FILED

November 19, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

ALEXANDER FRIEDMANN, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

)

) Davidson Chancery

VS. ) No. 96-3848-III

)

) Appeal No.

CHARLES BASS, et al., ) 01A01-9707-CH-00331

)

Defendants/Appellees. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE ELLEN HOBBS LYLE, CHANCELLOR

For the Plaintiff/Appellant: For the Defendants/Appellees:

Alexander Friedmann, Pro Se John Knox Walkup

Attorney General and Reporter

Michael E. Moore

Solicitor General

Sohnia W. Hong

Assistant Attorney General

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAMC.KOCH,JR.,JUDGE
1Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b) provides:

The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when

a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by

memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall

not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a subsequent

unrelated case.

2The Department of Correction’s administrative policies define “making an unauthorized

financial transaction” as “[t]he selling, borrowing or lending of goods (whether monies or property)

or services between inmates or between inmates and free-world persons. The entering into any

financial obligation between inmates or between inmates and free-world people without the consent

of the warden.” (underlining in the original).

-2-

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal involves a prison disciplinary proceeding. After being found guilty

of engaging in an unauthorized monetary transaction, the prisoner filed a petition for

common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County alleging

that the disciplinary proceeding violated his due process rights. The trial court

granted the prison officials’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition

on the ground that the petitioner had failed to make out a due process claim as a

matter of law. We affirm the summary judgment in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App.

R. 10(b).1

I.

Alexander Friedmann was transferred from the South Central Correctional

Center to the Lake County Regional Correctional Facility on August 28, 1996. On

September 18, 1996, prison officials charged him with engaging in an unauthorized

financial transaction2 after the discovery of a postal mail order bearing his name that

had been made payable to another prisoner at the South Central Correctional Center.

A disciplinary board convened at the Lake County Regional Correctional

Facility on September 20, 1996. After waiving his rights to the presence of a

reporting official and to call witnesses on his own behalf, Mr. Friedmann explained

to the board that his grandmother had sent the mail order to the inmate without his

knowledge to pay for the postage necessary to mail the personal property he had left

at the South Central Correctional Center. The board found Mr. Friedmann guilty of

the disciplinary offense and gave him a written warning and ordered him to forfeit the
3Mr. Friedmann asserts that the board also deducted eight days of his prisoner sentence

reduction credits; however, the prison officials insist that they did not, and the record contains no

evidence indicating that they did.

4Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, App. No. 01S01-9610-CH-00210, 1997 WL 693708,

at *2 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 1997).

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money order.3

After exhausting his appeals within the Department of Correction, Mr.

Friedmann filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court

for Davidson County asserting that the prison officials had denied his due process

rights by (1) finding him guilty of a disciplinary infraction without evidence, (2) by

conducting a disciplinary hearing at the Lake County Regional Correctional Facility

when the alleged offense occurred at the South Central Correctional Center, (3) by

preventing him from calling witnesses who could have proved his innocence, and (4)

by imposing punishment that was excessively harsh. The trial court granted the

prison officials’ motion for summary judgment after finding that Mr. Friedmann had

not demonstrated that the disciplinary proceedings had imposed on him any “atypical

and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

II.

The only vehicle for seeking judicialreview of a prison disciplinary proceeding

is a petition for common-law writ of certiorari. See Bishop v. Conley, 894 S.W.2d

294, 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed);

Snodgrass v. Noles, App. No. 02C01-9403-CC-00037, 1994WL328762, at *1 (Tenn.

Crim. App. July 8, 1994) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). These

proceedings permit courts to review a disciplinary proceeding only to determine

whether the disciplinary board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally,

fraudulently, or arbitrarily. The courts will not grant relief if the decision being

reviewed was arrived at in a constitutional and lawful manner. See Arnold v.

Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, ___ S.W.2d ___, ___ (Tenn. 1997);4 Powell v. Parole

Eligibility Review Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

Mr. Friedmann asserts that the disciplinary proceedings he was subjected to in

this case violated his procedural due process rights. In order to prevail with these

claims, he must demonstrate that the conduct of prison officials has imposed atypical
-4-

and significant hardships on him that are not ordinarily incident to prison life. See

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Prison

disciplinary proceedings are within the expected parameters of a prison sentence and

are an ordinary part of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S. Ct.

at 2301. 

We find nothing arbitrary or fundamentally improper in the decision to conduct

Mr. Friedmann’s disciplinary hearing at the Lake County Regional Correctional

Facility where he was incarcerated. Likewise, there is no evidence that Mr.

Friedmann was unfairly prevented from presenting favorable witnesses because he

signed a written waiver of this right to present witnesses. The disciplinary board had

before it sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a conclusion that Mr.

Friedmann had been involved in an unauthorized financial transaction, and the

punishment meted out by the board was consistent with the applicable disciplinary

regulations. Accordingly, we concur with the trial court’s decision to summarily

dismiss Mr. Friedmann’s petition.

III.

We affirm the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Friedmann’s petition and

remand the case to the trial court for whatever other proceedings may be required.

We also tax the costs of this appeal to Alexander Friedmann for which execution, if

necessary, may issue.

_____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

_________________________________

HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE

MIDDLE SECTION 

_________________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE