About the Report

This report draws on the discussions and conclusions of a 

conference on security sector transformation in North Africa 

and the Middle East hosted by the United States Institute of 

Peace’s Center of Innovation for Security Sector Governance 

on May 10, 2012. The conference brought together a group 

of activists from the region with U.S. government and 

international officials and SSR experts in a morning public 

forum and an afternoon private roundtable session. There was 

a general consensus that more than a year after the 

initial successes of the Arab Spring, security sector reform 

remained an essential requirement of achieving democracy in 

transition states. 

About the Author

Donald J. Planty is a former career member of the Senior 

Foreign Service of the United States. As U.S. Ambassador to 

Guatemala in 1996–99, he facilitated the negotiation and 

implementation of the historic 1996 Peace Accords. He worked 

on NATO and U.S.-European security issues in Washington and 

abroad, including assignments as Counselor for Political-Military 

Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Madrid and Deputy Chief of 

Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Oslo.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 317 September 2012

© 2012 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

The Three Pillars of Security Sector Reform 3

The Special Cases: Syria and the Gulf

Cooperation Council Countries 6

Recommendations for the International Community 7

Conclusions 11

Donald J. Planty

Security Sector 

Transformation in the 

Arab Awakening

Summary

•	 The Arab Awakening opened the door to democratic political change in the Middle East and 

North Africa (MENA). Security sector reform (SSR) is an integral component of the nascent 

democratic process in the region. While SSR is a long-term process, it should be a key part 

of institution building in the new democracies. Democracy requires security institutions that 

are open, professional, and responsive to public needs.

•	 The transitions to democracy are varied in nature and scope. SSR will differ by country 

and must be tailored to the political realities and specific circumstances of each state. The 

international community can foster successful SSR processes by calibrating its assistance 

according to the reform efforts in each country. A general or “one-size-fits-all” approach to 

SSR will not be successful.

•	 A sense of political powerlessness, an unresponsive bureaucracy, a general lack of opportunity, economic stagnation (including high unemployment), and repressive security forces 

all contributed to the Arab Awakening. As a result of the upheaval, democratic forces 

in several of the MENA countries are pushing for transparency and accountability in the 

security services.

•	 SSR must be undertaken in a holistic manner, couched within the framework of overall 

democratic reform and linked to other broad policies such as justice sector reform, evolution of the political process, and economic development. SSR will only be achieved if it is 

integrated and pursued in unison with these larger processes of democratic change. 

•	 The international community, especially the United States and the European Union, need to 

foster democratic developments and, in particular, to support and coordinate SSR.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 

Introduction

The Arab Awakening has created an unprecedented moment in the history of the Middle 

East and North Africa—a time when people are pressing for democracy to replace the old 

authoritarian order. An integral element of this change is the reform of the security services 

constructed by the old regimes. These regimes used the security agencies as instruments 

of repression; therefore, the security agencies are symbolic of a lack of freedom and the 

abridgement of citizens’ rights. The security sector is a visible, physical symbol of the old 

order. It is no surprise that public anger has centered on this segment of government and 

that security sector reform is an urgent priority for democracy activists and the leaders of 

transitional governments. In fact, it is difficult to see how democracy can be established 

unless SSR is pursued in a holistic manner and pursued in tandem with the larger process of 

democratic development.

Despite this groundswell of enthusiasm for change, the region is confronted with an array 

of challenges as it works to transition from authoritarianism to democracy. One of the most 

urgent tasks will be to reshape and reform the security services along democratic lines. The 

people of countries in transition will expect their new democratic leaders to replace the 

opaque security apparatuses of the old regimes with open, transparent, and accountable 

security institutions. Security sector reform, therefore, will be a major factor in winning the 

allegiance of the populace to the new order. A transitional government’s credibility will be 

linked to its ability to launch SSR as a pillar of the new democracy.

That is not to say that SSR can be accomplished overnight or even the next few years. 

SSR is a long-term process that may require a generation to take full effect. What can be 

demonstrated, however, is a commitment to reform from the outset. Such a commitment 

can be signaled to the public through the adoption of strategies for transforming security 

institutions, the appointment of civilian defense and interior ministers, the introduction 

of parliamentary oversight, and the inclusion of members of the security services who are 

willing to align themselves with the new political order. 

Successful SSR requires the extension of the principles of good governance to the 

security sector. Governance issues, such as the relationship between the executive and the 

legislative branches and responsibility for management and oversight of the security services, should be addressed. Security ministries and intelligence agencies must follow good 

governance practices and principles. SSR must be pursued simultaneously with the wider 

reform of the justice sector, including prosecutor’s offices, judiciaries, and penal systems. 

Security services in a democracy must uphold the laws that guarantee the right of citizens 

to exercise political, economic, social, and cultural freedoms while maintaining public order 

and defending the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Reforming the security sector according to democratic principles will require leaders to 

articulate a vision of the country’s new democratic vocation in response to the wishes of 

the people. It will also require strong civilian leadership and a commitment to institutional 

change. The politics of SSR in the region will be challenging and there is a need to address 

the ideological gaps between Islamist and liberal politics, which have very different attitudes toward reform. Security sector reform is an essential component of the modernization 

and strengthening of new democratic states. 

Before the Arab Spring, the security sectors in Middle Eastern and North African countries were structured to assure control of populations. The police focused more on monitoring political activities than on law enforcement. Intelligence agencies spied on citizens. 

The armed forces were dedicated to assuring internal security. Egypt under former president 

Hosni Mubarak was a police state and the army had more power than elected officials. The 

security apparatus was present in all aspects of daily life—economic, political, and reliThe views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org.

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice,

The George Washington University • Judy Ansley, Former 

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security 

Adviser under President George W. Bush • Eric Edelman,

Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins 

School of Advanced International Studies • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, 

LLC • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of 

International Relations, Stanford University • John A. 

Lancaster, Former Executive Director of the National Council 

on Independent Living • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, 

George Mason School of Law • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice 

President, International Republican Institute • Nancy Zirkin,

Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
 3

gious. It is no accident that the Egyptian revolution began with a crowd protesting police 

abuse in front of the Ministry of Interior on January 25, National Police Day. In Syria, the 

army replaced the police as managers of public order and provoked a public revolt. While 

some progress has been achieved, across the region the overriding question of how to proceed with SSR remains unanswered. Transitional governments struggle with the question of 

whether SSR should be confrontational or collaborative. Clearly, there may be elements of 

both in the process. 

The Three Pillars of Security Sector Reform

Police Reform

The Arab Awakening was ignited by one Tunisian citizen’s resistance to police corruption. 

The Egyptian revolution also targeted the police as symbols of repression and political control. These events underscore the importance of the police-citizen relationship to democracy 

and good governance. Police reform, therefore, must be at the center of SSR in transitions 

to democracy.

It is useful to recall that the roots of the Arab Awakening are found in the desire for 

basic human rights such as more jobs and more social, economic, and political opportunity, 

including the fundamental right to have a voice in how one is governed. Unresponsive 

bureaucracies and repressive police forces frustrate the exercise of these rights. In coercive 

states, the police are agents of government political control. In democracies, the police are 

on the front lines of democratic governance, interacting with citizens on a daily basis. The 

police are responsible for maintaining public order, the cornerstone of a peaceful society. 

The public’s sense of the government’s respect for basic human rights is formed by contacts 

with the police. Countries in transition to democracy must exchange the old police model 

characterized by mistreatment of the public for models that stress transparency, accountability, and citizen involvement. Without this fundamental change, it will be difficult to 

achieve true reform. 

Transitional governments should reach out to civil society and the police to determine 

what each needs from the other to forge a consensus on police reform. There must be a 

symbiotic process—the police must listen to citizen’s concerns, while civil society must 

adopt a posture of positive contact, participating in discussions and helping to find solutions. An important step is to convey to the public that the transitional government has an 

overall strategic plan for police reform. The presentation of a plan will reassure the public 

that real police reform is under way. Transitional governments should emphasize that a new 

model will be adopted that replaces the repressive, politicized police force with a police 

service that is dedicated to protecting the public. In Egypt, civil society has worked with 

the lower ranks of the police to develop a plan for police reform that includes a draft law 

with clear provisions for civilian oversight. This could be a useful model for other countries 

in the region. The international community could offer counseling and training in support 

of such efforts. 

A critical part of institutional change will be reforming ministries of the interior. This will 

require the introduction of modern management practices, computer-based administrative 

systems, the creation of departments to deal with human resources and career development, 

procurement, and logistics, an inspector general’s office to ensure discipline, and an internal 

affairs section to deal with citizen complaints. Pay and benefits must be adequate in order 

to attract and retain high-quality individuals, to blunt corruption, and to create a sense of 

professionalism and pride in a police career. Appropriate compensation and merit-based promotions will also produce institutional loyalty and acceptance of the new democratic norms.

Countries in transition to 

democracy must exchange the 

old police model characterized 

by mistreatment of the 

public for models that stress 

transparency, accountability, 

and citizen involvement.
4 

Problems related to policing have arisen early in the transition in several countries. The 

appearance of street crime and a growing sense of personal insecurity were major issues 

in the Egyptian presidential campaign. The ruling military council failed to start reforming 

the police despite early promises. Lower-ranking police officers in Egypt have pressured 

for reforms, including organizing strikes and calling for changes in the Ministry of Interior. 

They are also interested in training and professionalization. However, these officers have 

had problems finding partners in the higher ranks and among the senior political leadership. 

The Interior Ministry has reacted to this pressure by introducing unhelpful amendments to a 

proposed police law. There is also a complicated relationship between civil society and the 

police in Egypt. The police view human rights organizations with suspicion and believe that 

nongovernmental organizations seek to punish the police. These attitudes have precluded a 

meaningful partnership with civil society to reform and reconstruct the police. A way must 

be found for the police and civil society to work together.

Pressures for immediate police reform can be difficult to manage for transitional regimes. 

In Tunisia, for example, the populace wants to keep the current police force operating in 

order to maintain basic law and order. On the other hand, there is a desire to clean up the 

police, remove the bad elements, and retrain the force along democratic lines. Reform will 

be a difficult balancing act because many policemen remain loyal to senior officials who 

have retained their positions in the ministry. Tunisians fear that these officials who were 

appointed by the former president, Ben Ali, might attempt to frustrate the transition to 

democracy. The police have gone on strike to protest the implementation of reforms or 

have refused to perform their duties claiming they were unsure how to proceed in the new 

environment. Experience suggests that the new political authorities must build public support for police reform while introducing programming to change the force. In Libya, which 

was left without a defense ministry and a functioning formal army by the Qaddafi regime, 

the transitional government is attempting to build national security institutions from the 

ground up. However, the transitional government has held off on long-term reforms pending 

election for a new National Congress. 

Armed Services Reform

Reform of the armed services is the second of the SSR pillars that must accompany transitions to democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. Armed forces must be restructured 

and reconfigured to conform to democratic models. This means establishing civilian authority 

over the armed forces, redefining the mission of the armed forces to one of providing security 

from external threats, eschewing any internal security role, and professionalizing the military 

through training and institutional development. Reform may also include downsizing the 

armed forces, depending on mission requirements, and reorganizing the forces internally.

Egypt is among the most problematic cases for reform given the power of the Supreme 

Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) relative to the newly elected president and the future 

Parliament. While guiding the reform process to date, the SCAF has tried to safeguard its 

economic interests and primary responsibility for national security matters. The Egyptian 

Armed Forces are major actors in the Egyptian economy, owning companies across a range of 

economic and financial areas from the manufacture of tanks and weapons to the production 

of pasta and bottled water. Maintaining these privileges has been the cornerstone of the 

SCAF’s approach to the transition. The army has attacked and arrested peaceful demonstrators at the Ministry of Defense and subjected detainees to military interrogations and military court proceedings. The SCAF defended these actions by maintaining that it is the only 

body capable of providing security for the country. While Parliament passed an ameliorating 

amendment to the military justice law, it kept intact many of the powers that permit the 

armed forces to continue arrests and military trials. 
 5

The emergence of competitive politics in Egypt has neither broken the SCAF’s control 

over the political arena nor limited its ability to shield long-standing privileges. While Egypt 

elected a president, the old security apparatus remains largely intact and protected from 

any real reform. The country is still experiencing crackdowns on political dissent, including 

the use of force against protestors and the intimidation and prosecution of activists. While 

there is hope that an elected president will break these patterns and introduce real change, 

it appears that Egypt is approaching a system wherein elected officials may be unable to 

control key government ministries. The most pressing challenge is taming unaccountable 

security bureaucracies and making them responsive to civilian leadership. 

Tunisia contrasts sharply with the situation in Egypt. The Tunisian Armed Forces have 

not interfered with the revolution and have remained out of politics. The Tunisian Army 

is a professional force that was barred from any political role under the Ben Ali regime. 

Members of the armed forces could not vote, join political parties, or run for office. The 

army was not assigned responsibility for internal security, reflecting Ben Ali’s high degree 

of reliance on the Interior Ministry, the security services, and the police. During the 

uprising, the armed forces refused Ben Ali’s orders to fire on protestors and bomb a city. 

The challenge for security sector reform in Tunisia is the Interior Ministry and the civilian 

security services. 

Libya represents a different case, underlining the point that SSR will be a different 

challenge in each of the Arab Awakening countries. The Libyan National Transitional 

Council (NTC) is in the process of consolidating power, especially in the security sector. 

Former revolutionary groups are being signed to short-term contracts and brought into 

the new national army and police as units, but they likely retain their loyalty to their 

commanders and home communities. Some revolutionary groups have refused to join the 

military and have said they are waiting for a constitutional government to emerge before 

handing over their weapons. Remnants of the Qaddafi regime smuggled large amounts of 

money out of the country and may attempt to use these funds to disrupt the transition. 

The NTC has money and is trying to take responsibility for its own reform process. The 

international community needs to take this into account when designing and implementing SSR programs in Libya.

Yemen is still another case, featuring a complex scenario where SSR in the armed forces 

has begun in the context of a “negotiated” revolution. Yemen had slowly been slipping 

into political paralysis with the opposition parties denouncing President Ali Abdullah 

Saleh’s decision to schedule elections for April 2012, without passing key reforms. In 

this context, while street demonstrations prompted by a pending constitutional amendment to lift presidential term limits were planned, events in Tunisia and Egypt provided 

added impetus. As is common in the region, close relatives of the president headed the 

key security entities. However, it would be a mistake to confuse the role of the Yemeni 

Armed Forces with the role of the military in Egypt. The Yemeni Armed Forces did not play 

a decisive role in overturning the regime. President Ali Abdullah Saleh was commander in 

chief and his relatives headed the Republican Guard and the Special Forces, but the army 

was deeply divided. 

SSR is an explicit element of the agreement that governs the transition and its implementation will be a major test for the transitional president, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi. 

The “good news” is that phase I of the transition has been reasonably successful. Security 

has improved, a military security committee has been established, and Parliament has ratified the Gulf Cooperation Council–brokered agreement. A general public acceptance of the 

transition prevails. Phase II of the transition will be more challenging and will pose such 

fundamental questions as who will participate in the national dialogue and how will the 

future of the south be determined. 

Libya represents a different 

case, underlining the point 

that SSR will be a different 

challenge in each of the Arab 

Awakening countries.
6 

Intelligence Services Reform

Reform of the intelligence services is the third pillar of security sector reform in the MENA 

region and is the murkiest and most difficult to handle. These services historically were 

targeted against internal opponents of the regime. Most citizens know little about the 

intelligence services beyond personal experience with abuse perpetrated by intelligence 

operatives. It is clear that transformation of the intelligence agencies is a requirement 

for successful security sector reform. These institutions have a track record of detention, 

torture, and arbitrary arrest and enjoy exemption from the rule of law. Reforms need to 

limit their function to collecting external intelligence, providing for civilian leadership, 

and establishing parliamentary oversight mechanisms. Reform of the intelligence services 

is perhaps the most daunting SSR challenge for the transitional regimes, but is an essential 

part of the democratic process. In Egypt, the three major intelligence agencies—the general 

intelligence agency, state security, and military intelligence—continue to crack down on 

demonstrators and there is little evidence of meaningful reform. 

The Special Cases: Syria and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

Syria

Syria’s popular uprising has yet to move beyond internal armed conflict. The Syrian case is 

unique because the prolonged nature of the fighting has provided time for the opposition to 

factor SSR into its planning for a transitional government. The Syrian Army is subordinate to 

the ruling Baath Party and the security services. It is controlled by the Assad family and the 

sectarian Alawite community that the Assad family represents. The opposition’s transition 

plans call for restructuring the army and assigning it an external security role—specifically, 

responsibility for protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. The army 

commander would report to a civilian minister of defense and the institution would be 

downsized to reflect its revised mission. The army would be retrained and professionalized.

All internal security responsibilities would be transferred to the Ministry of Interior. A 

professional national police force would be created to substitute for the existing force that 

has atrophied as the army has assumed responsibility for internal security. The police commander would report to a civilian interior minister and the police would undergo a thorough 

institutional reform. Similarly, the intelligence services would be reduced in number and 

their mission changed to providing external intelligence only. A new intelligence agency 

would be created headed by a civilian official. Each military service would have an internal 

intelligence bureau that would be limited to collecting tactical intelligence on military 

issues. While none of these reforms will be easy, particularly given the divisions among the 

Syrian opposition, it is encouraging that transition planning for Syria highlights SSR as a 

critical part of future democratic development.

Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

While the Arab Awakening enveloped much of the MENA region, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, with the exception of Bahrain, contained or neutralized their internal 

protests. The GCC countries also mediated the terms of the transition in Yemen. Along with 

the Arab League, the GCC joined the consensus on Libya and has been actively involved 

with the United Nations and others in attempting to craft a solution for Syria. Saudi Arabia 

proposed a wagon-circling arrangement to include the two non-Gulf monarchies in the GCC 

and closer integration of Bahrain into the Saudi security net. There is little doubt that the 

Arab Awakening made the Saudis nervous, although most of the smaller Gulf States continue 

to enjoy a considerable degree of legitimacy bolstered by generous distributions of hydroThe Syrian case is unique 

because the prolonged nature of 

the fighting has provided time 

for the opposition to factor 

SSR into its planning for a 

transitional government. 
 7

carbon wealth to their citizenry. However, these states face demographic pressures and need 

to diversify their economies to provide greater employment opportunities. 

Recommendations for the International Community

Although SSR must be an internal process generated by the region’s transitional governments, the international community can provide resources that can play a decisive role 

in the success or failure of these processes. The role of the international community is to 

create the enabling environment where consensus on SSR can be fostered and achieved. 

In this connection, realistic assessments of the local situation will be important. International community involvement must be based on solid, well-informed assessments of what 

is achievable with a clear statement of goals, objectives, and specific courses of action. 

Quantitative and qualitative evaluations based on objective criteria must be articulated 

at the outset and replicated periodically to measure progress and to allow for program 

adjustments. Programming must be dynamic and must take into account field reporting on 

the cultural, social, economic, and political dynamics at work. Programming cannot be one 

dimensional or static. For effective delivery, it must be dynamic and integrated into the 

overall SSR goals of the country in question. 

Connect SSR to Democratic Development

First and foremost, the international community, especially the United States and the 

European Union, should see SSR as a necessary component of developing democratic movements in the region. It should remind itself that there must be security sector reform to 

have democracy and vice versa. SSR cannot be set aside for action at some later date. 

The international community must visualize SSR in the context of the overall democratic 

development of the MENA countries. SSR must be part of long-term political, economic, and 

social development and cannot be divorced from these processes. Changing mind-sets about 

political participation, economic liberalization, and the role of civil society must include 

changing attitudes about security sector reform. 

Whether the international community can obtain local “buy in” for SSR has important 

implications for overall development in the region. The biggest question relates to the financial resources available for transitional governments to pursue SSR. In the cases of Tunisia and 

Morocco, for example, economic assistance is a primary consideration when it comes to SSR. 

Unemployment is high in Tunisia, especially among youth, and there are increasing social tensions. Prices have risen, tourism is down, and the economy is in decline. The country needs foreign investment and reform of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few families that 

typified the old regime. What is needed most is economic assistance to allow the transition to 

succeed. There is a feeling that counterrevolutionary forces are organizing and trying to derail 

the transition to democracy by arguing that conditions were better under the Ben Ali regime. 

In Morocco, a very young population coupled with high unemployment and limited job 

opportunities combine to limit resources available for SSR. In thinking about prospects for 

SSR, underlying economic challenges should be addressed, such as the limits on natural 

resource production, the lack of educational opportunities, and the cost of food and energy. 

Civil society needs to be more involved in SSR from the beginning. International assistance 

programs often suffer from a lack of follow-up, adequate management, and evaluation. 

These conditions cannot prevail in the SSR arena without endangering the entire process. 

These are all areas where the international community will need to play a strong supportive 

role. The World Bank and the United Nations are assembling a sourcebook for SSR expenditure management, which could be a practical tool for countries engaged in SSR and the 

international organizations that are supporting them.

Although SSR must be an 

internal process generated 

by the region’s transitional 

governments, the international 

community can provide 

resources that can play a 

decisive role in the success or 

failure of these processes. 
8 

Coordinate SSR Programming

Another area where the international community can help is through better coordination 

of SSR programming. Often SSR programming emanating from the United States, European 

Union, and international organizations is duplicative, wasting time and resources. This 

programming could be coordinated better and targeted on those countries most in need of 

assistance. Police training programs, for example, should be rationalized so that there is an 

overall strategic plan in place that identifies one country or organization as the lead with 

the others in a supporting role. The international community could create a SSR program 

coordinating committee in an effort to maximize resources for SSR programming.

Foster a Culture of Reform and Promote Institutional Development

The success of security sector reform in the MENA region has strategic implications for the 

United States. The United States needs to engage on key issues such as creating communityoriented police services, refocusing military forces on external defense, and reforming 

nefarious intelligence services. U.S. policy should be guided by two main principles: (1) fostering a culture of reform that will make long-term SSR reform possible and allow democratic 

governance to take hold, and (2) promoting institutional development that will undergird 

the new democracies and prevent the old order from reasserting itself. Implementation of 

the first principle puts a premium on urging transitional governments to proceed with SSR, 

no matter how difficult the challenges faced.

In Yemen, U.S. programming must deal with the dichotomy created by its training of 

boutique forces to combat Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that are outside the 

regular military structure. The United States will need to define how its counterterrorism 

approach in Yemen fits into overall SSR and the underlying problems of Yemeni society such 

as economic underdevelopment, crime, and threats to key infrastructure. In Yemen and 

in other countries in the region, the United States has narrowed the dialogue to counterterrorism issues. Unless the United States takes the root problems in the region into account 

and broadens the narrative beyond countering AQAP, democracy will continue to wobble and 

long-term security sector transformation will prove elusive.

Implementing the second principle means far more extensive U.S. programmatic engagement in SSR. A prime area of opportunity for Washington is the chance to support the development of professional law enforcement agencies throughout the Arab Awakening countries. 

Unlike the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, where police forces were trained on a paramilitary model in the midst of war, the Arab Awakening countries provide an opportunity for 

the United States to help with the development of civilian police services based on Western 

models. Law enforcement agencies would provide transitional governments with immediate support among the population and serve to jump-start the institutional framework for 

reform needed to underpin long-term development.

Reframe Relationships in the Region

SSR is also important in reframing U.S. relationships with many countries in the region. 

After 9/11, the United States emphasized counterterrorism in its relations with some 

regional states. As the Arab Awakening has illustrated, a security-centric policy toward the 

region has its limitations. In countries like Yemen, where security assistance is directed to 

counterterrorism operations, there have been questions concerning U.S. motives. Since the 

GCC-brokered agreement in Yemen includes military reform, SSR is an area where the United 

States could play a valuable and welcome role, one that maintains an emphasis on U.S. 

and Yemeni security interests while broadening that lens beyond counterterrorism. Yemen’s 

new president has begun to restructure the military but needs continued financial support 
 9

and technical assistance. This effort presents an opportunity for the United States and the 

international community to build a long-term program that could become a model for SSR 

in the region. In this regard, the United States Institute of Peace has developed the capacity to organize and deploy SSR advisory teams to assist U.S. embassy country teams and 

combatant commands to conduct security sector evaluations and develop strategic plans 

for implementing comprehensive reform. These teams, which would include SSR and regional 

experts, could assist partner governments in developing effective programs that would meet 

popular expectations for meaningful reforms.

The European Union can also support SSR in the MENA region. The European Union 

brings a somewhat different worldview to the table, one centered on a more comprehensive 

approach rather than on attacking problems on a piecemeal basis. This approach stresses 

support for a broad, national strategy with an emphasis on the political process, including 

special attention to civil society engagement. The European Union is looking for a stronger 

partnership with the people of the region and to promote sustainable growth. It also links 

SSR to larger democratic reform and has held discussions with regional countries on how to 

support the development of more robust SSR. While any external activity such as providing 

SSR assistance requires the approval of all twenty-seven EU countries, stronger EU action 

both in the region and in cooperation with the United States would be desirable.

Both the United States and the European Union can do more to involve the United 

Nations and other multilateral organizations in SSR. While the European Union has an official policy of cooperation with like-minded partners, EU action is sometimes delayed in the 

process of consulting so many different actors. Both in the region and in capitals, there has 

been discussion of more extensive cooperation between the European Union and the United 

Nations, but action needs to be taken. On the other hand, the United States has worked 

with the United Nations on SSR and, generally speaking, the United States and the United 

Nations are on the same page. 

Maintain Military-to-Military Relationships

Without doubt, military-to-military relationships are smoother between countries that share 

political systems. The U.S. military-to-military relationships with democracies are more 

compatible than similar relationships with authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, military-tomilitary dialogues with former authoritarian regimes that are in transition produce benefits 

on a variety of levels. In the interplay of military-to-military conversations, the attributes of 

democratic systems come through as the two militaries discuss issues and compare experiences. While these talks may not list SSR as a specific agenda item, the contact helps spread 

basic values such as civilian authority over the military. Military-to-military relationships 

should be maintained and, if possible, upgraded. In fact, such dialogues can be natural entry 

points for stimulating movement toward SSR when the in-country timing is right. Cutting off 

the military-to-military dialogue serves no purpose other than to foster misunderstanding. 

If managed diplomatically, such discussions can produce important attitudinal changes on 

the desirability of introducing security sector reform in certain countries in the MENA region.

Address Transitional Justice Issues and Reconciliation

Transitional justice and reconciliation are issues that must be addressed in any transition 

from authoritarianism to democracy and are related to overall security sector reform. Police 

reform is inextricably linked to reform of the entire justice sector, including courts and 

prisons. It is natural for citizens to seek redress for grievances stemming from actions by 

repressive regimes once those regimes pass from the scene. The trial of Hosni Mubarak and 

resulting verdict in Egypt is a manifestation of this sentiment. In Tunisia, victims of the Ben 

Ali regime want justice and reform of the security services, particularly in the countryside 

Military-to-military dialogues with 

former authoritarian regimes that 

are in transition produce benefits 

on a variety of levels.
10 

where villagers were killed and brutalized by the police. Many individuals know the identity 

of the perpetrators of past crimes, which increases the desire for justice. 

This demand brings another problem to the fore. Transitional justice will rely on judicial 

institutions that were part of the previous regime and are themselves in need of reform. 

Balancing justice with the need for peace and stability is a major challenge facing Tunisia. 

Tunisia’s new Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice is examining how to provide 

justice while advancing the spirit of reconciliation. Tunisia’s current minister of interior, Ali 

Laarayedh, was a former political prisoner who spent sixteen years in jail, including twelve 

years in solitary confinement. As minister, he is now supervising the same people who tortured him. Nevertheless, he has told his former tormentors that he is trying to build a new 

Tunisia based on reconciliation and will work with anyone who shares that vision. The international community is well placed to support transitional justice programs through assistance 

with vetting, promoting transparency, and sharing “best practices” from around the world. 

Focus on Restructuring 

The pursuit of SSR in the MENA countries does not require dismantling the existing security 

institutions. In most cases, existing institutions can be restructured and reformed, while 

remaining essentially intact. Such reforms do not need to produce carbon copies of Western 

models. While they should be democratic in nature, they will have their own unique regional 

attributes that will help make them sustainable. In this process, it will be important to 

locate and draw on current members of the security forces who favor democracy and who are 

anxious to professionalize their institutions. In many instances, these people have argued 

for reform even during the old regimes. They need to be identified and incorporated into the 

reform process under new political leadership. Tunisia is a prime case in point where there 

is a cadre of talented people in the security sector who share the values and objectives of 

the reform government and can be enlisted to lead a SSR process. In Egypt, under the old 

regime, reform-minded leadership in the national police sought U.S. training on community 

policing concepts and visited U.S. police departments to gain knowledge and experience. 

Understand the Sociocultural Milieu

Security sector reform is difficult even in established democracies with strong institutions 

and developed political processes. It becomes a major undertaking in countries accustomed 

to authoritarian rule and repressive security services that are undergoing a sea change from 

one system of government to another. To be successful, SSR will require a fundamental 

change in the mind-set of key stakeholders and massive amounts of political will. Participants must accept that new approaches are required and that old ways of doing business no 

longer apply. Change in the security sector, where individuals are used to wielding decisive 

power, will not come easily. Public expectations must be managed; the popular belief is that 

the departure of the old regime will right all previous wrongs. Transitional governments 

must moderate public expectations by explaining clearly that reform of the security sector 

will take time. The key to success is to have a clearly identified start to the process and 

that the process continues, gaining momentum along the way. Public expectations will be 

tempered if the reform process is visible and the transitional government reports regularly 

on the progress achieved.

As democratic processes unfold, the international community should not lose sight of 

the stimulus behind the revolutions in the MENA region—the people. Popular pressure 

from below will be important because elites are unlikely to push the SSR process forward. 

Respecting the will of the people is a central tenet of democracy and the people must 

be involved in the process of change. The energy that citizens brought to removing the 

old regimes should be redirected to the rebuilding process. Coherent strategies should be 

In most cases, existing 

institutions can be restructured 

and reformed, while remaining 

essentially intact.
 11

developed for citizen support of SSR and a dialogue started with the authorities governing 

the security sector. That said, transitional governments have to manage the military and 

the security services carefully to avoid a backlash; this will take patience and a great deal of 

work to secure meaningful change. Dialogue involving civil society can prompt agreement 

on change. The Syrian opposition is instructive in this regard; it is developing experts and 

plans on SSR to be deployed when a transitional government takes power. These experts 

can bring a citizen’s perspective on SSR to the transitional government’s work in the postAssad era. There is also a need for public education on the role and responsibilities of the 

security sector in a democratic society. In the end, a sense of balance and proportion will 

be required, including the ability to see progress despite sometimes messy conditions. 

Conclusions

Security sector reform entails transforming the three basic units of national security: 

the police, the armed forces, and the intelligence services. In each of these organizations, reform must reflect the will of the people and the public demand for transparency, 

accountability, responsiveness, and professionalism. Police forces that are antagonistic and 

abusive to the public must be replaced by police forces built on democratic, civilian models 

that can provide effective internal security while stressing community engagement, crime 

prevention, and service. Armies that subjugate civilian populations must be reassigned to 

protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation. Intelligence services must 

be reduced in number and reconfigured to produce classic national security intelligence and 

to renounce any internal security role. Transitional governments should develop strategic 

plans for SSR that deal with the short-, medium-, and long-term challenges, including plans 

for the institutional development of these entities as pillars of the new democracy.

The international community, particularly the United States, the European Union, and 

the United Nations, should support SSR to the fullest as a critical part of the transition 

to democracy in the MENA area. The nature of international support will vary country by 

country, depending on the stage of the democratic transition. U.S. and EU assistance with 

SSR in Libya or Syria will differ from similar work in Egypt or Yemen.

Whatever form such assistance takes, it needs to be preceded by a careful assessment to 

assure it is attuned to the SSR challenges faced by the individual country. The assessment 

must be based upon careful dialogue and political negotiation, resulting in a broad consensus on how to proceed. Similarly, international assistance should be closely coordinated to 

avoid overlapping programs and duplication of effort. A special coordinating committee of 

SSR donors should be established to assure that programming is coherent in its approach 

and is implemented efficiently and expertly. This will maximize the application of financial 

and human resources in the current climate of fiscal austerity.

As SSR evolves, transitional justice and reconciliation issues need to be taken into 

account. Since the police function is part of the larger criminal justice sector, police reform 

should be attuned to reform of the rest of the justice system, including courts and prisons. 

The need to maintain public order and bring criminals to justice should be balanced with 

access to justice and respect for human rights.

It will be important to keep in mind the socio-cultural-historic context within which 

SSR takes place, in particular the need to understand that SSR is a long-term process and 

that changes will be incremental. Transitional governments should be open and communicative with publics on SSR, explaining the cumulative nature of reform over time. This 

government-public dialogue will be important to garnering and sustaining public support for 

SSR. Finally, civil society must participate strongly and visibly in SSR as part of its support 

for transitional governments and its engagement on the larger issues of democratic reform. 
Of Related Interest

•	 Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East by Mark Sedra (Special 

Report, November 2011)

•	 The Politics of Security Sector Reform in Egypt by Daniel Brumberg and Hesham Sallam 

(Special Report, October 2012) 

•	 Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police by Robert Perito (Special Report, May 2012)

•	 Paying for Afghanistan’s Security Forces During Transition: Issues for Chicago and Beyond by 

William Byrd (Peace Brief, April 2012)

•	 Defusing Egypt’s Demographic Time Bomb by Raymond Gilpin, Amal A. Kandeel, and Paul 

Sullivan (Peace Brief, March 2011)

•	 Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges by David Bayley and 

Robert M. Perito (Special Report, November 2011)

•	 The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, 

October 2011)

•	 Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability 

Force (USIP Press, 2004) by Robert M Perito

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