Office of Inspector General

Audit Report

DOT ESTABLISHED TIMELY CONTROLS FOR 

THE TIGER DISCRETIONARY GRANTS 

PROGRAM, BUT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO 

STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT

Department of Transportation

Report Number: MH-2012-188

Date Issued: September 20, 2012
U.S. Department of

Memorandum

Transportation

Office of the Secretary

of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: ACTION: DOT Established Timely Controls for

the TIGER Discretionary Grants Program, But 

Opportunities Exist To Strengthen Oversight

Department of Transportation

Report No. MH-2012-188

Date: September 20, 2012

From:

Joseph W. Comé

Assistant Inspector General for

Highway and Transit Audits

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-40

To: Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy

The Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) 

Discretionary Grants Program provides funding for capital investments to improve

the Nation's highway, bridge, public transportation, rail, and port infrastructure. 

The TIGER program is unlike the Department of Transportation's (DOT)

traditional, formula-based grants because it uses competitive discretionary grants 

to fund infrastructure projects. Congress initially appropriated $1.5 billion through 

the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 20091

Our objective was to assess OST's and the OAs' efforts to provide oversight of 

TIGER projects with a focus on the ARRA-funded portion of the program.

Specifically, we evaluated the effectiveness of (1) OST's management and 

oversight of the TIGER program, including the performance measures for 

determining economic and transportation-related impacts and (2) the OAs' policies 

and practices established for overseeing their respective TIGER projects.

and charged 

DOT with implementing the new program within 1 year. Since its establishment, 

the TIGER program has grown to over $3.1 billion through additional 

appropriations. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) administers 

the program and relies on four Operating Administrations (OA)—the Federal 

Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), 

the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and the Maritime Administration 

(MARAD)—for project-level oversight.

 1 Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009).
2

To conduct our audit work, we interviewed OST and OA Headquarters and 

regional personnel; reviewed policies, procedures, and practices; and analyzed 

program documentation. We statistically sampled 14 of 51 projects across the OAs 

with TIGER grant responsibilities and conducted an in-depth review of them. We 

also made site visits to review projects under construction and met with grantee 

and contractor personnel to gain their perspectives on the TIGER program. We 

conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing 

standards. Exhibit A details our scope and methodology and exhibit B lists the 

projects in our sample.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

Shortly after ARRA's passage, OST developed TIGER program policies that 

generally adhered to best practices for grant management. However, we identified 

vulnerabilities in four areas: (1) reviewing and finalizing grant agreements 

between the Department and grantees, (2) monitoring OAs' oversight of individual 

projects, (3) assessing OAs' oversight risks, and (4) measuring performance. For 

example, nearly one-third of the grant agreements for the 14 projects in our sample 

had unclear project milestones and scopes of work, which hinder OST’s ability to 

hold grantees accountable for meeting milestones and achieving expected results.

Also, while OST established reporting and oversight mechanisms for the OAs and 

grantees, OST lacks a formal process for documenting decisions and ensuring 

follow up on corrective actions by OAs. Further, OST’s TIGER program risk 

assessments focused on OST activities, resources, and policies for administering 

the program, but did not fully recognize risks within the OAs, which bear most of 

the burden of day-to-day oversight of TIGER projects. Finally, while OST 

required grantees to set performance measures for TIGER projects, it has not fully 

established a process for evaluating program performance based on project 

outcomes. For example, 42 of 53 performance measures in the grant agreements 

for our sample of 14 projects were not outcome-based, thereby limiting OST’s 

ability to describe the extent to which projects achieved expected benefits. Since 

subsequent appropriations for TIGER have more than doubled the program's 

funding, it is important that OST take timely actions to make oversight 

improvements.

OAs differed in their approach, experience, and capability to oversee the TIGER 

grantees and projects. FHWA and FTA had fully developed grant management 

policies in place when they assumed oversight of TIGER projects. FRA and 

MARAD only recently established grant management policies. However, they are 

still working on implementing standard oversight practices, such as routine site 

visits and verification of grantee information. This is occurring even as ARRAfunded TIGER projects are under construction and OAs have additional oversight 

responsibilities for new TIGER projects. Further, we found that FHWA and FRA 
3

did not fully coordinate to leverage FRA's experience and technical expertise on 

FHWA administered rail projects. Neither agency provided evidence of ongoing 

coordination on technical issues related to project design and construction

monitoring. FRA's limited involvement increases the risk of grantees not 

complying with safety and other rail standards, potentially resulting in a need for 

costly and disruptive corrective actions. The TIGER program emphasized the 

selection of projects with intermodal benefits, which highlights the importance of 

ensuring effective coordination between OAs in future rounds of TIGER funding.

We are making a series of recommendations to strengthen OST's and the OAs'

oversight of the continuing TIGER program.

BACKGROUND

Congress established the TIGER Discretionary Grant Program by appropriating 

$1.5 billion in ARRA funding for capital investments in surface transportation. 

OST’s Under Secretary for Policy has overall responsibility for the program. The 

goals of the TIGER program are to create and preserve jobs, promote economic 

recovery, and invest in infrastructure that has long-term economic benefits. DOT 

received more than 1,400 applications in response to the initial availability of 

funds and selected 51 grantees. In accordance with ARRA, DOT obligated the 

TIGER funding to the grantees by September 30, 2011. Federal law governing 

discretionary grants requires that all TIGER funds be expended by 

September 30, 2016.

The Department's policy for administering the TIGER program requires OST to 

monitor the implementation of the program; assess the performance of each of the 

grants; and approve major decisions on funding, coordination, and reporting. The 

OAs are responsible for overseeing each grant at the project level, including 

reporting monthly performance and financial information to OST, and ensuring 

the close-out of completed projects. TIGER program policy also requires that 

grant recipients monitor award activities, maintain financial records, track project 

status information, submit quarterly progress reports to OST, and collect project 

performance measurement data. OST developed site visit guidance that requires

OAs to perform a minimum of one site visit for each TIGER project, and OST to 

perform limited on-site monitoring based on risk-based selection criteria. 

From fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated funds for 

additional rounds of TIGER grants (the initial ARRA round is often referred to as 

TIGER I). In 2010, Congress provided $528 million for 42 capital projects and 33 

planning projects (TIGER II). In 2011, Congress provided $527 million for 46 

capital projects (TIGER III) and $500 million in 2012 (TIGER IV).
4

OST ESTABLISHED THE TIGER PROGRAM AND POLICIES IN A 

TIMELY MANNER, BUT VULNERABILITIES EXIST IN PROGRAM 

OVERSIGHT PROCESSES

While OST quickly established TIGER program policies and responsibilities, it 

does not have formal processes to ensure consistent, rigorous reviews of grant 

agreements before they are finalized and to track and follow up on OAs' corrective 

actions to address project concerns. OST also has not fully assessed risks related to 

the OAs' oversight of TIGER projects, as Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) ARRA guidance requires, or fully established a process for measuring 

program performance, based on program outcomes. 

OST Developed Policies for the Administration and Oversight of the 

TIGER Program in a Timely Manner

Within 1 year of ARRA's passage, OST created the TIGER program, selected 

grantees, and developed a program policy that generally adhered to best practices 

in grant management. The policy included a program structure that defined the 

roles and responsibilities of OST and the OAs, established methods to collect and 

report performance information, and created a plan to oversee and monitor the 

program and each grant. OST coordinated with FHWA, FRA, FTA, and MARAD 

to evaluate applications and subsequently selected 51 projects to receive 

$1.5 billion in TIGER funds. Creating the TIGER program was a challenge for 

OST because it had never managed a grant program of this magnitude.

OST Lacks a Consistent Process for Reviewing and Finalizing TIGER 

Grant Agreements

While agreements for 10 of the 14 projects in our sample had sufficient scope and 

detail, 4 lacked key elements to hold grantees accountable for achieving promised 

benefits and complying with agreed-to budgets and schedules. This is due in part 

to the lack of a formal OST review process with tools, such as a standard checklist 

and a method to document OST's review and approval of agreements. Such a 

process would better detect and prevent inconsistencies and missing information in 

the grant agreements. Problems we found included conflicting milestone dates 

within the same agreement, a lack of clear milestones to track project progress, 

and imprecise information on how TIGER funds would be used in relation to other 

sources of project funding. For example:

• The grant agreements for the Port of Gulfport Rail Improvement project in 

Gulfport, Mississippi; the Indianapolis Bicycle and Pedestrian Network in 

Indianapolis, Indiana; and Quonset Wind Energy and Surface Transportation, 

in North Kingston, Rhode Island, included conflicting schedules and dates. In 

one instance, the project schedule (which identifies an activity timeline) in the 
5

Quonset grant agreement has the start of construction for one pier occurring 

4 months later than the date in the agreement's milestone schedule (which 

identifies key deliverables). 

• The project and milestone schedules in the Port of Gulfport Rail Improvement 

grant provided only an estimate for completing the entire project. Unlike other 

TIGER grant agreements, it did not provide intermediate milestones to assess 

progress in ensuring timely completion of the project, such as the completion 

dates for each construction phase—design, bid, and construction. 

• The grant agreement for the Bella Vista project in Arkansas and Missouri did 

not specify items that TIGER funds will pay for, even though TIGER program 

policy requires that grantees outline the sources and uses of all project funds.2

In addition, OST did not ensure that OAs added project performance measures to 

grant agreements for 6 of the 14 TIGER projects in our sample within the required 

timeframe. OST's policy requires that grantees add performance measures to each 

grant agreement within 60 days of their signing. According to OST and OA 

program officials, performance measures had been added for all but 2 of the 51 

TIGER projects by April 2012.

Agreements with inconsistent or missing information do not adhere to best 

practices and grant principles developed by Federal, State, and local audit 

organizations—all of which call for grant agreements that include clear terms, 

conditions, and provisions to hold grantees accountable for achieving results.3

Similarly, OMB Circular A-102 requires that grantees outline their approach for 

achieving results, including a schedule of accomplishments and expected 

completion dates.4

OST Does Not Have a Formal Process To Document and Monitor the

Operating Administrations' Oversight of TIGER Projects 

Without a systematic OST process for reviewing grant 

agreements that adheres to best practices and OMB requirements, there is greater 

potential that future TIGER grant agreements will lack key elements necessary to 

ensure effective oversight and promote grantee accountability for results.

OST has not formalized a process to follow up on major decisions related to 

funding and project performance, corrective actions, overall program 

 2 DOT's Notice of Funding Availability for Supplemental Discretionary Grants for Capital Investments in Surface 

Transportation Infrastructure Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 74 FR 28755, June 17, 2009, 

requires grantees to provide the sources and uses of all TIGER project funds. 3 "Guide to Opportunities for Improving Accountability," Grant Accountability Project, October 2005; U.S. 

Department of Transportation's Financial Assistance Guidance Manual; OMB, “Updated Implementing Guidance for 

the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,” April 3, 2009; and TIGER policies and procedures. 4 OMB Circular A-102, "Grant and Cooperative Agreements with State and Local Governments."
6

expenditures, and project information from grantees. OST receives program and 

project performance information from the OAs and grantees through biweekly 

meetings with the OAs, monthly management reports from OAs describing issues 

associated with individual projects, quarterly reports from grantees, and site visits. 

Yet, OST does not have a systematic process to document key decisions it and the 

OAs make on how to address project issues or to ensure effective follow up on 

corrective actions that OAs have taken or plan to take. Instead, OST stated that it 

tracks the status of corrective actions through more informal discussions and 

emails with OAs and grantee officials, but OST was unable to provide copies of 

requested emails for the 14 projects in our sample. GAO guidance stipulates that 

key internal controls include the communication and documentation of relevant 

and reliable information, and effective, ongoing monitoring of agency activities as 

a basis to hold those responsible for administration of the program accountable for 

results. 5

Further, while the TIGER program office tracks expenditures on individual 

projects, it does not have overall expenditure targets for the program or a plan to 

assess the overall progress of the TIGER program in spending Federal dollars as 

quickly as possible. As of February 2012, the program had expended more than 32

percent of the first round of TIGER funding. OST has until September 2016,6

The ability to monitor and keep projects on track is important given the

challenging priorities for timely project completion set forth in ARRA and the 

delays that have developed in some projects underway. ARRA specified that 

TIGER projects scheduled for completion by February 2012 be given priority, 

although OST officials stated that other ARRA priorities, such as ensuring that 

projects have a significant impact, did not lend themselves to quick 

implementation. The difficulty with meeting ARRA's quick implementation 

priority is illustrated by the fact that only 11 of the 51 grant agreements contained 

project schedules that would meet the February 2012 priority goal. Most of the 

remaining 39 projects are scheduled to be completed by 2014 and one is due for 

completion in February 2016—7 months ahead of the September 30, 2016, 

deadline for spending the first round of TIGER funding. 

to 

fully expend ARRA funds, but has not demonstrated that it has a process to 

promptly identify and mitigate issues that could delay the timely expenditure of 

funds.

 5 According to GAO's "Internal Control and Management Tool," key transactions should be recorded promptly to 

maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling operations and making decisions. GAO-01-1008G, 

August 2001. 6 31 U.S.C. 1552 requires that all discretionary grant funds be spent before September 30 of the fifth fiscal year after 

the period of availability for obligation of a fixed appropriation account ends. In the case of TIGER grants, this date 

is September 30, 2016. On September 15, 2011, OMB issued a memorandum that directed Federal agencies to 

complete ARRA projects by September 30, 2013, with certain exceptions. Currently, OST is discussing with OMB 

whether this memorandum applies to the TIGER program and whether OST needs to apply for a waiver.
7

As of March 2012, grantees had not closed out any of the TIGER projects and 

only seven had fully expended their funding. In addition, the latest data we 

received from OST shows that 8 of 51 TIGER projects face actual or potential 

schedule delays.

7

Initially, OST's delayed initiation of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) process 

hindered its ability to receive timely and relevant information from grantees—a 

challenge the program will continue to face with additional rounds of TIGER 

funding in different legislation. PRA requires OST to get approval from OMB to 

receive quarterly reports and performance information directly from grantees—a 

process that can take over a year to complete. OST did not initiate the process to 

obtain OMB approval until February 2011, approximately 1 year after the 

Secretary selected projects for the TIGER program. OMB approved OST’s request 

for this information in July 2011, well after construction had begun on 40 of the 51 

TIGER projects. Because TIGER depends on annual congressional appropriations, 

OST officials will face the challenge of obtaining PRA approval with each new 

appropriation of TIGER funding.

OST officials stated that they could address scheduling issues as 

needed by making inquiries to the OAs. However, they had no formal process in 

place to track how the OAs and grantees were addressing delays across all 

projects. Given that the projects will be underway for several years and staff 

turnover may occur within that timeframe, the lack of a formal systematic process 

increases the risk that grantees will not be held accountable for meeting agreed-to 

schedules.

OST’s Analysis of Program Risk Did Not Adequately Assess OAs' 

Oversight Capabilities

While OST completed risk assessments of the TIGER program in 2009 and 2011, 

it did not address risks specific to each OA’s ability to effectively oversee TIGER 

projects in addition to their existing responsibilities. OMB requires agencies to 

identify, prioritize, and mitigate agency and program risks of new programs 

receiving ARRA funding.8

Likewise, the OAs did not fully assess their own risks related to the TIGER 

program because they considered TIGER projects, which are generally smaller 

than their other projects, to be less risky. For example, FHWA and FTA officials 

stated that their agencies manage large grant programs, and the dollar value of the 

TIGER projects were not significant enough for them to address in their ARRA 

OST's ARRA risk assessment focused on OST 

activities, resources, and policies for administering the program, but did not fully 

recognize risks within the OAs, which bear most of the burden of day-to-day 

oversight of TIGER projects. 

 7 The project performance data are current as of January 30, 2012. We requested, but did not receive more current 

information from OST. 8 OMB "Updated Implementing Guidance for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009," April 3, 2009.
8

risk assessments. Similarly, oversight risks at FRA and MARAD have not been 

fully assessed. OST's 2009 risk assessment did not address the lack of grant 

management policies at FRA and MARAD when the TIGER program began. 

Although OST's 2009 risk assessment recognized the OAs' need for TIGER 

dedicated resources, it did not specifically address the significant impact of the 

program's demands on FRA's staffing. In addition to the TIGER program, FRA 

has the responsibility to manage the new, largely ARRA-funded multibillion

dollar High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program. FRA's 2009 risk assessment 

did not focus on TIGER program risks, but instead addressed the risks of the high 

speed rail program. According to FRA, its resources to manage TIGER grants are 

strained and would be insufficient to perform oversight if additional TIGER 

projects were assigned to the agency, which is now the case. FRA now has the 

responsibility to administer an additional 13 projects from the second and third 

rounds of TIGER.

9 MARAD's risk assessment process was similarly insufficient. 

For example, its risk mitigation plan was modeled after a FHWA plan and 

references to nonapplicable FHWA programs remained in the document, 

indicating a lack of attention to risks specific to MARAD's capability to manage 

the TIGER program.

Without robust risk assessments, OST does not have an effective mechanism to 

identify OA risks that could impede the efficient and effective implementation of 

the TIGER program and to guide the OAs in mitigating those risks. TIGERspecific risk assessments at the OA level have become more critical as Congress 

continues to fund subsequent rounds of TIGER projects and as OAs' oversight 

responsibilities increase.

OST Proactively Established Performance Measures for TIGER 

Projects, But Is Not Positioned To Fully Assess Overall Program 

Performance

ARRA did not require performance measures, but OST took the initiative to 

require each TIGER grantee to develop performance plans that describe the 

projected outcomes for each project. However, OST has not instituted a process to 

effectively follow through on its plan to assess the program's overall performance.

Specifically, OST has not ensured that all projects set outcome-based performance 

measures and related targets necessary to make meaningful comparisons between 

projects. To assess the program's overall outcomes, OST is faced with the 

challenge of aggregating performance data across the 51 diverse projects that 

received ARRA funding. The absence of a more systematic process for developing 

performance measures will continue to hinder OST’s ability to assess the 

outcomes of the subsequent TIGER projects funded through non-ARRA

legislation.

 9 TIGER II assigned an additional seven projects to FRA, and TIGER III assigned an additional six.
9

Despite OST's emphasis on assessing performance and the availability of 

considerable guidance on best practices,10 our review of grant agreements for our 

sample of 14 projects found that most measures were not outcome based. Only 11 

of 53 measures in the grant agreements for the 14 projects in our sample were 

long-term outcome measures, such as improvement of bridge and road 

conditions.11

Moreover, OST does not have performance targets to assess the impacts of the 

TIGER projects on the Nation's transportation system. None of the performance 

measurement plans for the 14 projects in our sample included performance targets

or goals necessary to gauge project success. For example, the performance 

measurement plan for FRA's New Bedford, Massachusetts, project includes a 

measure of the number of rail cars passing over three bridges. The bridges were 

constructed over 100 years ago and due to structural deficiencies could allow 

trains to cross at a maximum speed of only 5 miles per hour. However, the 

performance management plan does not specify targets for the number of rail cars 

and the speed at which trains are expected to pass over the reconstructed bridges.

The remaining 42 measures focused on project outputs. Outcome 

measures compare the results of a program activity to its intended purpose; 

whereas output measures record the quantity and quality of an activity or effort. 

The lack of outcome measures hinders OST's ability to use performance 

information to describe the extent to which projects achieve the expected benefits. 

For example, MARAD's Quonset Wind Energy and Surface Transportation project 

in Rhode Island established measures that count volumes of container traffic, 

cargo throughput at the port, and improvements in revenue. The project's measures 

do not clearly link to expected program outcomes listed in the project's grant 

application, such as state of good repair or sustainability. According to OST, it 

will eventually use the output information grantees collect to report on each 

project's outcomes. However, OST is still developing the methodology needed to 

translate the output measures into long-term outcomes.

Finally, TIGER program policy states that OST will complete an analysis of the 

long-term benefits of the TIGER program, but OST has not yet determined how it 

will do so. Although it plans to aggregate performance information from a diverse 

set of projects designed to achieve a variety of outcomes, OST has not developed 

the specific methodology necessary to carry out this task. OST prepared a table 

showing the types of measures that it would aggregate into one of four 

classifications—usage, operations, safety, and state of good repair (see exhibit C);

but it is still developing the process for combining these disparate measures. In 

addition, OST acknowledged that it might be years before the benefits of the 

 10 "Guide to Opportunities for Improving Accountability," Grant Accountability Project, October 2005; and "Reporting 

Performance Information: Suggested Criteria for Effective Communication," Governmental Accounting Standards 

Board, October 2003. 11 Of the remaining 42 measures, 38 were output measures, such as passenger boarding or traffic counts, and 4 did not 

fit the definition of either type of measure.
10

projects can be quantified and reported, even as subsequent rounds of TIGER 

grants were funded.

LIMITATIONS EXIST IN THE OPERATING ADMINISTRATIONS'

OVERSIGHT OF TIGER PROJECTS 

OAs differed in their approach, experience, and capability to oversee the TIGER 

grantees and projects. FRA and MARAD did not have grant management policies

in place when they assumed oversight of TIGER projects. This was in contrast to

FHWA and FTA, which had fully developed grant oversight policies and 

practices.

12 While FRA and MARAD have since established grant management 

policies, they are still implementing standard oversight practices for grants, even 

as ARRA-funded TIGER projects are under construction and these agencies are

assuming oversight responsibilities for additional TIGER projects. In addition, 

FHWA and FRA did not fully coordinate to leverage FRA's technical experience 

and expertise during FHWA’s implementation of rail projects.

13

FRA and MARAD Have Not Fully Implemented Systematic Oversight 

Practices

FRA and MARAD had not administered significant grant programs and 

consequently had to develop new policies to oversee TIGER grantees after final 

selection of individual projects. FRA and MARAD are still implementing their 

standard oversight practices. MARAD finalized its grant management policy in 

May 2011, and FRA issued its grant management policy in March 2012.14 Both 

MARAD’s and FRA’s grant management policies were finalized well after the 

award of TIGER grants and after many projects had begun expending funds.15

FRA and MARAD have relied primarily on informal communications with 

grantees to provide oversight, such as phone calls and emails, as interim measures

to verify grantee information on the status of projects while they formalize 

standard practices. As of February 2012, FRA had not conducted a TIGER project 

 12 FTA employs Project Management Oversight Contractors (PMOC) to oversee each TIGER project. The PMOCs 

make periodic site visits to projects, or may be located on-site for large projects. They prepare monthly reports and 

quarterly project reviews that alert regional offices of issues and propose corrective recommendations. FHWA 

performs process reviews to assess State DOT practices and uses national review team assessments to focus on 

individual TIGER projects. FHWA's Office of Federal Lands Highway oversees its projects directly. 13 Given FRA’s resource constraints and FHWA’s experience with surface transportation projects, project oversight 

and delivery responsibilities were transferred to FHWA for 4 of the 6 TIGER rail projects. Therefore, on 

May 25, 2010, the National Gateway, Crescent Corridor, Colton Crossing, and Appalachian Short Line TIGER rail 

projects were transferred to FHWA. 14 These policies include standard operating practices for grant management, including financial oversight, project 

monitoring and reporting, and the roles and responsibilities of its staff. 15 MARAD’s Discretionary Grants Administration Manual is dated May 25, 2011, and FRA's Office of Railroad Policy 

and Development Grant Management Manual is dated March 2012. The award of the TIGER grants was announced 

on February 16, 2010, and project status reports show expenditures occurring well before policy documents were 

finalized.
11

site visit. MARAD had conducted site visits to six of its seven TIGER projects, 

but in many cases MARAD’s site visit reports did not contain all the elements 

outlined in its site visit report guidance.16

FRA has struggled to balance its TIGER responsibilities with its separate mandate 

to create a new, multibillion dollar high speed rail program. Its limited staff and 

the increasing demand for oversight of large dollar, high speed rail grants creates a 

challenge for FRA to provide the resources necessary to oversee the TIGER grant

projects. Specifically, FRA's Office of Passenger and Freight Programs, which 

manages FRA's TIGER projects, had a staff of only 4 grants managers charged 

with overseeing 8 different programs, including 315 active grants. During our field 

work, one grant manager stated that he was monitoring over 100 projects in the 

northeast region and that this heavy workload was the reason FRA had not visited 

any TIGER projects. 

For example, the September 27, 2011,

site visit report for the Green Trade Corridor project did not document interviews, 

identify the materials reviewed, nor explain how MARAD assessed grantee 

compliance with the requirements detailed in its site visit checklist. Further, the 

report did not state whether the project was on schedule or whether funds were 

being spent appropriately, although these were identified as purposes of the site 

visit. Because FRA and MARAD have received oversight responsibility for 

additional TIGER grants through the TIGER II and III selection processes, the 

absence of systematic oversight practices increases the risk that future TIGER 

projects will not be constructed on time, within budget, and in accordance with 

grant terms.

FHWA and FRA Coordination on Rail Projects Did Not Consistently 

Address Rail Standards

While some initial coordination occurred between FHWA and FRA on rail 

projects, FHWA and FRA grant agreements contained different requirements 

related to track safety standards. As steward of the TIGER program—which 

emphasizes projects with intermodal benefits—OST has the key role in ensuring 

that coordination between the OAs takes place. OST's TIGER policy states that 

OST will coordinate the administration of the program among the relevant OAs, 

but it does not specify under what circumstances or how the OAs should 

coordinate with each other on multimodal projects. Without clear guidance on how 

the OAs should coordinate, FHWA's Federal Lands Highway Division—the lead 

agency on four TIGER rail projects—and FRA did not leverage FRA's technical 

experience and expertise on rail systems. FRA's insufficient involvement in design 

and construction monitoring creates a risk of noncompliance with safety and other 

 16 MARAD's guidance for a site visit report includes findings on administrative, programmatic, and technical issues, as 

well as recommendations and action items.
12

rail standards that could lead to cost increases and schedule delays if corrective 

actions are required later.

When OST transferred four of six rail projects from FRA to FHWA, the FHWA 

and FRA Administrators agreed on the importance of coordination. For example, 

one of these projects required modifications to existing railway infrastructure,

bridges, and signal systems to separate an intersection of rail tracks operated by 

two companies. FRA support is particularly important in areas such as engineering 

design review; and FHWA and FRA coordination is critical to ensuring safe 

construction, because rail and highway construction projects adhere to different 

standards.17

We reviewed all six TIGER grant agreements for rail infrastructure and found 

discrepancies in the requirements that FHWA and FRA included, indicating a lack 

of an OST-led centralized process for ensuring that TIGER agreements contain all 

necessary requirements. Specifically, the FRA grant agreements include a 

requirement that grantees comply with track safety standards for 20 years after 

completion of a project. If a grantee does not comply with this requirement, in 

accordance with the agreement, it must return grant funds. In contrast, FHWA's 

grant agreements for similar rail projects did not include this key provision.

FHWA and FRA provided us copies of correspondence showing their coordination

during the environmental review process, which occurs early in the design phase. 

However, neither agency provided evidence of their ongoing coordination on 

technical issues related to project design and construction. FHWA officials stated 

they have sufficient in-house expertise and that private railroad companies, which 

will benefit from these projects, could be relied upon to act in their own interest to 

ensure technical issues are resolved. For example, FHWA officials told us they 

were relying on a private freight rail company—a subrecipient of the TIGER 

funds—to specify and approve requirements related to the rail elements of the 

National Gateway project. By relying on the recipient of TIGER funds to oversee 

the technical aspects of the project, FHWA limits its ability to ensure the project 

complies with the rail standards FRA uses.

CONCLUSION

As the TIGER program has grown to over $3.1 billion since ARRA's passage, the 

importance of formalizing a systematic oversight process at the OST and OA 

levels has increased significantly. While OST and the OAs focused their prior 

efforts on establishing a new program and getting funds obligated to meet tight 

 17 FHWA applies standards of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials during 

highway construction projects, while FRA applies standards of the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance 

of Way Association when assessing freight and passenger railroad infrastructure.
13

ARRA deadlines, the program has entered a new phase in which greater attention 

is needed to build oversight processes that will benefit future TIGER projects and 

to establish the framework for a lasting program. OST and the OAs have made 

strides in developing policies and practices, but improvements are needed in their 

oversight of the TIGER projects that are under construction and their efforts to 

monitor and assess the performance of grantees. Management attention on making 

such improvements will go a long way in meeting program goals as ARRA-funded 

TIGER projects are completed and as TIGER II, III, and IV projects get underway. 

By taking action now, the Department will help ensure that the TIGER program 

will stimulate the economy and make transportation improvements that have a 

significant impact on the Nation, a region, or a metropolitan area.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve the continuing TIGER program, we recommend that the Under 

Secretary of Transportation for Policy:

1. Establish and implement a formal process to ensure all grant agreements 

include clear schedules, scopes, milestones, and outcome-based performance 

measures that will allow OST to assess a project's progress towards the longterm goals of the program.

2. Establish and implement a systematic process for documenting significant

management decisions involving the program and individual TIGER projects, 

including follow-up actions resulting from meetings with the OAs.

3. Update OST's risk assessments to include an evaluation of the OAs' 

capabilities to manage the TIGER program.

4. Establish a methodology to identify program outcomes from grantee 

performance data for each TIGER project.

5. Establish a comprehensive methodology to aggregate performance measures to 

assess the overall impact of the TIGER program.

6. Require the OAs to fully implement their grant management policies, as 

appropriate.

7. Clarify the TIGER program guidance and grant agreements to indicate under 

what circumstances and by what manner OAs and grantees must collaborate on 

multimodal projects.
14

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

RESPONSE

We provided OST our draft report on June 19, 2012, and received its response on 

August 22, 2012. OST’s response is included in its entirety as an appendix to this 

report. OST concurred with recommendations 1, 2, and 6, and we consider OST's 

actions taken or planned responsive to our recommendations. Accordingly, we 

consider these recommendations resolved but open pending receipt of appropriate 

documentation supporting the actions taken.

For recommendation 3, OST partially concurred, stating its revised monitoring 

actions in response to recommendation 2 are sufficient. We agree that these 

actions would be responsive and consider recommendation 3 resolved but open 

pending receipt of documentation supporting OST's revised monitoring activities. 

Regarding recommendations 4 and 5, OST partially concurred, but does not 

anticipate modifying its performance measures at this “late point in the program.” 

OST stated that it will complete the already established performance measure 

methodology and report the aggregate results of the individual projects by 

July 31, 2013. We recognize the complexity of assessing performance across the 

diverse range of TIGER projects. However, OST has yet to demonstrate how the 

TIGER projects meet the program’s long-term goals and will deliver the 

anticipated benefits that were the basis for each project’s selection. OST's 

promised report on the program’s outcomes provides an opportunity to assess the 

impact of the TIGER projects and the effectiveness of the performance measures. 

Given OST's desire to have the TIGER I performance measurement system 

provide useful information to inform future investment decision making, we agree 

with its proposed approach. Accordingly, we consider recommendations 4 and 5 

resolved but open pending receipt of the methodology used to determine project 

results and OST's July 2013 report on project outcomes.

For recommendation 7, OST partially concurred, but questioned the need for 

creating formal collaboration requirements between the OAs, even though OST 

designed TIGER to fund intermodal, multijurisdictional projects. OST's response 

did not specifically discuss the implications of our finding that some FHWA grant 

agreements on rail projects did not include the requirements that the grantee 

comply with track safety standards for 20 years, a provision included in the FRA 

agreements we reviewed. We maintain that when engineering or safety standards 

are key elements of project design or construction, more formal collaboration 

guidance is warranted to ensure that projects benefit from the expertise of all 

relevant OAs. These benefits could come through the revision of OST's TIGER 

program guidance to address how agencies should collaborate on projects with 

significant intermodal issues, such as the documentation of each OA's review at 
15

key project milestones. Accordingly, we consider recommendation 7 open and 

unresolved until OST provides additional details on what circumstances and by 

what manner OAs and grantees must collaborate on multimodal projects, 

specifically on those issues with safety-related implications.

ACTIONS REQUIRED

In accordance with follow-up provisions in Department of Transportation 

Order 8000.1C, we will close recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 after we receive 

acceptable documentation of OST's completed actions. For recommendation 7, in 

order to fully assess the adequacy of the OST response, we request additional 

information within 60 days detailing any safety implications related to our finding 

that some FHWA grant agreements on rail projects did not include the requirement 

that grantees comply with track safety standards for 20 years and any specific 

actions planned to address intermodal collaboration issues.

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of the Office of the Secretary of 

Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Federal Railroad 

Administration, Federal Transit Administration, and the Maritime Administration 

during this audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me 

at (202) 366-5630 or Gary Middleton, Program Director, at (202) 366-0625.

#

cc: Federal Highway Administrator

Federal Railroad Administrator

Federal Transit Administrator

Maritime Administrator

DOT Audit Liaison, M-1
16

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

To address our audit objectives we assessed Office of the Secretary of 

Transportation (OST) and Operating Administrations' (OA) policies, procedures, 

and practices for administering the Transportation Investment Generating 

Economic Recovery (TIGER) Discretionary Grant Program. Our assessment 

evaluated the effectiveness of OST's management of the TIGER program, 

including the performance measures for determining economic and transportationrelated impacts. We also assessed the OAs' policies and practices established for 

the oversight of their respective TIGER projects.

We interviewed OST officials and officials from FHWA, FRA, FTA, and 

MARAD; examined TIGER program policies and procedures; evaluated projects;

and conducted site visits to five TIGER projects from our sample. We conducted

interviews to determine how key officials in the management and oversight of the 

TIGER program are meeting their responsibilities. We obtained documentation to 

verify that these efforts are occurring. In addition, we determined how OST 

assigned performance measures to each of the grants; how OST obtained data to 

report on these measures; and inquired as to how OST plans to use the 

performance data.

In addition to ongoing contact with OST, we assessed whether the OAs were 

coordinating effectively with senior Department officials and developed effective 

methods for tracking and reporting on TIGER program results and their effect on 

the Nation's infrastructure and economy. We determined whether the OAs

implemented appropriate strategies to oversee the TIGER grant projects, while 

following relevant OA and DOT policies and procedures. We also reviewed

information the OAs collected and analyzed in support of OST's evaluation of the 

program. We also examined policies, procedures, and practices for other 

discretionary grant programs and identified best practices.

In coordination with the OIG statistician, we selected a statistical sample of 14 of 

51 TIGER projects for in-depth review during the verification phase of the audit.

Our sample included at least one project in each of the OAs (FHWA, FRA, FTA, 

and MARAD) that are providing grant oversight. For each of these projects, we 

verified that the OAs were conducting oversight activities in accordance with the 

TIGER program policies and procedures. We collected relevant documentation on 

each project and conducted interviews in person, via telephone, or teleconference 

with OA staff at DOT Headquarters, applicable regional offices, and grantees. We 

also consulted with OIG engineering and economist staff on technical issues, and 

with an OIG legal counsel on the legal sufficiency of TIGER grant agreements and 

related issues.
17

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

We conducted site visits to projects within our sample and administered by each 

OA and FHWA's Federal Lands Highways Division. The locations for our site 

visits were based on project activity as determined by the level of expenditures 

and we did not make projections to each OA based on site visits. We assessed the 

OAs' oversight of these projects by examining specific project elements, such as 

whether the project is on schedule and within budget. We determined whether 

schedule and budget modifications were adequately justified, as well as whether 

performance measures were applicable to the project and accurately reported. We

did not examine grantee compliance with other Federal programs that might be 

providing funding to a project we selected.

We conducted our work from November 2010 through June 2012 in accordance 

with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
18

Exhibit B. TIGER I Projects Reviewed

EXHIBIT B. TIGER I PROJECTS REVIEWED

Mode Project Name Amount Obligated State

Site 

Visits

FHWA

National Gateway Freight Rail 

Corridor $98,000,000.00 OH Yes

FHWA

Indianapolis Bicycle & 

Pedestrian Network $20,500,000.00 IN No

FHWA

Alameda Corridor East: Colton 

Crossing $33,800,000.00 CA No

FHWA Bella Vista Bypass $10,000,000.00 AR No

FHWA

Appalachian Regional Short 

Line Rail Project $17,551,028.00 

KYTNWV No

FHWA

Black River Bridge 

Replacement $30,000,000.00 MI No

FHWA

Beartooth Highway 

Reconstruction Project $6,000,000.00 WY No

FTA

Kansas City Transit Corridors & 

Green Impact Zone Project $50,000,000.00 

KSMO No

FTA Downtown Dallas Streetcar $23,000,000.00 TX No

FTA

Fitchburg Commuter Rail 

Extension & Wachusett Station $55,500,000.00 MA Yes

MARAD

Quonset Wind Energy & 

Surface Transportation Project $22,300,000.00 RI Yes

MARAD

Port of Gulfport Rail 

Improvements $20,000,000.00 MS No

FRA Fast Track New Bedford $20,000,000.00 MA Yes

FRA Moynihan Station, Phase 1 $83,000,000.00 NY No

Source: Information provided by OST and the OAs and traced to individual TIGER grant agreements.

Note: We also conducted a site visit to FHWA's Otay Mesa Port of Entry I-805/SR-905 Interchange project, in 

California, which was awarded $20,200,000 of TIGER I funds.
19

Exhibit C. TIGER Project Performance Measures

EXHIBIT C. TIGER PROJECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Category Measures 

Reporting Frequency and 

Timing 

Usage Before/after annual average tons 

handle/day

Average daily value for the year 

before the project and then 

quarterly for 3 years starting 1 

year after project completion. 

Before/after annual average daily 

gross ton-miles (GTM)

Before/after annual average. 

container lifts per day(TEUs)

Before/after inbound & outbound 

container mode split

Annual TEUs for the year before 

the project and then quarterly for 

3 years starting 1 year after 

project completion. 

Before/after annual average 

annual containers transported on 

lines (TEUs)

Before/after transit passenger 

miles and hours of travel

Daily counts for a typical 

weekday (while schools are in 

session), Saturday and Sunday 

1 year before the project and 

then again 2 years after the 

project opens for revenue 

operations. 

Before/after transit passenger & 

non-passenger counts 

Before/after transit facility 

passenger & non-passenger 

counts

Before/after transit rider 

characteristics 

Representative of typical 

weekday while school is in 

session 1 year before project 

and then again 2 years after 

project opens for revenue 

operations. 

Before/after average monthly 

bike and/or pedestrian users at 

key locations 

Average monthly count (using 

minimum 3 day time periods) 

collected before the project and 

then yearly for 3 years starting 1 

year after project completion. 

Before/after annual average daily 

traffic (ADT) and average daily 

truck traffic (ADTT) counts

ADT and ADTT for the year 

before the project and then 

quarterly for 5 years after the 

project opens for operation 

under normal conditions. 
20

Exhibit C. TIGER Project Performance Measures

Category Measures 

Reporting Frequency and 

Timing 

Operations Before/after annual average 

daily total train delay (minutes)

Average daily minutes for the 

year before the project and then 

quarterly for 3 years after the 

project opens for operation 

under normal conditions. 

Before/after annual average 

daily total (all vehicles) vehicle 

delay at crossings

Before/after transit service level Data for one typical weekday 

(while school is in session), 

Saturday and Sunday 1 year 

before the project and then 

again 2 years after the project 

opens for operations under 

normal conditions. 

Before/after facility service level

Before/after annual average 

hourly (or peak & off-peak) 

vehicle travel time

Average hourly (or peak & offpeak) values for the year before 

the project and then quarterly for 

3 years after the project opens 

for operations under normal 

conditions. 

Before/after annual average

hourly (or peak & off-peak) 

buffer index

Safety Before/after annual crash rates 

by type/severity

Annual rates for 5 years prior to 

the project and then quarterly for 

5 years after the project opens 

for operation under normal 

conditions.

Before/after annual non-vehicle 

(bike or pedestrian) crash rates 

by type/severity

State of 

Good 

Repair

Before/after average monthly 

slow order miles and annual 

average daily delay minutes due 

to slow orders 

Monthly slow orders and 

average daily delay minutes for 

the year before the project and 

then quarterly for 3 years 

starting 1 year after project 

completion.

Before/after bridge condition 

(Sufficiency Rating)

Condition rating for the year 

before the project and then 

yearly for 5 years after the 

bridge project opens for 

operation under normal 

conditions. 

Before/after annual road 

closure/lost capacity time (lanehours)

Annual lane-hours for the year 

before the project opens for 

operation under normal 

conditions. 

Source: OST's TIGER Performance Measurement Plan, June 28, 2010.

Note: These measures represent a menu of industry standard metrics. Modal Administrators and grant recipients 

may choose to use these metrics or negotiate measures more appropriate for specific projects.
21

Exhibit D. Major Contributors to This Report

EXHIBIT D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT

Gary Middleton Program Director

Name Title

Jay Swartzbaugh Project Manager

P. David McBride Senior Analyst

Shirell Butcher Auditor

Jamila Mammadova Analyst

Harriet E. Lambert Writer-Editor

Anne-Marie Joseph Engineer

Petra Swartzlander Senior Statistician

Fritz Swartzbaugh Associate Counsel

Kang Cao Economist
22

Appendix. Agency Comments

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS

U.S. Department of Acting Under Secretary for Policy 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE

Transportation Washington, DC 20590

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation

August 22, 2012

MEMORANDUM TO: Joseph W. Comé

Assistant Inspector General for 

Highway and Transit Audits

FROM: Polly Trottenberg 

Acting Under Secretary for Policy

SUBJECT: Management Response to OIG Draft Report on TIGER

Discretionary Grant Program

In February 2009, Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

(Recovery Act) as an immediate measure to address the Nation’s economic crisis. The 

Recovery Act included $1.5 billion for the Office of the Secretary (OST) to make 

multimodal discretionary grants to surface transportation projects of national and regional 

significance. The Recovery Act included specific deadlines that required the Department 

to create this new discretionary grant program, run a nationwide competition, award 

grants, and obligate the funds within relatively short time frames. 

The Department responded by expeditiously creating the Transportation Investment 

Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) program, which included outcome-driven, 

transparent, objective processes for selecting meritorious projects that would foster job 

creation, achieve the Department’s strategic goals, leverage non-Federal dollars, and 

boost partnerships and innovation, all while reinvesting in America’s transportation 

infrastructure. The TIGER program built an interdisciplinary and multimodal framework 

for collaboration drawing upon the expertise of OST, the operating administrations 

(OAs), other Federal agencies, state transportation departments, transit agencies, and 

local governments.

The TIGER Discretionary Grant program was developed and implemented with 

remarkable speed and accountability in accordance with all statutory requirements and 

deadlines. It has proven tremendously successful in selecting and funding important 

transportation projects, including some beyond the reach of existing funding mechanisms, 

such as major multi-state freight networks across the nation. Congress recognized and 

endorsed the merits of our approach by providing funding for three subsequent rounds of 

TIGER – for a total of $3.1 billion.
23

Appendix. Agency Comments

Creating an innovative multimodal transportation grant program on a very tight timeline 

was an extraordinary challenge that at times required simultaneous program design and 

implementation. The Department built the TIGER program using the best current grant 

competition, evaluation, and oversight practices, including extensive use of benefit-cost 

analysis. The short timeframes included in the Recovery Act catalyzed the Department’s 

use of this innovative approach to program design in contrast to traditional sequential 

methods of planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and oversight. To meet these 

challenges, the Department established a critical path of first designing those elements 

necessary early in the process, implementing them, and subsequently designing those 

aspects needed later. 

We are pleased with the OIG draft report’s recognition that the TIGER program generally 

adhered to best practices in grant management. The Department is continually refining 

its approach and is intent on improving the program, as it has demonstrated in subsequent 

rounds of program implementation. We intend to make good use of the information in 

the OIG report as we continue to administer the TIGER program. 

TIGER Program Focused on Innovative Projects

The TIGER program is particularly innovative from a functional perspective—what it 

does—and from an operational perspective—how it works. TIGER is a competitive 

discretionary grant program that enables the Department to address important 

transportation issues including existing programmatic gaps created by traditional formula 

based appropriation funding silos, which are driven by mode. Furthermore, while most 

Federal transportation funding flows to State DOTs and major transit agencies, TIGER is 

one of the only transportation programs where localities can apply directly for, and be 

direct recipients of, Federal funding for projects often with local and regional priorities.

TIGER Uses Existing Expertise and Processes

The TIGER program drew personnel and expertise from existing programs within the 

Department and made use of established grant management and oversight mechanisms. 

As a result, once selected, TIGER projects are administered and overseen by OAs 

without the need to create new layers of bureaucracy. OST’s role is one of monitoring the 

OAs and not one of adding additional layers of oversight on top of the OA oversight.

The Congress clearly anticipated lean and efficient program operation when it afforded 

the TIGER program only 1/10th of 1 percent of overall program funding for conducting 

oversight. OST fulfilled those expectations by creating a cost-efficient, transparent and 

multimodal program that made the best use of existing programmatic expertise and 

processes without creating duplicate processes or unnecessary overhead. 

While OST is actively engaged in monitoring the administration of the TIGER grants, 

DOT is driven by economy and prudence to make the best use of existing agency 

resources through a strong partnership between OST and the OAs for program 

implementation. This partnership utilizes OST’s expertise in evaluating projects across 

all transportation modes and leverages the OAs’ experience in managing grants. 

During the grant administration phase, OST carefully monitors OA projects through bi- weekly meetings, monthly project status reports from the OAs, quarterly and annual 

reporting by the grantees, and a defined chain of command for elevating any issues that 

may arise. This combination of partnership and monitoring makes the best use of 

expertise in each organization, minimizes overhead costs, and maintains a thorough and 

effective flow of information.
24

Appendix. Agency Comments

The OIG draft report approaches OST’s role from the perspective of traditional 

government operations: devote more staff to create new oversight systems in OST to 

check the work of the people in the OAs who are overseeing work in the field. While 

OST is carefully monitoring the OAs’ progress, it has no budgetary authority or intention 

to add more staff to duplicate the work that the OAs have a long-standing record of 

demonstrated effectiveness in accomplishing. Instead, OST has been judicious in 

limiting monitoring to complement the OAs’ activities. Furthermore, OST already has 

longstanding policies for overseeing OA activities, including OA administration of 

billions of dollars of grants through existing programs.

Operating Administrations Managing TIGER Projects Effectively

The vast majority of Recovery Act TIGER grants are being administered by 

organizations in the Department with extensive experience in grants management. More 

than 80 percent of the projects are being administered by FTA and FHWA, which have 

proven systems and processes for providing effective grant management along with 

decades of experience. 

Both FTA and FHWA have carefully considered the programmatic risks posed by TIGER 

projects, and have fine-tuned their oversight accordingly. FTA recognized the risks of a 

new, discretionary grant program with rapid grant awards and expedited implementation

milestones by implementing additional oversight. For example, FTA mitigated project 

risk by making Project Management Oversight Contractor (PMOC) resources available to 

every TIGER I project it administered regardless of the dollar value or risk assessment 

associated with each project. Even though TIGER projects were typically smaller than 

those FTA would typically utilize its PMOC resources for, FTA implemented proactive 

measures to help ensure the grantees followed sound project management practices in 

developing and implementing the projects. 

Similarly, FHWA recognized the benefit of supplemental oversight for TIGER projects, 

and included them within the scope of its National Review Team (NRT) efforts. The 

NRT used an independent, multi-disciplinary team of experts to enhance Recovery Act 

project risk management and oversight efforts in a corporate and strategic manner. By 

conducting on-site reviews of quality assurance, financial controls, and data quality and 

integrity, the NRT enhanced FHWA’s stewardship and oversight on TIGER and other 

Recovery Act funded projects. FHWA incorporated TIGER as a specific focus area in its 

Recovery Act Risk Management Plan and continues to carefully track the results of the 

NRT reviews. As of July 3, 2012, the NRT finalized 48 TIGER site visits consisting of 

61 reviewed risk areas. 

While FRA and MARAD have comparatively less experience in grants management, 

each has made strong progress in building the processes and expertise necessary for 

effective grant management. As detailed in the Department’s response to another OIG 

report in the process of issuance,1 similar to the TIGER program, the Department’s High 

Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Grant program had to be built as it was hurtling down the 

tracks at high speed. FRA has already demonstrated its capability to effectively manage 

risks and continues to refine its grants management practices. Similarly, MARAD has 

been refining its processes and is conducting effective grants management activities. It 

has also demonstrated its capability to effectively monitor and oversee the completion of 

its TIGER program projects.

 1 The OIG report, “Completing a Grants Management Framework Can Enhance FRA’s Administration of the HSIPR 

Program,” will incorporate a detailed management response describing the progress of FRA’s Grant Processes for 

High Speed Rail.
25

Appendix. Agency Comments

TIGER’s unique, multimodal evaluation and oversight arrangement also provided an 

environment conducive to knowledge sharing among the OAs. For example, MARAD 

made use of best practices learned from FHWA’s grant oversight structure and avoided 

the need to reinvent similar processes. MARAD has continued to refine these practices as 

appropriate for its projects, and as recently as June 15, 2012, issued an updated Grant 

Administration Manual. 

OST Uses Feedback and Stakeholder Input to Strengthen Program

Since the Recovery Act TIGER program, which serves as the focus for this OIG draft 

report, the Department has implemented three additional rounds of TIGER and has 

worked hard to continuously improve the program’s design, implementation, execution 

and monitoring. TIGER has made use of lessons learned to implement useful 

improvements, including:

• Decision Tracking – the TIGER program now has a system for tracking all 

material decisions made by the Under Secretary regarding TIGER grants and 

TIGER funds. This system, which was put in place after the third round of 

TIGER, will create a searchable electronic record of all material decisions made 

for the program.

• Document Review and Approval Tracking – all OAs participating in the 

TIGER program are now using a SharePoint system for document review and 

tracking to ensure that each grant agreement developed under the TIGER program 

is processed expeditiously and completely by all necessary organizations.

• Collaborative Work Groups – OST created collaborative working groups to 

enhance OST and modal coordination in key areas. For example, a working group 

that includes Counsel from OST, FHWA, FRA, FTA, and MARAD is currently 

analyzing best practices across the modal administrations for managing the 

purchase and disposition of equipment using grant funds. These groups will 

continue to work collaboratively on cross-cutting issues.

The OIG work pursuant to this draft report has also provided useful input for refining 

TIGER grant processes. For example, OST is conducting risk-based site visits to validate 

information provided by the OAs and grantees. OST will continue to make the best use of 

all available information to further refine the TIGER program throughout each phase of 

implementation.

TIGER Performance Measures Will Inform Future Investment Decision making

The TIGER program investment framework incorporates multiple innovative, 

performance-driven policies. These efforts focus on aligning investments with key 

national objectives, encouraging grantees to produce robust economic analyses 

demonstrating that their projects are expected to produce net benefits, and implementing 

a performance measurement program by which grantees collect data and report on the 

performance of their projects. This focus on performance is unprecedented for a 

multimodal DOT program and reflects DOT’s determination to introduce reforms 

through TIGER that can positively impact DOT’s broader investment practices. 

Working with experts in the field of transportation economics and performance, DOT has 

developed sets of measures to better capture project benefits that avoid placing undue 

burdens on grantees, many of whom lack the resources and technical expertise to engage 

in sophisticated analytics. DOT also decided not to compel grantees to achieve predetermined targets, but rather to focus on collecting data that could inform future 

investment decision-making processes. 
26

Appendix. Agency Comments

The TIGER program emphasizes managing infrastructure investments during 

construction and tracking performance once the project opens for use. Each grantee 

collaborates with DOT to develop a project-specific performance measurement plan, and 

report on achieving the benefits identified in the application. 

TIGER projects can be found in every corner of the country, from the densest urban 

environments to the most rural tribal areas, and include multi-state freight rail networks 

that cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build, transit systems and streetcars, highway 

and bridge improvements, port infrastructure and bicycle/pedestrian networks, As such, 

OST is focused on individual projects achieving their stated outcomes, which include 

safety, economic competitiveness, state of good repair, livability, and environmental 

sustainability. OST does not believe it is feasible to create a consolidated project 

performance evaluation system that can adequately convey outcome information 

spanning this diverse set of projects within the existing data-gathering and analytic 

capabilities of typical TIGER grantees. 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSES

Recommendation 1: Establish and implement a formal process to ensure all grant 

agreements include clear schedules, scopes, milestones, and outcome-based performance 

measures that will allow OST to assess a project’s progress towards the long-term goals 

of the program.

Response: Concur. We agree that grant agreements should include clear schedules, 

scopes, and milestones, and have devoted considerable effort, along with the OAs, to 

achieve this objective. As described above, the Department has implemented refined 

processes for moving grant agreements through review to ensure complete and consistent 

documentation. While we will continue to monitor the efficacy of this system and make 

improvements as needed, we consider the actions taken responsive to the 

recommendation and ask that it be closed.

Recommendation 2: Establish and implement a systematic process for documenting 

significant management decisions involving the program and individual TIGER projects, 

including follow-up actions resulting from meetings with the OAs.

Response: Concur. As described above, the Department has implemented refined 

processes for documenting significant management decisions. While we will continue to 

monitor the efficacy of this system and make improvements as needed, we consider the 

actions taken responsive to the recommendation and ask that it be closed.

Recommendation 3: Update OST’s risk assessments to include an evaluation of the 

OAs’ capabilities to manage the TIGER program.

Response: Concur in part. Through its regular monitoring activities and interactions with 

the OAs, OST is fully apprised of the status of OA capabilities to manage grants. More 

than 80 percent of TIGER I projects were within organizations with mature, fully 

developed, world class grant management systems in place. Processes were augmented 

with additional oversight resources in FTA, and added to the National Review Teams in 

FHWA. The remaining 20 percent are within organizations that have rapidly developed 

their grant management capabilities based on best practices and have issued recent 

updates to their processes over the last several months. While OST will continue to 

monitor, and work with all the grant management agencies participating in the TIGER 

program, we see no further benefit to be gained by conducting a formal risk management 

exercise and request that this recommendation be closed.

Recommendation 4: Establish a methodology to identify program outcomes from 

grantee performance data for each TIGER project.
27

Appendix. Agency Comments

Response: Concur in part. As discussed earlier in this response, the primary purpose of

DOT’s performance measurement program is to ensure that grantees are collecting and 

reporting information about the performance of their projects. As recognized in the OIG 

draft report, consolidating the results from a diverse set of 51 projects would, at best, be 

challenging. The TIGER I performance measurement program is intended to provide 

useful information and help inform future investment decision-making processes. 

Overall, TIGER has established a program to collect useful programmatic information 

that exceeds the requirements and expectations of the Recovery Act while not unduly 

burdening grantees. The Department will ensure that the established methodology is fully 

implemented and completed as planned, but does not anticipate modifying the scope or 

nature of the measures at this late point in the program, and requests that this 

recommendation be closed.

Recommendation 5: Establish a comprehensive methodology to aggregate performance 

measures to assess the overall impact of the TIGER program.

Response: Concur in part. As discussed earlier in this response, the Department 

established programmatic measures that exceed the expectations and requirements of the 

Recovery Act and will provide useful information about the utility of our actions and 

inform future decision making. At this late juncture, the Department does not intend to 

modify its programmatic metrics, though it does intend to make full and best use of the 

data it derives from program implementation, both with regard to the effectiveness of 

program implementation and to inform future decision making. Once the vast majority of 

Recovery Act TIGER projects are complete, the Department intends to consolidate the 

results of the individual projects, and report those results by July 31, 2013.

Recommendation 6: Require the OAs to fully implement their grant management 

policies, as appropriate.

Response: Concur. Grant management policies are established for the purpose of guiding 

processes by establishing clear expectations. The TIGER Program Policies and 

Procedures make it clear that each OA is responsible for assuring that is has all of the 

necessary policies, systems, and controls in place to administer the TIGER discretionary 

grants for which they are responsible. We consider the existing requirements, policies and 

expectations to be sufficient. OST will continue to monitor actions by the OAs and

ensure that they are following our Policies and Procedures that require the 

implementation of their grant management policies to TIGER Grants. No further action is 

planned with specific regard to this recommendation and we request that it be closed.

Recommendation 7: Clarify the TIGER program guidance and grant agreements to 

indicate under what circumstances and by what manner OAs and grantees must 

collaborate on multimodal projects.

Response: Concur in part. The Department will continue to actively monitor OA 

performance and convene forums for multimodal collaboration and information sharing. 

However, the utility for creating formal collaboration requirements is not apparent. OST 

oversees the implementation of all TIGER grants, identifies projects that need 

collaboration, and calls the modes to work together with OST as needed. Because of the 

varied and innovative nature of the projects funded, it is not possible to identify in 

advance all of the circumstances that would require OA partnership. In fact, sometimes 

the need for collaboration comes on single mode projects where best practices in other 

modes can improve outcomes. OST will use its oversight role to follow all grants that 

require OAs to work together and improve collaboration. While we will continue to 

monitor the efficacy of this system, and make improvements as needed, we consider the 

actions taken responsive to the recommendation and ask that it be closed.