UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RIAD ALI DAKROUB,

CASE NO. 15-12484

Plaintiff, DISTRICT JUDGE DENISE PAGE HOOD

v. MAGISTRATE JUDGE PATRICIA T. MORRIS

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

___________________________/

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docs. 12, 15)

I. RECOMMENDATION

In light of the entire record in this case, I suggest that substantial evidence 

supports the Commissioner’s determination that Dakroub is not disabled. Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Dakroub’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) be 

DENIED, that the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) be 

GRANTED, and that this case be AFFIRMED.

II. REPORT

A. Introduction and Procedural History

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(b)(3), and by Notice of 

Reference, this case was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for the purpose of 

reviewing a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)

denying Plaintiff’s claim for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Doc. 2; Tr. 1-

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3). The matter is currently before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. 

(Docs. 12, 15).

Plaintiff Riad Dakroub was fifty-seven years old as of April 14, 2014, the date of 

the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 18, 115). His application for benefits was initially denied on 

January 2, 2013. (Tr. 50). Dakroub requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”), which took place before ALJ Denise M. Martin on October 2, 2014. (Tr.

23-49). Dakroub, represented by attorney Syed Yousef, testified, as did vocational expert 

(“VE”) Cheryl Holseth. (Id.). On January 23, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision in 

which she found Dakroub not disabled. (Tr. 8-18). On August 16, 2015, the Appeals 

Council denied review.

1 (Tr. 1-3). Dakroub filed for judicial review of that final decision 

on July 13, 2015. (Doc. 1). 

B. Standard of Review

The district court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final 

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court’s review is 

restricted solely to determining whether the “Commissioner has failed to apply the 

correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in 

the record.” Sullivan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 595 F. App’x 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but 

 1 Dakroub included in his submission to the Appeals Council a new exhibit which was not part of the 

record before the ALJ, namely exhibit 14F. (Tr. 4, 1040-57). These records are of no assistance in 

determining whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and the Court is not 

permitted to consider them. See Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]his court has 

repeatedly held that evidence submitted to the Appeals Council after the ALJ’s decision cannot be 

considered part of the record for purposes of substantial evidence review.”).

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less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 

(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). 

The Court must examine the administrative record as a whole, and may consider 

any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the ALJ. See 

Walker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). 

The Court will not “try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor decide 

questions of credibility.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 

(6th Cir. 1994). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, “it 

must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and 

even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Id. at 286 (internal 

citations omitted). 

C. Framework for Disability Determinations

Under the Act, “DIB and SSI are available only for those who have a ‘disability.’”

Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). “Disability” means the inability

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 

can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 

[twelve] months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (DIB); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (SSI). The 

Commissioner’s regulations provide that disability is to be determined through the 

application of a five-step sequential analysis:

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Step One: If the claimant is currently engaged in substantial 

gainful activity, benefits are denied without further analysis.

Step Two: If the claimant does not have a severe impairment 

or combination of impairments that “significantly limits . . . 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” benefits 

are denied without further analysis.

Step Three: If the claimant is not performing substantial 

gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to 

last for at least twelve months, and the severe impairment 

meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the 

regulations, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be 

disabled regardless of age, education or work experience.

Step Four: If the claimant is able to perform his or her past 

relevant work, benefits are denied without further analysis.

Step Five: Even if the claimant is unable to perform his or her 

past relevant work, if other work exists in the national 

economy that plaintiff can perform, in view of his or her age, 

education, and work experience, benefits are denied.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. See also Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 

534 (6th Cir. 2001). “Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the 

existence and severity of limitations caused by [his or] her impairments and the fact that 

she is precluded from performing [his or] her past relevant work.” Jones v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). The burden transfers to the Commissioner if 

the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that the claimant is not disabled. 

Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). At the fifth step, the 

Commissioner is required to show that “other jobs in significant numbers exist in the 

national economy that [the claimant] could perform given [his or] her RFC [residual 

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functional capacity] and considering relevant vocational factors.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 

(citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g)).

Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the SSA has promulgated 

regulations that provide for the payment of disabled child’s insurance benefits if the 

claimant is at least 18 years old and has a disability that began before age 22 (20 C.F.R. 

404.350(a) (5) (2013). A claimant must establish a medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment (expected to last at least twelve months or result in death) that 

rendered her unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

The regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation for evaluating disability claims.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

D. ALJ Findings

Following the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found Dakroub not disabled 

under the Act. (Tr. 18). The ALJ found at Step One that Dakroub had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity following the alleged onset date, December 20, 2013. (Tr. 13).

At Step Two, the ALJ concluded that Dakroub had the following severe impairments: 

“neuropathy; diabetes; colitis; degenerative disc disease; obesity; chronic renal failure; 

and a history of kidney transplant.” (Tr. 13-15). At Step Three, the ALJ found that 

Dakroub’s combination of impairments did not meet or equal one of the listed 

impairments. (Tr. 15). The ALJ then found that Dakroub had the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except with additional limitations as follows:

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He cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. In addition, he can perform no 

more than occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; and occasional 

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. Further, the 

claimant would be limited to frequent, but not repetitive, use of foot/leg 

controls.

(Tr. 15-17). At Step Four, the ALJ found that Dakroub could return to his past relevant 

work as an owner/general manager, and thus did not proceed to Step Five. (Tr. 17).

E. Administrative Record

1. Medical Evidence

The Court has reviewed Dakroub’s medical record. In lieu of summarizing his

medical history here, the Court will make references and provide citations to the record 

as necessary in its discussion of the parties’ arguments.

2. Application Reports and Administrative Hearing

a. Dakroub’s Function Report

Dakroub completed a function report on January 20, 2014, in which he asserted 

that he was disabled by kidney disease, kidney transplant, dialysis, diabetes, foot pain, 

and back pain, among other symptoms. (Tr. 136). He indicated that his feet were numb 

and that he experienced burning pain in those extremities. (Tr. 138). He did not prepare 

his own meals due to back pain and difficulty walking or standing. (Tr. 139). He did not 

perform chores due to difficulty lifting, pushing, and standing. (Tr. 140). He could drive, 

and shopped in stores once or twice weekly for up to an hour. (Id.). He was in constant 

back and foot pain, and made frequent bathroom trips. (Tr. 141). He watched television 

daily, could no longer play sports, and could perform “no lifting.” (Id.). He frequently 

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visited his doctors’ offices and the hospital for check-ups related to his kidney transplant. 

(Id.). He reported difficulty lifting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, kneeling, 

climbing stairs, and using his hands. (Tr. 142). 

Dakroub could walk for about ten minutes before stopping, and could resume after 

a fifteen to twenty minute break. (Tr. 142). He used a cane for walking “as needed” and 

on a “daily” basis. (Tr. 143). 

b. Dakroub’s Testimony at the Administrative Hearing

At the October 2, 2014, hearing before the ALJ, Dakroub testified that he worked

as a warehouse manager and owner between 1990 and 2013, and ceased working due to 

symptoms resulting from kidney ailments, including diabetes and foot neuropathy. (Tr. 

28). He worked eight to twelve hours daily, performing duties such as acquiring product, 

and managing employee and customer relationships, but did “not really” lift any heavy 

weight in that position. (Tr. 29). Dakroub also testified that he sometimes lifted up to 

thirty or forty pounds of weight at a time, but apparently ceased doing so following a 

back operation in 2007. (Tr. 30). Dakroub later clarified that he stopped working out “at 

the end of this last year in December,” which is to say December 2013. (Tr. 41). He 

testified that his job was “mostly . . . a desk job.” (Tr. 40).

Dakroub testified that he could manage self-care tasks without difficulty. (Tr. 30). 

He could sit for about thirty minutes comfortably, stand for ten minutes, and walk for 

twenty minutes. (Tr. 30-31). He could lift up to fifteen pounds. (Tr. 31). As to 

neuropathy, he complained of burning, itching pain in both feet. (Id.). He recently began 

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taking Neuropentin 300, which had not yet taken effect but which stood to reduce his 

neuropathic symptoms. (Tr. 32). As to diabetes, Dakroub stated that his blood sugar was 

unstable. (Tr. 33). He reported taking “over 30 pills a day,” and experienced headache, 

neck pain, morning dizziness, sleepiness, difficulty sleeping, and weakness. (Tr. 32-34). 

Dakroub stated that his days consisted of making coffee, managing his medication, 

watching television, walking around the block, and talking with friends or family. (Tr. 

35). His wife took primary care of his son, including dropping him off at school. (Tr. 35-

36). He did not perform household chores “at all,” but clarified that he sometimes helps 

to perform “easy” chores “like towels.” (Tr. 36). He could drive for only ten to twenty 

minutes for fear of falling asleep behind the wheel due to diabetes-related symptoms. (Tr. 

37). Dakroub testified that he “used to exercise,” but apparently ceased that activity due 

to foot pain. (Tr. 37). He rarely played with his son, and rarely took his son to the park. 

(Tr. 38). His back pain was on two occasions severe enough to merit visits to the 

emergency ward. (Tr. 40). 

Dakroub also testified that his condition had worsened since he quit working in 

December 2013 because of “my diabetes, the sugar, you know, more and they can’t 

control it . . . . Plus, the neuropathy.” (Tr. 45). 

c. The VE’s Testimony at the Administrative Hearing

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The ALJ then called upon the services of a VE to determine Dakroub’s ability to 

perform work. (Tr. 42). The VE found that Dakroub’s past relevant work as a warehouse 

owner and manager was not fully addressed by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 

which has no provision for ownership roles. (Tr. 43). The VE found that Dakroub’s 

position was most similar to the listing for General Manager, performed at the light level 

of exertion, though Dakroub’s allegation that he sometimes lifted up to forty pounds 

would place the job in the “medium” category of exertion. (Id.).

The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual with Dakroub’s age, 

education, and work experience, who could perform work at the light level of exertion, 

and who could “not climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and 

stairs; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling,” and who was 

limited to “frequent but not repetitive use of foot or leg controls.” (Tr. 44). The VE found 

that such a worker could perform Dakroub’s past relevant work as general manager. (Id.). 

However, the VE also confirmed that the hypothetical worker would not be able to return 

to Dakroub’s past relevant work “as the gentleman said he performed it,” because 

Dakroub described work that necessitated lifting at the medium level of exertion. (Tr. 

46). 

Dakroub closed his testimony by noting that his business ultimately failed because 

he was the main operator, and was unable to continue his duties due to sleepiness and 

other ailments. (Tr. 48). 

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 F. Governing Law

The ALJ must “consider all evidence” in the record when making a disability 

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B). The regulations carve the evidence into various 

categories, “acceptable medical sources” and “other sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513. 

“Acceptable medical sources” include, among others, licensed physicians and licensed or 

certified psychologists. Id. § 404.1513(a). “Other sources” include medical sources who 

are not “acceptable” and almost any other individual able to provide relevant evidence. 

Id. § 404.1513(d). Only “acceptable medical sources” can establish the existence of an 

impairment. SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2. Both “acceptable” and nonacceptable sources provide evidence to the Commissioner, often in the form of opinions 

“about the nature and severity of an individual’s impairment(s), including symptoms, 

diagnosis and prognosis, what the individual can still do despite the impairment(s), and 

physical and mental restrictions.” Id. at *2. When “acceptable medical sources” issue 

such opinions, the regulations deem the statements to be “medical opinions” subject to a 

multi-factor test that weighs their value. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Excluded from the 

definition of “medical opinions” are various decisions reserved to the Commissioner, 

such as whether the claimant meets the statutory definition of disability and how to 

measure his or her RFC. Id. at 404.1527(d). 

The ALJ must use a six-factor balancing test to determine the probative value of 

medical opinions from acceptable sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The test looks at 

whether the source examined the claimant, “the length of the treatment relationship and 

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the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, 

supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and 

specialization of the treating source.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 

(6th Cir. 2004). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ALJs must also apply those factors to 

“other source” opinions. See Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 540-42 (6th 

Cir. 2007); SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2. 

Certain opinions of a treating physician, in contrast, receive controlling weight if 

they are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques” and are “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case 

record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). See also Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. The only opinions 

entitled to dispositive effect deal with the nature and severity of the claimant’s 

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *1-2. Therefore, 

the ALJ does not owe a treating opinion deference on matters reserved to the 

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *1-2. The ALJ 

“will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion” regarding whether a 

person is disabled or unable to work, whether an impairment meets or equals a Listing, 

the individual’s RFC, and the application of vocational factors. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(3). 

The regulations mandate that the ALJ provide “good reasons” for the weight 

assigned to the treating source’s opinion in the written determination. 20 C.F.R. § 

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404.1527(c)(2). See also Dakroub v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 875 (6th Cir. 

2007). Therefore, a decision denying benefits

must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating 

source’s medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case 

record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any 

subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating 

source’s opinion and the reasons for that weight.

SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996). See also Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242. For 

example, an ALJ may properly reject a treating source opinion if it lacks supporting 

objective evidence. Revels v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs, 882 F. Supp. 637, 640-41 

(E.D. Mich. 1994), aff’d, 51 F.3d 273, 1995 WL 138930, at *1 (6th Cir. 1995) 

(unpublished table decision).

An ALJ must analyze the credibility of the claimant, considering the claimant’s 

statements about pain or other symptoms with the rest of the relevant evidence in the 

record and factors outlined in Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Credibility determinations 

regarding a claimant’s subjective complaints rest with the ALJ. See Siterlet v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir. 1987). Generally, an ALJ’s 

credibility assessment can be disturbed only for a “compelling reason.” Sims v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., No. 09-5773, 2011 WL 180789, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 19, 2011) (citing

Dakroub v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001)); Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004). 

The Social Security regulations establish a two-step process for evaluating 

subjective symptoms, including pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 

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374186, at *2. The ALJ evaluates complaints of disabling pain by confirming that 

objective medical evidence of the underlying condition exists. The ALJ then determines 

whether that condition could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain or 

whether other objective evidence verifies the severity of the pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2; Stanley v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 39 F.3d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 1994). The ALJ ascertains the extent of the workrelated limitations by determining the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

claimant’s symptoms. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2. 

While “objective evidence of the pain itself” is not required, Duncan v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted), a 

claimant’s description of his or her physical or mental impairments alone is “not enough 

to establish the existence of a physical or mental impairment,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(a). 

Nonetheless, the ALJ may not disregard the claimant’s subjective complaints about the 

severity and persistence of the pain simply because they lack substantiating objective 

evidence. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1. Instead, the absence of objective 

confirming evidence forces the ALJ to consider the following factors:

(i) [D]aily activities;

(ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of . . . pain;

(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;

(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any 

medication . . . taken to alleviate . . . pain or other symptoms;

(v) Treatment, other than medication, . . . received for relief of . . . 

pain;

(vi) Any measures . . . used to relieve . . . pain.

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20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). See also Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 

1039-40 (6th Cir. 1994); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3. Furthermore, the 

claimant’s work history and the consistency of his or her subjective statements are also 

relevant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5.

The claimant must provide evidence establishing her RFC. The statute lays the 

groundwork for this, stating, “An individual shall not be considered to be under a 

disability unless he [or she] furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence 

thereof as the Secretary may require.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). See also Bowen, 482 

U.S. at 146 n.5. The RFC “is the most he [or she] can still do despite his [or her] 

limitations,” and is measured using “all the relevant evidence in [the] case record.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). A hypothetical question to the VE is valid if it includes all 

credible limitations developed prior to Step Five. Casey v. Sec. of Health & Human 

Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993); Donald v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-

14784-BC, 2009 WL 4730453, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2009).

G. Analysis

Dakroub argues that the ALJ erred by: 1) Failing to comply with SSR 96-8p and 

SSR 86-8; 2) Failing to comply with SSR 96-7p by insufficiently justifying her 

credibility finding; 3) Insufficiently addressing whether Dakroub’s conditions met or 

equaled a Listed Impairment; 4) Failing to address Dakroub’s obesity; 5) Improperly 

considering Dr. Abufarha’s report; and 6) Failing to find that Dakroub was disabled 

under the Grids. (Doc. 12 at 5-10). These arguments will be addressed in turn. 

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1. The ALJ Properly Complied With SSR 96-8p and 86-8

Dakroub first argues that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 96-8p by “rush[ing] 

to the conclusion that the claimant could work at a given exertional level without doing 

the function-by-function analysis required” by that ruling. (Doc. 12 at 6). 

SSR 96-8p provides that an ALJ’s “RFC assessment must include a narrative 

discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical 

facts . . . and nonmedical evidence,” and describing “the maximum amount of each workrelated activity the individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case 

record.” SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. Additionally, the ALJ must “explain how 

any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence . . . were considered and 

resolved.” Id. To meet these demands, the ALJ should offer “a thorough discussion” of 

the evidence and “a logical explanation” of the symptoms’ effects on the individual’s 

capacity to work. Id. These requirements preclude an ALJ from simply stating that his 

conclusion “was ‘based on the medical evidence.’” Payne v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 402 Fed.

Appx. 109, 117–18 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting the district court’s opinion and finding the 

narrative sufficient because the ALJ did more than say the opinion was supported by 

evidence).

Dakroub does not explain how the ALJ’s decision runs afoul of SSR 96-8p, and 

instead merely asserts that the decision lacks a function-by-function analysis. (Doc. 12 at 

6). Review of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that she addressed Dakroub’s neuropathy, 

diabetes, colitis, dizziness, sleepiness, weakness, fatigue, weight gain, and associated 

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symptoms, along with his ability to walk, sit, stand, lift, and exercise. (Tr. 13-17). The 

ALJ thus sufficiently analyzed all of Dakroub’s functional capabilities insofar as 

supported by the medical record, and insofar as those ailments might be expected to limit 

his functional capabilities. No error can be found here.

Dakroub also argues that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 86-8 by reaching 

“conclusions . . . . based on assumptions, rather than on the evidence.” (Doc. 12 at 6). 

Dakroub makes no effort to cite SSR 86-8, leaving it to the Court to decipher which 

portion of that ruling he believes the ALJ violated. Likewise, Dakroub makes no effort to 

apply the facts of the ALJ’s decision to SSR 86-8, thus it cannot be determined which 

“assumptions” the ALJ made. It is well settled that where a Social Security claimant 

makes arguments which are “adverted to in only a perfunctory manner,” those arguments 

“are waived.” Kuhn v. Washtenaw Cnty., 709 F.3d 612, 624 (6th Cir. 2013). See also 

Aarti Hospitality, L.L.C. v. City of Grove City, Ohio, 350 Fed. Appx. 1, 11 (6th Cir. 

2009) (“After setting forth the applicable law on their due process claim, plaintiffs devote 

one sentence in their appellate brief to ‘arguing’ why the district court’s judgment should 

be reversed . . . . Accordingly, we deem plaintiffs’ appeal of their due process claim 

forfeited.”); Fielder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1310325, 2014 WL 1207865, at *2 (E.D. 

Mich. Mar. 24, 2014). Dakroub’s argument under SSR 86-8 is thus waived.

Even if Dakroub’s SSR 86-8 argument was not waived, it would fail. Review of 

the ALJ’s decision reveals no unsupported assumptions regarding Dakroub’s condition. 

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On the contrary, the ALJ cites numerous portions of the record, including the findings of 

Dakroub’s physicians, objective medical data, and his own testimony. 

2. Dakroub’s Credibility Argument is Waived and Unsupported

A heading in Dakroub’s brief contains a single line asserting that “ALJ Martin 

made the assumption that the claimant’s testimony was not fully credible, therefore the 

claimant can do light work.” (Doc. 12 at 6). Immediately below that heading, he notes 

that “credibility findings cannot be substituted for medical evidence.” (Id.). In his 

conclusion, Dakroub cites SSR 96-7p, which provides:

It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single, conclusory 

statement that ‘the individual’s allegations have been considered’ or that 

‘the allegations are (or are not) credible.’ It is also not enough for the 

adjudicator simply to recite the factors that are described in the regulations 

for evaluating symptoms. The determination or decision must contain 

specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in 

the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the 

individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave 

to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.

See SSR 96–7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996). Dakroub does not develop his 

credibility argument beyond referencing SSR 96-7p and concluding, without support, that 

the ALJ’s credibility finding was erroneous. This sort of undeveloped, perfunctory 

argumentation merits a finding of waiver. 

 Even if the argument was not waived, the ALJ gave specific reasons for his 

credibility assessment which are supported by substantial evidence. Foremost, the ALJ 

found that Dakroub testified that he ceased exercising at a gym in late 2013 (Tr. 41), yet 

medical records indicate that he injured himself while exercising at a gym in mid-2014 

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(Tr. 587). The ALJ reasonably cited this inconsistency as a good reason to doubt 

Dakroub’s credibility. (Tr. 16). See Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 

(6th Cir. 1997) (“Discounting credibility to a certain degree is appropriate where an ALJ 

finds contradictions among the medical reports, claimant’s testimony, and other 

evidence.”); Evans v. Astrue, No. 09–10184, 2009 WL 4506435, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 

1, 2009) (holding that an ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily activities in conjunction 

with other evidence of record to conclude that the claimant is less than credible). This 

inconsistency also suggests that Dakroub retained greater functional capabilities than he 

alleged in his testimony, providing further reason to discount his asserted limitations. (Tr. 

16). 

3. The ALJ Properly Considered Whether Dakroub’s Ailments Met or 

Equaled a Listing

Dakroub next argues that the ALJ erred in finding that his ailments did not meet or 

equal a Listed impairment. (Doc. 12 at 7-8). Claimants with severe impairments that meet 

or equal a listing in the Appendix are deemed disabled without further analysis. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Fitting a claimant into a listing is dispositive and thus demands a 

higher level of proof: listed impairments preclude any gainful activity, not just substantial 

gainful activity. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525 (1990); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

subpt. P, App. 1. Each listing specifies “the objective medical and other findings needed 

to satisfy the criteria of that listing.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c). A claimant must satisfy all 

of the criteria to meet the listing. Id. See also Zebley, 493 U.S. at 530 (“An impairment 

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that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”). 

Alternatively, medical equivalence of a listing can occur in three situations where the 

claimant fails to meet all of the criteria:

(1) the claimant has a listed impairment but does not exhibit the specified 

severity or findings, yet has “other findings” that are “at least of equal 

medical significance” to the criteria; (2) the claimant has a non-listed 

impairment that is at least of equal medical significance to a listed 

impairment; or (3) the claimant has a combination of impairments which 

do not individually meet a Listed Impairment, but are “at least of equal 

medical significance” to a listing when viewed in totality.

Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 Fed. Appx. 411, 415 n.2 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1526). The ALJ retains discretion at this stage, and does not need to 

attach “any special significance to the source of a [medical] opinion . . . [regarding] 

whether an impairment meets or equals a listing.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). This is 

particularly true for the first part of the analysis: “‘an ALJ is capable of reviewing records 

to determine whether a claimant’s ailments meet the Listings.’” Stratton v. Astrue, 987 F. 

Supp.2d 135, 148 (D. N.H. 2012) (quoting Galloway v. Astrue, No. H-07-01646, 2008 

WL 8053508, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2008)). The Commissioner, however, has 

qualified the ALJ’s discretion to decide equivalence, noting that “longstanding policy 

requires that the judgment of a physician (or psychologist) designated by the 

Commissioner on the issue of equivalence on the evidence before the administrative law 

judge or the Appeals Council must be received into the record as expert opinion evidence 

and given appropriate weight.” SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3.

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“When a claimant alleges that he meets or equals a listed impairment, he must 

present specific medical findings that satisfy the various tests listed in the description of 

the applicable impairment or present medical evidence which describes how the 

impairment has such equivalency.” Thacker v. Social Sec. Admin., 93 Fed. Appx. 725, 

728 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Consequently, an ALJ’s listing analysis must be 

viewed in light of the evidence the claimant presents.

Dakroub first notes that “[i]n accordance with . . . Listing . . . 1.04, claimant is 

suffering from disorders of the spine, based on degenerative disc disease, resulting in a 

compromise of a nerve root, established by MRI.” (Id. at 6). While Dakroub does not 

actually assert that he meets or equals Listing 1.04, a fair reading of his brief suggests 

that he believes he meets that listing. 

Listing 1.04 can be met in three ways: with evidence of nerve root compression, 

spinal arachnoiditis, or lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication. 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 1.04 (“Listing 1.04”). Nerve root compression must 

be accompanied with limited spinal movement, motor and sensory or reflex loss, and 

positive straight-leg raising tests, both sitting and supine, if the lower back is involved. 

Id. Spinal arachnoiditis must be confirmed by surgery notes, tissue biopsies, or medical 

imaging. Id. Finally, lumbar spinal stenosis is established by imaging studies, “chronic 

nonradicular pain and weakness,” and “inability to ambulate effectively . . . .” Id. 

“Inability to ambulate effectively means an extreme limitation of the ability to walk; i.e., 

an impairment(s) that interferes very seriously with the individual’s ability to 

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independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” Id. § 1.00(B)(2)(b). An individual 

meets this condition when, for example, they need two crutches or canes, cannot walk 

without a walker, cannot travel alone, cannot use public transportation, or cannot walk. 

Id.

Dakroub asserts that he meets Listing 1.04 via “degenerative disc disease” and 

“compromise of a nerve root.” (Doc. 12 at 7). Listing 1.04(A) deals with nerve root 

compression, thus it appears that he believes he meets this subsection of the Listing. Yet 

Dakroub makes no effort whatsoever to demonstrate that he experiences the other 

ailments necessary to meet Listing 1.04(A), including “neuro-anatomic distribution of 

pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle 

weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if there is 

involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine).” 

Listing 1.04(A). It is the claimant’s burden to show that she meets or medically equals an 

impairment in the listings. Evans v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 161, 164 

(6th Cir. 1987). A claimant’s failure to specifically detail, in a point-by-point fashion, 

how he or she meets a listing waives that argument. See Mortzfield v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., No. 12-15270, 2014 WL 1304991, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2014) (“Plaintiff 

bears the burden of establishing that he meets a particular listing and plaintiff’s argument 

in this regard is not sufficiently developed such that the undersigned can make such a 

determination. Plaintiff cannot simply make the bald claims that the ALJ erred, while 

leaving it to the Court to scour the record to support this claim.”). Dakroub’s claim that 

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he meets Listing 1.04(A) is thus waived, because he makes no effort whatsoever to point 

to specific evidence in the record demonstrating that he meets the multifactor criteria 

listed in that subsection. 

Even if Dakroub’s Listing 1.04(A) claim was not waived, the Court notes that a 

review of the record does not demonstrate limited motion of the spine, which is necessary 

to meet Listing 1.04(A). On the contrary, there is evidence that Dakroub continued 

working out in the gym through 2014, suggesting that he was not experiencing a 

significant limitation to back movement. (Tr. 16, 587). 

Dakroub next asserts that the ALJ did not “take into account a long-standing 

history of Colitis, in accordance with section 5.06.” (Doc. 12 at 7); 20 C.F.R. 404, subpt. 

P, app. 1, § 5.06 (“Listing 5.06”). Once again, Dakroub does not actually claim that he 

meets this Listing, but a fair reading of his brief suggests that he believes he does meet 

Listing 5.06. Dakroub supports his claim to Listing 5.06 by noting that while he “had no 

significant weight loss, the medical records contained in the records from Henry Ford 

(Tr. 479-997) indicate that he has a history of chronic Colitis.” (Doc. 12 at 7). 

Listing 5.06 deals with inflammatory bowel disease, of which colitis is one 

variety. See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (“Inflammatory bowel disease (5.06) 

includes, but is not limited to, Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis.”). Once again, 

Dakroub does not assert that he meets the necessary subparts of this Listing, much less 

point to specific evidence in the record supporting a claim under Listing 5.06. A claimant 

meets Listing 5.06 if they meet the following criteria: 

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5.06 Chronic ulcerative or granulomatous colitis (demonstrated by 

endoscopy, barium enema, biopsy, or operative findings). With:

A. Recurrent bloody stools documented on repeated examinations 

and anemia manifested by hematocrit of 30 percent or less 

on repeated examinations; or

B. Persistent or recurrent systematic manifestations, such as 

arthritis, iritis, fever, or liver dysfunction, not attributable 

to other causes; or

C. Intermittent obstruction due to intractable abscess, fistula 

formation, or stenosis; or

D. Recurrence of findings A, B, or C above after total 

colonectomy; or

E. Weight loss as described under 5.08.

20 C.F.R. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 5.06. While Dakroub is correct that the medical record 

supports a finding of colitis, he has failed to demonstrate that he satisfies any of the “A” 

through “E” sub-criteria necessary to meet that Listing. He has thus also waived any 

argument that he meets this Listing. 

Even if Dakroub did not waive his argument, the medical record reveals no 

findings which could satisfy the sub-criteria of Listing 5.06. Review of the record reveals 

some evidence of bloody stool (Tr. 195), and anemia (Tr. 200, 221), but there is no 

indication that these symptoms were “recurrent” as required by Listing 5.06, and 

Dakroub makes no effort to establish the recurrence of these conditions. 

4. The ALJ Adequately Addressed Dakroub’s Obesity

Dakroub next argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the impact of his 

obesity on his overall level of functioning. (Doc. 12 at 7). Dakroub is correct that the ALJ 

offers little specific, reviewable detail on the issue of obesity. The ALJ noted that 

Dakroub was seventy inches tall and weighed 240 pounds, which computes to a body2:15-cv-12484-DPH-PTM Doc # 20 Filed 08/01/16 Pg 23 of 33 Pg ID 1194
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mass index of approximately 34.4, indicating obesity. See SSR 02-01p, 2002 WL 

34686281. The ALJ also found that Dakroub’s obesity was a “severe impairment,” and 

made a general statement that she considered all of Dakroub’s impairments in rendering 

her decision. (Tr. 13-14). The ALJ did not explain in detail how Dakroub’s obesity might 

impact his other severe impairments or functional capacity. 

“‘Social Security Ruling 02–01p does not mandate a particular mode of analysis,’

but merely directs an ALJ to consider the claimant’s obesity, in combination with other 

impairments, at all stages of the sequential evaluation.” Nejat v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 

Fed. Appx. 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 Fed. Appx. 408, 

411–12 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Duncan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-12047, 2015 

WL 2405581, at *13 (E.D. Mich. May 20, 2015) (holding that “there is no prescribed 

analysis required” to satisfy SSR 02-01p). 

The question here is whether an ALJ’s conclusion that a claimant’s obesity is a 

severe impairment, along with an assertion that all impairments were considered in 

rendering a decision, is adequate to satisfy SSR 02-01p. The court in Stone v. Colvin, No. 

14-261-WOB-CJS, 2015 WL 5634322, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2015), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. CV2014261WOBCJS, 2015 WL 5611605 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 

21, 2015) addressed a scenario almost identical to the instant case, and concluded that the 

ALJ’s finding that obesity was a “severe” impairment, along with a statement that all 

impairments were considered at Steps Three through Five, was sufficient to discharge the 

ALJ’s obligations under SSR 02-01p. See also Ring v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-

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CV-197, 2013 WL 4500444, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 21, 2013) (reaching the same 

conclusion where the ALJ found obesity to be a severe impairment, stated that he 

considered the effect of all impairments during the sequential evaluation process, and 

plaintiff failed to present evidence that her obesity caused limitations not accounted for in 

the ALJ’s RFC finding); Jarman v. Colvin, No. CIV. 13-434-GFVT, 2015 WL 1246292, 

at *6 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 17, 2015) (same).

Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. In Sheeks v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., No. 13-13647, 2015 WL 753205, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 2015), the court held

that an ALJ’s finding that obesity was a severe impairment was not sufficient to 

discharge the ALJ’s duty under SSR 02-01p, because that ruling requires ALJs to 

generate an “assessment . . . of the effect obesity has upon the individual’s ability to 

perform routine movement and necessary physical activity within the work 

environment,” something which the ALJ’s decision did not include. Yet the Sheeks court 

also found that the “ALJ’s single reference to obesity may not, standing alone, be enough 

to require remand.” Id. Similarly, the court in Smith v. Colvin, No. 13 CV 5433, 2015 WL 

329371, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2015) found that an ALJ’s boilerplate assurance that he 

considered obesity was insufficient to satisfy SSR 02-01p in light of the claimant’s severe 

obesity, which might be expected to result in an “effect on his surgically reconstructed 

ankle.” Id. Likewise, the court in Walker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 15-887, 2016 

WL 3917438, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 20, 2016) held that an ALJ’s finding that obesity was 

a severe impairment and assertion that he considered obesity throughout the sequential 

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analysis did not satisfy SSR 02-01p because the RFC discussion included no mention of

limitations imposed by obesity. Finally, the court in Ellis v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 09-1212, 

2010 WL 1817246, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2010) concluded that “[r]emand is required 

where a claimant alleges obesity, the ALJ finds obesity is a severe impairment, and the 

ALJ fails to evaluate obesity when determining the RFC.” 

While the ALJ’s review of Dakroub’s obesity is minimal, the undersigned 

concludes that it is sufficient in light of Dakroub’s testimony and the medical record. In 

this case, where Dakroub alleged that he was disabled by physical maladies alone (rather 

than mental maladies), his obesity might be expected to produce limitations on his ability 

to walk, sit, stand, lift, and perform other postural and exertional activities. Yet the ALJ 

found that Dakroub retained a great deal of physical functioning, supported by reference 

to medical records indicating that Dakroub was exercising at the gym well into 2014, 

after his alleged onset date and months after he claimed to have ceased exercising. (Tr. 

16, 41, 587). This finding not only challenges the credibility of Dakroub’s alleged 

symptoms, it also provides some support for the ALJ’s assertion that she considered his 

obesity throughout the sequential analysis, but nevertheless found that he was capable of 

performing work despite his combination of ailments. While this analysis is fairly 

minimal, I find that it distinguishes the ALJ’s decision from those in Alicea and Padilla, 

and is sufficient to satisfy the ALJ’s obligations under SSR 02-01p. 

The Court also notes that Dakroub himself placed relatively little emphasis on the 

impact of his obesity on his overall wellbeing. The issue of weight gain came up at the 

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hearing only when his attorney inquired about it in the course of laying out Dakroub’s 

basic characteristics, alongside his date of birth, age, right handedness, use of eye glasses, 

and the location of his home. (Tr. 27). Likewise, Dakroub said nothing about his obesity 

in his function report, instead focusing on the effects of his kidney disease, including 

diabetes, neuropathy, back pain, somnolence, and lifting limitations. (Tr. 136-42). 

Dakroub’s physicians also had little to say about his obesity, instead focusing on his 

neuropathy and other kidney-related disorders. In light of the relatively minor role that 

obesity played in Dakroub’s claim for benefits, the ALJ’s somewhat cursory treatment of

that disorder is sufficient. 

Alternately, even assuming that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 02-01p by 

insufficiently discussing Dakroub’s obesity, Dakroub has waived any argument relating 

to obesity. Dakroub leaves it to the Court to determine which limitations, if any, result 

from his obesity. He has not, for instance, laid the ALJ’s RFC finding side-by-side with 

his medical records and demonstrated how his obesity imposes greater limitation than 

accounted for in the ALJ’s RFC. The claimant bears the burden of demonstrating 

how obesity would limit his or her abilities in a manner not encompassed by the ALJ’s 

RFC finding. See Boley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-CV-15707, 2013 WL 1090531, at 

*4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2013) (“Accordingly, even assuming the ALJ erred by failing to 

discuss the effects of her obesity and violated S.S.R. 02–1p, the Social Security Ruling 

concerning the evaluation of obesity in disability claims, Plaintiff has failed to show this 

error was harmful such that remand or reversal is warranted. The objection is 

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overruled.”). Numerous courts around the country have refused to remand where an ALJ 

stated that he or she “fully considered obesity,” and where the claimant failed to identify 

specific limitations caused by obesity not incorporated into the ALJ’s RFC finding. See, 

e.g., Osing v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-3326, 2016 WL 1060184, at *12 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 

2016); Rix v. Colvin, No. CV 14-5733 (PGS), 2016 WL 199419, at *10 (D. N.J. Jan. 15, 

2016); Davis v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-13-3761, 2014 WL 7014500, at *3 

(D. Md. Dec. 9, 2014); Burgess v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-252-WGH-WTL, 2013 WL 

1619551, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 15, 2013); Palisay v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CIV.A. 11-

4857, 2012 WL 3201428, at *14 (D. N.J. Aug. 2, 2012). Dakroub’s obesity argument 

thus presents no cause for remand. 

5. The ALJ Properly Considered Dr. Abufarha’s September 25, 2014 

Report

Dakroub next asserts that the ALJ neglected to consider a “report dated 9/25/2014 

authored by Dr. Abufarha . . . which clearly supports a finding of disability.” (Doc. 12 at 

8). Quite to the contrary, the ALJ specifically addressed this report, finding that “the 

record contains two medical opinions, each from September 2014 (Ex. 8F; 13F.) 

Essentially, they suggest that the claimant is incapable of full-time work. However, I give 

little weight to these assessments . . . [because they] are cursory, and the doctors’

signatures are virtually illegible. Nor are the opinions well supported.” (Tr. 17). The ALJ 

noted that while both reports provide that Dakroub should avoid all exposure to heat and 

cold, they fail to provide specific support for that restriction. (Id.). The ALJ also notes 

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that these reports “are virtually identical,” suggesting that one of the physicians merely 

parroted the findings of the other, rather than applying “independent, objective thought.” 

(Id.). The ALJ gave “some weight” to these reports insofar as they suggested “limitations 

to some degree.” (Id.). 

Dakroub’s assertion that the ALJ neglected to discuss Dr. Abufarha’s September 

2014 report is thus unfounded and readily dispelled by a reading of the ALJ’s decision. 

The ALJ’s discussion of the two physician reports from September 2014 provides good 

reason to doubt the accuracy of those reports. The ALJ thus gave “good reasons” for 

providing less weight to these reports, and was not obligated to accept the finding of 

disability included in those reports. See Bouschor v. Colvin, No. 2:15-CV-47, 2016 WL 

336099, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2016) (“[A]n ALJ may discredit a treating 

physician’s opinion, despite his or her reasonable knowledge of a patient, if that opinion 

is not supported by objective medical evidence and the ALJ provides reasons for 

rejecting that opinion.”). See also 20 C.F.R. § 1527. 

In addition, the ALJ properly rejected the report as “cursory.” (Tr. 17). Dr. 

Abufarha’s September 2014 assessment is almost entirely composed of check-the-box 

restrictions, including limitations to weight lifting, sitting, and walking capacities, 

without any explanation or justification for those restrictions. (Tr. 1037-39). Dr. 

Abufarha offered only one written sentence in support of his restrictions, stating that 

Dakroub would require environmental limitations because of a “[h]istory of kidney 

transplant, ulcerative colitis, [type two diabetes] + neuropathy.” (Tr. 1039). The other 

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function assessment largely duplicates these findings, adding only that Dakroub had 

“significant neuropathy,” along with “peripheral neuropathy from [diabetes], transplant 

medications.” (Tr. 476-78). Courts in this circuit have repeatedly found that check-thebox forms offer little insight into a claimant’s condition because they offer little support 

for the physician’s conclusions, and may be given less weight on that basis. See 

Hernandez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-1875, 2016 WL 1055828, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 

17, 2016) (“We have previously declined to give significant weight to rudimentary 

indications that lack an accompanying explanation.”); Boley v. Astrue, No. 11–10896, 

2012 WL 680393, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Feb.10, 2012); Ahee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

07–CV–12071, 2008 WL 4377652, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept.22, 2008) (“The ALJ has 

discretion to reject a medical opinion, here a form, when the opinion is not supported by 

objective medical evidence.”).

6. The ALJ Properly Refused to Apply the Medical Vocational Guidelines

Finally, Dakroub argues that the ALJ erred by not finding him disabled pursuant to 

the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”), which provide that a claimant will be found 

disabled if he is i) of advanced age (i.e. 55 or older), ii) limited to sedentary work, and iii) 

has no transferable skills, or skills which could only be transferred via “very little, if any, 

vocational adjustment.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 2, § 201.00(f). At the outset, 

Dakroub ignores that the ALJ found he was capable of “light” work, not the lesser 

category of “sedentary work,” thus even if the Grids did apply, he would not be found 

disabled on that basis.

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More importantly, the Grids are applied only if the five-step sequential analysis 

proceeds beyond Step Four. See Fetters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 160 F. App’x 462, 463 

(6th Cir. 2005) (“Use of the Grids is not required at step four of the five-step sequential 

process prescribed by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 for evaluating disabilities.”); Smith v. Sec’y 

of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 110 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he ALJ had 

substantial evidence for his conclusion that [the claimant] could perform her past relevant 

work as an assembler. The Grid is therefore inapplicable to her case.”). In this case, the 

ALJ found that Dakroub could return to his past relevant work as an owner/general 

manager, and thus did not proceed to Step Five. (Tr. 17). The ALJ thus properly found 

that Dakroub was not disabled based on her Step Four finding, and ended the sequential 

analysis at that step. 

H. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Dakroub’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) be DENIED, the Commissioner’s Motion (Doc. 15) be 

GRANTED, and that this case be AFFIRMED. 

III. REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]ithin 14 

days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve 

and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A 

party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file specific 

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objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 

140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed.2d 435 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). The 

parties are advised that making some objections, but failing to raise others, will not 

preserve all the objections a party may have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis 

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Dakroub v. 

Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to 

E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this magistrate 

judge. 

Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,” etc. 

Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to 

which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party 

may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each 

issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection 

No. 1,” “Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections 

are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.

Date: August 1, 2016 s/ Patricia T. Morris

Patricia T. Morris

United States Magistrate Judge

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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the foregoing document was electronically filed this date 

through the Court’s CM/ECF system which delivers a copy to all counsel of record.

Date: August 1, 2016 By s/Kristen Krawczyk 

 Case Manager

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