United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate

February 1998 BOSNIA

Operational Decisions

Needed Before

Estimating DOD’s

Costs

GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-279183 

February 11, 1998

The Honorable Jesse Helms

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, we have reported extensively on contingency operations,

including the Department of Defense’s (DOD) costs for military operations

in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina1

 and on the progress toward

restoring peace in Bosnia (see page 24 for a list of related GAO products).

As you requested, this report reviews (1) DOD’s incremental costs for its

Bosnia operations, (2) whether DOD’s fiscal year 1998 appropriations for

Bosnia are adequate to cover the costs of planned operations, and (3) the

nature and timing of key decisions that could significantly affect the costs.

We will be sending you shortly related reports on the progress made

toward achieving the Dayton Agreement’s goals for Bosnia and on the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Background Since December 1995, the United States has deployed military forces in

and around Bosnia to assist in implementing the General Framework

Agreement (also known as the Dayton Agreement). U.S. forces are part of

a multilateral coalition under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). From December 1995 to December 1996, the coalition

was called the Implementation Force. In December 1996, NATO authorized

a new mission and renamed the coalition the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

On December 18, 1997, the President announced that in principle the

United States will participate in an international military presence in

Bosnia past June 1998, when SFOR’s mandate expires. According to the

President, the agreement in principle will become a commitment only

when he approves NATO’s action plan for its military forces.

In this report, the costs of operations in and around Bosnia exclude the

costs of Task Force Able Sentry in Macedonia ($11.7 million in fiscal year

1997). In its reports, DOD includes Macedonia costs as Bosnia costs. Also,

we have used the term “budget-quality estimates,” by which we mean

budget estimates based on known operational and cost factors, rather than

a rough guess or willingness to pay.

1

Hereafter, we have referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina as Bosnia.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
B-279183 

Results in Brief DOD’s incremental costs for its operations in and around Bosnia are

expected to be $6.4 billion through June 1998. DOD reported $2.5 billion in

costs for fiscal year 1996 and $2.3 billion for fiscal year 1997. For fiscal

year 1998, DOD is estimating costs of $1.6 billion for its Bosnia operations.

DOD based its fiscal year 1998 estimate on the then-current plan to

withdraw U.S. forces by June 1998 and consequently requested no funds

for Bosnia in the fiscal year 1999 President’s budget.

Fiscal year 1998 Bosnia funding will not cover DOD’s likely Bosnia costs if

the President’s tentative decision to extend the mission beyond June 1998

is affirmed. Operations costs for July-September 1998 are unbudgeted, as

is a troop rotation due in the summer to replace Army troops currently in

Bosnia. Therefore, executing commands, such as U.S. Army Europe, will

require additional funds for Bosnia or will need to reduce other planned

activities, such as training and equipment maintenance. However, funding

requirements for these unanticipated tasks should be offset somewhat by

the availability of budgeted funds no longer required in fiscal year 1998,

such as funds for closing all base camps.

Revised budget-quality estimates for fiscal years 1998-99 are not likely

until key decisions are made. To be as accurate as possible, estimates

should be based on NATO and U.S. decisions about the mission in Bosnia,

the military tasks, force size, force mix, operational tempo, and logistical

and other factors. Also, the military services are considering additional

ways to reduce costs, now that the Bosnia mission appears to have been

extended. To meet Congress’ legislative calendar, in March 1998, DOD plans

to amend its fiscal year 1999 budget and request supplemental

appropriations for fiscal year 1998. However, if NATO and the United States

have not decided on the force size and other details by March, then

budget-quality estimates may not be possible at that time.

Scope and

Methodology

To obtain prior-year costs for DOD’s Bosnia operations, we used data

reported by DOD components to the Defense Finance and Accounting

Service’s Denver Center. To obtain current cost estimates and other data,

we interviewed officials and examined documents at the Office of the

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the offices of the Assistant

Secretaries (Financial Management and Comptroller) of the military

services. To discuss fiscal year 1998 cost estimates, current operations,

and key decisions, we also visited the Air Combat Command

Headquarters, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the U.S. European

Command Headquarters, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe Headquarters, and

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
B-279183 

the U.S. Army Europe Headquarters, all in Germany; and the U.S. Mission

to NATO, Brussels, Belgium. We did not independently verify the financial

data DOD provided us. Our past work has shown that DOD’s financial

information is not always reliable and that its financial management

practices are sometimes inadequate.

We performed our review between October 1997 and January 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We

reviewed the information in this report with DOD officials and made

changes where appropriate. DOD officials agreed with the facts in this

report.

We are providing copies of this report to other congressional committees

and to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,

and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. This report will also

be made available to others on request. If you or your staff have any

questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3504. 

Steven H. Sternlieb, Assistant Director, and Douglas M. Horner, Senior

Evaluator, prepared this report.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO U.S. Military Has Major Role in 

Implementing Dayton Peace Agreement

U.S. provides about 25 percent of 

Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops in 

Bosnia

U.S. officer commands SFOR

U.S. in charge of one of three military 

districts in Bosnia

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

Since December 1995, the United States has deployed military forces in

and around Bosnia to assist in implementing the General Framework

Agreement (also known as the Dayton Agreement). U.S. forces are part of

a multilateral coalition under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). From December 1995 to December 1996, the coalition

was called the Implementation Force. In December 1996, NATO authorized

a new mission and renamed the coalition the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

In Bosnia, the United States provides approximately 8,300 troops—about

25 percent—of SFOR’s 31,000 troops. In addition, the United States supports

SFOR with about 3,400 troops based in Italy, Hungary, and Croatia. These

figures are approximate averages—actual troop strengths vary over time.

For example, during 1997, U.S. Army personnel in and around Bosnia

numbered about 11,400 in January, declined to 8,800 in July, peaked at

14,400 in October, and dropped to 9,100 in December.

Americans hold key leadership positions. SFOR is commanded by a U.S.

Army general under the overall military authority of the Supreme Allied

Commander, Europe, also a U.S. Army officer. In addition, another U.S.

Army general commands Multi-National Division-North, one of the three

military districts into which NATO divides Bosnia.

On December 18, 1997, the President announced that in principle the

United States will participate in an international military presence in

Bosnia past June 1998, when SFOR’s mandate expires. According to the

President, the agreement in principle will become a commitment only

when he approves NATO’s action plan for its military forces. NATO is

currently developing options for the mission and size of military forces in

Bosnia after June 1998.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO Military Tasks

Keep peace--separate warring armies and monitor 

their training and movement

Enforce "no-fly" zone over Bosnia

Control or destroy certain weapons

Protect SFOR military personnel

As resources permit

Remove unauthorized checkpoints to allow 

civilians free movement

Supervise demining operations by parties

Support elections, police restructuring, other tasks

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

Under the provisions of the Dayton Agreement, the primary military

objective for the NATO-led coalition is to prevent resumption of the war

that raged in Bosnia from 1992 to October 1995. The military tasks include

separating the armed forces of the parties to the Dayton Agreement,

moving these forces and their heavy weapons into approved sites,

regularly inspecting these sites, confiscating and destroying illegal

weapons, patrolling the 1,400-kilometer (870-mile) demilitarized boundary

line, and monitoring the training and movement of the parties. In addition,

NATO—including U.S.—aircraft have enforced a “no fly” zone over Bosnia

since April 1993. During a 3-month period in 1997, 8,250 sorties were flown

by combat aircraft in support of the Bosnia mission. Force protection is

also an important task for the military.

The NATO-led military coalition also performs supporting tasks “within the

limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources.” These tasks

include providing increased security and transporting ballots during

elections, assisting with the movement of humanitarian organizations,

preventing interference with civilian movement and refugee resettlement,

and monitoring the clearing of minefields and obstacles. The military also

assists the Office of the High Representative and the United Nations with

certain tasks, such as monitoring and restructuring police. For example, in

November 1997, SFOR confiscated the weapons of the Republika Srpska

Specialist Police Unit in Doboj and gave police officials direction on the

future role of the force.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO $6.4 Billion in DOD Costs Are 

Expected Through June 1998

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year 1998

Fiscal year 1997

Fiscal year 1996

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) incremental costs for its operations in

and around Bosnia are expected to be $6,389 million through June 1998.

DOD reported $2,489 million in costs for fiscal year 1996 and $2,271 million

for fiscal year 1997, for a total of $4,760 million. In early December 1997,

DOD estimated fiscal year 1998 costs at $1,629 million. However, the Office

of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) prepared the estimate

before the President’s December 18, 1997, decision to extend the U.S.

military presence in Bosnia. Therefore, the estimate assumed withdrawal

of U.S. forces by June 1998.

Incremental costs are additional costs to DOD that are directly related to

the Bosnia operation and would not otherwise have been incurred. In

some cases, incremental costs are offset by avoiding costs (such as

training exercises) that would have occurred in the absence of the

operation.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO Fiscal Year 1997 Operations Were 

Fully Funded

Budget estimate

Actual

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000

2,510

2,271

Dollars in millions

Army Air Force Navy/USMC Other DOD

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

In March 1997, DOD revised its fiscal year 1997 Bosnia budget estimate to

$2,510 million. This revised estimate was $2 billion more than the initial

fiscal year 1997 request of $542 million that was predicated on a

withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 1996, because the President and

NATO decided to extend the Bosnia mission beyond that date.

In December 1997, DOD reported $2,271 million in incremental Bosnia costs

for fiscal year 1997.2

 The Army incurred nearly 80 percent ($1,767 million)

of these costs. The Air Force had the next largest share, $256 million,

while the Navy and the Marine Corps had $77 million in costs. The

remaining $172 million were incurred by the following DOD components:

the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency,

Defense Logistics Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Defense

Health Program, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the National

Security Agency.

Fiscal year 1997 Bosnia costs were financed by the Omnibus Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208), and by the June 1997

supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 105-18) that provided additional

funds for the Bosnia operation and for other purposes.3

 However, the

$1.9 billion appropriated to DOD in the supplemental appropriations act

was offset by rescissions of $1.9 billion in other previously appropriated

DOD funds.

In total, Congress appropriated $2,570 million for operation and

maintenance expenses of contingency operations in fiscal year 1997. These

funds were appropriated to the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer

Fund, and the funds not needed for Bosnia were applied to other

contingency operations, such as those in Southwest Asia, according to the

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The transfer fund

is available to pay for overseas contingency operations—as operations

unfold during the year, DOD transfers money from the fund to the military

services’ operation and maintenance accounts.

2

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service reported $2,280 million for fiscal year 1997 in its

December 1997 contingency cost reports on Bosnia. In February 1998, the Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) told us that these costs should be reduced by $17 million because

of an error in recording Navy military personnel costs, and should be increased by $8 million because

of previously unreported National Security Agency costs. The net result of these adjustments is fiscal

year 1997 costs of $2,271 million.

3

P.L. 105-18 also funded recovery from natural disasters, created a National Commission on the Cost of

Higher Education, and modified the Food Stamp Act of 1977.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Request Was 

$1.5 Billion

Operation & 

maintenance

Military

personnel Total

Army $850 $158 $1,009

Navy/USMC 74 8 82

Air Force 266 47 313

Other DOD 64 0 64

Total DOD $1,254 $214 $1,468

Dollars in millions

Note:Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

For fiscal year 1998, DOD requested and received from Congress

$1,468 million for its Bosnia operations. DOD’s request assumed that U.S.

forces would withdraw from Bosnia by June 1998. Funds for the Army

were nearly 70 percent of the total request ($1,009 million). The Air Force

had the next largest share, $313 million, while the Navy and the Marine

Corps were budgeted at $82 million for Bosnia. DOD also requested

$64 million for the U.S. Special Operations Command, the Defense Health

Program, and several defense agencies. Congress fully funded DOD’s

request for Bosnia in the fiscal year 1998 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L.

105-56).

Operation and maintenance funds comprise 85 percent of the total request

and are used for a wide variety of purposes, including transportation of

personnel, goods, and equipment; unit operational tempo (fuel and repair

parts); base operating support; clothing, individual equipment, and

personal demand items for troops; per diem; facilities and headquarters

costs; and intelligence, communications, and logistics support.

Military personnel funds are the remainder of the request. Most of these

funds are for the pay and allowances of mobilized (mostly Army)

reservists. Military personnel funds are also used for special payments or

allowances for all qualifying military personnel, such as Imminent Danger

Pay ($150 per month), Family Separation Allowance ($75 per month), and

Foreign Duty Pay (an average of $15 per month for enlisted personnel).

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO Fiscal Year 1998 Costs Higher Than 

Budgeted

$161 million (net) more required under a 

June 1998 withdrawal

+$343 million over budget due to 

program changes (e.g., more troops)

-$182 million under budget due to lower 

spending in some areas (e.g., travel, 

contractor assistance)

Extension of mission past June 1998 will 

further increase costs

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

In December 1997, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

(Comptroller) estimated that DOD’s Bosnia costs for fiscal year 1998 would

be $1,629 million, or $161 million more than DOD’s budget request of

$1,468 million.

The Comptroller’s staff estimates that program changes will increase costs

by $343 million over budget, including costs for sustainment, unit

operating tempo (fuel and parts), deployment to the theater, and military

pay. DOD’s budget assumed that 5,000 troops would be deployed in and

around Bosnia. Instead, about 12,000 troops have been deployed during

the first quarter of the fiscal year. Furthermore, the Army has used more

reservists than the budget assumed, which has increased incremental

Bosnia costs. Under the definition of incremental costs, all pay for

reservists on active duty is an incremental cost, while only special

payments (such as Imminent Danger Pay) that active duty personnel

receive for deploying to Bosnia are considered incremental costs.

Other costs are projected to be $182 million lower than planned in the

budget, including travel, rents and leases, and contractor-provided support

in Bosnia and Hungary. Contractors provide a wide range of services,

including base camp maintenance, food, water, laundry service, snow and

ice removal, road repair, and waste management.

However, the Comptroller’s staff prepared this revised estimate before the

President announced his decision in principle to extend DOD’s mission in

Bosnia beyond June 1998. Extending the mission past June 1998 will

further increase fiscal year 1998 costs. Operations costs for

July-September 1998 are unbudgeted, as is a troop rotation due in the

summer to replace Army troops currently in Bosnia. Therefore, executing

commands, such as U.S. Army Europe, will require additional funds for

Bosnia or will need to reduce other planned activities, such as training and

equipment maintenance.

Funding requirements for these unanticipated tasks should be offset

somewhat by the availability of approximately $135 million in budgeted

funds no longer required in fiscal year 1998. These offsets include about

$60 million for the Army to close base camps and perform other activities;

$10 million for the Navy to help close base camps; and $65 million for the

planned operation of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System,

which DOD no longer considers necessary for the mission.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO Budget-Quality Estimates Not Likely 

Until Key Decisions Made

Decision Made

Not 

made

Continue presence? X

Mission scope? X

Troop strength? X

Source of U.S. forces? X

Mission duration? X

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

Budget-quality estimates for Bosnia costs in fiscal years 1998-99 are not

likely until several key decisions are made, according to the Office of the

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the U.S. Army Europe

Headquarters, and our analysis.

The highest-order decision, whether the U.S. military will remain in

Bosnia, appears to have been made. On December 18, 1997, the President

announced that in principle the United States will participate in an

international military presence in Bosnia past June 1998. As previously

noted, this agreement will become a commitment only when the President

approves NATO’s action plan for its military forces. NATO is currently

developing options for the mission and size of a NATO-led military presence

in Bosnia after June 1998, when SFOR’s mandate expires. NATO will review

these options and select one by March 1, 1998, according to U.S. and NATO

officials. During April-May 1998, NATO plans to review and approve an

operational plan and force commitments from participating nations,

according to these officials.

Key decisions that are not yet made will drive costs. Primarily, these

decisions concern the scope of the mission and its associated tasks; the

size of the force, including the U.S. contribution; the specific U.S. units to

be sent and their distance from Bosnia; the frequency of troop rotation;

and the number of reservists needed. To prepare budget-quality estimates,

rather than a rough estimate, budget officials need to know how these key

factors will be decided. For example, if the United States decided to send

significantly less troops, then certain costs would decrease, such as

special pay and entitlement costs, operational tempo costs, and base

operating support costs.

The duration of the new mission obviously affects the ultimate total cost.

The President has set no new deadline for withdrawal. The decision to

withdraw will now be based on achieving certain conditions within

Bosnia. Therefore, budget estimates will have to make an assumption

about the length of the mission during each fiscal year estimated.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO Military Services Considering Ways to 

Reduce Costs

Reduce or close bases

Improve troop housing

Permanent change of station

Reduce redundant intelligence systems

Increase use of prepositioned stocks

Rely on other countries more

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

Now that the Bosnia mission appears to have been extended past

June 1998 without an end date, the military services are considering

additional ways to reduce costs. The Army may be able to reduce or close

bases in Bosnia and Hungary. After the closure of Camp Steel Castle in

October 1997, the Army maintains eight camps in Bosnia that can serve

about 10,000 personnel.4

 However, the Army currently has fewer troops

than camp capacity—about 8,000 troops in Bosnia. In addition, the Army is

examining ways to reduce the $3.5 million per month it spends on the

Intermediate Staging Base in Taszar, Hungary, which serves as a

way-station for troops arriving in and departing from Bosnia. The Air

Force is also exploring ways to lower costs in Taszar by studying the

feasibility of having the Hungarians provide more base operating support

at the air base.

U.S. Army Europe officials are analyzing the costs and quality-of-life

implications of switching from tents used in base camps to transportable

wood barracks (called SEAhuts). The SEAhuts are more fuel efficient and

less damp than the canvas over wood frame tents. At a cost of 

$6-$10 thousand apiece, the switch would save the Army money if the huts

were used for 3-5 years, according to officials.

The Army is also analyzing whether to send military personnel to Bosnia

for a 1-year permanent change of station, rather than on a temporary duty,

and U.S. Air Forces in Europe staff are assessing permanent tours for Air

Force personnel at the Tuzla air base. Employing a permanent change of

station, as in Korea, saves per diem and some troop rotation costs

(because troops would rotate less frequently), but could entitle soldiers

and their dependents to several travel and transportation allowances. Such

a change could also have operational and force structure impacts,

according to a Department of the Army headquarters official.

Lower costs may be possible by reducing redundant intelligence and

surveillance systems and infrastructure, increasing the Army’s use of

prepositioned stocks, and relying more on other countries for support or

personnel.

4

The Army also maintains one camp in Croatia that can serve about 1,300 personnel and one camp

complex in Hungary.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

GAO Status of Funding

Shortfall projected for fiscal year 1998

Some costs higher than assumed

Last 3 months are new--unfunded-- 

requirement

No funds requested in DOD's fiscal year 

1999 budget

DOD plans to amend budget request and 

submit supplemental in March 1998

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Briefing Section 

DOD’s Bosnia Costs

In December 1997, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

(Comptroller) estimated that DOD’s Bosnia costs for fiscal year 1998 would

be $161 million more than DOD’s budget request for Bosnia, assuming that

troops would withdraw by June 1998. Extending the mission past

June 1998 will further increase fiscal year 1998 costs and funding

requirements. If DOD were to continue to provide 11,000-12,000 troops in

and around Bosnia during July-September 1998, at the current operational

tempo, DOD would need between $400-$500 million more for Bosnia in

fiscal year 1998, according to our analysis. We also project that DOD would

need about $2 billion to operate for 12 months during fiscal year 1999,

using the same assumptions on troop levels and operational tempo.5

No DOD funds for Bosnia operations were requested in the President’s

budget for fiscal year 1999. To meet Congress’ legislative calendar, in

March 1998, DOD plans to amend its fiscal year 1999 budget and request

supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1998. However, if NATO and the

United States have not decided on the force size and other details by

March, then budget-quality estimates may not be possible at that time.

Congress has directed the President to submit a supplemental request for

any funding necessary to continue DOD’s Bosnia deployment beyond

June 30, 1998.6

 In fiscal years 1996 and 1997, DOD received supplemental

appropriations for Bosnia.

5

To estimate the cost of 3 additional months to operate, we calculated a monthly cost to operate using

revised DOD budget data that covered the first 9 months of fiscal year 1998. We excluded $65 million

not needed for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System and redeployment and

reconstitution costs. To estimate fiscal year 1999 costs, we used our monthly cost estimate and added

back estimated redeployment and reconstitution costs.

6

Both the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85, sec. 1203) and the

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998 (P.L. 105-56, sec. 8132) directed the President to

submit a supplemental appropriations request for this purpose.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
Related GAO Products

Bosnia: Cost Estimating Has Improved, but Operational Changes Will

Affect Current Estimates (GAO/NSIAD-97-183, July 28, 1997).

Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement’s

Goals—An Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997).

Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton

Agreement’s Goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-132, May 5, 1997).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform

(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139, Apr. 9, 1997).

Bosnia: Costs Are Exceeding DOD’s Estimate (GAO/NSIAD-96-204BR, July 25,

1996).

Contingency Operations: Update on DOD’s Fiscal Year 1995 Cost and

Funding (GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR, June 27, 1996).

Contingency Operations: DOD’s Reported Costs Contain Significant

Inaccuracies (GAO/NSIAD-96-115, May 17, 1996).

Contingency Operations: Defense Cost and Funding Issues

(GAO/NSIAD-96-121BR, Mar. 15, 1996).

Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Seem Likely to Exceed DOD’s Estimate

(GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar. 14, 1996).

Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia,

Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, Mar. 6, 1996).

Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia

(GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995).

Peace Operations: DOD’s Incremental Costs and Funding for Fiscal 

Year 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-95-119BR, Apr. 18, 1995).

Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia

(GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994).

(701123) Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR DOD’s Bosnia Costs
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