Sensemaking is a tall order, but there is no better Sherpa for 

the unfamiliar terrain of this new paradigm than David Moore. 

He almost uniquely embodies both practice and academic 

scholarship. I’d be happy if the Intelligence Community began 

a number of pilot projects trying to develop sensemaking, but 

Moore is much more ambitious: while recognizing its limitations, 

he’d make sensemaking the basis of intelligence. It should be.

—GREGORY TREVERTON

Director, RAND Corporation Center for Global Risk and Security

Moore has done a deep and convincing job of diagnosing the 

ills of the IC, and has proposed a rich and promising cure. He 

describes the potential that sensemaking offers as a means 

precisely for helping policymakers to improve how they think 

about policy. The most valuable part of the book could well be 

the ... attention it devotes to the problem of how we formulate our 

questions in the fi rst place.

—ANTHONY OLCOTT

Associate, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy 

Georgetown University

The application of a rigorous metric to a valid case study in 

this book is the fi rst such application in intelligence analysis to 

compare processes by different analytic teams.

—EMILY S. PATTERSON

 College of Medicine, The Ohio State University

David Moore has written for the Intelligence Community a 

revolutionary epistemology. His novel construct for intelligence 

professionals is the foundation for a philosophy of intelligence. 

He has started where he left off in his work on Critical Thinking 

and Intelligence Analysis with a path forward for analysts to 

move beyond the methods they learn as “good” tradecraft.

—CHRISTIAN P. WESTERMANN

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State

Visit the NDIC Press at www.ndic.edu 

PCN23353
Sensemaking

A Structure for an 

Intelligence Revolution

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not refl ect the offi cial policy or pos

of any branch of the U.S. Government.

David T. Moore

NATIONAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, DC

March 2011
ii

Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution, by David T. Moore

Sensemaking, whereby intelligence professionals would work with 

executive decisionmakers to explain data that are “sparse, noisy, and uncertain,” requires an interpreter and experienced champion to bring about a 

practicable understanding and acceptance of the concept among intelligence 

practitioners. David Moore has accomplished that feat. Further, he, along 

with collaborators in chapters 5 and 7, demonstrate how sensemaking can be 

accomplished as a collaborative enterprise.

Th e manuscript for this publication was reviewed and cleared for public release by the Department of Defense’s Offi ce of Security Review. Clearance does not imply endorsement of opinion nor of factual accuracy. Th is 

volume is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in 

the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

How to order this book. Everyone may download a free electronic 

copy from our website at www.ndic.edu. U.S. government employees may 

request a complimentary copy by contacting us at: press@ndic.edu. Th e 

general public may purchase a copy from the Government Printing Offi ce 

(GPO) at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.

Cathryn Quantic Th urston, PhD

Editor, NDIC Press

Library of Congress Control Number 2011924457

ISBN 978-1-932946-28-4

Sensemaking is the inaugural book in 

our new series, titled Th e A. Denis Clift Series 

on the Intelligence Profession. Th e Clift Series

will present original research on intelligence 

analysis and the teaching of intelligence.

In 2009, A. Denis Clift concluded a 

50-year career with the federal government. 

Clift was president of the National Defense 

Intelligence College from 1994 to 2009 and 

was instrumental in creating the Center for 

Strategic Intelligence Research, which houses 

the NDIC Press.
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Gregory F. Treverton

Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii

Anthony Olcott, PhD

Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xvi

Emily S. Patterson, PhD

Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

Christian P. Westermann

Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xx

Phil Williams, PhD

Preface: On Being Mindful. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxii

What is Mindlessness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxii

Attaining Mindfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxii

Defi nitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxv

Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Where We Are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Kent’s Imperative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Chapter 2: Th e Failure of “Normal Intelligence” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Intelligence Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Errors and Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Considering Standard Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Types of Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

A Wicked Look at Wicked Problems in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

An Intelligence Example: Pandemics as Wicked Problems . . . . . . 29

Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Chapter 3: From Normal to Revolutionary Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . 37

Evidence-Based Intelligence Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Considering the Normal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Paradigm Shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
CONTENTS (Continued)

iv

Chapter 4: Th e Shape of Intelligence Sensemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Planning for Tame and Wicked Intelligence Problems . . . . . . . . . . 51

Foraging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Marshaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Communicating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Chapter 5: A Practice of Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Types of Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Th inking About Anticipating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Th e Roles of Intuitive Th inking in Intelligence 

Sensemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Does More Information Improve Anticipation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Future Vision: Red Brains, Blue Brains? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Looking Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Chapter 6: Considering Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Analogies from Other Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Replication in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Validation in Foresight and Hindsight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Validating the Practice of Intelligence Sensemaking . . . . . . . . . . .100

Seeking Validation: Toward Multiple Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103

Chapter 7: Making Sense of Non-State Actors: 

A Multimethod Case Study of a Wicked Problem . . . . . . . . . . .105

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105

Introducing the Wicked Problem of Non-State Actors . . . . . . . .106

Th ree Approaches to Making Sense of Non-State Actors . . . . . . .108

Approaches and Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114

Critical Assessment: 

Lessons Learned from the Study of Non-State Actors . . . . . .122

Changes in the Roles of Non-State Actors: 

An Alternative View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123

Moving Beyond a Proto-Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129
CONTENTS (Continued)

v

Chapter 8: Establishing Metrics of Rigor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133

Defi ning Intelligence Rigor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133

Assessing Sensemaking Rigor in Studies of 

Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138

Observations and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144

Chapter 9: Implications, Limitations, and Conclusions . . . . . . . . .149

Considering Foresight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149

Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152

Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185

Colophon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195
CONTENTS (Continued)

vi

Tables

1. Characteristics of Wicked Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2. Cooper’s Analytic Pathologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3. Classical Planning and Execution Versus Flexecution . . . . . . . . . . . 53

4. Comparing NIC and LSS Critical Th inking Perspectives . . . . . . . .115

5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118

6. Attributes of the Th e Rigor Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136

7. Comparative Scores of the Th ree Eff orts Examining 

the Roles of Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138
CONTENTS (Continued)

vii

Figures

 1. Types of Intelligence and the Phenomena 

Th ey Characterize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

 2. Changes in Predictive Accuracy and Confi dence 

as Available Information Increases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

 3. Space-Time Envelope of Indeterminate Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

 4. A Notional Example of Causality Across the 

Space-Time Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

 5. A Space-Time Envelope of Anticipation Regarding 

the Authenticity of the Documents Recovered 

at Huelva, Spain, 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

 6. Drivers for the Rise and Growth of Violent 

Non-State Actors (vNSAs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107

 7. Composite Non-State Actor Role Scores for Africa . . . . . . . . . . . .110

 8. Non-State Actor Potential Spectra for Botswana and 

the Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112

 9. Kenyan Non-State Actor Potential Spectra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113

10. Iraqi Points of Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121

11. A Metric for Rigor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135

12. Th e Rigor of the NIC-Eurasia Group Study 

of Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140

13. Th e Rigor of the Mercyhurst College Students’ Study 

of Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142

14. Th e Rigor of the Least Squares Social Science Study 

of Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143

15. Th e Composite Rigor of the Th ree Studies 

of Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145

16. Conceptual Comparison of Kent and Kendall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150

ix

FOREWORD

Gregory F. Treverton

Director

RAND Corporation Center for Global Risk and Security

Recently, I had the opportunity to work with some very impres

young analysts at David Moore’s recent home-away-from-home, the Nati

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Assisting U.S. operations in Iraq 

Afghanistan, they understood how much the world of what we still call “im

ery” had changed. As they put it: We at NGA used to look for things and k

what we were looking for. If we saw a Soviet T-72 tank, we knew we’d fi 

number of its brethren nearby. Now, though, we’re not looking for thi

Instead, we’re looking for activities or transactions. And we don’t know w

we’re looking for.

In fancier language, the paradigm of intelligence and intellige

analysis has changed, driven primarily by the shift in targets from the prim

of nation-states to trans-national groups or irregular forces. In the worl

the national-state, I and others divided intelligence problems into puzzles 

mysteries (or variants of those words).1 Puzzles are those questions that h

a defi nitive answer in principle. How many nuclear missiles the Soviet Un

had was a puzzle. So is whether Al Qaeda possesses fi ssile material. By c

trast, mysteries are questions that cannot be answered with certainty. Th ey 

future and contingent. Will North Korea reach agreement to cease its nuc

program? No one knows the answer, not even North Korean leader Kim J

Il. It depends. Th e question is a mystery, not a puzzle.

For puzzles, intelligence tried to produce the answer. In solving p

zles about the Soviet Union, the United States spent billions of dollars, 

marily on the technical systems whose fruits were and are analyzed at Da

home institution, the National Security Agency (NSA) and at NGA, a

with espionage collected by the CIA. For mysteries there was no ans

Instead, analysts sought to frame the mystery by providing a best estim

along, perhaps, with excursions or scenarios to test the sensitivity of cri

factors. If intelligence failed to understand the full picture of Soviet miss

1 For my version of the distinction, see Gregory F. Treverton, “Estimating Beyond the 

War,” Defense Intelligence Journal 3, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 5-20. Cited hereafter as Treve

“Estimating.”
x

and puzzle became mystery, it at least knew something about where to look: 

there was experience and theory about missile building, plus historical experience of Soviet programs. Th e mystery came with some shape.

However, today’s transnational threats confront us with something 

more than mysteries. I call these shapeless mysteries-plus “complexities,” borrowing Dave Snowden’s term. Th ey are sometimes called, as Moore notes, 

“wicked problems” or simply “messes.” Th e come without history or shape. 

Large numbers of relatively small actors respond to a shift ing set of situational 

factors. Th us, they do not necessarily repeat in any established pattern and are 

not amenable to predictive analysis in the same way as mysteries. Th ose characteristics describe many transnational targets, like terrorists—small groups 

forming and reforming, seeking to fi nd vulnerabilities, thus adapting constantly, and interacting in ways that may be new.

For complexities, especially, the challenge is to employ sensemaking—

the term is from Michigan psychologist, Karl Weick. Exactly how to accomplish sensemaking is a task that still mostly lies before us, which makes this 

book such an important contribution. Sensemaking departs, as Moore notes, 

from the postwar tradition of Sherman Kent, in which analysis meant, in the 

dictionary’s language, “the process of separating something into its constituent 

elements.” Sensemaking also blurs America’s bright white line between intelligence and policy, for, ideally, the two would try to make sense together, sometimes disaggregating events, sometimes aggregating multiple perspectives, 

always entertaining new hypotheses, all against the recognition that dramatic 

failure (or success) might occur at any moment.

Sensemaking is a tall order, but there is no better sherpa for the unfamiliar terrain of this new paradigm than David Moore. He almost uniquely 

embodies both practice and academic scholarship. Indeed, one of the tantalizing aspects of his academic work is that, as a careful intelligence professional 

(and one from NSA to boot), he is very careful about classifi cation. Th at means 

the visible trails of his practice in his scholarship are sparse, and his cases are 

mostly familiar ones, albeit ones oft en spun in new directions.

His approach to sensemaking takes us from information foraging, 

harvesting and marshalling into understanding. He looks at various forms 

of tacit knowledge, and he and the contributors report on some intriguing tests of sensemaking. Several of us who looked around the Intelligence 

Community in the years aft er September 11th noted how little use it made 
xi

of formal methods or machines other than computers for sorting.2 Wo

in some sense the Cold War practice of analysis sought to turn humans 

machines by rooting out judgment, bias, hunch, stereotyping—all the th

humans do best. Th e new paradigm makes the use of machines and met

imperative, letting machines do what they do best—searching large amo

of data, remembering old patterns, and the like—while letting humans 

the judgment they alone can apply. Yet the tests by Moore and his colleag

remind us that methods are critical but only if they have been tested. It tu

out, for instance, that ACH, analysis of competing hypotheses, a met

more frequently used now and one that has been tested, isn’t all that v

able, at least not for analysts beyond the novice level.

For years I’ve had at hand a bumper sticker for which I lacked the 

Th e bumper sticker is: Intelligence cannot truly be reshaped until it resh

its products. So long as it thinks of products primarily as words on paper 

bytes on a screen) produced by relevant experts and stovepiped by agency 

stuck in the old paradigm. Moore should not be blamed for my bumper st

ers, but his emphasis on communication echoes the concern underlyin

I’d be happy if the Intelligence Community began a number of pilot proj

trying to develop sensemaking, but Moore is much more ambitious: w

recognizing its limitations, he’d make sensemaking the basis of intellige

It should be.

2 Most striking is the work of anthropologist Rob Johnston, now on the inside: Rob 

ston, The Culture of Analytic Tradecraft: An Ethnography of the Intelligence Community (Was

ton, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2005). My 

version is Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis (with C. Bryan Gabbard), TR

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).

xiii

COMMENTARY

Anthony Olcott, PhD

Associate, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

Georgetown University

David Moore is right to talk of the need for an intelligence revolut

However, as Lenin learned in the 18 years that passed between publica

of Th e Development of Capitalism in Russia and taking over the Winter 

ace, it takes more than a diagnosis and a prescription to make a revolut

Although his is among the best, Moore’s book is also but the latest addi

to a groaning shelf of books devoted to intelligence and analytic reform w

the companion shelf, for books on how to improve the policy process, 

dusty and all but empty. In that regard, even though Moore’s discussio

the processes of analysis and how the ways we answer questions migh

improved is one of the strongest in recent memory, the most valuable pa

the book could well be the somewhat smaller amount of attention it devot

the problem of how we formulate our questions in the fi rst place.

As Moore points out, Sherman Kent and the other ur-fathers of in

ligence took for granted that the “intelligence questions” are self-evide

foreign policy is (Walter Lippmann’s words) “the shield of the republic” 

strategic intelligence is (Kent’s addition to Lippmann) what “gets the shiel

the right place at the right time” and what “stands ready to guide the swo

In that metaphor there is no room for doubt about what is threat, w

defense, or indeed what receives the thrust of the sword. Even as Kent’s b

appeared, however, other voices were arguing that policy formation is no

self-evident or straightforward.

Moore quotes one of these voices, that of Kent’s contemporary and

a time, IC colleague, Willmoore Kendall. Kendall did not share Kent’s con

tion that the job of the analyst was “to stand behind [the policymakers] w

the book opened at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn 

they may be neglecting.”4 Unlike Kent, who was an unabashed elitist, Ken

was a “majoritarian,” who believed that, in a democracy, all policy, foreign 

domestic, could only be set by the wishes of the “50 percent plus 1” who 

3 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton NJ: Prin

University Press, 1949), p. viii. Cited hereafter as Kent, Strategic Intelligence.

4 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p. 182.
xiv

for a particular person, platform, or party—and the job of the analyst, therefore, was to help the “politically responsible laymen” whom that majority 

had elected to bring those policies into being. Although “majoritarianism” 

led Kendall into some positions which today seem deeply repugnant —for 

example, he defended racial segregation, on the grounds that this was the 

wish of the majority—his argument that policy is determined by beliefs, not 

“objective facts,” is one that, had it prevailed, could probably have helped us 

to avoid a good number of the familiar “intelligence failures” that Moore’s 

book enumerates.

Moore moves some way toward Kendall’s position when he describes 

the potential that sensemaking off ers as a means precisely for helping policymakers to improve how they think about policy. Th e collaborative processes 

he outlines would help analysts and policymakers alike move from the present fi xation on “how things work” (the provenance of analysis) to imaginative 

exploration of the ways in which things could work (the purpose, it would 

seem, of policy).

It is here particularly that I would encourage Moore’s readers to think 

about how to move this sense-making revolution closer to reality. As philosopher Denis Hilton has remarked, there is a profound diff erence between 

“causal attribution” and “causal explanation”—in his words, “attributing the 

9/11 attacks to someone is not the same as explaining them to him.”5 Moore 

has done a deep and convincing job of diagnosing the ills of the IC, and 

has proposed a rich and promising cure. Th is, as Hilton points out, is an 

extended act of cognition. What lies between this book and Moore’s revolution, however, is the need to have others come to the same conclusion—

which, as Hilton points out, requires communication, not cognition.

Sixty years ago a small group of analysts—dubbed “Talmudists” for 

their pains—worked out a complex, sophisticated method of deriving actionable intelligence from the tightly controlled propaganda outlets of the USSR 

and Mao’s China. Th is let IC sinologists spot the fi rst signs of the Sino-Soviet 

split as early as April 1952, and by 1955 Khrushchev had been tagged as the 

likely winner in the struggle to consolidate power in the Kremlin aft er Stalin’s 

death. Th ose early indicators, however, remained scoff ed at and un-acted upon 

precisely because the methodology—which a colleague in the CIA compared 

to studying “invisible writing on slugs”6 —was too complex and too weird to 

5 Denis Hilton, “Causality vs. Explanation: Objective Relations vs. Subjective Interests,” Interdisciplines, Institute of Cognitive Sciences, University of Geneva, URL: <http://www.interdisciplines.

org/causality/papers/14>, accessed 1 November 2010.

6 Richard Shryock, “For An Eclectic Sovietology,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 8, no. 1 (Winter 1964).
xv

be easily explained to policymakers—who, in any case, already believed o

hypotheses, and had their own “facts.” 7

Th e challenge we face is the same as that which faced those Talm

ists. Moore has convinced himself, and he is highly likely to convince al

analysts who read his book, that sensemaking is indeed the intelligence r

lution we need. Th e challenge now is to communicate that to policymaker

that they too will be willing to join David Moore’s sensemaking revolutio

7 Harold P. Ford, “The CIA and Double Demonology: Calling the Sino-Soviet Split,” Stud

Intelligence, vol. 42, no. 5 (Winter 1988-1989).

xvii

COMMENTARY

Emily S. Patterson, PhD

Assistant Professor

College of Medicine

Th e Ohio State University

A colleague once said that he was dedicated to the vision of hav

decisionmaking be directly informed by evidence rather than the popu

ity of the latest fad or pet projects of powerful leaders. Th e context for 

comment was for deciding what innovations to implement in hundred

Intensive Care Units to reduce risk-adjusted patient mortality. Neverthe

I believe that this loft y goal could easily apply to United States policymak

In my opinion, it is an achievable goal for the vast majority of United St

policy to be directly informed by evidence that is systematically valida

collated, and synthesized by teams of professional intelligence analysts.

Th is book is a critical milestone in attaining the goal of ana

directly supporting evidence-based policymaking. Th is book’s primary c

tribution is to conduct sensemaking on the label sensemaking. Decade

relevant academic literatures have been synthesized into one framework 

illustrates how disparate research streams relate to each other and to 

framework. Until now, there has not been such an extensive eff ort to 

together related research on sensemaking from such diverse discipline

psychology, political science, philosophy, organizational science, busin

education, economics, design, human-computer interaction, natural

decisionmaking, and macrocognition.

Th e contributions of this book go beyond a literature review, h

ever, in that an action-oriented stance is taken toward capturing nug

of insight on how to improve aspects of analysis. Th e categories themse

are useful in putting some shape and structure to the amorphous value 

expertise brings to creating a solid analytic product in an uncertain wo

planning, foraging, marshaling, understanding, and communicating. Of 

ticular value is describing diff erent aspects of validation that are relevan

intelligence sensemaking, and distinguishing processes for predicting fu

events (foresight) from processes for describing past events and asses

their impacts (hindsight).
xviii

Another colleague once said that she looks at what is measured operationally to determine how people truly defi ne a concept. Chapter 8, Establishing Metrics of Rigor, is therefore critically important to any discussion 

of how to encourage improved sensemaking in the Intelligence Community. 

As David Moore notes, although we believe our rigor metric to be a promising fi rst step, much more needs to be done to ensure that all of the important 

aspects of rigorous analysis are captured. Th e application of the rigor metric 

to a face valid case study in this book is the fi rst such application in intelligence analysis to compare processes by diff erent analytic teams. Whether or 

not high rigor on all of these inter-related dimensions is possible to achieve 

under the working conditions for intelligence analysts today is an unresolved debate. Even if high rigor is not possible under extreme time pressure, 

data overload, and workload conditions, the measure has potential value in 

supporting negotiations for what aspects are most important to do well for 

a given task, as well as communicating the strengths and weaknesses of the 

process behind an analytic conclusion.
xix

COMMENTARY

Christian P. Westermann

Senior Analyst

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

U.S. Department of State

History will tell us if current intelligence reforms are evolutionar

revolutionary, but the Intelligence Community is responding to mand

change brought about by the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

vention Act (IRTPA).8 In particular, the analytic and collector commun

are adjusting to one of IRTPA’s pillars—improved information sharing

reforms unfold, the collector and analyst must adapt to new rules and 

analytic standards, and incorporate more methodologies, techniques, 

alternatives in their analysis, in collaboration with managers and tradec

cells in the national intelligence organizations. Th ese new structures 

guidelines present an intellectual challenge as well as a bureaucratic maze 

the collector and analyst struggling not only to “produce” intelligence 

timely fashion but also to improve their product. Th is is not easy for the in

ligence professional because time is not on their side. Th is is why impro

the way in which all analysts think is so important and why an understand

of sensemaking will help advance the profession beyond the “established 

lytic paradigm” for complex problems and create greater possibilities for 

application of imagination in the IC. Th e failure to properly assess Sad

Hussein’s WMD programs during the lead-up to Operation Iraqi Freedo

the preferred example of this failure to imagine alternatives. Th e corpo

solution to this problem is increased collaboration and information shar

David Moore is not in disagreement but has suggested that it must go bey

new methodologies or techniques—it must be done with a strong sens

rigor and individualism in one’s thinking.

David Moore has written for the Intelligence Community a rev

tionary epistemology. His novel construct for intelligence professionals is 

foundation for a philosophy of intelligence. He has started where he left 

in his work on Critical Th inking and Intelligence Analysis with a path forw

for analysts and how they can improve their capacity and move beyond 

8 United States Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 1

Congress, 2nd Session, 20 January 2004. Cited hereafter as U.S. Congress, IRTPA, 2004
xx

methods they learn as “good” tradecraft .9 Moore’s prescription is to take the 

disaggregation of data, commonly referred to as analysis, synthesize it, and 

then apply to it one’s interpretation and communication skills to make sense 

of the information. Sensemaking therefore is a theory of knowledge for the 

intelligence professional and also a practice to aid the diffi cult art of intelligence reasoning.

Current “total” intelligence reform, as described by Director of 

National Intelligence James Clapper in late 2010, is reform that is focused 

on “integration, the merging of collection and analysis—particularly at the 

ODNI level—analytic transformation, analytic integrity, acquisition reform, 

counterintelligence—and information sharing.”10 Th is involves a great deal 

of uncertainty for organizations and analysts, in light of the formation of 

new intelligence fusion centers reminiscent of Defense intelligence reform 

of the 1990s—which saw the rise of Joint Intelligence Centers—and presents a challenge to make sense of new security challenges in the post-9/11 

world. Th e time is therefore ripe for analysts to transform their thinking 

and tradecraft and Moore’s new paradigm off ers real improvements to their 

practice of intelligence. His attention to revolutionary change in the art of 

intelligence thinking grows from his recognition that organizational reform 

has been ongoing for decades and despite those changes attendant failures 

have occurred and continue to occur. Th erefore the only hope for achieving positive reform rests with changing the practice of intelligence whereby 

the individual collector and analyst, working together, and accepting the 

responsibility to think critically but also independently and across the Community, make sense of the 21st century national security environment.

 9 David T. Moore, Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: NDIC Press, 

2007). Cited hereafter as Moore, Critical Thinking.

10 James Clapper, “Remarks and Q & A by Director of National Intelligence Mr. James 

Clapper,” Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) — The State of Domestic Intelligence Reform, 6 October 2010, URL: <http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20101006_speech_clapper.pdf>, accessed 

29 October 2010.
xxi

COMMENTARY

Phil Williams, PhD

Director, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies

Wesley W. Posvar Chair of International Security

Graduate School of Public and International Aff airs

University of Pittsburgh

Moore’s Law for Intelligence

Any book that discusses amongst other things, red brains and 

brains, kayaking, information foraging, fl ashlights as blindfolds, space-t

envelopes, and intellectual audit trails, is out of the ordinary. When you th

in the contention by the author that intelligence as currently practiced is 

to medicine in the 14th Century you have a book that will raise hackles, bl

pressure, and voices. David Moore’s provocative and stimulating analys

critical thinking and sensemaking for intelligence does all of the above.

Th is is not an easy read. But the overall thesis is straightforward 

compelling: the environment within which the U.S. intelligence commu

now fi nds itself is not only highly complex but also full of wicked problem

provide the kind of intelligence that is useful, relevant, and helpful to po

makers who have to anticipate and respond to these problems and challen

Moore argues that the traditional paradigm developed largely by Sherm

Kent has to be superseded by a new paradigm based largely on ideas init

outlined by Willmoore Kendall, a contemporary critic of Kent. Th e o

nal Moore’s Law11 was narrowly technical; David Moore in contrast ar

that a complex environment full of mysteries, not puzzles, requires hol

thinking (as opposed to simply disaggregation of problems), mindfulnes

opposed to mindlessness which he also elucidates), and a dynamic will

ness to change paradigms, shift perspectives, and abandon strongly held 

ceptions. Th e book also develops the notion of sensemaking rigor and sh

how metrics of rigor can be applied to several studies examining the rise 

impact of non-state actors.

David Moore’s analysis is important and deserves to be widely rea

the intelligence community and in the academic world. Yet, the volume

11 Gordon E. Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,” Electro

vol. 38, no. 8 (19 April 1965), URL: <ftp://download.intel.com/museum/Moores_Law/Art

Press_Releases/Gordon_Moore_1965_Article.pdf>, accessed 7 November 2010.
xxii

he would be the fi rst to acknowledge—is intended as an early word on sensemaking and intelligence, rather than the last word. Indeed, it would have 

been helpful, for example, if David Moore had considered more explicitly the 

argument by David Snowden that making sense of a complex environment 

requires probing the environment. Further thought about this suggests that 

law enforcement is particularly good at this form of knowledge elicitation and 

sensemaking: sting operations, controlled deliveries, infi ltration of criminal 

organizations, are all probing mechanisms that can contribute signifi cantly 

to an increased level of understanding and, concomitantly, to an enhanced 

capacity for eff ective action. For many intelligence professionals, especially 

those who have had a dismissive view of law enforcement, the idea that law 

enforcement approaches to sensemaking might be ahead of those in the intelligence community, is likely to be as uncomfortable as most of the arguments 

in David Moore’s book. Certainly Moore’s volume is designed to shake and 

to stir. It is a manifesto for an intellectual revolution in the approach to intelligence and, as such, is likely to be both acclaimed and reviled. One suspects 

that the author will measure his own success by the depth of opposition as 

well as the levels of support for the revolution he is proposing.
xxiii

PREFACE

On Being Mindful

What Is Mindlessness?

We are surrounded by errors and they are ours. Intelligence offi cia

the national level repeatedly use the same excuses for professional errors 

for the systemic failures that follow. Despite directives to “fi x” the structu

and most recently the means, by which intelligence is created, we insiste

fail at our obligation to make early sense of vital threats and opportuni

What is our problem?

We may begin by examining the concept of mindlessness. Ellen Lan

summarizing her pioneering social psychology research, fi nds mindless

to arise from an over-reliance on “categories and distinctions created in 

past.”12 She holds that such categories “take on a life of their own.”13 See

this context, the failure to recognize in foresight that an American or a N

rian man could be a member of Al Qaeda arises from a rigid deductive 

egorization of who is a member of Al Qaeda and is a case of mindlessnes

Langer also sees mindlessness arising from “automatic behav

Here, people rely on automatic responses as the basis for their behavio

when one writes “a check in January with the previous year’s date.”14 By ex

sion, intelligence professionals, in assessing sources, may develop a hab

discounting human intelligence sources because some are untrustworthy

a result, they may miss novel insights because they use certain sources to 

exclusion of others.

Finally, mindlessness can result from a failure to take into acco

alternative information that transcends our comfortable worldview. La

observes that “[highly] specifi c instructions...encourage mindlessness” bec

they defi ne what is acceptable and limit the viability of alternative signals 

could lead to more accurate understanding of a phenomenon.15 During 

summer of 1962, CIA and DIA intelligence professionals at the Refu

12 Ellen J. Langer, Mindfulness (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1989), 11. Cited here

as Langer, Mindfulness.

13 Langer, Mindfulness, 11.

14 Langer, Mindfulness, 12.

15 Langer, Mindfulness, 17-18.
xxiv

Processing Center (RPC) in Miami discounted the validity of refugee reports of 

nuclear missiles on the island because some refugees also went beyond the 

pale by concocting “farfetched tales of African troops with rings in their noses, 

lurking Mongolians, and even Chinese troops.”16 Th ere were in fact 100 nucleartipped tactical missiles deployed on the island months before the arrival of the 

more infamous strategic missiles.17 A rigid notion of what constituted a nuclear 

missile, usually conceived as an off ensive weapon, appears to have contributed 

to the case offi cers’ mindless disregard of the witnesses.

Not only intelligence practitioners, but also those with whom they 

communicate their understandings, remain subject to the dangers of mindlessness. With respect to intelligence consumers, two faculty members at the 

International Institute of Management Development (IMD), corporate strategy expert Cyril Bouquet and corporate leadership and organization expert 

Ben Bryant, suggest that “decision makers oft en suff er from poor attention 

management, being obsessed with the wrong types of signals and ignoring 

possibilities that could signifi cantly improve the fate of their undertakings.”18

Th ey characterize these behaviors as fi xation and relaxation. People who 

fi xate “become so preoccupied with a few central signals that they largely 

ignore things at the periphery.”19 A deadly example of fi xation occurred in 

1977, when the KLM 747 fl ight crew on Tenerife failed to avoid a collision 

with a Pan Am 747: “they didn’t give suffi cient attention to the presumably 

very important communications coming in from air traffi c controllers.”20

Naval aviators engaged in night landings on aircraft carriers also fi xate and 

this leads to pilots’ ignoring “the obvious and doing the inexplicable” (and 

16 James H. Hansen, “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Studies in Intelligence, 

46, no. 1 (2002), 56. The author referred to this incident in his book on critical thinking and 

intelligence. See Moore, Critical Thinking, 20.

17 Raymond L. Garthoff, “US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in James G. Blight 

and David A. Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London, UK: Frank Cass, 

1998), 22.

18 Cyril Bouquet and Ben Bryant, “The Crisis Is Here To Stay. Do You Have The Key To 

Coping?” Forbes, 21 April 2009, Online Edition, URL: <http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/21/

stress-coping-mindfulness-leadership-managing-fixation.html>, accessed 13 January 2010. 

Cited hereafter as Bouquet and Bryant, “Key to Coping.” IMD is not well known within the Intelligence Community. Its Executive Education program has been rated the number two program 

worldwide by the Financial Times for the past three years; The Economist rates its MBA Program 

as the second best in the world. See Financial Times, “Executive Education—open—2009, URL: 

<http://rankings.ft.com/businessschoolrankings/executive-education—open>, accessed 15 

January 2010; and The Economist, “Which MBA? 2009 Full-time MBA Ranking,” URL: <http://

www.economist.com/business-education/whichmba/>, accessed 15 January 2010.

19 Bouquet and Bryant, “Key to Coping.”

20 Bouquet and Bryant, “Key to Coping.” The accident occurred when KLM 747 collided with the Pan Am 747 as the former took off over the latter. In the crash 583 passengers and crew were killed although miraculously, 65 passengers and crew on the Pan Am 

flight survived.
xxv

oft en dying).21 Such fi xations are goal-oriented—taking off in the for

example and landing in the second. Th e pilots know intellectually wha

do but their fi xation on an emotional goal mis-focuses them: “knowing 

no match for emotion.”22 While they are fi xated, they are not truly aw

Nor are they living in the moment; instead, they are inadvisably envis

ing themselves already in the air or on the deck and expecting the resul

emotional sense of relief.

Bouquet and Bryant identify relaxation as when, aft er a “susta

period of high concentration,” people become unfocused on the task at h

and look to the ultimate goal.23 A case in point involves the deaths of t

climbers on Oregon’s Mount Hood in 2002: they were distracted from 

matter at hand—that of completing a diffi cult descent; they took shortcut

Both fi xation and relaxation contribute to intelligence failures. 

intelligence practitioners, focusing on the wrong factors and failing to 

ognize the signifi cance of novel indicators are examples of fi xation that 

have been at work in the December 2009 failure to anticipate the attem

bombing of Northwest Airlines fl ight 253 over Detroit. Sometimes ascr

to intelligence professionals’ and national consumers’ falling prey to “creep

normalcy,” relaxation was also a contributor to Israel’s failure to anticipate 

attacks by Egypt and Syria in 1973.

In sum, mindlessness too oft en guides the assessment of aff air

too many domains, leading to errors, failures, and catastrophes. Mind

ness is deemed unacceptable within the larger American society only w

the resulting errors do lead to accidents and disasters. However, mindless

is completely unacceptable within the domain of intelligence. One can n

be certain in foresight whether errors will occur, so intelligence professio

must seek to anticipate, recognize and avoid them at all costs.

Attaining Mindfulness

Th e antithesis of mindlessness is mindfulness.25 For Langer, a m

ful state corresponds with: “(1) [aptitude for the] creation of new catego

21 Laurence Gonzales, Deep Survival: Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why (New York, NY: W.W

ton, 2003), 26. Cited hereafter as Gonzales, Deep Survival.

22 Gonzales, Deep Survival, 35.

23 Bouquet and Bryant, “Key to Coping.”

24 Gonzales, Deep Survival, 97-123.

25 One of the origins of the concept of mindfulness lies in the work of the 19th-ce

U.S. philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, whose notion of “thirdness” relates to present 

notations of “mindfulness” by recognizing thirdness as an observer’s self-referenced conte

an interpretation. See: Charles Sanders Peirce, “Lowell Lectures (1903),” Collected Pap

Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume 1, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. (Cambridge

Harvard University Press, 1958), para 331-332.
xxvi

(2) openness to new information; and (3) awareness of more than one 

perspective.”26 For example, as an intelligence professional considers who 

might be a member of Al Qaeda, a mindful attitude would involve constant 

reassessment and categorization of who might hold such membership—

leaving the path open to new information for making sense of the organization and its membership. Th us, as we apply the idea that “[a] steer is a steak to 

a rancher, a sacred object to a Hindu, and a collection of genes and proteins 

to a molecular biologist,”27 the notion of a Nigerian male or even a blonde 

woman from Pennsylvania as a possible Al Qaeda affi liate would emerge 

from a mindful perspective.

Leadership scholar Deepak Sethi sees mindfulness as a “form of meditation” teaching “three simple-on-the-surface yet revolutionary skills: Focus, 

Awareness, and Living in the Moment.”28 Th is defi nition descends from millennia of Buddhist tradition. He argues that rather than an esoteric method it 

is “very practical, action oriented, and transformational.” Sethi believes that 

one practical way to bring about mindfulness is through the use of daily meditation, fi rst using one’s breathing as a focus, and then using “specifi c daily 

activities such as meetings with another colleague.” However, the “real challenge [of employing mindfulness] is to take it from the meditation chair to the 

offi ce chair and the real world.”29 Intelligence journeymen face this dilemma 

from a diff erent perspective. Th ey confront the real world and are challenged 

to contemplate their own thought processes as they engage it.

Australian expert on argumentation Tim Van Gelder distinguishes 

mindfulness from critical thinking (which he calls “metacognition”): “Metacognition is concerned with what you are thinking about. Mindfulness is concerned with how you think as you go about what you are doing.” 30 While Van 

Gelder accepts Ellen Langer’s defi nition, he argues that metacognition and 

mindfulness can bear an inverse relationship to one another. As an individual 

masters one, the need for the other diminishes. To illustrate this point, he 

asserts that “[in metacognitive terms, a novice] driver needs to pay lots of 

attention to even the most mundane aspects of driving, such as where the 

gearshift is. Th e experienced [mindful] driver pays very little attention to 

26 Langer, Mindfulness, 62.

27 Langer, Mindfulness, 69.

28 Deepak Sethi, “Mindful Leadership,” Leader to Leader, no. 51 (Winter 2009), 7. Cited 

hereafter as Sethi, “Mindful Leadership.”

29 Sethi, “Mindful Leadership,” 10.

30 Tim Van Gelder, “Mindfulness Versus Metacognition, and Critical Thinking,” [Weblog 

Entry] Bringing Visual Clarity to Complex Issues, 27 May 2009, URL: <http://timvangelder.

com/2009/05/27/mindfulness-versus-metacognition-and-critical-thinking/>, accessed 13 January 2010. Emphasis in original. Cited hereafter as Van Gelder, “Mindfulness.”
xxvii

driving, and can carry on a lively conversation instead.” 31 Van Gelder’s v

point—which derives from his defi nition of critical thinking—holds a ser

implication for the intelligence professional: if one learns to be mindful, an

good at it, the risk of a lapse in critical thinking will have increased.

For example, empirical studies of the level of distraction am

drivers who are using cell phones reveal an associated, diminished dr

capacity.32 Non-distracted drivers are receiving information—without c

scious awareness—from: traffi c changes ahead, behind, and along side; v

ous mirrors in and on the car; and weather and light conditions. All t

inputs factor into their decisions on how to proceed. Th ey are intuiti

“in the moment,” that is, mindful of what they are doing and what is g

on around them. Th ey are, as Sethi notes, focused, aware, and living in 

moment. But if, as experienced drivers, they are at ease in carrying on a 

phone conversation, are they not more accident-prone as a result of ope

ing with a reduced capability or likelihood to be thinking critically?

Van Gelder notes that novice drivers likely monitor their think

and actions closely—at least intermittently.33 Th e amount of metacogn

monitoring that occurs as they become more skilled probably dimini

under normal circumstances. However, it is the author’s experience, dr

from offi ce and classroom observation, that people who are skilled cri

thinkers still tend to be able to question what is occurring around them e

as they are aware of how they are thinking about it. Th ey are thinking c

cally, even if it is not obvious that they are doing so.

Drivers who employ critical thinking skills to ensure they rem

mindful of the appropriate stimuli continually make sense of the environm

in which they fi nd themselves. Being metacognitively aware of their li

diminished capacity to drive safely while engaging in cell phone conve

tions (as well as texting), they are likely to engage in these dangerous acts 

oft en than one who is mindlessly fi xated on the cell phone conversation 

not mindfully aware of the environment inside and outside their vehicles

use Gelder’s defi nitions, they are thinking about what to do as well as ho

do it; critical thinking and mindful thinking inform each other.

Ben Bryant and IMD research associate Jeanny Wildi write 

mindfulness “involves the ability to accurately recognize where one is in o

31 Van Gelder, “Mindfulness.”

32 For more information on diminished driver capacity see Transportation Research B

of the National Academies, “Selected References on Distracted Driving: 2005-2009,” 

<http://pubsindex.trb.org/DOCs/Publications from TRIS on Distracted Driving.pdf>, acce

9 December 2009.

33 Van Gelder, “Mindfulness.”
xxviii

emotional landscape and allows...understanding, empathy, and capacity for 

accurate analysis and problem-solving.” 34 Th ey identify a process of detaching, noticing, and developing “here and now awareness.” 35 Detachment, for 

example, allows a viewer to remember that a movie is really merely a “beam of 

light passing through a piece of moving celluloid projecting onto a screen with 

some sound and music that are designed to generate particular emotions.”36

In intelligence work, detachment involves stepping back from the full 

sensual experience of an issue to consider the actors involved, their motives, 

the larger context. Critical thinking as it is taught in the Intelligence Community attempts to make sense of the overall purpose or goal of a phenomenon, 

the points of view and assumptions of the actors involved, the implications of 

their acting in certain fashions, and other aspects of the larger context surrounding the issue.37 Questioning the available evidence and the inferences 

arising from it brings further detachment from the issue.

Noticing involves remaining open to both internal and external stimuli. Ultimately, situational information is conveyed from external sources 

through sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste. People can think consciously 

about these but they tend to process them using more autonomic brain structures, oft en without noticing they are doing so. Th e unease one feels about 

getting into a taxi or onto an elevator in an unfamiliar setting are examples of 

such input. In intelligence work this might be represented as a hunch about 

what an adversary will do. As Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein note, in certain environments—where one can learn the cues—these intuitions may be 

quite accurate.38 However, in domains where one has not developed expertise, such intuitions can be inaccurate.

39 Th e challenge is determining which 

of these situations one is in. Th is brings us back to the imperative of applying 

mindful detachment from the situation.

34 Ben Bryant and Jeanny Wildi, “Mindfulness,” Perspectives for Managers, no. 162 

(September 2008), 1, URL: <http://www.imd.ch/research/publications/upload/PFM162_

LR_Bryant_Wildi.pdf>, accessed 14 January 2010. Cited hereafter as Bryant and Wildi, 

“Mindfulness.”

35 Bryant and Wildi, “Mindfulness,” 2-3.

36 Bryant and Wildi, “Mindfulness,” 3.

37 These are some of the “Elements of Thought” developed by Linda Elder, Richard Paul, 

and Gerald Nosich of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. This author operationalized the 

Foundation’s critical thinking paradigm for intelligence work. See Moore, Critical Thinking, 8-9; 

and Gerald M. Nosich, Learning to Think Things Through: A Guide to Critical Thinking Across the 

Curriculum, 3rd edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall, 2009), 50-67. Cited 

hereafter as Nosich, Learning to Think Things Through.

38 Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein, “Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree,” American Psychologist, vol. 64, no. 6 (September 2009), 520. Cited hereafter as Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise.”

39 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 521-522.
xxix

Critical thinking assists noticing as well. Bryant and Wildi obs

that because people tend to make immediate sense of stimuli, “We all too o

contaminate our perceptions with unexamined assumptions we have alre

internalized.”40 In other words, from the time when we have already dec

what something means, everything we notice tends to confi rm that inter

tation. However, by challenging critically our assumptions and choices of 

dence (and their interpretations) and asking about alternative explanati

we may bring our noticing back to a state where it “contributes to mindful

by keeping us open to our experiences of the external.”41

Bryant and Wildi consider “here and now awareness” to involve 

ing attention to immediate experience—as it happens. Clausewitz obse

this phenomenon when he distinguishes between a commander’s plan for 

and the friction of war.42 Th e former must be adapted in light of the la

Knowing how to do this, and when, requires the situational awareness fo

in the here and now. As has been noted, critical thinking allows questionin

both what one is doing and how one is doing it. Here again, one can challe

whether one is focused in the present or dwelling in the past or imagini

future. One can ask whether one is relaxed or fi xated on a goal; we can 

refl ect on whether we are acting mindlessly or mindfully. Th e key is rem

ing vigilant, as Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton note, as “[mind

ness] is the result of a never-ending eff ort to challenge expectations an

consider alternative possibilities.”43

Such mindful vigilance can be a lifesaver, as Foreign Policy col

nist and blogger Th omas Ricks notes about its absence among troops s

ing in Afghanistan, where Marines wearing iPods while on patrol can (

apparently do) fail to notice changes in the environment they have previo

patrolled, and get hit by improvised explosive devices.44 If they were m

ful, they could have noticed that a hole in the road when they went ou

patrol has been fi lled in before their return. Instead, the “turret gunner 

40 Bryant and Wildi, “Mindfulness,” 3.

41 Bryant and Wildi, “Mindfulness,” 3.

42 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, COL James J. Graham, trans. (London, UK: Keegan 

Trench, Truebner & Co., Ltd.: 1908), 80.

43 Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton, “Making Sense of Transnational Threats,” 

man Kent Center Occasional Papers, vol. 3, no. 1 (October 2004), 17, URL: <https://www

gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/pdf/OPV3No1.pdf>, accessed 8 November 2

Cited hereafter as Fishbein and Treverton, “Making Sense.”

44 Thomas E. Ricks, “A Marine’s Afghan AAR (XIV): Get Rid of the iPods on Patrol,” 

Log, Foreign Policy. URL: <http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/20/a_marin

afghan_aar_xiv_get_rid_of_ the_ipods_on_patrol>, accessed 26 January 2009. Ricks q

a Marine Corps source, referred to in the web log as “CWO2/Gunner Keith Marine.” Cited 

after as Ricks, “Get Rid of the iPods.” iPod is a registered trademark of Apple Computer.
xxx

watching a movie on an iPod...[and] the back seater [is] listening to music on 

his [iPod].”45 Not only are they not mindful, but no one is paying attention. 

According to Rick’s Marine informant, ensuing and repeated iPod-wearinginduced mindlessness led to the unit’s losing “15 out of 20 vehicles in about a 

month.”46 Clearly, the cost of not being mindful is high. However, becoming 

mindful is not diffi cult; that cost is relatively low.

Developing mindfulness is not—as Bouquet and Bryant, as well as 

Sethi, observe—an arcane spiritual practice. Th e process certainly involves 

self-refl ection—meditation to some—but in fact self-refl ection has become 

a central facet of professional practice in “real-world” security and defense 

planning.47 However, mindfulness in operations or in intelligence is neither 

a panacea nor a formula: Bouquet and Wildi observe that “executives need to 

meditate in their own way, fi nd ways to step back and refl ect on their thoughts, 

actions, and motivations, and decide which ones are really supportive of 

their strategic agendas.”48 One of the benefi ts of such meditation, according 

to recent experimental fi ndings, is that perceptual sensitivity and vigilance 

improve in situations requiring sustained visual attention.49 While perceptual sensitivity and increased vigilance could also be attained, as in the case 

cited by Ricks, by simply leaving the iPods turned off and actually conducting 

reconnaissance and surveillance of one’s surroundings, the problem of sustained-attention failure remains. Simply put, mindfulness declines over time. 

However, as MacLean et alia have demonstrated, sustained-attention failure 

can be reduced through formal meditation training.50 In this case, formal 

45 Ricks, “Get Rid of the iPods.”

46 Ricks, “Get Rid of the iPods.”

47 For an example of a “how-to” guide to reflective practice, see Faculty of the School for 

Advanced Military Studies, The Art of Design, vol. 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010). Available at 

URL: <http://www.cgsc.edu/events/sams/ArtofDesign_v2.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2010. This 

student text, which aims to prepare senior military officials for leadership roles in overseas 

operations, employs “reflective practice [to construct] a cognitive framework for how to reason through complexity.” The doctrinal publication develops and applies reflective thinking 

ideas originated by Donald Schön. See URL: <http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-schon.htm>, 

accessed 20 May 2010.

48 Bouquet and Bryant, “Key to Coping.”

49 Katherine A. MacLean and others, “Intensive Meditation Training Improves Perceptual 

Discrimination and Sustained Attention,” Psychological Science, vol. 21, no. 6 (2010), 829. 

Cited hereafter as MacLean et al., “Intensive Meditation.” See also, John Cloud, “Losing Focus? 

Studies Say Meditation May Help,” Time, online edition, 6 August 2010, URL: <http://www.

time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2008914,00.html>, accessed, 11 August 2010. Cited 

hereafter as Cloud, “Meditation.”

50 MacLean et al., “Intensive Meditation,” 829.
xxxi

meditation practices appear to sustain longer-term mindfulness—someth

the U.S. Army hopes will enhance the capabilities of its soldiers.51

While the U.S. Military and the Intelligence Community (like b

ness enterprises) can provide environments conducive to developing m

fulness, Bouquet and Bryant remind us that developing mindfulness is 

responsibility of individuals, not companies.”52 Th e simple expedien

not engaging in mindfulness-reducing activities is one means of enhan

mindfulness; there are many others.53 Critical thinking provides one 

refl ective or metacognitive means to ascertain what surrounding phen

ena are or are not taken into account.54 Such mindfulness in turn supp

the larger objective of intelligence sensemaking, the subject of this b

Th e author is aware of the confounding problem that intelligence may n

to give attention to the entire domain of human behavior because e

sphere of human practice and knowledge can be of interest and of use in 

process of sensemaking. To limit this challenge, this book focuses on th

areas that in the author’s observation and experience appear most germ

to the successful practice of national intelligence. Th e author intends for 

book to generate benefi cial discussion and further consideration of exa

what it means to engage in intelligence sensemaking and how one can 

about it eff ectively.

51 Bonnie Rochman, “Samurai Mind Training for Modern American Warriors,” 

online edition, 6 September 2009, URL: <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8

1920753,00.html>, accessed 4 August 2010.

52 Bouquet and Bryant, “Key to Coping.”

53 Cloud, “Meditation.”

54 “Metacognitive” as used here refers to a process of critically monitoring one’s reas

about an issue while one is engaged in that reasoning or critical thinking. This makes ex

the process of reasoning. However, the term “metacognitive” refers to much more as w

developed further in the paper that follows.

xxxiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Th e author’s fi rst notes about what 21st Century intelligence wo

look like as well as how it might be accomplished were craft ed at a 2001 c

ference on the future of intelligence in Italy. Th e intervening years brou

work on what it takes to be a successful intelligence professional and 

critical thinking could aid the consideration of strategic issues and the 

ation of intelligence knowledge for decisionmakers. Th ese steps, it tur

out, led to a larger vision of what the practice of intelligence could be: a 

cess of sensemaking.

Few projects are created without substantial assistance from oth

Th is book is no exception. Elizabeth Moore off ered valuable ideas 

challenged my thinking. She also once again put up with a distracted husb

who worked (very) late into the night and on the weekends. Colleagues 

peers read and commented on various draft s, criticizing and off ering valu

suggestions that sent the author in new directions. Among them are Ja

Bruce, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC); Stu C

Palo Alto Research Center; Steven Carey, NDIC; Bruce Chew, Mon

Group; Jeff rey Cooper, SAIC; Linda Elder, Enoch Hale, Gerald Nos

and Richard Paul, Foundation for Critical Th inking; Norman End

University of Maryland; Warren Fishbein, Department of State; Ro

Heibel, Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies (MCIIS); N

Hendrickson, James Madison University; Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Cen

Intelligence Agency (retired); Robert Horn, Stanford University; Fra

J. Hughes, NDIC; Gary Klein, Klein Associates; Lisa Krizan, Nati

Security Agency (NSA); Martin Krizan, NSA; Mark Lowenthal, presi

of the Intelligence and Security Academy, LLC; Brandon S. Minn

IARPA (Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity); Esther Neck

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; William Nolte, University 

Maryland; Anthony Olcott, Georgetown University; Emily S. Patter

Ohio State University; Randy Pherson, Pherson Associates; Peter Pir

Palo Alto Research Center; Timothy Smith, Offi ce of Naval Intellige

David Snowden, Cognitive Edge; Mark Stefi k, Palo Alto Research Cen

Kenneth Stringer, Booze Allen Hamilton; Cathryn Th urston, NDIC Pr

Gregory Treverton, RAND; Kristan J. Wheaton, MCIIS; Phil Willia

University of Pittsburgh; Chris Westermann, Department of State; D

Woods, Ohio State University; and Daniel Zelik, Ohio State University
xxxiv

Th e participants in a number of workshops sponsored by IARPA, 

the Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), NSA, and the 

ODNI Global Futures Forum also provided input and ideas. Th e staff of the 

Foreign Denial and Deception Committee’s denial and deception program 

at the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) invited the author to 

defend an early version of the text as part of an advanced studies program.

Contributors Robert Hoff man (Chapter 5) and Elizabeth Moore, 

William Reynolds, and Marta Weber (Chapter 7) graciously agreed to share 

their ideas in collaborative eff orts to bring those chapters about. Without 

their assistance those two chapters would have been far less rich. Colleagues 

of Dr. Reynolds as well as Kristan Wheaton and his students in the MCIIS 

(acknowledged separately in Chapter 7) provided much of the “heavy lift ing” 

that made the conclusions derived possible.

Russell Swenson, under contract to the NDIC’s Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, once again provided the essential input of a good 

editor. His reviews tightened arguments and focused what follows. He also 

provided a wealth of new ideas that sent the author off in new directions 

and enriched the book signifi cantly. William Spracher once more provided 

the skills of a technical editor. Cathryn Th urston, the Director of the NDIC 

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research and NDIC Press editor, supported 

the creation of this project as part of her advocacy that intelligence needs to 

be recast for this century.

While the author was privileged to receive the assistance of others, 

this remains his work and any errors are his. Th e author may be reached via 

electronic mail at david.t.moore@ugov.gov.
xxxv

Defi nitions for Making Sense of Sensemaking

Intelligence is a “specialized form of knowledge...[that] informs lead

ers, uniquely aiding their judgment and decision-making.” It is a type o

knowledge created through organized activity that adds unique value 

to the policy- or decisionmaker’s deliberations. In the U.S. context, i

makes sense of phenomena of interest to national leaders, warfi ght

ers, and those that directly and indirectly support them. Intelligence 

makes sense of phenomena related to the social behaviors of others. I

refl ects interest in what anyone will do to, and with, others that could 

aff ect the national interests of the United States as well as the pros

perity and security of its citizens. Intelligence maintains an interes

in external phenomena, such as epidemic or pandemic diseases, tha

impact U.S. national interests. In contrast to some popular portray

als, it really is not voyeuristic: what others do privately and alone i

generally of little interest or value except as it aff ects how they relate 

to, and behave toward others. In other words, when private behavior

reveal either vulnerabilities or preferences, they may become of value 

to intelligence practitioners.

Sources: David T. Moore, Critical Th inking and Intelligence Analy

sis, Occasional Paper Number Fourteen (Washington, DC: Nationa

Defense Intelligence College, 2006), 2. Cited hereaft er as Moore

Critical Th inking. Intelligence also refers to activity and organiza

tion: See Kent, Strategic Intelligence.

Sensemaking as it is used here refers to “a set of philosophica

assumptions, substantive propositions, methodological framings

and methods.” As Mark Stefi k notes (referring to work done with col

leagues Stuart Card and Peter Pirolli), it “is how we gain a necessary 

understanding of relevant parts of our world. Everyone does it.” Sen

semaking goes beyond analysis, a disaggregative process, and also 

beyond synthesis, which meaningfully integrates factors relevant to 

an issue. It includes an interpretation of the results of that analysi

and synthesis. It is sometimes referred to as an approach to creat

ing situational awareness “in situations of uncertainty.” Gary Klein

Brian Moon, and Robert Hoff man consider the elements of sense

making and conclude that it “is a motivated, continuous eff ort to 

understand connections (which can be among people, places, and 

events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act eff ectively.
xxxvi

Th ese authors conclude that “the phenomena of sensemaking remain 

ripe for further empirical investigation and [warn] that the common 

view of sensemaking might suff er from the tendency toward reductive explanation.” By reductive explanation Klein, Moon, and Hoff -

man refer to a tendency to overly simplify explanations — to “reduce” 

complex phenomena to simplistic models facilitating an apparently 

needed but shallow understanding.

Sources: Brenda Dervin, “Sense-Making Methodology Site”, URL: 

<http://communication.sbs.ohio-state.edu/sense-making/>, accessed 

12 September 2007; Mark Stefi k, “Th e New Sensemakers: Th e Next 

Th ing Beyond Search Is Sensemaking,” Innovation Pipeline (15 October 

2004), URL: <http://www.parc.com/research/publications/fi les/5367.

pdf>, accessed 11 March 2009; Dennis K. Leedom, Final Report: Sensemaking Symposium, 23-25 October 2001, Command and Control 

Research Program Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. Gary Klein, 

Brian Moon, and Robert R. Hoff man, “Making Sense of Sensemaking 1: Alternative Perspectives,” IEEE Intelligent Systems vol. 21, no. 4 

(July/August 2006), 71, 72. Cited hereaft er as Klein, Moon, and Hoff -

man, “Making Sense of Sensemaking 1.” Paul J. Feltovich, Robert R. 

Hoff man, Axel Roesler, and David Woods, “Keeping It Too Simple: 

How the Reductive Tendency Aff ects Cognitive Engineering,” IEEE 

Intelligent Systems vol. 19, no. 3 (May/June 2004).

Intelligence sensemaking encompasses the processes by which specialized knowledge about ambiguous, complex, and uncertain issues 

is created. Th is knowledge is generated by professionals who in this 

context become known as Intelligence Sensemakers.

Th ese terms are used as defi ned here throughout this book.
1

Sensemaking: A Structure for an 

Intelligence Revolution55

David T. Moore

Knowledge welcomes challenges.

— Peter Kosso

Venture boldly into nonsense. Nonsense is nonsense only 

when we have not yet found that point of view from which 

it makes sense.

— Gary Zukav

CHAPTER 1 

Introduction

Where We Are

How people notice and make sense of phenomena are core issue

assessing intelligence successes and failures. Members of the U.S. Intellige

Community (IC) became adept at responding to certain sets of phenom

and “analyzing” their signifi cance (not always correctly) during the C

War. Th e paradigm was one of “hard, formalized and centralized proce

involving planned searches, scrupulously sticking with a cycle of gather

analyzing, estimating and disseminating supposed enriched information

Th e paradigm did not stop within the IC, either. As Pierre Baumard no

it was also imported, unchanged, by corporations.57 However, the ra

55 The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent those o

National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, or the Office of the Direct

National Intelligence.

56 Philippe Baumard, “From Noticing to Making Sense: Using Intelligence to Develop S

egy,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring, 1994

Cited hereafter as Baumard, “From Noticing to Making Sense.”

57 Baumard, “From Noticing to Making Sense,” 30.
2

of phenomena noticed by intelligence professionals has broadened from a 

focus on largely static issues to encompass highly dynamic topics over the 

two decades since the end of the Cold War. Intelligence professionals are 

challenged to stay abreast. A growing professional literature by intelligence 

practitioners discusses these trends and their implications for advising and 

warning policymakers.58

Th e literature by practitioners embodies a trust that national intelligence producers can overcome the “inherent” enemies of intelligence to 

prevent strategic intelligence failure.59 Th e disparity between this approach 

and accepting the inevitability of intelligence failure has grown sharp enough 

to warrant the identifi cation of separate camps or schools of “skeptics” and 

“meliorists.” 60 As a leading skeptic, Richard Betts charitably plants the hopeful note that in ambiguous situations, “the intelligence offi cer may perform 

most usefully by not off ering the answer sought by authorities but by forcing 

questions on them, acting as a Socratic agnostic.” 61 However, he completes 

this thought by declaring, fatalistically, that most leaders will neither appreciate nor accept this approach.

Robert Jervis resurrects a colorful quote from former President Lyndon Johnson, who epitomized the skeptical policymaker:

Let me tell you about these intelligence guys. When I was growing up in Texas we had a cow named Bessie. I’d go out early and 

milk her. I’d get her in the stanchion, seat myself and squeeze out 

a pail of fresh milk. One day I’d worked hard and gotten a full 

pail of milk, but I wasn’t paying attention, and old Bessie swung 

her s[..]t-smeared tail through the bucket of milk. Now, you know 

58 The author previously explored this topic in David T. Moore, Creating Intelligence: Evidence and Inference in the Analysis Process, MSSI Thesis chaired by Francis J. Hughes (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, July 2002) and David T. Moore, Critical Thinking 

and Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Paper Number Fourteen (Washington, DC: National 

Defense Intelligence College, 2006). Earlier work completed with coauthor Lisa Krizan also 

included such an examination. See, for example David T. Moore and Lisa Krizan, “Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the National Security Agency,” in Russell G. Swenson, 

ed., Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices (Washington, DC: Joint 

Intelligence Military College, 2003), 95-132. Other recent work includes the writings of a 

number of Intelligence Community practitioners collected by Roger Z. George and James B. 

Bruce in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).

59 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National 

Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Cited hereafter as Betts, Enemies of 

Intelligence.

60 Tamas Meszerics and Levente Littvay, “Pseudo-Wisdom and Intelligence Failures, 

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence vol. 23, no. 1 (December 2009), 

134, 135.

61 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 51.
3

that’s what these intelligence guys do. You work hard and get a 

good program or policy going, and they swing a s[..]t-smeared tail 

through it.62

Jervis asserts that policymakers and decisionmakers “need confi dence 

political support, and honest intelligence unfortunately oft en dimini

rather than increases these goods by pointing to ambiguities, uncertain

and the costs and risks of policies.”63 Th e antagonism is exacerbated w

policy is revealed to be fl awed and to have ignored intelligence knowle

For example, in the case of the Bush administration’s handling of the 

War, intelligence challenges to policy were seen as “being disloyal and 

thering its own agenda.”64 Jervis adds that the Bush administration is only 

most recent one to exhibit such behavior. He fi nds that the administrat

of Presidents Clinton, Johnson, Kennedy, and Eisenhower also browbeat 

ignored intelligence.65

Betts, Jervis, and other skeptics believe that potential impr

ments to intelligence processes are limited. Jervis’ article on intellige

and policy relations, while it correctly notes the tensions arising from 

diff ering roles of intelligence and policy, over-generalizes the homogen

of the policy community. It is the author’s experience that outside of 

highest levels, there are many levels of policymaking that both encou

and welcome the contributions of intelligence. Indeed, some parts of 

policy community, beyond the Department of Defense (DoD) where 

the norm to do so, rely strongly on intelligence. Further, disagreem

(which Jervis consistently labels confl ict) are inherent and typically 

come in the process. Hard questions about the accuracy of judgments m

be asked. If we are doomed to such “disagreements,” then it is a doom 

should be eager to embrace.66

Th e other perspective is that of the meliorists—those who feel in

ligence processes can be improved. Th e present authors reside in this ca

preferring to believe that the application of well-informed, mindful ex

tise, as developed in the present work, can bring positive and substan

value to the fulfi llment of the IC’s obligations.

62 President Lyndon Johnson quoted by Robert Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policym

Clash,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 125, no. 2 (Summer 2010), 185. Cited hereaft

Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash.”

63 Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash,” 187.

64 Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash,” 190.

65 Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash,” 190.

66 Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash,” 204.
4

Much of the community and its supporting contractors have adopted 

the meliorist position.67 As a result, intense attention within and outside the 

IC has focused on the means by which pertinent phenomena are to be understood. So-called intelligence “analytic” methods are being unshelved or developed and taught to novice and experienced intelligence professionals alike. 

However, less fully considered are the appropriateness and validity of these 

methods as well as the underlying assumptions they enshrine. Even less well 

understood is what happens when specifi c methods are combined and how 

those combinations may be made. Several ways exist to characterize these 

methods in terms of their purpose. However, to date, there is no readily available way to characterize methodological appropriateness or eff ectiveness, nor 

the limitations of individual methods. We also lack sound guidance on the use 

of combined methodologies, despite some recent, promising literature.68

A Roadmap

Before these defi ciencies can be remedied, however, we need to reframe 

the way in which intelligence is created. Such a re-conceptualization involves 

critically examining what intelligence practitioners actually do, and why. Th e 

examination demands methodological rigor with particular attention to how 

we might ensure the validity of our approach to the work of intelligence. If the 

examination indicates that the existing paradigm for intelligence creation is 

inadequate, then a revolutionary shift in IC habits will be justifi ed.

Despite the existence of legislative mandates for change, the intelligence-creation process remains largely a product of Cold War-era institutions 

67 It should be observed that it is in the interest of IC contractors to adopt this position. As 

they lobby IC leadership, their sales pitch rests on the idea that their products are best suited 

for “fixing” the IC’s problems. A contractor who is (honestly) skeptical of the possibility that 

intelligence can be improved is thus likely to see little IC business.

68 The human species likes to organize knowledge and intelligence professionals are no 

exception. The list of proposed organizational strategies or taxonomies for intelligence analysis 

is growing: Morgan Jones developed one such system fifteen years ago in conjunction with his 

book, The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 Powerful Methods for Problem Solving (New York, NY: Random 

House, Inc., 1995). Babette Bensoussan and Craig Fleisher include taxonomic elements in their 

catalog of competitive intelligence methods. See for instance, Craig S. Fleisher and Babette 

Bensoussan, Strategic and Competitive Analysis: Methods and Techniques for Analyzing Business 

Competition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002) and Business and Competitive Analysis: Effective Application of New and Classic Methods (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2007). 

The faculty of Mercyhurst College’s Institute for Intelligence Studies has issued a taxonomy of 

methods. Richards Heuer, Jr. developed one on a subcontract to support work performed by 

Least Squares Software under a contract to IARPA. Another former IC practitioner, Randy 

Pherson, developed a taxonomy for use in his training programs and subsequently combined 

his taxonomy with that of Heuer. See Richards J. Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010). To date, none of 

the taxonomies use cases nor do they ontologize the techniques, that is, show how they are 

interrelated in process.
5

and thinking, using the same cognitive frameworks that have been emplo

for decades. Some argue that what worked in the past is still appropr

However, as numerous executive and legislative reports confi rm, intellige

targets have in fact evolved: adversaries’ goals have changed, and their m

ods have evolved, even if the threats they pose seem very familiar. In sum

old national intelligence paradigm is woefully out of date.

What is needed now is a discussion of how intelligence can be adju

to deal with its “traditional” issues as well as new and evolving ones. 

book begins that discussion by challenging the standard view of how in

ligence professionals do their work. First, as will become clear, intellige

professionals ought not be characterized as “analysts.” Th e term is impre

and inaccurate. If real improvement in intelligence practice is to occur, pr

sion and accuracy in terminology, and thereby in how we think about w

we do, are essential fi rst steps.

Intelligence issues are not the same as the issues framed separatel

policymakers. To partner successfully with policymakers, intelligence pro

sionals must consider issues from multiple perspectives. Th is is the rol

sensemaking. Yes, the sensemaking process includes “analysis” or attac

issues by “taking them apart.” Th e process also includes synthesis—put

the pieces back together; interpretation—making sense of what the evide

means; and communication—sharing the fi ndings with interested consum

Essential to these processes is another, that of sound planning or “desig

While it could be said that this is what intelligence analysts do, such a st

ment is epistemologically false. Strictly speaking, intelligence analysts 

take issues apart.

So what? Why should we be concerned with a matter of seman

In short, because the terms we use within the Intelligence Community sh

and refl ect our practice. If we are to change the culture of intelligence, an

changed by it, our practice of intelligence must also change. New langu

encourages a new paradigm, and paradigm shift s are revolutionary, not 

lutionary. Such a revolution in intelligence is implied in the reform leg

tion arising out of the 9/11 attacks and the failures to accurately assess 

state of Saddam Hussein’s programs of weapons of mass destruction.

69 Here, the term “design” mirrors the reflective re-conceptualization of the operat

planning process being put in place, as noted earlier, by the School of Advanced Military 

ies at Fort Leavenworth.
6

Kent’s Imperative 70

When much of the tradecraft of intelligence was put in place sixty or 

more years ago, the dominant framework was that of the historian as scientist. 

Th e primary intellectual framework for Cold War intelligence at the national 

level grew from Sherman Kent’s seminal work, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.

71 Kent’s legacy remains active in the National Intelligence 

Council and the Community at large.72 Although decision theory and other 

social science thinking began to infl uence the creation of intelligence in the 

1960s and 1970s, these inputs languished until the reform eff orts of recent 

years. More recently, advances in cognitive science, anthropology, decision 

theory, knowledge theory, and methods and operations research have brought 

us to the brink of informed, mindful intelligence sensemaking.

Sherman Kent argues that in creating predictive intelligence about its 

adversaries “the United States should know two things. Th ese are: (1)...strategic stature, (2)...specifi c vulnerabilities.” 73 Th ese objectives focus on capabilities and draw heavily from the “descriptive and reportorial elements” of 

intelligence for basic data.74 In this way, knowledge about what an adversary 

ought to do is created. Th e method by which this is accomplished, according to Kent, is “the one which students reared in the Western tradition have 

found to be best adapted to the search for truth. It is the classical method of 

the natural sciences.” 75 It involves advice from experts but sees as superfl uous 

to these experts the use of designated red teams—which Kent considers “a 

new high in human fatuity.” 76 If estimates developed from expert judgments 

are erroneous, he sees the remedy simply in getting more and better information to shed more light on foreign decisionmaking.77

70 This phrase was originally adopted by an anonymous blogger as the name for a web log 

of musings on intelligence that ran from 1 January 2006 to 15 October 2008. URL: <http://

kentsimperative.blogspot.com>, accessed 6 October, 2010.

71 Kent, Strategic Intelligence.

72 Anthony Olcott, “Revisiting the Legacy: Sherman Kent, Willmoore Kendall, and George 

Pettee — Strategic Intelligence in the Digital Age, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 53, no. 2 (June 

2009): 21-32.

73 Kent, Strategic Intelligence, 40.

74 Kent, Strategic Intelligence, 56.

75 Sherman Kent, “Cuban Missile Crisis: A Crucial Estimate Relived,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 8, no. 2 (1964), reprint, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-studyof-intelligence/kent-csi/vol8no2/pdf/v08i2a01p.pdf>, accessed 27 May 2010, 113. Cited 

hereafter as Kent, “Crucial Estimate.”

76 Kent, “Crucial Estimate,” 118.

77 Kent, “Crucial Estimate,” 119.
7

Th e Failure of an Analytic Paradigm...

Kent’s preference for gathering and disaggregating more and m

data to fi nd answers fails today in the face of information volume, velo

and volatility. Marshaling and disaggregating ever more data does not eq

to contextual understanding. Further, the assumption that larger pipe

collect data and larger arrays to store it will then allow us to uncover the 

den, clarifying nuggets, is misleading.

Consider what actually happens when intelligence professionals 

for an answer to a problem or question. Th ey do not just disaggregate d

Instead, people inquisitively (and selectively) interpret patterns by com

ing observed, newly emergent phenomena to what they already “understa

Th ey make sense of phenomena by asking questions; foraging for infor

tion; marshaling it into evidence; analyzing, synthesizing, and interpre

that evidence, and communicating their evidence-based understandin

issues to others. Something makes sense because, based on their experie

its pattern is similar to something they previously have seen and that m

sense to them. Th ey may even employ a new, self-generated pattern base

previously learned and remembered patterns if they do not get a good m

to an ostensible pattern.78

Doing so accurately requires making judgments that correlate, acc

ing to Air Force thinker William Brei, to the “external world, as it actu

exists, regardless of [one’s] desires.” 79 In other words, one must be abl

convincingly correlate ostensible patterns to the data or information 

which one is attempting to “make sense.” Th is is not always possible, e

cially if the phenomenon or issue is broad, novel, or poorly understood; 

is, not easily subject to confi rmation by universal human sensory appar

Brei invokes Ayn Rand on this point:

To defi ne the meaning of the color “blue,” for instance, one must 

point to some blue objects to signify, in eff ect: “I mean this.”...To 

defi ne “existence,” one would have to sweep one’s arms around and 

say: “I mean this.”80

78 Dr. David Snowden, conversation with the author, 22 January 2008. Snowden

merly director of IBM’s Institute for Knowledge Management, writes and teaches on 

plexity and how organizations can leverage it to their advantage. Cited hereafter as Snow

conversation.

79 Capt William S. Brei, USAF, Getting intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Proce

Occasional Paper Number Two (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1996

Cited hereafter as Brei, Logical Procedure.

80 Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (New York, NY: Mentor, 1979)

Referenced in Brei, Logical Procedure, 18.
8

Th e social, economic and political relationships that characterize the government intelligence milieu mean that severe uncertainty will oft en remain part 

of the practitioner’s conclusions; telling patterns are at best elusive.

... And a Remedy in Sensemaking

For practitioners to create intelligence knowledge—even with an 

acknowledged degree of uncertainty—therefore requires much more than 

mere “analysis.” One alternative framework is embodied in the concept of 

sensemaking. Sensemaking begins with a mindful planning and questioning that leads to foraging for answers. It is true that along the way the resulting relevant assemblage of information—or evidence—is disaggregated into 

its constituent elements. However, it is also synthesized or combined to form 

a theory or systematic interpretation of the issue that subsequently must be 

explained, and convincingly. Th roughout sensemaking, a continuous assessment is demanded of both the processes by which the intelligence is created and of the intelligence knowledge itself.81 Mindfulness—as discussed 

above in the Preface—coupled with a critical thinking-based approach, provide the vigilance, awareness, and self-refl ection needed to assess an issue 

rigorously. Th is is a central point: Intelligence does not exist in a vacuum. 

It must contribute to the understanding of an issue by informing the concerned parties of a perspective or information they did not already know. 

Ultimately, if no one is concerned about the knowledge sensemakers create, 

it is not intelligence.82

Karl Weick sees sensemaking as a multiple-step process by which 

someone goes from becoming aware of “something, in an ongoing fl ow of 

events, something in the form of a surprise, a discrepant set of cues, [or] 

something that does not fi t,” to a useful understanding of the phenomenon.83 Th is defi nition, which allows for a focus on the social and political 

environments in which sensemaking takes place, applies to the concept as 

developed in the present book.

81 For a further discussion of assessing both the process and product of intelligence, see 

David T. Moore and Lisa Krizan, “Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the National 

Security Agency,” in Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices, Russell 

Swenson, ed. (2004), 95-131; and David T. Moore, Lisa Krizan, and Elizabeth J. Moore, “Evaluating Intelligence: A Competency-Based Approach,” in the International Journal of Intelligence 

and CounterIntelligence, vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 204-220. Cited hereafter as Moore, 

Krizan, Moore, “Evaluating.”

82 See Lois Foreman-Wernet, “Rethinking Communication: Introducing the Sense-Making 

Methodology,” in Brenda Dervin, Lois Foreman-Wernet, and Eric Lauterbach, Sense-Making 

Methodology Reader: Selected Writings of Brenda Dervin (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., 

2003), 1-10. The authors consider communicating an essential part of sensemaking.

83 Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 

1995), 2. Cited hereafter as Weick, Sensemaking.
9

Building on Weick’s defi nition and work he did with Kathleen 

cliff e, Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton observe that sensemakin

about anticipating uncertainty as opposed to reacting to it.84 Th is means 

the processes of sensemaking, and particularly collaborative sensemak

are never satisfi ed with the status quo. Rather, sensemaking institutions c

stantly admit and raise doubts about what they believe. Because threats

typifi ed by many 21st century issues—can emerge “at any time, anywhere, 

in a variety of forms, analysts need to think more in terms of a broad me

readiness to perceive early warning signs.” 85

IARPA, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, emp

a defi nition of sensemaking that is complementary to that developed he

Th ey propose that sensemaking is “a core human cognitive ability [t

underlies intelligence analysts’ ability to recognize and explain relations

among sparse and ambiguous data.”87 Th is book accepts that perspec

and develops the psychological, behavioral, and social levels of sensem

ing as they apply to intelligence creation. By contrast, IARPA’s own prog

on sensemaking seeks to build upon advances in computational cogn

neuroscience that reveal “the underlying neuro-cognitive mechanism

sensemaking.”88

As characterized by Peter Pirolli, the process of sensemaking is hi

iterative, involving a foraging loop and a sensemaking loop.89 In the for

the sensemaker seeks information, “searching and fi ltering it,” while in 

84 Fishbein and Treverton, “Making Sense,” 17. See also, Karl E. Weick and Kathlee

Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity (San 

cisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2001).

85 Fishbein and Treverton, “Making Sense,” 18.

86 See IARPA Broad-Agency Announcement IARPA-BAA-10-04, Integrated Cognitive-N

science Architectures for Understanding Sensemaking (ICArUS) Program, 1 April 2010. 

<http://www.iarpa.gov/solicitations_icarus.html>, accessed 1 June 2010. Cited hereaft

IARPA, BAA-10-04.

87 IARPA, BAA-10-04, 4.

88 IARPA, BAA-10-04, 4. On the emerging discipline of cognitive neuroscience, see 

4th Computational Cognitive Neuroscience Conference, URL: <http://ccnconference.o

accessed 7 June 2010.

89 Peter Pirolli and Stuart Card, “The Sensemaking Process and Leverage Points for 

lyst Technology as Identified Through Cognitive Task Analysis,” 2005 International Co

ence on Intelligence Analysis, McLean, VA, 2-6 May, 2005, URL: <https://analysis.m

org/proceedings/Final_Papers_Files/206_Camera_Ready_Paper.pdf>, accessed 18 Au

2010. Cited hereafter as Pirolli and Card, “Sensemaking.” Pirolli and Card’s work here b

on earlier work. See particularly Peter Pirolli and Stuart Card, “Information Foraging,” Ps

logical Review, vol. 106, no. 4 (October 1999): 643-675; and Dennis M. Russell, Mark J. S

Peter Pirolli, and Stuart Card, “The Cost Structure of Sensemaking,” paper presented a

INTERCHI ‘93 Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Amsterdam, NL, 2

April 1993, URL: <http://www2.parc.com/istl/groups/uir/publications/items/UIR-199

Russell.pdf>, accessed 18 August 2010.
10

latter an iteratively developed mental model or schema is developed “that 

best fi ts the evidence.” 90 While the overall fl ow is “from raw information 

to reportable results,” top-down and bottom-up processes act in concert to 

reframe issues: information either does or does not fi t the hypotheses being 

considered; hypotheses are refuted or refi ned, and the larger issue and its 

context are also reframed, as it comes to be more thoroughly understood.91

How this can occur within the context of intelligence creation is developed 

in the following chapters.

To sum up, this book argues that intelligence built around a model 

of disaggregation as it originated with and developed under Kent, and is still 

largely practiced today, is at best insuffi cient. A paradigm based on the concept of sensemaking and employing insights from other knowledge-creation 

disciplines provides a more appropriate means of skillfully creating intelligence. Th is book draws a general picture of 21st Century intelligence under 

a revolutionary paradigm, although it does not explain how all its contours 

can be fl eshed out. We believe that intelligence could be a true profession 

and moving toward that goal is our desire.92

90 Pirolli and Card, “Sensemaking,” 3.

91 Pirolli and Card, “Sensemaking,” 3.

92 In 1960, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) defined the role of an “intelligence 

research specialist” as administrative work, not professional work. As it stands, professionals 

with “state of the discipline knowledge” are by definition excluded from intelligence work. See 

United States Office of Personnel Management, Workforce Compensation and Performance 

Service, Introduction to the Position Classification Standards, TS-107 August 1991, URL: <http://

www.opm.gov/fedclass/gshbkocc.pdf>, accessed 11 December 2009; and United States Office 

of Personnel Management, Position Classification Standard for Intelligence Series, GS-0132 TS-28 

June 1960, TS-27 April 1960, URL: <http://www.opm.gov/fedclass/html/gsseries.asp>, last 

accessed 11 December 2009.
11

CHAPTER 2

Th e Failure of “Normal Intelligence”

Intelligence Challenges

Our understanding of everyday phenomena is confounded by ev

day strategies employed to mitigate cognitive dissonance, a stressful co

tion arising when reality clashes with one’s perceptions. Two broad strateg

selective exposure and selective perception, can prevent dissonance, bu

the expense of sound, mindful reasoning. Th rough the former, we limit 

evidence to that which agrees with or otherwise supports our position

the latter, we interpret what we experience in terms of our pre-existing wo

view.93 Examples abound, for these strategies are inherent to the human 

cies. A non-intelligence example appeared in a 2008 broadcast of Nati

Public Radio’s Th is American Life, in the story “What Part of ‘Bomb’ D

You Understand?” In the broadcast, BBC commentator Jon Ronson ju

poses the stories of London subway bomb survivor Rachel North and c

spiracy theorists who claimed the entire event was fabricated by the Br

government. Th e conspiracy theorists even claimed that Rachel North 

not an actual person despite her well-documented reality.94

Instructive accounts of 9/11 conspiracies and others appear in Far

Manjoo’s True Enough: Learning to Live in a Post-Fact Society. One exam

related to 9/11, is a belief by some that the second plane that struck the W

Trade Center fi rst launched a missile into the building.95 In both of the ab

cases, the conspiracy theorists only selected evidence consistent with t

conspiracy world-views. What of the situation within intelligence se

making circles? If the phenomena of both selective exposure and selec

93 For a highly readable discussion of cognitive dissonance, see Carol Tavris and 

Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions

Hurtful Acts (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2007). For more on selective exposure and selective pe

tion see Farhad Manjoo, True Enough: Learning to Live in a Post-Fact Society (Hoboken, NJ: 

Wiley & Sons, 2008), especially Chapters 2 and 3. Cited hereafter as Manjoo, True Enough

94 Jon Ronson, “What Part of ‘Bomb’ Don’t You Understand?” This American Life

sode 338, 3 August 2008, URL: <http://www.thislife.org/Radio_Episode.aspx?episode=3

accessed 4 August 2008.

95 Manjoo, True Enough, 74-80. Its proponents do not adequately explain the logic of 

a claim. One key question is “What purpose would such a missile serve?” The proponen

this notion fail to answer this and a number of other important questions.
12

perception are common, then their eff ects on intelligence professionals 

deserve fuller study. It is not understood, for example, how much selective 

use of evidence typically occurs in the creation of intelligence assessments 

and estimates.

However, intelligence professionals cannot aff ord to consider only 

information that conforms to their own pre-existing worldview or agreedupon, collective perspective. It is likely that selective exposure and selective 

perception contributed to the “failures of imagination” noted by the authors 

of the 9/11 Commission Report: U.S. intelligence professionals and policymakers in two U.S. administrations failed to make sense of the events leading 

up to the 11 September 2001 disaster.96 Failure of imagination was so pervasive a factor that the 9/11 Commission Report found that even those who 

were oriented toward the threat, such as Richard Clarke, failed to adequately 

imagine the events of that tragic day.97

Errors and Failures

A fi rst step in understanding the lack of sensemaking prior to the 

11 September 2001 attacks and other similar events is to understand the 

diff erences between “intelligence error” and “intelligence failure.” Anthropologist Rob Johnston defi nes intelligence error in terms of “factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from poor or missing data.” 98 Conversely, 

intelligence failures are “systemic organizational surprise resulting from 

incorrect, missing, discarded, or inadequate hypotheses.” 99 Th us, the term 

“failure of imagination” makes sense as a synonym for intelligence failure, 

where members of an intelligence creating organization fail to imagine in 

advance the essential outlines of an incident that subsequently occurs.

Additionally, one must consider policy failures. Characterized simply, this failure is seen as the failure to act on intelligence received, and it 

occurs at many levels. Bruce Berkowitz argues that these errors arise when 

policymakers “blindside themselves by how they perceive intelligence, by 

96 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 339-360. Cited hereafter 

as The 9/11 Report.

97 The 9/11 Report, 344. Richard Clarke’s memo to Condoleezza Rice warning of the aftermath of such an attack understates the consequences. Clarke considers hundreds dead, not 

thousands. See Dan Eggen and Walter Pincus, “Ex-Aide Recounts Terror Warnings: Clarke Says 

Bush Didn’t Consider Al Qaeda Threat a Priority Before 9/11,” The Washington Post, 25 March 

2004, A01.

98 Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study

(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 6. Cited hereafter as Johnston, 

Analytic Culture.

99 Johnston, Analytic Culture, 6.
13

the mental hurdles intelligence must surmount before it can change t

perceptions, and in the constraints that limit their ability to act on infor

tion...deep down, offi cials seem to want intelligence to make decisions 

them, when in reality, it rarely can.”100 Th us Admiral Husband Kimm

failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor can be attributed 

part) to an inability to overcome a preexisting view about the (in)vulnera

ity of U.S. forces in Hawaii and particularly at the Pacifi c Fleet headquar

of which he was in charge.101 Th is was exacerbated presumably by a de

of uncertainty in the intelligence. In order to take preventative measu

Kimmel had to act based on intelligence reporting, not react to it. In con

ering intelligence-based policy failures, one must consider that despite t

explanations, it is the job of intelligence to make sure policy “gets it” 

therefore intelligence (or at least its presenters) must also share in the bla

Th us the briefer of a senior policymaker bears a degree of responsibility i

message is not eff ectively transmitted and acted upon. Th at this is a diffi 

task at best must be noted. Policymakers—as is widely noted—oft en h

their own agendas. Would they use intelligence to further them? Fen O

Hampson argues this was the case in (at least) three separate crises involv

Cuba (1962, 1973, and 1979).102

Intelligence failures, policy failures and their resulting crises a

regularly recurring theme in U.S. intelligence and policy from at least 

mid-20th Century, and likely earlier, to the present. A list of such fail

includes:

• Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor (intelligence failure, policy failure

100 Bruce Berkowitz, “U.S. Intelligence Estimates of Soviet Collapse: Reality and Pe

tion,” in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Ca

Global Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 30. Cited hereaft

Berkowitz, “Soviet Collapse.”

101 See Francis Fukuyama, “The Challenges of Uncertainty: An Introduction,” in Fr

Fukuyama, ed., Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics (W

ington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 1.

102 Fen Osler Hampson, “The Divided Decision-Maker: American Domestic Politics an

Cuban Crises,” International Security, vol. 9, no. 3 (Winter, 1984-1985), 130. Cited hereaft

Hampson, “The Divided Decision-Maker.” The ODNI issued Intelligence Community Dire

Number 203: Analytic Standards (June 21, 2007), URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/dni

icd-203.pdf>, accessed 16 October 2010. The second standard is “Independent of Po

Considerations” (p. 2).

103 This failure consisted of intelligence policy and errors, as well as intelligence 

policy failures. However, hindsight consideration of the events clouds the fact that it wa

clear until just before the Japanese attack that an attack was indeed likely. That it was a 

sibility was, however, discussed. At Pearl Harbor, however, no measures were taken to 

gate the impact of such an attack: Aircraft remained tightly packed on landing areas 

ships lacked torpedo nets. The result was strategic surprise at all levels. The best acc

remains Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford 

versity Press, 1962).
14

• North Korea’s invasion of the South and China’s involvement in the 

subsequent war (policy failure, intelligence failure);104

• Th e Soviet Union’s deployment of IRBM and MRBM nuclear missiles in Cuba (intelligence failure);105

• Th e Vietnamese’ Tet Off ensive (policy failure, intelligence error);106

• Th e fall of the Shah of Iran (intelligence failure);107

• Th e Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan (intelligence failure);108

104 There is controversy as to whether the invasion of South Korea by North Korea was 

predicted in advance. Common wisdom considers that no prediction was made. However, 

Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s Korean Liaison Office (KLO) did predict the likelihood 

of invasion in the spring of 1950 (Kenneth J. Campbell, “Major General Charles A. Willoughby: 

A Mixed Performance,” unpublished paper, URL: <http://intellit.muskingum.edu/wwii_

folder/wwiifepac_folder/wwiifepacwilloughby.html>, accessed 5 January 2010). However, 

according to D. Clayton James, Willoughby had so alienated himself from the CIA and the 

State Department’s intelligence bureau that his warnings apparently were ignored by the 

civilian intelligence components. The Army’s G-2 apparently ignored his warning as well, 

possibly because the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, and not 

the KLO, was tasked with such estimating. See also, D. Clayton James, Years of MacArthur, 

1945-1964 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 416. The fact that warnings were issued 

but ignored adds the policy failure component.

105 DCI John McCone was at first skeptical and then was convinced that there were missiles in Cuba. Refugee reports during the summer of 1962 suggested that the missiles were 

based in Cuba. However, the Office of National Estimates under the leadership of Sherman 

Kent predicted the Soviets would not deploy missiles in Cuba. U-2 overflights did not detect the 

presence of the missiles until mid October, although they had earlier detected the presence of 

defensive Surface to Air Missiles. Lacking confirmatory technical corroboration, the State 

Department and the White House were not willing to act based on refugee reports (which had 

been received since 1960 and up to this point apparently had been incorrect). See Linda K. 

Miller and Mary McAuliffe, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” Magazine of History, vol.8 (Winter 1994), 

URL: <http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/coldwar/miller.html>, accessed 5 January 2010.

106 According to Harold Ford, despite analyses to the contrary, wishful thinking by key policymakers and their political pressure on the Intelligence Community to concur led to an underestimation of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam’s military capabilities. Such a view precluded 

the possibility of a Tet-like offensive. Thus systemic surprise from a policy failure is associated 

with the Tet Offensive. See Harold Ford, CIA and Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968 

(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), 85-138.

107 In writing about failure, Bruce Berkowitz quotes the CIA August 1978 assessment that 

“Iran is not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary state.” See Bruce Berkowitz, “U.S. Intelligence Estimates of Soviet Collapse: Reality and Perception,” in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 2007), XX. Cited hereafter as Berkowitz, “Soviet Collapse.”

108 Doug MacEachin writes that the failure to predict the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 

“illustrates probably the most recurrent trap for analysts...One part of it might be called the 

‘model cage.’ Once having constructed an intellectual model of how the variables are likely to 

play out, each new piece of information is weighed in accordance with the components of that 

model. Evidence that does not fit is far more likely to be explained away than used to question 

the model’s validity. In this case, the actions taken (military preparations) were not used to 

interpret intentions so much as the conclusions about intentions were used to interpret the 

actions.” See Douglas MacEachin, Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: the Intelligence 

Community’s Record (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2002), URL: 

<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitysrecord/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record.

html>, accessed 5 January 2010.
15

• Th e collapse of the Soviet Union (intelligence failure?, po

failure?);109 and

• Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait (intelligence failure, policy failure

Similarly, professionals apparently failed to make sense of the 

cursors of the 25 December 2009 attempt to bring down a U.S. airliner 

Detroit. Here again, failures of imagination that accompanied the centrif

disaggregation of data gathering and evaluation on the “underwear bom

contributed to the scenario of not performing early cross-checking of no

lists and other terrorist-related databases, as well as not accepting the fa

of a motivated Islamic radical as a credible source.111

Th ese intelligence errors and failures have occurred as the IC 

continued in the Kent vein of seeking more and better data, but with

framing the issues in a way that allows the national intelligence proces

use its special capabilities to apply deductive or even abductive logic to 

aging for, marshaling and evaluating data. At the same time, intellige

oversight reports by Congressional committees and Special Commiss

109 There is considerable disagreement about whether the Community failed to pr

the collapse of the Soviet empire. For a summary of both sides of the issue with refere

see Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, ed., “Introduction and Overview of the Confe

Papers” in Watching The Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union (Washington

Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-fo

study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essay

cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/index.html>, accessed 5 January 2010. In taking the pos

that the community did warn, Bruce Berkowitz argues the “record suggests that U.S. in

gence provided about as good a product as one could reasonably expect...[It] stipulated 

of conditions...and it notified top U.S. leaders when these conditions were met.” If n

intelligence failure, then what? Berkowitz offers clues to this question in noting that lea

blindside themselves by failing to understand intelligence — in this case their failing to “g

about the intelligence coming out of the IC leads one to conclude the failure was their

policy failure. Additionally, he notes that popular belief in the failure, an example of sele

perception, was also the result of key documents remaining classified, a sort of selective 

sure. See Berkowitz, “Soviet Collapse,” 29-30, xx.

110 Don Oberdorfer, writing in The Washington Post, notes that policymakers admitt

being “guilty of a kind of mind-set or framework about Iraq.” They failed to consider tha

Iraqis would go beyond saber rattling to invade Kuwait. Oberdorfer also quotes administr

officials as admitting that they did not focus on Iraq because the “didn’t have the time.

Don Oberdorfer, “Missed Signals in the Middle East, The Washington Post Magazine, 17 M

1991, 40.

111 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released its report on the “unde

bomber” incident on 18 May 2010 (see http://intelligence.senate.gov/100518/1225r

pdf ). Of 14 points of failure identified, 12 were failures of intelligence process, including 

pretation. Failures to correctly interpret source information are a part of the other fa

cited above. For example, such failures also occurred in the case of the Cuban Missile 

where (as we discovered some 40 years later) the refugees were telling us the truth: there 

nuclear missiles in Cuba during the summer of 1962; they simply were not strategic mis

Rather they were tactical, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. See Raymond L. Garthoff, “US 

ligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., Intellig

and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), 29. Cited hereafter as Gar

“US Intelligence.”
16

have repeatedly faulted the Community for its lack of imagination in anticipating at least the grand design of events that, instead, surprised or shocked 

nearly everyone associated with this Community. Th is unhappy situation 

suggests that there are fl aws in Kent’s model of disaggregating signifi cant 

amounts of data in order to predict specifi c events. Th e etymology of “imagination”— generating images — reminds us of the contemporary critic of 

Kent, Willmoore Kendall, who suggested that the job of national intelligence is to communicate with decisionmakers in a “holistic” way so as to 

generate the “pictures [mental models] that they have in their heads of the 

world to which their decisions relate.”112

Considering Standard Models

Intelligence failures occur as practitioners employ a “standard 

model”113 of intelligence: In it, analysts “separate something into its constituent elements114 so as to fi nd out their nature, proportion, function, relationship, etc.115 and “produce reports” based on “collected” information and data. 

Th ere is a defi nitional presumption that disaggregation will lead to answers. 

However, this model incompletely describes what the intelligence professional 

does and its underlying presumption about fi nding answers may be false.

One problem is that in Kent’s data-based analytic framework, analysts 

need to have all the data available so they can be marshaled into a coherent account. “Dots”— if they exist at all — can be connected in more than one 

way.116 In foresight it is diffi cult at best to determine which combination and 

order is valid. Such determinations can be further complicated by the fact 

that adversaries may change their actions if they suspect we have arrived at a 

certain conclusion.

An additional problem is that with an increased number of signals 

there is also an increased level of noise. Which signals, which facts, or which 

inferences the intelligence professional should consider valid becomes a very 

important consideration. At best, warning of a pending incident is a problem of assembling and making sense of the details of a specifi c incident in 

advance. However, many intelligence problems inherently defy such linear 

112 Willmoore Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence,” World Politics, vol. 1, no. 4 (July 

1949), 550. Cited hereafter as Kendall, “Function of Intelligence.”

113 A standard model is one that is widely accepted to be justified and true. It is — in dayto-day considerations — sufficient and therefore its validity is not questioned.

114 New Oxford American Dictionary, Apple Computer Edition, entry under “analysis.”

115 Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1983, entry under “Analysis.”

116 Robert Horn prefers to refer to dots as “smudges,” suggesting that they are at best 

imprecise in both existential and contextual frameworks. Robert Horn, conversation with the 

author, 6 October 2010.
17

characterization. Th ey are in fact “wicked” problems—a formal designa

of a complex issue with myriad linkages. We turn next to an exploratio

problem types to see how their nature directs our making sense of them.

Types of Problems

In order to understand “wicked problems,” one must fi rst underst

the nature of “tame problems.”

Tame Problems

In a tame problem there is general agreement as to what or wh

adversary is, what the “battlefi eld area” is, and what an attack is. Such p

lems, while diffi cult, exhibit specifi c characteristics: Th ey are clearly defi 

and it is obvious when they are solved. Solutions to these problems arise f

a limited set of alternatives that can be tested; the correct solution can 

objectively assessed. Finally, solving one tame problem can facilitate crea

valid solutions to other, similar tame problems.117

It is important to note that analysis protocols for tame problems c

tain little or no room for “emergent” properties. One may not know that 

analytic protocol is insuffi cient until the puzzle has been incorrectly defi 

characterized, and solved, if it is in fact solvable. One arrives at one solu

that at fi rst appears to have resolved the issue, but in fact, the issue reeme

elsewhere. For example, the implementation of a linear, intelligence-dr

solution to crack down on insurgents and their improvised explosive dev

(IEDs) in one area may lead to an emergence of IED-caused explosions so

where else. In such a case, the application of “tame problem protocols” ma

fact have been inappropriate—the problem is in fact not tame.

Admittedly, many 21st Century intelligence issues remain puz

or tame problems. Th is occurs when the events surrounding the issues h

already occurred, appropriate questions are readily identifi able, and answ

exist, even if they are diffi cult to fi nd. For example, in a weapons prolifera

puzzle, if we know that missiles have been built, the nature of their warh

and their accuracy “may remain unknown even though they are knowable

Solution is a process of discovery and sensemaking.

Seen in this light, even the attacks on the United States by Al Qa

on 11 September 2001 could be considered a puzzle or tame problem. P

117 Jeff Conklin, Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Prob

(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 2005), 9.

118 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for An Age of Information (

bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12. Cited hereafter as Treverton, Resh

National Intelligence.
18

had been made, necessary skills (fl ying airplanes) learned, surveillance conducted, targets selected, weapons acquired, and terrorists positioned. Th e issue 

faced by intelligence professionals—and where we failed—was to sense and 

then fi gure out all (or at least enough) of the pieces before the events of that 

day occurred. We also had to fi gure out what the “event” was. Th e diffi culty of 

doing so at both a theoretical and practical level points out how diffi cult tame 

problems can be to solve. As noted, in the end we failed, although some pieces 

of the puzzle—such as the fl ying skills necessary—at least had been sensed. In 

this case, the essence of the puzzle itself—the intention to deliberately fl y passenger airplanes into structures in the U.S.— remained unidentifi ed.

Wicked Problems

However, seen in a larger context, are such puzzles truly tame? Or 

are they components — as Russell Ackoff suggests — of something larger: 

a mystery in Treverton’s terms, or a “mess” according to Ackoff .119 Treverton’s intelligence mysteries defy easy defi nition. Th ey belong to a class of 

problems defi ned by social researchers Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber as 

“Wicked Problems.” In describing this domain Rittel and Webber note that 

in considering wicked problems and systems there are a great many barriers 

to sensemaking:

[Th eory] is inadequate for decent forecasting; our intelligence is 

insuffi cient to our tasks; plurality of objectives held by pluralities of 

politics makes it impossible to pursue unitary aims; and so on. Th e 

diffi culties attached to rationality are tenacious, and we have so far 

been unable to get untangled from their web. Th is is partly because 

the classical paradigm of science and engineering—the paradigm 

that has underlain modern professionalism—is not applicable to the 

problems of open societal systems.120

Th e adaptive nature of adversaries makes seemingly tame puzzles wicked, 

moving them into the realm of “unknown unknowables.”

By defi nition, wicked problems are “incomplete, contradictory, and 

changing.”121 Th ey do not have single answers and in fact, are never truly 

119 Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence, 11-13; Russell A. Ackoff, Redesigning the 

Future: A Systems Approach to Societal Problems (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 

1974), 11.

120 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 

Policy Sciences, vol. 4 (1973), 157. Cited hereafter as Horst and Webber, “Dilemmas.” The term 

“men” refers to people.

121 Wikipedia, Entry under “Wicked Problem,” accessed 28 March 2007. Cited hereafter 

as Wikipedia, “Wicked Problem.”
19

answered. In the context of intelligence, the sensemaker may never reali

problem has been resolved. Th is is because “the solution of one of its asp

may reveal or create another, even more complex problem.”122 Th e emer

complexity of the problem itself, its adaptive nature, eff orts at denial 

deception by adversarial actors, as well as cognitive frailties on the par

sensemakers, compound the problem, confounding sensemaking, leadin

some cases to disastrous courses of action or consequences.

Table 1. Characteristics of Wicked Problems

Wicked problems have no defi nite formulation.

Wicked problems have no clear end-point.

Solutions to wicked problems are at best good or bad.

Tests of solutions to wicked problems may not demonstrate 

their validity and may provoke undesired consequences.

Implementing solutions to wicked problems changes the problem.

Sensemakers can never know if they have determined 

all the solutions to wicked problems.

Each wicked problem is essentially unique.

Every wicked problem is embodied in another one.

How wicked problems are resolved is determined by the 

means and methods used to make sense of them.

Sensemakers have no right to be wrong.

Source: Derived from Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a 

General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973), 155-169.

Rittel and Webber note that all wicked problems share at leas

characteristics in common (summarized in table 1). Wicked problem

framed allow us to proceed with discussions into their nature. Th e two 

argue, however, that our standard “basis for confronting problems of so

policy is bound to fail, because of the nature of these problems.” Th e me

that we typically have at hand for cognitive handling of these problem

not applicable.”123

122 Wikipedia, “Wicked Problem.”

123 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 162.
20

A Wicked Look at Wicked Problems in Intelligence

Characterizing intelligence issues in terms of their problem type—

admittedly somewhat vaguely (in keeping with their nature)— reveals just 

how prevalent wicked problems are within the domains of intelligence.

Wicked problems have no defi nite formulation. To Rittel and 

Webber, “the process of solving the problem is identical with the process 

of understanding its nature, because there are no criteria for suffi cient 

understanding.”124 In other words, making sense of problems deemed suffi -

ciently complex so as to be considered wicked is equivalent to characterizing 

them in the fi rst place; the description encompasses all possible solutions.

For example, one wicked problem could be “how best to stem the 

growth of terrorism in the Middle East.” An assumption in considering this 

problem is that if intelligence professionals can understand what motivates 

people to become terrorists in the fi rst place, intervention might be possible. Mitigating the creation of new terrorists could aid in reducing both 

their numbers and by extension, their attacks. Do people become terrorists 

because they are dissatisfi ed with what they see as contradictions and hypocrisies in their lives? If so, what then are the specifi c roots of dissatisfaction 

and contradiction? One commonly cited is a lack of economic opportunity 

for males within societies. In that light, Rittel and Webber ask, “where within 

the...system does the real problem lie? Is it defi ciency of the national and 

regional economies, or is it defi ciencies of cognitive and occupational skills 

within the labor force?”125 Th e possible solutions to this problem extend the 

domain of questions, spreading ever outward.126

Our ignoring domains that seem irrelevant (either for practical or 

political reasons) is a strategy of selective exposure and perception. Admittedly, some domains may be inconsequential. On the other hand, one of the 

interesting features of complex systems is that small perturbations can produce large impacts. So, a decision to eliminate factors from consideration 

may result in discarding seemingly inconsequential elements, with as yet 

unknown but major impacts. Such possible impacts cannot be known in 

advance, as they are a part of the noise surrounding the issue. Indeed, as 

Nicholas Taleb notes,

[Our] track record in predicting those events is dismal; yet by some 

mechanism called the hindsight bias we think that we understand 

124 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 162.

125 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 161.

126 Such domains include (among others) economics, culture, history, geography, roles of 

language, religion, or law, singly or in combinations.
21

them. We have a bad habit of fi nding “laws” in history (by fi tting 

stories to events and detecting false patterns); we are drivers looking through the rear view mirror while convinced we are looking 

ahead.127

Seemingly unimportant factors also are not considered by sensem

ers due to a failure to adequately address assumptions about the issue at h

as noted in offi cial reviews of recent “intelligence failures.” For example

Senate’s report on the prewar assessment of weapons of mass destructio

Iraq specifi cally notes that analysts’ assumptions were not challenged in 

creation of the estimate.128

Even with the addressal of major assumptions, there remain a

tional underlying factors that do not get questioned—almost an endless 

cession of assumptions that must be peeled off the problem much as 

peels layers off an onion. Th ere is an added complication that individual 

ers are not sequential and in fact may lead (to continue the analogy) to o

onions or other vegetables, or even fruit. In intelligence, such assumption

themselves a mess: a complex system of interrelated experience, knowle

and even ignorance that aff ects reasoning at multiple levels sequentially 

simultaneously. Th ere is an old English children’s nursery rhyme that ne

characterizes this: “For want of a nail the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe 

horse was lost. For want of a horse the rider was lost. For want of a rider 

battle was lost. For want of a battle the kingdom was lost. And all for the w

of a horseshoe nail.”129 Clearly, such a sequence implies a logical progress

whereas in dealing with wicked problems, the order may be mixed up. S

of the links may even be unknown—either missing or unknowable.

Wicked problems have no clear end-point. With tame and w

structured problems one knows when the solution is reached. In wicked p

lems this is not so, as Rittel and Webber make clear:

Th ere are no criteria for suffi cient understanding and because 

there are no ends to the causal chains that link interacting open 

systems, the would-be planner can always try to do better. Some 

additional investment of eff ort might increase the chances of fi nding a better solution.130

127 Nicholas Nassim Taleb, “Learning to Expect the Unexpected,” Edge, 19 April 2

URL: <http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/taleb04/taleb_indexx.html>, accessed 1 March 2

128 United States Senate, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intellig

Assessments on Iraq, Select Senate Committee on Intelligence, 108th Congress, 7 July 2004

129 Anonymous, For Want of a Nail Rhyme, URL: <http://www.rhymes.org.uk/for_want_

nail.htm>, accessed 10 September 2007.

130 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 162.
22

Th is is not a new consideration. Writing in the 1930s, John Dewey 

observed that “the ‘settlement’ of a particular situation by a particular inquiry 

is no guarantee that that settled conclusion will always remain settled. Th e 

attainment of settled beliefs is a progressive matter; there is no belief so settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry.”131 Intelligence sensemakers 

routinely confront this challenge. Reports and assessments oft en update or 

revise previous conclusions. Oft en the previous reporting is consulted before

the new report is written so that the author can determine the preexisting 

point of view on the issue. Such consultations at best determine whether the 

current situation deviates from the norm. Unfortunately, sometimes such 

consultations lead to the rejection of the new evidence, opening the way to 

intelligence errors and failures. One goal of an adversary’s denial and deception activities is to facilitate rejection of the novel deviation. It was in this 

way that the possibility of nuclear missiles deployed to Cuba was rejected 

amid outlandish noise during the summer of 1962, and military exercises 

along the Suez Canal lulled Israel into a sense of creeping normalcy prior to 

October 1973.

Solutions to problems may be implemented for “considerations that 

are external to the problem” itself: problem solvers “run out of time, or money, 

or patience.”132 In intelligence, sensemakers may only be able to work for a 

given time on a problem before they have to issue their report. Changes in 

funding may mean that an eff ort to understand a phenomenon has to be discontinued. Th e practicalities of resource limitations force changes in sensemakers’ foci. However, this does not mean that the problem does not continue 

to exist and perhaps, threaten. Rather, an answer has been developed to a distilled problem, communicated, and now other things must be done.

Solutions to wicked problems are at best good or bad. Some problems have true or false, yes or no answers. Th ese are not wicked problems. 

Wicked problems have no such answers. Diff ering perspectives applied by different problem solvers, diff ering sets of assumptions, and diff ering sources of 

evidence are several of the factors that lead separate groups to come to different judgments about wicked problems. Th e impossibility of exhaustively 

considering all the factors and solutions of the problem also contributes to a 

multiplicity of solutions. At best these can be ranked as good or bad solutions. 

In most cases, according to Rittel and Webber, the solutions are expressed as 

“better or worse” or “satisfying” or “good enough.”133

131 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 1938), 8-9. Emphasis (italics) in the original.

132 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 162.

133 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 163.
23

Given, for example, the problem of stemming the growth of ter

ism, there is no one simple solution that suffi ces. Instead, a number of di

ing solutions exist, depending upon (among other things) the perspect

about the domains at work in the problem. Focusing on the economics 

rounding the growth of terrorism leads to diff erent proposed solutions t

does focusing on the demographics involved in the issue. Religious consi

ations or broader cultural considerations also create diff erent solutions. E

of these perspectives in turn optimizes multiple points of view with diff er

good and bad solutions. Overlap is possible and even desired. Good solut

encompass multiple domains.

Tests of solutions to wicked problems may not demonstrate t

validity and may provoke undesired consequences. Implemented solut

to wicked problems “generate waves of consequences over an extende

virtually an unbounded—period of time.”134 Further, these conseque

may themselves prove so undesirable as to negate any and all benefi ts of 

original decision—and this cannot be determined in advance. Th us an in

ligence-based decision to invade a country’s possessions may create circ

stances that off set any gains initially won, as the Argentineans discovere

1982 when they—unwisely in retrospect—seized the British-owned Falk

Islands. From the perspective of the Argentine regime, the initial “vict

was off set when Britain forcibly retook the islands. Th e Argentine Navy lo

capital ship and many died; the regime lost power and was ultimately ous

Seen from the perspective of the Argentine people this was, in the long te

of benefi t. Th e government-condoned disappearances (torture and mur

of its foes ceased. Democratic processes were restored. However, things co

easily have gone in another direction. One repressive regime could have b

replaced by another. None of these outcomes was knowable in advance.

Implementing solutions to wicked problems can change the p

lem. In intelligence problems, real solutions cannot be practiced; there ar

“dry runs.” True, sensemakers and their policy-making customers can (

should) consider what might happen or the “implications” of the decision

solutions of the problem at hand. Doing so might increase the likelihood 

the decision selected is the best or the less bad of a set of bad alternative

Modeling the situation is one common means of assessing the im

cations of a potential action. However, models must by their very nature l

the factors considered. Th is raises the question of how one might know 

advance if the eliminated factors are in fact signifi cant. Further, modelin

any other means of generating solutions does not guarantee that the sele

134 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 163.
24

decision is the right decision. Once implemented it cannot be undone. It is 

noteworthy that at this point “implications” that do arise are actually “consequences” and hopefully they have been considered. But additional consequences and responses to those consequences by the actors in the problem as 

they respond to the “solution” will change, transform and evolve the problem. 

Taking down a terrorist’s “safe house” may not reduce the threat, but does 

change where and how the remaining terrorists operate. Th is applies as well 

to attempts to reverse decisions. As Rittel and Webber note, “every attempt to 

reverse a decision or to correct for...undesired consequences poses another 

set of wicked problems,”135 as sensemakers and planners involved in the U.S.-

led “war on terror” have discovered. Actions, once taken, may mitigate the 

threat, or may not, which leads to the next facet of wicked problems.

Sensemakers can never know if they have determined all the solutions to wicked problems. Th ey can expect, however, that they almost certainly have not determined all the solutions. In developing the range of 

alternatives within scenarios, two goals predominate: mutual exclusivity 

and collective exhaustion. In other words, each alternative must preclude 

the simultaneous possibility of the others, and the entire set of known alternatives must be considered. In practical terms, this is much more diffi cult 

to achieve than it sounds. Intellectual frameworks and so-called “biases” 

such as vividness, anchoring, confi rmation, and others combine to prevent 

people from being able to consider all the alternatives. Adding to this is the 

fact that issues evolve in unpredictable ways. All the solutions simply are not 

knowable because they lie in the future. Th is does not justify not trying to 

completely assess the alternatives but rather provides recognition that some 

alternatives elude consideration.

Each wicked problem is unique. While it is true that common elements can be found between problems, there remain additional and unique 

properties of “overriding importance.”136 In other words, wicked problems 

cannot be characterized into “classes...in the sense that principles of solution can be developed to fi t all members of a class.”137 For example, there are 

common elements or patterns in proliferation that allow recognition by sensemakers: acquisition of certain materials, construction of facilities, and the 

like. However, denial and deception—if applied—may obscure these commonalities. Knowing specifi c details of a weapons development program 

can be elusive. Another element, the intentions of the proliferators or the 

135 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 163.

136 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 164.

137 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 164.
25

recipients of the proliferated systems are also of critical importance; 

may be unique, and perhaps intractable. What Rittel and Webber have to 

about this consideration is germane to intelligence: “Despite seeming s

larities...one can never be certain that the particulars of a problem do 

override its commonalities with other problems already dealt with.”138

Every wicked problem is embodied in another one. Rittel and W

ber describe problems as

[discrepancies] between the state of aff airs as it is and the state as 

it ought to be. Th e process of resolving the problem starts with 

the search for causal explanation of the discrepancy. Removal of 

that cause poses another problem of which the original problem 

is a “symptom.” In turn, it can be considered the symptom of still 

another, “higher level” problem.139

What policies and actions, for example, are necessary to “fi x intelligen

Answering this involves asking what is causing intelligence to fail. One p

to start is to consider why analysts are wrong and how intelligence er

lead to intelligence failure.140 Yet such considerations lead one to cons

how consumers may ignore intelligence, and how adversaries may in 

be “more capable” than expected. Th ese in turn lead to what Jeff rey Coo

considers “analytic pathologies” that decrement both individual and cor

rate eff orts to make sense of issues (table 2). Each of Cooper’s specifi c pat

ogies is furthermore at least partially embodied in the others, giving ris

error-producing systems.141 For example, Cooper argues that intellige

professionals’ pathological focus on both “the ‘dots’ analogy and the m

of ‘evidence-based’ analysis...understate signifi cantly the need for imag

tion and curiosity.”142 Related to this is what he calls the myth of “Scien

Methodology.” Analysis is not [hard] science and is not about proof. Ra

it is about discovery.143 Th ese are embodied in the protocols he refers t

the fl awed “Tradecraft Culture,”— a guild system of potential sensema

and their historically unchanging ways of working.144

138 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 165. Emphasis in original.

139 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 165.

140 Johnston develops this distinction. Johnston, Analytic Culture, 64-66.

141 See Jeffrey R. Cooper, Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intellig

Analysis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intellig

2005). Cited hereafter as Cooper, Analytic Pathologies.

142 Cooper, Analytic Pathologies, 28.

143 Cooper, Analytic Pathologies, 28-29.

144 Cooper, Analytic Pathologies, 30.
26

Table 2. Cooper’s Analytic Pathologies

An intelligence account system whereby institutions and individuals 

“own” issues is ineffi cient. The return on investment for having 

accountability is too low when compared to the lack of cooperation, 

collaboration, and sharing such a system promotes. (30-31)

A cultural “evidence-based scientism” that prevents anticipatory 

consideration of policy and military intelligence consumers’ needs. (31)

An overemphasis on current intelligence to the detriment 

of the “long view” resulting from a chaotic post-Cold War 

environment of emergent issues and crises. (32)

A production-oriented model that focuses on collecting, and processing 

massive quantities of data, and producing routine reports without the 

capability to adroitly refocus resources for ad hoc reports. (32)

A use of previous judgments as the starting point for all subsequent 

reporting. A corollary is a belief that “fi nished intelligence” is anything 

more than a snapshot in time, that it conveys larger “truth.” (33)

A neglect of deep research about issues brought 

about by short-term tasks. (34)

A neglect of anticipatory intelligence arising from attempts by intelligence 

sensemakers to emulate the other (current) intelligence sources — such 

as news networks — on which their consumers also rely. (35)

A loss of “keynote species,” mid-level sensemakers with 

deep domain expertise who create the in-depth assessments 

that convey what specifi c issues are all about. (36-37)

An inaccurate focus on results instead of processes 

leads to a failure to develop, validate, and promulgate 

methods of intelligence sensemaking. (37)

A security mindset leads to a lack of cooperation between 

intelligence sensemakers, and domain experts and their 

knowledge regardless of who and where they are. (38)

Source: Derived from Jeffrey Cooper, Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to 

Improved Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 

Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 30-38.
27

Rittel and Webber posit “incrementalism” as a not uncomm

approach to mitigating these eff ects. Related to Kuhn’s concept of “nor

science,” incrementalism may actually compound the specifi c problem 

ther because incrementalism

[advertises] a policy of small steps, in the hope of contributing 

systematically to overall improvement. If, however, the problem is 

attacked on too low a level (an increment), then success or resolution 

may result in making things worse, because it may become more diffi cult to deal with the higher problems. Marginal improvement does 

not guarantee overall improvement.145

In considering Cooper’s pathologies, summarized in table 2, fi x

selective individual pathologies—insofar as possible—produces organ

tional changes that may inhibit further “fi xes” by making them moneta

or organizationally too expensive. For instance, “solving” technolog

problems associated with Cooper’s identifi ed pathologies imposes in

structures that may inhibit other necessary transformations such as de

oping a more agile workforce.

How wicked problems are resolved is determined by the me

and methods used to make sense of them. In other words, how problem

perceived determines the kinds of solutions that are proposed. Point of v

becomes essential in defi ning what a problem is and how it is to be resol

Complex, wicked problems (as well as many “tame” ones) cannot be defi 

from one point of view. Defi ning the causes of terrorism is a case in point

considered by the participants at the 2005 International Summit on Dem

racy, Terrorism, and Security, sponsored by the Club de Madrid, terrori

causes lie in fi ve broad domains: psychology, politics, economics, relig

and culture. Yet, as Martha Crenshaw notes in the conference report on 

causes of terrorism, such considerations may be invalid:

Explaining terrorism in terms of background conditions (social, 

economic, demographic, political, or cultural) is insuffi cient at best, 

and wrong at worst. Focusing exclusively on underlying structures 

provides little predictive capacity. “Root causes” may, in fact, infl uence the subsequent trajectory of terrorism more than its onset since 

they determine the extent of social support for violence by justifying grievances.146

145 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 165.

146 Martha Crenshaw, “Political Explanations,” in Kim Campbell, ed., Addressin

Causes of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy, vol. 1 (Madrid, SP: Clu

Madrid, 2005), 13.
28

Yet these considerations are used to develop “solutions” to terrorism. Methods 

that consider and “solve” underlying economic or demographic issues, we 

may discover, only partly explain the phenomena.

How Are Wicked Problems Disruptive?

Disruption, as developed by Clayton Christensen, emerges from 

technologies that, while they may under-perform established technologies, open new markets and change the ways people do things. 

Enlarging the defi nition, disruptive intelligence problems threaten 

to change the way people interact. Th ey proff er or impose new paradigms—both “good” and “bad”— for non-governments and governments alike. Th e disruption occurs because the incumbent is doing 

the most rational thing it can do given its circumstances. Doing the 

right thing generates the opportunity for disruption. For example, 

among the disruptions arising from a pandemic could be an easing 

of population pressures (if enough people die). Th is could lead to a 

freeing-up of energy resources for the survivors. Alternately, such a 

population die-off might cause a breakdown of societal infrastructures leading to riots and chaos. Both outcomes (and others) — as seen 

in anticipation — share likelihoods: all are likely. None of them can 

be reliably calculated (and therefore predicted) with any certainty.

See Clayton Christensen, Th e Innovator’s Dilemma (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 1997).

Sensemakers have no right to be wrong. One of the fi rst things many 

visitors to the CIA fi rst see is the aphorism, “You shall know the truth, and the 

truth shall set you free.”147 As retired CIA veteran Ray McGovern comments,

[T]he primary function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to seek 

the truth regarding what is going on abroad and be able to report 

that truth without fear or favor. In other words, the CIA at its best 

is the one place in Washington that a President can turn to for an 

unvarnished truthful answer to a delicate policy problem.148

Th is aphorism may have validity in the domain of tame problems 

where the truth is known or knowable. However, it has much less (if any) 

validity in the world of wicked problems where many truths can coexist, 

147 John, 8:32 (King James’ Version).

148 Will Pitt, “Interview: 27-Year CIA Veteran,” Truthout, 26 June 2003, URL: <http://www.

truthout.org/docs_03/ 062603B.shtml>, accessed 12 March 2007.
29

depending on the point of view expressed, the context can be simultaneo

true and contradictory, and may in fact be unknowable.

Th e goal of assessing wicked problems may be to “improve s

characteristics of the world where people live. Planners are liable for the c

sequences of the actions they generate; the eff ects can matter a great de

those people that are touched by those actions.”149 Intelligence error, reg

less of what causes it, is considered intolerable as U.S. policymakers 

Intelligence Community sensemakers most recently discovered with t

inaccurate estimate on the state of Iraq’s programs to develop WMD. Ea

policymakers and sensemakers faced similar situations regarding the in

tions of Japan, North Korea, China, Cuba, the Soviet Union (repeatedly), 

India. In other words, restating part of Rittel and Webber’s quote above yi

this guideline: “intelligence professionals are liable for the consequences o

intelligence they generate.”

An Intelligence Example: Pandemics as 

Wicked Problems

One of the threats faced by intelligence organizations and their 

fessionals is that of an emergent global pandemic. What kind of a threat 

pandemic? Is it a tame or wicked problem, or something in between? S

considerations matter because they defi ne what approaches are suitable 

alleviating or mitigating the threats to national security that pandemics p

Historically, pandemic infectious diseases disrupted societies 

wide regions of the world. Of these, the bubonic plague pandemic of the 

14th Century, also called the “Black Death,” is perhaps the best known

killing off approximately one-third of Europe’s population, it is credited w

ending serfdom in most of the region. Th ere was tremendous disrupt

with both good and bad eff ects, and it is no coincidence that the Renaissa

arose in its aft ermath.150 According to Norman Cantor, “[the] Black D

was the trauma that liberated the new.”151 Th e rational things to do in 

149 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 167.

150 Other developments such as the invention and use of the legal contract (by the 

ians), which spurred trade; and a widening use of water wheels, which facilitated manufa

ing, also were significant factors.

151 Norman F. Cantor, In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death & the World it Made 

York, NY: The Free Press, 2001), 202. Cantor observes that this idea is controversial, 

work by Medieval historian Dom David Knowles arguing that the Black Death had little 

impact on Europe, and that of historian David Herlihy, which argues that it was highly s

cant. See David Knowles, Great Historical Enterprises and Problems in Monastic History (Lon

UK: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962); and David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transform

of the West, Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
30

14th Century were to join concentrated populations in cities with regular 

inter-city trade routes to move goods. Th ese conditions provided the disruptive opportunity for the pathogen.

Pandemics are by their nature adaptive and possibly recurring. Seen 

in hindsight, pandemics may appear to be tame problems, seemingly clearly 

defi ned and understood. But the requirement to deal with pandemics (and 

other wicked problems) is not to address them merely in hindsight — rather 

our well-being depends on foresight. Th is is, aft er all, how intelligence enterprises and their professionals work their issues. Rittel and Webber’s criteria 

for a wicked problem provide a means of characterizing pandemics?152

• . Ninety years aft Wicked problems have no defi nite formulation er 

it occurred, the 1918 infl uenza pandemic remains only partially 

understood. As Edwin Kilbourne notes, “the origin of this pandemic has always been disputed and may never be resolved.”153

Seen as it emerged, the pandemic was even less clearly understood. 

While germ theory was known in some places, we did not know 

how to apply it to the pandemic nor how to protect ourselves. Similarly, while today the causes of Avian Flu are known to be the H5N1 

virus, if, when, how, and where it (or some other as yet unknown 

virus) mutates from an animal-to-animal (and occasionally an 

animal-to-human form) to a human-to-human form remains 

unknown. Further, the exact nature of the mutation—necessary 

for the formulation of a vaccine—is and remains unknown. Most 

recently the diffi culty in determining these factors with regard to 

the 2009-2010 H1N1 “Swine Flu” pandemic may have led to an 

overestimation of the severity of the pandemic by the U.S. Centers 

for Disease Control.154 While this is a problem for epidemiologists 

and others tasked to create vaccines, it is also a problem for the sensemakers —who have to estimate the impact of having or not having 

a vaccine— and the policymaker who has to consider the implications of various courses of action (with or without a vaccine).

• . Specifi Wicked problems have no clear end-point c pandemics do 

have an end. Th e disease, having run through the population, 

152 It is germane to note that if pandemics truly are a wicked problem (as is argued here) 

then characterizing them as such only partially and inexactly describes them.

153 Edwin D. Kilbourne, “Influenza Pandemics of the 20th Century” Emerging Infectious 

Diseases, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2006), 9. URL: <www.cdc.gov/eid>, accessed 28 March 2007. 

Cited hereafter as Kilbourne, “Influenza.”

154 Carl Bialki, “Swine Flu Count Plagued by Flawed Data,” Wall Street Journal, online edition, 23 January 2010, URL: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870450970

4575019313343580460.html>, accessed 2 February 2010.
31

dissipates or abates. However, the diseases recur as the vir

evolve and mutate. In the case of the 1918 pandemic, the sec

wave of the virus apparently was more lethal than the fi rst. 

similar, less deadly infl uenza occurs annually and subsequent p

demics are repeating phenomena.

• . Vaccines Solutions to wicked problems are at best good or bad

typically the solution to the annual infl uenza epidemic. In s

years they are good—they are eff ective against the specifi c str

of the virus—and in some years they are not good (bad)—they 

less eff ective against the specifi c strains.

• Tests of solutions to wicked problems may not demonstrate their v

ity and may provoke undesired consequences. Tests of pandemic p

and preparedness for cities and even countries provide a degre

comfort but no guarantee they will be eff ective against either 

pandemic against which they were developed or another unexpe

pandemic (such as that of the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic). It 

ply is not known nor knowable in foresight whether the meas

will work, or the degree to which they will work until they are te

by the actual event. Furthermore, the proposed measures — o

made — close off governments, corporations, and people from 

sidering other options. If major adjustments are needed against 

actual pandemic, it will take time to overcome the understand

resistance. Th us, testing and planning may have undesirable co

quences in a real pandemic emergency.

• Implementing solutions to wicked problems can change the prob

One means of dealing with a pandemic in its early stages is q

antine. At the national level, this means closing international 

ders, preventing people as well as goods from entering or lea

the country. Doing so compounds the pandemic problem by add

economic issues. Companies relying on imported goods or on 

ability to export goods may fail. Essential food items may no

available. Entire sectors of an economy may fail. Th e eff ective

of closing the borders depends (in part) on timing. Fewer pe

may die in the short-term but the longer-term economic disrupt

may in fact increase mortality from other causes. Th e “problem

no longer (just) the pandemic itself. Sometimes highly benefi 

consequences arise out of catastrophes brought about by wic

problems. For example, as related by David Morens and Jeff 

Taubenberger, the Phillips Collection of Art in Washington, 

owes its creation to the response of Duncan Phillips to the de
32

of his father and especially to the death of his brother James.155

Phillips “as a direct consequence of the death of his brother James 

from infl uenza...dedicated his life...to establishing one of the fi nest public museums of modern art in the world.”156

• Sensemakers can never know if they have determined all the solutions to wicked problems. Developing a collectively exhaustive list of 

options is diffi cult even when a complex issue is well understood. 

When the issue is not well understood, or is emerging, such lists 

become almost impossible to complete. In the case at hand, vaccinations, quarantines, and border closings all are suggested as means of 

mitigating a pandemic. However, it remains unknown what else is 

necessary to prevent or stem the spread of viruses and their impact 

on populations. While steps such as closing the borders, closing the 

schools, curfews, and ensuring that people wash their hands can be 

put in place, they can easily reach a point of unmanageability.

• . While there are some Each wicked problem is essentially unique

commonalities between them, each infl uenza pandemic of the 20th 

Century essentially was unique. As Kilbourne notes, “Each diff ered 

from the others with respect to etiologic agents, epidemiology, and 

disease severity.”157

• . Infl Every wicked problem can be embodied in another one uenza typically arises from close contact among animals and humans in agrarian settings. Th us, the infl uenza problem overlaps social problems 

that overlap economic problems and so on...

• How wicked problems are resolved is determined by the means and 

methods used to make sense of them. Means and methods of problem 

solving carry embedded assumptions about their appropriateness, 

the degree to which they are suited to the problem at hand, and of 

what they actually attempt to make sense. In examining a pandemic, 

vaccination strategies lead to certain results, whereas border closures 

lead to other ones.

• . Nor, in the case of pan- Sensemakers have no right to be wrong

demics or other global threats, do their policymaking consumers. When the stakes are the lives of many people, sensemakers 

155 David M. Morens and Jeffery K. Taubenberger, “Influenza and the Origins of The Phillips Collection, Washington, DC,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2006), 79. 

URL: <www.cdc.gov/eid>, accessed 28 March 2007. Cited hereafter as Morens and Taubenberger, “The Phillips Collection.”

156 Morens and Taubenberger, “The Phillips Collection,” 79.

157 Kilbourne, “Influenza,” 9.
33

and policymakers who miscalculate or underestimate or are 

erwise wrong about a pandemic and its impact on their count

or region can expect vilifi cation at best. A fear of such vili

tion from the public and the media might contribute to the s

ation whereby pandemic-tracking organizations such as the U

World Health Organization or the CDC overestimate the seve

and threat posed by a pandemic such as the 2009-2010 Swine 

pandemic.158 For intelligence professionals this phenomeno

not unknown. Common wisdom among intelligence sensema

is that it is far better to warn and be mistaken (and nothing h

pens) than to not warn and be mistaken (something happens)

Complexity

Rittel and Webber’s notions of wicked problems can also be c

acterized through the lens of complexity theory. As developed by Jonat

Rosenhead, “systems of interest to complexity theory, under certain co

tions, perform in regular, predictable ways; under other conditions, 

exhibit behaviour [sic] in which regularity and predictability is lost.”159 

is exceptionally true of intelligence. Certain kinds of issues, including 

interpretable indications of a build-up to armed confl ict, can be extrem

predictable. For example, if one observes a mass of troops approachin

national border and knows that the means by which these troops were tra

includes a doctrine of “mass and attack,” then one might legitimately add

that an attack is likely and imminent. One could even use the past as a m

of prognosticating the future with some degree of legitimate confi dence.

However, in other situations, there may be a number of unknowa

unpredictable, and unanticipatable outcomes. Th us, reliable prognostica

is simply not possible.160 For instance, if a coalition of nations remove

oligarch in another nation from power, the specifi c outcomes of that ac

cannot be known in foresight. While alternative outcomes can be mod

158 Whether overestimation occurred was argued in the European Parliamentary As

bly, although the WHO denied that it occurred. See “WHO Rejects Accusations It Misha

H1N1, Updates Worldwide Stats,” Kaiser Family Foundation, URL: <http://globalhealth.kff

Daily-Reports/2010/January/25/GH-012510-Swine-Flu.aspx?utm_source=feedburner&

medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+kff%2Fkdghpr+%28Kaiser+Daily+Global+He

Policy+Report%29>, accessed 2 February 2010.

159 Jonathan Rosenhead, “Complexity Theory and Management Practice,” URL: <ht

www.human-nature.com/science-as-culture/rosenhead.html>, accessed 23 December 2

Cited hereafter as Rosenhead, “Complexity Theory.” See also, Jonathan Rosenhead, ed., Ra

Analysis for a Problematic World: Problem Structuring Methods for Complexity, Uncertainty 

Conflict, 2nd Edition (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2001).

160 More on this below.
34

and simulated, they remain valuable only as discussion points: there is no 

guarantee in advance that they have captured the reality that will occur. 

Modeling and simulation are feasible because complexity science shows that 

the “indeterminate meanderings of these systems, plotted over time, show 

there is pattern in the movements...the pattern stays within a pattern, a family of trajectories.”161 Unfortunately, because intelligence must address the 

“real” world, rather than its modeled or simulated semblance, events oft en 

are unique and therefore their patterns also are unique.162 Th us, there exists 

an inability to guarantee a future reality; even probabilities may be suspect.

Analysis as here defi ned is insuffi cient to address complexity. Disaggregation simply does not reveal future alternatives. Th at this is so becomes 

obvious if one fi nds that it is the emergence of unique and novel behaviors 

arising from diff erent and minutely diff ering initial conditions that characterize many 21st Century intelligence issues. In these circumstances, the 

whole of an issue is greater than its parts. But, in analysis, the issue is by defi -

nition and practice the sum of its parts.

Given these complex issues, the concept of “analysis” is simply insuffi cient for sensemaking. Instead, greater conceptual accuracy and precision 

of terminology is required. To achieve the needed accuracy and precision 

requires more than semantic invention. It also demands that underlying concepts, known as assumptions or premises, be identifi ed and accounted for. 

Th erefore, in developing the case for considering new paradigms for intelligence, certain terms require explicit (re)defi nition.

Implications of Complexity

Viewed from a larger context, complexity stymies the entire “standard 

model” of intelligence creation. With regard to Kent’s concept of knowledge, 

or how intelligence is created, complexity— as viewed from the framework 

of wicked problems — confounds the consideration and mitigation of such 

problems. Kent’s model of predictive and specifi c warning seems more miss 

than hit. Complexity further confounds the collaborative processes contained 

161 Rosenhead, “Complexity Theory.”

162 It should be noted that some intelligence-associated phenomena do exhibit general 

patterns that may be indicative. Observations of military preparations are an example, although 

caution is necessary when one extrapolates what those observations mean. For example, while 

one may make certain conclusions about a massing of troops on a border in light of who 

trained those troops (as was the case with Iraqi troops massed along the Kuwaiti border in 

1990), what the indicator means may be subject to error. This latter point is illustrated by CIA 

Director John McCone’s conclusion that SA-2 deployments in Cuba indicated strategic nuclear 

missiles were also being deployed. McCone’s conclusion — although it turned out to be correct 

in the Cuban case — ignored the deployment of SA-2s without (presumably) the accompanying 

strategic nuclear-armed missiles to Egypt and Syria that was taking place at the same time. 

See Moore, Critical Thinking.
35

within Kent’s notions of Activity and Organization, by which intelligence 

fessionals are tasked to interact. How does the intelligence professional k

in advance whose imagination will be most helpful in making sense of 

problem at hand in time to prevent a catastrophe or even imagine one? 

example, viewed in hindsight, the Drug Enforcement Administration (D

might have had a key piece of knowledge that would have been usefu

the early apprehension of the December 2009 “underwear bomber.” Cer

illegal drugs — marijuana is one — are oft en “stashed” in a traveler’s un

wear.163 In retrospect, one question becomes, “what else could be carrie

this fashion?”

Asking such questions in retrospect is irrelevant. Th e question sho

have been asked in foresight—but how does an intelligence professiona

even an airline security offi cial know to ask the question in advance? H

again, complexity confounds the necessary collaboration. An intellige

professional might ask, “Which agency or agencies can help me make s

of this issue?” With 17 intelligence agency partners, there are up to 131

possible collaborative combinations—any of which (in various comb

tions) might be valuable.164 Th is number presumes the searching int

gence professional knows which person—and there is only one person

each agency who can help. Th e number grows at least exponentially w

more than one individual at each agency might be helpful. While this s

ation presumes that the intelligence professional does not know who 

person is in advance, in fact the professional does have a likely list of c

tacts, reducing the number of possible combinations dramatically. Still, 

collaboration exercise may be a wicked problem. Th ere may be sets of be

collaborative combinations. Th e key imagination—as characterized by 

DEA in the example above—may not be part of the collaborating group. 

challenge is to determine a best collaborative combination prior to the e

and develop believeable scenarios of what might transpire.165 Finall

163 The author presumes the DEA is aware of this practice and would think of it if a

“how might one transport something without its being detected.” The author’s youthful o

vations while growing up in the American Southwest as well as discussions with state and 

law enforcement officials engaged in intelligence-led policing training suggest the pract

fairly widespread.

164 The formula for such calculations is 2 raised to the power of the number of varia

in this case intelligence agencies, or 17, minus 1 (2n - 1). See David T. Moore and Willia

Reynolds, “So Many Ways To Lie: The Complexity of Denial and Deception,” Defense Intellig

Journal, vol. 15, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 95-116. While the author and William Reynolds dis

complexity calculations in the context of denial and deception, the same notions app

collaboration.

165 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, “Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic 

prise,” in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Ca

Global Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 94. Cited hereaft

Schwartz and Randall, “Ahead of the Curve.”
36

must lead to an action. As Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall write, “Achieving believability and action requires a depth of insight and understanding 

that is rare.”166

Given the challenges of both tame and wicked 21st Century intelligence problems and their inherent complexity, what are intelligence professionals to do? One avenue open to them, and presented below, is the 

development and validation of methods of reasoning about key evidence.

166 Schwartz and Randall, “Ahead of the Curve,” 94.
37

CHAPTER 3

From Normal to Revolutionary 

Intelligence

Evidence-Based Intelligence Creation

Intelligence sensemakers use more than context-less data and in

mation. Th ey employ assemblages of evidence—at a minimum, collection

data and information determined through marshaling to be relevant to 

issue under consideration—in other words, contextualized to specifi c iss

Evidence reveals alternative explanations through pattern-primed, indu

inferences about what is going to happen or what has happened already in 

past.167 While the inferences are typically uncertain, they do justify be

about phenomena. Justifying beliefs (or theories or hypotheses) presen

case for their accuracy but does not guarantee ground (or any other) “tru

Rather, as Peter Kosso notes, justifying beliefs is “about meeting the stand

of evidence and reason [to] indicate [the] likelihood of accuracy.”168 Se

makers go further and seek to demonstrate that the knowledge of tenden

they establish provides for “a correlation between being more justifi ed 

being true.”169 For example, during a recent exercise in which the author 

a participant, one team reached an inferential conclusion about a likely ex

nation of the phenomenon being examined. Th e participants were prese

with a set of previously determined alternative conclusions and a set of 

posedly relevant evidence and asked to assess which (if any) conclusions w

justifi ed and true. Aft er reaching an initial position they then were requ

to consider an alternative conclusion that presumed their original conclu

was false. In so doing they found that while the original conclusion init

167 Reasoning about past events remains easier than reasoning about the future. I

former case, the evidence may be contradictory, deceptive, and subject to more than one 

pretation. However, it tends to be more complete and marshaled (or at least discovera

When looking to the future the important consideration is that much of the evidence doe

yet exist. The events described by precursor information may not have occurred. Additio

the tests of the information that transform it into evidence necessarily remain incomplet

168 Peter Kosso, “Introduction: The Epistemology of Archaeology,” in Garrett G. Fa

Archaeological Fantasies: How Pseudoarchaeology Misrepresents the Past and Misleads the P

(London, UK: Routledge, 2006), 4. Cited hereafter as Kosso, “Epistemology.”

169 Kosso, “Epistemology,” 4.
38

appeared more accurate, the latter one was in fact “true.” Th is was in part 

because they made wishful assumptions about the evidence they used to justify their conclusions. As Kosso observes, “more justifi cation is better, since it 

raises the likelihood of accuracy. But it is certainly possible for a well-justifi ed 

belief to be false.”170 Th is realization on the part of the participants subsequently led to a more critical assessment of the evidence, much of which was 

found to be false. Th ey discovered that “justifi cation comes in degrees, but 

truth does not.”171

It is arguable whether greater evidentiary justifi cation demonstrates 

the likelihood of a strongly accurate correlation with truth. As Kosso makes 

clear, even with abundant justifi cation, there is no certainty of truth. Th erefore, according to Kosso, it “is the task of the systematic disciplines...to refi ne 

carefully the content of justifi cation, the evidence and the network of theoretical beliefs, to bring justifi cation into ever closer correlation with truth.”172

If intelligence is to “speak truth to power” it must fi rst ensure its words are 

well and critically justifi ed.173

As fi gure 1 illustrates, intelligence sensemaking is conducted in service of a number of goals, including describing states of aff airs, explaining 

phenomena, interpreting events and actions, and estimating the likelihood 

and impact of a foe’s future actions As intelligence professionals move from 

describing events, explaining patterns of behavior, and grasping underlying 

factors and intentions, ever more justifi cation of beliefs about the phenomena under scrutiny is required. Yet, as intelligence professionals attempt to 

apply greater scrutiny in this sequence, their capability to do so decreases 

as they face greater ambiguity.

Additionally, we may expect that sensemakers will more oft en be 

wrong in off ering estimations about phenomena than when they are merely 

describing them. Th is is in part because of an interesting reality characterized by Taleb: To predict the future we must already know the future.174

What Taleb means is that one has to already have visualized what the 

future will be in order to estimate it. Kosso, in writing about epistemic science, elaborates:

170 Kosso, “Epistemology,” 4.

171 Kosso, “Epistemology,” 4.

172 Kosso, “Epistemology,” 5.

173 The aphorism “speak truth to power” is variously (and wishfully) ascribed to Sherman 

Kent. Research by the author and discussions with former intelligence officers who knew and 

worked with Kent fails to reveal this to be the case. Intelligence strives to ensure its findings are 

factual and — to the best knowledge of its creators —“true.”

174 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York, 

NY: Random House, 2007), 173. Cited hereafter as Taleb, The Black Swan.
39

[Th e] knowledge claims are more ambitious in that they stray further from what is immediately observed...Th e theoretical descriptions are based on observation and evidence...But it is important to 

note that the observations themselves are based on theory. Scientifi c evidence, aft er all, is neither haphazard nor uninterpreted, and 

some prior conceptual understanding of nature will inform decisions about what to observe, which observations are credible, what 

the observation means, and how what is observed is causally (and 

hence intentionally) linked to what is not observed. Th eory is necessary to turn mindless sensations into meaningful evidence.175

While Kosso writes in the language of science, his argument app

as well to Manjoo’s “post-fact” world of which intelligence oft en attem

to make sense.176 Intelligence is created ultimately from human, sens

mediated observations of phenomena. Further, intelligence evidence, w

175 Kosso, “Epistemology,” 5.

176 By “post-fact” Manjoo refers to a tendency to ignore evidence in favor of pred

mined conclusions. Common examples include the arguments of pseudosciences suc

astrology or intelligent design. A more serious example is manifested by parents who refu

due to pseudoscientific (and disproved) conclusions — to vaccinate their children. Within t

this tendency manifests itself when intelligence professionals let predetermined conclu

drive their intelligence creation efforts rather than let evidence go in search of hypothese

Figure 1. Types of Intelligence and the Phenomena They Characterize.

Complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty increase as one moves from Descripti

to Estimative Intelligence.

Source: Author.

Description Explanation Interpretation Estimation

Problem Ambiguity and Solution Uncertainty Increase

Patterns of 

Behavior

Underlying 

Factors

and Intentions

Events

Problem Clarity and Solution Certainty Increase
40

it may appear to remain “haphazard,” is the result of systematic foraging, 

gathering and interpretation. Th e past tells intelligence practitioners what 

to look for in the future. Th is poses dangers when those indicators are no 

longer (if indeed they ever were) valid. As Baruch Fischoff suggests, “searching for wisdom in historic events requires an act of faith—a belief in the 

existence of recurrent patterns waiting to be discovered.”177 Yet, while general patterns may exist, “the past never repeats itself in detail.”178 In other 

words one might detect indicators suggesting that an upcoming event similar to one in the past is possible, likely, or even reasonable. On this basis, one 

could, for example, have anticipated that sooner or later foreign terrorists 

would again attack the United States by targeting some high-value building 

or event, such as the World Trade Center.179 Th is is a far cry from predicting 

that Al Qaeda terrorists would fl y airplanes into the World Trade Center and 

the Pentagon on the morning of 11 September 2001.180 Finally, intelligence 

practitioners making sense of issues rely heavily on theories, which if unacknowledged, essentially are unexamined assumptions.

If using the past to gain wisdom about what the future holds is not 

feasible, what about studying the past to avoid folly? Tversky and Kahneman’s 

work on availability leads one to suspect (as Fischoff also notes) that focusing 

on misfortunes “disproportionately enhance[s] their perceived frequency.”181

Another challenge to considering the past as a teacher of what not to do is 

that one may not properly understand the problem. While understanding 

may be possible (or even easier) when dealing with Tame Problems — as has 

been discussed above, when considering Wicked Problems, such understanding is elusive at best and is dependent on the methods chosen to deal with the 

problem; in other words, woefully incomplete.

177 Baruch Fischoff, “For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in 

Hindsight,” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 

Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 338. Cited hereafter 

as Fischoff, “Condemned to Study the Past.”

178 Fischoff, “Condemned to Study the Past,” 336.

179 On 26 February 1993, a truck bomb placed by Islamic terrorists exploded below one 

of the buildings of the World Trade Center and was apparently intended to topple both towers. 

For a discussion of the security implications, see Laurie Mylroie, “Who is Ramzi Yousef? And 

Why It Matters,” The National Interest, 22 December 1995. Available at URL: <http://www.fas.

org/irp/world/iraq/956-tni.htm>, accessed 12 October 2010.

180 Such an attack had been anticipated. As Schwartz and Randall comment, “many people did anticipate the terrorist attacks of September 11 [2001]...Yet most Americans, as well 

as officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, focused their attention elsewhere 

while the inevitable grew imminent.” Schwartz and Randall, “Ahead of the Curve,” 94.

181 Fischoff, “Condemned to Study the Past,” 339. See also Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,” Cognitive Psychology, 

vol. 5 (1973): 207-232.
41

With the intention to improve evidence-based intelligence creat

recent legislation “reforming” intelligence goes so far as to require that “a

native analysis” be conducted.182 Th e IC, at least through its schools, in

prets this to mean that multiple hypotheses be considered. Th e relevant 

mentions “red teaming: a means by which another group of intelligence 

fessionals consider alternative explanations for an issue being scrutinized

Th e legislation leaves unexamined the question of whether the criteria 

sensemaking will be met in examining tame problems and especially wic

problems arising from consideration of adversarial intentions.

If, for example, one estimates that a particular country whose p

cies one’s own government generally opposes will develop both a long-ra

missile capability and a nuclear weapons capability and then marry the 

together, one has to have already imagined, in the context of the target co

try’s political and technological environment, what a long-range mi

capability is, what a nuclear weapon is, what a weapon of mass destruc

is, and a strong sense of the will to combine these threat elements. P

cymakers may challenge the target country’s actions, making their lea

more adversarial. Th us, at a minimum, intelligence and policy create 

future—or a version of it. Done poorly, this can lead to unintended and d

gerous implications.

Emerging from this mélange are hypotheses that are ripe for disc

fi rmation, although a tendency to compound uncertainties on the par

intelligence professionals and their consumers my serve to prevent this f

occurring. If in fact, in the example above the assessment is wrong, and 

nuclear capability assessed to be for weapons really is intended to provid

alternative to the nation’s dependency on a dwindling supply of increasi

more expensive petroleum as a source of energy, and the missiles suppo

nascent space program designed to orbit telecommunications satellites 

can fulfi ll the country’s needs and those of their neighbors as well as ge

ate income for the government, then sensemakers and policymakers on 

sides will have extrapolated inappropriate patterns arising from a misun

stood present. In a tense bilateral or even multilateral environment, rhet

and actions can precipitate events so as to create a future consistent w

those pattern-derived conclusions, driving the target country to produce 

weapons. Each side then blames the other nation’s government for hav

“caused” the crisis.

182 U.S. Congress, IRTPA, 2004, 33.

183 U.S. Congress, IRTPA 2004, 33.
42

Th ere are a number reasons why such faulty causal networks occur. 

Honest evidentiary considerations demand a degree of agnosticism about the 

theories being justifi ed. Evidence-based knowledge, as Peter Kosso’s epigraph at the beginning of this book acknowledges, is not absolute; justifi ed 

evidence changes theories and not the other way around. In other words, 

when interpretations of the evidence lead to coherent alternative inferential 

conclusions, then the existing or accepted theories require changing. What 

must not happen is to reinterpret the evidence to support the prevailing preexisting theory, as is the case in the above example.

However, this is exactly what happens all too oft en. People are oft en 

unwilling to abandon their cherished positions. Th is occurs in part because 

they are not dispassionate as they reason about evidence. In other words, 

positions are infl uenced by various worldviews or cognitive approaches, 

particularly selective perception and selective exposure. Th ese combine to 

steer how people recognize issues, the phenomena that comprise them, and 

how they go about making sense of them.184 Th ese infl uences or theoretical 

frameworks shape the patterns people use to interpret new phenomena. Th e 

benefi t is that these frameworks make people smart and do so quickly.185

However, this benefi t depends on the existence of a repetition of observed 

phenomena. In order to work successfully, an intuitive framework for understanding requires at least a similar situation, a condition that may not occur 

with intelligence phenomena.

In an information-rich environment brought about by technical collection, intelligence professionals can select inappropriate patterns to use in 

making sense of new phenomena. In intelligence work, if such patterns conspire to aff ect the search for and the selection of the evidence sensemakers 

use, and that they and their consumers then accept, selective perception and 

selective exposure set the stage for intelligence error and failure.

Evidence always requires a context, and as the missile example illustrates, there may be more than one explanatory context that makes sense. In 

intelligence, “evidence is [particularly] rarely self-suffi cient in information or 

credibility.”186 Additionally, the dispassionate nature of evidence itself, when 

184 For more information on frameworks or “heuristics” that people employ to cope with 

judgments about which they are uncertain, the reader should consult the works of Daniel 

Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel 

Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

185 This is the premise of Gerd Gigerenzer’s book Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart 

(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). These patterns of behavior evolved as survival 

mechanisms and by and large they have sufficed — the human species survives to the present.

186 Kosso, “Epistemology,” 8.
43

viewed outside its political and social context, contributes to a failure to 

quately explore issues. In other words, unless the correct context is kno

evidence—if its constituent information can even meet that thresho

is subject to many diff erent interpretations. Without context the per

assessing the evidence has no way of knowing which interpretation is 

rect. Multiple contexts further confound the situation, for diff erent cont

oft en lead to alternative conclusions as was illustrated in the missile de

opment scenario just described. Finally, as Hampson’s essay reveals, 

political context of the policymaker may skew the actual context conve

by intelligence.187

What is occurring in the contextual consideration of evidence 

process of epistemological justifi cation and as Kosso notes the “key conce

to distinguish knowledge, on the one hand, from mere belief, opinion, dog

and wishful thinking, on the other.”188 In relation to intelligence, knowle

depends on contextual justifi cation of evidence and, as noted earlier, 

“business of epistemology is to show that there is a correlation between b

more justifi ed and being more likely to be true.”189

Despite their inherently greater inaccuracy, predictions seem to 

ner more interest from consumers than do explanations. In biology, predic

hypotheses require accommodation to valid background information in o

to be useful.190 Is this true in intelligence? As illustrated by two National in

ligence Estimates (NIE’s) dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WM

that were subsequently found to be wrong, incorrect predictions certainly 

ner considerable attention. In these cases, the incorrect predictions perh

resulted in part from a lack of time available for their preparation. In the 

case, the estimate on whether or not the Soviets would place strategic nuc

missiles in Cuba in 1962 was written in a week.191 In the case of Sad

Hussein’s WMD programs, the preparation time was three weeks. Such s

time frames for preparation would seem to prevent new information and 

187 Hampson, “The Divided Decision-Maker.”

188 Kosso, “Epistemology,” 4.

189 Kosso, “Epistemology,” 4.

190 Kathrin Stanger-Hall and others, “Accommodation or Prediction?” Letter in resp

to Peter Lipton, “Testing Hypotheses: Prediction and Prejudice,” Science, vol. 308, no. 

(3 June 2005), 1409.

191 Admittedly this is hindsight analysis. Sherman Kent, writing in 1964, asserts th

retrospect the authors did have sufficient time to assess the evidence. See Kent, “A Crucia

mate Relived,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 8, no. 2 (Spring 1964):1-18. Originally clas

SECRET, it was declassified and reprinted in Studies in Intelligence, vol. 36, no. 5 (1

111-119. Kent carefully considers the reasons why the estimate was wrong and why it wa

revised. Among the reasons cited was the presumption that past precedents of Soviet fo

policy would continue into the future. Thus, no offensive missiles would be deployed in Cu
44

from being collected and made relevant to the issues (i.e. marshaled as evidence), and prevented alternative perspectives from being fully explored.192

A lack of time typifi es one context of intelligence sensemaking. Th is 

context in which intelligence professionals work and the constraints imposed 

upon them facilitate their successes but also their failures. As the above examples demonstrate, intelligence sensemakers are oft en under pressure to consider massive amounts of data and information in a short time. Th ese same 

professionals must marshal the data and information into evidence even as 

they attempt to understand, and then explain, the associated complex issues 

to policy- and decisionmaking consumers.

Finally, the current and past practice of intelligence in the U.S. is 

consistent with a focus on prediction rather than explanation as its ultimate 

purpose. Th is has not been without critique. Willmoore Kendall, in reviewing Kent’s book in 1949 for World Politics, criticized Kent’s “compulsive 

preoccupation with prediction.”193 Given the experience of Kent and others 

during World War II, it is not surprising that the desire to prevent another 

Pearl Harbor dominated their practices; such a desire naturally would have 

led to an activity organized around the creation of surprise-preventing predictive knowledge.194

Considering the Normal

Th e process described in the preceding section can be thought of as 

“normal intelligence.” As conceived by Th omas Kuhn, “normal” refers to “the 

relatively routine work...within a paradigm, slowly accumulating detail in 

accord with established broad theory, not actually challenging or attempting 

to test the underlying assumptions of that theory.”195 We can thus see that 

“normal intelligence” is an activity of expanding knowledge in which most 

intelligence professionals engage and which incrementally increases knowledge about targeted phenomena.196 Th e professionals work within a model 

192 The Senate report on the Iraqi WMD noted that alternatives were not explored although 

this is not the case with the aluminum tubes alternately argued to be for centrifuges and rockets. In this case a groupthink framework seems to have shaped the results. See United States 

Senate, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 

Select Senate Committee on Intelligence, 108th Congress, 7 July 2004, 18, 21.

193 Kendall, “Function of Intelligence,” 549.

194 Given a “worst-case” perspective about WMD such a perspective perhaps also partially 

explains points of view about Iraq’s alleged WMD programs leading up to the 2002 estimate. It 

does not, however, explain the apparent 9/11 “failures of imagination.”

195 Wikipedia, entry under “Normal Science,” URL: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_

science>, accessed 26 September 2007.

196 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 

Press, 1962), 10-42, Cited hereafter as Kuhn, Structure.
45

or “paradigm” of reality forged during the Second World War and reinfo

throughout the ensuing Cold War. Th e perceived and recalled successe

the past contribute to the repeat use of unvalidated tradecraft . Th e p

digm presumes state-level adversaries — eventually with mutually dest

tive capabilities.

As used in this context, “normal intelligence” is to “intelligence

Th omas Kuhn’s “normal science” is to “science.” In both domains newly 

ated knowledge incrementally adds to an increasingly established parad

new knowledge does not easily redefi ne the paradigm. Even the anoma

and truly unknown are only considered in terms of what is known. Nor

science or normal intelligence does not seek to revise signifi cantly the p

digm by which new phenomena are known and understood. Th is may be 

in the way new intelligence personnel adopt existing job accounts. A comm

practice involves their reviewing previous reporting on the account, wi

tendency for new reporting to stay within the conceptual boundaries of w

has gone before. Knowledge increases only incrementally.

Intelligence practitioners working within the paradigm of nor

intelligence attempt to describe, explain, or predict phenomena cohere

In this case, the term refers to another concept developed by Kuhn: A c

mon framework for understanding the phenomena is sought or presum

New knowledge is understood in the context of the dominant paradigm. 

example, normal intelligence of the latter half of the 20th century underst

events in relation to the missions and goals of U.S. adversaries, principally 

former Soviet Union and to a lesser degree, China. World aff airs were un

stood in the context of the state-based adversaries’ hegemonic competi

with the United States.

Normal paradigms prevail until previously unnoticed and un

ticeable discrepancies create suffi cient inconsistencies in explaining 

understanding phenomena so as to cause errors that cannot be ignored. 

Kuhn this means a necessary change in scientists’ perception of the real

as characterized by science. Kuhn illustrates this with an example of th

transition from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy. Before it 

occurred, the sun and moon were planets, the earth was not. Aft er 

it, the earth was a planet, like Mars and Jupiter; the sun was a star, 

and the moon was a new sort of body, a satellite. Changes of that 

sort were not simply corrections of individual mistakes embedded in the Ptolemaic system...they involved not only changes in 

laws of nature but also changes in the criteria by which some terms 

in those laws are attached to nature. Th ese criteria, furthermore, 
46

were in part dependent upon the theory with which they were 

introduced.197

In the physical sciences, the phenomena themselves do not change (although 

newly noticed phenomena could make it appear so). In the cultural environment of human interaction, the new perceptions of reality can be enough to 

force a reconsideration of the old. In social scientifi c terms, a new paradigm 

not only explains the new, it does better at explaining the old. Further, even 

the language previously employed to describe a phenomenon is inadequate 

because — as Kuhn notes —“scientifi c development cannot be quite cumulative. One cannot get from the old to the new simply by an addition to what 

was already known.”198

Failures to consider discrepancies lead prospective intelligence sensemakers to retain an invalid understanding of phenomena even as the phenomena themselves change. Th is larger discrepancy leads either to intelligence 

error or intelligence failure. Once again, within the Kentian paradigm, intelligence errors derive from “factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from 

poor or missing data.”199 Conversely, as has been noted, intelligence failures 

refer to “systemic organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, missing, 

discarded, or inadequate hypotheses.”200 Within the former concept there 

is a presumption that if more data are available or better understood, errors 

can be prevented. In the latter, intelligence practitioners or their policymaking customers have misunderstood the issue and its context.

Th e existence of particular intelligence errors does not necessarily 

indicate a paradigm has changed. However, repeated intelligence errors do. 

As is the case with science, small errors in adequately characterizing phenomena lead to the emergence of “corrective constants.” Th e sensemaker 

may have made a perceptual or interpretive error. However, left unchecked, 

errors eventually combine to cause systemic failures. Intelligence practitioners and policymakers repeatedly may come to incorrect conclusions from 

faulty sensemaking, leading to policy failures, defi ned by Rob Johnston as 

“systemic organizational surprise” resulting from a mixture of practitioners’ lapses and policymakers’ ignoring proff ered intelligence.201 Th e more 

197 Thomas S. Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn, The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 

1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview, James Conant and John Haugeland, eds. 

(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 15. Cited hereafter as Kuhn, The Road 

Since Structure.

198 Kuhn, The Road Since Structure, 15.

199 Johnston, Analytic Culture, 6.

200 Johnston, Analytic Culture, 6.

201 Johnston, Analytic Culture, 6.
47

germane interpretation off ered in the present work is that intelligence 

ure stems from inadequacies on the part of both policymaker and int

gence professionals to recognize a fundamental, revolutionary shift of 

intelligence context.

Th e state-as-adversary paradigm for intelligence creation is obso

Two decades now separate the interpretable intelligence context from th

the Cold War: the adversaries and issues are now strikingly diff erent.202 

power of the Soviet Union waned dramatically aft er 1990 as that of C

increased. But even more central to the intelligence context, novel phen

ena also appeared that were non-state based: emerging non-state actors po

new challenges by threatening traditional state structures. Emerging p

nomena such as disease and climate change imposed new complexities. 

anomalies these new phenomena have created illustrate how and why 

mal intelligence is no longer adequate: it could no longer characterize t

phenomena within the threat and opportunity framework of strategic in

ligence. Th e “normal” means by which error is explained remain inadequ

As documented in the various Congressional and independent commis

reports, intelligence no longer adequately describes, explains, or predicts w

respect to the phenomena its consumers need to understand. Th us, int

gence change is necessary—revolutionary change.

Paradigm Shift

Revolutions in science, politics, and military aff airs occur bec

crises reveal the insuffi ciency of the reigning paradigm. As Kuhn notes

existing paradigm can “cease to function adequately in the exploration o

aspect of nature to which the paradigm itself [has] previously led the way

Kuhn argues further that science does not evolve smoothly. Rather, peri

revolutions change how phenomena are perceived and understood.204 

ses are a precursor of such paradigm shift s. Analogously to Kuhn’s noti

the (offi cially) serious failures of the Intelligence Community to predict 

attacks of 11 September 2001 and the state of Saddam Hussein’s program

202 It should be noted that the traditional adversaries of the Cold War remain th

While an argument can be made that other issues overshadow the dangers they pose, i

also be claimed that emerging threats simply compound the traditional ones. 21st Ce

dangers are complex; one of their dangers is their complexity.

203 Kuhn, Structure, 92.

204 Kuhn, Structure, 92-110.
48

WMD (both in 1990 and prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq) are examples of 

systemic reframing crises.205

If we review these failures through their offi cial re-examinations, 

certain phrases recur: mind-sets, politicization, and faulty analysis. Across 

the same period, there are repeated attempts to impose methods of “[social] 

scientifi c study...to analysis of complex ongoing situations and estimates of 

likely future events.”206 What is lacking is any sort of a systematic approach 

across the Intelligence Community. As long-time practitioner and observer 

Jack Davis noted a decade ago, no corporate standards for how intelligence is 

created, including the methods employed, exist.207 Although sound practice 

does not ensure that intelligence assessments will be correct, its absence, by 

defi nition, contributes to fl awed conclusions. Contributing to this scenario is 

the fact, as Aris Pappas and James Simon observe, that “[potential] opponents 

[are] oft en...driven by emotional agendas that [make] them unpredictable.”208

While eff ective practice might not drive the production of sound estimates 

from ambiguous evidence, it would routinely alert practitioners to the prospect that these same opponents’ actions are unpredictable or at best, that they 

are predictable within a range of behaviors.

In short, U.S. intelligence professionals operate in an environment 

similar to an unfolding Kuhnian revolution: the epistemology of normal 

intelligence is insuffi cient and new knowledge is needed. Th e recent failures 

highlight the necessity for change, as does the graying of the intelligence sensemaking workforce—new people faced with new and emerging issues should 

be comfortable with fi nding new ways to systematize their work. Th e changed 

contexts and data, once they confront practitioners with problems that are 

205 The argument that these were crises in reframing rests on the observation that intelligence practitioners were as shocked at the inaccuracy of their estimates as were the surprised 

policymakers. In the case of the 2000 estimates of Iraqi WMD, the CIA underestimated the state 

of Iraqi WMD, leading to a claim that the apparent overestimation in the 2002 estimate was 

compensation for that earlier error. While admitting to the underestimation, a CIA press release 

adds, “in no case were any of the judgments [in the 2002 estimate] ‘hyped’ to compensate for 

earlier underestimates.” See, Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s WMD Programs: Culling Hard 

Facts from Soft Myths,” Press Release, 28 November 2003, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2003/pr11282003.html>, 

accessed 9 December 2009.

206 Jack Davis, “Introduction — Improving Intelligence Analysis at CIA: Dick Heuer’s Contribution to Intelligence Analysis,” in Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis

(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), xv. Cited hereafter as Davis, 

“Improving Intelligence.”

207 Davis, “Improving Intelligence,” xxv.

208 Aris A. Pappas and James M. Simon, Jr., “The Intelligence Community: 2001-2015: 

Daunting Challenges, Hard Decisions,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 46, no. 1 (2002), URL: 

<http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol46no1/article05.html>, last accessed 10 January 2006.
49

unintelligible in normal intelligence, will refl ect the idea that a Kuhnian-s

revolution in intelligence is underway.

However, a caveat is necessary. Not all “old school” intelligence p

tices are without continuing value. Several signifi cant state-level adversa

remain as threats to the security of the American nation although they too 

challenged by the new non-state actors and issues that populate the parad

of the new intelligence—something that compounds any estimate of 

they are likely to engage the United States. Further, in many circumsta

and in dealing with certain issues, the tacit expertise of highly experien

intelligence professionals is appropriately tapped for “recognition-prim

sensemaking.209 Th ese “old hands” possess both current knowledge an

highly evolved skill set. Years of innovative and critical thinking mean 

are skilled in looking at issues from a variety of perspectives and have 

wisdom of deep context. It is no accident, therefore that the contributor

Roger George and James Bruce’s recent book, Analyzing Intelligence, are 

senior intelligence practitioners.210 Th e challenges involve knowing w

such expertise is valuable and needed in the fi rst place, and encouraging 

intelligence enterprise to develop and retain the cognitive and organizati

fl exibility that such thinking requires.

Indeed, a part of successful and revolutionized intelligence w

involves gleaning new meanings from old patterns that have remained 

den to those who have stopped short of sensemaking. One challenge is 

the “fresh” eyes lack the knowledge of potentially relevant patterns while 

“old” eyes cannot see things as new. Each lacks the other’s strength. Exp

ence acquired by newer professionals who engage in the practice of tr

tional “analysis” jaundices their once-fresh viewpoints even as they star

acquire the relevant and necessary experience.

One solution may be to adopt a model of core competencies bro

out according to task analyses of existing intelligence missions and functi

Such a model identifi es what is needed and has been at least partially im

mented in the IC’s Analytic Resource Catalog developed during the tenur

former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet.211 Rewarding the 

cessful use of some of the most important competencies may also encou

209 Robert Hoffman, conversation with the author, 4 October 2007.

210 Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles

Innovations (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).

211 Mark M. Lowenthal, “Foreword,” in Moore, Critical Thinking, xi.
50

their retention in the catalog. Among these are curiosity, perseverance, and 

pattern recognition.212

A necessary fi rst step in a revolution in intelligence work is looking in 

depth at what it is intelligence professionals do, must do, and how they do it. 

Simply put, intelligence practitioners create knowledge to support their customers. As used here, intelligence practitioners are presumed to be contributors to government plans and policies at a variety of levels where they have 

the opportunity to share broad strategic perspectives with national leaders as 

well as ensure that deployed warfi ghters have at hand the fruits of technical 

collection and marshaling of tactical data.

Finally, it should be noted that intelligence Knowledge is only one 

component of a strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence triumvirate.213 Activity and Organization are the other two. It is the author’s belief 

that Activity and Organization also are in need of new paradigms. However, 

such a discussion hinges on what intelligence Knowledge is and how it is 

created—in short, the sensemaking involved. Insofar as Activity describes 

how the precursors of intelligence are hunted, gathered, made sense of, and 

transformed into knowledge, it is considered here. However, the uses of intelligence (also an activity) and how intelligence professionals are grouped, led, 

and managed to act and create knowledge—the realm of Organization—lie 

beyond the scope of this book.

212 For more on core competencies for successful intelligence work see David T. Moore and 

Lisa Krizan, “Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the National Security Agency,” in 

Russell G. Swenson, ed., Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices (Washington, DC: Joint Intelligence Military College, 2003): 95-132. Cited hereafter as Moore and 

Krizan, “Core Competencies.”

213 Kent identified and developed three concepts related to strategic intelligence: Knowledge or what is produced and disseminated; Activity, or how such knowledge is produced and 

disseminated; and Organization, or how people are grouped to produce and disseminate such 

knowledge. Kent, Strategic Intelligence. Moore and Krizan advocated this approach in their competency work. See Moore and Krizan, “Core Competencies” and David T. Moore, Lisa Krizan, 

and Elizabeth J. Moore, “Evaluating Intelligence: A Competency-Based Approach,” International 

Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005).
51

CHAPTER 4: 

Th e Shape of Intelligence 

Sensemaking

Intelligence Sensemaking involves a number of overlapping h

level activities. First, intelligence professionals engage in planning or de

and then hunt for and gather the materials they require in order to un

stand issues, answer questions, or explore new ideas. Th ey can be ex

nally motivated by the needs of a customer or they can be self-motiv

as a result of an observation, or both. Second, these professionals disag

gate and then reassemble relevant information, trying to determine wh

means. At every stage in their work they assess critically their processes 

results, seeking to validate both how they are engaged and the outco

of their engagements. Th ese overlapping activities can be characterize

Planning, Foraging, Marshaling, Understanding, and Communicat

Th ey are supported by Questioning and Assessing. Although these elem

are discussed separately, it is of course only through their applied inte

tion that they describe sensemaking.

Planning for Tame and Wicked 

Intelligence Problems

Making sense of either tame or wicked problems is predicated u

planning. Plans, according to Gary Klein, are “prescriptions or roadmap

procedures that can be followed to reach some goal, with perhaps some m

fi cation based on monitoring outcomes.”214 Creating plans requires “choo

and organizing courses of action on the basis of assumptions about what 

happen in the future.”215 Known as planning, this process characterizes 

“contingencies and interdependencies such as actions that must occur fi r

a precondition for later actions.”216 When we add the concept that pract

ners—through critical thinking—also engage in refl ective thinking and le

ing, both singularly and collaboratively, we may similarly label this pro

“the art of intelligence design.”

214 Gary Klein, “Flexecution as a Paradigm for Replanning, Part 1,” IEEE Intelligent Sys

vol. 22, no. 5 (September/October 2007), 79. Cited hereafter as Klein, “Flexecution 1.”

215 Klein, “Flexecution 1,” 79.

216 Klein, “Flexecution 1,” 79.
52

With tame problems, where answers and solutions can be anticipated, algorithms can calculate actionable probabilities and repeatedly make 

sense of the problem.217 Th e design of useful algorithms may be complex 

and they operate well only in fi nite and specifi c environments. How, on the 

other hand does one plan or design for wicked problems? One answer is to 

re-imagine the wicked problem as a tame one. However, the repeated occurrence of “unintended consequences” in past scenarios suggests that this is not 

a good option. Disaggregating what are assumed to be tame problems into 

their component parts, regardless of the actual problem type, oft en proves 

inadequate, as unintended and unforeseen consequences make clear.

Yet planning must occur regardless of problem type. Otherwise, 

dealing with problems becomes a process of trial and error with no means 

of agreement on assessing the solutions or even on what are the solutions. 

Klein considers— along with Rittel and Webber —that planning is an emergent process: Goals are clarifi ed and revised as understanding of the problem grows.218 He notes,

Goals can be dynamic and can change completely as a function of 

changing circumstances. Goals can confl ict with other goals in ways 

we can’t anticipate or resolve in advance. Goals can carry implications we can’t perceive or anticipate until events transpire.219

In terms of intelligence creation, this means that larger, strategic goals 

can—and perhaps must—emerge as sense is made of the problems under 

scrutiny. Th us, a tasking from an intelligence consumer changes as mindful sense is made of the tasking itself, of the resources that are available for 

understanding it, and the mix of actors involved.

 Klein refers to this refl ective problem planning as “fl exible execution” or “Flexecution.”220 Within the framework of intelligence sensemaking, 

it provides a self-refl ective process—at the individual and organizational levels—that monitors the goals and whether what is understood or being done is 

consistent with those goals, modifying those goals as understanding emerges. 

For example, in examining the situation in Cuba during the summer of 1962, 

the understanding of the intelligence professionals at the Refugee Processing 

Center in Miami developed as the summer progressed. A new understanding emerged of what the Soviet forces deployed to the island might be doing. 

217 Gary Klein, “Flexecution as a Paradigm for Replanning, Part 2,” IEEE Intelligent Systems, 

vol. 22, no. 5 (November/December 2007), 112. Cited hereafter as Klein, “Flexecution 2.”

218 Klein, “Flexecution 1,” 81.

219 Klein, “Flexecution 1,” 81.

220 Klein, “Flexecution 2, 108.
53

Intelligence planning took place as sense was being made of the situat

(fi nally) monitoring what they were observing and what it meant. Such de

erations apparently led two analysts to conclude that the indicators for s

tegic nuclear missiles deployed in Cuba might be valid, resulting in the 

overfl ight of 14 October 1962 and the “discovery” of the missiles.221 Un

tunately, as has been noted, the intelligence professionals were not suffi cie

fl exible in their planning to consider that other types of nuclear missiles 

might be (and in fact were) deployed on the island.

As summarized in table 3, fl executive planning seems ideally st

tured for making sense of wicked problems and taking advantage of 

peculiar capability that intelligence has to initiate information actions 

then clandestinely determine the adversary’s reactions to it. Intelligence 

fessionals are well placed to learn of changes in planning or strategy on 

part of adversaries as well as of their own decisionmakers. One can n

be certain that all potential planning options are known, but by focusin

“alternative goals and priorities” to which an adversary might migrate, 

the potential actions both at the onset of the sensemaking process an

221 Garthoff, “US Intelligence,” 23.

Table 3. Classical Planning and Execution Versus Flexecution

Classical Planning/

Execution Flexecution

End state Known Unknown

Preparation Alternative courses 

of action

Contingencies

Alternative goals and 

priorities

Potential actions

Mode Increase constraints 

and control

Fix/fl ex cycles

Prior plans Useful Often obsolete

Commander’s intent Fixed Continually adjusted

Shows goal priorities

Shows trade-offs

Strategy Management by 

Objectives

Management by 

Discovery

Accountability Clear Unclear

Source: Gary Klein, “Flexecution as a Paradigm for Replanning, Part 2,” IEEE 

Intelligent Systems, vol. 22, no. 5 (November/December 2007), 112.
54

a part of an ongoing, mindful critical refl ection, one comes to understand 

the alternative goals and priorities of one’s own actors as well as those of 

the adversary.222

Foraging

Hunting and Gathering

If, as Baumard asserts, “Intelligence, a continuous human activity, 

gives sense to the stimuli received from the environment [then] these stimuli 

[must] be passively or actively sought.”223 Th is requires hunting and gathering. Th ey comprise foraging, which in turn refers to “a wide search over 

an area in order to obtain something.”224 Whether it describes birds seeking life-sustaining berries, bees scouting for pollen, or people searching for 

information, foraging describes how animals go about satisfying their needs. 

For intelligence professionals, foraging describes the means by which the raw 

materials needed to notice and make sense of phenomena are acquired.

An apt analogy for the foraging activities of intelligence professionals 

can be drawn from anthropology, where the activities of the hunter-gatherer 

have been immortalized. In nonagricultural societies people both hunt for 

specifi c game and take advantage of what the local environment provides.225

Similarly, intelligence professionals may seek specifi c information, oft en tasking collection systems as part of the search. Th ey also take advantage of existing repositories of information. Neither approach is wholly satisfying nor 

provides for all of the sensemaker’s needs all of the time. However, without 

the basic act of foraging there can be no sensemaking as there is nothing from 

which to make sense.

Information foraging is a rich subject about which Peter Pirolli has 

done extensive work, some of it sponsored by the Intelligence Community’s 

Novel Intelligence from Massive Data research project funded by IARPA’s 

predecessor, ARDA (Advanced Research and Development Activity). Known 

222 Within the domain of wicked problem consideration there is a means, known as 

morphological analysis, that may come close to at least identifying all possible planning 

options. Invented and developed by astrophysicist Fritz Zwicky, the paradigm has been 

further developed by the Swedish Morphological Society (URL: <www.swemorph.com>, 

accessed 10 October 2010), and for the U.S. Government by William N. Reynolds, Least 

Squares Software. Combined with a model of Flexecution, it seems a promising approach 

for intelligence (re)planning.

223 Baumard, “From Noticing to Making Sense,” 31.

224 New Oxford American Dictionary, Apple Computer Edition, 2005, entry under “foraging.” 

Cited hereafter as New Oxford American Dictionary.

225 This remains such a culturally (and perhaps psychologically) essential human activity 

that the practice remains part of seasonal life in modern post-industrial societies.
55

as “Information Foraging Th eory,” Pirolli’s work makes use of the optim

foraging strategies of animals as a basis for assessing the human acq

tion of information. Underlying information foraging theory is the idea 

“humans actively seek, gather, share, and consume information to a de

unapproached by other organisms” and therefore, “when feasible, nat

information systems evolve toward stable states that maximize gains of v

able information per unit cost.”226

Pirolli’s research and experimentation devotes special attentio

foraging effi ciency. Effi ciency derives from optimizing the time necessar

achieve a goal, the quality of the achievement, and the satisfaction obta

in doing so.227 In application to the human information foraging scene

theory becomes “a rational analysis of the task and information environm

that draws on optimal foraging theory from biology and...a production 

tem model of the cognitive structure of [the] task.”228

Toward a Practice of Intelligence Foraging

Developing an optimal foraging model for information acquisi

requires the subject to consider whether to remain at a source that prov

a superabundance of information of questionable value, or to seek anot

more valuable, source.229 Pirolli and colleague Stuart Card observe tha

human foragers, this involves “a tradeoff among three kinds of proces

exploring, enriching, and exploiting.230

Th ese three foraging steps will not seem foreign to traditional int

gence practitioners. “Exploring” is a breadth activity whereby a sensem

broadly examines a wide variety of information that may or may not be 

evant to the issue. Th e premise is that when one considers a broad var

and volume of data, there is less opportunity to miss “something nove

226 Peter Pirolli and Stuart Card, “Information Foraging,” Psychological Review, vol. 

no. 4 (October 1999), 643. Cited hereafter as Pirolli and Card, “Information Foraging.”

227 Peter Pirolli, Information Foraging Theory: Adaptive Interaction with Information (Ox

UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5. Cited hereafter as Pirolli, Information Foraging Theo

228 Pirolli, Information Foraging Theory, 5.

229 In the animal kingdom this quantifiable function is known as the “Conventional 

Model.” It was developed by David W. Stephens and John R. Krebs, Foraging Theory (Princ

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); and based on work by Eric L. Charnov, “Optimal F

ing: The Marginal Value Theorem,” Theoretical Population Biology, 9, no 2 (April 1976): 129

Referenced in Pirolli, Information Foraging Theory, 7-8.

230 Peter Pirolli and Stuart Card, “The Sensemaking Process and Leverage Point

Analyst Technology as Identified Through Cognitive Task Analysis,” paper presented a

2005 International Conference on Intelligence Analysis, Vienna, Virginia, 2-6 May 2

URL: <https://analysis.mitre.org/proceedings_agenda.htm#papers>, accessed 11 M

2009. Cited hereafter as Pirolli and Card, “Sensemaking Process.”
56

the data.” 231 Speaking in traditional intelligence terms, exploring is like 

reconnaissance. By contrast, “enriching” is a depth activity. Here the sensemaker identifi es areas of interest and focuses attention on those areas. As 

Pirolli and Card note, this is “a process in which smaller, higher-precision 

sets of documents are created.”232 Reconnaissance has become more narrowly focused, but highly targeted “surveillance” is not yet in play. Finally, 

the practitioner “exploits” the results of foraging by thoroughly examining 

what is found and extracting information as needed. Th is activity extrapolates from tacit sensemaker behaviors and information-based patterns to 

create hypotheses about what the information means. At this point, foraging 

evolves to sensemaking.

Th e appropriate amount of exploration depends on the context. 

However, there appears to be a limit aft er which more information does not 

increase accuracy although it does increase the sensemaker’s overall confi -

dence. One example of this phenomenon was discovered by Paul Slovic in 

an experiment with odds makers who, when predicting the winners of horse 

races, were not signifi cantly more accurate if they used 40 variables or only 

5 (out of sets of 88 possible variables).233 What Slovic additionally observed, 

however, is that the odds makers’ confi dence did increase directly with the 

number of variables considered.234 Slovic’s fi ndings about accuracy and confi dence are reproduced in Figure 2.

Th e discussion of how much exploration is needed is germane because 

in the Pirolli-Card framework the sensemaker may believe she controls the 

amount of foraging. In a sense this is true. Th e sensemaker will stop foraging 

once she believes she has what she needs. But how much information is suffi -

cient? Slovic’s results and Heuer’s subsequent discussion suggest that practical suffi ciency is achieved at lower levels of exploration than expected.235

Further, contrary to the beliefs of the sensemaker, it is oft en information itself that controls the processes. Intelligence professionals are overwhelmed with more and more information that arrives faster and faster and 

may be valuable for shorter and shorter periods of time. Th is information 

fl ood challenges the sensemaker to effi ciently fi nd the information needed 

in order to make sense of the phenomena or issue under scrutiny in a timely 

231 Pirolli and Card, “Sensemaking Process.”

232 Pirolli and Card, “Sensemaking Process.”

233 Paul Slovic, “Behavioral Problems of Adhering to a Decision Policy,” Paper presented 

at the Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance, Napa, CA, May 1973. Cited hereafter as 

Slovic, “Behavioral Problems.”

234 Slovic, “Behavioral Problems.”

235 See Richards J. Heuer, Jr., The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 54. Cited hereafter as Heuer, Psychology.
57

manner. Does one need to peruse all the information received? Would a 

ferent source be more productive by providing more focused informat

Th ese are examples of the diffi cult questions the sensemaker must cons

Compounding her deliberations further is the fact that she must answer 

question in foresight; hindsight is too late.

Referring to the animal foraging analogy that underlies informa

foraging theory, one asks, is the nutrition gained of suffi ciently low qu

(even though there is lots of it) to justify seeking another source of unkn

(but possibly higher) nutritional value? Failure to make the right deci

may result in starvation. For the sensemaker this means she may never 

what she needs. An implication is that her lack of information may cont

ute to an error leading to a catastrophic failure. To make such a deci

wisely requires something she currently lacks: a practice of foraging. Su

Figure 2. Changes in Predictive Accuracy and Confidence as Available 

Information Increases. The accuracy of odds-makers’ predictions about horse 

races does not increase as they consider more items of information although 

their confidence in those predictions does.

Image Source: Richards J. Heuer, Jr., The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis

(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 54. The illustrat

reproduces one originally presented by Paul Slovic in 1973. See Slovic, 

“Behavioral Problems.”

0

10

20

30

40

0

10

20

30

40

0 10 20 30 40

CONFIDENCE (%)

ACCURACY (%)

CORRECT FIRST PLACE SELECTIONS

ITEMS OF INFORMATION

CONFIDENCE

ACCURACY
58

practice puts her, not the information, in control of foraging practice. It provides her with a systematic means of reducing her uncertainty.

Foraging practice begins with an understanding of what it is the sensemaker seeks to know, the foraging resources available, and the urgency of 

the issue. But how can an intelligence sensemaker know what to look for? 

To what degree does she need to explore, enrich, or exploit the information? 

Further, how does she know if she is getting what she needs?

A fi rst step is to think critically about the issue itself and the resources 

needed. Using a metacognitive, process-focused critical-thinking model 

such as that adapted from Richard Paul, Linda Elder, and Gerald Nosich, 

the practitioner can dissect the issue and her thinking on the issue.236 She 

makes assumptions explicit, explores relevant points of view, starts to consider the ramifi cations of the issue, and she asks important questions about 

what resources will best inform her about the issue; she considers the context in which she is working, and ponders the alternatives to her reasoning 

about where and how to forage. Th is critical thinking defi nes her foraging 

activities. She may engage in all three strategies at once or at diff erent times 

as she engages in the analyses that produce her syntheses and the interpretations necessary to generate knowledge. A well-developed understanding 

of exploited information may direct her back to do additional exploring or 

enriching (or both).

In intelligence foraging as it traditionally has been practiced, there 

is a tendency to linger at a fruitful source rather than to explore elsewhere 

for the required information. Th is is a function of the confi dence one gains 

in those systems that previously have supplied information, and the available tools for ferreting out the information. Th e danger, of course, is that the 

practitioner may limit the information she acquires and the relevant perspectives it informs. If, for example, the practitioner has a belief that two parties 

in whom she has an interest communicate via one means and she can acquire 

technical collection that captures the communications via those means, she 

may ignore the fact that they also use other methods to communicate. She 

may subsequently fail to task systems that collect those other communications in the belief that what she is getting suffi ces. Should the parties suspect 

that their communications are being targeted, they may engage in deceptive 

practices over that collected means and use the other non-collected methods 

for their real exchanges.

236 Moore, Critical Thinking, especially chapter 1. Also see: Richard W. Paul and Linda 

Elder. Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Professional and Personal Life (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002); and Nosich, Learning to Think Things Through.
59

Foraging Challenges

Ongoing research at University College London off ers a view of 

younger sensemakers likely search for information. Th e researchers re

that people foraging for information spend four to eight minutes view

each resource.237 Th us, a great many resources may be consulted but non

them very deeply. Within the context of intelligence, such foraging strate

may facilitate broad searches but leave open the question of whether de

searches are also accomplished. As Nicholas Carr observes in the July/Au

2008 Atlantic, Internet search strategies, as epitomized by the operatio

search tools such as Google, will put in place a new behavior of foraging 

consuming information. Carr notes:

It is clear that users are not reading online in the traditional sense; 

indeed there are signs that new forms of “reading” are emerging as 

users “power browse” horizontally through titles, contents pages and 

abstracts going for quick wins. It almost seems that they go online to 

avoid reading in the traditional sense.238

From the perspective of actually making sense of issues, these strategies im

that the manner in which issues are understood is also likely to change. 

such new foraging practices suitable to meet the needs of intelligence c

sumers? Will they be better at satisfying those needs for knowledge than 

paradigm previously practiced?

An additional challenge with information foraging is that if the p

titioner misses the opportunity to acquire something, it may never a

be obtainable. Like the elements of a fl eeting interpersonal conversat

the original foraging behavior, if left un-captured, can never be recaptu

Indeed, there may be no indications that such a conversation even occur

A further consideration for the practitioner is the “self-market

of the information. Vivid stories market themselves much better than 

fl at ones. Exploited information that supports a favored hypothesis ma

preferred over information that does not; an unfortunate reality is that l

motivation remains for further exploration. Th e practitioner is human—

will not likely have a truly agnostic attitude about what she seeks and wh

Compounding this is the idea that sources and means for foraging 

self-protective. For example, there is a presumption that sources will cont

237 Ian Rowlands and others. “The information Behaviour of the Researcher of the F

(Google Generation),” URL: <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/infostudies/research/ciber/downlo

ggexecutive.pdf>, accessed 27 May 2010.

238 Nicholas Carr, “Is Google Making Us Stupid?” The Atlantic, Online Edition (July/A

2008), URL: <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-makin

stupid/6868>, accessed 27 May 2010. Cited hereafter as Carr, “Google.”
60

to communicate via specifi c means. Th e methods that capture those communications and the people that support them tend to seek justifi cation. Assets 

may be kept active aft er their usefulness expires. Th e practitioner returns to 

the same sources over and over because they have been useful in the past and 

such attention helps keep those sources actively collecting.

Critically assessing what she is doing is one way the sensemaking 

practitioner may be able to overcome these limiting tendencies. By constantly 

asking herself how she is thinking about the issue, what she seeks, other perspectives, her assumptions, as well as relevant concepts such as self-deception 

or adversarial deception, the practitioner may diminish the impact that her 

preferences play on her foraging decisions.

Another part of this critical assessment is the consideration of the 

costs of foraging. As Herbert Simon notes,

What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the 

attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a 

poverty of attention, and a need to allocate that attention effi ciently 

among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it.239

Simon in fact anticipates the conclusions of Carr: Th e superabundance of information available on the Internet (and elsewhere) creates a 

“poverty of attention” to any one source. Rather, people skim across a great 

many sources.240

Questions the sensemaker must ask include whether or not she can 

aff ord to explore an issue’s information fi eld further. She needs to consider 

how certain she is that she has suffi cient exploitable information to make 

sense of the issue. Further, if the issue is inadequately understood, opportunism may aff ect the foraging as a hunting analogy illustrates. A predator may 

go out seeking one type of prey and fi nd none of it but there may be an abundance of some other kind of game. Within the context of intelligence such 

opportunism may or may not be appropriate (or even legal) when a technical 

system or an asset is tasked to provide information for intelligence. Lacking the desired information, a human source might opportunistically substitute what might be perceived as desired or desirable, even if it is not closely 

related to the issue at hand—or for that matter, even “true.” It is used because 

it satisfi ces for the immediate term.

239 Herbert A. Simon, “Designing Organizations in an Information-Rich World,” in Martin 

Greenberger, ed., Computers, Communications, and the Public Interest (Baltimore, MD: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1971), 40-41.

240 Carr, “Google.”
61

Harvesting 241

A special case of foraging involves “harvested” information. Tec

cal agencies that fi eld systems to gather information also can be character

by a diff erent model, that of harvesting. Th e systems employed simply 

vest that which lies within their purview, then process it and store it in sil

data repositories from which sensemakers subsequently must forage.242 S

systems are effi cient at creating broad collections; they tend to be ineffi c

and unreliable when very narrowly focused. Th us, directed rather than br

collection of specifi c phenomena is needed.

Technical collection systems tend to provide—even in the n

tive—what sensemakers want to fi nd. Th is can create a potentially dange

confi rmation of an idea that may be invalid. Th is tendency is exacerbate

the post-Cold War world. Although previously, certain intelligence tar

did remain relatively unchanged over considerable periods of time, this i

longer the case.

Th e harvesting system automatically explores a subset of a la

reality based on a collective agreement among sensemakers that the su

is relevant. Th e sensemakers subsequently enrich their knowledge and 

best-case situation can exploit the information to provide themselves w

the necessary information to make sense of the issue. A challenge is th

is impossible to collect everything. Yet, uncertainty about whether or 

one really has collected what is necessary remains unresolved. While s

technical systems are more usable for “random” exploration than oth

most require a preexisting idea about what one seeks. Such preconcept

limit exploration.

Automated retrievals from information repositories typically 

vide sensemakers with what they believe to be the needed and relevant in

mation—in short, their evidence. Th e evidence pertaining to specifi c is

arrives at the sensemaker’s desk and reports are issued. At fi rst, the evide

is carefully scrutinized and the system that provides it assessed. As the pro

repeats, however, as it certainly did in the Cold War era, complacency ma

in. Critical assessment of quality and quantity may cease. And, one day

evidence that a specifi c sensemaker requires no longer appears. Th e repor

on that specifi c issue withers. If suffi cient evidence valuable to other se

makers still is harvested, the value of the continued tasking of the system 

241 The author is indebted to Martin Krizan for raising this idea.

242 It should be noted that “reaping” and “threshing” both manipulate the collected 

mation into usable formats. The processed information must be compatible with U.S. law 

specific agency procedures for handling such information.
62

not be questioned. Th e failure is not noticed and may even be rationalized—

perhaps as a failure to forage adequately—if it is noticed in the fi rst place. 

Even when it is noticed, it may be impossible to determine why it occurred. 

Finally, no amount of foraging can discover valuable information if it has not 

been collected by some system — human or technical — in the fi rst place.

Marshaling

What can be done to revolutionize the way information foraging is 

accomplished so as to overcome or at least mitigate these problems? Some 

answers lie in an understanding of marshaling. Part of the sensemaker’s 

practice is to turn foraged and gleaned information into evidence. Doing so 

requires sift ing and other organizing activities to determine which information is relevant to the issue. Th is is a broad activity, for if the issue has multiple explanations or future possibilities, then evidence will be information 

relevant to any, many, or even all of those explanations or possible outcomes. 

In order to make that determination, the sensemaker will need to have identifi ed what those alternatives are and to have collected information (both disconfi rming and confi rming) about them.243 Th is may require foraging from 

additional resources with all the attendant challenges discussed above. Conceivably this could overwhelm the sensemaker. However, questions such as 

“if this alternative were true, what would be the evidence for it?” can lead one 

to identify what she needs to know. Th en asking whether or not she sees it, or 

where she might forage for it (and can do so), starts the process of marshaling. Th is activity represents a change from traditional practices because the 

intelligence professional goes beyond what she knows into what she knows 

she does not know.

Understanding

If we presume that foraging has yielded relevant and valuable information—evidence—on the issue under study, the next step is to determine what 

it means. Th is is the heart of sensemaking: evidence is dissected, reassembled 

243 Disconfirming alternative explanations (or hypotheses) is one means of avoiding confirming a favored (and possibly wrong) possibility. This disconfirmatory approach is one of the 

strengths of Richards Heuer and Morgan Jones’ independent work with hypothesis testing 

(Heuer calls it alternative competing hypotheses). How effectively this approach actually works 

is subject to debate. Another challenge is to define foraging strategies that yield disconfirming 

(i.e. negative evidence). An absence of evidence is insufficient. See Heuer, Psychology, Chapter 

8, and Morgan Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit (New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 1995), 178-216. 

For discussion about whether or not the method effectively disconfirms, see Brant A. Cheikes, 

Mark J. Brown, Paul E. Lehner, and Leonard Adelman, Confirmation Bias in Complex Analyses, 

Mitre Technical Report, MTR 04B0000017 (Bedford, MA: Mitre, 2004). Cited hereafter as 

Cheikes and others, Confirmation Bias.
63

with other evidence, and its meanings determined by analyzing, synthesiz

and then interpreting the evidence.

Analyzing

Th e intelligence issue or question itself requires analytic scrutiny. 

ferent foraging disciplines represent diff erent points of view. In other wo

signals intelligence or SIGINT; human sources embodied in HUMI

images and geospatial data (known as GEOINT), and others tell diff erent 

ries about a phenomenon. Each story requires dissection. Similarly, wi

a foraged source, the diff erent perspectives of the sensemaker require 

section. For example, is the sensemaker focusing on individual actors, 

actions of a collection of actors, the beliefs that guide the activity, or the 

cesses that determine the actions of the collective? 244

Th e disaggregation of each of these perspectives and their associ

stories provides a rich brew for sensemaking. For example, in the Cuban M

sile Crisis of 1962, such a dissection reveals the intentions and underl

beliefs of the principal actors (Castro, Kennedy, and Khrushchev), as we

the roles and procedures of their larger collectives, in this case the Cu

and Soviet governments (specifi cally the Soviet Politburo and General S

as well as Kennedy’s Executive Committee (EXCOM) and indeed the m

larger American political collective. However, as rich as these stories beco

they remain inadequate in assessing what is likely to happen. Dissecting 

evidence is insuffi cient. Pulling the pieces together becomes the next step

Synthesizing

Synthesizing is “the combination of ideas to form a theory 

system.”245 Even as the intelligence professional analyzes the indivi

pieces of information, they are synthesized into a mental picture of the la

issue. Pieces of information are implicitly combined even when the se

maker works within the yield of a particular foraging discipline or with

frame or reference. Such synthesis drives further foraging and analysis.

Synthesis needs to be explicit. In the example developed above

intelligence professional is required to synthesize the diff ering trajecto

244 These four groups form the basis of a novel sensemaking approach develope

Monitor 360 for the National Security Agency and incorporated into a course on multi-f

sensemaking. As characterized in the course, the four groups or frames are the “empow

actor,” “cooperation and conflict,” “beliefs and affiliations,” and “roles and procedures.

author is a champion of this approach, and worked with the senior course developer, B

Chew, in creating the course.

245 New Oxford American Dictionary, Apple Computer Edition, entry under “synthesis.
64

of the three principal actors, considering how their beliefs harden or soft en 

their positions and how they are vulnerable to the actions, infl uences and processes of the groups. Doing so in a systematic fashion leads the intelligence 

professional to new insights about the situation: what is going on in Cuba 

and (from the U.S. perspective) what to do about it.

Interpreting

Issues can be dissected and reconstructed in a variety of ways, creating diff erent meanings. Sense must be made of these diff erent meanings. 

Interpreting, or “the action of explaining the meaning of something,” is 

another component of sensemaking.246 We may say that whereas analysis 

and synthesis establish the what, interpretation establishes the so what.

Depending on the frameworks involved, the interpretations of common information vary widely, as the above referenced experience of London 

subway bombing victim Rachel North illustrates. An evolving practice within 

intelligence of establishing competing teams of intelligence professionals to 

develop diff erent aspects of an issue is an example whereby diff ering interpretations compete in an eff ort to establish “ground truth” about issues. A 

revolutionary approach to sensemaking now being undertaken by analysts 

from DIA, State, and CIA, is to engage in “adversarial briefi ng” of principals, 

where briefers adopt opposing perspectives for a thorough airing of the issue, 

complete with the participation of the principals themselves.

Communicating

New models of knowledge transfer recognize change in both message and medium. Social networking, peer-reviewed shared multimedia, and 

interactively blogged communications are examples of these new mediums. 

Th e message is short and subject to change by diff erent contributors. Authority is based on consensus. Th e distinction—if it exists at all—between formal 

and informal communication is blurred. Th ere are dangers here as authority and truth are no longer necessarily linked. One risk is that the “wisdom 

of a crowd” can in fact be the “madness of a mob”— a phenomenon occurring in both the public arena and within the IC’s blogosphere. In both arenas 

the loudest voices strive to bludgeon into silence those who would disagree, 

all the while advancing their egocentric or sociocentric positions. Scientifi c 

knowledge and empirical facts matter little in such cases. Th e danger in both 

246 New Oxford American Dictionary, Apple Computer Edition, entry under “interpretation.”
65

arenas is, of course, that people make poor decisions based on informa

that later proves to be false.247

However, communications within the Intelligence Commu

remain fi rmly embedded in traditional formats of printing and briefi n

is true that blogging and informal communications are utilized, but t

are used by intelligence practitioners to discuss the issues they make s

of before they craft their traditionally formatted assessments, briefi ngs, 

reports. Th e ultimate Intelligence Community report, the President’s D

Brief, remains primarily a hard copy document. While it has been upd

incrementally over the years, the presentation remains similar to the s

mary that was nicknamed “Truman’s Newspaper.”

As has been noted, newer Intelligence Community directives pro

for presenting alternative hypotheses as well as documenting confi dence 

els in sources and in intelligence assessments. Is this guidance suffi cient 

valid for sensemaking? In summarizing the “introspective works respond

to...intelligence failures,” Charles Weiss agrees that intelligence practition

failures include a lack of proper attention to hypotheses and data collec

eff orts that are contrary to what they regard as the most likely interpr

tion of available information.”248 One danger is that the very judgment ab

which the sensemaker is least confi dent might be the one that turns out t

correct. Th e fallacy of depending on the communication of confi dence le

relates to the fact that each assessment or report only fi lls in some unkn

portion of the gaps in the sensemaker’s and policymaker’s knowledge.

Presenting a novel hypothesis and interpreted argument about w

one is uncertain, along with an assessment based on a more likely prem

also carries dangers. A policymaker might disregard the alternate possib

because of the declared lack of confi dence (which might stem merely fro

lack of evidence) and choose the evidentiarily better-supported hypothesi

Here, a carefully considered, standardized metric of uncertainty could 

vide one means of assessing and communicating confi dence independe

247 The “Swift Boat” controversy of 2004, the matter of autism-caused vaccines, an

uncivil discourse between the major political parties are several non-intelligence exam

These are different from debates, which advance knowledge through open discussion. Thes

about having one’s way. Whoever can shout the longest and loudest wins. See also Peter M

The Smart Swarm: How Understanding Flocks, Schools, and Colonies Can Make Us Better at 

municating, Decision Making, and Getting Things Done (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2

chapter 5. Miller explores the transformation of the crowd to a mob, as well as the self-des

tive behavior of the mob, through the example of locusts.

248 Charles Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence and Other Professi

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence vol. 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008), 5

Cited hereafter as Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty.”

249 Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty,” 62.
66

from the sensemaker. Weiss suggests that either Kent’s scale 250 or its more 

recent instantiation by the Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence 

off ers an appropriate means by which the uncertainty could be systematically captured.251 Th e challenges inherent in such metrics are twofold. First, 

the evidentiary statistics necessary for their use are “typically unavailable 

to intelligence analysts — or it they are available, must be based on small 

samples of past events.”252 Additionally, scoring the conclusions from such 

small samples across production lines and even from day to day by a single 

intelligence professional can be observed to be inconsistent. Steve Rieber 

discusses calibrating sensemakers as a solution.253 To date no such strategy 

has been implemented.

Peer-reviewed, discussed and argued fi ndings published in blogs (as 

a formal means of communicating) would be a novel means of communicating results. If they are readily available to the policy community, they would 

enhance the capabilities of intelligence practitioners and policymakers alike 

to collaboratively make sense of the issues that policy faces. Intelligence could 

truly speak truth to power and policy could speak truth to intelligence. As an 

alternative communications medium where body language and other nonverbal cues can be read, the adversarial briefi ng initiative mentioned earlier 

off ers an intermediate solution to the problem of communicating intelligence 

needs and perspectives.

At the same time, the blogosphere certainly provides an eff ective 

locus for discussion of developments surrounding ongoing issues. Th is is 

manifest in the IC’s implementation of “A-Space” or Analysts’ Space, a blogosphere where intelligence professionals can communicate among themselves regarding topical and methodological issues.254 Th is new model for 

managing intelligence practitioners that respects their expertise and capabilities is an integral part of the ongoing revolution in communicating intelligence. A useful future step might be the inclusion of the consumer as part 

of the discussions; such a step would truly be revolutionary.

250 Sherman Kent’s estimative probability scale appears in Sherman Kent and the Board 

of National Estimates, Collected Essays edited by Donald P Steury (Washington, DC: Center 

for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 137. It is reproduced in modified form in Heuer, Psychology, 155.

251 Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty,” 61.

252 Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty,” 60-62.

253 Steven Rieber, “Intelligence Analysis and Judgmental Calibration,” International Journal 

of Intelligence and CounterIntellgience, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 97-112.

254 Ben Bain, “A-Space Set to Launch this Month,” Federal Computer Week, 3 September 

2008, URL: <http://fcw.com/articles/2008/09/03/aspace-set-to-launch-this-month.aspx>, 

accessed 15 June 2010.
67

In the end, how these actors actually go about understanding 

issues they consider is a complex process involving both the foraged and m

shaled evidence as well as the beliefs and assumptions of the parties invol

Making sense of this requires both deliberative reasoning and intu

approaches. Exploring how this works is the subject of the next chapter.

69

CHAPTER 5

A Practice of Understanding

David T. Moore and Robert R. Hoff man

We begin this chapter by considering intuition, trying carefull

defi ne this nebulous term, and exploring the benefi ts and hazards of in

tive judgments. In order to accomplish this, an understanding of exa

what is meant by the similarly nebulous term ‘judgment’ is also needed

develop our position from the work of Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klei

we explore skill-based and heuristic-based intuitive judgments and how 

aff ect forecasting.255

Judgment in intelligence sensemaking, as in a number of o

domains, likely improves as one progresses to higher levels of profi cie

and expertise. However, prediction is both diffi cult and inherently unreli

because events of diff erent kinds vary considerably in their inherent pred

ability. A common view is that prediction has these three features:

• It is the act of forecasting a specifi c future occurrence,

• It has some associated degree of probability and/or confi dence, 

• It is linked logically to one or more specifi c courses of action tha

predictor might take to achieve one or another specifi c goal.

We believe that another paradigm for shaping how we think ab

prediction is needed, along with fresh terminology. We present a view 

tered on the notion of “anticipation of ranges” and the concept of the “co

of action envelope” as we begin to envision an alternative model of the p

nomenon. We turn next to the implications of intuition and predictability 

intelligence sensemaking. We conclude by looking ahead at some prelimin

research into how the circumstances for sound reasoning may be impro

and we raise some questions about future directions for the Community

Intuition

It is diffi cult to wrap appropriate words around the concepts tha

at hand, thus care should be taken to make certain distinctions. Sometim

judgments can be rapid, non-conscious, non-deliberative, and almost seem 

if they are immediate perceptions and feelings rather than judgments. Th 

255 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise.”
70

immediate attitudes can blend seamlessly into more deliberative or conscious 

reasoning, which in turn can, even if fl eetingly, maintain the emotion and 

immediacy normally associated with intuition. Th ereaft er, we might say that 

purely deliberative and non-intuitional thinking might transpire. None of 

these distinctions is clear-cut in the social science approach to mental phenomena or in the annals of philosophy.

Th e process of intuitive thinking refers — according to psychologist 

David Myers—to the ability of individuals to fl y “through life mostly on autopilot” even as they function eff ectively.256 Neurologist Robert Burton observes 

this phenomenon in the actions of batters who can hit a ball (or miss it) in 

advance of their being able to consciously perceive it.257 Burton also highlights a danger of such non-conscious thinking: People can misinterpret the 

input, leading us to think twice about relying on intuition for important decisions.258 Aft er all, as in the batter’s case, it seems that intuition-based accuracy 

is limited to extremely rapid events.

At the same time, in fear and fl ight behavior, a certain level of inaccuracy can be tolerated. If early hominids misinterpreted, for example, the 

presence of certain shadows in the tall grass and reacted by running away, 

and the shadows were in fact benign, then the error had few consequences. 

Similarly, while one’s “gut” may advise one not to get into a particular elevator late at night, people nonetheless tend to board the next one. Is there some 

stimulus of which one is not consciously aware—perhaps a shadow in the 

elevator— of someone who might be a mugger or worse? If one listens to 

one’s “gut” and does not get on the elevator car, one will never know. Consequently, one will rationalize, “while I may have been wrong, at least I did not 

get mugged (or worse).”259

Intuitive, or, as it is sometimes called, automatic thinking forms 

the basis for much of our personal sensemaking.260 It allows us to process 

256 David G. Myers, Intuition: its Powers and Perils (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

2002), 16. Cited hereafter as Myers, Intuition.

257 Robert A. Burton, On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When You’re Not (New 

York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 75. Cited hereafter as Burton, On Being Certain.

258 When and how we intuit accurately (and inaccurately) is one of the themes of this 

chapter.

259 Only if one gets on the elevator, does not get mugged, travels safely to the desired 

floor, and then safely exits the elevator does one know that the instinct was incorrect. And 

even then, one merely has one anecdote’s worth of experience contrary to that intuition. That 

nothing untoward occurred in this specific instance is no guarantee of the outcome in any 

future situations.

260 See Douglas J. Herrmann, and Roger Chaffin, “Memory before Ebbinghaus,” in David 

S. Gorfein and Robert Hoffman, eds., Memory and Learning: The Ebbinghaus Centennial Conference (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1982), 35-56 and George A. Miller, “The Magical Number Seven, 

Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information,” Psychological 

Review, vol. 63 (1956): 81-97. Cited hereafter as Miller, “Limits.”
71

complex inputs that far exceed the “span of immediate apprehension

approximately seven “chunks” or elements that individuals can conscio

process in working (or short-term) memory.261 Such thinking, for exam

explains how people (mostly) drive successfully. Recent research rev

ing a correlation between cell phone use (especially texting) and accid

leads one to extrapolate that attention-requiring activities such as en

ing in professional-level offi ce conversation or dialing and conversing w

mobile respectively impede otherwise eff ective automatic activities suc

ten-fi nger typing or absent-mindedly but safely driving an automobile

one study sponsored by the British Royal Automobile Club Foundati

Transport Research Laboratory, researchers found that texting while driv

contributed to impaired driving more than either moderate alcohol or 

nabis consumption.262 From these and other similar studies it becomes c

that conscious reasoning can distract and thus decrease the eff ectivene

“automatic thinking,” leading to fl awed and sometimes fatal decisions.

With other combinations of activities, people can simultaneo

and very successfully perform more than one task. Many people are a

for instance, both to chop vegetables and converse casually. It seems that 

mechanics of these two simultaneous activities are more automatic than de

erate. Further, we would expect that driving and conversing emotional

arguing—would impair one’s ability to negotiate traffi c, for arguing requ

deliberation, whereas the usual aff ective responses in conversation can be 

rapid, or “pre-cognitive.” In sum, humans are limited with respect to t

mental resources for conscious and non-conscious thinking when engage

complex tasks.263 Psychological research has shown that with extensive p

tice and training one can learn to perform two tasks at once, even appare

incompatible tasks such as taking dictation while reading.264 On the o

hand, in most day-to-day “multitasking,” performance generally suff ers, e

261 Miller, “Limits.”

262 Nick Reed and R. Robbins, “The Effect of Text Messaging on Driver Behaviour,” 

lished Project Report PPR 367, RAC Foundation Transport Research Laboratory, September 2

URL: <http://www.racfoundation.org/files/textingwhiledrivingreport.pdf>, accessed 9 De

ber 2009. This is but one of a number of similar reports. For a summary of research in 

domain see Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Selected Referenc

Distracted Driving: 2005-2009. URL: <http://pubsindex.trb.org/DOCs/Publications%20fr

20TRIS%20on%20Distracted%20Driving.pdf>, accessed 9 December 2009.

263 Given the distracting effect of conscious thought on non-conscious activity in c

such as driving and cell phone use, an interesting experiment would be to examine the dis

tion posed by non-conscious activities on conscious reasoning.

264 See Elizabeth S. Spelke, William Hirst, and Ulric Neisser, “Skills of Divided A

tion,” Cognition, vol. 4 (1976), 215-230; and Christopher A. Monk, J. Gregory Trafton, 

and Deborah A. Boehm-Davis, “The Effect of Interruption Duration and Demand on Re

ing Suspended Goals,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, vol. 14 (December 20

299-313.
72

for individuals of the Web generation who are widely believed to be skilled 

at multitasking.265

Th ere is another side of intuitive reasoning that sometimes works in 

opposition to one’s survival. Intuitively reasoned responses to stress are oft en 

highly focused and narrow. Laurence Gonzales notes that in such reactions 

“the amygdala...in concert with numerous other structures in the brain and 

body, help to trigger a staggeringly complex sequence of events, all aimed at 

producing a behavior to promote survival.”266 But, in many cases, behavior 

is also locked down. Citing the cases of Navy and Marine Corps pilots who 

fl y their aircraft into the “round down” or stern of aircraft carriers as well as 

his own experience of nearly crashing while landing a private plane, Gonzales observed that other vital input becomes “irrelevant noise, effi ciently 

screened out by the brain.”267 However, unless such input is accounted for, 

accidents happen and people die. Non-intuitive input, then, needs to be considered; however, it may take too long to accomplish.

Intuitive or automatic thinking is a survival mechanism.268 Gonzales 

notes that such mechanisms “work across a large number of trials to keep 

the species alive. Th e individual may live or die.”269 But over time—and in 

reference to humans—generally more live than die, leading to evolution and 

the genetic transmission of the “refl ex.” If a particular set of behaviors confers a survival value, that set can become more widespread in the population. 

Seen in this light, unease at entering an elevator at night could be a modern 

instance of sensing shadows in the tall grass.

On a shorter time horizon, people use experience-based intuitive patterns or mental models. Th ese patterns or models direct how situations are perceived and how they are responded to. Mental models provide 

265 For recent work in this area see Paul Raeburn, “Multitasking May Not Mean Higher 

Productivity,” NPR News: Science Friday, 28 August 2009, URL: <http://www.npr.org/

templates/story/story.php/storyId=112334449&ft=1&f=1007>, accessed 21 February 2010. 

Raeburn interviews sociologist Clifford Nass about his work on multitasking. For more on Nass’ 

work see Eyal Ophir, Clifford Nass, and Anthony D. Wagner, “Cognitive Control in Media Multitaskers,” Proceedings of the National Academies of Science, Early Edition, vol. 106, no. 37, 

15583-15587, URL: <http://www.pnas.org/content/106/37/15583.full>, accessed 18 March 

2010 ; and Lin Lin, “Breadth-Biased Versus Focused Cognitive Control in Media Multitasking 

Behaviors,” Proceedings of the National Academies of Science, vol. 106, no. 37 (15 September 

2009): 15521-15522, URL: <www.pnas.org!cgi!doi!10.1073!pnas.0908642106 PNAS>, accessed 18 March 2010.

266 Laurence Gonzales, Deep Survival: Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why (New York, NY: W.W. 

Norton, 2003), 35-36. Cited hereafter as Gonzales, Deep Survival.

267 Gonzales, Deep Survival, 39.

268 See William James, Principles of Psychology, two vols. (New York, NY: Henry Holt and 

Company, 1890).

269 Gonzales, Deep Survival, 39.
73

rapid shortcuts to determining the nature of situations and the appropr

responses.270

Th e challenge is that some intuitive mental models can ill-serve 

individual. Th ey can be incomplete or can contain incorrect concepts

Gonzales notes, they can impede our “ability to use working memory p

erly, to process new information from the world, and to integrate it with lo

term memory. And there’s plenty of evidence that while they’re not alw

lethal, such lapses are perfectly normal and happen all the time.”271

In a recent article, Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein engage in a 

prising collaboration to clarify the roles of intuition in human decisionm

ing, particularly in the realms of expert judgment.272 Th eir collaboratio

surprising because Kahneman and Klein come from diff erent commun

of practice. Th at Kahneman, as a recognized leader in the “judgment un

uncertainty” decisionmaking community, and Klein, as a recognized le

in the naturalistic decisionmaking movement, fi nd they agree on intu

expertise opens new partnering opportunities for adherents of both p

digms to seek other common ground, enhancing our understanding of d

sionmaking and judgment.

Th eir shared concern is with how “skilled intuitive judgment de

ops with experience” and the nature of “the activities in which experie

is more likely to produce overconfi dence than genuine skill.”273 Th e aut

note that the “judgments and decisions we are most likely to call intu

come to mind on their own without evoking cues and of course with

an explicit evaluation of the validity of those cues.”274 Intuition and int

gence sensemaking are linked by the very concept of judgment as develo

by Kahneman and Klein.

We turn next to an examination of types of judgment, distinguish

between those that are skill-based and those that rely on “heuristics,” or le

ing through personal discovery whether rules of thumb are valid shortcu

understanding an issue. We then link this dissection of judgment to the w

of intelligence professionals.

270 Gary Klein and Robert R. Hoffman, “Macrocognition, Mental Models, and Cog

Task Analysis Methodology,” in Jan Maarten Schraagen, Laura Grace Militello, Tom Orm

and Raanan Lipshitz, eds., Naturalistic Decision Making and Macrocognition (Aldershot, UK

gate Publishing Limited, 2008), 57-80.

271 Gonzales, Deep Survival, 79.

272 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise.”

273 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 515.

274 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 519.
74

Types of Judgment

First we must clarify the meaning of “judgment.” A judgment can be 

an observer’s belief, evaluation or conclusion about anything— one can form a 

judgment about anything of interest, including one’s own reasoning.275 Judgment also describes a process, surely more than one kind of mental process, by 

which one reaches a decision. Judgment can be expressed as aff ective evaluation (example: Th at is a good thing), objective evaluation (It looks like a cat, 

but it is just a stuff ed cat), or categorical assignment (My judgment is that this 

is a case of highway robbery). Judgment as process can also be described as 

apodictic, modal, or oral, among others.276

Kahneman and Klein relate judgment to intuition with these diverse 

examples:

Th e fi refi ghter feels that the house is very dangerous, the nurse feels 

that an infant is ill, and the chess master immediately sees a promising move. Intuitive skills are not restricted to professionals: Anyone 

can recognize tension or fatigue in a familiar voice on the phone.277

A standard approach to understanding a phenomenon invokes categorization. For example, judgment can be seen as taking one of two forms: skillbased intuitive judgment, and heuristic-based intuitive judgment.

Skill-Based Intuitive Judgments

A simple example of skill-based intuitive judgment is the act of parallel parking by an experienced driver. Th e experienced driver has repeatedly 

parked in a similar manner over years of operating a vehicle and has become 

familiar with its dimensions; also, parking spaces are fairly uniform in size. 

Th ese factors lead to a likely successful conclusion—dent-free parking.

Examples of skill-based intuitive judgment also seem to occur routinely in sports where repetition facilitates learning. A particular move 

becomes a habit, a refl ex, or as we would say, automatic. Th e author (Moore) 

has repeatedly and deliberately capsized and righted his kayak in a similar 

manner over years of paddling on the Chesapeake Bay, nearby rivers, and 

elsewhere. He is intuitively familiar with his boat, how it behaves under various circumstances, and what it can be made to do (its “aff ordances”). He is 

also familiar with the supporting capacity of various paddles, and the motions 

275 See James McCosh, LL.D., Intuitions of the Mind: Inductively Investigated (London: UK: 

Macmillan and Company, 1882).

276 See Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Antos C. Rancurello, trans. 

(New York, NY: Humanities Press, 1973). Originally published as Psychologie vom empirischen 

Standpunkte, by Dunker and Humblot, Leipzig, Germany, 1874.

277 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 519.
75

of his body and paddle. Th e upshot of such skill-based practice is that in 

emergency, the author does not have to deliberate about what to do. Inst

he knows how to position himself and “roll up,” righting the kayak. In act

ity, intuition allows him to paddle in such a manner that post-capsize ac

is typically unnecessary. He knows the things he can do with his own b

his paddle, and the kayak to prevent capsize—his own “eff ectivities.”278

Successful skill-based intuitive judgment presumes “high-vali

environments and an opportunity to learn them.” such as those found in 

allel parking and kayak rolling.279 Th is process only works when the e

ronment surrounding the issue “provides adequately valid cues,” and 

sensemaker “has time to learn those cues.”280 Kahneman and Klein note 

in intuition of this sort, “[no] magic is involved. A crucial conclusion emer

Skilled intuitions will only develop in an environment of suffi cient regula

which provides valid cues to the situation.”281

In terms of intelligence sensemaking, successful intuitive judgm

arises from the tacit knowledge of experts who assess “normal” (in Kuh

terms) situations, or as has been discussed above, the tame, familiar or r

larly occurring kinds of problems (although they may be quite complex). 

uations involving state-based actors or others for whom events tend to fo

from earlier, observable indicators are an example of environments suit

for the operation of skill-based, expert intuitive judgment.

Heuristic-Based Intuitive Judgments

Heuristic-based intuition relies on “rules of thumb” in order to m

sense of situations.282 Rather than making judgments based on deliberat

the experienced sensemaker can at times recognize when a case fi ts a no

nal type; that is, it is similar in many respects to a well-known instance o

situation. Based on recognition that a given case fi ts a type, the practitio

knows immediately what principles to apply or actions to take. Heuri

based intuition, as Klein and Kahneman defi ne it, is rapid and autom

278 Michael Young, Yi Guan, John Toman, Andy DePalma, and Elena Znamenskaia, “A

as Detector: An Ecological Psychology Perspective on Learning by Perceiving-Acting Syste

in Barry J. Fishman & Samuel F. O’Connor-Divelbiss, eds., Fourth International Conference 

Learning Sciences (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2000), 299.

279 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 519.

280 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 520.

281 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 520.

282 The term “rule of thumb” has unclear origins in antiquity, likely related to the id

using the thumb as a measurement device. In computer science and cognitive science, he

tic rules are distinguished from algorithms. The latter are known to give precise answe

finite time. A heuristic is any short cut that is not guaranteed to give precise answers, but 

less time than required to use an algorithm.
76

almost like skill-based intuition. Th ere is no pause to reason through a decision or judgment, but there is an act of recognition. Th e sensemaker recognizes that actions learned or developed in one context—rules of thumb—are 

appropriate in another situation. Where the environment is suffi ciently 

unstable so as to preclude recognition and learning of appropriate cues (or 

the time to do so is too short), heuristics operate similarly to make sense of 

the situation and off er solutions. Oft en accompanying such judgment is an 

“unjustifi ed sense of confi dence,” a concept Kahneman terms the “illusion of 

validity.”283 Under such circumstances, the success of intuitive judgment in 

such conditions may be limited.

However, it should be noted that the combination of skill-based and 

heuristic-based intuition confers a benefi t to mindful experts: a sense of when 

a case seems typical at fi rst glance, yet there is something not quite right about 

it. While the less experienced person may be lulled into believing the case 

fi ts a certain type, expert decision makers react diff erently. Th ey note some 

worrisome clue that raises questions. “Maybe this is not a typical case,” they 

venture. Eventually they may come to see that the case is in fact atypical. So 

informed, they make a diff erent judgment, sometimes in disagreement with 

other experts. As we will now see, intuition certainly becomes a part of the 

intelligence process when practitioners make, or fail to make, useful and 

accurate predictions.

Th e Question of Predictability

Some in the IC argue that the pertinent aspects of all intelligence 

problems can be adduced, “if we only knew more” or “had the right algorithm or method.” However, we mislead ourselves if we believe that any messy 

problem can be resolved with a probability-juggling program. Th e authors are 

reminded of the observation, “Th ere are the hard sciences and then there are 

the diffi cult sciences.” It is both impossible and inappropriate to attempt to 

remake social and cognitive sciences into emulations of calculational physical sciences. If the reduction were possible, someone would have achieved it, 

or would have at least made demonstrable progress toward its realization, in 

the 200-plus years during which psychology and the other “social sciences” 

have called themselves “sciences.” If reduction was appropriate, and we could 

get “the right information to the right person at the right time,” we would not 

need that right person—“truth” would be self-evident.

By contrast, sensemaking is all about creating and recognizing proximate knowledge and meaning through human cognition. A useful question is 

not “How can cognitive work be automated?” but “In what ways and to what 

283 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 517.
77

extent might technology and soft ware amplify and extend the human a

ity to engage in cognitive work?” In other words, the unexpected happ

even on a large scale, as is illustrated by the inaccurate predictions off 

by a number of books published in the 1995-2001 period that addressed 

issues of the looming 21st Century and missed climate change—and m

importantly from the U.S. perspective—the likelihood of attacks suc

those by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 

tember 2001.284

Th e IC’s fl agship, publicly available forecasting reports, the Nati

Intelligence Council’s (NIC) quinquennial “global trends” reports, also mi

the opportunity to bring attention to a “global war on terror,” although eff 

of climate change did receive consideration in the report published in 2000

Inclusion of this latter driver is not surprising considering that the NIC’s b

examination of climate change occurred at least a decade into the discus

and debate about “global warming,” suggesting that the phenomenon 

known even if the impact was not clearly predictable. One could argue 

the likelihood of a war on terror was also knowable. At least one intellige

adviser, Richard Clarke, warned of what would come to be known as the 

attacks during the spring and summer of 2001; that is, prior to the even

that tragic day.286 Th e fact that some people did anticipate these trends 

events relates to a conclusion of Kahneman and Klein, namely, that “wi

shared patterns of association exist, which everyone can recognize altho

few can fi nd them without prompting.”287

Interestingly, Th e Atlantic Monthly did warn in a speculative p

published during the summer of 2005 of a looming economic crisis.2

blamed the crisis in part on people using home equity to buy stocks—at l

getting “right” the fact that the then-future 2009-2010 crisis was (at lea

part) about real estate.289 Th e real culprit—as has become clear—was 

284 Peter Schwartz’s The Art of the Long View (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1996) is an e

ple. An irony here is that previously Schwartz headed the forecasting (scenario planning

at Royal Dutch Shell, which was (at least according to Schwartz) often correct in their p

tions. Schwartz, conversation with the author, September 2006.

285 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with 

governmental Experts (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), URL: <http://

dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2015.html>, accessed 15 February 2010. It should be noted 

climate change was already a discussed topic at the time.

286 As also did others according to Berkowitz (referenced above). While a failure to 

and warn was part of the tragedy, so was a failure to believe and act.

287 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 520.

288 See James Fallows, “Countdown to a Meltdown,” The Atlantic Monthly, July/Au

2005, URL: <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200507/fallows>, accessed 15 February 2

289 As seen from hindsight. Mr. Fallows had no way of knowing in foresight which pa

his speculative piece would come “true.”
78

behavior of banking institutions, not individual investors. In both cases greed 

was a motivating factor.290 However, the same Atlantic piece also speculated 

on the impending death of Fidel Castro, expected in 2008.291

Some examples of mindful, heuristic-based decision making, especially pertinent because they involve the thinking habits of senior U.S. civilian and military offi cials as well as of their strategic advisors, are discussed 

in Neustadt and May’s Th inking in Time.

292 Th e authors point out that a sensemaker’s awareness of historical decision making in even loosely analogous 

situations helps to keep at bay the further unsettling idea that the present 

circumstances constitute a “crisis.” Even in the absence of politically or militarily identical precedents as a guide, they note that George Marshall, Chief of 

Staff of the U.S. Army, read history and possessed “the kind of mental quality 

that readily connects discrete phenomena over time and repeatedly checks 

connections.”293 Decisions, as informed at times by the IC, might benefi t 

from Neustadt and May’s recommendation that heuristic-based decisions can 

grow from “imagining the future as it may be when it becomes the past.”294

Th is advice would seem to be useful in making decisions on a strategic 

basis rather than a more tactical, reactionary plane. From a national intelligence perspective, where proactive decisionmaking in the face of impending change in the national security environment ought to reign supreme, 

Neustadt and May’s heuristic advice about “thinking in time” becomes apt: 

“You may even [achieve] headway toward identifying changes that might be 

made to take place.”295

However, like all strategies for framing and re-framing, caution 

is needed, perhaps especially in considering Neustadt and May’s specifi c 

method of heuristic reasoning. An awareness that some current occasion or 

event repeats one that occurred in the past, or that the patterns bear some 

similarities or symmetries, can serve as either a fl ashlight or a blindfold. Th e 

pattern suggests where to look in fi nding evidence, but it might also prevent 

one from looking for other possibilities and particularly for the unique elements of the situation at hand. Th e characterization by some of the 1991 Gulf 

War as “another Vietnam” cognitively blinded them to the specifi cs of the 

290 But greed, although a constant or enabling condition, is not a good explanation 

of cause.

291 As of March 2011, Castro still lives.

292 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision 

Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). See especially chapters 13 and 14. Cited hereafter as 

Neustadt and May, Thinking.

293 Neustadt and May, Thinking, 252.

294 Neustadt and May, Thinking, 253-254.

295 Neustadt and May, Thinking, 259.
79

case at hand. Similarly, those who considered the second Gulf War as one 

completed the fi rst apparently missed key unique elements of that situat

Even so, there are instances when such reasoning is possible and valua

particularly when expertise can be acquired and is useful.296

Th e two types of intuition suggested here—skill-based and heuri

based—arise from a number of cognitive processes, including “the op

tions of memory.”297 While Kahneman and Klein disagree on the freque

and utility of non-skill-based intuitive judgment, they do agree that in

tive judgment may be limited in situations when the decisionmaker is ei

unskilled or the environment fl uctuates irregularly and therefore canno

learned. “Anchoring,” which is the biasing of a judgment because of the fr

ing of the initial question, and “attribute substitution,” arising from repla

a diffi cult question with an easier one, are two contributors to such fl a

intuitive judgments.298

If venturing predictions is too uncertain for intelligence profess

als, what can be done? We address this in our next section as we conside

more detail both why intuitive predictions fail, and when they may succ

We also present an alternative paradigm for assessing the future.

Th inking About Anticipating

Jurisprudence, clinical psychology, and economic forecasting ar

examples of domains where accurate prediction is diffi cult or imposs

and it is not terribly clear what it means for a person to be an expert in an

those fi elds. In the realm of jurisprudence, studies of the low rate of succ

ful intuitive predictions about future recidivism among paroled off en

serves as one of many pieces of evidence showing that even highly exp

enced professionals in certain domains may be no better than layper

at making intuitive judgments. As recounted by Myers, a 1998 Canad

Solicitor General research team found that the experts—in this case the 

nicians—were one of the “least accurate predictors of future criminality

Researchers at the University of Minnesota found such “expert” predict

were on average 10 percent less accurate than ones made with “mech

cal” i.e. statistical, actuarial, or algorithmic techniques, although they 

296 We discuss this below in more detail along with a means of making use of the pa

better understand the present and explore the future.

297 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 521.

298 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 520-21.

299 Myers, Intuition, 173; emphasis in original.
80

observe that in 63 of the 134 cases they studied, clinical predictions fared as 

well as mechanical ones.300

Admittedly one explanation (at least in the latter case) is that lack of 

timely feedback inhibits the acquisition of the skills needed for successful 

prediction. Psychologist James Shanteau observed that domains where the 

practitioner’s task is to predict human activity have few “experts.”301 Indeed, 

the expertise may lie in tasks other than those that are assumed to be the 

principal task goals. Th us, for instance, we might think that to be an expert 

clinical psychologist, one would have to be able to correctly diagnose and 

then correctly predict the likelihood of recovery, and then correctly treat the 

client, but the true skill might lie in being a very good listener. Human activity oft en fails to provide the needed cues for timely feedback, and at a collective level is subject to too many unpredictable events and decisions at the 

same time as it is subject to known trends and forces. Th e viral spread of 

unsubstantiated ideas on the World Wide Web through such mechanisms 

as YouTube off ers an example of how weak feedback at the collective level 

breeds low intrinsic predictability.

Th ese domains contrast with those where it is relatively easy to identify experts on the basis of operational defi nitions that specify what it means 

for a person to be an expert, in terms of performance at principal task goals. 

Examples would be medicine, weather forecasting, piloting, musical performance, and industrial process control. Th ese latter domains are known by 

convenience as “Type 1.” Th ey contrast with the formerly described domains, 

known as “Type 2.”

How professionals fare in estimative judgments in these domains has 

been studied. Th e results of one study of members of the intelligence unit of the 

Canadian Privy Council Offi ce, carried out by Defence Research and Development Canada, concluded that with ample time and resources the “quality of analytic judgments was ‘good to excellent’ across [a series of] various 

indices.”302 Th e researchers noted, “[experts] that perform well tend to work 

in areas that provide timely, unambiguous feedback on their performance”—

in other words, in stable, Type 1 domains.

300 William M. Grove, David H. Zald, Boyd S. Lebow, Beth E. Snitz, and Chad Nelson, “Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Assessment, vol. 12, no. 1 

(2000), 25. Cited hereafter as Grove and others, “Meta-Analysis.” As recounted by Myers 

(p. 173) 63 cases were also a draw; in only 8 cases did clinical methods fare better.

301 James Shanteau, “Competence in Experts: The Role of Task Characteristics,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, vol. 53 (1992): 252-266.

302 David R. Mandel, Alan Barnes, and John Hannigan, “A Calibration Study of an Intelligence Assessment Division,” PowerPoint Presentation, Defense Research and Development Canada, Toronto, CA, n.d. Cited hereafter as Mandel, Barnes, and Hannigan, “Calibration Study.”
81

For Type 2 domains, however, the evidence points the other way

can expect intelligence professionals to be poorer at point prediction un

the predictions are very near term. Th is tendency is confi rmed by the 

long-range predictions contained in the Global Trends papers. In a rel

example, Th e Economist found greater accuracy in their control group t

among the experts in a set of economic point predictions spanning 198

1994.303 About this experiment, the members of the U.S. Commission 

National Security observed that of four groups of people—“fi nance mi

ters, chairmen of multinational corporations, Oxford University econom

students, and, as a control group, four London garbage collectors”—“[ev

group did poorly; the garbage collectors, as it happened, turned out t

the most accurate.”304 In commenting about its own study, Th e Econo

concluded, “Th e contents of dustbins could well be a useful leading 

nomic indicator.”305

A Space-Time Envelope of Anticipation

What actually occurs when we think about an event or trend l

in the future? Hoff man suggests that causality arises from what he refer

as long-term forces and abstractions, rather than near-term events and d

sions. We project past events, decisions, and perceived forces and abstract

forward in space and time toward the present eff ect or event as we begin 

ing to make sense of the future. Th en we envision the reach and conseque

of that eff ect or event further, into the future; we extrapolate future forces 

abstractions from ongoing events and decisions. We therefore convert ev

of the present moment into a “specious present.”

Th is all occurs in foresight. But we subsequently look at event

backward fashion. Someone got onto an airliner with a bomb in their un

wear. What explains this? We can reason backward across actual time f

eff ects and aft ereff ects (the attempt by the bomber to detonate his explos

and the successful preventative intervention) to causal explanations. And 

303 The United States Commission on National Security, New World Coming: Ame

Security in the 21st Century, Study Addendum, Phase 1 (July 1998-August 1999), 1. 

hereafter as Commission on National Security. Since the National Intelligence Counc

an “Economics” portfolio, one safely can surmise that economics is an intelligence i

Therefore the results from the experiment by The Economist study has relevance to the 

tice of intelligence.

304 Commission on National Security, 1. One might well wonder how a group of four 

ligence professionals might have fared. Hoffman suspects that the researchers probably 

looked at prediction hit-rate and did not drill down into the reasoning and knowledge co

relied upon. It is there, he suspects that the expertise of the “experts” would have eme

Still, because economics is a Type 2 domain, the results are not implausible.

305 The Economist, “Garbage In, Garbage Out,” (U.S. Edition), 3 June 1970, 70.
82

always fi nd those causal explanations; we’re certain they’re the right ones. 

For Type 1 domains we may be good at this. Th e very nature of Type 2 

domains precludes any reasonable expectation of accuracy on our part about 

causal explanations. But, as Kahneman and others point out, people are 

nonetheless certain they are right: the “illusion of validity” prevails. Such 

cogitation in hindsight is a quite rational kind of sensemaking, as it is the 

reconsideration of a case aft er one has obtained more information about it. It 

works because we only consider what we knew aft erward and what we could 

or should have known aft erward. We do not consider the event from the perspective of what we knew before the event occurred, and this feeds into the 

blame game.

Such human thinking may be illustrated as a series of interlocking triangles set across a “space-time envelope of indeterminate causality” as shown 

in fi gure 3. “Eff ects” or events are predicated upon other events and decisions 

that are themselves infl uenced by forces and abstractions. Th ey in turn give 

rise to new (or continuing) events and decisions that are in turn embodied in 

Figure 3. Space-Time Envelope of Indeterminate Causality.

Source: Robert Hoffman.

One looks for different kinds

of data and patterns

Proximity of causes 

to the effect in 

spacetime

Forces and 

Abstractions

Events 

and

Decisions

Forces and 

Abstractions

Events 

and

Decisions

E

F

F

E

C

T

Expanding scale 

and scope 

of consequences

What do I mean by the "Present?" How do I explain 

the occurrence of 

the effect?

What do I need to 

forecast?

Toward the Distant Past Toward the Distant Future

There was an assassination 

attempt today

versus

Popular unrest has increased this week.

The further back one goes, the less 

certain one can be about specific causes, 

the more one must look at forces and 

abstractions, and the greater the number 

of contributory causes one might list

The further forward one looks, the less one 

can anticipate the reach and consequences
83

new (or continuing) forces and abstractions. Th ese predicate and subseq

factors can be viewed from a variety of scales. Using a model of weather f

casting (from which this “envelope” was developed), we observe that at e

scale, there are particular dynamics having particular space-time par

eters. As one progresses from higher scales to lower, each scale provides 

“boundary conditions” or forcing events for the scale below it. Each s

requires the examination of diff erent kinds of data and emergent patt

as well as diff ering meanings. For example, at a microscale in weather f

casting, one might simply look up and observe what is going on locally 

a period of a few minutes; at a continental or “synoptic” scale one m

sense of radar or satellite images showing events that transpire over a pe

of hours; at global scale observations consider the actions of the jet str

and the worldwide eff ects of phenomena such as El Niño over time sp

of months. Dynamics are coupled to space-time, and because time is a 

tor, there is an explicit expression of increasing uncertainty the farther 

is from the eff ect or event — either in the past or in the future. Placin

episode of intelligence sensemaking into this framework might help keep 

thinking honest.

Let us consider that the point of view of the observer is one o

“unspecifi c present.” Th is is not a single point in time but a range of tim

little in the future and a little in the past, depending on the context or ev

under analysis. Hoff man’s model allows for the factors—at diff ering scal

to be mapped out conceptually as is shown in fi gure 4.

At the conclusion of making such a diagram, one has mapped o

path of reasoning—forward in foresight, backward in hindsight—ident

the drivers, and placed them in one of three space-time envelopes: past, p

ent, or future. Th e creation of diagrams of this sort has been useful in char

analyst reasoning and knowledge, making it explicit for discussion and 

contributing to knowledge capture and preservation.306 Th e diagram fa

tates sensemaking by making explicit what one knows and when one kn

it as well as how the various trifl es of information are related and contri

to one another.

306 Robert R. Hoffman, “Use of Concept Mapping and the Critical Decision Meth

Support Human-Centered Computing for the Intelligence Community.” Report to the Palo 

Research Center (PARC) on the Project, “Theory and Design of Adaptable Human Inform

Interaction Systems for Intelligence Work,” Novel Intelligence From Massive Data (NIMD) 

Program, Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA), Department of Def

Washington, DC, November 2003; and Robert R. Hoffman, “Making Good Decisions a

Decision-aiding?” panel on “Beyond Requirements: Decision Making Developing Software 

for Intelligence Analysts” 49th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics So

Orlando, Florida, 2005.
84

Figure 4. A Notional Example of Causality Across the Space-Time Envelope.Source:

Event U

Robert Hoffman

Event T

has been

has been

entails

could be

could be

could be was

is the current

convergent

causes of

may

lead to

was

Event ~X

Known Past Present Hypothetical Future

Hypothetical Past

Compromise

Event V

Event W

Forces and

Abstractions

Event X

Riot

Event Z

Event Y

Lowered perceived

legitimacy of the 

dictatorship

would be

counter-cause

to

Behind-the-scenes

reconciliation

meeting

Assassination

of insurgency

leader this week

Protests of

the election

results

Increasing

poverty

since 1980s

Five-year

inflationary

surge

Events and

Decisions

Events and

Decisions

Forces and

Abstractions %

&&

%

#

4
85

Anticipating Deception: Applying the Space-Time Envelo

A recurring worry within alert intelligence services is whether 

are being deceived by their adversaries. From Troy, in the second millenn

BCE, through to mis-direction schemes in World War II, and on to the l

up to the Iraq invasion of 2003, adversarial deception has played a stron

decisive role in fi nal outcomes.307

World War II’s Operation Mincemeat is of particular interest for 

opportunity it aff ords for counterfactual examination, and thus for a 

semaker’s anticipation of future strategic deception.308 Th e premise of 

Mincemeat deception was to employ a stratagem known as the “lost disp

case,” a sort of portable Trojan Horse, to mislead the Germans about w

the Allies would invade as they moved from North Africa onto the Europ

continent. To both sides, Sicily was the logical candidate for the initial la

ings. Th us, the English proposed fl oating a corpse ashore at Huelva, Sp

with a dispatch case containing letters and other references to invasion po

through the Peloponnese, and Sardinia and Corfu; Sicily was to be a di

sion. As both Montagu and Macintyre make clear, the Germans decided 

recovered documents were authentic and redeployed troops to strengt

their positions in the incorrect locations. Subsequently the Allies faced c

siderably less resistance when they landed on Sicily.309

However, could the Germans have come to a diff erent conclus

Such counterfactual questions normally leave us with a less than satisf

answer. But in this case, in light of fi rst-hand and well-founded knowledg

decisionmaking on both sides, we can marshal the authentic beliefs, eve

and drivers that led to a decision to make a well-informed estimate of w

could have evoked an opposing decision. As shown in fi gure 5, key evide

and beliefs, when laid out in the space-time envelope of anticipation, wo

facilitate the counterfactual process by indicating what underlies the G

man belief that the documents were authentic. Behind each “event” ar

fact chains of evidence that could be explicitly included in a more deta

307 For a very interesting take on the many layers of Iraqi deception see Kevin W

James Lacey and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: The View From the Inside,” Fo

Affairs (May/June 2006). It seems that Hussein was himself deceived even as he strove to 

vince his neighbors that he had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and strove to convinc

United States that he had gotten rid of his WMD — which apparently was the ground trut

308 See Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was: World War II’s Boldest Counterin

gence Operation (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001, reprinted from 1953 orig

Cited hereafter as Montagu, The Man Who Never Was. The story, a first-hand accou

Montagu as one of its planners, is also told in the 1956 movie of the same name. Als

Ben Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat (New York, NY: Harmony Books, 2010). Cited here

as Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat.

309 Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat, 284-285; Montagu, The Man Who Never Was, 139
86

Figure 5. A Space-Time Envelope of Anticipation Regarding the Authenticity of the Documents Recovered at Huelva, Spain, 1943.Source: Authors

%

&&

%

#

4

However in 1942, a

recovered English

briefcase contains

authentic documents

Best practices of

phony documents 

in lost English 

dispatch cases

Deception

has been

has been

entails

has been

could be

would be counter-cause to

may lead to

could be

is the

current

convergent

causes of

was

was was

was

Event B Event G Event I

Event A Event ~H

Event C

Hypothetical Future

Hypothetical Past

Known Past Present

Event D

Event E Event F

Event F

English and American

troops land where 

the documents say

they will

In April, an English

briefcase is

recovered at

Huelva, Spain

Belief that

recovered briefcase

contents are not

authentic

Forces and

Abstractions

Forces and

Abstractions

Events and

Decisions

Events and

Decisions

Deception to draw

troops away from

actual Sicilian

invasion site

Indications of

imminent invasion

through the

Peloponnese and

Sardinia/Corfu

Belief that

documents in case

are legitimate

Assertion by principal

agent in Madrid that

case documents are

authentic
87

version of this sensemaking approach.310 Had the Germans employed 

cognitive tool, a diff erent decision regarding the authenticity of the do

ments and therefore the location of the invasion might have been reac

Th e Allies might have been repulsed and the events of the remainder of 

War would have been diff erent.311

Implications of Visualizing Anticipation

Diagramming using Concept Maps (and related kinds of diagr

called causal maps and cognitive maps) has been used as a de-biasing t

nique for analysis under uncertainty. Th is use is well known in the fi el

business and strategic management:

Causal maps allow the map maker to focus on action — for example, how the respondent explains the current situation in terms of 

previous events, and what changes he or she expects in the future. 

Th is kind of cognitive map is currently the most popular mapping 

method in organization theory and strategic management.312

And in the pages of Th e Journal of Strategic Management, Ge

Hodgkinson and his colleagues added:

In addition to providing a useful means for gaining insights into the 

nature and signifi cance of cognitive processes underpinning strategic decision making, this dynamic emphasis on antecedents, behaviors and consequences, renders causal cognitive mapping techniques 

particularly attractive as a potential means for overcoming the eff ects 

of framing (and possibly other cognitive biases) in situations involving relatively complex decision scenarios.313

Hodgkinson et alia investigated “the extent to which judgmental biases 

ing from the framing of risky decision problems [could] indeed be elimin

310 This is known as “inference diagramming” and was developed for jurispruden

jurist John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943). David Schum developed the paradigm for intellig

work, and Moore explored applications of it for intelligence work. See John Henry Wigmore

Science of Proof: As Given by Logic, Psychology and General Experience and Illustrated in Ju

Trials, 3rd edition (Boston, MA: Little, Brown,1937); David A. Schum, Evidence and Inferen

the Intelligence Analyst, Two Volumes, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987)

David T. Moore, Creating Intelligence: Evidence and Inference in the Analysis Process, MSSI T

chaired by Francis J. Hughes (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, July 20

311 See for example, Peter G. Tsouras, Third Reich Victorious: Ten Dynamic Scenar

Which Hitler Wins the War (London, UK: Lionel Leventhal Limited, 2002); and Peter G. Tso

Disaster at D-Day: The Germans Defeat the Allies, June 1944 (London, UK: Greenhill Books, 2

312 Anne Huff, ed., Mapping Strategic Thought (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1990), 16.

313 Gerard P Hodgkinson and others, Nicola J. Bown, A. John Maule, Keith W. Gla

and Alan D. Pearman, “Breaking The Frame: An Analysis Of Strategic Cognition And Dec

Making Under Uncertainty,” Strategic Management Journal, 20 (1999): 979. Cited hereaft

Hodgkinson and others, “Strategic Cognition.”
88

through the use of this particular cognitive mapping technique” and found 

cognitive mapping to be “an eff ective means of limiting the damage accruing 

from this bias.”314

Because Hoff man’s approach is generalized from weather forecast 

modeling—which has become increasingly accurate at certain scales—

it would be reasonable that against Type 1 domains this may be a useful 

approach. But, what of Type 2 domains? Given the appeal and excitement 

that come with attacking such mysteries, innovative experimentation 

remains the surest way to learn about how causality mapping might contribute to positive advances in intelligence sensemaking about Type 2 domains. 

Given the conclusions reached by Hodgkinson, it appears likely that intelligence professionals making sense of type 2 domains might mitigate framing 

eff ects through such diagramming.

Th e Roles of Intuitive Th inking in 

Intelligence Sensemaking

Given these considerations, what are (or should be) the roles of skillsbased intuitive and heuristic-based intuitive thinking in intelligence sensemaking? Many, if not most, intelligence professionals have had a “feeling” 

about an issue and what is going to happen. Sometimes those intuitions are 

correct, particularly if the requirement entails real-time observation and situational awareness. When it comes to anticipatory sensemaking, however, the 

authors suspect that intelligence professionals may fare no better than does 

the average citizen in predictive situations.315

Th ere are a number of reasons for this, not the least of which has 

to do with the availability of evidence, or relevant information. A somewhat 

persistent myth about intelligence is that its professionals have access to all 

the information they need and that they can get any and all other necessary 

information. Th is not only simply is not true but is likely highly undesirable. 

While it is true that intelligence professionals must make their assessments 

based on incomplete, oft en faulty, and sometimes deceptive information, at 

least they can do so. Forcing them to try to make sense of all the relevant 

information relating to an issue would likely burden them suffi ciently so as 

to preclude anything but the most general fi ndings being issued—if anything 

314 Hodgkinson and others, “Strategic Cognition,” 977, 979. Framing problems differently 

has been empirically shown to dramatically change the decisions people make. See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science, 

vol. 211, no. 4481 (10 January 1981), 453-458.

315 A near synonym is “prediction.” However, the term implies a future that can be anticipated along with the establishment of the likelihood (probability) that it can be determined. 

Rather than such probability juggling, what people really do is to anticipate ranges of situations. This is the meaning attributed to “anticipatory sensemaking.”
89

can be issued at all. Finally, as was discussed above in relation to fi gure 1 

Chapter 3), complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty increase as one m

from Descriptive to Estimative (or Anticipatory) Intelligence.316

It is true that a so-called “smoking gun” may exist from time to t

For example, the images of the Soviet SS-4 MRBMs in Cuba collected 

15 October 1962 left little doubt as to what they were—but such occurre

are rare. Further, intelligence professionals compete against other for

intelligence organizations whose professionals may be as skilled at obfus

ing what their factions, groups, or nations are doing as we are at making s

of what they are doing. Sometimes that other side is, in fact, better. And, 

a closely matched sports event, the diff erence between valid and true se

making versus invalid or untrue sensemaking—or even no sensemakin

all—might be the result of luck.

Whether or not intelligence professionals do indeed have any be

predictive skills than non-professionals should be a testable question; h

ever, it remains one of many questions about intelligence sensemaking 

remain open because of gaps in the empirical foundation for a psycholog

theory of performance of intelligence sensemaking.317

Many intelligence professionals work in one or more Type 2 dom

where it is far from easy to come up with good operational defi nitions to id

tify experts. For example, how does one determine that an intelligence pro

sional is an expert? In Type 1 domains, as discussed above, this can be c

Among the defi ning features are years and breadth of experience, but 

measurable performance, and status within social networks (i.e., the expe

the “go-to” person for dealing with specialized problems).318

However, as Kahneman and Klein note, such is not the case w

“experts” must work outside their favored domains or within ones that 

unstable and do not provide the cues and feedback necessary for cali

tion.319 Since such Type 2 domains are ones in which the primary task g

involve the understanding and prediction of the activities of individual

groups, accuracy and precision are elusive. Consequently, as has been no

Type 2 domains are also characterized by tasks involving a lack of tim

feedback and a paucity of robust decision aids. Further, if the object of st

316 How much information is truly necessary is discussed in more detail below.

317 Robert R. Hoffman, “Biased about Biases: The Theory of the Handicapped Mind i

Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,” Panel Presentation for “Designing Support for Intellig

Analysts,” S. Potter, Chair, in Proceedings of the 48th Annual Meeting of the Human Factor

Ergonomics Society (Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 2005), 4

318 Robert R. Hoffman, “How Can Expertise be Defined?: Implications of Research 

Cognitive Psychology,” in Robin Williams, Wendy Faulkner and James Fleck, eds., Exp

Expertise (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1998), 85.

319 Kahneman and Klein, “Intuitive Expertise,” 521.
90

does not know what she or they will do, how can someone else predict it reliably? Th erefore, is it any surprise that in such domains, intuition is limited in 

its usefulness? What are intelligence professionals to do?

It should be reiterated that although over-estimative errors in intelligence sensemaking, as has been noted, are unacceptable, under-estimative 

errors are even less tolerated. It is better to have warned and been wrong than 

not to have warned and been wrong. False alarms are better than misses. A 

warning about an attempt by another individual to set off a bomb on a subway 

system—which subsequently does not occur—generates far less uproar (if any 

at all) than does a failure to warn of an individual who in fact plans to blow 

up an airliner, and through anticipatory sensemaking, being able to catch him 

preemptively. In the former case, the fact of the warning may even be viewed 

as the measure by which the attack was prevented. Th e would-be terrorist was 

scared off because his plans were publicized.

Unfortunately, this bias toward false alarms feeds into the blame 

game that demoralizes intelligence professionals. Th is creates a perception 

of an inevitability of failure perhaps captured by the water cooler joke, “How 

many analysts does it take to change a light bulb?” For which the answer is 

three: “One to not notice it is burned out, one to not change it, and one to 

take the blame.”

Does More Information Improve Anticipation?

What about foraging for more information? Paul Slovic’s 1973 research 

into the impact on the reliability of bookmakers as they brought more information into consideration noted that it did not increase their accuracy (fi gure 2, above).320 Myers, in commenting on the Minnesota meta-study, notes 

further that providing clinicians with additional information from fi les or 

interviews actually reduced their accuracy.321 Th e question becomes how 

much information is enough? A related question is, “how does one know that 

in advance?” It must be concluded that even with more information, Type 2 

intuition remains of uncertain validity.

It is by no means obvious that simply throwing more information 

at a problem will make solving it any easier. For instance, to investigate the 

question of apparent under-utilization of information, Phelps and Shanteau 

(1978) used two methods to examine the strategies of livestock judges. In one 

situation, judges were presented with photos of female pigs (gilts) and asked 

320 Slovic, “Behavioral Problems”; also Fischoff, “Condemned to Study the Past.”

321 Myers, Intuition, 173-174. See W. M. Grove and others, “Clinical Versus Mechanical 

Prediction: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Assessment, vol. 12 (2000): 19-30. Paul Slovic 

came to the same conclusions in 1973; see Slovic, “Behavioral Problems.”
91

to rate each on breeding quality (their usual task). Th e results revealed 

same sorts of limitations reported by other research, with each judge ap

ently relying on only a few of the 11 possible cues (e.g., weight, length, 

thickness, heaviness of bone structure, freeness of gait, etc.). In the sec

condition, judges were presented with verbal descriptions of the gilts (

posedly based on a telephone conversation) that listed the levels of th

attributes for each animal. In this case, analysis of the judgments of bree

quality revealed a subtle pattern: Judges used between nine and eleven c

which tended to interact. Combined with results from a post-experime

interview, the judgments revealed an underlying strategy involving two w

of information integration: Measures are collapsed into intermediate ju

ments including size and meat quality; these judgments are then comb

into an overall judgment.

Th e diff erence in results for the two tasks is striking. With the 

tures of gilts, the relevant stimulus attributes were naturally correlated 

perceptually chunked (e.g., tall gilts tend to be heavier and wider). Th us, e

though a judge may have perceived all of the cues, only one signifi cant 

might be needed explicitly to generate a given intermediate judgment. W

the verbal descriptions, on the other hand, the cues were presented separa

the expert had to work through them explicitly, and the eff ects of cue in

correlations revealed.

Benjamin Kleinmuntz obtained a similar result using the “Tw

Questions” game and a set of test cases to add structure to interviews w

intern and resident neurologists.322 Experience made a big diff erence in d

nostic accuracy, of course, but also in the number of questions asked ab

symptoms in each test case. In order to diagnose a case, the advanced exp

asked fewer questions but they also spent less time pursuing incorrect hyp

eses. Indeed, experts tended to ask about symptoms that yielded the gr

est amount of diagnostic information relative to their hypothesis, refl ec

“economy of eff ort.”323

322 Benjamin Kleinmuntz, “The Processing of Clinical Information by Man and Mach

In Benjamin Kleinmuntz, ed., Formal Representations of Human Judgment (New York, NY: W

1968), 149-186.

323 The field of expert reasoning has a particularly rich literature. See, for example S

Scribner, “Studying Working Intelligence,” in Barbara Rogoff and Jean Lave, Everyday Cogn

Its Development in Social Context (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 9-40

Sylvia Scribner, “Thinking in Action: Some Characteristics of Practical Thought,” in 

Tobach, Rachel Joffe Falmagne, Mary Brown Parlee, Laura M. W. Martin, and Aggie Scr

Kapelman, eds., Mind and Social Practice: Selected Writings of Sylvia Scribner (Cambridge

Cambridge University Press, 1997), 319-337; K. Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Robe

Hoffman, and Paul J. Feltovich, eds., Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Perform

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Robert R. Hoffman and Laura G

Militello, Perspectives on Cognitive Task Analysis: Historical Origins and Modern Communit

Practice (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press/Taylor and Francis, 2008).
92

Future Vision: Red Brains, Blue Brains?

Given the discussion to this point, it is not enough to continue to ask 

whether expertise hinders judgment, or whether more information improves 

prediction. One might ask more productively about how we might improve 

the circumstances for sound reasoning. A partial answer may lie in the work 

of a group of Southern California political scientists whose recent neurocognitive research addresses how people behave and make predictions. For 

example, Darren Schreiber et alia used functional MRIs (magnetic resonance 

imaging tests) to assess how people associated with the U.S. Republican and 

Democratic political parties deal with risk. Th e researchers discovered that 

members of the two groups used distinctly diff erent portions of their brains 

when making “winning risky versus winning safe decisions.”324 Th e authors 

note that the diff erent portions of the brain play diff erent roles in human cognition and conclude that

it appears in our experiment that Republican participants, when 

making a risky choice, are predominantly externally oriented, reacting to the fear-related processes with a tangible potential external 

consequence. In comparison, risky decisions made by Democratic 

participants appear to be associated with monitoring how the selection of a risky response might feel internally.325

While neurocognitive paradigms for intelligence sensemaking have 

not yet formally been identifi ed or established, implications of this work—to 

the degree that intelligence professionals can speak to the concerns of decisionmakers who are, aft er all, particular political partisans—may be signifi -

cant. Th e research to date shows that the cognitive mechanisms and especially 

the emotion-based attitudes of partisan sensemakers shape their reasoning as 

they assess uncertain and risky phenomena.

Additional research could explore biologically based diff erences that 

correlate with the strong intuitive tradition by which sensemakers (and others) analyze, synthesize, and interpret intelligence phenomena. For example, 

in what situations are the skills and services of externally oriented intelligence 

professionals required and in what situations are those of internally oriented 

professionals needed? Similarly, in communicating intelligence results to 

324 Darren M. Schreiber and others, “Red Brain, Blue Brain: Evaluative Processes Differ in 

Democrats and Republicans,” Paper delivered at the 2009 American Political Science Association Meeting, Toronto, CA, URL: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1451867>, accessed 9 December 

2009. Cited hereafter as Schreiber and others, “Red Brain, Blue Brain.” While it is too soon to 

determine the impact of their (and similar) work, it may prove revolutionary to political affiliation studies.

325 Schreiber and others, “Red Brain, Blue Brain.”
93

consumers, are briefers more eff ective if their neurocognitive “risk” strate

match those of their consumers? 326

Looking Ahead

Intuitive reasoning is something that we do naturally, all the tim

cannot be prevented, is not easily neutralized, and it is sometimes useful 

necessary in sensemaking. While it can be reliable when employed as the 

basis for actionably valid, predictive intelligence creation in Type 1 doma

it is highly fallible when used for intelligence creation in Type 2 domains

What can be done to challenge and validate the surety one has ab

an intuitive intelligence judgment? Employing approaches to reasoning s

as those found in critical thinking seminars and courses, especially as 

rently off ered across the IC’s educational institutions, and developing s

that aid mindfulness (as discussed in the Preface), off er possible mean

accomplishing calibrated reasoning.327 Diagramming such as was don

fi gure 4 may challenge and certainly will augment the reasoning. But w

else can be done to increase certainty that derived conclusions are valid? 

becomes the subject of the next chapter.

326 An important caveat is that just because one person exhibits a particular “styl

dealing with risk does not make them unsuited for other situations where a different app

may seem to be warranted. Such reasoning smacks of “biological determinism” and is no 

appropriate in intelligence work than it was in the domains discussed in Richard Hernstei

Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York

The Free Press, 1996). For a history and in-depth discussion of scientific determinism (s

times also referred to as scientific racism) see Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man 

York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1996).

327 That these approaches will be effective admittedly is a hypothesis in need of test

real-life situations. In experiments with students, Jennifer Reed (among others) finds that 

cal thinking does improve the quality of judgment and decision-making. The handy diffe

between the world in which intelligence professionals find themselves and Reed’s class

setting is that while there are no answers in foresight in the former, truth can be know

advance in the latter. See Jennifer H. Reed, Effect of a Model For Critical Thinking on St

Achievement In Primary Source Document Analysis And Interpretation, Argumentative Reaso

Critical Thinking Dispositions, And History Content in a Community College History Course, 

Dissertation, College of Education, University of South Florida, December 1998, URL: <ht

www.criticalthinking.org/resources/JReed-Dissertation.pdf>, accessed 2 February 2010.

95

CHAPTER 6

Considering Validation

How does one know if the knowledge that intelligence sensema

create is itself valid? Does accuracy alone ensure validity? What was accu

when fi ndings were communicated may not be accurate subsequently. 

fl ux suggests a strong procedural basis for validation. For example, were s

followed to avoid perceptual errors and cognitive traps? Was the process d

umented? Were alternatives adequately explored? Given the inherent un

tainty in intelligence judgments, it remains possible that all the appropr

processes may be suffi ciently applied and yet the judgment is wrong—

comfort for relatives of the victims and the survivors if the result is a terro

attack on a scale of those in September 2001. By exploring validation pers

tives from cognate fi elds, we may advance our parochial understanding.

Analogies from Other Fields

Medicine

Medical practice is at times presented as having notable simi

ties to intelligence practice. For example, with respect to validation, an 

mate metric for failure in medicine is that the patient dies. But is medi

successful if the patient lives? At what quality of life and for how long 

two additional questions. Perhaps death with a minimum of suff ering is 

most favorable medical outcome—is this a success? Depending on the 

cifi cs of the case, maybe it is. Is there a diff erence if the patient is very 

or very young? Th e author’s own experience with the death of his moth

that elderly, somewhat frail patients—in practice—do not seem to receive 

same level of treatment as do younger but equally severely ill patients. In 

former case the patient, the author’s mother, died within about 72 hours w

out what appears to be undue suff ering but also without signifi cant treatm

of the condition, only an easing of the symptoms. In the latter case, the c

recovers. Are both treatment regimes successful? Does the inevitable or 

haps the perceived inevitability of death by the attending physician becom

factor in determining the treatment?

In medicine, success is measured post-facto. Early organ transpl

were successes if the patients lived only for a brief period aft erward. O
96

factors include quality of life, longevity, and costs. A recent T-cell-based, 

bioengineered trachea is considered a signifi cant success not only because 

it succeeds but also because it dramatically improves the patient’s quality 

of life:

the successful outcome shows it is possible to produce a tissueengineered airway with mechanical properties that permit normal 

breathing and which is free from the risks of rejection seen with conventional transplanted organs. Th e patient has not developed antibodies to her graft , despite not taking any immunosuppressive drugs. 

Lung function tests performed two months aft er the operation were 

all at the better end of the normal range for a young woman.328

If, a year later, however, the patient dies (from a related cause) was the expense 

worth it? Certainly, her family can be expected to indicate this is the case. 

But what of the cost to the larger society and perhaps other patients suff ering 

from other ailments, who cannot get necessary resources because they are 

tied up in this specifi c treatment? Viewed in an intelligence context, if a terrorist attack is thwarted (characterized as a success) but a year later a larger 

and more devastating attack occurs, and it does so because the earlier attack 

was prevented, was the earlier disruption a success?

Jurisprudence

Jurisprudence is an adversarial system in which the ultimate confrontation is a trial wherein two advocates make inferences about evidence to 

argue opposite sides of a case before an impartial third entity or body (oft en 

of non-experts). Th is is the system at its best. In practice, the skill level of the 

advocates may vary. One may be more skilled or more profi cient than the 

other. Th e impartial body (judge, jury) may be misled to a decision. Were this 

not the case then there would never (or very rarely) be cases where innocent 

people are convicted, imprisoned, and sometimes executed.329

While such failures appear to be rare, they may be examples of a limited consideration of evidence where only one side of an issue is examined. 

Th e fallacy is not new. Diagoras of Melos (5th Century BCE) was confronted 

with votive off erings carved by sailors in gratitude to the gods at their safe 

return from the sea. Diagoras unpopularly observed that only those who had 

328 University of Bristol, “Adult Stem Cell Breakthrough: First Tissue-engineered Trachea 

Successfully Transplanted,” Science Daily, 18 November 2008, URL: <http://www.sciencedaily.

com/releases/2008/11/081119092939.htm>, accessed 21 November 2008.

329 For more on exonerations see Samuel R. Gross and others, “Exonerations in the 

United States, 1989 through 2003,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 95, no. 2 (2005): 

523-560.
97

returned carved the votives; those who had not returned [the missing cla

evidence] carved none.330

A success metric involving law would be one where either no challe

was made or it was repudiated and the convicted person was in fact gu

But, what if the person is found innocent, or at least not guilty? Th ey ma

truly innocent. However, the prosecuting attorney may be incompetent

evidence circumstantial or otherwise incomplete. In this case the actual in

cence of the person may be independent of the fi ndings of the court.

So, how does one measure success? Th ere are at least fi ve point

view involved in jurisprudence: Th at of each of the advocates, the jud

entity (a jury or judge) the accused person, and the community or gov

ment. Each party, depending on the verdict, has a diff erent metric for suc

In certain types of cases such as those involving child molestation or alle

terrorism, the accused person tends to be deemed guilty by the commu

prosecuting advocate, and government even if exonerated. In all cases w

an opinion—particularly in the media—runs counter to the majority’s vi

the conclusion may be made that the court failed to render the “right” ver

as was also seen in the highly publicized cases of motorist Rodney King 

the murder trial of O.J. Simpson.

Science

Science involves a number of metrics that include a sound metho

documenting both process and results, as well as replication. Work is con

ered preliminary and non-defi nitive if it has not been replicated. As a typ

example, in writing about the need for studies of the genetic bases of fi d

among humans, the editors of a collection of articles on genetics of be

ior in Science refer to a comment by Australian psychologist, Simon Eas

that despite the intellectual appeal of theories about genetic links to spe

behaviors, “there are few replicated studies to give them heft .”331 In o

words, the underlying theories may not be sound.

Science depends on refutation of alternative hypotheses, and rep

tion studies attempt to refute that which has been shown. It is quite accept

to be wrong so long as one admits it when the fact becomes apparent. Ind

one model for science is that of competitive cooperation. Scientists attemp

tear down the new work of colleagues—without resorting to personal atta

Th is dialectic approach may last generations or longer. In the process 

knowledge is discovered and—if it cannot be refuted—validated.

330 Taleb, The Black Swan, 100.

331 Constance Holden, “Parsing the Genetics of Behavior,” Science, vol. 322, no. 

(7 November 2008), 893.
98

Replication in Intelligence

Th e inability to replicate much of the process of sensemaking in intelligence limits the application of this indispensable practice of science. Th e 

pressures of real-time production inhibit the re-visitation of past judgments, 

although with at least one recent National Intelligence Estimate, the repetition of “alternative analysis” led to the questioning and revision of the original 

conclusions. Essentially, any meaningful replication of intelligence phenomena can only be accurately made in foresight, as in a National Intelligence 

Estimate. It is not replication if one group of practitioners performs sensemaking of an event before it happens and another group does so aft erward.332

Th erefore, replication needs to occur before an event occurs.

When replication of methods against the same problem occurs it is 

typically in the intelligence school setting. It is the author’s experience that 

such eff orts yield a common set of explanations with some outliers.333 For 

example, when intelligence students faced with a scenario involving three fi ctitious nations at odds with each other develop a common set of hypotheses 

regarding who will initiate a war and with whom, and are then given a fi nite 

set of evidence and a common method such as the Analysis of Competing 

Hypotheses, they come to similar conclusions as to which hypotheses are the 

least likely and therefore which eventualities can be expected.334 Unfortunately there does not yet exist a similar body of results for real intelligence 

problems interpreted through the lenses of diff erent intelligence disciplines 

and sources.

Yet, replication remains an important metric of the intelligence sensemaking process. As Caroline Park notes, “[the] basic reason research must be 

replicated is because the fi ndings of a lone researcher might not be correct.”335

In the context of intelligence, un-reviewed and even reviewed conclusions 

of an intelligence professional may simply be incorrect. Admittedly a supervisory review process that grows more stringent as increasingly signifi cant 

332 The problem is that latter group has the benefit of being aware of what actually happened, a factor they are unable to ignore in their deliberations. Since the two groups therefore 

are working in different contexts, replication has not occurred.

333 The author observed this over a period of eight years of teaching new intelligence professionals at the National Security Agency in both a new employee orientation program and in 

the author’s critical thinking and structured analysis course. At least 1,000 individuals have 

participated in the two courses the author offers. For more information on the course see 

Moore, Critical Thinking.

334 It is the outliers that are truly fascinating in this classroom experience. Unfortunately, 

given the context imposed by a classroom setting and operational constraints, it has so far not 

been possible to capture why some students offer the outlying positions.

335 Caroline L. Park. “What is the Value of Replicating other Studies?” Research Evaluation 13. No. 1 (December 2004), 198. Cited hereafter as Park, “Value.”
99

implications emerge from the intelligence conclusions minimizes the lik

hood of error. Still, errors do occur. One replicative method known within 

IC, that of “Team A – Team B,” appears not to be widely practiced althoug

has been used on specifi c issues.336

But what of the methods employed in the intelligence sensema

process itself? Intelligence sensemaking can involve both quantitative 

qualitative methods. As Park observes, quantitative research “can be re

cated with great accuracy and precision.”337 Intelligence conclusions 

result from counting observed phenomena such as aircraft located aroun

airfi eld can easily be repeated. But repeatedly and consistently measuring 

intentions of the owners of those aircraft —the object of qualitative sensem

ing—is more diffi cult although, as has been noted, not impossible.

Of note, however, is a danger of repetition confi rming false res

Lynn Hasher, David Goldstein, and Th omas Toppino concluded that co

dence in assertions increases through repetition of the assertions in situat

when it is impossible to independently determine their truth or falsit

Since intelligence evidence harbors a degree of uncertainty, repetition of 

dence or even fi ndings in proceedings designed to confi rm their validity 

only increase confi dence that they are valid irrespective of whether this is a

ally the case. Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer, and Ulrich Hoff rage fur

show this “reiteration eff ect” is also part of evaluations made in hindsight

Validation in Foresight and Hindsight

People—and intelligence practitioners and their customers are me

people — evaluate judgments they have made in hindsight. Th ey beli

according to Mark and Stephanie Pezzo, “that one could have more accura

predicted past events than is actually the case.”340 Th us, hindsight occu

least in part because as people make sense of “surprising or negative” eve

336 Critical references to one effort commissioned by (then) DCI George Bush in 

regarding an NIE on Soviet Strategic Objectives are at URL: <http://intellit.muskingum

analysis_folder/analysissov_folder/analysissovteams.html>, accessed 28 May 2010. In th

erenced case CIA analysts conducted one analysis while a team of outside experts cond

an identical analysis.

337 Park, “Value,” 190.

338 Lynn Hasher, David Goldstein, and Thomas Toppino, “Frequency and the Conferen

Referential Validity,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, vol. 16 (1977), 107. 

work has been validated by Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer, and Ulrich Hoffrage, “The Re

tion Effect in Hindsight Bias,” Psychological Review, vol. 104, no. 1 (1997): 194-202.

339 Hertwig, Gigerenzer, and Hoffrage, “The Reiteration Effect in Hindsight Bias,” 194

340 Mark V. Pezzo and Stephanie P. Pezzo, “Making Sense of Failure: A Motivated Mod

Hindsight Bias,” Social Cognition, vol. 25, no. 1 (2007), 147. Cited hereafter as Pezzo 

Pezzo, “Making Sense of Failure.”
100

“the reasons in favor of the outcome [are] strengthened, and reasons for 

alternative outcomes [are] weakened.” Further, in hindsight all the relevant 

facts may be known whereas in foresight this is not the case. But evaluating 

“mistakes” in hindsight obscures an important point made clear by Taleb: 

Mistakes can only be determined as such by what was known at the time 

they were made and then only by the person making the mistake.341 In other 

words, mistakes need to be evaluated from the points of view held in foresight. And seen from that perspective they may not be mistakes at all.

Applied to intelligence sensemaking, this means that many so-called 

intelligence errors and failures may, in fact, be well-reasoned and reasonable 

judgments based on what is known prior to the decision. Certainly, when 

viewed in hindsight they were wrong. But in foresight they were accurate and 

valid to the best of the sensemaker’s abilities. How can this enduring problem be mitigated? One means involves making the process of sensemaking 

as deliberate and thorough as possible.342 Doing so may reduce mistakes and 

failures as more alternative possibilities are considered and assessed. However, achieving this objective requires that the underlying practice be valid. 

Finally, it assumes that key evidence is knowable and known.

Validating the Practice of 

Intelligence Sensemaking

What else contributes to bringing about validated sensemaking? If a 

method does not do what it is commonly purported to do, is it invalid? Th is 

is one question that has been raised with regard to the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, or as it is commonly known, ACH. Richards Heuer, Jr. initially developed the method for the detection and mitigation of attempts at 

adversarial denial and deception.343 ACH forces consideration of alternative 

explanations for, or predictions about, phenomena.344 It forces consideration 

of the entire set of evidence, not “cherry-picked” trifl es that support a favored 

hypothesis. A common belief is that ACH mitigates what is sometimes 

known as the “Confi rmation Bias,” whereby people seek to prove a favored 

341 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in 

the Markets, 2nd revised edition (New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 2004, 2008), 56.

342 One means of accomplishing this is discussed below in Chapter 8.

343 Heuer did not invent this method. The earliest use of multiple hypotheses in examining phenomena was by Thomas C. Chamberlin prior to 1890. See Thomas C. Chamberlin, “The 

Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses,” Science, vol. 15 (old series), no. 366 (7 February 

1890): 92-96. Another former CIA employee, Morgan Jones, offers a version of ACH he calls 

hypothesis testing. See Morgan D. Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving, revised edition (New York, NY: Crown Publishing, 1998). Jones’ book also introduces the concept of and phrase “structured analysis.”

344 Heuer, Psychology, Chapter 8.
101

hypothesis through (among other things) selective exposure and selec

perception. Allegedly it does so by asking people to think in a disconfi r

tory fashion. Th ey are to use the available evidence to disprove as many o

existing hypotheses as possible. However, a study by MITRE failed to s

that it does eliminate the confi rmation bias.345 Both the MITRE study an

earlier one by NDIC student Robert Folker do suggest that ACH is of v

when used by novice intelligence professionals. However, Folker tentati

concluded that experts seem not to be aided by the method.346 Is it st

valid method for intelligence sensemaking?

Perhaps it is. Th e method provokes detailed consideration of 

issue and the associated evidence through the generation of alternative ex

nations or predictions and the marshaling of the evidence. It asks the 

semaker to establish the diagnosticity of each piece of evidence. In s

versions of the method, evidence is weighted based on source and releva

Some computer-assisted versions of ACH under review for applicatio

the IC consider the likelihood that the sensemaker has omitted a releva

and perhaps the correct—explanation. Th erefore, it can prompt a broade

more detailed sensemaking of the issue than might otherwise occur.

ACH further makes explicit the fact that evidence may be consis

with more than one hypothesis. Since the most likely hypothesis is deeme

be the one with the least evidence against it, honest consideration may re

that an alternative explanation is as likely or even more likely than that w

is favored. Th e synthesis of the evidence and the subsequent interpretat

in light of the multiple hypotheses is also more thorough than when no s

formalized method is employed.

Indeed, Robert Folker’s “modest” experiment in applying qualita

structured methods—specifi cally ACH—to intelligence issues showed 

“analysts who apply a structured method—hypothesis testing, in this ca

to an intelligence problem, outperform those who rely on “analysis-as-

or the intuitive approach.”347 Simply put, Folker experimentally showed 

method improves the quality of practitioners’ fi ndings. Folker’s study o

evidence that “intelligence value may be added to information by inves

some pointed time and eff ort in analysis, rather than expecting such valu

arise as a by-product of ‘normal’ offi ce activity.”348

345 Cheikes and others, Confirmation Bias, iii.

346 MSgt Robert D. Folker, Jr., USAF, Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence 

ters: An Experiment in Applying Structured Methods, Occasional Paper Number Seven (Was

ton, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2000). Cited hereafter as Folker, Experiment.

347 Folker, Experiment, 2.

348 Folker, Experiment, 2.
102

One variation on ACH implementation provides a structured means 

of developing issues. As applied by the faculty and students of the Institute for 

Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst College, practitioners begin with a highlevel question and use sequential iterations of ACH to eliminate alternative 

explanations.349 Th e next phase takes the “non-losers” and develops them 

further. Another round is conducted and again the “non-losers” are selected 

and further developed. While this could generate a plethora of branching 

explanations, in reality it is the author’s experience that it tends to disambiguate the issue fairly effi ciently. At worst the structuring inherent in the method 

leaves the sensemaker with an in-depth understanding of the issue; at best, a 

couple of eventualities and their likely indicators are determined. Assets can 

then be tasked, foraging conducted, and more exact determinations made as 

the issue develops.

Th e question remains: Is the method valid? Th is question generates considerable discussion among practitioners. When used honestly, the 

method certainly prompts a more thorough assessment of the issue.350 Evidence is considered singularly and severally. Alternative explanations for the 

phenomena are taken seriously. New possibilities are discovered. Even the 

skeptical MITRE team noted some validity in the method, whereby

participant assessment of new evidence was signifi cantly impacted 

by beliefs they held at the time evidence was received. Evidence confi rming current beliefs was given more “weight” than disconfi rming 

evidence. However, current beliefs did not infl uence the assessment 

of whether an evidence item was confi rming or disconfi rming.351

Appropriateness, fl exibility, and ease of use are other criteria that 

need to be established with respect to the various sensemaking methods. 

Whether the method facilitates foraging, analysis, synthesis, interpretation 

or some combination of the foraging and understanding processes, some 

means is needed to operationalize validation procedures so that intelligence 

practitioners can increase their effi ciency and accuracy.

Since Congress (in 2004) directed the Intelligence Community to 

employ “Alternative Analysis” in its intelligence deliberations, structured 

analytic methods now are taught to all new intelligence sensemakers.352

349 Kris Wheaton and others, Structured Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (Erie, PA: Mercyhurst College, 2005).

350 The issue of “honest use” is nontrivial. Less-than-scrupulous sensemakers are certainly free to cherry-pick favorite evidence and go through the motions of considering alternative hypotheses. Then, once they have eliminated competing alternatives, their favorite remains. 

The difficulty for them is what to do with the audit trail the method produces.

351 Cheikes and others, Confirmation Bias, iii.

352 U.S. Congress, IRTPA, 2004, 33. The phrase “Alternative Analysis” is interpreted as 

meaning structured analytic methods.
103

Many more experienced professionals also receive education and trainin

such methods.

Johnston observed that the IC has at its disposal “at least 160” [

lytic methods]...but it lacks “a standardized analytic doctrine. Th at is, the

no body of research across the Intelligence Community asserting that met

X is the most eff ective method for solving case one and that method Y is 

most eff ective method for solving case two.”353 As referenced here, su

doctrine arises out of knowledge that the specifi c methods are valid, in o

words it has been demonstrated empirically that they actually do what 

claim to do. Such a doctrine proff ers a menu of sensemaking options dep

dent on the goals of the sensemaker. Th e current model, where validity is 

sumed by intelligence professionals because they are taught the method(

the community’s training schools, is insuffi cient because—at the most b

level such a metric is insuffi cient for determining validity. Further, the

little sense of what methods are appropriate in what situations. A claim 

“we always do it that way,” is known to be insuffi cient but remains part of 

“corporate analytic tradecraft .”

Heuer noted that “intelligence [error] and failures must be expected

One implication of this assertion is that intelligence leadership cannot 

back on a “lack of skills” excuse when the next major intelligence fai

occurs. However, without validating a canon of method and a taxonom

characterize its use, intelligence professionals will remain hamstrung in t

eff orts to make fuller sense of threatening phenomena, increasing the li

hood of error and failure. It is reasonable to presume Congress will not le

Community commit failures similar to those of the past nine years with

severe repercussions.355

Seeking Validation: Toward Multiple Methods

Within the canon of social science method lies an approach to se

making that may off er intelligence practitioners a means of disambigua

the wicked mysteries as well as the hard puzzles they face daily. Even in 

rent practice, intelligence practitioners employ this approach when the

not rely on merely one method for sensemaking. Multi-method intellige

353 Johnston, Analytic Culture, xviii.

354 Heuer, Psychology, 184.

355 As has been noted, such an intelligence failure occurred on 25 December 2009 i

skies over Detroit, Michigan (see URL: <http://intelligence.senate.gov/100518/1225re

pdf>). Two days after the release of the Senate report, 20 May 2010, partly as a result, Dir

of National Intelligence Dennis Blair left office at the request of the President. Even thoug

attempted attack was thwarted, it is reasonable to expect that intelligence professionals w

required to consider more possibilities and examine more information in the hopes the

notice its evidentiary value. They will need to be more imaginative.
104

sensemaking explores complex issues from multiple perspectives. Each 

method used—such as ACH—provides an incomplete understanding of the 

issue, leaving the intelligence professional the task of making sense of the 

diff ering sensemaking conclusions. While the results of diff erent methods 

may converge, reinforcing a particular understanding of a phenomenon, 

they may also diverge and yield diff erent interpretations. It is up to the intelligence professional to resolve and make sense of the diff erences.

For example, intelligence professionals who engage in a “multiframe” sensemaking approach consider issues from multiple points of view 

created from the intersections of action- and process-focused vantage points 

and the perspectives of the individual and the collective. As developed by 

Monitor 360 for the National Security Agency’s Institute for Analysis, it facilitates sensemakers’ developing diff erent answers to the intelligence question 

at hand.356 Th ey must combine the diff ering results, in other words, synthesize and interpret partial answers, in order to better understand the issue 

underlying the question and to determine a best (at the time) understanding 

of the issue.

Th e lexicon of multi-methodology provides a term for this combinatorial activity: triangulation, or pinpointing “the values of a phenomenon more accurately by sighting in on it from [the] diff erent methodological 

viewpoints employed.357 Th is is a process of measurement—which to be 

useful (accurate) “must give both consistent results and measure the phenomenon it purports to measure.”358 In other words, triangulation requires 

that the methods employed are repeatable and valid. Intelligence creation 

requires that those methods be applied with rigor.

Fortuitous circumstances allow the authors to present in the next 

chapter a multi-method case study of sensemaking in a Type 2 environment 

that illustrates the interplay of intuition, logic, analysis, synthesis and interpretation of an issue of interest to the National Intelligence Council.

356 While the approach is unclassified, it was first presented at an NSA (CLASSIFIED) conference on analysis. The author subsequently worked with a team from Monitor 360 to create a 

training course through which intelligence professionals could learn and apply this approach.

357 John Brewer and Albert Hunter, Foundations of Multimethod Research: Synthesizing 

Styles (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 5. Cited hereafter as Brewer and Hunter, 

Multimethod Research.

358 Brewer and Hunter, Multimethod Research, 5.
105

CHAPTER 7

Making Sense of Non-State Actors: 

A Multimethod Case Study of a 

Wicked Problem359

David T. Moore, with Elizabeth J. Moore, William N. Reynolds, 

and Marta S. Weber

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by 

little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency 

a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern 

himself with his shadow on the wall.

— Emerson, Essay on Self-Reliance

Introduction

In the pragmatic U.S. tradition invoked by Emerson, we ques

the utility of consistently following the Sherman Kent model where on

many solitary scholars try to work out the solution to problems. We also 

ognize that team-based intelligence production suff ers from inherent dr

backs.360 However revolutionary it may be, we fi nd that a diversely practi

multimethod approach that does incorporate a specifi c process, organi

principles, and an operational structure can fulfi ll the need for 21st cen

intelligence sensemaking. Such an approach refl ects a Kendallian appro

to intelligence sensemaking: It collaboratively paints a picture for a decis

maker rather than presenting a “scientifi c fact.”

359 The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance i

research that led to this chapter: David Colander, Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Robert K. Hitch

James Holden-Rhodes, Donald McGregor, Suzanne Sluizer, Joseph Tainter, Kristan J. Whe

and students in the 2007-2008 cohort of the Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence 

ies. Thanks are also due to the participants of the Eurasia Group-sponsored conference

their insights.

Work done by Least Squares Software was funded by IARPA under AFRL Contract 

ber FA8750-07-C-0312.

360 Johnston, Analytic Culture, 68-70. Johnston finds that “without specific proce

organizing principles, and operational structures, interdisciplinary teams will quickly rev

being simply a room full of experts who ultimately drift back to their previous work patte
106

Th e case study of sensemaking presented here is not merely a thoughtexperiment. It rests on a shortfall in understanding the security implications 

of non-state actors. In this instance, an original National Intelligence Council 

study prompted a further examination by an academic intelligence studies 

department and a government contractor. In all three studies partial sense of 

the issue was made. As we explore their independent work, we seek to apply 

intelligence rigor and discuss—admittedly in hindsight—how separate parts 

of the problem could benefi t from a triangulation of concepts and approaches 

to provide a coherent, larger view of the security role of non-state actors.

Introducing the Wicked Problem of 

Non-State Actors

It is commonly thought that non-state actors are emerging as a dominant global force in the realm of national and international security, yet conclusive evidence confi rming this belief is lacking. Part of the challenge is that 

non-state actors fi t the profi le of a wicked problem. While it is true they can 

be identifi ed (the name accomplishes this — they are non-state versus state

actors), there is no commonly accepted defi nition.361 In other words, nonstate actors are defi ned by what they are not, leaving room for disagreement 

as to what they are. Further, some non-state actors can be characterized as 

“good” and others as “bad.” Diff ering points of view about whether a particular non-state actor is “good” or “bad” leads to varying characterizations 

of their activities. Attempting to “solve” a non-state actor problem leads to 

good or bad solutions that may provoke unanticipated (and undesired) consequences. For example, U.S. attempts to eliminate threats posed by Al Qaeda 

gave rise to a diff erent and unexpected problem, that of a globally distributed 

network of Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda “wannabes.” An argument could also be 

made that the apparently unique globalization of a terrorist organization was 

also unpredictable in foresight.362

361 National Intelligence Council, “Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and 

Implications for the United States,” Conference Report, August 2007, URL: <http://www.dni.

gov/nic/confreports_nonstate_actors.html>, accessed 10 May 2010, The Conference Report 

suggested that “Nonstate actors are non-sovereign entities that exercise significant economic, 

political, or social power and influence at a national, and in some cases international, level. 

There is no consensus on the members of this category, and some definitions include trade 

unions, community organizations, religious institutions, ethnic groupings, and universities in 

addition to the players outlined above” (p. 2, emphasis in original)

362 In hindsight it seems obvious that, in an era when globalization is a driving force, a terrorist organization would naturally become a globalized phenomenon. However, we must adopt 

the point of view we enjoyed prior to 11 September 2001. At that time what occurred was 

largely unlooked for and unpredicted. Most of us simply could not conceive of such a group as 

being globalized or taking advantage of globalized resources. Therefore, in that context, it was 

unpredictable and we were surprised.
107

Issues involving non-state actors lack clear defi nitions and are r

tant to traditional intelligence approaches due to their open-ended nat

potential solutions to problems are neither clearly right or wrong; and d

cult-to-discern and complex inter-linkages exist, although drivers for is

involving non-state actors can be identifi ed (see fi gure 6).

Once an insurgency or terrorist campaign (or any other non-s

actor activity) begins, the issue shift s from being a merely wicked prob

to a combination of wicked and tame problems. Some aspects of the i

remain wicked—ill-defi ned, no right or wrong solution, open-ended, an

on. However, other aspects of the issue are tame, although diffi cult to m

sense of. For example, the tactics likely to be used in an insurgency are fi 

and understandable and making sense of them is a tame, bounded proc

Yet countering them invokes a series of new wicked problems encapsul

in the larger issue and likely to lead to unanticipated consequences (man

them wicked problems in their own right)— as the United States discov

with its post-9/11 dealings with Al Qaeda.

Figure 6. Drivers for the Rise and Growth of Violent Non-State Actors (vNSAs

Sources: William Reynolds et alia, “Social Science Modeling Workshop: 

Understanding Iraqi Non-State Actors,” Workshop Proceedings, Least Square

Software, Albuquerque, NM, 15 February 2008 (proprietary, used with 

permission). Image derived from Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, and William 

Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: 

Lexington Books, 2005).

V

I

O

L

E

N

C

E

reinforcement of volatile conditions

resource

scarcity

Environmental

Inputs Transformation Potential vNSAs Outpu

demographic

pressures

failures of

governance

identity

mobilization

environmental

dimensions

ethnopolitical

groups

transnational

crime syndicates

militant religious

movements

warlords backed

by militias

ideological

extremists

eco-warriors

straw breaks

camel’s back

government

corruption

violent

atmosphere

organized

crime

identity

cleavage

socio-economic

deprivation
108

Th ree Approaches to Making Sense of 

Non-State Actors

Th e starting point for this case study was a 2007 National Intelligence 

Council (NIC) Desktop Memorandum that analyzed key fi ndings from a 

series of seminars co-hosted with the Eurasia Group, a global political risk 

research and consulting fi rm.363 Th e Memorandum observes that non-state 

actors are of interest “because they have international clout, but are oft en 

overlooked in geopolitical analysis.” Th e implicit but demanding questions of 

why and how much non-state actor “power” and “infl uence” have increased 

worldwide was not answered.364 In light of this limitation, two follow-on projects were undertaken to complement the NIC study. First, the Mercyhurst 

College Institute for Intelligence Studies examined the impact of non-state 

actors in Africa. Th en, a social science workshop convened by Least Squares 

Soft ware of Albuquerque, New Mexico, under the auspices of IARPA, considered whether the infl uence and impact of non-state actors on international 

relations can actually be measured.

Key Findings of the NIC Study on Non-State Actors

A series of NIC-Eurasia Group seminars in 2006 and 2007 discussed 

in exploratory fashion how the proliferation of non-state actors since the end 

of the Cold War “is transforming international relations.”365 As a collaborative, prospective assessment, the study found that

a globalization-fueled diff usion of fi nance and technology has 

enabled non-state actors to encroach upon functions traditionally 

performed by nation-states. Th is has facilitated their evolution into a 

363 See the Eurasia Group web site, URL: <http://www.eurasiagroup.net/about-eurasiagroup>, accessed 14 May 2010.

364 National Intelligence Council, “Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and 

Implications for the United States,” Conference Report, August 2007, URL: <http://www.dni.

gov/nic/confreports_nonstate_actors.html>, accessed 27 April 2010, 2. Cited hereafter as 

NIC, “Nonstate Actors.”

365 NIC, “Nonstate Actors,” 1. The NIC study focused on so-called benign non-state actors—

non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and super-empowered individuals—although it was impossible to have the discussions without frequent reference to 

terrorists, warlords, and other “malign” actors. The word “benign” is relative, but in this case 

refers to entities that at least give a nod to national and international institutions, laws, and 

norms. Nearly a decade earlier political scientists Philip Schrodt and Deborah Gerner derived 

similar conclusions about the post-Cold War explosion of violent non-state actors as agents 

of complex humanitarian crises. See Philip A. Schrodt and Deborah J. Gerner, “The Impact 

of Early Warning on Institutional Responses to Complex Humanitarian Crises,” Paper presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting with 

the International Studies Association, Vienna, Austria, 16-19 September 1998. Cited hereafter as Schrodt and Gerner, “CHC.”
109

form unheard of even a few years ago. For example, “philanthrocapitalist” charities such as the Gates Foundation have greatly expanded 

notions of what a charitable NGO should look like.366

Th e discussions found that few non-state actors are completely in

pendent of nation-states, and they do not have uniform freedom of m

ment. Further, non-state actors have the most latitude in either weak, o

the other end of the spectrum, post-industrial states. Th e bulk of the wo

population, however, lives in so-called “modernizing” states such as Ch

India, and Russia.367 Th ey remain entrenched in the class state sys

fi rmly sovereign, centralized, and bureaucratic; using nationalism (inc

ing suppression of minorities) as an instrument of state power; and defi n

national security in terms of force. Th ese nations have been highly eff ec

in suppressing non-state actors or co-opting them through deploymen

state-controlled substitutes including a subset of state-owned multinati

corporations and enterprises (sometimes referred to as the mind-ben

GONGO (government-operated non-governmental organization). Th e N

Eurasia Group discussions determined that the entity (aside from terro

and criminals) that is most problematic for the United States is not tec

cally non-state at all. It is instead the state-owned enterprise, oft en a fron

advancing the interests of a modernizing-state government.

Finally, the NIC-Eurasia Group eff ort posited that the signifi canc

“benign” non-state actors was that they propagated Western values in reg

where these were absent. In this case, the problem was not that such ac

were too powerful. Rather the opposite was the case: “in many parts of 

world [benign non-state actors’] infl uence is limited—a factor that is cont

uting to the tilting of the global playing fi eld away from the United States 

its developed-world allies.”368

Key Findings of the Mercyhurst Study on Non-State Acto

Students in the Mercyhurst College Institute of Intelligence Stu

(MCIIS) focused on the roles non-state actors play and their expected im

in Sub-Saharan Africa over the next fi ve years (results), and on buildin

multi-methodological paradigm for considering the issue (process).369 Wi

this context, three additional questions were raised:

366 NIC, “Nonstate Actors,” 1.

367 NIC, “Nonstate Actors,” 1.

368 NIC, “Nonstate Actors,” 1.

369 Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, “Terms of Reference: The Ro

Non-State Actors in Sub Saharan Africa,” Wikispaces.com, URL: < https://nonstateactorsa

wikispaces.com/Terms+of+Reference>, accessed 28 April 2010. Cited hereafter as M

“Terms of Reference.”
110

• What is the likely importance of [Non-State Actors] vs. State Actors, 

Supra-State Actors and other relevant categories of actors in SubSaharan Africa?

• What are the roles of these actors in key countries, such as Niger?

• Are there geographic, cultural, economic or other patterns of activity along which the roles of these actors are either very diff erent or 

strikingly similar?370

With respect to the fi rst question, their research found that Africa can 

be organized into three geographical regions based on the roles that non-state 

actors play (fi gure 7): In Western Sub-Saharan Africa there are no clear trends 

in the roles played by non-state actors; in Central Sub-Saharan Africa, antigovernment non-state actors are most active and likely to remain so over the 

next fi ve years; and in Southern and Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa government 

370 MCIIS, “Terms of Reference.”

Figure 7. Composite Non-State Actor Role Scores for Africa.

Source: Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, URL: <https://

nonstateactorsafrica.wikispaces.com/Are+there+geographic%2C+cultural%2C+

economic+or+other+patterns+of+activity+along+which+the+roles+of+these+

actors+are+either+very+different+or+strikingly+similar%3F>, accessed 

2 March 2008.

Central Region

Southern and

Western Region Eastern Region

Government-Sanctioned

Power Venues

Overall NSA Role Scores

Multiple

Significant 

Roles

5 4 5 3 4 2 3 10 2 1

No

Role Multiple

Significant 

Roles

Extra-Government

Power Venues
111

sanctioned non-state actors are likely to wield the most infl uence.371 A

tionally, there appeared to be a strong correlation between the number of 

ernment-sanctioned multinational corporations and the number of NG

Finally, it seemed that terrorist organizations in Africa preferred operatin

“countries with relatively more than less state control.”372

Th e students developed a scoring system for both lawful and unlaw

non-state actors, in terms of the socio-political environment, and applied 

index to all 42 Sub-Saharan African countries (fi gure 7). Th e scoring cha

terized the roles of non-state actors vis-à-vis government and non-gov

ment interactions based on four drivers: An “ease of doing business” vari

and a contrasting “corruption perception” variable; a democracy variable 

a contrasting failed states variable.373 Stable and failing states were reve

to have diff ering interactions with non-state actors. In the former, non-s

actors were lawful actors who tended to have government-sanctioned 

potentials, whereas in the latter they were typically unlawful actors enga

in anti-government roles. Botswana (a stable state) and the Central Afr

Republic (a failed state) were representative of each (shown in fi gure 8)

greater interest were the indicators for Kenya (fi gure 9), because they sign

or anticipated stability issues. Th e assessment was born out by the events 

occurred during and aft er the early 2008 elections.374

Mapping signifi cant multinational corporations, NGOs, and ter

ist organizations to specifi c countries as representative of non-state a

activity revealed correlations between role potential spectra and geosp

data, whereby each generally supported the other.375 Th us, geospatial se

making tended to confi rm the conclusions derived from the non-state a

role spectra.

371 Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, URL: <http://nonstateactorsa

wikispaces.com/Key+Findings>, accessed 2 March 2008. Cited hereafter as MCIIS, “Pat

of Activity.”

372 MCIIS, “Patterns of Activity.”

373 MCIIS, “Process and Methodology.” The roles of non-state actors were tracked 

scale anchored by scores from six sample totalitarian states: North Korea, Cuba, Iran, S

Myanmar, Laos, and Libya.

374 Kristan J. Wheaton, email to the author, 4 March 2008. Such foresightful activ

students is not unknown. Schrodt and Gerner report a similar result involving student p

tions about the state of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis in December 1990. Kahneman and Klein’s re

about some individuals being able to discern correctly patterns that others miss (Chapter 

probably relevant in explaining both phenomena. See also Schrodt and Gerner, “CHC”, 5.

375 Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, “Non-State Actors in 

Saharan Africa 2007-2012 Outlook,” URL: <https://nonstateactorsafrica.wikispaces.

Key+Findings>, accessed 2 march 2008. Cited hereafter as MCIIS, “Outlook.”
112

Government Sanctioned

Role Potentials

Government

Control

Lawful Actors Unlawful Actors

(i.e. Unions, Lobbyists, Privatization)

Totalitarianism

Extra-Government

Role Potentials

Potentials

Role For

NSA Scale

(i.e. Violence, Bribery, etc.)

Failed States Variable: 3

Democracy Variable: 4

Doing Business Variable: 3

Corruption Perception Variable: 4

5

+ +

4 4 3 3 2 2 5

0

1 No Role 1

Botswana

Government Sanctioned

Role Potentials

(i.e. Unions, Lobbyists, Privatization)

Totalitarianism

Extra-Government

Role Potentials

(i.e. Violence, Bribery, etc.)

Government

Control

Potentials

Role For

NSA Scale

Failed States Variable: 4

Democracy Variable: 4

Doing Business Variable: 5

Corruption Perception Variable: 3

5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2

0

1 No Role 1

Central African Republic 

+ +

Lawful Actors Unlawful Actors

Figure 8. Non-State Actor Potential Spectra for Botswana and the 

Central African Republic.

Source: Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, “Role+Scores.

ppt”, URL: <https://nonstateactorsafrica.wikispaces.com/Model+for+SFAR>, 

accessed 2 March 2008. Cited hereafter as MCIIS, “Role Scores.”
113

Key Findings of the Least Squares Study on Non-State Act

Th e Least Squares study of non-state actors began with the hypoth

that “non-state actors emerge in vacuums and voids.”376 Th eir study focu

on the issue of violent and non-violent non-state actors but also explored 

of contingent methodological approaches. Th e inquiry sought to contri

novel understanding of non-state actors by

synthesizing available data and disparate taxonomies, ...by generating and testing hypotheses concerning the key dynamics driving the 

transfer of power from states to [non-state actors] and favoring the 

emergence of novel [non-state actors] under globalization; and...by 

investigating the development of methodologies that might be most 

useful for future research.377

Two key fi ndings revealed the critical role of environmental kn

edge and of public expectations in motivating non-state actors, both as i

viduals and as members of the collective. Such fi ndings were found to 

376 Marta S. Weber, William N. Reynolds, James Holden-Rhodes, and Elizabeth J. M

Non-State Actors in the Post-Westphalian World Order: A Preliminary LSS Inquiry, Final Report f

Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Contract FA8750-07-C-031, March 2007, 6. Cited here

as Weber and others, Non-State Actors.

377 Weber and others, Non-State Actors, 6.

Figure 9. Kenyan Non-State Actor Potential Spectra.

Source: MCIIS, “Role Scores.”

Government Sanctioned

Role Potentials

(i.e. Unions, Lobbyists, Privatization)

Totalitarianism

Extra-Government

Role Potentials

(i.e. Violence, Bribery, etc.)

Government

Control

Potentials Role 

For NSA Scale

Failed States Variable: 2

Democracy Variable: 2

Doing Business Variable: 3

Corruption Perception Variable: 2

0

5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 No Role 1

Kenya

+ +

Lawful Actors Unlawful Actors
114

signifi cant to eff orts aimed at mitigating the recruitment of specifi c Al Qaedaassociated individuals to assail the United States. Additionally, the team found 

that an approach based on critical thinking led to reasoning pathways that 

likely would not have been noticed or explored had a more intuitive and less 

rigorous approach been employed.378

Approaches and Methodologies

Th inking Critically about the Issue

In order to impose structured thinking on a highly unstructured 

problem, the NIC advisor to, and the members of LSS fi rst inventoried their 

own understanding of the non-state actor issue using the “eight elements of 

reasoning” developed and espoused by the Foundation for Critical Th inking 

and used throughout much of the IC.379 Th ese elements include:

• Question at issue (What is the issue at hand?)

• Purpose of thinking (why examine the issue?)

• Points of view (What other perspectives need consideration?)

• Assumptions (What presuppositions are being taken for granted?)

• Implications and consequences (What might happen? What does 

happen?)

• Evidence (What relevant data, information, or experiences are 

needed for assessment?)

• Inferences and interpretations (What can be inferred from the 

evidence?)

• Concepts (What theories, defi nitions, axioms, laws, principles, or 

models underlie the issue?

A summary of several of the NIC and LSS perspectives on non-state 

actors based on this exercise are provided in table 4. Both groups agreed that 

a critical thinking approach was useful in developing a common understanding of the problem as it helped to ensure that the participants questioned 

their own thinking about non-state actors, rather than relying on previously 

held presumptions.

378 These points are derived from William Reynolds’ observations of and discussions with 

fellow LSS Workshop participants.

379 Moore, Critical Thinking, 8-9; Richard Paul and Linda Elder, The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking: Concepts and Tools, Sixth Edition (Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2009), 3-6. Some practitioners in the U.S. Intelligence Community (among them one of the 

authors) in late 2008 expanded these eight elements of reasoning to ten based on the work of 

Gerald Nosich. Included were “alternatives,” which makes explicit the fact that there are other 

ways to view an issue; and “context,” which considers the fact that most issues or problems are 

themselves a piece of some larger issue or problem: There is a broader background for the 

issue that must be explored. See Nosich, Learning to Think Things Through, 96-98.
115

Table 4. Comparing NIC and LSS Critical Thinking Perspectives

Purpose, Points of View, and Assumptions

Purpose

NIC Perspective LSS Perspective

To test whether the infl uence 

and impact of non-state actors 

on international relations can be 

measured; if so, whether they are 

serious competitors for power with 

nation-states; and the implications 

for US foreign policy.

ID role of non-state actors;

Determine infl uence of non-state 

actors compared to state actors;

Assess utility of sensemaking 

methodology/Multimethodology (MM

mechanisms of non-state actors 

role/infl uence;

Develop/Defi ne the concepts of non

state actors Infl uence/Impact;

ID MM’s useful for assessing impact

role of non-state actors;

ID MM’s/problem motifs of general 

interest to other research contracts;

Points of View

NIC Perspective LSS Perspective

Although non-state actors seem to 

be more powerful than ever before 

in history, few of them act in total 

independence from nation-states 

and their infl uence and impact are 

highly dependent upon which part 

of the world is under discussion.

Another (and common) point of 

view is that powerful non-state 

actors are universal and a serious 

threat to nation-states.

“Victims”/Benefi ciaries of non-state 

actor impact:

Policy Makers

 Minimizing Risk

 Achieving Agenda

Other non-state actors

 Analyst—understand/advise

 Methodologist/Researcher—Iden

 techniques for understanding

 Useful methods

 Understand/advise

Sub interest structures within non-st

actors and States
116

Literature Consultation

Concurrent with their critical thinking, MCIIS, LSS, and others examined key academic and applied-academic works related to the assessment of 

non-state actors. Notable among them, work by Bas Arts and Piet Verschuren 

describes a qualitative method for assessing the infl uence of stakeholders 

in political decision-making.380 Th e “triangulation” referred to in their title 

encompasses “(1) political players’ own perception of their infl uence; (2) other 

players’ perceptions of the infl uence brought to bear; and (3) a process analysis by the researcher.”381 Arts and Verschuren tested this method through an 

assessment of the infl uence of NGOs on the 1992 Climate Convention. Th eir 

380 Bas Arts and Piet Verschuren, “Assessing Political Influence in Complex Decision-Making: An Instrument Based on Triangulation,” International Political Science Review, vol. 20, no. 4 

(1999): 411-424. Cited hereafter as Arts and Verschuren, “Assessing Political Influence.”

381 Arts and Verschuren, “Assessing Political Influence,” 411.

Table 4. Comparing NIC and LSS Critical Thinking Perspectives: 

Purpose, Points of View, and Assumptions 

(Continued)

Assumptions

NIC Perspective LSS Perspective

Our point of view: implications 

for the US of the rise of powerful 

non-state actors depend upon 

which part of the world is under 

discussion. At times, our main 

concern may be that benign nonstate actors are excluded from, or 

usurped by, certain states.

The common point of view: all 

non-state actors in all parts of the 

world have serious implications for 

national governments (including 

that of the US).

Relation between nature of country 

and nature of economy — concept of 

industrial as an important discriminator;

That we can induce truths from 

examples — commonalities -> 

analogy -> truth;

Normative idea that pursuit of self 

interest a driver in observed outcomes:

The frame of a value system—suicide 

bombing makes different sense in 

different frames;

Idea of a pro/con/fi x or ACH type 

approach to value outcomes in 

different frames;

International means “between 

nations.” Are we only concerned with 

“international” phenomena?

Source: Participant notes, edited by the authors.
117

work remains signifi cant because attempts to measure or associate num

with non-state actor power or infl uence have been so rare.

Another contribution in the applied realm came from recent w

by a new generation of military (and ex-military) authors who see the 

of non-state actors as a seminal event that will drive U.S. national s

rity strategy. Among these sources is Warlords Rising: Confronting Vio

Non-State Actors, whose authors anchor their work in open systems th

(the concept that actors and organizations are strongly infl uenced by t

environment).382 In particular, they ask what environments give rise to 

lent383 non-state actors, what sustains them, and how changes to those e

ronments might disrupt them.

Application: Indicators of Non-State Actor Power in Afri

Th e project aff orded the Mercyhurst team an opportunity to dev

a promising new method for intelligence sensemaking and to catalogu

advantages and disadvantages (table 5). Th e students were able to vali

their fi ndings employing three diff erent methods as well as diff erent 

dence sets and also assess their methodological validity. Th is kind of m

sensemaking could constitute a bridge between now-traditional IC eff 

and a revolutionary approach to building a sensemaking argument in 

cial circles.

Of note is a remark by project supervisor Professor Wheaton: “

big advantage [of the multimethodological approach] was the ability to 

similar patterns crop up again and again by looking at the data in diff e

ways. Th is increased their [the students’] confi dence enormously.”384 A

tionally, given the temporal context (short) and the scale of the project (la

a multimethodological approach was perhaps the only means of tackling 

problem. Finally, as Wheaton also notes,

we may well be wrong about Liberia or some other country in the 

current study but we are unlikely to be wrong about every country 

and highly unlikely to be wrong about every country in the same 

direction. Assuming the model is reasonably accurate and given 

382 Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confro

Violent Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). Other key books in this g

are General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York

Alfred A. Knopf, 2007) and John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the E

Globalization (New York, NY: John A. Wiley and Sons, 2007).

383 Warlords Rising is focused on violent non-state actors, but the present authors find 

the question of environmental factors is readily applicable to benign non-state actors as 

384 Kristan J. Wheaton, email to William N. Reynolds, 15 November 2007. Cited here

as Wheaton, email to Reynolds, 15 November 2007.
118

Table 5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Method

Role Potential Spectrum Analysis

Advantages Disadvantages

Created a standardized foundation 

to measure environmental infl uences 

on the roles of non-state actors 

to produce comparable fi ndings 

across Sub-Saharan Africa states.

Created a prediction model for 

the roles of non-state actor in 

a country.

The state centric environmental 

approach allowed the analysts to 

effectively consider key factors 

across the entire socio-political 

environment of individual SubSaharan African countries

Able to represent both government 

sanctioned and extra government 

role potentials for non-state actors.

Guided further efforts to effi ciently 

identify and assess signifi cant 

indicative characteristics of the 

socio-political environments in 

Sub-Saharan Africa.

The major indices in unaltered states 

are unsuited for measuring the role of 

non-state actors.

The matrix required several weeks to 

fi nish, and took time away from starting 

and completing other types of analysis.

Would be diffi cult for other analysts 

without statistical background to 

successfully complete.

Geospatial Analysis

Advantages Disadvantages

Created a visual representation 

allowing the team to identify 

patterns and correlations among 

different sets of data, particularly 

with the statistical matrix.

Independent from other analyses.

Information retrieved from uniform 

databases; not truly random, but 

relatively objective sample.

Simple and easy to do with the 

information being imported from 

Excel Spreadsheets directly into 

Community Walk.

Much of the available information 

on NGOs, terrorist groups, and 

businesses was not in English, which 

made it diffi cult to collect a larger 

sampling of the information.

The team limited the NGO map to 

development, women’s rights, HIV/

AIDS, human rights, and environmental 

issues. This was not an exhaustive 

list of all the different NGOs operating 

within the region.
119

the sample size, then, we can have more rather than less confi dence 

about the broader conclusions and are likely right about the overall 

picture.385

Such a conclusion is signifi cant for the larger IC. Th rough this still-experime

application of methods and models we may be able to develop a mean

increasing the accuracy of intelligence sensemaking when time is short 

the scope is large.

Application: A Multi-Disciplinary Workshop on 

Non-State Actors

In February 2008, LSS brought together a methodologist, an eco

mist, a political scientist, two psychologists, an anthropologist, and a c

puter scientist to test the Warlords Rising, open-systems approach again

real-life problem: the roles of three sets of non-state actors (representing 

three major ethnic groups) in Iraq: Shi’a militia, Sunni sheiks, and Al Qa

in Iraq (AQI). Participants used three frameworks to consider the envi

ment within which the three groups exist and operate.

• Points of segmentation are the boundaries or borders betw

and among groups of people, where the degree of disagreemen

385 Wheaton, email to Reynolds, 15 November 2007.

Table 5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Method

(Continued)

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

Advantages Disadvantages

Able to detect an increase or 

decrease in the roles of non-state 

actors.

Uniform sources throughout.

Easy for team to complete 

(received in-class instruction on 

this type of analysis).

Dependent upon completion of the 

matrix analysis.

Evidence selected tends to be 

subjective.

Susceptible to confi rmation bias and 

the anchoring effect.

Source: Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, “Teams’ Non-Sta

Actors Process and Methodology Report,” Wikispaces.com, URL: <https://

nonstateactorsafrica.wikispaces.com/Process+and+Methodology>, accessed 

2 March 2008. Cited hereafter as MCIIS, “Process and Methodology.”
120

issues is indicated numerically.386 Points of segmentation can track 

inherent characteristics such as gender or ascribed cultural diff erentiators such as Sunni or Shiite. Th e set of points distinguishes 

one individual or group from another and identifi es possible points 

of cooperation and confl ict that can be exploited. Specifi c values 

for points of segmentation are derived from an expert assessment of the strength of the actors’ expressed attitudes, reinforced 

by observable behavior. Th ey distinguish one individual or group 

from another, and identify the points most suitable for exploitation by the protagonist. Numbers were elicited from experts, calibrated against one another for consistency, and used to quantify 

expert consensus. Computer modeling by Least Squares addressed 

fi ve pertinent actors: two state-associated, the Iraqi government 

and the U.S.-led coalition forces; and three non-state-associated 

actors, the Shi’a militia, the Sunni sheiks, and AQI. Th e modeling was conducted along fi ve points of segmentation: Arab versus non-Arab; Islamicist versus non-Islamicist; rural versus urban; 

Sunni versus Shi’a; and strength of tribal allegiance. Th ese issues 

form a 5-dimensional space — the cells in fi gure 10 depict the distance between players in this issue space.387 One especially revealing point of segmentation centers around the question of expected 

attitudes and behavior in Anbar Province found AQI and Coalition 

forces on one side, with Shi’a militia, Sunni sheiks, and the Iraqi 

government on the other side.

As noted by one of the workshop participants, there are three significant implications to segmentation for policy and decisionmakers: 

First, projects proceed most smoothly within a segment. Second, 

segments that are neglected or discriminated against will push 

back. Finally, brokers mediating inter-segmental projects need to 

be viewed as impartial.

386 Points of Segmentation is an anthropological term referring to the natural pattern of 

social divisions within kinship-based societies, in which kinship units form as internally cooperative units. Conflict occurs between segments composed of distinct kinship lines. Segmentation is also used to describe the anthropological analysis of societies into kinship-based units. 

See Rudolph J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War: War, Power, Peace (Beverly Hills, CA: 

Sage Publications, 1991); Benoit Rihoux, “Constructing Political Science Methodology: From 

Segmented Polarization to Enlightened Pluralism,” Joint Chair, Standing Group on Political 

Methodology. IPSA Conference, Montreal, Canada, 2008; George De Vos and Lola RomanucciRoss, eds., Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1982); and 

William S. McCallister, “COIN and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society,” Small Wars Journal, 

Blog and Pamphlet, 4 February 2008, URL: <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/

coinandiwinatribalsociety.pdf>, accessed 31 May 2010.

387 The technique can be further refined by weighting the different issue axes using expert 

knowledge. We have omitted this part for brevity.
121

• Prospect theory, originally developed by Kahneman and Tver

posits that “people tend to be risk-preferring when facing long 

risks involving signifi cant gains, such as betting on race ho

and are risk averse when facing signifi cant losses: [in other wo

when] buying a home or car insurance” respectively.”388 Works

participants concluded that in Iraq, expectations contribute to e

ronments where individuals (and communities) are likely to 

port or to become non-state actors. Assessment of fi ndings f

388 “Why do People ‘Play the Longshot’ and Buy Insurance? It’s in Our Genes,” Geno

and Genetics Weekly, 29 January 2010, 184. For a technical description of prospect theor

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under R

Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 263-291; and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahne

“Advances In Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty,” Journal of Ris

Uncertainty, vol. 5 (1992): 297-323.

Figure 10. Iraqi Points of Segmentation.

Source: William Reynolds et alia, “Social Science Modeling Workshop: 

Understanding Iraqi Non-State Actors,” Workshop Proceedings, Least Squares 

Software, Albuquerque, NM, 15 February 2008.

(Raw distances shown below diagonal)

Absolute Color Scale: 0 25 50 75 100

(Raw distances shown below diagonal)

Absolute Color Scale: 0 25 50 75 100

(Raw distances shown below diagonal)

Absolute Color Scale: 0 25 50 75 100

(Raw distances shown below diago

Absolute Color Scale:

(Raw distances shown below diagonal)

Absolute Color Scale: 0 25 50 75 100

(Raw distances shown below diago

Absolute Color Scale: 0 25 50 75 

10

Sunni Sheik

US Forces

AQI

AnbarAfterAwakening1: Sunni/Shi’a

Sunni/Shi’a

File

File File File

File File

AnbarAfterAwakening1: Rural/Urban AnbarAfterAwakening1: Islam AnbarAfterAwakening1: Total Disa

AnbarAfterAwakening1: Islamism AnbarAfterAwakening1: Tri

Shi’a Militia

Shi’a MilitiaIraqi GovtSunni SheikUS ForcesAQI

Shi’a MilitiaIraqi GovtSunni SheikUS ForcesAQI

Shi’a MilitiaIraqi GovtSunni SheikUS ForcesAQI

Shi’a MilitiaIraqi GovtSunni SheikUS ForcesAQI

Shi’a MilitiaIraqi GovtSunni SheikUS Forces

Shi’a MilitiaIraqi GovtSunni SheikUS Forces

Iraqi Govt

Sunni Sheik

US Forces

AQI

Shi’a Militia

Iraqi Govt

Sunni Sheik

US Forces

AQI

Shi’a Militia

Iraqi Govt

Sunni Sheik

US Forces

AQI

Shi’a Militia

Iraqi Govt

Sunni Sheik

US Forces

AQI

Shi’a Militia

Iraqi Govt

Sunni Sheik

US Forces

AQI

Shi’a Militia

Iraqi Govt

70 60

30 20 40

80 70 10 50

10

20 30

30 40 10

30 40 10 0

15

15 0

90 75 75

10 25 25 100

29

94 84

106 90 91

122 133 144 166

20

30 10

30 10 0

70 90 100 100

0

50 50

20 20 30

50 50 100 70

0 56 112 16

Rural/Urban Islam Total Disagreement

Islamism Tribal
122

the application of prospect theory to the Iraqi environment are 

ongoing, and will be published in forthcoming studies.

• Institutional interactions is the name associated with a systematic 

model that allowed workshop participants to explore the complex 

roles non-state actors play as they infl uence (and are infl uenced by) 

overlapping institutional capabilities and needs.389 Th e participants 

concluded that even a simple model of institutional networks has 

enormous complexity—or high entropy—making it a good candidate for a subsequent in-depth modeling project. Due to imposed 

time constraints, development and application of the modeling was 

not completed.

• Morphological Analysis was identifi ed as an additional approach 

through the institutional interactions method. Morphological analysis considers an entire space of possible implications opening the 

way for follow-on disambiguation (perhaps using additional multimethodological approaches) in order to abductively and soundly 

derive the kind of judgments that become useful knowledge.390

Th e workshop participants were unable to formally triangulate the 

results from the three approaches, also because of insuffi cient time. Th eir discussions and modeling, however, supported the Warlords Rising thesis: that 

environment is a critical factor in understanding the emergence and roles of 

non-state actors. Additionally, the modeling appeared to provide a promise of 

metrics that, with further development, can be applied against the non-state 

actor problem.

Critical Assessment: Lessons Learned from the 

Study of Non-State Actors

No matter what the methodological approach, project participants 

emphasized that close attention to environmental factors remains a key to 

understanding non-state actors. Nonetheless, even those approaches that 

emphasized environmental factors fell prey to certain inadequacies.

389 The application of this model is exemplified in Robert Gibbons and Andrew Rutten, 

“Institutional Interactions: An Equilibrium Approach to the State and Civil Society,” IQ online 

journal, The Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University. URL: <http://www.

iq.harvard.edu/files/iqss/old/PPE/gibbons+rutten.pdf>, accessed 14 May 2010.

390 Morphological Analysis is an approach for considering all the factors and their interrelationships in non-quantifiable, multidimensional problems. Developed by Swiss astrophysicist Fritz Zwicky, morphological analysis begins with the premise that “within the final and true 

world image everything is related to everything, and nothing can be discarded a priori as being 

unimportant.” [Fritz Zwicky, Discovery, Invention, Research — Through the Morphological Approach

(Toronto, CA: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 44.] It is particularly well suited (and often used) 

to make sense of non-quantifiable wicked problems.
123

Both the Mercyhurst and the LSS teams adopted multimethodol

cally rich approaches to making sense of non-state actors; both quantita

and qualitative methods were employed. While novel insights were ge

ated as has been noted, no means emerged to quantify a specifi c increas

decrease in non-state actor roles worldwide. Although the multiple meth

framed the issues in both complementary and contradictory ways, none, 

gly or in combination, answered the question of “how much non-state a

‘power’ and ‘infl uence’ have increased worldwide.”391

Th at the members of each study group were working independe

supports the contention that the groups were not somehow engaged in a c

fi rmation exercise of each other’s work; the conclusions were independe

derived. What cannot be determined, however, is the extent—if any

which specifi c methods employed in the specifi c eff orts may have impa

conclusions derived from subsequently employed methods (especially in 

cases of the MCIIS and LSS teams).

Serendipitous conclusions such as the possible indicator of s

instability as illustrated in the case of Kenya by the Mercyhurst team, and 

interesting points of segmentation found by the LSS team, suggest fur

avenues of intelligence research and modeling. Th e division of Africa refl 

ing three zones of non-state actor infl uence was also interesting. But t

conclusions, while novel, did not satisfy the initial requirement, a quanti

tion of phenomena associated with change in the power positions of var

non-state actors. While all three teams clearly engaged in critical think

about the issue, as viewed in hindsight, diff erent purposes (specifi call

expressed by the NIC/LSS team) led to conclusions diff erent from those o

original, albeit implied, question. Th at these purposes were diff erent co

have been seen as an indicator that the teams were working on diff erent p

lems within the issue of non-state actors. Coming to a consensus of wha

actual tasking was could be expected to have narrowed the divergent res

and provided a more specifi c answer about how the roles of non-state ac

have changed.

Changes in the Roles of Non-State Actors: 

An Alternative View

A systematic review of what was done and not done in the t

non-state actor studies provides insights into how critical thinking can c

bine with multimethodological, mindful sensemaking, to provide a p

digm for 21st Century intelligence creation and its active communicatio

391 NIC, “Nonstate Actors,” 6.
124

policymakers in a fashion that transcends the Sherman Kent tradition. Th is 

review is facilitated by employing the ten elements of reasoning noted above.

• the beginning question of the NIC-Eurasia Group semi- Question:

nars was, “If non-state actors are emerging as a dominant global 

force, where is the evidence?” In other words, while there appears 

to be a consensus that they are a dominant global force, where is the 

formal evidence? For example, given the premise that we are experiencing an emerging phenomenon, is there evidence that non-State 

actors wield more power in 2010 (or in 2007 when the original study 

was made) than they did a decade earlier? A key question, and really 

the central question, to be answered is fi rst, how does one measure 

the relative power of non-state actors? A follow-on question to this 

becomes, “Is such power therefore suffi cient to render them dominant global forces?”

• Determine whether or not there is evidence that non-state Purpose:

actors are emerging as a dominant global force. Th is problem is one 

of basic research to determine if the evidence in fact exists. However, the underlying issue of how we might measure relative power 

must fi rst be conceptualized and addressed.

• As we consider the original and complementary Points of View:

studies, there are two predominant points of view at issue: fi rst, 

that of the NIC and its customers—who may believe that non-state 

actors are an emerging global force and want to quantify this shift in 

infl uence and power. Th e other, unavoidable point of view is that of 

non-state actors—some of whom would believe they are an emerging force and some who would not believe they are. For example, 

Al Qaeda, as a non-state actor, might want to believe (and might be 

justifi ed in believing) that they are a signifi cant global force. On the 

other hand, a super-empowered individual might believe she or he 

is not a signifi cant global force (and yet, might be one).

Each group that considered the issue also refl ected diff erent points of 

view. Th e NIC-Eurasia Group study focused on three broad categories of “benign” non-state actors: non-governmental organizations, 

multinational corporations, and super-empowered individuals. 

Mercyhurst focused on all categories of non-state actors and the 

LSS workshop focused primarily on violent non-state actors in Iraq. 

Among other things, this diff erentiation of what constitutes a nonstate actor also refl ects diff erent interpretations of the key question. 

Each group brought its own perspectives about its larger focus as 

well. For example, both the Mercyhurst and LSS approaches to the 
125

issue refl ected a strong reliance on structured methods as the m

of making sense of issues. Th e Eurasia group imparted a more in

tive approach by subject matter experts. A more explicit accoun

of the points of view embodied at each stage of an ongoing st

would help both intelligence producers and their policyma

counterparts maintain a focus on their respective stakeholders’ c

cerns and opportunities.

• Th Assumptions: e use of the term “non-state actor” as an appa

all-encompassing term in the initial problem question and statem

presumes an initial understanding and consensus about what 

is not a non-state actor. Th is is actually inaccurate as the diff e

foci of the three groups make clear. However, the diff erences in 

case become evident in hindsight although measures could be ta

in foresight to at least check the understanding of diff erent gro

engaged in collaborative assessments.

Greater precision of the term non-state actors is needed. Diff e

tiating between benign and non-benign non-state actors is a 

step. Subsequent refi nements of “benign non-state actors” into n

governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and su

empowered individuals is also useful. A similar set of distinct

within the set of violent non-state actors is also necessary. Th e

crosscheck among the teams must be accomplished so that con

sus on the meaning and use of these terms is achieved.

Another assumption involves what is meant by the term “domi

global force.” Again, both greater precision and clarity is neede

coping with this assumption. One key question is, “Exactly w

does dominant global force mean?” One answer to this could 

that everywhere on the planet non-state actors are the force aff 

ing politics and life. Such a simplifi ed and simplistic view is li

inaccurate, and a range of political process models — among t

those of the “rational actor,” of “bureaucratic politics,” and of “o

nizational process,” need to be parsed.

• Th Implications and Consequences: e consideration of imp

tions and consequences means to anticipate and explore the ev

that follow a decision, and to put in play especially the interpre

aspect of sensemaking. In the context of non-state actors, it m

to explore what happens if non-state actors are (or are not) em

ing as dominant global forces and we are right or wrong ab

their power. Regardless of whether non-state actors are a domi

global force, if their infl uence is underestimated then surprises 
126

be expected: Some non-state actor is likely to act in a fashion that is 

completely unexpected and with unanticipated results. On the other 

hand, overestimating the infl uence of non-state actors might create self-fulfi lling prophecies. If, though, the infl uence of non-state 

actors is accurately measured it may be possible to mitigate that 

infl uence (where the non-state actors are acting on interests at odds 

with those of the United States). Alternately, where non-state actors 

are acting in consonance with the interests of the United States or 

are able to exploit opportunities put in place to get them to be helpful, the United States fulfi lls its goals.

Finally, the sensemakers’ interpretation of likely actions or events 

allows the implications and consequences of those actions to be 

considered, even if absolute prediction is elusive. Here, in the context of collaborative sensemaking through the communication of 

intelligence to a policymaker, we understand the admonition of 

Sherman’s Kent’s contemporary critic, Willmoore Kendall, that 

intelligence most critically “concerns the communication to the 

politically responsible laymen of the knowledge which...determines the ‘pictures’ they have in their heads of the world to which 

their decisions relate.”392 Th is vision suggests communication of 

intelligence as an “insider” rather than off ering “intelligence input” 

at arms length in the Kent paradigm.393 Kendall faults Kent’s equation of wartime and peacetime intelligence, insisting that peacetime intelligence represents a more strategic calling that requires 

intelligence to consider the course of events as something one 

must infl uence, by making what he distinguishes as “contingent 

predictions.”394 An issue in the case at hand is whether interactions 

of the United States with non-state actors represent those of war or 

peacetime intelligence frameworks. Additionally, given the wicked 

nature of the issue, Kendall’s more tailored, “insider” paradigm may 

prove better in assisting the policy customer in grasping the issue 

and its contingent predictions.

392 Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence,” 550. One might guess that Kendall had in 

mind the clear depiction of what we now typically call “scenarios.”

393 Richard K. Betts, in Enemies of Intelligence (chapter 2), argues for a modulated “politicization” of intelligence. He identifies Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central 

Intelligence Robert Gates as an effective leading exponent of the “insider” approach. Ultimately, Betts declares, “Taxpayers hire intelligence analysts not to produce truth for its own 

sake but to produce useful truth,” 78.

394 Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence,” 549.
127

• What evidence is needed to determine that non-sEvidence:

actors are, and as importantly, are not an emerging dominant gl

force? As we have seen, each group gathered and sift ed consi

able information on non-state actors, some of it highly relevan

the central question and some not. To the best knowledge of 

authors, each of the three groups chose and evaluated evidence 

with inductive logic. Th ey did not take advantage of a means, av

able in particular to a community with robust intelligence capa

ties, to deductively eliminate one of the two possibilities.

A seminal essay by an Israeli intelligence practitioner, Isaac B

Israel, explains how a technique, viewed in retrospect, would h

led the Israelis to dismiss deceptive indicators of Arab prep

tions and to expect the coordinated attack in October 1973.395 

fi nding rests on the idea that intelligence foraging and marsha

capabilities can be used effi ciently to focus on a greatly redu

information stream if the reports that support both options 

this case Arab war preparations or exercise) are simply set as

Reports that are incompatible with either war preparations, on 

one hand, or with activity being only an exercise on the other

few enough to explore with special intelligence means.396 A fo

on detecting evidence of deception in either of those sets wo

at least bring effi ciency to the sensemaking process. In the cas

the emerging roles of non-state actors, examining evidence 

neither is happening and why would yield alternative views 

might also force a disconfi rmatory framework allowing better 

ambiguation of all the hypotheses. Th e application of this met

to intelligence issues is likely not as diffi cult or inconvenien

practitioners may guess.397

395 Isaac Ben-Israel, “Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of Esti

Process,” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 4, no. 4 (October 1989): 660-718. Cited 

after as Ben-Israel, “Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence.”

396 Ben-Israel, “Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence,” 709.

397 The challenge of “one-off” prediction is especially inviting to proponents of app

deductive logic to the collection and analysis of evidence. Practitioners who consciously em

this technique can demonstrate to later investigators or inquisitors the logical as well as 

tive steps they took with respect to evidence, such as often occurs in intelligence. In 

domains (such as weather forecasting) predictions are constantly updated as inputs to a

spheric models change and as new inputs are revealed. Further, if only an inductive app

to evidence collection and processing is used, when intelligence predictions change, i

gence customers and overseers are often quick, in their own inductive and intuitive way, to 

cize either the original or revised results (depending on which set of results they agree w

Thus, a 21st Century approach to forecasting must adopt a constantly updated, dedu

paradigm if it is going to be accurate against constantly shifting adversaries and issues.
128

• With three diff Inferences and Conclusions: erent and independent eff orts, the challenge lies in ensuring a useful triangulation 

of the results of those potentially disparate eff orts. Th e Mercyhurst 

approach (internally triangulated) found that non-state actors, both 

legal and extralegal, are least eff ective in authoritarian states. Using 

Iraq as a case study, the Least Squares workshop demonstrated 

that within the context of either failed or failing states, expectations and perceptions of the public, or the political environment, 

are key drivers in anticipating the likelihood of actions by (violent) 

non-state actors. Strident or acrimonious expression of dissent that 

arises when domestic and international political/economic issues 

reinforce each other within the United States and Europe suggest a 

possible correlation in post-industrial states. Th is leads to a general 

conclusion that when expectations are at odds with situational reality, non-state actor activity increases.

Together, these fi ndings may assist in anticipating the likelihood 

of future actions by non-state actors. As Schrodt and Gerner note, 

“political predictions tend to be short-term rather than longterm.”398 Yet, as they also note, eff ective warning (of a complex 

humanitarian crisis, for example) requires a fairly long lead-time:

Warnings of less than three months provide insuffi cient 

lead time for most non-military organizations to react; in 

other words, the responses to a warning of less than three 

months will look pretty much the same as a response to a 

situation that develops without warning.399

• Not only the assumptions, but other concepts as well Concepts:

were in play at multiple levels in the non-state actor case studies. 

Th e very notions of “non-state actor” and the ideas of democracy, 

authoritarianism, and anarchy needed clarifi cation, ideally through 

well-grounded, empirical as well as theoretical research, to ensure 

common understanding.

• If non-state actors are not emerging as a dominant Alternatives:

global force, then what can we say about their global role? Is their 

infl uence staying the same? Is it diminishing? Given a credible 

means of measuring change in the infl uence and power of non-state 

actors, the next step in this study of non-state actors would be to 

examine hypotheses generated from these alternative questions. 

398 Schrodt and Gerner, “CHC,” 4.

399 Schrodt and Gerner, “CHC,” 4.
129

Such follow-on studies also examine and attempt to make sens

instances where non-state actor infl uence has waned. As was n

by the Eurasia group, in some situations, pro-Western non-

actors actually shift infl uence away from themselves and the Un

States and its allies.

• As has been repeatedly noted, non-state actors preContext:

both a challenge to U.S. interests and an opportunity for advan

those interests. Th e U.S. would like to mitigate the challenges 

take advantage of the opportunities. How to make that happe

domains and regions of little existing U.S. infl uence or of wan

U.S. and Western infl uence becomes a key concern as the Un

States strives to carry out a meaningful global role. Future attem

to make sense of the role of non-state actors may benefi t from 

ping into the larger context of recent policy-relevant literatur

the problem of fragile states in applied academic journals.400

Moving Beyond a Proto-Revolution

Microcognition and Macrocognition in the Study of 

Non-State Actors

Th ere emerge two very general domains of which intelligence pro

sionals must make sense: that of the relatively static, state-based system 

that of the much more dynamic non-state actor. Of course, these do not e

in isolation from one another. Th ere are boundaries, interstices, and poin

segmentation; there is considerable overlap when one usurps or adopts 

actions of the other. Further, the separate domains of domestic and for

areas of interest and action, embraced by the Kent model of intelligence 

ation and communication, have been superseded by an indivisible, wo

wide web of personal and organizational relationships. Broadly speak

the “classic” model of intelligence sensemaking largely suffi ced and perh

continues to suffi ce when issues remain clearly tied to the political ent

associated with the Westphalian system of state-based power. However w

dealing with non-state actors, a new, revolutionary paradigm becomes es

tial for making sense of issues as well as their interactions with the states o

other paradigm. In the former, a traditional, intuitive and expert-suppo

approach was largely adequate. In the case of the latter, as is glimpsed in 

case study, a more rigorous approach is required.

400 For example, see Kenneth Menkhaus, “State Fragility as a Wicked Problem,” P

vol. 1, no. 2 (March 2010): 85-100. URL: <http//:www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1

Prism_85-100_Menkhaus.pdf>, accessed 14 May 2010.
130

Such an approach is “macrocognitive” in the terminology developed 

by those who study naturalistic decisionmaking.401 In national intelligence 

terms, practitioners and their customers work in a macrocognitive environment as they manage the uncertainty they face in dealing with wicked 

problems.402 Macrocognition, then, includes a focus on process as well as 

results—what we have labeled mindful, self-refl ective sensemaking.

Klein et alia observe that intelligence professionals and decisionmakers traditionally are “microcognitively” focused. Th at is, like those who 

follow in the Sherman Kent tradition, they are concerned with solving puzzles, searching, and “estimating probabilities or uncertainty values” for different phenomena of interest.403 As has been discussed, such an approach 

still may be suitable for solving tame problems or those of the Type 1 domain. 

Th us, microcognition describes the reductionist foci of the current intelligence “analysis” paradigm. However, this is not sensemaking, which requires 

another approach.

Th e transition or shift to macrocognition requires a focus on “planning and problem detection, using leverage points to construct options 

and attention management.”404 Elements of the foregoing case study exemplify this strategy. Both the Mercyhurst Role Spectrum Analysis and the 

Least Squares Points of Segmentation identifi ed potential leverage points 

that revealed truths about non-state actors, leading to more robust problem detection. A next step would have been to take the triangulated results 

from all the deployed sensemaking methods and use the results to construct 

options for dealing with nonstate actors in multiple environments. Such a 

macrocognitive approach would allow more persistent attention to the anticipation of the broad course of events (in this case involving non-state actors), 

in contrast to a microcognitive focus on predicting more isolated and specifi c 

future incidents.

Next Steps in Revolutionary Sensemaking about 

Non-State Actors

Th e foregoing elaboration of non-coordinated sensemaking activities, even with its limitations, moved beyond the traditional model of intelligence creation. It specifi cally identifi ed the multiple approaches taken by 

401 Gary Klein and others, “Macrocognition,” IEEE Intelligent Systems, vol. 18, no. 3 (May/

June 2003), 81. Cited hereafter as Klein and others, “Macrocognition.”

402 Pietro C. Cacciabue and Erik Hollnagel, “Simulation of Cognition: Applications,” in JeanMichel Hoc, Pietro C. Cacciabue, and Erik Hollnagel, eds., Expertise and Technology: Cognition and 

Human-Computer Cooperation (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995), 55-73.

403 Klein and others, “Macrocognition,” 82.

404 Klein and others, “Macrocognition,” 82.
131

independent teams who used alternative schema and methods that, perh

unsurprisingly, resulted in a broader understanding of the problem. Muc

the multimethod work was based on diff ering perceptions of the task at h

Triangulation was largely informal both within and between the groups. Th 

the work met the criteria for a transitional intelligence sensemaking pro

Th e participants in all three eff orts engaged in critical thinking to one de

or another. All were also mindful of the wicked issue of non-state actors 

its signifi cance.

To move farther toward a revolutionary paradigm for intellige

these approaches need to be formalized beyond the transitional phase 

vided here into a new paradigm of sensemaking. Th is does not mean 

the structured methods of “science” are to be imposed blindly on an issu

Rather than leading to a scientifi c approach, this could lead to scient

wherein meaning accrues only to measurable phenomena for which 

understanding rests on hypothesis testing and refutation.406 Instead, 

adoption of the new paradigm for sensemaking depends on bringing 

play a cooperative spirit of science and scientifi c inquiry to the proces

intelligence creation and communication. Mindful, critical thinking-ba

multimethodological approaches to analysis, synthesis and interpretation 

one means of doing this. Additionally, a means needs to be found to en

that this approach to sensemaking remains rigorous. Th is becomes the 

ject of the next chapter.

405 Here, one is reminded of a quote attributed to Secretary of Defense Robert McNam

“We need to stop making what is measurable important and start making what is impo

measurable.”

406 Friedrich August Hayak, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, developed the distin

between science and scientism. See Friedrich August Hayak, The Counter-Revolution of Sci

Studies on the Abuse of Reason, 2nd Edition (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1

19-25.

133

CHAPTER 8

Establishing Metrics of Rigor

Defi ning Intelligence Rigor

I know the distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning. An intelligence offi cer is inherently inductive. We begin with 

the particular and we draw generalized conclusions. Policymakers are generally deductive. Th ey start with the vision or general 

principle and then apply it to specifi c situations. Th at creates a 

fascinating dynamic, when the intelligence guy, who I call the 

fact guy, has to have a conversation with the policymaker, who I 

tend to call the vision guy. You get into the same room, but you 

clearly come into the room from diff erent doors. Th e task of the 

intelligence offi cer is to be true to his base, which is true to the 

facts, and yet at the same time be relevant to the policymaker 

and his vision. Th at’s a fairly narrow sweet spot, but the task of 

the intelligence offi cer is to operate in that spot.

— GEN Michael V. Hayden (Ret.), 

former Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency and the National Security Agency 407

Michael Hayden’s view that the intelligence offi cer needs to ope

in the “sweet spot” linking intelligence and policymaker cognitive wo

coincides with the aim of the sensemaking paradigm. To bring these 

worlds together, intelligence professionals can take advantage of the op

tunity to meld their fact-based inductive tendencies with the vision

deductive model of policymakers through the application of collective r

to well-conceived questions. Th is approach allows intelligence profess

als to embrace a triangulation on wicked problems from their professi

perspective, and to improve their chance to communicate with policym

ers whose circumscribed comfort zone may accept or even welcome wic

problems as opportunities to apply their vision to bring about politic

rewarding solutions.

407 From a 9 August 2010 interview on national security and U.S. strategy, aired by C-

radio, URL: <http://www.cspan.org/Watch/Media/2010/08/09/Terr/A/36779/Gen+Mic

Hayden+Ret+The+Chertoff+Group+Principal.aspx>, accessed 11 August 2010.
134

At present most tradecraft for sensemaking triangulation remains 

intuitive, operating in the realm of tacit knowledge. Th us, part of a revolution 

in intelligence requires that more formal and explicit means of triangulation 

be developed. It may be that some existing analytic tradecraft , when conscientiously applied, will improve synthesis and interpretation. Another option is 

to explore and experiment with new tools for conceptualizing rigor in information analysis, synthesis and interpretation.

Rigor in sensemaking can refer to infl exible adherence to a process or, alternatively, to fl exibility and adaptation “to highly dynamic 

environments.”408 As proponents of the latter approach, Daniel Zelik, Emily 

Patterson, and David Woods recently reframed the idea of rigor into a more 

manageable concept of “suffi ciency.”409 In the applied world of sensemakers, 

then, an apt question is: “Were suffi cient considerations made or precautions 

taken in the process of making sense of the issue?” Zelik et alia observe that 

this requires a “deliberate process of collecting data, refl ecting upon it, and 

aggregating those fi ndings into knowledge, understanding, and the potential 

for action.”410 In order to achieve answers to this question Zelik et alia developed an eight-element taxonomy of suffi ciency and a trinomial measurement of rigor: Each element was calibrated in terms of high, medium or low 

rigor. In their examination of information products, an overall score could be 

computed that, in intelligence terms, would communicate to both the practitioner’s management and to consumers the rigor of the craft ed intelligence 

product. Th eir model of the metric is shown in fi gure 11 and its attributes are 

reproduced in table 6.

408 Daniel J. Zelik, Emily S. Patterson, and David D. Woods, “Understanding Rigor in Information Analysis,” in Kathleen Mosier and Ute Fischer, eds., Proceedings of the Eighth International NDM Conference, Eighth International Naturalistic Decision-Making Conference, Pacific 

Grove, CA, June 2007, 1. Cited hereafter as Zelik, and others, “Rigor.”

409 Zelik and others, “Rigor,” 1. Note that “sufficiency” differs from “satisficing,” by definition a low-rigor process where only enough sensemaking is conducted to get to an initial answer. 

Indeed, satisficing may be considered the epitome of low rigor.

410 Daniel J. Zelik, Emily S. Patterson, and David D. Woods, “Measuring Attributes of Rigor 

in Information Analysis,” in Emily S. Patterson, and Janet E. Miller, Macrocognition Metrics and 

Scenarios: Design and Evaluation for Real World Teams (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 65. Cited 

hereafter as Zelik and others, “Measuring Rigor.”
135

Figure 11. A Metric for Rigor.

Source: Daniel J. Zelik, Emily S. Patterson, David D. Woods, “Modeling Rigor 

in Information Analysis: A Metric for Rigor,” Cognitive Systems Engineering 

Laboratory, The Ohio State University. Used with permission.

Hypothesis Exploration
136

Table 6. Attributes of the Rigor Metric

Hypothesis Exploration describes the extent to which multiple hypotheses 

were considered in explaining data. In a low-rigor process there is minimal 

weighing of alternatives. A high-rigor process, in contrast, involves 

broadening of the hypothesis set beyond an initial framing and incorporating 

multiple perspectives to identify the best, most probable explanations.

Information Search relates to the depth and breadth of the search process 

used in collecting data. A low rigor analysis process does not go beyond 

routine and readily available data sources, whereas a high rigor process 

attempts to exhaustively explore all data potentially available in the relevant 

sample space.

Information Validation details the levels at which information sources are 

corroborated and cross-validated. In a low-rigor process little effort is made 

to use converging evidence to verify source accuracy, while a high-rigor 

process includes a systematic approach for verifying information and, when 

possible, ensures the use of sources closest to the areas of interest.

Stance Analysis is the evaluation of data with the goal of identifying the 

stance or perspective of the source and placing it into a broader context 

of understanding. At the low-rigor level an analyst may notice a clear 

bias in a source, while a high-rigor process involves research into source 

backgrounds with the intent of gaining a more subtle understanding 

of how their perspective might infl uence their stance toward analysisrelevant issues.

Sensitivity Analysis considers the extent to which the analyst considers and 

understands the assumptions and limitations of their analysis. In a low-rigor 

process, explanations seem appropriate and valid on a surface level. In a 

high-rigor process the analyst employs a strategy to consider the strength 

of explanations if individual supporting sources were to prove invalid.

Specialist Collaboration describes the degree to which an analyst 

incorporates the perspectives of domain experts into their assessments. 

In a low-rigor process little effort is made to seek out such expertise, while 

in a high-rigor process the analyst has talked to, or may be, a leading 

expert in the key content areas of the analysis.

Information Synthesis refers to how far beyond simply collecting and listing 

data an analyst went in their process. In the low rigor process an analyst 

simply compiles the relevant information in a unifi ed form, whereas a highrigor process has extracted and integrated information with a thorough 

consideration of diverse interpretations of relevant data.
137

Th e tradecraft underlying these attributes assesses the domain

intelligence foraging and intelligence sensemaking (analyzing, synthesiz

and interpreting) as described here. Th e study by Zelik et alia reveals that w

might at fi rst glance be considered the application of a low level of rigor re

is merely a function of a varying distribution of rigor applied among the a

butes. In their study some notable diff erences appeared in the absolute sc

on the rigor scale as diff erent products were scrutinized. However, the m

interesting cases involved notable swings in specifi c attribute scores. Th u

a test scenario assessing the work of two practitioners (see fi gure 11), one w

a predetermined “high rigor” score and the other with a predetermined “

rigor,” the fact that the high-rigor practitioner (Process 2) had a high scor

information search and a medium score for information synthesis whereas 

low-rigor practitioner (Process 1) had a medium score for information se

and a medium score for information synthesis is noteworthy.

Th is distinction suggests a profound insight, namely that infor

tion search is perceived as more highly valued than information synthesi

the case above, a defi nitive judgment about this insight cannot be mad

the other attributes of the two assessments were not identical. Still, it se

clear that at least the participants in the study were still wrestling with a c

sideration formally discussed by Richards Heuer, Jr. (and many others be

and since—including Moore and Hoff man above): How much informatio

necessary for eff ective sensemaking? 411 Th e observations may also refl ec

“data-centric” culture of the participants. Finally, it off ers a means to cou

a tendency or preference among “Google Generation” foragers, as descr

in Chapter 4, for broad but shallow searches. A next step in examining 

metric is to apply it to an assemblage of intelligence assessments. An i

tration of how this might work using the case study of the previous cha

appears below.

411 Heuer, Psychology, Chapter 5. See also, Slovic, “Behavioral Problems.”

Table 6. Attributes of the Rigor Metric (Continued)

Explanation Critique is a different form of collaboration that captures how 

many different perspectives were incorporated in examining the primary 

hypotheses. In a low-rigor process, there is little use of other analysts to 

give input on explanation quality. In a high-rigor process peers and expert

have examined the chain of reasoning and explicitly identifi ed which 

inferences are stronger and which are weaker.

Source: Zelik et alia, “Rigor,” 4.
138

Assessing Sensemaking Rigor in Studies of 

Non-State Actors

Table 7. Comparative Scores of the Three Efforts 

Examining the Roles of Non-State Actors

Criteria

NIC-Eurasia 

Group Mercyhurst LSS

Hypothesis Exploration

describes the extent to which 

multiple hypotheses were 

created and considered in 

explaining data.

Low High High

Information Search relates to 

the depth and breadth of the 

processes used in foraging 

and harvesting data.

Medium High High

Information Validation

expresses the level to which 

information sources are 

corroborated and crossvalidated.

Medium Medium Medium

Stance Analysis is the 

evaluation of data with the goal 

of identifying the stance or 

perspective of the sources and 

their placement into a broader 

context of understanding.

Medium Medium High

Sensitivity Analysis considers 

the extent to which the analyst 

considers and understands the 

assumptions and limitations of 

their analysis.

Medium High High

Specialist Collaboration

describes the degree to 

which an analyst incorporates 

the perspectives of domain 

experts into their assessments.

High Low High
139

Table 7. Comparative Scores of the Three Efforts 

Examining the Roles of Non-State Actors (Continued)

Criteria

NIC-Eurasia 

Group Mercyhurst LSS

Information Synthesis refers 

to how far beyond simply 

collecting and assembling data 

an analyst progressed.

High High High

Explanation Critique is a 

measure of collaboration 

that captures how many 

different perspectives were 

incorporated in examining the 

primary hypotheses.

Medium Medium High

Team Scores (Each low = 1; 

medium = 2; high = 3)

17 19 23

Sources: Zelik et alia, “Rigor,” 4; Author.

Th e case study in the previous chapter aff ords an opportunity to d

onstrate how this rigor metric functions when applied against the wor

real intelligence professionals—or in this case, teams of intelligence pro

sionals. In this example the informed judgment of the author leads to t

individual rigor metric diagrams as well as a composite; fi nally, a table s

marizes the results.412 Applying a scoring metric of 1 point for a Low Sc

2 points for a Medium Score, and 3 points for a High Score yields a range 

to 24 possible points. For the reviewers, when no evidence pointed clear

a low or high score, a default position of medium was presumed.

412 The author is indebted to Russell Swenson who reviewed the assessments (and ag

with the scoring of the author). Numerical scores were assigned at his suggestion. It shou

observed that this assessment is not intended to be authoritative. Rather it is provided 

example of how rigor can be assessed.
140

Rigor and the NIC-Eurasia Group Eff ort

Th e NIC-Eurasia Group eff ort (summarized in fi gure 12 and column one of table 7) garnered the fewest points of the three groups. Hypothesis Exploration — Low: Th e NIC-Eurasia Group memorandum noted that 

non-state actors are of interest “because they have international clout, but 

are oft en overlooked in geopolitical analysis.” Th e implicit but demanding 

questions of why and how much non-state actor “power” and “infl uence” 

have increased worldwide were not answered, nor was a time frame established. Th is failure to broaden the hypotheses beyond the initial framing 

of the issue led to a lack of incorporation of multiple perspectives to identify at least “best,” and perhaps most probable answers to these questions. 

Information Search — Medium: Based on the memorandum there was no 

evidence of a “high rigor” or exhaustive information search. Information 

Figure 12. The Rigor of the NIC-Eurasia Group Study of Non-State Actors.

Source: Author, based on Zelik et alia, “Rigor.”

Information Validation

Information Search

Hypothesis Exploration

Explanation Critiquing

Information Synthesis

Stance Analysis

Sensitivity Analysis

Specialist Collaboration
141

Validation — Medium: Convergence of evidence was apparent in the N

Eurasia Group desktop memorandum. Stance Analysis — Medium: 

was found to be a process-related metric and the desktop memorand

did not adequately reveal the process undertaken. However, some evide

exists that consideration of the source backgrounds took place. Sensiti

Analysis — Medium: While the NIC-Eurasia Group’s explanations w

beyond the “surface level,” no obvious evidence was presented of an exp

strategy to consider the strength and sensitivity of explanations about n

state actors. Specialist Collaboration — High: Such a score was expec

Eurasia Group is an organization of experts; this is one of its values to 

Community (and others). Leading experts provided their informed o

ions about the roles of non-state actors. Information Synthesis — High: 

NIC-Eurasia Group desktop memorandum presented integrated infor

tion with a thorough consideration of the underlying evidence such as 

conclusion that “state-owned enterprises” posing as NGOs oft en are a f

for advancing the interests of a modernizing state-government. Expla

tion Critique — Medium: A discussion process presumes the examina

and critique of each participant’s chains of reasoning. Since discussions w

a part of the sensemaking process undertaken by the NIC-Eurasia Gr

participants, this form of collaboration was present. However, the degre

which this occurred could not be determined from the desktop memo

dum, resulting in a score of medium.

Rigor and the Mercyhurst Eff ort

Th e work of the Mercyhurst College students earned a score mid

between the other two groups. Th eir Hypothesis Exploration was jud

to be High. Th eir considerations of the issue clearly went beyond their 

tial framing of the issue. Similarly, their Information Search also sco

High. A broad range of evidence was employed in making sense of n

state actors in Africa.413 On the other hand, while the information con

gence necessary for the “non-state actor potential spectra” was indica

of high rigor, an informal non-systematic approach resulted in Infor

tion Validation being assigned a Medium score. Stance Analysis also 

scored as Medium. As was the case with the NIC-Eurasia Group eff ort, 

process-related metric could not be further evaluated. With regard to Se

tivity Analysis, the Mercyhurst eff ort was scored as High: Th e particip

focused on the non-state actors themselves as well as the means by w

they could be assessed. Such a focus leads naturally to a consideration of 

413 This was not unexpected. A finely honed skill of participants in the Mercyhurst Co

Institute for Intelligence Studies program is that of effective, broad and deep search.
142

strengths and weaknesses of explanations. Th e Mercyhurst students relied 

on published data. No evidence of consultation with external experts was 

evident. While this was to be expected given the demographics of a student 

team, it nevertheless led to a score of Low for the Specialist Collaboration

metric. By contrast, Information Synthesis received a High score. Th e consideration of diverse interpretations of the data led the Mercyhurst students 

to anticipate that Kenya had stability issues well in advance of the breakout of politically related violence. Th is was unexpected and possibly unanticipated elsewhere. Finally, the Explanation Critique metric was scored a 

Medium. Th e review by the mentoring faculty member and fellow students 

provided a level of critique that, while valuable, did not meet the standard 

set by a full peer and expert review of inferences and conclusions, which is 

necessary for a high score in this category.

Figure 13. The Rigor of the Mercyhurst College Students’ Study of 

Non-State Actors.

Source: Author, based on Zelik et alia, “Rigor.”

Information Validation

Information Search

Hypothesis Exploration

Explanation Critiquing

Information Synthesis

Stance Analysis

Sensitivity Analysis

Specialist Collaboration
143

Rigor and the LSS Eff ort

Th e LSS social science study of non-state actors scored the highe

all three groups, earning a high in each metric save one, Information Val

tion, where they scored a Medium. In this case, while converging infor

tion was employed to cross-validate source accuracy for the evidence clo

to the areas of interest, a systematic approach for doing this was not 

dent, resulting in the lower score.414 Overall the LSS eff ort went well bey

the initial framing of the issue, resulting in a High score for Hypoth

Exploration. Similarly, their Information Search considered every so

they could access within their available resources. It was clearly evident 

414 This determination may be overly stringent, as the LSS Stance Analysis (a related 

ric) was rated as high.

Figure 14. The Rigor of the Least Squares Social Science Study of 

Non-State Actors.

Source: Author, based on Zelik et alia, “Rigor.”

Information Validation

Information Search

Hypothesis Exploration

Explanation Critiquing

Information Synthesis

Stance Analysis

Sensitivity Analysis

Specialist Collaboration
144

this group conducted rigorous research into source background, facilitating an understanding of how their respective points of view might infl uence 

their stances on the issues of violent non-state actors. Th e use of a formal 

model of critical thinking added considerable rigor to both Hypothesis 

Exploration and Sensitivity Analysis. Furthermore, their conversations 

specifi cally focused on the strength of explanations. Th e use of multiple 

points of segmentation also captured the diverse alternatives of this complex (or “wicked”) issue. Since the entire team was made up of specialists, 

their score in Specialist Collaboration should come as no surprise. Similarly, the involvement of diverse social scientists as well as the involvement 

of external peers foreordained that the Explanation Critique would be rigorous. All the individuals brought diff ering perspectives as they identifi ed 

the strengths and weaknesses of each other’s inferences and conclusions. 

Finally, an explicit multi-methodological approach forced consideration of 

diverse interpretations of the evidence—a highly rigorous example of Information Synthesis.

Observations and Discussion

It is no accident that the traditional means by which assessments of 

such issues are created, as evidenced by the NIC-Eurasia Group eff ort, resulted 

in a relatively weak score, whereas the highly rigorous, critical-thinking based, 

multimethodological eff ort by a collaborative team of diverse experts led to a 

relatively high score (a comparison highlighted by fi gure 15). It should also be 

noted that absent the LSS eff ort, a composite eff ort by the NIC-Eurasia Group 

and Mercyhurst teams would have come close to the score attained by the LSS 

group (21 versus 23 points). Here again, the utility of this metric becomes evident. Teams that complement each others’ strengths and mitigate each others’ 

shortcomings can be assigned the same general problem, with the expectation of a more rigorous composite eff ort and more suitable result. As has been 

illustrated here, the results of individual eff orts and combined eff orts can be 

assessed for their rigor as a guide to the purposeful improvement of sensemaking. Specifi c feedback can be provided so that eff orts can be adjusted.

Another advantage of graphic analysis using Zelik et alia’s metric is 

that more information can be clearly conveyed. For example, in examining 

the composite eff orts of all three groups of participants in the non-state actor 

study, it is evident that Information Validation could have been improved 

through the use of a more rigorous systematic approach, ensuring that the 

sources were deemed valid and “closest to the areas of interest.”415 In 2005, 

415 Zelik and others, “Rigor,” 4.
145

an offi cial report on the IC’s performance specifi cally called for improvem

in this area.416

Despite this call for improvement, there appear to be several 

sons why information is oft en not fully validated in intelligence work. F

416 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Rega

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Report to the President of the United States (Was

ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 31 March 2005), 15, and 371-372. The report re

mends that asset validation procedures (a part of information validation) be systema

and standardized.

Figure 15. The Composite Rigor of the Three Studies of Non-State Actors.

Source: Author, based on Zelik et alia, “Rigor.”

Information Validation

Information Search

Hypothesis Exploration

Explanation Critiquing

Information Synthesis

Stance Analysis

Sensitivity Analysis

Specialist Collaboration

Mercyhurst Group

Least Squares Software Group

NIC-Eurasia Group
146

validation is diffi cult and the intelligence professional may decide the result 

is not worth the eff ort, or that initial conditions suggest validity. “Information hubris”— arising when similar information has without negative consequence been presumed or found to be valid, may compound this eff ort. 

Wishful thinking and belief in the infallibility of the source are other factors 

that may contribute to this pathology. Finally, information uncertainty may 

allow it to resist validation. Unfortunately any or all of these can lead to intelligence errors and failures, suggesting that information validation, despite its 

inclusion in the rigor metric itself, may require a transcendent application 

of rigor.

In applying the metric it becomes apparent that some disambiguation 

is necessary between several of the individual considerations. Th e diff erences 

between high rigor assessments involving Stance Analysis and Sensitivity 

Analysis at fi rst glance appear to be unusually subtle, suggesting a need for 

an explanatory critique as part of the standard process assessment. Additionally, because several of the specifi c metrics are process-related, assessors need 

to be present to observe the process or otherwise have access to appropriate and sometimes-scarce process-associated materials. Alternately, a formal 

means for capturing applied (and omitted) sensemaking processes needs to 

be developed.

In developing the rigor metric, Zelik et alia note that it is “grounded 

largely in the domain of intelligence analysis.”417 Looking at the metric from 

a generalizing point of view, Zelik et alia are interested in whether it can be 

broadened to other disciplines such “as information search by students working on educational projects, medical diagnosis using automated algorithms 

for x-ray interpretation, and accident investigation analyses.”418 For those of 

us within the domain of intelligence, however, that this model “emerged from 

studies of how experts ‘critique’ analysis (rather than how experts ‘perform’ 

analysis.” is a strength.419 Th e rigor metric has been empirically, if tentatively, 

shown (according to Daniel Zelik) to “reveal [some of the] “critical attributes 

to consider in judging analytical rigor” in intelligence sensemaking.420 In 

so doing, Zelik and his colleagues also validated the usefulness of the model 

within the intelligence domain.

417 Zelik and others, “Measuring Rigor,” 77.

418 Zelik and others, “Measuring Rigor,” 77-78. Some of these domains contain applicability to intelligence. Given a tendency for shallow searches by younger people, then a metric 

for rigor that offers guidance may facilitate the “deep diving” necessary for adequate information foraging.

419 Daniel J. Zelik, email to the author, 15 October 2010. Cited hereafter as Zelik, email, 

15 October 2010.

420 Zelik, email, 15 October 2010.
147

While the rigor metric requires further development, it off ers an e

tive means of assessing the processes underlying intelligence assessments. 

rigor metric provides a means of assessing the processes of intelligence se

making, allowing managers of intelligence professionals to ascertain whe

or not more work is required before the results of the sensemaking are c

municated. Additionally, it off ers a practical technique to facilitate comm

cation between practitioner and consumer; that is, to promote sensemak

A danger inherent in any process of making sense of an issue exists w

the “process is prematurely concluded and is subsequently of inadeq

depth relative to the demands of [the] situation.”421 Finally, the metric 

gests other sensemaking considerations that, if used, may help reduce in

equacies in the consideration of intelligence issues. Th is may lead furthe

an honest reduction in sensemakers’ and their customers’ uncertainty ab

issues being examined. In sum, the metric for rigor developed by Zelik 

his colleagues is itself an objectifi cation of what they fi nd rigor to be and w

rants further study.422 Zelik, et alia note that the metric “represents a cur

iteration of an ongoing direction of exploration.”423 Such studies, rigoro

making sense of rigor, would be yet another example of the model for in

ligence sensemaking that has been championed in this book. As Zelik et 

conclude, “the concept of analytical rigor in information analysis warr

continued exploration and diverse application as a macrocognitive mea

of analytical sensemaking activity.”424 But what does it mean if such a m

is adopted, or not adopted? Th e fi nal chapter examines the implication

either outcome.

421 Zelik and others, “Measuring Rigor,” 65.

422 Zelik and others, “Rigor,” 5.

423 Zelik and others, “Measuring Rigor,” 78.

424 Zelik and others, “Measuring Rigor,” 78.

149

CHAPTER 9

In Search of Foresight: Implications, 

Limitations, and Conclusions

Considering Foresight

We turn in conclusion to a discussion of the purpose of mind

critical sensemaking for intelligence. Th e discussion may be best frame

pertinent questions: To what end is intelligence intended? In other wo

intelligence professionals and their overseers critically ask “knowledg

what?” and, secondly, “knowledge for whom?” One answer to these quest

is embodied in the concept of foresight: Intelligence knowledge advises p

cymakers and decisionmakers about what phenomena are likely precur

of events of interest before they occur. Such foresight—in light of the dis

sions in this book—does not entail specifi c predictions. Rather, it allows u

anticipate a range of alternative event sequences.

Foresight informs policy and decisionmakers about what could h

pen so that those individuals can improve the quality of their decisions. D

mindfully, its vision shift s and evolves apace with the phenomena about w

it makes sense. Done wisely in such a manner as presented here, it augm

the vision of leaders, enabling mobilization and discouraging two traits 

oft en handicap visionaries: recklessness and intolerance. Done rigorous

cannot be accused of failing to be imaginative. Th is prospective approach c

trasts with the current practice and paradigm for intelligence production

Reprising Anthony Olcott’s observations reminds us again that S

man Kent’s vision of national intelligence—his “intellectual genetics”—

predominated in U.S. national intelligence since the late 1940s.425 Th at it 

so was because it “served the United States extremely well for a long t

However, as happens when environments undergo dramatic change, succ

ful adaptations for one environment can prove to be much less effi caciou

perhaps even fatal—in a new environment.”426 In the Kent tradition, as 

been noted (and is summarized in fi gure 16), intelligence knowledge of “

lyzed” issues becomes and tends to remain disaggregated into constit

parts—oriented, as Treverton notes, toward solving isolated “puzzles” ra

425 Olcott, “Revisiting the Legacy,” 21.

426 Olcott, “Revisiting the Legacy,” 21.
150

Figure 16. Conceptual Comparison of Kent and Kendall. These diagrams track 

the potent nodes that signal the differences in the visions of Sherman Kent and 

Willmoore Kendall. The diagram to the right also traces a revolutionary, Kendallian 

pathway toward the creation and communication of strategic intelligence.

Sources: Author; based on Jack Davis, “Analysis and Policy: The Kent-Kendall 

Debate of 1949,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 36, no. 2 (1992); Kendall, “Function 

of Intelligence;” Kent, Strategic Intelligence; Olcott, “Revisiting the Legacy;” and 

Treverton, “Estimating.”

The course of events is a tape and all you have to do is figure out how to read it.

Intelligence needs are the same in war and peace 

special elite

leads to

Analysts Intelligence

are

is a

to solve

has

speak “truth” to

separate from

to answer

satisfying

serving

who creates

cumulatively

research

Puzzle

Kent

Policy

one predictive answer

Mid-Level Official

Senior Official

fact finding

process

central

intelligence

tidal waves of

previously collected

data and information
151

The course of events is something you try to influence favorably.

Intelligence needs in war are tactical and in peace are strategic 

not special elite

are

has

engaging

to make sense of

paint a picture for

embedded wit

to make sense of

who steers

understands employ

Analysts

theory

Intelligence

Mystery

Policy

Senior Official

covert

information

overt

information

Kendall leads to distributed

intelligence

how humans behave

and think

many conditionally

predictive answers
152

than the more holistic “mysteries” of the intelligence world. On the other 

hand, we have discussed how Kendall’s competing idea, that intelligence 

knowledge should “paint a picture” (by way of a macrocognitive, holistic 

approach) for the policy maker as a fellow “insider,” is consistent with a model 

of intelligence where the predominant method and motive of intelligence 

sensemaking is through aggregation and the articulation of a fact-based 

“vision” recognizable by national-level policymakers (fi gure 16). Even in an 

operational military scenario, where isolated, specifi c facts are essential to 

successful employment of mission knowledge, a larger intelligence sense of 

who the ultimate commanders are and why they are doing what they’re doing, 

remains the essence of useful, foresightful strategic knowledge—also known 

as national intelligence.

Implications

Creating intelligence as presented here is a mindful process of sensemaking, encompassing the activities of planning, foraging, marshaling, 

understanding, and communicating. It is critical of itself and the means that 

are employed in bringing it about. It lies within the largely overlooked Kendallian vision of what national intelligence ought to accomplish. Th is approach 

allows a focus on better and worse solutions, and anticipation of likely futures, 

instead of a more narrow focus on right and wrong answers in an intellectual 

environment trained on predictive and specifi c warning. It can make sense of 

wicked problems.

By contrast, intelligence as it is currently practiced is still somewhat 

akin to the practice of medicine in the 14th Century. In Medieval medicine, 

herbs and poultices were applied without (from a modern perspective) an 

understanding of why they might work. If the patient survived, then the 

method worked. If not, then from the medieval perspective, God willed it 

otherwise. Intelligence practitioners fi nd themselves in a similar situation. 

Th ey oft en do not know why they do what they do, only that the last time, it 

“worked”— or that it is an “accepted practice.” Th ey do not acknowledge that 

they have “forgotten” all the times it did not work. Yet, intelligence practitioners who would wear the “professional” label need to know what they are 

doing and why.427

One means set forth for “improving intelligence” is to capture the 

processes by which sense is made of an issue. It is certainly true that imposing audit trails is a critical step because they encourage process improvement 

427 It is pertinent to note that suggesting, “God willed it otherwise,” is unacceptable for 

justifying either an intelligence error or an intelligence failure.
153

in the light of serious errors, and stimulate repetitive analysis, synthesis, 

interpretation for validation in the full course of sensemaking. Howe

auditing trails remain inadequate when the Community cannot underst

from an epistemological point of view what does and does not work an

what situations.

Th e major intelligence failures of the fi rst years of the present dec

as well as repeated failures over at least six decades, demonstrate what h

pens when there is a formal failure to synthesize and interpret beyond w

is popularly believed or even to recognize that a situation exists that requ

new synthesis and interpretation. A popular hypothesis is that tradecraft 

minimize the likelihood of such failures of imagination. Yet this hypoth

remains untested except in some anecdotal cases which, given the Typ

wicked nature of the intelligence issues now oft en faced by the Communi

inadequate. Indeed, as Grove et alia discovered in their psychological m

study (discussed above), technological approaches (a structuring of sorts) 

vided accurate solutions less that half the time.428 Th us, a Community e

to research, test, and evaluate tradecraft remains a need if for no other rea

than so the IC can understand what approaches to foresightful sensema

are likely to be useful and in what circumstances. Th e above-mentioned 

ures (and others) show that the typical “analytic” paradigm that remain

place leads to failures of imagination in policy circles as well as in intellige

cloisters.429 Th e most recent failures point out that the Community still d

not understand how desperately it needs to make sense.

Limitations

It should be noted that a tradecraft of mindful understanding d

not guarantee accurate fi ndings. Any of the components of sensemaking 

be done poorly yet “correct” answers can be reached. Disaggregating p

nomena can be done well yet yield faulty results. Synthesis and interpr

tion of analyzed phenomena can still lead to faulty conclusions. Howe

analysis, synthesis and interpretation within the framework of appropria

applied, multimethod tradecraft does guarantee more rigorous sensem

ing. As illustrated in the case study presented above (chapter 7), greater r

can reveal the hidden discrepancies in an intelligence problem. In the ex

ple contained in chapter 5, it can be seen that increased rigor may re

whether the discrepancies comprise self-generated erroneous conclus

or whether one has been manipulated by a deceptive adversary. A rigo

428 Grove and others, “Meta-Analysis,” 25.

429 The 9/11 Report, 339. The four failures are discussed in depth in subsequent sec

of the commission’s report.
154

multimethodological approach will increase the reliability and validity of the 

fi ndings. Taken together, the entire process certainly will increase the intelligence practitioner’s understanding of the issue, allowing more informed 

communication of associated knowledge to a decisionmaker. Th is may lead 

to increased “accuracy.” At best, errors will occur with less frequency, or at 

least they are more likely to be caught.

Conclusions

As has been noted repeatedly in this book, many 21st-Century intelligence issues are wicked problems: Th ey are ill-defi ned and poorly understood 

issues with multiple goals that must be made sense of within severe time constraints; the stakes and risks are high and there exists no tolerance for failure. 

As a means of increasing situational awareness, merely creating mindfulness 

about such complex issues falls short. On the other hand, a mindful sensemaking approach to situational awareness accomplishes more by enabling the 

intense, holistic scrutiny of a complex developing scenario, as suggested in 

the case study in chapter 7. Th is macrocognitive approach ensures that the 

knowledge created also evolves.

Schwartz and Randall believe that to be successful against strategic surprise—a goal the IC seeks—organizations must be both imaginative 

and systematic.430 Th is is so, because “[one] cannot foresee strategic surprise 

without being imaginative, but the results will not be believable without being 

systematic.”431 If intelligence is to rise above the noise and get the attention 

of policy and then be acted upon it must be both. A critical, mindful process 

of sensemaking off ers a means for this to occur. As we have seen, it covers 

the issue broadly, takes into account its complexity, is systematic and rigorous. It off ers the best means currently understood for making sense of what is 

known and knowable.

Th ere is and will always be information of which intelligence professionals are unaware. Th ere is certainly information that does not exist because 

its precursors have not yet occurred. Th ere also is information that exists but 

is unavailable to the intelligence sensemaker and their associated decisionmakers. Any of this information can change the conclusions reached in making sense of it. In short, intelligence professionals currently make judgments 

and will continue to make judgments that, while they appear valid at the 

time, diff er from what ultimately occurs, either because of omission or commission. For evidence of this one need not look further than at the diff ering 

430 Schwartz and Randall, “Ahead of the Curve,” 96-100.

431 Schwartz and Randall, “Ahead of the Curve,” 97.
155

judgments contained in the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s serie

global trends summaries published every fi ve years since 1995.432 Th 

documents, which look outward 15 years, perhaps are better seen as expr

ing the issues and concerns of the times in which they are written, sugges

the validity of Taleb’s point that to predict the future one must already b

the future.433

Th e spread and use of the sensemaking paradigm, wherein in

ligence professionals move from a reductionist, analytic view to form

include the other elements of sensemaking—synthesis and interpretatio

increases the value of intelligence fi ndings. Engaging in macrocognitive 

semaking, with its multiple foci of (re)planning for problem detection, us

leverage points in constructing options, and management of both atten

and uncertainty, further creates an approach that will improve commun

tion with consumers of intelligence.434 As Zukav’s epigraph at the beginn

of this book reminds us, “[nonsense] is nonsense only when we have no

found that point of view from which it makes sense.”435 Such an inclu

process provides that point — or rather points — of view; nonsense is tr

formed into vital, strategic, and foresightful knowledge facilitating be

decisions by leaders.

Some elements of the IC have begun to establish “tradecraft ” 

or similar centers focusing on the practice and process of intelligence. T

cally, however, they have not transcended the “analysis” paradigm and rem

mired in the uncertainty reduction that is characteristic of the practice o

past sixty-plus years. At best, they are not yet able to transform a professi

workforce. Pierre Baumard in 1994 anticipated the persistence of this sta

aff airs: “[Individuals] act on incomplete and variously reliable informat

Caught by approaching dead-lines, surrounded by urgency, individuals 

the simplest means to reduce complexity according to the criteria on w

they will be locally judged.”436 Although some might gain hope from 

renewed interest in tradecraft , the fact that the same errors are being repe

by a new generation of intelligence professionals certainly should lead on

doubt that an underlying and necessary paradigm shift has occurred. Th a

the change is not occurring because before the “opponents” die off they 

432 The most recent version of the NIC forecasts is Global Trends 2025: A Transfo

World, URL: <http://www.odni.gov/>, accessed 12 December 2008.

433 Taleb, The Black Swan, 173.

434 Klein and others, “Macrocognition,” 82-83.

435 Gary Zukav, The Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics (New York

Harper Collins, 2001), 117.

436 Baumard, “From Noticing to Making Sense, 31-32. Emphasis in original.
156

acculturating a new, younger generation.437 If the community is to change it 

cannot wait for another generation (or longer), especially if that new generation is hired and acculturated into the inadequate paradigm of the preceding 

or present generations.438

Achieving this paradigm shift therefore requires revolutionary action 

by a revolutionary workforce. Aggressive, mindful sensemaking is one pathway to this new paradigm, and may require a diff erent mix of skills and abilities than is currently present. It certainly requires greater, authentic diversity. 

Considering the present community, one is reminded of Kent’s quip, “When 

an intelligence staff has been screened through [too fi ne a mesh], its members will be as alike as tiles on a bathroom fl oor—and about as capable of 

meaningful and original thought.”439 In contrast, making sense of the 21st 

Century’s intelligence challenges requires as much rigorous, “meaningful and 

original thought” as we can muster. Sensemaking, as it has been developed 

here, off ers us a means of creating that desperately needed thought.

For the Community to remain unchanged is unacceptable: the implications of being wrong are too dire. Developing a validated practice of mindful sensemaking for intelligence, while not a panacea, is a necessary fi rst step 

in making sense of the nonsense. Th e results from IARPA’s ongoing exploration of sensemaking, if successful, also can be expected to shed light on 

how this can practically and functionally be accomplished. Both represent a 

step toward a true professional practice of intelligence that can meaningfully 

make sense of the national security challenges of the 21st Century.

437 Planck observed, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a 

new generation grows up familiar with it.” Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other 

Papers, F. Glynor, trans. (New York, NY: Philosophical Library, 1949), 33-34. Cited in Charles 

Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence and Other Professions,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008), 78-79.

438 While beyond the scope of this book, organizing to bring about a “revolution in intelligence affairs” is another important aspect of focusing intelligence for the century in which it 

finds itself. William Nolte, writing in Studies in Intelligence, explores the environment for reorganization. Yet, Nolte also presages the argument of this volume in noting that “we need to focus 

less on structure and more on behavior.” See William Nolte, “Keeping Pace with the Revolution 

in Military Affairs,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 48, no. 1 (Winter 2004), 1-10.

439 Kent’s comment appears in a footnote on page 74 of his Strategic Intelligence for 

American World Policy (1951 and 1966 printings). It is reproduced in Jack Davis’ Occasional 

Paper for the Kent Center at the CIA. Although Kent was reacting to the stringent security 

policies of the McCarthy era, his remark also applies to all workforce acquisition practices 

that promote anything but the widest of diversity. See Jack Davis, “Sherman Kent and the 

Profession of Intelligence Analysis,” The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, vol. 1, no. 5 (November 2002), URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-centeroccasional-papers/vol1no5.htm>, accessed 10 June 2010.
157

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David T. Moore is a senior intelligence professional and ed

tor. He teaches critical thinking and structured techniques for intellige

sensemaking and his research focuses on developing multidisciplin

approaches to facilitate intelligence sensemaking. His most recent p

ing was to the School of Leadership and Professional Development at 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Formerly he served as a techn

director at the National Security Agency where he advocated and mento

best practices in intelligence sensemaking. He is an adjunct faculty mem

of the National Cryptologic School; has taught at Trinity University, W

ington, DC; and lectures at the National Defense Intelligence College 

the National Defense University. He received a Master of Science of Strat

Intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College in 2002.

Mr. Moore’s publications include:

• “Species of Competencies for Intelligence Analysis,” Defense In

gence Journal 11, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 97-119.

• “Species of Competencies for Intelligence Analysis,” American I

ligence Journal 23 (2005): 29-43 (an expanded version of the o

nal article).

• , Occasional Paper NumCritical Th inking and Intelligence Analysis

Fourteen; Authorized, Revised Edition (Washington, DC: Nati

Defense Intelligence College, 2006, 2009).

• With coauthor Lisa Krizan:

“Intelligence Analysis, Does NSA Have What It Takes?” ° C

tologic Quarterly 20, nos. 1/2 (Summer/Fall 2001): 1-32.

“Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the Nati

°

Security Agency,” in Bringing Intelligence About: Pract

ners Refl ect on Best Practices, Russell Swenson, ed. (20

95-131.

• With coauthors Lisa Krizan and Elizabeth J. Moore:

“Evaluating Intelligence: A Competency-Based Approa

°

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntellig

18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 204-220.
182

• With coauthor William N. Reynolds:

“So Many Ways To Lie: Th e Complexity of Denial and °

Deception,” Defense Intelligence Journal 15, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 

95-116.

“Advancing the Practice: Multi-methodological Analysis for °

Intelligence”, forthcoming.

Th e author can be contacted via email at david.t.moore@ugov.gov .
183

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Robert R. Hoff man, PhD. A world leader in the fi eld of cogn

systems engineering and Human-Centered Computing, he is a Fellow of 

Association for Psychological Science and a Fulbright Scholar. Follow

post-doctoral work at the Center for Research on Human Learning at 

University of Minnesota, Dr. Hoff man joined the faculty of the Institute 

Advanced Psychological Studies at Adelphi University. Dr. Hoff man has b

recognized internationally for his research on cognitive task analysis and 

design of macrocognitive work systems.

Elizabeth J. Moore is a senior intelligence professional. She hol

BA in Russian Studies from Randolph-Macon Woman’s College, and an 

in International Politics from American University. Ms. Moore began 

government career as a Russian linguist in 1982, and has served in a num

of language and analysis positions at the Defense, State, and Treasury Dep

ments; at the National Intelligence Council; as a Director of National In

ligence Fellow attached to the National Security Council; and overseas.

William N. Reynolds, PhD. Th e founder, President and Chief 

ence Offi cer of Least Squares Soft ware, he has been a principal resear

and innovator in the fi eld of complexity for more than twenty years. O

the past eight years, he has focused on the role of complex systems in in

ligence analysis, especially complexity-based analytic methodologies. In 

capacity, Dr. Reynolds has formulated numerous intelligence analysis 

studies assessing the impact of technology on effi ciency and eff ectivenes

analytic practice.

Marta S. Weber, PhD. A psychologist who has applied thirty y

of clinical and forensic training and experience to the intelligence dom

Dr. Weber pioneered in the development of sophisticated remote profi 

and behavioral forecasting techniques. She is an internationally recogn

expert in that highly specialized fi eld. She founded and heads Applied Be

ioral Sciences, LLC, a boutique consultancy specializing in primary hum

source, human-subject research, analysis, strategic consultation and train

185

INDEX

A

Adversarial deception 19, 60, 85, 100

Operation Mincemeat 85

Analysis

defi nition xxxv, 16, 34

function of ii, 16, 55, 150

imprecision and inaccuracy of concept 43, 48

Analysis of competing hypotheses xi, 98, 102, 119

defi nition 62

Folker’s experiment 101

Mercyhurst structured version 102

MITRE critique 101

value and limitations xi, 118-119

Analytic pathologies 25, 26

Anchoring 24, 119

defi nition 79

Automatic thinking 70-72

defi nition 70

risks 71

C

Cognitive dissonance 11

strategies for coping with 11

Communication

dangers in xxiv, xxxvi, 64, 65

IC models of xiv, 5, 123, 129, 154

new models of 64

uncertainty in xx, 8, 58, 65-66, 129

use of blogs in 66

Complexity xxx, 19, 33-36, 39, 47, 89, 122, 154-155

confounds Kent paradigm 34-35

Complexity theory 19, 33-34, 39

analysis inadequate 47, 52, 63, 147, 153, 156

defi nition 34-35

Concept map 83, 86-87

use of 84, 87

value of 87
186

INDEX (Continued)

Critical thinking xx, xxi, xxiv, xxvi-xxix, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxv, 2, 8, 49, 51, 58, 60, 

93, 98,114-116, 123, 130, 131, 144

and role in intelligence planning 8, 51

assists mindfulness xxvi-xxix, 8, 93

defi nes foraging activities 58, 60

D

Decision making

Examples 11, 48, 65, 116

Diagoras of Melos 96

E

Evidence

changes theories 22, 39, 42, 44, 63

defi nition 8, 37

epistemological justifi cation of 7, 37-39, 42-43, 48

function of 44, 96, 139

marshaling multiple contexts for 7, 37, 62, 101, 127

relation to truth 37-38, 85, 99, 126

requires agnosticism 42

source of xxviii, 22, 63, 65, 98, 101, 136, 141, 143-144

F

Failure of imagination xix, 12, 15-16, 44, 153

Foraging

and critical thinking xxi, 8, 51, 58, 60

and enriching 55-56, 58

and exploiting 55

and exploring 55-56, 58

and intelligence 7-9, 51, 54-59, 60-63, 90, 102, 127, 137, 146, 152

and planning 8, 51, 54

costs of 60

defi nition 58

emerging strategies for 59

self-marketing information for 59

self-protective assets in 59-60

suffi ciency in 56
187

INDEX (Continued)

H

Harvesting 61, 138

Heuristic-based judgment 42, 69, 73-76, 79

Hypotheses

use of alternative 37, 41, 43, 62, 65, 97-98, 100-102, 127-128, 136

I

IARPA xxxiii-xxxiv, 4, 9, 54, 105, 108, 156

Illusions of validity 76, 82

Information

how much is enough 56, 89-90, 137

defi nition 8

Intelligence

20th century paradigm 45

adequacy of sensemaking paradigm 18, 46, 130, 153, 156

and highly dynamic adversaries 16, 18, 25, 127

and meliorists 2, 3

and multiframe analysis 63, 103-104

as activity 35, 50

as knowledge 35, 50

as organization 35, 50

attribute substitution 79

Cold War paradigm for ix, xi, 1, 4, 45, 47

core competencies in 8, 49-50

defi nition xxxv

expertise in xvii, xxviii, 26, 49, 66, 69, 73, 76, 79, 81, 89, 92, 129

fl aws in Kent paradigm for xxi, 7, 10, 46, 126, 129, 149

fl aws of “standard model” for 16

foresight in xvii, xxiii, 16, 30, 33, 35, 57, 81, 83, 98, 100, 125, 149

hindsight in 99-100

inadequacy of disaggregative paradigm for xxxv

Kendall’s paradigm for xiii, xxi, 16, 44, 105, 126, 151-152

Kent’s purpose of 44, 149

lack of evidence in 65, 97, 106

multiple method triangulation in 104, 106, 116, 127, 130, 133-134

no standardized doctrine for 103

old paradigm for xi, 1, 5, 46

“over” versus “under” estimation in 48

probing 53, 78, 127
188

INDEX (Continued)

purpose of 44, 149

replication of results in 97-98

signal and noise in xxiii, 16

skeptics of 2-3

source of xxiii, xxviii, 15, 22, 55, 57-59, 60, 63, 65, 98, 101, 119, 141, 146

standard model for 16, 34, 103

validity of methods in 4, 28, 90, 99, 102-103, 117

Intelligence error

and intelligence failure xxiii, xxv, 12-15, 22, 25, 42, 46-48, 57, 77, 90, 95, 

99-100, 103, 146, 152, 153

and paradigm failure xix, 1, 7, 46-47, 153

and poor or missing data 12, 46

caused by selective exposure 11-12, 20, 42, 101

caused by selective perception 11-12, 15, 20, 42, 101

defi nition 12, 46

Intelligence failure

and inadequate or erroneous hypotheses x, 12, 43, 46, 62, 65, 100

as recurring theme 13

and relation to policy failure 2, 12-15, 26, 44, 46, 48, 65, 153

and relaxation xxv

caused by selective exposure 11-12, 42

caused by selective perception 11-12, 15, 42

defi nition 12, 16, 46, 48

example of 11-12, 15, 21, 48, 96

explanations of 13

fi xation and xxv

Intelligence sensemaking

components 18, 153

defi nition xxxv, 8-9

planning 5, 8, 53-54, 152, 155

Interpretation

defi nition 144

Intuition

and expert judgment 69, 73-76, 79

and limits of prediction 70, 76, 79, 90

as automatic thinking 70, 74-75

cognitive processes 73, 75-76, 79

defi nition 69-70, 79

mental models of 70, 73-74
189

INDEX (Continued)

J

Judgment

and intuition 69, 73-76, 79

defi nition 69, 75

heuristic-based 42, 69, 73-76, 79

skill-based 69, 74-76, 79-80

skill-based example of 75, 80, 92

skill-based success in 75-76, 79-80

K

Kendall

and purpose of intelligence 44

Kent

and purpose of intelligence 44, 149

analytic framework of 7, 16, 46, 105

Cold War legacy of 6, 14

intelligence method of 6, 105, 123, 130

L

London subway bombing 64

M

Macrocognition 147, 152, 154-155

anticipation versus prediction 130

defi nition 129, 155

Marshaling 15, 37, 50-51, 101, 127, 152

defi nition 62

Mental model 16

defi nition 72-73

Metacognition and mindfulness xxvi

inverse relationship of xxvi

Microcognition 129-130

defi nition 130

Mindfulness

acquisition of xxv-xxvii, xxx, 129

and critical thinking xxvi-xxvii, xxix, xxxi, 8, 93, 123, 130-131

and here and now awareness xxviii

and intuitive judgment xxvii, 76, 93, 129
190

INDEX (Continued)

and meditation xxvi, xxx-xxxi

and sensemaking xxxi, 6, 8, 13, 76, 93, 123, 129-130, 152-154, 156

characteristics of xxv-xxviii, xxx-xxxi, 8

defi nition xxv-xxviii

example of xxv-xxviii, xxx

IC development of xxxi, 93

means of enhancing xxxi

responsibility of individual for xxvi, xxxi

Mindlessless

and relaxation xxv

defi nition xxiii

example of xxiii

fi xation on xxv

source of xxx

unacceptability of xxv, xxx

N

National Public Radio 11, 72

National Intelligence Council 6, 77, 81, 104, 106, 108, 155

Non-state actor xxi, 47, 49, 105-109, 111, 113-126, 128-130, 138-141, 

143-144

Africa examples 108-112, 117-118, 123, 141

and importance of environmental considerations 22, 107, 111, 113, 

117-118, 121, 127

defi nition 106

Iraq examples 107, 111, 119-120, 121, 124, 127

Normal intelligence 11, 37, 44-45, 47-49, 75

and incremental increase of knowledge xxv, 45

defi nition 45, 75

no revision of paradigm for 22, 45

purpose of 11, 44

P

Pandemic xxxv, 28-33

characterized as wicked problem 28-32

Paradigm shift xxi, 4, 47, 130, 149, 155-156

defi nition 48-49

reasons for 5, 47, 127
191

INDEX (Continued)

Planning

as emergent process xxx, 8, 52-53, 152, 155

as fl execution 52-54

as fl exible execution 52-53

defi nition 5, 51

for tame problems 51-52

Points of segmentation 119-121, 123, 129, 130, 144

defi nition 119-120

Iraq example 121

Policy failure

and Admiral H. Kimmel 13

example of 2, 12, 15, 48, 65

recurrence of 13-14, 48

Prediction

compulsive preoccupation with 44

critique of 44

more interesting than explanation 43

reasons for error in 57, 100

Prospect theory 121

defi nition 121

R

Rachel North 11, 64

Rigor

and explanation critique 135-145

and hypothesis exploration 131, 135-145

defi nition xviii, 133

in sensemaking xix, xxi, 8, 104, 106, 124, 131, 134, 137-138, 146-147

153-154, 156

in information search 134-146

in information synthesis 134-146

in information validation 136-146

metric for determining 133-147

sensitivity analysis and 136-146

specialist collaboration and 136-145

Rigor Metric

assessment of sensemaking 137, 146-147
192

INDEX (Continued)

S

Scientism 26, 131

Selective exposure 11-12, 20, 42, 101

Selective perception 11-12, 15, 20, 42, 101

Sensemaking

as macrocognitive activity 129-130, 147, 152, 154-155

cognition in x, 49-50, 87-88, 99, 129

components of 153

defi nition xxxv, 8-9

goals of 38, 53, 154

IARPA’s defi nition of 9, 105, 156

intuitive trianglation in 127, 134

role of 5, 63

use of evidence in 5, 8, 12, 62, 88, 98, 100-102, 125-127, 141

Skill-based judgment

intelligence success from 74-76

Space-time envelope of indeterminate causality 81-86

defi nition 81-83

Sustained-attention failure xxx

Synthesis xxxv, 63-64, 101-102, 104, 131, 134, 136, 139-145, 153, 155

defi nition 63

T

Tame problem 17-18, 21, 27-30, 36, 40-41, 51-52, 75, 107, 130

9/11 attacks as example of 107

defi nition 17, 52

Type 1 domain 80, 82, 88-89, 93, 130

intelligence example of 89

Type 2 domain 80-81, 89

intelligence example of 89

V

Validation of intelligence 99, 102-103, 136-146, 153

defi nition 95

insuffi ciency of current paradigm for 103

insuffi ciency of hindsight for xvii, 99

multiple method approach to 103-104, 144

replication and 98
193

INDEX (Continued)

W

Wicked problem 17-25, 27-36, 40-41, 51-54, 105-107, 122, 129-130, 133, 

144, 152-154

characteristics of 18-19

complexity of 33-36, 154

defi nition 18-19, 28

goal of sensemaking for 51-53, 154

pandemic as intelligence example of 28-33

195

COLOPHON

A colophon records the details of the layout and design of a pu

cation. It acknowledges the craft smanship and artistic sense required fo

attractive graphic representation of ideas. Whereas the acknowledgem

record the textual assistance an author receives, a colophon records 

equally important technical assistance received.

Th e text of this book was set in Minion Pro, an Adobe Origi

typeface designed by Robert Slimbach. It was inspired by classical old-s

typefaces of the late Renaissance, a period of elegant, beautiful, and hi

readable type designs. Minion Pro exhibits the aesthetic and functional qu

ties that make text type highly readable, yet is also suitable for display 

tings. Tables are presented in Neue Helvetica. Helvetica was develope

1957 by Max Miedinger with Eduard Hoff mann at the Haas’sche Sch

giesserei (Haas type foundry) of Münchenstein, Switzerland. Haas set ou

design a new sans-serif typeface that would compete well in the Swiss mar

and be suitable for a wide variety of signage. Aft er further development

typeface’s name was changed by Haas’ German parent company to Helve

(derived from Confoederatio Helvetica, the Latin name for Switzerland

make it more marketable internationally. Th is Neue Helvetica features a m

structurally unifi ed set of heights and widths.

Th is publication was written on an iMac and a Macbook Pro u

Microsoft Word. Typesetting was done using Adobe Systems InDesign. I

trations were prepared in Omni Systems Omni Graffl e and Adobe Photosh

Type fonts, as well as iMac, Macbook Pro, Acrobat, InDesign, O

Graffl e, and Photoshop are registered trademarks of their respective compan

Desktop composition by Joseph Gallagher.

Th e cover was designed by Bridgette White.

Published by the National Defense Intelligence College Press, M

2011. Printed at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.