United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Honorable

Duncan Hunter, House of

Representatives

March 1998 OVERSEAS

PRESENCE

Issues Involved in

Reducing the Impact of

the U.S. Military

Presence on Okinawa

GAO/NSIAD-98-66

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278862 

March 2, 1998

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

House of Representatives

The United States and Japan released the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on

Okinawa on December 2, 1996. The report made 27 recommendations to reduce the impact of

the U.S. military presence on the Okinawan people. As requested, we reviewed the contents of

the Final Report, evaluated the impact on readiness of U.S. forces based on Okinawa after

implementation of the report recommendations, estimated the U.S. cost of implementing the

recommendations, and determined the benefit or necessity of having U.S. Marine Corps forces

on Okinawa.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the

House Committee on National Security, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the

House and Senate Committees on Appropriations; the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army,

the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will make copies

available to others on request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director, Military

Operations and Capabilities Issues, who may be reached on (202) 512-3958 if you or your staff

have any questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose The United States maintains a military presence of about 100,000

servicemembers in the Asia-Pacific region. Of this presence, 47,000

servicemembers are in Japan, over half of whom are based on Okinawa.

On December 2, 1996, the United States and Japan agreed to a number of

recommendations for reducing the impact of U.S. military operations and

training on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthening the

U.S.-Japan alliance. These recommendations were set forth in the Final

Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and are to be

implemented over the next decade. Concerned over the impact that

implementation of SACO recommendations will have on the readiness and

training of U.S. forces stationed on Okinawa, Congressman Duncan

Hunter requested GAO to review several issues. This report (1) describes

the Department of Defense’s perspectives on the need for U.S. forces on

Okinawa and (2) describes SACO’s report recommendations and identifies

the impact of their implementation on U.S. operations, training, and costs,

particularly the recommendation to build a sea-based facility off Okinawa.

The report also provides information on two environmental issues that

may result from implementing the SACO recommendations.

Background The U.S. military presence in Japan and on Okinawa began at the end of

World War II. Although the U.S. occupation in Japan ended in 1952, U.S.

administration continued on Okinawa until 1972. The U.S.-Japan security

relationship is defined by a number of documents, including the Treaty of

Mutual Cooperation and Security, which commits both countries to meet

common dangers, and a Status of Forces Agreement that governs the legal

status of U.S. forces and their dependents stationed in Japan. The U.S.

forces on Okinawa occupy about 10 percent of the land in the prefecture.1

Japan provides part of the cost of the forward deployment of U.S. forces

throughout Japan, through an annual burden-sharing payment. This

payment was about $4.9 billion in fiscal year 1997.

Discontent among the people of Okinawa regarding the U.S. military

presence and its impacts has been rising for years. Their chief complaint is

that the Okinawa prefecture hosts over half of the U.S. forces in Japan and

that about 75 percent of the land U.S. forces occupy in Japan is on

Okinawa. They also believe the U.S. presence has hampered economic

development. The abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl in

September 1995 by three U.S. servicemembers prompted the U.S. and

Japanese governments to establish the SACO in November 1995. To reduce

1

Japan is divided into 47 local administrative jurisdictions, or prefectures. The Okinawa prefecture

includes the main island of Okinawa plus several outlying islands.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Executive Summary

the impact of the U.S. military presence on the people of Okinawa, the

SACO developed recommendations to realign, consolidate, and reduce U.S.

facilities and adjust operational procedures. In December 1996, the United

States agreed to return to Japanese control about 21 percent of the land on

Okinawa used for U.S. military bases, adjust training and operational

procedures, implement noise abatement procedures, and change Status of

Forces Agreement procedures. (The SACO Final Report is reprinted

verbatim in app. I.)

Results in Brief The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that Marine Corps forces along

with other U.S. forces on Okinawa satisfy the U.S. national security

strategy by visibly demonstrating the U.S. commitment to security in the

region. These forces are thought to deter aggression, provide a crisis

response capability should deterrence fail, and avoid the risk that U.S.

allies may interpret the withdrawal of U.S. forces as a lessening of U.S.

commitment to peace and stability in the region. Okinawa’s proximity to

potential regional trouble spots promotes the early arrival of U.S. military

forces due to shorter transit times and reduces potential problems that

could arise due to late arrival. The cost of this presence is shared by the

government of Japan, which provides bases and other infrastructure on

Okinawa rent-free and pays part of the annual cost of Okinawa-based

Marine Corps forces.

The SACO Final Report calls on the United States to (1) return land that

includes one base and portions of camps, sites, and training areas on

Okinawa to Japan; (2) implement changes to three operational procedures,

and (3) implement changes to five noise abatement procedures.

Additionally, it recommends implementing eight changes to Status of

Forces Agreement procedures. In implementing most of the SACO

recommendations, the United States expects to encounter few operational

and training problems; however, replacing Marine Corps Air Station

Futenma with a sea-based facility will be a major challenge. In addition to

significant cost, the sea-based facility poses technological and operational

complications that must be overcome if U. S. operational capability is to

be maintained. The United States has established requirements that Japan

must meet as it designs, builds, and pays for the sea-based facility before

Futenma is closed and operations are moved to the sea-based facility.

However, such a facility has never been built and operated.

Annual operations and maintenance costs for the sea-based facility were

initially estimated at $200 million based on a $4-billion design and

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Executive Summary

construction cost, significantly higher than the $2.8 million currently being

paid by the United States at Futenma. The United States requested that the

Japanese government pay the cost to maintain the new sea-based facility,

but as of the date of this report, it had not agreed to do so. Further, the

current schedule for designing and building the sea-based facility does not

include a risk-reduction phase that includes risk assessments, life-cycle

cost analyses, and design trade-offs. Given the scope, technical challenges,

and unique nature of the sea-based facility, a risk-reduction phase would

permit the U. S. and Japanese governments to establish that the proposed

facility will be affordable and operationally suitable.

Excluding the cost to operate the sea-based facility, the current estimated

cost to the United States to implement the SACO land return

recommendations is about $193.5 million over about 10 years. The United

States and Japan are negotiating an arrangement under which Japan

would assume some SACO-related responsibilities consistent with their

domestic laws. This arrangement could result in reduced U.S. costs. U.S.

costs include the cost to renovate some facilities at Futenma, previously

identified by both the United States and Japan for replacement, until the

sea-based facility is ready for occupancy. Japan had planned to replace

these facilities but decided not to after SACO was established in 1995.

Additionally, the U.S. cost could be significantly higher than the estimated

$193.5 million if Japan does not agree to pay operations and maintenance

cost of the new sea-based facility.

While final implementation of the SACO recommendations is intended to

reduce the burden of the U.S. forces’ presence on Okinawa, two

environmental issues could arise. The first issue concerns the potential for

environmental contamination being found on military facilities returned to

Japan and responsibility for cleanup of those facilities. The second issue

concerns the potential adverse effects that the construction and operation

of the sea-based facility could have on the environment.

Principal Findings

U.S. Forces on Okinawa

Support National Security

Strategy

The III Marine Expeditionary Force (along with other U.S. forces on

Okinawa and in the region) supports the U.S. national security strategy to

promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and to deter

aggression by forcing an aggressor to risk a military confrontation with

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Executive Summary

U.S. forces, according to DOD. The national security strategy and the

congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review2

 cite U.S.

presence in the region as necessary to demonstrate U.S. political

commitment to security in the region. In addition, the United States has

long-standing mutual defense treaty obligations with five countries in the

region, including Japan and South Korea, and the U.S. forward presence

visibly demonstrates commitment to these treaties, according to the U.S.

Pacific Command, the geographic combatant command.

In addition to showing the U.S. commitment to the region, the U.S. forces

on Okinawa could be used if crises arise, according to the Pacific

Command. Furthermore, forward-deployed U.S. forces could readily

respond to a contingency because Okinawa is near several potential

regional trouble spots, including the Korean peninsula, and the operational

risk of a late arrival in an area of operations could be avoided. Moreover,

Japan pays a significant share of the Okinawa-based Marine Corps force’s

annual cost, including the cost of base infrastructure that is provided

rent-free to the United States.

Building a Sea-Based

Facility Will Be a Major

Challenge but Other

Changes Pose Few

Problems

Of all the SACO recommendations, construction of a sea-based facility to

replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma poses the greatest challenge.

Three types of sea-based facilities were under consideration: two would

float and one would be supported on columns driven into the sea floor.

Some local opposition has surfaced against the facility in the area in which

it is to be built, but U.S. officials are proceeding on the basis that the

facility will be built. The United States and/or Japan will face

(1) significant costs to acquire and maintain the facility; (2) major

technological challenges, as no sea-based facility of the type and scale

envisioned has ever been built; and (3) operational complications because

the sea-based facility envisioned would be insufficient to support all U.S.

operating requirements and maintain maximum safety margins, as stated

in a Marine Corps study.

The United States also runs the risk that Japan will design and build a

sea-based facility that does not meet all U.S. requirements because at the

time of GAO’s review, U.S. oversight capability was limited. Officials at U.S.

Forces Japan and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command told GAO that

the organizations currently tasked with oversight responsibility cannot

2

The Quadrennial Defense Review was required by section 923 of the National Defense Authorization

Act for 1997 to study national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans,

infrastructure, budget plans, and other issues in 1997 and at the start of each newly elected

administration after 1997.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Executive Summary

provide the day-to-day detailed oversight such a project requires and still

meet their other responsibilities. USFJ has requested establishment of a

Project Management Office to oversee and coordinate SACO

implementation while the Naval Facilities Engineering Command has

asked for funding for a special project office to oversee the design and

construction of the sea-based facility.

Japan’s acquisition strategy could add to U.S. operating and support costs

and increase operational risk unnecessarily. At the time of GAO’s review,

Japan had not included a risk-reduction phase in its acquisition schedule.

Given the scope, technical challenges, and unique nature of the sea-based

facility, a risk-reduction phase would allow the U.S. and Japanese

governments to prove that the sea-based facility will be affordable and

operationally suitable prior to committing to a specific design. The

inclusion of a risk-reduction phase in the sea-based facility’s acquisition

schedule is currently being discussed between the United States and

Japanese governments.

U.S. operational capability can be maintained if the problems associated

with the sea-based facility can be overcome and Japan imposes no limits

on U.S. operating rights in Okinawa other than those recommended by

SACO. The SACO recommendations to return land do not significantly add

risks to U.S. operations, but at the time of GAO’s review, the cost to

implement these recommendations was about $193.5 million above

current operating costs over about 10 years. The United States and Japan

are negotiating an arrangement under which Japan would assume some

responsibilities, consistent with its domestic law thereby reducing U.S.

cost. U.S. costs include the cost to renovate facilities at Futenma to

maintain base operations while the sea-based facility is designed and built.

Japan had planned to replace these facilities under the Japan Facilities

Improvement Program3

 but decided not to after the SACO was established

in 1995. The United States believes these projects need to be completed in

order to continue to operate Futenma during the sea-based facility

acquisition period. U.S. costs could be significantly higher than the

$193.5 million estimate because the United States and Japan have not

agreed on which country will be responsible for the sea-based facility’s

maintenance. This cost is estimated to be $200 million annually based on a

$4-billion sea-based facility design and construction cost. The United

States is currently responsible for the maintenance of its facilities in Japan

and spends about $2.8 million annually for maintenance at Futenma.

3

Under the Japan facilities budget, Japan pays for certain facilities improvements on installations used

by U.S. forces, including new construction under the Japan Facilities Improvement Program, vicinity

improvements, and relocation construction and other costs.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Executive Summary

The United States has encountered some problems in implementing one of

the three changes to operational procedures. After relocating parachute

exercises for Army Special Forces units to nearby Ie Jima Island, about

73 percent of the planned jumps were cancelled, most often for

weather-related reasons. These cancellations have put these forces at risk

of failing to stay airborne qualified. On the other hand, artillery live-fire

training for Marine Corps forces has been relocated from Okinawa to

ranges on the main Japanese islands. The training is comparable to that on

Okinawa and other ranges in the United States. For the remaining

provisions of the SACO report—implementing noise reduction initiatives

and changing some Status of Forces Agreement procedures—the United

States expects to encounter few problems.

Two Environmental Issues

Could Arise From

Implementing SACO

Recommendations

If environmental contamination is found in areas to be returned under

SACO, cleanup could be expensive and reuse could be delayed. When the

United States returns land or closes bases in Japan, it is not obligated,

under the Status of Forces Agreement, to return lands to the condition

they were in when they became available to the United States. According

to U.S. Forces-Japan officials, this agreement relieves the United States of

an obligation for environmental cleanup. However, DOD policy calls for the

removal of known imminent and substantial dangers to health and safety

due to environmental contamination caused by operations on DOD

installations or facilities designated for return to the host nation. The

government of Japan believes it has found hazardous substances on an

installation on Okinawa returned by the United States prior to the SACO

report. It has requested that the United States look for environmental

contamination on its remaining bases on Okinawa and clean up the bases

if contamination is found before returning them under the SACO process. If

a survey is conducted and contamination is found, a decision would be

needed as to whether the United States or Japan would pay cleanup costs.

Regarding the second issue, concerns have been raised that construction

of the sea-based facility or the facility itself after construction could

adversely affect the ocean environment, including nearby coral reefs. The

United States intends to operate at the facility in a manner that protects

and preserves Okinawa’s natural resources. However, routine operations

aboard the facility may inadvertently contaminate the nearby ocean

environment, including coral reefs. For example, the accidental runoff of

fuels, cleaning fluids, and other substances required for aircraft and base

operations could pose a risk. The government of Japan has undertaken a

study to determine the condition of the coral.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Executive Summary

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense

• decide on the means to monitor the design, engineering, and construction

of the sea-based facility;

• work with Japan to include a risk-reduction phase in the acquisition

schedule to establish that the designed sea-based facility will be affordable

and operationally suitable;

• take steps to ensure that all U.S. concerns, especially the costs of

operations and maintenance on the sea-based facility and operational

concerns, have been satisfactorily addressed before Japan begins to build

the sea-based facility; and

• request the Japanese government to allocate funds for those projects at

Futenma that were cancelled by Japan due to the planned closure of

Futenma and are deemed essential to continued operations of the station

and the 1st Marine Air Wing until completion of the replacement facility.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO’s

recommendations and noted that the report effectively outlines the major

operational and technical issues involved in realigning, consolidating, and

reducing U.S. force presence on Okinawa, as set forth in the SACO process.

DOD also noted that the role of Congress will be critical in maintaining the

strategic relationship with Japan and therefore the GAO report was timely

and welcome. DOD provided technical comments, which were incorporated

in the report where appropriate. The DOD response is printed in its entirety

in appendix II.

GAO also provided a copy of the draft report to the Department of State. In

oral comments, the Department of State concurred with GAO’s report and

offered one technical change which was incorporated into the report.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

The U.S. Military Has Maintained a Presence in Japan Since

World War II

14

The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship Is Managed Through

Bilateral Agreements and a Joint Process

15

The SACO Process Is a Reaction to Discontent About the U.S.

Military Presence on Okinawa

16

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 19

Chapter 2 

U.S. Forces on

Okinawa Support U.S.

National Security

Strategy

22

U.S. Forces on Okinawa Are Part of the Pacific Command’s

Regional Forward Presence

22

U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region Provide Political Benefits 24

The U.S. Presence in Okinawa Provides Operational Benefits 25

Chapter 3 

Some SACO

Recommendations

Carry Risk That Must

Be Overcome to

Maintain U.S.

Operational Capability

26

The United States Plans to Return Land Used on Okinawa 26

MCAS Futenma Is Scheduled to Be Largely Replaced by a

Sea-Based Facility

29

Costs, Challenges, and Complications Threaten Capability of the

Sea-Based Facility

37

Problems Associated With Remaining 10 Land Return

Recommendations Are Minimal, and Some Benefits Are Likely

40

Some Problems and Risks in Implementing One of the Three

Operational Changes

42

Risks Are Minimal From Five Noise Reduction Initiatives 44

Risks Are Minimal From Eight Status of Forces Agreement

Changes

45

Recommendations 46

Agency Comments 46

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Contents

Chapter 4 

Two Environmental

Issues Could Arise

From Implementing

the SACO

Recommendations

47

Environmental Cleanup Issues Could Affect Land Return 47

Construction and Operation of the Sea-Based Facility Could

Harm the Environment

48

Appendixes Appendix I: The Final Report of the Special Action Committee on

Okinawa

50

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 60

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 62

Tables Table 3.1: Land to be Returned to Japan Under SACO

Recommendations

26

Table 3.2: Training and Operational Procedures Changes

Addressed in the SACO Final Report

42

Table 3.3: Noise Reduction Initiatives Called For in the SACO

Final Report

44

Table 3.4: Improvements to Status of Forces Agreement

Procedures

45

Figures Figure 1.1: Major U.S. Installations on Okinawa 17

Figure 2.1: U.S. Pacific Command’s Area of Responsibility 23

Figure 3.1: Aerial View of MCAS Futenma 28

Figure 3.2: Artist’s Conception of a Pontoon-Type Sea-Based

Facility With a Cut-Away To Show the Lower Deck

33

Figure 3.3: Artist’s Conception of a Pile-Supported Sea-Based

Facility

35

Figure 3.4: Artist’s Conception of a Semisubmersible Sea-Based

Facility

36

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Contents

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

FIG Futenma Implementation Group

IFR Instrument Flight Rules

MCAS Marine Corps Air Station

SACO Special Action Committee on Okinawa

SCC Security Consultative Committee

SSC Security Sub-Committee

USFJ United States Forces-Japan

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has maintained a presence

in Japan and on Okinawa, first as an occupation force and later as an ally

committed to maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region. The security

relationship between the United States and Japan is defined through

bilateral agreements and is managed through a joint process. Over half of

the U.S. forces in Japan are on Okinawa, a presence that has caused

increasing discontent among the people of Okinawa. In September 1995,

after three U.S. servicemen raped an Okinawan schoolgirl, Japan and the

United States formed the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to

find ways to limit the impact of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa.

The Committee developed 27 recommendations to reduce the impact of

U.S. operations.

The U.S. Military Has

Maintained a

Presence in Japan

Since World War II

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has based forces in Japan

and Okinawa. The U.S. military occupation of Japan began after World

War II and continued until 1952, but the United States administered the

Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, until 1972.

Since the end of World War II, U.S. forces have mounted major operations

from Japan when needed. Among the most important of these operations

was the initial defense of South Korea in the 1950-53 Korean War, when

Eighth U.S. Army units left occupation duties in Japan to help defend

South Korea. The United States again used its bases in Japan and on

Okinawa to fight the Vietnam War. Finally, elements of the III Marine

Expeditionary Force deployed from their bases on Okinawa to the Persian

Gulf during Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s.

To demonstrate a commitment to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific

region, the United States has about 47,000 servicemembers, about half of

all U.S. forces deployed in the Pacific region, stationed in Japan. Of the

47,000 U.S. servicemembers in Japan, over half are based on Okinawa, a

subtropical island about 67 miles long and from 2 to 18 miles wide, with

coral reefs in many offshore locations. In fiscal year 1997, U.S. forces on

Okinawa occupied 58,072 acres of the land in the Okinawa prefecture.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The U.S.-Japan

Security Relationship

Is Managed Through

Bilateral Agreements

and a Joint Process

The security relationship between the United States and Japan is defined

through bilateral agreements. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and

Security, signed in January 1960 by the United States and Japan, specifies

that each country recognizes that an attack against either country in the

territory of Japan is dangerous to its peace and security and declares that

both countries would respond to meet the common danger under their

constitutional processes. The treaty also commits the two countries to

consult with each other from time to time and grants to U.S. military

forces the use of facilities and areas in Japan. Lastly, the treaty specifies

that a separate Status of Forces Agreement will govern the use of these

facilities and areas as well as the status of U.S. forces in Japan.

The Status of Forces Agreement, signed on the same day as the treaty,

permits the United States to bring servicemembers and their dependents

into Japan. It also contains certain stipulations regarding U.S. forces in

Japan, including some exemptions from import duties for items brought

into Japan for the personal use of U.S. servicemembers; the right of the

U.S. military services to operate exchanges, social clubs, newspapers, and

theaters; and legal jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers and their

dependents accused of committing a crime in Japan.1

 The agreement also

(1) requires the United States to return land to Japan when the land is no

longer needed, (2) specifies that the United States will perform

maintenance on bases its occupies in Japan, and (3) relieves the United

States of the obligation to restore bases in Japan to the condition they

were in when they became available to the United States. U.S.

Forces-Japan (USFJ) has interpreted this latter provision to mean that the

United States is not required to conduct environmental cleanup on bases it

closes in Japan. The agreement also required the United States and Japan

to establish a Joint Committee as the means for consultation in

implementing the agreement. In particular, the Joint Committee is

responsible for determining what facilities U.S. forces need in Japan.

The U.S.-Japan security relationship is managed through a joint process

that includes meetings between the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense

and Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense,

who make up the Security Consultative Committee. The Committee sets

overall bilateral policy regarding the security relationship between the

United States and Japan.

1

Japan also has jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers and their dependents for offenses committed

within Japan and punishable by Japanese law.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Japan pays part of the cost of the U.S. forces stationed in its country with

annual burden-sharing payments that totaled about $4.9 billion in fiscal

year 1997.2

 The annual payments fall into four categories. First, Japan paid

about $712 million for leased land on which U.S. bases sit. Second, Japan

provided about $1.7 billion in accordance with the Special Measures

Agreement, under which Japan pays the costs of (1) local national labor

employed by U.S. forces in Japan, (2) public utilities on U.S. bases, and

(3) the transfer of U.S. forces’ training from U.S. bases to other facilities in

Japan when Japan requests such transfers. Third, USFJ estimated that

Japan provided about $876 million in indirect costs, such as rents foregone

at fair market value and tax concessions.3

 Last, although not covered by

any agreements, Japan provided about $1.7 billion from its facilities

budget for facilities and new construction which included new facilities

under the Japan under the Japan Facilities Improvement Program, vicinity

improvements, and relocation construction and other costs.

Finally, in September 1997, the United States and Japan issued new

Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation that replaced the existing

1978 guidelines. The new guidelines provide for more effective

cooperation between U.S. forces and Japan’s self-defense forces under

“normal circumstances,” when an armed attack against Japan has

occurred, and as a response to situations in areas surrounding Japan that

could threaten Japan’s security.

The SACO Process Is

a Reaction to

Discontent About the

U.S. Military Presence

on Okinawa

Discontent among the people of Okinawa about the impact of the U.S.

presence on their land has been rising for years, particularly as the

economic benefits of the U.S. presence have diminished and the people of

Okinawa became relatively more prosperous, according to the

Congressional Research Service.4

 Among the chief complaints of the

Okinawan people is that their prefecture hosts over half of the U.S. force

presence in Japan and that about 75 percent of the total land used by U.S.

2

In 1997, Japan’s burden-sharing payments totaled about 544 billion yen, or about $4.9 billion using a

conversion rate of 111 yen to $1.00, according to USFJ.

3

The Congressional Research Service believes that the Department of Defense (DOD) overstates the

true value of burden-sharing payments from Japan because such costs as base lease payments and

rents foregone are costs unique to operating in Japan. DOD would not pay these costs if troops based

in Japan were relocated to bases in the continental United States. For more information, see the

Congressional Research Service’s Defense Burdensharing: Is Japan’s Host Nation Support a Model for

Other Allies? (94-515 F, June 20, 1994).

4

Congressional Research Service, Okinawa Bases and Other Issues in U.S. - Japan Security Relations

(96-646 F, July 23, 1996).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Chapter 1 

Introduction

forces in Japan is on Okinawa. Figure 1.1 shows the location and

approximate size of major U.S. installations in the Okinawa prefecture.

Figure 1.1: Major U.S. Installations on Okinawa



Northern Trng. Area (MC)

Sobe Comm. Site (N)

Naha Military Port (A)

White Beach (N)

Camp Shields (N)

Camp McTureous (MC)

Camp Courtney (MC)

Tengan Pier (N)

Gimbaru Trng. Area (MC)

Camp Hansen

Kin Blue Beach (MC)

Camp Schwab

Yomitan Aux. Airfield (MC)

Torii Station Site (A)

Camp Lester (MC)

Kadena (AB)

Camp Kisner (MC)

MCAS Futenma

Camp Foster

Central Trng. Area (MC)

IE Jima Aux. Airfield (MC)

MC Marine Corps

Legend

N Navy

AF Air Force

A Army

Training

Source: Marine Corps Bases, Japan.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Some Okinawans feel the U.S. military presence has hampered economic

development. Other Okinawans object to the noise generated by U.S.

operations, especially around the Air Force’s Kadena Air Base and Marine

Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma (which are located in the middle of

urban areas), and risks to civilians from serious military accidents,

including crashes of aircraft. In addition, some have objected to artillery

live-fire exercises conducted in the Central Training Area. When the

exercises were held, firing took place over prefectural highway 104, and

the highway had to be closed to civilian traffic until the exercises

concluded. The Okinawa prefectural government has also objected to the

destruction of vegetation on nearby mountains in the artillery range’s

impact area. Lastly, some perceive that crime committed by U.S. personnel

and their dependents on Okinawa is a problem.5

The public outcry in Okinawa following the September 1995 abduction and

rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemembers brought to a

head long-standing concerns among Okinawans about the impact of the

U.S. presence and made it difficult for some members of the Japanese Diet

to support the continued U.S. military presence in Japan.6

 According to the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the continued ability of the United

States to remain in Japan was at risk due to the outcry over the rape

incident, and the United States and Japan had to do something to reduce

the impact of the presence on Okinawans. To address Okinawans’ and

Japanese legislators’ concerns, bilateral negotiations between the United

States and Japan began, and the Security Consultative Committee

established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa in November 1995.

The Committee developed recommendations on ways to limit the impact

of the U.S. military presence on Okinawans. On December 2, 1996, the U.S.

Secretary of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Japanese Minister of

Foreign Affairs, and Minister of State and Director-General of the Defense

Agency of Japan issued the Committee’s final report.

According to USFJ, the SACO Final Report is not a binding bilateral

agreement, but it does contain a series of recommendations to which the

U.S. and Japanese governments have committed themselves. Officials

from USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, told us that the United States

approaches the recommendations as if they were agreements by making

5

According to the U.S. Consolidated Public Affairs Office, Okinawa, U.S. personnel make up about

3.8 percent of the population and were responsible for about 1.1 percent of total crime on Okinawa in

1996.

6

The U.S. servicemembers were convicted. Two were sentenced to 7-year jail terms and one to a

6.5-year jail term.

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Introduction

reasonable efforts to implement the recommendations. However, they also

stated that if Japan does not provide adequate replacement facilities or

complete action needed to implement some recommendations, the United

States will not be obligated to implement those particular

recommendations.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

In response to Representative Duncan Hunter’s concerns about the impact

of implementing SACO’s recommendations on U.S. force readiness, we

describe (1) the benefit or necessity of retaining U.S. forces in Japan and

on Okinawa and (2) SACO’s report recommendations and identify the

impact of implementation on U.S. operations, training, and costs. The

report also identifies two environmental issues that may remain after the

SACO recommendations have been implemented.

To determine DOD’s views on the benefit or necessity of having U.S. forces

stationed on Okinawa, we interviewed officials and obtained relevant

documents, including the Quadrennial Defense Review report, the

President’s National Security Strategy for a New Century, The Security

Strategy for East Asia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command’s

regional strategy, and other documents. Because it was outside the scope

of our work, we did not evaluate any alternatives to forward deployment.

However, in a June 1997 report, we concluded that DOD had not adequately

considered alternatives to forward presence to accomplish its stated

security objectives.7

 To determine U.S. and Japanese obligations under the

bilateral security relationship, we reviewed the Treaty of Mutual

Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, the Status

of Forces Agreement, the Special Measures Agreement, Joint Statement of

the Security Consultative Committee on the review of 1978 guidelines for

defense cooperation, the new 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense

Cooperation, and other documents.

To determine SACO’s report recommendations, we reviewed the Final

Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, Joint Committee

meeting minutes and related documents, briefings, the testimony of the

Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command to the Senate

Committee on Armed Services on March 18, 1997, and other documents.

To determine the impact of the SACO report recommendations on

readiness, training, and costs of operations of U.S. forces, we interviewed

officials and reviewed memorandums, cables, reports, analyses, and other

7

Overseas Presence: More Data and Analysis Needed to Determine Whether Cost-Effective Alternatives

Exist (GAO/NSIAD-97-133, June 3, 1997).

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Introduction

documents discussing the impact on readiness and training or providing

evidence of the impact. To review the feasibility of construction and

operation of a sea-based facility, we interviewed officials and reviewed

relevant documents, including the Functional Analysis and Concept of

Operations report prepared by DOD officials from several organizations,

briefing documents, memorandums, and other documents. We also

reviewed a number of scholarly papers presented at the Japanese Ministry

of Transport’s International Workshop on Very Large Floating Structures,

held in Hayama, Japan, in November 1996.

To identify the environmental issues that could remain after the SACO

recommendations are implemented, we reviewed the Status of Forces

Agreement and DOD environmental policy and interviewed DOD and

Department of State officials.

We also interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of

Defense/International Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, headquarters of the

U.S. Marine Corps, headquarters of the U.S. Air Force, Office of Naval

Research, Defense Logistics Agency, Military Traffic Management

Command, and Department of State in Washington, D.C., and the U.S.

Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. We also interviewed

officials from the U.S. Pacific Command; Marine Forces, Pacific; Pacific

Air Forces; Naval Facilities Engineering Command; Army Corps of

Engineers; Military Traffic Management Command; and East-West Center

in Honolulu, Hawaii. We interviewed officials from U.S. Forces-Japan, the

5th Air Force, U.S. Naval Forces-Japan, U.S. Army-Japan, and the U.S.

Embassy-Tokyo in the Tokyo, Japan, area. Lastly, we interviewed officials

from Marine Corps Bases, Japan; the 1st Marine Air Wing; the Air Force’s

18th Wing; the Army’s 1/1 Special Forces Group (Airborne); the Army’s

10th Area Support Group; the Navy’s Fleet Activities, Okinawa; and the

Navy’s Task Force 76 on Okinawa. To discuss the feasibility of very large

floating structures, we interviewed two ocean engineering professors at

the University of Hawaii who were instrumental in organizing the 1996

conference in Japan. We also viewed the proposed site for a sea-based

facility by helicopter and inspected several U.S. bases affected by the SACO

process, including MCAS Futenma; Kadena Air Base; Camp Schwab; and the

Northern, Central, Gimbaru, and Kin Blue Beach training areas on

Okinawa. We also visited the Ie Jima parachute drop zone on Ie Jima

Island.

We obtained comments from the Departments of Defense and State on this

report and have incorporated their comments where appropriate.

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We conducted our work from June 1997 to March 1998 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

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U.S. Forces on Okinawa Support U.S.

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U.S. forces on Okinawa support U.S. national security and national

military strategies to promote peace and maintain stability in the region.

These forces can also deter aggression and can deploy throughout the

region if needed. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

Pacific Command, and USFJ, relocating these forces outside the region

would increase political risk by appearing to decrease commitment to

regional security and treaty obligations and undercut deterrence.

Furthermore, relocating U.S. forces outside of Japan could adversely

affect military operations by increasing transit times to areas where crises

are occurring. Finally, the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan is shared by

the government of Japan, which also provides bases and other

infrastructure used by U.S. forces on Okinawa.

U.S. Forces on

Okinawa Are Part of

the Pacific

Command’s Regional

Forward Presence

The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command, who is the geographic

combatant commander for the Asia-Pacific region, develops a regional

strategy to support the national security strategy and the national military

strategy. The Pacific Command’s area of responsibility is the largest of that

of the five geographic combatant commands: it covers about 105 million

square miles (about 52 percent of the earth’s surface) and contains 44

countries, including Japan, China, India, and North and South Korea (see

fig. 2.1).

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Figure 2.1: U.S. Pacific Command’s Area of Responsibility

100E 95W

17E 92W

5S

68E

Arctic Ocean

Indian Ocean Pacific Ocean

Hawaii

The

Philippines

Guam

Okinawa

Australia

Indonesia

Malaysia

India

Thailand

Japan

China

Korea

Source: U.S. Pacific Command.

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Pacific Command forces provide a military presence in the Asia-Pacific

region, promote international security relationships in the region, and

deter aggression and prevent conflict through a crisis response capability,

according to the Pacific Command. These forces include over 300,000

servicemembers, of which about 100,000 are in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan,

South Korea, and certain other locations overseas. The Quadrennial

Defense Review reaffirmed the need for the U.S. forward presence of

about 100,000 U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific region. About 47,000 U.S.

servicemembers are stationed in Japan. Of those, about 28,000 are based

on Okinawa, including about 17,000 assigned to the Marine Corps’ III

Marine Expeditionary Force and supporting establishment.

The III Marine Expeditionary Force, the primary Marine Corps component

on Okinawa, consists of the (1) 3rd Marine Division, the ground combat

component; (2) 1st Marine Air Wing, the air combat component; (3) 3rd

Force Service Support Group, the logistics support component; and

(4) command element. The Force, and other deployed U.S. forces, support

the security strategy by providing the forces that could be employed if

crises arise. The III Marine Expeditionary Force can deploy throughout the

region, using sealift, airlift, and amphibious shipping, and operate without

outside support for up to 60 days.

U.S. Forces in the

Asia-Pacific Region

Provide Political

Benefits

Under the national strategy, U.S. forward deployment is necessary because

it demonstrates a visible political commitment by the United States to

peace and stability in the region, according to DOD. The United States has

mutual defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,

Australia, and Thailand. In addition to demonstrating commitment, the

U.S. forward deployment also deters aggression, according to the Pacific

Command, because a regional aggressor cannot threaten its neighbors

without risking a military confrontation with U.S. forces in place on

Okinawa (or elsewhere in the region).

To help maintain peace and stability in the region, the Pacific Command

strategy features engagement through joint, combined, and multilateral

military exercises; military-to-military contacts; and security assistance,

among other activities. According to the Pacific Command, the III Marine

Expeditionary Force is a key force that is employed to carry out these

activities.

According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pacific Command, and

USFJ, a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region could be interpreted by

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countries in the region as a weakening of the U.S. commitment to peace

and stability in Asia-Pacific and could undercut the deterrent value of the

forward deployment. While U.S. forces may not have to be on Okinawa

specifically for the United States to demonstrate such commitments, USFJ

officials told us that U.S. forces do need to be located somewhere in the

Western Pacific region.

The U.S. Presence in

Okinawa Provides

Operational Benefits

If hostilities erupt in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. forces need to arrive in

the crisis area quickly to repel aggression and end the conflict on terms

favorable to the United States. U.S. forces could be used in a conflict and

could deploy from their bases on Okinawa. The forward deployment on

Okinawa significantly shortens transit times, thereby promoting early

arrival in potential regional trouble spots such as the Korean peninsula

and the Taiwan straits, a significant benefit in the initial stages of a

conflict. For example, it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsula from

Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from

Hawaii, and 16 hours from the continental United States. Similarly, it takes

about 1 1/2 days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship to South Korea, as

compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from Hawaii, and 17 days

from the continental United States.

In addition to its strategic location, Okinawa has a well-established

military infrastructure that is provided to the United States rent-free and

that supports the III Marine Expeditionary Force (and other U.S. forces).

Housing, training, communications, and numerous other facilities are

already in place on Okinawa, including those at MCAS Futenma, a strategic

airfield for the 1st Marine Air Wing, and Camp Courtney, home of the 3rd

Marine Division. Marine Corps logistics operations are based at Camp

Kinser, which has about a million square feet of warehouse space for

Marine forces’ use in the Pacific. For example, warehouses hold war

reserve supplies on Okinawa that would support U.S. operations, including

14,400 tons of ammunition, 5,000 pieces of unit and individual equipment,

and 50 million gallons of fuel. Military port facilities capable of handling

military sealift ships and amphibious ships are available at the Army’s

Naha Military Port and the Navy’s White Beach. In addition to providing

base infrastructure, Japan provides about $368 million per year as part of

its burden-sharing to help support the III Marine Expeditionary Force

deployment on Okinawa.

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The SACO Final Report calls for the United States to (1) return land at 11

U.S. bases on Okinawa and replace MCAS Futenma with a sea-based facility,

(2) change 3 operational procedures, (3) implement 5 noise abatement

procedures, and (4) implement 7 Status of Forces Agreement changes.

Japan agreed to implement one Status of Force Agreement procedure

change. Of all of the SACO report recommendations, replacing MCAS

Futenma with a sea-based facility poses the greatest challenge. Most of the

other SACO report recommendations can be implemented with few

problems.

The United States

Plans to Return Land

Used on Okinawa

As called for in the SACO Final Report, the United States plans to return to

Japan about 12,000 acres, or 21 percent of the total acreage, used by U.S.

forces on 11 installations. The plan is to relocate personnel and facilities

from bases to be closed to new bases or to consolidate them at the

remaining bases. Table 3.1 shows the land to be returned, the planned

return date, and the plan for replacing capabilities that would be lost

through the land return.

Table 3.1: Land to Be Returned to

Japan Under SACO Recommendations Land return Planned return date Replacement facility

MCAS Futenma Between 2001 and 2003 Sea-based facility

About 9,900 acres of the

Northern Training Area

March 2003 Remaining Northern

Training Area plus new

acreage to be added by

March 1998

Aha training area March 1998 Acreage added to the

Northern Training Area

Gimbaru training area March 1998 Kin Blue Beach training

area and Camp Hansen

Sobe communications site March 2001 Camp Hansen

Yomitan auxiliary airfield March 2001 Ie Jima auxiliary airfield

Most of Camp Kuwae March 2008 Camp Zukeran and other

facilities

Senaha communications

station

March 2001 Torii communications station

Small portion of the

Makiminato service area

Between 1998 and 2001 Remaining Makiminato

service area and Kadena

Air Base

Naha Port No date established Urasoe pier area

Housing consolidation on

Camps Kuwae and Zukeran

March 2008 Remaining portions of

Camps Kuwae and Zukeran

Sources: SACO Final Report; Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and the 18th Wing.

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The most significant land deal involves the planned closure and return of

MCAS Futenma. The installation is a critical component of the Marine

Corps’ forward deployment because it is the home base of the 1st Marine

Air Wing. The Wing’s primary mission is to participate as the air

component of the III Marine Expeditionary Force. The wing’s Marine Air

Group-36 provides tactical fixed and rotary wing aircraft and flies about 70

aircraft, including CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters and KC-130 aerial refueling

airplanes.

MCAS Futenma’s primary mission is to maintain and operate facilities and

provide services and materials to support Marine aircraft operations. MCAS

Futenma covers 1,188 acres of land and is completely surrounded by the

urbanized growth of Ginowan City, as shown in figure 3.1.

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Figure 3.1: Aerial View of MCAS Futenma

Source: MCAS Futenma Master Plan.

Officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USFJ, and Marine Corps

Bases, Japan, told us that encroachment along the perimeter of MCAS

Futenma is a concern. In fact, according to Marine Corps Bases, Japan, in

one instance, the owner of land outside MCAS Futenma erected a building

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at the end of the runway that was tall enough to create a hazard to aircraft

using the base. The building was removed.

The land at MCAS Futenma is leased from about 2,000 private landowners

by the government of Japan. About 40 percent of the base is used for

runways, taxiways, and aircraft parking. The remaining portions of the

base are used for air operations, personnel support facilities, housing, and

administrative activities. MCAS Futenma has a runway and parallel taxiway

that are 9,000 feet long as well as an aircraft washrack, maintenance

facilities, vehicle maintenance facilities, fuel storage facilities, a hazardous

waste storage and transfer facility, a control tower, an armory, and other

facilities needed to operate a Marine Corps air station.

If the Marine Corps presence is to be maintained with air and ground

combat units and logistical support collocated on Okinawa, then MCAS

Futenma or a suitable replacement is required to maintain the operational

capability of the III Marine Expeditionary Force’s air combat element.

MCAS Futenma Is

Scheduled to Be

Largely Replaced by a

Sea-Based Facility

The U.S. and Japanese governments established a working group to

examine three options for replacing MCAS Futenma. The options were

relocation of the air station onto (1) Kadena Air Base, (2) Camp Schwab,

or (3) a sea-based facility to be located in the ocean offshore from

Okinawa Island. The SACO Final Report stated that the sea-based facility

was judged to be the best option to enhance the safety and quality of life of

the Okinawan people and maintain the operational capabilities of U.S.

forces. The report also cited as a benefit that a sea-based facility could be

removed when no longer needed.

Acquisition of the sea-based facility would follow a process that began

with the United States’ establishing operational and quality-of-life

requirements and would conclude with Japan’s selecting, financing,

designing, and building the sea-based facility to meet U.S. requirements.

The government of Japan has decided to locate the sea-based facility

offshore from Camp Schwab. However, at the time of our review some

residents living near the proposed site had opposed having the sea-based

facility near their community, but U.S. officials are proceeding on the basis

that the facility will be built.

The Security Consultative Committee established the Futenma

Implementation Group to identify a relocation site and an implementation

plan for the transfer from MCAS Futenma to the sea-based facility. On the

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U.S. side, the Group is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense for International Security Affairs and has representatives from the

Joint Staff; the headquarters of the Marine Corps; the Assistant Secretary

of the Navy for Installations and Environment; the Pacific Command; USFJ;

the Office of Japanese Affairs, Department of State; and the

Political-Military Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy-Tokyo. The Group

was established to oversee the design, construction, testing, and transfer

of assets to the sea-based facility.

MCAS Futenma will not be closed until the sea-based facility is operational.

Only when U.S. operating and support requirements have been met will

Marine Air Group-36 and its rotary wing aircraft relocate to the sea-based

facility. As part of the closure and return of MCAS Futenma, 12 KC-130

aircraft are scheduled to relocate to MCAS Iwakuni, on the Japanese

mainland, after Japan builds new maintenance and other facilities to

support the relocation. In addition, Japan is scheduled to build other

support facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft maintenance and

logistics operations that are to relocate there. Ground elements of the 1st

Marine Air Wing not relocated to the sea-based facility would relocate to

other bases on Okinawa.

DOD Has Established

Requirements for the

Sea-Based Facility

The sea-based facility is to be designed by Japan to meet U.S. operational

requirements.

During regular operations, about 66 helicopters and MV-22 aircraft (when

fielded) would be stationed aboard the sea-based facility. The MV-22 can

operate in either vertical takeoff and landing mode, like a helicopter, or

short takeoff and landing mode, like an airplane. The sea-based facility

airfield requirements are based on MV-22 operating requirements.

According to a Marine Corps study, a runway length of 2,600 feet is

sufficient for normal day-to-day operations, training missions, and

self-deployment to Korea in its vertical takeoff and landing mode under

most conditions. The Pacific Command has established a 4,200-foot

runway for all MV-22 operations based on aircraft performance and

meteorological data. The Marine Corps study indicates that a 4,200-foot

runway is sufficient for most training and mission requirements. However,

the study also stated that for missions requiring an MV-22 gross weight

near the maximum of 59,305 pounds, the aircraft would have to operate in

its short takeoff mode and would require a runway of 5,112 feet under

certain weather conditions.

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The United States has established a runway length requirement of about

4,200 feet for the sea-based facility. Arresting gear would be located about

1,200 feet from either end of the runway to permit carrier aircraft to land.

In addition, the runway would have 328-foot overruns at each end to

provide a safety margin in case a pilot overshoots the optimal landing spot

during an approach and a parallel taxiway about 75 feet wide alongside the

runway. Additional aircraft facilities include a drive-through rinse facility

for aircraft corrosion control, an air traffic control tower, and aircraft

firefighting and rescue facilities. Up to 10,000 pounds of ordnance would

be stored in a magazine collocated with an ordnance assembly area aboard

the sea-based facility. Also, flight simulators and security and rescue boat

operations, among other capabilities, are required aboard the sea-based

facility.

Aircraft maintenance would be performed aboard the sea-based facility.

Marine Air Group-36 requires hangar space for five helicopter squadrons,

including space for Marine Corps air logistics; corrosion control; aircraft

maintenance; secure storage; administrative functions; ground support

equipment; and engine test cells, among other facilities. Logistics

operations requirements aboard the sea-based facility include aircraft

supply and fuel/oil supply, spill response capability, and parking for up to

800 personally owned and government-owned vehicles. MCAS Futenma can

store about 828,000 gallons of aircraft fuel. At the time of our review, the

United States had not determined how much fuel storage capacity was

needed, or how fuel is to be provided to support sea-based facility

operations. Food service for about 1,400 on-duty servicemembers per meal

would be required on the sea-based facility to provide meals during the

day and for crews working nights.

The United States planned to locate the headquarters, logistics, and most

operational activities aboard the sea-based facility and most quality-of-life

activities, including housing, food service, and medical and dental

services, ashore at Camp Schwab. U.S. officials estimate that over 2,500

servicemembers currently stationed at MCAS Futenma would transfer to the

sea-based facility and Camp Schwab. To accommodate the incoming

arrivals from MCAS Futenma, Marine Corps Bases, Japan, plans to relocate

about 800 to 1,000 servicemembers currently housed at Camp Schwab to

Camp Hansen and absorb the remainder at Camp Schwab. U.S. engineers

estimated that about 1,900 people would work on the sea-based facility.

Due to a lack of DOD dependent schools in the Camp Schwab area, only

unmarried servicemembers will be housed at Camp Schwab.

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Servicemembers accompanied by dependents will be housed where most

of them and most of the DOD schools (including the only two high schools)

are located now, although not on MCAS Futenma. Marine Corps Bases,

Japan, would have to either house all incoming servicemembers on or near

Camp Schwab and bus their dependent children to the schools or keep

servicemembers who have dependents housed in the southern part of the

island and have them commute to work. Marine Corps Bases, Japan, chose

the latter.

Contractors Have

Developed Three Concepts

for a Sea-Based Facility

Japan will design, build, and pay for the sea-based facility and plans to

locate it offshore from Camp Schwab. The sea-based facility is be provided

rent-free to USFJ, which would then provide it to the 1st Marine Air Wing.

Government of Japan, ocean engineering and other university professors,

and other experts have concluded that three types of sea-based facilities

are technically feasible—the pontoon-type, pile-supported-type, or

semisubmersible-type.

Pontoon-Type Sea-Based

Facility

A pontoon-type sea-based facility would essentially be a large platform

that would float in the water on pontoons (see fig. 3.2). The structure

would be located about 3,000 feet from shore in about 100 feet of water.

Part of the platform would be below the water line. To keep the sea

relatively calm around the platform, a breakwater would be installed to

absorb the wave action. The breakwater would be constructed in about 60

feet of water atop a coral ridge. To prevent the structure from floating

away, it would be attached to a mooring system attached to the sea floor.

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Figure 3.2: Artist’s Conception of a Pontoon-Type Sea-Based Facility With a Cut-Away to Show the Lower Deck

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

The pontoon-type sea-based facility envisioned would have a runway and

control tower on the deck and most maintenance, storage, and personnel

support activities (such as food service) below deck. According to

documents that we obtained, no floating structure of the size required has

ever been built. In addition, Naval Facilities Engineering Command

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officials told us that construction of a breakwater in about 60 feet of water

would be “at the edge of technical feasibility.”

Pile-Supported Sea-Based

Facility

A pile-supported sea-based facility essentially would be a large platform

supported by columns, or piles, driven into the sea floor (see fig. 3.3). The

structure would be located in about 16 feet to 82 feet of water and

relatively closer to shore than the proposed pontoon-type sea-based

facility. According to Naval Engineers, about 7,000 piles would be needed

to support a structure of the size proposed.

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Figure 3.3: Artist’s Conception of a Pile-Supported Sea-Based Facility

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

The pile-supported sea-based facility envisioned would have one deck. In

addition to the runway and control tower, maintenance, storage, and

personnel support activities would be in buildings on the deck. Structures

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similar to the pile-supported sea-based facility have already been built for

other purposes.

Semisubmersible-Type

Sea-Based Facility

The semisubmersible-type sea-based facility would consist of a platform

above the water line supported by a series of floating underwater hulls

(see fig. 3.4). The facility would have interconnected modules with a

runway and control tower atop the deck and maintenance, storage, and

other functions on a lower deck.

Figure 3.4: Artist’s Conception of a Semisubmersible Sea-Based Facility

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

The semisubmersible sea-based facility relies on technology that does not

yet exist, according to documents provided by DOD. For example,

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documents indicate that semisubmersible sea-based facilities are limited

by current technology to about 1,000 feet in length.

Costs, Challenges, and

Complications

Threaten Capability of

the Sea-Based Facility

The United States and/or Japan are likely to encounter high costs,

technological challenges, and operational complications in designing,

constructing, and operating the sea-based facility.

Costs The sea-based facility is estimated to cost Japan between $2.4 billion and

$4.9 billion to design and build. Operations and support costs are expected

to be much higher on the sea-based facility than at MCAS Futenma. Under

the Status of Forces Agreement, the United States pays for the

maintenance of bases it uses in Japan. Based on a $4-billion sea-based

facility design and construction cost, U.S. engineers have initially

estimated maintenance costs to be about $8 billion over the 40-year life

span of the facility. Thus, annual maintenance would cost about

$200 million, compared with about $2.8 million spent at MCAS Futenma. At

the time of this report, the United States and Japan were discussing having

Japan pay for maintenance on the sea-based facility. If Japan does not pay

maintenance costs, then the U.S. cost related to the SACO

recommendations could be much higher.

In addition to potential increased maintenance costs, the United States

may spend money to renovate facilities at MCAS Futenma previously

identified by both the U.S. and Japanese governments for replacement by

Japan. Because of the planned closure of MCAS Futenma, the government

of Japan cancelled about $140 million worth of projects at the air station

that were to be funded under Japan’s Facilities Improvement Program.

The United States believes these facilities are important to Futenma’s

operations until the sea-based facility is ready. Marine Forces, Japan, has

requested $13.6 million in U.S. funds to complete some of those projects.

During the 10-year sea-based facility acquisition period, some of the other

projects may be needed to continue to operate MCAS Futenma. If the

government of Japan does not fund these projects for MCAS Futenma, the

United States will have to choose between the added risk of operating

from decaying facilities or pay additional renovation costs at a base

scheduled for closure.

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Technological Challenges Technological challenges may arise because no sea-based facility of the

type and scale envisioned has ever been built to serve as an air base. To

address these challenges and develop sea-based facility operational and

support requirements, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command

convened a working group in August 1997. In its report, the group

concluded that for the three sea-based facilities being considered, “none of

these technologies has been demonstrated to the scale envisioned.”

The report described numerous challenges that would have to be

overcome to make a sea-based facility viable. For example, the sea-based

facility would have to survive natural events such as typhoons, which

strike within 180 nautical miles of Okinawa Island an average of four times

per year. During a typhoon, personnel would evacuate the sea-based

facility, but the aircraft would remain aboard the facility in hangars to ride

out the storm, according to 1st Marine Air Wing officials. U.S. engineers

we spoke with indicated that a pile-supported sea-based facility’s

underside would have to withstand pressure caused by storm-tossed

waves slamming beneath the deck, and the pontoon- and

semisubmersible-type sea-based facilities must be designed to avoid

instability or sinking. Tsunamis are also a threat. In a tsunami, the water

level near shore generally drops (sometimes substantially) and then rises

to great heights, causing large, destructive waves. U.S. engineers we spoke

with indicated that a floating sea-based facility’s mooring system would

have to permit the floating structure to drop with the water level without

hitting bottom and then rise as the waves returned.

Also, structural issues pose technological challenges. The sea-based

facility would have to be invulnerable to sinking or capsizing and resume

normal operations within 24 to 48 hours after an aircraft crash, an accident

involving ordnance aboard the facility, or an attack in wartime or by

terrorists. An issue involving the pontoon and semisubmersible facilities is

the potential for them to become unstable if an interior compartment is

flooded. Thus, watertight doors and compartments (similar to those on

ships) may be required. Corrosion control is a major concern because the

facility would always be in salt water. Therefore, that part of the structure

below the waterline would have to be built to minimize or resist corrosion

for the 40-year life span of the facility, or a method of identifying and

repairing corrosion (possibly underwater) without disrupting military

operations would have to be devised.

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Operational Complications The Marine Corps may experience operational complications because the

proposed length of the sea-based facility runway can compromise safety

margins when an MV-22 aircraft is taking off at maximum weight under

wet runway conditions.1

 Since the MV-22 requires a 5,112-foot runway to

take off at its maximum weight of 59,305 pounds and maintain maximum

safety margins on a wet runway, the proposed 4,200-foot runway for the

sea-based facility is too short. While the MV-22 can take off from a

4,200-foot runway at its maximum weight, in the event of an engine failure,

or other emergency, on a wet runway, the safety margin is reduced. This

risks the loss of the aircraft because the stopping distance for an aborted

takeoff is longer on a wet runway than the runway planned. According to

the Pacific Command, conditions that require more than 4,200 feet for

takeoff would not preclude effective MV-22 contingency missions. A

commander would need to make a decision to accept the increased risk of

aircraft loss based on the criticality of the mission, or to reduce the

aircraft’s load. The Pacific Command considers the risk acceptable and

accepted the reduced the size of the sea-based facility.

Alternatively, with a reduced load, MV-22s could take off from the

sea-based facility without a full fuel load, use Kadena Air Base to finish

fueling to capacity, and take off from its longer runway to continue the

mission. However, this requires Kadena Air Base to absorb increased air

traffic and risks later arrival in an area of operations. Ultimately, the added

risk, time, and coordination are problems that would not occur at MCAS

Futenma because its 9,000-foot runway is long enough for all MV-22

missions. Also, if Kadena Air Base is not available for MV-22 operations,

the Marines would have no alternative U.S. military runway of sufficient

length on Okinawa to support MV-22 missions at its maximum weight and

maintain maximum safety margins in certain weather conditions.

Moreover, the loss of MCAS Futenma’s runway equates to the loss of an

emergency landing strip for fixed-wing aircraft in the area. However,

safety margins may not be compromised even if Kadena Air Base is shut

down (for weather or other reasons), MCAS Futenma is closed, and the

sea-based facility’s runway as currently designed is too short for certain

aircraft, because Naha International Airport would be available as an

emergency landing strip for U.S. military aircraft.

U.S. Project Oversight Is

Currently Limited

USFJ and Naval Facilities Engineering Command officials told us that the

United States must oversee the design, engineering, and construction of

1

According to the Pacific Command, Okinawa experiences rainfall an average of 135 days a year.

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the sea-based facility to ensure that it meets U.S. requirements, is

operationally adequate, and is affordable to operate and maintain.

However, current staff and funding resources are dedicated to managing

other programs associated with the U.S. presence in Japan. Therefore, USFJ

has requested establishment of a Project Management Office to oversee

and coordinate SACO implementation while the Naval Facilities

Engineering Command has asked for funding for a special project office to

oversee the design and construction of the sea-based facility.

In addition to the high cost, technological challenges, and operational

complications that stem from the planned sea-based facility and limited

U.S. oversight of the project, Japan’s sea-based facility acquisition strategy

compounds the risk. At the time of our review, Japan did not have a

risk-reduction phase planned to demonstrate that the design of the

sea-based facility meets U.S. operating and affordability requirements. A

risk-reduction phase could include risk assessments, life-cycle cost

analyses, and design tradeoffs. DOD’s policy is to include a risk-reduction

phase in its acquisition of major systems. U.S. officials believe it will take

up to 10 years to design, build, and relocate to the sea-based facility as

compared with the 5 to 7 years estimated in the SACO Final Report. On the

other hand, these officials also believe that adding time to the project is a

price worth paying to include a risk-reduction phase. Given the scope,

technical challenges, and unique nature of the sea-based facility, including

a risk-reduction phase would permit the U.S. and Japanese governments to

establish that the proposed sea-based facility will be affordable and

operationally suitable. The inclusion of a risk-reduction phase in the

sea-based facility’s acquisition schedule is currently being discussed

between the U.S. and Japanese governments.

Problems Associated

With Remaining 10

Land Return

Recommendations

Are Minimal, and

Some Benefits Are

Likely

U.S. forces on Okinawa will face minimal risks to operations from the

remaining 10 land return issues. The services can maintain training

opportunities and deployment plans and schedules, because land to be

returned is no longer needed or will be returned only after Japan provides

adequate replacement facilities on existing bases or adds land by

extending other base boundaries.

First, while the Northern Training Area is still used extensively for combat

skills training, about 9,900 acres can be returned to Japan because that

land is no longer needed by the United States. The Marine Corps will

retain about 9,400 acres of the Northern Training Area and expects to be

able to continue all needed training on the remaining acreage. The return

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of the 9,900 acres is contingent on Japan’s relocating helicopter landing

zones within what will remain of the Northern Training Area. In addition,

the adjacent Aha training area can be returned without risk once Japan

provides new shoreline access to the Northern Training Area to replace

what would be lost by the closure and return of the Aha training area.

Likewise, return of the Gimbaru training area presents low risk because

the helicopter landing zone is to be relocated to the nearby Kin Blue Beach

training area and the vehicle washrack and firefighting training tower will

be relocated to Camp Hansen. The Yomitan auxiliary airfield can be

returned because parachute drop training conducted there has already

been transferred to the Ie Jima auxiliary airfield on Ie Jima Island, just off

the northwest coast of Okinawa Island. Lastly, the Sobe communication

station can be returned because it will be relocated to the remaining

Northern Training Area, and Naha Port can be returned when it is replaced

by a suitable facility elsewhere on Okinawa.

While risks from the return of land (other than that related to MCAS

Futenma) are minimal, the United States expects some benefits from the

consolidation of housing on the remaining portion of Camp Zukeran. First,

the SACO Final Report calls on Japan to build a new naval hospital on Camp

Zukeran to replace the existing hospital on that part of Camp Kuwae

scheduled for return. Marine Corps Bases, Japan estimated the

construction cost to be about $300 million, which Japan is scheduled to

pay. In addition, Japan is to provide 2,041 new or reconstructed housing

units at Camp Zukeran as part of the SACO process and another 1,473

reconstructed housing units at Kadena Air Base, which is not part of SACO’s

recommendations. Air Force 18th Wing civil engineering officials

estimated the total housing construction cost at about $2 billion.2

 The 18th

Wing has requested establishment of a special project office to help with

the design of the housing units and to ensure that the units meet U.S.

health and safety code standards.

The current estimated cost to the United States to implement the

recommendations related to the return of land is about $193.5 million over

about 10 years. This includes (1) $80 million to furnish the new hospital;

(2) $71 million for the Futenma Implementation Group; (3) $8.2 million to

furnish 2,041 housing units; (4) $8.1 million for USFJ to oversee and

coordinate SACO implementation; (5) $8 million for the Naval Facilities

Engineering Command project office to oversee the sea-based facility’s

engineering and construction; (6) $4.4 million for a special project office

for oversight of the housing project and master plan; and (7) $13.6 million

2

The Air Force is DOD’s executive agent for housing in Japan.

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for MCAS Futenma projects that would have been paid for by Japan had it

not cancelled funding for the base. DOD officials told us that the U.S. and

Japanese governments were negotiating an arrangement whereby Japan

might assume those portions of the $71 million in costs which they can pay

(and still comply with their domestic laws), for the Futenma

Implementation Group. This arrangement could reduce U.S. costs below

the current estimate of $193.5 million. Also, some initial costs may be

offset in later years because the 18th Wing expects maintenance costs will

be lower at the new hospital and housing. However, U. S. costs could be

significantly higher than the $193.5 million estimate because the United

States and Japan have not agreed on which country would be responsible

for the sea-based facility’s maintenance.

Some Problems and

Risks in Implementing

One of the Three

Operational Changes

The United States has already implemented all three changes in training

and operational procedures called for in the SACO Final Report (see table

3.2).

Table 3.2: Training and Operational

Procedures Changes Addressed in the

SACO Final Report Operational procedure change

How operational procedures will be

maintained

End artillery live-fire training over highway

104

Relocate training to ranges on Japan’s

mainland

Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima

auxiliary airfield

End parachute drop training at Yomitan

auxiliary airfield and relocate to Ie Jima

auxiliary airfield.

End conditioning hikes on public roads Relocate training onto U.S. bases

Sources: SACO Final Report and Marine Corps Bases, Japan.

The 3rd Marine Division’s artillery live-fire exercises have been relocated

from the Central Training Area on Okinawa to the Kita-Fuji, Higashi-Fuji,

Ojojihara, Yausubetsu, and Hijudai training ranges on the Japanese

mainland. Prior to the SACO Final Report, the 3rd Marine Division was

already conducting 60 to 80 days of artillery live-fire exercises at the two

Fuji ranges. Under the SACO relocation, another 35 days of training will be

split among the five ranges. Japan has agreed to pay transportation costs

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to the artillery ranges and wants to use Japanese commercial airliners for

this purpose.

The III Marine Expeditionary Force believes the training at the five ranges

is comparable to that available on Okinawa and other ranges in the United

States. At the time of our review, the Marine Corps had successfully

completed one relocated artillery live-fire exercise each at the Kita-Fuji

and Yausubetsu ranges. The relocation has had virtually no impact on

deployment plans and schedules, according to III Marine Expeditionary

Force officials.

In addition to the artillery training relocation, the United States has

transferred parachute jump training conducted by the Army’s 1st

Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), from the Yomitan auxiliary

airfield (which was closed) to the auxiliary airfield on Ie Jima Island, just

off the northwest coast of Okinawa.3

 However, special forces soldiers are

at increased risk of failing to maintain airborne qualifications because

parachute operations training has proven more difficult to complete on Ie

Jima Island. About 73 percent of the training jumps scheduled between

July 1996 and September 1997 on Ie Jima Island were canceled due to

adverse weather at the drop zone; adverse weather at sea, preventing

required safety boats from standing by in the event a parachutist landed in

the water; and equipment problems that prevented the safety boats from

departing their berths. The relocation has not affected operational

deployments and schedules, although training deployments have been

disrupted.

Lastly, the Marine Corps has already ended conditioning hikes for troops

on public roads off base and transferred those hikes to roads within U.S.

bases. USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, indicated that this has not cost

the United States any money and has had no impact on operational

capability, deployment plans and schedules, or training.

As requested, we also reviewed the impact of the SACO Final Report

recommendations on bomber operations in the Pacific, although bomber

operations were not specifically addressed by the SACO report. According

to the headquarters of the Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, and 18th Wing, the

SACO Final Report recommendations will have no impact on bomber

operations in the Pacific.

3

The Yomitan auxiliary airfield has been closed but is not scheduled for return to Japan until

March 2001.

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Risks Are Minimal

From Five Noise

Reduction Initiatives

The United States has implemented two noise reduction initiatives at

Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma called for in the SACO Final Report.

Three more noise reduction initiatives are to be implemented after Japan

constructs new facilities. Table 3.3 shows the status of the five noise

reduction initiatives and U.S. plans for maintaining training and

operational capability after their implementation.

Table 3.3: Noise Reduction Initiatives

Called for in the SACO Final Report

Noise reduction initiative Implementation date

How training and

operational procedures

are to be maintained

Aircraft noise

countermeasures at Kadena

Air Base and MCAS Futenma

Implemented All flights required to do

missions and maintain

aircrew proficiency are

permitted, even at night.

Transfer KC-130 and AV-8

aircraft

Partially implemented Japan will build

replacement facilities at

MCAS Iwakuni for the

KC-130s; all but 6 AV-8s

have returned to the United

States.a

Relocate Navy aircraft and

MC-130 operations within

Kadena Air Base

Partially implemented Japan will build facilities at

Kadena Air Base.

Noise reduction baffles at

Kadena Air Base

March 1998 Japan will build noise

reduction baffles.

Limitations on nighttime

training operations at MCAS

Futenma

Implemented Nighttime flying is still

permitted for training.

aThese aircraft are now based at MCAS Iwakuni and frequently deploy to Kadena Air Base.

Sources: SACO Final Report; Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and the 18th Wing.

The United States will encounter few problems from the noise abatement

procedures, according to USFJ; Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and the 18th

Wing. Commanders at MCAS Futenma and Kadena Air Base retain the right

to order nighttime flying operations to maintain aircrew proficiency and

meet all training, mission, and safety requirements. In fact, the noise

abatement countermeasures have been in effect since March 1996, and

commanders at both installations indicated that the procedures have not

affected operational capability, deployment plans and schedules, or

training.

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Risks Are Minimal

From Eight Status of

Forces Agreement

Changes

The United States has implemented seven of the eight changes to Status of

Forces Agreement procedures called for in the SACO Final Report. Table 3.4

shows the new Status of Forces Agreement procedures.

Table 3.4: Improvements to Status of

Forces Agreement Procedures Improve Status of Forces Agreement procedures

Provide timely reports on U.S. military accidents to authorities in Japan.

Provide greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

Implement new procedures to authorize visits to U.S. facilities by Japanese nationals.a

Attach new number plates to all U.S. force official vehicles, including tactical vehicles.

Advise U.S. personnel to purchase supplemental automobile insurance for personally

owned vehicles.b

Japan will try to pay the difference between Japanese court judgments and the amount

that the United States is willing to pay to compensate for claims against U.S. military

personnel not involved in the performance of official duties.c

Implement new quarantine procedures for pets brought to Japan by U.S. personnel.

Continue to use procedures already in place for removal of unexploded ordnance at the

Central Training Area. These procedures are equivalent to those used in the United

States.

aSome Japanese nationals visit U.S. bases to view land that they own within the base and

because some ancient cultural assets are located within some U.S. bases.

bUSFJ went beyond the SACO report goal and now requires U.S. personnel to buy supplemental

insurance for their personally owned vehicles.

cJapan is scheduled to implement these procedures by March 1998.

Sources: SACO Final Report; USFJ; and Marine Corps Bases, Japan.

According to USFJ officials, with the exception of affixing number plates to

official vehicles, the changes in Status of Forces Agreement procedures

cost the United States nothing and had no impact on deployment plans,

schedules, and training. The number plates cost about $30,000 according

to USFJ officials.

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Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense

• decide on the means to monitor the design, engineering, and construction

of the sea-based facility;

• work with Japan to include a risk-reduction phase in the acquisition

schedule to establish that the designed sea-based facility will be affordable

and operationally suitable;

• take steps to ensure that all U.S. concerns, especially the costs of

operations and maintenance on the sea-based facility and operational

concerns, have been satisfactorily addressed before Japan begins to build

the sea-based facility; and

• request the Japanese government to allocate funds for those projects at

Futenma that were cancelled by Japan due to the planned closure of

Futenma and are deemed essential to continued operations of the station

and the 1st Marine Air Wing until completion of the replacement facility.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO’s

recommendations and noted that the report effectively outlines the major

operational and technical issues involved in realigning, consolidating, and

reducing U.S. force presence on Okinawa, as set forth in the SACO process.

DOD also noted that the role of Congress will be critical in maintaining the

strategic relationship with Japan and therefore the GAO report was timely

and welcome. DOD provided technical comments, which we have

incorporated in our report where appropriate. The DOD response is printed

in its entirety in appendix II.

We also provided a copy of our draft report to the Department of State. In

oral comments, the Department of State concurred with our report and

offered one technical change which we incorporated into the report.

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Two Environmental Issues Could Arise

From Implementing the SACO

Recommendations

It may take a decade or more to fully achieve all of the SACO’s

recommendations, but two environmental issues may arise and remain

during and after implementation. The first concerns the potential for

environmental contamination on U.S. bases scheduled for closure. The

second concerns the potential adverse impact on the environment from

construction and operation of the sea-based facility.

Environmental

Cleanup Issues Could

Affect Land Return

If environmental contamination is found on bases to be closed under the

SACO process, cleanup could be expensive. As we noted in chapter 1, the

Status of Forces Agreement does not require the United States to return

bases in Japan to the condition they were in at the time they were

provided to U.S. forces or to compensate Japan for not having done so.

Thus, USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, officials believe that the United

States is not obligated to do environmental cleanup at bases to be closed.

Nevertheless, a 1995 DOD policy calls for the removal of known imminent

and substantial dangers to health and safety due to environmental

contamination caused by DOD operations on installations or facilities

designated for return to the host nation overseas. Furthermore, if the

bases are closed and the land returned to Japan and environmental

contamination is subsequently found, redevelopment and reuse efforts

planned for some of these facilities could be hampered. In fact, Marine

Corps Bases, Japan, and other Okinawa-based U.S. forces were informed

by a letter dated August 25, 1997, from the government of Japan’s Naha

Defense Facilities Administration Bureau that the toxic substances

mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls were found on the Onna

communications site. The United States had closed the base and returned

the land to Japan in November 1995 (a land return unrelated to the SACO

process). The letter indicated that the presence of these substances has

prevented the land from being returned to its owners and thus being

available for reuse. The letter concludes by requesting that the United

States conduct a survey, identify any contamination that may exist, and

clean up bases scheduled for closure in the future. If the United States

agrees to this request, land return under the SACO process could be

affected. At the time of our review, the United States had not responded to

the letter.

If such a survey, sometimes called an environmental baseline survey, is

conducted and contamination is found, cleanup could prove expensive.

For example, environmental remediation at MCAS Tustin in California is

expected to cost more than $53 million when completed. If a survey is

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conducted and contamination is found, a decision would be needed as to

whether the United States or Japan would pay the cost.

Construction and

Operation of the

Sea-Based Facility

Could Harm the

Environment

DOD’s position is that the sea-based facility should be constructed and

operated in a manner that preserves and protects the natural resources of

Okinawa, including the ocean environment and coral reefs that partially

surround the island. Further, the United States and Japan, along with a

substantial number of other countries, support an international coral reef

initiative aimed at conservation and management of coral reefs and related

ecosystems. Coral reefs are in the area in which the sea-based facility is

tentatively to be located. However, two sea-based facility options currently

under consideration have the potential to harm the coral reefs. The

pontoon-type facility requires the installation of a large breakwater and

several mooring stations onto the seafloor. The pile-supported facility

requires several thousand support pilings that would need to be driven

into the coral reef or seafloor and reinforced to withstand storm

conditions. Both of these options require at least one, and possibly two,

causeways connecting them to shore facilities. Numerous scientific

studies show that large construction projects can cause damage to coral

reefs and the nearby coastal areas. The government of Japan is evaluating

the condition of the coral reef.

The environment could also be contaminated through routine operations

aboard the sea-based facility. The accidental runoff of cleaning fluids used

to wash aircraft or unintentional fuel system leaks could contaminate the

nearby ocean environment.

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Appendix I 

The Final Report of the Special Action

Committee on Okinawa

The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996, by Minister for Foreign Affairs

Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, Secretary of Defense Perry,

Ambassador Mondale

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in

November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The

two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the

people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the

Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint

endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop

recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways

to realign, consolidate and reduce US facilities and areas, and adjust

operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa consistent with their

respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and

Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was

scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim

Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the

SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation

schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of

intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and

measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim

Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and

Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and

measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce

the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in Okinawa. At

the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and

readiness of US forces in Japan while addressing security and force

protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of

the US facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and

areas (approx. 5,002 ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the

successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored their

strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt

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The Final Report of the Special Action

Committee on Okinawa

implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With

this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary

forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where

specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed.

Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make

every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and

status of US forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between US

forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that

efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at

the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security

Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint

Committee as described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The

SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues

as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC

on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security,

the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the

international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral

policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable

security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC

to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the

same time.

Return Land

Futenma Air Station See attached (p. 56).

Northern Training Area Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987

ha/9,852 acres) and release US joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159

ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of

March 2003 under the following conditions:

Provide land area (approx. 38 ha/93 acres) and water area (approx.

121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of

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Committee on Okinawa

March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern

Training Area to the ocean.

Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the

remaining Northern Training Area.

Aha Training Area Release US joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480 ha/1,185 acres) and

release US joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895 ha/19,509 acres) with

the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and

water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are

provided.

Gimbaru Training Area Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60 ha/149 acres) with the intention

to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing

zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities

are relocated to Camp Hansen.

Sobe Communication Site Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53 ha/132 acres) with the

intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna

facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. l91 ha/471 acres) with the

intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the

parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe

Communications Sites is relocated.

Camp Kuwae Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx 99 ha/245 acres) with the intention

to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is

relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to

Camp Zukeran or other facilities and areas in Okinawa.

Senaha Communication

Station

Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61 ha/151 acres) with the

intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna

facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii

Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx.-

0. l ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.

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Makiminato Service Area Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3 ha/8 acres) in order to widen

the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are

relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.

Naha Port Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx.

57 ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area

(approx. 35 ha/87 acres).

Housing Consolidation

(Camp Kuwae and Camp

Zukeran)

Consolidate US housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and

return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish

the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83 ha/206 acres at Camp

Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35 ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be

returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in

the above entry on Camp Kuwae.

Adjust Training and

Operational

Procedures

Artillery Live-Fire Training

Over Highway 104

Terminate artillery fire-training over Highway 104, with the exception of

artillery fire required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated

to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese Fiscal Year

1997.

Parachute Drop Training Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.

Conditioning Hikes on

Public Roads

Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

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Committee on Okinawa

Implement Noise

Reduction Initiatives:

Aircraft Noise Abatement

Countermeasures at

Kadena Air Base and

Futenma Air Station

Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air

Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in

March 1996 have been implemented.

Transfer of KC-130

Hercules Aircraft and AV-8

Harrier Aircraft

Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently~ based at Futenma Air Station to

Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8

aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.

Relocation of Navy Aircraft

and MC-130 Operations at

Kadena Air Base

Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air

Base from the Navy ramp to other side of the major runways. The

implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with

the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities

at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move

the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest

corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.

Noise Reduction Baffles at

Kadena Air Base

Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base

with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.

Limitation of Night Flight

Training Operations at

Futenma Air Station

Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the

maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of US

forces.

Improve Status of

Forces Agreement

Procedures

Accident Reports Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide

investigation reports on US military aircraft accidents announced on

December 2, 1996.

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Committee on Okinawa

In addition, as part of the US forces’ good neighbor policy, every effort will

be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well

as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving US forces’

assets or facilities.

Public Exposure of Joint

Committee Agreements

Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

Visits to US Facilities and

Areas

Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to US facilities and

areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

Markings on US Forces

Official Vehicles

Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on US forces

official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical US

forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other US forces vehicles by

October 1997.

Supplemental Automobile

Insurance

Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded.

Additionally, on its own initiative, the US has further elected to have all

personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning

in January 1997.

Payment for Claims Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims

under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:

Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and

evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures.

Whenever warranted under US laws and regulatory guidance, advance

payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible. A new system will be

introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will

make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance

of the final adjudication of claims by US authorities.

In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the

US Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court

judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of

Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in

order to address the difference in amount.

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Committee on Okinawa

Quarantine Procedures Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced

by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

Removal of Unexploded

Ordinance in Camp Hansen

Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordinance in

Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the US

forces in the United States.

Continue Efforts to

Improve the SOFA

Procedures in the Joint

Committee1

The SACO Final

Report on Futenma

Air Station (an

Integral Part of the

SACO Final Report)

Tokyo, Japan,

December 2, 1996

Introduction At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996,

Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador

Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on

Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of

September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments

have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of

Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and

areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield’s critical military

functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special

Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives:

1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) incorporate the

heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based

facility (sea-based facility).

1

 Marine Corps Bases, Japan officials stated that this item is an ongoing process and does not require

any specific action as a result of the signing of the SACO Final Report.

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On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to

pursue the sea-based facility option. Compared to the other two options,

the sea-based facility is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced

safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining the

operational capabilities of United States forces. In addition, the sea-based

facility can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and

can also be removed when no longer necessary.

The SCC will establish a bilateral United States-Japan working group under

the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma

Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical

experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for

implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this

plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design,

construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the

FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.

Decisions of the SCC Pursue construction of a sea-based facility to absorb most of the

helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will

be approximately 1500 meters long, and will support the majority of

Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Flight

Rules (IFR)-capable runway (approximately 1300 meters long), direct air

operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as

headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base

operating support. The sea-based facility will be designed to support

basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field

aircraft operations.

Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this

base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these

aircraft and their missions.

Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft,

maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at

Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the sea-based facility or

Iwakuni Air Base.

Study the emergency and contingency use of alternative facilities which

may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the

transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the sea-based facility

will reduce operational flexibility currently available.

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Committee on Okinawa

Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after

adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

Guiding Principles Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be

maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels

throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of

facilities.

To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and

activities will be transferred to the sea-based facility. Operational

capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be

supported by the shorter runway of the sea-based facility (such as

strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency

throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to

be located on the sea-based facility, due to operational, cost, or

quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing US facilities and

areas.

The sea-based facility will be located off the east coast of the main island

of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or

causeway. Selection of the locations will take into account operational

requirements, air-space and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access,

environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement,

survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to

other US military facilities and housing.

The design of the sea-based facility will incorporate adequate measures to

ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against

severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and

prevention for the sea-based facility and all equipment located on the

sea-based facility; safety; and platform security. Support will include

reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other

utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully

self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.

The Government of Japan will provide the sea-based facility and other

relocation facilities for the use of United States forces, in accordance with

the U. S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status

of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all

aspects of life-cycle cost as part of the design/acquisition decision.

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Committee on Okinawa

The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa

informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and

schedules of implementation.

Possible Sea-Based Facility

Construction Methods

Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised

of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory

Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the

Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods

mentioned below are technically feasible.

Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)-supported by a number

of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.

Pontoon Type-platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in

a calm sea protected by a breakwater.

Semi-Submersible Type-platform at a wave free height, supported by

buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

The Next Steps The FIG will recommend a candidate sea-based facility area to the SCC as

soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later

than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following

items: concept development and definition of operational requirements,

technology performance specifications and construction method, site

survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.

The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational

capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction,

installation of required components, validation tests and suitability

demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.

The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant

milestones concerning sea-based facility program feasibility.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Reginald L. Furr

Brian J. Lepore

Colin L. Chambers

Nancy L. Ragsdale

Julio A. Luna

Office of the General

Counsel, Washington,

D.C.

Richard Seldin

(703214) Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-98-66 Overseas Presence
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