TRANSFORMING 

URITY 

CATION 

EM

 H H H H H H H

the SEC

CLASSIFI

SYST

 H H H H H H H H H H H 

REPORT to the PRESIDENT from the 

PUBLIC INTEREST 

DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

NOVEMBER 2012

H H H H H H H H H

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b | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H 

“It is time to reexamine the long-standing tension between secrecy and openness, 

and develop a new way of thinking about government secrecy as we move into 

the next century.” 

Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 

1997, Senate Document 105-2, Public Law 236

“...the only effective restraint upon Executive policy and power...may lie in an 

informed and enlightened citizenry - in an informed and critical public opinion 

which alone can here protect the values of democratic government.

I should suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate 

that a very first principle of ...wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding 

secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified, nothing is classified, 

and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and 

to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion.” 

Potter Stewart, New York Times Co. v. U.S.

Images on the following pages are courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, with the exception of the images on page 24 

and the inside back cover which are courtesy of the National Security Agency.
TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS for TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM ii

LETTER to the PRESIDENT iv

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

INTRODUCTION 6

THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 9

RECOMMENDATIONS for TRANSFORMING CLASSIFICATION 11

THE DECLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 16

RECOMMENDATIONS for TRANSFORMING DECLASSIFICATION 20

USING TECHNOLOGY to AID CLASSIFICATION and DECLASSIFICATION 25

CONCLUSION 28

A VISION for a CLASSIFICATION and DECLASSIFICATION SYSTEM of the FUTURE 29

ENDNOTES 30

APPENDIX A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION for CURRENT BOARD MEMBERS 32

APPENDIX B—WITNESSES APPEARING BEFORE the BOARD 34

APPENDIX C—GLOSSARY 38

APPENDIX D—BOARD’S AUTHORIZING STATUTE 42

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ii | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

RECOMMENDATIONS for TRANSFORMING 

the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

[RECOMMENDATION 1]: 11

The President should appoint a White House-led Security Classification Reform Steering 

Committee to oversee implementation of the Board’s recommendations to modernize the 

current system of classification and declassification.

[RECOMMENDATION 2]: 11

Classification should be simplified and rationalized by placing national security information 

in only two classification categories. 

[RECOMMENDATION 3]: 12

The threshold for classifying in the two-tiered system should be adjusted to align the level of 

protection with the level of harm anticipated in the event of unauthorized release.

[RECOMMENDATION 4]: 14

The specific protections afforded intelligence sources and methods need to be precisely defined 

and distinguished. 

[RECOMMENDATION 5]: 14

Pre-decisional, tactical and operational information with short-lived sensitivity should be 

identified and segmented for automatic declassification without further review.

[RECOMMENDATION 6]: 15

Agencies should recognize in policy and practice a “safe harbor” protection for classifiers 

who adhere to rigorous risk management practices and determine in good faith to classify 

information at a lower level or not at all.

[RECOMMENDATION 7]: 20

The classification status of Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) information should be reexamined. A process should be implemented for the systematic declassification review of 

historical FRD information. 

[RECOMMENDATION 8]: 21

The President should bolster the authority and capacity of the National Declassification Center 

(NDC) with specific measures to advance a government-wide declassification strategy.

[8A], Executive Order 13526 should be amended to eliminate the additional three years 

now permitted for review of multiple agency equities in all archival records (including 

those stored outside the NDC).

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | iii

[8B], The requirement of agencies to share declassification guidance with other classifying 

agencies and the NDC should be strengthened. Retention of agency declassification 

authority should be contingent upon sharing agency guidance.

[8C], The President should direct Agencies to consult the NDC prior to prioritizing their 

records for declassification and transfer to the National Archives.

[8D], The Interagency National Declassification Center Advisory Panel (NAP) should 

have representation from the public, including representation from the Government 

Openness advocacy community. 

[8E], An interagency effort to develop new declassification review processes should be 

coordinated by the NDC and be based on a risk management approach.

[RECOMMENDATION 9]: 23

Historically significant records should be identified and set aside as early as possible after 

their creation to ensure their preservation, long-term access, and availability to agency 

policymakers and historians. Each agency should strive to have an in-house history staff to 

assist in the prioritization of records.

[RECOMMENDATION 10]: 24

Agencies should improve records management overall by supporting and advancing the 

government-wide information management practices found in the President’s Memorandum 

on Managing Government Records and its Directive.

[RECOMMENDATION 11]: 24

The organization and integration of agency declassification programs must be improved across 

government.

[RECOMMENDATION 12]: 24

Agencies should be encouraged to prepare case studies and national security histories, in 

classified and unclassified versions.

[RECOMMENDATION 13]: 24

A series of pilot projects should be used to evaluate proposals for enhancing capabilities at the 

NDC, streamlining the declassification system and improving access to historically significant 

records, including historical nuclear information.

[RECOMMENDATION 14]: 26

The President should direct the Security Classification Reform Steering Committee to 

encourage collaboration and to determine how to employ existing technologies and develop 

and pilot new methods to modernize classification and declassification.

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iv | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

LETTER to the PRESIDENT

November 27, 2012

The Honorable Barack Obama

President of the United States

Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Public Interest Declassification Board (“the Board”) is pleased to submit Transforming the Security Classification 

System, the study conducted pursuant to your Implementing Memorandum (December 29, 2009) for Executive Order 

13526, “Classified National Security Information.” The report sets forth and explains key recommendations that flowed 

from the study we undertook in cooperation with the National Security Advisor to design a fundamental transformation 

of the security classification system. 

We believe the current classification and declassification systems are outdated and incapable of dealing adequately with 

the large volumes of  classified information generated in an era of  digital communications and information systems. 

Overcoming entrenched practices that no longer serve the purpose of protecting our national security will prove difficult. 

We believe it will require a White House-led steering committee to drive reform, led by a chair that is carefully selected 

and appointed with specific authorities that you grant.

The Government’s management of classified information must match the realities and demands in the 21st century. We 

hope our recommendations serve as a guide to lead the proposed committee in developing a comprehensive new policy 

and implementation plan.

The Board has consulted extensively with experts from the Government openness advocacy community, civil society and 

transparency groups, archival researchers, and technologists and solicited opinions from distinguished civil servants, 

Executive department and agency officials, and the Congress. Our efforts were designed to gain a broad perspective on 

issues confronting the classification system and led to the fourteen core recommendations in this report. Sharing the recommendations with agencies has elicited a number of negative comments; there is little recognition among Government 

practitioners that there is a fundamental problem. Clearly, it will require a Presidential mandate to energize and direct 

agencies to work together to reform the classification system. 

The classification system exists to protect national security, but its outdated design and implementation often hinders 

that mission. The system is compromised by over-classification and, not coincidentally, by increasing instances of unauthorized disclosures. This undermines the credibility of the classification system, blurs the focus on what truly requires 

protection, and fails to serve the public interest. Notwithstanding the best efforts of information security professionals, the 

current system is outmoded and unsustainable; transformation is not simply advisable but imperative.

Currently, classification and declassification do not facilitate rapid and agile information sharing required to fully support today’s national security mission. It became clear to the Board that only by exploiting current and developing new 

technologies and applying them in an improved policy framework will the national security community be capable of 

managing the growing volume of electronic information created in the digital age. 

If implemented, our proposed recommendations will increase efficiency, reduce costs, improve transparency and, ultimately, help restore confidence in the classification and declassification system.

Sincerely,

Nancy E. Soderberg

Chair

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 1

Executive Summary of the Report to the President from the Public Interest 

Declassification Board on Transforming the Security Classification System

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A democratic society is grounded in the informed participation of the citizenry, and their informed participation requires access to Government information. An open record of 

official decisions is essential to educate and inform the public and enable it to assess the policies 

of its elected leaders. If officials are to be accountable for their actions and decisions, secrecy 

must be kept to the minimum required to meet legitimate national security considerations. 

To maintain democratic values, Government must act to ensure openness and should have to 

justify any resort to secrecy. Better access to Government records and internal history will help 

both policymakers and the American public meet their mutual responsibilities to address national security and foreign policy challenges consistent with democratic values. 

As requested by the President, the Public Interest 

Declassification Board (the Board) researched and studied the security classification system in cooperation with 

the National Security Advisor to design a fundamental 

transformation of the security classification system.i The 

Board sought to understand how classified records of every level of sensitivity are managed and how different users influence classification and declassification decisions 

at the front-end and the back-end of the system. The 

Board met extensively with stakeholders inside and outside of government during its study: senior government 

officials, Executive departments and agencies (agencies), 

distinguished civil servants, the Congress, leading technologists, experts from public interest, civil society and 

transparency groups, historians, classifiers, declassifiers, 

and archival researchers. Its research led the Board to understand the challenges the system presents to all users 

and to solicit suggestions and ideas for its transformation. 

The findings of the Board are conclusive; present practices 

for classification and declassification of national security 

information are outmoded, unsustainable and keep too 

much information from the public. The prevalence of electronic records has made the current paper-based system 

of classification and declassification unworkable. Use of 

advanced information technology is crucial to achieving 

increases in efficiency and better balancing information 

security with government openness. However, there is 

little evidence that Executive departments and agencies 

(agencies) are employing or developing the technologies 

needed to meet these objectives. 

Reforms are essential if we expect to manage the increased 

volume of records, share critical information among 

agencies and live within available resources. Essential to 

such reforms must be improved integration of classification and declassification programs and better resolution 

of the inherent tension between keeping secrets and ensuring the openness required for an accurate historical 

record. 

This report describes the difficulties—both technical and 

cultural—we face in reforming the system and recommends practicable steps to overcome them and effect reform. The Board understands the many challenges facing 

agencies in today’s resource-constrained environment. 

Nonetheless, the measures in this report are critical to 

modernize a security classification program capable of 

protecting our nation and supporting fundamental democratic values and transparency. The Board recognizes 

there is disagreement among stakeholders with many of 

the recommendations in its report. Modernization is difficult and bureaucracies’ natural tendency is to maintain 

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2 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

the status quo. These recommendations will succeed only 

with a determined implementation strategy and vigorous 

oversight backed by the President. The Board believes 

it will require a White House-led steering committee 

to drive reform, led by a chair who is carefully selected 

and appointed with specific authorities granted by the 

President. A White House-led Security Classification 

Reform Steering Committee, appointed by and accountable to the President, should manage the implementation 

of the reforms required to transform current classification 

and declassification guidance and practice.ii

Transforming the Classification System 

After extensive research and discussions with stakeholders in and outside Government, the Board has concluded that the current classification system is fraught with 

problems. In its mission to support national security, it 

keeps too many secrets, and keeps them too long; it is 

overly complex; it obstructs desirable information sharing inside of government and with the public. There are 

many explanations for over-classification: most classification occurs by rote; criteria and agency guidance have not 

kept pace with the information explosion; and despite the 

Presidential order to refrain from unwarranted classification, a culture persists that defaults to the avoidance of 

risk rather than its proper management.

To address the concerns of excessive classification under 

present practice, the Board recommends: 

•	 Classification should be simplified and rationalized by placing national security information in 

only two categories. This would align with the 

actual two-tiered practices existing throughout 

government, regarding security clearance investigations, physical safeguarding, and information systems domains. Top Secret would remain 

the Higher-Level category, retaining its current, 

high level of protection. All other classified information would be categorized at a Lower-Level, which would follow standards for a lower level of protection. Both categories would include 

compartmented and special access information, 

as they do today. Newly established criteria for 

classifying information in the two tiers would 

identify the needed levels of protection against 

disclosure of the information. Using identifiable 

risk as the basis for classification criteria should 

help in deciding if classification is warranted 

and, if so, at what level and duration.

•	 Classified national security information in the 

two tiered model would continue to be subject 

to declassification in accordance with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information”.iii The two 

tiers should be defined and distinguished by 

the level of identifiable protection needed to 

safeguard and share information appropriately, 

and these protection levels would determine 

whether classification is warranted, at what level, 

and for how long. Classification guidance would 

clearly define levels of protection by identifying 

a specific consequence of release of the classified 

information and the potential harm to the national security of limiting the sharing of the information. The difficulty of applying the current 

concept of presumed “damage” during derivative classification would be replaced by a more 

concrete application of level of protection necessary for sharing and protecting. This change 

in guidance would reflect how classification is 

actually practiced by derivative classifiers—deciding how much protection is needed based on 

the sensitivity of the information to both protect 

and share appropriately. Determining a level of 

protection to facilitate or impede dissemination 

is more prescriptive in practice and would assist 

classifiers in making more accurate classification decisions. Applying this risk management 

practice by identifying the level of protection 

needed based on the sensitivity of the information, rather than potential damage if disclosed, 

should allow users to classify information at the 

lowest level of protection or to keep the information unclassified. Specific protections accorded 

intelligence and non-intelligence sources and 

methods should also be better-defined and -distinguished.

•	 The Board recognizes that the adoption of a 

two-tiered model will pose greater challenges 

for those agencies whose internal practices are 

more dependent upon current distinctions between Secret and Confidential.

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 3

•	 Classified information that is operational or 

based on a specific date or event should be 

automatically declassified without additional 

review or exemption when that operation or 

event passes. The records containing this perishable information should be marked as classified “Short-term” (or similar term) at the time 

of creation.

•	 In order to effect the cultural shift implicit in 

these recommendations, guidance should assume that classification decisions are made in 

good faith and should afford a ‘safe harbor’ for 

classifiers who adhere to proper risk management practices and, when unsure, decide not to 

classify. Classification training should address 

the culture bias that favors classification, and 

often over-classification, through coordinated, 

consistent education that underscores the responsibility to not classify in the presence of 

doubt.

As discussed in the technology section of this report, 

available technologies, such as context accumulation, 

predictive analytics and artificial intelligence, should be 

piloted to study their effectiveness on helping implement 

these recommendations and to engage users and garner 

their trust in a new system.

Transforming the Declassification 

System

Declassification is a complex and time-consuming process, typically performed in a culture of caution without much attention to efficiency and risk management. 

Sequential referral of classified records for review by each 

agency that claims an “equity” in the record takes a great 

deal of time.iv Agencies are reluctant to share their declassification guidelines, impeding efficiency that could be 

realized from greater interagency coordination and collaboration. Because declassification is not seen as a way 

to serve the national security mission, the public’s right to 

know what its government does is not well-served.

The problem is growing. Agencies are currently creating 

petabytes of classified information annually, which quickly outpaces the amount of information the Government 

has declassified in total in the previous seventeen years 

since Executive Order 12958 established the policy of automatic declassification for 25 year old records.v

 Without 

dramatic improvement in the declassification process, the 

rate at which classified records are being created will drive 

an exponential growth in the archival backlog of classified 

records awaiting declassification, and public access to the 

nation’s history will deteriorate further. 

To address this serious concern, the Board recommends 

streamlining the declassification process as follows:

•	 A process should be implemented for the systematic declassification review of historical Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) information. The 

Departments of Energy and Defense may choose 

to convert historical FRD information either 

to Restricted Data information or to classified 

national security information.vi FRD information concerns the military utilization of nuclear 

weapons, including storage locations and stockpile information and often dates from the end 

of World War II through the height of the Cold 

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4 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

War. Although often no longer sensitive or current, this type of FRD information is of high interest to researchers yet remains largely unavailable to the public, because there is no process for 

systematically reviewing it for declassification 

and release under the terms of the Executive Order for national security information. 

•	 Strengthen the National Declassification Center 

(NDC) to establish a more coordinated government-wide declassification system.

•	 Executive Order 13526 should be revised to 

eliminate the additional three years now authorized to process multiple agency equities 

in all archival records (including those outside the NDC). 

•	 The declassification system should manage 

risk and better balance resource-intensive 

agency reviews with the democratic value 

of timely public release. Rules that govern 

declassification, including those concerning 

historical nuclear information, should tolerate greater risk.vii

•	 Streamlined archival processing should expedite public release of declassified records, 

with such records automatically transferred 

to the National Archives and Records Administration (National Archives).viii 

•	 Public representatives, including experts 

from the Government Openness advocacy 

community, should be added to the interagency NDC Advisory Panel (NAP) advising 

the NDC Director.ix 

•	 Immediately require agencies to share declassification guidance and training and prioritize 

the review of historically significant records and 

ensure timely transfer to the National Archives.

•	 Streamline activities of both the NDC and agencies to complement the modernization initiatives directed by the President in his Memorandum on Managing Government Records.x

•	 Classification and declassification program staffs 

should collaborate with agency historians and 

records officers to ensure that historically significant information is identified as early as possible in its “life” and then set aside for historical 

review and preserved for the long-term. Agency 

histories, both classified and unclassified, should 

serve policymakers and operational leaders with 

“lessons learned” as well as contributing to the 

historical record. Agency history programs 

should be promoted across Government and 

aligned in “centers” that bring declassification 

reviewers and historians together. Classified histories should be reviewed at a specified interval 

for declassification and release to the public.

•	 Pilot projects should be identified to develop best 

practices and design a more streamlined system.

Using Technology to Aid Classification 

and Declassification

Classification and declassification are not keeping pace 

with the myriad of challenges facing the system: digital 

information creation, access for cleared persons, existing backlogs of paper holdings awaiting declassification 

review, long-term storage requirements, or the rights of 

a democratic society to as much information as possible 

about its Government. Available technologies are rarely 

used to meet current needs; neither are agencies preparing to use these technologies to handle the enormous 

volume of digital records. As a result, the Government is 

currently unable to preserve or provide access to a great 

many important records. 

The challenge can be met only with determined efforts 

to modernize classification and declassification by employing existing technologies and developing new tools. 

Agencies should collaborate on policy, share technologies, 

promote best practices and develop common standards. 

Metadata are especially critical to future high-speed data 

manipulation in the digital era. Promising new technologies should be tested through a series of pilot projects, beginning with a declassification project at the NDC; once 

proven, they can be deployed at multiple agencies and 

then expanded to include pilot projects for classification. 

The ultimate goal of these pilots is to discover, develop 

and deploy technology that will:

•	 Automate and streamline classification and declassification processes, and ensure integration 

with electronic records management systems. 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 5

•	 Provide tools for preservation, search, storage, 

scalability, review for access, and security 

application. 

•	 Address cyber security concerns, especially 

when integrating open source information into 

classified systems.

•	 Standardize metadata generation and tagging, 

creating a government-wide metadata registry. 

Lessons learned from the intelligence community will be helpful here.

•	 Accommodate complex volumes of data (e.g. 

email, non-structured data, and video teleconferencing information). 

•	 Advance government-wide information management practices by supporting the President’s 

Memorandum on Managing Government Records.

The President should hold the Steering Committee accountable for ensuring the interagency collaboration 

needed to employ existing technologies and develop new 

methods to modernize classification and declassification.

H H H

ENDNOTES for EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

i Memorandum for Implementation of the Executive Order 

13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 

2009, 75 FR 733, Document Number E9-31424. 

ii Modeled on the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding 

Steering Committee, Executive Order 13587, “Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the 

Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information,” 76 FR 63811, Document Number 2011-26729. The Public 

Interest Declassification Board would be available to assist this 

committee.

iii Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” 75 FR 68675, Document Number 2010-28360.

iv An equity is information that was originated, created by, classified by, or concerns the activities of a specific government agency 

or organization and, as owners of the information, only they 

can declassify it. Records that contain multiple agency “equities” 

must be referred to those agencies for declassification review. 

Sources: 32 C.F.R. Parts 2001 and 2003 Classified National Security Information; Final Rule, section 2001. 92(g), 75 FR 37279, 

Document Number 2010-15443 and The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy (http://www.justice.gov/

open/declassification/).

v One intelligence agency estimates that one terabyte of data is 

equivalent to approximately 112 million pages of information, 

making one petabyte of data equivalent to approximately 1.2 

trillion pages of information. The Government declassified 1.27 

billion pages of information between FY 1995 and 2011 according to figures from the FY 2011 Annual Report to the President 

from the Information Security Oversight Office. (http://www.

archives.gov/isoo/reports/2011-annual-report.pdf). Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security Information” is a predecessor order to today’s Executive Order 13526. See Endnote 2. 

vi Contemplation of recommendations regarding RD and FRD 

should include determination if legislative changes are needed. 

vii Agencies have adopted conservative “no risk” practices when reviewing records for declassification. Agencies use this “no risk” 

practice most notably when implementing the requirements of 

the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Year 1999 

and 2000 (Public Laws 105-261 and 106-65 respectively), which 

relate to RD/FRD.

viii Currently, many transfers of declassified records to the National 

Archives are hindered by outdated scheduling requirements, 

making declassified records unavailable to users.

ix The NDC Director is currently advised by an interagency NDC 

Advisory Panel (NAP) and assisted by an inter-agency Program 

Management Team (PMT). The NAP examines current declassification review processes throughout government. It consists of 

senior managers from the Departments of State, Defense, and 

Energy as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, Director of 

National Intelligence, the Information Security Oversight Office, 

and the National Archives. 

x Managing Government Records, Memorandum for the Heads of 

Executive Departments and Agencies, A Presidential Document 

by the Executive Office of the President on 11/28/2011, 76 FR 

75423, Document Number 2011-31096. The Office of Management and Budget issued M-12-18, Managing Government Records 

Directive on August 24, 2012. This Directive creates a robust records management framework that complies with statutes and 

regulations to achieve the benefits outlined in the Presidential 

Memorandum. This Directive was informed by agency reports 

submitted pursuant to Sec. 2 (b) of the Presidential Memorandum and feedback from consultations with agencies, interagency 

groups, and public stakeholders. 

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6 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

Report to the President from the Public Interest Declassification Board on 

Transforming the Security Classification System

INTRODUCTION

“A popular Government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a 

Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who mean to be 

their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” 

James Madison to W.T. Barry, August 4, 1822

A democratic society is grounded on the informed participation of the citizenry, which in turn requires access to Government information. If officials are to be accountable for 

their actions and decisions, secrecy must be kept to the minimum necessary to meet legitimate 

national security considerations. An open documentary record of official decisions is essential 

to educate and inform the public and enable it to assess the policies of its elected leaders. To 

maintain democratic values, government must act to ensure openness and should have to justify any use of secrecy. 

Adequate public access to Government information by 

definition depends on how well government agencies 

record what they do and then permit access to those 

records. Without accurate and accessible records, history and democratic accountability suffer. Any overlay of 

secrecy makes accountability more difficult. At its most 

benign, secrecy impedes informed government decisions 

and an informed public; at worst, it enables corruption 

and malfeasance. 

Technology has revolutionized the way information is 

created, stored, disseminated and used. This has led to 

an exponential increase in electronic information creation and, compared to the paper age, to vastly accelerated growth of records. For most government agencies, 

the information explosion of the last two decades has 

significantly compromised their ability to manage records properly, especially records “born digital.” Policies 

and practices have not been modernized to keep pace 

with the increasing volume and changing nature of electronic records. 

Modernizing records management through the use of 

technology will improve performance and promote 

openness and accountability in government. This is particularly true in the area of electronic records management. The President’s recent Memorandum on Managing 

Government Records and its Directive specifically addresses this relationship between transparency and 

openness of government.1 The memorandum calls for a 

much-needed modernization effort across Government 

to ensure improved management of records, particularly 

those of historical value. Among the many challenges in 

managing electronic records is the high cost of operating decentralized, disparate systems securely. Preserving 

large volumes of electronic records for future access is 

also problematic as media formats and retrieval hardware continually evolve. 

While agencies need to modernize and improve overall 

records management performance, classified records 

pertaining to our nation’s security demand particular 

attention. Current practices for handling classification, 

declassification, and management of these records are 

outmoded, unsustainable, and keep too much information from the public. Classification and declassification 

are typically performed in isolation from each other, 

rather than as phases in a record-keeping continuum, 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 7

and reflect an imbalance between the value of safeguarding national security information and the value of 

public release. 

The Board previously issued a report to the White House 

in 2008 detailing a series of recommendations to improve the performance of the declassification system. 

The report, Improving Declassification, led to significant 

changes in declassification policy.2 Many of the Board’s 

recommendations were included as new policy in 

Executive Order 13526, including the recommendation 

for establishing a National Declassification Center to 

organize and consolidate declassification efforts across 

Government.3 In his Implementing Memorandum on 

Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security 

Information,” the President tasked the Public Interest 

Declassification Board “to design a more fundamental 

transformation of the security classification system,” to 

help it function effectively and efficiently in the information age.4

In response to the President’s tasking, the Board researched and studied the security classification system 

to understand how classified records of every level of 

sensitivity are managed and how different users influence classification and declassification decisions at the 

front-end and the back-end of the system. The Board met 

extensively with stakeholders inside and outside of government to understand the challenges the system presents to all users and to solicit suggestions and ideas for 

its transformation. The Board engaged senior leaders at 

agencies, as well as their subject matter experts, classifiers and declassifiers in their discussions. They assembled 

representatives from civil society and open government 

groups, as well as historians, researchers and information 

and archives professionals in academia and Government. 

They also consulted with leading technologists and security experts in the private sector.

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8 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

The Board drafted eight preliminary recommendations based on the outcome of these meetings. As part 

of its outreach efforts, the Board hosted a public blog, 

Transforming Classification, launched on March 16, 2011, 

after a public forum held at the Newseum in Washington, 

D.C.5 Subsequently, the Board expanded its recommendations into white papers and posted them for comment 

on the blog. To advance the online discussion, the Board 

solicited ideas and posted white papers submitted by the 

public. The blog remained active for thirteen weeks and 

received 104 comments. A subsequent public meeting at 

the National Archives invited further public participation 

in reviewing the draft recommendations and opened a 

wider dialogue about the public’s white papers and comments. Discussion with key stakeholders inside and outside of government continued following the completion 

of the blog. The Board refined their recommendations 

based on these continued discussions with leaders and 

experts inside and outside government. 

From discussion with system users, the Board learned 

how classification, declassification, and access-control 

policies come into conflict and inhibit the ability to share 

information critical to operations, all with great consequence to users. The Board also concluded that new 

policies and, likely, some new organization and culture 

change are necessary to transform the classification system for the digital age and better align it with public access to historical information. 

Policies and practices based on an outdated secrecy bias 

are often counterproductive in the current information 

environment and require modernization. Better organizing and integrating classification, declassification, advanced technologies, and historical interests will improve 

access to Government records for all users. Better access 

to information will help our citizens and their government better manage national security and foreign policy 

in a complex, dangerous, and rapidly changing world. 

With this background and analysis, the Board has prepared a series of recommendations on how best to transform the security classification system to protect national 

security more effectively while promoting government 

openness. Success will hinge on the Government’s ability to apply new and existing technologies to advance 

automation and human-assisted analysis. Evaluating the 

effectiveness of proposed changes, particularly “piloting” 

new technologies prior to widespread implementation, 

will be critical to their acceptance in the national security community and so to their practical success in transforming the system. 

There is still much work to be done. The recommendations in this report are but a first step in a series of serious measures that can reform and modernize the security classification system. The Board recognizes that 

its recommendations will require discussion to address 

the needs of implementation. This report’s recommendations are intended as a catalyst for an inter-agency process that will result in meaningful reform. Once implemented, these recommendations will ensure more open 

and transparent government for a society that accepts 

necessary, but more limited, secrecy. 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 9

THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

The process for classifying information remains much as it was when first established more than 70 years ago. The methods for identifying, marking, handling and storing sensitive 

information have remained fairly constant. Users make decisions to assign information to one 

of three current categories based on loosely defined levels of presumed “damage” to national 

security.6 Estimating the level of damage that might result from unauthorized release is often 

an exercise in speculation and more art than science, particularly when prediction of damage is 

inconclusive. Agencies often make these decisions in isolation, without input from other classifying agencies or knowledge of prior declassification actions. The vagaries in this process lead 

to imprecise and excessive classification. 

 From its inception, the purpose of the classification system was to categorize and protect sensitive information. 

Classified information lost its national security value 

and risked national security damage if not closely held 

by those who created it and their authorized customers. Historically, classification occurred mostly through 

a rote process, almost always favoring protection and 

with little restraint or concern for declassification and 

eventual public access. Over-classification was a natural 

consequence of having a culture of caution, with every 

incentive to avoid risk rather than manage it. Outdated 

and inadequate guidance and training only added to the 

problem, and little or no consideration was accorded to 

the possible tactical value of disclosure or to the public’s 

eventual right to know.7 As a result, limits on access were 

unnecessarily broad and long-lived, and the cost to store 

and safeguard this information dramatically increased.

The original design of the classification system was simple enough. Its rules, designations, and markings worked 

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10 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

fairly well to control access and prevent unauthorized 

disclosure of paper records. Beginning in the 1980s, an 

increasingly complex national security posture resulted 

in a sharp increase in compartmented and special access programs. These highly sensitive programs required 

new safeguarding, handling, and disseminating practices 

that were added piecemeal to a system never intended 

to manage such a complicated information framework. 

The number of cleared users increased dramatically, 

while the secrecy culture was compounded with more 

sub-categories and markings. No operational incentives 

existed to impose limits, and the size and complexity of 

the system were effectively masked from real oversight. 

Stove-piping not only segregated classified information, 

but also kept users from seeing how bloated the system 

had become. 

A government producing substantially larger numbers 

of classified records in a hybrid of formats has led to a 

patchwork of modifications to policies and practices of the 

older, analog paper-based system. With the explosion of 

digital records, new classification guidance has developed 

mainly by adapting and applying outdated practices to individual cases, and so has increased the complexity of the 

system. This complexity makes integration and modernization more difficult and worsens over-classification. 

Changes in government operations and the rapid growth 

of digital information reinforce the case for a new model. 

There is a need for more streamlined access to information by the Government and the public, challenging 

longstanding notions of secrecy born in the Cold War information environment. The classification system must 

be modernized as a dynamic, easily understood and 

mission-enabling system and one that deters over-classification and encourages accessibility. This will require a 

coordinated effort across Government beginning with an 

inter-agency process led by the White House.

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 11

RECOMMENDATIONS for TRANSFORMING 

CLASSIFICATION

[RECOMMENDATION 1]: The President should appoint a White House-led Security Classification Reform 

Steering Committee to oversee implementation of the 

Board’s recommendations to modernize the current system of classification and declassification. This committee 

would exercise overall responsibility and ensure seniorlevel accountability for the coordinated interagency 

development and implementation of policies and standards regarding the transformation of the security classification system. The Senior Information Sharing and 

Safeguarding Steering Committee provides a good model for the committee. Its chair should be appointed and 

granted specific authorities by the President.8 Members of 

the committee should be knowledgeable and experienced 

senior officials from the national security community, as 

well as officials responsible for federal information technology, records management, and public information 

policy and practice. It should have the authority to enact 

the changes recommended by the Board: identifying and 

implementing new initiatives, policies, and standards in 

support of transformation. The committee would establish, monitor, and enforce priorities and corresponding 

benchmarks and timeframes for meeting specific goals, 

reporting successes and shortcomings to the President. 

The Board recognizes that to be successful, the implementation process itself must be transparent and earn 

support from both Government agencies and the public. The Board will be available to assist the committee in 

carrying out the President’s direction by monitoring and 

evaluating agency implementation efforts. 

[RECOMMENDATION 2]: Classification should be 

simplified and rationalized by placing national security information in only two classification categories, aligned to 

existing practices in much of the government. Top Secret 

will remain and retain its current, high level of protection. All other classified information would be categorized at a Lower-Level (to be named), which would 

follow standards for a lower level of protection. Both 

categories would include compartmented and special 

access information, as they do today. The two categories should be defined and distinguished by the level of 

identifiable protection needed to safeguard and share 

information appropriately; these identifiable levels of 

protection would determine whether classification is 

warranted and at what level. The new model will require 

all classified information to continue to be subject to 

declassification and all other requirements of Executive 

Order 13526. 

The Board’s study revealed the concern by users about 

the increasing complexity of the classification system 

and accelerating growth of classified records, and confirmed a practical need to simplify policies and practices and make the system more usable. We believe that 

the system, in practice, need not be complex. The goal 

of reforming the system is to align classification levels 

with actual safeguarding practices throughout government. This alignment, when used in combination with 

accurate classification guidance linking clearly identifiable risk to classification level, will result in more precise and appropriate classification. Accurate classification most certainly aids future declassification activity, 

and we believe two-levels of classification may lead to 

less classification overall. There is a need to define more 

precisely and narrowly what types of information warrant security classification. The two-tiered system of 

classification will prod agencies to reexamine the current broad definitions of information that qualifies for 

classification. 

The actions consequent to classifying align to only two 

levels of protection in Government-wide safeguarding 

disciplines: two levels of security clearance investigations, two levels of physical safeguarding and two levels of information systems domains. There is a practical 

need to simplify current policies and practices to make 

the system more usable. The Board found that classifying 

agencies in the U.S. Government and our international 

partners share this concern. In the case of international 

partners, some are moving to a two-tiered model similar 

to that recommended by the Board. 9 In the case of U.S. 

agencies, some already are operating in a de-facto twotiered model, though the levels of classification vary (i.e. 

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12 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

some classify almost exclusively at the CONFIDENTIAL/

SECRET levels, while for others SECRET/TOP SECRET 

predominate).

[RECOMMENDATION 3]: The decision to classify 

information and at what level in the two-tiered system 

should be more clearly defined and distinguished by the 

level of identifiable protection needed to safeguard and 

share information appropriately. The threshold for classifying in the two-tiered system should be adjusted to align 

the level of protection with the level of harm anticipated 

in the event of unauthorized release. This can only be 

achieved by linking clearly identifiable risk to an accurate 

harm assessment in classification guidance. Classifiers 

then would only be required to identify the corresponding minimum level of protection needed to ensure appropriate safeguarding and facilitate required information 

sharing. Determining a level of protection to facilitate or 

limit dissemination is more prescriptive in practice and 

would assist classifiers in making more accurate classification decisions. Applying this risk management practice 

by identifying the level of protection needed based on the 

sensitivity of the information, rather than potential damage if disclosed, would allow users to classify information 

at the lowest level of protection or to keep the information unclassified. 

Classification guidance would need to be revised to reflect the two-tiered model, with the goals of reducing 

over-classification, improving authorized information 

sharing, and not focusing solely on the dangers of inappropriate disclosure. Guidance would clearly define levels of protection by identifying a specific consequence 

of release of the classified information and the potential 

harm to the national security of limiting the sharing of 

the information. The difficulty of applying the current 

concept of presumed “damage” during derivative classification would be replaced by a more concrete application of the level of protection necessary for sharing and 

protecting. This change in guidance would reflect how 

classification is actually practiced by derivative classifiers—deciding how much protection is needed based 

on the sensitivity of the information to both protect and 

share appropriately. 

The best way to deal with over-classification and promote 

information sharing is to manage risk by correctly assessing potential harm and classifying to meet the minimum 

New Classification 

Category

Old Classification

Category

Level of 

Protection

Higher-Level

“Top Secret” Top Secret Higher level of protection 

Includes compartmented and 

special access 

information Lower-Level Confidential and Secret Lower 

level of protection 

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE UNDER THE RECOMMENDED SYSTEM WOULD ADDRESS 

the specific consequences and potential harm to the national security of unauthorized release and of limitations on 

the sharing the information. This guidance will also provide classifiers more information at the time of classification about any likelihood the information would need to be shared with state, local, or tribal governments during a 

crisis. A risk management protocol would aid in deciding whether the potential harm of inadvertent release would 

entail more damage than the inability to share the information on a broader level and would direct classification 

accordingly. Currently, classification decisions are based on the loosely defined levels of presumed “damage” found 

in Executive Order 13526. These decisions are often made without regard to the public or tactical value of disclosure 

and reflect an institutional risk-averse culture that results in systematic over-classification.

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 13

level of protection needed, or often even keeping the 

information unclassified. When considering classifying, every classifier should give serious consideration to 

declassification and strive to better balance the need to 

protect information with the public’s right to access information about its government. 

Confidential and Secret information in the current system require similar levels of protection against unauthorized release.10 Classifiers are often unable to distinguish between the criteria for applying the Confidential 

and the Secret markings and default to the higher classification, erring on the side of protection. More difficult still is judging when to apply the criteria for the 

Confidential marking rather than refraining from any 

classification. In the simplified model, tighter definitions keyed to identifiable risks and sharper description of the protections under the new Lower-Level 

category should help classifiers make better decisions. 

The new two-tiered classification model should not simply combine the Confidential and Secret categories of 

classification. Although some information previously 

marked as Confidential may receive the Lower-Level 

marking in the new model, much more information 

should remain unclassified in the first instance. In order to simplify the system and classify less, agencies will 

need tighter definitions, better measures of identifiable 

risk and level of protection, clearer standards for access 

to information, and robust, new training to implement 

these changes.

The creation of a new Lower-Level classification category 

will ease the burden placed on users needing to share 

information that is not of the highest sensitivity. Access 

controls in this Lower-Level category will be the most 

instrumental factor in protecting information. The new 

THE SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM TO A TWO-TIERED MODEL IS 

not without meaningful challenges for agencies, particularly the Departments of State and Energy. In the FY 2011 

Annual Report to the President, agencies reported to ISOO the use of Confidential in 15.2% of their total classification decisions; the State Department’s use was at 27% and 61% of its original classification decisions were at the 

Confidential level.11 Diplomatic conversations are regularly classified as Confidential. In its meetings with senior 

agency officials at the State Department, the Board learned that the State Department (and many other agencies) 

already operates in a de facto two-tiered classification system. Currently, the State Department classifies primarily 

at the Confidential and Secret levels. In the new, two-tiered model the information will continue to be classified 

where an identifiable risk mandates a level of protection, but at the Lower-Level. 

The Department of Energy must navigate between two regimes of classification: for Classified National Security 

Information (under Executive Order 13526) and for nuclear information, known as Restricted Data information 

(under the Atomic Energy Act).12 Some Restricted Data information currently bears a Confidential marking, 

though its level of protection is roughly equivalent to that of Secret national security information. It will require 

substantial effort to harmonize and clarify the markings and protections within these two regime

“The best way to ensure that secrecy is respected, and that the most important secrets remain 

secret, is for secrecy to be returned to its limited but necessary role. Secrets can be protected 

more effectively if secrecy is reduced overall.”

Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 

1997, Senate Document 105-2, Public Law 236.

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14 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

Lower-Level category will enable information technology platforms to support and share classified information consistently across user domains. More unified security policy should facilitate greater system integration 

and improved protection. Compartmented and special 

access information, including Sensitive Compartmented 

Information, would be held, as appropriate, in either the 

Top Secret or the new Lower-Level category, with access 

tightly controlled. 

[RECOMMENDATION 4]: The specific protections afforded intelligence sources and methods need to be precisely 

defined and distinguished. Intelligence sources and methods require special evaluation when determining classification. The ability to safeguard and share this type of 

information appropriately depends on the capacity to distinguish between intelligence and non-intelligence sources. 

Intelligence methods, in particular, must be more precisely 

defined in classification guidance to aid appropriate classification and, ultimately, declassification. The Board recognizes the compelling need to mitigate risk within this specific information grouping because of its high sensitivity. 

[RECOMMENDATION 5]: Pre-decisional, tactical, 

and operational information with short-lived sensitivity 

should be identified and segmented for automatic declassification without further review. This type of time-specific 

classified information should be declassified automatically without any review only after the pertinent specific 

event occurs or date passes. It should be classified and 

marked as “Short-term” (or similar term) at creation, and 

technology should be employed to automate the declassification action. Agency declassifiers may offer expertise 

on the type of information that could be marked in this 

category. The automatic declassification of “Short-term” 

information would save valuable resources and inform 

the historical record of decisions and actions at the earliest time, hopefully earning public support and improving agency relationships with partners. 

[RECOMMENDATION 6]: Agencies should recognize 

in policy and practice a “safe harbor” protection for classifiers who adhere to rigorous risk management practices 

and determine in good faith to classify information at a 

lower level or not at all. Classifiers face incentives that 

bias their decisions toward classification. They should 

be encouraged and rewarded—and at least not punished—for good-faith decisions that certain information should remain unclassified. Some agencies currently exercise these provisions and should be recognized 

“Put positively, a new classification system should maintain classification for the shortest possible time and 

make the declassification system more efficient rather than more costly.” 

Redefining Security, A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, 

February 28, 1994, Joint Security Commission

PRESENTLY, THE INTELLIGENCE AND DEFENSE COMMUNITIES STRIVE FOR GREATER

information sharing on their electronic networks13 through a two-tier classification level strategy:

Network Category Level of Protection for 

Classified Information

JWICS Top Secret/SCI Higher level of protection 

compared to Secret

SIPRNET Secret Lower level of protection 

compared to Top Secret

NIPRNET Unclassified N/A*

*The NIPR network contains appropriate protection levels afforded controlled, unclassified information (CUI).

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 15

and serve as models of “best practice” for establishing 

procedures and training programs that encourage classification challenges. In addition to new policies, implementing this recommendation will depend on a fundamental change in culture and longstanding practice. 

Classification training should address the deep-rooted 

cultural bias that favors classification, and often overclassification, through coordinated, consistent education that underscores the responsibility to not classify 

if in doubt.

Changing the culture of classification also will require 

effective training in the proper use of the classification 

system. The Information Security Oversight Office historically has found that the quality of classification training programs varies significantly across agencies, and 

that many of these programs are deficient. The President 

should direct the Security Classification Reform Steering 

Committee to examine agencies’ training programs and 

develop a strong model for training that draws on best 

practices.

From discussions with Executive branch officials, the 

Congress, and the public, the Board recognizes that 

over-classification impedes access to information for all 

users, including the public. It also undermines the integrity of the system. Agencies should be required to conduct separate training units on over-classification, which 

could include illustrative examples, case studies of resulting harms, an explication of the limits of the authority 

of derivative classifiers, and other pertinent information. 

This would ensure meaningful adherence to Executive 

Order 13526’s requirement that classifiers be trained in 

avoiding over-classification. The Board recommends using incentives to encourage challenges to classification 

that would increase oversight and help shift the culture 

bias from favoring classification to one that recognizes 

the opportunity found in and need for declassification.14

IN OPERATION DESERT STORM, THE UNITED STATES LED A UN-AUTHORIZED

coalition force from 34 nations in a war against Iraq after its invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The initial 

action to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on January 17, 1991, followed by a 

ground assault on February 23. Coalition forces liberated Kuwait decisively, halted its advance into Iraqi territory, and declared a cease-fire after only 100 hours of the ground campaign. 

Command of this large-scale conflict was conducted in a mostly digital environment through the use of leadership video teleconferencing, battlefield reporting and other digital media coordination. Much of the operational 

and tactical military information regarding Operation Desert Storm, including records “born-digital,” could 

have been classified and marked as “Short-term” at the time the records were created. The cease-fire declared 

on February 28, 1991, could have been the occasion for automatically declassifying some specific, time-limited 

information no longer requiring protection, including born-digital information. Such automatic declassification 

of born-digital information would lessen the burden of preserving this information from format obsolescence and 

enable study by the government and civilian historical communities at the earliest permissible time.

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16 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

THE DECLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

Declassification is used to remove restrictions on and grant public access to classified information that no longer requires safeguarding. The current business practices used for 

declassification review are slow, resource-intensive, and painstaking. In the typical review process, agency reviewers apply their own agency standards for continued classification to a document on a page-by-page, line-by-line basis. If more than one agency asserts its equities in a 

piece of information because of sources or origination, the document is referred for review by 

each agency sequentially, but with little pressure for timely action.15 It is not a methodology 

designed for efficiency or for managing risk with appropriate regard for the public interest or 

other policy objectives.

Most agencies operate their declassification programs in 

isolation from each other, using disparate sets of rules 

and procedures. They generally do not collaborate to 

gain efficiency or to fashion systematic, governmentwide approaches to declassification. Because agencies’ 

declassification guidelines and criteria are often outdated 

or difficult to understand, they can produce inconsistent 

declassification decisions and missed referrals to other 

agencies. Agencies rarely share internal classification and 

declassification guidance, fearing loss of control of their 

information equities and contributing to partner agencies’ lack of understanding of their specific interests and 

sensitivities. This sort of disjointed approach may put 

classified information needlessly at risk while also avoiding timely declassification of information. 

Today’s national security actions increasingly produce 

records containing information from several agencies. 

The current process of referring records between agencies to complete declassification review may take years to 

coordinate and complete. The slow pace of declassification can also be traced in part to inadequate declassification training and outdated or confusing guidance. 

Desktop computers and email changed the landscape of 

Government operations. “Information” is produced and 

shared easily, and data volumes have soared. The current approach to declassification, rooted in the paperbased past, is comprised of multiple layers of human review, lacking both a risk management approach and the 

advantages of modern technology. It is clear that current 

capabilities and business practices will never be up to the 

task of handling the volume of digital records held by, 

and being newly created across, Government. Without 

changes, the exponential growth in the creation of digital 

records requiring review will radically increase backlogs, 

and thus dramatic reform of the review process is needed. 

Beyond the sheer volume, classified data exist in varying 

technical formats and are subject to decentralized agency-centric management and policies. Government has 

failed so far to manage review of the paper records and 

media created in the 20th century. Agencies are not using 

available technologies fully or consistently, although this 

would surely improve efficiency and effectiveness. The 

demands presented by 21st century digital data generation underscore the need to replace the traditional, timeintensive, agency declassification process with an integrated Government-wide system that takes advantage of 

today’s digital age technologies. 

Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security 

Information” and its two predecessors established specific declassification requirements for all national security agencies.20 Despite these identical mandates, a 

Government-wide approach to declassification remains 

elusive. Separate agency declassification programs evolved 

into a segmented declassification system where each agency reviewed its information and attempted to identify any 

classified information from other agencies. Agencies were 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 17

required to perform the same tasks, such as completing 

automatic, systematic, and mandatory declassification reviews, yet how agencies designed and implemented their 

specific programming to meet requirements was conducted without interagency coordination. The declassification 

system has become increasingly complex and unwieldy. 

Accordingly, the public has become increasingly frustrated and confused by what it encounters when trying to 

navigate the labyrinth of agency programs. 

Executive Order 13526 also mandates that all classified 

information be automatically declassified by agencies 

when it is 25 years old. The birth date of records soon 

subject to automatic declassification coincides with the 

dawn of the digital Internet Age: classified records from 

1988 will be automatically declassified on January 1, 

2013. Agencies are unprepared and ill-equipped to handle the difficult task of reviewing the enormous volume 

of these so-called “born-digital” records as they become 

A SNAPSHOT OF THE LOOMING DIGITAL CHALLENGE

This graph represents one isolated example of just how quickly the volume of digital information assets is growing at 

agencies across Government.16 According to the National Archives’ estimates, the Presidential Libraries alone hold 

the equivalent of at least 5 billion pages of digital information in need of review.17 Lining the pages end-to-end would 

stretch over 631,313 miles and would be long enough to circle the Earth more than 25 times. Even as we struggle to 

comprehend numbers of this size, agencies are predicting further exponential information growth at shorter intervals.

AT ONE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ALONE, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT APPROXIMATELY 1 

petabyte of classified records data accumulates every 18 months. One petabyte of information is equivalent to approximately 20 million four-drawer filing cabinets filled with text, or about 13.3 years of High- Definition video.18

Under the current declassification model, it is estimated that one full-time employee can review 10 four-drawer 

filing cabinets of text records in one year. In the above example, it is estimated that one intelligence agency would, 

therefore, require two million employees to review manually its one petabyte of information each year. Similarly, 

other agencies would hypothetically require millions more employees just to conduct their reviews.

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18 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

subject to automatic declassification after 25 years. In 

2009, the Board noted that “future historians may find 

that the paper records of early American history provide 

a more reliable historical account than the inchoate mass 

of digital communications of the current era.”21 This concern persists today, and has only grown worse.

The automatic declassification efforts begun during the 

Clinton Administration to improve transparency and access to information have been hamstrung by the complex 

and inefficient interagency referral and review processes. 

This has resulted in a processing backlog at the National 

Archives of approximately 400 million pages older than 

25 years. In an effort to address the growing backlog, the 

President established the National Declassification Center 

(NDC) within the National Archives to “streamline declassification processes, facilitate quality-assurance measures, and implement standardized training to allow more 

effective and efficient declassification review of records 

determined to have permanent historical value.”22

In addition to records awaiting standard declassification review, the backlog includes records pending review 

for other access restrictions, such as proper handling of 

historical nuclear information, Privacy Act compliance, 

and archival records processing. 23 These are additional, 

resource-intensive procedures that must be completed by 

agencies, the NDC, and the National Archives before records are made available to the public. The President instructed agencies to develop more cooperative processes 

FILE FORMAT OBSOLESCENCE: The Threat to Long-term Maintenance of Digital Assets19

During the early decades of computing, no systematic efforts were made to collect software documentation or file 

format specifications. Without proper documentation, the task of trying to interpret an old file, or even determine 

what format it was written in, becomes daunting. 

Case in Point: While we may not have realized the threat of obsolescence when we first started purchasing personal 

computers over twenty years ago, we certainly experience the frustration of it now. Trying to read an old 3.5 floppy 

from ten years ago can be frustrating if you don’t know what software or hardware was involved in its creation. Say you 

find a ten year old PC to test an old floppy on and it is unable to read it. You may believe the floppy is damaged, but it 

could just as easily be an old Macintosh floppy, which your PC would be unable to identify because it runs a different 

Operating System. Most people would probably throw that floppy in the bin, unaware that those files were just fine.

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 19

to eliminate this backlog and make as many records accessible to the public as possible by the end of 2013.24

Although the NDC has streamlined declassification review and has sizably reduced the backlog, its bi-annual 

reports indicate that it may not meet the President’s prescribed goal to eliminate the backlog. 25 The expected 

growth of electronic records will create new backlogs 

almost incomprehensible in size.

Under the terms of Executive Order 13526, agencies may 

exempt from declassification specific information as it 

becomes 25 years old if release would damage national 

security. Guided almost exclusively by the need to identify records requiring continued protection, agencies have 

followed page-by-page review practices with little or no 

attempt to prioritize collections of higher historical value 

or with high demand for access. 

Declassification review processes are built and operated 

to accept no risk in reviewer decision-making—a much 

more conservative process than is prescribed by the current Executive Order. There remains an institutional culture where reviewers routinely exempt information from 

declassification without actually considering whether 

harm will occur if it were released. This practice of managing the declassification system to zero risk wastes valuable resources and extends secrecy without justification. 

There are significant policy benefits from declassification 

that can aid national security decisions and diplomacy. 

Declassification is a valuable information sharing tool, 

particularly when information holders must partner 

with stakeholders outside the intelligence and defense 

communities. Information may be the newest and most 

important policy tool of the modern era, with declassification during operations offering a strategic advantage. 

Public release not only makes policymakers accountable 

for their decisions and actions; it also affords agencies 

the opportunity to correct misinformation in the public domain and bolster their position in current debates. 

Nonetheless, declassification review is perceived by agencies as an historical exercise with very limited relevance 

to today’s national security mission, making declassification a significantly under-resourced and under-appreciated function. 

Declassification performs a service crucial to democratic 

society, informing citizens and promoting responsible 

dialogue between the public and Government. As dramatic changes take place in the information landscape, 

so the public’s expectations are changing as well. The 

public, now fluent in digital technology and communication, is accustomed to timely information and expects 

improved access to Government information. The denial 

or loss of access to historically valuable records is a real 

concern. National security and democratic values are not 

separate and cannot be treated as conflicting. The new 

realities of the digital age require agencies modernize 

their declassification practices to meet the needs of all 

information users. 

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT CITED THE NEED FOR INCREASED INFORMATION 

sharing across agencies and with Government partners to better protect national security interests.26 Success in 

combating the nation’s adversaries may dictate refraining from classification or downgrading or declassifying information to permit access. Despite this imperative, declassification continues to be conducted largely in isolation as 

before, despite the need for greater collaboration and better access to information

“The opportunity to change the classification system comes at an important point in our history. In this post 

Cold War period, we can move away from a strategy that has been characterized as something close to total 

risk avoidance and develop instead an approach more clearly based on risk management.” 

Redefining Security, A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, 

February 28, 1994, Joint Security Commission

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20 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

RECOMMENDATIONS for TRANSFORMING 

DECLASSIFICATION

[RECOMMENDATION 7]: The classification status 

of Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) information should 

be re-examined. A process should be implemented for the 

systematic declassification review of historical FRD information. As designated by the Department of Energy 

under provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, FRD information is classified information that has been removed 

from the Restricted Data category after the Departments 

of Energy and Defense jointly determine that it relates 

primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons 

and can be adequately safeguarded in a manner similar

to national security information.27 FRD information 

primarily concerns the military utilization of nuclear 

weapons, including storage locations and stockpile information. Restricted Data (RD) information is defined 

by the Atomic Energy Act as information concerning the 

design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; 

the production of special nuclear material; and the use of 

special nuclear material to generate electricity.28 FRD information, along with RD information, is automatically 

excluded from declassification review under the current 

Executive Order.29

Historical FRD information, created from the end of 

World War II through the end of the Cold War, is often 

obsolete and no longer has any military or operational 

value. Because FRD information is the joint equity of the 

Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, attempts at review of this information are complex.30 There 

are also high costs associated with having competing classification systems controlling access to obsolete information regarding deployment of nuclear weapons, generating 

confusion when users from the agencies are asked to interpret two sets of policies, guidance and procedures. 

This type of information is of high interest to historians studying the Cold War, including US nuclear policy. 

Yet, Government regulations require that it be afforded 

special safeguarding and protection. At present, existing 

processes have had little effect in declassifying historical 

nuclear policy information. Requests for this information from classified files are routinely denied. The public 

does not understand this arcane policy, especially when 

so much historical nuclear policy information is in the 

public domain. 

DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962, THE UNITED STATES 

confronted the Soviet Union over the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. On October 14, 1962, a U.S. 

Air Force U-2 photoreconnaissance plane photographed Soviet missile launch facilities under construction in Cuba. 

The launchers were designed for medium- and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles capable of reaching 

most of the continental United States. 

The ensuing crisis is widely considered to be the most dangerous episode of the Cold War, coming closest to an actual 

nuclear conflict. The U.S. demanded removal of the launchers and imposed a naval blockade of Cuba. The Soviet 

Union balked at U.S. demands, and President John F. Kennedy and his administration expected military action. 

Secret negotiations ended the crisis. The Soviet Union agreed to remove missiles from Cuba, and the United States 

agreed to give up unneeded missile sites in other countries. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis is a critical event in Cold War history, yet key information about the negotiations and 

settlement fifty years ago have not been declassified due to restrictions on access to FRD information. Although 

inaccessible and still officially classified, much of this information is available from sources outside of the U.S. 

Government – a factor that contributes to public cynicism about classification.

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 21

Given these complexities, the Departments of Energy 

and Defense should consider appropriate conversion of 

historical FRD information to classified national security 

information or to RD information.31 FRD records converted to classified national security information would 

be subject to the requirements of Executive Order 13526, 

including the provisions for declassification. Agencies 

would have the authority to declassify or exempt this information from declassification, based on content. In addition to reconsidering the declassification of historical 

FRD information, larger reforms in the declassification 

strategy across government are needed, including an acknowledgement from agencies that changes to legislation 

may be necessary to streamline policy and practice to aid 

all users. 

[RECOMMENDATION 8]: The President should 

bolster the authority and capacity of the National 

Declassification Center with specific measures to advance a government-wide declassification strategy. 

[8A], Executive Order 13526 should be amended to 

eliminate the additional three years now permitted for 

review of multiple agency equities in all archival records 

(including those stored outside the NDC).32 Eliminating 

the additional time for multiple-agency declassification 

review will compel agencies to integrate and change their 

declassification processes. It will facilitate and improve 

public access to important historical records. Since the 

current backlog of 400 million pages must be reviewed 

for declassification by the end of 2013, implementing this 

change should be an imperative. 

[8B], The requirement of agencies to share declassification guidance with other classifying agencies and the NDC 

should be strengthened. Retention of agency declassification 

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
22 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

authority should be contingent upon sharing agency guidance. Sharing guidance enables better identification of classified information created by other agencies and results in 

more accurate referrals. Agencies that do not share declassification guidance should waive their right to review their 

information equities found in archival records containing 

multiple agency equities. Some agencies currently adhere 

to the requirement to share guidance and these agencies 

should be recognized and serve as models of “best practice” for inter-agency declassification cooperation.33

Enhancing the requirement to share guidance with other 

classifying agencies and eliminating the additional three 

years now permitted for reviewing referred records 

should reduce unnecessary referrals and allow more information that is no longer sensitive to be declassified. 

The referral system functions under the basic tenet that 

reviewers from all agencies have the knowledge and expertise to recognize information equities of other agencies. The ability to question agency counterparts is an 

important tool to assist reviewers in identifying equities, 

particularly for staff at the NDC where reviewers from 

multiple agencies are co-located. This organizational 

strategy will facilitate more accurate declassification reviews and limit referrals to those only absolutely necessary. Training programs should address greater interagency coordination across declassification programs.34

Declassification guidance must also be kept current. 

Agencies should take advantage of technology to ensure 

guidance is accurate, reflects current mission needs, and 

is readily available to sister agencies. 

[8C], The President should direct Agencies to consult the 

NDC before prioritizing their records for declassification 

and transfer to the National Archives. Prioritization plans 

should align with records schedules jointly created by 

agencies and the National Archives that direct the transfer of legal and physical custody of those records to the 

National Archives. 

The age of the records, their historical significance, their 

public interest and their likelihood of declassification, 

should influence how and when the records are reviewed 

and transferred to the National Archives.35 Once the records are transferred to the National Archives, the NDC 

should coordinate review of additional access provisions 

and restrictions and complete archival processing. Like 

declassification decisions, access provisions and restrictions on transferred records should be assessed with an 

appropriate level of risk tolerance. This would streamline 

one component of archival processing that currently delays the release of records to the public. The NDC should 

facilitate a dialogue with historians to assist agencies, 

policymakers, records officers, archivists, and declassification reviewers in setting priorities to improve public 

access to historical records. 

[8D], The Interagency National Declassification Center 

Advisory Panel (NAP) should have representation from 

the public, including representation from the Government 

Openness advocacy community. Since its inception, the 

NDC has actively engaged the public and solicited comments in determining processing priorities and planning 

for future work. Additional public representation will 

improve transparency of NDC actions, provide important new perspectives to Government members and allow for greater public confidence. Currently, the NDC 

Director receives policy advice and guidance from the 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 23

inter-agency NDC Advisory Panel. The NDC Director 

also receives advice from an inter-agency Program 

Management Team (PMT) that assists the NDC in evaluating new business processes used to review records for 

declassification. The Board recommends these advisory 

groups be expanded to include public members with the 

knowledge and expertise to represent non-governmental 

interests, to help design processes to review large volumes of electronic records, to aid in re-engineering of 

procedures across agencies and to validate the work of 

the NDC to external stakeholders. 

[8E], An inter-agency effort to develop new declassification review processes should be coordinated by the NDC 

and be based on a risk management approach. New processes are needed to enable agency reviewers to focus 

their reviews on the most sensitive records series and 

to cope with large volumes of digital records.36 A risk 

management approach to declassification carries clear 

implications for classification policy and procedures and 

should help drive a coherent approach to risk tolerance 

in each part of the security classification system. Such 

a risk management model should also recognize that 

not all classified information carries the same risks or 

requires the same protection, and thus different levels of 

declassification rigor would be appropriate. It should direct limited resources to focus on reviewing information 

of historical significance, but which is still likely to be 

highly sensitive and damaging to the national security 

if released without careful review. External factors, such 

as changing world circumstances and policy determinations, should also be weighed when considering declassification review procedures for certain records series. 

Managing risk in the declassification process depends 

largely on having available for reviewers current and 

detailed guidance, examples of (and stated rationales 

for) previous declassification decisions and subject matter experts who can aid declassifiers in reviewing technical or highly specialized and sensitive information. 

Adopting new policies to manage risk appropriately 

will allow a greater volume of records to be reviewed for 

public access, conserve limited resources, facilitate cultural changes needed for acceptance by the declassification experts and ensure agency resources are focused on 

their most sensitive information. 

[RECOMMENDATION 9]: Historically significant records should be identified and set aside as early as possible 

after their creation to ensure their preservation, long-term 

access and availability to agency policymakers and historians. Each agency should have an in-house history staff 

to assist agency records officers and declassifiers in the prioritization of records. Through the use of existing technologies, including data tagging, historically significant 

records should be prepositioned for review and timely 

public release. Selection of these records should reflect 

a reasoned judgment as to what information will be of 

the most interest to the public or future policymakers. 

Expedited access to these historical records will aid policymakers in retrieving the documentary records of past 

policy decisions, lending context to contemporary decision-making while cataloging valuable information for 

future analysis and public release. Such material not only 

informs public discussion of historical decisions and 

policies, but is also intrinsically important in documenting the Government’s national security history. For these 

reasons, it is most desirable to bring this information into 

the public domain as early as possible. Agencies should 

understand that, if information of this level of historical 

significance must remain classified for some period of 

time, at least some of it should be analyzed, studied, and 

prepositioned by historians at the classified level until 

FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE RECORDS SERIES THAT ARE RETAINED IN RECORDS 

storage facilities by agencies for fifty years, while they are reviewed for declassification at twenty-five years in anticipation of the automatic declassification deadline requirements of E.O. 13526. Because these reviewed records 

are not yet transferred to the National Archives, they remain inaccessible and undiscoverable to the public. Some of 

these records series are of high researcher interest, and synchronizing their transfer schedules and declassification 

review would result in improved public access.

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24 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

such time as it qualifies for full declassification. Some 

agencies currently support an in-house history staff and 

should be recognized as models of “best practice” for 

fledgling history programs in other agencies. 

[RECOMMENDATION 10]: Agencies should improve 

records management overall by supporting and advancing the government-wide information management practices found in the President’s Memorandum on Managing 

Government Records and its Directive.37 The President’s 

Memorandum on Managing Government Records and 

its Directive recognize that effective records management practices are essential to enable access to valuable 

Government information and that the release of historically significant records must be a first priority under 

new cross-agency records management policy. The ability of agencies to transfer archival records to the National 

Archives for public release depends to a great degree on 

how efficiently agencies manage and organize their records in the first place.38

Implementing an effective risk management procedure 

that utilizes page-by-page, line-by-line reviews only 

when warranted depends on having confidence that the 

records officers have produced an accurate description 

of the content found in agency folders, files, boxes, and 

cabinets. The records management process is vital to an 

agency’s ability to review its records of permanent value 

and facilitate timely release using an appropriate risk 

management strategy. Legislation and statutory guidelines addressing records management policies should 

be modernized to reflect the evolving definition of what 

constitutes a federal record and what portion of those 

federal records are permanently valuable records.39 As 

agencies continue to use information technology systems 

to store their information and defining and identifying 

permanently valuable records in these systems becomes 

more complex, improvements in records management 

practices are imperative.

[RECOMMENDATION 11]: The organization and integration of agency declassification programs must be improved across Government. The Board recommends that 

declassification programs be aligned around “centers” 

that bring declassification reviewers and agency historians 

together more closely and earlier to undertake a range of 

case studies, outreach, and production of interdisciplinary 

and cross-departmental storytelling.40 Better organization should result in improved historical understanding. 

Agencies should link their historians with their policymakers, classifiers, declassification reviewers, and records 

officers to promote the identification of permanently valuable information. As a result, outside public and private interests should ideally become more knowledgeable about 

the inner workings of Government agencies.

[RECOMMENDATION 12]: Agencies should be encouraged to prepare case studies and national security histories, 

in classified and unclassified versions. These studies may aid 

policymakers and current mission activity through a “lessons learned” perspective, while simultaneously informing the historical record of agency policies and practices. 

Classified histories should be reviewed for declassification 

at specified intervals to promote the earliest release to the 

public consistent with national security interests. 

[RECOMMENDATION 13]: A series of pilot projects 

should be used to evaluate proposals for enhancing capabilities at the NDC, streamlining the declassification system and 

improving access to historically significant records, including historical nuclear information. These projects should be 

used to test the practicability and wisdom of the Board’s 

recommendations and garner best practices for future implementation. In addition to the resources allocated to the 

NDC, these pilots should be conducted within agencies’ 

declassification programs, employing the full range of resources available while sharing results and findings across 

all agencies, and with the public. The projects should concentrate on potential benefits from the enhanced use of 

technology, outlined in the following section. 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 25

USING TECHNOLOGY to AID CLASSIFICATION 

and DECLASSIFICATION

The digital age has revolutionized the way information is created, stored, transmitted, and accessed. Processes for classification, declassification, and records management have not 

kept pace. Defining a record based on informational, evidentiary, intrinsic, and historical value is 

much more complicated in the digital environment, often creating all-or-nothing retention practices at agencies because of outdated guidance that does not address the complexities of streaming 

data creation, platform generation, or the other complexities of the emerging “Big Data” era.41

Management and preservation of electronic records are of serious concern to agencies, as are the 

overwhelming volume of records awaiting review and the complexity of record formats. These 

factors all conspire to make the costs of manual declassification review prohibitive. 

In the digital age, the approach to managing historical 

records requires much foresight. The many complexities 

of information creation and dissemination may mean we 

have to redefine permanently valuable records, in order 

that agencies have the guidance needed to identify and 

preserve historically significant information buried in 

a mass of digital information. The Government is only 

now entering the digital records era in their declassification processes, and the nature and character of contemporary information technology and communications 

offer both challenges and promise.

The search for technological solutions to classification and 

declassification problems must be driven by a larger vision 

that brings together all the component processes in the security classification system. Solutions will have to emerge from 

collaboration among technologists, archivists and records 

officers, human factors experts, historians, and national security departments and their classifiers and declassification 

reviewers. Reforms need to accommodate the requirement 

for continued improvement in government efficiencies, 

driven by what will likely be a resource-constrained future, 

but one where modern technology is essential to declassification and data discovery processes of all types.

Agencies face the rapid obsolescence of formats as paper 

records transition to digital media. Methods of preservation and access to old records will necessarily have to 

yield to innovative and sometimes costly strategies to 

make the transition. This extends beyond just email and 

current textual media, to the expanding world of audio, 

video, imagery, graphics, and video/audio-teleconferencing where many decisions of historical significance are 

made and little is now preserved for future access. 

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26 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

Technological innovation is simply a matter of necessity 

in order to achieve transformation in classification and 

declassification. Existing technologies, such as predictive 

analytics, automated metadata creation, content clustering, and context accumulation, may enhance consistency 

in classification and declassification, facilitate rapid information retrieval, improve information security, and 

hasten declassification in the electronic environment.42

Metadata are especially critical to future high-speed data 

manipulation. Users must understand how metadata are 

generated and used in a system, and be able to distinguish the varying levels of classification found in metadata tags. Highly classified metadata should be studied 

to determine their usefulness in understanding the information they describe and in their ability to aid access 

to that information. Because the sensitivity of highly 

classified metadata is likely to outlive the sensitivity of 

the information they describe, such metadata may need 

to be segregated from unclassified metadata in order to 

facilitate information sharing and declassification. Great 

promise comes with the digital era for data and metadata 

tagging, indexing and cross-indexing, searching, mass 

storage, inference, and other rules-based applications 

to assist declassification, access, convergence, and aggregation of media, and access by historians and public 

interest activities. Progress will require agencies to collaborate on policy, to share technologies, to promote best 

practices, and to develop common standards. 

[RECOMMENDATION 14]: The President should direct the Security Classification Reform Steering Committee 

to encourage collaboration and to determine how to employ existing technologies, and to develop and pilot new 

methods to modernize classification and declassification. Pilot projects that test new technological solutions 

should inform a government-wide technology strategy 

for classification and declassification that will thoroughly 

streamline information management and access for all 

system users and, after declassification, for the public. 

Beginning at the NDC, these projects should be designed 

to advance the objectives of a transformed classification 

system. The projects should move forward as quickly as 

possible and, based on results, be expanded and deployed 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 27

at several agencies. The ultimate goal of the pilot projects 

is to discover, develop, and deploy technology that will:

•	 Automate and streamline declassification and 

classification processes, and ensure integration 

with electronic records management systems. 

•	 Provide tools for preservation, search, storage, 

scalability, review for access, and security application. 

•	 Address cyber security concerns, especially 

when integrating open source information into 

classified systems.

•	 Standardize metadata generation and tagging, 

creating a government-wide metadata registry, 

drawing on lessons learned from the intelligence community.

•	 Accommodate complex volumes of data (e.g. 

email, non-structured data, and video teleconferencing information). 

•	 Advance government-wide information management practices by supporting the President’s 

Memorandum on Managing Government 

Records.43

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28 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

CONCLUSION

Policymakers have the opportunity to transform the classification and declassification system. Their actions will improve security, increase democratic discourse, and conserve 

valuable resources. The recommendations in this report require leadership, a detailed implementation strategy and vigorous oversight to ensure success. Transformation of the security 

classification system will take time and resources and a commitment to shift the culture from 

primarily risk aversion to risk management and information sharing. This will entail fundamental changes across all agencies in how information is viewed and valued, how it is accessed 

and preserved, and how it is managed and safeguarded. A balanced security classification system will maintain the secrecy necessary to protect national security and at the same time assure 

the transparency and openness required in and for a democratic society.

To make classification and declassification functional for 

the future, respected by users, and trusted by the public, 

longstanding policy and practice must change. Staying 

the present course will prove exceedingly difficult, costly, 

and even damaging to national security. Technology and 

the rapid growth of digital information, in particular, 

places extraordinary stresses on the current classification 

system beyond anything that could have been anticipated 

when the system was created. Paper-based protocols developed seventy years ago no longer suffice.

To meet contemporary challenges, the Government needs 

a fresh approach. Abandoning outdated attitudes and 

embracing a new vision will transform the Government’s 

ability to manage secrecy, accomplish the national security mission, and appropriately inform the public. 

Transforming the classification system will not happen 

overnight. It will take time, resources, and commitment. 

The way forward will require a fundamental change in how 

American society and its Government understand, manage, safeguard, and preserve Government information. 

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H 
TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 29

A Vision for a Classification and Declassification System of the Future:

ONE EXAMPLE of a FUNCTIONING SECURITY 

CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 

As an agency official creates an electronic record, an automated tool assists the official by reviewing the record’s 

content, comparing it to previously unclassified, classified, and declassified records, and suggests an appropriate 

classification level, if any, and corresponding markings. When the official disagrees with the system’s prompt, the 

record is referred to information security personnel and original classification authorities for deliberation. The 

results of this classification review are ingested into the system, which immediately identifies all existing and future 

appearances of comparable information and marks it accordingly. 

The system imprints all records with standardized metadata, which chronicle the record’s authorship, sources, and 

access controls, as well as its reasons for classification and its declassification instructions. The digital signatures 

of credentialed personnel who access the record are captured in its transaction history. Security managers audit 

record access histories to protect against insider threats and ensure appropriate access. Agency records officers and 

historians identify and digitally annotate historically significant file series, which are used to compose classified 

and unclassified agency histories. 

Metadata facilitate the rapid retrieval of information to fulfill mission requirements, assist in preemptive disclosures, and honor public requests. If a record is not already declassified after discretionary review, its access 

restrictions and classification automatically self-extinguish as it reaches its declassification date. Records deemed 

historically valuable but exempt from automatic declassification are prioritized in eventual systematic declassification reviews. 

To prevent referral backlogs and encourage a historical perspective, all exempted records are reviewed for declassification at the National Declassification Center (NDC). Agency reviewers at the NDC conduct systematic and 

mandatory declassification reviews and input the results to expand the system’s contextual knowledge. Pass-fail 

reviews of classified records are a thing of the past; the sophistication and automation of the system allows all 

declassification reviews to be conducted at the redaction level. Records containing Formerly Restricted Data information are eligible for declassification review at the NDC after 25 years. At the request of respective Congressional 

committees, classified House and Senate records are also systematically processed for declassification at the NDC. 

Information flows readily and effectively between policymakers, users, records managers, and historians and, 

through efficient and accurate declassification, to the public. Technology and procedural reforms make classification consistent and declassification timely. Advanced information retrieval and analysis tools are used to address 

over-classification in a comprehensive, real-time manner, and changes in classification precedent are immediately 

and comprehensively implemented. The centralization of government work processes and the renewed emphasis on 

openness increase the public’s confidence in the security classification system and reinforce the fact that national 

security information belongs to the American people. 

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30 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

ENDNOTES for RECOMMENDATIONS

Endnotes i-x for Executive Summary on page 5. 

1 See Endnote x.

2 Improving Declassification, A Report to the President from the 

Public Interest Declassification Board, (http://www.archives.gov/

declassification/pidb/improving-declassification.pdf), January 2008.

3 See Endnote iii: section 3.7. 

4 See Endnote i.

5 Transforming Classification, (http://blogs.archives.gov/

transformingclassification/), March 2011. 

6 See Endnote iii: sections 1.1 and 1.2.

7 When he signed Executive Order 13526, the President mandated agencies to undertake a Fundamental Classification Guidance Review to review the accuracy of their current classification guides. He required agencies to complete their reviews by 

June 27, 2012 and submit their final reports to the Information 

Security Oversight Office (ISOO). See Endnote iii: section 1.9.

8 See Endnote ii.

9 The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) is engaged 

in dialogue with United Kingdom counterparts on the topic of 

simplifying and rationalizing information security policy in our 

respective governments. United Kingdom experience has shown 

that the proliferation of levels of classification and methods of 

restriction require redress to reduce costs and improve information sharing access across Government. As a result, the United 

Kingdom is formally developing a new classification model that 

contemplates using only two levels of classification. In addition, 

United Kingdom officials have engaged other Commonwealth 

partners on these topics and found similar efforts to identify and 

adopt a streamlined classification system.

10 As part of its study, the Board found that information classified 

as Confidential is created, stored, disseminated and safeguarded 

on Secret systems in the current classification system.

11 See Endnote v.

12 Public Law 83-703 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2011 et seq. See also Endnote iii: section 6.2 and Endnote 30. 

13 The classified electronic network systems for the intelligence 

and defense communities are the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 

Communications System (JWICS) and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). The unclassified electronic 

network system is the Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol 

Router Network (NIPRNET).

14 Agencies have established procedures under which authorized 

holders of information, including authorized holders outside 

the classifying agency, are encouraged and expected to challenge 

the classification of information that they believe is improperly 

classified or unclassified. Classification challenges rarely occur 

as reported in ISOO’s Annual Report to the President. See Endnote iii: section 1.8 and Endnote v. 

15 Under the auspices of the National Declassification Center, the 

implementing directive of E.O. 13526 allows agencies up to 

three years to complete a review their information for declassification. See 32 C.F.R. Parts 2001 and 2003 Classified National 

Security Information; Final Rule, section 2001.34.

16 A digital asset is digital content owned by an individual or organization. Digital assets are any digital material owned by an 

enterprise or individual including text, graphics, audio, video, 

and animations. Digital content includes individual files such as 

images, photos, videos, and text files, and also other digital content, such as data in a database. Today, enterprises have a huge 

amount of digital assets that require managing. PC Magazine, 

(http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,1237,t=digital+a

sset&i=41283,00.asp), Copyright © 1981–2012, The Computer 

Language Company, Inc.

17 One intelligence agency estimates that one terabyte of data is 

equivalent to approximately 112 million pages of information.

18 “How Large is a Petabyte?” GIZMODO Storage. (http://gizmodo.

com/5309889/how-large-is-a-petabyte), July 2012.

19 Digital Preservation Management Workshop, Cornell University Library. Digital Preservation Management: Implementing 

Short-Term Strategies for Long-Term Solutions, online tutorial 

developed for the Digital Preservation Management workshop, 

developed and maintained by Cornell University Library, 2003-

2006; extended and maintained by ICPSR, 2007-on. (http://

www.dpworkshop.org/index.html), 2012.

20 See Endnote iii. Predecessor orders to E.O. 13526 include 

Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, and its amendment, 

Executive Order 13292 of March 25, 2003.

21 Public Interest Declassification Board’s Letter to the President, 

March 6, 2009. (http://www.archives.gov/declassification/pidb/

letter03-06-09.pdf) 2012.

22 See Endnote iii: section 3.7.

23 The Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law 93-579, 5 U.S.C. 552a, as 

amended.

24 The President gave the NDC a December 31, 2013 deadline to 

review for declassification and process for release the 400 million page backlog of archival records. See Endnote i: section 2.

25 The NDC streamlined its declassification review process by using 

the Six Sigma business philosophy to focus on meeting customer 

requirements and sustaining business products and services. The 

Six Sigma business management strategy seeks to improve the 

quality of process outputs by identifying and removing the causes 

of defects (errors) and minimizing variability in manufacturing 

and business processes. It uses a set of quality management methods, including statistical methods, and creates a special infrastructure of people within the organization (“Black Belts”, “Green 

Belts”, etc.) who are experts in these methods. Antony, Jiju. “Pros 

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H 
TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 31

and cons of Six Sigma: an academic perspective”. Archived from 

the original on July 23, 2008. Retrieved August 5, 2010.

26 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 

States. (Philip Zelikow, Executive Director; Bonnie D. Jenkins, 

Counsel; Ernest R. May, Senior Advisor). The 9/11 Commission 

Report. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004.

27 Public Law 83-703 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 

2011 et seq.: section 142 and 10 C.F.R. PART 1045 Nuclear Classification and Declassification; Final Rule, section 1045.3.

28 Public Law 83-703 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 

2011 et seq.: section 11 10 C.F.R. PART 1045 Nuclear Classification and Declassification; Final Rule, section 1045.3.

29 See Endnote iii: section 6.2. 

30 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives equity to the Department 

of Energy over all atomic energy and nuclear information, and 

stipulates that this information is automatically classified in 

a separate system. The two classification categories—RD and 

FRD—were created pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act and its 

implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. 1045, Nuclear Classification 

and Declassification. There was recognition that it was imperative to closely safeguard and protect information on the design 

of nuclear weapons. There was also recognition that, while the 

military did not need to know how to design and build a weapon, 

it had the responsibility to safeguard, maintain, and plan for use 

of the actual weapons. Thus, the implementing regulations to this 

act specify that FRD information is to be administered jointly by 

the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense.

31 See Endnote vi.

32 See Endnote 15.

33 See Endnote iii: section 3.7 (b) (3).

34 See Endnote iii: section 3.7 (b) (4).

35 Although the President’s Memorandum on Managing Government Records and its Directive requires senior agency officials 

to identify records for eventual transfer to the National Archives, the agencies should also be required to collaborate with 

records officers from National Archives and the NDC to develop 

prioritization plans that ensure timely transfer of records for improved access to historically significant records. See Endnote x, 

section 2.

36 See Endnote 16, “A Snapshot of the Looming Digital Challenge.”

37 See Endnote x. 

38 The Board learned there are cases when information is so tightly 

controlled that agency records officers are prohibited clearance 

or access, and consequently are unable to evaluate the records.

39 Contemplation of recommendations regarding records management practices should include determination if legislative 

changes are needed, specifically regarding the Federal Records 

Act of 1950, as amended, and the Presidential Records Act. The 

Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended, codified at 44 U.S.C. 

Chapters 29, 31 and 33, establishes the framework for records 

management programs in Federal Agencies. It was last amended 

on October 21, 1976. The Presidential Records Act of 1978, 

codified at 44 U.S.C. Chapter 22, governs the official records of 

Presidents and Vice Presidents created or received after January 

20, 1981. It mandates the preservation of all presidential records, 

changing the legal ownership of the official records of the President from private to public, and implements a new statutory 

structure under which all presidential records must be managed. It has not been amended.

40 “Center concepts” in this context refers to the declassification 

programming and prioritization plans associated with historical centers that operate across Government. This alignment 

will ensure interagency and across-agency collaboration. Some 

examples include the National Declassification Center and the 

Center for the Study of Intelligence. 

41 See Endnote 39.

42 Context accumulation is the incremental process of relating 

new data to previous data and remembering these relationships, 

for improved data accuracy. It is an advanced computing 

process related to entity analytics in which a system is able to 

predict relevance and importance dynamically, based on the 

accumulation and persistence of context produced by ingested 

data. Algorithms are generated using this contextual data and then 

employed to determine whether newly introduced data have a 

place or relationship with historical data. Once this determination 

is made, the system then saves and uses this new observation 

when evaluating other introduced data. Source: Using Entity 

Analytics to Greatly Increase the Accuracy of Your Models Quickly 

and Easily, 2012, IBM®, Redbooks®, (http://www.redbooks.

ibm.com/redpapers/pdfs/redp4913.pdf).

43 See Endnote x.

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32 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

APPENDIX A

PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD 

MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

Presidential Appointees

NANCY E. SODERBERG (CHAIR) was reappointed 

by the President as Chair on November 16, 2012. She is 

a national security expert with experience at the White 

House, United Nations, and Congress. While at the 

National Security Council, she worked extensively on declassification issues. She is currently the President of the 

Connect U.S. Fund, a non-profit organization that focuses on promoting U.S. global engagement. In addition, she 

is a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the University of 

North Florida and the President and CEO of Soderberg 

Global Solutions. Ambassador Soderberg served as Vice 

President of the International Crisis Group from 2001 

until 2005. She was the U.S. Representative for Special 

Political Affairs at the United Nations from 1997 to 2001, 

and Staff Director of the National Security Council and 

Deputy Assistant to the President from 1993 until 1997. 

From 1985 to 1992, she served as a Foreign Policy Advisor 

to Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Ambassador Soderberg 

has written The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of 

American Might and co-authored, with Brian Katulis, The 

Prosperity Agenda: What the World Wants from America 

—and What We Need in Return. She is a member of the 

Council on Foreign Relations. She earned a B.A. from 

Vanderbilt University and an M.S. from Georgetown 

University’s School of Foreign Service. Ambassador 

Soderberg is serving her second term on the Board.

MARTIN C. FAGA was reappointed by the President 

on February 10, 2012. He was the President and Chief 

Executive Officer of The MITRE Corporation for six 

years, retiring in 2006. Before joining MITRE, Mr. Faga 

served as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space 

from 1989 until 1993. At the same time, he served as 

Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, responsible to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 

Central Intelligence for the development, acquisition, and 

operation of all U.S. satellite reconnaissance programs. 

Mr. Faga has been awarded the National Intelligence 

Distinguished Service Medal, the Department of 

Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal, the Air 

Force Exceptional Civilian Service Medal, and the NASA 

Distinguished Service Medal. In 2004, he was awarded 

the Intelligence Community Seal Medallion. He was 

first appointed to the Board in October 2004, and again 

in January 2009. He has also served on the President’s 

Intelligence Advisory Board. Mr. Faga graduated from 

Lehigh University with a B.S. and an M.S. in electrical 

engineering. He is serving his third term on the Board.

WILLIAM H. LEARY was appointed by the President 

on February 10, 2012. He was the Special Adviser to the 

National Security Advisor and Senior Director for Records 

and Access Management on the National Security Staff 

until his retirement in 2011. In that capacity, he served as 

Chair of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals 

Panel and Chair of the Records Access and Information 

Security Interagency Policy Committee. A strong proponent of governmental transparency, Mr. Leary was 

one of the primary executive branch officials behind the 

creation of the Board in 2000 and the development of 

President Obama’s Executive Order 13526 on Classified 

National Security Information. Prior to joining the 

National Security Council staff, he served as the Deputy 

Director of the Agency Services Division at the National 

Archives and Records Administration for five years. 

From 1968 until 1973, Mr. Leary taught American history at the University of Virginia, the College of William 

and Mary, and the University of South Alabama. He received his B.A. in foreign affairs and M.A. and A.B.D. in 

history, all from the University of Virginia. He is serving 

his first term on the Board. 

ELIZABETH RINDSKOPF PARKER was reappointed by the President on January 10, 2012. She is currently a 

professor of law at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge 

School of Law where she earlier served as dean from 2002-

2012. Previously, she served as general counsel for the 

University of Wisconsin System (1999 to 2002); general 

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H 
TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 33

counsel to the Central Intelligence Agency (1990 to 1995); 

Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State 

(1989-1990); general counsel, National Security Agency 

(1984-1989) and as Acting Assistant Director (Mergers 

and Acquisitions) at the Federal Trade Commission. In 

addition to her experience managing government legal 

offices, Ms. Parker also served as the director of the New 

Haven Legal Assistance Association, Inc. (1973-1976) 

after handling civil rights and civil liberties litigation as 

a co-operating attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense 

and Education Fund, Inc. She has been a member of 

the Special Advisory Group to the Director of National 

Intelligence since 2009 and is a member of the Board of 

the Civilian Research Development Foundation-Global 

and the Council on Foreign Relations. Both her law 

(1968) and undergraduate (cum laude, 1964) degrees are 

from the University of Michigan. Ms. Parker is serving 

her third term on the Board.

Congressional Appointees

DAVID E. SKAGGSwas appointed by Rep. Nancy Pelosi, 

Minority Leader of the House, on March 29, 2012. He is 

the Chairman of the Board of the Office of Congressional 

Ethics and practices law with the firm McKenna, Long, 

and Aldridge. He previously served as Executive Director 

of the Colorado Department of Higher Education from 

2007 to 2009. He served 12 years in Congress from 1987 

to1999 as the Representative from the 2nd Congressional 

District in Colorado, including 8 years on the House 

Appropriations Committee and 6 years on the House 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After leaving Congress, he served as Executive Director of the 

Center for Democracy and Citizenship at the Council for 

Excellence in Government from 1999 to 2006, and taught 

as an adjunct professor at the University of Colorado, 

where he recently resumed teaching as an adjunct professor at the University of Colorado Law School. He has 

a B.A. in philosophy from Wesleyan University and an 

LL.B from Yale Law School. Mr. Skaggs is serving his 

third term on the Board.

ADMIRAL WILLIAM O. STUDEMAN, USN (RET.)

was appointed by Rep. John Boehner, Speaker of the 

House, on May 18, 2012. He recently retired from 

Northrop Grumman Corporation as Vice President 

and Deputy General Manager of Mission Systems. 

Admiral Studeman’s flag tours included Office of the 

Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Director of Long 

Range Navy Planning; Director of Naval Intelligence; 

Director of the National Security Agency; and Deputy 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with 

two extended periods as Acting Director. He served 

as a member of the Commission on the Intelligence 

Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons 

of Mass Destruction and is currently serving on both 

the National Advisory Board on Bio-Security and the 

Defense Science Board. He holds a B.A. in history 

from the University of the South in Sewanee, TN, 

and an M.A. in public and international affairs from 

George Washington University. Admiral Studeman is 

serving his third term on the Board.

SANFORD J. UNGAR was reappointed to the Board 

by Sen. Harry Reid as Majority Leader of the Senate on 

March 7, 2011. He currently serves as the tenth President 

of Goucher College in Baltimore, Maryland. Prior to assuming his position at Goucher College, Mr. Ungar served 

as Director of the Voice of America, Dean of the School of 

Communication at American University in Washington, 

D.C., as the Washington editor of The Atlantic, as managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine, and as a staff writer 

for The Washington Post. He is a former host of “All Things 

Considered” on National Public Radio and had published 

six books, including The Papers & The Papers: An Account 

of the Legal and Political Battle over the Pentagon Papers. 

Mr. Ungar obtained his B.A. in Government from Harvard 

College and a Master’s degree in International History from 

the London School of Economics and Political Science. Mr. 

Ungar is serving his second term on the Board.

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
34 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

APPENDIX B

WITNESSES APPEARING BEFORE the BOARD

During its study of the security classification system, the Public Interest Declassification Board met with individuals and groups from Executive branch agencies, international 

partners, the public interest and openness community, and the Congress. Additionally, representatives from academia, the private sector, and the media, as well as experts in the fields of 

technology and public policy, and individual agency classification and declassification program 

managers and practitioners all contributed to the Board’s study. 

Those individuals and groups include representatives 

from the following Executive branch agencies and 

departments:

Central Intelligence Agency

Department of Defense

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Department of the Air Force

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Defense Intelligence Agency

National Security Agency

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

National Reconnaissance Office

Department of Energy

Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of State

National Archives and Records Administration

Office of Government Information Services

National Security Staff

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity

The Board also wishes to thank members of the 

Directorate of Security and Intelligence, Government 

Security Secretariat, United Kingdom, for sharing its 

study on the topic of transforming the UK security 

classification system. In particular:

•	 Michael Brennan, Deputy Director of the 

Government Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office 

•	 Michael Shryane, Head of Policy, Government 

Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office

In preparing this report, the Board heard from the 

following individuals and groups:

•	 Steve Aftergood, Senior Research Analyst, 

Project on Government Secrecy, Federation of 

American Scientists

•	 Carol Anderson, Member, Historical Advisory 

Committee, Department of State

•	 Randy Avent, Chief Scientist, Defense 

Department Research and Engineering, 

Department of Defense (DoD)

•	 Jason Baron, Director of Litigation, National 

Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 

and Co-Chair of The Sedona Conference® 

Working Group on Electronic Document 

Retention and Production

•	 David M. Barrett, Professor, Villanova University

•	 John Bell, Policy Analyst, Information Security 

Oversight Office

•	 Laura A. Belmonte, Professor, Oklahoma State 

University and Member, State Department’s 

Historical Advisory Committee

•	 Dr. Scott Bernard, Federal chief Enterprise 

Architect

•	 Tom Blanton, Executive Director, National 

Security Archive

•	 Deborah Bonanni, Chief of Staff, National 

Security Agency (NSA)

•	 Elizabeth Brooks, Associate Director for 

Community Integration, Policy and Records, NSA

•	 Edmund Brynn, The Historian (acting), 

Department of State

•	 William Burr, Senior Analyst, National 

Security Archive

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 35

•	 Neil Carmichael, Indexing and Declassification 

Review Director, National Declassification 

Center (NDC)

•	 William Carpenter, Lead Staff Member, 

Interagency Security Classification Appeals 

Panel

•	 Honorable Ashton Carter, Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, DoD 

•	 Robert Chadduck, Principal Technologist for 

Advanced Research, NARA

•	 Jeff Charlston, Professor, University of 

Maryland University College and Former 

Historian, US Army Center of Military History

•	 Honorable James R. Clapper, Director of 

National Intelligence

•	 Nicklous Combs, Chief Technology Officer, 

EMC Federal; Former IT Director and Chief 

Information Officer of the National Media 

Exploitation Center, Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNI); and Former 

Deputy Chief for Enterprise IT Solutions, 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

•	 Mark Conrad, Archives Specialist, Center for 

Advanced Systems and Technologies (NCAST), 

NARA

•	 Harry P. Cooper, Jr. Chief of Classification 

Management and Collaboration Group, 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

•	 Adrian Cunningham, Director, Strategic 

Relations and Personal Records, National 

Archives of Australia and Former President, 

Australian Society of Archivists

•	 A.J. Daverede, Production Division Director, 

NDC

•	 James David, Historian, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration

•	 William Eckroade, Principal Deputy Chief for 

Mission Support Activities, Office of Health, 

Safety, and Security, Department of Energy 

(DOE)

•	 John Elliff, Former Staff Member; Church 

Committee, Former Staff Member, Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence; and, Former 

Senior Executive at the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI)

•	 Brian Eshenbrenner, Director, Security and 

Intelligence Directorate, Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency

•	 Thomas A. Ferguson, Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

•	 Honorable David Ferriero, Archivist of the 

United States, NARA

•	 Sharon Bradford Franklin, Senior Counsel, The 

Constitution Project

•	 Michael German, Policy Counsel on National 

Security, Immigration and Privacy, ACLU and 

Former Special Agent, FBI

•	 Elizabeth Goitein, Co-Director, Liberty and 

National Security Program, Brennan Center for 

Justice

•	 Honorable Porter Goss, Former Chair of 

the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence and Former Director of Central 

Intelligence

•	 Margaret P. Grafeld, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Global Information Services, Bureau of 

Administration, Department of State

•	 Dr. Dolly Greenwood, Director, Enterprise 

Engineering & ISR, MITRE

•	 James Hallo, Director, Corporate Security, 

MITRE

•	 Morton Halperin, Senior Advisor, Open Society 

Institute; Former Director of the Policy Planning 

Staff at the Department of State; Former Special 

Assistant to the President and Senior Director 

for Democracy, National Security Council; and 

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(International Security Affairs).

•	 Honorable John Paul Hammerschmidt, Former 

Congressman and Former Member of the 

President’s Commission on Aviation Security 

and Terrorism 

•	 Honorable Kenneth B. Handelman, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic 

Affairs, DoD

•	 David Hardy, Section Chief, Record / 

Information Dissemination Section, FBI

•	 General Michael Hayden (Ret.), Former 

Director, NSA; Former Director, CIA; and 

Former Principal Deputy Director of National 

Intelligence, ODNI

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
36 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

•	 Steve Henry, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear Matters

•	 David Herschler, Deputy Historian, Department 

of State

•	 Douglas Hudson, Director of Special Programs, 

Applied Physics Laboratory, The Johns Hopkins 

University

•	 Ken Hughes, Presidential Records Program, 

Miller Center, University of Virginia

•	 Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, (ret.) Vice 

President for Intelligence and Counterterrorism, 

L3 Communications and Former Director, DIA

•	 Richard H. Immerman, Professor, Temple 

University and Member, Department of State’s 

Historical Advisory Committee

•	 Diane Janosek, Deputy Associate Director for 

Community Integration, Policy and Records, 

NSA

•	 Vincent Jarvie, Vice President for Corporate 

Security, L3 Communications

•	 Jeff Jonas, Chief Scientist, IBM Entity Analytics 

Group and IMB Distinguished Engineer, IBM

•	 Nate Jones, Freedom of Information 

Coordinator, National Security Archive

•	 John Judge, Founder, Committee for an Open 

Archives

•	 Fred Kaplan, Writer, Slate Magazine

•	 Edmund Kaufhold, Staff Member, Security 

Directorate, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Intelligence)

•	 Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary 

for Management, Department of State 

•	 Jeffrey P. Kimball, Professor Emeritus, Miami 

University of Ohio

•	 Horen Kuecuekyan, Principal Software 

Architect, Sensis Corporation

•	 Vivek Kundra, Former United States Chief 

Information Officer, Office of Management and 

Budget 

•	 Michael Kurtz, Former Acting Director, NDC

•	 Joseph Lambert, Director, Information 

Management Services, CIA

•	 Wayne Leathers, Defense Change Management 

Organization

•	 Tom Lee, Director of Sunlight Labs, Sunlight 

Foundation

•	 Ann Levin, Program Manager, CACI, Inc.

•	 Robert Litt, General Counsel, ODNI

•	 Brian Martin, President, History Associates

•	 Patrice McDermott, Executive Director, 

OpenTheGovernment.org

•	 Elizabeth A. McGrath, Deputy Chief 

Management Officer for the Department of 

Defense

•	 Don McIlwain, Chief, FOIA-MDR Division, 

NDC

•	 Robert McMahon, Chairman, Historical 

Advisory Committee, Department of State

•	 Carmen Medina, Former Associate Deputy 

Director of Intelligence, CIA

•	 David Mengel, Deputy Director, NDC

•	 Ambassador Robert Miller, Information 

Programs and Services, Department of State

•	 Nicholas Murphy, Information Programs and 

Services, Department of State

•	 Anna Nelson, Professor, American University 

and Former Member, John F. Kennedy 

Assassination Records Review Board

•	 Miriam Nisbet, Director, Office of Government 

Information Services, NARA 

•	 R. Stan Norris, Senior Research Associate, 

National Defense Council

•	 Eric Olson, QinetiQ

•	 Pablo Osinaga, Co-Founder of Kormox

•	 Honorable Stephanie O’Sullivan, Principal 

Deputy Director of National Intelligence

•	 Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Member, Historical 

Advisory Committee, Department of State, 

Former Acting Archivist of the United States; 

Former Archivist, United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees; and Former 

Executive Director, Open Society Archives

•	 Honorable Daniel Poneman, Deputy Secretary 

of Energy, DOE

•	 John Prados, Senior Research Fellow, National 

Security Archive

•	 Madeline Proctor, Initial Processing and 

Declassification Division, NDC

•	 Harold Reylea, Policy Analyst, Congressional 

Research Service (ret.)

•	 Fred Riccardi, Senior Executive Director, 

ManTech International Corporation

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 37

•	 Douglas Richards, Chief, Declassification Branch, 

Information Management Division, Joint Staff 

Secretariat

•	 Don Richie, Senate Historian

•	 Alison Roach, Fried Frank Legal Fellow, The 

Constitution Project

•	 David Robarge, Chief Historian, CIA

•	 Mary Ronan, Director, Access Management, 

National Security Staff

•	 Lisa Rosenberg, Government Affairs 

Consultant, Sunlight Foundation

•	 Debbie Ross, DoD Information Security Policy, 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(HUMINT, Counterintelligence and Security) 

•	 James Russell, QinetiQ

•	 Bob Savage, Formerly Media Preservation Unit, 

Stanford University Libraries and Formerly 

Director, Records and Institutional Research, 

College of Arts and Sciences, Vanderbilt 

University

•	 Daniel Schuman, Policy Counsel, Sunlight 

Foundation

•	 David Shapiro, Co-Director, Liberty and 

National Security Program, Brennan Center for 

Justice

•	 Michael Sheehy, Former Staff Director of 

the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence

•	 Sheryl Shenberger, Director, NDC

•	 Katherine Sibley, Member, Historical Advisory 

Committee, Department of State

•	 Nancy Smith, Director, Presidential Materials 

Staff, NARA

•	 Bob Spangler, Acting Division Director for 

Electronic and Special Media Records Services, 

NARA

•	 Peter Spiro, Member, Historical Advisory 

Committee, Department of State

•	 Corin Stone, Deputy Assistant Director of 

National Intelligence for Policy, ODNI

•	 Al Tarasuik, Intelligence Community Chief 

Information Officer

•	 Russell Travers, Former Deputy Director 

for Information Sharing and Knowledge 

Development at the National Counterterrorism 

Center 

•	 Tom Uva, Vice President & Chief Information 

Officer, Sensis Corporation

•	 John Verdi, Senior Council and Director of 

Open Government Project, Electronic Privacy 

Information Center 

•	 Sheryl Walter, Director of Information 

Programs and Services, Bureau of 

Administration, Department of State

•	 Paul Wester, Chief Records Officer, NARA

•	 Andrew Weston-Dawkes, Director, Office of 

Classification, DOE

•	 Lee White, Executive Director, National 

Coalition for History

•	 James Wilson-Quayle, Chief, Records, Research 

& Content Branch, Joint Staff Secretariat

•	 John Wonderlich, Policy Director, Sunlight 

Foundation

•	 Thomas Zeiler, Member, Historical Advisory 

Committee, Department of State

•	 David Zierler, Historian, Office of the Historian, 

Department of State

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
38 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY

Accession: To take legal and physical custody of a group 

of records or other materials and to formally document 

their receipt. Source: A Glossary of Archival and Records 

Terminology, Copyright © 2012, Society of American 

Archivists, (http://www2.archivists.org/glossary).

Archival Processing: The arrangement, description, 

and housing of archival materials for storage and use 

by patrons. Source: A Glossary of Archival and Records 

Terminology, Copyright © 2012, Society of American 

Archivists, (http://www2.archivists.org/glossary). Archival 

processing Federal records at the National Archives and 

Records Administration also entails a review for public 

access. The review is necessary to remove certain information that would compromise national security, violate 

the privacy of a living person, or would violate a Federal 

statute. This Information is then indexed so researchers 

know what has been removed.

Automatic Declassification Review: The declassification 

of information based solely upon (1) the occurrence of a 

specific date or event as determined by the original classification authority, or (2) the expiration of a maximum 

time frame for duration of classification established under this order. Source: E.O. 13526, section 6.1(e).

Byte: A unit of computer information or data-storage 

capacity that consists of a group of eight bits and that 

is used especially to represent an alphanumeric character. Source: “Byte.” Merriam-Webster.com. MerriamWebster, 2011.

Classification Challenges: The challenge of classification 

status of information by an authorized holders of information who, in good faith, believe that its classification 

status is improper in accordance with agency procedures 

established under section 1.8 of Executive Order 13526. 

Source: E.O. 13526, section 1.8. 

Classified national security information: Information 

that has been determined (pursuant to E.O. 13526, or 

any predecessor order) to require protection against 

unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its 

classified status when in documentary form. Source: E.O. 

13526, section 6.1(i).

Content Clustering: Connecting two or more computers together in such a way that they behave like a single 

computer. Clustering is used for parallel processing, 

load balancing and fault tolerance. Clustering is a popular strategy for implementing parallel processing applications because it enables companies to leverage the 

investment already made in PCs and workstations. In 

addition, it’s relatively easy to add new CPUs simply by 

adding a new PC to the network. Source: “Clustering.” 

Webopedia.com. The IT Business Edge Network, 2012.

Context Accumulation: Context accumulation is the 

incremental process of relating new data to previous data and remembering these relationships, for 

improved data accuracy. It is an advanced computing 

process related to entity analytics in which a system is 

able to predict relevance and importance dynamically, 

based on the accumulation and persistence of context 

produced by ingested data. Algorithms are generated 

using this contextual data and then employed to determine whether newly introduced data have a place or 

relationship with historical data. Once this determination is made, the system then saves and uses this new 

observation when evaluating other introduced data. 

Source: Using Entity Analytics to Greatly Increase the 

Accuracy of Your Models Quickly and Easily, 2012, IBM®, 

Redbooks®, (http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redpapers/

pdfs/redp4913.pdf). 

Declassification: The authorized change in the status of 

information from classified information to unclassified 

information. Source: E.O. 13526, section 6.1(m).

Derivative Classification: The incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form information 

that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings 

that apply to the source information. Derivative classification includes the classification of information based on 

classification guidance. The duplication or reproduction 

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H 
TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 39

of existing classified information is not derivative classification. Source: E.O. 13526, section 6.1(o). 

Digital Asset: The digital content owned by an individual or organization. Digital assets are any digital material owned by an enterprise or individual including text, 

graphics, audio, video, and animations. Digital content 

includes individual files such as images, photos, videos, 

and text files, and also other digital content, such as data 

in a database. Today, enterprises have a huge amount 

of digital assets that require managing. PC Magazine, 

(http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,1237,t=dig

ital+asset&i=41283,00.asp) Copyright © 1981–2012, The 

Computer Language Company, Inc.

Equity: Information that was originated, created by, classified by, or concerns the activities of another government agency or organization and only they can declassify it. Records that contain other agency “equities” must 

be referred to those agencies for declassification review. 

Sources: 32 C.F.R. Parts 2001 and 2003 Classified National 

Security Information; Final Rule, section 2001. 92(g), 75 

FR 37279, Document Number 2010-15443 and The U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy 

(http://www.justice.gov/open/declassification-faq.html).

Executive Order (E.O.) 13526: E.O. 13526, “Classified 

National Security Information,” signed by President 

Barack Obama in 2008. This order prescribes a uniform 

system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying 

national security information, including information 

relating to defense against transnational terrorism. Its 

immediate predecessor Orders were E.O. 12958, signed 

by President William J. Clinton in 1995, and E.O. 13292, 

which amended E.O. 12958, and was signed by President 

George W. Bush in 2003. E.O. 12958 established the concept of automatic declassification, in which all classified 

records shall be automatically declassified on December 

31 of the year that is 25 years from the date of their original creation, unless properly exempted from declassification. E.O. 13292 and E.O. 13526 continued this automatic declassification requirement. Source: E.O. 13526, 

introduction and section 3.3(a).

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): The official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign 

policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. The 

series, which is produced by the State Department’s 

Office of the Historian, began in 1861 and now comprises more than 350 individual volumes. The volumes 

published since 1980 increasingly contain declassified 

records from all the foreign affairs agencies. Source: The 

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, (www.

state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/).

Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) Information: As designated by the Department of Energy under provisions 

of the Atomic Energy Act, FRD information is classified 

information that has been removed from the Restricted 

Data category after the Departments of Energy and 

Defense jointly determine that it relates primarily to 

the military utilization of atomic weapons and can be 

adequately safeguarded in a manner similar to national 

security information. FRD information is automatically 

excluded from declassification review under the current 

Executive Order. Sources: Public Law 83-703 The Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.: section 142 

and 10 C.F.R. PART 1045 Nuclear Classification and 

Declassification; Final Rule, section 1045.3. 

Historically Significant Records: Federal records,

Presidential papers, or Presidential records that the 

Archivist has determined should be maintained permanently in accordance with title 44, United States Code. 

Records or materials that demonstrate and record the 

national security policies, actions, and decisions of the 

United States, including (1) policies, events, actions, and 

decisions that led to significant national security outcomes; and (2) the development and evolution of significant United States national security policies, actions, and 

decisions. These records will provide a significantly different perspective in general from records and materials 

publicly available in other historical sources and would 

need to be addressed through ad hoc record searches 

outside any systematic declassification program established under Executive order. Sources: E.O. 13526, section 6.1(ii) and the Public Interest Declassification Board 

enabling legislation: Public Law 106-657, section 709.

Index: The process of creating an ordered list of concepts, expressed as terms or phrases, with pointers to the 

place in indexed material where those concepts appear. 

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40 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

Source: A Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology,

Copyright © 2012, Society of American Archivists, 

(http://www2.archivists.org/glossary). At the National 

Archives, indexing occurs during archival processing 

and entails documenting decisions to remove certain records from public access. Typically, records are restricted 

from public access for statutory reasons (e.g. the Privacy 

Act) or for reasons of national security.

Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO): A component of the National Archives that receives program 

and policy guidance from the National Security Staff at 

the White House. Among its main responsibilities, ISOO 

oversees the security classification programs in both 

Government and industry and reports annually to the 

President on their status. Source: ISOO Report to the 

President, FY 2011. 

Kyl-Lott Amendment: This provision is named after its 

two legislative sponsors, Senators Trent Lott and John Kyl, 

who authored an amendment to the National Defense 

Authorization Act of 1999. Section 3161, “Protection 

against Inadvertent Release of Restricted Data and 

Formerly Restricted Data,” requires the Department of 

Energy to develop a plan to prevent the release of nuclear 

weapons design and employment information. Among 

its provisions is the requirement that records subject to 

the automatic declassification provisions of E.O. 13526 

be reviewed on a page-by-page basis for Restricted 

Data and Formerly Restricted Data unless the originating agency certifies that the records are highly unlikely 

to contain RD or FRD information. Source: Public Law 

105-261, section 3161.

Mandatory Declassification Review: The review for declassification of classified information in response to a 

request for declassification that meets the requirements 

under section 3.5 of Executive Order 13526. Source: E.O. 

13526, section 6.1(aa).

Metadata: A characterization or description documenting the identification, management, nature, use, or location of information resources (data). Source: A Glossary 

of Archival and Records Terminology Copyright, © 2012, 

Society of American Archivists, (http://www2.archivists.

org/glossary).

Multiple Agency Equities: Refers to when a record contains information that was originated, classified by, or concerns the activities of more than one government agency 

or organization. These records are challenging to review 

for public access as they must be referred to each agency 

that owns information in the record. Source: E.O. 13526, 

section 3.3 (b) (3).

National Declassification Center: The center established 

within the National Archives to streamline declassification processes, facilitate quality-assurance measures, and 

implement standardized training regarding the declassification of records determined to have permanent historical value. E.O. 13526, section 3.7. 

National Security: The national defense or foreign relations of the United States. Source: E.O. 13526, section 

6.1(cc).

Original Classification: The initial determination that 

information requires, in the interest of the national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure. Source: 

E.O. 13526, section 6.1(ff).

Petabyte: 1,024 terabytes or 1,125,899,906,842,624 bytes. 

See “Byte; Terabyte.” Source: “Petabyte.” Dictionary.com 

Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 21 Nov. 2012. 

Predictive Analytics: An area of statistical analysis that 

deals with extracting information from data and using it 

to predict future trends and behavior patterns. The core 

of predictive analytics relies on capturing relationships 

between explanatory variables and the predicted variables from past occurrences, and exploiting it to predict 

future outcomes. It is important to note, however, that the 

accuracy and usability of results will depend greatly on 

the level of data analysis and the quality of assumptions. 

Source: Nyce, Charles (2007), Predictive Analytics White 

Paper, American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty 

Underwriters/Insurance Institute of America, p. 1.

Records Having Permanent Historical Value: Federal 

records, Presidential papers, or Presidential records that 

the Archivist has determined should be maintained permanently in accordance with title 44, United States Code. 

Source: E.O. 13526, section 6.1(ii).

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 41

Referral of Records: The act of identifying and sourcing 

information to the original information owner and requesting review of that information for declassification 

or other access measure. The process of referring records 

entails the identification of records containing classified 

information that originated with other agencies or the 

disclosure of which would affect the interests or activities 

of other agencies. Those records that could reasonably 

be expected to fall under one or more of the exemptions 

in section 3.3(b) of the Order are eligible for referral. 

The referral process also entails formal notification to 

those agencies, making the records available for review 

by those agencies, and recording final agency determinations. Sources: E.O. 13526, section 3.3(d)(3) and 32 

C.F.R. Parts 2001 and 2003 Classified National Security 

Information; Final Rule, section 2001.34.

Records: The records of an agency and Presidential papers or Presidential records, as those terms are defined 

in title 44, United States Code, including those created 

or maintained by a Government contractor, licensee, 

certificate holder, or grantee that are subject to the 

sponsoring agency’s control under the terms of the contract, license, certificate, or grant. Source: E.O. 13526, 

section 6.1(hh). 

Restricted Data (RD) Information: Information concerning the design, manufacture, or utilization of 

atomic weapons; the production of special nuclear material; and the use of special nuclear material to generate electricity. RD information is automatically excluded from declassification review under the current 

Executive Order. Sources: Public Law 83-703 The Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.: section 11 

and 10 C.F.R. PART 1045 Nuclear Classification and 

Declassification; Final Rule, section 1045.3. 

Schedule: The process of identifying and describing records held by an organization, determining their retention 

period, and describing disposition actions throughout 

their life cycle. Source: A Glossary of Archival and Records 

Terminology, Copyright © 2012, Society of American 

Archivists, (http://www2.archivists.org/glossary).

Systematic Declassification Review: The review for declassification of classified information contained in records that have been determined by the Archivist to have 

permanent historical value in accordance with title 44, 

United States Code. Systematic Declassification Review 

occurs to those records containing information exempted from automatic declassification. This includes individual records as well as file series of records. Agencies 

shall prioritize their review of such records in accordance 

with priorities established by the NDC. Sources: E.O. 

13526, section 6.1(pp) and 32 C.F.R. Parts 2001 and 2003 

Classified National Security Information; Final Rule, section 2001.31.

Terabyte: 1024 gigabytes or 1,099,511,627,776 bytes; also: 

one trillion bytes. See “Byte; Petabyte.” Source: “Terabyte.” 

Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, 2011.

Transfer: The process of moving records as part of their 

scheduled disposition, especially from an office to a records center, or from a records center to an archives. 

Source: A Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology,

Copyright © 2012, Society of American Archivists, 

(http://www2.archivists.org/glossary).

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
42 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

APPENDIX D

BOARD’S AUTHORIZING STATUTE

SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ‘‘Public Interest Declassification 

Act of 2000’’.

SEC. 702. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) It is in the national interest to establish an effective, 

coordinated, and cost-effective means by which records 

on specific subjects of extraordinary public interest that 

do not undermine the national security interests of the 

United States may be collected, retained, reviewed, and 

disseminated to Congress, policymakers in the executive 

branch, and the public.

(2) Ensuring, through such measures, public access to 

information that does not require continued protection 

to maintain the national security interests of the United 

States is a key to striking the balance between secrecy essential to national security and the openness that is central 

to the proper functioning of the political institutions of the 

United States.

SEC. 703. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION 

BOARD.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—

(1) There is established within the executive branch of the 

United States a board to be known as the ‘‘Public Interest 

Declassification Board’’ (in this title referred to as the 

‘‘Board’’).

(2) The Board shall report directly to the President or, 

upon designation by the President, the Vice President, the 

Attorney General, or other designee of the President. The 

other designee of the President under this paragraph may 

not be an agency head or official authorized to classify information under Executive Order 12958, or any successor 

order.

(b)PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Board are as follows:

(1) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President 

for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget, and such other executive branch 

officials as the Board considers appropriate on the systematic, thorough, coordinated, and comprehensive identification, collection, review for declassification, and release 

to Congress, interested agencies, and the public of declassified records and materials (including donated historical 

materials) that are of archival value, including records and 

materials of extraordinary public interest. 

(2) To promote the fullest possible public access to a 

thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of 

significant United States national security decisions and 

significant United States national security activities in order to—

(A) support the oversight and legislative functions

of Congress;

(B) support the policymaking role of the executive branch;

(C) respond to the interest of the public in national security matters; and

(D) promote reliable historical analysis and new avenues 

of historical study in national security matters.

(3) To provide recommendations to the President for the 

identification, collection, and review for declassification 

of information of extraordinary public interest that does 

not undermine the national security of the United States, 

to be undertaken in accordance with a declassification 

program that has been established or may be established 

by the President by Executive order.

(4) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President 

for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget, and such other executive 

branch officials as the Board considers appropriate on 

policies deriving from the issuance by the President of 

Executive orders regarding the classification and declassification of national security information.

(5) To review and make recommendations to the President 

in a timely manner with respect to any congressional request, made by the committee of jurisdiction, to declassify 

certain records or to reconsider a declination to declassify 

specific records.

(c) MEMBERSHIP.—

(1) The Board shall be composed of nine individuals appointed from among citizens of the United States who 

are preeminent in the fields of history, national security, 

foreign policy, intelligence policy, social science, law, or 

See: Public Law 106-567 (December 27, 2000), as amended by section 1102 of P.L. 108-458 (Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004) (December 17, 

2004), and as further amended by section 602 of P.L. 

110-53 (Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007) (August 3, 2007).

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 43

TITLE VII—DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION

41

APPENDIX D

archives, including individuals who have served in 

Congress or otherwise in the Federal Government or have 

otherwise engaged in research, scholarship, or publication 

in such fields on matters relating to the national security of 

the United States, of whom—

(A) five shall be appointed by the President;

(B) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives;

(C) one shall be appointed by the majority leader of the 

Senate;

(D) one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the 

Senate; and

(E) one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the 

House of Representatives.

(2) (A) Of the members initially appointed to the Board by 

the President—

(i) three shall be appointed for a term of 4 years;

(ii) one shall be appointed for a term of 3 years; and

(iii) one shall be appointed for a term of 2 years.

(B) The members initially appointed to the Board by the 

Speaker of the House of Representatives or by the majority leader of the Senate shall be appointed for a term of 3 

years.

(C) The members initially appointed to the Board by the 

minority leader of the House of Representatives or the 

Senate shall be appointed for a term of 2 years.

(D) Any subsequent appointment to the Board shall be for 

a term of 3 years.

(3) A vacancy in the Board shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. A member of the Board 

appointed to fill a vacancy before the expiration of a term 

shall serve for the remainder of the term.

(4) A member of the Board may be appointed to a new 

term on the Board upon the expiration of the member’s 

term on the Board, except that no member may serve 

more than three full terms on the Board.

(d) CHAIRPERSON; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.—

(1) (A) The President shall designate one of the members 

of the Board as the chairperson of the Board.

(B) The term of service as Chairperson of the Board shall 

be 2 years.

(C) A member serving as Chairperson of the Board may 

be redesignated as Chairperson of the Board upon the 

expiration of the member’s term as Chairperson of the 

Board, except that no member shall serve as Chairperson 

of the Board for more than 6 years.

(2) The Director of the Information Security Oversight 

Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the Board.

(e) MEETINGS.—The Board shall meet as needed to accomplish its mission, consistent with the availability of 

funds. A majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.

(f ) STAFF.—Any employee of the Federal Government 

may be detailed to the Board, with the agreement of and 

without reimbursement to the detailing agency, and such 

detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil, military, 

or foreign service status or privilege.

(g) SECURITY. —

(1) The members and staff of the Board shall, as a condition of appointment to or employment with the Board, 

hold appropriate security clearances for access to the classified records and materials to be reviewed by the Board or 

its staff, and shall follow the guidance and practices on security under applicable Executive orders and Presidential 

or agency directives.

(2) The head of an agency shall, as a condition of granting 

access to a member of the Board, the Executive Secretary 

of the Board, or a member of the staff of the Board to classified records or materials of the agency under this title, 

require the member, the Executive Secretary, or the member of the staff, as the case may be, to—

(A) execute an agreement regarding the security of such 

records or materials that is approved by the head of the . 

agency; and

(B) hold an appropriate security clearance granted or recognized under the standard procedures and eligibility criteria of the agency, including any special access approval 

required for access to such records or materials.

(3) The members of the Board, the Executive Secretary of 

the Board, and the members of the staff of the Board may 

not use any information acquired in the course of their official activities on the Board for nonofficial purposes.

(4) For purposes of any law or regulation governing access to classified information that pertains to the national 

security of the United States, and subject to any limitations on access arising under section 706(b), and to facilitate the advisory functions of the Board under this 

title, a member of the Board seeking access to a record or 

material under this title shall be deemed for purposes of 

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
44 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

this subsection to have a need to know the contents of the 

record or material.

(h) COMPENSATION. —

(1) Each member of the Board shall receive compensation 

at a rate not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual 

rate of basic pay payable for positions at ES–1 of the Senior 

Executive Service under section 5382 of title 5, United 

States Code, for each day such member is engaged in the 

actual performance of duties of the Board. 42

(2) Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of 

chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from 

their homes or regular places of business in the performance of the duties of the Board.

(i) GUIDANCE; ANNUAL BUDGET. —

(1) On behalf of the President, the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs shall provide guidance on policy to the Board.

(2) The Executive Secretary of the Board, under the direction of the Chairperson of the Board and the Board, and 

acting in consultation with the Archivist of the United 

States, the Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs, and the Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget, shall prepare the annual budget of the Board.

(j) SUPPORT.—The Information Security Oversight Office 

may support the activities of the Board under this title. 

Such support shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

(k) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF RECORDS AND

REPORTS. —

(1) The Board shall make available for public inspection 

records of its proceedings and reports prepared in the 

course of its activities under this title to the extent such 

records and reports are not classified and would not be exempt from release under the provisions of section 552 of 

title 5, United States Code.

(2) In making records and reports available under paragraph (1), the Board shall coordinate the release of such 

records and reports with appropriate officials from agencies with expertise in classified information in order to 

ensure that such records and reports do not inadvertently 

contain classified information.

(l) APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE 

LAWS.—The provisions of the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Board under this title. However, the records 

of the Board shall be governed by the provisions of the 

Federal Records Act of 1950.

SEC. 704. IDENTIFICATION, COLLECTION, 

AND REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF 

INFORMATION OF ARCHIVAL VALUE OR 

EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC INTEREST.

(a) BRIEFINGS ON AGENCY DECLASSIFICATION 

PROGRAMS. —

(1) As requested by the Board, or by the Select Committee 

on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 

Representatives, the head of any agency with the authority under an Executive order to classify information shall 

provide to the Board, the Select Committee on Intelligence 

of the Senate, or the Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence of the House of Representatives, on an annual basis, a summary briefing and report on such agency’s progress and plans in the declassification of national 

security information. Such briefing shall cover the declassification goals set by statute, regulation, or policy, 

the agency’s progress with respect to such goals, and the 

agency’s planned goals and priorities for its declassification activities over the next 2 fiscal years. Agency briefings and reports shall give particular attention to progress on the declassification of records and materials that 

are of archival value or extraordinary public interest to 

the people of the United States.

(2)(A) The annual briefing and report under paragraph (1) 

for agencies within the Department of Defense, including 

the military departments and the elements of the intelligence community, shall be provided on a consolidated 

basis.

(B) In this paragraph, the term ‘‘elements of the intelligence community’’ means the elements of the intelligence 

community specified or designated under section 3(4) of 

the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS ON AGENCY 

DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS. —

(1) Upon reviewing and discussing declassification plans 

and progress with an agency, the Board shall provide to 

the head of the agency the written recommendations of 

the Board as to how the agency’s declassification program 

could be improved. A copy of each recommendation shall 

also be submitted to the Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs and the Director of the Office of 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 45

Management and Budget.

(2) Consistent with the provisions of section 703(k), the 

Board’s recommendations to the head of an agency under 

paragraph (1) shall become public 60 days after such recommendations are sent to the head of the agency under 

that paragraph.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS ON SPECIAL SEARCHES 

FOR RECORDS OF EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC 

INTEREST. —

(1) The Board shall also make recommendations to the 

President regarding proposed initiatives to identify, collect, and review for declassification classified records and 

materials of extraordinary public interest.

(2) In making recommendations under paragraph (1), the 

Board shall consider the following:

(A) The opinions and requests of Members of Congress, 

including opinions and requests expressed or embodied in 

letters or legislative proposals, and also including specific 

requests for the declassification of certain records or for 

the reconsideration of declinations to declassify specific 

records.

(B) The opinions and requests of the National Security 

Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the 

heads of other agencies.

43

(C) The opinions of United States citizens.

(D) The opinions of members of the Board.

(E) The impact of special searches on systematic and all 

other on-going declassification programs.

(F) The costs (including budgetary costs) and the impact 

that complying with the recommendations would have on 

agency budgets, programs, and operations.

(G) The benefits of the recommendations.

(H) The impact of compliance with the recommendations 

on the national security of the United States.

(d) PRESIDENT’S DECLASSIFICATION PRIORITIES.—

(1) Concurrent with the submission to Congress of the 

budget of the President each fiscal year under section 1105 

of title 31, United States Code, the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget shall publish a description of 

the President’s declassification program and priorities, together with a listing of the funds requested to implement 

that program.

(2) Nothing in this title shall be construed to substitute or 

supersede, or establish a funding process for, any declassification program that has been established or may be 

established by the President by Executive order.

(e) DECLASSIFICATION REVIEWS. —

(1) IN GENERAL—If requested by the President, the 

Board shall review in a timely manner certain records or 

declinations to declassify specific records, the declassification of which has been the subject of specific congressional 

request described in section 703(b)(5).

(2) AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD—Upon receiving a 

congressional request described in section 703(b)(5), the 

Board may conduct the review and make the recommendations described in that section, regardless of whether 

such a review is requested by the President.

(3) REPORTING—Any recommendations submitted to 

the President by the Board under section 703(b)(5), shall 

be submitted to the chairman and ranking member of the 

committee of Congress that made the request relating to 

such recommendations.

SEC. 705. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 

INFORMATION AND OTHER INFORMATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the authority of the head of an agency to 

classify information or to continue the classification of information previously classified by that agency.

(b) SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.—Nothing in this 

title shall be construed to limit the authority of the head 

of an agency to grant or deny access to a special access 

program.

(c) AUTHORITIES OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE.—Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the authorities of the Director of Central 

Intelligence as the head of the intelligence community, including the Director’s responsibility to protect intelligence 

sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure as required by section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 

1947 (50 U.S.C. 403– 3(c)(6)).

(d) EXEMPTIONS TO RELEASE OF INFORMATION.—

Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit any exemption or exception to the release to the public under this 

title of information that is protected under subsection (b) 

of section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Freedom of Information Act’’), or section 

552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to 

as the ‘‘Privacy Act’’).

(e) WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM 

CONGRESS.—Nothing in this title shall be construed to 

authorize the withholding of information from Congress. 

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46 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

SEC. 706. STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES.

(a) LIAISON.—(1) The head of each agency with the authority under an Executive order to classify information 

and the head of each Federal Presidential library shall designate an employee of such agency or library to act as liaison to the Board for purposes of this title.

(2) The Board may establish liaison and otherwise consult 

with such other historical and advisory committees as the 

Board considers appropriate for purposes of this title.

(b) LIMITATIONS ON ACCESS. —

(1) (A) Except as provided in paragraph (2), if the head 

of an agency or the head of a Federal Presidential library 

determines it necessary to deny or restrict access of the 

Board, or of the agency or library liaison to the Board, to 

information contained in a record or material, in whole 

or in part, the head of the agency or the head of the library shall promptly notify the Board in writing of such 

determination.

(B) Each notice to the Board under subparagraph (A) shall 

include a description of the nature of the records or materials, and a justification for the determination, covered by 

such notice.

44

(2) In the case of a determination referred to in paragraph 

(1) with respect to a special access program created by the 

Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, 

or the head of any other agency, the notification of denial of access under paragraph (1), including a description of the nature of the Board’s request for access, shall 

be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs rather than to the Board.

(c) DISCRETION TO DISCLOSE.—At the conclusion of 

a declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the 

discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the 

public’s interest in the disclosure of records or materials of 

the agency covered by such review, and still properly classified, outweighs the Government’s need to protect such 

records or materials, and may release such records or materials in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 

No. 12958 or any successor order to such Executive order.

(d) DISCRETION TO PROTECT.—At the conclusion of 

a declassification review, the head of an agency may, in 

the discretion of the head of the agency, determine that 

the interest of the agency in the protection of records or 

materials of the agency covered by such review, and still 

properly classified, outweighs the public’s need for access 

to such records or materials, and may deny release of such 

records or materials in accordance with the provisions of 

Executive Order No. 12958 or any successor order to such 

Executive order.

(e) REPORTS. —

(1) (A) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Board 

shall annually submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report on the activities of the Board under 

this title, including summary information regarding any 

denials to the Board by the head of an agency or the head 

of a Federal Presidential library of access to records or materials under this title.

(B) In this paragraph, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

committees’’ means the Select Committee on Intelligence 

and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate 

and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 

the Committee on Government Reform of the House of 

Representatives.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), notice that the Board 

has been denied access to records and materials, and a justification for the determination in support of the denial, 

shall be submitted by the agency denying the access as 

follows:

(A) In the case of the denial of access to a special access program created by the Secretary of Defense, to the 

Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of 

the Senate and to the Committees on Armed Services and 

Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(B) In the case of the denial of access to a special access 

program created by the Director of Central Intelligence, or 

by the head of any other agency (including the Department 

of Defense) if the special access program pertains to intelligence activities, or of access to any information and 

materials relating to intelligence sources and methods, to 

the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 

of Representatives.

(C) In the case of the denial of access to a special access program created by the Secretary of Energy or the 

Administrator for Nuclear Security, to the Committees 

on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select 

Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the 

Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and 

the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

House of Representatives.

(f) NOTIFICATION OF REVIEW.—In response to a 

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TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 47

specific congressional request for declassification review 

described in section 703(b)(5), the Board shall advise the 

originators of the request in a timely manner whether the 

Board intends to conduct such review.

SEC. 707. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Nothing in this title limits the protection afforded to any information under any other provision of law. This title is not 

intended and may not be construed to create any right or 

benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable against the 

United States, its agencies, its officers, or its employees. This 

title does not modify in any way the substantive criteria or 

procedures for the classification of information, nor does 

this title create any right or benefit subject to judicial review.

SEC. 708. FUNDING.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

is hereby authorized to be appropriated to carry out the 

provisions of this title amounts as follows:

(1) For fiscal year 2001, $650,000.

(2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2001, such sums as 

may be necessary for such fiscal year.

(b) FUNDING REQUESTS.—The President shall include 

in the budget submitted to Congress for each fiscal year 

under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, a request for amounts for the activities of the Board under this 

title during such fiscal year.

SEC. 709. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) AGENCY.—

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term 

‘‘agency’’ means the following:

(i) An Executive agency, as that term is defined in section 

105 of title 5, United States Code.

(ii) A military department, as that term is defined in section 102 of such title.

45

(iii) Any other entity in the executive branch that comes 

into the possession of classified information.

(B) The term does not include the Board.

(2) CLASSIFIED MATERIAL OR RECORD.— The terms 

‘‘classified material’’ and ‘‘classified record’’ include any 

correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing, diagram, pictorial or graphic work,

photograph, film, microfilm, sound recording, videotape, 

machine readable records, and other documentary material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that has 

been determined pursuant to Executive order to require 

protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interests 

of the national security of the United States.

(3) DECLASSIFICATION.—The term ‘‘declassification’’ 

means the process by which records or materials that have 

been classified are determined no longer to require protection from unauthorized disclosure to protect the national 

security of the United States.

(4) DONATED HISTORICAL MATERIAL.—The term 

‘‘donated historical material’’ means collections of personal 

papers donated or given to a Federal Presidential library or 

other archival repository under a deed of gift or otherwise.

(5) FEDERAL PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY.—The term 

‘‘Federal Presidential library’’ means a library operated and 

maintained by the United States Government through the 

National Archives and Records Administration under the 

applicable provisions of the Federal Records Act of 1950.

(6) NATIONAL SECURITY.—The term ‘‘national security’’ means the national defense or foreign relations of the 

United States.

(7) RECORDS OR MATERIALS OF EXTRAORDINARY 

PUBLIC INTEREST.—The term ‘‘records or materials of 

extraordinary public interest’’ means records or materials 

that—

(A) demonstrate and record the national security policies, 

actions, and decisions of the United States, including—

(i) policies, events, actions, and decisions which led to significant national security outcomes; and

(ii) the development and evolution of significant United 

States national security policies, actions, and decisions;

(B) will provide a significantly different perspective in general from records and materials publicly available in other 

historical sources; and

(C) would need to be addressed through ad hoc record 

searches outside any systematic declassification program 

established under Executive order.

(8) RECORDS OF ARCHIVAL VALUE.—The term ‘‘records of archival value’’ means records that have been determined by the Archivist of the United States to have sufficient historical or other value to warrant their continued 

preservation by the Federal Government.

SEC. 710. EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET.

(a) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This title shall take effect on the 

date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 

Act.

(b) SUNSET.—The provisions of this title shall expire on 

December 31, 2012, unless reauthorized by statute.

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48 | PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

 “Despite the best of intentions, the classification system, largely 

unchanged since the Eisenhower administration, has grown out 

of control. More information is being classified and for extended 

periods of time. Security rules proliferate, becoming more complex yet 

remaining unrelated to the threat. Security costs increase as inconsistent 

requirements are imposed by different agencies or by different program 

managers within the same agency.

This accretion of security rules and requirements to protect classified 

information does not make the system work better. Indeed, the 

classification system is not trusted on the inside any more than it is on 

the outside. Insiders do not trust it to protect information that needs 

protection. Outsiders do not trust it to release information that does not 

need protection.

This Cold War classification system can be simplified.” 

Redefining Security, A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, 

February 28, 1994, Joint Security Commission

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H 
TRANSFORMING the SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM | 49

H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
PUBLIC INTEREST 

DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

c/o Information Security Oversight Office

700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Room 503

Washington D.C. 20408

Telephone: 202.357.5250

Fax: 202.357.5907

pidb@nara.gov

www.archives.gov/declassification/pidb