NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TOMAS PEREZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-15043

D.C. No. 

3:19-cv-00067-RCJ-CSD

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert C. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 14, 2024

San Francisco, California

Before: LEE and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,** District Judge.

Plaintiff Tomas Perez brought this action against his former employer, Barrick 

Goldstrike Mines, Inc., for wrongful interference with his rights under the Family 

and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and retaliatory discharge in violation of Nevada 

public policy. The jury returned a verdict for Barrick on both claims, finding that

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the 

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 28 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Perez had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a serious 

health condition preventing him from performing his job under the FMLA or that 

Barrick terminated his employment because he filed a worker’s compensation claim. 

Perez appeals, arguing that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s FMLA 

verdict and that the district court erred by omitting his proposed jury instructions 

regarding Nevada’s workers’ compensation code, Nevada’s “Spotters” statute, and 

the FMLA good-faith defense. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

and we affirm.1

1. Perez waived his sufficiency of the evidence challenge by failing to file 

motions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 or 59. Unitherm Food Sys., 

Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 401–04 (2006); Nitco Holding Corp. v. 

Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2007). In any event, Perez’s challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence would fail on the merits. 

“We review a jury verdict to determine whether it is supported by substantial 

evidence, and we may overturn a jury’s verdict in those rare cases where the 

evidence ‘permits only a conclusion contrary to [that] verdict.’” Barnard v. 

Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting McLean v. Runyon, 222 

1

In a concurrently filed opinion, we reject Perez’s argument that the district court 

should have instructed the jury that the only way for Barrick to challenge a doctor’s 

certification would have been to obtain recertifications or subsequent opinions from 

additional medical experts.
3 

F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended). “Substantial evidence is such 

relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the 

evidence.” Landes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 

(9th Cir. 1987).

Perez argues that the jury’s finding that he did not have a serious health 

condition is unsupported. An employee is entitled to FMLA leave if he has “a 

serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of 

the position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). A “serious health condition” is an “injury” 

that involves “continuing treatment” by a health care provider—or a period of 

incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar days. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11); 29 

C.F.R. § 825.115(a). As support for the conclusion that his injury satisfied this 

standard, Perez points to the fact that Dr. Black diagnosed him with a chest wall 

contusion and muscle spasms, prescribed him muscle relaxants that would make 

driving an underground haul truck dangerous, certified that he was to remain offwork for more than three consecutive days, and scheduled follow-up appointments. 

Yet this is not a case where there is “an absolute absence of evidence to 

support the jury’s verdict.” Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 

1195, 1212 (9th Cir. 1997). The jury considered ample evidence suggesting that 

Perez faked his injury to fraudulently obtain FMLA leave, including: an employee
4 

report that Perez was feigning a work-related injury to take time off to fix his rental 

properties; video evidence depicting Perez engaging in various activities, including 

manual labor, without visible difficulty or discomfort; Perez’s failure to explain 

himself when given the opportunity to do so; and the doctor’s testimony that his 

treatment plan was based on Perez’s subjective complaints of pain. Moreover, Dr. 

Black observed no apparent physical injuries on Perez; his X-rays were normal and 

his heart and lungs were functioning normally.

2

 On this record, there was ample 

basis for the jury to conclude that Perez lied about sustaining an injury so he could 

take off work to focus on outside business activities. The only evidence that could 

corroborate Perez’s injury was his own narrative, which the jury was free to 

disregard. Kode v. Carlson, 596 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(“Although the trial judge can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of 

witnesses, we may not.”). And for the reasons we explain in our accompanying 

opinion, the jury’s verdict is not unsupported simply because Barrick chose not to 

offer a competing medical opinion, which it was not required to do under the FMLA.

2. We review jury instructions de novo for prejudicial error. Swinton v. 

Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 2001). “[P]rejudicial error results when, 

2 Perez contends his injuries could not be faked because muscle spasms are 

involuntary conditions. But the jury could still conclude, based on the rest of the 

evidence, that Perez did not have a serious health condition that prevented him from 

performing the functions of his job.
5 

‘looking to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law was [not] 

fairly and correctly covered.’” Id. (quoting In re Asbestos Cases, 847 F.2d 523, 524 

(9th Cir. 1988)). Reversal is required unless “the error is more probably than not 

harmless.” Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The district court properly rejected Perez’s proposed instructions because they 

were not germane to the issues within the jury’s purview. Perez did not have a cause 

of action under Nevada’s workers’ compensation law, so there was no need to 

instruct the jury on it. Similarly, Perez did not assert a claim under the Nevada 

Spotters statute, nor could he have. See NRS § 613.160, subd. 2 (providing no 

private right of action). Finally, the district court ruled that Barrick could not rely 

on the FMLA’s good-faith defense, which negated any need to instruct the jury on 

it. 

Because Perez’s proposed instructions had no bearing on the elements of his 

FMLA interference or retaliatory discharge claims, they could not have changed the 

outcome of the case. See Clem, 566 F.3d at 1182. Accordingly, there was no 

prejudicial error.

AFFIRMED.