### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 18, 200 5
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. PH ILLIP W. D AILE Y
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Blou nt County No. C14437 D. K elly Thomas, Jr ., Judge

No. E2004-01984-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Septem ber 2, 2005

Th e Ap pe lla nt, Phi lli p W. Da ile y , a pp e a ls the se ntencin g de c isi on of the B lou nt C ou nty

Cir c uit Court, which re sulted in the imposit ion of an e ffe ctive thre e-y ear sentenc e o f i ncar cer ation. On appea l, Dailey

challeng es the trial c ourt’s denia l of alternat i v e s en t encing. Af ter re view of the
rec ord, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.
Stacey Nordquist, Assistant District Public Def ender , Mary ville, Tenne ssee ( at trial); and Julie A. Rice, Appe llate Def

ender , Knoxvi l l e, Tenne ssee ( on appea l), for the Appellant, Phillip W ay ne D a i l e y.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B e njamin A. B a ll, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Ellen L . Be reze, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

I n May 2003, a B lount Count y

g rand jury

returne d an indictment ag ainst the App ellant char g ing him with two counts of a g g ravated assault. The indi ctments resulted from offe nses which
occur red on D ece mber 31, 2002.

On New Yea

rs Eve o f 2 0 0 2, Doug Moore, a Corporal with the B lount Count y Sheriff’ s Offic e, re sponded to a 911 hang up call at 3202 Wright’s Ferr y Road in L ouisvill e, Tennessee . Upon
arriving at the addr ess, Corpora l Moore saw Lucy Snider, the Appe llant’s ex-wife who wa s living with the Appellant, standing in the driveway in the rain. Snider reported that she had be en assaulted,
a ndMo or e ob se rv e d b loo d o n Sn ide r’ s li p a nd“ pu mp kno ts” on the ba ck of her he a d. At

tr ia l,-2-

Snider testified that her

ex-husband had bee n bickering w ith her all day over the cable and interne t bills and tha t w hen the Appellant came home from drinking a nd watching a UT g ame with his son around 8:00 or 8:30 P.M., he acc used her of having an af

fair and abruptly

flipped the c ircuit brea

ker pr ov idi ng po we r t o th e ir

apa rt me nt. Sni de r b e g g e d h im t o tu rn the po we r b a c k o n a nde ve ntu a lly flipped the switch back on herse lf. The Appellant ag ain t urned the brea ker off, and, as Snider beg an t o t u r n i t b a c k o n , t h e A p p e l l a n t h i t h e r a c r o s s t h e b a c k o f t h e h e a d w i t h a l ar g e m e ta l f la sh lig ht. Snider testified that the Appe llant then “g rabbe d me by my hair and y anked me back w ith one hand and hit me with the other, with the flashlig ht a g ain,” stating “I ’ll fix it so that y ou can’ t turn it back on.” He then started ja

bbing the circ uit br eake r with a larg e scr ewdriver. Snider wa s able to re trea t into the kitchen and dial 911, but the Appe llant y anked the phone out of he r hand and started hitting h erwi t h i t

. T h e A p p el l an tp u s h ed S n i d eri n t o t h e l i v i n g ro o m an d t h en o u t t h e f ro n td o o r y el l i n g, “I should fucking shoot y ou, bitch.”

After talking to Snider in the driveway , Corporal Moore enter ed the duplex where the Ap pe lla nt a ndSni de r l ive d. Mo ore ide nti fi e d h ims e lf a s a me mbe r o f the She ri ff ’s De pa rt me nt, called out the A ppellant’s name , and found the Appellant in the bathroom brushing his teeth. He told the Appellant to finish a nd to g o into the living room. Afte r consider able de lay , the Appellant finally stopped brushing his teeth and informed Moore that he was g oing to the bedr o o m

. The Appellant then, without warning, r ushed towar d Moore, a nd a st rug g le ensued. The two ended up
a g a ins t the wa sh e r a nd dry e r, wh e re Mo or e un su c c e ssf ull y a tte mpt e d to su bd ue the Ap pe lla nt w ith
a c he mic a l sp ray . A s Co rp or al Mo ore use d h is r a dio to c a ll f or ba c k- up , th e tw o, sti ll p hy sic a lly
e ng a g e d, mov e d in to the be dr oo m a g a ins t a wh ite pla sti c Ru bb e rm a id c he st o f dra we rs . A t so me point, the Appellant opene d the dra wer s and re moved a Ke l Tec nine milli meter pistol. Moore te sti fi e d, “ I

ha d a fl e e tin g tho ug ht at th a t e xac t se c on d, wa s I ’m g oin g to d ie in the ba c k be dr oo m in the dar k. And I g rabbe d his left hand - - his right ha nd, chicke n wing ed his fee t out from under him.” The two fe ll on t o t h e ch est of dra wer s, and Moore g rabbe d the Appellant’ s wrist and struck the Ap pe lla nt i n th e fa c e un til the Ap pe lla nt dro pp e d th e g un . A t th a t po int , M oo re tos se d th e pis tol to the side, handc uffe d the Appellant, a nd drug him into t he living r oom. On May 13, 2004, at the conc lusion of proof, the jury found the Appe llant guilty of one c ount of misdemeanor

assault of his ex -wife and one c ount of ag g ravated assault of Corpor al Moore. T he trial court se ntence d the Appellant to eleve n months and twenty -nine day s for assault and to three y ear s in the Depa

rtment of Corre ction for a g g ravated assault, ordering the sentenc es to run
concur rently

. The Appe llant appea ls this ruli ng , arg uing that “the trial c ourt err oneously interpre ted and applied a

pplicable law in deny ing . . . any form of a lternative se n t en ci ng for his ag g ravated assault.”

Ana lys is The Appe llant appea ls the trial court’s d enial of his re quest for a lternative se ntencing arg uing that the re cord doe s not support the court’s conclusion that the presumption in favor of alternative sentenc ing ha d been r ebutted and that the trial court failed to apply mitigating fac tors. He maintains that he should rec eive “ a sentence of split or periodic confine ment coupled with probation.” When-3-

a n a c c us e d c ha lle ng e s th e le ng th, ra ng e , o r m a nn e r o f the se rv ic e of a se nte nc e , this c ou rt ha s a du ty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sentenc e with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations made by the tr ia l c ou rt are c or

re c t. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ); State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The c ourt must consider the e vidence rec eived at the trial and sente ncing hearing, the pre- sentenc e re p o r

t, th e p rinciples of se ntencing , arg uments of counse l, the nature and cha rac teristics of the off ense, mitig ating and enhancing fac tors, statements m ade by the offe nder, a nd the potential for r ehabilitation. Ashby , 8 23 S.W. 2da t 16 8; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (2003). The burden of showing that the sentenc e is improper is upon the appealing party

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) , Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments.

A def endant c onvicted of a

Class C, D, or E felony and sentenc ed as an espec ially mitigated
or sta nd ardof

fe nd e r is “ pr e su me d to b e a fa vo ra ble c a nd idate fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing op tio ns in the abse nce of ev idence to the contra ry ." T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(6) (2003). Althoug h a defe ndant may

be pre sumed a fa vorable candidate for alternative sentenc ing, the def endant ha s the bu rd e n o f e sta

bli sh ing su ita

bil ity fo r t ota l pr ob a tio n. Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (b ) ( 20 03 ); Sta te v. Bog gs , 932 S.W .2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . Even thoug h probation must be automatically

considere d, “the de fenda nt is not au tomatically entitled to probation as a matter of la w. ” Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (b ), Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts ; State v. Hartley , 818 S.W .2d 370, 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). I n determining whe ther to g rant or de ny probation, a trial cour t s h o u ld consider the c ircumstance s of the off ense, the defe ndant’s criminal recor d, the defe ndant’s socia l history and pre sent condition, the nee d for deterre nce, and the best intere st of the defe ndant and the public. State v. Gre er , 5 6 8 S

. W

. 2 d 2 8 5 , 2 8 6 ( T e n n. 19 78 ); State v. Boy d , 925 S.W .2d 237, 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). A trial court must a cknowledg e one o f t h e f o l l o wi ng c on sid e ratio ns be fo re imp os ing a se nte nc e of

tot a l c on fi ne me nt:
(A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a

defe ndant who has
a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nec essary to a void de prec iating the seriousness of the offe nse or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to p ro vid e a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less restrictive than c onfinement ha ve fr equently or re cently

been
ap p li e d u n s u c c e s s f

u ll y to th e d e f

e n d a n t[

. ]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1) (2003).
We note that, as a Rang e I standard of

fende r convic ted of a

Class C felony , the Appell ant
rec eives a n in i t i al presumption in favor of alternative sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 102(5). The rec ord demonstra tes that the trial court a ffor ded the Appe llant this presumption at the sentenc in g h e ar in g

. T h e tria l c o u r t d e n ie d a lt e r n a ti v e s e n te n c in g n o ti n g : ( 1 ) “ th e e xtr e me d a ng er cre ated by

this offense” ; (2) the Appe llant’s “history . . . of dang erous thre at s o f homicide a nd suicide”; a nd (3) the A ppellant’s unlikely succe ss at reha

bilitation.-4-

With re g ardto the Ap pe lla nt’ s a rg ume nt c on c e rn ing t hetr ia l c ou rt ’s c on sid e ratio n o f h is unlikelihood of reha

bilitation, t his court has he ld that the potential or lac k of po t en t ial for reha b il it a ti o n is n o t r e le v a n t i n d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r a n a lt e r n a ti v e s e n te n c e s h o u ldb e g r anted. Ra the r, a s e xpre sse d in the la ng ua g e of Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 (5 ), it is rele vant only

in de termining which alternative option should be imposed following the g rant of an alternative sentenc e. State v. Dowdy , 894 S.W .2d 301, 306 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. The Appe llant also contends that the tria l court fa iled to consider a pplic able mit igating fac tors in determining the manner of ser vice of

his sentence

. He submi ts that sufficie nt proof wa s prese nted that “( 2) he a cted a fter strong and re peate d provocation fro m S n ider, (11) the circ umstances we re unusua l enoug h that it is l ikely he did not ha ve a sustained intent to violate the la w, (1 3) he ha s n o p ri or

c ri min a l hi sto ry , h a s be e n g a inf ull y e mpl oy e d f

or ov e r 2 0 y e ars a ndon ly since c onviction has had t ro u ble g etting a job, and has be en a c ontributing a nd valued membe r of society in Blount County

for y ear s.” See T en n

. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113 (2003). This court has previously

held that the mitigating a nd enhanc ing fac tors set forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated §§ 40 -3 5- 11 3, -1 14 (2 00 3) are re le va nt to the de te rm inatio n of wh e the r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing is appropriate. Sta te v . Ze oli a , 928 S.W .2d 457, 461 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (b )( 5) ); se e als o S tat e v. Bolling , 75 S.W .3d 418, 421 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) . Upon de novo revie w, we conclude , howeve r, t hat t he record does not support the application of miti g ating fac tors (2) or (11). Wit h reg ard to fac tor (13), a lthough the r ecor d does show that the Appe llant has been g ainfully

employ ed in the past, he is curre ntly unemploy ed.
The Appe llant arg ues t h at p arts (A) and ( C) of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35- 103(1) do not rebut his presumption in favor of alternative sente ncing . After revie w of the r ecor d, we conclud e th a t th e tria l c o u r t d idn o t b a s e it s d e c is io n o n e ith e r o f th e s e f a c to r s

. F r o m the comments of the trial court, we discern that the t rial court conclude d that confine ment was ne cessa ry to avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of the off ense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1) (B ).
Additionally , the Appellant contends that his c riminal conduct does not justi fy confine ment based on the seriousness of the offense. To deny probation or another alternative sentenc e base d on the se ri ou sn e ss o f the of

fe ns e , “ ‘the c ir c ums ta nc e s of the of fe ns e a s c omm itt e d mus t be e sp e c ia lly violent, horrify ing, shoc king, repr ehensible, offe nsive, or otherwise of an excessive or exag g erated deg ree ,’ and the nature of the off ense must outweig h all fac tors favoring” an alternative sente nce. State v. Bingham , 910 S.W .2d 448, 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting Hartley , 818 S.W .2d at 375). The A ppellant contends that Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-102(d)( 1), which
re qu ir e s th e c ou rt

to c on sid e r a s a n e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor that th e vic tim

of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult wa s a law enf orce ment office r, does not automatically make the a ssault “so shocking or re prehe nsible as to deny all possibili ty

of an a lternative se ntence .” We ag ree that a defe ndant’s criminal acts dire cted at a membe r of l aw enforceme nt alone do not pre vent a de fenda nt from re ceiving an alternative sentenc e; howeve r, we conclude that the trial court proper ly examined the evidenc e at trial and the sentenc ing he aring , which demonstrates that the Appe llant’s conduct was eg reg ious and repr ehensible. The Appellant stands convic ted of one count of a g g ravated assault in addition to one count of misdemea nor assault. He not only beat his e x -wife over the head and thre atene d to kill her-5-

but also armed himself w ith a nine m illim eter pistol and fought with the arresting office r. I ndeed, the Appellant a dmitted to another off icer that he intended to kill Co rp o ra l M o o re. Although the Appellant wa s presumed to be a favor able c andidate f or alternative sente ncing , see Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 02 (6 ), the pr oo f of his e xce ssi ve a nd e g re g iou s a c ts a g a ins t the vic tim s wa s su ff ic ie nt t o overc ome this presumption.

CO NC LU SION

Ba s ed u p o n t h e foreg oing, w e af firm the B lount Count y

Circuit Court’s imposi tion of an eff ective thr ee- y ear

sentenc e.

______________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE