Air University

AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

General McChrystal’s 

Strategic Assessment

Evaluating the Operating Environment 

in Afghanistan in the Summer of 2009

Matthew C. Brand

Colonel, USAF

Research Paper 2011-1

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112–6026

July 2011
ii

Disclaimer

The analysis, opinions, and conclusions either expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) papers are 

occasional studies written by Air Force researchers 

at large and military defense analysts assigned to 

AFRI. The purpose of this series is to provide useful ideas and independent analysis of issues of 

current or potential importance to the nation. This 

paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Press website at 

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’S STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: 

EVALUATING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN 

AFGHANISTAN IN THE SUMMER OF 2009

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Assessment Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Early Organizational Difficulties and 

Cultural Clashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The Team Comes Together and Moves Forward . . . . 15

Initial Assessment Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

General McChrystal Takes Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . 25

General McChrystal Takes Specific Troop Numbers 

out of the Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Strategic Assessment Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

APPENDIX: “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” 

30 August 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

v

About the Author

Col Matthew Brand is currently the director of staff for the 

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. His previous assignment was the United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) 

command historian from June 2009 to June 2010, where he 

chronicled the activities of Gen Stanley McChrystal during his 

first year as the USFOR-A commander. After graduating from 

Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training in 1988, Colonel 

Brand flew approximately 3,400 hours during a variety of operational assignments as an HC-130 and MC-130P navigator 

for Air Force Special Operations Command before arriving at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 2001 to attend the US Army 

Command and General Staff College (CGSC). From 2002 

through 2007, Colonel Brand remained at Fort Leavenworth, 

first serving as an instructor at the CGSC where he taught joint 

and multinational operations, air operations, and special operations, and then as deputy commander of Detachment 1, 

505th Command and Control Wing, helping to integrate airpower into the Army Battle Command Training Program. 

Colonel Brand was then assigned to Fort Rucker, Alabama, 

from 2007 to 2009 as the LeMay Center’s operating location 

director, ensuring that the doctrinally correct application of 

airpower was presented to the US Army Aviation Center of Excellence academic programs, exercises, and war games. Colonel 

Brand earned a bachelor of science degree in business administration from California State University at Northridge in 1987, 

a master of arts degree in management from Webster University in 1997, and a master’s degree in military arts and sciences, history option, from the CGSC in 2007. He is married 

with two children.

vii

Abstract

Dissatisfied with the leadership of Army general David McKiernan and recognizing a decline in overall security in Afghanistan 

occurring since 2006, Pres. Barack Obama named Army general 

Stanley McChrystal the new commander of US and coalition 

forces in Afghanistan on 15 June 2009. General McChrystal was 

immediately tasked to conduct a 60-day initial assessment of 

the situation in Afghanistan and to recommend a new strategy 

that would stop the growth of the insurgency and assist the 

US-backed Afghan government in stabilizing the war-torn nation. 

General McChrystal had very little time to assess the exceedingly complex Afghanistan operating environment and to propose 

a new strategy to stop the Taliban momentum and ultimately 

defeat the insurgency. He quickly assembled a headquarters 

team, led by US Army colonel Kevin Owens, to analyze the complex strategic and operational environment in Afghanistan. That 

analysis, combined with his own study of the command, spurred 

McChrystal to subsequently recommend a greater resourced, 

population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. 

This narrative focuses on General McChrystal and his strategic assessment team’s analysis. It describes the assessment 

team and covers some of the early friction between the members 

of the team who had arrived with the new commander and the 

existing headquarters staff. It then dissects the Initial Assessment Working Group that relied heavily on the expertise of a 

number of civilian scholars invited to take part in the analysis. 

This study breaks down each of the additional assessment subcomponents, all of which had their own separate working group. 

The seven annexes are as follows: (A) “Military Plans,” (B) “Command and Control, and Command Relationships,” (C) “USG 

[US Government] Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan,” 

(D) “Strategic Communication,” (E) “Civilian Casualties, Collateral Damage, and Escalation of Force,” (F) “Detainee Operations, Rule of Law, and Afghan Corrections,” and (G) “Afghan 

National Security Force (ANSF) Growth and Acceleration.”

Despite difficulties along the way, General McChrystal and 

his assessment team produced a remarkable document that 

convincingly argues for a comprehensive counterinsurgency 

strategy that was eventually adopted by President Obama and 

his North Atlantic Treaty Organization counterparts in late 

2009. Attached to this narrative is an unclassified redacted 
viii

copy of the final product: “COMISAF’s [Commander, International Security Assistance Force] Initial Assessment.”
ix

Preface 

When I arrived in Kabul as the first official United States 

Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) command historian on 12 June 

2009, I received a few pieces of important advice from the command historian, US Central Command, Mr. David “Scotty” 

Dawson. Mr. Dawson told me to “be careful not to become the 

‘special project’ officer for the command staff.” He continued, 

“Don’t get me wrong; you’ve got to be a team player, but you are 

there for an important reason, so that we can finally properly 

organize the history effort for this critically important campaign.” Yet, less than a week later, I was told by the USFOR-A 

chief of staff that the deputy command general for support, Maj 

Gen John Macdonald, US Army, wanted me to be the primary 

USFOR-A headquarters staff representative for the “60-day assessment” that the new commander, Gen Stanley McChrystal, 

was charged with conducting. This assessment was going to be 

General McChrystal’s number one priority for the first two 

months of his command. Although this was certainly a “special 

project” that would likely fall into the category that Mr. Dawson 

cautioned against, it was also a golden opportunity for the new 

historian to capture this story from the inside. It was the start 

of a journey that would lead to this narrative of the historic 

strategic assessment, an analysis that charted the way-ahead 

for US and coalition forces in Afghanistan as they battled a 

growing insurgency which was threatening the precarious Afghan government. 

Key to understanding how the strategic assessment was conducted and my role in monitoring its progress is how the overall command structure works. The command relationships in 

Afghanistan for US and coalition forces are complicated because of the unique nature of international involvement in Afghanistan since 2001. The International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) headquarters is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led organization with more than 44 contributing 

nations. Although its initial charter and mission were somewhat limited, it now essentially runs the tactical war fight 

across Afghanistan. USFOR-A began standing up in late 2008, 

becoming officially operational in early 2009, shortly after Pres. 

Barack Obama ordered an additional 21,000 forces to Afghanistan. This new US headquarters took over the Title 10 support 

role for US forces in Afghanistan from the 101st Airborne Divi-
x

sion, the division responsible for Regional Command-East in the 

early months of 2009. 

As the strategic assessment began, the Headquarters USFOR-A 

staff numbered approximately 350 personnel, most of whom 

lived and worked at the New Kabul Compound (NKC) under the 

day-to-day control of General Macdonald. General McChrystal 

was the dual-hatted commander of both ISAF and USFOR-A 

but lived and worked at the ISAF headquarters compound and 

spent 99 percent of his time and energy running his operational command, delegating all but key decisions for USFOR-A 

to General Macdonald. General McChrystal was ordered to conduct the strategic assessment by the US secretary of defense, 

Robert Gates, and then later also tasked identically by his ISAF 

chain of command through NATO leadership at Brussels, Belgium. The assessment was conducted at Headquarters ISAF, 

led primarily by US officers on the ISAF staff. However, Headquarters USFOR-A had officers in almost all of the strategic 

assessment working groups, and I was responsible for monitoring 

the working groups and reporting back daily to General Macdonald at NKC on the progress of the strategic assessment and 

its effect on USFOR-A interests. Thus, this “fly on the wall” perspective allowed me to observe many of the key aspects of the 

strategic assessment and also allowed access to critical assessment personnel for interviews in this narrative.

The primary sources for this narrative are interviews with the 

key participants, the author’s personal notes, and the assessment, entitled “COMISAF’s [commander of the (US-led) International Security Assistance Force] Initial Assessment,” which 

was submitted on 30 August 2009 and is included as the sole 

attachment to this narrative. Leading participants in the strategic assessment tell the story of this incredibly historic period, 

often in their own words. Although the strategic assessment 

was developed with input from many staff officers, advisors, 

and outside experts, General McChrystal took the assessment 

and made it his own. He was the final arbitrator to the recommendations that formed the new recommended counterinsurgency strategy for US and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The 

strategic assessment was his assessment, and General 

McChrystal would lead the effort to stop the insurgent momentum and regain the initiative for US, coalition, and Afghan 

forces. Only time will tell if he was successful. 
xi

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all of the participants that I interviewed 

for this project for candidly sharing their experiences with me 

and allowing me to use some of their quotes in this paper. I 

would like to particularly single out Gen Stanley McChrystal 

for his leadership during the period of the strategic assessment 

and for allowing the release of this remarkable story while the 

major counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan are still ongoing. I would also like to thank US Army colonels Kevin 

Owens, Christopher Kolenda, and Wayne Grigsby and US 

Marine Corps colonel James McGrath for honestly sharing all 

the lessons learned from this historic period, both good and 

bad, to more completely tell the story of the strategic assessment. Finally, I would like to thank Lt Col Greg McCarthy, US 

Marine Corps, the deputy historian during my tenure at United 

States Forces-Afghanistan, for assisting with the initial editing 

process for this piece and for taking many of the command historian duties after his arrival, freeing me up to complete my 

writing projects.

1

General McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment 

Evaluating the Operating Environment in 

Afghanistan in the Summer of 2009

Introduction

By the summer of 2009, Afghanistan had become the main 

foreign policy effort of the United States. With the state of affairs there deteriorating, Pres. Barack Obama replaced Gen 

David McKiernan with Gen Stanley McChrystal on 15 June 

2009. Obama requested that US defense secretary Robert 

Gates task the new International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) commander with conducting a 60-day strategic assessment of the situation in order to craft a successful strategy to 

turn the war around. The assessment had a somewhat turbulent start due to a variety of factors involved with the new commander and turmoil created with a new team replacing some of 

the previous staff at ISAF headquarters (HQ) in Afghanistan. It 

also had a delayed turn-in because of the Afghan presidential 

election. However, despite these problems, the assessment successfully captured the incredibly complex environment in Afghanistan, breaking it down into understandable pieces, and 

presented a strategy for regaining momentum and eventually 

defeating the insurgency. 

This paper primarily focuses on the process involved with 

creating the final assessment report over its actual content. In 

other words, how did General McChrystal and his staff go about 

organizing and completing the assessment? The assessment 

was an evolving document, but after a couple of weeks into the 

analysis, it had settled into a relatively fixed structure. An initial assessment section includes the commander’s summary 

and the overarching strategic assessment and is followed by 

several annexes. The annexes are comprised of these subject 

areas: (A) “Military Plans,” (B) “Command and Control [C2], and 

Command Relationships,” (C) “USG [US Government] Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan,” (D) “Strategic Communication [StratCom],” (E) “Civilian Casualties, Collateral Damage, 

and Escalation of Force,” (F) “Detainee Operations, Rule of Law, 
2

and Afghan Corrections,” and (G) “Afghan National Security 

Force (ANSF) Growth and Acceleration.”

The name of the assessment changed several times throughout the evolution of the analysis. First, it was called the “60-day 

assessment.” Then, when the team realized that the actual 

assessing would occur in far fewer than 60 days (prior to the 

decision to delay the turn-in), it was relabeled the “strategic assessment,” which is what the ISAF and United States ForcesAfghanistan (USFOR-A) staff knew it as for most of the process. 

However, when the assessment was released on 30 August 2009, 

the subject title on the cover letter from McChrystal to Secretary 

Gates was “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment.” This is the title that 

is used hereafter to refer to the report that McChrystal turned 

into the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the secretary of defense (SecDef), and the president. To avoid confusing 

the name of the overall assessment with the initial assessment 

section that is its core, the overall effort is referred to as the 

strategic assessment, just as it was by the staff throughout the 

process. 

The Tasking

Prior to his arrival in Afghanistan, General McChrystal received verbal guidance to conduct this assessment directly from 

Secretary Gates. Ironically, it was not until after the assessment had begun that the CJCS (or “chairman”), through Central Command (CENTCOM), then created the written order for 

General McChrystal, acting in his USFOR-A command capacity, to proceed. This written order was dated 26 June 2009. It is 

slightly unusual for a combat organization of this size to begin 

such a large undertaking as the strategic assessment without a 

formal tasking. However, in this case, since General McChrystal 

was handpicked by Secretary Gates based on the recommendation of Adm Michael Mullen, the CJCS, the defense secretary had 

provided his own verbal guidance directly to his new commanderselect prior to his arrival and assumption of command. Secretary 

Gates told General McChrystal, “Go take 60 days, do an assessment, and tell me what you need.” General McChrystal took 

this to mean that after the assessment was completed, whatever resources he thought he needed, if any, would then be re-
3

quested. General McChrystal also realized that the assessment 

should be one effort for both the United States and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), so he told NATO leadership back in Europe, “You ought to task me to do this—that 

way I’ll do one product for both groups.”1 Thus, both CENTCOM and NATO provided written guidance to do the strategic 

assessment after the early stages of the assessment had already started. This created a somewhat awkward situation in 

that the CJCS and CENTCOM staffs contacted the USFOR-A 

HQ staff asking for what was being assessed so they could then 

provide written tasking for these assessed areas. 

The Team

First and foremost, General McChrystal was the leader of the 

strategic assessment. His participation is detailed later, but the 

strategic assessment was his assessment. He had dozens of 

members of his staff working on this analysis, but he put his 

stamp on the final product through countless changes in its 

multiple iterations prior to completion. General McChrystal 

brought in several of his own military advisors to become part of 

his Strategic Advisory Group (SAG), led by Army colonels Kevin 

Owens and Christopher Kolenda and Navy commander Jeffrey 

Eggers. Rear Adm Gregory Smith was also sent out to join the 

team from CENTCOM, where he was Gen David Petraeus’s public affairs officer. Admiral Smith was previously sent to Iraq in 

2007 by Admiral Mullen, who was then chief of naval operations, 

for a “few weeks” to see if he could help General Petraeus, then 

the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commander, put together 

his winning counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. The admiral 

ended up staying on at MNF-I for an entire year. The situation 

repeated itself in the summer of 2009. Admiral Smith was preparing for retirement when Admiral Mullen, now the CJCS, 

asked him to instead go to Afghanistan and be General 

McChrystal’s communication director. Admiral Smith, a career 

Navy public affairs officer, ended up leading the strategic assessment’s Strategic Communication Working Group. 

Colonel Owens, a career infantry officer, had worked in several organizations with General McChrystal throughout his career, including the 75th Ranger Regiment and Joint Special 
4

Operations Command, although he had never previously 

worked directly for him. He commanded a battalion in 2002 

and a brigade in 2005–6 in Afghanistan. He was a fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations in New York prior to being rushed 

to theater to eventually take charge of General McChrystal’s 

SAG. Colonel Owens soon became General McChrystal’s lead 

coordinator organizing the assessment process. Colonel Kolenda served as battalion commander in Kunar, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, from May 2007 to August 2008. In January 

2009, he helped write the incoming Obama administration’s 

strategy review, as well as other strategy pieces, in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD). General McChrystal, as the 

director of the Joint Staff, became familiar with Colonel Kolenda’s work at the OSD and asked him to come to Afghanistan 

as one of his special advisors. Colonel Kolenda led the overall 

initial assessment that is the main analysis of the strategic assessment. Commander Eggers had worked with General 

McChrystal previously and was one of the major editors of the 

written product. 

Lt Gen David Rodriguez was selected to lead the ISAF Joint 

Command (IJC), and his official title during the IJC stand-up 

period was the USFOR-A deputy commanding general. He and 

General McChrystal had a deep relationship that went back 

decades, and his perspective influenced many aspects of the 

assessment. General McChrystal believed that the fact that 

both he and General Rodriguez were sent to Afghanistan together was no coincidence. He said, 

I’ve known General Rodriguez for 37 years. We were cadets at West 

Point together. We were company commanders together next door to 

each other in the Rangers. My wife is the godmother of one of his kids. 

We’ve been best friends for years. We were here in Afghanistan together 

when he commanded the 82nd and I had some of the special operations 

forces. We had been at the Pentagon and worked together every day. We 

were very close friends. I believe that the secretary of defense and the 

chairman picked us together. One, they’d seen us operate. But they also 

knew the relationship we had. I think that was part of their calculus.2

Previously, General Rodriguez spent more than a year as the 

US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) commander when he 

deployed with his division, the 82nd Airborne, in February 

2007. General Rodriguez came with three handpicked Army 
5

colonels to help with the stand-up of the IJC. Army colonel 

Clarence Chinn was the acting chief of staff for the US team 

standing up the IJC. Army colonel Patrick Dedham, who would 

eventually become the IJC CJ6 (responsible for providing NATO 

information systems and communications in Afghanistan to 

support the ISAF mission), was the point man for the IJC construction efforts at North Kabul International Airport (KAIA). 

Army colonel Wayne Grigsby, a career infantryman who had 

served 37 months in Iraq since 2003, was working on the Joint 

Staff when General Rodriguez asked him to help stand up the 

IJC and to stay on and serve on the IJC staff when it was to 

become operational in October. Colonel Chinn’s role in the 

strategic assessment was limited since he was leading the effort to stand up the IJC. Colonel Grigsby, however, had a more 

involved role in the assessment as an early key player in the 

Command and Control Working Group. 

Besides the players who arrived with the new commander, 

several personnel already in theater or recently arrived coincidental to the change in USFOR-A leadership had key roles in the 

assessment. Marine Corps colonel James McGrath, ISAF’s CJ5 

Plans Directorate deputy director, essentially led the Campaign 

Plan and the C2 Working Groups and wrote both working group 

annexes. McGrath, a career infantryman as well as a plans officer, graduated from the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. He had three tours in Iraq, but this was his first tour in 

Afghanistan. He was previously the lead planner for Combined 

Joint Task Force (JTF)-Horn of Africa. Working hand in hand with 

Colonel McGrath was Royal Air Force (RAF) group captain Jules 

Eaton, who led the efforts to complete the revision of the current 

ISAF operations order that was in place when General McChrystal took command. USFOR-A J5 director, Col Steven Briggs, US 

Army, led the US government’s Integrated Civil-Military (Civ-Mil) 

Campaign Plan Working Group. The US government had begun 

an integrated campaign plan process prior to General McChrystal’s arrival, and Colonel Briggs had been the USFOR-A lead representative. Thus, when the Strategic Assessment Civ-Mil Working Group began, Briggs was the obvious choice to become 

McChrystal’s lead on this US-focused effort. 

US Army colonel Raymond “Kent” Hann, the USFOR-A J7 

(Operational Plans and Force Development) director, was ini-
6

tially a member of only the Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS), Collateral Damage, and Escalation of Force Strategic Assessment 

Working Group. However, as time went on, because of some difficult issues within the group, Colonel Hann joined French air 

force colonel Olivier Bertrand as the group’s informal coleader. 

Colonel Hann was voluntarily recalled from retirement to serve 

in Afghanistan and saw combat experience in Vietnam, helping 

advise a battalion of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. One 

of the training areas Colonel Hann was responsible for as the J7 

was training US forces in the compliance of General McChrystal’s 1 July tactical directive designed to minimize CIVCAS and 

collateral damage. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel Rhett 

Jeppson, the USFOR-A deputy J3 (Operations Directorate), was 

already working with a detainee operations study group led by 

Army major general Douglas Stone when the strategic assessment began with its own Detainee Operations Working Group. 

He became the working group lead, although he primarily acted 

as a conduit through which information from his group funneled into General McChrystal’s working group. Finally, although these were the primary military actors involved with 

leading the assessment, many other staff members at both ISAF 

and USFOR-A HQ worked many long hours with these working 

group leaders to successfully complete the assessment. 

The team leads referred to are the colonels mentioned in 

charge of the various working groups. While flag officers were 

the official leads of most working groups, they did not participate to any great extent in the day-to-day work on the assessment. They typically were periodically back-briefed on the respective working group’s progress and provided feedback. 

General McChrystal generally gave guidance directly to the 

colonel leads during in-progress reviews or roundtable feedback sessions. The primary exception to this rule was Admiral 

Smith, who was much more involved with the daily progression 

of the StratCom Working Group. The strategic assessment coincided with Admiral Smith’s own internal assessment and restructuring of ISAF’s StratCom Directorate.

In addition to the military members working the strategic assessment, General McChrystal brought in several civilian experts to assist Colonel Kolenda with the initial assessment portion. These experts were from a variety of think tanks from the 
7

United States and Europe and toured the country with Colonel 

Kolenda, getting updates from all of the regional commands. 

These pundits included Fred Kagan, an American resident 

scholar from the American Enterprise Institute, and his wife, 

Kimberly Kagan, president of the Institute for the Study of War. 

Also on the team were Dr. Stephen Biddle, senior fellow for defense policy for the Council on Foreign Relations, and Anthony 

Cordesman, the chair in strategy for the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. Additionally, there were Catherine 

Dale from the Congressional Research Service and Andrew 

Exum from the Center for a New American Security. Terry Kelly 

from the RAND Corporation, Whitney Kassel from the OSD, 

and Jeremy Shapiro from the Brookings Institution were also 

part of the group. Lt Col Aaron Prupas, US Air Force, from the 

CENTCOM Commander’s Initiative Group, also participated. 

Finally, adding an international flavor, Etienne de Durand from 

France and Luis Peral from Spain took part. 

The Assessment Begins

The assessment began amid the tumultuous first few days of 

General McChrystal’s arrival and assumption of command of 

ISAF and USFOR-A in June 2009. Starting a project of this 

magnitude, while at the same time getting familiar with his new 

staff and command environment, was a huge undertaking for 

the new commander. Among the multitude of important tasks 

General McChrystal undertook in those early days was meeting 

with key government players, both Afghani and American, in 

Kabul. These included Afghan president Hamid Karzai and 

members of his cabinet, along with US ambassador Karl Eikenberry and key embassy staff. He also had to visit all of the regional commands (RC) and meet the RC commanders. Additionally, he received numerous briefings from the different ISAF and 

USFOR-A staff sections to become as familiar as possible, as 

rapidly as he could, with all aspects of his new dual-hatted command. As a result of this “fire hose” of critical engagement and 

in-depth theater indoctrination, General McChrystal simply did 

not have the time to spend getting into the early mechanical 

details of the strategic assessment. Thus, early on, he was 

forced to provide just the basic strategic guidance to his key 
8

staff members and give them room to accomplish the task. 

However, perhaps based on the frenetic early pace of the new 

commander, none of the individual staff members were told 

that this overall assessment was theirs to run. 

Army colonel Skip Davis, the outgoing leader of the SAG who 

was scheduled to depart theater in July, was told to gather the 

team of civilian think-tank scholars to put together the strategic assessment working groups based on the subject areas that 

General McChrystal was to examine. However, with his impending redeployment looming within weeks, which was well 

prior to the assessment’s completion, Colonel Davis was not 

the right choice to be the primary officer in charge to lead the 

assessment team in its day-to-day tactical progression from 

cradle to grave. Colonel Davis seemed to recognize this, as he 

was from the outgoing General McKiernan team and not one of 

the new advisors brought in by General McChrystal, Secretary 

Gates, or Admiral Mullen. Without an appointed assessment 

process leader and with Colonel Davis unable to see the assessment through to the end, somebody needed to step in and 

fill the void. 

Colonel Owens and Colonel Kolenda arrived together into 

North KAIA from Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan in the early 

morning hours of 12 June in the back of a C-130 packed with 

Georgia National Guard Soldiers. The C-130 cargo compartment carried a couple of colonels working the high-end strategic and operational changes that would determine the future of 

the American military involvement in Afghanistan, sitting next 

to some of the very citizen-soldiers who would begin to carry 

out this strategy on the tactical end of the spear. Both Colonel 

Owens and Colonel Kolenda had been asked on short notice to 

come over and join General McChrystal’s team. Colonel Kolenda recalled, “I knew that General McChrystal had been directed to do an assessment, and I assumed those of us being 

brought in were going to be a part of it, but beyond that, I 

wasn’t sure what my exact role would be.” He added, “Shortly 

after arriving, I got with Skip Davis, and we began to discuss 

how we would frame the assessment and what kind of key 

chapters we needed to look at.”3

At the time, Davis and Kolenda knew that there would be an 

assessment of the civ-mil as well as the military campaign 
9

plans, but as Colonel Kolenda put it, “there wasn’t a planned 

overall assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and what 

the appropriate implementation strategy recommendations 

would be as we implemented the Obama administration 

strategy review.”4 The two decided to add what became the first 

main section of the report—the initial assessment, an analysis 

of the strategic environment. Ultimately, the staff referred to 

the entire process as the strategic assessment as the project 

progressed through the summer, capturing the essence of the 

colonels’ recommendation. The initial assessment became the 

heart of the overall assessment. Special subject areas, such as 

the civ-mil campaign and the military plans review, would become annexes to the initial assessment in the final version sent 

to the president. Based on his previous experience as a battalion commander in Afghanistan, along with his work on the 

Obama strategy review and several pieces he wrote on the 

Taliban and the environment in Afghanistan, Colonel Kolenda 

was given the lead of the Initial Assessment Working Group.

Colonel Owens arrived with roughly the same lack of clarity 

as Colonel Kolenda on what his exact role would be on General 

McChrystal’s team, beyond being one of several handpicked 

advisors. He said, “I came over here with unspecified duties. 

Really, we all rushed over here together, and, frankly, we said, 

‘we’ll figure it out when we get there.’ ”5 After a short time, he 

recognized that Colonel Davis was on the way out and somebody needed to grab the reins. Colonel Owens described it well:

The Strategic Advisory Group was led by Skip Davis, and he was out of 

here by late July. . . . I was working short-term issues for the commander when this was unfolding, and it was clear to me that Skip Davis 

was on his way out, and no one was grabbing it. So I said, “Let me take 

this thing on,” and he [Davis] was glad to give it to me. General McChrystal was told about it, but he didn’t really approve it, nor did he need to. 

I was comfortable moving into the role, and he needed someone to take 

it and get on with it. Prior to that, it was Skip Davis’s initiative. He contacted the pundits. He assigned OPRs [office of primary responsibility] 

for the working groups.6

The assessment now had two of its key players in place in 

Colonels Owens and Kolenda, and soon others would emerge. 

There was no time to waste. General McChrystal had been 

given 60 total days to write the assessment. Knowing that the 
10

document would have to go through numerous edits and reviews up through the chain of command, the entire planning 

team knew that it really only had about 45 days to turn in a 

final draft, and many of those days had already been burned 

since the SecDef had given the verbal order. This rapid time 

line would stress the ISAF HQ staff to work at a tempo that was 

heretofore not seen by members who had been there during the 

previous commander’s tenure. Colonel McGrath described the 

tempo of the CJ5 staff working in the various assessment working groups, “The plan was very fast . . . from flash to bang. We 

basically locked ourselves in a room until we were done.”7 Adding to the stress of the time line was the sheer enormity of the 

task. As Colonel Owens put it, “My personal level of anxiety 

was high from the beginning. The magnitude of the task . . . it’s 

going to chart where we’re going to go over the years. It’s being 

read by every head of state and everyone who can get their 

hands on it. I’m not trying to overdramatize it, but it was a very 

important document.”8

Early Organizational 

Difficulties and Cultural Clashes

With only a few short weeks to complete the strategic assessment draft, get it to General McChrystal and the editors, and 

move it through the briefing trail and chain of command, several layers of team building and group bonding had to quickly 

occur, or the whole project might have floundered. First, there 

was the issue of a new commander and staff arriving after the 

previous commander was essentially relieved. The sacking of 

an operational commander by US leadership during a large 

conflict, although not unheard of, is highly uncommon in modern warfare. Thus, when General McKiernan was asked to step 

down, some of his staff members likely had the perception that 

they, too, were part of the overall failures that led to the change 

of commanders. Moreover, it was a US decision to relieve General McKiernan, and in his place came another US general with 

his own set of handpicked advisors who were coming into theater to assess what was going wrong and determine how it 

could be fixed. By all accounts, General McKiernan was well 
11

liked by his staff. A natural reaction from the original staff 

might have been to be somewhat defensive of its former commander and his policies and perhaps resentful of this new advisory team coming to the headquarters to “fix” everything. 

General McChrystal, who professionally respected General 

McKiernan, said of him personally that “he could not have been 

a better friend.” 

On the difficulty of having to come to Afghanistan with his 

advisors after General McKiernan’s firing, General McChrystal 

added, “When I came over here, there was some scar tissue in 

the force—in the headquarters particularly—but also in the 

force. Maybe [there was] some resentment in the change [due 

to] personal loyalty, and that’s always going to happen.”9

Colonel Owens, too, immediately recognized this awkward 

transition and its potentially hazardous consequences, stating 

that “the ‘old team’ felt like it was part of the problem. There 

was also this perception that that this ‘A team’ of handpicked 

guys was here to take over. I’ve never considered myself a ‘handpicked’ guy. Plus, it was a US-only team. This created a palpable resentment when we came on board, and, frankly, we probably reinforced it at times, whether consciously or otherwise.”10

Colonel Grigsby was also very well aware of the potential 

backlash from the holdover staff, saying,

I was concerned about it. . . . There were some good things going on 

here, and there were a lot of members from a lot of nations that were 

busting their butts. The first day I walked into USFOR-A, I had a colonel 

come up to me and say, “Who got fired? Whose place are you taking?” I 

said, “Hey, look, I just came in here to row like the rest of you and be 

part of the team.” No one was trying to come in here and say “I, me, and 

my.” No. It’s “we, ours, and us.” It was a big deal though.11

Like Colonel Owens, Colonel Grigsby also felt the new team 

members did, whether consciously or not, exacerbate the 

situation.12

Adding to the frustration of General McKiernan’s staff adjusting to the new command team was the sense that many of 

the COIN principles and ideas that were being presented as 

new were actually part of General McKiernan’s previous guidance. General McKiernan did ask for more resources several 

times, but with Iraq still drawing the overwhelming attention of 

US political and military leadership, he was mostly unsuccess-
12

ful until President Obama approved the additional 21,000 new 

forces in February 2009. McKiernan was relieved before most 

of these forces had arrived and could be integrated into the 

counterinsurgency effort. General McChrystal, while acknowledging he had compassion for General McKiernan and the way 

in which he was relieved, also saw opportunity knocking. He 

stated,

There were lots of things that General McKiernan wanted to do that he 

couldn’t get done because he couldn’t get resources, couldn’t get people’s attention. The decision by the secretary of defense to make that 

change actually opened up opportunities for me that could not have 

existed for General McKiernan. Just the nature of doing that, painful 

though it was, sent a message to everybody across the coalition, the 

Afghans, and others about how serious the US was. I think it enabled 

me to have opportunities for me to push a few things that I don’t think 

would have been possible otherwise. So in a perverse way, I benefited 

from the severity of the way that was handled, although you know he’s 

a fellow Soldier, and I definitely feel for him.13

One example of the tension between the “old” ISAF headquarters staff and the new one came during one large strategic 

assessment in-progress review. The issue of civilian casualties 

was being discussed, and a set of potential recommendations 

was suggested. The ISAF deputy commander (DCOM), British 

Royal Marine lieutenant general Jim Dutton, who was also 

General McKiernan’s deputy, said in a mildly irritated tone, 

“You know, these are not new ideas. We actually put out guidance to this effect several months ago.”14 This was awkward for 

several reasons. First, it demonstrated some of that defensiveness and resentfulness discussed above, but it was also true. 

General McKiernan did put out his own tactical directive that, 

in principle, was very similar to the one issued by General 

McChrystal on 1 July. However, by making one point in defense 

of the old boss, the DCOM inadvertently lent credence to the 

apparent conclusion that there were serious C2 problems at 

ISAF under General McKiernan, because after his directive 

there had been no reduction of CIVCAS events. In fact, these 

events actually increased, with some garnering massive negative media coverage toward the coalition. This was an example 

of guidance being put out at the ISAF HQ that was not getting 

effectively implemented down to the platoon and squad levels 
13

or, alternatively, was being largely ignored with apparently no 

repercussions from above. 

Another big issue that had to be reconciled by the staff as it 

began the assessment was the differences in approach and 

tempo between the US and the NATO planners. Many of the US 

officers had assisted in implementing successful COIN strategy 

in Iraq based on the Army and Marine Corps COIN doctrine 

outlined in Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. The 

principles in 3-24 had become the US “bible” on defeating a 

counterinsurgency, whereas NATO did not even have a COIN 

doctrine. These nations were still operating under a security, 

stability, and reconstruction framework. US assessment planners realized that because Iraq and Afghanistan were different, 

a cookie-cutter strategy could not be applied from one to the 

other. However, the overarching COIN principles that many of 

these officers had used in Iraq were viewed as flexible enough 

to be adapted successfully in Afghanistan. But COIN is not 

simply a stability operation, and these US planners had to convince NATO’s planners and leadership in Europe as well that 

this was no longer simply a stability operation, if it ever was, 

but instead was a fight against insurgents. Colonel McGrath 

put it this way:

“Defeat” scared the hell out of NATO. Defeat was not defined in their 

doctrine. We had to explain what that meant to them. There were some 

national frictions, but Brunssum [NATO joint force command responsible for ISAF] had to approve it. They had 101 issues with it, but we 

stood firm on the key principles. We were not going to take out our lines 

of operation that say “neutralize malign actors and foreign fighters and 

narco traffickers.” It was a tall order to get our NATO brothers to understand that we’re going to call a spade a spade and, frankly, be very 

American about it. They might say, “It smells foul,” whereas we’ll just 

say, “It smells like [expletive].” That was an affront to the NATO sensibilities, but it helped us get through this faster.15

In addition to the differences in strategic approach just described, there was also a perception that the NATO operational 

tempo was not on par with what US officers coming out of Iraq 

were used to. This was likely related to the issue previously 

described regarding performing stability ops versus fighting a 

war against insurgent foes. Perhaps, when doing stability ops, 

one could operate at a more “normal” peacetime pace, but fight-
14

ing a counterinsurgency requires greater urgency. To be fair, it 

is unjust to generalize motives and actions of an alliance and 

each individual nation and officer. Certainly the United Kingdom, for example, stood side by side with the United States in 

Iraq for more than five years. Arguably, most UK officers wholly 

bought into the American view on COIN operations and were 

more accustomed to the up-tempo pace. That said, the differences the Americans perceived between the United States and 

NATO—whether accurate or otherwise—existed. Colonel McGrath once again provided a straightforward observation on 

this issue: “There was a degree of friction. The staff was used to 

a NATO time line: 10 o’clock tea . . . we’ll follow the NATO standard; nice measured pace, etc. This was different. It was along 

the US ‘fast food’ pace. ‘We want it now. Let’s get it done. We’re 

going to work like dogs.’ That’s not the way NATO operates.”16

Thus, a culture shift had to take place at ISAF HQ, and it 

was not just the US coalition partners who had to make it. The 

US officers from General McKiernan’s command also were 

forced to shift into high gear to meet the new standard required 

by General McChrystal, his new team, and the short time line 

of the strategic assessment. The caveat should be made that 

there were obviously individual officers under General McKiernan, along with the general himself, who worked extremely 

hard to accomplish the ISAF mission. However, there is little 

doubt that the overall organization had to shift dramatically to 

meet the increasing operational tempo brought about by the 

change of leadership and tasking for a 60-day assessment. All 

of this was fittingly summed up by Colonel McGrath, who was 

relatively new but not part of the new team brought in by General McChrystal.

It definitely did not begin in the most positive manner. . . . All these 

colonels and special operators showed up and basically said “your plan 

is broken.” It wasn’t communicated in the optimum way. I’ll caveat that 

by saying that at the same time it was a good thing because what it did 

was it shook up the malaise that I think this headquarters was in. . . . 

It had some ugliness to it, but some goodness as well because it reinvigorated the staff. No, it wasn’t going to be business as usual. We just 

changed US commanders and not much else is supposed to change? 

No! We came not to lose, but to win this thing!17
15

The Team Comes Together and Moves Forward

Notwithstanding all the team and organizational bonding issues that surfaced as the strategic assessment began, there 

was no time for a pity party or a series of “group therapy” sessions. As usually occurs with military professionals, once team 

members move toward a common purpose under steady leadership, personal differences and hurt feelings are put aside and 

team bonding is the typical result. The frenetic pace of the assessment process simply overrode these other issues. That is 

not to say the underlying issues did not affect the early days of 

the assessment, but there was simply no time to waste looking 

backward and attempting to resolve early difficulties. General 

McChrystal’s US officers did their best to be tactful and not 

antagonistic toward their new ISAF teammates and, for the 

most part, were successful. Similarly, most holdover ISAF 

members did their best to hide any disappointment or resentment and worked with the fervor of their new arrivals. To be 

frank, it was either jump on board or get out of the way because the train was moving, and it was not going to stop for 

stragglers. 

Shortly after he assumed command on 15 June, General 

McChrystal met with his core advisors, including Colonels 

Chris Kolenda and Skip Davis, and the organizational structure of the strategic assessment was ironed out. An overall initial assessment narrative section would be followed by the special subject chapters, or annexes. At this point, Colonel Davis 

notified key ISAF and USFOR-A staff what the working groups 

would be and the early recommended composition. Some working group members were obvious. For example, the Military 

Plans Working Group would primarily be comprised of ISAF 

CJ5 planners, some CJ35 (current operations plans section) 

planners, and USFOR-A J5 (plans) Directorate representatives. 

These same staff sections also had natural tie-ins to the C2 

Working Group. The Civ-Mil Campaign Working Group was immediately populated primarily by members of the already ongoing 

USG Civ-Mil Campaign Plan. Where the connections were not 

so obvious, the SAG recommended certain personnel or staff 

functional areas attend certain groups. Additionally, once the 

working group subject areas were communicated across the 
16

ISAF and USFOR-A staff directorates, certain officers saw a role 

for themselves in the effort and simply signed themselves onto 

the team. As mentioned, the working groups were given official 

flag officer leaders, most of whom were more part-time figureheads providing overarching direction and guidance rather 

than full-time participants. Admiral Smith, however, made it 

his top priority to assess the overall strategic communication 

effort and to attempt to fix what he saw early on as fundamental flaws in ISAF’s communication process. 

On 20 June, five days after General McChrystal assumed 

command, Colonel Owens called a meeting to finalize the logistical arrangements for picking up, housing, and transporting 

the initial assessment team of civilian scholars, most of whom 

would be arriving over the next few days. At this meeting, the 

schedule of the Initial Assessment Working Group was mapped 

out, with Colonel Kolenda leading members on a whirlwind 

theaterwide tour, interrupted by stops back at ISAF for periodic 

in-progress review (IPR) updates to General McChrystal every 

week or so. By 26 June, most of the outside scholars had arrived and, along with the rest of the strategic assessment working group members, were ready to get a formal inbrief by General McChrystal and Colonel Owens and a campaign plan brief 

by RAF group captain Jules Eaton. In the 11 days since the arrival of General McChrystal, all the working group teams were 

organized, had begun the team bonding challenges already 

mentioned, had been given a rapid time line to work with, and 

were off to the races. 

Only 11 days had passed from General McChrystal’s assumption of command to the first official strategic assessment

kickoff meeting on 26 June. This was a rapid spin-up—given 

all the factors involved with the new commander and staff, as 

well as daunting challenges—and it came at a cost. The 60-day 

clock had already been ticking for these 11 days, which theoretically should have left 49 days for the assessment. However, 

the time line ran from assumption of command to the assessment’s planned final turn-in to the SecDef. In reality, time 

would have to be allocated not only to first brief General Petraeus at CENTCOM, where the assessment might require his 

editing, but also for a likely review by the CJCS and potential 

others at the Pentagon prior to the deadline. More time would 
17

be needed for General McChrystal’s editing and review after the 

report’s initial turn-in and prior to it being taken to CENTCOM. 

With all of these back-end time constraints considered, Colonel 

Owens, in consultation with General McChrystal and the rest of 

the SAG, mapped out a rough strategic assessment time line 

from the 26 June meeting. The working groups would take roughly 

three weeks to assess and one week to write, or approximately 

30 days total. When added to the initial 11 days already passed, 

this left approximately 19 days for multiple edits, if necessary; 

commander review; and then taking the assessment up the 

chain of command for briefing, discussion, and potential revisions. Thus, in essence, the 60-day assessment had in reality 

been boiled down to a 30-day assessment.18 Everyone involved 

clearly recognized that time was of the essence.

Initial Assessment Working Group

The Initial Assessment Working Group officially kicked off 

with the 26 June inbrief. The schedule would be extremely busy 

for this group because it had to become intimately familiar with 

the current situation. Although the entire group had written 

and covered the situation in-country to one extent or another, 

no one was familiar with the midsummer 2009 situation for all 

regions of the country. The group’s currency-building started at 

the initial meeting, where it received a detailed brief of the campaign plan, developed by the CJ5 staff under General McKiernan a few months earlier. The group also received briefings on 

ISAF’s current stability operations plan as well as a current intelligence laydown, along with other key staff briefings. Group 

members took tours of each of the RCs as well, where they spent 

24–48 hours getting briefings from the RC commanders and key 

staff, as well as meeting with one or two brigade combat team 

and provincial reconstruction team commanders. Time permitting, they talked with government officials and local leaders. 

But time was very short. After each RC visit, group members 

would fly back to ISAF HQ in Kabul to coalesce, take and compare notes, discuss what they observed, and sometimes attend 

one of the scheduled IPRs to General McChrystal. 

The Initial Assessment Working Group basically consisted of 

Colonel Kolenda and the civilian scholars, plus a representa-
18

tive from the OSD and CENTCOM. General McChrystal, who 

would ultimately put his own stamp on the assessment, was 

making his own battlefield circulation, becoming familiar with 

his new command and the current situation in the country 

while the initial assessment team made its rounds. According 

to Colonel Kolenda, the civilians represented a “very broad 

spectrum of perspectives.”19 When asked if he was the primary 

military representative in the overall assessment working 

group, Colonel Kolenda said that he was, but added,

[Col] Dino Pick worked a lot of the arrangements to get us from point A 

to point B, and he worked all the life support for the team, which was 

absolutely invaluable. Once we completed the draft, [Cdr] Jeff Eggers 

took over the editing piece of it. Plus, we would have briefings and interact with the rest of the staff, with UNAMA [United Nations Assistance 

Mission in Afghanistan], with the Afghan government, and with local 

elders and NGOs [nongovernmental organization] who would give us 

their perspectives on a variety of issues. So we touched just about every 

demographic and population group: military, international, and political.20

Although Colonels Pick and Kolenda felt that the civilian 

scholars came in with some very diverse perspectives, they 

ended up forming a rough consensus on the way forward in 

Afghanistan. Colonel Owens also noted that the group members all seemed to agree on their final recommendations, which 

led him to a different perspective. He concluded that “the pundits could have been more diverse in thought; a better mix of 

opinion makers. Alternate points of view would have, if nothing 

else, helped us develop our arguments against their case.”21

Why did Colonel Kolenda conclude that the pundit group 

brought some very different perspectives, and yet Colonel Owens seemed to disagree? One likely reason was that having 

been with the group virtually around the clock, Colonel Kolenda witnessed lively debates on many issues and challenges 

affecting Afghanistan and the coalition on a daily basis. Yes, 

the scholars ultimately came around to a synthesis of the situation in Afghanistan and on a set of recommendations for General McChrystal, but getting there was no picnic. While, admittedly, Colonel Owens witnessed a small sample of that debate 

in a few IPRs and other briefings that he watched with the 

group, he was not inundated with the daily disagreements in 

the guided discussions that Colonel Kolenda led and adjudi-
19

cated. In fact, Colonel Kolenda pointed out that “some of the 

members came in with the initial impression that a lighterfootprint counterterror approach was more feasible.”22 Additionally, Colonel Pick invited some other vocal advocates of the 

counterterror approach, but these individuals declined because of scheduling conflicts or for other reasons. The evolution of the group from individual disagreements to overall consensus was complicated, and perhaps it is best understood 

through Colonel Kolenda’s own explanation of it:

It was interesting. I had expected, based on the very different perspectives—some liberal, some centrist, some conservative, and some international audience as well—that there would be considerable disagreements, especially given the force of the personalities involved. But as we 

did the travel and we began to discuss the nature of the conflict and 

what some of the core challenges were, as we formed an assessment of 

those from every perspective, and every perspective contributed something different to this analysis . . . the key solutions tended to come 

naturally from that understanding of the nature of the conflict and the 

assessment of the situation. . . . The various perspectives and arguments on the nature of the conflict and the recommended implementation strategy created a remarkable synthesis from the group rather 

than a milquetoast document that met a lowest bar of agreement.23

The fact that the overall director of the strategic assessment, 

Colonel Owens, saw the incoming perspective of the scholars 

differently than Colonel Kolenda perhaps raises a different critique. Colonel Kolenda and the scholars were somewhat isolated from the rest of the strategic assessment group, and although they updated General McChrystal and the rest of the 

group during the IPRs, the individual conclusions that each 

member may have had were not necessarily apparent to the 

rest of the group. Perhaps one final meeting should have been 

scheduled between the scholar group and the rest of the assessment team just prior to its departure, where all of the scholars could have had five to 10 minutes each to let the overall 

group know their own individual assessments of the situation. 

As it was, the final IPR was cancelled, as General McChrystal 

decided to close ranks with his assessment and to include just 

a small group of trusted advisors in the final revision effort. 

Following their battlefield circulation and after receiving numerous briefings from ISAF, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and other relevant parties, the 
20

initial assessment team members went into their final phase of 

their working group, the writing stage. The team organized into 

working groups for detailed analysis. Then the academic scholars wrote their papers, highlighting key issues and insights. 

Following this, the team collaborated over the course of two 

days, and Colonel Kolenda then wrote the initial assessment 

draft. The draft was then refined by the group, with General 

McChrystal asking questions and providing feedback along the 

way. This process continued until the visiting civilian scholars 

departed Afghanistan. The scholars wrote much of their individual thoughts and conclusions throughout the process, so 

there was a large body of existing material. Plus, all had written 

on Afghanistan prior to their selection to the team. Since the 

group was comprised predominantly of professional writers, it 

was able to rapidly articulate the cogent takeaways from its 

analyses. Colonel Kolenda then used this product to write the 

initial draft. However, he was clear that “this was no ‘cut and 

paste’ drill.”24 As Colonel Kolenda observed,

Some of these working groups focused on intelligence, others focused 

on governance, others on development, and another on the ANSF. So 

there was a large body of raw material. Our time line was accelerated a 

bit, to get an initial draft to General McChrystal. In our two-day session, 

we talked about how we were going to structure the assessment. What 

were the key components and features of it? As we got that together collaboratively, I essentially spent an all-nighter or two writing this all 

down . . . capturing it in an initial draft. The group would read it. We 

would churn on it, then provide feedback . . . iterate, iterate, iterate. We 

went through this multiple times until we had our first deliverable with 

General McChrystal, and then that process continued.25

One significant bone of contention within the group was governance. For the most part, everyone agreed on the need to 

protect the population, increase the size and competency of the 

ANSF, and have unity of command. But the governance issue 

was tricky. Weak and corrupt governance drives insurgency. 

This was true during the Vietnam conflict, and Colonel Kolenda’s 

team agreed that it was true in Afghanistan. However, the difficult part of the equation is how much can—and how much 

should—a military headquarters like ISAF attempt to actively 

attempt to fix a weak and arguably corrupt Afghan government. 

Should not that be the main effort of the USG civilian leader-
21

ship through the US Embassy? How much or how little should 

the strategic assessment tackle this tough issue? Colonel Kolenda certainly had an answer. “This was a revolutionary 

change in this document. We prioritized governance on par 

with security, not just ‘governance is someone else’s job.’ We’ve 

got a vested interest in this because it feeds into the security 

lane; it feeds into instability. We need to ensure that we play 

the appropriate roles in dealing with bad governance, with 

weak governance.”26

Thus, governance was addressed in the assessment. It accurately describes the crisis in confidence in the GIRoA, asserting that “the Afghan government has made progress, yet serious problems remain. The people’s lack of trust in their 

government results from two key factors. First, some GIRoA officials have given preferential treatment to certain individuals, 

tribes, and groups or, worse, abused their power at the expense 

of the people. Second, the Afghan government has been unable 

to provide sufficient security, justice, and basic services to the 

people.”27 The assessment describes GIRoA state weaknesses, 

the tolerance of corruption and abuse of power, and Afghan 

power brokers and factional leaders, many of whom are current 

or former members of the GIRoA. Finally, the pillar “prioritize 

responsive and accountable governance” is one of four main 

principles on which the new recommended strategy is built.28

Having the civilian scholars involved in the Initial Assessment Working Group had some unintended consequences. After approximately one month, and after many of the back-andforth iterations between General McChrystal and the Initial 

Assessment Working Group, most of the scholars returned to 

the United States on schedule. However, at this point General 

McChrystal and his SAG were still editing and finalizing the 

strategic assessment’s initial assessment portion. Upon their 

release, the civilian members of this working group agreed to 

three key principles. First, they were told not to discuss resourcing in regards to the assessment. About halfway through 

the process, General McChrystal decided to remove the resourcing discussion from the report and make that a separate 

follow-on document. The reasons for this are discussed later in 

this paper. Second, they were advised not to discuss the content of their many lively debates; the participants all agreed 
22

that this should stay private. Third, the colleagues were told to 

make it clear in their public comments that they were speaking 

for themselves and not for ISAF or General McChrystal. As 

might be expected, many of the civilians wrote on the topic or, 

at the very least, were quoted in other articles. 

On the one hand, the scholars’ writing better informed public debate. They also seemed to support the counterinsurgency 

approach that was expressed in the Obama administration’s 

strategy review earlier in the year. However, there is a subtle 

difference between support and advocacy. Some critics of the 

counterinsurgency approach perceived that General McChrystal was using these pundits as advocates, which was not his 

intent. General McChrystal said,

We got a little bit burned in the process because some of the pundits 

went out and talked and I think gave the impressions that they were 

either selling the assessment or they were spinning their versions of it. 

Live and learn. In the future, what I would fight to do is get more opposing viewpoints, although as Chris [Kolenda] said, we did try to do that. 

We had a pretty good spread. But I would be even more focused on telling people the rules of the game. Until this thing is out, you can’t discuss this issue. If you can’t agree to that before the assessment begins, 

you just can’t be part of it.29

Over the summer and during the period of the assessment, 

US public opinion on the conflict, along with the opinion of 

many in Congress and within the Obama administration, began to shift toward a reduced US footprint in Afghanistan. 

Those within the administration who were advocating the counterterrorism approach were reportedly from within Vice Pres. 

Joe Biden’s office. The counterterrorism approach was explored in detail during the administration’s strategy review in 

February and March but was rejected by the principals—the 

National Security Council (NSC) and the president himself—in 

favor of counterinsurgency.30 However, those advocating for it 

persisted throughout the spring and summer. They seemed to 

gain steam not only from the increasingly effective insurgency 

and the resultant rise in US casualties but also as a result of a 

US recession in the middle of rising war costs. While all this 

was occurring, General McChrystal, when asked by higher US 

authorities, delayed the turn-in of the strategic assessment until after the 20 August Afghan presidential elections. Then 
23

the elections appeared to have been tainted by massive fraud, 

further strengthening those advocating a different approach 

in Afghanistan. The civilian scholars departed in late July, 

with some recommending more troops for Afghanistan, and 

“COMISAF’s Initial Assessment” was formally turned in on 30 

August. Adding to this tension, the Washington Post’s Bob Woodward published an article on 20 September based on a leaked 

copy of the assessment. Following that, on 25 September, General 

McChrystal’s troop request was sent to US and NATO leadership. 

Then, General McChrystal spoke at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on 1 October and unintentionally added to the public debate. When asked about whether 

a counterterror strategy advocated by the vice president would 

work, he said, “The short answer is no.” He added that “you 

have to navigate from where you are, not from where you wish 

to be. A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable 

position is probably a shortsighted strategy.”31 At this point, 

General McChrystal’s innocent comments set off a firestorm 

and were suddenly the focus of the debate on more forces for 

Afghanistan. As a result, the various articles and interviews 

that the civilian scholars had provided seemed to fade in the 

overall debate. With all of these events as a backdrop, President Obama ordered an exhaustive review of General McChrystal’s assessment and resource recommendations. General 

McChrystal began to recognize that public support for US military operations was falling and commented on this extremely 

difficult period:

We could see [the falling public support], but we were so focused that 

maybe we didn’t appreciate it as much. So what started as a straightforward assessment that was going to include whatever we thought 

[needed] for resources became a politically charged thing that we didn’t 

realize until close to the end. General Rodriguez and I did not come 

over here expecting to ask for more forces. Of course we spent so much 

time together in the Pentagon talking about it, prepping after the day 

they directed us to do it. We actually thought we didn’t need any more 

forces. It was only the analysis that pulled us toward that, and we were 

actually a little bit surprised by it. But we talked every day during that 

process, often just one-on-one. We let the analysis pull us where it did. 

We made decisions based on that. We didn’t just start with a preconceived notion.32
24

In summary, General McChrystal had concluded an assessment that strongly advocated a counterinsurgency strategy 

and now had sent in a force request asking for the course of 

action that called for approximately 40,000 more coalition 

forces to be sent to Afghanistan. At the same time, his commander in chief began reconsidering his strategy, with one of 

the new options being a drastically reduced “counterterror” 

footprint and another being a force structure somewhere between what the general wanted and the low-end option. At this 

juncture, General McChrystal had to be very careful about 

publicly advocating a way ahead that might run counter to the 

eventual decision of his commander in chief, particularly after 

the initial articles and interviews that the scholars gave and his 

London speech. Although just one factor among many, the “impartial” civilian pundits—advocating not only the desired 

strategy but also advocating more forces—left a negative impression with some that they were putting themselves out there 

as unofficial spokesmen for General McChrystal, even though 

by and large this was not the case. This raised concern about 

operational security, given the pundits’ intimate knowledge of 

current ISAF strategy and operational plans. Colonel Grigsby 

voiced some of this frustration but then also recognized some 

of the benefit when he said, “And then you had some of these 

guys [the pundits] go back and write about it. I thought they 

weren’t supposed to do that. One guy had a map out and was 

putting icons on it about where we were and where the enemy 

was. I said to myself, ‘What?’ That’s the danger. But on the 

positive side, you had a lot of perspectives, and you also co-opt 

these guys into advocating within their networks the new COIN 

strategy . . . becoming part of the team.”33

On 1 December, while speaking at the US Military Academy, 

President Obama laid out his new strategy in Afghanistan, 

which added 30,000 new US forces in 2010 and reaffirmed 

General McChrystal’s counterinsurgency approach. However, 

he did announce that the troops would begin to come home in 

18 months, sending a message of urgency to US military and 

civilian leadership in Afghanistan as well as to President Karzai’s government. 
25

General McChrystal Takes Ownership

Despite all of the effort that went into producing the preliminary set of drafts that went into the key initial assessment section of the report, General McChrystal clearly owned the final 

product. He repeatedly sent the product back to be changed to 

more perfectly reflect his thoughts. General McChrystal has 

said publicly, “I stand by the assessment. It’s my words on that 

paper. Hold me accountable.”34 Admiral Smith, describing the 

relationship between General McChrystal and the Initial Assessment Working Group, said,

He relied on the group to be a starting point for his own personal responsibility . . . to actually author the assessment. So it wasn’t perceived that he thought “I’ll turn this over to a staff function and let 

people just mill about and come up with something that I’ll put my signature on. . . .” In the end, it really became informed by all of our efforts, both inside and outside the organization in that iterative process, 

and then at some point he personalized it and made it his own.35

Colonel McGrath echoed Admiral Smith’s commentary, adding 

that since General McChrystal was in essence the leading expert in counterterrorism strategy and its successful implementation, this made his recommendation of a COIN strategy that 

much more telling. Colonel McGrath stated,

General McChrystal used the pundits to help shape his thoughts. You 

could tell about halfway through that he was formulating his strategy 

and he wanted this assessment to be his, not a group effort. He pushed 

off academia once he got their views because he had his own views, his 

own judgments. He had four years of combat in Iraq, and because he 

was a counterterror leader there and elsewhere, it’s very powerful that 

he thinks the COIN strategy is the way to go. Of all people, if he was a 

convert, then COIN must be the way to go. General McChrystal wanted 

this to be his assessment. He said, “This is my assessment,” and when 

it came out, it was.36

Although the initial assessment portion of the strategic assessment went through dozens of iterations, it was indeed General 

McChrystal’s assessment. Not only was he involved with the 

iterative process with his strategic assessment team, but with 

all the major players in Afghanistan during his first two months 

in command. He had met with all the key GIRoA officials, including President Karzai, and with many provincial and local 

leaders during his various battlefield circulations. He had 
26

discussed Afghanistan’s precarious situation with all of the RC 

commanders and different brigade commanders and with a 

myriad of Soldiers, Marines, and others whom he ran across 

while circulating the battlefield. General McChrystal also talked 

with many Afghan civilians from around the country, taking 

the local pulse wherever he went. He combined all of these new 

experiences in Afghanistan with all of his previous military experience elsewhere, including his four years in Iraq, to formulate and solidify his vision for Afghanistan. Thus, at the end of 

the assessment, it was his assessment, his words on “that paper.” As has since been borne out, it is he who was judged one 

way or the other, just as he described. 

It was precisely because of all the work that went into the 

strategic assessment and the professional military way it was 

conducted that General McChrystal was exasperated that it 

was leaked to the Washington Post. But, in hindsight, he acknowledged the one good thing was that the leak dispelled 

some myths that were floating around. He explained,

The leaking of the assessment was really frustrating for me personally 

because we had worked so hard over the summer and we had succeeded in keeping that thing so tight. To be honest, it was probably not 

a bad thing that it got leaked because had the information stayed in a 

secret report, people would have continued to opine with ignorance 

about what was in the report. It was probably better that it was out 

there. But that’s not to excuse or condone the leak. I was very much 

disturbed about the leak because it undercut our credibility and our 

ability to operate, and again, I’ll tell you, we didn’t leak it.37

When finally published, the initial assessment section of 

“COMISAF’s Initial Assessment” was a remarkable piece of 

analysis. Intense energy had gone into evaluating the incredibly 

complex environment that Afghanistan represented in the summer of 2009 and then articulating this evaluation in a manner 

that could be understood and, if necessary, defended to a large 

diverse audience of military and political leaders. As Colonel Kolenda summed up, “For the first time in eight years there was a 

sound articulation of the nature of the conflict. It detailed an 

implementation strategy that linked NATO and US policy guidance and formed the basis for a new campaign plan. While some 

could argue that many of the ideas were not essentially ‘new,’ it 

was the articulation of them together into a coherent whole that 
27

paved the way ahead for the conflict.”38 The rigor and depth of 

the document and the resource implications that flowed from it 

withstood tremendous scrutiny from a detailed NSC review process. Ultimately, it enabled General McChrystal to secure the 

resourcing needed to implement the strategy.39

General McChrystal Takes Specific Troop 

Numbers out of the Assessment

Approximately halfway through the assessment, General 

McChrystal told his team to delink any request for additional 

forces with the strategic assessment. He said that this was not 

his decision, indicating that it was made by superiors back in 

Washington.40 Based on the growing public debate in the United 

States and Europe regarding what future US involvement 

should be amidst the increase in violence and apparent GIRoA 

corruption, many pundits and media members began to speculate on how many additional forces General McChrystal might 

request. Although it was pretty clear to most everyone involved 

in the assessment process that an approved counterinsurgency 

strategy would require more forces, US military leadership did 

not want the strategic assessment to be simplified down to just 

a numbers game. US military leaders, General McChrystal included, did not want commentators, and even US government 

stakeholders, simply flipping through the pages until they got to 

the numbers and skipping over all of the strategic analysis associated with dissecting the complex operational environment 

that was Afghanistan. By pushing the troop-to-task analysis to 

a separate study that would immediately follow the strategic assessment, he basically forced all of those involved to digest the 

analysis for awhile before seeing any troop increase options. 

Strategic Assessment Annexes

It was clear that the initial assessment had the most strategic consequences. General McChrystal was seeking external 

validation for his analysis of the operating environment in Afghanistan as well as approval for his COIN strategy recommendation, both contained in this section, from both the United 
28

States and NATO. Although the seven annexes were also a vital 

part of the analysis and helped complete the picture for both 

US and NATO leadership, for the most part, they covered areas 

for which General McChrystal had direct authority to make decisions and changes. That being said, there are some areas in 

the annexes that went beyond General McChrystal’s direct 

control, such as parts of C2 and the area of civ-mil operations. 

Generally, though, the annexes were supportive in nature to 

the overall strategy recommendations in the initial assessment. 

Each of the strategic assessment annexes are areas worthy of 

mention. 

Annex A: Military Plans 

Even before the strategic assessment officially kicked off with 

its first meeting on 26 June, General McChrystal was briefed 

on the current operational plan (OPLAN) and on the operations 

order (OPORD) that flowed out of it. This plan had been completed in April to accept the 21,000 new forces that President 

Obama had approved in February. While ISAF holdovers had a 

stake in the old plan, they understood that with a new commander there would be changes. Although a specific commander’s intent was not initially communicated, based on general direction provided by General McChrystal to the Military 

Plans Working Group, it was clear that changes would have to 

be made. Colonel McGrath said,

The new plan was a wholesale shift. The old plan said “populationcentered strategy,” but it didn’t do population-centered strategy. It said 

“holistic,” but it wasn’t. It said it was “comprehensive,” but it wasn’t 

comprehensive. There was no meat; the lines of operation were very 

broad: security, governance, and development. What was missing was 

an operational design. It actually was focused on one line of operation: 

security. Governance and development were lip service. It was someone 

else’s job.41

Just like the Initial Assessment Working Group, the Military 

Plans Working Group recognized that it could not ignore governance. The GIRoA could not reach all areas of Afghanistan, and 

where it did reach, it was often ineffective or corrupt. Even organizations like the UNAMA were not everywhere. ISAF is the 

one organization that could reach nearly everywhere and thus 

can assist governance and development in many ways that the 
29

other actors could not. The old plan tended to focus on ISAF 

efforts in areas where everyone could go, including GIRoA, 

UNAMA, and other international and nongovernmental organizations. The new plan developed would shift that focus to protecting the population in areas where they were most threatened, in particular, many areas in the south and east, not 

where it was most convenient for ISAF. 

The short time available to write a new campaign plan was 

unprecedented. The actual deliverable from the Military Plans 

Working Group was a written annex that was the result of an 

analysis of the current campaign plan, supporting plans, and 

orders to determine whether the strategy and means provided 

were adequate to accomplish the desired end state.42 However, 

on 24 July, Colonel McGrath and the ISAF CJ5 shop official 

started the planning process to develop the new campaign plan. 

Thus, as the analysis of General McKiernan’s previously approved plan was wrapping up, but five weeks before the 

“COMISAF’s Initial Assessment” was turned in, the CJ5 began 

concurrent work on the new campaign plan. Officially, the work 

on this new plan was delinked from the strategic assessment

because the time lines for developing a new campaign plan, 

even working at a frenetic pace, would stretch beyond the initially proposed assessment turn-in date. Remarkably, the CJ5-

led planning team almost beat the actual turn-in of the assessment, getting General McChrystal’s signature on the new 

campaign plan on 9 September, only 10 days after the written 

assessment turn-in. As Colonel McGrath had pointed out, 

they had to “work like dogs” to achieve these unprecedented 

time lines and also got daily “head-nods” from General 

McChrystal to insure they did not waste any time going down 

the wrong track.43

One of the big changes in structure that this new planning 

effort would have to deal with was the stand-up of the IJC. The 

new focus of ISAF HQ would be “up and out,” while the IJC 

focus would be “down and in.” ISAF’s up-and-out focus includes coordinating with GIRoA, UNAMA, and the embassies, 

as well as the critically important neighboring nation of Pakistan. To assist the IJC, ISAF’s new plan would have to provide 

direction to the IJC and then resource the IJC’s new plan. The 

IJC would then deal with the day-to-day tactical guidance to 
30

the regional commanders. Planners from the RCs were brought 

in to provide their regional focus to the working group. 

General McKiernan’s plan had a population-centric approach 

but did not prioritize the population centers. General McChrystal took General McKiernan’s plan one step further and prioritized the population areas based on where the enemy was going after their objectives, primarily in the south and east. 

Additionally, technically General McChrystal’s plan was not resource dependent. The more resources he received, the more 

population centers he could protect. The fewer he received, the 

fewer he could protect. But this population protection would 

start with the highest priority and then work down the list until ISAF ran out of forces. Clearly, the plan would likely take 

longer with fewer forces but could theoretically still be executed. In this manner, the plan was flexible enough to adjust to 

whatever decision President Obama made regarding additional 

forces. Still, more forces meant more Afghan citizens protected 

and greater likelihood of success, all other things being equal. 

Of course, given the incredibly complex political, diplomatic, 

informational, logistical, and other environmental factors of Afghanistan, Europe, and the United States during this period, 

“all other things” are rarely equal. 

Colonel McGrath described ISAF’s initial primary center of 

gravity as the cohesion of the coalition, but now that ISAF was 

prioritizing partnering with the Afghans, their friendly center of 

gravity became ISAF’s center of gravity. The Afghan center of 

gravity—to support and protect the population—fit right in with 

US counterinsurgency doctrine and as a result became ISAF’s 

primary center of gravity.44 The previous plan had populationcentered focus areas drawn up, but they were based on where 

all the players could safely operate. If an area was too dangerous, or if NGOs and the coalition civilian effort could not operate there, then it did not make the list of focus areas. Thus, in 

many cases, particularly in the south, many key population 

centers that were active Taliban threat areas were left unprotected, allowing insurgents to strengthen their grip in these 

areas. In General McKiernan’s defense, there were not enough 

coalition forces during his tenure to protect many of the population centers. However, when President Obama approved 

21,000 additional forces in February, General McKiernan’s 
31

plan sent many of these forces into Helmand based on where 

the enemy was, not necessarily where the critical population 

centers such as Kandahar were. General McChrystal arrived 

too late to change this plan, which already had gained momentum with infrastructure expansion and force deployment. The 

new plan, however, was designed to shift the focus of newly approved incoming forces to genuinely threatened population 

centers, thus putting General McChrystal’s new COIN strategy 

to the test. 

As previously stated, the biggest obstacle to effective planning 

was a lack of time. The new commander had arrived with a 

mandate to change direction quickly, but exactly in what direction was not exactly clear at the beginning, even to the commander. He needed time to familiarize himself with the environment, assess the situation, and make a decision on precisely 

what military strategy he would take for his planners to begin 

planning. In this case, given the time constraints of the assessment, planners did not have enough time to wait for General 

McChrystal’s conclusion. They had to begin planning parallel to 

the commander’s assessment right from the start and then get 

guidance from near-daily office visits. Additionally, given enough 

time, military planning staffs normally use formal planning 

procedures to take them through a planning process. Joint 

staffs will typically use the joint operation planning process. 

The Army uses the military decision-making process. ISAF, 

however, is a NATO-structured organization and thus uses 

NATO’s Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) architecture. 

Many of the newer US officers in the ISAF CJ5 plans shop were 

unfamiliar with this process, causing some initial confusion as 

the planning began. Adding to the confusion was the fact that 

the GOP had to be condensed, with certain steps omitted or severely abridged to meet the short suspense. Colonel McGrath 

described the hybrid planning process this way:

We used the proper process, but we had to condense it to meet our time 

lines. The commander didn’t sit down and give formal guidance. That’s 

normally the first step. The commander is meant to step in at specific 

times and places and give guidance, but he didn’t engage in that manner. He simply didn’t have time. There are set process points where the 

commander normally steps in to make a decision—the mission analysis brief, the COA [course-of-action] development brief, the COA analy-
32

sis brief—but General McChrystal didn’t do all of these steps. In fact, we 

didn’t even get an initial “commander’s intent.” We wrote the first one, 

and it morphed, and it changed, so we had to circle back and make sure 

our original planning assumptions were still good.45

Reading Colonel McGrath’s description of the planning process, it is worth remembering that during this time, General 

McChrystal was doing not only his initial battlefield circulation 

across five regions and dozens of forward operating bases but 

also his GIRoA leadership circulation. Furthermore, he was advising six other assessment working groups, along with the 

overall assessment group being led by Colonel Kolenda. General McChrystal was on a frenetic pace required to meet the 

initial time lines of the strategic assessment, in addition to the 

ongoing current fight. So if General McChrystal did not hit 

these formal benchmarks, how did he inject himself into the 

process? According to Colonel McGrath, it went like this:

He gave us feedback in small groups in his office among trusted advisors. 

We only gave him two formal briefs as part of the process. First, we gave 

him the mission analysis brief. We had to do it three times. General 

McChrystal did a rough-cut approval of COAs but then gave a directed 

COA. We just kept doing office visits to get rudder checks. General 

McChrystal was a little indecisive in the beginning, but very decisive near 

the end of the assessment. Once he decided, he was very directive.46

To put these comments in perspective, one has to remember 

that General McChrystal needed some time himself to decide 

on what course of action he wanted to take. It would have been 

unwise for him to land on the first day and begin issuing formal 

intent when he had not even had time to fully assess the situation. The cost of kicking off a parallel planning process running 

side by side with a commander’s initial assessment was that 

the planners executing the formal planning process were forced 

to make numerous assumptions and not to be as structured as 

the process usually entailed. 

In the end, the Military Plans Working Group decided to retain major elements of the previous operations plan, with the 

caveat that the operational design should be revised substantially to provide the benchmarks of progress to guide prioritization and synchronization of subordinate efforts.47 However, 

General McKiernan’s OPORD would need revision to incorporate the direction outlined in the new operational design. Ad-
33

ditionally, the development of the operational design must incorporate the new command relationships under which the 

order will be executed. Finally, the “Military Plans” annex in 

the “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment” recommends using the refined operational design as the basis to request additional resource capabilities that generate an overmatch of insurgent 

forces prior to the historical operational tempo increase of insurgent operations.48

Annex B: Command and Control, and Command 

Relationships

One of the areas that General McChrystal was charged with 

improving was the C2 structure. The military C2 structure General McChrystal inherited was a convoluted system that made 

unity of command very difficult. The United States had initially 

come into Afghanistan with a clear counterterror goal, to eliminate safe havens for al-Qaeda elements within Afghanistan and 

also target with direct action those terrorists still within its borders. After removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan at 

the end of 2001 and installing an interim government led by 

Hamid Karzai, US forces continued to target both al-Qaeda 

remnants remaining within Afghanistan and Taliban forces still 

present in many areas of the country. They did both of these 

mission sets under the OEF mandate. NATO forces began to 

move into the country in 2002 and, for nearly two years, primarily operated in the Kabul area. Then ISAF gradually expanded its area of operations throughout the country and, by 

the start of 2007, had tactical control of all areas of the country 

for stability assistance, not counterterror missions. US forces 

still had a unilateral counterterror mission with a US commander operating under the OEF mandate. By the fall of 2008, 

General McKiernan was dual-hatted as commander of both 

USFOR-A and COMISAF. Four of the five regional commands 

had a non-US NATO commander, with only RC-East and the 

82nd Airborne Division under USFOR-A operational control. 

The first thing that Secretary Gates, General Petraeus, and 

General McChrystal recognized, even prior to General McChrystal’s assumption of command, was that there needed to be an 

intermediate-level, corps-like command between the two-star 
34

regional commands and the four-star multinational headquarters. The number of nations contributing forces was increasing 

along with the size of those coalition forces, which were nearly 

100,000 strong and divided amongst five division-sized commands. This by itself certainly justified a three-star intermediate command. Added to this were the difficult nonmilitary issues that the ISAF commander was forced to deal with on a 

daily basis. First, the relationship with GIRoA was complex, 

with many perceiving Karzai’s regime as corrupt. This was further exacerbated by the fraud-plagued Afghan presidential 

elections, making the relationship even more challenging. Secondly, General McChrystal had to worry about keeping the 

ISAF coalition strong in the face of increasingly uneasy nations 

pondering the increasing violence by strengthened insurgents. 

US leaders realized that no one commander could effectively 

deal with both the complex strategic “up and out” issues that 

faced ISAF, as just described, and also effectively tactically control nearly 100,000 forces in the operational area. The decision 

was made prior to General McChrystal’s arrival to also send 

General Rodriguez to be the IJC commander-presumptive, 

prior even to US Senate confirmation and NATO approval. After 

his arrival in Afghanistan, General Rodriguez’s official title was 

deputy commanding general, USFOR-A, with no ISAF role until 

the three-star IJC headquarters stood up in October. 

When the Strategic Assessment C2 Working Group began, 

there was a lack of clarity as to who would lead it. As previously 

mentioned, the entire strategic assessment lacked a process 

leader at the beginning, and until Colonel Owens finally took 

over, individual working groups were not necessarily appointed 

leaders right from the start. The only thing that the C2 Working 

Group participants knew for sure going into the group was that 

there would be a new intermediate three-star headquarters, 

the IJC. Some thought that perhaps recently arrived officers 

sent to Afghanistan along with General Rodriguez to plan for 

the stand-up of the IJC should also be the ones to lead the C2 

Working Group. Others recognized that many broader C2 issues also needed to be examined and that the CJ5 ought to 

lead it. In the end, Colonel McGrath led the group and wrote 

the draft annex. According to Colonel McGrath, the guidance to 
35

the working group was simply “what’s the problem?” and “what 

can we do to fix it?”49

The C2 Working Group was quickly broken down to this: 

seek unity of command wherever possible and unity of effort in 

all other cases. Furthermore, the group tried to recommend 

bringing everything possible underneath the ISAF NATO mandate. OEF-only areas, like counterterrorism and detention operations, would have to be connected as smoothly as possible. 

Put a different way, the regional commanders needed to be 

given C2 of forces in their battlespace to the greatest extent 

possible. As Colonel Grigsby put it,

A key COIN principle is to have battlespace commanders own all the 

military things in their battlespace. As an example, in RC-West you’ve 

got a portion of 4/82 trainers that work for CSTC-A [Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan] instead of the RC-West commander 

because originally CSTC-A was an OEF force. That hasn’t been changed 

yet. Another example is SOF [special operations forces]. SOF, except 

counterterror forces, should work for the RC commanders, but there 

are a lot of rice bowls that we are trying to break here. Everyone is trying to coordinate, but it’s not the same.50

Although C2 is improving, it is likely that the RC commanders 

will never get full unity of command of all the forces operating 

in their operational areas, but there have been improvements. 

Another glaring area where there was lack of coordination, 

not to mention integration, was the relationship between ISAF 

and the ANSF. This was the result of having a parallel command structure, with the dual-hatted General McChrystal reporting up through his US and NATO chain and with ANSF 

forces reporting up a completely separate Afghan chain of command to the minister of defense. Both military organizations 

were fighting the insurgents but in an uncoordinated manner. 

General McChrystal, in collaboration with the C2 Working 

Group and with GIRoA, decided to create a National Military 

Coordination Center for planning joint military operations. In 

conjunction with this, coalition and Afghan forces began partnering to a much greater extent. The two military organizations 

now routinely patrol together. 

In addition to the IJC, General McChrystal decided to create 

the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) under a new 

three-star commander to unify both NATO and US training 
36

forces previously operating under separate command relationship lines. This recommendation is an improvement in the C2 

area, and it also falls in the area of the ANSF Growth and Acceleration Working Group. This new headquarters is now operational and is led by US Army lieutenant general William 

Caldwell, who is dual-hatted as the CSTC-A commander. Patience is wearing thin for the various NATO countries involved 

in Afghanistan, and, eventually—likely in the near future—

ISAF forces will begin to off-ramp. Thus, an ISAF main effort is 

to build up ANSF forces as quickly as feasible so that when 

ISAF forces begin to draw down, ANSF forces stand up and 

keep the pressure on the insurgency. 

Annex C: USG Civil-Military Campaign Plan

As General McChrystal’s strategic assessment began, the 

USG Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan (ICMCP) was already nearing its completion as an initiative that had been underway since early spring. In fact, on 15 August, the ICMCP 

was signed by General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry and forwarded to Amb. Richard Holbrooke, US special 

representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and General Petraeus. The ICMCP aligns USG efforts on a single objective: the 

people of Afghanistan. It focuses on both US civilian and military efforts in applying COIN efforts across the 11 transformative effects listed below:

• Population Security

•  Claim the Information Initiative

• Access to Justice

•  Expansion of Accountable and Transparent Governance

•  Elections and Continuity of Governance

• Action against Irreconcilables

•  Creating Sustainable Jobs

• Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access

•  Countering the Nexus of Narcotics, Corruption, Insurgency, 

and Criminality

•  Community and Government-led Reintegration

•  Cross-Border Access for Commerce Not Insurgents51
37

According to Civ-Mil Working Group leader Colonel Briggs, 

General Petraeus, Ambassador Holbrooke, and the newly 

sworn-in Ambassador Eikenberry met at Fort McNair, Washington, DC, on 1 May and established the priorities for the civmil effort in Afghanistan.52 Goals were established, a strategy 

was developed, and all of this turned into the 11 transformative 

effects listed above. One of the key enablers that needed to be 

in place for the civilian side of the civ-mil partnership to be effective was that more civilians had to be sent to Afghanistan. 

There were simply too few USG civilians to push outside of Kabul and into the provincial and district levels to make any difference. The problem was that the State Department and many 

other agencies simply aren’t organized for rapid deployment of 

their members. As Colonel Briggs noted,

The long pole in the tent was definitely the interagency piece. Would 

interagency be able to resource this effort with subject-matter experts 

in sufficient numbers who could get here in sufficient time to have the 

effect we needed in 12 to 18 months, the time General McChrystal had 

to start having a positive impact? We’ve made strides, but the total 

number of USG civilians here by Christmas will only be around 250. We 

just haven’t seen the numbers.53

The focus on the ICMCP was to get the US “house” in order 

and then worry about other nations and integrating their civilian efforts. However, planners interacted with the United Nations, different GIRoA ministries, and other nations. Some of 

the civilian mentor teams that were planned to come in and assist the Afghans were engineers from Germany, Sweden, and 

India. Other international experts in areas such as agriculture 

were also called upon. Although the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is a big asset, it does not have a lot 

of foot soldiers and primarily uses contractors to help with the 

building of roads, schools, and other infrastructure projects. 

Expanding on his comments above regarding the difficulty in 

adding civilians to Afghanistan, Colonel Briggs elaborated that 

“the State Department just doesn’t have the large force waiting 

to deploy. Their process was cumbersome . . . looking for the 

right skill sets willing to come to an austere environment and 

live under harsh conditions in an unsafe environment. It’s 

easier to get volunteers to come to Kabul, but more are needed 

at the lower governmental levels throughout the country.”54
38

Many leaders and experts from both the military and civilian 

camps have cited the civ-mil effort as one of the key ingredients 

to success in Afghanistan. However, meshing the military and 

civilian cultures to work together is not as easy as it sounds. In 

his seemingly endless hours attending meetings involving civmil integration, Colonel Briggs captures some of these cultural 

differences:

The military has really latched onto a PowerPoint-landscaped way of 

thinking, maybe to a fault. When you look at our products, they have 

lots of arrows and lots of objectives. We think very linearly, and that’s 

the way we approach a problem. The other culture is more of a portrait. 

If you think of MS Word, [those users] take a problem and they write a 

25-page document, and they’ll talk about ideas and concepts. They’re 

not as much action-, goal-, or results-oriented as the military.55

Along with the different ways of processing problems as noted 

above, the hierarchical culture of State Department personnel 

at the embassy also was different than the typical military organization. He noted that

[US Embassy civilian personnel) tend to take a more measured approach to things; they clearly don’t like to put folks on the spot in terms 

of fixing responsibility and tasking people to do things. They tend to talk 

a lot about issues. . . . Some of them are great Americans, interested in 

moving ahead and getting things done. Others were more worried about 

things that did not matter as much. I saw a lot of power struggles occurring within the embassy structure. People that were at higher levels 

were resentful of action officers taking the initiative to try to get things 

done. . . . [It was] frustrating to watch. Some were more concerned with 

process and protocols than results.56

According to Colonel Briggs, Ambassador Eikenberry is trying 

to change some of these negatively perceived cultural attitudes 

at the US Embassy in Afghanistan, but it is a very tough challenge to change the culture of any large organization. There is 

ordinarily much resistance. 

Annex D: Strategic Communication

In one of the first briefings that General McChrystal took after 

arriving at ISAF HQ, strategic communications was shown as 

its own line of operation in the existing campaign plan. As soon 

as the slide went up, Admiral Smith, the newly arrived director 

of communications saw it and said, “That’s not a line of opera-
39

tion. It’s just flat not.”57 And that began the reexamination of 

ISAF’s strategic communications process with General McChrystal’s new team. Admiral Smith then explained that strategic 

communications is not a separate group of people or a separate 

headquarters function but, instead, was a part of all of the different staff functions and lines of operation. As he explained all 

of this, heads began nodding in agreement around the room, 

even amongst the holdovers from General McKiernan’s team. 

Afterwards, some of them said, “Yes, sir, we had the same debate as we developed this thing, but your predecessor felt that 

to not emphasize this thing—StratCom—meant that it wasn’t 

going to have value.”58 ISAF’s next iteration of the campaign 

plan dropped strategic communication as its own line of operation. Thus, this initial discussion was really the first big input 

to General McChrystal that the StratCom Working Group leader 

made, even before the working began formally meeting. 

One of the important concepts recognized right away, even 

before General McChrystal took over, was that StratCom was 

not just a US military issue, and not even just an ISAF issue, 

but a USG civilian and GIRoA issue as well. All of these players 

in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan needed to improve their 

efforts to effectively communicate with the Afghan people. Admiral Smith saw it this way:

We got here when there was just a four-star headquarters in existence 

in which there had been very little resources put into all the fields of 

communication, whether it be public affairs, information operations, or 

PSYOPS [psychological operations]. And we also had this USFOR-A 

thing sitting over here versus ISAF. So one of the first things we did was 

kluge the two things together as part of our assessment. Also, we recognized that there was an equally important assessment going on at the 

US Embassy with the civ-mil integration. We took advantage of working 

that piece, which had some traction back in the United States in terms 

of working groups that I was involved in prior to my departure. So, in 

effect, we were working communications strategy for Afghanistan as the 

US element [and] brought the NATO piece together as one assessment 

group as a partner with the US Embassy. Then we brought in other 

embassies on a case-by-case basis.59

Admiral Smith confirmed the somewhat informal, unstructured start to the overall assessment, and even within his own 

working group. He recounted a few months later, “I don’t remember a specific starting point beyond some of the initial 
40

meetings that we had—it was more of an iterative process.”60

Because Admiral Smith had come in with the reputation of 

having helped fix StratCom in Iraq, and because he was personally involved with the StratCom Working Group, General 

McChrystal gave the group a very long leash. As Admiral Smith 

recalled, “He placed much, much more emphasis on the base 

document than he did on the annexes. He may have focused on 

one or two annexes, but in our case, annex D, I think that because of the trust and confidence that he had in myself as the 

expert in this area, I don’t recall any challenges to my assumptions in that area.”61

One of the areas that was of huge concern to both General 

McChrystal and Admiral Smith was the negative StratCom effect 

of CIVCAS incidents in general and large casualty-producing 

events in particular. Admiral Smith used the phrase “speed 

kills” to describe the critical importance of not allowing the insurgents time to get their story out to the public first. He described that if you can get there “first with the truth” you can 

kill the enemy’s ability to propagandize the event.62 Admiral 

Smith and his working group realized that one of the ways to 

be there first with the truth is not just to wait until after an 

operation or event goes badly and then react, but to try to anticipate coalition operations or activities that might have a high 

potential to result in a StratCom event. And this ties right in 

with the fact that StratCom is not its own line of operation but 

must be a key component of all of the lines of operations, directorates, and unit activities. Then, when planning an operation, 

StratCom effects must be planned into it. Admiral Smith provided a telling example:

If I’m going to launch an operation at 0400 with SOF forces, that’s the 

beginning of our communication right there. How we do that op begins 

to send a message locally as to what our intent is. How we interface with 

the population sends a message. And then if I’m not right on the heels 

of that with some sort of contextual statement that says, “At four o’clock 

in the morning, we went into Village X because a bad guy lived there, 

and we came out . . . ”—if I wait until noon to say that information because I have the position to do that because I wasn’t connected to that 

operation—chances are that somebody in that village will spin that out 

of control. Before I know it, I’ve lost it.63
41

However, sometimes events happen that cannot be fully anticipated. On 4 September, in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, 

German forces called in an air strike on suspected insurgent 

forces standing around two stolen tanker trucks. In the aftermath, ISAF forces quickly realized that numerous civilians 

were likely in and around the tankers. This unfortunate incident was a big test case for the “speed kills” and “first with the 

truth” doctrine. In a similar incident that occurred in Farah, 

Afghanistan, under General McKiernan’s tenure, ISAF and local leaders got into a tit-for-tat argument on whether civilians 

were killed and then how many civilians were killed. In that 

case, ISAF was not first, and it unintentionally did not initially 

provide accurate information on the casualties. The 4 September Kunduz incident was similar in many respects but handled 

far differently. Admiral Smith described it this way:

When Kunduz hit that morning, we put the SOP [standard operating 

procedure—new StratCom postincident mitigation procedures published in annex D of “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment”] into play. I was 

out of here about three in the afternoon with a team that went up to 

Kunduz. I took a reporter with me. My goal is transparency in the first 

48 hours because my sense is in the first 48 hours, pretty much everything that needs to be known, normally can be known. In the past, we 

would get into a cryptic denial type of situation, say we’re going to do an 

investigation, and lock it all down. We allowed the enemy to spin the 

incident out of control.64

Part of that open transparency in the Kunduz incident included 

General McChrystal presenting a taped message broadcast nationally acknowledging that the incident occurred, that he took 

it very seriously, and that he would do everything in his power to 

ensure it never happened again. He stated, “I take this possible 

loss of life or injury to innocent Afghans very seriously. . . . As 

commander, nothing is more important [to me] than the safety 

and protection of the Afghan people.”65 He also went to Kunduz 

and was a very visible on-scene symbol of ISAF’s commitment 

to fix the problem. Because of the quick and effective ISAF reaction to this incident, remarkably, the story was out of the headlines within a few days. What could have been a huge StratCom 

victory for the insurgents actually turned into a long-term win 

for ISAF’s credibility.
42

Overall, this working group had no major group cohesion 

challenges, and it was better served than some of the other 

working groups in that it had an actively involved flag officer 

with the trust and confidence of General McChrystal leading it. 

Annex E: Civilian Casualties, Collateral Damage, and 

Escalation of Force

As has been alluded to, CIVCAS incidents were a major impediment in ISAF efforts to win over Afghan support in the attempt to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents. Several highvisibility CIVCAS events, along with dozens of other smaller 

escalation-of-force incidents over the past few years, damaged 

ISAF’s credibility as it battled the Taliban for the “hearts and 

minds” of the Afghan people. Putting an exclamation point on 

the urgency of this issue right before General McChrystal took 

command, ISAF airstrikes in Farah Province killed at least 20 

to 30 civilians, with local Afghans believing the toll was much 

higher. This was a high-publicity incident and put the issue of 

CIVCAS on the front burner as General McChrystal began the 

strategic assessment. 

As a major part of the effort to minimize civilian casualties, 

General McChrystal issued a tactical directive, dated 1 July 

2009, that specified his commander’s intent, fire control measures, battle damage assessment criteria, and other CIVCAS 

direction. As mentioned, General McKiernan also had published a tactical directive, but it did not improve CIVCAS problems, and it did not appear to have been properly followed down 

to the platoon and squad levels. General McChrystal released 

his directive with strong follow-up actions. In the first month 

after its release, he focused great attention in his morning staff 

updates on virtually every escalation-of-force incident that led 

to possible civilian casualties. In fact, there were other incidents that, while not resulting in civilian casualties, did not 

appear to follow the intent of the tactical directive. General 

McChrystal sternly reminded regional commanders of his intent with the directive. The word filtered down, and CIVCAS 

incidents were reduced. 

The CIVCAS Working Group was officially headed by British 

air commodore Paddy Teakle and initially informally led by his 
43

French air force deputy, Col Olivier Bertrand. It also had members, both ground and air, from multiple US services and many 

coalition nations. However, the working group was plagued by 

a slow start because of the inability of the group to agree on the 

actual intent and scope that it was supposed to study. Initially, 

the entire focus of the CIVCAS Working Group was on air-toground CIVCAS. However, the group quickly learned that most 

of the issues were escalation-of-force issues and not close air 

support (CAS)–related, even though CAS attacks received the 

bulk of the negative publicity. Thus, the focus then shifted 

more to escalation-of-force incidents. Invariably, the first two 

meetings turned into discussions of rules of engagement 

(ROE)—what they were, whether or not ISAF had any influence 

on them or they were national caveats, and even arguments 

regarding European versus US methods of engaging enemy 

forces. 

At the height of this debate, one European officer heatedly 

implied that if under any kind of attack from insurgents, ISAF 

forces should first look for an escape route and only fight if 

there was no other choice. The response of an unnamed, newly 

arrived US Army colonel was to throw his hands up and practically shout, “We’re the friggin’ Army; whatever happened to 

‘close with and destroy the enemy?’ ”66 This argument was a 

microcosm of the larger issue that had been a source of frustration for years in Afghanistan, where US military leaders were 

hampered by the many national caveats that some nations’ 

military forces brought with them. In addition, it highlighted 

some of the tension between the new handpicked team that 

came in with General McChrystal and NATO members of the 

former commander’s ISAF HQ staff. 

Additionally, this group was plagued by leadership problems. 

Colonel Bertrand was in Afghanistan on a five-month tour, had 

never done a nonflying staff job in his career before, and was 

not a fluent English speaker to boot. Colonel Bertrand initially 

focused on ROEs, but US members felt that the issue wasn’t 

with ROEs but with following the commander’s guidance. Early 

on, based on these various issues, Colonel Hann stepped in and 

became more of a partner with Colonel Bertrand to help lead 

the group. As far as ROEs went, it soon became a nonissue. 
44

Colonel Hann described this, the view of SOF, and the early 

group interaction this way:

The cultural issues really peaked over people’s personal venue. We had 

lawyers from three different entities present in the group who spoke 

great “lawyerese” and who were determined to go in certain directions. 

As it turns out, unbeknownst to us, ROE is a legal process . . . so our 

ability to amend or change that was quite limited. People from the SOF 

community seemed to feel that there should be no limitations on what 

they do, so no one should look, talk, or speak about what they do. But 

you had the commander’s guidance that we had to limit to the greatest 

degree possible any kind of civilian casualty incidents. So yes, the debates were quite vigorous.67

One thing was clear to most in the group—ISAF Soldiers had 

become too reliant on fire support in their tactical fights with 

insurgents. Coalition airpower had complete air supremacy 

over Afghanistan, and generally if forces were in a troops-incontact (TIC) situation and CAS was called, it arrived within 10 

or 15 minutes. Thus, to minimize the risk to a Soldier’s platoon 

or squad in a firefight, calling CAS right away became almost a 

knee-jerk reaction. This was occurring even when the forces 

were not exchanging fire. Colonel Hann observed that

if we saw two bad guys run into a house, the first reaction was to take 

a 500-pound bomb from an airplane or some great big artillery shell 

and quite accurately destroy the house and everyone inside the house. 

Well, if you were in Akron or Omaha or Miami or San Francisco and two 

bad guys ran into a house, your first reaction would not be to drop a 

500-pound bomb on that house. And yet that was the first reaction 

here. There was a cultural piece that we need to recognize. We were 

guests in their country first, so there was a great deal of cultural ground 

to cover by all people involved in this.68

As Colonel Hann stated, behavior needed to be changed. General McChrystal’s tactical directive was one measure taken. Another requirement was better training. Forces already in Afghanistan would have to be trained and, just as importantly, 

the various training institutions involved in predeployment 

training would also have to change. True COIN training requires a different mentality for the Soldiers and Marines on the 

ground, and thus both of the service training institutions need 

to shift their focus to a complete population-centric approach. 

Colonel Hann adds that “we’ve now stood up COIN training in 

country [in Afghanistan] to try to get some of that [new train-
45

ing]. We had a hard time convincing NATO to do COIN training 

because it did not do COIN. COIN was a nasty word. Not only 

do they do COIN operations in Afghanistan now, but General 

McChrystal persuaded Gen [Egon] Ramms [Bundeswehr, or 

Federal Defense Force, commander, Allied Joint Force Command, Brunssum] to teach COIN to NATO forces in Europe.69

General McChrystal knew he had to rapidly change the ISAF 

climate in regards to CIVCAS, and he could not wait even for an 

accelerated 60-day assessment to finish before providing guidance. Thus, much of his personal CIVCAS reduction guidance is 

provided in the 1 July tactical directive. As a result, annex E is 

relatively brief and to some extent corollary to the tactical directive, with an additional training recommendation, a clarification 

of TIC situations, a discussion of proportionality, and a few other 

items. Minimizing civilian casualties will continue to be an ISAF 

priority as long as it is combating insurgent forces. While it is 

likely impossible to completely eliminate ISAF-caused civilian 

casualties as long as insurgent forces are fighting in and around 

population areas, the tactical directive and other recommendations implemented from annex E of “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment” have gone a long way toward reducing these events. 

Annex F: Detainee Operations, Rule of Law, and Afghan 

Corrections

Like the Civ-Mil Working Group, the Detainee Operations, 

Rule of Law, and Afghan Corrections Working Group began 

with an existing major effort already under way. Army major 

general Douglas Stone was leading a team in Afghanistan 

studying detainee operations and rule of law with essentially 

the same charter as the strategic assessment working group 

covering the same effort. General Stone applied lessons-learned 

from his experience with detainee ops in Iraq. So as not to duplicate effort, the assessment team, led by Colonel Jeppson, 

essentially let General Stone’s group complete its analysis and 

then turned its report into the strategic assessment draft that 

went to General McChrystal. Instead of running their own separate meetings, Colonel Jeppson and a couple of others simply 

sat in the IPRs that General Stone’s group had with General 

McChrystal to follow the progress of their effort. Since this 
46

strategic assessment working group did not meet and only took 

General Stone’s study and folded its results into the assessment, 

there is really no “process” to cover in this paper. However, 

some of the outcomes of the effort are highlighted. 

Detention operations have generated negative publicity for 

US and coalition efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the 

world. With the projected closure of Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, more international attention was being focused on 

the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF) and its detainees. Even more important than just the negative publicity, 

which includes the perception that US detention ops are secretive and lacking in due process, detainee operations are crucial 

to the overall COIN fight in Afghanistan. Hard-core al-Qaeda 

insurgents in the Afghan Corrections System (ACS), now numbering more than 2,500, are radicalizing the other noninsurgent inmates who are indiscriminately mixed within overcrowded facilities. As annex F states, “In effect, insurgents use 

the ACS as a sanctuary and base to conduct lethal operations 

against GIRoA and coalition forces. . . . The U.S. came to Afghanistan vowing to deny these same enemies safe haven in 

2001. They have gone from inaccessible mountain hideouts to 

recruiting and indoctrinating hiding in the open, in the ACS.”70

Annex F proposes the formation of a new combined joint 

interagency task force to work toward the long-term goal of 

getting the United States out of the detention business, giving 

it to the GIRoA. This organization is nearing its operational 

point in its first version as Joint Task Force 435. The goal is, 

as quickly as possible, to include interagency and coalition 

partners. Ultimately, the concept will be developed based on 

three capabilities.

•  Capability 1 – Assume the U.S. detention oversight and support responsibilities . . . to include the operation and management of the 

BTIF, to . . . focus on the operational fight. Once the JTF stands up 

and the commander and his staff are on the ground in Afghanistan, 

they can begin planning and further developing capabilities 2 and 3. 

•  Capability 2 – Conduct corrections and Rule of Law development 

within the Afghan National Defense Force (ANDF) detention facilities.

•  Capability 3 –  In close coordination and cooperation with the U.S.

Embassy, conduct corrections and Rule of Law development within 

the Afghan CPD [Central Prisons Directorate] system of prisons.71
47

The end state or goal of this entire detainee operations effort is 

the turnover of all detention operations in Afghanistan, to include the 

BTIF, to the Afghan government once they have developed the requisite 

sustainable capacity to run those detention systems in accordance with 

international and national law. This will empower the Afghan government, enable counterinsurgency operations, and restore the faith of the 

Afghan people in their government’s ability to apply good governance 

and Rule of Law with respect to corrections, detention, and justice.72

Annex G: Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Growth 

and Acceleration

There was initial confusion as to whether ANSF growth would 

just be part of the general discussion or have its own separate 

annex. Colonel Pick and, later, Colonel Owens both decided 

that ANSF growth would not be a separate annex in the beginning but just assumed that it would be discussed in the initial 

assessment section of the “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment.”

However, when the CJCS and CENTCOM actually published 

the written order charging General McChrystal to conduct the 

assessment, two extra annexes were in it that were not part of 

the strategic assessment that had already begun in Kabul. As 

mentioned earlier, the assessment actually began on verbal 

guidance from Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to General 

McChrystal, and then their staffs had to follow up with the 

written order. One of these two extra annexes was an ANSF 

growth annex, and the other was a review of the coordination 

measures with Pakistan to improve performance across the Afghanistan/Pakistan regional theater. 

It was not until the third IPR on 18 July when General 

McChrystal asked about the progress of the ANSF growth that 

he realized there was not a separate annex for this subject. He 

then said that he wanted one. At this point, however, there was 

little time to draw together an official working group, given that 

there was only a week or more left to complete the analysis before writing the assessment. Thus, this working group was 

quickly formed from a few planners at CSTC-A who were already working ANSF growth strategies, along with General 

McChrystal’s key advisors, to make some decisions on the way 

ahead. General McChrystal approved the specific growth goals 
48

and time lines, and the annex was written. The tasking to review coordination measures with Pakistan did not become part 

of this assessment but was addressed by General McChrystal 

and his USFOR-A and ISAF staffs by other means. 

The key findings of the ANSF growth annex were that US and 

coalition forces would need to accelerate the growth of ANSF 

forces in order to increase the overall size of friendly forces, 

both ISAF and Afghan, to quell the insurgency. This more rapidly growing force would also reduce the risk of failure should 

coalition forces begin pulling out of Afghanistan earlier than 

anticipated. Annex G calls for the Afghan National Army growth 

to 134,000 to be completed by October of 2010, instead of December 2011, with a further growth to 240,000 by an undetermined future date. Annex G recommends a growth of the Afghan National Police up to 160,000 “as soon as practicable 

with the right mix of capabilities that better satisfies the requirements of a counter-insurgency effort.”73

As mentioned in the C2 annex, NATO stood up a new organization to assist with the growth and development of the ANSF, 

called NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan or NTM-A. This annex calls for CSTC-A and NTM-A to coexist as a single headquarters with a fully integrated staff under a dual-hatted commander. This new coalition command became operational 

under the command of General Caldwell as of this writing. 

Conclusion

General McChrystal’s strategic assessment was a historic effort for US and NATO interests in Afghanistan and may mark a 

turning point in the conflict against Afghanistan’s insurgents. 

The assessment occurred during a very tumultuous transitional period and required a major effort by a large group of 

officers working at a breathtaking pace to complete. Notwithstanding this group effort, the strategic assessment reflects 

General McChrystal’s personal conclusions, and it is wholly 

owned by him. The assessment overcame many difficulties, including a difficult start due to the nature of General McKiernan’s departure and General McChrystal’s sudden arrival, 

along with rising public and political discontent with growing 

coalition casualties, Afghan government corruption, and rising 
49

war costs in the midst of a US recession. In the face of these 

difficulties, the persuasive analytical work and well-argued 

conclusions in “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment” were key to 

General McChrystal and others persuading President Obama 

to reaffirm his counterinsurgency strategy and reinforce his 

Afghan campaign with 30,000 additional troops. The process 

that General McChrystal and his team used to complete the 

assessment, while not perfect, is an extremely useful tool for 

future US commanders and their staffs to use when tasked 

with a similar effort on another battlefield down the road. 

Notes

1. Gen Stanley McChrystal (US Army, commander, ISAF), interview by the 

author, 13 March 2010.

2. Ibid. 

3. Col Christopher Kolenda (US Army, contributing author, “Strategy Review,” January 2009, and “Strategic Assessment,” 30 August 2009), interview by the author, 22 October 2009.

4. Ibid.

5. Col Kevin Owens (US Army, lead, General McChrystal’s Strategic Advisory Group), interview by the author, 28 October 2009.

6. Ibid.

7. Col James McGrath (US Marine Corps, ISAF, CJ5 Plans Directorate, 

deputy director), interview by the author, 10 November 2009.

8. Owens, interview.

9. McChrystal, interview.

10. Owens, interview.

11. Col Wayne Grigsby (US Army, key player, Command and Control 

Working Group), interview by the author, 10 November 2009.

12. Ibid.

13. McChrystal, interview.

14. Remark overheard by the author, who was at the in-progress review.

15. McGrath, interview.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Near the end of the assessment process, General McChrystal decided 

to delay the document turn-in until after the Afghan presidential elections on 

20 Aug 2009.

19. Kolenda, interview.

20. Ibid.

21. Owens, interview.

22. Col Christopher Kolenda, to the author, e-mail, 12 February 2010.

23. Kolenda, interview.

24. Kolenda to the author, e-mail.
50

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. See annex C, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” 2-8.

28. Ibid., 1-3.

29. McChrystal, interview.

30. Kolenda to the author, e-mail.

31. Michael D. Shear, “McChrystal Flown to Denmark to Discuss War with 

Obama,” Washington Post, 3 October 2009.

32. McChrystal, interview.

33. Grigsby, interview.

34. Owens, interview.

35. Rear Adm Gregory Smith (US Navy, lead, Strategic Communication 

Working Group), interview by the author, 5 November 2009.

36. McGrath, interview. 

37. McChrystal, interview.

38. Kolenda to the author, e-mail.

39. Ideas taken from Kolenda e-mail, 12 February 2010.

40. McChrystal, interview.

41. McGrath, interview.

42. Annex A, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” A-1.

43. McGrath, interview.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Annex C, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” A-4, A-5.

48. Ibid., A-5.

49. McGrath, interview.

50. Grigsby, interview.

51. Annex C, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” C-1.

52. Col Steven Briggs (US Army, lead, ICMCP Working Group), interview 

by the author, 23 October 2009.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Smith, interview.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Rajiv Chandrasekaran,“NATO Probing Deadly Airstrike,” Washington 

Post, 5 September 2009, 1.

66. Discussion witnessed by author.
51

67. Col Raymond Hann (US Army, coleader, Civilian Casualties, Collateral 

Damage, and Escalation of Force Strategic Assessment Working Group), interview by the author, 5 November 2009.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Annex F, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” F-1.

71. Ibid., F-4.

72. Ibid., F-4–F-5.

73. Annex G, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” G-3.

53

Abbreviations

ACS Afghan Corrections System

ANSF Afghan National Security Force

BTIF Bagram Theater Internment Facility

C2 command and control

CAS close air support

CENTCOM Central Command

CGSC Command and General Staff College

CIVCAS civilian casualties

civ-mil civil-military

CJCS chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COA course of action

COIN counterinsurgency

COMISAF commander of the (US-led) International 

Security Assistance Force

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan

DCOM deputy commander

GIRoA Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan

GOP Guidelines for Operational Planning

HQ headquarters

ICMCP Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan

IJC ISAF Joint Command

IPR in-progress review

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

JTF joint task force

KAIA Kabul International Airport

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO nongovernmental organization

NKC New Kabul Compound

NSC National Security Council

NTM-A NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OPLAN operational plan

OPORD operations order

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
54

RAF Royal Air Force

RC regional command

ROE rule of engagement

SAG Strategic Advisory Group

SecDef secretary of defense

SOF special operations forces

StratCom strategic communication

TIC troops in contact

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan

USAID US Agency for International Development

USFOR-A United States Forces-Afghanistan

USG US government
55

Appendix

“COMISAF’s Initial Assessment”

30 August 2009

Commander’s Initial Assessment

30 August 2009

Commander

NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan

U.S. Forces, Afghanistan
Table of Contents

i Purpose

Initial Assessment

1. Commander’s Summary

2. Initial Assessment

Annexes

A. Military Plans

B. Command and Control, and Command Relationships

C. USG Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan

D. Strategic Communication

E. Civilian Casualties, Collateral Damage, and Escalation of Force

F. Detainee Operations, Rule of Law, and Afghan Corrections

G. Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Growth and Acceleration

H. Glossary

I. References
i

Purpose

On 26 June, 2009, the United States Secretary of Defense directed Commander, United 

States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM), to provide a multidisciplinary assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. On 02 July, 2009, Commander, NATO International 

Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) I U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), received 

direction from CDRUSCENTCOM to complete the overall review.

On 01 July 2009, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and NATO Secretary General also issued a similar directive.

COMISAF subsequently issued an order to the ISAF staff and component commands 

to conduct a comprehensive review to assess the overall situation, review plans and 

ongoing efforts, and identify revisions to operational, tactical and strategic guidance.

The following assessment is a report of COMISAF’s findings and conclusions. In summary, this assessment sought to answer the following questions:

- Can ISAF achieve the mission?

- If so, how should ISAF go about achieving the mission?

- What is required to achieve the mission?

The assessment draws on both internal ISAF components, to include Regional Commands, and external agencies such as GIRoA ministries, International Governmental 

Organizations and Nongovernmental Organizations. It also draws on existing ISAF 

and USFOR-A plans and policy guidance, relevant reports and studies, and the consultation of external experts and advisors.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1-1

Commander’s Summary

The stakes in Afghanistan are high. NATO’s Comprehensive Strategic Political Military 

Plan and President Obama’s strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al 

Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan have laid out a clear path of what we 

must do. Stability in Afghanistan is an imperative; if the Afghan government falls to the 

Taliban—or has insufficient capability to counter transnational terrorists—Afghanistan 

could again become a base for terrorism, with obvious implications for regional stability.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for 

granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, 

many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans—in 

both their government and the international community—that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.

Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or “doubling 

down” on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on 

force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key takeaway from this 

assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way 

that we think and operate.

NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) requires a new strategy that is 

credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly 

resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency 

campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment.

To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance. We must 

also prioritize resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain the 

initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment to see it through to 

success. Finally, we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.

Redefining the Fight

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations 

in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 

years of conflict. This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. 

Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our 

objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, 

every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support 
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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will require a better understanding of the people’s choices and needs. However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence 

in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.

Many describe the conflict in Afghanistan as a war of ideas, which I believe to be true. 

However, this is a “deeds-based” information environment where perceptions derive 

from actions, such as how we interact with the population and how quickly things improve. The key to changing perceptions lies in changing the underlying truths. We 

must never confuse the situation as it stands with the one we desire, lest we risk our 

credibility.

The Criticality of Time 

The impact of time on our effort in Afghanistan has been underappreciated and we 

require a new way of thinking about it.

First, the fight is not an annual cyclical campaign of kinetics driven by an insurgent 

“fighting season.” Rather, it is a year-round struggle, often conducted with little apparent violence to win the support of the people. Protecting the population from insurgent 

coercion and intimidation demands a persistent presence and focus that cannot be 

interrupted without risking serious setback.

Second, and more importantly, we face both a short- and long-term fight. The longterm fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will 

be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the nearterm (next 12 months)—while Afghan security capacity matures—risks an outcome 

where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.

Change the Operational Culture

As formidable as the threat may be, we make the problem harder. ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and 

culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic 

disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate.

Preoccupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that 

distances us—physically and psychologically—from the people we seek to protect. In 

addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian 

casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.

Accomplishing the mission demands a renewed emphasis on the basics through a 

dramatic change in how we operate, with specific focus in two principle areas:

1. Change the operational culture to connect with the people. I believe we must 

interact more closely with the population and focus on operations that bring stability, while shielding them from insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion.
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2. Improve unity of effort and command. We must significantly modify organizational 

structures to achieve better unity of effort. We will continue to realign relationships to 

improve coordination within ISAF and the international community.

The New Strategy: Focus on the Population

Getting these basics right is necessary for success, but it is not enough. To accomplish the mission and defeat the insurgency we also require a properly resourced 

strategy built on four main pillars: 

1. Improve effectiveness through greater partnering with ANSF. We will increase 

the size and accelerate the growth of the ANSF, with a radically improved partnership at every level, to improve effectiveness and prepare them to take the lead in 

security operations.

2. Prioritize responsive and accountable governance. We must assist in improving governance at all levels through both formal and traditional mechanisms.

3. Gain the Initiative. Our first imperative, in a series of operational stages, is to gain 

the initiative and reverse the insurgency’s momentum.

4. Focus Resources. We will prioritize available resources to those critical areas 

where vulnerable populations are most threatened.

These concepts are not new. However, implemented aggressively, they will be revolutionary to our effectiveness. We must do things dramatically differently—even uncomfortably differently—to change how we operate, and also how we think. Our every 

action must reflect this change of mind-set: how we traverse the country, how we use 

force, and how we partner with the Afghans. Conventional wisdom is not sacred; security may not come from the barrel of a gun. Better force protection may be counterintuitive; it might come from less armor and less distance from the population.

The Basis of Assessment: Analysis and Experience

My conclusions were informed through a rigorous multidisciplinary assessment by a 

team of accomplished military personnel and civilians and my personal experience 

and core beliefs. Central to my analysis is a belief that we must respect the complexities of the operational environment and design our strategic approach accordingly. As we analyzed the situation, I became increasingly convinced of several 

themes: that the objective is the will of the people, our conventional warfare culture is 

part of the problem, the Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency, we cannot 

succeed without significantly improved unity of effort, and finally, that protecting the 

people means shielding them from all threats.

A Strategy for Success: Balancing Resources and Risk

Our campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so 

today. Almost every aspect of our collective effort and associated resourcing has 

lagged a growing insurgency—historically a recipe for failure in COIN. Success will 
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require a discrete “jump” to gain the initiative, demonstrate progress in the short term, 

and secure long-term support.

Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it. Resourcing communicates commitment, but we must also balance force levels to enable effective 

ANSF partnering and provide population security, while avoiding perceptions of coalition dominance. Ideally, the ANSF must lead this fight, but they will not have enough 

capability in the near-term given the insurgency’s growth rate. In the interim, coalition 

forces must provide a bridge capability to protect critical segments of the population. 

The status quo will lead to failure if we wait for the ANSF to grow.

The new strategy will improve effectiveness through better application of existing assets, but it also requires additional resources. Broadly speaking, we require more civilian and military resources, more ANSF, and more ISR and other enablers. At the 

same time, we will find offsets as we reprogram other assets and improve efficiency. 

Overall, ISAF requires an increase in the total coalition force capability and endstrength. This “properly resourced” requirement will define the minimum force levels 

to accomplish the mission with an acceptable level of risk.

Unique Moment in Time

This is an important—and likely decisive—period of this war. Afghans are frustrated 

and weary after eight years without evidence of the progress they anticipated. Patience is understandably short, both in Afghanistan and in our own countries. Time 

matters; we must act now to reverse the negative trends and demonstrate progress.

I do not underestimate the enormous challenges in executing this new strategy; however, we have a key advantage: the majority of Afghans do not want a return of the 

Taliban. During consultations with Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, I found some of 

his writings insightful: 

“Victory is within our grasp, provided that we recommit ourselves based on lessons 

learned and provided that we fulfill the requirements needed to make success inevitable.... I reject the myth advanced in the media that Afghanistan is a ‘graveyard 

of empires’ and that the U.S. and NATO effort is destined to fail. Afghans have 

never seen you as occupiers, even though this has been the major focus of the 

enemy’s propaganda campaign. Unlike the Russians, who imposed a government 

with an alien ideology, you enabled us to write a democratic constitution and 

choose our own government. Unlike the Russians, who destroyed our country, you 

came to rebuild.”

Given that this conflict and country are his to win—not mine—Minister Wardak’s assessment was part of my calculus. While the situation is serious, success is still 

achievable. This starts with redefining both the fight itself and what we need for the 

fight. It is then sustained through a fundamentally new way of doing business. Finally, 

it will be realized when our new operational culture connects with the powerful will of 

the Afghan people.
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Initial Assessment

The situation in Afghanistan is serious. The mission is achievable, but success demands a fundamentally new approach—one that is properly resourced and supported 

by better unity of effort.

Important progress has been made, yet many indicators suggest the overall situation 

is deteriorating despite considerable effort by ISAF. The threat has grown steadily but 

subtly, and unchecked by commensurate counteraction, its severity now surpasses 

the capabilities of the current strategy. We cannot succeed simply by trying harder; 

ISAF must now adopt a fundamentally new approach. The entire culture—how ISAF 

understands the environment and defines the fight, how it interacts with the Afghan 

people and government, and how it operates both on the ground and within the coalition1—must change profoundly.

As announced by President Obama in his March 27, 2009 speech outlining the new 

U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the mission in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced, resulting in a culture of poverty that has plagued ISAF’s 

efforts to date. ISAF requires a properly-resourced force and capability level to correct 

this deficiency. Success is not ensured by additional forces alone, but continued 

under-resourcing will likely cause failure.

Nonetheless, it must be made clear: new resources are not the crux. To succeed, 

ISAF requires a new approach—with a significant magnitude of change—in addition 

to a proper level of resourcing. ISAF must restore confidence in the near-term through 

renewed commitment, intellectual energy, and visible progress.

This assessment prescribes two fundamental changes. First, ISAF must improve 

execution and the understanding of the basics of COIN—those essential elements 

common to any counterinsurgency strategy. Second, ISAF requires a new strategy to 

counter a growing threat. Both of these reforms are required to reverse the negative 

trends in Afghanistan and achieve success.

ISAF is not adequately executing the basics of counterinsurgency warfare. In particular, there are two fundamental elements where ISAF must improve:

•change the operational culture of USAF to focus on protecting the Afghan people, 

understanding their environment, and building relationships with them, and; 

•transform ISAF processes to be more operationally efficient and effective, creating more coherent unity of command within ISAF, and fostering stronger unity of 

effort across the international community. 

1“coalition” hereafter refers to ISAF’s coalition of troop and resources contributing nations
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Simultaneous to improving on these basic principles, ISAF must also adopt a profoundly new strategy with four fundamental pillars: 

•develop a significantly more effective and larger ANSF with radically expanded 

coalition force partnering at every echelon;

•prioritize responsive and accountable governance—that the Afghan people find 

acceptable—to be on par with, and integral to, delivering security;

•gain the initiative and reverse the insurgency’s momentum as the first imperative 

in a series of temporal stages, and;

•prioritize available resources to those critical areas where the population is most 

threatened.

There is nothing new about these principles of counterinsurgency and organizational 

efficacy. Rather, they represent profoundly renewed attention to pursuing the basic 

tenet of protecting the population specifically adapted for this diverse force and unique 

conflict, and targeted to work through the most challenging obstacles that have hindered previous efforts.

ISAF’s new strategy is consistent with the NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political 

Military Plan and supports the implementation of President Obama’s strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan. ISAF’s new approach will be nested within an integrated and properly-resourced 

civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy.

This will be enormously difficult. To execute this strategy, ISAF must use existing assets in innovative and unconventional ways, but ISAF will also require additional resources, forces and possibly even new authorities. All steps are imperative and time 

is of the essence. Patience will see the mission through; but to have that chance, real 

progress must be demonstrated in the near future.

I. Describing the Mission

ISAF’s mission statement is: “ISAF, in support of GIRoA, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in 

capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate 

improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a 

secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.”

Accomplishing this mission requires defeating the insurgency, which this paper defines as a condition where the insurgency no longer threatens the viability of the state.

GIRoA must sufficiently control its territory to support regional stability and prevent its 

use for international terrorism. Accomplishing this mission also requires a better un-
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derstanding of the nature of the conflict, a change in the basic operational culture, 

concepts and tactics, and a corresponding change in strategy.

NATO source documents2 have been consulted and the new strategy remains consistent with the NATO comprehensive approach. Existing UN mandates will continue to 

provide a framework for ISAF’s effort. The international military forces, their civilian 

counterparts, and international organizations are a key component of ISAF’s shared 

mission to support the people of Afghanistan. It is crucial that ISAF preserve, bolster, 

and help focus this diverse partnership.

II. Nature of the Conflict

While not a war in the conventional sense, the conflict in Afghanistan demands a 

similar focus and an equal level of effort, and the consequences of failure are just as 

grave. The fight also demands an improved and evolved level of understanding.

The conflict in Afghanistan is often described as a war of ideas and perceptions; this 

is true and demands important consideration. However, perceptions are generally 

derived from actions and real conditions, for example by the provision or a lack of 

security, governance, and economic opportunity. Thus the key to changing perceptions is to change the fundamental underlying truths. To be effective, the counterinsurgent cannot risk credibility by substituting the situation they desire for reality.

Redefining the Fight

The conflict in Afghanistan can be viewed as a set of related insurgencies, each of 

which is a complex system with multiple actors and a vast set of interconnecting relationships among those actors. The most important implication of this view is that no 

element of the conflict can be viewed in isolation—a change anywhere will affect everything else. This view implies that the system must be understood holistically, and 

while such understanding is not predictive, it will help to recognize general causal 

relationships.

The new strategy redefines the nature of the fight. It is not a cyclical, kinetic campaign 

based on a set “fighting season.” Rather it is a continuous, year-long effort to help 

GIRoA win the support of the people and counter insurgent coercion and intimidation.

There are five principal actors in this conflict: the Afghan population, GIRoA, ISAF, the 

insurgency, and the external “players.” It is important to begin with an understanding 

of each of these actors, starting with the most important: the people.

The people of Afghanistan represent many things in this conflict—an audience, an 

actor, and a source of leverage—but above all, they are the objective. The population 

can also be a source of strength and intelligence and provide resistance to the insur2A list of references is included as Annex I.
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gency. Alternatively, they can often change sides and provide tacit or real support to 

the insurgents. Communities make deliberate choices to resist, support, or allow insurgent influence. The reasons for these choices must be better understood.

GIRoA and ISAF have both failed to focus on this objective. The weakness of state 

institutions, malign actions of power brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of 

power by various officials, and ISAF’s own errors have given Afghans little reason to 

support their government. These problems have alienated large segments of the 

Afghan population. They do not trust GIRoA to provide their essential needs, such as 

security, justice, and basic services. This crisis of confidence, coupled with a distinct 

lack of economic and educational opportunity, has created fertile ground for the insurgency.

ISAF’s center of gravity is the will and ability to provide for the needs of the population “by, with, and through” the Afghan government. A foreign army alone cannot beat 

an insurgency; the insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan solution. This is 

their war and, in the end, ISAF’s competency will prove less decisive than GIRoA’s; 

eventual success requires capable Afghan governance capabilities and security 

forces. While these institutions are still developing, ISAF and the international community must provide substantial assistance to Afghanistan until the Afghan people 

make the decision to support their government and are capable of providing for their 

own security.

An isolating geography and a natural aversion to foreign intervention further works 

against ISAF. Historical grievances reinforce connections to tribal or ethnic identity 

and can diminish the appeal of a centralized state. All ethnicities, particularly the 

Pashtuns, have traditionally sought a degree of independence from the central government, particularly when it is not seen as acting in the best interests of the population. 

These and other factors result in elements of the population tolerating the insurgency 

and calling to push out foreigners.

Nonetheless, the Afghan people also expect appropriate governance, the delivery of 

basic services, and the provision of justice. The popular myth that Afghans do not 

want governance is overplayed—while Afghan society is rooted in tribal structures 

and ethnic identities, Afghans do have a sense of national identity.

However, these generalizations risk oversimplifying this uniquely complicated environment. The complex social landscape of Afghanistan is in many ways much more 

difficult to understand than Afghanistan’s enemies. Insurgent groups have been the 

focus of U.S. and allied intelligence for many years; however, ISAF has not sufficiently 

studied Afghanistan’s peoples, whose needs, identities and grievances vary from 

province to province and from valley to valley. This complex environment is challenging to understand, particularly for foreigners. For this strategy to succeed, ISAF leaders must redouble efforts to understand the social and political dynamics of areas in 

all regions of the country and take action that meets the needs of the people, and insist that GIRoA officials do the same. 
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Finally, either side can succeed in this conflict: GIRoA by securing the support of the 

people and the insurgents by controlling them. While this multifaceted model of the 

fight is centered on the people, it is not symmetrical: the insurgents can also succeed 

more simply by preventing GIRoA from achieving their goals before the international 

community becomes exhausted.

Two Main Threats: Insurgency and Crisis in Confidence

The ISAF mission faces two principal threats and is also subject to the influence of 

external actors.

The first threat is the existence of organized and determined insurgent groups working to expel international forces, separate the Afghan people from GIRoA, and gain 

control of the population.

The second threat, of a very different kind, is the crisis of popular confidence that 

springs from the weakness of GIRoA institutions, the unpunished abuse of power by 

corrupt officials and power brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement, and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity. ISAF errors have further compounded the problem. These factors generate recruits for the insurgent groups, elevate local conflicts and power-broker disputes to a national level, degrade the people’s 

security and quality-of-Iife, and undermine international will.

Addressing the external actors will enable success; however, insufficiently addressing 

either principle threat will result in failure.

Insurgent Groups

Most insurgent fighters are Afghans. They are directed by a small number of Afghan 

senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan. They are aided by foreign fighters, elements of some intelligence 

agencies, and international funding, resources, and training. Foreign fighters provide 

materiel, expertise, and ideological commitment.

The insurgents wage a “silent war” of fear, intimidation, and persuasion throughout 

the year—not just during the warmer weather “fighting season”—to gain control over 

the population. These efforts make possible, in many places, a Taliban “shadow government” that actively seeks to control the population and displace the national government and traditional power structures. Insurgent military operations attract more 

attention than this silent war but are only a supporting effort. Violent attacks are designed to weaken the government by demonstrating its inability to provide security, to 

fuel recruiting and financing efforts, to provoke reactions from ISAF that further alienate the population, and also to undermine public and political support for the ISAF 

mission in coalition capitals.

The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission are the Quetta Shura 

Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN), and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). 
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These groups coordinate activities loosely, often achieving significant unity of purpose and even some unity of effort, but they do not share a formal command-andcontrol structure. They also do not have a single overarching strategy or campaign 

plan. Each individual group, however, has a specific strategy, develops annual plans, 

and allocates resources accordingly. Each group has its own methods of developing 

and executing these plans and each has adapted over time. Despite the best efforts 

of GIRoA and ISAF, the insurgents currently have the initiative.

Insurgent Strategy and Campaign Design

The insurgents have two primary objectives: controlling the Afghan people and breaking the coalition’s will. Their aim is to expel international forces and influences and to 

supplant GIRoA. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Omar announces his guidance and intent for the coming year. . . . 

The key geographical objectives of the major insurgent groups are Kandahar City and 

Khowst Province. The QST has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches 

for several years and there are indications that their influence over the city and neighboring districts is significant and growing. HQN aims to regain eventually full control 

of its traditional base in Khowst, Paktia, and Paktika. HQN controls some of the key 

terrain around Khowst and can influence the population in the region. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s HiG maintains militant bases in Nangarhar, Nuristan, and Kunar, as well as 

Pakistan, but he also sustains political connections through HiG networks and aims to 

negotiate a major role in a future Taliban government. He does not currently have 

geographical objectives as is the case with the other groups.

All three insurgent groups require resources—mainly money and manpower. The 

QST derives funding from the narcotics trade and external donors. HQN similarly 

draws resources principally from Pakistan, Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups. HiG seeks control of mineral wealth and smuggling routes in the east.

Insurgent Lines of Operation

The QST’s main efforts focus on the governance line of operations. Security and information operations support these efforts. ISAF’s tendency to measure the enemy 

predominantly by kinetic events masks the true extent of insurgent activity and prevents an accurate assessment of the insurgents’ intentions, progress, and level of 

control of the population.
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Governance. The QST has a governing structure in Afghanistan under the rubric of 

the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They appoint shadow governors for most provinces, review their performance, and replace them periodically. They established a 

body to receive complaints against their own “officials” and to act on them. They 

install “shari’a” courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to 

provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local 

power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment. In short, the QST provides major elements of governance and 

a national and religious narrative. HQN and HIG coexist with, but do not necessarily 

accept, the QST governing framework and have yet to develop competing governing structures.

Information. Major insurgent groups outperform GIRoA and ISAF at information operations. Information operations drive many insurgent operations as they work to 

shape the cultural and religious narrative. They have carefully analyzed their audience and target products accordingly. They use their Pashtun identity, physical proximity to the population, and violent intimidation to deliver immediate and enduring 

messages with which ISAF and GIRoA have been unable to compete. They leverage 

this advantage by projecting the inevitability of their victory, a key source of their 

strength.

Security. Major insurgent groups use violence, coercion and intimidation against civilians to control the population. They seek to inflict casualties on ISAF forces to break 

the will of individual lSAF countries and the coalition as a whole. They also use military activities to shape ISAF actions by denying freedom of movement, denying access to the population, and defending important terrain. The insurgents use the psychological effects of IEDs and the coalition force’s preoccupation with force protection 

to reinforce the garrison posture and mentality. The major insurgent groups target 

GIRoA and ANSF to dissuade cooperation with the government and to show that 

GIRoA is ineffective. The insurgents control or contest a significant portion of the 

country, although it is difficult to assess precisely how much is due to a lack of ISAF 

presence. . . .

Social/Economic. The QST and other insurgent groups have deliberate social strategies that exacerbate the breakdown in Afghan social cohesion. They empower radical 

mullahs to replace local leaders, undermine or eliminate local elders and mullahs who 

do not support them, and consistently support weaker, disenfranchised, or threatened 

tribes or groups. They erode traditional social structures and capitalize on vast unemployment by empowering the young and disenfranchised through cash payments, 

weapons, and prestige.
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Insurgent Enablers and Vulnerabilities

Criminal networks. Criminality creates a pool of manpower, resources, and capabilities for insurgents and contributes to a pervasive sense of insecurity among the 

people. Extensive smuggling diverts major revenue from GIRoA. Criminality exacerbates the fragmentation of Afghan society and increases its susceptibility to insurgent 

penetration. A number of Afghan government officials, at all levels, are reported to be 

complicit in these activities, further undermining GIRoA credibility.

Narcotics and Financing. The most significant aspect of the production and sale of 

opium and other narcotics is the corrosive and destabilizing impact on corruption 

within GIRoA. Narcotics activity also funds insurgent groups, however the importance 

of this funding must be understood within the overall context of insurgent financing, 

some of which comes from other sources. Insurgent groups also receive substantial 

income from foreign donors as well as from other criminal activities within Afghanistan 

such as smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. Some insurgent groups “tax” the local 

population through checkpoints, demanding protection money, and other methods. 

Eliminating insurgent access to narco-profits—even if possible, and while disruptive—would not destroy their ability to operate so long as other funding sources remained intact.

Insurgent Vulnerabilities. The insurgents have important and exploitable shortcomings; 

they are not invulnerable. Command and control frictions and divergent goals hamper 

insurgent planning and restrict coordination of operations. . . . Insurgent excesses can 

alienate the people. Moreover, the core elements of the insurgency have previously 

held power in Afghanistan and failed. Popular enthusiasm for them appears limited, 

as does their ability to spread viably beyond Pashtun areas. GIRoA and ISAF have an 

opportunity to exploit the insurgent’s inability to mobilize public support.

In summary, ISAF confronts a loose federation of insurgent groups that are sophisticated, organized, adaptive, determined, and nuanced across all lines of operations, 

with many enablers, but not without vulnerability. These groups are dangerous and, if 

not effectively countered, could exhaust the coalition and prevent GIRoA from being 

able to govern the state of Afghanistan.

Crisis of Confidence in GIRoA and ISAF Actions

The Afghan government has made progress, yet serious problems remain. The 

people’s lack of trust in their government results from two key factors. First, some 

GIRoA officials have given preferential treatment to certain individuals, tribes, and 

groups or worse, abused their power at the expense of the people. Second, the Afghan government has been unable to provide sufficient security, justice, and basic 

services to the people. Although the capacity and integrity of some Afghan institutions 

have improved and the number of competent officials has grown, this progress has 

been insufficient to counter the issues that undermine legitimacy. These problems 

contribute to the Afghan government’s inability to gain the support of the Afghan 

population. ISAF errors also compound the problem.
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GIRoA State Weakness. There is little connection between the central government and the local populations, particularly in rural areas. The top-down approach to developing government capacity has failed to provide services that 

reach local communities. GIRoA has not developed the means to collect revenue 

and distribute resources. Subnational officials vary in competency and capability 

and most provincial and district governments are seriously undermanned and 

under-resourced.

The Afghan government has not integrated or supported traditional community governance structures—historically an important component of Afghan civil society—

leaving communities vulnerable to being undermined by insurgent groups and power 

brokers. The breakdown of social cohesion at the community level has increased instability, made Afghans feel unsafe, and fueled the insurgency.

Tolerance of Corruption and Abuse of Power. Widespread corruption and abuse 

of power exacerbate the popular crisis of confidence in the government and reinforce a culture of impunity. Local Afghan communities are unable to hold local 

officials accountable through either direct elections or judicial processes, especially when those Individuals are protected by senior government officials. Further, the public perceives that ISAF is complicit in these matters, and that there 

is no appetite or capacity—either among the internationals or within GIRoA—to 

correct the situation. The resulting public anger and alienation undermine ISAF’s 

ability to accomplish its mission. The QST’s establishment of ombudsmen to 

investigate abuse of power in its own cadres and remove those found guilty 

capitalizes on this GIRoA weakness and attracts popular support for their 

shadow government.

Afghan power brokers and factional leaders. Some local and regional power brokers were allies early in the conflict and now help control their own areas. Many 

are current or former members of GIRoA whose financial independence and loyal 

armed followers give them autonomy from GIRoA, further hindering efforts to 

build a coherent Afghan state. In most cases, their interests are not aligned with 

either the interests of the Afghan people or GIRoA, leading to conflicts that offer 

opportunities for insurgent groups to exploit. Finally, some of these power brokers hold positions in the ANSF, particularly the Afghan National Police (ANP), 

and have been major agents of corruption and illicit trafficking. ISAF’s relationship with these individuals can be problematic. Some are forces of stability in 

certain areas, but many others are polarizing and predatory.

There are no clear lines separating insurgent groups, criminal networks (including the 

narcotics networks), and corrupt GIRoA officials. Malign actors within GIRoA support 

insurgent groups directly, support criminal networks that are linked to insurgents, and 

support corruption that helps feed the insurgency.

ISAF Shortcomings. Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in 

local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power 

brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population. A focus by ISAF 
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intelligence on kinetic targeting and a failure to bring together what is known about the 

political and social realm have hindered ISAF’s comprehension of the critical aspects 

of Afghan society.

ISAF’s attitudes and actions have reinforced the Afghan people’s frustrations with 

the shortcomings of their government. Civilian casualties and collateral damage to 

homes and property resulting from an overreliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged ISAF’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. 

Further, poor unity of effort among ISAF, UNAMA, and the rest of the international 

community undermines their collective effectiveness, while failure to deliver on 

promises further alienates the people. Problematic contracting processes and insufficient oversight also reinforce the perception of corruption within ISAF and the international community.

In summary, the absence of personal and economic security, along with the erosion 

of public confidence in the government, and a perceived lack of respect for Afghan 

culture pose as great a challenge to ISAF’s success as the insurgent threat. Protecting the population is more than preventing insurgent violence and intimidation. It also 

means that ISAF can no longer ignore or tacitly accept abuse of power, corruption, or 

marginalization.

External Influences

Pakistan. Afghanistan’s insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders 

of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda 

and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of 

Pakistan’s ISI. AI Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan 

channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, 

and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support. AI Qaeda’s links with 

HQN have grown, suggesting that expanded HQN control could create a favorable 

environment for AQAM to reestablish safe havens in Afghanistan. Additionally, the 

ISAF mission In Afghanistan is reliant on ground supply routes through Pakistan that 

remain vulnerable to these threats.

Stability in Pakistan is essential, not only in its own right, but also to enable progress in Afghanistan. While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not 

guarantee ISAF failure, Afghanistan does require Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against those groups active in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the insurgency in Afghanistan is predominantly Afghan. By 

defending the population, improving subnational governance, and giving disenfranchised rural communities a voice in their government, GIRoA—with support 

from ISAF—can strengthen Afghanistan against both domestic and foreign insurgent penetration. Reintegrating communities and individuals into the political 

system can help reduce the insurgency’s virulence to a point where it is no longer 

an existential threat to GIRoA.
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India. Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including 

significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities 

largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely 

to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.

Iran. Iran plays an ambiguous role in Afghanistan, providing developmental assistance and political support to GIRoA while the Iranian Qods Force is reportedly training fighters for certain Taliban groups and providing other forms of military assistance 

to insurgents. Iran’s current policies and actions do not pose a short-term threat to the 

mission, but Iran has the capability to threaten the mission in the future. Pakistan may 

see Iranian economic and political initiatives as threats to their strategic interests, and 

may continue to address these issues in ways that are counterproductive to the ISAF 

effort.

Russia/Central Asia. Afghanistan’s northern neighbors have enduring interests in, 

and influence over, particular segments of Afghanistan. They pursue objectives that 

are not necessarily congruent to ISAF’s mission. ISAF’s Northern Distribution Network and logistical hubs are dependent upon support from Russian and Central Asian 

States, giving them the potential to act as either spoilers or positive influences.

III. Getting the Basics Right

ISAF is not adequately executing the basics of COIN doctrine. Thus the first major 

recommendation of this assessment is to change and focus on that which ISAF has 

the most control of: ISAF. The coalition must hold itself accountable before it can attempt to do so with others. Specifically, ISAF will focus on two major changes to improve execution of COIN fundamentals and enhance organizational alignment and 

efficacy:

•ISAF will change its operating culture to pursue a counterinsurgency approach 

that puts the Afghan people first. While the insurgency can afford to lose fighters 

and leaders, it cannot afford to lose control of the population.

•ISAF will change the way it does business to improve unity of command within 

ISAF, seek to improve unity of effort with the international community, and to use 

resources more effectively.

New Operational Culture: Population-Centric COIN

ISAF must operate differently. Preoccupied with force protection, ISAF has operated 

in a manner that distances itself, both physically and psychologically, from the people 

they seek to protect. The Afghan people have paid the price, and the mission has 

been put at risk. ISAF, with the ANSF, must shift its approach to bring security and 

normalcy to the people and shield them from insurgent violence, corruption and coer-
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cion, ultimately enabling GIRoA to gain the trust and confidence of the people while 

reducing the influence of insurgents. Hard-earned credibility and face-to-face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan 

counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level through dynamic 

partnership, engaged leadership, decentralized decision making, and a fundamental 

shift in priorities.

Improve Understanding. ISAF—military and civilian personnel alike—must acquire a 

far better understanding of Afghanistan and its people. ISAF personnel must be seen 

as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army. Key 

personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages. Tour lengths should be 

long enough to build continuity and ownership of success. AII ISAF personnel must 

show respect for local cultures and customs and demonstrate intellectual curiosity 

about the people of Afghanistan. The United States should fully implement—and encourage other nations to emulate—the “Afghan Hands” program that recruits and 

maintains a cadre of military and civilian practitioners and outside experts with deep 

knowledge of Afghanistan.

Build Relationships. In order to be successful as counterinsurgents, ISAF must alter 

its operational culture to focus on building personal relationships with its Afghan 

partners and the protected population. To gain accurate information and intelligence 

about the local environment, ISAF must spend as much time as possible with the 

people and as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases. ISAF personnel must seek out, understand, and act to address the needs and grievances of the people in their local environment. Strong 

personal relationships forged between security forces and local populations will be 

a key to success.

Project Confidence. Creating a perception of security is imperative if the local 

population is to “buy-in” and invest in the institutions of governance and step 

forward with local solutions. When ISAF forces travel through even the most secure areas of Afghanistan firmly ensconced in armored vehicles with body armor 

and turrets manned, they convey a sense of high risk and fear to the population. 

ISAF cannot expect unarmed Afghans to feel secure before heavily armed ISAF 

forces do. ISAF cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, 

with the people.

In fact, once the risk is shared, effective force protection will come from the 

people, and the overall risk can actually be reduced by operating differently. The 

more coalition forces are seen and known by the local population, the more their 

threat will be reduced. Adjusting force protection measures to local conditions 

sends a powerful message of confidence and normalcy to the population. Subordinate commanders must have greater freedom with respect to setting force protection measures they employ in order to help close the gap between security 

forces and the people they protect. Arguably, giving leaders greater flexibility to 

adjust force protection measures could expose military personnel and civilians to 
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greater risk in the near term; however, historical experiences in counterinsurgency warfare, coupled with the above mitigation, suggests that accepting some 

risk in the short term will ultimately save lives in the long run.

Decentralize. To be effective, commanders and their civilian partners must have authorities to use resources flexibly—and on their own initiative—as opportunities arise, 

while maintaining appropriate accountability measures. ISAF must strike the right balance between control and initiative, but err on the side of initiative. Mistakes will inevitably be made, but a culture of excessive bureaucracy designed with the best of 

intentions will be far more costly in blood and treasure.

Reintegration and Reconciliation. Insurgencies of this nature typically conclude 

through military operations and political efforts driving some degree of host-nation 

reconciliation with elements of the insurgency. In the Afghan conflict, reconciliation 

may involve GIRoA-led, high-level political settlements. This is not within the domain 

of ISAF’s responsibilities, but ISAF must be in a position to support appropriate Afghan reconciliation policies.

Reintegration is a normal component of counterinsurgency warfare. It is qualitatively 

different from reconciliation and is a critical part of the new strategy. As coalition operations proceed, insurgents will have three choices: fight, flee, or reintegrate. ISAF 

must identify opportunities to reintegrate former mid- to low-level insurgent fighters 

into normal society by offering them a way out. To do so, ISAF requires a credible 

program to offer eligible insurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return 

to normalcy, possibly including the provision of employment and protection. Such a 

program will require resources and focus, as appropriate, on people’s future rather 

than past behavior. ISAF’s soldiers will be required to think about COIN operations 

differently, in that there are now three outcomes instead of two: enemy may be killed, 

captured, or reintegrated.

In executing a reintegration program, ISAF will necessarily assume decentralized authorities, in coordination with GIRoA, for ISAF field commanders to support the reintegration of fighters and low-level leaders. Local leaders are critical figures in any reintegration efforts and must be free to make the decisions that bind their entire 

community.

Economic Support to Counterinsurgency. ISAF has an important asymmetric advantage; it can aid the local economy, along with its civilian counterparts, in ways 

that the insurgents cannot. Local development can change incentive structures 

and increase stability in communities. Economic opportunity, especially job creation, is a critical part of reintegrating the foot-soldier into normal life. Economic 

support to counterinsurgency is distinct from and cannot substitute for longerterm development initiatives. With some coordination it can lay the groundwork 

for, and complement, those longer-term efforts and show that the Afghan government is active at the local level. ISAF must increase the flexibility and responsive-
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ness of funding programs to enable commanders and their civilian partners to 

make immediate economic and quality of life improvements in accordance with 

Afghan priorities.

Improve Unity of Effort and Command

ISAF’s subordinate headquarters must stop fighting separate campaigns. Under the 

existing structure, some components are not effectively organized and multiple headquarters fail to achieve either unity of command or unity of effort.

The establishment of an intermediate operational headquarters is the first step toward 

rectifying these problems. This new headquarters will enable the ISAF headquarters 

to focus on strategic and operational matters and enhance coordination with GIRoA, 

UNAMA, and the international community. The intermediate headquarters will synchronize operational activities and local civil-military coordination and ensure a shared 

understanding of the mission throughout the force. The intermediate headquarters 

must be supported with increased information collection and analysis capabilities to 

improve significantly ISAF’s understanding of the political, cultural, social, and economic dynamics.

The intermediate headquarters will also provide command and control for all ANSF 

mentor teams, enabling CSTC-A and the new NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan 

(NTM-A) to focus on ANSF institution-building, force generation, force sustainment, 

and leader development. Command relationships must be clarified so that battle space 

owners at every echelon can synchronize operations in accordance with ISAF priorities, with effective control of all operations in their area of operations, to include 

theaterwide forces, SOF, and mentoring teams. Mechanisms must be established at 

all echelons to integrate information from ISAF, ANSF, GIRoA, and other actors. Additional changes are required to address the myriad of other command and control challenges and parochial interests that have emerged over time. ISAF must continue to 

confront these challenges internally and in partnership with NATO and national capitals.

IV. A Strategy for Success

Success will be achieved when GIRoA has earned the support of the powerful Afghan 

people and effectively controls its own territory. This will not come easily or quickly. It 

is realistic to expect that Afghan and coalition casualties will increase until GIRoA and 

ISAF regain the initiative.

ISAF’s strategy to defeat the insurgency and achieve this end state, based on an indepth analysis of the nature of the conflict, includes four major pillars:

•ISAF will become radically more integrated and partnered with the ANSF to enable a more rapid expansion of their capacity and responsibility for security.

•ISAF will place support to responsive and accountable governance, including 

subnational and community governance, on par with security.
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•ISAF’s operations will focus first on gaining the initiative and reversing the momentum of the insurgency.

•ISAF will prioritize available resources to those critical areas where the population is most threatened.

1. Increase partnership with the ANSF to increase size and capabilities

Radically Expanded and Embedded Partnering. Success will require trust-based, 

expanded partnering with the ANSF with assigned relationships at all echelons to 

improve effectiveness of the ANSF. Neither the Afghan National Army (ANA) nor 

the ANP is sufficiently effective. ISAF must place far more emphasis on ANSF 

development in every aspect of daily operations. ISAF will integrate headquarters and enablers with ANA units to execute a full partnership, with the shared 

goal of working together to bring security to the Afghan people. ISAF units will 

physically colocate with the ANSF, establish the same battle rhythm, and plan 

and execute operations together. This initiative will increase ANSF force quality 

and accelerate their ownership of Afghanistan’s security.

Accelerated Growth. The ANA must accelerate growth to the present target 

strength of 134,000 by Fall 2010, with the institutional flexibility to continue that 

growth to a new target ceiling of 240,000. The target strength of the ANP must be 

raised to 160,000. This will require additional mentors, trainers, partners and 

funds through an expanded participation by GIRoA, the support of ISAF, and the 

resources oftroop contributing and donor nations.

The ANP suffers from a lack of training, leaders, resources, equipment, and mentoring. Effective policing is inhibited by the absence of a working system of justice or 

dispute resolution; poor pay has also encouraged corruption. Substantial reform with 

appropriate resources—and possibly even new authorities—are critically important 

and must not be delayed.

GIRoA and ISAF will evaluate the utility of using locally-based security initiatives 

such as the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), where appropriate conditions exist, to create village-level indigenous security in partnership with GIRoA 

and local shuras.

Detainee Operations. Effective detainee operations are essential to success. The 

ability to remove insurgents from the battlefield is critical to effective protection of the 

population. Further, the precision demanded in effective counterinsurgency operations must be intelligence-driven; detainee operations are a critical part of this. Getting the right information and evidence from those detained in military operations is 

also necessary to support rule of law and reintegration programs and help ensure that 

only insurgents are detained and civilians are not unduly affected.

Detainee operations are both complex and politically sensitive. There are strategic 

vulnerabilities in a non-Afghan system. By contrast, an Afghan system reinforces their 

sense of sovereignty and responsibility. As always, the detention process must be 
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effective in providing key intelligence and avoid “catch and release” approaches that 

endanger coalition and ANSF forces. It is therefore imperative to evolve to a more 

holistic model centered on an Afghan-run system. This will require a comprehensive 

system that addresses the entire “life cycle” and extends from point of capture to 

eventual reintegration or prosecution.

ISAF has completed a full review of current detainee policies and practices with 

recommendations for substantial revisions to complement ISAF’s revised 

strategy. Key elements of a new detention policy should include transferring responsibility for long-term detention of insurgents to GIRoA, establishing procedures with GIRoA for ISAF access to detainees for interrogation within the bounds 

of national caveats, application of counter-radicalization and disengagement 

practices, and training of ISAF forces to better collect intelligence for continued 

operations and evidence for prosecution in the Afghan judicial system. Afghanistan must develop detention capabilities and operations that respect the Afghan 

people. A failure to address GIRoA incapacity in this area presents a serious risk 

to the mission.

2. Facilitating Afghan governance and mitigating the effects of malign 

actors

Success requires a stronger Afghan government that is seen by the Afghan people as 

working in their interests. Success does not require perfection—an improvement in 

governance that addresses the worst of today’s high-level abuse of power, low-level 

corruption, and bureaucratic incapacity will suffice.

Learning from and leveraging the elections. The recent Presidential and Provincial Council elections were far from perfect. From a security standpoint, they 

were generally executed smoothly and without major physical disruption, although the credibility of the election results remains an open question. The countrywide spike in violence against ISAF and ANSF, with three to four times the average 

number of attacks, underscores the widespread reach of insurgent influence, 

particularly in the south and the east and in select areas of the north and west. 

However, the relatively low number of effective attacks against polling centers 

offers some evidence that insurgents were targeting ISAF and ANSF, not the voters. The Afghans’ ability to plan and execute the elections, along with the close 

partnering between ISAF and ANSF, and the mass deployment of security forces 

were notable achievements nonetheless. The elections were also an opportunity, and 

a forcing function, that will help to improve future coordination within the ANSF and 

expand ISAF’s partnership with GIRoA and the international community.

Supporting local governance. Elements of Afghan society, particularly rural populations, have been excluded from the political process. ISAF must support UNAMA and 

the international community in subnational governance reform by working directly 

with local communities, starting by assessing Afghan civilian needs by population 

center and developing partnerships to act on them. By empowering local communities, GIRoA, supported by ISAF, can encourage them to support the political system. 
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District elections and the civilian resources deployed to Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams, District Support Teams, and ISAF task forces will also help build legitimate 

governance structures at the subnational levels.

Efforts are under way that may address some of these issues, including those 

that have been cultivated through the National Solidarity Program and the Afghan 

Social Outreach Program. These structures will enable improvements at the 

community level to link communities with the national government over time. In 

addition, GIRoA’s proposed subnational governance policy aims to give greater 

authority and responsibility to the elected councils and to clarify their relationships with governors and individual line ministries. The U.S. Government Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan also provides a basis for improving subnational 

governance at every level—provided it is appropriately staffed and resourced. 

Similar coordinated action is also required from other partner governments. Similarly, the request for support from the Ministry of Finance for civilian technical 

assistance must be welcomed and met. Indeed, ISAF and the international community must support the acceleration of these efforts, while recognizing that additional legislative initiatives may be required.

Negative Influencers. ISAF must understand and address underlying factors that encourage malign behavior and undermine governance. The narco- and illicit economy 

and the extortion associated with large-scale developmental projects undermine the 

economy in Afghanistan. GIRoA cannot fund its operations because of its inability to 

raise revenue, a situation made worse by the illicit economy. Poorly paid officials may 

resort to petty corruption, contributing to the people’s crisis in confidence. The international community must appropriately supplement revenues until these problems are 

addressed. ISAF must also change its concept of the “border fight” . . . to expanding 

GIRoA’s revenue base through improved border control and customs collection.

Discerning Support. ISAF must develop a discerning approach that rewards competent Afghan governance and leadership, recognizes the distinction between incapacity 

and predatory behavior, and leverages ISAF’s influence to address both challenges. 

ISAF and its partners must develop appropriate measures to reduce the incentives for 

corrupt actors that impede the mission, work around them if necessary, and develop 

actionable evidence of their malfeasance. Improving information collection and 

analysis will provide better understanding of the motivations, practices, and effects 

of corruption.

Transparency and Accountability. ISAF must work with UNAMA and the international community to build public finance mechanisms that enable GIRoA to create 

credible programs and allocate resources according to the needs of the Afghan 

people. The international community must address its own corrupt or counterproductive practices, including reducing the amount of development money that 

goes toward overhead and intermediaries rather than the Afghan people. A recent OXFAM report indicates that a significant percentage of such funding is diverted. ISAF must pay particular attention to how development projects are contracted and to whom. Too often these projects enrich power brokers, corrupt 

officials or international contractors, and serve only limited segments of the popula-
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tion. Improving ISAF’s knowledge of the environment and sharing this information with UNAMA and the international community will help mitigate such harmful 

practices.

ISAF will provide economic support to counterinsurgency operations to help provide 

a bridge to critical developmental projects in priority areas that UN agencies and the 

international community cannot reach, while working closely with UNAMA to help set 

conditions for NGOs to enter stabilized areas.

Rule of Law. Finally, ISAF must work with its civilian and international counterparts to enable justice sector reform and locate resources for formal and informal 

justice systems that offer swift and fair resolution of disputes, particularly at the 

local level. The provision of local justice, to include such initiatives as mobile 

courts, will be a critical enhancement of Afghan capacity in the eyes of the people. 

ISAF must work with GIRoA to develop a clear mandate and boundaries for local 

informal justice systems.

3. Gain the initiative and evolve in stages

ISAF’s new strategy will include three stages. These stages will unfold at different 

rates and times in different geographic areas of Afghanistan. Most importantly, they 

will be led increasingly by the Afghan people and their government.

Gain the Initiative. First, ISAF must refocus its operations to gain the initiative in seriously threatened, populated areas by working directly with GIRoA institutions and 

people in local communities to gain their support and to diminish insurgent access 

and influence. This stage is clearly decisive to the overall effort. It will require sufficient 

resources to gain the initiative and definitively check the insurgency. A failure to reverse the momentum of the insurgency will not only preclude success in Afghanistan, 

it will result in a loss of public and political support outside Afghanistan.

In this stage, ISAF will take a new approach to integrate fully with the ANSF through 

extensive partnering. This will enable improved effectiveness and a more rapid growth 

of ANSF capability. Together with UNAMA and the international community, ISAF will 

work with all levels of GIRoA to expand substantially responsive and accountable 

governance that focuses on the needs of the people. Finally, there must be full international community support and commitment to the full range of civil-military capabilities concentrated in the priority areas.

Strategic Consolidation. As ISAF and ANSF capabilities grow over the next 12–24 

months and the insurgency diminishes in critical areas, ISAF will begin a second 

stage—a strategic consolidation. As ANSF and GIRoA increasingly take the lead for 

security operations and as new civilian and military capacity arrives, security operations will expand to wider areas while consolidating initial gains. These efforts will increase the space in which the population feels protected and served by their government, and insulate them from a return of insurgent influence. Meanwhile, ANSF and 
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ISAF must have the capability to respond flexibly to insurgent adaptation and retain 

the initiative.

Sustained Security. When the insurgent groups no longer pose an existential threat to 

GIRoA, ISAF will move into a third stage of sustained security to ensure achieved 

gains are durable as ISAF forces begin to draw down. As ANSF demonstrate the capability to defeat remaining pockets of insurgents on their own, ISAF will transition to 

a train, advise, and assist role. UNAMA and the international community will have increased freedom of action to continue to help develop the Afghan state and meet the 

needs of the Afghan people.

In all of these stages, the insurgents will adapt, possibly moving their operations to 

different areas. This risk is mitigated by the fact that the insurgents are weakened 

when forced to relocate from their traditional areas; the burden of migration, renewed 

recruiting, and reestablishing a stronghold will incur a cost to the insurgents. ISAF 

must have the capability to respond to these adaptations.

4. Prioritize allocation of resources to threatened populations

In a country as large and complex as Afghanistan, ISAF cannot be strong everywhere. ISAF must focus its full range of civilian and military resources where they will 

have the greatest effect on the people. This will generally be in those specific geographical areas that represent key terrain. For the counterinsurgent, the key terrain is 

generally where the population lives and works. This is also where the insurgents are 

typically focused; thus, it is here where the population is threatened by the enemy and 

that the two sides inevitably meet. ISAF will initially focus on critical high-population 

areas that are contested or controlled by insurgents, not because the enemy is present, but because it is here that the population is threatened by the insurgency.

The geographical deployment of forces may not be static; ISAF must retain the operational flexibility to adapt to changes in the environment. Based on current assessments, ISAF prioritizes the effort in Afghanistan into three categories to guide the allocation of resources. These priorities will evolve over time as conditions on the 

ground change. . . .

V. Assessments: Measuring Progress

ISAF must develop effective assessment architectures, in concert with civilian 

partners and home nations, to measure the effects of the strategy, assess progress toward key objectives, and make necessary adjustments. ISAF must identify 

and refine appropriate indicators to assess progress, clarifying the difference between operational measures of effectiveness critical to practitioners on the 

ground and strategic measures more appropriate to national capitals. Because 

the mission depends on GIRoA, ISAF must also develop clear metrics to assess 

progress in governance.
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VI. Resources and Risk

Proper resourcing will be critical. The campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today—ISAF is operating in a culture of 

poverty.

Consequently, ISAF requires more forces. This increase partially reflects previously 

validated,

 yet unsourced, requirements. This also stems from the new mix of capabilities essential to execute the new strategy. Some efficiency will be gained through 

better use of ISAF’s existing resources, eliminating redundancy, and the leveraging of 

ANSF growth, increases in GIRoA capacity, international community resources, and 

the population itself. Nonetheless, ISAF requires capabilities and resources well in 

excess of these efficiency gains. The greater resources will not be sufficient to achieve 

success, but will enable implementation of the new strategy. Conversely, inadequate 

resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission 

should not be resourced.

A “properly-resourced” strategy provides the means deemed necessary to accomplish 

the mission with appropriate and acceptable risk. In the case of Afghanistan, this level 

of resourcing is less than the amount that is required to secure the whole country. By 

comparison, a “fully-resourced” strategy could achieve low risk, but this would be 

excessive in the final analysis. Some areas are more consequential for the survival of 

GIRoA than others.

The determination of what constitutes “properly-resourced” will be based on 

force-density doctrine applied with best military judgment of factors such as terrain, location and accessibility of the population, intensity of the threats, the effects of ISR capabilities and other enablers, logistical constraints, and historical 

experience. As always, assessment of risk will necessarily include subjective 

professional judgment. Under-resourcing COIN is perilous because the insurgent 

has the advantage of mobility whereas security forces become relatively fixed 

after securing an area. Force density doctrine is based in historical analysis and 

suggests that a certain presence of security forces is required to achieve a critical threshold that overmatches the insurgents’ ability to leverage their mobility. In 

short, a “properly-resourced” strategy places enough things, in enough places, 

for enough time. All three are mandatory.

A “properly-resourced” strategy is imperative. Resourcing coalition forces below 

this level will leave critical areas of Afghanistan open to insurgent influence while 

the ANSF grows. Thus, the first stage of the strategy will be unachievable, leaving GIRoA and ISAF unable to execute the decisive second stage. In addition, the 

international community is unlikely to have the access necessary to facilitate effective Afghan governance in contested areas. Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and, 

ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely 

to result in mission failure.
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Civilian Capacity. ISAF cannot succeed without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts to support the change in strategy and capitalize on the expansion and acceleration of counterinsurgency efforts. Effective civilian capabilities and resourcing mechanisms are critical to achieving demonstrable progress. The relative level of civilian 

resources must be balanced with security forces, lest gains in security outpace civilian capacity for governance and economic improvements. In particular, ensuring 

alignment of resources for immediate and rapid expansion into newly secured areas 

will require integrated civil-military planning teams that establish mechanisms for 

rapid response. In addition, extensive work is required to ensure international and 

host nation partners are engaged and fully integrated.

ISAF’s efforts in Afghanistan must be directed through its Afghan counterparts to 

enable them to succeed in the long term. Working within Afghan constructs, fostering Afghan solutions, and building Afghan capacity are essential. Particular 

focus is required at the community level where the insurgency draws its strength 

through coercion and exploitation of the people’s dissatisfaction with their government and local conditions. Focusing on the community can drive a wedge 

between the insurgents and the people, giving them the freedom and incentive to 

support the Afghan government.

Some of the additional civilian experts will partner with ISAF task forces or serve on 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Others will work with new District Support Teams as 

necessary to support this strategy. As necessary, ISAF must facilitate performance of 

civil-military functions wherever civilian capacity is lacking, the arrival of the civilians 

is delayed, or the authorities that the civilians bring prove insufficient. ISAF will welcome the introduction of any new civilian funding streams, but must be prepared to 

make up the difference using military funding as necessary.

Risks. No strategy can guarantee success. A number of risks outside of ISAF’s control 

could undermine the mission, to include a loss of coalition political will, insufficient 

ability and political will on GIRoA’s part to win the support of its people and to control 

its territory, failure to provide effective civilian capabilities by ISAF’s partners, significant improvements or adaptations by insurgent groups, and actions of external actors 

such as Pakistan and Iran.

VII. Conclusion

The situation in Afghanistan is serious. The mission can be accomplished, but this will 

require two fundamental changes. First, ISAF must focus on getting the basics right 

to achieve a new, population-centric operational culture and better unity of effort. 

Second, ISAF must also adopt a new strategy, one that is properly resourced, to 

radically increase partnership with the ANSF, emphasize governance, prioritize resources where the population is threatened, and gain the initiative from the insurgency. This will entail significant near-term cost and risk; however, the long-term risk 
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of not executing this strategy is greater. The U.S. Strategy and NATO mission for Afghanistan both call for a committed and comprehensive approach to the strategic 

threat of an unsecure and unstable Afghanistan. Through proper resourcing, rigorous 

implementation, and sustained political will, this refocused strategy offers ISAF the 

best prospect for success in this important mission.
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Annex A: Military Plans

Background

ISAF CJ5, Plans and Strategy, conducted an analysis of the current campaign plan . . ., 

supporting plans, and orders to determine whether the strategy and means provided 

are adequate to accomplish the desired endstate. Many elements . . . are deemed to 

be adequate; however, there are gaps in the operational design.

Scope

A multidisciplinary Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG) was formed to conduct 

a thorough assessment of the ISAF counterinsurgency campaign strategy. The JOPG 

conducted a detailed analysis of both the ISAF OPLAN and OPORD. . . . Previous 

versions of these orders were also analyzed to ascertain the rationale for successive 

versions. Analysis was also conducted . . . to confirm that the ISAF OPLAN and 

OPORD followed the guiding principles contained in the higher headquarters frameworks. The JOPG also reviewed the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and 

the UNAMA mandate. Other documents were also consulted and analyzed, including 

the draft U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to 

Afghanistan. These efforts were complemented by an analysis of the seasonal, agricultural, and narcotic cycles as they relate to the historic operational cycle of insurgent forces to ensure that the subsequent recommendations were situated within a 

real world timeline. There was significant linkage to three other work efforts being 

conducted under the Initial Assessment:

1. The “Troops to Task” Working Group determining the resource requirements and allocation of forces and capabilities.

2. The Initial Assessment Working Group tasked with examining the overarching strategy.

3. The ANSF Expansion Working Group tasked with determining the feasibility for rapid growth of GIRoA security capacity.

Key Findings

a. . . . This OPLAN explicitly states that it serves as the campaign plan for ISAF. 

Contained within this OPLAN is a clear mission and intent, supported by four 

Lines of Operation (LoO): Security (lead responsibility), Governance (supporting 

effort), Development (supporting effort), and Strategic Communication 

(supporting effort). Associated with these LoO are ten effects. These effects are 

broadly phrased and are not linked with Decisive Points (DP)/Decisive Conditions 

(DC). This missing element of operational design is crucial, as it should be used 

to generate associated actions (tasks and purposes) for the OPORD. Similarly, 

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)/Measures of Performance (MOP) should 
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inform assessments, demonstrating progress along the various LoO. Without this 

linkage, it is exceptionally difficult to provide accurate advice to the commander 

to inform optimal decisions on forces, resources, and tasks to continue on the 

projected path to achieve the desired endstate.

b. . . . The OPORD contains much detail but does not explicitly link the Regional 

Commands (RC) operations under a coherent, single, nationwide strategy. This is 

one of the critical deficiencies of the existing OPORD. The following observations 

are provided:

i. The mission and intent contained in the OPORD are broadly phrased, 

covering all lines of operation contained in the OPLAN, but it provides 

insufficient guidance for Regional Commanders to achieve unity of effort.

ii. The Shape/Clear/Hold/Build construct . . . provides the rudimentary 

elements of an operational framework that forms the basis for the tasks 

contained in the OPORD.

iii. The OPORD is exceptionally detailed and complex. Within the Main Body 

alone, 47 tasks are directed toward the Regional Commands and ISAF 

Special Operations Forces (SOF). There are an additional 50 tasks found 

throughout the OPORD annexes. There is no clear prioritization of the tasks 

within the OPORD.

c. OPLAN and OPORD Development. Analysis of the successive versions of 

. . . the OPORD indicate that each refinement sought to generate increased 

synchronization and clarity of tasks. The various staffs that generated 

these modifications were attempting to refine inherited products to produce 

improved linkages. Viewed independently, both the OPLAN and the OPORD 

are good products; however, the linkage from higher strategy down to specific 

tasks remains tenuous. Specifically, prioritization and synchronization have 

become unclear. Substance exists in both the OPLAN and the OPORD; 

however, they are now overly complex, necessitating revision and alignment. 

d. Prioritization. The lack of clear prioritization of tasks in the OPORD has 

allowed each of the five subordinate RCs to develop OPORDs with a slightly 

different emphasis. Some flexibility appears to be a key part of the OPORD 

design, allowing for sufficient variance between RCs to align toward the 

specific threats faced in their region. While minor variations were anticipated, 

a deeper examination shows a lack of coherence within the Security LoO 

between RCs. The OPORD allows RCs to determine their prioritization and 

focus within this “Iead effort” LoO, with emphasis on protecting the population, 

growing security capacity, and/or combating insurgents (or other Enemies 

of Afghanistan). The diversity of Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) further 

increases variance and differences of interpretation across the force. The 

multiplicity of priorities (e.g., Focus Areas, Action Districts, Priority Action 
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Districts, and Focused District Development) seemingly makes “everything” 

important. 

e. Synchronization. Although the OPORD attempts to generate synchronization, 

the variation in interpretation and prioritization of effort hinders development 

of the necessary synergy. Synchronization across the theater should provide 

a greater opportunity for the generation of collective effects across all LoO, 

but is not currently achieved. The lack of prioritization makes synchronization 

exceptionally difficult.

f. Assessments. The campaign assessment construct uses a methodology to 

measure effectiveness of operations along the LoO described in the OPLAN. 

The current assessment provides a broad measure of progress that requires 

substantial interpretation to determine interrelationships among the various 

aspects within the LoO. The current campaign design does not utilize decisive 

points or milestones within the broad effects; accordingly, it is difficult to assess 

progress along a LoO. This does not assist the Commander in evaluating where 

changes in strategy or main effort may be required.

g. Supporting Plans and Annexes

i. Counternarcotics (CN). It is clear that CN efforts were not fully integrated 

into the counterinsurgency campaign; efforts were collaborative but 

not centrally coordinated. Substantial intelligence points directly at the 

Afghanistan narcotics industry as a significant economic enabler for the 

insurgency. The ISAF mandate, with its clear security focus and individual 

TCN caveats, coupled with the ubiquitous nature of the narcotics problem, 

clearly limited CN efforts by ISAF forces. CN engagement has increased 

significantly since the Budapest Summit which called upon NATO and TCN 

to grant sufficient legal authority to increase ISAF assistance to GIRoA to 

execute the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. With the clarification of 

legal authorities, Annex RR–Counter Narcotics was integrated. . . . The RCs 

are currently developing supporting plans to address the 2010 opium poppy 

season. Though CN efforts are improving, they must be fully integrated into 

the overall plan.

ii. ISAF and ANSF Partnering and Mentoring. Partnering continues to evolve. 

Efforts to formalize the partnership between ISAF and ANSF can be traced to 

June 2008. It took until Nov 2008 to develop the framework for the plan and 

issue the fragmentary order (FRAGO) . . . directing this effort. The FRAGO 

sought to create a baseline for both partnering operations and reporting 

requirements; RCs continue to progress toward the objectives described in 

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the FRAGO; however, they are hampered by the lack of clarity expressed in 

the operational design.

h. Operational Environment. Elements of the operational environment dictate 

the operational cycle of the insurgency. It is critical to consider the seasonal, 

agricultural, and narcotic cycles, as well as the religious calendar and external 

events like Pakistani military operations in the border area, in order to refine 

the campaign design. Traditionally, insurgents have used the winter months to 

reorganize and prepare for the “fighting” season which coincides with improving 

weather. Generally, ISAF forces have matched the insurgent’s operational cycle 

each year. Without a significant change, ISAF will remain in consonance with this 

cycle. This winter, there is an opportunity to break our inadvertent operational 

synchronicity with the insurgents. The new operational design must be linked 

to “real world” event cycles rather than being considered in abstract and place 

greater emphasis on nonkinetic operations, noting that the insurgency remains 

active within the population even when kinetic operations are greatly reduced 

during the winter.

i. Command Relationships. Although indirectly related to the analysis 

of the campaign design, command relationships are a key element to 

synchronization of efforts under the lines of operation provided in the ISAF 

OPORD and OPLAN. Within campaign design, the link between operational 

design and operational management is provided by operational command; 

accordingly a review of operational plans should also consider the relevant 

command relationships. The ISAF upper command and control arrangements 

are undergoing restructuring concurrently with the Initial Assessment. 

Clarification of the relationship between the evolving four-star ISAF HQ and 

the new three-star ISAF Joint Command (IJC) will assist significantly in the 

synchronization of efforts across the campaign. The transition of CSTC-A/

DATES to NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) in the same 

timeframe as the formation of the IJC brings an opportunity to achieve a 

fully coordinated new operational level command structure with associated 

realignment of subordinate elements (e.g., Operational Mentoring and 

Liaison Teams [OMLTs] and Embedded Training Teams [ETTs]). Realignment 

of these relationships necessitates an operational design that considers the 

new command lines provided to COMISAF. Efficient command and control 

alignment will enhance execution of the revised operational design.

Recommendations

a. OPLAN 38302. Retain major elements of the OPLAN as the base 

document that frames the ISAF Campaign Plan. The document is sufficient to 

complement the efforts of external agencies (e.g., GIRoA and UNAMA) along 

the supporting LoO of Governance and Development. Significant change 

may be counterproductive in the short term; specifically, the Comprehensive 

and Integrated Approach described in Annex W of the OPLAN is procedurally 

understood by critical stakeholders. The OPLAN provides the framework for the 

“lead effort” Security LoO to guide development of the operational design. Within 
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the OPLAN framework, the operational design should be revised substantially to 

provide the benchmarks of progress to guide prioritization and synchronization 

of subordinate efforts.

b. Revise the OPORD. Given both the refined command relationships and 

anticipated direction to develop an operational design, the OPORD will require 

substantial revision to prioritize and synchronize the efforts across all COMISAF 

subordinates. The current OPORD contains elements that can be prioritized and 

synchronized in the short term through fragmentary orders until a new OPORD 

is developed and published.

c. Command Relationships. The development of the operational design must 

incorporate the anticipated command relationships under which the order will be 

executed.

d. Resourcing. Use the refined operational design as the basis to request 

additional resource capabilities that generate overmatch of insurgent forces prior 

to the historical operational tempo increase of insurgent operations.

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Annex B: Command and Control, and Command Relationships

ISAF analysed the command relationships between military forces and civilian organizations operating in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations. To date, various initiatives have either been planned or are underway in order to improve unity of command 

and unity of effort within the Afghanistan Area of Operations (AoO).

Status Update

•On August 4th, NATO’s North Atlantic Council officially approved the creation of 

an intermediate three-star command between COMISAF and the RCs. This new 

headquarters is on pace to reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by 12 October 09 and Full Operational Capability by 12 November 09.

•Along with the creation of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), the decision was made 

to create NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) to unify both NATO and 

U.S. forces previously operating under separate command relationship lines (Directorate for Afghan National Army Training and Equipment [NATO] and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan [U.S.]) conducting advisory 

roles with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) throughout Afghanistan. 

This new headquarters will reach IOC by 10 September 09.

•Related to the creation of NTM-A is a proposal to move all of the advisory elements that reside in the Afghanistan AOO—OMLTs, POMLTs, PMTs, ETTs, 

OCCs, etc.—under the operational control of the Regional Commands (RC) and 

battlespace owners (BSO). A portion of the . . . staff will migrate to the IJC to 

manage various resourcing functions related to the support of these advisory 

elements.

•HQ ISAF issued FRAGO 408-2009 directing the establishment, in coordination 

with GIRoA, of a National Military Coordination Center (NMCC) for the coordination and planning of joint military operations.

•The RCs have been directed to partner with the ANSF at every level within their 

RC AOOs in order to gain synergy of operations and improve the capability and 

capacity of the ANSF.

•The RCs were also tasked with further developing Operations Coordination Centers at the Regional and Provincial levels to enable a comprehensive approach 

to planning and operating down to the tactical level and to monitor and report 

partner ANSF unit readiness to COMISAF.

•USFOR-A has been tasked with the following:
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ο	 Direct CSTC-A to focus on force generation and institutional and ministerial development. 

ο	 Transfer OEF units OPCON to COMISAF and place them on the 

ISAF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. 

•Draft C2 guidance for command and control of special operations forces will be 

issued soon. This FRAGO will direct the realignment of all SOF . . . OPCON to 

COMISAF. OEF and ISAF SOF will be directed to enhance the coordination of 

their operations through the provision of SOF operations and planning staff, SOF 

advisors, and liaison officers to the RC HQs.

•In cooperation with JFC-Brunssum, Allied Transformation Command (ATC), 

Joint Warfare Center, the Joint Warfighting Center (USJFCOM), and V Corps, a 

training plan has been developed to support the stand up of the IJC.

Remaining Challenges

•. . . Other challenges to unity of command lie in the variations of each troop contributing nation’s Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA) report. Since 

there is such variation in the ORBATIOA reports, it is difficult to achieve a common command authority structure throughout the theater.

•Another challenge comes from U.S. sponsored, non-NATO nations that deploy 

forces using U.S. Global-War-on-Terrorism (GWOT) funding under U.S. Code 

Title X. These nations include Georgia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Mongolia, Bahrain, 

and others. The unique challenge created under this process specifies that Title 

X funding is tied to a direct command relationship with a U.S. commander.

•Even if unity of effort is achieved with all international military forces in full partnership with the ANSF, unity of command remains a significant challenge because of the many international community and nongovernmental organizations 

that make significant unilateral contributions in the Governance and Development Lines of Operation. In order to address this, the BSO must be fully engaged 

with GIRoA, UNAMA, ANSF and any civilian capacity building entities or International Organization. Engagement and coordination is critical; deconfliction by 

itself is insufficient. It is important that BSOs develop relationships with these 

organizations that help to achieve the desired end state.

•One issue to be resolved is whether COMISAF has the authority to move personnel assigned to ISAF HQ under CE 13.0 over to the new Intermediate HQ CE 

1.0. Current planning is based on the assumption that he has this authority; however, this issue must be resolved in writing from SHAPE prior to any personnel 

migration.
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Annex C: USG Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan

The Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan (ICMCP) represents the collaborative 

planning efforts of the United States Government (USG) operating in Afghanistan. It 

was signed by the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry and 

General Stanley McChrystal, Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan, on 15 

August 2009 and forwarded to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and General David Petraeus, Commander, United States Central Command. The USG will execute this plan from a 

“whole-of-government” approach in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force (lSAF), United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

The ICMCP aligns USG efforts on a single objective: the people of Afghanistan. It specifies 

that every action must focus on securing and enabling the Afghan people to resist the 

insurgents and engage with GIRoA and the international community to develop effective governance. Shifting focus to deliver results for the 

population requires comprehensive integration 

and synchronization of USG and ISAF civilianmilitary teams working across the Security, Development, and Governance Lines of Operation. The ICMCP details how this new integrated 

approach will be applied across 11 Counterinsurgency (COIN) Transformative Effects (see 

table opposite). These effects will enable tangible progress in fighting the insurgency and 

building stability at the local community, provincial, and national levels.

ICMCP implementation is supported by two 

significant civilian initiatives. First, U.S. Senior 

Civilian Representative positions have been 

established in RC(E) and RC(S) at each subregional U.S. Brigade Task Force, and in each 

province and district support team to coordinate activities of civilians operating under 

Chief of Mission authority to execute US policy 

and guidance, serve as the civilian counterpart to the military commander, and integrate 

and coordinate civ-mil efforts. The second civilian initiative, the USG Civilian Uplift, 

will deploy additional USG civilians throughout Afghanistan at the regional, brigade 

task force, provincial, and district levels.

In summary, the ICMCP describes target activities and initiatives for our personnel on the 

ground. By mandating an integrated, multilevel civilian chain of command for the best 

partnership possible with military forces, U.S. personnel will have a sound construct within 

which to determine what areas of the plan to implement in their respective areas.

11 Transformative Effects:

•	 Population Security

•	 Claim the Information Initiative 

•	 Access to Justice

•	 Expansion of Accountable and 

Transparent Governance

•	 Elections and Continuity of 

Governance

•	 Action Against Irreconcilables

•	 Creating Sustainable Jobs

•	 Agricultural Opportunity and 

Market Access

•	 Countering the Nexus 

of Narcotics, Corruption, 

Insurgency and Criminality

•	 Community and Government 

led Reintegration

•	 Cross-Border Access for 

Commerce Not Insurgents

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Annex D: Strategic Communication

Background

The information domain is a battlespace, and it is one in which ISAF must take aggressive actions to win the important battle of perception. Strategic Communication 

(StratCom) makes a vital contribution to the overall effort, and more specifically, to the 

operational center of gravity: the continued support of the Afghan population. In order 

to achieve success we must make better use of existing assets and bolster these with 

new capabilities to meet the challenges ahead. To date, the Insurgents (INS) have 

undermined the credibility of ISAF, the International Community (IC), and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) through effective use of the information environment, albeit without a commensurate increase in their own credibility. Whilst this is a critical problem for ISAF, the consequences for GIRoA are even 

starker. GIRoA and the IC need to wrest the Information Initiative from the INS.

Scope

ISAF has undertaken a comprehensive assessment of StratCom objectives, policies, 

and capability requirements, which has resulted in several key recommendations in 

order to achieve the mission. The command also developed a StratCom Action Plan 

which details those tasks and activities which must be implemented in order to put the 

recommendations into effect. This plan is not focused on ISAF in isolation but has 

been derived from a variety of other planning efforts which have set the framework for 

this assessment. While the primary focus was on the Afghan environment, some of 

the actions outlined may have a wider effect in the regional context. The planning 

process benefitted from the participation of StratCom experts in the “community of 

interest,” including HQ NATO, SHAPE, and JFC-B as well as the visiting Initial Assessment Team.

Key Findings

DEVELOPING CAPACITY

Apart from improving its own performance, ISAF needs to help ensure that GIRoA 

receives the necessary partnering, assistance, training and equipment to further develop their own capacity and improve performance. In so doing, we need to be careful 

that we do not continue to overpromise and underdeliver across the lines of operation. 

ISAF needs to be able to support both the NATO strategic centre of gravity (the maintenance of Alliance cohesion as specified in the ISAF OPLAN), as well as ensure that 

GIRoA is placed at the forefront of all possible endeavors with its credibility enhanced. 

Over the years a consistent set of problems have been identified but not adequately 

addressed, primarily as a result of insufficient coordination and a lack of resources. 

The key for StratCom is to implement a plan based on these lessons learned. ISAF is 

not the sole player in the StratCom area. Success also depends on improving the currently inadequate capabilities of other nonmilitary critical players, especially in areas 

outside security such as the governance, reconstruction, and development arenas.
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NEW OBJECTIVES

For success, the following StratCom objectives need to be accomplished in partnership with other key stakeholders:

•Discredit and diminish insurgents and their extremist allies’ capability to influence attitudes and behaviour in AFG.

•In partnership, assist GIRoA and the populace in developing a sense of ownership and responsibility for countering violent extremism in order to advance their 

own security, stability, and development.

•Increase effectiveness of international and GIRoA communications with the Afghan people and the IC.

•Increase AFG political and popular will to counter violent extremism and protect 

the operational centre of gravity, namely the support of the Afghan people.

•Enhance StratCom coordination with Higher Headquarters (HHQ) and, through 

them, the troop contributing nations (TCN) in order to support SACEUR’s strategic center of gravity, which is the maintenance of Alliance cohesion.

•Promote the capability of, and confidence in, the Afghan National Security Forces 

as a force for good in the country.

•Maintain and increase international and public support for ISAF goals and policies in AFG.

MAIN EFFORT

The StratCom main effort is to maintain and strengthen the Afghan population’s positive perception of, and support for, GIRoA institutions and the constructive supporting 

role played by ISAF and the IC.

Recommendations

Change of culture

There must be a fundamental change of culture in how ISAF approaches operations. 

StratCom should not be a separate Line of Operation, but rather an integral and fully 

embedded part of policy development, planning processes, and the execution of 

operations. Analyzing and maximizing StratCom effects must be central to the formulation of schemes of maneuver and during the execution of operations. In order to 

affect this paradigm shift, ISAF HQ must synchronize all StratCom stakeholders. 

Implicit in this change of culture is the clear recognition that modern strategic communication is about credible dialogue, not a monologue where we design our systems and resources to deliver messages to target audiences in the most effective 

manner. This is now a population centric campaign and no effort should be spared to 

ensure that the Afghan people are part of the conversation. Receiving, understand-
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ing, and amending behavior as a result of messages received from audiences can be 

an effective method of gaining genuine trust and credibility. This would improve the 

likelihood of the population accepting ISAF messages and changing their behavior 

as a result.

Win the battle of perceptions

ISAF must act to assist GIRoA in the battle of perceptions through gaining and maintaining the Afghan population’s trust and confidence in GIRoA institutions. This will 

help establish GIRoA as a credible government. For GIRoA and ISAF to win the battle 

of perceptions we must demonstrably change behavior and actions on the ground—

our policies and actions must reflect this reality. StratCom should take every opportunity to highlight the protection of civilians in accordance with the revised Tactical Directive dated 1 July 2009, which is a key StratCom tool.

Build AFG capacity and capability

Additional emphasis must be placed on assisting and building AFG capacity and 

capability so that they are better able to take the lead in StratCom related issues. 

Better linkages and a robust partnership must be forged with MOD and MOl 

spokespersons, allowing a supportive and complementary network to be developed. Increasing capacity requires an improved understanding of the environment, better procedures, and additional required equipment and training. The 

Government Media and Information Centre needs to be expanded to include regional nodes able to disseminate government briefings and releases throughout 

the region.

Postelection engagement

ISAF’s engagement with senior GIRoA members should be reassessed following 

the Presidential Elections, in order to promote the effective coordination of messaging.

Expand reach of messaging

ISAF must extend both the reach and propagation of its message delivery, together 

with determining the effectiveness of that message. Focus should be on identifying 

the optimum medium for propagation rather than just on the message alone. The following means will be evaluated:

•Commercial communications systems and systems operated by ISAF and GIRoA 

must be further developed with the necessary protection for communications 

infrastructure. ISAF should partner more effectively with the Afghan commercial 
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sector to enhance COIN effects by empowering the population through access 

to telecommunications and information via TV and radio.

•The use of traditional communications to disseminate messages must be better 

exploited using both modern technology and more orthodox methods such as 

word of mouth. These messages should be delivered by authoritative figures 

within the AFG community, both rural and urban, so that they are credible. This 

will include religious leaders, maliks, and tribal elders.

•There must be development and use of indigenous narratives to tap into the 

wider cultural pulse of Afghanistan.

•Increased cultural expertise is required in order to enhance the development and 

use of StratCom messaging.

•A more comprehensive and reliable system of developing metrics for Communication Measurement of Effectiveness must be developed to inform ISAF 

of the perceptions and atmospherics within AFG communities.

Offensive information operations (IO)

Offensive I0 must be used to target INS networks in order to disrupt and degrade 

their operational effectiveness, while also offering opportunities for lower level 

insurgent reintegration. ISAF should continue to develop and implement a robust 

and proactive capability to counter hostile information activities and propaganda. 

A more forceful and offensive StratCom approach must be devised whereby INS 

are exposed continually for their cultural and religious violations, anti-Islamic and 

indiscriminate use of violence and terror, and by concentrating on their vulnerabilities. These include their causing of the majority of civilian casualties, attacks 

on education, development projects, and government institutions, and flagrant 

contravention of the principles of the Koran. These vulnerabilities must be expressed in a manner that exploits the cultural and ideological separation of the 

INS from the vast majority of the Afghan population.

Agile response to incidents

ISAF, in conjunction with GIRoA, must enhance its responsiveness to incidents. 

Subordinate echelons must have the authority and freedom to act within an agile, 

transparent, and unified environment. Information must be widely shared, horizontally and vertically, including with GIRoA and the IC. New Tactics, Techniques 

and Procedures (TTPs) must be produced to reflect a flatter command philosophy whereby subordinates are expected to act in accordance with the Commander’s intent to ensure a swift, effective response to achieve the information initiative against the enemy. In particular, risk mitigation measures in the event of 

CIVCAS must be widely understood and practiced before the incident and accomplished in a timely manner so that we are “first with the truth.”
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Counter-IED IO focus

The C-IED I0 efforts must be fully integrated into the overall StratCom strategy and 

structures. StratCom must focus on encouraging the population to assist in countering the scourge of IEDs. Effective messaging and offensive Information Operations 

(IO) are critical to this effort.

StratCom capacity

Throughout the ISAF chain of command StratCom elements must be structured and 

resourced appropriately, and manned at the requisite levels of expertise to achieve 

the desired effects. Some of these elements are known to be relatively weak in 

RC(N), RC(W) and RC(C) and will need augmenting. The inclusion of the critical 

capabilities provided by Information Operation Task Force (IOTF), Information Operation Advisory Task Force (IOATF), Media Monitoring, STRATCOM Information 

Fusion Network, and CAPSTONE contracts within the StratCom structure should be 

supported as these will significantly enhance the Directorate’s enabling, monitoring, 

and assessment efforts.

Unity of command—unity of effort

ISAF and USFOR-A StratCom I0 and Public Affairs (PA) components must be fully 

integrated in order to provide unity of command and effort and enable coherent and 

rapid messaging. It will be necessary to promote the single ISAF “brand” to multiple 

internal and external stakeholders.

Refocus media efforts

ISAF must refocus its media efforts in the following specific areas:

•Migrate to a 24/7 StratCom operation

•Delegate Public Affairs (PA) release authority to the appropriate level

•Create opportunities for Afghans to communicate as opposed to attempting to 

always control the message

•Link regional stories back to national Afghan ones

•Concentrate on the youth and those pursuing further education1

•Orientate the message from a struggle for the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan 

population to one of giving them “trust and confidence”

•Seek ways to reach the INS in Pakistan

170% of the Afghan population is under 22 years old.
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•Focus media operations and subsequent analysis on context, characterization, 

and accuracy

•Reprioritize the policies governing practical support for media in terms of military 

airlift, credentialing, and embeds

Declassification authority for ISR/WSV

There has been consistent recognition of problems in using visual imagery, particularly ISR and weapons’ system video, and other operational information for StratCom 

purposes. Every effort must be made to identify, declassify, and exploit such material 

in a timely manner.

StratCom links

StratCom links to intelligence organizations must be strengthened. This will enable 

more effective countermeasures to hostile propaganda and provide more detailed 

network analysis in support of I0 targeting.

New media

HQ ISAF must understand and adapt to the immediacy of the contemporary information environment through the employment of new/social media as well as cell phones, 

TV, and radio in order to promote interactive communication between Afghan and 

international audiences. This will involve a significant investment in technical architecture.

StratCom messengers and partners

ISAF must develop a more widely understood internal communication strategy that 

enables every member of ISAF to be able to clearly articulate a short narrative of what 

ISAF wants to achieve in Afghanistan and how it is going to do it. Every soldier must 

be empowered to be a StratCom messenger for ISAF.

ISAF must strengthen its partnership with relevant IC stakeholders, both within the 

NATO system and internationally, to improve the flow of information and cooperation 

both horizontally and vertically. Specifically, in-theater communication efforts to coordinate between TCNs must involve the office of the Senior Civilian Representative 

and HHQs in order to maximize the propagation of COMISAF’s intent and help protect 

NATO/SHAPE’s strategic center of gravity in national capitals.

NATO has had consistent problems producing trained personnel in all information 

disciplines. Significant investment is required to solve both a short-term problem 

and generate a longer term solution to producing the necessary fully-qualified 

personnel.
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Annex E: Civilian Casualties, Collateral Damage, 

and Escalation of Force

Background

Civilian casualties (CIVCAS) and damage to public and private property (collateral 

damage), no matter how they are caused, undermine support for GIRoA, ISAF, and 

the international community in the eyes of the Afghan population. Although the majority 

of CIVCAS incidents are caused by insurgents, the Afghan people hold ISAF to a 

higher standard. Strict comparisons of amount of damage caused by either side are 

unhelpful. To protect the population from harm, ISAF must take every practical precaution to avoid CIVCAS and collateral damage.

ISAF established a CIVCAS Tracking Cell in August 2008. This step was reinforced 

by a revised Tactical Directive (TD) issued to all troops in theatre on 1 July 2009, 

which, inter alia, clearly described how and when lethal force should be used. All 

subordinate commanders were explicitly instructed to brief their troops (to include civilian contractors) on the TD. Further, a thorough review of ISAF and USFOR-A operating procedures and processes has been ordered.

Scope

The TD, in conjunction with COMISAF’s COIN guidance and other supporting directives, describes how ISAF will both mitigate CIVCAS incidents and change its approach to COIN and stability operations. These measures will improve the ability of 

ISAF to protect the population from harm.

This paper proposed recommendations to enhance the direction given in the TD.

Key Findings

Training

Though it is not possible to prescribe the appropriate use of force for every situation 

on a complex battlefield, all troops must know, understand, comply, and train with 

the direction outlined in the TD. This implies a change in culture across the force. 

ISAF units and soldiers must be fully prepared to operate within the guidelines of 

the TD and other directives prior to deployment. Home-station training events must 

be nested within these directives. Training must continue in-theater to ensure the 

guidance is being implemented correctly.

Recommendation: ISAF must utilize expertise resident at the Counterinsurgency 

Training Center–Afghanistan (“COIN Academy”) and within ISAF organizations to ensure all units in theater understand and are able to apply the TD, COIN Guidance, and 

standing ROE. ISAF must also work together with home-station training centers and 

professional development schools to ensure units are properly prepared through education and predeployment training.
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The TD and COIN Guidance will be disseminated rapidly to U.S. Combat Training 

Centers and to NATO and ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) for inclusion in 

scenario development and programs of instruction.

Troops in contact (TIC)

The TD stresses the necessity to avoid winning tactical victories while suffering strategic defeats. Ground commanders must fully understand the delicate balance between strategic intent and tactical necessity. Commanders must prioritize operational 

effectiveness within their operating areas by considering the effects of their actions on 

the Afghan population at every stage.

Recommendation: Under the direction of Task Force Commanders. subunit ground 

commanders must plan for and rehearse a full range of tactical options to include application of force in unpopulated areas, deescalation of force within populated ones, 

or even breaking contact as appropriate to accomplish the mission.

Proportionality

In order to minimize the risk of alienating the Afghan population, and in accordance 

with International law, ISAF operations must be conducted in a manner that is both 

proportionate and reasonable. 

Recommendation: When requesting Close Air Support (CAS) ground commanders 

and Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC) must use appropriate munitions or capabilities to achieve desired effects while minimizing the risk to the Afghan people and their 

property. Ground commanders must exercise similar judgment in the employment of 

indirect fires.

Shaping the environment and preconditions

The importance of cultural awareness during the conduct of operations is highlighted 

in the TD. Specifically, it notes that a significant amount of CIVCAS occur during Escalation of Force (EoF) procedures (14% of people killed and 22% of those wounded 

during the last recorded 6 months). These incidents tend to occur in units with less 

training experience and lower unit cohesion. Fear and uncertainty among ISAF soldiers contributes to escalation of force incidents. Furthermore, although ISAF has 

refined and enhanced the warnings that are issued, many Afghans do not understand 

them and consequently fail to comply. Low literacy levels and cultural differences may 

explain a misunderstanding of EoF procedures and the actions that ISAF troop expect 

them to take.

Recommendation: Effective predeployment training and the development of unit cohesion are essential in honing the tactical judgment of soldiers and small unit leaders. 

Training scenarios at home station and combat training centers must improve. As 
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ISAF reviews and modifies its escalation of force procedures to better fit the Afghan 

context, ISAF and GIRoA must communicate those procedures more effectively to the 

Afghan people in appropriate media.

Press release / public Information

The TD also stresses the requirement to acknowledge any CIVCAS incident in the 

media expeditiously and accurately; timely engagement with key leaders is also a 

critical element. The aim is to be “first with the known truth,” based on the information 

available at the time. ISAF competes with insurgents’ (INS) information operations 

(I0), and the INS I0 is not hampered by the need to be truthful; moreover, any statements made by the INS are rapidly disseminated and can be persuasive to the Afghan 

population. As the TD notes, it is far more effective to release a factual statement with 

the known details early, and then a follow-on statement with additional clarification at 

a later stage. This procedure is more effective than simply issuing a rebuttal of an INS 

version of the account. Furthermore, debating the number of people killed or injured 

misses the point. The fact that civilians were harmed or property was damaged needs 

to be acknowledged and investigated, and measures must be taken for redress.

Recommendation: First, ISAF and GIRoA must aim for a consistent rather than conflicting message through appropriate media, to include word of mouth in affected local 

communities. Be first with the known truth; be transparent in the investigation. Second, ISAF and GIRoA should follow-up on any incident with periodic press updates 

regarding the progress of the investigation, procedures for redress, and measures 

taken to ensure appropriate accountability.

Aircraft video release procedures

The advantage of photographic imagery to support any Battle Damage Assessment 

(BDA) is covered in the TD. This can be expanded to include aircraft weapon system 

imagery. The NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan (CSPMP) for Afghanistan requires nations to establish agreed procedures for declassifying and making use of national operational imagery to reinforce NATO messages. Presently, national caveats apply to the release of aircraft BDA and weapon release imagery, and 

these caveats have different procedures and timelines for release. Some nations do 

not comply with the CSPMP. 

Recommendation: Establish a standard procedure for all nations and services to 

attain the necessary release approval and delivery of the footage.

Honor and “assistance”

Under the terms of the Military Technical Agreement between ISAF and GIRoA 

(dated 4 Jan 02), ISAF is not required to make compensation payments for any 

damage to civilian or governmental property. Contributing nations are responsible 

for damages caused by their soldiers. Some nations contribute to individual or 
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collective compensation, a number do not, whilst others contribute in different 

ways. This creates an extremely unhelpful imbalance and undermines COIN 

Strategy. To address this, the NATO CSPMP for Afghanistan encourages nations 

to fund the NATO Post Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF) to compensate or assist individuals and communities.

CIVCAS payments and compensation must be carefully considered against a large 

number of different factors. Whilst being sensitive to the affected families and communities, improper procedures and poor investigations and accountability may encourage subsequent exaggerated claims.

Recommendation: Develop and implement an equitable system of compensation for 

damages, whether individual or community based. ISAF TCNs must develop a common policy for compensation and redress due to injury, loss of life, and damage to 

property. Although compensation can never make up for such loss, appropriate measures to ensure accountability and recognition of the importance of Afghan life and 

property can help mitigate public anger over the incident.
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Annex F: Detainee Operations, Rule of Law, and Afghan Corrections

Background

Detention operations, while critical to successful counterinsurgency operations, 

also have the potential to become a strategic liability for the U.S. and ISAF. With 

the drawdown in Iraq and the closing of Guantanamo Bay, the focus on U.S. detention operations will turn to the U.S. Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF). 

Because of the classification level of the BTIF and the lack of public transparency, the Afghan people see U.S. detention operations as secretive and lacking 

in due process. It is critical that we continue to develop and build capacity to 

empower the Afghan government to conduct all detentions operations in this 

country in accordance with international and national law. The desired endstate 

must be the eventual turnover of all detention operations in Afghanistan, to include the BTIF, to the Afghan government once they have developed the requisite sustainable capacity to run those systems properly.

Currently, Taliban and AI Qaeda insurgents represent more than 2,500 of the 14,500 

inmates in the increasingly overcrowded Afghan Corrections System (ACS). These 

detainees are currently radicalizing non-insurgent inmates and worsening an already 

overcrowded prison system. Hardened, committed Islamists are indiscriminately 

mixed with petty criminals and sex offenders, and they are using the opportunity to 

radicalize and indoctrinate them. In effect, insurgents use the ACS as a sanctuary and 

base to conduct lethal operations against GIRoA and coalition forces (e.g., Serena 

Hotel bombing, GIRoA assassinations, governmental facility bombings).

The U.S. came to Afghanistan vowing to deny these same enemies safe haven in 

2001. They have gone from inaccessible mountain hideouts to recruiting, indoctrinating, and hiding in the open in the ACS. There are more insurgents per square foot in 

corrections facilities than anywhere else in Afghanistan. Unchecked, Taliban/AI Qaeda 

leaders patiently coordinate and plan, unconcerned with interference from prison personnel or the military.

Multiple national facilities are firmly under the control of the Taliban. The Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) accepts a lack of offensive violence there as a half-win. Within 

the U.S. Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF), due to a lack of capacity and 

capability, productive interrogations and detainee intelligence collection have been 

reduced. As a result, hundreds are held without charge or without a defined wayahead. This allows the enemy to radicalize them far beyond their precapture orientation. This problem can no longer be ignored.

Scope

In order to transform detention and corrections operations in theater, U.S. Forces–

Afghanistan (USFOR-A) proposes the formation of a new Combined Joint Interagency 

Task Force, CJIATF . . . to work toward the long-term goal of getting the U.S. out of the 

detention business. The priority for the CJIATF . . . in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy 
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and our interagency and international partners, will be to build the capacity of the Afghan government to take over responsibility for detention in its own country as soon 

as possible, to include the BTIF. The CJIATF will provide two primary functions:

•Assume oversight responsibilities and Title 10 support for detention and interrogation operations of all U.S.-held detainees in Afghanistan; and

•Conduct Rule of law (Corrections) operations, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy, working with and advising the Ministry of Defense, the Afghan Central 

Prison Directorate (CPO), and associated Afghan Ministries.

The CJIATF will train and apply sound corrections management techniques and Rule 

of Law principles in all detention systems in Afghanistan, whether currently run by the 

U.S. government or the Afghan government. These sound corrections management 

techniques (“best practices”) and Rule of Law principles, applicable to all detention 

facilities, include: adherence to international humanitarian law; due process; vocational and technical training; deradicalization; rehabilitation; education; and classifying and segregating detainee populations (segregating hard-core insurgents from low 

level fighters, juveniles from adults, women from men, common criminals from insurgents, etc.).

Systemic Challenges in Detention and Corrections

The CJIATF . . . will address 10 systemic challenges in the current U.S., Afghan military, and CPO detention and prison systems. These include:

•Need for a countrywide, coalition-supported corrections and detention plan to 

help establish unity of effort.

•Need for all detainees and prisoners to be correctly classified and separated accordingly.

•Need for a GIRoA and International community supported Rule of Law program 

which allows for and codifies alternatives to incarceration.

•Within U.S. Detention and Afghanistan Prison systems alike, take immediate 

measures to counter insurgent actions and minimize the religious radicalization 

process of inmates.

•Need to plan and provide for Afghanistan corrections infrastructure multiyear 

sustainment.

•Need to ensure meaningful corrections reform in both U.S. and Afghanistan 

detention/prison systems. These reforms include changing punishment from 

retribution to rehabilitation, purposeful and effective staff training, equity of 

pay, and improved alignment with law enforcement and legal systems, both 

formal and informal.
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•Need to review and ensure the intelligence policy and procedures match the 

exigencies of the Government of Afghanistan and Coalition counterinsurgent 

activity.

•Need to address the current and projected overcrowding situation.

•Need to address the current shortage of knowledgeable, competent, and committed leadership within both U.S. and Afghanistan corrections systems and advisory groups.

•Need to address the command and control and unity of command over both U.S. 

detention and Afghan advisory efforts.

Recommendations

Establish a CJIATF

Establish a CJIATF commanded by a General Officer, with a civilian deputy at the 

Ambassador level, to lead an organization of approximately 120 personnel (70 civilian, 50 military). The CJIATF will be a Major Subordinate Command under USFOR-A 

with a coordination relationship reporting to the U.S. Ambassador Afghanistan. The 

CJIATF will have a Command/Control Headquarters Element and the following six 

Lines of Operation:

•The U.S. Detention Operations Brigade will provide safe, secure, legal, and humane custody, care, and control of detainees at the BTIF.

•The Intelligence Group will support the Task Force’s mission to identify and defeat the insurgency through intelligence collection and analysis, and improve interrogations intelligence collection though operations at the Joint Interrogation 

Debriefing Center and Strategic Debriefing Center, including input from field detention sites after capture.

•The Detention and Prisons Common Program Support Group will establish and 

conduct a series of programs designed to move detention/corrections operations 

from retribution to rehabilitation. A deradicalization process will attack the enemy 

ethos center of gravity and enable successful reintegration of inmates back to 

the Afghan (or home origin) population.

•The Engagement and Outreach Group will formulate and implement strategic 

communication and outreach as a proactive tool to protect and defend the truth 

of U.S. detention and interrogation practices to further assist in the development 

of the Rule of Law within Afghanistan.

•The Legal Group will identify gaps in the Rule of Law framework that are inhibiting U.S. and Afghan detention/corrections operations from completing their mission and will develop solutions through consistent engagement with GIRoA elements and the International Community.

•The Afghanistan Prison Engagement Group will assist GIRoA in reforming the 

Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) so it can defeat the insurgency within its walls. 
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The reformed CPD National Prison System will meet international standards, 

employ best correctional practices, comply with Afghan laws, and be capable of 

sustaining deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs.

Capabilities

The CJIATF Concept will be developed based on three capabilities (or phases):

•Capability 1—Assume the U.S. detention oversight and support responsibilities 

. . . to include the operation and management of the BTIF, to allow . . . focus on 

the operational fight. Once the JTF stands up, and the commander and his staff 

are on the ground in Afghanistan, they can begin planning and further developing 

Capabilities 2 and 3.

•Capability 2—Conduct corrections and Rule of Law development within the Afghan National Defense Force (ANDF) detention facilities.

•Capability 3—In close coordination and cooperation with the U.S. Embassy, conduct corrections and Rule of Law development within the Afghan CPD system of 

prisons.

Endstate

The desired endstate is the turnover of all detention operations in Afghanistan, to include the BTIF, to the Afghan government once they have developed the requisite 

sustainable capacity to run those detention systems in accordance with international 

and national law. This will empower the Afghan government, enable counterinsurgency operations, and restore the faith of the Afghan people in their government’s 

ability to apply good governance and Rule of Law with respect to corrections, detention, and justice.
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Annex G: Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF) Growth and Acceleration

Background

The ANSF is currently not large enough to cope with the demands of fighting the resilient insurgency in Afghanistan. Accelerating the growth and development of both 

the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) is a vital part of 

the strategy to create the conditions for sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan. Demonstrable progress by the Afghan government and its security forces in 

countering the insurgency over the next 12 to 18 months is critical in order to preserve 

the sustained commitment and support of the international community. A key component of success will be the ability of the ANSF to assume progressively greater responsibility for security operations from the deployed international forces. The requirement to expand the ANSF (both ANA and ANP) rapidly to address the challenges 

of the insurgency will require ISAF to provide enhanced partnering, mentoring, and 

enabling capabilities until parallel capabilities are developed within the ANSF.

Key Findings

ANA

The ANA has a force structure of nearly 92k and, while still nascent and dependent on enablers provided by international forces, is increasingly capable of leading or conducting independent operations; however, more COIN capable Afghan 

Army forces are required in order to conduct sustained COIN operations in key 

areas of the country.

Over the past several years, the ANA has grown in capacity and capability. Late last 

year a decision to increase the size of the ANA to 134k was followed by a plan from 

the Afghan Ministry of Defense (supported by CSTC-A) to accelerate the training of 8 

Kandaks in order to enhance security in key areas, mainly in Southern Afghanistan. 

That acceleration is currently ongoing.

The growth of the ANA to 134k needs to be brought forward from December 2011 to 

October 2010 in order to create sufficient ANA capacity to create conditions for rapid 

and sustainable progress in the current campaign; however, there is a requirement for 

further substantial growth (to an estimated endstrength of 240k) of COIN capable 

ANA troops in order to increase pressure on the insurgency in all threatened areas in 

the country. Current plans provide for a start date of Oct 2009 to commence an acceleration in growth through a combination of overmanning and rapid force generation of ANA infantry and combat service support units. In order to generate the required numbers of “boots on the ground,” the emphasis will be on the development of 

maneuver units rather than enabler capabilities. The generation of previously planned 

and programmed enablers such as corps engineers, artillery, motorized quick reaction forces, and large support battalions will be deferred to enable a more rapid generation of maneuver forces that provide the operational capabilities required now. The 

forces generated during this phase will have sufficient training, capability and equipment to conduct effective COIN operations and to generate momentum. Tighter, re-
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structured training programs will deliver an infantry-based, COIN-capable force in a 

shorter period of time with the capability of conducting “hold” operations with some 

“clear” capability while closely partnered with coalition forces. These forces will be 

equipped at a “minimally combat essential” level as determined by the Ministry of 

Defense, ISAF’s operational requirements, and CSTC-A’s ability to generate forces. 

Initially, facilities will be austere and temporary (including tented camps at the outset) 

in order to reduce construction timelines and cost.

Risks inherent in this approach such as inadequate training and a lack of organic 

enablers will be mitigated through close partnering and mentoring by Regional Commanders delivered through the ISAF Joint Command. More inexperienced leaders 

will be accepted into the junior officer and NCO ranks and the risk will be balanced by 

closely partnering ANSF with coalition forces. In time, a “rebalancing” and generation 

of enabling capabilities must occur as part of subsequent ANA growth to ensure that 

the ANA can achieve a degree of self-sufficiency, sustainable capability, and capacity. 

The growth of the ANA beyond 134k will be tailored to meet operational conditions on 

the ground and to create the required effects desired in the regions.

Finally, the Afghan National Army Air Corps will continue to grow and develop at a 

measured pace, given the long lead times required for the acquisition of aircraft and 

development of technical skills to operate and maintain the aircraft in the inventory. In 

the short term, the accelerated acquisition of additional Mi-17 airframes will enable 

greater lift capacity for the ANSF. In parallel, dedicated training of Mi-35 aircrews will 

add a rotary wing attack capability in the fall of 2009. Deliveries of the first C-27 aircraft in November 2009 will dramatically increase operational capability as the first 

crews are trained in March 2010.

ANP

The Afghan National Police has grown to a current force structure of approximately 

84k and is several years behind the ANA in its development. Due to a lack of overall 

strategic coherence and insufficient resources, the ANP has not been organized, 

trained, and equipped to operate effectively as a counterinsurgency force. Promising 

programs to reform and train police have proceeded too slowly due to a lack of training teams. To enhance the ANP’s capacity and capabilities, the Focused District Development (FDO) program must be accelerated to organize, train, equip, and reform 

police that have not yet completed a formal program of instruction, and new police 

forces such as the elite Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) must be generated to prepare the ANP properly to operate in this challenging COIN environment.

The ANP must increase in size in order to provide sufficient police needed to hold 

areas that have been cleared of insurgents, and to increase the capacity to secure the 

population. This assessment recommends further growth of the ANP to a total of 160k 

as soon as practicable with the right mix of capabilities that better satisfies the requirements of a counterinsurgency effort. This larger number of policemen also needs 

to be trained more quickly in order to “thicken” security forces in the districts, provinces, and regions. The numbers of Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National 

Civil Order Police (ANCOP) should also be considerably increased, and consider-
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ation should be given to expanding the Afghan Public Protection Force or other similar 

initiatives where appropriate.

In April 2009, a decision was made to grow the ANP by 4.8K to provide security for 

Kabul in advance of the Afghan National elections. This action was followed by a second 

decision to further grow the police by 10K in order to enhance security in 14 key provinces for the upcoming elections. This 14.8K police growth is proceeding and will increase the ANP authorized strength to 96.8K while improving accountability of “non 

and above tashkiel” police.

Subsequent ANP growth to 160k will include doubling ANP strength at the District and 

Provincial levels, significantly increasing the police-to-population ratio. The growth of 

ANCOP will be accelerated by generating 5 national battalions in FY ’10 followed by 

the generation of 34 new provincial battalions and 6 new regional battalions. While 

the number of ABP companies will remain the same, each ABP company will increase 

in strength by 65% to 150 men per company. Finally, the Afghan Public Protection 

Force (APPF) personnel will be absorbed into the ANP as it expands.

Over the 4 year program, special police growth will provide important niche capabilities. The national Crisis Response Unit (CRU) will provide Assault, Surveillance, and 

Support squadrons. Counternarcotics Aviation is projected to grow by over 100%. 

Afghan Special Narcotics forces grow by 25%. Security forces will also be provided to 

ensure international and nongovernmental organizations’ freedom of movement.

NATO training mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A)

On 12 June, 2009 the North Atlantic Council endorsed the creation of NATO Training 

Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) to oversee higher level training for the ANA and for 

development of the ANP. CSTC-A and NTM-A will coexist as a single HQ with fully 

integrated staff sections under a dual-hatted commander. As approved by the North 

Atlantic Council, the NTM-A will stand up in mid-September to generate forces and 

provide institutional training for the ANA and ANP. Once the IJC is operational, the 

three NATO tasks assigned to NTM-A associated directly with providing NATO OMLTs 

and POMLTs to the ANA and ANP will migrate to the IJC. At that time, NATO/ISAF will 

redirect responsibilities for developing fielded ANSF to the IJC. NTM-A will retain responsibility for ANSF institutional training, education, and professional development 

activities. CJTF Phoenix and its two subordinate Brigades will be transferred to the 

IJC when it establishes Initial Operating Capability.

Key stakeholder engagement

This assessment recommends that the United States Government develop an engagement strategy to garner the international support and the multilateral approval 

required for the continued growth of the ANSF to the 400k target (240K ANA, 160K 

ANP). This includes the actions necessary to secure greater international funding to 

pay a fair share of the growth and sustainment costs of the ANSF, as well as generating the training teams required to support ANSF development. As a point of reference, 
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the international community contributed $25M (~7%) of the cost of the expansion of 

the ANP by 14.8k earlier this summer. Furthermore, the European Commission requested a parallel study to recommend the character and end strength of ANP. When 

the EC study is completed, the findings will be reconciled to gain consensus in the 

international community about the way ahead.

A more cost-effective way to procure capabilities for the ANSF

This initial assessment recommends that the OSD Comptroller fund CSTC-A directly, 

and allow CSTC-A to work directly with the appropriate contracting agency to procure 

required capabilities for the ANSF. The current system of executing Afghan Security 

Forces Funding (ASFF) must become more agile in the face of the requirement to 

adapt this program quickly. All procurement actions for the ANSF are handled as 

“pseudo” Foreign Military Sales Cases by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

(DSCA) and the United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), each 

of which charge considerable fees for an “Above Standard Level of Service.” These 

fees and the direct involvement of the DSCA apply to the procurement of most capabilities, including those that are executed by local contracting authorities as well as 

other actions not directly related to Foreign Military Sales such as construction. Direct 

authority to obligate ASFF without passing actions through the DSCA or USASAC will 

shorten timelines and preserve more money for the specific purpose of supporting the 

growth and sustainment of the ANSF.

Strengthen ANSF development through realigned C2

CSTC-A is responsible for three lines of operation: ministerial and institutional development; generation of the force; and develop the fielded force. This assessment concludes that the IJC should assume responsibility for developing the fielded force. The 

transfer of this mission will require the reassignment of CJTF Phoenix and its subordinate elements to the IJC. CSTC-A will retain the responsibility to train, advise, and 

educate personnel in the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as those 

in the institutional elements of the Army and Police (national logistics, medical, facilities management, detainee operations, etc.). CSTC-A will also retain responsibility to 

resource the fielded ANSF.

Unity of effort and coherence in police development

In an effort to streamline police development efforts and to create greater unity of effort in the development of COIN capable police, the responsibility and authority for all 

police training should be placed under the commander CSTC-A/NTM-A. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) should 

transfer responsibility for police training to CSTC-A. Since 2005, OSD has transferred 

funding to INL for developmental efforts of the ANP. CSTC-A will execute this mission 

and contract as appropriate for trainers with law enforcement experience to augment 
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efforts by the IJC to develop fielded police, and to assist CSTC-A’s actions for ministerial and institutional training.

Build and leverage Afghan ministerial capacity

CSTC-A should take every opportunity to build and leverage ministerial capacity to 

shift the responsibility for the long-term sustainability of a larger ANSF to the Afghan 

Government. One opportunity is to find an appropriate legal and accountable way to 

allow the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to contract for the construction of 

their own facilities. Today, more than 70% of all major construction projects in support 

of the ANA are at least 10% behind schedule. In response to this situation, CSTC-A 

and the Army Corps of Engineers have already standardized and reduced the scope 

of future projects to mitigate costs and delays. Additionally, CSTC-A will investigate 

the feasibility and practicality of providing discreet funding for Afghan Ministries to 

contract for the construction of their own facilities to drive lower costs and improve 

project timeliness. This process will also provide an opportunity to develop Afghan 

ministerial capacity. There are inherent risks in this approach but CSTC-A will develop 

a construct for this proposal with CENTCOM and OSD to ensure proper program 

management and the required oversight of funding provided to the Afghan ministries.

Recommendations

1. Grow the ANA to a target authorization of 240k. Accelerate the growth of the currently approved COIN focused infantry force of 134k by late 2010 and generate more 

counterinsurgency forces consistent with operational requirements.

2. Grow and develop the ANP to a total of 160k as soon as practicable to “thicken and 

harden” security in the districts, provinces, and regions. This total will also more than 

double the size of Afghan Border Police, considerably grow ANCOP, and allow for 

expansion of the Afghan Public Protection Force where appropriate.

3. Realign and streamline the responsibilities for ANSF generation and development:

a. CSTC-A/NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) focuses on ANSF force 

generation consistent with operational requirements, develops Afghan ministerial and institutional capabilities, and resources the fielded forces.

b. Shift responsibility for development of fielded ANSF to the IJC.

c. Employ enhanced partnering and mentoring to more rapidly develop Afghan forces.

4. Provide CSTC-A direct authority to obligate Afghan Security Forces Funding 

(ASFF) without passing actions through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to 

shorten capabilities procurement timelines and avoid unnecessary fees.

5. Shift the responsibility and authority for execution of all police training from the 

Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) 

to CSTC-A to enhance unity of effort in police development. CSTC-A will assume 
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operational control of INL contracted trainers as soon as possible until January 2010 

when a new contract managed by CSTC-A can begin.
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Annex H: Glossary

A

ABP Afghan Border Police

ACS Afghan Corrections System

AFCENT Air Forces Central Command

ANA Afghan National Army

ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

AOO Area of Operations

AP3 Afghan Public Protection Program

APPF Afghan Public Protection Force

AQAM AI Qaeda and associated movements

ASFF Afghan Security Forces Funding

ATC Allied Transformation Command

B

BDA Battle Damage Assessment 

BSO Battlespace Owner

BTIF Bagram Theater Internment Facility

C

C2 Command and Control

CAS Close Air Support

CE Crisis Establishment

CENTCOM Central Command

CFACC Combined Forces Air Component Commander

CFSOCC-A Combined Forces Special Operations Component

 Command–Afghanistan

CIS Communications Infrastructure

CIVCAS Civilian Casualties 

CJIATF Combined Joint Interagency Task Force

CJOC Coalition Joint Operations Center

CN Counternarcotics

COIN Counterinsurgency

COIN TE Counterinsurgency Transformative Effects

COMISAF Commander ISAF

CPD Central Prison Directorate

CRU Crisis Response Unit

CSPMP Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan

D

DC Decisive Conditions

DCOS Deputy Chief of Staff

DoD Department of Defense (US)
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DP Decisive Points

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

E

EoF Escalation of Force

ETT Embedded Training Team

F

FDD Focused District Development

FID Foreign Internal Defense

FOC Fully Operational Capability

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

G

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

H

HiG Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin

HHQ Higher Headquarters

HQN Haqqani Network

I

IC International Community 

ICMCP Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IJC ISAF Joint Command 

INL International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (US Dept. of State)

INS Insurgents

IO Information Operations 

IOATF Information Operation Advisory Task Force

IOTF Information Operation Task Force

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISI Interservices Intelligence

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

J

JFC-B Joint Force Command–Brunssum

JIDC Joint Interrogation Detention Center

JOPG Joint Operational Planning Group

JOPS Joint Operations

JTAC Joint Tactical Air Controllers

K

KAlA Kabul International Airport
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L

LoO Lines of Operation

M

MARCENT Marine Corps Central Command

MOE Measures of Effectiveness

MOP Measures of Performance

N

NAC North Atlantic Council

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NGO Nongovernmental organization

NSC National Security Council (US)

NSE National Support Element

NTM-A NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan

O

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OMLF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team

OPCOM Operational Command

OPCON Operational Control 

OPLAN Operational Plan

OPORD Operational Order

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense (US) 

P

PA Public Affairs

POERF Post Operations Emergency Fund Relief 

POMLT Police Operational Mentoring liaison Team

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

Q

QST Quetta Shura Taliban

R

RC Regional Command

RLS Real Life Support

ROE Rules of Engagement

S

S/CRS State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (US)

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SDC Strategic Debriefing Center 

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
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SOCCENT Special Operations Command–Central Command

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

StratCom Strategic Communication

T

TACOM Tactical Command

TACON Tactical Control

TCN Troop Contributing Nation

TD Tactical Directive

TTPs Tactics, Techniques, Procedures

U

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

USASAC United States Army Security Assistance Command

ASFOR-A US Forces–Afghanistan

USG United States Government 

USMC US Marine Corps 

W

WSV Weapons System Video
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Annex I: References

1. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), 5 Dec 01

2. Military Technical Agreement (MTA) Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (31 Dec 01), 

4 Jan 02; Amendment 2, 14 Mar 03

4. . . . The Bonn Agreement 2004

5. The Afghan Compact 2006

10. . . . COMISAF Commander’s Initial Guidance dated 13 June 2009

11. COMISAF Tactical Directive dated 01 July 2009 

13. . . . Bucharest Summit Declaration Apr 08

14. United Nations Security Council Resolutions

a. Resolution 1383 (2001) of 6 December—endorses the Bonn Agreement as 

a first step towards the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, 

multiethnic and fully representative government in Afghanistan.

b. Resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December—authorizes the deployment for 

six months of an International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan 

(ISAF).

c. Resolution 1401 (2002) of 28 March—establishes for an initial period of 12 

months a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

d. Resolution 1413 (2002) of 23 May—extends the authorization of ISAF for 

an additional 6 months. 

e. Resolution 1419 (2002) of 26 June—welcomes the results of the Emergency Loya Jirga and commends the role of UNAMA and ISAF.

f. Resolution 1444 (2002) of 27 November—extends the authorization of 

ISAF for one year beyond 20 Dec 02.

g. Resolution 1453 (2002) of 24 December—recognizes the Transitional Administration (TA) as the sole legitimate government of Afghanistan and welcomes the Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations signed by 

the TA and the States neighbouring Afghanistan.

h. Resolution 1471 (2003) of 28 March—extends UNAMA for another 12 

months.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

H-6

i. Resolution 1510 (2003) of 13 October—authorizes expansion of the ISAF 

mandate outside of Kabul and its environs.

j. Resolution 1776 (2007) of 19 September—extends the mandate of ISAF 

for 12 months beyond 13 Oct 07.

k. Resolution 1806 (2008) of 20 March—extends UNAMA for another 12 

months and designates it as the IC lead in AFG. 

l. Resolution 1817 (2008) of 11 June—adopts a declaration on the global effort to combat drug trafficking.

m. Resolution 1833 (2008) of 22 September—extends the mandate of ISAF 

for 12 months beyond 13 Oct 08.
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Title of Paper: General McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment: 

Evaluating the Operating Environment in Afghanistan in 

the Summer of 2009 

Author: Col Matthew C. Brand

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General McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment

Evaluating the Operating Environment 

in Afghanistan in the Summer of 2009

Commander, Air University

Lt Gen Allen G. Peck

Director, Air Force Research Institute

Gen John Shaud, USAF, Retired, PhD

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