J-S44045-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANNTONESA WOODARD, 

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2711 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order July 17, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0905851-1998

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2018

Anntonesa Woodard (“Woodard”), pro se, appeals from the Order 

dismissing her second Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On October 20, 2000, Woodard pled guilty to second-degree murder, 

kidnapping, arson, and possession of an instrument of crime. The trial court 

sentenced Woodard to an aggregate term of life in prison. This Court affirmed 

the judgment of sentence in part, and remanded for resentencing, based upon 

the fact that the sentence for kidnapping should have merged with the 

sentence for second-degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Woodard, 833 

A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. 2003) (unpublished memorandum). On December 29, 

2003, our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth 

v. Woodard, 841 A.2d 531 (Pa. 2003). 
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On September 28, 2004, Woodard filed her first PCRA Petition, which 

the PCRA court denied. Her appeal was dismissed for her failure to file a brief. 

On August 20, 2012, Woodard filed the instant PCRA Petition. 

Eventually, on April 10, 2017, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 

Notice. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed the Petition. Woodard filed a 

timely Notice of Appeal. 

Our standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA 

petition is whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of 

record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 

803 (Pa. 2014).

Initially, we observe that all PCRA petitions, including second or 

subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the defendant’s 

judgment of sentence becoming final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are 

jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues 

raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 

994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

In this case, Woodard’s judgment became final on March 29, 2004, after 

the time to seek review with the United States Supreme Court had expired. 

See SUP. CT. R. 13 (allowing ninety days to file a petition for a writ of 
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certiorari). Accordingly, Woodard had until March 29, 2005, to file a timely 

PCRA petition. Woodard’s August 20, 2012 Petition is thus facially untimely 

under the PCRA. 

However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition 

where the defendant can explicitly plead and prove one of the three exceptions 

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any PCRA petition invoking one 

of these exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could 

have been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2); Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1094. 

Here, Woodard invokes the newly-recognized constitutional right 

exception, based upon Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Brief for 

Appellant at 4. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that sentencing schemes 

that mandate life in prison without parole for defendants who committed their 

crimes while under the age of eighteen violate the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 465. The Court reasoned 

that in light of a juvenile’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 

change, mandatory juvenile sentencing schemes pose too great a risk of 

disproportionate punishment, in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. Id. 

at 479.1 Woodard argues that Miller should extend to offenders over the age 

of 18 when the crime was committed, because research indicates that young 

adults are not fully mentally and emotionally mature until over the age of 21. 

Brief for Appellant at 5. 

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1

In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016), the United 

States Supreme Court held that its decision in Miller applies retroactively. 
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Miller is inapplicable to this case, as Woodard was 23 years old when 

she committed the crimes. See Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 

94 (Pa. Super. 2016) (noting that “petitioners who were older than 18 at the 

time they committed murder are not within the ambit of the Miller decision,

and therefore may not rely on that decision to bring themselves within the 

time-bar exception in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii).”); id. (rejecting appellant’s 

argument to extend the Miller holding based upon neuroscientific theories 

regarding brain development of persons over the age of 18).2

Accordingly, Woodard failed to meet the requirements of the newlyrecognized constitutional right exception. Thus, the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Woodard’s second PCRA Petition as untimely. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/18/18

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2 We note that an en banc panel of this Court will determine whether Miller

applies only to individuals under the age of 18 at the time of the offense. See 

Commonwealth v. Lee, 1891 WDA 2016 (reargument granted Mar. 9, 

2018). However, as no decision has been filed, we are bound by Furgess.