GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 1999 DRUG CONTROL

Assets DOD 

Contributes to 

Reducing the Illegal 

Drug Supply Have 

Declined

GAO/NSIAD-00-9

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Framework of Strategies Directs Department of 

Defense’s Counterdrug Efforts 29

Appendix II: Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, 

and Monitoring Assets 34

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 42

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense 44

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 47

Tables Table 1: Transshipment Area Flying Hours of Major DOD Aircraft 

Used for Counterdrug Missions, Fiscal Years 1992-99 15

Table 2: Inventory of Major DOD Equipment Available for 

Counterdrug Missions, Fiscal Years 1992-99 24

Table 3: Major DOD Airborne and Maritime Assets Used for 

Counterdrug Operations 34

Table 4: DOD Radar Assets Used for Counterdrug Operations 36

Figures Figure 1: Estimated 1998 Cocaine Flow to the United States 6

Figure 2: DOD’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Counterdrug Aircraft Support in Central and South America and 

the Caribbean, Fiscal Years 1997-99 12

Figure 3: DOD, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard Flight 

Hours Allocated to Tracking Illegal Drug Shipments in 

Transshipment Areas, Fiscal Years 1992-99 14

Figure 4: DOD and U.S. Coast Guard Counterdrug Ship Days, Fiscal 

Years 1992-99 16

Figure 5: DOD Forward Operating Locations and Sites 19

Figure 6: Major DOD and Interagency Counterdrug Strategies and 

Plans 29

Figure 7: Location of DOD-supported Regional Counterdrug 

Campaigns and Steady-state Operations 33

Figure 8: Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar Coverage 37

Figure 9: DOD's Radar Network Coverage on the U.S. Southern 

Border and in the Caribbean and Central America and South America 38

Figure 10: DOD Counterdrug Assets 40
Contents

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-283733 Letr

December 21, 1999

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control

United States Senate

The Honorable John L. Mica

Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,

 Drug Policy and Human Resources

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Illegal drugs, primarily cocaine and, increasingly, heroin from South 

America, continue to threaten the health and well-being of American 

citizens. The U.S. national counterdrug effort is directed by the five goals of 

the National Drug Control Strategy published by the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy. In 1998, approximately $16.1 billion was spent to 

support the strategy. The Department of Defense (DOD) plays an important 

role in U.S. efforts to interdict drugs in transit to the United States and to 

stop drugs at their source−two major goals of the National Drug Control 

Strategy. In 1998, DOD spent about $635 million to support these supply 

reduction efforts.1

DOD is the lead federal agency for detecting and monitoring maritime and 

aerial shipments of illegal drugs and provides assistance and training to 

foreign governments to combat drug-trafficking activities. DOD’s 

counterdrug activities are integrated with the international activities of 

other U.S. agencies such as the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the 

Drug Enforcement Administration and with foreign governments. These 

agencies and governments are largely responsible for the “end game”−the 

arrest of traffickers and the seizure of illicit drugs. Despite U.S. efforts to 

stem the flow of illicit drugs into the United States, the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy reported in 1999 that cocaine usage and price have 

been relatively stable throughout the 1990s.

1

National Drug Control Strategy, Budget Summary, Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1999). The amount excludes the value of excess defense articles, 

international military education and training, and foreign military sales programs DOD 

provides to foreign governments for counterdrug purposes. 
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You expressed concerns as to how DOD carries out its counterdrug 

mission. As requested, we examined (1) DOD’s plan for supporting U.S. 

counterdrug efforts and how DOD measures its effectiveness, (2) changes 

in the level of DOD support for counterdrug activities from fiscal year 1992 

through fiscal year 19992

 and the reasons for the changes, and (3) obstacles 

DOD faces in providing counterdrug assistance to foreign governments.

Results in Brief The Department of Defense has plans and strategies that support the goal 

of reducing the nation’s illegal drug supply as specified in the National Drug 

Control Strategy. DOD supports this goal by providing military personnel, 

detection and monitoring equipment, intelligence support, communication 

systems, and training. However, DOD has not yet developed a set of 

performance measures to assess its effectiveness in contributing to this 

goal but has taken some initial steps to develop such measures. These steps 

include the development of a database to capture information that can be 

used to assess the relative performance of DOD’s detection and monitoring 

assets.

DOD’s level of support to international drug control efforts has declined 

significantly since 1992. For example, the number of flight hours dedicated 

to detecting and monitoring illicit drug shipments declined from 

approximately 46,000 to 15,000, or 68 percent, from 1992 through 1999. 

Likewise, the number of ship days declined from about 4,800 to 1,800, or 

62 percent, over the same period. Some of the decline in air and maritime 

support has been partially offset by increased support provided by the U.S. 

Coast Guard and Customs Service. Nevertheless, DOD officials have stated 

that coverage in key, high-threat drug-trafficking areas in the Caribbean and 

in cocaine-producing countries is limited. The decline in assets DOD uses 

to carry out its counterdrug responsibilities is due to (1) the lower priority 

assigned to the counterdrug mission compared with that assigned to other 

military missions that might involve contact with hostile forces such as 

peacekeeping and (2) overall reductions in defense budgets and force 

levels. DOD officials believe that their operations are more efficient today 

than in the past and that this has partially offset the decline in assets 

available for counterdrug operations. Because of a lack of data, however, 

the impact of the reduced level of DOD support on drug trafficking is 

unknown.

2

This period was selected because data on DOD’s support for counterdrug activities was not 

available before 1992.
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DOD faces several challenges in providing counterdrug support to 

host-nation military and law enforcement organizations. These 

organizations often lack the capability to operate and repair equipment and 

effectively utilize training provided by the United States. In addition, DOD 

faces restrictions on providing training support to some foreign military 

units and sharing intelligence information with certain host-nation 

counterdrug organizations because of past evidence of human rights 

violations and corruption within these organizations.

We are recommending that DOD develop measures to assess the 

effectiveness of its counterdrug activities.

Background According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, almost 14 million 

Americans use illegal drugs regularly, and drug-related illness, death, and 

crime cost the nation approximately $110 billion annually. Between 1990 

and 1997, there were more than 100,000 drug-induced deaths in the United 

States. The United States consumes over 300 metric tons of cocaine per 

year. Coca is grown for market distribution almost exclusively in Bolivia, 

Colombia, and Peru (see fig. 1). Also, over the last 4 years, Colombia has 

supplied an increasing percentage of the heroin used in the United States.
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Figure 1: Estimated 1998 Cocaine Flow to the United States

Note: Percentage figures refer to total cocaine shipped through Central America, the Caribbean, or 

directly to the United States from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Mexico/Central America

corridor

Direct to the continental United States

Caribbean corridor

59%

321 Metric tons

30%

161 Metric tons

11%

59 Metric tons

Colombia

Peru

Bolivia
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In response to the threat, in 1995 the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

prepared a national drug control strategy that established goals to reduce 

drug demand and supply.3

 The strategy includes two supply reduction goals 

to reduce the flow of drugs entering the United States by 20 percent by 

2002. The two goals are to shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from 

the drug threat and to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

DOD initially became involved in counterdrug operations in the early 1980s 

and in 1988 was formally tasked by Congress to take the lead in detecting 

and monitoring illegal drug shipments and assisting domestic and foreign 

law enforcement agencies in interdicting them.4

 From fiscal year 1989 

through 1999, DOD spent over $10 billion for counterdrug activities. DOD 

primarily provides support by using equipment such as ships, patrol boats, 

aircraft, and radar to detect drug shipments in the transshipment areas 

from South America to the United States.5

3

 The Office of National Drug Control Policy was created in 1989 to establish a coherent 

national policy and to unify the more than 30 federal agencies and innumerable state and 

local authorities involved in counterdrug activities.

4

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989 (P.L.100-456 [Sept. 29,1988]).

5

In 1981 Congress enacted legislation authorizing DOD to provide certain types of assistance 

to civilian law enforcement agencies, and in 1990 Congress enacted legislation specifically 

intended for DOD support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (See 

10 U.S.C. 371-382 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 

respectively.) The 1981 legislation states that DOD shall prescribe regulations as may be 

necessary to ensure that any activity performed under this legislation shall not include or 

permit direct participation by a DOD member in a search, seizure, arrest, or similar activity, 

unless participation in such activity is otherwise authorized by law (10 U.S.C. 375). Also, 

DOD personnel are prohibited, with certain exceptions, from directly effecting an arrest in 

any foreign country as part of any foreign police action with respect to narcotic control 

efforts (22 U.S.C. 2291 (c)).
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The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 

Intensity Conflict has been designated as the DOD Coordinator for Drug 

Enforcement Policy and Support. The Coordinator is the principal staff 

assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for drug enforcement 

policy, requirements, priorities, systems, resources, and programs and 

serves as DOD’s liaison to the Office of National Drug Control Policy. DOD 

works closely with the other U.S. agencies involved in interdiction 

activities, such as the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Drug 

Enforcement Administration.6

 U.S. embassies are responsible for working 

with other federal agencies to formulate a comprehensive strategy for U.S. 

counterdrug activities within host nations that is consistent with the U.S. 

national drug strategy.

DOD’s Southern Command, one of DOD’s five combatant commands, has 

the lead role in counterdrug detection and monitoring in the area that 

includes Central and South America and the Caribbean. DOD’s Atlantic and 

Pacific Commands also support DOD counterdrug activities in their 

respective regions. Two counterdrug joint interagency task forces, East and 

West, come under the authority of the Southern and Pacific Commands, 

respectively. These task forces, comprised of personnel from the Army, the 

Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Customs 

Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, have primary responsibility for implementing international 

counterdrug detection and monitoring activities. Joint Interagency Task 

Force East takes the lead role in the coordination of efforts against the 

northward flow of drugs from South America, and Joint Interagency Task 

Force West takes the lead in the flow of drugs from Asia.

DOD provides support to domestic and foreign counterdrug organizations 

in the form of detection and monitoring, intelligence, and communication 

assets. DOD provides these assets from its existing inventory rather than 

purchasing new equipment. DOD also provides counterdrug support to 

host nations by supplying support services and training and allowing use of 

its facilities. In 1997, DOD provided Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia with 

assistance totaling about $44 million, $28 million, and $4 million, 

respectively. 

6

 The U.S. Customs Service and Coast Guard also conduct detection and monitoring 

activities.
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DOD’s Counterdrug 

Strategies Are Linked 

to the National 

Strategy, but DOD 

Lacks Measures of 

Effectiveness 

A framework of strategies and plans linked to the National Drug Control 

Strategy guides DOD’s counterdrug activities. DOD has not yet developed a 

set of performance measures to assess the impact of its counterdrug 

operations but has taken some steps to improve its ability to measure its 

performance. Without such measures, DOD cannot clearly assess the 

effectiveness of its strategy, operations, and limited counterdrug assets. 

A Framework of 

Counterdrug Strategies and 

Plans Guides DOD’s Efforts

National, headquarters, and command-level strategies and plans, all of 

which are linked to the National Drug Control Strategy, provide guidance 

for DOD’s counterdrug activities (see app. I for a complete description of 

these strategies and plans). These strategies and plans, drafted by various 

organizations within the national security system and proceeding from the 

President’s office down to field commanders, guide DOD’s counterdrug 

operations. Each strategy or plan is crafted for a specific purpose and 

supports the higher-level strategies above it. The national security, military, 

and drug control strategies describe the broad policy goals and objectives 

the nation wants to achieve in combating illegal drugs. In addition, they 

place counterdrug activities within the context of the nation’s overall 

national security concerns and provide a rationale for DOD’s involvement. 

DOD’s Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support has developed a 

5-year counterdrug plan based on the goals of the National Drug Control 

Strategy. The plan broadly describes the military personnel, detection and 

monitoring assets, intelligence support, communication systems, and 

training DOD will provide to domestic law enforcement agencies and 

foreign counterdrug military and police forces to implement the National 

Drug Control Strategy’s supply reduction goals. Regional commanders in 

the field develop more detailed strategies and plans. For example, the U.S. 

Southern Command’s latest counterdrug campaign plan, completed in 

August 1999, describes the illicit drug threat, the command’s counterdrug 

mission, objectives intended to counter the threat, and some of the key 

resources available to achieve the plan’s objectives. In addition, the plan 

reflects changes that have occurred in the illicit drug threat, the level of 

available assets, and the command’s location and geographic area of 

responsibility since 1992 when the command’s prior plan was issued. 

According to a Southern Command official, a new plan was needed to 

provide a framework for conducting operations over the long term, to 
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better focus limited assets, to define future requirements, and to improve 

interagency coordination. 

The campaign plan is based on the assumption that the assets required to 

achieve Southern Command’s counterdrug objectives will be available. 

However, DOD officials noted that the level of counterdrug assets will 

continue to be constrained by DOD’s requirement to satisfy other higher 

priority missions; consequently, the assets may not be available.

DOD Has Not Developed 

Performance Measures 

DOD has not developed a set of performance measures to evaluate its 

counterdrug activities as part of its counterdrug strategies; however, it has 

taken steps that may help it develop performance measures. Such 

measures could help DOD determine the effectiveness of its counterdrug 

operations and make better use of limited intelligence, detection, and 

monitoring assets. The 1993 Government Performance and Results Act 

incorporates performance measurement as one of its most important 

features.7

 Under the act, executive branch agencies are required to develop 

annual performance plans that use performance measurement to reinforce 

the connection between the long-term strategic goals outlined in their 

strategic plans and their day-to-day activities. DOD designated the 1997 

Quadrennial Defense Review as its overall strategic planning document for 

the purpose of satisfying the requirements of the Results Act. The 

Quadrennial Review identifies DOD’s support role in reducing the 

production and flow of illegal drugs to the United States as a subset of the 

overall DOD strategy of “shaping the international environment.”

According to DOD, although the Department has not developed its own 

performance measures, it supports the goals and measures of the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy. However, we found that the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy’s measures are intended to determine 

progress in achieving national counterdrug-related goals, not to measure 

the performance of the individual federal agencies that implement U.S. 

counterdrug activities. None of the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s 

measures relates directly to DOD’s current detection and monitoring 

efforts.

According to DOD officials, DOD is working with the joint interagency task 

forces to help them develop performance measures and that it will use its 

7

P. L. 103-62 (Aug. 3, 1993).
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Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base to help judge the performance of its 

detection and monitoring assets. DOD officials believe these initial steps 

will enable them to begin the process of establishing departmentwide 

counterdrug performance measures.

DOD’s Support to 

Counterdrug Efforts 

Has Declined 

DOD’s support of U.S. intelligence, detection, and monitoring of illegal drug 

shipments declined from fiscal years 1992 through 1999. Specifically, the 

number of flight hours and ship days DOD dedicated to detecting and 

monitoring drug trafficking in primary drug-trafficking routes to the United 

States dropped. In addition, interdiction support in cocaine source 

countries has also declined in recent years. Consequently, coverage of key 

drug-trafficking routes to the United States is limited. DOD attributes the 

decline to the low priority assigned to the counterdrug mission compared 

with that assigned to other missions, as well as to decreases in its overall 

budget. Although they had not developed any supporting data, DOD 

officials believe their operations are more efficient today than in the past 

and that this has partially offset the decline in assets available for 

counterdrug operations. The officials cited a better understanding of the 

drug threat, the addition of Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar systems 

that provide increased wide-area surveillance of airborne targets, and 

enhanced cooperation with U.S. and host-nation organizations as factors 

contributing to more efficient operations. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance Flights 

Have Declined

Effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations are 

critical to the U.S. international counterdrug efforts. DOD uses intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft to provide timely and focused 

intelligence information to forces involved in detection, monitoring, and 

interdiction. The assets collect signals, imagery, and measurement and 

signature intelligence.8

 DOD officials told us that without a robust 

intelligence collection capability, the U.S.’ ability to locate and identify drug 

production facilities, airfields, and trafficking patterns is greatly reduced. 

As shown in figure 2, the number of intelligence collection flights 

8

Signals intelligence comprises all communications, electronic, and foreign government 

instrumentation intelligence, however transmitted. Imagery intelligence involves the 

production of images from visual photography, lasers, electro-optics, and infrared and radar 

sensors. Measurement and signature intelligence is the scientific and technical information 

obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from sensors for the 

purpose of identifying a target’s features. 
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decreased by over 30 percent from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 in Central 

and South America and the Caribbean, while Southern Command’s 

requirements increased. DOD could only meet 43 percent of U.S. Southern 

Command’s requests for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

flights in fiscal year 1999.

Figure 2: DOD’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Counterdrug 

Aircraft Support in Central and South America and the Caribbean, Fiscal Years 

1997-99

Note: Data prior to 1997 was not available.

Source: U.S. Southern Command.

According to the Southern Command Commander, “significant deficiencies 

in the availability of required assets” impede the command’s ability to react 

quickly and effectively to changes in drug traffickers’ patterns throughout 
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the region. For example, U.S. embassy officials in Peru told us that 

shortages of intelligence assets are a problem there. The United States uses 

reconnaissance assets to collect information that helps analysts 

understand the drug-trafficking threat and traffickers’ trends. According to 

embassy officials in Peru, reconnaissance assets have only been used once 

in Peru in recent years. Results from this reconnaissance activity were 

limited because of (1) the amount of time the assets were available, (2) the 

distraction of assisting ongoing humanitarian operations outside of Peru, 

and (3) a scheduled maintenance period that occurred during the time the 

assets were in Peru. Consequently, while the information provided by the 

reconnaissance assets was useful, it was of limited quantity. The embassy 

would like more frequent deployments of longer duration in the future.

DOD Detection and 

Monitoring Support Has 

Been Reduced

Early detection and continuous tracking of air and surface vessels 

suspected of drug trafficking are key aspects of U.S. interdiction efforts. 

Although DOD has a lead role in this task, its contribution in terms of flying 

hours and ship days has decreased since its peak in fiscal year 1992. As 

shown in figure 3, flying hours dedicated to tracking suspect shipments in 

transit to the United States declined from 46,264 to 14,770, or 68 percent, 

from fiscal years 1992 through 1999. Some of the reduction in aerial 

support can be attributed to the shift in drug trafficking from aerial to 

maritime methods.9

 In addition, as shown in figure 3, increases in the U.S. 

Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard aircraft flight hours have offset 

some of the decline in DOD’s flight hours during this period.10 DOD officials 

stated that the Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar systems, introduced in 

1994 and 1995, improved their ability to detect airborne drug trafficking by 

providing near 24-hour, wide-area surveillance. However, the radar systems 

lack the capability to provide data on the precise location of air targets and 

provide only limited surveillance of maritime drug traffic. 

9

 Beginning in fiscal year 1993 and continuing through fiscal year 1998, cocaine traffickers 

increased their reliance on maritime vessels rather than aircraft. During this period, air 

drug-trafficking events decreased by 42 percent, while maritime events increased by 55 

percent.

10 The increase, due in part to congressional funding decisions to enhance law enforcement 

interdiction capabilities, was not planned as a direct response to DOD reductions.
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Figure 3: DOD, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard Flight Hours Allocated 

to Tracking Illegal Drug Shipments in Transshipment Areas, Fiscal Years 1992-99

Note: U.S. Customs Service data prior to 1993 was not available.

Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard.

As shown in table 1, reductions in flight hours occurred in most classes of 

aircraft. See appendix II for descriptions of DOD’s counterdrug detection 

and monitoring assets.
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Table 1: Transshipment Area Flying Hours of Major DOD Aircraft Used for 

Counterdrug Missions, Fiscal Years 1992-99

Legend: AEW=Airborne Early Warning

Note: Flight hours in the table do not reflect all DOD assets included in figure 3.

Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West.

Despite the shift in trafficking methods from primarily airborne to 

maritime, the number of DOD ship days devoted to supporting interdiction 

of suspected maritime illegal drug shipments declined 62 percent from 1992 

through 1999 (see fig. 4). Declines occurred in several key vessel types 

employed by DOD. For example, ship days for DOD cruisers declined from 

558 in fiscal year 1992 to 183 in fiscal year 1999. These declines in maritime 

interdiction were partially offset by the increase in U.S. Coast Guard ship 

days during the same period.

Aircraft 1992 1999

Percent change

1992-99

Navy P-3C 23,254 8,321 -64

Navy E-2 (AEW) 7,334 3,154 -57

Air Force F-15/16 574 638 +11

Air Force E-3 2,734 544 -80

Air Force KC-135 995 291 -71

Navy S-3 1,644 0 -100

Navy SH2F 2,876 640 -78

Navy SH60B 4,611 1182 -74
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Figure 4: DOD and U.S. Coast Guard Counterdrug Ship Days, Fiscal Years 1992-99

Note: “Ship Day” refers to each day a ship was working on counterdrug efforts.

Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West and U.S. Coast Guard.

Limited Coverage in Key 

Drug-trafficking Areas

Although DOD’s 5-year counterdrug plan states that DOD will ensure that 

sufficient assets are allocated to support domestic and foreign counterdrug 

agencies, DOD officials indicated that there are gaps in coverage of highthreat drug-trafficking routes in South America and transit routes to the 

United States. According to the Southern Command Commander, the 

command can only detect and monitor 15 percent of key routes in the 

overall drug-trafficking area about 15 percent of the time. This has been a 

continuing problem. Consequently, illegal drug shipments to the United 
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States can go largely undetected. Further exacerbating DOD’s declining 

support was the closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama in May 1999. 

The base provided the logistical and tactical infrastructure for launching 

counterdrug flight missions to South and Central America and the 

Caribbean. 

Gaps in Monitoring Illegal Drug 

Production and Shipment in 

Source Countries

Reductions have occurred in DOD’s air coverage to support the interdiction 

of drugs in the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Between 

fiscal years 1998 and 1999, detection and monitoring flight hours over these 

source countries declined from 2,092 to 1,090, or 48 percent.11

According to embassy officials, reduced aerial support to monitor and 

track cocaine shipments within the source countries has hurt U.S. efforts to 

sustain a previously successful interdiction program focused on 

transshipment routes between Peru and Colombia. In 1995, the Peruvian 

Air Force began a program to disrupt air shipments of cocaine base12 from 

Peru to Colombia. The program, the Air Bridge Denial Program, used DOD 

and other U.S. intelligence and radar data to locate suspect aircraft, which 

were then intercepted and either shot down or grounded by the Peruvian 

Air Force. As air trafficking dropped, a surplus of cocaine base developed; 

consequently, cultivation dropped as coca base prices declined. According 

to a State Department report,13 the interception of aircraft was a major 

factor in suppressing cocaine base prices to levels below farmers’ 

production costs. The report further states that as a consequence, farmers 

abandoned coca fields because they found coca farming no longer 

profitable. 

However, since late 1997, U.S. aerial support for the program has declined. 

U.S. officials in Peru told us that there has been little or no U.S. airborne 

intelligence or surveillance of air traffic routes between Peru and Colombia 

since 1997, even though recent changes in smuggling tactics and 

communications have made sophisticated airborne surveillance 

increasingly important. The U.S. Ambassador to Peru warned in an October 

1998 letter to the State Department that the reduction in air support could 

11Data prior to fiscal year 1998 was not available. 

12Cocaine base is partially refined cocaine. Final refinement of cocaine base occurs in 

Colombia. 

13 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 

State, 1997-98).
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have a serious impact on the price of coca. According to the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy, coca cultivation and price in Peru have risen 

over the past year.

With the runway closed at Howard Air Force Base in Panama on May 1, 

1999, DOD said that its and other U.S. counterdrug agencies’ aerial 

detection and monitoring coverage would be significantly reduced if not 

replicated by other means. Howard Air Force Base provided a position 

close to cocaine-producing countries for launching U.S. counterdrug 

aircraft. To offset the loss of Howard, DOD is establishing three “forward 

operating” locations for U.S. aerial detection and interdiction assets in 

Aruba/Curacao, Netherlands Antilles; Manta, Ecuador; and a third location 

in Central America. The forward operating locations were established 

through temporary agreements with the governments of Ecuador and the 

Netherlands. The United States signed a long-term agreement (10-year 

initial term) with Ecuador in November 1999 and is negotiating a long-term 

agreement with the Netherlands for continuous operations from these 

locations. The forward operating locations will provide a 24-hour, 7-day 

operational capability, including runways, ramp space, maintenance 

facilities, refueling and service capability, force protection, and support 

services for personnel and aircrews. DOD also has other forward operating 

sites throughout the Caribbean and in Central and South America that 

supplement the three forward operating locations by providing refueling, 

logistical services, and emergency landing rights (see fig. 5 for site 

locations). 
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Figure 5: DOD Forward Operating Locations and Sites

Source: DOD.

Belize

Cayman

 San Jose, Costa Rica

 Chiclayo

Lima

Curacao/Aruba

Central America

(to be determined)

Manta,

Ecuador

Guantanamo, Cuba

Forward operating site 

Forward operating location 

Venezuela

Colombia

Peru

Bolivia

Howard Air Force Base 

Howard Air Force

Base, Panama 
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DOD conducts regular detection and monitoring flights over transit routes 

from Aruba/Curacao and Manta, but it is not currently conducting as many 

flights in source countries from these locations as it historically conducted 

from Howard Air Force Base. The main contributing factor is that Manta 

currently accommodates only one P-3 aircraft. Safety upgrades to Manta’s 

facilities scheduled over the next 5 months will allow for multi-aircraft 

operations, to include U.S. Customs Service Airborne Early Warning and 

other aircraft. Additional upgrades to Manta during fiscal year 2001 will 

allow larger U.S. Air Force Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems 

aircraft to operate throughout cocaine-producing countries. DOD stated 

that once Congress appropriates the funds, it would take 2 years to fully 

upgrade Manta. DOD officials told us that a Relocatable Over-The-Horizon 

Radar system in Puerto Rico, scheduled to be operational by February 

2000, would extend into the source region, allowing for more efficient use 

of limited airborne surveillance assets by providing information on specific 

targets and identifying drug-trafficking trends.14 In addition, while 

agreements between the United States and Venezuela for overflight exist, 

since June 1999 the Venezuelan government has only allowed a very limited 

number of U.S. counterdrug aircraft to fly over its territory. DOD officials 

told us that unless overflights are allowed, its aerial surveillance support 

would be reduced for cocaine source countries. 

Gaps in the Transit Zone DOD has been unable to sustain operational support in a key threat area in 

the Eastern Pacific. The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimated 

in 1998 that 33 percent of the illegal drugs shipped to the United States 

transits this area. In 1996, DOD supported a successful operation, called 

Caper Focus, but was unable to sustain the effort due to a lack of available 

assets. During the operation, Joint Interagency Task Force East 

temporarily shifted about 200 flight hours and two ships per month from 

the Caribbean to the Eastern Pacific. As a result of the temporary 

operation, 27 metric tons of cocaine were seized or jettisoned. Prior to the 

operation, few seizures had been made. However, according to DOD, it was 

unable to sustain the operation during 1997 and 1998 because of 

insufficient flight hours. In fiscal year 1999, Congress provided $6 million in 

additional funds to DOD for renewed operational support to the Eastern 

14 DOD operates two Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar, located in Virginia and Texas, 

which provide wide-area coverage to detect suspect aircraft (mostly in the Caribbean). The 

radar sites do not provide coverage into key trafficking areas in cocaine producing 

countries. Appendix II provides additional information on DOD’s counterdrug radar 

facilities. 
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Pacific. The funds were used to gather intelligence to assess the threat and 

modes of transportation and to design operations to interdict illegal drug 

shipments. In June and August 1999, DOD and U.S. agencies helped 

host-nation authorities seize over 16 metric tons of cocaine.

Better Understanding of Drug 

Threat and Cooperation Cited

DOD officials stated that its reduced support to the counterdrug effort has 

hampered coverage in key drug-trafficking routes. However, they also 

believe that DOD’s counterdrug efforts are more efficient today than in the 

past. The officials cited a better understanding of the drug threat by U.S. 

counterdrug organizations and improved coordination between U.S. and 

host nations’ counterdrug organizations as factors that have contributed to 

increased efficiency. For example, host nations have cooperated with Joint 

Interagency Task Force East in planning and conducting regional 

counterdrug operations. 

Joint Interagency Task Force East officials told us their work with host 

governments in Central America and the Caribbean resulted in several drug 

seizures in 1999. For example, Panama supported the United States in the 

seizure of 27 kilograms of cocaine off the Panamanian coast. In addition, 

Panamanian and Nicaraguan law enforcement officials eradicated 1.7 

million marijuana plants in 1999. DOD did not provide any data to 

demonstrate the degree to which DOD detection and monitoring support 

had contributed to these improvements. See appendix I for the locations of 

the Joint Interagency Task Force East/DOD-supported operations.

Low Priority of the 

Counterdrug Mission Limits 

DOD Assets Available for 

Detection and Monitoring

The lower priority assigned by DOD to the counterdrug mission in 

comparison to other missions reduces the availability of detection and 

monitoring assets for counterdrug operations. In 1989, the Secretary of 

Defense issued guidance stating that: 

“the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high 

priority national security mission...[and] the Department of Defense will work to advance 

substantially the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs to the United States 

through the effective application of available resources....” 
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DOD does not purchase major equipment such as aircraft and ships 

specifically for the counterdrug mission. Rather, it carries out counterdrug 

operations using assets that are purchased primarily for other missions. 

DOD categorizes some of the assets that it uses for counterdrug operations 

as low-density, high-demand assets.15 DOD policy that sets priorities for the 

use of its low-density, high-demand assets states that the counterdrug 

mission is the fourth priority after war, other military operations that might 

involve contact with hostile forces such as peacekeeping, and training.

Due to the lower priority assigned to the counterdrug mission, DOD 

allocates assets to counterdrug detection and monitoring operations after it 

meets the requirements for higher-priority missions. DOD develops 

standing orders that specify the number and types of equipment it expects 

to be available for counterdrug operations on a continuous basis. However, 

commands that provide counterdrug assets can request “relief” from 

standing counterdrug orders when higher-priority missions arise. For 

example, although DOD usually commits two airborne warning and control 

systems aircraft to the counterdrug mission, one aircraft was reassigned in 

January 1999 to support the Iraqi no-fly zone (Operation Southern Watch) 

and then in April 1999 for the Kosovo crisis. The aircraft has not yet 

returned to the counterdrug mission. Further, although Southern 

Command’s new counterdrug campaign plan defines detection and 

monitoring resource requirements, according to a Southern Command 

official, the DOD resource requirements contained in the plan are 

constrained by the level of assets DOD has determined are available for the 

counterdrug effort after considering other requirements. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff officials told us that the level of assets DOD commits to counterdrug 

activities is unlikely to change because DOD’s inventory of assets for 

detection and monitoring is not growing, and the priority of the 

counterdrug mission in comparison to other missions is unlikely to change. 

15According to DOD policy, low-density, high-demand assets are “major platforms, weapons 

systems, units, and/or personnel that possess unique mission capabilities and are in 

continual high demand to support worldwide joint military operations.”
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Funding and Equipment 

Levels Have Declined Since 

the Early 1990s

DOD’s counterdrug budget has generally declined since 1993. At the same 

time, the inventory of important counterdrug assets has also declined. DOD 

experienced initial funding increases in the early 1990s. However, from 

fiscal years 1993 through 1999, DOD’s counterdrug budget declined from 

$1.3 billion to $975 million, or 24 percent. The funds are used to support 

military training deployments, radar systems, aircraft, ships, and command 

and communications systems. DOD’s overall budget declined by 

approximately 14 percent during this period, from $300 billion in fiscal year 

1993 to about $260 billion in fiscal year 1999.16

DOD spends about 75 percent of its counterdrug funds on drug supply 

reduction goals to support the interdiction of drugs in cocaine source 

countries and in transit to the United States. The remaining 25 percent are 

spent on the domestic and demand reduction goals of the National Drug 

Control Strategy.17 The funds support law enforcement interdiction efforts 

in the United States through the use of active duty military and reserve 

components for intelligence, transportation, and training. Funds are also 

used for education and awareness programs and drug testing.

In addition to decreases in the budget, DOD officials told us that the overall 

inventory of defense equipment that can be used for counterdrug purposes 

has declined as a result of the post-Cold War drawdown of U.S. forces. 

Between 1989 and 1999, DOD made force reductions that included an 

active military personnel reduction of about 35 percent and corresponding 

reductions in equipment levels. For example, DOD reduced the number of 

naval ships by 44 percent from 562 in fiscal year 1989 to 317 ships in fiscal 

year 1999. As shown in table 2, the inventory of some of DOD’s important 

detection and monitoring assets also declined from fiscal years 1992 

through 1999. 

16 All figures are in 1999 constant dollars.

17 Data on the budget for reducing the drug supply was only available from fiscal years 1996 

through 1999.
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Table 2: Inventory of Major DOD Equipment Available for Counterdrug Missions, 

Fiscal Years 1992-99

Legend: AEW=Airborne Early Warning

a

Data is through June 1999.

Source: DOD.

Challenges to DOD’s 

Support of HostNations’ Counterdrug 

Efforts

DOD provides a variety of support, such as detection and monitoring, 

training, logistics, and equipment, to assist host nations’ counterdrug 

efforts. In 1997, DOD spent over $459 million on this type of assistance 

worldwide. In doing so, it faces several challenges, including (1) the limited 

capability of host nations to operate and repair equipment or to effectively 

utilize training provided by the United States, (2) host-nation difficulties in 

meeting U.S. eligibility conditions for providing training aid to military 

units, and (3) U.S. restrictions on sharing intelligence with some hostnation counterdrug organizations.

Maintenance of Equipment 

and Utilization of Training 

Although DOD has provided equipment and training to a number of hostnation counterdrug organizations, these organizations have not always 

been able to utilize this assistance. For example, Congress has 

appropriated $89 million over 5 years (1998-2002) for a program to interdict 

drug shipments on the rivers of Colombia and Peru. The program is 

designed to develop counterdrug forces dedicated to operations on 

Colombian and Peruvian rivers and includes provisions for training, boats, 

and floating maintenance facilities and support bases. However, according 

to U.S. embassy officials in Peru, the Peruvian police (the lead agency for 

counterdrug enforcement) does not have maintenance capabilities or 

adequately trained staff to manage its own or U.S.-provided boats designed 

for river operations. Embassy officials told us that 8 of 16 boats the police 

purchased with its own funds in 1998 quickly became inoperable because 

the boats were accidentally beached when water levels dropped, and 

Peruvian police lacked the knowledge and/or parts to repair them.

Asset type 1992 1999a

Percent change

1992-99

Navy P-3C 255 244 -04

Navy E-2 AEW 115 71 -38

Air Force F-15/16 974 735 -25
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A February 1999 DOD memorandum on support to the Peruvian police 

stated that the police lacked the will and skills to maintain the boats. 

Peruvian police officials told us they do not have the budget resources to 

assume responsibility for spare parts and maintenance by January 2000, as 

required by the program agreement between the United States and Peru. 

Further, Drug Enforcement Administration officials told us that the 

Peruvian police force does not traditionally dedicate officers to specific 

tasks or missions and concluded that the objectives of the program may not 

be met. DOD officials told us that they are working with the Peruvian 

police to improve the situation. 

Restrictions on Assistance Human rights concerns also limit DOD’s counterdrug assistance to foreign 

governments. U.S. law prohibits U.S. counterdrug assistance to personnel 

or units in foreign countries that have credible evidence against them of 

gross human rights violations.18 We previously reported that U.S. officials 

had raised concerns about human rights problems with Colombian and 

Peruvian military and police units and that efforts were underway to 

overcome the problems.19 According to State Department officials, these 

concerns have since increased. U.S. embassy personnel in Colombia told us 

that it would be difficult to provide support for counterdrug efforts to the 

Colombian military unless its units pass State Department screening for 

human rights abuses. However, only three of six army brigades operating in 

drug-trafficking areas passed the screening.20

Limitations on Intelligence 

Sharing 

Concerns over evidence of corruption within foreign government 

counternarcotics units have caused the United States to limit the amount of 

intelligence information it will share with other governments. 

Consequently, although DOD may develop information on suspected drugtrafficking targets, it cannot always provide the information to the host 

nation. Intelligence obtained by the United States is a crucial element in 

counterdrug operations in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Some cooperation 

1822 U.S.C. 2304 (a)(2)

19Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 

30, 1991) and Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru

(GAO/T/NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992).

20Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow (GAO/NSIAD-99-136, 

June 22, 1999).
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is occurring. For example, in 1999 the United States signed an agreement 

with Mexico to increase intelligence sharing on law enforcement activities. 

Joint Interagency Task Force West officials told us that there have been 

some improvements in the way they share information with Mexico on the 

eastern Pacific area. Mexican counterdrug forces now receive more timely 

data on the presence and movement of vessels suspected of carrying illicit 

drugs.

In Peru, U.S. officials collect intelligence, analyze it, and pass it on to the 

Peruvian military. However, U.S. officials there told us they are not 

sufficiently staffed to carry out this task and have therefore been unable to 

build a sufficient base of intelligence information needed for effective 

operations. In Colombia, where DOD can share information on insurgent 

activity if it is directly related to an approved counterdrug operation, U.S. 

embassy officials sometimes have difficulty distinguishing insurgents from 

drug traffickers.

Conclusions Due to reductions in budgets, force structure, and the lower priority 

accorded to the counterdrug mission, the assets DOD provides to the 

interagency counterdrug effort have declined. After a decade of effort, 

DOD has not developed counterdrug performance measures. Without such 

measures, DOD cannot clearly assess the effectiveness of its strategy, 

operations, and the assets it contributes to the national drug control effort.

Recommendation In order for DOD to analyze and report on the relative effectiveness of its 

counterdrug detection and monitoring efforts on a consistent basis, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that DOD’s Office for Drug 

Enforcement Policy and Support coordinate with the joint interagency task 

forces and the Office of National Drug Control Policy to develop a set of 

performance measures for assessing DOD’s contributions to U.S. 

counterdrug operations.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD partially 

concurred with the report, and agreed that the Department needs to 

develop measures of effectiveness for its counterdrug operations. DOD has 

taken some initial steps to improve its ability to measure its performance 

that we discuss in our report. However, DOD has not yet developed specific 

measures of effectiveness. Our recommendation is intended to encourage 
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DOD to take further steps to develop a set of performance measures as part 

of its counterdrug strategies. For example, one performance measure 

might be to determine how often DOD detects known cocaine shipments 

and the percentage of detected shipments successfully handed off to law 

enforcement organizations. Analyzing trends in such measures could help 

DOD better evaluate the effectiveness of its contributions to the national 

drug control effort. 

DOD stated that it has taken aggressive action to meet its detection and 

monitoring responsibilities but that it has no law enforcement role in the 

U.S. counterdrug effort. DOD stated that its mission is to support the 

efforts of law enforcement agencies and that it should not be evaluated 

based on the success or failure of these agencies’ arrests or drug seizures. 

DOD noted that it has consistently applied available assets to detect and 

monitor illegal drug shipments. However, DOD pointed out that the number 

of available assets for counterdrug operations was affected by significant 

reductions in force structure, including the 44-percent decline in naval 

vessels from 1989 through1999. Further, DOD stated that the introduction 

of the Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar system and the efforts of other 

U.S. agencies have partially offset the decline in available assets.

Our report clearly defines DOD’s counterdrug support role and does not 

attempt to evaluate DOD’s contributions based on the level of arrests or 

drug seizures. Our analysis focuses on the unique detection, monitoring, 

and intelligence assets DOD contributes to the law enforcement 

community. The report accurately describes the decline in the level of 

assets DOD has made available to the U.S. counterdrug effort, the reasons 

for the decline, the capabilities of the Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar, 

and the involvement of other agencies. While DOD states that it has 

consistently applied available resources in areas where drugs are produced 

and shipped, our report clearly demonstrates that gaps in detection, 

monitoring, and intelligence coverage exist in these areas. For example, as 

we note in the report, DOD was unable to sustain operations in two high 

threat areas, the Eastern Pacific and the transshipment area between Peru 

and Colombia, due to a lack of resources devoted to the counterdrug 

mission.

DOD also stated that our discussion of the lack of intelligence assets in 

cocaine-producing areas is not supported by empirical evidence. Further, 

DOD questioned whether the intelligence community would agree that 

there is a need for additional airborne intelligence assets in cocaineproducing areas and Peru, specifically. Our discussion of DOD intelligence 
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support in the region is based on documents from DOD, Department of 

State, and other agencies. We corroborated the information with a wide 

range of officials from the U.S. Mission in Peru and the U.S. Southern 

Command. Further, we note that in congressional testimony the 

Commander of the U.S. Southern Command stated that significant 

deficiencies in the availability of intelligence assets impede the command’s 

ability to react to the drug threat. Therefore, we believe the report is 

accurate and we have made no changes.

The comments provided by DOD are reprinted in appendix IV. DOD 

officials also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in 

the report as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, the 

Secretary of Defense, and to interested congressional committees. Copies 

will also be made available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call 

me at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

listed in appendix V. 

Jess T. Ford 

Associate Director,

International Relations and Trade Issues
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Appendix I

Framework of Strategies Directs Department Apendxies

of Defense’s Counterdrug Efforts ApendxIi

A framework of national; U.S. embassy; Department of Defense (DOD); and 

command-level strategic, operational, and tactical plans and strategies 

exist to guide DOD’s counterdrug activities. Figure 6 provides a schematic 

of the hierarchy of these strategies and plans. 

Figure 6: Major DOD and Interagency Counterdrug Strategies and Plans

Source: Office of the President, DOD, Office of National Drug Control Policy, and Joint Interagency 

Task Force East.
Appendix I

Framework of Strategies Directs Department 

of Defense’s Counterdrug Efforts

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

National Strategies The national security strategy presents the core national security 

objectives of the United States and includes counterdrug activities as one 

of a wide range of initiatives. The national military strategy provides 

direction to the military in its efforts to implement the national security 

strategy. The strategy treats trafficking in illicit drugs as one of several 

transnational dangers that threaten U.S. national interests. The 1999 

National Drug Control Strategy and its classified annex identify 5 strategic 

goals and 31 objectives as part of a comprehensive effort to reduce drug 

use (demand), lower drug availability (supply), and reduce the adverse 

consequences of drug use.1

 The five goals are to

• educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs, as well as 

alcohol and tobacco;

• increase the safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drugrelated crime and violence;

• reduce the health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use;

• shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and

• break foreign and domestic sources of drug supply.

The majority of DOD’s counterdrug activities focus on the last two goals. 

The strategy’s annex presents strategic concepts, specific agency tasks, 

desired conditions, and impact targets for these two goals. Each of the 

specific agency tasks is assigned to multiple agencies and describes in 

broad terms what is to be done to reach the goal’s desired condition. For 

example, under the fourth goal, one of the tasks is to 

“Support expanding and enhancing dedicated, vetted, foreign drug law enforcement units in 

key source and transit countries. Facilitate sharing of intelligence and law enforcement 

information, and the conduct of cooperative investigations and law enforcement 

operations.”

This task is assigned to six U.S. government organizations, including the 

Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 

Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Departments of Defense and 

State. The specific actions that each agency must take to accomplish the 

1 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 

Oct. 1998); National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Shape, Respond, 

Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

1997); and The National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Office of National Drug 

Control Strategy, Feb. 1999). All of these strategies are broad in scope and do not provide 

any specifics of how their objectives are to be achieved.
Appendix I

Framework of Strategies Directs Department 

of Defense’s Counterdrug Efforts

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

tasks are not articulated in the strategy. Instead, each agency, on its own 

and in consultation with other agencies, must design and implement 

activities that will contribute to the accomplishment of the task and the 

desired objective.

Embassy Counterdrug Plans To implement the national strategies at the host-nation level, U.S. 

embassies, located in countries where drug trafficking is a problem, 

include counterdrug-related sections in their program plans. These 

counterdrug sections identify the needs of host-nation military and civilian 

counterdrug organizations and are the basis for the counterdrug assistance 

DOD provides to host nations.

Department of Defense 

Counterdrug Plan

DOD has developed a 5-year counterdrug plan, based on the goals of the 

National Drug Control Strategy. The plan broadly describes the military 

personnel, detection and monitoring assets, intelligence support, 

communication systems, and training DOD provides to domestic law 

enforcement agencies and foreign counterdrug military and police forces. 

According to the plan, DOD will ensure that sufficient forces and resources 

are allocated to the counterdrug mission to support domestic and foreign 

counterdrug agencies in achieving “high-impact results.” However, DOD is 

legally prohibited from actively participating in the apprehension or arrest 

of drug traffickers or the seizure of their assets. Moreover, DOD’s plan 

states that personnel will not accompany participating nation forces on 

field operations. 

Southern Command 

Strategies

Southern Command counterdrug strategies include the Southern 

Command Commander in Chief’s theater strategy and theater engagement 

plan. The theater strategy presents Southern Command’s vision, mission, 

goals, and strategic concepts necessary for developing engagement and 

counterdrug plans for its geographic area of responsibility. The theater 

engagement plan identifies all military activities involving other nations 

and details the command’s concept for achieving national and theater 

engagement objectives. The plan is organized around three goals. The 

plan’s second goal directs the command to develop an effective capability 

and will to respond to theater challenges and support counterdrug 

operations. This goal is supported by a number of counterdrug-related 

aims, the most prominent being to “assist in reducing illicit source zone 

activities and flow of illegal drugs through the transit zone.” This aim is, in 
Appendix I

Framework of Strategies Directs Department 

of Defense’s Counterdrug Efforts

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

turn, supported by three objectives that directly support the last two goals 

of the National Drug Control Strategy. The three objectives are to provide 

effective, cooperative support to U.S. and participating nations’ efforts to 

• interdict shipments of illicit drugs,

• reduce the supply of illicit drugs, and

• disrupt and dismantle drug-trafficking organizations.

Southern Command 

Counterdrug Campaign Plan

Southern Command’s counterdrug campaign plan is a 10-year plan 

designed to support interagency efforts that diminish the economic 

viability of the illicit drug trade through the disruption of growth, 

production, and movement of illicit drugs, especially the shipment of 

cocaine into, within, and out of major production areas of the Andean 

Ridge region of South America. The plan is intended to better focus 

counterdrug resources and coordinate the command’s efforts with other 

U.S. counterdrug agencies and participating nations. To that end, the plan 

defines the drug threat, the objectives to counter the threat, and the 

resources necessary to achieve the plan’s objectives. In addition to the 

campaign plan, the command is developing a functional plan and an annual 

operations order. The functional plan, to be completed in January 2000, will 

describe the tasks that Southern Command’s subordinate commands, such 

as U.S. Army South and Joint Interagency Task Force East, will implement 

to achieve the campaign plan’s goals and objectives. The operations order 

will identify the time and location of operations and the forces that will 

execute the operations.

Joint Interagency Task 

Force Level Strategies and 

Plans

Joint Interagency Task Force East’s regional counterdrug campaign plan 

defines the task force’s mission and objectives for supporting the Southern 

Command’s counterdrug campaign plan. The task force is executing its 

counterdrug campaign plan through a number of regional, land-based 

counterdrug campaigns and air- and sea-based, “steady-state” counterdrug 

operations such as Central Skies and Caper Focus. Each campaign is 

comprised of a number of sequenced operations designed to achieve the 

goals of the campaign. For example, the Central Skies’ campaign goal is to 

develop a “seamless regional counterdrug architecture in Central America.” 

Joint Interagency Task Force East is attempting to achieve this goal by 

conducting operations that, among other things, enhance intelligence and 

information exchange between the United States and countries in the 

region; establish command, control, communication, computer, and 

intelligence systems between U.S. embassy country teams and host-nation 
Appendix I

Framework of Strategies Directs Department 

of Defense’s Counterdrug Efforts

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

law enforcement organizations; support U.S. embassy counterdrug plans; 

provide regional planning assistance; and enhance host-nation counterdrug 

forces’ capabilities. Each operation is implemented through individual 

plans and orders. The operational plans and orders move beyond broad 

statements of policy, mission, and objectives and provide details such as 

date, location, assets, entities involved, and counterdrug targets. Figure 7 

illustrates the geographic areas where the campaigns and “steady state” 

operations are being implemented.

Figure 7: Location of DOD-supported Regional Counterdrug Campaigns and 

Steady-state Operations

Source: Joint Interagency Task Force East.

Inca Gold

Air- and sea-based steady-state operations

Land-based campaigns

Carib Ceiling

Close Corridor

Central Skies

Guyana

Suriname

French Guiana

Caper Focus

Carib Shield

Cuba

Texas Florida

Mexico
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Appendix II

Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, 

and Monitoring Assets ApendxiI

Through its standing counterdrug order, DOD has committed seven Navy 

P-3 tracker aircraft for maritime patrols, two E-3 Airborne Warning and 

Control System surveillance aircraft, four E-2 Airborne Early Warning 

aircraft, four F-15/16 interceptor aircraft, several naval combatant ships, 

and three radar picket ships to the counterdrug mission. Table 3 provides a 

description of the key assets DOD uses. 

Table 3: Major DOD Airborne and Maritime Assets Used for Counterdrug Operations

Asset Capability

E-2 Hawkeye aircraft -Fixed-wing airborne early warning aircraft with air and 

maritime radar detection, search and surveillance 

capabilities.

-Maximum endurance of 6 hours.

E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and 

Control Systems aircraft 

-Airborne early warning system with command and 

control capabilities. 

-Air and maritime radar surveillance, detection, and 

tracking of suspect targets. 

-Data link to ground sites, naval vessels, and aircraft.

-Endurance of over 9 hours, which can be extended 

with aerial refueling.

P-3 Counterdrug Upgrade Orion 

aircraft

-Fixed-wing surveillance aircraft with maritime surface 

radar search, electronic surveillance, and 

communications.

-Maximum endurance of over 11 hours.

F-15 Eagle aircraft -Single engine air-to-air search and tracking radar with 

identification of friend or foe capability.

-Operated by U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard as 

an interceptor aircraft for counternarcotics purposes.

F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft -Single engine air-to-air or air-to-ground fighter

-Equipped with air-to-air search and track radar with 

identification of friend or foe capability. 

-Operated by U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard as 

an interceptor aircraft for counternarcotics purposes.

S-3 Viking -Fixed-wing, twin-turbofan antisubmarine warfare 

aircraft used in a maritime patrol aircraft role. 

-Operated by the U.S. Navy and has surface radar 

search, electronic surveillance, and communications 

capabilities.

SH-60B Seahawk -Twin-engine helicopter used for antisubmarine 

warfare, search and rescue, drug interdiction, antiship 

warfare, cargo lift, and special operations. 

-Operated by the navy as an airborne tracking 

platform based aboard cruisers, destroyers, and 

frigates.
Appendix II

Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, 

Detection, and Monitoring Assets

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Source: DOD.

DOD also operates two Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar sites in the 

United States for aircraft detection and various radar sites throughout 

South and Central America and the Caribbean.11

A third Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar site, located in Puerto Rico, is 

expected to be operational in February 2000. Table 4 provides a description 

of the radar assets, figure 8 is a map of the coverage provided by the 

Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar system, figure 9 is a map of DOD's 

other radar systems, and figure 10 contains pictures of DOD's assets. 

SH2F -Ship-based, medium, and antisurface warfare 

helicopter.

Air Reconnaissance Low -U.S. Army multisensor, fixed-wing surveillance 

aircraft. 

-Collects image and signals intelligence

Picket ships (cruisers, destroyers, 

and frigates)

-Used as radar ships for air and maritime search and 

surveillance to support detection, monitoring, and 

tracking. 

-Capable of supporting a helicopter. 

-When law enforcement detachment is embarked, 

ships can support maritime intercept and 

apprehension.

Modified Tactical-Auxiliary 

General Ocean Surveillance 

ships 

-Equipped with air search radar capability and 

deployed in lieu of navy combatants. 

-Capable of data linking with other platforms and have 

extensive communications equipment.

Patrol craft -Special operations surface vessel equipped with 

surface search radar and communications equipment. 

-Used for detection and monitoring and interdiction 

when law enforcement detachment is embarked.

11 The systems, located in Texas and Virginia, provide radar coverage in the Caribbean.
Appendix II

Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, 

Detection, and Monitoring Assets

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Table 4: DOD Radar Assets Used for Counterdrug Operations

Source: DOD.

Radar Capability

Relocatable Over-the-Horizon 

Radar 

-Provides wide-area detection and surveillance of air 

targets, with real reporting of targets of interest. 

-Lacks capacity to provide data on precise location of 

track or to engage in intercept operations.

Ground Mobile Radar -Provides primary or augments existing radar 

coverage and is capable of long-range searches up to 

95,000 feet.

Tethered Aerostat Radar System -Static, tethered balloons that carry radar sets to an 

altitude of 10,000-15,000 feet.

-Covers the major drug-smuggling routes along the 

U.S. southern border into the Gulf of Mexico and the 

Caribbean.

Counterdrug Surveillance and 

Control System

-A series of linked U.S. or host-nation-owned radar 

sites. 

-Provides air surveillance information indirectly to the 

North American Aerospace Defense Command, and 

directly to the U.S. Southern Command, Joint 

Interagency Task Force East, and host nations.
Appendix II

Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, 

Detection, and Monitoring Assets

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Figure 8: Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar Coverage

Legend: ROTHR = Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar Coverage

Source: DOD.

Mexico

Bermuda

Cuba

Jamaica Haiti

Dominican

Republic

Belize

Guatemala

El Salvador

Pacific Ocean

Panama

Costa Rica

Nicaragua

Suriname

Venezuela

Brazil

Atlantic Ocean

Peru

Ecuador

Bolivia

Colombia

French

Guiana

ROTHR

Puerto Rico

Honduras

ROTHR

Virginia

ROTHR

Texas

Guyana

February 2000 coverage

Current coverage
Appendix II

Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, 

Detection, and Monitoring Assets

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Figure 9: DOD's Radar Network Coverage on the U.S. Southern Border and in the 

Caribbean and Central America and South America

Source: DOD.

Legend:

Tethered Aerostat

U.S. Counterdrug Surveillance and Control System

Host-nation Ground Mobil Radar

U.S. Ground Mobil Radar

Puerto 

Rico

Host-nation Counterdrug Surveillance and Control System

Peru

Bolivia

Brazil

Suriname

French Guiana

Guyana

Ecuador

Colombia

Panama

Costa Rica

Nicaragua

Honduras

Belize

Cuba

Jamaica

Haiti

Dominican

Republic

Guatemala

Mexico

El Salvador

Pacific Ocean Venezuela

Atlantic Ocean
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix II

Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, 

Detection, and Monitoring Assets

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Figure 10: DOD Counterdrug Assets
Appendix II

Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, 

Detection, and Monitoring Assets

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Source: DOD.
Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxIi

At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control and the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, we examined (1) DOD’s plan for supporting U.S. 

counterdrug efforts and how DOD measures its effectiveness, (2) changes 

in the level of DOD support for counterdrug activities from fiscal year 1992 

through fiscal year 1999 and the reasons for the changes, and (3) obstacles 

DOD faces in providing counterdrug assistance to foreign governments.

Our work focused on the U.S. Southern Command’s counterdrug 

intelligence, detection, and monitoring operations because of the 

Command’s central role in the DOD’s counterdrug activities and the 

importance and cost of these operations. We used fiscal year 1992 through 

1999 DOD counterdrug flight hour and ship day data because earlier data 

was not available.

To address whether DOD has a plan for supporting U.S. international 

counterdrug efforts, we examined the national security, military, and drug 

control strategies, as well as plans and strategies developed by DOD’s 

Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, U.S. Southern Command, 

and joint interagency task forces. In addition, we reviewed military 

planning guidance and counterdrug-related planning studies published by 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.; the Foreign Military Studies 

Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the National Defense University, 

Washington, D.C. We interviewed officials responsible for the development 

and implementation of the strategies and plans at the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy and DOD, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Southern 

Command, Miami, Florida; the Joint Interagency Task Force East, Key 

West, Florida; the Joint Interagency Task Force West, Alameda, California; 

and the U.S. embassy, Lima, Peru.

To determine whether DOD has a system for measuring the effectiveness of 

its counterdrug activities, we examined related documents prepared by 

DOD, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, U.S. Southern Command, 

and Joint Interagency Task Forces East and South. We also examined the 

operation of and data generated by the Consolidated Counterdrug Data 

Base used by DOD to compare the relative performance of its detection and 

monitoring assets. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOD’s Office 

for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support and Office of National Drug 

Control Policy, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida; 

Joint Interagency Task Force East, Key West, Florida; Joint Interagency 
Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Task Force South, Howard Air Force Base, Panama; and Joint Interagency 

Task Force West, Alameda, California. 

To determine the changes in DOD’s counterdrug support levels and the 

challenges DOD faces in providing counterdrug assistance to foreign 

governments, we analyzed DOD counterdrug budgets and interviewed 

officials from agencies involved in counterdrug activities in Washington, 

D.C.; Key West, Miami, and Tampa, Florida; Chesapeake and Norfolk, 

Virginia; Alameda, California; Lima and Iquitos, Peru; and Panama. In 

Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials and reviewed planning, budget, 

implementation, and related documents and reports concerning 

counterdrug activities at the Offices of National Drug Control Policy, the 

U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, and the Departments of State and Defense. 

At the Florida locations, we interviewed officials at Southern Command, 

Joint Interagency Task Force East, and the Special Operations Command 

and reviewed plans and other documents related to counterdrug activities. 

In Chesapeake, Virginia, we interviewed officials at the Fleet Surveillance 

Support Command and reviewed documents related to the Relocatable 

Over-The-Horizon Radar’s role in counterdrug surveillance. In Norfolk, we 

interviewed officials at the Atlantic Command to obtain information on the 

resources the command provides to support DOD’s counterdrug mission. 

In Alameda, we interviewed officials at Joint Interagency Task Force West 

and reviewed plans and other documents related to its role in 

counterdrugs. In Lima, we interviewed the U.S. Ambassador and Deputy 

Chief of Mission and officials from the Drug Enforcement Administration 

and the Military Advisory and Assistance Group. We also interviewed 

officials from the Peruvian Air Force, the National Police, and the Coast 

Guard. In Iquitos, we visited the Ground Mobile Radar site and the Joint 

Peruvian Riverine Training Center. In Panama, we interviewed the U.S. 

Deputy Chief of Mission and Drug Enforcement Administration officials. 

We were also briefed on counterdrug operations at Howard Air Force Base 

and Joint Interagency Task Force South and reviewed plans and other 

documents related to their counterdrug operations. 

We conducted our review from September 1998 through September 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxIVi
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Now on p. 26.
Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control

Appendix V

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxVi

GAO Contact Lawrence L. Suda (202) 512-5380

Acknowledgments In addition to Mr. Suda, Joseph C. Brown, David M. Bruno, and Janice V. 

Morrison made key contributions to this report.

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