United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

March 1998 F-22 AIRCRAFT

Progress in Achieving

Engineering and

Manufacturing

Development Goals

GAO/NSIAD-98-67

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278307 

March 10, 1998

Congressional Committees

As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998

(P. L. 105-85), we reviewed the Air Force’s F-22 engineering and

manufacturing development (EMD) program. This report presents our

conclusions regarding whether the EMD program is likely to be completed

at a total cost that does not exceed the cost limitation established in the

act. The report also discusses the extent to which the cost, schedule, and

performance goals for the F-22 EMD program are being met and identifies

contract modifications expected to have a significant effect on cost or

performance of F-22 aircraft. The act requires us to certify whether we had

access to sufficient information to make judgments on the matters covered

by this report.

Background The F-22 is an air superiority aircraft with the capability to deliver

air-to-ground weapons. The most significant advanced technology features

include supercruise, the ability to fly efficiently at supersonic speeds

without using fuel-consuming afterburners; low observability to adversary

systems; and integrated avionics to significantly improve the pilot’s

situational awareness.

The objectives of the F-22 EMD program, begun in 1991, are to (1) design,

fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F-22 flight test vehicles, 2 ground test articles,

and 26 flight qualified engines; (2) design, fabricate, integrate, and test the

avionics suite; and (3) design, develop, and test the F-22 system support

and training systems.

In June 1996, because of indications of potential cost growth on the F-22

program, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition chartered

a Joint Estimating Team (JET) consisting of personnel from the Air Force,

the Department of Defense (DOD), and private industry. The objectives of

the JET were to estimate the most probable cost of the F-22 program and to

identify realistic initiatives that could be implemented to lower program

costs. In January 1997, the JET estimated the F-22 EMD program would cost

$18.688 billion, an increase of about $1.45 billion1

 over the previous Air

Force estimate. The JET also reported that additional time would be

1

JET estimated the increase at $2.16 billion; however, a decision to delete preproduction aircraft,

estimated to cost $0.71 billion, reduced the estimated increase to $1.45 billion.

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required to complete the EMD program and recommended changes to the

EMD schedule.

The Air Force and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology adopted the JET’s recommendations, including its cost

estimate for the EMD program. Other JET recommendations included

slowing the manufacturing of the EMD aircraft to ensure an efficient

transition from development to low-rate initial production and increasing

the time available to develop and integrate avionics software.2

 In August

and September 1997, the Air Force negotiated changes with the prime

contractors3

 to more closely align the cost-plus-award-fee contracts with

the JET cost estimate and revised schedule. However, as of January 1998,

many substantial planned changes recommended by the JET had not been

incorporated into the Lockheed Martin contract, such as changes to the

avionics estimated to cost $221 million.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, enacted on

November 18, 1997, imposed cost limitations of $18.688 billion on the F-22

EMD program and $43.4 billion on the production program. The limitation

on production cost did not specify a quantity of aircraft to be procured.

The act instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to adjust the cost

limitations for (1) the amounts of increases or decreases in costs

attributable to economic inflation after September 30, 1997, and (2) the

amounts of increases or decreases in costs attributable to compliance with

changes in federal, state, or local laws enacted after September 30, 1997.

Conferees for the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998,

enacted October 8, 1997, provided direction to the Secretary of the Air

Force regarding out-of-production parts on the F-22 program. Because it is

not economical for some component manufacturers to keep production

lines open to produce old technology parts with low demand, they have

discontinued making parts, some of which are used on the F-22 EMD

aircraft, and will discontinue making others. To minimize cost and

schedule impacts on the F-22 EMD and production programs, the Air Force

plans to redesign these out-of-production parts or buy sufficient quantities

of them for the first five lots of production aircraft. The appropriations

conferees directed the Secretary of the Air Force to fund the cost of

redesigning out-of-production parts from the Research, Development, Test

2

For more information on the JET’s recommendations see Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air

Force F-22 Fighter Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997). 

3

The major prime contractors are Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems for the aircraft and United

Technologies Corporation (Pratt & Whitney) for the engines.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
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and Evaluation appropriation. The effect of following that direction would

be to add that effort, expected by the Air Force to cost $353 million, to the

EMD program.

In January 1998, the Air Force notified the Congress that it increased the

EMD cost limitation by $353 million, to respond to direction from the

conferees, and decreased the production cost limitation by the same

amount. As adjusted, the EMD cost limitation increased to $19.041 billion.

In addition, the Air Force plans to adjust the cost limitation downward by

$102 million to $18.939 billion, to recognize revisions to inflation

assumptions by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Results in Brief The Air Force’s estimate to complete F-22 EMD is $18.884 billion,

$55 million less than the EMD cost limitation that will be adjusted to

$18.939 billion. However, the F-22 EMD program is not meeting schedule

goals established in response to the JET review. The first flight of the F-22

was about 3 months late, issues have emerged concerning production and

delivery of wings and fuselages for the EMD aircraft, and test schedules

have consequently been delayed. Lockheed Martin has indicated that

negotiated costs should not be exceeded because of these issues. The Air

Force, however, is further assessing the impact of these issues on EMD

cost, the schedule upon which test data is produced, and the schedule

upon which the EMD program is to be completed. The Air Force expects to

complete this assessment at the end of February 1998.

The Air Force is estimating that the F-22 will meet or exceed its

performance goals. However, less flight test data have been accumulated

through January 1998 than were expected because the beginning of the

flight test program was delayed from May 1997 to September 1997 and

flight tests have been suspended to accomplish planned ground tests and

minor structural additions to the airframe. Flight testing will not resume

until April 1998. Delayed tests reduce the amount of actual F-22

performance information that will be available to support Air Force plans

to begin production in fiscal year 1999.

The Air Force and contractors provided us access to sufficient information

to make informed judgments on the matters covered by this report. This is

discussed further in appendix II.

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Extent to Which the

F-22 Program Is

Meeting the Cost Goal

for the EMD Program

In the fiscal year 1999 President’s budget, the Air Force’s estimate to

complete the EMD program was $18.884 billion. The estimated cost to

complete EMD includes the negotiated prices of the major prime contracts,

estimated costs of significant planned contract modifications, other

government costs, and a margin to accommodate future cost growth.

Although contractor reports through December 1997 project that the

efforts on contract are expected to be completed within the negotiated

contract prices, manufacturing problems with the wings and the aft

fuselage could change those projections for Lockheed Martin.

Estimated Cost of EMD The Air Force contracts with Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, after

being restructured, had negotiated prices of $16.003 billion. The Air Force,

as of December 1997, planned to add modifications to the contracts

totaling about $1.546 billion. The Air Force’s estimated costs for F-22 EMD

are shown in table 1.

Table 1: Air Force Estimated Cost of

F-22 EMD Dollars in billions

Element of cost Amount

Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney

contracts

$16.003

Planned modifications to contracts 1.546

Other government costs 1.184

Margin for cost growth 0.151

Total costs $18.884

Modifications Planned to

EMD Contracts

Air Force officials provided us a list of planned and budgeted

modifications that will increase the contract prices. The list is consistent

with the JET findings. Modifications planned relate to

• efforts directed by the conferees on the Department of Defense

Appropriations Act, 1998, to redesign out-of-production parts

($353 million);

• award fees to be paid to the contractor based on evaluations of contractor

performance ($262 million);

• extending the time period for F-22 testing ($230 million);

• addition of changes (Block IV) to the avionics, including interface

capability with the newly developed AIM-9X air-to-air missile

($221 million);

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• extending the time period for keeping an active laboratory infrastructure

($158 million);

• efforts to provide the capability to perform air combat simulation and

ground testing of avionics prior to its delivery ($65 million);

• provision for contractor resources to conduct initial operational test and

evaluation ($60 million);

• efforts to test and approve the F-22 for supersonic launch of external

missiles ($51 million);

• implementation of aircraft battle damage repair capability ($29 million);

and

• other changes ($117 million).

Limited Cost Experience

Indicates Contract Cost

Goals Are Being Met

Since the contracts were restructured in August and September 1997,

limited experience has been accumulated to indicate the extent to which

contractors are completing scheduled work at the planned cost.

Contractor reports reflecting experience through December 1997,

however, indicate the contractors are predicting they will be able to

complete efforts now covered by the contract within the negotiated costs.

Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney report to the Air Force monthly

concerning their progress compared to contract costs and schedules.

These reports define the cost and schedule variances from the contract

plans. When the contracts were restructured, the contractors rebaselined

their cost control systems that measure the cost and schedule progress

and calculate how the actual costs and schedules vary from the goals.

Prior to restructuring the contracts, the Lockheed Martin and Pratt &

Whitney reports indicated unfavorable variances at completion of EMD

totaling about $1.2 billion.

Both Pratt & Whitney and Lockheed Martin reports showed variances of

less than 1 percent from the negotiated contract cost and planned

schedule through December 1997. The most significant variance identified

in the contractor reports was about a $54 million unfavorable schedule

variance for Lockheed Martin. The contractors’ reports showed that the

negotiated costs include about $194 million for management reserves.

Management reserves are amounts set aside to react to cost increases due

to unplanned efforts or cost growth in planned efforts. Lockheed Martin

and Pratt & Whitney December 1997 reports indicate they plan to

complete the contract efforts within the negotiated costs. However, the

impact of delays in the delivery of wing and aft fuselage assemblies and

the flight test program have not been reflected in those reports. Lockheed

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
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Martin has advised the Air Force that it can execute the revised schedule

caused by the late deliveries at no increased cost to the EMD contract. At

the time of our review, the Air Force was assessing the impact of these

delays and whether it agrees that the changes can be accomplished with

no cost increase to the EMD contract.

Extent to Which the

F-22 Program Is

Meeting the Schedule

Goals for the EMD

Program

In January 1998, the F-22 program was not meeting its schedule goals. The

first flight of an F-22 did not occur on time and resumption of its flight test

program will be delayed by at least 2 to 3 weeks to correct a problem

discovered in the horizontal tail of the aircraft. Also, the late delivery of aft

fuselage assemblies and wing assemblies is expected to cause delays in

delivery of other EMD aircraft. These problems will also delay the progress

of the flight test program. The Air Force has revised its schedule to reflect

the late first flight. However, it had not determined how the late deliveries

of aft fuselage assemblies and wing assemblies will impact the overall F-22

EMD schedule. The Air Force planned to complete its evaluation of the

impact on the schedule by the end of February 1998.

First F-22 Flight Over 

3 Months Late

Because of a number of technical problems with the aircraft, the first flight

of the first F-22 EMD aircraft was delayed over 3 months, until September 7,

1997. According to the Air Force, the problems were not caused by the

design of the aircraft but involved a fuel tank leak, failure of an auxiliary

power unit resulting from faulty installation, a software defect, incorrect

installation of the electrical connector to a fuel tank probe, and foreign

object damage from debris being ingested into an engine. After making

two flights, the aircraft flight test program was suspended to accomplish

planned ground tests and minor structural additions to the airframe.

Resumption of the flight test program, planned for March 1998, is expected

to be delayed until at least April 17, 1998, because materials in the

horizontal tail of the aircraft became disbonded, or separated. Air Force

officials said a solution to this problem has been identified and it will not

impact other EMD aircraft schedules.

Impact of Late Aircraft

Deliveries on Test Plans for

Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999

The flight test schedule was updated in May 1997 based on the review of

the program by the JET, with first flight planned to occur in late May 1997.

However, because first flight did not occur as scheduled, the beginning of

the flight test program was delayed. Flight tests are also expected to be

delayed because of problems with manufacturing wings and aft fuselages

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and expected late delivery of the third through sixth EMD flight test

aircraft.

Because of the delay in first flight and expected delays in delivery of

several later EMD aircraft, a number of flight test hours planned for fiscal

years 1998 and 1999 have been deferred until later in the test program.

About 55 percent (120 of 217 hours) of the flight test hours planned for

fiscal year 1998 and about 11 percent (51 of 449 hours) of the flight test

hours planned for fiscal year 1999 have been deferred until later in the test

program. Although test hours planned for the early stages of the flight test

program are now planned to be accumulated more slowly, Air Force

officials said the total number of flight test hours planned, the number of

flight test months planned, and the completion date for the F-22 EMD

program remain about the same.

Wings and Aft Fuselages

Are Expected to Be Late

for Most EMD Aircraft

Wing deliveries are behind schedule because of problems with the

development and manufacturing of large titanium wing castings, the

foundation upon which the wing is built. As of January 1998, the

contractor and the Air Force were still working to resolve the casting

problem. The wings for the next four flight test aircraft and the two

ground test articles are expected to be delivered about 2 weeks to over 

4 months late to Lockheed Martin.

Delivery of the F-22 aft fuselage—the rear aircraft body section—is

expected to be late for the next four flight test aircraft and the two ground

test articles because of late parts deliveries and difficulties with the

welding process caused by tight tolerances when fitting the many pieces of

the fuselage together. An Air Force and contractor team has been formed

to evaluate potential cost, schedule, testing, and production impacts

associated with this problem. This team plans to complete its assessment

by the end of February 1998.

As a result of the late deliveries of the wings and aft fuselages, the first

flights of the third through the sixth EMD aircraft are expected to be from

about 2 weeks to over 5 months late. Air Force officials said first flight of

the second EMD aircraft is expected to occur on schedule because the time

available between production of the first and second EMD aircraft is

expected to be sufficient to allow the manufacturing problems to be

corrected. Since there was significantly less time scheduled between the

second EMD aircraft and subsequent EMD aircraft, first flight of later EMD

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
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aircraft will be delayed. Table 2 compares the May 1997 scheduled first

flights to the expected dates of first flights as of January 1998.

Table 2: Comparison of Schedules for

First Flights of EMD Aircraft

EMD aircraft

Scheduled first

flight as of May

1997

Expected first

flight as of January

1998

Months of delay in

first flight

4001 May 29, 1997 September 7, 1997a 3.3

4002 July 9, 1998 July 9, 1998 0

4003 June 16, 1999 November 22, 1999 5.2

4004 August 17, 1999 February 3, 2000 5.6

4005 January 11, 2000 March 31, 2000 2.7

4006 May 18, 2000 May 30, 2000 0.4

4007 September 25, 2000 September 25, 2000 0

4008 February 2, 2001 February 2, 2001 0

4009 June 1, 2001 June 1, 2001 0

aActual date of first flight.

Extent to Which the

F-22 Program Is

Meeting the

Performance Goals

for the EMD Program

The Air Force estimates that the F-22 will meet or exceed the goals for the

major performance parameters. These include 10 parameters4

 for which

the Air Force reports regularly to DOD, and two additional performance

features GAO reviewed that relate to other critical characteristics of the

F-22 aircraft. The Air Force estimates how performance is expected to

compare to specific goals for each parameter by estimating and

summarizing the performance of relevant subparameters. The estimates

are engineering judgments based on computer and other models, tests of

some components in flying test beds, ground tests, analyses, and, to a

limited extent, flight tests. The goal for each parameter is based on the EMD

contract specifications. Goals for the many subparameters (about 160) are

established to ensure that the goal for each parameter can be met.

Although the Air Force has not included them in the 10 parameters for

regular reporting, we identified and reviewed two additional

features—situational awareness and low observability—that are an

integral part of the F-22 being able to operate as intended.5

 The F-22

4

The 10 parameters are radar cross section from the front sector of the aircraft, supercruise,

acceleration, maneuverability, payload, combat radius, radar detection range, airlift support, sortie

generation rate, and mean time between maintenance.

5

Although these additional features are not official performance parameters, the Air Force does

consider them critical system characteristics, which it describes as generic characteristics that do not

lend themselves as well to measurement and reporting.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
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sensors, advanced aircraft electronics, and cockpit display screens are

required to provide the pilot improved situational awareness of potential

enemy threats and targets. This increased awareness is to improve pilot

response time to the threats, thus increasing the lethality and survivability

of the aircraft. The aircraft’s low observable or “stealthy” features allow it

to evade detection by enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. We

believe the situational awareness and low observability features are

critical to the success of the F-22 program and, therefore, we reviewed

them and are reporting on the Air Force’s progress in achieving them

along with the 10 parameters the Air Force established. The Air Force’s 

10 parameters and the 2 additional features we identified and reviewed are

described in appendix I.

Air Force Estimates of F-22

Performance

As of January 1998, the Air Force estimated that, at the end of the EMD

program, the F-22’s performance will meet or exceed the goals for all 

10 established parameters. Table 3 shows the goal (contract specification)

for each parameter; the estimated performance achieved for each

parameter based on computer models, analyses, or testing; and the Air

Force’s current estimate of the performance each parameter is expected to

achieve by the end of EMD. Most of the goals and related performance

information are classified and are therefore shown as percentages instead

of actual numbers. To interpret the table, it is constructed so that

estimated performance greater than the goal is better than the goal, except

for airlift support where using fewer assets is better. Table 3 also shows

the two additional features that we included (situational awareness and

aircraft low observability) because of their importance to the success of

the F-22 program.

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Table 3: Estimates of Performance for

Selected Parameters and Additional

GAO Identified Features Key performance

parameters

Goal (contract

specification)

Estimated

performance

achieved to date

Air Force current

estimate at EMD

completion

Supercruise 100% 114% 114%

Acceleration 100% 108% 107%

Maneuverability 100% 100% 100%

Airlift support

(C-141 equivalents)

8 7 to 9 Less than 8

Sortie generation rate 100% 104% 103%

Radar cross section,

front sector only

100% Favorable Favorable

Mean time between

maintenance

3.0 hours 3.1 hours 3.1 hours

Payload (missiles) 6 medium-range

2 short-range

6 medium-range

2 short-range

6 medium-range 

2 short-range

Combat radius 100% 127% 127%

Radar detection range 100% 117% 117%

Additional features

reviewed by GAO Goala

Estimated

performance

achieved to date

Current estimate at

EMD completion

Situational

awareness

100% Favorable Favorable

Low observability 100% Favorable Favorable

aThese goals are not contract specifications. We assigned a value of 100% to evaluate the

features.

Basis for Air Force

Estimates

We evaluated the basis for the Air Force’s current performance estimates

by reviewing and analyzing performance information and estimates for

subparameters that are the components of each parameter. We reviewed

selected analyses, test reports, and plans the Air Force used to formulate

its estimated performance achieved to date and projected estimates for the

end of EMD.

As of January 1998, estimated performance concerning two

subparameters, aircraft weight and fuel usage, was not expected to

achieve goals established for those subparameters. However, the Air

Force’s analysis indicates that failure to achieve those goals will not cause

the associated parameters to fail to meet their established goals. For

example, aircraft empty weight is a subparameter that affects the

supercruise, acceleration, maneuverability, and combat radius

performance parameters. Although the aircraft’s empty weight is currently

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
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expected to be 2 percent higher than the established goal for that

subparameter, Air Force analyses indicate that the increased weight is not

significant enough to cause the estimates for the affected parameters to

not meet their goals. A more extensive discussion of our analysis and a

chart listing the major performance subparameters are included in

appendix II.

Conclusion The Air Force’s estimate to complete F-22 EMD is $18.884 billion,

$55 million less than the EMD cost limitation that will be adjusted to

$18.939 billion. However, issues have emerged concerning production and

delivery of wings and fuselages for the EMD aircraft, and test schedules

have consequently been delayed. The Air Force is further assessing the

impact of these issues on EMD cost, the schedule upon which test data is

produced, and the schedule upon which the EMD program is to be

completed.

The Air Force is estimating that the F-22 will meet or exceed its

performance goals. However, less flight test data have been accumulated

through January 1998 than were expected because the flight test program

was delayed and flight tests have been suspended to accomplish planned

ground tests and minor structural additions to the test aircraft airframe.

Delayed tests reduce the amount of actual F-22 performance information

that will be available to support Air Force plans to begin production in

fiscal year 1999.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with it

and advised us the Air Force has notified the Congress about changing the

EMD and production cost limitations to recognize direction from the

conferees on the fiscal year 1998 Defense Appropriations Act. As a result

of this additional information, we have removed a matter for congressional

consideration that had been included in the draft report. DOD’s comments

are included in appendix III to this report.

We performed our review between July 1997 and February 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A

description of our objectives, scope, and methodology is included in

appendix II.

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We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other

interested parties.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix IV.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
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List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Description of F-22

Performance

Parameters

16

Appendix II 

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

21

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

25

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

28

Related GAO Products 32

Tables Table 1: Air Force Estimated Cost of F-22 EMD 4

Table 2: Comparison of Schedules for First Flights of EMD

Aircraft

8

Table 3: Estimates of Performance for Selected Parameters and

Additional GAO Identified Features

10

Table II.1: List of F-22 Performance Parameters and Critical

Subparameters

23

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

EMD engineering and manufacturing development

JET Joint Estimating Team

RCS radar cross section

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix I 

Description of F-22 Performance

Parameters

Supercruise Supercruise means the aircraft can sustain supersonic or mach1

 speed

without using its afterburners. Supercruise saves fuel and helps reduce the

aircraft’s infrared signature by not using afterburners that produce a high

infrared signature. A reduced infrared signature, in turn, helps make the

F-22 low observable and harder for enemy aircraft and missiles to detect.

The measurement used for supercruise is the highest mach obtainable in a

stable, level flight at 40,000 feet altitude.

The Air Force estimated the F-22 will exceed the supercruise goal by

about 14 percent. This estimate was determined by analysis of computer

models using the latest data available on aspects such as the engines’

thrust and fuel flow characteristics. Propulsion flight testing is scheduled

to begin in the first quarter of 1998 and end in the second quarter of 2000.

Acceleration Acceleration is a key parameter because the F-22 must be able to outrun

enemy aircraft and exit an area after it employs air-to-air or air-to-ground

munitions. The acceleration parameter refers to the amount of time it

takes the aircraft to go from 0.8 mach to 1.5 mach at 30,000 feet altitude.

The Air Force estimated that the F-22 will be faster than the acceleration

goal. This estimate was determined by analysis of computer models and

ground test data using the latest data available on the major

subparameters affecting acceleration. Propulsion flight testing is

scheduled to begin in the first quarter of 1998 and end in the second

quarter of 2000 and flight performance testing is scheduled to begin in the

fourth quarter of 1998 and end in the third quarter of 2001.

Maneuverability The maneuverability parameter is a measurement of the maximum force

the aircraft can generate during a turn at 0.9 mach at 30,000 feet altitude

without losing speed or altitude. Many additional measures that relate to

the maneuverability of an aircraft exist, but the Air Force has determined

that this measurement is the most appropriate to demonstrate the general

F-22 maneuverability at key flight conditions.

The Air Force estimated the F-22 will meet its maneuverability goal. The

Air Force estimate was determined by analysis of computer models using

the latest data available on the major subparameters affecting

maneuverability. Flight performance testing is scheduled to begin in the

fourth quarter of 1998 and end in the third quarter of 2001.

1

The ratio of the speed of the aircraft to the speed of sound, which is about 738 miles per hour.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix I 

Description of F-22 Performance

Parameters

Airlift Support This parameter measures the number of C-141B transport aircraft

equivalents required to deploy and maintain a squadron of 24 F-22 aircraft

for 30 days without resupply. The goal is to be able to provide this support

with eight C-141 equivalents, thereby reducing the assets needed to deploy

and the cost of deployment.

The Air Force estimated it will require less than eight C-141 equivalents to

transport a squadron of 24 F-22s. This estimate was based on a recent

study. A mobility demonstration to verify the estimate, which cannot be

done until a full squadron of 24 F-22 aircraft is activated, is scheduled for

2004 upon delivery of the 24th production aircraft. A squadron of 24 F-15s

requires 19 C-141 equivalents.

Sortie Generation Rate Sortie generation rate is defined as the average number of sorties or

missions flown per aircraft per day for the first 6 days of a potential

conflict. This parameter measures the degree to which the F-22 will be

available during the first few days of a potential conflict to achieve and

maintain air superiority.

The Air Force estimated the F-22 will exceed the sortie generation rate

goal. This estimate was based on the results of a 6-day surge analysis done

on a computer model using many statistics such as maintenance

characteristics, support equipment and resource availability, and aircraft

maintenance policy. F-22 maintainability demonstrations are scheduled to

be accomplished by 2002 to verify the sortie generation rate estimates.

Radar Cross Section The radar cross section (RCS) parameter essentially refers to how large the

F-22 should appear to enemy radar. The smaller an aircraft’s RCS, the

harder it is for enemy radar to detect and track. A small RCS, along with

several other factors,2

 contributes to an aircraft’s low observability or

“stealthy” nature. This particular parameter is called front sector RCS,

which means it is the RCS when the F-22 is viewed from the front by enemy

radar. While there are over 200 F-22 RCS measurement points, the Air Force

considers the front sector RCS the most important measure of the aircraft’s

ability to avoid detection by an enemy.

The Air Force estimated the F-22’s front sector RCS will be smaller or

better than its goal. Air Force RCS estimates were based on component

2

Other factors contributing to an aircraft’s low observability include low (1) infrared signature,

(2) electromagnetic signature, (3) acoustic level, and (4) visibility.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix I 

Description of F-22 Performance

Parameters

models that predict the RCS of major components, such as engine inlets

and wings, and then use this data to predict the RCS of an entire aircraft.

There are 27 major subparameters of this RCS parameter. RCS design

validation and specification compliance are also being conducted with a

full-scale F-22 mounted on a pole enabling testers to take RCS

measurements. This testing will continue into 1999. In-flight RCS

measurements will begin in 1999 and continue into 2002.

Mean Time Between

Maintenance

Mean time between maintenance is a measure of aircraft reliability defined

as the total number of aircraft flight hours divided by the total number of

aircraft maintenance actions in the same period. The F-22 goal is 3 flight

hours between maintenance actions by the time the F-22 reaches system

maturity.

The Air Force estimated that by the time the F-22 reaches system maturity

(100,000 flight hours, or about year 2008), the F-22 will only require

maintenance every 3.1 flight hours. A reliability computer model was used

to develop this estimate by using factors like the design of systems on the

aircraft and scheduled maintenance activities. Throughout development

and operational flight testing, maintenance data is to be collected from the

500th through the 5,000th hour of flight testing to update the maintenance

estimate. Data will continue to be collected about operational usage of the

aircraft through system maturity to verify requirements.

Payload The payload parameter is the number of air-to-air missiles, medium and

short range, the F-22 is to carry when conducting an air superiority

mission and not attacking enemy ground targets. Payload is a key

parameter because the F-22 is designed to carry missiles in its internal

weapons bay, not externally. Carrying weapons externally increases an

aircraft’s radar cross section and can allow easier detection by enemy

radar.

The Air Force estimated that the F-22 will meet the payload goal of

carrying six AIM-120C medium-range missiles and two AIM-9X short-range

missiles internally. Weapons bay testing is scheduled for mid-2000 to

determine how well the missiles can exit the weapons bay when launched.

Combat Radius The combat radius parameter refers to the nautical miles the F-22 is

required to fly to achieve its primary mission of air superiority. This

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix I 

Description of F-22 Performance

Parameters

mission requires the F-22 to be able to fly a certain distance subsonically

and a certain distance supersonically to achieve the mission.

The Air Force estimated the F-22 will exceed its combat radius goal by

23 percent. Unfavorable estimates for two of three major

subparameters—fuel usage and aircraft weight—are not unfavorable

enough to prevent the F-22 from meeting its combat radius goal.

Performance flight testing to help compute the aircraft’s combat radius

performance, as well as other aerodynamic capabilities, is scheduled to

begin in late 1998 and end the third quarter of 2001.

Radar Detection Range The radar detection range parameter refers to the number of nautical

miles at which the F-22 radar should be able to detect enemy threats or

potential targets. The radar needs to be able to detect enemy targets with

small radar signatures at sufficient distance to ensure the F-22 can engage

the enemy first.

The Air Force estimated that the F-22 radar will exceed the established

radar goal by 17 percent. This estimate was based primarily on digital

simulations and models used to develop confidence in the tactical

functions of radar search and detection capabilities. Radar detection

performance is scheduled to be verified against the simulations and

models in an aviation electronics laboratory from the first quarter of 1998

to the third quarter of 1999. Actual flight testing of the radar in F-22 EMD

aircraft is scheduled to begin in the third quarter of 1999 and continue to

at least the second quarter of 2001.

Situational Awareness The situational awareness parameter refers to the extent the F-22 sensors

and aviation electronics systems are able to make pilots aware of the

situation around them. The planned integration of the many aviation

electronics systems and sensors is meant to (1) minimize pilot workload of

managing and interpreting sensors and (2) provide previously unmatched

awareness of potential F-22 threats and targets.

Air Force data indicated the F-22 will meet the pilot situational awareness

goal based on its performance estimates of the major aviation electronics

subparameters affecting situational awareness including the radar system,

the electronic warfare systems, and the communications, navigation, and

identification systems. Sixty-three major aviation electronics functions

contribute to these three major subparameters.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix I 

Description of F-22 Performance

Parameters

Development of the integrated aviation electronics, however, is in the

early stages. For example, the Air Force provided us information on 

10 major milestones that must be completed before integrated avionics

development will be complete and the first milestone is not scheduled

until October 1998. The last of these milestones is scheduled for

November 2001.

Low Observability The low observability parameter refers to the aircraft’s “stealthy” nature or

ability to evade detection by enemy radar long enough for it to detect the

enemy and shoot first. Five features of an aircraft contribute to its degree

of low observability or “stealthiness” including radar cross section,

infrared signature, electromagnetic signature, visual signature, and

acoustic signature. However, the F-22 does not have a requirement for an

acoustic signature.

Air Force information indicated it expects the F-22 to meet the

performance goals established for the various aspects of low observability.

Specification compliance on the most critical feature, radar cross section,

is being checked with a full-scale F-22 mounted on a pole and will

continue into 1999. In-flight radar cross section measurements will begin

in 1999 and continue into 2002. Flight testing to help predict the F-22

infrared signature, another critical aspect of low observability, is

scheduled for the third quarter of 1999.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix II 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to determine whether the F-22 EMD program can be

completed within the cost limitation established by the Congress. We also

reviewed the extent to which the F-22 EMD program was achieving cost,

schedule, and performance goals, including major modifications.

To determine whether the program was expected to meet the cost

limitation, we obtained the current cost estimate, which served as a basis

for the fiscal year 1999 budget request. We compared that estimate to the

estimate supporting the cost limitation and discussed the reasons for the

differences with F-22 financial management officials. We made several

analyses, including comparing the estimated cost at completion for the

prime contracts with planned amounts, and evaluating cost variances

identified in the earned value management system.

We obtained and reviewed information on the cost and schedule goals for

the F-22 EMD program established by the JET during its review of the F-22

program. Since the JET did not revise F-22 performance requirements, we

defined the performance goals as those performance requirements on

contract at the time the JET reviewed the program. To assist us in

determining the goals, we also reviewed overall program documents such

as Selected Acquisition Reports, Monthly Acquisition Reports, Defense

Acquisition Executive Summaries, Program Management Reviews,

contracts with the prime contractors, Test and Evaluation Master Plans,

and Program Management Directives.

To determine whether the program was expected to meet schedule goals,

we obtained the current approved program schedule, which incorporated

the latest restructured plans for the F-22 EMD program. We discussed the

schedule and potential changes to it with F-22 program officials. We also

reviewed the planned flight test schedule and the changes to it as a result

of the late first flight of the first EMD aircraft. In addition, we discussed

technical problems in assembling subsequent EMD aircraft. We evaluated

schedule variances in the earned value management system and compared

planned milestone accomplishment dates with actual dates of

accomplishments. We also assessed the impact the late first flight may

have on the overall EMD schedule.

To determine whether the program was expected to meet the F-22

performance goals, we analyzed information on the performance of key

performance parameters and of those important subparameters that are

measured. We compared the Air Force’s current estimate for these

parameters to previous estimates to determine whether estimated

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix II 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

performance had changed. We determined whether the current estimates

were based on actual tests, engineering models, or engineering judgment.

We discussed each of the key performance parameters with program

officials and determined the basis for the current estimates. We also

reviewed past program documentation to determine the basis for the

required performance and discussed the reasons for differences between

required performance and estimated performance.

To evaluate the bases for the Air Force’s current performance estimates,

we collected information on the goals established for the major

performance subparameters that are critical components of the

performance parameters. We collected and analyzed information on Air

Force estimates, as of January 1998, toward meeting the goals of these

subparameters to determine whether the Air Force estimates seemed

reasonable. For example, the major subparameters of the airlift support

parameter are the number of aircraft support equipment items, the airlift

loads necessary to transport aircraft support equipment items, and the

maintenance manpower required for a squadron of F-22s. Each of these

subparameters has a performance goal just as the overall parameter has a

performance goal. The performance parameters and their associated

major subparameters are shown in table II.1.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix II 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Table II.1: List of F-22 Performance

Parameters and Critical

Subparameters

Performance parameter Major subparameter

Supercruise Engine thrust

Acceleration Aircraft weight

Maneuverability Airframe drag

Airlift support Number of support equipment items

Airlift loads required to deploy support

equipment

Maintenance manpower required

Sortie generation rate Mean time between maintenance

Maintenance manhours/flying hour

Number of support equipment items

Maintenance manpower required

Radar cross section (27 individual subparameters)

Mean time between maintenance Airframe

Avionics

Engines

Payload (No subparameters)

Combat radius Fuel usage

Aircraft weight

Airframe drag

Radar detection range Range in searching for targets

Range in searching for targets by tracking

target speed

Time taken to search for targets

Time taken to search for targets by

tracking target speed

Additional features identified by GAO Major subparameter

Situational awareness Radar function

Electronic warfare function

Communication, navigation, identification

function

Low observability Infrared signature

Electromagnetic emissions signature

Visual signature

Radar cross section

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix II 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To determine the status of contract modifications expected to have a

significant effect on F-22 cost or performance, we reviewed the Air Force’s

process for receiving, reviewing, approving, and monitoring engineering

change proposals. We obtained a list of the proposals received and

determined which had been approved. For those proposals that were

approved, we reviewed the related documentation to determine their

status and their estimated impact on aircraft performance and on the cost

of the EMD program.

To be able to certify whether we had access to sufficient data to make

informed judgments on the matters covered in our report, we maintained a

log of our requests and the Air Force responses. We numbered and tracked

each request we made for documents and for meetings to determine how

long it took to receive responses from the Air Force. As a result of this

tracking, we were able to certify that we had access to sufficient

information to make informed judgements on the cost, schedule, and

performance matters covered in this report.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s letter

dated February 12, 1998.

GAO Comment 1. Our draft report was submitted to DOD for comment at about the same

time as the Air Force notified the Congress that the EMD cost limitation

was being increased and the production cost limitation was being

decreased to recognize direction from the conferees on the Department of

Defense Appropriations Act, 1998. Although direction from the conferees

is technically not a change in federal, state, or local law defined as a

criteria for changing the cost limitations, we believe the intent of the

conferees’ direction is clear and that the types of adjustments the Air

Force made to the cost limitations are appropriate.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David E. Cooper

Robert D. Murphy

Atlanta Field Office Christopher T. Brannon

Chicago Field Office Leonard L. Benson

Edward R. Browning

Don M. Springman

Office of General

Counsel, Washington,

D.C.

William T. Woods

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
Related GAO Products

Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program

(GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997).

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on

Optimistic Budget Projections (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103, Mar. 5, 1997).

F-22 Restructuring (GAO/NSIAD-97-100R, Feb. 28, 1997).

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22

Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).

Air Force F-22 Embedded Computers (GAO/AIMD-94-177R, Sept. 20, 1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176, May 5, 1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned

(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25, 1994).

Aircraft Development: Reasons for Recent Cost Growth in the Advanced

Tactical Fighter Program (GAO/NSIAD-91-138, Feb. 1, 1991).

Aircraft Development: Navy’s Participation in Air Force’s Advanced

Tactical Fighter Program (GAO/NSIAD-90-54, Mar. 7, 1990).

Aircraft Development: The Advanced Tactical Fighter’s Costs, Schedule,

and Performance Goals (GAO/NSIAD-88-76, Jan. 13, 1988).

Aircraft Procurement: Status and Cost of Air Force Fighter Procurement

(GAO/NSIAD-87-121, Apr. 14, 1987).

DOD Acquisition: Case Study of the Air Force Advanced Tactical Fighter

Program (GAO/NSIAD-86-45S-12, Aug. 25, 1986).

(707275) Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-67 F-22 Development Program
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