, the general populace, young Muslim 

Islamists, and jihadists. He was replaced by the energetic 48-year-old ethnic Kabardin businessman Arsen 

Kanokov. He immediately moved to address the concerns of Muslims as well as the ethnic Balkar minority. Kanokov replaced the republic’s premier with an 

ethnic Balkar and its hard-line MVD chief Khachim 

Shogenov with an ethnic Russian, Yurii Tomchak. 

Shogenov had been sharply criticized by almost everyone in the republic, including the KBR’s DUM, for 

his heavy-handed and broad-brushed crackdown on 

Muslims in 2003-04 in an effort to contain the burgeoning jihadi movement in the republic. Tomchak 

took immediate steps to assuage the KBR’s Muslims, 

especially the more volatile young generation, including the inclusion of KBR DUM representatives on the 

MVD’s public council. The ministry also signed a cooperation agreement with the DUM and other confessions’ public organizations.155 Not a single jihadi attack was carried out in the KBR in 2006.156 KBR DUM 

chairman, mufti Anas Pshikhachev, quickly acknowledged the MVD’s efforts under Tomchak to address 

the DUM’s grievances but warned that the threat of 

Islamic extremism persists in the KBR.157 In addition, 

Kanokov set aside 4.5 million rubles in April 2007 for 

the construction of two new mosques in the capital 

Nalchik. The closing of mosques by the authorities in 
55

2004 had helped spark the rise of the jihadist combat 

jamaat “Yarmuk” in 2004 and irritated moderate Muslims and official clergy alike. Kanokov also attracted 

new investments for developing tourism in the Elbrus 

District resort area.

However, rather than seeing a decline in jihadi 

attacks, Kanokov presided over a marked increase: 

28 in 2008, 23 in 2009, and 113 in 2010, despite amir 

Astemirov’s demise in March 2010.158 In January 2011, 

OVKBK mujahedin killed chief mufti of the KBR’s 

DUM, Anas Pshikhachev, in the republic’s capital of 

Nalchik. The KBR plunged into a state of desperation. 

In February, the Council of Elders of the Balkar people 

called for the introduction of direct federal rule and 

Kanokov’s resignation. Kanokov, speaking before 

the KBR parliament, appealed to the federal authorities for additional assistance in combating jihadism 

in the republic, adding that the mujahedin “are not 

afraid.”159At the end of February, the OVKBK carried 

out the noted series of attacks across the Elbrus resort 

area. In May, the OVKBK attempted to assassinate 

Kanokov in the largest attack in the KBR since Basaev’s and Astemirov’s October 2005 Nalchik raid by 

exploding a bomb under the VIP reviewing stand at a 

horse racing track during Nalchik’s May Day festivities. The attack killed at least one civilian, a 97-yearold Great Patriotic War veteran, and wounded some 

40 civilians and officials. Among the wounded were 

the KBR’s Culture Minister Ruslan Firov and former 

MVD chief Khachim Shogenov.160 At this point, Kanokov or someone in the KBR may have adopted Kadyrov’s approach of forming special units to fight the 

mujahedin. A group calling itself the “Black Hawks” 

(chernyie yastreby) declared war on the OVKBK, but 

nothing much seems to have come of the group. In 
56

April, security forces killed Astemirov’s successor, 

OVKBK amir “Abdullah” Asker Dzhappuev, along 

with his naibs and several other top OVKBK amirs. 

Since then, there has been a slight decline in the rate 

of attacks in the KBR. 

In Dagestan, today the CE’s spearhead, a new 

president and his team, have borrowed more elements 

from Yevkurov than from Kadyrov. Unlike Chechnya, 

the origins of jihadism in Dagestan are driven entirely 

by intra-confessional tensions created by the emergence of a significant Salafi community at odds with 

traditional Sufis. Successive leaders have failed to resolve the religious tensions. In February 2006, Putin 

replaced long-standing ethnic Dargin Dagestan President Magomedali Magomedov with the ethnic Avar 

chairman of Dagestan’s Legislative Assembly, Mukhu 

Aliev. His tenure saw a steady increase in jihadi activity and no perceptible improvement in the civility 

of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism polices in 

the region. Aliev was replaced in 2010 with Magomedov’s son, Magomedsalem Magomedov, who endeavored to engage the Salafi community in Dagestan, coordinating the formation of a council of Salafi Islamic 

scholars (ulema), which drafted a series of demands 

for the government to meet. According to the Russian 

human rights group “Memorial,” a government representative was authorized to meet with the council, but 

the dialogue has not produced notable results other 

than the regular appearance of Salafi representatives 

at public ceremonies. Magomedov has also endeavored to replicate Yevkurov’s efforts in Ingushetia by 

succeeding in enticing some young mujahedin from 

the forest and back to civilian life, and institutionalizing the process in November 2010 in the form of an 

adaptation commission. The commission includes the 
57

imam of Dagestan’s Central Mosque and the head of 

the Salafist umbrella organization, Akhlyu-s-sunna, 

A. K. Kebedov and is chaired by Rizvan Kurbanov, 

deputy premier in charge of the power ministries in 

the republic who personally led talks with prospective defectors from the mujahedin. Kurbanov was 

described by Memorial as “open to representatives 

of civil society, reacted without fail, personally, and 

immediately to reports about the crudest violations of 

human rights . . . met with the relatives of abductees, 

[and] cooperated with lawyers in specific cases.”161

Magomedov has also worked on the economy. Dagestan’s government has developed a joint project with 

the majority state-owned Russian Copper Company 

to develop the North Caucasus’s largest ore deposit of 

Kizil-Dere in southern Dagestan’s Ahtynsky District. 

The mining project plus the accompanying development of transport infrastructure and utilities should 

provide considerable employment.162 Another investment project for the region is Dagestani oligarch Suleiman Kerimov’s purchase of the republic’s Anzhi 

Makhachkala (AM) premier soccer team. This is being 

followed up by further investments of $1.4 billion by 

Kermiov into AM’s stadium and Makhachkala hotels 

and AM’s recent $30 million purchase of global soccer superstar Samuel Eto’o in August 2011. Kerimov 

is also investing in the North Caucasus tourist resort 

cluster project.163

During his still short tenure, Magomedov’s new 

course has yielded few results unless one can show 

that jihadi violence would be even more prevalent 

without his policies. The CE’s DV has been able to step 

up its violence, threatening Magomedov and killing 

numerous government officials. Since April 2010, the 

DV has been the most prolific of the CE’s vilaiyats in 
58

terms of number of attacks, including suicide bombings, with approximately 267 total attacks (including 

six suicide attacks) in 2010 and 200 attacks (including three suicide attacks) during the first 6 months of 

2011, compared to 144 total attacks, including one suicide bombing, in 2009.164 Nor is there a demonstrable 

improvement in the republic’s human rights record, 

either.165

Siloviki.

A key problem is that neither the republic presidents nor SKFO envoy Khloponin exercise much, if 

any, control over the siloviki as the latter continue to 

violate Muslim citizens’ human, civil, and political 

rights. How much Moscow or the civilian leadership 

controls federal forces in the North Caucasus also remains a question, though not their responsibility for 

rights violations. Both federal forces and local police, 

often working jointly in counter-terrorist operations, 

continue to employ detention on the basis of mere 

suspicion and falsified evidence, beatings, and torture 

during detentions, and extrajudicial punishments, including abductions and killings. The European Court 

for Human Rights continues to hand down judgments 

against Russian authorities regarding such violations.166

Federal forces still deployed in the region include 

military, FSB specially designated forces (spetsnaz), 

and GRU. MVD forces, which according to federal law 

are supposed to be under federal control, are often 

an object of contestation in numerous regions across 

Russia. Kadyrov appears to control not only his own 

forces but the MVD and perhaps its Internal Troops in 

Chechnya, both of which have made incursions into 
59

Ingushetia sometimes coordinated with Ingushetia’s 

MVD and sometimes not. Military forces, including 

new mountain fighting forces created a few years ago 

and based in Botlikh (Dagestan) and Zelenchukskaya 

(Karachaevo-Cherkessia), maintain a low profile, remaining on their bases. In rare cases when military 

units are called upon to take part in counterterrorist 

operations, military helicopters, and more rarely artillery are called in to target mujahedin uncovered in 

mountainous areas. For example, CE amir Umarov’s 

naib Supyan Abduallev was killed in March 2011 in an 

operation that used helicopters and artillery. Military 

and other convoys occasionally come under ambush 

by mujahedin in all four of the main republics where 

the CE maintains a permanent presence. The creation 

of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK) and 

regional counterparts appears to have improved coordination and intelligence-sharing between the various 

power ministries. Security and police forces have become proficient in tracking and killing leading amirs, 

but they have been less successful in capturing high 

value targets that would provide invaluable additional intelligence. The only such case was the July 2010 

capture of GV amir and CE military amir “Magas” Ali 

Taziyev; ever since, the Ingushetia mujahedin’s fortunes have been in steady decline.

Chechnya’s Kadyrov maintains considerable control over MVD forces in his republic and deploys his 

own presidential guards, which in the past have come 

into conflict with special battalions subordinated to 

federal power ministries and led by the leaders of families and teips or clans in competition with Kadyrov 

as a counterweight to Kadyrov’s power. In 2010 the 

federal authorities decided that the dire situation in 

Dagestan required a new approach. It was decided to 
60

replicate the Chechenization of the conflict in Chechnya under Kadyrov with the formation of special battalions under the control of various federal organs 

of coercion, and by establishing under the Dagestan 

MVD a separate volunteer special motorized battalion 

of native Dagestanis for carrying out counterinsurgency operations. The first 300 volunteers were trained by 

November 2010, with another 400 intended to complete the 700-man force.167 There is no evidence that 

this measure has produced any appreciable results.

In sum, Russian and North Caucasus authorities’ 

continuing rights violations largely, if not entirely, 

negate the positive development of an increased use 

of soft power methods in fighting jihadism pushed by 

Medvedev, Yevkurov, and Kanokov. However counterintuitive it may be, the steepest decline in jihadi 

activity has occurred in the republics with the harshest policy line, Kadyrov’s Chechnya, and the softest, 

Yevkurov’s Ingushetia. 

THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The rise of the CE, and attendant theoretical concepts, have concrete security policy implications for 

Russia, the United States, and globally. The CE’s rise 

refutes many widespread assumptions, biases, hypotheses, and theories extant in the scholarly, analytical, activist, and policymaking communities regarding the violence in the North Caucasus and the 

organization and causality of terrorism and jihadism 

in general. The CE’s continuing capability to recruit 

and attack is not simply a response to Russian brutality and poor governance, but is also a consequence of 

the CE’s effective deployment of jihadi propaganda, 

training, leadership, and substantial ties to AQ, as 
61

well as the global jihadi revolutionary alliance, and an 

umma in the throes of radicalism and revolution. The 

CE’s long-standing though evolving relationship with 

AQ and the larger global movement and its organization and structure do not confirm the leaderless jihad 

hypothesis which argues that AQ has lost much of its 

relevance and the global jihadi movement is devolving into a diffusion of atomized lone wolves.168 Similarly, the CE’s own decentralized network structure 

and functioning and the nature of its relationship with 

AQ and the global jihadi alliance supports a more 

traditional view of a network inspired and loosely 

grouped around AQ and its affiliates. The CE, like the 

inspirational, if not institutional, AQ hub and more 

nodal elements among the global jihad’s innumerable 

groups, is likewise decentralized, but it retains a hub 

consisting of Umarov and top amirs and qadis and 

loosely coordinating interconnected nodes or vilaiyats 

working largely independently but towards one and 

the same set of goals: The creation of an Islamist CE 

state and a confederated global caliphate.

If one regards AQ as the inspirational core, if not 

the organizational leader, of a highly decentralized 

global jihadi revolutionary movement, then a conceptualization of the CE’s place would find it several 

degrees removed from the core, comprised of AQ central and affiliates like AQAP and AQ in the Maghreb 

(AQIM). Groups like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba 

comprise the first concentric circle around the AQ core 

because of both their involvement in international 

attacks and their deep involvement with, and geographical proximity to AQ central. The CE’s position 

is similar to that of as-Shabaab in Somali and other 

groups in the second concentric circle, since they are 

not located near and do not cooperate as closely with 
62

AQ central, are only just beginning to participate in 

international operations, and prefer to, or because of 

resource shortages must, focus largely on establishing 

their local emirate. The third concentric circle would 

be lone wolves inspired by but having no ties to a formal jihadi group. The fourth, most outer concentric 

circle lies outside the alliance but within the movement. It consists of groups that ascribe to the violent 

establishment of their own Islamist government but 

reject the goal of creating a caliphate and cooperation 

with other global jihadi revolutionary groups.

Nor do patterns in the CE correlate with the conclusion put forward by Robert Pape that suicide terrorism is largely a response to foreign occupation, having 

little or no connection to jihadi ideology or goals.169

Leaving aside the fact that suicide terrorism is almost 

exclusively a jihadist phenomenon, this mono-causal 

explanation is simplistic, especially when it comes 

to any jihadi organization, including the North Caucasus. CE suicide bombers’ videotaped martyrdom 

testaments state explicitly that their motivation is to 

“raise the banner of Allah above all others.” The CE’s 

chief propagandist and organizer of suicide terrorism 

from mid-2008 to early 2010, Sheikh Said Abu Saad 

Buryatskii was an ethnic Buryat-Russian, converted to 

Islam, and never set foot in the Caucasus until spring 

2008 after he returned from abroad to study Islam in 

Egypt and Kuwait. The goals and strategy of the CE 

and other global jihadi revolutionary groups are not 

simply local or defensive, seeking merely to drive out 

occupiers, but are explicitly offensive and expansionist. Thus, the CE’s expansionist goals aimed at seizing 

all of Russia and the Transcaucasus and recreating the 

Islamist caliphate defuse Pape’s theory.
63

These theoretical conclusions have policy implications: First, the CE’s ties to AQ, its own sophisticated 

organization and decentralized functioning, and its 

religious rather than nationalist motives are transforming it from a local to an international actor and 

emerging threat. Second, even if it were, like the ChRI, 

only a threat to Russian national security, this threat 

would still have international security implications, 

since Russia remains an important Eurasian power 

and is emerging as a useful ally of the United States 

and the West in the war against jihadism. Third, the 

CE’s emergence as a transnational threat with growing radicalization, capacity, and aspirations marks a 

newly emerging threat to U.S. national and international security. Fourth, the CE’s transformation and 

integration into the global jihadi revolutionary alliance demonstrate the ability of AQ and its affiliated 

movements to evolve, adapt, and flourish in response 

to Western counter-jihadism efforts. Fifth, the global 

jihadi revolutionary alliance’s ability to evolve and 

adapt is facilitated by the existence of the larger jihadi 

and Islamist social movements emerging from a prerevolutionary Muslim world that includes democratic, 

nationalist, communist, Islamist, and jihadist forces. 

Sixth, except in the most failed states like Yemen and 

Somalia, the groups that make up the global jihadi 

revolutionary alliance are unlikely to seize power precisely because of the limited appeal of their narrow 

and strict ideological orientation. Seventh, given this 

larger revolutionary and radicalizing context, international, Western, Eurasian, American, and Russian 

security are likely to be threatened by this revolution’s 

intended and unintended destabilizing and violent effects for decades to come; the most virulent of which 

are the global jihadi revolutionary alliance and its in-
64

dividual groups. Finally, the jihadi revolutionary alliance’s globalism dictates a global and cooperative 

response on the part of those whom it targets.

Operationally, Caucasus jihadists are now recruits 

for major terrorist attacks against the West. Sheikh alMaqdisi has designated the CE as the global jihad’s 

bridgehead into Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the 

CE inserted cells into Belgium and the Czech Republic 

and its apparent involvement in its first international 

terrorist plot in Belgium. The CE itself could attempt 

to attack U.S. targets in Russia or elsewhere, including the northern supply route for U.S. and NATO 

troops fighting in Afghanistan. Its most capacious DV 

and its Azerbaijan Jamaat put Umarov within striking 

range of international and U.S. interests in Azerbaijan 

such as oil company headquarters, refineries, and the 

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carrying oil to Europe. 

Clearly, a CE or other significant jihadi presence in 

Azerbaijan would have security implications for the 

entire Transcaucasus and the Persian Gulf region. In 

addition, the CE is a recruiting ground of mujahedin 

for other fronts in the global jihad. Moreover, Russia has the largest stockpiles of chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear materials and WMD in the 

world. The CE adds potential demand to this supply. 

In the past, there have been reports of Chechen separatist and Caucasus jihadi attempts to acquire WMD 

in Russia, and the CE websites’ posting of the famous 

2003 Al-Fahd fatwa three times in 2010 suggests that 

some in the CE may wish to obtain them.

Given the emerging CE threat, the U.S. Government should maximize cooperation across Eurasia to 

include Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the war against jihadism. The United 
65

States and Europe should also attempt to stabilize 

the Caucasus by resolving the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and at least minimizing 

Russian-Georgian tensions, so these do not play into 

the hands of CE or other jihadists. One goal might be 

to rein in Georgian efforts to whip up trouble in the 

North Caucasus, especially among the Muslim Circassian ethnic groups. Tbilisi has opened up a television 

and radio company that broadcasts anti-Russian propaganda to the region, and some Georgian opposition 

figures and one former U.S. official have claimed that 

President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government is providing financial and training assistance to the CE.170 Speculating on the Circassian genocide issue as the Sochi 

Olympics approach, Tbilisi adopted a parliamentary 

resolution calling for a boycott of the Sochi games and 

for Russian and international recognition of the Tsarist forces’ rout and exile of the Circassians in the 1860s 

as a genocide. Georgia’s policies could radicalize 

some Circassians and thus improve the CE prospects 

for recruitment and attacking the Sochi games. Tbilisi 

also waived visa requirements for Iranians and North 

Caucasus residents, which could facilitate the movement of global jihadists from South Asia and the Persian Gulf region to the North Caucasus and Europe.

Finally, Western-Eurasian (NATO-CSTO) cooperation can be used to nudge Eurasia’s authoritarian 

regimes, including Moscow, to conduct their anti-jihadism and other policies with a greater eye towards 

citizens’ human, civil and political rights, and the 

implications of all of the above for the war against jihadism. Only with broad and effective regional cooperation involving all of the post-Soviet states will the 

United States and the West be able to defeat the global 

jihadi threat.
66

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Interview with Basaev in Oleg Blotskii, “Terroristy pronikayut v Rossiyu za dengi,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 12, 1996, 

cited in James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, pp. 101, 154.

2. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, New Haven, CT, 

and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2007.

3. “Aslan Maskhadov: ‘My sozdadim polnotsennoe Islamskoe Gosudarstvo,” Kavkaz tsentr, March 8, 2010, 15:55, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/03/08/71101.shtml; 

“Abdallakh Shamil Abu-Idris: ‘My oderzhali strategicheskuyu 

pobedu,’” Kavkaz-Tsentr, January 9, 2006, 08:47:10, available from 

www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2006/01/09/40869.shtml; “Prezident ChRI Sheik Abdul-Khalim. Kto On?” Kavkaz-Tsentr, March 

12, 2005, 00:59:07, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2005/03/12/31285.shtml; Aleksandr Ignatenko, “Vakhkhabitskoe kvazigosudarstvo,” Russkii Zhurnal, available from www.

russ.ru/publish/96073701, citing the Chechen militants’ website, 

Kavkaz-Tsentr, September 10, 2002; Paul Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism, Dulles, VA: Brassey’s 

Inc., 2004, pp. 171-75; and Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, pp. 40-64.

4. Available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_con

tent&view=category&id=4&Itemid=28. The audios are available from 

www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category

&id=33&Itemid=31. The videos are available from www.islamdin.

com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=7&Itemid=8.

5. For example, see “Usama bin Laden ob’ yasnaet khadis 

Kaba bin Malika,” Kavkaz tsentr, April 12, 2011, 01:08, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/04/12/80669.

shtml; “AL’-kaida: Sheikh Usama bin Laden obratilsya k frantsuzskomu narodu,” Kavkaz tsentr, January 21, 2011, 21:44, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/01/21/78402.

shtml; “Sheikh Aiman az-Zavakhiri: ‘Dagestan—osvozhdenie posle otchayaniya’,” Umma News, January 20, 2011, 00:07, 

available from ummanews.com/minbar/359-----l----r.html; “Prisoediniyaites’ k Karavanu,” Islamdin.com, February 19, 2009, 

12:09, available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_
67

content&view=article&id=278:2009-02-19-12-11-52&catid=4:2009-

02-04-14-07-09&Itemid=28; Ibrakhim Abu Ubeidulakh, “Zashchita 

Usamy Bin Ladena ot napadok murdzhiitov, nechestivtsev!,” 

Islamdin.com, January 4, 2010, available from www.islamdin.com/

index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=609:2010-01-04-

23-52-10&catid=8:2009-02-04-22-51-14&Itemid=26; “Sheikh Usama 

Bin Laden-Imam Mudzhakhidov Nashei Epokhi,” Jamaat Shariat, 

January 7, 2010, 12:53, available from www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/

content/view/414/29/; Hunafa.com’s video compilation “Oh, He 

Who Rebrukes Me,” bin Laden and the CE’s Sheikh Said Abu 

Saad Buryatskii, “O, uprekayushchii menya,” available from 

Hunafa.com.

6. Some of the other jihadi sheiks, scholars, and propagandists prominent on CE websites include: medieval source of jihadi 

thought Taki al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taimiyya; the Egyptian scholar 

and Muslim Brotherhood leading figure, Sayyid Qutb; the Pakistani Salafist and jihadi revolutionary, Sayed Abul Ala Maududi; 

the London-based Syrian sheikh, Sheikh Abu Basyr At-Tartusi; 

Sheikh and Imam, Abdullah bin Abdu-Rakhman bin Jibrin; Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Hukail; Iraqi Sheikh and mujahed, Addullah 

Ibn Muhammad Ar-Rashud; Sheikh Muhammad Salih al-Munajid; and Sheikh Abdurrakhman Al-Barrak.

7. “Zhurnal ‘Vdokhnovlai’: ‘Sdelai bombu v Maminoi kukhne’,” 

Islamdin.com, December 3, 2010, available from www.islamdin.

com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=992:2010-12-

03-10-29-08&catid=43:2010-11-25-17-50-11&Itemid=33; “Zhurnal 

‘Vdokhnovlyai’: Operatsiya ‘Krovotechenie’,” Islamdin.com, December 8, 2010, 11:51, available from www.islamdin.com/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=999:2010-12-08-11-56-

36&catid=27:2009-02-09-17-38-17&Itemid=16; “V internete rasprostranen vtoroi nomer zhurnala ‘Al-Kaidy’, Inspire, Vdokhnovenie, Kavkaz tsentr, October 12, 2010, 12:07, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/10/12/75767.shtml; and Gordon 

M. Hahn, Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report, International Institute of Professional Education and Research (IIPER), 

No. 40, May 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/23115/

original/kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_40_may_2011.pdf.
68

8. “Executive Report,” Militant Ideology Atlas, West Point, NY: 

U.S. Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, November 

2006, pp. 7-8.

9. “Amir Saifullakh o knige sheikha Abu Mukhammada al’ 

Makdisi ‘Milleti Ibrakhim’,” Islamdin.com, February 18, 2010, 

08:03, available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=656:-q-q-&catid=7:2009-02-04-15-45-

20&Itemid=8; and “Amir Saifullakh: ‘O Tavkhide’—1 chast’,” 

Islamdin.com, February 15, 2010, 01:37:27, available from www.

islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=651:-

q-q-1-&catid=7:2009-02-04-15-45-20&Itemid=8.

10. See, for example, “A message from Sheikh al-Maqdisi to 

the Mujahedeen of the Caucasus Emirate,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 18, 2009, 16:55, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/

content/2009/09/18/11018.shtml, first published in Arabic on alMaqdisi’s site Almaqdese.net, 15 Ramadan 1430, available from 

almaqdese.net/r?i=07090901. See also “Nastavlenie mudzhakhidam ot sheikh Abu Mukhammada al’ Makdisi,” Islamdin.com, 

March 13, 2011, 23:37, available from www.islamdin.com/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1077:2011-03-14-00-00-

13&catid=4:2009-02-04-14-07-09&Itemid=28; “Pis’mo ot Sheikha

Abu Mukhammad Al-Makdisi,” Kavkaz tsentr, February 5,

2011, 13:50, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content

/2011/02/05/78885.shtml; and “Razmyshleniya, imam Abu Mukhammad Al’-Makdisi,” Hunafa.com, December 11, 2009, 12:00, 

available from hunafa.com/?p=2530.

11. “A message from Sheikh al-Maqdisi to the Mujahedeen of 

the Caucasus Emirate,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 18, 2009, 16:55, 

available from www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2009/09/18/11018.

shtml; first published in Arabic on al-Maqdisi’s site, Almaqdese.net, 

15 Ramadan 1430, available from almaqdese.net/r?i=07090901.

12. “Fatva Sheikha Abu Mukhammada al’-Makdisi, da ykrepit 

ego Allakh,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 10, 2010, 20:55, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/09/10/75149.shtml.

13. “Amir Seifullah o protsesse podgotovki k provoglasheniyu Kavkazskogo Emirata,” Kavkaz tsentr, November 20, 2007, 

23:15, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/

11/20/54479.shtml.
69

14. On Astemirov’s view of the amir’s unilateral powers, see 

“Amir Seifullah o protsesse podgotovki k provoglasheniyu Kavkazskogo Emirata,” Kavkaz tsentr, November 20, 2007, 23:15, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/11/20/54479.

shtml. For the same by Astemirov’s successors, see “Amir Seifullakh Gubdenskii, ra: Ot togo, chto my zdes’ voyuem, my 

nichego ne vyigraem,” JamaatShariat.com, November 12, 2010, 

05:17, available from www.jamaatshariat.com/-mainmenu-29/14-

facty/1345-2010-11-12-02-18-12.html; and “Kadii IK Ali Abu 

MukhIammad o pravlenii, dzhikhade, o polozhenii shakhidov 

i mnogom drugom,” Guraba.info, June 28, 2011, 10:57, available 

from www.guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1107--i-.html.

15. CE qadi Astemirov passed down a death sentence against 

London exile and former ChRI foreign minister Akhmed Zakaev 

when he broke with the CE upon its creation in October 2007. 

See “Shariatskii sud vynes reshenie po dely Zakaeva,” Kavkaz 

tsentr, August 25, 2009, 02:45, available from www.kavkazcenter.

com/russ/content/2009/08/25/67586.shtml and www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=467:2009-08-24-21-

30-20&catid=10:2009-02-06-21-56-11&Itemid=26. The CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) qadis have even passed down, and the DV 

mujahedin have consequently carried out, two known death sentences against Dagestani citizens. In July 2010, then DV qadi and 

soon-to-be CE qadi Abu Muhamad al-Dagistani issued a death 

sentence against Salimhan Shagidkhanov, condemned for adultery and raping a Muslim woman. Al-Dagistani issued a second 

death fatwa against Patimat Magomedova, a female headmaster 

accused of kicking school girls out of class for wearing the hijab. 

After each of the accused was executed, the verdicts were posted 

on JamaatShariat.com as a warning to those who would dare noncompliance with Shariah. “V Vilaiyate Dagestan progovoren Shariatskom sudom i unichtozhen vrag Allakha Shagidkhanov Salimkhan,” JamaatShariat.com, August 10, 2010, 13:56, available from 

www.jamaatshariat.com/new/15-new/1095-2010-08-10-10-58-30.html; 

and “Zayavlenie Spetsial’noi operativnoi gruppy mudzhakhidov dagestanskogo fronta: Prigovor priveden v ispolnenie,” 

Jamaat Shariat.com, September 25, 2010, 15:24, available from www.

jamaatshariat.com/new/15-new/1298-2010-09-25-12-47-36.html.

16. “Otvety na voprosy k”adiya Imarata Kavkaz, amira

Ob”edinennogo Vilaiyata Kabardy, Balkarii i Karachya, Saiful-
70

lakha,” Islamdin.com, December 12, 2010, 14:54, available from 

www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article

&id=594:2009-12-12-14-58-15&catid=27:2009-02-09-17-38-

17&Itemid=16.

17. “Amir Saifullakh o knige sheikha Abu Mukhammada al’ 

Makdisi ‘Milleti Ibrakhim’,” and “Otvety na voprosy k’adiya Imarata Kavkaz, amira Ob’edinennogo Vilaiyata Kabardy, Balkarii i 

Karachaya, Saifullakha.”

18. See, for example, the writings of Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, Aleksandr Tikhomirov, the CE’s leading propagandist 

and operative for suicide bombings in 2008 and 2009, especially: 

Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi 

Istiny i lzhi,” Hunafa.info, May 30, 2009, 1:01, available from 

hunafa.com??p=1534; and Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na 

Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi istiny i lzhi, Chast’ 2,” Hunafa.info, June 

24, 2009, 4:04, available from hunafa.info/?p=1715. See also the final 

istishkhad testament of his student, “Zaveshchanie Abdul-Malika: 

‘Ya ukhozhu na Istishkhad, chtoby pozhertvovat’ svoei dushoi vo 

imya Allakha!’,” Kavkaz tsentr, July 29, 2010, 12:04, available from 

www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/07/29/74167.shtml.

19. In 2002, the ChRI’s jihadist wing had convinced 

Maskhadov of the need to jihadize the ChRI’s constitution and 

expand their operations across the North Caucasus and Russia. 

“Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: ‘Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,” KavkazInform.com, 

May 27, 2010, 05:13, available from www.kavkazinform.com/2011-

05-27-02-00-06/3-2011-05-27-05-14-31.html. The first result was the 

October 2002 Dubrovka Theatre hostage taking. According to a 

CE biography of the late Dagestan amir and CE Shariah Court 

“qadi” (chief magistrate) Magomedali Vagabov, a.k.a. Seifullah 

Gubdenskii, in autumn 2003 Vagabov and his fellow mujahedin 

wanted to go to Chechnya and to fight but were ordered to remain near Khasavyurt, Dagestan, “in connection with a decision 

of Maskhadov and Basaev to spread combat to the entire territory of 

the Caucasus” (my italics), “Amir Dagestanskogo Fronta i K”adii 

Imarata Kavkaz Saifullakh. Chast’ 2—Dzhikhad,” Jamaat Shariat.

com, August 13, 2010, 02:50, available from jamaatshariat.com/ru/-

mainmenu-29/14-facty/1105--2-.html. For the interview of Ichkeria 

Republic President Aslan Maskhadov and Chairman of the Shar-
71

iat Committee of Ichkeria Republic’s State Defense Committee 

Abdul-Khalim, Sadulaev, see “’My perenosim voinu na territoriyu vraga. . . .’,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, August 1, 2004, 13:09:21, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2004/08/01/24101.shtml. In 

an August 1, 2004, interview Maskhadov portrayed himself as a 

devout Muslim but purely nationalist freedom fighter, but he also 

publicly supported the creation of a broad Muslim cohort of insurgents for actions throughout the North Caucasus, and indeed 

all of Russia. Seated next to his designated successor and ChRI 

Shariah Court Chairman Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev for a joint interview, Maskhadov warned: “We are capable of carrying out such 

operations in Ichkeria, Ingushetiya and Russia, and we will prove 

it.” See “’My perenosim voinu na territoriyu vraga. . .’,” KavkazTsentr, August 1, 2004, 13:09:21, available from www.kavkazcenter.

com/russ/content/2004/08/01/24101.shtml. After Maskhadov’s death 

in March 2005, new ChRI president Sadulaev created the North 

Caucasus and Dagestan Fronts in May 2005, demonstrating his 

intent to spread the jihad across the North Caucasus. The North 

Caucasus Front included Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria Sectors. See “ukazom Prezidenta ChRI Sadulaeva sozdan Kavkazskii 

front,” Kavkaz tsentr, May 16, 2005, 00:54:35, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2005/05/16/33965.shtml. Upon his 

succession of Sadulaev in June 2006, Umarov created the Volga 

and Urals Fronts in order to target Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and 

other Russian Federation regions with significant Muslim Tatar 

and Bashkir populations. See “Prezident ChRI podpisal ukazy 

o sozdanii Uralskogo i Povolzhskgo frontov,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, 

July 9, 2007, 14:34, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2006/07/09/45779.shtml. In January 2006, Basaev, encouraged by Kabardin mujahedin like Anzor Astemirov and Musa 

Mukozhev, convinced ChRI president Sadulaev to create a council of ulema, Islamic scholars, in preparation for the declaration of 

the Caucasus Emirate (CE), but Sadulaev and Basaev were killed 

in June and July, respectively, leaving the task to Umarov. “Amir 

Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: ‘Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili 

Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim.”

20. For the full declaration, see “Ofitsial’nyi reliz zayavleniya Amira Dokki Umarova o provozglashenii Kavkazskogo 

Emirata,” Kavkaz tsentr, November 21, 2007, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/11/21/54480.shtml; and “Komu 

vygodna provokatsiay pod nazvaniem ‘Kavkazskii Emirat’,” 
72

Chechenpress.org, October 29, 2007, available from www.chechenpress.org/events/2007/10/29/04.shtml.

21. “Amir Dokku Abu Usman o bin Ladene, Imarate Kavkaz I poteryakh modzhakhedov,” Kavkaz tsentr, May 17, 

2011, 00:01, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/

2011/05/17/81607.shtml. The English translation is available from 

www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2011/05/17/14313.shtml.

22. See, for example, Testimony of Miriam Lanskoy, “Human Rights in the North Caucasus,” Tom Lantos Human Rights 

Commission, U.S. Congress, April 15, 2011, available from tlhrc.

house.gov/docs/transcripts/2011_04_15_North_Caucasus/Lanskoy_

Testimony.pdf; “Miriam Lanskaya o terakte v Domodedovo i momente istiny,” Caucasus Times, February 2, 2011, available from 

www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20748; Robert Pape, Lindsey 

O’Rourke, and Jenna McDermit, “What Makes Chechen Women 

So Dangerous?” New York Times, March 31, 2010; and Mairbek 

Vatchagaev, “Arrests in Europe Place 100,000 Member Chechen 

Diaspora in the Spotlight,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 215, December 2, 2010, 01:13, available from 

www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%

5D=37230&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=85a84a8365.

23. “Ofitsial’nyi reliz zayavleniya Amira Dokki Umarova 

o provozglashenii Kavkazskogo Emirata,” and “Obrashchenie 

amira IK Dokku Abu Usman k musulmanam Egipta i Tunis,” JamaatShariat.com, available from www.jamaatshariat.com.

24. “Raz’yasnenie Amira IK Dokku Abu Usman v svyazi s fitnoi sredi modzhakhedov,” Kavkaz tsentr, October 18, 

2010, 12:51, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content

/2010/10/18/75902.shtml.

25. Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, “Vchera, segodnya, zavtra . . . ,”

Hunafa.com, April 24, 2010, 11:23, available from hunafa.

com/?p=3451.

26. “Stennogramma video: Kadii IK Abu Mukhammad—

‘Otvety na voprosy’—1 chast’,” Guraba.info, July 8, 2011, 00:18, 

available from guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1117--

i-q-q-1-.html; and VDagestan.info, July 8, 2011, available from 
73

vdagestan.info/2011/07/08/%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b

8%d0%b9-%d0%b8%d0%ba-%d0%b0%d0%b1%d1%83-%d0

%bc%d1%83%d1%85i%d0%b0%d0%bc%d0%bc%d0%b0%d

0%b4-%d0%be%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%b5%d1%82%d1%8b-

%d0%bd%d0%b0-%d0%b2%d0%be%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be/.

27. The CE’s DV mujahedin provided a somewhat explicit description of this strategy in “Perekhvat initsiativy,” Jamaat Shariat, 

June 2, 2010, 03:29, available from www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/-

mainmenu-29/14--/834-2010-06-02-03-05-02.html.

28. “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usman: ‘My osvobodim Krasnodarskii krai, Astrakhan i Povolzhskii zemli . . .”, 

Kavkaz tsentr, March 8, 2010, 11:38, available from www.kavkazcenter.

com/russ/content/2010/03/08/71087.shtml.

29. These include, according to my own estimate, some 30 in 

the last 2 months of 2007, 373 in 2008, 511 in 2009, 583 in 2010, and 

some 300 in the first 5 months of 2011.

30. Gordon M. Hahn, “The Caucasus Emirate’s ‘Year of the 

Offensive’ in Figures: Data and Analysis of the Caucasus Emirate’s Terrorist Activity in 2009,” Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report (henceforth IIPER), No. 7, January 18, 2010; Gordon M. 

Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009,” IIPER, No. 8, February 5, 2010; Gordon M. 

Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statistics,” IIPER, No. 33, January 26, 2011; and Gordon M. Hahn, “CEAffiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Resulting Casualties from January Through June 2011,” IIPER, No. 44, 

August 12, 2011, all available from www.miis.edu/academics/faculty

/ghahn/report.

31. “Fatalities by Year and Month as Part of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in All Theatres of Operation,” Icasulaties.org, 

available from icasualties.org/oef/ByMonth.aspx; “Operation Enduring Freedom: U.S. Wounded Totals,” Icasualties.org, available 

from icasualties.org/OEF/USCasualtiesByState.aspx.

32. See the video “Majlis al-Shura of the Caucasus Emirate—25 

April 2009,” You Tube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=DQQKPNfmo1U. 

For the English translation of Umarov’s post-Shura declaration 
74

with a link to his downloadable video statement in Russian, see 

“Amir Dokka Abu Usman: ‘This Year Will Be Our Offensive 

Year’,” Kavkaz tsentr, May 17, 2009, 15:17, available from www.

kavkaz.tv/eng/content/2009/05/17/10700.shtml.

33. See, for example, Said Abu Saad, Buryatskii, “Istishkhad 

mezhdu pravdoi i lozh’yu,” Hunafa.com, December 9, 2009, 1:01, 

available from hunafa.com/?p=2514; “Said abu Saad. Ob rezultatakh operatsii v Nazrani 17 avgusta 2009g,” Hunafa.com, September 7, 2009, 11:23, available from hunafa.com/?p=1984; Said 

Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi Istiny i lzhi,” Hunafa.info, May 30, 2009, 1:01, available from hunafa.

com??p=1534; Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad 

iznutri: Geroi istiny i lzhi, Chast’ 2,” Hunafa.info, June 24, 2009, 

4:04, available from hunafa.info/?p=1715; and “Said Abu Saad. 

Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi Istiny i lzhi, Chast’ 3,” 

Hunafa.com, July 24, 2009, 1:01, available from hunafa.com??p=1855.

34. Umarov appeared in a videotape released shortly after 

the bombing along with the Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs Brigade's 

(RSMB) amir Khamzat and the suicide bomber, Magomed Yevloev, before the latter was dispatched to Moscow. See “Video: 

Amir Imarata Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usman posetil bazu Brigady 

Shakhidov Riyadus Salikhin i sdelal zayavlenie,” Kavkaz tsentr, 

February 4, 2011, 23:18, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2011/02/04/78877.shtml; and “Obrashchenie amira Imarata 

Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usman v svyazi s Shakhidskoi operatsiei v 

Moskve 24 yanvarya 2011 goda” at “Amir Dokku Abu Usman: 

‘Spetsoperatsiya v Moskve byla provedena po moemu prikazu’,” 

Kavkaz tsentr, February 7, 2011, 22:58, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/02/07/78967.shtml. 

35. Then U.S. State Department Deputy Chief for C.I.S. Affairs Stephen Sestanovich told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in his November 1999 testimony: “Chechen insurgents are 

receiving help from radical groups in other countries, including 

Osama bin Laden’s network and others who have attacked or 

threatened Americans and American interests.” See “Text: Sestanovich Statement on Chechnya to Senate Committee, November 

4,” GlobalSecurity.com, USIS Washington File, November 4, 1999; 

and www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1999/11/991104-

chechen-usia1.htm. See also then U.S. National Security Council 
75

adviser Richard Clarke’s comments regarding ChRI-AQ ties on 

the Charlie Rose Show, PBS, November 30, 1999, available from 

www.charlierose.com/view/interview/3968; and then U.S. Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Director Joseph Bodansky’s comments on ChRI-AQ ties in Joseph 

Bodansky, “Chechnya: The Mujahedin Factor,” Freeman.org, 1999, 

available from www.freeman.org/m_online/bodansky/chechnya.htm.

36. Defense Intelligence Agency Declassified Swift Knight 

Report, Document No. 3095345, no date, Judicial Watch, available 

from www.judicialwatch.org/cases/102/dia.pdf.

37. Ibid., p. 4.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

40. Ibid., p. 5.

41. On Al-Haramain, see “Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation 

v. United States Department of the Treasury, Hearing No. 10-

350,” Ninth Circuit Court, March 9, 2011, available from www.ca9.

uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000007126; and the

U.S. government’s sentencing memorandum, evidentiary exhibits, and a Russian FSB officer’s testimony about al-Haramian’s 

assistance to Chechen and Dagestani mujahedin in “United 

States of America v. Perouz Sedaghaty, Case No. 05-CR-60008-

HO,” United States District Court for the State of Oregon, November 23, 2010, available from the Investigative Project, www.

investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1422.pdf#page=65.

42. See Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Robert Walker’s “Affidavit in Support of Complaint Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. and Emman M. Arnout, a.k.a. Abu 

Mahmood, a.k.a. Abdel Samia,” April 29, 2002, in the 2002 case, 

“The United States of America v. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. and Emman M. Arnout,” Investigative Project, p. 3, 

available from www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/94.

pdf (henceforth Walker Affadavit).
76

43. “Treasury Designates Benevolence International Foundation and Related Entities as Financiers of Terrorism,” Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Public Affairs, PO3632, November 19, 2002, available from www.investigativeproject.

org/documents/case_docs/1176.pdf.

44. Walker Affidavit, p. 3.

45. Walker Affidavit, pp. 3, 24-28.

46. One disc of videos was viewed by the author and deposited by him in the archives at the Hoover Institution, Stanford 

University.

47. “Indictment in United States of America v. Babar Ahmad, 

aka Babar Ahmed, and Azzam Publications,” Investigative Project, no date, pp. 1, 5-9, and 12-13, available from www.investigative

project.org/documents/case_docs/96.pdf.

48. Walker Affidavit, pp. 24-28.

49. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 180; and S. 

Pryganov, Vtorzhenie v Rossiyu, Moscow, Russia: Eksprint, 2003, 

pp. 189-90.

50. “Chechen commander Basayev vows more attacks,” BBC 

Monitoring, in Johnson’s Russia List, November 2, 2004, citing 

Kavkaz tsentr; see also The Globe and Mail, November 2, 2004, available from www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/

LAC/20041102/CHECHEN02/TPInternational/?query=basayev.

51. “Militants Target Arabs in Massive Fundraising Campaign 

for Chechen Insurgents,” Transnational Security Issues Report, December 13, 2007; and “Amir Seifullakh Gubdenskii, (ra): Ot togo, 

chto my zdes’ voyuem, my nichego ne vyigraem,” JamaatShariat.

com, November 12, 2010, 05:17, available from www.jamaatshariat.

com/-mainmenu-29/14-facty/1345-2010-11-12-02-18-12.html.

52. Swift Knight Report, p. 3.

53. Ibid., p. 5.
77

54. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 179.

55. RFERL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 60, March 28, 2003; RFERL 

Russian Federation Report, Vol. 4, No. 14, April 17, 2002; “Russia’s ‘Taliban’ Faces Uneasy Future after Guantanamo Torment,” 

AFP, August 1, 2004; and Regions.ru, March 27, 2003, available 

from www.regions.ru.

56. The account does not make it precisely clear whether Vagabov himself went to Afghanistan. “Amir Dagestanskogo Fronta 

i K adii Imarata Kavkaz Saifullakh. Chast’ 2—Dzhikhad.” Jamaat 

Shariat, August 13, 2010, 02:50, available from jamaatshariat.com/

ru/-mainmenu-29/14-facty/1105--2-.html.

57. “Czech Police Arrest Suspected Russia’s North Caucasus 

Terrorists,” BNO News, May 3, 2011, 2:27, available from wireupdate.com/wires/17128/czech-police-arrest-suspected-russias-north-caucasus-terrorists/.

58. The Bulgar Jamaat’s Russian-language website is available from tawba.info or jamaatbulgar.narod.ru. For the call for jihad against Russia, see “Obrashchenie Dzhamaata Bulgar k 

Musul’manam Rossii, Jammat Bulgar,” February 28, 2009, available from jamaatbulgar.narod.ru/statiy/v1_28-02-09.htm. See also 

Laith Alkhouri, “’Jamaat Bulgar’ Website—‘About Us’ Section—

Provides Background Information on Ties to Taliban, Tactics,” 

Flashpoint Intel, April 29, 2010, available from www.flashpoint-intel.

com/images/documents/pdf/0410/flashpoint_jamaatbulgaraboutus.pdf.

59. Brian Glynn Williams, “Shattering the Al-Qaeda-Chechen 

Myth,” Jamestown Foundation Chechen Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 40, November 6, 2003; Brian Glyn Williams, “Allah’s Foot Soldiers: An 

Assessment of the Role of Foreign Fighters and Al-Qa-ida in the 

Chechen Insurgency,” in Moshe Gammer, ed., Ethno-Nationalism, 

Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, London, 

UK: Routledge, 2007, pp. 156-78; and Brian Glynn Williams, Keynote Lecture, International Conference, “The Northern Caucasus: 

Russia’s Tinderbox,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, November 30-December 1, 2010.
78

60. This is according to Iraqi Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib. 

See “Iraq’s Al-Naqib—‘Terrorists’ From Chechnya, Sudan, and 

Syria Killed Arrested,” Beirut LBC SAT Television, 1300 GMT, January 30, 2005.

61. See Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 292.

62. The four were 18-year-old Sergey Viktorovich Vysotskiy, 

20-year-old Timur Vladimirovich Khozkov, 20-year-old Aslan Yerikovich Imkodzhayev, and a 20-year-old Dagestani national who 

calls himself Abu Abdul. “Vlasti Livana obvinyayut v terrorizme 

chetyrekh grazhdan Rossii,” Kavkaz uzel, October 5, 2007, available from www.kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/1198805.html;

and “Four Russian Citizens Accused of Terrorism in Lebanon,” Retwa.org, October 5, 2007, available from www.retwa.org/

home.cfm?articleId=4834, citing Kavkaz uzel, available from www.

kavkaz-uzel.ru.

63. Luiza Orazaeva, “NAK: ubityi v Kabardino-Balkarii boevik obuchalsya v Livane,” Kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 16, 2011, 21:45, 

available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/182411/.

64. Dagestani mujahed Yasin Rasulov has written convincingly about this in Yasin Rasulov, Dzhikhad na Severnom Kavkaze: 

storonniki i protivniki, Kavkaz tsentr, pp. 18-29 and 55-59, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/islam/jihad_in_ncaucasus/

PDF_version.pdf. Rasulov was killed by Russian forces in 2007; he 

uses reliable pre-communist Russian Muslim scholarly sources to 

document his claims.

65. The extent to which the Russian conquest and the Caucasus, especially Dagestani resistance in the 19th century, were 

marked by an intra-Caucasus struggle between gazavatists, defending local sovereignty and the customs of adat and Sufism, and 

pro-Shariah quasi-Islamists like Imam Shamil, Gazi Mukhammad, 

and Kuraly-Magoma, sometimes backed by the Iranian Shah, is 

often overlooked. See, for example, N. I. Pokrovskii, Kavkazskie 

Voiny i Imamat Shamilya, Moscow, Russia: ROSSPEN, 2009.

66. Rasulov, Dzhikhad na Severnom Kavkaze: storonniki i protivniki.
79

67. Olga Bobrova, “Imarat Kavkaz: Gosudarstvo kotorogo net,” Novaya gazeta, No. 27, March 17, 2010, available from 

www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/027/18.html; and Oleg Guseinov, 

“Stroite’stvo khrama Marii Magdaliny priostanovlena iz-za otsutsviya sredstv,” Gazeta yuga, April 21, 2005, available from www.

gazetayuga.ru/archive/2005/16.htm.

68. Aleksandr Zhukov, Kabardino-Balkariya: Na puti k katastofe, 

Legal Defense Center ‘Memorial’, Kavkaz uzel, Appendix 9, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/analyticstext/analytics/id/1231255.

html; Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, pp. 152-65; “Amir Seifullah o 

protsesse podgotovki k provoglasheniyu Kavkazskogo Emirata”; 

Gordon M. Hahn, “Profile of ‘Seifullah’ Anzor Astemirov, Part 3: 

Astemirov and the Caucasus Emirate,” IIPER, No. 23, September 

13, 2010, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/21434/original/

kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_23_sept_2010.pdf; “Amir Seifullah: ‘Pobeda ot Allakha, tak zhe kak i porazhenie’,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, May 

29, 2006, 03:34, and May 30, 2006, 04:34, available from www.

kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2006/05/29/44895; Aleksandr Zhukov,

“Religioznyi raskol i politicheskoe reshenie,” Polit.ru, May 18, 

2006, 08:25, available from www.polit.ru/analytics/2006/05/18/

kanokov.html.

69. “Amir Seifullah o protsesse podgotovki k provoglasheniyu Kavkazskogo Emirata”; Hahn, “Profile of ‘Seifullah’ Anzor 

Astemirov, Part 3: Astemirov and the Caucasus Emirate”; and 

“Shamil sprosil menya: ‘Kogda stanesh’ Amirom, ty ob’ yavish’ 

Imarat?’,” Kavkaz tsentr, August 30, 2011, 02:19, available from 

www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/08/30/84755.shtml.

70. “Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Sheikh Said Abu Sadd al-Buryatii-Said Buryatskii,” Kavkaz uzel, August 17, 2009, 17:02, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/158565; and “Kadyrov nazval Saida Buryatskogo ‘ideologom terakta, nakachivayushchim 

smertnikov tabletkami,” July 30, 2009, 11:39, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/07/30/67080.shtml; and Said Abu

Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi Istiny 

i lzhi,” Hunafa.info, May 30, 2009, 1:01, available from hunafa.

com??p=1534.
80

71. Ibid. One source reports that Buryatskii supposedly visited the North Caucasus as early as the late 1990s and at that time 

declared his loyalty to the mujahedin before he traveled to Egypt 

and other countries in the Middle East to receive a “Wahhabist” 

education. Alena Larina, “Poslednii spektakl’,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 

March 5, 2010, available from www.rg.ru/2010/03/05/said-bur-site.

html. Buryatskii’s conversion and radicalization might have been 

connected to his relationship with Bakhtiyar Umarov, no relation 

to the CE’s amir, a local imam in Ulan-Ude formerly from Uzbekistan. In November 2008, Bakhtiyar Umarov was arrested in 

Russia, charged with having ties to the radical international Islamist party, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami’, and had his recently granted 

Russian passport confiscated. The CE-affiliated site Kavkaz tsentr

claimed locals were sure imam Umarov’s arrest was a consequence of his association with Buryatskii. “Buryatiya. Arestovan 

znakomyi Sheikha Saida Burtaskogo imam Bakhtiyar Umarov,” 

Kavkaz tsentr, November 21, 2008, 07:53, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/11/21/62314.shtml.

72. Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: 

Geroi istiny i lzhi, Chast’ 2,” Hunafa.info, June 24, 2009, 4:04, available from hunafa.info/?p=1715.

73. “Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Sheikh Said Abu Sadd al-Buryatii—Said Buryatskii.”

74. Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi istiny 

i lzhi, Chast’ 2”; Video “How I went to Jihad and What I have 

seen here (English subtitles)—Sheikh Sayeed of Buratia 1,” ‘i24 

sishan tschetschenien jihad islam nasheed qoqaz kaukasus’, You Tube, 

June 17, 2009, www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgE19xcasEg; Said Abu 

Saad, Buryatskii, “Said Buryatskii: ‘Vzglyad na dzhikhad isnutri, po proshestvii goda,” Imam TV, May 18, 2009, http://imamtv.

com/news-18-05-1009.htm citing Hunafa.com; and “Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Sheikh Said Abu Saad al-Buryatii—Said Buryatskii.”

75. Hahn, “The Caucasus Emirate’s ‘Year of the Offensive’ in 

Figures: Data and Analysis of the Caucasus Emirate’s Terrorist 

Activity in 2009”; and Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus 

Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009.”
81

76. On these ethnic Slav CE operatives and their terrorist attacks and plots, see Gordon M. Hahn, “Alleged Russian Jihadi 

Suicide Bomber Viktor Dvorakovskii Captured,” IIPER, No. 43, 

July 21, 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/21196/

original/KAVKAZJIHAD_MonTREP_IIPER_20_Aug2010.pdf; Gordon M. Hahn, “Kosolapov Re-emerges Ahead of Peak Jihadi 

Fighting Season,” IIPER, No. 41, May 27, 2011, available from 

www.miis.edu/media/view/23146/original/kavkazjihad_montrep_

iiper_41_june_2011.pdf; and Gordon M. Hahn, “Two More Suicide 

Bombings,” IIPER, No. 35, February 18, 2011, available from www.

miis.edu/media/view/22492/original/kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_35_

feb_2011.pdf.

77. “Amir Dagestanskogo Fronta i K’adii Imarata Kavkaz 

Saifullakh. Chast’ 1—Do Dzhikhada,” Jamaat Shariat, August 

8, 2010, 21:58, available from jamaatshariat.com/ru/fakty/29-

facty/1089-2010-08-08-21-40-39.html.

78. “Amir Dagestanskogo Fronta i K’adii Imarata Kavkaz 

Saifullakh. Chast’ 2—Dzhikhad,” Jamaat Shariat, August 13, 

2010, 02:50, available from jamaatshariat.com/ru/-mainmenu-29/14-

facty/1105--2-.html.

79. Leading jihadism expert Evan Kohlmann describes Ansar 

as “self-selecting form of internet-based terrorism,” “promoting 

the mission of al-Qa`ida” and “loyal” to AQ. Evan Kohlmann, “A 

Beacon for Extremists: The Ansar al-Mujahideen Web Forum,” 

CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 2, February 2010, pp. 1-4, available 

from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-beacon-for-extremists-the-ansar-almujahideen-web-forum.

80. “Hammer Time: Ansar al-Mujahideen Webmaster Arrested!,” Jawa Report, August 31, 2010, available from mypetjawa.

mu.nu/archives/203766.php.

81. “Fairfax County Man Accused of Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” U.S. Attorney General’s Office, July 21, 2010, 

available from www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFA

rchive/10/20100721chessernr.html; and “Hammer Time: Ansar alMujahideen Webmaster Arrested!”
82

82. “Hammer Time: Ansar al-Mujahideen Webmaster Arrested!”

83. Kohlmann, “A Beacon for Extremists: The Ansar al-Mujahideen Web Forum.”

84. “Announcing the Start of a New Campaign in Support of 

the Caucasus Emirate,” Alqimmah.net, December 5, 2010, available 

from www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=21139&goto=nextoldest.

85. “V global’noi seti interneta otkrylsya novyi forum v 

podderzhku Dzhikhada,” Islamdin, July 20, 2010, 16:18, available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view

=article&id=849:2010-07-20-16-49-47&catid=32:2009-03-05-23-19-

06&Itemid=29.

86. According to the Spanish Civil Guard, Errai registered 

and paid for the hosting of the site for purposes of spreading jihadi propaganda and indoctrinating and recruiting sympathizers 

to radical Islamism and jihad. “Another Online Jihadi Arrested in 

Spain,” Jawa Report, August 31, 2010, available from mypetjawa.

mu.nu/archives/203757.php.

87. Awlaki proposes creation of fee-free and uncensored discussion fora, lists of e-mail addresses so Muslims interested in jihad 

can contact each other and exchange information, online publications and distribution of literature and news of the jihad, and sites 

which focus on separate aspects of the jihad. He urges Muslims to 

follow the events of the jihad because it “enlivens our connection 

to the jihad”; “strengthens our belongingness to the Umma”; “approves our joining the jihad”; “inflames our desire to receive martyrdom”; allows Muslims “to see how Allah defends his slaves 

and leads them to victory”; provides “practical examples on how 

our brothers are applying theory in contemporary conditions”; 

and “strengthens our attention to the Koran,” to which strengthened ties “[reach their] peak when we ourselves participate in this 

conflict, jihad, entering the ranks of the mujahedin.” “V global’noi 

seti interneta otkrylsya novyi forum v podderzhku Dzhikhada,” 

Islamdin.com, July 20, 2010, 16:18, available from www.islamdin.

com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=849:2010-07-

20-16-49-47&catid=32:2009-03-05-23-19-06&Itemid=29.
83

88. “Imam Anuar al’ Aulyaki: Al-Dzhanna—Chast 1,” 

Islamdin.com, July 25, 2010, 06:09, available from www.

islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=854:-

q-q-1&catid=4:2009-02-04-14-07-09&Itemid=28; and Anwar Al-Awlaki, “Akhira: Sudnyi den i Ognennyi ad,” Islamdin.com, March 

25, 22:45, available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=1084:2011-03-25-22-51-31&catid=4:2009-

02-04-14-07-09&Itemid=28.

89. Abdallakh Shamil Abu-Idris, “My odrerzhali strategicheskyu pobedu,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, January 9, 2006, 08:47:10, 

available from www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2006/01/09/40869.

shtml.

90. “Prezident ChRI podpisal ukazy o sozdanii Uralskogo i 

Povolzhskgo frontov,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, July 9, 2007, 14:34, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2006/07/09/45779.shtml.

91. A group of Tatar “garage jihadists,” the so-called “Islamic 

Jamaat,” was allegedly formed in Tatarstan by ethnic Tatars before it was uncovered and its members tried, convicted, and sentenced to various prison sentences in 2008. However, there was 

no evidence of ties to the CE. Irina Borogan, “Dzhamaat v dva 

khoda,” Novaya gazeta, No. 9, February 7, 2008, p. 10, available 

from www.novayagazeta.ru/data/09/10.html.

92. Marat Gareev and El’vira Mirgaziyanova, “Krupnyie terakty gotovilis’ i v Bashkirii,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 29, 

2010, available from www.kp.ru/daily/24463.5/624739/.

93. “V Bashkirii ‘shyut’ delo ‘Uiguro-Bulgarskogo dzhamaata,’” Islam.ru, April 29, 2009, available from www.islam.ru/rus/2009-

04-29/. Dorokhov was killed when he allegedly offered resistance 

during a search of his residence. His colleague, Rustem Zainagutdinov was sentenced to 15 years for planning to blow up a barrier 

separating a water supply tank and an ammonia tank, attack a 

traffic police post and seize weapons, and seize the Salavat city’s 

FSB building. Stanislav Shakhov and Ivan Panfilov, “KP: V Bashkirii obezvrezhen terroristicheskii Uiguro-Bulgarskii dzhamaat,” 

TsentrAzii, March 29, 2010, 09:30, available from www.centrasia.ru/

newsA.php?st=1269840600.
84

94. In March 2010, after a group of armed men attacked a 

food store in Oktyabrskii District, Bashkortostan, wounding two 

seriously, the Bashkortostan Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) 

mounted an operation, eventually capturing a group of 10 Bashkir and two Ingush mujahedin said to be providing funds to the 

CE and led by one Bashir Allautdinovich Pliev (born 1966) from 

Ingushetia. “V Bashkirii zaderzhany 8 chlenov religiozno-ekstremistckogo bandpodpol’ya,” Regnum.ru, March 29, 2010, 10:27, 

available from www.regnum.ru/news/1267599.html; and “Uderzhan esho odin uchastnik ekstrimistskogo bandpodpol’ya,” 

Regnum.ru, April 1, 2010, 19:04, available from www.regnum.ru/

news/fd-volga/bash/1269348.html. In July another jihadi jamaat was 

allegedly involved in a series of attacks on police and planning 

some 18 more, including on gas pipelines, in Bashkortostan, and 

perm Oblast. “Obstrelyavshikh post DPS ishchet polk militsii,” 

Lifenews.ru, July 4, 2010, 16:55, and July 5, 2010, 20:06, lifenews.

ru/news/30293, 08:25, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2010/07/05/73590.shtml; “V Bashkortostane atakovan blokpost okkupatsionnoi bandy DPS,” Kavkaz tsentr, July 5, 2010, 

00:20; “Viktor Palagin: ‘Ekstremistov vovse ne shef FSB pridumal,” MediaKorSet, December 16, 2011, 21:43, available from www.

mkset.ru/news/person/13353/; and Tatyana Maiorov, “V Bashkirr 

minuvshim letom predotvratili neskol’ko teraktov,” Rossiiskaya 

gazeta, December 17, 2010, available from www.rg.ru/2010/12/17/

reg-bashkortostan/fsb-anons.html. In February 2011, another group 

of four mujahedin was uncovered in the Oktyabrskii District of 

Bashkiriya. Its members were charged with illegal weapons possession and illegal production of and intent to use explosives. 

They were said to have “extremist literature,” and the official arrest report stated that one of the arrestees was the amir of the 

“Oktyabrskii Jamaat” and that the jamaat was part of the CE. “Alleged Islamic Extremists Detained In Russia’s Bashkortostan,” 

RFERL, February 8, 2011, available from www.rferl.org/content/

bashkortostan_islamists/2301430.html. In Tatarstan, a jihadist cell 

allegedly tied to Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami was uncovered and destroyed in November 2010. “Likvidirovannnyie v Tatarstane terroristy byli islamistami,” Regnum.ru, November 25, 2010, 14:48, 

available from www.regnum.ru/news/fd-volga/tatarstan/1350137.

html. A series of incidents involving alleged mujahedin occurred in Astrakhan in late 2010 and early 2011. See Gordon M. 
85

Hahn, “More Evidence of Jihadism in Astrakhan,” IIPER, No. 

41, May 27, 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/23146/

original/kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_41_june_2011.pdf; and Gordon 

M. Hahn, “Is There an Astrakhan Jamaat?,” IIPER, No. 36, March 

11, 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/22714/original/

kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_36_mar_2011.pdf. 

95. “Zayavlenie o granitsakh vilaiyat Idel-Ural,” Kavkaz tsentr, 

January 26, 2011, 21:12, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2011/01/26/78553.shtml; and “Pis’mo v redaktsiyu: Obrashchenie modzhakhedov Idel-Ural k modzhakhedam Imarata 

Kavkaz,” Kavkaz tsentr, February 1, 2011, 00:03, available from 

www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/02/01/78726.shtml. 

96. The failed 2010 New Year’s Eve Moscow plot involved 

several Stavropol residents, who, in turn, were friends or acquaintances with several ethnic Russian mujahedin who converted to 

Islam, including the abovementioned ethnic Russian, Islamic-convert couple, Vitalii Razdobudko and Marina Khorosheva, who 

carried out separate suicide bombings in Gubden, Dagestan, on 

February 14, 2011, and Viktor Dvorakovskii, who was wanted for 

5 months and finally captured in July 2011.

97. Video “Shura amirov Dagestana. Bayat Amira Dagestana 

Khasana, October 19, 2010,” JamaatShariat.com, December 1, 2010, 

available from www.jamaatshariat.com/ru; and Kavkaz tsentr, December 1, 2010, available from www.kavkazcenter.com.

98. “Press-Sluzhba Amira DF: My gordy uchasti nashikh 

brat’ev, nashi ubityie—v Rayu, vashi—c Adu,” Jamaat Shariat, 

August 22, 2010, 17:53, available from jamaatshariat.com/-mainmenu-29/14-facty/1152-2010-08-22-17-00-31.html.

99. Sochi and the southern Krasnodar are native lands of 

ethnic Circassian Adygs; the Kabards, and Cherkess of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya 

(KChR) respectively, are also Circassian ethnic groups. The locus 

for much of the Olympic Games is located on Red Hill, known as 

the spot of the last battle of the Circassians against the Russians, 

which ended in their defeat and eventual deportation and exile of 

many Circassians abroad.
86

100. The attacks included a truck bomb targeting a resort hotel that was uncovered and disarmed and the bombing of support pillars for a ski lift that brought down over 40 of its cabins 

and necessitated closure of the resort for several days. See Gordon M. Hahn, “The OVKBK’s Sochi Vector,” IIPER, No. 36, March 

11, 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/22714/original/

kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_36_mar_2011.pdf.

101. CE maps depict the future emirate’s territory as comprising the entire North Caucasus, including predominantly ethnicRussian populated regions like the abovementioned Krasnodar 

and Stavropol Territories. But both Russian territory north of the 

CE’s North Caucasus and the Transcaucasus south of the North 

Caucasus—that is, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—are labeled “occupied Muslim lands.” See “Ideyu otdeleniya Kavkaz est 

smysli obsuzhdat,’ chtoby lishit’ islamistov znameni borby . . .!,”

Kavkaz tsentr, February 12, 2011, 11:15, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/02/12/79121.shtml; and “Posol 

SShA v Moskve o neizbezhnom ob”edinenie musul’man Severnogo Kavkaza,” Kavkaz tsentr, December 6, 2010, 09:18, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/12/06/77052.shtml.

102. Likely CE mujahedin from Dagestan have been crossing 

Azerbaijan’s border recently, engaging battle in the north with 

Baku’s army and police. A recent indigenous jihadist attack on 

Baku’s Shiite-led Juma mosque underscores the point. An armed 

Wahhabi group led by a former Azeri army officer Kyamran Asadov was uncovered in October 2007 plotting to attack state institutions and blow up U.S. and other Western embassies in Azerbaijan. In 2008, a jihadist group previously active in Chechnya 

and Dagestan was uncovered in Baku by Azeri intelligence.

103. Video, “Shura amirov Dagestana,” Bayat Amira Dagestana Khasana, October 19, 2010.”

104. Rose revolution leaders and former Saakashvili allies, such as the former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze 

and former Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili, have claimed 

that Tbilisi has been training Ingush mujahedin and that Georgian banks have facilitated money transfers to the Caucasus 

mujahedin. “Burjanadze Talks About Danger of one more War 
87

from Russia,” Georgian Journal, October 21, 2010, available from 

georgianjournal.ge/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i

d=664:burjanadze-talks-about-danger-of-one-more-war-from-russia-

&catid=9:news&Itemid=8; and “Burjanadze Slams Visa Provocations,” Interfax, October 21, 2010, 19:01, available from www.

interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=2&id=197175. Former U.S. Foreign 

Service officer and U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee foreign policy analyst, James George Jatras claims that in December 

2009, a secret meeting took place in Tbilisi with “representatives 

of numerous jihad groups based in various Islamic and European 

countries for the purpose of coordinating their activities on Russia’s southern flank.” According to Jatras, “the meeting was organized under the auspices of high officials of the Georgian government.” Although Saakashvili did not attend, Georgian MVD 

officials and “others acted as hosts and coordinators,” and the 

Georgian ambassador to Kuwait “purportedly facilitated” the 

participants’ travel “from the Middle East.” Finally, “[I]n addition 

to ’military’ operations (i.e., attacks in southern Russia) special 

attention was given to ideological warfare, for example, launching of the Russian-language TV station ‘First Caucasus’.” James 

Jatras, “The Georgian Imbroglio—And a Choice for the United 

States,” America-Russia Net, February 14, 2010, available from 

www.america-russia.net/eng/face/236661338?user_session=4827e878c

0267ddbdd6ee738f8212f1d.

105. Saoud Mekhennet and Michael Moss, “Europeans Are 

Being Trained in Pakistani Terrorism Camps, Officials Fear,” New 

York Times, September 10, 2007, p. A8.

106. “IJU: Message from the Mujahideen of the Khorasan to the 

Caucasus Emirate,” Kavkaz Jihad Blogspot, March 14, 2011, available from kavkaz-jihad.blogspot.com/2011/03/message-of-mujahideenfrom-khorasan-to.html; and “Video Badr at-Tawheed ‘Mensaje de 

los mujahidines del Jorasán al Emirato del Cáucaso,” Jihad-e-Informacion, March 2011, available from jihad-e-informacion.blogspot.

com/2011/03/video-badr-at-tawheed-mensaje-de-los.html.

107. Ibid.

108. “Tadzhikistan: Shakhid atakoval bazu RUBOP Sogdiiskii oblasti,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 3, 2010, 11:39, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/09/03/75000.
88

shtml; and “Tadzhikistan: Otvetstvennost’ za Shakhidskuyu 

ataku v Khudzhande vzyala na sebya organizarsiya ‘Dzhamaat 

Ansarullakh’,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 8, 2010, 12:23, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/09/08/75108.shtml. 

On these attacks, see also “MVD Tadzhikistana: Pri vzryve u 

zdaniya ROBOP v Khudzhande pogib militsioner, smertnikov 

bylo neskol’ko,” Ferghana.ru, September 3, 2010, 14:26, available 

from www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=15461&mode=snews; “Perestrelka s beglymi zaklyuchennymi proizoshlo v Tadzhikistane, 

rossiiskie voennyie v operatsii ne uchastvuyut,” Materik, September 8, 2010, 11:21:16, available from materik.ru/rubric/detail.

php?ID=10653; “Tadzhikistan: Po faktu vzryva v nochnom klube 

v Dushanbe zaderzhany dvoe podzrevaemykh,” Ferghana.ru, 

September 6, 2010, 10:14, available from www.ferghana.ru/news.

php?id=15470&mode=snews; and “GKNB Tadzhikistana: Nochnoi 

vzryv v disko-klube ‘Dusti’—khuliganstvo, a ne terakt,” Ferghana.

ru, September 6, 2010, 13:57, available from www.ferghana.ru/news.

php?id=15475&mode=snews.

109. “Obraschenie Kazakhstanskogo dzhamaata ‘Ansaru-ddin’,” Hunafa.com, November 10, 2010, 1:01, available from hunafa.com/?p=3839; and “Vopros o zakonnosti voennikh deistvii v 

Kazakhstane,” Hunafa.com, March 18, 2011, 1:01, available from 

hunafa.com/?p=4831#more-4831; and “Vopros o zakonnosti 

voennikh deistvii v Kazakhstane,” Kavkaz tsentr, March 19, 

2011, 12:16, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/

2011/03/19/80081.shtml.

110. Kazakhstan has played down the terrorist and religious nature of the May 17, 2011 suicide bombing and May 24 

car bombing in Alma-Ata or the killing of several policemen 

on July 7 in Aqtobe. “Vakhkhabity Velikoi Stepi,” Nezavismaya gazeta—Religii, July 20, 2011, available from religion.ng.ru/

problems/2011-07-20/4_vahhabity.html; “Kazakhstan Suicide Bombing Puts Spotlight on Western Regions,” Eurasianet.org, May 

24, 2011, 2:10, available from www.eurasianet.org/node/63549; 

“Two die in Kazakhstan car blast,” AFP, May 24 2011, available 

from news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/two-die-in-kazakhstancar-blast-20110524-1f1zk.html; “Suicide Bomber has Shahid Belt in 

Blast in Kazakhstan,” RETWA, May 17, 2011, available from www.

retwa.com/home.cfm?articleId=11372; “Kazakh City Hit By Suicide 

Blast, First Known Attack Of Its Kind,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
89

Liberty, May 17, 2011, available from www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan_suicide_bomber/24177028.html; “Suicide bomber attacks Kazakh secret police HQ ,” Telegraph, May 17, 2011, available from 

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/kazakhstan/8518895/Suicide-bomber-attacks-Kazakh-secret-police-HQ.html; and “Blast Kills

Two Outside Kazakh Security Service Building,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 24, 2011 09:02, available from www.

rferl.org/content/blast_outside_security_service_building_kazakh_

capital/24184422.html.

111. “Modzhahedi Kyrgyzstana prisyagnuli Amiry Islamskogo Emirata Afghanistan Myllo Omary,” Kavkaz tsentr,

March 22, 2011, 12:51, availale from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2011/03/22/80140.shtml.

112. See Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, pp. 221-25; and Gordon 

M. Hahn, “Anti-Americanism, Anti-Westernism, and Anti-Semitism Among Russia’s Muslims,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 16, No. 1, 

Winter 2008, pp. 49-60. 

113. “Belgian Islamist Abou Imran, of Shariah4Belgium: We 

Will Conquer the White House, Europe Will Be Dominated by 

Islam,” MEMRI, #2695, November 9, 2010, 09:42, available from 

www.memritv.org/clip/en/2695.htm.

114. Stephen Castle, “Police Arrest Suspects in Plot Against 

Belgium,” New York Times, November 23, 2010, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/europe/24belgium.html; 

Philippe Siuberski, “Police arrest 11 over Belgium ‘terror plot’,” 

Agence France Presse, November 23, 2010, available from news.

yahoo.com/s/afp/20101123/wl_afp/belgiumnetherlandsgermany

securityattacks/print; and Philippe Siuberski, “Belgium arrests 26 

in raids against terror,” NineMSN, November 24, 2010, 06:13, 

available from news.ninemsn.com.au/world/8168623/10-held-overterror-plot-in-belgium.

115. Valentina Pop, “Chechen Terror Suspects Busted in Belgian Raid,” EU Observer, November 24, 2010, 09:29, available from 

euobserver.com/9/31341; and Olesya Khantsevich, “Chechenskoe 

podpol’e raskryto v Belgii,” Nezavsismaya gazeta, November 25, 

2010, available from www.ng.ru/world/2010-11-25/1_belgium.html.
90

116. Castle, “Police Arrest Suspects in Plot Against Belgium”; 

Siuberski, “Police arrest 11 over Belgium ‘terror plot’”; Siuberski, 

“Belgium arrests 26 in raids against terror”; Pop, “Chechen Terror 

Suspects Busted in Belgian Raid”; and Khantsevich, “Chechenskoe podpol’e raskryto v Belgii.”

117. “Austria arrests Chechen fugitive in Belgium plot,” AP, 

December 4, 2010, 8:51:46, available from www.themoscowtimes.

com/news/article/austria-arrests-chechen-in-belgian-nato-plot/425658.

html.

118. “Austrian police arrest Chechen over possible jihad 

attack on Belgian NATO facility,” Jihad Watch, December 4, 2010, 

available from www.jihadwatch.org/2010/12/austrian-police-arrestchechen-over-possible-jihad-attack-on-belgian-nato-base.

html; and “Austrian police hold Chechen in Belgian attack 

probe,” Expatica, December 4, 2010, available from www.expatica.

com/be/news/belgian-news/austrian-police-hold-chechen-in-belgiumattack-probe_115126.html, citing “Austrian police hold Chechen in 

Belgian attack probe,” Agence France Press, December 4, 2010.

119. “Suspected Terrorist: A Ghost in Neunkirchen,” Die 

Presse, December 5, 2010, 18:19, available from diepresse.com/home/

panorama/oesterreich/616045/Mutmasslicher-Terrorist_Ein-Phantomin-Neunkirchen?direct=611111&_vl_backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/index.do&selChannel=100.

120. “Qaeda Plans US, UK Christmas Attacks: Iraq Official,” 

Reuters, December 16, 2010, 3:35, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2010/12/16/us-iraq-qaeda-idUSTRE6BF3CR20101216.

121. “Obrashchenie musul’man Bel’gii k imamu Abu 

Mukhamammadu al’-Makdisi za naztavleniem,” Islamdin.com, 

June 22, 2010, 19:01, available from www.islamdin.com/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=814:2010-06-22-19-09-

08&catid=25:2009-02-09-17-15-12&Itemid=17.

122. Castle, “Police Arrest Suspects in Plot Against Belgium”; 

Siuberski, “Police arrest 11 over Belgium ‘terror plot’”; and Siuberski, “Belgium arrests 26 in raids against terror.”
91

123. “Czech Police Arrest Suspected Russia’s North Caucasus 

Terrorists,” BNO News, May 3, 2011, 2:27, available from wireupdate.

com/wires/17128/czech-police-arrest-suspected-russias-north-caucasusterrorists/.

124. “Policie stiha pet lidi z podpory terorismu,” Lydovki, 

Prague, May 3, 2011, 11:19 and 16:15, available from www.lidovky.

cz/tiskni.asp?r=ln_domov&c=A110503_111957_ln_domov_ape; and 

Christian Falvey, “Police uncover first case of a terrorist network operating in the Czech Republic, eight charged with aiding 

Dagestani Shariat Jamaat,” Radio Praha, May 4, 16:24, available 

from www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/police-uncover-first-case-of-aterrorist-network-operating-in-the-czech-republic-eight-charged-withaiding-dagestani-shariat-jamaat.

125. “Czech Police Arrest Suspected Russia’s North Caucasus 

Terrorists.”

126. “Nemetskaya politsiya arestovala grazhdanina RF po 

podozreniyu v prichastnosti k teraktam v Chechne i Dagestane,” 

Kavkaz uzel, June 24, 2011, 7:10, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/

articles/187809/.

127. “Double anti-terrorist operation in Le Mans,” Lemans 

Maville, July 5, 2010, available from www.lemans.maville.com/actu/

actudet_-Double-operation-antiterroriste-au-Mans-_dep-1440912_

actu.Htm.

128. “Doukaev far 12 ar for terror,” Avisen.dk, May 31, 2011, 

11:32, available from avisen.dk/doukaev-faar-12-aar-for-terror_

147226.aspx?utm_source=avisen&utm_medium=frontpage&utm_

campaign=latestNewsBox. In December 2010, Danish authorities 

brought charges against the ethnic Chechen, Lors Doukaev, for 

involvement in a terrorist plot. Doukaev, who lost a leg at age 

12 due to an explosion in his native Chechnya, was arrested in 

September in a Copenhagen hotel after apparently he accidentally detonated an explosive device he was preparing. He was 

found with a map on which was the location of the offices of the 

newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which published the famous caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005. “Urozhentsu Chechni 

Dukaevu v Danii pred’yavleno obvinenie v terrorizme,” Kavkaz 

uzel, December 21, 2010, 19:09, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/

articles/178729/. 
92

129. See, for example, “Issledovanie o pravovom statuse ispol’zovaniya oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya protiv

nevernykh,” Islamdin.com, January 9, 2010.

130. Gordon M. Hahn, “The Bioterrorism Threat in the Russian Federation,” in Rebecca Katz and Raymond A. Zilinskas, 

eds., Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, 2nd Ed., Hoboken, NJ: 

John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2011, pp. 581-584.

131. “FSB Has Info On Terrorists Attempts To Seize Fissile 

Materials,” Itar-Tass, June 2, 2010, available from www.itar-tass.

com; and “Russia says terrorist seeking nuclear materials,” Reuters, 

June 2, 2011, available from www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/02/

us-russia-security-nuclear-idUSTRE6512RQ20100602.

132. For more details, see Gordon M. Hahn, “The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, January-February 2008, 

pp. 1-39.

133. A short list of top CE amirs killed over the last few years 

includes: at least six successive DV amirs (Vagabov, killed on 

August 10, 2010; ‘Al-Bara’ Umalat Magomedov, January 6, 2010; 

Nabi Mediddinov, 2009; ‘Muaz’ Omar Sheikhulaev, March 10, 

2009; ‘Muaz’ Ilgar Mollachiev, February 5, 2009; Abdul Majid, October 1, 2007; the Algerian amir, Doctor Mohammed, August 31, 

2009; Arab amir, Seif al-Islam al-Urdani, February 2, 2010; Buryatskii, March 4, 2010; Astemirov, March 24, 2010; Astemirov’s successor as OVKBK amir, Arsen Tatarov, March 31, 2010; Galgaiche 

Vilaiyat (GV) naibs, Adam Korigov, April 9, 2010; and ‘Shamil’ 

Akhmed Tsaloev, April 9, 2010; North African amir, Yasir Amarat, June 8, 2010; Urus Martan Sector amir, ‘Abdul Malik’ Chingiskhan Gishaev, January 19, 2010; Vedeno Raion Sector amir, Ilman Istamirov, February 4, 2010; CE naib, Supyan Abduallayev, 

March 28, 2011; the Jordanian amir, Abu Anas Muhannad, May 

2011; Groznyi Front amir, Hamzat Shemilev, August 23, 2010; GV 

amir, Ilez Gardanov, August 23, 2010; and six top OVKBK amirs, 

including the OVKBK’s amir, vali Askar Dzhappuev, April 2011.

134. “Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Kremlin.ru, November 12, 2009, 13:45, available from www.

kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979; and Guy Falconbridge and Denis 
93

Dyomkin, “N. Caucasus strife is Russia’s top problem-Kremlin,” 

Reuters, November 12, 2009.

135. Andrew C. Kuchins, Matthew Malarkey, and Sergey Markedonov, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier, A Report of the Russia and Eurasia Program, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2011, 

available from csis.org/files/publication/110321_Kuchins_NorthCaucasus_WEB.pdf; and Ivan Sukhov, “’Kuda eti den’gi delis’?’” 

Moskovskie novosti, April 4, 2011, 00:32, available from mn.ru/

politics/20110404/300841916.html.

136. Tatyana Stanovaya, “Problemy Severnogo Kavkaza: 

Mezhdu Prezidenton and Pravitelstvom,” Politkom.ru, August 8, 

2011, available from www.politcom.ru.

137. Ibid.

138. Kuchins, Malarkey, and Markedonov, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier; and Sukhov, “’Kuda eti den’gi 

delis’?’”

139. “Na Severnom Kavkaze budet sozdano ne menee 400 

tysyach rabochikh mest, Mezhregional’naya konferentsiya 

‘Yedinoi Rossii’ ‘Razvitie Kavkaza 2010-2012,” Yedinaya Rossiya Website, July 7, 2010, available from www.edinros.ru/text.

shtml?14/4565,110040; and Ivan Sukhov, “Semeinnyi podryad,” 

Vremya novostei, July 7, 2010, www.vremya.ru/2010/117/4/257340.

html.

140. Ibid.

141. Abu Amin, “’Investitsii’ v Severnyi Kavkaz, ili popytka 

putinskoi svory ostanovit’ protsess otdeleniya Severnogo Kavkaza ot rusni i stanovleniya na ego meste islamskogo gosudarstva 

Imarat Kavkaz,” Islamdin.com, February 20, 2011.

142. “Na Severnom Kavkaze budet sozdano ne menee 400 

tysyach rabochikh mest, Mezhregional’naya konferentsiya ‘Yedinoi Rossii’ ‘Razvitie Kvkaza 2010-2012”; and Sukhov, “Semeinnyi 

podryad.”
94

143. The project is being organized under a new open stock 

company North Caucasus Resorts (Kurorty Severnogo Kavkaza) 

headed by Akhmed Bilalov.

144. Timur Samedov, Musa Muradov and Khalim Aminov, “Boeviki otkryli vserossiiskii kurort,” Kommersant, February 21, 2011, pp. 1, 3, available from www.kommersant.ru/doc.

aspx?DocsID=1589344.

145. “Russia, France plan joint holiday resorts in turbulent 

North Caucasus,” RIA Novosti, June 29, 2011, 08:02 AM PDT, 

available from en.rian.ru/russia/20110629/164915641.html.

146. “Yevkurov zaprosil dopolnitel’no 20 podrazdelenii 

spetsnaza GRU,” January 4, 2010, 19:58, available from kavkazcenter.

com/russ/content/2010/01/04/69927.shtml.

147. Sergei Minenko, “Al’-Kaida’ na ‘Zhigulyakh’,” Vremya 

novostei, February 4, 2010, available from www.vremya.ru/246760.

html; and “36 Fighters Voluntarily Surrendered in 2010,” Russia 

Eurasia Terrorism Watch, November 7, 2010, available from www.

retwa.com/home.cfm?articleDate=7Nov2010.

148. “Yevkurov predlagaet boevikam v Ingushetii sdat’sya 

v obmen na myagkoe nakazanie,” Kavkaz uzel, February 9, 2010, 

11:30, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/165231/.

149. Ibid.

150. “Prezident Ingushetii vstretilsya s rodstvennikami ukryvavshikh Saida Buryatskogo,” Kavkaz uzel, March 7, 2010, 00:55,

available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/166249/.

151. Ivan Sukhov, “Kalymskii krai,” Vremya novostei, July 8, 

2010, available from www.vremya.ru/2010/118/4/257507.html.

152. Sukhov, “’Kuda eti den’gi delis?’”

153. “Yevkurov zaprosil dopolnitel’no 20 podrazdelenii 

spetsnaza GRU.”
95

154. Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009”; Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statistics”; and Hahn, “CE-Affiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Resulting 

Casualties from January Through June 2011.”

155. RFERL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 82, May 4, 2007.

156. “UFSB: v Kabardino-Balkarii sokhranyaetsya ugroza 

teraktov,” Kavkaz Memo, March 15, 2007, available from www.

kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/118554.html.

157. RFERL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 82, May 4, 2007.

158. Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009”; Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statistics”; and Hahn, “CE-Affiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Resulting 

Casualties from January Through June 2011.”

159. Kanokov emphasized that the new year was beginning “much worse than last year,” a year in which the mujahedin killed “six times as many law enforcement personnel killed 

than in previous years.” Sergei Polyakov, “Kabardino-Balkariya 

sprosit pomoshchi v bor’be s terroristami,” Infox.ru, February 3, 

2011, 17:46, available from infox.ru/accident/incident/2011/02/03/

Kabardino_Balkariya_.phtml.

160. “Shkhagoshev: terakt v Nalchike—pryamoe pokushenie 

na prezidenta Kabardino-Balkarii,” Kavkaz uzel, May 4, 2010, 17:59, 

available from kabardino-balkariya.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/168443/.

161. “’Novyi kurs Magomedova’? Situatsii s pravami cheloveka i popytki konsolidatsii obshchestva v Respublike Dagestan. 

Fevralya 2010—mart 2011 g.,” Kavkaz uzel, April 12, 2011, 11:54, 

available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/183646/?print=true, 

sections 7.1 and 7.2.

162. Andrey Bondarev, “The President of Dagestan meets 

with the delegation of ZAO Russian Copper Company,” RIA Novosti, May 13, 2011, 11:32, available from www.riadagestan.com/

news/2011/05/13/6472/.
96

163. Maksim Tivkailo, “Kerimov vlozhit v gostinitsy i stadiony Dagestana $1.4 mlrd,” Vedomosti, July 15, 2011, available 

from www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/1319006/kerimov_vlozhit_

v_gostinicy_i_stadiony_dagestana_14_mlrd.

164. Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009”; Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statistics”; and Hahn, “CE-Affiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Resulting 

Casualties from January Through June 2011.”

165. With regard to abductions in Dagestan, which are carried out most often but not always by authorities, there were 15 

abductions, including four found dead and two found in police 

detention on average in the 3 years prior to Magomedov. During Magomedov’s first year, 2010, there were 18, including four 

found dead and seven found in police detention. See Table 1 in 

”Vvedenie” of “’Novyi kurs Magomedova’? Situatsii s pravami 

cheloveka i popytki konsolidatsii obshchestva v Respublike 

Dagestan. Fevralya 2010—mart 2011 g.”

166. On recent violations and European Court of Human 

Rights (ECHR) cases, see, for example, the Russian human rights 

organization Memorial’s reports “Situatsiya v zone konflikta na 

Severnom Kavkaze: otsenka pravozashitnikov. Vesna 2011 g.,” 

Kavkaz uzel, July 22, 2011, 00:00, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.

ru/articles/189517/#6; and “’Novyi kurs Magomedova’? Situatsii s 

pravami cheloveka i popytki konsolidatsii obshchestva v Respublike Dagestan. Fevralya 2010—mart 2011 g,” sections 5.1-5.6. 

167. “V Dagestane sozdadut spetspodrazdelenie Vnutrennykh voisk MVD,” Kavkaz uzel, December 15, 2010, 15:45, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174793/; and “Dagestantsy 

dadut dostoiny otpor banditskomu otreb’yu,” Kavkaz news, November 11, 2010, 12:42, available from www.kavkaz-news.info/

portal/cnid_122389/alias__Caucasus-Info/lang__en/tabid__2434/default.aspx.

168. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the 

Twenty-First Century, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
97

169. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random House, 2005. See also Robert 

A. Pape and James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of 

Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It, Chicago, IL: University 

of Chicago Press, 2010.

170. Rose revolution leaders and former Saakashvili allies, 

former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze and former Defense 

Minister Irakly Okruashvili, have claimed that Tbilisi has been 

training Ingush mujahedin and that Georgian banks have facilitated money transfers to the Caucasus mujahedin. “Burjanadze 

Talks About Danger of one more War from Russia,” Georgian 

Journal, October 21, 2010, available from georgianjournal.ge/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=664:burjanadze-talksabout-danger-of-one-more-war-from-russia-&catid=9:news&Itemid=8; 

and “Burjanadze Slams Visa Provocations,” Interfax, October 21, 2010, 19:01, available from www.interfax.com/newsinf.

asp?pg=2&id=197175. Former U.S. Foreign Service officer and 

U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee foreign policy analyst, James George Jatras claims that in December 2009 a secret 

meeting took place in Tbilisi with “representatives of numerous 

jihad groups based in various Islamic and European countries for 

the purpose of coordinating their activities on Russia’s southern 

flank.” According to Jatras, “the meeting was organized under 

the auspices of high officials of the Georgian government.” “In 

addition to ‘military’ operations, (i.e., attacks in southern Russia) 

special attention was given to ideological warfare, for example, 

launching of the Russian-language TV station ‘First Caucasus’.” 

James Jatras, “The Georgian Imbroglio—And a Choice for the 

United States,” America-Russia Net, February 14, 2010, available 

from www.america-russia.net/eng/face/236661338?user_session=4827

e878c0267ddbdd6ee738f8212f1d.

99

CHAPTER 2

THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN RUSSIA

AND RUSSIA IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS:

STATE APPROACHES AND POLITICAL 

DYNAMICS IN THE TURBULENT REGION

Sergey Markedonov

Any attempts to make generalizations about Russian policy on the North Caucasus face serious methodological difficulties. In spite of analysts’ personal 

attitude to the problem, all observers agree that this 

area is the most acute one in Russia. Here the problem 

of Russia’s territorial integrity and sustainability is being resolved. 

 The growth of political violence (the most impressive example is the tragic terrorist bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport in January 

2011) has brought the danger of growing instability 

in the region to the attention of foreign countries, especially on the eve of the Sochi Olympics of 2014 and 

World Soccer Cup of 2018. While in the 1990s violence in the North Caucasus was primarily based in 

Chechnya, over the last years it has increased for other 

republics like Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KabardinoBalkaria (KBR). The North Caucasus agenda today 

is extremely tense with the events and challenges of 

terrorism and counterterrorism. In 2009, the counterterrorist operation (CTO) regime in Chechnya was 

cancelled, but in 2010 there was not only a quantitative but also qualitative rise in the attacks in this republic (like the attack on Tsentoroy, the native village 

of Ramzan Kadyrov, as well as that of the Chechen 

parliament in Grozny). At the same time, violence in 
100

the neighboring republics (Dagestan, Ingushetia, and 

KBR) has not declined either. In 2010, KBR, which had 

a reputation of being a “Sleeping Beauty” during the 

1990s surpassed Chechnya in the number of acts of 

terrorism, taking a place in the top three, after Dagestan and Ingushetia, with 48 explosions, 21 shootings, 

and 14 attempts on the life of law enforcement officials and special troops. During the same period, local CTOs were launched twice in the republic, with 

the operation in Tyrnauza lasting from October 20 

through December 25. For the first time in the recent 

history of North Caucasus terrorism, there was an attack on an industrial facility in 2010: targeted at the 

Baksan Hydroelectric Plant in KBR.1

 Almost every 

day, sabotage and terrorist attacks on representatives 

of law enforcement and military personnel take place 

along with civilian murders. We can also observe the 

revival of ethnic nationalism (despite the fact that radical Islamism has not handed over its positions, rather, 

on the contrary, it has grown), and at the same time, 

we see a fundamentally important step to resolving 

long-standing ethno-political confrontation between 

North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The struggle for power 

inside the Caucasus constituencies repeatedly makes 

itself felt through corrupt, authoritarian, and even occasionally violent means.

Apart from the growing violence that plagues 

the region, the Caucasus has become a subject of 

great importance in Russia. This thesis was proven 

by the events on Manege Square in December 2010 

and increasing interethnic clashes between Russians 

and Caucasian peoples (Chechens and Dagestanis).2

This is becoming a serious issue. Interestingly, the 

phenomenon of Russian ethnic chauvinism directed 

against the peoples of the Caucasus has recently as-
101

sumed a macro-economic veneer. In April 2011, the 

Russian Civil Union movement organized a rally in 

Moscow under the slogan: “Stop feeding the Caucasus.”3

 Participants objected to the federal government 

subsidizing its counterparts in Chechnya, Dagestan, 

and other republics, likening the North Caucasus to “a 

voracious crocodile which demands more blood and 

money.” This problem could become more serious if 

the Russian officials attempt to exploit these ideas. We 

can already see attempts to use anti-Caucasus public 

opinion to obtain additional popularity on the eve of 

both parliamentary and presidential elections.4

However, Russian policy in the region has not 

really been conceptualized or even verbalized, and 

this circumstance creates many obstacles (first and 

foremost for Russian authorities) for adequately 

comprehending what Moscow wants to do. There is 

a great paradox in this situation. Identifying itself as 

a guarantor of Caucasus stability and security and 

demonstrating its willingness to pretend to be a key 

stakeholder for the whole region, including newly 

independent and de facto states of the South Caucasus, Russia faces challenges inside its own country 

regarding the North Caucasus area. Moreover, in 2009 

the situation there was characterized as the most important domestic policy issue by President Dmitry 

Medvedev in his Presidential Address to the Federal 

Assembly (Parliament).5

 As a result, the Kremlin and 

the federal government brought in an official position 

of special plenipotentiary—with broadened functions 

in the newly created North Caucasus Federal District. 

For the first time in Russia’s post-Soviet history, this 

official has the rank of deputy prime-minister.

In this chapter, some basic aspects will be considered. To what extent has recognition of the systemic 
102

and internal natures of the North Caucasus challenges 

helped to change political dynamics in the region? 

Why has the activity of the new plenipotentiary not 

been effective and failed to reach expectations? What 

new challenges would define the agenda in the most 

turbulent area of Russia? The purpose of this report 

is to examine major social and political trends in the 

North Caucasus region, with an emphasis on the last 3 

years because historical aspects (including the 1990s) 

are separate topics for discussion.

“SOFT POWER”: MADE BY ALEXANDER 

KHLOPONIN 

In the early 2000s, the Russian authorities were 

all too ready to speak about the North Caucasus. Discussion centered on several topics. The first was the 

Caucasus as a platform for international terrorism, 

where Russia was being put to the test. The image of 

the “international terrorist” changed according to the 

political situation of the time. Sometimes the face had 

Georgian features, at other times Afghan and sometimes even the “treacherous West” seemed to be involved. The role of the West in affairs of the North 

Caucasus was actually interpreted in two ways. On 

the one hand, the West was seen as a natural ally at 

risk from Third World intrigues, and on the other, an 

unimaginative and bothersome partner trying to impose its incorrect ideas (or “double standards”) upon 

Russia. The second topic was the swiftly stabilizing 

Caucasus, an image that effectively came to mean 

Chechnya under the wise leadership of Akhmad and 

then Ramzan Kadyrov, father and son. There were 

attempts to diversify the North Caucasus issue: The 

most outstanding examples were the speeches by 
103

Dmitry Kozak, the Russian President’s representative 

in the South (in this position from September 2004 to 

September 2007). He tried to focus the attention of his 

immediate superiors and society on the problems of 

the clan system and the inefficiency of the regional 

administrations (particularly in conditions of budget 

dependency on the federal centre). However, Russia’s 

ruling elite was not concerned with the region’s domestic situation, at least until the middle of 2011.

The decision to end CTO in Chechnya in April 

2009, dictated as it was by public relations considerations, did not have the effect of reducing the number 

of terrorist acts in that republic. Diversionary terrorist activity actually spread to the neighboring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia. That summer saw a 

brazen attempt to assassinate Ingushetia’s president 

Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, which temporarily put him out 

of action. Aldigirei Magomedtagirov, Interior Minister of Dagestan, the largest North Caucasus republic, 

was murdered. All this required some coherent explanation. It was impossible just to keep saying that 

the region would soon be stabilized, although “some 

people are working against this.”

Medvedev’s Makhachkala speech on June 9, 2009, 

marked the moment when the focus changed from 

external to internal threats. The Russian President 

talked of “systemic problems” in the North Caucasus 

region. For the first time since the 1990s, the head of 

state was officially admitting that socio-political turbulence in the Russian Caucasus was not the result of 

foreign interference, but of internal problems like corruption, unemployment, and poverty. However, both 

the President and the Prime Minister still kept talking 

about the battle with “bandits” and “organized crime 

groups,” as if the current problems of the Caucasus 
104

could be compared to the situation in Harlem, New 

York, or Southeast Washington, DC, in the 1980s. The 

failures of government in the North Caucasus were 

not honestly discussed. Blame was laid on the regional and local authorities, while the federal authorities 

escaped criticism. This was the origin of bizarre ideas 

like the introduction of special jurisdiction for matters 

involving terrorism. Regardless, in his address last 

year, Medvedev called the North Caucasus the main 

problem of Russian domestic politics. That was when 

another idea emerged: a new bureaucratic structure, 

backed by Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, entrusted 

with “establishing order” in the North Caucasus.

As a result, Alexander Khloponin arrived in the 

Caucasus in January 2010 as Moscow’s plenipotentiary. This looked like an innovation. The man responsible for Russia’s most unstable region was not one of 

the siloviki (members of the central bureaucracy), but 

a manager who had worked for “Norilsk Nickel” enterprise and served as governor of the Taymyr Peninsula and Krasnoyarsk. The media adopted a different 

language when discussing the North Caucasus. Apart 

from the usual reference to “terrorists” and “extremists,” they began talking of “clusters,” “investments,” 

and “innovations.”

But Khloponin’s appointment had nothing to do 

with modernization. It was a typical behind-the-scenes 

advancement of a person lacking the appropriate experience, motivated by internal bureaucratic logic, 

rather than pressing national interest. In addition, the 

functions of this new head of the Caucasus were very 

limited. Khloponin was thrown in the deep end of the 

pool, without being given the necessary political powers to keep himself afloat. And how can there be any 

real investment or innovation in a region so close to 
105

a state of war? In the end, things did not turn out for 

the better, but as usual, as Viktor Chernomyrdin so 

memorably put it in 1993: “We wanted the best but it 

came out like it always does.”

The economy and the social sphere were recognized as important. The Kremlin and the Federal 

Government put all their efforts into developing these 

sectors, but political themes (ethnic conflicts and the 

relations between the different religions) remained 

taboo. They were seen as merely superficial, a function of the socio-economic situation. This has made 

it impossible to produce a large-scale strategy for the 

development of the Caucasus. When the politics of the 

region are as unstable as they are, socio-economic conditions matter, but while unquestionably important, 

they do not play a determining role.

Still, on July 6, 2010, Putin asked for a strategy document to be delivered “within a period of 2 months,” 

a reasonable amount of time for a good academic article or a chapter of a book, but not for a document 

with a 15-year perspective. By September 6, 2010, the 

draft of the strategy was ready. In less than a month, 

it went through the entire cycle from being signed to 

publication by the federal government. The aims and 

objectives of “Strategy-2025,” as set out in the initial 

“General Provisions,” are skewed from the very beginning. We read that: 

The Strategy takes account of:

• The current state of the economy of Russian 

Federation administrative entities which are part 

of The North Caucasus Federal District;

• The Russian economy;

• The global economy;

• Their potential for development; and,

• Regional and inter-regional projects and their outcomes.6
106

But what about the political development of the 

Caucasus? Don’t the facts of terrorism, subversive 

actions, and an ethnocratic leadership automatically make any business plan a “risky undertaking”? 

Shouldn’t future investors be taking this into account 

(unless the money comes from the federal budget, 

which does not depend on public opinion)? 

The North Caucasus District offers favorable conditions for developing the agro-industrial complex, the 

spheres of tourism and health tourism, electricity, 

mining and manufacturing. It also affords developed 

transit facilities. However, economic and socio-political instability mean that natural advantages remain 

unrealized and make the North Caucasus Federal District an unattractive environment for investment.7

The political element is mentioned in passing, after the economy, and is not elaborated upon in any 

way. What does socio-political instability mean? Is it 

the separatist threat or the “religious revival” which is 

incompatible with the constitutional and legal regulations and laws of the Russian Federation? According 

to Strategy-2025, “The main goal of the Strategy is to 

provide conditions conducive to the rapid growth of 

the real sector of the economy in Russian Federation 

administrative units that make up the North Caucasus 

Federal District. Also to create new jobs, and improve 

the standard of life.” What a wonderful goal! But is this 

possible in an area that is practically on a war footing 

(This is the felicitous description of the present situation given by the head of the Prosecutor General’s 

Office Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin 

in an interview with radio “Moscow Echo”)8? It is not 

the grey economy, which makes its living from illegal 
107

or semi-legal deals, that is being discussed in this document. Incidentally, Strategy-2025 does not set itself 

to deal with institutional change, i.e. creating a new 

generation of managers who could give the economy 

the chance to breathe without killing it with their kickbacks and pay-offs. The abuse of power and illegal 

methods of carrying out anti-terrorist operations give 

rise to a lack of trust in the authorities, and even a situation where people start regarding law enforcers as 

enemies. Young people who are constantly victimized 

become particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the 

rebels. There is plenty of evidence that the activity of 

the armed underground has been growing recently. 

The crisis will only get worse if the state keeps fighting 

the insurgents using methods like kidnapping and executions without trial. Two incomplete subsections of 

Strategy-2025 are devoted to ethnic relations, but they 

are limited to generalities. There is no real information and no analysis. “The current socio-political and 

ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus Federal District is characterized by several pronounced 

negative social tendencies, manifestations of ethnopolitical and religious extremism, and a high risk of 

conflict.”9

Any specialist could probably find a great many 

negative tendencies in any part of the Russian Federation, if he or she so desired. They exist in Moscow 

and St. Petersburg (Is not xenophobia a “negative social tendency”?), and in the Volga area (where there 

is both ethnic and religious extremism). But the difference between the Caucasus and the Volga area is 

that only in the North Caucasus is there a situation 

akin to war. This document of considerable strategic 

importance offers no explanation for why events developed as they did. The reader is left to guess. The 
108

Strategy’s analytical section does not even have a subsection dealing with the religious revival, although 

radical Islam is the main vehicle for protests in the 

Caucasus. Anything to do with relations between the 

religions is relegated to the subsection “Ethnic Relationships.” The reasons for the growth of radical Islam 

are set out with alarming simplicity: “Radical forms 

of Islam (have been) imported into the said Federal 

District.” The text offers no explanation as to what 

these “imported forms” are, why they have been imported into the region, what the expectations of the 

importers are, or the extent to which the importers 

have gained indigenous support.10 In the interests of 

objectivity, one can say, of course, that other reasons 

for the dissemination of extremist views (the Strategy 

makes no special distinction between nationalists and 

Islamists) include “widespread corruption” or “questions relating to the owning and disposing of land, 

which are unregulated and the cause of most of the 

ethnic conflicts, including at the level of the man in 

the street,” and also “ethnic tension as a result of illdefined civic identity.”11 But again, none of this can be 

linked to the need for institutional change in the Caucasus. In short, the objectives of “Strategy-2025” are 

clearly unachievable. It focuses on economic growth 

without addressing the socio-political preconditions 

that make the North Caucasus explosive and unstable. 

This document seems to isolate the economy and the 

social sphere from the rest of the complex whole. 
109

NORTH CAUCASUS: RADICAL ISLAMISM 

ON THE RISE

Since the Beslan tragedy in September 2004, the 

main anti-Russian discourse in the North Caucasus 

has not been under the slogans of ethno-political selfdetermination but under the green banner of radical 

Islam. On October 31, 2007, President of the so-called 

“Chechen Republic of Icheria,” Doku Umarov, built 

upon his powers as the head of the separatist government and proclaimed a new formation —the Caucasus Emirate (CE).

Umarov proclaimed himself as “the only legitimate 

authority in all areas where there are Mujahideen.” He 

also said that he denies the laws of the secular authorities that exist in the North Caucasus. It is hard to define Umarov personally and many of his supporters as 

real Islamists in the fullest sense of the word; they lack 

the necessary theological training and, in some cases, 

elementary education base. But for such unskilled Islamists the ideals of “pure Islam” are the main drivers of protest activities against the Russian State. With 

them, they have to determine the effectiveness of its 

potential for mobilizing extremists. To some extent, 

belonging to a radical Islamist current is a marker of 

radicalism in general (ethnic nationalism in this context is regarded as a moderate political movement that 

could include dialogue and certain concessions to the 

Russian State).

However, at the same time, we can report the presence in the ranks of the North Caucasian Islamists 

trained preachers who fully meet the standards of 

“Mujahedin of the future” (that is competent theologians, who could exploit both explosives and Kalashnikovs). The most famous of them were not ethnic 
110

Chechens by origin. In 2009 they came to the forefront 

in the Caucasus radical Islamist movement. They 

brought new characters into the anti-Russian struggle in the North Caucasus. It is unlikely that such a 

man as Said Buryatskii (1982-2010, a.k.a. Alexander 

Tikhomirov, on his father’s side a Buryat and on his 

mother’s side a Russian) could inspire the defenders 

of a secular nationalist project to fight. Rather his appeal was religious.

In June 2009, Umarov’s supporters claimed responsibility for the murder of the interior minister 

of Dagestan, Adilgerei Magomedtagirov as well as 

murders of Aza Gazgireeva, deputy Chairman of 

the Supreme Court of Ingushetia, and Bashir Aushev, former Deputy Prime Minister of Ingushetia. In 

July 2009, they announced their involvement in the 

attempted assassination of the President of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In August, 2009, they issued a statement saying that the “accident” at the 

Sayano-Shushenskaya power plant was a matter of 

their hands. In November-December 2009, militants 

claimed responsibility for the murder of an Orthodox 

priest, Father Daniel (Sysoev) and the explosion of 

the train “Nevsky Express.” On March 31, 2010, in his 

video address, Doku Umarov talked about his own orders for the suicide bombing in the Moscow subway, 

carried out on March 29. In January 2011, he claimed 

credit for the Domodedovo Airport terrorist attack. 

 Even if the responsibility for one or another of 

these attacks is not true, and is part of a public relations campaign, the struggle for “true faith” is selling 

and becoming a popular political commodity. This 

product will be even more in demand than would 

be the level of social injustice, judicial, and administrative efficiency. The aforementioned Buryatskii is 
111

a phenomenon in this regard. Not being a preacher 

from Pakistan or Arab countries, he found a fertile 

environment in the Caucasian audience as a result of 

his own religious and political evolution. Note that 

nowadays this audience knows the Soviet and Russian reality far less than what Jokhar Dudayev and 

Aslan Maskhadov did. The works of Sheikh Anwar 

al-Awlaki, Sheikh Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi, and 

others feature prominently on various web portals 

associated with the Caucasus rebels. The Caucasus 

rebels have indeed embraced the political lexicon of 

the “global jihad,” styling their leaders as “amirs” 

and establishing a “Caucasus Emirate” with its own 

“Shariah Court.” It is much less connected with the 

nationwide socio-cultural environment. However, 

while assessing the “Islamic factor” it is necessary to 

add some nuances. Often many stories regarding the 

intra-administrative-bureaucratic struggle are hidden 

under the “Wahhabis” (as the Russian media define 

radical Islam). It would seem that the authorities both 

at regional and federal levels must do their utmost to 

understand where there are religious radicals or simple criminals, and where their synthesis takes place 

(the latter is extremely important to discredit the militants and their ideological patrons). But instead of doing this, officials repeat propaganda theses about the 

“agonizing bandits.”

ETHNIC NATIONALISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES?

The last 3 years showed, among other things, that 

the hope of “self-liquidation” of nationalism has not 

been justified. Rallies of Balkars and Circassians, interethnic relations in Dagestan and tensions between 

Ossets and Ingushsis forced the authorities to pay at-
112

tention to the problem, which by the early 2000s had 

seemed generally to be clearing up. A revival of ethnic nationalism in the North Caucasus has taken place 

since 2008. For this development, there are both internal and external prerequisites. The Circassian issue revival has occurred after a series of personnel decisions 

of the fourth president of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya 

Republic (KCR), Boris Ebzeev. Russia’s recognition 

of Abkhazia’s independence on August 26, 2008, also 

played a role in the revitalization of Circassian ethnic 

nationalism as well as the upcoming Sochi Olympic 

Games. Since 2010, the “Circassian question” has become one of the focal points of the Georgian foreign 

policy agenda. Two conferences (March and November 2010), began the discussion at the parliamentary 

level of the problem of the so-called “Circassian genocide” in the Russian Empire in the 19th century, and 

finally Georgian recognition of this massacre as a case 

of genocide in May 2011 created a serious precedent. 

Before it, Russian policy in the Caucasus was not recognized as genocide by foreign states. This charge 

therefore contributes to the internationalization of 

debates about this troubled Russian region. Thus it 

requires from the Russian government and society 

more thoughtful action. Moscow must find competent 

answers to this problem as soon as possible. 

However, the “new” nationalists in their statements remain within the Russian political-legal space. 

Balkars, the Ingush human rights activists, and Circassian activists are trying to appeal to the Federal Russian government, and not to the Council of Europe, 

the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 

(PACE), or the European Union (EU)/United States. 

In March 2010, at a meeting dedicated to the 66th anniversary of the Russian deportation—of Balkars, Kara-
113

chais, Chechens, Ingush, and Kalmyks to Siberia—the 

representatives of the Council of Elders of the Balkar 

people prepared an appeal to the presidential envoy 

in the North Caucasus Alexander Khloponin.

It is necessary to make a distinction between nationalism in the period of the “parade of sovereignties” in the early 1990s, and that of 2009-10. “The old 

nationalism” was a political riposte to the Soviet (and 

to a lesser extent the imperial) era. The current Balkar 

or Circassian movements, though using the historical 

material, have another nature. This is the reaction to 

today’s realities (e.g., land issues and the attendant 

corruption, human resource policies, and issues of local self-government). Using quantitative approaches 

(and certain of their manifestations we see in KBR in 

the form of conciliation of the national movements) 

the danger of nationalism’s revival can be minimized 

(but not eliminated completely). However (and 2009-

2010 have demonstrated it), there are cases when the 

republican authorities try to extinguish the fire of Islamist activity by using nationalist kerosene. Such a 

tool (playing the ethnic card) is extremely dangerous 

(as shown in 1989-91). 

The Ossetian-Ingush reconciliations have inspired 

cautious optimism. The third President of Ingushetia, Yunus Bek Evkurov, has played a great role in 

its promotion. Ingushetia now insists on the return of 

displaced persons who fled their homes during the 

conflict in October-November 1992, namely in the 

villages of the Suburban District (Prigorodnyi rayon) 

where they lived before the conflict, but the Ingush 

leadership clearly rejects the claims for the return of 

the district itself! At a meeting on the problems of displaced persons held on October 2, 2009, the President 

of North Ossetia, Teimuraz Mamsurov, said that the 
114

Ingush would be free to return to the Suburban District and the authorities of his republic, North Ossetia, 

would not be an obstacle.

According to various sources, approximately 15-

20,000 displaced people (DP) could return to their 

former places of residence. In this case, both the conflicting parties are dissatisfied with federal policy to 

resolve this problem. The Ossetian side said that the 

return of the Ingush is being done at a forced pace, 

while the Ingush are unhappy with the low intensity 

of the return. Soft apartheid is preserved. In particular, on March 1, 2009, during the elections of local bodies in the Suburban District, the vote was conducted in 

the villages settled by the Ingushis. The situation for 

all these years is complicated by the conflict between 

Georgia and South Ossetia because North Ossetia was 

forced to place Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia 

and interior regions of Georgia in its territory. Regardless of this, on December 17, 2009, the leaders of the 

two republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed 

a bilateral agreement.

For the first time in the post-Soviet era Ingush DPs 

had the right to return to their homes in an official 

document. (Previously they were offered different 

versions of arrangements at the new location.) Human and civil rights took precedence over the “right 

of blood.” Practically for the first time since 1992, it 

was recognized that the Ossetians and the Ingush are 

two peoples of the Russian nation-state project that 

should be more than just neighbors, and become fellow citizens of one country.
115

NORTH CAUCASUS: PUBLIC POLICY 

OF LIMITED DURATION

In addition to Islam and ethnic nationalism, bureaucratic competition for dominance in the framework of a single republic has been a serious challenge. 

This management struggle has once again proved that 

disputes over power are not maintained in rigid adherence to an ethnic or religious affiliation. This is a 

complex configuration of clan interests and pressure 

groups both in Moscow and within the region itself. 

Perhaps the most exemplary republic in this respect 

is Dagestan, the largest (in territory and population) 

of the North Caucasian republics. It is no accident because the year of 2009 was a preparatory period for the 

Republican presidential elections (in February 2010, 

the Presidential term of Mukhu Aliev expired). In the 

absence of direct elections of the Republic’s president, 

we witnessed complex bureaucratic fights with very 

specific ideas about public policy.

As a result, the procedure for determining a candidate for the presidency in Dagestan unprecedentedly 

dragged on from November 2009 until February 2010. 

In fact, it took 2 additional weeks beyond the legal 

procedure for Moscow to announce the final decision 

on the candidacy of the head of the Republic. Finally, 

Magomedsalam Magomedov got the support of the 

Federal Center. But as the Russian political scientist 

and journalist Ivan Sukhov justly remarked, “[The] 

appointment of the president in Dagestan looked like 

the most problematic one for the entire period.”12
116

THE NORTH CAUCASUS FROM THE 

PERSPECTIVE OF THE KREMLIN 

At first glance, the tragic events at the Manege 

Square on December 11, 2010 (and their echoes in St. 

Petersburg and Rostov-on-Don), are not connected 

directly with ethno-political and religious dynamics. Activity, clashes, and pogroms under the Russian 

ethno-nationalist slogans are not a response to one 

or another act of terrorism, sabotage, or injustice to 

the ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus republics. 

The Manege incident was provoked by the murder of 

Spartak soccer club fan Yegor Sviridov. In other cases, reasons are different, but they do not refer to the 

North Caucasus regional issues. Meanwhile, it would 

be very naïve to consider those clashes as absolutely 

isolated problems. The Sviridov case became a kind 

of trigger for anti-Caucasus opinions existing in the 

central parts of Russia. It also showed that Russia 

lacks a coherent national policy (or rather, it substituted folklore and ethnographic considerations) and 

that the inhabitants of the Caucasus and the rest of 

Russia had long lists of grievances against each other. 

Regardless of what it was, it revitalized the problem 

of a divided community and actualized the necessity 

to find ways for a civic nation option. It also demonstrated the challenge of Russian separatism because 

it displayed numerous groups of Russian citizens 

who would be ready to separate from the Caucasus. 

This fact violates the stereotype that the region can 

only be put beyond Moscow’s strategic influence by 

means of a conscious campaign to free itself of Russia’s suzerainty. But what if the unilateral separation 

of the Caucasus by Russian power took place? In this 

scenario, it would matter little whether the North 
117

Caucasus followed a nationalist or Islamist agenda. It 

does not mean that Russia would have great benefits 

from the realization of this scenario. But now it has 

created new options for Caucasus politics as well as 

Russian domestic policy as a whole. The fact that the 

central government on the eve of the election year decided to play the Russian chauvinist bargaining chip 

is also dangerous because it makes two groups of the 

citizens of one country (ethnic Russians and Caucasus 

peoples) confront each other. 

Thus, the North Caucasus has not become a more 

secure, and most importantly, predictable region. The 

region poses for the Russian state and society a wide 

variety of challenges, ranging from Islamic radicalism 

to sophisticated closed bureaucratic confrontation and 

Russian separatism. Despite the fact that in 2009 the 

Russian central government had recognized the crisis 

in the North Caucasus, breakthrough strategies for 

the development of the region have not surfaced. The 

state bodies continue focusing on bureaucratic methods of improving the situation, refuse to be engaged in 

dialogue with the civil society, and use “soft power” 

(integration projects, the introduction of elements of 

civic identity, and attempts to redefine the religious 

sphere such as ”Euro-Islam” as an alternative to radical Islamism) in promoting their own interests. While 

modernization has been proclaimed as the strategic 

goal of the Russian policy, the North Caucasus has 

not been meaningfully considered in this context. By 

inertia, it is regarded rather as an underdeveloped 

outskirt, rather than an integral part of the nationwide 

political-legal space. Encouragingly, there is some 

safety margin; the region’s population is interested in 

strengthening the Russian state’s presence and the effectiveness of arbitration by the central government, 
118

while there is simultaneously a more active desire of 

the Russian authorities to make a critical assessment of 

the regional realities. However, an ad hoc situational 

response remains the dominant political and managerial style of the Russian elite for the Caucasus region.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Sergey Markedonov, “Causes of the Growing Instability in 

Kabardino-Balkaria and Ways of Overcoming It,” Anthropology 

and Archeology of Eurasia, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2011, pp. 72-81.

2. See our comment in “Russian Separatism” (“Russkii Separatizm”), December, 16, 2010, available from www.politcom.ru/11193.

html.

3. The Russian Civil Union is a public organization founded 

in November 2010. Ideologically it is based on alleged “nationaldemocracy” principles. It seeks to give the ethnic Russians the 

right of self-determination and replace the federation in the Russian national democratic state. 

4. Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO, in his presentation, “National question in Russia and in Europe” for the Yaroslavl’ World Forum, September 2011, identified the “Russian issue” as a core problem of Russia’s domestic policy in the Caucuses 

and claimed a need to stop discrimination of ethnic Russians by 

the Caucasus peoples. Vladimir Putin (Russian prime-minister) in 

one of his speeches on December, 21, 2010, said: “We will have to 

develop the rules of registration in Moscow and Saint Petersburg 

as well as other big cities.” It is worth noting that the practice of 

registration is an unconstitutional requirement because the Russian Constitution gives to all citizens the right of free movement.

5. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia, November 12, 2009, available from www.

kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979.

6. Strategy for the Socio-economic Development of the North 

Caucasus Federal District until 2025, July 6, 2010, available from 

premier.gov.ru/events/news/13920/.
119

7. Ibid.

8. This evaluation was done in the open air of the radio “Moscow Echo” [Ekho Moskvy], October, 10, 2010, available from 

www.echo.msk.ru/news/717094-echo.html. 

9. Strategy for the Socio-economic Development of the North 

Caucasus Federal District until 2025.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Cited in “Kremlin Does not Comment on Delay with the 

Dagestan President appointment” [“Kreml’ ne kommentiruet zaderzhku naznacheniya Prezidenta Dagestana”], January, 20, 2010, 

available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/164449/.

121

CHAPTER 3

THE “AFGHANIZATION” OF THE NORTH

 CAUCASUS: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS 

OF A CHANGING CONFLICT

Svante E. Cornell

The situation in the North Caucasus, particularly 

in Chechnya, frequently made headlines in the 1990s 

and early 2000s. In fact, it was a key issue in affecting Western views of Russia, a particular mobilizing 

factor for the democracy and human rights agenda as 

Russia was concerned. This changed, however, with 

President Vladimir Putin’s successful curtailing of 

media freedoms in Russia, and the gradual decline of 

violence in Chechnya, with violence sinking to a low 

point in 2006. For the past 5 years, the North Caucasus 

has hardly had an effect on relations between the West 

and Russia; in fact, both the media and policy communities in the West have largely ignored the region. 

That has nevertheless begun to change in the recent 

past, for two main reasons: First, there has been a clear 

upsurge in violence in and related to the North Caucasus since 2007, with the completion of the process of 

transformation of a Chechen nationalist rebellion to a 

region-wide Islamist insurgency. It has become clear 

that far from pacifying the region, Moscow is failing 

to exert sovereignty there. Second, the International 

Olympic Committee’s decision to hold the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi on the Russian Black Sea coast 

adjacent to the North Caucasus has made the North 

Caucasus a magnet for attention. This chapter seeks to 

assess the current situation in the North Caucasus, the 

reasons behind the evolution of the past decade, and 

its implications for Russia, the region, and the West.
122

THE NORTH CAUCASUS TODAY

The republics of the North Caucasus are presently characterized by a combination of factors that the 

present author has likened to “Afghanization.” The 

term evokes the development of Afghanistan in the 

mid-1990s: a combination of war, human suffering, 

poverty, organized crime, and externally sponsored 

Islamic radicalism combined to generate an explosive 

situation, which the authorities are increasingly unable to respond to—and which, failing to understand 

the web of problems correctly and suffering from the 

constraints of their own system, they end up exacerbating. 

Demographically and economically, the North 

Caucasus is in a deep malaise. Unemployment rates 

are sky-high, averaging 50 percent by some estimates, 

with 80 percent rates of youth unemployment being 

common in many areas of the region.1 Between 60 and 

90 percent of the budgets of the republics consist of 

direct subsidies from Moscow, suggesting the weakness of economic activity and of government ability 

to raise revenues. In fact, subsidies to the North Caucasus have begun to generate a backlash in Russia 

itself, with growing popular movements wanting to 

stop the government from “feeding the Caucasus.”2

 A 

leaked Russian government report in 2006 cited that 

the shadow economy constituted an estimated 44 percent of Dagestan’s economy, as opposed to 17 percent 

in Russia as a whole; 50 to 70 percent of Dagestanis 

with some form of employment were thought to work 

in the shadow economy.3

 These figures are unlikely to 

have improved since then. Ethnic Russians have largely left the region, removing some of the most-skilled 
123

labor force. In Chechnya, where 200,000 Russians once 

lived, they now number in the hundreds. In Ingushetia, the number of Russians declined by a factor of 

over six. In other republics, the decline between the 

censuses of 1989 and 2002 are not as dramatic but nevertheless stark: The percentage of Russians fell from 

42 percent to 33 percent in Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; 

from 30 to 23 percent in North Ossetia; and from 10 

to 5 percent in Dagestan. The exodus of Russians has 

only continued since then, although census figures are 

not available.4

 Meanwhile, the educational system has 

largely collapsed while there is a rapid population increase due to historically high birth rates.

Since 2004, with the strengthening of the “vertical 

of power” in Russia, the republics are ruled increasingly by elites whose main feature is loyalty (of an 

often personal nature) to the leadership in Moscow 

rather than, as had been the case, with roots in the local politics of the region. This has been a source of additional friction between Moscow and the populations 

of the North Caucasus. Not only are these populations 

no longer able to elect their leaders even on paper, but 

their leaders are responsive mainly to the demands of 

the distant capital rather than their own needs. While 

the most well-known example is Chechnya, where 

Moscow supported the elevation of the Kadyrov clan 

to lead the republic, the most egregious case is Ingushetia. There, a highly respected but independentminded leader, General Ruslan Aushev, managed to 

keep the republic stable and peaceful during the first 

Chechen war and its chaotic aftermath. Deemed too 

independent, he was replaced in 2002 by a Federal 

Security Service (FSB) officer of Ingush descent but 

with little connection to the region, Murad Zyazikov. 

Zyazikov’s subsequent mismanagement, insensitivity 
124

to local power-brokers, and repression alienated considerable parts of the population and led numerous 

young Ingush to join the armed resistance. KabardinoBalkaria (KBR), Putin similarly appointed a Moscowbased businessman with roots in the republic, Arsen 

Kanokov, to the presidency in 2005, with the explicit 

purpose of appointing a person without links to the 

“clan politics” of the republic. However, Kanokov’s 

lack of a popular base in KBR led the situation to deteriorate further.5

The North Caucasus is no longer the scene of 

large-scale warfare concentrated in Chechnya, as 

was the case in 1994-96 and 1999-2002. Instead, the 

resistance has morphed into a low-to-medium level 

insurgency that spans the entire region. Chechnya is 

among the calmer areas of the region, with the epicenter of the resistance having moved first to Ingushetia, 

then to Dagestan, with spikes of violence in KBR and 

the other republics as well. The conflict pits Moscow 

and its local allies, such as the Kadyrov clan, against 

loosely coordinated multiethnic groups of insurgents 

that largely remain led by ethnic Chechens. This insurgency no longer sees itself as a nationalist movement, but as part of the global jihadi movement. As 

such, it seeks the establishment of a region-wide Islamic state, dubbed the “Caucasus Emirate.” Inspired 

by the global jihadi movement, the insurgency targets 

not only Russian forces but also civilian authorities 

across the region, as well as engaging in terrorist attacks on civilians, including in Russia proper. Thus, 

Chechnya has come to resemble Kashmir: a formerly 

nationalist and separatist insurgency morphed into 

a jihadi movement with whom central authorities 

can no longer, realistically, expect to reach a political 

compromise.
125

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

The present condition of the conflict in the North 

Caucasus is a fairly recent development, having undergone deep transformations in the past decade. An 

overview of the history of the conflict makes this clear. 

Indeed, it suggests that in 1989, ethnicity was increasingly politicized across the former Soviet Union. The 

ethno-nationalist uprisings and movements of 1989-94 

clearly provide corroboration for that assessment. By 

contrast, religion was not politicized, and would not 

be for another decade. Among North Caucasus ethnic groups, only the Chechens had both the incentives 

and the capacity to sustain an insurgency against the 

Russian state, while a religious revival gradually got 

under way, centered on Dagestan. It was the first war 

in Chechnya in 1994-96 that attracted militant Islamist 

groups to the North Caucasus, whose ideology came 

to spread across the region, fanning out from Chechnya and Dagestan to span the North Caucasus.

The Salience of the Deportations.

 The resistance of Chechens as well as other North 

Caucasian peoples to Russian rule in the 19th century 

is legendary. It is instructive to note that Russia had 

annexed Georgia by 1801, and acquired control over 

Armenia and Azerbaijan gradually in 1812-13 and 

1827-28. By contrast, the areas north of the mountains 

were not subjugated until 1859-64. It took Russia 30 

years after gaining control over the South Caucasus 

to pacify the North. Chechens, Dagestanis, and the 

Circassian peoples to the west fought an unequal 

battle until the 1860s to escape Russian rule.6

 Under 
126

the legendary Dagestani chieftain, Shamil, the areas 

that today form southern Chechnya and inner Dagestan formed a shrinking independent Islamic state, 

an Imamate, from 1824 until the Russian capture of 

Shamil in 1859.7

 The Circassian rebels were not defeated until the mass expulsion of Circassians to the 

Ottoman Empire in 1864. 

Even following the incorporation of the North 

Caucasus into the Russian empire, the northeastern 

regions were only partially pacified, but never appeared to become integrated with Russia in ways that 

other minority-dominated areas, such as in the Volga 

region, did. The physical expulsion of the majority of 

the Circassian population helped Russia manage the 

northwestern Caucasus; but Chechnya and Dagestan 

remained unruly. Whenever Russia was at war or otherwise weakened, these lands saw rebellions of varying length and strength. This occurred after World War 

I during the Russian civil war 1918-21, and, though in 

a much smaller scale, during the collectivization of the 

1930s and World War II. In 1944, this obstinate refusal 

to submit had tragic consequences. Falsely claiming 

that Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, and Balkars had collaborated with the invading German forces, Joseph 

Stalin in February 1944 ordered the wholesale deportation of these peoples to Central Asia. Entire populations were loaded on cattle wagons and transported 

in the middle of winter to the steppes of Central Asia, 

where little preparation had been made for their arrival. An estimated quarter of the deportees died during 

transport or shortly after arrival due to cold, hunger, 

or epidemics.8

The largest number of the deported peoples of the 

North Caucasus was the Chechens. However, until 

deportation, Chechens primarily identified with their 
127

Teip or clan, not as members of a Chechen nation. More 

than anything, deportation helped develop national 

consciousness among the Chechens. The demographic consequences of deportation and the 13-year exile 

of the Chechens until they were allowed to return in 

1957 are very tangible. Between 1926-37, the Chechen 

population increased by 36 percent; in another 11-

year period, between 1959 and 1970, the figure was 46 

percent. But during the 20-year period from 1939-59, 

the rate of increase was only 2.5 percent, although the 

population would almost have doubled under normal 

circumstances.9

 Thus, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the deportations in the collective memory 

of the punished peoples. With regard to the Chechens, it had important political consequences that did 

not immediately materialize among the much smaller 

Ingush, Karachai, and Balkar populations. Most leaders of the Chechen movement for independence in 

the 1990s were either born or grew up in exile in Kazakhstan. The deportation convinced many Chechens 

that there was no way for them to live securely under 

Russian rule; it also explains the extent of support for 

separation from Russia among the people and perhaps the readiness among portions of the population 

to embrace radical ideologies of resistance.

After the August coup in Moscow against Mikhail 

Gorbachev that spelled the end of the Soviet Union, 

most constituent republics declared their independence. So did two autonomous republics within the 

Russian Federation: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Tatarstan, encircled by Russia proper, began negotiations on mutual relations with Moscow that eventually led to a deal in 1994 that granted Tatarstan broad 

autonomy. In Chechnya, however, the nationalist 

movement in power was less compromising. Gen-
128

eral Jokhar Dudayev, who had seized power from 

the former communist leadership in September 1991, 

was elected President of Chechnya and declared its 

independence soon after. Chechnya, in this context, 

stood out by being the only autonomous republic in 

Russia where a nationalist movement took power and 

ousted the communist party leadership. In this sense, 

it resembled the developments in Georgia and Armenia more than that of the Central Asian republics or 

Russia’s other autonomous republics: The leadership 

consisted of true nationalists, not former Communist 

elites that cloaked a nationalist mantle. 

While Russian President Boris Yeltsin made an 

abortive attempt to rein in Dudayev by sending special forces to Chechnya to restore Moscow’s rule, Dudayev had managed to create a presidential guard that 

was enough of a deterrent to avoid Russian military 

action. At this point, Russia was itself in a chaotic situation. Yeltsin was preoccupied with building Russian 

statehood, and Chechnya was put on the back burner. 

However, by 1994, Yeltsin had consolidated his power 

after physically attacking his parliamentary opposition in October 1993—an action that indebted him to 

the military and security forces. Chechnya hence remained as a thorn in the eye of a rising Russia. Moreover, Chechnya’s de facto independence and the heavily anti-Russian rhetoric emanating from Dudayev 

was foiling Russian plans of asserting control over the 

South Caucasus states of Azerbaijan and Georgia, in 

particular controlling the westward export of Caspian 

oil resources. Thus, for both internal and external reasons, the Russian government was now prompted to 

“solve” the Chechnya problem. Serious negotiations 

between Moscow and Grozny were never attempted, 

mainly because of the personal enmity between Du-
129

dayev and Yeltsin.10 After seeking briefly to use subversion to overthrow Dudayev without success, the 

Russian government decided to launch a wholesale 

invasion of Chechnya in late 1994.11

Importantly, the Chechen movement for independence was an almost entirely secular affair.12 Its 

chief leaders, such as Jokhar Dudayev and Aslan 

Maskhadov, were former Soviet officers with highly 

secular lifestyles. This is not to say that Islamist elements were not present: They did develop among the 

Chechen leadership, mainly through the efforts of 

Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Movladi Udugov, high 

officials in Dudayev’s administration. However, they 

remained largely marginal, being able to assert themselves only tepidly during the internal crisis that Dudayev experienced in 1993, in which he briefly began 

using increasingly religious language in an attempt to 

shore up legitimacy when faced with growing criticism of his mismanagement of Chechnya’s economy. 

Moreover, there is significant evidence suggesting 

that Yandarbiyev and Uduguov embraced Islamism 

in a mainly instrumental way.13

The First War.

Contrary to Moscow’s expectations, the Russian 

threat rallied erstwhile skeptics around Dudayev once 

the war started. Aided by the dismal character of the 

Russian military campaign, the Chechen forces were 

able to resist the Russian invasion. Getting bogged 

down in Chechnya, the Russian military resorted to 

brutal tactics to subdue an opponent they had thoroughly underestimated, and used air bombing and 

artillery to level Grozny before entering it. Only after 2 months did the Russian army manage to estab-
130

lish control over the city—at the cost of thousands of 

Russian casualties, over 20,000 killed civilians, a total 

destruction of the city, and hundreds of thousands of 

refugees. The war continued, with the Chechen forces 

regrouping in the south of Chechnya. Meanwhile, Dudayev himself was killed by Russian forces in April 

1996. Despite this setback, the Chechen forces in August 1996 managed to stage a counteroffensive, and 

retake the three major cities of Chechnya, including 

Grozny, in 3 days of fighting. This amounted to a total 

humiliation of the Russian forces, and the government 

was forced to end the war and pull out all its forces by 

a cease-fire signed 3 weeks later. 

The war led to the total devastation of Grozny and 

many other Chechen towns and villages. According to 

the most credible estimates, the death toll in the first 

war was in the range of 50,000 people.14 Compared 

with the war in Afghanistan, the Chechen war was 

far more lethal for the Russian army. During 1984, 

the worst year in Afghanistan, almost 2,500 Soviet 

soldiers were killed. In Chechnya, Russian losses surpassed this number within 4 months of the intervention. At its highest, the shelling of Grozny, counted 

by the number of explosions per day, surpassed the 

shelling of Sarajevo in the early 1990s by a factor of at 

least 50. Grozny was literally leveled to the ground in 

a destruction that recalled the battle of Stalingrad. 

Moreover, the war was dominated by massive human rights violations, which are considered the worst 

in Europe since World War II. Russian forces engaged 

in several well-documented massacres of civilians, 

the most well-known of which occurred in the village 

of Samashki in April 1995. As noted above, the first 

war in Chechnya was waged almost exclusively in the 

name of national independence. But it is in the context 
131

of the brutality of the Russian onslaught that the first 

jihadi elements appeared in Chechnya. Indeed, it is 

also the context in which the Chechen leadership and 

fighters welcomed or tolerated these foreign recruits; 

there is ample evidence that there was little love lost 

between the Chechen leadership and the jihadis—but 

the Chechens needed all the help that they could get, 

and were hardly in a position to turn away these newfound allies, all the more since they were exceptionally effective in combat. 

Similarly, this is the context in which terrorist tactics enter the Chechen war. Practiced from the outset 

by the Russian detachments, some of the Chechens 

commanders gradually came to employ them. Here, 

the notorious Shamil Basayev deserves particular 

mention, whose hostage-taking raid on a hospital in 

the southern Russian town of Budyonnovsk in June 

1995 was the first large-scale use of terrorism by the 

Chechens. It occurred at a time when the Chechen 

cause seemed all but lost, and arguably contributed 

to turning the tide in the war, or at least in forestalling 

defeat. Basayev himself was in one sense an unlikely 

terrorist: Only 3 years earlier, he had deployed as a 

volunteer to fight the Georgians in Abkhazia, being 

among the North Caucasian volunteers that received 

training and assistance for the purpose from the Russian military intelligence services.15

The number of foreign fighters in the first war was 

small, perhaps a few hundred at most. These were 

mainly the roving “Arab Afghans” who had fought in 

Kashmir, Tajikistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which 

was the big focus of jihadi attention in the early 1990s. 

Tellingly, the person who actually declared a jihad on 

Russia was none other than Akhmad Kadyrov, then 

mufti of Chechnya, who would switch sides in 1999, 
132

and became Russia’s local satrap, a position his son, 

Ramzan, inherited upon his assassination in May 2004.

The Inter-War Period.

The August 1996 accords, complemented by a formal peace treaty in May 1997, granted Chechnya de 

facto independence, though the issue of Chechnya’s 

status was deferred until December 31, 2001. In practice, Chechnya had the opportunity to build what in 

practice amounted to an independent state. Russian 

law did not apply in Chechnya, and no Russian police, 

army, customs, or postal service operated there. 

However, for both internal and external reasons, 

this second attempt at independence in a decade ended in a dismal failure. Russia consistently prevented 

Chechnya from seeking outside financial help, and 

though it committed funds to the reconstruction of 

the war-ravaged republic, $100 million disappeared 

before they even reached Chechnya. In a celebrated 

statement, President Yeltsin publicly admitted “only 

the devil” knew where the money had gone.16 Hence 

the basis on which the Chechen government could 

create a functioning state was shaky indeed. 

Yet initial signals were positive. In a presidential 

election that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) termed largely free and fair, 

the population of Chechnya overwhelmingly voted 

for Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of Staff of the Chechen 

armed forces and the most moderate among the three 

presidential contenders. Thus, Chechnya acquired a 

legitimate government that was open to compromise 

and cooperation, although it never wavered from its 

commitment to an independent Chechnya. Sadly, 

this initial stability did not last. Chechnya was awash 
133

with young, unemployed war veterans with arsenals 

of weapons, whose loyalty was to individual field 

commanders rather than to the central Chechen government. With the economic depression deepening, 

Maskhadov’s authority over Chechnya gradually diminished, and the government became unable to uphold law and order. Various criminal groups emerged 

that engaged in smuggling and kidnapping, and the 

government showed its inability to effectively deal 

with this problem. Most alarmingly, warlords Shamil 

Basayev and the Jordanian-born Khattab began planning for the unification of Chechnya with the neighboring republic of Dagestan, still part of the Russian 

Federation. Maskhadov was either unwilling or unable to rein in these warlords, fearing an intra-Chechen war. As a result, Basayev and Khattab were able to 

recruit hundreds of Dagestanis and other North Caucasians, including Chechens, into what they termed 

an Islamic Brigade based in Southeastern Chechnya. 

This brigade would eventually launch the incursion 

into Dagestan in August 1999, which precipitated the 

second war.

It is instructive, at this point, to compare Chechnya to the major other armed conflict in Europe of the 

time: Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, Chechnya was similar to Bosnia in terms of the level and character of the 

jihadi presence; where it differed was in the absence of 

a Dayton-type internationalized conflict management 

mechanism.

Indeed, most jihadis that came to fight in Chechnya were veterans of the Bosnian campaign. This was 

true for the poster child of Chechen jihadis, the Saudiborn Amir al-Khattab. What is seldom recalled is the 

extent of the Islamist contagion in Bosnia at the time 

of the Dayton Accords. Indeed, the leadership of the 
134

Bosnian Muslims in many ways leaned more toward 

Islamism than that of the Chechens: Alija Izetbegovic, 

the Bosnian Muslim leader, had a long history of Islamist inclinations dating back to his involvement 

in the Young Muslim organizations in Bosnia, Mladi 

Muslimani, during World War II .17 Haris Silajdzic, his 

closest advisor, received Islamic education in Libya 

and served as an advisor to Bosnia’s spiritual leader, 

the Reis-ul-Ulema. By contrast, the only Islamist to lead 

the Chechen resistance was Yandarbiyev, who only 

served as interim president between Dudayev’s death 

in April 1996 and Maskhadov’s election in January 

1997. By contrast, Dudayev and Maskhadov were considerably more secular than the key Bosnian leaders.

The jihadi presence in Bosnia was a real problem 

at the close of the war. The Bosnian leadership was 

split between those wanting to rid Bosnia of the foreign radicals, and those grateful for their support and 

who wanted to allow them to stay. Most jihadis were 

nevertheless evicted shortly following the Dayton Accords, after several altercations with North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) forces brought attention 

to their presence.18 Indeed, this highlights the main 

difference between Bosnia and Chechnya: Chechnya 

had the Khasavyurt treaty that postponed the key issue in the conflict; was never fully implemented; was 

bilateral and lacked any international guarantor; and 

lacked international peacekeeping forces. Bosnia, on 

the other hand, had a real peace treaty, and NATO 

forces to keep that treaty. Thus, most jihadis were 

gradually evicted from Bosnia following the Dayton 

Accords. However, small numbers remained until as 

late as 2007, when the Bosnian government finally removed the last remnants.19
135

In Chechnya, there was no force capable of removing the jihadi elements. Indeed, the Maskhadov administration was considerably weaker than its Bosnian 

counterpart, and could not rely on an international 

force, whether military such as the NATO Implementation Forces (IFOR) or civilian such as the Office of 

the High Representative. Unlike Bosnia, which was 

awash in international assistance already a year following the Dayton Accords, Chechnya received next to 

no foreign assistance. Thus, the crippled Maskhadov 

government was in no position to successfully oust 

the jihadis. This was not for a lack of trying: In 1998, 

there was even fire exchanged between the Chechen 

government forces and jihadi groups. But unlike in 

Bosnia, the jihadi forces led by Khattab had found a 

powerful local ally in Shamil Basayev. Maskhadov 

was thus faced with a dire choice. He could either 

confront the jihadis that had ensconced themselves 

in southeastern Chechnya, at the cost of a Chechen 

civil war; or he could tolerate their presence, preserving peace and trying to strengthen state institutions. 

In the end, he chose the latter—which appeared the 

lesser of two evils. While he even sought a deal with 

Moscow in rooting out the radicals, a call that went 

unanswered, his decision contributed greatly to the 

failure of Chechen state-building and led directly to 

the second war.20

Thus, the Chechnya-based jihadis coalesced with 

Wahhabi groups that had emerged independently in 

Dagestan in the late 1990s. Training camps developed 

modeled on those in Afghanistan, where small numbers of people from the entire North Caucasus and 

beyond received training; many then fought in the 

second Chechen war, and subsequently spread the 

militant ideology and tactics back to their own home 

republics.
136

The Second War.

During the course of the second Chechen war, 

which began in October 1999, concern grew over the 

radicalization of the Chechen resistance movement 

and its links to extremist Islamic groups in the Middle 

East. Indeed, authors like Gordon Hahn have come to 

conclude that the “key, if not main factor driving the 

violence in the North Caucasus” is “the salience of local cultural and the Salafist jihadist theo-ideology and 

the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement.”21 While this chapter takes issue with that claim, 

the Chechen resistance has indeed acquired a much 

stronger Islamic character. The use of Islamic vocabulary such as jihad (holy war) or mujahedin (resistance 

fighters) increased markedly, as did active support for 

the Chechen cause by radical Islamic groups in the 

Middle East, at least until the U.S. invasion of Iraq led 

jihadis to flock to that conflict. 

Moscow managed to drive this point across especially after September 11, 2001 (9/11). Immediately 

after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Russian leadership began drawing comparisons between 

the attacks and the situation in Chechnya. Only hours 

after the collapse of the World Trade Centers, Russian State television broadcast a statement by President Vladimir Putin expressing solidarity with the 

American people, but also reminding the audience of 

Russia’s earlier warnings of the common threat of “Islamic Fundamentalism.” This marked the beginning 

of a strategy aiming to capitalize on the tragic attacks 

on America by highlighting the alleged parallels between the attacks on the United States and the situation in Chechnya. “The Russian people understand 

the American people better than anyone else, having 
137

experienced terrorism first-hand,” President Putin 

said the day after the attacks.22

This turned out to be the harbinger of a diplomatic 

campaign targeted at Western countries intended to 

shore up legitimacy, if not support, for the Russian army’s violent crackdown in Chechnya.23 This campaign 

was part and parcel of a five-step strategy to reduce 

the negative fallout of the war in Chechnya. The first 

component of that strategy was to isolate the conflict 

zone and prevent both Russian and international media from reporting on the conflict independently. The 

kidnapping of Andrei Babitsky, a reporter for Radio 

Liberty, early on served as a warning for journalists 

of the consequences of ignoring Moscow’s rules on 

reporting the conflict. Since then, only a few journalists have actually been able to provide independent 

reporting from Chechnya. Most prominent has been 

the late Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya who 

was murdered in Moscow in 2007, and French writer, 

Anne Nivat. 

The second prong in the strategy was to rename the 

conflict: Instead of a “war,” it was an “anti-terrorist 

operation.” Third, and stemming directly from this, 

Russia sought to discredit the Chechen struggle and 

undermine its leadership by accusing them individually and collectively of involvement with terrorism. 

Russia’s campaign against Chechen President Aslan 

Maskhadov’s chief negotiator, Akhmed Zakayev, is 

one example of this. This nevertheless backfired as 

first Denmark and then Great Britain refused to extradite Zakayev to Russia; Great Britain instead providing him with political asylum. Fourth, Russia sought 

to “Chechenize” the conflict and turn it into an intraChechen confrontation by setting up and arming a 

brutal but ethnically Chechen puppet regime in Gro-
138

zny under Kadyrov, the former Mufti (a professional 

jurist interpreting Muslin law) of the republic. This 

would reduce Russian casualties and enable hostilities 

to be depicted as a war between Chechen factions that 

Russia was helping to stabilize. Fifth, after branding 

the war as an anti-terrorist campaign, discrediting the 

rebel leadership, and trying to turn the war into a civil 

war among Chechens, Russia declared that the war 

was over. 

The second war proved as heavy on the civilian 

population as the first. In many ways, Russian abuses 

were more systematic. For example, the Russian leadership set up what they termed “filtration camps”—

essentially concentration camps that gathered male 

Chechens of fighting age, and in which torture and 

disappearances were rampant.24 Whereas European 

countries and the United States kept a moderate but 

noticeable level of criticism against Russia’s massive 

human rights violations in Chechnya during both the 

first war in 1994-96 and in 1999-2001, Russia succeeded in convincing western observers it was not fighting 

a people, but terrorists. In an atmosphere of increased 

cooperation between Russia and the West, with American need for Russian intelligence and cooperation in 

Afghanistan, a halt to criticism on Chechnya became 

the foremost price Russia managed to extract. 

A Regional Insurgency.

Today, the nationalist Chechen leadership is almost exclusively an expatriate phenomenon. The 

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has for all practical 

purposes ceased to exist; instead, the insurgency 

brands itself the “Caucasus Emirate” (CE), overtly 

boasts of its belonging to the global jihad, and oper-
139

ates across the North Caucasus. Studies of violent 

incidents in the North Caucasus agree that the violence peaked in April 2001, 18 months into the second 

Chechen war. From 2002 to 2006, violence was fairly 

steady before declining to a low point in 2006-07.25

From 2007 onwards, however, violence has been on 

a steady increase, albeit fluctuating in both intensity 

and regional focus. Already in 2005, Dagestan and Ingushetia began seeing escalating violence, rivaling at 

times the levels in Chechnya.26 Since 2007, the situation has continued to deteriorate, with the number of 

violent incidents rising sharply every year from 2007 

to 2010.27 In 2009 alone, for example, the number of 

violent incidents went from 795 to 1,100, with fatalities mounting from 586 to 900.28 In the first 11 months 

of 2010, federal prosecutors acknowledged the death 

of 218 security personnel and the wounding of 536.29

From 2008 onward, Dagestan and Ingushetia have 

alternated in the lead in the frequency of incidents.30

In 2010 and 2011, the violence escalated significantly 

in the Western republic of KBR as well—marking the 

diffusion of large-scale and enduring violence beyond 

the republics bordering Chechnya. Thus, in 2010 political violence claimed 79 deaths and 39 wounded; the 

first 11 months of 2011 saw those figures rise to 98 and 

39, respectively.31 As if this was not enough, 2011 also 

saw violence spread to North Ossetia, a traditionally 

calm and majority Orthodox Christian republic.32

RUSSIAN POLICIES

What role did Russian policies play in transforming the conflict from a contained, nationalist rebellion 

to a sprawling jihadi insurgency? Counterintuitively 

as it may seem, Russian policies have contributed di-
140

rectly to this development. In another parallel to the 

Bosnian conflict, Russian rhetoric mirrored that of the 

Serbs: misunderstood defenders of Europe against 

the threat of Islamic radicalism, the “green wave.” Indeed, this line of reasoning has been visible in Russian 

outreach efforts since the mid-1990s, with increasing 

fervor following 9/11.33 But more than just arguing for 

their case, Russian officials actively worked to make 

the reality of the conflict conform to their vision of 

it. Thus, there was a remarkable pattern in Russia’s 

priorities during the second war: the priority given 

to targeting the nationalist Chechen leadership rather 

than the jihadi elements within it. Therefore, on the 

battlefield, Russia targeted field commanders like 

Ruslan Gelayev, as well as Maskhadov himself, whom 

Russian forces killed in March 2005. On the diplomatic 

front, Russian diplomats and lawyers furiously prosecuted and sought the extradition of secular leaders 

like Zakayev and Maskhadov’s foreign minister, Ilyas 

Akhmadov. By comparison, Islamist Chechen leaders 

have fared much better. Among exiles, Movladi Udugov remains alive, among the few remaining members 

of the first generation of Chechen leaders to survive. 

Yandarbiyev was killed in Qatar by Russian agents, 

but only in 2004. Similarly, the current leader of the 

CE, Dokka Umarov, has served since June 2006. The 

most notorious Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev, 

was killed in 2006, but not necessarily by the Russians.

French journalist, Anne Nivat, once wrote that the 

safest place in Chechnya was near Shamil Basayev: 

Russian bombs never appeared to fall there. Given Basayev’s connection with Russian special forces (GRU) 

through the conflict in Abkhazia, numerous conspiracy theories emerged of Basayev’s continued relationship with Russian state institutions; indeed, news re-
141

ports following his death suggested that he was killed 

accidently by explosives in the truck he was driving in 

mountain roads in Ingushetia.34

While allegations of Basayev’s GRU connections 

during the Georgia-Abkhaz war are well-established,35

those concerning subsequent periods are based mainly 

on innuendo. Clearer evidence is available in the case 

of Arbi Barayev, one of the most viciously militant as 

well as most criminalized of Chechnya’s warlords. 

Barayev was one of the key forces seeking to undermine Maskhadov’s leadership in the interwar era; it 

was his group that kidnapped and beheaded foreign 

telecommunications workers in 1998, effectively forcing out the small international presence in Chechnya. 

Similarly, it was Barayev’s forces that engaged in firefights with Maskhadov’s troops in 1998. Following the 

renewed warfare, Barayev lived freely in the town of 

Alkhan-Kala, under Russian control, until his death 

in 2001—despite the fact that he was responsible for 

gruesome, video-recorded murders of captive Russian servicemen. As several observers have noted, his 

opulent residence was only a few miles away from 

a Russian checkpoint near his native Alkhan-Kala, 

while his car had an FSB identification which allowed 

him to race through Russian checkpoints.36 Tellingly, 

Barayev was killed by a GRU hit squad only after the 

FSB’s then-head of counterterrorism, General Ugryumov, had died. The apparent conclusion was that 

Ugryumov provided a cover for Barayev, and the 

former’s death made it possible for the GRU to take 

Barayev out.

Given the nature of this conflict, evidence can at 

best be inconclusive. But circumstantial evidence suggests two things: First, that during the second war 

there was no clear and unified chain of command on 
142

either the Chechen or the Russian side. Chechen forces 

paid nominal allegiance to Maskhadov but, in practice, field commanders behaved independently, and 

with little coordination. On the Russian side, detachments of the army, GRU, FSB, and Ministry of Interior 

played different roles in the conflict, roles that were 

poorly coordinated; moreover, they each appeared 

to keep ties with some Chechen commanders, while 

combating others. Second, the policies of the Russian 

leadership itself contributed to change the nature of 

the conflict from a nationalist rebellion to one where 

the enemy was Islamic jihadis. While this is likely in 

the long run to be of greater danger to Russia, it did 

succeed in making the conflict fit into Moscow’s desired narrative. After all, Maskhadov and the Chechen 

nationalist leadership was respected in Western circles, being granted meetings with Western officials 

and maintaining strong support among Western media, civil society, and human rights organizations. The 

jihadi elements, needless to say, did not and do not 

enjoy this status.

In a sense, however, Moscow is now faced both 

with a jihadi movement and a nationalist Chechnya. 

Indeed, the CE is everything it is blamed of being: a 

part of the global jihad, and a terrorist incubator on 

Europe’s borders. While primarily led by Chechens, 

it is most active in the other republics of the North 

Caucasus. But Moscow also is faced with a nationalist 

Chechen leadership in Grozny. Indeed, the Kadyrov 

administration appointed by Moscow has developed 

in such a nationalistic direction that the secular Chechen nationalists in exile, who broke with the Islamist 

faction with the establishment of the Emirate in 2007, 

began mending fences with Kadyrov, their erstwhile 

foe, by 2009.37 While a counterintuitive turn, the secu-
143

lar nationalists concluded that Kadyrov has in practice achieved what they failed to achieve through an 

armed rebellion: a Chechen republic that is for most 

practical purposes behaving as an independent entity. 

As early as 2005, Russian analysts began referring to 

Kadyrov’s moves as “separatism-light.”38

A PACIFIED CHECHNYA? 

Presently, Chechnya is arguably among the least 

violence-ridden republics in the North Caucasus. 

The last several years have seen widespread violence 

in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KBR; by comparison, 

Chechnya has been relatively stable. But the longterm outlook is clouded by the fragility on which this 

relative quiet rests.

The main reason for Chechnya’s stability is the 

dominance that Ramzan Kadyrov and his militia forces exert over the republic. These fighters, estimated at 

over 5,000 in number, consist mainly of former resistance fighters. Moscow initially sought to balance the 

Kadyrov clan with other political figures. Following 

Akhmad Kadyrov’s assassination, Ramzan—who had 

not yet achieved the eligible age for the presidency—

was appointed deputy prime minister. Chechnya was 

instead led by career police officer Alu Alkhanov, who 

had sided with Moscow already in the first war. By 

March 2006, Ramzan Kadyrov was elevated to the 

post of Prime Minister, replacing Sergey Abramov. 

Less than a year later, Alkhanov was dismissed and 

Kadyrov appointed President. Thus, by 2007, any political balances to Kadyrov had been removed; fighting forces outside his control nevertheless remained: 

the “Zapad” and “Vostok” battalions, the latter commanded by Sulim Yamadayev, were nevertheless dis-
144

banded in November 2008 following escalating tensions and actual armed clashes with Kadyrov’s forces. 

Yamadayev loyalists were evicted from Chechnya; 

Sulim Yamadayev was assassinated in Dubai in 2009, 

while his brother met the same fate in Moscow, presumably at Kadyrov’s orders.39 This removed the sole 

remaining check on Kadyrov’s power in Chechnya, to 

the chagrin of many decisionmakers in Moscow—but 

with the apparent blessing of Putin and Kadyrov’s immediate handler, the Chechen-born Vladislav Surkov, 

who serves as Putin’s first deputy chief of staff and 

chief ideologue. 

Kadyrov has walked a fine line between vows of 

absolute personal loyalty and subservience to Vladimir Putin, on the one hand, and institutional distancing from Russia. Thus, in 2007, he repeatedly urged 

Putin to stay on as president for life.40 In 2009, Kadyrov said “if it was not for Putin, Chechnya would not 

exist.”41 In January 2010, he added that “I am completely Vladimir Putin’s man. I would rather die 100 

times than let him down.”42 Kadyrov also delivers 

votes for the ruling party. In 2007, for example, official 

figures showed that 99.5 percent of the Chechen electorate cast their votes, and that 99.3 percent voted for 

the United Russia party.

On the other hand, Kadyrov has increasingly appealed to Chechen nationalism and sought to Islamize 

Chechnya. In December 2006, he publicly sought the 

prosecution of Russian officers responsible for civilian 

deaths in Chechnya.43 His attitude toward the Russian military, which he sought to have expelled from 

Chechnya, is best illustrated by his 2006 statement 

that “as for the generals, I’m not going to say that I 

care about their opinion.”44 Following his appointment as President, Kadyrov moved strongly to assert 
145

Chechnya’s economic and political autonomy. For 

example, he has sought the creation of a Chechen oil 

company that would keep the revenues of Chechnya’s 

oil industry instead of sending them to Moscow; and 

campaigned to have Chechens convicted elsewhere 

in Russia serve prison time in Chechnya.45 Already in 

2006, Kadyrov began urging women to comply with 

Islamic dress codes, something that was later officially 

promulgated with a program to strengthen “female 

virtue.”46 He has also spoken favorably of Shariah in 

general, and of both honor killings and of polygamy 

in particular, and referred to women as men’s property—all of which are in violation of Russian laws.47

Adding to this, Kadyrov has made a habit of diverting the enormous funds coming to Chechnya from 

the federal center. Indeed, Russian state auditors have 

repeatedly noted the disappearance of the equivalent 

of dozens of millions of dollars in state subsidies to 

Chechnya, which amount to 90 percent of the republic’s budget. 

Thus, all in all, Kadyrov has stabilized Chechnya on 

the surface. But the stability rests on a very weak foundation. On the one hand, it rests solely on the personal 

relationship between Kadyrov and Putin. As such, the 

question is whether the stability of the republic would 

outlive the departure from power of either man. Given 

the average life expectancy of Chechen politicians, the 

possibility of Kadyrov being assassinated is very real. 

If that were to happen, would the thousands of former rebels now forming the bulk of his militia pledge 

loyalty to a new leader, or would they return to the 

resistance, ushering in a third Chechen war? Even if 

Kadyrov remains in power, the defection of large sections of his militia to the resistance cannot be excluded. 

Similarly, Kadyrov’s pragmatism is exhibited by his 
146

decision to switch sides from the resistance to Russia. 

It is not inconceivable that he could switch sides again 

under some scenario—for example, if Putin were to 

leave power and his successor would discontinue the 

arrangement with Kadyrov. Before her death, Anna 

Politkovskaya observed that by his policies in Chechnya, Putin had essentially guaranteed a third Chechen 

war at some future point. She may have turned out to 

be prescient.48

CONCLUSION

The North Caucasus is sinking ever deeper into a 

process of Afghanization. While the external impetus 

of jihadi ideology has played a role in this development, this chapter has sought to show that the root 

cause of the region’s decline is the Russian government’s policies—in particular its prosecution of the 

wars in Chechnya; its over-reliance on repression in 

both Chechnya and the rest of the region; its centralization of power; its unwillingness to allow the North 

Caucasus to open up to the rest of the world; its failure 

to provide an economic future for the region’s population; a political discourse that is making North Caucasians increasingly estranged from Russian society; 

and the corruption and criminalization of the Russian 

political system. 

This situation destabilizes Russia, and forms its 

most acute political problem. But it does not only affect Russia: It greatly affects the security and prosperity of the South Caucasus, as well as potentially all of 

Europe. The impact on the South Caucasus is threefold. Most obviously, Azerbaijan and Georgia are directly affected by the violence and economic woes of 

the region. This is only likely to be exacerbated in the 
147

future: While Azerbaijan experiences rapid growth 

thanks to its oil and gas industry, Georgia has made 

great strides in reforms, not least in terms of practically abolishing administrative corruption. Over 

time, the contrast between these economies and the 

languishing North Caucasus will have consequences, 

in terms, for example, of migration flows. Secondly, 

the southern neighbors of the North Caucasus are affected by the diffusion of the conflicts in the North. 

Thus, flows of refugees—and fighters—from the 

North Caucasus into Georgia and Azerbaijan have 

been a recurring phenomenon over the past 2 decades, 

with destabilizing effects on both countries. Third, the 

Russian government has shown a distinctive tendency 

to assign blame to its neighbors when it has proven 

unable to deal with the consequences of its own failures in the North Caucasus. In the beginning of the 

second Chechnyan war, both Azerbaijan and Georgia 

were accused, without a shred of evidence, of serving 

as conduits for thousands of foreign fighters to Chechnya; ever since, Russian accusations have focused on 

Georgia, with threats of intervention into the Pankisi 

Gorge on Georgian territory in 2002, and actual instances of Russian bombings of the Gorge.49 Following 

the escalation of violence in 2008-11, Russian officials 

have made a custom of blaming Georgia—and occasionally Western powers—for actively colluding with 

the jihadi rebels in the North Caucasus. Thus, Russia’s 

tendency to blame others for its failures poses a constant risk to its neighbors.

This predicament is most acute, given the upcoming Olympic Games in Sochi. Given current trends, 

Moscow is unlikely to be able to pacify the North 

Caucasus ahead of the Games, and will be increasingly likely to blame others for any terrorist attacks that 
148

would threaten this prestigious event. The alternative 

option, a gigantic security operation to assert control 

over the region, would itself very likely have a spillover effect on the South Caucasus. 

Beyond the Caucasus itself, Russia’s misrule in the 

North Caucasus poses a threat to Europe as a whole. 

In fact, with the European Union (EU) now extended 

to the shores of the Black Sea, it is a direct neighbor of 

the North Caucasus. Through the Eastern Partnership, 

Partnership for Peace, and other instruments, the EU 

and NATO are seeking to contribute to the building 

of stability, security, and prosperity in their eastern 

neighborhood. In spite of the unresolved conflicts 

of the South Caucasus and Moldova, and the mixed 

scorecard for democratic development across the region, the Eastern neighborhood has indeed seen largely positive trends over the past decade. But the North 

Caucasus is the sole remaining area where Europe 

has little to no ability to influence developments, but 

which could nevertheless have a considerably negative effect on Europe. The region is already a transshipment point for smuggled goods to Europe, and an 

incubator of jihadi elements from the region and beyond. Thus far, the Islamic Emirate has stayed focused 

on targets in the North Caucasus and Russia. But given 

its broader ideological orientation and its perception 

of Europe as a collaborator with Russia in the repression of Muslims, the prospect of groups affiliated with 

the Emirate targeting Europe itself should not be excluded. After all, jihadi elements with connections to 

Central Asia have already been implicated in planned 

terrorist attacks in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

Thus, Russia’s failure to stabilize the North Caucasus has amounted to the creation of an Afghanistanlike environment in Europe: a failed state within a 
149

state. Moscow is patently unable to remedy the situation, seeming only to design policies that are as a 

whole counterproductive. Unfortunately, the failure 

of Russia to address the region’s problems is related 

directly to Russia’s very system. The sad fact is that as 

long as Russia itself maintains a political system based 

on kleptocratic authoritarianism, the prospects of the 

North Caucasus will remain dim. 

This poses a conundrum for Western powers. If 

the situation continues to deteriorate, Western powers may not be able to afford simply treating the North 

Caucasus as a domestic Russian issue. At the same 

time, their policy options in designing responses to 

the situation in the region are highly limited. While 

efforts could be undertake in conjunction with the 

South Caucasian states to contain the destabilization 

emanating from the North Caucasus, addressing the 

root causes of the problem will require a dialogue 

with Moscow, the prospects of which are dim.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Marina Kamenev, “Has Russia Lost Control of the North 

Caucasus?” Time, June 12, 2009, available from www.time.

com/time/world/article/0,8599,1904234,00.html; Emil Souleimonov, 

“Dagestan: the Emerging Core of the North Caucasus Insurgency,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, September 29, 2010, available 

from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5415.

2. Olof Staaf, “Moscow Unable to Afford New Development 

Program for the North Caucasus,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 

August 17, 2011, available from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5614; 

“Moscow Hosts Rally under the Motto ‘Stop Feeding Caucasus!’” 

Caucasian Knot, October 22, 2011, available from rf.eng.kavkaz-uzel.

ru/articles/18748.

3. Charles Blandy, North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching 

Destabilisation, Caucasus Series, 05/36, Shrivenham, UK: United 
150

Kingdom Defence Academy, Conflict Studies Research Center, 

August 2005, p. 6.

4. Sergey Markedonov, “’Russkiy Vopros’ v kavkazskom 

izmerenii” (“The ‘Russian question’ in the Caucasian dimension”), Caucasus Times, April 9, 2007, available from www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=12365; Olga I. Vendina et al., “The Wars 

in Chechnya and their Effects on Neighboring Regions,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2007, pp. 194-195, 

available from www.colorado.edu/ibs/waroutcomes/docs/EGE_2007_

WarChechnya_s4.pdf.

5. Paul Goble, “Kabardino-Balkaria Highlights Putin’s ‘Failure’ in the Caucasus,” Window on Eurasia, January 23, 2008, 

available from windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/01/window-oneurasia-kabardino-balkaria.html.

6. Marie Bennigsen Broxup, ed., The North Caucasus Barrier, 

London, UK: C. Hurst, 1992; John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1-40.

7. Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the 

Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, London, UK: Routledge, 2003.

8. Aleksandr Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation 

and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War, New 

York: W.W. Norton, 1981; Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, 

Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, Basingstoke, UK: Pan Books, 

1997, pp. 56-75.

9. Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of 

Nationalities, London, UK: MacMillan, 1970, p. 160.

10. See Gall and de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War.

11. For details, see Chap. 5, “The War in Chechnya,” in Svante 

E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical 

Conflict in the Caucasus, Richmond, VA: Curzon Press, 2001.

12. Emil Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 

9, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 48-71.
151

13. Julie Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The 

Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement,” Europe-Asia 

Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 38-39.

14. John B. Dunlop, “How Many Soldiers and Civilians Died 

During the Russo-Chechen War of 1994-96?” Central Asian Survey, 

Vol. 19, No. 3/4, 2000, pp. 328-338.

15. Boris Kagarlitsky, Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-Liberal Autocracy, London, UK: Pluto Press, 2002, pp. 229-234. Russian press reports in Novaya Gazeta, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and Versiya

have all provided documentation to this effect.

16. Peter Ford, “Yeltsin Admits Aid Misses Chechnya,” Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1997. Only $21 million of the $138 

million committed eventually reached Chechnya.

17. Gerard F. Powers, “Religion, Conflict and Prospects for 

Peace in Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia,” Journal of International 

Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, Summer 1996, available from www.georgefox.

edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swk/ree/Powers_Religion_

Oct%201996.pdf.

18. See Evan Kohlmann, Al Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The AfghanBosnian Network, Oxford, UK: Berg Publications, 2004; Michael 

A. Innes, Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens, 

Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997, pp. 55-56.

19. Anes Alic, “Foreign jihadis face Deportation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 

21, 8 November 2007, available from www.jamestown.org/

programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4532&tx_

ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=182&no_cache=1.

20. See Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” pp. 

46-50.

21. Gordon M. Hahn, Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right, 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

August 2011, p. 1.
152

22. RTR (Russian State Television), September 12, 2001, 1300 

GMT. See also Francesca Mereu, “U.S.: Russia Says Chechen Conflict Aids ‘Understanding’ Of U.S. Tragedy,” RFE/RL, September 

14, 2001.

23. See Janusz Bugajski, “Beware of Putin Bearing Gifts,” The 

Washington Times, October 10, 2001.

24. Human Rights Watch, “Hundreds of Chechens Detained 

in ‘Filtration Camps’,” February 17, 2000, available from www.hrw.

org/news/2000/02/17/hundreds-chechens-detained-filtration-camps.

25. John O'Loughlin and Frank D. W. Witmer, “The Localized 

Geographies of Violence in the North Caucasus of Russia,” Annals 

of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 101, No. 1, 2011, pp. 

178-201, first published on December 15, 2010.

26. Emil Pain, “Moscow’s North Caucasus Policy Backfires,” 

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Vol. 6, No. 13, June 29, 2005, available from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3151.

27. Valery Dzutsev, “Another Lost Year for the Kremlin in 

the North Caucasus: 2010 in Review (Part 1),” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 8, January 12, 2011, available from www.

jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%

5D=37350&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=

660e50c38e.

28. Human Rights and Security Initiative, “Violence in 

the North Caucasus—2009: A Bloody Year,” Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 14, 

2010, available from csis.org/files/publication/100114_Violence_

NorthCaucasus_2009optimize.pdf.

29. Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia’s North Caucasus: the Terrorism Revival,” ISN Insights, December 23, 2010, available from 

www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en

&ots627=fce62fe0-528d-4884-9cdf-283c282cf0b2&id=125837&tabid=

125818&contextid734=125837&contextid735=125818.

30. Human Rights and Security Initiative, “Violence in the 

North Caucasus—Spring 2010: On the rise, Again?” Washington, 
153

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 13, 2010, 

available from csis.org/files/publication/100513_Violence_in_the_

North_Caucasus_Spring_2010.pdf.

31. Igor Rotar, “Growing Violence in Kabardino-Balkaria 

Threatens to Destabilize the Northwest Caucasus,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 218, December 1, 2011, available from www.

jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38

732&cHash=530491ac52389684440e5dcc84e128a7.

32. Emil Souleimanov, “North Ossetia: Jihadization in the 

Making?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, June 8, 2011, available 

from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5573. 

33. Graeme P. Herd, “The Russo-Chechen Information Warfare and 9/11: Al-Qaeda through the South Caucasus Looking 

Glass,” European Security, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2002. 

34. “Basayev’s Death May Have Been an Accident,” Prague 

Watchdog, July 10, 2006; “Basayev Didn’t Save Face,” Kommersant, July 11, 2006, available from www.kommersant.com/page.

asp?idr=527&id=689111.

35. Kagarlitsky, Russia under Yeltsin and Putin, pp. 229-234. 

36. Sanobar Shermatova, ”The Secret War between Russian 

Intelligence Agencies,” Moscow News, August 8, 2000. Also see 

Khassan Baiev, Nicholas Daniloff, and Ruth Daniloff, The Oath: A 

Surgeon Under Fire, New York: Walker & Company, 2004.

37. Kevin Daniel Leahy, “Reconciliation between Akhmed 

Zakayev and Ramzan Kadyrov: A Triumph of Historical Pragmatism?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 25, 2009, available 

from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5048.

38. Ivan Sukhov, ”Chechensky Ochag,” Agenstvo Politicheskikh 

Novostey, August 16, 2005, available from www.apn.ru/publications/

article1519.htm.

39. Ellen Barry and Michael Schwartz, ”Killing of Leader’s Foes 

May Test Kremlin’s Will,” New York Times, April 6, 2009, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/world/europe/07chechnya.html.
154

40. Andrew Osborn, “Ramzan Kadyrov: The Warrior King of 

Chechnya,” The Independent, January 4, 2007, available from www.

independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/ramzan-kadyrov-the-warriorking-of-chechnya-430738.html.

41. ”Kadyrov Says Putin Saved Chechnya,” RIA Novosti, April 

7, 2009, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20090407/120959179.html.

42. “Ramzan Kadyrov: ya sto raz umry za Putina” (“Ramzan Kadyrov: I would die a hundred times for Putin”), versia.ru, 

January 11, 2010, available from versia.ru/articles/2010/jan/11/

kadyrov_interview.

43. “Kadyrov Vows to Prosecute Federal Commanders for 

Abuses,” Chechnya Weekly, December 7, 2006.

44. Kevin Daniel Leahy, “Kadyrov’s Bluff,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Vol. 8, No. 10, May 17, 2006, p. 7, available from 

www.cacianalyst.org/issues/20060517Analyst.pdf.

45. Kevin Daniel Leahy, “Chechnya’s New President: Rational Actor or Ideological Zealot?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 

Vol. 9, No. 7, April 4, 2007, p. 6, available from www.cacianalyst.

org/files/070404Analyst_0.pdf.

46. See Human Rights Watch, ”You Dress According to Their 

Rules”: Enforcement of an Islamic Dress Code for Women in Chechnya, 

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011, available from www.hrw.

org/sites/default/files/reports/chechnya0311webwcover.pdf.

47. See, e.g., Oleg Antonenko, ”Chechnya: Gde konchayetsya 

konstitutsiya i nachinayetsya shariat?” (“Chechnya: where does 

the constitution end and sharia begin?”), BBC Russian Service, 

December 26, 2008, available from news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/

newsid_7800000/7800125.stm.

48. Personal communication, Washington, DC, 2006.

49. Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Georgia/Russia: Tbilisi Moves 

Against Pankisi,” RFE/RL, August 28, 2002, available from www.

rferl.org/content/article/1100642.html.
155

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the postSoviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate 

Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace 

Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force 

Base, AL; and taught at the University of Texas, San 

Antonio; and at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: Russia’s 

Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military 

and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He 

has also written many articles and conference papers 

on Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, 

and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in 

Eurasia. His two most recent books are Russo-Chinese 

Energy Relations: Politics in Command, London, UK: 

Global Markets Briefing, 2006; and Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American 

Strategic Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. Dr. Blank holds 

a B.A. in history from the University of Pennsylvania, 

and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from the University 

of Chicago.

SVANTE E. CORNELL is Research Director of the 

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies 

Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy 

Center affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, DC, and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development 

Policy. Dr. Cornell is an Associate Research Professor 

at SAIS.
156

GORDON M. HAHN is a Senior Associate (NonResident) at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC; a Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor in the Monterey Terrorism 

Research and Education Program at the Monterey 

Institute for International Studies in California; and 

an Analyst and Consultant for Russia—Other Points 

of View (www.russiaotherpointsofview.com). Dr. Hahn 

is author of the well-received books, Russia’s Islamic 

Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), Russia’s Revolution 

From Above, 1985-2000 (Transaction Publishers, 2002), 

and numerous articles in academic journals and other 

English and Russian language media. He has taught 

at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, and San 

Francisco State Universities and as a Fulbright Scholar 

at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia. Dr. Hahn 

writes and edits the bimonthly “Islam, Islamism, and 

Politics in Eurasia Report” published under the auspices of CSIS.

SERGEY MARKEDONOV has been a visiting fellow in 

the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program since May 2010. 

He is an expert on the Caucasus, as well as Black Sea 

regional security, nationalism, interethnic conflicts, 

and de-facto states in the post-Soviet area. From 2001 

to 2010, he worked as head of the Interethnic Relations 

Group and deputy director at the Institute for Political 

and Military Analysis in Moscow. He has held teaching positions at the Russian State University for the 

Humanities, the Moscow State University, and the 

Diplomatic Academy. Dr. Markedonov’s publications 

include several books and reports, about 100 academic 

articles, and more than 500 press pieces. Recently published books and reports include De facto States of the 
157

Post-Soviet Space: Particularities of the Nation-Building

(Caucasus Institute, 2012), The Turbulent Eurasia (Academia, 2010), “The Big Caucasus: Consequences of the 

‘Five Day War’,” and New Challenges and Prospects (International Centre for Black Sea Studies, 2009). 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Editor

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

RUSSIA'S HOMEGROWN INSURGENCY: 

JIHAD IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

Stephen J. Blank

Editor

October 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-544-5
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword ........................................................................v

1. The Caucasus Emirate Jihadists: 

 The Security and Strategic Implications ...............1

Gordon M. Hahn

2. The North Caucasus in Russia and Russia 

 in the North Caucasus: State Approaches 

 and Political Dynamics in the 

 Turbulent Region ...................................................99

Sergey Markedonov

3. The “Afghanization” of the North 

 Caucasus: Causes and Implications 

 of a Changing Conflict ........................................121 

Svante E. Cornell

About the Contributors .............................................155
v

FOREWORD

The United States has had a bitter set of experiences 

with insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations, 

but it is by no means alone in having to confront such 

threats and challenges. Indeed, according to Russian 

President Dmitry Medvedev, the greatest domestic 

threat to Russia’s security is the ongoing insurgency 

in the North Caucasus. This insurgency grew out of 

Russia’s wars in Chechnya and has gone on for several years, with no end in sight. Yet it is hardly known in 

the West and barely covered even by experts. In view 

of this insurgency’s strategic importance and the fact 

that the U.S. military can and must learn for other contemporary wars, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 

felt the need to bring this war to our readers’ attention 

and shed more light upon both sides, the Islamist (and 

nationalist) rebels and Russia, as they wage either an 

insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign.

While the evident and primary cause of this current war is Russian misrule in the North Caucasus in 

the context of the Chechen wars, it also is true that 

Russia is now facing a self-proclaimed fundamentalist, Salafi-oriented, Islamist challenge, that openly 

proclaims its links to al-Qaeda and whose avowed 

aim is the detachment of the North Caucasus from the 

Russian Federation. Therefore, we should have a substantial interest in scrutinizing the course of this war 

both for its real-world strategic implications and for 

the lessons that we can garner by close analysis of it. 

The three papers presented here are by well-known 

experts and were delivered at SSI’s third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on 

September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, Eu-
ropean, and American experts to engage in a regular, 

open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security; this panel realized that ambition, 

as Dr. Hahn is American, Dr. Markedonov is Russian, 

and Dr. Cornell is Swedish. 

SSI believes that such regular international dialogue plays an important role in expanding the repertoire of ideas and potential course of action available 

to Army and other strategic leaders, and we look forward to continuing this process in the future. Bearing 

these objectives in mind and with the goal of informing senior Army and other strategic leaders about contemporary strategic and military developments, SSI 

is pleased to present this monograph to our readers 

for their consideration. We hope that it will stimulate 

further debate, reflection, and learning among our 

readers, as the issues of insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as Islamist-driven terrorism, will not go 

away anytime soon.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vi
1

CHAPTER 1

THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE JIHADISTS:

THE SECURITY AND STRATEGIC 

IMPLICATIONS

Gordon M. Hahn

In 1994, before the outbreak of the first post-Soviet 

Russo-Chechen war, Shamil Basaev, the leading operative of the then self-declared independent Chechen 

Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI), took a group of some 30 

men from his battalion of Abkhaz fighters to Osama 

bin Laden’s al-Qaeda (AQ) training camps in Khost, 

Afghanistan.1

 From this fleeting but nevertheless seminal contact between the ChRI and AQ, an increasingly closer relationship gradually developed between 

Chechen as well as other Caucasus nationalist and 

Sufi Islamic insurgents on the one hand, and AQ and 

the burgeoning global jihadi revolutionary movement 

on the other. After more than a decade of evolution, 

this trend culminated in the full “Salafization” or “takfirization” of the ChRI’s ideology and the jihadization 

of its goals, operations, and tactics.2

 With the dissolution of ChRI by its then President Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov in October 2007 and his creation of the 

Caucasus Emirate (CE) in its place, the Salafization 

and jihadization processes were made official.

We can point to a series of factors that for more 

than a decade drove the radicalization and jihadization of the Chechen/Caucasus mujahedin. These factors include: the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement and ideology realized through the 

Internet and other means; brutal Russian warfighting 

and counterinsurgency methods; the North Cauca-
2

sus’s colonial experience at the hands of the Russians; 

the region’s relatively low standard of living and socioeconomic development; corrupt and ineffective local and Russian governance; and, Caucasus customs 

of blood revenge and martial courage. What is clear 

is that the CE is an explicitly self-identified global 

jihadist organization. Somewhat belatedly in May 

2011, the CE was placed on the U.S. State Department’s 

list of specially designated international terrorist 

organizations.

Still, the overwhelming weight of journalistic, 

analytical, and academic work on the violence in the 

North Caucasus tends to avoid mention of the global 

jihad’s role in the region, the attractiveness of jihadism to a consistent portion of youth across the entire 

umma, or the influence of these factors on the CE’s 

ideology, goals, strategy, and tactics. The focus is 

almost always on factors related to Russian responsibility for the generically named violence: the form 

of siloviki brutality, poor governance, and economic 

dependence and limited investment in the region’s 

development. Given this chapter’s purpose of providing a strategic threat assessment of the current CE insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus and its broader 

regional implications, it will focus on the CE’s theoideology, goals, strategies, tactics, and capacity to deliver violence inside Russia. Given the CE’s new place 

within the global jihadi revolutionary alliance, I will 

also look at the CE’s broader strategic regional and 

global security implications.
3

THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE: THEO-IDEOLOGY, 

GOALS, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONAL 

CAPACITY

The CE’s ideology and goals are now defined entirely by the global jihadi revolutionary movement’s 

Salafi takfirism and jihadism. They have broadened 

exponentially to include not only the internationalist aspirations of the global jihadi revolutionary alliance but also an expanded vision of the CE’s territorial claims. Those claims now extend beyond the 

pan-Caucasus goal of the emirate to all of Russia’s 

Muslim lands, defined so broadly as to encompass all 

of Russia for all intents and purposes. Operationally, 

I discuss the CE’s wide range of tactics, including the 

use of the typically jihadi istishkhad, that is, martyrdom or suicide operations.

The CE’s Salafist Theo-Ideology.

The Salafist theo-ideology made serious inroads 

beginning in the inter-war period and reached critical mass in 2002 when a ChRI shura subordinated the 

ChRI constitution to Shariah law, approved a strategy 

of bringing jihad to the entire North Caucasus, and 

appointed the Islamist-oriented Abdul Khalim Sadulaev as Chairman of both the new ruling Madzhlisul Shura’s Shariah Law Committee and the Shariah 

Court, and designated him successor to ChRI president and former Soviet general Aslan Maskhadov.3

With Umarov’s declaration of the CE in October 2007, 

the monopoly of the Salafist theo-ideology and its violent universal jihadism over the North Caucasus mujahedin was fully secured and institutionalized. The 
4

CE’s ideology is now precisely the same Salafist theoideology as that proselytized by AQ and other groups 

in the global jihadi revolutionary alliance (global jihad) and movement. 

The key elements of this theo-ideology are tawhid, 

takfir, jihad, and martyrdom. These principles have 

been elaborated upon in great detail by three successive CE Shariah Court qadis (judges or magistrates). 

Of the three, it was the CE’s first Shariat Court qadi 

“Seifullah” Anzor Astemirov, who most effectively 

propagated the principles of tawhid and takfir. Astemirov, like many of the CE’s young generation of 

leaders, studied Islam abroad in the late 1990s before turning to Salafism and jihadism. Appointed 

by CE amir Umarov as the CE’s qadi in early 2008, 

Astemirov founded the website, Islamdin.com, which 

incorporated his library of foreign Salafi jihadi texts, 

audiotapes, and videos.4

 By then, Islamdin.com and 

the other CE vilaiyats’ websites carried jihadi literature exclusively, including numerous translations of 

the writings of leading radical Saudi, Egyptian, Iraqi, 

and Pakistani jihadist theologians, ideologists, and 

propagandists, including AQ’s Osama bin Laden and 

Ayman al-Zawahiri;5 the American Yemeni-based AQ 

in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Anwar AlAwlaki; and, tens of others.6

 CE sites now post Russian-language summaries and translations of editions 

of and articles from AQ’s English-language journal Inspire and within days of bin Laden’s death published 

at least 15 articles, announcements, and testimonials.7

Among the most prominent of the foreign jihadi 

theo-ideologists who Astemirov featured on Islamdin.com was the Jordanian Sheikh Abu Muhammad 

Asem al-Maqdisi. According to the United States 

Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center 
5

(CTC) among others, Maqdisi is “the most influential 

living Jihadi Theorist” and “the key contemporary 

ideologue in the Jihadi intellectual universe,” and 

his website Minbar al-Jihad wa’l-Tawhid is “al-Qa`ida’s 

main online library” and “very representative of Jihadi literature.”8

 Astemirov and Maqdisi struck up a 

close student-mentor relationship of correspondence 

and consultations that would cement the CE’s alliance 

with AQ and the global jihadi revolutionary movement. Astemirov translated and generously cited 

Maqdisi’s works. Astemirov’s key video lecture “On 

Tawhid” was based on Maqdisi’s Millat Ibrahim (The 

Religion of Abraham), both becoming staples on CE and 

other jihadi websites.9

 Maqdisi’s website began publishing articles about the CE, which were translated 

into Russian and posted on CE sites.10 Maqdisi endorsed the CE in September 2009 as a fervent global 

jihadi organization, praising Astemirov for his Islamic 

knowledge.11 In September 2010 Maqdisi urged Muslims to support the CE, “so the Emirate becomes the 

door to Eastern Europe.”12 Since then, the CE has entered Europe.

The theological elements of tawhid and takfir are 

encoded in Shariah law on the basis of the Koran and 

Sunna as interpreted by true (and self-selected) Salafi 

leaders. They have profound political, economic, and 

operational implications, since they define jihadists’ 

political ideology and goals and thereby their militarily strategy and tactics.13 Tawid, or strict monotheism, 

requires that Muslims worship only Allah; even worship of, or prayers to the Prophet Mohammed are forbidden. This puts the CE’s ideology within the mainstream of global jihadism but decidedly at odds with 

the North Caucasus’s chief Islamic tendency, Sufism, 

which holds a prominent place for prayer to Sufi saints 
6

and teachers, the creation of shrines at their graves, 

and prayers to the Prophet Mohammed. Tawhidism’s 

call to “raise the word” or “raise the religion of Allah 

above all others” influences every aspect of the jihadi 

theo-ideology and political philosophy. It renders 

all other ideologies and identities—democracy, communism, socialism, nationalism, and class or ethnic 

identity—to be sacrilegious. Its exclusivist focus on 

the Deity’s will for guidance in all matters, presupposes the possibility that this will is made privy to the 

movement’s leaders, opening the way to a totalitarian 

monopoly over thought and power. 

Much as international communism’s party of professional revolutionaries were afforded a vanguard 

role in divining what was best for the proletariat, 

under jihadist theo-ideology the power to interpret 

Allah’s will devolves by default to a small coterie of 

leaders (amirs), theologians (ulema and qadis), and 

ideologists among the mujahedin, regarded as the 

most devout and committed of the umma’s Muslims. 

The special knowledge, faith, and commitment of the 

mujahedin vanguard—the amirs and qadis—justify 

their monopoly on the interpretation of the Koran and 

Sunna. According to Astemirov and other jihadists, 

the amirs, advised by Shariah court qadis, possess dictatorial powers to take unilateral decisions on the most 

important questions, such as that taken by Umarov in 

formation of the CE. The CE amir holds the ultimate 

reins in a circular flow of power, as he appoints the 

amirs and qadis for each of its largest substructures—

the CE vilaiyats (from the Arabic word “welaiyat” for 

provinces or governates). The amir cannot be challenged on any decision unless he is deemed by a qadi 

to have deviated from Shariah law as interpreted by 

the qadi whom he has appointed.14 The qadis’ author-
7

ity to advise and confirm the decisions of the amirs 

gives them great power. CE and some vilaiyat qadis 

have passed death sentences, some of which have 

been carried out.15 Not surprisingly then, Astemirov 

and other jihadi leaders regard democratic institutions and primary allegiance to country or nationality as major deviations from monotheism and thus 

sacrilege, even manifestations of nonbelief. Similarly, 

all other philosophies, allegiances or interests that intervene between the all-knowing amirs and qadis and 

their interpretation of the holy texts are forbidden, 

since they undermine Muslims’ unity in their fight 

against nonbelief and, more to the point, undermine 

their monopoly over interpretation of the Koran and 

Sunna, the foundations of Shariah law. Thus, nationalism is rejected as a legitimate ideological basis and is 

regarded as a manifestation of nonbelief, for it places 

the religion of Islam below ethnicity.16

Among Salafists and jihadists violating the principle of tawhid by worshipping these false gods leads 

to what is the second basic building block of the global 

jihad’s and the CE’s theology, takfirism, a trend informed by an extremely exclusivist definition of what 

constitutes true Islam and a real Muslim. The designation of takfir means the excommunication from the 

Islamic religious community and is reserved for those 

Muslims who are deemed to have violated fundamental tenets of Islam, such as tawhid, in accordance with 

Salafist interpretation. Many takfirists hold that those 

ruled apostates may be subject to the death penalty. 

Given the extremist nature of their monotheism, tawhidists and jihadists have a low threshold in deciding 

who should be designated takfir and subjected to the 

harshest of penalties. For Astemirov and the CE, those 

who help the Russian infidel and those who practice 

Sufism are at risk of takfir denunciation.17
8

The iconoclastic nature of the battle between those 

who observe the supposedly true Salafi version of Islam and those who do not, whether Muslim or infidel, 

leads to the jihadist’s third main principle: a kinetic 

rather than contemplative definition of jihad and an 

offensive rather than defensive global jihadism. Rather than Islam’s traditional emphasis on the greater 

jihad of the inner search for faith in Allah, takfirists 

require that all Muslims support to the best of their 

ability an Islamic war against nonbelievers, whether 

Christian, Jew, Hindu, secularist or any other nonMuslim religion, as well as fallen Muslim apostates; 

otherwise, they themselves can be subject to takfir and 

be deemed targets of the jihad. The implication of takfirism is that the world is divided into two camps: the 

takfiri jihadists and everyone else. The catholic nature 

of this schism combines with the general trend toward 

globalization fostered by technology to push Salafists 

towards a global rather than a local vision of jihad. 

Since neither ethnicity nor state borders can trump the 

principle of raising Islam’s word above all others, the 

jihad cannot be confined to specific regions or targeted attacks; it must be carried out globally. Given the 

maximalist, sacred, and twilight nature of the struggle 

between the abode of Islam and the abode of the infidel in the takfirist jihadis’ vision, the jihadists permit themselves rather extremist methods to maximize 

their capacity to attain the goal. Using Islamic holy 

texts’ frequent praise for martyrdom in battle with the 

infidel during the early centuries of Islam’s expansion 

across the Arabian Peninsula and beyond, jihadists 

routinely proselytize, train, and deploy the ultimate 

form of self-sacrificial martyrdom, (istishkhad)—that 

is, suicide operations. The ability to offer one’s life for 

the jihad is incontrovertible evidence of one’s purity 
9

and closeness to Allah.18 The remainder of this chapter 

demonstrates that all of these jihadi tenets have become part and parcel of the CE’s theo-ideology, behavior and aspirations.

The CE’s Goals and Strategic Vision.

The ChRI’s implicitly expanding pan-Caucasus 

ambitions became explicit and institutionalized in October 2007 with Dokku “Abu Usman” Umarov’s declaration of the CE.19 Umarov’s declaration of the CE 

claimed not only domain over the entire North Caucasus from the Caspian to Black Seas, but it also included a declaration of jihad against the United States, 

Great Britain, Israel, and any country fighting Muslims anywhere on the globe.20 The unilateral nature of 

this decision, although prompted and supported by 

both foreign jihadists and many North Caucasus mujahedin as well as by their Islamic texts, demonstrates 

the totalitarian essence of the Salafi takfirism. In order to achieve their local emirate, Umarov divided the 

Caucasus mujahedin into some five vilaiyats loosely 

based along the territorial borders of Russia’s North 

Caucasus republics: the Nokchicho (Chechnya) Vilaiyat (NV), the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV); the Galgaiche 

Vilaiyat (GV) covering Ingushetia and North Ossetiya; 

the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya, and Karachai (OVKBK) covering the republics of KabardinoBalkaria (KBR) and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; and, the 

Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat (NSV) covering Krasnodar and 

Stavropol Krais. Except for the NSV, which has never 

been fully developed, each is headed by an amir with 

similar dictatorial powers. The chief theo-ideological 

figure is the vilaiyat’s shariah court qadi. Qadis sometimes are amirs simultaneously.
10

In a May 2011 interview, Umarov again elaborated 

on the CE’s expansive goals: 

We consider the CE and Russia as a single theater of 

war.

We are not in a hurry. The path has been chosen, we 

know our tasks, and we will not turn back, Insha’Allah, 

from this path. Today, the battlefield is not just Chechnya and the Caucasus Emirate, but also the whole [of] 

Russia. The situation is visible to everybody who has 

eyes. The Jihad is spreading, steadily and inevitably, 

everywhere.

I have already mentioned that all those artificial 

borders, administrative divisions, which the Taghut 

drew, mean nothing to us. The days when we wanted 

to secede and dreamed of building a small Chechen 

Kuwait in the Caucasus are over. Now, when you tell 

the young Mujahedeen about these stories, they are 

surprised and want to understand how those plans 

related to the Koran and the Sunnah.

Alhamdulillah! I sometimes think that Allah has 

called these young people to the Jihad, so that we, the 

older generation, could not stray from the right path. 

Now we know that we should not be divided, and 

must unite with our brothers in faith. We must reconquer Astrakhan, Idel-Ural, Siberia—these are indigenous Muslim lands. And then, God willing, we shall 

deal with [the] Moscow District. 21

The evidence of the CE’s adoption of the global 

jihad’s universal goals as its very own is overwhelming. Yet, most analysts and activists appear unaware 

or unwilling to acknowledge the fact.22 Umarov has 

repeatedly associated the CE with the global jihad, 

from his announcement declaring the foundation of 
11

the CE and its jihad against anyone fighting against 

Muslims anywhere across the globe to his most recent 

February 2011 “Appeal to the Muslims of Egypt and 

Tunisia.”23 For example, in October 2010, Umarov addressed the global jihad: 

Today, I want to describe the situation in the world because, even if thousands of kilometers separate us, those 

mujahedin who are carrying out Jihad in Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, Kashmir and many, many other places, they 

are our brothers, and we today (with them) are insisting 

on the laws of Allah on this earth. 

He also noted that the CE mujahedin follow the 

Afghani jihad closely by radio and Internet and that 

the Taliban are “opposed by Christian-Zionist forces 

led by America.” In traditional jihadi fashion, Umarov calls jihadism’s enemies “the army of Iblis” or the 

“army of Satan,” uniting “the Americans, who today 

confess Christian Zionism, and European atheists, 

who do not confess any of the religions.” Iblis fight 

so “there will be no abode for Islam (Dar as-Salam)” 

anywhere on earth.24 A leading ideologist for the CE’s 

Ingush mujahedin of its Galgaiche (Ingushetia) Vilaiyat, Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, laid out in detail the 

connection between the CE’s prospective emirate and 

the grander global caliphate:

In the near future we can assume that after the liberation of the Caucasus, Jihad will begin in Idel-Ural 

and Western Siberia. And, of course we will be obligated to assist with all our strength in the liberation 

of our brothers’ lands from the centuries-long infidel 

yoke and in the establishment there of the laws of the 

Ruler of the Worlds. It is also possible that our help 

will be very much needed in Kazakhstan and Central 

Asia, and Allah has ordered us to render it. And we, 
12

Allah willing, will destroy the laws of the infidel on 

the Central Asian lands in league with the mujahedin of Afghanistan. And it is impossible to forget our 

brothers in the Crimea, which is also land occupied by 

non-believers.25

The CE’s top qadi has put it more explicitly and 

concisely: “We are doing everything possible to build 

the Caliphate and prepare the ground for this to the 

extent of our capabilities.”26

Domestic Strategy.

The CE issues few documents indicating their 

strategy. However, some implicit strategic approaches can be sketched from some of its statements and 

propaganda articles. Essentially, the CE is attempting 

to create a revolutionary situation through the establishment of a credible, alternative claim on the sovereign right to rule in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia. This state-building political strategy 

includes: (1) establishing a judicial system based on 

Shariah courts and qadis; (2) enforcement of Shariah 

law through attacks on owners, workers, and patrons 

of gaming, prostitution, drinking, and alcohol-selling 

establishments; (3) tax collection in the form of the Islamic tithe or zakyat to fund CE military, police, and 

judicial functions; and, (4) a more expanded propaganda strategy focused exclusively on proselytizing 

the Salafist theology and jihadist ideology by multiplying the number of CE-affiliated websites.27 Military 

strategy compliments this political strategy, weakening the infidel state and regime by targeting state 

institutions, officials, and personnel—civilian, police, 

military, and intelligence alike.
13

Creating a credible alternative sovereignty requires not simply weakening local branches of the 

present Russian regime and state but also the federal government in Moscow and its affiliates across 

the federation. Combined with the basic homeland 

strategy focused on creating dual sovereignty in the 

Caucasus, there is an effort to expand operations and 

eventually more state-building efforts across Russia, 

using concentrations of Muslim populations in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and elsewhere as platforms 

from which the network could conceivably expand. 

Thus, CE amir Umarov promised to liberate not just 

Krasnodar Krai—part of its still very virtual Nogai 

Steppe Vilaiyat—but also Astrakhan and the entire 

Volga mega-region, which would include Tatarstan, 

Bashkortostan, and other predominantly Muslim 

Tatar-populated regions in Russia’s Volga and Urals 

Federal Districts.28 Simultaneously, attacks like those 

on the Nevskii Express St. Petersburg-Moscow train 

in November 2009, the Moscow subway system in 

March 2010, and Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport in 

January 2011 serve the purpose of terrorizing the Russian elite and population, creating political disunity, 

and undermining the Russian will to fight for the region’s continued inclusion in the federation. 

Operational Capacity and Tactics.

Although the CE is overlooked by most terrorism 

or jihadism experts, its operational capacity puts the 

North Caucasus a distant third among the world’s 

various jihadi fronts behind the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

(AfPak) theatre of AQ including the Taliban and their 

numerous allies in the region, and Yemen. In recent 

years, jihadi-related violence in the North Caucasus 
14

has outstripped that in Iraq. From late October 2007 

through June 2011, CE mujahedin have carried out 

or been involved in approximately 1,800 attacks and 

violent incidents, with an increase in the number of 

attacks/incidents each full year of the CE’s existence, 

2008-10.29 Those 1,800 attacks have killed approximately 1,300 and wounded 2,100 state agents (civilian officials and military, intelligence, and police officials and personnel) and killed 300 and wounded 

800 civilians, for a total of some 4,500 casualties.30 This 

amounts to nearly two attacks/incidents and more 

than three casualties per day. For comparison, for the 

period 2008-10, there were 1,527 U.S./North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) troops killed and 9,703 

U.S./NATO casualties in Afghanistan.31

Like its allies in the global jihadi revolutionary 

movement, the CE has carried out spectacular and horridly effective attacks, in particular tens of istishkhad 

operations—that is, suicide bombing operations. For 

example, in November 2009, the CE, perhaps its Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs Brigade (RSMB), was behind 

the bombing of the Moscow-St. Petersburg Nevskii Express high speed train, which killed 21 and wounded 

74 civilians. The explosion of the train was followed 

by a second as investigators arrived on the scene that 

slightly wounded several officials. In April 2009 amir 

Umarov announced after the CE’s traditional spring 

planning shura that the CE had revived warlord and 

notorious terrorist Shamil Basaev’s RSMB in 2008, and 

that it had already carried out two operations, including the November 2008 suicide bombing of a bus in 

Vladikavkaz, Ingushetia, that killed 14 and wounded 

43 civilians.32 In June 2009, the notorious ethnic BuryatRussian Muslim convert Aleksandr Tikhomirov, a.k.a. 

Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, masterminded the 
15

suicide bombing that severely wounded and nearly 

killed Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov and 

the August 2009 suicide bombing of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) district headquarters in Nazran 

that killed 24 MVD servicemen and wounded approximately 260 people, including 11 children, on the very 

day that Yevkurov returned to Ingushetia after months 

of hospitalization. Based with the CE’s GV mujahedin 

and RSMB, Buryatskii wrote prolifically about the importance of istishkhad operations and his preparation 

with RSMB suicide bombers.33 The equally notorious 

‘Seifullah Gubdenskii’ Magomedali Vagabov, CE DV 

amir and CE qadi in 2010 until his demise in August 

of that year, organized the double suicide bombing of 

the Moscow Metropolitan subway in March 2010 that 

killed 40 and wounded 101 civilians, including some 

10 traveling foreigners. (Both Buryatskii and Vagabov 

received Islamic education abroad before turning to 

jihad; the former—in Egypt, Yemen and perhaps Saudi Arabia; the latter in Pakistan.) On amir Umarov’s 

orders, the CE’s RSMB prepared and dispatched 20-

year old Ingush Magomed Yevloev from Ingushetia 

to carry out the January 2011 suicide attack in the international terminal of Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport that killed 37 and wounded 180.34 In total, the CE 

has carried out some 36 suicide attacks since CE amir 

Umarov revived the RSMB: 1 in 2008, 16 in 2009, 14 

in 2010, and 5 during the first 6 months of 2011. Istishkhad bombing operations are a distinct symptom 

of the CE’s global jihadist theo-ideology and a symbol of its alliance with the global jihadi revolutionary 

movement.
16

THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE AND THE GLOBAL 

JIHADI REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

The CE’s jihadization of the Chechen and North 

Caucasus insurgency, in particular its alliance with 

the global jihadi revolutionary movement, imparts it 

strategic importance. The process of the Salafization 

of the ChRI’s ranks was a long process and was driven 

by both the external influence of jihadist groups and 

the weak but nevertheless existing Salafist elements 

in the North Caucasus. The connections between AQ 

and the ChRI were common knowledge by the late 

1990s among U.S. Government officials, intelligence 

analysts, and terrorism experts.35 It was well-known 

and well-documented as early as the mid-1990s, for 

example, that the notorious Abu Ibn al-Khattab was 

an AQ operative and fought in the North Caucasus. 

The declassified Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) 

Swift Knight Report documents not just Khattab’s deep 

involvement, but also that of AQ and Osama bin Laden personally with the ChRI in the mid-1990s.36

After the visit by Basaev and his ethnic Circassian 

or Akhaz fighters to Afghanistan, other radical nationalist and Sufi Chechen and Caucasus leaders followed 

with visits to bin Laden. An important but often overlooked DIA document details the results of some of 

those visits occurring in 1997. Thus, “several times in 

1997 in Afghanistan bin Laden met with representatives of Movlady (Movladi) Udugov’s party ‘Islamic 

Way’ (Islamskii Put’) and representatives of Chechen 

and Dagestani Wahhabites from Gudermes, Grozny, 

and Karamakhi.”37 Udugov would become the chief 

ideologist and propagandist for both the ChRI and 

CE for a decade or more. The village of Karamakhi 

would be the locus of one of the self-declared Salafi 
17

Islamic states that popped up intermittently in the late 

1990s and the focal point of Khattab’s, Basaev’s, and 

Bagautdin’s incursions and ultimate full-scale invasion of Dagestan in July and August 1999 that kicked 

off the second post-Soviet Russo-Chechen war. The 

result of this local-global nexus rooted in a common 

theo-ideology, mutual training camps, and overlapping personnel was a gradual but significant spread 

of Salafism and exclusionary takfirism among young 

Muslims across the Caucasus, creating an unprecedented recruitment pool for both the local and global 

jihads.

AQ and the Caucasus Islamic separatists agreed to 

create a jihadist movement and insurgency across Russia with AQ supplying funding, training, and fighters 

towards the goal of attacking Russians and Westerners. AQ money funded the establishment of training 

camps in Chechnya and Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, a 

steady supply of trainers for those camps, and fighters who spread out across Chechnya and the North 

Caucasus bringing the message of Salfism and global 

jihadism to the ChRI insurgents and their still very 

few allies in other North Caucasus regions such as the 

Republic of Dagestan and the Republic of KabardinoBalkaria (KBR).38 The DIA document details AQ’s 

plans for the North Caucasus and Russia’s Muslims: 

[R]adical Islamic (predominantly Sunni) regimes are 

to be established and supported everywhere possible, including Bosnia, Albania, Chechnya, Dagestan, 

the entire North Caucasus ”from sea to sea”, Central 

Asian republics, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, all of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and the 

states of the Persian Gulf. Terrorist activities are to be 

conducted against Americans and Westerners, Israe-
18

lis, Russians (predominantly Cossacks), Serbs, Chinese, Armenians, and disloyal Muslims. . . .

Special attention should be given to the Northern Caucasus, and especially Chechnya since they are regarded as areas unreachable by strikes from the West. The 

intent is to create a newly developed base for training 

terrorists. Amir Khattab and nine other militants of 

Usam Ben (sic) Laden were sent there with passports 

of Arab countries. They work as military instructors in 

Khattab’s three schools; they also work as instructors 

in the army of Chechnya. Two more schools are being 

organized in Ingushetiya and Dagestan.39

“’Volunteers’ from ben Laden’s ‘charity societies’ from 

Pakistan and Afghanistan” went to Chechnya and the 

Northern Caucasus for a “new round of jihad against 

Cossacks and Russia.”40

These AQ-affilitated “charity societies” ensured a 

steady flow of AQ funds, Salafist Wahhabi literature, 

and equipment to the region. The DIA’s Swift Knight 

Report, as well as numerous trial transcripts, document 

the support rendered by the AQ-affiliated Benevolent 

International Foundation (BIF) and Al-Haramain to 

the ChRI or at least its radical wing beginning in the 

early 1990s.41 The U.S. criminal prosecution of BIF 

for supporting terrorist activity reveals much about 

the AQ-BIF-ChRI connection. AQ used BIF for “the 

movement of money to fund its operations” and the 

support of “persons trying to obtain chemical and 

nuclear weapons on behalf of AQ,” and BIF funded 

and supplied the Chechen separatist mujahedin before, during, and after the first Chechen-Russian war 

before Moscow forced BIF to shut down its operations 

in Russia.42 AQ ruling Majlisul Shura member Seif 

al-Islam al-Masry was an officer in BIF’s Grozny of-
19

fice, which moved to Ingushetia in 1998.43 A BIF officer “had direct dealings with representatives of the 

Chechen mujahideen (guerrillas or freedom fighters) 

as well as Hezb i Islami, a military group operating in 

Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.”44 BIF’s work with Hezb 

i Islami in Azerbaijan was likely related to AQ’s corridor to the North Caucasus noted in the DIA document. BIF worked to provide the Chechen mujahedin 

with recruits, doctors, medicine, “money, an X-ray 

machine, and anti-mine boots, among other things.”45

Beginning around 2000, the pro-Khattab and likely 

AQ-backed website, Qoqaz.net (Qoqaz is Arabic for 

Caucasus) sought funders and recruits for the Chechen 

jihad. Qoqaz.net, Qoqaz.co.uk, Webstorage.com/~azzam, 

and Waaqiah.com were created and supported by the 

AQ-affiliated Azzam Publications run by Babar Ahmad, both based in London. Azzam Publications produced numerous video discs featuring the terrorist 

attacks carried out by Khattab and Basaev as well as 

other ChRI operations.46 According to the U.S. indictment of Ahmad, through Azzam he 

provided, through the creation and use of various 

internet websites, email communication, and other 

means, expert advice and assistance, communications equipment, military items, currency, monetary 

instruments, financial services, personnel designed 

to recruit and assist the Chechen Mujahideen and the 

Taliban, and raise funds for violent jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other places.” 

Azzam’s web sites were created for communicating 

with: (1) “members of the Taliban, Chechen Mujahideen, and associated groups;” (2) others “who sought 

to support violent jihad” by providing “material support;” (3) individuals who wished to join these groups, 
20

“solicit donations,” and arrange money transfers; and, 

(4) those who sought to purchase “videotapes depicting violent jihad in Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, 

and other lands of jihad, and the torture and killing 

of captured Russian troops.” Videotapes, including 

those eulogizing dead fighters, were intended to help 

and indeed were used to solicit donations for the jihad 

in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Ahmad also assisted 

terrorists to secure temporary residence in London, 

and to travel to Afghanistan and Chechnya in order to 

participate in jihad. He also assisted terrorists in procuring “camouflage suits; global positioning system 

(GPS) equipment; and, other materials and information.” Ahmad even put Shamil Basaev in touch with 

an individual who had traveled to the United States 

in order to raise money and purchase footwarmers for 

the ChRI fighters.47

Documents found in BIF’s trash revealed that 42 

percent of its budget was spent on Chechnya. During 

a 4-month period in 2000, BIF funneled $685,000 to 

Chechnya in 19 wire bank transfers through the Georgian Relief Association (GRA) in Tbilisi and various 

BIF accounts across the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), according to Citibank records introduced to the court. The GRA was actually a BIF front 

organization and was run by the brother of Chechen 

field commander Chamsoudin Avraligov, who was 

operating in AQ’s training camp in Georgia’s Pankisi 

Gorge.48 Given that BIF was able to function in Russia 

for nearly a decade, claims made by Russian officials 

that AQ sent tens of millions of dollars to the North 

Caucasus mujahedin are plausible. One expert claims 

that AQ has funneled $25 million to the Chechen resistance including a one-time contribution in 2000 of 

$2 million, four Stinger missiles, 700 plastic explosive 
21

packs amounting to over 350 kilograms, remote detonators, and medical supplies.49 Basaev acknowledged 

in a 2004 interview receiving funds from international 

Islamists “on a regular basis,” perhaps understating 

the amount he received that year at some $20 thousand.50 Despite the crackdown on Saudi-sponsored 

and AQ-tied foundations like the BIF and the deaths 

of Khattab in 2003 and Basaev in 2006, both the ChRI 

and then its successor organization the CE continued 

to receive foreign funding from Middle Eastern contributions funneled through foreign and AQ-tied mujahedin through 2010.51

There were two principal figures involved in leading AQ’s work in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: 

Khattab, who turned high-ranking ChRI warlord and 

Prime Minister Shamil Basaev to Salafi global jihadism 

and together with him ran training camps and numerous operations, and Abu Sayif, who headed the Saudi 

BIFs office in Grozny before the second war and ran 

communications and the transport of supplies, fighters, and funding from AQ to the Caucasus. Upon arriving in the Caucasus, Khattab linked up with Shamil 

Basaev, a notorious terrorist in Chechnya, and married 

the sister of Nadir Khachilaev, the leader of the Union 

of the Muslims of Russia (Soyuz musul’man Rossii) and 

an ethnic Lak from Dagestan.52 By so cementing his 

connection to a pan-Russian Islamist organization and 

to Dagestan, Khattab was clearly using a standard AQ 

approach of imbedding into the local social fabric in 

the service of highjacking local Muslim nationalist and 

Islamic movements for the global jihadi movement. 

Excluding Khattab, AQ operative Abu Sayif, who 

worked in the Chechen Foreign Ministry under Movladi Udugov in the inter-war years, played the most 

important role in developing AQ’s presence in Chech-
22

nya and the North Caucasus. Sayif coordinated the 

travel route, which was used to route volunteers and 

drug trafficking, and Sayif and Khattab were the only 

ones permitted to know the real names of the foreign 

volunteers. A travel route from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Chechnya, via Azerbaijan and Turkey, was established. The first group of some 25 “Afghan Arabs” 

arrived in Khattab’s Vedeno camp in June 1998. Some 

were to pass through Tatarstan on their way to Central Asian Republics, where they were supposed to 

create “Wahhabite and Taliban cells, spreading terror 

against U.S., Russian, and other Western officials and 

businessmen.”53 It is now common knowledge that the 

lead perpetrator of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, Mohammed Atta, was on his way to Chechnya 

when he was sent to Germany and later the United 

States. Rohan Gunaratna claims that already by 1995, 

there were some 300 Afghan Arabs fighting in Chechnya against the Russians. They were joined by mujahedin from Bosnia and Azerbaidzhan.54 Thus, there 

were perhaps as many as 500 foreign fighters in the 

North Caucasus on the eve of the Khattab-Basaev-led 

invasion of Dagestan. Indeed, the nexus of Dagestan, 

Karamakhi, bin Laden, and Khattab’s and Basaev’s 

Chechnya training camps draws a straight line from 

AQ in Afghanistan to the second post-Soviet RussoChechen war and the ChRI’s expansion of operations 

across the North Caucasus.

Not only did AQ mujahedin fight in the North 

Caucasus during the ChRI struggle but North Caucasus mujahedin fought on other fronts in the global 

jihad during the same time frame. Two ethnic Kabardins from KBR were among eight ethnic Muslims 

from regions both in the North Caucasus and Volga 

area captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2001 
23

fighting among the Taliban and AQ and sent to the 

Guantanamo Bay prison camp in 2002.55 A brief official CE biography of late Dagestani amir and CE 

qadi Magomed Vagabov (a.k.a. Seifullah Gubdenskii) 

shows that in 2001-02 some members of his Gubden 

Jamaat went to Afghanistan after the rout of the joint 

Chechen-Dagestani-foreign jihadi force that invaded 

Dagestan in August 1999. Among those Gubden Jamaat members who went to Afghanistan was its then 

amir Khabibullah, who became the amir of “a Russian-speaking jamaat of AQ.”56 More recently, some 

members of the DV-tied cell, that was uncovered in 

the Czech Republic and discussed below, were at one 

time based in Germany and underwent training in Afghanistan and Pakistan.57 We also know that the Tatar 

jihadi “Bulgar Jamaat,” made up mostly of ethnic Tatars who made the hijra from Russia and now based 

in Waziristan, Pakistan, has declared jihad against 

Russia and stated that it includes “Dagestanis, Russians, Kabardins” and has carried out operations in 

Afghanistan.58

If one prefers to narrow the issue to Chechens, Bryan Glynn Williams claims that after extensive travel 

across Afghanistan, he was unable to find evidence 

that even one Chechen fighter ever fought there.59 But 

there have been numerous reports of Chechens fighting not just in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq against 

U.S. forces.60 In 2003, Indian police uncovered an AQ 

cell led by a Chechen planning to assassinate Vice 

Admiral V. J. Metzger, commander-in-chief of the 

U.S. Seventh Fleet, forcing the admiral’s trip to India to be cancelled.61 Every officer and junior officer 

with whom I have had the pleasure of speaking has 

claimed that he encountered a Chechen presence in 

both Afghanistan and Iraq. Almost all of these officers 
24

spoke some Russian. It is certainly true that some of 

these testimonials are cases of mistaken identity, taking Russian-speaking Central Asians for Chechens. 

But it simply strains credulity to believe that not a 

single Chechen has fought in Afghanistan, when we 

have seen that Americans, Germans, other Westerners, Central Asians, Tatars, Kabardins, and Dagestanis 

have been there. 

These are a few examples of CE ties to other fronts 

in the global jihad. In the same month that the CE was 

formed (October 2007), the Lebanese government arrested four Russian citizens, including three ethnic 

North Caucasians (one from Dagestan), who were 

charged with belonging to Fatah-el-Islam, fighting 

in northern Lebanon that summer, and carrying out 

terrorist attacks against Lebanese servicemen while 

participating in an armed revolt in the Nahr el-Barid 

Palestinian refugee camp. Along with 16 Palestinians, 

they formed a Fatah cell.62 According to a recent report by Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee, 

a Kabardin, who allegedly was recently fighting in 

Lebanon, returned home and was killed in Nalchik.63

Thus, there have been some, but very few Chechen 

or other North Caucasus mujahedin who have fought 

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other fronts of the global 

jihad. The Chechen and then Caucasus mujahedin’s 

operational connections with, and influence on the 

more central fronts of the global jihad are evident. 

However, these connections are less than robust and 

of limited strategic significance, with the caveat that 

a small number of well-funded and capable terrorists 

can do great damage, as we saw on 9/11. Neither the 

ChRI nor the CE ever declared themselves AQ in the 

Caucasus or North Caucasus. But the close ties that 

developed between the ChRI and AQ beginning in the 
25

inter-war period meant that the ChRI units and camps 

of foreign fighters and their local allies led by Khattab and Basaev became AQ’s de facto, unofficial North 

Caucasus affiliate and a key, if relatively weak, front 

in the global jihad. The AQ-tied foreign fighters, many 

of whom settled down and even married in Chechnya 

and other North Caucasus republics after the second 

war, were in large part responsible for the growing 

influence of jihadist ideologies in the region and fundamentally altered the nature of what began as a secessionist struggle for Chechen independence; this is 

precisely what AQ had counted on when it infiltrated 

the ChRI.

AQ’s intervention and the growing influence of the 

global jihadi revolutionary movement led the radical 

Chechen national separatist movement down a path 

traversed by many such movements across the Muslim world in recent decades. In the Caucasus, especially Dagestan, they mixed with the very limited indigenous history of Salfism and significant contemporary 

flood of young Caucasus Muslims to study abroad in 

the Middle East and South Asia, on the one hand, and 

of Wahhabi and other Salafi teachings from there to 

the Caucasus through the Internet on the other. In the 

18th and certainly by the 19th centuries, Salafism was 

brought in from abroad by Caucasians like Mukhamad Al-Kuduki after travels in Egypt and Yemen introduced him to scholars like Salikh al-Yamani.64 The 

revival of this relatively recent, if thin, Salafi Islamist 

usable past, along with the national myths during the 

perestroika and post-perestroika periods, yielded the 

rehabilitation and of the 19th century imams and religious teachers who led the gazavats against Russian 

rule teachers.65 But the nationalist ideas and cadres 

were gradually displaced by jihadist elements, trans-
26

forming the secular movement into a jihadist one. This 

process was increasingly legitimized and gained momentum as Islamic elements were incorporated into 

the ChRI proto-state and foreign Salafists, Wahabbis, 

and other Islamic extremists continued to infiltrate 

the movement throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 

bringing finances, guerrilla and terrorist training and, 

most importantly, a new jihadist ideo-theological orientation. The Salafist historical myth and related historical figures served as models for some local Salafists, who played key roles in the ChRI’s incomplete 

Islamization even before 2007.66

The combination of AQ and other foreign Salafi intervention, a usable indigenous Salafi historical myth, 

and locals studying Islam abroad influenced a small 

but highly motivated group of Islamist and ultimately 

jihadist leaders across the North Caucasus. Beginning 

in the early 1990s, thousands of Muslims from Russia traveled abroad to receive Islamic education in 

Islamic schools which were experiencing the rise of 

a significant global jihadi revolutionary movement. 

They returned home with Wahhabist and other forms 

of Salafist zeal for jihad and a strong sense of kinship 

with radical Islamists and mujahedin in Afghanistan, 

Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere. Three young, foreigneducated Muslims—”Sefullah” Anzor Astemirov, 

Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii (Aleksandr Tikhomirov), and “Seifullah Gubdenskii” Magomedali 

Vagabov—joined the ChRI’s jihadi wing or later the 

CE and rose quickly up the CE’s ranks, driving its expanding jihad on three main fronts outside Chechnya: 

Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KBR.

In the early 1990s, the foreign-educated Dagestani 

Salafist Ahmad-Kadi Akhtaev taught the first important post-Soviet Dagestani jihadi theo-ideologists, Ma-
27

gomed Tegaev and Bagautdin Magomedov (Kebedov), 

and the two leading ethnic Kabard jihadists, Musa 

Mukozhev and “Seifullah” Anzor Astemirov, both of 

whom studied abroad as well. Astemirov would play 

a key role in the formation of a small cadre of jihadi 

fighters in the KBR, in Umarov’s decision to form the 

CE and jettison the ChRI Chechen nationalist project, 

and in the development of the CE’s relationship with 

Jordanian Sheikh Maqdisi and thus the global jihadi 

revolutionary movement. In the mid-1990s, as one of 

the leading students at a madrassah run by the official 

Muslim Spiritual Administration (DUM) of the KBR, 

Astemirov was one among many sent by the DUM to 

study Islam abroad in an unknown higher education 

religious school in Saudi Arabia.67 This set him and 

many other young Muslims from the KBR on the path 

of Islamism and ultimately jihadism.68 In summer 

2005 Mukozhev and Astemirov met with Basaev, and 

they agreed that they would transform their Islamist 

Jamaat of KBR into the ChRI North Caucasus Front’s 

Kabardino-Balkaria Sector (KBS) on the condition that 

Sadulaev and Basaev saw through to the end the formation of a pan-Caucasus jihadi organization like the 

future CE based on a strict takfirist interpretation of 

Shariah law. In addition to this and his abovementioned role as CE qadi, Astemirov’s organizational efforts as amir of the CE’s OVKBK resulted in its becoming the CE’s second most operationally active vilaiyat 

in 2010, ahead of Chechnya’s NV and Ingushetia’s 

GV.69

Sheikh Buryatskii is representative of an even 

more disturbing transformation which shows that one 

does not need to be a victim of Russian brutality and 

bad governance or the product of the Caucasus traditions of martial violence and blood revenge to join the 
28

Caucasus jihad and that the jihadist theo-ideology is 

by itself a substantial driver of jihadism in the region. 

As his jihadi nom de guerre suggests, Buryatskii was 

part ethnic Buryat, a Mongol and traditionally Buddhist ethnic group, and part ethnic Russian. Born as 

Aleksandr Tikhomirov in 1982, he lived in far away 

Ulan-Ude, the capitol of Russia’s republic of Buryatia. His mother was Russian and Orthodox Christian; 

his father was an ethnic Buryat and Buddhist. 70 Buryatskii studied at a Buddhist datsan, but at age 15 he 

converted to Islam. He moved to Moscow and then to 

Bugurslan, Orenburg where he studied at the Sunni 

madrasah, Rasul Akram. Buryatskii then studied 

Arabic at the Saudi-supported Fajr language center 

in 2002-05 before traveling to Egypt to study Islamic 

theology at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University as well as 

under several authoritative sheikhs in Egypt, Kuwait 

and, according to Russian prosecutors, Saudi Arabia.71

Buryatskii himself reveals what his education in the 

core of an umma plagued by global jihadi revolutionary ideology taught him: 

At one time when I was in Egypt at the lecture of one 

of the scholars, who openly said to us: “Do you really think that you can so simply spread the Allah’s 

religion without the blood of martyrs?! The disciples 

of Allah’s prophet spilt the blood of martyrs on many 

lands, and Islam bloomed on their blood!”72

Running afoul of the Egypt’s secret services, Buryatskii returned to Russia.73 Buryatskii left for the Caucasus jihad in May 2008.74

Assigned by Umarov to the CE’s GV in Ingushetia, 

the fervent Buryatskii became a recruiting draw. In 

2009, Buryatskii was the CE’s main, if fatal, attraction 

and its most effective propagandist and operative, 
29

showing shades of the charisma and ruthlessness for 

which Shamil Basaev became infamous. His articles 

detailing his mentoring of RSMB suicide bombers and 

his video lectures propagandizing jihadism and the 

importance of istshkhad drew new forces to the CE’s 

once relatively quiet Ingush mujahedin. Buryatskii’s 

activity was perhaps the main factor making the CE’s 

GV the most operationally capacious of its vilaiyats in 

2008-09, leading in the number of attacks both years.75

Thus, there is a direct line between Buryatskii’s Islamic conversion and study abroad to the explosion of 

terrorism in Ingushetia during 2008-09. Buryatskii is 

but one of several ethnic Russian and Slavic converts 

to Islam from outside Russia’s Muslim republics who 

have become prominent CE terrorists in recent years, 

including Pavel Kosolapov, Vitalii Razdobudko, Maria Khorsheva, and Viktor Dvorakovskii.76

In contrast to Astemirov and Buryatskii, Vagabov 

was influenced by Pakistani Salafism. After studying 

Islam locally in Dagestan, he began to work with missionaries of the peaceful Pakistan-based international 

Salafist sect Tabligh Jamaat in Dagestan. His native 

Gubden District was declared the Tablighists’ center 

for the call to the Tabligh in Russia. Vagabov then 

traveled in 1994 to Raiwand, Pakistan, the center of 

the Tabligh Jamaat movement, and studied there for 

several months in a madrassah learning the Koran by 

heart and receiving the diploma of a khafiz. Traveling 

on to Karachi, he studied the fundamentals of Shariah 

law apparently both at university and privately with 

sheikhs and became an adherent of Salafism and the 

writings of imam Abul Hasan Al-Ashari, Al-Ibana, 

and Risalyatu ila Aglyu Sagr-Vibabil Abvab. Vagabov 

returned home in 1997, opened the School of Khafiz 

in Gubden to courses on the hadiths, and traveled to 
30

Chechnya where he met with Khattab and underwent 

military training in the AQ-funded camps. He fought 

for the Salafis, who declared an independent Islamic 

state in Karamakhi and two other Dagestani villages 

in 1998, and in the 1999 Khattab-Basaev invasion of 

Dagestan that kicked off the second Chechen war.77 In 

the 2000s, Vagabov rose up the ranks of the ChRI’s 

Dagestani Front and then the CE’s DV. He played a 

lead role in building up the DV’s dominant Central 

Sector, which has made Dagestan the locus of the 

highest number of attacks of any Russian region since 

April 2010. Vagabov also organized the pivotal March 

2010 Moscow subway suicide bombings carried out by 

the respective wives of his predecessor and successor 

as DV amir. In June 2010, Umarov appointed him as 

the DV’s amir, and Astemirov’s successor as the CE’s 

qadi.78 Vagabov’s biography draws a direct line from 

the umma’s global jihadi revolutionary movement and 

radical Pakistani madrassahs, mosques, and universities to the rise of the Dagestani jihad within the overall 

CE and to terrorism in Moscow itself with the Moscow 

subway bombing among others. Although Astemirov, 

Vagabov, and Buryatskii were killed in 2010, by then 

each had left their mark on the CE’s expansion across 

the Caucasus and transformation into a viable jihadist 

project allied with the global jihadi revolutionary alliance inspired by AQ and its takfirist theo-ideology.

As AQ and the global jihadi revolutionary alliance 

have evolved into a more decentralized network of 

jihadi groups, interacting increasingly for theo-ideological sustenance, funding, training, and operational 

planning through the Internet rather than directly, 

the CE integrated into the AQ’s wider network of 

jihadi websites. In this way, it developed relationships with jihadi leaders and philosophers such as 
31

Maqdisi, mentioned earlier, and AQ in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) and Anwar Al-Awlaki. The AQaffiliated website, Ansar al-Mujahideen (www.ansar1.

info/), is used to recruit fighters and raise funds for the 

CE by those involved in the Belgian plot uncovered 

last autumn and is closely linked to AQ. The Ansar 

al-Mujahideen network is typically regarded as a selfstarted jihadi and pro-AQ site that helps propagandize and recruit for the global jihad and AQ.79 Ansar al 

Mujahideen’s English-language forum’s (AMEF) leading personality was “Abu Risaas” Samir Khan until 

mid-2010 when he turned up working with Awlaki in 

AQAP.80 The Virginian Zachary Adam Chasser, alias 

Abu Talhah al-Amriki, in prison for assisting the Somalian AQ affiliate Al-Shabaab, also participated in 

AMEF.81 Ansar al Mujahideen’s German-language sister site is closely associated with the Global Islamic 

Media Front (GIMF), which also has produced several 

operatives arrested for involvement in AQ terrorism 

plots.82 The Taliban has authorized the Ansar al-Mujahideen network as one of three entities that may publish its official statements, and Ansar al-Mujahideen’s 

founder noted “we have brothers from Chechnya and 

Dagestan.”83

In December 2010, Ansar al-Mujahideen announced 

“the Start of a New Campaign in Support of the Caucasus Emirate,” signaling a request for fighters and 

funds for the CE and emphasizing: “We ask Allah to 

make this year a year of constant discord and increasing enmity for the enemies of the Islamic Emirate of 

the Caucasus.” The announcement welcomed emerging signs of jihadism in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, 

asking Allah for “a new generation of scholars” to replace Astemirov, Buryatskii, and AQ operative Omar 

al-Sayif, all mentioned by name.84 Ansar al-Mujahedeen
32

soon partnered with Astemirov’s and the CE OVKBK’s 

Islamdin.com to create a new Russian-language global 

jihadi website (al-ansar.info) no later than July 2010.85

In August, the webmaster of Ansar al-Mujahideen, an 

ethnic Moroccan named Faisal Errai, was arrested in 

Spain. Spanish authorities also reported that the website was already raising money for terrorists in Chechnya and Afghanistan.86 The Russian-language Al-Ansar.info was set up to “highlight news summaries of 

the Jihad on all fronts, both in the Caucasus and in 

all other lands of the fight” and publish old and new 

works of scholars of the “ahli sunny ual’ jama’a.” The 

fact that it contains primarily Russian-language but 

also English-language content suggests, along with 

other factors, that AQAP’s Awlaki may be a driving 

force behind the Ansar al-Mujahideen network of which 

Al-Ansar.info is a part. Thus, Islamdin.com’s announcement of the joint project with the Ansar al-Mujahideen

network extensively quotes Awlaki (who otherwise 

retains a high profile on CE sites) on the value of being a “jihadist of the internet.”87 Islamdin.com posted 

the first part of Awlaki’s Al-Janna the day after this 

announcement, and CE websites continue to post Awlaki’s works.88 With the CE tied into the global jihadi 

revolutionary alliance and once again plugged into 

the AQ-affiliated Internet network, it was just a matter 

of time before it developed a more international role.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

IMPLICATIONS

The CE’s more expansive aspirations and growing ties with the global jihad revolutionary movement 

have been accompanied by closer propaganda and operational ties to jihadists in other regions of Russia, the 
33

former Soviet Union, other fronts in the global jihad 

and, per Maqdisi’s call, even Europe. Moreover, there 

are even broader strategic implications impinging on 

both international and U.S. national security.

To the Volga and Beyond.

Aside from the abovementioned train, subway, 

and airport attacks in and around Moscow, the CE 

is involved in several projects inside Russia far beyond the virtual emirate’s supposed borders. But the 

CE also has plans to expand operations beyond Russia. Already in January 2006, Basaev warned that by 

summer, the ChRI’s combat jamaat network would 

“cross the Volga,” suggesting expansion to Tatarstan, 

Bashkortostan, and likely beyond.89 In June 2006, then 

ChRI amir Umarov issued a decree creating Volga 

and Urals Fronts, hoping to expand operations to 

Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and other ethnic Tatar and 

Bashkir communities across Russia.90 Through 2009 

there was much CE propaganda targeting Tatars and 

Bashkirs but few jihadi deeds. A group called Islamic Jamaat was uncovered in 2007, but there was no 

evidence that it had CE ties.91 Rather, the group may 

have been the predecessor of the allegedly CE-tied 

so-called Oktyabrskii Jamaat uncovered in 2010, both 

of which could have been connected to the so-called 

Uighur-Bulgar Jamaat (UBJ), which may be one and 

the same as the abovementioned Bulgar Jamaat, fighting with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan.92 The UBJ, like the Bulgar Jamaat, is Tatardominated and adheres to the ideology of resettling 

in order to fight the infidel (at-Takfir Val Khidzhra). 

Several alleged operatives from the UBJ were arrested 

in Bashkortostan in August 2008 after a shootout with 
34

Bashkir police in Salavat, Bashkortostan. They went 

on trial in April 2009 for allegedly planning terrorist 

attacks in the republic. According to Bashkir authorities, the UBJ was founded by Bashkiriya native Pavel 

Dorokhov, who underwent training in al-Qaeda and 

Taliban camps.93

More recently, during 2010 and early 2011, several 

arrests of alleged mujahedin with ties to the CE have 

been made and the first apparent jihadi attacks occurred in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Astrakhan.94

This suggests that the CE may indeed be expanding 

operations to these key Muslim communities. In addition, this past winter a group from Tatarstan and/or 

Bashkortostan appealed to Umarov to recognize their 

self-declared Idel-Ural Vilaiyat (IUV) and provide 

financial and other assistance in setting up training 

camps in the southern Ural Mountains and in organizing attacks.95 As of mid-summer 2011, there had been 

no public response by Umarov, though clandestine assistance cannot be ruled out. The UBJ/Bulgar Jamaat 

also could be playing a role in these possible efforts by 

these Tatars and Bashkirs. Bringing Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Astrakhan would help form a bridgehead to Siberia, the Far East, and Central Asia. Gaining a foothold in ethnic Bashkir and especially Tatar 

communities in these regions would vastly expand the 

CE’s pool of potential recruits and geographical reach 

into both Russia and Central Asia, since Tatar communities can be found in almost all of Russia’s provincial 

capitals, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, and 

in Central Asia. Expansion along these lines would 

further tax Russian resources, already burdened by 

massive federal subsidies to the North Caucasus. Although it is unlikely that the CE will achieve substantial progress in expanding to a permanent presence in 
35

the Volga, Urals, or Siberian regions, the ChRI’s and 

CE’s record in expanding operations across the North 

Caucasus argues against complacency. Few expected 

that Ingushetia rather than Chechnya would be the 

center of gravity of the jihadi in 2008 and 2009, or that 

Dagestan and KBR would supersede both Vainakh 

republics in the number of jihadi operations in 2010. 

Even a small IUV enterprise could significantly complicate Moscow’s coordination problems, given some 

creativity and modest resources on the part of the mujahedin.

More disturbing is the threat posed by the CE mujahedin to the 2014 Olympic Games to be held in the 

North Caucasus resort city of Sochi, Krasnodar. The 

area comes under the CE’s NSV, which is responsible 

for Russia’s Krasnodar and Stavropol regions but it 

has not demonstrated much of an existence no less capacity, with a caveat: Recent suicide operations, failed 

and successful, have involved ethnic Russian Islamic 

converts from Stavropol. The advantage that less conspicuous ethnic Russian mujahedin might offer in an 

operation targeting Sochi raises red flags. These same 

ethnic Russian mujahedin’s ties to the most capacious 

of the CE’s vilaiyats, the DV, raise more concerns.96

Not only have the Dagestani mujahedin carried out 

the highest number of operations each month since 

April 2011, but the DV has also led in the number of 

suicide bombings and created its own Riyadus Salikhiin Jamaat (RSJ).97 In August 2010, Dagestani mujahedin issued an explicit promise of “operations in 

Sochi and across Russia and more ‘surprises’ from the 

horror of which you will blacken.”98 The CE’s OVKBK 

mujahedin also might be involved in an attack on the 

Sochi Games. Its field of operations, the republics of 

KBR and lesser so Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (KChR), 
36

are geographically closer to Sochi than is Dagestan.99

In February 2011, the OVKBK carried out a series coordinated attacks against the winter ski resort area 

around Mt. Elbrus. The entire operation resembled 

a training operation for an attack on Sochi, and the 

OVKBK warned it would continue to fight infidel Russian development efforts and international culture in 

the region.100 Thus, CE plans for Sochi could include 

a joint DV-OVKBK operation or separate ones by the 

DV and OVKBK with built-in redundancy, utilizing 

ethnic Russian suicide bombers. The possibility that 

the CE might strike at the Sochi Games, an international target, is strengthened by its active support for 

the global jihadi revolutionary alliance’s goals.

The Eurasian Horizon.

There already are connections between the CE 

and other post-Soviet jihadists. At the most general 

level, mujahedin from Central Asian states, Azerbaijan, and even Georgia, have turned up among the CE 

mujahedin, but the reverse has not been true, putting 

aside the CE’s use of Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge as a rear 

base. The CE has declared not only all Muslim lands 

in Russia, but also the entire Caucasus as its rightful 

domain.101 In the Caucasus writ large, Azerbaijan, bordering and having some ethnic and Islamic overlap 

with Dagestan, the present spearhead of the CE’s activity, is most vulnerable to CE penetration. Its Islamic 

population includes nationalities such as the Lezgins, 

who straddle the Azerbaijani-Dagestan border and are 

an important nationality in Dagestan. As noted above, 

the ChRI, AQ, and its affiliated charity societies used 

Azerbaijan as a transit point for funneling funds, cadres, and weapons to Chechnya in the 1990s. The CE also 
37

seems to be taking note. Recent incursions south by 

likely CE mujahedin into northern Azerbaijan as well 

as jihadist activity in Baku suggest mujahedin could 

threaten this strategically important state.102 Recently, 

the DV added an Azerbaijan Jamaat with unidentified 

locale and goals.103 The CE’s capacious vanguard DV 

puts Umarov within striking range of international 

and U.S. interests in Azerbaijan such as oil company 

headquarters, refineries, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 

pipeline carrying oil to Europe. Clearly, a CE or other 

significant jihadi presence in Azerbaijan would have 

security implications for the entire Transcaucasus and 

the Persian Gulf region.

The bad blood between Moscow and Tbilisi created 

by the 2008 Georgian-Russian 5-day war is beginning 

to influence the situation in the North Caucasus. To 

be sure, there is little evidence of the ethno-nationalist 

mobilizational effect on Russia’s Circassian nationalities that many predicted would be a result of Russia’s 

recognition of the independence of Abkhazia. However, Georgia has been speculating on the situation in 

the region, especially the Circassian genocide issue, 

as the Sochi Olympics approach. It has opened up a 

television and radio company that broadcasts propaganda to the region, waived visa requirements for 

North Caucasus residents, and adopted a parliamentary resolution calling for a boycott of the Sochi Olympics and Russian and international recognition of the 

Russians’ rout and partially forced exile of Circassians 

in the 1860s as a genocide. Some Georgian opposition 

figures and one former U.S. official claim that President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government is providing 

financial and training assistance to the CE.104 Georgia’s policies could radicalize some Circassians and 

thus improve the CE OVKBK’s and NSV’s prospects 

for recruitment.
38

Consistent with the interrelated goals of recreating 

the caliphate and extending the CE through the Volga 

and southern Urals regions as a bridge to Central Asia, 

the CE maintains relations with Central Asian jihadi 

organizations tied to AQ and the Taliban in AfPak 

such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 

and the IMU splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union 

(IJU). Both the IMU and IJU have fighters in Afghanistan, train in Pakistan, and fight in both as well as in 

Central Asia. In a May 2007 statement, IJU amir Ebu 

Yahya Muhammad Fatih stated that the IJU had “also 

been working on our common targets together with 

Caucasian mujahedeens.”105 In March 2011, the IJU’s 

media department, Badr At-Tawhid, sent a 7-minute 

video message to the CE mujahedin from the IJU’s 

amirs in the “land of Horosan,” Afghanistan.106 It 

praised the CE mujahedin for joining the global jihad 

and noted: “In our jamaat, there are many brothers 

who were trained or fought on the lands of the Caucasus Emirate.”107 The CE DV cell uncovered in the Czech 

Republic discussed below could have been training 

with the IJU or IMU. CE websites regularly cover and 

provide at least propaganda support to Central Asia’s 

leading jihadi organizations, including the IMU and 

IJU. Thus, the CE reported extensively on the series of 

suicide, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ambush attacks and skirmishes carried out by the IMU, 

IJU, and/or a possible subunit thereof, the “Jamaat 

‘Ansarullah’ in Tajikistan,” during autumn 2010 in 

Hujand, Sogdo Oblast’ and elsewhere in Tajikistan.108

The CE Ingush GV’s website Hunafa.com, founded by Buryatskii, has shown a special interest in the 

emergence of jihadism in Kazakhstan, carrying propaganda materials from a Kazakhstan jihadi jamaat 

“Ansaru-d-din,” calling Kazakhstan’s Muslims to 
39

jihad and a fatwa issued by Sheikh Abul-Mundhir 

Al-Shinkiti, asserting the Shariah legality of attacking 

police and fighting jihad in Kazkahstan, even though 

the Muslims there are weak and small in number.109

It is unclear whether the CE, GV independently, or 

Absaru-d-din played a role in recent bombings and attacks on police this year.110 The CE’s main website Kavkaz tsentr also reported in March 2011 the bayat to the 

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammad 

Omar Mujahid, the Islamic group taken by a group of 

Kyrgyzstan mujahedin, Jaish Jamaat al-Mahdi (Amirul-Mu’minin), and their call to the Kyrgyz to take up 

jihad.111

Thinking Globally: The CE and Jihad in Europe.

The CE’s rabid anti-infidelism is not new; the ChRI’s 

websites were replete with anti-Western, anti-Semitic, 

and anti-American articulations as far back as 2005.112

The CE’s growing ties with AQ and the global jihadi 

revolutionary alliance produced in 2010 what appears 

to have been the first CE-tied activity in Europe: the 

plot by “Shariah4Belgium” broken up in November 

2010, and the DV-tied Czech cell uncovered in April 

2011. On November 23, 11 suspects tied to the jihadi 

Shariah4Belgium group were arrested in Belgium, the 

Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Morocco, and Saudi 

Arabia on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks in Belgium, recruiting “jihadist candidates” and financing 

the CE. Earlier in 2010, Shariah4Belgium leader Abou 

Imran declared that the White House would “be conquered,” and “Europe will be dominated by Islam.”113

The Belgian-based detainees included six Moroccan 

Belgian citizens detained in Antwerp, three Moroccan 

Belgian citizens arrested in the Netherlands, and two 
40

Chechens apprehended in the German city of Aachen 

near the Belgian border.

114All the suspects held dual 

citizenship and belonged to the Antwerp-based Shariah4Belgium.115 Belgian police said the Shariah4Belgium cell had ties to a local Islamic Center and had 

been under investigation since at least 2009. One of 

the Russian nationals was a 31-year-old “Chechen” arrested in Aachen, Germany, under a European arrest 

warrant issued by Belgium who was suspected of having recruited young people to fight in Chechnya.All 

the detainees, including the two Chechens, were said 

to have been involved in both recruiting and financing for the CE and planning attacks in Belgium.

116 A 

third Chechen supporter of Doku Umarov allegedly 

involved in the Shariah4Belgium plot was arrested on 

December 1 at Vienna’s Schwechat airport on the basis 

of one of nine international arrest warrants issued by 

the Belgian government.117The 32-year old Aslambek 

I., as he was identified by the authorities, was detained 

upon his return from the hajj to Mecca in connection 

with an international plot to attack “a NATO facility 

in Belgium.”118 Aslambek I. reportedly lived in the 

Austrian town of Neunkirchen with this family and 

was planning to bomb a train carrying NATO troops. 

Earlier, he reportedly lost both his hands in a grenade 

attack in Chechnya and had been arrested in Sweden 

for smuggling weapons, was released, and then left 

for Mecca.

119

It remains unclear whether this CE-connected plot 

was part of the reported AQ plan to carry out a series 

of Christmas terrorist attacks in the United States and 

Europe last holiday season..

120Besides the Chechen origins of three members of the Belguim4Shariah cell and 

their assistance to the CE, there was other evidence 

of the plot’s connection simultaneously to the CE, 
41

AQ, and the global jihad. On June 20, the OVKBK’s 

Islamdin.com posted an appeal from Belgian Muslims 

to Maqdisi, underscoring once again the way in which 

the CE’s tie to Maqdisi unites it with the larger global 

jihadi revolution.121 More significantly, the arrested 

Shariah4Belgium suspects were said to have been using the jihadi website Ansar al-Mujahidin in carrying 

out their activity.122As noted above, the CE OVKBK’s 

Islamdin.com co-sponsored with Ansar al-Mujahidin the 

Russian-language forum Al-Ansar.info.

In April 2011, counterterrorism officials in the 

Czech Republic uncovered an international cell in 

Bohemia connected to the CE’s DV. According to the 

chief of the Czech Unit for Combating Organized 

Crime (UOOZ) Robert Slachta, the group included 

one Chechen, two or three Dagestanis, two or three 

Moldovans, and two Bulgarians, who are accused 

variously of weapons possession, document falsification, financing and supplying terrorist organizations, 

specifically the DV’s new members, with weapons 

and explosives.123Documents relating to the Dagestan 

mujahedin in both Arabic and Russian were found 

during the arrests. The apartment of the Chechen 

involved in the Czech cell was reported to have contained significant quantities of arms and ammunition. 

Six of the eight accused were arrested in the Czech 

Republic, with two members still at large in Germany. 

There was also an unidentified ninth member. Profits made from the falsification of passports and other 

documents were sent to Dagestan as were weapons 

and explosives purchased by the cell. None of those 

arrested were suspected of planning terrorist attacks 

in the Czech Republic.124 However, one press report 

claimed that the Bulgarian members of the group were 

involved in planning terrorist attacks in unidentified 
42

other states.125 In June 2011, two more unidentified 

Russian citizens were arrested in Germany engaging 

in the same activity for the DV and perhaps working 

with the abovementioned DV Czech cell.126The CEand DV-tied Czech Republic cell represents global jihadi thinking and suggests the CE and its DV as clear 

and present dangers to the Sochi Games.

On July 5, 2010, French police and security carried 

out a counterterrorism operation arresting five Chechens, three men aged 21 to 36, and two women, in several districts across the city of Le Mans. One of the 

three males was described as an imam and father of 

five. Reportedly, French counterterrorism was tipped 

off by Russian security after they arrested a Chechen 

citizen in Moscow in possession of weapons, explosives, plans for making bombs, and a residence permit issued by France’s Prefecture de la Sarthe. Russian investigators also discovered that the wife of the 

arrested Chechen lives in Le Mans. The three males 

were arraigned on July 9 and charged on suspicion of 

“criminal association in relation with a terrorist enterprise.”127The CE also could be connected directly or 

indirectly to several Chechens arrested individually 

in Europe in recent years; for example Lors Doukaev, 

who was sentenced in May 2011 to 12 years in prison 

for planning an attack on the offices of the newspaper 

Jyllands-Posten, which published the famous 12 caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005.128 In sum, the 

CE and perhaps lone wolf terrorists inspired by it are 

posing a new threat to Europe and the West.
43

Potential Threats to U.S. Interests.

The CE also poses a potential threat to U.S. interests 

and citizens, if not the homeland. It may be significant 

that both the Nevskii Express and Domodedovo Airport attacks targeted transport infrastructure where 

foreigners, in particular Americans, are often present. 

The potential threat to U.S. interests and even personnel is suggested by the Nevskii Express attack. The 

Moscow-St. Petersburg rail route is located within 100 

miles of the northern stretch of the Northern Distribution Route (NDR) supplying U.S. and NATO troops in 

Afghanistan. Beginning in Latvia, it traverses through 

northeast Russia on its way to Central Asia and Afghanistan. If the Shariah4Belgium plot was intended 

to target NATO transport, then a similar project to 

one that would target the NDR has already been on 

the CE-tied jihadists’ agenda. Finally, aside from the 

numerous propaganda attacks on the U.S. extant on 

CE websites, in 2010 two sites taken together thrice 

published the infamous al-Fahd fatwa calling for the 

use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against 

the Americans.129 To be sure, in contrast to the ChRI, 

there is only limited evidence to suggest that CE operatives intend or have attempted to acquire chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear materials.130 However, the CE’s jihadization and the al-Fahd posting 

suggest a theo-ideological orientation that could so 

incline CE operatives to employ such tactics, and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Aleksandr 

Bortnikov’s claim in June 2010 that terrorists continue 

to “attempt to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical components” across the former Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR) underscores the point.131
44

RUSSIAN COUNTER-JIHADISM POLICY

How is Moscow dealing with the CE insurgency 

and its alliance with the global jihad? It must be noted 

that the derision that many in the West devoted to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims that Russia was 

dealing with international terrorism was misplaced. 

Putin was exaggerating his claim but not inventing it 

out of whole cloth, as the discussion above of AQ’s 

ties to those ChRI elements involved in the 1999 invasion of Dagestan clearly shows. There is probably 

some truth to the assumption that Putin’s claim was 

intended to serve as a justification for Russia’s heavyhanded tactics in dealing with the ChRI and CE. Russian military, police, and special security forces have 

committed and, to a much lesser degree, continue to 

commit atrocities. However, the last few years have 

seen a considerable shift in the Russian strategy and 

tactics to include more elements of soft power in its 

overlapping counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, 

including attempts to combat jihadism theo-ideologically and through greater investment in the socioeconomic development of the North Caucasus.

Federal Policy.

Already during Putin’s second term, there was a 

shift to include nonmilitary means: (1) better intelligence gathering and dissemination and better interoperational coordination among the siloviki with the 

creation of federal and regional anti-terrorism committees for searching out and destroying CE amirs 

and operatives; (2) the removal from office of the oldest, longest-serving, and most odious of the North 

Caucasus republics’ presidents, with the exception of 
45

Chechenya’s Ramzan Kadyrov and Ingushetia’s Murat Zyazikov; and, (3) “draining the pond” of mujahedin through a fourth amnesty in 2006 which brought 

in 600 mujahedin from the forest.132 Russian security 

and local police forces have become quite efficient at 

eliminating top CE leaders, with the exception of CE 

amir Umarov.133 On June 9, 2009, the FSB managed for 

the first time to capture rather than kill a major CE 

amir, the CE’s military amir, and the CE GV’s amir and 

vali “Magas” Ali Taziyev (a.k.a. Akhmed Yevloyev). 

His capture likely led to actionable intelligence that 

has facilitated many of the increasing number of CE 

amirs killed since then. Also during his second term, 

Putin undertook a massive reconstruction effort for 

Chechnya, which after years of slow progress finally 

achieved considerable results. Groznyi has been almost completely rebuilt, and Chechnya’s second city, 

Gudermes, is also making progress. The reconstruction efforts provided some employment for Chechen 

youth, but unemployment remains high, and Kadyrov 

has been criticized for funneling work to his Benoi and 

political clans. Putin-era anti-extremism laws remain 

in force and far too broad, allowing Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and FSB operatives to apply them 

occasionally against journalists, moderate Muslims, 

and certain Islamic texts.

Under the Medvdev presidency, Russia has moved 

further in complimenting hard power with a robust 

soft power component in attempting to tackle jihadism in the Caucasus. In his first annual presidential 

address to Russia’s Federal Assembly in November 

2009, President Dmitry Medvedev called the North 

Caucasus Russia’s “most serious domestic political 

problem” and announced a federal program to invest 

800 billion rubles in Ingushetia, which since the sum-
46

mer of 2007 had been the center of gravity of the jihad, 

with the largest number of CE attacks of any North 

Caucasus region.134 Medvedev also fired the extremely 

unpopular, incompetent, and violence-prone Ingushetiyan president Murat Zyazikov, who, largely on 

the strength of his FSB career, had been ensconced in 

power by Putin through a series of electoral manipulations. Under Zyazikov, Ingushetia saw abductions 

skyrocket, with many suspecting Zyazikov’s cousin, 

who headed the security forces, of organizing the abductions. The final straw for Zyazikov came when Ingushetia’s top opposition leader Magomed Yevloyev 

was shot while in the custody of the Ingushetia’s MVD 

chief, after arguing with Zyazikov on a plane flight 

in August 2008. Zyazikov’s removal and the security 

forces’ killing of Buryatskii and GV amir Taziyev were 

followed since March 2010 by a fall both in attacks by 

the CE and abductions in the republic. Medvedev’s 

federal assistance program for Ingushetia has made it 

since 2009 the most highly subsidized region in Russia, with 91 percent of the republic’s budget being 

federally funded. From 2008 to 2010, expenditures increased for sectors crucial to socioeconomic development and jobs: by 282 percent for housing, 110 percent 

for economic development, 103 percent for education, 

with slightly lower increases for state agency expenditures, culture, health, and sport.135

Medvedev also moved to increase, better target, 

and ensure proper use of funding for the North Caucasus as a whole by creating the North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO) and appointing as its presidential 

envoy and as federal government deputy premier, 

the former businessman and Krasoyarsk Governor 

Aleksandr Khloponin. It is planned to fold the federal 

targeted programs for the North Caucasus, Chechnya, 
47

and Ingushetia into a single program, with one-third 

of the unified program designated for the most jihadplagued republic, Dagestan.136 Medvedev’s June 2011 

proposal to decentralize aspects of government to the 

regions and municipalities appears to be dictated in 

part by the situation in the North Caucasus, as SKFO 

envoy Khloponin has been assigned to draft the details 

for the decentralization of interbudgetary relations 

along with his fellow vice premier Dmitrii Kozak.137

Since 2008, federal expenditures have increased in all 

the SKFO’s regions, except for Chechnya. This has led 

to some modest economic growth for the SKFO as a 

whole, with some republics’ economic growth outpacing the federal average. However, unemployment remains high, especially youth unemployment.138

In line with Medvedev’s overall liberalization 

policies and his turn to more use of soft power in the 

North Caucasus, Prime Minister Putin announced a 

radical departure in Kremlin policy in the Caucasus, 

unveiling an ambitious economic development program for the region that was long overdue. He also 

called for the North Caucasus governments to open 

up in order to attract private investment, to pay more 

attention to the views of human rights activists, to encourage the development of civil society, and to air 

more federal broadcasts offering “objective and honest stories about life in the North Caucasus” and not an 

“artificially” drawn “soft and pleasing picture.” The 

new development strategy detailed in Putin’s speech 

is to integrate the North Caucasus into the Russian 

and global economies and to create 400,000 new jobs 

in the region by 2020 by: (1) plugging the region into 

the international North-South transit corridor linking 

Russia and Europe with Central Asian and Gulf states; 

(2) organizing several major public works and con-
48

struction projects toward that end, to include building 

a major oil refinery in Chechnya’s capital; (3) creating a modern tourism industry including a system of 

ski and other recreational resorts; and, (4) increasing 

North Caucasians’ access to university education.139

Specifically, these goals are to be achieved by 

building a network of highways, renovating airports, 

and developing energy projects and recreation resort 

areas across the region. The construction and resulting 

resort-related businesses will help solve the region’s 

unemployment problem. The government is already 

constructing highways around and between cities 

such as Mozdok in Republic of Ingushetia, Nalchik 

(the capital of the KBR), and Stavropol (capital of Stavropol Krai or Territory). A highway is being designed 

for Chechnya’s second largest city, Gudermes, and another for Beslan, North Ossetia, will be commissioned 

by 2015. Another approximately 150-kilometer highway will link Cherkassk with Sukhum, the capital of 

Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia, through 

a six-kilometer tunnel to be constructed through 

the mountains. The airports in Magas (Ingushetia), 

Beslan, and Stavropol’s Shpakovskoye and Mineralny Vody airports will be modernized. In the field of 

energy, he announced new hydroelectricity projects 

for the mountainous region and the construction of 

a Rosneft oil refinery in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, 

to be commissioned in 2014. The total sum of investments for these anticipated economic projects will be 

3.4 trillion rubles, according to Putin. The government 

is ready to cover risk for private investors guaranteeing up to 70 percent of project costs. The government 

will choose investors and distribute money through 

a new North Caucasian branch of Russia’s Development Bank. This year, three federal programs—one 
49

for the entire region and one each for Chechnya and 

Ingushetia—will invest 20 billion rubles (some $700 

million) in social and economic development projects 

in the North Caucasus. Putin also announced plans 

to develop the education infrastructure in the North 

Caucasus. A new proposal is to require that Russia’s 

leading universities admit 1,300 students from North 

Caucasian republics annually. A project to build one 

of the eight federal universities in the North Caucasian District was announced in January.140

Putin also proposed “alpine skiing, ethnographic, 

or family” tourism. Specifically, he proposed creating 

a network of ski resorts across the region stretching 

from the Caspian to Black Seas building on the Elbrus 

ski resort in KBR. Mt. Elbrus is the highest mountain in 

Europe. This resort area was targeted by the OVKBK in 

February 2011, which issued an explicit statement that 

it would fight to prevent any resort development and 

keep out Russian and foreign infidel influence.141 The 

planned tourism cluster will include resorts in Dagestan, North Ossetia, KBR, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and 

Adygeya. The resorts should accommodate 100,000 

tourists and create 160,000 jobs. Putin also announced 

plans to upgrade the Mineralnyi Vody hot springs 

and spa resort in Stavropol into a “hi-tech resort” and 

the nucleus of the healthcare and tourism industries of 

the region. He promised eight billion rubles in investments to kick start the tourism industry component 

of the development strategy.142 At the June 2011 St. 

Petersburg International Economic Forum, Medvedev 

endorsed Khloponin’s additional proposal to attract 

foreign direct investment of some 300 billion rubles 

on the basis of a 60 billion rubles initial investment to 

lay down infrastructure in the first 4 years followed 

by 240 billion rubles in tax breaks and investment.143
50

Credit Suisse and the United Arab Republic’s (UAR) 

Abu Dhabi Investment Company (Invest AD) have already declared their readiness to invest in the project. 

Included among these plans is the KBR’s 2008 plan for 

five major investment projects that would be able to 

entertain 25,000 visitors at any one time and provide 

20,000 jobs. In 2009 the South Korean company Hanok and Russia’s Olimp agreed to invest 600 million 

euros in Elbrus to build 300 kilometers of trails, eight 

lifts totaling 100 kilometers, a skating rink, hotel, and 

sports complexes.144 Following a joint statement on development of the North Caucasus by President Medvedev and French leader Nicolas Sarkozy during the 

G8 summit in Deauville, France’s Caisse des Depots et 

Consignations holding company signed an investment 

agreement at the June 2011 St. Petersburg Economic 

Forum.145

Local Policy.

Each Muslim republic where the CE has a permanent network—Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and 

the KBR—has its own style and counterinsurgency 

and counterterrorism (anti-jihadism) policies. Under 

Ramzan Kadyrov’s brutal rule, Chechnya maintains 

the harshest regime, while Ingushetia and the KBR 

have taken a softer line with the arrival of new presidents, and Dagestan falls in the middle between Ramzan Kadyrov’s harsh rule and the more conciliatory 

line in Ingushetia and the KBR. Kadyrov has made 

some gains in reducing insurgent and terrorist activity in Chechnya, which by 2010 was the least active 

of the CE’s four main vilaiyats in terms of the number of jihadi attacks and related casualties. This result 

has been achieved through a mixture of the carrot and 
51

the stick, with a clear emphasis on the latter but with 

far less violence than that inflicted by the mujahedin. 

Localized counterterrorist operations are carried out 

ruthlessly, on occasion with casualties among civilians 

or innocent family members of mujahedin. Abductions, though fewer and sometimes driven by blood 

revenge rather than jihad-related problems, continue 

at a somewhat lower level in several of the Caucasus 

republics. Kadyrov’s policy towards the families of 

mujahedin differs significantly from that of his North 

Caucasus counterparts. The families of known or suspected mujahedin are often harassed, detained, and 

beaten, and their homes are occasionally demolished. 

Such policies negate any progress Kadyrov has made 

in the battle for “hearts and minds” by attempting to 

co-opt the banner of Islam claimed by the CE. This cooptation effort has been built around the construction 

of Europe’s largest mosque and an Islamic university 

and moderately enforcing some Islamic holidays and 

customs, including restrictions on female dress. At the 

same time, Kadyrov, like his Caucasus counterparts, 

has supported the traditional Sufi clerics under theoideological and physical attack from the takfirist mujahedin, and he has tried to enlist clerics in efforts to 

counter the CE’s increasingly sophisticated and effective propaganda.

Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov has 

employed a very different policy—the most liberal 

policy of any North Caucasus leader—initiating a sea 

change from Zyazikov’s brutal regime and showing 

enormous courage in the process. Upon assuming 

office in 2008, he reached out to the nationalist and 

democratic opposition, offering them positions in his 

government, and created an advisory body of societal 

and opposition organizations. Yevkurov also moved 
52

aggressively to talk young Muslims out of joining the 

jihad and into leaving it, working with families, councils of village elders, and teip or clan councils.146 According to Yevkurov, 16 mujahedin were convinced 

to turn themselves in during 2009 and 36 in 2010, and 

there were only 15 mujahedin active in the republic by 

early 2010.147 In some cases, the courts applied no punishment to those who surrendered, and many were 

provided work or education.148

Yevkurov was targeted by Buryatskii in a car 

bomb assassination attempt in June 2009 that left the 

Ingush President severely wounded. Nevertheless, after rehabilitation, Yevkurov returned to work within 

2 months, publicly forgave his attackers, and continued to work with families of mujahedin to convince 

them to leave the jihad. In February 2010, Yevkurov 

reiterated the cornerstone of his anti-jihadism policy 

of “showing good will towards those who have deviated from the law” and even offered mujahedin an 

amnesty of sorts, promising that if mujahedin turned 

themselves in, they would receive soft sentences and 

would be eased back into society: 

Today a unique opportunity has been created, and a 

chance to become a fully engaged citizen of society included in the process of the economic rebirth of our 

Ingushetia, applying your strength and knowledge in 

creative places of work and showing yourselves favorably in any of the spheres of social and public political 

life, is still being preserved for each of you [mujahedin].149

Two days after Buryatskii’s demise in March 2010, 

Yevkurov met with the relatives of those who had 

sheltered Buryatskii and the other mujahedin who 

were planning a major terrorist attack in Ingushetia. 
53

Yevkurov told these families and, by extension, all 

Ingushetia’s families, that they should know who is 

coming into their homes. He added that the authorities would continue his policy of trying to persuade 

mujahedin to abandon jihad, but that the security infrastructure would go into action for those who could 

not be persuaded.150 Similarly, Yevkurov has led in 

reducing violent outcomes of the notoriously violent 

Caucasus tradition of blood feuds that contribute to 

both jihadi and non-jihadi violence in the region. In 

a 2-year period, the Ingush authorities reconciled 150 

families, according to Yevkurov, in part by raising the 

ransom for resolving them from 100 thousand rubles 

to one million rubles.151

Compared to his colleagues in the North Caucasus, 

which is plagued more by corruption than any other 

region, Yevkurov has carried out the most aggressive 

anti-corruption campaign. Greater social expenditures 

and economic investment plus Yevkurov’s struggle 

against corruption and clean bookkeeping is improving the situation, but slowly. Yevkurov policies have 

allowed Ingushetia to double its revenues from 810 

million rubles in 2008 to 1.744 billion rubles in 2010!152

This is not to say that Yevkurov has ignored the stick. 

In early January, rumors claimed that Yevkurov had 

requested 20 units of additional military intelligence 

(GRU) forces for the republic.153 However, whereas 

Kadyrov has overemphasized the “stick” of hard 

power, Yevkurov has heavily favored the “carrot” of 

soft power. Yevkurov’s policies have corresponded 

with a significant decline in the number of attacks in 

Ingushetia, according to my own estimates, from some 

138 in 2008 and 175 in 2009, to only 99 in 2010 and approximately 40 in the first 6 months of 2011.154 However, it remains unclear whether Yevkurov’s policies 
54

are responsible for the decline, factoring in the killing 

of Buryatskii and the capture of CE military amir and 

GV amir “Magas” Ali Taziyev.

Since Putin’s removal of the ailing Valerii Kokov 

(the KBR’s ancient Soviet-era communist party first 

secretary) from the KBR presidency in 2005, the republic has adopted policies closer to Yevkurov’s. Like Zyazikov, Kokov had been harshly criticized by official 

Islamic clergy, the general populace, young Muslim 

Islamists, and jihadists. He was replaced by the energetic 48-year-old ethnic Kabardin businessman Arsen 

Kanokov. He immediately moved to address the concerns of Muslims as well as the ethnic Balkar minority. Kanokov replaced the republic’s premier with an 

ethnic Balkar and its hard-line MVD chief Khachim 

Shogenov with an ethnic Russian, Yurii Tomchak. 

Shogenov had been sharply criticized by almost everyone in the republic, including the KBR’s DUM, for 

his heavy-handed and broad-brushed crackdown on 

Muslims in 2003-04 in an effort to contain the burgeoning jihadi movement in the republic. Tomchak 

took immediate steps to assuage the KBR’s Muslims, 

especially the more volatile young generation, including the inclusion of KBR DUM representatives on the 

MVD’s public council. The ministry also signed a cooperation agreement with the DUM and other confessions’ public organizations.155 Not a single jihadi attack was carried out in the KBR in 2006.156 KBR DUM 

chairman, mufti Anas Pshikhachev, quickly acknowledged the MVD’s efforts under Tomchak to address 

the DUM’s grievances but warned that the threat of 

Islamic extremism persists in the KBR.157 In addition, 

Kanokov set aside 4.5 million rubles in April 2007 for 

the construction of two new mosques in the capital 

Nalchik. The closing of mosques by the authorities in 
55

2004 had helped spark the rise of the jihadist combat 

jamaat “Yarmuk” in 2004 and irritated moderate Muslims and official clergy alike. Kanokov also attracted 

new investments for developing tourism in the Elbrus 

District resort area.

However, rather than seeing a decline in jihadi 

attacks, Kanokov presided over a marked increase: 

28 in 2008, 23 in 2009, and 113 in 2010, despite amir 

Astemirov’s demise in March 2010.158 In January 2011, 

OVKBK mujahedin killed chief mufti of the KBR’s 

DUM, Anas Pshikhachev, in the republic’s capital of 

Nalchik. The KBR plunged into a state of desperation. 

In February, the Council of Elders of the Balkar people 

called for the introduction of direct federal rule and 

Kanokov’s resignation. Kanokov, speaking before 

the KBR parliament, appealed to the federal authorities for additional assistance in combating jihadism 

in the republic, adding that the mujahedin “are not 

afraid.”159At the end of February, the OVKBK carried 

out the noted series of attacks across the Elbrus resort 

area. In May, the OVKBK attempted to assassinate 

Kanokov in the largest attack in the KBR since Basaev’s and Astemirov’s October 2005 Nalchik raid by 

exploding a bomb under the VIP reviewing stand at a 

horse racing track during Nalchik’s May Day festivities. The attack killed at least one civilian, a 97-yearold Great Patriotic War veteran, and wounded some 

40 civilians and officials. Among the wounded were 

the KBR’s Culture Minister Ruslan Firov and former 

MVD chief Khachim Shogenov.160 At this point, Kanokov or someone in the KBR may have adopted Kadyrov’s approach of forming special units to fight the 

mujahedin. A group calling itself the “Black Hawks” 

(chernyie yastreby) declared war on the OVKBK, but 

nothing much seems to have come of the group. In 
56

April, security forces killed Astemirov’s successor, 

OVKBK amir “Abdullah” Asker Dzhappuev, along 

with his naibs and several other top OVKBK amirs. 

Since then, there has been a slight decline in the rate 

of attacks in the KBR. 

In Dagestan, today the CE’s spearhead, a new 

president and his team, have borrowed more elements 

from Yevkurov than from Kadyrov. Unlike Chechnya, 

the origins of jihadism in Dagestan are driven entirely 

by intra-confessional tensions created by the emergence of a significant Salafi community at odds with 

traditional Sufis. Successive leaders have failed to resolve the religious tensions. In February 2006, Putin 

replaced long-standing ethnic Dargin Dagestan President Magomedali Magomedov with the ethnic Avar 

chairman of Dagestan’s Legislative Assembly, Mukhu 

Aliev. His tenure saw a steady increase in jihadi activity and no perceptible improvement in the civility 

of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism polices in 

the region. Aliev was replaced in 2010 with Magomedov’s son, Magomedsalem Magomedov, who endeavored to engage the Salafi community in Dagestan, coordinating the formation of a council of Salafi Islamic 

scholars (ulema), which drafted a series of demands 

for the government to meet. According to the Russian 

human rights group “Memorial,” a government representative was authorized to meet with the council, but 

the dialogue has not produced notable results other 

than the regular appearance of Salafi representatives 

at public ceremonies. Magomedov has also endeavored to replicate Yevkurov’s efforts in Ingushetia by 

succeeding in enticing some young mujahedin from 

the forest and back to civilian life, and institutionalizing the process in November 2010 in the form of an 

adaptation commission. The commission includes the 
57

imam of Dagestan’s Central Mosque and the head of 

the Salafist umbrella organization, Akhlyu-s-sunna, 

A. K. Kebedov and is chaired by Rizvan Kurbanov, 

deputy premier in charge of the power ministries in 

the republic who personally led talks with prospective defectors from the mujahedin. Kurbanov was 

described by Memorial as “open to representatives 

of civil society, reacted without fail, personally, and 

immediately to reports about the crudest violations of 

human rights . . . met with the relatives of abductees, 

[and] cooperated with lawyers in specific cases.”161

Magomedov has also worked on the economy. Dagestan’s government has developed a joint project with 

the majority state-owned Russian Copper Company 

to develop the North Caucasus’s largest ore deposit of 

Kizil-Dere in southern Dagestan’s Ahtynsky District. 

The mining project plus the accompanying development of transport infrastructure and utilities should 

provide considerable employment.162 Another investment project for the region is Dagestani oligarch Suleiman Kerimov’s purchase of the republic’s Anzhi 

Makhachkala (AM) premier soccer team. This is being 

followed up by further investments of $1.4 billion by 

Kermiov into AM’s stadium and Makhachkala hotels 

and AM’s recent $30 million purchase of global soccer superstar Samuel Eto’o in August 2011. Kerimov 

is also investing in the North Caucasus tourist resort 

cluster project.163

During his still short tenure, Magomedov’s new 

course has yielded few results unless one can show 

that jihadi violence would be even more prevalent 

without his policies. The CE’s DV has been able to step 

up its violence, threatening Magomedov and killing 

numerous government officials. Since April 2010, the 

DV has been the most prolific of the CE’s vilaiyats in 
58

terms of number of attacks, including suicide bombings, with approximately 267 total attacks (including 

six suicide attacks) in 2010 and 200 attacks (including three suicide attacks) during the first 6 months of 

2011, compared to 144 total attacks, including one suicide bombing, in 2009.164 Nor is there a demonstrable 

improvement in the republic’s human rights record, 

either.165

Siloviki.

A key problem is that neither the republic presidents nor SKFO envoy Khloponin exercise much, if 

any, control over the siloviki as the latter continue to 

violate Muslim citizens’ human, civil, and political 

rights. How much Moscow or the civilian leadership 

controls federal forces in the North Caucasus also remains a question, though not their responsibility for 

rights violations. Both federal forces and local police, 

often working jointly in counter-terrorist operations, 

continue to employ detention on the basis of mere 

suspicion and falsified evidence, beatings, and torture 

during detentions, and extrajudicial punishments, including abductions and killings. The European Court 

for Human Rights continues to hand down judgments 

against Russian authorities regarding such violations.166

Federal forces still deployed in the region include 

military, FSB specially designated forces (spetsnaz), 

and GRU. MVD forces, which according to federal law 

are supposed to be under federal control, are often 

an object of contestation in numerous regions across 

Russia. Kadyrov appears to control not only his own 

forces but the MVD and perhaps its Internal Troops in 

Chechnya, both of which have made incursions into 
59

Ingushetia sometimes coordinated with Ingushetia’s 

MVD and sometimes not. Military forces, including 

new mountain fighting forces created a few years ago 

and based in Botlikh (Dagestan) and Zelenchukskaya 

(Karachaevo-Cherkessia), maintain a low profile, remaining on their bases. In rare cases when military 

units are called upon to take part in counterterrorist 

operations, military helicopters, and more rarely artillery are called in to target mujahedin uncovered in 

mountainous areas. For example, CE amir Umarov’s 

naib Supyan Abduallev was killed in March 2011 in an 

operation that used helicopters and artillery. Military 

and other convoys occasionally come under ambush 

by mujahedin in all four of the main republics where 

the CE maintains a permanent presence. The creation 

of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK) and 

regional counterparts appears to have improved coordination and intelligence-sharing between the various 

power ministries. Security and police forces have become proficient in tracking and killing leading amirs, 

but they have been less successful in capturing high 

value targets that would provide invaluable additional intelligence. The only such case was the July 2010 

capture of GV amir and CE military amir “Magas” Ali 

Taziyev; ever since, the Ingushetia mujahedin’s fortunes have been in steady decline.

Chechnya’s Kadyrov maintains considerable control over MVD forces in his republic and deploys his 

own presidential guards, which in the past have come 

into conflict with special battalions subordinated to 

federal power ministries and led by the leaders of families and teips or clans in competition with Kadyrov 

as a counterweight to Kadyrov’s power. In 2010 the 

federal authorities decided that the dire situation in 

Dagestan required a new approach. It was decided to 
60

replicate the Chechenization of the conflict in Chechnya under Kadyrov with the formation of special battalions under the control of various federal organs 

of coercion, and by establishing under the Dagestan 

MVD a separate volunteer special motorized battalion 

of native Dagestanis for carrying out counterinsurgency operations. The first 300 volunteers were trained by 

November 2010, with another 400 intended to complete the 700-man force.167 There is no evidence that 

this measure has produced any appreciable results.

In sum, Russian and North Caucasus authorities’ 

continuing rights violations largely, if not entirely, 

negate the positive development of an increased use 

of soft power methods in fighting jihadism pushed by 

Medvedev, Yevkurov, and Kanokov. However counterintuitive it may be, the steepest decline in jihadi 

activity has occurred in the republics with the harshest policy line, Kadyrov’s Chechnya, and the softest, 

Yevkurov’s Ingushetia. 

THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The rise of the CE, and attendant theoretical concepts, have concrete security policy implications for 

Russia, the United States, and globally. The CE’s rise 

refutes many widespread assumptions, biases, hypotheses, and theories extant in the scholarly, analytical, activist, and policymaking communities regarding the violence in the North Caucasus and the 

organization and causality of terrorism and jihadism 

in general. The CE’s continuing capability to recruit 

and attack is not simply a response to Russian brutality and poor governance, but is also a consequence of 

the CE’s effective deployment of jihadi propaganda, 

training, leadership, and substantial ties to AQ, as 
61

well as the global jihadi revolutionary alliance, and an 

umma in the throes of radicalism and revolution. The 

CE’s long-standing though evolving relationship with 

AQ and the larger global movement and its organization and structure do not confirm the leaderless jihad 

hypothesis which argues that AQ has lost much of its 

relevance and the global jihadi movement is devolving into a diffusion of atomized lone wolves.168 Similarly, the CE’s own decentralized network structure 

and functioning and the nature of its relationship with 

AQ and the global jihadi alliance supports a more 

traditional view of a network inspired and loosely 

grouped around AQ and its affiliates. The CE, like the 

inspirational, if not institutional, AQ hub and more 

nodal elements among the global jihad’s innumerable 

groups, is likewise decentralized, but it retains a hub 

consisting of Umarov and top amirs and qadis and 

loosely coordinating interconnected nodes or vilaiyats 

working largely independently but towards one and 

the same set of goals: The creation of an Islamist CE 

state and a confederated global caliphate.

If one regards AQ as the inspirational core, if not 

the organizational leader, of a highly decentralized 

global jihadi revolutionary movement, then a conceptualization of the CE’s place would find it several 

degrees removed from the core, comprised of AQ central and affiliates like AQAP and AQ in the Maghreb 

(AQIM). Groups like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba 

comprise the first concentric circle around the AQ core 

because of both their involvement in international 

attacks and their deep involvement with, and geographical proximity to AQ central. The CE’s position 

is similar to that of as-Shabaab in Somali and other 

groups in the second concentric circle, since they are 

not located near and do not cooperate as closely with 
62

AQ central, are only just beginning to participate in 

international operations, and prefer to, or because of 

resource shortages must, focus largely on establishing 

their local emirate. The third concentric circle would 

be lone wolves inspired by but having no ties to a formal jihadi group. The fourth, most outer concentric 

circle lies outside the alliance but within the movement. It consists of groups that ascribe to the violent 

establishment of their own Islamist government but 

reject the goal of creating a caliphate and cooperation 

with other global jihadi revolutionary groups.

Nor do patterns in the CE correlate with the conclusion put forward by Robert Pape that suicide terrorism is largely a response to foreign occupation, having 

little or no connection to jihadi ideology or goals.169

Leaving aside the fact that suicide terrorism is almost 

exclusively a jihadist phenomenon, this mono-causal 

explanation is simplistic, especially when it comes 

to any jihadi organization, including the North Caucasus. CE suicide bombers’ videotaped martyrdom 

testaments state explicitly that their motivation is to 

“raise the banner of Allah above all others.” The CE’s 

chief propagandist and organizer of suicide terrorism 

from mid-2008 to early 2010, Sheikh Said Abu Saad 

Buryatskii was an ethnic Buryat-Russian, converted to 

Islam, and never set foot in the Caucasus until spring 

2008 after he returned from abroad to study Islam in 

Egypt and Kuwait. The goals and strategy of the CE 

and other global jihadi revolutionary groups are not 

simply local or defensive, seeking merely to drive out 

occupiers, but are explicitly offensive and expansionist. Thus, the CE’s expansionist goals aimed at seizing 

all of Russia and the Transcaucasus and recreating the 

Islamist caliphate defuse Pape’s theory.
63

These theoretical conclusions have policy implications: First, the CE’s ties to AQ, its own sophisticated 

organization and decentralized functioning, and its 

religious rather than nationalist motives are transforming it from a local to an international actor and 

emerging threat. Second, even if it were, like the ChRI, 

only a threat to Russian national security, this threat 

would still have international security implications, 

since Russia remains an important Eurasian power 

and is emerging as a useful ally of the United States 

and the West in the war against jihadism. Third, the 

CE’s emergence as a transnational threat with growing radicalization, capacity, and aspirations marks a 

newly emerging threat to U.S. national and international security. Fourth, the CE’s transformation and 

integration into the global jihadi revolutionary alliance demonstrate the ability of AQ and its affiliated 

movements to evolve, adapt, and flourish in response 

to Western counter-jihadism efforts. Fifth, the global 

jihadi revolutionary alliance’s ability to evolve and 

adapt is facilitated by the existence of the larger jihadi 

and Islamist social movements emerging from a prerevolutionary Muslim world that includes democratic, 

nationalist, communist, Islamist, and jihadist forces. 

Sixth, except in the most failed states like Yemen and 

Somalia, the groups that make up the global jihadi 

revolutionary alliance are unlikely to seize power precisely because of the limited appeal of their narrow 

and strict ideological orientation. Seventh, given this 

larger revolutionary and radicalizing context, international, Western, Eurasian, American, and Russian 

security are likely to be threatened by this revolution’s 

intended and unintended destabilizing and violent effects for decades to come; the most virulent of which 

are the global jihadi revolutionary alliance and its in-
64

dividual groups. Finally, the jihadi revolutionary alliance’s globalism dictates a global and cooperative 

response on the part of those whom it targets.

Operationally, Caucasus jihadists are now recruits 

for major terrorist attacks against the West. Sheikh alMaqdisi has designated the CE as the global jihad’s 

bridgehead into Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the 

CE inserted cells into Belgium and the Czech Republic 

and its apparent involvement in its first international 

terrorist plot in Belgium. The CE itself could attempt 

to attack U.S. targets in Russia or elsewhere, including the northern supply route for U.S. and NATO 

troops fighting in Afghanistan. Its most capacious DV 

and its Azerbaijan Jamaat put Umarov within striking 

range of international and U.S. interests in Azerbaijan 

such as oil company headquarters, refineries, and the 

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carrying oil to Europe. 

Clearly, a CE or other significant jihadi presence in 

Azerbaijan would have security implications for the 

entire Transcaucasus and the Persian Gulf region. In 

addition, the CE is a recruiting ground of mujahedin 

for other fronts in the global jihad. Moreover, Russia has the largest stockpiles of chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear materials and WMD in the 

world. The CE adds potential demand to this supply. 

In the past, there have been reports of Chechen separatist and Caucasus jihadi attempts to acquire WMD 

in Russia, and the CE websites’ posting of the famous 

2003 Al-Fahd fatwa three times in 2010 suggests that 

some in the CE may wish to obtain them.

Given the emerging CE threat, the U.S. Government should maximize cooperation across Eurasia to 

include Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the war against jihadism. The United 
65

States and Europe should also attempt to stabilize 

the Caucasus by resolving the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and at least minimizing 

Russian-Georgian tensions, so these do not play into 

the hands of CE or other jihadists. One goal might be 

to rein in Georgian efforts to whip up trouble in the 

North Caucasus, especially among the Muslim Circassian ethnic groups. Tbilisi has opened up a television 

and radio company that broadcasts anti-Russian propaganda to the region, and some Georgian opposition 

figures and one former U.S. official have claimed that 

President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government is providing financial and training assistance to the CE.170 Speculating on the Circassian genocide issue as the Sochi 

Olympics approach, Tbilisi adopted a parliamentary 

resolution calling for a boycott of the Sochi games and 

for Russian and international recognition of the Tsarist forces’ rout and exile of the Circassians in the 1860s 

as a genocide. Georgia’s policies could radicalize 

some Circassians and thus improve the CE prospects 

for recruitment and attacking the Sochi games. Tbilisi 

also waived visa requirements for Iranians and North 

Caucasus residents, which could facilitate the movement of global jihadists from South Asia and the Persian Gulf region to the North Caucasus and Europe.

Finally, Western-Eurasian (NATO-CSTO) cooperation can be used to nudge Eurasia’s authoritarian 

regimes, including Moscow, to conduct their anti-jihadism and other policies with a greater eye towards 

citizens’ human, civil and political rights, and the 

implications of all of the above for the war against jihadism. Only with broad and effective regional cooperation involving all of the post-Soviet states will the 

United States and the West be able to defeat the global 

jihadi threat.
66

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Interview with Basaev in Oleg Blotskii, “Terroristy pronikayut v Rossiyu za dengi,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 12, 1996, 

cited in James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, pp. 101, 154.

2. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, New Haven, CT, 

and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2007.

3. “Aslan Maskhadov: ‘My sozdadim polnotsennoe Islamskoe Gosudarstvo,” Kavkaz tsentr, March 8, 2010, 15:55, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/03/08/71101.shtml; 

“Abdallakh Shamil Abu-Idris: ‘My oderzhali strategicheskuyu 

pobedu,’” Kavkaz-Tsentr, January 9, 2006, 08:47:10, available from 

www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2006/01/09/40869.shtml; “Prezident ChRI Sheik Abdul-Khalim. Kto On?” Kavkaz-Tsentr, March 

12, 2005, 00:59:07, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2005/03/12/31285.shtml; Aleksandr Ignatenko, “Vakhkhabitskoe kvazigosudarstvo,” Russkii Zhurnal, available from www.

russ.ru/publish/96073701, citing the Chechen militants’ website, 

Kavkaz-Tsentr, September 10, 2002; Paul Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism, Dulles, VA: Brassey’s 

Inc., 2004, pp. 171-75; and Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, pp. 40-64.

4. Available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_con

tent&view=category&id=4&Itemid=28. The audios are available from 

www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category

&id=33&Itemid=31. The videos are available from www.islamdin.

com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=7&Itemid=8.

5. For example, see “Usama bin Laden ob’ yasnaet khadis 

Kaba bin Malika,” Kavkaz tsentr, April 12, 2011, 01:08, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/04/12/80669.

shtml; “AL’-kaida: Sheikh Usama bin Laden obratilsya k frantsuzskomu narodu,” Kavkaz tsentr, January 21, 2011, 21:44, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/01/21/78402.

shtml; “Sheikh Aiman az-Zavakhiri: ‘Dagestan—osvozhdenie posle otchayaniya’,” Umma News, January 20, 2011, 00:07, 

available from ummanews.com/minbar/359-----l----r.html; “Prisoediniyaites’ k Karavanu,” Islamdin.com, February 19, 2009, 

12:09, available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_
67

content&view=article&id=278:2009-02-19-12-11-52&catid=4:2009-

02-04-14-07-09&Itemid=28; Ibrakhim Abu Ubeidulakh, “Zashchita 

Usamy Bin Ladena ot napadok murdzhiitov, nechestivtsev!,” 

Islamdin.com, January 4, 2010, available from www.islamdin.com/

index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=609:2010-01-04-

23-52-10&catid=8:2009-02-04-22-51-14&Itemid=26; “Sheikh Usama 

Bin Laden-Imam Mudzhakhidov Nashei Epokhi,” Jamaat Shariat, 

January 7, 2010, 12:53, available from www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/

content/view/414/29/; Hunafa.com’s video compilation “Oh, He 

Who Rebrukes Me,” bin Laden and the CE’s Sheikh Said Abu 

Saad Buryatskii, “O, uprekayushchii menya,” available from 

Hunafa.com.

6. Some of the other jihadi sheiks, scholars, and propagandists prominent on CE websites include: medieval source of jihadi 

thought Taki al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taimiyya; the Egyptian scholar 

and Muslim Brotherhood leading figure, Sayyid Qutb; the Pakistani Salafist and jihadi revolutionary, Sayed Abul Ala Maududi; 

the London-based Syrian sheikh, Sheikh Abu Basyr At-Tartusi; 

Sheikh and Imam, Abdullah bin Abdu-Rakhman bin Jibrin; Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Hukail; Iraqi Sheikh and mujahed, Addullah 

Ibn Muhammad Ar-Rashud; Sheikh Muhammad Salih al-Munajid; and Sheikh Abdurrakhman Al-Barrak.

7. “Zhurnal ‘Vdokhnovlai’: ‘Sdelai bombu v Maminoi kukhne’,” 

Islamdin.com, December 3, 2010, available from www.islamdin.

com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=992:2010-12-

03-10-29-08&catid=43:2010-11-25-17-50-11&Itemid=33; “Zhurnal 

‘Vdokhnovlyai’: Operatsiya ‘Krovotechenie’,” Islamdin.com, December 8, 2010, 11:51, available from www.islamdin.com/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=999:2010-12-08-11-56-

36&catid=27:2009-02-09-17-38-17&Itemid=16; “V internete rasprostranen vtoroi nomer zhurnala ‘Al-Kaidy’, Inspire, Vdokhnovenie, Kavkaz tsentr, October 12, 2010, 12:07, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/10/12/75767.shtml; and Gordon 

M. Hahn, Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report, International Institute of Professional Education and Research (IIPER), 

No. 40, May 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/23115/

original/kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_40_may_2011.pdf.
68

8. “Executive Report,” Militant Ideology Atlas, West Point, NY: 

U.S. Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, November 

2006, pp. 7-8.

9. “Amir Saifullakh o knige sheikha Abu Mukhammada al’ 

Makdisi ‘Milleti Ibrakhim’,” Islamdin.com, February 18, 2010, 

08:03, available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=656:-q-q-&catid=7:2009-02-04-15-45-

20&Itemid=8; and “Amir Saifullakh: ‘O Tavkhide’—1 chast’,” 

Islamdin.com, February 15, 2010, 01:37:27, available from www.

islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=651:-

q-q-1-&catid=7:2009-02-04-15-45-20&Itemid=8.

10. See, for example, “A message from Sheikh al-Maqdisi to 

the Mujahedeen of the Caucasus Emirate,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 18, 2009, 16:55, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/

content/2009/09/18/11018.shtml, first published in Arabic on alMaqdisi’s site Almaqdese.net, 15 Ramadan 1430, available from 

almaqdese.net/r?i=07090901. See also “Nastavlenie mudzhakhidam ot sheikh Abu Mukhammada al’ Makdisi,” Islamdin.com, 

March 13, 2011, 23:37, available from www.islamdin.com/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1077:2011-03-14-00-00-

13&catid=4:2009-02-04-14-07-09&Itemid=28; “Pis’mo ot Sheikha

Abu Mukhammad Al-Makdisi,” Kavkaz tsentr, February 5,

2011, 13:50, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content

/2011/02/05/78885.shtml; and “Razmyshleniya, imam Abu Mukhammad Al’-Makdisi,” Hunafa.com, December 11, 2009, 12:00, 

available from hunafa.com/?p=2530.

11. “A message from Sheikh al-Maqdisi to the Mujahedeen of 

the Caucasus Emirate,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 18, 2009, 16:55, 

available from www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2009/09/18/11018.

shtml; first published in Arabic on al-Maqdisi’s site, Almaqdese.net, 

15 Ramadan 1430, available from almaqdese.net/r?i=07090901.

12. “Fatva Sheikha Abu Mukhammada al’-Makdisi, da ykrepit 

ego Allakh,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 10, 2010, 20:55, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/09/10/75149.shtml.

13. “Amir Seifullah o protsesse podgotovki k provoglasheniyu Kavkazskogo Emirata,” Kavkaz tsentr, November 20, 2007, 

23:15, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/

11/20/54479.shtml.
69

14. On Astemirov’s view of the amir’s unilateral powers, see 

“Amir Seifullah o protsesse podgotovki k provoglasheniyu Kavkazskogo Emirata,” Kavkaz tsentr, November 20, 2007, 23:15, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/11/20/54479.

shtml. For the same by Astemirov’s successors, see “Amir Seifullakh Gubdenskii, ra: Ot togo, chto my zdes’ voyuem, my 

nichego ne vyigraem,” JamaatShariat.com, November 12, 2010, 

05:17, available from www.jamaatshariat.com/-mainmenu-29/14-

facty/1345-2010-11-12-02-18-12.html; and “Kadii IK Ali Abu 

MukhIammad o pravlenii, dzhikhade, o polozhenii shakhidov 

i mnogom drugom,” Guraba.info, June 28, 2011, 10:57, available 

from www.guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1107--i-.html.

15. CE qadi Astemirov passed down a death sentence against 

London exile and former ChRI foreign minister Akhmed Zakaev 

when he broke with the CE upon its creation in October 2007. 

See “Shariatskii sud vynes reshenie po dely Zakaeva,” Kavkaz 

tsentr, August 25, 2009, 02:45, available from www.kavkazcenter.

com/russ/content/2009/08/25/67586.shtml and www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=467:2009-08-24-21-

30-20&catid=10:2009-02-06-21-56-11&Itemid=26. The CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) qadis have even passed down, and the DV 

mujahedin have consequently carried out, two known death sentences against Dagestani citizens. In July 2010, then DV qadi and 

soon-to-be CE qadi Abu Muhamad al-Dagistani issued a death 

sentence against Salimhan Shagidkhanov, condemned for adultery and raping a Muslim woman. Al-Dagistani issued a second 

death fatwa against Patimat Magomedova, a female headmaster 

accused of kicking school girls out of class for wearing the hijab. 

After each of the accused was executed, the verdicts were posted 

on JamaatShariat.com as a warning to those who would dare noncompliance with Shariah. “V Vilaiyate Dagestan progovoren Shariatskom sudom i unichtozhen vrag Allakha Shagidkhanov Salimkhan,” JamaatShariat.com, August 10, 2010, 13:56, available from 

www.jamaatshariat.com/new/15-new/1095-2010-08-10-10-58-30.html; 

and “Zayavlenie Spetsial’noi operativnoi gruppy mudzhakhidov dagestanskogo fronta: Prigovor priveden v ispolnenie,” 

Jamaat Shariat.com, September 25, 2010, 15:24, available from www.

jamaatshariat.com/new/15-new/1298-2010-09-25-12-47-36.html.

16. “Otvety na voprosy k”adiya Imarata Kavkaz, amira

Ob”edinennogo Vilaiyata Kabardy, Balkarii i Karachya, Saiful-
70

lakha,” Islamdin.com, December 12, 2010, 14:54, available from 

www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article

&id=594:2009-12-12-14-58-15&catid=27:2009-02-09-17-38-

17&Itemid=16.

17. “Amir Saifullakh o knige sheikha Abu Mukhammada al’ 

Makdisi ‘Milleti Ibrakhim’,” and “Otvety na voprosy k’adiya Imarata Kavkaz, amira Ob’edinennogo Vilaiyata Kabardy, Balkarii i 

Karachaya, Saifullakha.”

18. See, for example, the writings of Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, Aleksandr Tikhomirov, the CE’s leading propagandist 

and operative for suicide bombings in 2008 and 2009, especially: 

Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi 

Istiny i lzhi,” Hunafa.info, May 30, 2009, 1:01, available from 

hunafa.com??p=1534; and Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na 

Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi istiny i lzhi, Chast’ 2,” Hunafa.info, June 

24, 2009, 4:04, available from hunafa.info/?p=1715. See also the final 

istishkhad testament of his student, “Zaveshchanie Abdul-Malika: 

‘Ya ukhozhu na Istishkhad, chtoby pozhertvovat’ svoei dushoi vo 

imya Allakha!’,” Kavkaz tsentr, July 29, 2010, 12:04, available from 

www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/07/29/74167.shtml.

19. In 2002, the ChRI’s jihadist wing had convinced 

Maskhadov of the need to jihadize the ChRI’s constitution and 

expand their operations across the North Caucasus and Russia. 

“Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: ‘Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,” KavkazInform.com, 

May 27, 2010, 05:13, available from www.kavkazinform.com/2011-

05-27-02-00-06/3-2011-05-27-05-14-31.html. The first result was the 

October 2002 Dubrovka Theatre hostage taking. According to a 

CE biography of the late Dagestan amir and CE Shariah Court 

“qadi” (chief magistrate) Magomedali Vagabov, a.k.a. Seifullah 

Gubdenskii, in autumn 2003 Vagabov and his fellow mujahedin 

wanted to go to Chechnya and to fight but were ordered to remain near Khasavyurt, Dagestan, “in connection with a decision 

of Maskhadov and Basaev to spread combat to the entire territory of 

the Caucasus” (my italics), “Amir Dagestanskogo Fronta i K”adii 

Imarata Kavkaz Saifullakh. Chast’ 2—Dzhikhad,” Jamaat Shariat.

com, August 13, 2010, 02:50, available from jamaatshariat.com/ru/-

mainmenu-29/14-facty/1105--2-.html. For the interview of Ichkeria 

Republic President Aslan Maskhadov and Chairman of the Shar-
71

iat Committee of Ichkeria Republic’s State Defense Committee 

Abdul-Khalim, Sadulaev, see “’My perenosim voinu na territoriyu vraga. . . .’,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, August 1, 2004, 13:09:21, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2004/08/01/24101.shtml. In 

an August 1, 2004, interview Maskhadov portrayed himself as a 

devout Muslim but purely nationalist freedom fighter, but he also 

publicly supported the creation of a broad Muslim cohort of insurgents for actions throughout the North Caucasus, and indeed 

all of Russia. Seated next to his designated successor and ChRI 

Shariah Court Chairman Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev for a joint interview, Maskhadov warned: “We are capable of carrying out such 

operations in Ichkeria, Ingushetiya and Russia, and we will prove 

it.” See “’My perenosim voinu na territoriyu vraga. . .’,” KavkazTsentr, August 1, 2004, 13:09:21, available from www.kavkazcenter.

com/russ/content/2004/08/01/24101.shtml. After Maskhadov’s death 

in March 2005, new ChRI president Sadulaev created the North 

Caucasus and Dagestan Fronts in May 2005, demonstrating his 

intent to spread the jihad across the North Caucasus. The North 

Caucasus Front included Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria Sectors. See “ukazom Prezidenta ChRI Sadulaeva sozdan Kavkazskii 

front,” Kavkaz tsentr, May 16, 2005, 00:54:35, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2005/05/16/33965.shtml. Upon his 

succession of Sadulaev in June 2006, Umarov created the Volga 

and Urals Fronts in order to target Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and 

other Russian Federation regions with significant Muslim Tatar 

and Bashkir populations. See “Prezident ChRI podpisal ukazy 

o sozdanii Uralskogo i Povolzhskgo frontov,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, 

July 9, 2007, 14:34, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2006/07/09/45779.shtml. In January 2006, Basaev, encouraged by Kabardin mujahedin like Anzor Astemirov and Musa 

Mukozhev, convinced ChRI president Sadulaev to create a council of ulema, Islamic scholars, in preparation for the declaration of 

the Caucasus Emirate (CE), but Sadulaev and Basaev were killed 

in June and July, respectively, leaving the task to Umarov. “Amir 

Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: ‘Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili 

Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim.”

20. For the full declaration, see “Ofitsial’nyi reliz zayavleniya Amira Dokki Umarova o provozglashenii Kavkazskogo 

Emirata,” Kavkaz tsentr, November 21, 2007, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/11/21/54480.shtml; and “Komu 

vygodna provokatsiay pod nazvaniem ‘Kavkazskii Emirat’,” 
72

Chechenpress.org, October 29, 2007, available from www.chechenpress.org/events/2007/10/29/04.shtml.

21. “Amir Dokku Abu Usman o bin Ladene, Imarate Kavkaz I poteryakh modzhakhedov,” Kavkaz tsentr, May 17, 

2011, 00:01, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/

2011/05/17/81607.shtml. The English translation is available from 

www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2011/05/17/14313.shtml.

22. See, for example, Testimony of Miriam Lanskoy, “Human Rights in the North Caucasus,” Tom Lantos Human Rights 

Commission, U.S. Congress, April 15, 2011, available from tlhrc.

house.gov/docs/transcripts/2011_04_15_North_Caucasus/Lanskoy_

Testimony.pdf; “Miriam Lanskaya o terakte v Domodedovo i momente istiny,” Caucasus Times, February 2, 2011, available from 

www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20748; Robert Pape, Lindsey 

O’Rourke, and Jenna McDermit, “What Makes Chechen Women 

So Dangerous?” New York Times, March 31, 2010; and Mairbek 

Vatchagaev, “Arrests in Europe Place 100,000 Member Chechen 

Diaspora in the Spotlight,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 215, December 2, 2010, 01:13, available from 

www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%

5D=37230&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=85a84a8365.

23. “Ofitsial’nyi reliz zayavleniya Amira Dokki Umarova 

o provozglashenii Kavkazskogo Emirata,” and “Obrashchenie 

amira IK Dokku Abu Usman k musulmanam Egipta i Tunis,” JamaatShariat.com, available from www.jamaatshariat.com.

24. “Raz’yasnenie Amira IK Dokku Abu Usman v svyazi s fitnoi sredi modzhakhedov,” Kavkaz tsentr, October 18, 

2010, 12:51, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content

/2010/10/18/75902.shtml.

25. Abu-t-Tanvir Kavkazskii, “Vchera, segodnya, zavtra . . . ,”

Hunafa.com, April 24, 2010, 11:23, available from hunafa.

com/?p=3451.

26. “Stennogramma video: Kadii IK Abu Mukhammad—

‘Otvety na voprosy’—1 chast’,” Guraba.info, July 8, 2011, 00:18, 

available from guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1117--

i-q-q-1-.html; and VDagestan.info, July 8, 2011, available from 
73

vdagestan.info/2011/07/08/%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b

8%d0%b9-%d0%b8%d0%ba-%d0%b0%d0%b1%d1%83-%d0

%bc%d1%83%d1%85i%d0%b0%d0%bc%d0%bc%d0%b0%d

0%b4-%d0%be%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%b5%d1%82%d1%8b-

%d0%bd%d0%b0-%d0%b2%d0%be%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be/.

27. The CE’s DV mujahedin provided a somewhat explicit description of this strategy in “Perekhvat initsiativy,” Jamaat Shariat, 

June 2, 2010, 03:29, available from www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/-

mainmenu-29/14--/834-2010-06-02-03-05-02.html.

28. “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usman: ‘My osvobodim Krasnodarskii krai, Astrakhan i Povolzhskii zemli . . .”, 

Kavkaz tsentr, March 8, 2010, 11:38, available from www.kavkazcenter.

com/russ/content/2010/03/08/71087.shtml.

29. These include, according to my own estimate, some 30 in 

the last 2 months of 2007, 373 in 2008, 511 in 2009, 583 in 2010, and 

some 300 in the first 5 months of 2011.

30. Gordon M. Hahn, “The Caucasus Emirate’s ‘Year of the 

Offensive’ in Figures: Data and Analysis of the Caucasus Emirate’s Terrorist Activity in 2009,” Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report (henceforth IIPER), No. 7, January 18, 2010; Gordon M. 

Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009,” IIPER, No. 8, February 5, 2010; Gordon M. 

Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statistics,” IIPER, No. 33, January 26, 2011; and Gordon M. Hahn, “CEAffiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Resulting Casualties from January Through June 2011,” IIPER, No. 44, 

August 12, 2011, all available from www.miis.edu/academics/faculty

/ghahn/report.

31. “Fatalities by Year and Month as Part of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in All Theatres of Operation,” Icasulaties.org, 

available from icasualties.org/oef/ByMonth.aspx; “Operation Enduring Freedom: U.S. Wounded Totals,” Icasualties.org, available 

from icasualties.org/OEF/USCasualtiesByState.aspx.

32. See the video “Majlis al-Shura of the Caucasus Emirate—25 

April 2009,” You Tube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=DQQKPNfmo1U. 

For the English translation of Umarov’s post-Shura declaration 
74

with a link to his downloadable video statement in Russian, see 

“Amir Dokka Abu Usman: ‘This Year Will Be Our Offensive 

Year’,” Kavkaz tsentr, May 17, 2009, 15:17, available from www.

kavkaz.tv/eng/content/2009/05/17/10700.shtml.

33. See, for example, Said Abu Saad, Buryatskii, “Istishkhad 

mezhdu pravdoi i lozh’yu,” Hunafa.com, December 9, 2009, 1:01, 

available from hunafa.com/?p=2514; “Said abu Saad. Ob rezultatakh operatsii v Nazrani 17 avgusta 2009g,” Hunafa.com, September 7, 2009, 11:23, available from hunafa.com/?p=1984; Said 

Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi Istiny i lzhi,” Hunafa.info, May 30, 2009, 1:01, available from hunafa.

com??p=1534; Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad 

iznutri: Geroi istiny i lzhi, Chast’ 2,” Hunafa.info, June 24, 2009, 

4:04, available from hunafa.info/?p=1715; and “Said Abu Saad. 

Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi Istiny i lzhi, Chast’ 3,” 

Hunafa.com, July 24, 2009, 1:01, available from hunafa.com??p=1855.

34. Umarov appeared in a videotape released shortly after 

the bombing along with the Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs Brigade's 

(RSMB) amir Khamzat and the suicide bomber, Magomed Yevloev, before the latter was dispatched to Moscow. See “Video: 

Amir Imarata Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usman posetil bazu Brigady 

Shakhidov Riyadus Salikhin i sdelal zayavlenie,” Kavkaz tsentr, 

February 4, 2011, 23:18, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2011/02/04/78877.shtml; and “Obrashchenie amira Imarata 

Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usman v svyazi s Shakhidskoi operatsiei v 

Moskve 24 yanvarya 2011 goda” at “Amir Dokku Abu Usman: 

‘Spetsoperatsiya v Moskve byla provedena po moemu prikazu’,” 

Kavkaz tsentr, February 7, 2011, 22:58, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/02/07/78967.shtml. 

35. Then U.S. State Department Deputy Chief for C.I.S. Affairs Stephen Sestanovich told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in his November 1999 testimony: “Chechen insurgents are 

receiving help from radical groups in other countries, including 

Osama bin Laden’s network and others who have attacked or 

threatened Americans and American interests.” See “Text: Sestanovich Statement on Chechnya to Senate Committee, November 

4,” GlobalSecurity.com, USIS Washington File, November 4, 1999; 

and www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1999/11/991104-

chechen-usia1.htm. See also then U.S. National Security Council 
75

adviser Richard Clarke’s comments regarding ChRI-AQ ties on 

the Charlie Rose Show, PBS, November 30, 1999, available from 

www.charlierose.com/view/interview/3968; and then U.S. Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Director Joseph Bodansky’s comments on ChRI-AQ ties in Joseph 

Bodansky, “Chechnya: The Mujahedin Factor,” Freeman.org, 1999, 

available from www.freeman.org/m_online/bodansky/chechnya.htm.

36. Defense Intelligence Agency Declassified Swift Knight 

Report, Document No. 3095345, no date, Judicial Watch, available 

from www.judicialwatch.org/cases/102/dia.pdf.

37. Ibid., p. 4.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

40. Ibid., p. 5.

41. On Al-Haramain, see “Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation 

v. United States Department of the Treasury, Hearing No. 10-

350,” Ninth Circuit Court, March 9, 2011, available from www.ca9.

uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000007126; and the

U.S. government’s sentencing memorandum, evidentiary exhibits, and a Russian FSB officer’s testimony about al-Haramian’s 

assistance to Chechen and Dagestani mujahedin in “United 

States of America v. Perouz Sedaghaty, Case No. 05-CR-60008-

HO,” United States District Court for the State of Oregon, November 23, 2010, available from the Investigative Project, www.

investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1422.pdf#page=65.

42. See Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Robert Walker’s “Affidavit in Support of Complaint Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. and Emman M. Arnout, a.k.a. Abu 

Mahmood, a.k.a. Abdel Samia,” April 29, 2002, in the 2002 case, 

“The United States of America v. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. and Emman M. Arnout,” Investigative Project, p. 3, 

available from www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/94.

pdf (henceforth Walker Affadavit).
76

43. “Treasury Designates Benevolence International Foundation and Related Entities as Financiers of Terrorism,” Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Public Affairs, PO3632, November 19, 2002, available from www.investigativeproject.

org/documents/case_docs/1176.pdf.

44. Walker Affidavit, p. 3.

45. Walker Affidavit, pp. 3, 24-28.

46. One disc of videos was viewed by the author and deposited by him in the archives at the Hoover Institution, Stanford 

University.

47. “Indictment in United States of America v. Babar Ahmad, 

aka Babar Ahmed, and Azzam Publications,” Investigative Project, no date, pp. 1, 5-9, and 12-13, available from www.investigative

project.org/documents/case_docs/96.pdf.

48. Walker Affidavit, pp. 24-28.

49. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 180; and S. 

Pryganov, Vtorzhenie v Rossiyu, Moscow, Russia: Eksprint, 2003, 

pp. 189-90.

50. “Chechen commander Basayev vows more attacks,” BBC 

Monitoring, in Johnson’s Russia List, November 2, 2004, citing 

Kavkaz tsentr; see also The Globe and Mail, November 2, 2004, available from www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/

LAC/20041102/CHECHEN02/TPInternational/?query=basayev.

51. “Militants Target Arabs in Massive Fundraising Campaign 

for Chechen Insurgents,” Transnational Security Issues Report, December 13, 2007; and “Amir Seifullakh Gubdenskii, (ra): Ot togo, 

chto my zdes’ voyuem, my nichego ne vyigraem,” JamaatShariat.

com, November 12, 2010, 05:17, available from www.jamaatshariat.

com/-mainmenu-29/14-facty/1345-2010-11-12-02-18-12.html.

52. Swift Knight Report, p. 3.

53. Ibid., p. 5.
77

54. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 179.

55. RFERL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 60, March 28, 2003; RFERL 

Russian Federation Report, Vol. 4, No. 14, April 17, 2002; “Russia’s ‘Taliban’ Faces Uneasy Future after Guantanamo Torment,” 

AFP, August 1, 2004; and Regions.ru, March 27, 2003, available 

from www.regions.ru.

56. The account does not make it precisely clear whether Vagabov himself went to Afghanistan. “Amir Dagestanskogo Fronta 

i K adii Imarata Kavkaz Saifullakh. Chast’ 2—Dzhikhad.” Jamaat 

Shariat, August 13, 2010, 02:50, available from jamaatshariat.com/

ru/-mainmenu-29/14-facty/1105--2-.html.

57. “Czech Police Arrest Suspected Russia’s North Caucasus 

Terrorists,” BNO News, May 3, 2011, 2:27, available from wireupdate.com/wires/17128/czech-police-arrest-suspected-russias-north-caucasus-terrorists/.

58. The Bulgar Jamaat’s Russian-language website is available from tawba.info or jamaatbulgar.narod.ru. For the call for jihad against Russia, see “Obrashchenie Dzhamaata Bulgar k 

Musul’manam Rossii, Jammat Bulgar,” February 28, 2009, available from jamaatbulgar.narod.ru/statiy/v1_28-02-09.htm. See also 

Laith Alkhouri, “’Jamaat Bulgar’ Website—‘About Us’ Section—

Provides Background Information on Ties to Taliban, Tactics,” 

Flashpoint Intel, April 29, 2010, available from www.flashpoint-intel.

com/images/documents/pdf/0410/flashpoint_jamaatbulgaraboutus.pdf.

59. Brian Glynn Williams, “Shattering the Al-Qaeda-Chechen 

Myth,” Jamestown Foundation Chechen Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 40, November 6, 2003; Brian Glyn Williams, “Allah’s Foot Soldiers: An 

Assessment of the Role of Foreign Fighters and Al-Qa-ida in the 

Chechen Insurgency,” in Moshe Gammer, ed., Ethno-Nationalism, 

Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, London, 

UK: Routledge, 2007, pp. 156-78; and Brian Glynn Williams, Keynote Lecture, International Conference, “The Northern Caucasus: 

Russia’s Tinderbox,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, November 30-December 1, 2010.
78

60. This is according to Iraqi Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib. 

See “Iraq’s Al-Naqib—‘Terrorists’ From Chechnya, Sudan, and 

Syria Killed Arrested,” Beirut LBC SAT Television, 1300 GMT, January 30, 2005.

61. See Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 292.

62. The four were 18-year-old Sergey Viktorovich Vysotskiy, 

20-year-old Timur Vladimirovich Khozkov, 20-year-old Aslan Yerikovich Imkodzhayev, and a 20-year-old Dagestani national who 

calls himself Abu Abdul. “Vlasti Livana obvinyayut v terrorizme 

chetyrekh grazhdan Rossii,” Kavkaz uzel, October 5, 2007, available from www.kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/1198805.html;

and “Four Russian Citizens Accused of Terrorism in Lebanon,” Retwa.org, October 5, 2007, available from www.retwa.org/

home.cfm?articleId=4834, citing Kavkaz uzel, available from www.

kavkaz-uzel.ru.

63. Luiza Orazaeva, “NAK: ubityi v Kabardino-Balkarii boevik obuchalsya v Livane,” Kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 16, 2011, 21:45, 

available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/182411/.

64. Dagestani mujahed Yasin Rasulov has written convincingly about this in Yasin Rasulov, Dzhikhad na Severnom Kavkaze: 

storonniki i protivniki, Kavkaz tsentr, pp. 18-29 and 55-59, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/islam/jihad_in_ncaucasus/

PDF_version.pdf. Rasulov was killed by Russian forces in 2007; he 

uses reliable pre-communist Russian Muslim scholarly sources to 

document his claims.

65. The extent to which the Russian conquest and the Caucasus, especially Dagestani resistance in the 19th century, were 

marked by an intra-Caucasus struggle between gazavatists, defending local sovereignty and the customs of adat and Sufism, and 

pro-Shariah quasi-Islamists like Imam Shamil, Gazi Mukhammad, 

and Kuraly-Magoma, sometimes backed by the Iranian Shah, is 

often overlooked. See, for example, N. I. Pokrovskii, Kavkazskie 

Voiny i Imamat Shamilya, Moscow, Russia: ROSSPEN, 2009.

66. Rasulov, Dzhikhad na Severnom Kavkaze: storonniki i protivniki.
79

67. Olga Bobrova, “Imarat Kavkaz: Gosudarstvo kotorogo net,” Novaya gazeta, No. 27, March 17, 2010, available from 

www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/027/18.html; and Oleg Guseinov, 

“Stroite’stvo khrama Marii Magdaliny priostanovlena iz-za otsutsviya sredstv,” Gazeta yuga, April 21, 2005, available from www.

gazetayuga.ru/archive/2005/16.htm.

68. Aleksandr Zhukov, Kabardino-Balkariya: Na puti k katastofe, 

Legal Defense Center ‘Memorial’, Kavkaz uzel, Appendix 9, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/analyticstext/analytics/id/1231255.

html; Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, pp. 152-65; “Amir Seifullah o 

protsesse podgotovki k provoglasheniyu Kavkazskogo Emirata”; 

Gordon M. Hahn, “Profile of ‘Seifullah’ Anzor Astemirov, Part 3: 

Astemirov and the Caucasus Emirate,” IIPER, No. 23, September 

13, 2010, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/21434/original/

kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_23_sept_2010.pdf; “Amir Seifullah: ‘Pobeda ot Allakha, tak zhe kak i porazhenie’,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, May 

29, 2006, 03:34, and May 30, 2006, 04:34, available from www.

kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2006/05/29/44895; Aleksandr Zhukov,

“Religioznyi raskol i politicheskoe reshenie,” Polit.ru, May 18, 

2006, 08:25, available from www.polit.ru/analytics/2006/05/18/

kanokov.html.

69. “Amir Seifullah o protsesse podgotovki k provoglasheniyu Kavkazskogo Emirata”; Hahn, “Profile of ‘Seifullah’ Anzor 

Astemirov, Part 3: Astemirov and the Caucasus Emirate”; and 

“Shamil sprosil menya: ‘Kogda stanesh’ Amirom, ty ob’ yavish’ 

Imarat?’,” Kavkaz tsentr, August 30, 2011, 02:19, available from 

www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/08/30/84755.shtml.

70. “Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Sheikh Said Abu Sadd al-Buryatii-Said Buryatskii,” Kavkaz uzel, August 17, 2009, 17:02, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/158565; and “Kadyrov nazval Saida Buryatskogo ‘ideologom terakta, nakachivayushchim 

smertnikov tabletkami,” July 30, 2009, 11:39, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/07/30/67080.shtml; and Said Abu

Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi Istiny 

i lzhi,” Hunafa.info, May 30, 2009, 1:01, available from hunafa.

com??p=1534.
80

71. Ibid. One source reports that Buryatskii supposedly visited the North Caucasus as early as the late 1990s and at that time 

declared his loyalty to the mujahedin before he traveled to Egypt 

and other countries in the Middle East to receive a “Wahhabist” 

education. Alena Larina, “Poslednii spektakl’,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 

March 5, 2010, available from www.rg.ru/2010/03/05/said-bur-site.

html. Buryatskii’s conversion and radicalization might have been 

connected to his relationship with Bakhtiyar Umarov, no relation 

to the CE’s amir, a local imam in Ulan-Ude formerly from Uzbekistan. In November 2008, Bakhtiyar Umarov was arrested in 

Russia, charged with having ties to the radical international Islamist party, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami’, and had his recently granted 

Russian passport confiscated. The CE-affiliated site Kavkaz tsentr

claimed locals were sure imam Umarov’s arrest was a consequence of his association with Buryatskii. “Buryatiya. Arestovan 

znakomyi Sheikha Saida Burtaskogo imam Bakhtiyar Umarov,” 

Kavkaz tsentr, November 21, 2008, 07:53, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/11/21/62314.shtml.

72. Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: 

Geroi istiny i lzhi, Chast’ 2,” Hunafa.info, June 24, 2009, 4:04, available from hunafa.info/?p=1715.

73. “Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Sheikh Said Abu Sadd al-Buryatii—Said Buryatskii.”

74. Buryatskii, “Vzglyad na Dzhikhad iznutri: Geroi istiny 

i lzhi, Chast’ 2”; Video “How I went to Jihad and What I have 

seen here (English subtitles)—Sheikh Sayeed of Buratia 1,” ‘i24 

sishan tschetschenien jihad islam nasheed qoqaz kaukasus’, You Tube, 

June 17, 2009, www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgE19xcasEg; Said Abu 

Saad, Buryatskii, “Said Buryatskii: ‘Vzglyad na dzhikhad isnutri, po proshestvii goda,” Imam TV, May 18, 2009, http://imamtv.

com/news-18-05-1009.htm citing Hunafa.com; and “Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Sheikh Said Abu Saad al-Buryatii—Said Buryatskii.”

75. Hahn, “The Caucasus Emirate’s ‘Year of the Offensive’ in 

Figures: Data and Analysis of the Caucasus Emirate’s Terrorist 

Activity in 2009”; and Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus 

Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009.”
81

76. On these ethnic Slav CE operatives and their terrorist attacks and plots, see Gordon M. Hahn, “Alleged Russian Jihadi 

Suicide Bomber Viktor Dvorakovskii Captured,” IIPER, No. 43, 

July 21, 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/21196/

original/KAVKAZJIHAD_MonTREP_IIPER_20_Aug2010.pdf; Gordon M. Hahn, “Kosolapov Re-emerges Ahead of Peak Jihadi 

Fighting Season,” IIPER, No. 41, May 27, 2011, available from 

www.miis.edu/media/view/23146/original/kavkazjihad_montrep_

iiper_41_june_2011.pdf; and Gordon M. Hahn, “Two More Suicide 

Bombings,” IIPER, No. 35, February 18, 2011, available from www.

miis.edu/media/view/22492/original/kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_35_

feb_2011.pdf.

77. “Amir Dagestanskogo Fronta i K’adii Imarata Kavkaz 

Saifullakh. Chast’ 1—Do Dzhikhada,” Jamaat Shariat, August 

8, 2010, 21:58, available from jamaatshariat.com/ru/fakty/29-

facty/1089-2010-08-08-21-40-39.html.

78. “Amir Dagestanskogo Fronta i K’adii Imarata Kavkaz 

Saifullakh. Chast’ 2—Dzhikhad,” Jamaat Shariat, August 13, 

2010, 02:50, available from jamaatshariat.com/ru/-mainmenu-29/14-

facty/1105--2-.html.

79. Leading jihadism expert Evan Kohlmann describes Ansar 

as “self-selecting form of internet-based terrorism,” “promoting 

the mission of al-Qa`ida” and “loyal” to AQ. Evan Kohlmann, “A 

Beacon for Extremists: The Ansar al-Mujahideen Web Forum,” 

CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 2, February 2010, pp. 1-4, available 

from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-beacon-for-extremists-the-ansar-almujahideen-web-forum.

80. “Hammer Time: Ansar al-Mujahideen Webmaster Arrested!,” Jawa Report, August 31, 2010, available from mypetjawa.

mu.nu/archives/203766.php.

81. “Fairfax County Man Accused of Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” U.S. Attorney General’s Office, July 21, 2010, 

available from www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFA

rchive/10/20100721chessernr.html; and “Hammer Time: Ansar alMujahideen Webmaster Arrested!”
82

82. “Hammer Time: Ansar al-Mujahideen Webmaster Arrested!”

83. Kohlmann, “A Beacon for Extremists: The Ansar al-Mujahideen Web Forum.”

84. “Announcing the Start of a New Campaign in Support of 

the Caucasus Emirate,” Alqimmah.net, December 5, 2010, available 

from www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=21139&goto=nextoldest.

85. “V global’noi seti interneta otkrylsya novyi forum v 

podderzhku Dzhikhada,” Islamdin, July 20, 2010, 16:18, available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view

=article&id=849:2010-07-20-16-49-47&catid=32:2009-03-05-23-19-

06&Itemid=29.

86. According to the Spanish Civil Guard, Errai registered 

and paid for the hosting of the site for purposes of spreading jihadi propaganda and indoctrinating and recruiting sympathizers 

to radical Islamism and jihad. “Another Online Jihadi Arrested in 

Spain,” Jawa Report, August 31, 2010, available from mypetjawa.

mu.nu/archives/203757.php.

87. Awlaki proposes creation of fee-free and uncensored discussion fora, lists of e-mail addresses so Muslims interested in jihad 

can contact each other and exchange information, online publications and distribution of literature and news of the jihad, and sites 

which focus on separate aspects of the jihad. He urges Muslims to 

follow the events of the jihad because it “enlivens our connection 

to the jihad”; “strengthens our belongingness to the Umma”; “approves our joining the jihad”; “inflames our desire to receive martyrdom”; allows Muslims “to see how Allah defends his slaves 

and leads them to victory”; provides “practical examples on how 

our brothers are applying theory in contemporary conditions”; 

and “strengthens our attention to the Koran,” to which strengthened ties “[reach their] peak when we ourselves participate in this 

conflict, jihad, entering the ranks of the mujahedin.” “V global’noi 

seti interneta otkrylsya novyi forum v podderzhku Dzhikhada,” 

Islamdin.com, July 20, 2010, 16:18, available from www.islamdin.

com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=849:2010-07-

20-16-49-47&catid=32:2009-03-05-23-19-06&Itemid=29.
83

88. “Imam Anuar al’ Aulyaki: Al-Dzhanna—Chast 1,” 

Islamdin.com, July 25, 2010, 06:09, available from www.

islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=854:-

q-q-1&catid=4:2009-02-04-14-07-09&Itemid=28; and Anwar Al-Awlaki, “Akhira: Sudnyi den i Ognennyi ad,” Islamdin.com, March 

25, 22:45, available from www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=1084:2011-03-25-22-51-31&catid=4:2009-

02-04-14-07-09&Itemid=28.

89. Abdallakh Shamil Abu-Idris, “My odrerzhali strategicheskyu pobedu,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, January 9, 2006, 08:47:10, 

available from www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2006/01/09/40869.

shtml.

90. “Prezident ChRI podpisal ukazy o sozdanii Uralskogo i 

Povolzhskgo frontov,” Kavkaz-Tsentr, July 9, 2007, 14:34, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2006/07/09/45779.shtml.

91. A group of Tatar “garage jihadists,” the so-called “Islamic 

Jamaat,” was allegedly formed in Tatarstan by ethnic Tatars before it was uncovered and its members tried, convicted, and sentenced to various prison sentences in 2008. However, there was 

no evidence of ties to the CE. Irina Borogan, “Dzhamaat v dva 

khoda,” Novaya gazeta, No. 9, February 7, 2008, p. 10, available 

from www.novayagazeta.ru/data/09/10.html.

92. Marat Gareev and El’vira Mirgaziyanova, “Krupnyie terakty gotovilis’ i v Bashkirii,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 29, 

2010, available from www.kp.ru/daily/24463.5/624739/.

93. “V Bashkirii ‘shyut’ delo ‘Uiguro-Bulgarskogo dzhamaata,’” Islam.ru, April 29, 2009, available from www.islam.ru/rus/2009-

04-29/. Dorokhov was killed when he allegedly offered resistance 

during a search of his residence. His colleague, Rustem Zainagutdinov was sentenced to 15 years for planning to blow up a barrier 

separating a water supply tank and an ammonia tank, attack a 

traffic police post and seize weapons, and seize the Salavat city’s 

FSB building. Stanislav Shakhov and Ivan Panfilov, “KP: V Bashkirii obezvrezhen terroristicheskii Uiguro-Bulgarskii dzhamaat,” 

TsentrAzii, March 29, 2010, 09:30, available from www.centrasia.ru/

newsA.php?st=1269840600.
84

94. In March 2010, after a group of armed men attacked a 

food store in Oktyabrskii District, Bashkortostan, wounding two 

seriously, the Bashkortostan Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) 

mounted an operation, eventually capturing a group of 10 Bashkir and two Ingush mujahedin said to be providing funds to the 

CE and led by one Bashir Allautdinovich Pliev (born 1966) from 

Ingushetia. “V Bashkirii zaderzhany 8 chlenov religiozno-ekstremistckogo bandpodpol’ya,” Regnum.ru, March 29, 2010, 10:27, 

available from www.regnum.ru/news/1267599.html; and “Uderzhan esho odin uchastnik ekstrimistskogo bandpodpol’ya,” 

Regnum.ru, April 1, 2010, 19:04, available from www.regnum.ru/

news/fd-volga/bash/1269348.html. In July another jihadi jamaat was 

allegedly involved in a series of attacks on police and planning 

some 18 more, including on gas pipelines, in Bashkortostan, and 

perm Oblast. “Obstrelyavshikh post DPS ishchet polk militsii,” 

Lifenews.ru, July 4, 2010, 16:55, and July 5, 2010, 20:06, lifenews.

ru/news/30293, 08:25, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2010/07/05/73590.shtml; “V Bashkortostane atakovan blokpost okkupatsionnoi bandy DPS,” Kavkaz tsentr, July 5, 2010, 

00:20; “Viktor Palagin: ‘Ekstremistov vovse ne shef FSB pridumal,” MediaKorSet, December 16, 2011, 21:43, available from www.

mkset.ru/news/person/13353/; and Tatyana Maiorov, “V Bashkirr 

minuvshim letom predotvratili neskol’ko teraktov,” Rossiiskaya 

gazeta, December 17, 2010, available from www.rg.ru/2010/12/17/

reg-bashkortostan/fsb-anons.html. In February 2011, another group 

of four mujahedin was uncovered in the Oktyabrskii District of 

Bashkiriya. Its members were charged with illegal weapons possession and illegal production of and intent to use explosives. 

They were said to have “extremist literature,” and the official arrest report stated that one of the arrestees was the amir of the 

“Oktyabrskii Jamaat” and that the jamaat was part of the CE. “Alleged Islamic Extremists Detained In Russia’s Bashkortostan,” 

RFERL, February 8, 2011, available from www.rferl.org/content/

bashkortostan_islamists/2301430.html. In Tatarstan, a jihadist cell 

allegedly tied to Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami was uncovered and destroyed in November 2010. “Likvidirovannnyie v Tatarstane terroristy byli islamistami,” Regnum.ru, November 25, 2010, 14:48, 

available from www.regnum.ru/news/fd-volga/tatarstan/1350137.

html. A series of incidents involving alleged mujahedin occurred in Astrakhan in late 2010 and early 2011. See Gordon M. 
85

Hahn, “More Evidence of Jihadism in Astrakhan,” IIPER, No. 

41, May 27, 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/23146/

original/kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_41_june_2011.pdf; and Gordon 

M. Hahn, “Is There an Astrakhan Jamaat?,” IIPER, No. 36, March 

11, 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/22714/original/

kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_36_mar_2011.pdf. 

95. “Zayavlenie o granitsakh vilaiyat Idel-Ural,” Kavkaz tsentr, 

January 26, 2011, 21:12, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2011/01/26/78553.shtml; and “Pis’mo v redaktsiyu: Obrashchenie modzhakhedov Idel-Ural k modzhakhedam Imarata 

Kavkaz,” Kavkaz tsentr, February 1, 2011, 00:03, available from 

www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/02/01/78726.shtml. 

96. The failed 2010 New Year’s Eve Moscow plot involved 

several Stavropol residents, who, in turn, were friends or acquaintances with several ethnic Russian mujahedin who converted to 

Islam, including the abovementioned ethnic Russian, Islamic-convert couple, Vitalii Razdobudko and Marina Khorosheva, who 

carried out separate suicide bombings in Gubden, Dagestan, on 

February 14, 2011, and Viktor Dvorakovskii, who was wanted for 

5 months and finally captured in July 2011.

97. Video “Shura amirov Dagestana. Bayat Amira Dagestana 

Khasana, October 19, 2010,” JamaatShariat.com, December 1, 2010, 

available from www.jamaatshariat.com/ru; and Kavkaz tsentr, December 1, 2010, available from www.kavkazcenter.com.

98. “Press-Sluzhba Amira DF: My gordy uchasti nashikh 

brat’ev, nashi ubityie—v Rayu, vashi—c Adu,” Jamaat Shariat, 

August 22, 2010, 17:53, available from jamaatshariat.com/-mainmenu-29/14-facty/1152-2010-08-22-17-00-31.html.

99. Sochi and the southern Krasnodar are native lands of 

ethnic Circassian Adygs; the Kabards, and Cherkess of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya 

(KChR) respectively, are also Circassian ethnic groups. The locus 

for much of the Olympic Games is located on Red Hill, known as 

the spot of the last battle of the Circassians against the Russians, 

which ended in their defeat and eventual deportation and exile of 

many Circassians abroad.
86

100. The attacks included a truck bomb targeting a resort hotel that was uncovered and disarmed and the bombing of support pillars for a ski lift that brought down over 40 of its cabins 

and necessitated closure of the resort for several days. See Gordon M. Hahn, “The OVKBK’s Sochi Vector,” IIPER, No. 36, March 

11, 2011, available from www.miis.edu/media/view/22714/original/

kavkazjihad_montrep_iiper_36_mar_2011.pdf.

101. CE maps depict the future emirate’s territory as comprising the entire North Caucasus, including predominantly ethnicRussian populated regions like the abovementioned Krasnodar 

and Stavropol Territories. But both Russian territory north of the 

CE’s North Caucasus and the Transcaucasus south of the North 

Caucasus—that is, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—are labeled “occupied Muslim lands.” See “Ideyu otdeleniya Kavkaz est 

smysli obsuzhdat,’ chtoby lishit’ islamistov znameni borby . . .!,”

Kavkaz tsentr, February 12, 2011, 11:15, available from www.

kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/02/12/79121.shtml; and “Posol 

SShA v Moskve o neizbezhnom ob”edinenie musul’man Severnogo Kavkaza,” Kavkaz tsentr, December 6, 2010, 09:18, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/12/06/77052.shtml.

102. Likely CE mujahedin from Dagestan have been crossing 

Azerbaijan’s border recently, engag ing battle in the north with 

Baku’s army and police. A recent indigenous jihadist attack on 

Baku’s Shiite-led Juma mosque underscores the point. An armed 

Wahhabi group led by a former Azeri army officer Kyamran Asadov was uncovered in October 2007 plotting to attack state institutions and blow up U.S. and other Western embassies in Azerbaijan. In 2008, a jihadist group previously active in Chechnya 

and Dagestan was uncovered in Baku by Azeri intelligence.

103. Video, “Shura amirov Dagestana,” Bayat Amira Dagestana Khasana, October 19, 2010.”

104. Rose revolution leaders and former Saakashvili allies, such as the former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze 

and former Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili, have claimed 

that Tbilisi has been training Ingush mujahedin and that Georgian banks have facilitated money transfers to the Caucasus 

mujahedin. “Burjanadze Talks About Danger of one more War 
87

from Russia,” Georgian Journal, October 21, 2010, available from 

georgianjournal.ge/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i

d=664:burjanadze-talks-about-danger-of-one-more-war-from-russia-

&catid=9:news&Itemid=8; and “Burjanadze Slams Visa Provocations,” Interfax, October 21, 2010, 19:01, available from www.

interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=2&id=197175. Former U.S. Foreign 

Service officer and U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee foreign policy analyst, James George Jatras claims that in December 

2009, a secret meeting took place in Tbilisi with “representatives 

of numerous jihad groups based in various Islamic and European 

countries for the purpose of coordinating their activities on Russia’s southern flank.” According to Jatras, “the meeting was organized under the auspices of high officials of the Georgian government.” Although Saakashvili did not attend, Georgian MVD 

officials and “others acted as hosts and coordinators,” and the 

Georgian ambassador to Kuwait “purportedly facilitated” the 

participants’ travel “from the Middle East.” Finally, “[I]n addition 

to ’military’ operations (i.e., attacks in southern Russia) special 

attention was given to ideological warfare, for example, launching of the Russian-language TV station ‘First Caucasus’.” James 

Jatras, “The Georgian Imbroglio—And a Choice for the United 

States,” America-Russia Net, February 14, 2010, available from 

www.america-russia.net/eng/face/236661338?user_session=4827e878c

0267ddbdd6ee738f8212f1d.

105. Saoud Mekhennet and Michael Moss, “Europeans Are 

Being Trained in Pakistani Terrorism Camps, Officials Fear,” New 

York Times, September 10, 2007, p. A8.

106. “IJU: Message from the Mujahideen of the Khorasan to the 

Caucasus Emirate,” Kavkaz Jihad Blogspot, March 14, 2011, available from kavkaz-jihad.blogspot.com/2011/03/message-of-mujahideenfrom-khorasan-to.html; and “Video Badr at-Tawheed ‘Mensaje de 

los mujahidines del Jorasán al Emirato del Cáucaso,” Jihad-e-Informacion, March 2011, available from jihad-e-informacion.blogspot.

com/2011/03/video-badr-at-tawheed-mensaje-de-los.html.

107. Ibid.

108. “Tadzhikistan: Shakhid atakoval bazu RUBOP Sogdiiskii oblasti,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 3, 2010, 11:39, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/09/03/75000.
88

shtml; and “Tadzhikistan: Otvetstvennost’ za Shakhidskuyu 

ataku v Khudzhande vzyala na sebya organizarsiya ‘Dzhamaat 

Ansarullakh’,” Kavkaz tsentr, September 8, 2010, 12:23, available 

from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/09/08/75108.shtml. 

On these attacks, see also “MVD Tadzhikistana: Pri vzryve u 

zdaniya ROBOP v Khudzhande pogib militsioner, smertnikov 

bylo neskol’ko,” Ferghana.ru, September 3, 2010, 14:26, available 

from www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=15461&mode=snews; “Perestrelka s beglymi zaklyuchennymi proizoshlo v Tadzhikistane, 

rossiiskie voennyie v operatsii ne uchastvuyut,” Materik, September 8, 2010, 11:21:16, available from materik.ru/rubric/detail.

php?ID=10653; “Tadzhikistan: Po faktu vzryva v nochnom klube 

v Dushanbe zaderzhany dvoe podzrevaemykh,” Ferghana.ru, 

September 6, 2010, 10:14, available from www.ferghana.ru/news.

php?id=15470&mode=snews; and “GKNB Tadzhikistana: Nochnoi 

vzryv v disko-klube ‘Dusti’—khuliganstvo, a ne terakt,” Ferghana.

ru, September 6, 2010, 13:57, available from www.ferghana.ru/news.

php?id=15475&mode=snews.

109. “Obraschenie Kazakhstanskogo dzhamaata ‘Ansaru-ddin’,” Hunafa.com, November 10, 2010, 1:01, available from hunafa.com/?p=3839; and “Vopros o zakonnosti voennikh deistvii v 

Kazakhstane,” Hunafa.com, March 18, 2011, 1:01, available from 

hunafa.com/?p=4831#more-4831; and “Vopros o zakonnosti 

voennikh deistvii v Kazakhstane,” Kavkaz tsentr, March 19, 

2011, 12:16, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/

2011/03/19/80081.shtml.

110. Kazakhstan has played down the terrorist and religious nature of the May 17, 2011 suicide bombing and May 24 

car bombing in Alma-Ata or the killing of several policemen 

on July 7 in Aqtobe. “Vakhkhabity Velikoi Stepi,” Nezavismaya gazeta—Religii, July 20, 2011, available from religion.ng.ru/

problems/2011-07-20/4_vahhabity.html; “Kazakhstan Suicide Bombing Puts Spotlight on Western Regions,” Eurasianet.org, May 

24, 2011, 2:10, available from www.eurasianet.org/node/63549; 

“Two die in Kazakhstan car blast,” AFP, May 24 2011, available 

from news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/two-die-in-kazakhstancar-blast-20110524-1f1zk.html; “Suicide Bomber has Shahid Belt in 

Blast in Kazakhstan,” RETWA, May 17, 2011, available from www.

retwa.com/home.cfm?articleId=11372; “Kazakh City Hit By Suicide 

Blast, First Known Attack Of Its Kind,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
89

Liberty, May 17, 2011, available from www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan_suicide_bomber/24177028.html; “Suicide bomber attacks Kazakh secret police HQ ,” Telegraph, May 17, 2011, available from 

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/kazakhstan/8518895/Suicide-bomber-attacks-Kazakh-secret-police-HQ.html; and “Blast Kills

Two Outside Kazakh Security Service Building,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 24, 2011 09:02, available from www.

rferl.org/content/blast_outside_security_service_building_kazakh_

capital/24184422.html.

111. “Modzhahedi Kyrgyzstana prisyagnuli Amiry Islamskogo Emirata Afghanistan Myllo Omary,” Kavkaz tsentr,

March 22, 2011, 12:51, availale from www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/

content/2011/03/22/80140.shtml. 

112. See Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, pp. 221-25; and Gordon 

M. Hahn, “Anti-Americanism, Anti-Westernism, and Anti-Semitism Among Russia’s Muslims,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 16, No. 1, 

Winter 2008, pp. 49-60. 

113. “Belgian Islamist Abou Imran, of Shariah4Belgium: We 

Will Conquer the White House, Europe Will Be Dominated by 

Islam,” MEMRI, #2695, November 9, 2010, 09:42, available from 

www.memritv.org/clip/en/2695.htm.

114. Stephen Castle, “Police Arrest Suspects in Plot Against 

Belgium,” New York Times, November 23, 2010, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/europe/24belgium.html; 

Philippe Siuberski, “Police arrest 11 over Belgium ‘terror plot’,” 

Agence France Presse, November 23, 2010, available from news.

yahoo.com/s/afp/20101123/wl_afp/belgiumnetherlandsgermany

securityattacks/print; and Philippe Siuberski, “Belgium arrests 26 

in raids against terror,” NineMSN, November 24, 2010, 06:13, 

available from news.ninemsn.com.au/world/8168623/10-held-overterror-plot-in-belgium.

115. Valentina Pop, “Chechen Terror Suspects Busted in Belgian Raid,” EU Observer, November 24, 2010, 09:29, available from 

euobserver.com/9/31341; and Olesya Khantsevich, “Chechenskoe 

podpol’e raskryto v Belgii,” Nezavsismaya gazeta, November 25, 

2010, available from www.ng.ru/world/2010-11-25/1_belgium.html.
90

116. Castle, “Police Arrest Suspects in Plot Against Belgium”; 

Siuberski, “Police arrest 11 over Belgium ‘terror plot’”; Siuberski, 

“Belgium arrests 26 in raids against terror”; Pop, “Chechen Terror 

Suspects Busted in Belgian Raid”; and Khantsevich, “Chechenskoe podpol’e raskryto v Belgii.”

117. “Austria arrests Chechen fugitive in Belgium plot,” AP, 

December 4, 2010, 8:51:46, available from www.themoscowtimes.

com/news/article/austria-arrests-chechen-in-belgian-nato-plot/425658.

html.

118. “Austrian police arrest Chechen over possible jihad 

attack on Belgian NATO facility,” Jihad Watch, December 4, 2010, 

available from www.jihadwatch.org/2010/12/austrian-police-arrestchechen-over-possible-jihad-attack-on-belgian-nato-base.

html; and “Austrian police hold Chechen in Belgian attack 

probe,” Expatica, December 4, 2010, available from www.expatica.

com/be/news/belgian-news/austrian-police-hold-chechen-in-belgiumattack-probe_115126.html, citing “Austrian police hold Chechen in 

Belgian attack probe,” Agence France Press, December 4, 2010.

119. “Suspected Terrorist: A Ghost in Neunkirchen,” Die 

Presse, December 5, 2010, 18:19, available from diepresse.com/home/

panorama/oesterreich/616045/Mutmasslicher-Terrorist_Ein-Phantomin-Neunkirchen?direct=611111&_vl_backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/index.do&selChannel=100.

120. “Qaeda Plans US, UK Christmas Attacks: Iraq Official,” 

Reuters, December 16, 2010, 3:35, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2010/12/16/us-iraq-qaeda-idUSTRE6BF3CR20101216.

121. “Obrashchenie musul’man Bel’gii k imamu Abu 

Mukhamammadu al’-Makdisi za naztavleniem,” Islamdin.com, 

June 22, 2010, 19:01, available from www.islamdin.com/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=814:2010-06-22-19-09-

08&catid=25:2009-02-09-17-15-12&Itemid=17.

122. Castle, “Police Arrest Suspects in Plot Against Belgium”; 

Siuberski, “Police arrest 11 over Belgium ‘terror plot’”; and Siuberski, “Belgium arrests 26 in raids against terror.”
91

123. “Czech Police Arrest Suspected Russia’s North Caucasus 

Terrorists,” BNO News, May 3, 2011, 2:27, available from wireupdate.

com/wires/17128/czech-police-arrest-suspected-russias-north-caucasusterrorists/.

124. “Policie stiha pet lidi z podpory terorismu,” Lydovki, 

Prague, May 3, 2011, 11:19 and 16:15, available from www.lidovky.

cz/tiskni.asp?r=ln_domov&c=A110503_111957_ln_domov_ape; and 

Christian Falvey, “Police uncover first case of a terrorist network operating in the Czech Republic, eight charged with aiding 

Dagestani Shariat Jamaat,” Radio Praha, May 4, 16:24, available 

from www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/police-uncover-first-case-of-aterrorist-network-operating-in-the-czech-republic-eight-charged-withaiding-dagestani-shariat-jamaat.

125. “Czech Police Arrest Suspected Russia’s North Caucasus 

Terrorists.”

126. “Nemetskaya politsiya arestovala grazhdanina RF po 

podozreniyu v prichastnosti k teraktam v Chechne i Dagestane,” 

Kavkaz uzel, June 24, 2011, 7:10, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/

articles/187809/.

127. “Double anti-terrorist operation in Le Mans,” Lemans 

Maville, July 5, 2010, available from www.lemans.maville.com/actu/

actudet_-Double-operation-antiterroriste-au-Mans-_dep-1440912_

actu.Htm.

128. “Doukaev far 12 ar for terror,” Avisen.dk, May 31, 2011, 

11:32, available from avisen.dk/doukaev-faar-12-aar-for-terror_

147226.aspx?utm_source=avisen&utm_medium=frontpage&utm_

campaign=latestNewsBox. In December 2010, Danish authorities 

brought charges against the ethnic Chechen, Lors Doukaev, for 

involvement in a terrorist plot. Doukaev, who lost a leg at age 

12 due to an explosion in his native Chechnya, was arrested in 

September in a Copenhagen hotel after apparently he accidentally detonated an explosive device he was preparing. He was 

found with a map on which was the location of the offices of the 

newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which published the famous caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005. “Urozhentsu Chechni 

Dukaevu v Danii pred’yavleno obvinenie v terrorizme,” Kavkaz 

uzel, December 21, 2010, 19:09, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/

articles/178729/. 
92

129. See, for example, “Issledovanie o pravovom statuse ispol’zovaniya oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya protiv

nevernykh,” Islamdin.com, January 9, 2010.

130. Gordon M. Hahn, “The Bioterrorism Threat in the Russian Federation,” in Rebecca Katz and Raymond A. Zilinskas, 

eds., Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, 2nd Ed., Hoboken, NJ: 

John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2011, pp. 581-584.

131. “FSB Has Info On Terrorists Attempts To Seize Fissile 

Materials,” Itar-Tass, June 2, 2010, available from www.itar-tass.

com; and “Russia says terrorist seeking nuclear materials,” Reuters, 

June 2, 2011, available from www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/02/

us-russia-security-nuclear-idUSTRE6512RQ20100602.

132. For more details, see Gordon M. Hahn, “The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, January-February 2008, 

pp. 1-39.

133. A short list of top CE amirs killed over the last few years 

includes: at least six successive DV amirs (Vagabov, killed on 

August 10, 2010; ‘Al-Bara’ Umalat Magomedov, January 6, 2010; 

Nabi Mediddinov, 2009; ‘Muaz’ Omar Sheikhulaev, March 10, 

2009; ‘Muaz’ Ilgar Mollachiev, February 5, 2009; Abdul Majid, October 1, 2007; the Algerian amir, Doctor Mohammed, August 31, 

2009; Arab amir, Seif al-Islam al-Urdani, February 2, 2010; Buryatskii, March 4, 2010; Astemirov, March 24, 2010; Astemirov’s successor as OVKBK amir, Arsen Tatarov, March 31, 2010; Galgaiche 

Vilaiyat (GV) naibs, Adam Korigov, April 9, 2010; and ‘Shamil’ 

Akhmed Tsaloev, April 9, 2010; North African amir, Yasir Amarat, June 8, 2010; Urus Martan Sector amir, ‘Abdul Malik’ Chingiskhan Gishaev, January 19, 2010; Vedeno Raion Sector amir, Ilman Istamirov, February 4, 2010; CE naib, Supyan Abduallayev, 

March 28, 2011; the Jordanian amir, Abu Anas Muhannad, May 

2011; Groznyi Front amir, Hamzat Shemilev, August 23, 2010; GV 

amir, Ilez Gardanov, August 23, 2010; and six top OVKBK amirs, 

including the OVKBK’s amir, vali Askar Dzhappuev, April 2011.

134. “Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Kremlin.ru, November 12, 2009, 13:45, available from www.

kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979; and Guy Falconbridge and Denis 
93

Dyomkin, “N. Caucasus strife is Russia’s top problem-Kremlin,” 

Reuters, November 12, 2009.

135. Andrew C. Kuchins, Matthew Malarkey, and Sergey Markedonov, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier, A Report of the Russia and Eurasia Program, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2011, 

available from csis.org/files/publication/110321_Kuchins_NorthCaucasus_WEB.pdf; and Ivan Sukhov, “’Kuda eti den’gi delis’?’” 

Moskovskie novosti, April 4, 2011, 00:32, available from mn.ru/

politics/20110404/300841916.html.

136. Tatyana Stanovaya, “Problemy Severnogo Kavkaza: 

Mezhdu Prezidenton and Pravitelstvom,” Politkom.ru, August 8, 

2011, available from www.politcom.ru.

137. Ibid.

138. Kuchins, Malarkey, and Markedonov, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier; and Sukhov, “’Kuda eti den’gi 

delis’?’”

139. “Na Severnom Kavkaze budet sozdano ne menee 400 

tysyach rabochikh mest, Mezhregional’naya konferentsiya 

‘Yedinoi Rossii’ ‘Razvitie Kavkaza 2010-2012,” Yedinaya Rossiya Website, July 7, 2010, available from www.edinros.ru/text.

shtml?14/4565,110040; and Ivan Sukhov, “Semeinnyi podryad,” 

Vremya novostei, July 7, 2010, www.vremya.ru/2010/117/4/257340.

html.

140. Ibid.

141. Abu Amin, “’Investitsii’ v Severnyi Kavkaz, ili popytka 

putinskoi svory ostanovit’ protsess otdeleniya Severnogo Kavkaza ot rusni i stanovleniya na ego meste islamskogo gosudarstva 

Imarat Kavkaz,” Islamdin.com, February 20, 2011.

142. “Na Severnom Kavkaze budet sozdano ne menee 400 

tysyach rabochikh mest, Mezhregional’naya konferentsiya ‘Yedinoi Rossii’ ‘Razvitie Kvkaza 2010-2012”; and Sukhov, “Semeinnyi 

podryad.”
94

143. The project is being organized under a new open stock 

company North Caucasus Resorts (Kurorty Severnogo Kavkaza) 

headed by Akhmed Bilalov.

144. Timur Samedov, Musa Muradov and Khalim Aminov, “Boeviki otkryli vserossiiskii kurort,” Kommersant, February 21, 2011, pp. 1, 3, available from www.kommersant.ru/doc.

aspx?DocsID=1589344.

145. “Russia, France plan joint holiday resorts in turbulent 

North Caucasus,” RIA Novosti, June 29, 2011, 08:02 AM PDT, 

available from en.rian.ru/russia/20110629/164915641.html.

146. “Yevkurov zaprosil dopolnitel’no 20 podrazdelenii 

spetsnaza GRU,” January 4, 2010, 19:58, available from kavkazcenter.

com/russ/content/2010/01/04/69927.shtml.

147. Sergei Minenko, “Al’-Kaida’ na ‘Zhigulyakh’,” Vremya 

novostei, February 4, 2010, available from www.vremya.ru/246760.

html; and “36 Fighters Voluntarily Surrendered in 2010,” Russia 

Eurasia Terrorism Watch, November 7, 2010, available from www.

retwa.com/home.cfm?articleDate=7Nov2010.

148. “Yevkurov predlagaet boevikam v Ingushetii sdat’sya 

v obmen na myagkoe nakazanie,” Kavkaz uzel, February 9, 2010, 

11:30, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/165231/.

149. Ibid.

150. “Prezident Ingushetii vstretilsya s rodstvennikami ukryvavshikh Saida Buryatskogo,” Kavkaz uzel, March 7, 2010, 00:55,

available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/166249/.

151. Ivan Sukhov, “Kalymskii krai,” Vremya novostei, July 8, 

2010, available from www.vremya.ru/2010/118/4/257507.html.

152. Sukhov, “’Kuda eti den’gi delis?’”

153. “Yevkurov zaprosil dopolnitel’no 20 podrazdelenii 

spetsnaza GRU.”
95

154. Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009”; Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statistics”; and Hahn, “CE-Affiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Resulting 

Casualties from January Through June 2011.”

155. RFERL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 82, May 4, 2007.

156. “UFSB: v Kabardino-Balkarii sokhranyaetsya ugroza 

teraktov,” Kavkaz Memo, March 15, 2007, available from www.

kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/118554.html.

157. RFERL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 82, May 4, 2007.

158. Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009”; Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statistics”; and Hahn, “CE-Affiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Resulting 

Casualties from January Through June 2011.”

159. Kanokov emphasized that the new year was beginning “much worse than last year,” a year in which the mujahedin killed “six times as many law enforcement personnel killed 

than in previous years.” Sergei Polyakov, “Kabardino-Balkariya 

sprosit pomoshchi v bor’be s terroristami,” Infox.ru, February 3, 

2011, 17:46, available from infox.ru/accident/incident/2011/02/03/

Kabardino_Balkariya_.phtml.

160. “Shkhagoshev: terakt v Nalchike—pryamoe pokushenie 

na prezidenta Kabardino-Balkarii,” Kavkaz uzel, May 4, 2010, 17:59, 

available from kabardino-balkariya.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/168443/.

161. “’Novyi kurs Magomedova’? Situatsii s pravami cheloveka i popytki konsolidatsii obshchestva v Respublike Dagestan. 

Fevralya 2010—mart 2011 g.,” Kavkaz uzel, April 12, 2011, 11:54, 

available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/183646/?print=true, 

sections 7.1 and 7.2.

162. Andrey Bondarev, “The President of Dagestan meets 

with the delegation of ZAO Russian Copper Company,” RIA Novosti, May 13, 2011, 11:32, available from www.riadagestan.com/

news/2011/05/13/6472/.
96

163. Maksim Tivkailo, “Kerimov vlozhit v gostinitsy i stadiony Dagestana $1.4 mlrd,” Vedomosti, July 15, 2011, available 

from www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/1319006/kerimov_vlozhit_

v_gostinicy_i_stadiony_dagestana_14_mlrd.

164. Hahn, “Comparing the Level of Caucasus Emirate Terrorist Activity in 2008 and 2009”; Hahn, “Trends in Jihadist Violence in Russia During 2010 in Statistics”; and Hahn, “CE-Affiliated Website Reports Number of Jihadi Attacks and Resulting 

Casualties from January Through June 2011.”

165. With regard to abductions in Dagestan, which are carried out most often but not always by authorities, there were 15 

abductions, including four found dead and two found in police 

detention on average in the 3 years prior to Magomedov. During Magomedov’s first year, 2010, there were 18, including four 

found dead and seven found in police detention. See Table 1 in 

”Vvedenie” of “’Novyi kurs Magomedova’? Situatsii s pravami 

cheloveka i popytki konsolidatsii obshchestva v Respublike 

Dagestan. Fevralya 2010—mart 2011 g.”

166. On recent violations and European Court of Human 

Rights (ECHR) cases, see, for example, the Russian human rights 

organization Memorial’s reports “Situatsiya v zone konflikta na 

Severnom Kavkaze: otsenka pravozashitnikov. Vesna 2011 g.,” 

Kavkaz uzel, July 22, 2011, 00:00, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.

ru/articles/189517/#6; and “’Novyi kurs Magomedova’? Situatsii s 

pravami cheloveka i popytki konsolidatsii obshchestva v Respublike Dagestan. Fevralya 2010—mart 2011 g,” sections 5.1-5.6. 

167. “V Dagestane sozdadut spetspodrazdelenie Vnutrennykh voisk MVD,” Kavkaz uzel, December 15, 2010, 15:45, available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174793/; and “Dagestantsy 

dadut dostoiny otpor banditskomu otreb’yu,” Kavkaz news, November 11, 2010, 12:42, available from www.kavkaz-news.info/

portal/cnid_122389/alias__Caucasus-Info/lang__en/tabid__2434/default.aspx.

168. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the 

Twenty-First Century, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
97

169. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random House, 2005. See also Robert 

A. Pape and James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of 

Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It, Chicago, IL: University 

of Chicago Press, 2010.

170. Rose revolution leaders and former Saakashvili allies, 

former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze and former Defense 

Minister Irakly Okruashvili, have claimed that Tbilisi has been 

training Ingush mujahedin and that Georgian banks have facilitated money transfers to the Caucasus mujahedin. “Burjanadze 

Talks About Danger of one more War from Russia,” Georgian 

Journal, October 21, 2010, available from georgianjournal.ge/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=664:burjanadze-talksabout-danger-of-one-more-war-from-russia-&catid=9:news&Itemid=8; 

and “Burjanadze Slams Visa Provocations,” Interfax, October 21, 2010, 19:01, available from www.interfax.com/newsinf.

asp?pg=2&id=197175. Former U.S. Foreign Service officer and 

U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee foreign policy analyst, James George Jatras claims that in December 2009 a secret 

meeting took place in Tbilisi with “representatives of numerous 

jihad groups based in various Islamic and European countries for 

the purpose of coordinating their activities on Russia’s southern 

flank.” According to Jatras, “the meeting was organized under 

the auspices of high officials of the Georgian government.” “In 

addition to ‘military’ operations, (i.e., attacks in southern Russia) 

special attention was given to ideological warfare, for example, 

launching of the Russian-language TV station ‘First Caucasus’.” 

James Jatras, “The Georgian Imbroglio—And a Choice for the 

United States,” America-Russia Net, February 14, 2010, available 

from www.america-russia.net/eng/face/236661338?user_session=4827

e878c0267ddbdd6ee738f8212f1d.
99

CHAPTER 2

THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN RUSSIA

AND RUSSIA IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS:

STATE APPROACHES AND POLITICAL 

DYNAMICS IN THE TURBULENT REGION

Sergey Markedonov

Any attempts to make generalizations about Russian policy on the North Caucasus face serious methodological difficulties. In spite of analysts’ personal 

attitude to the problem, all observers agree that this 

area is the most acute one in Russia. Here the problem 

of Russia’s territorial integrity and sustainability is being resolved. 

 The growth of political violence (the most impressive example is the tragic terrorist bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport in January 

2011) has brought the danger of growing instability 

in the region to the attention of foreign countries, especially on the eve of the Sochi Olympics of 2014 and 

World Soccer Cup of 2018. While in the 1990s violence in the North Caucasus was primarily based in 

Chechnya, over the last years it has increased for other 

republics like Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KabardinoBalkaria (KBR). The North Caucasus agenda today 

is extremely tense with the events and challenges of 

terrorism and counterterrorism. In 2009, the counterterrorist operation (CTO) regime in Chechnya was 

cancelled, but in 2010 there was not only a quantitative but also qualitative rise in the attacks in this republic (like the attack on Tsentoroy, the native village 

of Ramzan Kadyrov, as well as that of the Chechen 

parliament in Grozny). At the same time, violence in 
100

the neighboring republics (Dagestan, Ingushetia, and 

KBR) has not declined either. In 2010, KBR, which had 

a reputation of being a “Sleeping Beauty” during the 

1990s surpassed Chechnya in the number of acts of 

terrorism, taking a place in the top three, after Dagestan and Ingushetia, with 48 explosions, 21 shootings, 

and 14 attempts on the life of law enforcement officials and special troops. During the same period, local CTOs were launched twice in the republic, with 

the operation in Tyrnauza lasting from October 20 

through December 25. For the first time in the recent 

history of North Caucasus terrorism, there was an attack on an industrial facility in 2010: targeted at the 

Baksan Hydroelectric Plant in KBR.1

 Almost every 

day, sabotage and terrorist attacks on representatives 

of law enforcement and military personnel take place 

along with civilian murders. We can also observe the 

revival of ethnic nationalism (despite the fact that radical Islamism has not handed over its positions, rather, 

on the contrary, it has grown), and at the same time, 

we see a fundamentally important step to resolving 

long-standing ethno-political confrontation between 

North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The struggle for power 

inside the Caucasus constituencies repeatedly makes 

itself felt through corrupt, authoritarian, and even occasionally violent means.

Apart from the growing violence that plagues 

the region, the Caucasus has become a subject of 

great importance in Russia. This thesis was proven 

by the events on Manege Square in December 2010 

and increasing interethnic clashes between Russians 

and Caucasian peoples (Chechens and Dagestanis).2

This is becoming a serious issue. Interestingly, the 

phenomenon of Russian ethnic chauvinism directed 

against the peoples of the Caucasus has recently as-
101

sumed a macro-economic veneer. In April 2011, the 

Russian Civil Union movement organized a rally in 

Moscow under the slogan: “Stop feeding the Caucasus.”3

 Participants objected to the federal government 

subsidizing its counterparts in Chechnya, Dagestan, 

and other republics, likening the North Caucasus to “a 

voracious crocodile which demands more blood and 

money.” This problem could become more serious if 

the Russian officials attempt to exploit these ideas. We 

can already see attempts to use anti-Caucasus public 

opinion to obtain additional popularity on the eve of 

both parliamentary and presidential elections.4

However, Russian policy in the region has not 

really been conceptualized or even verbalized, and 

this circumstance creates many obstacles (first and 

foremost for Russian authorities) for adequately 

comprehending what Moscow wants to do. There is 

a great paradox in this situation. Identifying itself as 

a guarantor of Caucasus stability and security and 

demonstrating its willingness to pretend to be a key 

stakeholder for the whole region, including newly 

independent and de facto states of the South Caucasus, Russia faces challenges inside its own country 

regarding the North Caucasus area. Moreover, in 2009 

the situation there was characterized as the most important domestic policy issue by President Dmitry 

Medvedev in his Presidential Address to the Federal 

Assembly (Parliament).5

 As a result, the Kremlin and 

the federal government brought in an official position 

of special plenipotentiary—with broadened functions 

in the newly created North Caucasus Federal District. 

For the first time in Russia’s post-Soviet history, this 

official has the rank of deputy prime-minister.

In this chapter, some basic aspects will be considered. To what extent has recognition of the systemic 
102

and internal natures of the North Caucasus challenges 

helped to change political dynamics in the region? 

Why has the activity of the new plenipotentiary not 

been effective and failed to reach expectations? What 

new challenges would define the agenda in the most 

turbulent area of Russia? The purpose of this report 

is to examine major social and political trends in the 

North Caucasus region, with an emphasis on the last 3 

years because historical aspects (including the 1990s) 

are separate topics for discussion.

“SOFT POWER”: MADE BY ALEXANDER 

KHLOPONIN 

In the early 2000s, the Russian authorities were 

all too ready to speak about the North Caucasus. Discussion centered on several topics. The first was the 

Caucasus as a platform for international terrorism, 

where Russia was being put to the test. The image of 

the “international terrorist” changed according to the 

political situation of the time. Sometimes the face had 

Georgian features, at other times Afghan and sometimes even the “treacherous West” seemed to be involved. The role of the West in affairs of the North 

Caucasus was actually interpreted in two ways. On 

the one hand, the West was seen as a natural ally at 

risk from Third World intrigues, and on the other, an 

unimaginative and bothersome partner trying to impose its incorrect ideas (or “double standards”) upon 

Russia. The second topic was the swiftly stabilizing 

Caucasus, an image that effectively came to mean 

Chechnya under the wise leadership of Akhmad and 

then Ramzan Kadyrov, father and son. There were 

attempts to diversify the North Caucasus issue: The 

most outstanding examples were the speeches by 
103

Dmitry Kozak, the Russian President’s representative 

in the South (in this position from September 2004 to 

September 2007). He tried to focus the attention of his 

immediate superiors and society on the problems of 

the clan system and the inefficiency of the regional 

administrations (particularly in conditions of budget 

dependency on the federal centre). However, Russia’s 

ruling elite was not concerned with the region’s domestic situation, at least until the middle of 2011.

The decision to end CTO in Chechnya in April 

2009, dictated as it was by public relations considerations, did not have the effect of reducing the number 

of terrorist acts in that republic. Diversionary terrorist activity actually spread to the neighboring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia. That summer saw a 

brazen attempt to assassinate Ingushetia’s president 

Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, which temporarily put him out 

of action. Aldigirei Magomedtagirov, Interior Minister of Dagestan, the largest North Caucasus republic, 

was murdered. All this required some coherent explanation. It was impossible just to keep saying that 

the region would soon be stabilized, although “some 

people are working against this.”

Medvedev’s Makhachkala speech on June 9, 2009, 

marked the moment when the focus changed from 

external to internal threats. The Russian President 

talked of “systemic problems” in the North Caucasus 

region. For the first time since the 1990s, the head of 

state was officially admitting that socio-political turbulence in the Russian Caucasus was not the result of 

foreign interference, but of internal problems like corruption, unemployment, and poverty. However, both 

the President and the Prime Minister still kept talking 

about the battle with “bandits” and “organized crime 

groups,” as if the current problems of the Caucasus 
104

could be compared to the situation in Harlem, New 

York, or Southeast Washington, DC, in the 1980s. The 

failures of government in the North Caucasus were 

not honestly discussed. Blame was laid on the regional and local authorities, while the federal authorities 

escaped criticism. This was the origin of bizarre ideas 

like the introduction of special jurisdiction for matters 

involving terrorism. Regardless, in his address last 

year, Medvedev called the North Caucasus the main 

problem of Russian domestic politics. That was when 

another idea emerged: a new bureaucratic structure, 

backed by Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, entrusted 

with “establishing order” in the North Caucasus.

As a result, Alexander Khloponin arrived in the 

Caucasus in January 2010 as Moscow’s plenipotentiary. This looked like an innovation. The man responsible for Russia’s most unstable region was not one of 

the siloviki (members of the central bureaucracy), but 

a manager who had worked for “Norilsk Nickel” enterprise and served as governor of the Taymyr Peninsula and Krasnoyarsk. The media adopted a different 

language when discussing the North Caucasus. Apart 

from the usual reference to “terrorists” and “extremists,” they began talking of “clusters,” “investments,” 

and “innovations.”

But Khloponin’s appointment had nothing to do 

with modernization. It was a typical behind-the-scenes 

advancement of a person lacking the appropriate experience, motivated by internal bureaucratic logic, 

rather than pressing national interest. In addition, the 

functions of this new head of the Caucasus were very 

limited. Khloponin was thrown in the deep end of the 

pool, without being given the necessary political powers to keep himself afloat. And how can there be any 

real investment or innovation in a region so close to 
105

a state of war? In the end, things did not turn out for 

the better, but as usual, as Viktor Chernomyrdin so 

memorably put it in 1993: “We wanted the best but it 

came out like it always does.”

The economy and the social sphere were recognized as important. The Kremlin and the Federal 

Government put all their efforts into developing these 

sectors, but political themes (ethnic conflicts and the 

relations between the different religions) remained 

taboo. They were seen as merely superficial, a function of the socio-economic situation. This has made 

it impossible to produce a large-scale strategy for the 

development of the Caucasus. When the politics of the 

region are as unstable as they are, socio-economic conditions matter, but while unquestionably important, 

they do not play a determining role.

Still, on July 6, 2010, Putin asked for a strategy document to be delivered “within a period of 2 months,” 

a reasonable amount of time for a good academic article or a chapter of a book, but not for a document 

with a 15-year perspective. By September 6, 2010, the 

draft of the strategy was ready. In less than a month, 

it went through the entire cycle from being signed to 

publication by the federal government. The aims and 

objectives of “Strategy-2025,” as set out in the initial 

“General Provisions,” are skewed from the very beginning. We read that: 

The Strategy takes account of:

• The current state of the economy of Russian 

Federation administrative entities which are part 

of The North Caucasus Federal District;

• The Russian economy;

• The global economy;

• Their potential for development; and,

• Regional and inter-regional projects and their outcomes.6
106

But what about the political development of the 

Caucasus? Don’t the facts of terrorism, subversive 

actions, and an ethnocratic leadership automatically make any business plan a “risky undertaking”? 

Shouldn’t future investors be taking this into account 

(unless the money comes from the federal budget, 

which does not depend on public opinion)? 

The North Caucasus District offers favorable conditions for developing the agro-industrial complex, the 

spheres of tourism and health tourism, electricity, 

mining and manufacturing. It also affords developed 

transit facilities. However, economic and socio-political instability mean that natural advantages remain 

unrealized and make the North Caucasus Federal District an unattractive environment for investment.7

The political element is mentioned in passing, after the economy, and is not elaborated upon in any 

way. What does socio-political instability mean? Is it 

the separatist threat or the “religious revival” which is 

incompatible with the constitutional and legal regulations and laws of the Russian Federation? According 

to Strategy-2025, “The main goal of the Strategy is to 

provide conditions conducive to the rapid growth of 

the real sector of the economy in Russian Federation 

administrative units that make up the North Caucasus 

Federal District. Also to create new jobs, and improve 

the standard of life.” What a wonderful goal! But is this 

possible in an area that is practically on a war footing 

(This is the felicitous description of the present situation given by the head of the Prosecutor General’s 

Office Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin 

in an interview with radio “Moscow Echo”)8? It is not 

the grey economy, which makes its living from illegal 
107

or semi-legal deals, that is being discussed in this document. Incidentally, Strategy-2025 does not set itself 

to deal with institutional change, i.e. creating a new 

generation of managers who could give the economy 

the chance to breathe without killing it with their kickbacks and pay-offs. The abuse of power and illegal 

methods of carrying out anti-terrorist operations give 

rise to a lack of trust in the authorities, and even a situation where people start regarding law enforcers as 

enemies. Young people who are constantly victimized 

become particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the 

rebels. There is plenty of evidence that the activity of 

the armed underground has been growing recently. 

The crisis will only get worse if the state keeps fighting 

the insurgents using methods like kidnapping and executions without trial. Two incomplete subsections of 

Strategy-2025 are devoted to ethnic relations, but they 

are limited to generalities. There is no real information and no analysis. “The current socio-political and 

ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus Federal District is characterized by several pronounced 

negative social tendencies, manifestations of ethnopolitical and religious extremism, and a high risk of 

conflict.”9

Any specialist could probably find a great many 

negative tendencies in any part of the Russian Federation, if he or she so desired. They exist in Moscow 

and St. Petersburg (Is not xenophobia a “negative social tendency”?), and in the Volga area (where there 

is both ethnic and religious extremism). But the difference between the Caucasus and the Volga area is 

that only in the North Caucasus is there a situation 

akin to war. This document of considerable strategic 

importance offers no explanation for why events developed as they did. The reader is left to guess. The 
108

Strategy’s analytical section does not even have a subsection dealing with the religious revival, although 

radical Islam is the main vehicle for protests in the 

Caucasus. Anything to do with relations between the 

religions is relegated to the subsection “Ethnic Relationships.” The reasons for the growth of radical Islam 

are set out with alarming simplicity: “Radical forms 

of Islam (have been) imported into the said Federal 

District.” The text offers no explanation as to what 

these “imported forms” are, why they have been imported into the region, what the expectations of the 

importers are, or the extent to which the importers 

have gained indigenous support.10 In the interests of 

objectivity, one can say, of course, that other reasons 

for the dissemination of extremist views (the Strategy 

makes no special distinction between nationalists and 

Islamists) include “widespread corruption” or “questions relating to the owning and disposing of land, 

which are unregulated and the cause of most of the 

ethnic conflicts, including at the level of the man in 

the street,” and also “ethnic tension as a result of illdefined civic identity.”11 But again, none of this can be 

linked to the need for institutional change in the Caucasus. In short, the objectives of “Strategy-2025” are 

clearly unachievable. It focuses on economic growth 

without addressing the socio-political preconditions 

that make the North Caucasus explosive and unstable. 

This document seems to isolate the economy and the 

social sphere from the rest of the complex whole. 
109

NORTH CAUCASUS: RADICAL ISLAMISM 

ON THE RISE

Since the Beslan tragedy in September 2004, the 

main anti-Russian discourse in the North Caucasus 

has not been under the slogans of ethno-political selfdetermination but under the green banner of radical 

Islam. On October 31, 2007, President of the so-called 

“Chechen Republic of Icheria,” Doku Umarov, built 

upon his powers as the head of the separatist government and proclaimed a new formation —the Caucasus Emirate (CE).

Umarov proclaimed himself as “the only legitimate 

authority in all areas where there are Mujahideen.” He 

also said that he denies the laws of the secular authorities that exist in the North Caucasus. It is hard to define Umarov personally and many of his supporters as 

real Islamists in the fullest sense of the word; they lack 

the necessary theological training and, in some cases, 

elementary education base. But for such unskilled Islamists the ideals of “pure Islam” are the main drivers of protest activities against the Russian State. With 

them, they have to determine the effectiveness of its 

potential for mobilizing extremists. To some extent, 

belonging to a radical Islamist current is a marker of 

radicalism in general (ethnic nationalism in this context is regarded as a moderate political movement that 

could include dialogue and certain concessions to the 

Russian State).

However, at the same time, we can report the presence in the ranks of the North Caucasian Islamists 

trained preachers who fully meet the standards of 

“Mujahedin of the future” (that is competent theologians, who could exploit both explosives and Kalashnikovs). The most famous of them were not ethnic 
110

Chechens by origin. In 2009 they came to the forefront 

in the Caucasus radical Islamist movement. They 

brought new characters into the anti-Russian struggle in the North Caucasus. It is unlikely that such a 

man as Said Buryatskii (1982-2010, a.k.a. Alexander 

Tikhomirov, on his father’s side a Buryat and on his 

mother’s side a Russian) could inspire the defenders 

of a secular nationalist project to fight. Rather his appeal was religious.

In June 2009, Umarov’s supporters claimed responsibility for the murder of the interior minister 

of Dagestan, Adilgerei Magomedtagirov as well as 

murders of Aza Gazgireeva, deputy Chairman of 

the Supreme Court of Ingushetia, and Bashir Aushev, former Deputy Prime Minister of Ingushetia. In 

July 2009, they announced their involvement in the 

attempted assassination of the President of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In August, 2009, they issued a statement saying that the “accident” at the 

Sayano-Shushenskaya power plant was a matter of 

their hands. In November-December 2009, militants 

claimed responsibility for the murder of an Orthodox 

priest, Father Daniel (Sysoev) and the explosion of 

the train “Nevsky Express.” On March 31, 2010, in his 

video address, Doku Umarov talked about his own orders for the suicide bombing in the Moscow subway, 

carried out on March 29. In January 2011, he claimed 

credit for the Domodedovo Airport terrorist attack. 

 Even if the responsibility for one or another of 

these attacks is not true, and is part of a public relations campaign, the struggle for “true faith” is selling 

and becoming a popular political commodity. This 

product will be even more in demand than would 

be the level of social injustice, judicial, and administrative efficiency. The aforementioned Buryatskii is 
111

a phenomenon in this regard. Not being a preacher 

from Pakistan or Arab countries, he found a fertile 

environment in the Caucasian audience as a result of 

his own religious and political evolution. Note that 

nowadays this audience knows the Soviet and Russian reality far less than what Jokhar Dudayev and 

Aslan Maskhadov did. The works of Sheikh Anwar 

al-Awlaki, Sheikh Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi, and 

others feature prominently on various web portals 

associated with the Caucasus rebels. The Caucasus 

rebels have indeed embraced the political lexicon of 

the “global jihad,” styling their leaders as “amirs” 

and establishing a “Caucasus Emirate” with its own 

“Shariah Court.” It is much less connected with the 

nationwide socio-cultural environment. However, 

while assessing the “Islamic factor” it is necessary to 

add some nuances. Often many stories regarding the 

intra-administrative-bureaucratic struggle are hidden 

under the “Wahhabis” (as the Russian media define 

radical Islam). It would seem that the authorities both 

at regional and federal levels must do their utmost to 

understand where there are religious radicals or simple criminals, and where their synthesis takes place 

(the latter is extremely important to discredit the militants and their ideological patrons). But instead of doing this, officials repeat propaganda theses about the 

“agonizing bandits.”

ETHNIC NATIONALISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES?

The last 3 years showed, among other things, that 

the hope of “self-liquidation” of nationalism has not 

been justified. Rallies of Balkars and Circassians, interethnic relations in Dagestan and tensions between 

Ossets and Ingushsis forced the authorities to pay at-
112

tention to the problem, which by the early 2000s had 

seemed generally to be clearing up. A revival of ethnic nationalism in the North Caucasus has taken place 

since 2008. For this development, there are both internal and external prerequisites. The Circassian issue revival has occurred after a series of personnel decisions 

of the fourth president of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya 

Republic (KCR), Boris Ebzeev. Russia’s recognition 

of Abkhazia’s independence on August 26, 2008, also 

played a role in the revitalization of Circassian ethnic 

nationalism as well as the upcoming Sochi Olympic 

Games. Since 2010, the “Circassian question” has become one of the focal points of the Georgian foreign 

policy agenda. Two conferences (March and November 2010), began the discussion at the parliamentary 

level of the problem of the so-called “Circassian genocide” in the Russian Empire in the 19th century, and 

finally Georgian recognition of this massacre as a case 

of genocide in May 2011 created a serious precedent. 

Before it, Russian policy in the Caucasus was not recognized as genocide by foreign states. This charge 

therefore contributes to the internationalization of 

debates about this troubled Russian region. Thus it 

requires from the Russian government and society 

more thoughtful action. Moscow must find competent 

answers to this problem as soon as possible. 

However, the “new” nationalists in their statements remain within the Russian political-legal space. 

Balkars, the Ingush human rights activists, and Circassian activists are trying to appeal to the Federal Russian government, and not to the Council of Europe, 

the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 

(PACE), or the European Union (EU)/United States. 

In March 2010, at a meeting dedicated to the 66th anniversary of the Russian deportation—of Balkars, Kara-
113

chais, Chechens, Ingush, and Kalmyks to Siberia—the 

representatives of the Council of Elders of the Balkar 

people prepared an appeal to the presidential envoy 

in the North Caucasus Alexander Khloponin.

It is necessary to make a distinction between nationalism in the period of the “parade of sovereignties” in the early 1990s, and that of 2009-10. “The old 

nationalism” was a political riposte to the Soviet (and 

to a lesser extent the imperial) era. The current Balkar 

or Circassian movements, though using the historical 

material, have another nature. This is the reaction to 

today’s realities (e.g., land issues and the attendant 

corruption, human resource policies, and issues of local self-government). Using quantitative approaches 

(and certain of their manifestations we see in KBR in 

the form of conciliation of the national movements) 

the danger of nationalism’s revival can be minimized 

(but not eliminated completely). However (and 2009-

2010 have demonstrated it), there are cases when the 

republican authorities try to extinguish the fire of Islamist activity by using nationalist kerosene. Such a 

tool (playing the ethnic card) is extremely dangerous 

(as shown in 1989-91). 

The Ossetian-Ingush reconciliations have inspired 

cautious optimism. The third President of Ingushetia, Yunus Bek Evkurov, has played a great role in 

its promotion. Ingushetia now insists on the return of 

displaced persons who fled their homes during the 

conflict in October-November 1992, namely in the 

villages of the Suburban District (Prigorodnyi rayon) 

where they lived before the conflict, but the Ingush 

leadership clearly rejects the claims for the return of 

the district itself! At a meeting on the problems of displaced persons held on October 2, 2009, the President 

of North Ossetia, Teimuraz Mamsurov, said that the 
114

Ingush would be free to return to the Suburban District and the authorities of his republic, North Ossetia, 

would not be an obstacle.

According to various sources, approximately 15-

20,000 displaced people (DP) could return to their 

former places of residence. In this case, both the conflicting parties are dissatisfied with federal policy to 

resolve this problem. The Ossetian side said that the 

return of the Ingush is being done at a forced pace, 

while the Ingush are unhappy with the low intensity 

of the return. Soft apartheid is preserved. In particular, on March 1, 2009, during the elections of local bodies in the Suburban District, the vote was conducted in 

the villages settled by the Ingushis. The situation for 

all these years is complicated by the conflict between 

Georgia and South Ossetia because North Ossetia was 

forced to place Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia 

and interior regions of Georgia in its territory. Regardless of this, on December 17, 2009, the leaders of the 

two republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed 

a bilateral agreement.

For the first time in the post-Soviet era Ingush DPs 

had the right to return to their homes in an official 

document. (Previously they were offered different 

versions of arrangements at the new location.) Human and civil rights took precedence over the “right 

of blood.” Practically for the first time since 1992, it 

was recognized that the Ossetians and the Ingush are 

two peoples of the Russian nation-state project that 

should be more than just neighbors, and become fellow citizens of one country.
115

NORTH CAUCASUS: PUBLIC POLICY 

OF LIMITED DURATION

In addition to Islam and ethnic nationalism, bureaucratic competition for dominance in the framework of a single republic has been a serious challenge. 

This management struggle has once again proved that 

disputes over power are not maintained in rigid adherence to an ethnic or religious affiliation. This is a 

complex configuration of clan interests and pressure 

groups both in Moscow and within the region itself. 

Perhaps the most exemplary republic in this respect 

is Dagestan, the largest (in territory and population) 

of the North Caucasian republics. It is no accident because the year of 2009 was a preparatory period for the 

Republican presidential elections (in February 2010, 

the Presidential term of Mukhu Aliev expired). In the 

absence of direct elections of the Republic’s president, 

we witnessed complex bureaucratic fights with very 

specific ideas about public policy.

As a result, the procedure for determining a candidate for the presidency in Dagestan unprecedentedly 

dragged on from November 2009 until February 2010. 

In fact, it took 2 additional weeks beyond the legal 

procedure for Moscow to announce the final decision 

on the candidacy of the head of the Republic. Finally, 

Magomedsalam Magomedov got the support of the 

Federal Center. But as the Russian political scientist 

and journalist Ivan Sukhov justly remarked, “[The] 

appointment of the president in Dagestan looked like 

the most problematic one for the entire period.”12
116

THE NORTH CAUCASUS FROM THE 

PERSPECTIVE OF THE KREMLIN 

At first glance, the tragic events at the Manege 

Square on December 11, 2010 (and their echoes in St. 

Petersburg and Rostov-on-Don), are not connected 

directly with ethno-political and religious dynamics. Activity, clashes, and pogroms under the Russian 

ethno-nationalist slogans are not a response to one 

or another act of terrorism, sabotage, or injustice to 

the ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus republics. 

The Manege incident was provoked by the murder of 

Spartak soccer club fan Yegor Sviridov. In other cases, reasons are different, but they do not refer to the 

North Caucasus regional issues. Meanwhile, it would 

be very naïve to consider those clashes as absolutely 

isolated problems. The Sviridov case became a kind 

of trigger for anti-Caucasus opinions existing in the 

central parts of Russia. It also showed that Russia 

lacks a coherent national policy (or rather, it substituted folklore and ethnographic considerations) and 

that the inhabitants of the Caucasus and the rest of 

Russia had long lists of grievances against each other. 

Regardless of what it was, it revitalized the problem 

of a divided community and actualized the necessity 

to find ways for a civic nation option. It also demonstrated the challenge of Russian separatism because 

it displayed numerous groups of Russian citizens 

who would be ready to separate from the Caucasus. 

This fact violates the stereotype that the region can 

only be put beyond Moscow’s strategic influence by 

means of a conscious campaign to free itself of Russia’s suzerainty. But what if the unilateral separation 

of the Caucasus by Russian power took place? In this 

scenario, it would matter little whether the North 
117

Caucasus followed a nationalist or Islamist agenda. It 

does not mean that Russia would have great benefits 

from the realization of this scenario. But now it has 

created new options for Caucasus politics as well as 

Russian domestic policy as a whole. The fact that the 

central government on the eve of the election year decided to play the Russian chauvinist bargaining chip 

is also dangerous because it makes two groups of the 

citizens of one country (ethnic Russians and Caucasus 

peoples) confront each other. 

Thus, the North Caucasus has not become a more 

secure, and most importantly, predictable region. The 

region poses for the Russian state and society a wide 

variety of challenges, ranging from Islamic radicalism 

to sophisticated closed bureaucratic confrontation and 

Russian separatism. Despite the fact that in 2009 the 

Russian central government had recognized the crisis 

in the North Caucasus, breakthrough strategies for 

the development of the region have not surfaced. The 

state bodies continue focusing on bureaucratic methods of improving the situation, refuse to be engaged in 

dialogue with the civil society, and use “soft power” 

(integration projects, the introduction of elements of 

civic identity, and attempts to redefine the religious 

sphere such as ”Euro-Islam” as an alternative to radical Islamism) in promoting their own interests. While 

modernization has been proclaimed as the strategic 

goal of the Russian policy, the North Caucasus has 

not been meaningfully considered in this context. By 

inertia, it is regarded rather as an underdeveloped 

outskirt, rather than an integral part of the nationwide 

political-legal space. Encouragingly, there is some 

safety margin; the region’s population is interested in 

strengthening the Russian state’s presence and the effectiveness of arbitration by the central government, 
118

while there is simultaneously a more active desire of 

the Russian authorities to make a critical assessment of 

the regional realities. However, an ad hoc situational 

response remains the dominant political and managerial style of the Russian elite for the Caucasus region.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Sergey Markedonov, “Causes of the Growing Instability in 

Kabardino-Balkaria and Ways of Overcoming It,” Anthropology 

and Archeology of Eurasia, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2011, pp. 72-81.

2. See our comment in “Russian Separatism” (“Russkii Separatizm”), December, 16, 2010, available from www.politcom.ru/11193.

html.

3. The Russian Civil Union is a public organization founded 

in November 2010. Ideologically it is based on alleged “nationaldemocracy” principles. It seeks to give the ethnic Russians the 

right of self-determination and replace the federation in the Russian national democratic state. 

4. Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO, in his presentation, “National question in Russia and in Europe” for the Yaroslavl’ World Forum, September 2011, identified the “Russian issue” as a core problem of Russia’s domestic policy in the Caucuses 

and claimed a need to stop discrimination of ethnic Russians by 

the Caucasus peoples. Vladimir Putin (Russian prime-minister) in 

one of his speeches on December, 21, 2010, said: “We will have to 

develop the rules of registration in Moscow and Saint Petersburg 

as well as other big cities.” It is worth noting that the practice of 

registration is an unconstitutional requirement because the Russian Constitution gives to all citizens the right of free movement.

5. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia, November 12, 2009, available from www.

kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979.

6. Strategy for the Socio-economic Development of the North 

Caucasus Federal District until 2025, July 6, 2010, available from 

premier.gov.ru/events/news/13920/.
119

7. Ibid.

8. This evaluation was done in the open air of the radio “Moscow Echo” [Ekho Moskvy], October, 10, 2010, available from 

www.echo.msk.ru/news/717094-echo.html. 

9. Strategy for the Socio-economic Development of the North 

Caucasus Federal District until 2025.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Cited in “Kremlin Does not Comment on Delay with the 

Dagestan President appointment” [“Kreml’ ne kommentiruet zaderzhku naznacheniya Prezidenta Dagestana”], January, 20, 2010, 

available from www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/164449/.
121

CHAPTER 3

THE “AFGHANIZATION” OF THE NORTH

 CAUCASUS: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS 

OF A CHANGING CONFLICT

Svante E. Cornell

The situation in the North Caucasus, particularly 

in Chechnya, frequently made headlines in the 1990s 

and early 2000s. In fact, it was a key issue in affecting Western views of Russia, a particular mobilizing 

factor for the democracy and human rights agenda as 

Russia was concerned. This changed, however, with 

President Vladimir Putin’s successful curtailing of 

media freedoms in Russia, and the gradual decline of 

violence in Chechnya, with violence sinking to a low 

point in 2006. For the past 5 years, the North Caucasus 

has hardly had an effect on relations between the West 

and Russia; in fact, both the media and policy communities in the West have largely ignored the region. 

That has nevertheless begun to change in the recent 

past, for two main reasons: First, there has been a clear 

upsurge in violence in and related to the North Caucasus since 2007, with the completion of the process of 

transformation of a Chechen nationalist rebellion to a 

region-wide Islamist insurgency. It has become clear 

that far from pacifying the region, Moscow is failing 

to exert sovereignty there. Second, the International 

Olympic Committee’s decision to hold the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi on the Russian Black Sea coast 

adjacent to the North Caucasus has made the North 

Caucasus a magnet for attention. This chapter seeks to 

assess the current situation in the North Caucasus, the 

reasons behind the evolution of the past decade, and 

its implications for Russia, the region, and the West.
122

THE NORTH CAUCASUS TODAY

The republics of the North Caucasus are presently characterized by a combination of factors that the 

present author has likened to “Afghanization.” The 

term evokes the development of Afghanistan in the 

mid-1990s: a combination of war, human suffering, 

poverty, organized crime, and externally sponsored 

Islamic radicalism combined to generate an explosive 

situation, which the authorities are increasingly unable to respond to—and which, failing to understand 

the web of problems correctly and suffering from the 

constraints of their own system, they end up exacerbating. 

Demographically and economically, the North 

Caucasus is in a deep malaise. Unemployment rates 

are sky-high, averaging 50 percent by some estimates, 

with 80 percent rates of youth unemployment being 

common in many areas of the region.1 Between 60 and 

90 percent of the budgets of the republics consist of 

direct subsidies from Moscow, suggesting the weakness of economic activity and of government ability 

to raise revenues. In fact, subsidies to the North Caucasus have begun to generate a backlash in Russia 

itself, with growing popular movements wanting to 

stop the government from “feeding the Caucasus.”2

 A 

leaked Russian government report in 2006 cited that 

the shadow economy constituted an estimated 44 percent of Dagestan’s economy, as opposed to 17 percent 

in Russia as a whole; 50 to 70 percent of Dagestanis 

with some form of employment were thought to work 

in the shadow economy.3

 These figures are unlikely to 

have improved since then. Ethnic Russians have largely left the region, removing some of the most-skilled 
123

labor force. In Chechnya, where 200,000 Russians once 

lived, they now number in the hundreds. In Ingushetia, the number of Russians declined by a factor of 

over six. In other republics, the decline between the 

censuses of 1989 and 2002 are not as dramatic but nevertheless stark: The percentage of Russians fell from 

42 percent to 33 percent in Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; 

from 30 to 23 percent in North Ossetia; and from 10 

to 5 percent in Dagestan. The exodus of Russians has 

only continued since then, although census figures are 

not available.4

 Meanwhile, the educational system has 

largely collapsed while there is a rapid population increase due to historically high birth rates.

Since 2004, with the strengthening of the “vertical 

of power” in Russia, the republics are ruled increasingly by elites whose main feature is loyalty (of an 

often personal nature) to the leadership in Moscow 

rather than, as had been the case, with roots in the local politics of the region. This has been a source of additional friction between Moscow and the populations 

of the North Caucasus. Not only are these populations 

no longer able to elect their leaders even on paper, but 

their leaders are responsive mainly to the demands of 

the distant capital rather than their own needs. While 

the most well-known example is Chechnya, where 

Moscow supported the elevation of the Kadyrov clan 

to lead the republic, the most egregious case is Ingushetia. There, a highly respected but independentminded leader, General Ruslan Aushev, managed to 

keep the republic stable and peaceful during the first 

Chechen war and its chaotic aftermath. Deemed too 

independent, he was replaced in 2002 by a Federal 

Security Service (FSB) officer of Ingush descent but 

with little connection to the region, Murad Zyazikov. 

Zyazikov’s subsequent mismanagement, insensitivity 
124

to local power-brokers, and repression alienated considerable parts of the population and led numerous 

young Ingush to join the armed resistance. KabardinoBalkaria (KBR), Putin similarly appointed a Moscowbased businessman with roots in the republic, Arsen 

Kanokov, to the presidency in 2005, with the explicit 

purpose of appointing a person without links to the 

“clan politics” of the republic. However, Kanokov’s 

lack of a popular base in KBR led the situation to deteriorate further.5

The North Caucasus is no longer the scene of 

large-scale warfare concentrated in Chechnya, as 

was the case in 1994-96 and 1999-2002. Instead, the 

resistance has morphed into a low-to-medium level 

insurgency that spans the entire region. Chechnya is 

among the calmer areas of the region, with the epicenter of the resistance having moved first to Ingushetia, 

then to Dagestan, with spikes of violence in KBR and 

the other republics as well. The conflict pits Moscow 

and its local allies, such as the Kadyrov clan, against 

loosely coordinated multiethnic groups of insurgents 

that largely remain led by ethnic Chechens. This insurgency no longer sees itself as a nationalist movement, but as part of the global jihadi movement. As 

such, it seeks the establishment of a region-wide Islamic state, dubbed the “Caucasus Emirate.” Inspired 

by the global jihadi movement, the insurgency targets 

not only Russian forces but also civilian authorities 

across the region, as well as engaging in terrorist attacks on civilians, including in Russia proper. Thus, 

Chechnya has come to resemble Kashmir: a formerly 

nationalist and separatist insurgency morphed into 

a jihadi movement with whom central authorities 

can no longer, realistically, expect to reach a political 

compromise.
125

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

The present condition of the conflict in the North 

Caucasus is a fairly recent development, having undergone deep transformations in the past decade. An 

overview of the history of the conflict makes this clear. 

Indeed, it suggests that in 1989, ethnicity was increasingly politicized across the former Soviet Union. The 

ethno-nationalist uprisings and movements of 1989-94 

clearly provide corroboration for that assessment. By 

contrast, religion was not politicized, and would not 

be for another decade. Among North Caucasus ethnic groups, only the Chechens had both the incentives 

and the capacity to sustain an insurgency against the 

Russian state, while a religious revival gradually got 

under way, centered on Dagestan. It was the first war 

in Chechnya in 1994-96 that attracted militant Islamist 

groups to the North Caucasus, whose ideology came 

to spread across the region, fanning out from Chechnya and Dagestan to span the North Caucasus.

The Salience of the Deportations.

 The resistance of Chechens as well as other North 

Caucasian peoples to Russian rule in the 19th century 

is legendary. It is instructive to note that Russia had 

annexed Georgia by 1801, and acquired control over 

Armenia and Azerbaijan gradually in 1812-13 and 

1827-28. By contrast, the areas north of the mountains 

were not subjugated until 1859-64. It took Russia 30 

years after gaining control over the South Caucasus 

to pacify the North. Chechens, Dagestanis, and the 

Circassian peoples to the west fought an unequal 

battle until the 1860s to escape Russian rule.6

 Under 
126

the legendary Dagestani chieftain, Shamil, the areas 

that today form southern Chechnya and inner Dagestan formed a shrinking independent Islamic state, 

an Imamate, from 1824 until the Russian capture of 

Shamil in 1859.7

 The Circassian rebels were not defeated until the mass expulsion of Circassians to the 

Ottoman Empire in 1864. 

Even following the incorporation of the North 

Caucasus into the Russian empire, the northeastern 

regions were only partially pacified, but never appeared to become integrated with Russia in ways that 

other minority-dominated areas, such as in the Volga 

region, did. The physical expulsion of the majority of 

the Circassian population helped Russia manage the 

northwestern Caucasus; but Chechnya and Dagestan 

remained unruly. Whenever Russia was at war or otherwise weakened, these lands saw rebellions of varying length and strength. This occurred after World War 

I during the Russian civil war 1918-21, and, though in 

a much smaller scale, during the collectivization of the 

1930s and World War II. In 1944, this obstinate refusal 

to submit had tragic consequences. Falsely claiming 

that Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, and Balkars had collaborated with the invading German forces, Joseph 

Stalin in February 1944 ordered the wholesale deportation of these peoples to Central Asia. Entire populations were loaded on cattle wagons and transported 

in the middle of winter to the steppes of Central Asia, 

where little preparation had been made for their arrival. An estimated quarter of the deportees died during 

transport or shortly after arrival due to cold, hunger, 

or epidemics.8

The largest number of the deported peoples of the 

North Caucasus was the Chechens. However, until 

deportation, Chechens primarily identified with their 
127

Teip or clan, not as members of a Chechen nation. More 

than anything, deportation helped develop national 

consciousness among the Chechens. The demographic consequences of deportation and the 13-year exile 

of the Chechens until they were allowed to return in 

1957 are very tangible. Between 1926-37, the Chechen 

population increased by 36 percent; in another 11-

year period, between 1959 and 1970, the figure was 46 

percent. But during the 20-year period from 1939-59, 

the rate of increase was only 2.5 percent, although the 

population would almost have doubled under normal 

circumstances.9

 Thus, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the deportations in the collective memory 

of the punished peoples. With regard to the Chechens, it had important political consequences that did 

not immediately materialize among the much smaller 

Ingush, Karachai, and Balkar populations. Most leaders of the Chechen movement for independence in 

the 1990s were either born or grew up in exile in Kazakhstan. The deportation convinced many Chechens 

that there was no way for them to live securely under 

Russian rule; it also explains the extent of support for 

separation from Russia among the people and perhaps the readiness among portions of the population 

to embrace radical ideologies of resistance.

After the August coup in Moscow against Mikhail 

Gorbachev that spelled the end of the Soviet Union, 

most constituent republics declared their independence. So did two autonomous republics within the 

Russian Federation: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Tatarstan, encircled by Russia proper, began negotiations on mutual relations with Moscow that eventually led to a deal in 1994 that granted Tatarstan broad 

autonomy. In Chechnya, however, the nationalist 

movement in power was less compromising. Gen-
128

eral Jokhar Dudayev, who had seized power from 

the former communist leadership in September 1991, 

was elected President of Chechnya and declared its 

independence soon after. Chechnya, in this context, 

stood out by being the only autonomous republic in 

Russia where a nationalist movement took power and 

ousted the communist party leadership. In this sense, 

it resembled the developments in Georgia and Armenia more than that of the Central Asian republics or 

Russia’s other autonomous republics: The leadership 

consisted of true nationalists, not former Communist 

elites that cloaked a nationalist mantle. 

While Russian President Boris Yeltsin made an 

abortive attempt to rein in Dudayev by sending special forces to Chechnya to restore Moscow’s rule, Dudayev had managed to create a presidential guard that 

was enough of a deterrent to avoid Russian military 

action. At this point, Russia was itself in a chaotic situation. Yeltsin was preoccupied with building Russian 

statehood, and Chechnya was put on the back burner. 

However, by 1994, Yeltsin had consolidated his power 

after physically attacking his parliamentary opposition in October 1993—an action that indebted him to 

the military and security forces. Chechnya hence remained as a thorn in the eye of a rising Russia. Moreover, Chechnya’s de facto independence and the heavily anti-Russian rhetoric emanating from Dudayev 

was foiling Russian plans of asserting control over the 

South Caucasus states of Azerbaijan and Georgia, in 

particular controlling the westward export of Caspian 

oil resources. Thus, for both internal and external reasons, the Russian government was now prompted to 

“solve” the Chechnya problem. Serious negotiations 

between Moscow and Grozny were never attempted, 

mainly because of the personal enmity between Du-
129

dayev and Yeltsin.10 After seeking briefly to use subversion to overthrow Dudayev without success, the 

Russian government decided to launch a wholesale 

invasion of Chechnya in late 1994.11

Importantly, the Chechen movement for independence was an almost entirely secular affair.12 Its 

chief leaders, such as Jokhar Dudayev and Aslan 

Maskhadov, were former Soviet officers with highly 

secular lifestyles. This is not to say that Islamist elements were not present: They did develop among the 

Chechen leadership, mainly through the efforts of 

Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Movladi Udugov, high 

officials in Dudayev’s administration. However, they 

remained largely marginal, being able to assert themselves only tepidly during the internal crisis that Dudayev experienced in 1993, in which he briefly began 

using increasingly religious language in an attempt to 

shore up legitimacy when faced with growing criticism of his mismanagement of Chechnya’s economy. 

Moreover, there is significant evidence suggesting 

that Yandarbiyev and Uduguov embraced Islamism 

in a mainly instrumental way.13

The First War.

Contrary to Moscow’s expectations, the Russian 

threat rallied erstwhile skeptics around Dudayev once 

the war started. Aided by the dismal character of the 

Russian military campaign, the Chechen forces were 

able to resist the Russian invasion. Getting bogged 

down in Chechnya, the Russian military resorted to 

brutal tactics to subdue an opponent they had thoroughly underestimated, and used air bombing and 

artillery to level Grozny before entering it. Only after 2 months did the Russian army manage to estab-
130

lish control over the city—at the cost of thousands of 

Russian casualties, over 20,000 killed civilians, a total 

destruction of the city, and hundreds of thousands of 

refugees. The war continued, with the Chechen forces 

regrouping in the south of Chechnya. Meanwhile, Dudayev himself was killed by Russian forces in April 

1996. Despite this setback, the Chechen forces in August 1996 managed to stage a counteroffensive, and 

retake the three major cities of Chechnya, including 

Grozny, in 3 days of fighting. This amounted to a total 

humiliation of the Russian forces, and the government 

was forced to end the war and pull out all its forces by 

a cease-fire signed 3 weeks later. 

The war led to the total devastation of Grozny and 

many other Chechen towns and villages. According to 

the most credible estimates, the death toll in the first 

war was in the range of 50,000 people.14 Compared 

with the war in Afghanistan, the Chechen war was 

far more lethal for the Russian army. During 1984, 

the worst year in Afghanistan, almost 2,500 Soviet 

soldiers were killed. In Chechnya, Russian losses surpassed this number within 4 months of the intervention. At its highest, the shelling of Grozny, counted 

by the number of explosions per day, surpassed the 

shelling of Sarajevo in the early 1990s by a factor of at 

least 50. Grozny was literally leveled to the ground in 

a destruction that recalled the battle of Stalingrad. 

Moreover, the war was dominated by massive human rights violations, which are considered the worst 

in Europe since World War II. Russian forces engaged 

in several well-documented massacres of civilians, 

the most well-known of which occurred in the village 

of Samashki in April 1995. As noted above, the first 

war in Chechnya was waged almost exclusively in the 

name of national independence. But it is in the context 
131

of the brutality of the Russian onslaught that the first 

jihadi elements appeared in Chechnya. Indeed, it is 

also the context in which the Chechen leadership and 

fighters welcomed or tolerated these foreign recruits; 

there is ample evidence that there was little love lost 

between the Chechen leadership and the jihadis—but 

the Chechens needed all the help that they could get, 

and were hardly in a position to turn away these newfound allies, all the more since they were exceptionally effective in combat. 

Similarly, this is the context in which terrorist tactics enter the Chechen war. Practiced from the outset 

by the Russian detachments, some of the Chechens 

commanders gradually came to employ them. Here, 

the notorious Shamil Basayev deserves particular 

mention, whose hostage-taking raid on a hospital in 

the southern Russian town of Budyonnovsk in June 

1995 was the first large-scale use of terrorism by the 

Chechens. It occurred at a time when the Chechen 

cause seemed all but lost, and arguably contributed 

to turning the tide in the war, or at least in forestalling 

defeat. Basayev himself was in one sense an unlikely 

terrorist: Only 3 years earlier, he had deployed as a 

volunteer to fight the Georgians in Abkhazia, being 

among the North Caucasian volunteers that received 

training and assistance for the purpose from the Russian military intelligence services.15

The number of foreign fighters in the first war was 

small, perhaps a few hundred at most. These were 

mainly the roving “Arab Afghans” who had fought in 

Kashmir, Tajikistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which 

was the big focus of jihadi attention in the early 1990s. 

Tellingly, the person who actually declared a jihad on 

Russia was none other than Akhmad Kadyrov, then 

mufti of Chechnya, who would switch sides in 1999, 
132

and became Russia’s local satrap, a position his son, 

Ramzan, inherited upon his assassination in May 2004.

The Inter-War Period.

The August 1996 accords, complemented by a formal peace treaty in May 1997, granted Chechnya de 

facto independence, though the issue of Chechnya’s 

status was deferred until December 31, 2001. In practice, Chechnya had the opportunity to build what in 

practice amounted to an independent state. Russian 

law did not apply in Chechnya, and no Russian police, 

army, customs, or postal service operated there. 

However, for both internal and external reasons, 

this second attempt at independence in a decade ended in a dismal failure. Russia consistently prevented 

Chechnya from seeking outside financial help, and 

though it committed funds to the reconstruction of 

the war-ravaged republic, $100 million disappeared 

before they even reached Chechnya. In a celebrated 

statement, President Yeltsin publicly admitted “only 

the devil” knew where the money had gone.16 Hence 

the basis on which the Chechen government could 

create a functioning state was shaky indeed. 

Yet initial signals were positive. In a presidential 

election that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) termed largely free and fair, 

the population of Chechnya overwhelmingly voted 

for Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of Staff of the Chechen 

armed forces and the most moderate among the three 

presidential contenders. Thus, Chechnya acquired a 

legitimate government that was open to compromise 

and cooperation, although it never wavered from its 

commitment to an independent Chechnya. Sadly, 

this initial stability did not last. Chechnya was awash 
133

with young, unemployed war veterans with arsenals 

of weapons, whose loyalty was to individual field 

commanders rather than to the central Chechen government. With the economic depression deepening, 

Maskhadov’s authority over Chechnya gradually diminished, and the government became unable to uphold law and order. Various criminal groups emerged 

that engaged in smuggling and kidnapping, and the 

government showed its inability to effectively deal 

with this problem. Most alarmingly, warlords Shamil 

Basayev and the Jordanian-born Khattab began planning for the unification of Chechnya with the neighboring republic of Dagestan, still part of the Russian 

Federation. Maskhadov was either unwilling or unable to rein in these warlords, fearing an intra-Chechen war. As a result, Basayev and Khattab were able to 

recruit hundreds of Dagestanis and other North Caucasians, including Chechens, into what they termed 

an Islamic Brigade based in Southeastern Chechnya. 

This brigade would eventually launch the incursion 

into Dagestan in August 1999, which precipitated the 

second war.

It is instructive, at this point, to compare Chechnya to the major other armed conflict in Europe of the 

time: Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, Chechnya was similar to Bosnia in terms of the level and character of the 

jihadi presence; where it differed was in the absence of 

a Dayton-type internationalized conflict management 

mechanism.

Indeed, most jihadis that came to fight in Chechnya were veterans of the Bosnian campaign. This was 

true for the poster child of Chechen jihadis, the Saudiborn Amir al-Khattab. What is seldom recalled is the 

extent of the Islamist contagion in Bosnia at the time 

of the Dayton Accords. Indeed, the leadership of the 
134

Bosnian Muslims in many ways leaned more toward 

Islamism than that of the Chechens: Alija Izetbegovic, 

the Bosnian Muslim leader, had a long history of Islamist inclinations dating back to his involvement 

in the Young Muslim organizations in Bosnia, Mladi 

Muslimani, during World War II .17 Haris Silajdzic, his 

closest advisor, received Islamic education in Libya 

and served as an advisor to Bosnia’s spiritual leader, 

the Reis-ul-Ulema. By contrast, the only Islamist to lead 

the Chechen resistance was Yandarbiyev, who only 

served as interim president between Dudayev’s death 

in April 1996 and Maskhadov’s election in January 

1997. By contrast, Dudayev and Maskhadov were considerably more secular than the key Bosnian leaders.

The jihadi presence in Bosnia was a real problem 

at the close of the war. The Bosnian leadership was 

split between those wanting to rid Bosnia of the foreign radicals, and those grateful for their support and 

who wanted to allow them to stay. Most jihadis were 

nevertheless evicted shortly following the Dayton Accords, after several altercations with North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) forces brought attention 

to their presence.18 Indeed, this highlights the main 

difference between Bosnia and Chechnya: Chechnya 

had the Khasavyurt treaty that postponed the key issue in the conflict; was never fully implemented; was 

bilateral and lacked any international guarantor; and 

lacked international peacekeeping forces. Bosnia, on 

the other hand, had a real peace treaty, and NATO 

forces to keep that treaty. Thus, most jihadis were 

gradually evicted from Bosnia following the Dayton 

Accords. However, small numbers remained until as 

late as 2007, when the Bosnian government finally removed the last remnants.19
135

In Chechnya, there was no force capable of removing the jihadi elements. Indeed, the Maskhadov administration was considerably weaker than its Bosnian 

counterpart, and could not rely on an international 

force, whether military such as the NATO Implementation Forces (IFOR) or civilian such as the Office of 

the High Representative. Unlike Bosnia, which was 

awash in international assistance already a year following the Dayton Accords, Chechnya received next to 

no foreign assistance. Thus, the crippled Maskhadov 

government was in no position to successfully oust 

the jihadis. This was not for a lack of trying: In 1998, 

there was even fire exchanged between the Chechen 

government forces and jihadi groups. But unlike in 

Bosnia, the jihadi forces led by Khattab had found a 

powerful local ally in Shamil Basayev. Maskhadov 

was thus faced with a dire choice. He could either 

confront the jihadis that had ensconced themselves 

in southeastern Chechnya, at the cost of a Chechen 

civil war; or he could tolerate their presence, preserving peace and trying to strengthen state institutions. 

In the end, he chose the latter—which appeared the 

lesser of two evils. While he even sought a deal with 

Moscow in rooting out the radicals, a call that went 

unanswered, his decision contributed greatly to the 

failure of Chechen state-building and led directly to 

the second war.20

Thus, the Chechnya-based jihadis coalesced with 

Wahhabi groups that had emerged independently in 

Dagestan in the late 1990s. Training camps developed 

modeled on those in Afghanistan, where small numbers of people from the entire North Caucasus and 

beyond received training; many then fought in the 

second Chechen war, and subsequently spread the 

militant ideology and tactics back to their own home 

republics.
136

The Second War.

During the course of the second Chechen war, 

which began in October 1999, concern grew over the 

radicalization of the Chechen resistance movement 

and its links to extremist Islamic groups in the Middle 

East. Indeed, authors like Gordon Hahn have come to 

conclude that the “key, if not main factor driving the 

violence in the North Caucasus” is “the salience of local cultural and the Salafist jihadist theo-ideology and 

the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement.”21 While this chapter takes issue with that claim, 

the Chechen resistance has indeed acquired a much 

stronger Islamic character. The use of Islamic vocabulary such as jihad (holy war) or mujahedin (resistance 

fighters) increased markedly, as did active support for 

the Chechen cause by radical Islamic groups in the 

Middle East, at least until the U.S. invasion of Iraq led 

jihadis to flock to that conflict. 

Moscow managed to drive this point across especially after September 11, 2001 (9/11). Immediately 

after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Russian leadership began drawing comparisons between 

the attacks and the situation in Chechnya. Only hours 

after the collapse of the World Trade Centers, Russian State television broadcast a statement by President Vladimir Putin expressing solidarity with the 

American people, but also reminding the audience of 

Russia’s earlier warnings of the common threat of “Islamic Fundamentalism.” This marked the beginning 

of a strategy aiming to capitalize on the tragic attacks 

on America by highlighting the alleged parallels between the attacks on the United States and the situation in Chechnya. “The Russian people understand 

the American people better than anyone else, having 
137

experienced terrorism first-hand,” President Putin 

said the day after the attacks.22

This turned out to be the harbinger of a diplomatic 

campaign targeted at Western countries intended to 

shore up legitimacy, if not support, for the Russian army’s violent crackdown in Chechnya.23 This campaign 

was part and parcel of a five-step strategy to reduce 

the negative fallout of the war in Chechnya. The first 

component of that strategy was to isolate the conflict 

zone and prevent both Russian and international media from reporting on the conflict independently. The 

kidnapping of Andrei Babitsky, a reporter for Radio 

Liberty, early on served as a warning for journalists 

of the consequences of ignoring Moscow’s rules on 

reporting the conflict. Since then, only a few journalists have actually been able to provide independent 

reporting from Chechnya. Most prominent has been 

the late Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya who 

was murdered in Moscow in 2007, and French writer, 

Anne Nivat. 

The second prong in the strategy was to rename the 

conflict: Instead of a “war,” it was an “anti-terrorist 

operation.” Third, and stemming directly from this, 

Russia sought to discredit the Chechen struggle and 

undermine its leadership by accusing them individually and collectively of involvement with terrorism. 

Russia’s campaign against Chechen President Aslan 

Maskhadov’s chief negotiator, Akhmed Zakayev, is 

one example of this. This nevertheless backfired as 

first Denmark and then Great Britain refused to extradite Zakayev to Russia; Great Britain instead providing him with political asylum. Fourth, Russia sought 

to “Chechenize” the conflict and turn it into an intraChechen confrontation by setting up and arming a 

brutal but ethnically Chechen puppet regime in Gro-
138

zny under Kadyrov, the former Mufti (a professional 

jurist interpreting Muslin law) of the republic. This 

would reduce Russian casualties and enable hostilities 

to be depicted as a war between Chechen factions that 

Russia was helping to stabilize. Fifth, after branding 

the war as an anti-terrorist campaign, discrediting the 

rebel leadership, and trying to turn the war into a civil 

war among Chechens, Russia declared that the war 

was over. 

The second war proved as heavy on the civilian 

population as the first. In many ways, Russian abuses 

were more systematic. For example, the Russian leadership set up what they termed “filtration camps”—

essentially concentration camps that gathered male 

Chechens of fighting age, and in which torture and 

disappearances were rampant.24 Whereas European 

countries and the United States kept a moderate but 

noticeable level of criticism against Russia’s massive 

human rights violations in Chechnya during both the 

first war in 1994-96 and in 1999-2001, Russia succeeded in convincing western observers it was not fighting 

a people, but terrorists. In an atmosphere of increased 

cooperation between Russia and the West, with American need for Russian intelligence and cooperation in 

Afghanistan, a halt to criticism on Chechnya became 

the foremost price Russia managed to extract. 

A Regional Insurgency.

Today, the nationalist Chechen leadership is almost exclusively an expatriate phenomenon. The 

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has for all practical 

purposes ceased to exist; instead, the insurgency 

brands itself the “Caucasus Emirate” (CE), overtly 

boasts of its belonging to the global jihad, and oper-
139

ates across the North Caucasus. Studies of violent 

incidents in the North Caucasus agree that the violence peaked in April 2001, 18 months into the second 

Chechen war. From 2002 to 2006, violence was fairly 

steady before declining to a low point in 2006-07.25

From 2007 onwards, however, violence has been on 

a steady increase, albeit fluctuating in both intensity 

and regional focus. Already in 2005, Dagestan and Ingushetia began seeing escalating violence, rivaling at 

times the levels in Chechnya.26 Since 2007, the situation has continued to deteriorate, with the number of 

violent incidents rising sharply every year from 2007 

to 2010.27 In 2009 alone, for example, the number of 

violent incidents went from 795 to 1,100, with fatalities mounting from 586 to 900.28 In the first 11 months 

of 2010, federal prosecutors acknowledged the death 

of 218 security personnel and the wounding of 536.29

From 2008 onward, Dagestan and Ingushetia have 

alternated in the lead in the frequency of incidents.30

In 2010 and 2011, the violence escalated significantly 

in the Western republic of KBR as well—marking the 

diffusion of large-scale and enduring violence beyond 

the republics bordering Chechnya. Thus, in 2010 political violence claimed 79 deaths and 39 wounded; the 

first 11 months of 2011 saw those figures rise to 98 and 

39, respectively.31 As if this was not enough, 2011 also 

saw violence spread to North Ossetia, a traditionally 

calm and majority Orthodox Christian republic.32

RUSSIAN POLICIES

What role did Russian policies play in transforming the conflict from a contained, nationalist rebellion 

to a sprawling jihadi insurgency? Counterintuitively 

as it may seem, Russian policies have contributed di-
140

rectly to this development. In another parallel to the 

Bosnian conflict, Russian rhetoric mirrored that of the 

Serbs: misunderstood defenders of Europe against 

the threat of Islamic radicalism, the “green wave.” Indeed, this line of reasoning has been visible in Russian 

outreach efforts since the mid-1990s, with increasing 

fervor following 9/11.33 But more than just arguing for 

their case, Russian officials actively worked to make 

the reality of the conflict conform to their vision of 

it. Thus, there was a remarkable pattern in Russia’s 

priorities during the second war: the priority given 

to targeting the nationalist Chechen leadership rather 

than the jihadi elements within it. Therefore, on the 

battlefield, Russia targeted field commanders like 

Ruslan Gelayev, as well as Maskhadov himself, whom 

Russian forces killed in March 2005. On the diplomatic 

front, Russian diplomats and lawyers furiously prosecuted and sought the extradition of secular leaders 

like Zakayev and Maskhadov’s foreign minister, Ilyas 

Akhmadov. By comparison, Islamist Chechen leaders 

have fared much better. Among exiles, Movladi Udugov remains alive, among the few remaining members 

of the first generation of Chechen leaders to survive. 

Yandarbiyev was killed in Qatar by Russian agents, 

but only in 2004. Similarly, the current leader of the 

CE, Dokka Umarov, has served since June 2006. The 

most notorious Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev, 

was killed in 2006, but not necessarily by the Russians.

French journalist, Anne Nivat, once wrote that the 

safest place in Chechnya was near Shamil Basayev: 

Russian bombs never appeared to fall there. Given Basayev’s connection with Russian special forces (GRU) 

through the conflict in Abkhazia, numerous conspiracy theories emerged of Basayev’s continued relationship with Russian state institutions; indeed, news re-
141

ports following his death suggested that he was killed 

accidently by explosives in the truck he was driving in 

mountain roads in Ingushetia.34

While allegations of Basayev’s GRU connections 

during the Georgia-Abkhaz war are well-established,35

those concerning subsequent periods are based mainly 

on innuendo. Clearer evidence is available in the case 

of Arbi Barayev, one of the most viciously militant as 

well as most criminalized of Chechnya’s warlords. 

Barayev was one of the key forces seeking to undermine Maskhadov’s leadership in the interwar era; it 

was his group that kidnapped and beheaded foreign 

telecommunications workers in 1998, effectively forcing out the small international presence in Chechnya. 

Similarly, it was Barayev’s forces that engaged in firefights with Maskhadov’s troops in 1998. Following the 

renewed warfare, Barayev lived freely in the town of 

Alkhan-Kala, under Russian control, until his death 

in 2001—despite the fact that he was responsible for 

gruesome, video-recorded murders of captive Russian servicemen. As several observers have noted, his 

opulent residence was only a few miles away from 

a Russian checkpoint near his native Alkhan-Kala, 

while his car had an FSB identification which allowed 

him to race through Russian checkpoints.36 Tellingly, 

Barayev was killed by a GRU hit squad only after the 

FSB’s then-head of counterterrorism, General Ugryumov, had died. The apparent conclusion was that 

Ugryumov provided a cover for Barayev, and the 

former’s death made it possible for the GRU to take 

Barayev out.

Given the nature of this conflict, evidence can at 

best be inconclusive. But circumstantial evidence suggests two things: First, that during the second war 

there was no clear and unified chain of command on 
142

either the Chechen or the Russian side. Chechen forces 

paid nominal allegiance to Maskhadov but, in practice, field commanders behaved independently, and 

with little coordination. On the Russian side, detachments of the army, GRU, FSB, and Ministry of Interior 

played different roles in the conflict, roles that were 

poorly coordinated; moreover, they each appeared 

to keep ties with some Chechen commanders, while 

combating others. Second, the policies of the Russian 

leadership itself contributed to change the nature of 

the conflict from a nationalist rebellion to one where 

the enemy was Islamic jihadis. While this is likely in 

the long run to be of greater danger to Russia, it did 

succeed in making the conflict fit into Moscow’s desired narrative. After all, Maskhadov and the Chechen 

nationalist leadership was respected in Western circles, being granted meetings with Western officials 

and maintaining strong support among Western media, civil society, and human rights organizations. The 

jihadi elements, needless to say, did not and do not 

enjoy this status.

In a sense, however, Moscow is now faced both 

with a jihadi movement and a nationalist Chechnya. 

Indeed, the CE is everything it is blamed of being: a 

part of the global jihad, and a terrorist incubator on 

Europe’s borders. While primarily led by Chechens, 

it is most active in the other republics of the North 

Caucasus. But Moscow also is faced with a nationalist 

Chechen leadership in Grozny. Indeed, the Kadyrov 

administration appointed by Moscow has developed 

in such a nationalistic direction that the secular Chechen nationalists in exile, who broke with the Islamist 

faction with the establishment of the Emirate in 2007, 

began mending fences with Kadyrov, their erstwhile 

foe, by 2009.37 While a counterintuitive turn, the secu-
143

lar nationalists concluded that Kadyrov has in practice achieved what they failed to achieve through an 

armed rebellion: a Chechen republic that is for most 

practical purposes behaving as an independent entity. 

As early as 2005, Russian analysts began referring to 

Kadyrov’s moves as “separatism-light.”38

A PACIFIED CHECHNYA? 

Presently, Chechnya is arguably among the least 

violence-ridden republics in the North Caucasus. 

The last several years have seen widespread violence 

in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KBR; by comparison, 

Chechnya has been relatively stable. But the longterm outlook is clouded by the fragility on which this 

relative quiet rests.

The main reason for Chechnya’s stability is the 

dominance that Ramzan Kadyrov and his militia forces exert over the republic. These fighters, estimated at 

over 5,000 in number, consist mainly of former resistance fighters. Moscow initially sought to balance the 

Kadyrov clan with other political figures. Following 

Akhmad Kadyrov’s assassination, Ramzan—who had 

not yet achieved the eligible age for the presidency—

was appointed deputy prime minister. Chechnya was 

instead led by career police officer Alu Alkhanov, who 

had sided with Moscow already in the first war. By 

March 2006, Ramzan Kadyrov was elevated to the 

post of Prime Minister, replacing Sergey Abramov. 

Less than a year later, Alkhanov was dismissed and 

Kadyrov appointed President. Thus, by 2007, any political balances to Kadyrov had been removed; fighting forces outside his control nevertheless remained: 

the “Zapad” and “Vostok” battalions, the latter commanded by Sulim Yamadayev, were nevertheless dis-
144

banded in November 2008 following escalating tensions and actual armed clashes with Kadyrov’s forces. 

Yamadayev loyalists were evicted from Chechnya; 

Sulim Yamadayev was assassinated in Dubai in 2009, 

while his brother met the same fate in Moscow, presumably at Kadyrov’s orders.39 This removed the sole 

remaining check on Kadyrov’s power in Chechnya, to 

the chagrin of many decisionmakers in Moscow—but 

with the apparent blessing of Putin and Kadyrov’s immediate handler, the Chechen-born Vladislav Surkov, 

who serves as Putin’s first deputy chief of staff and 

chief ideologue. 

Kadyrov has walked a fine line between vows of 

absolute personal loyalty and subservience to Vladimir Putin, on the one hand, and institutional distancing from Russia. Thus, in 2007, he repeatedly urged 

Putin to stay on as president for life.40 In 2009, Kadyrov said “if it was not for Putin, Chechnya would not 

exist.”41 In January 2010, he added that “I am completely Vladimir Putin’s man. I would rather die 100 

times than let him down.”42 Kadyrov also delivers 

votes for the ruling party. In 2007, for example, official 

figures showed that 99.5 percent of the Chechen electorate cast their votes, and that 99.3 percent voted for 

the United Russia party.

On the other hand, Kadyrov has increasingly appealed to Chechen nationalism and sought to Islamize 

Chechnya. In December 2006, he publicly sought the 

prosecution of Russian officers responsible for civilian 

deaths in Chechnya.43 His attitude toward the Russian military, which he sought to have expelled from 

Chechnya, is best illustrated by his 2006 statement 

that “as for the generals, I’m not going to say that I 

care about their opinion.”44 Following his appointment as President, Kadyrov moved strongly to assert 
145

Chechnya’s economic and political autonomy. For 

example, he has sought the creation of a Chechen oil 

company that would keep the revenues of Chechnya’s 

oil industry instead of sending them to Moscow; and 

campaigned to have Chechens convicted elsewhere 

in Russia serve prison time in Chechnya.45 Already in 

2006, Kadyrov began urging women to comply with 

Islamic dress codes, something that was later officially 

promulgated with a program to strengthen “female 

virtue.”46 He has also spoken favorably of Shariah in 

general, and of both honor killings and of polygamy 

in particular, and referred to women as men’s property—all of which are in violation of Russian laws.47

Adding to this, Kadyrov has made a habit of diverting the enormous funds coming to Chechnya from 

the federal center. Indeed, Russian state auditors have 

repeatedly noted the disappearance of the equivalent 

of dozens of millions of dollars in state subsidies to 

Chechnya, which amount to 90 percent of the republic’s budget. 

Thus, all in all, Kadyrov has stabilized Chechnya on 

the surface. But the stability rests on a very weak foundation. On the one hand, it rests solely on the personal 

relationship between Kadyrov and Putin. As such, the 

question is whether the stability of the republic would 

outlive the departure from power of either man. Given 

the average life expectancy of Chechen politicians, the 

possibility of Kadyrov being assassinated is very real. 

If that were to happen, would the thousands of former rebels now forming the bulk of his militia pledge 

loyalty to a new leader, or would they return to the 

resistance, ushering in a third Chechen war? Even if 

Kadyrov remains in power, the defection of large sections of his militia to the resistance cannot be excluded. 

Similarly, Kadyrov’s pragmatism is exhibited by his 
146

decision to switch sides from the resistance to Russia. 

It is not inconceivable that he could switch sides again 

under some scenario—for example, if Putin were to 

leave power and his successor would discontinue the 

arrangement with Kadyrov. Before her death, Anna 

Politkovskaya observed that by his policies in Chechnya, Putin had essentially guaranteed a third Chechen 

war at some future point. She may have turned out to 

be prescient.48

CONCLUSION

The North Caucasus is sinking ever deeper into a 

process of Afghanization. While the external impetus 

of jihadi ideology has played a role in this development, this chapter has sought to show that the root 

cause of the region’s decline is the Russian government’s policies—in particular its prosecution of the 

wars in Chechnya; its over-reliance on repression in 

both Chechnya and the rest of the region; its centralization of power; its unwillingness to allow the North 

Caucasus to open up to the rest of the world; its failure 

to provide an economic future for the region’s population; a political discourse that is making North Caucasians increasingly estranged from Russian society; 

and the corruption and criminalization of the Russian 

political system. 

This situation destabilizes Russia, and forms its 

most acute political problem. But it does not only affect Russia: It greatly affects the security and prosperity of the South Caucasus, as well as potentially all of 

Europe. The impact on the South Caucasus is threefold. Most obviously, Azerbaijan and Georgia are directly affected by the violence and economic woes of 

the region. This is only likely to be exacerbated in the 
147

future: While Azerbaijan experiences rapid growth 

thanks to its oil and gas industry, Georgia has made 

great strides in reforms, not least in terms of practically abolishing administrative corruption. Over 

time, the contrast between these economies and the 

languishing North Caucasus will have consequences, 

in terms, for example, of migration flows. Secondly, 

the southern neighbors of the North Caucasus are affected by the diffusion of the conflicts in the North. 

Thus, flows of refugees—and fighters—from the 

North Caucasus into Georgia and Azerbaijan have 

been a recurring phenomenon over the past 2 decades, 

with destabilizing effects on both countries. Third, the 

Russian government has shown a distinctive tendency 

to assign blame to its neighbors when it has proven 

unable to deal with the consequences of its own failures in the North Caucasus. In the beginning of the 

second Chechnyan war, both Azerbaijan and Georgia 

were accused, without a shred of evidence, of serving 

as conduits for thousands of foreign fighters to Chechnya; ever since, Russian accusations have focused on 

Georgia, with threats of intervention into the Pankisi 

Gorge on Georgian territory in 2002, and actual instances of Russian bombings of the Gorge.49 Following 

the escalation of violence in 2008-11, Russian officials 

have made a custom of blaming Georgia—and occasionally Western powers—for actively colluding with 

the jihadi rebels in the North Caucasus. Thus, Russia’s 

tendency to blame others for its failures poses a constant risk to its neighbors.

This predicament is most acute, given the upcoming Olympic Games in Sochi. Given current trends, 

Moscow is unlikely to be able to pacify the North 

Caucasus ahead of the Games, and will be increasingly likely to blame others for any terrorist attacks that 
148

would threaten this prestigious event. The alternative 

option, a gigantic security operation to assert control 

over the region, would itself very likely have a spillover effect on the South Caucasus. 

Beyond the Caucasus itself, Russia’s misrule in the 

North Caucasus poses a threat to Europe as a whole. 

In fact, with the European Union (EU) now extended 

to the shores of the Black Sea, it is a direct neighbor of 

the North Caucasus. Through the Eastern Partnership, 

Partnership for Peace, and other instruments, the EU 

and NATO are seeking to contribute to the building 

of stability, security, and prosperity in their eastern 

neighborhood. In spite of the unresolved conflicts 

of the South Caucasus and Moldova, and the mixed 

scorecard for democratic development across the region, the Eastern neighborhood has indeed seen largely positive trends over the past decade. But the North 

Caucasus is the sole remaining area where Europe 

has little to no ability to influence developments, but 

which could nevertheless have a considerably negative effect on Europe. The region is already a transshipment point for smuggled goods to Europe, and an 

incubator of jihadi elements from the region and beyond. Thus far, the Islamic Emirate has stayed focused 

on targets in the North Caucasus and Russia. But given 

its broader ideological orientation and its perception 

of Europe as a collaborator with Russia in the repression of Muslims, the prospect of groups affiliated with 

the Emirate targeting Europe itself should not be excluded. After all, jihadi elements with connections to 

Central Asia have already been implicated in planned 

terrorist attacks in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

Thus, Russia’s failure to stabilize the North Caucasus has amounted to the creation of an Afghanistanlike environment in Europe: a failed state within a 
149

state. Moscow is patently unable to remedy the situation, seeming only to design policies that are as a 

whole counterproductive. Unfortunately, the failure 

of Russia to address the region’s problems is related 

directly to Russia’s very system. The sad fact is that as 

long as Russia itself maintains a political system based 

on kleptocratic authoritarianism, the prospects of the 

North Caucasus will remain dim. 

This poses a conundrum for Western powers. If 

the situation continues to deteriorate, Western powers may not be able to afford simply treating the North 

Caucasus as a domestic Russian issue. At the same 

time, their policy options in designing responses to 

the situation in the region are highly limited. While 

efforts could be undertake in conjunction with the 

South Caucasian states to contain the destabilization 

emanating from the North Caucasus, addressing the 

root causes of the problem will require a dialogue 

with Moscow, the prospects of which are dim.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Marina Kamenev, “Has Russia Lost Control of the North 

Caucasus?” Time, June 12, 2009, available from www.time.

com/time/world/article/0,8599,1904234,00.html; Emil Souleimonov, 

“Dagestan: the Emerging Core of the North Caucasus Insurgency,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, September 29, 2010, available 

from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5415.

2. Olof Staaf, “Moscow Unable to Afford New Development 

Program for the North Caucasus,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 

August 17, 2011, available from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5614; 

“Moscow Hosts Rally under the Motto ‘Stop Feeding Caucasus!’” 

Caucasian Knot, October 22, 2011, available from rf.eng.kavkaz-uzel.

ru/articles/18748.

3. Charles Blandy, North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching 

Destabilisation, Caucasus Series, 05/36, Shrivenham, UK: United 
150

Kingdom Defence Academy, Conflict Studies Research Center, 

August 2005, p. 6.

4. Sergey Markedonov, “’Russkiy Vopros’ v kavkazskom 

izmerenii” (“The ‘Russian question’ in the Caucasian dimension”), Caucasus Times, April 9, 2007, available from www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=12365; Olga I. Vendina et al., “The Wars 

in Chechnya and their Effects on Neighboring Regions,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2007, pp. 194-195, 

available from www.colorado.edu/ibs/waroutcomes/docs/EGE_2007_

WarChechnya_s4.pdf.

5. Paul Goble, “Kabardino-Balkaria Highlights Putin’s ‘Failure’ in the Caucasus,” Window on Eurasia, January 23, 2008, 

available from windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/01/window-oneurasia-kabardino-balkaria.html.

6. Marie Bennigsen Broxup, ed., The North Caucasus Barrier, 

London, UK: C. Hurst, 1992; John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1-40.

7. Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the 

Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, London, UK: Routledge, 2003.

8. Aleksandr Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation 

and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War, New 

York: W.W. Norton, 1981; Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, 

Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, Basingstoke, UK: Pan Books, 

1997, pp. 56-75.

9. Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of 

Nationalities, London, UK: MacMillan, 1970, p. 160.

10. See Gall and de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War.

11. For details, see Chap. 5, “The War in Chechnya,” in Svante 

E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical 

Conflict in the Caucasus, Richmond, VA: Curzon Press, 2001.

12. Emil Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 

9, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 48-71.
151

13. Julie Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The 

Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement,” Europe-Asia 

Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 38-39.

14. John B. Dunlop, “How Many Soldiers and Civilians Died 

During the Russo-Chechen War of 1994-96?” Central Asian Survey, 

Vol. 19, No. 3/4, 2000, pp. 328-338.

15. Boris Kagarlitsky, Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-Liberal Autocracy, London, UK: Pluto Press, 2002, pp. 229-234. Russian press reports in Novaya Gazeta, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and Versiya

have all provided documentation to this effect.

16. Peter Ford, “Yeltsin Admits Aid Misses Chechnya,” Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1997. Only $21 million of the $138 

million committed eventually reached Chechnya.

17. Gerard F. Powers, “Religion, Conflict and Prospects for 

Peace in Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia,” Journal of International 

Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, Summer 1996, available from www.georgefox.

edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swk/ree/Powers_Religion_

Oct%201996.pdf.

18. See Evan Kohlmann, Al Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The AfghanBosnian Network, Oxford, UK: Berg Publications, 2004; Michael 

A. Innes, Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens, 

Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997, pp. 55-56.

19. Anes Alic, “Foreign jihadis face Deportation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 

21, 8 November 2007, available from www.jamestown.org/

programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4532&tx_

ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=182&no_cache=1.

20. See Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” pp. 

46-50.

21. Gordon M. Hahn, Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right, 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

August 2011, p. 1.
152

22. RTR (Russian State Television), September 12, 2001, 1300 

GMT. See also Francesca Mereu, “U.S.: Russia Says Chechen Conflict Aids ‘Understanding’ Of U.S. Tragedy,” RFE/RL, September 

14, 2001.

23. See Janusz Bugajski, “Beware of Putin Bearing Gifts,” The 

Washington Times, October 10, 2001.

24. Human Rights Watch, “Hundreds of Chechens Detained 

in ‘Filtration Camps’,” February 17, 2000, available from www.hrw.

org/news/2000/02/17/hundreds-chechens-detained-filtration-camps.

25. John O'Loughlin and Frank D. W. Witmer, “The Localized 

Geographies of Violence in the North Caucasus of Russia,” Annals 

of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 101, No. 1, 2011, pp. 

178-201, first published on December 15, 2010.

26. Emil Pain, “Moscow’s North Caucasus Policy Backfires,” 

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Vol. 6, No. 13, June 29, 2005, available from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3151.

27. Valery Dzutsev, “Another Lost Year for the Kremlin in 

the North Caucasus: 2010 in Review (Part 1),” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 8, January 12, 2011, available from www.

jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%

5D=37350&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=

660e50c38e.

28. Human Rights and Security Initiative, “Violence in 

the North Caucasus—2009: A Bloody Year,” Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 14, 

2010, available from csis.org/files/publication/100114_Violence_

NorthCaucasus_2009optimize.pdf.

29. Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia’s North Caucasus: the Terrorism Revival,” ISN Insights, December 23, 2010, available from 

www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en

&ots627=fce62fe0-528d-4884-9cdf-283c282cf0b2&id=125837&tabid=

125818&contextid734=125837&contextid735=125818.

30. Human Rights and Security Initiative, “Violence in the 

North Caucasus—Spring 2010: On the rise, Again?” Washington, 
153

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 13, 2010, 

available from csis.org/files/publication/100513_Violence_in_the_

North_Caucasus_Spring_2010.pdf.

31. Igor Rotar, “Growing Violence in Kabardino-Balkaria 

Threatens to Destabilize the Northwest Caucasus,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 218, December 1, 2011, available from www.

jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38

732&cHash=530491ac52389684440e5dcc84e128a7.

32. Emil Souleimanov, “North Ossetia: Jihadization in the 

Making?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, June 8, 2011, available 

from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5573. 

33. Graeme P. Herd, “The Russo-Chechen Information Warfare and 9/11: Al-Qaeda through the South Caucasus Looking 

Glass,” European Security, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2002. 

34. “Basayev’s Death May Have Been an Accident,” Prague 

Watchdog, July 10, 2006; “Basayev Didn’t Save Face,” Kommersant, July 11, 2006, available from www.kommersant.com/page.

asp?idr=527&id=689111.

35. Kagarlitsky, Russia under Yeltsin and Putin, pp. 229-234. 

36. Sanobar Shermatova, ”The Secret War between Russian 

Intelligence Agencies,” Moscow News, August 8, 2000. Also see 

Khassan Baiev, Nicholas Daniloff, and Ruth Daniloff, The Oath: A 

Surgeon Under Fire, New York: Walker & Company, 2004.

37. Kevin Daniel Leahy, “Reconciliation between Akhmed 

Zakayev and Ramzan Kadyrov: A Triumph of Historical Pragmatism?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 25, 2009, available 

from www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5048.

38. Ivan Sukhov, ”Chechensky Ochag,” Agenstvo Politicheskikh 

Novostey, August 16, 2005, available from www.apn.ru/publications/

article1519.htm.

39. Ellen Barry and Michael Schwartz, ”Killing of Leader’s Foes 

May Test Kremlin’s Will,” New York Times, April 6, 2009, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/world/europe/07chechnya.html.
154

40. Andrew Osborn, “Ramzan Kadyrov: The Warrior King of 

Chechnya,” The Independent, January 4, 2007, available from www.

independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/ramzan-kadyrov-the-warriorking-of-chechnya-430738.html.

41. ”Kadyrov Says Putin Saved Chechnya,” RIA Novosti, April 

7, 2009, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20090407/120959179.html.

42. “Ramzan Kadyrov: ya sto raz umry za Putina” (“Ramzan Kadyrov: I would die a hundred times for Putin”), versia.ru, 

January 11, 2010, available from versia.ru/articles/2010/jan/11/

kadyrov_interview.

43. “Kadyrov Vows to Prosecute Federal Commanders for 

Abuses,” Chechnya Weekly, December 7, 2006.

44. Kevin Daniel Leahy, “Kadyrov’s Bluff,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Vol. 8, No. 10, May 17, 2006, p. 7, available from 

www.cacianalyst.org/issues/20060517Analyst.pdf.

45. Kevin Daniel Leahy, “Chechnya’s New President: Rational Actor or Ideological Zealot?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 

Vol. 9, No. 7, April 4, 2007, p. 6, available from www.cacianalyst.

org/files/070404Analyst_0.pdf.

46. See Human Rights Watch, ”You Dress According to Their 

Rules”: Enforcement of an Islamic Dress Code for Women in Chechnya, 

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011, available from www.hrw.

org/sites/default/files/reports/chechnya0311webwcover.pdf.

47. See, e.g., Oleg Antonenko, ”Chechnya: Gde konchayetsya 

konstitutsiya i nachinayetsya shariat?” (“Chechnya: where does 

the constitution end and sharia begin?”), BBC Russian Service, 

December 26, 2008, available from news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/

newsid_7800000/7800125.stm.

48. Personal communication, Washington, DC, 2006.

49. Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Georgia/Russia: Tbilisi Moves 

Against Pankisi,” RFE/RL, August 28, 2002, available from www.

rferl.org/content/article/1100642.html.
155

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the postSoviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate 

Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace 

Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force 

Base, AL; and taught at the University of Texas, San 

Antonio; and at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: Russia’s 

Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military 

and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He 

has also written many articles and conference papers 

on Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, 

and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in 

Eurasia. His two most recent books are Russo-Chinese 

Energy Relations: Politics in Command, London, UK: 

Global Markets Briefing, 2006; and Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American 

Strategic Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. Dr. Blank holds 

a B.A. in history from the University of Pennsylvania, 

and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from the University 

of Chicago.

SVANTE E. CORNELL is Research Director of the 

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies 

Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy 

Center affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, DC, and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development 

Policy. Dr. Cornell is an Associate Research Professor 

at SAIS.
156

GORDON M. HAHN is a Senior Associate (NonResident) at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC; a Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor in the Monterey Terrorism 

Research and Education Program at the Monterey 

Institute for International Studies in California; and 

an Analyst and Consultant for Russia—Other Points 

of View (www.russiaotherpointsofview.com). Dr. Hahn 

is author of the well-received books, Russia’s Islamic 

Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), Russia’s Revolution 

From Above, 1985-2000 (Transaction Publishers, 2002), 

and numerous articles in academic journals and other 

English and Russian language media. He has taught 

at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, and San 

Francisco State Universities and as a Fulbright Scholar 

at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia. Dr. Hahn 

writes and edits the bimonthly “Islam, Islamism, and 

Politics in Eurasia Report” published under the auspices of CSIS.

SERGEY MARKEDONOV has been a visiting fellow in 

the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program since May 2010. 

He is an expert on the Caucasus, as well as Black Sea 

regional security, nationalism, interethnic conflicts, 

and de-facto states in the post-Soviet area. From 2001 

to 2010, he worked as head of the Interethnic Relations 

Group and deputy director at the Institute for Political 

and Military Analysis in Moscow. He has held teaching positions at the Russian State University for the 

Humanities, the Moscow State University, and the 

Diplomatic Academy. Dr. Markedonov’s publications 

include several books and reports, about 100 academic 

articles, and more than 500 press pieces. Recently published books and reports include De facto States of the 
157

Post-Soviet Space: Particularities of the Nation-Building

(Caucasus Institute, 2012), The Turbulent Eurasia (Academia, 2010), “The Big Caucasus: Consequences of the 

‘Five Day War’,” and New Challenges and Prospects (International Centre for Black Sea Studies, 2009). 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Editor

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil